Foreign Policy of China Under Deng Xiaoping: Contemporary Relevance and Continuity 9811947635, 9789811947636

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Foreign Policy of China Under Deng Xiaoping Contemporary Relevance and Continuity Priya Suresh

Foreign Policy of China Under Deng Xiaoping

Priya Suresh

Foreign Policy of China Under Deng Xiaoping Contemporary Relevance and Continuity

Priya Suresh Stella Maris College Chennai, Tamil Nadu, India

ISBN 978-981-19-4763-6 ISBN 978-981-19-4764-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4764-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

I dedicate the book to my father

Preface and Acknowledgments

Political leadership is pivotal in foreign policy decision-making. Studying leadership traits, styles, beliefs, and world view enable foreign policy analysts to comprehend political leaders and their influence on foreign policy. When it comes to authoritarian countries like China, its foreign policy decision-making has several layers, of which the role played by political leaders is all the more cruicial. Irrespective of the period— Imperial, Nationalist or Communist—in formulating and implementing the country’s foreign policy, the political leaders of China are guided by its history, philosophy, and the then existing domestic and global circumstances. With a strong analytical framework linking two key variables—‘political leadership’ and ‘foreign policy’—this book examines in detail the role of Deng Xiaoping in China’s foreign policy shift in politico-strategic and economic domains after Mao. The study concludes that Deng’s attempts to resolve the long-standing domestic and political issues, while in staying within the socio-economic-politico-cultural-historical construct were guided by his own personality, worldview, experience, pragmatism, beliefs and style. Most importantly, Deng’s move from the primacy of politics to economic modernisation resulted in far-reaching changes in China’s external relations. The book also examines the contemporary relevance of Deng’s foreign policy. My fascination with China’s foreign policy was kindled when I was nominated to attend a three-month program on National Security Studies

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at the University of California, San Diego. I would like to place on record my deep appreciation for the US State Department for nominating me. It was during this trip to the United States that I had a rare opportunity of visiting several think tanks such as Carnegie and Brookings and engaging in meaningful conversations with experts in the field. The program gave me the chance to avail both digital repositories and libraries. While researching my Ph.D. I realized foremost among the few books on Deng’s foreign policy, and political leadership available was Deng Xiaoping and Transformation of China by Harvard Professor Ezra Vogel. It was this book that kindled my interest in examining a more leader-centric approach. My thanks to Professor David Shambaugh, Gatson Sigur Professor of Asian Studies, Political Science and International Affairs, Director China Policy program, Elliot School of International Affairs, for making time for me during my visit to Washington DC despite his extremely tight schedule. I would like to thank: my mentor and guide Dr. N. Manoharan, Director, Center for East Asian Studies, Christ (Deemed to be University) Bangalore without whose guidance the completion of the book would not have been possible; Dr. Sunitha Abhay Jain, Professor, School of Law, Christ (Deemed to be University); Dr. Jabin Jacob, Associate Professor, Department of International Relations & Governance Studies, Shiv Nadar University, Delhi for his valuable input that has considerably shaped my ideas; the Management & Principal of Stella Maris College (Autonomous), Dr. Kamala Arvind, Former Head of the Department of History and International Studies, Stella Maris College; my friend and colleague Ms. Aarti Santhanam, Associate Professor and Head Department of International Studies, Stella Maris College; my friend Dr. Padma V Mckertich, Associate Professor, Department of English, Stella Maris College; and Ms. Madhu Madhavi Singh for her meticulous copyediting. My family-my mother Bharathi, husband Suresh, sister Vidya, brotherin-law Karthik, my daughter Manassa and son-in-law Vignesh-for all their love and support and enduring with me during this critical journey. Last, but not the least, I thank the almighty for the blessings showered on me, for I do not think the completion of the book would have been possible without them. Chennai, India

Priya Suresh

Contents

1

Introduction 1.1 Outline References

2

Role of Political Leadership in Foreign Policymaking: Analytical Framework 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Defining Key Concepts 2.2.1 Political Leadership 2.2.2 Nature of Political Leadership 2.2.3 Styles of Political Leadership 2.2.4 Political Leaders: Traits/Skills 2.3 Foreign Policy 2.3.1 Impact of Decision-Makers 2.3.2 Political Leadership and Foreign Policy Decision-Making 2.3.3 Political Leadership in the Context of China 2.4 Conclusion References

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Political Leadership in China: A Historical Perspective 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Philosophical Context of Political Leadership 3.2.1 Confucianism and Political Leadership

1 1 7 9 9 10 10 16 17 23 24 32 34 40 43 44 55 55 56 57

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3.2.2 3.2.3 3.2.4

Daoism and Political Leadership Legalism and Political Leadership Sun Tzu’s Strategic Approach and Political Leadership 3.3 Historical Approach to Political Leadership 3.3.1 Characteristics of Political Leadership: Imperial Period (221 BCE–1912 CE) 3.3.2 Characteristics of Political Leadership: Nationalist Period (1912–1949) 3.3.3 Characteristics of Political Leadership: Communist Period (1949 to Date) 3.4 Characteristics of Deng’s Political Leadership 3.5 Influences on Deng Xiaoping 3.5.1 Early Experiences 3.5.2 Lessons from France (1920–1926) 3.5.3 Sojourn in Moscow 3.5.4 From Moscow to China 3.5.5 Deng’s Military Experience 3.5.6 Political Rise of Deng Xiaoping 3.6 Deng’s Characteristics as a Leader 3.6.1 Deng’s Personality 3.6.2 Willingness to Consider New Information 3.6.3 Pragmatic Approach in Handling Foreign Affairs 3.6.4 Deng’s Understanding of Economics 3.6.5 Deng as Predominant Leader 3.6.6 Belief Systems 3.7 Conclusion References 4

Foreign Policy of China Under Deng Xiaoping: Politico-Strategic Dimension 4.1 Introduction 4.2 An Overview of China’s Foreign Policy 4.2.1 Determinants of Foreign Policy Internal Factors External Determinants

59 61 62 63 64 65 67 69 70 70 72 73 74 75 77 82 82 86 87 91 92 93 93 95 103 103 104 105 105 110

CONTENTS

4.3

Politico-Strategic Foreign Policy Changes Under Deng 4.3.1 Shift in China’s Politico-Strategic Approach 4.3.2 Changing Phase of Relations with the Superpowers Soviet Union United States 4.3.3 The Beginning of Sino–Japanese Normalization 4.3.4 China–Europe Relations 4.3.5 China and the United Nations 4.3.6 China and the Third World 4.4 Conclusion References 5

Foreign Policy of China Under Deng Xiaoping: Economic Dimension 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Elements of Economic Modernization 5.2.1 “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” 5.2.2 The “Open-Door” Policy 5.2.3 Policy of Modernization 5.3 Reform Policy: Domestic and Foreign 5.3.1 Domestic Economic Reform and Growth 5.3.2 Foreign Economic Reform & Growth Special Economic Zones (SEZs) Coastal Development Plan Joint Ventures (JVs) Foreign Trade Relations with the United States Relations with Japan Relations with the Soviet Union Relations with Western Europe Relations with the Middle East and the Third World Forex Reserves 5.3.3 China and International Economic Institutions 5.3.4 Rise of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) 5.4 Conclusion References

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112 113 117 118 122 128 131 135 137 139 140 149 149 150 154 156 159 161 162 170 171 173 174 175 176 179 179 180 181 182 188 190 191 193

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Contemporary Relevance of Deng Xiaoping’s Foreign Policy 6.1 Introduction 6.2 The Post-Deng Foreign Policy of China 6.3 Foreign Policy Under Jiang Zemin 6.4 Foreign Policy Under Hu Jintao 6.5 Foreign Policy Under Xi Jinping 6.6 Contemporary Relevance of Deng’s Foreign Policy 6.6.1 Continuity in China’s Foreign Policy 6.6.2 Changes in China’s Foreign Policy 6.7 Conclusion References

203 203 204 207 211 216 224 224 229 241 243

Conclusion References

259 269

Select Bibliography

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Index

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7

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 5.4 Table 5.5 Table 5.6 Table 5.7

The trend in leadership theory and research China’s total foreign exchange earnings (TVEs) 1984–1990 (US $billion) China’s import and export trade 1979–1988 Annual foreign investment in joint ventures by country of origin China’s total volume of trade: Export and imports 1972–1983 (units in $100 million) China’s foreign trade 1979–1991 (US $billion) China’s exports of crude oil AND refined petroleum products 1977–1990 The commodity composition of China’s exports 1980–1991

18 163 164 175 180 185 185 186

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1

Outline

Among the many issues that political science deals with, understanding leadership and its myriad implications is of primary importance. Leadership is a historical construct and an essential feature of all governments and governance. Weak leadership contributes to government failure; strong leadership helps a government succeed (Masciulli et al., 2009, p. 4). Thus, defining political leadership is imperative to better understand and predict patterns of behavior, such as beliefs, style, values, and their respective historical-social-cultural milieus and a more holistic, in-depth study and understanding of political leadership has become an important part of scholarship. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a “leader as the person who directs or commands a country, organization or a group” (Masciulli et al., 2009, p. 4). Traditionally, most political science research on leadership studied narrative biographies, mostly from the Western perspective, mainly from British and American texts (Swatt et al., 2014, p. 1). In the 1980s Jackson and Rosberg’s fascinating study on political leadership and its effect on African politics scrutinized this neglected area of political analysis, focusing on the relevance of individual leadership styles (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982, p. 421). They emphasized the importance of leadership beyond Africa or developing countries. Most research on

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 P. Suresh, Foreign Policy of China Under Deng Xiaoping, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4764-3_1

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leadership that followed analyzed the leader as an independent variable, making the approach universal. Studies on the influence of leaders can be dated back to Plato c.428–347 B.C., who highlighted the need for the right kind of leader and discussed methods to identify leaders. Aristotle and contemporary scholars of the time 384–322 B.C. studied individual leaders and policy decisions through the prism of “leader personality”. When Machiavelli introduced political theory and study on leadership, he turned leadership theory in a distinctly new direction (Bell, 2014, p. 2). Realist scholars from Thucydides, Saint Augustine, and Niccolò Machiavelli, to Reinhold Niebuhr, Raymond Aron, and Hans Morgenthau had embedded their understanding in more realistic psychology (Rosati, 2000, p. 47). They defined the world order in terms of power configurations (Alker & Biersteker, 1984, p. 132). Policy making became simplified; routinely treating states as the equivalent of unitary rational actors pursuing their goals and interests while constrained by their respective structural environment (Rosati, 2000, p. 47). The Realist theory offered a limited explanation of the capability of a state or behavior patterns of leaders in foreign policy decision-making. While realist thinkers acknowledged the study of the leader in International Relations (IR), the domain experts remained mostly historians, psychologists, and specialists. Political leadership fell into the matrix of comparative politics that encouraged transferrable generalizations in social sciences. In the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the American science of politics became an essential academic mode, and the search for empirical and verifiable political research became imperative (Bell, 2014, p. 4). Political scientists largely accepted British philosopher and historian Thomas Carlyle’s maxim on “great men” and outlined their contribution in shaping the country (Krcmaric et al., 2020, p. 134). Until the 1950s, the focus was mainly on the great men of history, such as Peter the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, Simon Bolivar, Otto Von Bismarck, Winston Churchill, Woodrow Wilson, Mahatma Gandhi, and Mao Zedong. These leaders were outstanding individual figures, and their political actions defined history more than they had themselves been forged by the historical context (Morin & Paquin, 2018, p. 69). The fundamental attribute of personality remained an important connect, in tune with that of state power. The philosophical and political writings of the time describe certain typical qualities in human nature.

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Max Weber’s essay on politics as a vocation, in its systematic understanding of political leadership, highlighted the neglect of studying political leaders (Tucker, 1995, p. 9) and provided the groundwork for future developments with charisma. Typologies remained one of the essential components of contemporary leadership study, and the data remained meaningful in comparing individual leaders. Weber’s understanding of appeal provided the scope for predictions about the likely development of leader types. In 1945, Charles E. Merriam wrote on the rise and fall of political leadership in his Systematic Politics. Glenn D. Paige wrote about the gross negligence of political leadership in the study of political science in his Scientific Study of Political Leadership, which provided a systematic understanding of the study of political leadership. With the advent of the Cold War and nuclear weapons, powerful factors such as the struggle between democracy, capitalism, and communism came to dominate world politics (Horowitz, 2018, p. 3). Advances in social sciences enabled scholars to apply scientific methods to the understanding of global events. Studying the personality of leaders and their influences in national policy appeared archaic. The result was a decline in research on political leaders. A cognitivist paradigm emerged with advances in the study of human psychology—the belief that government and leaders think and act rationally in their quest for power, prestige, and wealth. Such rationality assumes that “decision-makers perceive the world accurately; therefore, misperceptions are a random occurrence” (Rosati, 2000, p. 45). The behavioral revolution of the early 50s and 60s abandoned the Great Man approach. They emphasized that several other factors contributed to reducing the role of individuals in foreign policy decisions, such as the lack of institutional and political capacity, and willingness to exert a significant influence on foreign policy, and political opportunity available to decision-makers. Abraham Maslow’s Theory of Human Needs provided the psychological foundation on which leadership interpreted happenings around the world. Freud, Laswell, and Erickson, in their way, influenced the study of political leadership. Then, a collection of articles on political leadership published in 1972, called Readings for an Emerging Field, questioned political leadership. James MacGregor Burns, who provided a conceptual framework for political leadership, termed leadership “as the most observed and least understood phenomenon” (Burns, 1978, p. 96). Experts lacked a holistic approach, and the result

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was a void in explaining individual personality and its influence on foreign policy decision-making. All incidences between nations are based on human choices, either as individuals or as a group (Hudson, 2005, p. 3). “Leaders matter, and political leaders more so” (Folley, 2013, p. 1), as they remain central to political discourse (Masciulli & Knight, 2009, p. 289) and their presence in policy making and governance is long lasting. This is a “historical phenomenon and a dynamic, coherent process” (Dahl & Neubauer, 1968, p. 233). While the general understanding is that IR bases its studies more on the state, the decisions taken by political leaders and their lasting influence cannot be ignored. This is why understanding rational decision-makers and how they perceive and react to the world around them remains a central point of inquiry, not only for social scientists but also for IR scholars. Analysis at the level of the individual provides an opportunity for better understanding of foreign policy decisions. There is no other question as central to political discussion as that of individual political leadership (Masciulli & Knight, 2009, p. 289). Political leadership is an “independent variable and viewed as a dynamic and coherent process within the sub-type of leadership and measured in terms of power” (Masciulli et al., 2009, p. 384). Leaders and their behavior are an outcome of their respective personalities, style, and belief in their socio-cultural-political milieu. Leaders are an essential element of political life; they exercise enough power to shape the destiny of their respective countries (Blondel, 1993, p. 5). This statement that leaders matter in international politics is a simple statement but impossible to support fully. The extent of the impact they have can be determined, perhaps when the reader identifies when the changes in personnel occurred (Jervis, 1976, p. 154). The study of leaders has gained prominence in the analysis of foreign policy (Dolan, 2016; Hall & Yarhi-Milo, 2012; Horowitz & Starn, 2014; Jervis, 1976; Krebs & Rapport, 2012; Tingyang, 2019; Xuetong, 2019; Xuezhi, 1956; Yaqing, 2012). Individual leaders can exert influence on foreign policy; perhaps they have the institutional and political capacity, the individual willingness to do so, or the political opportunity to be decision-makers (Morin & Paquin, 2018, p. 7). That the pre-existing beliefs of the individual are critical can be the only answer to the basic question that asks: do the decision-maker’s perceptions matter? (Jervis, 1976, p. 13). This is because they provide a precise

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understanding of a leader’s worldview, and the psychological and operational milieu in which decision-makers operate provides a logical insight into world events. Leaders perceive a situation and consider possibilities and implement their decisions (Dyson, 2014, p. 8). Their goals, calculations, and perceptions, often at a subconscious level, become a satisfactory explanation for behavior. Historical examples reveal the decision-makers’ use of a past event as an analogy for a contemporary one (Jervis, 1976, p. 218). Looking back at an incident offers an essential lesson, particularly if leaders viewed it as an impossible occurrence or, perhaps, never even thought about it at all (Jervis, 1976, p. 20). It allows the development of specific strategies and methods to justify actions. For example, British belief and Middle East and American politics formed the basis for deriving Truman’s Palestine Policy (Jervis, 1976, p. 223). Scholars such as Snyder and Harold and Margret explained the importance of perception in foreign policy decision-making. It provides one of the bases of understanding world politics and events. At the same time, a perceived world can lose objectivity. The other aspects of decision-making are bureaucracy, domestic politics, and the international environment, which assist in predicting actor behavior (Jervis, 1976, p. 15). The perceptions and calculations of decision-makers are critical in policy making. Bureaucratic bargains and routines influence state policies and, in turn, determine a statesman’s decisions. Policy variations among decision-makers may be accounted for by changes in social and economic structure, national culture, tradition, and domestic politics of the state they are serving (Jervis, 1976, p. 21). The international environment determines state behavior; the examples of the Truman Doctrine of the Marshall Plan stand out because they are rare (Jervis, 1976, p. 20). External environments restrict a decision-makers choice of alternatives. Political leadership is a social construct that acts within a particular historical and social context (Rotberg, 2014, p. 242). Therefore, leadership is the art of influencing people, organizations, and institutions. In recent years the study of political leadership has been ignored in mainstream social science. However, since it is the leaders who establish foreign policy, it is essential to create a precise understanding of how a leader’s personality influences foreign policy. Leaders make a difference, and in such a situation, leadership quality continues to matter. The “Mandela Method”—which describes how Nelson Mandela sought to overcome

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all intense and societal changes he inherited in South Africa, is an illustration of leader competency that plays an important role (Rotberg, 2014, p. 248). Several connected themes, such as “resistance movements, anti-colonial struggles, nationalism, and choice of the political system, dominated Asia’s political history and influenced political leadership” (Guha, 2013, p. 9). Foreign policy was carefully crafted by leaders to suit their domestic needs and requirements. The long period of oppression and humiliation China went through during which the Western powers pushed it into a state of absolute misery and poverty compelled its leaders to chart out a unique course of action. The central argument is that, while state capacity remains the same, the leadership of that state can initiate change and articulate new foreign policy strategy: political leadership is viewed as a dynamic factor in foreign policy decision-making. It is essential to examine how the leaders “shape the intention and strategies of their state and form a part of the countries’ diplomatic capability” (Kaarbo, 1996, p. 37). The increasing curiosity about leaders comes about since existing studies do not provide a sufficient response to the fundamental questions: What is the role of a political leader in policymaking? How far does a leader’s personality, belief, character, and style of decision-making play a decisive role in bringing about foreign policy change? Are there any valid generalizations or factors that influence political leadership? How does political leadership function in a centralized authoritarian system? What compels leaders to initiate policy change in general and in foreign policy specifically? Is there foreign policy continuity despite a change in leadership? This book integrates the personality of leadership and policymaking in the specific context of China and Deng Xiaoping. The empirical questions include: In what ways has the Chinese leadership combined Confucian principles with contemporary China? Do history, tradition, and culture determine the direction and decision-making approach? In what way did Deng’s personality support his decision to modernize China? How did Chinese leaders, especially Deng, respond to the new world order during the period 1960–1990?

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References Alker, H., & Biersteker, T. (1984). The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a Future Archaeologist of International Savoir Faire. International Studies Quarterly, 28(2), 121–142. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600692 Bell, D. (2014). Political Science. In R. A. W. Rhodes & P. T. Hart (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership. https://doi.org/10. 1093/oxfordhb/9780199653881.013.005 Blondel, J. (1993). A Framework for the Analysis of Political Leadership. Oriente Moderno, 73(1–6), 5–21. https://doi.org/10.1163/22138617-0730106003 Breslin, S. (2008). Do Leaders Matter? Chinese Politics, Leadership Transition and the 17th Party Congress. Contemporary Politics, 14(2), 215–231. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569770802176952 Dahl, R., & Neubauer, D. (1968). Reading in Modern Political Analysis. Prentice-Hall. Dolan, T. M. (2016). Emotion and Strategic Learning in War. Foreign Policy Analysis, 12(4), 571–590. https://doi.org/10.1111/fpa.12052 Dyson, S. (2014). Leaders and International Politics. Leaders in Conflict: Bush and Rumsfeld in Iraq (pp. 8–39). Manchester University Press. www.jstor. org/stable/j.ctt18mbfbp.5 Dyson, S. B., & Preston, T. (2006). Individual Characteristics of Political Leaders and the Use of Analogy in Foreign Policy Decision Making. Political Psychology, 27 (2), 265–288. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221. 2006.00006.x Folley, M. (2013). Political Leadership: Themes. Oxford University Press. Guha, R. (2013). Makers of Modern India. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Hermann, M. G., Preston, T., Korany, B., & Shaw, T. M. (2001). Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful Individuals. International Studies Review, 3(2), 83–131. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186566 Horowitz, M. (2018). Leaders, Leadership, and International Security. In A. Gheciu & W. Wohlforth. The Oxford Handbook of International Security, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198777854.013.17 Horowitz, M., & Starn, A. (2014). How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders. International Organization, 68(3), 527–559. www.jstor.org/stable/43282118 Hudson, V. M. (2005). Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations. Foreign Policy Analysis, 1(1), 1–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2005.00001.x Jackson, R. H., & Rosberg, C. G. (1982). Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet. University of California Press. Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton University Press.

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Kaarbo, J. (1996). Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role of Junior Coalition Partners in German and Israeli Foreign Policy. International Studies Quarterly, 40(4), 501. https://doi.org/10.2307/260 0889 Krcmaric, D., Nelson, S. C., & Roberts, A. (2020). Studying Leaders and Elites: The Personal Biography Approach. Annual Review of Political Science, 23(1), 133–151. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-032801 Krebs, R., & Rapport, A. (2012). International Relations and the Psychology of Time Horizons. International Studies Quarterly, 56(3), 530–543. www.jstor. org/stable/23256803 Masciulli, J., & Knight, A. (2009). The Future of Political Leadership: Uncertain & Dangerous Contexts. In J. Masciulli & M. Molchanov (Eds.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Political Leadership. Ashgate Publishing. Masciulli, J., Molchanov, M. A., & Knight, W. A. (2009). The Ashgate Research Companion to Political Leadership. Ashgate Publishing. Morin, J. F., & Paquin, J. (Eds.). (2018). Foreign Policy Analysis: A Toolbox. Palgrave Macmillan. Qichen Qian. (2006). Ten Episodes in China’s Diplomacy. Harper Collins. Rosati, J. A. (2000). The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World Politics. International Studies Review, 2(3), 45–75. https://doi.org/10.1111/ 1521-9488.00215 Rotberg, R. (2014). The Need for Strengthened Political Leadership. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 652, 238–256. Retrieved November 20, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/24541726 Swatt, G., et al. (2014). ‘African Political Leadership’. In R. A. W. Rhodes (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership. https://doi.org/10. 1093/oxfordhb/9780199653881.013.043 Tucker, R. C. (1995). Politics as Leadership. University of Missouri Press. Yahuda, M. B. (1983). Towards the End of Isolationism: China’s Foreign Policy After Mao. Martin’s Press. Yan, X. (2019). Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers (e-Book Edition). Princeton University Press. Zhang, Q. (2014). Towards an Integrated Theory of Chinese Foreign Policy: Bringing Leadership Personality Back. Journal of Contemporary China, 23(89), 902–922. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2014.882566

CHAPTER 2

Role of Political Leadership in Foreign Policymaking: Analytical Framework

2.1

Introduction

Leaders matter the most, even more so the political leaders (Foley, 2013, p. 1). All interaction between nations is grounded in human decisions, either individual or group (Hudson, 2012, p. 3). While the general understanding is that IR bases itself more on studies of the state, the decisions taken by political leaders and their lasting influence cannot wholly be ignored. Understanding the rationale that drives decision-makers, how they perceive and react to the world around them, remains the central point of inquiry not only for social scientists but also for IR scholars. Plato thought a great deal about political leadership and emphasized leadership as a duty of the philosopher kings. The study of individual leaders, where scholars illustrated foreign policy decisions through the prism of leader personality, predates Aristotle. It was with Machiavelli that political theory and the study of leadership came into effect. He directed the leadership theory in a distinctly new direction (Bell, 2014, p. 2). Max Weber provided the groundwork for future developments by introducing the concept of charisma. Weber’s understanding of appeal provided the scope for predictions on the likely development of leader types. These typologies became one of the essential components of contemporary leadership study, and the data remained meaningful for a comparison of individual leaders. However, though classical Realist thinkers such as Thucydides and Hans Morgenthau acknowledged the relevance of studies © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 P. Suresh, Foreign Policy of China Under Deng Xiaoping, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4764-3_2

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of individual leaders in IR, the domain experts were mostly historians, psychologists, and specialists. There is no question as central to “political discourse as that of political leadership” Masciulli & Knight (2009, p. 289). The political leader is an “independent variable and leadership is a dynamic and coherent process to be viewed within a subtype and measured in terms of power” (Masciulli et al., 2009, p. 384). Leaders and their behavior are an outcome of their respective personalities, style, and belief in their socio-cultural-political milieu. They are an “essential element of political life; they exercise adequate power to outline the destiny of their countries” (Blondel, 1993, p. 5). This makes studying the role of leaders in foreign policy and decision-making pertinent. The increasing curiosity about, and need to study, leaders are a result of the inadequacy of existing studies to provide a sufficient response to the fundamental questions: What is the role of a political leader in policymaking? How far does a leader’s personality, belief, character, world view, and style of decision-making play a decisive role in bringing about foreign policy change? Are there any clear links between the type of political leaders and strategic preferences? How does political leadership function in a centralized authoritarian system? What compels leaders to initiate change, in policy in general and in foreign policy in particular? Is there continuity in foreign policy despite a change in leadership? The purpose of this chapter is to evolve a theoretical construct for answering these questions.

2.2

Defining Key Concepts

Dissimilarities in the use of terms hinder effective understanding, especially in the field of scholarly and academic research. Definitions and explanations provided here seek to avoid misinterpretation and misconception. The two basic concepts applied in the study are political leadership and foreign policy. 2.2.1

Political Leadership

The study of political leadership is age-old. Myths and legends about leaders have contributed to shaping civilized societies. Leaders and guidance have been an essential theme of the Old Testament of the Bible, Hindu religious texts, as well as the cannon of Confucianism. Egyptian hieroglyphs for leaders and followers were written 5000 years ago,

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weaving leadership into the very fabric of the civilization. The many early, scholarly writings on leadership referred to today can be traced back to ancient Greece and Rome. Different disciplines study leadership differently. Each subject in the field of Social Science looks at leadership from its own particular perspective and approaches. Thus, Political Science views leadership through its contribution to the political process (Hargrove, 2003, p. 581); History understands leadership from a historical context, while Psychology associates it with personality traits, and character. Thus, the study of political leadership is multi-disciplinary, included in Sociology, Psychology, Political Science, and also, Management. Despite the variance in understanding based on its subject affiliation, the term leadership, by and large, continues to have a conventional connotation in the dictionary and lexicographic sense. There are several definitions of political leadership interpreted according to the specific situation and know-how of peoples, nations, and groups. Political leadership can be comprehended by examining beliefs, ethics, charismas, power relations, and leaders’ styles, including the socio-political and cultural milieu (Masciulli & Knight, 2009, p. 209). The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines a “leader as the person who leads or commands a group organization or country”. According to Barbara Kellerman, a leader is the “one who chooses a particular course of action, safeguards others get along, and inspires followers to select the direction that the group will obey” (Kellerman, 2010, p. 1). Harry S. Truman on leaders explained the “influence the leaders can wield and make people do what he/she wanted them to do” (Truman, 1958, p. n.a.). Leadership according to Winston Churchill is the “intelligent use of power” (Winston Churchill, n.d.). “Leadership is the active influencing of people to cooperate towards goals that they come to find desirable” (Tead, 1935, p. 21). Tannenbaum et al. (1961) explained leadership as an “interpersonal influence exercised in particular situations and through a communication process that is aimed at attaining a specified goal or goals” (Singh Sengupta, 1997, p. 266). Leadership is a process of “mutual stimulation, which, by the fruitful interplay of relevant individual differences, controls human energy in the pursuit of a common cause” (Pigors, 1934, p. 378). Chester Bernard defined leadership as a “quality of behavior of individuals through which they guide people or their activities in an organized effort” (Bernard, 1940, p. 261). Seligman termed the leader the “central person”—what Korac-Kakabadse and Kouzmin called “captains of the

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ship”, describing their role in “operating the organization delegated to them as guardians” (Korac-Kakabadse et al., 2001, p. 212). According to Cecil A. Gibb, leadership implies a “shared direction, which often means that all parties in the leadership relation have a common goal, or at least a similar or compatible purpose”. Political leadership is represented by individuals who “exercise authority through an officially constituted position, such as a president of a country or party leader” (Moller & Schierenbeck, 2015, p. 94). Chang Do Heh and Fredrick G. Bartol define political leadership as “the mobilization and direction of people, by a person within a society, to act in patterned and coherent ways to cause (or prevent) change in the authoritative allocation of value within that society” (Nye, 2008, p. 98). The leader’s image is an important component of leadership and politics (Gaffney, 1991, p. 124). Political leadership is a process of “human interaction in which some individuals exert, or attempt to exert, a determining influence upon others” (Tucker, 1981, p. 11).Power is a vital element of leadership “employed by one or a few individuals to direct members of the nation towards a particular act” (Blondel, 1993, p. 17). It is the relationship between “leaders who intend real changes, and their followers, that reflects their mutual purpose” (Rost, 1991, p. 102). Burns views political leadership as ubiquitous and pervasive. Seligman, in his seminal work on the Study of Political Leadership (1950), called “leadership a representative role, a function of acceptance by the followers” (Bhuiyan, 2012, p. 380). A political leader is one who gives “direction to the activities of a political community” (Tucker, 1981, p. 14). This idea, of course, is critical to leadership and is applicable to political leadership “where political communities confront situations in which policy must be formulated, promulgated and executed” (Tucker, 1981, p. 15). According to Lao Tzu, “good leadership is when people barely know the leader exists; it is not so good when people obey and acclaim him; and is of the worst kind when they despise him” (Lao, 1988, p. 19). Machiavelli defined leaders as “people to be feared and loved, but, as it is difficult for the two to go together, it is much safer to be feared than loved” (Machiavelli, 1952, p. 110). A prince should “make himself feared in such a way that if he cannot gain love, he avoids being hated by his people” (Machiavelli, 1952, p. 113). The ancient Greek philosopher, “Plato, offered a methodical approach to administrative and organizational models to dispose of life in an ideal state” (Takala, 1998, p. 787). In this, political leaders who have the skills to rule are rulers of the perfect

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state. According to Confucius a true leader is one who is a “gentleman, superior man, noble man and a man of superior order” (Confucius, 1995, p. 310). The definitions above identify political leaders as influencers, motivators, mobilizers, those who have the power and charisma to initiate change. They provide an “understanding of what the role entails but explaining the precise nature of a political leader remains difficult” (Tucker, 1981, p. 11). There are several theories and explanations on leadership and many attempts have been made to integrate leadership theories to provide a comprehensive understanding of the subject. The framework below illustrates the various factors influencing direction (Fig. 2.1). Political leadership is a process by which governments try to exercise control over public policy decisions in interaction with their followers. More of an “abstract concept rather than a material extrapolation, it is a social science concept and is related to terms such as authority, influence, power, and control” (Elgie, 1995, p. 3). There has been continued scholarship on leadership. However, despite all this study, the vast amount of

Leader characteristics and traits

Internal and external environments

Leader behavior and style

Group member characteristics

Fig. 2.1 Leadership: characteristics and traits (Source DuBrin, 2007 Leadership: Research Findings, Practice, and Skills, p. 55)

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research conducted, and its hugely interdisciplinary nature that cuts across social sciences—psychology, sociology, education, business, and anthropology—a succinct definition has not been arrived at. This is what calls for greater theoretical and empirical investigation. There is widespread debate on whether it is a few exceptional individuals that make history or whether a nation’s destiny is, by and large, shaped by society. Thomas Carlyle asserted that “individuals contribute to change; while Herbert Spencer argued that socio-political change is the outcome of aggregate conditions” (Kellerman, 1986, p. 5). Scholars such as Sidney Hook, Fred Greenstein, and Robert C. Tucker subscribed to the view that individuals have a profound impact on political outcomes. Lucian Pye observes that the traditional concept of authority allowed for the “epic hero, the bold leader, the imaginative warrior, the conqueror of the unknown” (Molchanov, 2016, p. 925). Leaders contribute to change. The basic understanding is that leaders draft short- and long-term goals, then manage and conduct the expectation to achieve these goals. There are many types of political leadership, but each has a unique style of approach. A different set of skills, belief systems, early experiences, socio-political-cultural environment, and worldview shape a leader’s personality and behavior. Scholars have pointed out that the “intersection of foreign policy formation is not the state; it is the human decision-maker, and that the country is an abstraction” (Krasno & LaPides, 2015, p. 129). Leaders, often through their natural attributes, qualities, beliefs, and approach, impact their followers. This interactive process between leaders and followers transforms the environment in which they operate. According to Kellerman, “a leader chooses a particular course of action and then, in some way, gets others to go along, or more subtly, encourages them to select a direction to follow” (Masciulli et al., 2009, p. 7). The political leader’s task is to: decipher and understand the problem, recommend how to solve it, come out with solutions based on vision and create a follower base to implement those solutions or responses. Political leadership is the process by which a government tries to exercise control over public policy decisions. There are different approaches, types, and forms of leadership, and they often correspond with the direction and how leaders use their influence. They include charismatic, heroic, revolutionary, innovative, transforming, transactional, personal, individual,

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collective, consensual, reactive, and managerial leadership. Political leadership operates in different arenas like policy leadership, cabinet leadership, bureaucratic leadership, and opinion leadership. In chronological terms, the first or classical leadership can be understood from four of the most influential writers: Plato, Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, and Pareto. All four have written against a background of war or conflict or imminent strife, and it is crucial to remember that no authors write in a political vacuum. The first reading is taken from Plato’s Republic, probably the first systematic theory of politics and leadership (Grint, 1997, p. 27). Traditional, classical, and modern thinking emphasize the connection between leader and society. A common approach to political theory starts with Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Politics. Plato’s Republic confirms the “central role of wise and well-informed leadership” and an ideal ruler must be a king who is capable of leading the country down a path of progress (classics.mit.edu, n.d.). According to Aristotle a leader should be a person who is capable of making sound and effective decisions. The Classical theory of political leadership transitioned with the rise of Christianity. The emerging Christian tradition emphasized the radical equality of human beings under God’s ultimate sovereignty and leadership rested under God and in him (Couto, 2010, p. 71). Rather than believing just in the wisdom and superiority of leaders, Social Contract theorists like Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau identified and “highlighted the importance of leaders by their ability to provide unitary judgment to guide social action” (Couto, 2010, p. 53). The West’s contribution to the scholarly works of International Relations is immense and has done a great deal in finding and refining concepts. The Behavioral Revolution of the 1950 and the 1960s moved from the conventional of scrutinizing or studying Political Science and International Relations. One of the drawbacks of the behavioral approach in the study of leadership is that the approach rejected the situational variable-like the styles of leadership. The approach stated that the style may or may not be effective in all circumstances. The leadership theories that were developed during the period when behavioral approach was popular approached leadership only from the real standpoint of leader behavior.

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2.2.2

Nature of Political Leadership

“Power is ubiquitous; it permeates human relationships” (Burns, 1978, p. 15). Bertrand Russell called “power the fundamental concept in social science” (Burns, 1978, p. 12). According to Weber, “power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (Burns, 1978, p. 12). He identified three ideal types of authority or legitimized power. Two depend on the position and one on the person (Nye, 2008, p. 37). Harold Laswell described power as “accentuated in nature and explained it as capable of influencing others and determining others’ actions” (Laswell, 2009, p. 46). To understand the nature of leadership requires an understanding of the essence of power. Power and leadership have a symbiotic relationship. Leadership is a pattern explaining three components: “a leader or team of leaders, the followers, and the functional relationship between all of them” (Dion, 1968, p. 4). To acquire the status of a political leader, the pursuit of power becomes imperative. While Machiavelli’s “The Prince may be considered an ancient manual for the princely power-seeker and power holder the notion of politics as power continues to be a stark reality” (Tucker, 1981, p. 4). Political leaders “represent one, and the most elusive, of the many categories of leadership” (Dion, 1968, p. 2). Political leadership is an overall study of power, authority and influence, and remain an enduring theme of human interest. Power remains the “important concept of social science, and leadership is a well-designed word implying power” (Helms, 2014, p. 262). A “politically driven man emphasizes power and demands power for the self” (Tucker, 1981, p. 5). The political leader, therefore, “is a power pursuer, power holder, and power exerciser, making conduct an essential component of leadership” (Tucker, 1981, p. 12). Hitler and Stalin were political leaders who were no less than absolute wielders of brutal power. A leader’s behavior is a “product of personal drivers, social influences, political motivation, job skills, and the structure of career possibilities” (Burns, 1978, p. 25). Robert Tucker studied Thomas Carlyle’s On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History and explained behavior and the leadership approach. In what became famously known as the “Great Man” theory of leadership, he asserted that there are specific individuals whose “innate superiority stamps them as natural leaders” (Tucker, 1981, p. 14).

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It is obvious that leaders have made a difference in history; they perform meaningful functions and create goals. However, leadership is a process and comprises three key “components: leaders, followers and context” (Nye, 2008, p. 20). The context identifies the external environment and the changing objectives in a particular situation. It is appropriate to view leaders from within this triangle rather than viewing them just as heroic individuals. One of the best summaries of leaders comes from Karl Marx who said, “men make their history, but they do not make it as they please … but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past” (Nye, 2008, p. 5). The scientific approach to leadership studies has gone through several phases. Until the late 1940s, the trait-centered approach dominated research on leadership. When this approach proved inadequate in determining leadership behavior, focus shifted to studying style as a requisite to determining leader behavior. Inconsistent results called for a further shift in the approach. The new leadership approach that focused on charisma and transformational leadership became the dominant theme in the late 1980s. The primary outcome of the twentieth century has been the establishment of the importance of the leadership approach and action that facilitated sound theoretical models and comprehensive hands-on experience. Power remained the core theme in the study of political science. Power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcome you want. It can be achieved in three ways: coercion with threats; inducement with payments; and attraction or co-option of support. The fact that one cannot lead without power was irrefutable, and so leadership and power remained synonymous (Nye, 2008, p. 27) (Table 2.1). 2.2.3

Styles of Political Leadership

In any political system, leaders perform various functions, such as initiating “intervention, advocacy strategy, maintaining coherence, control, and directing action” (Foley, 2013, p. 32). As such they are catalysts in precipitating change. Though leaders come in a variety of types, all demonstrate specific, shared characteristics. Generally speaking, they are charismatic and enjoy a certain level of attention. Studying styles of leadership allows a broader basis for investigation, with many styles having been identified as being generic. Based on behavior, leaders have been

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Table 2.1 The trend in leadership theory and research Period

Approach

Core theme

Up to the late 1940s Late 1940s to 1960s

Trait Approach Style Approach

Late 1960s to 1980s

Contingency Approach

Since early 1980s

New Leadership Approach (includes charismatic leadership

Leadership ability is innate Leadership effectiveness has to do with how the leader behaves It all depends; effective leadership is affected by the situation Leaders need vision

(Source Bryman, 1992 Charisma and leadership in organizations, p. 1)

designated style categories as facilitators, drivers, integrators, strategists, thinkers, and exemplars (Foley, 2013, p. 40). Understanding the style or type of leaders offers a calibrated approach to the study of leadership. The style can be broadly categorized as charismatic, democratic, transactional, or transformational, totalitarian, reformist and revolutionary. Each elaborates an “exceptional political skill and plays an important role in converting economic and social exploitation into political demands” (Burns, 1978, p. 118). Charismatic Leadership: The word charisma is Greek for divine gift or gift of grace. Max Weber defined the term “charismatic leadership” as a mission and vision that inspires others (Tucker, 1981, p. 93). This type of leadership is distinctly personal and rests on devotion to the specific “sacrosanctity, bravery, archetypal character of an individual, and the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him. It is distinctly individual, and the qualities are rare” (Weber, 1986, p. 233). There are four essential dimensions to charismatic leadership: leader-image, the idea of acceptance, compliance, and emotional. All influence the leader’s decision-making approach. Charisma is a well-developed social and political skill considered either as a natural trait or an attribute. It is an “effulgence of personal qualities that is innate or, at any rate, not capable of being learnt” (Den Hartog et al., 1995, p. 38). A charismatic leader is perceived as a person with exceptional capabilities, as someone endowed with extraordinary power that inspires fascination and loyalty. Charismatic leaders rely on

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personal and inspirational power rather than power rooted in an official position of authority such as that of monarch or president. They are self-confident, with strong convictions, high energy, enthusiasm, and can manipulate symbols of power and success to create an emotional attraction for followers (Nye, 2008, p. 55). House’s model of charismatic leadership elaborated: that such a leader possesses extraordinary skills, high vibrant personal attributes, can articulate a vision, and engage in personal image-building that effectively produces a favorable perception of themselves in the minds of followers. It also involves a higher level of social exchange between the two in which the leader exerts profound personal influence upon his or her followers. (Don & Sosik, 2006, p. 13)

Charismatic leadersplay the role of a change agent and their influence on their followers is tremendous. Charismatic leadership can be further categorized into three broad theoretical perspectives in terms of charisma as a personal attribute, as a social relationship and charisma and organizational behavior. Democratic Leadership: This is the type of leadership style in which members play a participative role in the decision-making process. The democratic style encompasses the notion that everyone should play an active part in decision-making. Democratic leadership is a collective leadership style that encourages the participation of various individuals towards a particular issue. Thomas Jefferson believed that the primary function of a leader in democracy was to inform the minds of the people and to follow their will (Genovese, 2017, p. 23). Informing the minds of the people speaks of the role of leader as educator—one who educates, enlightens, and informs people (Genovese, 2017, p. 23). Following the will of the people remains an essential task of a democratic leader. A democratic leader is one who not only serves people’s interest but furthers their democratic dignity as well. Vision, egalitarian goals, and facilitation are important components of such leadership. It is also conciliatory and participative in nature, supporting optimal collaboration in achieving group goals and minimal external control on the action of individuals. Reciprocity and acceptance create a positive climate. Democratic leaders do not fight one another because they assume their peers have peaceful intentions and adhere to cooperative norms. Scholars such as Ido Orren and John Owen proposed that leaders who respect

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a liberal ideology place a high degree of trust in the leaders of other countries (Herman & Hagan, 1998, p. 127). The democratic style of leadership creates a sense of shared perspective, tolerance and provides an open approach conducive for decision-making. Thus, features of a democratic style of leadership include consensus, supervision, and the active participation of followers in achieving goals. This style of leadership assures more freedom to followers in fulfilling their tasks. In essence, the overall functioning is delegative and collegial in nature. Transactional/Transformational Leadership: This is a popular theory in leadership studies, with several scholars and researchers having established the validity of the concept. James MacGregor Burns’ seminal study on Leadership (1978) provided the initial definitions by drawing a distinction between transformational and transactional leadership styles (Tucker et al., 2004, p. 103). According to Tracey & Hinkin, the transformational leadership style motivates people by appealing to higher ideals and moral values, defining and articulating a vision for the future that forms the basis of credibility (Tucker et al., 2004, p. 104). The converse is transactional leadership, which is based on bureaucracy and organizational standards. Transformational leadership exhibits greater self-confidence, inner integrity, honesty, and personal values. It promotes non-traditional thinking, focus on change, progress, and development (Tucker et al., 2004, p. 105). A transformational leader appeals to the collective interest of the group or organization (Nye, 2008, p. 62). Most often cited as an example of such a leader is Franklin Roosevelt, who applied the soft power of inspirational communication to help achieve his transformational goals of social reform, transforming his followers’ views in the process (Nye, 2008, p. 64). Transactional leaders are conventional in nature. They operate within the given environment, attempting to change behavior through reward, punishment, and self-interest and influencing the process of social exchange, negotiation, and coalition building (Foley, 2013, p. 51). However, transformational leaders differ from conventional leaders in that they create a vision through inspiration, encourage members to follow it, initiate radical changes by altering existing rules and norms, and make the change a reality. (Nye, 2008, p. 126). They aim at exploiting the current need or demand by recognizing the motives, aspirations, and expectations. The result of transforming leadership is a relationship of mutual

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stimulation and elevation that converts followers into leaders and may even convert leaders to moral agents (Burns, 1978, p. 4). Totalitarian Leadership: The term totalitarianism was coined in the 1920s by Italian anti-Fascists to refer to the new system of rule imposed by the Fascist party after its accession to power in October 1922 and its transformation into a one-party regime after 1925 (Gentile, 2013, p. 9). In the 1930s, totalitarianism included both the Soviet and Nazi regimes and in the second half of the twentieth century included all Communist regimes. But people lived under totalitarian political regimes long before the advent of these modern systems (Nye, 2008, p. 33). Totalitarian rulers control the government and have absolute authority. Totalitarian leaders envisage a transformed domestic society. They direct and embody the will of the mass and often go beyond personal greed, developing a charismatic mystique that enables them to utilize power for personal aggrandizement (Sondrol, 1991, p. 600). Authoritarian Leadership: Authoritarian leaders enforce strict and formal rules of conduct that have to be obeyed—refusal attracts a severe penalty. This type of leadership has shortcomings because it is not just applicable to “individual psychological pre-disposition, but also to the content of political beliefs and the make-up of the political system” (Greenstein, 1992, p. 120). It is possible for liberal views to be forced in an authoritarian manner and within an authoritarian movement. According to Blondel, authoritarian leaders maximize coercive power. The leader’s resort to a paternalistic-benevolent rule, that is compulsive and ruthless as and when needed. A high level of supervision and minimal delegation of power predominates the authoritarian style of leadership. Authoritarian regimes do not contend with public opinion during the policymaking process (Tucker, 1968, p. 61). It is the leader’s decision alone that will prevail in determining general policy, though persuasion remains a collective act. Alan C. Elms described authoritarian leaders as very conservative in their approach, and their response is quite often hierarchical in nature (Elms, 1976, p. 36).The authoritarian trait has a bearing on political behavior and manifests itself as dominance over subordinates, respect towards superiors, sensitivity towards power relations (Greenstein, 1992, p. 128). The Authoritarian Personality (1950) by Theodor Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford, a major work in political psychology, elaborated a set of criteria to identify personality traits (Adorno et al., 1993, p. 972). It was an influential book in American

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Social Sciences based on the Holocaust and the genocidal extinction of the Jews by Hitler. The personality type identified behavior as a pattern of childhood experiences. The authoritarian personality has the ability to control the weak, and the authoritarian leader, therefore, exercise greater power. Reform Leadership: Reform leaders have often appeared as heads of government or in other constituted roles of leadership, such as legislative or judicial posts, and have furnished leadership for reform without initiating political movements (Tucker, 1981, p. 96). Moral beliefs remain the key driver for reform leadership. Leaders of reform movements seek change through a gradual process, proclaiming an outlook or vision of what society would look like: they define a collective situation, as in the case of apartheid in South Africa. If leadership activities bring about considerable public response, a reform movement comes into existence. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., of the American civil rights movement is a notable example of a reform leader. Revolutionary Leadership: Similar to the reform leader, the revolutionary leader also seeks social change (Tucker, 1981, p. 107), and may adopt a reformist approach before applying revolutionary tactics. What stands out is that from the earliest writing on great social revolutions, terror has been seen as integral to the revolutionary process. True practitioners of revolution from Robespierre to Lenin, Stalin, and Mao (Julia, 2013, p. 1), all were concerned about breaking the hold of society’s proclaimed principles on the minds of people. An archetypal revolutionary mind is that of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, whose The Communist Manifesto of 1848, created the most influential socialist movements of the nineteenth and twentieth century (Tucker, 1981, p. 107). Whatever the style of leadership, there is a command and pattern of authority. Power remains vested with the head of the organization. The entire process is dynamic, and it is difficult to assess which form is functional in nature. Understanding the influence of individual actors on political outcomes remains imperative, as most political actions can be comprehended by taking account of the personal characteristics of the actors involved (Greenstein, 1992, p. 122). For example, what impact would Napoleon have had on history if he had been born in the middle ages? (Greenstein, 1992, p. 633). The analysis of individual action based on a model examines the: (a) extent to which activities take place in an environment that accepts change; (b) position of the actor in the milieu; and (c) core strength and weakness of the actor. Personality and political

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opinion continue to be relevant, despite a general opinion that they are habituated and controlled. 2.2.4

Political Leaders: Traits/Skills

Leaders, irrespective of their skills and traits, enjoy the attention and attract curiosity and interest. They need to have specific, unique skills or qualities that compel people to follow them. To stay in power, they have to “steal the soul”(Foley, 2013, p. 31). The discernible or patterned behavior of leaders needs to be focused on. Scholars like Barber (1992), Etheredge (1979), George (1980, 1988) George and Stern (1998), Renhson (1994, 1995, 1996) who have studied the American presidency, have identified personal characteristics as relevant traits affecting policymaking. A successful vision is based on the proper identification of issues people face, which makes for a more positive outcome; perception varies from leader to leader. Assertiveness refers to being forthright in expressing a viewpoint and making sure others understand that standpoint. An assertive style helps a leader perform many tasks and achieve the expected outcome. Flexibility facilitates shifting positions and adapting to the changing global order, new situations, new ideas, and innovation. Intelligence is the cognitive capability to think analytically and rationally while making decisions. The intelligent leader can think differently and makes calculated choices. Other desirable traits are self-confidence and pragmatism. Selfconfidence indicates whether you are self-assured in your judgments, decision-making, ideas, and capabilities (Lussier & Achua, 2007, p. 38). Leaders exhibit confidence in their ability to instill confidence and faith among their followers, which makes this a valued trait and a precursor for success. Pragmatic leaders focus on current issues and exert their influence through an in-depth understanding and sensitivity of the social system. The other two skills that are observable are Machiavellian organizational and political skills. Organizational skills vary from delegation of responsibility and allocation of work to communication, and all of these play a critical role in facilitating leadership. They point out the capability of a leader in managing information outflow (Nye, 2008, p. 77). Leaders who have these skills encourage greater participation. They also ensure that there is accurate communication and recognize that any failure in this process

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will lead to a distorted flow of information. History is replete with examples where information misrepresentation has resulted in a dysfunctional decision-making process. Administrative skills include both hard and soft power like maneuvering, conciliation, coercion, and developing networks (Nye, 2008, p. 84). The Stanford psychologist Roderick Kramer explains political intelligence as the capacity to prepare a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis, which could, in turn, be beneficial to the leader in the decision-making process and referred to Machiavellian political skills—that remain important for leadership. Traits fit into the broader classification of personality type: authoritarian, chaotic and impulsive, flexible, and pragmatic. These skills and attributes are the archetypes, into which individuals fit (Krasno & LaPides, 2015, p. 276). There is a common belief that personal characteristics and abilities contribute to leadership effectiveness and contribute to the universal theory of leadership (DuBrin, 2007, p. 7). Traits have been useful in assessing leadership styles, and in providing an understanding of how leaders process information and what motivates them. In conclusion, power remains an exclusive prerogative of leadership. Ambiguity prevails in the Classical study of leadership because of a lack of clear empirical evidence in understanding characteristics, personality, and behavior of leaders. The methodology is presumed to be narrow, limited, and lacking in empirical validity and scope.

