Foreign Aid in the Middle East: In Search of Peace and Democracy 9781788319089, 9781788315210

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To the Reader, the Critic and the Reviewer

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Tables Table 3.1. The Arab-Israeli conflict seen as an obstacle to political reform.

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Table 3.2. Main indicators (Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Israel), selected years.

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Table 3.3. Arms Deliveries to the Middle East by supplier (in millions of current US dollars, all data are rounded).

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Table 3.4. Regional share of arms deliveries and arms transfer agreement value, all suppliers, 2008– 2011, 2012– 2015 (%).

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Table 4.1. ODA grants (development and humanitarian aid) from the United States to selected MENA countries, 2006–2015 (constant prices, millions $US dollar, 2014 and %). 113 Table 4.2. US foreign military assistance to selected counties in the Near East, thousand $US, 2009– 2015.

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Table 4.3. ODA grants (development and humanitarian aid) from EU institutions to selected MENA countries, 2006–2015 (constant prices, millions $US dollar, 2014).

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Table 4.4. Humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC donors to developing countries and the MENA region, 2006–2015 (constant prices, in millions $US, 2014).

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Table 4.5. Net ODA/capita only from OECD DAC countries to selected MENA countries, $US, 2006– 2015 (current $US).

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Table 4.6. Net ODA/capita from all donors to selected MENA countries, $US, 2006– 2015 (current $US).

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Table 4.7. Total grants from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia to selected MENA countries, 2006– 2015 (constant prices, millions $US dollar, 2015).

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Table 4.8. Neighbourhood Barometer AB8(6) Could you tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements concerning the European Union? Only ‘agree’ answers, 2012 –2104, %.

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Table 4.9. Comparison of similar questions formulated in the Arab Barometer Wave II-III (2010–2011, 2012 –2013) and Neighbourhood Barometer (2012– 2014).

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Table 4.10. Egyptian attitudes towards foreign aid, various polls, 2011–2012.

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Table 4.11. Arab Barometer wave III, q701. Question on the future of foreign aid.

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Figures Figure 3.1. ODA grants (development and humanitarian aid) from OECD DAC donors to selected MENA countries, 2006–2015 (constant prices, millions $US dollar, 2014).

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Figure 4.1. Humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC donors to selected Middle Eastern countries, 2006– 2015 (constant prices, millions $US dollar, 2014). Source: OECD DAC Statistics, Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a], Data extracted on 25 January 2017.

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Figure 4.2. Trends in humanitarian aid from DAC donor countries to selected countries in the Middle East, in millions $US, 2006– 2015. Source: OECD DAC Statistics, aid disbursements to countries and regions.

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Figure 4.3. Net ODA/capita from OECD DAC countries to selected MENA countries, $US, 2006–2015 (current $US). Source: OECD DAC Statistics, Aid (ODA) disbursements to

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countries and regions [DAC2a], Data extracted on 25 January 2017.

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Figure 4.4. Trends in ODA/capita from all donor countries and OECD DAC countries, $US, 2006–2015 (Egypt, Jordan, Palestine). Source: OECD DAC Statistics, Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a], Data extracted on 25 January 2017.

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Figure 4.5. Neighbourhood Barometer A8(6) Agreement with the statement, ‘(our country) and the EU have sufficient common values to cooperate’ (2012–2014), agree, %.

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Figure 4.6. Neighbourhood Barometer A8(6) Agreement with the statement, ‘the European Union brings peace and stability in the region’ (2012–2014), agree, %.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AIPAC DONGO EC EEAS ECA ECHO EU DEVCO GS IDF IMF INGO IR ISIS MENA MEPP NED NGO

American Israeli Public Affairs Committee Donor-Oriented Non-Governmental Organization European Commission European External Action Service European Court of Auditors Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (EU/EC) European Union EuropeAid, Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development Gaza Strip Israeli Defense Forces International Monetary Fund International Non-Governmental Organization International Relations The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Middle East and North Africa (with a focus on Jordan, Egypt, Palestine and Israel) Middle East Peace Process National Endowment for the Humanities Programme (NEH), US, https://www.neh.gov/ Non-Governmental Organization

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OECD Oslo I Oslo II PLO PA/PNA PP SCAF USAID WB WDR

OF ABBREVIATIONS AND

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Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Declaration of Principles, signed by Israel and the PLO (1993) Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (1995) Palestine Liberation Organization Palestinian Authority (‘government’); Palestinian National Authority (‘entity’); the terms are used interchangeably with ‘Palestine’ Oslo Peace Process Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Egypt United States Agency for International Development West Bank World Development Report (issued by The World Bank)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The core ideas presented in this book are built on some findings of a Marie Curie research project funded by the EU and the Research Council of Norway from 2013 to 2016. Yet, this book was not only written mostly in isolation, but it was also a long time in the making. I could not always work on the manuscript under ideal circumstances. When I submitted the book proposal to I.B.Tauris in 2014, I was in the middle of my research project hosted by Fafo Research Foundation, Oslo. The working conditions were pleasant, I had a convenient office space, free lunch and some funding to cover fieldwork and data collection. When the proposal was accepted a year later, my contract was almost over, our kitchen table came to be my office desk, and I was a proud but tired mother of a newborn baby – in addition to two other little troublemakers. I am very grateful to Sophie Rudland, my editor at I.B.Tauris for her understanding and constant support that she has provided me on the one hand and also to Prof. Gerd Nonneman for his encouragement at the very beginning on the other. I also owe a lot to those colleagues and friends whose thoughts, decisions and attitudes supported not simply this project, but my desire to combine my family life (mostly lived in Oslo) with my professional life (nurtured and hosted in Budapest). I came to to Norway as a visiting research fellow, which is a fancy title in academic circles, but I had to realize soon that I was only ‘an immigrant’ from ‘Øst-Europa’ without any meaningful social capital needed in Norwegian academic circles. The trust that my family got from individuals outside these academic circles, Knut, Inger-Lise and Stener has simply been priceless. Without

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the stability they offered us, this book would not have been possible either. The same applies to Didier Eribon’s Returning to Reims that helped a lot to recognize the opportunities and dangers embodied in the surrounding social order (Stefan, danke scho¨n for reading and recommending this book at the right time). Writing and submitting this manuscript simply would not have been possible either without the decade-long support that I have received at my home department, the Institute of International Studies at Corvinus University of Budapest (from Laszlo Csicsmann, our colleagues and students), the material conditions provided by Fafo Research Foundation, Oslo and my former colleagues during the research period (Jon Pedersen, Tone Fløtten, A˚ge Tiltnes, Mark Taylor, Hani Eldada and Akram Ayasa), the hospitality of the main library at the University of Oslo and cafe´ Karabista in Majorstuen that used to have an inspiring marketing slogan: ‘you cannot buy friendship, but you can buy coffee.’ Some colleagues, just as the anonymous reviewers, were kind enough to read the manuscripts of the journal articles cited below as well as the manuscript of this book. They provided me with useful and constructive feedback. I cannot list all of them by name, but I am thankful for all the input I received. The irregular and unstructured communications exchanged on the broader subject with Balazs SzentIvanyi (Aston University), Istvan Benczes and Anas Audeh (both at Corvinus Univeristy of Budapest), Alaa Tartir (Graduate Institute Geneva), Nora L. Murad (co-founder of Dalia Association and Aid Watch Palestine), Annalisa Furia (University of Bologna) and Tomohisa Hattori (Lehman College, CUNY) were particularly instrumental in refining the main argument of this book. Their work, questions, concerns and critiques helped a lot to see the weaknesses and opportunities embodied in identifying and exploring the return gifts in the context of contemporary foreign aid. This logic received some recognition when one of my papers was accepted for publication by the editors of Current Anthropology. I also felt encouraged to take this project (more) seriously when readers of the published paper (researchers dealing with West Africa, Kathrin Knodel, Melina Kalfelis and their colleagues at the Goethe Universita¨t Frankfurt, unknown to me at that point) invited me to a symposium, Histories in Oblivion and Overlooked Lifeworlds. This invitation

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indicated that the existence of return gifts is recognized elsewhere too even if many foreign aid transfers are portrayed as unilateral transfers. The arguments presented in this book are mine and I claim full responsibility for any error or mistake. Finally, instead of thanking my family for their help and support, I ask my husband and children to forgive me for each and every minute that I spent with this manuscript. Many times, it happened at the expense of the time that I could, or should, have spent with them. Last, but not least I would like to express my gratitude to those people that invited me (the individual, not the researcher) to their house, offered ‘board and meal’, shared their family life, feelings and thoughts with me in Herzliya, Jeruselem and Ramallah in certain phases of the long research period. I will always owe them for their hospitality and trust. (forthcoming, 2019) ‘Matching empirical data with theories.’ SAGE Research Methods Cases. http://methods.sagepub.com/cases (forthcoming) ‘The price of getting donor money: Gift exchange in aid relations and the depolitisation of NGOs’ in Kathrin Knodel and Melina Kalfelis (eds, forthcoming, 2020) NGOs and Lifeworlds in Africa. Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. Berghahn. (2018) Cultures of (dis)trust: shame and solidarity from recipient NGO perspectives. International Journal of Cultural Studies 21(5): 486– 504. (2017) ‘Contemporary gifts. Solidarity, compassion, equality, sacrifice and reciprocity from the perspective of NGOs’, Current Anthropology 58(3): 317– 339. (2016) ‘Hegemonic solidarity? Palestinian NGO perceptions on power and cooperation with their donors’ Alternatives 41(2): 98 –115. (2016) ‘Foreign aid, international social exchange and reciprocity in the Middle East’ In Imad El-Anis et al (ed.): Regional Integration and National Disintegration in the Post-Arab Spring Middle East. UK: Cambridge Scholars, pp. 72–97. (2016) Divide et Impera? Foreign aid interventions in the Middle East and North Africa region. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 10(2): 200– 221. (2015) ‘Eastern and Western Perceptions on EU Aid in Light of the Arab Spring,’ Democracy and Security 11/1, pp. 60 – 82.

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(2012) ‘The Spiritual Essence: Palestinian Perceptions on Foreign Aid, Conditionality and Reciprocity’, International Political Anthropology 5/1, pp. 3– 28. (2012) ‘First impressions and perceived roles. Palestinian perceptions on foreign aid’, Society and Economy 35/3, pp. 389–410.

INTRODUCTION CONTEMPORARY GIFTS

The saying, it is better to give than to receive reflects a global experience, as does the sister wisdom there is no such thing as a free lunch. Do they jointly mean that providing a free lunch deprives the recipient from something and benefit the giver simultaneously? How does it apply to contemporary gifts in the context of international relations? If most foreign aid transactions, namely grants, are unilateral and financially unreciprocated, how do donors1 benefit from it? What do recipients lose? How does receiving and accepting ‘gifts’ from abroad relate to domestic political events such as war, quest for self-determination, struggle against occupation, peace, legitimacy battles or the fight for dignity? Is it only a matter of fantasy or that of reality that foreign aid can buy peace, democracy and stability, at least, their promise or illusion? This book concerns the most conflict-ridden regions of the world from an interdisciplinary perspective. So much has been written on the contemporary history of the Middle East, the region’s resistance to democratization, Islam fundamentalism and the Arab-Israeli conflict, that most readers have an approximate knowledge on the subject. However, when it comes to explaining the failures of democratization or a permanent/prolonged conflict, the general audience tends to look for reasons concerning cultural and social norms, radical Islam or conspiracy theories about Zionism. The Western portrayal of the region reflects a sort of cognitive dissonance: as if (memories on) colonization have been blown away by the wind of decolonization to leave behind only the sensitive, pro-democracy and pro-human rights Western actor being

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interested in doing development, making peace, stability and democracy. This work is interested in understanding the impossibility of foreign (Western) assistance, the vague, perhaps even irresponsible promise carried by external support and assistance. It offers neither an in-depth analysis of the social, political, economic realities of the Middle East, nor deals with the detailed history of the foreign aid relations. It rather attempts to offer an alternative interpretation of how external funds interact with local developments, how they shape and structure local realities and how their noble objectives are distorted in the very moment when they enter the stage. The book focusses on the relations between aid recipients and their donors – Western powers, whose central role is to provide foreign aid to almost all parties, Israel2 and the allied Arab States on the one hand, state and non-state actors on the other. The main goal of this book is to show how contemporary foreign gifts operate in an environment which is far from being ideal and analyse the nature of foreign aid relations by focusing on the dilemmas Western donors face in the countries being the main beneficiaries of Western foreign aid – military, development and humanitarian assistance – in the region. Even if Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian National Authority (Palestine)3 and Israel are locked by peace agreements, the unresolved Palestinian question, the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and the blockade around the Gaza Strip prevents deep normalization. It does not mean that other factors cannot be cited to explain the Middle Eastern turmoil, but it would be a failure to ignore the vital role of the Palestinian question as ‘an excuse’ justifying various actions of various actors, or their very lack. Following earlier studies, foreign aid will be conceptualized as a sort of contemporary gift and to analyse the nature of relations between donors and recipients, the theoretical framework of gift-giving (exchange) borrowed from anthropology will be applied. By drawing attention to the inherent complexities of donor-recipient (giver-givee) interactions, this conceptual framwork allows for an examination of both sides of the relationship with particular focus on how aid recipients serve donor interests. These ‘services’ will be interpreted as return gifts, which represents one of the two main arguments of this work. Foreign aid never remains unilateral, and just as in premodern gift relations, members of the international community expect reciprocity beyond and over the

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financial conditions. Conceptualizing regime stability – or at least the promise, or illusion, of stability – offered by aid recipients as ‘return gift’ aspires to complement the existing literature on strategic rentierstate and patron-client explanations between Western donors and their Middle Eastern allies.4 As implied, foreign aid relations are interpreted in an alternative way. Unlike in modernization theories and mainstraim development studies, cooperation financed by foreign aid is not seen as a linear process that will lead to the ‘development’ of the recipient by time. Development (or any other result) may be present, but the emphasis is placed on a dynamic process, continuous cycle shaped by interactions between the recipient and the donor. This process involves the recipient influencing not only actors on the donor side (governments, legislators, the public opinion or civil society organizations), but also their decision-making concerning (aid-related) interventions. The second main argument of the book focuses on the perceived link between missing domestic political reforms (explaining constant turmoil in the region) and the Arab-Israeli relations (seen as a key to regional stability by many). What role is played by the IsraeliPalestinian conflict in the domestic affairs of Arab states? How (missing) dignity in Egypt and Jordan is linked to the Palestinian question? Why do people living in the region feel that their countries pay so much for Western support, if the bulk of Western aid is financially non-reciprocated money transfer? The questions raised in the book mainly embark on the Arab Spring5 (2011) demonstrators’ demand for dignity and the tensions between the population (the alleged final beneficiaries of development and humanitarian aid) on the one hand and their governments (the main recipients of Western grants, which allow them to serve military, security or development purposes) on the other. While Europe bears a historical responsibility for shaping the modern Middle East, the United States has played a unique role in supporting Israel’s security and regional stability. The European Union (EU) has been the main donor of the PNA by providing development and humanitarian aid since the beginning, whereas Israel, Egypt and Jordan have been among the main beneficiaries of US military aid since the 1970s. Long-standing Western donor aims in the Middle East have been to ensure peace, security and regional stability by enhancing ‘cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations’ in line with

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the Camp David Accords (1978).6 The Oslo Peace Process (1993– 2000) between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement (1994) were built on the convictions laid down in the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement (1979). Aid, for various reasons, has been been channelled mainly to (semi)-authoritarian governments with a doubtful record of human rights.7 True democracybuilding in the region has been of marginal interest contrary to the official declarations and various communications that have been issued by the US and EU since the 1990s. It was only the Arab Spring – mass demonstrations calling for real democracy, political, economic and human rights – that made the Western powers ‘wake up’ upon seeing the existence of genuine demands for democracy in the region. While the intensity, the length and the depth of resistance varied from country to country, none in the region has remained intact. Western donors, in particularly the EU, attempted at looking for more effective ways of democracy promotion during 2011 and 2012. However, the unfinished being of the Arab Spring – the strategic weakness of pro-democracy demonstrators to consolidate their power in Egypt, the removal of a democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi by military coup (2013), the weak, pre-empted or oppressed demonstrations in Palestine and Jordan, the civil war in Syria, the Iranian ambitions in the region, the brutality of ISIS, general instability throughout the region – have questioned the feasibility of impatient donor strategies advocating ‘deep’ democracies in the region. Why? There is no straightforward answer to the question what the major source of instability and authoritarianism in the region is. While there are scholars arguing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict serves as an obvious reason for everything, others offer alternative explanations ranging from the political influence of Islam to environmental concerns affecting political outcomes. Regardless to the reply, official communications, documents and speeches are quite clear: the rationale behind Western aid in the region is security and stability, calm and peace. Solving the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict and supporting the peace process has been part of the Western donor ambitions for decades, but foreign aid has had further consequences and side effects since the beginning. The hopelessness (even cynicism?) stemming from the failure of the peace process has obviously contributed to distancing the masses from

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their rulers not only in Palestine, but also in Egypt and Jordan. Beyond that it was the way how aid recipient governments oppressed their own populations and public opinion/discontent, partially for the sake of peace agreements supported by Western aid (rents), which made people so much disappointed. The link between the Arab Spring and the Palestinian question seems obvious: the sense of humiliation (the lack of dignity) in political terms is part of the every day life in those Arab countries that were colonies or mandate areas by the middle of the twentieth century and/or signed peace agreements with Israel in past decades. There is a sort of shared perception: while many Palestinians feel humiliated by the ‘ambiguous’ Oslo Accords signed with Israel, people living in neighbouring Egypt and Jordan feel equally humiliated by seeing their own leaders (regimes/elites) at least as much complicit in the Israeli occupation,8 as those Western donors that support the peace process (in theory), that is, the occupation (in reality). The link between the Palestinian question and Arab domestic politics was reinforced long ago. As the Palestinian National Charter adopted in 1968 (excerpts from Articles 13, 14, 15, 17) says: Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary objectives . . . The destiny of the Arab nation, and indeed Arab existence itself, depend upon the destiny of the Palestine cause. From this interdependence springs the Arab nation’s pursuit of, and striving for, the liberation of Palestine. The people of Palestine play the role of the vanguard in the realization of this sacred (qawmi) goal. . . . The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint, is a national (qawmi) duty and it attempts to repel the Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Arab homeland . . . Absolute responsibility for this falls upon the Arab nation – peoples and governments – with the Arab people of Palestine in the vanguard. Accordingly, the Arab nation must mobilize all its military, human, moral, and spiritual capabilities to participate actively . . . in the liberation of Palestine . . . [that], from a human point of view, will restore to the Palestinian individual his dignity, pride and freedom. Accordingly, the Palestinian Arab people look forward to the support of all those who believe in the dignity of man and his freedom in the world.

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And even if a lot has changed for the past decades (Pan-Arabism has only disappeared, Jordan, Egypt and the PLO itself signed a peace agreement with Israel, new enemies, like Iran or radical/militant Islam fundamentalism, emerged), perceptions and memories on the essence of the Palestinian question seem to have remained intact in human minds. The ‘essence’ can be detected in Article 23 that established a direct link between ‘peace and security’ on the one hand and ‘the demand of right and justice’ on the other hand. While Israel and the Western donors of Arab allies are obsessed with making peace and securing stability, they paid far less attention to demands concerning [Palestinian] rights and justice in historical terms. And even if many other waves of unrest developed independently during the Arab Spring,9 the IsraeliPalestinian conflict lies at the heart of instability in the region. Ignoring local Arab (and/or Islamic) perceptions on what is just and what is right, both fighting wars and making peace encouraged the militarization of politics thoughout the region. And not only in Lebanon, Syria or Iraq that have never settled their disagreements with Israel. The cases of Egypt, Jordan – and to some extent that of the Palestinian Authority – are far more interesting as the governments of these countries (the PLO in the Palestinian case) have signed peace agreements with Israel. These peace agreements, however, not only set back political reforms and liberalization in all these countries, but they, especially the Oslo Accords, have been criticized by many for being unfair. Peace has become somehow a matter of formality agreed upon by governments and honoured by foreign aid – but it has not that much to do with substantial reconciliation between ordinary people. It is as if peace agreements had nothing to do with peace itself. It is well illustrated by statements frequently aired by diplomats and politicans in Egypt and Jordan that emphasize that ‘in the absence of a just solution to the Palestinian problem, never will there be a durable and just peace.’10 It is the lack of Palestinian sovereignty (one might say the prolonged Israeli occupation) on the one hand, the contested relations between the rulers and ruled, the privileged and the inferior in the neighbouring Arab countries combined with the massive inflow of external funds, which directly links the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the Arab Spring. Just as many Palestinians feel oppressed and humiliated, deprived both of

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self-determination and dignity by Israel and their own Palestinian leaders, people living in the neighbouring countries have also experienced the lack of power and dignity vis-a`-vis their own governments and ruling elites. The only difference concerns formal independence: while Palestinians are deprived of national self-determination, neighbouring Arab countries enjoy it; while the PNA is controlled by Israel in many regards, the neighbouring Arab societies are controlled by their own regimes. It does not mean that people cannot have a happy life in these countries and many do have. But it requires them to stay away from delicate political matters and retreat to the private sphere (if it exists at all) by not raising complicated questions about freedom and oppression. Considering their historical role in the regional turmoil, it cannot be very easy to be a Western power. Not only people living in the region, but Western taxpayers want to see their governments advocating for human rights and promoting democratic reforms. However, international solidarity and universal values were overwritten by realities and strategic interests long ago. For this, Western donors cooperate with everyone interested in doing business – creating or maintaining social bonds – with governments implementing some political reforms, with NGOs implementing aid projects, as long as recipient governments, guardians of national sovereignty and security, do not block their ambitions and activities. In hindsight, donor practices remained the same after the Arab Spring as they had been before: preaching about the necessity of democratic reforms and respect for human rights, supporting pro-Western civil society organizations cautiously, but simultaneously silently cooperating with any government for the sake of stability. If the US is mostly interested in maintaining regional stability for the sake of Israeli security, the European Union provides aid for its own regional, ie. European, stability. And in the meantime, Arab governments, not only in Syria, but in Egypt, Jordan and the PNA too, continue to oppress and manipulate people by silencing those that campaign for ‘too much’ democracy, that is, regime change. The book investigates this principal dilemma (supporting democracy vs. strengthening stability) both from the perspective of the Western donors and that of the recipients. The conceptual framework is mostly theoretical, but it hopefully raises some practical questions too.

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Theoretical-conceptual frames Inspired by Marcel Mauss’ revolutionary work on the theory on gift and the norm of reciprocity (1925/2002),11 a significant body of literature has focused on the philosophy of the gift,12 on the role gifts play in social and economic relations in general13 and in international relations in particular.14 This book is mostly concerned with the relations established by foreign aid, seen as a form of contemporary gift exchange between the Western world and allied countries on the recipient side.15 Leaning, to some extent, on arguments developed by Annalisa Furia, foreign aid is justified on the donor side, because recipients are deemed to be the cause of local, regional or global disorder. This ‘problem’ requires Western, international cooperation, or more recently, global initiatives in the Middle East too. Indeed, as observed in the Middle East, many activities financed from Western foreign aid are seen as control mechanisms aiming to colonize – but at least to influence – local minds.16 International foreign aid relations can be compared to the relations established by gifts and giving, in as much as both imply the norm of reciprocity, a sort of demand for commitment in the form of loyalty and alliances, to maintain international order. Moreover, both evolves around concepts such as power, domination and subordination. Gift and aid relations equally reflect dominance and subordination on the one hand and maintain social cohesion, at least the illusion of social cohesion, on the other. While gifts, in ancient and modern societies alike, serve the purpose of establishing and maintaining social bonds with hierarchies,17 foreign aid can be seen as an instrument to control or dominate the rest of the world18 by means of substituting war with more peaceful means and co-opting elites on the recipient side. Gifts – or, somewhat more precisely, scholars dealing with gift theories – claim to argue for a better understanding of social and human relations than that offered by mainstream economic science and related theories on rational choice and action. There is a strong, even fierce competition between social scientists arguing for and those arguing against the exclusivity of economics and its capacity to describe and explain the human and social world. Foreign aid, seen either as an incentive contributing to economic growth and poverty reduction on the one hand or an instrument strengthening social-political bonds within the international community on the other illustrates the conceptual

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competition between utilitarianism and anti-utilitarianism.19 Do people, politicians, diplomats, aid officials, activists, NGO workers, volunteers, Israelis and Arabs, Jews, Muslims and Christians, act purely by their rational-economic interests, are they motivated by gains, profits and benefits or are their decisions and actions determined by altruism, generosity, in general, sociality and sociability, habituation20 included? Within the discipline of economic science, it was the Chicago School and Gary Becker that extended the rational action/choice theories to any kind of social behaviour within the human realm. Many social scientists (economists dealing with development aid included) accept that there are needs beyond self-interest – let it be defined in economic, social or cultural terms. Their majority, however, continue to insist on methodological individualism, that is, ‘on the principle that explanations of social phenomena should be reducible to rational-choice explanations of the actions of the individual human beings involved. . . . [this approach assumes that] socially-oriented motivations can be treated as particular kinds of desire or preference which, just like self-interested desires, are acted on by rational individual agents.’21 Neoliberals believe not only in the marketplace of goods, but in that of ideas too: the truth is validated as what sells.22 As such, the vision of good society, international society included, comes to be a reality only if the conditions for its existence are constructed by interventions, activism and vigilance.23 The ‘land for peace’ idea put forth by the UN in 1967 (242 SCR) and the vision on the ‘New Middle East’ (economic cooperation between Israel and the Arab neighbours will lead to political reconciliation; better living standards in the Palestinian territories will make them see the dividends of peace)24 may illustrate the relevance of these ideas in the Middle East too. However, as emphasized by Alain Caille the ‘enlargement of the traditional scope of economic science has been the intellectual and ideological prelude and the starting point to neo-liberalism which is nowadays triumphing as well in academic economic science as in the real world.’25 Indeed, many argue that not all social phenomena can be fully explained in methodologically individualistic terms, which implies that preferences or assumptions about preferences are not sufficiently explaining the social world.26 People will not necessarily do business with each other just because it is economically rational – as Israel’s struggle for being accepted in the Middle East and the long history of the Arab boycott show. Equally, recipients will likely accept, but not

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necessarily embrace/appreciate foreign aid, let it be grant aid and portrayed as a generous gift, if there is a sharp contradiction perceived between its stated objectives and people’s perceptions on justice. The distinction between these approaches (or world views) will be instrumental in understanding why contemporary foreign gifts make so much trouble in the Middle East (and elsewhere). To put it very simply, perceptions on justice and economic rationality are two distinct ideas that cannot be always easily reconciled. The question matters only because those criticizing development aid, in particular in Palestine (in the Arab world in general), at least as much blame the ideology of neoliberalism, the global order and related development paradigms for the lack of independence and for the failure of the peace process as the Israeli occupation itself.27 By applying Mauss’ gift theory and the related analytical framework discussed with reference to foreign aid (see Chapter 2), the book aims to analyse the complex relations created by foreign aid, its contribution to the tensions within the recipient society and to assess the dilemmas related to giving and getting ‘foreign gifts’. It is not my intention in this book to argue for or against foreign aid. There are quite many situations when foreign assistance is the only solution. I do not claim either that all projects supported by foreign aid are part of the political game. Instead, my goal is twofold: primarily, to assess as carefully as possible the political dilemmas evoked by foreign aid in recipient countries; and secondarily, to explain why foreign aid fails to make a difference from social and political perspectives. The former will require us to conceptualize foreign aid as gifts and take a closer look at its role in the social relations of state and non-state actors based on the literature; the latter will be based on citing local perceptions of foreign aid and its consequences to understand the limited power embodied in Western foreign aid. Due to page limits, the history of international relations (IR) between the West and the region will not be analysed in depth.28 However, it is worthwhile to recall that IR theories explaining the relations between the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and the West from historical perspectives emphasize the ‘penetrated’ feature of the region. On the one hand it has been subject to an exceptional level of external intervention and control since the first part of the twentieth century. On the other, mainly due to its cultural distinctiveness, it has been stubbornly resistant to external subordination.29 Even if most regimes in the Middle

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East have sought Western or regional patrons to consolidate their power for decades, they have also manipulated their very donors. The masterclient relationship between MENA states and their patrons are so complicated that, as Fred Halliday put it long ago, ‘it is not entirely clear which one is the master’.30 Accepting the argument that an explanation for the persistance of Arab authoritarianism is Western material support for maintaining the status quo,31 it appears worthwile to explore how and why it has failed to buy real peace/stability and support truly democratic changes in the region. As case studies, the book will focus on the most important beneficiaries of Western foreign aid, military aid, development and humanitarian aid included, in the Middle East: Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Israel. These countries, unlike their fellows in the region, have been tied to each other by bilateral peace agreements having been built on the concepts such as security and reciprocity. As the Preamble of the Camp David Frameworks for Peace agreement (1978) says illustratively: Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoys normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree on special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other agreements that they agree are useful. . . . Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The purpose of the cited framework agreement, the subsequent peace treaty between Egypt and Israel (1979), the Oslo Accords between Israel and the PNA (1993– 1995) and the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement (1994) has been to achieve peace and mutually good relations between Israel its neighbours. In many cases, such major agreements assuming mutual cooperation are guaranteed by third parties.32 In the Middle East, regional stability secured by peace agreements has been supported by unprecedented US military and Western economic assistance to the concerned parties since the 1970s. Trustees of regional stability and the eternal promise of peace have deserved foreign support as the region

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hosts not only Israel, but directly neighbouring Europe simultaneously. The recent refugee crisis in Europe, not being the subject of this book though, illustrates well what is at stake if stability in the Middle East decreases and state sovereignty, let this sovereignty be authoritarian, decreases. Strong regimes being capable to practice effective sovereignty over their territories, to control societies and politics and population movements continue to be close allies, or as Donald Trump put it as a presidential candidate, ‘loyal friends’.33 It is not coincidence that deep democracy-building has been of marginal interest in the region contrary to the official (EU, US) declarations and various communications issued since the early 1990s. All peace agreements, the Oslo agreements between Israel and the PLO included, were built on the assumption that people make decisions based on their rational (economic) interests, and as a consequence ‘peace’ can be exchanged for economic development34 in a way as if it was a good (ie. product) to be sold or bought on the international market. Their implementation and consequences, however, drew attention to more complex phenomena: the decisive role of socialization and sociability, the importance of human perceptions on justice, fairness and dignity.35 While the Arab Spring articulated these perceptions, experiences and voices, donor countries and aid advocates keep on prioritizing stability over such vague concepts as justice and dignity. Not only for the sake of Israel, as assumed by advocates of conspiracy theories – the massive inflow of US military aid rather separates it from the neighbouring societies than connects it to the same countries – but for the sake of Western economic and business interests in the region and for the sake of Europeans residing not far away from Middle Eastern complexities.

Methods and structure To understand how Western foreign powers, their expectations and money (dubbed as ‘aid’) are seen in the recipient countries, I propose to begin by raising some conceptual questions on gift-giving, differences between social and economic exchange, the norm of reciprocity, debt and the sense of indebtedness based on some relevant economic, anthropological, sociological and philosophical theories (Chapter 1). Even when foreign aid is a grant without monetary obligations to return, reality and recipient perceptions seem to justify the old wisdom that

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‘there are no free gifts’ and givers/donors ‘always expect something in return’. To put these perceptions into a broader theoretical context with reference to foreign aid, Chapter 2 will discuss the tradition of giving gifts and the nature of social relations created by the gifts recalling sociological-anthropological theories, Marcel Mauss’ essai sur le don, first and foremost. It will also elaborate on the concept of reciprocity in the context of gift economy being, in principle, an expression of recognition and a sort of mutual reinforcement by two parties of each other’s actions. The norm of reciprocity forms an important part of social exchange theories as well as that of the gift economies. The concept will help us understand how the logic of non-monetary obligations works in gift relations, why true gifts are ‘impossible’ and what conditionality means in contemporary aid relations. A brief exploration of the historical role played by gifts in international relations will be followed by applying the concept on gift to foreign aid/grants. The contemporary anarchic international system reminds to archaic societies that international politics are seen as ‘a realm of human experience’ without any central sovereign power.36 Societies in general and the international community in particular are similar to the extent to which, ‘it is not individuals but collectivities that impose obligations of exchange and contract upon each other’.37 Understanding the nature of gift exchange and those of the established relations will be instrumental in analysing the ambiguous role foreign aid plays by creating solidarity bonds between the donor and the recipient and weakening social cohesion within the recipient societies. Turning from theory to practice, Chapters 3 to 5 will test the argument in the Middle East. It will require us to recall what gifts mean within Middle Eastern traditions as well as how the contemporary history of foreign aid to the Middle East unfolded. Although the Middle East has never belonged to the top recipients of official development assistance (ODA) – the only exception is the PNA which receives the highest ODA per capita and Iraq due to the fact, that it had to be reconstructed after the war initiated by the US – Israel, Egypt and Jordan have been receiving high portions of US military aid. The main objectives of foreign aid channelled to the region, regardless to its particular objectives and specific contexts, have been the following: to strengthen regional stability, to facilitate cooperation between ‘enemies’ tied by peace treaties (Egypt-Israel, Israel-Jordan) or an eternal peace

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process (Israel and the PNA), to keep the idea of the two-state solution alive, to secure Israel’s stability, to offset the consequences of the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and that of the blockade around the Gaza Strip, to prevent the cross-border escalation of the Palestinian problem – that is to secure stability in the southern EU-neighbourhood. Chapter 3 will start by briefly summarizing the Middle Eastern giftgiving traditions, which will be followed by discussing the Western donors’ general motives and interests in the region, recalling the Arab Spring demands and discussing how foreign aid becomes a rent and interacts with legitimacy issues. Chapter 4 will explore the conflicting objectives of official donors: how Western donors buy (the promise of) stability in the region, how they promote political reforms by supporting state and non-state actors simultaneously, and how they are ready to offer humanitarian assistance in the absence of political visions. To discuss some recipient motives to accept foreign aid, the main forms, channels and recipients of foreign aid in the Middle East will be described, as well as the concept of political and peace conditionality and the way these have been applied since the Camp David agreement (1978). With reference to the equality of the actors (giver-givee), the relations between Israel and the United States are balanced and strengthened by military aid, they resemble both market and gift exchange. The mutual gains are more evident. For example, the US has access to military technology developed by Israeli firms, which qualifies as an obvious return gift. The relations between the US and the Arab recipients of military aid is less rosy, partially because these regimes can return the ‘foreign gifts’ only by ‘gestures’ and ‘favours’ alienating certain segments of their own societies. The same applies to development aid, the acceptance of which, in many cases, creates tensions by influencing power relations between governments and civil society actors and their community. Unlike relations established and maintained by gifts circulating in archaic societies, contemporary foreign aid relationships mirror inequality regardless to the official rhetoric emphasizing ‘partnership’ between the donor and the recipient. Recipients are subordinated as they always stand at the ‘recipient end’ of ‘aid economy’ relations in financial terms and hardly can they return the ‘foreign gifts’ without compromising some political values and, consequently, alienating their own population. This compromise includes accepting conditions set by the

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donors in contemporary aid relations. Complying with conditions will be interpreted as sacrifice, a sort of price, to be paid for accepting the gift. Taking sacrifices is one way of returning the gift of aid. By doing so, it is only a matter of time to get the next gift – let it be budgetary assistance, military equipment, a development project or else. To elaborate on the argument presented in Chapter 4, dilemmas emerging in the context of the Arab Spring will be analysed in Chapter 5 with particular focus on the image of ‘foreign agent’ and the very impossibility of foreign aid. This chapter will discuss the political dilemmas embodied in foreign aid by applying terms known from gift exchange theories and applied in the context of foreign aid (reciprocity, return gifts, symbolic domination, sacrifice, the spiritual essence) to contemporary donor-recipient relations in the Middle Eastern context, in countries being closest to the Arab-Israeli conflict, namely, in Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Israel. Finally, we will conclude with some thoughts on the dilemmas of ‘foreign gifts’. Arguments will be discussed on how foreign aid may convey ‘external’ values (‘spiritual essence’, such as the idea of regional stability and cooperation with the ‘enemy’, universal human rights and Western(ized) democratic values, neoliberalism), how ‘international exchange’ – receiving foreign aid and the norm of reciprocity – may contribute to stability by strengthening external legitimacy and to instability by weakening internal legitimacy and how recipients are expected to sell their ‘misfortune’ in exchange for further foreign aid. It is beyond the purpose and scope of the book to explore all reasons for discontent in the concerned countries,38 but results of the desk research and theoretical reasoning presented in the first chapters will be complemented by some empirical data in Chapters 3 to 5. Opinions on foreign donors will be illustrated by analysing data gained from various surveys (Arab Barometer, EU Neighbourhood Barometer). While survey research, done by various polling institutes, is useful to describe main patterns and trends, qualitative interviews facilitate a much deeper understanding of how people think about foreign donors and their support. Qualitative data, collected before and after the Arab Spring, comes from the following main sources: First, there have been excellent ‘voices’ collections published in the past years. Almost without exception the editors of these books tried to channel voices from the region directly to the reader. These personal narratives say far more about the way how people in the Middle East

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think and feel than any scholarly publication (this book included).39 As conducting interviews in Egypt were not, for various reasons, feasible, related experiences were explored by leaning on alternative sources.40 Secondly, new empirical data were collected in two main rounds of interviews in order to capture and measure Palestinian perceptions on Western assistance. In both years (2010, 2015) the research and questionnaires were designed by the author of this book and the interviews were conducted in Arabic by local interviewers, native Palestinians experienced both with qualitative and quantitative data collection and who worked at the same research institute as the author of this paper (Fafo, Oslo) in those years. The interviews were recorded, transcribed and translated to English. Transcripts of the interviews were processed by the means of simple content analysis in 2010, by constant comprarative method and grounded theory in 2015. Separating data collection (done by local Palestinians) from research design and data analysis (conducted by the foreign researcher, the author of this book) resulted in better quality data (more sincere discussions) as the interviewers and the interviewees lived the same reality and they spoke the same language: not only in linguistic, but social, political and cultural terms too. The first round of interviews involved 21 in-depth individual and three mini focus group interviews in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in July and August 2010. The respondents were all men between 30 and 60 years old (mean age close to 50) with diverse occupational background. Their places of living and that of work were Ramallah, Bethlehem and Gaza City. All of them had some solid experience with the dynamics of foreign assistance channelled to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. All interviews were semistructured containing a series of open-ended questions concentrating on three main areas: (i) basic concepts and local interpretations of international assistance; (ii) past and present experiences with foreign aid and future expectations regarding its role and impact; and (iii) the perceived priorities of Western foreign assistance with reference to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.41 The second round of interviews was conducted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip from July to September 2015.42 The interviews aimed to explore the nature of relations (bonds, ties) between NGO recipients and (locally active, bigger) foreign donor organizations by means of qualitative methods. Building on earlier research mapping local perceptions on foreign aid in Palestine, its core objective was to understand the personal-level feelings and human

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experiences attached to or stemming from daily interactions between organizations (between the NGO recipient and the donor organization). Altogether 22 people were interviewed (9 female, 13 male; 12 in the West Bank, 10 in the Gaza Strip). They had rich experience in working with various local, regional, and international aid organizations during the course of their lives. All of the interviews were semi-structured; the vast majority of the interviews were face-to-face (20), while two of them were conducted via e-mail correspondence. In addition to Palestinian interviews, the author of this book has conducted further interviews with officers and diplomats working at EU delegations and aid agencies, in Jordanian, Israeli and Palestinian foreign ministries between 2013 and 2015.43 With reference to the data collected by means of interviews, many scholars would probably be more critical regarding the explanatory power (validity, reliability) of perceptions. Although I never found using people’s opinion (as data) highly problematic and making qualitative interviews is a well-known research method, I must somehow agree with those that draw attention to inherent dangers. I was just re-reading Eribon’s Returning to Reims when Tomohisa Hattori asked me in an email-correspondence whether I was taking perceptions too seriously. As he argued ‘while I try to doubt my per-ception, per-ception is the filter by which I (and most of us) see a lot of things. That is why we use con-ception to detach ourselves from that filter, which may (may not) be misleading or misunderstanding the reality’ (private email correspondence, 22 January 2018). His formulation resonated well with Eribon’s (self-)reflection on the same issue: ‘only an epistomological break with the way individuals spontaneously think about themselves renders possible the description of the mechanisms by which the social order reproduces itself’ (Eribon, Returning to Reims, pp. 52– 53). Perceptions (as empirical data) matter but we have to contextualize them to generate theory even if the result is not necessarily appealing. It applies to this work too. Arguing that aid recipients return and honour foreign aid by trading off or exchanging their misfortune (stories of pain, images of poverty, underdevelopment) or security threats raises philosophical and ethical questions, but does not necessarily have that much practical significance, I am afraid. As Stephen M. Walt put it ‘a low regard for theory is [also] reflected in the organizations responsible for conducting foreign policy’ (Walt, 2005, 24). And it is just gets worse, apparently, these days.

CHAPTER 1 THE MARKET, THE SOCIETY AND THE GIFT

You give but little when you give of your possessions. It is when you give of yourself that you truly give. (Kahlil Gibran, The Prophet)

Exchange theories in a nutshell The literature on social and gift exchange concerns various theories in the field of economics, anthropology, sociology, socio-psychology and philosophy as well as their interdisciplinary combinations.1 Both empirical and conceptual questions are raised, and explanations are offered on the differences between market and social exchange on the one hand and differences between social exchange and gift-exchange on the other hand. A key question is whether individuals are ‘only’ individuals, that is, independent and autonomous rational decision makers (as seen as by most theorists of market and social exchange) or they can rather be understood as parts of a bigger collective, that is, ‘not free’ of their social relations embodied in the concept of people, nation, religious community or other group affiliation (as prompted by gift exchange theories). Theories on social and economic exchange, mostly within the realm of sociology and economic science, are dealing with individual motives and interests that play a role in maintaining social relations within the family or at a workplace. Gift exchange theories, the concern of anthropologists, are mostly built on the assumption that the parties

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involved are groups. As observed in ‘archaic’ communities, groups may exchange with each other not simply objects, goods or commodities, but gestures, favours, military assistance, ceremonies, food, jokes, land, labour services2 and a lot else. Looking at the major differences, modern market exchange is a prompt interaction between actors – individuals, households, organizations, states – without long-term social or emotional consequences, such as expectations or promises. In market transactions goods and services are exchanged for money, the quantity of which is known as price. A currency is used to indicate the price, not necessarily the value though, of a given commodity. The exchange, in its most elementary form, means that a commodity or service is exchanged on the market that sets the price by harmonizing the supply and demand side. If there is considerable time difference between taking something and giving its counter-value (the money), the price will increase, and the transaction will involve a loan/debt element with proper financial conditions, such as the interest rate. Social exchange theories explore social relationships between actors (mostly individuals) whereby the monetary element of exchange is missing. Unlike in market exchange transactions, there are no prices (in numerical terms) or price tags, even if returns can be detected. Elusive forms of return may include gestures, favours or behaviour, obedience or rebellion. Another main difference between social and market exchange is the durability (endurance) of relations. Social exchange entails long-run consequences by focusing on the principle of reciprocity, emphasizing the importance of social relationships and that of non-monetary gains and costs. The durability of the relationship established by exchange as well as the equality of the parties depends on the nature of the ‘return-gift,’ the related costs and the actor’s satisfaction with the rewards.3

Social exchange Building on the philosophical and disciplinary traditions of neoclassicism and economics, utilitarianism and behaviourism in economic science and psychology, the first social exchange theories were developed by sociologists mapping the meaning and substance of rational selfinterest in (individual) human relationships,4 first and foremost within family relations.5

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Social exchange theories attempt to explain the relations between human individuals – mostly between individuals and not between groups – on the analogy of market exchange. Actors exchange certain ‘assets’ (favours, gestures, affection, deterrence, gratifications, etc.) for similar assets of roughly, but not necessarily equivalent value. In other words, people decide about their behaviour (about the ‘how’ of reciprocity) taking into consideration their self-interest. Decisions and behaviours pattern and structure the existing relationships, just as relationships influence decisions and behaviours. The exchange is not as obvious, overt and prompt as in the case of market exchange, for obligations are unspecified and favours and gestures do not have any (pre)defined price. Yet, the parties involved continue to ‘trade’ with each other during the course of any social relationship as long as they feel satisfied with rewards. In market exchange transactions nothing is for free, that is, a commodity always has a price that is usually expressed in monetary terms and known both to the seller and the buyer. In social exchange the actors are aware of their moral obligation to ‘repay’ – return or reciprocate – what was given to them ‘for free’ without an explicitly set price. The phenomenon of this way of ‘trading’ is known as the principle, norm or rule of reciprocity. Reciprocity explains the length, strength and endurance of social and human relations that are not free from power concerns as illustrated most typically in family relations. Within this context, the principle of ‘least interests’ means that those with less gain in terms of meeting their basic needs usually hold more power in the sequences of exchanges. It applies not only to parent-child relationships (a classic example of social exchange), but to the relations between donor states and recipients as well (see Chapter 2). And it implies that power stems from less basic dependence on social interaction,6 which applies to relations between donors and recipients in the international community too. Social exchange theories claim that individuals perceiving the presence of reciprocity in their social relationships are more satisfied with their relationships and for this they are more interested in maintaining them.7 But how is it possible to capture the essence of reciprocity? Rewards (benefits) and costs help the givee know how much should be returned. While rewards denote the benefits exchanged between individuals engaged in a social relationship, costs are either

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‘punishments or forfeited rewards that result from social exchanges.’8 With reference to family-relations and based on the literature, Chibous identified three different types of costs in a typical social exchange relation: investment cost (energy, cognitive and emotional commitment), direct costs (material, financial resources devoted to maintaining the relation) and opportunity costs (indicating the possible rewards that be lost as a result of the given social exchange). This latter is of particular importance inasmuch as the ‘loss’ can be captured as ‘sacrifice’ – a concept so much important both in conceptualizing gift exchange (see next section) and understanding local perceptions on foreign aid in the Middle East (Chapters 3 to 5). If social exchange theories attracted criticisms, they did so due to some of their basic assumptions. Just as most sub-disciplines within economic science, social exchange theories take it for granted that the actors are individuals, that people make rational decisions, they are engaged in thoroughly cost-benefit analyses before their actions being selfinterested, seeking material or non-material profits, and being obsessed with utility functions by constantly analysing their individual needs. Theories on gift exchange offer a complementary approach.

