Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival (Oxford Studies in Democratization) 9780198746997, 0198746997

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FOREIGN PRESSURE AND THE POLITICS OF AUTOCRATIC SURVIVAL

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OXFORD STUDIES IN DEMOCRATIZATION Series editor: Laurence Whitehead

............ Oxford Studies in Democratization is a series for scholars and students of comparative politics and related disciplines. Volumes will concentrate on the comparative study of the democratization processes that accompanied the decline and termination of the Cold War. The geographical focus of the series will primarily be Latin America, the Caribbean, Southern and Eastern Europe, and relevant experiences in Africa and Asia. OTHER BOOKS IN THE SERIES Regime-Building: Democratization and International Administration Oisín Tansey Rethinking Arab Democratization: Elections without Democracy Larbi Sadiki Accountability Politics: Power and Voice in Rural Mexico Jonathan A. Fox Regimes and Democracy in Latin America: Theories and Methods Edited by Gerardo L. Munck Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific Benjamin Reilly Democratic Accountability in Latin America Edited by Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna Democratization: Theory and Experience Laurence Whitehead The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism Andreas Schedler The Politics of Accountability in Southeast Asia: The Dominance of Moral Ideologies Garry Rodan and Caroline Hughes Segmented Representation: Political Party Strategies in Unequal Democracies Juan Pablo Luna Europe in the New Middle East: Opportunity or Exclusion? Richard Youngs Turkey’s Difficult Journey to Democracy: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back İlter Turan

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Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival ............

ABEL ESCRIBÀ-FOLCH AND JOSEPH WRIGHT

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries # Abel Escribà-Folch and Joseph Wright 2015 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted First Edition published in 2015 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2015932611 ISBN 978–0–19–874699–7 Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

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............ Preface ............ In the decade after the 2001 terrorist attacks against the U.S., Western military intervention aimed at regime change triggered a wave of political instability, factional violence, and further terror attacks. Toppling dictatorships with military force in Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq has not brought a new era of stable democracy in these countries much less in the rest of the Middle East. Instead, at the time of this writing (fall 2014), insurgent forces threaten to topple the U.S.-backed regime in Baghdad, a militia group now controls Tripoli, and even though Afghans bravely elected a new government in 2014, it looks as if any Kabul-based regime will have to contend with longterm Taliban control over substantial portions of Afghan territory. The failure of these military incursions, coupled with the vast external resources and many soldiers still invested in these countries, suggests that the capacity of the lone global military power to pursue future military interventions against dictators is diminishing. This book examines how common foreign policy tools such as aid, economic sanctions, and human rights shaming and prosecutions influence the survival of autocratic regimes. We then compare the effectiveness of these policies to military intervention. In this effort, we make two advances in studying foreign pressure targeting dictatorships. First, we show that authoritarian regime collapse and democratization are not the same things. While democratization is often equated with the demise of autocratic rule, it is just one possible outcome after an autocratic regime collapses. Many times, instead of democratization, regime collapse means that a new dictatorship replaces the old one. For example, when Islamic revolutionaries overthrew Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in Iran in 1979, one autocratic regime fell and another took its place. As critics of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq have pointed out, toppling a dictatorship does not necessarily promote democracy. These are instances of regime change, but they are not democratization. Thus autocratic regime collapse can result in one of two outcomes: a transition to a democracy or a transition to a subsequent authoritarian regime. We examine both scenarios in this project and show that different foreign policy tools are more effective for producing one type of failure than another. To understand the usefulness of particular foreign policy tools, policymakers need to know if foreign pressure can destabilize a regime. Once an autocratic

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Preface

regime collapses, we also want to know if the subsequent government is likely to be a democracy or simply a new dictatorship. Prior to U.S. military interventions, dictatorships in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya shared many similarities. Unlike dictatorships in Egypt, Iran, or Tunisia, top military officers and security commanders in the countries attacked by the U.S. were either blood relatives of the man in power or members of the same narrow sectarian group. None had a professionalized military with a corporate identity separate from the dictator. And unlike autocratic regimes in China, Cuba, and Vietnam, Gaddafi and the Taliban never formed supporting political parties. Even though Saddam Hussein rose to power through the Ba’th party, by the time of the U.S. invasion he had transformed it into a tool for Sunni—and increasingly Tikriti—domination. Thus, the countries targeted by U.S. military interventions lacked both de-personalized militaries and strong, broad-based support parties. Our second innovation in this study is to look closely at the domestic politics of a range of different types of dictatorships to explain how foreign pressure undermines autocratic regimes. We distinguish personalist rule—the type of dictatorship found in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya—from party-based regimes and military dictatorships. We then show how these distinct institutional settings influence dictators’ strategies for surviving in power, such as buying support and repressing opponents, as well as the propensity with which these leaders are punished after a regime transition. From these insights, we build a theory linking foreign pressure to autocratic survival strategies, and ultimately to regime collapse. Hindsight makes it easy to criticize the recent U.S. military interventions for not only failing to promote stable democracies, but also for unleashing brutal violence that has killed or displaced hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. However, the two key points we advance in this study—that not all regime collapses end in democracy and that foreign pressure that topples personalist dictatorships rarely leads to stable democracy—provide an empirically grounded framework for understanding why the post-2001 military interventions have ended disastrously.

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............ Acknowledgements ............ The idea of writing this book first came up in 2008 during a conversation in a coffee shop in Princeton, where the authors met in person for the first time at a conference on dictatorships after having exchanged numerous emails. The idea further developed next year, 2009, in Chicago, where we were both attending a conference. By then, Abel was a post-doctoral researcher at IBEI. He later moved to Universitat Pompeu Fabra. He is grateful to many people at both institutions for their support. Joe started work on this project while in residence at the Kellogg Institute for International Development and then moved to Pennsylvania State University. He thanks colleagues at both institutions for support. Joe also received funding from the National Science Foundation (BCS-0904463) to support this research, which he gratefully acknowledges. Many colleagues and friends have discussed with us and read parts of this book. Others have encouraged and supported us during this time. We are extremely grateful to Lisa Blaydes, Carles Boix, Jeff Colgan, Sarah Croco, Alexandre Debs, Xun Cao, Simone Dietrich, Robert Fishman, Erica Frantz, Jennifer Gandhi, Barbara Geddes, Desha Girod, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Yoshiharu Kobayashi, Steve Krasner, Doug Lemke, Margaret Levi, Jeff Lewis, Zachariah Mampilly, Covadonga Meseguer, Jrgen Mller, Jim Morrow, Adam Przeworski, Gonzalo Rivero, Tyson Roberts, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Milan Svolik, Jessica Weeks, Matthew Winters, and Cesar Zucco. We would also like to thank our editor at Oxford University Press, Dominic Byatt, for his interest in the book, for all his support throughout the publishing process, and for answering our (many) questions. Portions of the book build on research that has been previously published as: “How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes.” American Journal of Political Science, 53(3): 552–71 (2009). “Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers.” International Studies Quarterly, 54(2): 335–59 (2010). “Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival: Transitions to Democracy and Subsequent Authoritarian Regimes.” British Journal of Political Science, 42(2): 283–309 (2012). “Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and Sanctions.” Comparative Political Studies, 45(6): 683–713 (2012). While the material we present in the following chapters is similar to material published in these articles, we have updated the data set used in the empirical

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Acknowledgements

work and thus present distinct results. In Chapters 1, 2, and 3 we present modified figures from previously published work, “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set.” Perspectives on Politics, 12(2): 313–31 (2014). These have been reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press. Finally, much of the material in Chapter 8 is a revised and edited version of a forthcoming article with Cambridge University Press: “Human Rights Prosecutions and Autocratic Survival.” International Organization. Abel would like to thank his friend and co-author Joe, among many things, for making him enjoy more than ever doing research, for his friendship, and for always finding brilliant solutions. Joe thanks a fantastic collaborator and friend, Abel, for his many ideas, great conversations, and gracious hospitality. We owe enormous gratitude to our families. Abel thanks his parents, Manel and Maria, his sisters, Cristina, Gemma, and Marta, his “brothers-in-law,” Fer, Aleix, and Iñaki, and his niece, Júlia, for all the great moments shared and their love. Abel dedicates this book to Tània. Per seguir fent camí amb mi. Joe thanks his family, especially Libero and Luca, who were born during the writing of this book, for tugging him away from research to enjoy the most important gifts in life. Joe dedicates the book to Jaimie, for sharing sorrows and joys, and for her ever-constant support.

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............ Contents ............ List of Figures List of Tables

xiii xv

1. Introduction Democracy Promotion Dealing with Dictatorship Strategies for Regime Change The Rise of Hard Power? The Senders The Targets Selecting Targets Previewing the Argument Plan of the Book

1 5 8 8 11 16 19 21 22 25

2. Autocratic Regimes and their Collapse Autocratic Rule Varieties of Autocratic Rule Autocratic Regimes’ Stability Regimes and their Leaders Autocratic Regime Collapse Conclusion

28 30 30 38 39 43 47

3. Foreign Pressure and Autocratic Survival How Autocratic Survival and Demise Differ across Regimes Survival Strategies The Post-Exit Fate of Dictators A Model of Regime Change How Foreign Pressure Influences Regime Survival Support Repression Expected Post-Transition Utility How Coercion Destabilizes Different Dictatorships Aid Conditionality Economic Sanctions Shaming Campaigns Human Rights Prosecutions Military Interventions Conclusion

49 50 50 60 64 69 70 72 74 76 77 78 80 81 82 83

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4. Foreign Aid and Political Reform How Does Aid Influence Dictators? When Can Aid Buy Democratization? The Argument Empirical Approach Foreign Aid and Regime Change Foreign Aid in the Post-Cold War World Variation in Coalitions within Regime Type Categories Donors and Democratization in Ghana Expanding Coalition International Pressure and Democratization Discussion

84 85 89 92 94 97 99 102 105 106 109 114

5. Economic Sanctions and the Defeat of Dictators Existing Approaches to Sanctions Effectiveness Sanctions and Instruments of Autocratic Survival Sanctions and Supporters Sanctions and the Opposition Sanctions and the Dictator’s Budget Sanctions and Survival Strategies: Spending and Repression Sanctions and Regime Change Results Robustness Tests Modeling Selection Sanctions and Amin’s Personalist Rule in Uganda Sanctions and Loyalty to Amin Sanctions and Foreign Invasion Discussion

117 120 123 124 125 127 131 136 138 141 142 144 147 148 150

6. Naming and Shaming Dictatorships Shaming and Autocratic Politics Norms and Domestic Pressure The Material Costs of Shame Shame and Post-Exit Punishment Shaming and Regime Change Data and Methods Results Robustness Tests Human Rights Campaigns and Regime Change in Chile Prior Democracy, Norms, and the Institutionalization of Military Rule Shaming in Context Discussion

154 157 157 160 166 168 169 170 170 173 174 180 182

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7. Do Human Rights Prosecutions Destabilize Dictatorships? Punishment Expectations and Transitions The Pessimistic View The Optimistic View Measuring Punishment Expectations Prosecutions and Regime Change Results Robustness Tests Personalism and Leaders’ Post-Transition Fate in Libya and Yemen Gaddafi’s Fate and Forced Regime Change in Libya External Exit Guarantees and Regime Change in Yemen Discussion

184 187 188 195 198 199 201 202

8. Military Intervention and Regime Change Military Interventions in the Post-War World Prior Research The Legal and Moral Dimensions Military Intervention in Autocratic Regimes Who Intervenes? Targeting Autocratic Regimes Destabilizing Mechanisms Do Military Interventions Destabilize Dictatorships? Results Robustness Tests How Does Military Intervention Influence Regime Stability? The Long-Term Influence of Military Intervention Discussion

211 213 217 219 222 223 224 229 231 233 234 235 243 245

9. Conclusion Does Foreign Pressure Destabilize Dictatorships? Foreign Policy Implications The Study of Autocratic Regimes The Limits of Foreign Pressure

250 250 254 257 260

Appendix A Chapter 4 Tables Appendix B Chapter 5 Tables Appendix C Chapter 6 Tables Appendix D Chapter 7 Table Appendix E Chapter 8 Table References Index

263 268 273 279 281 285 315

203 204 207 209

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............ List of Figures ............ 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.1 8.1 8.2 8.3

Foreign military interventions against dictators Foreign aid to dictatorships New sanctions and percent targeted at dictators Human rights shaming and prosecutions targeting dictatorships Autocratic regimes and the Polity score Autocratic regime types across time Leader and regime failure rates Democratic and autocratic regime transitions Repression and spending, by regime type Post-exit fate of dictators, by regime type A model of political transitions Coalition size and autocratic regime types Foreign aid and regime failure Foreign aid and regime failure by period Democracy-promoting sanctions Sanctions and revenue Economic sanctions, government spending, and repression Sanctions and regime change Oil rents, sanctions, and autocratic transition Sanctions and calorie consumption U.N. resolutions and foreign aid Shaming campaigns and new sanction imposition Shaming and regime change Human rights prosecutions and regime change Hostile military interventions in autocracies, by sender regime type Regime change military interventions Military interventions and regime change

11 12 13 15 20 38 42 44 59 64 67 96 98 101 119 129 132 139 141 153 163 165 171 202 214 215 234

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............ List of Tables ............ 1.1 Foreign policy tools for democracy promotion 3.1 Regime types and their preferred survival strategies 3.2 Regime types, survival strategies, and post-transition fates 4.1 The democratic fate of former dominant parties 5.1 Selection-corrected probability of autocratic transition 8.1 Hostile military interventions and autocratic regime failure 8.2 Longer-term influence of hostile military interventions A.1 Electoral success of former dominant parties A.2 Aid and regime transition A.3 Aid and regime transition by period B.1 Sanctions and repression B.2 Sanctions and regime transitions B.3 First stage selection equation C.1 U.N. resolutions, aid, and sanctions C.2 Shaming and regime transitions C.3 Two stage model D.1 Human rights prosecutions and regime transitions E.1 Military intervention and regime transitions

9 58 77 91 143 236 244 263 265 267 268 270 272 273 275 277 280 282

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Introduction The Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 surprised academics and up-ended longstanding foreign policy towards the region.1 In response, Western powers pursued just about every foreign policy tool at their disposal. Events in Tunisia unfolded quickly, but this did not stop the European Union from freezing Ben Ali’s assets. Despite warming relations between Libya and the West in the decade prior to the Arab Spring, international organizations moved swiftly to support the insurgents and condemn the regime. Economic sanctions, military intervention, and the indictment of key regime elites, including Gaddafi, at the International Criminal Court (ICC) soon followed. Egypt had received more Western foreign aid than any other dictatorship in the decades since the Camp David Accords (1979). But when protesters mobilized and Mubarak’s security forces responded with lethal force, U.S. officials began questioning their aid commitments. The U.S. did not suspend aid, however, until the military overthrew President Mursi in mid-2013.2 In Yemen, the European Union condemned Saleh’s efforts to quell protests, and threatened to impose economic sanctions. Perhaps the most difficult case for foreign policymakers was Syria. The initially peaceful anti-regime protests were met with brutal repression from the Ba’thist regime, marking the start of a conflict that devolved into full-scale civil war. Despite attempts at diplomatic solutions and numerous defections from the military, the regime remains in power. In dealing with Syria, Western officials have debated all the foreign policy tricks in the book. A human rights shaming campaign was aided by thousands of video-clips documenting government violence (Hänska-Ahy and Shapour, 2013). Democracies first imposed economic sanctions against the regime elite, but later extended them to restrict oil imports and impose a travel ban on the President’s wife. Nearly a year into the conflict, the U.N. Human Rights Council accused the Syrian regime of crimes against humanity. Finally, in response to chemical weapons attacks on its own civilians, the U.S. threatened to bomb Damascus. 1 2

See, for example, Gause (2011) and Lust-Okar (2011). A year later, however, the U.S. restored military aid to Egypt’s military government.

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Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival

Democracies, in particular the U.S., have not been shy about using foreign pressure in attempts to sway the outcome of events in these countries. Yet there exists little consensus from academic studies as to which foreign policy tools are likely to pressure dictators to reform, much less leave power. If anything, the conventional wisdom suggests that foreign pressure, particularly economic pressure in the form of aid conditionality or sanctions, may be more likely to entrench autocratic rulers than force them from power.3 In light of the fact that democracies continue to engage dictatorships, this book looks inside the domestic politics of dictatorships to examine how foreign pressure influences their stability. Central to this task, we argue, is understanding the institutional structure of autocratic rule, in particular the relationship between the regime leader, the military, and the support party. Consider the differences between Gaddafi’s regime in Libya and that in neighboring Tunisia. Who controlled the military in these regimes? Were elites in the supporting political party and military likely to survive if the dictator fell? Would the military or regime party help protect the interests of elites if the dictatorship conceded democracy and the opposition won elections? In Gaddafi’s dictatorship, two of his sons, Khamis and Mutassim, commanded key security organizations crucial to supporting his rule and fighting rebels. His regime was the rare dictatorship that lacked a supporting political party. In Tunisia, in contrast, the leaders of the military and key security organizations were not blood relatives of the man in power; and the political party that helped the regime rule for over five decades was founded in 1920. Dictators who install their family members in high-ranking military positions are better placed to use armed repression to quell protests and fight rebels, which increases the chances that the dictator will fight to the end and decreases the prospect of a negotiated transition. As a result, when these regimes fall, elites typically lose power as well. Muammar Gaddafi and two of his sons are dead; another is in prison. Ben Ali’s top military officer in Tunisia, in contrast, not only remained head of the military after the dictator’s ouster, but retired peacefully two years later with a medal of honor from the new president.4 And although Ben Ali and his family fled to exile, one of the regime’s elite figures, a former interior and defense minister, oversaw the first post-transition election and led the strongest non-Islamist party, Nidaa

3 See, for example, Pape (1997), Marinov (2005), and Lektzian and Souva (2007) on economic sanctions; Smith (2008), Kono and Montinola (2009), Morrison (2009), and Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) on foreign aid. 4 See “Tunisian Army chief of staff announces resignation,” Asharq Al-Awsat, 26 June 2013.

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Introduction

3

Tounes, to victory in the second post-transition election.5 Beji Caid el Sebsi’s party is no instrument of populist personal power, but rather a coalition of former members of Ben Ali’s political machine (RCD) and elites from the neoDestourians and the main labor union, which at various points was co-opted to support the ousted regime.6 Thus, in Tunisia, elites jettisoned the dictator and still have power. This book builds upon these types of distinctions to examine how foreign policy tools such as aid conditionality, sanctions, human rights shaming and prosecutions, and military intervention influence the survival of autocratic regimes. Our explanation for how foreign pressure influences dictators relies on a careful understanding of elite politics in different autocratic contexts. Classifying dictatorships by whether the dictator is a personalistic ruler, a member of a ruling military junta, or relies on a broad-based political party will prove useful in understanding when and why some forms of foreign pressure can be destabilizing. Just as important, focusing on the type of autocratic rule provides leverage on the question of “what comes next?” when dictators fall. If foreign pressure successfully deposes an autocratic regime, we want to know whether this leads to a democratic transition or if a new dictatorship will simply arise to take its place. Some democracy promotion strategies might thus succeed in destabilizing dictatorships but as a result simply replace one dictatorship with another. Even if the Arab Spring uprisings lead to a few new democracies, dictatorship will still persist in every region of the world. According to one source, the Freedom House, only 40 percent of the world’s population lived in fully free and democratic countries in 2013. According to another measure, nearly half of the countries in the world were not fully democratic in that year.7 A large share of the world remains under autocratic rule. The third wave of democracy, which started in 1974 with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, has been the largest and most rapid wave of democratization. In 1974, only 25 percent of world’s countries were democratic; a quarter century later, this number grew to one-half. The rapid rise of David D. Kirkpatrick, “Interim Tunisian Leader With Ties to Old Ruler Defends a Gradual Path,” The New York Times, 3 October 2011. Nidaa Tounes defeated the incumbent Ennahda party in October 2014, to gain a parliamentary majority. See Carlotta Gall, “Islamist Party in Tunisia Concedes to Secularists,” The New York Times, 27 October 2014. 6 See Monica Marks and Omar Belhaj Salah, “Uniting for Tunisia?,” Sada, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 28 March 2013. See Anderson (1986, 232) and Vandewalle (1988, 605) on regime co-optation of the Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT) during the independence period. 7 Autocracies are those countries coded six or lower in the Polity IV index, which ranges from –10 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic). 5

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Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival

democracy provides evidence from an array of cases to help us understand how foreign pressure influences dictatorships. While the first and second waves of democratization were “inside jobs,” driven primarily by domestic factors, external forces have been more influential in the third wave (Huntington, 1991b). To understand how international factors affect democratization during the third wave, we consider how democratic countries and international organizations interact with dictatorships. Foreign military intervention and less forceful forms of international pressure have long served as important foreign policy tools for democracies, and continue to do so today. This book seeks to explain when foreign pressure can destabilize autocratic governments by altering domestic politics in these regimes. By using insights about how autocratic regimes work, the nature of their support coalitions, the domestic constraints they face, and the relationships between leaders and elites in the military and their support parties, we uncover the strategies that are most likely to destabilize dictatorships. In the past fifteen years, the United States military invaded and occupied Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). These incursions were officially aimed at fighting international terrorism and liberating these countries from dictatorship. Yet, despite the new rhetorical emphasis on democracy promotion, the military adventures in Afghanistan and Iraq resulted in protracted conflicts, each with high costs in treasure, troops, and renewed terrorist attacks. The difficulties of these interventions have prompted scholars and policymakers to (re)evaluate other tools for promoting democracy and respect for human rights. While many policymakers at the time assumed these invasions would yield durable democracy, there was little discussion of whether other foreign policies might be more effective in pursuing democratic regime change. The existing literature analyzing the effectiveness of foreign policy techniques is fragmented, using different theoretical approaches, samples, empirical strategies, and definitions of success. There is, as a result, a large disagreement about whether these foreign policy instruments are effective or not. Further, studies of foreign policy tend to focus on either the senders or on a single policy tool with little (if any) discussion of other policy alternatives (Hafner-Burton, 2014; Krasner and Weinstein, 2014). As Baldwin (2000, 176) emphasizes, “[k]nowledge about the likely success of a foreign policy instrument provides no useful guidance to policy makers as to whether it should be used. Only comparative analysis of the prospective success of alternative instruments provides policy relevant knowledge.” To that end, in addition to assessing military interventions, we examine how foreign aid conditionality, economic sanctions, and human rights shaming and prosecutions influence autocratic survival.

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Introduction

5

D E MO C R A C Y PR O MO T I O N The advantages of democracy are widely acknowledged: democratic countries rarely fight one another, are less prone to civil war, show greater respect for human rights, provide more public goods, offer better governance and accountability, and improve the material well-being of their citizens. Democracy also constitutes a universal human value that embodies freedom and enables participation in public life (Sen, 1999). Be it for normative or strategic reasons, democracy promotion has gained increasing prominence since the end of the Cold War in the development and foreign policy agendas of international organizations, such as the United Nations (U.N.) and the European Union (E.U.), as well as individual countries (Carothers, 1999; McFaul, 2010). The international consensus in favor of protecting state sovereignty has weakened just as international norms for promoting democracy and human rights increased. During his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan confirmed that: In the 21st century . . . the mission of the United Nations will be defined by a new, more profound awareness of the sanctity and dignity of every human life, regardless of race or religion. This will require us to look beyond the framework of States, and beneath the surface of nations or communities.8

This statement reflects the growing acknowledgement that democracy, broadly defined, is a universal right, which is increasingly incorporated as a norm in international law (Franck, 1992; Sen, 1999; Rich, 2001). Further, recent evidence shows that when asked about whether democracy is the best form of government, people across all regions of the world overwhelmingly answer in the affirmative (Inglehart, 2003; Diamond, 2008). Consistent with emerging consensus of democracy, there has also been an increasing willingness to enforce human rights and democracy norms by governments, international organizations, and other non-governmental actors (Schraeder, 2002; McFaul, 2004, 2010). Thus, for example, the U.N. has institutionalized pro-democracy campaigns: in 1992, it created the Electoral Assistance Division; four years later it approved the Agenda for Democratization; and in 2000 the Millennium Summit Declaration named democracy promotion as a key goal for future U.N. action (Newman and Rich, 2004). This process culminated in 2005 with the establishment of the United Nations Democracy Fund.

8

See McFaul (2004, 154).

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Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival

U.S. democracy promotion efforts persisted through numerous changes in the international context, including the end of the Cold War and the rise of China as a global power (Cox et al., 2000; McFaul, 2010). In the 1960s, the U.S. provided large-scale foreign aid to develop the economies of poor countries, with the hope that this would lead to democratic political change.9 In 1961, the U.S. State Department created the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to implement foreign aid policy. Latin America, through the Alliance for Progress, received increased attention after the Cuban revolution in 1959, when U.S. officials became concerned that supporting dictatorships might increase the chances of communist revolutions in the region. After a period of realism during Nixon’s presidency, American foreign policy focused on human rights during the Carter administration. His policy relied on diplomatic and economic pressure targeting dictatorships that abused human rights. For example, the U.S. participated in an international campaign of denunciation and shaming against Argentina’s military junta (Sikkink, 1993, 412). In the early 1980s, during the Reagan administration, the U.S. institutionalized democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy infrastructure with the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). While this pro-democracy move coexisted with a military-oriented anticommunist policy in Central America, it set the stage for subsequent U.S. democracy promotion efforts by providing funds to countries throughout the world with the aim of strengthening nascent democratic institutions, supporting pro-democracy groups, and developing civic education.10 Foreign policy liberalism re-emerged at the end of the Cold War as the U.S. increased investment in democracy assistance programs. Coercive instruments, such as foreign aid conditionality and economic sanctions, were used with increasing frequency. Under the “Democracy Initiative,” USAID placed democracy assistance as its central goal in 1990. Eastern European and subSaharan African countries received the most attention during the Clinton administration, with the aim of preventing new democracies from backsliding into authoritarianism. Through the Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED) program, for example, the U.S. spent roughly $1 billion in democracy programs in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Carothers, 1999). 9

Lipset’s influential article arguing that development is a precursor to democracy was published in 1959. 10 The democracy-promoting efforts of NED have been questioned in some cases. For example, critics argue that funding from NED was directed to groups that participated in the 2002 coup against Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. See Brendan Koerner, “Bush Aims To Raise Whose Budget?,” Slate, 22 January 2004.

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Introduction

7

Paralleling this new wave of assistance programs, aid donors viewed democracy as a vital component of successful development. The largest bilateral donors—the United States, Britain, and France—as well as international financial institutions such as the World Bank, placed political conditionality as a central component of broader developmental objectives (Crawford, 1997). Coercion and conditionality gained momentum when democracy promotion became the center of U.S. foreign policy under President George W. Bush’s Freedom Agenda. For example, in 2004, the U.S. created the Millennium Challenge Corporation, another bilateral aid agency separate from USAID that emphasized conditionality based on specific governance performance indicators. This new international context prompted other actors to follow suit. In Europe, early initiatives date to the 1950s with the establishment of the German Stiftungen (party foundations), which supported pro-democratic opposition parties (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991). At the regional level, the E.U. became a key actor in advancing democracy, establishing electoral democracy as a condition for membership.11 The 1989 Lomé IV Agreement between the E.U. and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group, marked the beginning of European foreign policy focusing on democratic development beyond neighboring regions. A revision of this agreement (Lomé IV bis) included specific procedures for imposing sanctions in response to violations of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. In 1994, the European Parliament created the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR, later renamed the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights) to support programs in human rights, democratization, and conflict prevention. Finally, in 2003, the European Neighborhood Policy was adopted to offer economic incentives to neighbor countries in exchange for economic and democratic reforms. The regulation of human rights in international law has also increased in the past few decades (Hafner-Burton, 2013), accompanied by a new model of enforcement that focuses on individual criminal accountability rather than just state responsibility (Sikkink, 2011). One outcome is a substantial rise in the number of trials for past violations. The creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002 marked a further step towards the universalization of human rights. The ICC works as a permanent, independent court with the charge of prosecuting individuals accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.

11

See Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2008) for an empirical assessment of this policy.

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Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival

Increased concern for democracy and human rights has been accompanied by the proliferation of transnational non-governmental organizations (INGOs) (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Murdie, 2014). By the late 1990s, there were nearly 300 registered human rights organizations throughout the world, more than half of which had been formed since 1979 (Ron et al., 2005, 558). Organizations such as Freedom House, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch lobby governments, publicize human rights violations, and initiate shaming campaigns to spur international action and shape public opinion. Widespread international consensus thus places a premium on the value of democracy and the desire to promote democracy where autocratic rule persists. In this book we examine how common tools of coercive foreign policy influence politics in autocratic countries. This approach contrasts with the bevy of studies that examine efforts in the past two decades by Western powers to promote democracy by funding and monitoring multi-party elections (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011; Hyde, 2011; Kelley, 2012b; Donno, 2013). Focusing on elections is understandable because for many in the democracypromotion industry, elections are a sine qua non. Yet for many dictatorships, the threat posed by elections and democracy is not their only, or indeed, their main concern. Instead of looking directly at the international actors who shape electoral practice and outcomes, we focus on the explicit policies these actors employ to examine how they influence domestic politics in a variety of authoritarian contexts across different time periods. To understand the consequences of democracy promotion efforts, we examine how these foreign policy strategies affect autocratic survival because defeating authoritarian regimes does not always lead to democracy. Thus we study how international pressure influences authoritarian power, not just democratization.

DEALING WIT H D ICTATORSHIP

Strategies for Regime Change A range of foreign policy tools directed at promoting democracy and improving human rights exists. These can be classified along different dimensions, such as the degree of legitimacy, multilateralism, or the extent to which they are coercive rather than persuasive or voluntary.12 We follow the latter 12 See, for example, Baldwin (1985), Schraeder (2003), Diamond (2008), and Krasner and Weinstein (2014).

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9

Table 1.1. Foreign policy tools for democracy promotion Policy Area

Policy Tool Persuasive

Coercive

Cultural

Educational and cultural exchanges; propaganda; value dissemination; socialization

None

Diplomatic/Political/ Judicial

Diplomatic persuasion and bargaining; electoral assistance

Naming and shaming campaigns; indictments and prosecutions

Economic

Democracy aid (civil society/ governance); economic assistance

Economic sanctions (trade/ financial); foreign aid conditionality

Military

Military aid and training to opposition groups

Show or threat of military force; military intervention/occupation

classification, and situate democracy promotion and regime change on a dimension measuring soft and hard power, to use Nye’s (2004) terms. Thus we distinguish between democracy assistance and persuasion (soft power) and foreign coercion (hard power). The latter entails coercive measures seeking to destabilize incumbent autocratic governments by imposing political conditions and economic costs on the target country or by threatening or seeking to punish domestic elites or to use force in order to alter the status quo. A second dimension marks the area of influence: whether the foreign policy takes the form of cultural, political, economic, or military action. Table 1.1 presents a summary of these policy instruments using this two-dimensional classification. Soft power includes cultural exchange policies, persuasive efforts, and political aid seeking to transform certain institutions. These tools provide positive incentives, assistance, and information for gradual liberalization and democratic consolidation. For example, broadcasts of Voice of America (1942), Radio Free Europe (1949), and Radio Liberty (1951) aimed to provide independent information to foreign citizens during the Cold War to change beliefs about the benefits of U.S. democracy. Direct democracy assistance consists of technical and financial aid to support pro-democracy actors and initiatives. For example, the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation, funded by the Social Democratic Party (SPD), developed various party-building programs to support opposition Socialist politicians during autocratic rule in Spain and Portugal (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991, 55). Similarly, the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy has supported democratic organizations, media, and civic movements in a number of countries such as Chile, Nicaragua,

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Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival

Poland, and South Africa.13 Also, international involvement in foreign elections is gaining much importance, with electoral assistance and observation becoming a central strategy for democracy promotion and consolidation policies of international organizations such as the U.N. and the E.U., and some Western countries.14 Our focus is on international coercion. As Diamond (2008, 114) argues, “peaceful pressure to democratize generally takes three intentional forms: diplomacy, the conditioning of aid, and sanctions.” We seek to explain when these policy tools are likely to destabilize dictatorships and promote democracy, and then compare these strategies to hostile military interventions. Our book builds on existing research in two ways. First, it analyzes the main instruments of foreign coercion using an integrated theoretical framework. As Baldwin notes (1999/2000, 84), “[i]n the context of the logic of choice, the evaluation of one policy alternative in isolation from others makes little sense.” Second, the effectiveness of these alternative foreign policy tools is tested using the same sample of regimes and dependent variables throughout the book: regime change, democratic transitions, and autocratic transitions. As a result, we establish a consistent and clear standard of success and thus avoid problems of comparability common in existing scholarly work (Baldwin, 2000). Under the rubric of diplomatic and judicial pressure, we examine international human rights shaming campaigns and prosecutions. Campaigns by international organizations, NGOs, and the media publicize and condemn human rights violations throughout the world, while prosecutions seek justice for perpetrators of human rights violations and aim to deter future abuse. Aid conditionality entails making foreign assistance contingent on political liberalization: donors demand that aid disbursements be accompanied by democratic reforms in recipient countries. There is an implicit threat, with varying degrees of credibility, that future aid will be reduced if these conditions are not met. Democratic countries and international organizations employ economic sanctions against another country’s government, or groups within it, to force policy change. To coerce, sanction senders seek to inflict costs on the target by restricting trade or by impeding financial exchanges (Hufbauer et al., 2007). Finally, hostile military interventions involve the realized threat of violent coercion using military forces to enter the target country’s territory (Pickering and Kisangani, 2009). 13

Some empirical evidence suggests that the role of NED support is significant in weakening autocratic regimes and preventing backslides (Scott and Steele, 2005). Likewise, USAID expenditures on democracy assistance and governance are found to be correlated with democratic improvements (Finkel et al., 2007; Scott and Steele, 2011). 14 On the impact of these policies, see, for example, Hyde (2011), Kelley (2012a, 2012b), Tusalem (2012), and Donno (2013).

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The Rise of Hard Power? The use of coercive foreign policy instruments has grown substantially in recent decades. While the number of military interventions decreased in the post-Cold War period, the number of economic sanctions and shaming campaigns increased. Aid to dictators has fallen since 1990, but this trend is caused, in part, by donor attempts to place political conditionality at the center of many aid agreements. If aid conditionality is enforced, some dictatorships will receive less aid, not more. Sanction episodes, shaming campaigns, and human rights prosecutions have all increased in the last two plus decades. Figure 1.1 shows the number of hostile military interventions against dictators carried out by democratic states during the postwar period. Since the peak in the 1960s, military interventions to support or oppose incumbent dictatorships have declined. Neutral interventions spiked in the early 1990s as democracies sent militaries on humanitarian missions during civil conflicts after the Cold War ended. However, even these types of intervention fell steeply in the ten years from 1995 to 2005. Despite U.S. military invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq and the NATO attack against Libya, the use of military

Number of interventions

10

8

6

4

2

0 1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Year Oppose

Neutral

Support

Figure 1.1. Foreign military interventions against dictators. Smoothed trend is the five-year moving average. Sources: Pickering and Kisangani (2009); Geddes et al. (2014a).

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Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival 70

Aid per capita (constant)

60 50 40 30 20 10 1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Year Mean

Median

Figure 1.2. Foreign aid to dictatorships. Mean and median level of aid per capita in constant USD for all dictatorships in a given year. Smoothed trend is the three-year moving average. Sources: World Bank (2010); Geddes et al. (2014a).

interventions against dictatorships aimed at forcibly changing the regime appears to be waning. However, the emergence of the “responsibility to protect” norm may lead to a rise in the number of humanitarian interventions in response to gross human rights violations. The end of the Cold War also marked a decrease in foreign aid to dictatorships, as shown in Figure 1.2. Aid fell from nearly $50 per capita in 1990 to roughly half that in the late 1990s before increasing slightly in the past decade. Two factors contributed to this decline. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union freed aid disbursements from major geostrategic considerations that benefited many autocratic governments. Second, development policy at International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the largest bilateral donors shifted to incorporate democracy and good governance as conditions for aid (Crawford, 2001). Because unelected and unaccountable governments were fingered as obstacles to sustained economic growth, donors had a rationale for cutting aid to dictatorships when these reform conditions went unmet. Thus, while aid to autocracies has decreased, the opportunity to buy political reform with aid expanded.

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13 100

80

8

60

6

4

40

2

20

0

0

% targeted at dictatorships

Number of new sanctions episodes

10

1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Year New sanctions

% targeted at dictatorships

Figure 1.3. New sanctions and percent targeted at dictators. Smoothed trend is the three-year moving average. Dictatorship defined as Polity2 score less than 6. Source: Hufbauer et al. (2007).

Economic sanctions are also used with increasing frequency, as experts proclaimed the 1990s “the sanctions decade” (Cortright and Lopez, 2000). The shaded bars in Figure 1.3 show two clear peaks in the number of new sanction episodes in the post-war period. The first occurred in the late 1970s when the Carter administration placed human rights at the center of its foreign policy. A second peak, in the early 1990s, occurred once the U.N. was no longer subject to permanent blockage on the Security Council and became more active in imposing sanctions. While the U.S. has continued to be the main unilateral sender, the U.N. emerged as a prominent sender only after 1990. Further, the majority of sanctions are imposed against autocratic regimes. From the mid-1970s through the 1990s, most new sanctions were imposed against dictatorships. According to the Hufbauer et al. (2007) data set, roughly one quarter of all sanctions in the post-war period were imposed against democracies.15 Almost half of the target countries were autocracies, with another one quarter coded as anocracies—countries that fall in the intermediate 15 Dictatorships are defined as regimes with a Polity score less than 6 on a scale that ranges from –10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic).

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Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival

category between democracy and closed dictatorship. The primary sender, the United States, has a similar target pattern: autocratic states represent 56 percent of the targets, 28 percent are anocracies, and only 16 percent are democracies. Further, Hufbauer et al. (2007) code the primary goal of sanctions as regime change for roughly half of the sanctions targeting dictatorships. Thus, not only are sanctions being used with increasing frequency, but they mostly target dictatorships, many with the primary goal of regime destabilization. Human rights shaming campaigns have also increased in the past thirty years. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) did not start investigating countries for human rights abuses until 1967, even though it was established in 1946. The UNCHR’s first human rights initiative that did not pertain to colonial powers, Israel, or apartheid South Africa, came in 1976 when it launched an investigation into Chile’s military junta (Farer, 1987, 580). International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) have also targeted repressive leaders with reports highlighting human rights abuses. Amnesty International (AI) began its letter-writing campaigns in 1965, and Human Rights Watch (HRW) began monitoring human rights violations in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1978, shortly after the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975. Media shaming is arguably a much older practice than the rise of international institutions suggests. It dates at least from the Spanish colonial era when the bishop of Chiapas, Bartolomé de las Casas, defended the rights of indigenous Mexicans. His shaming campaign helped pressure the Spanish crown to pass the New Laws of 1542, which abolished the enslavement of indigenous Americans in Spanish colonies (de las Casas, 1992). More than three centuries later, anti-slavery abolitionists in Britain relied on newspapers to shame slave traders. Edmund Morel’s shaming campaign against abuses in the Belgian Congo began in a British weekly, the Speaker, and he later started his own newspaper to expose atrocities committed by King Leopold II’s Congo Free State (Hochschild, 1998). As the left panel of Figure 1.4 indicates, from 1976 to 2000, the proportion of dictatorships targeted by shaming campaigns increased steadily—particularly the share targeted by Amnesty International. While public resolutions by the UNCHR condemning these regimes are much less frequent than INGO or media targets, their number has risen from two in 1976 to roughly ten per year in the late 1990s. Finally, the past three decades have also witnessed the rise of individual criminal accountability and a subsequent increase in the number of human rights prosecutions targeting leaders accused of human rights abuses. According to data from Kim and Sikkink (2010), human rights prosecutions in

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15

Shaming campaigns

Prosecutions 25

Human rights prosecutions

Share of dictatorships shamed

.8

.6

.4

.2

20

15

10

5

0

0 1976

1980

1984

1988

1992

1996

Year Amnesty Intl

2000

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

Year Media

U.N.

Figure 1.4. Human rights shaming and prosecutions targeting dictatorships. Smoothed trend is the three-year moving average. Sources: Hafner-Burton (2008); Lebovic and Voeten (2009); Kim and Sikkink (2010), Geddes et al. (2014a).

transition countries have risen from one in 1979 to over twenty per year in the mid-2000s. Coupled with the new legal regime embodied in the International Criminal Court (ICC), human rights advocates no longer rely solely on shaming campaigns but also use international and domestic arenas of justice to enforce human rights norms and to prosecute human rights abusers in attempts to deter future repression (Schabas, 2001). The ICC’s first arrest warrant for a sitting head of state targeted Sudan’s President, Omar al-Bashir, in 2008. The warrant for Gaddafi in 2011 was the second. And the first successful ICC prosecution sentenced a former militia leader from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, in 2012 for war crimes committed during the Second Congo War. Because we examine a variety of explicit and deliberate policies of foreign coercion, our approach moves beyond structural accounts of how the international environment influences authoritarian stability, such as Levitsky and Way’s (2010). Their study begins with the assumption that external structural factors—such as geography, cultural ties, colonial heritage, and economic integration—constitute the international linkages that influence democracy in electoral autocracies during the post-Cold War era. Rather than looking inside the politics of dictatorships across different authoritarian contexts as we do, they posit that dependence on foreign support, or leverage, is the key intervening factor that explains when linkage is likely to matter.

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Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival

Further, they restrict their analysis to one group of dictatorships, namely, competitive authoritarian regimes.

TH E S ENDE RS To date, there is little comparative evidence that examines how various foreign policy tools influence the prospects of democratization in dictatorships. As a result, policymakers have little systematic guidance on whether and how foreign policy tools are likely to work in particular cases (Baldwin, 2000), as the examples at the beginning of this chapter suggest. As McFaul (2004, 157) states, “[n]o blueprint is universally recognized as the most effective way to promote democracy.” This may explain why sending countries and organizations pay insufficient attention to domestic politics in target countries and often underestimate the perverse consequences of foreign coercion. A recent poll by the Fund for Peace asked the following question: “What should the world do about failing states like Burma and Zimbabwe?”16 The options from which to choose were the following: a) Provide aid to these governments for them to distribute as they wish; b) Launch diplomatic offensives to get governments to reverse their policies; c) Undertake airdrops of aid in spite of government opposition; d) Censure the governments at the U.N. Security Council; e) Increase sanctions against the top leaders; f) Indict government officials for gross violation of human rights; g) Militarily intervene to provide humanitarian assistance, or h) Militarily intervene to overthrow the current regime. This poll addresses some of the most controversial issues in international relations. In September 2009, the two most common responses to this poll were “militarily intervene to overthrow the current regime” and “indict government officials for gross violation of human rights,” each receiving 23.9 and 21.5 percent of the votes, respectively. Respondents viewed the other options, including foreign aid, economic sanctions, and shaming as less useful. Are these latter instruments of foreign policy really less effective? Are military interventions and indictments the best way to deal with dictatorships? The poll question underscores the first key factor that senders tend to overlook. Note that the question did not distinguish between Zimbabwe and Burma, but placed both countries in the category of “failed states.” Yet these 16

See .

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17

countries are ruled by very different regimes. President Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) entered into a powersharing agreement with the opposition after the controversial 2008 election, and won outright in the 2013 presidential election, with his party controlling more than 75 percent of parliamentary seats. Though Mugabe has been president for over thirty years, the country holds regular elections in which the main opposition party participates and wins legislative seats. Even amidst high levels of repression, the ZANU-PF stands up a legislature and uses courts to ratify legislation. In contrast, Burma has been ruled by a military junta since a coup in 1988. The 2010 election was the first in twenty years and was won by a new party created by the military. Prior to this, the junta ruled without an elected legislature for more than two decades. The regime recently allowed a multiparty by-election, won by the main opposition party, but still seeks to exclude the main opposition leader from the 2015 contest. The preferences of leaders, the institutions they use to rule, and intra-elite relationships are different in party-based dictatorships and military juntas. These differences have implications for how foreign policy tools are likely to influence domestic politics in different autocratic contexts. Thus, we should not necessarily expect the same strategies to work in both Burma and Zimbabwe. Foreign policymakers and governments have also paid too little attention to the variation in domestic politics in different dictatorships. For example, in his 2002 State of the Union Address, U.S. President George W. Bush referred to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the “axis of evil.” He grouped these states with transnational terrorist organizations as the main threats to international peace and national security. In 2005, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice identified six “outposts of tyranny” as threats to security, labeling them “fear societies” where freedom should be promoted. The list included Iran, Cuba, Belarus, Burma, North Korea, and Zimbabwe.17 Both lists established clear authoritarian targets for U.S. foreign policy. However, policymakers made no distinction between these regimes, advocating a similar approach to each even though these dictatorships differ immensely from each other. According to the classification we employ, the list includes two personalist regimes (Belarus and North Korea), a military regime (Burma), two party-based regimes (Cuba and Zimbabwe), and a theocracy (Iran).18 17 The U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 so it was struck from the list. See Nicholas Kralev, “Rice targets 6 ‘outposts of tyranny’,” Washington Post, 19 January 2005. 18 Iran is treated as dominant party in the following empirical applications (Geddes et al., 2014a).

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Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival

A second mistake often made by sending countries has been to ignore the political outcomes of different courses of action. Despite warnings from experts and public officials, the consequences of autocratic collapse have often been overlooked by foreign policymakers. As we stress throughout this book, the rise of a new dictatorship more often than not follows autocratic collapse. Further, whether ousting a dictatorship leads to a democracy or simply a new authoritarian regime varies systematically across different types of dictatorships. Some public officials have been aware of such intricacies. Bringing attention to a key point about what comes next after dictatorships fall, Jeane Kirkpatrick, the former U.S. ambassador to the U.N. during the Reagan administration, criticized the Carter administration for not considering domestic power structures (Kirkpatrick, 1979). She noted that domestic characteristics largely explain what comes next once a regime collapses. Distinguishing between traditional and totalitarian regimes, she argued that adopting coercive measures against traditional (what we call personalist) dictatorships in Nicaragua and Iran would embolden existing domestic forces, which, if victorious, would inaugurate new revolutionary autocracies hostile to American interests. In another example, the U.S. congressmen who imposed sanctions against Idi Amin’s rule in Uganda understood that his power rested on revenue from coffee exports, which made the regime vulnerable to economic coercion (Nurnberger, 1982). However, while these officials correctly guessed that sanctions would destabilize Amin’s regime, they paid little attention to other regime characteristics and underestimated his resolve. When sanctions undermined his patronage capacity, Amin initiated a war against Tanzania in an attempt to reduce threats from his own disloyal military units. Tanzanian forces and Ugandan exiles eventually ousted Amin, but his rule was not replaced by a democratic government. Rather, after a short provisional period, a former dictator, Milton Obote, returned to power only to be ousted again a few years later. The Ugandan case raises a difficult question for foreign policymakers: Is it worth deposing rogue rulers if what comes next may be just as bad? As we show in the next chapter, destabilizing a traditional (or personalist) dictatorship may simply lead to more autocratic rule. This possibility must be weighed against the risks of allowing a personalist ruler, such as Amin, to remain in power because evidence suggests that these types of dictatorships are the most likely to initiate interstate wars and pursue nuclear weapons (Peceny and Beer, 2003; Weeks, 2008; Way and Weeks, 2014). Indeed, such considerations may have influenced U.S. policy discussions prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In her memoirs, Condoleezza Rice, by then the National Security Advisor, writes:

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19

[W]e did not go to Iraq to bring democracy any more than Roosevelt went to war against Hitler to democratize Germany, though that became American policy once the Nazis were defeated. We went to war because we saw a threat to our national security and that of our allies. But if we did have to overthrow Saddam, the United States had to have a view of what would come next. When the NSC had the discussion, some members, including Don [Rumsfeld], argued that we had no such obligation. If a strongman emerged, so be it.

Hence, this book assesses how foreign pressure influences authoritarian survival by considering the two outcomes that emerge after a dictatorship collapses: transition to democracy and transition to a new autocracy. We focus on five strategies of foreign pressure: aid conditionality, economic sanctions, shaming campaigns, prosecutions, and military interventions. None of these instruments, except direct military intervention, can force dictatorships from power by itself. In fact, less than 5 percent of the regime collapse events from 1946 to 2010 were the direct result of foreign military invasion (Geddes et al., 2014a). Other instruments of foreign pressure work through domestic actors; and even in some instances of military intervention, domestic—not foreign— actors oust the regime. Thus when foreign policy destabilizes dictatorships, it does so by altering the preferences, capacities, or incentives of domestic actors. To explain how foreign pressure can destabilize dictatorships, we must first understand how international forces influence domestic politics.

TH E T AR GETS While most approaches to studying foreign policy focus on why sending countries, particularly the U.S., pursue particular policies,19 our analysis takes the decision to employ coercive measures as the starting point for understanding how they influence domestic politics in autocracies. Thus we do not take up the question of how and why democracies promote democracy.20 Instead, we treat coercive foreign policy as an external shock to autocratic regimes that can potentially destabilize them. We focus on different forms of autocratic rule—dominant party autocracies, military dictatorships, and personalist regimes—which provide insights about how foreign pressure influences instability in a variety of contexts. We 19 Scholars have provided a variety of explanations for the behavior of sending governments, including rational actor approaches as well as institutional, bureaucratic, social, and psychological models (Hill, 2003; Hudson, 2007; Neack, 2008). 20 We do, however, address the consequences of non-random selection in our empirical tests.

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Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival

Polity, recoded to 1 January

10

5

0

–5

–10 Military

Personal

Party

Figure 1.5. Autocratic regimes and the Polity score. Military-personal hybrid regimes are grouped with pure military regimes, and all party-hybrid regimes are grouped with party regimes. Sources: Marshall and Jaggers (2010); Geddes et al. (2014a).

employ a regime categorization that distinguishes between dictatorships on the basis of the political institutions used to retain power, the nature of the support coalition, and the relationship between the leader, his party, and the military (Geddes et al., 2014a). This approach complements recent studies that focus on domestic politics in dictatorships to explain authoritarian survival and international behavior. While Gandhi (2008) and Svolik (2012) examine domestic political structures in these regimes, others probe how variation across autocracies affects international conflict and cooperation (Mattes and Rodríguez, 2014; Weeks, 2014). These latter studies use the same categorization, or a slight variant on it, that we employ. The regime classification measures important differences in the institutional structure of dictatorships, which cannot be done with existing data on the level of democracy, such as the widely used Polity index. Figure 1.5 shows the distribution of Polity scores, which range from +10 (most democratic) to –10 (least democratic) for each of the three regime types. The distribution is remarkably similar across these three types of dictatorships. Indeed, the average Polity scores for countries in these categories are not statistically different from one another.

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21

Despite similar Polity scores, dictatorships rule in systematically different ways. Leaders in personalist regimes typically have control over the military and few institutional checks on their power, while leaders in military regimes are frequently constrained by other senior officers and may care more about protecting the military’s institutional interests than about staying in power indefinitely. This suggests that the Polity score and our regime classification capture different features of autocratic rule. For example, the Polity score groups together regimes such as Algeria’s military junta in the 1990s, Maurice Yaméogo’s and Sangoulé Lamizana’s personalist dictatorships in Burkina Faso, and the durable party regime under the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico. All of these dictatorships received a Polity score between –3 and –5 for most of their time in power. However, as we discuss in the next chapters, these distinct regimes use very different strategies to retain power. Finally, we examine what comes next when dictatorships collapse because destabilizing dictatorships may not always result in a transition to democracy, but rather may end with a new dictatorship replacing the ousted regime. In fact, during the post-Second World War period, autocratic regime breakdown has more often led to a subsequent dictatorship than to democracy (Geddes et al., 2014a). In short, assessing foreign policy effectiveness in a world where more than half of the population still lives under autocratic rule requires that we first map how international pressure influences domestic politics in a variety of distinct autocratic contexts. Second we must assess not only how these tools influence the prospects for democracy but also whether they simply lead from one dictatorship to another.

Selecting Targets Democracies and international organizations do not employ foreign policy tools randomly. Some countries are reluctant to sanction important trading partners; others provide substantially more foreign aid to their former colonies; and still others define their security interests regionally rather than globally. For example, Germany was reluctant to impose sanctions on Russia after Putin’s army invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea because the German economy relies heavily on Russian energy; and French aid policy targets former French colonies, not former British ones. The U.S. devises strategies to deal with dictators in both the Caribbean basin and the East Asian Pacific, while Australian policy largely overlooks what happens in the Atlantic to concentrate on international relationships in the Pacific region. The same is true of other foreign policy tools we examine: given prior civil society linkages,

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Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival

human rights shaming campaigns largely focused on Latin American dictatorships; critics of the ICC claim that it unfairly targets African leaders; and democracies are less likely to invade powerful dictatorships. Factors that determine target selection can also influence autocratic regime survival. Simply looking at the correlation, for example, between economic sanctions and regime survival could yield biased inferences if dictatorships with ample natural resources that rule in strategically important regions, such as the Middle East, are less likely to be targeted with sanctions and yet more stable precisely because of their geography and resource wealth. Similarly, strong civil society could explain both the rise of human rights shaming campaigns in Latin America and the largely successful record of democratization in the region. Our analysis in each chapter anticipates this type of non-random selection of foreign policy targets by employing empirical methods that account for relatively time-invariant factors—such as geographic location, natural resource endowments, the historical strength of civil society, colonial heritage, and even state capacity—that are likely to influence both policy choice and the outcomes we examine.21 This approach assumes that the strategic selection of targets that might introduce bias into our analysis is largely determined by structural factors that do not change quickly over time. And while some factors that determine target selection have certainly changed over the past fifty years, such as U.S. foreign policy shifts that accompany newly elected presidents, these shifts in preferences are unlikely to influence autocratic stability except through the foreign policy instruments we examine.

PREVIEWING THE ARGUMENT To explain why foreign policy instruments work in some cases but not others requires understanding how they interact with domestic factors (Whitehead, We show that all empirical findings are robust to using both random- and fixed-effects estimators. In addition to accounting for time-invariant factors, we directly model target selection in the analysis of economic sanctions and human rights shaming campaigns because these policy tools, unlike foreign aid, are highly visible to publics in the sending states, and thus sending states are most likely to target in these areas based on anticipated success. While military intervention certainly falls into this category as well, it would be foolish to believe we can model random assignment in this policy area. Instead, we address inference issues in this chapter by tracing the causal process in each positive case. Finally, we measure human rights prosecutions with data on neighboring country prosecutions in countries that have already transitioned to democracy. This measure therefore only contains information from outside the group of dictatorships that we treat as “targets” in this chapter. 21

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1996; Geddes, 2009; Levitsky and Way, 2010). We begin with the premise that autocratic leaders want to stay in power. Whether foreign pressure is successful in its proximate goal, such as deterring nuclear investment or spurring democratic reforms, depends on the extent to which foreign pressure can impose political costs on the regime in power. To assess foreign policy effectiveness, we first need to know whether foreign pressure can destabilize autocratic regimes. If these tools can impose political costs, then our analysis will help us understand the domestic political contexts in which these different foreign policy options are most likely to succeed. We argue that regime transitions and the form they take arise from two factors, destabilizing conditions and expectations about the ex-post consequences of leaving power. These factors affect the actors’ expected utilities of different courses of action. In our theoretical setting, the dictator chooses between stepping down peacefully—negotiating a democratic transition—and resisting (and maybe fighting) to remain in power. Should he choose the latter, the opposition then must decide whether to rebel against the regime and try to forcibly overthrow it. Should the opposition win, the regime is forcibly removed. As we show, regimes overthrown forcibly tend to be replaced by a subsequent autocracy, whereas peaceful transitions tend to result in democratization. Should it rebel, the probability that the opposition succeeds in overthrowing the regime depends on the regime’s ability to use its two key survival strategies: i) buying or co-opting support and ii) repression. Any shock undermining the autocrat’s ability to use these instruments increases the likelihood that the opposition rebels and, in turn, decreases the benefits of holding onto power for the dictator. Under these circumstances, the expectations about the consequences of leaving power influence whether the autocrat is likely to negotiate a transition and relinquish power or whether he is likely to violently resist political change. If the benefits of stepping down are low because the outgoing dictator and his elite supporters are likely to be punished, the dictator is more likely to choose to fight for survival. Conversely, if authoritarian elites can obtain credible exit guarantees, they may decide to step down peacefully in the face of a growing likelihood of a forcible ouster. We conceptualize foreign pressure as external shocks that alter the key parameters in the model, thereby influencing the decisions of the two key actors. First, coercive policy instruments can alter the expected utility of rebelling for the opposition and, as a result, the expected utility of resisting for the dictator. In other words, under some circumstances, by undermining the regime’s ability to retain support and/or repress rivals, tools of statecraft bring about an increase in the probability of a rebel’s victorious ouster of the regime. Some foreign policy tools, such as aid conditionality, sanctions, and

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shaming campaigns, may undermine the regime’s capacity to deliver rents to the support coalition. Similarly, international pressure may reduce the regime’s repressive capacity by diminishing its resources, causing division among security forces, or by bolstering the opposition. Faced with this, some dictators may choose to step down if they believe they can protect their interests and safety after a democratic transition. Others may choose to resist but face a higher risk of being forcibly overthrown. Second, foreign coercion can alter the expected utility of stepping down for political elites by increasing the chances of post-exit punishment. Some foreign policy tools, such as human rights shaming campaigns and prosecutions, may decrease the utility of ceding power by bringing international attention to human rights abuses of some regimes or by revealing the willingness of international actors to prosecute former autocratic elites. If faced with an increased likelihood of being punished, rulers unable to obtain credible domestic or foreign protection become more inclined to fight for survival. In contrast, other instruments, like conditional aid, offer incentives to step down by rewarding regime change, which may entice authoritarian elites if they can retain access to political power after the transition. We distinguish between personalist, dominant party, and military regimes (Geddes, 2003; Geddes et al., 2014a). Autocratic regimes differ in the strategies their rulers use to remain in power, in the consequences of losing power for elites, and, thus, in the way they tend to collapse. Therefore, we examine the interaction between various coercive foreign policy instruments and these distinct domestic political arrangements. Party-based regimes build lasting power-sharing institutions as well as broad and deep support coalitions. They frequently rotate leadership, and in some cases win elections without resorting to fraud or repression. Military regimes typically have the greatest capacity for repression, and increasingly rule with a narrow coalition of supporters among which power is shared. Still other dictators, namely personalist rulers, rely on patronage for survival and are successful in consolidating power: they create their own personal political party, purge the military of potential opponents, and face few institutional checks on their power. Furthermore, regime types differ in their capacity to extract credible domestic guarantees at the time of transition. With weak institutions, personalists have little domestic protection. In contrast, organizational regimes, such as military juntas and dominant party dictatorships, often retain leverage after regime change, which makes immunity guarantees more credible. The survival strategies dictatorships employ and their capacity to protect their domestic interests after a transition influence regimes’ vulnerability to foreign pressure. Coercive pressure that succeeds in weakening the regime, by undermining either its ability to retain political support or its capacity to

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repress, decreases the benefits of resisting in power. Foreign policy that decreases the chances that authoritarian elites obtain domestic protection decrease the benefits of stepping down relative to the prospects of resisting, thus harming the chances of a peaceful exit from power and the emergence of a new democracy. For other regimes, namely personalist dictatorships, for which stepping down involves a high risk of punishment, the best strategy is often to fight for survival, more often than not resulting in a new dictatorship should they fall.

Plan of the Book The next chapter introduces the regime classification we use throughout. We discuss how the relationship between the support party, the military, and the leader in each regime type influences the composition of the support coalition and elite preferences for remaining in power, which in turn structure the leaders’ incentives for choosing among various survival strategies. Next we argue that autocratic regimes, rather than particular leaders, are essential for understanding stability. We introduce the dependent variable by showing that, historically, regime collapse is as likely to be followed by a new dictatorship as by a democratic transition. The third chapter examines the strategies that distinct regimes employ to retain power, in particular buying support and repressing foes, and shows how the post-exit fate of dictators varies across regime type. We then present a decision-theoretic model of autocratic regime change that builds on the democratization literature by incorporating two concepts central to the study of transition in comparative politics: the likelihood of being removed violently by a new autocratic coalition; and the prospects of being punished under a new democracy should the incumbent regime concede. This setting allows us to develop a unified theory of regime change in dictatorships that explains two outcomes that can transpire after autocratic regime collapse: democratization and a transition to a subsequent authoritarian regime. Next we explore how foreign pressure alters actors’ choices in our model, and use these comparative statics to derive testable hypotheses. The next five chapters each examine how a separate foreign policy tool influences autocratic survival: foreign aid conditionality; economic sanctions; human rights shaming campaigns; human rights prosecutions; and military interventions. Although various forms of international pressure are often used in conjunction, we examine each in turn to focus our discussion on how shocks from distinct foreign policy tools alter the logic of our theory of regime change. In the empirical section of each chapter, we account for competing

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explanations, including other forms of foreign pressure, to pinpoint the causal role of the foreign policy instrument under consideration.22 Each chapter employs cross-national empirical tests to examine both democratic transitions and regime collapse that leads to a new dictatorship. We discuss historical cases in each chapter to trace the causal process in instances where foreign pressure helped oust a dictatorship. These case studies are not selected to test theory, but rather to provide a chain of evidence aimed at establishing construct validity for our theory and to probe the internal validity of the argument and the proposed causal mechanisms. The fourth chapter argues that the depth and breadth of the autocratic support coalition in dominant party dictatorships increases the chances regime elites survive political liberalization intact. Conditional foreign aid is therefore most likely to induce democratization in party regimes. We examine the case of Ghana in the 1990s to show how the regime expanded its support coalition and responded to aid conditionality by democratizing. The next chapter shows that because personalist regimes are more reliant on current patronage to buy support, they are more vulnerable to economic pressure than other dictatorships. Although sanctions destabilize these regimes, they are unlikely to promote democratization. We illustrate our argument with a case study of sanctions targeting Idi Amin’s rule in Uganda. The sixth chapter explores how international campaigns to shame human rights abusers are mostly likely to push dictators to democratize by activating human rights norms in dictatorships ruled by military juntas and not by inducing material costs on the regime or by directly altering the costs of leaving power. We demonstrate the causal mechanisms with a case study of military rule in Chile under General Augusto Pinochet. Chapter 7 shows that international human rights prosecutions only deter dictators from relinquishing power in personalist regimes because they generally lack the institutional mechanisms to preserve elites’ interests after a regime transition. The cases of Libya and Yemen during the Arab Spring illustrate how the expected consequences of losing power influence the way regimes collapse. The eighth chapter examines military interventions. We review the existing evidence that assesses whether foreign intervention destabilizes autocratic regimes to point out that prior research has yet to consider the possibility of adverse regime change when democracies invade dictatorships. Our empirical 22

For example, democratic countries often invade dictatorships only after economic sanctions have failed to destabilize the target regime. Thus we must account for military interventions when assessing the influence of sanctions to ensure we do not falsely attribute successful destabilization to sanctions when economic pressure might have failed without military intervention.

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analysis shows that interventions are most likely to topple military dictatorships. As with sanctions, however, success does not necessarily mean democratization because over half of regime-toppling military interventions result in new dictatorships. To further examine the evidence, we conduct short case studies to trace the causal process in each instance when military intervention coincides with regime collapse. In the end, we show that military intervention rarely produces democracy. We conclude with a discussion of the main theoretical expectations for how tools of foreign pressure influence autocratic survival in different regimes, and suggest some basic descriptive tendencies to aid policymakers in understanding whether foreign pressure is likely to destabilize autocratic rule. Throughout we stress that foreign pressure is only likely to destabilize dictatorships under a relatively narrow set of conditions; and even then, many forms of foreign pressure do little to promote democratization.

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Autocratic Regimes and their Collapse The uprising in Egypt in spring 2011 that chased President Mubarak from office brought a military junta to power. They oversaw multiparty elections for a constituent assembly in November 2011 and presidential elections the following year. This delayed transition allowed the military to ascertain the most likely new party to win power, the Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) Freedom and Justice Party; and gave them ample opportunity to bargain with the MB in attempts to obtain protections once the transition to civilian rule took place. Prior to the constituent assembly elections, the journalist David Kirkpatrick articulated the logic of a delayed transition from the military’s perspective: [T]he military is seeking to slow down a democratic transition until it feels certain that its position and privileges will remain unassailable even under civilian rule. Some here have advocated offering the military special rights including immunity from prosecution in civilian courts, protection from oversight of their operations and budget.1

While the election brought President Mohamed Mursi to power, his victory was quite narrow, with the military-backed candidate, Ahmed Shafik, coming a close second in each round of balloting. Thus the military junta not only correctly bargained with the eventual winners, but they nearly won the presidency outright in a multiparty contest. And while the Mursi government did not necessarily rule in close consultation with the military—and even attempted to circumscribe military power by purging senior officers—in the end the soldiers took back power by force, executing a coup in July 2013. A year later, the new military leader General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi dropped all charges against Mubarak and his sons. Thus the Egyptian military only ceded power after attempting to stack the transition in their favor; and when the elected president ruled without protecting the military’s interests, they took back power. These two mechanisms—bargaining with civilian opposition parties and credibly threatening, or in some cases executing, a coup—are common 1 David Kirkpatrick, “Egypt’s Military Expands Power, Raising Alarms,” The New York Times, 14 October 2011.

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features of military behavior in transitions to democracy. Because military regimes have the capacity to protect their interests in some fashion, they often successfully bargain with civilian elites in what becomes a peaceful transition to democracy. In contrast, when domestic unrest erupted in Libya in the spring of 2011, the Gaddafi regime failed to bargain with domestic opponents and was unable to secure a safe exile. Instead, the regime aimed to wipe out the opposition and fought to the end, with Gaddafi dead and his eldest son imprisoned. Gaddafi’s regime, a prototypical example of a personalist dictatorship, ended violently; and far from bringing a new democracy, the collapse of Gaddafi’s rule left a Libyan state largely controlled by the militias that filled the power vacuum after the last of Gaddafi’s inner circle fled Tripoli. Most regime changes in dictatorships are carried out by domestic actors. Therefore, assessing common foreign policy tools requires paying close attention to the internal dynamics and institutional characteristics of the target regimes. Only military interventions (but not all of them) directly overthrow autocratic regimes. Other coercive foreign policy tools only destabilize autocracies when they alter the incentives or capabilities of domestic actors, be it the regime elites or the opposition. And even when foreign pressure is successful in ousting a dictatorship, this often does not mean democracy will follow. This chapter introduces the regime classification used throughout this study, detailing the internal politics of party-based, personalist, and military regimes.2 We then explain why we need to understand the survival of autocratic regimes and not just their leaders. Because many autocratic regimes survive by regularly rotating executive leadership, changing leaders does not actually destabilize autocratic rule. Instead executive turnover is a sign of authoritarian resilience. We then turn to the question of “what comes next when autocratic regimes collapse?” Regime changes may yield two political outcomes: either transition to a new democracy or to a new dictatorship. We show how regime collapse and what comes next vary substantially across autocratic contexts, and demonstrate that, historically, transitions to new autocracies outnumber democratic transitions. Most importantly, we show that forced regime transitions usually result in a transition to a new dictatorship, while peaceful regime changes tend to result in democratization.

2 We exclude monarchies from the analysis because these dictatorships tend to be highly stable and we therefore have less room to examine how foreign pressure influences their survival. In fact, there is only one monarchy, in Nepal, that transitioned to democracy in the post-war period. See Menaldo (2012) on the durability of monarchies in the Middle East and North Africa.

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Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival AUTOCRATIC RULE

To assess whether international pressure destabilizes dictatorships, we first examine the domestic factors that underpin stability in different autocratic contexts. Distinct dictatorships pursue particular strategies to retain power over domestic threats; and because the relative strength of the leader, the military, and the support party varies across different types of regimes, the fate of their rulers and elite supporters after losing power differs as well. The institutional structures of regimes—namely the relationships between the leader, the military, and the party—can explain these differences. The strategies dictators pursue to retain power and their expectations about the chances that they retain post-transition power influence the regimes’ propensity to fall and the manner in which they collapse. Furthermore, as we discuss in Chapter 3, these differences allow us to examine these regimes’ distinct vulnerability to alternative instruments of statecraft.

Varieties of Autocratic Rule Dictatorships are as different from each other as they are from democracies (Geddes, 1999). These differences have important political consequences. We focus on distinct types of autocracies that give us leverage along the following dimensions: how leaders are selected and replaced; the nature of their support coalition; the degree of the leaders’ control over policy and leadership selection; the strategies they use to survive in power; and the likely consequences of leaving office. Scholars of dictatorships have offered several categorizations of autocratic regimes (Huntington, 1968; Huntington, 1991a; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Chehabi and Linz, 1998; Wintrobe, 1998; Geddes, 1999; Hadenius and Teorell, 2007; Magaloni, 2008; Cheibub et al., 2010). During the height of the third wave of democratization in the 1990s, comparative scholars turned to studying these transitions, which in turn spawned even more regime categorizations focusing on hybrid or transitional autocracies—countries that had the trappings of democracy, but where leaders and parties did not leave office in fair and free elections or where political participation was still severely restricted (Valenzuela, 1992; Karl, 1995; Zakaria, 1997; Collier and Levitsky, 1997; Levitsky and Way, 2010). In this study, we use a categorization of dictatorships generated from the question of “who rules?” (Brooker, 2000). The data set we employ distinguishes among personalist, party-based, and military rule (Geddes

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et al., 2014a). This approach builds on the sociological literature of regimes and treats the institutional structure of the regime and the preferences of leaders as central to the task of distinguishing regime types (Janowitz, 1960; Weber, 1964; Huntington, 1968; Nordlinger, 1977; Linz, 2000). This approach differs from recent studies that focus on a specific attribute of autocratic rule to examine formal political institutions and autocratic survival (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Svolik, 2012). For example, Gandhi (2008) theorizes about the level of institutionalization (parties and legislatures) and uses military leaders and monarchies as measures of organizational structures upon which a dictator can rely for support. Svolik (2012) studies how dictators use institutions to deal with two key threats: that from the masses and that from the elites. These approaches benefit from thinking about a characteristic of autocratic rule that varies in its extent rather than relying on typologies. Other recent work picks one feature of autocratic rule, such as the existence of a long-dominant political party or competitive elections in the post-1989 period, to define the group of countries under study (Brownlee, 2007a; Levitsky and Way, 2010; Bunce and Wolchik, 2011). Our analysis compares distinct types of autocracies throughout the world since the mid-1940s (or the year of the country’s independence) to allow comparisons both across dictatorships with different institutional structures and across time as the nature of international pressure changes. While regime typologies attempt to measure important theoretical concepts, they are nonetheless imperfect proxies, with well-known limitations. For example, the data do not capture variation in the personalization of power over the lifetime of a regime (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). Communist party rule in China and the former Soviet Union are categorized as party-based regimes, even though consolidation of personal power undoubtedly varied over time (Svolik, 2012; Weeks, 2014). The typology we employ nonetheless provides substantial explanatory power. Many of the findings in this book suggest that personalist dictatorships stand apart. For example, economic sanctions only destabilize personalist dictatorships, though this rarely leads to democratic transition. Similarly, military intervention can increase the likelihood of regime change, but not necessarily in the direction of a new democracy. And while critics of human rights prosecutions argue that they may entrench autocratic rule, we only find evidence of this in personalist regimes. Our results are not alone in fingering personalist dictatorships as distinct from others. Increasing evidence from comparative politics and international relations studies concurs (Peceny and Beer, 2003; Weeks, 2008; Wright, 2008; Gurses and Mason, 2010; Wright and Escribà-Folch, 2012; Way and Weeks, 2014).

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Although separating personalist dictatorships from others helps explain many important outcomes, employing a typology does not in itself offer an explanation for why different dictatorships are distinct from one another. Because the regime data are coded using descriptive tendencies to categorize regimes according to the observed institutional structure of the elite in power, they are of little use in understanding the origins of these diverse settings (Haber, 2006; Slater, 2010). Our task is less ambitious. While we take the institutional structure of dictatorships as exogenous to help us understand how external pressure influences political change, we acknowledge that domestic political arrangements are the outcome of strategic interactions among domestic actors and have prior causes rooted in the historical political economy of the country. We employ observable characteristics of the relationship between the leader and the military and his support party to circumscribe the institutional rules through which autocratic elites aggregate power and make policy decisions. The regime typologies are simply groups of dictatorships that share many of the same characteristics. For our purposes, these categories serve as measures of constraint to help us understand the preferences of elite actors,3 while fully acknowledging that the latter are determined in part by the former. In using regime types as a heuristic for institutions, we understand this term in a Northian sense as a set of formal and informal constraints (North, 1990). This view of institutions allows us to model the systematic behavior of individuals under a particular contextual constraint when faced with a foreign-generated shock to the endowments available for dictators to sustain their rule.