2.3

Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is a common but much widely debated concept. It refers to the intention and actions of an actor directed at the actor’s external world (Verbeek & Zaslove, 2017, p. 2). Foreign policy refers to a set of official interactions between independent nation-states conducted by legitimate officials. The term is a single-point definition to understanding the behavior of a state towards other states. Several factors influence foreign policy and the most important of all is the “human decisionmaker, either acting as a single individual or in a group” (Hudson & Vore, 1995, p. 209). The Oxford Dictionary defines foreign policy as “an act of government’s strategy in dealing with other nations” lexico.com. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, foreign policy can be defined as a “general objective that guides the activities and relationships of one state in its

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interaction with other states” Britannica.com. Foreign policy is, therefore, an activity of the state with which it fulfills its aims and interests in the international arena. Benko claims “foreign policy as a process and a system of activities performed by a state-organized community of people within the international arena” (Petric, 2003, p. 56). Calvert defines foreign policy as “decisions and activities that largely concern relations between one state and the others”. Frankel’s definition of foreign policy is in line with that of James Rosenau, who defines foreign policy as “methodical policy making by constitutionally approved administrators of different states”. George Modolski defines foreign policy as “systematic activities evolved by a community to change the behavior of other states and to adjust its own activities in the international environment”. Foreign policy, therefore, must offer explanation on the ways “states try to change, and succeed in changing, the behavior of other states and this, is argued, as the primary objective” (Bojang, 2018, p. 1). Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne define foreign policy as the strategy or approach “designated by a national government to attain its goals in association with external entities” (Hudson, 2012, p. 13). Foreign policy is considered a network of communication that connects other areas of politics and covers a wide span of activities, ranging from summit meetings to informal talks among diplomats at social gatherings. The Brockhaus Encyclopedia states that “foreign policy is the institution for managing a state’s relations with other states with the aim of preserving its own independence and promoting the social, economic and cultural interest of its citizens”. Joseph Frankel defines foreign policy as “consisting of actions and decisions that involve, to some appreciable extent, relations between one state and others” (Bojang, 2018, p. 2). The Marxist definition of foreign policy is the policy of the ruling class of a state, directed towards the outside, i.e., towards the external relations of the state. Foreign policy is a strategy or a calculated action developed by decsion-makers of a state, other states, or external factos, aimed at achieving a specific goal defined in terms of nationl interest. The foreign policy action initiated by a state could be the outcome of the interest of the state or a reaction to actions undertaken by other states. Foreign policy, therefore, is the “outcome of the interplay of a large number of factors that affect policy formulations” (Bandyopadhyaya, 1970, p. 29). Definitions provide a basic outline to understanding the complex phenomenon of how states interact with each other, relecting not only changes in outlook but also attempts at

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changing the behavior of other states. It is shaped by domestic factors, by the approach and perception of policymakers, and by the international environment or conditions in which states exist. There is a general consensus among scholars that foregin policy acts as an intersection between domestic and international politics (Bojang, 2018, p. 2). The foreign policy of every state is influenced by two determinants: one is the domestic, and the other is the external environment. The main external determinants are the geostrategic environment, international sytem, international organizations, and alliances. Internal determinants can be idenfified as history and culture, geography and natural resources, ideology, economic and political system, characteristics of political leadership, and science and technology. Foreign policy decision-making, therefore, entails several processes and involves different actors. Theorizing foreign policy is important. All mainstream theories of international relations offer different perspectives on what they treat as significant in the study of foreign policy (Mallavarpu, 2020, p. 4). The Realists’ approach the world in terms of: a human group classified as the nation-state; behavior in terms of self-interest; and power as the key to politics (Wohlforth, 2013, p. 36). The nation-state is accepted as the main and influential group with which people identify and which exerts influence on human affairs. Foreign policy is defined in terms of power politics and called a struggle among rivals characterized by collective self-interest. Therefore, the classical and modern variation of Realism emphasizes two important aspects: anarchy and power in foreign policy. According to Mearsheimer the absence of an overarching authority compels states to ensure their own security (Wivel, 2017, p. 2). This is, therefore, a top-down approach to understanding foreign policy, which calls for an understanding of the international conditions within which foreign policy is drafted. Realists view foreign policy as important and link it to security and state survival. States as unitary actors strive to attain maximum capability. The pursuit of national interest, national power, and a capable leadership with an effective foreign policy can reduce conflict among states. Bad foreign policy choices, therefore, will have bad consequences not only for the foreign policy decision-maker, but for the state as well (Wivel, 2017, p. 3). From a Realist perspective, therefore, the state preserves its own position. Realists rarely follow or pursue morality while engaging with

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others. The argument being that international politics operate very differently and the conduct of foreign policy is different from that of domestic politics (Wivel, 2017, p. 2). Neo-Realism is a sub-school of Realism. Since the focus is more on the international system than on human nature, neo-Realists explain the behavior of states in terms similar to that of Realists. The neo-Realist understands foreign policy in terms of ideology, domestic politics, leaders’ personal preferences, and moral consideration (Telbami, 2002, p. 164). The international system is a well-defined structure in terms of distribution capability, character of the unit in the system, and the ordering principle. At the same time the ordering principle claims that states often seek to survive and, therefore, security and power remain the key driver. The Liberal approach came as a rejoinder to the Realist theory of international politics and foreign policy, based on the inability of states to control war. Liberal thinkers like Kant, Mill, and Schumpeter criticized the Realist notion on state power and national interest. They viewed state interaction more in terms of the need for cooperation rather than confrontation, basing their approach more on plurality of action rather than the unitary nature. According to the Liberals, states needed to look at economic and other considerations rather than limiting themselves to survival and security. Liberals view war as an unnatural phenomenon: they emphasize peace, cooperation, and harmony as important in state relations. The homogenous foreign policy behavior of states, according to them, can be attributed to their anarchical nature (Burchill, 2005, p. 57). Neo-Liberalism is an extension of Liberal theory, which places importance on institutions in promoting state relations: international institutions act as the binding force that is absent in an anarchical society; free market and open trade, if practiced globally, will reduce disparity between states. Removal of barriers and free trade is at the heart of modern interdependency theory (Burchill, 2005, p. 64). The tenets of neo-Liberal foreign policy objectives aim at the idea of the well-being of people irrespective of creed, race, and nation. They believe moral and individual liberty is a universally accepted principle, reducing human suffering and upholding rights and policy compatible with the formal institutions. The end of the Cold War saw new developments in international relations and foreign policymaking, which moved to a more polityoriented approach that included more actors and structure in world affairs. Constructivism offered an alternative understanding on several central themes such as anarchy, balance of power, state identity, and

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interest (Hopf, 1998, p. 172). Constructivists explain foreign policy in terms of the state’s articulation of its identity, which, in turn, constructs its national interest (Mallavarpu, 2020, p. 5). State policy and behavior is explained by emphasizing the norms that guide policymakers. Shared ideas, beliefs, and values, according to the Constructivists, provide an understanding of IR. Non-material structures condition the actors’ identities and interests and, in turn, their actions (Reus-Smit, 2005, p. 197). Thus, the interests of actors become crucial in explaining a wide range of international political phenomena (Reus-Smit, 2005, p. 197). Human identity and behavior shapes institutions that are, in turn, shaped by society. According to Wendt, in an anarchic system, states possess the military capability that can be threatening to others; social interaction can bring about a greater affinity and closeness. Constructivism creates awareness of a society’s place in the world. Constructivist theories do not offer a unified understanding on any set of issues but create a common framework of a reality that is socially constructed. Identity, values, and cognition remain important to international relations and foreign affairs. The Marxist approach to foreign policy was based on hierarchical priorities and aimed at achieving state-oriented goals based on socialist principles. The two important theories of development-dependency and world systems explain the power hierarchy between the core and the periphery. Human history according to Marx is a struggle to meet material needs, to understand the physical world, to stop exploitation and resist class domination, and to overcome the fear and distrust of the human race (Linklater, 2005, p. 112). Marx and Engels were interested in the modes of production, social and political revolution, class conflict, and economic and technological unification of the human race (Linklater, 2005, p. 120). Marx’s analysis of society and the world had a deep impact on international relations. The traditional IR theories begin with the state as the unit of analysis—Marx claimed the unity of mankind as ideal and, therefore, concepts such as class and class struggle were brought into the foray. For Marx, class struggle is permanent as is the march towards a stateless and a classless society. The Marxian ideal of socialism, according to Berki, appears either in the shape of hegemony, as the domination of strong nations over weak one—no longer tinged with the features of capitalism, but neither is it the realization of higher human freedom—or it appears in the shape of a community of independent nations, in which case it may come to represent freedom and progress over capitalism proper, but

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remains a system still visibly bearing the birthmarks of capitalism (Berki, 1971, p. 105). The theory of imperialism developed by Lenin (1968) and Bukharin (1972) explained the reasons for the First World War (Linklater, 2005, p. 120). War was the outcome of the need for new outlets for the surplus capital accumulated by dominant capitalist states. Lenin’s theoretical construct addressed concepts such as world markets, nation, state, party, imperialism, war, peace, and revolution and had a bearing on theories of international relations. He gave a clear picture of the theory of the party and drew guidelines for its working. The end of the dictatorship of capitalism and the strengthening of the state was the outcome of economic development. The growth of the proletarian state was a process by which liberated people began to suppress their oppressors and the result was the victory of the proletariat. The outcome was a transition to communism. Lenin recognized the revolutionary instincts of liberation movements. According to him political self-determination led to political independence for the formation of the nation-state and the proletarian struggle was the key to self-determination. Proletarian internationalism is an outcome of the victory of class struggle over nationalism. Imperialism was the highest form of capitalism and impacted the nature of international relations. Lenin’s views on war and his anti-imperialist stand led him to classify states as advanced countries, comprising West Europe, Eastern Europe, the colonies, and semi-colonies. The feminist approach to foreign policy moves from the traditional realm of foreign policy. It brings in a greater understanding by addressing gender concerns and issues in the realm of international politics, highlighting gender as an integral part to international affairs. Feminist approaches to international relations became popular in the 1990s, explaining the absence of women’s experiences in the study of international relations. The Feminist theory offered fresh insights on global politics. IR had a great significance for patterns of gender relations (True, 2005, p. 214). Cynthia Enloe in the book Bananas, Beaches and Bases (1989) exposed how international politics highlighted gender relations as integral to IR. Feminist scholars explain IR through the lens of a gendered construction that has excluded women from the affairs of the state (Enloe, 2014, p. 3). Feminist theories of IR can be studied through forms such as empirical feminism, analytical feminism, and normative feminism. For empirical

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feminism studies, gender forms an empirical perspective; normative feminism considers social and political change; analytical feminism explains gender from a theoretical perspective. The theoretical standpoint explains the impact of the neglect of a study of the feminist perspective in IR. Feminist scholars in the area of foreign policy have highlighted the dominant masculine gender policies and that policymakers make decision in the name of an abstract concept of “national interest” (True, 2005, p. 219). They claim that the conventional IR has distorted, neglected, or overlooked gender perspectives; for instance, states with greater gender inequality are more likely to go to war or engage in state-organized violence. Another criticism is that women are often seen as marginalized, vulnerable, and poor, and that the visibility of women who provide support is not appropriately recognized. Women are likely to be among the group of non-state actors in international affairs (True, 2005, p. 220). Over the years the contribution of women in areas of disarmament, peace, and conflict has been significant. This has created a momentum for greater collective action. The involvement of women and women’s networks has remained the forerunner for gender justice. Including gender relations in empirical research offers the possibility of the creation of policies that are relevant and have a material impact on the call of women for greater recognition and involvement in decision-making. The English School is another distinctive and systematic approach to IR (Dunne, 2013, p. 2). It asserts that the sovereign states form a society, albeit an anarchic one, that does not have to accept the will of the higher power (Linklater, 2005, p. 84). The English School succeeded in creating a society of sovereign equals (Linklater, 2005, p. 84) that emphasized a high level of order and low level of violence. A democratic society, the absence of sovereign authority, could result in increased violence, fear, insecurity, and distrust, culminating in chaos. When violence becomes an integral part of an anarchical society, international law and morality can restore order. The English School views the international political system as more orderly. There are no expectations among states that the international political system should enjoy a greater level of cooperation. The end of the twentieth century saw the rise of critical theories that subjected the traditional theories to scrutiny. The prominent theorists are Eric Fromm (1900–1980), Friedrich Pollack (1894–1970), Walter Benjamin (1892–1940) and Max Horkheimer (1895–1973). The Frankfurt School gained global significance with Habermas developing a theory

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of society based on Hegelian and Marxian philosophy. The School falls into the broad philosophical movement called as post-Modernity. However, the Frankfurt School never addressed international relations in its critiques of the modern world and even Habermas hardly made a reference to it (Devetak, 2005, p. 140). The Critical International theory highlights the increasing interconnectedness that enables political communities, emphasizing the Universalist principles of justice, and concerns itself with explaining the reality of world politics. The emergence of behavioral theories in the mid-twentieth century led to a split in the field of foreign policy analysis and international relations. Kenneth Waltz in his book Man, the State and War published in 1959, identified three levels of analysis: the individual level (first image), national level (second image), and the international system (third image) (Waltz, 1992, p. 10). The foreign policy analysis focuses on Waltz’s first and second image as it is an agent-centered field of research (Morin & Paquin, 2018, p. 8). It relies on actor-specific decision-making and places greater emphasis on the decision-making approach. Foreign policy analysis looks at factors such as personality of leaders, social groups, and bureaucracy. The field of International Relations focuses on Waltz’s third image. But even before we attempt to understand the causes and consequences of decision-making, it is important that we discuss how far the perception of leaders remain significant (Jervis, 1976, p. 219). For a logical understanding it is better to distinguish between the operational milieu (the world in which policy is carried out) and the psychological milieu (the world as seen by the decision-maker) and clarify that strategies and choices must be facilitated by the statesmen’s goals, calculations, and perceptions (Jervis, 1976, p. 15). An event, condition, or an outcome can be understood by raising the question “why”. Decision-making can be assessed at four different levels: bureaucracy, domestic factors, nature of the state, and international environment. As a subfield of IR, the study of foreign policy emphasizes the external behavior of states in the international system through their respective government or persons authorized to carry on activities of the government. States formulate foreign policy to serve their respective national interests. Margret Herman theorizes political leadership in the forging of policy maintaining that political leadership and foreign policy can be studied by examining the decision units—leaders. Leaders define the state’s international and domestic constraints and based on their individual perceptions and interpretations, they build expectations, plan

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strategy, and urge actions on the government that confirm their judgment about what is possible and likely to keep them in a position of power (Hermann & Hagan, 1998, p. 126). Scholars such as Graham Allison, Michael Brecher, Alexander George, Morton Halperin, Ole Holsti, Irving Janis, Robert Jervis, Ernest May, James Rosenau, and Richard Snyder have explored how leaders perceive and interpret constraints in their international and domestic environments, make decisions, and manage domestic political pressure in their foreign policy choices (Hermann & Hagan, 1998, p. 125). What a leader infers is based on beliefs, experience, ambition, and an understanding of the political situation. 2.3.1

Impact of Decision-Makers

If the study of IR is grounded on human decision-makers, either as individuals or a group, then foreign policy can be better grasped with human decision-makers as one of the referent objects. Thus, the impact of decision-makers on consequences, known and unknown, on international relations and foreign policies demands attention. Foreign policy decisions should be seen primarily as heightened moments of commitment in a perpetual process of action and reaction, and further action and reaction at many different levels, involving a range of different actors (Hudson & Vore, 1995, p. 214), at different stages of decision-making. This could become the point of inquiry, deliberation, and discussion in terms of problem identification, framing an insight into an advanced stage of goal prioritization, planning and assessment study. Every foreign policy decision is meant to have an outcome, but the absolute success of a policy can be rare. Individual leaders can exert influence on foreign policy; perhaps they have the institutional and political capacity, the willingness, and the political opportunity to make decisions (Morin & Paquin, 2018, p. 7). But experts initially lacked a holistic approach, and there was a void in explaining individual personality and its influence on foreign policy decision-making. Gradually, the study of leaders gained prominence in the analysis of foreign policy. One reason for this could be that, while the statement that leaders matter in international politics is a simple one, it is impossible to answer fully. The extent of the impact can perhaps be determined by identifying the point when the individual came into a position of influence and changes thereafter (Jervis, 1976, p. 154).

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Kenneth Waltz stated that the nature and behavior of men was too complex and idiosyncratic for a systematic inquiry but acknowledged their defining role as leaders (Waltz, 1992, p. 501). The story of Prussia’s reprieve is an extreme example of the role that individuals play in international relations (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p. 108). Political and religious thinkers have penned men as both optimists and pessimists, emphasizing elements of human influence on world history events. The onset of the Cold War was followed by the Behavioral Revolution in 1960. World events began to be understood through the lens of bipolarity rather than in terms of individual American or Soviet leaders (Morin & Paquin, 2018, p. 70). The literature on IR placed international and domestic issues as the principal factors impacting leadership decisions. Several political scientists argued that individuals mattered but did not really shape world events—that they may matter in specific circumstances. From the theoretical perspective of IR, studies remained limited. When he became the National Security Advisor for President Nixon, Henry Kissinger recognized that different personalities impact their environment in different ways (Byman & Pollack, 2001, p. 109) and that it was essential to study the individual’s impact on foreign policy decision-making. The first question to be asked is, do the decision-maker’s perceptions matter? (Jervis, 1976, p. 13). Scholars such as Snyder, Harold and Margret explained the importance of perception in foreign policy decision-making (Hudson, 2012, p. 13). It provides one of the bases of understanding world politics and events. Leaders perceive a situation, consider possibilities, and implement their decisions (Dyson, 2014, p. 8). These perceptions and calculations of decision-makers are critical in their choices when policymaking. It is the psychological and operational milieu in which the decision-makers operate that provides a logical claim to world events. The policymaker’s goals, calculations, and perceptions at the subconscious level can be a satisfying method of explaining leader behavior. Individual, pre-existing beliefs are critical: they provide a precise understanding of the worldview of leaders, which, because a perceived world can lose objectivity, may be subjective. A leader’s use of a past event, “learning from history”, as an analogy for a contemporary one (Jervis, 1976, p. 218), for instance, shows how perceptions govern decisionmaking. Past incidents offer essential lessons for leaders, especially if they

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regard an occurrence as impossible or have never thought about it (Jervis, 1976, p. 20). In such cases, they develop specific strategies and methods to justify their actions. British perceptions of the Middle East and American politics formed the basis of Truman’s Palestine policy (Jervis, 1976, p. 223). The other aspects of decision-making that come into play are bureaucracy, domestic politics, and the international environment, which assist in predicting actor behavior (Jervis, 1976, p. 15). Bureaucratic bargains and routines influence state policies and, in turn, determine a statesman’s decisions. Policy variations among decision-makers may be accounted for by changes in social and economic structure, national culture, tradition, and domestic politics of the state they are serving (Jervis, 1976, p. 21). The international environment also determines state behavior. The example of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan stand out because they are rare (Jervis, 1976, p. 20). The external environment can restrict a decision-maker’s choice of alternatives. 2.3.2

Political Leadership and Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Leaders can conceive and articulate goals that lift people out of their petty preoccupations, carry them above conflicts that tear a society apart and unite them in pursuit of objectives worthy of their efforts (Rhodes & Hart, 2014, p. 3). Evaluating leaders and their approaches remain crucial in understanding foreign policy decision-making. Several aspects affect policymaking, but the most decisive is the influence leadership styles have on the choices. With changing global dynamics, a leader’s perspective on policymaking continues to remain significant. Political leaders regularly face several dilemmas while making policy decisions and leaders who consider that they can impact the events in the world are generally more engrossed and active in policymaking. Works by scholars such as Alexander George, Ole Holsti, Robert Jervis, Graham Allison, Michael Brecher, James N. Rosenau, Ernest May, and Richard Snyder emphasize the pivotal role of leaders in the decisionmaking process. An evaluation of individual differences reveals a set of orientations that guide how presidents, prime ministers, heads of parties, and premiers interact with those they lead and share power. These orientations suggest a leadership style, which indicates the way these leaders relate to those around them—whether they are constituents, advisors, or

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other leaders—and how they structure interactions and the norms, rules, and principles they use to guide such interactions. To understand the above we must look at two critical questions: 1. Who are the actors involved in foreign policy decision-making? 2. What is the impact of these decision units on foreign policy? Though we see numerous units, domestic and international factors that influence foreign policy decisions, what cannot be ignored is the fact that policies are made by people or individuals who are at the helm of affairs in the government—people who can make decisions. Hence, conversations on foreign policy and international politics will remain incomplete if leaders and leadership are not discussed or evaluated. Studying the decision-making process is essential as it provides a better understanding of a country’s behavior in the international arena. Individual leaders are one of the three forms of decision-making units that explain types of outcomes in foreign policy decision-making. The lack of a theoretical framework on leaders and decision-making in mainstream IR theory has hindered an exploration of the contribution of leaders and decision-makers to foreign policy change. Such studies will provide greater clarity on foreign policy. This is because the fact that foreign policy decisions are often based on the perception and beliefs of individual leaders cannot be ignored. Reflecting on the perspective of the policymaker, Louis Halle, a former US State Department planner, wrote that the foreign policy of a nation addresses itself not to the external world as is commonly stated, but rather to an image of the external world that is in the minds of those who make foreign policy (George, 1969, p. 191). In his Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Robert Jervis described how “the requirements of political leadership coupled with the costs of dissenting from the established view could lead foreign policy decision-makers to withhold doubts about the existing policies” (Jervis, 1976, p. 24). Leadership dynamics provide a more in-depth understanding of foreign policy. But traditional theories of IR have relegated the role of leaders to a secondary status. No theories other than Realism and Balance of Power dominate the Cold War period. Kenneth Waltz recognized the idea that leaders outweigh the structure. Scholarly works on personality and politics have tried to place the relationship between leader and environment in a

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framework within political psychology. Most often, however, the leader’s image is seen more as a firefighter—merely responding to events or global occurrences. Irrespective of the system, leaders face particular common challenges that could impact their political goals. Confronting issues from the environment, the structure, and select strategies to harness support, such as identifying a wider audience, buying them, framing threats, etc. History provides many illustrations of this, such as the way Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez drew in the people by creating an anti-American euphoria; Chinese leaders solidified support through heightened nationalism; US president Nixon tried to pull domestic sympathy for the Vietnam war; US President Bush’s “Operation Enduring Freedom” and the call for a global was on terrorism after 9/11. Leaders have a profound impact on the policies formulated by the government. They adopt several ways of handling the policymaking process around them, in particular, by managing the deliberative process and structure. There is a link between leadership style and policy decisions. As leaders use several ways and means to exercise their power, a variety of leadership styles influence the overall foreign policy and decision-making processes. In Changing Leadership Styles and Political Images, Victor Vine quotes Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba to point out that political style represents the way political beliefs shape politics (Le Vine, 1977, p. 631). A country’s foreign policy is, therefore, an interplay of history, past experiences and perceptions of ruling elites, and a combination of domestic and international factors. It is a reflection or aspiration of the multitude of people that are represented by political leaders and is influenced by the preferences and perceptions of the leader who is involved in the task of foreign policymaking. The perception of the leader is one of the key determinants of foreign policy formulation. The leader remains a dominant force in foreign policy irrespective of the forms of government or leadership styles. It is the beliefs and ideology of the leaders that make a foreign policy the “right” one to pursue. In addition, the overall success of foreign policy also depends on the personality of a leader, making leadership a significant aspect of foreign policymaking. Across many fields of endeavor, leadership has been recognized as the most important variable influencing the success or failure of various activities, ranging from military campaigns to the character and quality of nation-state foreign and domestic policy (Preston, 2017, p. 1). In his

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writing on the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides highlighted how individual leaders and their styles played a significant role in decision-making. Similarly, the writings of Machiavelli mention the difference individual leaders can bring about. From the Great Man focus of early leadership to the much-nuanced treatment of today, the subfield of foreign policy analysis has been at the forefront of efforts to explore the role of leadership in foreign policymaking within the discipline of political science (Preston, 2017, p. 2). Greenstein suggested three propositions on the individual actor’s influence on events: the environment; location of the actor; and the strength and weakness of the individual actor (personality style) (Preston, 2017, p. 2). Hermann identified a set of propositions, isolating specific conditions under which the personality characteristics of leaders are expected to influence foreign policy decisions and behavior: beliefs, motives, decision style, and interpersonal style (Hermann, 1980, p. 8). Belief refers to the fundamental assumptions of the political leader’s view of the world: Are events predictable? Is conflict the basis of human interaction? Can events be controlled? Is national sovereignty and territory the most important objective of a nation? And the suggestion is that the political leaders’ beliefs validate changes (Hermann, 1980, p. 9). Motives appear to impact political leaders’ understanding of their environment and, therefore, the strategies they adopt. Individual style is important in understanding how leaders go about making decisions. Interpersonal style explains the way policymakers deal with other policymakers. Personal characteristics form a personal orientation to behavior. Interest in foreign affairs acts as the motivating force and the outcome is greater participation in the making of foreign policy (Hermann, 1980, p. 12). Heads of government will always want to be consulted on decisions and to be involved in what is happening in foreign affairs, but the greater the interest in foreign affairs, the more value the leader will place on external relations. The impact, consequence, and contribution of individual leaders to world politics have become more important and have resulted in an increasing number of studies on leaders and leadership. The influence of political leadership in defining the state’s interest and its orientation towards international affairs has significantly augmented the scope and study of the subject. Several theories of international politics and foreign policy hypothesize that leaders are lawful and, hence, act on behalf of the state. Numerous studies relating to the predicament of

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World War I described national actors as the key decision-makers on foreign policy choices (Holsti, 1970, p. 309). Research reveals that this understanding is not simply an aggregation of data collected, but rather is based on empirical findings that elucidate the outcome of personal factors in decision-making (Holsti, 1970, p. 303). The data was gathered from diplomatic documents written by specific foreign policy leaders during the period between the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28 and England’s entry into the war at midnight on August 4, 1914 (Holsti, 1970, p. 304). The most comprehensively used data included were 1,096 insights into international hostility. Likewise, the foreign policy decisions during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 underlined the capability of President Kennedy in identifying several options, for both the United States and the Soviet Union, thus prolonging the decision time for both countries, and opening up numerous channels of communication. Leaders outline the challenges and constraints a state faces at the domestic and international levels. Their perception, beliefs, goals, experiences, and sensitivity to political context allows them to create a plan of action (Hermann, 2001, p. 64). Several examples explain the perceptions and beliefs of leaders and their view of the world, which, in turn, become decisive in foreign policy decision-making. Emphasizing the vulnerability of empires, Charles Kupchan observed that it was the entrenched belief that their state was vulnerable that led leaders of declining states to appease powers they perceived as rising. Leaders share their perceptions and version of the world order. Their behavior and approach reflect the period in which they are born. It is contextualized within the political scenario to which they belong, and which shapes their preferences. For example, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Cuban President Fidel Castro are more persuaders than people who could be persuaded (Hermann, 2001, p. 66). There are times when domestic pressure outweighs balancing foreign opinion and examples of such situations are the Cultural Revolution of China and the Botha regime in South Africa. Another aspect is the strategic attribution as filtered through the lens of the leadership. Lack of exposure can constrain leaders to be limited by their perception and understanding of a problem. The backlash to Nikita Khrushchev’s attempt to deploy Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962 is a classic example of improper assessment of the world political situation by a leader (Hermann, 2001, p. 51).

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Policymakers work on an actor-specific model and it is imperative to assess the type of state and the position of the state in the world order when attempting to understand leader preferences and perceptions. The nature of decision-making varies among individual leaders, for example, Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping, a single group such as the junta in Burma, or a ruling coalition. When a single predominant leader makes a decision, it is the individual leader who comes into focus, while in the case of the group it is the bureaucratic framework that could come into play. Decision-makers are compelled to find alternate decisions and provide alternative solutions. A classic example is the approach of the American statesmen in the Cold War era, who viewed communism as the greatest threat and menace to the security of the United States of America, and made it the derivative for American foreign policy during the period. Decision-makers operate in the domestic and external environment and a psychological milieu that adds to their perception of the world. The external environment includes the balance of power and polarity exhibited in the international structure. The domestic environment includes several categories such as history, culture, values, and political structure. Both the domestic and external environments together create an operating environment in which events occur. The psychological environment wherein events play out depends on the way the decision-makers perceive them. U. S. President Eisenhower’s foreign policy more closely resembled that of his predecessor than it did in his campaign rhetoric (Jervis, 1976, p. 22). In the case of the United States President Kennedy on Vietnam, the argument raised by those who favored war, saw it as an extension of the decisions made by the earlier presidents. The way these policies were viewed is a matter of concern and there are several arguments about the way they can be interpreted or understood. The decisions were attributed to either international or domestic constraints and very few differences were traced to the identity of the president. It is impractical to understand critical decisions and policies without any reference to the decision-maker’s dogmas about the world and understanding of other leaders. These have a direct impact on behavior and any other level of analysis cannot immediately present a better insight into decisions made. For example, the decision to escalate the Vietnam War in the hope of victory was the result of the decision-maker’s belief that saving Vietnam was important enough to justify the expected rise in deaths (Jervis, 1976, p. 9). Perceptible differences among individual leaders can be seen in decisions on war and diplomacy. For example,

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Thatcher’s Britain and Reagan’s America were distinctly different from what came before and changed the basis of polity in the United Kingdom and the United States (Breslin, 2008, p. 215). Despite the individual, external, and internal determinants, as a level of analysis the bureaucracy cannot be ignored since its functioning may determine policy. The case of President Nixon in the Watergate scandal refers not to a single individual behavior but a product of set interactions involving several layers of decision units. That begs the question, are policy preferences determined by one’s role within the government? The answer: role does not define all the answers. There are two ways to look at bureaucratic operability—as various parts of the government that implement or may not implement policies in ways that are compatible with established preferences and practices rather than with the decisions of national leaders; and as authoritative decision making units that can be elucidated by the interface with the bureaucratic stand. In the context of foreign policy, it is difficult to act effectively internationally if policies lack domestic acceptability. Political decisionmakers assess domestic sentiment along with the international situation (Farnham, 2004, p. 445). For political leadership, acceptance and acceptability of decisions is a predominant concern. Unless there is a domestic acceptability, especially of foreign policy, it is difficult for policymakers to act effectively. The Cuban missile crisis where President Kennedy developed a trade-off relationship to avert nuclear crisis is an example of this. What cannot be ignored is the role of the many decision units in foreign policymaking. They shape the nature of the foreign policy. Variation in personality and style plays a decisive role in shaping or altering foreign policy. The framework provided herewith gives a better theoretical understanding on the role of individual decision-makers in the foreign policy of a country. The study highlights the role of national leaders in shaping the content and effectiveness of foreign policy (Rosenau, 1963, p. 3). 2.3.3

Political Leadership in the Context of China

Political leaders dominate in the life and politics of all nations. Leaders wield more power in an authoritarian or a totalitarian system and China is one such example. Unconstrained by power, the leaders action remains decisive and has an immense effect on the society. The study of the

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Chinese leader personality- eccentricities, style, and institutional power and influence warrants a closer scrutiny. Understanding Chinese leaders from different “prisms and models” that have been established to scrutinize leadership and authority (reference) indicates that (Shambaugh, 2002, p. 3). Chinese leadership exhibits the Weberian style of leadershipcharismatic, traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational criteria. traditional authority is deeply rooted in the custom; charismatic authority displays greater reverence to the leader; and rational-legal authority is anchored in the constitutional and legal norms. Commonalities exist among the leadership. The leaders are very proud of the country’s long history and are driven by the historical past. History manifests several aspects such as national identity, oppression, self-doubt, and a sense of uprightness in foreign affairs. A strong sense of national pride working to enhance China’s global image remains a key binding force among Chinese leaders. Chinese leaders believe that China must be protected by the Chinese themselves and view outsiders as irrelevant. The leaders sought to build an economically strong China and were committed to making the country wealthy and strong. Contemporary Chinese leaders who ruled China after 1949 continued to follow the lines of their predecessors. The leaders were committed to development and to absolve China of its poverty, at the same time each had his own formula towards attaining these goals. Chinese leaders are driven by historical and cultural traditions. The leaders are essentially benevolent and exhibit great morality in their behavior. While a benevolent attitude is preferred, oppression against usurpers is befitting to preserve the virtue of the regime. China essentially comprised of the Han dynasty and other ethnic groups are considered barbarians. The common belief is the Western powers are predatory and cannot be trusted. China is an ancient civilization and Chinese leaders deem it as a prerogative to restore global primacy. Being the leading Asian power, China prefers deferential treatment from its neighbors. Beginning from the late eighteenth century China was subjected to humiliation and disgrace by the foreign powers. The Chinese leaders inculcated a strong sense of nationalism among the people. Chinese leaders are known to have ruled large and diverse territories for over a thousand years and have well-articulated leadership tasks since the pre-Qin era (p. 66). Chinese Communist leaders are deeply influenced by the Leninist Party style. The Party structure is unique to Communist Parties and comprises of the Politburo, Politburo Standing Committee,

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Central Committee, Party Committees, and Party groups and are deeply rooted within the mainstream institutions in the society. Leaders are at the core of Chinese philosophy and aim to empower them. Leaders are deeply influenced by the Confucian, Legalist, and Daoist approaches that placed the quality and character of a leader at the center. Leaders exhibit qualities of humanness and well-being of the people. The leader has the accountability to implement policies in the interest of the people. Traditionally Chinese leaders play a dominant role in identifying their successors. Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin in their capacity identified their respective successors. The other aspect of leadership is the shift from the traditional strongman to a more collective leadership style. The new leadership shifted from transformational to a transactional style of leadership. Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping reflected a transformational style, while Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping were more transactional in their approach. Max Weber categorized leadership based on authority, legitimacy, and power. The three approaches to leadership are traditional authority rooted in custom, charismatic authority anchored in personality/character, and legal-rational authority in norms. Society evolves based on charismatic grounds and then moves to being based on norms. From Mao to Deng then to Jiang to Hu and Xi reflected Weberian approach to leadership. The Chinese leadership reflected a mix of traditional charismatic and legalrational approaches. All the five leaders Mao, Deng, Jiang, Hu, and Xi inherited a traditional-hierarchical style of leadership that described China since its foundations. Mao, Deng, and Xi reflected charismatic style, through their personality were able to influence the multitudes. Jiang and Hu were outgoing and sociable but were not charismatic. American Political scientist Mac Gregor Burns in his seminal book on Leadership put forth examples of transformational and transactional leadership. Leaders such as Mao, Deng, and Xi could be placed under the category of transformational leaders with an unconventional style and transformed the opinions of the follower. All the three leaders Mao, Deng, and Xi strongly exhibited a deep sense of national commitment. Mao’s egalitarian socialism, Deng’s economic empowerment, and Xi’s anti-corruption campaign. Jiang and Hu were transactional leaders who demonstrated a managerial style of leadership tilted more towards consent building. According to Blondel authoritarian leaders maximize coercive powers. Mao, Deng, and Xi could

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be placed in the category of authoritarian leaders who demonstrated coercive tendencies. Jiang and Hu were less despotic in their approach. The leaders were born at different times and were confronted with challenges unique to their respective periods. Faced with various issues Mao inherited a newly independent state, Deng bequeathed an anarchic society, Jiang took over the post-1989 China departed from the policies enunciated by Deng, Hu more or less toed similar lines except China became more proactive and Xi departed from the Dengist dictum of low profile to a more active foreign policy.

2.4

Conclusion

Political leadership is a dynamic process that must be understood from historical, socio-political, and cultural contexts. This vast and interdisciplinary nature of the subject makes it overwhelming and complicated to study. Post the middle and classical ages, the scholarly discourse on leadership ran into a tremendous intellectual deficit. Studies on leaders and policymaking became very narrow or closed, remaining purely subjective and descriptive. The numerous biographies, narratives, definitions, and theoretical constructs became mere literature on leaders, not on their contribution to foreign policy. They resulted in a downplaying of the significance of leaders in foreign policy. Political leadership does influence foreign policymaking. It remains one of the most critical variables influencing the success or failure of several activities, including domestic and foreign policies. While most leaders consider themselves being the vital driving force behind foreign policy changes, the greater a leader’s interest in foreign policy, the stronger the impact of his personality upon foreign policy behavior as he has specific goals, motivation, and style, in addition to the power and authority to influence foreign policy. Theoretical constructs such as Realism, the balance of power, anarchy, and economic and military power pushed an examination of the personality and influence of foreign policy leaders to the background. In their work Foreign Policy Decision-Making, Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin challenged the orthodoxy of state-centered Realism by calling scholars to open up the black box of decision-making to explain foreign policymaking (Preston, 2017, p. 13). Machiavelli’s writings provided a guide to individual action. The study of leaders in foreign policy remains one of its important domestic determinants. From the Great Man focus of early leadership

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studies to the contemporary treatments of today, the subfield of foreign policy analysis explores the role of leadership in foreign policy decisionmaking. The study of personality and its influence on foreign policy is an interesting angle that continues to gain importance. For this reason, we must continue building awareness on the importance of leaders and place them in proper context in our analysis. The theoretical framework provided is an attempt to examine the influence a leader wields in formulating foreign policy irrespective of the political system. Leaders do take objectives and interests into consideration while formulating decisions, however, foreign policy is largely designed in a way that captures priorities and choices based on the perception of the leader. For the Chinese, foreign policy was a comprehensive design for interaction with other countries and was shaped by the perceptions of the political leadership, which played a decisive role in its formulation. Deng’s interest in foreign affairs was visible in his interaction with the outside world. Thus, a theoretical framework endorses the view that foreign policy derives from the actions of leaders—that the influence of personality is obvious and is a key determinant of foreign policy.

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CHAPTER 3

Political Leadership in China: A Historical Perspective

3.1

Introduction

Ancient Chinese philosophy refers to a set of beliefs or ideas developed by philosophers during the period known as the Hundred Schools of Thought. Of these, those that gained influence and prominence were Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism. China’s important classical philosophers were Confucius and Mencius (Confucianism), Lao Zi (Daoism) and Shang Yang, Li Si and Hanfezi (Legalism) and Sun Tzu. For Chinese political leaders, natural disposition is a combination of the values and ethics of Confucian, Daoist, and the Legalist tradition that derive from the ideal pursuit of the Confucian nobleman, the Daoist sage, and the enlightened leader (Guo, 2003, p. 15). Traditional Chinese philosophy is linked to the individual and society in that it influences the behavior and thought process of all citizens, including the leaders. According to Chinese philosophers, man should be perfect in order to achieve peace and order. The salient feature of Chinese thought can, therefore, be summed up in terms of the “Mandate of Heaven” whereby rulers may continue to rule as long as they delivered justice with wisdom. History regards China as a source of a variety of intellectual, philosophical, and ideological traditions (Canchu, 2008, p. 304), which are expressed through a set of assumptions, beliefs, ideas, and attitudes of political elites, and developed and perpetuated by Chinese rulers over many centuries. The old China lived in its ancient past, and contemporary © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 P. Suresh, Foreign Policy of China Under Deng Xiaoping, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4764-3_3

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China uses its ancient past to serve the present. Its sheer size, selfsufficiency, the tribute system, and Sino centrism have compounded the notion of Chinese superiority (Fairbank, 1969, p. 461). In what way does this history influence the contemporary Chinese leader? Michael Swaine explains it in terms of “pride in the nation’, the image of a peace-loving nation and a defensive polity alongside a virtuous central government, and a uniquely hierarchical but mutually beneficial interstate relationship (Swaine, 2015, thediplomat.com). The Chinese pride in their culture and long history continues to influence the thinking of contemporary political leaders. The personality of Chinese political leaders, therefore, is a reflection of the ethics and values of Confucian, Daoist, Legalist traditions, and Sun Tzu (Guo, 2002, p. 15). Their actions reflect the lessons of history. Both ancient and contemporary leaders exhibit “Chinese” characteristics that have given them a unique place in the world. This chapter examines the following questions: How far have the philosophical-historical underpinnings influenced contemporary political leadership, and, in what way have they influenced Deng’s leadership style in particular?

3.2 Philosophical Context of Political Leadership Confucianism, Daoism, Legalism, as well as Sun Tzu have all influenced the creation of a comprehensive socio-political order and these ideas and concepts of the past continue to be relevant when studying Chinese leaders and foreign policy even in the present day. In Chinese culture, personality is a significant factor that regulates the pursuit of political effort. Rule of virtue, according to Confucius, can be compared to the “Pole Star, which commands homage from a multitude of stars without moving from its place” (Leung, 2002, p. 27). All philosophies are shaped by primary concepts and values: family, lineage, intra-family hierarchy, honor and obedience, rites, ritual, interpersonal and inter-role relationships that include traditional systems of authority by ruler, lord, and teacher. Chinese culture and philosophy placed the “Mandate of Heaven” as the philosophical basis for lawful administration, influencing the major view of rulers (Zhao, 2009, p. 419). The Early Period in Chinese history saw the kings accepted as supreme leaders: having descended from God, they had the ultimate authority to rule. Unlike the philosopher kings of Plato, under Confucianism, the ruler

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was supreme. Chinese culture sees nature as a key influence in “regulating political figures and their moral behavior—the Confucian sage-king represented perfection of the ‘moral’ personality” (Guo, 2002, p. 912). Confucianism and Daoism encouraged internal harmony, peace, compassion, empathy, discipline, and wisdom. The Legalist doctrine rationalized the legal system through which rulers could effectively maintain social order (Wah, 2009, p. 68). Sun Tzu’s political philosophy emphasized war as an essential element of state policy and, as a political realist, he was conscious of the danger that was present in the international environment and called for preparedness. Chinese philosophy and thought, therefore, greatly influences the personalities of Chinese political leaders—it shapes their conduct and forms their personalities. 3.2.1

Confucianism and Political Leadership

Confucianism is the way of life propounded by Confucius, the sixth– fifth century BCE Chinese philosopher (britannica.com). The interplay of moral values and political beliefs made Confucianism the dominant practice in Chinese history. It was politicized and Confucian values were made to serve the interest of the emperors (Guo, 2002, p. 2827). Several features of contemporary Chinese political leadership have their roots in ancient Chinese philosophy and this normative set of practices and ideas perpetuated by the ruler continues to play a decisive role in determining the behavior of today’s political leaders. Confucius “likened the rule of virtue to the Pole Star” (The Analects , 12:1). Power was bestowed “on the ‘Son of Heaven’, who controlled li (里 ceremonies) and fa (发regulations)” (Fairbank, 1968, p. 45). Society paid reverence to the individual at the top rather than abiding by impersonal concepts such as state, people, or nation, (Fairbank, 1968, p. 42). Rulers in Chinese society enjoyed a special position and privileges, which were regarded as sacrosanct. Based on several works of literature, in-depth analysis, and study of The Analects , “it is possible to identify five qualities of an effective leader: moral character, proper conduct, humanity, life-long learning, and maintaining balance” (Wah, 2003, p. 41). Moral character was the foundation for a good leader. Chinese philosophers and thinkers such as Confucius completely understood the significance and importance of good leadership and reiterated the need for a good political order through the authority of one

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key figure: the ruler (Leung, 2002, p. 27). A good government depicts the moral role and value of a leader. Confucius said that to govern is to do things correctly and “if you set an example by being correct, who would then dare to remain incorrect” (The Analects , 12:17). According to Confucian philosophy, “leadership aimed to elevate the human species to new heights summed up as “ren” (人 person)” (Chang, 2012, p. 401). To govern means to guide, and the role of leadership is to lead the people. Confucius provided a multifaceted treatise of the many features of an excellent ruler. A ruler must attract people by moral excellence rather than by fear of penalty. He must be clear and objective, a good listener, be warm, sincere, dangerous, and righteous (Wah, 2003, p. 65). He must also be unfailingly respectful. The ruler has to lead people with dignity, and, in turn, they will remain loyal. The three core Confucian values are: qin qin (亲亲being harmonious), zun zun (尊尊 being respectful), and xian xian (显现 being virtuous). (Appelbaum & Croft, 1995, p. 203)

It was Confucius who envisaged a golden period in which rulers governed through moral example, people practiced time-honored rituals, and social harmony prevailed throughout the land. He hoped this approach could become the law of the land where, as a result, peace and harmony would prevail. During the Han dynasty, Confucianism as a way of life gained relevance and served as the ideological prop of imperial China. Every ruler embraced Confucian philosophy as the cardinal principle to govern the people. Grounded in the traditional Chinese beliefs of Buddhism and Daoism, the Confucian leadership style emphasized humane values. The Chinese political tradition puts the human being at the center of the universe, and the value of populism was the foundation of Confucian political theory. In the 2000-year long history of China, The Analects have inspired several people in different walks of life. Confucian teachings on benevolent government and people-oriented governance continue to be relevant in the contemporary context. Chinese political thinkers believe that common people’s aspirations are the basis of political stability and successful political rule. Therefore, the ruler must attach importance to the people. The subject of leadership continues to be pertinent wherever human beings have interacted to accomplish a task. There can be no one single

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approach to leadership. It is nation- and culture-specific (Mingzheng & Wu, 2014, p. 170). Distinct features in Chinese leadership style reflect the cultural emphasis on “guanxi” (关系 relationship), where followers pay obeisance without questioning and a high moral component is rooted in traditional culture (Mingzheng & Wu, 2014, p. 169). Confucian values emphasize that a virtuous leader can be a living example and influence the behavior of the subject. Chinese leaders have been deeply influenced by the Confucian Analects. The nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek drew its influence from Confucian principles. The Three Great Principles, also called the Three Principles of the People, were the ideological basis of the political program of the Chinese leader Sun Yat-sen who championed the principles of socialism, democracy, and nationalism. Confucianism as a philosophy thrived but, in an agrarian society, it lacked the dynamism to embrace the needs of modernization (Ohja, 1969, p. 24). Though it tried to bridge the gap between the basics of economics and politics of scarcity, since it could not provide a remedy to Western imperialism and challenges, it virtually faded away. Further, in values and deeds Confucianism was discouraged throughout Mao’s period and was almost wiped out on the Chinese mainland after the CPC came to power in 1949. It was not until the 1980s that, as result of the opening and reform, schools and universities gradually started imparting education on Confucian values and practices. 3.2.2

Daoism and Political Leadership

Daoism is one of the critical schools of thought or philosophies that emerged during the Warring States Period in ancient Chinese history (600–300 BCE), a turbulent period when people suffered the ravages of war, poverty, and disease (Johnson, 2000, p. 82). Daoism can be called “the other way” and it has coexisted alongside the Confucian tradition. The different schools of thought offered advice to the ruler on restoring normalcy in society. Daoism’s two major texts are Tai Tao Ching and Chuang Tzu (Johnson, 2000, p. 84). The texts detail the way of nature, the method of “Ultimate Reality, the Law of Nature, humanistic behavior, virtues, character, the influence of moral force” (Lee, 2003, p. 68). Concerned about the prevailing social strife and tragedy, the Daoist’s aimed at propagating humanistic philosophy that emphasized the role of the ruler and the correct way to resolve contentious issues.

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Daoism focuses on the qualities of “humaneness and morality in promoting a junzi personality” (Guo, 2002, p. 967). Compared with Confucian principles, Daoists are in accord with the flow of nature— “Dao or the Way”. Their sensitivity to ways of nature encouraged them to “reject human ideas or standards that might lead to a greater assertiveness over nature through too strong a commitment to the achievement of worldly goals” (Guo, 2002, p. 962). According to Daoism, unnatural assertiveness is the root cause of violence and aggression. Daoism’s doctrine highlighted that a wise ruler chooses the middle path and practices moderation. The standard norm in “Chinese society is when a leader interacts with the community and pursues political power; he embraces Confucian ideas with Daoist thought” (Guo, 2002, p. 1117). Daoist philosophy encourages leaders to base themselves more on the idea of “non-interference and promotes the use of dialectic rules such as wisdom and intelligence in social and political interactions” (Guo, 2002, p. 1134). Daoism believes that change is a constant process, but the way to address change continues to be static. Daoism speaks about the “truth of life, human nature, pettiness, selfishness, openness, tolerance, harmony, peace, and opposition to war” (Lee, 2003, p. 65). According to the Daoist, the best approach to avoid social conflict and war is by applying the “water personality method of lying low and not competing yet being strong and sturdy” (Guo, 2002, p. 1164). Humility and modesty remain the best characteristics of a successful leader. An essential trait for leaders is a concern for the welfare of others. The Daoist raises the leader to the position of a sage or a benevolent ruler. The ideal Daoist leader maintains a “low profile, leading mostly by example” (Johnson, 2000, p. 84). Daoist “humanism is more of a philosophy than a religion and is a way of life” (Hsieh, 2017, p. 257). The central concern is achieving political order and social harmony. Lao Zi encourages rulers to ensure their dominance and, thus, maintain social stability—highly pragmatic and manipulative advice that is oriented towards realpolitik (Guo, 2002, p. 1272). During the pre-Qin and the Han period, Daoist influence spread among Chinese thinkers and philosophers. Guanxi, an essential political treatise, absorbed Daoist philosophy and successfully “synthesized the thoughts of Huang-Lao Daoism and Daoist classics” (Guo, 2002, p. 1278). Daoism had a profound impact on Chinese society at the level of both “elite and popular culture” (Guo, 2002, p. 1300). Daoist strategic thought has had an enduring effect on the national character

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of China. It highlighted the theoretical basis of strategic behavior and had a lasting impact on the political elite. Daoist philosophy exhibits greater pragmatism and details how leaders can safeguard themselves, avoid damage, and lead a better life. 3.2.3

Legalism and Political Leadership

Legalism is a “ruler-centered political system which asserts that it is strict laws, and not moral persuasion that encourages people to be good” (Guo, 2002, p. 4067). The Legalists borrowed ideas of political tactics from Daoism. The doctrine was practiced during the Qin Empire (221– 206) and remained omnipresent in the study of early Chinese political philosophy. The Chinese political scholar Han Fei Tzu of the Han state explained the responsibility of a leader from a Legalist approach. In contrast to the teachings of Confucius and Mencius, the Legalist ruler believed that self-interest guided humans, and that inherent human nature was evil. Order in society was possible only through strict law and stringent punishment. This approach put into place a comprehensive legal framework for rulers that completely overlooked the human aspects. The Legalist employs three themes: “techniques (shu,術), political authority (shi,勢), and penal law (fa 法), to ensure control over subordinates and support for the position of the ruler over the ruled” (Guo, 2002, p. 2185). The art of ruling is based on the proficient use of political strategy and manipulation to protect the ruler. Legalism assumes that human nature is harmful and therefore, relationships are based merely on benefit and outcome. The leader uses methods such as manipulation, deception, incentive, and price. Using power to control one’s followers remains the very basis of a leader’s approach. Legalism emphasizes human nature as multifaceted and evil and, therefore, placed greater emphasis on use of “knowledge and duplicity in social relations and political pursuit” (Guo, 2002, p. 63). An enlightened ruler had to use power to control subordinates. The political leader uses methods and techniques to avert his downfall. According to the Legalists, the state rests on the power of ruler and acceptance of authority is a natural process. Legalism coexisted with Confucianism.

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3.2.4

Sun Tzu’s Strategic Approach and Political Leadership

Sun Tzu’s political philosophy advocated that the best way to achieve peace is by quick victory, and at times it is better to defeat the enemy even before the war and the best way is to break the enemy’s resistance without fighting. Sun Tzu’s The Art of War elaborates a “strategy combining wisdom, science, and craft, making it a universally accepted and soughtafter skill” (Pardhasaradhi, 2015, p. 642). The Art of War was a treatise that helped the first emperor of China, Qin Shihuang, end the Age of the Warring States (McNeilly, 2001, p. 45). It is a discourse on strategies to achieve political outcomes that include negotiation, deception, diplomacy, espionage, and finally, war. An astute leader develops both strategy and action. Born in a family of military officers, at a time called the Warring State Period (475–221 BCE), when China was divided and engaged in perpetual warfare, Sun Tzu became adept at understanding military affairs; he was a philosopher-scholar who offered strategic and military expertise to rulers. The Art of War emphasizes the waging of war, “laying plans, attack by stratagem, tactical dispositions, energy, weak points, maneuvering, tactics, terrain, situation, attack by fire, and spies” (classics. mit.edu). It was a complete theory of war vital for the state. His manual is still widely used today to manage armies and conduct war (Ruggeiri, 2017, p. 45). Five factors determine the outcome of warfare: moral law, state of harmony, the unity of rulers and followers, and warfare conducted with the consent of the governed (Juergensmeyer & Kitts, 2011, p. 17). Engaging in warfare involves foresight, planning, integrating ideas, leadership, as well as the means to do so. Sun Tzu highlights not only warfare and statecraft but also military strategy (McNeilly, 2001, p. 6). The Art of War details certain critical traits and qualities of a successful military leader: character, the ability to motivate and direct, as well as military and diplomatic genius (McNeilly, 2001, p. 131). The leader or the commander recognizes the situation and acts swiftly, learns to appreciate sincerity, is adept at seizing an opportunity and emerging victorious, distributes rewards and punishment equally. War is a costly proposition. A leader, according to Sun Tzu, is a person of exemplary nature—a statement that has influenced many rulers, notable military thinkers, and strategists. The most significant contribution of Sun Tzu to both ancient and contemporary rulers, military thinkers, and strategists,

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however, are the fundamental strategic concepts that provide an in-depth understanding of the art of war. Traditional philosophical and cultural roots influence leaders’ behavior and Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalist doctrines remain the significant philosophies that influenced ancient and contemporary political leadership in China. The Chinese philosophical approach to political leadership embodies a worldly and pragmatic character. Philosophical assumptions regulate the pursuits of political figures and influence their moral behavior and personalities (Guo, 2002, p. 15). A political leader has heroic tendencies, humane values, concern for the welfare of the people, virtue and goodness, spiritual and political pursuits, and is a strategist (Guo, 2002, p. 113): a combination of the values and ethics of the Confucianist, Daoist, and Legalist traditions (Guo, 2002, p. 19).

3.3

Historical Approach to Political Leadership

Foreign policy is an important form of social action and foreign policymakers are considerably influenced by the socio-political-cultural milieu in which they operate. The foundation of China’s foreign policy was determined by the historical, cultural, and philosophical experiences that considerably shaped its approach to the world. The historical approach to political leadership remained important in shaping the leaders’ understanding of the world. The Chinese worldview is a reflection of its history. The country’s leaders are proud of their long history and are driven by their strong historical past. The lessons of history are manifest in several aspects of national identity: a sense of victimization and insecurity leading to a sense of righteousness in foreign affairs (Zhao, 2016, p. 1); a strong sense of national pride working to boost China’s image in the world; the pursuit of peace and harmony; historical references that are often used to achieve political and strategic objectives. The common elements that bind the leaders of the three periods— Imperial Period (221 BCE–1912), Nationalist/Republican (1912–1949), and Communist (1949 to the present)—are a reverence for Chinese culture and tradition and acceptance of hierarchy (Leung, 2002, p. 32). The belief that China can be saved by the Chinese themselves and, therefore, external collaboration is essentially irrelevant, called for a strong and charismatic leader (Russell, 1922, p. 2664). All leaders have been committed to safeguarding the nation and unswervingly believe in

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increasing China’s wealth and strength (Ohja, 1969, p. 24). Most were driven by the desire for power and desired to control the fate of China. At the same time not all of them were successful (Leung, 2002, p. 37). 3.3.1

Characteristics of Political Leadership: Imperial Period (221 BCE–1912 CE)

The Imperial Period was marked by a claim to authority by the rulers. The ruling elite, and the monarch in particular, was vested by the “Mandate of Heaven”, which provided full authority and unlimited power to rule the nation (Guo, 2002, p. 320). Supremacy rested on a monopoly on leadership, the performance of omnipresent functions, a claimed access to heaven and the heavenly spirit (Merle & Fairbank, 2006, p. 43). Even at that time leaders were keen to project a national self-image and followed a hierarchical world order. China’s engagement with the outside world was minimal almost until the mid-nineteenth century. The similarities between the diverse individuals who ruled and influenced the country over this lengthy period makes up a composite Confucian tradition that dominates Chinese history (Leung, 2002, p. 76). China’s relationship with its immediate neighbors was that of cultural superiority, while those farther distant were classed as barbarians (Zhao, 2016, p. 5). Clear boundaries demarcated China from those outsiders. As belonging to one of the oldest civilizations, the emperors felt they had very little to gain from the outside world. Their Sino-centric worldview placed China at the center of human civilization—hence the name Middle Kingdom. They developed a “pattern of Sinicization (丝尼兹砸提哦你) and truly believed that every non-Chinese should pay obeisance to Confucian virtue, values, and the civilization that upheld them” (Ohja, 1969, p. 20). The notion of the universal king, the “Son of Heaven”, who alone could preserve universal harmony, was deeply embedded. The emperors claimed cultural superiority and moral virtue. The idea of supremacy and authority in the world became the dominant paradigm among Chinese emperors. Paying respect began with the tributary system, which validated their political power, supremacy, and prominence (Zhao, 2016, p. 4). The emperors rightfully believed that absolute control was power and favored a hierarchical world order. That China and Confucianism alone provided a stable world order became the dominant paradigm of worldview among Chinese emperors. Chinese culture raised the “goodness of Chinese rulers

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emphasizing the promotion of the universal as a particular virtue of the emperor” (Zhao, 2016, p. 5). At the same time, the Chinese world order stressed ideological orthodoxy, making the emperor/ruler a highly venerated person. Confucianism played a dominant role in Imperial China’s strategic culture, defined in terms of cultural moralism (Zhang, 2002, p. 73). Despite Confucian ideals and virtues, the documentation of strategic culture emerged during the Imperial period. For leaders defending the socio-political-economic culture of the heartland, defense of and safeguarding the cultural borders, periphery control, and diplomacy remained key priorities (Zhang, 2002, p. 74). The emperors were careful not to allow the rise of rival authority or anything that might challenge their monopoly. Forts and garrison, such as the Great Wall of China built in the early Imperial Period, defended the Chinese heartland. War was the last resort, and a non-strategic culture dominated the approach among the leaders of Imperial China. At the same time Imperial rulers conducted expeditions and used war as an effective tool to manage interstate relations (Zhao, 2016, p. 13). The common trait among the leaders of Imperial, Nationalist/Republican, and also Communist China was the emphasis on Chinese characteristics. All of this emerged from a deep sense of history and tradition. Pre-modern Chinese foreign relations discouraged any form of interaction or association with foreign countries. This Middle Kingdom syndrome was no exception in the times, it was a common strategy among non-industrialized empires and civilizations of the time, where contact among equals was almost unknown in international relations, which resulted in a sense of superiority and pride and defined China’s approach to the outside world (Ohja, 1966, p. 9). This strategy of remoteness that China practiced also spilled over to the twentieth century. 3.3.2

Characteristics of Political Leadership: Nationalist Period (1912–1949)

The emphasis on “Chinese” characteristics is rooted in a deep sense of history and culture, both among modern and contemporary leaders. This made them unique in world politics. The common features that leaders exhibited were pride, ruthlessness and a desire for power. They were also bound by a deep sense of nationalism and aimed at doing the best for China.

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The National Democratic Revolt of 1912 overthrew the Qing dynasty and resulted in the creation of a republic. The early Republican Period (1912–1927), marked by the emergence of the warlord, was a consequence of the militarization of politics that had resulted in the fall of China’s last Imperial dynasty (McCord, 1992, p. 36). Yuan Shikai was an all-powerful political figure (Zenghui, 2018, p. 133). Yuan turned the crisis into opportunity, extracted concessions, and demanded there be a President (Yong, 2012, p. 15). Thereafter, he was the officially elected President of the Republic of China from 1911 to 1949. However, it was not a sense of Chinese nationalism that drove Yuan, but the desire to benefit himself (Leung, 2002, p. 2882). In an attempt to consolidate power, Yuan defied constitutional procedures and dissolved the parliament, pushing the country into a great disaster. The consolidation of power and the end of Imperialist rule brought in the beginning of a new era of government marked by the rise of the Nationalist state in China. Sun Yat-sen, known as the father of Modern China, was the leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang). He played an important role in overthrowing the Qing Dynasty and became the first provisional President of the Republic of China in 1911–1912. Sun Yat-sen formed a united front with the Chinese Communists and the Soviets in 1923–1924. He built an effective political system and spread a culture of nationalism. His death in 1925 resulted in a bitter struggle for leadership of the Nationalist movement (Eastman, 1986, p. 117). Sun Yat-sen envisaged a new republic. Reforms came with a lot of challenges because differences persisted over the type of reforms and between the Nationalist and the Communist. The Communists prevailed and formed the Republic of China in 1949. Chiang Kai-shek joined the Chinese Nationalist Party in 1918 and succeeded Sun Yat-sen as KMT leader in 1925. Most of Chiang Kai-shek’s thinking was shaped by China’s vulnerability and helplessness before the imperial powers. By the time he was eighteen, Chiang Kai-shek was a staunch revolutionary and a modern Confucianist trying to place neoConfucian ideas of modernization within the Chinese context. Despite the ultra-nationalist spirit Japan exhibited, Chiang spent a considerable time in Japan, and, his exposure to the West and modernization happened early. Though hungry for power he was, nevertheless, moved by Japanese culture and the heavily state-directed industrialization of the country (Guha, 2014, p. 837).