Gift exchange Gift exchange, conceptualized by Marcel Mauss (1925) can be understood as a special form of exchange entailing reciprocity obligations and regulating power dynamics between actors. Mauss’ theory inspired both his followers and critiques to discuss various forms, norms and conditions of gift-giving9 – as opposed to money-based market exchange transactions. The actors can be both individuals and groups, but Mauss originally was concerned with exchange between communities in archaic, or pre-modern, societies.10 Later on, Marshall Sahlins and Alvin Gouldner focused on the ‘spirit’ of the gift, explored and expanded the norm of reciprocity from alternative perspectives.11 George Bataille discussed the importance and role of expenditure (de´pense) as an unacknowledged force in all human culture within the broader context of excess, giving and loss.12 Since Mauss it has been widely accepted that gift-giving can be motivated either by altruism, self-interest or their various combinations,13 and it involves complex social, cultural, ethical concerns beyond pure market logic and economic efficiency.14

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The multiple obligation of giving, receiving and returning (gifts) forms ‘the concrete face of the principle of reciprocity’ that has been set as the basic anthropological principle being part of a larger system by Claude Le´vi-Strauss and explored in sharp contrast with modern market exchange and redistribution by Karl Polanyi.15 Mauss, however, did not draw such sharp distinction between the purchasing power of money and that of gifts. By ‘money’, Mauss understood any instrument of gift or commodity exchange. In this sense money is not simply a physical thing, but essentially a social relation.16 It may equally take the form of gift or money as long as the relationship established is more significant than the objects exchanged. Discussing Mauss’ works, Chris Gregory tried to distinguish (money based) commodity exchange from gift exchange in the following way:17 Commodity exchange is an exchange of alienable objects between people who are in a state of reciprocal independence that establishes a quantitative relationship between the objects exchanged . . . Gift exchange [however] is an exchange of inalienable objects between people who are in a state of reciprocal dependence that establishes a qualitative relationship. As Gregory highlighted the most significant difference between commodities and gifts: while commodity exchange (barter or monetary exchange) is about the relationship between the objects exchanged, gift exchange (even if the given thing itself is money), establishes a relationship between the people, that is, the subjects. As Mauss wrote: ‘through the thing passed on, even if it is consumable, the alliance that has been contracted is no momentary phenomenon, and the contracting parties are deemed to be in a state of perpetual dependence toward one another.’18 To sum up: the gift cannot be confined (to be) monetized commodity, but any commodity, even money, can be a gift, provided that it ensures a lasting relationship between the giver and the receiver. For this, the typical gift is a ‘hybridation’ between self-interest and other-interest, between obligation and liberty (or creativity),’19 which explains why it is so difficult to capture its substance and social role. Reviewing the political philosophy of gift and the related history of political-economic thinking,20 the central question concerning the merits of the gift concerns the relation, or balance, between self-interest

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and altruism/benevolence. While there were thinkers, Adam Smith, first and foremost, emphasizing the primacy of commodity exchange based on self-interest in terms of creating and maintaining social bonds, others argue that the free market, especially its modern, money-based version can guarantee neither economic efficiency nor social cohesion.21 Indeed, if ‘self-interest was not mixed with interest toward others’, the gift would become either a ‘buying act’ or a ‘sacrifice’22 and ‘if obligation were not mixed with freedom, it would become a purely formal and empty ritual or collapse into nonsense.’23 In this latter sense, foreign aid (as a financial transfer) is a gift only partially (see Chapter 2). Aiming at creating or maintaining international social bonds it creates mutual social-political dependence by reciprocity obligations, but it also perpetuates indebtedness in financial terms.24 The concept, norm and practice of reciprocity is of utmost importance for distinguishing interested giving (expecting return gifts based on the social norm of reciprocity) from conceptually existing, but practically ‘impossible’ (unacknowledged and as such, unreciprocated) gifts on the one hand and contract-based market exchange (monetary, barter) on the other.25 The social relation established by reciprocity (a gift or favour motivated by another gift) can be seen as different from contract-based market exchange, where each transfer is provided under the condition that the other is provided prompt and without entailing commitments or expectations once the transaction is completed (over).26 In case of foreign aid (gifts), however, the transaction is never completed, which can be explained only by identifying certain return gifts exchanged for aid.

The modern gift: From Christmas presents to global solidarity Gifts in (post-)modern societies are mostly tied to concepts like generosity, altruism, friendship and love, celebrations and holidays – all falling within the private realm.27 They are usually exchanged between individuals or organizations,28 like birthday, wedding or Christmas gifts. Since it is almost always better to give cash rather than an in-kind gift from market perspectives, the social impact of gift is widely discussed with reference to its economic efficiency and within the context of microeconomics. Criticizing the economic nonsense behind gifts, Waldfogel argued that ‘when other people do our shopping . . . it’s pretty

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unlikely that they’ll choose as well as we would have chosen for ourselves. We can expect their choices, no matter how well intentioned, to miss the mark. Relative to how much satisfaction their expenditures could have given us, their choices destroy value.’29 His underlying assumption and conclusion is that even if they are called beneficiaries or givers, the rational choices are not made by the ultimate consumers in case of gift giving – and as such inefficiency and waste is inevitable. In case of foreign aid, allocation (and other imporant) choices are made by the donors historically, not by the ‘ultimate consumers’, that is, beneficiaries. The emerging question – if buying and giving gifts is a wasteful and inefficient activity, why do we insist on it30 – leads for expecting us to look at the relations between people as if they were autonomous from the concerned actors and their interests. To put it differently it is the relation between two actors, which gives meaning to the calculated practice, or altruistic habit, of gift-giving. The purpose of giving gifts is not simply making the recipient happy, but to satisfy some needs on the giver’s side at the same time and to strengthen ties and bonds between them. And as there are factors beyond individual concerns involved in gift-giving, discussing group-level formations such as community, society and the related public sphere becomes inevitable. Within the context of the modern public sphere, modern gift-giving is legally regulated by the state as for example public officials cannot accept anything beyond a given value in most modern counties. Gifts, indeed, are frequently discussed as bribe in the context of transparency and corruption.31 Common in bribes to public officials and cash gifts between individuals is the stigma of corruption attached to the crude involvement of money (as cash). Waldfogel argued that the rarity of cash gifts between individuals can be rationalized by a stigma of cash giving.32 It implies that the stigma and the related sense of corruption may be a price that has to be paid (a sacrifice to be taken) for accepting certain gifts. Foreign aid is by no means an exception. Categorizing gifts at conceptual level Marcel He´naff distinguised three different forms of giving emphasizing that any ‘definition is imprecise’ and the variety of practices involved cannot be sufficiently described and categorized.33 The ceremonial or ‘archaic’ gift is loaded with presuppositions and is always described as public and reciprocal (see Chapter 2). The gracious or obligatory gift-giving, ‘may or may not be private but it is primarily unilateral’, that is, ‘free’ in principle

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(see the discussion on the impossibility of gifts later). Finally, it is ‘mutual aid’ (giving recalling and including both social solidarity and so-called philanthropic activity) that ‘is viewed by some as constituting the modern form of traditional gift-giving.’34 The ‘modern form of traditional gift-giving’ may equally be private and public provided that it is given in a transparent way and can be either taxed by the state or exempted from taxes. Tax (exemption) depends on the value of the gift and, also on the (legal) personality of the actors involved. In any case both private and public gifts have to be monitored and acknowledged by the state (acting on behalf of the society), otherwise the practice of gift giving will soon be shadowed by the monster of corruption – and the related social stigma. With reference to international aid relations, to be further discussed in Chapter 2, the desire of the donor (states, international organizations, global governance) to monitor recipients’ actions is embodied in aid effectiveness principles like transparency and accountability. These ‘norms’ simultaneously enable the donor to control the recipient and prevent it from doing whatever it wants with the ‘gift’ received. While money and gift are not identical concepts as reflected in the distinction between monetary and social/gift exchange, money can play the role of the gift in our (post)modern world. Equally, the gift (mostly as bribe) can also function as a sort of currency buying this or that. Discussing the philosophy of money, the American philosopher, Michael Sandel, devoted an entire chapter to gifts, monetized gifts included, ‘buying’ friends. Making distinction between things that money ‘can’t buy (the Nobel prize, for example),’ and things (human organs or children) that money ‘can buy, but arguably shouldn’t’, Sandel argued that ‘monetary exchange spoils the good being bought . . . in controversial cases, in which the good survives the selling but is arguably degraded, or corrupted, or diminished as a result’.35 He points to two dangers embodied in the pure market logic with reference to social and human relations: inequality and corruption. Both highlight the dark side of gift-giving that are mostly overlooked by those being concerned only with the positive or societally constructive, stabilizing impacts of gift-giving, foreign donations included. Common in archaic gifts and modern public gifts is the potential sense of corruption on the one hand and the role gifts may play in the power relations existing between the parties involved on the other. Gifts not only imply good

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relations, cooperation and solidarity, but they reveal more about the complex nature of human relations by substituting war (see later).

Summary Analysing the practice and forms of gift-giving between individuals, Sandel argued that money, monetized or in-kind gifts can’t buy friendship, at most are tokens and expressions of friendship. Converting gestures or gifts into commodities does not destroy them altogether, goes on Sandel’s argument, but it apparently diminishes their value. Neither money nor gifts, whether they are monetized or in-kind, can buy friends, since true friendship and related social practices that sustain friendship are constituted by shared norms, attitudes and virtues. Commodifying these practices is possible, but it displaces essential norms – sympathy, solidarity, generosity, thoughtfulness – by replacing them with market values. To sum up the argument: if money can buy friendship, it can do it only in a degraded form.36 Sandel’s conclusion recalls questions, raised by continental philosophers, on the essence of exchange,37 giving and their impact on sociality in our modern world. While Sandel drew attention to the corrupting impact of giving money or gifts in individual relationships, leaning on anthropological theories on gift exchange, Alan D. Schrift and Marcel He´naff argued that giving is of a positive nature: relationships established by the gift guarantee the core of any social bond between people.38 Scholars with diverse interests and disciplinary background – from Hobbes to Hume, Rousseau to Adam Smith, from Axelrod to Fiske – tried to explain what makes up the social bond between people in the past few hundred years.39 The vital role of cooperation, altruism and solidarity – ‘the glue that keeps people together’,40 ‘a firm and lasting commitment to the best for all’41 – has been explored from various disciplinary perspectives mostly in the political context of the modern welfare state.42 Solidarity is very close to the evolutionary term ‘mutual aid’,43 but it has further dimensions. It can be economic, social, cultural, political on the one hand, local, national or global on the other.44 It can be measured both at the individual (interpersonal) and group level.45 Solidarity within the welfare state can be expressed, for example, by political gestures or economic benefits offered to different groups of people.46 Discussing solidarity, Komter identified four sets of motives in

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gift relations, that is, affection (belonging to the same group) (the desire to prove) equality (of members), power (to do something) and instrumentality (or self-interest).47 The common understanding ‘to give is to recognize in order to be recognized,’48 is the simplest way of preventing violence, conflict or wars. Global challenges, poverty humanitarian crises, transnational migration and integration offer countless opportunities to show solidarity within the welfare state and beyond its borders. Contemporary gifts, such as foreign aid, aspire to contribute to international and global solidarity,49 not without controversies though.

CHAPTER 2 THE CONTEMPORARY GIFT

Donating private and public money for charity or development purposes is built on the widely shared conviction that giving – without expecting any return in the financial sense – can only do good. But what do we mean by gifts, how and why do we expect them to make a difference? Is it really an incentive promoting positive change? Is it not about managing order and preventing the global poor from revolting (following Simmel)1 or gaining recognition, societal prestige, power and status (Bataille, Derrida)2 by means of symbolic domination (Bourdieu)?3 Contrary to the officially stated lofty objectives, donors usually give aid for ‘themselves’, not for ‘others’ to maintain military alliances, to support business interests or to justify moral and humanitarian beliefs.4 Pure altruism may work on an ad hoc basis, but donor states have vested interests when providing foreign aid as they are liable to their own populations. In similar vein, civil society organizations are not necessarily equal to enthusiastic volunteers, donators, activists or experts representing them. State and non-state actors equally pursue their own objectives on the donors’ side, even if these objectives may communicate well with recipient objectives. Aid chanelled to the Middle East that offers countless opportunities to explore these interests. Authors exploring activities financed by foreign aid in the Middle East frequently use the term ‘buying’ alliances and stability.5 As discussed in the literature, Western donors tend to match the ideas they promote with global or universal values so that they avoid being labelled as neocolonizers (or neoliberals). Yet, their political ambitions to transform the ‘aided’ world and shape the Middle East are usually

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portayed as such. Neither the literature, nor the local public opinion (trained and educated by authoritarian elites in most cases) questions that donors seek to secure their own world view and interests by providing aid for political advocacy, military trainings or charity purposes.6

Foreign aid in international relations The gift is alliance, solidarity, communion – in brief, peace. (Marshal Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, p. 169) If the history of gift can be read as the history of solidarity,7 the most obvious form of expressing solidarity8 within the international community is probably foreign aid9 – with a strong emphasis on development or humanitarian motives. While solidarity with foreignborn others is mostly expressed in the form of providing assistance to the developing states and hosting migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers from foreign countries, many beneficiaries tend to doubt the nobility of aid objectives and actions for historical reasons. The origins of the contemporary foreign aid regime trace back to the post Second World War reconstruction in Western Europe (Marshall Plan, 1947). Long before the emerging of fancy concepts such as global governance, responsibility to protect, millennium or sustainable development goals, the Marshall Plan and the subsequent development of the European integration made politicians and scholars believe that external economic assistance shall play a significant role in reconstruction after wars, just as it can contribute to economic growth, development and peaceful coexistence in the longer run. While the European Recovery Programme has served as a sort of model for justifying foreign aid policies, the main target of external funds has been the ‘individual’ developing country producing global problems and threatening the (global) common good on Western peripheries since the 1950s. Contemporary aid activity and research concerns problems in former colonies, conflict-related areas and developing countries that are eligible for official development assistance (ODA, emergency and humanitarian assistance included). From post-colonial perspectives foreign aid can be

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portrayed an instrument – a poisonous gift – to control or dominate the rest of the world by the developed countries or elites being interested in doing development.10 Aid creates and maintains social bonds, but not without hierarchies and definitely not exclusively for the sake of the givee. The rationale behind applying the gift exchange framework to relations established or maintained by contemporary foreign aid cannot be understood without referring to the origins of today’s foreign aid: ‘gifts exchanged between sovereigns have a long tradition . . . gifts have more often than not been used to buy and maintain friendship, forge alliances.’11 The first gifts exchanged between states were by no means ‘foreign aid,’ at least not in the contemporary sense of the term (official transfers between the donor state and the eligible recipients). They were given on the quiet and aimed at achieving certain politically or diplomatically important goals by means of expressing (personal) respect and honour towards distinguished individuals. Sometimes it was about buying personal commitments of a foreign politician so that he could achieve something within his own government on behalf of the foreign government (at least for the sake of the giver).12 In such relations ‘the gift, whether of substantial or symbolic nature, has had its primary function to secure or increase the power position of the donor or to fend off real or imagined threats.’13 This motive – counterbalancing threats by foreign aid – is typical of the contemporary Middle Eastern aid targeting actors either in the governmental or civil society sector. Scholars, activists and aid officers have debated since the beginnings whether aid should serve diplomatic purposes advancing the interests of the donor country or it should serve purposes of better human conditions in the recipient countries.14 Along these lines contemporary scholars of IR and development studies have become divided over the question whether it is simply a foreign policy instrument of the donor country or it has a more altruistic (solidarity) function in international and global terms.15 The literature on aid and its effectiveness within the field of development economics is equally rich in big debates on the reasons of underdevelopment, proper economic growth, lack of good governance and the prevalence of poverty, which cannot be presented in depth here.16 Accordingly, there have been creative solutions, proposed by Western governments and international financial institutions to be implemented in forms of policies, reforms, programmes and projects from the macro to

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micro levels to improve the human and economic conditions in the recipient state – with or without success.17 The history of foreign aid is long. As this latter is well-documented in the literature,18 this chapter will focus on the ‘bonding’ role foreign aid plays in international relations. While aid is provided for a diverse set of purposes, chief among them is economic development, Tomohisa Hattori was probably right in arguing what foreign aid is [in general, social-societal sense] is more important than what it does [in particular, economic terms].19 And if aid recipient countries have transformed themselves into ‘a lobbying group for ever greater amounts of assistance’ for decades, ‘the rich countries are primarily to blame since, . . ., the demand for foreign aid was created by the very act of giving it, with the original sin dating back to US president Harry Truman’s misguided Point Four Program.’20 As donor objectives are seem to be more decisive than recipient interests – for it is very difficult to identify ‘single’ recipient interests due to the diversity of actors and associated interests in recipient countries – the following paragraphs will briefly summarize the roles attributed to foreign aid by main IR schools.21

Foreign aid in IR theories The realist school in IR argues that states operate in a Hobbesian anarchic environment, which requires them to maximize their profits and survival in a security sense. In this view aid is simply an instrument of political power22 and its impact on the recipient country or society is either instrumental or incidental inasmuch as any development in remote countries increases the security of the donor nation. Shaped by the realities of the Cold War, realist arguments interpreted aid as a means to make alliances within the bipolar world. Economic development, served by foreign aid, was seen as a tool preventing a country from getting too close to Moscow in political terms. In similar vein, diverse arguments offered within the broad framework of structuralism, world system, Marxism and dependency theories claim that foreign aid is nothing more than imperialism, being about dominating and controlling the developing countries. It serves their exploitation by actors in the developed world and, as such, it constrains their real development. It is simply a mechanism connecting the former colonies (current aid recipients) to the developed world, which

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has been euphemized in the context of decolonization.23 As such, foreign aid cannot serve the true interests, economic and political sovereignty of the recipients. The cooperation, however, is ensured by the active cooperation of the elites in the recipient countries that are interested in cultivating good relations with the donors for various interests. Situated on the opposite end, liberal/institutionalist scholars are firmly convinced that foreign aid fosters cooperation within the international community as long as states are interested in solving global problems – problems of common concern for every actor, not only for donors (or recipients, for that matter). Unlike realist scholars, liberal institutionalism argues that the more aid is channelled through international organizations and with the mediation of global governance mechanisms, the more international public goods (such as global security, sustainable development, environmental diversity) will be enjoyed worldwide. Aid is a means that can and should be carefully planned and designed in order to achieve social, economic and political development in recipient countries.24 Constructivism is somehow complementary to the institutionalist thinking interpreting foreign aid as an international norm ‘that has evolved in relations between states’ saying that ‘rich states should provide assistance to poor countries to help the latter better the quality of lives of their peoples.’25 This normative stance, so popular among the Nordic donors, has its roots in Lumsdaine’s Moral Vision and International Politics in which the author argues that ‘support for aid . . . arose mainly from ethical and humane concern and, secondarily, from the belief that long-term peace and prosperity was possible only in a generous and just international order where all could prosper.’26 Accepting the explanatory factor of altruism/generosity, questions may arise. The first concerns the relations between economic development and (democratic) peace, which is taken for granted by Lumsdaine and his followers, but not necessarily proved by history. The success of the Marshall Plan in Europe and its impact in the European integration by no means guarantees that countries and societies with entirely different histories and environments can reproduce the same outcome. It is not clear how external aid can be provided justly and efficiently, by ‘not’ troubling the otherwise delicate power relations between various actors that usually have conflicting interests in the recipient states. There is a strong ‘innocence’ motive attributed to ‘foreign aid’ by Western donors,

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which reveals more about the ‘wishful’ thinking of the rich,27 than about the wisdom needed to solve complicated political problems in less lucky parts of the world. While global solidarity actions and contemporary humanitarianism attempt to bring about change in cases of underdevelopment, injustice, oppression, or tyranny,28 development assistance aims to mitigate economic differences by helping ‘others’ ‘adjust to’ the Western standards. However, the mostly Western-led endeavour of ‘closing the gaps’ is far from being without controversies – even if local elites take part in it. Aid effectiveness principles29 target local ownership and participation, but how these concepts can be interpreted in nonWestern, less democratic environments is left unanswered. Regardless to the adjective preceding the term aid/assistance (military, humanitarian, development, see later), the role played by foreign aid within the international order has been criticized extensively by many.30 There is a broad set of critical academic arguments that can be described as post-colonialist or post-development (or anti-globalist, or critical naturalist, or else). These criticisms place little emphasis on the official, rhetorical or stated objectives and effectiveness of foreign aid. They are, however, concerned with the harmful side effects and destructive consequences seen mostly from the perspective of locals. As prompted by these views, state and non-state actors with vested interests in the aid industry use ‘aid’ as a sort of poisonous gift both in the donor and recipient countries. The true aim is either self-serving or it is about to control the social and political developments in the developing world, while the officially formulated objectives, such as, ‘global development’, ‘international security’ or ‘universal humanitarianism’ are only fig leaves.31 The participation of civil society organizations (NGOs for the sake of simplicity, see later) is instrumental for enchancing (normative) legitimacy (see later, in Chapter 3). Cooperation is designed and implemented under the flag of ‘generosity and gratitude’ in case of development aid32 and as a kind of ‘organized compassion’ in case of humanitarian assistance.33 Indeed, critical discourses also go ‘beyond and below’ the macro (state, IR) level arguing that many non-governmental organizations being responsible for aid implementation adapted their social action strategies and moral convictions to the policies of the official donors’ neoliberal ‘consensus’.34 The moral convictions and ethical justifications whether they are represented by state or non-state donor actors may correspond to liberal

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ideals of rights, humanitarianism, and development. Yet, the practice these idea(l)s justify works towards the opposite end in many cases. They contribute neither to the mitigation/deconstruction of the existing material hierarchy, nor offer a remedy to a diseased condition.35 At the core of post-development arguments lies the ‘disbelief’ in the problem-solving ambitions of economic science in general, in the exclusive power of economic incentives in achieving ‘peace’ in particular. Their arguments are common in ‘not believing in’ the aid endeavour, not being interested in reforming the system and criticizing aid practices on various platforms and from different perspectives. They share the firm conviction that social and human interactions among individuals, groups, nations or states can hardly be reduced to the methodological individualism (to decisions based on rational choice) advocated by mainstream economic sciences. Foreign aid, as argued, can be effective in terms of achieving the officially stated objectives neither at micro, nor at macro level, neither in political, nor in economic terms, if its rationale lays somewhere else. This rationale, as the gift theory framework justifies (see later), is about maintaining the existing ‘international’ relations between actors36 for the sake of elites living in the donor and recipient states by allowing the conservation of order, hierarchy and inequality and by simultaneously promising a transformation in material and ethical sense too.37

Critique of foreign aid beyond the discipline of IR As shown above, significant attention has been paid to the role played by foreign aid in political science, international relations (IR) and economic science, but the impact it has in the developing world goes far beyond these disciplinary borders. There are plenty of empirical studies in the field of anthropology and sociology drawing attention to the ambiguities built in the practice/implementation of foreign aid. To explore and understand the impact of aid on local social relationships, business opportunities and political processes, a growing body of critical literature focused on the anthropology of development.38 While there were attempts to explore the personal dimension and its relation to professional activities from the perspective of aid workers,39 other projects focused on how recipients and beneficiaries thought about donors and foreign aid.40 In addition, investigating perceptions from the recipient perspective concerned, among others, the Rwandan experiences

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with ‘stealing their pain’ by Canadian ‘audience’ after the genocide;41 the ambiguous effects of an aid project aiming to reduce child labour in the name of corporate social responsibility in Pakistan;42 or experiences of the local civil society on the realities of ‘partnership’ in Uganda.43 With reference to the Middle Eastern context not only the recipient perceptions on and experiences with foreign aid were investigated in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,44 but even feminist perspectives by exploring the painful fund-raising experiences of Bedouin women living in Israel.45 Much of the literature emphasizes the triumph of donor priorities over recipient interests by highlighting controversial effects of aid on recipient organizations and beneficiaries. Their common point is that what is portrayed as ‘generosity’, ‘altruism’, ‘humanitarian sensitivity’ or ‘solidarity’ in the West, that is at most only about reinforcing Western positions and identities,46 while simultaneously humiliating recipients, ignoring local identities, stealing their pain, portraying beneficiaries as ‘pure victims’ with ‘bare life’, co-opting them to betray their fellows or cooperating with enemies in political conflicts, even making them sell images and stories of sufferings.47 The problem is, however, that many actors on the recipient side do not even have anything else to exchange on the global market, but (stories and images) misfortune, threats of instability, underdevelopment, poverty or conflicts and the eternal promise of ‘doing the homework’ well by implementing reforms by using external aid properly. None is an easily quantifiable commodity, but, following Chris Gregory, all may qualify as ‘inalienable objects’ exchanged for foreign aid (see later). One of the strongest critique concerns the fact that foreign aid, by definition, cannot but ignore the local context, knowledge (me´tis following James C. Scott’s discussion) and identities. If overall goals, aims and principles are formulated by foreign or global actors, the local me´tis – representing practical skills and acquired intelligence in responding to a constantly changing natural and human environment48 – becomes marginalized. Recent trends, like recipient governments and local beneficiaries being increasingly excepted to take the leading role (due to aid effectiveness principles, such as partnership, participation and ownership) hardly make any difference. Recipients – at state and civil society level – are capable to learn and reproduce donor expectations. As a Palestinian NGO leader put it, one can ‘learn how to address the donors with the language that most suits their sensitivities;

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politically, ideologically and socially. You know the vocabulary to use with [a given] donor.’49 The fact that aid objectives or indicators measuring impact are defined locally (by Palestinians, as this example illustrates) does not mean that there is true ownership on the recipient side and donors do not impose their agendas on the recipient. Participation does not necessarily go beyond accepting the rules of the game set by donors. Acknowledging that the effect of aid on political institutions may vary across different context50 donors take away ‘things’ that would voluntarily not have been given away by the recipient either by coopting local elites, aid beneficiaries or by setting various conditions.51 Indeed, the fact that local elites in recipient countries take part in this process actively, only complicates the picture as their co-optation, or cooperation, troubles the relations between the elites and the masses in their recipient states regardless to the official objectives, size and magnitude of aid.52 The donor-recipient ‘cooperation’ may weaken socio-political cohesion by making recipient governments less accountable to its people, for ‘the [official] givers and receivers of aid, the governments in both countries, are allied against their own peoples.’53 Many civil society actors have also face the same criticism – serving foreign interests – as they are part and product of the very same political-social reality they aspire to change. The Middle East is not an exception in this regard.54 Focusing on the very essence and function of aid, the hegemonic being of development (and humanitarian) cooperation is widely acknowledged.55 Construing IR and foreign aid relations as a sort of social exchange is more about establishing and regulating than changing relationships – ‘maintaining a conservative space in which transformation is always yet to come’56 – the emphasis is placed on managing relations (peace or conflict) rather than transforming the nature of relationships.57 Theoretical concerns resonate well with empirical data. As a civil society activist in Palestine self-reflexively said:58 The ethical problem for me is that if you are within the system and you criticize it then how long can you continue criticize it and be impartial in your critique. But there is no real alternative to being in it. The system is totally hegemonic. You can’t really work

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without supporting the Israeli economy, while in Palestine for example. This is uncomfortable for everyone involved . . . Someone suggested to me that we should get USAID out of Palestine. I suggested getting Palestinians to stop taking their money. That would make them leave. The system has created this environment that makes us dependent on donors and makes the NGOs stronger than the government. The mess is institutionalized that I don’t think anyone can fix it. This perception corresponds to further arguments known from critical literature. Foreign aid, as put forth by Hattori and Furia, symbolizes domination in a way which is acceptable in our (post-)modern age. It is an elegant and innocent means attempting to buy the promise of transformation/development, economic growth, poverty reduction or peace without asking disturbing and inconvenient questions about identities, realities, experiences or truths on the recipient side. Furia’s emphasis on the interchangeability of concepts – disorder: war (colonization, exploitation, domination) vs. order: peace-related means, such as commerce (exchange, trade) and gift (donation, grant) – reveals that it is not ‘good intentions’ (serving recipient interests) that needs to be sought behind contemporary gifts. Post-development arguments and other critical theories may help a lot in understanding why and how gift theories are better suited to explain the role and function of foreign aid than IR theories. While according to the realist scholar, Hans Morgenthau, foreign aid is one of the ‘real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy’,59 if aid is interpreted within the analytical framework offered by gift theories, this practice is far from being a novelty. While the vast majority of scholars in the field of development studies and economics argue that ‘foreign aid did not exist’ before the Second World War, it is probably true only in conceptual or statistical sense (ODA activities were not registered, indeed). However, gifts, courtesies, favours and else have been exchanged between communities for ages, just as military aid was provided by the European states in exchange for future benefits even before the twentieth century.60 Based on the literature, there is no reason to assume that foreign aid cannot fit the old ways of settling disputes, managing order and rivalries or substituting wars for that matter.

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Applying the gift exchange framework to foreign aid relations The gift is what should be done [given], what should be received, and yet, what is dangerous to take. (Mauss, The Gift, p. 76) The gift – both as a concept and as an everyday practice – is crucial for understanding social relations and human life as it constitutes the very foundation of human relations and togetherness.61 Gifts are always received with a ‘burden attached,’62 which concerns the social bond between the giver/donor and the receiver. The (burden of the) ties and bonds involve the actors, the object itself, the norms of gift-giving, the principle of reciprocity, the existence of return gifts and the ‘spiritual essence.’ As mentioned earlier, Marcel Mauss studied forms of exchange and contract arguing that the phenomenon of exchange has always existed.63 It was the constant and uninterrupted circulation of gifts and return-gifts which provided equality and social cohesion between the donor (the future recipient or creditor) and the recipient communities (the future donor) in archaic (pre-modern) societies. As long as the receiver of the archaic gift was willing and able to reciprocate, he proved his equality. For this, the practice of giving gifts has never been an innocent act. The gift is what should not only be given, received, and returned, but ‘what is dangerous to take’ too.64 Mauss saw it as a ‘total social fact’ influencing totality of human interactions and social relations. Although widely assumed, it was not pure altruism or pre-modern social solidarity which explained benevolent giving, but archaic gifts were motivated by the rules of the game (contemporary social norms) between the communities exchanging gifts. The alternative would (have) be(en) violence, coercion or war as the old phrase ‘killing with kindness’ wisely prompts. Although the idea of the gift and the norm of reciprocity have been explored via various disciplinary lenses for decades, it has been widely discussed with reference to the concept and practice of foreign aid only since the 1990s. It is the conceptual complexity of the anthropological gift which enables us to analyse contemporary foreign aid relations within the analytical framework offered by gift exchange. A large amount of goods and services circulate through the gift principle in our (post-)modern era, foreign aid and related counter-services included.

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As such it should be seen as a ‘total international fact’ symbolizing the essence of relations within the international community (beyond trade and the exchange of goods and services). The understanding ‘foreign aid as gift’ seduced a broad range of scholars in various fields ranging from anthropology via political science to communication studies and inspired them to discuss foreign (aid) policies and global solidarity movements from critical perspectives.65 Their common point is the consensus that the rationale of foreign aid lies not in the stated objectives, but in the domain of social and political relationships.66 By deriving their arguments from Mauss’ gift theory on gift-giving practices and applying it as an analytical tool, most of the authors offer a critique of the foreign aid (system) emphasizing the role foreign aid plays in preserving the status quo (power relations and inequalities included) and preventing real changes both in economic and political terms in the developing world. This view goes beyond the narrow interpretations offered by political science and IR on the one hand (‘aid is an instrument of foreign policies’) and on the other by economic science (‘aid is a tool contributing to economic growth or poverty reduction’ and as such success is only a matter of effectiveness and reforms). Gifts, however, have that much to do neither with development, nor charity, rather they are pervaded with power, aggression and ambivalence conveying the message of (or covering) subtle coercion.67 Arguing that foreign aid (grant aid) is rarely reciprocated in a material sense as givers always remain givers and recipients remain recipients,68 Hattori, following Sahlins, Polanyi and Parry, made distinction between redistribution (allocation of resources through a central authority), exchange (a voluntary and simultaneous exchange of goods and services) and giving (a voluntary transfer that involves neither certainty of return, nor political entitlement).69 In this book foreign aid is interpreted as a unique, albeit imperfect form of international gift exchange between both state and non-state actors,70 covering military, development and humanitarian assistance (ODA), loans and grants too. The purest form of the contemporary international gift is the financially unreciprocated grant. Even if concessional ODA loans and military loans are provided on a contractual basis with obligations to repay, these practices also resemble ‘giving’ as long as their purpose is not the allocation of resources, but the maintenance of social and peaceful political relations, partnerships and alliances on the one hand

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and securing regional stability or the avoiding of inter- and intrastate wars on the other. Even if (as loans) they involve ‘contractual obligations to repay’, much depends on the recipients’ judgement and preferences regarding the ‘when’ and ‘how’. Recent principles of international development cooperation – in particularly, the principle of ownership, the necessary involvement of the recipients in decision making and implementation – illustrate it well. As reciprocity is not understood and will not be explored in financial terms (concessional) loans chanelled to the concerned countries will enjoy much less attention than the non-material, non-financial reciprocity. Hence, the main argument will focus on conceptualizing the return gift in alternative ways. Gifts, even if financially unreciprocated, can be returned by other, less quantifiable favours, gestures and services in order to maintain the relationship – the relationship which is more important than the (exchanged) object (the gift) itself. While Hattori claimed that ‘if the gift is returned, the relationship is rejected’,71 it would probably be more precise to say that if the gift is returned, even if not financially, only by acknowledgement, favours or alternative services (such as the promise of stability, the threat of instability), the economic, moral, or any superiority of the donor is rejected. The constant circulation of the gift, for example, aid for favours, favours for aid must keep the relationship alive. Due to the asymmetries existing between the (developed) donor and (developing) recipient states in an economic, political and military sense, it is fair to say that foreign aid is, indeed, a source of symbolic domination seeking to achieve influence in the recipient country.72 The same applies to the return ‘gift’ by means of which aid recipients seek to influence the public opinion and governments in the donor countries – at least symbolically.

Societies compared . . . It is not individuals but collectivities that impose obligations of exchange and contract upon each other. The contracting parties are legal entities: clans, tribes, and families who confront and oppose one another either in groups who meet face to face in one spot, or through their chiefs, or in both these ways at once . . . (Mauss, The Gift, p. 6)

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The complex nature of human and social interactions has motivated scientists to examine the causes of conflict and cooperation and the role played by gifts in preserving order.73 Discussing kinship help in pre-colonial Africa Steven Feierman drew attention to features similar to those of Maussan gift, saying that it is ‘a peculiar combination of caring and dominance, of generosity and property, of tangled rights in things and people, all in a time and place where the strong would not let the weak go under, except sometimes.’74 This ‘except’ implies that even kinship solidarity tends to fade in cases of imminent danger.75 The interest of the individual (of a single actor) is not necessarily identical to that of a larger group. Discussing the meaning and role of charity in the Middle Ages, Adam Smith also drew attention to the importance of individual selfinterest arguing that giving to the poor is not about altruistic giving, but self-promoting exchange. By providing economic assistance to their tenants, the feudal lord and clergy extended their influence – the only way to return the gift was to offer loyalty, protective and military services and submission – in order to secure social order and survival of the community.76 Something very similar applies to the objectives of the Western aid policies vis-a`-vis the concerned Middle Eastern countries. The decision to apply the gift theories to contemporary foreign aid relations in the Middle East can be justified, among others, by some similarities between archaic societies and the anarchic international system.77 Gift exchange theories are built on the assumption that the parties involved in exchange are groups with distinct characteristics, whereby the practice of giving and sharing serves the higher good of the society. The international community (of states) can be considered similar to a(archaic, pre-modern) society as international politics is seen as ‘a realm of human experience’.78 Further similarities include the lack of a single sovereign power, the importance of alliances and contracts in maintaining order and the instrumental role of foreign aid (gift). Persons and groups confront each other ‘not merely as distinct interests but with the possible inclination and certain right to physically prosecute these interests’ in archaic societies. IR actors interact alongside material interests and capabilities, but they are simultaneously guided by ideas and norms (shaped by fear or unrestricted violence, external threats), which result in setting common rules even if not universally, but at least concerning a particular set of actors (friends, partners, allies).

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Force is decentralized in both systems and ‘legitimately held in severalty.’ In the contemporary anarchic society, it is the state that has monopoly over force, but international cooperation also exists (NATO, various UN peace-building forces). Moreover, there are common rules and institutions for the conduct of interstate relations (UN and related bodies, treaties, organizations). The role of archaic gifts and their contemporary equivalents (foreign aid) exchanged are very similar: they manage order and secure peace between different worlds.79 Beyond individual relations within the private realm, friendship in the contemporary international context can be interpreted, among others, as humanity or solidarity even between strangers (international humanitarian law), political integration or military alliance between states (international relations (IR), political science), or partnership between the donor and the recipient country (international development cooperation). Foreign aid as a voluntary transfer of public resources and/ or private donations, as well as the return gift, plays an important role in maintaining friendship among nations, people, organizations and individuals of different nationalities. At the level of rhetorics, it is the recipient state which is supposed to benefit the most from internationonal friendships. However, if the gift is equivalent to the creation of the community, it also has the capacity to destroy it.80 To avoid it, the contemporary recipient (state or nonstate actor) has to participate by choosing between ‘enjoying formal sovereignty in the form of freedom from outside intervention (to be recognized as equal in the international system) or enjoying development assistance (to be recognized as unequal and therefore entitled to aid).’81 This ambivalent nature of aid relationship can be resolved, or covered, by emphasizing common values (international or global solidarity, universal human rights, economic prosperity) so that the recipient could feel that they all are members of the same international society working for the same public good. It implies that the primary purpose of international gift exchange is the initiation or maintenance of social relations – not the allocation of resources with development purposes. The framework of gift exchange can be used to understand international relations as giving/aiding is a preferred form, or norm, of ‘social behaviour’. Societies in general and the international community in particular are similar to the extent to which ‘it is not individuals but

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collectivities that impose obligations of exchange and contract upon each other.’82 If the archaic society lacks ‘public and sovereign power’, the modern international system is anarchic:83 the sovereign central power is missing, but a community of actors exists, not to mention the concept of the international community.84 This latter involves international organizations and non-governmental organizations too. Indeed, perhaps the most significant difference between archaic (pre-modern) and contemporary international societies, which requires some extra attention, is the multiplicity of actors in international relations and the ‘objects’ they exchange as ‘gifts’.

Main features of the international gift: Object and relationship in contemporary IR . . . what is noteworthy about these tribes is the principle of rivalry and hostility that prevails in all these practices . . . It [giving] is a struggle between nobles to establish a hierarchy amongst themselves from which their clan will benefit at a later date. (Mauss, The Gift, p. 8)

On the diversity of actors in aid implementation The primary source and recipient of contemporary foreign gifts is the state. It is the donor state, the government of which makes decisions on aid allocations and budgets,85 even if part of this aid is channelled or ‘redistributed’ multilaterally. Contemporary gifts operate in a very complex environment and involve myriads of actors from public opinion and official actors in the donor countries, through international organizations and NGOs to local recipients, governments and grassroots organizations. Aid, indeed, would be simply a budgetary item of financial concern, if only governments disposed it. Due to the participation of the civil society organizations, foreign aid from governmental sources are usually complemented by private donations, which makes it very difficult to distinguish impacts of official (development, humanitarian) assistance from those of private (development, humanitarian) charity. It explains, at least partially, why this book prefers using the term foreign aid with a rather general meaning.

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From the perspectives of the public (private individuals), modern giftgiving, post-modern humanitarianism is one of the most influential, simultaneously peaceful and joyful ways of helping others. 86 Diverse public sentiments upon seeing the suffering of others87 but at least watching the mediating media representations play an important role in official donor and private charity (and development NGO) decisions concerning aid allocations.88 The public is ready to take certain material ‘sacrifices’, expecting the state to spend part of the taxpayers’ money in remote countries, with the intention to alleviate others’ suffering. While public opinion is consulted on the necessity of aid policies in donor counties, it is implementation that requires the participation of state and non-state actors on both sides in the case of development and humanitarian projects. A broad range of actors – states and governmental agencies, non-state actors, civil society, ordinary people, business organizations and the academic sector – take part in, shape and benefit from development (and humanitarian) cooperation. With the active participation of the media,89 civil society actors (local and international non-governmental organizations, grassroots organizations) play a prominent role in this institutionalized endeavour.90 Research exploring the motives, intentions, interests and tendencies of civil participation shows that while ordinary people usually act upon naive beliefs or well-intentioned conviction,91 organizational decisions and behaviour are usually based on rational calculation and interests.92 The fact that implementing actors (organizations) have to survive by complying with two sets of domestic laws (one on the donor side, another on the recipient side), regulations and informal institutions/ norms, a sort of metamorphosis of the altruistic gift can be tracked. As noted by Henkel and Stirrat:93 The pure, or free, gift of the disinterested, anonymous donor in, for example, Europe or America is progressively transformed into an interested, accountable, and non-free transaction. The first step is indeed the epitome of the free gift, but as soon as it reaches the international development NGO, its character changes. At this point, it becomes entrapped in a system of rules and regulations that are antithetical to the spirit of the free gift. Rules that govern the use of donations turn these gifts into accountable items.