Personalist rule Personalist rule occurs when power is concentrated in the hands of a single individual leader (Geddes, 2003). Early theories of personalist rule focus on patrimonialism to explain how leaders rule without an ideological or rationallegal source of legitimacy (Weber, 1964; Roth, 1968; Chehabi and Linz, 1998). For example, Bratton and van de Walle (1997, 62) emphasize that personalist leaders frequently stand above the law, and thus face few institutional or legal constraints on their behavior. Geddes (1999) notes that personalist leaders consolidate power over policy and personnel recruitment, which typically means extricating power from military officers and party leaders. A defining

3 See Roeder (1993) for an analysis of how institutions operate to constrain elite behavior during transitions.

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feature of personalist regimes, therefore, lies in whether advancement in regime organizations such as the military or party depends on a personal connection to the ruler. Government stability in these regimes does not typically rely on powersharing agreements made credible through formal institutions, but is based on personal loyalties bought with immediate rewards and material benefits, often distributed through an elite patronage network (Snyder, 1992; Bratton and van de Walle, 1994; Chehabi and Linz, 1998). Political loyalty in these contexts therefore depends on the rewards accrued from clientelistic practices and not on credible promises about the future behavior of the dictator or access to decision-making. For example, in the former Zaire, President Mobutu rewarded supporters with appointments to state-regulated industries; in the Dominican Republic, Trujillo used access to land to control elites. This group of regime insiders comprises a relatively small support coalition which often amounts to a group of individuals with family, ethnic, friendship, or clan ties to the leader. Jackson and Rosberg (1984, 424) describe this feature of personal rule as a, “system [that] favours the ruler and his allies and clients: its essential activity involves gaining access to a personal regime’s patronage or displacing the ruler and perhaps his regime and installing another.” The coalition of supporters may not be durable in the long-term, especially when the rewards of patronage wear thin. While enclaves of personalist rule can persist across time, they still nonetheless rest on the ability of a particular leader (and/or his or her family) to reward loyalty with material benefits (Hutchcroft, 1991). Personalist dictators seek control of the military by purging senior officers who may threaten their rule, replacing them with soldiers who are then dependent on the dictator for their position. In the former Zaire, Mobutu swiftly executed a number of high-ranking officers shortly after coming to power, placing untrained junior officials in command “either because of their family attachment and personal loyalty, or because [he] was too incompetent to pose a threat to Mobutu’s continued rule” (Schatzberg, 1988, 61). To forestall threats from the military and coup-proof their regimes, these leaders not only reshape the military command, but frequently rotate officers to weaken the cohesiveness of the military, often by creating paramilitary organizations (Quinlivan, 1999; Belkin and Schofer, 2003). Continuing with the Mobutu example, Schatzberg (1988, 59) notes that “[h]igh-ranking soldiers . . . are well aware of [his] frequent rotations of officeholders to ensure that none can build an autonomous base of power.” Mobutu’s military was too weak to put down internal insurrection in the 1960s without substantial aid from other countries, particularly the U.S. and Belgium (Callaghy, 1984, 161). In the mid-1990s, what was left of Mobutu’s military disintegrated when

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Kabila’s rebel army marched across the former Zaire from the East (Prunier, 2009). After military officers ousted Emperor Selassie in Ethiopia in 1974, Colonel Mengistu proceeded to execute rival officers, starting with the highest ranking Eritrean officer (Abate, 1983, 35–6). Trujillo, with the help of U.S. military advisors, created a modern military in the Dominican Republic but kept personal control by appointing close family members, related either by blood or marriage, to leadership positions, even refusing to give weapons to some officers (Wiarda, 1968, 50–1). These examples contrast with military regimes where the nominal leader rarely has the power to unilaterally alter the leadership structure and hierarchy of the military, and risks being replaced if he does (Stepan, 1971, 165–7). In addition, in personalist regimes, parties are frequently the creation of the leader rather than a pre-existing political organization, such as an independence movement or labor union. And they typically play little role in helping elites rotate regime leadership. Both Mobutu’s (MPR) and Trujillo’s (PD) parties disintegrated once they lost power. Instead of constraining leaders, political institutions such as legislatures or parties in these regimes may simply help them control elites (Lust-Okar, 2005; Wright, 2008); and rather than elites rotating the leader, the leader rotates elites to prevent them from accumulating power. In the Dominican Republic, Trujillo at first forced only two of twelve Senators and nineteen of thirty-three Deputies to “resign.” In his second term, the Senate saw twelve resignations for thirteen seats and forty-six resignations for thirty-five lower house seats. In his third term, thirty-two Senators (nineteen seats) and 122 Deputies (forty-two seats) “resigned” (Wiarda, 1968, 48).

Military rule While personalist dictatorships typically lack an organizational form of rule, power in other dictatorships resides in a collective organization such as the military or a dominant party. Geddes (2003) codes military regimes using questions about whether the military hierarchy has been maintained, the role of senior officers in policymaking, and the rules for leadership succession. Military regimes are thus “governed . . . with the support of the military establishment and some routine mechanism for high level officers to influence policy choice and appointment” (Geddes, 2003, 72). Even if the dictator is a former officer and coup leader, as is the case in many personalist regimes, the dictatorship is not considered a military regime unless there is clear evidence that the leader shares decision-making power with other officers. Hence, a military regime entails rule by an officer constrained by other officers, not rule by a military strongman (Geddes et al., 2014b).

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Military regimes stand apart from other autocracies because officers may value the corporate interests of the military, such as an ample military budget and control over the military hierarchy, more than staying in power. Nordlinger (1977, 51–3) argues that the military’s corporate interests, especially its preference for autonomy, are due in part to the professionalization of military officers.4 Perhaps the most vital corporate interest is the unity of the military itself, which has implications for their survival in power. Geddes (1999, 140) suggests that “because most officers value the unity and capacity of the military institution more than they value holding office, they cling less tightly to power than do office holders in other forms of authoritarianism.” The preference for military unity and against factionalism makes military regimes particularly vulnerable to elite divisions (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). As a result, elites in these regimes are more likely to bargain with civilian elites to negotiate a transition to democracy, especially when the military has a credible guarantee that their corporate interests will be protected (Dix, 1982). One guarantee stems from the military’s capacity to stage a coup should the new authorities encroach on their interests (Sutter, 1995). This makes possible extracting institutional arrangements to protect military elites. For example, the Chilean Constitution of 1980, written by the military regime of General Pinochet, guaranteed ample budgets for the military and allowed Pinochet to remain as commander of the military, ensuring civilians would not be able to directly interfere in military appointments (Valenzuela, 1992). The preference for internal military unity also has implications for how these regimes rule. To prevent internal conflicts, leaders develop power-sharing agreements to rotate leadership and prevent any individual from consolidating power. Military juntas are therefore frequently composed of leaders from different military branches to keep any one branch from dominating. For example, prior to the Argentine coup in 1976, officers reached a deal among all three service branches to ensure sharing of power and preserve unity within the armed forces (Fontana, 1987, 45–8). In Chile, though Pinochet remained the president throughout, “a partial separation of powers and the adoption of decision by unanimity set fundamental constraints preventing any Junta member from dominating” (Barros, 2002, 8).

4 As Bellin (2004, 145) points out, the institutionalization of the coercive apparatus in an autocratic regime “is rule-governed, predictable, and meritocratic. It has established paths of career advancement and recruitment; promotion is based on performance, not politics; there is a clear delineation between the public and private that forbids predatory behavior vis-à-vis society; and discipline is maintained through the inculcation of a service ethic and strict enforcement of a merit-based hierarchy.” These qualities build on the Weberian concept of institutionalization that contrasts with patrimonialism.

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Party rule The final autocratic category is dominant party regimes. In these dictatorships, the regime party and not the leader “controls the career paths of officials, organizes the distribution of benefits to supporters, and mobilizes citizens to vote and show support” (Geddes, 1999, 124). Magaloni (2006) points out that, if these regimes can dominate politics (and elections), they present themselves as “the only game in town.” For ambitious politicians, winning power means being part of the party, since the party provides opportunities for career advancement. Further, party-based co-optation often conditions the benefits of senior membership on costly service during early stages of a member’s career, giving junior cadres a stake in regime survival (Svolik, 2012). Additionally, party organizations can provide members with a durable framework wherein to resolve differences, bargain and advance their influence (Brownlee, 2007a). As a result, dominant party systems are able to generate and to maintain a cohesive and loyal leadership cadre. Party dictatorships typically have large support coalitions, built and sustained by institutions that provide information about societal demands that mobilize support for the regime. Institutionalization of the regime confers credibility to its policy concessions and power-sharing agreements, thus helping it to mobilize both citizen and elite cooperation (Gandhi, 2008; Svolik, 2012). In an institutionalized forum, information and demands can be revealed, and factions can reach compromises within the regime. Credible power-sharing, however, can only succeed when the dictator faces a credible threat of being removed by regime insiders (Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2012; Boix and Svolik, 2013). In post-Mao China, for example, political reforms helped prevent the concentration of power in one individual by setting term limits for the regime leader, establishing retirement-age provisions for party leaders, and ensuring that collective decision-making bodies, such as the Standing Committee of the Politburo, meet regularly. Parties also operate as patronage distribution networks that mobilize mass support. A dominant party regime’s grip on power may hinge on its capacity to monopolize and politicize public resources (Greene, 2010). To this end, these regimes distribute perks and privileges by diverting funds from stateowned enterprises, appointing supporters to public positions in the administration and state corporations, and by delivering targeted public goods to specific constituencies. Chhibber (1996, 130), for example, notes that state intervention in the Algerian economy by the dominant party (FLN) provided the regime “with a formidable instrument for drawing support from a wide range of economic interests.”

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While access to public resources for rent-distribution may be essential for dominant parties to survive, their support coalitions may nonetheless be quite deep. Magaloni (2006), for example, finds that older voters were more likely to support the dominant party (PRI) in Mexico during the 1990s, which suggests that older voters, having experienced decades of good economic performance under PRI rule, were more likely to have enduring loyalties towards the dominant party despite economic decline in the last decade of PRI rule. The capacity to effectively deliver patronage rents and credibly promise policymaking influence helps party regimes mobilize public support and coopt rivals and potential opposition leaders. In Egypt, for example, the rise of a young new business elite in the 1990s posed a threat to Hosni Mubarak’s ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). This new group at first sought to create its own party to compete against the NDP. Instead of forming a new rival party, however, this new group, led by the president’s son, was bought off with promises of leadership positions within the NDP (Brownlee, 2007a, 133–4). Finally, the party organization also serves as an instrument of control. The regime extends power through local party officials and other territorial branches to ensure control of civil society organizations and mobilize support. Broad sectors of the population are integrated into the regime through “administered mass organizations,” or “formal organizations structured and managed by the state’s ruling apparatus to shape mass social action for the purpose of implementing public policy” (Kazsa, 1995, 218). These organizations help extend party control into society as they are used to channel material rewards, to organize support, offices and honors, and a self-directed local administration. In the end, these regimes “typically do not need to rely on outcome-changing fraud or bone-crushing repression to maintain their rule” (Greene, 2010, 723). Figure 2.1 shows the number of countries under the rule of different types of dictatorship from 1946 to 2010 (Geddes et al., 2014a). The number of autocracies rose in the 1950s and 1960s during de-colonization, particularly in Africa and Asia. The trend in the number of dictatorships reverses with the start of the third wave of democratization in the mid-1970s, falling from its peak in 1977 to less than sixty in 2010. The most common type of dictatorship are party regimes; the trend in the number of these regimes follows the overall trend, rising from 1950 through the early-1970s, then declining in the late 1980s with the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. The rise of military rule, particularly in Latin America, begins in the early 1960s. Yet, while the third wave of democratization has seen a marked decline in military regimes, the number of personalist dictatorships has increased. This trend can be explained in part by the fact that

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Number of regimes

40

30

20

10

10 20

05 20

00

95

20

19

90 19

85 19

80 19

75

70

19

19

65 19

60

55

19

19

50 19

19

45

0

Year Party

Personal

Military

Figure 2.1. Autocratic regime types across time. Smoothed trend line: three-year moving average. Data source: Geddes et al. (2014a).

military regimes in the post-Cold War era tend to be very short-lived, while personalist regimes last longer. Further, many of the post-Soviet dictatorships are personalist, where leaders from the Soviet era consolidated power. In 2010, personalist regimes were almost as common as party-based ones, with military dictatorships numbering the fewest.

AUTOCRATIC REG IMES ’ S T A B I L I T Y The analysis in this book considers the survival of autocratic regimes. We want to know if a particular foreign policy tool influences the survival of regimes and, if so, what comes next after regime collapse: democracy or a subsequent autocracy. In some cases, deposing the leader will cause the regime to fall as well because the latter cannot survive without the former. In other cases, however, policies that are linked to a particular leader leaving office may not uproot the regime and will cause little damage to the power of the elite who

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support the regime. The next section explains how we define autocratic regimes and introduces the two categories of transitions that occur when they collapse: democratic and autocratic transitions. The following section shows how different types of autocracies are likely to collapse and demonstrates that this varies by autocratic regime type. It also shows that the mode in which regimes collapse is highly correlated with the political outcome of a transition.

Regimes and their Leaders In 1979 long-standing dictatorships in Iran and Nicaragua collapsed as revolutionaries forced hated dictators from power. These events entailed much more than simply replacing one dictator with another. Not only did the ruling families leave power, flee the country, and face the threat of assassination, but landed business elites and families that supported the Somozas in Nicaragua were left powerless, while in Iran a secular, foreign-backed monarchy was replaced by a clerical regime. In both cases, the new dictatorship was, at least at first, less autocratic than its predecessor. For example, in Iran’s first election after the Shah’s ouster, the country selected a secularist president who was also the Commander-in-Chief of the military. The initial Sandinista government in Nicaragua included opposition members, such as Violeta Chamorro, on the ruling Council of National Reconstruction and allowed token opponents to be seated in the Council of State (Williams, 1994, 177). But neither the Sandinista government nor the clerical regime in Iran were democracies. Revolution in these countries ousted dictatorships and replaced them with new ones. These political transitions are fundamentally different than democratic transitions because even though dictatorship collapsed, the new regime was not a democracy. Further, these transitions from one autocracy to another entailed much more political change than many constitutional (and even unconstitutional) leadership changes because the incumbent elites lost power and were replaced by an entirely new group of elites. In contrast, many irregular leadership changes—such as the replacement of one member of the Argentine military junta with another in the early 1980s or the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981—simply reshuffle the leadership atop a dictatorship without substantially altering the group which holds power. While many studies examine how domestic and international factors influence leadership survival, we argue that this approach is not suitable for understanding how dictatorships remain in power. Because many autocracies rotate leadership among a group of elites, we cannot assume that ousting a

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particular leader will necessarily destabilize the regime. That is, we cannot always equate regime and leadership survival in autocratic contexts. Autocratic regimes are defined as a set of formal and informal rules for choosing leaders and policies (Geddes et al., 2014a). Informal rules are included because autocracies often hide the rules that shape and constrain political choices, even though dictatorship routinely coexists with many of the formal institutions seen in democracies. The informal rule central to distinguishing one autocratic regime from another is the rule that identifies the group from which leaders can be chosen and determines who influences leadership choice and policy. To remain in power, regime leaders must retain the support of members of this group, but leaders also have substantial ability to influence the membership of the group, especially after initial leadership selection. In some cases the concepts of regime and leader are nearly identical. For example, in many personalist regimes, we can fruitfully think of the leader as the regime: when one falls, the group of elite surrounding the leader also tends to lose power. Distinguishing between leaders and regimes in these countries provides little analytic advantage. For example, Ferdinand Marcos, Gaddafi, and Mobutu were the sole leaders in their countries during their regimes. While this is not true of all personalist leaders because sometimes they die and are replaced by family members, or name a family member as president without really giving up power, these cases are relatively rare.5 In other dictatorships, however, distinguishing between leaders and the regime itself can aid our understanding of how groups of elites who support the regime behave. The distinction between leader and regime is perhaps most important in regimes where elites regularly and peacefully rotate leadership. This can be done through regularized term limits in regimes with national elections (e.g., Mexico, post-Nyerere Tanzania), and even in dictatorships without direct executive ballots (e.g., post-Mao China). This type of regularized leadership turnover is conceptually distinct from regime failure. In fact, regularized leadership change in these dictatorships is part of the institutionalization of these regimes that aids their longevity (Magaloni, 2006; Ezrow and Frantz, 2011b). Once the regime is fully institutionalized, there is little opportunity for leaders to consolidate power in their own hands, and leaders face little prospect of losing office before the end of their term. 5

After François Duvalier died in Haiti, his son replaced him as regime leader. Other personalist rulers change the official head of state even while maintaining power behind the scenes. For example, Rafael Trujillo named his brother President of the Dominican Republic in 1952 and Anastasio Somoza García installed his uncle, Víctor Manuel Román, as puppet president of Nicaragua after the 1947 coup.

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Consequently, distinguishing between the end of a leader’s tenure in power and regime failure is particularly salient in countries with dominant parties because leadership turnover is actually a consequence of a prior factor (institutionalization) which causes both frequent turnover of leaders and the relative longevity of the regime itself. Thus leadership turnover does not represent instability in these regimes but is a feature of autocratic survival— that is, the opposite of regime failure. The Mexican case perhaps best illustrates the distinction between regime and leader. Data on leader survival typically codes each of the transfers of power between PRI presidents as separate leadership failures. This means that the transition from Salinas to Zedillo (1994) and the transition from Zedillo to Fox (2000) are both coded as regular, peaceful, and constitutional leadership transitions. The first of these leader exits entailed the continued survival of PRI rule while the latter marked the end of the autocratic period and a transition to democracy. Some military regimes can also peacefully rotate leadership. In Argentina, for example, the military attempted to institutionalize leadership succession, but largely failed in the execution, mixing consensus alternation of leaders with coup threats and actual coups. Prior to the 1976 coup, senior officers reached a deal to share power among the various service branches to ensure military unity after seizing power (Fontana, 1987, 45–6). This agreement stipulated that the acting president should first retire from the military before assuming power. In practice, however, to reach an agreement on whom to choose as the first president, officers agreed that General Videla should remain in the military while still serving as president. While the pre-coup agreement suggested a “rotating presidency,” the first transfer of power did not take place until 1981 amid general crisis environment, at which point the military elite agreed on a consensus candidate, General Viola. He lasted less than a year and was peacefully replaced with an interim president, General Galtieri, though the military command had threatened a coup throughout Viola’s brief tenure (Fontana, 1987, 129). Galtieri was then ousted in a coup following Argentina’s disastrous defeat in the Malvinas War (1982), but the military regime did not end until Bignone handed power back to civilians in 1983. Figure 2.2 plots the failure rates of regimes and leaders for each regime category.6 The failure rate is the number of failures (leader or regime) divided

6

The leader data is from Svolik (2012) because this source records whether the leader exited office when an executive term limit expired. We recoded the data to account for leaders who leave office after the end of the regime, as defined in the regime data. For example, we account for the fact that the regime data codes the end of military rule in Chile in 1989, while the leader data codes Pinochet stepping down in 1990.

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20

Failure rate (%)

19.6

15

16.7 13.1

10 8

7.5

5

6.7

7.1 5.3 2.6

0

Military Leader

Personal Leader (no term limits)

Party Regime

Figure 2.2. Leader and regime failure rates. All leader failure rates exclude natural death and foreign invasion. Years: 1946–2004 (Goemans et al.), 1946–2002 (Svolik), 1946–2010 (Geddes et al.). Data sources: Goemans et al. (2009); Svolik (2012); Geddes et al. (2014a).

by the number of years at risk of failure. We do not count natural death or ousters due to foreign invasion. All measures indicate that autocratic instability is highest among military regimes. Leader failure occurs in roughly 20 percent of regime-years. This number drops to 17 percent when we exclude leader exits that occur at the end of a term limit. The regime itself fails in 13 percent of regime-years. Using regimes instead of leaders as the unit of analysis thus drops the baseline failure risk by roughly one-third. Personalist dictators are less likely to fail. Their failure rate is 8 percent, dropping only slightly to 7.5 when we exclude term-limit failures, and to just under 7 percent when we consider regimes. Whether personalist leaders or regimes are the unit of analysis, the failure rate does not vary substantially. Party regimes illustrate the difference between leaders and regimes most clearly. Leaders in these regimes fail at a rate of 7 percent—a similar rate to that of personalist leaders. However, if we exclude term-limit exits, the failure rate drops to just over 5 percent. The regime failure rate, however, is less than 3 percent. The difference in failure rates for party leaders and regimes is the starkest, falling by almost two-thirds. That is, the failure rate

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of leaders in these autocracies is nearly three times the regime failure rate. As we noted earlier, this difference is due largely to the regular manner in which party regimes rotate leadership. Institutionalizing a regime to the point where it can peacefully rotate leaders can help these regimes stay in power (Ezrow and Frantz, 2011b). If we simply model leader survival in these dictatorships, we would be treating a mechanism for preserving autocratic power (i.e. leadership turnover) as a marker of instability when in fact it is often just the opposite. These patterns demonstrate that regime and leader failure are different concepts, and that these differences vary systemically by the type of autocracy. When elites have a mechanism for regularly rotating leaders, this may be a sign of stability. The difference between leaders and regimes shows up in party dictatorships and to a lesser extent in military regimes because they are organized through an institution that allows elites to have a say in leadership selection. Autocratic leaders and their exits from power are easier to identify than regimes and their failures, and thus make for more transparent units of analysis. But focusing on leaders obscures one of the most important features of autocratic politics—namely that some of the most durable dictatorships survive precisely because they rotate rulers.

Autocratic Regime Collapse In this section we examine the various threats dictators face. Although recent theories of regime transition focus on popular revolution as the key threat to autocratic rule,7 dictators are removed from power in a wide variety ways, with most autocratic leaders overthrown by regime insiders and not by a “revolution from below” (Svolik, 2009, 2012). As noted earlier, while democratization is often equated with the demise of autocratic rule, it is certainly not the only outcome that can transpire after autocratic regime collapse. Coups, assassinations, and rebellions feature prominently in the demise of dictatorships, but not all autocratic exits need be violent. Some dictators leave power peacefully, for example when they lose an election or when the military negotiates a peaceful transfer of power to civilians. How dictators lose power and the type of regime likely to replace them varies considerably across different types of regimes. Moreover, the manner in which regimes collapse and whether the next regime is democratic are highly correlated. 7

See, for example, Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).

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Probability of Transition | Failure

60

63

.8

63 56

50 44

40 37

37

30 20 10

Probability of Transition | Failure Type

44

.7 .6 .5 .4 .3 .2 .1

0 Military

Personal

Party Democracy

Forced (N=147)

Not-forced (N=76)

Dictatorship

Figure 2.3. Democratic and autocratic regime transitions. Years: 1946–2010. Source: Geddes et al. (2014a).

Since 1946, roughly half of autocratic regime collapses result in a transition to democracy. The other half of regime collapses entails one dictatorship replacing another, as occurred in the Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions in 1979 or in Zaire in 1997.8 In all these cases, a new (and in some cases revolutionary) autocratic regime replaced a prior dictatorship—the Shah’s regime in Iran, the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua, and Mobutu’s oneman rule in Zaire. The left panel of Figure 2.3 shows that the propensity for democracy to follow regime collapse varies considerably across autocracies. Following the collapse of military regimes, roughly two-thirds of the time a new democracy emerges. The opposite pattern occurs in personalist regimes: roughly twothirds end in transition to a new autocracy. In dominant party regimes, just over half end in a new autocracy. These patterns give us initial insight into what we might expect to occur if foreign pressure destabilizes a dictatorship: ousting a personalist dictatorship may not be a reliable strategy for promoting democracy, but pushing military regimes to relinquish power may be. To link foreign pressure to the distinct trajectories that occur after autocratic regime collapse, the right panel examines whether the manner in which 8 Subsequent regimes coded as “ceasing to exist” or “failed state” are classified as transition to subsequent dictatorship, except East Germany (1989) and the Soviet Union (1990) which are treated as transitions to democracy. We exclude regime failures that end in occupation by a foreign military (e.g. Iraq 2003).

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a regime collapses is correlated with what comes next after regime failure. We divide regime collapse events into two categories: forced regime changes and peaceful ones. The former include foreign invasions, coups, uprisings, and ouster by insurgents in a civil war; peaceful events include elections and rule changes made by regime elites.9 More than 80 percent of the autocratic regimes that collapsed as a result of some forceful action were followed by a subsequent dictatorship, while almost three-quarters of regime collapse events that were not caused by a forcible action were followed by a new democracy. Finally, when we put the insights from these graphs together, we find that, unsurprisingly, regime collapse in personalist dictatorships (85 percent) is most likely to be forced while in military regimes (43 percent) it is most likely to be peaceful. Party regimes (63 percent) fall in between. These descriptive tendencies suggest that theories of democratization which posit violent strategies—such as coups, rebellions, revolutions, and insurgencies—against a dictatorship as the key vehicle of democracy are at best predicting a relatively small share of democratization episodes, though the unrealized threat of violent may play a role.10 Further, these patterns indicate that peaceful regime change is the most likely route to democratization. This suggests that external pressure that foments violent or forced regime change in dictatorships is unlikely to yield democracy on a consistent basis. Forced transitions usually result from factional conflicts, ethnic rivalries, and protracted group conflicts in highly exclusionary regimes where outsiders have no option of peacefully accessing power. The data on regime change in dictatorships illustrate why the institutional differences among regimes matter for how they collapse and what comes next. Three stylized facts emerge. First, military regimes are the most unstable; but they are also the most likely to end peacefully and to be followed by a democracy. Whether this pattern emerges from the preferences of leaders in professionalized militaries, as Geddes (1999) argues, or from their greater capacity for violence, as Debs (2010) suggests, it has implications for our analysis because this pattern highlights both how regimes’ survival strategies and the likely post-exit fates of their leaders influence outcomes. Geddes’

9

While we use the term forced regime change to categorize the use of force during the regime collapse event, a separate variable in the data from Geddes et al. (2014a) codes the number of deaths that occur during the regime collapse event. Thus some events which we include under forced regime change do not entail deaths, such as bloodless coups. 10 Formal theories of democratization in Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) rely on the credible threat of revolution against a dictator, not necessarily a realized revolution, to yield predictions about the likelihood of democratization. Our model of regime change in the next chapter incorporates this possibility as well.

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explanation for military withdrawal assumes leaders in these regimes prefer protecting military unity or other corporate military interests to retaining executive power. Increasing the costs of remaining in power, or alternatively raising the benefits of leaving power, can sway military regimes to hand power to civilians in a new democracy. Debs’ argument focuses on a strategic decision of military leaders to cede power to democrats because losing power to another dictator is potentially very costly, as he may try to eliminate military leaders. Both of these explanations rest on the institutionalization of the regime in the organization of the military and on the post-exit consequences of losing power. While the professional organization of the military may engender particular preferences for unity (Nordlinger, 1977), that these regimes tend to end in peaceful, bargained transitions is largely explained by their capacity to protect their interests after a regime transition (Huntington, 1991b; Geddes, 1999). The high capacity for organized violence in these regimes stems from the fact that military organizations can more easily overcome collective action problems to credibly threaten subsequent rulers and are thus likely to cede power to a democratic leader who is less likely to eliminate them (Debs, 2010). In short, the military as an organization—whether through the preferences it breeds or the collective action capacity it enables—can explain why these dictatorships are not only short-lived, but also the most likely to peacefully transition to democracy. Second, while personalist dictatorships are more stable than military rule, the former are more likely to lose power in a coerced transition in which a subsequent dictatorship comes to power. Because rulers in these regimes principally employ private goods patronage and repression of rivals to survive in office, they often lack institutionalized procedures for dealing with challengers. Consequently, they are less capable of peacefully selecting new leaders from among the regime elite. This exclusionary logic leaves alienated elites and regime outsiders without access to rents and other political or economic opportunities. Challengers are therefore more likely to resort to violence, such as a coup or rebellion, to oust the incumbent (Snyder, 1998; Roessler, 2011). As Bratton and van de Walle (1994, 465) argue, “[i]ncumbent and opposition leaders are usually so polarized as a result of winner-take-all power struggles that there is slim possibility that moderate factions from either side can negotiate an agreement. Instead transitions unfold along a path of escalating confrontations until one side or other loses definitively.” Because they often weaken organizations such as parties and the military, personalist rulers have less capacity to retain leverage after regime change. Therefore, negotiated transitions are less likely and violent ousters more likely. Indeed, leaders in these regimes “usually tr[y] to remain in power as long as they can”

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(Huntington, 1991a, 588). Or as Bratton and van de Walle (1997, 86) put it, elite supporters in these dictatorships, “face the prospect of losing all visible means of support in a political transition,” and thus “have little option but to cling to the regime, to sink or swim with it.” Finally, dominant party regimes are the most stable because they mobilize support from a large coalition through both institutional co-optation and broad patronage. As a result, these regimes often collapse when long-term structural processes undermine their capacity to retain support by reducing citizens’ dependence on state provision of goods and the party’s monopoly over state resources (Magaloni, 2006; McMann, 2006; Greene, 2007). On the other hand, party-based regimes fall between personalist regimes and military regimes in their propensity to transition to democracy. “Like officers, singleparty cadres can expect life as they know it to continue after liberalization or even regime change” (Geddes, 1999, 141). If the former regime party has a broad and deep support coalition, they can compete in and sometimes win post-transition elections. Electoral power gives them leverage to protect elites’ interests and prevent bad post-transition outcomes. For this reason, dominant party dictatorships also frequently end in negotiated transitions.

C O N C L U SI O N This chapter presents the classification of authoritarian regimes we use throughout this book and examines their main characteristics. We distinguish between personalist, party-based, and military regimes. Such classification is based on observable characteristics of the existing relationship between the leader, the military, and the support party to identify which of them has effective control over policy decisions and political appointments. We also make the case for why we focus on autocratic regimes rather than leaders when analyzing authoritarian stability: in institutionalized regimes, especially dominant party regimes, the regular replacement of leaders is an indicator of their organizational strength and stability. In contrast, in personalistic regimes, the fall of the leader usually entails the fall of the whole regime as well. Our measure of regime collapse marks a fundamental change in the group of elite who rules and selects the leader. Finally, we emphasize one key distinction often neglected by scholarly work on regime change: when authoritarian regimes collapse, the establishment of a democracy does not automatically follow. In fact, one of two outcomes may transpire, either a transition to a new democracy or a transition to a new dictatorship. Further, how regimes fall and what comes next vary substantially

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across autocratic contexts: personalist regimes tend to be forcibly overthrown and be followed by a new autocracy, while military regimes are the most likely to end peacefully and be replaced by a democratic regime. Hence, the data reveal that there exists a strong correlation between the type of collapse and the outcome of transitions. In particular, we show that forced transitions usually result in a new dictatorship, while non-forced regime changes tend to lead to a democratic transition. This is relevant for the study of foreign pressure because some foreign policy tools, by increasing the likelihood of a forced regime change, may not promote democracy. In the next chapter we develop a theoretical model of regime transitions that incorporates these stylized facts and accounts for both types of political outcomes. We also discuss two elements in which regimes differ that are of particular importance to understanding regime transitions and the influence of foreign pressure: the strategies dictators use to retain power, and the posttransition fate of their leaders and elites.

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Foreign Pressure and Autocratic Survival The next five chapters discuss the specific literatures linking instruments of foreign pressure to democratization and regime stability: foreign aid, economic sanctions, human rights shaming, human rights prosecutions, and military interventions. These literatures largely developed independently of each other and rarely focus on the specific question of how foreign policy tools influence autocratic survival.1 To offer a systematic and comparative analysis of these various tools of foreign pressure, the first challenge is thus theoretical. In this chapter we specify how foreign pressure shape the preferences and capacities of domestic actors in a theory of political transitions. Importantly, our model of regime change allows for both the possibility of democratization as well as transitions to new autocracies. Only military interventions can directly overthrow regimes without the involvement of domestic actors, but as we show in Chapter 8, most military interventions that oust dictatorships involve domestic actors actually deposing the incumbent ruler. Thus if coercive foreign policy tools have any influence on autocratic regime survival, international pressure must do so by altering the incentives, preferences, and capacities—and, hence, the choices—of domestic political actors. Democratic transitions have been generally studied from two approaches:2 a macro approach focusing on structural determinants of democratization, such as economic development and performance or natural resource abundance (Lipset, 1959; Gasiorowski, 1995; Przeworski et al., 2000; Ross, 2001), and a strategic approach focusing on interactions among actors, especially elites (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Przeworski, 1991). Both approaches have their limitations. While the structural approaches sometimes overlook the role played by political actors in the process of democratization and thus pay too little attention to how structural features shape actors’ incentives, strategic approaches have been criticized for focusing too much on elites and 1

For recent excellent reviews of these literatures, see Hafner-Burton (2014) and Krasner and Weinstein (2014). 2 See Teorell (2010) for a discussion.

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overlooking the role of opposition forces. Furthermore, until quite recently, most democratization studies viewed regime transitions as the outcome of domestic factors and processes, thereby neglecting the international dimension. New literature on comparative democratization challenged this by developing theories that brought international factors into the study of regime change (Pridham, 1994; Whitehead, 1996). However, even some of the best recent work on the international dimensions of democratization features structural accounts of the international environment, such as linkage to the West and the leverage Western powers retain over autocracies, with little discussion of how these factors shape the strategic decisions of domestic political actors (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Integrating structural and strategic approaches requires scholars to specify the causal mechanisms that link structural characteristics and other contextual variables to changes in the preferences and capacities of political actors. Some recent studies analyzing how international factors influence regime transitions do precisely this. Thus, for example, the well-established democratic diffusion effect cannot be understood without examining how characteristics of neighboring countries influence the preferences of elites or the capacity of opposition forces to challenge the regime (Kopstein and Reilly, 2000; Brinks and Coppedge, 2006; Gleditsch and Ward, 2006). Similarly, membership in regional international organizations may make democratization more likely by pressuring, persuading, and socializing elites (Pevehouse, 2002, 2005). To explain how these diverse policy instruments influence regime survival, we first establish two stylized facts: autocratic regimes differ in the strategies they employ to retain power; and their leaders and elites face different outcomes—or what we call post-exit fate—once ousted from power. Building on the implications of these descriptive tendencies, we then develop a general theoretical framework linking foreign pressure to autocratic survival strategies and the likely post-exit fate of regime leaders and their elites. Our model thus examines how foreign pressure may alter the choices of domestic actors in different authoritarian settings.

H O W A UT O C R A T I C S U RV I V A L AN D D E M I SE DIFF ER AC ROS S REGIM ES

Survival Strategies Autocratic regimes employ two primary strategies to retain power: repressing opponents, and building support through patronage and institutional

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co-optation.3 The probability of a regime retaining power is thus a function of support and repression. Foreign pressure, we posit, destabilizes regimes by undermining their capacity to use their “preferred” survival strategies, thus limiting their capacity to respond to domestic threats. Foreign policy tools destabilize autocracies either by reducing the regime’s ability to retain the support of its coalition or by undermining the regimes’ repressive capacity. While an early literature on dictatorships focused on repression as the central instrument of power (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1961; Arendt, 1962; Linz, 2000), dictators must use more than repression to survive and thus build political loyalty as well (Wintrobe, 1990, 854). Recent research has therefore turned from studying repression to examining the mobilization of loyalty as well as the combination of these two strategies (Wintrobe, 1998; Gershenson and Grossman, 2001; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; Magaloni, 2006; Desai et al., 2009; Conrad, 2011; Boix and Svolik, 2013; Frantz and KendallTaylor, 2014). In addition to repression, dictators mobilize support through both patronage and institutional co-optation. Because distinct autocratic regimes use these three strategies—repression, patronage, and institutions— to different degrees, we can use regime type as a starting point for explaining how foreign pressure is likely to influence these strategies, and hence regime survival. Repression seeks to eliminate or prevent threats to the political regime. Governments use repression to constrain the behavior of individuals and groups, and to obtain information to prevent future challenges. Repression can take two forms: first, the threat and use of physical violence and, second, the restriction of citizens’ civil and political rights (Way and Levitsky, 2006; Davenport, 2007a). Violent (or high intensity) coercion, such as imprisonment, torture, and extrajudicial execution, is directed at organized threats to the regime (Escribà-Folch, 2013b). While much repression targets members of an identifiable opposition (e.g., leaders, groups, and parties) and collective action activities (e.g., strikes and protests), it is also used against rivals within the support coalition. In addition to violence against individuals, repression may consist of restrictions on empowerment rights, which entail monitoring and restricting group activities to prevent collective action by opposition members and the coordination of inside rivals (Way and Levitsky, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010; Escribà-Folch, 2013b; Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014). Thus, low-intensity repression includes measures such as harassing or banning political parties and civil society organizations,

3 These strategies are in line with those proposed by Wintrobe (1990, 1998) and echo those proposed by Haber (2006): terror, co-optation, and organizational proliferation.

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censoring the media, limiting free speech, economic or job discrimination, and circumscribing workers’ rights. Recent data advances permit researchers to analyze coercive behavior across political regimes. With more institutional channels for expressing demands and a more inclusive decision-making process, not surprisingly, repression is less likely to occur in democracies (Poe and Tate, 1994; Davenport, 1999, 2004; Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005; Davenport, 2007b). Yet, systematic differences also exist among autocracies. Davenport (2007c), for example, shows that party-based regimes are less repressive than other dictatorships. The evidence also indicates that military regimes may be more repressive because they have a relative organizational advantage in the use of violence (Poe et al., 1999). This explanation for military repression builds on the intuition that a trade-off exists between pursuing repression and securing political loyalty, with military dictatorships being relatively better at the former. For instance, Davenport (2007c, 486) argues that “in governments where authorities have involved more individuals/organizations (e.g. single-party governments), the likelihood of coercive behavior would be lower.”4 Conversely, with relatively weak institutions available for co-optation and small support coalitions, personalist regimes rely heavily on harsh repression for their survival as well, especially when shocks diminish their capacity for patronage distribution (Snyder, 1998). Using repression without building a reliable support base, however, may be a risky long-term strategy for two reasons. First, repression can trigger an escalation of conflict with opponents, causing further opposition mobilization (Opp and Roehl, 1990; Ortiz, 2007; Pierskalla, 2010). In turn, violent repression may prompt elite and security force defection as well as military fractures and disobedience (McLauchlin, 2010; Bellin, 2012; Lutterbeck, 2013). Machiavelli (1971, 79) notes the example of Antonious, who “began to be feared even by those whom he had around him, so that he was killed by a centurion in the midst of his army.” Second, terror requires an organization to implement repression—agents who can also threaten the dictator (Haber, 2006; Ezrow and Frantz, 2011a).5 Indeed, Vargas Llosa (2000) highlights repression against regime insiders, especially military officers, as the primary motivating factor for the soldiers who plot Trujillo’s assassination in the Dominican Republic. Thus, the returns to survival of increasing repression are often decreasing and may turn negative: at very high levels, repression can lower the probability of regime survival. 4

See also Frantz and Kendall-Taylor (2014). See Acemoglu et al. (2010) for a model of the military as agents of repression with the (potential) capacity to unseat the dictator. 5

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The logic of loyalty involves political exchange. Mobilizing support is a political investment by rulers aimed at increasing political security for the incumbent (Wintrobe, 1990). Regimes can generate support by buying loyalty through patronage and co-opting potential opponents with institutional power. Patronage entails the exchange of resources, rents, and other private goods for support. This allows the regime to reward supporters and secure alliances with potential rivals. Buying loyalty may involve direct payments of money and material goods, such as rents, licenses, contracts, and positions; or interventionist economic policies that benefit small groups, such as trade barriers, access to foreign currency, or state regulation of production and markets (e.g. monopsony boards) (Bates, 2008). This is the principal survival strategy of personalist regimes. For example, Ferdinand Marcos granted monopolies in the sugar, coconut, and grain sectors to loyalists in the Philippines (Hawes, 1987; Thompson, 1998). Through presidential decree, he forced all coconut processing companies to sell to or affiliate with UNICOM, whose board chair, Juan Ponce Enrile, was his defense minister. In Rwanda, Juvénal Habyarimana granted control of the state-owned coffee and tea agencies to the Akazu, the main members of his support coalition (Verwimp, 2003). Coffee exports accounted for more than half of all export revenues, making for a lucrative loyalty payment. Patronage may be most pervasive in personalist regimes because they concentrate power in the leader and a small group of elites, with few institutional constraints on the ruler and little power-sharing. Benefits accruing to each member of a personalist coalition are private goods and thus substantially larger (for each recipient) since their marginal contribution to regime stability is higher than that of members of the support coalition in a party regime. Effective patronage means the regime must control key economic sectors to divert resources and distribute rents to elite supporters. Alternatively, patronage resources can be obtained from the economic (and military) aid provided by foreign patrons (Snyder, 1998). For example, Ferdinand Marcos kept many agricultural export industries under his direct control (Hawes, 1987; Thompson, 1998), while Malawi’s ruler Hastings Banda directed a conglomerate of companies in key export sectors such as tobacco (Posner, 1995). Trujillo owned most of the Dominican Republic’s sugar industries as well as other agricultural export production (Hall, 2000). The viability of private-goods distribution in personalist regimes thus often depends on the presence of valuable natural resources that generate foreign income, or on the presence of abundant assistance strategically distributed by influential foreign patrons. Even in Russia, where much of the oil industry remains privately owned, the nationalization of the gas industry helped the

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regime to strip power from a potential rival, Mikhail Khodorkovsky; and because property rights are not secure, the privately owned resource sector must remain loyal to the regime to avoid state predation (Treisman, 2010, 13). Patronage not only benefits civilian insiders but also the military, whose support is crucial for defending against external threats and maintaining internal security. Further, because the military may possess organizational advantages that give it the capacity to act collectively, it can directly threaten the leader (Haber, 2006; Svolik, 2013). Thus leaders attempt to coup-proof their regimes by undermining its collective action capacity and providing officers with loyalty payments (Feaver, 1999). By increasing military expenditures, particularly salaries and personal allowances, regimes can reduce the incentives of militaries to stage a coup (Collier and Hoeffler, 2007; Powell, 2012). Regimes can often purchase the loyalty of senior officers and key leaders of the security apparatus by granting them control over key economic sectors too. Indeed, Treisman (2007, 142) notes that Putin’s rise to power produced a new breed of Russian oligarchs “from the network of security service and law enforcement veterans known as the siloviki who form the backbone of President Putin’s administration.” Under Sadat and Mubarak, the Egyptian military controlled or had interests in many and diverse economic sectors such as tourism, real estate, food, and services.6 Patronage need not be personalized. In Botswana, for example, patronage networks run through the dominant Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), but “the distribution of funds is strictly retained in the hands of the field services of the central government, thereby allowing only comparatively constrained and limited . . . party-centred access to patronage resources” (Charlton, 1993, 341). Dominant party regimes also work as large clientelistic machines through which the government distributes benefits in an effort to mobilize mass support (Magaloni, 2006; Greene, 2007; Pepinsky, 2007; Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010). The party monopolizes state resources and can then make access to housing, jobs, subsidies, and public services conditional on support for the regime. Greene (2010, 6) notes that in these regimes, “a large public sector allows the incumbent to dole out huge numbers of patronage jobs to supporters.” Dominant parties can mobilize citizen support through a “punishment regime,” which rewards regime supporters and excludes opposition supporters from the spoils system (Magaloni, 2006). This requires a strong party capable of reaching voters throughout the country so it can monitor both supporters and opponents. It also requires substantial government control of the economy.

6

Sherine Tadros, “Egypt military’s economic empire,” Al Jazeera, 15 February 2012.

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For example, in Tanzania under the rule of the dominant Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), private sector employment fell in the 1970s, from 45 percent in 1969 to less than 30 percent in 1978 (Stein, 1985, 120), while the Senegalese Socialist Party used state-owned enterprises to “generate patronage posts and high-powered government jobs for Senegal’s most skilled and ambitious professionals” (Boone, 1992, 179). This strategy brought regime critics and students groups into the party fold. The dominant party in post-independence Algeria (FLN) used public sector employment to prevent “the formation of broad social protest movements” (Chhibber, 1996, 135). Amidst the 1970s oil price spikes, state employment in Algeria rose from 46 to 61 percent of total employment, and by 1983 the Algerian state employed 86 percent of the nonagricultural workforce (Leca, 1990, 162–4). Most commonly, the benefits delivered from dominant parties take the form of targeted public goods and services. For example, public works directed at specific regions or municipalities have been a recurrent strategy to reward those loyal to the PRI regime in Mexico and Egypt under Mubarak (Magaloni, 2006; Blaydes, 2011). These strategies in dominant party settings, while still relying on patronage, differ from the loyalty networks in personalist regimes where rent distribution tends to take the form of “personalized exchanges” (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994, 458), and so it is dependent on an ethnic or familial relationship with the ruler rather than on support for the party. For example, Hutchcroft (1991, 427) argues that in Marcos’s personalist regime in the Philippines, loyalty to the regime was purchased almost exclusively through families. A second strategy for mobilizing regime support is to co-opt nominal supporters and potential opponents with institutional power. Political institutions such as ruling parties, legislatures, and other power-sharing bodies aid regime survival by: managing elite conflict; providing power to moderate opponents; enabling monitoring of power-sharing agreements; and regulating leadership succession (Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010; Ezrow and Frantz, 2011b; Svolik, 2012). Legislatures and ruling parties, for example, help manage elite conflict by providing an arena for intra-elite bargaining and by establishing credible power-sharing agreements (Gandhi, 2008; Magaloni, 2006). By constraining dictators’ decision-making capacity and alleviating monitoring problems, collective decision-making bodies can prevent one leader from consolidating personal power and thus promote elite cohesion (Svolik, 2012). This may also be true for deliberative and decision-making bodies in military juntas. Officers can create military councils to facilitate leadership rotation, provide top officers with access to decision-making, and distribute power among multiple branches. These institutional arrangements were present, for instance, during

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military rule in Brazil (Skidmore, 1990), Argentina (Fontana, 1987), and Chile (Barros, 2002), but also in Burma under the State Peace and Development Council. Second, political institutions in dictatorships can co-opt potential challengers by giving them a stake in the regime (Gandhi, 2008). When dictators need cooperation from the population, perhaps because they lack sources of non-tax income or face a strong opposition, regimes create political institutions to cede some power to potential challengers (Smith, 2005; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007). These institutions make policy concessions and the promise of future distribution more credible because they lower the costs of collective action, thereby easing power takeovers by rival factions and other regime insiders (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011). In addition, regimes can allocate leadership positions and benefits to secure loyalty from party members (Brownlee, 2007a; Svolik, 2012). Finally, institutions stabilize regimes by reducing conflict and uncertainty surrounding leadership succession. By providing formal and regular mechanisms for replacing one leader with another from the same group of elite, institutions reduce factional conflict and supporters’ uncertainty about their future status. This, in turn, reduces the likelihood of violent takeovers and ensures the continuity of the regime. Peaceful and regular leadership rotation is common in military and many party-based regimes, such as those in postMao China and in Brazil under military government. Devoid of such institutional procedures but with an incentive to reduce uncertainty about leadership change, personalist regimes often seek to establish hereditary succession like that existing in monarchies (Brownlee, 2007b). For example, Jean-Claude Duvalier succeeded his father François Duvalier as President of Haiti in 1971. In Togo, Faure Gnassingbé replaced his father Étienne Eyadema after his death in 2005 from a heart attack. The credibility of institutional agreements and the capacity of party and legislative bodies to promote elite cohesion and constrain rulers are more salient in some regimes than others. In dominant party regimes, these institutions ensure factions that lose out on power today believe they will have a chance to win power in the future (Geddes, 2003; Magaloni, 2006). Similarly, in military regimes institutions help to prevent power concentration by establishing rules for rotating leadership and sharing power. These institutions thus provide supporters with a vested interest in regime survival. Although patronage is also extensive under party rule, institutions constitute the most important survival strategy under such regimes. Patronage in party regimes is subsumed under a broader strategy based on institutional cooptation. The party organizes and regulates access to the spoils (Geddes, 1999), as illustrated by the capacity of party regimes to endure despite

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experiencing economic crises that curtail the resources available for patronage. Smith (2005, 431) argues that [d]uring ‘routine’ periods, strong parties provide a means for incorporated groups to present their political and policy preferences to the regime, channeling interests in much the same way that Huntington foresaw in the single-party rule of the 1960s. During periods of crisis, the crucial task of party institutions is to provide a credible guarantee to in-groups that their long-term interests will be best served by remaining loyal to the regime.

The sustainability of this system hinges on supporters’ beliefs about the durability of the spoils distribution and their future capacity to access power in the regime. This is the main reason why, some argue, party regimes hold elections (Magaloni, 2006; Blaydes, 2008). High turnout rates and electoral victories with overwhelming margins demonstrate the strength of the regime, signaling that the political exchange system will endure, thereby discouraging potential defectors. While Greene (2010) argues that the long-term decline of public resources can sap a dominant party regime’s support, Magaloni (2006) highlights voters’ long-term political loyalties in these regimes—even in the face of economic decline. In contrast, political institutions are less crucial for retaining support in personalist regimes and are less likely to constrain the leader’s power (Wright, 2008). Jackson and Rosberg (1984, 424), for example, note that “[e]stablished and effective political institutions are largely absent from regimes of personal rule.” For example, during Banda’s personalist rule in Malawi, the “[p]arliament became a rubber-stamp institution filled with Banda’s sycophants.” As for the party, Banda “reshaped the Congress Party, the key vehicle of the independence movement, into his personal instrument” (Posner, 1995, 134). During Trujillo’s rule in the Dominican Republic, Wiarda (1975, 1262) points out that “[t]he Congress also served as a dumping grounds for out-of-favor Trujillo cronies, as an agency where they could demonstrate their continued loyalty and perhaps be rehabilitated and restored to favor.” While elite turnover in dominant party regimes may stabilize them by providing losing factions with the possibility of winning power in the future, elite turnover in personalist regimes has the opposite logic, though with the same goal of preserving power. Bratton and van de Walle (1994, 463) underscore this point: “[t]o regulate and control rent seeking, to prevent rivals from developing their own power base, and to demonstrate their own power, rulers regularly rotate officeholders.” In personalist regimes, continuous rotation of cabinet and military posts, seats in the legislature, and other offices prevents elite coordination and hinders the creation of autonomous power bases (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984; Snyder, 1998). Decalo (1998, 68) reports the

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frequent shuffle of MPs in Malawi under Banda’s rule: “every year between 1970 and 1980 an average of seven Malawi constituencies remained unrepresented in Parliament due to expulsions; and of the 150 members expelled during 1964–1981, forty ended up in prison.” Forced resignations and rotation of legislators increased dramatically during Trujillo’s rule (Wiarda, 1968, 48). Mobutu, in the former Zaire, did likewise (Callaghy, 1984, 180). “The MPR Political Bureau, for example, was revamped a dozen times in the first decade of party life” (Young and Turner, 1985, 165–6). Thus parties and legislatures may be less likely to constrain the dictator in these regimes, and thus do little to enable elite collective action that threatens the leader (Wright, 2008). Personalist rulers also weaken the military. To prevent coups, these rulers use an array of coup-proofing strategies, such as: creating paramilitary units and other parallel security forces to counterbalance the regular army; diversifying chains of command; personally controlling promotions and recruitment; and selecting officers based on ethnic, religious, or familial loyalties (Snyder, 1998; Feaver, 1999; Quinlivan, 1999; Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Pilster and Böhmelt, 2012). These tactics foster divisions within the armed forces and undermine their capacity to act collectively against the leader. By making the regime less dependent on the regular armed forces for internal security, dictators also reduce the military’s capacity to influence policy and constrain decision-making, which allows the ruler to further concentrate power (Svolik, 2013). In sum, regimes vary in the intensity with which they rely on these three survival strategies (i.e., patronage, institutions, and repression). They thus differ in their ability to substitute institutions for repression or immediate private goods payments by making credible promises about future behavior or by giving potential opponents access to power in durable institutions. Table 3.1 presents a summary of the stylized survival strategies and their relative importance for each type of regime. Figure 3.1 provides evidence of the pattern described above by looking at the average level of repression and government spending for each

Table 3.1. Regime types and their preferred survival strategies Personalist

Dominant party

Military

1. Patronage

Institutions

Repression

2. Repression

Patronage

Institutions

3. Institutions

Repression

Patronage

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Spending 25

.8 .81 .6

.4

.5 .41

.2

Mean spending level (% above minimum)

1

Mean repression level

59

0

20

22.1

15

10

5

12.6 8.8

0 Military

Personal

Party Mean level

Military

Personal

Party

95% CI

Figure 3.1. Repression and spending, by regime type. Repression is a latent measure of repression. Spending is the percentage spending above the minimum level (as a share of GDP) observed in the data set, averaged across all regimes of a particular type. Years: 1949–2010 (repression), 1960–2008 (spending). Data sources: Fariss (2014); World Bank (2010); Geddes et al. (2014a).

regime type.7 These variables are (imperfect) proxies for regime loyalty and cooptation (Desai et al., 2009). Nonetheless, they show that military dictatorships repress the most but spend the least, while dominant party regimes spend the most and repress the least. This evidence suggests that regimes with higher levels of repression tend to rely less on distributing benefits via government spending. Across all regimes, spending and repression are negatively correlated.8 These descriptive tendencies illustrate that spending and repression represent trade-offs that may be substitute strategies for remaining in power. Furthermore, the averages in Figure 3.1 suggest that this trade-off may be institutionalized in regime types.9 7

The latent measure of repression is a scaled variable, which has been multiplied by negative one so that positive values reflect higher levels of repression. Spending is the predicted (logged) spending level, by regime type, controlling for the Age dependency ratio. The reported figures are the average, by regime type, above the minimum observed value. Thus, on average, military regimes spend roughly 9 percent more than the lowest value, while party regimes spend roughly 22 percent more than the lowest value. 8 The correlation between repression and spending is –0.18. 9 This correlation within groups may be a composition fallacy and should not be interpreted as evidence of substitutes. For systematic evidence of an autocratic trade-off, see Desai et al. (2009).

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In sum, survival strategies vary across different types of autocratic regimes. Dictatorships that repress the most spend the least and vice versa. Further, some regimes use political institutions to co-opt opponents with policy concessions and to make credible power-sharing promises with elites. The effectiveness of institutions for these tasks, however, varies by regime type as well. With larger support coalitions and more credible mechanisms for intra-elite co-optation, party-based regimes are more likely to rely on institutions and broad-based patronage. There is considerable evidence that institutions in these regimes serve to credibly share power, enable elites to rotate leadership, and build long-term loyalty. With narrow coalitions, personalist regimes rely principally on patronage that delivers private goods to cliques and on repressing opponents. With weaker institutions in these regimes, loyalty depends more on the availability of immediate material rewards, and less on credible policy concessions and promises of future rents and power. In military regimes, institutions can enhance power-sharing and mitigate elite conflict, while their advantage in violence allows them to use repression more intensively.

The Post-Exit Fate of Dictators The personal consequences of regime change can vary dramatically. Joseph Mobutu, Idi Amin, Ferdinand Marcos, Alberto Fujimori, and “Baby Doc” Duvalier fled into exile when their regimes collapsed. In contrast, Nicolae Ceaucescu, Sylvanus Olympio, François Tombalbaye, Francisco Macías Nguema, and Rafael Trujillo were assassinated or executed. Ahmed Sukarno and Habib Bourguiba were placed under house arrest. Valentine Strasser, who at first fled to exile in the U.K., where he was dismissed from law school and ended up homeless, returned to Sierra Leone to live with his mother. Tanzania’s first post-independence leader, Julius Nyerere, lived in peaceful retirement after he stepped down from office in 1985; and Hugo Banzer, head of military junta in Bolivia in the 1970s, ran for president in a democratic election in 1997, and won. For dictators, being in power is better than losing it. Actually, many would like to be in office until they die, such as Spain’s Franco and North Korea’s Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. Yet, if replaced or deposed, much is still at stake. They may face different types of post-exit punishment. Dictators would prefer to remain in their own country free from prosecution to enjoy the spoils accumulated during their rule, perhaps with the possibility of returning to politics someday. This outcome is better than fleeing to exile. Yet exile is also better than being imprisoned, or worse, ending up dead. Therefore, one factor

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that influences the leader’s behavior during his tenure is his assessment of the chances that he and/or his elite supporters will suffer a bad post-transition fate should the regime collapse. The expectations about the consequences of regime change have often been overlooked in recent studies of transitions despite having had a prominent place in the early literature on the topic (Dix, 1982; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Huntington, 1991b; Przeworski, 1991). Our theory incorporates this factor, which is essential to understanding how regimes fall, but also, we argue, to examine the influence of external pressure on regime change. The expected consequences of losing power influence a leader’s policy choices while in power (Goemans, 2008; Escribà-Folch, 2013a). For example, the post-exit fate of dictators affects whether they initiate war and can alter a rulers’ ability to extract rents (Escribà-Folch, 2007; Goemans, 2008; Benhabib and Przeworski, 2010). Most importantly, the fate of dictators after regime transition has implications for the prospects of regime change and democratization in the first place (Dix, 1982; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Huntington, 1991b; Przeworski, 1991). The anticipation of a particular postexit fate may alter an autocratic leader’s decision over whether he should concede to foreign or domestic demands and step down or to resist transition violently. Due to commitment problems, the expectation that regime elites will be punished after a transition lowers the chances that the regime negotiates an exit, making a peaceful transition less likely (Sutter, 1995). Hence, transitional justice can be an obstacle to democratization. Conversely, credible prospects of a good post-tenure fate, or what Dix (1982) refers to as “exit guarantees,” may help pave the way for a peaceful regime transition (Huntington, 1991b; Przeworski, 1991), which more often than not, result in democratization. An important source of “exit guarantees” is domestic. In particular, the institutional structure of the regime, which we proxy using regime type, can influence the fate of leaders by altering the distribution of power after a transition and thus enforce guarantees of immunity made before the transition (Huntington, 1991b; Escribà-Folch, 2013a; Albertus and Menaldo, 2014). As Huntington (1991b, 120) notes, after a transition from autocracy, “[t]he party gives up its monopoly of power but not the opportunity to compete for power by democratic means. When they return to the barracks, the military give up both, but they also retain the capacity to reacquire power by nondemocratic means.” Hence, dominant parties can protect the interests of former autocratic elites because these dictatorships have relatively broad and deep autocratic support coalitions such that the former ruling party can compete in posttransition elections and may even win them (Huntington, 1991a; Wright and Escribà-Folch, 2012). Its organizational strength allows the ruling party to extract beneficial concessions for their elites during transitional

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pacts, concessions that are enforced after the transition by the capacity of the party to regain power or act as a veto player in a new democratic regime. The Party of Labor of Albania, for example, used its institutionalized structure to win the 1991 multiparty election, giving it a large majority in the new Constitutional Assembly. The Colorado Party in Paraguay dominated elections after the 1993 transition, as their presidential candidate only lost for the first time in 2008 and they continue to win a legislative plurality. Similarly, the Communist Party in Mongolia has won a plurality in three of four legislative elections since their transition in 1993. Military leaders can lower the cost of stepping down from power and defend their interests by credibly threatening a coup (Huntington, 1991a; Sutter, 1995). Post-transition coup threats may never be realized but can still force a new democracy to back down, as in post-junta Argentina; or they may be executed as the military retakes power, as in post-Mubarak Egypt. Militaries are thus able to secure credible commitments from democratic elites to forgo prosecuting past human rights abuses. For example, amnesty laws protected former officers in many southern cone countries in South America and Spain. Military regimes also use allied civilian parties to secure post-transition protection when the latter represent their interests in subsequent democratic institutions (Wright and Escribà-Folch, 2012). Pacts or alliances between the military and a civilian party are common during transition periods. Last, militaries sometimes field their own candidates. For instance, Roh Tae-woo, a retired general, won the first democratic election in South Korea as the presidential candidate of the Democratic Justice Party, which was created in 1963 as a political tool of the military regime. And the military-backed candidate, again a former general, nearly won the first and second rounds of balloting in Egypt’s first post-Mubarak election. In contrast, personalist dictators weaken the very organizations that can prevent a nasty post-exit fate: the military and the support party. To deter coups, for example, these rulers frequently undermine the collective action capacity of the military; and they may weaken or eliminate support parties so that elites do not accumulate power that can threaten the dictator. Because personalist regimes rely more heavily on private goods patronage and are the least likely to have strong political institutions, they have less capacity to retain domestic political leverage after a transition. They are thus more likely to resist peaceful transitions and hang onto power for as long as possible. When the regime verges on collapse, they are simply left to either flee to exile or face punishment once they lose power to domestic opponents (Escribà-Folch, 2013a). For most dictators, political exile after regime collapse is preferred to domestic punishment. When domestic institutions cannot credibly protect an ex-dictator after his regime falls, foreign protection presents a better, albeit

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uncertain, outcome than jail or death.10 While exile is not uncommon during democratic transitions, unsurprisingly, political asylum is more common during transitions in which one dictatorship replaces another; in these cases incumbent dictators often flee in an effort to escape violent punishment as rebels approach the capital city or military officers surround the presidential palace.11 Prior to the rise of the international human rights regime in the past three decades, asylum was a useful alternative to induce autocrats to step down, often as part of a negotiated transition to democracy. International involvement has facilitated such processes in regimes where outgoing leaders are unable to rely on credible domestic protections by, for example, offering asylum to fleeing rulers, convincing leaders to leave, or brokering agreements with local authorities to expedite authoritarian withdrawal. The involvement of third parties—often democratic states—reduces the uncertainty associated with exile and is aimed at halting escalating violence between the regime and opposition forces. For instance, in 2003, and after being indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Liberia’s leader Charles Taylor resigned and left for Nigeria. Taylor’s foreign protection in exile was part of the peace agreement that ended the civil war and made possible the transition to democracy. In other cases, Western democracies hosted ex-dictators to facilitate democratic transitions. For instance, João Bernardo Vieira went to Portugal, Ferdinand Marcos fled to the U.S., Fujimori left for Japan, and Haiti’s Lescot went to Canada. While exile is not the worst fate, dictators prefer credible domestic immunity or guarantees based on institutional power to political asylum, for two reasons. First, exile means the dictator has to find a country willing to host him. Although Jean-Claude Duvalier ended up in France after he was ousted, he was first refused by eight countries, including the U.S. and Switzerland. France did not want him either, but relented once it became apparent he could not find asylum anywhere else.12 Second, the host nation can renege on an agreement to offer protection by extraditing or punishing the ex-ruler, such as in the case of former leaders in Liberia and Chad. 10 The ruler fled to exile in more than 34 percent of transitions to democracy from personalist rule. The need to seek foreign exile is lower for leaders of military and party regimes, who generally are more likely to remain unpunished in their countries. 11 For some rulers, not even exile served to protect them from punishment. For example, Anastasio Somoza Debayle was assassinated in 1980 in Paraguay, where he had gone into exile in 1979, by a Sandinista Commando. Guy Gugliotta, “Assassinating A Tyrant: How Somoza Died,” Chicago Tribune, 19 July 1989. 12 Kim Willsher, “Jean-Claude Duvalier’s turbulent years in exile,” The Guardian, 17 January 2011.

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percent

80

60

40

20

0

Military Death

Personal Jail

Exile

Party OK/Natural Death

Figure 3.2. Post-exit fate of dictators, by regime type. Years: 1946–2004. Data sources: Goemans et al. (2009); Geddes et al. (2014a).

Figure 3.2 shows the fate of autocratic leaders after a regime transition, by regime type. The leader data code the fate of a dictator up to one year after he lost office (Goemans et al., 2009). We include leaders who died a natural death in office in the analysis to provide context for the other types of post-transition outcomes. Overall half of all leaders in military and party regimes have a “good” post-exit fate, defined as either dying a natural death in office or remaining unpunished after leaving power. This outcome, however, drops to less than 25 percent for personalist leaders. For these rulers, exile is the most common fate, followed by imprisonment, and then death. Indeed, almost 15 percent of personalist leaders are killed either during or shortly after regime transition, while in military regimes this fate is the least common. These figures indicate that regime transition offers very different prospects for exiting dictators, with personalist leaders systematically faring the worst.

A M OD E L OF R EG IME CHANG E Many studies of democracy and regime change focus on the role of structural conditions, such as the level of development and inequality, or on the micro-

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foundations of regime change that result from elite interactions. While the structural approach identifies destabilizing conditions, these factors can be viewed as proxies for the mechanisms that change the incentives or capacities of political actors as stressed by elite-centric theories. For example, destabilizing conditions such as a negative economic shock can lead to elite divisions or strengthen opponents. Our theory integrates foreign pressure in a model of regime change by positing that distinct autocratic contexts structure elite interactions differently. While our strategic model of regime change assumes unitary actors and perfect information, it allows for the possibility of democratization as well as transitions to new autocracies. Regime transitions, we posit, result from a combination of destabilizing conditions and expectations about the ex-post consequences of leaving power. Destabilizing conditions, whether domestic or international, can influence transitions by: (1) limiting the regime’s capacity to maintain support; or (2) undermining its repressive capacity. These factors shape the chances the opposition can successfully rebel against the regime. Expectations about post-exit fate, on the other hand, alter the willingness of the authoritarian elites to negotiate a peaceful transition when faced with the prospect of losing power violently. This second factor has often been neglected in recent studies of regime transition but remains important for understanding differences across regimes in their propensity to democratize. Our starting point is a model with two actors: the dictator (or regime elite) and the opposition. The latter can be either rivals from within the regime elite or outside opponents such as insurgents, opposition parties, or mobilized citizens. The game starts with the dictator choosing whether to (1) step down peacefully and negotiate an exit as part of a democratic transition; or (2) resist in power and not concede power to domestic opponents. If the dictator chooses the former, then nature decides whether he is punished.13 The outgoing dictator experiences a bad post-exit fate with probability q and remains unpunished with probability 1
q. This latter outcome includes the possibility of retaining influence in the new regime’s politics or returning to politics in the future. It also includes being granted asylum in a third country and thus obtaining foreign protection. The outcomes are thus democracy with punishment (dp) and democracy with immunity (di), respectively. Hence, using the stylized facts identified in the previous chapter, we equate peaceful regime change with a transition to democracy (see Figure 2.3, right panel).

13 By punishment we mean that the dictator experiences a bad post-exit fate, namely, being imprisoned or killed.

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We treat post-exit punishment as a probabilistic event. This setting helps us simplify the game and captures the idea that actors in a real-world transition process face uncertainty about eventual outcomes. Negotiated transitions that grant immunity to former elites face a commitment problem, which stems from the fact that after ceding power through a pact, the new democratic government has an incentive to renege and punish the outgoing elites (Sutter, 1995). This logic suggests that, unless these elites retain some post-transition leverage, they will not believe promises of immunity. The institutional characteristics of the exiting regime, in particular whether the regime has a mobilizing organization such as a strong support party or a cohesive military, can confer credibility to transition agreements. Yet there still exists ex-ante uncertainty for outgoing elites. The capacity of elites in party regimes to protect their interests hinges, we posit, on their capacity to retain some power in post-transition elections. The outcome of these elections, however, remain uncertain at the time of authoritarian withdrawal. For military elites, protection depends on retaining sufficient collective action capacity to credibly threaten a coup or to ally with a strong party that will win enough power to protect its interests. Again, allied parties can lose elections and coup attempts can fail, making the protection of post-exit power uncertain. Personalist leaders, we argue, face the lowest likelihood of retaining post-transition protection, particularly as foreign asylum becomes a riskier option.14 If the dictator chooses to resist in power, then the opposition chooses between two strategies. First, the opposition may decide not to rebel: the regime remains in power unchallenged and the outcome is the status quo, sq. Second, the opposition may decide to try to oust the regime, for example, by staging a coup, plotting an assassination, mobilizing a protest campaign, or launching an insurgency. If the opposition chooses rebellion, then nature decides the result of the conflict: with probability p the dictator wins and remains in power with a repressive autocracy, or ra. With probability 1
p, the opposition wins and the regime is forcibly overthrown. As shown in Figure 2.3, forced regime changes most often result in a transition to a subsequent dictatorship. Consistent with this stylized fact, we model opposition success in forcibly ousting the regime as a transition to a new autocracy, or na. Furthermore, a coerced ouster is the 14

Rulers who fail to escape often face a nasty fate. Mussolini, for example, was captured by antifascist partisans while trying to flee to Switzerland—and from there to Franco’s Spain. He and his mistress were shot next day. Similarly, the former Romanian dictator, Nicolae Ceauşescu, was captured during his attempt to escape first by helicopter and then by car. He was later tried and executed by a firing squad. See Clyde Haberman, “Pilot of Helicopter Describes Ceausescu’s Escape Attempt,” The New York Times, 1 January 1990.

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most likely mode of regime collapse to result in the former dictator experiencing a bad post-tenure fate (Goemans, 2008; Escribà-Folch, 2013a). Figure 3.3 shows the game in extensive form. Let us now define the order of preferences of both actors, where U i ðxÞ is the utility for the actor i of the outcome x. The dictator preferences are the following: U Dict ðsqÞ > U Dict ðraÞ > U Dict ðdiÞ > U Dict ðdpÞ > U Dict ðnaÞ. The best outcome for the dictator is staying in power unchallenged. Next, he prefers to retain power through costly repression if necessary. If keeping power is not possible, the ruler prefers to step down peacefully, preferably with (domestic or foreign) guarantees against prosecution—and the possibility of returning to politics. Even if that is not possible, the dictator still prefers a peaceful transition to a forced regime change because, although both entail punishment, the latter is more likely to result in a violent death (Goemans, 2008; Escribà-Folch, 2013a). For the opposition, the preference ordering is: U Opp ðdpÞ > U Opp ðnaÞ > U Opp ðdiÞ > U Opp ðsqÞ > U Opp ðraÞ. The opposition prefers peaceful regime change leading to democracy, with former elites held accountable for past abuses. Its second preference is a forcible, and thus more costly, regime change, which also results in punishment for the outgoing elite. A transition with exit guarantees for the exiting ruler is the third preference since this outcome excludes punishment and generally entails the possibility that the former elites retain some influence and may regain power in the future. Finally, the two least preferred scenarios are the status quo and, last, a repressive dictatorship after a failed attempt at ousting the regime. The equilibrium of the game will depend on the values of both p and q. Let us first define the values of p that determine the opposition’s decision whether Autocrat

step down

resist Opposition

N punishment q

dp

immunity 1 − q

di

rebel

not rebel

N

sq win 1 − p na

Figure 3.3. A model of political transitions.

lose p ra

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to rebel. Starting in the last subgame, the opposition rebels if the expected utility of rebelling is higher than the utility of not rebelling: EU opp ðRebelÞ ¼ pU Opp ðraÞ þ ð1
pÞU Opp ðnaÞ > U Opp ðsqÞ ðnaÞ
U ðsqÞ 15 Hence, the opposition rebels if p < p* ¼ UU opp ðnaÞ
U that is, when the opp ðraÞ , probability that the dictator wins is lower than the threshold value p*. Conversely, if p>p* , the opposition does not rebel since the regime is deemed to be stronger. Moving to the first subgame, the dictator’s decision whether to step down is based on the opposition’s equilibrium strategy, and on the value of q. If p>p*, the opposition does not rebel due to the low chances of succeeding in its attempt to overthrow the regime. Through backward induction, this scenario leads the dictator to resist in power and not step down, regardless of the value of q. The outcome is sq, with the dictator remaining unchallenged—at least for now—in power. If p EU Dict ðResist; RebelÞ ¼ pU Dict ðraÞ þ ð1
pÞU Dict ðnaÞ Rearranging terms, the dictator resigns only if q is sufficiently low, that is, ðraÞ
ð1
pÞU ðnaÞ q < q* ¼ U ðdiÞ
pU . Conversely, the dictator resists if q > q*, U Dict ðdiÞ
U Dict ðdpÞ that is, if the risk of being punished is deemed to be high. Under this latter scenario, the dictator prefers to resist and fight for survival. Note that, as in Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), a credible threat of rebellion, not necessarily a realized one, can yield a liberalizing political change.16 Anticipating a rebellion, some dictators will abdicate if democratic change is accompanied with sufficiently credible exit guarantees. We summarize the equilibrium outcomes as follows. First, if the opposition is weak or, in other words, if the regime has the capacity to retain the support of its coalition and to repress opponents, the dictator chooses to remain in power and the opposition is unable to pose a threat to his rule. Since, p > p*, Dict

15 U Opp ðnaÞ
U Opp ðsqÞ

Dict

Dict

is the utility of gaining and controlling power relative to being out of power. The credibility of such threat is often made evident by street protests or growing unrest amongst military troops. Some dictators, fearing such signals may evolve into full-scale revolutions or coups, may decide to resign. 16

U Opp ðnaÞ
U Opp ðraÞ

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the equilibrium strategies for the dictator and the opposition, respectively, are: resist (dictator); not rebel (opposition). The outcome in this scenario is the status quo (sq). Second, if p q*, the opposition rebels but the dictator decides to cling on to power given that the expected utility of resisting is higher than that of stepping down. The equilibrium strategies would then be: resist (dictator); rebel (opposition). The dictator thus decides to fight for survival and faces the risk of being removed by force and punished. According to the regime characteristics and the stylized facts presented above, this scenario is more likely to occur in personalist regimes because, we posit, the risk of posttransition punishment, q, is relatively high unless they can find a foreign country where they can go into exile. Finally, if pP>R

R>I>P

Risk of domestic punishment

High q

Low q

Low q

P = patronage; I = institutions; R = repression; q = probability of post-transition punishment.

openings by rewarding countries that undertake them. Again, this logic is most likely to appeal to authoritarian elites who are able to retain (some) political power after a democratic transition. Therefore, we should not expect all forms of foreign pressure to work equally well or to yield the same political results in all autocratic contexts. Dictators operate in different types of institutional settings which influence their strategies for surviving in power as well as their prospects of experiencing a bad post-transition fate. Consequently, the influence of foreign pressure should vary across autocratic regime types. We thus expect some foreign policy instruments to work when targeting some regimes but not others. When foreign coercion diminishes a dictatorship’s capacity to pursue optimal survival strategies or alters elites’ expectations about post-transition utility, this may not always lead to democratic regime change because different regimes break down in distinct ways. Table 3.2 displays how personalist, dominant party, and military regimes vary along two parameters of interest: their preferred survival strategies and their capacity to domestically protect their interests after transition. This variation helps explain why regimes fall, how they do so, and whether regime collapse entails transition to democracy or to a subsequent autocracy. In turn, this allows us to understand which regime type will be most vulnerable to each instrument of foreign coercion.