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Chiang sported an authoritarian outlook that shaped most of his decisions and he believed that it was right for China to wage war on its neighbors. He developed a personality cult with power centralized in the person of the President and little distinction was made between party and state (Taylor, 2010, p. 182). Chiang Kai-shek was the vital driving force in the institutional and bureaucratic development of the Nationalist government. To save China from foreign control, he encouraged the rise of an extremist party that practiced a radical model of modernizing China. Despite his commitment to a state-owned economy, he did not resist the private sector or foreign investment. He possessed many qualities similar to traditional rulers before him and never hesitated to strategize to consolidate his political power (Guo, 2002, p. 3134). When Chiang Kai-shek succeeded Sun Yat-sen as the KMT leader in 1925, he expelled the Communists from the party and led a successful unification of China. He was also faced with the task of combating Japanese aggression. In 1941 the Allies declared war on Japan and China was among the “big four”—the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Russia. The civil war that broke out in 1946 resulted in victory for the Communist Party and led to the formation of People’s Republic of China in 1949. From 1949, Chiang led the KMT government in exile from Taiwan. 3.3.3

Characteristics of Political Leadership: Communist Period (1949 to Date)

Most views of contemporary Chinese politics are shaped by a sense of victimization, insecurity and righteousness in foreign affairs (Zhao, 2016, p. 2). As a living tradition, history and culture play a significant role and exert an enduring influence on the attitudes and values of modern political leaders (Guo, 2002, p. 3729). The Communist leaders believe that they are repositories of unique values that need to be accepted by all and therefore, their political leadership must be accepted and acknowledged by all. It is these factors that have shaped China’s approach to the world. Specific ideological elements mark each of the three periods and reveal their common heritage in a tradition that favors a stable central government. While this belief is not necessarily unique to the Chinese per se, its expression allows a deep historical understanding of what it means to be Chinese. This reverence for Chinese culture reveals how, even the most

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“radical elements of contemporary politics could not shake off the residue of some traditional Chinese values and ideas” (Wah, 2009, p. 123). A particular set of challenges and the rise of anti-western sentiments in China led to the increase of highly motivated ideological and political figures at the beginning of the twentieth century (Ohja, 1969, p. 5). They believed that China could be saved by her own efforts and need not rely on any outside help (Russell, 1922, p. 3056). The deep sense of a national identity—of being Chinese—was the result of years of encroachment into China by foreign powers. The leaders exhibited a keen desire for order through the authority of one key figure—the ruler (Confucius, n.d.) as well as other fascinating characteristics that linked them to political leaders of other periods. The leaders of Communist China were bold, resolute, with a strong sense of camaraderie. They had an innate desire for power and control; put emphasis on Chinese characteristics; on the superiority of China’s political and cultural legacy; and welcomed change without compromising their “Chineseness”. Their distinctive characteristics were historically shaped, developed, revised, and self-transmitted from the very ancient past to contemporary times, with little care about the outside world. Chinese leadership continues to shape policies upholding its sovereignty, power, and ideology (Kane, 2001, p. 45). Its leaders have not forgotten the shame and suppression they experienced at the hands of foreigners. They are very much aware of the honorable legacy they have been bequeathed and so are guided by a sense of pride, stability, responsibility, and vision. They want to ensure that their State will be able to determine its own destiny. Mao Tse-Tung belonged to the transition generation and his political views were a reflection of his ideas. His thoughts and actions evoked a sense of nationalism or patriotism and admiration for the martial spirit (Schram, 1986, p. 791). His thinking lacked the traditional approach and though he placed philosophy and ethics at the core of his thinking he gradually ostracized Confucian values. Deng on the other hand, continued to emphasize Confucian values. Chinese leaders, irrespective of the period—Imperial, Republican, or Communist were complex personalities and tried to work within China’s existing circumstances (Leung, 2002, p. 95). From the late Imperial period to the Communist period were on the whole complex personalities (Leung, 2002, p. 93). They tried to work within China’s own conditions. Nationalistic sentiments remained the common bond and they tried to do the best for China and its people.

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3.4 Characteristics of Deng’s Political Leadership Philosophy and history continue to shape the beliefs and values of modern and contemporary Chinese political leadership. It viewed classical philosophy as a mirror of Chinese civilization (Prosekov, 2018, p. 1528). Deng was aware that Confucian ideals constituted the fundamental values of Chinese civilization and therefore, without abandoning Marxist principles, brought these ideals to the forefront. Deng remembered the Confucian covenant that people needed to be clothed and fed before being urged to do anything. He re-enforced the Confucian ideals of collective consciousness, social harmony and human capability. His thinking was typically the Chinese way—thinking in metaphors, typical situations that are located in the consciousness in the form of proverbs, sayings, and stable word-formations (Prosekov, 2018, p. 1531). All modern and contemporary Chinese political leaders including Deng had in their own way advocated the policy of change or modernization. The traditional value that impelled China into modernization was the sense of national shame. On this very basis, Deng initiated several programs, including party affirmation of the principle of seeking truth from facts and emphasized the Party’s commitment to ensuring that China became wealthier and more robust. Deng restored a new political order, initiated economic reforms, and opened China to the outside world, resulting in expanded foreign relations. In the Chinese context, leaders enjoyed greater flexibility and Deng’s personality influenced China’s foreign policy. While domestic and international factors do influence foreign policy behavior, strong leaders contribute to policy change and continuity (Hermann, 2001, p. 47). Policy is made by people and configured to the nature of the problem and structure of the government (Hermann, 2001, p. 46). Studying Deng’s personality and the influence on foreign policy is, therefore, of considerable interest. He was a strategist and a skillful political leader, who knew exactly when to take the initiative for political advantage (Guo, 2002, p. 3298). Much of China’s recent style of diplomacy and foreign relations can be attributed to Deng Xiaoping. The founding political leaders of the People’s Republic of China had set their goals on rebuilding a country devastated by centuries of struggle and disgrace imposed by Western imperial powers. The approach to modernization was determined by

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factors unique to their leadership. Strategies and methods they initiated brought both success and setbacks. Deng Xiaoping altered the path to modernization that China was on, introducing change in conjunction with the socio-economic-politico-cultural construct guided by his personality, beliefs, and style. His stand regarding the economic reforms he initiated was liberal, but he was conservative politically: as a liberal, he was open to Western ideas, but as a conservative, he held that it was the Party that had to decide the course to China’s future and lead the people to it. Power and authority gave Deng Xiaoping’s decision-making credibility. From 1970 to 1990 he served as both the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and also the supreme leader of China. He was an outstanding leader of twentieth-century Asia but though much has been written on him, there is still more to be deliberated on his role as a leader. The empirical questions include: In what way did Deng respond to the new world order during 1960–1990? What are the key determinants that influenced foreign policy change in China after Mao? How far has Deng’s individuality, style, dogmas, and pragmatism been central to the change in foreign policy? In what ways have Chinese philosophies influenced the leadership of contemporary China? Has history, tradition, and culture influenced the leadership and decision-making approach?

3.5

Influences on Deng Xiaoping

Enquiring into the influences in Deng’s life reveals how much these factors shaped his belief systems and the manner in which they shaped his pragmatic approach towards decision-making His political understanding developed out of the changes that emerged in the national setting during his childhood and adulthood years, and his experiences during that time had a significant impact on his leadership qualities. 3.5.1

Early Experiences

Deng was born on 22 August 1904, at a time when China was plagued by the lack of any kind of development. Unequal treaties and agreements negotiated between China and the western powers, especially Great Britain, Germany, Russia, United States, and Japan, forced China to concede several of its sovereign and territorial rights. This gave rise to a deep resentment and a sense of humiliation among the Chinese, which

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was further aggravated when these powers forcibly occupied Chinese territory, reducing it to a semi-colonial society. The very basis of China’s economic self-sufficiency was destroyed, and the country was subjected to humiliation and disgrace. The resultant dissatisfaction and social crisis intensified. Financially drained, the country was in abject poverty. The Chinese people were pursuing an endless struggle with the colonial powers, and the intelligentsia believed that only a strong anti-Western movement could save the country (Maomao, 1995, p. 42). Deng’s career was not smooth sailing either politically or personally but the lessons he learnt proved to be an asset to his political career (Goodman, 1994, p. 4). He was a small man, hardly five feet tall; he was coarse, which was probably a style he developed to hide his background (Westad, 2014, p. 199); he belonged to the Hakka clan, a victimized minority group that came to Guang’an county in Sichuan, 200 km east of Chengdu in southwestern China, from the south around 1800 (Westad, 2014, p. 199). The region was beleaguered by internal turmoil and external invasion. Wars, natural disasters, epidemics, famine, and starvation kept the region closed to the outside world (Maomao, 1995, p. 34). However, his family was relatively affluent with a decent social standing and Deng grew up in a caring environment. The fact that his family were outsiders made him feel unique and robust (Westad, 2014, p. 199). His early years were very protected. At the age of five, he was sent to a Chinese private school and entered primary school at the age of eleven and later enrolled in the middle school in a town in Guang’an county. He was intelligent and diligent, and trained in several subjects such as arithmetic, history, natural sciences, geography, literature, physical culture, music, and art (Pantsov & Levine, 2015, p. 577). These and the teachings in Confucian classics provided Deng with the necessary training for his political way of life. Progressive and relatively well educated, Deng had studied also in a modern college in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province. It was here that he encountered nationalist ideas, as his school years (1910– 1915) corresponded with the turbulent events of the anti-monarchical revolution in China. The Manchu rulers were accused of conniving with foreigners and betraying the people. These events saw the rise of patriotic movements across China, especially in Deng’s hometown of Sichuan. The patriotic movement soon spread to other southern provinces and became sharply militarized.

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In 1912, two French-educated anarchists who believed education and revolution were interconnected, organized the Chinese Society for Frugal Study in France. This was a work-study program for Chinese youth aimed at introducing the Western system of knowledge as a way to revive the self-image of the Chinese people. China organized a massive Chinese youth movement to study and work in France and established a SinoFrench study society. Students who wished to travel to France were encouraged to enroll in preparatory schools established in Chinese cities. Deng enrolled in one such preparatory school in Chongqing. The signing of the Anglo-Chinese treaty in 1890 had accorded Chongqing the status of an open, international port, attracting foreign traders and missionaries. The city sported new buildings, schools, and banks, but there were no industries. In addition, the inhabitants worked as menial laborers. The suffering of the people, the humiliating presence of foreigners, and the high-handedness of the imperial powers towards the Chinese people appalled Deng and his comrades, leading them to participate actively in the Communist movement, developing, in the process, a deep sense of patriotism and passion for ending western domination (Vogel, 2011, p. 20). Propelled by the hardship society faced, he felt industrialization could be the way to save China. 3.5.2

Lessons from France (1920–1926)

In 1920, Deng left Chongqing for France. His seven years in France were a determining factor in his life (Westad, 2014, p. 200). On his way to France, he passed through several Asian countries such as Hong Kong, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Singapore, and Egypt and in each country, he witnessed the humiliation of Asians by Europeans, and these experiences were also integral aspects of his awakening. In France, Deng was actively involved in politics and learned novel Communist ideas, embracing Communism not so much because he understood it, but because he was disappointed with capitalism. His concern for the poor condition of workers pushed him to join the Communist movement and their struggle against the bourgeoisie. French radicals remained less sympathetic to their Asian comrades, which made Deng stay away from them (Westad, 2014) His revolutionary instincts brought him into the Chinese Communist Movement (Wang, 1982, p. 701), and in 1923, at the age of nineteen, he joined the Chinese Communist Youth League, the youth wing of the CCP. It was in France

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that Deng realized that the complete Chinese identity mattered more than the Hakka, Sichuan, or the Southerner (Westad, 2014, p. 200). He acquired a public image, and his role as a comrade intensified and firmed up his position in the French branch of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He insisted that comrades continue the battle against international imperialism (Wang, 1982, p. 702). The economic recession in France that followed the end of the First World War was a significant setback for Chinese students. They had neither work nor any monetary backing from the Franco-Chinese society that had been established. But despite the challenges, Deng’s stay in France was exciting. It was here that that he adopted a pseudonym, Deng Xixian. He worked as a journal editor and was awarded a Doctor of Publishing Sciences degree. He saw the material and technological advantage France enjoyed, which confirmed to him that modernity could transform society. He had the opportunity to learn the use of advanced technology and, though he could never ignore capitalism’s harsh reality, he was convinced that industrialization could bring positive changes to society. When events in China called for young comrades in Europe to join the Kuomintang, Deng became a part of this movement. Participating in political campaigns aroused his interest in civic life. 3.5.3

Sojourn in Moscow

Deng’s+ revolutionary activity attracted the attention of the French police and in 1926, to avoid arrest, he escaped to Moscow where he stayed for a year. The attitude in Moscow was very different from what Deng had experienced in France. Here the leaders were revered. Chinese youth were treated with respect and dignity, and could intellectually participate in Party activities (Maomao, 1995, p. 58). The students were organized in smaller groups, and participated in intense sessions, critical discussions, and weekly interactions. The level of education and understanding among students varied and there were several groups—Deng belonged to the group of theorists that had outstanding students from the CPC and KMT. Due to their training in France, the CPC members were adept in ideology and participated in the revolutionary struggle. The academic rigor and training in Moscow firmed his views on Marxism and allied topics. Deng was a passionate Communist. He opposed imperialism, was open to revolution and reform. His vigor, agility, and discipline earned him a respectable position in the party. It made him an acclaimed party member

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who was diligent, disciplined, committed, accurate, and sharp. All of these traits earned him credibility as a comrade. As a party worker, he influenced the other comrades and accepted the top-down and hierarchical style of leadership. 3.5.4

From Moscow to China

Deng was called back to China by the party and assigned to the Sun Yatsen Military Academy. He had many acquaintances at the academy with whom he had worked in France and Moscow. His multifaceted personality capability and experience were put to best use in Xian Military Academy, where his training included teaching student’s history and Bolshevism, and delivering reports to cadres and instructors on China’s political and international situation. He adopted novel teaching methods of combining theory and practice, making his classes very informative and exciting. Keen to acquire knowledge on Communist ideology, Deng studied several subjects such as the Russian Marxist theory of historical materialism, Chinese and foreign revolutionary history, history of the Bolsheviks, economic geography, political economy (Pantsov & Levine, 1995, p. 37), at the Sun Yat-sen University. Learning Russian made it possible for him to read the Russian texts, interpret and understand the theoretical concepts better. He read extensively, familiarizing himself with all that was written on Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Bukharin. Deng absorbed the typical Leninist approach of self-criticism and was encouraged to appreciate new initiatives and viewpoints. The “New Economic Policy” that allowed capitalism, but left control in its entirety with the proletarian state (Pantsov & Levine, 1995, p. 6), was one of these beliefs. The training at the Sun Yat-sen University gave him a sense of the centrality of the movement (Westad, 2014, p. 200). As the Secretary of the Executive Committee of the special Kuomintang cell at the academy, Deng had the opportunity to work alone at Wuhan. His activities involved draft preparation, liaising with local communities, and establishing links with Communist workers, keeping minutes of meetings, all of which made him adept at managerial skills. In 1927, he arrived in Wuhan and was immediately assigned work as the lone secretary of the Central Committee (CC), where he demonstrated that he was more than capable of handling administrative and technical aspects (Pantsov & Levine 1995, p. 19). That he was meticulous in his work

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fetched Deng several opportunities as the Secretary of the Provisional Politburo and Director of the Secretariat Central Committee. By now Deng was no longer a mute spectator at party meetings— his voice counted. The situation in China was grim. From 1928 to 1945, the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was in session to assess China’s political situation. Deng was entrusted with a dual assignment; he was called to conduct the business of the CC and contribute to the Party’s political affairs, reaffirming his own belief in formal party institutions and collectivist norms. Approaching Communism from a Leninist perspective, Deng looked at it more as an organization directive rather than an ideology, as seen by Mao and others. Therefore, his total obligation was to safeguard the Party’s organizational identity and integrity (Pye, 2001, p. 25). As a critical party worker, an excellent administrator with a keen eye for military affairs, and a dedicated party worker (Westad, 2014, p. 202), Deng was sent to several parts of China to comprehend the internal situation. His assignment to Kuomintang devastated Shanghai, which he rebuilt and restored to normalcy, affirmed his capability, conviction, and dedication to his country’s interests. Soon he was appointed as the Director of the Secretariat but preferred to continue as the Secretary, considering it a rare opportunity to prove his worth. His exposure made him adapt to the situation, and he learned to work in disguise—a unique opportunity to showcase his talent to the party leadership. Deng’s revolutionary career began in 1928, when the CCP leadership sent him south, to Guanxi province, to build a strong Communist base in the region. 3.5.5

Deng’s Military Experience

Deng’s participation in the military began with the first experiment in the Jiangxi Soviet Republic in 1920 and continued till 1930. Though more of a political commissar, he described himself as a military man, and this experience left a lasting impression. In 1930, he was made the political commissar of the Seventh Red Army in Guanxi. The army suffered a setback from the KMT, and Deng owned up to his share of responsibility. When he moved from Guanxi to Jinggangshan, his role was more administrative in nature. He was involved in editing the journal Red Star, of which a phenomenal number of 17,300 copies had to be printed (Pantsov & Levine, 2015, p. 95). In 1934, together with his

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editorial staff, he joined the Long March in a transport filed column bearing the secret code name Red Order. Deng increased the number of copies hoping that every soldier who read it would feel more inspired and committed. He worked in the army as Chief of the Department of Propaganda of the Political Administration of the First Army group commanded by Lin Biao and enjoyed his new task (Pantsov & Levine, 2015, p. 98). In 1936, he was appointed Deputy Chief of the Political Administration of the First Army Group responsible for party organizational and propaganda work (Pantsov & Levine, 2015, p. 106). In January, Deng went along with the Red Army to Shanxi province and also spent several months in northwest Gansu campaigning for the military. He suffered a health setback but soon recovered to be promoted as the Chief of Public Administration of the First Army Group. By 1937, Deng was placed in the Yan’an top leadership. In July 1937, the Japanese began a large-scale military operation. On January 5, 1938 he was transferred to the 129th Division as political commissar and chief of the political department where he was responsible for conducting party propaganda work in the academy as well as teaching subjects such as the history of Kuomintang and the Chinese Revolution. On January 18, 1938, from Shanxi, Deng was relocated to Hongdong, located in the spur of the Taiyue Mountain, an extension of the Taihang Mountains. Little did he know that he would have a new appointment in Taihang. Soon his military involvement increased, and he was appointed the deputy director of the Political Department of the 8th Army. Here Deng was engaged in administrative, organizational, and political work in the area and adjacent territory. Most of Deng’s interest and commitment was towards Communist propaganda. To evoke greater response from the people, he and his colleagues used various propaganda tools to instill a deep sense of patriotism. They conducted several programs to explain the atrocities committed by the enemy. By 1938 several bases were established behind enemy lines. Personally, and professionally, Deng’s participation in the Yan’an CC plenum was important. Soon after, the Politburo decided to induct him into the North China Bureau of the Central Committee. He then participated in all top-level meetings, marking his presence. In 1942, Mao, appointed Deng as the head of the Taihang Sub-bureau of the North China Bureau in the area where the 129th Division was deployed (Pantsov & Levine, 2015, p. 113). Between 1943 and 1945 Deng was in

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charge of the North China Bureau of the CC and the Front Headquarters of the 18th Army Group in Taihang (Pantsov & Levine, 2015, p. 118). He was entrusted with greater responsibilities and in 1948 was invited by Mao to be a part of the core group that deliberated the formation, requirement, and needs of the new territory. Deng played a decisive role in the formation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. As a competent and reliable commissar, he proved to be a valuable and reliable resource in the campaign. He never exhibited an inclination to be the leader and openly acknowledged the leadership of Chairman Mao. After the formation of People’s Republic of China in 1949, Deng once again returned to the executive role in which he had worked while in France and Shanghai. 3.5.6

Political Rise of Deng Xiaoping

Accompanied by political cadres in 1945, Deng went back to Taihang from Yan’an. Like the Americans and the Soviets, the Chinese too rejoiced in the collapse of Japan. Neither the Americans nor the Soviets were keen to enter into a new conflict with China. Despite concessions to the Soviet Union, Stalin was concerned about the CCP’s capability and advised Mao to sign a provisional pact with Chiang Kai-shek. The troops under Deng’s leadership had a significant role to play. By 1948 Mao had encouraged Deng to participate in several forums and valued his opinion on socioeconomic problems and agrarian reforms. By 1945, Mao had transformed the CCP into a leader-dominated party somewhat in line with the Soviet-Stalinist Communist Party. With victory on the cards, he called for the Second Plenum in 1949 in which Deng participated. He played a decisive role in forming the People’s Republic of China and was involved in the new operation in his home province of Sichuan. The area was unstable, with several Kuomintang troops determined to wage war on the Communists. The Chinese Revolution left China considerably weak and it was finding it hard to rebuild. Between September 1948 and January 1949, Communist forces undertook three main tasks: in Manchuria, East China, and in the Beijing-Tianjin region (Pantsov & Levine, 2015, p. 134). The Second Army, led by Deng, was committed to bringing the provinces of Guizhou, Guangxi, Yunnan, Xikang, and the state of Tibet under the Communists (Pantsov & Levine, 2015, p. 139). After liberating Tibet, Deng was given charge of Yunnan province, a region overpopulated and

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economically backward. By 1951, the first phase of reform ended. Mao appreciated Deng’s approach towards reforms and encouraged him to introduce this process throughout the country and, by 1953 the agrarian reforms had a far-reaching effect, with most peasants owning their plots of land. In 1952, Deng was transferred to Beijing and made deputy to Zhou Enlai, the premier of the State Administrative Council. Deng remained in close touch with Chairman Mao. Dominant personalities dominate authoritarian regimes, and hence identifying and catering to the needs of leaders remains critical. Deng knew the art of going along with the wind and could thus, survive the leadership megalomania. By 1953 several departments were under his supervision. He served in various capacities such as the Financial and Economic Council Deputy Chairman and Minister of Finance and In-charge of the Central Committee (CC) Secretariat. Among the several offices he held, the most coveted was his appointment as the Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Council. Deng was appointed head of the delegation that represented the CCP at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) (Pantsov & Levine, 2015, p. 165). The first forum that was convened by Premier Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union following the death of Stalin. Deng was a part of the delegation that visited Moscow. Deng’s political exposure gave him an opportunity to act on certain dos and don’ts. It was during his visit that he heard the Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev recalling Stalin’s cult of personality and its impact on Stalin. Deng realized the impact of the concept of cult personality on the politics of the country and the morale of the people. He also understood that the approach was quite a common prototype among the leaders of the Communist country and, therefore, restrained caution in following the style. Yet another quality of Deng that needs to be mentioned in the context of political exposure is his restraint in criticizing leaders in public. Deng’s skillful handling of Stalin was a way of safeguarding Mao’s leadership approach. This unique style that he consciously imbibed, helped his political career. Chairman Mao acknowledged Deng on several occasions. One such incident was the fortieth-anniversary celebration of the October Revolution in Moscow in 1957. Mao introduced Deng to Khrushchev with the words: “see that little fellow over there? He’s a very wise man, sees far into the future” (Pantsov & Levine, 2015, p. 186). He praised Deng

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as the future leader of China and the Communist Party and acknowledged his upright and adaptable qualities. Deng had the rare opportunity of meeting delegates from Communist and workers’ parties across sixty countries in Moscow. Meanwhile, Deng learned of Mao’s innermost thoughts regarding “Chinese-style socialism based on the principles of more, faster, better, and more economical” (Pantsov & Levine, 2015, p. 188). The leaders Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng were all aligned with Mao’s policies. On instructions from Mao, Deng wrote the report on the Moscow conference. As a facilitator in the negotiations at Moscow, he steadily devoted more time to international affairs. Deng influenced many vital decisions and political choices. In September 1956, at the Eighth CCP Congress, he was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee (CC). This was the opportunity for him to enter the elite circle of party leadership in the newly established Politburo Standing Committee. In 1956, the Chinese Communist Party leaders were genuinely concerned about the situation in Eastern Europe. Khrushchev’s statement on Stalin, followed by the displeasure expressed by several Chinese leaders, including Deng Xiaoping had drawn an unfavorable reaction. Deng addressed the Secretariat in November 1956 on the situation in Poland and Hungary and shared his apprehensions on the ideological confusion. Ruthlessness was central to Deng’s leadership and was evident in his warning of action against cadres who did not abide party decisions. Deng’s approach to political matters impressed the party and Chairman Mao and he was made the head of the newly created wing of the Central Committee that was entrusted to carry a counter offensive campaign against right-wing cadres in the Party. Deng’s success in the political sphere made him more vocal in defiance towards Mao. Expert administrators like Liu, Zhou, and Chen Yun were unable to accept this, yet they recognized the impending economic disaster. Deng’s famous expression “it does not matter if the cat is black or yellow, as long as it catches the mice” (Buckle, 2018, August 2), invited criticism from Mao, who also criticized Deng for supporting capitalist ideas. Subsequently, the Cultural Revolution spread throughout the country. Soon, Deng was deprived of the right to participate in meetings and was attacked openly in the newspapers for his capitalist leanings. Although Mao continued to refer to Deng as a comrade despite the criticisms and charges leveled against him, Deng no longer enjoyed the warmth and comfort of being a confidante of Chairman Mao.

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Relations between China and USSR deteriorated in 1968. Deng was sent to Jiangxi province in southeast China to go through a process of rectification and time in seclusion. One could say that he had become a point of concern in Mao’s mind. But Deng’s situational awareness was robust, and he was a shrewd political player; he was a tough, disciplined soldier and a politician. In 1970, noticing visible structural changes both at the domestic and international front, he decided to capitalize on the moment, and wrote to Mao apologizing for his wrongdoings. The apology and appeal to Mao, combined with an unprecedented political vacuum caused by Zhou Enlai’s ill health made Deng’s return easier. He was brought back into the Party in February 1972. In 1972, US president Richard Nixon, visited China, and a joint communiqué in Shanghai was signed between the two countries emphasizing the Sino-American rapprochement. After years of seclusion, Deng appeared at one of the public diplomatic receptions. He was soon formally inducted into the highest organ, the Politburo, and into the Military Commission. In 1973 he was called to Beijing and officially took charge as the Deputy Premier of Foreign Affairs, being reappointed by the Central Committee on the recommendation of Mao and Zhou Enlai. His first appearance, public acknowledgment that he had been rehabilitated (Dillon, 2015, p. 198), was at the Banquet of the Great Hall of the People welcoming the Cambodian leader, Prince Sihanouk and his wife. Despite his still precarious position, Deng was involved in a series of high-profile official activities. On Mao’s instructions, he attended the UN General Assembly in 1974 as part of a mission to present China before the United Nations. At the UN, Deng articulated the destiny of Third World countries dominated by the superpowers and expressed China’s opposition to hegemony. However, though the message from the Central Committee to Jiangxi Party officials in one way or another highlighted his important role in the future, Deng was in political limbo, unsure of his position in the Party (Dillon, 2015, p. 192). In 1972, in a bid to return to political life he traveled to several parts of China, carefully choosing his travel itinerary. He visited Jingganshan, a county level city in the southwest of Jiangxi province where Mao had set his first revolutionary base. Deng’s visit to the region was an effort to show his reverence to Mao and acknowledge his commitment to the Communist Party. It was a way to reconnect to the people and a way forward in his political career. Deng realized that self-appraisal was much needed to reestablish his position in the Party.

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Therefore, he embarked on a critical self-appraisal that earned him popularity and respect among the cadres. This political shrewdness was critical for his re-entry into the Party. The Fourth National Congress, which had been held from 13 to 17 January 1975 adopted a newly revised State Constitution (Kim, 1977, p. 34). Aimed at rectifying the effects of the Great Leap Forward, it enshrined the values and principles of the Mao Zedong and practiced the revolutionary ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. The most salient feature was the enunciation of an anti-hegemony policy in international relations. The Eleventh National Congress was convened in August 1977 and marked a new phase of socialist modernization. In January 1975, at the end of the Second Plenum of the Tenth Central Committee, Deng was chosen as the Deputy Chairman of the CC and member of the Politburo Standing Committee. Subsequently, at the National People’s Congress meeting, he was officially confirmed as the first Deputy Premier. This could be seen as confirmation of his position as third in the hierarchy, after Mao and Zhou Enlai. When Zhou Enlai passed away on 8 January 1976. Deng was formally designated to read Zhou’s funeral speech and was seen by the Chinese people as his successor. The domestic turmoil that ensued when Mao Zedong passed away on 9 September 1976, along with emerging strategic uncertainty, hit China very strongly. The Gang of Four—Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen, led by, Jiang Qing (Mao’s wife)—was blamed by the Party and the government for the problems and ills in society. The downfall of the group came a month after Mao’s death in 1976 when they were arrested in a move organized by Hua Guofeng, Chairman of the Communist Party and the Premier of the People’s Republic of China between 1976 and 1981. Hua tried to introduce moderate reforms and to remove the excesses of the Cultural Revolution but, since he continued some of the Maoist approaches, he faced resistance from the Party. By 1978, Deng Xiaoping had consolidated power and emerged as the political leader of China. In December of that year, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Central Committee revived and reiterated the following: Mao’s ideology; emancipation from the personality cult; extricating people from dogmas; seeking truth from facts. It focused on economic construction; introduced policies of reform and opening China up to the outside world: it brought back China to a period of socialist construction.

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3.6

Deng’s Characteristics as a Leader

Deng was a revolutionary and was witness to several historic events in China. He was ambitious and ruthless, strong willed and charismatic, and as such he accomplished what he was able to conceive. He developed the theory of reform and articulated a concept he was committed to during his trip to Moscow. Comprehending his leadership style offers a good basis for an understanding of China’s changing foreign policy trajectory. It is important to examine what sort of a person he was, how his personality can be classified, and in what way did his leadership style influence foreign policy? 3.6.1

Deng’s Personality

Deng’s personality remains an enigma. Physically, he was barely five feet tall and was rather plain in appearance. Three main personal habits, obvious to all, were: smoking cigarettes, drinking alcohol, and his use of a spittoon (Vogel, 2011, p. 9). He was witty, formal but approachable and, while he enjoyed the love and warmth of his family, he was a committed Party worker. He was undaunted by failure and opposition— twice purged from the Party by Mao, he did not give up. There was also a ruthlessness that was central to his philosophy and strategy. The Tiananmen Square incident is a reflection of his political philosophy and approach (Shambaugh, 2001, p. 2010). Yet, he drastically changed China for the good (Yang, 1998, p. 81). Several factors influenced his role in Chinese history: his background as a Hakka Chinese from Sichuan; his sojourn in France; his nationalist and military experience; the period of exile and his reinstatement; his coming to power. The word Hakka was associated with a group of wandering, underprivileged people, who were generally viewed as “outsiders’ (Westad, 2014, p. 199). While nobody really knows where they originally came from, the most accepted understanding is that they migrated south, fleeing poverty, war and chaos, eventually settling in the region extending from Jiangxi to Sichuan. Military heroism was central to Hakka tradition and the hardship that the people endured is focal to the understanding of these people. Though the Chinese avoid discussions on sub-ethnic groups, Deng was very conscious of his Hakka identity. Deng was the youngest in the group of twenty students who traveled to Marseilles in 1920. The voyage to France left a deep impression on

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him—the treatment of native, Asian people by Western imperial powers that he saw on the way appalled him. In France, he saw modernity, industrialization, and development, and he believed that Asians, including the Chinese, needed to modernize if they were to survive Western oppression. The material advantage that Europe enjoyed was what Deng wanted for China and the Chinese people. In France, he abandoned his identity as a Sichuanese and identified himself more as wholly Chinese. He chose the pseudonym, Deng Xixian, perhaps because it was phonetically easy for foreigners to pronounce (Wang, 1982, p. 348). This was also when he prepared to be an active Communist Party worker. Though he did not hold an official position, he participated in revolutionary struggles and joined the Chinese Communist Youth League of the European branch in 1924. He took care of the Party matters. He aired his views on international imperialism and expressed his keenness to associate with the Soviet Union in the struggle against imperialism. Understanding Deng is not very easy, as he left no notes behind; he relied entirely on his memory (Vogel, 2011, p. xi). He had consciously developed this habit while carrying out underground activities in Paris and Shanghai in the 1920s. Most formal meetings were marked by impromptu lectures. He never shared official matters with his family, never reminisced in public about past experiences, and observed austerity concerning party discipline. Mostly a behind-the-scenes man, his portrait rarely appears on posters (chineseposters.net). Deng had a broad spectrum of understanding but was also good with details on several smaller issues. He eliminated the personality cult of political leaders. An ardent patriot, he was passionately committed to the cause of China and the Chinese people and was progressive in his thinking, with a distinct outlook on life and the world (Maomao, 1995, p. 138). Deng was a spirited Sichuanese and wanted his fellow people to understand that success was a real possibility. He had the natural poise of a wartime military commander and was sufficiently confident of himself and his capabilities. His experience in the military and in wartime made him a “Master of Creative” escape tactics. He appreciated the essentials and conduct of war and as the political commissar, linked the CCP’s political needs with armies fighting in the field (Westad, 2014, p. 201). A natural leader, Deng also had the political muscle to deliver results. He was an expert in politics and exhibited two fundamental roles: at first, subordinate to Mao, and later, the predominant leader. Though Deng accepted

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being subordinate to Mao, it was clear that he would be the paramount leader following Mao’s death (Teiwes, 2001, p. 27). For his part, Mao had first projected Deng as his successor, then dismissed him, and again recalled him to deal with worsening problems. Deng’s reverence for Mao Zedong went beyond Chairman Mao the leader to Mao as a person; he was impressed by his hands-on and problem-solving approach (Westad, 2014, p. 202). The stark difference between the two was that Mao was a home-grown revolutionary, while Deng had been exposed to the West and was a pragmatist. His most famous dictum states that “it does not matter if the cat is white or black as long as it catches the mice” (Deng, 2012), which departed from the radical, orthodox approach. Deng believed that European modernity alone could save Asians, and China was no exception to this. He was the chief architect of China’s socialist modernization and built a theory of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ (Zemin, 1997, p. 114). By the time he emerged as the pre-eminent leader of China, Deng Xiaoping was disciplined, experienced, and determined to serve his party and his country. He had a wide range of administrative experiences at the local, regional, and national levels. Interaction with party leaders over more than half a century had broadened his ability to think strategically. He was confident, believed in following orders and, when it was required, responded strongly. His deep commitment and conviction revolved around the country and his comrades. While some considered him autocratic, most Chinese respected him. The beginning of his leadership was a time of turmoil and challenge for China. As a tough and decisive leader, he addressed the problem of dealing with the debacle of the Cultural Revolution and restoring order. At seventy-four he was still active and alert, focused on the person with whom he was talking, had an inquisitive mind and was a good listener. A witty person, sure of himself and his authority, Deng’s understanding and grasp of situations and world events were far better than that of Chairman Mao. Foreigners were impressed by his pragmatic and direct approach. When he objected to the policies of foreign nations and officials, he was described as feisty and tough as nails (Vogel, 2011, p. 4). Deng believed in modernity and development but, according to him, it was possible only if it proceeded from Chinese realities. Knowledge had to be gleaned from foreign countries in an open environment and integrated with the universal truth of Marxism based on concrete facts that were exclusively Chinese to build a “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’.

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While China and the Chinese people valued friendship and cooperation, they also valued independence and sovereign rights (Deng, 2012, p. 2). None other than the people of China should ever be allowed to handle China’s affairs. Having seen nations pursuing their self-interest through imperialism, colonialism, and the use of military force abroad, Deng was always prepared for what to expect from foreign leaders. It is befitting that deliberations on Deng’s personality begin with the observations and comments of his daughter Deng Maomao. In her book, Deng Xiaoping: My Father (1995), she recounts meetings she had with several veteran revolutionaries. Each of them recollected their experiences of Deng Xiaoping. Veteran revolutionary Zhou Duanshou lucidly remembered him as an outspoken, persuasive, prudent, calm, and amiable person. Huang Jieran spoke to Deng Maomao of her father’s administrative and technical competence as well as his ability to comprehend a situation and recalled Deng as a calm, wise, and friendly person. Zhang Ji’an remembered the meetings where Deng meticulously took note of deliberations. He was in charge of drafting and processing documents. Sessions were elaborate, and they included issues such as workers’ movements, the international and domestic situation, and the economic problems that confronted China. Deng spoke little—he was a deep thinker and rarely blurted out anything without contemplation. Secretary General Deng’s strength lay in encouraging discussion. When spoke, he was lucid, accessible, and understandable. Dialogue remains the basis for understanding Deng’s personality and forms the basis for his political narrative. Deng Xiaoping inherited firmness from his mother and from his father his hot temper (Pantsov & Levine, 2015, p. 570); which was why, in the Communist Party, he was called Peppery Napoleon and the Little Cannon (Pantsov & Levine, 2015, p. 18). Though he appeared soft like cotton, he was sharp as a needle; and even under duress, he remained calm, composed, and resolute. Most of his personality was shaped during the period of revolution and civil war in China. It was these experiences that formed his character, attitudes, and beliefs. Throughout his life, he remained intrinsically Chinese. Deng Xiaoping never projected himself as a leader. He engaged in both consensus building and imposed his will when necessary. A keen listener with an inquisitive mind, he commanded respect from his comrades. As an efficient and dependable commissar, he was the heart and soul of any campaign. Though he was more than willing to use what was available and

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efficacious to achieve a given end, he claimed accountability for all actions. His career and life spanned years as a revolutionary, political soldier, and a politician in and out of power. He behaved modestly and demonstrated his exceptional devotion to the Party Chairman as undisputed leader. It was only in 1976, when he came to power, that he could exert his influence and had the most excellent opportunities to influence the course of modern Chinese history (Dillon, 2015, p. 111). Even then he saw his role more as a facilitator and created a core team that briefed him on domestic and international affairs. As a person, Deng was not concerned about possessions, status, or society’s’ expectations; all he had was a Swiss Rolex watch and a goodquality woolen sweater. His daughter, Deng Rong, called him the “black box’ because he spoke so little. He did not like to give interviews and left no written documents or papers, leaving scholars and others wanting to learn about him in a quandary, since all they have to comprehend the Chinese leader are the writings of Western scholars of China and the book written on him by his daughter. There are, however, a few selected works that provide a fair understanding of Deng’s personality, and they remain an essential means to grasp his ideas and foreign policy decision-making process. He also made a lasting impact on Evans F. Carlson, an unofficial representative of President Franklin D. Roosevelt who visited Taihang region in 1938 and described Deng as short, tough, and sharp (Pantsov & Levine, 2015, p. 109). 3.6.2

Willingness to Consider New Information

Deng Xiaoping believed in opening China to the outside world and called for support in seeking cooperation to speed up China’s technological revolution (Deng, 2012, p. 22). He was open to association with the West and was excited to see a whole range of new technologies so different from what China had till then. He encouraged outside participation and called for greater investments. Deng saw this openness as an opportunity for his country’s growth and development. The message he sent out to the international community was that China was open to the outside world and was prepared to expand diplomatic relations, as well as economic and cultural ties with all countries (Deng, 2012, p. 262). In his view, China’s weakness could be identified with its policy of isolation and autarky. He was convinced that the country could not sustain itself alone, in isolation from the rest of the world. At the same time, he

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was cautious about too much dependency on other countries. He maintained that China should hold on to self-reliance even as it opened itself up to the outside world and received aid as foreign investment, capital, and technology (Deng, 2012, p. 61). Deng’s changing perceptions impacted foreign policy in the 1980s in two ways: firstly, understanding the questions of war and peace (Deng, 2012, p. 97). He believed that major foreign policy decisions all revolved around the belief that war was inevitable; but it was only the superpowers that had the military and weapon capability to launch world wars (Deng, 2012, p. 82). Since the superpowers were aware of the outcome of such a war, the possibility of their initiating it was a remote one. However, it was their engagement in the arms race that could push the world to the brink of war. Deng explained that no country could ignore the impact of the revolution in military affairs and, therefore, a large-scale war would not, in all probability, ever happen. The general trend was towards world peace, and this changed the perception of war that China had in the past. Secondly, in terms of foreign policy, China had been wary of the Soviet threat and hegemonic tendency and had formed a strategic line of defense; this strategy changed (Deng, 2012, p. 98). China’s orientation towards the external world was committed to pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace (Deng, 2012, p. 128). The new approach and new policy were conducive to and in line with the opening up of China and its economic modernization. China needed a peaceful international environment that it could exploit to the best of its advantage. 3.6.3

Pragmatic Approach in Handling Foreign Affairs

Demonstrating great resilience, flexibility, and pragmatism in approaching sensitive foreign policy matters, Deng calculated the cost–benefit ratio without compromising core Chinese values and principles. Opposing hegemony and safeguarding peace remained his twin foreign policy goals and based on these he sought to normalize relations with the United States and tried to bring substantive progress in improving Sino-Soviet relations (Deng, 2012, p. 134). Under Deng, China went through a process of overhaul or renovation, adapting to the changing domestic and international situations. Between the Third Plenary Session in the Eleventh Central Committee and the Twelfth National Congress, China placed economic development

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at the center of foreign policy (Deng, 2012, p. 189). To gain more credibility, the nation needed a peaceful environment. Safeguarding peace and opposing hegemony remained a critical task (Deng, 2012, p. 281). Deng left a personal imprint on Chinese foreign policy. He was able to identify matters that were very critical. He set the conduct of relations with the United States and Soviet Union (Shambaugh, 2001, p. 2017). He re-drew China’s international orientation to benefit its national interest, reducing aid to Third World countries and ending China’s support to revolutionary movements abroad, assuring the international community that his country’s support to insurgent groups would be negligible, or even non-existent. In fact, it was Deng who made the decision to attack Vietnam in 1979. It was his way of representing the Chinese version of deterrence as an initiative to stop the Vietnamese move. The entire problem between China and the Soviet Union had been an outcome of the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia in 1978. In overthrowing the Khmer Rouge Regime in Cambodia in 1978, the Soviet-backed Vietnamese toppled the China-allied, Pol Pot regime. China responded with a limited invasion of Vietnam, claiming its interest in the region had to be respected. Deng viewed the entire Sino-Soviet normalization process as an opportunity for the future (Qichen, 2006, p. 30) and exhibited a great sense of maturity and restraint while handling the Soviets. The first breakthrough in Sino-Soviet relations was in July 1986, when Gorbachev announced several concessions to the Chinese. The Soviets also pledged to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, East Russia, and Mongolia. Deng was of the opinion that Gorbachev’s speech and unilateral concessions offered to China were a welcome initiative and a positive move towards normalization between the two countries. Both were pragmatic leaders were keen to reach a détente in their foreign relations. Regarding the United States, there were several issues in SinoAmerican relations beginning from 1949, but undoubtedly Taiwan was the key obstacle. By the late 1960s, the leaders of PRC and United States recognized that the strategic environment was more receptive. The rapprochement between China–US made them understand that economic cooperation could be the basis on which the two countries could initiate better relations. Prior to normalization the United States had friendly relations with Taiwan. It was Deng who insisted that normalcy between China and US could be more effective if the United States withdrew

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its friendly overtures with Taiwan. In principle, the Carter administration accepted this requirement. The normalization agreement of 1978, therefore, advocated that the US government recognize PRC as the sole government representing China. United States terminated relations with Taiwan (Republic of China) but continued to maintain unofficial relations. This formed the basis of America’s “One China” policy. China’s open-door reform began with the creation of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in 1979. In his impromptu speeches during trips to Shenzhen and other places in 1992, Deng expressed his receptiveness to any reasonable policy or scheme from the West (Wong, 2014, p. 3781). In addition to the existing SEZs, more port cities such as Dalian and Qingdao were opened (Deng, 2012, p. 40). Deng gradually took over foreign affairs and the dynamics of foreign policy; he was hard and tough-minded. Under him, foreign policy decision-making followed a top-down approach (Teiwes, 2001, p. 83). The PLA’s polytechnologies’ sale of the DF3 missile to Saudi Arabia was a decision made by Deng—nothing much was known about it until the issue became a concern (Shambaugh, 2002, p. 467). With the expansion of China’s international agenda, several organizations involved in domestic affairs were made a part of foreign affairs activities (Zhang, 2016, p. 2). Deng also called for an improved relationship with Japan, and for mutual investment from which both countries could benefit. In the conflict with Japan over the Spratly Islands, he set aside issues of sovereignty and called for joint solutions to international disputes (Deng, 2012, p. 307). By 1982, the Soviet threat had considerably decreased and between 1982 and 1989 there was a normalcy that meant that China could become less dependent on the United States. The collapse of the Soviet Union drew a sharp reaction from China and the post-Cold War period saw the country engage regionally, one such attempt being the “Good Neighbor” policy (Shambaugh, 2012, p. 2214). So, though Deng crafted an international outlook that was contentious, he was always aware that it needed to be beneficial to China’s needs and aspirations. During the period 1989–1992, China followed a non-aligned approach with the superpowers. Deng affirmed an independent foreign policy, and that China would no longer play the card of bloc politics. Peace was possible only by opposing hegemony. He elaborated on the North–South divide and called for the North to develop the South, and claimed China’s role in maintaining world peace, stressing that the stronger China grew,

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the better the chances for preserving world peace (Deng, 2012, p. 44). The objective was to draw the international and domestic audience’s attention to China’s critical role in foreign affairs. According to Deng, China belonged to the Third World and would continue to be a part of this world grouping even when it became wealthier and more productive (Deng, 2012, p. 307). China would not seek hegemony. Several forces operated within the international environment, including the North–South issue, and there was an emerging gap in terms of wealth and productivity. Exchanges and learning between these countries could, to a great extent, resolve this problem. It would be far from possible if the developed countries did not appreciate the more significant development of the Third World (Deng, 2012, p. 286). He reiterated that China’s foreign policy would remain independent, and that it would not join either of the blocs and, at the same time, would not encourage others to play the China card (Deng, 2012, p. 187). Deng claimed world peace as very important and even more so for China as it was concentrating on its modernization program and development. China would continue to establish diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with other countries based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (FPCC) (Deng, 2012, p. 286). Deng affirmed China’s stand on the peaceful reunification of Taiwan with Mainland China, including that of Hong Kong and Macao. Under his leadership, China made substantive improvements in relations with countries like the United States and the Soviet Union, and expanded relations with Japan and Europe, including greater cooperation with other Third World countries. The country adopted a more balanced approach with the superpowers and termed it as an independent foreign policy of peace. Peace became the core of national construction and development. Deng’s strategy followed a two-pronged approach in China’s role in international affairs: on the one hand, a multifaceted engagement with various forces operating in the global system; and, on the other, the interest of the Chinese state as primary. The entries on foreign affairs in the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping 1982–1992, stand at twenty-six and include: Deng’s active participation in normalizing relations with the United States and the Soviet Union (Deng, 2012, p. 135); recovery of Hong Kong in agreement with Britain; interest in pursuing friendly relations with Japan; supportive and helpful policies with Eastern and Western Europe; strong association with Third World countries that represent at least three-quarters of the world population. While Deng had no formal

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training in foreign affairs, he made the most critical strategic decisions in his time (Zhang, 2012, p. 73). His strategy had a two-fold advantage for China: firstly, it brought the country into a multi-dimensional engagement with various forces that operated at the international level, and secondly, it ensured that China would retain a clear understanding of its national interest (Zhang, 2016, p. 87). Overall, Deng’s reorientation of China’s foreign policy fundamentally aimed at supporting China’s economic modernization. 3.6.4

Deng’s Understanding of Economics

Deng Xiaoping is recognized for the success of his economic policies and modernization of China. His ascent to power came when the socio-political-economic system was in a state of collapse. It was thus, possible for him to realize his commitment to making China wealthier and more prosperous by making foreign policy serve the domestic needs of economic modernization—the theory of opening up to the outside world and inviting foreigners into the country (Deng, 2012, p. 25). He was candid about admitting that China lacked expertise in modernization and technical know-how, and his call for greater engagement with other developed countries to speed up technological transformation was instrumental in kick-starting the process of economic development (Deng, 2012, p. 25). This new goal was enshrined in the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC held in December 1978, which also introduced the whole process of opening up, ending almost two decades of autarky. Deng preferred to rely on professional economists to advise him on economic policies. He ushered in a flexible approach that attracted several Chinese economists and technocrats to contribute to the process of economic modernization. A critical aspect of this was the shift from ideological to pragmatic thinking, and the frequent citations from Marx and Engels in Chinese economic literature gradually disappeared. Deng carefully selected his advisers on economic modernization and categorized them on the following basis: older generation people who lacked education but had been there even before the setting up of PRC; middle group economists who came after 1949 and whose numbers increased under him; the younger generation, educated and trained abroad, who were involved with the start of the reform.

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In 1977, Deng re-launched the Four Modernization program that was initially articulated by Zhou Enlai. Though unsure of his understanding of economics, he was insightful in acknowledging that the country’s backwardness was the result of its isolationist policy. He called for an invigorating opening up of the domestic economy to the outside world (Deng, 2012, p. 46). Recognizing the challenges of opening up, he explained that foreign investments could be a significant supplement in the building of socialism (Deng, 2012, p. 51), and that the entire economic modernization would be based on Socialism with Chinese characteristics. His pragmatic approach to problem solving proved extremely valuable in handling economic modernization. 3.6.5

Deng as Predominant Leader

As a leader, Deng enjoyed authority in areas of economic and foreign policy decisions: he introduced initiatives to speed up and broaden the scope of reforms (Deshingkar, 1992, p. 156). Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen credited major diplomatic accomplishments from the time of China’s opening up to the end of the Cold War to Deng Xiaoping (Zhang, 2016, p. 77). He had the conviction to change the development trajectory of China. He reoriented foreign policy with an understanding of both domestic factors and international forces and had no doubt that foreign policy change should be propelled by domestic requirements. Economic modernization was placed at the center of foreign policy interests. At the Twelfth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in September 1982 an independent foreign policy of peace serving China’s very own interest of development was adopted (Deng, 2012, p. 2012). Deng had abolished the personality cult that Mao based his authority on but was still able to determine matters he regarded as important (Shambaugh, 2001, p. 1051). His situational awareness made him realize that China could no longer remain closed. At the Third Plenary Session held in 1978, Deng’s idea of opening up was adopted. In the past, China believed that war was inevitable, but Deng’s understanding of the international situation changed the perception of war and peace. The very idea of economic modernization gave credibility to Deng’s claim to international peace and tranquility. The resurgence of China’s economy would not have been possible without Deng. He took advantage of the conducive atmosphere

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and in 1979 announced the policy of Special Economic Zones (SEZ). Thus, Deng left a legacy for further opening the market. Deng was nominated as Man of the Year by Time Magazine and appeared on the cover of the 6 January 1986 issue (content.time.com). He left behind a “mild authoritarian government that was committed to the CCP’s one party rule even while it relied on a free-market mechanism to transform China into a developed country” (Dillon, 2012, p. 292). Deng was an outstanding revolutionary leader, social and economic reformer, and a skillful political leader. 3.6.6

Belief Systems

An unassuming nature and behind-the-scene leadership defined Deng Xiaoping’s persona. Opening up the country was a post-Maoist reform very much in continuation of Mao’s Great Leap Forward policies. Though Deng still believed in the universal truth of Marxism, he was convinced that these ideas had to be integrated with the concrete realities of China. He emphasized that China’s affairs should be run according to China’s particular conditions and by the Chinese people. This would enable the nation to illuminate a path of her own and build a “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”. Though he continued to value friendship and cooperation with other countries, it was never at the expense of China’s hard-won independence and sovereign rights (Deng, 2012, p. 2). In addition to the values of self-respect and pride, Deng deeply believed in peace as being of supreme significance, and in developing friendship with neighbors to achieve universal peace. The pursuit of peaceful development represented the peace-loving cultural tradition inherited by China from its ancient past and, according to him, the pursuit of peace, unity, and harmony that was ingrained in the nation’s spiritual roots continued to be very significant (Zhao, 2016, p. 2). This pursuit of a peaceful evolution defines China as a peace-loving nation and remains integral to the Chinese way of life.

3.7

Conclusion

The philosophical and historical approach continues to influence both ancient and contemporary Chinese leaders. Their belief systems continue to be shaped by traditional ideas and values that are purely Chinese. While a specific character marks each of the periods of Chinese history, the

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common factor that unites all is the desire for power and a strong central government. Chinese leaders continue to honor belief in a hierarchical arrangement of states that reiterates China’s position at the center of the world. The result is a heightened sense of Chinese superiority that places the rest of the world subservient to China’s interest. Special value was placed on “Chinese” characteristics and in taking great pride in Chinese culture and political legacy (Leung, 2002, p. 58). The Confucian, Daoist, Legalist, and Sun Tzu’s approach instilled values and shaped the minds of the rulers, and Chinese philosophy upheld the Mandate of Heaven that shaped the dominant view of rulers. Chinese culture placed great emphasis on the virtue of the ruler per se, and harmony was a product of the emperor’s virtue. The Chinese worldview is a reflection of its history. The people are proud of their vibrant culture. The lessons of history are a manifestation of several factors such as the sense of victimization and insecurity that resulted in a greater sense of righteousness about China’s position in the world. A century of humiliation played an important role in PRCs foreign relations, as noticed in terms of China’s support to anti-colonial movements in Asia and Africa. Leadership styles affect decision-making and have both a direct and indirect influence on foreign policy. Deng’s experiences and personality offer an insight to his approach on foreign affairs. He was shrewd, sensitive, and suave in his handling of people, and his goals were based on immediate realities. His broad view in handling foreign policy matters exhibited maturity and restraint and he was clearly able to identify those matters in foreign policy that he felt were critical and important. As an effective decision-maker, his key slogan was “Seek truth from facts” (Deng, 2012, p. 49). A flexible and pragmatic approach made Deng think differently from Mao. He always referred to ancient texts that detailed how his predecessors had addressed tough situations. While China’s conduct of foreign affairs in the past was not as relevant in the contemporary context, it gave a perspective to issues. As a pragmatic decision-maker, Deng’s goal was to make China wealthier and more prosperous. His emphasis on economic development and opening up the country resulted in greater engagement with the outside world. The outcome was the initiation of a dramatic shift in the politico-strategic and economic environment of the country.