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But does the gift cease to be a gift by becoming part of the system of rules and regulations? Does it mean that institutionalization deprives the gift from its very essence? Not necessarily, but it obviously complicates the picture by turning the altruistic donation into interested gifts. But Mauss’ gift was by no means altruistic, free or disinterested. Indeed, civil society94 organizations (grassroots organizations, local and international non-governmental organizations, hereinafter NGOs for the sake of simplicity) are mostly seen as trustful channels for promoting donors’ agendas on solidarity and peaceful coexistence, political reforms and democratization,95 solving social problems and providing basic services to the population. The extent to which they comply with this ‘mediator’ role depends on their self-definition and classification.96 Yet, their aspirations and activities are contingent on the capacities and willingness of the recipient state (central government, official implementing agencies) to address contemporary problems.97 State and civil society, however, are not distinct spheres. They are strongly connected within and beyond the state borders.98 Non-governmental organizations play important, many times even ambiguous roles in implementing official policies by attempting to simultaneously satisfy public concerns and maintain the appearance of domestic sovereign competence depending on the level and quality of collaboration with official actors.99 They may even contribute to the emergence of a ‘chimera state’ that is composed of two parallel institutional sectors offering public good. At many places in the developing world donor-financed NGOs and the so-called sovereign state operate independently of each other offering alternative basic goods or welfare services to the population.100 To implement their projects international NGOs need a considerable amount of time by familiarizing themselves with the ‘system of rules and regulations’, not to mention the norms, values and languages, defined either by the donor, the recipient, or both. Furthermore, local people working at local CSOs, even at official implementing actors on the recipient side often find themselves ‘squeezed’ between their own history, culture and society on the one hand and the externally defined donor priorities and values on the other.101 They have to navigate in complex realities by balancing between the expectations of their (foreign) donors, those of their own (national) governments, the fellow NGOs and the target population. Since each of these sets of actors

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employ people, the outcome of this navigation can be, at least partially, explained by rational choices and as such they can be influenced by economic incentives.102 However, the individuals involved have ‘less rational’ emotions (fear, pity, compassion, solidarity with their own fellows, or on the contrary, solidarity with their donors, sense of justice, etc.), beliefs and ‘cultural models’ too.103 These have profound implications in terms of (project) aid implementation and related perceptions on the rationale and impacts of external grants and donors (seen as international powers) behind them. Critical literature scrutinizes the accountability of civil society actors in terms of their global activities.104 Although the work of larger NGOs is constantly evaluated to provide feedback to policy planners, ‘pessimism prevails with regard to the ability of evaluation to improve transparency and accountability towards taxpayers’, for ‘evaluation itself is subject to political manipulation’.105 Indeed, the old micro-macro paradox106 suggests that while positive impacts are reported at micro (project) level by implementing organizations, macro-level effectiveness (contribution to economic growth, fiscal discipline, poverty reduction, peace-building or democratic reforms, etc.) can hardly be proved on empirical grounds.107 In addition, contrary to the results evaluated and success reported at micro level, most people working at official and non-governmental implementing partners report frustration, disappointment and discontent upon experiencing the differences between the feasibility of ‘development plans’ and ‘facts on the ground’ determining the success of these plans.108 To talk about his frustration, however, equals to biting the helping (Western) hand in many cases. As far as the NGOs’ local reputation is concerned, neither their cooperation with Western and international counterparts, nor the closeness or commonality of their goals and norms are free from tensions. Indeed, as emphasized by Carapico, ‘Western is often and adjectival descriptor of imperialism signifying alien, domineering, insidious and haughty’ in the Middle East,109 which makes it quite difficult, if not impossible for most local NGOs to please their ‘donors’, the ‘public’ and the ‘recipient regime’ simultaneously. The reason is already mentioned above: the civil society nowhere is independent of the state. Most actors operating in non-democratic countries, the Middle East included, are not only expected to cooperate with ‘authoritarian authorities’, but they are even supposed to accept them as legitimate powers. If it operates in

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an authoritarian regime, it has to accept some rules of the game, even if it aspires to change them. The alternative is persecution, imprisonment or torture that are frequently applied against politically conscious civil society organizations even in pro-Western Arab countries and even before the Arab Spring (see Chapters 4 and 5).110

The relationship and the objects: Contemporary gifts and return gifts The idea of gift is usually known as ‘grant’, ‘donation’, ‘aid’, ‘assistance’ or ‘support’ in the context of foreign aid, but before elaborating on what we mean by contemporary international gifts, the main forms/types of foreign aid need to be reviewed briefly. If foreign aid is seen as a policy tool and categorized by purpose, it may serve military, economic or moral-humanitarian purposes. While military assistance is an intergovernmental, basically bilateral business negotiated behind the scenes, official development and humanitarian assistance (ODA) is more multinational especially in terms of the guiding principles and implementation practices. All of them may well qualify as ‘gift’ in Maussean terms. Gift(-giving) is not about altruism, it aims to strengthen relations between the actors and the reciprocity obligations result in the constant circulation of gifts and return-gifts. Military aid serves the purpose of creating or maintaining military alliances on a contractual basis, by assisting the defense efforts of a recipient country or supporting its activities for controlling its territory and borders. Whether it is a grant or loan, military aid is never ‘for free’, as the recipient government is expected to be loyal to the donor. Decisions concerning its size or allocation are rarely debated publicly. Within these constraints both donor and recipient governments can use military assistance as a deliberate instrument of their national policy and military strategy to achieve national aims.111 Development and humanitarian assistance also have an inescapable political dimension. Political objectives are more overtly formulated in case of development assistance and widely discussed in the context of donor policies. Official development assistance (humanitarian/ emergency assistance included in the statistical category of ODA) may go from a government to another government, to an NGO or through an NGO, to and through an international organization, such as the UN or the World Bank.112 Unlike military assistance, it aims to tackle problems

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of economic development, poverty reduction or humanitarian crises at least at the level of state objectives. Both development and humanitarian aid is a voluntary transfer of public resources, and they both aim to better the human condition on the recipient side, at least, at the level of official objectives. The loan or grant element of development aid is pretty much context dependent. Officially any transfer to eligible countries with at least a 25 per cent grant element qualifies to be ODA. ODA disbursements are usually complemented by private donations at the level of implementation. Public and private resources, both are seen as an instrument aspiring to contribute to development and prosperity of the recipient countries and to influence societies and institutions113 are merged with the mediation of non-governmental or other civil society organizations. Humanitarian aid is perhaps the purest disinterested, free (non-Maussan) gift – at least at the level of intentions – as it is always a unilateral grant without overtly formulated reciprocity expectation. It does not mean, however, that reciprocity is entirely missing. The donor can gain a lot by the very act of giving: positive feelings, strengthened self-esteem, the appreciation of the people/society surrounding him. While these are less qualified as return gifts from the givee, acknowledgement or gratitude upon receiving the gift may be considered return gifts. Simply because without feedback, the donor will lose its motivation to repeat/continue giving. While strings and conditions can be attached to development aid to buy economic or political reforms, humanitarian aid claims to be neutral and impartial in line with international humanitarian norms, principles and laws. It must be noted, however, that neutrality and impartiality concerns only the donor intentions – there is neither theoretical reason to assume, nor any historical proof to claim that any resource (money, inkind assistance) can behave ‘neutrally’ on the recipient side, especially not in man-made conflict situations. If humanitarian assistance is the only available resource to seize, either with the intention to finance war, to feed loyal people, or to weaken the enemy, it will be seized.114 As implied, humanitarian aid may lack overtly political goals on the donor side, but it concerns power relations on the recipient side. Although private philanthropy and charity are said to be apolitical, it has also long been acknowledged that humanitarian/charity organizations are not immune to political influence, and as a result, to

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political analysis either.115 Indeed, humanitarian ‘international’ – small charities, big NGOs – is also political as long as ‘they compete for annual aid budget . . .; their policies are moulded by states; their actions can inadvertently fuel conflicts or sustain genocidal movements; they can provide a fig leaf for the inefficacy of politicians.’116. It is well-illustrated by the Palestinian case. Humanitarian donors and aid organizations are not simply accused for being complicit in the Israeli occupation, but their very presence and activities lead to serious cynicisms questing the merits of human rights on the one side and donors’ good intention on the other.117 To sum up the above written, the ultimate goal of the contemporary gift118 is to maintain peaceful relations between international actors and the (illusory?) stability of the status quo – and not necessarily to develop any economy or society. As such it is an expression of identity and boundaries with people or groups (nations, people or other, not necessarily ethnically defined sub-groups) the donor feels solidarity with or belonging to.119 Even if ‘archaic’ and ‘modern’ gifts are not identical – for archaic and (post)modern societies are different – both maintain solidarity between the giver and the receiver, discipline contest and conflict by reflecting power relations. It is particularly true as ‘the recipient [always] puts himself in a position of dependence’ vis-a`-vis the donor by accepting the gift.120 Whether the dependence is a matter of deliberate decision (with vested interests?) or produced structurally is of secondary importance. The point is that it can hardly be separated from the local contexts, borders defining groups within the public sphere, individual and social norms, and values, from perceptions on dignity, humiliation, justice, fairness or corruption for that matter. Western, or global, values and norms are transferred under the flag of cooperation and partnership by demanding the recipient’s active participation and ownership (more on the ‘spirit of the gift’, later). They are embodied in the constant desire to ‘develop development,’ to control disorder by transforming the recipients, but at least by promising constant transformation. These values are promoted in policies and programmes and supported by evaluation reports and predictive models reducing human lives to statistical data, in universal principles ignoring differences in history, culture and sociability and proposing ahistorical and non-political solutions.121 They are backed by the assumption, or expectation, that recipients will be grateful for what

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have been given to them. They may be grateful, yes after all these values are not without merits, but recipients – governments, local NGOs, individual beneficiaries – also unanimously agree that there is always a price to be paid, a price which is of non-monetary nature. The only way to escape harmful dependence and inequality, at least at the level of illusions, is to (attempt to) return the gift so that the recipient could get rid of the ‘burden attached’, which is involved in all gift relationships. Mauss’ ‘essential discovery’ was that social bonds are not built on pure self-interest embodied in prompt market/monetary exchange, a contract or barter, but ‘through obeying the obligation of rivalry through displayed generosity.’122 It explains what was observed by the German sociologist, Georg Simmel well before Mauss that ‘a gift should be accepted only if it can be reciprocated in many societies’123 otherwise the givee, or recipient, must take the consequences of accepting without return. Even if gifts are given without an overtly set ‘price’ by the giver, the recipient is either expected to return the given object, gesture or favour in a hidden way or he simply feels compelled to do so. Whether the return is equivalent in its material value, a different kind of acknowledgement, or simply a symbolic gesture expressing gratitude hardly matters. Gifts need to be acknowledged upon acceptance as a minimum, even if they cannot be returned by any other means. By pure acknowledgement and recognition gifts become somehow compensated.124 Recognition implies that the trouble/problem is acknowledged and addressed by foreign aid. But it should work the other way around too: aid donors also call for recognition. Donors even tend to ‘coerce’ recognition gently by expecting their implementing partners to communicate explicitly that they stand behind a given project. This way expectations for reciprocity (and return gifts) is not simply ‘in the air’, but explicitely called for by the donors in the context of foreign aid. The attention of aid recipients, in particularly with reference to project aid implemented by recipient governments or non-state actors, is drawn to the principles of reciprocity in form of billboards, posters and other forms of communications conveying the message that ‘people should help those who have helped them’ and ‘people should not injure those who have helped them.’125 Hence, reciprocity, being originally an unwritten norm, a sort of informal institution guiding people’s direct interaction for the sake of the entire community, its stability and social capital included, becomes a prescribed/expected obligation in contemporary aid relations.

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Beyond acknowledgement and gratitude the recipient, in principle, is free to decide about the details of this obedience: how and when the gift is returned cannot be set by the giver/donor. This flexibility may help us recognize and conceptualize return gifts in the context of financially unreciprocated foreign grants. It requires us to identify those ‘inalienable’ and abstract ‘objects’ that shall make the Western donor feel compelled to ‘do something,’ that is, to provide. In aid relations reciprocity can take a variety of forms and is often expected even when the donor explicitly denies having any such expectations.126 Some of these ‘inelienable goods’ are present in the recipient countries, others may be the results of conditions attached to aid transfers and set bye the donors (this latter will be discussed towards the end of this chapter). Common is the instrumental role that ‘return gifts’ play in convincing those that stand behind the donors and influence decisions about the volume and allocation of aid (‘gift’). The ‘those’ equally involves the public opinion and elites behind donor governments, and private philanthropes behind civil society organizations and foundations. As Georg Simmel argued long ago ‘poverty is relational, and it is assistance which creates the poor’ in order to prevent them from revolting.127 Just as poverty and underdevelopment, conflict also ‘invites’ the gift in international relations, not necessarily actively, but by the pure existence and observing of people living in poverty, underdevelopment, injustice or conflict. In the very moment when money, gifts, or in-kind assistance is offered with the promise of cure or transformation, appeals, reports, images, stories or any other documentation of misfortune may become a commodity: sort of exchanged object.128 The purpose of the return gift (grotesque, but inalienable object) is to get the donor engaged. As observed by many people living in aid recipient countries, ‘aid providers depend on the recipients’ «needs» because responding to these needs justifies the providers’ existence and work.129 In the context of international and foreign aid relations «needs» may also be interpreted as return gifts, ‘inalienable objects’ (features, qualities) to be exchanged. The permanent recipient (developing country and its society) either ‘possesses’ vulnerability, poverty, underdevelopment, human suffering, or (stemming from the previous list, to some extent) instability, chaos, violence, conflict. All these phenomena are ‘produced’ by many countries in the developing world (examples from the Middle East will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5), even if not purposefully, but on a permanent basis.

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The return gift – ensuring incoming foreign aid, that is constant circulation of gifts – may include a diverse set of ‘inalienable objects’: the threat of instability, the promise of transformation or change, favours and gestures, images and stories of sufferings, pain, misery, the constant demand for development and prosperity and partial and selective compliance with the conditions attached to foreign aid. As long as it involves the documented story of poverty, underdevelopment, instability, chaos or conflict, the ‘return gift’ will entail further aid by influencing and engaging the decisionmakers’ hearts and minds. It must be acknowledged that conceptualizing the above listed ‘inelianable objects’ or ‘services’ as return gifts may sound outrageous or humiliating from recipient perspectives. However, the alternative interpretation is not more favourable for beneficiaries at all. As discussed by Michel Serres, the relations when the receiver is ‘always taking, never giving’ can be described by the term ‘parasite.’130 In the absence of either material or symbolic reciprocity, the gift-relation is not about equality and balanced exchange, it has nothing to do with solidarity or charity either, rather the opposite. The parasite takes advantage of its relationship with the giver/donor without being able or willing to contribute to the social order by reciprocity. The only way to escape this state/status is to recognize the existence of return gifts, otherwise foreign aid cannot but produce international parasites. If the donor is perceived to put himself/herself in a morally superior position by the act of giving,131 humiliation – negative public perceptions, that is, stigma – could be avoided only by returning the gift to counterbalance the donor’s influence. Attempts to prove equality is the only way to get rid of the ghosts of subordination and shame, and also to remain eligible for further aid. By ‘selling’ instability, underdevelopment or poverty (or by promising compliance with the conditions attached to aid and discussed later) the poor/underdeveloped has some meaningful power over the donors. While power is of utmost importance in IR132 in general, and in aid relations133 in particular, the power of ‘weak’ is usually underestimated or even ignored. If power is seen as a more complex concept than simple domination/subordination, the powerful may also be afraid of the weak, whereby fear is based on ‘the existence of some real capacity which is in the possession of the weak.’134 Simmel also observed long ago that ‘even in the most oppressive and cruel cases of subordination,

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there is still a considerable measure of personal freedom’ enabling the weak to rebel in its own way. Exploring how rural (peasant) communities and slave societies respond to domination, James C. Scott argued that resistance can also be built on various forms of cultural resistance and non-compliance that are employed over time ‘through the course of persistent servitude.’135 By going a step further, Thrainn Eggertsson pointed out that ‘the costs of monitoring the activities of slaves enables them to acquire “rights they can trade”’.136 In similar vein, aid recipients in the developing world, state and non-state actors alike, cannot but take part in the contemporary gift economy by trading those ‘rights’, ‘inalienable objects’ or particular services that they own. The role of power becomes clear by the obligation involved: gifts are voluntary only in theory, ‘in reality they are given and reciprocated obligatorily.’137 As long as the receiver is willing and capable to reciprocate, even if in non-material terms, he proves his equality138 (stipulated by voting rights in the UN General Assembly). It is the constant and uninterrupted circulation of gifts and return-gifts which provides equality between the donor (the future recipient or creditor) and the recipient (the future donor). Gifts, apparently, do not only maintain social cohesion within the community of the giver and the receiver, but also create the sense of indebtedness and maintain subordination temporarily – as long as they are not returned. By integrating the Dahl’s concept of power into the exchange approach, Baldwin recognized the simultaneous appearance of donor’s influence and the recipient’s gains in foreign aid relations.139 The logic works in the opposite way too: the recipient’s influence cannot be separated from the donors’ gains. For example, the aid recipient, in need of resources, is being interested in getting more aid to realize its objectives, while the aid donor may gain more security and stability, less poverty or more democracy by providing aid – as the history of foreign aid shows. The fact that foreign aid relations involve the appearance of donor’s influence (recipient’s influence) and the recipient’ gains (donor’s gains) simultaneously140 not only undermines the image of altruism attached to development and humanitarian aid so often, but also makes it easier to interpreted foreign aid as (Maussan) gift: interested and reciprocated. If the weak recipient does not return the gift by sharing what it owns (see the discussion of return gifts above, and later in

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Chapter 5), if it does not honour the donation or if it does not exhibit gratitude towards the donors (or those financing the gift-giving), the system cannot be upheld. To sum up, power in any aid relations stems from ‘less basic dependence on social interaction’: if aid recipients depend on aid, so as donors depend on the return gifts without which many of their interests or activities in the aid-recipient countries cannot be justified. Beyond their self-interests in maintaining bonds with the recipients, rich donors return these grotesque non-material gifts to avoid humiliation. It would be shameful both in domestic and international counts, if donors did not provide aid upon seeing pain and suffering (humanitarian aid), confronting threats (military aid) or encountering poverty (development aid) in developing countries. These challenges require response from donors either because risks threatening donor countries must be mitigated and counterbalanced, or because giving ‘aid’ contributes to collective and individual self-esteem in Western societies too.141 Gratitude on the recipient side, however, may not necessarily be automatic.

The merits of gifts and reciprocity: substituting wars and managing order . . . To refuse to give, to fail to invite, just as to refuse to accept, is tantamount to declaring war; it is to reject the bond of alliance and commonality. Also, one gives because one is compelled to do so, because the recipient possesses some kind of right of property over anything that belongs to the donor. This ownership is expressed and conceived of as a spiritual bond. . . . (Mauss, The Gift, p. 17) Gifts exchanged between pre-modern communities offered a ‘solution’ for the ultimate question of survival. Marshall Sahlins went as far as to say that ‘the primitive analogue of social contract is not the State, but the gift’ as ‘the gift is the primitive way of achieving peace that in [a] civil[ian or civilized] society is secured by the State.’ 142 Just as cooperation and conflict are two sides of the same coin of co-existence, exchanging gifts and fighting wars have quite much in common: reciprocity (or retaliation). Both speaks about the relationships between people and both are attempts

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to discipline and regulate social and power relations between the actors – not only in pre-modern, but in contemporary societies too.

Gift-giving, reciprocity and indebtedness at the level of theories Theories on gift and social exchange143 say that reciprocal obligations are important because they hold societies together whereby coercion and consensus complement each other. The concept of reciprocity can hardly be separated from that of exchange, but the time dimension, ownership concerning the decisions and the equivalence of exchanged values deserve more attention so that the impossibility of altruistic and unilateral, non-returned gift could be discussed later. As formulated by Simmel in The Philosophy of Money: Exchange is the purest and most developed kind of interaction, which shapes human life when it seeks to acquire substance and content. It is often overlooked how much what appears at first a one-sided activity is actually based upon reciprocity . . . Every interaction has to be regarded as an exchange: every conversation, every affection (even if it is rejected), every game, every glance at another person . . . There are, as one might expect, a number of intermediate phenomena between pure subjectivity in the change of ownership, exemplified by robbery or gifts, and objectivity in the form of exchange where things are exchanged according to the equal value they contain. This is exemplified by the traditional reciprocity in making gifts. The idea exists among many people that a gift should be accepted only if it can be reciprocated, that is, so to speak, subsequently acquired. This leads on directly to regular exchange when, as often occurs in the Orient, the seller gives the object to the buyer as a ‘present’, but woe to him if he does not make a corresponding present in exchange.144 The norm of reciprocity, provided that it is properly practiced, plays a stabilizing role in human interactions and social relations as it provides a certain source of motivation and moral sanction.145 Acknowledgement, recognition, gratitude or return gifts (discussed in the previous section) have a complementary function too: they contribute to the maintenance of social bonds between the giver and the recipient. As emphasized by

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Gouldner, reciprocity, being ‘a pattern of mutually contingent exchange’ is a conditional norm that ‘evokes obligations toward others on the basis of their past behavior.’146 If reciprocity reflects a sort of mutual reinforcement by two parties of each other’s actions,147 the lack of it, that is, indebtedness can be defined as a sense and state of obligation to repay another. Discussing the archaic gifts and Mauss’ theory Bourdieu148 claimed that [m]an possesses in order to give. But he also possesses by giving. A gift that is not returned can become a debt, a lasting obligation; and the only recognized power – recognition, personal loyalty or prestige – is the one that is obtained by giving. In such a universe, there are only two ways of getting and keeping a lasting hold over someone: debts and gifts, the overtly economic obligations imposed by the usurer, or the moral obligations and emotional attachments created and maintained by the generous gift, in short, overt violence or symbolic violence, censored, euphemized, that is, misrecognizable, recognized violence. The ‘way of giving’, the manner, the forms are what separate a gift from straight exchange, [what separate] moral obligation from economic obligation. If Bourdieu managed to squeeze the terms debt, gift and violence into one long sentence, David Graber, an admittedly anarchist contemporary anthropologist, argued that the ‘debt is not just victor’s justice’ but ‘it can also be a way of punishing winners who weren’t supposed to win’ in his long epos exploring the history of debt.149 To put it differently, receiving a gift creates a debt inasmuch as there is an obligation to return one’s turn to avoid defeat and humiliation. The ‘how and when’ the recipient returns the gift is not pre-qualified, but the challenge to redeem the debt cannot be denied or escaped as the idea of return gift testifies.150 Clarifying the theoretical and empirical status of the term ‘indebtedness’ and its utility for understanding social interaction, Greenberg claimed that the ‘discomfort associated with indebtedness’ is related to early socialization experiences with the norm of reciprocity, ‘during which individuals associate being indebted with a restriction on their freedom of action, loss of power and status relative to the donor, and anticipated costs of repayment’.151 Concerning the magnitude of

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perceived indebtedness Greenberg identified four potential determinants: the donor’s motives; the costs and benefits incurred by the recipient and the donor a result of the exchange; the ‘locus of causality’ of the donor’s action and cues emitted by comparison with others.152 The magnitude of indebtedness can be measured, among others, by the donor’s influence on the recipient’s decisions and by various attempts to reduce indebtedness153 both in material and non-material terms. The objective existence of debt – and the subjective sense of indebtedness, for that matter – may be also seen as missing or negative reciprocity. Indeed, the norm of reciprocity does not concern only positive situations and benevolent actions.154 If an actor, group or individual, fails to acknowledge what it sees, fails to return what it received, to act in line with the norm of positive reciprocity, subsequent sanctions can play the role of negative reciprocity. Even if sanctions are never free, they are usually applied to discipline those violating social norms.155 By referring to the ‘shadow of indebtedness’, Gouldner saw the obligation of reciprocity as one of the most powerful unwritten norm or principle shaping human interactions and structuring social relations. Devoting considerable attention to reciprocity under non-monetary market conditions,156 sociologists, economists and cognitive psychologists emphasize that ‘free riding’ (not returning gifts and gestures and not contributing to the common good) leads to decreasing trust and solidarity among members of any community, recipients and donors included. Individual social exchange theories, as briefly discussed in Chapter 1, pay more attention to the inequality of actors and do not identify reciprocity with the strict equivalence of benefits. For Mauss, the very circulation (getting, receiving and returning of the) gift ensured the equality of actors, while power relations and the equivalence of gifts (benefits) was of secondary concern. In his world the social cohesion was maintained by the ‘swinging’ nature of power between the actors as the groups engaged in exchange always retain their strength. Yet, Mauss can be read in an alternative way too: the act of giving and that of receiving reflect hierarchical relations as ‘the recipient puts himself in a position of dependence vis-a`-vis the donor.’157 Reciprocity, as argued by Sahlins with reference to pre-modern societies, can establish ‘solidarity relations insofar as the material flow suggests assistance or mutual benefit, yet the social fact of the [existence of the] sides is inescapable.’158 The distinction and distance between the parties

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involved is crucial as ‘reciprocity does not dissolve the separate parties within a higher unity, but on the contrary, in correlating their opposition, perpetuates it.’159 In the world of IR, actors are far from being equal and most aid transactions are unilateral in financial terms – yet, recipients of contemporary gifts must somehow pay for the ‘gifts’ to keep the system alive as discussed earlier. Without certain reciprocity – gains, that is, return gifts – donors could hardly convince those (taxpayers) that to finance any international aid cooperation, that it is worthwhile to continue with it.

Reciprocity and indebtedness in IR Concepts such as exchange and reciprocity are widely used in international relations describing, among others, diplomatic, trade or aid relations.160,161 Social (and gift) exchange within the context of IR can be defined as ‘mutually rewarding behaviour’ yielding mutual gains and cooperation to the parties,162 let them be state, or non-state actors. In similar vein, reciprocity in IR denotes ‘an ongoing series of sequential actions’ never balancing but ‘continuing to entail mutual concessions within the context of shared commitments and values’.163 It can be associated with ‘an appropriate standard of behaviour which can produce cooperation not only among sovereign states’164 and between nongovernmental organizations (benefiting from official ODA) too. The mutually accepted values and behavioural norms imply that it is not overt coercion, rather consensus promising gains and benefits which leads to or maintains aid cooperation. While ‘rough equivalence’ is the usual expectation ‘among equals’, reciprocity can also characterize relations among unequals.165 This disparity makes it possible to apply social exchange theories (seen as an overlapping category with gift exchange) to foreign aid relations even in cases when the donor and the recipient are not really ‘like-minded’, equal or similar in size (population, GDP, political-military power, etc). Discussing reciprocity in IR, Keohane distinguished ‘specific reciprocity’ from ‘diffuse reciprocity’. The former refers to situations in which ‘specific partners exchange items of equivalent value in a strictly delimited sequence’. It applies to the Israel-US relations as there is such reciprocity in this case, as we will see later, that Egyptians, Jordanians, and Palestinians cannot reproduce. Indeed, Israel is a sort of

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control case, as its military cooperation with the US goes beyond oneway weapon transfers and joint military trainings. The US military/ security industry benefits extensively from the Israeli technology.166 The latter concept, diffuse reciprocity, typical of Western-Arab relations, is much more elusive because one’s partners rather form an unspecified group than one or more particular actor(s) and the sequence of events are less narrowly bounded.167 For Keohane it is only ‘diffuse reciprocity’ which is about adjusting to generally accepted standards of behaviour during an unspecified period of time. It entails not only obligation, but even a temporary sense of indebtedness too.168 A function of the indebtedness of one party to the other for goods or services that they cannot obtain by other means can be conceptualized and quantified as influence.169 This influence, or the power of the donor can be counterbalanced, only if the recipient somehow attempts to return the gift (see the previous section and the discussion on conditions at the end of this chapter).

The role of reciprocity and recognition: Substituting war As Mauss put it ‘to refuse to give or to fail to invite is, like refusing to accept, equivalent to a declaration of war; it is to refuse alliance and communication.’170 Indeed, ‘exchanges are peacefully resolved wars and wars are the result of unsuccessful transactions.’171 This trade-off between commodity and gift exchange on the one hand and war on the other implies a double bind situation172 as noted by Olli Pyyhtinen. While the inability or unwillingness to return the gift runs the risk of fuelling violence (ie. ‘the poor should not revolt’ if it wants to avoid persecution), peaceful exchange (both trade and foreign aid) aims to contribute to conflict prevention and resolution. The chaos and disorder may be worse without donations and aid, but it is beyond any doubt that the givee (recipient, beneficiary) is expected to cooperate in preventing war and violence. By being given, the poor obtains recognition, which is supposed to ensure peace and stability between the (rich) donor and the (not so rich) recipient, if inequality between the actors prevails. Drawing attention to the importance of recognition embodied in gift exchange, Marcel He´naff distinguished three components of reciprocal recognition: identifying, accepting, and honouring others. The role of recognition seems to be crucial. For Derrida and Pyyhtinen

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the gift negates itself in the very moment when it is recognized and acknowledged as gift. Scholars concerned with (reasons for) social order, cooperation and conflict drew attention to the opposite: they claim the gift exchange expresses and symbolizes recognition without which there is no society and sociability. As summarized by He´naff:173 Reciprocal gift-giving is nothing else than the originating gesture of reciprocal recognition between humans, a gesture that is found in no other living beings in that it is mediated by a thing, but a thing that comes from oneself, stands for oneself, and bears witness to the commitment that was made. Forming an alliance – a pact – means bringing together one’s own self and the strangeness of the other through a thing that comes from oneself and is desirable by the other. . . . The thing given binds the two parties primarily by bearing witness that the bond has been accepted. This reciprocal recognition through the exchange of something that specifically belongs to the group (or its representative) and is offered to the other, is at the core of the exogamic relationship . . . one is a human being to the extent that one moves outside of the “natural” group based on consanguinity by recognizing and forming an alliance with the other. In order to be oneself, one must recognize what one is not.174 As the citation above implies, a crucial and important function of the archaic gift and even the (modern) ceremonial gift is to reinforce personal prestige and power between communities in order to avoid conflicts and wars by recognition175 The gift is a total social phenomenon merging terms that are mutually exclusive in our minds. The gift is simultaneously and at once ‘both peace and war, both solidarity and strife, both alliance and animosity.’176 It does not hold only positive connotations (generosity, solidarity, charity), as believed by many, but it makes it possible to express opposition without resorting to violence. As life is always shadowed by the threat of violence, the gift being about exchange, trade and alliance is a gentle/soft means of coercion that substitutes violence and war. Its disciplining and control function becomes clear when its meaning is confined to the assistance to the poor or others in need (see the discussion on Simmel and poverty earlier).

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For Mauss, as emphasized by Sahlins, the gift stems from Reason. It expresses – and celebrates – rationality over the folly of war inasmuch as ‘peoples succeed in substituting alliance, gift and commerce for war, isolation and stagnation.’177 If Clausewitz argued, famously, that ‘war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other mean’, the practice of gift-giving is, indeed, a political means: the prevention of continuation of war by other means.’178 Looking at the logic of contemporary foreign aid, there is no reason to assume that the rules of the game have changed much since old times. The belief in the magic power of exchange survived the archaic era of gifts: the Marshall Plan, the European reconstruction after the Second World War, the development of the European integration, the parallel history of foreign aid between the developed and the developing countries is about making friends and allies and trading peacefully with each other instead of waging wars.

The role of contemporary gifts: Managing order War, violence and threats have been present in IR since the beginning of the modern state system (1648), but solving interstate affairs and conflicts by war has become unacceptable at the level of universal norms since the Second World War. As the Charter of the United Nations says:179 ‘the Purpose[s] of the United Nations [is] [t]o maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace’. In other words, effective collective measures (trade and foreign aid) shall yield peace, stability and security. Indeed, one of the main function of foreign aid has been the prevention and removal of threats to the international peace. Even if not violence, but at least war between states should be prevented.180 Inalienable goods such as threat and instability, as discussed earlier, may well qualify as countergifts ‘honouring’ the generosity of the donor and inviting higher and higher commitments to counterbalance threats. It was probably Georges Bataille who first deemed and analysed the Marshall Plan as a gift, arguing that ‘without the salutary fear of the Soviets (or some analogous threat) there would be

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no Marshall Plan. The truth is that the diplomacy of the Kremlin [or some analogous threat] holds the key to American coffers.’181 The US, however, did not gave this ‘aid’ to Moscow, but to those that could have been influenced by the Russians. By doing so it strengthened solidarity, maintained and managed order in transatlantic terms. Contemporary international gifts aspire to connect quite distinct worlds, the developed and the developing, the peaceful and the conflictridden, the democratic and the non-democratic flagging the eternal promise of transition from the negative set to the positive one. Foreign aid interventions have increasingly focused on the problems of governmentality (in)stability and (dis)order – on issues raised after the era of world wars, colonialization and the Cold War.182 Foreign aid, however, is not simply about altruistic solidarity or disinterested giving. Rather, it ‘could be seen as “the riot control” end of a spectrum encompassing a broad range of global poor relief.’183 Recalling Mauss’ theory, gifts may serve not only as a cohesive force, but also as a substitute for war by seducing and disciplining beneficiaries. As such, they simultaneously reflect domination/subordination and maintain solidarity, at least its illusion, between the donor and the recipient.184 The international and global endeavour of foreign aid tries at least as much to ‘discipline’ states and societies in global terms as the Western (nation)state learnt, throughout the centuries, how to discipline the (poor, uneducated segments of) population living under its sovereignty.185 The former European coercive state turned to be enlightened, modern and democratic as ‘subaltern groups [have] become socialized into the bourgeois order of things through educational process’ and ‘people’s overall interpretative horizon [has been] shaped through everyday interaction.’186 This process has been financed by state budgets and aimed at disciplining people, that is, citizens. Recalling Foucault’s thoughts on the concept of power and governmentality, power can be ‘productive, creating certain ways of behaving or knowing’ which means ‘power over people’s minds and bodies, over their routine chores and daily activities.’187 Modern education, among others, played a crucial role in the process of disciplining human minds in the West. The knowledge of how the world should be conceived and perceived has been disseminated through the modern school system (mandatory education) on the one hand and by educated people, classes on the other.188 As Scott

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summarized it ‘while factories and forests might be planned by interpreters, the ambition of engineering whole societies was almost exclusively a project of the [European] nation state’.189 Something very similar applies to the international community with the mediation of (post-colonial) foreign aid. Giving aid is based on systematically generated scientific knowledge and promises to serve the higher good of the (international, global) society. Governmental actors, international organizations, academic circles, NGOs and think tanks and business corporations (tech giants, social media actors) participate in the production of a vast amount of knowledge about the populations living in remote countries from the era of colonization until today. This systematic activity – knowledge accumulation and data collection on people in global terms – allows powerful and creative actors on the donor side to characterize, profile categorize and control populations, to draft plans, to set benchmarks, to impose their own principles of order when designing foreign aid programmes and implementing projects. Inspired by Kipling’s poem, William Easterly called it the ‘white man’s burden’ and divided the participants into two groups: the planners and the searchers.190 The educated Western public opinion and activists, Gramsci’s ‘organic intellectuals’ or Easterly’s ‘planners’ – politicians, civil activists, scholars and enlightened business people included – claim to shape the context of international social action in remote countries and preferably with the cooperation of local elites. They claim to know what the best institutions are to serve economic development and prosperity, how to make, build and maintain peace, even how people, living anywhere in the world, should think and act in order to secure a peaceful, prosperous or ‘sustainable’ life. It is a simplification, of course, as there are many outsiders equipped with local knowledge – me´tis, to use the term applied by James C. Scott – that may even be better than the knowledge of the locals. It is, however, also true that there are too many people and organizations dealing with global problems ‘casually’, just because they have a few years in their lives to volunteer in the ‘world of development’ or only because there is a considerable amount of donor money available to NGOs to apply for. Foreign aid – ODA – is an income source for many both in the donor and recipient countries, a simple means of making a living. But not just that. Applying

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Simmel’s argument on poverty and assistance, foreign aid is a measure that keeps the ‘weak’ – the non-Westerner, at the level of simplification – under control in a very sophisticated way which is wrapped into solidarity, generosity, gratitude, compassion and a lot else. One of the biggest strengths of foreign aid is building solidarity among those that give and those that enjoy either the gift itself or participating in the foreign aid business. Elites (and actors in the aid industry) in many developing countries usually have stronger relations with those in the donor countries that with their own societies, the beneficiaries of foreign aid. To sum up, the theory of the gift can be seen as the theory of human solidarity as it substitutes war and violence191 provided that the norm of reciprocity prevails. The act of giving, receiving and returning the gift usually reflect solidarity – or other social relations based on emotions, calculation or their unique combination – between the particular donor and the recipient. Gift-giving, however, is too complex a phenomenon to occur without ambiguities and unintended consequences as it involves the desire to transform the other by creating (mutual) dependency: the latter is the source of one actor’s power over the other. As a crucial and important function of the archaic gift was to reinforce personal prestige and power between communities in order to avoid conflicts/wars,192 contemporary foreign aid is one of the most ‘innocent’ means promising transformation and peaceful coexistence for the sake of stability. This transformation, however, not only aims at realizing peaceful and prosperous coexistence, but should be achieved in a democratic and peaceful way. When it cannot be done so, donors resort to providing military assistance and equipment, supporting security-related programmes by ODA or choosing other creative solutions like the privatization of security193 or leaving it to the recipient governments how they, their army and intelligence service make order, but at least, silence.

The ‘spiritual essence’: Values, norms and identities conveyed by foreign aid . . . The most important feature among these spiritual mechanisms is clearly one that obliges a person to reciprocate the present that has been received. . . .

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. . . what imposes obligation in the present received and exchanged, is the fact that the thing received is not inactive. Even when it has been abandoned by the giver, it still possesses something of him. Through it the giver has a hold over the beneficiary just as, being its owner, through it he has a hold over the thief. . . . In this system of ideas one clearly and logically realizes that one must give back to another person what is really part and parcel of his nature and substance, because to accept something from somebody is to accept some part of his spiritual essence, of his soul. To retain that thing would be dangerous and mortal, not only because it would be against law and morality, but also because that thing coming from the person not only morally, but physically and spiritually, that essence, that food, those goods, whether movable or immovable, those women or those descendants, those rituals or those acts of communion – all exert a magical or religious hold over you. (Mauss, The Gift, p. 9 and 15) As shown in the previous parts, even financially unilateral foreign aid transfers are guided by the norm of reciprocity by entailing return gifts. But why they are so important in IR relations? As long as foreign aid is provided on a conditional basis – with or without financial obligations to reciprocate – donors can keep the gift flow by attaching Westernbacked ideas, universal values or global interests to it. These are the ‘burden attached’ to the so-called ‘free’ gift. Gifts and their ‘spiritual essence’ are about influencing social norms, values and identities on the recipient end – in a way that benefits the donor too. Discussing the practices of giving and the substance of hau among maori people, Mauss devoted considerable attention to the ‘spiritual essence’ of the gifts. Reviewing the alternative literature (Ranapiri, Le´vi-Strauss) Sahlins emphasized that a distinction should be made between the hau of the gift (object) and the hau of the giver (person). However, the point is that a person’s spirit can be found in the object, which obliges the receiver to return the gift,194 quoting Mauss:195 What imposes obligation in the present received and exchanged is the fact that the thing received is not inactive. Even when it has

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been abandoned by the giver, it still possesses something of him. Through it the giver has a hold over the beneficiary . . . Hence it follows that to make a gift of something to someone is to make a present of some part of oneself. Next, in this way we can better account for the very nature of exchange through gifts, of everything that we call ‘total services’ . . . In this system of ideas one clearly and logically realizes that one must give back to another person what is really part and parcel of his nature and substance, because to accept something from somebody is to accept some part of his spiritual essence, of his soul. To retain that thing would be dangerous and mortal, not only because it would be against law and morality, but also because that thing coming from the person not only morally, but physically and spiritually, that essence, . . ., those goods, whether movable or immovable, . . ., those rituals or those acts of communion - all exert a magical or religious hold over you. The genuine specificity of the modern gift is that it becomes a faceless gift to strangers in many cases,196 faceless, but by no means spiritless. If ‘to accept something from somebody is to accept some part of his spiritual essence, of his soul,’197 this ‘some part of his spiritual essence’ deserves attention in the case of contemporary relations maintained, among others, by external funds. Contemporary gifts are not for free, not without a ‘burden attached’ and not without conditions either. They aim to convey the values of the donor and achieve changes imagined or prescribed by the donor. Foreign aid is widely seen as an instrument aspiring to contribute to development and prosperity of the recipient by inducing change, by influencing institutions both at the level of state and society.198 While global public debate on foreign aid is evolving around concepts of charity, philanthropy, pity or compassion, official actors (donor states, international organizations) tend to emphasize the importance of common responsibility, shared interests and solidarity for the sake of aid effectiveness, ‘our common future’ or ‘global justice.’ Under the pretext of a ‘common universe between the more economically developed and the less economically developed countries’,199 foreign aid programmes and projects equally aspire to support peace and transitions to democracy, conflict resolution and post-war reconstruction concerns. However, external funds, whether private or public, are not purely technical instruments: they

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operate in and simultaneously shape the domestic political and social realities – informal and formal institutions200 and human relations alike – in the recipient country.201 Like archaic gifts, modern gifts also influence the distribution of goods in society and hence justice, fairness202 and legitimacy too due to their very allocation, abundance and scarcity and by the norms and values that they convey. Messages, norms, values, whether they are labelled as Western, global, universal, neoliberal or religious, violent or humanitarian, are part of the foreign ‘spiritual and material package’ received from the foreign donor. A question is how these external norms and values are related to local realities (perceptions on justice and fairness, legitimacy, corruption and power, etc.) on the recipient side. The spirit of the gift implies that both accepting the gifts (burdened by the donor’s spiritual essence or conditions formulated by the giver) and returning them (at the expense of social cohesion, norms, values and identities?) can be seen as a sort of ‘sacrifice’. It is particularly true when gifts are used to ‘buy’ or ‘influence’ or ‘externally induce’ changes in norms, values, decisions, behaviour or identities either at material or at symbolic level. The gift may well be seen as a sort of loss or sacrifice – a price to be paid in exchange for the gift.

Insights from the philosophy of the gift . . . [G]ifts circulate . . . with the certainty that they will be reciprocated. Their ‘surety’ lies in the quality of the thing given, which is itself that surety. But in every possible form of society it is in the nature of a gift to impose an obligatory time limit. By their very definition, [gifts] cannot be reciprocated immediately. Time is needed in order to perform any counter-service . . . (Mauss, The Gift, p. 45) It is the obscure difference between true gifts and exchange embodied in the concepts of reciprocity and sacrifice203 combined with the ‘subtle balance of dependence and independence causing power and control to be deeply ingrained’,204 which explains the ‘impossibility of foreign aid’ and its unintended consequences or negative externalities in economic terms.205

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Impossibility and sacrifice Gifts and gift relations cannot be understood without the concept of sacrifice and questions regarding the very (im)possibility of any gift.206 As broadly assumed, one either gives, which is an altruistic, one-way move, or exchanges with appropriate interests. The latter transaction is an action with intentions behind that may lead to constant exchange. According to Mauss the concept of exchange is needed to understand the constant circulation of gifts. However, the incompatibility between (theoretical) gifts and (Maussean gift) exchange must be acknowledged at least at conceptual level. Arguing that the gift stops being a gift as it is destroyed in the very moment when it is recognized, acknowledged or decompensated,207 Derrida claimed that the very recognition of the gift, whether it is accepted or rejected, entails obligations and therefore it no longer qualifies as a pure present.208 Since a simple ‘thank you’ qualifies as recognition, and as such complies with the (hidden) condition of reciprocity, the only solution is to preserve the anonymity of the giver. Anonymity can ensure that there is no accrued benefit in giving on the donor side (well, except for self-praise or narcissism). It is not simply a philosophical question but also has some practical implications. Comparing the principles alongside which foreign aid works and aspires to make a difference in the Middle East (emphasizing transparency, accountability, among others) to the local principles of solidarity (anonymous giving reflects higher morality than its opposite) will reproduce the tensions existing at conceptual levels. Discussing Mauss’ influential work and Derrida’s arguments on the essence of the gift, Pyyhtinen emphasized the incompatibility between gifts and exchange. He did so admittedly only at conceptual level, but it deserves attention as long as the distinction will be needed to understand the ambiguities built in contemporary foreign gifts. Acknowledging that not every gift (relation) can be conceptualized as exchange,209 Pyyhtinen’s major conceptual problem with Mauss’ theory was that it did not problematize the connection between gift and exchange. In other words ‘by subsuming the gift within the order of exchange, Mauss ultimately subjects the gift to the logic of debt . . . he always interprets it in the framework of exchange . . . [but] as soon as there is a guarantee that a gift once given will be compensated, we are no longer dealing with the gift, but with exchange.’210

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The ‘difference’ between (genuine, true, non-Maussan, theoretical) gift and (the practical, Maussan gift) exchange is a sort of ‘necessary loss’ or sacrifice as pointed out by Pyyhtinen. In the absence of sacrifice (on the giver’s side), the gift negates itself.211 In its presence, the gift becomes genuine: for there to be a true gift (present), the donor should not profit from the gift, otherwise the given thing becomes merely a means of exchange or an instrument for gaining profit.212 Or, as implied in this logic, for there to be an exchange, Maussan gift exchange included, the recipient should be able to return the given thing even if not immediately. In Pyyhtinen’s view Mauss underestimated the sacrifice and loss involved in the (concept of the) gift simply because he, intentionally or not, identified it with debt/loan by interpreting it within the framework of exchange. For Mauss, every gift is a debt, an instrument for discharging debts – as long as it is not returned. However, in order to remain a gift (even if only at conceptual level), it must distance itself from exchange. Foreign aid cannot do it. Putting aside its religious connotations,213 the concept of sacrifice deserves a little more attention as it is widely used in the context of (accepting) foreign aid on the recipient side. Sacrifice is known as ‘opportunity cost’ in the language of economic science as it represents an alternative to be given up when a decision, for example to give or to receive a gift, is made. Pyyhtinen defined sacrifice as a loss. For Simmel sacrifice meant ‘the experience that the satisfaction of desire has a price’, which is determined by a bargaining process over the concerned object.214 Life, and not just economic life can be seen as an exchange of sacrifices – giving up something in order to gain something (else).215 The difference between the gift that exist only conceptually and exchange that is much closer to reality is a certain sort of ‘necessary’ loss, some sort of sacrifice, price or expenditure.216 The practice of foreign aid, seen as gift exchange, is not an exception. With reference to contemporary gifts, the most remarkable point is the existence of sacrifice – perceived on the aid recipient side too. In the context of foreign aid, it may be called the price of (accepting or receiving) contemporary gifts. While Olli Pyyhtinen saw sacrifice as an essential element of gift(-giving) on the giver’s side, he overlooked the relevance and meaning of the concept on the receiving end. Not only donors give up part of their wealth in form of public and private donations, but recipients also take sacrifices. First and foremost, by

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accepting foreign aid, the opportunity of refusal is sacrificed. While true giving requires sacrifice (for there to be a gift), gifts may also require the recipient to make certain sacrifices upon accepting the gift. And vica versa, by rejecting the gift or by returning it, the lasting relationship (bond) itself comes to be sacrificed – at least in theory. Beyond the philosophical debates on the (im)possibility of the gift, in the very moment when the exchange dimension of the gift is doubted or denied, the related social bonds are also jeopardized or even annulled. Sacrifices on the recipient end will also remain unrecognized. If there is no return (‘exchange’ of gifts and sacrifices), there is no social bond between the giver and the recipient either. Truly altruistic (unacknowledged) gifts may exist at conceptual level, but real gifts, contemporary foreign aid included, call for recognition, symbolic or material return – for the sake of the broader community, international and global community included. As reciprocity influences social cohesion and identity (not only between the giver and the recipient, but) within the communities of the giver and receiver respectively,217 not only gifts circulate by exchange, but sacrifices also. In Mauss’ world the most elementary condition was the obligation to return a gift. Recognition and reciprocity made Derrida and Pyyhtinen conclude that ‘gifts are impossible’. However, the analytical framework offered by Mauss, even if seen as inconsistent or paradoxical at conceptual level, may help us understand the way how foreign aid and aid-related conditions work. Having conceptualized foreign aid as gifts yielding return gifts in this chapter, we cannot but devote a separate few paragraphs to the concept of conditionality. Compliance with conditions (at least the promise of compliance) and its implications is a kind of price – beyond the earlier discussed existence of return gifts – that makes us acknowledge the price aid recipients pay for donor generosity.