Aid Conditionality Aid conditionality involves a threat to cut aid if the target does not meet certain political conditions, such as holding multiparty elections. If conditions are met, aid increases or remains; if conditions are not met, aid is cut. Aid conditionality can influence regime stability through two mechanisms. First, a decline in aid decreases the likelihood of surviving in power for aid-dependent regimes because less aid means fewer resources with which to buy support. Thus by harming domestic support, a potential aid cut increases the chances

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an opposition rebellion succeeds. This, in turn, decreases the autocrat’s expected utility of resisting in office. Second, conditional aid can increase the utility of democracy since aid flows remain or increase when the target state meets the political conditions. Benefiting from this aid, however, is conditional on not being punished (di) and retaining some political power after a transition. Because party regimes have relatively broad and deep support coalitions that help ensure some claim on power after conceding, foreign aid conditionality, we posit, raises the expected utility of reform—by increasing the payoffs to democracy. For other dictatorships, aid conditionality does not do this. More aid after a transition narrows the difference between conceding and resisting, making a democratic transition more likely. For personalist regimes—and to a lesser extent party dictatorships—the credible threat of losing foreign monies (decreased P) when hit with aid conditionality lowers the expected utility of resisting (via p(S(P))). This latter mechanism also narrows the difference between conceding and resisting, making democratic transition more likely. For party regimes, aid conditionality works to both increase the benefits of conceding and decrease the payoffs to resisting, while for personalists only the latter mechanism works. For military regimes neither works because they are the least likely to depend on buying support to retain power. This logic provides an ordering of which regimes should be most sensitive to aid conditionality: party > personalist > military. Thus, foreign aid conditionality should increase the likelihood of democratic transition in dominant party regimes more than in other dictatorships.

Economic Sanctions Sanctions restrict trade and financial exchanges, thereby imposing economic costs on the target in attempts to force compliance with the senders’ demands. Sanctions are therefore likely to influence regime stability by reducing the resources available for patronage distribution, undermining the regime’s capacity to reward supporters (S). However, the political consequences of sanctions vary across autocratic contexts because dictatorships differ in the extent to which they rely on buying support with immediate material payouts. While material losses influence the resources available to buy support in any dictatorship, this can be particularly harmful for regimes that are dependent on external sources of revenue to generate rents. Consequently, cutting foreign sources of income should be most effective in destabilizing dictatorships that are most reliant on patronage for survival, particularly when patronage

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depends on foreign revenue streams. In weakly institutionalized personalist regimes revenues are often dependent on export revenue and foreign aid (c.f. Wright, 2008). Yet, both income streams can be easily disrupted by Western democracies. This can lead to a substantial reduction of support—due to changed preferences and defections—from elite members; but it may also embolden opposition groups in these exclusionary systems. With reduced patronage, a large increase in repression in these regimes can cause further defections among elites and ultimately fail due to the reduced capacity of the security forces. In contrast, dominant party regimes, which rely more on institutional cooptation for survival, should be less vulnerable to changing beliefs about grievance against the regime because they are better placed to make credible intertemporal promises and power-sharing concessions (Smith, 2005; Magaloni, 2006; Brownlee, 2007a; Gandhi, 2008). For military juntas, which rely primarily on repression for survival, sanctions should have little impact unless they cause divisions among elites over the use of coercion. Thus, by decreasing p, especially in personalist regimes, sanctions increase the likelihood that opposition rebellion succeeds, and thus lowers the benefits of resisting in power. However, given a high likelihood of punishment should the regime relinquish power peacefully in a democratic transition (q), personalists rulers rarely concede. At the same time, though, a sanction-induced decline in domestic support increases the chances of being deposed forcibly (i.e., via a coup, insurgency, etc.), which usually results in an autocratic transition, not a democratic one. In short, economic sanctions decrease patronage available for dictators, so this mechanism hurts personalist regimes the most.20 This should both narrow the distance between conceding and resisting, making democratic transition more likely, and lower p, making an autocratic transition more likely. However, personalist regimes differ from other dictatorships, we argue, not only in @ S=@ P but also in the a priori distance between conceding and resisting because they are the most likely to be punished after conceding (high initial q) due to their lack of organizational mechanisms to domestically protect their interests after a transition. Therefore, even factors that narrow the distance between resisting and conceding may not be sufficient to influence the likelihood of democratic transitions in personalist dictatorships. Rather, if sanctions lower expected benefits of resisting for personalist regimes, the most likely observable outcome is an increase in the prospects of an autocratic transition. Military and party regimes, on the other hand, are not as dependent

20

The assumption that follows from Figure 3.2 is that




@S @P personalist

>




@S @P party

>




@S @P military .

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on short-term patronage and therefore do not experience the same shock to p. Thus, economic sanctions should increase the likelihood of autocratic transition in personalist regimes more than in other dictatorships. Aid conditionality and economic sanctions differ, therefore, because: (1) aid conditionality can increase the benefits of conceding (and the marginal effect is greater in party regimes) while sanctions cannot; and (2) even though both foreign policy tools may influence the chances of remaining in power as a dictator by reducing patronage, the marginal effect of this should be largest for personalist regimes, which changes p in these regimes (and hence the probability of an autocratic transition) without narrowing the distance between conceding and resisting sufficiently to incentivize personalist dictators to democratize.

Shaming Campaigns Shaming campaigns publicize and condemn human rights violations and authoritarian practices in attempts to spur international action and shape public opinion. Further, reports by transnational NGOs and international monitoring bodies gather information on norm-violating behavior that can later prompt criminal prosecution of targeted individuals. Thus, shaming principally targets one key survival strategy, namely, repression. Shaming campaigns, we posit, can alter the domestic actors’ strategies through three distinct mechanisms. First, shaming campaigns may limit the repressive capacity of the regime by emboldening opposition and human rights groups, and by making normsbased military officers become more reluctant to use coercion. This mechanism is more likely in professionalized military regimes, particularly in countries where human rights norms have taken hold under prior democratic rule. This increases the expected utility of rebelling for the opposition. Faced with a lower expected utility of resisting, military regimes might decide to step down and negotiate a transition to democracy provided that the likelihood that they are punished is low. Hence, shaming campaigns should increase the likelihood of democratic transition in military regimes more than in other dictatorships because military regimes are typically run by a junta of professionalized officers in a country with prior democracy. Professionalized militaries with rulesoriented officers should be more vulnerable to human rights norm entrepreneurs, and transnational networks associated with shaming campaigns should be most effective in aiding anti-regime mobilization in countries with prior democratic experience. Because elites in military regimes have a high capacity

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to protect their interests after a transition, regime change is more likely to be negotiated, ending in a transition to democracy. Second, shaming campaigns may result in a reduction of the resources accruing to autocracies if they marshal international support for reducing aid flows or economic exchange with the targeted regimes. This would undermine the regime’s capacity to buy support through patronage and thus reduce p. Fewer patronage resources should principally affect personalist regimes, which are the least likely to concede to democracy given their inability to secure a good post-exit outcome. If this mechanism is at work, we should observe that shaming campaigns are associated with an increase in the likelihood of autocratic transitions in personalist regimes. Finally, shaming campaigns may increase the perceived likelihood of punishment by documenting and publicizing information on abuses, and pressuring international and domestic groups to pursue criminal action against violators. By increasing the likelihood of post-exit punishment q, shaming would decrease the expected utility of stepping down. This logic should be strongest in dictatorships that cannot protect their post-transition interests domestically, namely, personalist regimes. If this mechanism is at work, shaming campaigns should decrease the likelihood of a democratic transition in personalist regimes.

Human Rights Prosecutions Peaceful transitions are more likely when outgoing elites believe they have domestic immunity from post-transition punishment. A second option, if the first is not feasible, is safe exile. The growing international human rights regime and the emerging mechanisms of individual criminal legal accountability adopted by states and international organizations provide credible enforcement. In the past thirty years, we have thus seen a steep increase in the number of human rights prosecutions in both domestic and international courts. Credible domestic exit guarantees are more likely in military and partybased regimes, we argue, because these dictatorships have institutions that provide transition pacts with sufficient credibility that stepping down in a peaceful transition is less risky. As a result, personalist rulers who lack these domestic protections have historically been those most likely to seek exile. The rise of human rights prosecutions in the past three decades should increase the chances an autocratic leader and his elite supporters are punished after leaving power. Personalist rulers, we posit, are more sensitive to externally generated

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changes in the likelihood of post-exit punishment because they lack a formal organizational structure and thus have fewer domestic protections after a democratic transition. Rising human rights prosecutions make exile increasingly more difficult as well. Thus, not only is the a priori prospect of punishment higher for personalist leaders, but these leaders are more sensitive to externally generated changes in the likelihood of punishment.21 Therefore, we expect that human rights prosecutions should decrease the likelihood of democratic transition in personalist dictatorships more than in other dictatorships.

Military Interventions Military interventions by foreign countries or international organizations entail the use of military force within the target country’s territory in the context of a political dispute. Military intervention stands apart from the other coercive instruments because it is the only instrument that can directly overthrow regimes without altering the capabilities or incentives of domestic actors. Military interventions aimed at overthrowing a regime and imposing a new democracy are often directed at restoring previously existing or recently elected democratic governments ousted by military coups. Thus, military dictatorships may be the most likely target of democratic interventions aimed at restoring democracies because they are the most likely to follow democracies upended by military coups such as in Haiti (1994). Nonetheless, military interventions can destabilize autocracies even if foreign forces do not directly overthrow the regime. In these cases, intervention operates by weakening the target regime militarily and thus altering the domestic balance of power. Weakening the incumbent dictatorship may reduce its capacity to use repression to forestall domestic threats; or foster dissent among elites that can raise the patronage or institutional co-optation needed to retain their support. The former entails a reduction in the repressive capacity of the regime (R), so that the regime is less able to fight against a domestic armed group. The latter involves a loss of support for the regime (S). Both mechanisms can thus decrease chances of surviving if the dictator chooses to resist (p).



21

In the expected utilities framework:  concede   concede (1) qpersonalist >qmilitary qparty ; and (2) > @EU@q  @EU@q .

@EU concede @q personalist

military

party

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Again, however, not all regimes are equally adept at holding leaders accountable for poor policy choices. Personalist rulers, for example, are less accountable to regime elites (Ezrow and Frantz, 2011a; Weeks, 2012, 2014), while organized elites can more easily remove leaders in military and dominant-party regimes when blamed for foreign policy mistakes (Weeks, 2014). Lower support decreases the expected utility of retaining power, and thus may induce elites in regimes that can obtain post-exit protection to step down. When hostile military intervention physically removes the regime from power, intervention should increase the likelihood of democratic transition in military regimes more than in other dictatorships because these interventions are often aimed at restoring democratic governments overthrown by a military coup. In contrast, when military intervention does not physically remove the incumbent regime from power, it should increase the likelihood of autocratic transition more in personalist regimes because weaker personalist regimes are more likely to collapse violently in a transition to a subsequent dictatorship. Finally, military intervention may increase the likelihood of democratization in party-based and military regimes if war defeat reduces domestic support for the regime.

C O N C L U SI O N Explaining how coercive foreign policies destabilize autocratic regimes requires a careful examination of domestic politics in target countries. Personalist, party-based, and military dictatorships differ along a number of dimensions that help us understand which foreign policy tools may be most effective in particular contexts. We focus on two dimensions: authoritarian survival strategies and the capacity of outgoing elites to secure credible postexit protection. Only foreign military intervention can directly overthrow a dictatorship, and historically not all succeed. For other foreign policy tools to destabilize autocracies, they must influence the incentives of domestic actors. Coercive instruments can change the prospects of regime change by: reducing the regime’s capacity to maintain domestic support; undermining its ability to employ repression; or altering the expected consequences of regime change. The combination of these allows us to predict whether regime collapse will result in a democratic transition or a transition to a new dictatorship.

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4

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Foreign Aid and Political Reform How does foreign aid influence autocratic regime survival? Does it keep dictators in power, when they would otherwise democratize? Does it make the regime more resilient to overthrow by autocratic rivals? This chapter addresses these questions by examining how foreign aid influences autocratic stability. Our argument integrates intuitions about how a regime’s support coalition can influence decisions about political reform and their implications for democratization, but we also examine whether foreign aid stabilizes dictatorships by deterring autocratic threats to their hold on power. We begin with the observation that political reform is more costly to some autocratic regimes than others. For some, political liberalization and a full fledged democracy means political death: they stand little chance of ever holding power again and elites in their regime are unlikely to enjoy the perks of power in the future. While at first glance we might conjecture that the most repressive dictatorships would be the least popular and have little chance of winning power in a democratic election, our contention is that autocratic regimes that have failed to build broad coalitions and durable political networks during their rule as dictators are the least likely to win some power in a fair election. For these regimes, political reform is costly. The groups that enable a dictatorship to retain power constitute the support coalition. Some dictatorships institutionalize power-sharing agreements and rule by distributing patronage through broad coalitions and deep political networks and thus credibly promise future benefits to their support coalition and build lasting political loyalties. Elites in these regimes, we argue, can competitively campaign in multiparty elections and win votes with promises of future redistribution. While the backing of large groups of supporters from an autocratic period is no guarantee these elites will automatically prosper in a new democracy, autocratic elites who rule through broad patronage coalitions and deep political networks will fare better in competitive elections than those who do not. Therefore, political reform is less costly. The prospect of winning competitive elections is a useful way to think about the costliness of domestic political reform, and we suggest that regimes with broad distributional coalitions and deep political networks will be the most

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competitive. From this variation, we build a theory linking foreign aid to democratization. We begin by discussing how aid influences a dictatorship’s decision over whether or not to democratize, and show that aid is not always inimical to democratization as it can increase the expected utility of conceding political reform in the face of international pressure. We exploit the fact that aid comes from international donors to argue that the probability of receiving future aid depends on the likelihood that regime elite survive in power—either as a dictatorship or by competing in multiparty elections after liberalizing the regime. If future aid flows are contingent on political liberalization, the likelihood of receiving future aid diminishes as elites become less likely to survive political liberalization in power (q, in our model). Thus, regime elites who stand little chance of surviving liberalization will not be swayed by promises of aid. But dictatorships where elites believe they have a chance to retain some power in the future even if they liberalize will view the promise of future aid as an incentive to democratize. The effect of aid on democratization, therefore, will vary by factors that increase the chances of a dictator surviving political liberalization intact. From incumbents’ perspective, trading political reforms for aid can be risky, as reforms may undermine incumbents’ control over the political process and decrease the chances they will win some power in a competitive election. The more likely incumbents are to survive political reform, the more likely they are to find the bargain attractive. Two key concepts emerge from this theory. First, aid must be contingent on political reform and recipient autocratic leaders must believe this conditionality has teeth; that is, recipients must believe that donors will decrease future aid allocations in the absence of efforts to democratize. Second, the autocratic elite must find the trade of aid for political reform enticing because continued aid compensates for the diminished prospects of remaining in power should they pursue political reform. We argue that dictatorships not only consider their prospects with and without aid, but they weigh their political fortunes with liberalization and without. Thus our theory highlights the domestic political prospects of autocratic regimes that may choose to concede under foreign pressure and democratize.

HOW D OES AID INFLUENCE D ICTATORS? Western foreign aid policy took shape after the Second World War when the United States and newly formed international institutions, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later the World Bank),

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disbursed funds to rebuild the economies of European allies. U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947 was quickly followed by over $12 billion in aid from 1948 to 1952 to an additional fourteen European countries under the Marshall Plan. European aid to developing countries grew out of both U.S. pressure to increase aid during the early years of the Cold War and later from a desire to ensure transitions to independence in former colonies did not produce an influx of migrants from settler colonies or large budget claims on the former colonizers (Lancaster, 2007). At least initially, many economists viewed foreign aid as a key piece of development policy in the Global South: aid would increase capital stock in recipient countries that lacked domestic investment and help jump-start sustained growth (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961; Chenery and Strout, 1966). While Western governments used aid policy to help promote economic stability (particularly in Europe) as a defense against Soviet encroachment during the 1950s and 1960s, aid was also used to win Cold War allies, including many dictatorships. Thus, from the beginning of modern aid policy, Western governments used foreign aid to pursue international political objectives. Early critics of foreign aid emphasized that aid would strengthen recipient governments and thus was detrimental to development in the private sector, which they argued, was inimical to democracy (Friedman, 1958). Other dissenters criticized aid not only for stunting economic development, but also for subsidizing wealthy citizens in recipient countries (Bauer, 1971). Aid, according to this logic, acted as a regressive tax on citizens in rich countries and often ended up in the hands of the wealthy citizens in poor countries.1 These early critiques, while largely focusing on whether aid could reliably foster economic growth, have resonated in more recent research linking foreign aid and political development. A central argument in this literature contends that aid hinders political development by fostering “bad” institutions (Bauer, 1971; Harford and Klein, 2005; Moss et al., 2006; Djankov et al., 2008). This view frequently groups foreign aid together with other types of “unearned income,” such as natural resource wealth, to argue that non-tax revenue enables leaders to forgo taxing the citizenry, resulting in a decreased demand for representative democracy and good governance (Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Morrison, 2009). This logic builds on the work of scholars such as Levi (1988), North and Weingast (1989), Tilly (1990), and Ross (2004), who posit that the rise of

1 However, as Mosley (1987, 162) points out, poor citizens in rich countries often pay very little income tax that supports foreign aid to developing countries.

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democracy rests in part on the need for leaders to generate revenue from citizens. In Western European political development, governments exchanged representative rule for the right to tax citizens, and these representative institutions, in turn, helped propel economic development (North, 1990). In modern polities, foreign aid can displace domestic tax revenue and sever the link between the ruler and those he rules by reducing the “incentives for democratic accountability” (Djankov et al., 2008, 172). Ultimately, this allows the government to forgo some of its responsibilities for public goods provision and equitable development (Moore, 1998). This type of argument posits that if foreign aid is bad for democracy, then aid and natural resource wealth may both suffer from some version of a “curse.”2 In addition to severing the fiscal link between citizen and ruler, foreign aid may directly hurt democracy by reinforcing the power of the executive at the expense of legislative constraints, thus stunting the development of effective checks and balances (Brautigam, 2000; van de Walle, 2005). Knack (2004, 253) articulates this logic with a quote from a report by the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission (2000): The use of IMF resources and conditionality to control the economies of developing nations often undermines the sovereignty and democratic processes of member governments receiving assistance. IMF staff often admit (with pride) that the executive branch of borrowing nations like to use IMF conditions to exact concessions from their legislatures. While this mechanism may sometimes work to achieve desirable reforms, it often does so by shifting the balance of power within countries in ways that distort the constitutionally established system of checks and balances.

Echoing Bauer’s earlier sentiments, Easterly (2006, 135) argues that aid largely benefits political insiders in recipient countries, and that these insiders oppose democratic reforms that might lead to a more equitable distribution of resources. Djankov et al. (2008, 172) similarly note that “corrupt government officials will try to perpetuate their rent seeking activities by reducing the likelihood of losing power.” These arguments suggest that aid benefits a political class who work to prevent democracy precisely because this would diminish their access to the rents derived from foreign assistance. This rentseeking argument has implications not just for democratization but for any type of regime change in which the incumbent ruling group loses power. If democratization reduces the “insiders” access to rents, so too might a transition to a subsequent autocratic regime where the group of elites who rule changes. 2 See Collier (2006), Wright (2011), and Bermeo (Forthcoming) for evidence that aid and oil are different.

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There are also plausible arguments for why foreign aid might influence the survival of individual leaders apart from its effect on democracy. For example, Kono and Montinola (2009) argue that autocratic leaders accumulate foreign aid over time, as a resource to deter threats to their rule. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) posit that aid prevents revolution by purchasing public goods if they have the support of a large coalition or private goods if their support coalition is small. Aid could simply be a fungible resource that dictators use to purchase loyalty or increase repression. Alternatively, aid might destabilize dictators. Some suggest aid increases the prospects for democracy by conditioning aid flows on political reform, an argument on which we build in this chapter (Goldsmith, 2001; Dunning, 2004). Others argue that foreign aid—like natural resources such as oil or diamonds—can destabilize rulers by making control of the government and aid receipts a more valuable prize (Grossman, 1992). When the personal benefits of holding office are higher, rivals have a greater incentive to attempt a coup (Collier and Hoeffler, 2007, 4). Many of these arguments suggest an intervening causal mechanism, such as taxation, accountability, purchasing political support, or greed, to explain how aid affects stability, but rarely test the mechanism at the heart of the story. One exception is Morrison’s (2007, 2009) work, which argues that non-tax revenue allows autocratic governments to reduce the “demand for democracy” by increasing redistributive transfers to the poor; he finds that non-tax revenue stabilizes autocratic regimes by increasing social spending. The empirical research linking foreign aid and political development generally looks at three types of dependent variables: (1) measures of institutional quality such as the International Country Risk Guide index (measuring corruption, bureaucratic quality, and the rule of law) and the Fraiser index of economic freedom (Knack, 2001; Brautigam and Knack, 2004); (2) measures of political institutions such as Polity or Freedom House scores (Goldsmith, 2001; Dunning, 2004; Knack, 2004; Djankov et al., 2008); or (3) the survival of particular leaders (Kono and Montinola, 2009; Licht, 2010; Ahmed, 2012) and institutional regimes (Morrison, 2009; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010). This literature has yielded mixed results. Consistent with aid critics, some find that aid is associated with decreases in institutional quality (Brautigam and Knack, 2004) and stunts democracy (Djankov et al., 2008), or has relatively little effect (either way) (Knack, 2004). Yet others have found that aid is associated with democracy (Goldsmith, 2001), in particular during the post-Cold War period (Dunning, 2004; Bermeo, 2011). Morrison (2009) finds that non-tax revenue reduces the likelihood of any kind of institutional change—positive or negative.

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However, none of these institutional or leader variables measure whether the ruling autocratic regime loses power, and if so whether regime collapse leads to a democratic transition. Thus one explanation for these inconclusive findings may be the inability of these data sets to capture a theoretically important concept linking foreign aid to autocratic survival: whether aid helps or hurts autocratic regimes’ hold on power. We focus on two types of political change that both entail incumbent autocratic regimes losing their monopoly on power: democratic and autocratic transitions.

When Can Aid Buy Democratization? In this section, we examine how the domestic political costs of liberalizing vary across incumbent autocratic regimes. Trading democratic reform for continued foreign aid is more likely when the cost of reform is low, which we argue can be measured by the chances of retaining some power after liberalization. A key factor that influences the prospects of retaining political influence after democratic reform is the breadth and depth of the prior autocratic support coalition. Aid contributes to the incumbent regime’s utility both when it concedes and when it resists, but donors can reduce the amount of aid in the next period if the regime does not democratize, thereby lowering aiddependent rulers’ expected utility of resisting. In other words, a cut in aid would result in a decrease in the levels of support for the regime and, in turn, in a lower likelihood of surviving in power in aid-dependent regimes (# S ! # p), because less foreign aid entails less revenue that can be used to fund patronage networks and to distribute targeted public goods. The promise of future aid, contingent on democratization, provides a stronger incentive for democratization for regimes which are more likely to retain some claim on power after democratization. If dictatorships with broad and deep distributional coalitions are more likely to win power in a democratic election, then aid to dictatorships with larger coalitions provides an incentive to concede democracy while aid to those with small coalitions offers no such incentive. For regimes with large coalitions, then, post-reform aid can increase the expected utility of regime change relative to the expected utility of resisting without aid (and hence, with less support). Before proceeding, we detail an observation that illustrates the main intuition: not all dictatorships face the same fate if they democratize. As we show in Chapter 3, dominant party regimes stand out from other types of dictatorship because the party typically competes in and sometimes wins competitive, multiparty elections after it democratizes (Huntington, 1991a, 587). For example Geddes (1999, 2003) and Ulfelder (2005) argue that this presents

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elites in these regimes with a different outlook on their own fate should democratization occur. In party-based regimes, Ulfelder (2005, 317) notes, elites can imagine a political future for themselves in the wake of a regime breakdown catalyzed by collective action. If democratization ensues, party elites who ally with collective actors can often expect to sustain their political career, and . . . they may even manage to retain or regain power through the ballot box.

Table 4.1 lists the party dictatorships in the data set that democratized.3 All former parties were competitive, winning at least the second largest share of seats in at least one lower house legislative election during or after the transition to democracy, and the majority (eleven of eighteen) won at least once. As an example of the “winner” category, note that in Mexico while the candidate from the incumbent party (PRI) lost to the opposition in the 2000 presidential election and placed third in 2006, the PRI won the largest share of votes in the lower house in 2003, and regained the presidency in 2012. In other types of dictatorships the dictator usually does not participate in elections once the regime liberalizes.4 In fact, there is only one instance of a military dictator competing in a democratic election directly following a transition to democracy: General Roh Tae-woo in South Korea (1986).5 That party regimes typically participate in competitive, multiparty elections subsequent to a democratic transition suggests that they may view the prospect of democratization, and any aid that comes with it, in a different light than other regimes that may not retain any power after democratization. This does not mean that party regimes are more likely to democratize than others, only that the political costs of democratizing are lower. Consequently, how a dictatorship views a trade of aid for liberalization will depend on how costly political liberalization is in terms of its probability of retaining some power. We posit that donors credibly offer aid that is

3

This sample only includes independent autocracies that democratized since 1960. Therefore the sample excludes Soviet successor states such as the Baltic republics that were not independent autocratic regimes that subsequently democratized. 4 While militaries often seek to put allies in power after democratization to secure military interests, militaries do not necessarily have access to development aid resources after they democratize. 5 One other example that predates the sample: Venezuelan admiral Larrazábal lost to Rómulo Betancourt (Acción Democrática) in 1958. Kantor (1959) reports that a pre-election survey predicted Larrazábal would defeat both the Acción Democrática and COPEI (Rafael Caldera) candidates. However, Betancourt won with 47 percent of the vote, ending military rule. In an example that postdates our sample, the leader of the 2006 military coup in Thailand, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, created his own party for the July 2011 election. It won two parliamentary seats. Other military elites, such as Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, have won power at the ballot box.

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Table 4.1. The democratic fate of former dominant parties Country

Transition year

Incumbent party

Electoral success

Albania

1991

PLS (later SP)

Win

Bulgaria

1990

BSP

Win

Congo Br.

1992

PCT

Competitive

Czechoslovakia

1990

KSČM, SDL

Competitive

Honduras

1956

PNH

Competitive

Hungary

1990

MSzP

Win

Indonesia

1998

Golkar

Win

Kenya

2002

KANU

Competitive

Mexico

2000

PRI

Win

Mongolia

1990

MRPR

Win

Nicaragua

1990

FSLN

Win

Paraguay

1993

ANR-PC

Dominant

Poland

1989

SLD

Win

Romania

1990

NSF (later PDSR)

Win

Senegal

2000

PS

Competitive

South Africa

1994

NP

Competitive

Taiwan

2000

KMT

Win

Zambia

1991

UNIP

Competitive

Total (18)

1 dominant; 10 win; 7 competitive

Dominant = Win a plurality of votes in all legislative elections since transition. Winner = At a minimum, the party with the highest (plurality) share of seats in a lower house election during the post-transition democratic period. Competitive = At a minimum, party with the second largest share of votes in at least one lower house election.

contingent on democratizing. Recent work on both political and economic reform indicates that during the post-Cold War period, aid donors were more likely to credibly condition foreign assistance on substantive reform efforts in recipient countries (Dunning, 2004; Bearce and Tirone, 2010). Other research suggests that multilateral donors use resolutions by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to reduce aid to countries that violate human rights (Lebovic and Voeten, 2009) and that bilateral donors reduce economic aid to repressive regimes in countries that are not allies (Nielsen, 2013). Further, beginning in the late 1980s, most multilateral aid agreements contained explicit language linking foreign aid disbursement to progress towards democracy (Crawford, 2001). Together, this evidence suggests that since the end of the Cold War, foreign aid can be viewed as marginally contingent on political development.

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This type of conditionality is an ex-ante mechanism, where donors provide aid, then establish conditions for continued aid dispersal, and, in some circumstances, reduce aid if those conditions are not met. Other types of aid conditionality, such as the mechanisms used to distribute funds from the USAID’s Millennium Challenge Corporation, specify that recipients meet certain governance conditions prior to receiving funds. Our approach focuses on the political costs of democratic reform, and assumes that other important factors such as the strategic interaction between donors and recipients are constant. Some theorize about the donor-recipient relationships as a strategic interaction between multiple players (Stone, 2004). While we concur that this is a useful approach, we abstract away from the interaction between multiple players and concentrate on how the recipient dictatorship’s support coalition influences its decision about political reform in response to the offer of contingent aid. Thus, our main contribution lies in understanding how incentives to concede democracy vary across different types of autocratic regimes.

The Argument We posit that donors care about democracy and can decrease aid by some proportion when they do not observe political liberalization in the recipient country. Aid benefits the incumbent regime, but these benefits only accrue if the leader or party continues to have some claim on power. The chances of retaining power despite liberalizing reform vary across dictatorships. When an incumbent has a large support coalition with a deep network of distributional ties to many groups in society, this translates into more name recognition and a larger patronage party, which increase the probability of winning power at some point after a transition to democracy. Smith (2005) shows that more extensive party institutions help regimes survive external shocks. The variation in duration among party regimes, he demonstrates, can be explained by the strength and breadth of party institutionalization. Thus, a deeper and broader distributional coalition makes for a more durable regime. The breadth of the support coalition should therefore increase the probability of surviving in the next period if the dictatorship does not democratize. Coalition breadth and depth therefore increases the chances of survival for the regime, regardless of whether it pursues political reform. The crucial assumption for our theory is that the breadth and depth of the autocratic coalition matter more for former autocratic elites in a democratic election than it does for the dictatorship’s survival without democratizing.

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While dictatorships with broad distributional coalitions are generally more stable than those with smaller and weaker coalitions, dictatorships choose the level of institutionalization and the extent of their patronage network based on the mix of resources available for their survival and the threats they face. Thus, in some instances, it is not optimal for regimes to build the largest possible distributional coalition (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006). In a democracy, however, the number of supporters typically translates into the probability of winning power in a competitive election. Thus, retaining the support of a large share of voters should matter more in a democratic election than for the survival of a dictatorship. If this is true, the additional utility of receiving aid in exchange for political reform can compensate the autocratic regime for lowering the probability that it retains some power after liberalization. Deeper autocratic support coalitions translate into greater expected post-transition benefits for regime elites. For highly aid-dependent countries where aid conditionality has at least some minimal bite, the exchange of aid for political reform may be enticing—but only if the prospects of retaining some power remain high. Foreign aid conditionality therefore raises the expected utility of democracy for party regimes because their relatively broad and deep support coalitions provide some claim on power after conceding. For other dictatorships, aid conditionality does not do this. For dictatorships that rely on distributing benefits to purchase support—namely personalist regimes and to a lesser extent party dictatorships—the credible threat of losing foreign monies when subject to aid conditionality also lowers the expected utility of remaining in power because aid cuts may undermine the regime’s capacity to reward support (S). For party regimes, aid conditionality both increases the benefits of conceding to a transition and decreases the utility of resisting; while for personalists only the latter mechanism works; and for military regimes, neither. This logic provides an ordering of which regimes should be most sensitive to aid conditionality: party > personalist > military. Two assumptions need to hold for this logic to work. First, aid conditionality must operate with some minimal consequences; and second, large and deep support coalitions are more helpful to a leader in retaining power after democratic transition than the same coalition is if the regime does not democratize. Both of these assumptions yield important scope conditions for the theory. Since we use regime type as a proxy for the breadth and the depth of political loyalties, the main hypothesis that we test is the following: as the breadth and depth of the autocratic distributional coalition increases, aid increases the likelihood of democratic transition. Further, we use the postCold War period as a crude proxy for credible conditionality. Therefore a

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corollary hypothesis is: aid to dictatorships with large coalitions is only likely to increase the likelihood of democratic transition in the post-Cold War era.

EMPIRICAL APPROACH We model regime transition by examining how foreign aid influences the likelihood of transitions to both democracy and a subsequent autocratic regime. We employ time-series, cross-section logit models that control for time dependence with duration polynomials (Carter and Signorino, 2010). Because time dependence varies by regime type, we also include the interaction between these duration polynomials and regime type.6 The main hypothesis focuses on coalition size. To measure this, we distinguish among party, military, and personalist regimes (Geddes et al., 2014a). Party regimes tend to have broader distributional coalitions because they frequently build large patronage parties and have relatively extensive networks outside the capital city, while military regimes typically have relatively small distributional coalitions because they are better able to use force to remain in power. Personalist regimes, we posit, should have intermediate-sized distributional coalitions. To show that regime type is correlated with coalition size, and in particular to illustrate that party regimes, on average, have the most extensive coalitions, we construct a measure of coalition breadth and depth consisting of the first factor from a principal component analysis of five questions from the original data used to code regime type (Wright et al., 2014). The variables for the factor analysis are: (1) Was the regime leader’s prior career in a party organized to run in democratic elections? (2) Does a support party exist? (3) Did the party exist prior to the current leader becoming regime leader (and not created by the leader)? (4) Does the party encompass members from more than one region, religion, ethnic group or tribe? And (5) Does the party have functioning local level organizations?7 This index is not an independent measure of coalition size because the answers to these questions (as well as other questions) are used to construct the regime categories themselves. Thus this index 6

This approach is similar to modeling non-proportional hazards in Cox duration models by including interaction between measures of time dependence and particular covariates (BoxSteffensmeier et al., 2003). Likelihood ratio tests and F-tests suggest that the interactions between duration polynomials and foreign aid do not need to be included in the models. 7 The first factor from the principal components analysis contains 89 percent of the variation in the raw variables.

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does not constitute external validation. Instead, we use it to highlight one concept that can be measured with the regime type categories. These questions measure concepts related to the political cost of liberalizing reform and not just the absolute size of the coalition. For example, questions (4) and (5) address the geographic and compositional breadth of the support coalition, while question (1) measures whether the leader has won elections in past regimes. Regimes with support coalitions of greater geographical and compositional breadth and those where the leader have past experience winning elections, we posit, should find political liberalization less costly because these features of the support coalition augur well for the prospects of winning power in newly competitive elections. Questions (2) and (3) pertain to how the support party originated and its relationship to the current leader. If the support party began before the leader assumed power and was not simply a creation of the leader, political loyalties to that party and its elite will be more likely to persist into a democratic period. Parties that outlast an independence leader (question 3), such as the CCM in Tanzania, and parties with a history of providing local benefits for diverse groups of supporters, such as the PRI in Mexico (question 5), are more likely to generate strong political networks and lasting loyalties. Figure 4.1 shows the regime types and their respective coalition sizes, as measured by the index constructed from the first factor of the principal components analysis. Party regimes have the largest coalition size and military regimes the smallest. Thus the ordering, from largest to smallest is the following: party > personalist > military. Second, an often-used measure of coalition size, W, independently confirms this ordering of regime types by support coalition size (Clark et al., 2012, 399). The W measure uses information from four variables: an indicator of whether the chief executive is or was ever a member of the military; and three variables from the Polity data set that measure the competitiveness of executive recruitment, the openness of executive recruitment, and the competitiveness of political participation.8 Thus while the variables used to code W rely on information about the identity of the leader and the process by which the leader

8

Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) use the Banks data, which Gandhi (2008) and Cheibub et al. (2010) also employ, to code military leadership. The coding of this variable differs significantly from the coding of military regime because it captures all regimes where the leader is or was a nominal member of the military. Thus many leaders that we categorize as personalist (e.g. Mobutu or Trujillo) are included as military according to the Banks coding used in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). The Geddes’ coding for military regimes is not a measure of the identity of the leader but rather of the constraints the leader faces in the military institution and the rules for leadership succession.

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Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival 4

Coalition breadth and depth (scaled)

3.81 3

2 1.8 1

.67 0 Military

Personal Mean level

Party 95% CI

Figure 4.1. Coalition size and autocratic regime types.

is selected—concepts that may not fully capture what we think of as coalition breadth and depth—W constitutes an independent measure of coalition size. The model specification includes dummy variables for Party and Personalist; we interact these with Aid. Military is the omitted category. We employ aid per capita data from the World Development Indicators, covering the years from 1960 to 2008. This measure includes loans and grants from all bilateral and multilateral donors, but does not cover military aid. This data captures aid flows from OECD donors and thus does not measure aid from autocratic countries, including Soviet aid to Eastern bloc countries during the Cold War period.9 We use aid per capita and not aid as a share of GDP because changes in the Aid denominator of GDP can influence the variation in the measure of aid. Economic shocks and short-term growth can influence autocratic survival independently of foreign aid. Therefore, the aid variable should be independent of this variation. Second, aid per capita provides better coverage in our sample. To ensure that causation runs from aid to democratization and not the other

9

There is no systematic data on non-Western aid during the entire sample period.

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way around, we lag the aid variable.10 To capture the level of aid in a recipient country and not large increases or decreases in aid (or regression to the mean), we average aid over the two previous years. Finally, we take the natural log to reduce the influence of outliers: ln (1 + AidPerCapitat1,t2). The empirical analysis includes three main control variables: log of GDP per capita as a measure of the level of development; the share of neighboring countries that are democracies; and population size.11 We include ln(GDPpc) because the literature on political development has long argued that level of development may influence democratization (Lipset, 1959; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Przeworski et al., 2000), and there is some evidence that poor countries are more likely to receive aid than rich countries.12 To control for the possibility that aid is picking up the effect of the global diffusion of democracy, particularly at the end of the Cold War, we include Neighbor Democracy, which is the average number of democratic countries with capital cities within 4000 km of the target country’s capital. Finally, because international pressure from Western countries to democracy changes over time, we include five-year time period dummies. To address concerns that country-specific factors—such as the geostrategic position, geographic endowments, colonial history, state capacity, or ethnic heterogeneity—may influence both aid distribution and regime survival, we test models with random effects as well as country fixed effects.

F O R E I G N AI D A N D RE G I M E CH A N G E We discuss the main findings in graphical presentations, with regression results reported in the Appendix (A). The first test, which excludes the interactions between Aid and regime type, reports a positive coefficient for Aid that is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that aid on average has little effect on the likelihood of regime stability in recipient countries as in Knack (2004). Once we interact Aid with regime type, however, there is

10

Donors sometimes reward countries that have recently democratized, and/or send aid, in the form of democracy assistance, to help conduct an election. In either of these scenarios, democratization would cause aid. See Wright (2009) and Dietrich and Wright (2015) for analyses that address issues of endogeneity. 11 ln(GDPpc) is from Maddison (2010). Neighbor democracy is calculated using the Cheibub et al. (2010) coding of democracy and non-democracy. 12 Alesina and Dollar (2000) argue that the evidence that bilateral donors give to poorer countries can be accounted for by the relative income of donor’s respective colonies.

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Autocratic transition .06

Aid distribution

.05

.04

.02

.03

.02

.01

.01

0

.06

.03 Probability of democratic transition

.03

0

.05

.04

.02

.03

.02

.01

.01

0

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Probability of autocratic transition

98

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Aid per capita

Aid per capita Party

Personal

Military

Figure 4.2. Foreign aid and regime failure.

considerable variation in the effect of aid on regime change. In both the random- and fixed-effects specifications, the interaction between Aid and Party is positive and statistically different from zero; however, the estimate for bAid + bAidParty is only statistically significant in the random-effects model. These tests group all regime collapse events together, so next we examine democratic and autocratic transitions separately. The left panel of Figure 4.2 depicts the predicted probability of democratization for different regimes across a range of values for aid dependency.13 The right vertical axis shows the scale for the predicted risk of each type of regime failure. In party-based regimes, increasing aid from $5 per capita to $100 per capita increases the likelihood of democratization from less than 1 percent to almost 4 percent. In personalist and military regimes, however, the aid effect is negative, though only statistically different from zero for aid in military dictatorships. This set of findings is robust to including country fixed effects, which is important to rule out the possibility that the findings can be explained by time-invariant factors that drive aid donors to select particular aid recipients, such as being a former colony or a country that is located in a strategically important area of the world, such as the Middle East. In the replication files,

13

These estimates are based on Model 5, Appendix Table A-2. We set all continuous variables at the in-sample mean; the decade is 1990s (except for military regimes, which is set to 1970s); and regime duration is set to the median by regime type.

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we also show that dropping control variables, including additional control variables or dropping post-civil war years, does not alter the main finding.14 To rule out the possibility that foreign aid revenue operates in a similar manner to oil rents (e.g. Morrison, 2009), we include oil rents in the model as well as an interaction between this variable and regime type. We find that while aid is still strongly correlated with democratic transitions in party regimes, oil rents are not. This suggests that oil rents and foreign aid conditionality operate differently in these dictatorships. The right panel shows that the effect of aid on transitions to subsequent dictatorship is negligible for all regime types. We can summarize the main result thus far in the following: foreign aid is correlated with a higher likelihood of democratic transition in party regimes but a lower likelihood of democratic transition in military ones. When stability is measured as the risk of autocratic transition, the only negative effects of aid are small and not statistically significant.

Foreign Aid in the Post-Cold War World By the late 1980s and early 1990s, Western aid donors began conditioning foreign aid on political reform (Crawford, 1997). This was due in part to the end of superpower politics during the Cold War era and in part to a shift in policy thinking about the role of the state in implementing economic reforms. First made explicit in a 1989 U.N. report on sustainable economic reform in Africa, policymakers shifted focus to the political and institutional factors that underpin growth during this period (Lancaster, 1993; Crawford, 2001). Democracy and good governance were no longer afterthoughts in development policy discussions, as donors began to link foreign aid to improvements in these areas. The new thinking about the role of democracy and governance in economic development thus provided a rationale for conditioning aid on political reform. Scholars have since modeled this shift in donor conditionality to show the relationship between aid and democracy may differ by time period (Dunning, 2004; Wright, 2009; Bermeo, 2011). Simply put, conditionality of any kind may not have worked before the fall of the Soviet Union because client states knew that during the Cold War 14

Additional control variables include civil conflict, international conflict, and either irregular leadership turnover in the past five years or the number of past coups. Post-civil war countries are more likely to both democratize and to receive substantial foreign aid, but excluding these cases from the analysis does not affect the finding for aid in party regimes. Models with no control variables drop all covariates save regime type, duration dependence, and period effects.

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donors would not rescind aid lest the other superpower bloc fill the gap. Citing a logic familiar to foreign aid critics, but placing the blame on Cold War politics, the former British Secretary of State for International Development Hilary Benn suggests:15 [Aid] has sometimes been part of the problem, where aid was used to buy support in the Cold War, rather than to fight poverty. All too often it rewarded dictators and the corrupt. Mobutu’s Zaire received enormous aid flows during this period. Most aid . . . reduced the need for governments to improve their public financial management—or to account to their people.

Our theory builds on the insight that autocratic regimes consider the likelihood of receiving aid in the future. The benefits of future aid, we argue, are determined by both the domestic politics of the recipient country as well as the extent to which future aid is contingent on conceding political reform. The difference between the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods serves as a rough proxy for the stringency of aid conditionality. If conditionality has more bite during the post-Cold War period, the theoretical argument for the nature of the support coalition and aid should be stronger in this period. Modeling the aid–democracy relationship both during and after the Cold War period, therefore, enables us to test the theory as we vary the conditionality constraint.16 This suggests that the regime type should have a larger effect on the aid-democratization relationship during the post-Cold War period than during the previous period. Before we test this corollary hypothesis, we note that no party regime democratized before 1988; thus the influence of aid on democratization in these regimes is drawn entirely from the post-Cold War period. However, we will still want to compare the results across the two periods to see if regime type makes a larger difference in the post-Cold War period. To do this, we divide the sample into two subsamples: 1962–86 and 1987–2008. Dunning (2004) first suggested using the mid-1980s as a cut point because superpower politics in most of the aid-recipient world had largely died down at this point, and Western aid policy had shifted to thinking about governance issues.17 Because there are no cases of party regimes democratizing during the Cold “Governance and Development—A Consultation with Hilary Benn,” The Royal African Society, 2 February 2006. 16 An alternative way to examine variation in conditionality would be to exclude particular country-years that violate the conditionality assumption, for example Egypt after the Camp David Accords and perhaps Pakistan (Bearce and Tirone, 2010). We tested models that exclude Egypt and Pakistan from the data, and unsurprisingly find similar results because Egypt does not democratize during the sample period and Pakistan is coded as a small coalition military regime. 17 See Wright (2009) and Bearce and Tirone (2010) for discussions of other cut-points. 15

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War era, we only examine personalist regimes as a separate category. Smaller sample sizes also mean that estimates are most stable during the post-Cold War period when we only analyze the link between aid and regime change in party regimes with all other regime types grouped together. The top panels of Figure 4.3 display the predicted probabilities of regime change during the Cold War, with the left panel showing results for transitions to democracy. While there is a negative and statistically significant correlation between aid and democratic transition in personalist regimes, aid has little influence on democratization in other dictatorships. Boosting aid to personalist rulers from $5 per capita to $100 per capita lowers the predicted probability of democratic transition from over 3 percent to under 0.5 percent. The (a) Cold war era Democratic transition

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right panel shows there is no strong relationship between aid and transitions to new dictatorships during this period. Thus the evidence from the Cold War suggests that aid did not help the prospects of democratization, and may even have hurt them in personalist regimes as it increased the resources available to fund patronage—their preferred survival strategy (see Chapter 3)—and so to reward support. The lower panels examine the influence of aid during the post-Cold War period. Party regimes are less likely overall to democratize than other regimes, but the effect of aid is strongest in these dictatorships. An increase in aid from $5 to $100 per capita raises the likelihood of democratization from roughly zero to over 3 percent. In other regimes, however, there is almost no connection between aid and democratic transition. Finally, the lower right panel shows that again there is almost no relationship between aid and transitions to subsequent dictatorships even during this period. The results by time period indicate that aid enhances the prospects of democratic transitions in party regimes only during the past two decades—a finding consistent with the theoretical predictions. Second, aid may have stabilized personalist dictatorships during the Cold War period by reducing the likelihood of democratization. The finding for aid in personalist regimes is consistent with the criticism of early aid dissenters, such as Friedman and Bauer, who argued that foreign aid helped keep dictators in power. This evidence, though, is dependent on the time period under consideration and the type of failure risk. When aid critics cite the example of Mobutu, they may be correct. As a typical case of personalist autocracy that never transitioned to democracy during the Cold War period, this regime fits these findings.

Variation in Coalitions within Regime Type Categories We posit that party regimes should have larger coalitions than personalist regimes and thus politically conditioned aid should be more persuasive in the former. However, some personalist regimes have strong political networks that sustain loyalty across time. For example, Hutchcroft (1991) argues that the elite families who ruled precolonial Philippines saw their power wane during the Marcos era, but ultimately personalist rule extended beyond the autocratic period into democracy, as many of the families that held sway before Marcos consolidated his rule and remain powerful today. Personalist rule, Hutchcroft suggests, was not limited to the post-martial law period of Marcos’s presidency. The case of Ghana, which we use to illustrate the logic of our hypothesized causal mechanism, is coded as a personalist regime under Rawlings—in large

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part because his political party was formed after he had been in power over a decade. However, the political coalition his regime constructed built on durable political cleavages that had manifested themselves in two-party democratic systems prior to military rule (Morrison, 2004). Partly as a consequence, the life of Rawlings’ party extended beyond the end of his time in power. While his party successors lost three presidential elections to the opposition from 2000 to 2008, Rawlings’ party won a plurality of legislative seats in 2008 and reclaimed the presidency in 2012. Rawlings’ party has thus continued to win power after democratization. A handful of personalist rulers have even come back to win elections after democratization. In Benin, Mathieu Kérékou, in power for nearly two decades after 1972, lost two multiparty elections in 1991 and 1996, but won again in 2001. Guinea Bissau’s longtime ruler João Bernardo Vieira lost power in 1999, and after having spent the last years in exile came back to win the second round of multiparty presidential elections in 2005, even though the party he lead for nearly twenty years ran a candidate against him. In contrast, the political fortunes of other personalist leaders and their parties have not been so favorable. Hastings Banda’s Malawi Congress Party (MCP) placed second in all presidential and legislative ballots under democratic rule, but the MCP’s candidate was roundly defeated by 66 percent to 30 percent in 2009. Trujillo’s Dominican Party fell apart shortly after his assassination in 1961; and Moussa Traoré’s party in Mali (UDPM), never competed in elections after the transition to democracy in 1992.18 In Peru, Fujimori’s party did not field a presidential candidate in 2001 and won only four legislative seats (out of 120) in the first post-Fujimori democratic election.19 Mobutu created his party, the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) in 1967 and fully institutionalized it as the only legal party in 1970—five years after he took power (Callaghy, 1984, 171–2). The MPR was not only the creation of the dictator, but placed few if any constraints on his behavior, with Mobutu retaining complete power over appointments throughout the

18 The coup leader who ousted Traoré in 1991, Amadou Touré, allowed opposition leaders to organize a National Conference which led to multiparty elections in 1992. Touré later ran for and won the presidency, albeit at first without a party. 19 A Fujimori ally, Martha Chávez Cossio, ran in the 2006 presidential elections, winning 7 percent of the first round vote. Her party, Alianza Para El Futuro, won thirteen of 120 Congressional seats in 2006. Levitsky and Cameron (2003, 14) describe the state of political parties in the aftermath of Fujimori’s rule as, “[l]acking national infrastructures, strong roots in society, or linkages to important civic and social organizations, parties were reduced to narrow circles of elites.”

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government (Callaghy, 1984, 180). When Mobutu and his dwindling supporters fled Kinshasa in 1997, the MPR collapsed.20 These examples suggest that there is a fair amount of diversity among personalist rulers in the depth and reach of their respective political parties. Trujillo, Traoré, and Mobutu created parties out of thin air, while other personalist leaders such as Banda, Noriega, and Marcos transformed existing movements or parties into vehicles to entrench their own political power. Marcos’s Nacionalista Party dates from the 1910s, and Banda built the MCP on the backs of the independence movement’s Nyasaland Congress Party. This is not to say that Banda, Noriega, and Marcos were unsuccessful in consolidating control over their parties. However, this snapshot suggests that parties which existed prior to the personalist leader’s tenure in power or those built on long-standing political coalitions are more likely to have deeper roots and more extensive loyalty networks that exist beyond the political life of a longtime ruler—precisely a factor that should increase the likelihood that elites in these parties face some positive probability of winning power in democratic elections. To examine this possibility, we construct a more precise measure of the depth of the support coalition by using recently collected data on whether the regime’s support party existed prior to the regime gaining power and whether the support party has functioning local-level party organizations (Wright et al., 2014).21 We create an indicator variable that equals 1 when both of these factors are present and zero otherwise. When we interact this variable with aid, we find that aid is strongly associated with democratization in dictatorships that meet both of these criteria but not in other dictatorships. This test provides evidence that the variable for dominant party regime we use in this chapter measures the appropriate theoretical concept (i.e. support coalition depth) and not another feature of autocratic rule—such as constraint 20

In the 2006 elections, an MPR successor party, MPR-Fait Privé won less than 0.5 percent of the first round presidential vote and one seat in the National Assembly (500 seats). Mobutu’s son, Nzanga Mobutu, ran under a different party label (Union of Mobutuist Democrats) gaining 4.7 percent of the presidential vote, while his party won eight legislative seats. He backed Joseph Kabila in the second round and was appointed agricultural minister. See “Relief at new DR Congo government,” BBC News, 6 February 2007. 21 Prior parties include regimes where: (a) the party won support under prior autocracy; (b) a party was formerly an insurgent or rebel group party; or (c) a party competed under prior democracy. Former rebel parties are included because successful insurgencies almost always require large-scale political support (Wickham-Crowley, 2001; Sambanis, 2008). Parties coded as not prior for this measure include: (d) parties created by the dictator after he gained power; (e) parties created to elect an authoritarian leader, such as Fujimori’s party in Peru; and (f) a party that existed under a prior autocratic regime but never won electoral support.

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on the leader or lack of personalization in the security forces—that might also be captured in the regime typology. While we acknowledge that the regime typology masks variation in coalition breadth and depth, this test strengthens the evidence consistent with our theory. Next we examine the case of foreign aid conditionality and political reform in Ghana. The purpose of this case study is to probe the causal process and not to test the theory. In doing so, we provide a chain of evidence aimed at establishing construct validity and examine alternative explanations to probe the internal validity of the argument. That said, because the regime typology categorizes Rawlings’ rule as a personalist dictatorship, probing the causal process in this case is a difficult test even for assessing construct validity since this example is not a typical positive observation that “falls on the regression line” in the cross-national empirical analysis.

D O NO R S A ND D E MO C RAT I Z A T I O N I N G H A N A Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings grabbed power in a 1981 coup. The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), with Rawlings at its head, ruled without national elections until 1992. In that year, Ghana approved a new constitution and held multiparty elections which Rawlings and the newly formed National Democratic Congress (NDC) won. In 1996 Rawlings and the NDC won a second multiparty election. Reaching the end of two terms as president under the new constitution, Rawlings stepped down in 2000. The opposition New Patriot Party (NPP) swept elections in 2000 and 2004. The NPP won the presidency again in 2008, but lost control of the legislature to the former ruling party. And in 2012, the NDC reclaimed the presidency. This case study makes two points. First, while the Rawlings regime initially ruled with a relatively narrow support base, the breadth and depth of the NDC coalition expanded through the 1990s. The broadened support coalition ensured NDC elites that they had access to power even after political liberalization. Central to the theory in this chapter is the contention that the expected post-transition utility of elites is greater when their autocratic support coalition is broad and deep. We argue that without an expanded support coalition, NDC elite would not have pursued the political reforms that eventually resulted in the loss of executive power in 2000. Second, we establish the role of foreign aid donors in the story of democratization in Ghana. Drawing on Handley’s (2008) account, we show that international pressure was crucial to both the advent of multiparty elections in 1992 and Rawlings’ decision to step down from power in 2000 after his party

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lost the election. The role of international donors in this case allows us to highlight an important feature of the theory: the credibility of donor threats to revoke aid when the recipient does not pursue political reform. As Handley (2008) points out, this threat was credible because Western donors did not have strategic political objectives in Ghana; and the prospect of aid from nonWestern donors was slim.

Expanding Coalition When Rawlings and the PNDC grabbed power, Ghana was on the brink of economic collapse: rampant inflation, an overvalued currency, and a decade of poor economic growth set the stage for the coup (Herbst, 1993, 27). The PNDC’s main political supporters at the time of the 1981 coup were lower ranking military officers and left-wing civilian groups, including the trade union movement, academics, and the urban unemployed (Ninsin, 1987, 19).22 During the first years of his rule, Rawlings pursued a strategy of purging close allies, including military officers who helped orchestrate the 1981 coup and initial supporters who opposed IMF reforms. With the constant threat of coups, Rawlings reduced the size of the military and purged potential rivals within the military, especially from the north (Crook, 1990). To pursue neoliberal economic reforms as part of the 1983 Economic Restructuring Programme (ERP), the PNDC narrowed its coalition of supporters further, jettisoning left-wing groups—such as the JFM—that had initially supported the PNDC (Akonor, 2006, 40). Akonor (2006, 59) notes that “by the end of 1983, Rawlings was the only one of the original seven PNDC members to remain in power.” His political vehicle, the PNDC, had shrunk, now comprising only two soldiers, two loyal technocrats, and one conservative politician (Akonor, 2006, 60). Rawlings’ relatively narrow support coalition had implications for his relationship with private investors, international donors, and labor. During the first decade of his rule, Rawlings viewed private sector development as a potential political threat, which put him at odds with the general thrust of IMF and World Bank reforms that emphasized private sector growth (Kragelund, 2005, 183). Rather than co-opting potential opposition groups, such as labor, the PNDC destroyed the leadership of the union sector (Trade Union Congress, TUC) and replaced it with loyal appointees (Herbst, 1993, 66). One 22

The PNDC’s alliance with left-wing groups, such as the June Fourth Movement (JFM), meant that the Ghanaian government initially sought foreign aid from Communist bloc countries, including Cuba, Libya, and the Soviet Union (Akonor, 2006, 41).

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description of Rawlings’ government in the 1980s suggests little depth or geographic breadth to his support coalition: “[The] PNDC had no such national political organization . . . The PNDC in fact had no means of articulating itself, either politically or administratively, into the countryside” (Crook, 1990, 33). In 1988, the PNDC embarked on a campaign to decentralize power by creating local District Assemblies in a “government programme of democratization that preceded the shift to a multiparty constitution” (Ayee, 1996, 33). This effort helped expand the PNDC coalition by bringing previously unorganized traditional leaders and young aspirants into the Rawlings camp. Morrison (2004, 426) notes that this involved “110 district chief executives, a third of the district assemblies, and ten ministers who coordinated regional coordinating councils.” The decentralization programme suggests an increased geographic reach of the PNDC beginning in the late 1980s. During the decade of military rule under Rawlings, the PNDC established the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) to bring Rawlings’ government into close contact with previously unorganized rural peasants through community development projects. The CDRs were used to co-opt and even replace chieftain rule at the local level, and were subsequently transformed into “non-governmental organizations” after the 1992 constitutional changes. Using patronage to buy support throughout the country, Sandbrook and Oelbaum (1997, 623) note that CDR members participate in local government institutions, from the unit/village committees and town councils to the district assemblies. These positions gave such NDC activists a continuing influence over the allocation of resources at the local level, in particular development funds, often in collaboration with the district chief executive and district NDC officials.

Decentralization and the restructuring of CDRs marked the start of the PNDC’s efforts to expand its support coalition. Formal movement towards multipartyism did not begin until 1990, when the government sponsored a series of seminars on democratization, and outlined a timetable for reform in January 1991. Thus efforts to expand the coalition preceded even the earliest democratizing reforms (Sandbrook and Oelbaum, 1997, 616). While the NDC was at first an instrument of Rawlings’ personalist rule, through the 1990s it expanded its base of support by creating close connections to civil society groups, labor, business interests, and the women’s movement.23 Beginning in the early 1990s, Rawlings and the NDC developed 23 The National Democratic Congress (NDC) was formed prior to the 1992 election as a new political party for Rawlings’ regime.

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private sector businesses linked to their party. As with other groups in the newly expanding coalition, patronage was key to cementing support for the NDC (Kragelund, 2005, 184). The ruling party also organized a mass movement for women headed by the first lady. This organization was designed to assist rural women with development projects, particularly in the education and health sectors. It had paid staff in Accra, regional capitals, and all 110 local districts, suggesting a relatively extensive geographic reach (Sandbrook and Oelbaum, 1997, 624). Like many party-based regimes, in the 1990s the NDC co-opted unions into their patronage machine. The NDC used the transportation workers union (the Ghana Private Road Transport Union, GPRTU) to provide jobs for political supporters. Sandbrook and Oelbaum (1997, 626) note that these political networks, “extend right down to the grassroots, many tens of thousands gain an incentive to support the NDC, including those who receive benefits directly from the Government, especially in the form of contracts to party loyalists.” If public sector workers can be counted on to stump for the incumbent, the growth of civil servants from 105,000 in 1992 to 183,000 in 1997 would suggest a rapidly expanding group of tacit supporters for the NDC (Sandbrook and Oelbaum, 1997, 639). These examples suggest that by the early 1990s, the NDC was actively working to lower the political costs of IFIimposed political reforms by expanding their support coalition. The expanded political coalition of the NDC, combined with a large resource advantage relative to the opposition NPP party, translated into two electoral victories in the 1990s. The NDC enjoyed the advantage of its incumbency status by strategically deploying the budget to buy political support, including government contracts to reward ruling party allies in the business community and government spending funneled to local community efforts aligned with the NDC (Handley, 2008, 25). Unlike the opposition, the NDC also had offices in all regions of the country and in over 90 percent of the constituencies (Sandbrook and Oelbaum, 1997, 633). The opposition NPP was not dominant in particular regions or even the urban centers, with the exception of the Ashanti region (Morrison, 2004, 430). Even in the 2000 election, which the opposition finally won, it was electorally dominant in only one of ten regions (Ashanti). In half of the regions (5), the NPP won between 50 and 55 percent of the vote, with the NDC picking up between 41 and 45 percent in these regions—all of which the NDC had won in the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections (Morrison, 2004, 429). In short, the regional evidence suggests that despite holding relatively fair and free multiparty elections, the autocratic incumbent (NDC) was still electorally competitive. We underscore two points from the story the NDC’s expanding coalition. First, expansion of the support coalition began prior to the first multiparty

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elections. Indeed, the title to Chazan’s article assessing Ghana and the PNDC in the late 1980s suggests that the PNDC was “planning for democracy” well before the fall of the Berlin Wall (Chazan, 1989). Second, Ghana has historically had what amounted to a two-party system; in the 1990s this two-party balance induced smaller parties to form pre-electoral coalitions with the NDC and NPP (Morrison, 2004). This suggests that autocratic elites in the NDC, including Rawlings, had some basis to assess how party politics would play out under multiparty competition. Prior multipartyism may be one reason elites can confidently calculate that political reform will not be particularly harmful to their political careers. A relatively stable party system, especially one that has practiced democracy in the past, may reduce uncertainty about future political prospects and thus increase the likelihood that aid can buy political reform.

International Pressure and Democratization From independence in 1957 through the early 1980s, Ghana received foreign aid from a variety of donors, including the World Bank and the IMF. Between 1960 and 1981, donors sent roughly $20 per capita (constant $2000) on average to Ghana, which is less than half of what other countries at a similar income level and size received during this period.24 Thus Ghana was not one of the most aid-dependent countries in the 1960s and 1970s. In the first decade after independence, the Nkrumah regime was openly hostile to foreign aid conditionality, especially from the IMF, though Nkrumah negotiated with the IMF shortly before the 1966 coup in which the National Liberation Council (NLC) came to power (Akonor, 2006, 22). While the next two governments were generally less ideologically opposed to dealing with the IMF and implemented numerous economic reforms attached to IFI aid, subsequent military rulers undid many of these reforms, broke off relations with the IMF, and repudiated debt to international banks (Akonor, 2006, 28). In the decade prior to the 1981 coup that brought Rawlings to power and even during the first few years of his rule, economic performance was disastrous, the product of both economic mismanagement and the declining price of cocoa. For example, GDP per capita had fallen by over 30 percent between 1970 and 1981 (Herbst, 1993, 27). The Rawlings regime was initially opposed to seeking aid from traditional Western donors and instead solicited help from

24 Regressing aid, log(GDPpc), log(area), and indicators for calendar year, we find that the predicted level of aid for Ghana during these two decades is just over $44 per capita.

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Eastern bloc countries, but met with little success. The PNDC delegation to the Soviet Union, for example, was told to solicit the IMF and World Bank (BoafoArthur, 1999, 48). In mid-1982, amidst continuing economic decline, Rawlings’ economic team began negotiations with the IMF. This culminated in a new loan package and the launch of the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) a year later (Akonor, 2006, 43). Subsequently, aid per capita nearly tripled, rising from $14 per capita in 1983 to $37 per capita in 1986. For the next fifteen years, foreign aid to Ghana would average over $43 per capita, roughly on par with other developing countries. During this time, World Bank lending was the largest source of aid to Ghana (Handley, 2008, 37). The World Bank’s 1989 report on development in Africa marked a shift in IFI thinking on political reform, putting governance and democratic political reform on the development agenda (Crawford, 1997, 59). While the aid effort in Ghana was led by the World Bank, other donors closely watched the IFI’s monitoring of Ghana’s progress on economic and political reform, giving the IFI’s a gatekeeping role for access to other Western donors (Handley, 2008, 37). From this point forward, “Ghana’s leadership clearly got the message that continued support from the West and, in particular the ongoing flow of IMF and Bank funds, required progress on the political front” (Handley, 2008, 37). Handley (2008) argues that during the 1990s, Rawlings and the NDC needed continued IFI funding to support economic recovery and public sector spending—both of which enhanced Rawlings’ popularity and the electoral prospects of the NDC. The regime decided to hold multiparty elections in early 1990s, in part because the economic recovery from the IFI-prompted reforms helped the economy recover. According to the World Bank (2010), annual growth averaged 2.3 percent from 1984 to 1991, compared with –5.2 percent over the previous eight years. Handley’s account stresses that donors coordinated strategies to hold Ghana accountable to promised political reforms, even if direct leverage only came from the World Bank. To spell out Rawlings’ assessment of aid conditionality, Handley (2008, 42) quotes a former senior strategy officer at the International Financial Corporation: [Rawlings] understood that to get continuous flow of money from the IMF, he needed to be less autocratic and have a more open society . . . Without money, Rawlings’ government would have been weakened, and since the US had to agree to loans, Rawlings’ move to democracy pleased the US and opened the doors for further aid.

While Rawlings’ government was well aware that continued foreign aid depended on pursuing democratic political reforms, the NDC’s domestic electoral prospects sealed the deal. Handley (2008, 5) argues that even with

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multiparty competition, Rawlings could “win a national ballot.” She goes on to explain that, “the PNDC government, nudged from without by the IFIs . . . chose in the end to move down the path of democracy because it promised tremendous rewards and threatened few unacceptable costs for the incumbents.” Or as another observer remarks, “[Rawlings] was converted to the virtues of multiparty democracy because he believed that he would win elections run under such an arrangement” (Haynes, 2001, 193). In short, the NDC benefited from continued aid and the political costs of political reforms were relatively low. Three alternative explanations are worth addressing: the influence of democracy assistance; the possibility that domestic groups forced the hand of Rawlings and the NDC; and finally, the role of “exit guarantees” in securing peaceful turnover of power in 2000. There are two possible channels through which aid can enhance democracy. First, aid can buy political reform. Second, it can serve as an investment in democracy-building when it funds elections, voter-education projects, and political party development. With respect to the latter, democracy assistance programs funded the 1996 electoral commission and the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC), which was a forum where both parties discussed the implementation of political reform and election practices (Handley, 2008, 24). Thus donors directly aided electoral functions in this period. However, as Crawford (2001) notes, democracy assistance averaged less than 5 percent of total aid throughout the 1990s. Further, much of the direct democracy assistance aid arrived in the late 1990s, after significant political reforms were well underway. Even then, aid directed at civil society was an attempt to cultivate support for economic reforms (Handley, 2008, 44). Both the size of democracy assistance relative to economic aid and the timing of its arrival suggest that the former had less influence than the large sums of economic aid that arrived with political conditionality. A second factor that might have contributed to democratization is domestic political unrest, particularly mobilization against economic reforms. In Ghana, however, this appears not to be the case. While some economic reforms prompted protest, the regime quickly backed away, easing political tensions. For example, in 1995 the regime passed a 17.5 percent Value Added Tax (VAT) to replace the existing sales tax. This led to anti-government demonstrations in Accra and some regional capitals (Boafo-Arthur, 1999, 64). Within a month, the NDC repealed the VAT.25 Preceding political

25 Shortly after the 1996 election, however, the NDC reintroduced the VAT, passing it a second time in February 1997.

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reforms in the early 1990s, the NDC faced a relatively weak pro-democracy opposition. Handley (2008, 17) notes that “[a]t no point was there any credible threat . . . that the opposition might shut down either the government or the economy.” The perceived electoral strength of the NDC was sufficient to make the trade of aid for political reform beneficial for the regime. This suggests that domestic political unrest played only a small role, relative to the low domestic political costs of reform, in pushing the NDC towards democracy. Finally, it is possible that “exit guarantees” were decisive in the PNDC elite’s decision to hold multiparty elections in 1992, and helped convince Rawlings to step down in 2000 even though his party lost the election. PNDC elite and members of affiliated military were offered guarantees of indemnity from prosecution for human rights abuses (Gyimah-Boadi, 1997, 85), and prior to stepping down after the 2000 election, the U.N. named Rawlings as one of three “eminent persons,” ensuring him a relatively powerful and prestigious post-exit fate (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001, 112). Even after the electoral defeat of his party, Rawlings continued to be active in politics, campaigning for the NDC in subsequent elections. While these “exit guarantees” may have pushed Ghana towards democracy, domestic guarantees are unlikely to be credible unless a political ally (the NDC in this case) wins sufficient power in a new democracy to help enforce them in the future. Given that the NDC was likely to win the 1992 and 1996 elections, it was also likely that such promises would be kept, at least in the short-term. Thus this alternative explanation for democracy in Ghana rests on a key factor, namely NDC electoral strength, which figures prominently in the account of democratization.

Ghana in context Contextual factors, both domestic and international, complete the story of aid and democratization in Ghana during the 1990s. In the international sphere, Ghana did not have access to loans or aid resources from non-Western donors; there was no competing donor group, such as China or the Soviet Union, during the late 1980s and 1990s. Handley (2008, 31) notes that China, while one of the top ten trading partners with Ghana during the late 1980s (less so in the 1990s), did not exert pressure one way or another with respect to democratization. Second, Ghana was not a strategic interest for Western countries, particularly the United States, during this time period. Aid darlings, such as Uganda, not only had a much less contentious relationship with IFIs, but were also more strategically important to the U.S. Uganda was a Western ally in military conflicts in Central Africa during the 1990s, and a stable

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Ugandan state was deemed necessary to achieve peace in the region. Thus, it was less likely that foreign aid could be credibly withdrawn from Uganda than from Ghana.26 On the domestic ledger, Ghana had a relatively stable two-party system with identifiable and balanced political cleavages dating back to the decade of independence (Morrison, 2004). Thus even if the NDC were to lose power in multiparty elections, the NDC knew the identity and preferences of the likely successor government. Further evidence of a relatively stable party system can be seen in the fact that smaller parties sought pre-electoral alliances with the two largest parties in every election since 1992. Relatively robust political cleavages would have also given the NDC some comfort that they could still be electorally competitive should they lose their monopoly on power. To put the relative stability of the two-party system in Ghana in perspective, we might contrast it with the chaotic “party” system in the former Zaire in the early 1990s. The introduction of multiparty politics at the National Sovereign Conference in 1992 resulted not in stable parties or even discernable political cleavages. Schatzberg (1997, 97), for example, notes that “[s]eemingly overnight, hundreds of political parties appeared (some with regime financing) . . . The opposition, however, remained largely fragmented. Many oppositionists could not resist the regime’s blandishments and rallied to it—for a price.” Thus the existence of relatively stable political cleavages which lay the foundation for a party system may be a necessary condition for incumbent autocratic leaders to view the prospects of multiparty competition and political reform as relatively non-threatening to their long-term political survival. That said, stable party systems may be most likely coming out of autocratic regimes that ruled with relatively large support coalitions. A positive inducement to liberalize provided by credible foreign aid conditionality might also apply in Zimbabwe, where two parties have competed for nearly two decades: Mugabe’s party, the ruling ZANU-PF, and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Western sanctions looking to force Mugabe from office have had little effect. However, as in Ghana, some advocate using conditional aid to incentivize reform. Gavin (2007, 18) stresses that, “it is hard to imagine a transitional scenario in which ZANU-PF does not 26

We might draw a further contrast with Uganda by looking at how aid influenced Museveni’s coalition. A number of scholars argue that Museveni’s support coalition decreased in size during the 1990s when Western aid donors provided ample funds without enforceable political conditionality (Hauser, 1999; Mwenda, 2007). The Ugandan case, therefore, may be a good example of the incentives that unconditional aid provides for leaders in small coalition regimes to further decrease the size of their coalition as “free resources” increase (Smith, 2008).

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play an important role.” She further points out that “[w]ould-be successors to President Mugabe should not have to guess at what the benefits of pursuing a reform agenda might be” (Gavin, 2007, 21). In this context, U.S. and other donors could make credible signals to potential reformers that aid will be committed to support Zimbabwe’s recovery, with the aim of altering the preferences of elites in favor of political change. For example, Gavin (2007, 4) argues: By working multilaterally to build consensus around governance-related conditions for re-engagement, and by marshaling significant reconstruction resources in an international trust fund for Zimbabwe, the United States can help establish clear incentives for potential successors to Mugabe to embrace vital reforms. In this way, the United States can encourage and even hasten constructive forms of potential political change by affecting the calculus of those who are in a position to trigger a transition.

Thus, the possibility that ruling party elites can plausibly retain post-transition leverage even if ZANU-PF loses its monopoly on power, combined with credible promises of future aid conditional on political reform, could incentivize elites to pursue a transition. In sum, to fully understand how aid influenced the process of democratization in Ghana, we underscore the fact that foreign aid came with enforceable political conditionalities—which are more likely when Western donors do not compete with non-democratic donors, such as China, and when the recipient country has little geostrategic value to the main donor interest, often the United States. Second, while political reforms that come with credibly enforceable aid conditionality may be less costly in large coalition regimes, a further necessary factor may be the makings of a relatively stable party system. Above we noted that many personalist regimes have autocratic parties that exist beyond the life of the dictator and are capable of winning at least some power after democratizing reforms. A key factor that separates personalist regimes that are likely to respond positively to aid conditionality from those that are not may be the prospects of a competitive and stable party system, where electoral losers have sufficiently strong parties to stand a chance of winning power in the future.