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Deng, X. (n.d.-b). The Selected works of Deng Xiaoping 1982–1992. https://den gxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/selected-works-vol-3-1982-1992/ Deng’s Legacy Still Influences China, Rest of World: President Hu. (2004). http:// en.people.cn/200408/22/eng20040822_154232.html Deshingkar, G. (1992). The Deng Xiaoping Whirlwind. China Report, 28(2), 153–158. https://doi.org/10.1177/000944559202800205 Dhakhwa, S., & Stacey, E. (2008). The Relevance of Confucian Philosophy to Modern Concepts of Leadership and Followership. The Osprey Journal of Ideas and Inquiry All Volumes (2001–2008). http://digitalcommons.unf.edu/ojii_v olumes/5 Dillon, M. (2015). Deng Xiaoping: The Man Who Made Modern China (e-Book Edition). I. B. Tauris Co & Ltd. Eastman, L. E. (1986). Nationalist China During the Nanking Decade 1927– 1937. In J. K. Fairbank & A. Feuerwerker (Eds.), The Cambridge History of China (1st ed., pp. 116–167). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/ 10.1017/chol9780521243384.004 Fairbank, J. K. (Ed.). (1968). The Chinese World Order Traditional China’s Foreign Relations. Harvard University Press. Fairbank, J. K. (1983). Introduction: Maritime and Continental in China’s History. In J. Fairbank (Ed.), The Cambridge History of China (pp. 1– 27). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/chol97805212 35419.002 Fairbank, J. K. (1994). The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations. Harvard University Press. Goodman, D. S. G. (1994). Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese revolution: A Political Biography. Routledge. Guha, R. (2014). The Politics Behind the Economics of Asia’s Rise. In R. Guha (Ed.), Makers of Modern Asia (e-Book Edition). The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Gungwu, W. (2013). The Chinese State and the New Global History (e-Book Edition). The Chinese University Press. Guo, X. (2002). The Ideal Chinese Political Leader: A Historical and Cultural Perspective (e-Book Edition). Prager Publishers. Hermann, M. G. (2001). How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework. International Studies Review, 3(2), 47–81. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/1521-9488.00234 Hsieh, S. (2017). Daoism and Nationalism in Modern and Contemporary China. In C. Kuo (Ed.), Religion and Nationalism in Chinese Societies (e-Book Edition). Amsterdam University Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1zk jzkd.13?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

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Huang, C. (2004). Salient Features of Chinese Historical Thinking. The Medieval History Journal, 7 (2), 243–254. https://doi.org/10.1177/097194580400 700205 Huntington, S., & Fukuyama, F. (1996). Political Order in Changing Societies (e-Book Edition). Yale University Press. Jeremy, T. (2006). The Production of the Chiang Kai-shek Personality Cult, 1929–1975. The China Quarterly, 185, 96–110. https://doi.org/10.1017/ s0305741006000063 Jiang, C. (2014). Zhou Enlai and China’s Prolonged Rose. In R. Guha (Ed.), The Makers of Modern Asia (e-Book Edition). The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Johnson, C. (2000). Taoist Leadership Ethics. Journal of Leadership Studies, 7 (1), 82–91. https://doi.org/10.1177/10717919000070010 Juergensmeyer, M., & Kitts, M. (Eds.). (2011). Princeton Readings in Religion and Violence (e-Book Edition). Princeton University Press. Kane, T. (2001). China’s Foundations: Guiding Principles of Chinese Foreign Policy. Comparative Strategy, 20(1), 45–55. https://doi.org/10.1080/014 95930150501106 Kim, B., & Vogel, E. (Eds.). (2011). The Park Chung Hee Era (e-Book Edition). Harvard University Press. Kim, C. (1977). The 1975 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, 1(2), 1–35. Kuhn, R. L. (2011). How China’s Leaders Think: The Inside Story of China’s Past, Current and Future Leaders (e-Book Edition). John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Ltd. Lee, Y.-T. (2003). Daoistic Humanism in Ancient China: Broadening Personality and Counselling Theories in the 21st Century. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 43(1), 64–85. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022167802238814 Leung, E. P. (Ed.). (2002). Political Leaders of Modern China: A Biographical Dictionary (e-Book Edition). Green Wood Press. Levinson, D. (n.d.). Theories of Life Stages and Human Development. http:// humangrowth.tripod.com/id3.html Lewis, M. (1999). Warring States Political History. In M. Loewe & E. Shaughnessy (Eds.), The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins Of Civilization To 221 BC. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10. 1017/chol9780521470308.011 Li, C. (2001). China’s Leaders: The New Generation (e-Book Edition). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Lieberthal, K. (1978). Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s Its Evolution and Implications for the Strategic Triangle (e-Book Edition). Rand Corporation. https:// www.rand.org/pubs/reports/r2342.html Lieberthal, K., & Oksenberg, M. (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders. Princeton University Press.

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Loewe, M., & Shaughnessy, E. L. (1999). The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization To 221 BC (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/chol9780521470308 Lu, X. (2017). The Rhetoric of Mao Zedong: Transforming China and Its People. University of Southern Carolina Press. Macfarquhar, R., & Fairbank, J. K. (Eds.). (1991). Front Matter. In The Cambridge History of China (i–xxvi). Cambridge University Press. https:// doi.org/10.1017/chol9780521243377.001 Mancall, M. (1963). The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 349, 14–26. Retrieved August 26, 2020, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1035694 Maomao, D. (1995). Deng Xiaoping: My Father. Basic Books. Mayer, A. (2017). Historical Development of the Communist Theory of Leadership. In B. Farrell (Ed.), Leadership in Eastern Communism 1945–1970 (e-Book Edition). Routledge. McCord, E. (1992). Civil War and the Emergence of Warlordism in Early Twentieth Century China. War & Society, 10(2), 35–56. https://doi.org/ 10.1179/072924792791198940 McNeilly, M. (2001). Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare (e-Book Edition). Oxford University Press. Mcelhatton, E., & Jackson, B. (2012). Paradox in Harmony: Formulating a Chinese Model of Leadership. Leadership, 8(4), 441–461. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/1742715012444054 Mingzheng, X., & Wu X. (2014). Chinese Leadership: Culture and Confucianism. Public Integrity, 16(2), 165–172. https://doi.org/10.2753/pin 1099-9922160204 Ojha, I. (1960). Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition. Beacon Press. Page, S. W. (1954). Lenin’s Assumption of International Proletarian Leadership. The Journal of Modern History, 26(3), 233–245. https://doi.org/10.1086/ 237706 Pantsov, A., & Levine, S. I. (2015). Deng Xiaoping: A Revolutionary Life (eBook edition). Oxford University Press. Pardhasaradhi, Y. (2015). The Art of War and Its Relevance to Modem Strategic Management and Administration: A Comparative Appraisal of Sun Tzu with Kautilya and Clausewitz. Indian Journal of Public Administration, 61(4), 641–657. https://doi.org/10.1177%2f0019556120150404 Prosekov, S. (2018). Confucianism and Its Influence on Deng Xiaoping’s Reforms. Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Contemporary Education, Social Sciences and Humanities (ICCESSH 2018). Advances in Social Sciences, Education and Humanities Research. https://doi.org/10. 2991/iccessh-18.2018.334

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Pye, L. (2001). An Introductory Profile: Deng Xiaoping and China’s Political Culture. In D. Shambaugh (Ed.), Deng Xiaoping: The Portrait of a Chinese Statesman (e-Book Edition). Clarendon Press (Original Work Published 1995). Qichen, Q. (2006). Ten Episodes in China’s Diplomacy. Harper Collins. Rankin, M., Fairbank, J., & Feuerwerker, A. (1986). Introduction: Perspectives on Modern China’s History. In J. Fairbank & A. Feuerwerker (Eds.), The Cambridge History of China (pp. 1–73). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/Cho:9780521243384.002 Ristaino, M. (1990). China’s Leaders: Individuals or Parties Spokesman. Problems of Communism, xxxix, 100–106. https://books.google.co.in/books?id= j0xgaqaaiaaj&pg=ra3-pa100&dq=marcia Robinson, T. (1994). Chinese Foreign Policy from the 1940s to the 1990s. In T. Robinson & D. Shambaugh (Eds.), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. Clarendon Press. Ruggeiri, A. (2017). Sun Tzu: The Art of War (e-Book edition). Russell, B. (1966). The Problem of China (e-Book Edition). George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Schram, S. (1986). Mao Tse-Tung’s Thought to 1949. In J. Fairbank & A. Feuerwerker (Eds.), The Cambridge History of China (pp. 789–870). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/chol97805212433 84.015 Schwartz, B. (1949). Marx and Lenin in China. Far Eastern Survey, 18(15), 174–178. https://doi.org/10.2307/3024355 Selected Works. (1938). International Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/17. 1.125b Shambaugh, D. (2001). Deng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Chinese Statesman (e-Book Edition). Clarendon Press (Original Work Published 1995). Shih, C. (1990). The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy: A Psycho Cultural View (e-Book Edition). Palgrave Macmillan. Sullivan, L. (2012). Leadership and Authority in China: 1895–1976 (e-Book Edition). Lexington Books. Swaine, M. (2015, January). China: The Influence of History: How Does History Influence Chinese Thought and Behavior Today? https://thediplomat.com/ 2015/01/china-the-influence-of-history/ Tai, P., & Kuo, T. (2010). Chiang Kai-Shek Revisited. American Journal of Chinese Studies, 17 (1), 81–86. www.jstor.org/stable/44288010 Taylor, J. (2010). Qujianghua: Disposing of and re-appraising the remnants of Chiang Kai-Shek’s reign in Taiwan. Journal of Contemporary History, 45(1), 181–196. www.jstor.org/stable/40542911

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CHAPTER 4

Foreign Policy of China Under Deng Xiaoping: Politico-Strategic Dimension

4.1

Introduction

China’s foreign policy underwent a significant change after the passing away of Mao. The “Open-Door” policy became an integral part of the country’s modernization and reform policy, paving the way for an expanded societal interaction (Yahuda, 1983, p. 125). In domestic politics Maoist radicalism was replaced by Deng’s pragmatism (Robinson, 1994, p. 568). China shifted from its revolutionary rhetoric to a more diplomatic engagement. From an economic standpoint, two strategically important issues were peace and development; the first involved East– West relations, and the second was in terms of North–South relations. From a political perspective, China preferred world peace and called for subtle alignment with the superpowers and, in fact, laid claim to superpower capability to wage war. An independent foreign policy of peace called for improved relations not only with the superpowers but other countries, particularly in Europe and with Japan. China’s foreign policy, therefore, opposed hegemonism and power politics and aimed at safeguarding world peace and setting up a new international and economic order. The outcome was expanded foreign relations that included a wide range of technological and scientific exchanges, especially with the West. China’s position within the strategic triangle underwent a change, leading to Sino–American rapprochement. Trade relations were expanded and there was increased political contact; © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 P. Suresh, Foreign Policy of China Under Deng Xiaoping, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4764-3_4

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thereafter China could downplay the Soviet threat and safely follow the policy of equidistance between the superpowers. China regarded the Third World as an essential element in its foreign policy and it was based on this “Three-World” concept that Deng went about normalizing state-to-state relations using the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (FPCC). An “Open-Door” policy was adopted to interact with the outside world as a part of its modernization effort. The reorientation of Chinese foreign policy under Deng thus signaled a paradigm shift both at the political and the strategic level.

4.2

An Overview of China’s Foreign Policy

China’s foreign policy is a product of its internal and external environment. Key foreign policy objectives are spelt out in terms of safeguarding its independence and sovereignty, promoting world peace, and creating an international environment favorable for growth and modernization of its economy. In international affairs the country determines its own policy and does not yield to pressure from other major powers. Its foreign policy principles as expressed in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (FPCC), lay down the best way to handle relations between nations (Deng, 2012, p. 75), and are aimed at safeguarding peace and opposing hegemony. In 2012, China stated that it belonged to the Third World and reiterated that it would always be part of the Third World (Deng, 2012, p. 44) in opposition to hegemony. Under Deng, the foreign policy objectives claimed that the two outstanding issues of the world were peace and development and opposing superpower hegemony. China desired peace and, in accordance with its independent foreign policy of peace, it would continue to engage with the United States and the Soviet Union but would not be a party to bloc politics (Deng, 2012, p. 98). It would also continue to follow the policy of opening up, which was conducive to its modernization drive and based firmly on its own condition and reality. Every country conducts its foreign relations with the aim of safeguarding its own national interest; China was no different—in opposing hegemonism and power politics and working towards establishing a new international political and economic order (Deng, 2012, p. 281), its foreign policy was determined by internal compulsions and requirements.

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Determinants of Foreign Policy

Foreign policy formulation is determined by the interplay of several factors. The foreign policies of modern states devolve from implied and explicit references to strategic, economic, and ideological considerations, and aim at the preservation and furtherance of national interest (Bozeman, 1958, p. 262). The determinants of foreign policy can thus broadly be divided into internal and external factors. Internal Factors Internally, China’s foreign policy is guided by its geographical location, culture, history, and political traditions that include ideology, national character, the socio-economic milieu, and national leadership. Geographical Location Geography is a stable and a permanent factor of a country’s foreign policy. China is a “huge continental country with a diverse population that was been traditionally economically regressive and strategically susceptible” (afe. easteasiacolumbia, n.d.). The borders of China are porous and easier to attack than to defend—the long coastline was open to incursion from the seas and its inland borders are largely mountainous (afe. easteasiacolumbia, n.d.). The tribes of Central Asia, Western powers and Japan invaded China during the dynastic era. The attack created a sense of fear and apprehension of invasion by hostile powers and this anxiety never disappeared. As part of its key foreign policy objective, China was committed to maintaining adequate economic and military strength to prevent even the possibility of any such attack in the future. History and Tradition These are extremely important influences on China’s worldview (Mancall, 1963, p. 16). Being one of the oldest uninterrupted civilizations, China placed “itself at the center of culture, as a leader, and practiced years of selective isolation based on the belief that it had little to learn from the outside world” (Ojha 1969, p. 2). The belief in Chinese supremacy controlled the behavior of most leaders, both past and contemporary (Kirby, 1994, p. 14). The memory of the glorious empire left a legacy of an “ethnocentric world outlook that created a great sense of victimization, insecurity, and righteousness in foreign affairs” (Zhao, 2016, p. 1). The self-proclaimed status of the Middle Kingdom placed China at the center of the world (Mondejar, 2015, p. na). Regardless of the domestic and international environment, Chinese leaders pursued a foreign policy based on their understanding,

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interest, and perception of the outside world. Convinced of its preeminence, China relinquished the advantages of western technology and knowledge. Repeated foreign incursions resulted in a significant setback to socio-political and economic conditions. China’s anti-Western behavior was, therefore, the result of a lopsided understanding of the world, and the anti-Western practices were the outcome of a century of shame and humiliation under foreign powers (Williams, 2005, p. 70). In 1949, the Communist Party defeated the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek to form the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC under Chairman Mao held the Qing dynasty’s feudalism responsible for all the ills in society (Gries, 2004, p. 48). Though the primary goal was to build a culture of Socialism, foreign policy decisions were affected by a continued resolve to reestablish the country as a leading world power and the desire to ensure that it never be taken for granted (Deng, 2012, p. 183). Domestic and foreign policies were intertwined in the concern for economic modernization and national security. Nationalism expressed itself in terms of pride and a sense of superiority rooted in being one of the cradles of civilization and the desire to rescind the years of humiliation by Western subjugation suffered from the time of the Opium Wars. The Chinese worldview became narrow and parochial—an ethnocentric outlook dominated by the notion of centrality. Traditional Chinese world order had refused to recognize any other sovereign state as equal (Zhao, 2016, p. 1) and the Chinese elite selectively used these historical memories to once again define their position in the world. Anti-Imperialism China believed in a greater understanding of “autonomy and self-seeking retreat” from the world (Kim, 1984, p. 45). The primary goal was to build Socialism. Under Mao, leftist policies hindered development (Deng, 2012, p. 44). As a newly liberated Third World country, China was confronted with challenges of adjustment both at the domestic and international level. Experiences and compulsions inherent to the ideology pushed it to identify with the Soviet Union. Local politics defined under Mao were narrow and parochial, autarkic, and Sino-centric (Kim, 1984, p. 62). Foreign policy was stilted; burdened with the weight of the past and the influence of ideology (Robinson, 1994, p. 555), and shaped by domestic conditions and leader perception. Marxism-Leninism was applied as the formal ideology in the realm of foreign policy (Levine, 1994, p. 31). Chinese leaders justified their actions on ideological terms. Mao strengthened the national morale by continually recalling ancient China’s glorious empire and the humiliation the

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country had suffered under the foreigners (Lu, 2017, p. 68). The past was idealized, Western imperialism was blamed for China’s backwardness, and the nationalist movement gained importance. The result was complete distrust in the West; China supported the newly liberated nations of the Third World and anti-imperialism became an accepted policy. Ideology The significant influence of ideology on China’s foreign policy is based on the extent to which it affected the nation’s understanding of the outside world. While China believed that war was inevitable, it was also convinced that war could be initiated only by the superpowers. Therefore, it focused its energies on opposing imperialism and was committed to expanding Communism. These ideological principles of Chinese foreign policy have remained consistent since the formation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, though interpretations may have changed according to individual leader’s assessment of goals and the international situation. The external, or the international, environment was perceived by leaders on the basis of ideology, which comprised three components: a Marxist approach to the class struggle, Lenin’s idea of imperialism, and the Maoist theory of contradiction (Kim, 1981, p. 180). This ideology impacted all areas of policy, internal as well as external. Individual policies were linked to the general ideology. China’s foreign policy, for instance, was governed by the theory of dialectical materialism, which provided its leaders with a wide understanding on the existing condition of the external environment. Leadership The foreign policy of a nation is considerably influenced by leaders and bears an imprint of their experiences, beliefs and traits. Their ideas, orientations, awareness, and knowledge of the world influence foreign policy decision-making. As one of the advanced socialist countries, leaders restrained China’s contact with foreign powers; relations were preferred with those who contributed to the Communist-led revolution. Though Chinese leaders believed that the country could benefit from the West, the untold hardship of the Opium Wars (1839–1842), the refusal to cooperate with Communists by President Truman, and the imperialist aggression that followed, etched a strong anti-Western sentiment, so much so that the rhetoric of centuries of shame and humiliation no longer sounded like empty slogans. Leaning towards the Soviet Union, on the other hand, was reassuring.

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Under Mao, the rhetorical belief in the United States shifted from friend to enemy when the United States decided to support the Nationalist government against the Chinese Communist Party. In the five essays Mao wrote in 1949 to unite the entire country under the Communist ideology, he condemned the Americans as imperialists and condemned US interference in China’s internal affairs. (Lu, 2017, p. 158). This belief was further intensified when the United States imposed a trade embargo when China intervened during the Korean War in 1950. However, when Deng took office, he realized that the lack of development in China was a result of its aloofness. He called for normalization of relations with the West, especially with the United States. Deng went about the process of reform and modernization, building is a “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (Deng, 2012, p. 22) by integrating China’s particular experiences and combining them with the technology and scientific advancement of the West. Deng acknowledged “One Country, Two Systems”, and reiterated China’s stand on sovereignty issues regarding Hong Kong and Taiwan., He continued to uphold socialist ideals despite the fact that agrarian reforms came with little success (Deng, 2012, p. 35). At the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held from 27 to 29 June 1981 (Goodman, 1981, p. 518), the roles of Mao, Hua Guofeng, and other CCP leaders were re-evaluated. The Plenum reviewed the Party’s history before 1949; reassessed Mao and Mao’s Thought; encouraged octogenarian cadres to resign; promoted younger people into the Party; rehabilitated victims of the Cultural Revolution; relaxed ideological norms for membership; decisions were now governed by government ministries; the Party’s influence on everyday life declined; dogmas were replaced by more practical ideas (Robinson, 1994, p. 569). It is important to note that Deng avoided claiming success over Mao’s failures. He did not see anything to be gained and was averse to personal adulation. In the later part of Mao’s leadership, in the 1960s, negative forces were strong in Chinese society. Three different types of people had predominantly affected the social fabric. There were those who had committed economic crimes, those who had abused power, and those who had impaired the Party. According to Deng all these people were dangerous and represented serious defects in the Party (Deng, 2012, p. 29). He believed that these forces could derail progress and called for stern action against them. The Twelfth National Party Congress expressed growing

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concern and it was decided to conduct a Party-wide rectification. All Party cadres were required to go through a process of self-criticism in a movement aimed at restoring and improving the overall functioning of the Party. Teaching ideology remained sacrosanct. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, there was a greater need to uplift the Chinese characteristics of Socialism. Deng called for reforming the political and economic structure and for training people in Communism and patriotism (Deng, 2012, p. 31). The aim was to ensure that the banner of Marxism and Socialism continued to be held high. He called for the Party to inspire people to work hard, have lofty goals, and moral integrity. In domestic politics, “Maoist radicalism was replaced by Deng’s pragmatism” (Robinson, 1994, p. 568). While Deng restored Mao’s ideals, he also developed several policies that were required to suit the new conditions (Deng, 2012, p. 277). Recalling the stagnant economy China earlier embraced, he attributed its successful transformation to the people’s faith in Marxism, which became the basis for reconstruction and development (Deng, 2012, p. 254). This Marxism, he believed, could be tailored to Chinese conditions and infused with specific Chinese characteristics (Deng, 2102, p. 49). Fully aware of the connection that needed to be made between his reform initiatives and Mao’s historical role (Mohanty, 1998, p. 104) he recalled the famous proclamation made by Mao on 1 October 1949: “the Chinese people have stood up” (Mao, n.d.), using it to underline the spirit of Chinese nationalism. He took responsibility for the late start of modernization and re-traditionalized customs, habits, and practices suppressed under Mao (Robinson, 1994, p. 569). While China accepted new approaches to enhance national strength on the domestic front, (Kleinberg, 1990, p. 3), its external relations also correspondingly needed to change. At the Twelfth Congress of the Communist Party in 1982, China announced its new policy opening its doors to the outside world and called for supporting action in its foreign relations. “Open-Door” Policy Following Chairman Mao’s death, far-reaching changes in China’s domestic affairs echoed in its external relations (Yahuda, 1983, p. 125). To strengthen the development and modernization program, Deng embraced an “Open-Door” policy towards the world. In addressing the degree of change and continuity in China’s foreign policy after Mao, it is but appropriate to study this transformation from the context of strategic and economic parlance (Yahuda, 1983,

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p. 3). These two aspects overlapped and continued to be an integral part of the national development and modernization program. Deng’s reform period typically dates from the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978. This plenary session called for the Party to concentrate on the Chinese people and on socialist modernization. It focused on political events and lowered the ideological emphasis while acknowledging Mao’s contribution to the Party. Explaining China’s opposition to hegemonism, it called for developing friendly relations with countries in all parts of the world (bjreview.com, 26 April 2011). Modernization was outlined in terms of advancement of industry, national defense, science and technology, and agriculture. The plenary session called for a national economic plan for 1979–1980. Deng called for socialist modernization based on both China’s past and on present Chinese experience and reality, stating that the country should learn from foreign countries, adapt and develop its own skills, and not just blindly accept unfamiliar practices (Deng, 2012, p. 277). External Determinants Along with domestic factors, the following external determinants have also influenced foreign policy. Geostrategic Environment Relations between nations are regularly backed by their corresponding national interest and powers. The foreign policy of a country is influenced by the power structure in which the most powerful nations, the superpowers and major powers, play a more important role as compared to the less developed countries. The post-War world was shaped by the diffusion of power into the hands of the superpowers. The strategic environment and the structure of the international system was more or less dominated by their respective foreign policies (Robinson, 1994, p. 555). The superpowers were embroiled in Cold War politics, which then dominated governed featured in both bilateral and strategic relations. China viewed the external world from this prism. When the Cold War was at its height in Asia, China was relatively weak and used this as an opportunity to become a part of the Third World, and though it initially followed a slight tilt towards the Soviet Union, it remained circumspect in the conduct of its foreign relations. International System Since the formation of the PRC in 1949, its foreign policy had been, to a large degree, “influenced by the balance of power, state-centric approach to international politics and security” (Tow,

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1994, p. 120). Since both the United States and the Soviet Union consistently pushed China into their geopolitical orbit, a theme that determined most of the nation’s foreign policy, especially during the Mao period, was the threat from these superpowers. Chinese leaders remained cautious of being used as pawns by either the Soviets or the Americans. From the onset of the Cold War, they sought to orchestrate strategic interests without losing sight of their vulnerable position among the superpowers, pursuing the contest with them with a revolutionary zeal. The strategic triangle involving US–USSR–China shaped the international environment and set the direction towards shaping the overall global power structure. In the 1950s, China was aligned with the Soviet Union and under threat from the United States. During the late 1950s to the 1960s, as a consequence of conflict with the Soviet Union, most of its foreign policy was directed towards the building of an anti-Soviet coalition. It was during this period that Mao and Zhou laid the foundation for a normalization of China–US relations. In the post-Mao period, responding to changes in the strategic environment, China began to wield considerable influence in international affairs. Following the Sino–American détente in the 1970s, its approach to the world underwent a change. While it believed war was imminent and inevitable, it was also convinced that only superpowers could launch a war and entered into diplomatic relations with other states. The forces of peace that included most of the developed world and the Third World to which China belonged gradually gained momentum. International Organizations China’s attitude to international organizations, especially the UN, may be characterized as one of “love me or leave me but don’t leave me alone” (Kim, 1974, p. 300). Its support for the UN Charter and its principles remained unaffected from 1945 to 1964. The withdrawal of Indonesia triggered a process of negative campaigning against the UN. Believing that the UN was an adjunct of the US State Department, China put forth new demands and conditions to join the organization. These included the expulsion of all imperialist countries and admission of all developing countries. Further, it demanded the removal of the United States and called for a reorganization of the UN. However, these demands received little attention and China’s interest in the world organization rapidly declined and it expressed the intent of not being part of the UN. After the Cultural Revolution, China demonstrated a greater degree of flexibility and engaged in normalizing relations with countries like the US,

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Japan and Yugoslavia. There was an attitudinal shift in PRC’s approach towards the UN and a campaign and several diplomatic initiatives were launched to gain entry to the international organization. Since the ending of the policy of isolation, China actively involved itself in the international organization to further its modernization goals. It received international status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and has used its position to speak on behalf of Third World countries. Alliances A very important foreign policy instrument these are viewed as a means of consolidating power and interests. Mao articulated the concept of “Three Worlds” as a way to separate China’s social and political forces into three categories. The First was the international situation that was dominated by the United States and whom the Soviets tried to balance. The Second and the Third worlds were at the core of superpower confrontation. As a part of the Third World, China formed a strategic base for a united front. After Mao’s passing there was a sea change both at the international and domestic levels. The changing international environment called for a change in China’s global strategy and expanded foreign relations. Today, the country has developed diplomatic relations with numerous developed and developing countries.

4.3 Politico-Strategic Foreign Policy Changes Under Deng As is the case with deciding the foreign policy of any major country, that of China is a product of a multiplicity of factors involving a complex mix of exchanges between domestic and external environments. China’s politico-strategic environment changed after the passing of Chairman Mao in 1976. The new relationship with the outside world began after the tumultuous happenings and personalities who had influenced the domestic front: the Great Leap Forward; Hundred Flowers Movement; Cultural Revolution; Gang of Four. On the external front it was in terms of superpower hostility. The “Open-Door” policy became an integral part of its foreign policy and modernization program (Yahuda, 1983, p. 4). The opening went beyond the earlier practice of minimal contact with one of the more significant Western countries. Domestic requirements determined most of China’s foreign policy formulated under Deng Xiaoping. When he came to power in 1978, Deng shifted the approach both at the domestic and foreign policy level,

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addressing the long-standing politico-economic and strategic issues that the country had faced in previous decades. He asserted that China would pursue an independent diplomatic line of foreign policy, continue to oppose hegemonism and war, and safeguard world peace. Under Deng, foreign policy remained truly non-aligned and abstained from its leanto-one-side strategy (Deng, 2012, p. 190)—diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with foreign countries were expanded, there were consistent improvements in relations with the United States and the Soviet Union, and a Peace and Friendship treaty with Japan was signed (Cheng, 2016, p. 64). China expanded foreign relations with the world and improved collaboration and cooperation with Third world countries. At the same time, like Mao, Deng was committed to issues of sovereignty. The line of thinking shifted from anti-hegemony to modernization diplomacy (Cheng, 2016, p. 94). He understood the importance of new technology and knowledge as well as the need to incorporate it within a Socialist system with Chinese characteristics. This new direction in China’s international politics has been perhaps the most pertinent development in its foreign policy (Yahuda, 1983, p. 171). 4.3.1

Shift in China’s Politico-Strategic Approach

Between 1949 and 1952, China’s interest had focused on the Third World and closely associated itself with revolutionary movements (Ghoble, 1988, p. 44). In 1952 it espoused the slogan of peaceful coexistence, leading to some form of affiliation and interaction with countries abroad and expanded relations with non-Communist countries including those of Western Europe. It emphasized close interaction with the Soviet Union to counter American imperialism and tried to collaborate with countries with similar apprehensions and identity in the hope of creating a Third Front as a way of standing against imperialism and hegemony. Most of China’s foreign policy approach seems to be in terms of its understanding of contradictions: war and peace; hegemony and imperialism; superpower politics and Third World solidarity. Though it was only a brief period, over 1957–1958 the country tried to establish friendly relations with nations even as domestic politics continued to shape most of its foreign policy (Ghoble, 1988, p. 45). Internal factors such as the Cultural Revolution of 1966, then Lin Biao’s death in 1971, were followed by profound disillusionment among those who had supported

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Mao and the Gang of Four who had risen to prominence during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976. When he became the supreme leader in 1977–1978, Deng inherited a country that was near anarchic (Deshpande, 1990a, 1990b, p. 29). Though Mao had spoken of modernization, it never became a reality. Four outstanding issues continued to impact the modernization program: the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution that resulted in longstanding politico-economic challenges; the influence of the ideology on society; lack of institutional regularity and order; and economic modernization itself. Deng felt only a political and strategic cleansing could change the situation and he set about re-evaluating China’s perceptions on war and peace; hegemony and modernization; superpower politics; and North–South cooperation. This was the first time that China felt the absence of fear and the threat of war. Until then, the probability of war, both internal and at the global level, had been very real—a perception that was an outcome of its own experiences. The Chinese were invaded and threatened from two quarters: by the United States during the Korean and Vietnam war; and the Soviet Union, which had supplied arms to the Chinese, but at a very high cost at a time when the economy was abysmally low, which resulted in a significant setback in Sino–Soviet relations. In 1960, the Soviet Union increased its military presence along the borders between China and the Soviet Union and Mongolia; Deng led a delegation to Moscow in 1963 but negotiations collapsed. China’s innate understanding and distrust combined with the changing events to strengthen the belief that world forces were acting against it. From the perspective of the Chinese state, the political setting was conducive for establishing economic cooperation between the developed and the less developed areas (Deng, 2012, p. 20). It was time for China to move from its embryonic stage of development to a rapid path of modernization. With global war a persistent concern, a peaceful and amicable resolution of the threat was essential. As no country other than the superpowers could initiate war China continued to oppose superpower hegemony (Deng, 2012, p. 82). Based on the same principle, it called for improved relations with Third World countries and expanded relations with Europe and Japan (Deng, 2012, p. 44). To settle issues of sovereignty and the several territorial and maritime disputes, such as the Spratly Islands and South China Sea, and with India, that were pending, Deng suggested a joint development solution (Deng, 2012, p. 68). He recalled the Opium

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Wars and the humiliation China had undergone and, while praising the PRC’s’ capability to rebuild the Chinese nation, expressed China’s desire for a peaceful solution to disputes. Deng Xiaoping maintained that China, on principle, refused to acknowledge war as an option, and called for a peaceful global environment. He elaborated that while the forces for world peace were growing, the danger of war persisted, as there was no progress being made in discussing nuclear arms and weapons in outer space (Deng, 2012, p. 82). Going to war was not what China or any country desired and, while was clear that only the superpowers were capable of launching a world war, it was also clear that neither of them would actually enter into one— weapons were the deterrent in power politics. No state, be it small or big, could prescribe war. Most of China’s foreign policy till then was framed looking at the threat from the Soviet Union and formed part of a strategic line of the defense stretching from Japan to Europe to the United States. This approach stood altered; a move that could be attributed to the composition of the big triangle composed of the Soviet Union, United States, and China (Deng, 2012, p. 98). Pursuing an independent and diplomatic foreign policy, opposing hegemony and power politics was the only way to achieve peace. As a Third World country, China shared a common destiny with others in that bloc. This was why it followed a policy of non-alignment and, in following the independent foreign policy of peace, while improving relations with the United States and the Soviet Union, it would neither play the card of another country nor allow others to use it (Deng, 2012, p. 98). Deng applied this strategy to improve China’s international status and influence in world affairs. Adjustments were made both at the domestic front and in foreign policy. China supported the cause of the oppressed nations and viewed the struggle and challenges of the Third World as its own. Deng called for Europe and the Third World countries to work together at modernizing their respective economies. During a talk with President Hussain Muhammad Ershad of Bangladesh on 4 July 1987, Deng called Europe a partner in economic modernization and world peace (Deng, 2012, p. 198). In his talk with President Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia on 22 June 1988, aware that Ethiopia, just like China, belonged to the Third World and was in the midst of reform, Deng pointed out that the international environment was peaceful and, therefore, conducive to growth (Deng, 2012, p. 262). Talking to President Yoweri Museveni

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of the Republic of Uganda, 23 March 1989, he appreciated the African country’s struggle for freedom and efforts to modernize. The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC in 1978 discussed past actions and spelt out new policies. China shifted its focus from class struggle to an expansion of productive forces, and it replaced the old closed door with an open-door policy. The only solution going forward was peaceful coexistence and cooperation with all countries regardless of different social systems, based on Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (FPCC) (Deng, 2012, p. 54). Maintaining peace and stability was not essential for China alone; it was critical for all countries with similar developmental needs. Peace and economic development were two crucial issues in the world still to be resolved. The first part involved East–West interaction, the second part, the North–South. Modernization diplomacy was the outcome of a better understanding and assessment of the international situation in China’s foreign policy (Cheng, 2011, p. 43). China not only improved relations with the superpowers but also with the world, a policy that was beneficial and committed to its modernization drive. “Banquet diplomacy” was an effective technique of welcoming prominent Western and Third World politicians to China. It was a resumption of the people-to-people, or “Ping-pong diplomacy” of the Bandung days—a way to redeem the tarnished face of China, by inviting several international delegates from across the world, including Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, former Premier Maurice Couve de Murville of France, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, and Premier Alfred Raoul of Congo (Deng, 2012, p. 216). China’s foreign relations evolved in an uneven way. Both Mao and Deng, in their own ways, impacted strategy. Deng’s strategy included a broad agenda of economic modernization and opening to the outside world. The new character of China’s foreign policy was premised on an independent and peaceful diplomatic strategy that aimed at a peaceful environment conducive to modernization, and the setting up of a new international economic and political order. Deng’s foreign relations’ strategies emphasized independence and non-alliance. In the post-Mao period, Deng called for greater self-reliance, evoking Sun Yat-sen’s famous metaphor that no country could bully China the way it had happened in the past (Keith, 2018, p. 44). China’s new proactive foreign policy of expanding its relations with countries around the world was one that would support the modernization drive most needed for China’s domestic consumption. On 12 August 1978, the

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Sino–Japanese and Friendship Treaty was signed with the then Fukada Takeo government that enumerated the anti-hegemony clause (Cheng, 2016, p. 64). The signing of a Joint Communiqué between China and the United States on 16 December 1978 was the beginning of formal relations between the two countries. A gradual improvement in Sino– Soviet relations resulted in a bilateral talk at the Deputy Foreign Minister level in October 1982. Deng took advantage of the international system that was conducive for China’s modernization program and encouraged a new approach in China’s foreign relations strategy. Further, even at the domestic level, economic modernization determined most of China’s foreign relations strategies. The period ushered in a new phase of diplomacy the beginning of normalization with the United States, the signing of the Friendship Treaty with Japan, expanded engagement with Europe, and other developing countries and continued interaction with the Third World. This contemporary policy was formally proclaimed in the State Constitution of 4 December 1982, as an independent foreign policy of peace based on the five principles of mutual respect, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Mutual non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs, as well as consistent opposition to imperialism, colonialism, and hegemonism were also emphasized (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, n.d.). The twin concepts of maintaining independence and self-reliance remained an integral part of independent foreign policy. Deng emphasized the Daoist principle of keeping a low profile (taoguang yang hui, meaning to hide brightness and cherish obscurity) (Yan, 2014, p. 155). An independent foreign policy, therefore, supported the goals of peace and development; it provided a durable policy structure by which China could engage with the outside world (Deng, 2012, p. 211). It combined self-reliance and independence, was a policy of non-interference and non-aggression based on mutual reciprocity and equality that aimed at preserving global peace. At the same time, China developed cordial relations, greater solidarity, and cooperation with all countries and actively participated in global concerns. 4.3.2

Changing Phase of Relations with the Superpowers

Changes in the domestic arena pushed China into an entirely new international course and explained most foreign policy variations in the post-Mao

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period. In the external context, two facts emerged in the understanding of superpower politics: first, that the threat from Moscow had considerably declined, though an absolute détente was absent; and second, the development in Sino–US normalization was conditional, limited and tactical—the very deep bitterness between the two countries continued. The partial détente with the Soviet Union was noticed during 1981– 1982. With the US, the signing of the Three Communiqués, the first, known as the Shanghai Communiqué on 28 February 1972, included views of both sides on Vietnam, the Korean peninsula and most importantly, the issue of Taiwan. Essentially the United States acknowledged “One China”. The second communiqué signed on 1 January 1979 acknowledged the normalization of relations between the United States and China. The third and final communiqué reaffirmed both countries’ desire to strengthen politico-strategic-educational-cultural ties. The outcome of the communiqués was a reduction in tension in Sino–American relations and greater engagement in areas of trade, investment, training, and tourism (Robinson, 1994, p. 562). At the same time China continued to maintain a policy of equidistance from the superpowers. Soviet Union Sino–Soviet relations can be dated to 1949 when the Soviet Union recognized Communist China, as the two countries were bound by ideology and conventional boundaries. Several phases marked Sino–Soviet relations: the first was from 1949 to 1959, following the signing of the Friendship Treaty in 1950. China received substantial support and assistance, the outcome of which was that it leaned towards the Soviets. During the second phase from 1959 to 1960, the Soviets were not as forthcoming with support and the Chinese accused them of being imperialistic and hegemonic. The third phase, 1969–1979, can be termed as a period of hostility. During this phase, the Chinese befriended the Americans, leading to the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué. Subsequently, Sino–Soviet normalization can be considered from 1979 when China briefed Moscow of its interest in renewing the Friendship Treaty of 1950. The normalization came at a time when the Afghanistan war had burdened the Soviets. Objectively, this situation allowed China to recalibrate its relations with the Soviet Union and bring the protracted rivalry to an end. At the same time, even as other bilateral discussions began, Deng Xiaoping advised caution and restraint while dealing with the Soviet Union. The first political consultations started in Beijing on 5

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October 1982, While the Chinese continued to be concerned about the Soviets’ support for Vietnam’s aggression in Cambodia, they were also committed to improving relations. In the mid-1970s, following North Vietnam military victory over South Vietnam, CCP leaders were concerned about Hanoi’s foreign policy. The Chinese were also worried about the growing Soviet influence in Indochina. China and Vietnam had clashed over territorial claims. China had invaded Vietnam in the past, and though the Vietnamese had never confronted the Chinese, this traditional pattern of behavior changed, and the number of incidents involving the Vietnamese increased. China’s initial move to war came in 1978 amidst concern over the fate of ethnic Chinese. On 12 August 1978, Vietnamese armed personnel sprang a surprise attack on a Chinese patrol and a fierce clash ensued. The Vietnamese Communist Party at its Fourth Plenary Session named China the most dangerous enemy. Vietnamese rhetoric confirmed alleged Soviet support. In the light of Vietnam’s attack on Cambodia, China viewed Vietnam as a proxy to Soviet expansionism in the region. The Vietnam War set the stage for China to use military force when it came to addressing issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Alarmed by the Soviet interventionist approach and its support for revolutionary ideas in the Third World, Deng was prompted to try and teach Vietnam a lesson. In his view, Soviet support for Vietnam was ungracious. The Chinese had two reasons to be wary of the Soviets: the continuous military build-up near the Chinese border and the growing cooperation between Vietnam and the Soviets. They expressed this fear of Soviet expansionism during US National Security Advisor Brzezinski’s visit to China in 1978. The Cambodian issue also had a significant impact on Sino–Soviet relations. Backed by the Soviet Union and ignoring Cambodian independence and sovereignty, the Vietnamese had made a series of demands on the Cambodian government that further intensified the conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia. On 25 December 1978, Vietnamese troops occupied Cambodia. They faced massive resistance from the Cambodian people, which became a factor in the international political struggle. Cambodia received support from China, the United States, Japan, and Western European countries. The thirty-fourth General Assembly of the United Nations in 1979 passed a resolution demanding that Vietnam withdraw its troops (Qichen, 2006, p. 67). Already heavily burdened by

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the war and facing pressure from the international community, the Vietnamese had no choice but to agree to a political settlement. Burdened by the arms race, the Soviets, who had backed Vietnam, were keen to improve relations with the United States. Deng Xiaoping seized this opportunity to renew Sino–Soviet relations and, when their delegates met at Vladivostok on 28 July 1986, he put forward the idea of Sino–Soviet normalization. He asked for a withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Sino– Soviet border area and the People’s Republic of Mongolia, as well as from Afghanistan, and also that Vietnamese troops withdraw from Cambodia. In 1982, Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev in a speech at Tashkent addressed a plea for compromise to China. Brezhnev was prepared to abandon ideological differences and was willing to discuss territorial issues. After the passing away of Mao, the Soviets had sent messages for talks but it was only under Deng in 1982, that China was prepared to bring to table a Sino–Soviet dialogue. The second round of consultation between China and the Soviet Union was held in August 1983. Soviet Premier Andropov sent a highlevel Soviet delegation to China. The visit of Soviet Deputy Premier Ivan Arhipov to China in 1984 led to signing of several agreements with China: Economic and Technological Cooperation and Agreement; Agreement on the Establishment of the Economic Trade and Science; Technology Cooperation Committee; Agreement on the Exchange of Goods and Payments from 1986 to 1990 (Qichen, 2006, p. 1). Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko accepted the Chinese stand on hegemonism and eliminating threats as a move towards Sino–Soviet normalization. After he passed away the Soviet politburo was divided in its view towards China. Gorbachev expressed a willingness to hold discussions with China and announced the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Negotiations with Mongolia followed on the substantial withdrawal of troops and also a commitment on a discussion regarding troop reduction along the Sino–Soviet border (Qichen, 2006, p. 37). He acceded to the Sino– Soviet border demarcated by the Amur River along the central line of the main channel and said that he hoped that it would remain peaceful, and also that China and Vietnam would engage in a high-level dialogue to resume a peaceful settlement on Cambodia. Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader to speak highly of China. He detailed Soviet interest in engaging and deepening ties with China. With no compromise on what were for them the three major issues, the Chinese

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welcomed the Soviet move and Deng grabbed this opportunity to mend China’s relations with the Soviet Union (Qichen, 2006, p. 36). As a part of the normalization process, Soviet border negotiations restarted in 1987 and the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited Moscow. The Soviets accepted past mistakes while the Chinese were receptive and emphasized looking to the future rather than remaining mired in the past. The Soviets conveyed Vietnamese interest in engaging in direct dialogue so as to accelerate the political settlement process in Cambodia. After that, a meeting with the foreign ministers of both countries resulted in a joint statement on Cambodia. The principal outcome was that both China and the Soviet Union wanted a fair and reasonable settlement of the Cambodian issue as soon as possible. After successful negotiations, a formal announcement and a joint communiqué on Cambodia was followed by dates of Gorbachev’s visit to China. The Chinese move in the case of both Vietnam and Cambodia was to counter Soviet expansionism in the region. But while the Soviets were willing to normalize relations, China continued to exercise caution. Talking to American TV Correspondent Mike Wallace on 2 September 1986, on Sino–American and Sino–Soviet relations, Deng claimed that states determine their foreign relations according to a given context and condition (Deng, 2012, p. 7), which was why China’s position on the Soviets had altered and why he was open to meeting Gorbachev with the intention of normalizing relations (Deng, 2012, p. 134). Meetings between Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping was held from 15 to 18 May 1989. Deng said the prospects for the future were bright and called for normalcy in Sino–Soviet relations while recalling past Soviet support to China. For his part, Gorbachev acknowledged mistakes of the past. It was affirmed that going forward, Sino–Soviet relations would operate based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The Joint Communiqué confirmed that the state-to-state relations, in principle, were normalizing. On 31 July 1989, at the international conference convened in Paris, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen acknowledged that the Cambodian issue was the outcome of the invasion of troops from another country followed by protracted occupation. The solution was the complete withdrawal of foreign troops, maintenance of peace, prevention of further civil war, and realization of national reconciliation. China and the other countries assured that military aid would be stopped, and that Cambodia would be able to hold free and fair elections in the future.

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Amidst a lot of confusion and apprehension, the Cambodian Peace Agreement was signed in Paris on 23 October 1991. The entire Cambodian issue was a crucial episode in China’s diplomacy under Deng, one that aimed to teach the Vietnamese a hard lesson. Domestically, the Vietnam War was timed to endorse Deng’s return to power and a robust foreign policy posture. United States The Sino–American relationship has been one of engagement and disengagement characterized by periods of hostility and normalcy. It remained a matter of convenience in the process of normalization and also the underpinning factor for anti-Sovietism (Pradhan, 1982, p. 29). The western approach to détente refers to a historical process evolving piecemeal solutions through dialogue towards stability and peace (White, 1981, p. 167). Mao and Zhou expressed their intent to normalize Sino– American relations based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Normalization began when both the countries were embroiled in their respective problems vis-à-vis the Cultural Revolution and Vietnam— the Cultural Revolution had destroyed China’s economy and traditional culture, and the United States was entangled in the Vietnam War to which the American public vocally objected. These factors impacted the process of dialogue and reconciliation. For almost two decades, the countries had been embroiled in a bitter struggle, and both Mao and Nixon had to carefully orchestrate the normalization process (Kissinger, 2001, p. 128). In fact, in his interview with the American Journalist Edgar Snow, Mao regretted the decades of the divide between the Chinese and American people. It was when the American army was steadily increasing its forces along the Chinese border in Vietnam, that Mao unequivocally stated that China would fight the United States only on its own territory and not in Vietnam. Aware that victory in the Vietnam War was impossible for the Americans, Nixon called for a staged withdrawal. China was more than willing to support Vietnam in this endeavor. Mao treated the rapprochement as a strategic objective; Nixon viewed it as an opportunity to re-define the American approach to foreign policy and international leadership. Normalization was a process that was not an easy one for either the United States or China. The approach was inhibited by domestic complexities, historical experience, and cultural perceptions (Kissinger, 2001, p. 658). Nixon’s general design turned into an opportunity after

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the clash between Soviet and the Chinese forces on Zhenbao Island near the Ussuri River. His visit to Asia followed and deliberations with world leaders such as Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s, paved the way for a greater understanding of the benefits of a strengthening of Sino–American relations (Oksenberg, 1982, p. 23). Nixon gradually ensured that the American government, as well as public, opinion changed its perception of Sino–American relations. The outcome was an increase in trade and travel between the two countries. While Mao had conceived the idea of opening up China, the Cultural Revolution distinctly alienated the country from the international environment. Over the course of the Vietnam War, Chinese leadership was convinced that the United States was no longer keen to be embroiled in the Cold War with China, especially after the Nixon administration expressed keen interest in deterring the Soviet Union (Oksenberg, 1982, p. 36). The Nixon Doctrine reassured the Chinese that the United States would no longer look at a policy of containment in Asia. They were confident that engagement with the United States would facilitate better opportunities and act as a counterweight against the Soviet Union. The outcome was two meetings, one on 20 January 1970, and the other on 20 February 1970 (Oksenberg, 1982, p. 189). The meetings ended in a deadlock on Taiwan, though the Americans were quick to acknowledge the Chinese desire to settle the issue amicably. There was a period of lull before normalization. Henry Kissinger was the first to visit, followed by the visit by American president Nixon on 4 February 1972. The Chinese reaffirmed their view of America as a credible partner in their effort to counter the Soviets. From 1971 onwards, both countries expressed their desire to normalize relations that had been hostile for more than two decades. On the issue of Taiwan, Deng stated that China believed in the formula of “One Country Two Systems” and called for no alteration in the proposal. Deng clarified that the Taiwan was purely an internal matter, and that the decision was China’s alone. Among the points put forth by the Chinese was the issue of war and peace. Deng called for greater responsibility from the United States, stating that the international strategic view had changed. He hoped that the triangle of the Soviet Union, United States, and China would be beneficial in the struggle against hegemony and war (Deng, 2012, p. 44). This, he said, explained China’s stand on global peace.

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The Sino–American détente began in the 1970s when the United States began the process of accommodating China (Fardella, 2009, p. 546). Talking to a Chinese-American physicist and Nobel Prize winner, Tsung-Dao Lee, Deng explained that China’s changing approach to the West was part of its modernization and open-door policy and that as long as there was a significant benefit to humanity, the country was open to change. He was aware that the West had an advanced science and technology program without which the Third World could not ward off poverty (Deng, 2012, p. 147). Deng’s call for more practical support for economic modernization (Harding, 2000, p. 61) resulted in normalization that supported an expanded economic and cultural contact between China and America. In his speech at the United Nations on 10 April 1974, Deng drew the world’s attention by illuminating the three forces in international politics (Yee, 1983, p. 239), which had been very explicitly presented by Mao as the Three World Theory. This represented first, declaring Mao’s revolutionary line in foreign policy; second, connecting all anti-Soviet forces including United States; and the third, underlining self-reliance strategy (Yee, 1983, p. 242). The signing of the Shanghai Communiqué on 28 February 1972, at the end of Nixon’s visit to Beijing, was the result of both sides coming closer. Despite the differences between the two countries on many issues, Sino–American normalization was in the interest of all countries (Joint Communiqué, 1972). Reaffirming the principles agreed in the communiqué, both sides were urged to maintain contact and diplomatic relations with each other (Joint Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America, 1982). The Shanghai Communiqué placed normalization of relations, despite the differences in ideology, between two countries as key to the process of greater respect, mutual trust, and the willingness to comply peacefully. The United States called for a negotiated settlement in Indochina. It was committed to the withdrawal of all American forces in the region. The Chinese were firm in that that every nation should enjoy the fruits of independence and liberation, and that they would continue to oppose hegemonism. They expressed their firm support for the people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, opposed Japanese militarism, and firmly supported the Japanese people’s desire to build an independent, peaceful, and neutral Japan. As per the communiqué, both China and the United States agreed to “progress towards normalization in the interest of all countries” (Nixon’s China Visit and Sino–US Joint Communiqué, n.d.).

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The communiqué reduced the danger of international military conflict; it stated that neither the United States nor China would ever seek hegemony in the Asia–Pacific region nor support any country in its efforts to establish hegemony, and that neither of them would be third party to any such negotiation. There were several impending issues that the United States did not concede but it did acknowledge China’s stand on Taiwan. The communiqué identified Taiwan as a part of China and assured that no country would meddle in its internal affairs. At the same time, the communiqué did not mention the withdrawal of all US forces and military installations from Taiwan. Beyond this it called for expanded scope of interaction in areas of cultural and scientific exchange, and assured facilitation of people-to-people exchanges. Several bilateral engagements were a part of the Shanghai Communiqué beginning with expanded trade relations that made China the largest trading partner of the US. Kissinger’s visit to China resulted in a US–China liaison office in Peking, the name was spelt differently in English and after the formation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, when Peking in the West was known as Beijing (Holdridge, 1997, p. 143). Bilateral trade increased from US $1.14billion to $5.2billion in 1981, and several prominent corporations collaborated with the Chinese, hoping for sizable growth in trade (Kim, 1984, p. 124). A framework on scientific and technological exchanges resulted in the signing of seventeen protocols between China and the United States. Sino–American interaction also expanded in areas of military security affairs, economic relations, cultural ties, and social and political values (Kim, 1989, p. 96). Several high-level visits and exchanges from the treasury, commerce, agriculture, and defense and energy took place, resulting in agreements being signed in areas of defense and military cooperation, and the setting up of a joint missile monitoring station at Xinjiang. In the Normalization Communiqué of December 16, 1978, the US government stated that it recognized the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China (Tkacik, n.d.). This resulted in the United States withdrawing its relations with the Republic of China and acknowledging the “One Country Two System” approach. When questioned on the Taiwan Relations Act, President Carter said that normalization would be on the condition that the United States would continue to sell military equipment to Taiwan. Communist Party Chairman Hua Guofeng acknowledged this condition and said normalization would proceed despite the differences.