Conditionality in foreign aid relations If gifts are ‘impossible’, so is foreign aid: they cannot remain unacknowledged. While conditionality is a well-known practice/ phenomenon in any aid-related cooperation, gifts – unlike goods and services exchanged on the market – are usually given without setting a price on it by the donor. Foreign aid relations can be compared to giftgiving in as much as they also imply reciprocity combined with a sort of demand, or expectation, for returning the favour. Characteristics of gift

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exchange allow us to understand foreign aid as an instrument of state power enabling states to get other states (and non-state actors on the recipient side) do things they would otherwise not necessarily do by nonviolent means. Indeed, in the context of international assistance it is widely accepted that governments and other donors do not provide foreign aid unless they intend to achieve something of interest to them.218 In similar vein, recipients – governments, local NGOs, individual beneficiaries – tend to agree that there is always a price to be paid, a price which can be financial or of a non-monetary nature. When the recipient returns the ‘foreign aid’ by accepting and complying with the attached, overtly formulated or hidden conditions (implementing donor-induced reforms, for example), the price – the loss or sacrifice – becomes real. Alternative ways of returning may include selling ‘stories of sufferings’219 or producing a constant, sometimes well-calculated, other times accidental threat to remain eligible for further gifts. Regardless to the broad spectrum of donor motives and convictions (IR schools) discussed earlier, foreign aid relations are based on the following tacit rules: no government can be forced to provide (development, military) assistance or to receive it; the aid relationship between donor and recipient is an asymmetric (ie. unequal) relationship in terms of power; and foreign aid represents an intervention in the recipient country.220 The emphasis is placed on the coercive element: on the denial of aid (‘gift’) resulting from non-compliance. Aid intervention is not overtly ‘coerced’ or violent, but gentle, voluntary and in principle, and at the level of official cooperation, ‘approved’ by the recipient government. It is not rare, that the government is simply bypassed as indicated in the concept ‘chimera state’.221 Coercion is smartly wrapped in the practice of conditionality, a key element of which is ‘the use of pressure, by the donor, in terms of threatening to terminate aid, or actually terminating or reducing it’, if conditions are not met by the recipient.222 It is important to emphasize that states are equal only ‘on paper’ (in international law principles or in the UN General Assembly). If the donor and the recipient would be equal and independent, the question of intervention would be much less relevant. Since giving/aiding is expected to be done efficiently both in political and economic terms – after all donor countries spend their taxpayer’s money abroad – ‘the gift’ inevitably entails intervention by the donor being politically and economically stronger than the

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beneficiary.223 Power lies in principles such as (recipient) participation, transparency and accountability, which ‘ensures that responsibility and giving are framed in [such] means-ends relation’ where the dominant, namely the donor has the right to impose conditions on the gift offered224 for the jointly accepted sake of aid effectiveness.225 In the context of IR, aid-related conditionality has not simply a long history, but even generations have been identified. Economic conditionality widely applied in the 1980s has been followed by a somewhat more ambitious political conditionality since the 1990s.226 While the former expects the recipient to implement changes at the level of economic, fiscal or monetary policies, the latter implies that the respect for individual human rights and democratic values acquires priority over state sovereignty.227 In the particular context of conflict situations and the subsequent peace agreements, peace conditionality has been complementary to economic and political conditions.228 Its general aim has been facilitating the short term implementation of various peace accords and the long-term consolidation of peace between adversaries.229 Technical conditionality, mostly seen as an innocent mandatory element of aid cooperation, denotes various practices. These conditions make external funds contingent on a set of specific policy-related conditions, which are specified in documents (‘policy matrixes’, benchmarks, indicators, etc.), signed both by the donor and the recipient. The disbursement of the funds is usually contingent on the degree to which recipients, governments and non-state actors comply with technical conditions, procedures and formal requirements. Technical conditions may fall into two broader categories: policy-based and result-based. While political conditionality links development aid to certain standards of observance of human rights and democracy, policy-based technical conditions cover policy measures and actions that the partner government must take, such as passing legislation or restructuring a ministry. Resultbased conditions involve for example such policy outputs and outcomes as school enrollment rates, numbers of health workers in clinics and health centres or vaccination/immunization rates.230 Technical conditions may involve so seemingly innocent items as the requirements of reporting, auditing and evaluation, payments for technical cooperation experts. Conditions are attached to the ‘given’ thing when the recipient does not have other means to return the ‘gift’ the acceptance of which, following Mauss, is at least as much mandatory as its return. Conditions

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can be formulated implicitly or explicitly, and their existence can even be denied on the side of the donor231 or left to the other side to decide about the nature of return gifts. Even if foreign aid is mostly grant without monetary obligations to return, perceptions on foreign aid in the Middle East seem to justify the notion that ‘there are no free gifts’ and the ‘donors always expect something in return’.232 Foreign aid – unless it is a concessional loan or military assistance provided on a contractual basis – usually does not have a price in monetary terms. It does not mean, however, that repayment is not expected: the price is labelled as conditionality. The example of financial conditionality helps a lot to understand the relation between the concept ‘price’ and ‘condition’. In market transactions goods and services are exchanged for money, the quantity of which is known as price. If the ‘buyer’ does not have the needed amount of money at disposal, the seller may be ready to provide the given thing (commodity, bank loan, etc.) before the payment occurs, but only with certain conditions. For example, the price of a credit/loan is the additional amount – over and above the initial amount – that the recipient must pay back. It is embodied in the interest rate (i). The financial conditions ensure that the recipient will pay the price by returning more (interest over the principal) within a given period of time as it has been originally given by the lender/donor. The interest is a sort of compensation to the donor (lender or giver), for the risk of principal loss and for the forgoing other useful investments that could have been realized with the given asset (opportunity costs or sacrifice). Setting financial conditions in the form of interest rate (i) and number of years (n) within which the debt must be paid back is the best way to maximize utility. All this may be applied to foreign aid – to the (im)possible contemporary gift233 – the price of which (pFA) is the function of: pFA ¼ fðCf ; Ce ; Cp ; Ct ; Cpe ; Ch Þ: While Cf denotes the financial conditions (i based on n, arrangement fees and any other charges) in case of concessional loans, Ce, Cp, Ct, Cpe, Ch refer to further economic, political, technical, peace and even overtly not formulated, implicit or hidden conditions that can be attached to the foreign aid provided as ‘grant.’ In case of financially unreciprocated

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grants, Ce, Cp, Ct, Cpe, Ch ensure that the grant will be used in the most effective (useful) way serving either the interests of the donor or interests of common, global concerns. When the recipient is not expected to pay back the received ‘asset’ (in form of money under Cf), Ce, Cp, Ct, Cpe, Ch provide the only opportunity to redeem the debt, to maintain the social and political relations between (international) actors and to preserve the eligibility for further aid. These are usually presented as ‘only conditions’ formulated either overtly or understood only in-between the lines, but in reality they are the price to be paid – or a sacrifice to be taken – in exchange for contemporary gifts. To comply with conditions being different from Cf, such as Ce, Cp, Ct, pe C , Ch is not only a moral obligation, but also well-established selfinterest of the recipient if it wants to see the game to be continued and receive further aid in the future. To put it bluntly the recipient can return the contemporary gift – or to redeem the debt and reduce the sense of indebtedness – either by complying with the stated and hidden conditions or by producing such alternative return gifts (documentation of chaos, instability, insecurity, threats, extreme poverty, etc) that do not allow for aid conditionality. Any of these are needed for a recipient to remain eligible for futher aid. Conditions are said to have been effectively exercised only if the recipient undertakes a policy change it would not have undertaken by itself, without the pressure made to bear upon it by the donor.234 Whether this pressure is a gentle carrot (financially unreciprocated grants for example), a coercive stick (measures sanctioning non-compliance) or their combination (conditional aid, for example) depends on the judgement of the donor. Usually the alternative which is considered to be more effective in a given context is chosen. Foreign aid, just as sanctions, are used as ‘a lever to promote objectives [being different from the stated objectives of the foreign aid itself] set by the donor whom and that the recipient would not otherwise have agreed to.’235 With reference to conditions, the emphasis is placed on the coercive element, on the denial of aid, portrayed as a generous gift on the surface, resulting from non-compliance or noncontingency. Beyond and over conditions, even in their very absence, the acceptance of any gift may imply a certain sense of indebtedness from the point of view of the recipient.236 As discussed earlier, neither individuals, nor states like to be influenced due to their indebtedness.

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But not only the experience of indebtedness, the norm of reciprocity also implies that exchange actions ‘are contingent on rewarding reactions from others and cease when these expected reactions are not forthcoming’ as argued in social exchange theories.237 By the same token unconditionally is ‘at variance with the basic character of reciprocity norm which imposes obligations only contingently, that is, in response to benefits conferred by others’.238 External conditionality needs to be applied only if the magnitude of indebtedness (reported, but at least perceived by the recipient) is (assumed to be) lower/less than the ‘price’ the donor wants to get in exchange for the given thing. The next chapters will discuss some dilemmas involved in the practice of international giving (supporting stability vs. democracy) applying the analytical framework of international gift exchange to contemporary donor-recipient relations in the Middle East. The analysis will focus on countries being closest to the Arab-Israeli conflict, namely, in Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Israel as they illustrate not only the conflicting objectives of democracy promotion and security objectives the best, but also show how recipients may return contemporary gifts.

CHAPTER 3 TRADITIONAL, RELIGIOUS AND CONTEMPORARY GIFTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Most people in the region seem to share the conviction that their government(s) are expected to give up ‘something’ in exchange for foreign aid. In other words, there is a sort of perceived ‘sacrifice’ to be paid by the recipients in the aid relations especially in East-West dimensions. Attention will be paid to international social bonds between donors and recipients, how they have been shaped by foreign aid, how aid recipient governments use and misuse funds and how they return the ‘gift of foreign aid’ even at the expense of social cohesion.

Gifts in pre-modern societies and generosity in the Middle East There is literally no aspect of the economy that is independent of Israeli control and international influence. The PA answers to international/Israeli orders and has almost no accountability to local communities. Sadly, international NGOs fail to live up to their civil society mandate. Instead, they compete with local NGOs for funding, staff and beneficiaries. (. . .) There is a massive and self-perpetuating “humanitarian” system that not only constrains local agency, but also undermines traditional systems

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for interdependence and self-reliance’ words of an activist at AidWatch Palestine1 Relations established by gifts are far more complicated than usually assumed. Gift-giving is the very precondition for the community, so much so, that the constitution of community is tied to the obligation to give, to receive and to return.2 It applies to the Middle East too. It has a very diverse population and it is particularly true in case of the countries being the subject of this book. Muslim Arabs, Christian Arabs and non-Arabs, minorities from the broader region (Armenians, Turks, for example), and Jews have different institutions, social norms and habits, yet, the groups are linked by the shared experience of living in permanent turmoil in the twentieth century. Group identity and belonging are important because private affairs and family law are guided by religious laws and rules in most countries. Although cultural and social norms do not necessarily have stronger explanatory force in terms of the contemporary challenges than political factors have – the experience of oppression by external powers, the legacy of colonialization in the Middle East,3 the memory of the Holocaust in Europe, that of the Palestinian nakba, the presence of the modern (nation)state in the region – it is worthwhile to recall the local norms of generosity and gift-giving in Islamic and Jewish traditions. The region hosts a Muslim majority society. Generosity is one of the most important virtues of Islam that cannot be strictly separated from Arab traditions. Dawn Chatty recalls the saying ‘I against my brother; I and my brother against my cousin; I, my brother and my cousin against the world’ to argue that ‘the layered outlook on alliances and enmity among families, lineages, and tribes throughout the Arab world’ defines how the principle of generosity (karam in Arabic) involves security, protection, and respect simultaneously. Compared to the Maussan gift, karam is also about creating relationship and calling for return. Excessive gifting or inappropriate return can equally result in hostility and insecurity in the Middle East too.4 Generosity (nobility) and charity is first and foremost based on religious duties. Traditional gifts, unlike Western aid, are not primarily offered to remote others. The system of Islamic solidarity starts with the

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individual, and then comes the family, followed by the Islamic society and finally the entire mankind. It aims to strengthen the Islamic communities locally and beyond the state borders, but applies to mankind en masse once the needs of the umma have been met.5 Nonetheless, due to globalization, contemporary Islamic charity organizations also have to work according to the market logic as they compete with Western (I)NGOs for donations.6 With reference to the religious roots, the noun ‘zakat’ stems from the verb ‘zaka’ the meaning of which is ‘to purify.’ The objective is to give up a given portion of one’s wealth in order ‘to purify’ that portion which remains.7 It is not simply an act correcting market failure (by fulfilling the needs of the poor), but it has a deep moral message and has a religious function too by being the third pillar of the Islam faith. To give zakat proves the giver’s (donor’s) restraint on selfishness, greed and imperviousness to other’s plight and simultaneously it purifies the beneficiary from jealousy and hatred towards the wealthy.8 The word, pure or purify deserves here attention the extent to which, as we will see later, accepting money from non-Islamic sources (Western donors) under politically unacceptable conditions may evoke the label ‘shameful’ or ‘dirty’ on the recipient side. The principles of zakat involve among others, a sort of ‘financial worship’ – Olli Pyyhtinen talked about necessary sacrifice (inevitable loss) upon discussing the conceptual problem built in the Maussan giftexchange – without which the efficacy of the prayer is negated. Giving is all the more mandatory as man is ‘merely viceregent or trustee over the resources available’ to him.9 Even if zakat is a religious duty, the Quran and the Sunna does not prescribe penalties in case of noncompliance. The practice from full incorporation of zakat by the state (Pakistan, for example) to its marginalization to the individual’s private sphere varies from country to country in the Muslim world.10 It is rather a matter of conscience and responsibility, fear of God (taqwa) probably because the modern state entered the Islamic world from a Western direction. In most Muslim countries zakat is a private matter and justified by Quran verses that expect the believer to distribute its wealth (zakat, alms) in secret. The phenomena that beneficiaries in many cases do not feel comfortable with disclosing how much and from whom they received is reasoned by the special religious merit that

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accompanies anonymous giving on the one hand. On the other, there are also fears that public welfare benefits from the state will not be available for them if they are given alms via private-religious channels.11 Regardless to the reasons behind, secrecy or discretion accompanying generosity is important at least at the level of traditions. It deserves attention as it is in sharp contrast to the contemporary ‘Western’ gift which promotes visibility, transparency and accountability in official communication manuals from paperwork to billboard on the street. Zakat – seen as a religious duty – should be distinguished from a more voluntarily form of giving, that is sadaqa (sadaqah or sadaka). This latter reflects moral excellence, beyond duty. Zakat is obligatory in religious terms, targets and benefits the Muslim poor and prioritizes kins over those outside the circle of the family. While zakat is a standardized proportion, usually the one-fortieth of one’s assets (wealth over the life necessities) that has to benefit Muslims in need, sadaqa is more like a ‘modern gift’ understood in everyday terms. It may take various forms (advice, in-kind-assistance, smiles or other gestures) and can be given to anyone – provided that the religious obligation of zakat has been met.12 The practice of zakat is closer to the gifts described by Mauss than sadaqa. Beyond the solidarity function, giving gifts on the occasion of holidays, weddings, etc. is also common, but much less guided by charity motives, but by other concerns. Gift-giving in Jewish teachings, culture and tradition has an equally central role and is similar to Islamic practices in many senses.13 It is somewhat closer to the idea of kindness, than to that of moral obligation or duty, but it is hard to separate these motives. Maimonides (1135 – 1204) collected three reasons to give gifts and eight levels of tzedakah, which latter term expresses a religious obligation to do what is right and just. The most valuable giving is to help someone to become self-sufficient and independent so that ‘the helped’ could give back to the society. This first level is followed by giving donations unanimously to unknown beneficiaries.14 Individuals in need should be given tzedakah – an obligation in Jewish tradition but reminding linguistically to the ‘voluntary’ sadaqa in Arabic – which has much less to do with charity than with justice. Furthermore, Rainer Barzen argued that ‘the meaning of the many forms of Jewish poor relief that are subsumed under the term tzedakah should not be reduced to their

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philanthropic or even theological implications’ as it has always been about strengthening ‘the organizational structures of the Jewish community’ against external threats.15 As Mauss described in a different geographical context, gifts circulate. Reciprocity equally applies to the Jewish comprehension of tzedakah: ‘the way we reach out to others . . . determines how others will treat us,’16 and to the Islamic-Arab understanding. This latter may be illustrated by contemporary words of a Palestinian businessman: ‘giving is a duty toward the civil society. If I don’t care for this [Palestinian] society, it won’t take care of me.’17 Beyond reciprocity, Jewish and Islamic giving, at least at theoretical level, is common in pleasing God, serving God’s interests and the individual’s good relations with God. As the brief discussion on the Middle Eastern (well, only Jewish and Islamic) traditions illustrates, the gift ‘does not affect only isolated and discontinuous incidents in social life but social life in its entirety,’18 which simultaneously includes the relations (transactions, social interactions) between actors and the gift-object too. As argued by Olli Pyyhtinen, the gift presents ‘how relation is transformed into thing and thing into relation’. The gift gains its ‘meaning, value and force in and through relations.’19 Beyond its material properties, the gift bears important information on ‘social’ properties, such as the giver and his intentions behind giving, the recipient, the history and future of the relation between the giver and the recipient, which all determine the meaning of the gift, its dark side included.20 It is the ‘relation’ between the foreign donor and the Middle Eastern recipient, an essential element of gift-giving (beyond the object itself), which makes it possible to analyse foreign aid practices within the analytical framework of gift exchange. Local norms and customs, discussed briefly in this section, not only guide everyday decisions or determine people’s interactions, expectations and beliefs, but also can be compared to alternative (global, international) understandings of solidarity. The differences between Western (international) and regional (Islamic) aid cultures can be conceptualized in the form of three sets of dichotomies, namely universalism vs. solidarity, neutrality vs. justice, and secularism vs. religion.21 The idea foreign aid is understood by the general Western public as a universal obligation that contributes constructively to development, democracy or poverty reduction with no implications for

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politics or justice (for European public opinion see Chapter 5). Yet, contemporary gifts of foreign origin may have serious negative side-effects on local habits and traditions:22 Domestic assistance plays smaller role as there is no need for [local] contributions since internationals are present . . . volunteerism is killed in Palestine because of our [NGO] work. If people know that they can get paid for something they could do voluntarily, people will choose to get paid and let others do the job. As illustrated by the cited thought, out-crowding local initiatives by foreign aid is a widely perceived phenomenon. It is coupled with the fact that Western aid not only ignores local perceptions on justice, legitimacy and historical narratives in many authoritarian countries, but it also expects the recipient (government, NGO) to talk as little about politics as possible in the context of development or humanitarian assistance. However, as Sheila Carapico emphasized ‘political aid interjects external symbolic, material and institutional resources’ into Middle Eastern and pan-Arab arenas and by doing so it cannot but ‘stimulate controversy and rivalry’23 at the expense of local customs and traditions. Societies and cultures in the region, without exception, have been shaped by perceptions on injustice, the ‘experiences of marginalization, of being colonized, and [understanding] of the poor not as a distant sufferer, but as a fellow member of the community.’24 Justice bears social and political relevance in both Jewish and Islamic traditions, which is crucial to understand why (Western, universal, global) giving in general, humanitarian aid in particular is so much criticized for its ‘apolitical’ and ‘neutral’ ambitions – both in Israel and the Arab countries – while military assistance is rather seen a means to keep regional clients alive (Chapter 4 and 5 will further elaborate on it).

Features of contemporary foreign aid in the Middle East The origins and background of Western donor presence in the Middle East The history of official foreign aid provided to Middle Eastern states traces back only a little more than a half century. Its origins, however,

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can be found in early charity activities in the region. Reviewing the history and origins of Western humanitarianism in the Middle East, Keith Watenplaugh captures ‘the inherent richness of [early] humanitarianism as a problem of social and cultural history in a way that retains relevance to contemporary debates about the promotion of human rights, and the work of relief and development.’25 A lot has changed since the early 1900s. Contemporary humanitarian assistance and development aid are conceptually distinct activities. Yet, their purposes can be distinguished only at the level of principles and intentions (donor end). Both become ‘political’ (or politicised) in the very moment when they reach the ground (recipient end). Either is free from the social and cultural history of the recipient and none of them can free itself from the historical legacy of colonial or mandate eras. Aidfinanced development and humanitarian activities also have considerable political and social impact on domestic fronts in the Middle East too.26 It is much more evident in case of development aid that openly aspires to change local institutions and norms guiding people’s interactions, than in the case of humanitarian aid. The latter claims to be neutral and impartial but cannot. Security-related development assistance or military aid has even more obvious impact on local developments (as the second part of this book will show). As Watenplaugh argued, the dominant ideologies of nationalism and colonialism in the first half of the twentieth century should be studied not only by focusing on the brutality of the time, but also by ‘studying the humanitarianism of that same era [which] is not a correction to that history but rather a way to understand an answer to its underlying inhumanity.’27 This observation applies to contemporary developments as well. If the Ottoman empire and its military in the late nineteenth century was seen as ‘exterior to “Europeanness”’ and labelled as ‘barbaric entity beyond the fold of barbaric civilizational norms’ by the intervening Western European states and their public opinion, the contemporary Middle East is seen as not less hopeless. Current domestic efforts to make peace or achieve political reforms, either assisted or ignored by Western ambitions and resources, are always seen as inadequate. Being not sufficient they constantly invite further money, external experts, development diplomats, and humanitarian activists to make a difference or visible changes. Edward Said in his famous Orientalism (1978) described illustratively how the European man invented the Oriental to define himself as

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superior: qualities such as lazy, irrational, uncivilized, crudeness were related to the Orientals (Arabs, Muslims), and automatically the Europeans became active, rational, civilized, modern, sophisticated.28 As local people have been seen incapable of running their own government in line with international standards of ‘good governance’, the European/Western presence has been justified since the age of colonization, through the mandate period and the decolonization process to the contemporary era of security and development cooperation. Even if Said’s methods and arguments were criticized, probably most illustratively by Malcolm Kerr (1980),29 one cannot deny that his approach has been echoed by other scholars and local voices doubting, among others, the constructiveness of foreign aid. Both development and humanitarian aid fails to acknowledge that while they may strengthen relations between the donor and the recipient, none guarantees efficient solutions to local problems. On the contrary – they usually only make a bigger mess (of course, we cannot know it in absence of laboratory environments). Most publications dealing with ‘foreign aid’ in the Middle East describe and explain the main donor motives and interests, objectives, channels and forms of foreign aid as well as its economic and political impacts, such as influence-buying, rent-seeking or corruption. There are authors investigating the (normative) donor objectives and economic, political and social consequences of foreign aid chanelled simultaneously, but not proportionally, to state and non-state actors.30 Others attempt to analyse Middle Eastern international relations by emphasizing, among others, the role played by foreign aid as part of the regional games and foreign policies.31 Rarely do they offer an in-depth analysis of the invisible political trade-off – international gift exchange – embodied in grant agreements, foreign aid programmes or projects. The ‘gift’ that meant to strengthen the relations between one of the Cold War blocks and their regional friends respectively took various forms in the 1960s, 1970s. It included budgetary assistance, political support; military assistance (combined with arms sales), long-term assistance to military industries, access to advanced surveillance techniques and cooperation with state-owned enterprises.32 The end of the Cold War and the changing balance of power in the region, the EU’s enlargement towards its Eastern and Mediterranean borders added a new layer, or dimension to Western ambitions: democratization. Since the early 1990s

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Table 3.1

THE

MIDDLE EAST

The Arab-Israeli conflict seen as an obstacle to political reform.

q711.1 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? The Arab-Israeli conflict is an obstacle to political reform in your country I agree to a I agree to I absolutely great extent some extent I disagree disagree Egypt Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Palestine Tunisia

38,6% 39,7% 25,8% 63,5% 27,2% 21,7% 49,7% 20,6%

40,5% 41,9% 46,7% 21,8% 21,3% 31,6% 38,4% 39,8%

11,5% 11,3% 22,0% 9,6% 31,3% 31,1% 9,9% 20,9%

9,4% 7,1% 5,5% 5,0% 20,2% 15,6% 2,0% 18,7%

Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%

Source: Arab Barometer Wave III (2012 – 2014).

most MENA countries have been equally engaged in long-term discussions on democratic transition, good governance, reforms and human rights (vis-a`-vis the EU),33 which was considered the only alternative for counterbalancing Islam fundamentalism and preventing regional destabilization. Both sets of objectives – transition to democracy and marginalizing the politically motivated Islamist movements – were meant to be achieved by development cooperation, that is, by ODA. Yet, contrary to ODA’s formal or expected objectives both economic development and deep democratization remained of secondary importance throughout the region. Recent events – the Gulf War (1991), the Oslo Peace Process and the second intifada (1993– 2000/2005), the US-led war on terror (since 2001), the Hamas-PLO/Fateh split in Palestine (2007), the Arab Spring and its regional consequences (2011), the NATO intervention in Libya (2011), the war in Syria and the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) on the ruins of Iraq and Syria, the Iranian nuclear programme – have continued to provide justification for massive humanitarian and military assistance. The specific regional objectives of Western foreign aid in historical terms have been to (i) strengthen regional and European/global stability

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by facilitating cooperation between ‘enemies’ tied by peace treaties (Egypt-Israel, Israel-Jordan); (ii) to support the peace process between Israel and the Palestinian people (at least with pro-Western and proIsraeli actors: PNA, PLO/Fateh); (iii) to secure Israel’s stability simultaneously by keeping the idea of the two-state solution alive; (iv) offsetting the humanitarian consequences of the Israeli occupation (in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) and those of other regional conflicts (Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon). While the list may not be full, and some aspects will be detailed only in Chapter 4, its approximate consideration is inevitable to understand the two main arguments of this book. The first is about the nonmaterial, non-financial forms of return gifts that usually remain invisible in or non-acknowledged by the literature discussing only statistics. The second concerns the perceived link between (missing) domestic political reforms (main motives behind the Arab Spring demonstration, see later) and the Arab-Israeli relations (seen as a key to regional stability by many). This latter link may be illustrated by the following data: As shown in Table 3.1. the public opinion in Egypt, Jordan, Palestine (and Lebanon) agreed far more with the statement that the Arab-Israeli conflict (as if there was no peace agreement between Israel and the concerned Arab countries!) is an obstacle to domestic political reform than people living in countries that are not so close to Israel. It also implies that the domestic consequences of the Arab Spring – human rights violations, the marginalization of many civil society organizations, the lack of real democratization – can also be explained by the Arab-Israeli conflict (peace in the case of Egypt and Jordan). It is, of course, not the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (peace process) itself, being of low-intensity, which prevents meaningful democratization. Unilateral measures applied by Israel against the Palestinians, regional perceptions on it, the way how governing Arab regimes usually portray Israel as a constant threat justifying their own oppressive practices are much stronger explanatory forces. Or, to put it in another way, Arab rulers, having been asked – in exchange for foreign aid – to back unpopular Western foreign policies (peace with Israel) pre-empted unrest by limiting freedom of expression and rounding up potential opponents well before the Arab Spring.34 The ‘spiritual essence’ of Western aid hurts many in the Middle East – not because peace agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jordan and the PNA would be

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shameful, but because the beneficiary countries are expected not to confront Israel for its policies applied in the Palestinian territories (occupation) if they want to remain eligible for external assistance. Of course, it would be simplifying to say that all regional developments, the outcomes of the Arab Spring or the emergence of the violent Islam fundamentalism can be explained by the Arab-Israeli conflict. There are far more states in the MENA region than the ones surrounding Israel, and far more problems not being closely related to the question of Palestinian sovereignty. However, the so-called ‘Palestinian card’ has been so frequently used by all the actors, Israel and the Arab States, regional and Western donors, elites and the masses, radical Islamists and victims of its terror, that one cannot but accept the argument (at least for the purpose of this book) that had the conflict been solved long ago, regional instability would not be a deep concern anymore. And foreign aid honouring – not peace, but – peace agreements (that are upheld by armies and intelligence services and supported by foreign aid) only complicates the picture by providing external legitimacy to actors that are ready to use violence against their own population (see later). Against this background, it is somewhat surprising that the West in general, Europe in particular, has long been puzzled over – well before the Arab Spring (see later) – why and how Middle Eastern countries resisted democratic changes.35 While many doubt any exclusiveness, cultural or social distinctiveness as being a real explanatory variable in understanding the regional developments,36 there is a strong, centurieslong tradition to blame the exceptionality of the region for the prevalence of conflicts, the lack of development or democratic transition (see later). Those referring to cultural reasons focus on traditions and perceived incompatibility of Islam and democracy.37 Others formulating their views more cautiously emphasize: there is nothing in Islam that would contradict democracy;38 at most its context-dependent interpretations or practical applications are at odds with democratic development. Accepting the notion that even MENA can be studied by lenses of social sciences and general theories,39 various factors arise to explain the stability of authoritarianism as well as the lack of real liberalization and democratization. Beyond the historical and political reasons,40 Salamey and Pearson suggest that a combination of various

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factors – international interests in ‘stability’ over democracy coupled with local authoritarian manipulation of colonial legacies, along with ethno-religious interests – played a decisive role.41 Others emphasize the lack of modern institutions and strong civil society pointing either to the significance of traditional family and religious ties, or to the importance of military establishments as factors being responsible for preventing structural-institutional reforms in the Middle East. Authors concerned with economic structures and political economy are convinced that rents, foreign aid or oil revenues combined with the lack of domestic taxes explain the inadequate democratization.42 And last but not least, the un(re)solved status of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the related militarization of the region and to some extent the very being of Israel has been cited as being the main source of oppression in the region and the main barrier of effective democratization.43 Discussing this latter argument (the politics of exceptionalism) will be instrumental in understanding how contemporary gifts work on the one hand. On the other hand, it will also explain, at least to some extent, how the Arab Spring, its failure and the aid-supported peace (process) between Israel and the Palestinians are related.

Arms trade and the politics of exceptionalism Authoritarianism in the Middle East is accompanied by high levels of militarization on the one hand and low respect for human rights on the other hand. Both domestic politics and international relations play their part in this outcome, but there is no straightforward answer to the question of how. This latter equally concerns the direction of causality, the extent and depth of the linkages and the role of ideology, identity and power in shaping both foreign and domestic politics. The answers are diverse but, as summarized by Rex Brynen in the context of the Middle East, the high levels of regional tensions coupled with the ‘inability of leaders to escape the belligerent politics’ clearly contributed to the outcome.44 While the claim concerning inability is probably correct, how ‘belligerent politics’ and violence could have been (could or should be) avoided when successive political actors have been habituated45 to colonization, wars, contemporary oppression, interventions and profitable businesses due to the international arms trade remains a mystery. No individual can really detach itself from the

.. 8,2% 6,2% 5,7%

468 000 .. 20,1% 12,4%

103% .. ..

8,5% 5% 4,4 billion $US

15,9%

26,9% 16% 1,5 billion $US 110 000 28,3% 23,7%

23,3%

15,2% 17 billion $US 160 000 37,4% 32,4%

7,6 8,3 2,4% 2% 7,6% 1% 0,3% 10 902 $US 35 831 $US 4 940 $US 35 728 $US 283 $US 39,4 $US 373 $US 26,3% -

Israel

*: own calculation based on Table 4.2. **: Credit Suisse, The End of Globalization or a more Multipolar World? CS Report, September 2015, p. 41.

Sources of data: World Bank website, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ (data extracted 25 January 2017).

** army size (regular forces, 2014) Expense (civil admin), % of GDP (2014) Central government revenue total (grants excluded), % of GDP (2013) Tax revenue, % of GDP (2013)

4,4 2,9% 17,5% .. 5020 $US 2 869 $US 424 $US 238,8%

Palestine (WB, GS) Jordan

91,5 2,1% 1,2% 8,5% 10 913 $US 3 615 $US 24 $US 14,3 $US ..

Egypt

Main indicators (Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Israel), selected years.

Population, million (2015) Population growth, % (2015) ODA/GNI (2014) Total natural resources rent, % of GDP GDP per capita (2015, current, PPP, $US) GDP capita (2015, current $US) ODA per capita (2015, from all donors) * US military assistance per capita Net ODA received as % of central government expense (2014) Net ODA received as % of gross capital formation (2014) Military expenditure % of GDP (2013) ** defense budget (2014)

Table 3.2

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surrounding authoritarian or militarized environment that nurtured him.46 It is, however, beyond doubt that the referred outcome is composed of authoritarianism in domestic affairs, intrastate and interstate conflict, which has provided justification for military programmes for decades. As Table 3.2 shows MENA countries, regardless to the level of their economic development, spent significant part of their GDP on military expenditure, their defense budgets amounting to billions of US dollars and they are among the top foreign aid recipients in global comparison.47 Military and security-related activities (the prevention of war officially) have been financed both by arms purchase on the market (Table 3.3) and by external military assistance (see later). They have served a dual purpose in the Middle Eastern countries. First, the strong state and military is seen as a guarantee for achieving regional stability by Western governments and donors. And not only that: the link between Middle Eastern and global stability, security and terrorism is perceived to be strong, that justifies even the ambiguous manner, modes and measures of Western democracy promotion in the region.48 In the years before and after the Arab Spring, the following countries purchased military equipment from the following suppliers: As data calculated from Table 3.3 show Saudi Arabia was the biggest buyer of military equipment ($US30,7 billion), followed by Egypt ($US14,8 billion), Iraq ($US14 billion), Algeria (ISD11 billion), the United Arab Emirates (UAE: $US9,2 billion), Israel ($US8,8 billion), Syria ($US4,1 billion) and Jordan ($US2,9 billion) during the total period (2008 – 2015). While the degree to which democracy-building ambitions and stability correlates with arms purchase varies from country to country, it is remarkable that the biggest buyers (UAE, Saudi Arabia) provide huge amounts of regional aid to all those pro-Western Arab governments that can keep Islamists (the Muslim Brotherhood, among others) under control (Cf. Tables 3.3 and 4.7). Putting these numbers into global perspectives, the Middle East (Near East) benefited the most both from arms deliveries and from (newly signed) arms transfer agreements between 2008 and 2015: While the value of arms transfer agreements with the Middle East, Asia, Latin America and Africa (developing states) comprised about 80

Russia

China

Rest

3 800 3 800 900 0 2 600 0 5 800 1 900

4 800 3 500 1 100 0 4 400 0 10 500 3 000

400 200 100 4 700 300 2 000 0 400

1 300 0 100 4 500 3 700 1 400 0 200

500 0 100 500 0 400 700 100 600

600 0 0 300 500

100 0 0 300 300 0 5 600 700

2 900 1 300 0 600 400 0 5 800 1 200

200 0 300 0 500 300 900 600

200 0 300 100 1 300 0 800 1 100

2008–11 2012–15 2008–11 2012–15 2008 –11 2012 –15 2008 –11 2012 –15 2008– 11 2012–15

US

Western Europe (France, UK, Germany, Italy)

Arms Deliveries to the Middle East by supplier (in millions of current US dollars, all data are rounded).

Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2008– 2015 (Washington, 2016), Table 22, p. 47.

Egypt Israel Jordan Algeria Iraq Syria Saudi-Arabia UAE

Table 3.3

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Table 3.4 Regional share of arms deliveries and arms transfer agreement value, all suppliers, 2008 –2011, 2012 –2015 (%). Percentage of Deliveries Value by Region, 2008–2015 % Near East Asia Latin America Africa (Egypt here)

Percentage of Agreement Value by Region, 2008–2015

2008 –2011

2012–2015

2008–2011

2012 –2015

41,95 40,96 10,17 6,92

49,04 37,24 9,38 4,34

54,47 28,85 12,39 4,29

61,11 31,33 7,17 4,19

Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2008–2015 (Washington, 2016), Table 7 and Table 18.

per cent of all agreements worldwide in both periods (2018– 2011, 2012–2015); its value (only) in 2015 with developing states was $US65,2 billion.49 As Table 4 shows almost half of the weapon transfers measured by their value (49,04 per cent) ended up in the Middle East between 2012– 2015 – and ‘stabilized’ countries with the exception of Syria and Iraq – which is an almost 8 per cent increase from the previous period (2008–2011). With reference to the value of arms transfer agreements, the role of the region is even more striking as its share is higher than 60 per cent (2012– 2015). Secondly, to continue with the original thought, Middle Eastern regimes could not only increase their defense capacities by purchasing weapons but could simultaneously use the same capacities to control their own population and opposition too. It is no surprise that the military or the armed forces – the very object and beneficiary of any military development – have played a major role in both the prevalence and persistence of (semi-)authoritarian regimes in the region since the early independence years. Historical trends have not changed that much since the end of the Cold War. According to Brynen et al, armed forces have remained ‘the cornerstone for authoritarian regimes seeking to maintain themselves in power’50 even at the expense of the democracy aspirations of their own populations. While this formulation prompts that the military plays an instrumental role within an authoritarian regime, it would perhaps be more precise to say that any extensive power vindicated by or provided to the armed forces equals to authoritarianism

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itself. This latter formulation puts somewhat more blame on any actor that has actively contributed to the ‘development’ of the military by selling arms and weapon systems. Indeed, world powers, the West in general, the US and the former USSR (Russia today), have done their best to incorporate Middle Eastern militaries into the global security order – or global security orders – by providing them with ‘massive amounts of arms and military assistance . . . either at low cost, or via privileged access.’51 If, as argued by Brynen, Eva Beilin is right in identifying the above discussed particular conditions as the true sources of Middle Eastern exceptionalism, external powers achieved two goals simultaneously. First, by supplying regional allies with weapons that have fostered strong authoritarianism and regional (in)stability, they have created and maintained both a sense and state of exceptionalism in the Middle East. Secondly, by contributing to regional exceptionalism, they provided a great opportunity for their own academic and think tank sectors to conduct research and seek for explanations of this exceptionalism – in many cases with the active cooperation of local, Middle Eastern academic staff and funded from development aid (ODA) budgets. Edward Said would have identified it, probably, as a dual source of control over the regional developments. Not just weapon, but knowledge is power following Foucault, and from ‘oriental’ perspectives the two complements each other in a certain sense. And both military and development aid has a lot to do with knowledge, let it mean production or transfer.

Gifts, reciprocity and return gifts – in the contemporary Middle Eastern relations It is by no means easy to recognize a universal logic behind aid transfers channelled to the Middle East, simply because one single donor actor (agent) can hardly be identified. Not even the West is a homogenous block. It is easy, however, to recall some general features and characteristics of foreign aid, since they may help us understand the importance of relationship and recognize the existence of Middle Eastern return gifts. While the overall objectives of Western foreign aid in the region are multiple, they have anchored around the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian question. Recent developments in the region, not being the subject of this book though, would confirm the claim that

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gifts indeed make friends. Israel and pro-Western Arab countries have apparently found common enemies to fight against: terrorism, militant Islam fundamentalism and Iran. Only time will tell how strong ties have been forged by Western aid channelled to historically rival forces since the 1970s. Historically, and as mentioned earlier, the main purpose of Western aid has been to ensure regional stability with particular focus on Israel’s security supported by peace agreements (Egypt-Israel 1979, IsraelJordan, 1994) and the peace process (Israel – PLO, 1993). With reference to Egypt and its peace treaty with Israel – seen as an anchor model for wider regional cooperation – US military aid (budget support, concessional loans, military equipment) has been channelled on the condition that Egypt respects its obligations vis-a`-vis Israel. For this purpose, the US signed two memorandums of understanding on foreign assistance with Israel and Egypt respectively in 1979. As the first memorandum of agreement52 (Article 2) between the US and Israel states: if a violation of the Treaty of Peace is deemed to threaten the security of Israel (. . .) the United States will be prepared to consider, on an urgent basis, such measures as the strengthening of the United States presence in the area, the providing of emergency supplies to Israel, and the exercise of maritime rights in order to put an end to the violation.53 As implied in the formulation the only way to honour the American gift (military aid in this case) is to deliver security around Israel. While Cairo accepted this condition for the envisioned sake of peace (or for other, more pragmatist reasons), other Arab countries rejected to sign the Camp David framework agreement (1978) inviting them to join. Instead, they accused Egypt with betrayal on two counts. Sadat, after all, not only undertook that Egypt would no longer fight a war against Israel, but the agreement also implied that the Palestinians, Jordan and Syria lost an Arab ally whose role could have been instrumental in achieving Palestinian independence and sovereignty. Egypt left the community of Arab states temporarily, and if measured by foreign aid conditional on peace (agreements), they reunited only when the PLO and Jordan signed the peace agreements with Israel 15 years later. Since then

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all the three actors benefit from their cooperative stance – which is paid by Western donors, not their old enemy (Israel). External aid – military, development and humanitarian – serves not only the security of the Israeli borders – by preventing traditional war around Israel, it also aspires to contribute to regional stability which is of utmost importance on the EU’s periphery. And while the consequences of the Arab Spring and those of the Western interventions in Iraq seem to question the essence of regional stability, it does not necessarily mean that foreign aid is meaningless or useless. It created new friends and allies in the region, which is beyond doubt. However, by doing so, it also contributed a lot to the sense of injustice in many countries, the populations of which experienced oppression and perceived humiliation to be paid, among others, for peace agreements and related foreign aid. Putting aside the case of concessional loans,54 many pro-Western countries and their civil society actors have received financially unreciprocated grants for the past decades,55 non-material forms of reciprocity deserve attention. The three main ‘motives’ inviting foreign aid transfers to the Middle East can be listed as follows: threat (of attacking Israel, radical Islam, instability, nuclear developments in Iran, cross-border migration, etc); human suffering and spectacle of pain;56 the lack of macroeconomic stability, meaningful political reforms and truly democratic changes. The first justifies military assistance, the second calls for humanitarian aid, and the third may be bought by development-related (ODA) conditionality. As discussed in Chapter 2, all the three types of aid may qualify as (return) gifts offered for the promise of stability, less human suffering and development (including economic growth, democratic change). One either identifies these promises – at least at conceptual level – as circulating gifts or deems the recipient countries and societies as ‘parasites’ (following Serres, see Chapter 2), that always take, never give and, consequently, remain indebted not only in financial, but in the moral and political sense too. To sum up, the Middle Eastern aid relations seem to offer an excellent opportunity to see how the logic of gifts and return gifts work as there is an abundance of official aid that flows to the region. The contemporary gift strengthens a complex set of social bonds between the aid recipients (Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the PNA) and their (Western and regional) donors in the Middle East on the one

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hand. On the other hand, the very same aid (of Western origin) also enhances the cooperation on the recipient side: between Israel and the Arab regimes concerned. The exchanges of ceremonial and contemporary international gifts equally provide human, social and international recognition beyond and over their material or monetized value. Hence, reciprocity has distinct functions in the Middle East(ern IR) too. Not least because transactions between enemies, foreign aid relations included, are more likely to be guided by the norm of reciprocity.57 They may serve not only as a cohesive force, but also as a substitute for war.58 The governments of Egypt (PNA and Jordan since the 1990s) cannot simply take Western money – if they cannot return the military-security assistance, or development aid by avoiding war, they will not get more aid. The same logic applies to those actors that are seen as legitimate representatives of democratic changes in the recipient countries.

The Arab Spring and the conflicting objectives of foreign aid The Arab Spring was received with huge enthusiasm and media coverage worldwide.59 The demonstrations seemed to reflect ‘a collective struggle of the subjugated Arab peoples against their non-responsive, but repressive governments’.60 Scholars envisioned long-lasting academic debates for ‘the affected societies will struggle with the challenges of transition to uncertain future’.61 The Arab Spring also stirred serious political debates on the role, necessity and merits of foreign support both in donor and recipient countries (see later).62 While the Western public and governments welcomed the victory of freedom over authoritarianism in the Middle East in 2011, fears about regime stability have significantly increased as time went on.63 These fears can be explained not only by apparent destabilization of the region, but also by the decreasing internal legitimacy of long-supported allies. Foreign aid, as it had been provided to internationally pro-Western, but domestically authoritarian regimes, has become part of the problem in countries where military aid (preserving the status quo) and development assistance (encouraging transition to democracy) was equally significant (detailed data illustrating trends in military support and ODA will be presented in Chapter 4).

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Figure 3.1 ODA grants (development and humanitarian aid) from OECD DAC donors to selected MENA countries, 2006– 2015 (constant prices, millions $US dollar, 2014).

Recipient (million $US)

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Egypt

899 1 202 1 216

833

657

474

597

645

Jordan

487

575

527

567

720

783 1 434 1 262 343

490

554

422 508

376

Lebanon

465

454

511

356

261

248

505

Syrian Arab

125

124

202

164

152

146

518 1 795 1 602 1 988

844

Republic West Bank and

887

910 1 408 1 853 1 714 1 556 1 101 1 759 1 406 1 023

220

225

Gaza Strip other Middle East

541

212

176

157

289

721

567

530

(regional scope)

Source: OECD DAC Statistics, Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a], Data extracted on 25 January 2017.

The value of ODA (only grants without the obligation of financial reciprocity from OECD DAC donors) has increased most remarkably towards Jordan and Syria due to the humanitarian aid component involved since the Arab Spring (Figure 3.1). Egypt, apparently, received less ODA from Western countries than it did before the Arab Spring, but its access to military assistance has remained, by and large, unaffected (Table 4.2, Chapter 4). In hindsight, local struggles and promising demonstrations have inspired major and visible changes

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neither in foreign aid disbursments (with the exception of humanitarian assistance, see Table 4.4. and Figure 4.1), nor in the structure and power relations of those Arab regimes that have peace agreements with Israel. US and European aid policies promoting stronger civil societies, respect for human rights, visible political reforms were ambitious enough to create tensions between Western capitals and aid recipient governments both before and after the Arab Spring. However, they failed to bring about positive changes in terms of real democratization. Western response to the Arab Spring would ‘make a perfect case study for those interested in the conflict between perceived interests and values’, since the ‘United States and Europe have for decades shown acquiescence towards, and often actively supported, Arab authoritarian regimes in return for Western-friendly policies’.64 It is not incidental that Western ‘democracy promotion’ in the Middle East has been seen counterproductive inasmuch as ‘by polishing some of the “rough edges” of authoritarianism, they might have even contributed to its persistence’65 not only in the Arab countries, but even in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian relations. While the Arab Spring shook Egypt in an unprecedented manner in 2011, the consecutive events seem to prove that Albert Camus was right in distinguishing rebellion from revolution. The rebel, as individual, always rebels for freedom. Egyptians did it, as their fellows in other countries too. Revolutionary governments, however, cannot but become war governments, even totalitarian governments by killing people and ideas.66 But even if it was possible to kill for the idea of democracy theoretically, it is impossible to kill democratically: peaceful rebels in Egypt and elsewhere did not know how to do it. And the relationship between the authoritarian government in Egypt and their Western (bilateral, multilateral) donors or regional patrons (like Saudi-Arabia) has proved to be stronger than the necessity for deep and substantial democracy. It cannot be a coincidence that the majority of the population in Jordan and Palestine could not be mobilized against the central regimes during the Arab Spring – either because they felt content with the current state of affairs, or because they did not or could not risk the relative freedom and prosperity they enjoyed for uncertain gains, but likely negative consequences.