DISCUSSION From Friedman (1958) and Bauer (1971) to recent policy briefs (Harford and Klein, 2005; Kenny, 2006; Islam and Coviello, 2006), aid critics have argued

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that foreign aid impedes democratization by keeping dictatorships in power. Presumably, without foreign aid, these regimes would fall, or better yet, democratize. Such critics have long cited Joseph Desire Mobutu’s regime in the former Zaire as an example of a brutal dictator kept in power with Western aid (e.g. Heckelman and Knack, 2008, 539).27 There is little doubt that Mobutu received large sums of aid; that he stayed in power for many years after economic crisis beset the country; and that he personally confiscated much of the country’s wealth, which was funded in part by foreign aid (Callaghy, 1984; Schatzberg, 1988). However, if for every long-lived dictatorship that receives generous foreign aid there are many short-lived regimes that receive equally generous amounts, then it becomes more difficult to point to aid as the cause of durable dictatorships. In this chapter, we have looked at nearly every dictatorship in the world since 1960—capturing both the durable dictatorships and the shortlived regimes. By considering all dictatorships, and not just the most prominent or the most durable, we get a different answer than by simply looking at the Mobutus of the world. To understand whether foreign aid helps or hinders democratization, we explored how a dictatorship might view the tradeoff between aid and conceding to democratic transition. In doing so, we largely ignored the donor’s objectives. While scholars have come to some fairly robust conclusions about which countries get foreign aid and why (Frey and Schneider, 1986; Schraeder et al., 1998; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Dietrich, 2013), we need only assume a minimal level of aid conditionality on the part of donors for the theoretical argument in this chapter. That the empirical results are stronger during the post-Cold War period, when conditionality was more meaningful, suggests that the theoretical implications are plausible. Thus for aid conditionality to have some bite in our framework, donors need only cut aid relative to the previous level to influence recipient leaders’ decision to democratize. As Handley notes, “it was the leverage associated with the flow of aid, rather than the aid itself, that was decisive” (2008, 44). An important limitation of this chapter is that we limit our analysis to aid from Western donors. During the Cold War period, both Western and Communist donors often gave aid to counter the assistance distributed by the other superpower bloc. Sometimes Western aid was delivered simultaneously with Communist aid, as in Tanzania, and in other cases, aid was doled

27 For a dissenting view, see Lancaster (1999, 497), who argues that Mobutu did not need Western aid to survive, as it represented only a small fraction of the resources available to him.

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out sequentially by each of the superpower blocs, as in Ethiopia (Brautigam, 2009). Fully modeling donor behavior requires an aid game that accounts for the strategies of two rival donors and the recipient country—that is, at least three distinct players. Empirically testing a model of donor behavior would thus require systematic data across many decades for Soviet and Chinese aid. Unfortunately, collecting Soviet and Chinese aid data that is consistent over time and with measures of Western aid is beyond the scope of this study. If our theory about how aid influences the prospects of democratization is correct, non-Western aid without political conditionalities is unlikely to spur democratization. Recent evidence comparing OECD aid with foreign aid from oilproducing monarchies in the Middle East suggests the same (Bermeo, 2011). The findings suggest that foreign aid with credible conditionality can serve as a carrot to entice autocratic regimes to concede democracy when the political costs of liberalization are relatively low. We argue that this scenario is most likely in party regimes during the post-Cold War period. The theory focuses on the political costs of conditionality faced by aid recipients. The primary factor that contributes to lowering these costs is the breadth and depth of the autocratic support coalition. Other factors, such as economic growth, might also contribute to lowering the political costs of complying with the conditions attached to aid (Wright, 2009). In the Ghanaian case, confidence from a growing economy under Rawlings’ rule influenced his decision to permit multiparty elections. In this chapter, we demonstrated how the political costs of political reform vary across autocratic contexts. If donors view aid as a means of foreign pressure to buy political reform, the key characteristics of the recipient country that will influence the prospects for the success of such efforts is the likelihood that incumbents retain some power should the regime pursue liberalization. Thus from a policy perspective, the results suggest that conditional foreign aid to party-based regimes is most likely to pressure the recipients to pursue political reform. However, even if donors are not interested in pursuing a political reform agenda when delivering aid to countries under autocratic rule, our findings indicate that aid is unlikely to entrench autocratic regimes or impede the process of democratization.

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Economic Sanctions and the Defeat of Dictators Brutal crackdowns on anti-government protesters during the Arab Spring of 2011 put Western policymakers in a quandary when the dictators in question were nominal Western allies, such as Bahrain, Egypt, and Yemen. However, in dictatorships with few friends in the West, the response from the U.S. and the E.U. was swift: in Libya and Syria, repression quickly led to Western sanctions. The U.S. government imposed sanctions against Syria in April 2011 following massacres in the city of Dara’a. These measures targeted the heads of the Syrian security and the intelligence apparatus, including two relatives of President al-Assad. U.S. Secretary of State Clinton affirmed that the sanctions were “intended to show the Syrian government that its behavior and actions are going to be held to account.”1 A few weeks later, the U.S. announced a new sanctions package prohibiting investment in Syria and freezing assets of the leading figures in the regime, including the president.2 The E.U. soon followed, again targeting al-Assad and other top officials with a travel ban and asset freezes.3 Permanent members of the U.N. Security Council pressed for further action.4 Although principally directed at condemning repression and ending violence against protesters, many viewed sanctions as a precursor for political change. William Hague, the British foreign secretary, argued that “[t]he repression in Syria continues and it is important to see the right to peaceful protest and the release of political prisoners and taking the path of reform, not repression.”5 In his speech on foreign policy in the Middle East on May 19, U.S. President Obama warned that “Assad now has a choice: He can lead that 1 Mark Hosenball and Matt Spetalnick, “U.S. slaps new sanctions on Syria over crackdown,” Reuters, 29 April 2011. 2 “Syria: US sanctions target President Bashar al-Assad,” BBC News, 19 May 2011. 3 “Syria’s Assad hit by EU sanctions,” The Guardian, 23 May 2011. 4 Barry Neild and Martin Chulov, “Syria’s Assad faces new sanctions by UN and European Union,” The Guardian, 8 June 2011. 5 “Syria’s Assad hit by EU sanctions,” The Guardian, 23 May 2011.

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transition, or get out of the way.” While economic sanctions frequently result from domestic political calculations in sending countries,6 many leaders and policymakers still invoke the possibility of sanctions upending autocratic rule. Economic sanctions are a peaceful form of foreign pressure based on coercive economic measures. A single country, international organization, or coalition of countries target another country—either its government or a group within the government—in an attempt to change a specific policy or behavior in the target country (Rennack and Shuey, 1998). In a best-case scenario, sanctions coerce the target by restricting trade or financial exchanges (Hufbauer et al., 2007). For this to occur, however, the economic costs of sanctions in the target country must have political consequences for the regime in power. Only then will they consider changing policy. Sanctions are perhaps the most widely used and visible form of foreign pressure; and dictatorships are historically their main target. Recall that almost 75 percent of all sanctions episodes since 1944 targeted autocracies (see Figure 1.3).7 The percentage of dictatorships under sanctions has steadily increased in the postwar era through the end of the 1990s, with the largest surge in sanctions against dictatorships taking place in the late 1970s. This spike coincides with the Carter administration’s increased concern for human rights (1977–81). The trend peaks in the early 1990s after the end of the Cold War. During most of the 1990s—dubbed the “sanctions decade” by Cortright and Lopez (2000)—more than 30 percent of all dictatorships were targeted with sanctions, with the U.N. increasingly employing them to force policy changes. The primary foreign policy goal of a majority (57 percent) of these sanctions was “regime change and democratization.” According to Hufbauer et al. (2007, 67), these types of sanctions entail economic pressure targeting a specific leader or group of elite with aim of “new leadership, most notably the embrace of democracy.” Figure 5.1 shows how the share of “democracypromoting” sanctions targeted at dictatorships has changed over time. Since the mid-1970s, nearly two-thirds of sanctions fall into this category. The United States has been one of the most active senders in targeting autocracies: 87 percent of targets were dictatorships when the U.S. is one of the senders; in 81 percent of the cases in which the U.S. was the sole sender, the target was a dictatorship. Despite their prevalence, many argue that economic sanctions are largely ineffective (Galtung, 1967; Wallensteen, 1968; Doxey, 1971; Barber, 1979; Pape, 1997, 1998). Numerous cases of failed sanctions help explain this pessimism. Fifty years of U.S. sanctions against Cuba, for example, have not

6

See, for example, Whang (2011).

7

See also Allen (2008b).

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Share of total sanctions

.8

.6

.4

.2

0 1950

1960

1970

1980 Year

1990

2000

Figure 5.1. Democracy-promoting sanctions. Share of all sanctions targeted at dictators that are democracy-promoting; smoothed three-year moving average. Sources: Hufbauer et al. (2007) and Geddes et al. (2014a).

yielded significant political improvements or any notable policy changes on the part of the Castro regime.8 Similarly, sanctions targeting the North Korean regime, in place since 1950, have done little to threaten its survival. More recent cases of apparent failure include sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, and the E.U. and U.S. measures aimed at Burma’s military dictatorship (Mueller and Mueller, 1999; Rarick, 2006; Banki, 2009). The general view is thus that sanctions almost never work (Pape, 1997). Yet, sanctions proponents can point to cases where sanctions appear to have played a role in fostering political change: for example, Trujillo’s regime in the Dominican Republic, the South African apartheid regime, Banda’s rule in Malawi, and Amin’s dictatorship in Uganda. In this chapter we examine why sanctions targeting autocracies have been successful in some cases but not in others. We argue that sanctions reduce a 8

Such failure was admitted by President Obama in a statement announcing the normalization of relations with Cuba. In particular, Obama affirmed that “we will end an outdated approach that for decades has failed to advance our interests, and instead we will begin to normalize relations between our two countries.” Peter Baker, “U.S. to Restore Full Relations With Cuba, Erasing a Last Trace of Cold War Hostility,” The New York Times, 17 December 2014.

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dictatorship’s ability to obtain patronage rents from external sources that are used to buy support (# S). The loss of patronage resources is particularly acute in personalist regimes, which, we argue, have limited capacity to compensate for this loss by increasing revenue from alternative streams. At the same time, personalist regimes are the least likely to get protection after a regime transition, so they are less likely to make a significant concession on issues that may affect their stability, let alone political reform. Consequently, personal rulers are likely to resist in power and fight for survival, but at the risk of being forcibly removed by rivals or rebel groups if sanctions undermine their capacity to reward support through patronage. Thus, we posit, if sanctions destabilize autocracies, the evidence should be strongest in personalist regimes. This means that if sanctions are to be effective in destabilizing dictators, they should strike at the revenue sources personalist dictators need to fund patronage—their preferred survival strategy. We find that sanctions are most likely to destabilize personalist regimes, but that this rarely means democratic regime change. Rather, sanctions increase the risk of regime change leading to a new autocracy. We find even stronger evidence for this when we consider democracy-promoting sanctions. These findings bear an important caveat, though, because we also show that sanctions against dictatorships with substantial oil revenue are generally ineffective. Thus, while democracy-promoting sanctions work in some circumstances, they are not successful in accomplishing their intended purpose, namely democratic regime change. Rather, they destabilize personalist dictatorships by making it more likely that they will be replaced by another dictatorship. Thus we should not expect sanctions to be an effective tool of democracy-promotion, though in a narrow set of circumstances they may be useful in extracting policy concessions short of democratic reform.

EXISTING APPROACHES TO SANCTIONS E FFE CTIVENESS Research on sanction effectiveness has traditionally adopted the perspective that governments strategically interact with foreign governments (or international organizations), calculate the economic costs of sanctions and those associated with conceding, and then decide whether to make concessions (Tsebelis, 1990; Drezner, 1998; Lacy and Niou, 2004). However, as Marinov (2005, 566) points out, “the economic price paid by a state need not correspond to the political cost paid by its rulers.” Sanctions

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influence target behavior when the economic costs they impose translate into political costs—namely an increased risk of destabilizing the regime. This is particularly true for sanctions aimed at producing democratic regime change. For example, while sanctions against Iraq were costly in economic and humanitarian terms, they did not significantly alter the regime’s behavior because they failed to pose a threat to Saddam Hussein’s rule. Sanctions did not significantly raise the likelihood of Hussein losing office, and the U.S. military eventually invaded the country to topple his regime in 2003. This chapter uses the framework presented in Chapter 3 to explain when and why sanctions “work” by focusing on the political costs they impose on targeted regimes. We therefore look at cases where sanctions were imposed against dictatorships and compare these situations to cases where sanctions were absent. Our research design thus departs from the dominant approach that only examines cases of sanction imposition to assess their effectiveness (Dashti-Gibson et al., 1997; Drury, 1998; Hufbauer et al., 2007). By restricting the analysis to target countries under sanctions, this research design places greater emphasis on the type of sanction but limits our understanding of how sanctions influence target behavior. To understand how sanctions affect dictators, we need a theory of regime survival that can incorporate the economic costs of sanctions to assess how they influence the risk of survival. This entails a comparison of cases with and without sanctions. The institutional arrangement of the targeted dictatorship and its survival strategies provide us with the leverage to understand when sanctions are destabilizing. Descriptive analyses of sanctions episodes suggest a low overall success rate. According to estimates by Hufbauer et al. (2007), sanctions “succeed” in only about 34 percent of cases. They find a similar result (31 percent) for sanctions specifically aimed at democratic regime change. Pape (1997), however, reexamines their data and contends that only 4 percent of sanction episodes were truly successful. One of his main critiques is that many cases of “success” are attributable to foreign military intervention, not economic sanctions. Much of the sanctions literature points to the economic costs faced by the target as the main factor that explains this variation in success (Dashti-Gibson et al., 1997; Drury, 1998; Drezner, 1999; Nooruddin, 2002; Hufbauer et al., 2007). The more costly the sanction, the greater is the chance of success.9 Others point to the relevance of the issue at stake. Sanctions seeking change in issues highly valued by the sender are less likely to be effective (Kirshner, 1997; Baldwin, 1999/2000; Ang and Peksen, 2007). 9

Building on Hufbauer et al.’s (1990, 2007) work, scholars typically measure these economic costs as the reduction of trade and financial flows due to sanctions as a share of the total target country’s economy.

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Subsequent studies link the success of sanctions to the regime type of the targeted country, as we do in this chapter. However, this literature usually focuses on the differences between democracy and dictatorship, broadly conceived. It concludes that sanctions may be effective against democracies but less so when targeted at autocratic governments (Van Bergeijk, 1989; Brooks, 2002; Nooruddin, 2002; Allen, 2005; Marinov, 2005; Lektzian and Souva, 2007; Allen, 2008b). In democracies, sanctions that harm the economy will hurt the population and thus reduce the electoral support for the targeted government. Anticipating this, democratic governments are therefore more likely to concede. In contrast, Lektzian and Souva (2007) argue that sanctions are less successful against dictatorships because they generate rents which rulers can use to retain power. Further, because dictators typically have relatively small coalitions, their leaders can shield these supporters from the adverse economic effects of sanctions.10 With regard to their impact on democracy, the evidence so far is quite pessimistic. Teorell (2010) finds that sanctions have no influence on liberalizing political change in target countries and may even encourage democratic backsliding. Similarly, Peksen and Drury (2010) find that sanctions reduce the level of democratic freedoms in the target countries. Some recent research on post-Cold War sanctions, however, challenges this finding and finds that pro-democracy sanctions increase democracy levels (von Soest and Wahman, 2014). Contributions from the public choice approach to sanctions highlight how target countries allocate the economic cost of sanctions, paying close attention to how these costs affect the leader’s support coalition (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1988, 792). Similarly, Kirshner (1997) claims that sanctions should target either the central government or the core groups whose support the regime needs to remain in power. Using the same logic, Brooks (2002, 122) suggests that, [S]anctions have a more nuanced effect on the welfare of different groups and interests, and unless these groups are politically salient, aggregate costs may not be sufficient to induce change in policy . . . [B]y harming or helping the welfare of these ‘allied interests,’ sanctions can actually hurt or help a leader’s ability to hold office.

This political logic as well as the harmful humanitarian consequences of sanctions against Iraq informed the deployment of “smart” (or targeted) sanctions, which seek to concentrate the costs on key supporters of the target regime without imposing costs on the population. This form of sanctions was 10 Major (2012) finds that sanctions succeed in coercing autocracies when these regimes face domestic instability.

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rapidly adopted by both unilateral and multilateral senders, especially the U.N. However, the existing evidence calls into question that smart sanctions are more effective in coercing the targets into conceding.11

S A N C T I O N S A N D I NS T R UM E N T S OF AUTOCRATIC SURVIVAL We start with the premise that “the effect of significant economic punishment is conditional on the target’s regime type” (Lektzian and Souva, 2007, 847), and explore how sanctions influence autocratic politics across a range of regimes (Escribà-Folch and Wright, 2010). Recall from Chapter 3 that autocrats use a mix of loyalty, obtained through either patronage or institutional co-optation, and repression to survive. Sanctions, we argue, alter the resources available for these policies as well as their price. This approach builds on the political economy models of sanctions (Wintrobe, 1990, 1998; Kaempfer et al., 2004). Kaempfer et al. (2004) begin with the assumption that sanctions increase the dictator’s budget because he is able to capture the rents associated with trade restrictions.12 This allows them to focus on how sanctions affect regime opponents. If sanctions increase the capacity of the opposition, they reduce the dictator’s budget by increasing the price of repression. The dictator has to purchase more loyalty or risk losing power. Gershenson and Grossman (2001) argue that a dictator’s optimal response to increasing foreign pressure is to increase both repression and co-optation. In this chapter we explore how dictators in different regimes deviate from this “ideal” response. Sanctions may weaken autocracies through multiple mechanisms. First, sanctions can reduce a regime’s capacity to buy support through patronage by reducing the dictator’s budget (# P ! # S). If sanctions diminish support without a response from the regime, they should increase the risk of losing power (Marinov, 2005). Sanctions can also raise the price of repression by emboldening opponents (# R). If sanctions curtail a dictatorship’s patronage resources, it must increase repression to retain power. However, a large increase in repression may eventually backfire, particularly if not accompanied by a strategy to increase patronage. We discuss each of these mechanisms in turn, and then argue that a dictator’s optimal response to sanctions differs

11 12

See Drezner (2011) for a review. Lektzian and Souva (2007) make the same untested assumption.

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according to the regime’s capacity to vary loyalty—through rents, transfers, and concessions—and repression (Escribà-Folch, 2012).

Sanctions and Supporters Sanctions often reduce the resources available to fund patronage. If this occurs, sanctions can undermine the main survival strategy of regimes that rely principally on patronage to retain support. This strategy is further complicated if economic coercion changes the preferences of elite regime supporters, prompting defections from the ruling coalition and the realignment of other supporting groups. Accordingly, economic hardship caused by sanctions may harm the economic interests of some coalition members by jeopardizing the flow of rents they receive. Bratton and van de Walle (1994, 460), for example, argue that “[w]hen public resources dwindle to the point where the incumbent government can no longer pay civil servants, the latter join the anti-regime protesters in the streets.” Sanctions can hurt regimes which, with poorly diversified economies, rely on trade in specific commodities to obtain foreign exchange and which need trade taxes to fund patronage (Kirshner, 1997); but also regimes highly dependent on foreign patrons’ economic assistance (Snyder, 1998). Consider an example from the Dominican Republic during Rafael Trujillo’s rule. Revenue from sugar exports helped purchase political support, including that of the armed forces. U.S. restrictions on sugar imports threatened one of the regime’s main tools for surviving in power.13 According to Schreiber (1973, 409), “[t]he primary economic effect of U.S. sugar restrictions had been to prevent a large increase in Dominican revenues at a time when this could have substantially bolstered the troubled economy.” Wiarda (1968, 160) makes a similar claim: “[b]ecause the Dominican Republic was so dependent on the United States (economically as well as in other ways) the cutting off of sugar importation, particularly when combined with the other economic sanctions, was the proverbial final straw which broke the back of the Trujillo regime.” Second, sanctions can reduce the expected utility of supporting the dictator. By signaling international disapproval and the potential for future foreign threats (including military intervention) economic coercion raises doubts about the regime’s stability and its future capacity for delivering rents.

13

The Organization of American States (OAS) had suspended diplomatic relations and arms sales in August 1960. These restrictions were extended in January 1961 to include oil, oil products, spare parts, and trucks.

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Increased uncertainty about regime stability and the flow of material benefits in the future reduces the expected utility of supporting the incumbent ruler in the current period, especially in regimes with weak institutions where dictators have less ability to credibly promise future rents or power-sharing concessions. Again Wiarda (1968, 157) makes the case that this mechanism was at work in the Dominican Republic prior to Trujillo’s assassination: “realizing that their interest could no longer be served by his continued rule, some elements in the armed forces, the government service, and the businessprofessional-landholding elite began to turn against Trujillo.”

Sanctions and the Opposition Sanctions may also embolden opposition groups and spur popular dissent. If sanctions increase support for the opposition, either by adding members to the opposition or by increasing the collective action capacity of existing antiregime groups, economic coercion should decrease the regime’s repressive capacity (# R). Sanctions can signal to domestic groups that foreign actors back the opposition rather than the incumbent (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1992). The withdrawal of foreign support for a dictator can increase public support for the opposition, lower the cost for opponents to publicly reveal their true preferences, and thus strengthen opposition groups’ resolve and organizing capacity (Wood, 2008). For instance, once the U.S. issued sanctions targeting Idi Amin in Uganda, Tanzania’s President Nyerere “interpreted Congressional actions as a carte blanche from the United States to take actions against Amin” (Nurnberger, 1982, 61). Kaempfer et al. (2004) note that sanctions against the South African apartheid regime strengthened domestic opponents in the black African anti-apartheid movement. The withdrawal of support may be particularly important for those regimes which rely on foreign military assistance and support. For instance, sanctions emboldened Zairian rebels led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila who ousted Mobutu in 1997. Without external support, Mobutu’s capacity to counter the insurgency eroded.14 In Nicaragua, U.S. sanctions aimed at destabilizing Somoza’s rule signaled the withdrawal of support of the regime’s main patron and thus bolstered the Frente 14

Foreign support for Mobutu consisted of economic aid as well as direct military assistance (American, Belgian, and French) to help counter Angolan-backed rebels from the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo in the Shaba region in the late 1970s. These three large donors targeted Mobutu’s regime with sanctions in the 1990s, signaling to domestic and foreign rivals that Western governments would not intervene to prop up Mobutu again.

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Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, which—after defeating the regime in 1979—assassinated Somoza a year later in Paraguay (Kirkpatrick, 1979). Second, opposition groups may benefit from sanctions through crossborder smuggling and black markets.15 As numerous sanctions scholars have pointed out, the disruption of trade creates new economic winners and losers (Rowe, 2001; Brooks, 2002). If the opposition groups either control territory or certain economic sectors that enable them to capture newly created rents, sanctions may increase opposition strength. Finally, a third mechanism that may link sanctions to opposition strength is economic deprivation. Some sanctions have severe humanitarian consequences for the target countries’ population (Weiss et al., 1997; Weiss, 1999; Peksen, 2011). Economic scarcity can create or exacerbate grievances, which may in turn spur collective action and political contestation against the incumbent regime, especially when dictators shift the economic costs of sanctions away from their core supporters (Niblock, 2001; Rowe, 2001; Brooks, 2002; Allen, 2008a). For example, when India imposed sanctions against Nepal in the late 1980s in response to King Birendra’s arms purchases from China, the embargo hurt the population and catalyzed anti-government riots (Garver, 1991, 970). The mobilization of pro-democratic forces prompted the King to legalize political parties and appoint a transitional government. Comparative evidence also suggests that sanctions can boost anti-government activity in target countries (Allen, 2008a). For example, the collapse of Iran’s currency and the rise of prices caused by hardened economic sanctions spurred discontent and protest against Ahmadinejad’s government.16 There are thus two related mechanisms which suggest that sanctions may alter the domestic balance of power: sanctions can hurt the interests of the support coalition by altering their beliefs (making loyalty more expensive) and reducing the dictator’s budget; and sanctions may increase the mobilization capacity of the opposition. The next three sections examine these mechanisms in detail by providing descriptive data demonstrating how sanctions targeting dictators influence revenue, spending, and repression in different autocratic settings. Before proceeding, though, we consider an alternative logic which argues that sanctions might strengthen autocratic rule. First, economic sanctions may mobilize support for the regime via a “rally around the flag” effect (Galtung, 1967; Grauvogel and von Soest, 2014). As Wood (2008, 495) notes, “[b]y 15 An expansion of the underground economy may erode the state’s monopoly on the provision of basic goods that are instrumental for buying loyalty. 16 Thomas Erdbrink and Rick Gladstone, “Violence and Protest in Iran as Currency Drops in Value,” The New York Times, 3 October 2012.

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strategically stoking nationalist sentiment the incumbent may successfully shift blame to the sender.” For example, sanctions may make a leader’s appeal to nationalism in the face of a common foreign enemy more potent, increasing loyalty to the regime (Kaempfer et al., 2004). Second, as Peksen and Drury (2010) argue and Rowe (2001) demonstrates in the case of Rhodesia, sanctions can lead to more government intervention in the economy and create rentseeking opportunities, increasing the dependence of supporters on the regime for the provision of basic goods. With greater control over the economy, the government is better placed to shield supporters from the economic costs of sanctions, shifting them to other groups. This strategy may also weaken opposition groups by further limiting their resources. In this case, the prices of repression and loyalty would fall, lowering the political costs of sanctions and, consequently, increasing the chances of survival. We note the ways in which sanctions might both destabilize and stabilize autocracies because the institutional structure of the targeted regime influences which effect is likely to dominate. First, we assess how sanctions affect government revenue in dictatorships. Then we examine how sanctions influence the strategies that dictatorships use to survive in power: public spending and repression.

Sanctions and the Dictator’s Budget Although sanctions may foster defections from elite members and encourage the opposition, they will not destabilize autocrats if the regime can respond to these threats. The optimal response depends on how sanctions influence the regime’s budget as well as the marginal political costs and benefits of increasing spending and repression. Therefore, how regimes respond to foreign pressure will be determined by how sanctions affect the dictatorship’s revenue sources. If sanctions reduce the targeted government’s budget, regimes that rely most heavily on current patronage will be the most likely to be destabilized. In contrast, some dictatorships can exploit sanctions by using them to extract rents (Rowe, 2001; Kaempfer et al., 2004; Lektzian and Souva, 2007). For example, when the U.N. imposed sanctions on Milošević’s regime in 1992, he responded by establishing smuggling networks for oil and other scarce goods. These rents primarily benefited those closest to the regime, including Milošević’s son Marko, the prime minister Mirko Marjanovic, and the paramilitary leader Zeljko Raznatovic. Andreas (2005, 342) argues that the “state-sponsored embargo-busting system eventually became institutionalized with the help of key actors close to Milošević in the State Security and the Interior Ministry.” Elite supporters managed the Customs Service, which

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controlled the flow of foreign currency as well as import and export permits. These operations generated considerable revenue for the regime. Statesponsored smuggling networks used Cyprus as the off-shore financial base, where Serbian companies and banks arranged exports and stored foreign reserves used to pay for imports (Naylor, 1999; Andreas, 2005). Sanctions similarly increased rent extraction in Rhodesia. Rowe (2001, 113) argues that sanctions against white minority rule in the 1970s prompted the ruling party, the Rhodesian Front (RF), to create a monopsony board to purchase all domestically produced tobacco. This made farmers more dependent on the RF for survival. The ruling party then split the farming constituency by using an intra-industry subsidy scheme to reward some farmers and punish others. Sanctions also increased government control over scarce foreign currency and oil, again giving the RF additional resources to buy support from potential defectors (Rowe, 2001, 115). If sanctions generate rents, they should then increase the dictator’s budget. However, a regime’s capacity to intervene in the economy when faced with sanctions may depend on the institutional context of the regime. Both the Yugoslavian and the Rhodesian regimes were party-based, with sufficient institutional and administrative capacity to deepen the regime’s economic intervention without creating strong rivals to the leader. Whereas Kaempfer et al. (2004) and Lektzian and Souva (2007) assume that sanctions increase the dictator’s budget, we show that this assumption is not true for all regimes. The revenue structure of the government can differ widely across regimes (Wright, 2008; Escribà-Folch, 2009, 2012). Those with weak institutions are more likely to rely on external revenue streams such as foreign aid or taxes on trade, especially the export of natural resources (Snyder, 1998; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; Wright, 2008). We thus examine how sanctions affect state revenues to show that some regimes bear a higher sanctions cost than others. Given the express purpose of sanctions—namely disrupting economic exchange—we should expect sanctions episodes to harm the economy. The deleterious effects, however, have distributional consequences and may not hurt all economic sectors equally. We focus on central government revenues because this is the revenue location from which dictatorships distribute targeted goods and fund patronage networks. We examine three types of revenue: taxes from international trade, income taxes, and non-tax revenue.17 17 To estimate the influence of sanctions, we regress logged revenue per capita from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators on a sanctions dummy variable from Hufbauer et al. (2007). We include country- and year-fixed effects as well as controls for the lagged level of revenue and hostile military interventions by democracies and autocracies. We calculate

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Government revenue

10 % change in revenues under sanction

129 2.3

2 7.4 4.9 .8

0

–2.3

0

.9

–.3

–4.6 –8

–9.8

–10

–2

–14 –14.2

–20

–2.7

–4 –23.8

–30

–6

–6 Military Trade taxes

Party Income taxes

Personal Non-tax

Military

Party

Current revenue

Personal Tax revenue

Figure 5.2. Sanctions and revenue. Percentage change in per capita revenue under sanction relative to not under sanction, based on OLS regression with country and year-fixed effects and controls for hostile military intervention and international war. For total revenue: 1143 observations in 85 countries; tax revenue: 1153 observations in 86 countries; revenue categories: 1143 observations in 85 countries. Years: 1971–2002. Sources: World Bank (2004); Hufbauer et al. (2007); and Geddes et al. (2014a).

The left panel of Figure 5.2 reports the average revenue losses associated with sanctions, by regime type, for the three streams of government revenue. While all dictatorships see taxes on trade fall when hit by sanctions, these revenue losses are largest in personalist dictatorships (14 percent). For income taxes, the data suggest that sanctions are actually associated with an increase in revenue in all regimes except personalist dictatorships, where income taxes decrease by 14 percent on average. Finally, non-tax revenue declines in all dictatorships, but again this revenue loss is largest for personalist dictators (24 percent). In short, these patterns suggest that while sanction senders may intend to inflict economic pain on the targeted dictatorship, the actual revenue losses associated with sanction episodes are largest in personalist regimes. The right panel shows overall government revenue and total tax revenue. Again, total revenue and tax revenue fall for personalist dictatorships under sanctions. In military and party regimes, the changes in overall revenue under the percent change with the transformed sanctions coefficient, â:(exp(â  F)  1) * 100, where F ¼ ^eðVÞ 2 (Kennedy, 1981). For all revenue equations, we exclude data from Congo/Zaire because it consistently produced large outliers. The data series for these revenue streams contain a significant number of missing observations (up to 55 percent). These estimates should therefore be treated with the appropriate caution.

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sanction are relatively small and in some cases even positive. These estimates bear an important note of caution given the widespread missingness on some of the revenue series, but they nonetheless illustrate a consistent pattern: sanctions in personalist regimes are more harmful to government revenue than their counterparts in other types of dictatorships (Escribà-Folch, 2012). Recall that many scholars argue that sanctions should only “work” when they affect the central government and/or key supporters (Kirshner, 1997; Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999; Brooks, 2002; Kaempfer et al., 2004). When sanctions hurt these groups, they can set in motion some of the mechanisms that destabilize the regime—such as elite defection to the opposition. Others argue that dictators are relatively immune from sanctions because they can extract rents from restricted trade and financial flows, turning sanctions into opportunities to increase control over the levers of power (Lektzian and Souva, 2007; Peksen and Drury, 2010). The evidence from Figure 5.2 indicates that the economic effect of sanctions on government revenue is much larger in personalist dictatorships. One explanation for this pattern is that these dictatorships are underinstitutionalized polities that rely on external revenue sources (aid and commodity exports) to fund patronage to retain power. The absence of effective political and administrative institutions may also diminish a personalist dictator’s ability to capture rents associated with sanctions. The ability of the targeted regime to extract rents from sanction-induced changes to trade patterns may vary by the extent to which the traded goods (especially exports) have inelastic demand—such as oil (Rowe, 2001; Brooks, 2002).18 For example, even though sanctions against Iraq prior to the U.S. invasion in 2003 were some of the harshest on record, Hussein’s regime continued to sell oil to countries such as Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, and Syria. A U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report revealed that Iraq illicitly exported 30–40 thousand barrels per day through the Persian Gulf in May 2002 with the cooperation of Iran (GAO, 2002). At the same time, 180–250 thousand barrels per day were exported through Syria, and a further 40–80 thousand barrels per day through Turkey. According to the Independent Inquiry Committee (IIC) into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme (OFFP), Hussein’s regime earned over $11 billion from illicit oil sales from 1990 to 2003. An estimated $1.8 billion was earned from kickbacks and surcharges on OFFP contracts and sales. These rents accrued directly to Hussein’s regime (unlike income from legal exports, which was controlled by 18

In contrast, it was relatively easy for the U.S. to reassign sugar quotas to Brazil and Mexico when sugar imports from Trujillo’s Dominican Republic and Cuba were restricted in 1960 and 1961.

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the U.N.), enabling him to pay his supporters and hold onto power until the 2003 invasion.19 This logic may also explain the record of failed sanctions in other resourcerich countries such as Sudan, Iran, and Equatorial Guinea. One commentator on sanctions against Iran noted that “[i]n the absence of a genuinely multilateral action, a European embargo on Iranian oil will only cause Iran to find new customers in Asia, especially in China.”20 When we examine the evidence for how sanctions influence autocratic stability, we will have to account for the possibility that oil wealth can alter the relationship between sanctions and regime stability.

Sanctions and Survival Strategies: Spending and Repression Sanctions can influence the prospects of political survival directly by influencing the dictator’s budget and indirectly by changing the capabilities and perceptions of elite supporters and opponents. Regimes deliver benefits by making transfers, granting subsidies, and increasing wages to groups deemed politically salient, including members of the ruling party, business elites, public officials in strategic sectors, heads of the armed forces, ethnic groups, and even union supporters. To understand how dictators respond to sanctions, we examine how they affect two survival strategies: purchasing support and repression. The left panel of Figure 5.3 shows the percentage change in government spending under sanctions, by regime type.21 The pattern that emerges is consistent with the findings for revenue: under sanctions, personalist dictatorships decrease spending the most. The change in government spending under sanctions for military and party-based regimes is almost negligible in comparison—and even positive in dominant party regimes. This evidence suggests that sanctions not only contract revenue in personalist regimes, but this new constraint translates into lower spending and, hence, less patronage.

“Smart Exit. The end of the smart sanctions,” The Economist, 5 July 2001. Jeff Colgan, “The Unintended Consequences of an Oil Embargo on Iran,” The Monkey Cage, 6 January 2012. 21 These estimates are derived from a linear regression of logged spending per capita (World Bank 2010) on binary indicators of sanctions and military intervention, the age dependency ratio, and country- and year-fixed effects. We calculate the percent change with the transformed sanctions coefficient, â:(exp(â  F)  1) * 100, where F ¼ ^eðVÞ 2 . Results for the short-term effect of sanctions remain similar, but substantively smaller, in an error-correction model. 19 20

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Repression

5 change in repression (scaled measure)

% change in spending under sanction

3.4 0 –3 –5

–10

–15

–20

.04

.023 .02 .011 0 –.009 –.02

–24.7 –25

–.04 Military

Party

Personal

Military

Party 95% CI

Personal Estimate

Figure 5.3. Economic sanctions, government spending, and repression. Government expenditure: average percentage difference in spending under sanction relative to not under sanction. Expenditure data in log absolute constant dollars. Repression is a scaled measure; estimates based on the model in Table B-1. Sources: World Bank (2010); Fariss (2014); Geddes et al. (2014a); Hufbauer et al. (2007).

Next we examine the repressive response to sanctions. If sanctions encourage anti-government opposition, dictators should respond with more repression (Kaempfer et al., 2004). This expectation is consistent with recent research that links sanctions to opposition strength and public dissent (Allen, 2008a; Wood, 2008; Peksen, 2009). Escribà-Folch (2012), Peksen (2009), and Wood (2008), for example, find that sanctions spur targeted states to commit more human rights violations,22 while Peksen (2010) finds that sanctions have a negative impact on press freedom. These approaches, however, do not account for a possible strategic substitution between spending and repression (Wintrobe, 1990, 1998; Desai et al., 2009; Conrad, 2011). If such a trade-off exists, regimes where sanctions diminish the resources available to buy loyalty should be the most likely to employ a second instrument of power when sanctions change the opposition’s capacity to resist the dictator: repression. As Wintrobe (1998, 47) points out, if repression levels can be altered in the short- as well as the long-run but loyalty is fixed in the short-term, dictators should increase state terror when the price of loyalty increases. That is, increased repression is an optimal response not 22

Peksen and Wood use the Polity index to capture countries’ democracy levels. This might be problematic because the Polity IV index includes a dimension related to government repression, namely, regulation and competitiveness of participation.

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just to a more powerful opposition but to new constraints on the regime’s budget. This perspective suggests that dictatorships that are the most limited in purchasing loyalty when faced with sanctions, should be the most likely to respond with increased repression (Escribà-Folch, 2012). To examine repression, we use estimates of the latent mean level of repression employed in Chapter 3. Fariss (2014) compiles information from the U.S. State Department and Amnesty International, as well as additional sources, to construct a yearly estimate of the level of human rights respect, which we interpret as repression. The influence of sanctions on repression is summarized in the right panel of Figure 5.3. The full results are reported in the Appendix to this chapter (Table B-1).23 The vertical axis shows the change in the scaled measure of repression associated with sanctions. While sanction years have higher repression levels in both personalist and party regimes, the substantive effect is twice as large in the former.24 The evidence for repression indicates that personalist dictatorships, on average, increase repression the most in response to sanctions. This finding complements the evidence for spending (and revenue) to suggest that sanctions alter the regime’s behavior and its capacity to use its most preferred survival strategies. In other dictatorships, however, sanctions do not affect spending or repression to the same degree, suggesting that these autocracies may better fit the stylized dictatorship that is relatively immune to foreign economic coercion (Marinov, 2005; Lektzian and Souva, 2007; Escribà-Folch, 2012). Party-based regimes rely more on institutions for survival, so demands are better channeled, concessions can be promised, and a larger share of the population has a vested interest in regime survival. Military dictatorships employ repression as their main tool, so their capacity to control dissent is already higher, and have a lower need to mobilize support, apart from that of key officers. Sanctions may only undermine these regimes if they cause divisions among regime elites, as shaming campaigns may do (see Chapter 6).

We flip the scale so that higher values can be interpreted as more repression. We estimate a generalized linear model with random effects and clustered standard errors. The specification includes the level of repression in the two prior years (Hafner-Burton, 2005). Control variables include: time-period fixed effects, log GDP per capita, log population, log regime duration, and binary indicators for civil war and hostile military interventions. In replication files we show that the result is robust to: including year-fixed effects, unit-fixed effects instead of random effects, no-unit effects, adding further repression lags, adding current year conflict variables, and using an error-correction model. Sample years from 1950 to 2004: 3394 observations in 235 regimes in 105 countries. 24 In a model with unit-fixed effects, we find that sanctions are not associated with more repression in party regimes. 23

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Our empirical tests for spending and repression cannot conclusively confirm the existence of substitution between spending and repression in dictatorships because our analysis focuses on groups of dictatorships and does not employ a model that subjects the substitution hypothesis to a test at the country level.25 That said, when we consider our findings with the comparative evidence from Desai et al. (2009)—which examines the substitution hypothesis at the country level—we are more confident that our results for spending and repression reflect real constraints that sanctions impose on personalist regimes. Although personalist dictatorships increase repression the most in response to sanctions, this strategy can be risky in the medium-term because elites in the regime’s coalition may fear that increased repression will target members of supporting groups (Gershenson and Grossman, 2001). For example, after U.S. sanctions were imposed against Amin’s regime in 1978, many of his ministers fled into exile when he assassinated some of their colleagues.26 Further, repression in personalist regimes is often left to government militias and paramilitary forces, which are more prone to use irregular repression tactics and to commit more human rights abuses (Mitchell et al., 2014). Lack of an institutionalized army also prevents dictators from gathering highquality military intelligence from their subordinates, reducing their military effectiveness (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011).27 As a result, some argue that harsh repression may trigger a backlash when dissidents react (Francisco, 1995). For example, in Nepal during the economic hardship caused by India’s sanctions, the security forces’ violent repression of protests led to large pro-democratic demonstrations in the capital, forcing King Birendra to liberalize the regime (Garver, 1991). Repression may thus spur violent escalation and further mobilization (Lichbach, 1987; Opp and Roehl, 1990; Moore, 1998), especially in regimes with weak military institutions or those highly dependent on foreign military assistance (Ortiz, 2007; Snyder, 1992). In fact, recent evidence suggests that autocracies that engage in coup-proofing are more likely to be challenged by insurgents in a civil war (Powell, 2013).

25

Our empirical tests for spending and repression group dictatorships by regime type and show that the effect of sanctions is different in personalist dictatorships for two types of behavior. We then attribute these changes in behavior at the group level to individual dictatorships. This is an example of a possible ecological fallacy. Such an exercise is beyond the scope of this research. 26 Michael Mubangizi, “Not even an archbishop was spared,” The Weekly Observer, 16 February 2006. 27 Even with a weakened military, personalist rulers may be reluctant to provide coordination goods to (and adequately supply) the military for fear soldiers will mobilize against the regime.

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In the context of the model in Chapter 3, revenue loss is most likely to hurt autocratic power in dictatorships that are most reliant on dispensing immediate material benefits to retain power (P). While many autocracies use some form of patronage to buy support, we argue that personalist regimes are the most sensitive to the loss of external revenue to buy support because they tend to lack diversified revenue streams and strong institutions to help them rule: they typically have weak militaries and ineffective power-sharing institutions. Thus, personalist rulers are less capable of making credible intertemporal promises to their supporters. Dominant party regimes can and do make good on promises to distribute patronage in the future, particularly around election time (Magaloni, 2006, 2008; Blaydes, 2011). Because of the long history of state patronage, sunk political investments by party members, and large margin of electoral victories, supporters in dominant party regimes expect the party to remain in power in the near- to mid-term, if not indefinitely, and thus believe party promises of future influence and benefits. In contrast, policy concessions are less credible when dictatorships cannot rely on strong institutions to ensure political supporters that their demands will be met. Hence, personalist rulers may have more difficulty substituting the promise of future rents or policy concessions for political rents in the current period when sanctions decrease patronage resources. Second, if sanctions destabilize personalist rule, they should increase the likelihood of a forced ouster because the regime lacks an institutionalized organization, such as a cohesive military or a strong support party that can protect former regime elites after a peaceful transition (high q). Personlist rulers, such as Idi Amin, thus generally choose to fight for survival; if defeat becomes imminent, they try to flee their countries in search of foreign protection. Other regimes are not only less likely to cut spending when targeted by sanctions, but they are more likely to peacefully transition to democracy when resources for purchasing loyalty gradually diminish.28 In contrast, personalist rulers, with little budgetary room to maneuver, increase repression—despite its risks—since peacefully stepping down is extremely costly because these rulers do not have credible guarantees of post-exit protection. In sum, personalist dictatorships are the most sensitive to revenue loss, and we show that sanctions undermine patronage strategies in these regimes more than in other autocracies. Further, personalist rulers not only increase repression the most in response to sanctions, but are also the most likely to resist in

28 See the discussion of party regimes in Chapter 4 and Greene (2010) for examples of dominant party regime collapse when public resources dwindle.

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power rather than concede. Thus regime collapse in these contexts is most likely to be followed by a new dictatorship. This logic suggests that sanctions should increase the prospects of autocratic transition in personalist dictatorships.

SA NC T IO N S A ND R E G I ME C H A N G E We expect sanctions to destabilize personalist dictatorships. These regimes are the least capable of responding to domestic pressures that arise from costly sanctions, both because they face more fiscal pressure than other leaders under sanctions and because they are more dependent on external resources to retain the support of their coalition. The first premise—that personalist dictatorships suffer more from sanctions—is an empirical question, and we provided an array of evidence to show that sanctions are indeed more costly for these regimes. The second premise—that personalist regimes are more sensitive to fiscal pressure—stands on a theoretical understanding of the institutional context in which these rulers operate. Thus even if the fiscal costs of sanctions were roughly equivalent across different types of dictatorships, we might still expect sanctions to destabilize personalist ones, simply because these regimes are more sensitive to (short-term) fiscal pressures given their main survival strategy is the delivery of private goods.29 To examine how economic sanctions influence regime survival, as in the other empirical chapters, we construct three dependent variables: all regime failures, democratic transitions, and autocratic transitions. We include regime change events that result from foreign military intervention because one way sanctions can destabilize dictatorships is by sending a signal to domestic and external rivals that the target is no longer supported by foreign powers, as in the case of Amin below.30 We control for the presence of external military conflict and foreign military intervention.31 These controls, especially the latter, are important because, in

29 Using an economic analogy for political survival, we might think of fiscal pressure as a change in prices and the institutional context of the dictator, or regime type, as the slope of the loyalty supply curve. Even if there is a common price shock, the effect of this price change will vary according to the sensitivity of the regime to these shocks. 30 Indeed, Peterson and Drury (2011) find that countries targeted by economic sanctions are more likely to be targeted with military intervention by countries that are not sanctioning the target country. 31 We code military intervention equal to 1 when a hostile foreign military intervened in either the previous calendar year or in the observation year if the intervention began prior to the

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some cases, sanctions arguably failed to remove a dictatorship and foreign military forces were employed to accomplish this task. For example, when the U.S. imposed sanctions against the military junta in Haiti in the early 1990s, the Cédras regime remained intransigent. Indeed, the Haitian military did not agree to hand back power to Aristide until hours before thousands of American troops landed on the island (Kretchik et al., 1998, 76). Pape (1997) argues that many sanctions are accompanied by supporting military interventions, so their success rate is overstated. Both tools may be used together, with military interventions being a tool of last resort. However, as Marinov (2005) notes, the proper way to account for this possibility is not to exclude cases where military intervention accompanied sanctions but to control for foreign military interventions in an empirical model, allowing us to estimate the effect of sanctions conditional on opposition military interventions. We adopt this approach. Our two main independent variables are sanctions and regime type. Sanction takes the value of 1 if a country has been targeted by economic sanctions in a given year and 0 if not.32 We lag this variable one year to avoid overestimating the effect of sanctions because in some cases sanctions may have been imposed as a response to a regime ouster. We interact the sanctions variable with dummy variables for party and personalist regimes. We include a control variable for oil rents, which can be used to buy both domestic and international political support. Data are logged oil rents per capita from Haber and Menaldo (2011).33 We also include an interaction between sanctions and oil rents because it may be especially difficult for sanctions to impose economic costs on the target regime when it has access to large endowments of a tradable good with inelastic demand. In fact, sanctions may have the unintended consequence of increasing the stability of the target regime in these cases because they provide greater scope for the target state to profit from rent opportunities created by the disruption of trade (Rowe, 2001, 173). The inelasticity of world demand for oil gives oil-importing countries a strong incentive to defect from a coalition that imposes sanctions. As we noted earlier, Hussein’s regime in Iraq was still able to sell substantial quantities of oil to foreign countries despite sanctions. Further, oil-exporting countries frequently have large stocks of foreign reserves that they can tap regime change. In robustness checks, we account for both hostile and supportive military interventions with no change to the main results. Data are from Pickering and Kisangani (2009). 32

Data are from Hufbauer et al. (2007). We use these instead of data from Ross (2008) because the latter does not have information from the 1950s. We use the Ross data for two countries missing from the Haber and Menaldo series, Georgia and Serbia. 33

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during periods of shrinking government revenue. This may allow them to smooth government consumption even when hit with the loss of revenue when targeted with sanctions. We also control for GDP per capita and international war. Wealthier countries are less likely to experience coups (Londregan and Poole, 1990) but may be more likely targets of sanctions because of their economic importance. Data are from Maddison (2010). We control for international war to further isolate the effect of sanctions conditional on violent foreign pressure. International war is a binary indicator of at least one international conflict in the previous year, from Gleditsch et al. (2002). We employ a random-effects logit, and control for time dependence with polynomial transformations of regime duration (Carter and Signorino, 2010). As in the previous chapter, the underlying hazard varies by regime type, so we include interactions between the duration polynomials and regime type. To account for changes over time in both the use of sanctions and the stability of autocracies, we include five-year time period dummies. We further address unit heterogeneity by testing models with country-fixed effects. Throughout, we report clustered standard errors.

Results We report results in tables in the Appendix (B) and interpret the substantive findings with graphs. First, we examine all types of autocratic regime change together—both democratic and autocratic transitions—and find that sanctions have little influence on aggregate regime stability. This finding is consistent with research which suggests that sanctions do not destabilize dictators (Marinov, 2005; Lektzian and Souva, 2007). Next we include the interaction between sanctions and regime type; the estimate for SanctionsPersonalist is positive but not significant.34 In the fixed effects model, the estimate for SanctionsPersonalist is positive and the linear combination of âSanction + âSanctionPersonalist is positive and significant, indicating that sanctions may destabilize these regimes. Further, the estimate for the interaction between sanctions and oil is negative and significant in the fixed effects specification, suggesting that oil wealth may stabilize regimes targeted with sanctions. Next, we examine democratic transitions and find that sanctions have little impact on this form of instability—in any of the regime types. Consistent with

34 The sanctions coefficient for military regimes is positive and statistically different from zero in the fixed effects model. This finding is not robust to alternative specifications, however.

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Autocratic transition

15

5.2

5

12.2 Probability of transition

139

4

11.1 10 3 2.9 2 5

2 1.6

3.7

3.9

1 .7

2 1.2 0

Military

Personalist

Party

0

No Sanction

Military

Personalist

.6

Party

Sanction

Figure 5.4. Sanctions and regime change. Years: 1947–2006.

the substantial research on the oil curse, the random effects models suggest that oil and democratic transition are negatively correlated. But this finding disappears in the fixed effects model, a result consistent with Haber and Menaldo (2011) and Wright et al. (2015). Finally, we test models of autocratic transition. In the random effects model, the estimates for âSanctionPersonalist and âSanctionPersonalist + âSanctionPersonalist are positive and statistically significant. This suggests that sanctions increase the risk that personalist dictatorships will be replaced by another dictatorship when targeted by sanctions. Further, the estimate for the interaction between oil and sanctions is negative in these specifications, suggesting that oil wealth ameliorates the destabilizing effect of sanctions. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show how sanctions influence autocratic stability from tests reported in columns 5 and 8 of Appendix Table B-2. The left panel of Figure 5.4 depicts the simulated probability of transition to democracy for each regime type, both not under sanction and when targeted by one. Importantly, these simulations set the value of oil wealth at zero; so the interpretation of these estimates assumes a country with no oil exports. In all three regime types, the influence of sanctions is substantively inconsequential. Indeed, the main pattern for democratic transitions is that military regimes are the most unstable and party regimes the most stable, a finding consistent with prior research. Sanctions only have a small positive impact in military regimes. The right panel shows the simulated probability of autocratic transitions. For personalist regimes, sanctions triple this risk, increasing it from under 2

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percent to over 5 percent.35 Sanctions lower the risk of autocratic transition in military regimes—helping to stabilize them—but we caution that this substantive result is not statistically significant. Finally, sanctions have little influence on stability in party regimes. These tests not only indicate that sanctions increase the risk of autocratic transition in personalist dictatorships, but also suggest that sanctions have little influence—one way or another—in dominant party regimes. Some sanctions critics, however, contend that sanctions may help legitimize authoritarian rule by rallying elites or even mass support (Galtung, 1967). For example, one observer contends that U.S. sanctions against Cuba allowed the Castro regime to “increase cohesion between the leadership and those strata of society believing in the legitimacy of the goals of the Revolution” by painting the embargo as a U.S. threat to the economic goals of the socialist project (von Burgsdorff, 2009, 46). If this “rally” mechanism is at work, we would expect the effect to be strongest in dominant party dictatorships—and particularly revolutionary regimes such as Cuba—because these autocracies not only tend to have broader support coalitions, but in some cases the regime’s legitimizing ideology may help lower the price of support. In these contexts, foreign economic coercion and attendant appeals to nationalism may boost loyalty to the regime and thus increase autocratic durability. To probe this conjecture, we use Lachapelle, Levitsky, and Way’s (2014) coding of revolutionary regimes. They use the Geddes et al. (2014a) data set to code a group of dictatorships that emerge from sustained violent and ideological struggle. Their list of twenty regimes includes mostly dominant party regimes but also a handful of autocracies not coded as such by Geddes et al. (2014a), such as personalist rule in North Korea and Rwanda. When we test a model with revolutionary regime and its interaction with sanctions, we find no association between sanctions and regime stability in these dictatorships.36 We do not view this as evidence contrary to Levitsky and Way’s contention that these regimes are the most stable. Rather, this finding is consistent with our argument that dominant party regimes—a subset of which are revolutionary regimes—are stable for a host of reasons, including the

35

The absolute value of these predicted probabilities should not be interpreted literally, since they depend on the choice of variable values in the simulation. For example, we can more than triple the size of the estimates for personalist dictatorships by setting the values of the time period variable to the late 1980s instead of the 2000s because there are many more autocratic transitions in the former period than in the latter. However, the relative values of estimates remain similar across different observed values set in the simulations. 36 This result is robust in models with random effects, fixed effects (both linear and nonlinear), and no unit effects.

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Change in probability of failure

.04

.02

0

-.02 0

20

40 60 Oil rents per capita Personal

Military

80

100

Party

Figure 5.5. Oil rents, sanctions, and autocratic transition. Years: 1947–2006.

capacity to make institutional promises and full control over the military, that make them resilient to sanction-induced economic pain. Despite the presence of a legitimizing ideology, we find little evidence that sanctions influence regime durability in these contexts. Next consider the findings for oil revenue and sanction effectiveness. Figure 5.5 shows how oil wealth influences the findings for autocratic transitions. The vertical axis depicts the change in the predicted probability of autocratic transition when targeted by a sanction. The horizontal axis depicts the range of values for oil wealth. The upper solid line for personalist regimes shows that the change in the predicted risk of autocratic transition is almost 4 percent in a dictatorship with no oil wealth. As oil rents increase, however, the change in the predicted risk of autocratic transition falls to less than 1 percent. Oil wealth, therefore, helps stabilize personalist dictatorships when targeted by sanctions. The influence of oil wealth is similarly stabilizing in military and party regimes, but overall sanctions have little impact on party regime stability.

Robustness Tests We examined a number of alternative specifications. One model excludes three control variables (war, military intervention, and GDP per capita).

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A second includes all forms of military intervention, even supporting invasions. Another includes controls for aid and trade (differenced and lagged). Additional models include one with country- and year-fixed effects as well as one without unit effects. We also test a linear probability model with unit-fixed effects. The main results are robust to all these changes. Next we examined different types of sanctions. Brooks (2002) argues that trade sanctions and, more generally, comprehensive sanctions are ineffective against autocracies. She advocates for targeted financial sanctions. Yet, some existing evidence indicates that comprehensive sanctions may be more effective (Cortright and Lopez, 2000, 2002; Drezner, 2011). In results reported in replication materials, we find that trade sanctions are more effective than financial sanctions in destabilizing personalist dictators, but that comprehensive sanctions are no more destabilizing. Third, we employed an alternative measure of sanctions, from Morgan et al. (2009). Similar to our approach with the Hufbauer data, we examine imposed sanctions, lagged one year. The Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) data set records nearly 1300 autocratic country-years targeted by sanctions, whereas the Hufbauer data record fewer than 800. Further, the overlap between the data sets during the postwar period is quite small, given that they purport to measure the same thing; the correlation is less 0.40. Despite the differences in the same variable of interest, we find similar results, especially when we model unit-fixed effects: sanctions in personalist dictatorships are associated with an increased likelihood of regime collapse that leads to a new dictatorship. Finally, we tested a subset of sanctions that Hufbauer et al. (2007) code as democracy-promotion sanctions, which comprise 62 percent of the total sanction-years in the sample. We find similar results to those reported for all sanctions: they destabilize personalist regimes, but only by increasing the risk of autocratic transition, and have little influence on stability in other dictatorships.37 Thus, even once we isolate the sanctions that are intended to promote democracy, we find little evidence that this outcome is likely to occur.

Modeling Selection The study of sanctions may suffer from selection bias for two reasons (Nooruddin, 2002; Marinov, 2005). First, senders may target some regimes because they consider them to be more vulnerable to foreign pressure or 37 Using the TIES data, we find that “regime destabilizing” and “human rights” sanctions increase the risk of autocratic transition but decrease the risk of democratic transition in personalist regimes, though neither result is statistically significant. Nonetheless, this pattern is consistent with that found employing the Hufbauer data.

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Table 5.1. Selection-corrected probability of autocratic transition All regimes

Military

Party

All personal

Oil-rich personal

Oil-poor personal

Under sanction

2.4

2.1

1.1

5.4

2.9

7.5

No sanction

2.5

4.1

1.5

3.3

2.0

3.6

Difference

0.2

–2.0

–0.4

2.1

0.9

3.9

t-stat

0.7

6.6

4.1

3.2

1.9

3.6

Note: Second-stage predicted probabilities. Oil rents cut-point is $10 per capita.

because of policies which senders dislike and that may be destabilizing in the targeted country. Second, selection bias may be caused by regimes’ selfselection into sanction episodes. The first mechanism is driven by observable factors like political-economic conditions that the sender takes into account to make its decision to coerce. We can observe (and measure) them as well and have attempted to do this through a battery of control variables discussed above. Conversely, the second source of bias is likely to be caused by unobservable factors because autocrats self-select on factors that only they know. One way of dealing with selection is to estimate a two-stage Heckman model, which allows us to control for both observable and unobservable factors influencing leaders’ self-selection into conflicts. We use a probit model in the first stage to estimate the probability of being under sanctions.38 The second stage estimates the survival model and includes the inverse Mill’s ratios computed from the first-stage regressions. Specifically, for each value j ∈ (Sanctions, NoSanctions) of the dependent variable in the first-stage, we estimate the second-stage equation including the respective Mill’s ratios. The coefficients obtained through this method should be unbiased if we believe we have accurately modeled the selection process. This allows us to calculate the predicted probability of losing power of each first-stage outcome j for the entire sample and for each of the sanction settings of interest. Table 5.1 reports the mean predicted probabilities of regime-failure exit for each type of dictatorship, as well as the differences in means and the t-statistics from one-sided tests, with similar results to those reported in Figures 5.4 and 5.5. While sanctions only destabilize personalist regimes, the main effect is concentrated among the oil-poor dictatorships in this category. 38 The covariates in the first stage include: international and civil war, foreign military intervention, Personalist, Party, oil rents, regime duration polynomials, and time period dummies. As first stage instruments, we also include Size (logged GDPlogged Population), Colony (British or French), and ColonyOil. An F-test indicates that these three variables are jointly insignificant in the outcome equation but jointly significant in the selection equation. The results of the first stage model are reported in Appendix B.

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Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival S A NC T IO N S A ND AM I N’ S PERSONALIST RULE IN UGANDA

To this point, we have offered evidence that sanctions are more likely to decrease revenue, curtail spending, and increase repression in personalist dictatorships than in other types of autocracies. Consistent with this, we have also found that sanctions destabilize oil-poor personalist autocracies but that this change does not entail democratization but a new dictatorship being installed. In this section we examine how sanctions destabilized Idi Amin’s regime in Uganda from 1971 to 1979. Uganda’s prior president and first leader after independence, Milton Obote, appointed Idi Amin major general and commander of the army in 1964. Amin’s high-ranking appointment in the military was part of Obote’s strategy to consolidate power and purge the rival Buganda faction from his support coalition. In 1966, Obote suspended the constitution and declared himself president, replacing Bugandan President Mutesa. After an assassination attempt on Obote in 1969, however, the president reorganized his support coalition again, this time reducing his reliance on Amin and the army. Amin and other high-ranking officers posed a potential threat to Obote because they recruited and promoted members of West Nile tribes. To counter the growing strength of these groups, Obote further increased the size of the special forces and secret police; “within the army Langi and Acholi officers were given rapid promotion and an attempt was made to isolate and neutralize Amin” (Glentworth and Hancock, 1973, 246). The military was thus quickly transformed into a recruiting tool for Obote supporters. As part of this process, Obote moved Amin to an administrative military position in 1970. In 1971, Idi Amin staged a military coup against President Obote while he was out of the country attending the Commonwealth Conference in Singapore. Obote settled in exile in Tanzania and began organizing military opposition to Amin, drawing support from Ugandans who subsequently fled Amin’s purges. At the time of the coup, Amin enjoyed popular support, though the rationale for the coup clearly lay in military politics. As Glentworth and Hancock (1973, 248) emphasize, “the immediate cause of the military coup was the attempt to re-align the factions controlling the Uganda armed forces.”39 Amin quickly moved to consolidate power. After the coup, he suspended the National Assembly, effectively giving himself legislative power. His first cabinet was mostly composed of public servants, and included only one other 39

See also Ravenhill (1974).

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member of the armed forces (Ravenhill, 1974, 231). However, the influence of the cabinet was small at best, and the balance of power progressively shifted to the military. Conflict between Amin and his cabinet ensued in 1972. Some ministers were dismissed while others resigned; and the minister of foreign affairs, Wanume Kibedi, defected. In early 1973, Amin suspended all ministers for thirty days; these “holidays” were later extended indefinitely. By March, Amin effectively ruled without a cabinet or a legislature (Ravenhill, 1974, 235). Amin also took steps to consolidate power over the military. OmaraOtunnu (1987, 105) summarizes the institutional changes to this effect: On the same day that he announced his cabinet . . . Amin promulgated the first decree of his rule, the Armed Forces decree, according to which supreme authority and control of the military was conferred on himself . . . This effectively delimited and circumscribed the powers of other Army officers vis-à-vis Amin as Commander-inChief. A few days later the posts of Army Chief of Staff and Chief of Air Staff, which had been created by Obote to counterbalance Amin’s influence, were suspended.

As previously under Obote, ethnicity became the main criterion for recruitment and promotion within the army. However, now the privileged groups were the Kakwa (Amin’s ethnic group), the Lugbara, and the Madi. Amin also recruited mercenaries to aid the military, including Nubian, Congolese, and Southern Sudanese fighters (Ravenhill, 1974, 241). Fighting between factions in the army continued after the coup as Amin purged officers belonging to rival ethnics groups. The 1971 coup and the subsequent killings caused the first wave of Lango and Acholi soldiers to flee to Tanzania.40 About a thousand of these exiles led the first attempt to invade Uganda from Tanzania in September 1972, an attack repelled by Amin’s forces. After the invasion, military purges accelerated, and by late 1972, Ravenhill (1974, 241) estimates that the number of Ugandan soldiers stood at less than one-third of its precoup total. Despite aid from the U.K. and Israel, Uganda’s economy soon deteriorated—the result of large increases in military spending, economic mismanagement, the decay of public services, and declining agricultural productivity in rural areas left under strongman rule (Decalo, 1985; Brett, 1995). To regain popular support and divert the attention from the crisis, Amin declared “economic war” on foreigners in 1972, leading to the expulsion of thousands of Asians living in Uganda and the expropriation of their assets. Dozens of British businesses were nationalized as well. This did not halt economic decline, as exports and state revenues continued to shrink (Ravenhill, 1974; 40 According to Melady and Melady (1977, 33), in the first year after the coup, about twothirds of the Lango and Acholi soldiers were killed.

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Brett, 1995). After Amin cemented a new alliance with Gaddafi’s Libya, he expelled the Israelis as well. Yet, as Brett (1995, 139) points out, “support derived from the expulsion was exhausted by 1974, and the resources available to pay off members of the political elite were to diminish continuously thereafter.” To continue delivering private goods, the regime reorganized local administrative districts, giving top officers control over the newly created provinces. With fewer resources to fund patronage, the regime turned to repression. Coercion soon moved beyond purges in the military to target political opponents and potential dissidents. Assassinations and disappearances increased, especially those targeting intellectuals, public servants, top bureaucrats, judges, Christian leaders, students, and journalists (Melady and Melady, 1977). State repression under Amin’s dictatorship is estimated to have resulted in the deaths of perhaps as many as 300,000 Ugandans.41 Despite growing brutality, Amin’s regime initially received little attention from the U.S. and international organizations. Few cared about the events in Uganda, with some exceptions. The U.S. ambassador in Uganda, Thomas Melady, relayed information on the atrocities and recommended the U.S. close its diplomatic mission, which it did in November 1973 (Melady and Melady, 1977, 55). Foreign economic pressure against Amin began in 1972 when the Israeli and British governments suspended arms sales and military aid. The British also withheld loans, while the U.S., Canada, and Israel suspended aid programs and security assistance (Ravenhill, 1974, 246). After breaking relations with his initial allies, Amin sought ties with Libya and the Soviet Union, which quickly became Uganda’s main arms supplier.42 Even though the U.S. closed the diplomatic mission and discontinued economic and military aid, it did not initially take coercive action against Uganda. In 1977 U.S. Congressman Donald Pease called for sanctions, fully aware of the regime’s dependence on coffee exports and that the U.S. was the largest export destination (Nurnberger, 2003, 72). Similarly, Ullman (1978) argued that sanctions would be effective in undermining Amin’s regime precisely because of Uganda’s dependence on coffee exports for obtaining foreign exchange. Foreign revenue was crucial to Amin’s strategy of providing private goods to his core group of supporters in the army and among civil servants (Miller, 1980, 121); coffee exports accounted for the bulk of this money.43 Referring 41 Estimates of the death total as a result of Amin’s repression range from a minimum of 80,000 up to 500,000. See Patrick Keatley, “Obituary: Idi Amin,” The Guardian, 18 August 2003. 42 “Fall of Idi Amin,” Economic and Political Weekly, 26 May 1979, 14 (21): 907–10. 43 Nurnberger (1982, 50) estimates that by 1977 coffee exports accounted for 97 percent of Uganda’s foreign export earnings. Prior to Amin’s regime, coffee earnings represented only 53 percent of Uganda’s total foreign income.

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to Ugandan coffee exports, Thomas Melady, former U.S. Ambassador to Uganda, pointed out that “[n]ot one penny goes back to poor Ugandans. It all goes back to Amin’s mercenaries. They live quite well.”44 The state-owned Coffee Marketing Board controlled these exports and used this power to extract rents. Coffee purchases by the U.S., U.K., France, Japan, and West Germany accounted for 73 percent of Uganda’s total export income, with U.S. coffee purchases alone accounting for over one-third of Uganda’s total export earnings (Nurnberger, 1982, 51).45 Eventually, President Carter signed a total trade ban in October 1978.

Sanctions and Loyalty to Amin The U.S. trade embargo helped destabilize Amin’s regime, though there is some debate about the specific mechanisms through which this worked. Members of U.S. Congress who pushed for sanctions, such as Senators Hatfield and Church, defended the boycott as the primary cause of Amin’s downfall (Nurnberger, 1982, 60). The sanctions weakened Amin’s regime by restricting the flow of funds needed to pay for oil imports and military salaries (Nurnberger, 1982, 72). That the embargo hurt coffee exports, and thus Amin’s ability to pay his military, is not in doubt. In March 1979 the British began cooperating with the U.S. to restrict “whiskey runs,” “through which luxury goods for the Ugandan military were delivered” (Miller, 1980, 124). Drezner (1999, 13) largely concurs, again citing the importance of international cooperation: “when Britain halted the export of luxury goods . . . [t]his hurt the Ugandan army elite.” Economic decline throughout the 1970s had already sapped military support for Amin, as fewer resources for patronage became a source of indiscipline and discontent. The measures initially adopted by the Carter administration, the announcement of Congressional action in 1977, and the coffee boycott and other financial restrictions in 1978, further contributed to waning military support. As emphasized by Miller (1980), the U.S. embargo hurt more than coffee exports. Scarcity of spare parts from U.S. manufacturers created difficulties in a number of economic sectors. IBM withdrew from Uganda, for example, leaving the government without a mechanized system to make payments to soldiers and civil servants (Miller, 1980, 122). Further, “the suspension of petroleum shipments to Uganda in October 1978 had a severe 44 Quoted in “Ex-ambassador asks end to importing ‘Amin’ coffee,” (United Press International) Eugene Register-Guard, 15 November 1974. 45 However, coffee from Uganda only represented about 7 percent of U.S. coffee imports (Nurnberger, 1982).

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impact on the Ugandan economy and ultimately limited Amin’s military options to fight the Tanzanian invasion” (Miller, 1980, 123).

Sanctions and Foreign Invasion In April 1978, Amin made a move to retain the loyalty of his remaining officers with a series of promotions. But promotion had been overused, as “it seemed to be losing its effectiveness” (Omara-Otunnu, 1987, 140). In late 1978, troops loyal to Mustafa Adrisi, the military’s second-in-command, mutinied after he was injured in a suspicious car accident. The insurrection quickly spread to other groups in the armed forces, such as the Simba and Chui Battalions.46 The revolt was brutally crushed. This set the stage for Amin’s decision to invade Tanzania. Omara-Otunnu (1987, 141) describes the situation: Under growing pressure from his own Army, and faced with ever more serious alienation from the populace, Amin decided to embark on a military adventure. In mid-October he ordered his troops to move into, and to annex, Tanzanian territory north of the Kagera River . . . The annexation was also designed to provide the military with credit for a tangible and supposedly glorious achievement, which might deflect the soldiers from seeking an alternative leader.

With his capacity to reward support and to repress undermined, Amin used international conflict in an effort to neutralize his internal opponents in the military by preventing exiles from returning and invading the country (Chiozza and Goemans, 2011, 21). Conflict was thus motivated by the increased risk of a forced ouster, which sanctions had made more likely. Some scholars argue that the coffee boycott may not have been the proximate cause of Amin’s ouster, but nonetheless influenced his decision to invade Tanzania and Nyerere’s subsequent decision to counterstrike and depose Amin (Miller, 1980; Lindsay, 1986; Nurnberger, 2003). Nurnberger (1982, 61), for example, notes that “Amin became increasingly nervous as he saw coffee begin to pile up in the nation’s warehouses.” Sanctions on coffee exports jeopardized Amin’s method of retaining military loyalty, and he responded with a diversionary military operation. Amin sought to solve two problems—foreign pressure and mutiny in the military—with one move, as he sent the most problematic and disloyal battalions to annex the Kagera Salient in Tanzania in October 1978 and to

46

“Fall of Idi Amin,” Economic and Political Weekly, 26 May 1979, 14 (21): 907–10.

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pursue rebels that refuged there.47 The timing of Amin’s decision to attack clearly suggests that it was a response to the trade embargo (Miller, 1980, 125). Further, sanctions signaled international disapproval and helped convince Nyerere to attack. Nurnberger (1982, 61) notes that, “[t]he embargo served as a stimulus to convince Nyerere that he would have United States support against Amin. He interpreted the Congressional actions as a carte blanche from the United States to take actions against Amin.” Indeed, a report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service attributed Tanzanian military involvement to U.S. sanctions: they helped “persuad[e] Nyerere that the time was propitious for intervention in Uganda,” and “encouraged the Ugandan exile opposition to unite and begin coordinating action against Amin” (cited in Miller, 1980, 125). Amin’s consolidation of power over the military through purges, forced exile, and executions, combined with cuts to foreign military assistance, weakened the fighting capacity of what remained of his army. The Tanzanian People’s Defense Force (TPDF) successfully repelled the attack, and on November 14, 1978, Nyerere gave the order to invade Uganda. The TPDF, joined by nearly 1000 Ugandan exiles organized into the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), defeated Amin’s troops. In April 1979 Kampala fell. Amin fled to exile in Libya and later Saudi Arabia, where he died in 2003. The UNLF took power and new elections were held in 1980. Milton Obote’s UPC won the election, but amid allegations of fraud, one of the candidates, a UNLF leader named Yoweri Museveni, started an armed rebellion. Museveni would eventually topple Obote’s government, and remains in power in 2014. The Ugandan case demonstrates the complexity of assessing sanctions success. The proximate event that precipitates Amin’s ouster is obviously foreign military intervention. However, as the case study evidence indicates, economic sanctions were central to how events unfolded in Uganda in 1978. While Pape (1997) argues that military intervention accounts for many cases of “sanctions success,” this perspective may overlook the causal role sanctions play in bringing about interventions in the first instance as well as laying the groundwork for their success (Peterson and Drury, 2011). Sanctions against Amin influenced his regime’s survival through both of these mechanisms. Despite the fact that Tanzania’s military forced Amin from power, the Ugandan example nonetheless illustrates the main mechanism through which sanctions work: striking at the patronage resources personalist dictatorships use to retain the loyalty of their coalition. Without revenue from coffee 47

Regimes with counterbalanced militaries have been shown to be more likely to initiate international conflicts (Belkin and Schofer, 2005). As in the case of Uganda, conflicts may serve to foster divisiveness and rivalries among the armed forces (Chiozza and Goemans, 2011).

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exports, Amin was unable to pay his military. Promises of future payment and promotion were not credible. He ruled without a legislature and abandoned potential civilian allies when he disbanded his own cabinet. So while diversionary military invasion is certainly part of the story, the timing of this move indicates it was a direct response to the destabilizing political costs imposed by sanctions. Further, sanctions weakened Amin’s military capacity and signaled international approval for Tanzanian intervention. Because sanctions and military intervention are often intertwined, it is important to account for foreign military interventions when examining a large number of cases. We have done this in our empirical analysis by controlling for hostile military interventions. Recall that even once we account for interventions, we find evidence that sanctions are destabilizing under some circumstances. However, consistent with Pape’s (1997) critique of sanctions, our results tend to be stronger when we do not account for military interventions. This suggests that military incursions account for some of the success often attributed to sanctions: without accounting for the former, we would overstate the destabilizing effect of sanctions.