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Deng’s visit to America in 1979 resulted in the celebration of a common strategy elaborating the Shanghai Communiqué, which applied primarily to the Soviet Union. Time magazine dated 1 January 1978, called Deng “The Man of the Year”. He was known as the architect of modernization and the Americans called him astute, candid, forceful, and useful. Deng’s week-long visit to the United States from 28 January– 5 February 1979, was part of the diplomatic summit and an important event in the process of normalization. It involved travel to Atlanta, Houston, and Seattle where he visited industrial and technical centers. Keen to obtain foreign technology to advance China’s economy, he visited several technological facilities, inspected offshore oil exploration rigs, and looked forward to Sino–American cooperation that would benefit the Chinese. Deng was known for his impromptu speeches, but he was cautious in mapping his thoughts. During his meeting with US President Jimmy Carter, Deng criticized Soviet’s action in Vietnam and hoped to maneuver normalization in China’s favor. Meeting with President Carter, he articulated China’s need for a peaceful environment to succeed in modernization. For this reason, a de facto alliance with the United States would help China in its struggle against Soviet expansion (Vogel, 2013, p. 276). He said that Vietnam was a Soviet base, and that it endangered the peace of the Asian region. According to him, the punitive strike on Vietnam was to thwart Soviet designs in Asia (Vogel, 2013, p. 526). Deng assured President Carter of beneficial results of the attack on Vietnam in the long run and that he did not want Vietnam to be another Cuba. He established a world different from Mao’s autarky, stating explicitly that China could not be a threat to the United States and that the United States should not even consider China a rival (Deng, 2012, p. 279). He won American support on Vietnam, and explored other areas of cooperation, student exchange, trade, science and technology, and cultural exchanges. However, as per the 17 August 1982 communiqué, the Americans were engaged in robust arms sales to Taiwan. This had become a political embarrassment to Deng Xiaoping (heritage.org, 2002, p. na). He now asked Chinese diplomats to re-engage Washington on the issue and get the United States to commit to stopping the sale of weapons to Taiwan in the shortest time. Though President Reagan viewed China as strategically important, especially with regard to Afghanistan, the United States paid little heed to the Chinese concern over the sale of arms. The Chinese

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leadership thought it better to deal with the issue at a later date, after the normalization process. In 1982, during the negotiation for the Third United States and China Joint Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan, the Taiwanese government presented the United States with a six-point proposal to conducting relations. According to former US Ambassador John Holdridge, the United States agreed and gave its assent to Taiwan. According to the agreement, the six assurances were: (1) no date for a termination of arms sales with Taiwan would be set by the US; (2) no alteration would be made to the Taiwan Relations Act; (3) there would be no advance consultation with China before making decisions about arms sales to Taiwan; (4) no there would be no alteration on the US stand on Taiwan’s sovereignty; (5) United States would not change its position on the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan and would not compel Taiwan to enter into negotiation with China; China would decide it peacefully; (6) the United States would not recognize China’s sovereignty over Taiwan (The “six assurances” to Taiwan, n.d.). The overall climate in Sino–American engagement was positive and upbeat. For the first time, the US table tennis team’s visited China in 1971, resulting in coining of the famous “Ping-pong” diplomacy. Deng encouraged not only the Americans but also called on other Western scientists to visit China. In articulating his vision for China, he was candid in admitting China’s lack of progress in science and technology areas and welcomed knowledge support and foreign investments. Despite the continued sales of arms to Taiwan, normalization came at a time when, as a leader of a Third World country that was economically and militarily stagnant, normalization would boost his image and strengthen his position. Rapprochement with the United States would be in the interest of economic modernization for which China needed capital, technology, and more partners; in the face of the increasing Soviet military threat, Sino–American cooperation would act as a deterrent and China’s attack on Vietnam might not push the Soviets to retaliate, At the same time Deng was unwilling to compromise on the issue of Taiwan and used this period of tranquility to pressurize the United States not to act (Vogel, 2013, p. 464). The three-level approach in terms of systemic, societal, and the government, offers a greater understanding of Sino–American rapprochement (Robinson, 1994, p. 574). At the systemic level, the change introduced a greater strategic engagement and an attempt to counter or check Soviet

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expansionism in Asia. The sustained period of détente reflected changes at various levels, including that of society in terms of greater people-topeople exchange and increased technical support and knowledge transfer. At the government level, greater institutional regularity between the countries eased tension in terms of trade and other expanded interactions. These factors significantly affected Sino–American normalization, pushing towards greater cooperation, mutual trust, and reduced misperceptions. 4.3.3

The Beginning of Sino–Japanese Normalization

It is essential to understand the Sino–Japanese relationship in the historical context of when the Chinese suffered the utmost humiliation and disgrace at the hands of Japanese militarism. Decades of Soviet–American rivalry and the severity of its impact on both China and Japan have left a powerful imprint on Sino–Japanese ties (Pollack, 1990, p. 714). The relationship was affected by significant interactions in East Asia shaped by increased Soviet militarization and influence of ideology, the extended American commitment in terms of American–Japanese relations and China’s own geostrategic and geopolitical requirements. Since the mid-1980s, there has been a paradigm shift in its response to Japan’s role in the international system. In 1976, the two nations underwent a visible change: the passing away of Zhou Enlai and the coming back of Deng Xiaoping in 1977, changed China’s domestic and foreign policies; in Japan, there was a political wave that brought in the Liberal Democratic Party to power. A long-term trade agreement between China and Japan was signed in 1978. This agreement did not reflect an enduring trade treaty but provided Japan with a necessary lift from the recession (Eto, 1980, p. 724). Sino–Japanese normalization began under Zhou Enlai when he articulated the Four Modernization idea to the Fourth National People’s Congress of the PRC. The proposal aimed to modernize agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology to push China’s growth on par with the developing countries. The domestic compulsions in China did not come about until Deng Xiaoping came to power and set the course of economic modernization in China’s foreign policy. Hua Guofeng signed the first long-term trade agreement in 1978. The ten-year development outline (1976–1985) embodied the Four Modernizations (chinadaily.com.cn, n.d.). This was the time that foreign trade and technological exchange entered a new phase (chinadaily.com.cn, n.d.). China

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called for more investment and looked for assistance from countries such as the United States, Japan, and other industrialized nations. Normalization between China–Japan developed from then on and the two-way trade steadily improved. A long-term trade agreement was signed in February 1978, committing Japanese exports to a total of 10 billion dollars in the areas of technology, plant, and construction materials (Eto, 1980, p. 728). However, political acrimony dominated Sino–Japanese relations even after the trade agreement normalized. The Soviets on their part had their interest added to the Sino–Japanese trade agreement. In the past they had proposed a treaty of Good Neighborliness between Japan and the Soviet Union. In order to impede Sino–Japanese relations, the Soviets made this treaty public. Another incident was the spotting of Chinese fishing boats off Senkaku Island, situated at the north of Taiwan, the island was a focus of territorial dispute between Japan–Taiwan and China–Japan. This came at a time when the Sino–Japanese peace and friendship treaty was on the cards. China hoped the friendship agreement with Japan would contain the growing Soviet presence in the region, but all of this impacted any improvement in Sino–Japanese relations. After Deng assumed office, China moved away from demanding that Japan join the anti-Soviet coalition. Talks resumed and China demanded the inclusion of an antihegemony clause (Eto, 1980, p. 734) in the draft that was signed between China and Japan. In 1978, China and Japan signed a Peace and Friendship Treaty. The treaty had its origin in the Joint Communiqué of the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of Japan in 1972. It consisted of five articles and opposed the Soviet Union. Under Deng Xiaoping, China called for increased cooperation to import Japanese technology. Although he raised the slogan that Chinese and Japanese people live in solidarity and friendship, it was also a reminder of Japanese militarism that had caused untold misery to the Chinese people. While speaking with the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Socialist Party of Japan, Takako Doi, Deng explained opening up to the outside world was the key feature of the Party’s Thirteenth National Congress (Deng, 2012, p. 206). Acknowledging Japanese growth, Deng stated China’s condition was because of its closeddoor policy, which now had been changed (Deng, 2012, p. 243). He was outspoken on the subject of Japanese occupation of Chinese territory and explained that a review of history was essential if the country was

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to embark on the way forward. That was why China was readjusting its relations with most countries, including Japan (Deng, 2012, p. 234). Since the signing of the long-term trade agreement in 1978, Sino– Japanese relations had improved considerably. The treaty, which called for a US $ 20 billion two-way trade from 1978 to 1985, was followed by the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship on August 12, 1978. It was this treaty that resulted in the normalization of relations and led to a substantial increase in high-level visits by leaders of both countries. The first two were made by Deng Xiaoping to Japan in October 1978 and February 1979, and were followed by the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Ohira Massoyoshi to Beijing in December 1979 (Kim, 1985, p. 22). Mutual concerns and interests dominated Sino–Japanese relations during this phase. During his visit to Japan, Deng met the Japanese emperor Hirohito and lauded his efforts to maintain cordial relations between the two nations. He expressed the importance of Sino–Japanese relations that had existed from the time of Mao and Zhou. He also stressed that on the path to modernization, China looked forward to a peaceful environment and was willing to give unstinted support to develop friendly ties with all countries—irrespective of different social systems, China and Japan could still enjoy a peaceful coexistence (english.china.org.cn, n.d.). Several interrelated variables, such as politics, strategy, and economic complementarity dominate Sino–Japanese relations (Arnold, 1990, p. 124). Studies on Japan–China reveal a model that reflects economic consideration and strategic intent. A series of largely symbolic issues remain a part of their relations: a renewed militarism that reinforced China’s occupation of Japan in the 1930s—a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Nakasone in 1985, sparked protest in several Chinese cities as these visits were seen an act of an unapologetic Japan honoring its militaristic past; China’s trade deficit leading to the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment; a dispute over ownership rights over a dormitory in Kyoto set up for Chinese students. The dormitory was purchased by the Taipei government in 1962 from the Japanese. In 1967, Taipei filed a legal suit for the eviction of the Chinese students from the dormitory. The case was still in court, when China and Japan established diplomatic relations in 1972 and Japan switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to China. In 1977, the Kyoto court favored the Chinese. The issue of the dormitory surfaced in 1987, in which the court did not give an absolute verdict in terms of transfer of ownership from Taipei to Beijing. The Kyoto dormitory continues to be a sticky issue in China–Japan relations.

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Japan’s increased military expenditure from 1978 on was not viewed with apprehension until the Nakasone government publicly acknowledged the resurgence of Japanese militarism and was widely criticized by Deng Xiaoping (Arnold, 1990, p. 135). Other economic differences between China and Japan are rooted in the emerging trade imbalance between the two countries. In 1981, China suspended the contract for the Baoshan Steel Complex being put up by Japan near Shanghai, on the basis that the location of the plant was faulty. After negotiations, Japan was compelled to pay Y300 billion to complete the project. The two-way dispute had a visible effect on the Sino–Japanese trade relations. In 1985, China suffered a trade deficit of US $6.1. billion in interest for FDI due to the transfer of Japanese technology (Arnold, 1990, p. 127). Japan’s renewed interest in promoting regional cooperation coincided with China’s reform and modernization under Deng. Economic cooperation began to top issues of bilateral diplomacy. However, bilateral economic relations were not free from problems. Protests and demonstrations expressed Sino– Japanese concerns and led to high-level disengagement. But Deng expressed his firm intention to build an expanded Sino–Japanese relationship, claiming that as close neighbors both countries had common interests. 4.3.4

China–Europe Relations

In the mid-nineteenth century, China had been exploited by European powers such as Germany, France, Britain, and Russia. Chinese leaders, therefore, remained opposed to European imperialism. At the same time, several young future leaders, including Deng and Zhou, had visited Europe on work-study programs. They were fascinated by the scientific and technological prowess and state-building initiative of European countries. It was a critical revelation for the Chinese youth as it gave them the necessary exposure to run their own state at a later date. The China– Europe relationship was one of mutual attraction and conflict (Westad, 2017, p. 111). The influence was evident with China adopting the ideology and teachings of Karl Marx, but relations remained ambivalent even though Europe had figured distinctly in China’s foreign policy. Economic and ideological changes attracted the Chinese towards Czechoslovakia and China’s foreign policy towards East Europe was a combination of both domestic and strategic interests (Yahuda, 1983, p. 192). The absence of a revisionist approach and existence of economic

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and political similarities convinced China to engage with East European countries, willingly or unwillingly, pursuing the Soviet model. Like China, Yugoslavia gained independence through revolution; other countries had gained independence through Soviet support. The proCommunist movements in Czechoslovakia drew China’s concern, but its policy towards Russian military intervention in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Poland (1956, 1970 and 1980–1981) varied depending on relations between the two superpowers. In the fifties, China supported Soviet Russia but eventually objected to the Soviet policy of intervention. The Sino–Soviet split severed China relations with several East European countries except for Albania, Yugoslavia, and Romania. By 1980, with Sino–Soviet relations improving, there was a gradual renewal of China’s ties with East European countries. Sino–East European links also expanded with several students from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and East Germany, coming to China to study (Shambaugh, 1992, p. 2086). Deng juggled Sino–European relations in the grand scheme of reform and opening (Albers & Chen, 2017, p. 115). He identified partners and expanded relations with those countries that were part of the Cold War grand strategy (Deng, 1987, n.d.). Based on his analysis, he called upon Europe to support PRC in its efforts to build peace and stability. Two common factors that bound Sino–European relations during the Cold War were the superpowers and their respective influence on each other’s environment. The PRC’s connection with states in Eastern and Western Europe during this time shaped, to a large extent, Beijing’s reform policy that laid the foundation of China’s economic rise (Albers & Chen, 2017, p. 115). At the start of the reform period, China had been a weak economy with very little industrial development. The European countries, on the other hand were far advanced in technology. Deng was convinced that Europe could serve as an essential source of capital and technological know-how for the Chinese reform process. Several European countries responded positively and though China’s trade with East Europe was negligible, Western Europe accounted for 24 percent of all Chinese imports and over 18 percent of its exports (Albers & Chen, 2017, p. 117). Deng’s time as a student in France provided him a first-hand idea of Western modernization and its benefits, even as it reinforced his reluctance to be a part of the Western bloc. When Sino–American normalization began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, China’s desire to pursue a relationship with the Eastern European countries declined.

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It was the European countries that first recognized the People’s Republic of China: diplomatic recognition came from the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Later Norway, Denmark, and Sweden recognized the PRC. Since the United Kingdom maintained a close relationship with Taiwan, the Chinese rejected its recognition. France and Germany followed. Mao’s leaning towards the Soviet Union had brought the Chinese under the umbrella of East Europe, but Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s statement criticizing Stalin on the cult of personality ruptured Sino–Soviet political relations. The divergent interpretation of Marxism and Leninism that was influenced by the geopolitical Cold War pushed both China and the Soviet Union to behave differently. Disputes emerged over USSR’s policy of deStalinization and peaceful coexistence with the West. It was against this background that China took a belligerent view towards the Soviet Union. This was followed by border skirmishes and rising Soviet hegemony and expansion and resulted in a hostile relationship between China and the Soviets. By 1960, influenced by the Sino–Soviet split, China drifted to the side of West European countries until domestic issues such as the Cultural Revolution eventually pushed it to distance itself from all countries. It was only after Mao’s death and the arrest of the Gang of Four that relationship with Europe could be resumed. The rapprochement with East Europe began after Mao passed away. Tito’s visit to China in 1977 brought about a change in China’s economic developmental strategy (Shambaugh, 1992, p. 105). Numerous study missions were sent to Romania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. While the East European economic model attracted Deng, he was concerned about political uprisings and the example of the Polish Solidarity movement. At the same time, he felt that associating with the Balkan states would in some way pressurize the Soviet Union. The China–Balkan strategy paved the way for China’s opening to Italian and Spanish Communist parties (Shambaugh, 1992, p. 106). As much as West European countries were essential, the East European countries were also a part of the new Chinese outlook. Earlier, trade remained minimal; there was a greater dependence on technology transfer. China did not fulfill the requirement of a full-fledged trade partner—geographical distance separated the two regions, and it did not want to be unduly tied. With the reform underway, bilateral economic trade engagement developed rapidly, and the volume of trade increased. China’s development in the field of science and technology also resulted

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in signing of several agreements on scientific and technological cooperation in 1978. Though a significant distance separated China and Europe, they did influence each other, particularly in their national security concerns. The Soviet Union remained a common adversary, yet their policies and approaches were way too different. First of all, West Europe, unlike the Chinese state, consists of several independent countries. Second, the defense of West Europe has been relatively dependent on the United States while China has had to take care of its own defense and deterrence. Third, West Europe has a strategic advantage between it and Soviet territory, while China had to confront the Soviets along the Sino– Soviet border. Finally, West Europe is more advanced and industrialized as compared to China and given its huge population and relatively less developed economy, the latter was concerned about developing its deterrent capability against the Soviets (Segal, 1986, p. 265). These differences altered Sino–West Europe relations towards the Soviet Union. As a mix of several nations, the European stand on the Soviets at any point of time remained hazy. Deng Xiaoping called for friendly and cooperative relations with Europe to safeguard world peace and economic engagement (Deng, 2012, p. 186). For him West Europe was a competent partner against Soviet hegemony (Yahuda, 1983, p. 195). From 1970 on, Chinese leaders attached greater importance to Europe in China’s foreign policy. China signed several deals, including the purchase of a British Harrier Vertical Take-off and Landing Jet aircraft in 1982, and was also interested in the French advanced military aircraft, Mirage 2000 (Yahuda, 1983, p. 190). China–Europe relations from the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the European nations in 1975, had several high and low points. The united front with the United States during the Cold War against the USSR laid the foundation for increased trade and economic cooperation between the two. When China initiated reforms, it was economically backward. In the 1970s, Western Europe was scientifically and technologically developed, but it faced structural challenges in terms of an economic recession that had significantly reduced its global influence. Even though it offered only limited access to the Chinese market, Europe, both East and West, accepted the relationship with China, which, in turn, acquired European technology. China’s economic rise owes much to this significant contribution from the European countries.

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China and the United Nations

The post-Cultural Revolution era resulted in unprecedented flexibility. Having moved beyond the approved limits of normalization with countries such as the United States, Soviet Union, and Japan, and buoyed by its own conciliatory and friendly attitude, China no longer regarded the United Nations negatively (Kim, 1974, p. 300). The PRC was keen to win the seat in the United Nations that, according to it, was due to China. It adopted several diplomatic techniques and actively pursued “Banquet diplomacy”, inviting prominent Western and Third World leaders to visit China. People-to-people diplomacy was another way of showcasing China’s image to the outside world, as were expanded state-to-state relations (Kim, 1974, p. 303). The issue of China’s representation in the United Nations first came up when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) demanded its seat in the UN Security Council in 1949. At the time of the signing of the UN Charter in 1945, PRC was not in existence, and it was the government of the Republic of China that was the legitimate representative of China. After PRC came into existence in 1949, two governments represented China—the Kuomintang and Communist China, and both claimed to be the true representative. During the civil war, the Americans supported the Kuomintang and the USSR supported Communist China. To oppose the Soviets, the United States continued to recognize the Republic of China (ROC) as the sole representative of China in the United Nations. From 1951 to 1971, China’s representation in the UN to rightfully replace the government of ROC with that of PRC became an annual feature. The Soviets supported the cause of the Chinese and asked the UN to admit PRC as the rightful representative of China. In addition to the USSR, the other countries that recognized PRC were Great Britain, Yugoslavia, and India. The United States was aware of a Soviet veto could go in China’s favor resulting in it replacing the ROC. United States, therefore, submitted a draft every year on the question of China’s representation in the UN and called it an Important Question (Chao, n.d., p. 135). In 1964, France recognized PRC and the situation in the General Assembly underwent a change. The Albania Resolution to restore the legitimate rights of the PRC in the UN followed in 1965 and received widespread support. In 1967, US policy towards PRC changed because of the need to counter-balance the Soviets by establishing a Sino–American

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alliance. The United States became increasingly aware that recognizing the PRC could no longer be avoided. After the 1969 Ussuri River incident, the most severe border clash between the two largest Communist powers brought the PRC and the Soviet on the brink of war and made both the countries drift apart. The United States grabbed this as a golden opportunity and followed up with the visit of President Nixon to China. In 1970, Nixon proposed diplomatic relations with China and proposed accepting China’s right to enter the UN. In that year, 1970–1971, articles on the UN regularly appeared in the Peking Review, expressing the PRC’s intention to regain a seat in the United Nations (Peking Review, 1972, p. 5). The restoration of the PRC’s lawful rights in the UN was added to the Assembly’s provisional agenda at the request of the 17 member countries. The United States proposed China on 22 September 1971, in the Assembly’s General Committee, but was rejected by 12 votes to 9, with three abstentions. In an explanatory memorandum on 15 July 1971, the 17 states called for China’s presence in the UN. On 25 October 1971, the General Assembly declared the restoration of all member rights to the People’s Republic of China and recognized the representatives of its government as the only legitimate representatives of the Chinese to the United Nations; representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek government were expelled forthwith (UN Yearbook, n.d.). The entire debate on its admission to the United Nations drew exceptional support for China from the Communist and Third World countries. At the same time, the West, especially the United States, were not in China’s favor, neither were the Soviets. The PRC’s resilience in Third World diplomacy was visible in this test at the United Nations. In his address at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on 10 April 1974, Deng Xiaoping said that imperialism, colonialism, and hegemony no longer played a dominant role on the world stage (Deng, 1974, na). At the UN forum, he rallied support from Third World countries for China and the Chinese people, emphasizing the need for Chinese presence in the UN, as it stood for Third World diplomacy and the resolve to translate weakness to strength (Kim, 1974, p. 303). This rally for the issues of developing countries received great appreciation and support. Gaining representation in the UN was the beginning of a new foreign policy in a unique institutional milieu (Kim, 1974, p. 312).

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China and the Third World

China’s interest in the Third World goes back to the early 1950s when its relations with the Soviet Union were at an all-time high. The 1960s called for a complete reorientation in the understanding of China’s foreign policy, which coincided with the Sino–Soviet conflict and decolonization movement in Africa (Yu, 1988, p. 861). The Third World had always remained a critical determining factor in Chinese foreign policy under Mao. His strategy was a dual one in terms of uniting a third force against the superpowers, and calling the people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to form a new international order (Yu, 1988, p. 850). The Eleventh Congress of the Communist Party of China acknowledged the international united front of Third World countries (Beijing Review, n.d.) as a force combating colonialism, imperialism, and hegemony. China’s expanded interest included several countries such as Korea, Romania, Yugoslavia, Kampuchea, Iran, Burma, Nepal, Philippines, Bangladesh, Japan, Thailand, and Singapore, as well as many others from Asia and Latin America (Beijing Review, n.d.). Growing US–USSR imperialism compelled the formulation of a Third World policy that could become the center of a revolutionary movement. In his address at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on 10 April 1974, Deng Xiaoping articulated all this as he detailed the profound significance of the developing countries in their struggle against the imperial powers, the trauma of nation-building and their efforts to safeguard national independence (marxist.org, n.d.). As China opened up to the outside world in order to invigorate its economy, Deng explained that: first, the opening up was not only to the West, but it involved other countries such as those of East Europe as well as the Soviet Union; second, the unique characteristics of the Third World countries would be identified and integrated as the best practices for reform and modernization; third, China was aware of the challenges but was confident of a solution; fourth, the path of modernization and reform included the areas of agriculture, science and technology, the military, and economics; fifth, national development would be given full state patronage and would involve active participation by the people; sixth, the world needed greater peace and stability and it was progress and advancement that could avert war; seventh, it was important for Third World countries to rally around each other in their struggle for sovereignty and over territorial integrity issues; eighth, a peaceful environment to develop or modernize

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was very important for countries like those from Africa, who had had gone through similar challenges and concerns of nation-building; lastly, he reiterated that isolating one’s country or adopting a closed-door policy was a bane to development (marxist.org, n.d.). China’s foreign policy, therefore, would safeguard world peace, oppose hegemony, remain truly non-aligned, expand foreign relations, and continue to be an integral part of the Third World (Deng, 2012, p. 44). During a talk with the delegation of Indian Council for Social Science Research on 22 October 1982, on a question regarding South–South cooperation, Deng reiterated China’s spirit of openness and expanded foreign relations and explained that such cooperation would address a range of issues and challenges. However, it would be effective through greater North–South cooperation (Deng, 2012, p. 75). The existing gap between the developed and developing world could be addressed only by identifying common areas of cooperation and engagement. A North–South relationship based on such cooperation could bring about a new international economic order. Deng was aware of the scientific and technological advantage the West enjoyed and called for North–South cooperation as an initiative that would benefit China as well as the rest of the Third World. Deng clarified that South–South cooperation would remain a key priority, and that it was imperative to look at newer areas of cooperation. He called for more dialogue between the North–South and South–South, saying that having embarked on the path of economic modernization, China called for expanded foreign relations not only with the Third World but also with other countries like Europe and Japan. The country subscribed to peace and a peaceful environment; war was no longer a part of the Chinese discourse on strategic thinking (Deng, 2012, p. 279). As a permanent member of the United Nations, China represented the interests of the Third World as a whole and would not claim the superpower status (Deng, 2012, p. 73). Speaking with the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on 1 November 1984, Deng assumed the role of Third World liberator, empathizing with all those countries that had struggled under imperialist powers. Deng recommended China’s step-by-step approach as a model for Third World development—opening to the outside world to invigorate the economy while identifying and integrating the unique characteristics of each country into the process of modernization and reform.

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Conclusion

China’s foreign policy reveals the wide range of options adopted by any major power. Therefore, it is imperative to understand how she changed her posture and behavior over time. At the time of establishing the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Mao ensured that the new government adopted a lean-to-one-side approach that was evident through the Sino–Soviet treaty of alliance signed in 1950. It was during the Korean War, that China adopted a militaristic posture and supported Stalin’s division of the world into two camps. Beginning with the Geneva conference in 1954, followed by the Bandung conference of Afro–Asian countries in 1955, China proclaimed its espousal of a policy of peaceful coexistence in its external relations. Mao’s metaphor “East Wind prevails over the West Wind” reiterated China’s assertive foreign policy (Whiting, 1977, p. 297). The 1960s saw a period of self-restraint but this was short-lived as Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966. The Soviet military build-up along the China–Soviet border resulted and a détente with the United States was seen as an option both by Mao and Zhou to remove the Soviet threat. This resulted in a normalization of Sino–US relations. What this emphasizes again is how China’s foreign policy has always been dictated by concern for its security and a reaction to foreign action and perceptions. By 1978, the international environment had transformed significantly, and this change determined Deng’s foreign policy. China abandoned its revolutionary rhetoric and embraced a more proactive approach in its foreign relations, touting a policy of peace and development aimed at serving its objective of modernization. China–Japan relations transformed and resulted in expanded foreign trade, loans, and technical assistance. Détente improved China’s relations with the superpowers. Sino–American rapprochement reflected changes at various levels and included greater cooperation and engagement. It resulted in expanded trade and political interaction, reducing misperceptions that dominated the relationship in the past. China has several friends both in the Communist and non-Communist blocs. Its foreign policy adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (FPCC) based on mutual respect, sovereignty, integrity, and independence. Alignment and strategies revolve around its modernization needs. To this effect, its leaders reiterated the spirit of safeguarding world peace, calling for greater unity and cooperation among the world’s

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countries. The call for solidarity using terms such as imperialism, victimization, oppression, humiliation, which reverberate with all Third World countries, was a call for acceptance of its place among them. Most wars had been fought in the Third World, and their impact on these countries made preventing war of utmost importance: war is anathema to development and, therefore, it must be eliminated. The primary path to follow was long-term peace and stability (Deng, 2012, p. 303). But while peace and development are significant issues in the world even today, neither was being resolved (Deng, 2012, p. 82). China, therefore, took it upon itself to resolutely oppose hegemony and power politics and safeguard world peace. Deng announced that no hegemonic power could decide the fate of China and the Third World—its influence had increased considerably, and they could no longer be left unnoticed (dengxiaopingworks, 2013, p. na). He also stated categorically that China was not seeking leadership but was genuinely concerned about progress and development. Opposing hegemony and safeguarding world peace, therefore, remained the core theme of China’s foreign policy. Deng’s flexible foreign policy advanced friendship everywhere (Keith, 2018, p. 257). China improved relations with the superpowers and all other countries, including Japan, Europe, and the Third World, making it clear that it does not join bloc politics and would not allow others to play China’s card. At the same time, it cautioned that it was not to be taken for granted, and if pushed to war, it would not back down. A modest, low posture that focused on an independent foreign policy and learning from abroad, was the foreign policy precisely enunciated by Deng to facilitate China’s economic modernization and reform. China also made clear that this would, in principle, remain its future direction and the foundation of foreign policies, and that it would continue irrespective of the leadership.

References Adamson, B. (2004). China’s English: A History of English in Chinese Education. Hong Kong University Press. Ahamad, N. (1979). Post-Mao Chinese Foreign Policy. Pakistan Horizon, 32(1/2), 47–85. www.jstor.org/stable/41394704

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CHAPTER 5

Foreign Policy of China Under Deng Xiaoping: Economic Dimension

5.1

Introduction

When China opened its doors to the outside world it was on the basis of a political decision made by its leader Deng Xiaoping. It was driven by a response to economic requirements rather than by ideology. From about 1978, Deng and the Communist Party were beginning to feel that foreign interest, and especially capitalist MNCs, could play a constructive role in China’s growth (Kleinberg, 1990, p. 247). When implemented, the “Open-Door” policy become an integral part of China’s modernization program (Yahuda, 1983, p. 1). It altered the country’s development strategy from one based on self-reliance to active involvement in the world market. It also paved the way for a more significant societal interaction with the outside world, challenging the old notions and political dogmas that had not desired it in the past (Huan, 1986, p. 183). However, opening up to Capitalist countries did not mean China was drifting away from Socialism. In a talk with Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Deng Xiaoping explained that China would integrate Marxism with Chinese practice, called “Socialism With Chinese Characteristics” (Deng, 2012, p. 105). It meant adopting new methods to increase national productivity that completely replaced the old dictum or understanding of the political theme of war and peace, hegemony, and superpower relations, and also expanded relations with countries like Japan, those of Europe, and the Third World. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 P. Suresh, Foreign Policy of China Under Deng Xiaoping, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4764-3_5

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China’s new developmental strategy was launched in 1978. The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee had formulated a policy of reviving the domestic economy and opening to the outside world (Deng, 2012, p. 125). Deng proposed an economic policy that would open up the country and promised that this would result in a better standard of living for the Chinese people (Deng, 2012, p. 210). The Fifth National People’s Congress held on 1 July 1979, prioritized the following: agriculture, adhering to the socialist principle of modernization; a greater institutional regularity; and replacing the revolutionary generation by inducting young educated professionals and technocrats. Deng’s holistic approach towards the strategic environment gradually shifted to accommodate the domestic need for economic modernization. The Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee 23–29 February 1980, marked the end of the transitional period following the death of Chairman Mao to the ushering in of Deng Xiaoping as leader (Hsu, 1990, p. 39). To enhance the Four Modernizations, Deng brought in Mao’s methods combined with the superiority of the socialist system, cuttingedge science and technology, advanced managerial practices, along with international experience. He was firm in his belief that the new system would change China’s economic topography and position in world affairs. This chapter details the economic dimension in China’s foreign policy.

5.2

Elements of Economic Modernization

Chinese modernization is rooted in deep and cautious changes to the economy. It meant reform of the existing system that brought about a change in the conventional way of Chinese thinking. China was an agrarian society that lacked advanced scientific technology and industrialization. It was important that the country “modernize” itself to be able to achieve recognition in the international community. The elements of modernization included: economic development on the basis of “Socialism With Chinese Characteristics”; the “Open-Door” policy aimed at allowing in foreign business thereby integrating China with the global market; and an attitudinal change in China’s approach to the outside world. The close of the Cultural Revolution marked the end of China’s political and economic isolation. Mao’s chosen successor Hua Guofeng revitalized several economic policies, including the Four Modernizations program that encompassed: agriculture, science and technology, defense,

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and industry. Hua, who was in office for a brief period, borrowed some ideas advanced by Deng Xiaoping, reviving the elements of Maoism and Dengism (Baum, 1994, p. 11). In 1978, Deng Xiaoping took control as the supreme leader. At the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in December 1978, China embarked on a reform and modernization process, ending two decades of relative autarky and isolation (Le, 2013, p. na). The plenary session unanimously endorsed the country’s socialist modernization. It called for an earnest effort from the Party towards modernizing agriculture, the very basis of China’s national economy (www.bjreview.com, 2009); This was to be based on the principle of each according to his work; the use of small lands for private use; holding of village fairs; three levels of ownership which made the production team the basic accounting unit; democratic management and the election of cadres; no excessive grain purchase; the continued balance between industrial and agricultural products; and unchanged market price of food grain. The result was strengthening the educational program in agricultural science by redrafting already existing programs. Other matters included in the discussion were: political events associated with the Maoist period; Mao’s achievements and his contribution to the Chinese people; Maoist Thought integrated into the universal principles of Marxism–Leninism–Mao Tse-tung Thought; all of these based on the practice of socialist modernization and the new historical condition (www.bjreview.com, 2009). Convinced that the session had addressed all issues including de-radicalizing the pre-existing program from the Mao period the arrest of the Gang of Four as well as the changing dynamics of the strategic environment, the Party embarked on the program of socialist modernization. The consensus-based decision became the norm of Chinese leadership under Deng Xiaoping (Brown, 2018, p. na). Gradually, China moved from a self-reliant to a more interdependent model (Wu, 1981, p. 452). The change was visible, and a more conducive vocabulary became a part of the Chinese economic policy speeches and declarations. The plenary session acknowledged the socialist modernization and outcome under Mao and Zhou Enlai and attributed the poor outcome to a lack of experience and understanding of the socialist construction. It also pointed out that the Lin Piao affair and the Gang of Four had had a negative impact on the national morale. Deng claimed socialist

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modernization to be an extensive revolution (www.bjreview.com, 2009), and together with Chen Yun and Zhao Ziyang envisaged opening China to foreign trade and technology (Bachman, 1986, p. 295). The national economic plans for 1979–1980 approved by the session included laying down the foundation and drafting a comprehensive plan for modernization and rapid development. Three critical factors were identified: a sound political system and policies; policy resilience in terms of improving the standard of living; and the growth of productive force (Deng, 2012, p. 215). Deng acknowledged that China was lagging in developmental terms and called the people and the Party to rally around the great mission of socialist modernization. The aim was to bring about a fundamental change in China’s backward condition so that it could become an established modern socialist power. Emphasizing that this could be achieved only through Socialism with specific Chinese characteristics (Deng, 2012, p. 115) he called for integrating Marxist principles based on Chinese realities. In May 1974, at the UN General Assembly Special Session, the Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua stated that a broad united front would help to prevent the United States and Soviet aggression. But, by 1978 the definition of the united front went through certain changes. Speaking at the UN General Assembly on 28 September 1978, Huang Hua reiterated the danger of hegemonism and the need for the united front and emphasized that China opposed all forms of hegemony and oppression (Deng, 2012, p. 275). It was as a direct result of the Third Plenum that Chinese delegates and state leaders visited several countries like Korea, Romania, Yugoslavia, Kampuchea, Iran, Burma, Nepal, Philippines, Bangladesh, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore, as well as others in Africa, Latin America, and Europe, and signed the Peace and Friendship Treaty with Japan as well as the Sino–American rapprochement. Despite the changes, Deng continued to be cautious and, wary of war as an omnipresent possibility, called for a strengthening of national defense. On the issue of sovereignty and the status of Taiwan, Deng reiterated China’s stand of “One Country Two Systems”, calling it a purely internal matter and, therefore, one in which no country had the right to meddle (Deng, 2012, p. 175). China, therefore, set an omni-directional foreign policy that placed economic modernization as the overriding priority in China’s foreign relations (Yahuda, 1989, p. 18). The country would oppose hegemony and imperialism, adhere to an independent foreign policy of peace,

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advocate the “Open-Door” policy, and expand foreign relations. Deng believed that China’s modernization would benefit from technological advancement from the West, and therefore began the process of normalizing relations with the United States (Hinton, 2015, p. 376). Deng’s visit to several countries, including the United States, was the first step towards modernization. According to the Shanghai Communiqué signed in 1972, the United States acknowledged China’s relevance and pledged to normalize relations, even as ideological differences with the Soviet Union persisted and relations continued to be grim. The Chinese feared that the Soviet Union could stall the modernization program. In the 1970s Japan moved to normalize relations with China, which believed that an economically strong Japan would be beneficial to its modernization. Since then, their relations have gradually progressed. China also expanded relations with Europe. Thus, the opening-up resulted in greater engagement with the rest of the world. The “Open-Door” policy flourished under Deng with economic modernization taking priority over others. Deng’s slogan of “practice as the sole criterion of truth” and “seeking truth from facts” reflected flexibility and pragmatism in policy (Kleinberg, 1990, p. 11). This change was an integral part of national development. It referred to a set of economic policies that called for foreign involvement and support in terms of scientific knowledge and technical expertise. It included several key aspects such as foreign investments, international trade, and Special Economic Zones (SEZ) (Kleinberg, 1990, p. 3) that were a crucial part of the reform process. It also included China accepting concessionary loans and foreign aid. Additionally, several graduate students were sent to study abroad and foreigners were encouraged to travel to China, exposing the Chinese to the outside world. Going forward, the relations of production in China were qualitatively different from what they were in the first four decades of PRC (Deshpande, 1990, p. 29). There was an openness in the Chinese attitude to the outside world and this has been one of the critical features of economic reform (Deshpande, 1990, p. 29). China’s three most important aspects of opening up concern foreign investment, foreign trade and Special Economic Zones. The first move towards foreign investment after 1979 was the initiation of a new body of laws and policies, new investments and special trade agreements, and better international borrowing—mostly below market rate (Kleinberg, 1990, p. 12). China obtained foreign capital by borrowing internationally and in the initial years of opening up received loans at a nominal interest

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rate. A repayable loan of 106 billion Yen at 3 percent over 30 years was received from Japan, and of US $1.5 billion at 6 percent over a period of 15 years (Kleinberg, 1990, p. 12). Interest-free loans provided China with an available international credit of US $20 billion. China’s foreign investment policy brought enormous success, making available close to US $2 billion in investment by 1981. All of the investments came from capitalist countries like the United States, Japan, and West Europe. Administrative and financial reforms under Deng facilitated this rapid increase in foreign trade. First, the organizational structure transformed to permitted localities and enterprises greater independence over key trade choices. Secondly, after 1978 the Foreign Trade Corporations became more specialized and new professional services were created to handle issues of foreign exchange, foreign investments, and to promote foreign trade (Kleinberg, 1990, p. 13). The third was the creation of the Special Economic Zones. These aimed to introduce new, advanced technology and earn foreign exchange through export production (Kleinberg, 1990, p. 15). These policies clearly reflected the national economic goals of China. Trade barriers were removed, and economic policies were more decentralized. The rapid flow of capital, investments and trade to China helped it to rapidly increase its economic capability. The shift to “Open-Door” policy ushered in greater economic growth. 5.2.1

“Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”

In carrying out the modernization program, Deng committed that China would proceed only from the Chinese reality. After reviewing history, he explained that while modernization has its own set of advantages and challenges, the mechanical application of knowledge may not produce effective results: modernization would have to remain integrated with the universal truth of Marxism and based on the Chinese reality. China would, therefore, have to plan its course on the edifice of “Socialism With Chinese Characteristics” (Deng, 2012, p. 105). Marxism is entirely scientific and is not a rigid dogma: it is a guide to action (FBIS-CHI86-095) clarifying the basic principles and methods to follow through ever-changing situations in order to solve problems (FBIS-CHI-86-095). Further, in the quest for economic modernization, Deng never abandoned the political structure, nor the ideological methods of Mao. The modernization program was a partial continuation of Mao’s alternative

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modernity and a partial rejection of it (Kang, 2004, p. 49). Deng was determined to modernize China while keeping it in tune with Mao’s ideals. As a pragmatist, he was aware of the ideological discourse and accepted Marxism and Mao Tse-tung Thought as the critical guiding force and the very edifice on which the country’s foundation was laid (Kang, 2004, p. 48). He adopted this ideological discourse as a tool to legitimize political rule. Therefore, the term “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” amounted to a system or process of identifying meanings, values, and ideologies that were historically constituted and specific to certain social groups that were politically and socially motivated (Kang, 2004, p. 54). Since the ideology covers its ideological nature by calling itself “universal truth”, Deng used this discourse as a banner to get the necessary support for economic modernization. He used ideology to serve a political purpose and towards nation-building. Mao had used ideology as political legitimization at the time when PRC was formed and further intensified its motivation during the Cultural Revolution. As a committed communist, it was easy for Deng to give new shape to the ideals of Marxist–Leninist and Maoist Thought. When he came to power, he carefully abandoned the theme of revolution but continued to use ideology for political legitimization. Marx–Lenin–Mao became part of Deng’s public discourse and debate on modernization. Deng subscribed to the model of developmental socialism (Dittmer, 2015, p. 3) and canonized Maoist Thought to legitimize the policy of modernization (Keith, 2018, p. 12). He summarized his approach saying that the Party had been looking at a new opening for China under the banner of Marxism since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee. Under this policy, it could continue to concentrate on economic development based on socialist principles because one of the strengths of Socialism was that it brings people together for a particular cause (Deng, 2012, p. 125). The philosophy formed the very basis on which China’s edifice of development had been built (Deng, 2012, p. 135). It speaks of public ownership that not only encourages collective ownership but also allows a small private sector to develop and absorb foreign capital, introduce advanced technology, encourage Chinese and foreign enterprise, establish joint and cooperative ventures, and call for foreigners to set up factories in China (Deng, 2012, p. 108). In order to uphold socialist modernization, advanced science, technology, and management methods continued to remain imperative (FBIS-CHI-84-076). In this speech, intended to emancipate mind, seek

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truth from facts, unite as one and look forward, Deng Xiaoping elaborated the need to use economic methods and manage an economy that would include both technical transformation and import of foreign technologies (Deng, 2012, p. 108) The idea is that promoting new technology would yield better results. Taking advantage of socialist practices with some amount of capitalism accelerated China’s modernization. 5.2.2

The “Open-Door” Policy

An allusion to the “Open-Door” policy can be dated back to the early nineteenth century when China first showed an interest in modernizing by engaging with the West (Huan, 1986, p. 2). The suffering and humiliation that resulted from this exposure pushed the country into a state of chaos. The domestic and the external environment during Mao’s time was not conducive to looking at engaging with the West. China remained remote and followed a policy of self-inflicted isolation. It was in the late 1970s, when Deng Xiaoping was reinstated to both the Party and power that he felt the negative impact of both the Cultural Revolution and the Gang of Four on China’s development. Even as a youth, he had been genuinely convinced of the relevance of Western technology and knowledge to the growth and development of a country. Now that he could, he transformed foreign policy to suit domestic requirements, reorienting his perception of the international environment to suit China’s modernization drive. His understanding of the terms “war” and “peace” remained synonymous only with development, and the call for an independent foreign policy of peace were focused on enabling China to achieve its modernization goals. China embarked on its “Open-Door” policy two years after Mao’s death. The immediate priority was to address long-standing socio-political concerns, better institutional provision and flexibility, and economic modernization (Yahuda, 1983, p. 127) that were the outcome of the Cultural Revolution followed by the impact the Gang of Four had on the socio-political environment. The Gang of Four had dominated much of the period just after Mao’s death, imposing an uncompromising ideological line that called for a cleansing of society. The immediate need was to start the process of de-radicalizing these elements. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution had affected the working of institutions and, therefore, called for more significant administrative

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reforms. This process of rectification of political organization and policies had to be in tandem with the call for opening up the country and economic modernization that would make China both healthier and wealthier (Deng, 2012, p. 29). It needed an effective policy and greater institutional regularity. The “Open-Door” policy would be decisive for China’s national economic development, resulting in the adoption of new ways to enhance national economic strength, replace class warfare, and deny the likelihood of global class conflict (Kleinberg, 1990, p. 1). In February 1978, Deng took charge of the Four Modernizations and raised the slogans “Practice is the Sole Criterion of Truth” and “Seek Truth From Facts”, pronouncing greater flexibility and pragmatism in policy (Kleinberg, 1990, p. 11). China is a big market. This fact has both advantages and disadvantages—it provides the basis for a massive market for many countries, while domestic factors remain the critical focus of change for China itself (Yahuda, 1983, p. 6). The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee was the historical turning point in the country’s foreign economic relations. A number of new measures were adopted that involved transforming the methods of economic management: expanding economic cooperation based on reciprocity and mutual benefit based on self-reliance; striving to reach state-of-the-art facilities in the field of science and technology; and establishing a world-class education—all to support the modernization drive (www.bjreview.com). The policy would bring an end to the abnormal state of China’s isolation in relation to the outside world (China FBIS-CHI-84-067). Deng was aware that there would be challenges but was confident that they could be handled—the country needed to be abreast of the world; it could not lag behind. China continued its call for greater reciprocity based on mutual consensus and interest and the “Open-Door” policy enabled it to swiftly stand up on its own (China FBIS-CHI-84-067). But the policy had broader implications beyond foreign capital and investment. Bound by the system of division of labour and competition in the international market (China FBIS-CHI-84-067), China had to be aware that the world economy was rapidly changing. The rise of the Third World brought about a significant change in the international economic arena and had broken the monopoly of the developed world. At the National Science Conference held on 18 March 1978, Deng called on nations to join hands together in the quest for science, technology, and innovation, all of which would not be possible in isolation.

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The development of production encouraged internationalization. He said that China had replaced the adage of seclusion and self-sufficiency with the universal interdependence of nations. The developed nations had embraced the Industrial Revolution, while today’s Third World countries, then embroiled in the struggle against imperial powers, had missed the opportunity. The “Open-Door” policy was an initiative that embarked on restoring economic policies based on China’s ground conditions and concrete realities. It undertook several activities, including the exchange of technology and knowledge, FDIs, increased trade opportunities, which would culminate in expanded foreign economic relations beneficial to China’s growth and modernization. As a self-propelling pattern of growth, it provided ample opportunity and encouraged the assimilation of new technology and knowledge. The aim of the “Open-Door” policy was to rebuild the economy that was completely damaged by the Cultural Revolution. It was on this foundation that Deng Xiaoping announced the policy at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held in 1978, and made it the core of China’s foreign economic relations. Even before China opened up, the Ministry of Foreign Trade had called for an open environment that would encourage foreign technologies and utilize foreign capital (Deng, 2012, p. 40). The overall aim was to increase production and productivity levels to boost national economic output, resulting in considerable readjustments to international markets. China had begun the long march towards modernization (Deng, 2012, p. 186). The changing strategic environment provided the country with the optimal opportunity to drive its economic programs and reaffirmed an independent foreign policy devoid of bloc politics (Deng, 2012, p. 75). China was clear that the change indicated a change in quality rather than quantity. China procured foreign equipment, technology, and other commodities needed for modernization from other countries. More than 30,000 students traveled on educational exchange programs. Opening up was a long-term development strategy. With economics at the core of China’s foreign policy, Deng called for a stable and peaceful world environment and made the country’s presence felt in several international fora. The “Open-Door” policy supported by an independent foreign policy provided China with the opportunity to engage and disengage with other

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countries, leading to a significant expansion in China’s economic relations. Under Deng the policy was no longer associated with only external economic relations or foreign capital and technology. It meant a greater integration with the forces of international labor, a dominant agenda of the capitalist means of production (FBIS-CHI-84-076). The “Open-Door” policy ushered in a significant shift in China’s developmental strategy. China moved from self-sufficiency to greater participation in the global market. Under this policy, there was a rapid increase in China’s foreign trade. Increased foreign trade nurtured production in all sectors, and improved technological levels resulted in overall progress and well-being. Deng Xiaoping was pleased that the technological products of Capitalism could remain useful to Socialism and no longer have a class character, since they raised the entire country’s wealth (Deng, 2012, p. 84). The beginning of foreign investment and trade acceptance propelled China’s economic development reducing its dependency (Kleinberg, 1990, p. 12). Its policies aimed at raising the standards of economic output and productivity. 5.2.3

Policy of Modernization

Modernization refers to a process by which a society is transformed under the impact of a scientific and technological revolution. In 1949, at the time of its formation, the PRC was excessively inclined towards the Soviet Union and did not work out a modernization model for itself. Lack of effectiveness of the Soviet model compelled Mao to develop a new economic model that gave greater importance to the kind of heavy industry that support agriculture. It was on the basis of this model that Mao launched the Great Leap Forward. Unfortunately, its failure pushed China into a relative state of decline, pushing modernization still further behind. It was Zhou Enlai, who in 1964, called for the Four Modernizations in the fields of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defense. This idea of modernization was repapered under Deng Xiaoping, who incorporated the idea into the Party and the Constitution in 1977. In the early 1970s and 1980s, the Party extensively debated the Four Modernizations and raised the slogan of the “Emancipation of Consciousness” and “Practice As The Criterion of Truth” calling for abandoning the leftist line of thinking (Suharchuk, 1984, p. 1157). The slogans affirmed China’s interest in assimilating Western technology. Deng was well known for using metaphors—one of the most

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famous of which stated that “whether the cat was grey or black hardly mattered, what was required was that it catch mice”. Based on this dictum, Deng explained that it was implementing an effective economic program that mattered and, if required, China would resort to capitalist economic methods (Suharchuk, 1984, p. 1159). Challenges would persist between the old and the new programs, which is why caution and restraint would be critical in adopting new methods from the West. China was heading into a quasi-liberalization model, and the democracy wall in Beijing was an example. Ideology was dominated by the concepts and ideas of a political economy. Deng grasped modernization on the basis of Marxist philosophy that conditions production in conformity with the development of productive forces. In the contemporary context, the old programs continued to coexist with new ones: large-scale socialist industrial production; socialist cooperative economy; small, privately owned or cooperative manual or semi-manual production. All of these were permitted by the state and controlled by it (Suharchuk, 1984, p. 1159). The theme of enhancement, consolidation, and steady growth of the Chinese economy was supported by the reform period. The progress in industry and increase in production can be attributed to the principles of economic management implemented after the Third Plenum. Based on the socialist principle, together with scientific and technological ideas, a set of Western socio-political views found their way into China (Suharchuk, 1984, p. 1158). The sudden alienation of the four fundamental principles of socialism, proletarian dictatorship, party leadership, Marxism–Leninism, and Maoist Thought that resulted, was restored by increased publication. The CPC leadership reiterated that the country would modernize based on the Chinese reality and reiterated the principles of “Socialism With Chinese Characteristics”. At the same time, China had to juggle elements of capitalism and the bourgeois, all in the spirit of technological modernization. This process of evolution was the foundation of China’s modernization efforts. Deng called for integrating Marxism’s universal truth with the concrete realities of China and vigorous leadership that modernization required, needed active cooperation between the old and new cadres (Deng, 2012, p. 2). Deng emphasized that the 1980s were critical for the Party and the Chinese people as a new phase that supported the modernization program. China would continue to consolidate and concentrate on modernization based on the socialist priciple (Deng, 2012, p. 87). The benefits of modernization were starting to be seen in the province of

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Jiangsu to Zhejiang, but more planning would further increase industrial and agriculture output (Deng, 2012, p. 19). Communes had been abolished and provincial autonomy encouraged in a modernization process that was summed up as an experimental economic reform that brought about significant change in China’s economic system and developmental strategy (Kau, 1993, p. 7). But Deng was not too keen to practice egalitarianism, to raise the standard of living, and stimulate their initiative (Deng, 2012, p. 125). He was conscious of the uniqueness of different practices and recognized that integrating all into one and one into all or, as he termed it, “letting everyone ‘eat from the same big pot”, may not be possible. The beginning of modernization, which was termed a period of attitudinal change towards external relations, resulted in the doubling of the national growth (Yahuda, 1983, p. 172). Greater diplomatic engagement and cooperation were visible between China and the rest of the world. Deng was absolutely clear that going forward, the policy of modernization would only expand and there would be no point in retreat. Analyzing modernization on the SWOT matrix, he concluded that China’s technical acumen was still primitive and called for the recruitment of foreigners to support China in this endeavor (Deng, 2012, p. 25). At the same time, in order to bridge the gap in education that was such a critical aspect of modernization, he encouraged student exchange. Deng’s model divided the realm of politics and economics. His highly pragmatic approach to modernization was a continuous effort and a philosophical reflection (Soo, 1989, p. 27). He encouraged the Chinese people, to preserve national pride by emphasizing that it would be their earnest effort that would continue to build a better China and by constantly affirming the two-way belief of what China could offer to the world and what the world could offer to China, which was the foundation to dispel imperialism.

5.3

Reform Policy: Domestic and Foreign

China initiated a program of economic modernization and reform that aimed at improving the prevailing economic condition of the Chinese people. Its foreign trade and investment policies changed in 1978 and transformed the country into a major trading nation. Major domestic and foreign economic reforms influenced change. The domestic economic policy was revamped to suit foreign trade and investment. Greater institutional regularity committed to a concrete national economic plan

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and foreign economic reforms resulted in the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), reorganization of trade and exchange, and opening of the domestic market (Shirk, 1994, p. 35). 5.3.1

Domestic Economic Reform and Growth

Deng initiated remarkable economic reforms both in domestic and foreign policy. At the domestic level, policies were an outcome of the change in the political climate of China. There was a shift from the planned economy of Mao to a more market-oriented economy. Under Deng, the breakthrough was in the de-collectivization of agriculture, wherein the land remained collectively owned but rights to the land were allocated to individuals (DeLisle & Goldstein, 2019, p. 3). Land reform increased agricultural productivity. The reform period encouraged private businesses; gave incentives to large enterprises; relaxed price controls; and led to a freeing of markets in terms of customers, contracts, suppliers, and employees (DeLisle & Goldstein, 2019, p. 4). Foreign investment was encouraged to boost the economy. Deng’s economic incentives offered greater autonomy to the production unit in terms of profit and loss. Many State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were privatized and had to compete and coexist with newer firms. Urban reforms seemed to be more challenging than those for rural China. The lack of prior experience, bureaucratic influences, and objections to disengaging from the principles of Socialism made reforms in urban areas very slow and challenging. Domestic economic reforms resulted in a better institutional regularity. The plans set out specific goals for economic development. The series of economic and social development initiatives together mapped strategies for China’s reform and modernization efforts. China’s effective reforms in the rural sector benefitted peasants. This transformed the social and economic life of rural China. The agricultural economy flourished, and over 800 million farmers gained through these reforms. The other achievement was the township enterprises. This was a new experiment that involved rural people in industry through the setting up of collectively owned rural industries, which came to be known as the Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) (Wong, 1987, p. 1866). It was a unique way of bringing industrialization into the countryside. The TVEs had to be very competitive to survive and operated like privately owned enterprises wherein they could compete in the market and could pay good compensation. TVEs had started under Mao, but effectively

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Table 5.1 China’s total foreign exchange earnings (TVEs) 1984–1990 (US $billion)

Year

1990 1989 1988 1987 1984–1985

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Total earnings

China’s total export earnings

Percentage of total exports

12.5 10.1 8.02 4.5 2.38

60.1 52.5 47.66 31.37 53.74

20.8 19.3 16.8 14.3 4.5

Source Wong (2014, p. 1760)

began thriving only during the reform era. Their numbers increased from 1.5 million to 18.7 million units with employment increasing eventually leading to an overall economic restructuring (Wong, 1987, p. 1878) (Table 5.1). The central government stipulated the 1976–1985 Ten Year Plan outline of developing the national economy that included the Fifth Five Year Plan (chinadaily.com.cn, 2012). This achieved considerable success, and in 1977 the gross output value of industrial agriculture reached 5050.5 billion Yuan (chinadaily.com.cn, 2012). The Ten Year Plan was amended in March 1978 because the target in the Plan was impractical and ran against the economic development rule. In order to ensure achievable targets, the Plan recommended a relatively complete, independent, and national economic system from 1978 to 1990. The implementation of the Plan showed considerable success. The outcome was that the GDP touched 301 billion Yuan, an increase of 12.3 percent (chinadaily.com.cn, 2012). In December 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC shifted the focus to modernization. The policies of 1977–1978 were markedly different from the earlier years. No longer was Party discipline used to attain targets as under Mao. Even by the end of 1977, substantial industrial production was reported, and the output exceeded that of earlier years: the total value of industrial and agricultural production had increased by 10.7 percent; industry by 14.3 percent, with critical items of steel and coal growing by 16 and 13.9 percent respectively (Teiwes & Sun, 2011, p. 10). The relative success of the new economic program resulted in quick economic growth. The entire period of 1977–1978 pushed for greater targets. The outcome of the push was opening up to the international economy and bringing advanced technology into the country (Teiwes & Sun, 2011, p. 11).

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Table 5.2 China’s import and export trade 1979–1988 Year

Total value of imports and exports

Export value

Import value

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Total

29.333 37.822 40.375 39.297 40.727 49.772 60.246 60.097 68.110 79.419 505.198

13.658 18.272 20.393 21.819 22.197 24.416 25.915 27.014 34.711 40.102 248.997

15.675 19.550 19.482 17.478 18.530 25.356 34.331 33.083 33.399 39.317 256.201

Source Xiangdong (1989, p. 19)

The March 1977 Central Work Conference emphasized the developing of trade relations with Second World countries (Table 5.2). The Sixth Five Year Plan 1981–1985 was a part of the Ten Year National Economic Development Plan Outline 1976–1985, but later in 1980, the State Council redrafted the county’s mid- and long-term plans into a comprehensive one to set the national economic plan on a sound platform. Firm targets were set out: an average annual growth rate for industrial advancement of national economic development; developing trade and introducing advanced technology to suit domestic needs; considerably increasing production in areas of agriculture and industry; entering a new phase in foreign trade and technological exchange, and pushing China’s export ranking in the world to number ten. The Twelfth National Congress of the CPC held on 1 September 1982, approved the all-round process of modernization (www.bjreview. com, 2011). The session called for the development of the national economy and outlined the modernization program that included the Four Modernizations of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology (www.bjreview.com, 2018). It recognized that the success of the program would be possible only if there was a rapid increase in the productive forces supported by new methods and techniques. The session discussed the national economic plans for 1979 and 1980 and approved them in principle. Increasing agriculture productivity to strengthen the foundation of the severely damaged and weak national economy was a

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priority. The other essential measures discussed were the right to ownership by the people’s communes, setting up production brigades and teams, an economic organization at various levels, and the implementation of “each according to his work”. The session highlighted the importance of self-reliance and independence in the overall development process (Suharchuk, 1984, p. 1157). The Eleventh Central Committee held in 1982 reiterated the need for all-around modernization. It placed economics at the core of development and called it the solution to all problems that China was undergoing (Deng, 2012, p. 199). Achieving a minimum standard of living by the end of the century was the criteria of modernization. Starting in 1981, Congress set an economic goal that mandated a quadrupling of the gross annual value of China’s industrial and agricultural output by the end of the twentieth century—from 710 billion Yuan in 1980 to about 2800 billion Yuan (globalsecurity.org, 1982). The Congress elected a new Central Committee comprising 210 members and 138 alternative members, a Central Advisory Commission composed of 172 members, and a Central Commission for Discipline Inspection composed of 132 members. At the First Plenary Session of the Twelfth CPC Central Committee, Hu Yabong, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, Li Xiannian and Chen Yun were elected Standing Committee Members of the Political Bureau (globalsecurity.org, 1982). This was the innermost circle of power and its six members were placed in the most critical Party and government posts marking the beginning of the new period of reform (globalsecurity.org, 1982). The drive for reform and opening began with the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee and developed after the Twelfth CPC Central Committee was held in Beijing on 20 October 1984, which adopted the Decision on Reform of the Economic Structure aimed at revamping the old system that had stunted development and establishing a socialist structure of a specifically Chinese character with a planned market economy based on public ownership. The document was a blueprint for the overall reform structure and to develop Marxist political economics. The reformed structure also included the area of education and politics. In the rural areas, the reform process began in conformity with the Chinese condition. The Party integrated a unified management system to deepen the reforms in rural China. Chinese farmers created a compensation-output-linked model, supported new programs, and shared new experiences across the country.