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Battles for external legitimacy: Competing for contemporary gifts ‘I wondered when we became slaves and others masters. Was it another era of intangible and invisible colonialism in which we lived? It was not the Ottomans, the French or the British who had colonized us; it was the remnants of the power left by colonizers. It was the sense of privilege over the inferior masses that had been taken over by the bourgeois that had claimed the privilege over all of us, using the state structure to disempower the rest of us, to keep us down, and to enslave us in mind and spirit.’67 Samaa Gamie’s story collected by Asaad al-Saleh, Voices of the Arab Spring, p. 101. Recent developments drew attention to the importance of legitimacy that has some relevance in gift exchange theories too as long as the (external) gift influences not only the distribution of goods in society, but perceptions on justice and fairness too. Although legitimacy is a core concept in social sciences, it is not easy to define it.68 It assumes that there is obedience and some level of consent on the part of those who are governed, and this consent stems more from persuasion and trust and less from overt physical coercion or material incentives (such as gifts, subsidies, tax examptions). Neither performance (providing public goods and services, welfare benefits or good governance), nor popularity (public or collective support measured by opinion polls) equals fully to legitimacy,69 even if none can be fully ignored when exploring legitimacy questions. To understand the problem of legitimacy in authoritarian regimes, a brief distinction is needed to be made between the democracy-related normative approach of legitimacy and its Weberian, descriptiveempirical understanding. The normative concept of legitimacy holds that ‘some objective notion of what is right, justifiable or legitimate exists’ and assumes certain conditions such as ‘acceptability or justification of political power or authority’.70 The ‘legitimate being’ of democracies can be described by such qualities as having a respect of the rule of law; equality of all citizens before the law; separation of executive, legislative and juridical powers; political pluralism and

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mass participation;71 free competition of political parties for votes; political and civil liberties; and also respect of human rights and particularly freedom of speech. These features are built in the normative interpretation of political legitimacy and are generally subsumed in the concept of ‘good governance’. In political systems where democratic (normative) political legitimacy is absent, such as in most countries in the MENA, regimes mainly survive because they are supported or considered ‘legitimate’ by small, influential national elite or by external powers that continue to cultivate relations with them. The survival of these elites and the stability of the authoritarian regimes depended on the descriptive understanding of legitimacy (among others). The majority of ‘Arab Spring’ demonstrators, however, aspired to attain normative legitimacy (see later). While legitimacy in general is viewed as a source of stability in social systems, political legitimacy is considered a basic condition for governing. Regime stability becomes a ‘function of the ongoing ability of the actors within the system to mobilize resources to perpetuate a legitimate system’.72 Indeed, throughout the decades (Western style) democracy and democratic legitimacy have become a sort of synonym for political stability – stability here means the management of orderly change and not simply the maintenance of status quo73 – and as such something to be promoted and supported worldwide. Hence, global democracy building has become one of the main focuses of Western foreign aid for the past two and a half decades. Outcomes and consequences of the ‘Arab Spring’, however, drew attention to the limits of external support. But if it is hard to define the concept of legitimacy precisely, it is not less difficult to describe how legitimacy interact with foreign aid. Western donors supported both sets of actors by providing aid (and expecting return gifts, see Chatper 4), which complicated the sense of justice and related legitimacy issues in the recipient countries. They did so, not because they could not provide assistance only to those fighting for democratic/normative legitimacy, but because supporting only them was simply not feasible. Just as there are conflicting interests on the donor side (for example prioritizing democracy-promotion over stability or vice versa) there are various/multiple beneficiaries in the recipient country pursuing conflicting goals. National/government elites are naturally interested in preserving their privileges, maintaining the status

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quo and securing order and stability (descriptive-empirical legitimacy). However, certain non-state beneficiaries,74 civil society organizations, grassroots initiatives and other segments of the population are more interested in reforms, democratic changes and attaining normative legitimacy (donors’ terminology: transition from authoritarianism to democracy).

Legitimacy in the Middle East Legitimacy in Arab countries75 – even if combined with coercion, threats or material incentives (welfare goods, tax exemption, etc.) – is much closer to the original, Weberian, descriptive-empirical definition which states that “the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige”.76 People tend to obey even in (semi-)authoritarian regimes, such as Egypt, Jordan, or the PNA;77 the Arab Spring, as an exception, only strengthens the rule. Stability, simply because the rules of the game are known to the people, apparently is valued more than uncertain and painful transition to democracy in authoritarian systems. It cannot be understood without referring briefly to historicalcolonial interactions with external powers on the one hand and the internal sources of legitimacy on the other. Colonialism, the independence movements and the gradual process of de-colonialism added various layers of complexity to the traditional concept of legitimacy having been based mainly on known sources of legitimacy such as religion, kinship and tradition. Indeed, the role played by religion and nationalism78 has been proposed to study the standards of legitimacy in terms of regime maintenance and stability.79 Not only modern nationalism, but religion clearly influences political attitudes on such matters as identity, concept of justice, the nature of a legitimate political system, obedience, or obligation and rights. Diverse political views on the authority and legitimacy of the new state order have created real and virtual battlefields not only in Egypt,80 but in other MENA countries as well. Recalling El Fadl’s analysis legitimacy (shar’iyya) is a key word in the Arab world81 which has become an elastic word that is exploited to invent and repress history; to construct and de-construct identity; and to uphold and

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deny rights. Legitimacy is possessed by no one, but claimed by everyone, and it is enforced only through sheer power. In the absence of a transparent and accountable civil process, those who believe that they are the de facto possessors of legitimacy massacre in cold blood, torture, maim and commit every possible offense in the name of defending the existing legitimacy. Lack of genuine democratization, related legitimacy problems and the inclination to authoritarian modes of government in the Middle East have received considerable attention in the literature alongside the questions on what role can be played by foreign aid. Explanations were into three major categories as summarized by Rex Brynen and his co-authors.82 First, there are scholars, labelled as essentialists that emphasize that (political) culture is resistant to change due to its embeddedness in history, religion and social organization. Whether the blame is put on Islam as a religion hardly inseparable from politics, government, state and society or on the role played by kinship, tribes and family in decision-making and behaviour, or the various combinations of these two main factors is secondary. The emphasis is on the lack of internal transformative power that should achieve meaningful changes against the traditional, historical or culturalreligious. As it is missing, foreign aid is justified. Secondly, there are theories arguing that political culture plays an important role in explaining politics, but its role is not exclusive and the processes and phenomena the concept denotes are subject to change. Conceptualist scholars argue that labels such as ‘Arab’ and ‘Islamic’ lead to misunderstandings by simplification and generalization. In addition, they question the central role attributed to monolithic interpretations of tradition, culture, history and religion by essentialists saying that the interplay between symbols, ideologies, material concerns and conditions are equally, if not more, important. The third group of authors, identified by Brynen et al, occupy the critical platform by doubting the very ‘feasibility or value of politicalculture analysis.’ They prefer to analyse institutions, legal rules, history, social class and political economy over obscure phenomena that can be described as ‘political culture.’ Although these sets are overlapping and are acknowledged,83 components of legitimacy should be recalled briefly.

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What are the most important features of regime legitimacy in the countries concerned? While Sedgwick identified three external plus seven internal components of legitimacy in Egypt, Schlumberger simply distinguished the international dimension of legitimacy from the local (domestic) dimensions.84 According to Schlumberger, there are four components being the main sources of domestic ‘nondemocratic’ legitimacy in the Arab world: religion; tradition; ideology; and the provision of welfare benefits to their populations. Schlumberger concludes that religion played a less important role than either traditional or material legitimacy, whereas ideology (nationalism, Islamism, globalization and neoliberalism, democracy-promotion and their combination alike) has become a more and more relevant category as reflected by foreign aid policies and priorities as well. Religion, which is an integral part of local identities, is seen as an obvious source of regime legitimacy in Jordan, whereas it has played and still plays a slightly less significant role in Egypt due to the state-led persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood85 and for other reasons in the PNA (at least in the West Bank since 2007).86 Islam, however, has been playing a more and more interesting role in the region since the Arab Spring obscuring many categories that used to be taken for granted. The recent contest for regional hegemony between Saudi Arabia and Iran combined with the political and economic support that they (as regional donors) provide to or deny from Islamic political movements (Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) cannot but drag religion into legitimacy debates. In similar vein, although mostly ignored by Western foreign aid interventions, tradition (which is not entirely independent of religion) plays a vital role in almost all Arab countries in the Middle East, mainly through family structures, the legacy and the question of ‘dynastization’ of power both in macro (IR) and micro (sociology) levels. By the logic of welfare legitimacy, regime legitimacy can be maintained either by ‘the oil rent’ (using oil income or financial transfers from oil-rich neighbours to buy legitimacy with subsidies and government jobs) or by foreign aid, which has attempted to prevent destabilization (see Chapter 5). It enabled Arab governments to provide various (welfare) benefits to various societal segments for decades and simultaneously to keep the population under control either by offering them jobs in the public sector or supervising them by the intelligence

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services. This kind of political legitimacy might also be seen as a ‘mediator’ between rents (foreign aid) and political stability, but rents can buy negative political legitimacy and provide ‘elusive stability’ as indicated by the ‘Arab Spring’.87 Nonetheless domestic ‘welfare’ legitimacy is hardly separable from international legitimacy. Sedgwick described external legitimacy as ‘the extent to which political regimes are considered legitimate by the leading external powers, that is, Western governments and international organizations.’88 Economic and political dependency (on external support/aid) is closely related in as much as the major function of MENA foreign policies have been securing resource flows and aid from external resources.89 This strengthened a non-democratic situation: most governments have tended to be more responsive to external demands (formulated in peace treaties, grant or loan agreements) than to (mostly) non-taxpaying domestic opinion. Regime legitimacy in the countries concerned has become dependent on foreign military-security assistance providing protection from regional and local ‘dangers’.90 As without a certain level of external/international legitimacy there is no access to rents, particularly foreign aid, it may be a convenient means of assessing external legitimacy. Since – as emphasized by constructivist IR theories – ‘the mutual recognition of standards of legitimacy’ plays an important role in shaping international behaviour,91 external (foreign aid) interventions can be seen as aiming to influence the ‘standards of legitimacy’ (see Chapter 4). Indeed, legitimacy is widely seen ‘as a device of social and [political] control’,92 and a way to ensure obedience and stability.

Contest for external legitimacy in the Middle East and its domestic impacts From critical perspectives, foreign aid may be seen as an instrument of hegemony by donors being primarily interested in a certain kind of political order by cultivating good relations with aid recipients (instead of waging wars). It implies that aid is about creating and maintaining ‘international’ social bonds93 only to enable the donors to pursue their policy goals.94 While the theory of the gift can be seen as a theory of human solidarity,95 gifts simultaneously convey certain donor identities that may represent a threat to the recipient’s status and identity (see later).96 In other words, ‘contemporary gifts’

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serve the purpose of maintaining any (Western, global, regional, neoliberal) order that favours donor interests and enjoys consent from the recipient side.97 Foreign aid has its own sociology in the Middle East too,98 its own ties and bonds to produce non-coerced and ‘voluntary’ cooperation, alliance or friendship between the donor and the recipient by strengthening or weakening the legitimacy of the latter. In the context of foreign aid external legitimacy refers not only to the relationship between the donor and the recipient, but also to the multilayered, complex relations between various beneficiaries (governments, NGOs, population) in the recipient country. The survival of Arab regimes – in Egypt, the PNA99 and Jordan alike – has become dependent on their external legitimacy (maintained by foreign, especially military and security-related aid flows) on the one hand and on internal legitimacy-building strategies on the other, such as providing welfare goods, patronage and applying well-calculated coercion, crushing rebellions and protest movements, prosecuting dissidents, and killing political opponents (see Chapters 4, 5).100 If most regimes in the MENA region have been quite stable enjoying even internal legitimacy for decades,101 it mostly took place ‘only’ due to certain incentives: their rent (aid) incomes, allocation practices and patronage systems.102 If analysed by econometric means, ‘unearned foreign income’ seems to prolong regime survival by mitigating revolutionary demands but not fully eliminating them.103 Since donors pursue simultaneously competing political objectives in the MENA region, it is not easy to answer the question of how foreign aid interacts with domestic interests, internal legitimacy, social cohesion or political stability. Jordan, Egypt and Palestine signed peace agreements with the ‘eternal’ enemy, Israel, the very act of which has been seen as a betrayal and shame by the wider Arab public opinion at least in light of the expansion of the Israeli settlements and partial occupation in the West Bank and blockade around Gaza. Indeed, the failure of the peace process and general toll over the years of the Israeli occupation of Palestine has contributed to the distancing of Palestinians, Jordanians and Egyptians from their elites. Ways and modes of respecting their legal obligations vis-a`-vis Israel led to tensions between the governments and their population thanks to the variety of means these regimes could apply thanks to the availability

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of donor money. The selected regimes have received ‘political aid’ or safeguarding Western interests in the region such as European stability or Israeli security104 regardless to their achievements in terms of economic development or political reforms. To understand ‘aid interventions’ and their impact on legitimacy in Egypt, Jordan and the PNA, it must also be kept in mind that they are supposed to be not coerced, but mostly ‘approved’ – even initiated in principle – by the recipient. The process of how foreign aid may interact with structures of (internal) legitimacy by creating or strengthening division lines in a given society has been much less evident. Indeed, little research has been carried out on how relations among various beneficiaries (governments, civil society organizations, populations) in the recipient countries are shaped by the very acceptance (reception) of foreign aid.105 Two phenomena, however, are clear by reading the literature. First, civil society organizations, grassroots movements, associations, charity foundations nowhere exist in a political vacuum; although Western donors often tend to look at and portray them as if they were independent of the authoritarian political landscape that they aspire to change. However, as discussed by Amaley Jamal, civil society organizations ‘need to conform to basic, minimal state expectations if they are to even exist’. The presence and participation of international donors not only offer funding opportunities (and some independence from the authoritarian powers), but even complicates the otherwise delicate position of local civil society organizations being interested in democratic changes. Secondly, as Shelia Carapico argued, international civil society promotion usually yields a dictatorial pushback against it – even if the central governments also benefit from aid cooperation with the same donors.106 Even the distinction between aid-recipient (authoritarian) governments (seen as trustees of stability) and civil society organizations (seen as democracy promoters) is misleading. Not all non-state beneficiaries are actively promoting change as quite many civil society organizations are supported by (authoritarian) governments in the Middle East too.107 The matter is compex as civil society actors may threaten regime stability in many ways (as we will see in Chapters 4 and 5). Taking the example of Palestinian NGOs, their (political) activities are constrained both by Israel, the PNA in the West Bank and the Hamas in the Gaza

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Strip. Yet, many NGOs can operate more or less freely in the Palestinian Territories, if they give up their overly political ambitions and focus on humanitarian activities. However, even by retreating they can somehow ‘threat’ the internal legitimacy of the central authorities by offering better services than the government. Anne M. Zimmermann called this phenomenon ‘chimera state’ arguing that the autonomy and core capabilities of parallel institutions not only allow producing higher levels of public services, but they, at the very same time, hinder the infrastructural power of the recipient states.108 Such parallel institutions may include such seemingly apolitical scenes, as health care centres and educational and social welfare services. Apart from legitimacy-problems, the parallel institutions may also serve government interests as the (donor funded) activities contribute to reducing government spending on welfare services. Not only Palestine, but Egypt and Jordan also illustrate the complexity of interests.109 The status of politically active civil society organizations (portrayed as ‘illegitimate’ or ‘foreign agent’ by the regimes) is even more complicated. Their persecution can be explained by the blurred border between political (Islamist opposition) parties and (politically conscious, secular or Islamist) civil society organizations. From the perspectives of the authoritarian governments both categories may qualify as an enemy jeopardizing the interests of the ruling elites. Recognizing growing Western interest in democracy support to civil society organizations since the 1990s, most Arab governments sensed threats and opportunities simultaneously. They tried to ‘nationalize’ democratization sources establishing various quasi non-governmental organizations representing their interests.110 These attempts, however, were seen as ‘the greatest promise for civil society and, hence, for the democratization process’ from the inside two decades ago. As further argued by Saad Eddin Ibrahim, ‘it has provided ample bargaining power to civil society organizations when they deal with the [authoritarian] state in attempts to gain concessions of socio-political reformative nature.’111 It is no surprise that foreign aid to civil society organizations has led to tensions between regional and Western capitals well before the Arab Spring. Widely perceived as an attempt to undermine the stability and legitimacy of authoritarian regimes, donors have been accused of influencing domestic political games by ignoring national sovereignty. In order to prevent their Western patrons’ betrayal behind the scenes,112

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most regimes in the Middle East hindered political liberalization by implementing restrictions on political rights and external support to their civil society organizations (as discussed in Chapter 4).113 As Western donors, especially the EU, expected political reforms and respect for human rights in exchange for aid both before and after the Arab Spring, (semi-)authoritarian governments started to rely on ‘more subtle, but ultimately more effective, techniques’ by ‘devoting full-time attention to the challenge of crippling the opposition without annihilating it, and flouting the rule of law while maintaining a plausible veneer of order, legitimacy, and prosperity’.114 To illustrate the relevance of Janus-faced democracy building and development in the context of legitimacy ‘[t]he elections have demonstrated that even the worst dictators feel obliged to seek popular legitimacy through the symbols of democracy. But the elections they orchestrate are less a contest between rival candidates than a measurement of the leader’s control over the population’.115 However, elections are not only about measuring loyalty. In a way they also provide external legitimacy which is needed to maintain foreign aid flows, especially, ‘political aid’ targeting legal and electoral reforms and civil society activism/ representation alike.116 Uninterrupted aid disbursements – to authoritarian governments promising reforms – not only prove how Arab governments successfully manipulated foreign donors expecting political reforms, but also indicate the strength of their external legitimacy. External legitimacy provided by donors, the income and wealth secured by foreign aid (complementing or substituting domestic local taxes) combined with the oppressive state capacities (developed with external support in order to ensure regional/global stability) all contribute to the conservation of authoritarian power and the ‘sense of privilege over the inferior masses’. It is far from being easy to capture the impact Western colonialization, subjugation, oppression has in today’s societies in the Middle East, but the lived experiences, narratives and memories illustrate the relevance of this legacy surprisingly well.117 Contemporary political and military elites oppress their own people, just as their predecessors were oppressed by the colonial powers long ago.118 And while recent concerns about the stability of regimes go back many decades, fears about the decreasing legitimacy of long-supported allies and the growing instability in the Middle East and North Africa

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appears to be at a higher level now than before. The traditional trade-off between the foreign support channelled in the form of aid to ‘cooperative’ governments in the Middle East and the return gift (stability, its promise or illusion) gained for such support has been challenged by the Arab Spring. It seems, foreign aid may contribute to stability selectively: only if the internal legitimacy of the beneficiary is not challenged on the grounds of serving foreign interests.

CHAPTER 3 TRADITIONAL, RELIGIOUS AND CONTEMPORARY GIFTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Most people in the region seem to share the conviction that their government(s) are expected to give up ‘something’ in exchange for foreign aid. In other words, there is a sort of perceived ‘sacrifice’ to be paid by the recipients in the aid relations especially in East-West dimensions. Attention will be paid to international social bonds between donors and recipients, how they have been shaped by foreign aid, how aid recipient governments use and misuse funds and how they return the ‘gift of foreign aid’ even at the expense of social cohesion.

Gifts in pre-modern societies and generosity in the Middle East There is literally no aspect of the economy that is independent of Israeli control and international influence. The PA answers to international/Israeli orders and has almost no accountability to local communities. Sadly, international NGOs fail to live up to their civil society mandate. Instead, they compete with local NGOs for funding, staff and beneficiaries. (. . .) There is a massive and self-perpetuating “humanitarian” system that not only constrains local agency, but also undermines traditional systems

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for interdependence and self-reliance’ words of an activist at AidWatch Palestine1 Relations established by gifts are far more complicated than usually assumed. Gift-giving is the very precondition for the community, so much so, that the constitution of community is tied to the obligation to give, to receive and to return.2 It applies to the Middle East too. It has a very diverse population and it is particularly true in case of the countries being the subject of this book. Muslim Arabs, Christian Arabs and non-Arabs, minorities from the broader region (Armenians, Turks, for example), and Jews have different institutions, social norms and habits, yet, the groups are linked by the shared experience of living in permanent turmoil in the twentieth century. Group identity and belonging are important because private affairs and family law are guided by religious laws and rules in most countries. Although cultural and social norms do not necessarily have stronger explanatory force in terms of the contemporary challenges than political factors have – the experience of oppression by external powers, the legacy of colonialization in the Middle East,3 the memory of the Holocaust in Europe, that of the Palestinian nakba, the presence of the modern (nation)state in the region – it is worthwhile to recall the local norms of generosity and gift-giving in Islamic and Jewish traditions. The region hosts a Muslim majority society. Generosity is one of the most important virtues of Islam that cannot be strictly separated from Arab traditions. Dawn Chatty recalls the saying ‘I against my brother; I and my brother against my cousin; I, my brother and my cousin against the world’ to argue that ‘the layered outlook on alliances and enmity among families, lineages, and tribes throughout the Arab world’ defines how the principle of generosity (karam in Arabic) involves security, protection, and respect simultaneously. Compared to the Maussan gift, karam is also about creating relationship and calling for return. Excessive gifting or inappropriate return can equally result in hostility and insecurity in the Middle East too.4 Generosity (nobility) and charity is first and foremost based on religious duties. Traditional gifts, unlike Western aid, are not primarily offered to remote others. The system of Islamic solidarity starts with the

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individual, and then comes the family, followed by the Islamic society and finally the entire mankind. It aims to strengthen the Islamic communities locally and beyond the state borders, but applies to mankind en masse once the needs of the umma have been met.5 Nonetheless, due to globalization, contemporary Islamic charity organizations also have to work according to the market logic as they compete with Western (I)NGOs for donations.6 With reference to the religious roots, the noun ‘zakat’ stems from the verb ‘zaka’ the meaning of which is ‘to purify.’ The objective is to give up a given portion of one’s wealth in order ‘to purify’ that portion which remains.7 It is not simply an act correcting market failure (by fulfilling the needs of the poor), but it has a deep moral message and has a religious function too by being the third pillar of the Islam faith. To give zakat proves the giver’s (donor’s) restraint on selfishness, greed and imperviousness to other’s plight and simultaneously it purifies the beneficiary from jealousy and hatred towards the wealthy.8 The word, pure or purify deserves here attention the extent to which, as we will see later, accepting money from non-Islamic sources (Western donors) under politically unacceptable conditions may evoke the label ‘shameful’ or ‘dirty’ on the recipient side. The principles of zakat involve among others, a sort of ‘financial worship’ – Olli Pyyhtinen talked about necessary sacrifice (inevitable loss) upon discussing the conceptual problem built in the Maussan giftexchange – without which the efficacy of the prayer is negated. Giving is all the more mandatory as man is ‘merely viceregent or trustee over the resources available’ to him.9 Even if zakat is a religious duty, the Quran and the Sunna does not prescribe penalties in case of noncompliance. The practice from full incorporation of zakat by the state (Pakistan, for example) to its marginalization to the individual’s private sphere varies from country to country in the Muslim world.10 It is rather a matter of conscience and responsibility, fear of God (taqwa) probably because the modern state entered the Islamic world from a Western direction. In most Muslim countries zakat is a private matter and justified by Quran verses that expect the believer to distribute its wealth (zakat, alms) in secret. The phenomena that beneficiaries in many cases do not feel comfortable with disclosing how much and from whom they received is reasoned by the special religious merit that

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accompanies anonymous giving on the one hand. On the other, there are also fears that public welfare benefits from the state will not be available for them if they are given alms via private-religious channels.11 Regardless to the reasons behind, secrecy or discretion accompanying generosity is important at least at the level of traditions. It deserves attention as it is in sharp contrast to the contemporary ‘Western’ gift which promotes visibility, transparency and accountability in official communication manuals from paperwork to billboard on the street. Zakat – seen as a religious duty – should be distinguished from a more voluntarily form of giving, that is sadaqa (sadaqah or sadaka). This latter reflects moral excellence, beyond duty. Zakat is obligatory in religious terms, targets and benefits the Muslim poor and prioritizes kins over those outside the circle of the family. While zakat is a standardized proportion, usually the one-fortieth of one’s assets (wealth over the life necessities) that has to benefit Muslims in need, sadaqa is more like a ‘modern gift’ understood in everyday terms. It may take various forms (advice, in-kind-assistance, smiles or other gestures) and can be given to anyone – provided that the religious obligation of zakat has been met.12 The practice of zakat is closer to the gifts described by Mauss than sadaqa. Beyond the solidarity function, giving gifts on the occasion of holidays, weddings, etc. is also common, but much less guided by charity motives, but by other concerns. Gift-giving in Jewish teachings, culture and tradition has an equally central role and is similar to Islamic practices in many senses.13 It is somewhat closer to the idea of kindness, than to that of moral obligation or duty, but it is hard to separate these motives. Maimonides (1135 – 1204) collected three reasons to give gifts and eight levels of tzedakah, which latter term expresses a religious obligation to do what is right and just. The most valuable giving is to help someone to become self-sufficient and independent so that ‘the helped’ could give back to the society. This first level is followed by giving donations unanimously to unknown beneficiaries.14 Individuals in need should be given tzedakah – an obligation in Jewish tradition but reminding linguistically to the ‘voluntary’ sadaqa in Arabic – which has much less to do with charity than with justice. Furthermore, Rainer Barzen argued that ‘the meaning of the many forms of Jewish poor relief that are subsumed under the term tzedakah should not be reduced to their

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philanthropic or even theological implications’ as it has always been about strengthening ‘the organizational structures of the Jewish community’ against external threats.15 As Mauss described in a different geographical context, gifts circulate. Reciprocity equally applies to the Jewish comprehension of tzedakah: ‘the way we reach out to others . . . determines how others will treat us,’16 and to the Islamic-Arab understanding. This latter may be illustrated by contemporary words of a Palestinian businessman: ‘giving is a duty toward the civil society. If I don’t care for this [Palestinian] society, it won’t take care of me.’17 Beyond reciprocity, Jewish and Islamic giving, at least at theoretical level, is common in pleasing God, serving God’s interests and the individual’s good relations with God. As the brief discussion on the Middle Eastern (well, only Jewish and Islamic) traditions illustrates, the gift ‘does not affect only isolated and discontinuous incidents in social life but social life in its entirety,’18 which simultaneously includes the relations (transactions, social interactions) between actors and the gift-object too. As argued by Olli Pyyhtinen, the gift presents ‘how relation is transformed into thing and thing into relation’. The gift gains its ‘meaning, value and force in and through relations.’19 Beyond its material properties, the gift bears important information on ‘social’ properties, such as the giver and his intentions behind giving, the recipient, the history and future of the relation between the giver and the recipient, which all determine the meaning of the gift, its dark side included.20 It is the ‘relation’ between the foreign donor and the Middle Eastern recipient, an essential element of gift-giving (beyond the object itself), which makes it possible to analyse foreign aid practices within the analytical framework of gift exchange. Local norms and customs, discussed briefly in this section, not only guide everyday decisions or determine people’s interactions, expectations and beliefs, but also can be compared to alternative (global, international) understandings of solidarity. The differences between Western (international) and regional (Islamic) aid cultures can be conceptualized in the form of three sets of dichotomies, namely universalism vs. solidarity, neutrality vs. justice, and secularism vs. religion.21 The idea foreign aid is understood by the general Western public as a universal obligation that contributes constructively to development, democracy or poverty reduction with no implications for

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politics or justice (for European public opinion see Chapter 5). Yet, contemporary gifts of foreign origin may have serious negative side-effects on local habits and traditions:22 Domestic assistance plays smaller role as there is no need for [local] contributions since internationals are present . . . volunteerism is killed in Palestine because of our [NGO] work. If people know that they can get paid for something they could do voluntarily, people will choose to get paid and let others do the job. As illustrated by the cited thought, out-crowding local initiatives by foreign aid is a widely perceived phenomenon. It is coupled with the fact that Western aid not only ignores local perceptions on justice, legitimacy and historical narratives in many authoritarian countries, but it also expects the recipient (government, NGO) to talk as little about politics as possible in the context of development or humanitarian assistance. However, as Sheila Carapico emphasized ‘political aid interjects external symbolic, material and institutional resources’ into Middle Eastern and pan-Arab arenas and by doing so it cannot but ‘stimulate controversy and rivalry’23 at the expense of local customs and traditions. Societies and cultures in the region, without exception, have been shaped by perceptions on injustice, the ‘experiences of marginalization, of being colonized, and [understanding] of the poor not as a distant sufferer, but as a fellow member of the community.’24 Justice bears social and political relevance in both Jewish and Islamic traditions, which is crucial to understand why (Western, universal, global) giving in general, humanitarian aid in particular is so much criticized for its ‘apolitical’ and ‘neutral’ ambitions – both in Israel and the Arab countries – while military assistance is rather seen a means to keep regional clients alive (Chapter 4 and 5 will further elaborate on it).

Features of contemporary foreign aid in the Middle East The origins and background of Western donor presence in the Middle East The history of official foreign aid provided to Middle Eastern states traces back only a little more than a half century. Its origins, however,

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can be found in early charity activities in the region. Reviewing the history and origins of Western humanitarianism in the Middle East, Keith Watenplaugh captures ‘the inherent richness of [early] humanitarianism as a problem of social and cultural history in a way that retains relevance to contemporary debates about the promotion of human rights, and the work of relief and development.’25 A lot has changed since the early 1900s. Contemporary humanitarian assistance and development aid are conceptually distinct activities. Yet, their purposes can be distinguished only at the level of principles and intentions (donor end). Both become ‘political’ (or politicised) in the very moment when they reach the ground (recipient end). Either is free from the social and cultural history of the recipient and none of them can free itself from the historical legacy of colonial or mandate eras. Aidfinanced development and humanitarian activities also have considerable political and social impact on domestic fronts in the Middle East too.26 It is much more evident in case of development aid that openly aspires to change local institutions and norms guiding people’s interactions, than in the case of humanitarian aid. The latter claims to be neutral and impartial but cannot. Security-related development assistance or military aid has even more obvious impact on local developments (as the second part of this book will show). As Watenplaugh argued, the dominant ideologies of nationalism and colonialism in the first half of the twentieth century should be studied not only by focusing on the brutality of the time, but also by ‘studying the humanitarianism of that same era [which] is not a correction to that history but rather a way to understand an answer to its underlying inhumanity.’27 This observation applies to contemporary developments as well. If the Ottoman empire and its military in the late nineteenth century was seen as ‘exterior to “Europeanness”’ and labelled as ‘barbaric entity beyond the fold of barbaric civilizational norms’ by the intervening Western European states and their public opinion, the contemporary Middle East is seen as not less hopeless. Current domestic efforts to make peace or achieve political reforms, either assisted or ignored by Western ambitions and resources, are always seen as inadequate. Being not sufficient they constantly invite further money, external experts, development diplomats, and humanitarian activists to make a difference or visible changes. Edward Said in his famous Orientalism (1978) described illustratively how the European man invented the Oriental to define himself as

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superior: qualities such as lazy, irrational, uncivilized, crudeness were related to the Orientals (Arabs, Muslims), and automatically the Europeans became active, rational, civilized, modern, sophisticated.28 As local people have been seen incapable of running their own government in line with international standards of ‘good governance’, the European/Western presence has been justified since the age of colonization, through the mandate period and the decolonization process to the contemporary era of security and development cooperation. Even if Said’s methods and arguments were criticized, probably most illustratively by Malcolm Kerr (1980),29 one cannot deny that his approach has been echoed by other scholars and local voices doubting, among others, the constructiveness of foreign aid. Both development and humanitarian aid fails to acknowledge that while they may strengthen relations between the donor and the recipient, none guarantees efficient solutions to local problems. On the contrary – they usually only make a bigger mess (of course, we cannot know it in absence of laboratory environments). Most publications dealing with ‘foreign aid’ in the Middle East describe and explain the main donor motives and interests, objectives, channels and forms of foreign aid as well as its economic and political impacts, such as influence-buying, rent-seeking or corruption. There are authors investigating the (normative) donor objectives and economic, political and social consequences of foreign aid chanelled simultaneously, but not proportionally, to state and non-state actors.30 Others attempt to analyse Middle Eastern international relations by emphasizing, among others, the role played by foreign aid as part of the regional games and foreign policies.31 Rarely do they offer an in-depth analysis of the invisible political trade-off – international gift exchange – embodied in grant agreements, foreign aid programmes or projects. The ‘gift’ that meant to strengthen the relations between one of the Cold War blocks and their regional friends respectively took various forms in the 1960s, 1970s. It included budgetary assistance, political support; military assistance (combined with arms sales), long-term assistance to military industries, access to advanced surveillance techniques and cooperation with state-owned enterprises.32 The end of the Cold War and the changing balance of power in the region, the EU’s enlargement towards its Eastern and Mediterranean borders added a new layer, or dimension to Western ambitions: democratization. Since the early 1990s

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Table 3.1

THE

MIDDLE EAST

The Arab-Israeli conflict seen as an obstacle to political reform.

q711.1 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? The Arab-Israeli conflict is an obstacle to political reform in your country I agree to a I agree to I absolutely great extent some extent I disagree disagree Egypt Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Palestine Tunisia

38,6% 39,7% 25,8% 63,5% 27,2% 21,7% 49,7% 20,6%

40,5% 41,9% 46,7% 21,8% 21,3% 31,6% 38,4% 39,8%

11,5% 11,3% 22,0% 9,6% 31,3% 31,1% 9,9% 20,9%

9,4% 7,1% 5,5% 5,0% 20,2% 15,6% 2,0% 18,7%

Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%

Source: Arab Barometer Wave III (2012 – 2014).

most MENA countries have been equally engaged in long-term discussions on democratic transition, good governance, reforms and human rights (vis-a`-vis the EU),33 which was considered the only alternative for counterbalancing Islam fundamentalism and preventing regional destabilization. Both sets of objectives – transition to democracy and marginalizing the politically motivated Islamist movements – were meant to be achieved by development cooperation, that is, by ODA. Yet, contrary to ODA’s formal or expected objectives both economic development and deep democratization remained of secondary importance throughout the region. Recent events – the Gulf War (1991), the Oslo Peace Process and the second intifada (1993– 2000/2005), the US-led war on terror (since 2001), the Hamas-PLO/Fateh split in Palestine (2007), the Arab Spring and its regional consequences (2011), the NATO intervention in Libya (2011), the war in Syria and the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) on the ruins of Iraq and Syria, the Iranian nuclear programme – have continued to provide justification for massive humanitarian and military assistance. The specific regional objectives of Western foreign aid in historical terms have been to (i) strengthen regional and European/global stability

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by facilitating cooperation between ‘enemies’ tied by peace treaties (Egypt-Israel, Israel-Jordan); (ii) to support the peace process between Israel and the Palestinian people (at least with pro-Western and proIsraeli actors: PNA, PLO/Fateh); (iii) to secure Israel’s stability simultaneously by keeping the idea of the two-state solution alive; (iv) offsetting the humanitarian consequences of the Israeli occupation (in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) and those of other regional conflicts (Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon). While the list may not be full, and some aspects will be detailed only in Chapter 4, its approximate consideration is inevitable to understand the two main arguments of this book. The first is about the nonmaterial, non-financial forms of return gifts that usually remain invisible in or non-acknowledged by the literature discussing only statistics. The second concerns the perceived link between (missing) domestic political reforms (main motives behind the Arab Spring demonstration, see later) and the Arab-Israeli relations (seen as a key to regional stability by many). This latter link may be illustrated by the following data: As shown in Table 3.1. the public opinion in Egypt, Jordan, Palestine (and Lebanon) agreed far more with the statement that the Arab-Israeli conflict (as if there was no peace agreement between Israel and the concerned Arab countries!) is an obstacle to domestic political reform than people living in countries that are not so close to Israel. It also implies that the domestic consequences of the Arab Spring – human rights violations, the marginalization of many civil society organizations, the lack of real democratization – can also be explained by the Arab-Israeli conflict (peace in the case of Egypt and Jordan). It is, of course, not the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (peace process) itself, being of low-intensity, which prevents meaningful democratization. Unilateral measures applied by Israel against the Palestinians, regional perceptions on it, the way how governing Arab regimes usually portray Israel as a constant threat justifying their own oppressive practices are much stronger explanatory forces. Or, to put it in another way, Arab rulers, having been asked – in exchange for foreign aid – to back unpopular Western foreign policies (peace with Israel) pre-empted unrest by limiting freedom of expression and rounding up potential opponents well before the Arab Spring.34 The ‘spiritual essence’ of Western aid hurts many in the Middle East – not because peace agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jordan and the PNA would be

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shameful, but because the beneficiary countries are expected not to confront Israel for its policies applied in the Palestinian territories (occupation) if they want to remain eligible for external assistance. Of course, it would be simplifying to say that all regional developments, the outcomes of the Arab Spring or the emergence of the violent Islam fundamentalism can be explained by the Arab-Israeli conflict. There are far more states in the MENA region than the ones surrounding Israel, and far more problems not being closely related to the question of Palestinian sovereignty. However, the so-called ‘Palestinian card’ has been so frequently used by all the actors, Israel and the Arab States, regional and Western donors, elites and the masses, radical Islamists and victims of its terror, that one cannot but accept the argument (at least for the purpose of this book) that had the conflict been solved long ago, regional instability would not be a deep concern anymore. And foreign aid honouring – not peace, but – peace agreements (that are upheld by armies and intelligence services and supported by foreign aid) only complicates the picture by providing external legitimacy to actors that are ready to use violence against their own population (see later). Against this background, it is somewhat surprising that the West in general, Europe in particular, has long been puzzled over – well before the Arab Spring (see later) – why and how Middle Eastern countries resisted democratic changes.35 While many doubt any exclusiveness, cultural or social distinctiveness as being a real explanatory variable in understanding the regional developments,36 there is a strong, centurieslong tradition to blame the exceptionality of the region for the prevalence of conflicts, the lack of development or democratic transition (see later). Those referring to cultural reasons focus on traditions and perceived incompatibility of Islam and democracy.37 Others formulating their views more cautiously emphasize: there is nothing in Islam that would contradict democracy;38 at most its context-dependent interpretations or practical applications are at odds with democratic development. Accepting the notion that even MENA can be studied by lenses of social sciences and general theories,39 various factors arise to explain the stability of authoritarianism as well as the lack of real liberalization and democratization. Beyond the historical and political reasons,40 Salamey and Pearson suggest that a combination of various

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factors – international interests in ‘stability’ over democracy coupled with local authoritarian manipulation of colonial legacies, along with ethno-religious interests – played a decisive role.41 Others emphasize the lack of modern institutions and strong civil society pointing either to the significance of traditional family and religious ties, or to the importance of military establishments as factors being responsible for preventing structural-institutional reforms in the Middle East. Authors concerned with economic structures and political economy are convinced that rents, foreign aid or oil revenues combined with the lack of domestic taxes explain the inadequate democratization.42 And last but not least, the un(re)solved status of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the related militarization of the region and to some extent the very being of Israel has been cited as being the main source of oppression in the region and the main barrier of effective democratization.43 Discussing this latter argument (the politics of exceptionalism) will be instrumental in understanding how contemporary gifts work on the one hand. On the other hand, it will also explain, at least to some extent, how the Arab Spring, its failure and the aid-supported peace (process) between Israel and the Palestinians are related.

Arms trade and the politics of exceptionalism Authoritarianism in the Middle East is accompanied by high levels of militarization on the one hand and low respect for human rights on the other hand. Both domestic politics and international relations play their part in this outcome, but there is no straightforward answer to the question of how. This latter equally concerns the direction of causality, the extent and depth of the linkages and the role of ideology, identity and power in shaping both foreign and domestic politics. The answers are diverse but, as summarized by Rex Brynen in the context of the Middle East, the high levels of regional tensions coupled with the ‘inability of leaders to escape the belligerent politics’ clearly contributed to the outcome.44 While the claim concerning inability is probably correct, how ‘belligerent politics’ and violence could have been (could or should be) avoided when successive political actors have been habituated45 to colonization, wars, contemporary oppression, interventions and profitable businesses due to the international arms trade remains a mystery. No individual can really detach itself from the

.. 8,2% 6,2% 5,7%

468 000 .. 20,1% 12,4%

103% .. ..

8,5% 5% 4,4 billion $US

15,9%

26,9% 16% 1,5 billion $US 110 000 28,3% 23,7%

23,3%

15,2% 17 billion $US 160 000 37,4% 32,4%

7,6 8,3 2,4% 2% 7,6% 1% 0,3% 10 902 $US 35 831 $US 4 940 $US 35 728 $US 283 $US 39,4 $US 373 $US 26,3% -

Israel

*: own calculation based on Table 4.2. **: Credit Suisse, The End of Globalization or a more Multipolar World? CS Report, September 2015, p. 41.

Sources of data: World Bank website, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ (data extracted 25 January 2017).

** army size (regular forces, 2014) Expense (civil admin), % of GDP (2014) Central government revenue total (grants excluded), % of GDP (2013) Tax revenue, % of GDP (2013)

4,4 2,9% 17,5% .. 5020 $US 2 869 $US 424 $US 238,8%

Palestine (WB, GS) Jordan

91,5 2,1% 1,2% 8,5% 10 913 $US 3 615 $US 24 $US 14,3 $US ..

Egypt

Main indicators (Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Israel), selected years.

Population, million (2015) Population growth, % (2015) ODA/GNI (2014) Total natural resources rent, % of GDP GDP per capita (2015, current, PPP, $US) GDP capita (2015, current $US) ODA per capita (2015, from all donors) * US military assistance per capita Net ODA received as % of central government expense (2014) Net ODA received as % of gross capital formation (2014) Military expenditure % of GDP (2013) ** defense budget (2014)

Table 3.2

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surrounding authoritarian or militarized environment that nurtured him.46 It is, however, beyond doubt that the referred outcome is composed of authoritarianism in domestic affairs, intrastate and interstate conflict, which has provided justification for military programmes for decades. As Table 3.2 shows MENA countries, regardless to the level of their economic development, spent significant part of their GDP on military expenditure, their defense budgets amounting to billions of US dollars and they are among the top foreign aid recipients in global comparison.47 Military and security-related activities (the prevention of war officially) have been financed both by arms purchase on the market (Table 3.3) and by external military assistance (see later). They have served a dual purpose in the Middle Eastern countries. First, the strong state and military is seen as a guarantee for achieving regional stability by Western governments and donors. And not only that: the link between Middle Eastern and global stability, security and terrorism is perceived to be strong, that justifies even the ambiguous manner, modes and measures of Western democracy promotion in the region.48 In the years before and after the Arab Spring, the following countries purchased military equipment from the following suppliers: As data calculated from Table 3.3 show Saudi Arabia was the biggest buyer of military equipment ($US30,7 billion), followed by Egypt ($US14,8 billion), Iraq ($US14 billion), Algeria (ISD11 billion), the United Arab Emirates (UAE: $US9,2 billion), Israel ($US8,8 billion), Syria ($US4,1 billion) and Jordan ($US2,9 billion) during the total period (2008 – 2015). While the degree to which democracy-building ambitions and stability correlates with arms purchase varies from country to country, it is remarkable that the biggest buyers (UAE, Saudi Arabia) provide huge amounts of regional aid to all those pro-Western Arab governments that can keep Islamists (the Muslim Brotherhood, among others) under control (Cf. Tables 3.3 and 4.7). Putting these numbers into global perspectives, the Middle East (Near East) benefited the most both from arms deliveries and from (newly signed) arms transfer agreements between 2008 and 2015: While the value of arms transfer agreements with the Middle East, Asia, Latin America and Africa (developing states) comprised about 80

Russia

China

Rest

3 800 3 800 900 0 2 600 0 5 800 1 900

4 800 3 500 1 100 0 4 400 0 10 500 3 000

400 200 100 4 700 300 2 000 0 400

1 300 0 100 4 500 3 700 1 400 0 200

500 0 100 500 0 400 700 100 600

600 0 0 300 500

100 0 0 300 300 0 5 600 700

2 900 1 300 0 600 400 0 5 800 1 200

200 0 300 0 500 300 900 600

200 0 300 100 1 300 0 800 1 100

2008–11 2012–15 2008–11 2012–15 2008 –11 2012 –15 2008 –11 2012 –15 2008– 11 2012–15

US

Western Europe (France, UK, Germany, Italy)

Arms Deliveries to the Middle East by supplier (in millions of current US dollars, all data are rounded).

Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2008– 2015 (Washington, 2016), Table 22, p. 47.

Egypt Israel Jordan Algeria Iraq Syria Saudi-Arabia UAE

Table 3.3

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Table 3.4 Regional share of arms deliveries and arms transfer agreement value, all suppliers, 2008 –2011, 2012 –2015 (%). Percentage of Deliveries Value by Region, 2008–2015 % Near East Asia Latin America Africa (Egypt here)

Percentage of Agreement Value by Region, 2008–2015

2008 –2011

2012–2015

2008–2011

2012 –2015

41,95 40,96 10,17 6,92

49,04 37,24 9,38 4,34

54,47 28,85 12,39 4,29

61,11 31,33 7,17 4,19

Source: Catherine A. Theohary, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2008–2015 (Washington, 2016), Table 7 and Table 18.

per cent of all agreements worldwide in both periods (2018– 2011, 2012–2015); its value (only) in 2015 with developing states was $US65,2 billion.49 As Table 4 shows almost half of the weapon transfers measured by their value (49,04 per cent) ended up in the Middle East between 2012– 2015 – and ‘stabilized’ countries with the exception of Syria and Iraq – which is an almost 8 per cent increase from the previous period (2008–2011). With reference to the value of arms transfer agreements, the role of the region is even more striking as its share is higher than 60 per cent (2012– 2015). Secondly, to continue with the original thought, Middle Eastern regimes could not only increase their defense capacities by purchasing weapons but could simultaneously use the same capacities to control their own population and opposition too. It is no surprise that the military or the armed forces – the very object and beneficiary of any military development – have played a major role in both the prevalence and persistence of (semi-)authoritarian regimes in the region since the early independence years. Historical trends have not changed that much since the end of the Cold War. According to Brynen et al, armed forces have remained ‘the cornerstone for authoritarian regimes seeking to maintain themselves in power’50 even at the expense of the democracy aspirations of their own populations. While this formulation prompts that the military plays an instrumental role within an authoritarian regime, it would perhaps be more precise to say that any extensive power vindicated by or provided to the armed forces equals to authoritarianism

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itself. This latter formulation puts somewhat more blame on any actor that has actively contributed to the ‘development’ of the military by selling arms and weapon systems. Indeed, world powers, the West in general, the US and the former USSR (Russia today), have done their best to incorporate Middle Eastern militaries into the global security order – or global security orders – by providing them with ‘massive amounts of arms and military assistance . . . either at low cost, or via privileged access.’51 If, as argued by Brynen, Eva Beilin is right in identifying the above discussed particular conditions as the true sources of Middle Eastern exceptionalism, external powers achieved two goals simultaneously. First, by supplying regional allies with weapons that have fostered strong authoritarianism and regional (in)stability, they have created and maintained both a sense and state of exceptionalism in the Middle East. Secondly, by contributing to regional exceptionalism, they provided a great opportunity for their own academic and think tank sectors to conduct research and seek for explanations of this exceptionalism – in many cases with the active cooperation of local, Middle Eastern academic staff and funded from development aid (ODA) budgets. Edward Said would have identified it, probably, as a dual source of control over the regional developments. Not just weapon, but knowledge is power following Foucault, and from ‘oriental’ perspectives the two complements each other in a certain sense. And both military and development aid has a lot to do with knowledge, let it mean production or transfer.