DISCUSSION Our findings in many ways corroborate existing research, much of which shows that sanctions are ineffective in destabilizing dictatorships and may even hurt democracy (Marinov, 2005; Wood, 2008; Peksen, 2009, 2010).48 However, we show that sanctions can destabilize personalist regimes that lack access to oil rents. Sanctions may undermine a personalist regime’s ability to reward support through patronage and its capacity to coerce its opponents. According to our framework, this makes opponents more likely to rebel or supporters more likely to defect, thus decreasing the expected utility of resisting in power. Yet, with few options for obtaining domestic guarantees, 48

Peksen and Drury (2010) investigate how sanctions influence the Freedom House’s aggregate index of political rights and civil liberties. This measure, while coinciding with regime change in some cases, is distinct because it groups together two concepts that may not actually influence regime transition. Stable autocratic leaders may restrict media openness or concede some rudimentary political rights without ceding power. Indeed, institutionalization of representation in a legislative body may be a tactic to preserve autocratic power (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Boix and Svolik, 2013). While Freedom House scores may pick up regime institutionalization, in many cases this means autocratic stability, not instability. Recall from Chapter 2 that our measure of democratization marks a fundamental change in the group of elite that rules and selects leaders.

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personalist rulers are unlikely to step down. They prefer to fight for survival, but, weakened by sanctions, they sometimes lose. When defeat approaches, they often seek foreign protection and go into exile, as Amin did. However, even though sanctions destabilize personalist rule, we demonstrate that this does not mean that sanctions help democracy. Sanctions just increase the likelihood of an autocratic transition. Because our research is the first to examine different types of autocratic regime failure—both democratic and autocratic transition—we have uncovered a new mechanism through which sanctions may in some sense “work.” If sanctions are destabilizing, they can impose a political cost on the target regime, and this political cost can potentially be used to extract policy concessions. The possibility that sanctions can destabilize autocratic regimes in a narrow set of circumstances must be tempered when we consider how economic coercion influences the well-being of citizens in the target state. Defining and then identifying sanctions “success” is not straightforward (Baldwin, 1999/ 2000). While much of the sanctions debate revolves around whether they “work,” recent research on sanctions underscores the negative effect of sanctions on the citizens in target states (Weiss et al., 1997; Weiss, 1999; Peksen, 2011). To cite one example, sanctions critics point to the harm they caused to many Iraqi citizens when Hussein’s regime was targeted in the 1990s (Cortright and Lopez, 1999; Mueller and Mueller, 1999; Herring, 2002). Economic coercion led to hyperinflation that affected many basic goods: the price of bread increased by nearly 3000 percent, and that of infant formula by over 2000 percent (Al-Samarrai, 1995, 137). The maternal mortality rate more than doubled from 1989 to 1997, while the mortality rate of children under five increased from thirty per one thousand live births to ninety-seven during the same period. According to U.N. estimates, “the dietary energy supply had fallen from 3.1 to 1.1 kilo calories per capita per day by 1994–5. The prevalence of malnutrition in Iraqi children under five almost doubled from 1991 to 1996.”49 Another study found that maternal and infant mortality in the south and central regions of Iraq skyrocketed after the imposition of U.N. sanctions, but actually declined in autonomous regions of Iraq that were neither under Hussein’s rule nor covered by international sanctions (Ali and Shah, 2000). Critics of sanctions thus argue that even if sanctions could work to change policies in the target regime, they may be too costly for the population of the targeted country to bear serious consideration (Mueller and Mueller, 1999). United Nations, “Report of the Second Panel Established Pursuant to the Note by the President of the Security Council of 30 January 1990 (S/1999/100). Concerning the Current Humanitarian Situation in Iraq.” S/1999/346, Annex II (30 March 1999). 49

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If sanctions can be effective in extracting policy concessions in personalist regimes and if they do not disproportionately harm citizens’ well-being in the target countries, then perhaps this would be justification for the selective use of sanctions in these cases. Given our analysis of how personalist dictators respond to sanctions with domestic spending and repression, however, we doubt that this is true. Indeed it is possible that sanctions are the most harmful to citizens in personalist regimes precisely because these leaders respond to foreign economic coercion with spending cuts and increased repression. To inform speculation on this point, we examine how sanctions influence average daily calorie consumption in dictatorships. Using the Geddes et al. (2014a) sample of regimes, we examine a model with the natural log of (total) calories per capita as the dependent variable and control for country- and year-fixed effects. We include variables for sanctions and personalist regimes and the interaction between the two. We also control for hostile military intervention.50 We test an error-correction model to account for the longand short-term effects of sanctions. Figure 5.6 shows the results.51 Sanctions in non-personalist regimes are associated with a 5-percent decrease in daily average calorie consumption in target countries. In personalist regimes, this figure jumps to 14 percent and is statistically significant. Military interventions are also associated with fewer calories—roughly a 7-percent decrease. This evidence is consistent with the conjecture that sanctions may be the most harmful to the general population in personalist autocracies. Thus, even if policymakers view sanctions targeted at personalist dictators as a possible strategy for extracting policy concessions, these are precisely the types of sanctions that have historically been most harmful to the citizens of the target country—at least as measured by calorie consumption. This evidence poses a dilemma for democratic states and international organizations that may choose to sanction personalist dictators. Sanctions not only are associated with an increase in human rights violations (Figure 5.3), but they pose an additional burden on the population by reducing calorie consumption. 50

h

This variable takes the value of 1 when there is at least one hostile military intervention in the target country (by either a democratic or non-democratic sender) and the value of 2 when both hostile interventions come from both democratic and non-democratic senders. 51 We calculate the percentage change with the transformed sanctions coefficient estimating the long-run multiplier for personalist dictators, âS|Pers  âS + âPers * S: (exp(âS|Pers  F)  1) * 100, where F ¼ varðbÞ 2 . Error bands calculated from variance-correction suggested by van Garderen et al. (2002); the approximate unbiased variance is: varðb^Þ ¼ 1002 * expð2b^Þ * ðexpð varðbÞÞ  expð2 * varðbÞÞÞ. Sample includes 2714 observations in 192 regimes in ninety-nine countries from 1962 to 2004. Estimating sample excludes outlier observations (1 percent with largest squared residuals). Estimates are robust to excluding 0.1 percent to 5 percent of sample observations with largest squared residuals as outliers.

h

h

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0 –4.5 % change in calories

–5 –7.4 –10 –14.4 –15

–20

–25 Sanction (non-personal)

Sanction (personal) 95% CI

Military intervention

Estimate

Figure 5.6. Sanctions and calorie consumption. Percentage change in average daily calories. Years: 1962–2005. Long-run multipliers based on Bewley transformation of an error correction model with country- and year-fixed effects. Sources: FAO (2008); Pickering and Kisangani (2009); Geddes et al. (2014a).

Further, states and international organizations (IOs) must also consider the costs to the sender in their calculus of the expected effectiveness of sanctions (Baldwin, 1999/2000). Restricted economic exchanges may harm firms and workers in some sectors of the senders’ economy. All these costs should be compared to the costs of not acting against a personalist ruler, which entails a series of risks as well. For example, civil wars are more likely to start in personalist regimes (Gurses and Mason, 2010), these dictators are the most likely to initiate international military conflicts (Peceny et al., 2002; Peceny and Beer, 2003; Reiter and Stam, 2003; Belkin and Schofer, 2005; Weeks, 2008), and are also more likely to pursue nuclear weapons (Way and Weeks, 2014). These conflicts leave many victims of violence and have long-lasting economic consequences. If by destabilizing a personalist dictator, sanctions reduce the risk of conflict, policymakers must weigh these potential benefits against the human and domestic costs. However, even if economic sanctions can help depose a personalist dictator, many are simply replaced by a new dictator or a failed state. Indeed we find little evidence that sanctions enhance the prospects of democratization.

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6

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Naming and Shaming Dictatorships Shortly after the end of the Second World War, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) was formed to promote and protect human rights. It issued its first reprimand in 1967, targeting the apartheid regime in South Africa. The first human rights investigation outside of South Africa or a country in the midst of an international conflict was conducted by the UNCHR in the late 1970s and targeted Pinochet’s military regime in Chile. In 2006, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) was created to replace the UNCHR, which had been largely criticized for being ineffective, particularly after losing credibility when Libya was selected to chair the Commission in 2003. International NGOs (INGOs) have also been active in shaming human rights abusers by disseminating reports cataloguing violations and identifying those responsible. Amnesty International (AI) began its letter-writing campaigns in 1965, three years after it released its first annual report on prisoners of conscience.1 Another INGO, Human Rights Watch (HRW), began monitoring human rights violations in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1978, shortly after the signing of the Helsinki Accords (1975). In the 1980s, HRW quickly expanded its coverage to most other regions of the world. Perhaps since the advent of mass-produced print newspapers, the media have also served to name and shame human rights abusers. Amidst the debate over the slave trade in early nineteenth-century Great Britain, an antiabolition M.P., General Gascoyne, once complained, “[t]he attempts to make a popular clamour against the trade were never so conspicuous as during the last election, when the public newspapers had teemed with abuse of this trade” (Furneaux, 1974, 251).2 One of the earliest international human rights shaming campaigns dates from the fifteenth century, when a Spanish bishop in Chiapas, Bartolomé de las Casas, lobbied the Spanish crown to end the slave trade in the “Americas.” With a long, though sporadic history, human rights

1 2

On the history and functioning of AI see Hopgood (2006). Quoted in Drescher (1994, 148).

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shaming has become much more common in the past two decades, a trend documented in the first chapter (Figure 1.4). In this chapter, we examine how shaming campaigns directed by international organizations influence regime survival. We posit three mechanisms, each with different empirical implications: (1) shaming increases domestic pressure on the target regime in countries with strong human rights norms; (2) shaming encourages international organizations and democratic countries to materially punish targeted regimes by reducing aid and imposing new sanctions; and (3) shaming raises exit costs for targeted elites. We first explore how shaming campaigns can bring down regimes in target countries with higher levels of human rights norms. Target countries with citizens who have experienced respect for human rights under democratic rule may be more susceptible to shaming because international campaigns help mobilize domestic pressure where prior normative fit is strongest. Domestic groups bolstered by shaming campaigns can undermine the regime’s ability to control and deter opposition’s activities (# R). When the norms logic extends to professionalized military elites, shaming can alter the elite preferences regarding the use of repression and even regarding the appropriateness of military rule itself (# S and # R)—officers who have been soldiers under democratic rule may be more apt to liberalize when targeted by shaming campaigns because they have a lower tolerance for human rights repression in the first place. Thus domestic pressure mobilized by international shaming campaigns may persuade military elites to step down. This often results in divisions among the ruling coalition, eroding the regime’s support. By activating prior human rights norms, shaming campaigns can therefore raise the regime’s costs of both obtaining domestic support and pursuing repression, thus reducing the expected utility of retaining power. Second, we posit a material explanation for how shaming campaigns might influence regime stability. We examine the costliness of shaming via reduced aid and the imposition of new sanctions. If shaming campaigns marshal international support for cutting aid to targeted dictators and prompt economic sanctions, shaming could hurt elite supporters. By reducing the international revenue sources necessary to retain loyalty through patronage (P), shaming would lower the probability of retaining power (# P ! # p) if the regime resists. Much like our explanation for why sanctions are destabilizing, this logic should be strongest not only in those regimes that lose the most when shamed but also in regimes that are most dependent on external resources to fund supporters. As we will see below (under ‘The Material Costs of Shame’), personalist regimes tend to be hurt the worst when targeted by a shaming campaign; and as we demonstrated in Chapter 5, these autocracies are also the most susceptible to loss of external sources of revenue to pay

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their support coalition. Thus, if shaming destabilizes by helping international actors punish them, the evidence should be strongest for personalist regimes. Finally, we consider the possibility that shaming deters repressive leaders from stepping down. By highlighting repression in dictatorships, international shaming campaigns may impose costs on the ruler and his elite supporters should the regime relinquish power. We know that when many regimes fall, their leaders seek to destroy evidence of repressive behavior. As Russian troops approached Auschwitz in 1945, for example, the SS blew up the gas chambers at Birkenau and the Gestapo ordered prisoners to burn evidence documenting their repressive apparatus (Shelley, 1992, 10).3 More recently, Egyptian protestors found piles of shredded documents when they stormed the main offices of the state security agency in early March 2011 in an attempt to preserve evidence of repression that could implicate senior officials.4 This behavior indicates that documentation of repression can harm perpetrators by increasing the likelihood that they will be brought to justice once they leave power (↑ q). When the Spanish judge Baltazar Garzón attempted to prosecute Pinochet in 1998, the judicial team relied on information collected during the human rights shaming campaign in the 1970s and 1980s (Roht-Arriaza, 2005). Without this documentation, the investigators would have had little evidence to pursue prosecution. If international shaming campaigns produce information about repression that can later be used to punish dictators should they step down, shaming should raise the costs of leaving power, and could thus lead dictators to cling to power. This argument is the opposite of the “exit guarantee” logic: exposing and documenting repression weakens the promise of protection for exiting leaders and elite supporters. The evidence for this explanation should be strongest in dictatorships where leaders face the worst post-exit outcomes. As we show in Chapter 3, personalist dictators are more likely to be killed or jailed upon leaving power; thus this argument implies that shaming should deter personalist regimes from stepping down. These three arguments—norms, material punishment, and direct exit costs—have different empirical implications. If the norms logic is correct, we should find evidence that shaming is more likely to destabilize military regimes because they rely most on repression and are more prone to elite divisions. The material punishment argument points to personalist dictatorships because these regimes are the hardest hit by the loss of aid and new sanctions when targeted by shaming campaigns. Finally, the exit-cost argument also points to 3

Also see Rees (2005, 326). Sarah El Deeb, “Egyptians fear evidence of abuse will be destroyed,” Associated Press, 5 March 2011. 4

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personalist dictatorships; however, it implies that shaming should make regime change more unlikely—the opposite prediction of the material punishment explanation. International actors direct human rights shaming campaigns at specific leaders and regimes. The three arguments we consider in this chapter posit a direct effect on the targeted regime; in the next, we examine whether the growing tide of human rights prosecutions deters dictatorships from relinquishing power. Much of the recent research on human rights shaming examines how international shaming campaigns influence human rights practices. HafnerBurton (2008), for example, shows that shaming increases violent repression outcomes in targeted countries but improves respect for political rights. In contrast, DeMeritt (2012) and Krain (2012) find that shaming reduces the likelihood and severity of state-sponsored mass killings. Similarly, Franklin (2008) shows that governments subject to criticism tend to reduce repression in the short-term. The search for how human rights naming and shaming can “work” took a step forward with Lebovic and Voeten’s (2009) study of UNCHR resolutions and foreign aid, which finds that this form of shaming reduces foreign aid in targeted countries. We build on this work by expanding their analysis to test whether the influence of resolutions varies by regime type. We examine regime survival not repression, though our findings have implications for the study of repression as well because such behavior is a strategic response to opponents in an attempt to remain in power (Davenport, 2007b). As we illustrated in Chapter 3, regimes vary substantially in their use of repression and the intensity of this behavior varies in predictable ways relative to the use of other strategies for dealing with the opposition—namely buying support and institutional co-optation. Establishing the link between shaming and regime survival should therefore be treated as a first step in a larger examination of how shaming can influence repression in dictatorships.

SHAMING AND AUTOCRA TIC POLITICS

Norms and Domestic Pressure The first approach we examine builds on the norms literature in international relations, which argues that beliefs and rules embodied in a set of norms can influence domestic politics when actors appeal to an international norm to further their own domestic political interests (Cortell and Davis, 1996; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). These mechanisms shape political outcomes when the

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domestic salience of the norms is high and when domestic actors have jurisdiction over the policy to which the norms apply. In dictatorships, repressive practices are typically well within the purview of the targeted government, though in some cases, for example during civil war, human rights abuses committed by non-state actors may be beyond the control of the government (Hafner-Burton and Ron, 2009). Since our focus is on autocratic politics, we concentrate on the normative fit argument: when international norms match domestic norms, human rights shaming should have a stronger effect on the behavior of the targeted regime. Hawkins (2002b, 37–8) summarizes the logic as: “[i]nternational norms and transnational actors are unlikely to have much impact if they promote ideas, beliefs, and values that fit poorly with preexisting, domestic social understandings.” He cites the failure of international campaign against female genital mutilation as a case in which international norms may not fit domestic cultural values in parts of some countries. This is particularly true for domestic anti-regime groups. Shaming campaigns against autocracies are more likely to target countries where there are more human rights organizations (Meernik et al., 2012). At the same time, there are usually more groups in countries where autocracies replace previous democratic governments. Transnational linkages between domestic and foreign human rights groups increase the mobilization capacity of domestic groups, both through grassroots organizing and lobbying elites (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Murdie, 2014). First, INGOs help domestic groups’ activities by gathering information and highlighting repressive behavior to other countries. Second, INGOs provide local protest groups with direct funding as well as with educational programs and legal assistance, and can also train them in anti-regime tactics (Murdie and Bhasin, 2011; Murdie, 2012). Direct support for domestic groups should be stronger where there are local human rights organizations and prior linkages to these groups via participation in international organizations. Murdie and Bhasin (2011, 167), for example, argue that “local representatives serve as conduits for resources provided by [human rights organizations], including the latest information about government atrocities and assistance to local groups already engaged in pressuring their governments for protection of human rights.” The domestic understanding of an issue is critical to whether it matches the conceptualization of the issue by international actors. The framing of repression is adaptable, and political actors attempt to shape how this behavior is interpreted. Importantly, this also affects regime elites faced with growing externally assisted domestic discontent. In Chile, for example, the military

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regime used rhetoric about the dangers of Marxism and the threat of armed civil war to depict repression as a national defense issue. Human rights advocates countered by framing repression and military government itself as a violation of normal life for Chileans. When the opposition was first allowed to advertise on television in the late 1980s, for instance, they opted for commercials that linked military rule with the disappearance of family members and the inability of elderly citizens to buy packets for their afternoon tea—both sharp departures from “normalcy” for ordinary Chileans. Hawkins’ work on Chile demonstrates the proximate mechanisms in this argument. He shows that efforts to frame repression as a rule-breaking activity contributed to the success of the international shaming campaign targeting the Pinochet regime. An international shaming campaign that appeals to rulesoriented officers can shape their view of repression as well as the appropriateness of military rule itself, thus causing divisions among the ruling officers. Shaming becomes salient to reformist officers when they view repression as a violation of a lawful and orderly society that they value. Hawkins (2002b, 64) quotes a high-ranking military officer defending the regime by highlighting the legality of military rule: “Yes we’re a legal government. We are not a dictatorship of the tropical variety.” Once repressive behavior is understood as illegal behavior, reformers in the military may be less likely to support military rule, particularly if it depends on continued repression that falls outside their understanding of “legality.” This logic echoes traditional explanations of authoritarian breakdown which pointed at elite divisions as the main factor explaining transitions from dictatorship (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, 19; Przeworski, 1991). Military regimes are particularly prone to such divisions, as Geddes (1999) suggests. Such splits within the regime can be caused by domestic factors, such as economic crises, but also, we argue, splits can be externally induced by foreign actors’ strategies, in this case, international shaming campaigns. Military dictatorships typically have more professionalized officers than strongman rule (Geddes et al., 2014b), and more so than other regimes, they arise after a period of democratic rule. During the third wave of democratization, for example, over one-half of the military regimes that democratized had come to power in coups that displaced elected democrats, whereas just over one-third of the personalist regimes that democratized arose from prior democracy, and only 20 percent of party regimes. If the normative fit argument explains how shaming destabilizes dictatorships, we expect the evidence to be strongest in military regimes for two reasons: higher pressure from local and international organizations and the likely presence of rules-oriented officers who, in response to the pressure of such groups, may change their preferences.

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The Material Costs of Shame The second mechanism focuses on the material costs of international shaming campaigns. These can be costly for the targeted government if the international community uses shaming campaigns to coordinate punishment of repressive regimes. In contrast to the “exit cost” logic, punishment changes the immediate costs of repression, not the calculation of expected costs associated with the higher likelihood of being prosecuted. Lebovic and Voeten (2009) provide the first systematic evidence that public resolutions by the UNCHR result in the loss of multilateral foreign aid. Likewise, Murdie and Peksen (2013) find that human rights INGOs’ activities increase the likelihood that a regime is targeted by sanctions. We expand this work in two ways: we examine which regimes lose the most aid; and we analyze whether shaming campaigns lead to the imposition of new economic sanctions. If shaming campaigns lead to a reduction in valuable sources of external revenue, we then need to ask whether the lost revenue loosens a dictator’s grip on power by decreasing his capacity to pay for the support of elites in his coalition. To generate empirical expectations for the material costs argument, we answer two questions: (1) Does shaming reduce external revenues? and (2) How important are external revenues for the survival of the regime? The next two sections take up each question in turn.

Who gets punished? Shaming campaigns are political tools that reflect the political calculations of the shaming organization. Being targeted by a shaming campaign is not simply a function of the level of repression, but also reflects larger political interactions.5 A quick look at some well-known human rights abusers represented on the UNCHR suggests political explanations for being targeted by a shaming campaign. For example, the UNCHR nominated Libya to its Commission in 2003. HRW and AI both protested the nomination, with AI arguing that “it expected the chair of the Commission to lead by example, but that it was apparent from various reports it had written on Libya that human rights were not respected there.”6 That repressive regimes make their way onto the 5

For explanations and analyses of why some countries are targeted and others not, see Lebovic and Voeten (2006), Ron et al. (2005), and Meernik et al. (2012). The former focuses on the UNCHR while the latter two focus on Amnesty International. 6 “Libya takes human rights role,” BBC News, 20 January 2003. Following the accession of repressive regimes to the UNCHR, the U.N. replaced it with a new organization, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), in 2006.

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U.N.’s shaming body suggests a political explanation for the initiation of shaming campaigns at international organizations. Candidates for the UNCHR are submitted by regional bodies and are thus the winners of a regional political game. They are not necessarily chosen based on their capacity to ferret out human rights abuses. Some repressive countries, such as Libya or Zimbabwe, have a stronger incentive to gain a seat on the UNCHR to shape international action and deflect criticism of their own human rights abuses. Other countries, such as Tanzania, may have less to gain precisely because their governments are less repressive and thus unlikely targets in the first place. Because shaming is the outcome of a political process, repression does not automatically result in being targeted by a shaming campaign. Extending this logic, being targeted by a shaming campaign may not always result in damaging action against the targeted regime. As Lebovic and Voeten (2009) show, bilateral aid donors do not always withdraw aid from strategically important recipients, even when the U.N. shames them. Alternatively, they argue, multilateral donors use UNCHR resolutions as a signal that the international community has agreed to cut aid to targeted countries. Their finding suggests that whether shaming results in less aid for the targeted country depends on the type of donor. We expand this research to examine how U.N. resolutions influence aid flows in different target regimes. Some regimes may have more capacity to lobby donors and block a shaming campaign from turning into a more costly loss of international revenue. The logic of Lebovic and Voeten (2009) suggests that UNCHR resolutions should matter because they signal to donors that the international community has given international organizations license to punish the targeted countries. In other words, targeted countries are not only guilty of repression, but they have lost the political battle and are now eligible for punishment. Personalist dictatorships typically lack strong domestic institutions and face few internal constraints on their behavior (Weeks, 2008; Frantz and Ezrow, 2011; Svolik, 2012). This means leaders in these regimes are less likely to face domestic audiences who can punish them for poor policy choices (Weeks, 2008) and more likely to have bad information about their own domestic sources of power (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011). Bad information and few domestic constraints, in turn, reduce the ability of these regimes to make credible promises during international bargaining, which should reduce compliance with international agreements and result in less international cooperation (Mattes and Rodríguez, 2014). With less-effective domestic institutions that would prove helpful for international bargaining, these regimes may therefore be less effective at international lobbying, and thus relatively unsuccessful in blocking action against them in the international arena.

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Further, personalist leaders may have less legitimacy than other autocrats. Winning relatively free elections by large margins may give leaders in dominant party regimes more international legitimacy, while military regimes during the Cold War were often viewed as more legitimate precisely because their military capacity was an asset in defending Western interests against the advance of communism—at least in the eyes of many Western powers. If personalist dictatorships have less international legitimacy and their domestic institutions make international bargaining and lobbying strategies less effective, these regimes should be more likely to be punished by the international community. This does not necessarily mean these regimes are the most likely to be targeted nor that they lack a presence in international organizations.7 Rather, we simply posit that personalist leaders are less successful in blocking the negative repercussions of international condemnation. We first explore how UNCHR resolutions influence foreign aid flows. In the context of our larger argument, we examine whether human rights shaming campaigns hurt autocratic regimes. According to the material costs argument, those punished the most by the international community, especially if they depend on external resources for survival, should be the most susceptible to shaming. Lebovic and Voeten (2009) show that UNCHR resolutions decrease multilateral aid disbursements but have no effect on bilateral aid. For now we use UNCHR resolutions to measure international naming and shaming. Below, we expand the measure of shaming to include NGO and media shaming. We use UNCHR resolutions because this allows us to directly expand upon earlier research, and this form of shaming is the culmination of a larger international process of condemnations than, for example, media shaming. These resolutions, as Lebovic and Voeten (2006) argue, are the last stage and the most severe punishment that the U.N. can dispense for human rights violators. Other forms of shaming (NGOs and media) may signal international disapproval, but they cannot directly punish the targeted country. The U.N. does, in the form of these UNCHR resolutions. Further, these resolutions capture the strategic component of aid distribution wherein multilateral institutions use resolutions to determine which repressive countries the international community has approved for targeting. After controlling for the level of repression, we can determine which regimes suffer the most when targeted by the UNCHR.

7 We find that personalist dictatorships are less likely than other regimes to be targeted by the U.N., and that they are slightly more likely to be members of the UNCHR.

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UNCHR resolutions and foreign aid We begin by extending Lebovic and Voeten’s (2009) analysis of UNCHR resolutions and foreign aid. Their sample covers the years 1979–2002 for all aid-eligible countries, including democracies. The two dependent variables are bilateral and multilateral aid, each divided by population and then logged.8 We use their preferred model specification and add dummy variables for the three types of autocratic regime. The excluded category is Democracy, and we drop monarchies from the sample. We then interact the autocratic regime variables with the indicator of UNCHR resolution. Figure 6.1 reports the findings for bilateral and multilateral aid, by recipient regime type.9 Lebovic and Voeten show that U.N. resolutions are associated with reductions in multilateral aid but not bilateral aid. When we separate the regime type of the targeted country, personalist regimes are the only ones hit by reductions of both types of aid. While all regimes targeted by the U.N. lose Bilateral aid

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Figure 6.1. U.N. resolutions and foreign aid. Replication of Lebovic and Voeten (2009) by regime type. Fixed effects regressions. They test both random- and (country)-fixed effects models. We report results from fixed effects models, though similar results hold with random effects. Their model specification includes: a lagged dependent variable; the Political Terror Scale as a measure of violent repression; Civil Liberties from the Freedom House; USAgree as a measure of how often the recipient country votes with the U.S. in the U.N. General Assembly; War as measures of internal or external conflict, coded by Gleditsch et al. (2002); and Capabilities as the Correlates of War’s Composite Indicator of National Capability. The time trends measure calendar years. 9 See Appendix Table C-1 for the full results of these models as well as those in the next figure. 8

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multilateral aid, personalist dictatorships again fare worse. The point estimates suggest that U.N. shaming that targets personalist regimes reduces bilateral aid by around 30 percent and multilateral aid by roughly 50 percent. These results are consistent with Lebovic and Voeten’s claim that the effect of U.N. resolutions varies by aid donor, but they also show that both bilateral and multilateral donors take aim at personalist dictatorships.

Shaming campaigns and sanctions imposition Next we examine whether shaming campaigns are associated with new sanctions. We use a measure of naming and shaming that captures how many times the country has been shamed by AI (Ron et al., 2005; Hafner-Burton, 2008).10 This measure adds the number of news releases and background reports published by AI in a given country-year. In the sample of regimes with available shaming data (1977–2001), 30 percent of observations had no shaming and 66 percent had four or more shaming incidents. We use the logged, one-year lag as the main explanatory variable. The dependent variable is a binary indicator of sanctions used in Chapter 5. We control for lagged sanctions so the estimate of interest gauges whether shaming campaigns are associated with the imposition of new sanctions or the end of a current sanction episode. The reported specification includes controls for time period, GDP per capita, population size, international war, and repression. However, the results are robust to specifications without control variables (save the fixed effects estimation) as well as to additional control variables such as civil war, protest, neighbor democracy, and prior democracy. We report results for linear probability models with country-fixed effects and clustered errors, though the results remain in a non-linear model. Figure 6.2 shows the substantive effect of shaming campaigns in targeted countries. Again, personalist dictatorships are hit the hardest. Shaming is associated with a 4-percent increase in the probability of changing sanction status in personalist dictatorships, while these campaigns have little effect on sanctions in other dictatorships. This result is substantially weaker, however, for democracy-promoting sanctions. The results for aid and sanctions imposition suggest an answer to the question of who gets punished: personalist dictatorships. These findings are consistent with the possibility that personalist dictators are more likely to be members of the UNCHR and less likely to be hit with U.N. resolutions in the 10

We use this form of shaming to capture advocacy group shaming campaigns; it has the longest time series; and it mirrors the research design in Murdie and Peksen (2013). Data on this variable obtained from replication files for Murdie and Peksen (2013).

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Figure 6.2. Shaming campaigns and new sanction imposition. Fixed effects regressions.

first place, once we consider the strategic nature of signing international agreements and U.N. politics (Vreeland, 2008). Potential targets with the most to lose—and the evidence would suggest that these are personalist regimes—have the greatest incentive to join the bodies that publicly shame and likewise have more to gain by blocking action against their countries.

Which regimes are the most sensitive to external revenue loss? As stressed in Chapter 3, while patronage is an important strategy available to all dictatorships, personalist regimes are more reliant upon supplying supporters with immediate material rewards than other dictatorships. Bratton and van de Walle (1994, 458), for example, argue that “[i]n neopatrimonial regimes, the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than ideology or law.” Personalist regimes often lack strong institutions to help them rule, with weak militaries and either weak or non-existent parties and legislative institutions (Wright, 2008). Even with an incapacitated military, they may be reluctant to activate (and adequately supply) it for fear the soldiers will organize against the leader. Thus, pursuing widespread repression can be a risky strategy for surviving in power when external resources available for patronage spending fall short. Further, because personalist regimes lack strong political institutions they are less likely to make credible inter-temporal promises to their supporters. Dominant party regimes can and do make good on promises to distribute

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patronage in the future—particularly around election time (Magaloni, 2006; Blaydes, 2008; Pepinsky, 2007). This may be one reason why dominant party regimes are relatively resistant to economic shocks (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Geddes, 1999), and typically only lose power once the state—and hence the party—permanently loses control of the economy (Greene, 2010). Because of the long history of state patronage and large margin of electoral victories for dominant parties, supporters expect the party to remain in power at least in the near- to mid-term, and thus believe party promises of future distribution. While much of the literature on personalism emphasizes the ruler’s dependence on patronage resources to maintain loyalty, we take this claim further to suggest that personalist rule is more sensitive to the loss of external revenue sources than other regimes because: (1) they do not have strong militaries that can effectively repress mobilization against their rule and mobilizing the military is a risky strategy; and (2) these leaders typically have weak parties and hence cannot make credible inter-temporal promises to their supporters. Therefore, when personalist leaders lose valuable external sources of revenue, they have little else left in their toolkit of autocratic strategies. Thus, we posit that the answer to the question “which regimes are most sensitive to external revenue losses?” is the same as in Chapter 5: personalist dictatorships.

Shame and Post-Exit Punishment After President Ben Ali fled Tunisia amidst mass uprisings in February 2011, the secret police emptied the ruling party’s headquarters of paper files under the watchful eye of soldiers.11 In 2004, Morocco established the Equity and Reconciliation Commission to investigate forced disappearances and detention under the rule of King Hassan II, who had died in 1999. However, this commission discovered that many files had gone missing. These examples suggest that repressive regimes fear public documentation of human rights abuses during their rule. Damaging information about repression may increase the likelihood that regime elites will be punished once they leave power. Shaming campaigns are information strategies, in which human rights organizations gather information about abuses and disseminate it to attract international attention. Since reports by these organizations and treatymonitoring bodies normally point to those state actors deemed responsible for the abuses, naming and shaming can also be viewed as “shaming and

11 Borzou Daragahi, “In Tunisia, where record keeping is good, some seek to preserve documents of tyranny,” Los Angeles Times, 16 April 2011.

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blaming” (Murdie and Bhasin, 2011; Murdie, 2012). For example, during the Syrian civil war, AI not only documented abuses but also repeatedly accused the Syrian government of crimes against humanity. Further, AI and the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights urged the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to refer Syria to the ICC.12 If human rights shaming campaigns unearth, document, and preserve information that can later be used against dictators and other state officials after they leave power, shaming in the current period could increase the costs of exiting power by raising the expected likelihood of post-exit punishment. Evidence from particular cases suggests that shaming campaigns aid documentation of abuses. For example, in Chile, INGOs received information from and provided funding for domestic human rights groups (Hawkins, 2002b, 57). The Vicaría de la Solidaridad, one of the most respected domestic human rights groups in Chile during military rule, worked extensively with international human rights groups to disseminate information about human rights violations. Information from the shaming campaign—in particular documentation from the Vicaría—was later used as evidence in the prosecution of Chile’s dictator, General Pinochet (Roht-Arriaza, 2005, 208). Many human rights abuses in Southern Cone military dictatorships were publicized to an international audience by AI.13 Central to this explanation is the prospect of punishment after leaving power. The converse would be “exit guarantees,” or credible promises not to harm regime elites once they leave power. The literature on democratic transitions has long noted conditions that make negotiated exits more likely, in particular exit guarantees (Dix, 1982; Huntington, 1991b; Sutter, 1995). Dix (1982) and Sutter (1995), for example, argue that military regimes are more likely to democratize via negotiated settlement because they do not cede control over violent coercion and can therefore credibly threaten to reintervene after they leave power. This may be one reason that amnesties for military elites are often credible. Some have argued, for example, that the Brazilian military left power peacefully because they not only perpetrated fewer human rights abuses than other Southern Cone military dictatorships (e.g. Argentina), but, as importantly, were granted a credible amnesty backed by guarantees of military autonomy (Oliveira, 1988; Stepan, 1988). Chile’s constitution directly protected Pinochet from domestic prosecution by granting immunity to the head of the military, which not coincidentally was the position Pinochet assumed after handing power back to civilians.

12 13

“Amnesty accuses Syria of crimes against humanity,” BBC News, 6 July 2011. See, for example, Amnesty International (1984).

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As shown in Chapter 4, in dominant party regimes, the party itself can guarantee protection for former ruling elites by winning power via elections in a new democracy (Huntington, 1991a; Wright and Escribà-Folch, 2012). Elites in these regimes frequently win some legislative power in subsequent democracies. While the long-dominant party in Mexico lost the presidency in 2000 and placed third in the 2006 presidential contest, they won a legislative plurality in 2003 and the 2012 presidential contest. After the fall of Soviet-bloc dictatorships, numerous ex-Communists won elections in Eastern Europe. Even those former ruling parties that lost elections were partially protected from punishment by the documentation of party collaboration by elites in opposition parties (Nalepa, 2010). When so many opponents had been (secretly) implicated in aiding the former Communist regime, the opposition was reluctant to push for punishment against ex-party elites for fear that their own records as collaborators would surface. As we have stressed throughout, personalist dictators typically lack both the means of violence and the strength of a party to protect them from post-exit punishment. Hence, if human rights shaming increases the likelihood of punishment, elites in these regimes should be most susceptible to changes in these costs. This logic suggests that these regimes should be less likely to leave power peacefully when targeted by a shaming campaign.

SHAMING A ND REGIME CHANGE Let us briefly summarize the hypotheses thus far. First, if the normative model is correct, shaming should destabilize military regimes because they typically have professionalized officers and arise in countries with prior democratic experience—both factors that increase normative fit. A second hypothesis argues that material costs matter. The immediate costs that result from a shaming campaign might destabilize the regime. Because personalist dictators face steeper material costs when shamed and because these regimes are typically the most sensitive to the loss of external revenue, this argument suggests that shaming campaigns should be most likely to destabilize personalist regimes. Our final hypothesis posits that shaming campaigns increase the expectation of post-exit punishment for dictators. By raising the cost of leaving power, international disapprobation lowers the expected utility of pursuing this strategy. Because elites in personalist regimes often lack strong organizations—such as a cohesive military or a dominant political party—that help preserve their interests after they leave power, they are likely to be the most sensitive to changes in post-exit punishment. Thus if shaming raises the

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prospects of punishment, we should expect shaming campaigns to decrease the likelihood that personalist dictators leave power.

Data and Methods To test how human rights shaming influences regime survival, we use a measure of naming and shaming that captures how many times the country has been shamed by AI (Ron et al., 2005; Hafner-Burton, 2008). We use a logged, one-year lag. In robustness tests, we replicate the main result using a scaled measure of three types of shaming: the number of AI reports and briefs; the number of articles in two international newspapers (The Economist and Newsweek) that mention human rights violations in the target country; and an indicator of whether the UNCHR targeted the country with a passing resolution condemning human rights violations.14 As the literature on naming and shaming demonstrates, countries targeted by international shaming campaigns are not randomly distributed across the world. There are systematic reasons why some countries are more likely to be targeted than others. Countries in regions closer to the U.S. or to Europe, for example, tend to garner more international attention. These geographic features could also independently influence outcomes such as democratization. To address omitted variable bias that results from time invariant factors, such as proximity to the West, that influence both regime stability and shaming campaigns by transnational human rights activists, we include country-fixed effects. Thus the interpretation of the results for shaming campaigns is timevarying and not cross-sectional because we account for different levels of shaming in different countries. Our preferred specification also includes variables to account for domestic repression: civil war, violent anti-regime protest movement, and political terror. We use a new measure of domestic political terror that accounts for the fact that standards for documenting human rights abuses have improved over time, leading to more reporting (and higher observed levels) of repression (Fariss, 2014). Because most measures of domestic repression use information from AI, we also tested models with measures of political terror from the

This scaled measure is the first principal component of a factor model with three shame variables: log(1+AI), log(1+Media), UNCHR. Missing data on the component variables drops the sample size from over 1600 to roughly 1100, thus excluding thirty-one dictatorships and eleven democratic transitions from the analysis. Data on additional sources of shaming are from Hafner-Burton (2008). 14

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Political Terror Scale project, which uses information from the U.S. State Department’s human rights reports. As in prior empirical tests, we include controls for population and level of development; regime duration (and interactions with regime type); and timeperiod-fixed effects. The main explanatory variables are Shame and the interaction between this variable and the regime type indicators. With data from a shorter time series (1977–2001), we employ a linear probability model with unit effects because this approach does not drop stable autocratic countries that do not experience regime failure during the shorter sample period. Again, we test three dependent variables: all regime collapse events, democratic transitions, and autocratic transitions.

Results The full results are reported in the Appendix (C); we concentrate on interpreting the findings in the Figures. The first models examine all regime failures and show that, on average, shaming has little influence on regime instability. Yet, when we include regime type interactions, the estimate for ShameMilitary is positive and significant. We replicate this finding for democratic transitions, but we find little evidence that shaming is correlated with autocratic transitions. Figure 6.3 shows the substantive interpretation of the main results.15 The left panel shows that shaming increases the linear probability of democratic transition in military regimes by over 10 percent, while it has little effect in other dictatorships. For autocratic transitions, shaming appears to have little influence. These results provide evidence consistent with only one of the three theories proposed: the normative argument. The other theories predicted that shaming should either increase or decrease the likelihood of transition in personalist regimes. However, we only find evidence that shaming is associated with democratic transitions in military regimes.

Robustness Tests We report two robustness tests in the Appendix (C).16 First, to ensure we have modeled time properly, we show that the main result remains when we 15 The substantive effects are calculated based on movement in the shame variable from the twenty-fifth percentile to the seventy-fifth percentile. 16 In replication files, we test additional models: without control variables, with additional control variables (domestic protest, non-violent protest movement, neighbor democracy, and

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Figure 6.3. Shaming and regime change. The change in the predicted linear probability of democratic and autocratic transition, by regime type.

employ year-fixed effects instead of time-period effects. Second, we report results from a specification that controls for foreign aid and economic sanctions. Because aid and sanctions are “post-treatment” conditions with respect to shaming campaigns, this test further rules out the possibility that the main finding is due to “material costs” and not the norms theory. Finally, we test a two-stage instrumental variables model because political instability might endogenously determine whether a particular regime is targeted by an international shaming campaign. If the estimate from a naive model is upwardly biased due to non-random target selection, this would mean that international organizations target regimes that are more likely to democratize due to unobserved factors. In a test of whether democratic and autocratic transitions influence the incidence of shaming in the subsequent year, we find that democratic transition is associated with less shaming while autocratic transition with more. This should not be surprising, since human rights groups would typically greet a democratic event by ending a shaming campaign. Thus the bias in naive tests of democratic transition may understate the influence of shaming campaigns. We employ an excluded instrument that contains information on the number of natural disasters in the target country in a given year, weighted by the inverse of the distance from the United States. Natural disasters bring

trade), as well as multiple specifications with alternative measures of domestic repression. We also show that the finding holds with a non-linear link function.

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international media attention. For example, when cyclone Nargis hit the Irrawaddy delta in Myanmar in 2008, journalists flocked to the region to report the story. Because the military junta largely rebuffed international organizations’ attempts to aid the relief effort, the regime did not actually receive additional foreign assistance as a result of the disaster. It did, however, suffer a torrent of negative international media coverage, largely focusing on the regime’s refusal to accept international aid. A month after the storm, AI issued a human rights report chastising the regime for abuses committed during the relief effort and then used the one-year anniversary of the storm to further shame the regime. The measure of natural disasters isolates geophysical events (earthquakes, volcanic activity, and dry mass movements) that are not influenced by human activity.17 Further, this measure does not contain information on damage, such as the numbers of deaths, from natural events because the level of disaster damage may be endogenously determined by political instability or regime type. Because we continue to model country-fixed effects, we exploit the exogenous timing of disasters, and control for the cross-country variation in the incidence of natural disasters. Geophysical natural disasters and distance from the U.S. should not be endogenously determined by political instability in the target country. While some research argues that natural disasters can independently influence stability by, for example, prompting anti-regime protest or inciting violence (Quiroz-Flores and Smith, 2013; Nel and Righarts, 2008), we directly model these causal pathways by including multiple measures of this concept in the specification: anti-government demonstrations; violent protest campaigns; non-violent protest campaigns; low-intensity civil war; and high-intensity civil war. We control for additional factors through which natural disasters and distance could influence regime stability, such as neighbor democracy (i.e. diffusion), population size, and prior democracy. We control for domestic repression with a variable that captures the changing standards for verifying human rights abuses (Fariss, 2014). Further, because we include country-fixed effects, we account for time-invariant factors that influence democratic transition and that are also correlated with distance to the U.S. Finally, to identify the equation with two endogenous variables (Shame and ShameMilitary), 17

The instrument is: the square root of the number of geophysical disasters in the past three years plus one, divided by the square root of the kilometer distance between the target country capital city and Washington D.C. Distance data is from Kristian Gleditsch; and the disaster data is from The International Disaster Database (EM-DAT) published by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the School of Public Health of the Université Catholique de Louvain.

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the second excluded instrument is the interaction between Military and the main instrument. The excluded instrument is correlated with shaming campaigns: the firststage F-statistic is almost 14, alleviating concerns about weak instruments. The second-stage result indicates a stronger pattern than reported in the naive models: shaming in military regimes increases the likelihood of democratic transition but is not strongly correlated with transitions in other regimes. We report these results in the Appendix.18

HUMAN R IGHTS CAMPAIGNS AND R E G I M E C HA NG E I N C HI L E The 1973 military coup in Chile followed over four decades of democratic politics. Military intervention to remove an elected civilian leader, suspend the legislature, and rule under a state of emergency marked a stark departure from politics as usual in South America’s most democratic country. In the late 1970s the military wrote a new constitution, adopted by popular referendum in 1980, and institutionalized military rule. It also circumscribed the powers of the military junta and laid the foundations for a plebiscite eight years later that would end military rule. Violent political repression peaked in the years immediately after the 1973 coup when the military attacked politicians and citizens associated with the democratic left. While repression diminished after this initial outburst, the regime never relinquished its power to repress and continued to use disappearances, torture, and detention to combat the opposition throughout the 1980s. Political repression sparked backlash, both at home and abroad, helping forge strong links between international human rights organizations and domestic opponents. Working in concert with domestic groups, the international shaming campaign turned the Pinochet regime into an international pariah by lobbying international actors, documenting and publicizing political repression, and providing material support for opposition mobilization at home. Our sketch of these events underscores two points. First, the 1980 Constitution and the legalization of military rule were the product of international pressure and the preferences of the military elite. Key military elites viewed

Robustness tests in replication files show that the results remain in specifications—with no control variables; adding controls for aid and sanctions; excluding high-intensity civil wars; and various lags for anti-government protest. 18

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institutionalization of military rule as a necessary component of rule of law as well as a means to counter international condemnation. Second, the international shaming campaign, in concert with domestic regime opponents, pressured the regime to hold a fair plebiscite in the late 1980s. Further, prior democracy helped shape the preferences of key military elite members as well as opposition mobilization strategies. Thus the combination of prior democracy, domestic human rights organizations, and international pressure led to the demise of autocratic rule and a peaceful transition to democracy. These factors did not operate alone. Military factionalism, the inability of Pinochet to consolidate power, and the opposition’s moderation and ultimate rejection of violence all contributed to a relatively peaceful regime change. But without international pressure, the institutionalization of the regime in the form of a new constitution would have come later, and the opposition likely would have had more difficulty voting out the dictator in 1988.

Prior Democracy, Norms, and the Institutionalization of Military Rule Prior to the 1973 coup, the Chilean military had a long tradition of constitutionalism, and Chile experienced over a century of democracy with only one brief period of military involvement in politics in the 1920s and early 1930s. During the subsequent democratic decades, the military was led by a generation of officers who had experienced prior military intervention, leading to strong preferences for adherence to civilian rule (Nunn, 1976, 223; Barros, 2002, 40–1). The last of these officers was the head of the military under Allende, General Carlos Prats.19 The next generation of officers who rose through the ranks to become generals in the early 1970s “had not experienced the antimilitary reaction of the 1930s nor the drastic professional losses associated with it” (Remmer, 1989, 153). However, many involved in the 1973 coup had family connections to the officers who intervened in the 1920s (Remmer, 1989, 154). Even with the rise of officers who had little memory of the military’s previous incursion into politics, the coup and especially efforts to secure indefinite military rule “represented a profound break with Chile’s constitutional and military traditions, as well as open rupture with widespread civilian expectations” (Barros, 2002, 52). Thus, decades of prior democracy had

19 After the coup, General Prats went into self-exile in Buenos Aires and was assassinated in 1974 by Pinochet’s security service.

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established a set of norms within the military and expectations among citizens—even for those who supported the coup—about the limits of military interference in politics (Hawkins, 2002b, 64). Divisions within the military were present from the beginning. While the junta leaders had successfully purged military elites who opposed intervention and many with close ties to the Christian Democrats, those in power still had substantial disagreements about the role of the military in the new government. As Loveman (1979, 314) notes, in the aftermath of the coup, “no fundamental consensus existed within the military regarding the appropriate duration of military rule or upon a comprehensive alternative political regime.” These divisions would be central to the bargaining over institutionalization of the regime as international pressure mounted in the late 1970s, leading to the 1980 Constitution (Barros, 2002, 68–9; Hawkins, 2002b, 83–4). Despite outward appearances of growing centralization of power in Pinochet’s hands—namely the securing of the titles of both President and Commander of the Armed Forces—Barros (2002) argues that the junta’s early negotiations over the rules for governing served to institutionalize checks on the power of the president. The leaders of each of the main branches of the military had veto power over major policy and institutional decisions. Thus while there existed few checks on the power of the junta from the outside, the group of junta leaders themselves presented a check on Pinochet (Barros, 2002, 68–9). Different branches of the military had separate organizational norms and traditions, and prior to the coup had been under the command of a civilian defense minister. While Pinochet emerged with the presidency in his hands and dissolved an informal agreement to rotate the executive, other junta leaders retained veto power. The preferences of the junta leaders over key institutional arrangements quickly surfaced. Hawkins (2002b, 83–5) depicts the main cleavage within the military as a group of “force-oriented” officers pitted against “rules-oriented” officers. The force-oriented faction backed continued use of repression and corporatist economic policies, while the rules-oriented group viewed repression as a potential obstacle to long-term military rule because it would help mobilize the domestic opposition. The latter faction preferred to institutionalize military rule through a constitution that would permit a “protected democracy” and ensure the interests of the military and their supporters were guaranteed over the long-term. With a constitution, military rule would not be indefinite.

International pressure and the 1980 Constitution Without a blueprint for governing, the junta met with an increasing legislative workload in the initial months after the coup. While the lack of governing

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expertise prior to the coup meant that institutionalization of military rule would be necessary for it to function, the shape of institutionalization in the first years after the coup would be the product of both the prior institutional structure of the military under democracy—i.e. separate and co-equal military branches—and international pressure. In response to repression, international pressure increased in the mid-1970s. Domestic groups provided international organizations with information about repression in exchange for material support to sustain their activities (Hawkins, 2002a, 55). Religious leaders created the Vicaría de la Solidaridad to investigate and document human rights abuses. In addition to providing information to international actors, the Vicaría opened up a political space for opponents to organize amidst continued repression (Oxhorn, 1995; Baldez, 2002). International financial support was crucial for domestic human rights groups, especially the Catholic Church, which received nearly $22 million in international donations from 1974 to 1975, with $67 million to follow in 1976–9—a sum an order of magnitude larger than domestic donations during that period (Smith, 1986, 283). Pinochet’s initial efforts to counter international criticism included an invitation to the Organization of American States (OAS) to visit Chile in 1975 and the sending of emissaries to Europe to lobby on behalf of the regime (Muñoz, 1986, 93). Upon returning from the international lobbying effort, one minister reported that international scrutiny of the regime was so high precisely because the country had a long democratic tradition: they told me that the past of Chile . . . is too interesting and important for them not to follow what happens here with much more care than they do regarding events in other countries. They add that we are neither Bolivia, nor Mexico, nor any other country that has had a stormy past.20

Thus international pressure was not simply the result of repression but also the seemingly anomalous combination of human rights abuse in a formerly democratic country. The regime’s charm offensive did not last long. In July 1975 Pinochet reneged on an agreement to allow the UNCHR to investigate human rights abuses in Chile, creating a sense of urgency to deal with impending international approbation (Muñoz, 1986, 193; Barros, 2002, 163). After the Chilean national security agency (DINA) assassinated a prominent critic of the regime, Orlando Letelier, in Washington D.C. in 1975, Pinochet himself came under

20 Fernando Linz, Actas de Sesiones de la Honorable Junta de Gobierno 177, 11 December 1974, page 3. Quoted in Barros (2002, 162).

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increased international pressure that threatened his position within the junta. Pinochet’s top civilian advisor warned that because by law Pinochet was directly responsible for DINA, he was “extremely vulnerable to charges leveled against the security agency” (Hawkins, 2002b, 97). The international shaming campaign intensified after the Letelier assassination, prompting the regime to restructure the national security agency—if only cosmetically—and dismiss its head. These efforts to blunt international criticism, however, did not suffice. The regime responded by institutionalizing checks on the power of the president and started to substitute “legalistic” repression for outright violence against opponents (Hawkins, 2002b, 101). Institutionalization of the regime became a solution to the human rights problem—“a tactic that would come to stand as the centerpiece of the military government’s maneuvers to stave off international pressure” (Barros, 2002, 165). Amidst the internal debates over institutionalization, the shaming campaign prompted the “rules-oriented” faction to advocate for constitutional rule. Their legal expertise gave them the upper hand in negotiations because they offered a solution to the issue of international criticism while still providing a mechanism for the regime to retain power. The 1980 Constitution therefore legitimized military rule by creating checks on the power of the junta, “strengthen[ing] the government’s long-term legitimacy problem while preserving its short-term power” (Hawkins, 2002b, 121). Legitimacy through constitutional rule came at a price, though. The constitution established a mechanism for removing the president, albeit through plebiscites that were potentially prone to manipulation. Perhaps more importantly, the new constitution institutionalized basic individual rights. In an effort to avoid a repeat of the political crisis under the later years of Allende’s presidency, the constitution writers re-invigorated extra checks on the power of elected leaders: a body with power to review presidential decrees (Contraloría) and a constitutional court (Tribunal Constitutional) (Barros, 2002, 237). The latter would prove crucial for ensuring a fair plebiscite in 1988. In short, international pressure set in motion a process of regime institutionalization and at the same time intensified existing divisions within the military during the bargaining over the 1980 Constitution. From the outset, “the Junta embraced constitutional ‘self-limitation’ as a stratagem to stave off international critics without abdicating power” (Barros, 2002, 167). But as Hawkins argues, the combination of international pressure and normative fit influenced the institutionalization process because the “rules-oriented” faction within the military understood that the long-term viability of military interests depended upon addressing the human rights question in a country with a long history of democracy. Citizens would “eventually generate demands for more participation and greater respect for human rights” (Hawkins, 2002b, 103).

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Although the 1980 Constitution succeeded in institutionalizing military rule, it also enshrined rights that would later become crucial in the referendum defeat of Pinochet. That said, the constitution was intended to and initially succeeded in prolonging military rule. As Barros (2002, 168) stresses, the constitution “neither set in motion a transition nor inaugurated a liberalization of the military dictatorship.”

Constitutional rule, shaming, and the 1988 plebiscite Nearly a decade after the coup, in mid-May 1983, opposition political parties and unions organized the first widespread national protests against the regime. Still technically illegal, parties mobilized opposition rallies, lobbied military reformers, and coordinated meetings of various opposition groups in the Asamblea de la Civilidad (Garretón, 1988). Constitutional rules—in particular the independent power of the Constitutional Tribunal—and international pressure combined with a mobilized domestic opposition to force a free and fair plebiscite in 1988. The opposition won and the military stepped down in early 1990. We highlight three key decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal that proved decisive in ensuring a fair plebiscite, and then describe how international pressure groups helped mobilize the opposition to vote against the dictatorship. The 1980 Constitution specified a bill of rights, such as the right to association and speech, and created a constitutional court to provide a check on the rulings of the junta. These institutional features proved important for ensuring a free and fair plebiscite in 1988. In the three years prior to the plebiscite the Constitutional Tribunal ruled against the junta on at least nine occasions (Zapata Larraín, 1991, 287). Perhaps most importantly, the Constitutional Tribunal decided that the formation of the electoral commission must take place before the plebiscite and not at a later date when the first direct elections for representatives were to be held. By eschewing a literal interpretation of the constitution, the court not only ensured the electoral commission would administer the plebiscite, it set a precedent for independent interpretation that would allow the court to rule against many of the junta’s laws (Barros, 2002, 293–302). In addition to forcing the regime to establish an independent electoral commission, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the electoral commission would oversee the voter-registration operation, prompting the government to embark on a fair process of creating the electoral registry. Barros (2002, 299) argues that without this ruling, electoral registries would not have been used for the plebiscite, further reducing the credibility of the vote. Based on the previous, rigged plebiscite in 1978, many potential opposition voters might have been circumspect about the 1988 plebiscite and abstained

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from voting so as not to legitimize an unfair contest. But the formation of the electoral commission and its mandate to oversee a fair voter registration campaign provided signals of credibility for voters who might have otherwise viewed the plebiscite as a sham. Indeed the success of the “¡No!” campaign against continued military rule would need both a fair ballot and the participation of opposition voters. Second, the constitution contained a bill of rights for individuals, including the right of association. After the Constitutional Tribunal ruled on the electoral commission, the court had a precedent to declare unconstitutional any law promulgated by the junta that violated these rights in the run-up to the plebiscite (Barros, 2002, 302). For example, the court ruled against the junta’s laws on the formation of groups that had ties to pre-coup political parties and undid emergency laws that restricted political activity (Zapata Larraín, 1991, 299–301; Hawkins, 2002b, 156). This allowed opposition groups to tap into party identification—especially among centrist Christian Democrat voters—to mobilize support for the “¡No!” campaign. Finally, a ruling by the court opened up television advertising to the opposition during the plebiscite campaign. This ruling required equal free TV time for opposition groups that coordinated the “¡No!” campaign. Hawkins (2002b, 157) notes that the TV spots “focused on Chile’s bright future and undoubtedly helped sway voters against Pinochet.” The Constitutional Tribunal was created by the junta with purview over constitutional matters; and importantly, their rulings on constitutional questions were absolute, with no process for appeal. Thus, in an attempt to preclude the possibility of an elected president ruling by decree as Allende had done in his final year in office, the 1980 Constitution circumscribed the rule-making power of the military. The same military that created the court was later bound to its ruling without recourse to revision. International pressure aided the plebiscite campaign by ensuring regime opponents would cast ballots. The international shaming campaign moved from documenting human rights abuses to lobbying international governments in an effort to provide material support for the opposition (Rickard et al., 1988). This financial support for domestic groups, such as the Catholic Church, helped organize a united opposition to military rule (PintoDuschinsky, 1991, 56). International funding helped opponents mobilize support, both on the ground through voter-registration programs and over the airwaves in television advertising promoting the “¡No!” vote. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation, a German Christian Democrat organization, funded activities such as an agrarian institute, a self-help project in working-class neighborhoods and academic institutes, including the Fundación Eduardo Frei (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991, 41).

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While technically this financial support was “non-political,” these organizations nonetheless helped opposition groups mobilize throughout the 1980s. U.S. foreign aid, sent under the auspices of the National Endowment of Democracy (NED), helped train election monitors and advised the opposition campaign on media strategies. NED money even helped fund an opposition newspaper, La Época, whose owners were Christian Democratic supporters of the “¡No!” campaign.21 A united opposition, with internationally supported leaders as their public face, not only helped convince a wary public that the plebiscite would be fair, but also provided a centrist alternative to the scaremongering campaign from the Pinochet camp. The opposition media campaign promised a new, brighter future that looked neither like military rule nor the chaos of the Allende years (Spooner, 1994, 232). In contrast, the military’s case for continued rule was simply offering more of the status quo because this was better than the political crisis of the early 1970s. Thus the “¡No!” campaign successfully convinced voters that a return to civilian rule would not mean a return to the days of polarization in the final months of Allende’s aborted presidency. In sum, the international shaming campaign proved crucial for both establishing legitimacy as the benchmark for the Constitutional Tribunal’s rulings against the regime and in supporting the opposition plebiscite campaign through international lobbying efforts and financial and organizational support.

Shaming in Context To complete the story of human rights shaming and political change in Chile, we discuss how the shaming campaign compares with other forms of international pressure, such as economic sanctions and foreign aid. We then contrast the effect of international pressure on the regime with sources of domestic pressure, in particular anti-regime violence. To posit a normative mechanism as the sole explanation for how international shaming campaigns influence regime change in military regimes might weaken the overall explanatory power of this type of international pressure because shaming is often a precursor to other forms of international pressure, such as the imposition of economic sanctions (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Murdie and Peksen, 2013). That said, the Chilean case offers an illustration of how shaming campaigns work relative to other forms of pressure.

21 Shirley Christian, “Group Is Channeling U.S. Funds to Parties Opposing Pinochet,” The New York Times, 15 June 1988.

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When the U.N. General Assembly condemned the regime in 1974, many Western countries were quick to cut foreign aid. Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway cut economic aid, while the U.S. and U.K. reduced military aid. U.S. Senator Kennedy obtained congressional restrictions on U.S. economic aid, capping it at $25 million in 1975. However, even with this cap and the decrease in military aid, total U.S. aid to Chile actually increased in 1975 because the Nixon–Ford administration circumvented the congressional mandate by sending aid from discretionary categories (Hawkins, 2002b, 72). Further, private international finance and multilateral lending more than filled the gap created by the loss of bilateral aid. Letelier and Moffitt (1978, 120) tracked down over $1 billion in loans from banks, mostly in the U.S. and U.K. And while the U.K. cut official military assistance, Brazil and Israel continued as major arms suppliers (Hawkins, 2002b, 73). Hawkins (2002b, 71–6) argues that economic sanctions were not helpful in placing human rights on the political agenda because many international actors continued to support the regime financially despite sanctions. The possibility of further sanctions, however, did threaten the regime, as they feared that pressure from human rights groups might lead to the loss of more crucial international financial support. Sanctions alone, though, cannot explain why the military junta put human rights concerns on the table during negotiations over institutional rules in the mid- to late 1970s. Further, Hawkins (2002b, 156–9) cites the need for legitimacy as a motivating factor for the Constitutional Tribunal’s decision to uphold equal television time for the opposition during the run-up to the plebiscite in 1988.22 Normative concerns driven by international pressure appear to be the primary factor explaining this outcome: “No mass protests or economic sanctions centered around television time for the opposition” (Hawkins, 2002b, 158). International pressure aligned with domestic opposition helped force regime change in Chile. Domestic opponents began mobilizing in early 1983 in response to continued economic hard times. A centrist union that had protested against the Allende government started the protests, giving credibility to the movement and spurring others to follow (Garretón, 1988; Oxhorn, 1995). The roots of this mobilization were predominantly domestic—namely the economic crisis in the early 1980s—and not international. The opposition protests of the mid-1980s provided cover for extreme leftwing groups to organize as well (Garretón, 1988). These groups applied violent pressure to the regime, culminating in an assassination attempt on Pinochet in 1986. The regime’s response to violence was to re-impose a state of siege, with

22

See Zapata Larraín (1991, 296–311) as well.

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an attendant increase in government repression (Policzer, 2009, 89). In contrast, international pressure helped domestic groups lobby the regime to lift the state of emergency shortly before the plebiscite in 1988 (Hawkins, 2002b, 156). Thus the risk of violent regime failure in Chile was the product of domestic factors and not the material consequences of the international shaming campaign. An increase in the chances of violent change prompted the regime to retrench. International pressure via domestic human rights groups had the opposite effect. Finally, the Chilean case illustrates the normative implications of prior democracy. We found evidence for this mechanism both among the military and the civilian opposition. Military generals and their appointed judges on the Constitutional Tribunal were swayed by appeals to legitimacy. Opposition groups built upon parties and unions that dated from decades of prior democracy, and were aided by international support from human rights organizations with strong links to domestic groups such as the Vicaría de la Solidaridad. To the extent that the military and the opposition can be circumscribed as the elite and citizens in Chile, we thus have evidence that normative pressures can operate from both the “top down” and the “bottom up.” However, from one case we cannot infer whether the normative effect of prior democracy is more important for opposition behavior or for shaping military preferences. While Remmer (1989) argues that junta leaders disregarded the longstanding norms of Chile’s democratic tradition, Barros (2002) and Hawkins (2002b) document numerous occasions when international pressure activated these norms among military leaders—even those who initially supported military intervention and appeared unmoved by the negative legacy of military interference half a century earlier. To understand the proximate causal role of human rights norms, we would need a contrasting case where military exit was not the mechanism for peaceful transition, but where international pressure activated human rights norms to help the domestic opposition mobilize and peacefully oust a dictatorship.

DISCUSSION This chapter shows that human rights shaming campaigns are associated with democratic transition in military regimes. This finding may give us some purchase on how shaming campaigns affect repression in different types of autocratic regimes. If we are unable to detect any average effect of human rights shaming campaigns on the observed level of repression in targeted countries (Hafner-Burton, 2008), our findings suggest a next step might

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explore how shaming influences the incentives to repress in a variety of different autocratic contexts. The evidence that human rights shaming campaigns are associated with an increased probability of democratic transition—but only in military regimes— is consistent with the literature on normative fit, which argues that human rights campaigns should be most effective when the norms they articulate are salient in the domestic context. This point underscores an important limitation of the analysis. Our research design does not allow us to pinpoint the causal arena in which norms shape actors’ preferences and behavior. The evidence from Chile suggests that shaming can reinforce norms in shaping collective mobilization among opposition groups as well as influencing the preferences of professional military elites. That is, there is evidence of norms operating from the bottom up as well as the top down. A paired comparison of a country with prior democracy but no professionalized military elite, and a country that has both, would provide the necessary analytic leverage to better answer this question. We leave this task for future research. We find little systematic evidence consistent with the direct material cost or post-exit punishment hypotheses, both of which have implications for regime stability in personalist dictatorships. Although U.N. shaming is associated with a decrease in aid and AI shaming with the imposition of new sanctions, this may not sufficiently hurt these regimes to destabilize them because shaming does not directly and automatically lead to aid cuts or trade sanctions. Or perhaps, as Figure 6.2 suggests, new sanctions are not sufficiently focused on democratic regime change. The study of human rights shaming is still in its infancy, as illustrated by the fact that the data we use span less than thirty years, mostly covering the 1980s and 1990s. The short time series reflects the fact that human rights regimes are a relatively recent phenomenon. Unlike sanctions and foreign aid, we can only study this form of foreign pressure during a time period when its use is escalating, as illustrated in the first chapter. The results in this chapter should therefore be treated with appropriate caution because, as we have seen in the case of foreign aid, the broader international context can play an important role in the effectiveness of foreign pressure. The most common approach to studying human rights focuses on their origins and whether they can be effective in combating repression (HafnerBurton, 2008; Kim and Sikkink, 2010). Our approach is to examine the broader domestic political context in which shaming campaigns take place to help us understand how human rights regimes influence the political incentives of targeted governments. We encourage future research on human rights and repression to approach the question through the lens of domestic political survival in dictatorships (Escribà-Folch, 2013b).

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Do Human Rights Prosecutions Destabilize Dictatorships? In March 2009, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity.1 Two years later, in the midst of civil rebellion in Libya, a rare bout of consensus at the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) prompted the ICC to issue arrest warrants for President Muammar Gaddafi, one of his sons, and another key regime leader. The origins of the ICC date from the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC), established in 1943 to investigate Nazi war crimes during the Second World War. The UNWCC aided domestic tribunals in member states in their efforts to pursue prosecutions, and helped develop the concept of international crimes, including crimes against peace and humanity, and the crime of genocide. By 1948, the UNWCC had supported domestic tribunals in conducting nearly 3500 trials, resulting in over 2800 prosecutions (Plesch, 2011, 102). Although the ICC did not issue its first indictment until 2005, a growing number of ex-dictators faced criminal prosecutions in domestic and international courts in the past three decades (Roht-Arriaza, 2005; Lutz and Reiger, 2009; Kim and Sikkink, 2010). News media have not been shy about showing footage of “famous” dictators such as Slobodan Milošević, Hosni Mubarak, and Charles Taylor sitting in a courtroom to face charges of crimes against humanity or violations of human rights. Further, media regularly report new human rights cases in which transition countries revisit their authoritarian past to bring those responsible of rights violations to justice. In Romania, for example, former members of the Communist security apparatus are starting to face charges more than twenty years after the ouster and execution of

1

The U.N. Security Council referred Sudan to the ICC in March 2005. Al-Bashir was formally indicted in July 2008 when the ICC requested a warrant for his arrest, but the warrant was not issued until March 2009.

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Ceaușescu.2 Officers and ex-dictators responsible for human rights violations during military rule in Brazil and Guatemala have also recently been sent to court for crimes committed nearly thirty years prior.3 Proponents of campaigns to prosecute human rights abuses hailed these events as key advancements for human rights and global justice.4 The optimistic view of prosecutions argues that they promote democratic consolidation and raise the cost of repression, thus deterring other regimes from abusing human rights (Kim and Sikkink, 2010; Olsen et al., 2010).5 As Sikkink clearly puts it, “[t]he possibility of punishment and disgrace makes violating human rights more costly, and thus deters future leaders from doing so.”6 Former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan also emphasized this point during the International Conference on Financing for Development in 2002: Our hope is that, by punishing the guilty, the ICC will bring some comfort to the surviving victims and to the communities that have been targeted. More important, we hope it will deter future war criminals, and bring nearer the day when no ruler, no State, no junta and no army anywhere will be able to abuse human rights with impunity.

Prosecution of dictators and the growing influence of the ICC are not without critics though.7 Some note that the ICC has insufficient enforcement capacity to induce better behavior (Goldsmith, 2003), while others stress that autocratic regimes sign human rights treaties for strategic reasons, but with little intention of complying (Vreeland, 2008; Hollyer and Rosendorff, 2011).8 Snyder and Vinjamuri (2004) argue that prosecuting human rights abusers involved in a conflict may provide a perverse incentive to continue fighting to avoid punishment.9 2 Andrew Higgins, “In Trial, Romania Warily Revisits a Brutal Past,” The New York Times, 29 September 2013. 3 “Brazil to charge army officer over military rule abuses,” BBC News, 14 March 2012; and “Guatemala Ríos Montt genocide trial to resume in 2015,” BBC News, 6 November 2013. 4 See, for example, Stanton (2009), and the deputy director Amnesty International’s Africa program, quoted in Xan Rice, “Sudanese president Bashir charged with Darfur war crimes,” The Guardian, 4 March 2009. See also: “ICC: Bashir Warrant Is Warning to Abusive Leaders,” Human Rights Watch, 3 February 2010. 5 For an approach advocating prosecutions based on legal arguments see, for example, Orentlicher (1991). 6 Kathryn Sikkink, “Making Tyrants Do Time,” op-ed in The New York Times, 15 September 2011. 7 See Osiel (2000) for a review. 8 On why countries join the ICC, see Simmons and Danner (2010) and Chapman and Chaudoin (2013). 9 In contrast, Gilligan (2006) posits that leaders with a high probability of being deposed may be more willing to surrender to the ICC than be punished by domestic actors.

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This logic points to a more far-reaching criticism: prosecutions may deter repressive regimes from relinquishing power (Goldsmith, 2003; Goldsmith and Krasner, 2003; Sutter, 1995, 2006). If prosecutions deter human rights abuses in transition countries, the proximate cause is that prosecutions raise the cost of using repression by increasing the likelihood of punishment after office (↑ q). For example, in reporting on Mubarak’s trial, the late Anthony Shadid noted that, “[s]ome Arab officials even suggested that the spectacle of the trial on Wednesday—a president and his family, along with his retinue of officials, facing charges—would make [other] . . . leaders all the more reluctant to step down.”10 For this reason, according to a more pessimistic view, prosecutions might also increase the cost of leaving power for elites in autocratic regimes that have committed human rights abuses by increasing the chances they are punished after stepping down. However, as Sikkink and Walling (2007, 429) point out, “there are many claims about the negative effects of trials but relatively little solid evidence to support them.” Attempts to prosecute human rights abuses have become a new tool of external pressure, even debated as a strategy to put pressure on the Syrian regime in the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings.11 However, given the paucity of ICC indictments to date, much less successful prosecution, there is little room to assess how ICC actions influence the behavior of repressive dictatorships. In contrast, the number of human rights prosecutions in domestic and international courts has risen significantly in the past thirty years (see Figure 1.4). In this chapter, we use the number of prosecutions in neighboring countries as a proxy for changes in the autocrats’ expectation about the likelihood of post-transition punishment. This allows us to assess whether the “accountability era,” measured by the growing number of prosecutions across the globe, deters dictatorships from giving up power. Prosecution of human rights violations principally influences regime elites’ incentive to step down from power when faced with a crisis. Rather than weakening regimes by undermining their capacity to obtain loyalty or repress, we posit that prosecutions alter elites’ expected utility of stepping down. Because the institutional mechanisms for protecting elite power after a transition vary across different types of dictatorships, we expect the influence of prosecutions to vary as well. In military regimes, for example, officers can Anthony Shadid, “At Mubarak Trial, Stark Image of Humbled Power,” The New York Times, 3 August 2011. 11 Philippe Sands, “Referring Syria to the international criminal court is a justified gamble,” The Guardian, 16 January 2013. Farida Hussain, “Is prosecuting Assad a better option than Syria strike?,” CBC News, 7 September 2013. 10

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threaten a coup if the new democracy encroaches on their interests. In partybased dictatorships, the dominant party frequently competes in and sometimes wins elections after a transition. These mechanisms for domestically— and credibly—protecting power after a transition mean prosecutions should be less likely to deter transitions in these regimes. In personalist autocracies, however, regime collapse and transition typically mean the old elites lose power and lack the institutional capacity to protect their interests after a transition. Personalist elites are thus more likely to be punished unless they can find foreign protection in the form of asylum. Prosecutions should therefore increase the likelihood of punishment but also make it more difficult to find a credible asylum offer. As a result, prosecutions reduce the expected utility of stepping down, so the evidence for the pessimistic view of human rights prosecutions should be strongest in personalist dictatorships.

P U N I S H M E N T E X P E C T A T I O N S A N D TR A N S I T I O N S Regime transitions result from destabilizing domestic conditions and expectations about the ex-post consequences of leaving power. Foreign policy instruments not only destabilize autocracies by limiting the regime’s capacity to buy support or by undermining its coercive capacity, but can also alter expectations of post-transition punishment (q in our model). Given a domestic or external shock that decreases the benefits of resisting in power, the ability of elites to protect their interests in a subsequent regime—be it democracy or new dictatorship—influences their willingness to negotiate a transition and relinquish power. Despite receiving considerable theoretical attention,12 this claim has not been systematically tested. Our model of regime change illustrates how expectations of post-transition punishment influence transitions. A peaceful democratic transition is more likely when the regime faces a credible possibility of rebellion (due to a decrease in p) plus a sufficiently low probability of experiencing a bad postexit fate should regime elites decide to step down. In other words, peaceful democratic transitions mostly occur when elites’ expected utility of stepping down is greater than that of resisting in power. However, promises to grant domestic immunity to former elites are not credible if a new democratic government has an incentive to punish former autocratic elites and these elites lack the capacity to protect themselves (Sutter, 12

See, for example, Dix (1982), Huntington (1991b), Sutter (1995), and Goldsmith (2003).