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In 1984, reversing the autarky model that marginalized the role of foreign trade, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT initiated) a proposal to liberalize overall foreign trade planning and administration (Zewig, 1991, p. 718). A more liberal policy concerning foreign exchange and a contract system for foreign trade was introduced (Zweig, 1991, p. 739). Coastal towns and rural areas played a significant role in China’s export. In early 1988, MOFERT, renamed the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, initiated an economic retrenchment program (Mee-kau, 1993, p. 163). The program was initiated as a move to curb the “high inflation rates that had an impact on the FDI in 1989” (Nyaw, 1997, p. 58). The Seventh Five Year Plan 1986–1990 was created as the first ever all-round plan for social and economic development. The primary aim was to ensure a coordinated economic plan that would improve overall economic efficiency based on the demand for economic modernization. Other aspects discussed were the: development of science and education; opening to the outside world, and combining domestic economic growth with expanding external economic and technological change. The specific goals were to increase total import and export volumes by 3.5 percent within five years while expanding large-scale foreign investments and advanced technology. The Thirteenth Party Congress 25 October to 1 November 1987, preceded by the Twelfth National Congress of the CPC, provided a springboard for deepening and accelerating reform and deepened the impression that China was serious on its reform policy of opening up to the outside world. The Congress also saw senior party leaders from the Politburo and its Standing Committee replaced by young leaders in tune with Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang (cia.gov, 1987) The economy continued to perform well during the first half of 1987 with a steady increase in foreign trade and an overall GDP increase from 6.4 percent to 10.1 percent; between 1985 and 1989 it increased to 11.5 percent— a steep increase that was testimony to the “Open-Door” policy (Wong, 1997, p. 1657). In 1988 foreign trade to the United States totaled US $79.419 billion, with exports to the United States reaching US $40.102 billion. Trade with Hong Kong, Japan, the United States, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union totaled US $51.96 billion (Xiangdong, 1989, p. 18). China received overseas funding and about 5890 foreign-funded enterprises were approved (Xiangdong, 1989, p. 17). Seven contracts for the

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joint exploration and exploitation of China’s offshore oil fields were approved during the year with a total value of US $58 million (Xiangdong, 1989, p. 18). China received new investment and projects: 410 private foreign-funded enterprises; 1650 contracts for overseas projects; contracted projects and labor services with 118 countries, primarily in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia; 300 businesspeople from 94 firms in Europe, Asia, and Australia and they discussed over 161 projects (Xiangdong, 1989, p. 18). China also welcomed foreign investments, the economic climate improved, and China’s import and export trade grew. The fourth phase and the Fourteenth Party Congress, 1989–1992 October, beginning with the Tiananmen square incident of 1989. At both national and international levels, this was a tough period for China, which reached a near domestic crisis point. Deng asked people to act with restraint and maintain a low profile (Cheng, 2016, p. 220), asserting at the same time that Tiananmen was purely an internal matter, and that interference from any outside agency or country would not be appreciated (Keith, 2018, p. 48). He affirmed that China would continue with the liberalization of the economy. But foreign economic relations dropped to an all-time low. Several countries, including France, Sweden, The Netherlands, and Britain suspended relations with China (Kovalio, 1990, p. 21). China’s technology import from the United States came to a halt. OECD countries placed an embargo on all forms of technology transfer and loans. However, this was not for long. Following the Tiananmen incident, the most critical task was to maintain economic growth and progress, so policies favorable towards foreign investment were adopted with the proportionate distribution of foreign exchange and regularized working systems and practices; MOFERT remained the nodal point for the issue of export licenses; new regulations and restrictions were introduced (Xiangdong, 1989, p. 16). Chinese leaders reassured the world of their continued commitment to reform and the “Open-Door” policy. The crisis in no particular way changed the quest for a viable economic model, and thus, a better economy and society (Naughton, 2009, p. 63). The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Fourth and Fifth Plenum took place around the time of the Tiananmen incident. The Plenum reiterated Deng as the supreme leader and the final arbiter, and that he would continue to be so as long as he lived (Shambaugh, 1989, p. 854). Further, the Fifth Plenum decided to improve the economic environment and placed the policy of opening up and reform as key to China’s growth.

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The Seventh Plenum of the Thirteenth Central Committee (CC) of the Chinese Communist Party was the most critical meeting after the June 1989 Tiananmen incident. The Eighth Five Year Plan 1991–1995 was launched in a subdued political environment immediately after the Tiananmen incident and it ended the spurt of hyper economic and double-digit growth (Wong, 2014, p. 1822). Deng called for a quick and efficient “Open-Door” program to renew the economy, and the reform process gained considerable momentum. Since the conservatives did not welcome his liberal reforms, Deng made it a point to travel to several parts of China, calling for stronger support for the economic recovery program. His spring of 1992 tour of South China, popularly known as Nanxun (southern tour), was a critical reform breakthrough. The origin of Nanxun in early 1991 ushered in a new period of reform and development for China’s economy and ignited over two decades of go-ahead growth. By 1995, the national economy had maintained its buoyancy with annual growth of 11 percent, which was 4 percent higher than the 7th Five Year Plan (chinadaily.com.cn, 2012). The period recorded an all-time high—foreign trade showed an astronomical rise with volumes reaching the US $1.0145 trillion at an annual growth rate of 19.5 percent, higher than the Sixth and Seventh Five Year Plan periods (chinadaily.com.cn, 2012). The annual export volume was 100 billion Yuan, accounting for 3 percent of the world’s commodity trade. By 1995, China ranked 11th in the world export and import trade. Foreign exchange reserves reached US $73.6 billion (chinadaily.com.cn, 2012). The outcome reflected a significant improvement in the lives of the Chinese people. For China, economic reform and growth was an indivisible partnership where both interacted with each other. A reform breakthrough in each period brought about significant development. The last three decades of China’s development can be termed as a reform-growth nexus over China’s past growth and development process: 1979–1988; 1989–1990; 1990–1991 and 2000–2012 (Wong, 2014, p. 127). The first period, 1979–1988, which was sparked off by the reform period, resulted in an overall growth rate of 9.8 percent with fluctuations and came to a halt after the Tiananmen incident. In the second period, 1989–1990, growth dropped to 4 percent and reforms came to a halt. Between 1990–1991, in the third reform period, the growth rate rose to 10.4 percent in what was termed the Nanxun effect, an answer to Deng’s call to build the

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socialist market economy (Wong, 2014, p. 136). In the fourth period, the post-Deng era of 2002–2012, growth touched an average of 9.9 percent (Wong, 2014, p. 410). This period is associated with China’s accession to the World Trade Organization, which resulted in growth fluctuation (Wong, 2014, p. 139). China’s economic reforms were an ongoing process of trial and error, as expressed by Deng Xiaoping’s famous metaphor, “crossing the river by first feeling the stone”. The FDI from 1979 to 2011 amounted to US $1.2 trillion, and 97 percent of it came after the Nanxun effect of 1992 (Wong, 2014, p. 175). China’s economy stabilized, calling for more significant reforms such as State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The period 1978–2012 was summarized as one of extraordinary growth that set the nation on the path of economic modernization. The Eighth Five Year Plan 1991–1995 firmly adhered to the objective of building “Socialism With Chinese Characteristics” and the policies of economic reform and “Open-Door” (Wong, 2014, p. 848). The Plan was presented along with the Ten Year Program by Premier Li Peng just after the Tiananmen incident. Severe austerity measures were introduced and inflation, which touched an all-time high of 29 percent in 1988, was brought under control (Wong, 2014, p. 536). Economic indicators that boosted foreign trade were reversed, and more tourists started visiting China. China began normalizing relations with countries in the region, especially Indonesia and Singapore. Deng Xiaoping was fully aware of his tarnished image after the Tiananmen incident, and that his media popularity had wholly declined. To gain more public support, he published articles under the pen name Huang Fuping—he called it the “northern expedition” (Zhao, 1993, p. 748). The articles gained attention not only among the Chinese but also with the Western media Then, on 17 January 1992, accompanied by his daughter, Deng traveled south with a stop at Wuhan and arrived in Shenzhen (Zhao, 1993, p. 741). With the orthodox camp gaining ground in Beijing, he also undertook an unusual trip to Shanghai and Guangdong province as a pre-emptive attack that could be equated to Mao’s strategy during the Cultural Revolution (Zhao, 1993, p. 745). The visit received an overwhelming public response: Deng at the age of ninety-two, was traveling to reach out to the people, and widely reasserted his position after the Tiananmen incident. Touring Wuhan, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai on the southern tour with his family, Deng praised the rapid development of Shenzhen

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and Zhuhai. There was an immediate impact on the implementation of economic reforms, which picked up greater momentum (Cheng YuShek & Brosseau, 1993, p. 1). In the south, Deng decided to abort the ideological and policy debate as he hoped that this would enable work in progress. Each region had its apprehensions; Beijing remained reluctant, while the Guangdong spirit welcomed Deng Xiaoping. The southern tour was an opportunity to assess the rights and the wrongs and provide solutions. Deng reiterated the correctness of the policy and applauded successes and failures alike (Deng, 2012, p. 188). That it was the eve of the Fourteenth Party Congress was a confirmation of the principle of reform and opening (China FBIS-CHI-92-060). Deng reiterated three important points: the country would adhere to the principle of reform and opening up; the basic policy formulated at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee would be carried into the future; it was possible for Socialism to adapt some Capitalist realities such as the stock market and joint-stock market. He emphasized that only reform and development could strengthen Socialism—no other criteria could replace it. Also, if it did not occur, it would only encourage bourgeois liberalization. The fundamental task of Socialism is to develop productive forces, which means it will remain firm on commercial construction, expand its material foundation, and strive to satisfy the people’s ever-growing material needs and cultural demands (China FBIS-CHI-92-060). A lot of new changes in terms of trade practice and policy were introduced to meet the requirement for China’s entry into the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT). China’s presence in international financial institutions was also a message to the world that its growth and liberal trade practices were conducive to more considerable investments from foreign enterprises. Toward the end of 1995, China was ready for the Ninth Five Year Plan (1996–2000) and made it the critical agenda of the Fifth Party Plenum. Deng’s strategy by this time was entirely in place, and the country was moving towards a socialist market economy that recorded an average of 12 percent growth combined with the same amount (12%) as inflation (Wong, 2014, p. 1731). The Fifth Plenum went ahead with the existing plan and endorsed Deng’s socialist modernization reform program.

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Foreign Economic Reform & Growth

Deng established a number of areas for foreign investments that included the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and Coastal Cities. To attract Western technology into the Chinese ecosystem, Deng ensured joint ventures (JVs) were formed with local Chinese participation to enhance technology. Its huge foreign exchange reserve was ensured by making it an export-oriented country with a large current account surplus, while the fact that it is one of the most populous countries in the world allowed the capitalization of cheap labor for low-cost, mass-produced, export-oriented products. The socialist modernization program and its credibility based on domestic and foreign resources compelled China to open its doors to expanded foreign economic relations that involved domestic and international markets (China FBIS-CHI-85-215). Developing foreign economic and trade relations is a universal principle for all countries engaged in modernization, which is why Third World countries focus on expanded foreign economic relations and practical demand (China FBIS-CHI-85215). This needs the integration of reform policies directed towards foreign investment. For China too, this was an essential strategy in the area of modernization: the country was still trailing in technology; it did not have adequate funds for modernization; resources had to be explored; the population, though a considerable challenge, if effectively utilized, could provide a vast labor market. Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1978, China’s foreign relations increased considerably, leading to expanded trade and contributing to its economic development. China called for foreign investment in 1980 and from then on foreign investment in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and coastal cities was welcomed, trade and exchange were reorganized, and the domestic market was opened (China FBIS-CHI-84-056). Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) contributed significantly to China’s post-1978 economic development. Despite being a late entrant into the global market, the country took advantage of economic expansion and utilized more foreign capital than any of its Asian neighbors. Beginning in 1978, strategic openness was adopted in terms of transfer of technology and, by 1979, more than twenty-two significant contracts had been signed with several foreign countries. Hong Kong was one of the four Asian tigers and leading at the time China embarked on its modernization program. The continued

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connection between Hong Kong and the Mainland, made most Hong Kong businesses proactive in China’s “Open-Door” policy. Special Economic Zones (SEZs) Special Economic Zones were developed in selected areas such as Shenzhen when market-oriented reforms were announced in the 1980s. Initially, only four areas were inducted because the old-time radicals tried to derail the policy as a pro-capitalist venture. Also, many inland provinces that supported Mao’s ideas of autarky resisted the opening of SEZs, and wanted to limit the foreign influence to smaller area (Shirk, 1994, p. 37). Therefore, the formation of fewer SEZs was a way to reduce the growing opposition in an unfavorable political climate. A separate SEZ office was established under the State Council. To attract foreign investments, a decentralization method with a certain degree of national control in terms of identifying and managing national capacity was introduced (Crane, 1990, p. 3). Given the SEZs’ geographical location close to Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore, they could attract more significant investment from overseas Chinese. While other countries remained wary about China and its regime flexibility when the “Open-Door” policy was introduced, the Chinese government attempted to capitalize on the patriotism and sense of belonging among the overseas Chinese. Most foreign investment to SEZs has come from Chinese settled in Hong Kong and Taiwan (Shirk, 1994, p. 81). Thus, the creation of SEZs had two important reasons: the first was to make China wealthier, thereby depicting growth-oriented economic nationalism; and the second was political nationalism in terms of reunification with Taiwan and Hong Kong (Kleinberg, 1990, p. 95). Since China is such a vast country, differences between the coastal and inland provinces persisted. A liberal approach to attract foreign investors was adopted. The SEZs were, in essence, meant to strive for the utilization of “international capital and advanced technology to assist China’s economic development” (Wong, 1987, p. 3505). SEZs enjoyed privileges, and Guangdong and Fujian were granted special foreign exchange retention rates that were higher than other provinces (Shirk, 1994, p. 35). Gu Mu, the State Councilor responsible for SEZ affairs, explained that the SEZ could import any industrial equipment and engage in all undertakings including industry, tourism, and trade (China FBIS-CHI-84-243). Soon the concept of geographical particularism gained popularity and more provinces looked to convert their areas into an SEZ. The Special Economic Zone was an experiment, something very new under Socialism

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(Deng, 2012, p. 33). It resulted in new jobs, better living standards, and increased production which led to its proliferation (Kleinberg, 1990, p. 87). The Chinese government also set up high-tech zones to benefit from the global market and talent. Four zones were established, three in Guangdong Province-Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou, and one in Fujian Province-Xiamen (Shirk, 1994, p. 35). The SEZs were divided based on their administrative areas, geographical location, international cooperation, local industrial parks, industry clusters, and those that were “corporate” SEZs. The foreign investment attracted could be effectively used to stimulate the overall Chinese economy. New innovative initiatives and experiments were permitted, and the SEZs acted as catalysts to market reform. The outcome was a higher investment in terms of capital, technology, and managerial skills, all of which stimulated the economy and provided an excellent opportunity for integration into the global market. By the end of 1984, the total foreign investment in Shenzhen stood at US $580 million. Shenzhen’s exports and imports increased to US $2.17 billion (Park, 1997, p. 98). Shenzhen’s annual industrial output value reached 3 billion Yuan, which earlier was at 50–60 million Yuan (China FBIS-CHI-87-028). Success and challenges mutually persisted in the Shenzhen area: in 1986, industrial output exceeded 3.4 billion Yuan; industrial production rose from 32 percent in 1985 to 45 percent and direct foreign investment reached US $360 million, double of what it was in 1985 (China FBIS-CHI-87-028). The four Special Economic Zones enhanced the areas of production, and efficiency, and developed an outward-oriented economy (China FBIS-CHI-87-028). They were followed in the mid-1980s by the establishment of coastal cities such as Zhangzhou that aimed at stimulating economic growth by taking advantage of the location and economic opening up (worldbank.org, nd). In addition to these SEZs, Deng called for opening up more port cities in Dalian and Qingdao and was keen to develop the Hainan Island (Deng, 2012, p. 41). Coastal Development Plan In continuity with the policy of welcoming foreign investment and advanced techniques to serve the building of Socialism (Deng, 2012, p. 87), Deng promoted the Coastal Development policy as a way to increase the income of the people. In spring of 1984, 14 coastal cities implemented the “Open-Door” policy and succeeded in bringing in

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foreign investment and advanced technology. The coastal area comprises a vast region with more than 200 million people, which was a significant reason to bring it into the purview of policy (Deng, 2012, p. 225). Once the coastal provinces were fully developed, they could extend their support to the interior provinces. The coastal and interior provinces would provide mutual assistance in the process of development. The Coastal Development Plan, with the international market was to be implemented in three stages. In the first stage, the region would be made into an export-oriented area focused on light industrial products, food items, textiles, small electric appliances, and greater engagement with the hinterland. Within five to seven years, in the second stage, the inland products would move towards the international market. In the third stage, the focus would shift to the production of sophisticated technology and technology-intensive products (Hsu, 1990, p. 252). The highly populated area was ideally suited for a labor-intensive export program. In October 1983, direct foreign investment in China totaled US $ 5.9 billion, and 7300 foreign-funded enterprises were opened (Hsu, 1990, p. 240). Rural industries grew faster in the Pearl River Delta’s eastern and southern coasts in the Canton province, Yangtze River Delta, Southern Fujian Triangle, and Shandong and the Liaodong Peninsula (Hsu, 1990, p. 237). Joint Ventures (JVs) Joint ventures soon became a part of the national strategy and were one of the effective initiatives of economic reforms. The first projects were set up in the areas of Guangdong and Fujian provinces in 1979 and spread to Beijing and Tianjin municipalities and Zhejiang and Hebei provinces in 1980 (Xie & Dutt, 1993, p. 389). By 1980, China’s trade relations with other countries had gathered momentum. Economic and technical corporation focused on the development of energy resources such as coal, petroleum, and power, the modernization of railway transport, port construction, and revamping of the existing enterprises. Foreign trade relations were signed with more than 170 countries and import–export commodities exceeded 50,000. The rapid expansion of JVs began in 1983 in the Eastern Coastal region and expanded into the Central and West regions. Investments and investors came from Europe, Hong Kong, Japan, the US, and Southeast Asia, which also included the oil-producing countries of the Middle East and by 1985, China had signed joint ventures with 28 countries; almost 19 provinces received more than $10 million in foreign investment (Xie &

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Table 5.3 Annual foreign investment in joint ventures by country of origin Country Hong Kong USA Japan Europe Others Uncertain

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

4.9 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 1.0 8.2

16.3 35.4 6.1 4.7 0/0 0.0 62.5

8.7 8.0 2.0 8.0 0.3 0.0 27.0

10.3 8.8 0.0 7.4 0.0 0.1 27.3

62.7 105.9 9.9 12.0 2.8 0.0 193.3

639.2 42.6 64.4 114.1 117.1 8.0 985.4

821.1 126.5 111.7 42.3 102.7 13.3 121.76

Source Xie and Dutt (1993, p. 390)

Dutt, 1993, p. 385). By 1987, the country had approved 5193 JVs involving 12.2 billion US dollars in total investment, and 3.38 billion US dollars in foreign funds were utilized (China FBIS-CHI-88-063) (Table 5.3). Sino-foreign contractual joint ventures became an important way to utilize foreign investment. The new ventures did have teething problems, and cadres needed to be given proper training and guidelines. It was also necessary to enforce state laws and ensure compliance resulting in a standardizing of processes. But the strategy was highly beneficial to the economy and led to the introduction of advanced technology and management, increased foreign revenues, expanded exports, identified substitutes for imports, speeded up the technological process, and set best practices. All these initiatives had considerable significance in the modernization drive and China could identify reliable partners based on mutual trust and understanding. Foreign Trade Foreign economic relations remained a crucial strategic initiative in the modernization program. The first work conference on foreign trade sponsored by the Shanxi Provincial Revolutionary Committee was held between 12 and 21 January 1979 in Xian and attended by more than 280 comrades responsible for economic work. The foreign trade report by comrade Hua Yabong provided a comprehensive understanding of the critical role of foreign trade procurement and exports, and this provided a provincial plan for developing foreign trade from 1980 to 1985. The

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conference highlighted the need to strengthen studies on the international market and called for a committed contribution towards foreign trade, keeping in mind the realities of the province. It also laid the foundation for increased coordination between the factories involved in export commodity production and the specialized departments to achieve higher results in foreign trade and follow standard trade international practices. The export product commodities would go through stringent quality checks, and those that did not meet the standards would be diverted to the domestic markets. There was a call for greater integration into the world market, for the developing foreign economic relations, and trade was critical to this development initiative. Third World countries place a great deal of importance on foreign economic relations in their commercial construction. China, striving to achieve a sustained, stable, and coordinated development and realize the goal of quadrupling the GNP of 1980 (China FBIS-CH-91163), was no exception. As a part of reviving the economy, Foreign Trade Minister Li Qiang said China would absorb and use funds from abroad (China FBIS-CHI-79-136). A three-pronged approach to a long-term policy of expansion in economic exchanges with foreign countries was laid out based on up-to-date technology, use of funds from abroad, and increase of exports (China FBIS-CHI-79-136). The project volume of China’s imports and exports in 1979 was 44,000 million yuan, an increase of 24 percent over the previous year (China FBIS-CHI-79-136). Foreign investors were optimistic about developing China’s export production and a two-way process was identified wherein they could benefit from their imports to China and, in turn, enable China to import technology and equipment to strengthen its industry. The Second Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress introduced greater institutional regularity to protect joint ventures in China. This would promote more significant economic and technical exchanges between China and other countries and, in turn, boost China’s foreign trade. Relations with the United States In 1950, the United States placed a strategic embargo on China that severed relations between the two countries for more than two decades. In 1972, the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué reestablished diplomatic relations, and trade relations were established between the two nations. By 1985, Sino–American trade stood at US $7.3 billion of which $5 billion accounted for imports and US $2.4 billion for exports—the

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trade volume had increased by more than 20 percent over 1984 (CHINA FBIS-CH-87-032). China ranked 15th in the US markets in the Far East and Asia–Pacific. Up to 1986, US exports consisted of commercial planes, locomotives, railroads, equipment, scientific research, drilling machines, telecommunication equipment, and computer and office equipment. From January to June 1986, US exports to China stood at a value of US $243 million (CHINA FBIS-CH-87-032). China exported garments, fibers, medicinal herbs, glass utensils, pottery, shoes, stockings, toys, athletics, and equipment. The largest segment, that of garments had a value of US $764 million, a total of 31.8 percent of the US $204 billion of the total value of China’s exports to the United States (CHINA FBISCH-87-032). Crude oil also found a great market in the United States at a value of US $330 million representing 13.8 percent of exports. The US Secretary of State, James Baker, called attention to a “rapid increase in China’s export of textiles, petroleum products and consumer goods” into the United States, pointing out that they were price competitive with a comparable quality (CHINA FBIS-CH-87-032). The low cost of labor in China meant it could produce goods for the US market at a cheaper rate. Appropriate measures were taken by both countries so as to partner more effectively; trade policies were relaxed; preferential treatment was given to exporters with regard to tax and foreign exchange. The United States had, in the 1970s, put China under the Y category along with the Soviet Union and other East European countries. After the normalization and several rounds of talks, China was moved to the “P” designation made China eligible for exports of transport aircrafts, long-distance communications equipment, and military type of helicopters (Kim & Hammersmith, 1986, p. 75). In May 1983, the US Secretary of Commerce, Malcolm Baldridge, visited China for a meeting of the first US–China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, and it was during this visit that the United States decided to move China further up from group P to group V, the category reserved for friendly countries such as NATO allies and Japan (Kim & Hammersmith, 1986, p. 83). By 1982, the Sino–American Economic Committee held in Washington suggested the drawing up of an investment treaty between the two countries, which resulted in advancing several Sino–American economic initiatives. In 1985, high-level delegations from US companies such as General Motors and Boeing visited China. US enterprises joined the bid to develop the Chengjiang Dam Project, a nuclear station in the

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southern province. In 1986 the international consortium, dominated by US companies and headed by General Electric, agreed to set up thermoelectric plants in Hebei and Jiangsu. In May 1986, the US Secretary of the Treasury, James Baker, visited China to participate in the Joint Sino–American Economic Committee with PRC State Councilor Wang Bingqian and discuss greater US investment in China. Technical cooperation was yet another important area of engagement between China and the United States. Several meetings were held with respect to improvement of trade and investments, followed by a meeting for transfer of technology by the United States. Progress was made in the areas of industrial and technical cooperation. This also paved the way for small- and medium-scale engagements such as that with McDonnell Douglas Company and Shanghai Aviation Industry Company. The US experts did a feasibility study on the Three Gorges Dam and provided technical assistance. The other areas were agriculture, animal husbandry and fishery—agro-technical exchanges between both sides involved more than 100 areas. Further evidence of cooperation was the study of atmospheric and oceanic interactions launched by the maritime climate observation group, jointly organized by the scientific and technical personnel of China’s State Oceanography Bureau and the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration at the end of 1985. The normalization of Sino–American relations and development of economic cooperation can be attributed to two major reasons: firstly, the emerging politico-economic pattern of the world. After World War II, countries globally were in a state of deep distress and engaging with the United States was critical. The breaking away of the Soviets from this grouping, especially after they took to hegemony, had most countries backing away from them. China had emulated the Soviet model of a planned economy, but that pattern no longer remained attractive in the global economic market. In its search for more opportunities, China renewed relations with the United States. Secondly, trade wars had intensified, and competition resulted in monopoly conditions. In this competition, Japan and Western Europe had left the United States behind. The United States was looking for bigger markets and with China looking to be a lucrative option, a relaxation of sanctions was necessary. This led to a greater interest, and a building of Sino–American economic relations. After political normalization, in 1979, two-way trade between the two countries expanded. By 1980, bilateral trade doubled to

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reach US $4.8 billion (CHINA FBIS-CH-87-032). In the 1980s, keeping foreign policy interests in mind, the US government recommended that its Congress extend the “Most Favored Nation” treatment to China. Relations with Japan Sino–Japanese trade had been increasing since 1972 when the two nations established diplomatic relations (Asia and Pacific FBIS-APA-80-214). In 1985 trade figures touched US $10 billion, a seven-fold increase over the past eight years (Asia and Pacific FBIS-APA-80-214). The normalization of Sino–Japanese relations resulted in an increase in the trade volume of over 1000 percent to US $55 billion (China FBIS-CHI-84078). In 1973, China exported a small quantity of crude oil to Japan and, in 1974, started selling the crude oil to other Asia–Pacific countries. It was the major diplomatic breakthrough with Japan that led to China’s engagement with other capitalist countries. To assist the infrastructural development of China in 1979, the Japanese government provided a loan of over 300 billion RMB for port, railway, and road construction. Further financial aid was provided for the electrification of railways. Over and above such financial aid, cooperation extended to the field of joint research in the scientific and technological arena. This cooperation further extended to joint ventures with over 21 enterprises like Fujian Hitachi Television Set Company and Otsuka Pharmaceuticals Product Company. Trade facilitated greater people-topeople contact, resulting in further economic cooperation. With domestic consumption in Japan being comparatively low, it had to look for opportunities outside. The possibility of China’s large consumption market becoming available made the opportunity to normalize Sino-Japanese trade relations very attractive. For China, Japanese technology could give it an edge in product development and reduce the single-country dependency syndrome. Over 1972–1983 the trade deficit was narrowed down due to the strengthening of Sino-Japan relations (Table 5.4). Relations with the Soviet Union Sino-Soviet economies have been complementary, resulting in opportunities for the expansion of trade ties. During the second half of the 1980s, cooperation was further strengthened in power generation, machine building, coal, and chemical industries (Soviet Union FBIS-SOV-86150). The two countries signed a five-year trade agreement encompassing the volume of trade and the mode of payment. The list of goods identified

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Table 5.4 China’s total volume of trade: Export and imports 1972–1983 (units in $100 million) Year

Total volume of trade

PRC exports

PRC imports

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

11.0 20.1 32.8 37.9 30.3 34.8 50.8 66.5 94.0 103.8 88.6 100.0

4.9 9.7 13.0 15.3 13.7 15.4 20.3 29.5 43.2 52.8 53.5 50.9

6.1 10.4 19.8 22.6 16.6 19.4 30.5 37.0 50.8 51.0 35.1 49.1

Difference -1.2 -0.7 -6.8 -7.3 -2.9 -4.0 -10.2 -7.5 -7.6 -1.8 -18.4 -1.8

Source CHINA FBIS-CHI-84-078

included high-tech areas such as aeronautical technology and equipment, light motor vehicles and trucks, ferrous metals, and chemical fertilizers that were imported by China from the Soviets (Soviet Union FBISSOV-86-150). In turn, China exported farm produce, textile products, consumer goods, and industrial raw material to the USSR (Soviet Union FBIS-SOV-86-150). Due to the geographical advantage of proximity, transport of goods was relatively cheap. The bilateral cooperation further strengthened the socialist nature of these two economies, despite the political hostility that existed between the two countries for almost two decades. Relations with Western Europe China always had a significant trade relationship with West European countries that have played an important role in its commercial construction. In the 1980s, despite ups and downs in trade volume, bilateral trade always showed an upward trend. In 1980, the total volume of trade was US $5.8 billion, and it had increased three-fold by 1989 (China FBISCHI-91-240). Exports to Western Europe were primarily agricultural and processed products, minerals, light industrial products, and textiles, while the list of imports comprised machinery, transport equipment, iron and steel, industrial chemical products, and medicines.

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The relationship resulted in significant investments by Western European industries either in the form of joint ventures or wholly owned companies. German automobile majors, such as Volkswagen, were among the earliest companies to invest in the country to manufacture limousines in cooperation with China’s motor vehicle industries. The Royal Dutch Shell Company cooperated with China Petroleum to carry out feasibility studies in the South China Sea in order to tap the energy potential available. In the ever-growing telecom market, Belgium’s Bell company set up a factory. The European Community and China also engaged in cooperative projects in the field of biology and agro-technology. Bilateral relations strengthened in the 1980s when China began to open up, providing substantial business opportunities for the EC though there have been several cases of trade protectionism resulting in the community levying anti-dumping duties on Chinese imports. Relations with the Middle East and the Third World China has had established trading ties with Southeast Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East for over 1000 years (China FBIS-CHI-82-104). Even during the 1970s, the country had expanded trade relations with Third World countries, resulting in increased trade volume over four times between 1975 and 1980. Chinese goods such as farm tools, handicrafts, and electrical appliances were popular in these countries, while China imported sugar, cotton, and natural rubber (China FBIS-CHI-82-104). Despite the geographical distance, China established diplomatic relations with Latin America in the 1960s, just after the Cuban Revolution. China– Latin America bilateral trade reached $31 million in 1960 and over $343 million in 1965 and $1.3 billion between 1960 and 1965 (Florido, n.d.). After that, the growth in trade slowed down considerably. The reasons were attributed to changing relations between China and the USSR, political changes in terms of military coups in Latin America, and China’s own Cultural Revolution. China’s trade with the Afro-Asian countries had been expanding since 1950, with more than 48 agreements having been signed. In 1980, the total trade volume was $4.76 billion (China FBIS-CHI-83-167). The 1981 figure was at US $5.49 billion and in 1982 stood at US $6.06 billion, a total increase of 27.3 percent over 1980 (China FBIS-CHI-83167). From 1980 to 1982, China’s trade volume with these Afro-Asian countries varied between 12.6 percent, 13.6 and 15.7 percent, respectively (China FBIS-CHI-83-167). The products exported also varied from

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chemicals (15.4 percent), light industrial products (13.1 percent), textiles (15 percent), metals and minerals (9.6 percent), native produce and animal products (7.8 percent), cereals, oils, and foodstuffs (8.3 percent), and machinery products (6 percent) (China FBIS-CHI-83-167). Products imported changed on the basis of domestic requirement. Over the past decades, China had remained committed to the principle of mutual benefit and cooperation through unity of economic development with the Afro-Asian countries. It, therefore, acted as a major market for important mineral and industrial crops (China FBIS-CHI-83-167). Now, keeping its exports to Afro-Asian countries in mind, China was more than willing to enter into a free trade agreement if the countries were willing. The scarcity of foreign exchange and similarity in consumption patterns, made reciprocity of products in a barter system most beneficial. This strategy helped China in the 1980s to export certain goods in lieu of imports of necessary items from these countries. In addition, the Chinese government signed several joint ventures spanning various industry segments. This had the potential to promote greater South–South cooperation and establish a new international economic order with China as one of the major players. It is undeniable that overseas Chinese diaspora, loosely referred to as the “bamboo network”, contributed to the economic development of PRC by investing in FDIs during the early phases. Over 56 percent of China’s FDI came from Hong Kong (Wong, 2014, p. 1289), while ASEAN countries contributed 1.7 percent, which is very low in light of the large Chinese diaspora in these countries. The fact is that FDIs of many ethnic Chinese based out of countries like Indonesia and Malaysia was routed through Hong Kong. The “Open-Door” policy and economic reforms in late 1970 saw spectacular growth resulting in annual GDP growth of 9.8 percent from 1978 to 1997 (Wong, 2014, p. 130). This rapid growth, when viewed from the demand side, was primarily due to a significant domestic investment level and was matched by high domestic savings. Forex Reserves Foreign exchange from export is a major source of earnings for a country. From 1979 to 1984, China’s export totaled over US $120 billion and provided the country the means to make the international payments required to sustain its imports and external economic activities (China FBIS-CHI-85-215). Trade and foreign economic relations promoted the

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development of industrial and agricultural production. China registered a substantial increase in both exports and imports, with a total trade volume for 1981 amounting to $40.4 billion, double that of 1978 (China FBISCHI-82-200). Total exports, expanded to $20.9 billion, from the actual figure of US $9.7 billion in 1979. The foreign exchange and imports from foreign countries substantially increased. From 1979 to 1981, a large amount of cotton and chemical fibers to boost its light and textile industry was imported. The import of large quantities of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, seeds, and animals for breeding purposes supported agriculture. Since 1978, China accelerated the process of single-item technology and major equipment and linked foreign technology to the utilization of foreign funds. In terms of joint ventures, investment increased to over $3 billion. Foreign loans were utilized to supplement domestic construction funds and accelerated China’s industrial base. The development of foreign trade also provided work to people. It was an opportunity to expand products developed within the country. As a result, almost a third of the Shanghai handicrafts industry workers and Changzhou Municipality’s industrial enterprise in Jiangsu, were directly engaged in the production of external commodities. In 1981, there was a steep increase in China’s imports. The total import value was US $12.44 billion, and the total export value was US $12.8 billion. The export value slightly exceeded the import value. Before 1970 imports had been restricted to just 30 countries but in the post-Mao’s period, there was substantial increase in imports from countries such as Japan, United States, Hong Kong and Macau, resulting in substantial increase, touching between 44.8 percent to 50.9 percent (China FBIS-CHI-81-189). The modernization drive defined in the country’s ten year program (1991–2000) and the Eighth Five Year Plan (1991–1995) firmly implemented the open open-door policy, and during this period, total foreign trade increased from US $38.1 billion in 1980 to US $115.4 billion in 1990. About 30,000 contracts worth US $37 billion were signed. Other than funds, advanced technology, management expertise, and market elements were introduced. The idea was to establish China in the league of export-oriented economies. Its position in the world trade league was upgraded from 28th in 1980 to 16th in 1984, and export volume increased by 44.3 percent in 1980 (China FBIS-CHI-85-186). In 1984, China’s total import and export trade volume reached US $53.55 billion, an increase of 40.4 percent over 1980, a year before the Sixth Five Year Plan. From 1979

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onward, with the reform process underway, the Chinese government signed various foreign loan agreements totaling US $18.2 billion and used various loans amounting to US $14 billion (China FBIS-CHI85-186). Contracts to assimilate direct investment by overseas Chinese were approved and foreign business enterprises touched US $12.3 billion (China FBIS-CHI-85-186). The state approved 1618 Chinese-foreign joint-capital enterprises, 3030 cooperative venture enterprises, and 94 foreign-owned enterprises (China FBIS-CHI-85-186). By the early 1980s, China signed more than 50 foreign contracts with engineering companies in over 70 countries. In 1982 China imported 23.8 billion Yuan of production and different equipment, all of which were in short supply within the country (China FBIS-CHI85-215). Foreign trade increased by an overall US $59.2 billion in 1985 (China FBIS-CHI-86-015). Huang Wenjun, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, said the preliminary figures showed imports and exports for the Sixth Five Year Plan period (1981–1985) totaling US $229.37 billion, a phenomenal increase when compared to the previous years (China FBIS-CHI-86-015). There was a substantial increase in imports from 31.84 percent to over US $33.4 billion, while exports grew from 5.7 percent to over US $25.8 billion (China FBIS-CHI-86-015). Effective trade policies that began in 1979, integrating the domestic economy with the world economy, resulted in increased foreign trade. China’s exports did not see a decline during the world economic recession in the 1980s, though there was a gradual reduction in its import of major agricultural products such as grain, cotton, fats, and cooking oil during the Sixth Five Year Plan. The promulgation of the Law of the PRC on Joint Venture for Chinese and Foreign Investment led to the establishment of Chinese-foreign joint ventures: Beijing-Air Catering Company, Tianjin Sino-French Wine Cooperation, Xinjiang Tianshan Woollen Textile Company, Shenzhen Guangming Overseas Chinese Electronics Industrial Company and the Shanghai-Foxboro Company Limited (China FBIS-CHI-86-175) (Table 5.5). Deng identified petroleum as having the potential to finance China’s outward returns, and crude oil and petroleum products grew from 12 to 36 million metric tons; the value of petroleum exports increased by US $6 billion (Lardy, 2005, p. 3219). Between 1977 and 1990 export of crude oil and petroleum products increased by almost US $6 billion and were categorized under the single-product earnings, which contributed to China’s export earnings (Lardy, 2005, p. 3220) (Table 5.6).

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Table 5.5 China’s foreign trade 1979–1991 (US $billion)

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Year

Total

Imports

Exports

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

10.9 15.7 19.6 19.5 17.5 18.5 25.4 34.3 60.1 68.1 80.5 82.6 84.1 99.5

10.9 15.7 19.6 19.5 17.5 18.5 25.4 34.3 33.1 33.4 39.9 39.2 32.4 38.5

9.7 13.7 18.3 20.9 21.9 22.2 24.4 25.9 27.0 34.7 40.6 43.4 51.7 60.9

Source Lardy (2005, p. 3193)

Table 5.6 China’s exports of crude oil AND refined petroleum products 1977–1990

Year

Millions of tons

Billions of US$

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

11.1 13.6 16.4 17.5 18.4 20.5 19.9 27.6 36.24 33.95 32.17 30.84 29.13 29.25

1.0 1.3 2.4 4.3 4.9 4.9 4.5 5.2 6.7 3.2 3.9 3.3 3.5 4.3

Source Lardy (2005, p. 3225)

The pattern changed post-1985, and petroleum and other products came under tight scrutiny, pushing aside other products. By the mid1980s, the share of primary commodities declined in China’s exports, and the share of manufactured goods increased. The rapid growth of textiles and light manufactured goods reached an all-time high. These

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Table 5.7 The commodity composition of China’s exports 1980–1991

Year

Primary products

Manufactured products

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

50.2 46.6 45.0 43.3 45.7 50.5 36.4 33.6 30.4 28.6 25.6 22.5

49.8 53.4 55.0 56.7 54.3 49.5 63.6 66.4 69.6 71.4 74.4 77.5

Source Lardy (2005, p. 3244)

products were heterogeneous and setting standards for international consumers based on quantity and quality was more amenable as they were more labor-intensive products. Given its vast population, this was entirely beneficial for China (Table 5.7). China is a labor-intensive country and as the focus changed from primary to manufactured products, this strategy paved the way for it to compete globally and establish itself as a leading exporter of manufactured goods across the world. With its vast labor force, China could manufacture goods at a cheaper cost and export them at a highly competitive price. This manufactured-export-oriented strategy resulted in China becoming a world leader in many of the manufacturing product segments, resulting in massive foreign currency inflow and forex reserves. In the pre-reform period, a strategy of importing certain high-priority capital goods was put in place to reduce the level of capital investments. The entire trade was coordinated by state-owned enterprises that controlled not only raw materials and intermediate goods but also the rate of production of finished goods, which was maintained at sufficient to meet inter-industry demands and consumption (Lardy, 2005, p. 3269). A pattern of domestic consumption with a smaller percentage of exports to match the imports was practiced. During the reform period from the 1980s, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade accounted for 91 percent of exports and 87 percent of imports (Lardy, 2005, p. 3278). In the subsequent years, their shares substantially altered

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to 79 percent and 65 percent, respectively: the rest of the trade was handled by the foreign trade cooperation and the monopoly of stateowned national foreign trade companies was on the decline. Gradually, foreign economic relations and trade had approved and created over 800 trading corporations to handle import and export affairs. But too much decentralization resulted in the non-performance of trade contracts. By 1990, the government had re-scrutinized the functions and responsibilities of the foreign trade corporations and many were either merged or closed, and the overall number was reduced. The number of planned export commodities fell from 3000 in the pre-reform era to 112 by 1988, resulting in a drop to 45 percent in the same year. The list of import commodities fell rapidly from 90 percent in 1980 to 40 percent by 1988. A mandatory plan to handle imports and export was created, which was controlled by the head office of the National Foreign Trade Companies. Economic factors remained the primary area to determine the mix of imports and exports. During the pre-reform period, China’s domestic product pricing was insulated from the world market. Domestic prices were determined by foreign trade corporations that purchased the goods and sold them in the international market. Irrespective of whether the goods were sold domestically or exported through the foreign trade corporation, the producers received the same price. Hence, there was no real incentive for producers to expand production or make internationally competitive products. The controlled system did not give any foreign exchange gain to the producers as the state controlled it. Moreover, this led to the protectionism of the domestic market. In fact, in a few cases, the import price was readjusted upwards to comparable domestic prices considering the quality level difference. In 1984 the State Council for Foreign Trade went in for a commission system for both exports and import of goods in line with the world market prices leading to foreign trade agent formation. By 1991, the import price of over 90 percent of items was based on the international market price and protectionism of the domestic market had reduced. While this was true for imports, export reforms were much slower. However, the government brought in competing trading corporations, giving them the flexibility to choose, thereby maximizing the gains. China gradually integrated the domestic market price with the international market price. These trading reforms in the latter half of the 1980s corrected anomalies of the pre-reform era concerning the pricing of traded commodities.

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As far as the forex market was concerned, in the pre-reform era, China was a centrally planned economy. The foreign exchange rate had minimal effect on the volume of export and imports. The Chinese RMB was a highly overvalued currency, making exports highly unprofitable. The Ministry made adjustments to profits made by a few trading corporations with loss-making export trading corporations. The effective exchange rate varied from corporation to corporation and product to product, resulting in a price equivalent mechanism. From the late 1980s, the Chinese government brought large-scale reform to the exchange rate market, devaluing the Yuan from 1.6 RMB to the US dollar in the 1970s, to 5.3 RMB in 1991 (Lardy, 2005, p. 3338). By the end of 1990, the real value of RMB (inflation-adjusted currency exchange rate) was at 61 percent of what it was in 1985 (Lardy, 2005, p. 3482). Furthermore, the official exchange rate’s anomaly against the market rate drastically reduced. The combined effect of a reformed trading price and devaluation of the currency readjusted to real value made China a vast export-oriented country. The outcome was substantial forex reserves; a large current account surplus allowing China to invest in several countries, resulting in the further expansion of foreign trade. 5.3.3

China and International Economic Institutions

Deng initiated policies of economic reform and modernization that would give China a greater role in international forums and secure membership in multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, as well as the opportunity to become a part of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT). From the time China opened, it identified ways to enhance its resources by participating in key international economic institutions—the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Kleinberg, 1990, p. 168). In order to accelerate modernization, Deng was keen to learn from the experiences of other countries and avail of foreign funding. In 1980, China entered the IMF and later World Bank and International Development Association (IDA) and International Financial Corporations (IFC). China was granted observer status in GATT in 1986. China’s involvement with international organizations can be divided into four stages: The first stage was from 1947 to 1971 when its interaction was very low or minimal; in the second stage, from 1971 to 1978, it regained its seat in the United Nations but viewed it as a tool of

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superpower interest; the third stage was from 1979 to 1989, the period coinciding with the reform process and opening up; and the fourth stage, from 1990 onwards was when China actively participated and tried to strengthen its position in international economic institutions. An important outcome of the open-door policy was China’s entry into formal international institutions such as the World Bank and its affiliates, like the International Financial Corporation and the International Development Assistance (IDA). It was in 1983 that China got observer status in GATT, and in 1986 it became a full-fledged member. China’s entry into GATT was a major breakthrough in economic diplomacy (Wong, 2014, p. 2845). In 1995 GATT was superseded by World Trade Organization (WTO). For China to get a seat in this international organization was a reassertion of its rights, especially when Taiwan was vying for the same position. In 1993, Deng’s Southern Tour resulted in expanded foreign trade and investment. This was when China adopted a high-profile international economic diplomacy (Wong, 2014, p. 3152). A stringent accession policy and compliance were drawn towards China’s membership in the WTO. China had not only to be GATT compatible but also WTO compatible. As a part of its economic diplomacy, China never compromised its bid to enter the WTO. The Chinese were convinced that this membership would facilitate their entry into the global trading system. It was in 2001 that China was awarded membership in the WTO. The outcome was increased engagement not only with political organizations but with those engaged in trade, finance, and commerce. GATT and WTO provided China with the opportunity to learn from the experience of other countries. It benefitted from the IMF and the World Bank when the representation shifted from Taipei to Beijing. The World Bank facilitated China with learning opportunities from East European countries such as Hungary. In 1982, the Bank organized a conference with East European experts on reforms (Bottelier, 2006, p. 10). This gave China the opportunity to understand that emulating the East European economic model might not be applicable. The Bashan Boat Conference of 1985 organized by the World Bank on the functioning of modern market economies, and the experiences of other developing countries provided China with a unique experience. The tone of the Bank was very positive and favorable towards China. China’s involvement with the World Bank increased under Deng, who was keen to understand its feasibility report on the Chinese government’s plan to quadruple the national income by 2020 (Bottelier, 2006,

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p. 9). Thereafter, the Bank came out with an economic report every year and it focused on actual development and reforms. The WTO also supported China’s development and modernization to the tune of US $450 billion and a total of 270 projects in China (Bottelier, 2006, p. 4). Other than access and benefits from the World Bank, what was important was acceptance and recognition among the world community and access to technical assistance and training. It also gave China an opportunity to understand the Western economic thought and best practices of these countries. Changes were evident at the domestic institutional level and in terms of understanding the world economy. China’s engagement in regional economic grouping began in the 1980s and 1986, it officially became a member of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC). Keen to promote economic cooperation and collaborate with countries of the Pacific Basin, China participated in APEC in 1990 and supported free trade and investment. It also fostered closer economic linkages with ASEAN countries. China–ASEAN trade increased in the 1990s and resulted in greater scope for expansion between China and ASEAN countries. In 1992, Foreign Minister Qian called for greater economic, trade, scientific, and technological cooperation (Lai To, 1993, p. 1101). The China and ASEAN links created a larger economic framework such as APEC and PECC in the Asia–Pacific region (Lai To, 1993, p. 1103). China’s engagement with the United States and the other Western countries and the launch of Deng’s “OpenDoor” policy created greater trust among the Southeast Asian countries and therefore, greater participation in regional forums. 5.3.4

Rise of Multinational Corporations (MNCs)

From the late 1970s, the People’s Republic of China laid down an economic modernization strategy that facilitated the functioning of FDIs. It adopted the two-pronged strategy of welcoming into the country foreign investors by undertaking technological advancement and capital and market reforms, and by going outside the country to deepen access to foreign markets, natural resources, and advanced technology. The idea was to integrate China into the global market (Nash, 2012, p. na). Initially, FDIs flowed into China through the then British territory of Hong Kong and only SOEs were allowed to invest abroad. Deng believed that China could benefit from capitalism guided by the state. His market reforms supported by cheap labor propelled China’s export drive.

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Beginning in the late 1970s, multinational corporations (MNCs), such as Volkswagen, Coca Cola, and 3 M started exploring the Chinese market, and in the 1980s, Motorola, Philips and NEC were encouraged to enter as well (Ho Park & Vanhonacker, 2007, p. na). In the early 1990s, especially after Deng’s Southern tour in 1992, the MNCs started investing back in the country. Investments varied with projects of industrialized countries such as British and Germany at US $6.2 million and $3.4 million respectively during 1983–1995 (Li, 1998, p. 57). About this time Kentucky Fried Chicken and MacDonald also entered China. While economic reforms and openness were critical for investments, the main attraction for several MNCs and industrialized countries was the huge consumer population. The direct manifestation of Deng’s reform policy was seen in terms of attracting foreign investments to China. There are a considerable number of multinational corporations in China, both Western and otherwise. From the time China embraced a free market economy, it has become one of the important investment locations geographically. It provides an opportunity for investors and companies. Deng’s economic model proved to be extremely beneficial in that it encouraged a huge influx of foreign multinationals to invest in China. The post-Deng period saw investments from several multinationals such as KFC, General Motors, Apple, Microsoft, Tesla, Cummins, Sony, Honda, Toyota, etc.

5.4

Conclusion

On the economic front, China became more of a socialist market economy with preference being given to foreign trade and Foreign Direct Investments. In a shift from Mao’s approach of self-reliance and autarky, Deng’s pragmatism propelled the Chinese economy to an “Open-Door” policy and reform over the last several decades of his leadership. The “Open-Door” policy reintegrated China into the world market. The outcome was a massive inflow of capital technology, higher economic efficiency, and a significant increase in the GDP of over 9 percent continuously year after year. China moved gradually through the reform process by decentralizing and regulating several foreign trade policies to suit foreign investors. Policies through Five Year Plans were well laid, and modernization and reform gained importance. The elements of modernization included: the establishment of a socialist economic structure that aimed at development;

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an “Open-Door” policy that resulted in expansion of China’s relations with the West and Japan; modernization that brought about an attitudinal change in China’s external relations. The foreign economic reforms included the setting up of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and Coastal Cities. Considering the technological might of the Western world, Deng’s policy encouraged a number of Joint Ventures in critical areas. In addition, he strongly believed in economic might as the prelude to becoming a big power. In order to achieve this goal, China concentrated on exports of industry segments that were mass produced for the world resulting in a huge accumulation of foreign exchange. In fact, China had a current account surplus with almost all of its trading partners, which helped it become a key player in the world treasury market. Deng ensured that the country single-mindedly devoted all its energy and intellectual acumen to addressing the need for economic growth. He may not have been an economist, but he ensured that educated young professionals were trained in the mission of nation-building. The massive influx of foreign intellectuals and business leaders provided China with adequate learning on managerial and technical skills. Unlike the other socialist countries like the USSR and those of East Europe, China made sure that it would never mechanically absorb foreign ideas. The entire process of modernization was based on Chinese conditions and the Chinese reality. There were several distinct phases to the modernization endeavor, both internally and externally. Deng faced several challenges in the process. Internally, there were barriers such as red-tapeism, over-regulation, and price distortion, while externally, there was severe competition for FDI investment from other Southeast Asian economies. In addition to the above were issues such as the Tiananmen incident, which pulled China’s growth to a deficient level from 1989 to 1990. Another problem was that the officials were losing faith in economic reforms. To break this stand-off and integrate interior China with the path of economic reforms, in 1992 Deng made his historic tour to South China popularly known as Nanxun. The Nanxun was a breakthrough; Deng appealed directly to the people and convinced the provinces to open up the economy. Deng boldly re-introduced the Socialist Market Economy, and reframed foreign policy to suit the domestic requirement of economic modernization. The reforms were marked by Dengist characteristics. First, after 1978, Chinese leaders replaced the class struggle with national economic development, and economic nationalism became the predominant theme of state propaganda. Second, the “Open-Door” policy

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resulted in a rapid expansion of foreign trade. Third, China’s global financial relations increased. Fourth, China’s support of the SouthSouth economic cooperation saw the emergence of a new international economic order. Fifth, China’s economy became a positive factor, conducive to the development of the world economy. The reforms achieved their objectives to foster China’s development and productivity, expand its economic base, and make the country a formidable competitor in the world market. This strong economic base created by Deng catapulted China, in subsequent years, to become the second-largest economy in the world, overtaking many large established economies. China became a positive role player in the global economy, thus establishing a strong political presence in the world.

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CHAPTER 6

Contemporary Relevance of Deng Xiaoping’s Foreign Policy

6.1

Introduction

Over the last six decades, China’s foreign policy objectives have been aimed at preserving its independence and territorial integrity and creating a peaceful environment conducive to reform and modernization. Under Mao, domestic factors such as the primacy of politics, ideology and the weight of the past, international factors such as superpower politics, as well as Mao’s own perception of the outside world, predominated policymaking (Robinson, 1994, p. 555). Under Deng, foreign policy was reoriented to suit China’s domestic requirements of economic modernization. The result was a visible policy change that was reflected at the politico-strategic and economic levels. From the early 1980s, the primacy of economics, and domestic priorities and development gained considerable significance and importance. The first change was in the understanding of war and peace. Most policy decisions until then were based on the belief that war was inevitable and imminent. After a careful assessment of the global situation, Deng concluded that only the two superpowers could initiate war, and also that, with the considerable growth in the global forces of peace, neither of them was keen to do so (Deng, 2012, p. 187). The Third World, with which China aligned itself, shared similar sentiments. This change in perception of the international environment meant that China could now concentrate on the process of

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modernization and reform, and to ensure that, it called for an independent foreign policy of peace and even more significant improvement in relations with the world outside. Unlike in Mao’s era, Deng’s foreign policy was facilitated by two factors—firstly, the call for domestic development, and secondly, the changing international strategic environment, which became more conducive and favorable towards China. Deng abandoned Mao’s radical politics for a more pragmatic approach. He ensured that China’s domestic economic interests became an intrinsic part of foreign policy. Economic development called for a peaceful international environment (Deng, 2012, p. 73), so Deng went about carefully examining the global situation to avoid entanglement in issues that could impact China’s reform and modernization program. A successful foreign policy, he believed, had to be based on the unity of domestic and foreign policies. The generation of leaders after Deng continued to emphasize the importance of peace and stability, and the unity of domestic and foreign policy as key to China’s growth. This chapter details Deng’s foreign policies that have endured to meet the changing politico-strategic and economic environment. The questions raised are: What are the continuities and changes in Chinese foreign policy in the post-Mao period? How far do Deng’s core foreign policy concepts continue to resonate among the post-Deng leadership? How resilient is Deng’s concept of peace and development for China in the contemporary context? What has contributed to China’s shift from a low profile country to a more proactive one?