Gifts, reciprocity and return gifts – in the contemporary Middle Eastern relations It is by no means easy to recognize a universal logic behind aid transfers channelled to the Middle East, simply because one single donor actor (agent) can hardly be identified. Not even the West is a homogenous block. It is easy, however, to recall some general features and characteristics of foreign aid, since they may help us understand the importance of relationship and recognize the existence of Middle Eastern return gifts. While the overall objectives of Western foreign aid in the region are multiple, they have anchored around the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian question. Recent developments in the region, not being the subject of this book though, would confirm the claim that

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gifts indeed make friends. Israel and pro-Western Arab countries have apparently found common enemies to fight against: terrorism, militant Islam fundamentalism and Iran. Only time will tell how strong ties have been forged by Western aid channelled to historically rival forces since the 1970s. Historically, and as mentioned earlier, the main purpose of Western aid has been to ensure regional stability with particular focus on Israel’s security supported by peace agreements (Egypt-Israel 1979, IsraelJordan, 1994) and the peace process (Israel – PLO, 1993). With reference to Egypt and its peace treaty with Israel – seen as an anchor model for wider regional cooperation – US military aid (budget support, concessional loans, military equipment) has been channelled on the condition that Egypt respects its obligations vis-a`-vis Israel. For this purpose, the US signed two memorandums of understanding on foreign assistance with Israel and Egypt respectively in 1979. As the first memorandum of agreement52 (Article 2) between the US and Israel states: if a violation of the Treaty of Peace is deemed to threaten the security of Israel (. . .) the United States will be prepared to consider, on an urgent basis, such measures as the strengthening of the United States presence in the area, the providing of emergency supplies to Israel, and the exercise of maritime rights in order to put an end to the violation.53 As implied in the formulation the only way to honour the American gift (military aid in this case) is to deliver security around Israel. While Cairo accepted this condition for the envisioned sake of peace (or for other, more pragmatist reasons), other Arab countries rejected to sign the Camp David framework agreement (1978) inviting them to join. Instead, they accused Egypt with betrayal on two counts. Sadat, after all, not only undertook that Egypt would no longer fight a war against Israel, but the agreement also implied that the Palestinians, Jordan and Syria lost an Arab ally whose role could have been instrumental in achieving Palestinian independence and sovereignty. Egypt left the community of Arab states temporarily, and if measured by foreign aid conditional on peace (agreements), they reunited only when the PLO and Jordan signed the peace agreements with Israel 15 years later. Since then

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all the three actors benefit from their cooperative stance – which is paid by Western donors, not their old enemy (Israel). External aid – military, development and humanitarian – serves not only the security of the Israeli borders – by preventing traditional war around Israel, it also aspires to contribute to regional stability which is of utmost importance on the EU’s periphery. And while the consequences of the Arab Spring and those of the Western interventions in Iraq seem to question the essence of regional stability, it does not necessarily mean that foreign aid is meaningless or useless. It created new friends and allies in the region, which is beyond doubt. However, by doing so, it also contributed a lot to the sense of injustice in many countries, the populations of which experienced oppression and perceived humiliation to be paid, among others, for peace agreements and related foreign aid. Putting aside the case of concessional loans,54 many pro-Western countries and their civil society actors have received financially unreciprocated grants for the past decades,55 non-material forms of reciprocity deserve attention. The three main ‘motives’ inviting foreign aid transfers to the Middle East can be listed as follows: threat (of attacking Israel, radical Islam, instability, nuclear developments in Iran, cross-border migration, etc); human suffering and spectacle of pain;56 the lack of macroeconomic stability, meaningful political reforms and truly democratic changes. The first justifies military assistance, the second calls for humanitarian aid, and the third may be bought by development-related (ODA) conditionality. As discussed in Chapter 2, all the three types of aid may qualify as (return) gifts offered for the promise of stability, less human suffering and development (including economic growth, democratic change). One either identifies these promises – at least at conceptual level – as circulating gifts or deems the recipient countries and societies as ‘parasites’ (following Serres, see Chapter 2), that always take, never give and, consequently, remain indebted not only in financial, but in the moral and political sense too. To sum up, the Middle Eastern aid relations seem to offer an excellent opportunity to see how the logic of gifts and return gifts work as there is an abundance of official aid that flows to the region. The contemporary gift strengthens a complex set of social bonds between the aid recipients (Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the PNA) and their (Western and regional) donors in the Middle East on the one

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hand. On the other hand, the very same aid (of Western origin) also enhances the cooperation on the recipient side: between Israel and the Arab regimes concerned. The exchanges of ceremonial and contemporary international gifts equally provide human, social and international recognition beyond and over their material or monetized value. Hence, reciprocity has distinct functions in the Middle East(ern IR) too. Not least because transactions between enemies, foreign aid relations included, are more likely to be guided by the norm of reciprocity.57 They may serve not only as a cohesive force, but also as a substitute for war.58 The governments of Egypt (PNA and Jordan since the 1990s) cannot simply take Western money – if they cannot return the military-security assistance, or development aid by avoiding war, they will not get more aid. The same logic applies to those actors that are seen as legitimate representatives of democratic changes in the recipient countries.

The Arab Spring and the conflicting objectives of foreign aid The Arab Spring was received with huge enthusiasm and media coverage worldwide.59 The demonstrations seemed to reflect ‘a collective struggle of the subjugated Arab peoples against their non-responsive, but repressive governments’.60 Scholars envisioned long-lasting academic debates for ‘the affected societies will struggle with the challenges of transition to uncertain future’.61 The Arab Spring also stirred serious political debates on the role, necessity and merits of foreign support both in donor and recipient countries (see later).62 While the Western public and governments welcomed the victory of freedom over authoritarianism in the Middle East in 2011, fears about regime stability have significantly increased as time went on.63 These fears can be explained not only by apparent destabilization of the region, but also by the decreasing internal legitimacy of long-supported allies. Foreign aid, as it had been provided to internationally pro-Western, but domestically authoritarian regimes, has become part of the problem in countries where military aid (preserving the status quo) and development assistance (encouraging transition to democracy) was equally significant (detailed data illustrating trends in military support and ODA will be presented in Chapter 4).

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Figure 3.1 ODA grants (development and humanitarian aid) from OECD DAC donors to selected MENA countries, 2006– 2015 (constant prices, millions $US dollar, 2014).

Recipient (million $US)

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Egypt

899 1 202 1 216

833

657

474

597

645

Jordan

487

575

527

567

720

783 1 434 1 262 343

490

554

422 508

376

Lebanon

465

454

511

356

261

248

505

Syrian Arab

125

124

202

164

152

146

518 1 795 1 602 1 988

844

Republic West Bank and

887

910 1 408 1 853 1 714 1 556 1 101 1 759 1 406 1 023

220

225

Gaza Strip other Middle East

541

212

176

157

289

721

567

530

(regional scope)

Source: OECD DAC Statistics, Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a], Data extracted on 25 January 2017.

The value of ODA (only grants without the obligation of financial reciprocity from OECD DAC donors) has increased most remarkably towards Jordan and Syria due to the humanitarian aid component involved since the Arab Spring (Figure 3.1). Egypt, apparently, received less ODA from Western countries than it did before the Arab Spring, but its access to military assistance has remained, by and large, unaffected (Table 4.2, Chapter 4). In hindsight, local struggles and promising demonstrations have inspired major and visible changes

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neither in foreign aid disbursments (with the exception of humanitarian assistance, see Table 4.4. and Figure 4.1), nor in the structure and power relations of those Arab regimes that have peace agreements with Israel. US and European aid policies promoting stronger civil societies, respect for human rights, visible political reforms were ambitious enough to create tensions between Western capitals and aid recipient governments both before and after the Arab Spring. However, they failed to bring about positive changes in terms of real democratization. Western response to the Arab Spring would ‘make a perfect case study for those interested in the conflict between perceived interests and values’, since the ‘United States and Europe have for decades shown acquiescence towards, and often actively supported, Arab authoritarian regimes in return for Western-friendly policies’.64 It is not incidental that Western ‘democracy promotion’ in the Middle East has been seen counterproductive inasmuch as ‘by polishing some of the “rough edges” of authoritarianism, they might have even contributed to its persistence’65 not only in the Arab countries, but even in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian relations. While the Arab Spring shook Egypt in an unprecedented manner in 2011, the consecutive events seem to prove that Albert Camus was right in distinguishing rebellion from revolution. The rebel, as individual, always rebels for freedom. Egyptians did it, as their fellows in other countries too. Revolutionary governments, however, cannot but become war governments, even totalitarian governments by killing people and ideas.66 But even if it was possible to kill for the idea of democracy theoretically, it is impossible to kill democratically: peaceful rebels in Egypt and elsewhere did not know how to do it. And the relationship between the authoritarian government in Egypt and their Western (bilateral, multilateral) donors or regional patrons (like Saudi-Arabia) has proved to be stronger than the necessity for deep and substantial democracy. It cannot be a coincidence that the majority of the population in Jordan and Palestine could not be mobilized against the central regimes during the Arab Spring – either because they felt content with the current state of affairs, or because they did not or could not risk the relative freedom and prosperity they enjoyed for uncertain gains, but likely negative consequences.

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Battles for external legitimacy: Competing for contemporary gifts ‘I wondered when we became slaves and others masters. Was it another era of intangible and invisible colonialism in which we lived? It was not the Ottomans, the French or the British who had colonized us; it was the remnants of the power left by colonizers. It was the sense of privilege over the inferior masses that had been taken over by the bourgeois that had claimed the privilege over all of us, using the state structure to disempower the rest of us, to keep us down, and to enslave us in mind and spirit.’67 Samaa Gamie’s story collected by Asaad al-Saleh, Voices of the Arab Spring, p. 101. Recent developments drew attention to the importance of legitimacy that has some relevance in gift exchange theories too as long as the (external) gift influences not only the distribution of goods in society, but perceptions on justice and fairness too. Although legitimacy is a core concept in social sciences, it is not easy to define it.68 It assumes that there is obedience and some level of consent on the part of those who are governed, and this consent stems more from persuasion and trust and less from overt physical coercion or material incentives (such as gifts, subsidies, tax examptions). Neither performance (providing public goods and services, welfare benefits or good governance), nor popularity (public or collective support measured by opinion polls) equals fully to legitimacy,69 even if none can be fully ignored when exploring legitimacy questions. To understand the problem of legitimacy in authoritarian regimes, a brief distinction is needed to be made between the democracy-related normative approach of legitimacy and its Weberian, descriptiveempirical understanding. The normative concept of legitimacy holds that ‘some objective notion of what is right, justifiable or legitimate exists’ and assumes certain conditions such as ‘acceptability or justification of political power or authority’.70 The ‘legitimate being’ of democracies can be described by such qualities as having a respect of the rule of law; equality of all citizens before the law; separation of executive, legislative and juridical powers; political pluralism and

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mass participation;71 free competition of political parties for votes; political and civil liberties; and also respect of human rights and particularly freedom of speech. These features are built in the normative interpretation of political legitimacy and are generally subsumed in the concept of ‘good governance’. In political systems where democratic (normative) political legitimacy is absent, such as in most countries in the MENA, regimes mainly survive because they are supported or considered ‘legitimate’ by small, influential national elite or by external powers that continue to cultivate relations with them. The survival of these elites and the stability of the authoritarian regimes depended on the descriptive understanding of legitimacy (among others). The majority of ‘Arab Spring’ demonstrators, however, aspired to attain normative legitimacy (see later). While legitimacy in general is viewed as a source of stability in social systems, political legitimacy is considered a basic condition for governing. Regime stability becomes a ‘function of the ongoing ability of the actors within the system to mobilize resources to perpetuate a legitimate system’.72 Indeed, throughout the decades (Western style) democracy and democratic legitimacy have become a sort of synonym for political stability – stability here means the management of orderly change and not simply the maintenance of status quo73 – and as such something to be promoted and supported worldwide. Hence, global democracy building has become one of the main focuses of Western foreign aid for the past two and a half decades. Outcomes and consequences of the ‘Arab Spring’, however, drew attention to the limits of external support. But if it is hard to define the concept of legitimacy precisely, it is not less difficult to describe how legitimacy interact with foreign aid. Western donors supported both sets of actors by providing aid (and expecting return gifts, see Chatper 4), which complicated the sense of justice and related legitimacy issues in the recipient countries. They did so, not because they could not provide assistance only to those fighting for democratic/normative legitimacy, but because supporting only them was simply not feasible. Just as there are conflicting interests on the donor side (for example prioritizing democracy-promotion over stability or vice versa) there are various/multiple beneficiaries in the recipient country pursuing conflicting goals. National/government elites are naturally interested in preserving their privileges, maintaining the status

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quo and securing order and stability (descriptive-empirical legitimacy). However, certain non-state beneficiaries,74 civil society organizations, grassroots initiatives and other segments of the population are more interested in reforms, democratic changes and attaining normative legitimacy (donors’ terminology: transition from authoritarianism to democracy).

Legitimacy in the Middle East Legitimacy in Arab countries75 – even if combined with coercion, threats or material incentives (welfare goods, tax exemption, etc.) – is much closer to the original, Weberian, descriptive-empirical definition which states that “the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige”.76 People tend to obey even in (semi-)authoritarian regimes, such as Egypt, Jordan, or the PNA;77 the Arab Spring, as an exception, only strengthens the rule. Stability, simply because the rules of the game are known to the people, apparently is valued more than uncertain and painful transition to democracy in authoritarian systems. It cannot be understood without referring briefly to historicalcolonial interactions with external powers on the one hand and the internal sources of legitimacy on the other. Colonialism, the independence movements and the gradual process of de-colonialism added various layers of complexity to the traditional concept of legitimacy having been based mainly on known sources of legitimacy such as religion, kinship and tradition. Indeed, the role played by religion and nationalism78 has been proposed to study the standards of legitimacy in terms of regime maintenance and stability.79 Not only modern nationalism, but religion clearly influences political attitudes on such matters as identity, concept of justice, the nature of a legitimate political system, obedience, or obligation and rights. Diverse political views on the authority and legitimacy of the new state order have created real and virtual battlefields not only in Egypt,80 but in other MENA countries as well. Recalling El Fadl’s analysis legitimacy (shar’iyya) is a key word in the Arab world81 which has become an elastic word that is exploited to invent and repress history; to construct and de-construct identity; and to uphold and

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deny rights. Legitimacy is possessed by no one, but claimed by everyone, and it is enforced only through sheer power. In the absence of a transparent and accountable civil process, those who believe that they are the de facto possessors of legitimacy massacre in cold blood, torture, maim and commit every possible offense in the name of defending the existing legitimacy. Lack of genuine democratization, related legitimacy problems and the inclination to authoritarian modes of government in the Middle East have received considerable attention in the literature alongside the questions on what role can be played by foreign aid. Explanations were into three major categories as summarized by Rex Brynen and his co-authors.82 First, there are scholars, labelled as essentialists that emphasize that (political) culture is resistant to change due to its embeddedness in history, religion and social organization. Whether the blame is put on Islam as a religion hardly inseparable from politics, government, state and society or on the role played by kinship, tribes and family in decision-making and behaviour, or the various combinations of these two main factors is secondary. The emphasis is on the lack of internal transformative power that should achieve meaningful changes against the traditional, historical or culturalreligious. As it is missing, foreign aid is justified. Secondly, there are theories arguing that political culture plays an important role in explaining politics, but its role is not exclusive and the processes and phenomena the concept denotes are subject to change. Conceptualist scholars argue that labels such as ‘Arab’ and ‘Islamic’ lead to misunderstandings by simplification and generalization. In addition, they question the central role attributed to monolithic interpretations of tradition, culture, history and religion by essentialists saying that the interplay between symbols, ideologies, material concerns and conditions are equally, if not more, important. The third group of authors, identified by Brynen et al, occupy the critical platform by doubting the very ‘feasibility or value of politicalculture analysis.’ They prefer to analyse institutions, legal rules, history, social class and political economy over obscure phenomena that can be described as ‘political culture.’ Although these sets are overlapping and are acknowledged,83 components of legitimacy should be recalled briefly.

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What are the most important features of regime legitimacy in the countries concerned? While Sedgwick identified three external plus seven internal components of legitimacy in Egypt, Schlumberger simply distinguished the international dimension of legitimacy from the local (domestic) dimensions.84 According to Schlumberger, there are four components being the main sources of domestic ‘nondemocratic’ legitimacy in the Arab world: religion; tradition; ideology; and the provision of welfare benefits to their populations. Schlumberger concludes that religion played a less important role than either traditional or material legitimacy, whereas ideology (nationalism, Islamism, globalization and neoliberalism, democracy-promotion and their combination alike) has become a more and more relevant category as reflected by foreign aid policies and priorities as well. Religion, which is an integral part of local identities, is seen as an obvious source of regime legitimacy in Jordan, whereas it has played and still plays a slightly less significant role in Egypt due to the state-led persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood85 and for other reasons in the PNA (at least in the West Bank since 2007).86 Islam, however, has been playing a more and more interesting role in the region since the Arab Spring obscuring many categories that used to be taken for granted. The recent contest for regional hegemony between Saudi Arabia and Iran combined with the political and economic support that they (as regional donors) provide to or deny from Islamic political movements (Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) cannot but drag religion into legitimacy debates. In similar vein, although mostly ignored by Western foreign aid interventions, tradition (which is not entirely independent of religion) plays a vital role in almost all Arab countries in the Middle East, mainly through family structures, the legacy and the question of ‘dynastization’ of power both in macro (IR) and micro (sociology) levels. By the logic of welfare legitimacy, regime legitimacy can be maintained either by ‘the oil rent’ (using oil income or financial transfers from oil-rich neighbours to buy legitimacy with subsidies and government jobs) or by foreign aid, which has attempted to prevent destabilization (see Chapter 5). It enabled Arab governments to provide various (welfare) benefits to various societal segments for decades and simultaneously to keep the population under control either by offering them jobs in the public sector or supervising them by the intelligence

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services. This kind of political legitimacy might also be seen as a ‘mediator’ between rents (foreign aid) and political stability, but rents can buy negative political legitimacy and provide ‘elusive stability’ as indicated by the ‘Arab Spring’.87 Nonetheless domestic ‘welfare’ legitimacy is hardly separable from international legitimacy. Sedgwick described external legitimacy as ‘the extent to which political regimes are considered legitimate by the leading external powers, that is, Western governments and international organizations.’88 Economic and political dependency (on external support/aid) is closely related in as much as the major function of MENA foreign policies have been securing resource flows and aid from external resources.89 This strengthened a non-democratic situation: most governments have tended to be more responsive to external demands (formulated in peace treaties, grant or loan agreements) than to (mostly) non-taxpaying domestic opinion. Regime legitimacy in the countries concerned has become dependent on foreign military-security assistance providing protection from regional and local ‘dangers’.90 As without a certain level of external/international legitimacy there is no access to rents, particularly foreign aid, it may be a convenient means of assessing external legitimacy. Since – as emphasized by constructivist IR theories – ‘the mutual recognition of standards of legitimacy’ plays an important role in shaping international behaviour,91 external (foreign aid) interventions can be seen as aiming to influence the ‘standards of legitimacy’ (see Chapter 4). Indeed, legitimacy is widely seen ‘as a device of social and [political] control’,92 and a way to ensure obedience and stability.

Contest for external legitimacy in the Middle East and its domestic impacts From critical perspectives, foreign aid may be seen as an instrument of hegemony by donors being primarily interested in a certain kind of political order by cultivating good relations with aid recipients (instead of waging wars). It implies that aid is about creating and maintaining ‘international’ social bonds93 only to enable the donors to pursue their policy goals.94 While the theory of the gift can be seen as a theory of human solidarity,95 gifts simultaneously convey certain donor identities that may represent a threat to the recipient’s status and identity (see later).96 In other words, ‘contemporary gifts’

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serve the purpose of maintaining any (Western, global, regional, neoliberal) order that favours donor interests and enjoys consent from the recipient side.97 Foreign aid has its own sociology in the Middle East too,98 its own ties and bonds to produce non-coerced and ‘voluntary’ cooperation, alliance or friendship between the donor and the recipient by strengthening or weakening the legitimacy of the latter. In the context of foreign aid external legitimacy refers not only to the relationship between the donor and the recipient, but also to the multilayered, complex relations between various beneficiaries (governments, NGOs, population) in the recipient country. The survival of Arab regimes – in Egypt, the PNA99 and Jordan alike – has become dependent on their external legitimacy (maintained by foreign, especially military and security-related aid flows) on the one hand and on internal legitimacy-building strategies on the other, such as providing welfare goods, patronage and applying well-calculated coercion, crushing rebellions and protest movements, prosecuting dissidents, and killing political opponents (see Chapters 4, 5).100 If most regimes in the MENA region have been quite stable enjoying even internal legitimacy for decades,101 it mostly took place ‘only’ due to certain incentives: their rent (aid) incomes, allocation practices and patronage systems.102 If analysed by econometric means, ‘unearned foreign income’ seems to prolong regime survival by mitigating revolutionary demands but not fully eliminating them.103 Since donors pursue simultaneously competing political objectives in the MENA region, it is not easy to answer the question of how foreign aid interacts with domestic interests, internal legitimacy, social cohesion or political stability. Jordan, Egypt and Palestine signed peace agreements with the ‘eternal’ enemy, Israel, the very act of which has been seen as a betrayal and shame by the wider Arab public opinion at least in light of the expansion of the Israeli settlements and partial occupation in the West Bank and blockade around Gaza. Indeed, the failure of the peace process and general toll over the years of the Israeli occupation of Palestine has contributed to the distancing of Palestinians, Jordanians and Egyptians from their elites. Ways and modes of respecting their legal obligations vis-a`-vis Israel led to tensions between the governments and their population thanks to the variety of means these regimes could apply thanks to the availability

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of donor money. The selected regimes have received ‘political aid’ or safeguarding Western interests in the region such as European stability or Israeli security104 regardless to their achievements in terms of economic development or political reforms. To understand ‘aid interventions’ and their impact on legitimacy in Egypt, Jordan and the PNA, it must also be kept in mind that they are supposed to be not coerced, but mostly ‘approved’ – even initiated in principle – by the recipient. The process of how foreign aid may interact with structures of (internal) legitimacy by creating or strengthening division lines in a given society has been much less evident. Indeed, little research has been carried out on how relations among various beneficiaries (governments, civil society organizations, populations) in the recipient countries are shaped by the very acceptance (reception) of foreign aid.105 Two phenomena, however, are clear by reading the literature. First, civil society organizations, grassroots movements, associations, charity foundations nowhere exist in a political vacuum; although Western donors often tend to look at and portray them as if they were independent of the authoritarian political landscape that they aspire to change. However, as discussed by Amaley Jamal, civil society organizations ‘need to conform to basic, minimal state expectations if they are to even exist’. The presence and participation of international donors not only offer funding opportunities (and some independence from the authoritarian powers), but even complicates the otherwise delicate position of local civil society organizations being interested in democratic changes. Secondly, as Shelia Carapico argued, international civil society promotion usually yields a dictatorial pushback against it – even if the central governments also benefit from aid cooperation with the same donors.106 Even the distinction between aid-recipient (authoritarian) governments (seen as trustees of stability) and civil society organizations (seen as democracy promoters) is misleading. Not all non-state beneficiaries are actively promoting change as quite many civil society organizations are supported by (authoritarian) governments in the Middle East too.107 The matter is compex as civil society actors may threaten regime stability in many ways (as we will see in Chapters 4 and 5). Taking the example of Palestinian NGOs, their (political) activities are constrained both by Israel, the PNA in the West Bank and the Hamas in the Gaza

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Strip. Yet, many NGOs can operate more or less freely in the Palestinian Territories, if they give up their overly political ambitions and focus on humanitarian activities. However, even by retreating they can somehow ‘threat’ the internal legitimacy of the central authorities by offering better services than the government. Anne M. Zimmermann called this phenomenon ‘chimera state’ arguing that the autonomy and core capabilities of parallel institutions not only allow producing higher levels of public services, but they, at the very same time, hinder the infrastructural power of the recipient states.108 Such parallel institutions may include such seemingly apolitical scenes, as health care centres and educational and social welfare services. Apart from legitimacy-problems, the parallel institutions may also serve government interests as the (donor funded) activities contribute to reducing government spending on welfare services. Not only Palestine, but Egypt and Jordan also illustrate the complexity of interests.109 The status of politically active civil society organizations (portrayed as ‘illegitimate’ or ‘foreign agent’ by the regimes) is even more complicated. Their persecution can be explained by the blurred border between political (Islamist opposition) parties and (politically conscious, secular or Islamist) civil society organizations. From the perspectives of the authoritarian governments both categories may qualify as an enemy jeopardizing the interests of the ruling elites. Recognizing growing Western interest in democracy support to civil society organizations since the 1990s, most Arab governments sensed threats and opportunities simultaneously. They tried to ‘nationalize’ democratization sources establishing various quasi non-governmental organizations representing their interests.110 These attempts, however, were seen as ‘the greatest promise for civil society and, hence, for the democratization process’ from the inside two decades ago. As further argued by Saad Eddin Ibrahim, ‘it has provided ample bargaining power to civil society organizations when they deal with the [authoritarian] state in attempts to gain concessions of socio-political reformative nature.’111 It is no surprise that foreign aid to civil society organizations has led to tensions between regional and Western capitals well before the Arab Spring. Widely perceived as an attempt to undermine the stability and legitimacy of authoritarian regimes, donors have been accused of influencing domestic political games by ignoring national sovereignty. In order to prevent their Western patrons’ betrayal behind the scenes,112

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most regimes in the Middle East hindered political liberalization by implementing restrictions on political rights and external support to their civil society organizations (as discussed in Chapter 4).113 As Western donors, especially the EU, expected political reforms and respect for human rights in exchange for aid both before and after the Arab Spring, (semi-)authoritarian governments started to rely on ‘more subtle, but ultimately more effective, techniques’ by ‘devoting full-time attention to the challenge of crippling the opposition without annihilating it, and flouting the rule of law while maintaining a plausible veneer of order, legitimacy, and prosperity’.114 To illustrate the relevance of Janus-faced democracy building and development in the context of legitimacy ‘[t]he elections have demonstrated that even the worst dictators feel obliged to seek popular legitimacy through the symbols of democracy. But the elections they orchestrate are less a contest between rival candidates than a measurement of the leader’s control over the population’.115 However, elections are not only about measuring loyalty. In a way they also provide external legitimacy which is needed to maintain foreign aid flows, especially, ‘political aid’ targeting legal and electoral reforms and civil society activism/ representation alike.116 Uninterrupted aid disbursements – to authoritarian governments promising reforms – not only prove how Arab governments successfully manipulated foreign donors expecting political reforms, but also indicate the strength of their external legitimacy. External legitimacy provided by donors, the income and wealth secured by foreign aid (complementing or substituting domestic local taxes) combined with the oppressive state capacities (developed with external support in order to ensure regional/global stability) all contribute to the conservation of authoritarian power and the ‘sense of privilege over the inferior masses’. It is far from being easy to capture the impact Western colonialization, subjugation, oppression has in today’s societies in the Middle East, but the lived experiences, narratives and memories illustrate the relevance of this legacy surprisingly well.117 Contemporary political and military elites oppress their own people, just as their predecessors were oppressed by the colonial powers long ago.118 And while recent concerns about the stability of regimes go back many decades, fears about the decreasing legitimacy of long-supported allies and the growing instability in the Middle East and North Africa

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appears to be at a higher level now than before. The traditional trade-off between the foreign support channelled in the form of aid to ‘cooperative’ governments in the Middle East and the return gift (stability, its promise or illusion) gained for such support has been challenged by the Arab Spring. It seems, foreign aid may contribute to stability selectively: only if the internal legitimacy of the beneficiary is not challenged on the grounds of serving foreign interests.

CHAPTER 4 IN SEARCH OF PEACE, STABILITY AND DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The very logic of foreign support provided to adversaries – Israel on the one hand and the cooperative Arab governments on the other – has been built on the assumption that the norm of reciprocity and the practice of honouring gifts may be even stronger in interactions between rivals than between friends or allies. As assumed, reciprocity between (former) enemies provides a predictable framework of interaction preventing war and forging closer ties.1 This purpose is served by various kinds of foreign aid and the related peace conditionality.2 While US military aid strengthens state capacities in terms of defending borders and sovereignty, development aid (ODA) from OECD donors is based on the belief that economic prosperity and growth will lead to peaceful cooperation and coexistence in the region. Humanitarian assistance, part of the ODA in statistical terms, compensates for the mistakes committed in the name of foreign policies in the region.

US aid for regional stability and Israeli security America’s commitment to Israel’s security is unshakeable, and our friendship with Israel is deep and enduring. And so we believe that any lasting peace must acknowledge the very real security concerns

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that Israel faces every single day . . . Israel deserves recognition. It deserves normal relations with its neighbors. And friends of the Palestinians do them no favors by ignoring this truth, just as friends of Israel must recognize the need to pursue a two state solution with a secure Israel next to an independent Palestine. (Barack Obama, Speech to the United Nations General Assembly, September 21, 2011) The Russians can give you arms, as Sadat used to say, but only the Americans can deliver peace.3 Although many recent critics of US foreign policies argue that Washington does not have any visionary foreign policy any more that would lead to peace,4 it cannot be claimed that the US would have disappeared fully from the region. Washington’s perceived role and influence has considerably decreased since the Obama-era (2008 – 2016) in the region. But from historical perspectives the core elements of US Middle East (Near East) policy were always supported both by military and economic assistance,5 which has not changed so much. During the Cold War era, Washington sought to contain and reduce Soviet influence and ensured the continuous access to Middle East oil and gas reserves. Israel and its survival were also of strategic interest, even if the ‘dysfunctional special relationship’ that now exists did not begin to emerge until the late 1960s.’6 The US had two major motives to provide economic assistance – complementing its military aid – to the Middle East, the first being political, the second concerns economic interests. While the latter (channelling American agriculture surplus to developing countries, MENA included) is important from the perspective of macroeconomic analysis, the former is more closely related to the subject of this book. Due to the Marshall Plan in Europe US administration has believed in the instrumental role of economic progress in terms of achieving political ends, like for example, counterbalancing the Soviet threat. However, experiences gained in the third world by the mid-1950s also drew attention to an unexpected byproduct of economic growth: political instability. Nevertheless, early US aid could still function as a useful commodity of political barter (in softer terms) or even a bludgeoning device (a ruder way of expressing the same) in the Middle East too.7

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The political aims of American aid equally include support to moderate and friendly regimes and attempts to encourage regimes to start or continue aligning their foreign policy with US needs and wishes (democratization included). To achieve them, the United States generally acted as an ‘offshore balancer’ from 1945 to 1990, but Washington didn’t station large ground forces in the Middle East keeping its overall military footprint low. Its local presence and strategy relied on a variety of local allies and clients – in Egypt, Jordan and Palestine in addition to the Gulf partners – coopted by benefits financed, directly or indirectly, by foreign aid.8 This was always evident in aid allocation decisions not only towards Egypt, Jordan and Palestine (West Bank and Gaza Strip), but towards other allies in the region (Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, others).9 Aid related decisions – allocation, termination and the threat of withdrawal – served as a means of political leverage persuading hesitant, neutral or non-aligned governments, their public or military officers that they had better respect the bond with the donor (US) by follow foreign policies consistent with its interests.10 While many recipient countries interpret the role of foreign aid within the simplistic ‘bargaining chip’ terms even today, certain changes could be tracked in the American aid policy during the Kennedy-, and Ford-administrations. By the 1960s it has become clear to Washington that aid cannot be tied directly and overtly to the recipient foreign policy behaviour, since actors – governments – within the international community do not like seeing themselves as objects to be purchased on the market. This recognition led to applying more sophisticated approaches and creating an ‘improved climate of confidence in which differences of view could more constructively be discussed’ vis-a`-vis recipient countries.11 Nevertheless, in the era of decolonization it was equally difficult (in donor capitals, Washington included) to understand the sensitivity of newly independent people and governments in the context of sovereignty, and to comprehend (in recipient countries) the complexity of the legal, institutional and procedural dimensions of decision making of Western donors in the context of foreign aid allocations. It was much simpler to label donors as ‘neo-imperialist’ (today’s equivalent is neoliberal) in many countries in the MENA too. In the early decades after WW the Second World War II, the United States backed conservative Arab monarchies in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the Persian Gulf; had a close relationship with Iran until the 1979

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revolution; and saw Israel as a strategic asset partially because it kept defeating the Soviet Union’s various Arab clients.12 This strategy worked more or less by the early 1990s. According to Stephen Walt, however, the US government simply failed to take account of the dramatic changes that have transformed the Middle East’s strategic landscape in the past two to three decades. It explains why its relations with its traditional Middle East allies are perceived to be at their lowest point in these years13 and why it could not help anti-governmental, prodemocracy forces to grab power either. As a result of the Arab Spring Washington saw some of its strongest friends removed from power, chief among them was, Mubarak in Egypt. To prevent the full collapse of friendly regimes (Egypt) and a further escalation of conflict (Jordan, the PNA in the West Bank) military and economic assistance targetted those actors and activities that were seen as guarantees of regional stability (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). The US has provided economic aid in the value of about $US2,5 – 3,5 billion annually to the MENA region since the Arab Spring, which is far less than the amounts that had been given before 2010 (2011) (Table 4.1). Jordan has become the biggest beneficiary – receiving one third of the US grants in the last two years ($US1192 million in 2014 and $US809 million in 2015), almost twice as much as Palestine received in 2014 ($US545 million) and three times more than in 2015 ($US254 million) – as both its stability has to be preserved and the Syrian refugees residing in Jordan needed to be cared for. For the same reasons, aid to Lebanon also increased from around $US100 million (annual average 2006 – 2011) to $US300 million (2012, 2015). In the case of Syria, the increase in ODA can be explained by the huge amount of emergency and humanitarian assistance provided to international governmental and non-governmental organizations. Egypt lost the most US economic assistance (it received around $US750 million annually in 2007 and 2008; $US300 – 450 million in the years 2010 and 2011 and less than $US100 million annually in years 2014 and 2015), which can partially be explained by a decrease in aid that had been provided to the NGO sector before and during the Arab Spring.14 As the data behind Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 show, Washington could not support the stability of the status quo (rewarding the militarysecurity establishments) and advocating for democratic transition simoultanously in the region.

524 89 % 6 346 86 % 6% 2% 0% 4%

North of Sahara, Total ($US), of which Egypt, % Middle East, Total ($US), of which Iraq Jordan Lebanon Syrian Arab Republic West Bank and Gaza Strip

800 94 % 5 024 83 % 6% 3% 0% 5%

2007 836 91 % 4 600 65 % 9% 5% 0% 12 %

2008 527 84 % 4 194 61 % 10 % 4% 0% 22 %

2009 404 77 % 3 095 56 % 13 % 3% 0% 25 %

2010 628 23 % 2 659 51 % 18 % 4% 1% 24 %

2011 594 41 % 2 124 28 % 27 % 16 % 7% 14 %

2012

637 49 % 3 210 15 % 17 % 3% 24 % 30 %

2013

153 57 % 3 030 12 % 39 % 4% 21 % 18 %

2014

Source: OECD DAC Statistics, Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a], Data extracted on 25 January 2017.

2006

Recipient

182 58 % 2 614 13 % 31 % 12 % 27 % 10 %

2015

Table 4.1 ODA grants (development and humanitarian aid) from the United States to selected MENA countries, 2006 –2015 (constant prices, millions $US dollar, 2014 and %).

5,526,169 4,592,498 1,300,000 2,775,000 350,000

FY 2010 Actual 5,374,230 4,740,177 1,297,400 2,994,000 299,400 395,700

FY 2011 Actual 6,290,423 5,675,500 1,300,000 3,075,000 300,000 395,700

FY 2012 Actual 5,660,731 5,073,106 1,234,259 2,943,234 284,829 366,700

FY 2013 Actual 5,742,509 5,140,000 1,300,000 3,100,000 300,000 370,000

FY 2014 Actual

1,300,000 3,100,000 300,000 370,000

FY 2015 Estimate

Source: Jeremy Sharp, US Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2016 Request (Washington, 2016). * West Bank and Gaza Strip: the amounts include both economic support (Economic Support Fund) and security-related support (Overseas Contingency Operations); More detailed and up-to-date statistics by recipient and aid type (economic, security) can be found at: https:// securityassistance.org/.

5,006,500 4,378,155 1,300,000 2,550,000 335,000

FY 2009 Actual

US foreign military assistance to selected counties in the Near East, thousand $US, 2009 –2015.

Total Near East, of which . . . Egypt . . . Israel . . . Jordan15 West Bank and Gaza Strip*

Table 4.2

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Military assistance trends, with some exception, remained unchanged if data before and after the Arab Spring is compared. A recent report examining patterns of US spending since 2011 concluded that ‘the percentage of US assistance devoted to supporting military and security forces has actually increased since 2010 while the percentage devoted to programming dedicated to democracy and governance has decreased’.16 Two years later the same authors noted that US government spending on democracy support, human rights, and governance reforms reached its lowest level in (fiscal year) 2015. While democracy and governance programming averaged approximately $US380 million annually (2009– 2014), Washington spent only $US180 million on such programming in 2015. One might say that return gifts (real steps towards democratization) missing, the donor stopped giving further aid. Regional realities, discussed in Chapter 3 (politics of exceptionalism), proved to be stronger than ambitions and rhetoric. Programmes advocating for deeper democracies or political reforms have become increasingly difficult to implement across the region, even in proWestern countries, like Jordan and Egypt.17 The biggest recipient of US military aid has remained Israel and Egypt, while Jordan’s share increased significantly (Table 4.2). US military assistance has been channelled to the recipients recognizing the significance of the peace treaties and the importance of regional peace and security since the late 1970s (in the cases of Israel, Egypt) and early 1990s (in the case of Jordan).18 Although data presented in Table 6 does not reflect on the size of the economy or that of the population (for these data see Table 3.2 in Chapter 3), it shows that the absolute volume of military aid increased (Israel) or remained at the same level regardless of the most recent developments (Arab Spring, war in Syria, the ISIS threat, general regional instability). The PNA also received significant security-related development assistance from the US, but in the absence of a state, sovereignty and the appropriate military establishment, it has never been called military aid. The biggest beneficiary of US military and economic assistance has been Israel both in relative and absolute terms for it has received more than $US120 billion in the form of military and economic aid (grants, loans, guarantees) since 1949.19 Throughout the decades the American support was critical in the face of the high military expenditures and the relative diplomatic isolation Israel enjoyed before the Oslo peace process.

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In return Israel has acted ‘as a surrogate for US policy in the Middle East.’20 Whether this relationship has been harmful to US interests or not is not the subject of this book, but the instrumental role Israel plays in shaping American foreign and aid policies in the region is undeniable.21 Many use the dog-tail analogy to describe the power relations between Israel and the US, but it may be correct only at the level of generalization or simplification. Israeli experts say that ‘the United States perceives Israel as a stabilizing factor in the Middle East and it is thus an American interest that Israel retains its qualitative military edge. [. . .] a lot of cooperation between the defense and intelligence communities of both states [are] close working relations [that] undoubtedly emanate from shared goals and strategic interests.’22 Beyond their regional interests, the US military and economy profits much from the Israeli know-how in the field of research and development. It is also true that Israel is allowed to spend large percentages of its grants at home, rather than using the money to purchase US goods.23 Other recipients of US military assistance, like Egypt and Jordan, are expected to finance the procurement of weapons systems and services from the US defense industry by spending US military aid. Egypt benefited from about $US76 billion in the form of bilateral foreign aid from the US from 1948 to 2015 (calculated in current dollars, i.e. not adjusted for inflation), including an average of $US1.3 billion per year in military aid from 1987 until today.24 A permanent goal of US aid policy toward Egypt has been ‘to moderate the behavior of the Egyptian government along lines which are at least not inimical to United States interests’ since the 1970s.25 The military defeats (suffered from Israel, 1956, 1967, 1973) and rising economic problems convinced Egypt to abandon Moscow and realign with Washington.26 Foreign – both economic and military – aid to Egypt started to rocket, after Sadat had turned its back on the USSR, initiated the ‘open door’ policy in terms of Egypt’s attitudes towards Israel and finally signed the Camp David Agreements (1978) with it. If anything, Cairo’s moderate and cooperative behaviour can be interpreted as a true counter-gift, which has ensured the continuous renewal of aid commitments from Washington for decades. Regarding the history of US foreign aid in the region, the Camp David Agreements (1978) meant a point of no return: while the Arab

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League punished Sadat for its betrayal of the Arab nation and cooperating with the enemy (by cutting its regional political ties and financial resources), the aid-financed American friendship has remained unchallenged since 1978. The significance of political bonds between the two countries – so much telling if one is to understand foreign aid within the gift exchange context – could be illustrated by the following:27 The purpose of the United States assistance program in Egypt is clear. We believe that a stronger Egypt is better able to do two things. One, to provide effective leadership in the peace process in the Middle East, and two, is better able to be a strong friend of its allies. However, it was clear as early as the 1980s that foreign aid would create dependency in Egypt – a situation so much typical of gift exchange relations. As it was put forth in 1984: Egypt will likely ‘become hooked on foreign aid, unable to manage life without it and unable to invest in the future.’28 After Sadat’s death (1981), the US-Egyptian cooperation was instrumental in enabling the pro-Western Mubarak-led regime (1981– 2011) to maintain itself in power despite its limited interests and achievements both in sustainable economic growth and in democratization.29 Neither the former, nor the latter was a central objective to be supported by US aid, taking into consideration that observing the peace agreement with Israel depended on the military establishment and Mubarak-government in Cairo. Mubarak’s removal (2011) has been the smartest step orchestrated by the Egyptian regime: it survived its own collapse and never really lost its external patrons. Egypt led first by the democratically elected Mohammed Morsi (2012–2013), then by its less democratic ‘successor’ the SCAF and currently by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (since 2013) successfully managed to preserve the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) regime’s external legitimacy if measured by the continuous flow of military foreign aid. If anything has decreased, as indicated in Table 4.1, that is the amount of development aid to be spent, among others, on pro-reform, or prodemocracy activities. And not because the US was not willing to support the pro-democracy Arab Spring actors any more, on the contrary. The Egyptian government – and its regional allies – could convince

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Washington that supporting the regime is more important than any concern for human rights or democratic regime change. The promise of (regional) stability ‘sold’ by the regime seems more valuable to the West than the (promise of) democratic transition pursued by (civil) recipients of political aid. As far as Jordan is concerned, the US had economic cooperation agreements with the country already in the 1950s.30 However, it was the peace agreement with Israel (1994) – and the ‘instabilities’ on the eastern Jordanian borders during the Iraq war (2003) and more recently in the shadow of the war in Syria (since 2012/2013) – which has led to gradual, but significant changes in the size of aid. While in 1993 Washington provided Amman with just $US35 million in economic support, the figure jumped to $US700 million in 2014. Military assistance increased from $US9 million (1993) to $US300 million in the past years.31 As part of it, the Jordanian secret service (GID, General Intelligence Directorate) has become ‘America’s most effective allied counter-terrorism agency in the Middle East’ so much so that ‘the CIA has had technical personnel “virtually embedded” at GID headquarters.’32 The Jordanian-US cooperation has reached historical levels as indicated by the renewed memorandum of understanding signed in February 2015 and reflecting the intention to increase the total US assistance to the Government of Jordan from about $US660 million per year to $US1 billion annually for the years 2015–2017.33 Palestine is the only non-sovereign recipient of US aid. The scope and focus of security-related foreign assistance is somewhere in-between the military and civil (development, economic) purposes. The PNA is not eligible to military aid, but receives the highest ODA per capita in the region, which is fairly comparable to the per capita military assistance received by Israel (Table 3.2). Following the lines drawn in Camp David (1978) one and a half decades ago, the Oslo Peace Process (1993– 2000) echoed the trade-off ‘aid for peace/stability’ with one particular feature. The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) has never been eligible to military aid, but received the highest ODA per capita, part of which has been spent on institutional development and reforms34 and, more recently on extensive security-related cooperation with Israel.35 The direct link between the two (institutional development, political reforms on the one hand and security cooperation with Israel on the other) became most evident in the years after the second intifada (2000)

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and since the Hamas takeover in the Gaza Strip (2007). The core focus of US aid has always been to support those actors around Israel that are willing and able to make, or keep, peace with it. For example, when it became clear that the Palestinian leadership (that is Yasser Arafat) was able neither to control the violent opposition during the intidafa years, nor to keep supporters of the Oslo Process on board, Israel and the US insisted on his removal. The relationship with him had been simply devalued by the donors. As such, US demands for ousting Arafat was much less the result of any democratization as hoped or prompted for by many in those years. The main objective was finding an alternative figure that could control the Palestinian people and secure a political order favouring Israel.36 The security-bias and the cooperation between Israel and the PNA security forces has only intensified since Arafat has left the scene. Looking at the main trends the PNA hardly received more than $US200 million year aid (ODA) from Washington from the early 1990s to 2006. The election results (2006), the Hamas takeover in Gaza and the split between the Gaza and the West Bank37 (2007) led to a significant increase with an annual average of $US400– 450 million from US sources to the PNA.38 A great part of this money was spent on security-related activities (training, equipment) facilitating a more effective PNA in terms of keeping order in the West Bank in close cooperation with the Israeli army.39 If the main beneficiaries of US military (and economic development) assistance have been Israel, Egypt and Jordan in the region, they could enjoy this aid for decades as there has been a mutual understanding among these actors: without using physical power, huge armies and sophisticated weaponry, the Middle Eastern state is vulnerable and weak. The presence of weapons not only ‘ensure peace (agreements)’, but it provides a constant sense of insecurity. Associate risks and threats can be marketed and sold as ‘return gifts’ for those donors that have enough money and ambition to get engaged in the game. The EU is another such example. If the United States has played a prominent role in simultaneously supporting Israel’s security and the overall regional ‘stability’ by billions of dollars of military aid, the European powers have a shared historical responsibility for shaping the modern Middle East – for the sake of their own, European stability. As Israel’s security is obviously part of the regional stability, and as (in)stability in the Middle East has a clear

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impact on challenges (migration, immigrant integration) the EU has had to face, the aid policies and activities of the US and EU cannot but complement each other. Yet, due to the historical experiences and institutional development, unique to the EU and its member states (economic and political integration among former enemies), the EU’s approach is different. It is based on the conviction that conflicts have to be solved by negotiations and peaceful measures in the Middle East too. Believing in the so-called peace dividend, the European Union – consisting of its institutions and members states – alongside Norway40 has become the main donor of the Oslo Peace Process envisioning regional peace since the beginning.