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1995). Two features of autocratic rule can ameliorate this credibility problem by ensuring the new government upholds a transition agreement after the autocratic elite relinquish their monopoly on power. Political parties representing the interests of former autocratic elites can win electoral power and veto revisions to transition agreements; and former elites in the military can credibly threaten to replace the new democratic government in a coup bid. Elites in dominant party dictatorships, we posit, are the most likely to have strong party representation after a transition; while elites in the military regimes, should have the most capacity to credibly threaten a coup. Elites in both types of dictatorships, therefore, should be better placed to successfully negotiate a peaceful transition than rulers in personalist regimes. If domestic protection cannot be enforced, an alternative course to alleviate the punishment dilemma is to seek foreign protection in exile (Sutter, 1995). However, the exile “solution” hinges on two increasingly difficult conditions. First, exiled elites must find a country willing to host them. Second, the risk the host country revokes protection to enable either extradition or prosecution by a foreign court must be sufficiently low so that the benefits of fleeing are greater than those of fighting to stay in power. Factors that increase the expectation that regime elites will be punished after a transition or will be unable to find asylum in a foreign country should lower the chances that the regime negotiates an exit, making a peaceful transition less likely. Because new democracy is less likely to emerge after forced or violent autocratic regime collapse (Figure 2.3), changes in post-exit punishment expectations have implications for the prospects of democracy. Thus, if prosecutions of human rights abusers in neighboring countries are a useful empirical proxy for changes in the expectation of post-exit punishment (q), these prosecutions should deter some dictatorships from transitioning to democracy. This logic informs one of the two competing views of human rights prosecutions, each of which points to different policy prescriptions for addressing past human rights abuses (Olsen et al., 2010). While the pessimistic view argues that these strategic considerations about the likelihood of punishment after leaving power deter leaders from stepping down, the optimistic view, which focuses on transition countries, claims that prosecutions deter repression by making such behavior more costly to the perpetrators. We discuss both views in turn.

The Pessimistic View Some early theories of democratic transition identify prosecutions for past abuses as a potential obstacle to democratization. Dix (1982), for example, emphasizes that exit guarantees for former ruling elites increase the chances of

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successful transition, while O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argue that past repression under military rule hinders “pacted” transitions to democracy. Further, if the military remains strong and cohesive, a democracy with some guarantees of the military’s interests—including immunity from prosecution— can facilitate extrication from autocratic rule (Przeworski, 1991). Consistent with the logic of our model, these arguments suggest that the anticipation of likely punishment after transition reduces the probability that autocratic elites relinquish power through a negotiated process. Indeed, in his “guidelines for democratizers,” Huntington urges new democratic politicians to refrain from prosecuting former elites for human rights violations (Huntington, 1991b). This reasoning informed decisions to pass amnesty laws during transitions in countries such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Spain (Kritz, 1995). Concern that prosecutions will deter repressive leaders from leaving power also informs critics of the ICC. Some argue that the growing reach of the ICC will prompt dictators to hold onto power (Goldsmith, 2003; Goldsmith and Krasner, 2003; Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2004; Nalepa and Powell, 2011). Ginsburg (2009, 499), for example, suggests that the ICC may take “away states’ ability to commit to non-prosecution in the case of amnesties.” Recent indictments of sitting rulers in countries such as Libya and Sudan have further fueled this debate because these actions targeted individuals who were concurrently facing pressure to step down peacefully. Commenting on the Syrian case, one expert argued that a criminal investigation would make Assad more reluctant to reach a diplomatic solution through U.N. talks.13 In short, the pessimistic view emphasizes that unless some mechanism exists to credibly prevent new elites from punishing former autocratic elites, a peaceful, negotiated democratic transition is unlikely. However, elites in some dictatorships, particularly those with an organizational basis, possess institutionalized mechanisms for retaining some domestic power even after democratization. The extent to which autocratic elites expect their power to be protected after transition, in turn, shapes their beliefs about the likelihood of post-transition punishment, q. Therefore, in dictatorships where elites can expect to retain some post-transition power, the pessimistic logic should be weaker. Military regimes are dictatorships where the military as an institution rules and thus constrains the power of the nominal leader. For these regimes, the capacity to make credible transition pacts stems from their advantage in violence. Exit guarantees are credible because the military retains the capacity

13 Cited in Farida Hussain, “Is prosecuting Assad a better option than Syria strike?,” CBC News, 7 September 2013.

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to re-intervene in politics if the new political elites encroach upon their interests. As O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, 29) point out, “[w]here they cannot prevent the transition, they will strive to obtain iron-clad guarantees that under no circumstances will ‘the past be unearthed’; failing to obtain that, they will remain a serious threat to the nascent democracy.” In Argentina, for example, the prosecution of former junta leaders prompted military unrest and a coup threat, forcing Alfonsín’s government to pass immunity laws shortly after the transition (Nobles, 2010). Similarly, during Brazil’s transition, the military eliminated “most of the proposed constitutional clauses that would have curtailed military autonomy” (Linz and Stepan, 1996, 169). The military’s willingness to bargain indicates they can credibly threaten to re-intervene once out of power, and are thus more likely than other autocratic elites to return power to civilians through a “pacted” transition (Sutter, 1995). A credible threat to dislodge a new government is sufficient to induce the opposition to refrain from revising the past, which lowers the expected probability of punishment (q). Indeed, many argue that a central reason militaries intervene in politics in the first place is to protect their corporate interests, particularly immunity from prosecution (Thompson, 1975; Nordlinger, 1977). Dominant party dictatorships also frequently end in negotiated transitions, with the regime party competing in post-transition multiparty elections (Huntington, 1991b; Ishiyama, 1995; Geddes, 1999). Thus the dominant party can act as a veto player after a transition, much like the military does in many new democracies that follow military rule. Dominant party autocracies typically have cohesive cadres and relatively broad and diverse support coalitions (Geddes, 1999; Smith, 2005; Magaloni, 2008). They also buy mass support through broad patronage networks, distributing benefits and public employment by politicizing public resources (Magaloni, 2006; Greene, 2010). Such features allow party elites to mobilize support and increase their power vis-à-vis the opposition during bargaining over electoral rules of a new democracy (Albertus and Menaldo, 2014). Indeed, former dominant regime parties have generally won at least the second largest share of seats in the legislature in post-transition democracies, with some former dominant parties even retaking legislative majorities or the executive (see Chapter 4). Consequently, these elites are likely to retain post-transition political leverage. If elites from a former party dictatorship win some legislative power, they can block a new democratic government’s policy choices that renege on previous promises and lead to punishment.14 An example from post-Communist 14 Further, Nalepa (2010) argues that after the breakdown of party regimes in Communist Europe, transitional justice was avoided because notable opposition members had worked as informants for the autocratic police. Elites in the new democracy therefore did not renege on their promise of amnesty in an effort to avoid exposing their own “skeletons in the closet.”

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transitions in Eastern Europe illustrates this point. David (2003) compares the timing and scope of lustration laws after transitions in Poland and Czechoslovakia to show that, in the former, these laws were limited and passed more than a decade after the transition because the negotiated transition allowed some former communists to retain power. The first Polish elections in 1989 were only partly competitive, with just one-third of parliamentary seats contested, and the regime leader Jaruzelski remained president until 1990. The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), controlled by former Communists and opposed to lustration, collected the second largest vote total in the 1991 legislative election, and won the 1993 parliamentary and 1995 presidential elections. This prevented a pro-lustration legislative majority from forming, forestalling the passage of lustration laws until the victory of the center-right in 1997. In post-Arab Spring Tunisia, the second post-transition election was won by a party, Nidaa Tounes, which includes former elites and members of Ben Ali’s political party (RCD).15 Personalist dictatorships stand apart from those based on an institutionalized organization such as a party or the military because leaders in these regimes typically have near-complete control over decision-making and political appointments (Geddes, 1999). By definition, these rulers weaken the two institutions, the party and the military, that not only constrain them in the present but, at the same time, are those most capable of defending their interests in the future, should they leave power. Personalist dictators often undermine the collective action capacity of their militaries to reduce the risk of coups. Coup-proofing strategies—such as personally controlling internal promotion and recruitment, using ethnic or familial criteria for officer selection, and creating parallel security organizations—ensure loyalty but do so at the expense of weakening the institutional structure of the armed forces (Quinlivan, 1999; Belkin and Schofer, 2003; Ezrow and Frantz, 2011a; Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011). By personalizing the military, these leaders rarely have allies within the military once they leave power because losing power means their key supporters in the military have lost power as well. Likewise, while legislatures and parties typically help enforce power-sharing agreements and policy concessions (Gandhi, 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Boix and Svolik, 2013), the logic of patrimonialism often renders these institutions

15 Prior to the election, and before the possibility of an alliance between the two largest parties, Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda, one commentator pointed that: “If this alliance is made, we must mourn the transitional justice, because who will account to whom? A tacit agreement was already signed by Nidaa Tunis and Ennahda not to open each other’s files and to ignore the corruption, the mismanagement of state resources, the dictatorship and the various abuses of human rights.” See Hanene Zbiss, “Dangerous alliance between Ennahda and Nidaa Tunis,” Al-Monitor, 2 April 2014.

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instruments of patronage, rotation, and control in personalist regimes (LustOkar, 2005; Wright, 2008). Appointments provide access to rents and other benefits, but those selected may be subject to frequent rotation to prevent the creation of independent power bases. Parties in these regimes are frequently the creation of the leader and often do not survive him. The support parties in Mobutu’s and Trujillo’s regimes, for example, disintegrated once their leaders lost power. Gaddafi did not have a party and, relying partly on mercenaries, left no military structure behind, save tribal militias, when his regime fell. With alienated militaries and weak parties, personalist rulers have less capacity to threaten new elites and thus retain leverage after a transition. For these rulers, retaining power may be the best protection against punishment. Thus, historically, personalist dictators have faced a worse fate when their regime is ousted, as Figure 3.2 illustrates (Escribà-Folch, 2013a). Consider the case of Malawi. In contrast to Rawlings’ regime in Ghana, Malawi’s long-time leader, Hastings Banda, systematically weakened existing regime institutions—the legislature and the regime party—to consolidate personal power (Posner, 1995). Further, rather than mobilizing a broad coalition, Banda’s support was drawn primarily from his own ethnic group, the Chewa, and those living in the central regions of Malawi. To reduce his reliance on the military and protect himself from a coup, Banda created a paramilitary group, the Malawi Young Pioneers, to repress dissent. After donors cut aid in the early 1990s, Banda conceded and held a referendum on his regime in 1993. Banda lost: nearly two-thirds of voters supported the adoption of free multiparty elections. In the 1994 general election, the first after the transition, Banda’s party placed second, and he was defeated in the presidential contest. The following year Banda was placed under house arrest and tried—along with some of his aides—for killing political adversaries. The new government also investigated the former dictator’s financial assets, later charging him with fraud. This example illustrates a personalist dictator’s inability to secure domestic protection after stepping down. He clearly miscalculated, and without post-transition protections, was quickly punished by the new democratic government. Alternatively, granting of asylum to outgoing dictators may serve to alleviate the “punishment dilemma” when domestic protection is unlikely. Indeed, historically exile has been a common fate of personalist rulers (see Figure 3.2). In the absence of domestic guarantees, foreign protection can facilitate democratic transitions even in personalist regimes.16 Democratic governments have

16 Indeed, more than 30 percent of transitions to democracy from personalist rule result in the dictator going into exile.

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often played an active role in making foreign protection credible and thus inducing rulers to step down. In some cases they contribute to broker peace agreements, such as in Ethiopia and Liberia. In the case of Liberia, Charles Taylor was offered asylum in Nigeria in exchange for stepping down. Democracies can also grant direct asylum to expedite transitions before domestic tension escalates or armed conflict erupts. For example, former Presidents Ferdinand Marcos (Philippines) and Singman Rhee (South Korea) both went to Hawaii (U.S.); Peru’s Fujimori announced his resignation once he was already in Japan; and Haiti’s Aristide was welcomed in South Africa in 2004. Nevertheless, as we argue in Chapter 3, growing international pressure to prosecute human rights abuses not only increases the expectation that postexit punishment is more likely at home, but also reduces dictators’ options for asylum in foreign countries by increasing the likelihood that they will be extradited to face trial or punished by international or mixed courts. In the past three plus decades human rights groups have gained more tools for holding past abusers accountable, including increasing involvement and support from international organizations and other states. For instance, since 1999 the U.N. forbids the promise of amnesties for the most serious crimes— genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and gross violations of human rights—in any United Nations-endorsed peace agreement.17 Some countries have also invoked universal jurisdiction to prosecute former dictators and other state officials living in their home countries. This puts pressure on domestic institutions, which, without such pressure, might be unable or unwilling to prosecute. For example, Argentine courts recently demanded extradition for those responsible for the crimes that occurred during the Francoist dictatorship in Spain.18 Domestic obstacles to criminal accountability can also be overcome with the establishment of hybrid or international courts supported by the international community, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The development of a comprehensive international human rights regime, particularly new enforcement mechanisms, makes exile an increasingly unattractive option (Gilligan, 2006; Chapman and Chaudoin, 2013). The risk of punishment in exile has increased not only because it is now more difficult for ex-dictators to find a country willing to host them in exile, but a substantial number of countries are also now parties to the ICC (122 in 2014) and many invoke universal jurisdiction in attempts to punish dictators 17 See the report of the U.N. Secretary-General: “The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies” (S/2004/616). 18 Raphael Minder, “Argentine Judge Seeks to Put Franco Officials on Trial,” The New York Times, 30 September 2013.

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who seek exile. Due to increased media and popular pressure, democratic countries are now unwilling or unable to host fleeing dictators as they had often done. At most, they can now contribute to brokering agreements and finding safe havens in third—especially, non-signatory—states. For example, despite attempts by numerous countries, including the U.S., to help Gaddafi find a suitable exile destination, this option failed to entice him and he instead fought to the death. Further, even dictators who initially succeeded in obtaining exile now face a growing risk of having their foreign protection revoked, again resulting in extradition or prosecution in a foreign court. For example, the former President of Chad Hissène Habré will be tried for human rights abuses in a Senegalese special court despite having lived in exile in Senegal since his ouster in 1990.19 Similarly, the former President of Liberia Charles Taylor initially fled to exile in Nigeria in 2003, but three years later the Nigerian authorities, facing both international and domestic pressure, facilitated his transfer to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. After a guilty verdict, Taylor was sentenced to fifty years in prison. The growing hostility of the international environment also manifests in the risks faced by former rulers who, for different reasons, decided to temporarily leave their safe havens. For instance, Baltasar Garzón, a Spanish judge, demanded extradition and tried to prosecute Augusto Pinochet while he was in London in 1998 seeking medical care. A defiant Fujimori, exiled in Japan, made preparations for returning to Peru to run for president, but Peruvian authorities charged him with numerous crimes. While Japan refused Peru’s extradition requests, Fujimori was arrested while traveling to Chile in 2006, and was eventually extradited to Peru and tried for human rights crimes (Burt, 2009). Likewise, when former Haitian President Jean-Claude Duvalier returned to Haiti in 2010, after over two decades in French exile, human rights groups demanded that the ex-dictator stand trial for past abuses. Initially, Haitian prosecutors ordered his arrest to face charges of corruption but subsequently pursued prosecution for crimes against humanity under international law.20 Duvalier’s death in 2014 put an end to the long-awaited judicial process.

19 Belgium demanded extradition on the grounds of universal jurisdiction and the International Court of Justice ordered Senegal to either prosecute Habré or to extradite him. Senegal and the African Union then agreed to prosecute Habré in Senegal. See: “Senegal: Proceedings Against Hissène Habré Draw Near,” Human Rights Watch, 19 December 2012. 20 A judge had previously dismissed human rights charges, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired. Amelie Baron, “Haiti court says human rights charges can be brought against Duvalier,” Reuters, 20 February 2014.

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Decreasing prospects of happy exile are particularly relevant for elites in personalist dictatorships because they are less capable of controlling the domestic transition process to negotiate a safe exit and have historically been the most likely to flee their countries upon ouster. Thus, as the exile option becomes less attractive, expectations about post-exit punishment— particularly for rulers who lack credible domestic guarantees in a posttransition setting—should increase. While the growing number of prosecutions may not alter the benefits or risks of fighting for survival, prosecutions make resisting look better relative to stepping down and fleeing to exile. This reinforces the logic that prosecutions in neighbor countries should reduce the likelihood of regime change in personalist regimes. If exile increasingly involves the risk of future punishment or is infeasible, the expected utility of this option becomes lower than the utility of fighting to retain power. In sum, the logic of the pessimistic view should be strongest in personalist dictatorships because they have few domestic mechanisms for obtaining credible protection of their interests and safety after a transition. This should make these regimes more sensitive to changes in externally generated costs of leaving power (growing pressure to prosecute proxied by neighbor human rights prosecutions). By increasing the expected likelihood of post-transition punishment (↑ q)—and reducing the prospects of a happy exile—prosecutions in neighbor countries should reduce the probability of personalist regimes leaving power.

The Optimistic View Proponents of human rights prosecutions argue that by improving accountability, establishing rule of law, and, thus raising the cost of repression, punishment can deter future abuses (Olsen et al., 2010). The increasing legalization of human rights regimes and the recent growth of international agreements obliging states to address human rights abuses have accompanied a steady rise in prosecutions (Méndez, 1997; Lutz and Sikkink, 2001; Sikkink and Walling, 2007; Kim and Sikkink, 2010; Sikkink, 2011). The potential costs associated with punishment are not only material (freedom and income), but also social (Kim and Sikkink, 2010). Aware of the increased probability of prosecution, proponents argue, state officials should refrain from violating human rights to avoid punishment. Indeed, the threat of prosecutions may deter human rights abuses even in the absence of reliable enforcement mechanisms (Ritter and Wolford, 2012). Recent evidence that human rights prosecutions in transition countries reduce state repression supports the optimistic view (Kim and Sikkink, 2010;

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Olsen et al., 2010). Further, deterrence may extend to neighboring countries: transitional states reduce repression when their neighbors prosecute past abusers. Evidence from Latin America suggests that human rights trials improved respect for human rights and democratic accountability (Sikkink and Walling, 2007), while others show that trials combined with other forms of transitional justice serve to further democracy and human rights (Olsen et al., 2010). The optimistic view focuses on how prosecutions influence repression in countries that have already transitioned from autocracy, not immediate decisions of sitting rulers about whether to negotiate an exit from power. However, if prosecutions make the use of repression more costly in the future, this mechanism may also influence the prospects for political survival in some regimes. First, public knowledge of costly repression can signal to the opposition that the regime is less capable of suppressing dissent and thus spur antiregime mobilization. Second, prosecutions may increase the likelihood that the repressive apparatus refuses to use violence against regime dissenters. Thus the likelihood that a dictator can successfully defend against violent threats to his rule when they arise—which increases the prospect that he ends up killed or jailed—decreases (# R). If prosecutions raise the long-term cost of repression for the regime, then when a regime chooses to hold onto power instead of negotiating an exit, there is some probability that the regime successfully fights for survival and retains power (p in our setting). Yet, with some probability the regime may be forcibly ousted and thus elites face a higher risk of a nasty post-exit fate (Goemans, 2008; Escribà-Folch, 2013a). If, by emboldening the opposition or reducing security forces’ willingness to repress, human rights prosecutions decrease the regime’s capacity to resist, the expected utility of staying in power decreases as well. Autocratic elites may thus face a dilemma. On the one hand, they can decide to stay in office, but at the risk of being less capable of handling dissent in the future, which reduces the expected utility of resisting. Alternatively, they may opt to step down in the current period provided they are able to negotiate with opposition forces and ensure a relatively benign fate after democratic transition. Prosecutions may therefore increase the likelihood that regime elites negotiate a peaceful exit from power provided the likelihood of being punished is sufficiently low. Again, this prediction should vary with regime type. Leaders in personalist dictatorships usually have more control over the selection of high-level military and security officers, and are more likely to personally command these organizations (Geddes, 1999; Weeks, 2012, 2014). Control over the military allows the dictator to staff these organizations using familial, ethnic, or sectarian loyalties, making them more dependent on a

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specific autocratic ruler remaining in office. Such strategies may strengthen the loyalty of the security apparatus, reduce the likelihood of defections, and facilitate the regime’s repressive response to challengers. Alternatively, in non-personalist regimes military and security forces are often less patrimonialized and more highly institutionalized. These organizations tend to be, as Bellin (2004, 145) argues, “rule-governed, predictable, and meritocratic,” with “established paths of career advancement and recruitment.” Thus the leaders of the coercive apparatus in these dictatorships are less likely to be tied to the regime leader and more likely to survive in their position should the regime fall. In Chile, for example, the leader of the military junta that democratized in 1989 not only retained his status as a general but continued for nearly a decade as the head of the armed forces. When faced with anti-regime uprisings, the regime’s survival often depends on whether the military and security forces use their violent capacity to repress opponents (Bellin, 2004; Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008; Svolik, 2011). Yet, as Bellin notes, institutionalization “determines the degree to which the military elite is personally invested in the regime’s survival” (Bellin, 2012, 132). Officers in an institutionalized military are more likely to turn their backs on the regime because they typically have fewer ties to the ruler and a more developed “corporate identity” linked to defending the state rather than the regime. If prosecutions in neighboring countries provide a signal that repression is more likely to be punished, the interests of the military may be better served by defecting rather than by fighting for regime survival. Hence, amid unfolding unrest, they may refuse to open fire. Recent events during the Arab Spring uprisings illustrate this point. In Tunisia, General Ammar, the army chief of staff, refused to obey Ben-Ali’s order to shoot protesters, and the dictator soon fled to exile. The Tunisian military was not highly personalized under Ben-Ali and “in time came to rank among the Arab world’s most professional forces” (Barany, 2011, 31). In Egypt, the decision to defect took more time, with the military initially helping other security forces. However, after violence intensified, the army announced its refusal to use force and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces quickly forced Mubarak to resign. Egypt’s military is highly institutionalized and their institutional economic interests conflicted with Mubarak’s plan to elevate his son to succeed him (Bellin, 2012). These cases contrast with Libya and Yemen, where the dictators’ sons held key posts in the regime’s most repressive military divisions (see below, “Personalism and Leaders’ Post-Transition Fate in Libya and Yemen”). If growing international protection of human rights and increasing resolve to prosecute violators make future repression more costly, elites in nonpersonalist regimes should have an incentive to step down in a controlled

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transition provided they have institutionalized exit guarantees to make transition agreements credible. Regime transition may thus be preferable to the uncertainty of fighting for regime survival given a reduced capacity to repress. Hence, this variant of the optimistic hypothesis suggests that neighboring country prosecutions for human rights abuses should be less likely to deter democratic transition in non-personalist dictatorships. That is, neighbor human rights prosecutions may advance the prospects of democratization in non-personalist dictatorships.

Measuring Punishment Expectations Both the pessimistic and optimistic views hinge on elites’ estimates of the likelihood of being punished after a transition, namely, q, in our model. It is difficult, however, to test this logic because these expectations are not directly observable. Further, while recent evidence suggests that prosecutions reduce repression (Kim and Sikkink, 2010; Olsen et al., 2010), these studies focus on countries that have already transitioned to democracy and therefore cannot rule out the possibility that unobserved factors in the new democracy cause both the timing of prosecutions after transition and improvements in human rights. The decision to prosecute may be endogenous to the political strength of the repressive actors (Skaar, 1999; Kim, 2012). Thus if countries only prosecute former abusers when the latter are less threatening, we only observe the benefits of prosecutions. To address these issues, we measure changes in elites’ perception of the likelihood of post-transition punishment with a proxy: the number of human rights prosecutions in neighboring countries that have already transitioned. This approach assumes that dictators observe prosecutions in proximate countries and expect that the politics of human rights punishment in their own country may be similar.21 Elites in dictatorships often use regional organizations and neighboring countries as a reference point for understanding and responding to political change. For example, Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister Karim Massimov told Reuters in an interview that his government was “watching very carefully what’s happening in North Africa and the Middle East.”22 And high-ranking officers in Pinochet’s regime looked to other Southern Cone military 21 See Haas (1992), Weyland (2005), and Meseguer (2009) for explanations of diffusion among neighboring countries. 22 Robin Paxton, “Interview-Kazakh PM says opposition needed in parliament,” Reuters, 2 April 2011.

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dictatorships (Argentina and Brazil) when searching for constitutional pathways to permanent rule. Furthermore, human rights prosecutions often result from the efforts of transnational advocacy networks that cluster geographically (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Hafner-Burton and Ron, 2009; Bell et al., 2012). These transnational networks, in turn, use news media, which can also reflect a regional bias in reporting on human rights abuses (Hafner-Burton and Ron, 2013). Autocratic elites are therefore likely to be more aware of and influenced by regional changes in human rights regimes. This suggests a regional focus to the relevant reference group for autocratic elites, with implications for human rights politics and transitions (Brinks and Coppedge, 2006; Hafner-Burton and Ron, 2009). With this measure of the expectation of post-transition punishment, we examine how the growing number of human rights prosecutions influence regime change. Consistent with the logic of the pessimistic view of prosecutions, our first hypothesis argues that neighbor human rights prosecutions should decrease the likelihood of transition, but only in personalist regimes. A second hypothesis, which builds on the optimistic view, argues that neighbor human rights prosecutions should increase the likelihood of democratic transition in non-personalist regimes.

PROSECUTIONS AND R EGIME CHANG E To test these expectations about prosecutions and regime change, we use data on transitional human rights prosecutions (HRPs). Kim and Sikkink (2010) code international and domestic HRPs with information from U.S. Department of State Human Rights Annual Country Reports, international organizations such as the U.N. Security Council, and human rights NGOs. This data do not include cases from the ICC because the court’s first investigation started in June 2004 but concluded in 2012, after the temporal span of the HRP data. We measure events in neighboring countries that have already experienced transitions, and thus do not rely on information from dictatorships that are currently in power. Therefore, neighbor prosecutions are more likely to be exogenous to the process of democratization than other measures, such as signing human rights treaties, that rely on information from strategic government behavior in dictatorships at risk of transition. The prosecutions measure is a weighted count of the number of HRP’s in neighboring countries in the past three years. We examine data from 1975 to 2006 because prosecutions only begin in the late 1970s (see Chapter 1). To define neighbor countries, we calculate a weighted index using minimum

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distance data from Gleditsch and Ward (2006). We assign a weight equal to the inverse distance from the target (w=1/ln(d)) for neighboring countries within a 50 km of threshold of minimum distance. The weight decreases for each group of countries at the next distance threshold, where each threshold is an additional 50 km in minimum distance. This weighted measure incorporates information from all neighbors within 1000 km of minimum distance: wHRPi ¼

20 X X

wiK Nk K¼1

k∈K

where N is the number of HRPs in the k neighboring countries within the group of countries that fall within each distance threshold K. w=1/ln (d) is the weight assigned to the count of all HRPs (Nk) for the countries in K group.23 The number of HRPs increased substantially over the past three decades, and this period coincides with the third wave of democratization. Therefore, we account for unmeasured factors that also increase over time and may be correlated with regime failure, particularly democratic diffusion processes. Further, both neighboring country HRPs and the political processes that shape the prospects for democratization cluster geographically, which is not surprising since the prosecutions data code political events that occur only after a country has transitioned from civil war or autocratic rule, with the majority occurring after a democratic transition. Because of this geographic clustering, we cannot rely on cross-sectional variation to estimate the influence of HRPs. Finally, there may be unobserved factors that vary by country (or geographic region)—such as the strength of civil society groups, human rights norms, and the political strength of the military—which are correlated with both the chances of democratization and the prospects of regional human rights prosecutions. For these reasons, we opt for a model specification that incorporates country- and time period-fixed effects. We test a model that includes four control variables: neighbor democratization, neighbor post-civil war, GDP per capita, and population size.24 23 K moves from 1 to 20 because we group countries that fall within each of the 20 distance thresholds between 0 km and 1000 km of minimum distance. The weight for the count of HRPs in neighboring countries within 50 km is therefore 1/ln (50)=0.2566. For P neighboring countries that fall within 950 km and 1000 km of minimum distance, the count ð k∈K Nk Þ of neighboring HRPs is weighted by 1/ln (1000)=0.1448. The sum of the weights (there are 20 weights, one for each 50 km and 1000 km) is 3.6437. 24 In replication files we show that the main result remains when dropping these variables and when adding more control variables (military intervention, civil war, anti-regime protest campaigns, and repression).

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Neighbor democratization is a count of the number of neighboring countries that democratized in the past three years, and neighbor post-civil war is a count of the number of neighboring countries that experienced a post-civil war transition in the past three years. Both measures use a binary cut-point (4000 km distance between capital cities) to delineate neighbors. These variables capture diffusion processes that are correlated with both democratization and neighbor human rights prosecutions. We also control for GDP per capita and population (both logged and lagged) because these structural features proxy for international political strength that may influence both the prospects of regime change as well as the likelihood of prosecution. We first test a conditional logit with time period-fixed effects and duration time polynomials to account for time dependence. We include a binary indicator of personalist regime and test models with the interaction between HRPs and personalist regime. We also report results from linear probability models with country- and year-fixed effects. We report clustered standard errors throughout. As in prior chapters, we examine three dependent variables: all regime failures, democratic transitions, and autocratic transitions.

Results The first set of tests group all regime failures together. Overall, HRPs are not strongly correlated with regime failure, but once we interact HRPs with Personalist regime, we find that HRPs are associated with a lower probability of democratic transition in personalist dictatorships, but a higher probability in other dictatorships. This result remains in the linear probability model. We find a similar pattern for both democratic and autocratic transitions. However, the estimates are not statistically different from zero in the autocratic transition models. Figure 7.1 shows results from linear probability models.25 An increase in neighbor prosecutions from zero to one standard deviation above the mean is associated with a 2-percent decline in the probability of democratic transition in personalist regimes, but a 3-percent increase in other dictatorships. While a similar pattern holds for autocratic transitions, the finding is not as substantively or statistically significant. However, despite the strong substantive finding for non-personalist dictatorships and democratic transition in the 25 The substantive interpretation from a conditional logit is biased upwards because the nonlinear estimator drops all countries that do not experience a transition during the sample period. Thus the baseline transition probability in these samples is considerably larger than the baseline probabilities from the larger sample employed in the linear model.

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% change in probability of transition

Democratic transition

Autocratic transition

6

6

4

4 3.1 2

2

0

0

1.3

–1.5 –1.9

–2

–2 –4

–4 Non-personalist

Personalist

Non-personalist 95% CI

Personalist

Estimate

Figure 7.1. Human rights prosecutions and regime change. The change in the predicted linear probability of democratic and autocratic transition, by regime type. Years: 1977–2006.

left panel, this result is not robust in all specifications, particularly when we alter the way we model the global time trend. In short, the finding for democratic transition is consistent with the expectation that prosecutions deter personalist dictatorships from relinquishing power peacefully in a negotiated transition to democracy. Importantly, we find no evidence that the rise of human rights prosecutions deter other dictatorships from leaving power. If anything, the results suggest the opposite.

Robustness Tests We conduct a number of additional tests. First, to account for region-specific factors that vary over time but that we cannot directly measure, such as the political strength of human rights groups or other regionally clustered aspects of democratic diffusion, we estimate specifications (with linear and non-linear link functions) that: replace country-and time period-fixed effects with regionspecific time trends (this entails including region-fixed effects); replace time period effects with year effects; replace time effects with the global prosecutions trend; and interact the global prosecutions trend with region. In these tests the finding that neighbor prosecution is associated with a lower probability of democratic transition in personalist regimes remains robust. The finding in Figure 7.1 for other dictatorships, however, is not robust. Thus, we cannot conclude that neighbor human rights prosecutions increase the chance

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of democracy in non-personalist regimes. Finally, the main result remains when we alter the lag on the prosecutions variable from a three-year lagged moving average to two or four years.

PERSONALISM AND LE ADERS ’ POST-TRANSITION F A T E I N L I B Y A AN D Y E M E N The Arab Spring uprisings led to a variety of outcomes that may have seemed difficult to anticipate. However, once we examine the structure of the regimes that eventually collapsed and the incentives of political actors, possible explanations emerge. Popular revolts quickly spread from Tunisia, where protests started in December 2010, to most of the rest of North Africa and the Middle East. However, to date, autocratic rulers have only been ousted in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen. In other countries, such as Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco, anti-regime protests triggered cosmetic political concessions, including the resignation or dismissal of top officials, but stopped well short of regime change. In other countries, such as Algeria and Saudi Arabia, protesters failed to mobilize in large numbers. Finally, protests in Syria were met with brutal repression and the conflict quickly devolved into a deadly civil war. In the three years since the revolts began, democratic change is still rare in the Middle East and North Africa. In fact, the only countries to hold democratic, multiparty elections since the uprisings began have been Egypt and Tunisia. Yet opposition politicians have since been assassinated in Tunisia, while Egypt slid back to autocratic rule after the military staged a coup that ousted President Mursi in July 2013. In the cases where uprisings led to regime collapse, another notable difference emerged: the ousted leaders experienced very different post-exit fates. Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisia’s president, fled to exile in Saudi Arabia. In Egypt, Hosni Mubarak initially went into internal “exile,” but was later arrested—along with other members of his family—to be tried in a domestic court for the deaths of protestors (among other charges). Muammar Gaddafi was killed by rebel forces during the Libyan civil war. And Yemen’s President Ali Abdullah Saleh stepped down from office after agreeing to the Gulf Cooperation Council transition plan which granted him and his family immunity from prosecution. The following sections examine the two cases in which popular revolt lead directly to the ouster of a personalist ruler. These examples illustrate how punishment expectations influenced rulers’ decisions about whether and when

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to step down peacefully, with implications for how the regime collapsed and what came next.

Gaddafi’s Fate and Forced Regime Change in Libya After deposing a foreign-backed monarchy in a 1969 coup, Muammar Gaddafi quickly consolidated personalist power. Following a failed coup attempt in 1975, he dismantled or marginalized constraining political institutions, in particular the ruling Revolutionary Command Council. He also disbanded the regime party, the Arab Socialist Union. Furthermore, as Vandewalle (1998, 88) notes, the 1975 coup “marked the end of professional and technical criteria for military recruitment and was the beginning of a steady but noticeable influx of individual members of Qadhafi’s tribe—and later of his family—into sensitive security and army positions.” Counterbalancing within the security apparatus also took the form of creating multiple overlapping paramilitary units such as the Revolutionary Guard Corps, the People’s militia, and a special military brigade led by his son (Lutterbeck, 2013). These units, especially the first, were charged with internal security to reduce Gaddafi’s dependence on the military (Gaub, 2013, 229). As Gaub (2013, 230) explains, the goal was to undermine the military’s organizational capacity: “Gaddafi proceeded to weaken precisely those elements of the military which could jeopardize the regime, namely all those which could provide a platform for collective identity and interests. His targets were hence not only cohesiveness, but also leadership as well as command and control structure.” Unsurprisingly, the wave of unrest that started in the eastern city of Benghazi in February 2011—right after Mubarak’s fall in Egypt—quickly devolved into a violent civil conflict. Gaddafi’s paramilitary forces and loyal military units opened fire on protesters, using snipers and airstrikes to crush the rebels and storm entire cities. Protest clashes rapidly turned into an armed rebellion and spread to other cities, such as Misrata, Bayda, Tobruk, and Zawiya. The escalation triggered numerous defections from military units less loyal to Gaddafi, some of which joined the National Liberation Army. With weak political institutions unable to protect his family’s interests and facing growing unrest, Gaddafi saw a negotiated exit from power as an increasingly remote option. Although his highly patrimonialized army was divided along tribal lines, the military’s strongest units were led by his family relatives. For example, one of the best-equipped and well-trained units, the 32nd Brigade, which remained loyal throughout the war and was initially quite effective in fighting rebel forces, was headed by Gaddafi’s son, Khamis. Given loyal military commanders, Gaddafi’s orders to respond to the protests with violent repression were more realistic than the similar calls to

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violence issued by rulers in Egypt and Tunisia. Mubarak and Ben Ali lacked personally loyal officers, and as a result, their most lethal military forces stood down when asked to shoot protesters. Even though military units in Eastern Libya soon defected from the regime and joined the rebels, Gaddafi countered by purchasing mercenary power with ample money from stockpiled oil revenues (Gaub, 2013; Lutterbeck, 2013).26 Shortly after the uprising began, Gaddafi found himself in a situation where he had committed crimes against humanity, was facing an armed opposition more than willing to punish him for past misdeeds, and was unable to secure a negotiated transition because he lacked the type of political institutions that might help protect his post-transition interests. Therefore, he chose to fight. In terms of our theoretical model, the best outcome for Gaddafi was to fight to preserve his power. Early in the conflict, on February 22, Gaddafi made clear his intentions during a televised address to his country: he stated that “I am not going to leave this land. I will die as a martyr at the end . . . I shall remain here defiant. Muammar is leader of the revolution until the end of time.”27 These were the words of a death foretold.

Gaddafi’s exit options Under these circumstances, the only way to avoid the punishment dilemma and negotiate a peaceful transition is for the dictator to secure asylum in a foreign country (Sutter, 1995). The need for a viable exit became more urgent in March 2011 when the U.N. Security Council imposed a no-fly zone that tipped the military balance in the rebel’s favor, thus increasing the probability Gaddafi would be defeated militarily. NATO forces attacked shortly after the U.N. resolution passed. At the same time, safe exile was unlikely because in late February the UNSC referred Gaddafi to the ICC, which issued arrest warrants against the dictator and two close relatives in June. Thus, although Gaddafi’s family was linked to early proposals for a peaceful transfer of power that included promises of a secure exile, in the end Gaddafi kept fighting because ICC intervention undermined the chances of finding a safe haven. As Phillippe Sands wrote in The Guardian after the ICC arrest warrant, Gaddafi “was bound to dig in his heels.”28

26 Peter Finn, “Experts say Gaddafi relying on paramilitary forces, foreign mercenaries to crush protests,” The Washington Post, 23 February 2011. 27 Ian Black, “Gaddafi urges violent showdown and tells Libya ‘I’ll die a martyr’,” The Guardian, 22 February 2011. 28 Philippe Sands, “The ICC arrest warrants will make Colonel Gaddafi dig in his heels,” The Guardian, 4 May 2011.

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Because a large number of countries had already ratified the Rome Statute, finding a country willing to host Gaddafi was difficult. Even in Africa, where thirty-one countries were already parties to the ICC, few options were available. Potential hosts had to be found then among non-signatories. Indeed, reports indicate that the U.S., the U.K., and Italy sought a third country that would take Gaddafi and his family as exiles.29 In May of that year, South African President Jacob Zuma—acting as the African Union’s mediator—met with Gaddafi and, allegedly, attempted to persuade him of the benefits of exile.30 However, the possibility of asylum in a non-signatory state faced several obstacles: some nonsignatory countries refused to accept Gaddafi, fearing international pressure to extradite him, while others did not offer long-term credible guarantees of protection.31 Moreover, Gaddafi’s past foreign policies had earned him numerous enemies throughout Africa, further reducing his options.32 One potential exile location emerged in Zimbabwe.33 Mugabe and Gaddafi were long-time allies, and Gaddafi already owned real state in Harare. Further, there was a precedent: in 1991, the U.S. helped former Ethiopian ruler Mengistu find asylum in Zimbabwe during the Ethiopian civil war.34 Nonetheless, Zimbabwe had one clear disadvantage. While Mugabe might have been interested in hosting Gaddafi, he could not guarantee his long-term safety. As one observer noted, “Mugabe is 87, and there is little guarantee that a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe would be safe for the Gaddafi clan.”35 Indeed, Mengistu may face this same problem because he was tried (in his absence) in Ethiopia, found guilty of genocide, and sentenced to death. Subsequently, Ethiopia requested that Zimbabwe extradite Mengistu, but thus far Mugabe’s regime has refused.36 Similarly, the recent trial of another Gaddafi ally, Charles Taylor, may have influenced the former’s decision to fight to the end. Gaddafi had previously

David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. and Allies Seek a Refuge for Qaddafi,” The New York Times, 16 April 2011. Holly Watt, “Secret MI6 plot to help Col Gaddafi escape Libya revealed,” The Telegraph, 27 September 2013. 30 Vivienne Walt, “Death, Prison or Exile: Gaddafi Is Out of Options,” Time, 1 June 2011. Aislinn Laing, “Libya: Col Gaddafi could flee to Venezuela or Cuba,” The Telegraph, 22 August 2011. 31 Barbara Walter, “Why Didn’t Qaddafi go into exile?,” The Monkey Cage, 25 October 2011. 32 David Smith, “Where could Colonel Muammar Gaddafi go if he were exiled?,” The Guardian, 21 February 2011. 33 “Rice: Qaddafi exile an option if he ends killing,” CBS News, 1 March 2011. 34 “US admits helping Mengistu escape,” BBC News, 22 December 1999. 35 William J. Dobson, “Dictator seeks second home? A guide to Gaddafi’s exile options,” The Washington Post, 29 March 2011. 36 “Mengistu found guilty of genocide,” BBC News, 12 December 2006. 29

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granted Taylor asylum in Libya, where Taylor trained in guerrilla tactics and later created the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, which he then used to invade Liberia and start a civil war. In negotiations to end the war, Taylor was granted asylum in Nigeria in 2003 in exchange for stepping down. However, despite exile, the Special Court for Sierra Leone issued an indictment for him. Three years later, under increasing international and domestic pressure, Nigeria sent Taylor back to Liberia, where he was sentenced to serve fifty years in prison. Because post-transition punishment for Gaddafi was likely, he did not leave his country and instead violently resisted, fighting to retain power until he was shot dead by rebels on October 20, 2011. Though foreign military intervention was crucial in aiding the rebel victory over Gaddafi’s forces, a peaceful negotiated transition never transpired. Instead, forced regime change led to a contested state in which decentralized militias hold more power than the nominal government (Gaub, 2013). Libya’s new authorities are struggling to build a stable state, much less a democracy, and the continued risk of state collapse concerns many observers.37

External Exit Guarantees and Regime Change in Yemen Events in Yemen largely resembled those in Libya, particularly at the start of the Arab Spring uprisings. President Ali Abdullah Saleh led a highly personalistic regime with rubber-stamp political institutions and a patrimonialized army; close relatives and members of his tribe held key security positions (Knights, 2013; Makara, 2013). Further, “[f]rom the 1980s onwards, Saleh built a range of parallel forces, that, in time, were brought under the control of his close relatives” (Knights, 2013, 273). For example, Saleh’s son, Ahmed, was the commander of the elite Republican Guard, and Saleh’s nephew commanded the Central Security Organization (CSO). Further, Saleh’s political party, the General People’s Congress, which he created in 1982, was largely an instrument for distributing patronage and put few effective limits on his power (Alley, 2010). As in the Libyan case, protests led to violent repression, the defection of several high-ranking officers and their battalions, and the conflict rapidly escalated.

Ariel Ben Solomon, “Could Libya break apart?,” Jerusalem Post, 4 November 2013. Patrick Cockburn, “We all thought Libya had moved on—it has, but into lawlessness and ruin,” The Independent, 3 September 2013. 37

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In an attempt to defuse the tension, Saleh sought to buy support and promised he would not run for re-election in 2013, but such promises fell short (Barany, 2011). In March 2011 the main opposition forces proposed a transition plan to Saleh.38 The plan stated that Saleh would step down and transfer his powers to his deputy, a transitional government would be formed, and elections held. Most importantly, the plan also called for an immediate restructuring of the security forces and for investigating state-led violence during the uprising. In terms of the logic of our theoretical model, the transition plan opened the door for future prosecution (q), and sought to undermine Saleh’s capacity to fight in the short term (R) by demanding security reforms. This initial plan would leave Saleh with few options to protect himself after a transition. Unsurprisingly, Saleh rejected the transition plan and continued to fight, confident that his most effective security forces would remain loyal. The ensuing violence led a leading general, Ali Mohsen, to defect to the opposition, taking his troops to side with the rebels (Barany, 2011; Makara, 2013). Yet, most of Saleh’s security forces remained loyal, as did key tribal militias (Brownlee et al., 2013; Makara, 2013). As in Libya, the country was on the verge of civil war, although the defecting generals sought to avoid direct clashes with troops still loyal to Saleh (Knights, 2013). In early June, Saleh was severely injured in an attack on his presidential palace, forcing him to flee to Saudi Arabia to receive medical treatment.39 This near-death event may have helped convince Saleh of the substantial risks of resisting. With Ben Ali on the run, Mubarak under house arrest, and Gaddafi indicted by the ICC, Saleh needed a safe exit. However, a negotiated exit plan would require immunity, something the Yemeni opposition could not credibly guarantee, as the initial transition plan proposed to punish Saleh. With weak political institutions, the only institutional power Saleh might retain upon leaving office would be the Republican Guard headed by his son. Afraid that the Yemeni conflict would spill into neighboring countries, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) proposed a new transition plan that included provisions to grant Saleh and his family immunity from prosecution in exchange for resignation. However, Saleh initially refused to sign the GCC plan three times.40 In the end, he relinquished, but only after witnessing Gaddafi’s assassination and with substantial pressure from Saudi Arabia. 38

Nasser Arrabyee, “Yemen’s Saleh calls on opposition to end protests,” Gulf News, 3 April

2011. “Yemen: President Saleh injured in attack on palace,” BBC News, 3 June 2011. Neil MacFarquhar, “Yemen’s Leader Is Said to Plan Return ‘in Days’,” The New York Times, 6 June 2011. 39 40

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The involvement of the GCC provided credibility to the domestic protection guarantees, which Saleh would have been unable to secure had he been defeated by force. In January 2012, the Yemeni Parliament passed an immunity law that would “cover the 33-year period of Saleh’s presidency and could not be cancelled or appealed.”41 Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi, Saleh’s vice-president, was the sole candidate in the February 2012 elections. In December 2012, Hadi restructured the armed forces, seeking to get rid of Saleh’s loyalists.42 However, despite the removal of numerous of Saleh’s relatives, his close relatives remained in control of special units such as the Republican Guard and the CSO (Knights, 2013). The decision to reform the security forces was resisted violently and lead to further clashes. Saleh’s son, Ahmed, was eventually appointed ambassador to the United Arab Emirates.43 A National Dialogue Conference was launched in March 2013 aimed at drafting a new constitution. Though Hadi’s government has largely jettisoned the Saleh family from its ranks, the Yemeni transition still has many challenges ahead. Two year after assuming office, Hadi would flee to exile in Saudi Arabia as Houthi rebels, allied with remnants of the Yemeni army still loyal to Saleh, captured Sanaa. As in Libya, the risks of state collapse remain.

DI S C US S I O N This chapter assesses whether prosecution of human rights abuses deters dictatorships from leaving power. We argue that the influence of human rights prosecutions should vary by whether the incumbent regime has institutionalized post-exit domestic guarantees. In autocracies where former elites are more likely to have credible guarantees of their interests—including protections from prosecution—we expect externally generated increases in the probability of punishment to have little deterrent effect. However, in dictatorships that lack a strong ruling party or institutionalized military that can preserve post-transition leverage, we expect human rights prosecutions to deter dictators from giving up power by increasing the expected utility of resisting and fighting for survival. Consistent with this logic, the evidence in this chapter shows that the influence of human rights prosecutions varies by regime type and is the “Yemen parliament approves immunity law,” Al Jazeera, 21 January 2012. Mohammed Ghobari, “Yemeni president curbs rival’s power in army overhaul,” Reuters, 19 December 2012. 43 “Yemen president orders military shake-up,” Al Jazeera, 11 April 2013. 41 42

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strongest for personalist dictatorships. As was the case with sanctions, personalist dictatorships are most affected by human rights prosecutions in neighbor countries. In contrast to sanctions, however, the evidence suggests that prosecutions deter these regimes from relinquishing power, particularly in peaceful democratic transitions. At first glance, our results for human rights prosecutions might appear to be at odds with the finding that these prosecutions reduce repression in transition countries (Kim and Sikkink, 2010). The reason underlying both, however, may be the same: human rights prosecutions increase the costs of repression. These findings can be reconciled once we consider the time inconsistency problem in the optimal treatment of dictators (Sutter, 1995, 126). Ideally, we would like to punish dictators severely to deter future repression. Kim and Sikkink provide evidence consistent with this logic, warranting some optimism for the future of international campaigns to prosecute repressive dictators. However, we would also like dictators to leave power peacefully, preferably with a transition leading to democracy. Credible guarantees of immunity may be the best way to lower the cost of leaving power, thereby inducing departure. Elites in personalist dictatorships are the least likely to have institutional guarantees of their interests once they leave power, an intuition we document in Chapter 3 with data on the post-exit fate of dictators. For regimes that have already committed human rights abuses, the costs of repression are sunk; they cannot undo them once the international climate changes and begins punishing ex-dictators. For these rulers, prosecutions in other countries simply raise the costs of exit. That the evidence is strongest for personalist dictators suggests exit guarantees may be the link between observing ex-dictators being punished and clinging to power. These autocrats do not have institutional guarantees—either a strong party or threatening military—to ensure a safe post-exit fate. Prosecution of their colleagues may only make them view retirement or exile all the more dimly. While we cannot systematically examine ICC prosecutions, since it handed down its first sentence in 2012, the evidence in this chapter nonetheless has implications for how this court operates. If indictments against repressive dictators work in a manner similar to transitional human rights prosecutions, then our findings indicate that some of the ICC’s critics have a point. One pathway through which the ICC could harm human rights is by prolonging the rule of dictators—albeit those governing personalist regimes. The next step in this research is to examine how prosecutions influence repression in countries that have not experienced transitions—a group that includes most dictatorships.

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Military Intervention and Regime Change Thus far we have analyzed four instruments of non-violent pressure: aid conditionality, economic sanctions, shaming campaigns, and human rights prosecutions. In this chapter we compare these strategies to violent foreign coercion in the form of hostile military interventions. One justification for pursuing military intervention against autocratic regimes begins with the premise that other tools of foreign pressure, in particular economic sanctions, are ineffective.1 Evidence from Chapter 5 casts some doubt on this premise. More importantly, however, the starting point for assessing whether democratic countries should pursue military action against dictatorships needs to be grounded in a careful understanding of the likely outcomes such action will produce. This is the task of the present chapter. Once we pinpoint the cases where intervention may yield democratic regime change or other positive outcomes, we can better assess the relative merits of military intervention and other forms of foreign pressure. In the post-Second World War period, both dictatorships and democracies have not been shy about pursuing military intervention. While the incidence of hostile interventions has trended downwards from a peak in the 1960s (see Figure 1.1), the recent revolts in the Middle East and North Africa have brought renewed attention to the issue. In March 2011, the U.N. Security Council authorized the use of force against Libyan troops for humanitarian purposes, ostensibly to prevent further attacks by the Gaddafi regime against the civilian population. Toppling the regime was not the stated goal of the U.N. resolution, but many proponents undoubtedly favored regime change.2 After NATO military intervention tipped the scales against the Gaddafi regime in August 2011, policymakers were not done debating the merits of such action. Hawkish politicians, such as Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, argued that military strikes would be necessary to counter possible

1

See Baldwin (1999/2000) for a discussion. Anne Penketh, “Obama’s military coalition for regime change in Libya,” The Hill, 18 March 2011. 2

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nuclear weapons development in Iran.3 Academics debated the effectiveness of such action in the pages of Foreign Affairs, some even suggesting that military intervention should only take place if the primary goal is regime change.4 Further, some policymakers and politicians suggested that the U.S. should intervene to topple the Ba’thist regime in Syria.5 Many scholars compare military intervention to economic sanctions because both are coercive tools that attempt to impose costs on the target regime (Betts, 1994; Reisman, 1994; Baldwin, 1999/2000; Huntington, 1999; Walzer, 2006). However, there is little consensus about whether military interventions can successfully pressure dictatorships to change their behavior and even less over whether military intervention to overthrow a dictator can bring democratic regime change. Critics of military intervention, such as Walzer (2006), argue that while intervention and regime change may be legitimate responses to aggression and massacre, dictatorships that are merely capable of such repression should be contained using other strategies short of war, such as sanctions. Proponents of military interventions, however, stress that sanctions are not effective in targeting repressive leaders because they fail to discriminate between the regime leadership and innocent citizens; indeed they may simply serve to “punish the victims while enriching the villains” (Reisman, 1994, 803). The evidence in Chapter 5 suggests that sanctions have costly humanitarian consequences, as Reisman argues. But sanctions also destabilize some dictatorships. In fact, our evidence suggests that these two consequences of sanctions are likely to occur in the same type of dictatorship: personalist regimes. If the indiscriminate human costs of sanctions and their destabilizing influence are linked, then there is little room for the debate over the relative merits of sanctions or military intervention to move forward without first assessing whether and how intervention influences autocratic survival. We begin by providing historical evidence on military interventions in dictatorships, and introduce the debate surrounding the legal and moral dimensions of humanitarian interventions and forced democratization. The second section proposes how mechanisms linking military intervention to

Barak Ravid, Amos Harel, Zvi Zrahiya, and Jonathan Lis, “Netanyahu trying to persuade cabinet to support attack on Iran,” Haaretz, 2 November 2011. 4 Jamie M. Fly and Gary Schmitt, “The Case For Regime Change in Iran,” Foreign Affairs, 17 January 2012. Colin H. Kahl, “Not Time to Attack Iran,” Foreign Affairs, 17 January 2012. Matthew Kroenig, “Time to Attack Iran,” Foreign Affairs, 17 January 2012. Alexandre Debs and Nuno Monteiro, “The Flawed Logic of Striking Iran,” Foreign Affairs, 17 January 2012. 5 Daniel Byman, “Finish Him,” Foreign Policy, 2 February 2012. Scott Wong, “John McCain: U.S. should bomb Syria,” Politico, 5 March 2012. 3

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regime collapse fit into our model of regime change. The next section describes the data and empirical approach. The fourth section reports the cross-national empirical results and then discusses the specific causal mechanisms linking intervention to regime change in positive cases identified in the data set. The final section discusses the implications of our findings for the use of hostile military interventions against autocratic regimes.

MIL I TAR Y INT ER VENTIONS IN TH E POST-WA R WORLD Foreign military interventions are still widely used (see Figure 1.1). Pickering and Kisangani (2009) report that there were 690 interventions during the Cold War and over 400 from 1990 to 2005. Apart from the higher incidence per year in the latter period, interventions against dictatorships since 1990 are also more likely to involve international organizations and less likely to be either supportive or hostile towards the incumbent regime in the target country. Rather, many recent interventions are neutral towards the target regime and instead focus on non-state actors in the target country, such as Russian troops chasing Chechen rebels in Georgia or Israeli bombers targeting Syrian-backed forces in Lebanon. In this chapter, we focus on hostile military interventions that target the incumbent dictatorship to understand how this form of foreign pressure influences autocratic survival and the prospects of democratization. Since the end of the Second World War, autocracies have been more likely than democracies to use military force against dictatorships. But, as Figure 8.1 shows, this number is skewed by the high number of interventions by autocracies in the 1970s and 1980s when the overall number of autocracies in the world was at its highest (see Figure 2.1). Since the end of the Cold War, the pattern of hostile interventions is similar for democratic and non-democratic interveners. The highest number of military interventions by democratic countries took place in the 1950s and 1960s during de-colonization in Africa and Asia. Figure 8.1 shows that while the number of hostile military interventions targeting dictatorships is lower in the post-Cold War period, this form of foreign pressure is still widely used. Not all military interventions are aimed at democracy-promotion or regime change though. According to the Pickering and Kisangani (2009) data, only about half of military interventions (48 percent) are undertaken with the goal of changing the target regime. This figure is similar for the three most frequent democratic interveners (U.S., U.K., and France—43 percent) and for international organizations (49 percent). The left panel of Figure 8.2 shows that the share of regime change interventions has decreased substantially in the

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Share of autocracies targeted

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Figure 8.1. Hostile military interventions in autocracies, by sender regime type. Three-year moving average. Sources: Pickering and Kisangani (2009); Geddes et al. (2014a).

post-Cold War period after Western rivalry with Soviet-bloc countries subsided. In the past two decades interventions are thus less likely to be aimed at regime change. This decline is reflected in the decrease in the number of regime change interventions since the mid-1980s, shown in the right panel of Figure 8.2. However, this trend obscures the fact that the three main democratic interveners and international organizations still pursue regime change interventions, and constitute the bulk of these military incursions since 1989. Indeed, the Pickering and Kisangani data indicate that interventions by international organizations are rare prior to 1990. Thus, while regime change interventions have declined over time, democratic powers and international organizations are now the most common interveners in dictatorships. Of the seventy-three regime change interventions since 1989, over half were led by international organizations, with another twenty percent led by at least one of the three major democratic powers. The modern history of democratization by military intervention started with some notable successes in Japan, Germany, and Austria at the close of the Second World War (Montgomery, 1957). Despite these early successes, forced

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Figure 8.2. Regime change military interventions. Left panel depicts the share of all military interventions in autocracies that are aimed at regime change. Right panel shows the five-year moving average. Sources: Pickering and Kisangani (2009); Geddes et al. (2014a).

regime change has not always ended in democratic transitions. The U.S., the U.K., and France have been the most likely countries to pursue military intervention in the past sixty years, and their record of success is (at best) mixed. The U.S. used military force to depose autocratic regimes in Grenada, Panama, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The first two cases are generally viewed as successes, but the latter three countries have yet to experience sustained democracy since U.S. intervention (Diamond, 2008).6 In October 1983, the U.S. invaded Grenada to topple the leftist party regime and return the country to civilian rule under the parliamentary system in place prior to the 1979 revolution.7 U.S. forces were aided by Jamaica and backed by a resolution from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). However, U.S. allies such as the U.K. and Canada condemned the operation, as did the U.N. General Assembly.8 Similarly, in December 1989 American 6

NATO intervention in the Kosovo conflict in 1999 might also be regarded as a success. Yet Kosovo declared independence much later, on 17 February 2008, and was under U.N. supervision for over a decade. 7 The empirical analysis in this chapter does not contain this case because Grenada’s population is less than the threshold Geddes et al. (2014a) use in identifying autocratic regimes. 8 The United States vetoed a U.N. Security Council vote to condemn the invasion, but the General Assembly adopted the resolution to denounce the invasion as a violation of international law.

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forces invaded Panama after the military dictator, President Manuel Noriega, annulled the presidential election in which his opponent, Guillermo Endara, defeated the pro-government coalition. U.S. forces arrested Noriega on drugtrafficking charges, and his electoral opponent was sworn in as president after the occupation. The U.N. General Assembly condemned the invasion as a violation of international law, as did the Organization of American States (OAS).9 Skepticism about the usefulness of foreign interventions increased after the failed U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1993, putting an end to U.S. interventions in conflicts abroad for humanitarian reasons.10 Two recent cases of U.S. military intervention aimed at regime change helped mobilize public opinion against interventions. Forced regime changes in Iraq (2003) and Afghanistan (2001) triggered a wave of political instability, factional violence, and further terrorist attacks. The immediate objectives of invading Afghanistan were to destroy al-Qaeda headquarters, capture its leaders, and rid the country of the Taliban. Yet, 2010 and 2011 were the deadliest years for U.S. troops; and Afghan government forces lost over two thousand soldiers in fighting the Taliban in 2014.11 More than a decade after the U.S.-led invasion, the Taliban remains strong and far from being a stable state, Afghanistan still ranks seventh in the 2014 Fragile States Index, with the worst ranking for security in the world because the government lacks a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.12 The situation in Iraq over a decade after the fall of President Hussein’s regime is perhaps worse. Restoration of Iraq’s sovereignty is still limited despite elections in 2005 and 2010 and the alternation of presidential power in 2014. The sectarian violence unleashed in the post-invasion period reached such a high level in the mid-2000s that a U.S. Intelligence assessment referred to it as “civil war.”13 And by 2014, Shia dominance of the Iraqi state’s patronage networks and security apparatus fueled jihadist insurgencies that had captured a large share of Iraqi territory, resulting in renewed U.S. air strikes in the region. French interventions have largely targeted post-colonial regimes in francophone Africa, with more than thirty operations since the early 1960s (Gregory,

9

The U.S., France, and the U.K. vetoed a draft resolution at the U.N.S.C. requesting the withdrawal of U.S. troops. 10 The U.S. military engaged in humanitarian efforts in the wake of natural disasters, but these are not humanitarian interventions during an ongoing conflict. 11 See and Jason Lyall, “A (fighting) season to remember in Afghanistan,” The Monkey Cage, 20 October 2014. 12 See . 13 See “Elements of Civil War in Iraq,” BBC News, 2 February 2007.

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2000). During the post-colonial period, France signed several defense agreements with ex-colonies committing themselves to intervention to protect their allies from domestic and international threats (Lellouche and Moisi, 1979; Gregory, 2000). For instance, French forces invaded Gabon in 1964 after a military coup ousted President Léon M’ba. In less than forty-eight hours, M’ba was freed and put back in power with the help of French paratroopers (Yates, 1996, 112). The mission to restore M’ba and protect French oil interests was not the first time foreign forces had come to his aid. French troops intervened at least twice prior to the coup against M’ba, ostensibly to suppress antiregime protests (Luckham, 1982, 61). French interventions have also successfully changed autocratic regimes, though this has rarely entailed a transition to democracy. After having initially supported Jean-Bedel Bokassa’s rule in the Central African Republic, French forces deposed him in 1979 when the self-styled Emperor started accepting military aid from Libya (Luckham, 1982, 61, 70). While formal French guarantee commitments in Africa ended in the mid1990s after criticism for involvement in the Rwandan conflict and the fall of Mobutu in Zaire (Gregory, 2000), French troops still intervene. In April 2011, for example, French forces intervened in Côte d’Ivoire after the apparent loser of the 2010 presidential elections, Laurent Gbagbo, refused to step down. With the backing of a U.N. resolution, French and U.N. soldiers intervened to put an end to the ensuing civil conflict, defeating Gbagbo’s forces in Abidjan. Two years later, in 2013, French troops invaded northern Mali to prevent radical Islamist armed groups from taking over the region after the Tuaregs declared independence of Azawad. British military incursions have also been aimed at protecting their interests in former colonies (Van Wingen and Tillema, 1980). Some interventions were condemned by allies, such as the bombing of Cairo during the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the brief war with Argentina over the Malvinas Islands. British interventions are not simply a Cold War relic, however, as British forces supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and intervened during civil war in Sierra Leone in 2000 to stop the advance of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). British Special Forces captured the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, and the president prior to the civil war, Ahmad Kabbah, was re-elected in 2002.

Prior Research The study of military interventions has received considerable attention. However, the empirical evidence thus far is inconclusive and has only recently begun to examine the consequences of non-U.S. military interventions. While

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early studies suggested that U.S. interventions aided democratization (Meernik, 1996; Hermann and Kegley, 1998), later research found weak support for this proposition, indicating instead that the democratization from military incursions was the result of liberalizing policies adopted during U.S. occupation (Peceny, 1999a, 1999b). Even this evidence has come under question (Walker and Pearson, 2007), and once U.S. covert operations are included, on balance U.S. intervention appears to have hurt the long-term prospects of democracy (Easterly et al., 2008). Turning to interventions from all sending countries, Pickering and Kisangani (2006) find that hostile interventions may further democracy, at least as measured by movements along the Polity scale—a finding replicated by Teorell (2010). Further evidence from the three main democratic interveners casts some doubt on those results though (Pickering and Peceny, 2006).14 The limited evidence on interventions by international organizations, such as the U.N., suggests a positive effect, particularly after civil war (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Pickering and Peceny, 2006). After correcting for selection, Downes and Monten (2013) conclude that foreign-imposed leader changes have no effect on democratization. None of this literature examines how hostile military interventions influence autocratic regime stability. By focusing largely on the question of whether interventions can force democracy on the target country, it provides little insight into what comes next when these “democratic regime change” missions fail. Thus, we do not yet know whether and under what conditions interventions lead to “adverse regime change.” This literature relies predominantly on the Polity scale to measure the level of “democraticness” in the target country. But, as we have pointed out in previous chapters, many autocratic regime changes are not captured by movements along this scale, and in some cases of transition between distinct autocratic regimes—such as the 1979 Iranian Revolution—the level of democraticness increases, according to the Polity scale. U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq provide a cautionary tale about the prospects for democratic regime change. If these types of military missions simply replace long-standing autocratic regimes with unstable dictatorships or failed states, then policymakers will want to understand these risks when considering such action. While liberating Libya from Gaddafi likely prevented the mass slaughter of civilian opponents to his regime, skeptics were wary that the subsequent regime in Libya would not only be autocratic but worse— unstable and unpredictable (Serwer, 2011). As Richard N. Hass, President of

14 They report only one case of successful and consolidated democratization after U.S. intervention: Panama 1989.

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the Council on Foreign Relations, stressed, “[i]t is one thing to oust a regime; it is something fundamentally different to install a viable entity in its place.”15 Any discussion of possible military strikes against Iran must assess the consequences of intervention for regime stability, with a clear acknowledgement of the possibility that if the current regime were to fall, a politically unstable dictatorship with potential nuclear power may simply take its place. This chapter is a first step to understanding the question of “what comes next?” when democracies use their military might to force regime change in dictatorships.

The Legal and Moral Dimensions Military intervention—whether to serve humanitarian purposes or to change targeted regimes—entails coercive violence, the risk of death for citizens of the targeted country as well as the intervening country, and the violation of national sovereignty. Thus hostile interventions bear moral and legal considerations. Wars of aggression are illegal under international law. The KelloggBriand Pact of 1928 and Article 2 (4) of the U.N. Charter ended prior customary doctrine and explicitly forbade the use of military force except in two circumstances: in self-defense against an aggressor state or with U.N. Security Council authorization under the intent to preserve international peace and security. These limits are difficult to enforce given the variety of situations in which intervening countries pursue “humanitarian interventions” (Murphy, 1996; Chesterman, 2001; Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003). Technically, humanitarian intervention consists of the use of military force against a country with the goal of ending large-scale human rights abuses in the target country (Seybolt, 2007; Carey et al., 2010; Weiss, 2012). Regime change is not a part of this goal. To provide legal cover for multilateral humanitarian missions and those aimed at regime change, democratic states and international organizations often seek approval from the U.N. Security Council to deem the conflict in a country a “threat to international peace and security.” The interpretation of these threats has changed since the early 1990s, expanding the scope for humanitarian interventions under the auspices of the U.N., as was the case for interventions in Somalia, Iraq, Bosnia, and Rwanda (Murphy, 1996; Chesterman, 2001; Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003). In two of these instances, Haiti (1994) and Sierra Leone (1997), the U.N. Security Council determined

15 Richard N. Hass, Ray Takeyh, and Ed Husain. “After Qaddafi, Libya’s Daunting Path,” The Council on Foreign Relations, 20 October 2011.

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that military intervention to overthrow an autocracy and restore a previously elected leader constituted appropriate action. In Haiti, U.N.S.C. Resolution 940 authorized a U.S.-led multilateral operation to use all necessary means to restore to power former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had been deposed in a 1991 military coup. The U.N. Security Council has not always provided license for military interventions, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s when many resolutions were blocked in the context of Cold War politics (Nowrot and Schabacker, 1998, 374–5). Further, prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, unilateral intervention carried the risk of igniting a large-scale international conflict. Since then, however, room for military intervention outside the auspices of the U.N. has expanded. For example, NATO led a bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999 during the Kosovo War, despite not receiving official support from the U.N. (Schraeder and Redissi, 1999). The failure to prevent mass atrocities in Rwanda and Bosnia led the former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to challenge the priority given to nonintervention in the U.N. Charter. In his 2000 report to the U.N. Millennium Summit, he asked “if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica— to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?”16 This challenge had an immediate effect. Later that year, the Canadian government established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which issued a report outlining the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2001 (Bellamy, 2009). This document links state sovereignty to the responsibility of a state to protect its own population from genocide and war crimes. If a state fails to do this, the international community has the obligation to intervene to stop gross violations of human rights. This principle has since been endorsed by influential international organizations, such as the U.N.S.C., the member states of the 2005 World Summit, and the African Union (Bellamy 2009, 77–81; Carey et al. 2010, 186). More recently, the U.N.S.C. authorized military operations to enforce a nofly zone over Libya in March 2011. Supporters of this intervention, especially liberal internationalists in the Obama administration, hailed it as a successful application of the new R2P doctrine (Bellamy and Williams, 2011). The scope of U.N. Resolution 1973 entailed using all necessary means to protect civilians, but did not authorize an occupation force. The resolution’s stated aim was to

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p. 48.

Kofi Annan. 2000. “We the Peoples, The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century,”

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stop the murder of Libyan citizens; it remained silent about the prospect of regime change. Though the NATO bombing campaign led to the ouster of Gaddafi’s regime, this intervention did not technically entail forcible democratization,17 the legal scope of which is now very limited. Military interventions with the explicit goal of regime change are deemed legal only if authorized as such by the U.N.S.C. or conducted with the consent of the target state (Wippman, 2000). Moral and ethical theories have long provided justification for humanitarian intervention in some circumstances, but they generally do not take up the question of forced regime change (Merkel, 2008). The principle of self-defense, for example, justifies intervention in response to prior aggression (Walzer, 1977). While military intervention against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan resulted in regime change, the justification for such action drew on the principle of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. This standard has been expanded to include aiding another state that is the victim of aggression. Some argued that the U.S. invasion of Kuwait in 1991 met this criterion because Iraqi aggression prompted the intervention (Walzer, 2006). Walzer’s (1977) development of just war theory outlines three additional situations of justified intervention: assisting secessionist movements of communities or nations within states; supporting one party in a civil conflict if their opponent also receives external support; and humanitarian intervention aimed at ending state-led mass killing. Thus according to standard criteria for just war, democratic regime change is never a justification for military intervention, even though it may be a by-product of action taken to meet other immediate objectives (Walzer, 2006). For example, if the just goal of military intervention is to end mass violations of human rights, effectively doing so may require regime change. Recently, advocates of an international right to democratic governance have urged an even greater scope for unilateral action, especially given the failure of the U.N. in securing these rights (Byers and Chesterman, 2000). Reisman (1994, 804), for example, argues that “democracy is a right guaranteed by international law and the condition sine qua non for the realization of many other internationally prescribed human rights.” According to this logic, popular sovereignty should replace traditional state sovereignty, the former being vested in citizens (Reisman, 1990). Undemocratic rule is therefore devoid of true sovereignty (Doppelt, 1978; Beitz, 1979; D’Amato, 1990). A similar argument for “democratization through force” notes that dictators forcibly prevent people from creating a democracy, and so, violate their right of self-determination

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See the U.N.S.C. Resolution 1973 (2011).

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(Buchanan, 2006). Extending this logic, Applbaum (2007) argues that governments only have the right to non-intervention if they secure the human rights of its citizens and represent their will. The right to intervene has also found its way into international agreements, such as the Copenhagen Document adopted by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (jointly with the U.S., Canada, and Eastern European countries). Attempts to develop a set of policy principles to allow pro-democratic interventions were initiated with the Reagan Doctrine, which pointed out that state legitimacy is conditional on having the consent of citizens (Chesterman, 2001). The articulation of the “Bush-Doctrine” in the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy argued that expanding democracy is both moral (in ideal terms) and instrumental, and helped to lay the intellectual framework for the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Sharansky and Dermer, 2004). The merits of these arguments hinge, in part, on establishing how their implementation works in practice. Reisman (1994, 803), for example, argues that a universal norm to unilaterally intervene in defense of democracy would deter coups. Collier (2007) makes a similar point in suggesting that the credible threat of intervention to overturn obviously fraudulent elections may create an incentive for establishing accountable government. He cites the example of Senegalese President Abdou Diouf stepping down after the 2000 elections out of fear that the Senegalese military would oust him if he had stayed.18 This prointervention position has not gone uncontested, as detractors point out that such pro-democratic incursions may not only be difficult in practice but that the presence of intervening militaries may breed further violence (Franck, 1992).19 While we cannot provide a full investigation of the many difficult questions posed in this debate, we believe that our evidence sheds light on the prospects for democratic regime change as well as the risk that intervention may simply be followed by an even more unstable or undemocratic government.

M I L I T A R Y I N T E RVE NT I O N I N A U TO C R A T I C R E G I ME S To explain how hostile military interventions influence political instability in autocratic regimes, we first discuss three issues that help us understand the mechanisms through which autocratic regime type may condition the prospects of intervention success. First, we examine hostile interventions from Paul Collier, “Development in Dangerous Places,” Boston Review, 9 July 2009. See also William Easterly, “The burden of proof should be on interventionists—doubt is a superb reason for inaction,” Boston Review, 10 July 2009. 18 19

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both democratic and autocratic states. By distinguishing the regime type of the intervening country we can better assess whether military incursions by democratic states further the prospects of democratization or whether they are simply destabilizing. Second, we discuss factors that influence the likelihood of being targeted for military intervention: conflict behavior, military capacity, and prior democracy. These factors not only help determine the risk of becoming a target, but they are also likely to influence the prospects of regime change. Finally, we detail the specific mechanisms that link intervention to regime change: direct removal of an autocratic leader by foreign military forces or destabilizing pressure that increases the chances that a domestic actor intervenes to end the regime.