6.2

The Post-Deng Foreign Policy of China

With the US and USSR entering a phase of détente by 1970, the international system began to see a transition. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, two of China’s most prominent leaders, had laid the foundation of China’s foreign policy, but their vision for the Chinese people had been challenged in the external environment by super-power politics. This was aggravated by internal compulsions and challenges. China lost both leaders in 1976, and the result was a change both at the international and domestic levels. The post-Mao period saw a visible politico-strategic as well as economic change under Deng Xiaoping. The revolutionary and classbased approach adopted by Mao was abandoned—Deng preferred a more liberal attitude with a capitalist mode of economic development. While

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remaining politically committed to the communist approach, he integrated Marxist–Leninist–Maoist thought with the pattern adopted by the developed countries and titled his amalgamation “Socialism With Chinese Characteristics”. Most significantly, he moved from the basis of class struggle to a more encompassing emphasis on modernization and nation building. Deng did not completely abandon Mao’s approach to foreign policy. He continued to address issues of security, sovereignty and integrity, acknowledged China as a part of the Third World, opposed superpower politics in terms of hegemony and imperialism. But he also realized that isolation and a closed-door approach were detrimental to China’s modernization and growth. Convinced that a peaceful international environment was what China’s domestic development needed, he emphasized peace and development as the two important pillars of China’s reform process. In doing so, he made economic development the core of China’s foreign policy. Formulating a foreign policy is a dynamic process and undergoes constant, gradual change. Post-Mao foreign policy witnessed some major changes that contributed to China’s integration into the world market and promoted its rise as a major power. When the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was formed, China’s foreign policy objective was based on ideology, but Mao’s policy of isolation and class-based struggle and revolution lacked the vigor of recognition from the other powers. Under Deng, a foreign policy based itself on the claim that peace and development remained the two outstanding issues of the world. On that basis, China would pursue an independent foreign policy, and an “Open-Door” economic policy, both of which were conducive to modernization. China’s foreign policy objectives transitioned at the politico-strategic level on the basis of Deng’s assessment of the domestic and external environment. He believed that states had the right to choose an appropriate development model based on historical and traditional economic conditions, which meant that China could develop a pattern of foreign relations and interaction with the outside world. Thus, he encouraged bilateral and multilateral engagement, introduced the “Open-Door” policy, and called for expanded foreign engagement. Aware of geopolitical complexities, Deng maintained a pattern of keeping equidistant from the superpowers. An independent foreign policy was an unequivocal claim to autonomy and practical interpretation of China’s national security interest (Keith, 1985/1986, p. 98). At the

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same time, with astute far-sightedness, he called for the normalization of superpower relations as a prerequisite for a peaceful environment and went about normalizing relations with them and other countries as well. On the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, Deng marked the establishment of two crucial diplomatic relations: the first was the Sino–Japanese Friendship Treaty, and the second, the beginning of the normalization of Sino–American relations. Both these moves were based on long-term diplomatic considerations. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence remain the critical factor in China’s relations with all countries, and the basis on which it established friendly relations with more than 125 countries, including all the developing countries (Beijing Review, 1982, p. 30). Deng defined the policy of peace and development in terms of the global standard for maintaining order and opposing hegemony. China would, along with the Third Word, fight oppression in any form (Deng, 2012, p. 286). The 1989–1990 Tiananmen incident changed foreign policy: Deng called for maintaining a low profile and bidding time and insisted on China not laying claim to any kind of international leadership. In the economic realm, China began the policy of opening its doors to the outside world; a move towards modernization that was a partial continuation of the earlier leadership. Instead of looking at the world from the perspective of capitalist and communist blocs, China expanded foreign relations with a view to increasing its national productivity. But, in the quest for economic reform, Deng did not abandon either the country’s political structure or its ideological belief. He called for a modernization program based on Chinese conditions and reality: China would plan its course on the basis of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”. For him, an “Open-Door” modernization program referred to a set of foreign economic policies that called for external participation in the national development of China. The opening up of China included several new initiatives and policies. At the domestic level, the country embraced greater institutional regularity and stipulated the 1976–1985 Ten Year Plan outline for developing the national economy. Subsequent Five-Year Plans defined the blueprint for economic development. Foreign economic reforms included several initiatives such as the setting up of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), Coastal Cities, Joint Ventures, foreign trade and forex reserves. Having accepted the fact of an international economic order designed by the Western powers, economic development became the critical foreign

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policy principle, and every attempt was made to learn from countries like Yugoslavia and Hungary. With Japan and the West willing to offer support, its independent foreign policy allowed China to consolidate its global standing (Cheng, 2016a, 2016b, p. 139) and secure membership to several multilateral organizations such as the WTO, ASEAN, APEC. Deng’s pragmatic approach and the changes he made at the politicostrategic level had a direct impact on China’s orientation towards the outside world. In addition, his foreign policy was reoriented to meet, or to accommodate, the changing international environment. As such, the policy has exhibited great resilience over generations of Chinese leaders. The post-Deng leadership continued adhering to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence so as to promote an environment of peace and development and maintained an independent foreign policy on the basis of “seeking truth from facts” (Keith, 2018, p. 237). Subsequent leaders have tried to retain several of the original policies while trying, in their own way to contribute to Deng’s theme of “peace and development”. It is, therefore, correct to say that the basis of contemporary Chinese foreign policy derives a great deal from Deng’s initiatives in the area.

6.3

Foreign Policy Under Jiang Zemin

The Fourteenth Party Congress in late 1992 was a personal victory for Deng Xiaoping and elevated his protégée Jiang Zemin as the President. Jiang, who was in office from 1982 to 2002, continued to interpret Deng’s foreign policy directives and implemented them as actual policies (Yoshifumi, 2003, p. 30). He followed Deng’s directives and tried to articulate them as policies, keeping in mind the changing international environment. At the international level, he kept the emphasis on the significance of common development. At the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002, Jiang underlined Deng’s approach: keeping a low profile, not seeking leadership, maintaining equanimity, and responding calmly, as useful tools to avoid confrontation. However, while his foreign policy reflected Deng’s in many ways, Jiang’s style of diplomacy was different and more outgoing. He aspired to a new style of international relations as well as a new regionalism in the Asia Pacific (Keith, 2018, p. 243). Extending Deng’s Legacy: At the Fourteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China held on 12 October 1992, Jiang committed to being guided by the theory of building “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” put forward by Deng Xiaoping (Beijing Review,

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2011). He explained that the end of the bipolar structure of world order had led to the emergence of new forces and elements in the international system, creating a multi-polar framework that made the new world order a more dynamic and complex entity. The forces operating in the international environment were contrary to those of the Cold War period, but the issues that faced the world then and today are much the same—ethnic contradictions, territorial disputes, religious conflicts, and an increasing economic competition that is widening the North–South gap. Reiterating Deng’s ideas on global peace and development as constituent factors of economic development, he explicitly pointed to peace as a precondition for China’s development. Reaffirming an Independent Foreign Policy: Jiang emphasized a commitment to a stable world order that would prove beneficial not only for modernization but for overall peace and stability. China would engage with the world while pursuing an independent foreign policy and, while acknowledging the changing global environment, would continue to oppose hegemony, power politics, and the arms race. Interaction and engagement with countries would be based on the core policy of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Having established relationships with several countries, China continued to set aside differences based on the principle of mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. Jiang upheld the role of international institutions in resolving disputes and maintaining world peace and shared Deng Xiaoping’s, view on strengthening solidarity and cooperation with Third World countries, increasing economic cooperation, and mutual exchanges. Proclaiming Deng Xiaoping’s Theory: The Fifteenth National Congress held from 12 to 18 September 1997 established the Deng Xiaoping Theory as the guideline for the Party, which was written into the Constitution (bjreview.com, 2011). At the Fifteenth National Congress, Jiang Zemin acknowledged the contribution of great Chinese leaders like Sun Yat-sen, Mao and Deng. Identifying the three critical phases of change in China as the revolution of 1911, the formation of the PRC in 1949, and the reform period, he vowed to uphold the banner of Deng Xiaoping’s theory of an all-round advancement and building “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” in the twenty-first century (bjreview.com, 2011). The investment of the CCP in Deng Xiaoping’s theory remains significant (Keith, 1985/1986, p. 115). Jiang affirmed that China would continue to keep the pace of economic development, persevere with economic reform and the “Open-Door” policy, and continue to pursue an

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independent foreign policy to safeguard world peace and promote joint development for settling territorial disputes (fmprc.gov.cn, 2002). Both the Deng Xiaoping Theory and Theory of Three Represents (introduced in 2000) paved the way for pragmatism and multilateralism as the guiding principle of action in the post-Deng era (Chai, 2003, p. 169). Theory of Three Represents: The Fifteenth National Party Congress, which convened after the passing away of Deng Xiaoping, was vital. Jiang Zemin vowed to continue to apply Deng’s policy (Baum, 1998, p. 146) and, at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifteenth Central Committee of the CPC in October 2000, introduced the Three Represents. These were based on the spirit of Marxism-Leninism-Maoist Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory, and reflected changing demands both at the Party and national level. Open to changing modernization requirements and needs they identified new initiatives for the growth of the Chinese state, and finally aimed at improving Party building and the spirit of reform. It was clear that China was entering a new phase of building “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”. In foreign affairs, the concept of multilateralism was introduced to resolve international disputes as against the previous preference for bilateral diplomacy (Baum, 1998, p. 148). Changing Strategic Environment: At the Fourteenth Congress, National Party 1992–1997 Jiang had put forward his views on the changing strategic environment from a bipolar to multipolar world order in which many more actors and forces would be part of the new emerging security conundrum (Khanna, 1993, p. 85). Jiang was aware of the turbulent strategic environment dominated by conflicts such as religious and territorial and ethnic issues that had led to local wars. From the economic angle, a widening gap was emerging between the North and South. The most pressing question was peace and development. The developing countries and China shared common experiences of vulnerability to imperialist powers. Therefore, China aimed at safeguarding its independence and sovereignty. China would embrace other countries and continue to expand its foreign relations and pursue the building of an international environment suitable for China’s reform and development. New Security Concept: Jiang proposed a new security concept that was rooted in the concept of security proposed in the 1980s and was based on the idea of peaceful coexistence and other recognized universal principles. From 1994 to 1995 the attempt had been to establish a China that could counter-balance and deter threats from the superpowers and, on that basis, call for greater international peace and tranquility.

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In a speech delivered in Geneva in 1999, Jiang Zemin presented the new security concept, much of the thinking of which was enshrined in the Sixteenth Chinese Communist Party Congress in 2002 (Ryan, 2017, p. na). According to this, China aimed to pursuing security that could sustain development making it more accommodative rather than confrontational (Thayer, 2003, p. 89). China increasingly behaved as a responsible world power and actively participated in several multilateral institutions, constantly reiterating the theme of peace and development as important pillars of Chinese diplomacy. A Constructive-strategic Partnership with the United States: China and the United States issued a joint statement in Washington on 29 October 1997, declaring that both countries would pursue a constructive strategic partnership. Both China and the United States have had their differences, specifically in the area of human rights. Jiang’s visit was seen in the light of a constructive partnership in US–China relations that could, in a way, help both countries find solutions to their challenges. Jiang Zemina recalled post-1989 contentions such as the Tiananmen incident, issues of human rights, the visit of Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to the United States in 1995 followed by China’s missile firing in early 1996. After assuming office in 1996, US President Clinton tried to normalize US–China relations. President Jiang’s visit to the United States in 1997 was symbolic. He emphasized China’s commitment to engage with the global economy (asiasociety.org/speech, n.d.). The joint statement issued by both China and the United States drew attention to the global situation and pledged to work towards strengthening a constructive strategic partnership. A major inclusion was the establishment of a direct hotline for communication, continuous dialogue, and a prospective visit by President Clinton. Both the countries were open to consulting each other on political, military and economic issues. The most pressing issue was that of Taiwan and Jiang reiterated that the United States should strictly adhere to the three China–US joint communiqués, which were signed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and to the One-China policy mentioned. Trade talks formed a significant aspect of Jiang’s visit. He met several American entrepreneurs and China signed an agreement to purchase 50 Boeing aircraft to a value of US $3 billion (Frost, 1997, p. na). Commitment to Regionalism: China joined APEC in 1991 and participated in UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia the same year. In 1994 China attended the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and also participated as an observer in ASEAN. This commitment to regional

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initiatives was an expression of China’s decision not to operate in isolation. Deng’s death in 1997 allowed Jiang to exercise his own diplomatic initiatives. He abandoned the policy of keeping a low profile (“tao guang yang hui” ) calling for greater engagement in the world, and the country aggressively engaged with regional organizations. The return of Hong Kong also encouraged China to engage multilaterally with Southeast Asia. In addition, as the Asian financial crisis of 1997 had little impact on China, the country was able to elevate its international position. In 2001 the APEC Summit Meeting was held in Shanghai and China established the Shanghai Cooperation in 2002 (Yoshifumi, 2003, p. 35). Its greater commitment to regional organizations was a way to counter Taiwan’s influence and diminish US influence in the region. Deng’s 24-character strategy emerged in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident in 1989. The crux of the strategy as espoused by Deng, called for China to remain calm, secure its position, hide capability and bide its time, keep a low profile, and not to claim leadership. Jiang continued with the policy and made it the core of China’s foreign policy (Shen, 2012, p. 176). He avoided confrontation with the West and embraced the theme of peace and development as the key element in China’s diplomacy (Goldstein, 2001, p. 838). While Jiang Zemin had his own style of working, he upheld the flag of Deng’s foreign policy. His diplomatic strategies continued to focus on a stable environment conducive to China’s economic growth, greater participation, power, and status for China in world affairs, and also greater international responsibility.

6.4

Foreign Policy Under Hu Jintao

Hu Jintao took over as China’s leader from 2002 to 2012, he credited Deng’s theme of peace and development as the core of China’s foreign policy (Keith, 2018, p. 245). He continued to emphasize economic development as the core of China’s foreign policy. Hu was keen to play a greater role in international affairs and therefore, initiated five theories: profound changes, constructing partnership, joint development, shared responsibilities, and enthusiastic involvement in global affairs (Jamestown, 2009). Harmonious World: The word “harmonious world” finds its place in the political jargon of ancient Chinese philosophy, and “harmony” is an

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important concept in Chinese culture. Given the complexity and challenges of the world, Chinese leaders have always regarded harmony and peace as an important element of China’s modern diplomacy. Hu used this concept to explain China’s intent of promoting peace and harmony with the rest of the world. He used the concept of “harmonious society” to emphasize that a leader should be able to achieve harmony and called it an extension of domestic policy into the realm of foreign relations. In 2005, China used the term “harmony” in the context of building a harmonious world order. In the same year in April at the Afro-Asian Summit, President Hu Jintao had called on world leaders to promote peaceful coexistence and jointly construct a harmonious society (Cheng, 2016a, 2016b, p. 220). The same year, Hu attended the UN’s 60th Anniversary Summit and delivered a speech entitled “Making Great Efforts to Build a Harmonious World with Long-lasting Peace and Common Prosperity” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, 2005). His speech elaborated a concern for world peace increasingly threatened by issues such as local conflicts, the emerging North– South divide, and other compelling non-traditional security concerns. This, he said, made it imperative that countries move away from the Cold War approach towards cultivating a new security concept based on the Five Principals of Peaceful Coexistence. Shared benefit, impartiality, and partnership would create a fair and effective collective security mechanism, and a multilateral and common global architecture would reinforce greater dialogue and cooperation and the construction of a harmonious world based on tolerance and mutual acceptance. He outlined four crucial points for shared prosperity: multilateralism, win–win cooperation, inclusiveness, and coexistence; and proposed that the UN had to reform to improve efficacy and maintain authority (Poole, 2014, p. na). Despite the trend towards a multipolar world, peace and cooperation continued to be the central theme. The United Nations Charter must continue to be the basis on which all states cooperate, coexist, uphold the benefit of cooperation, and achieve shared prosperity. To ensure a sound trading and economic environment, he recommended the setting up of a multilateral trading system that was open, fair, and approachable, was conducive to growth and modernization, and could dissipate the growing North–South divide. Hu called for a spirit of inclusiveness to build a harmonious society that would respect individuality and the path of development. The details of the approach were reinforced in a White Paper entitled “China’s Peaceful Development Road” in the same year

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and it was reiterated in Hu’s speech to the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC held in November 2007. From the perspective of foreign policy, a “harmonious world” represents a shift in leadership approach in China’s position in the world and its overall international strategy (Zheng & Chen, 2007, p. 4). From the end of the cold war, China’s diplomacy had featured multi-directional cooperation with all countries in the world, which created a framework of “multi-level partnership” engaging in non-political areas (Hao, 2008, p. 35). Hu’s “harmonious world” was defined to suit the changing international environment and was based on China’s own experience of peaceful development, under Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Hu Jintao stated that China could not develop in isolation from the rest of the world and nor could the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China (Hao, 2008, p. 31). Hu’s words at the Seventeenth Congress were important, especially in terms of foreign policy objectives and diplomatic strategy. The Seventeenth Party Congress highlighted the strategic advantages not just of a peaceful, harmonious society, but a declaration of China’s peaceful development. The path of peaceful development is, therefore, a strategic choice to accommodate China’s overall national development. At the Consultative Council of Saudi Arabia on 23 April 2006, Hu Jintao delivered another important speech promoting peace in the Middle East and building a “harmonious world”. He emphasized the need for harmony in the region and pointed out that in a world facing challenges emerging from multipolarization and globalization, traditional and non-traditional factors threatening peace are interwoven and heightened by uneven economic development and the emerging North–South gap. Given the complex situation, it was important to promote harmony. Building a harmonious world with lasting peace and prosperity called for a concerted effort from the international community. Hu followed the policy of hiding capability—keeping a low profile—and focused on building the nation and a “harmonious world” within the framework of common prosperity forwarded by Deng during his southern tour in 1992. Path of Peaceful Development: The overall goal of China was peaceful development both at the domestic and international levels—to ensure a better life for the Chinese people and contribute towards human progress and development at the same time. The pursuit of peaceful development would provide a conducive and favorable climate for building a prosperous society, and it was only through its own development and prosperity that China could promote world peace. According to the

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concept of peaceful development, development should always contribute to world progress and be a common development; China would look for durable peace and prosperity. Peaceful development encompassed a scientific, independent, common, and cooperative approach. Hu explained that China had suffered in the past, which was why it valued peace and harmony and kept them at the core of its diplomacy. He acknowledged that creating a peaceful and stable international order would assist China’s own development, and to achieve this, the country would establish a friendly relationship and cooperation with the other countries based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It would not interfere in the internal affairs of another country, look to the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and it would open up and contribute to regional global development. The overall pursuit of peaceful development had two components—the domestic and international level. At the domestic level, Hu encouraged development and at the international level called for greater cooperation. In order to modernize and make China prosperous, peaceful development aimed at giving the Chinese people an all-round development. Both short- and long-term goals were outlined in the Twelfth Five Year Plan. Only a harmonious society could bring about this change, which would benefit not only China but the world at large. On this very basis China would continue its foreign trade and engagement with the rest of the world and promote a peaceful international environment. It would expand its relations with major countries, develop the “good neighbor” approach and expand bilateral and multilateral cooperation with neighboring countries. This was how China explained its oneness with the international community and commitment to promoting global peace and common development. China–Asia Diplomatic Strategy: China also promoted Asia’s regional integration and was committed to constructing a supportive, stable, and flourishing Asia. Its Asian diplomatic strategy was crucial and followed the principle of opening up, tolerating, and complementing other nations, guided by the theory of open regionalism (Hao, 2008, p. 36). The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established in 1996 between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, called the Shanghai Five, and was based on mutual trust and friendship across border areas. It addressed issues such as security, terrorism, politics, diplomacy, economics, and trade (Hao, 2008, p. 34). In 2007, the

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members of the SCO signed the Treaty on Long-term Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation. China gradually engaged with all regional and multilateral forums, but was limited in making an active contribution towards norms and setting agendas. Both Jiang and Hu made efforts to engage in several bilateral and multilateral forums and Track 2 diplomacy. Chinese involvement in the Asian region was gradual. Relations with the states of the erstwhile Soviet Union were cultivated through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This was a beneficial move as China faced domestic challenges from the national minorities and autonomous regions in the northwest (Cheng, 2016a, 2016b, p. 115). It established the Bao Forum in 2001, which was modeled on the World Economic Forum and was the largest such forum from the Asian perspective. It also actively engaged in setting up several trans-regional cooperative forums such as the Asia Pacific Trans-regional Cooperation, Asian Inter-regional cooperation, Asia–European Interregional cooperation, and Interregional Cooperation between East Asia and Other Developing Countries. Shift from Low Profile to Assertive Policy: Hu suggested a departure from Deng Xiaoping’s policy of lying low and keeping a low profile to a more assertive approach (Poole, 2014, p. na). In the past, China hardly articulated its core interest, and it was only in 2011 that the Chinese Peaceful Development position paper spelt out its core interests. China’s core interest were its major national interests, and these were defined in terms of protecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity, particularly with reference to Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and the South and the East China Sea. Initially, the term referred particularly to Taiwan, especially after Taiwan’s independence was supported by the United States. The Chinese recognize Tibet as a part of their country, and maintain the line that they been holding on to from 1992, when they claimed Tibet as an unassailable part of China. Tibet became a part of China’s core interest concerns in 2006 when the Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong met the Sri Lankan Prime Minster Wickramanayake. Xinjiang was also termed a core interest in 2006 by Hu, at a speech in Pakistan. This more assertive policy was formulated in response to the 2008– 2009 global financial crisis. Speaking at the national envoy meeting in July 2009, Hu Jintao had outlined the need for the country to have greater power and influence globally. He referred to the strategic guideline, called “taoguang yang hui, yousou zuowei” (keeping low profile and achievement strategy) (KLP/AS) coined by Deng Xiaoping in 1990 and

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proposed that China should continue keeping a low profile but proactively also keep achieving something (eastasiaforum, 2016, p. na). The country would pursue a foreign policy that would help it attain a more significant influence in international politics, reinforce its competitiveness in the global economy, cultivate more affinity in its image, and become a more appealing moral force. Hu followed an all-directional diplomacy but continued to base it on Deng’s strategy of peace and development, accepting both the Deng Xiaoping Theory, and Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents as the critical guiding forces in his approach to the world outside. Deng’s foreign policy remained the premise on which adjustments were made according to the changing international environment.

6.5

Foreign Policy Under Xi Jinping

By November 2012, when Xi Jinping took over as the leader of the Party, Deng’s independent foreign policy had been well consolidated (Keith, 2018, p. 248). Xi laid out a new pattern of international relations on already existing concepts and themes. The foreign policy continued to foster a stable external milieu conducive to China’s development and to oppose the Cold War framework and hegemonism, but there was also a profound shift. The country strengthened its relations with major countries, initiated and set up the Asian Infrastructure Bank (AIB), the Silk Road Economic Belt (SERB), and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR), collectively called the Belt Road Initiative (BRI). Peaceful Development: Since the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012, the CPC central leadership led by Xi Jinping had been pressing forward with reforms in all areas (Xinmin, 2017, p. 350). The most noticeable was the management of national development and Chinese foreign relations. At the politburo study session on China’s peaceful development policy in 2013, Xi restated the commitment to “peaceful development”, but at the same time, emphasized that China would not forsake its legitimate rights and interests (Zhang, 2015a, 2015b, p. 9). Speaking at the Kober Foundation on 29 March 2014, Xi Jinping once again articulated China’s foreign policy as independent; a policy that aimed at maintaining world peace and promoting joint development (Jinping, 2014, p. na) As consistently stated on several occasions, China would continue to oppose hegemony and would neither interfere in internal affairs of other countries nor seek hegemony or expansion.

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It would uphold its sovereignty, security, and development interests and these remained the guiding policy for the Chinese political system. Therefore, as always, the country’s then foreign policy sought to maintain harmony, foster friendship with neighbors, and achieve universal peace. These axioms had been passed from generation to generation along with the pursuit of “peaceful development”. As laid down by the Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Three Represents, and the scientific outlook on development, which was part of the theory of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” raised by Hu during his visit to Guangdong. China would always balance its domestic and international interests as it continued to enhance its foreign policy goal with the objective of building a stable and prosperous country—achieving the Chinese Dream of the great renewal of the nation. Major Power Relations: China’s diplomatic relationships were not unique, the major effort was focused towards managing relations with big powers like the US, Russia, EU, and to a lesser extent with Japan and India. China views itself as a relevant country and pursues foreign relations from the vantage point of a country of significance, with influence, power, and responsibility (Wang, 2019, p. 16). It aimed at developing global partnerships through establishing major country relations, engaging with other countries, and with its neighbors, and other international political parties and organizations of other countries. Unlike Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao who focused on domestic affairs, Xi Jinping prioritized expanded foreign relations as a new initiative. New concepts were introduced in the foreign policy such as significant power relations; major power diplomacy; common destiny; a new type of international relations (Premium Official News, 2017). Xi called on the international community to build a new type of international relations with a win–win competition at its core that would support the path of peaceful development. Maintaining that continued bilateral relations would be mutually beneficial, Xi called Russia a “friendly neighbor”, and reached out to initiate the development of a comprehensive strategic partnership (Jinping, 2013, p. na). The new, primary type of relation was proposed once again when Xi met Obama at an informal summit in June 2013. Both countries highlighted the importance of creating a new model of major power relations or (NMMPR) on the basis of cooperation, mutual trust, and win–win relations that would benefit the two countries as well as the world at large (Chen, 2014, p. na). This had a great impact on China–US relations.

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Major power relations derived from the fact that a peaceful international environment was essential for China’s continued modernization and any confrontation with the United States would disrupt such an environment. Xi was certain that both China and the United States could build a new model for their relationship by moving away from conflict and confrontation (Xi, 2014, p. 4568), going beyond the complexities and contentions that have always prevailed. However, China’s interdependent relationship with the United States acts as a constraint for both powers (Donohue, 2017, p. 54). The United States adopts a more multilateral approach to strengthen partnerships in the region. It has several partners in Asia, thereby bringing a bilateral partnership into trilateral or multilateral spheres to create an East Asian security architecture (Donohue, 2017, p. 55). At the same time, China is a dominant power and the US consolidation of partners creates a network of security providers to help augment China’s ascendency (Donohue, 2017, p. 56). In 2013, during his visit to Russia, Xi put forth the idea of building a new type of international relations that aimed at win–win cooperation. The concept could be translated into every aspect of cooperation—political, economic, cultural, and security. In 2014, at the Central Conference on work relating to foreign affairs, he highlighted the importance of this type of international relations, which became the guiding feature of China’s diplomacy under Xi. China–European Union Relations: China–EU relations are one of the most important bilateral relations built on three important pillars: high-level strategic dialogue; people-to-people exchange; and high-level economic and trade dialogue (Men, 2017, p. 62). The relationship is motivated by China’s active participation in world affairs and the two have jointly addressed issues of common concern such as nuclear nonproliferation, reconstruction and stabilization in conflict-prone zones as well as regional and global security (Casarini, 2014, p. 2). China–EU security relations can be predated to 2003 when both established a strategic partnership. EU’s policy paper stated that EU and Chinese interests converge on global governance. The other areas of interaction are non-traditional security relations. Areas of anti-piracy, a joint naval exercise on the counter policy held on 20 March 2014 in the Gulf of Aden, resulted in a practical joint effort by the Chinese navy and EU to strengthen maritime security and foreign policy (Delegation of the European Union to China, 2016). The second policy paper released on China–EU relations in April 2014 was titled “Deepening the China–EU

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Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefits and Win–Win Cooperation”. While China continues to be wary of the US rebalancing strategy, it does not have the same concerns about the EU. Both the EU and China share an interest in maintaining global peace and sustainable development (Men, 2017, p. 65). China and its Neighbors: On 24–25 October 2013, in the conference on The Diplomatic Work with Neighboring Countries held in Beijing, Xi pointed out that China was committed towards its two centenary goals: the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and advancing diplomacy with neighboring countries (Xi, 25 October 2013, p. na). The “good-neighborly” policy, therefore, aimed at establishing peaceful border areas that would be conducive to China’s continued growth and development. PRC’s interest in a peaceful neighborhood had been a core theme of Xi’s predecessor, and that continued to be the basis on which the overall neighborhood diplomacy was initiated. The Eighteenth National Congress of the CPC laid down continuity and stability as the fundamental foreign policy goal. Xi said that, for China, a peaceful neighborhood was of utmost strategic significance and would continue to find greater relevance in China’s foreign diplomacy. All-round engagement would be based on mutual trust and integrity, but China would continue to safeguard its national sovereignty and security interest. By engaging politically and economically, and thereby developing better bonds and deeper security cooperation, China would continue to build a comprehensive policy that would encourage greater participation and regional integration. The idea of an all-encompassing Asia Pacific region, with China as the core player, was to break the US pivot in Asia. Xi reiterated cooperation in the areas of trade and investment, greater connectivity through the Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road and opening up of border areas. Premier Li Keqiang pointed out that the Eighteenth National Congress of the CPC had reiterated the country’s commitment to greater diplomatic engagement with neighboring countries. Based on this, China remained unswervingly committed to a peaceful neighborhood on the very principle of independent foreign policy. At the Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference held on 24–25 October 2013, Xi called for a rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. He encouraged promoting peripheral diplomacy to win a sound development that was conducive not only to China’s development but also for cooperation in the surrounding region (Jinping, 2013, p. na). Xi defined the basics of peripheral diplomacy in terms of friendship and partnership

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aimed at deepening mutual benefits. The idea was to join hands with relative countries to accelerate infrastructure and intercommunication and construct the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. China and Multilateral Organizations: The Fourth Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, the first since 2006, was held on 28–29 November 2014. It was followed by another relevant post-Eighteenth Party Congress foreign affairs-related Work Forum on Chinese Diplomacy (Swaine, 2014, p. 46). These were presided over by Xi Jinping, the General Secretary of the CPC, Chinese President, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Xi spoke about peaceful development, mutual respect, and a win–win approach in China’s diplomacy. Continued development was the core concept of China’s national interest that explicitly linked both its security and economic interests, and therefore, China would promote these interests (Chua, 2017, p. na). While in the past, Chinese leaders believed that the country could survive with minimal interaction with the world outside, that dictum was made irrelevant by the current national goal (Chua, 2017, p. na). China would pursue an outward approach and a stable external environment conducive to its growth. Therefore, President Xi placed importance on the role of multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and ASEAN+3 (Chua, 2017, p. na). Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): The Belt and Road Initiative, formerly called the One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR) and also referred to as the New Silk Road was announced by Xi during his visit to Kazakhstan in 2013. The plan was a two-pronged approach—one an overland Silk and Economic Belt, and the other a Maritime Silk Road (MSR). The BRI aims to promote greater connectivity among Asian, African, European, and Middle East countries. A total of 71 countries are participants in the initiative, with China at the center of the geoeconomic connectivity. The announcement of MSR came as a backdrop to China’s reiteration of its maritime claim to the South China Sea. In order to garner greater support to China’s claim, Xi advocated a stronger foreign policy that would support the Chinese dream and Xi announced the idea of MSR in 2013 during his visit to Indonesia. The setting up of MSR which offers greater regional connectivity and infrastructure development ensured China a favorable position in its maritime claims. The

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improved connectivity between Southeast Asia, South Asia, West Asia, and Africa was further enhanced by building a network of port cities along the ancient Silk Route linking it with the economic hinterland in China. Xi pointed out that China and the ASEAN countries shared a common destiny and called for a joint effort to build an Excellent Neighbor policy. With economic connectivity in the region being such an important part of the national economic rejuvenation strategy, China proposed the building of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road in 2013. Explaining the importance of the Silk Route as fundamental mutual exchange, benefit, cooperation, and respect, Xi elaborated that it brought in a greater exchange between the ancient civilization and the world outside which resulted in greater cooperation and trust (Full text of Hu Jintao’s Report at the Eighteenth Party Congress, N.D.). China was aware that such a mammoth project of national renewal was not possible on its own, and looked for enhanced cooperation and policy initiatives such as the Eurasian Economic Union of Russia, the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, the Bright Road Initiative of Kazakhstan, the Middle Corridor Initiative of Turkey, the Development Road Initiative of Mongolia, the Two Corridors One Economic Circle Initiative of Vietnam, the Northern Powerhouse Initiative of the UK and the Amber Road Initiative of Poland (Full text of Hu Jintao’s Report at the 18th Party Congress, N.D.). Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Hungary, and other countries were included in its developmental model. The focus of the Belt and Road Initiative and Maritime Silk Road was to boost infrastructure connectivity in roads, railways, and ports, resulting in the Jakarta-Bandung High-speed railway, China–Laos railway, Addis Ababa–Djibouti railway, and Hungary–Serbia Railway as well as the upgradation of the Gwadar and Piraeus ports. It resulted in increased trade connectivity between China and the Bright Road countries, improving the trade environment. The total trade between China and other Belt and Road countries in 2014–2016 has exceeded US $3 trillion, and China’s investment in these countries has surpassed the US $50 billion, with Chinese companies setting up 56 economic cooperation zones in over 20 countries, generating US $1.1 billion (Xinuha, 2017, p. na) The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank provided US $1.7 billion of investment for nine projects in countries participating in the Belt and Road Initiative and also strengthened people-to-people contact (Xinhua, 2017, p. na).

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With the visit to Central Asia and Southeast Asia in October 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping raised the building of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), maintaining that it was in tune with the purpose and principles of the UN Charter and would uphold the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (National Development and Reform Commission, 2015). Speaking at Kazakhstan Nazarbayev University on 7 September 2013, Xi Jinping pointed to the historical connection between China and Central Asian Republics and proposed to uphold friendship, to be in harmony with neighboring countries, respect their individual paths of progress and, most importantly, act with due respect to domestic and foreign policy of Central Asian countries and not interfere in their internal affairs. The SREB model would improve connectivity between China and its neighbors in Central Asia based on mutual trust and cooperation, promote economic development strategies, improve road connectivity, facilitate trade, enhance monetary circulation, and strengthen people-topeople contacts (FMPRC, 2017, p. na). China–Kazakhstan is one example where broad exchanges and interactions have been made possible through the SREB. The overall trade pattern reflects a steep growth. Estimated at $1 billion at the start, trade volumes swelled to $50 billion by 2013 (CQ Congressional Testimony & Commission, 2015). China built critical infrastructure, including the new energy Atyrau–Malashenko oil pipeline across Kazakhstan and China–Central Asia, and has also been funding Tajikistan’s cross-country Dushanbe–Chanak highway (CQ Congressional Testimony & Commission, 2015). SREB falls within the internal security concern regarding Xinjiang region, which continues to be volatile, with many Uighurs feeling marginalized. SREB represents an intensification of an older but more comprehensive program. It represents Xi Jinping’s vision of foreign policy. China had been long importing energy from Central Asia to meet its guzzling energy demands. Between 2009 and 2012 the region found a unique place in China’s foreign policy as a critical route for China’s manufactured goods. It was also an important energy supply route, had shared common security concerns, was an import route in the China BRI initiative, and addressed transnational threats and issues of ethnic separatism (Dhaka Courier, 2016). The SREB is a part of China’s peripheral diplomacy. This initiative is a way of creating a sphere of influence in Central Asia. The launching of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Maritime Silk Road (MSR) and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) are all a part of Xi’s signature foreign policy. The launching of these initiatives is an

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international economic development investment program and can be seen as an attempt by Xi to wield China’s influence to secure and safeguard its national interests. Through this initiative, China aims to create greater economic interconnectivity that connects countries through a single economic corridor (Khalid, 2017, p. na). Speaking at the inaugural ceremony of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation held on 14 May 2017, Xi Jinping pointed out that the ancient Silk Route has existed for several decades and that it embodied the spirit of peace, cooperation, inclusiveness, mutual learning and benefit (Chua, 2017, p. na). BRI, MSR and SREB continue to be an important component of China’s foreign policy. Expanding China’s Core Interest: Xi Jinping repeated the Peaceful Rise policy with a more significant commitment to China’s core interests defined in terms of sovereignty, territorial integrity, security, and development (Chua, 2017, p. na). Defending sovereignty is not something unique for the Chinese and the stand on Taiwan, and Tibet is an illustration of this commitment. Xi’s commitment to this has often created tension in the region. China’s broad definition of this interest vis-à-vis the South China Sea’s maritime territorial claim, though contested by other claimant states, was followed by heightened deployment of military forces in its territorial waters. Its willingness to use its economic affluence as a threat underlines its more assertive and a proactive approach. Engaging with several multilateral institutions is another way to protect its core interests by trying to push at the United States. Proactive Foreign Policy: Xi continues to echo the spirit of the independent foreign policy of peace and pursue peaceful development but there is a perceptible change in the approach to sovereignty and territorial integrity issues, with him leaning towards a more confident assertiveness. This is reflected in several areas: the Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change in 2009, US arms sales to Taiwan in 2010; reaction to the visit of Dalai Lama to the United States in 2010; claims over the South China Sea; Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang province (Johnston, 2013, p. 17). The Eighteenth Congress reaffirmed the pursuit of an independent foreign policy of peace but at the same time, stated emphatically that China would never give up its legitimate rights and interests. It would pursue a defensive national defense policy (Xinhuanet, 2017, p. na), actively develop global partnerships and expand the convergence of interests with

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other countries. The Belt Road Initiative was an example of a proactive promotion of international cooperation. The beginning of China’s abandonment of Deng’s policy of keeping a low profile was a more assertive and authoritative diplomatic stand (Johnston, 2013, p. 14). It is imperative to understand the application of the term assertiveness in the Chinese context, as Beijing is likely to act more robustly or retaliate in an uncompromising way when it comes to its core interests (Boon, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, p. 656). It combines two factors: an uncompromising and authoritative attitude to China’s core interest, which remains very tough and non-negotiable and may involve the use of the military and circumventing international legal principles (Johnston, 2013, p. 359). The reaction to Chinese assertiveness can be due to the shifting balance of power in China’s favor, growing Chinese national interest that has involved its core interests, the expanding Chinese military, and swirling nationalist sentiments, and the defensive reaction of claimant states to US responses. Unlike his predecessors, Xi Jinping’s rhetoric departed from keeping a low international profile and emphasized that China needed to go beyond biding time (Chang-Liao, 2016). The foreign policy discourse now varies from reaction to proactiveness when areas of core interests are threatened. China’s foreign policy continues to be a combination of its domestic and external priorities, but its growing international presence has compelled a shift from the dictum of low profile to striving for achievement (Shambaugh, 2001, p. 898).

6.6 Contemporary Relevance of Deng’s Foreign Policy The Chinese foreign policy has derived substantially from Deng’s foreign policy making it relevant in contemporary times. Amidst continuity there are visible changes. 6.6.1

Continuity in China’s Foreign Policy

Changes in the contemporary foreign policy of China are accompanied by continuity. Today, the key thrust is towards preserving its core national interests—a tremendous change in its foreign relations beginning from 1949. Under Mao Zedong, given the strategic environment and context, China’s foreign policy reflected a revolutionary approach and class-based struggle. The guiding principle emphasized autarky and self-reliance, and

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the building of a united front against anti-imperialism and hegemony. Though the foreign policy principles that were framed in the 1950s, such as Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (FPCC), non-interference in other affairs and peaceful coexistence, continue to be relevant in the contemporary context, the de-radicalization of Mao’s foreign policy began when the revolutionary policy no longer provided China with diplomatic success. Deng Xiaoping aimed at making China a robust power and, therefore, his foreign policy was guided by a long-term vision. He believed in the unity of domestic and foreign policy (Keith, 2018, p. 235), and most importantly, that an independent foreign policy based on FPCC would continue to be the basis on which China conducts its relations with the outside world. Given the resilience and validity of these concepts both continue to be relevant, providing contemporary China with a rare opportunity to focus on its development program while managing changes in international relations. The enduring nature of policies such as the FPCC, the drive to great power status, the prospects of war and peace, nationalism and patriotism, ensures their continuity. The conceptual basis of China’s foreign policy can be traced to Deng. Its substantive and logical assumption is derived from the independent foreign policy of peace and development. The fundamental core rests on sovereignty, territorial integrity, and creating an international environment conducive to modernization and growth. Therefore, peace and development remain the twin goals of China’s foreign policy. Reciprocity and Non-interference as Core of China’s Foreign Policy: Right from the nineteenth century when she was compelled into the international system by the West—forced by several unequal treaties and compelled to cede several territories to Western interests, China has made every effort to defend its sovereignty and independence. Memories of the past have had a tremendous influence on China’s contemporary foreign policy and lie at the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in recent years. The FPCC was proclaimed in 1954 as part of the China–India agreement and enabled China to overcome differences with Third World countries. In the post-Deng or the globalization era, China strictly adhered to this policy when it came to sovereignty and rejected interference by any country in its internal affairs, be it on the ground of human rights or humanitarian intervention (Yahuda, 2007, p. 340). Speaking at the UN in 2000, Jiang Zemin said that sovereignty

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is the core of any state and, therefore, should be regarded as very important (the People’s Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). Chinese leaders reaffirmed that the FPCC policy augmented China’s core foreign policy objective of non-interference. The policy thus, became the basis of China’s relationships with other countries—embodying its independence in world affairs. China continued to refer to it in every forum, condemning any form of interference—in the case of Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang—and countering any criticism of this principle. The post-Deng leadership continued to draw its strength from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to overcome differences. It continues to be well received in contemporary times and draws continuous support from the leadership and the Party. The resilience of the policy is seen in its wide acceptance, especially the principle of non-interference, which reassures China’s sovereignty and rejects any external influence that could infringe on its claims that are a part of its core interests. Leaders of the post-Deng period, such as Jiang, Hu, and Xi, have continued to give concrete identity to the expression. The Five Principles are still the basic norm of governing international relations as well as basic principles of international law (China.org.cn, 7 July 2014), constituting the cornerstone of China’s foreign policy. China will pursue a path of peaceful development and friendly cooperation with countries on the basis of FPCC. Independent Foreign Policy: On the basis of an independent foreign policy, China opposes hegemony, power politics, as well as spheres of influence. It combines the elements of self-reliance and independence based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, calling for greater engagement with countries based on mutual trust and reciprocity (Keith, 2018, p. 265). Deng Xiaoping shifted his approach to foreign policy from the primacy of politics to that of economics. War and peace were perceived from the perspective of economic modernization, which led to an independent foreign policy of peace opposing hegemony and war. China’s foreign policy did indeed remain neutral. This independent foreign policy was articulated in the Seventh Five Year Plan (1986–1990) to the fourth session of the Sixth National People’s Congress on 25 March 1986 (Cheng, 2016a, 2016b, p. 48). China was peace-oriented, committed to developing friendly relations and cooperation with all countries in the world, and would rarely discuss colonialism, imperialism, and hegemony (Zhengang, 1998, p. 3). Peace and development were common references in Deng’s independent foreign policy.

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Deng’s foreign policy, consolidated by Jiang, Hu, and Xi indicated a new style of international relations based on the fundamental theme of peace and stability, and facilitating shared prosperity and harmony (Keith, 2018, p. 257). China follows this principle to determine its position regarding all international issues on the merit of the case (Bouyan, 1998, p. na). Jiang Zemin elevated Deng’s views to a theory—of emphasizing keeping a low profile (Keith, 2018, p. 239). Hu Jintao also reiterated that China would unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development and pursue an independent foreign policy and an economic policy of reform and opening up (Swaine, 2018, p. na). Deng’s successors continue to pursue the guidelines of an independent foreign policy of peace. They continue to reiterate the objective of the policy in terms of safeguarding China’s sovereignty and independence and creating an international environment favorable for China’s development. China today pursues omni-directional diplomacy that encompasses all aspects—the political-social-economic-strategic well-being of China— and, therefore, bases its relations on mutual trust, non-interference, reciprocity, and integrity. At every stage of development, China has continued to embrace peace and tranquility and though there have been differences in the levels of achievement, diplomacy of peace and harmony is one of the basic objectives of China’s foreign policy (Yang, 2014, p. 16). While pursuing its independent foreign policy, China has remained committed to the democratization of international relations (Yang, 2016, p. 22) and has made an effort to promote a new type of international relations. With the end of the Cold War followed by globalization, this strategy of peace and development for the realization of a moderately prosperous society finds greater relevance and acceptance among the international community. Economic Diplomacy and Foreign Policy: China has not hesitated to use economic diplomacy to pursue its political objective and economic goals. Over the past three decades its leaders have consistently aimed at a peaceful and stable international environment conducive to modernization and reform. This consistent economic logic is the driving force of China’s foreign policy and foreign relations (Medeiros, 2009, p. 50). This was the core foreign policy goal set by Deng throughout the reform era—an agenda aimed at minimizing threats to China’s development and interests. Growth and development were the two important pillars of China’s foreign policy. Focusing on economic development, even today

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China continues to adhere to maintaining a peaceful environment favorable to its modernization program (Lai & Kang, 2012, p. 113). Its foreign policy has given greater credibility to the quest for economic prosperity and growth and remains the driving force in its external behavior. With China’s growing political and economic influence, economic diplomacy became an important tool in China’s foreign policy. It has offered extensive support in terms of aid and investments to several countries of Africa, South and Southeast Asia and Latin America through its Belt and Road Initiative. Multilateralism in Deng’s Foreign policy: Deng’s flexible foreign policy and changing worldview paved way for domestic economic development, initiating new levels of bilateralism and multilateralism. China was now focused on expanded foreign relations beyond its neighborhood. This decisive shift with regard to multilateral institutions was visible with its entry into the UN in the late 1970s. Multilateralism remains key to China’s development on the principles of peaceful coexistence. These principles are even applied in the context of handling contemporary issues such as the emerging non-traditional security threats and China’s responses. Despite the changing dynamics in world affairs with increased multi-polarity and globalization, peace and development continue to dominate the theme of international politics and security and, irrespective of the changes in the international environment, China continues to subscribe to these twin goals. The conceptual basis of China’s contemporary foreign policy draws its inference from Deng’s independent foreign policy based on peace and development (Keith, 2018, p. 253). China favors a peaceful international environment conducive for its own modernization and development. While it continues to oppose hegemony and imperialism, its perception of war and peace changed. The country’s builds relations with the rest of the world on the principle of reciprocity and non-interference that is rooted in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (FPCC). Multilateralism was the basis on which its foreign relations were expanded, and economic development formed the core of its foreign policy. While Deng’s successors have endorsed the conceptual continuity of independent foreign policy that stressed peace and development, at the same, there are areas of discontinuity seen in terms of new concepts of international relations and security.

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Changes in China’s Foreign Policy

The changes in foreign policy reflected a fundamental shift in China’s worldview in the post-Deng period, giving rise to the aspiration of becoming a more important and robust actor in international affairs. The Deng era saw the opening up of the economy and all the consequent changes in foreign policy. The 1990s witnessed more rapid development under Jiang. Hu’s leadership offered a new approach and theme to the country’s foreign relations and, subsequently, under Xi, bolstered by its robust economic strength and growing confidence, China’s foreign policy exhibited greater activism. The changing trajectory of China’s foreign policy can be seen in the following realms: new security concepts and international relations; moving beyond neighborhood diplomacy; the shift from bilateral to multilateral engagement; the shift from keeping a low profile to a more proactive foreign policy; core diplomatic objectives and emerging non-traditional areas of concern. Changing China–US Relations: China–US relations remain the most important bilateral relations in the contemporary world (Yuan, 2020, p. 14). China–US rapprochement in 1979 resulted at the beginning of formal relations between the two countries. The bilateral trade between the two has increased manifold, taking the stakes higher than ever before, which is why relations between the two countries continue to be very significant. China–US relations have often been explained as one of engagement and disengagement. Today, with relations between the two countries in areas such as economy, security, and technology moving towards becoming competitive, many of the fundamental guidelines that prevailed in their relations earlier are being questions (Medeiros, 2019, p. 95). International security relations continue to be dominated by a wide range of issues such as Taiwan, which is central to China’s core sovereignty issue; China’s military modernization defies US interest in the region and, post-2010, maritime issues have also become important to China–US security relations as China applies several options to consolidate its position in the South and East China Sea (SCS). Intense competition has been growing in the economic field as well. Earlier, reform leaders emphasized technology in terms of learning from the West, but Xi’s vision was to be a global leader in technology, and he placed it at the center of the Chinese dream aimed at technology superiority (Medeiros, 2019, p. 100). As of 2020, in terms of global governance

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China–US relations are dominated by an absence of goodwill, lack of trust, and declining cooperation in certain areas (Yuan, 2020, p. 18). New Security Concepts and International Relations: With the end of the Cold War in 1990, the world became less threatening but, until 1992, China was embroiled in its internal issues, both political and economic. It was also trying to recover from the backlash of the Tiananmen incident. Foreign policy was limited to taking small steps that attempted to improve China’s position in the world. On the basis of Deng’s policy, Jiang tried to push the country to the forefront by expanding foreign trade and investments. The focus remained on Deng’s foreign policy of peace and development and called for improved relations with the neighboring countries and normalized state-to-state relations. Then, in 1990, the carefully built international image was thrown into disarray when the world reacted to China’s assertive stand both on the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait Crisis—the environment rapidly turned hostile. China had to reassure its neighbors not with words but through actions: it had to demonstrate that it was a responsible actor on the world stage. As a result, it expanded its partnerships, shifted from bilateral to a more multilateral approach and participation, and emphasized its independent foreign policy as well as the fact that it would not seek hegemony. In April 1996, China signed the first multilateral treaty—with the Shanghai Five comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (Goldstein, 2001, p. 845). The same year, by signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), it indicated a willingness to moderate the discussion directed at reducing tension in the Korean Peninsula, support the nuclear non-proliferation regimes, and stated that it was ready to work on a code of conduct on the South China Sea (SCS). The change in diplomatic style was a welcome initiative. Multilateralism offered China a better footing among other countries and served as a diplomatic tool to counter its hostile image in the world. It embraced “great power” diplomacy, reassuring its neighbors and transforming its global image by advocating new security concepts that condemned power politics and re-emphasized the themes of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Goldstein, 2001, p. 845). Partnerships were expanded to cope with the challenges that the country faced in the post-Cold War period and to thwart the US-led international system. The outcome was a transition to multipolarity. Thereafter, China promoted greater exchange and engagement, committed to building a stable external environment

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that was conducive to its economic development. Partners from big, medium, and small countries were all embraced based on the new security perspective, mutual trust and benefit, equality and reciprocity, common development, and shared interest (Li & Yangzhu, 2015, p. na). Its neighbors, who were reliable partners, became very important in China’s BRI strategy. In 1997 China introduced the New Security Concept at a time when the strategic environment was still in flux after the end of the Cold War. The concept elaborated the definition of security and encompassed defense, political, diplomatic, and economic considerations. The White Paper issued in 1998 clearly spelt out the need to dispel the Cold War agenda and establish a new security concept in the new world. China acknowledged the need for long-term peace in handling international affairs and objected to hegemonism and power politics: Countries, irrespective of size, should respect each other’s interests and refrain from interfering in internal matters and settle disputes amicably. In spirit, the Position Paper on the New Security Concept enunciated in 2002, was raised above the narrow understanding of security to a more holistic approach seeking common security through mutually beneficial cooperation. The new security concept reiterated China’s continued firmness on the issue of sovereignty and economic development to build a modernized socialist society. China bases its new model of security partnership on the very basis of trust, cooperation, dialogue, benefit, and reciprocity. The idea was that all countries should abandon the Cold War mentality and no longer be hostile to each other. This would create a climate more conducive to greater interaction and dialogue. Common security could become the key to development. In 2007, China called on the countries of Asia Pacific to collaborate on the principle of mutual trust, equality, and integrity. In 2014, Xi expanded on the New Security Concept and proposed mutual cooperation and comprehensive security. Given the changing strategic environment, China faced an enormous challenge and safeguarding its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity remained at the core of the concept (Xinhua, 2013). However, since its destiny was intertwined with the global world, it would follow the path of peaceful development while pursuing an independent foreign policy and continuing to oppose hegemony and power politics (Xinhua, 2015). At the same time, since the external environment was favorable, it would continue to enjoy international standing and influence. The goal was to build a moderately prosperous society—the Chinese Dream of rejuvenating

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the Chinese nation. For this reason, China’s foreign policy had to be pragmatic and without any biases. The New Security Concept enunciated by Xi was based on common security through mutual cooperation. It was a concept that took forward the idea of common interests being conducive to growth (China’s Position paper on the New Security Concept). The strategic situation was more relaxed after the Cold War, and security concepts integrated all areas from military to economic, political, and cultural. China advocated building trust through dialogue and promoting security through cooperation (China’s Position paper on the New Security Concept). It called on countries to cooperate with each other on the basis of the UN Charter and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, use negotiation as a means to resolve disputes, work towards common prosperity on the basis of reciprocity, benefit and development, and place greater emphasis on non-traditional security issues such as terrorism, environment, and proliferation of weapons. The New Security Concept spoke of mutual trust, cooperation, and equality. This called for countries to transcend differences in ideology and abandon the Cold War framework that was no longer relevant. The world was diverse, therefore, cooperation between countries was the most suitable mode of development. For mutual benefit, all countries should respect each other and create conditions for common security. Countries should work towards a peaceful settlement of disputes through dialogue and cooperation. It was with firm belief in greater cooperation among states as a way to safeguard security, that China, under Xi, launched the New Security Concept of partnership as the first step of a long-term action plan (Ekman, 2019). Moving Beyond Neighborhood Diplomacy: Looking to the wider world, China called for greater engagement with a range of partners beyond its neighborhood. Jiang subscribed to a new style of international relations as well as regionalism in the Asia Pacific (Keith, 2018, p. 243). Instead of focusing only on the big powers, Hu Jintao looked beyond China’s neighborhood and followed a more balanced approach by engaging diplomatically with the rest of the world and making the international environment more China-friendly. He spoke of the theory of opportunity and used it to expand the “good-neighborly” policy. The China–Europe all-round strategic partnership and the bilateral cooperation in the field of science and technology, education, environmental protection, and culture had been very beneficial (FMPRC, 10

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November 2005). Xi upgraded China–EU relations and the broader mission to Europe was a clear recognition of the importance of the EU to China (Casarini, 2014, p. na). As two critical economies in the world, a greater integration would result in expanded trade, commerce, and investment. The China–EU strategic dialogue, thus, was important. Expanded EU relations under Xi were based on openness and cooperation, consultation and dialogue, multilateralism and peaceful coexistence (news.gtn.2020). China and Europe are important trade and investment partners. There have been several bilateral engagements between them. In 2006, a conference on the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) expressed China’s intent to boost a strategic partnership with Africa. China was looking to expand cooperation in several areas ranging from economic cooperation, health care, and education (english.gov.cn, 2012), as well as boosting people-to-people ties that would lay the foundation for a long-term China–Africa partnership. The China–Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security also deepened cooperation with the African Union. Speaking at the Tanzanian capital Dar-es Salaam on 16 February 2009, Hu Jintao had said that China–Africa relations had entered a new strategic partnership featuring greater politicstrategic and economic cooperation. Xi Jinping continued to deepen South–South cooperation and upheld multilateralism (Xinhuanet, 2018). Attaching great importance to China–Africa relations. Africa was the first region to be visited after he became president in 2013. Visiting several African countries, he traced the time-honored relationship between China and Africa (People Daily online, 2009, p. na) emphasizing long-term partnerships with African countries. China’s investments in Africa topped US $15 billion in 2012 (Xi, 2014, p. 4393). Actively engaging with the countries beyond the immediate neighborhood, Xi forged a stronger partnership with Latin America and the Caribbean. He also reached out to the Middle East and Gulf countries, stating that partnering with China would bring greater opportunities (Xi, 2014, p. 6507). All of these relationships were viewed as mutually beneficial and called for a comprehensive partnership that would boost development. It was in 2017 at the Nineteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, that Xi incorporated the ideology into the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party. This made him the third leader whose name is reflected in the fundamental doctrines of the Chinese Communist Party after Mao and Deng. Xi Jinping Thought is a combination of Xi himself and his style of leadership. Xi Jinping’s thoughts