EU assistance for regional stability by supporting the peace process In an interconnected world, the[se] developments have an impact on the European Union. Europe cannot be an ‘introspective bystander’. On the contrary, we are and must remain a key actor in the region; a political and economic partner who supports and manages change and who helps reap the opportunities that flow from it. This is not just a political imperative, but a matter of self-interest. If Europe did not ‘export’ stability, it would import ‘instability’. (Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, 2006) In the context of the Cold War, the main motives behind the Western European aid has been threefold: first it was based on the colonialhistorical bonds vis-a`-vis the Middle East, on economic-commercial concerns and related political interests, such as better access to markets or ensuring the European oil supply from the region. As Israel (and Egypt) enjoyed American support since the late-1970s, the Western European countries have become more pro-Arab in their political stances favouring multilateral solutions over ‘partial’ peace negotiated between individual actors.41 The evolution of the EU’s Mediterranean policy, the Barcelonaprocess, and the current European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and its parallel policy on the Middle East Peace Process, even the contested relations between the two policies, is widely covered in the literature.42

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The EU (the European Commission and the member states) has been the single largest donor to Palestinian state-building efforts – seen as a precondition for regional stability – since the early 1990s.43 The current official position is the two-state solution with an independent, democratic, viable and a geographically contiguous Palestinian state living side-by-side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbours. Living ‘side-by-side in peace’ is not simply the ends, but a means too: the only way to resolve the conflict, in the EU’s interpretation, is through an agreement that ends the occupation which began in 1967.44 The formulation, through an agreement, implies that all forms of violence are rejected in theory on the one hand and only peaceful solutions (negotiations, preferably multilateral negotiations) are to be supported by EU aid on the other. Indeed, the EU not only principally ‘condemns all acts of violence which cannot be allowed to impede progress towards peace’, but it provides active ‘support for local and international civil society initiatives that promote peace, tolerance and non-violence in the Middle East.’45 In the EU’s normative understanding the would-be Palestinian state must be ‘based on the rule of law and respect of human rights’ for which the EU ‘has consistently called for intra-Palestinian reconciliation and holding of democratic election.’46 To put it simply, a democratic Palestinian state can and shall be established only by peaceful strategies and means (vis-a`-vis Israel) in order to gain any legitimacy in the international community. This policy and attitude, supported by massive aid, while looks enlightened on the surface and advocated by international solidarity movements and European public opinion has its own implications. Chief among them is the perception, widely shared in the region, that the EU serves only Israeli47 and/or American interests by expecting the Palestinians not to resist to the occupation or fight for independence by freely chosen means. In other words, any support from the EU is conditional on denouncing violence by Palestinian actors. As no viable and sovereign Palestinian state is on the horizon, the EU’s stubborn support for a peaceful two-state solution would appear to be carelessly – or purposefully? – sacrificed at the altar of gods promising, but never delivering the independent Palestinian state. The EU’s presence and policy, however, may also be explained by the daily experiences of EU diplomats and officers experiencing the Israeli occupation in the Ramallah-Jerusalem area. Drawing attention to this

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factor, Federica Bicchi argued for the relevance of local, daily doings in policy making by encouraging a shift from ‘the broader picture . . . to the smaller story, which can deliver a more conclusive set of evidence’ saying48 the description of the way in which European diplomats act and represent Europe in the area in and around Jerusalem is a description of how Europe tries (among other practices) to resist Israeli occupation and contribute to the recognition of Palestinian institutions as a different source of political authority. It is precisely the EU diplomats’ and officers’ familiarity with the ‘facts on the ground’ which makes many wonder what the real purpose of donor generosity and support is. While the Israeli public opinion tends to blame the EU for its pro-Palestinian stance, many Palestinians and the wider Arab public look at the EU’s political, diplomatic and financial aid as a sign of hypocrisy. Rhetorical and economic support may be necessary for European conscience, but has never been sufficient enough to challenge or change geographic, social, economic and political impacts of the Israeli measures in Palestine. If the EU had been more attentive and responsive to the voices of the oppressed both in terms of politics and its financial support, the Arab Spring would not have taken it by surprise probably.

European reactions to the Arab Spring Contrary to its old historical ties and familiarity with the region49 – beyond the borders of Palestine too – the Arab Spring and people’s rebellion against oppressive, authoritarian regimes took the EU by surprise. Rosemary Hollis argued that the ‘Arab revolts has actually demonstrated the[ir] failure’ – namely the failure of former EU policies – the extent to which, ‘EU has favoured regimes and practices that ultimately proved intolerable to a broad stratum of Arab society.’50 In other words ‘the European Union favored stability (. . .) over the requirements of democratization and (uncertain) political changes’ before the Arab Spring.51 In light of the Arab Spring demonstrations sweeping through the region and sensing the public sentiments surrounding the developments, the EU had to reconsider its policies vis-a`-vis the region during the course of 2011.

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The EU’s reaction to the ‘Arab Spring’, temporary changes in its policies and democracy promotion attempts are well-documented.52 The reactive EU-policies were shaped not only by the events, but also by the EU’s internal dynamics.53 Having witnessed not only the mass demonstrations in Tunisia, Egypt and later in Syria (or their weakness, for that matter, in Jordan and Palestine), but also the enthusiastic reaction of its own European public opinion and media, Brussels opted for promising conditional support for political transition (towards democracy) and economic transition (to real market economy) instead of backing the failing authoritarian politicians rhetorically. To compensate for its earlier co-operation with authoritarian governments, the EU (re-)invented the approach evolving around the concept of conditionality and the ‘more for more’ principle, ie. for giving more money (foreign aid), markets and mobility for those countries that exhibit deep commitment towards democratic reforms in 2011.54 The EU support to (authoritarian) Arab governments has become conditional on the ‘progress in building and consolidating democracy and respect for the law of rule’. It was explicitly worded in the documents that ‘the more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will get from the EU’.55 By (re)formulating its policies and (re)introducing the ‘sticks and carrot’ method the EU not only took into consideration the importance of its European public opinion (see later), but also assumed that societies (masses) and governments (elites) were united by sharing the desire for change. In other words, the EU seemed to assume that actors in the concerned countries only needed some external pressure to attain revolutionary goals.56 Conditionality was justified in the following way: ‘a radically changing political landscape in the Southern Mediterranean requires a change in the EU’s approach to the region – the underlying themes of differentiation, conditionality and of a partnership between our societies are part of the ongoing review of the European Neighborhood Policy (. . .) It is an incentive-based approach based on more differentiation (. . .): those that go further and faster with reforms will be able to count on greater support from the EU’.57 It soon became clear that the situation is somewhat more complicated and not every actor is interested in deep political changes. Recognizing the delicate situation, conditions were scheduled to be applied only from 2014 implying that the EU continued to dispense

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funds to the region – the Middle East Peace Process included – regardless to the lack progress with democratic reforms in Egypt, Jordan and Palestine.58 The only exception was Egypt, the government of which did not receive budgetary assistance for a brief period after the military coup in July 2013.59 The pro-human rights NGO sector was also severely affected in the concerned countries as governments increasingly labelled them as traitors and ‘foreign agents’ that accepted foreign support only to undermine the nation state and stability (see Chapter 5). Any increase in the size of ODA could be explained by the fact the humanitarian aid component has visibly increased for various reasons since 2013 (2014). If data show an increase that is due to the humanitarian element of the total grants (Table 4.3), which is mostly spent on Syrian refugees residing in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip (the 2014 war led to significant increase in humanitarian aid). Otherwise development aid for political purposes (democratization, human rights) could not increase. It has become a widely shared Western experience that cooperating with governments (especially in Egypt, but to a lesser extent in Jordan and Palestine too) is far more difficult that it was before the Arab Spring. Governments are far more reluctant to accept aid with political conditions and civil society organizations (associations working with human rights, democracy promotion) are much less free to accept money from foreign sources then they were before the Arab Spring. If there is anything ironic in the story of the Arab Spring it is that relates to the call for dignity. Demonstrators, rebels and revolutionaries called for a life with dignity not only in economic terms, not only being concerned with the prices of bread or employment opportunities, but rather in social-political terms. They rebelled for a life that is free of humiliating control, intimidation and domination. Even if Western donors understood and appreciated it due to their own historical experiences at least at the level of communications,60 they could not but continue to cooperate with ‘available’ actors and offer external aid, grants and loans to authoritarian regimes oppressing those that are advocating for regime change. For the past years, cooperation with the civil sector has been hindered in Egypt and Jordan, especially in the case of advocacy and human rights NGOs in different ways, though. For example, the EU’s assistance to Egypt could focus on three sectors considered to be apolitical: poverty

967 56 276 1 387 140 107 972 72 149 35 304 106

North Africa, total, of which Algeria Egypt Libya Morocco Tunisia North of Sahara, regional, non-spec Middle East, total, of which Jordan Lebanon Syrian Arab Republic West Bank and Gaza Strip Middle East, regional, non-spec

994 90 232 1 324 141 206 897 71 81 50 568 8

2007 803 86 199 4 322 81 110 1 000 104 127 52 648 12

2008 776 83 205 2 283 108 94 841 86 74 55 540 4

2009 673 54 143 1 234 97 144 824 136 56 54 462 14

2010 709 79 66 49 209 179 128 696 111 54 36 394 34

2011 682 64 126 31 153 200 109 805 144 68 38 335 53

2012 443 68 40 61 116 118 40 1 197 224 182 183 361 80

2013

629 60 137 38 107 241 46 1 255 179 214 194 483 27

2014

Source: OECD DAC Statistics, Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a], Data extracted on 25 January 2017.

2006

Recipient

665 57 93 30 202 206 76 1 416 206 197 263 483 70

2015

Table 4.3 ODA grants (development and humanitarian aid) from EU institutions to selected MENA countries, 2006 –2015 (constant prices, millions $US dollar, 2014).

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alleviation, local socio-economic development and social protection; governance, transparency and business environment; quality of life and environment. The reference document specifying the details of EUEgyptian cooperation mentions the term ‘human rights’ only four times (expressing the EU worries), but it does not demand any immediate changes. It only ‘seeks to support a democratic transition and enhance stability, peace and prosperity in Egypt,’ but the how is left unspecified.61 The reluctance to accept Western support – with burden attached, that is, contingent on ‘Western’ norms – concerns not only human rights and democracy promotion, but governments have started to prevent certain international and Western NGOs to work in the fields such as education, water, and economic growth. The only exception may be Palestine where donors enjoy relative freedom. Not simply because the PNA is much weaker in terms of practicing sovereignty over its own affairs than governments in the neighbouring countries. Equally important is the fact that the EU itself had preferred supporting projects in Palestine that are as free of politics as possible – in order to avoid conflicts over each and every ambitious project with Israel – well before the Arab Spring.62 If it has become easier to implement projects in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, that is because activities financed by donor money have become less and less developmental and more and more humanitarian since the latest elections (2006) and the Fatah-Hamas split (2007). Local, regional and international (humanitarian) NGOs enjoy relative freedom to do their business as long as they only provide ‘relief’, ‘reconstruct’, ‘recover’ or ‘rehabilitate’ (the Gaza Strip)63 and stay away from the political scene by not challenging the delicate status quo. Summarizing briefly, the EU’s response to the Arab Spring, it was, indeed, a mistake to assume that aid conditionality could be exported to politicized areas falling into the more traditional foreign policy domains. The ‘new’ EU-approach reminded many scholars to an’ old wine in new bottle’ or to a’ leopard being unable to change its spots scenario.64 Shared prosperity – economic development, reducing poverty and unemployment – in the Southern Neighbourhood has remained of secondary importance to stability concerns.65 As discussed by many, the weakness of applying political conditionality within the ENP framework rests on the absence of the ‘final carrot’.66 The EU simply could not offer tangible benefits for the Arab MENA countries in exchange for their compliance in

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the field of democratic and good governance reforms or human rights. And, as argued in Chapter 2, aid (money) itself cannot buy true friendship (inclusive to all segments and actors of the populations). No surprise then that the EU aid policies – decisions concerning allocation or conditionality – are more responsive to the European public opinion than adaptive (adaptable) to local, Middle Eastern circumstances.

The European public opinion behind donor policies The EU’s initial insistence on conditionality in the context of the Arab Spring cannot be understood without drawing attention to the relevance of public opinion in democracies. It is needed for two reasons. First, democratic governments cannot conduct foreign or development policies without the consent (opinion) of their citizens, voters and taxpayers. As, in Mauss’ world, the chief was obligated to give in order to reproduce his authority in the village or his tribe by means of expenditure (giving gifts), the public opinion expects their governments to spend on foreign aid in our contemporary (post) modern world to recognize the misfortune (injustice) by showing solidarity. Secondly, this reality (Western solidarity at the level of public opinion) is simply overlooked by local (Palestinian, Egyptian) critiques of foreign aid that tend to blame the EU, the US, international financial institutions (WB, IMF), and the pro-Western regional governments for cooperating (plotting) against people in the Middle East in the spirit of neoliberalism.67 As if donor governments were actors independent of their voters and taxpayers’ will. It is simply impossible to blame coordinated neoliberal solutions ‘imposed upon’ peoples in the Middle East (elsewhere) without risking the support of Western public opinion – the true (political engaged) solidarity of which would be of vital importance for fundraising in Western donor countries (see Table 4.11 on the necessity of foreign aid). Western public opinion interacts with policy making as the substance of democracy depends to a large extent on the free and fair dissemination of information and ideas. Freedom of speech and related liberties continue to form a fundamental part of democracies as well as that of the way they are being built and promoted. It helps to provide a balance between stability and change; it is a means which ensures the stability of a democratic society.68 These lessons are well understood in Western democracies, even if their foreign policies may be in contradiction with the domestic rules of the game.69 Most European ministers of foreign

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affairs and development co-operation have always paid attention to public opinion, media outlets and their parliaments. Equally, the public servants in headquarters have been ‘equally sensitive to reputational hazard and legitimacy issues’.70 The relationship between public opinion and development aid policy is much clearer in the donor countries than in the recipient countries. Views on foreign aid and aid-related decisions are equally well-investigated.71 It is also known that the European public opinion tends to support aid, whereas the people in the United States are more critical of the US aid overseas programmes.72 Scrutinizing here only the European public opinion, citizens are asked in Eurobarometer (EB) surveys from time to time, whether the level of aid should be linked to the efforts taken by the recipient countries to encourage and sustain democracy. Early findings (2004) showed that there was a widespread consensus that the level of aid should be dependent on recipient countries’ efforts, in the Middle East and elsewhere, even if the term ‘condition’ was not used in the survey. The proportion of EU citizens considering that development aid should be used as an incentive for encouraging sustainable democracy rose from 2002 to 2004 by 5 per cent points to 74 per cent.73 Years later, already after the Arab Spring, the majority of respondents (84 per cent) believed that developing countries should follow certain rules regarding democracy, human rights and governance as a condition for receiving EU development aid.74 As authors of the concerned EB report noted, this may also be related to the events of the Arab Spring.75 In terms of aid allocation European respondents ranked Sub-Saharan Africa at the first place (by 64 per cent of the respondents in 2007 and by 70 per cent in 2011) when they were asked about the regional priorities. Historical developments in the MENA region have not yielded significantly more attention after the Arab Spring: 29 per cent and 33 per cent of the respondents mentioned it in 2007 and 2011 respectively.76 Asked about the importance of helping others, a large majority of respondents said it was important or very important to help people in developing countries (average 89 per cent); the proportion of respondents who thought it was important to help people in developing countries was at its highest since June 2010, and has increased by four percentage points since 2014.77 Still, there are meaningful differences between the Western (Northern) and Eastern (Southern) parts of the EU in terms of evaluating the role EU citizens and EU aid can play.78

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Regarding the priority areas, the escalating unrest in the Middle East probably influenced views on the priority areas for development: peace and security (41 per cent) is now more likely to be considered as a pressing challenge for developing countries than health (34 per cent) or education (34 per cent).79 Besides the abstract questions formulated on the necessity to help, capabilities were assessed similarly. While 90 per cent of Swedish respondents thought (in 2013) they could play an active role in tackling poverty (Ireland: 65 per cent, Luxembourg: 65 per cent, Spain: 65 per cent), people in the Eastern part of the EU exhibited much less (self-)confidence. In Bulgaria only 10 per cent of people said they could play a role in tackling poverty in developing countries (Estonia: 17 per cent, Hungary: 28 per cent).80 With reference to the interaction between the donor and the donated, 87 per cent of respondents in Sweden said that tackling poverty in developing countries has a positive influence on EU citizens (Finland: 83 per cent, Denmark: 82 per cent) in 2013. The ‘causality’ is much less visible for those living in Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria: 26 per cent, Czech Republic: 39 per cent, Slovakia: 39 per cent).81 People living in richer countries seem to feel more responsibility and solidarity for non-European hardships, than people living in the more ‘problematic’ regions inside the EU. Equally, they find more pleasure in helping those living far from them. These trends have not changed that much throughout the years.82 Citing the 2015 EB, 76 percent of respondents were convinced that aid for developing countries contributes to a more peaceful and equal world, while 74 per cent agreed that tackling poverty in developing countries is a moral obligation for the EU.83 Reading these data from an Eastern perspective, not only Western ‘neoliberal’ powers, but the public in general seems to have got used to the notion that ‘they can shape and control most aspects of power and policy across the Arab world, whether due to imperial self-interest, energy requirements, economic needs, or pro-Israeli biases’.84 As indicated by the EB surveys most of the Europeans are ready to provide help for the developing world, the Middle East included, even if they do not know precisely the scope or magnitude of the problem to be solved (as public opinion polls are not exams taken in schools). Contemporary international solidarity appears to be only momentary, compassion-based and not so conscious, or constructive, in political terms.85 Yet, it is so closely linked to the

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concept of global justice, that it is the sense of injustice – the Palestinian pain in Gaza, the Egyptian heroism on Tahrir square, or Jordanian development needs in light of the burden caused by Syrian refugees – combined with the spectacle of suffering86 that mobilizes Western and regional public support for official foreign aid and charities in donor countries (in addition to foreign policy interests of the states). This mobilization, however, does not mean that aid can buy justice and truth in the recipient country. Foreign aid can buy only its promise (or illusion) by paying for stories and images (documenting injustice) delivered by the media or actors in the NGO sector. Critiques of (Western, international) humanitarian communication emphasize that ‘humanitarian communication’ is designed by donors and implementing international NGOs in such manner as to serve the ‘consumerist’ taste of the public in donor countries. Modern (Western, global) solidarity with distant others, occupied Palestinians or Syrian refugees, is a rather selfserving and ironic endeavour in many cases, and just as pity and compassion, it is a form of politics which relies on the spectacle of vulnerability.87 Most Europeans worry much less for regional stability itself than for their consequences jeopardizing stability in Europe, Westerns lives, norms and values. Available public opinion data show that (re)inventing the principle of conditionality in 2011 has been more in line with the European way of thinking than with the demands of the ‘Arab Spring.’ Although it is difficult to detect direct causality between public opinion and policy formulation, the EU was expected – by its own population – to set conditions if it has been spending European money on promoting democracy, good governance and human rights outside its borders. Solidarity with people living in the developing world, the Arab Spring demonstrators included, enjoyed great support within the EU countries with a majority being ready to spend EU money on development and democracy promotion, but only with conditions attached. Conditional political aid, however, was much less received in the target counties. Democratization is an internal process of societal change and the role of political conditionality is obviously limited.88 The fact that prosperous, substantial democracies cannot be ‘established’ by wishful thinking or externally set conditions matters hardly to the West and its public opinion. It recalls Rosa Balfour’s question whether the

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donor focus on conditionality was relevant at all. Sovereignty, self-determination and dignity have always been crucial concepts in the Middle East too. To set external conditions in exchange for democratic changes that have otherwise been initiated by local citizens – having been oppressed by authoritarian governments that enjoy the support of Western powers – is more about paternalism (or narcissism?), than reflection on the reality. Since conditions were addressed to authoritarian (or transitional) governments which were apparently not ready to share power with the masses/people at that stage, the EU could not be very tough in its demands. Not to mention the competitive role played by regional donors (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE) not being so much concerned with human rights and democracy promotion. To sum up, the practice of attaching conditions to aid seemed to be more in line with European public opinion, than with local realities. As the EU as a donor had cultivated friendly bonds with those oppressing pro-democracy segments of the population, ‘most of the young Arab democracies are unlikely to pursue a policy that binds them ever more closely to a declining Europe.’89 Heirs of former authoritarian regimes (in Egypt first and foremost) or those leaders that survived the demonstrations by intimidating their own populations could not be bought conditional aid either.

Simply saying: The US set the rules, the EU paid (pays!?) the bill I perceived in this moment that when the white man turns tyrant it is his own freedom that he destroys (. . .) And my whole life, every white man’s life in the East was one long struggle not to be laughed at. (George Orwell, 1962, ‘Shooting and Elephant’ in Inside the Whale and Other Essays, Harmondsworth: Penguin, pp. 95 –96) Although discussed as separate actors here, the American and European (EU) aid policies are at least as much complementing each other in the Middle East as their foreign policies. A stable region, free of hostility toward the West and turmoil, is of utmost importance both for the US and the EU.90 Violence, interstate wars and other domestic conflicts threaten peaceful commerce, business interests; create an influx of

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refugees as indicated by intra- and inter-regional consequences of the Arab Spring. In addition, the Western, especially European, public opinion also pressures their governments to spend more aid and get engaged in interventions to solve conflicts, and prevent immigration, preferably, peacefully, which is not always an easy task to accomplish. Even if it seems to be more a wish than a reality looking at the current state of affairs, the closer the Middle East gets to stability, however authoritarian stability is, the better European and US interests are served. Both sides of the transatlantic alliance, after all, have got used to cooperating with authoritarian governments in the region. It is precisely the dual lack of democracy and associated (democratic) stability that yields contemporary gifts from donors and justify their involvement in regional affairs. The EU, its member states and the US share a considerable amount of common interests in the region, but a certain sort of division of labour also applies. As Western aid policies and practices regarding democracy promotion are far from being homogenous,91 it is beyond the scope of this book to discuss the differences in depth. To put them briefly, the US has increasingly relied upon the EU to carry out its foreign policy aims in the region,92 which is illustrated by a common local perception: the US sets the rules, the EU pays the bill.93 While only the US disposes over military assistance, the EU seems to be more actively involved in mitigating the negative implications of this military assistance by providing ‘apolitical/technicized’ development cooperation and ‘neutral’ humanitarian affairs. This latter does not mean that the EU does not participate in security-related activities in recipient countries, nor does it mean that some of its members (UK, France and Germany) do not transfer weapons to the region (see Table 3.3), but the US leading role cannot be questioned on that front; nor the fact that humanitarian and development assistance is chanelled for those purposes and actors that strengthen ties and bonds with the West. Measuring the impacts and efficiency of foreign aid is not easy, especially not in political or security terms. To estimate how much security or stability a dollar can buy whether in the form of military or security-related assistance or in political terms, one should be able to measure the level of insecurity in a given country or region, the prevailing threats, their associated costs and the likelihood of unknown threats and their probable costs among others.94 The following three

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(four) sections are much less ambitious. They will only look at the conflicting objectives of foreign aid channelled to a diverse set of actors to illustrate how the recipient-donor relations have developed and what exchange and reciprocity means between Middle Eastern and Western actors. Baldwin was probably right in saying that donor’s influence and the recipient’s gains are simultaneously present in foreign aid relations, but there are multiple actors with conflicting interests on the recipient side, not to mention the final beneficiaries. As such aid targets different sets of actors – inviting different sorts of return gifts. For the sake of simplicity three (four) main cycles composed of gifts and return gifts will be discussed in the sections below: (i) military and economic support provided for managing order, (ii and iii) keeping peace and stability, development assistance for the promise of political reforms and for strenghtening civil society actors and (iv) humanitarian aid for the lack of stability.

Aid for managing order (keeping stability and peace) No revolution will be won against a modern army when that army is putting out its full strength against the insurrection.95 cited by Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, p. 289. As discussed earlier, US military assistance has been channelled to Egypt, Palestine/PNA and Jordan recognizing the significance of the peace agreements they signed with Israel and their contribution to regional peace and more recently to global security (in light of the global war on terror). The US has not only supported ‘mutual cooperation’ between Egypt and Israel. It ‘bought’ peace and (the promise of) regional stability by providing military assistance or security-related ODA to Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the PNA.96 Honouring their cooperative stance the US – alongside other Western donors – has provided more and more aid to Middle Eastern governments since the late 1970s and 1990s respectively. Arab regimes in turn, did their best to control and discipline their populations in Egypt, Jordan and the PNA. Not simply because a great part of their public opinion has not been in favour of the outcome of the peace process (Israeli occupation, settlements on Palestinian land, etc), but for other reasons too. The constant threat of

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radical Islamism and the results of democratic elections (Algeria/FLN 1994; PNA/Hamas 2007; Egypt/Muslim Brotherhood/2011) played a serious role in mobilizing contemporary gifts for pro-Western powers in the region.97 The Oslo Peace Process. One of the most obvious examples indicating how foreign aid structures and shapes local ‘order’ is offered by the Oslo Peace Process (PP), which confirmed the ‘aid for stability’ trade-off. It offered the first ‘big’ opportunity for the post-Cold War international community to show that pro-peace, non-violent attitudes can be effectively bought by economic assistance in the Middle East too. In the context of the PP, the principal aim of the donor community was to support the implementation of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993. As worded in the Co-Sponsors Summary of the first meeting conveyed by international actors in the shadow of the DOP ceremony, the donors officially sought to pursue ‘twin goals’ in terms of immediate and longer-term actions: to have a short term impact on economic prospects and living standards, to ensure that longer-term assistance lays the basis for launching sustained growth.98 Since then, foreign aid aimed at improving the Palestinian socio-economic conditions and building the institutional system of the PNA. Its utmost objective ranged from supporting the Oslo Peace Process (1993–2000)99 to strengthening the Israeli-Palestinian efforts for returning to the negotiation table (since the outbreak of the second intifada, 2000).100 The Oslo Agreements attempted to regulate only the interim period with the implied objective to create a Palestinian state as the end-result of the ‘final status’ negotiations. For the past 25 years the ‘interim’ has become ‘permanent’ and there is no Palestinian state on the horizon. Since the implementation of the agreements were not in full harmony with the expectations, foreign aid disbursements soon become the target of criticisms from those that expected more from these transfers (gifts) than the prevetion of violence or substitution of war (intifada would be a proper term). According to local perceptions as well, donors provided foreign aid, in the form of official development assistance and humanitarian aid for getting something back since the early 1990s, to see their agendas and conditions met. Contrary to the officially stated goals this agenda could not be identical to the establishment of the Palestinian state.

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Implicit conditions – to go on with the implementation of the Oslo Agreements and to keep the Palestinian territories quiet and peaceful – have been rather set since the early 1990s. Palestinians have been expected to ‘behave well’ in exchange for the aid that promised peace with Israel, but never delivered independence. The hidden conditions became openly stated only after the elections (2006) when the donor community (the Quartet) set three conditions in exchange for accepting the results of the parliamentary elections which had led to the electoral victory of Hamas (Reform and Change Movement).101 Foreign aid has meant to be channelled to ‘cooperative’ or ‘collaborative’ Palestinian actors with the aim of isolating or removing those political and social elites102 that were not seen as real ‘partners in the game called ‘peace process’’. By setting conditions to ‘reverse’ the outcome of the elections in 2006, the US and the EU strengthened not only the pro-Western moderate actors at the expense of democratic ideas and otherwise fragile social cohesion, but also ‘encouraged the emergence of rival armed camps and militarization of national politics.’103 The Quartet-conditions, however, have proved to be somehow senseless, if not counterproductive as they obviously contributed to the weakening internal legitimacy of the Westerners backed actors. Acknowledging the complexity of the situation, the donor community was very cautious to ask anything formally in exchange for aid during the course of 2007 and 2008. These years marked the Hamas takeover in the Gaza Strip, the Israeli measures, operations and restrictions, and Fayyad’s development and reconstruction plans in the West Bank. As implied, the long-term structure, channels, forms of international assistance – provided partly through the PEGASE mechanism and from the EU budget – have not been deeply affected in Palestine by the Arab Spring and the related ‘more for more’ principle (discussed earlier). Conditionality officially and intentionally has not been applied to the PNA to ensure that the PA benefits from a predictable flow of funds,104 beyond what has been the norm since the early 1990s: violence against Israel cannot be applied and the PNA should do its best to prevent hostilities against Israel. The international community’s belief that the peace process is contingent on non-violence has resulted in foreign support for a strong dual authority that is composed of two ‘independent’ heads: Israel and

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the PNA. Foreign aid enchanced, among others, the PNA’s capacity to meet its security obligations vis-a`-vis Israel.105 Foreign assistance in Palestine is available only to those actors, ‘partners in peace’ (the PNA and NGOs alike), that accept the ‘two states’ idea, support the peace process, accept the existing order and denounce violence against Israel. The link between the politics and aid is widely acknowledged even if, contrary to the perception above, overt conditionality does not apply officially in Palestine. Palestinian NGOs cannot even accept foreign funding with conditions in line with the NGO law enacted in 2000. In absence of formal/official conditions, Western donors did their best to ‘depolitize’ their aid projects as much as possible: Donors are fully aware of what they are doing, they pay millions of dollars, and there is no real [political] development, there is no change or any progress in the situation, the situation is heading always to the worst (. . .) there was a massive destruction after the wars [that] led to the shift in the priorities, donor objectives. [While] these big amounts of money were supposed to go to build the Palestinian state, [due to] the political situation the policies and the priorities of the donors changed in Gaza. [There] was a lot of promises from the international community and the Arab countries to reconstruction of Gaza after the last war in 2014, but until now there are no real process ongoing. (. . .) after the war in 2009 the EU reviewed its policies and started to fund the NGOs far from Hamas. Now, there is a competition between the donors in Gaza, all of them want to fund the NGOs, but all the projects are relief or humanitarian projects.106 Donors have been equally criticized for maintaining the Oslo status quo107 by preferring relief and humanitarian solutions over political engagement, that is, for their complicity in the Israeli occupation too.108 Israel, obviously, not only enjoys US military assistance, but simultaneously benefits from the EU’s anti-violence stance expected from Palestinian aid beneficiaires. As a head of department within the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs hinted: ‘we are very happy with the EU’s assistance and activity in the Palestinian territories, we even cooperate with them by facilitating the implementation of EU-funded projects’.109 It must be

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emphasized, again, that aid to Palestine is conditional only on its peaceful relations with Israel and on denouncing violence and terrorism. Yet, the perception that aid is not free of political intentions – tacit conditions and sacrifices to be taken by the recipient – is strong enough to be ignored. Aid recipients, both the PNA and civil society organizations are expected to prevent anything that would otherwise destabilize the fragile (security) cooperation between Israel and the PNA. More overtly than the EU, the US Congress tends to condition its economic and security-related assistance to its commitment to peaceful coexistence with Israel. The US law regularly contains a set of restrictions and limitations, for example, by prohibiting any US assistance to a PA government that included Hamas, unless it agrees to Israel’s right to exist and accept the Oslo peace agreements signed in the 1990s. Washington has always expected the PNA to demonstrate commitment to peaceful coexistence with Israel, to cooperate with it to prevent terrorism and also with other countries in the region to establish a lasting peace, that is stability around Israel.110 Israel and the IDF, however, is not subject to any regular ’human rights record’ assesment as part of the US State Department’s military assistance review.111 These US set rules seem to be accepted by the EU too, which has been encouraged to take a leading role in financing the Palestinian institution-building and development since the 1990s. No surprise that local interpretations place ‘Israeli’ and ‘international’ next to each other by emphasizing complicity: security-related and development cooperation (keeping the two-state solution alive) and the Israeli occupation (undermining it) seem to complement each other. Just as the donor community could not challenge or change the Israeli policies applied vis-a`-vis the Palestinain territories, it could not help deep democratization in Egypt and Jordan either: the promise of stability was worth more money than transition to or promise of deep democracy. Egypt. The US has not simply supported ‘mutual cooperation’ between the Egypt and Israel since the 1970s, but it has bought Israel’s security by the continuous flow of military aid to both parties (see earlier). The political role played by US foreign aid has become even more visible after the Arab Spring, when military aid (budget support) and equipment has been channelled on the overt condition that Egypt respects its obligations – not in terms of human rights and the

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democracy demands of the Egyptian demonstrators, but – vis-a`-vis Israel. Regardless to the ideological differences between Washington and the Egyptian government led by Mohammed Morsi (2012–2013), the Muslim Brotherhood had to honour the American assistance. During the course of 2012 and 2013, the Egyptian leadership was warned multiple times that ‘there would be consequences’ if the army ‘were not to fulfil its obligations toward the Egyptian people’, if it failed to protect the Egyptian national security interests.112 As a ‘counter-gift’ Egypt continued to maintain peace with Israel, fought terror groups in the Sinai Peninsula, mediated between Israel and the Palestinian actors and participated in military-security cooperation with the United States,113 not without sacrifices though. Domestic politics do not seem to influence the Egyptian commitments towards Israel as the two countries have some common enemies: radical Islamists. This cooperative stance was so much appreciated by Israel, that it – via the AIPAC, one of the biggest pro-Israel lobby in Washington – managed to convince the Obama-administration that suspending its military assistance to Egypt after the non-democratic removal of a democratically elected president (Summer 2013) would be a catastrophe.114 As an AIPAC memo emphasized, ‘the United States should continue its strong support for the treaty and back Egypt as it works with Israel to combat the threats of extremists within its borders who would seek to undermine it.’115 In the end, Washington, with the tacit cooperation of the EU, approved what happened (by refraining from using the term ‘military coup’), and accepted the dismissal of the democratically elected Morsi-government by ‘unfreezing’ the temporary suspended military assistance. If it reminds us how the West reacted to the Palestinian elections (2006), it cannot be a coincidence. The local perceptions were identical in both cases: Western powers simply ‘buy’ their countries, local elites included, by using (American) military aid to leverage influence over domestic politics, by offering concessional (IMF; World Bank) loans for the sake of macroeconmic stability and providing (American, European) development and humanitarian grants to maintain a status quo favouring the West in the region.116 Moving a bit away, Jordan’s strongest lobbying force is its (self-) portrayal as a stable island neighbouring Israel. Indeed, Amman does not need to explain lengthily why its stability needs to be cushioned with further assistance in light of the terrifying pictures of

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the Syrian war and refugees, or the consequences of the ISIS operation in the region. Recalling briefly the background, the US had cooperation agreements with Jordan already in the 1950s.117 However, it was the peace agreement with Israel (1994) – combined with the ‘instabilities’ on the eastern Jordanian borders for the past decade – which has led to gradual, but significant changes in the size of aid.118 Yet, peace with Israel was followed by the ‘first sustained setback’ in Jordanian liberalization and the regime started to weaken the opposition systematically by preventing NGOs from becoming involved in political mobilization. Demonstrations and protests were not only discouraged, but actively contained during the 1990s. Both King Hussein and his son, Abdullah ‘advanced political reforms only to suspend them when convinced that they pose risk to stability’.119 As far as the ‘exchange’ perspective and reciprocity is concerned, ‘Amman has received a free pass on human rights because it has been so useful strategically [to the US]’.120 Regime stability, in Jordan too, was preferred by foreign donors. The Palestinian(-Israeli), Jordanian and Egyptian ‘ability’ to use excessive force against their own populations (see later) and insurgents is partly explained by the combined role played by foreign donors and local governing elites. One of the most effective way of controlling the population, political opponents, civil society organizations and activists is expanding the ‘deep state’ instead of promoting ‘deep democracy’. The former term comes from Turkey and consists of the complex layers of military, political and bureaucratic power commanding and regulating the lives of ordinary citizens. Key elements include the intelligence services on the one hand, and the size of the army on the other. For example, if Mubarak was sacrificed in Egypt (in 2011), that was due to the fact that the Egyptian army is mainly composed of civilian recruits. From the perspective of the regime (SCAF) it was much easier to sacrifice the president than to convince half a million soldiers in uniform to fight its fellow citizens.121 The ‘deep state’, the regime ensuring the stability of the staus quo, had to survive and bonds and ties with donor countries played an instrumental role in it. The intelligence services gather information and keep the population under control both in Israel(-Palestine), and the concerned Arab countries. All of them cooperate actively with Western partner agencies, first and foremost with the CIA, on a lot of issues of common

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interests.122 Focusing here only on the Jordanian Mukhaabaraat (GID, General Directorate of Intelligence), the Egyptian National Security Agency (NSA) and General Intelligence Agency (GIA), they all play an inevitable role in maintaining the ‘deep state’ and preventing democratization. Their efficiency is not limited to hunting for terrorists in the region,123 but they devote a great part of their time to keep an eye on what the individual citizen is doing with paying particular attention to the activities of foreign funded civil society organizations and their activists. Dirty details are covered mostly by newspaper articles, and rarely cited in academic works.124 An exemption is offered by Sirrs’ monograph on the history of the Egyptian secret services which claims that the security services were subsequently ‘reorganized, augmented and centralized to meet an increasingly sophisticated array of challenges, including fascism, communism, army unrest, Israel, France, the United Kingdom, conservative Arab states, the Muslim Brotherhood and others’ in the past hundred years.125 The same applies to the PNA security forces. They not only cooperate with Israel, but just as their counterparts in Egypt and Jordan, they have committed serious human rights violations against civil Palestinians.126 Hamas has beein doing the same (mostly in the Gaza Strip),127 but it does not get assistance from official Western sources. Anyhow, trained by such experiences, peaceful civil society activists could not pose a tough challenge for the Middle Eastern state working on preserving ‘stability’. To sum up, Israel’s very existence seems to legitimize the extensive military, security and intelligence establishments in the region, which has recently been complemented by the threats posed by violent political Islam. Although there have been the modest Western efforts in the form of development aid favouring reforms since the 1990s (to be discussed below), still, much larger efforts have been invested to strengthen the institutions of repression in Arab countries,128 whose strategic support has been sought by the US, Israel and the European powers. By legitimizing the recipient governments at international level, foreign support – military, humanitarian and development assistance – also provides the regime with the needed means to survive or, as the military coup in Egypt (2013) proves, retain power. The biggest problem with (Western) foreign aid is that supporting security-related institutions (military, intelligence, police) to meet certain obligations in the context of international relations does not prevent aid

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recipient governments to use the very same institutions against those that living inside the borders are controlled by them. And, as argued by F. Gregory Gause, they probably do so because defeating and oppressing political opponents militarily can be done at lower costs than co-optation or compromise would require. Political reforms are welcomed, but neither donors, nor non-state beneficiaries could go too far in their demands if these demands threat either stability (as ‘return gift’ delivered) or the bonds between the giver and the givee.129 The relations between the proWestern Middle Eastern regimes and their Western ‘patrons’ are reminiscent to the relations between the elites and masses in the authoritarian Arab context. Military and political elites in authoritarian(like) regimes expect their own population not to challenge the status quo by using the military and intelligence services against them and offering some benefits (tax, subsidies) for the people. In similar vein, Western donors try to squeeze as much ‘stability’ as possible from their regional allies. Instead of sending their armies, however, it is foreign aid that fulfils this role in most cases.

Aid for (missing) political and economic reforms [T]echnical assistance can often be a substitute for efforts . . . to achieve justice in unjust societies; in its worst forms it merely helps expand the power and authority of dictators, kings and military junas. Watenpaugh, Bread from Stones, xiv Foreign aid – political aid, military aid – has not only strengthened authoritarianism (stability), it also attempted to undermine it (for the sake of democratic transition).130 Donors had received, in turn, considerable promises for democratic changes, especially before the Arab Spring and in those cases when rents from alternative sources were not available. Governments in Egypt, Jordan and the PNA received development aid (ODA) for implementing non-violent, gradual and ‘never ending’ political reforms. It implies that there were meaningful governmental efforts to implement political reforms in all countries. These reforms, in many cases, were results of negotiations and consultations with some local civil society actors and opposition parties. Others were initiated and encouraged by Western donors, that had tried not to tolerate human rights abuses

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before the Arab Spring. The US not only gave aid for supporting democratization, it also terminated it in case of non-compliance. In 2007, for example, the US Congress witheld $US200 million from the $US1,3 billion military assistance in order to ‘encourage’ Egypt to improve the human rights not only within its borders, but in the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip too. Most political reforms implemented in Egypt (changes and amendments in the constitutions) before the Arab Spring concerned not so much individual human rights, but the election system and the procedures of forming parties.131 The Arab Spring reforms resulted in bringing the Muslim Brotherhood into power by democratic elections. After their removal by military coup (Summer 2013) and in parallel with the AIPAC lobbying in Washington (mentioned earlier), the Council of the European Union warned the regime led by Sisi132 that budgetary assistance would be not available to those governments that were not ready to cooperate with European norms. The council conclusions, in August 2013, listed at length the democratic values and principles in order to make the public understand that only ‘assistance in the socio-economic sector and to civil society will continue.’ 133 After the Council had reiterated its position in February 2014,134 the Egyptian Ministry of Planning, probably knowing about the developments in Washington, rejected the European conditions saying ‘the EU appoints itself as a judge or guardian to assess the political and social developments in Egypt, and thus it interferes in the management of the transitional phase. This is an unacceptable and incorrect approach by the EU, rejected by the Egyptian people who carried out two revolutions to achieve genuine democracy and to be able to determine their future on their own.’135 Politicians usually talk this way only if they hold the winning cards. The ‘winning cards’ meant the eventual continuation of the US assistance to the (would-be) Sisi-government – combined with access to alternative sources from Saudi Arabia and the UAE – which was followed by changes in the EU’s position too. Political conditionality is a temporary affair that needs to be used from time to time to keep the recipient on the right path. Since 2013 the US lawmakers have decided numerous times to suspend part of the military aid package available to Egypt, but never really considered withdrawing their support fully.136 Furthermore, Washington assisted the international financial institutions that provided

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a considerable amount of concessional loans to Cairo for stabilizing its economy. To restore Egypt’s macroeconomic stability and promote inclusive growth, the IMF approved its largest regional programme (a three-year extended arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility, $US12 billion) in 2016.137 Macroeconomic measures, even if they are not the subject of this book, deserve attention as they are to be defended by the police in Egypt. As Maha Abdelrahman argues the police is central to the Sisi regime’s efforts that aim at reducing political discourse to a simplistic concept of ‘security’ in an attempt to maintain its long-term legitimacy.138 Jordan has always been rewarded for the role it played as a moderate, pro-Western Muslim country regardless of its doubtful record on human rights. And economic reforms attracting foreign investment and increasing exports have always been preferred over political reforms. Political liberalization has usually been hindered by various security-related issues in the neighbourhood (peace agreement with Israel, the second intifada, supporting the US in the Iraq war, the Arab Spring and the Syrian refugee crisis), which led to significant reversal in civil liberties. While foreign donors, at least before the Arab Spring in the region, concerned the strengthening of the civil society and participation, free press and improving the legal system, the real problem (the election system) in Jordan has remained more or less intact. Jordan illustrates well how domestic politics (the lack of political or democratic reforms) are related to the Palestinian question: “as long as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is unresolved, the monarchy will not be forced to reform the electoral law and settle the question of PalestinianJordanian representation in the kingdom . . . the regime fears that the lack of options for a viable Palestinian state will encourage Palestinians to move to Jordan”.139 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has also hindered political reform by strengthening conservative elements around the monarch, especially the security establishment.140 Beyond the developments in the neighbouring West Bank, the recent episodes of violence elsewhere in the region also strengthened the sense of insecurity and the importance/influence of the security elite in Jordan. The ‘stubborn Jordanian stability’ has been honoured and supported by its Western donors that never really questioned Jordan on its track record on political reforms and democratization.

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Indeed, the EU has apparently learned something from the Egyptian experience as conditionality has been hardly visible in Jordan regardless to the 2011 communications detailing the importance of human rights concerns. Although the association agreements link free trade and political reform, the EU had to make some compromises in terms of making assistance and trade relations contingent on progress towards democracy in Jordan. As European officials put it: ‘we do not even use the word condition and conditionality (. . .) we are not here to impose our values.’141 According to a Jordanian official, however, it was a Jordanian request to replace the term ‘condition’ with that of ‘benchmark’ in official communications before the Arab Spring (in 2010). While the former term is more about imposing externally, the latter is ‘you know, something which is agreed upon together.’142 Eliminating political conditionality led to a cooperation in fields deemed innocent between 2014 and 2016 by the EU, such assistance related to the Syrian war; water, renewable energies and energy efficiency, employment and private sector development; enhanced accountability and equity in public service delivery.143 The reason behind probably lies in Jordan’s smart ‘cooperation style’ vis-a`-vis the EU and the US on the one hand and its strategic location on the other. Preserving its stability is of utmost importance under the given circumstances (Palestinian question, Syrian war and refugees, the ISIS fragile situation in Egypt). Any fierce demand or condition would entail undesired tensions between the government and the EU, when cooperation and coordination is of common interest for the sake of Jordanian stability (‘the return gift’), something which is more honoured in practice than any transition to democracy. It is not a coincidence that both the Jordanian-EU and the Jordanian-US cooperation and aid disbursements have reached historical levels in the past few years. Political reforms and democratization in Palestine were widely discussed in the late 1990s and around Arafat’s death144 and could never be separated from the question how Palestinian actors and fractions should behave vis-a`vis Israel. The EU’s support has produced significant results if it is measured by building the Palestinian institution system or by keeping the idea of the two-state solution alive. Regarding the former, the PNA was ready for statehood technically around 2011, but the overall record is very poor: the EU could not take any measure to get the Palestinians closer to sovereignty. Instead, it cooperated extensively with the (technocratic/pragmatic) PNA

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leadership, and as argued by Bouris, did not pay too much attention to strengthening ‘democratic civilian oversight and accountability.’145 The reason is simple: neither the Oslo Peace Process, nor the ‘two-state’ solution has been about democracy building. They concerned the Israeli-Palestinian relations which could not be further from democratic ideals. In other words, the EU has been supporting the consolidation of a non-democratic situation (it may be called occupation, peace process, or efforts for keeping the the two-state idea alive – the experienced reality is the same) between the sea and the Jordan river. The purpose of this and the next section is to show how controversial the role that aid plays by focussing on the second main ‘sets of recipients’: official governmental partners (authoritarian actors) and the so-called non-state beneficiaries (pro-democracy actors). While it may sound as a rather simplified model (it is that, indeed), it facilitates a better understanding of the competitive relations between the state (favouring the non-democratic status quo) and some politically active civil society actors (promoting change towards democratization).