Who Intervenes? Much of the empirical literature focuses on the intentions of the intervening state or organization (Pickering and Peceny, 2006; Pickering and Kisangani, 2006; Gleditsch et al., 2007). The core intuition from these studies presumes that democratic countries are more likely to promote democracy through their interventions. This may be particularly true of U.S. military interventions, where the explicit foreign policy goal is the promotion of democracy, and less true of other democratic intervening countries such as France and the U.K. (Van Wingen and Tillema, 1980; Pickering and Peceny, 2006). Successful U.S. interventions, for example, are more likely when the president makes public commitments to promoting democracy and when occupying forces pursue liberalizing reforms such as sponsoring fair elections (Meernik, 1996; Hermann and Kegley, 1998; Peceny, 1999a, 1999b). Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) propose an alternative logic, arguing that while the intervening country may support democracy in the target state, it also expects that the policies of the new government will benefit its own domestic constituencies. However, a new democratic government in the target country will be constrained by its own electorate in designing policies and thus less willing to make concessions to the foreign intervener. This instrumental logic helps explain why a democratic intervener may be more interested in supporting an autocratic regime that can more reliably concede to the preferences of the intervener. These motivations may have been particularly relevant during the Cold War when purely strategic considerations drove the superpower states to unilateral interventions that damaged the long-term prospects for democracy (Easterly et al., 2008). To explain why hostile military interventions by democratic states and international organizations can possibly further democratization, we examine

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interventions by both democratic and autocratic states. If hostile interventions destabilize autocratic governments but have little influence on democratization per se, then we should find evidence that the effect of interventions by democratic states differs little from the effect of autocratic incursions. If this is the case, then any observed democratic effect may simply be the result of domestic conditions in the target country that have little to do with the intentions of the intervening state. If, however, interventions by democracies are markedly different than hostile interventions by autocratic countries then this could be interpreted as evidence that military interventions by the former have the intended effect. By comparing democratic and autocratic interventions, we can assess whether military incursions by democratic countries improve the prospects of democratization or whether they simply destabilize autocracies. To our knowledge, this distinction has gone unexamined in studies of military interventions, perhaps because they largely neglect the question of whether interventions by democracies increase the risk of adverse regime change.

Targeting Autocratic Regimes Three factors are likely to influence both whether an autocracy is targeted by a hostile military intervention and the prospects for regime change: conflict behavior, military capacity, and prior democracy. Some autocracies, for example, are more prone to conflict and have less military capacity than others, and are thus more likely to be targeted by interventions. Further, dictatorships that displace prior democracies may not only be better placed to transition to a new democracy given their democratic history but may also be more likely targets for that same reason. Each of these factors also maps onto the regime type classification we have used throughout the book. Studies of international relations in autocracies have relied heavily on these categories of dictatorship to help answer questions about conflict and democratization. Thus these factors indicate that regime type not only will be an important variable to include in an analysis of military interventions but can also provide theoretical guidance for the empirical expectations for intervention success.

Conflict behavior in dictatorships Dictatorships display a wide variety of conflict behavior. Personalist dictatorships, for example, are more likely to initiate conflict with democracies, but party-based regimes are less likely to be involved in military disputes (Peceny

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et al., 2002; Reiter and Stam, 2003). Building on audience cost theories, Weeks (2008) shows that personalist dictatorships are also more likely to face resistance from the targets of their militarized threats because, during inter-state disputes, these threats are less credible. Hence, crises initiated by them are more likely to escalate (Frantz, 2010; Frantz and Ezrow, 2011). In contrast, threats issued by party-based and military regimes are generally more credible because elites in these regimes are bound by an institution that eases coordination and thus makes it easier to punish a leader for backing down. Further, party-based civilian regimes, or what Weeks (2012) calls “machine” dictatorships, are no more likely to initiate conflicts than democracies. The most conflict prone, on the other hand, are regimes led by unconstrained military officers seeking to further rivalries within the armed forces. Numerous explanations may account for this variation in conflict behavior. Audience cost theories and those that highlight the propensity of personalist dictators to initiate conflict stress the role of (absent) institutional constraints on the leader (Reiter and Stam, 2003; Weeks, 2008). Others point to the leadership selection process that may produce erratic leaders in personalist dictatorships with poor information about their own military capabilities and a high psychological need for status vis-à-vis peers (Kinne, 2005; Ezrow and Frantz, 2011a; Weeks, 2012, 2014). Further, Belkin and Schofer (2005, 151) claim that “leaders of counterbalanced militaries have strong incentives to engage in such international conflict,” since engaging in conflict furthers divisions and rivalries that reduce the risks of coups.20 Diversionary war theory and the logic of “gambling for resurrection” link conflict behavior with domestic political instability to suggest that leaders facing a high risk of losing power may be more likely to engage in risky international behavior (Richards et al., 1993; Downs and Rocke, 1994; Chiozza and Goemans, 2003; Goemans, 2008; Debs and Goemans, 2010; Chiozza and Goemans, 2011). To the extent that personalist dictators are the most likely to face a nasty post-exit fate (see Figure 3.2), they may be particularly prone to risky or diversionary conflict behavior. With the exception of studies that highlight the martial instincts of military leaders, the bulk of the growing literature on conflict in autocratic regimes points to the possibility that relatively unconstrained personalist dictatorships with counterbalanced militaries may be the main culprits of aggressive international behavior. This has implications for the study of hostile military interventions. If personalist regimes are prone to conflict, they may be the

20 In contrast, Powell (2014) claims that by reducing coup risk, coup-proofing actually reduces the use of diversionary international conflict.

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most likely targets of military intervention, particularly by democratic states and international organizations. Further, if these regimes are the least likely to democratize should they fail (see Figure 2.3), then combining these two stylized facts suggests military interventions should not be particularly helpful for promoting democracy in personalist dictatorships.

Military capacity in dictatorships Some regimes may be targeted because they have relatively weak military. A democratic state, for instance, may be more likely to target a weak dictatorship to ensure that a battlefield victory leads to a regime ouster. Indeed, choosing winnable conflicts may be one reason democracies are frequent victors (Filson and Werner, 2004). This may have been the case of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent removal of Hussein’s regime. Other noteworthy—and “successful”—U.S. interventions have targeted small population countries with weak militaries, such as the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Grenada, and Panama. Personalist regimes again stand out for having relatively weak military capacity (Peceny et al., 2002). A defining feature of these dictatorships is the leader’s personal control over the security apparatus to deter internal threats from the military. The collective action capacity of the armed forces and their control over weaponry make them perhaps the greatest threat to a personal ruler’s power. As explained in Chapters 2 and 3, to counter this destabilizing force, personal rulers often undermine the capacity of the military to ensure its loyalty through “coup-proofing” strategies (Quinlivan, 1999; Frantz and Ezrow, 2011). To this end, dictators control promotion and recruitment processes, purge and reshuffle officers to weaken potential rivals, keep their armies poorly equipped, and create divisions between military and security organizations to thwart coordination against the dictator. Central to this strategy is the creation of multiple security services directly dependent on the leader to reduce his reliance on the armed forces for internal security and personal protection. Further, personalist dictators often appoint family members and co-ethnics to top positions in the security forces. Finally, Frantz (2009) points out that personalist dictators often receive lowquality information from their military intelligence. To prevent the emergence of rivals from within their clique, these leaders surround themselves with mediocre and incompetent officials. The quality of the advice they may obtain when facing foreign policy crises is therefore likely to be poor, which may lead them to make ill-informed military decisions. Personalization of the military and related coup-proofing strategies weaken the fighting capacity of the armed forces. Recent research, for instance,

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shows that “coup-proofing harms military effectiveness and therefore makes leaders more vulnerable to external threats” (Pilster and Böhmelt, 2011, 345). Examples of short, decisive military victories over personalist dictators abound. It took only six months for Tanzanian troops to repel Amin’s invasion in 1978, invade Uganda, and overthrow Amin’s regime (Brett, 1995). In Iraq, the U.S.-led invasion against Hussein’s regime lasted less than six weeks (Bennett and Stam, 2006). In 1979, French troops deposed Jean-Bedel Bokassa’s regime in the Central African Republic in just a few hours (Titley, 1997). Kabila’s rebels and their Rwandan and Ugandan allies marched across the entire country to oust Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime in less than eight months. Though the Forces Armées Zaïroises (FAZ) fought the rebels at the start of the conflict, much of the campaign entailed rebel announcements of an attack target so Mobutu’s troops could loot and flee the location before they encountered rebel forces (Reyntjens, 2009, 100).21 Weak militaries in personalist dictatorships may thus make them more susceptible to military intervention and to be defeated. Recent debate over U.S. intervention in Libya and Syria reflects similar assessments of the relative risks of intervening against a weak military in a personalist dictatorship and a relatively strong force in a more party-based regime. In addition to the failure to secure full support from the U.N.S.C. to pursue military options against the Ba’thist regime in Syria, U.S. military officials noted that attacking the Syrian military would require a lengthy and potentially costly air campaign that would likely result in a large number of casualties.22 In contrast, there were few fears that attacking Gaddafi’s military in Libya would entail such risks.23

Democratic restoration The final factor that may explain both the risk of being targeted by intervention as well as the prospects for regime change, especially democratic transitions, is prior democracy. Restoring overthrown democracies is a primary goal of promoting democracy through force (Grimm, 2008). Indeed there have

Reyntjens (2009, 108) describes the ZAF as “undermined by politicisation, nepotism, corruption, and embezzlement” and lead by “unpaid, untrained, and unequipped officers and soldiers.” 22 Elisabeth Bumiller, “Military Points to Risks of a Syrian Intervention,” The New York Times, 11 March 2012. 23 David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “Gates Warns of Risks of a No-Flight Zone,” The New York Times, 2 March 2011. Barbara Starr, “Official: U.S. military options for Libya being planned,” CNN, 24 February 2011. 21

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been a number of cases in the Caribbean and Central America, an area the U.S. considers of primary strategic interest: Dominican Republic (1965), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), and Haiti (1994) (Grimm and Merkel, 2008). Military dictatorships may be the most likely target of democratic interventions aimed at restoring democracies because they are the most likely to follow democracies upended by coups. Svolik (2014), for example, finds that coups account for over two-thirds of democratic failures. Military regimes replaced democracies after coups throughout Latin America;24 and in the past decade they upended democracy in the Central African Republic (2003), Madagascar (2009), Mali (2012), Mauritania (2008), and Thailand (2006). If military regimes are the most likely autocracies to replace democracies, they should also be the most likely to be targeted by foreign interventions with the aim of restoring democratic government. Haiti is a clear example. In 1991, a military coup deposed President Jean Bertrand Aristide, and a military junta led by Raoul Cédras took power. Under the authorization of U.N.S.C. Resolution 940, U.S. forces led a multinational operation that lasted from September 1994 to March 1996. More than 20,000 American soldiers plus roughly 5000 troops from other countries were deployed. With the invasion forces approaching the island, Cédras fled to Panama to avoid an overt military conflict. Foreign troops entered the country peacefully and restored President Aristide. Regional treaties and international organizations increasingly contain provisions that encourage democracy and, in some cases, the forceful imposition of democracy. In the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System, both adopted in June 1991, OAS members adopted “efficacious, timely, and expeditious procedures to ensure the promotion and defense of representative democracy.” This understanding provided explicit support for military interventions to restore democracy in the region. In Africa, ECOWAS intervened to restore democracy in Sierra Leone. When the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) ousted the elected president, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, in May 1997, the international community quickly condemned the coup and the U.N.S.C. imposed sanctions, including arms and oil embargoes as well as travel restrictions against junta members. ECOWAS authorized a multilateral military force, comprising mostly Nigerian soldiers, to intervene. After the failure of the Conakry Peace Plan, foreign troops chased the RUF from Freetown, and less than a year after his ouster President Kabbah returned as president. 24

These include: Argentina (1955, 1962, 1966, and 1976); Bolivia (1980); Brazil (1964); Chile (1973); Guatemala (1954, 1963, and 1982); Honduras (1963 and 1972); Panama (1951 and 1968); and Uruguay (1973).

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Destabilizing Mechanisms The two main mechanisms through which military intervention can destabilize a dictatorship are by directly removing the targeted regime from power or by changing the relative domestic power of the targeted regime such that domestic actors can remove it. Direct removal by a foreign military may entail the physical capture of the targeted leader by foreign troops, as was the case with President Noriega in Panama. Alternatively, the threat of military conflict or direct removal may convince the targeted leader to flee the country, perhaps to some agreed destination upon exile. Idi Amin fled to Libya as Tanzania troops and Ugandan rebels approached Kampala in 1979 and Raoul Cédras left for Panama in 1994 just hours before U.S. forces landed in Haiti. The interpretation of these events is relatively straightforward: without the presence of a foreign military force, the dictator would not have left power, at least not at that time. Further, while domestic actors may have helped convince the targeted leader it was time to give up, the timing of exit in these cases was directly linked to the presence of foreign troops. At first glance, defeat in war by the intervening forces may have consequences for the prospects of democratization. In Germany and Japan after the Second World War, military defeat and the dismantling of the old system led directly to installation of new democracies. These cases suggest that total defeat after war might make it easier for the intervening forces to create a new regime (Grimm, 2008, 545). However, the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) have not resulted in consolidated democratic regimes (to date) despite the initial defeat of the targeted regime’s military and substantial investment in “external incentives for democratization” (Enterline and Greig, 2008). The second class of destabilizing mechanism entails removal by a domestic actor either during or shortly after foreign military intervention. These events might be termed “indirect” consequences of military intervention because the observed removal of the targeted regime requires the direct action of a domestic actor. In cases where military intervention coincides with regime change, we find at least three forms of indirect removal: elite accountability, popular protest, and defeat by a rebel group or insurgency. Elite accountability entails high-ranking regime supporters removing the incumbent leader from power. This most often occurs when a military regime replaces its titular head and decides to return power to civilians. Popular protest occurs when fallout from military intervention (most often military defeat) prompts anti-regime protests or electoral defeat. Hence, according to our model in Chapter 3, a military defeat may cause discontent among elite members or citizens and so reduce support (# S) for the regime, which may lead, then, to elite accountability and protests.

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Elite and popular accountability can be difficult to distinguish because antiregime protest and dissent following an unpopular military conflict may influence the behavior of key regime supporters, perhaps most importantly, the military. Indeed, the Serbian case we discuss below (‘How Does Military Intervention Influence Regime Stability?’) contains elements of both: anti-regime protests after Milošević annulled an election prompted the military to decide that it would not intervene on his behalf, forcing him to step down. When we discuss particular cases below, we do not distinguish between the top-down and bottom-up nature of domestic accountability because we cannot always directly observe how popular dissent interacts with military decision-making. The accountability mechanism may be most prevalent in military dictatorships. Professionalized militaries may value the corporate interests of the armed forces more highly than holding the reins of power (Nordlinger, 1977; Geddes, 1999). Combined with the credible threat to re-intervene in civilian politics, this preference for corporate unity may mean that their willingness to cede power is more sensitive to military defeat and the associated loss of support (Agüero, 1992). For example, the Argentine military leader Leopoldo Galtieri was removed from power by the junta in 1982 just a few days after the British had retaken the Falkland Islands from Argentine forces, marking the first step towards handing power back to civilians. Likewise, the Greek junta left power soon after being defeated by Turkey in Cyprus, which caused officers to defect. Both military regimes were followed by democracies. The third domestic mechanism entails weakening the regime economically or militarily. In terms of our model, this weakening consists of a decrease in the repressive capacity of the regime (# R), which renders it more vulnerable to a forcible removal by domestic armed groups. If foreign intervention directly hurts the incumbent regime by weakening its military power, destroying physical assets, or deterring investments in capital and labor, the resulting loss of power for the target regime may tip the balance in favor of a domestic rival, particularly a rebel group or insurgency. While the causal factors behind the “weakening” mechanism and the accountability mechanism may at times be similar, we distinguish the former by the realized threat of an armed antiregime group with sufficient military capacity to drive the incumbent regime from power in the capital city. Thus while rebels controlled Benghazi in eastern Libya for only a few months before they drove Gaddafi from Tripoli, and Kabila’s insurgency against Mobutu’s regime in South Kivu had been festering for decades, they both succeeded in ousting the autocratic regime only with the aid of foreign militaries.25 25

Indeed, one could argue that leaders in Rwanda and Uganda picked Kabila as the Congolese face of their military campaign against Mobutu’s regime (Mampilly, 2011, 181).

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These domestic mechanisms reflect the logic that military defeat can jeopardize the tenure of leaders (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Chiozza and Goemans, 2004; Debs and Goemans, 2010). While we have outlined the types of observable events that mark the removal of autocratic regimes in the face of foreign military intervention, these mechanisms may also reflect the causal role of an unobservable factor: signaling. Weeks (2009, 16), for example, notes that “defeat, in turn, could make the overthrow of the regime more likely by providing a focal point for domestic discontent.” Whether this coordinating signal bolsters the resolve of insurgents, increases the chances that citizens protest a rigged election, or prods military officers back to the barracks, it is difficult to separate the unobservable effects of signaling from the observable political events (such as defeat at the hands of rebels or military acquiescence) with which we mark regime failure.

D O M I L I T A R Y I N T E RVE NT I O N S D E S T A B I L I Z E D I C TA T O R S H I P S ? To test the influence of interventions in target autocracies, we use a data set on interventions developed by Pickering and Kisangani (2009), which contains data from 1946 to 2005. They define military interventions as “the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc.) of one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute” (Pickering and Kisangani, 2009, 593). We create indicator variables for the direction of the interventions (hostile or supportive of the target government) and the type of intervening country (autocratic or democratic).26 We focus on hostile interventions and thus have two main explanatory variables: hostile democratic interventions and hostile autocratic interventions. We lag these variables one year to ensure intervention precedes regime change. We also code interventions in the observation year when the intervention occurs prior to the regime change event. This last procedure is necessary because some military interventions that threaten or topple dictatorships only occur in the days or weeks 26

We use Cheibub et al. (2010) to distinguish between democratic and autocratic sending countries. We code international organizations that intervene as autocratic if the majority of their member states are autocratic. For example, the Arab League and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are two organizations coded as autocratic, while the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and NATO are coded as democratic. The U.N. and the OAS are coded as democratic. Interventions are coded as hostile to the target government if Pickering and Kisangani’s (2009) data set marks the intent as either “oppose government” or “support rebel or opposition groups.”

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prior to the failure event, such as the U.S. invasion of Haiti in 1994 (Kretchik et al., 1998). If we simply used a one-year lag on the interventions variable, we would miss these cases. The reported specification employs controls for: GDP per capita, population, civil war, regime duration (and interactions with regime type), as well as year-fixed effects. We test both conditional logit and linear probability models with country-fixed effects to account for time-invariant factors, such as geographic position and neighborhood effects, that influence both the likelihood of intervention and regime stability. In robustness tests, we control for other factors: military size, sanctions, and neighbor democratization. International conflict studies typically control for the “national capabilities” of the military because countries with stronger militaries may be less likely to be attacked. One component of a commonly used variable, the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC), is the number of military personnel (Singer, 1987). Further, this variable serves as a proxy for the domestic coercive capacity of the regime (Albertus and Menaldo, 2012). Several scholars argue that the coercive apparatus of an autocratic regime—in particular a large military—may be instrumental in suppressing pro-democracy pressure (Stepan, 1971; Bellin, 2004; Svolik, 2011; Albertus and Menaldo, 2012).27 Second, we include an indicator of sanctions used in Chapter 5 because many interventions follow the imposition of (failed) sanctions. Finally, neighbor democratization is a time-varying feature of geographic position and captures both democratic diffusion processes that influence the likelihood of hostile intervention and regime stability. There are relatively few cases where hostile military intervention coincides with regime change. While roughly 5 percent of the sample is targeted with military intervention, there are only six democratic and six autocratic regime transitions that coincide with hostile intervention by democratic states or organizations.28 Unlike in previous chapters, the results we present for interventions should be interpreted with substantial caution. That said, we believe that examining the cross-country data is still important because restricting the analysis to the positive cases leaves no leverage to compare cases of regime failure with cases of regime survival. The paucity of positive cases, however, allows us to look at each one in more detail to better understand the causal influence of military intervention during regime transitions—a task we take up later in the chapter. 27 Following Albertus and Menaldo (2012), we take the natural log of the number of military personnel per hundred citizens from an updated version of Singer (1987). 28 The regime transitions that coincide with hostile military interventions by democracies are listed in Table 8.1.

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Results As in the previous chapters, we report the main results in the Appendix (E) and interpret the findings in graphs. The first model examines how hostile military interventions by democracies (DHI) and autocracies (AHI) influence all regime collapse events. The results indicate that across all dictatorships DHIs are correlated with an increased risk of regime collapse. In the model with interaction terms, we find the effect for DHIs in both personalist and non-personalist regimes. While this would suggest that military intervention destabilizes a range of autocracies, the outcome variable in these tests groups democratic transitions with autocratic transitions. Turning to democratic transitions, we find that both DHIs and AHIs increase the likelihood of democratic transition in non-personalist dictatorships, but neither influences democratization in personalist regimes. We find, however, that DHIs increase the risk of autocratic transition in personalist regimes. These findings remain in logit and linear models. Figure 8.3 displays the main findings from the linear probability models. The left panel shows that interventions by both democracies (7 percent) and other autocracies (3 percent) increase the prospects of a democratic transition—but only in nonpersonalist regimes. The right panel shows that intervention by democracies targeting personalist regimes raises the estimated likelihood of autocratic transition by 7.5 percent. Although not statistically different from zero, the estimate for democratic interventions shows that in non-personalist regimes the risk of autocratic transition increases by 3 percent. Thus, the empirical evidence for military intervention and democratization during the post-Second World War period suggests that forced regime change is unlikely to yield new democracy in personalist dictatorships. Further, the positive result for DHIs in non-personalist regimes is driven by cases of military rule in Pakistan—two regimes that both ended in democratic transition (1971 and 1988). Democracy did not survive in either case, as the military would take back power in each. Further, as we show below (‘How Does Military Intervention Influence Regime Stability?’), one of these cases appears to be a false positive. Other positive cases involved direct removal of a dictator by U.S. military forces in Panama (1989) and Haiti (1994)—two small ethnically homogenous Caribbean countries with prior experience with democratic rule. Putting the information from both panels of Figure 8.3 together, the evidence suggests that intervention can be destabilizing. While military incursions by democracies may destabilize personalist dictatorships, this is unlikely to be followed by a transition to democracy, but is associated with an increased risk of autocratic transition. Like economic sanctions, military interventions in these regimes are unlikely to promote democracy. In non-personalist

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Autocratic transition

% change in probability of transition

15

15

10

10 7.5

7.4 5

5 2.9

2.8 1.1 0

.4

1.1 0 –3.5

–5

–5

–10

–10 DHI DHI AHI AHI (non-personal) (personal) (non-personal) (personal) 95% CI

DHI DHI AHI AHI (non-personal) (personal) (non-personal) (personal) Estimate

DHI Democratic sender Hostile Intervention; AHI Autocratic sender Hostile Intervention

Figure 8.3. Military interventions and regime change. The predicted risk of democratic and autocratic transition, by autocratic regime type and category of intervening country. DHI = hostile military intervention by democracy; AHI = hostile military intervention by autocracy. Years: 1947–2005.

dictatorships, hostile interventions by both democracies and other autocracies are associated with an increased risk of democratic transition. This last piece of evidence is consistent with previous studies showing that military intervention is correlated with democratic regime change (Meernik, 1996; Pickering and Peceny, 2006).

Robustness Tests In replication files, we show the two main findings—that DHIs increase the likelihood of democratic transition in non-personalist regimes but increase the risk of autocratic transition in personalist ones—are robust to a number of changes to the specification: with additional control variables (sanctions, neighbor democracy, military size); without control variables; with periodfixed effects instead of year-fixed effects; and with random effects instead of unit-fixed effects. Bearing in mind the caveats associated with drawing inferences from a limited number of positive cases, the evidence can be summarized as follows. First, hostile democratic military interventions targeting personalist regimes are unlikely to be followed by democracy, but rather are associated with an

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increased risk of adverse regime change. This finding therefore predicts that military incursions against regimes such as those in Iraq (2003) and Libya (2011) are not likely to secure democratic regime change and may only replace a stable dictatorship with an unstable one. A full accounting of the costs involved in targeting personalist dictatorships should therefore consider the risk of adverse regime change. That said, if hostile military intervention raises the risk of regime transition then, like sanctions, they may be useful for extracting policy concessions short of regime change. Again, such action should be taken with the full knowledge of the associated risk of adverse regime change. Second, hostile interventions by both democracies and autocracies are associated with a higher risk of democratic transition in other dictatorships; however this finding rests on just two cases of military rule in Pakistan.

H O W D OE S M IL ITA RY I NTE RV E NT I O N I N FL UE NC E R E G I M E S TA B I L I TY ? In this section, we examine the cases where hostile military intervention by a democratic state or international organization coincided with regime change during the sample period.29 This exercise helps us pinpoint the domestic mechanisms that link intervention to political instability. Selecting on the dependent variable allows us to explore common mechanisms across cases and rule out pathways absent in the relevant cases.30 Further, examining these cases can aid measurement validity by establishing whether the historical record indicates military intervention influenced the specific domestic actors who, in the end, ousted the regime. In some cases, military intervention was largely peripheral to domestic political struggles; thus although intervention and regime transition coincide temporally in these instances, the historical evidence indicates that the empirical correspondence in the data is simply a “false positive.” The regime transitions that end in democracy are: Azerbaijan 1992, Dominican Republic 1962, Haiti 1994, Panama 1989, Pakistan 1971, Pakistan 1988, and Serbia 2000; and the regime transitions that result in a subsequent 29

Regime failure events that resulted in foreign occupation (e.g. Afghanistan 2001) are coded according to the regime that immediately followed the end of the occupation. We do not include them in the following analysis. 30 This approach is similar in spirit to Mill’s method of agreement and can help disprove a hypothesis but cannot confirm one because it cannot establish correlation.

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Table 8.1. Hostile military interventions and autocratic regime failure Target country

Year

Democratic Incumbent intervener regime type

Regime transition

Role of military intervention

Dominican Rep.

1962

U.S.

Personalist

Democratic

Weaken

Pakistan

1971

India

Military

Democratic

Accountability

Pakistan

1988

India

Military

Democratic

None

Panama

1989

U.S.

Military

Democratic

Leader removal

Azerbaijan

1992

Armenia

Personalist

Democratic

Accountability

Haiti

1994

U.S.

Military

Democratic

Leader removal

Serbia

2000

NATO

Party

Democratic

Accountability

Syria

1951

Israel

Military

Autocratic

None

Syria

1963

Israel

Military

Autocratic

None

Yemen

1967

Israel

Military

Autocratic

Weaken

Iraq

1968

Israel

Personalist

Autocratic

Accountability

Afghanistan

1992

Pakistan

Party–personalist

Autocratic

Weaken

Congo/Zaire

1997

Burundi

Personalist

Autocratic

Weaken (limited)

dictatorship are: Afghanistan 1992, Congo/Zaire 1997, Iraq 1968, Syria 1951, Syria 1963, and Yemen 1967.31 To assess the influence of democratic interventions we examine the potential mechanism linking intervention to regime change in each case. Table 8.1 summarizes the results. The first case is the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1961. U.S. naval forces docked in the harbor of Santo Domingo after the assassination of the long-time dictator, Rafael Trujillo. The U.S. threatened his family with further intervention if they succeeded in ousting Trujillo’s designated successor, Joaquín Balaguer, who assumed the presidency after Trujillo’s death. Thus at first glance, the intervention actually strengthened Balaguer’s position against elite rivals within the regime (i.e. Trujillo’s brothers). U.S. intervention, however, also forced Balaguer to rely on General Rodríguez Echevarría,32 and continued U.S. naval presence in Dominican waters kept 31

As already mentioned, there is one case of successful military intervention leading to democracy not included in our sample: Grenada in 1983. The U.S. launched Operation Urgent Fury aimed at ending the leftist single-party regime and restoring the parliamentary government in place prior to the 1979 revolution. As in Panama (1989) and Haiti (1994), the regime in Grenada was directly removed by the foreign forces. 32 U.S. military forces were in direct contact with Rodríguez Echevarría when the latter bombed the San Isidro Air Base, driving the Trujillo brothers from the island (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978, 297).

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pressure on Balaguer to democratize by forcing him to rule with a Council of State.33 The data we use code the regime failure event as the coup by General Rodríguez in January 1962 which ousted Balaguer, ending the rule of Trujillo’s designated successor. With the support of the U.S., a counter-coup two days later reinstated the authority of the Council of State, this time with Balaguer in exile in New York City (Wiarda and Kryzanek, 1982, 40). The Council conducted democratic elections in December 20 1962, which the opposition won. U.S. military and economic pressure thus not only helped ensure that Trujillo’s family would not take power in his stead, but they also strengthened the hand of the coup leader that deposed Balaguer. In this case, forces from the intervening democracy did not physically remove the autocratic leader, but instead weakened elite members of the incumbent personalist regime who attempted to retain power, including at various points both Trujillo’s family and Balaguer. Further, the intervening power in this case had a prior expectation that pressure to ensure a democratic election would lead to a moderate left-wing president taking power (Wiarda and Kryzanek, 1982, 41). The new democracy, however, did not last more than seven months. Two other cases of military intervention precipitating democratic transitions in the Caribbean Basin, Panama 1989 and Haiti 1994, have a straightforward interpretation. The U.S. sent military forces to each country and directly removed the autocratic leader from power. In both cases, the incumbent regime was a military dictatorship. In Haiti, the U.S. restored a previously elected president, Jean Bertrand Aristide, but the new democracy did not last.34 In Panama, U.S. forces invaded and arrested the military dictator, Manuel Noriega, after he annulled the results of an election he lost. Noriega’s electoral opponent assumed office after the invasion, and Panama has been a democracy since 1989. Thus, of the three cases in which U.S. military intervention paved the way for a democratic transition, only one resulted in a consolidated democracy.35 There are two further cases of democratic military interventions targeting a military regime, both in Pakistan. The first occurred in the wake of Pakistan’s defeat in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971. India intervened when their forces

33

The main opposition leader, Juan Bosch, praised U.S. intervention, viewing it as an implicit backing of his attempts to gain the presidency via an election (Blechman and Kaplan, 1978, 300). Three years later, the U.S. would intervene again after forces loyal to Bosch ousted a military government. This time the U.S. intervention restored an undemocratic government to power. 34 Geddes et al. (2014a) code the end of that democratic episode in Haiti in January 1999 when the incumbent President René Préval dismissed the legislature and started ruling by decree (Taft-Morales, 2001). 35 The number of successes is two—out of four—if Grenada is also considered.

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invaded East Pakistan during the Bangladeshi liberation war to support the Bengali rebels, forcing the Pakistani army to surrender in December 1971. This military intervention critically influenced regime change via a secondorder consequence: leader accountability resulting from a humiliating and costly military defeat. Angry demonstrations and pressure from fellow officers in the wake of Pakistan’s military defeat forced President General Yahya Khan to resign, restoring the previously elected Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to power (LaPorte, 1972, 104). The second military intervention that coincided with democratic transition in Pakistan occurred in 1988 following the death of President Zia al-Huq in a plane crash. After Zia’s death, Pakistani military commanders appointed a civilian, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, as president, and democratic elections were conducted under his watch later that year. The democratic military intervention coinciding with this episode was the conflict between India and Pakistan over the Siachen Glacier between 1984 and 1987. India gained control of the area after launching an offensive in April 1984. While we cannot know if Pakistan would have democratized in the late 1980s had Zia survived, the main international factor that contributed to his personal popularity within the military was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent U.S. support for Pakistani military (Noman, 1989; Hoffman, 2011). Further, Hoffman (2011, 76) argues that military extrication in 1988 was the result of a strategic calculation that the military would have an opportunity to return to power after handing leadership to a weak civilian government. The generals determined that quick elections would lead to rule by poorly organized and weak civilian parties—a situation they could manipulate to retain power (Hoffman, 2011, 89). Further, there was little indication at the time that U.S. support for the Pakistani military was likely to decline. Thus there is little evidence to indicate that the conflict with India contributed to the military’s decision to withdraw in 1988. The Azerbaijani regime collapse in 1992 occurred during a secessionist conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, where Armenian forces backed ethnic Armenian residents fighting the Azerbaijani government. In February 1992, foreign forces36 massacred hundreds of Azerbaijanis in the town of Khojaly. Azerbaijan’s leader Ayaz Mutalibov was accused of being unable to prevent and respond to the Armenian advance and the killings.37 Cornell 36

Human Rights Watch (1994, 6) reports that both Armenian forces as well as renegade Russian military units—366th Regiment of the Russian army—participated in the massacre of Azeri residents at Khojaly. The Russian government generally supported the Mutalibov regime and opposed the anti-Russian PFA. 37 Abulfaz Aliyev, chairman of the Azerbaijani Popular Front, for example said that “Mutalibov could not defend his homeland and his people.” See Carey Goldberg, “Azerbaijani Leader

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(1999, 53) notes that “the pro-Soviet Mutalibov regime had pursued a proRussian policy very much to the dismay of the people—public opinion having turned increasingly anti-Russian after the January 1990 military intervention—and was deposed in the aftermath of the Khojaly massacre of February 1992. Mutalibov was blamed for the military setbacks.” Anti-government demonstrations, fueled by the events in Nagorno-Karabakh, forced him to resign the next month.38 After Mutalibov stepped down, power passed to a National Assembly, which scheduled a multiparty election in June. The opposition Popular Front of Azerbaijan (PFA) won the contest, marking a democratic transition. The new democracy lasted just one year. This case, therefore, falls in the category of domestic accountability for defeat. The final case of democratic military intervention and democratic transition occurred in Serbia in 2000 after the resignation of President Slobodan Milošević. NATO forces intervened in Yugoslavia in 1999 during the Kosovo war and launched several air attacks directed at Serbian forces in Kosovo. The bombing campaign forced Serbian troops to withdraw from Kosovo and the U.N. established a protectorate in the province. Milošević stepped down from power on October 5, 2000 amidst anti-regime protests that followed his refusal to accept the results of a September election. After military forces refused to shoot demonstrators and key officers signaled their unwillingness to see the regime violently removed, Milošević resigned (Binnendijk and Marovic, 2006, 426). He handed power to the electoral victor, Vojislav Koštunica. Anti-regime mobilization and the loss of popular support for Milošević were a direct consequence of military intervention and defeat by NATO forces. McFaul (2005, 8), for example, notes that “several military defeats, culminating with capitulation to the 1999 NATO air campaign, and years of economic decline severely undermined his support.” Thompson and Kuntz (2004, 165) concur, adding that “when the Kosovo war ended in June 1999 with Belgrade’s de facto loss of control over Serbia’s ‘sacred places,’ Milošević’s image as a savior of Serbia was irrevocably shattered.” This case can thus be classified as one in which domestic actors held the targeted regime accountable for military defeat. Next we consider the six autocratic transitions that coincided with hostile interventions by democratic states or international organizations. The autocratic

Resigns Amid Protests, New Battles: Nagorno-Karabakh: He is blamed for the deaths of scores of citizens at the hands of Armenian militants,” Los Angeles Times, 7 March 1992. Francis X. Clines, “Angry Azerbaijanis Impel Chief to Quit,” The New York Times, 7 March 1992. Another, larger uprising prevented Mutalibov from taking power after being reinstated by the parliament in May 1992 (Kamrava, 2001, 221). 38

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transitions in Syria (1951 and 1963) are false positives.39 The Shishakli coup in November of 1951 was precipitated by a conflict over the military budget and the repeated failure of the civilian president to find a prime minister who could staple together a ruling coalition that did not threaten the military’s position (Torrey, 1964, 200).40 The hostile military intervention occurred in April 1951 when Israeli forces retaliated against Syrian sniper activity in Israeli-held territory. Instead of prompting a coup, however, the Israeli attack actually temporarily solidified parliamentary support for the civilian regime in early 1951 by helping the Prime Minister Khalid al-Azm win a confidence vote (Torrey, 1964, 192). He drew the support of would-be opponents such as members of the Ba’th party and the Islamic Socialist Front who only voted for Azm in a show of unity against foreign aggression (Torrey, 1964, 192). The democratic hostile military intervention that coincided with the Syrian Ba’thist Revolution in 1963 is also a false positive. The hostile intervention in this case occurred in the spring of 1962, when Israeli forces killed Syrian soldiers in the village of Nuqayb in a dispute over fishing rights on Lake Tiberias (Neff, 1994, 36). And while the alliance between the Ba’th party and the military was many years in the making, the timing of the March 1963 coup that brought the Ba’thist faction of the military to power came on the heels of the Ba’thist coup in Iraq a month earlier (Perlmutter, 1969, 838).41 The military intervention by a democracy in the Yemeni case plausibly had an indirect effect on regime stability. The military incursion took place in 1966 during the Yemeni civil war between the al-Sallal regime and the Saudi-backed remnants of the Zaydi imamate (Van Wingen and Tillema, 1980). During this 39

If any coups in Syria could be attributed to fallout from foreign military intervention, they would be the 1949 coups: one ending civilian rule in March of that year and another deposing President Za’im six months later (Torrey, 1964, 114, 137). In both cases, territorial losses in the 1948 war with Israel and attempts at restructuring the military in its aftermath contributed to coups. For example, Torrey (1964, 137) argues that “the antagonism of the army to civilian government leaders stemmed from the officers’ belief that the military was being made the scapegoat for the Palestine fiasco.” 40 The 1951 coup was Shishakli’s second successful attempt to remove the leader. In December 1949, Colonel Shishakli helped a group of officers oust the Chief of Staff, Sami Hinnawi. However, the civilian government under Prime Minister Hashem al-Atassi continued to rule the country (Haddad, 1971a, 205). Haddad (1971a, 211) also argues that Shishakli’s motivation for the 1951 coup stemmed from the civilian cabinet’s attempt to remove him from the military and to move internal security from the defense portfolio to the interior ministry. 41 Conflict with Israel only played a minor role in the 1963 Ba’thist coup: in the wake of the Iraqi Ba’thist coup in February 1963, the civilian Syrian government under Prime Minister Khalid Azem ordered “suspected officers to the front thinking that their duties near the Israeli border would detract them from attempting a rebellion” (Haddad, 1971a, 195). Just the opposite occurred, and these officers successfully ousted Azem.

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conflict, the British supported the royalist forces. Nasser’s government in Egypt sided with al-Sallal’s regime until 1967 when losses in the conflict with Israel forced Nasser to withdraw his troops from the Arabian Peninsula, quickly leading to the fall of al-Sallal’s regime in early November 1967 (Burrowes, 1991; Haddad, 1971b). Egyptian involvement in the Yemeni conflict undoubtedly contributed to Egypt’s military defeat in the 1967 war with Israel (Burrowes, 1982, 23). Thus British military action in Yemen the prior year might plausibly have contributed to weakening the Egyptian military and led indirectly to the withdrawal of Egyptian troops in the wake of the 1967 Israeli–Arab conflict. Hostile military intervention by a democracy also likely contributed to the 1968 Ba’thist coup in Iraq. In this case, the Aref government’s involvement in the 1967 Arab–Israeli conflict led to his ouster by nationalist military officers allied with the Ba’thist party.42 While the 1968 coup drew support from Ba’thist officers, such as al-Bakr and al-Takriti, who had been pushed from senior positions by Aref in 1964, the coup leaders also included two key non-Ba’thist officers, Colonel ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Nayif and Ibrahim ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Da’ud, who feared retaliation from the discredited Nasserist faction of the military upon which Aref ’s brother had increasingly relied (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1987, 111–12). Directly implicating the military defeat in 1967, Alam (2004, 89) argues that “[t]he Baathist Revolution of July 1968 was one of the consequences of the defeat of Arab forces in June 1967 war. The radical nationalist forces in Iraq were much disgusted with the government’s handling of the situation of the Arab-Israeli conflict in June 1967 war.”43 In the two most recent cases of autocratic transition that occurred after a hostile military intervention by a democracy, the intervening country aided rebels in a civil conflict with the incumbent regime. Najibullah’s regime in Afghanistan fought the mujahedeen, who were funded and trained by the Pakistani military, in a conflict that led directly to the fall of Kabul in April 1992 (Rais, 1993; Halliday and Tanin, 1998). In this case, hostile intervention by a democracy arguably weakened the military position of the incumbent

Jordan gave Iraqi forces permission “to enter Jordan to complete defensive deployment of all available troops in their confrontation with Israel” in May 1967 and supplied them with military equipment (Alam, 1994, 86). Israeli forces retaliated by attacking an Iraqi air force target (Oren, 2002, 187–8). 43 Haddad (1971a, 156) makes a similar point: “The year that followed the Six Day War of June 1967 was one of unrest and discontent in Iraq. There were criticisms of Iraqi handling of the forces that were sent to fight against Israel, and protests and demonstrations against Iraqi interaction in the Arab national efforts.” 42

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regime. In the second case, however, the role of the democratic military intervention in weakening the incumbent’s military was marginal. While Burundi aided Tutsi rebels opposed to Mobutu’s regime, the involvement of the Burundian military in Eastern Congo in 1996 was relatively limited compared with intervention by other, mostly autocratic, neighboring countries such as Rwanda and Uganda (Reyntjens, 2009, 61). Further, in both the Afghan and Zairian cases, the ongoing civil conflict took its toll on the incumbent regime only once large-scale foreign support for the regime diminished—Soviet aid in the case of Afghanistan and Western assistance to Mobutu’s regime in Zaire. Examining each positive case in the sample yielded three (possibly four) false positives: instances in which democratic hostile military intervention was not plausibly related to regime change. Further, this exercise confirmed the mechanisms linking intervention to regime change: (1) direct removal of an autocratic leader by military forces; (2) weakening the incumbent militarily such that rebel opponents are better able to oust the regime; and (3) accountability for military defeat. Setting aside the false positive cases and summarizing the results by target regime type yields two main results. First, the tally for the type of transition that occurs when intervention successfully dislodges an incumbent regime follows a now familiar pattern: conditional on regime collapse, personalist dictatorships are more likely to transition to subsequent autocracies, while military regimes are more likely to democratize. Half of the personalist cases end in democratic transition, while three-quarters of military cases end in democratic episodes. Neither of the cases where intervention led to consolidated democracies, however, were personalist dictatorships. In the Dominican case, the new democracy was ousted in less than a year and was followed by a civil war. The new “democracy” in Azerbaijan lasted fifteen months.44 Second, the mechanism through which the regime falls as a result of military intervention differs by target regime type. In half of the cases, personalist regimes are rendered sufficiently weak by military intervention that domestic opponents seize the advantage and violently force the target leader from power. We could only identify one of four military cases (Yemen 1967) where military intervention potentially weakened the target regime during a civil conflict. Even here, though, it was probably military defeat in an allied dictatorship (Egypt) and the subsequent withdraw of external

44 The military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh also led to the defeat of the PFA government and to a new personalist regime that remains in power.

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support that weakened the target regime such that their domestic opponents could oust the regime. Finally, the accountability mechanism takes a different shape in each targeted regime type. In the personalist case (Iraq 1968), accountability entailed a military coup against a civilian regime. In Azerbaijan, the disgraced Mutalibov attempted to return to power shortly after his resignation but was rebuffed by a further round of popular protest.45 In the military case (Pakistan 1971), accountability meant the military returned to the barracks after antiregime protests indicated the military had lost popular support. And in the party case (Serbia 2000), accountability worked through an electoral process and ultimately through (non-violent) mass demonstrations. While it would be futile to generalize from so few cases, these characterizations are consistent with patterns that we have seen throughout the book. For example, violence is more likely to accompany regime failure in personalist dictatorships, while relatively peaceful regime change is more likely to occur in military regimes. Likewise, the selection of a new leader is more likely to occur violently in personalist dictatorships but more likely to entail elections in party-based regimes.

The Long-Term Influence of Military Intervention The analysis thus far examines the short-term influence of military interventions. However, regime change does not always occur immediately, even if the military objective of the intervention succeeds quickly. Some mechanisms linking intervention to regime change, such as the punishment of the incumbent leader or increased domestic dissent after a military defeat, may take more time to unfold. Prior research, for example, examines the effect of interventions over a ten-year period (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2006; Grimm, 2008). To address this long-term possibility, we investigate cases where hostile military intervention by a democracy coincides with regime change in later years. The analysis in the previous sections examined the influence of interventions on regime change in the current or subsequent year (t + 1). We now expand this in Table 8.2 to add cases where regime change occurred in years t + 2 to t + 6. The first two columns list the target country and the intervention year, while the third column lists the year of regime change. This identifies 45 Mutalibov’s successor, Abulfaz Elchibey, gained the presidency by winning an election in June 1992, making this an anomalous outcome for a personalist dictator. Yet, the new democratic regime did only last one year to be replaced by a new personalist regime. Seeking foreign protection, Mutalibov went into exile in Russia, a quite normal outcome for personalist leaders.

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Table 8.2. Longer-term influence of hostile military interventions Target country

Intervention Transition Democratic Incumbent Transition year year intervener regime type type

Destabilizing influence

Nicaragua

1988

t+2 (1990)

Honduras

Party

Democratic

Yes

Peru

1998

t+2 (2000)

Ecuador

Personalist

Democratic

No

Peru

1995

t+5 (2000)

Ecuador

Personalist

Democratic

No

Pakistan

1966

t+5 (1971)

India

Military

Democratic

No

four more cases where intervention coincides with regime change at a later date: four democratic transitions and two autocratic transitions.46 Of the four democratic transitions, only one entails a likely case where intervention proved influential in the regime transition; in the other three there is little evidence linking intervention and transition. The Honduran intervention against Nicaragua in the 1980s was part of the U.S. military strategy to use Central American proxies against the Sandinista government. The emerging military stalemate and efforts by other Central American countries to end the fighting led to the political agreement that was followed by multiparty elections in 1990 (Roberts, 1990, 100). Thus while Honduran intervention did not help produce decisive victory for the contras (Williams, 1994, 179), the use of force in this case pushed the Sandinista regime towards elections that resulted in a transition to democracy. The conflict between Ecuador and Peru entailed multiple clashes over a disputed border area dating back to the nineteenth century. The 1995 and 1998 military interventions comprise the start and end points for the latest flare-up. Fujimori faced domestic backlash stemming from the illpreparedness of the military during the 1995 battle over the Cenepa River, but he controlled the media and was able to mute the criticism (Herz and Nogueira, 2002, 80). In 1998, Fujimori challenged the two consecutive termlimit rule in the constitution to allow himself a third term. He understood that ending the conflict with Ecuador would help his position in that constitutional 46

This list does not include Cambodia 1975 (t + 4) and Syria 1951 (t + 3) because the targeted regime was not the same as the one that collapsed in the subsequent year. Nor does this list include two monarchies ousted after hostile intervention by a democracy: Egypt 1952 (Israel intervention in 1949) and Yemen 1962 (British intervention in 1959). In both cases, foreign military intervention plausibly led to regime ouster; and the subsequent regime in both cases was a dictatorship.

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battle (Herz and Nogueira, 2002, 81). Thus if anything, the conclusion of the conflict strengthened Fujimori. He fled Peru amid a corruption scandal in 2000 that had little to do with the Ecuadorian conflict. Finally, the Indian intervention targeting Pakistan in 1966 was the culmination of the 1965 conflict with India over Kashmir. The peace agreement signed in Tashkent in January 1966 stipulated that all foreign military personnel be removed from the disputed region by 25 February 1966, and returned territory occupied during the conflict to the status quo ante. Pakistan’s military leader, General Ayub Khan, faced domestic criticism both from his chief civilian opponent as well as from within the military (LaPorte, 1969, 854), which played a role in the internal military coup that replaced Ayub Khan with Yahya Khan in 1969 (Ganguly, 1990, 61). The leadership change in 1969 did not end the military regime, which only handed power back to a civilian government two years later following the 1971 conflict with India. Therefore, the democratic transition in Pakistan is better explained by military defeat during the Bengal conflict in 1971 than by the 1965 conflict and domestic fallout from the 1966 Tashkent settlement. Setting aside what appear to be false positives (Peru and Pakistan), the Nicaraguan case underscores another key point about autocratic regime collapse. Intervention against the Sandinista government contributed to a military stalemate and pushed both sides towards a negotiated settlement that entailed multiparty elections which the opposition won. Thus the failure event in a party regime entailed an election where the incumbent lost. Consistent with the pattern we illustrated in Chapter 4 (Table 4.1), the Sandinistas not only contested future elections as a viable opposition party, they won a plurality of the legislative seats in the 2006 and 2011 elections. And a former autocratic leader, Daniel Ortega, won the presidency in a multiparty contest in 2006.

DI S C US S I O N The United Nation’s Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine contains six principles to guide military intervention. Evans and Sahnoun (2002, 101) group these provisions into “the ‘just cause’ threshold, four precautionary principles, and the requirement of ‘right authority’.” The analysis in this chapter speaks directly to the precautionary principle concerning the consequences of military intervention: “there must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of

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inaction” (Evans and Sahnoun, 2002, 105). A key factor in evaluating the latter clause in the “consequences” principle must address the question of “what comes next?” when foreign forces topple an autocratic regime. This chapter attempts to answer this question. Our approach to assessing the consequences of military intervention entails three innovations: we examine all hostile military interventions targeting dictatorships, not just interventions by the U.S. or democratic countries; we investigate how interventions influence the risk of both democratic and autocratic transitions; and we focus the theoretical analysis on the autocratic regime type of the target country and the mechanisms that may lead to its collapse. We expand the analysis beyond U.S. interventions for two reasons. First, other democracies, such as the U.K. and France, have historically intervened militarily in their former colonies, and increasingly international organizations pursue military interventions against dictatorships. Discussion of how military intervention influences regime change needs to account for the fact that, going forward, military interventions may increasingly be initiated under the auspices of international organizations and not go-it-alone operations by single states. Focusing exclusively on U.S. interventions would miss many of these cases. Second, we assess whether the influence of military interventions by democratic countries differs from that of autocratic countries. As Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) point out, intervening states may have difficulty forcing democracy because they prefer pliant regimes in foreign countries—and the relative lack of domestic constraints in dictatorships should make them more pliant. One way to assess this possibility is to compare democratic interventions to those by non-democratic countries. If we assume that democracies not only prefer democratic regime change to autocratic regime change but can credibly stand by that preference, then we would expect the regime type of the intervening country to matter. Therefore, it is not enough to show that military intervention by democracies can increase the chances of democratic regime change. Instead, to understand whether military intervention “works,” we compare the influence of democratic and non-democratic interventions to see whether the former are more likely to induce democratic regime change in the target dictatorship. Central to understanding the influence of military intervention is assessing the risk of adverse regime that may result. If military intervention destabilizes a dictatorship, policymakers should understand that not all regime change is democratic. Some are simply replaced by new ones; some end in state failure. Thus, answering the question of “what comes next?” starts by assessing the

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changes in the relative risk of democratic and autocratic regime change when a democracy targets a dictatorship with violent force. Finally, while some scholars have searched for the domestic conditions of success, few examine how the vast differences among different types of autocracies shape how they respond to military intervention and how incursions influence post-intervention outcomes such as democratic transition and adverse regime change. By underscoring the unique difficulties many countries ruled by personalist dictatorships face when the regime falls, we provide theoretical leverage to help answer the question of when and where hostile military interventions are most (and least) likely to result in democratic regime change. An important part of research is making the case for how a quantity of interest, such as the chances that a hostile military intervention targeting a dictatorship will lead to a new democracy, should be interpreted. Essential to this task is stating the relevant comparison. If the analysis in this chapter simply asked whether hostile military interventions by democratic states increase the risk of democratic regime change in target dictatorships, the answer would be affirmative. However, when we compare military interventions by democracies with those initiated by autocracies, we find that interventions by both are associated with an increased risk of democratic transition. The finding is stronger for democratic interventions, but some autocratic interventions result in democratic transition in the target country as well. This comparison is important because to believe military intervention initiated by democracies can further democratic regime change in target countries, we need evidence that democratic intervention is more successful in this endeavor than autocratic intervention. If hostile incursions by both democracies and autocracies improve the chances of democratic transition in some types of target regimes, then it is likely that some underlying condition (perhaps unobserved) in the target regime is responsible for the observed democratization, rather than the unique “powers” of military intervention by democracies. Thus although we find a correlation between democratic military incursions and democratic transition in non-personalist regimes, this cannot necessarily be interpreted as evidence in favor of hostile military adventures in the name of democratic regime change because autocratic military interventions are also associated with democratic transitions in the same group of targeted dictatorships. Further, interventions by democratic states and international organizations are correlated with a higher risk of autocratic regime change. That is, some hostile interventions by democracies are not likely to bring about democratic

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regime change, even if they destabilize the target regime by increasing the risk that a new dictatorship rises to take its place. This point is too often glossed over in debates about the merits of military intervention. “Unintended” consequences are real and we show that they often mean substituting one dictatorship for another, probably, weaker one.47 Finally, we assess the influence of military interventions in different autocratic contexts. By estimating the effect of military interventions in personalist and non-personalist dictatorships, we find that hostile incursions by democracies are correlated with an increased risk of democratic transition in nonpersonalist (mostly military) regimes, while these interventions are associated with an increased risk of autocratic transition in personalist dictatorships. This finding not only parallels the results in Chapter 5 for economic sanctions, it also provides some guidance on the likely outcome of military interventions in distinct autocratic settings. If military intervention destabilizes a personalist dictatorship, our findings suggest that a new autocratic regime is more likely to replace it than a new democracy. The opposite appears to be true of other dictatorships, though this result is driven by cases of hostile intervention by India targeting military regimes in Pakistan. Throughout the chapter, we underscore the point that broad conclusions from cross-national statistical work on military interventions should be treated with extreme caution. Unlike in previous chapters, the empirical results depend on a handful of positive cases. Further, examination of the cases where hostile military intervention coincides with regime failure pinpoints some instances in which intervention is peripheral to the main causes of autocratic collapse, which further reduces the number of positive cases. There are numerous ways to assess hostile foreign military interventions, such as respect for human rights, civil rights, and political freedoms (Walker and Pearson, 2007; Peksen, 2012). Policymakers also want to know whether foreign intervention, particularly peace-keeping missions, can reduce violence in post-conflict countries.48 We do not take up this broad range of issues and goals. Rather, we focus on a narrowly defined concept of regime change in autocratic countries: when the elites who hold power over policy and personnel choices lose that power. Importantly, regime failure can end with a democratic transition or a subsequent dictatorship. We close by noting that the main empirical finding underscores a point we have made throughout: the institutional setting of the incumbent autocratic 47 This may be the point if the new dictatorship is likely to accede to policy that the intervening state prefers (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). 48 See Paul Collier and and Bjrn Lomborg, “Does Military Intervention Work?,” Project Syndicate, 30 April 2008.

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regime is likely to influence the end result of a particular foreign policy tool. As in the case of economic sanctions and human rights prosecutions, personalist regimes stand apart because regime collapse more often than not leads to a subsequent dictatorship. If we employ our empirical model with data through 2000, it predicts that hostile foreign military interventions targeting regimes such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, Hussein’s in Iraq, and Gaddafi’s in Libya— if militarily successful—would be more likely to lead to a new dictatorship than to democracy. Given the paucity of positive cases, we urge caution in interpreting the cross-national correlations for military interventions. But we encourage future research to think about how the nature of the existing regime—and particularly the extent to which the targeted leader has consolidated power over the military and the support party—is likely to influence the chances that, should the targeted dictatorship fall, it will simply be replaced by a new dictatorship or a failed state.

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9

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Conclusion Democratic countries and international organizations remain hostile towards many dictatorships. Now more than ever, democracy is viewed as a fundamental and universal human right. Further, democratic rule is generally better for its citizens. Democracies rarely fight each other, provide more public goods for their citizens, and generate greater levels of well-being than autocratic regimes. Even though international policies aimed at democratization have grown in the past twenty-five years, autocracy remains entrenched in almost every region of the world. Policymakers and academics, meanwhile, debate how foreign policy can foster regime change and democratization. We add to this debate by showing how foreign aid, economic sanctions, human rights shaming, prosecutions, and military intervention influence autocratic stability. Foreign actors attempt to influence regime stability in target countries by either imposing costs on the regime or by providing incentives to change the behavior of domestic political actors. Two recent examples illustrate this point. In Libya, international actors imposed economic and political costs on Muammar Gaddafi and his elite supporters by enforcing economic sanctions, condemning the regime for human rights abuses, and indicting its leaders for crimes against humanity. Foreign governments also gave material support to the rebels who toppled the regime. In contrast, foreign governments intervened in Yemen to provide positive incentives for the ruler, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to step down.

DO E S F O R E I G N PR E S S U R E D E S T A B I L I Z E DICT AT OR S H IP S? Governments and international organizations use a variety of foreign policy instruments in attempts to coerce autocratic governments: aid conditionality, economic sanctions, naming and shaming campaigns, prosecution of outgoing elites, and military interventions. This book offers a systematic investigation of their influence on autocratic stability. By analyzing all the major instruments

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of external pressure and their impact on the same political outcome, our study allows policymakers not only to evaluate the expected effectiveness of a particular tool but also to understand the mechanisms through which they can influence authoritarian politics. We argue that to understand whether these instruments of foreign pressure “work,” we must first examine whether and how they impose political costs on the target regimes. The proximate cause of regime ouster entails action by at least one of three actors: regime insiders, domestic opposition groups, or foreign military forces. The only coercive foreign policy tool that can lead directly to regime ouster is military intervention. Other policy tools influence regime stability indirectly by changing the behavior of domestic actors. Despite being the only direct mechanism for ousting autocratic regimes, hostile military interventions by foreign forces are the proximate cause of only a small number of regime transitions. Of all dictatorships which lost power between 1946 and 2010, less than 5 percent did so as a result of foreign forces removing the regime. The vast majority of regime transitions thus result from the actions of domestic actors. Therefore the study of how foreign policy tools influence autocratic stability must examine how foreign pressure affects the internal dynamics of autocratic regimes and their domestic sources of power. These interactions constitute the core of our theoretical approach. We distinguish between three types of autocratic regimes: personalist dictatorships, party-based regimes, and military dictatorships. This classification captures broad patterns in the internal dynamics of autocratic regimes. Dictatorships across these categories tend to have different sized support coalitions, rely on distinct instruments of domestic power, vary in the degree of formal political institutionalization, and as a result, their leaders face dissimilar risks of being ousted and killed or jailed after leaving power. Once we examine how foreign policy tools influence autocratic stability in different contexts, we find that some instruments are more likely to destabilize some autocracies more than others. Foreign pressure can potentially impose costs or provide positive incentives for changing the behavior of targeted regimes, and each of the tools we examine creates different types of costs and positive incentives for various political actors in the target regime. Let us briefly summarize the key findings. While much of the conventional wisdom on foreign aid suggests that it stabilizes dictatorships, we show that given the right international context and domestic conditions, aid conditionality prompts democratic political change. If credible, aid conditionality entails reducing foreign revenue to dictatorships when they do not liberalize. The loss of aid, in this context, reduces the ability of incumbents to purchase political support. The most promising

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international context for aid conditionality to work is one where (Western) donors can credibly threaten to reduce aid flows when recipient countries do not comply with political conditions attached to aid agreements. The presence of a rival donor or the elevated geostrategic importance of the recipient country should reduce the credibility of this threat. We measure these concepts by separating the era of Cold War politics from the two decades hence. Second, aid conditionality is most likely to work when the domestic costs of political reform are relatively low. We argue that this is the case when the incumbent regime has a broad and deep support coalition with which it can win some power even after political liberalization. We measure this concept using the autocratic regime classification, where party-based dictatorships have the broadest and deepest support coalitions; and show that in these dictatorships, the former regime party frequently competes in and often retains some power in competitive, multiparty elections after democratization. Better prospects of post-transition power increase the utility associated with liberalizing and the continued receipt of aid. We find that foreign aid destabilizes party-based dictatorships in the post-Cold War era by increasing the prospects of a democratic transition. We find little evidence consistent with the contention that foreign aid entrenches autocratic regimes in power. Thus foreign aid conditionality, we argue, is most likely to work in some contexts by posing an ex-ante threat and by providing an ex-post positive incentive to reform. In contrast to foreign aid, sanctions are most likely to work because they impose a political cost on regime elites, altering their incentive to support the dictatorship. Economic sanctions have been a source of debate for decades, and despite ample evidence of their ineffectiveness they continue to be one of the most widely used instruments of foreign pressure. Sanctions seek to coerce the target country by restricting trade or financial exchanges, which in many cases impose economic costs on the target country. However, not all autocratic regimes are equally vulnerable to economically costly sanctions. We find that sanctions targeting personalist dictatorships diminish their often poorly diversified revenue streams. The loss of revenue for these regimes constrains their ability to respond to the increased costs of maintaining loyalty with patronage and funding the regime’s repressive apparatus. Sanctions thus increase uncertainty about the regime’s capacity to reward coalition members and may embolden opposition groups. Because these autocracies typically lack credible institutions and may be wary of providing coordination goods to repressive organizations for fear of a coup, they tend to be the most dependent on rewarding supporters in the short-term with material benefits. Therefore, the loss of external revenue from sanctions, we argue, should hurt personalist dictators’ grip on power the most.

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Our empirical evidence confirms that sanctions increase the chances that a personalist dictator will be ousted, but suggests that sanctions are unlikely to destabilize other types of dictatorships. We also find that oil-rich autocracies are relatively immune from sanctions. Importantly, we show that even in cases where sanctions may destabilize the regime, its ouster is unlikely to result in a democratic transition. Put simply, though sanctions can destabilize personalist dictatorships, they do not promote democratization. If foreign aid and economic sanctions cannot directly remove dictatorships from power, they nonetheless operate through material resources and constraints. The condemnation of dictators for human rights violations can also alter the beliefs of key actors—whether domestic political elites, opposition forces, or foreign governments. Few dictatorships escape the scrutiny of human rights organizations and the media, but the influence of shaming campaigns varies considerably. We find that shaming campaigns are associated with a reduction in foreign aid and a higher likelihood of a new sanction imposition when they target personalist regimes. The economic costs of shaming in these cases, however, do not appear to be sufficient to destabilize them. On the positive ledger, we find evidence that shaming campaigns increase the prospects of democratic transition in military dictatorships. Prior experience with democracy and the presence of a relatively professionalized officer corps in these regimes facilitate stronger normative values about human rights. Shaming thus raises the costs of using repression and lowers opponents’ cost of mobilizing against the regime. Because military juntas rely more on repression to rule than other dictatorships, changing the costs associated with this survival strategy can thus create (externally induced) elite divisions and push these regimes to the negotiation table to work out an agreement on transition to democracy. Further, a democratic pathway of regime transition is more likely in these regimes, precisely because former authoritarian elites—in this case a cohesive military—often retain the capacity to re-intervene in politics as a credible threat against the new democratic elite revising a transition agreement. This makes democratization more likely. Our findings for human rights prosecutions are less optimistic. We show that human rights prosecutions in neighboring countries that have transitioned from dictatorship or civil war are associated with a lower probability of democratic transition in personalist dictatorships. Prosecutions in neighboring countries, we argue, raise the costs of exiting power by increasing the expectations that outgoing leaders will themselves face prosecution or will be unable to find a safe place where to go into exile. Whereas some dictatorships have political parties to mobilize support after leaving power and military leaders often have the capacity to threaten a new regime, personalist

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dictatorships typically lack domestic guarantees of post-exit security that can prevent subsequent elites from reneging on a transition pact and punishing them afterwards. Thus, when personalist dictators see their peers being prosecuted, they are more likely to believe that they will meet this same fate should they leave power peacefully. Prosecuting fallen dictators therefore increases the chances that personalist regimes will cling to power. That said, we also show that human rights prosecutions do not prevent non-personalist dictatorships from relinquishing power. In fact, if anything, the data indicate the opposite. Military intervention by foreign countries is probably the most controversial policy tool we examine. While foreign military force can directly remove autocratic regimes from power, intervention can also weaken the target regime such that domestic actors oust the dictatorship. Using both cross-national empirical tests and case studies, we show that military interventions are associated with an increased risk of transition to a new autocracy in personalist dictatorships. In most of these cases, intervention weakens the regime and domestic opponents oust it. Second, we find a correlation between interventions targeting non-personalist dictatorships and democratic transition. In these cases, direct removal of the regime leader by foreign forces is the most common method of regime ouster. The two cases of U.S. intervention associated with democratic transition occur in small, ethnically homogenous Caribbean countries with a legacy of at least some democratic rule. Further, the empirical evidence linking foreign military intervention to a democratic transition rests on the two Pakistani transitions from military rule shortly after conflicts with India—one of which, we argue, was unrelated to the military ceding power back to civilians in 1988. Overall, the empirical record of military intervention in dictatorships indicates very little evidence—particularly in personalist regimes—linking them to democratic regime change. With so few positive cases, it would be rash to draw hard and fast policy conclusions.

F O R E I G N P OL I C Y I M P L I C A T IO N S What do these findings tell us about foreign policy? Two implications follow from this research that may be instructive for policymakers in thinking about how to deal with autocratic regimes. First, autocratic regimes vary considerably but do so in predictable ways. This means that some foreign policy tools are more likely to be effective when targeting some types of autocracies but may be ineffective, or worse counterproductive, when targeting other

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autocracies. Ascertaining the contexts in which foreign pressure is most likely to destabilize autocracies requires understanding the institutional structure and strength of the regime as well as the breadth and composition of its support coalition. Each of these factors influences the core strategies the regime uses to maintain power and how they are likely to respond to foreign pressure. The institutional structure of the regime, such as the relationship between the leader, the support party, and the military, as well as the strength of regime parties, influences the strategies dictatorships employ to retain power and the extent to which elites can protect their post-exit interests in the event of a regime change. When foreign policy tools provide a positive incentive for regime elites to pursue political liberalization or even to give up power, these international benefits must be weighed against their prospects for retaining power, resources, and security after political change occurs. This logic applies equally to situations of negotiated exit, such as promises of amnesty in exchange for exile, as to political conditionalities attached to foreign aid disbursements. When the regime has the institutional capacity to protect its post-exit interests, accepting international benefits in exchange for costly domestic political change is more likely. As we have stressed throughout, personalist dictators tend to lack such institutional guarantees. Elites in party-based dictatorships, on the other hand, often have organizational tools, specifically the regime party, with which they can mobilize support even after losing their monopoly on power. While autocratic regime type is the rough empirical proxy we use to measure these concepts, one key feature of authoritarianism at work, we argue, is how the institutional structure of the regime will influence the capacity of elites to protect their interests once they leave power. Autocracies also differ in the size and composition of their support coalitions. Dictatorships with relatively broad and deep coalitions can typically make more credible promises to their supporters than small coalition regimes and are less likely to rely on providing immediate material rewards to supporters or overt repression to retain power. Party regimes have a strong institutional structure that provides supporters with a vested interest in regime survival. This makes these regimes generally less vulnerable to tools of statecraft aimed at causing material costs or limiting the repressive capacity of autocracies. Further, broad coalitions often mean regime elites are better able to secure their interests after a transition and are therefore less likely to fight to the end when faced with foreign pressure. In contrast, regimes that rely on providing supporters with private goods may be more vulnerable to foreign pressure if it restricts the flow of revenues necessary to provide such benefits. The source of regime revenue and how the

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regime uses it also matter. When regimes depend on narrow revenue streams, they are more vulnerable to foreign coercion. This is particularly true for foreign aid, the control of which lies in the hands of a few donors, and taxes from international trade. However, oil revenue is different from other types of export earnings because world demand for it is relatively inelastic. Finally, the identity of the core elites in the regime’s support coalition and their relationship with the regime leader influence how they share power and relinquish it. Elites in party-based and military regimes have organizations with which they can relatively peacefully rotate leadership. In personalist dictatorships, power resides in the regime leader; and rather than elites rotating the leader, the leader rotates elites. In regimes where elites are less dependent on the leader for the position of power, they are more likely to abandon him during times of regime crisis. This does not necessarily mean the regime will fall, but it opens a space for political change that is less threatening to the elites. In contrast, when elites rely on the leader for their power, they are more likely to be loyal until the end. For them, political change of any kind is much more costly. The second implication concerns unintended consequences. In the wrong context, foreign pressure may entrench autocratic regimes, and even when foreign coercion destabilizes them, this does not guarantee that ousting the regime will bring about democracy. Rather, in many cases, the incumbent regime is likely to be replaced by another dictatorship. Indeed, more than half of all regime failures from 1946 to 2010 resulted in a new dictatorship or a failed state (Geddes et al., 2014a). This point bears repeating because researchers and policymakers too often fail to grasp that regime collapse is not the same as democratic regime change. This fact not only means that destabilizing foreign pressure may in many cases not sow the seeds of democracy. It also suggests that if we want to understand how dictatorships are likely to respond to foreign pressure, we need to examine how pressure from the international arena influences their strategies to thwart all the domestic threats to their power. Domestic democratizing actors are not their only, nor in many cases, their primary threat. Rather, their response to foreign pressure must be analyzed through the lens of a regime that attempts to eliminate and constrain would-be dictators as well. With respect to specific foreign policy tools, we find evidence which suggests that many commonly used foreign policy tools may not further democratic political change when they target personalist dictators: (unconditional) foreign aid may have helped prop up personalist dictators during the Cold War; and while there is evidence that economic sanctions destabilize personalist dictatorships, this rarely increases the odds of a democratic transition. Further, human rights prosecutions in neighboring countries may entrench

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personalist dictatorships in power. Last, but perhaps most importantly, we find that military incursions that help topple personalist rulers are more likely to end in transitions to new dictatorship than to entail democratic regime change. These findings, we argue, should not be surprising once we understand how dictatorships work in these contexts: personalist regimes are the most likely to rely on immediate material rewards for their supporters to retain power; they are highly exclusionary; they tend to have weak political institutions; and they face the worst fate after ouster. Together, these features of personalist rule help explain why these dictatorships are the least likely to democratize after regime collapse. This point bears particular importance in light of the fact that personalist rule is fast becoming the most common type of autocracy that policymakers must face. Future research should therefore take up the task of explaining both when and where personalist rule is most likely to arise. We need to know, for example, if there are prior conditions rooted in weak states or a particular historical legacy of colonial rule, that give rise to personalist rule. And then we need to explain how international factors—including coercive foreign pressure—influence the consolidation of personalist power in the contexts where it is most propitious.

T H E S T U D Y O F A U T OC RA TI C R E G I M E S This book examines how foreign policy tools influence autocratic survival. In doing so, we break new ground in the study of autocratic regimes. First, we examine how foreign pressure affects both transitions to democracy as well as regime failures that end in transitions to a new dictatorship. This allows us to assess the relative utility of foreign policy tools in destabilizing autocracies by weighing the potential benefits of coercion—such as democratic regime change—against potential negative consequences, namely, replacing the incumbent regime with a new dictatorship. For most of the past quarter-century, research on autocratic rule has been dominated by a presumption that political rule follows an ontological path towards democracy. Graduate courses titled “Political Development” proliferate and think tanks and centers devoted to democracy promotion dominate the policy discourse. Despite notable efforts to put an end to the “transition paradigm,”1 the myth that toppling dictators leads to democracy persists. 1

See, for example, Carothers (2002) and McFaul (2002).

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The wave of optimism that followed the uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 quickly fell prey to the usual myopia about democratic transition: if dictators fall, it must mean that democrats will rise to take their place. Headline writers at major news organizations, for example, not only pronounced the end game of the Yemeni uprising a “revolution,” but concluded that because the incumbent leader ceded power to his vice president, who won an uncontested election with over 99 percent of the vote, Yemen is now a democracy.2 When dictatorships collapse, however, they are more often than not followed by another autocratic regime. Recall, less than half of all regime failures end in a democratic transition. And even many of these democratic transition events do not yield sustained democratic rule. Journalists and policymakers are by no means the only ones to fall under the spell of the transition mythology. Scholars’ ability to predict what will happen after the ouster of autocracies has been limited by focusing narrowly on democratic transitions. While much existing research tests theories using the duration of autocratic leader tenures or the likelihood of transitions to democracy, we show in Chapter 2 that these proxies introduce measurement error into the analysis: the use of autocratic leadership tenures underestimates the survival of autocratic regimes because regimes often survive the ouster of individual leaders; and the use of autocratic spell data overestimates regime duration because periods of non-democratic rule ignore autocracy-to-autocracy regime transitions. This book explains how foreign pressure influences autocratic stability. In doing so, we engage the debate about the international sources of democratization. However, our analysis also answers the vital question of “What comes next?” when dictatorships fall. While most theoretical advances in comparative politics in the past thirty years help us come closer to understanding why countries democratize, we still have a long way to go to understand why toppling dictatorships so often does not lead to democratization. Answering this question requires moving away from the transition paradigm and entails measuring features of autocratic rule that are unrelated to “political development” or “democracy.” The data we employ in this book pinpoint the historical political events that comprise autocratic regime failure: elections where the dictator’s party loses and he steps down; uprisings where See for example, the Washington Post’s headline “Inside Yemen’s revolution, cracks appear as Saleh leaves” (27 February 2012); and The New York Times headline “Yemen’s New Democracy Juggles with Tribal Traditions” (13 June 2012). To be fair, the journalists who wrote these articles pointed out factors which do not corroborate such optimism on democratic revolution in Yemen. 2

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the military refuses to shoot protesters and the dictator flees; rebel advancements on the capital city that force the regime elite to scatter across the border; and military coups that sweep an outcast ethnic group into power or chase a monarch from the throne. Studying autocratic survival by examining the likelihood of these types of political events is a very different endeavor than assessing the level of “democraticness” or “freedom” using a scaled index such as those from the Polity project or Freedom House. We have many structural explanations for why some countries are more democratic than others,3 but we still know little about when these types of transitions are likely to happen, and even less about why regime failures do not always lead to democratic transitions. The inability to predict when autocratic regimes fail has led to frustration in both policy and academic circles. Periods of mass political upheaval, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the subsequent collapse of Soviet bloc regimes in Europe, and the recent regime ousters in some Arab countries, have taken most observers by surprise. Once regime collapse occurs, we have plausible theories, largely based on structural accounts of democratization, for why transition periods in some countries are more likely to end in democracy than in others. These theories, however, give us little purchase on predicting when regime collapse is likely to occur. Surprises arise because we are much less adept at knowing when (as opposed to where) a key political event, such as autocratic collapse, is likely to happen. So before we can explain democratization, we need to understand regime breakdown. This book, we hope, begins to shed light on the international dimensions of this question. When scholars and policymakers talk of the prospects for “regime change” in countries governed by dictatorship, we are usually referring to more than the ouster of a particular leader. Beyond the leader, “regimes” encompass a set of elites who decide policy and shape leadership selection. Although some factors, like economic difficulty, contribute to both leader and regime ouster, in some situations regime elites can save themselves by ousting a particular leader. This is a standard feature of autocratic politics, and may have been what the military and other Egyptian elites intended when they turned their backs on Mubarak in the face of mass uprisings in 2011. By conceptualizing autocratic instability as the risk of an autocratic regime falling and not just the chances that a particular leader leaves office, we can better explain how foreign pressure influences democratization as well as transitions to subsequent dictatorships. Future research, however, should 3

Predominant structural explanations for democratization include modernization theory (Lipset, 1959), theories of social class and inequality (Moore, 1966), and cultural explanations (Almond and Verba, 1963).