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on diplomacy elevated China’s achievement in the diplomatic arena: it raised the fine points of China’s culture, developed new diplomatic theories for China, and moved beyond the traditional theory of diplomacy. This elevated China’s development and achievement in the global context and at the same time aligned with the interest of the Chinese people. (FMPRC, 2020, p. na). Shift from Bilateral Arrangement to Multilateral Engagement: At the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997, the post-Deng leadership under Jiang used Deng Thought to endorse China’s pragmatism in world affairs and emphasized multilateralism as core to China’s foreign policy initiatives and action (Singh, 2010, p. 7290). Deng had remarked that China would be one pole in the multipolar world. This concept was further elaborated at the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2002, making it more meaningful in the country’s socio-economic development. Gradually, China’s understanding of multilateral engagement changed until it became synonymous with China’s foreign policy. At the end of the Cold War, China saw multipolarity as a means to constrain the dominance of hegemony and began to actively participate in several multilateral forums. This was a gradual departure from the rigid framework of non-interference that it had prescribed during the Cold War period. US involvement and participation in multilateral forums were seen as a threat that could undermine its new, global image. In 2002 China voted for Resolution 1441 on the inspection of weapons in Iraq (UNSCR 1441, 2002); also, for Resolution 1769 in 2007 towards sending troops to Sudan (UNSCR 1769, 2009), China’s key ally in Africa. In addition, China participated in several multilateral dialogues, especially with regard to the South China Sea (SCS) dispute and showed great restraint by suggesting shelving of the dispute in favor of working for joint development (Zhao, 2019, p. 3). It also hosted the six-party talks, a series of multilateral negotiations from 2003, created on the framework of the UN to address the North Korea nuclear issue. Shifting its stand from apprehension to a more comfortable position, China actively embraced multilateralism from the 1990s in order to realize its foreign policy objectives. This intention was strengthened by the onus of having to establish itself as a responsible international player, especially after the severe backlash that followed the Tiananmen issue in June 1989. Becoming an active player on the world stage, China joined the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1991, when multilateralism was spreading in the Asia Pacific. It then used this platform to get entry into

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the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) the predecessor of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Cheng, 2018, p. 13). At the same time, the possibility of involvement of other actors in the South China Sea dispute was of major concern. During the Asian Financial Crisis 1997– 1998, China acted as a mature and responsible power by refraining from devaluing its currency. It also engaged in multilateral diplomatic activities and from December 1997–1998, participated in four-party talks with the US and two Koreas. It joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 and was open to globalization and change. Also, in 2001 China went about creating the China–ASEAN Free Trade Area (FTA). In fact, under Deng in 1978, China’s trade with original ASEAN countries was at US $859 million; in 2008. China–ASEAN trade increased to US $231.1 billion (Cheng, 2018, p. 16). ASEAN became China’s fourth largest export market. China’s active involvement in multilateral institutions was well supported by initiatives such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Bo’ao Forum (Shan, 2010, p. 182). The SCO, as the first multilateral organization it initiated and sponsored, was a major breakthrough, and from then on, the move towards internationalization has been steady. China’s approach to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is based on its influence in the region. In 2016, Xi Jinping devoted funding and support under the China Arab Policy to the Gulf region, which is included in the Belt Road Initiative. This commitment to multilateralism was evident in Xi’s support to the theme of the 75th session of the UN General Assembly as “The future we want, the UN we need” (Xinhua, 2020). He also continued to step up cooperation under the UN framework, the G-20, and other international financial and economic institutions (Jinping, 2014, p. 4741). Xi’s continuous participation in the UN and other related agencies to tackle global problems reiterate his commitment and support to multilateral organizations, giving them due importance in China’s foreign policy. For example, in 2014, the economic growth of the BRICS group of countries had dropped and the group could only strengthen its position through impressive economic growth. He called for active participation in the BRICS’ development bank. Chinese leaders have ensured securing a balanced development pattern (Yu-Shek, 2018, p. 23). The country has also had a very impressive interaction with Latin American countries as well as the Caribbean, bringing the Third Word into Sino– Latin American diplomacy. The China–Latin America and the Caribbean

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Summit was held in Brasilia in 2014. China–Latin America and the Caribbean’s renewed friendship was based on mutual benefit and a win– win cooperation and the countries agreed to establish a comprehensive partnership and announced the establishment of the Forum of China and Community of Latin America and the Caribbean States (CELAC) (FMPRC, 2018, p. na). Xi announced at this forum China’s proposal for building a Hand-in-Hand of Common Destiny. Xi promoted a Five-inOne pattern of China–Latin America and Caribbean relations based on mutual trust, the win–win outcome in the economy, learning from each other, people-to-people contact, and cultural exchanges (FMPRC, 2018, p. na). The Chinese leadership was convinced that involvement in multilateral organizations was important to the country’s diplomatic endeavors. It gives the benefit of communicating China’s interests, furthering its influence, and promoting multipolarity (Yu-Shek, 2018, p. 30). For this reason, China moved from its sober and self-justifying approach to a more engaged approach. Since the mid-1990s, China has embraced multilateralism as key to its foreign policy objectives of ensuring a peaceful international environment conducive to its economic growth, stature, and influence. Shift from Low Profile to more Proactive Policy: China’s foreign policy largely revolves around ideology. This orientation resulted in an aligning with the Soviet Union and the adoption of “lean-to-one-side strategy” in its foreign policy under Mao (Robinson, 1994, p. 501) Ideology, revolution, and class-based struggle remained the core foreign policy objective. Gradually, after Mao’s death foreign policy was reoriented to suit the domestic requirement of economic modernization. Foreign entanglements were avoided in the creation of a peaceful environment most conducive for economic modernization. Deng’s dictum of hiding capability or maintaining a low profile remained significant in China’s foreign policy for almost three decades. The post-Deng leadership, beginning with Jiang Zemin, continued to follow the Dengist dictum of keeping a low profile but focused on major-power diplomacy and tried to establish strategic partnerships with the US, Russia, and the EU (Masayuki, p. 72). At the same time, he brought the developing countries into China’s foreign policy and ensured a robust China–Africa relationship. After him, Hu Jintao continued to raise China’s relations with developing countries, initiating a number of strategic partnerships. Hu introduced the concept of “Harmonious

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World” and the path to peaceful development, themes that supported China’s requirement of a stable world order conducive for its economic growth. The change began in 2009 with the self-realization of its growing economic capability that was brought to the forefront by two factors, one was the global financial crisis, and the other, the hosting of the Beijing Olympics (Hass & Rubenstein, 2018, p. 3). At the Eighteenth Congress held in 2012, China reaffirmed the pursuit of an independent foreign policy of peace but not at the cost of legitimate rights and interests. The national defense policy would be defensive (Xinuha, 2017). It elaborated on the active development of global partnerships and expansion of the convergence of interests with other countries. China would continue to adhere to the policy of opening up and pursuing development, with its doors open, promoting international cooperation through the Belt Road Initiative. It was the beginning of an abandonment of Deng’s policy of low profile and the beginning of a more assertive and authoritative diplomatic stand (Johnston, 2013, p. 14). However, it is imperative to understand the application of the term “assertiveness” in the Chinese context, and it is not so surprising as Beijing is likely to act more robustly or retaliate in an uncompromising way when it comes to its core interests (Hoo, 2017, p. 656). In a 30,000-word political report presented at the Nineteenth Party Congress on 24 October 2017, Xi Jinping emphasized great power plans for a “National Rejuvenation” (Washingtonpost.com, 2017). Even as he stressed that the country would never pursue expansionism and hegemony, there was an explicit mention of the South China Sea and a more assertive stand throughout Asia (Washingtonpost.com 2017). The central foreign policy theme affirmed China’s capability to play a more active and influential role in the world and to end the so-called hide-and-bide approach that had been dominant since the advent of the reform era. It supported China’s well-established, independent policy of peace, a more significant role in the UN, the national policy of opening up with the support of multilateral regimes, and a holistic approach to national security (Swaine, 2018). It drew attention to the all-around effort to pursue major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, as well as the Belt and Road Initiative, Silk Road Initiative, and Maritime Silk Route, and would continue to contribute to peace and development (Xinuha, 2017). Xi pointed out that China’s national rejuvenation policy, based on the principle of “Socialism With Chinese Characteristics” was guided by an independent foreign policy aimed at achieving shared prosperity and a

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shared future. All of this remained closely connected to the Chinese Dream that called for a peaceful environment under a stable international order (Xinuha, 2017). Xi highlighted the need to expand China’s foreign relations and effectively understand neighborhood diplomacy (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2014) in order to build a community of common destiny (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 2014). He emphasized major power relationships and greater engagement with significant developing counties. In a perceptible change in China’s foreign policy approach to sovereignty and territorial integrity issues, Xi Jinping was for being more assertive and confident. This was reflected in several areas—at the Copenhagen Conference on Climate Change in 2009, over US arms sales to Taiwan in 2010, the reaction to the visit of the Dalai Lama to the United States in 2010, on claims over the South China Sea, Tibet, Taiwan and Xinjiang province (Johnston, 2013, p. 17). South China Sea: Given the importance of the SCS and the rapid centralization of power under Xi, public expectation and increased national performance contributed to China’s assertive behavior. The growing national power and domestic compulsion made it easier for Chinese leaders to boost the acceptability of the administration and enhance their position in the Party (Cheng, 2016a, 2016b, p. 134). It was an expression of Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream, the concept of national rejuvenation and a response to centuries of humiliation. The proactive stand was well supported by national performance (Xi, 2014, p. 960) as well as China’s position and presence in every international and regional institution. The lack of limitations in the form of any legally binding code of conduct in the SCS provided enormous scope for China to assert itself (Turcsanyi, 2018, p. 425) and challenge the US in the changing geostrategic environment in Asia. The response to developments such as the court ruling in The Hague on Filipino actions at the Scarborough Shoal and the Second Thomas Shoal, and also the attempt by the US-initiated pivot to Asia strategy was viewed as a threat by China to its growing geopolitical presence in the SCS, and it was quick to apply the theory of reactive and proactive assertiveness. Regardless of whether China follows an assertive foreign policy, its national identity narrative remains a driving force for dissent in the regional and international order (Rozman, 2011, p. 84). China’s foreign policy has always been a combination of its domestic and external priorities and Xi Jinping’s new rhetoric moved away from

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the low international profile followed by his predecessors, emphasizing that the country was ready to go beyond just biding time (Chang-Liao, 2016). The foreign policy discourse varied from reaction to proactiveness when areas of core interest were threatened. It was the growing presence that China had established in the world that made the shift from the dictum of low profile to striving for achievement without altering much of the foreign policy framed by Xi’s predecessors (Shambaugh, 2001, p. 898). It was a calibration of China’s assertive behavior with an uncompromising attitude towards its core interests or aspects, that resulted in China forcefully asserting its stand on East China and the South China Sea. The narrative of Chinese assertiveness dates back to 2009–2010, the end of the Hu Jintao era when China renounced its low-profile and the famous Deng dictum of “hiding brightness cherishing obscurity” (Economy, 2010, p. 142). It thus predated Xi Jinping. Assertiveness elaborates a behavior pattern that stems from the following factors: shifting balance of power in China’s favor; growing Chinese national interest that revolves around its core interests; expanding Chinese military and swirling nationalist sentiments; the response of the claimant states; defensive reaction to moves by Washington. Economic Diplomacy: Throughout the 1970s, economic diplomacy not only featured in China’s foreign policy it was also an instrument of national development strategy (Zhang, 2016, p. 153). After the launch of the “go global” strategy, the focus of diplomacy shifted from politics to economics, and foreign trade was used to accumulate soft power (Zhang, 2016, p. 287). In the late 1990s, this became the strategy entitled the New Security Concept. It expanded the meaning of security to include defense, political, diplomatic, and economic considerations (Thayer, 2000, p. 89). Economic security was treated in terms of high politics. From Deng’s time on, economic interests served as the basis of China’s foreign policy. The new reflection of China’s economic diplomacy is an outcome of its economic development. Economic diplomacy has become more proactive in the current context. The BRI, MSR and SREB initiatives remain the key thrust in China’s economic diplomacy. The aim is to reorient China’s regional discourse from security to economics. China looks at creating a more open environment conducive to growth and development that in a way can prevent the emergence of the US-led alliance system to contain China’s development (Wong, 2020, p. na).

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Today, China is practicing an aggressive form of economic statecraft (Wong, 2020, p. na.). It has adopted an outbound strategy of encouraging Chinese firms to invest outside as is reflected in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is very much a part of China’s inward development strategy. It is the notion of the Chinese Dream that is guide to the country’s own development and the way it relates to the world (Daojiong, 2015, p. 2). The Asian Infrastructure Bank (AIB) was aimed at deepening Chinese trade and investment along the Silk Route. It serves to quantify China’s commitment to multilateral institutions and China’s role within it plays an important role in reassuring the country’s stand with its neighbors. China’s Activism beyond Asia: China’s position has expanded beyond Asia in recent years as it deliberately went about partnering with every country outside the region in order to enhance its influence. Russia was a willing partner and both countries seek to strategically partner with each other. While friendly relations with the United States are maintained, the US-led Asian order is worrisome for China. It is the US rebalancing strategy and the pivot to Asia in 2011 that ascertains the US alliance in the region. Cautious of the US-led security architecture in the region, China has attempted to ascertain its position by actively increasing its presence in several multilateral institutions that include World Trade Organization, UN systems, and Asia lead institutions. It continues to play a lead role in BRICS. In 2015, China launched the Asian Infrastructure Bank (AIB). In setting up the bank it demonstrated its resolve as a strong financial power, reasserting its position in the global arena and triggering concern in the West on its growing capability. Xi’s signature foreign policy Belt Road Initiative (BRI) will gradually link China and the rest of the world. The BRI will not only benefit China but exhibits greater activism in the global arena. Non-traditional Security Agenda: With the end of the Cold War, China had to face challenges beyond the traditional concept of a stateoriented foreign policy (Shen, 2011, p. 194). These included challenges in terms of climate change, health, terrorism, and globalization. Wanting to demonstrate to the world its commitment to addressing issues regarding climate change, China’s National Climate Change Program (CNCCP) was drafted in 2007 to outline China’s concern on issues regarding the environment and development, affirming a strong commitment to combating climate change. The economy was restructured to promote non-fossil fuels.

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The CCP refers to separatism, terrorism, and extremism as the Three Evil Forces (Doyon, 2019, p. 24). Using this phrase to promote cooperation for security purposes, China has been working with neighbors on issues of terrorism (Shen, 2011, p. 196) with its own goals and for the stability of others. The establishment of SCO has deepened support towards regional stability. In the past, the United States had listed human rights as an important prerequisite to China’s Most Favored Nation status (Shen, 2011, p. 195), but though it opposes the idea of placing human rights on par with sovereignty, in recent times China has exhibited greater flexibility in addressing human rights issues. Speaking at the symposium marking the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 12 October 2018, Xi pledged to uphold common values of humanity that are peace, development, equality, freedom, and justice (Xinhua, October 12, 2018). Leaders who came after Deng felt that success at home and abroad would depend on China’s interaction with the world and called for greater involvement. Participation in the global market resulted in the impact of various external forces and global and regional policies and the outcome was multilateralism as an important foreign policy concept. Along with the continuities, noticeable shifts in policy were made to accommodate growing internal demands and the changing global environment. Most noticeable was the call for discarding the policy of low profile and hiding capability for a greater proactiveness on the world stage.

6.7

Conclusion

China’s foreign policy discourse has always aimed at stabilizing and accepting its vision of international affairs. To suit the imperative domestic requirement of economic modernization, Deng Xiaoping reviewed his understanding of war and peace, opposed hegemony, and power politics, and subscribed to peace and development to reorient the foreign policy directives. In 1982, he summed up China’s independent foreign policy based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that supported the country’s development. Deng’s decision to end China’s policy of isolation changed the way, or the nature, of China’s conduct of external relations with other countries. There are several areas where Deng’s legacy continues to prevail, politically and economically, with regard to China’s role in the world and especially China–US relations. Deng remains the chief architect of economic modernization. His commitment to China’s

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modernization made him place economics at the core of China’s foreign policy. Throughout the 1980s, Deng opened China to foreign investments and technology. The growth was extraordinary, and China’s GDP touched almost 11 percent. Deng’s decision to end China’s self-imposed isolation and his “Open-Door” policy changed the conduct of China’s relations with the outside world. It was Deng who devised the strategy of “one China two systems” and the framework continues to be adopted. It was Deng who pushed China into joining international organizations; Deng who laid the foundation for a long-standing relation between the United States and China. His passing away did not result in a major conceptual change in China’s foreign policy, which remains valid even in the present day. Contemporary leaders continue to endorse Deng’s conceptual foundations of an independent foreign policy of peace and development. Jiang Zemin mostly stayed true to Deng’s foreign policies; strengthening relations based on Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and upholding the banner of the Deng Thought and Three Represents. He reiterated Deng’s ideas on peace and development as the constituting factors towards economic development with peace and stability as the core foreign policy goal. Hu Jintao continued to base foreign policy on Dengist lines elaborating the idea of building a harmonious world of lasting prosperity and peace. He affirmed that China would continue to stand for peace and development based on Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and pursue an independent foreign policy. Hu’s narrative of a peaceful rise was not very well received among foreign countries, even though it was carefully reworded as “peaceful development”. Xi Jinping articulated an independent foreign policy almost in line with his predecessors. Like the other leaders, he claimed a foreign policy aimed at building a stable and prosperous country—what he referred to as the Chinese Dream. He pointed to China’s policy of national rejuvenation based on the principle of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” guided by independent foreign policy. Unlike his predecessors, however, Xi Jinping’s new rhetoric moved from a low profile to be more proactive. However, despite the changes, Deng’s policies of peaceful coexistence and an independent foreign policy continue to be acknowledged and the substantial basis of contemporary policymaking finds its basis in Dengist thought. While in operative terms, China’s foreign policy may elucidate a new vision, his successors have endorsed a strong continuity on his foreign

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policy objectives. While there are a few discontinuities manifested in a new type of international relations, a blend of the old and new concepts can clearly be seen: peace, development, harmony continue to find their relevant spaces in the contemporary context; opposition to hegemony and power politics continue to be the norm that guides major power relations. The theme of war and peace finds relevance even in contemporary times; foreign policy goals continue to be directed by economic development and, therefore, China remains disinterested in war; development continues to be the key foreign policy goal. All of this continues to call for unity in domestic and foreign policies. Deng’s dictum of keeping a low profile served the broader strategic goals that called for China to defer its assertive stand (Medeiros, 2019, p. 106). His successors took to a more robust foreign policy style reflecting a move or shift from the dictum of “keeping a low profile and hiding capability”. Given the complexity and global challenges in the contemporary world, keeping a low profile could help and provide the benefit of striving for achievement. The resilience and flexibility of Deng’s foreign policy can be seen in its enduring nature, making it the premise on which subsequent foreign policy in the post-Deng period has been built.

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CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

With an analytical framework linking political leadership and foreign policy making, the book examines the changing dynamics of China’s foreign policy under Deng Xiaoping that brought about a transformation both at politico-strategic and economic dimensions. The book has been guided by two premise. • Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy was determined by his pragmatic approach to the then-existing strategic and socio-economic challenges faced by China. • Contemporary relevance of Deng’s foreign policy continues except on China’s pro-activeness towards issues pertaining to its sovereignty. Political leadership remains important and is the most critical variable in explaining political processes and outcomes, perhaps making it the most important form of leadership. Political leaders enjoy the power, authority, and influence in making policy decisions. Several definitions are available towards understanding political leadership, and these definitions can be applied to a specific condition or experiences. Among many leadership styles in political leadership, newly independent and Communist nations have a greater tendency to depend on the traditional and charismatic style of leadership. Modernization and reform were the common goals of most © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 P. Suresh, Foreign Policy of China Under Deng Xiaoping, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4764-3_7

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national leaders including Deng. Deng was engaged with the dual task of initiating changes at the politico-strategic and economic levels. Chinese leadership continues to be influenced by a philosophical and historical approach. In Chinese culture leaders remain a very important factor that manages the pursuits of political leaders and guides their moral behaviour. It is an amalgamation of the values and ethics of Confucian, Daoist, Legalist, and Sun Tzu’s principles that drive the ideal personality. According to Confucianism, political leaders are ideal rulers in whom is vested the capacity to establish moral order. The Daoist leader plays a greater role in ensuring political order and harmony, while the Legalist emphasizes greater wisdom and shrewdness, and Sun Tzu places greater emphasis on strategy and tactics. History reflects China’s orientation in several ways. China and the Chinese people are proud of their ancient civilization and their leaders have always been mindful of this. The country Sinicizes its ideas, values, and its long memory makes it mostly ethnocentric. This is reflected in the strong sense of shame over the period of western oppression, and manifested as uncertainty and righteousness in foreign affairs today. Chinese leaders have selectively used the past as a thread of connectivity to the present and these sentiments drive the modern Chinese leaders as well. Just like any other leaders of the state, the Chinese leaders emphasize the benign nature of the Chinese state. They have inculcated the view of China as a benign state that aims only to safeguard its territory and sovereignty. Modern Chinese leaders continue to be influenced by these sentiments. This is true especially with regards to China’s foreign policy and external orientation. China always believed that its rightful place in the international system was as a major power and that its views on world affairs should be respected. Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic and flexible approach to development looked to make China wealthier and stronger. In his view, modernization would be possible only if the country opened its doors and made greater engagement, and expanded foreign relations the official policy. The outcome was a shift in the politico-strategic-economic environment of China in the post-Mao period. Deng re-oriented the foreign policy to suit economic modernization. Deng’s domestic strategy in 1978 was based on the assumption that substantial foreign assistance could be obtained in terms of up-to-date technology, funds from abroad, and increase of exports. He went about normalizing relations with the US and revamped PRC’s relations with the

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Soviet Union as well. Deng saw United States as the key to this program. Firstly, Deng’s perception of war and peace changed, and he assigned very little priority to military spending. He presumed a better relationship with the United States that would afford additional protection against Soviet pressure. Secondly the normalization of Sino-US relations would build greater faith among other countries in terms of making substantial investment in China. The open-door policy demonstrated success in Deng’s Sino-US relations. Deng’s pragmatic style of decision-making was visible in the handling of Taiwan, maximized economic interest over ideology. The exchange between PRC and the Soviet Union improved and several agreements were initiated in the areas of economic, trade, and scientific and technical cooperation. Improved relations between PRC and the Soviet Union were a way forward to implement four modernizations, according to Deng. First, the decrease in tension between China and the Soviet Union resulted in reduced defense spending. Second, the PRC, by taking advantage of the Sino-US normalization, was able to attract the US and other Western countries and benefit from foreign exchange and lending capital. The outcome was an effective increase in the balance of trade between China and the United States. Deng’s pragmatism was visible in normalizing relations with Japan. Though several interrelated variables such as politics, strategic, and socioeconomics dominated Sino–Japanese relations, the two countries signed a long-term trade agreement in 1978, and also the Treaty of Peace and Friendship. The relationship between China and Europe was one of mutual attraction and conflict. West Europe was a visible partner in the struggle against the Soviets and also a means to reduce greater dependency on the United States. Sino-Europe relations figured in China’s foreign policy from the super-power framework. As far as the Third World was concerned, China associated with and supported those countries in their struggle against Imperialism. With the transformation of the international environment since 1978, China’s approach to war and peace changed: peace and development became two important pillars of its foreign policy. Opening up to the outside world was a political choice made under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership. Committed to integrate China into the global system, the “Open-Door” policy became an integral part of a modernization program. The development strategy shifted from one based on self-reliance to a more active involvement in the world market. The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee formulated

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a policy to revive the domestic economy. The move to modernization represented a deep and cautious change in the economy and meant reform of the existing pattern. The policy of opening-up referred to a set of foreign policy principles that called for foreign involvement and support in terms of scientific knowledge and technical expertise. The reform process propelled China’s foreign trade—from no foreign investment in 1978, the FDI had increased significantly by 1993. Deng was committed to carrying out a modernization program that would proceed from the Chinese reality. This meant that modernization would remain integrated with the truth of Marxism and be built on the edifice of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”. To achieve this, China’s foreign trade and investment policies changed. At the domestic level, greater institutional regularity was introduced. The country committed itself to a concrete national economic plan, while the foreign economic reform resulted in the creation of SEZs and Coastal Cities, joint venture, and Foreign trade. Deng believed that China would benefit from capitalism guided by the State. The reform supported cheap labor, which led to the establishment of a significant MNC presence. Economic modernization gave China a greater role in international forums and provided the opportunity to secure membership in multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization. On the economic front, China became more of a Socialist market economy, giving preference to foreign trade and FDIs. It was Deng Xiaoping’s single-minded approach that ensured the country’s economic modernization. China reframed its domestic requirement to suit its economic growth; it replaced class struggle with national economic development; and the politico-strategic environment was reframed to suit its modernization drive. The “Open-Door”, therefore, boosted development and productivity and provided the basis for China to become a formidable competitor in the global economy. Deng aimed at achieving the primary foreign policy goals in terms of peace and development. An “independent foreign policy” remains the core of Deng’s foreign policy by which China can engage with the world. Deng similarly used the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (FPCC) to establish interstate relations. The foreign policy discourse aimed at alleviating and accepting the visions of international affairs. Deng reviewed the understanding of war and peace, opposed hegemony and power politics, and subscribed to peace and development. While the post-Deng

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leadership of Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping continued to articulate on the lines on independent foreign policy, peace and development, though Xi elucidated a more robust foreign policy. There has been a shift from Deng’s dictum of lying low and hiding capability towards striving for achievement and a greater proactive approach towards core issues. Xi’s foreign policy exhibits greater activism, emphasizing China’s strength in the international arena in countering the US policy of pivot to Asia and the Quad. Despite the shift Deng’s foreign policy continues to have an enduring legacy, making it relevant in contemporary times. Among many types of leaders, political leadership remains one of the important variables impacting foreign policy. Political leadership can be understood within the framework of Max Weber’s theoretical understanding of the traditional-charismatic-legal-rational authority. The traditional authority the right to rule is rooted in custom, charismatic authority based in the character and acceptance of the leader and legalrational authority is a legitimacy where authority is based in constitutional and legal norms. Deng reflected both a traditional and charismatic style of leadership. Four philosophical approaches—Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism, Sun Tzu’s principles—in one way or the other, continue to influence modern Chinese leaders. By looking at the values and virtues of early Chinese philosophy, the study investigates its dynamism and its enduring influence on modern political leaders in China. It establishes certain features that are reflected in the behavior and approach of major political actors. The ideal personality, as defined by the Chinese philosophy, has molded many political personalities. The Mandate of Heaven is an ancient philosophical concept that determines the legitimacy of the ruler’s role as the mediator between heaven and humans. Rebellion and revolution are justified under the Mandate theory as against an unjust ruler to reestablish political order. In Chinese culture, personality plays a very important role that often guides the pursuits of political figures and influences their moral behavior. The ideal personality symbolizes how values are represented in Chinese philosophical thought specifically with regard to Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism. The philosophical approach offers political leadership basic guidance and wisdom that can be applied to political and strategic governance. China’s perception and approach to the world has been, by and large, shaped by its experience with imperialism. It remains a key driving force

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not only in the minds of the Chinese leaders but also in Chinese politics, making it consistently emphasize independence and autonomy over its internal affairs. This legacy of the past especially influenced its interaction with the post-colonial world. Subscribing to the belief that weakness can be exploited by powerful states, China supported anti-colonial movements in the Third World countries of Africa and Asia, opposed hegemony and imperialism, and championed for the cause of peace and development. It grabbed the opportunity of its experience with imperialism to expand its objectives in the developing world. In the past, Chinese emperors had perceived themselves as the rulers of the world and this approach continued even when China’s influence diminished in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Chinese leaders have always viewed themselves as the leaders and they deem it appropriate to regain their global influence. Pride in their country’s ancient glory makes Chinese leaders committed to making their country wealthier and stronger, on its own terms, and guided by its own objectives, both in Asia and in the rest of the world. There is a great enthusiasm for the restoration of international status and influence, almost as if past humiliation has rendered the people obsessive about their nation’s status. The claim for international recognition appears constantly in speeches and CPC documents, explaining what China means when it talks about global recognition as a foreign policy goal. The post-Mao and post-Deng leadership continued the pursuit of China’s recognition by the world, moving from a bilateral to a multilateral approach in foreign policy. Post-1949, the foreign policy of China reflected the two key objectives of independence and autonomy in dealing with superpowers. Past humiliation and ambition drive the CCP to extend China’s influence beyond its borders. The independent foreign policy of peace is based on the objective of safeguarding China’s interest and sovereignty and creating an external environment conducive for modernization. The fundamentals of China’s foreign policy are stated as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The core principle are non-interference and safeguarding sovereignty and territorial integrity. The quest for national independence, territorial integrity, and autonomy has been the salient features of China’s foreign policy since its independence. The country created an international space for its national development and showed its unwillingness to compromise its core interests. From the inception of the PRC, its leaders have strongly opposed hegemonism and power politics. They have been anti-imperialist and have aligned

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closley with developing countries, preferably of the Third World, with whom China shared great similarities and concerns such as maintaining independence and determining position and policies in international affairs. China remained adamant that it would never yield or succumb to pressure from major powers nor be a part of the bloc politics. Chinese leaders attach great importance to diplomacy as an important tool to safeguard sovereignty, especially in the context of China’s economic growth and transition. The effort to boost its economy has resulted in expanded foreign relations and shift from bilateral to a greater multilateral approach in foreign policy. China’s prominence in the world has increased substantially, but it continues to be governed by a robust approach to sovereignty and the pursuit of national interest. Seeing economic diplomacy as an appropriate tool to achieve its economic goals, China is an active member of multilateral institutions such as the UN, WTO, and several other international institutions. It has embraced multilateralism to realize its objective of building a new economic and international order. Today China’s stand on multilateralism is one of comfort. The China-led SCO demonstrates its move towards internationalization. Economic diplomacy was part of the broader strategy introduced by the government in the 1990s. The idea was to generate greater economic and diplomatic engagement in the post-Cold War period. China’s economic diplomacy encompasses political, cultural and economic approaches. Its international orientation aims at maintaining reasonable and friendly relations with all major trading nations that can contribute to its economy. As the second largest economy in the world, and one that is growing rapidly, China uses this economic strength to leverage its international influence and raise its international reputation. The analysis, therefore, show it to be obvious that Deng believed in the “unity of foreign and domestic policy” (Keith, 2018, p. 235). Deng’s independent foreign policy aimed at “seeking truth from facts” and above all required peace and development. Deng emphasized the “future of China is linked with the world at large”. Deng’s successors have contributed to the slogan of peace and development. As the saying goes, under Mao Zedong the Chinese “stood up” (Shambaugh, 2021, p. 258); under Deng Xiaoping the Chinese became rich and under Xi Jinping the Chinese became strong. Xi Jinping abandoned Deng’s posture of hiding capability and biding time to a far more assertive international posture. Speaking at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi Jinping claimed that China has stood up, become richer,

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and grown strong. Customary to the Chinese practice like all the other Chinese leaders, Xi Jniping acknowledged the responsibility of making China a strong and prosperous country and called it as the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. China under Xi witnessed significant economic growth and has sought greater leadership in the world affairs. This is seen in terms of the “Chinese Dream” that is not only meant for the Chinese people but for the world at large. The China Dream aims to make China richer and stronger by 2050. Xi symbolic gestures and occasional mention of Deng is a means to convince the Chinese people that he wants to be remembered as a “reformer and not a caretaker” (Tiezzi, 2014). Deng has been reminisced in the public, a 48-episode television serial focused on Deng’s role in the reform and modernization of China has been broadcasted. Xi endorsed Deng’s political legacy of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”. There are several interesting parallels between Xi and Deng. Xi’s book on the Governance of China published 2014 has sixty-six mentions of or references on Deng. Xi’s foreign policy initiatives mark some continuities with the previous leadership, but also show a significant departure from the previous world view and outlook of the ruling Chinese elite. Xi has transformed China’s position in the world and has explicitly abandoned Deng’s dictum of hiding capability and bidding time to a more assertive foreign policy. Speaking at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi implied China’s transformation to a rich and strong country and committed himself to the rejuvenation of the Chinese nations. China’s new posture can be attributed to the leadership style of Xi. The phrase “Chinese Dream” was mentioned by Xi just after assuming office as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China. The term is associated with the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, called for greater economic prosperity, improved livelihood for the people, and better society and robust military strength. Xi’s “Chinese Dream” offers continuity with the past reform efforts including Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” and Hu Jintao’s “Harmonious world”. Xi Jinping’s political mantra of “Four Comprehensives” involves the building of a moderately prosperous society that was envisioned by Deng Xiaoping in 1979. Speaking at the 19th National Congress in 2017, Xi claimed that China will strive for a central role in the global stage. Over the coming years Xi will take up an assertive approach in its foreign policy. Xi therefore put across to the foreign audience that none can “bully China” (Jabin &

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Subba, 2002, p. 19). While the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has plenty of challenges, it is a clear expression of Xi’s determination to abandon Deng’s dictum of “hide our capabilities and bide our time”. Xi’s ultimate aspiration is to make Eurasia dominated by China, create an economic and trading area that will counter America. Xi tends to be more an autocrat and has amassed more official power than any of his predecessors. The overall direction of Xi’s leadership includes a more assertive posture in China’s power. As Xi aims to elevate his leadership, there is a gradual disappearance of Deng legacy. The outcome is Deng’s famous dictums have been altered, but not fully discarded. Speaking at the 19th National Congress on 18 October 2017, Xi announced the dawn of a new era of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”. The prefix “new era” distinguished his policies from those of his predecessors. “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” was Deng’s most outstanding contributions. Deng adopted a market economy to suit China’s own condition that showed remarkable economic success. Xi has modified the application of Deng’s policies to suit the “new era” (Daekwon, 2017). Under Xi, China will more actively participate in world affairs. Deng’s strategy of “taoguang yanghui” hiding brightness and nourishing obscurity. Xi’s conviction is that China shall no longer maintain low profile and more actively contribute to world peace and development. Unlike Deng who “donned a cowboy hat” during his visit to America that was followed by the Sino-American rapprochement and denoted the end of decade long enmity between the two countries (Economist, 2015), since the time Xi has assumed office, he has been flexing muscles and directly threatening America and its allies. Xi will do very little to prevail upon America. Xi’s inconsistency towards Deng’s signature policy is obvious in his approach to the former leader. Xi prefers at times to be the successor of Deng and sometimes abandon him in entirety. Speaking at the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in Guangdong Province in 2020, Xi claimed that the establishment of SEZs was a great innovation of the CPC in the reform and modernization of the country, there was no mention of Deng in the speech (Xinhua, 2020). The difference between Xi and Deng is in their approach. Deng was a pragmatist “It does not matter whether the cat is black or white so long as it catches the mice”, while Xi is more a traditionalist, placing greater emphasis on inculcating “Marxist wisdom” (Miller, 2017).

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In recent times, China’s foreign policy has become more assertive as is reflected in greater military spending, proactive-diplomatic initiatives, and a move towards a more multilateral approach to world politics that suggests greater international activism. An assertive China will defend its core interest. This unequivocal statement reveals that the country will ensure that its interest and choices are accorded greater preference among the international community. It is premature to say that China’s choices will be accepted globally, but a significant change has been noticed. The calibration of the “Chinese Dream” set down a new narrative of increasing or doubling China’s economic growth. Effectively, this meant that Deng’s dictum of hiding capability and staying low that was the mantra of the reform era is replaced by a more confident and robust China that fit well within the framework of a great power. There is a visible shift in Chinese foreign policy since the time Xi assumed leadership. The operative term is modification rather than transformation, there is no fundamental alteration in foreign policy. Several permanencies can be noticed in foreign policy. China continues to uphold a stable and peaceful environment; the language of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence pervades in all official documents and speeches of Chinese leaders. China continues to participate in global affairs and pushes for a more impartial and just world order. Xi is not the only modern-day Chinese leader to reminisce on the theme of rejuvenation or remind the Chinese people of their past glory. Yet in the quest of pursuing the shared vision, the post-Deng leadership including Xi has “parted ways with their predecessors” (Council of foreign Relations, 2018). Xi has a global vision for China and a centralized foreign policy, aimed at his leadership and CCP. He announced, “new type of and international relations” and coined concepts such as shared destiny of mankind. The vision of China’s central role in the world is matched by Xi’s key role in foreign policymaking. There is a clear indication signaling a shift from Deng’s decision on deferring maritime disputes and calling for a stable international environment, to a more resolute approach towards the South and East China Sea dispute. China’s “expansionary tactics” intimidate her neighbors (Economist, 2018). At the same time, as China’s robust economic and military growth is increasing it makes it impossible to hide power and capability, signaling a shift from Deng’s dictum. China’s desire to assert remains a prerequisite for its growth and capability. According to Robert Kagan an American foreign policy commentator “power changes nation” and China desires its

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rightful place in the Western-led international order world (Economist, 2010). The slogan “hide and bide” is repeatedly debated among the Party echelons. The sense of their past greatness, repeated humiliation, and supremacy is a strong concoction. China is currently functioning in a society that is fast-changing and is predisposed towards a new set of foreign policies. The most likely outcome is an assertive foreign policy that wants to get more done aboard than fundamentally upset the world. On issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity where the Party credentials are at stake, China may be stubborn and irrational. In other areas, China might look for its own benefits or strike a deal. Xi’s vision of revival of the Chinese nations has certainly moved from Deng’s version of modest behavior. Xi has made it implicit that “China is a great power and needs a foreign policy and an international respect to match it” (Economist, 2014). According to Xi, the international order is multipolar in nature and, in every way, China has a greater role to play in it. China will not remain low key when it comes to its interest and a win–win situation and peaceful settlement could be in the interest of China and the world. Xi amended the policy of “tao guang yang hui” or keeping a low profile to “fen fa you wei” striving for achievement. The discussion is not unique and has been widely deliberated but the “level of intensity is new” (Chen, 2014). The theoretical basis of China’s foreign policy continues to draw its reference from Deng’s independent policy of peace and development. Yet amidst all these continuities there is a clear shift in China’s foreign policy. China has embraced a new type of major power relations, the making of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Maritime Silk Route (MSR), and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) collectively known as the Belt Road Initiative (BRI). In short, China’s foreign policy shows a shift, but a complete transformation is absent making Deng relevant in contemporary times.

References Chen, D. (2014). Defining A ‘New Type of Major Power Relations’. Retrieved September 21, 2020, from https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/defining-anew-type-of-major-power-relations/ Daekwon, S. (2017). Xi Jinping Thought vs Deng Xiaoping Theory. https://the diplomat.com/2017/10/xi-jinping-thought-vs-deng-xiaoping-theory/

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Index

A Activism, 229, 240, 263, 268 Asian Infrastructure Bank (AIB), 216, 240 Assertive foreign policy, 139, 238, 266, 269 Assertive policy, 215 Attitudinal change, 150, 161, 191 Austerity measures, 169 Autarky model, 165 Authoritarian Leadership, 21 Authority, 14, 16, 19, 21, 22, 26, 30, 41–43, 56, 57, 61, 64, 65, 68, 70, 84, 92, 212, 259, 263 B Bamboo network, 182 Behavioral Revolution, 15, 33 Behavioral theory, 31 Behind-the-scenes, 83 Beliefs, 1, 3–6, 10, 11, 14, 21, 22, 24, 28, 32, 33, 35–39, 41, 55, 57, 58, 63, 67, 69, 70, 74, 75, 85, 87, 93, 94, 105, 107, 108,

114, 150, 161, 203, 206, 232, 264 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 216, 220–223, 228, 231, 237, 239, 240, 267, 269 Black box, 43, 86 Bo’ao Forum, 235 Burns, James MacGregor, 3, 12, 16, 18, 20, 21, 42 C Cambodia, 88, 116, 119–121, 124, 210, 221 Cat was grey or black hardly mattered, 159 Central Work Conference, 163 Charismatic leadership, 18, 19 Chengdu province, 71 Chen Yun, 79, 152, 165 China’s core interests, 223, 224 China’s National Climate Change Program (CNCCP), 240 China’s Peaceful Development Road, 212

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 P. Suresh, Foreign Policy of China Under Deng Xiaoping, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4764-3

315

316

INDEX

Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 70, 72, 73, 75, 77–79, 83, 92, 93, 108, 119, 151, 158, 167, 171, 208, 233, 241, 264, 268 Chinese Dream, 217, 231, 238, 240, 242, 266, 268 Chineseness, 68 Chinese philosophy, 42, 55, 57, 94, 211, 263 Chinese pride, 56 Chinese Revolution, 76, 77 Chinese worldview, 63, 94, 106 Chongqing, 72 Coastal Cities, 170, 191, 206 Common security, 231 Communism, 72, 75, 107, 109 Confucianism, 10, 55–59, 61, 63–65, 260, 263 Constructive strategic partnership, 210 Contemporary relevance, 259 ‘crossing the river by first feeling the stone’, 169 Cuban missile crisis, 38, 40 Cultural, 43, 59, 63–65, 68, 86, 90, 93, 113, 124–126, 236 Cultural Revolution, 38, 79, 81, 84, 108, 111–114, 122, 123, 133, 135, 139, 150, 155, 156, 158, 169, 181 D Daoism, 55–61, 63, 263 Decision-makers, 39 Decision making, 10, 19, 26, 31–35, 37–39, 43, 44, 70, 94, 107, 261 Democratic leadership, 19 Deng’s 24-character strategy, 211 Deng’s pragmatism, 103, 191, 261 Deng Xiaoping, 39, 42–44, 56, 68–94, 104, 106, 108–110, 112–124, 126–134, 136–140,

149–162, 165–170, 172, 173, 184, 188–193, 203–209, 211, 213, 215, 216, 224–230, 233–237, 239, 241–243, 259–263, 265–269 Deng Xiaoping Theory, 208, 209, 216, 217 Détente, 88, 111, 118, 122, 124, 128, 139, 204 Domestic requirements, 92, 112, 156, 181, 192, 203, 236, 241, 262 Dormitory, 130 E Economic diplomacy, 189, 227, 228, 239, 265 Economic modernization, 87, 91, 92, 106, 114–117, 124, 127, 128, 138, 140, 150, 152–157, 161, 166, 169, 190, 192, 203, 226, 236, 241, 260, 262 Economic nationalism, 172, 192 Eighteenth National Congress, 216, 219 Eighth Five Year Plan, 167, 169, 183 Eleventh National Congress, 81 ‘Emancipation of Consciousness’, 159 English School, 30 F Feminist approach, 29 Fifth Five Year Plan, 163 Fifth National People’s Congress, 150, 176 First Plenary Session, 165 Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (FPCC), 90, 104, 116, 121, 122, 139, 206, 208, 212, 214, 222, 225, 226, 228, 232, 241, 242, 262, 268 Flexible, 24, 91, 94, 140, 228, 260

INDEX

Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), 131, 158, 166, 169, 171, 182, 190–192, 262 Foreign exchange reserves, 168 Foreign relations, 69, 88, 94, 103, 104, 109, 110, 112, 113, 116, 117, 121, 138, 139, 152, 153, 171, 205, 206, 209, 212, 216, 217, 224, 227–229, 238, 260, 265, 268 Forex reserves, 186, 188, 206 Four Comprehensives, 266 Four Modernization, 92, 128, 150, 157, 159, 164, 261 Fourteenth Party Congress, 1989–1992, 167, 170, 207 Fourth National Congress, 81 France, 72–74, 77, 82, 83, 116, 131–133, 135, 167 G General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT), 170, 188, 189, 235 ‘Good Neighbor’ policy, 89 Gorbachev, 88, 120, 121 Great rejuvenation, 219 Greenstein, Fred, 14, 21, 22, 37 Guanxi, 59, 60, 75 H Hakka, 71, 73, 82 Han Fei Tzu, 61 Harmony, 27, 57, 58, 60, 62–64, 69, 93, 94, 211–214, 217, 222, 227, 243, 260 Heartland defence, 65 Hegemony, 28, 80, 87–90, 104, 113–115, 123, 125, 133, 134, 136–138, 140, 149, 152, 178, 205, 206, 208, 216, 225, 226,

317

228, 230, 231, 234, 237, 241, 243, 262, 264 Hermann, M.G., 32, 37, 38, 69 Hiding capability, 213, 236, 241, 263, 265, 266, 268 Hierarchical style, 74 Historical, 1, 2, 5, 11, 41, 43, 63, 67, 68, 74, 93, 106, 109, 122, 128, 151, 155, 157, 205, 222, 260 Hong Kong, 72, 90, 108, 166, 171, 172, 174, 182, 183, 190, 211 Hua Guofeng, 81, 108, 125, 128, 150 Hu Jintao, 42, 43, 211–217, 226, 227, 229, 232, 233, 236, 242, 263 I Imperial, 29, 58, 59, 65, 66, 68, 69, 72, 73, 83, 85, 107, 113, 117, 131, 136, 137, 140, 152, 158, 161, 205, 226, 228, 261, 263, 264 Independent foreign policy of peace, 87, 90, 92, 103, 104, 115, 117, 152, 156, 204, 223, 225–227, 237, 242, 264 International Relations (IR), 2, 15, 26–29, 31–33, 65, 81, 207, 216–218, 225–229, 232, 243 J Japan, 66, 67, 70, 77, 89, 90, 103, 105, 112–115, 117, 119, 124, 128–131, 135, 137–140, 149, 152–154, 166, 174, 177–179, 183, 191, 207, 217, 261 Jiang Zemin, 42, 43, 207–211, 215, 217, 225–227, 230, 232, 234, 236, 242, 263 Jinggangshan, 75

318

INDEX

Joint ventures (JVs), 170, 174–176, 179, 180, 182–184, 191, 206

K Kai-shek, Chiang, 59, 66, 67, 77, 106, 136 Kissinger, Henry, 33, 122, 123, 125 Kuomintang, 66, 73–77, 135 Kyoto, 130

L Labor-intensive, 174, 185 Laswell, Harold, 3, 16 Leaders, 2–6, 9–24, 27, 31–44, 55–57, 59–61, 63–65, 67–69, 73, 78, 79, 83–85, 88, 93, 94, 105–108, 111, 119, 123, 130, 131, 134, 135, 139, 152, 166, 167, 192, 204, 207, 208, 212, 220, 226, 227, 229, 235, 238, 241, 242, 259, 260, 263–266, 268 Legalism, 55, 56, 61, 263 Lenin, 22, 29, 74, 107 Liberal, 20, 21, 27, 70, 165, 168, 170, 172, 204 Little Cannon, 85 Liu, Zhou, 79 Low profile, 43, 117, 167, 204, 206, 207, 211, 213, 215, 216, 224, 227, 229, 236, 237, 239, 241–243, 267, 269

M Macau, 183 Machiavelli, Niccolò, 2, 9, 12, 15, 16, 37, 43 Manchu rulers, 71 Mandate of Heaven, 55, 56, 64, 94, 263

Maoist radicalism, 103 Mao, Zedong, 2, 22, 39, 42, 43, 59, 68, 75–84, 92, 94, 106, 108–114, 116, 120, 122–124, 126, 130, 133, 137, 139, 150, 151, 154–156, 159, 162, 163, 169, 172, 191, 203–205, 208, 213, 224, 225, 233, 236, 265 Maritime Silk Road (MSR), 216, 219–223, 239, 269 Marshall Plan, 5, 34 Marxist approach, 28, 107 Marx, Karl, 17, 22, 131 Maslow’s Theory, 3 ‘Master of Creative’, 83 Merriam, Charles E., 3 Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT), 165–167, 184, 186 Modernization, 59, 66, 69, 70, 90, 91, 103, 104, 108–110, 112–114, 116, 117, 124, 126, 130–132, 137–139, 149–165, 171, 174, 175, 183, 188, 189, 191, 192, 203–206, 208, 209, 212, 218, 225, 227–229, 242, 260–262, 264, 266, 267 Morgenthau, Hans, 2, 9 Moscow, 73, 74, 78, 79, 82, 114, 118, 121 Multilateralism, 209, 212, 228, 230, 233–236, 241, 265 Multinational corporations (MNCs), 149, 190, 191 Mutual cooperation, 231, 232 N Nanxun, 168, 169, 192 Nationalist, 59, 63, 65–67, 71, 82, 106–108, 224, 239 National leaders, 40, 260 National Rejuvenation, 237, 238, 242

INDEX

Neo-Liberal, 27 Neo-Realism, 27 New Economic Policy, 74 New initiative, 74, 206, 209, 217 New model of major power relations (NMMPR), 217 New Security Concept, 209, 210, 212, 229–232, 239 New style, 207, 227, 232 Nineteenth Party Congress, 237 Non-interference, 117, 208, 225–228, 234, 264 Normalization, 88, 89, 108, 111, 117, 118, 120–130, 132, 135, 139, 177–179, 206, 261 North-South, 89, 90, 208, 212, 213 Not seeking leadership, 140, 207 O Omni-directional foreign policy, 152 One Country Two System, 123, 125, 152 Open-Door, 89, 103, 104, 109, 112, 116, 124, 149, 150, 153, 154, 156–159, 166–169, 171–173, 182, 183, 188, 190–192, 205, 206, 208, 242, 261, 262 Opium War, 106, 107, 115 Outward-oriented, 173 P Paige, Glenn D., 3 Peace and development, 103, 104, 117, 139, 140, 204–211, 216, 225–228, 230, 237, 241, 242, 261–265, 267, 269 Peaceful coexistence, 113, 116, 130, 133, 139, 209, 212, 228, 242 Peaceful development, 93, 213, 214, 216, 217, 220, 223, 226, 227, 231, 237, 242

319

Peppery Napoleon, 85 Perception, 4, 5, 23, 26, 31, 33–36, 38, 39, 44, 87, 92, 106, 114, 122, 123, 139, 156, 203, 228, 261, 263 Peripheral diplomacy, 219, 222 Personality, 2–6, 9–11, 14, 21, 22, 24, 31, 32, 35, 36, 40, 42–44, 56, 60, 67, 69, 70, 74, 78, 81–83, 85, 86, 92, 94, 133, 260, 263 Political leadership, 1–6, 9–16, 26, 31, 37, 40, 43, 44, 56, 57, 63, 67, 69, 259, 263 Political traits, 23 Politics, 1–5, 12, 15, 16, 25–27, 29, 31–37, 40, 59, 65–67, 72, 78, 83, 89, 103, 104, 106, 109, 110, 113–115, 118, 124, 130, 140, 158, 161, 165, 203–205, 208, 214, 216, 226, 228, 230, 231, 239, 241, 243, 261, 262, 264, 265, 268 Power, 2–4, 6, 10–13, 16–24, 26–28, 30, 32, 34–36, 38–43, 57, 59–61, 64–72, 81–83, 86, 91, 94, 103–108, 110–112, 115, 122, 128, 131, 136–140, 152, 155, 156, 158, 165, 174, 179, 192, 205, 208, 210, 211, 215, 217, 218, 224–226, 230–232, 235, 237–241, 243, 259, 260, 262, 264, 265, 267–269 Practice is the Sole Criterion of Truth, 157 Predecessors, 39, 41, 94, 219, 224, 235, 239, 242, 267 Premier Andropov, 120 Premier Li Keqiang, 219 President Carter, 125, 126 President Nixon, 33, 36, 40, 123, 136 Privately-owned, 160, 162

320

INDEX

Proactive foreign policy, 116, 229

Q Qin Empire, 61

R Realism, 26, 27, 35, 43 Reform-growth, 168 Reform leadership, 22 Regionalism, 207, 214, 232 ren, 58 Republican Period, 66 Resilience, 87, 136, 152, 207, 225, 226, 243 Revolutionary leadership, 22, 93 Righteousness, 63, 67, 94, 260 Rosenau, James N., 25, 32, 34, 40 Royal Dutch Shell Company, 181

S Second Plenum, 77, 81 Seek Truth From Facts, 94, 157 Semi-colonial society, 71 Seventeenth National Congress, 213 Seventh Five Year Plan, 166, 168, 226 Shanghai Communiqué, 80, 118, 124–126, 153, 176 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 214, 215, 220, 235, 241, 265 Shantou, 172 Shenzhen, 89, 169, 171, 173 Sichuan, 71, 73, 77, 82 Silk Road Economic Belt (SERB), 216, 219–222, 269 Sinicization, 64 Sino-American, 88 Sino–American Economic Committee, 177, 178

Sino-American rapprochement, 80, 267 Sino-centric, 64, 106 Sino-European, 261 Sino-Japanese, 179 Sino-Soviet border, 120, 134 Sixth Plenum, 108 Snyder, Richard, 5, 32–34, 43 Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, 84, 92, 93, 108, 149, 150, 154, 155, 160, 169, 205–209, 217, 237, 242, 262, 266, 267 Socialist modernization, 81, 84, 110, 151, 152, 155, 170, 171 South China, 168, 192 South China Sea (SCS), 181, 220, 223, 229, 230, 234, 235, 237–239 Southeast Asia, 174, 181, 190, 192, 211, 221, 222, 228 Sovereignty, 15, 37, 68, 89, 104, 108, 113, 114, 117, 119, 127, 137, 139, 152, 205, 209, 215, 217, 219, 223, 225–227, 229, 231, 238, 241, 259, 264, 265, 269 Special Economic Zones (SEZs), 89, 93, 153, 154, 161, 170–173, 191, 206, 262, 267 State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), 162, 169, 186, 190 Striving for achievement, 224, 239, 243, 263, 269 Strong continuity, 242 Style, 1, 4, 6, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17–24, 34, 36, 37, 40–43, 56, 58, 59, 69–71, 78, 82, 94, 207, 211, 230, 233, 243, 259, 261, 263, 266 Sun Tzu, 15, 55–57, 62, 94, 260, 263 Sun Yat-sen, 59, 66, 67, 74, 116, 208

INDEX

T Taihang, 76, 77, 86 Taiwan, 67, 88–90, 108, 118, 123, 125–127, 129, 133, 152, 172, 189, 210, 211, 215, 223, 226, 229, 230, 238, 261 Taoguang yang hui, 117, 215 Tenth Central Committee, 81 Ten Year Plan, 163, 206 Territorial integrity, 117, 119, 137, 203, 215, 223, 225, 231, 238, 264, 269 The Analects , 57, 58 The Art of War, 62 The Gang of Four, 81, 114, 133, 151, 156 Theory of imperialism, 29 Theory of Three Represents, 209 Third Plenary Session, 92 Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Central Committee, 81, 87, 150, 157, 158, 165, 171, 261 Third World, 80, 88, 90, 104, 106, 107, 110–117, 119, 124, 127, 135–138, 140, 149, 157, 158, 171, 176, 181, 203, 205, 208, 225, 261, 264, 265 Thirteenth Central Committee, 167 Thirteenth National Congress, 129 Thirteenth Party Congress, 166 Thucydides, 2, 9, 37 Tiananmen Square incident, 82, 167 Tibet, 77, 215, 223, 226, 238 Totalitarian Leadership, 21 Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs), 162 Traditionalist, 267 Transactional leadership, 20, 42 Transformational leadership, 17, 20 Truman Doctrine, 5, 34 Tucker, R.C., 3, 12–14, 16, 18, 20–22

321

Twelfth National Congress, 87, 92, 164, 166 U Unequal treaties, 70, 225 United Nations (UN), 80, 111, 112, 119, 124, 135–138, 152, 188, 210, 212, 220, 222, 225, 228, 232, 234, 235, 237, 240 V Victimization and insecurity, 63, 67, 94, 105 Vietnam, 39, 72, 88, 118–122, 124, 126, 127, 221 Vietnam War, 36, 39, 114, 119, 122, 123 W Waltz, Kenneth, 31, 33, 35 War, 15, 27, 29, 30, 38, 39, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 67, 77, 82, 83, 85, 87, 92, 103, 107, 111, 113–115, 118–121, 123, 135–138, 140, 149, 152, 156, 178, 203, 209, 213, 225, 226, 228, 241, 243, 261, 262 Weber, Max, 3, 9, 16, 18, 42, 263 West Europe, 29, 133, 134, 154, 180, 261 World Trade Organization (WTO), 169, 189, 207, 220, 235, 240, 262 Wuhan, 74, 169 X Xian Military Academy, 74 Xi Jinping, 42, 43, 216–224, 226, 227, 229, 231–233, 235–239, 241, 242, 263, 265–269

322

INDEX

Y yousou zuowei’ , 215 Yuan Shikai, 66

Z Zhao Ziyang, 152, 165, 166 Zhou Enlai, 78–81, 92, 128, 151, 159, 204