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not abandon the study of how foreign factors influence leadership survival in autocratic contexts. Rather, we need to better understand when leadership change is likely to undermine authoritarian survival and when it can prolong it.

T H E LI M IT S OF FO RE IG N P R E S S UR E We close with a caveat. Foreign policy aimed at destabilizing autocratic regimes entails important direct costs, both economic and humanitarian. As critics of sanctions have long pointed out, even though they may be extremely economically costly, this is no guarantee they will prompt political change. The potential political benefits of foreign pressure must be weighed against very real human and economic costs, both to the sender and to the target countries. As Baldwin (2000, 174) stresses, “[u]nfortunately, the success of economic and military statecraft is often estimated solely on the basis of goal achievement without reference to the costs incurred.” Our approach in this book suggests that the benefits of foreign pressure can be understood in two ways. First, it can potentially increase the risk of regime failure. Destabilizing pressure is probabilistic not deterministic; that is, elites in autocratic regimes can believe foreign pressure has significantly increased the risk of their losing power without actually losing power. In these cases when foreign pressure does not succeed in dismantling the target regime, it can nonetheless be used to extract policy concessions. Second, the benefits of foreign pressure can be viewed in terms of democracy promotion. If that is the goal, the empirical evidence in this book gives less reason for optimism. There is no certainty that a regime under pressure will become democratic, not even if foreigners invade and impose regime change. Further, some foreign policy instruments may undermine the prospects of democratization or simply foster transitions to a new dictatorship. And those policies that are most likely to increase the chances of democratization, do so in very limited circumstances. The instruments of foreign policy that we consider can also impose substantial costs on the sender and, especially, on the target country’s population. While the benefits of foreign coercion are uncertain, many of the costs are borne irrespective of whether foreign pressure successfully destabilizes the target regime. Military interventions, no matter how rapid or well planned, entail violence which often leaves victims on both sides. Sanctions, aid restrictions, and even shaming campaigns may cause shortages of basic goods and

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hurt human development. And in some circumstances, human rights prosecutions increase the incentives of dictators to retain power by any means, which can lead to more repression and violence. We encourage policymakers and researchers to examine how the institutional structure of the target regime influences its response to foreign pressure. As we have shown with respect to economic sanctions, the types of autocracies in which foreign pressure is likely to be most destabilizing may also be precisely those regimes where citizens bear the highest cost. If the most effective foreign policy tools are also the most costly to innocent citizens in the target country, this further underscores the limitations of coercive foreign pressure.

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............ Appendix A ............ CHAPTER 4 TABLES Table A.1. Electoral success of former dominant parties Country (outcome)

Election details

Albania 1991 (win)

31 March 1991 Party of Labor of Albania (PLA) 1st in votes (56.4%) 29 June 1997 Socialist Party of Albania (PSS, PLA successor) 1st in seats (101/155)

Bulgaria 1990 (win)

18 December 1994 Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) 1st in votes (43.5%)

Congo Br. 1992 (comp)

6 June 1993 Congolese Labor Party (PCT) 3rd in seats (15/125); coalition 2nd in seats (56/125)

Czech. 1990 (comp)

6 June 1992 Czech Republic: Comm. Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) 2nd in seats (35/185) KSČM with Democratic Left formed Left Bloc 2nd in seats (51/185) 6 June 1992 Slovakia: Party of Democratic Left (SDL) 2nd in seats (29/150)

El Salvador 1984 (win)

Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) first in seats in elections from 1988–2000 20 March 1988 ARENA 1st in votes (48.1%) 10 March 1991 ARENA 1st in votes (44.3%) 20 March 1994 ARENA 1st in votes (45.0%) 16 March 1997 ARENA 1st in votes (35.4%) 12 March 2000 ARENA 1st in votes (36.0%) 16 March 2003 ARENA 2nd in votes (32.0%)

Honduras 1956 (comp)

22 September 1957 National Party of Honduras (PNH) 2nd in seats (18/58)

Hungary 1990 (win)

8 May 1994 Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) 1st in votes (33.0%)

Indonesia 1998 (win)

5 April 2004 Party of the Functional Groups (GOLKAR) 1st in votes (21.6%)

Kenya 2002 (comp)

27 December 2002 Kenya African National Union (KANU) 2nd in seats (14/207) 27 December 2007 KANU 4th in seats (64/210) 27 December 2007 KANU in PNU coalition, supported Kibaki who was 1st in votes (disputed)

Mexico 2000 (win)

6 July 2003 Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 1st in seats (222/500) (continued)

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Appendix A

Table A.1. Continued Country (outcome)

Election details

Mongolia 1990 (win)

28 June 1992 Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) 1st in seats (70/76) 30 June 1996 MPRP 2nd in votes (39%) 2 July 2000 MPRP 1st in seats (72/76) 17 July 2004 MPRP 1st in votes (48.2%)

Nicaragua 1990 (win)

25 February 1990 Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) 2nd in seats (39/92) 20 October 1996 FSLN 2nd in seats (36/92) 4 November 2001 2nd in seats (42/92) 5 November 2006 1st in seats (38/92)

Paraguay 1993 (dom)

10 May 1998 National Republican Association (ANR)-Colorado Party (PC) 1st in votes (53.8%) 27 April 2003 ANR-PC 1st in votes (35.3%) 20 April 2008 ANR-PC 1st in seats (29/80)

Poland 1989 (win)

19 September 1993 Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 2nd in seats (60/360) 19 September 1993 SDL 1st in seats (171/360)

Romania 1990 (win)

27 September 1992 National Democratic Salvation Front (NDSF) 1st in votes (27.7%) 3 November 1996 Social Democracy Pole of Romania (PDSR) 2nd in votes (21.5%) 26 November 2000 PDSR 1st in votes (36.6%)

Senegal 2000 (comp)

29 April 2001 Socialist Party (PS) 2nd in votes (17.4%), 3rd in seats (10/120), boycott 2007 election

South Africa 1994 (comp)

26 April 1994 National Party (NP) 2nd in votes (24.4%) 2 June 1999 New National Party (NNP) 4th in votes (6.9%)

Taiwan 2000 (win)

1 December 2001 Kuomintang (KMT) 2nd in votes (31.3%) 11 December 2004 KMT 2nd in votes (34.9%); part of Pan-Blue coalition 1st in seats (114/225) 22 March 2008 Kuomintang (KMT) 1st in Presidential votes (58.5%)

Zambia 1991 (comp)

31 October 1991 United National Independence Party (UNIP) 2nd in votes (24.2%) 27 December 2001 UNIP 3rd in seats (13, winner had 69)

Dominant (dom) = Win a plurality of votes in all legislative elections since transition; Winner (win) = At a minimum, the party with the highest (plurality) share of seats in a lower house election during the posttransition democratic period; Competitive (comp) = At a minimum, party with the second largest share of votes in at least one lower house election.

Table A.2. Aid and regime transition All regime failures

Aid

Democratic transition

Autocratic transition

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.050

–0.171

–0.659*

–0.082

–0.446

–1.265+

(0.12)

(0.18)

(0.33)

(0.21)

(0.28)

(0.65)

0.569*

1.194*

1.215*

2.747*

–0.072

0.403

(0.26)

(0.51)

(0.45)

(1.15)

(0.36)

(0.79)

Aid  Party

(8)

(9)

0.064

0.198

–0.103

(0.16)

(0.29)

(0.72)

0.162

0.485

0.321

0.490

–0.240

0.285

(0.23)

(0.40)

(0.42)

(0.78)

(0.33)

(0.73)

–3.735**

–4.937**

–6.067**

–10.526+

–2.366**

–2.108

–3.418

Party

–1.953** (0.49)

(0.92)

(1.72)

(0.90)

(1.73)

(5.63)

(0.84)

(1.34)

(2.75)

Personalist

–0.827+

–1.352+

–2.743*

–1.999*

–2.917*

–2.828

–0.400

0.358

–1.835

(0.45)

(0.79)

(1.30)

(0.85)

(1.44)

(2.37)

(0.57)

(1.11)

(2.53)

Log GDP pc

–0.349*

–0.438*

–0.356

–0.288

–0.381

0.978

–0.498*

–0.479*

–1.143+

(0.17)

(0.19)

(0.54)

(0.31)

(0.32)

(1.94)

(0.20)

(0.20)

(0.65)

Neighbor democracy

1.352*

1.623**

4.196**

2.324*

2.710*

7.700*

0.816

0.793

3.124

(0.55)

(0.57)

(1.39)

(1.06)

(1.06)

(3.09)

(0.73)

(0.71)

(2.31)

–0.148

–0.160

–4.009*

–0.112

–0.116

–5.293+

–0.216+

–0.198+

–2.341

(0.11)

(0.11)

(1.61)

(0.17)

(0.19)

(3.00)

(0.12)

(0.12)

(2.23)

Log population

–2.110*

(continued)

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/7/2015, SPi

Aid  Personal

(7)

All regime failures (1) (Intercept)

(2)

Democratic transition (3)

(4)

(5)

Autocratic transition (6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

1.192

2.492

17.532

0.348

1.890

7.774

1.243

0.554

5.421

(1.85)

(2.10)

(15.62)

(3.14)

(3.37)

(31.14)

(2.34)

(2.63)

(20.62)

âAid + âAid  Party âAid + âAid  Pers

0.397*

0.535

0.769*

1.481+

0.127

0.300

(0.20)

(0.41)

(0.35)

(0.87)

(0.56)

(0.43)

–0.001

–0.174

–0.125

–0.776

–0.042

0.183

(0.18)

(0.29)

(0.41)

(0.47)

(0.21)

(0.32)

Log-likelihood

–539.6

–536.7

–441.9

–265.8

–261.8

–155.7

–338.3

–337.9

–267.1

Observations

2816

2816

2134

2816

2816

1313

2816

2816

1658

Regimes

217

217

178

217

217

121

217

217

147

Countries

93

93

70

93

93

48

93

93

49

Unit effects

RE

RE

FE

RE

RE

FE

RE

RE

FE

+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Years covered: 1962–2008. Military is the excluded regime type. Duration polynomials and interactions between duration polynomials and regime type included in all models, but not reported. Time-period fixed effects in all models, but not reported. Aid is the moving average of the natural log of aid per capita over the last two calendar years.

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Table A.2. Continued

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Appendix A

267

Table A.3. Aid and regime transition by period Period Regime failure

Aid

Cold War

Post-Cold War

Democratic

Autocratic

Democratic

Autocratic

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.356

0.246

0.052

0.305

(0.32)

(0.24)

(0.27)

(0.36)

Aid  Party Aid  Personal

0.860*

0.357

(0.43)

(0.34)

Party Personalist

Log GDP pc

0.585

1.556

(1.85)

(1.06)

1.148*

0.066

(0.56)

(0.45)

4.961*

0.780

(2.34)

(2.60)

0.452

0.528*

0.358

0.405

(0.44)

(0.25)

(0.39)

(0.32)

Neighbor democracy

4.180*

1.692+

2.624*

0.227

(1.73)

(1.00)

(1.06)

(1.22)

Log population

0.591+

0.128

0.141

0.005

(0.33)

(0.13)

(0.22)

(0.21)

14.884**

0.364

3.073

2.334

(5.58)

(2.16)

(3.98)

(4.07)

(Intercept) âAid + âAid  Party âAid + âAid  Personal

1.216**

0.111

(0.31)

(0.23)

1.096*

0.239

(0.49)

(0.41)

Log-likelihood

100.5

245.8

178.9

101.1

Observations

1533

1533

1263

1263

Regimes

150

150

116

116

Countries

79

79

84

84

+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. Random effects logit with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Regime duration polynomials and interactions with (included) regime type estimated but not reported. Aid is the moving average of the natural log of aid per capita over the last two calendar years.

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............ Appendix B ............ C HA P T E R 5 T A B L E S Table B.1. Sanctions and repression (1) Repression t

1

1.530** (0.02)

Repression t

2

0.562** (0.02)

Sanction

0.009 (0.01)

Sanction  Party

0.020 (0.01)

Sanction  Personalist

0.032+ (0.02)

Party

0.011 (0.01)

Personalist

0.001 (0.01)

Log population

0.010** (0.00)

Log GDP pc

0.006+ (0.00)

Civil war

0.014 (0.01)

Democratic military intervention

0.012 (0.01)

Autocratic military intervention

0.002 (0.01)

Regime duration

0.000 (0.00) (continued)

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Appendix B

269

Table B.1. Continued Regime duration2

0.000 (0.00)

(Intercept)

0.038 (0.04)

âSanction + âSanction  Party

0.011 (0.01)

âSanction + âSanction  Personalist

0.023+ (0.01)

+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. Random effects generalized linear model with clustered standard errors in parentheses. 3394 observations in 223 regimes in 105 countries from 1950 to 2004.

All regime failures (1) Sanction

(3)

0.089

0.099

1.521**

0.195

0.066

1.337

0.246

0.423

1.008

(0.38)

(0.40)

(0.48)

(0.49)

(0.56)

(0.88)

(0.41)

(0.44)

(0.92)

0.549

0.404

0.269

1.379

1.663**

1.470

(0.48)

(0.68)

(0.82)

(1.43)

(0.63)

(1.11)

0.620

1.160

0.836

3.582

0.128

0.011

(0.61)

(0.97)

(0.93)

(4.24)

(0.75)

(1.20)

0.031

0.019

0.255

0.168

0.204+

0.539**

(0.15)

(0.15)

(0.32)

(0.12)

(0.12)

(0.15)

Sanction  Party

Oil

0.124

0.133

(0.10)

(0.10)

0.473** (0.14)

(4)

(5)

Autocratic transition

(2)

Sanction  Personal

Sanction  Oil

Democratic transition (6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

0.105+

0.110+

0.239+

0.169*

0.169*

0.212

0.040

0.052

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.13)

(0.08)

(0.08)

(0.41)

(0.07)

(0.08)

(0.17)

0.203

0.321

0.281

0.320

0.266

0.878

0.346

0.523

0.972

(0.44)

(0.45)

(0.45)

(0.69)

(0.75)

(1.23)

(0.48)

(0.48)

(0.63)

1.851**

1.781**

0.992+

3.022**

2.907**

1.638**

1.572**

1.647*

(0.45)

(0.44)

(0.52)

(0.87)

(0.86)

(1.33)

(0.59)

(0.58)

(0.71)

Log GDP pc

0.128

0.128

0.269

0.537**

0.515**

0.417

0.229

0.193

0.096

(0.13)

(0.13)

(0.59)

(0.18)

(0.19)

(1.37)

(0.21)

(0.20)

(0.70)

Military int.

1.013**

1.023**

1.187**

1.249*

1.246*

1.869**

0.780

0.832+

0.733

(0.34)

(0.32)

(0.42)

(0.54)

(0.55)

(0.71)

(0.54)

(0.49)

(0.54)

0.262

0.257

0.759+

0.370

0.374

1.248

0.116

0.107

0.079

(0.36)

(0.36)

(0.43)

(0.53)

(0.54)

(0.78)

(0.42)

(0.42)

(0.54)

Personalist Party

International war

1.755

0.300+

(continued)

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Table B.2. Sanctions and regime transitions

Table B.2. Continued (Intercept)

2.769**

2.722**

(1.02)

(1.02)

(3.96)

0.648

1.926**

0.203

(0.51)

(0.55)

(0.65) 0.769 (0.72)

âSanct. + âSanct.  Pers. âSanct. + âSanct.  Party

0.521 (0.55)

Log-likelihood Observations

6.996**

6.869**

(1.59)

(1.62)

0.36 (0.89)

2.435

0.550

0.748

1.180

(9.35)

(1.63)

(1.55)

(4.92)

0.042

1.240*

2.478**

(1.26)

(0.51)

(0.77)

2.245

0.295

1.019

(4.34)

(0.57)

(0.79)

678

676

549

347

346

235

434

430

332

3560

3560

2841

3560

3560

1935

3560

3560

1985

RE

RE

FE

RE

RE

FE

RE

RE

FE

+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. Random effects probit with clustered standard errors in parentheses (columns 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8). Logit with country fixed effects in columns 3, 6, and 9 with clustered standard errors. Time period dummies and duration time polynomials not reported. Monarchies excluded from the sample. Years covered: 1946–2006.

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Unit effects

3.985

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272

Appendix B Table B.3. First stage selection equation Variable Size

Sanctions 2.123** (0.22)

Colony

0.267** (0.07)

Colony  Oil

0.049* (0.02)

Oil

0.023 (0.02)

Log GDP pc

0.154** (0.05)

Military intervention

1.170**

International war

0.490**

Civil war

0.288**

(0.11) (0.10) (0.07) Party

0.344* (0.14)

Personalist

0.113 (0.16)

(Intercept)

8.185** (0.85)

Log-likelihood

1420.8

Observations

3535

+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. Probit with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is a binary indicator of sanctions episode. Military regime is the excluded regime category. Duration time polynomials and period-fixed effects included but not reported. Sample does not include monarchies. Years covered: 1961–2004.

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............ Appendix C ............ CHAPTER 6 TABLES Table C.1. U.N. resolutions, aid, and sanctions

Dependent variable t–1 Shame Personal  Shame Military  Shame Party  Shame

Personalist Military Party ΔRepression Repression t

1

Δ Civil liberties Civil liberties t

1

Bilateral aid

Multilateral aid

Sanction

Democracy sanction

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.452**

0.345**

0.266**

0.246**

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.03)

0.137

0.159

0.007

0.012

(0.13)

(0.17)

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.510**

0.532*

0.028+

0.021

(0.19)

(0.25)

(0.02)

(0.01)

0.148

0.155

0.014

0.019

(0.16)

(0.21)

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.253

0.089

(0.18)

(0.24)

0.017

0.039

0.000

0.007

(0.06)

(0.07)

(0.05)

(0.04)

0.000

0.079

0.019

0.006

(0.06)

(0.08)

(0.07)

(0.06)

0.042

0.121

(0.06)

(0.08)

0.043*

0.002

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.024

0.000

(0.02)

(0.03)

0.012

0.011

(0.02)

(0.03)

0.004

0.004

(0.01)

(0.02)

0.041*

0.042**

(0.02)

(0.01)

(continued)

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274

Appendix C

Table C.1. Continued

ln(GDPpc) t ln(Pop) t

1

1

U.S. agree t

1

War Capabilities

Bilateral aid

Multilateral aid

Sanction

Democracy sanction

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.072+

0.223**

0.042

0.001

(0.04)

(0.05)

(0.04)

(0.03)

0.943**

1.283**

(0.23)

(0.31)

0.346*

0.297

(0.15)

(0.21)

0.101**

0.095+

(0.04)

(0.05)

0.085 (0.09)

0.106+ (0.06)

0.035

0.023

(0.03)

(0.03)

1.859

2.845

(1.88)

(2.55)

17.485**

23.433**

0.513

0.765+

(3.75)

(5.05)

(0.69)

(0.45)

R-squared

0.35

0.24

0.16

0.16

Observations

2121

2114

1663

1663

(Intercept)

+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. Fixed effects OLS; standard errors in parentheses. The natural log of aid per capita is the dependent variable in (1) and (2); 133 regimes in eighty-five autocratic countries from 1979 to 2002. Excluded regime category is democracy (sixty-seven countries). Time trend included but not reported in (1) and (2). All data, except regime type, from Lebovic and Voeten (2009). The dependent variable in (3) and (4) is Sanctiont – Sanctiont–1; 152 regimes in ninety-six countries from 1977 to 2000. Excluded regime category is dominant party. Regime duration polynomials and time period dummies included but not reported.

Table C.2. Shaming and regime transitions Dependent variable

All regime failures (1)

Shaming

Log GDP pc Log population Repression Civil war Violent protest

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.013

0.005

0.018+

0.011

0.004

0.005

0.017+

0.008

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.051+

0.053+

0.003

0.046

0.052+

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.03)

0.002

0.006

0.005

0.012

0.007

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.063

0.116

0.033

0.089

0.023

0.019

0.088

0.083

(0.06)

(0.07)

(0.05)

(0.06)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.06)

(0.06)

0.094

0.088

0.066

0.008

0.004

0.068

0.055

(0.07)

(0.07)

(0.04)

(0.06)

(0.06)

(0.04)

(0.05)

0.075+ (0.04)

0.002

0.009

0.015

0.023

0.004

0.005

0.006

0.021

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.03)

0.041

0.050

0.086+

0.089+

0.058

0.133*

(0.07)

0.108

(0.07)

0.119+

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.08)

(0.06)

0.002

0.004

0.019

0.021

0.028*

0.028*

0.012

0.021

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.002

0.003

0.010

0.008

0.011

0.011

0.007

0.009

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

0.120**

0.118**

0.015

0.012

0.092**

0.091**

0.007

0.016

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.03) (continued)

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/7/2015, SPi

Personalist

(5)

Democratic transition

(3)

Shaming  Personal

(4)

Autocratic transition

(2)

Shaming  Military

Military

Democratic transition

Dependent variable

All regime failures (1)

(2)

Democratic transition (3)

(4)

Autocratic transition (5)

(6)

Aid

Democratic transition (7)

(8)

0.013 (0.01)

Sanction

0.006 (0.02)

(Intercept)

1.382

1.576

0.737

0.909

0.957

0.982

0.780

2.053*

(1.00)

(1.03)

(0.74)

(0.76)

(0.73)

(0.74)

(1.12)

(0.90)

âShame + âShame  Military âShame + âShame  Personal

0.056+

0.064*

0.007

0.063*

0.060*

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.03)

0.003

0.005

0.000

0.005

0.001

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.02)

Period FE

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Year FE

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

Y

R-squared

0.13

0.14

0.13

0.14

0.12

0.12

0.16

0.16

Observations

1664

1664

1664

1664

1664

1664

1534

1664

+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. Linear probability model with country-fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Duration time polynomials and interactions with regime type; period- (or year-) fixed effects; country-fixed effects in all models but not reported. Years: 1977–2001.

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Table C.2. Continued

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Appendix C

277

Table C.3. Two stage model 1st stage (2) Dependent variable

1st stage (5)

Shame

Democratic transition

Shame

Shame  Mil

Democratic transition

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Shaming

0.066

0.031

(0.07)

(0.06)

Shaming  Military

0.132+ (0.07)

Military

0.130

0.128

(0.29)

(0.34)

(0.08)

0.156

0.135*

0.033

(0.03)

(0.14)

(0.05)

(0.03)

0.055

0.049

0.053

0.119

0.076+

(0.28)

(0.04)

(0.28)

(0.13)

(0.05)

0.419**

0.041

0.420**

0.107**

0.041

(0.06)

(0.03)

(0.06)

(0.03)

(0.03)

Civil war (low)

0.090

0.001

0.089

0.042

0.000

(0.07)

(0.02)

(0.07)

(0.03)

(0.02)

Civil war (high)

0.223*

0.034

0.223*

0.015

0.023

(0.10)

(0.03)

(0.10)

(0.05)

(0.03)

Log GDP pc Log population Repression

Violent protest Non-violent protest

0.398*

0.005

0.373

(0.18)

(0.06)

0.156

0.023

(0.14)

0.018

0.011

0.018

0.089+

0.003

(0.10)

(0.02)

(0.10)

(0.05)

(0.03)

0.052

0.185**

0.052

0.028

0.179**

(0.12)

(0.05)

(0.12)

(0.06)

(0.05)

Anti-government

0.103*

0.023

0.103*

0.024

0.022

demonstrations

(0.04)

(0.01)

(0.04)

(0.02)

(0.02)

Neighbor democracy

0.091+

0.006

0.091+

0.008

0.010

(0.05)

(0.01)

(0.05)

(0.02)

(0.01)

Prior democracy (Intercept)

Instrument Instrument  Military

0.057

0.025

0.054

0.362

0.002

(0.18)

(0.06)

(0.19)

(0.35)

(0.09)

0.036

0.002

2.212

(3.44)

(3.45)

(1.71)

36.244**

36.626**

(9.75)

(10.87)

6.033+ (3.48)

1.587

65.226**

(11.98)

(15.92) (continued)

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278

Appendix C

Table C.3. Continued 1st stage (2) Dependent variable

1st stage (5)

Shame

Democratic transition

Shame

Shame  Mil

Democratic transition

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

âShame + âShame 

0.162 (0.10)

Military

F-statistic

13.8

7.4

10.0

Kleibergen-Paap Wald F

13.2

6.6

Weak ID critical value 10% maximal IV size

16.4

7.0

Weak ID critical value 15% maximal IV size

9.0

4.6

Weak ID critical value 20% maximal IV size

6.7

4.0

+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. Linear probability model with country fixed effects. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Duration time polynomials and interactions with regime type, and country fixed effects in all models but not reported. 1601 observations in 95 countries from 1977–2001. The coefficient estimate for âShame + âShame  Military is statistically significant at the 0.102 level.

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............ Appendix D ............ C HA P TER 7 T A B L E

Table D.1. Human rights prosecutions and regime transitions Dependent variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.420

2.706*

0.122*

(0.77) HRP  Personal

(1.31) 4.663** (1.54)

Personalist

1.989+ (1.20)

Log GDP pc

2.636+ (1.51)

Log population Neighbor democracy Neighbor post-civil war (Intercept)

0.058 (0.06)

2.545+

3.256

3.408 (2.65) 0.534+

(0.29)

(0.31)

0.530

0.466

(0.35)

(0.36)

46.157

46.922

(32.49)

(33.72)

âHRP + âHRP  Personal

1.956+ (1.11)

(5)

0.134

2.369

(1.37)

(2.01) 6.285*

(0.07)

1.246

(1.52)

(4)

0.215**

(1.26)

(2.55) 0.550+

(0.06)

Democratic transition (4–6)

0.083** (0.03) 0.162+ (0.09) 0.030+ (0.02) 0.027* (0.01) 2.488+ (1.31)

(2.86) 4.725+ (2.59) 3.735+ (2.24)

4.206+ (2.26) 3.681+ (2.08)

4.340

5.499

(7.46)

(6.95)

0.894+

(6)

(7)

0.086+

0.727

(0.05)

0.044

0.013

(1.72)

(0.05)

0.046+ (0.02) 0.163* (0.07)

0.428

0.093*

3.916+

(0.04)

0.076 (0.06)

0.623

0.520

(85.46)

(2.03)

(0.03)

(1.59)

0.012

(89.84)

(1.82)

0.036

0.045

(0.01)

(0.72)

3.688*

(9)

(0.04)

0.814

55.408

(8)

5.175*

(0.05)

(0.54)

(0.72)

(0.99)

0.139**

(0.54)

41.388

Autocratic transition (7–9)

0.015* (0.01) 2.417* (0.94)

1.394

1.018

(2.45)

(2.63)

2.148

2.590

0.001

(4.11)

(4.38)

(0.07)

0.706+

(0.03)

0.777+

0.018+

(0.37)

(0.41)

(0.01)

0.586

0.579

0.012 (0.01)

(0.49)

(0.50)

30.711

33.122

0.071

(47.78)

(49.95)

(1.00)

0.053+

(2.16)

0.037+ (0.02)

1.487

0.040

(1.37)

(0.04)

Log-likelihood

278.5

272.0

194.8

142.9

138.4

673.2

134.6

131.6

931.0

Observations

1270

1270

1835

854

854

1835

772

772

1835

Estimator

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

Logit

Logit

LPM

Logit

Logit

LPM

Logit

Logit

LPM

+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. HRP  Neighbor human rights prosecutions. Conditional logit and FE linear probability model (LPM) with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is regime transition, as specified in the column headings. Duration time polynomials and interactions with regime type, and country and year effects included but not reported. One hundred and fifty-one regimes in ninety-two countries from 1975 to 2006.

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HRP

All regime failures (1–3)

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............ Appendix E ............ C HA P TER 8 T A B L E

Dependent variable

DHI AHI

All regime failures (1–3) (2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

1.755**

1.963**

0.103**

1.791+

3.776*

0.074*

1.114*

0.889

0.029

(0.44)

(0.53)

(0.03)

(0.95)

(1.63)

(0.03)

(0.52)

(0.56)

(0.02)

0.378

1.258**

0.039*

0.852

1.779*

0.028*

0.096

0.798

0.011

(0.40)

(0.44)

(0.02)

(0.70)

(0.79)

(0.01)

(0.52)

(0.56)

(0.02)

0.469

0.017

(0.97)

(0.06)

1.970*

0.070*

(0.82)

(0.04)

AHI  Personal

Log GDP pc Log population Civil war (Intercept) âDHI + âDHI  Personal

Autocratic transition (7–9)

(1)

DHI  Personal

Personalist

Democratic transition (4–6)

4.115+

(8)

(9)

0.063

1.097

0.046

(2.37)

(0.05)

(1.23)

(0.04)

2.356

0.024

(1.57)

(0.02)

2.054* (0.93)

0.046 (0.03)

0.303

0.449

0.039

0.267

0.104

0.006

0.384

0.545

0.033

(0.43)

(0.43)

(0.03)

(1.09)

(1.05)

(0.02)

(0.54)

(0.57)

(0.03)

0.088

0.119

0.018

0.206

0.050

0.000

0.759

0.622

0.018

(0.49)

(0.49)

(0.02)

(1.22)

(1.30)

(0.01)

(0.58)

(0.60)

(0.01)

4.354**

4.306**

0.126**

11.046*

10.766*

0.076**

0.422

0.418

(1.39)

(1.41)

(0.03)

(5.25)

(5.17)

(0.03)

(1.49)

(1.56)

(0.03)

0.529*

0.546*

0.028*

0.038

0.037

0.000

0.822**

0.904**

0.028**

0.050+

(0.22)

(0.23)

(0.01)

(0.40)

(0.44)

(0.01)

(0.27)

(0.28)

(0.01)

34.095**

33.700**

1.320**

81.218

77.467

0.618*

1.962

0.669

0.703*

(12.83)

(13.05)

(0.38)

(54.79)

(54.22)

(0.28)

(15.56)

(15.88)

(0.30)

1.494+

0.086

0.339

0.011

1.987+

0.075*

(0.84)

(0.05)

(1.57)

(0.05)

(1.13)

(0.03) (continued)

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Table E.1. Military intervention and regime transitions

Table E.1. Continued âAHI + âAHI  Personal

0.712

0.031

0.577

0.004

1.255

0.035

(0.72)

(0.03)

(1.36)

(0.02)

(0.83)

(0.03)

1752.6

1452.5

Log-likelihood

553.4

549.9

432.7

229.1

224.9

319.1

316.8

Observations

2855

2855

3567

1542

1542

3567

1709

1709

3567

Regimes

220

220

241

158

158

241

181

181

241

Countries

85

85

106

63

63

106

57

57

106

Estimator

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

FE

Logit

Logit

LPM

Logit

Logit

LPM

Logit

Logit

LPM OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/7/2015, SPi

+ p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. DHI  Democratic Hostile Intervention; AHI  Autocratic Hostile Intervention. Conditional logit and FE linear probability model (LPM) with clustered standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is regime transition, as specified in the column headings. Duration time polynomials and interactions with regime type, and country and year effects included but not reported. Sample years: 1947–2005.

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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/7/2015, SPi

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............ Index ............ A accountability elite 229, 230 human rights law 7, 75, 81, 193 increase prosecutions 14, 15, 15fig, 186 military intervention and 236t, 238, 239, 242, 243 military regimes 230 personalist leaders 83 Adrisi, Mustafa 148 advocacy networks, human rights 199 Afghanistan dictatorship after military intervention 236, 241, 242 self-defense 221 Soviet military intervention 238 U.S. military intervention 4, 11, 215, 216, 218 African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group 7 African Union 206 Agenda for Democratization (UN) 5 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud 126 AI (Amnesty International) 14, 154, 160, 167 aid conditionality 10, 77–8 ex-ante 92 International Financial Institutions 12 liberalization 71 objectives of foreign donors 115 political reform 85 Post-Cold war 99 reduction of dictatorships 11 and regime change 24, 80, 251, 252, 253 Akazu (Rwanda) 53 Akonor, Kwame 106 Alam, Mahboob 241 Albania 62 Alesina, Alberto, and Dollar, David 97n12 Alfonsín, Raul 190 Algeria 21, 36, 55 Allende, Salvador 174, 177, 179, 181 Alliance for Progress 6 Amin, Idi 18, 60, 71, 125, 134, 144, 149 Ammar, Rachid 197 amnesties 62, 167, 189, 193 Amnesty International (AI) 14, 154, 160, 167 Andreas, Peter 127 Annan, Kofi 5, 185, 220

anocracies 13 anti-slavery abolitionists 14 apartheid 74, 119, 125, 154 Applbaum, Arthur I. 222 Arab-Israeli war 1967 241 Arab Socialist Union (Libya) 204 Arab Spring 1, 26, 117, 186, 197, 203, 207 Aref, ‘Abd al-Salām 241 Argentina 6, 35, 41, 62, 190, 199, 217, 230 Aristide, Jean-Bertrand 137, 220, 228, 237 al-Assad, Bashar 74, 117, 189 assassinations attempts 144, 181 Letelier 176 as post-exit fate 60 Prats 174n19 Somoza 63n11, 126 Trujillo 52, 236 Tunisia 203 Uganda 134, 146 asset freeze 117 asylum, political 63, 66, 75, 187, 192, 193, 206 audience cost theories 225 Auschwitz 156 Australia 21 Austria 214 autocratic regimes 49–83 collapse 18, 28–48 definition of 40 destabilization 51, 76–83 family members 2 foreign pressure and regime survival 69, 70–6 military capacity 225 military intervention 236 over time 38fig post-exit fate of leaders 60–4 Polity score 20fig regime change 8, 9–10, 29 rotation of leaders 29 stability 9, 15, 38, 39–47 subsequent dictatorships 21 survival strategies 50, 51–60 transition to another autocracy 39 varieties of 30–8 worldwide 3 “axis of evil” 17 Ayub Khan, Mohammad 245 Azerbaijan 235, 238, 239, 242, 243

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316

Index

B Balaguer, Joaquín 236, 237 Baldwin, David A. 4, 10, 260 Banda, Hastings 53, 57, 58, 103, 104, 192 Banzer, Hugo 60 Barros, Robert 35, 174, 175, 177, 178, 182 al-Bashir, Omar Hassan 15, 184 Ba’thist regime, Syria 1 Bauer, P. T. 87 BDP (Botswana Democratic Party) 54 Belarus 17 Belgium 33 Belkin, Aaron, and Schofer, Evan 225 Bellin, Eva 35n4, 197 Ben Ali 1, 2, 75, 166, 191, 197, 205 Bengal 245 Benghazi 204 Benin 103 Benn, Hilary 100 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali 238 Bignone, Reynaldo 41 Birendra, King of Nepal 126, 134 Birkenau 156 black market 126 Bokassa, Jean-Bedel 217 Bolivia 60 Boone, Catherine 55 Bosch, Juan 237n33 Bosnia 219, 220 Botswana 54 Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) 54 Bourguiba, Habib 60 Bratton, Michael, and van de Walle, Nicolas 32, 46, 47, 57, 124, 165 Brazil 167, 185, 190, 198, 199 Brett, E. A. 146 Britain economic pressure on Uganda 146, 147 military intervention in former colonies 217 military intervention in Yemen 241, 242, 244n46 political conditionality and development 7 slave trade 154 Brooks, Risa A. 122, 142 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Downs, George W. 223 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce et al. 246 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Smith, Alastair 88 Buganda faction Uganda 144 Burkina Faso 21 Burma 16, 17, 56, 119 Burundi 242 Bush, George W. 7, 17 “Bush-Doctrine” 222

C calorie consumption, effect of sanctions 152, 153fig Camp David Accords 1 Canada 146, 215, 220 Caribbean basin 21 Carnation Revolution, Portugal 3 Carter, Jimmy 6, 13, 18, 118, 147 Casas, Bartolomé de las 14, 154 Castro, Fidel 119, 140 Catholic Church 176 CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi) (Tanzania) 55 CDRs (Committees for the Defence of the Revolution) (Ghana) 107 Ceaușescu, Nicolae 60, 185 Cédras, Raoul 137, 228 Central African Republic 217, 228 Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) (Tanzania) 55 Charlton, Roger 54 Chazan, Naomi 109 Cheibub, José A. et al. 231n26 chemical weapons attacks 1 Chhibber, Pradeep 36, 55 Chile 173–83 Constitution 35, 177, 178 Constitutional Tribunal 178–80, 181 coup 173, 174, 175 economic sanctions 181 effect of human rights prosecutions 26 factions 175, 177 human rights groups 167, 176 international pressure and constitution 175, 176–7, 178 military regime institutionalization 173–8, 197 opposition media campaign 179, 180 plebiscite 174, 177 prior democracy and norms 174, 175, 182 repression 158, 159, 173, 176 UNCHR investigation 14, 154 China 36, 112, 116, 126, 131 Christian Democrats (Chile) 175, 179, 180 CINC (Composite Index of National Capability) 232 civil society 21, 22, 37, 107, 111 civil wars autocracies 134 Dominican Republic 242 Ethiopia 206 and international organizations 218 Iraq 216 Liberia 63, 207 personalist regimes 153, 253 Sierra Leone 217

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Index Syria 1, 167, 203 threat of in Chile 159 Yemen 240 Clinton, Bill 6 Clinton, Hilary 117 coercive foreign policy 10–15, 16 effect on opposition groups 73, 74 effect on support and repression 70 and repression 72–3 tools 9t, 19 weakening of regime 24, 25 Cold War broadcasts re U.S. democracy 9 Communist aid 115, 116 democracy promotion post Cold war 97, 99–102, 223 effect of end on foreign aid 6, 11, 12 European aid 86 military interventions during 213, 220, 223 military regimes and 162 and personalist dictators 256 collective decision bodies 55 Collier Paul 222 colonialism 14 Colorado Party (Paraguay) 62 Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) (Ghana) 107 Communism 6, 37, 115, 168 Communist Party (Mongolia) 62 community development 107 Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) 232 Conakry Peace Plan 228 conflict behaviour in dictatorships 224, 225, 226 audience cost theories 225 diversionary war theory 225 Congo, Belgian 14 Congo Free State 14 Congress Party (Malawi) 57 Copenhagen Document 222 Cornell, Svante E. 238, 239 Côte d’Ivoire 217 coups Argentina 35, 41, 190 and autocratic regime collapse 43, 66 Burma 17 Chile 173–6 “coup-proofing” 54, 58, 134, 191, 192, 222, 225, 225n20, 226, 227 and democratic failure 45 Dominican Republic 237 Egypt 28, 203 displacement of the democratically elected 159

317

effect of sanctions 79, 252 foreign aid 88 foreign military intervention 82, 83 Gabon 217 GDP per capita and 138 Ghana 105, 106, 109 Haiti 220 Iraq 240, 241, 243 Libya 204 and military regimes 28, 29, 33, 35, 78, 187, 188, 228 Nicaragua 40n5 Pakistan 245 Syria 240 threat of 62 Uganda 144–5 Crawford, Gordon 111 Crimea 21 Crook, Richard 107 Cuba 6, 17, 118, 119, 140 Cyprus 230 Czechoslovakia 191 D Damascus 1 Dara’a, Syria 117 Davenport, Christian 52 David, Roman 191 Debs, Alexander 45, 46 Decalo, Samuel 57, 58 decision-theoretic model 69 de-colonialization, rise of autocracies 37, 86, 213 defections elections and 57 Greece 230 Libya 204, 205 neighbor prosecutions and 197 repression and 52, 72 sanctions and future patronage 71, 79, 124, 128, 150 Syria 1 Uganda 145 Yemen 207, 208 DeMeritt, Jacqueline H. R. 157 democracy assistance programs 111 diffusion effect 50 direct democracy assistance 9 promotion 5–8, 9t and sovereignty 221, 222 with immunity 65, 66 worldwide 3 Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) (Poland) 191 Democratic Republic of Congo 15, 236

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318

Index

democratization after military intervention 235 aid conditionality 12 comparative 50, 69 strategic approach 49, 50 structural approach 49, 50 theories of 45n10 third wave 3, 4, 30, 37, 159, 200 Desai, Raj M. et al. 134 Diamond, Larry 10 DINA (security agency, Chile) 176, 177 Diouf, Abdou 222 diplomacy 189 diversionary war theory 225 Dix, Robert H. 61, 167, 188 Djankov, Simeon et al. 87 domestic immunity 63, 81, 187–8 Dominican Party 103 Dominican Republic appointment family members 34 assassination of Trujillo 52, 103 civil war 242 control of elites 34, 57, 58 democratic restoration 228 democratization after military intervention 235, 236–7 effect of sanctions 71, 124, 125 patronage 33, 53 Downes, Alexander B., and Monten, Jonathan 218 Drezner, Daniel W. 147 Dunning, Thad 100 Duvalier, François 40n5, 56 Duvalier, Jean-Claude 56, 60, 63, 194

EIDHR (European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights) 7 el Sebsi, Beji Caid 3 Electoral Assistance Division (UN) 5 Elchibey, Abulfaz 243n45 elites defections 52 division 71 expected post-transition utility 74–6 patronage network 33 post-exit fates 2 rotation 34 empirical approach 94–7 empowerment rights, restriction of 51, 52 Endara, Guillermo 216 Enrile, Juan Ponce 53 La Época (Chilean newspaper) 180 ERP (Economic Restructuring Programme) (Ghana) 106 Escribà-Folch, Abel 132 Ethiopia 34, 116, 206 E.U. (European Union) 1, 7, 117 European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) 7 European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 7 European Neighborhood Policy 7 European Union (E.U.) 1, 7, 117 Evans, Gareth, and Sahnoun, Mohamed 245 executions 33, 34, 60, 62, 149, 184 exile 60, 62, 63, 81, 188, 192–5 “exit guarantees” 23, 61–2, 112, 210 extradition 63, 75, 188, 193–4, 206 Eyadema, Étienne 56

E East Asian Pacific 21 Easterly, William 87 Eastern Congo 242 Eastern Europe 6, 14, 154, 168, 191 Echevarría, Rodríguez 236, 237 economic growth 12, 86, 106, 116 Economic Restructuring Programme (ERP) (Ghana) 106 ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) 228 Ecuador 244, 245 Egypt collapse of autocratic regime 28 delayed transition 28 destruction of evidence of repression 156 institutionalization of military 54, 197 military coup 28, 62 patronage 37, 55 Western reaction to uprising 1 and Yemen 241

F Fariss, Christopher J. 133 female genital mutilation 158 FLN party (Algeria) 36, 55 foreign aid and political reform 84–116, 254, 255–7 criticisms of 86–7 democracy-building 111 and democratization 77, 87–97 destabilization 76–83 to dictatorships 12, 12fig expected post-transition utility 74–6 history post WWII 85, 86 limits of 260–1 as maintaining dictatorships 114, 115 per capita 96, 97 political conditionality and development 6, 7 political contingency of 91, 92 political objectives 86, 111, 115 post-Cold War 99–102, 101fig

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Index reduction in investment 71, 72 regime change 23–4, 42fig, 64, 65–9, 70–6, 97–9, 98fig resources for patronage 53, 77, 89 senders of 16–19 social spending and stabilization 88 and survival of leaders 88 targets 19–24, 25 Fox, Vicente 41 Fragile States Index 216 France asylum 63, 75 former colonies as targets of aid 21 military intervention 213, 215, 216, 217 political conditionality and development 7 Franklin, James C. 157 Frantz, Erica 226 Freedom Agenda (US) 7 Freedom and Justice Party (Egypt) 28 Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Nicaragua) 125, 126 Friedrich Ebert Foundation 9 Fujimori, Alberto 60, 103, 194, 244, 245 Fund for Peace poll 16 G Gabon 217 Gaddafi, Khamis 2, 204 Gaddafi, Muammar 2, 204–7 alliance with Uganda 146 exile sought 194, 206 exit options 205–7 International Criminal Court 15, 184, 205 military intervention 218 violent end to regime 29 Gaddafi, Mutassim 2 Galtieri, Leopoldo 41, 230 Gandhi, Jennifer 20, 31 Garzón, Baltazar 156 Gascoyne, Bamber 154 Gaub, Florence 204 Gavin, Michelle D. 113, 114 Gbagbo, Laurent 217 GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) 208, 209 Geddes, Barbara 32, 34, 35, 36, 45, 47, 69, 89, 159 Geddes, Barbara et al. 140, 152 Germany 7, 19, 21, 214 Gershenson, Dmitriy, and Grossman, Herschel I. 123 Ghana 26, 102, 103, 105–14 aid and political reform 110 broadened support coalition 105 coup 109 decentralization 107 economic disaster 109

319

Economic Recovery Program 110 economic reforms 111 electoral victories 108 elite power 105 growth civil service 108 hostility to foreign aid 109 multiparty elections 105, 110 negotiations with IMF 110 political stability 113 purge 106 support coalition 106–9 Western aid option 112 Ghana Private Road Transport Union (GPRTU) (Ghana) 108 Gilligan, Michael J. 185n9 Ginsburg, Tom 189 Gleditsch, Nils et al. 138 Glentworth, Garth and Hancock, Ian 144 Gnassingbé, Faure 56 GPRTU (Ghana Private Road Transport Union) (Ghana) 108 Greece 86, 230 Greene, Kenneth F. 37, 54, 57 Grenada 215, 228, 236n31 Guardian, The 205 Guatemala 185 Guinea Bissau 103 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 208, 209 Gulf Wars 73 H Haber, Stephen, and Menaldo, Victor 137, 139 Habré, Chad Hisséne 75 Habyarimana, Juvénal 53 Haddad, George 241n43 al-Hadi, Abd Rabbuh Mansur 209 Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 157 Hague, William 117 Haile Selassie 34 Haiti democratization 228, 235, 237 Duvalier prosecution 194 humanitarian intervention 219, 220 power within family 40n5, 56 sanctions 137 U.S. intervention 215, 228, 233 Handley, Antoinette 105, 106, 110, 111, 112, 115 hard power (coercive) 9, 11–15, 16 Hass, Richard N. 218, 219 Hassan II, King of Morocco 166 Hawkins, Darren 158, 159, 175, 177, 179, 181, 182 Helsinki Accords 14 Hitler, Adolf 19 Hoffman, Michael 238

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320

Index

Honduras 244 house arrest 60 HRW (Human Rights Watch) 14, 154, 160 Hufbauer, Gary C. et al. 13, 14, 118, 121, 142 human rights campaigns 1, 10, 13 failure to prosecute 62 norms 5, 7 organizations 8 prosecutions 11, 24, 73, 154 regional changes in regimes 199 and sanctions 118, 132 Human Rights Council (UN) 1 human rights shaming campaigns 15fig, 154–83 Chile 173–4, 180–2 data and methodology 169–70 destruction of evidence 156, 166 effect of threat 74–6 effect on resources and support 71 geographic reasons for targeting 169 material costs 160–6 and multilateral donors 161–2 norms and domestic pressure 157, 158–9 political aspects 160–1 and post-exit punishment 166–8 and regime change 168–83, 253 and repression 73 revenue loss 165–6 and sanctions 164–5, 165fig suggestion foreign policy backs opposition 74 UNCHR and foreign aid 163, 163fig, 164 Human Rights Watch (HRW) 14, 154, 160 Huntington, Samuel P. 46, 61, 189 Hussein, Saddam 19, 73, 119, 121, 216 Hutchcroft, Paul D. 55, 102 hyperinflation 151 I IBM 147 ICC (International Criminal Court) 184–6, 193 Africa as target 22 al-Bashir 184 creation of 7, 15 criticisms of 22, 185, 189, 210 Gaddafi 1, 184, 205 origins 184–5 state parties to 75, 193, 206 Syria 74, 167 IMF (International Monetary Fund) 87, 106, 109, 110 immunity guarantees 210 India 126, 134, 237, 238, 245 Indo-Pakistani war 237

INGOs (international non-governmental organizations) 8, 14, 154, 158, 160, 167 institutional co-optation autocratic regimes 123 military intervention and 82 party-based regimes 36, 47, 79, 108 stabilization of regime 47, 56–7 as survival strategy 51, 52, 55, 56, 58t, 60, 70, 71 Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (Mexico) 21, 37, 41, 55, 90 institutionalization, Weberian concept 35n4 intelligence, military, lack of 134 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 220 International Criminal Court (ICC) 184–6, 193 Africa as target 22 Al-Bashir 184 Creation of 7, 15 criticisms of 22, 185, 189, 210 Gaddafi 1, 184, 205 origins 184–5 state parties to 75, 193, 206 Syria 74, 167 International Financial Institution Advisory Commission 87 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 87, 106, 109, 110 international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) 8, 14, 154, 158, 160, 167 international organizations 50, 213, 214 IPAC (Inter-Party Advisory Committee) (Ghana) 111 Iran 17, 18, 39, 44, 126, 130, 131 Iraq armed rebellions 73 “axis of evil” 17 Ba’thist coup 241 British military intervention 217 dictatorship after military intervention 236, 241 humanitarian intervention 219 and Kuwait 221 sanctions 119, 121, 122, 130, 151 U.S. military intervention 4, 11, 18, 19, 215, 216, 218, 222 Israel 145, 146 J Jackson, Robert H., and Rosberg, Carl G. 33, 57 Jamaica 215 Japan 194, 214 Jordan 241n42

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Index K Kabbah, Ahmad Tejan 217, 228 Kabila, Laurent 34, 125 Kabul 241 Kaempfer, William H. et al. 123, 125, 128 Kampala 149 Kashmir 245 Kazakhstan 198 Kazsa, Gregory J. 37 Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928 219 Kérékou, Mathieu 103 Khan, Ghulam Ishaq 238 Khodorkovsky, Mikhail 54 Kibedi, Wanume 145 Kim, Hun Joon, and Sikkink, Kathryn 14, 199, 210 Kirkpatrick, David 28 Kirkpatrick, Jeane 18 Kirshner, Jonathan 122 Knack, Stephen 87, 97 Knights, Michael 207 Kono, Daniel Yuichi, and Montinola, Gabriella R. 88 Konrad Adenauer Foundation 179 Kosovo 215n6 Kosovo War 220, 239 Koštunica, Vojislav 239 Krain, Matthew 157 Kuwait 221 L Lachapelle, Jean, Levitsky, Steven, and Way, Lucan 140 Lamizana, Sangoulé 21 Latin America 6, 22, 37, 196, 228 leaders 39–42, 42fig, 43, 57 Lebovic, James, and Voeten, Erik 157, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164 Lektzian, David, and Souva, Mark 122, 123, 128 Leopold II, King of Belgium 14 Letelier, Orlando 176, 177 Levitsky, Steven, and Way, Lucan 15 Liberia 75, 193, 194, 207 Libya alliance with Uganda 146 attempt to remain in power 29 authorization enforcing no-fly zone 220, 221 chair of UNHCR 154, 160 elite loss of power 2 family positions in regime 197 International Criminal Court 1, 184, 205 military intervention 211, 218 NATO intervention 11, 205 sanctions 117

321

security forces 204 U.S. intervention 227 Western reaction to uprising 1 Linz, Fernando 176n20 Linz, Juan, and Stepan, Alfred 190 Lomé IV Agreement 1989 7 Loveman, Brian 175 loyalty Amin and 148, 149 human rights shaming campaigns 155 Libya 204 literature on 51 party-based regimes 36, 37, 55, 60, 95 patronage 53–4 personalist regimes 33, 55, 57, 58, 60, 102, 104, 135, 166, 191 and sanctions 123, 126, 127, 132, 133, 252 Yemen 208 Lubanga Dyilo, Thomas 15 M Machiavelli, Niccolo 52 Macias Nguema, Francisco 60 Madagascar 228 Maddison, Angus 138 Magaloni, Beatriz 36, 37, 57 Major, Solomon 122n10 Malawi 53, 57, 58, 71, 103, 104, 192 Malawi Congress Party (MCP) 103, 104 Malawi Young Pioneers 192 Mali 103, 217, 228 malnutrition 151, 152, 153fig Malvinas War 41 Marcos, Ferdinand 53, 55, 60, 102, 104 Marinov, Nikolay 120, 137 Marjanovic, Mirko 127 Marshall Plan 86 Massimov, Karim 198 Mattes, Michaela, and Rodríguez, Mariana 20 Mauritania 228 MB (Muslim Brotherhood) 28 M’ba, Léon 217 McFaul, Michael 16, 239 MCP (Malawi Congress Party) 103, 104 MDC (Movement for Democratic Change) (Zimbabwe) 113 Melady, Thomas 146, 147 Mengistu Haile Mariam 34, 206 Mexico 14, 21, 37, 41, 55, 90, 168 military intervention 82–2 autocratic regimes 222, 223–49 and calorie consumption 152, 153fig and capabilities of military 232 decrease post Cold War 11 and democratization 10, 223, 227, 228 destabilizing mechanisms 229–31

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322

Index

military intervention (cont.) against dictators 11fig, 12 domestic actors 49 elite accountability 229 humanitarian missions 11, 12, 219 as indiscriminate 212 international organizations 218 legal dimensions 219–21 literature 217, 218–19 long term influence 243–5, 244t moral dimension 221–2 neighbor democratization 232 as neutral 213 personalist regimes 31 popular accountability 230 post Cold War 220 post war 213–17, 214fig, 215fig reduction of repressive ability 82 and regime change 211–49, 254 and regime collapse 19 and regime stability 235–43 and removal of leader 229 responsibility to protect 245 sanctions 136, 137 self-defense 221 undermining of regime 72, 230 military regimes 34–5, 42fig, 77t accountability, individual criminal 83 accountability mechanism 230, 243 corporate interests 35, 230 and democratization 29, 35, 44–5, 83, 98, 159, 167, 242 effect of shaming campaigns 80, 81 Egypt 28, 29 elite division 159 elite leadership 34, 43, 56 exile 81 failure rates 42fig as following democracies after coups 228 Haiti 137 immunity from prosecution 190 instability 42 institutionalization 46, 197 institutions and regime survival 56 leader failure 42 leader retention after transition 197 as more repressive 52 and organized violence 46 patronage 54 and peaceful transition/domestic immunity 188 Polity score 20fig post-exit fate 46, 62, 64fig post-transition elections 66, 90 preferred survival strategy 58t

protection of interests 21, 28 and regime change 24, 139fig, 234fig, 236t, 244t repression and spending 59fig rise of 37 sanctions 79, 129fig, 132fig, 133, 140 shaming campaigns 71 shared decision making 34, 35 as short-lived 38 support coalition 94–7 target of military interventions 82 transition 44fig and transition pacts 189, 190 value of military institution 35 militias 29 Millennium Challenge Corporation (U.S.) 7 Millennium Summit Declaration 2000 5 Miller, Judith 147, 148 Milošević, Marko 127 Milošević, Slobodan 127, 230, 239 Mobutu, Joseph collapse of regime 217, 227, 230 effect of sanctions 125 exile 60 foreign aid 100, 102, 115 personalist rule 33–4, 40 replacement of autocracy with another 44 rotation of elite 58 support coalition 103, 104 Mohsen, Ali 208 Mongolia 62 Morel, Edmund 14 Morgan, T. et al. 142 Morocco 166 Morrison, Kevin 88 Morrison, Minion K. C. 107 mortality, maternal/infant, sanctions 151 Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) (Zimbabwe) 113 MPR party (Popular Movement of the Revolution) (Zaire) 34, 103, 104 Mubarak, Hosni 1, 28, 37, 54, 55, 186, 197, 204, 205 Mugabe, Robert 17, 113–14, 206 multiparty elections aid conditionality 71, 76, 84, 85 Albania 62 Azerbaijan 239 Benin 103 Burma 17 Egypt 28, 203 Ghana 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 116 Guinea Bissau 103 Malawi 192

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/7/2015, SPi

Index Nicaragua 244, 245 party-based regimes 89, 90, 190, 252 Tunisia 203 Zaire 113 Murdie, Amanda, and Bhasin, Tavishi 158 Murdie, Amanda, and Peksen, Dursun 160 Mursi, Mohamed 1, 28 Museveni, Yoweri 149 Muslim Brotherhood (MB) 28 Mutalibov, Ayaz 238, 239, 243 Mutesa II, King of Uganda 144 N Nacionalista Party (Philippines) 104 Najibullah, Mohammad 241 Nalepa, Monika 190n14 Nasser, Gamal 241 National Democratic Congress (NDC) (Ghana) 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 National Democratic Party (NDP) (Egypt) 37 National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (US) 6, 9, 180 National Liberation Army (Libya) 204 National Liberation Council (NLC) (Ghana) 109 National Patriotic Front of Liberia 207 National Security Council (NSC) (US) 19 nationalism 72, 140 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 205, 215n6, 220, 239 natural disasters 171, 172 natural resources 53 Nazi war crimes 156, 184 NDC (National Democratic Congress) (Ghana) 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 NDP (National Democratic Party) (Egypt) 37 NED (National Endowment for Democracy) (NED) (US) 6, 9, 180 Neighbor Democracy 97 neighbor prosecutions 198, 199, 201 neo- Destourians 3 Nepal 126, 134 New Patriot Party (NPP) (Ghana) 105, 108, 109 Nicaragua 18, 39, 44, 125, 244, 245 Nidaa Tounes (Tunisia) 2, 191 Nigeria 75, 194, 207 Nixon, Richard 6 Nkrumah, Kwame 109 NLC (National Liberation Council) (Ghana) 109 Nordlinger, Eric 35 Noriega, Manuel 216, 237

323

normative fit argument 155, 158, 159, 168, 177 North Korea 17, 119 NPP (Ghana) 105, 108, 109 NSC (National Security Council) (US) 19 nuclear weapons 18 Nurnberger, Ralph 148 Nyasaland Congress Party 104 Nye, Joseph S. 9 Nyerere, Julius 60, 125, 148, 149 O OAS (Organization of American States) 176, 215, 216, 228 Obama, Barack 117, 119n8 Obote, Milton 18, 144, 149 O’Donnell, Guillermo, and Schmitter, Philippe 189, 190 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) 96, 116 OECS (Organization of Eastern Caribbean States) 176, 215, 216, 228 oil 130, 137, 139, 141, 141fig, 150 Olympio, Sylvanus 60 Omara-Otunnu, Amii 145, 148 P Pacific region 21 Pakistan 233, 235, 237, 238, 245 Panama 215, 216, 228, 233, 235, 237 Pape, Robert A. 121, 137, 149, 150 Paraguay 62 paramilitaries 33, 192 Party of Labor of Albania 62 party-based regimes 36–7, 38, 42fig, 77t accountability, individual criminal 83 accountability mechanism 243 aid conditionality 93 collapse of 44, 47 and democratization 78, 89, 90, 98, 102, 159, 168 electoral power 47 exercise of control 37 exile 81 failure rates 42fig institutionalization and cooperation 36 institutions and regime survival 56, 57 leader failure 42, 43 leadership rotation 56 as less repressive 52 military intervention 83 patronage 36–7, 54, 55, 165, 166, 190 and peaceful transition 188 Polity score 20fig post-exit fate 64fig post-transition elections 66

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/7/2015, SPi

324

Index

party-based regimes (cont.) power-sharing and threat of removal of dictator 36 preferred survival strategy 58t “punishment regime” 54, 55 and regime change 24, 139fig and sanctions 54, 79, 128, 129fig, 132fig, 133, 135, 140 stability 47, 140 support coalition 94–7 transition 44fig and transition pacts 190 as unlikely to provoke conflict 225 patronage effect of sanctions 71, 120, 123, 124, 131, 135, 165 and loyalty 53 military regimes 54 party-based regimes 36 personalist regimes 46, 52 public works 55 and support coalitions 51, 70, 84, 108 as survival strategy 58t PD party (Dominican Republic) 34 Pease, Donald 146 Peksen, Dursun 132 Peksen, Dursun, and Drury, A. Cooper 122, 127, 150n48 personalist regimes 32–4, 42fig, 77t, 161–2 accountability, individual criminal 83 accountability mechanism 243 aid and democratic transition 101, 102 aid conditionality 78, 93 Amin 144–50 attempt to retain power 46, 47, 62 calorie consumption and sanctions 152, 153fig collapse followed by autocracy 44 collapse forced 45 concentration of power 53, 58 conflict with democracy 224, 225 and democratization 98, 159, 242 destabilization of 18, 142, 150 effect of coercive measures 18 election victories 103 as exclusionary 46 exile 81, 192 exit guarantees 210 failure rates 42fig and further autocratic rule 151, 153 Gaddafi 29, 204–7 and hereditary succession 56 human rights shaming 181, 155, 156, 161–2, 163, 164, 168 increased repression under sanctions 135 institutions as less important 57 leader failure 42 low quality military intelligence 226

loyalty of security forces 196, 197 and the military 21, 33–4, 58, 191, 225, 226, 227 military intervention 83, 233 patronage 52, 53, 54, 55, 165–6 political loyalty 102 Polity score 20fig post-exit fate 62, 64fig post-transition elections 66 preferred survival strategy 58t and prosecutions 82, 187, 191–2, 195, 201, 210, 225 and regime change 24, 25, 139fig repression 52, 59fig, 133–4 rise of 37, 38 risk interstate war/nuclear weapons 18 risk of inaction 153 rotation of leaders 57–8 Saleh 207–9 sanctions 79–80, 120, 129fig, 130, 131, 132fig, 133–4, 135, 136, 138–41, 142, 150, 151–3, 165–6 stability 46 subsequent dictatorship 46 support coalition 94–7 transition 44fig persuasive policy tools 9t Peru 103, 194, 244, 245 Peterson, Timothy M., and Drury, A. Cooper 136n30 petroleum 147 PFA (Popular Front of Azerbaijan) 239 Philippines 53, 55, 102 Pickering, Jeffrey, and Kisangani, Emizet F. 213, 214, 218, 231 Pillay, Navi 74 Pilster, Ulrich, and Böhmelt, Tobias 227 Pinochet, Augusto 35, 154, 156, 159, 167, 173–81, 198 PNDC (Provisional National Defence Council) (Ghana) 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112 Poland 191 Political Terror Scale project 170 political transitions, model of 67fig Polity scores 20–1, 20fig, 88, 95, 218 Popular Front of Azerbaijan (PFA) 239 Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) (Zaire) 34, 103, 104 Portugal 3, 9 Posner, Daniel N. 57 post-colonialism 216, 217 post-exit fate 60–4, 65, 66 Prats, Carlos 174 PRD party (Dominican Republic) 34 press freedom 132 PRI party (Institutional Revolutionary Party) (Mexico) 21, 37, 41, 55, 90

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/7/2015, SPi

Index prosecutions, human rights 80, 81–2 as aid to democratization 195–8 destabilization 184–210 as deterrence 185, 196 expectations and transitions 187–8 foreign courts 188, 194, 195 immunity 112, 189, 190 increase in 200 and increased cost repression 210 as obstacle to democratization 74–6, 188, 189–95 and regime change 199–202, 202fig, 203, 253–4 Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) (Ghana) 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112 public sector, patronage jobs 54, 55 punishment, post-exit 23, 24 and attempt to retain power 207 expectations 197–8, 198–202, 203 as hindering democratization 74–6, 81 effect on peaceful transition 61, 70 personalist regimes 79, 81, 82 Putin, Vladimir 21, 54 R Radio Free Europe 9 Radio Liberty 9 Ravenhill, F. J. 145 Rawlings, Jerry 102, 103, 105–9, 110–11, 112 Raznatovic, Zeljko 127 RCD party (Tunisia) 3, 191 Reagan, Ronald 6, 18 Reagan Doctrine 222 reform cost, and power retention 89 regime transitions 143t autocratic 44fig democratic 44, 44fig factors 23 forced/non-forced 44fig, 45 human rights prosecutions and 202fig military intervention 234fig, 236t, 244t peaceful and democratization 23 sanctions and 139fig and shaming campaigns 171fig Reisman, W. Michael 212, 221, 222 Remmer, Karen L. 174, 182 Renewal of the Inter-American System 228 repression 72–3, 74 effect of coercive foreign policy 70 and escalation 52, 134 high and regime collapse 52 limited by shaming campaigns 80 non-violent 73 restriction of empowerment rights 51, 52 and sanctions 123, 132–4, 132fig as survival strategy 58–9, 58t

325

undermining and destabilization 65 violent 2, 50, 51, 72–3 Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 12, 220, 245 revolutionary regimes, and sanctions 140, 141 Revolutionary United Front (RUF) (Sierra Leone) 217, 228 RF (Rhodesian Front) 128 Rhodesia 127, 128 Rice, Condoleezza 17, 18, 19 Roh Tae-woo 90 Romania 184 Rome Statute 206 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 19 Rowe, David M. 127, 128 RUF (Revolutionary United Front) (Sierra Leone) 217, 228 Russia 21, 53, 54 Rwanda 53, 217, 219, 220 S Sadat, Anwar 54 Saleh, Ahmed 207, 209 Saleh, Ali Abdullah 1, 207–9 Salinas, Carlos 41 al-Sallal, Abdullah 240, 241 sanctions 129fig aimed at dictatorships 13, 13fig and calorie consumption 153fig Chile 181 comprehensive 142 and defeat of dictators 117–53 and democratization 10, 119fig and dictator’s budget 127–31 economic deprivation 126 effect on senders’ economy 153 effectiveness of 118, 119, 120–2, 123 and foreign military support 125 goal as regime change 14 government control over economy 127 as harmful 151 and human rights violations 132 increase post Cold War 11 increased support for the opposition 125–7 and instruments of autocratic survival 123–35, 136 Lomé IV Agreement 7 and opposition 74, 125–7 and patronage 71, 78–80, 124–5, 127–31 and political reform 117–20, 123 public choice approach 122 and regime change 120, 121, 136–8, 139fig, 252–3 regime stability questioned 124, 125 repression 131–5, 136 and security 72 selection bias in studies 142, 143 smuggling and black market 126, 127 “success” rate 121

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/7/2015, SPi

326

Index

sanctions (cont.) and support coalition 72, 122, 124–5 and survival strategies 131–5, 136 Syria 1 targeted 118, 122, 123 trade disruption 126, 130 Uganda 18, 144–50 uneven effect economy 128 Zimbabwe 113 Sandbrook, Richard, and Oelbaum, Jay 107, 108 Sandinistas (Nicaragua) 39, 244, 245 Sands, Phillippe 205 Sankoh, Foday 217 Santiago Commitment to Democracy 228 Schatzberg, Michael 33, 113 Schreiber, Anna P. 124 security forces, state 72–3 SEED (Support for Eastern European Democracy) 6 Senegal 55, 75, 222 Senegalese Socialist Party 55 Serbia 127, 128, 230, 235, 239 Shadid, Anthony 186 Shafik, Ahmed 28 shaming campaigns 80–1, 154–83, 252 Chile 173–82 costs of 160–2 increase in 11, 14–16 nationalism 72 norms and domestic pressure 157, 158–9 and opposition goals 74 and patronage reduction 81 post transition prosecution 74, 75, 166–8, and reduced resources 71 and regime change 168–73, 171fig repression 73 targets 22 UNCHR and foreign aid 163–6 Sierra Leone 60, 217, 219, 228 signaling 231 Sikkink, Kathryn 75, 185 Sikkink, Kathryn, and Walling, Carrie 186 al-Sisi, Abdel Fattah 28 slave trade 154 SLD (Democratic Left Alliance) (Poland) 191 Smith, Benjamin 57, 92 smuggling 126, 127, 128 Snyder, Jack, and Vinjamuri, Leslie 185 Social Democratic Party (SPD) (Germany) 9 soft power (persuasive) 9 Somalia 216, 219 Somoza, Anastasio 125, 126 Somozas (Nicaragua) 39 South Africa 74, 125, 154 South Korea 90

Southern Cone military dictatorships 167, 198, 199 Soviet Union 12, 14, 116, 146, 154 Spain 9, 14, 154 SPD (Social Democratic Party) (Germany) 9 Speaker 14 state sovereignty 5, 87, 219, 220–1 Strasser, Valentine 60 structural approach 65 sub-Saharan Africa 6 Sudan 15, 184 Suez Crisis 217 Sukarno, Ahmed 60 support coalitions 94–7, 102–5 effect of foreign policy 24, 51, 70, 71–2, 76, 88, 89 limit 65 and loyalty 92, 93, 104 party-based regimes 24, 26, 36, 37, 47, 60, 61, 78 personalist regimes 33, 52, 53 retention of power 84, 92, 93 and sanctions 122 Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED) (US) 6 survival strategies 50, 51–60 Sutter, Daniel 167 Svolik, Milan W. 20, 31, 228 Syria 240 accusation of crimes against humanity 1 cooperation with Iraq in oil exports 130 crimes against humanity 1, 167 dictatorship after military intervention 236 military intervention suggested 212 sanctions 117 U.S. intervention 227 T Taliban 216 Tanzania 18, 55, 60, 115, 125, 145, 148–50 Tanzanian People’s Defense Force (TPDF) 149 Tashkent settlement 245 taxation 111 Taylor, Charles 75, 193, 194, 206, 207 Teorell, Jan 122, 218 Thailand 228 theocracy 17 Thompson, Mark R., and Kuntz, Philipp 239 TIES (Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) 142 Togo 56 Tombalbaye, François 60 TPDF (Tanzanian People’s Defense Force) 149 Traoré, Moussa 103, 104

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/7/2015, SPi

Index travel restrictions 1, 117 Treisman, Daniel 54 Trujillo, Rafael assassination 52, 103, 125 control of military 34 defections 71 effect of sanctions 119, 124 elite support 57, 58 patronage 33, 53 successor 236, 237 Tunisia 1, 2, 3, 75, 166, 191, 197 Turkey 86, 130, 230 U UDPM party (Mali) 103 Uganda 18, 26, 71, 113, 125, 134, 144–50 Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) 149 U.K. (United Kingdom) 118, 145, 213, 215 Ukraine 21 Ulfelder, Jay 89, 90 Ullman, Richard H. 146 U.N. (United Nations) charter on military intervention 219 condemnation U.S. intervention Panama 216 military intervention 217 Oil-for-Food Programme 130 pro-democracy campaigns 5 sanctions 13, 127 Security Council 220 UNCHR (United Nations Commission on Human Rights) 14, 154, 157, 160–4, 165, 176 UNICOM 53, 123 United Nations Democracy Fund 5 United Nations’ Human Rights Commission 74 United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) 184 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 6 UNLF (Uganda National Liberation Front) 149 UPC (Uganda) 149 U.S. (United States) and Afghanistan 11 and Burma 119 and Chile 180 and Cuba 140 Central American intervention 244 Congressional Research Service 149 democracy promotion 4, 6, 223, 228 and Dominican Republic 124, 236–7

327

economic sanctions 13–14 and Ghana 112 Government Accountability Office 130 and Grenada 236n31 and Haiti 137, 228 and Iraq 11, 18, 19, 121 and Libya 117 military interventions 11, 18, 19, 121, 213, 215–16, 218, 236–7 and Nicaragua 125 origins of foreign aid 85, 86 political conditionality and development 7 sanctions targeting autocracies 17, 118 and Uganda 125, 134, 146, 147 and Syria 1, 117 use of pressure 2 and Zaire 33 Zimbabwe 114 U.S. National Security Strategy 2002 222 USAID (United States Agency for International Development) 6 V Vandewalle, Dirk J. 204 Vargas Llosa, Mario 52 Vicaría de la Solidaridad (Chile) 167, 176 Videla, Jorge Rafael 41 Vieira, João Bernardo 103 Viola, Roberto Eduardo 41 Voice of America 9 von Burgsdorff, Sven Kuhn 140 W Walzer, Michael 212, 221 Weeks, Jessica L. 225, 231 Wiarda, Howard J. 57, 124, 125 Wintrobe, Ronald 132 women 107, 108 Wood, Reed M. 126, 132 World Bank 85, 106, 110 World Development Indicators 96 Wright, Joseph et al. 139 Y Yahya Khan, Agha Mohammad 238, 245 Yaméogo, Maurice 21 Yemen defections 208 dictatorship after military intervention 236, 240, 242 family posts 197 immunity law 209 leader’s post-transition fate 203, 207–9 National Dialogue Conference 209 sanctions threat 1 transition plan 208

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/7/2015, SPi

328 Young, Crawford, and Turner, Thomas 58 Yugoslavia 128, 239 Z Zaire autocracy replaced by another 44, 236 foreign aid 100, 115, 242 military 33, 34 multiparty system 113 patronage 33 political instability 113

Index purge 33 rotation of elites 58 ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe) 17, 113–14 Zaydi imamate Yemen 240 Zedillo, Ernesto 41 Zia al-Huq, Mohammad 238 Zimbabwe 16, 17, 113–14, 206 Zimbabwe African National UnionPatriotic Front (ZANU-PF) 17, 113–14 Zuma, Jacob 206