Aid for supporting politically conscious actors in the civil society How will history regard the people of Egypt? Will it say that the revolution failed because people traded the blood of their young men and women for grocery bags, meat, and cell-phone charge card, which were distributed by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists before and around election time? Samaa Gamie’s question cited by Al-Saleh, ed, Voices of the Arab Spring, p. 108. Democracy promotion could never be complete without the participation of the civil society actors. From historical perspectives the lack of substantial democratization could be explained, at least in part, by the weakness of the civil society and a political culture that provided room for the emergence of alternative actors (Islamist movements with political aspirations) in the Arab Middle East.146 Yet, contrary to the ambiguous or insufficient results, the slow and lagging democratization started decades ago. It is not a coincidence that, as noted by Amaney Jamal, democratic governments do not promote their own interest at the expense of their

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people, their association rights and civic activism included.147 Democratization can be neither understood, nor theorised without the belief in the instrumental role and constructive power of civic (civil society) organizations. They need to enjoy a broad autonomy and freedom so that they could constructively contribute to certain common goods. These common goods (welfare, prosperity, human rights, democratic values), however, are not without purpose. As illustrated by the century-long development process of Western/European countries, the welfare and freedom enjoyed by their citizens played an instrumental role in consolidating statecraft and power. It was, of course, coupled with a science of governing/government and bureaucratic power extended not only to economic and political activities, but also to education and social policies.148 By providing individual freedom and freedom of association, the Western democratic states have secured consent and strong support – precisely from those whom they aspire rule over in a rather invisible and sophisticated manner. Non-European ways of governments, however, are somewhat different. Middle Eastern authoritarian governments usually portray and treat many civil society organizations as if they were dangerous political opponents jeopardizing regime stability (and indeed, they do so). Basically, any foreign aid, mostly project aid, is deemed to be a potential means of political intervention potentially hurting state sovereignty, and as a consequence, regime stability. Comparing the European style of government to that of the Middle Eastern (Islamic) ‘oriental despotism’, Elie Kedourie drew attention to ‘a great distance, not to say an outright separation’ between concerns of the ruler and those of the ruled. In this system, goes the argument, the main concern of the ruler is ‘that there should be no challenge to his power and that as much wealth as possible should be squeezed out of the ruled to pay for his army and his court.’149 Middle Eastern regimes have always mastered to rule over their own populations – and they could simultaneously convince their Western donors that their Western security, economic interests or concerns for political reforms, democratisation or universal human rights can be exchanged for foreign aid. The art of manipulation becomes clear if one looks at how (semi-)authoritarian governments played off their own population against the external donors, and vica versa (see the public opinion data on Western actors later) and how the (food and fuel) subsidies provided to the same

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population have been financed from external rents, income from oil or foreign aid. Pouring massive external aid into a system that does not operate democratically, and many actors of which do not even honour democratic norms and ideals, cannot be about expecting transition to democracy seriously. The end of the Cold War, however, reinforced some illusions and led to conclusions such as ‘regimes in the region are under increasing pressure from their citizens’ as early (as the early 1990s) and ‘the Arab world is currently going through society building and democratization’ (in the late 1990s).150 As emphasized by Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the famous Egyptian human rights activist, civil society organizations in the Arab world have pressured for liberalization for two reasons. The Arab state’s failure to meet socio-economic needs coupled with its reluctance to respond positively to desires for political participation were equally legitimate bases for increased civil, Islamic or non-Islamic, consciousness and activism.151 Western donors, however, have been quite selective in terms of funding local partners by ignoring certain foundations of internal legitimacy, for example, religion (see Chapter 3). The US, the EU and its member states have provided ‘modest, but important’ support to local civic empowerment projects via local civil society organizations, universities, international and local NGOs, and think tanks for decades. Nevertheless, as emphasized by Sheila Carapico, it was always hard to distinguish ‘independent advocacy’ from inter-governmental transactions as long as most of the organizations are not only expected to be registered both with national authorities and the UN or donor agencies, but most of their funding comes from official sources. Talking about ‘foreign influence’ in the context of civil consciousness is always a bit of a delicate issue as it concerns (existing? missing?) local agency (the image of foreign agent will be discussed in Chapter 5). The Russian involvement in the latest US presidential elections (2016) led to a loud public debate on the historical role the US played in other countries’ political affairs. As Stephen Kinzer put it, ‘over a period of more than a century, American leaders have used a variety of tools to influence voters in other countries . . . we have chosen candidates, advised them, financed their parties, designed their campaigns, bribed media outlets to support them, and intimidated or smeared their rivals’.152 Marc Trachtenberg went even further arguing153 that

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this interference is a type of behavior that the United States helped establish; indeed, meddling in other countries’ politics has been an American specialty for a long time. . . . Since 1945, America has intervened in the internal political affairs of other countries as a matter of course. Our basic attitude has been that free elections are great – as long as they don’t produce outcomes the US government doesn’t like. None of this should be dismissed as ancient history. The habits that were formed during the Cold War period remain very much intact. The US government still feels it has the right to influence the outcomes of elections in other countries . . . The assumption is that . . . we have the right to intervene in the internal political affairs of all kinds of countries around the world. Activities bypassing the governments, such as trainings, workshops or conferences,154 have been long favoured and financed by Western donors. The US actively, but selectively contributed to ‘funding virtue’ within the local civil societies.155 Analysing almost 600 democracy-related projects sponsored by Western agencies and international organizations and implemented in the Arab world in the 1990s, Carapico found that ‘democracy brokers’ preferred working with Arab think-tanks, women’s groups, certain political parties, universities and educational programmes over openly Islamists and nationalist organizations.156 The US practice has, by and large, been in harmony with those of the EU that also spent millions of dollars on democracy promotion in line with the association agreements that were signed with the Mediterranean countries since the 1990s. Democratic political reforms, after all, are contingent not only on good quality public/welfare services, but also on strong and politically conscious civil societies too.157 Advocating for democracy in the MENA region included, among others, promoting universal values and forming partnerships with liberal (preferably nonIslamist) civil society organizations well before the Arab Spring.158 This process led to a three-way race among the authoritarian central governments/elites, the Islamist activists and the non-Islamist civil society forces before the Arab Spring with the purpose to seize or maintain power. Western foreign donors aspired to cultivate good relations with two of the three forces; the Islamist movements, those deemed to be dangerous, were marginalized regardless to the popular support they enjoy.

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Since the early 2000s levels of activism by foreign-funded civil society organizations had begun to reach unprecedented levels in Egypt, Jordan and Palestine among others159 leading to conflicts not only between the government and the civil society actors, but also among organizations and associations within the latter sector. As implied, the secular civil society (favoured by the West) could not become strong/ united enough in Egypt (in a country the population size of which is around 90 million) to change the game during the ‘Arab Spring’. Many socially well-embedded Islamist ‘civil society’ organizations, however, were feared not only by the West,160 but also by the Egyptian government and big regional donors (UEA, Saudi Arabia) as well. Taking the Palestinian case as another example, its non-governmental sector161 is exceptionally vibrant and active due to the unique historical context and the overwhelming donor interests in supporting the Oslo peace process (PP) since 1993.162 Palestinian civil society organizations provided various services to the population well before the beginning of the PP and the establishment of the PNA (1994). However, it was the PP which brought about major changes and not only in terms of size and nature. Due to the huge foreign interest in ‘supporting the peace process’ and the relative abundance of sources a completely new NGO sector emerged at the expense of the older, indigenous initiatives. This ‘tier’ of NGOs was cut off not only from the final beneficiaries that they were supposed to serve, but also from the grassroots organizations and the PNA itself for different reasons though.163 The failure of the PP, the forced competition with DONGOs and INGOs and the prolonged Israeli occupation has posed a huge challenge for the indigenous civil society.164 And while non-governmental organizations were supposed to play a significant role not only in implementing projects in the field of humanitarian assistance, but also in the ‘emergence of a democratic system and democratic practices in the West Bank and Gaza Strip’, their role has been constantly undermined by the PA/PNA and in some sense by their very donors as well.165 It can be illustrated by how the Palestinians and the civil society actors were expected to behave during the solidarity demonstrations with Egypt166 (in 2011). While the PNA security forces attacked peaceful demonstrators in Ramallah, and some local and international human rights organizations encouraged the donors to make their funding to the PA conditional on respect for human rights, nothing

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really happened.167 Just as Israel has not had to take responsibility for (impacts of) the occupation since the 1990s,168 donor countries equally forgive/condone many human (and political) rights abuses committed against Palestinians, by Palestinian security forces. Concerned with Israeli, regional and European stability, Western donors not only close their eyes, but they also tend to exclude a broad range of actors from their ‘secular’ vision of democracy-building.While, in general, EU policies in the MENA region attempted to focus on ‘how the EU can engage with so called «moderate» Islamist movements’ (seeing the early developments of the Arab Spring in Egypt),169 civil society organizations have been ‘encouraged’ to limit their politicalideological agenda in many regards. It is a kind of price donors and their implementing organizations have to pay for their presence to be welcomed and tolerated by authoritarian(-like) regimes in many cases. Any ‘fight’ for the the two-state solution in Palestine had to be done ‘peacefully’ in exchange for the generous flow of Western aid supporting the abstract notion of ‘peace process’ and non-violent attitudes towards Israel since 1990.170 Western donors do not offer gifts to those that cannot accept these terms. It applies to two overlapping sets of civil society associations: the radical, religious-affiliated (Islamist) organizations171 and those organizations that did not denounce violence. Concerning the former, leaders of many Islamic NGOs complain about having been ignored unfairly by Western donors, even if they feel wellprepared in terms of organization culture, ‘modern management and communication’ skills. But even if universal values, neoliberal ways of development, or technocratic ways of public administration (as ‘spiritual essence’) were portrayed as means leading to Palestiniain independence, the results are very poor in terms of political gains. Neither the Palestinian civil society, nor the pragmatist Palestinian government (led by Salem Fayyad, 2007– 2013) could take the Palestinians closer to independence. Regardless to these difficulties typical of the Palestinian NGO scene, the ‘rise of [globalized] civil societies and the formation of intellectual circles’ were critical factors in helping ‘to crack down the bulkwark of fear’ elsewhere in the region during the Arab Spring. ICT innovations, social media combined with targeted foreign aid and training programmes also contributed a lot to the emerging of civil consciousness in the MENA region too.172 Increased access to the internet, blogging,

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Twitter feeds and Facebook pages helped open discussions on traditionally forbidden topics such as sex and gender, political freedom and human rights (abuses), tolerance and religion.173 At least for a while. This attitude and behaviour, that is, active democracy promotion and encouragement of civil consciousness, cost a lot not only to Western donors, but to politically active civil society organizations too. The reluctance to cooperate with Islamist movements and the weakness of pro-democracy forces in the region meant that donors could not but continously cooperate with those in power: authoritarian governments. All this explains, at least to some extent, why the Arab Spring, contrary to the initial Western promises and communications,174 has not led to major changes at aid policy level.175 Accepting that foreign aid relations resemble gift exchange, the principal function of which is maintaining relations (‘managing order’) between the donor and the recipient,176 it is equally important to draw attention to the ‘magical, religious, and spiritual force’ of the contemporary gifts. It is rather remarkable that while the Israeli, Jordanian, Egyptian and Palestinian governments (PNA/PLO-Fateh) do their best to observe the bilateral peace agreements in order to ensure regional stability, all of them, without exception, cultivate minimum ambiguous relations with the civil society actors being interested in human rights, democratization and real peace-building. There are, of course, meaningful differences across the cases, but these non-democratic governments are common in portraying members of the civil society, Islamists movements and pro-Western actors alike, as a threat to sovereignty betraying national interests. Grassroots organizations and NGOs are tolerated only to the extent which they serve regime interests. To sum up, even if authoriarian regimes supported political reforms and transition to democracy on the surface before the Arab Spring, the Egyptian governments – and to lesser extent the Palestinian and the Jordanian governments as well – also oppresses various segments of their ‘vibrant civil society’ in addition to excluding and marginalizing political opponents. Those ‘liberal’ actors aspiring for too much democracy have been at least as much harassed as the Islamic or other religious activists under various governments in contemporary Egypt. Military-security institutions have been used to control their populations (what else could have been done with the army, in absence of traditional wars?) and suppress politically engaged movements

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regardless to their secular/religious affiliations – in order to maintain order and secure regime stability. While US military assistance is needed for national security interests, to curb Islamist opposition movements, for securing regional stability on the one hand, development (economic) cooperation on the other hand has to remain neutral and technized – for more or less the same purposes. Supporting the Palestiniain institution system, strengthening the Egyptian fiscal stability, or aiding the Jordanian government to meet the needs of Syrian refugees is welcomed, but serious demands on deep political reforms, democratization and human rights is not a matter of negotiation nowadays. As a result, it has been the Middle Eastern authoritarian regime that could set unique ‘conditions’ for accepting Western aid since the Arab Spring is over. Any expectation or foreign-set political conditionality would further harm the stability of the otherwise pro-friendly Western regimes and regional stability. If donors want regional stability, they have to sacrifice their beliefs in Middle Eastern democracies. They cannot but pay the price for maintaining relationship and cooperation with friendly Arab regimes as these regimes play in the regional league too. Looking at the negative image of the West in many countries in the region, donor money from Saudi Arabia and the UAE are better welcomed than US or EU money. Ordinary people do not pay that much attention to the fact that these regional powers purchase weapons from the West; that the communication among Saudi Arabia, Israel and the US has intensified recently – targeting Iran and its regional proxies in the region.

Aid for (the lack of) stability. The case of humanitarian assistance [W]hat concerns me . . . is . . . that our moral encounter with human vulnerability is now cast in a particular logic of the market. Lilie Choulariaki, The Ironic Spectator, p. 5. Humanitarian assistance, in global terms, almost doubled from 2006 ($US7,9 billion) to 2015 ($US14,3 billion) and the Middle East played a significant role in this change. Humanitarian aid serves ‘only’ humanitarian purposes in the Middle East too, but not without side effects or negative externalities in political and social terms. It must also be kept in mind that humanitarian assistance on the one hand

7918 4105 33 881 12 %

7162 3537 35 1022 15 %

2007 9376 4735 40 1076 12 %

2008 9423 4617 29 1320 14 %

2009 9757 3518 23 561 6%

2010 9570 4393 504 920 15 %

2011 8505 4282 66 1335 16 %

2012

10755 4388 91 3186 30 %

2013

13120 5631 108 3350 26 %

2014

Post-Arab Spring

Source: OECD DAC Statistics, Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a], Data extracted on 25 January 2017.

Developing Countries, of which Africa, total, of which North of Sahara, total Middle East, total Share of the MENA region (%)

2006

Pre-Arab Spring

14377 5460 131 4282 31 %

2015

Table 4.4 Humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC donors to developing countries and the MENA region, 2006 –2015 (constant prices, millions $US dollar, 2014).

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(Table 4.4), military assistance and arms imports on the other (Tables 3.3 and 4.2) complement each other. People to be saved by humanitarian aid are persecuted by weapons. As shown in Table 4.4, while the MENA received around $US1 billion (10 – 15 per cent of the total) in the first half of the past decade (2006– 2010), almost one third of the total humanitarian aid ended up in the region in the period 2011 –2015. Since, at least at the level of official rhetoric, humanitarian aid is supposed to be neutral and impartial, one cannot except that it would contribute to political developments in any constructive way.177 The matter of justice, the how of cooperation, the question of peace require other measures: diplomacy and peace treaties. It is development aid and beyond that military assistance that is supposed to recognize and support these efforts. The most significant difference in aid allocations and disbursements concerned Jordan in geographical terms. Indeed, any increase in ODA disbursements (Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) can be explained by the humanitarian/emergency aid component, which is related to the crossborder effect of the Syrian war (Figure 4.1). These trends (Figure 2) affected the Palestinians and regional Middle Eastern programmes (UNRWA, for example) most negatively. It was

Figure 4.1 Humanitarian assistance from OECD DAC donors to selected Middle Eastern countries, 2006–2015 (constant prices, millions $US dollar, 2014). Source: OECD DAC Statistics, Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a], Data extracted on 25 January 2017.

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obviously sensed by local implementing organizations as the following perceptions illustrate: There are many donor institutions that moved its activity to the neighboring countries, in order to provide services to the Syrian refugees. We contact some of our donor partners [so that they] provide support for our projects in Gaza, but they tell us that the activity moved to Syria . . . they believe that Gaza is not in need of this support, some of them believe that the situation in Gaza is better than other regions, others believe that Gaza is a terrorist [hotbed]. and The situation in Syria influenced the donations to Gaza . . . in the last Ramadan there was significant decrease of [our] aid to the people compared to the previous years because the decrease of donations from the donors, charities and individuals to our association. Most of the donations [has been] transferred to Syrian refugees in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon, also to other countries such as Yemen.178 As data in Figure 4.2 indeed show humanitarian assitance works according to a market logic: it increased in those countries (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq) that hosted Syrian refugees in large scale,

Figure 4.2 Trends in humanitarian aid from DAC donor countries to selected countries in the Middle East, in millions $US, 2006– 2015. Source: OECD DAC Statistics, aid disbursements to countries and regions.

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while it has decreased, with smaller peaks, in the West Bank from 2009 to 2015 - even if the situation has not improved there. Donors, obviously, had to prioritize certain (Syria-related) humanitarian needs over other (Palestinian) humanitarian needs as shown above. The (missing, inappropriate) reconstruction of the Gaza Strip after the Israeli military operations (November 2012, Summer 2014) was affected/hindered by the consequences of the Syrian war. Although the concerned Arab countries have received aid for other purposes,179 both from bilateral and multilateral (UN, World Bank) sources, the common purpose of donor policies has been to keep calm, to prevent hostilities, violence, unnecessary deaths and suffering in the region in general and in the areas surrounding Israel in particular. The presence of the massive, self-perpetuating humanitarian regime is the most visible in Palestine: both cynicism and accusation (complicity in the Israeli occupation) accompany their activities.180 To sum up the ‘new spirit of interventionism’ conveyed by apolitical humanitarian projects – prioritizing basic human rights over other political demands concerns from Syria through Jordan and Lebanon to the Palestinian case – ‘goes beyond relief’ by aspiring (?) ‘to transform the economic and political structures,’181 at least as much as development aid projects and technical assistance do. The division of labour between Israel on the one hand, the EU (campaigning for Palestinian non-violence) and the US (providing military aid for Israel, and ODA to the PNA force to cooperate with the Israeli security establishment) on the other recalls the lessons of an unrelated old story: how early humanitarian aid became possible (or: could operate) during the Armenian genocide. As discussed by Watenpaugh, the Turks did not oppose to charity from missionaries to Armenians believing that ‘temporary relief cannot repair the damage’. Turkey in the early twentieth century welcomed the ‘modes of humanitarian action as an adjunct to the act of genocide’ in the case of Turkey.182 Putting the term ‘genocide’ away, many actors in the Middle East very much do the same: instead of respecting human rights, avoiding or preventing violence, or that of pursuing just political solutions to contemporary problems, they allow humanitarian aid organizations to ‘compensate’ for the losses caused by violence, arms and weapons. While Israel fiercely denies the accusations of being (even reminiscent to) an apartheid state officially and at the level of mainstream public

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opinion, neither the consequences of the occupation183 can be denied, nor the fact that Israel is very proud of its army. The IDF is usually portrayed as ‘the most moral army’ in the world by Israeli politicians. One of the most important arguments behind this image is that it tries to minimize civilian losses during its interactions with Palestinians. Furthermore it also facilitates humanitarian activities (in cooperation with the Israeli civil administration, COGAT) in the Palestinian Territories. The satisfaction of the Israeli authorities with donor presence is the result of the radical change in the local NGOs’ self-reflection. In 1980s the strategic objective of local NGOs was to resist the occupation by strengthening steadfastness or ‘sumud’, albeit failing to achieve such objective because of factional, social and personal considerations.184 Since the Oslo Process most NGOs dropped such ambitions by focusing on easing the suffering under the inescapable reality of a long-lasting conflict. Suffering caused by oppression and violence is a precondition of most humanitarian activities. It is beyond any doubt that donor money and aid organizations are somehow instrumentalized in all such cases: donors and aid organizations are allowed to be present, to document what is going on and to provide relief that remains ‘constantly temporarily’. Their role is limited to mitigating human suffering: challenging the status quo or preventing military actions is not their business.

Regime survival and public opinion on foreign donors “I am an unreliable, disrespectful client that openly takes you for granted and jibes against you at every possible turn, but I know you will eventually come back to me because you are more afraid of my weakness and nuisance capacity than of my potential strength. So when is that next check coming?” (Issandr El Amrani, blog post on the Saudi-Egyptian aid relationship, October 2016)185

Aid as rent From a historical perspective foreign assistance (military and development, that is, budgetary and technical assistance) has been an important element of regime survival, especially in pro-Western states, since Western countries have been interested in supporting regime

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stability for the sake of regional stability.186 The peace agreements have led not only to economic (development) aid inflows (or their increase in volume), but also military or security-driven foreign assistance (since the late 1970s) available in various forms (weapon supplies, long-term assistance for military industries, state-owned enterprises, intelligence and surveillance technologies).187 The West has become, or rather remained, part of the game as foreign aid (just as rents from oil revenues) reinforced the notion that rent impedes democratic reforms.188 They may have provided for provisional, but not sustainable, stability for authoritarian rentier regimes in the region. Indeed, it is very likely that the combination of ‘chronic violent conflict in a region with widespread access to rents (foreign aid, oil, phosphate, etc.)’ influenced the durability of Middle Easter authoritarian regimes.189 Gift exchange, in principle, assumes dependency and foreign aid is no exception. Throughout the decades, all the three Arab countries become dependent as political elites have relied, among others, on foreign aid to stay in power.190 Hence, foreign aid may be a ‘useful indicator of the types of relationships that exist between local actors in Arab countries’ and international powers.191 One of the most important functions of any state is resource allocation, which makes the typical Middle Eastern Arab state unique in the structure of the revenue and expenditure side of the central budgets. While Western states usually collect taxes to redistribute them with welfare concerns, Middle Eastern states tend to use national economies and government budgets as a means of solving strategic puzzles with the purpose of maintaining domestic order and regional stability.192 Resource scarcity combined with the trade-off between threatening regional stability or simultaneously being ready to coexist peacefully alongside Israel has led to a massive inflow of Western foreign aid to the region. Combined with military assistance discussed earlier (see Table 4.2), military aid per capita (Table 3.2) and ODA per capita (Table 4.5 and 4.6) reveals the relative significance of Western foreign aid within the recipient country. The rentier state hypothesis explains these tensions by arguing that ‘individuals, groups, even the state, compete for the control of the rent’ (military and development aid at the level of states, project aid at the level of NGOs and subsidies (financed by rents) at the level of individuals) instead of spending time with advancing production- or

15 11 6 7 6 19 28 58 309 66 96 222

Developing Countries, average North of Sahara, average Algeria Egypt Libya Morocco Tunisia Middle East, average Iraq Jordan Lebanon Syrian Arab Republic West Bank and Gaza Strip

14 13 9 10 3 20 19 60 319 51 115 0 239

2007 16 14 7 12 9 20 24 82 335 71 183 3 377

2008 15 12 6 7 5 22 33 36 88 78 93 3 470

2009 16 10 4 4 3 19 34 29 65 63 61 2 427

2010 17 15 3 3 74 26 46 28 57 69 57 4 396

2011 15 11 3 4 16 27 35 29 34 122 109 25 270

2012 16 11 3 4 12 34 19 43 39 104 63 90 419

2013 16 10 3 0 16 31 20 41 32 202 88 85 327

2014

Source: OECD DAC Statistics, Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a], Data extracted on 25 January 2017.

2006

16 8 1 1 10 20 17 41 33 195 123 99 208

2015

Net ODA/capita only from OECD DAC countries to selected MENA countries, $US, 2006 – 2015 (current $US).

Recipient

Table 4.5

12 321 104 202 1 399

Egypt Iraq Jordan Lebanon Syrian Arab Republic West Bank and Gaza Strip

15 324 110 240 4 491

2007 22 339 122 260 8 687

2008 12 93 118 139 10 764

2009 7 71 146 103 6 659

2010 5 60 144 104 16 620

2011 21 39 166 145 84 496

2012

63 45 194 118 188 624

2013

39 39 364 146 224 579

2014

Source: OECD DAC Statistics, Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a], Data extracted on 25 January 2017.

2006

Net ODA/capita from all donors to selected MENA countries, $US, 2006 – 2015 (current $US).

Recipient

Table 4.6

27 41 283 167 264 424

2015

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service-oriented behaviour.193 Rents can finance state-controlled or state-supported companies and enterprises, food and fuel subsidies and even artificial prices of other products. By availability and restrictions on access they influence social justice and perceptions on social justice. The core problem is not simply the questionable positive impact of aid on political reforms, conflict resolution or economic development, but the very fact that getting access to the rent circuit (foreign aid, workers’ remittances, oil income, etc.) – whether it is channelled via state or non-state actors, NGOs or private persons is of secondary importance – is a ‘greater preoccupation than reaching productive efficiency’ in economic activities.194 Actors become concerned with generating income from these resources, instead of pursuing other, more productive activities. Moreover, government revenues (budgetary support) from foreign sources provided ‘protection’ from indigenous opposition by encouraging increased military spending and building patronage-networks (subsidies on food and petrol, jobs in the military and public sector, corruption). ODA per capita trends in Palestine remained more or less the same in the past decade (Tables 4.5 and 4.6). While Israeli military operations in Gaza (Winter 2008/2009, November 2012 and Summer 2014) led to an increase in aid from OECD donors, the regional consequences of the

Figure 4.3 Net ODA/capita from OECD DAC countries to selected MENA countries, $US, 2006 – 2015 (current $US). Source: OECD DAC Statistics, Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a], Data extracted on 25 January 2017.

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Syrian war resulted in a slight decrease as the humanitarian assistance targeted Syria, Lebanon and Jordan (2014, 2015). Comparing the data presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6, the years since the Arab Spring marked significant changes in the case of Jordan and Egypt. Egypt ‘sacrificed’ some of its Western support, that part which targeted civil society consciousness and advocacy. Regional donors (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE) and international organizations (the IMF) however, took the role, at least in statistical terms that could not be taken by donors targeting political reforms and human rights. The most significant changes can be tracked in Jordan as the aid it received from Western donors in 2015 is three times higher ($US208 per capita) than it was in 2010 ($US63 per capita). Securing aid (as rent) from Western donors, however, has became more and more inconvenient in Egypt and Jordan after the Arab Spring. If external aid is needed, it is better to get it from sources that enjoy more legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Hence, Arab governments did their best to look for alternative resources within the region to restore their digntity. Grants from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (Table 4.7), of course, are not to replace money from Western sources. Rather, they play a complementary rule offsetting the negative image Arab governments have to counterbalance as Western donor money is usually associated with conditions perceived to be humiliating (such as keeping peace with Israel that blocks Palestinian sovereignty). Looking at the data presented in Table 4.7 – and comparing it to the arms trade numbers (Table 3.3) – it is obvious that the biggest arms importers of Western military equipment, Saudi Arabia and the UEA, are the biggest regional donors providing not only aid, but investing heavily in the Egyptian and Jordanian economy.195 The fact that these countries have provided a considerable amount of aid both to Jordan and Egypt without being concerned with human rights and democracy promotion does not allow much room for manoeuvre to the OECD DAC donors in this regard. The same applies to the Gaza Strip where Western and international donors are quite active in humanitarian fields, but Qatar’s economic presence (in form of aid and investments) has also been significant.196 Looking at the per capita aid data (Figures 4.3 and 4.4), the label ‘OECD DAC’ marks the bilateral aid from this group, while the ‘all

67 2 143 0 129

Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syrian Arab Republic Palestine (WBGS) Grants from Saudi Arabia Middle East, total North Africa, total

384 7 51 19 154 4 017 20

1 129 62

2008

57 132 59 12 109

2007

2 113 47

70 11 15 98 244

2009

2 080 22

29 0 3 1 91

2010

3889 13

15 200 3 1 21

2011

617 42

14 1 6 0 114

2012

4569 42

2 617 132 23 1 63

2013

10 390 7

3 134 684 13 50 94

2014

5 310 1 141

508 238 14 28 25

2015

Source: OECD DAC Statistics, Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a], Data extracted on 25 January and 20 October 2017.

2006

Grants from UAE, by country

Table 4.7 Total grants from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia to selected MENA countries, 2006 –2015 (constant prices, millions $US dollar, 2015).

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Figure 4.4 Trends in ODA/capita from all donor countries and OECD DAC countries, $US, 2006– 2015 (Egypt, Jordan, Palestine). Source: OECD DAC Statistics, Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a], Data extracted on 25 January 2017.

donors’ category equally involves regional actors (like Saudi Arabia and the UAE), regional and multilateral institutions: Comparing the countries above (Figure 4.3, Tables 4.5– 4.7), the biggest aid beneficiary has been the Palestinian society if measured by ODA per capita level. Jordanians received approximately as much ODA/ capita (around 200 USD/capita) as the Palestinians from their Western OECD donors (2014, 2015). Due to regional donors (Table 4.7) the total aid per capita aid is about 50 per cent higher in statistical terms in Jordan and Palestine and almost three times higher in the case of Egypt than ODA/capita data from OECD DAC donors (Figure 4.3). The general increase and peak in Egypt (2013) is due to public transfers from UAE and Saudi sources honouring Morsi’s removal in Summer 2013. The trend (2013–2015), however, is slightly decreasing as the situation in Egypt is under control and the Arab Spring demands are being gradually forgotten. The ‘rentier state’ logic is based on the conviction that ‘even limited resources [from abroad] can buy an enormous amount of legitimacy’.197 It explains why the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian army leadership (SCAF) established a sort of pact for mutual collaboration with the intention to preserve their institutional and political interests in the second half of 2011.198 The regime had to prove that it enjoys the needed power, without which external legitimacy cannot be sustained

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either. This legitimacy was needed for Egypt to secure a $US4.8 billion loan from the IMF in 2012, but the deal then failed as the parties could not agree on reforms to be implemented. Four years later when the conditions were more favourable, that is, stable, the Muslim Brotherhood long forgotten, the IMF nodded to the concessional loan (Extended Fund Facility, EFF) – the size of which is more than double ($US12 billion) than the one requested in 2012. While it will support a comprehensive economic reform programme to restore macroeconomic stability and strong, sustainable and job-rich growth, only the social safety net ‘to protect the vulnerable groups during the process of adjustment’ will be covered by the EFF.199 The human rights of those detained and persecuted will not be part of the package as it is out of the IMF’s competence. In similar vein, donors in general do not care that much about the real preconditions for peace and stability.

Local public opinion on foreign donors The EU’s new response formulated right after the Arab Spring explicitly stated that its future approach ‘will be developed by listening, not only to requests for support from partner governments, but also to demands expressed by civil society’200 as they are seen instrumental in reflecting on the demands of ordinary people. Public opinion, reflections on and experiences with donors, foreign aid and the conveyed norms and values are important. Palestinians, interviewed in summer 2010, provided very diverse answers to the question what foreign aid meant to them seeing foreign aid as a means of assistance easing sufferings; a way of control of the Palestinian population; a donor means to achieve certain related and various distant political goals (bargaining chip); a sacrifice by Palestinians as accepting aid entails giving up violence against Israel; reward for good performance and cooperation with Israel and a compensation for the historical mistakes committed against the Palestinian people.201 Surveys, that provide insights into the minds of the general public in order to see how Middle Easterners see the role of their foreign donors, are conducted on an ad hoc basis. While waves of the Arab Barometer contain only a few relevant questions, the EU Neighbourhood Barometer (2012– 2014) was the first attempt to measure on how people in the Eastern and Southern neighbouring countries think about the EU and its role played in the region.202 The presented findings need

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to be assessed by keeping in mind that public opinion is not truly ‘free’ in the region. Recalling a Freedom House report (2014), the MENA registered the worst civil liberties scores of any region.203 The relations between the state and the society, the state and the public or the state and the ‘civil society’ are much more contested than in European (Western) minds. It requires the reader to interpret ‘local voices’, results of public opinion polls included, cautiously. Literature dealing with the demonstrators’ motivations and contemporary history of the Arab Spring places the emphasis on the role of the middle class and structural transformation, the socioeconomic hardships such as increasing food prices and high unemployment, the desire for regime change or the importance of internet-based technological development. But what do they think about the donor countries? Related perceptions were measured by the Arab Barometer surveys (wave II, III and IV),204 the Gallup and the Neighbourhood Barometer (NB) surveys (waves Spring and Autumn)205 among others. Due to page limits not all of the questions-answers can be Table 4.8 Neighbourhood Barometer AB8(6) Could you tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements concerning the European Union? Only ‘agree’ answers, 2012 –2014, %. ENPI South (10 countries) agree (total) %, regional average (our country) and the EU have sufficient common values to cooperate The support of the EU contributes a lot to the development of (our country) The European Union brings peace and stability in the region surrounding (our country)

Mashreq without Egypt (Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine)

Spring Autumn Spring Autumn Spring 2012 2012 2013 2013 2014 45

43

61

55

60

40

40

49

46

48

37

37

47

42

43

Jordan Palestine Egypt Israel

19,2 30,5 26,4 36,2 32,1 19,3 scale: 5(þ2): very positive, positive, neither-nor; somewhat negative; very negative (do not know and declined)

2012 –13

Autumn 2012

Spring 2013

Autumn 2013

Spring 2014

76 46 50 37 40 62 54 52 46 60 16 15 6 13 12 40 41 48 47 43 scale: 4(þ1): totally agree, agree, tend to disagree, totally disagree (and do not know)

Spring 2012

The support of the EU contributes a lot to the development of (our country), ‘totally agree’ AND ‘tend to agree’ (%)

Do you think the influence of the EU on the development of democracy in your country has been positive AND somewhat positive (%)

2010 –11

Neighbourhood Barometer (NB), 2012–2014 (AB8(6)-3)

Arab Barometer (q7012)

Table 4.9 Comparison of similar questions formulated in the Arab Barometer Wave II-III (2010 –2011, 2012 – 2013) and Neighbourhood Barometer (2012 – 2014).

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analysed here, but it is worthwhile to recall how the most relevant NB questions were formulated and how people in the ENPI South countries agreed with the given statements (Table 4.8). As Table 4.8 prompts only every second person living in the MENA region appreciated the EU’s role. To understand the extent to which people living in Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Israel agree with the statement ‘the support of the EU contributes a lot to the development of (our country)’, let us recall a similar question formulated in the Arab Barometer Wave II and III (this question was not asked in Israel) (Table 4.9). The comparison is justified on the basis that since the Arab Spring the term ‘development’ has clearly become a ‘pro-democracy’ concept, which is much less ‘technical’ and more overtly ‘political’ and democracy-related. Assuming that the questions formulated in the two surveys (the Arab Barometer and the Neighbourhood Barometer) conveyed a fairly similar message to the respondents, moving beyond the numbers and focussing only on the trends, the EU’s response to the Arab Spring was appreciated ‘so-so’ in all countries. The less satisfied with the EU’s contribution were the Egyptian public. While one third of the Egyptians (32,1 per cent) said that the influence of the EU on the development of democracy in Egypt has been ‘positive’ or ‘somewhat positive’ in early 2011 (Arab Barometer), the rate of respondents agreeing with a similar statement (the support of the EU contributes a lot to the development of Egypt, ‘totally agree’ and ‘tend to agree’) dropped to 19,5 per cent (NB) or 16 per cent (AB) by 2012. Egypt is the only place, where the EU received such a negative judgement. Respondents living in Jordan and Palestine highly appreciated the EU’s contribution to the development of their countries measured in Summer (Spring) 2012 (Jordan 76 per cent, Palestine 62 per cent), but there has been a rapid decline in Jordan and a somewhat smaller discontent measured in Palestine from 2012 to 2014 (NB). The EU’s ‘popularity’ in Israel (measured by this statement) is probably due to the shared historical-cultural roots, the country’s extensive trade, economic and cultural relations and the benefits it gains from the research and development co-operation with the EU. In the Arab countries the EU’s contribution is more or less confined to its development and humanitarian assistance programmes and security cooperation. It is worthwhile to see how this contribution is related to the perceptions on shared values.

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Figure 4.5 Neighbourhood Barometer A8(6) Agreement with the statement, ‘(our country) and the EU have sufficient common values to cooperate’ (2012 –2014), agree, %.

Israel is the ‘most European’ country if it is measured by the perceived common values (Figure 4.5), inasmuch as more than two thirds of the society shares this view (multiannual average, 71,8 per cent). The second most like-minded county is Palestine (53 per cent) and Jordan (47 per cent), while Egypt can be found at the bottom of the list (12,8 per cent). The Egyptian data can partially be explained by the likely high rate of

Figure 4.6 Neighbourhood Barometer A8(6) Agreement with the statement, ‘the European Union brings peace and stability in the region’ (2012 –2014), agree, %.

52%

Do you favour or oppose the US sending aid to Egypt?

Do you favour or oppose the US sending aid to political 75% groups in Egypt? Do you favour or oppose the US sending direct financial aid to civil society organizations in Egypt? Do you favour or oppose aid to Egypt from the following 29% sources? Arab governments Do you favour or oppose aid to Egypt from the following 42% sources? The World Bank and IMF

April 2011 69%

85% 39% 57%

28% 42%

82%

Gallup

Gallup

Abu Dhabi Gallup Center Gallup

Gallup

February Polling 2012 institute

74%

71%

August Dec 2011 2011

Egyptian attitudes towards foreign aid, various polls, 2011 –2012.

Oppose (%)

Table 4.10

Younis and Younis 2012 Younis and Younis 2012 Younis and Younis 2012206

Younis and Younis 2012 ADGC 2011: 24

Source

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‘do not knows’ as well as the official ‘propaganda’ against foreign powers. Regarding the statement ‘the European Union brings peace and stability in the region’ the negative Egyptian attitute is even more obvious. The less satisfied people live in Egypt, while the Palestinians were the happiest within this small sample of four countries (Figure 4.5). Approximately half of the Palestinians (multiannual average, 53,8 per cent) and more than two-fifth of the Jordanians (44,4 per cent) agreed with the statement that the EU brought stability to the region (Figure 4.6). The most skeptical is the Egyptian public (12,4 per cent), while one third of the Israelis doubted the effectiveness of European peacemaking efforts (37,2 per cent). As indicated by the Neighbourhood Barometer data, Egyptians were much less knowledgeable about the details of European involvement than the Palestinians: around 50 per cent and 65 per cent of the population does not know what to think about the EU (depending on the question). The reasons are unclear, partly due to the fact that before 2012 there had not been any comprehensive survey in the region measuring public opinion. Soha Bayoumi, author of a report investigating the Egyptians attitude towards the EU emphasized the high illiteracy rate in the country (one third of the population) and described the public awareness in the following way: ‘levels of public awareness [of the EU partnership] are moderate and largely confined to officials, the media, research centres, universities, political elite, and the business class’.207 Lack of reliable information and official retaliation in case of political activism may contribute both to hostility and ignorance towards foreign aid. Although it has been the second largest recipient of US military and economic aid since the 1970s in the region, Egyptians are clearly more hostile towards foreign (mostly, but not only US) aid than their peers living in neighbouring countries. Findings show that somewhere between 55 – 85 per cent of the population are against US aid (Table 4.10). Attitudes about US aid became increasingly negative since the Arab Spring, while Western NGO employees faced charges of illegally accepting foreign funds and stirring unrest in Egypt. And while Egypt has not stopped to be interested in maintaining privileged relations with Western donors, the regime has never been ashamed to mobilize their own public opinion against ‘foreign intervention’ labelling them ‘foreign agents.’

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Putting these data next to questions formulated in the fourth wave of Arab Barometer (2017) it becomes clear that people in Egypt and Jordan equally prefer regional economic cooperation and actors over Western donors. The US policy (toward the IP conflict, its role in Iraq and Syria, in the region in general) has generated an unprecedented anti-US sentiment in Jordan and Egypt (region-wide), but perceptions on the EU do not look that much better either. While Jordanians are most supportive of stronger (economic) ties with Saudi Arabia (78 per cent want stronger relations), only slightly more than half of the respondents (56 per cent) also want stronger economic relations with the United States (with Turkey: 48 per cent, the European Union: 28 per cent, Russia: 26 per cent, with Iran: 11 per cent). Asked about the US political involvement in the region, while 35 per cent of the respondents said that it had better solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, another 33 per cent agreed with the statement that the US’s ‘most positive potential action would be not to get involved in the region.’ Egyptians are even more radical in judging their regional economic partners and Western donors. While 84 per cent of the respondents want stronger relations with Saudi Arabia, the EU (33 per cent) and the US (32 per cent) enjoys support only from one third of the population. Every second Egyptian (51 per cent) say that the influence of the United States has been somewhat or very negative on the development of democracy in Egypt and 62 per cent says that the US should keep away from the regional affairs.208 Assessing the positive and negative aspects of foreign funding provided to Egyptian civil society organizations, Elagati collected the following main arguments against aid (in 2012): donors forcing a specific agenda onto the general work of the organization; unwillingness amongst CSOs to reveal sources and amounts of foreign funding, as well as the conditions under which it was granted; donor intervention in the work of these organizations; creating ‘local agents’ for the donor states’ vested interests; foreign funding inciting the creation of projects by local NGOs only for the sake of securing funding; the risk of civil society corruption and the creation of a new class of Egyptians working with foreign organizations that depend on foreign money; weakening the development of local alternatives; the risk of a long-term structural dependence of Egyptian NGOs on foreign funding.209 The list is neither representative, nor full, but reflects well the variety of accusations

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formulated against foreign aid both by non-beneficiary NGOs and the government.210 By similar logic Western donors have been accused of ‘donor complicity’ with the Israeli occupation (Palestine), supporting both pro-peace Israeli ‘foreign agents’ and anti-Israeli activities in Palestine (Israel),211 serving authoritarian governments and cooperating with a ‘secretly oppressive’ regime (Jordan).212 This section is about answering the question how the public opinion thinks about Western powers in the context of foreign aid and that of the Arab Spring. The most interesting results come from Egypt if it is taken into consideration that Egypt is a key strategic partner to the West. By looking at the data presented in Tables 4.9 and 4.10 one may assume that around third/half of the population – only those agreeing with statements on the donors’ positive role – would be in favour of further increase in foreign aid in each country except for Egypt. The Arab Barometer survey, however, indicated a much higher rate of support for foreign aid in general (Table 4.11). Focusing on Egypt, Jordan and Palestine (Lebanon and Iraq may serve as a comparison) an overwhelming majority would support further increase in foreign aid (Egypt; 83,8 per cent, Jordan: 78,7 per cent, Palestine: 83,5 per cent) even if (at least) half of the population simultaneously show discontent with it. This is the real double bind of contemporary gifts. While receiving higher and higher portions of foreign aid is of constant concern of both state and non-state actors, foreign support seems to undermine dignity and to appear more and more as a barrier to profound social and political change.213 By comparing the French, Soviet and Chinese revolutions, Theda Skocpol argued that ‘the course and outcomes of social revolutions in dependent countries are powerfully conditioned not just by the requisites of military defense and assertion against actual and potential invaders, but also by direct (. . .) aid from abroad’.214 Such aid, goes the argument, can be offered to the emerging revolutionary victors by foreign powers interested in influencing the policies of the new regimes. Western aid to Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine continues to have significant impact not only on the regional and international relations of the concerned states, but on internal dynamics too. One could name the authoritarianism-democracy continuum, and as part of it, the sociopolitical-economic space within which civil society groups are confined to manoeuvre. While budgetary and/or military assistance has obviously

April 2013 June 2013 Dec 2013 July 2013 Dec 2012

Egypt Iraq Jordan Lebanon Palestine

0,3

0,1

Missing 41,6 39,26 53,4 72,3 66,4

Increase a lot 22,2 37,2 25,3 14,8 17,1

Increase a little 9,9 15,0 11,9 7,1 6,6

Remain at its current level 9,4 4,5 3,3 2,0 3,0

Decrease a little 8,7 0,7 1,9 2,5 4,7

Decrease a lot

8,3 3,4 4,1 1,3 1,9

Don’t know

0,1

Refuse

q701c Do you think that the sum of foreign aid to your country shall increase, decrease, or remain at its current level? % within Country

Arab Barometer wave III, q701.Question on the future of foreign aid.

Survey date (and place)

Table 4.11

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developed international social bonds at level of states (but at least that of governments), the very same bond between Israel and its Arab partners, has alienated much of the giftee’s society from their governing elites in the Arab countries – due to the nature of the ‘social bond’ and the ‘return gifts’ offered in exchange for foreign aid. Slogans and demands echoed in pro-Western countries during the Arab Spring demonstrations illustrated it well. The main problem with the ‘social bond’ is that the concerned Arab governments historically receive aid for ‘peace’ with Israel, which peace is rather illusory looking at the consequences of the Israeli occupation and the lack of Palestinian self-determination. Recent regional developments (the impact of the Syrian war on the neighbouring countries, Iran’s nuclear ambitions and support for regional proxies) only complicate this issue (but they will be discussed by someone else). The long stability of authoritarian regimes in the MENA and foreign aid being at their disposal seemed to justify the argument that a combination of various factors – prioritizing of ‘stability’ over democracy, manipulation of colonial legacies, ethno-religious interests – played a decisive role in the lack of genuine (normative) democratization in the region.215 Foreign aid prolonged political survival in exchange for regional stability by equipping recipient governments with external legitimacy.216 Although promoting democratic values, human rights and strengthening civil society have become visible goals of development cooperation in the MENA region as well, the relations between the simultaneously supported ‘civil society’ and (semi-)authoritarian governments have never been free from serious tensions. The Arab Spring only complicated the issue. The next chapter will focus on the political dilemmas evoked by foreign aid (supporting stability vs. democracy) in countries being closest to the Arab-Israeli conflict and being the main beneficiaries of Western foreign aid (Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Israel).

CHAPTER 5 THE (IM)POSSIBILITY OF CONTEMPORARY GIFTS

As discussed in Chapter 4, Western donors have offered aid to various segments of the society in the past decades – official actors and nonstate actors – not only to those ‘likely to win’ to maintain relations with the recipients. Aid recipients honoured the foreign aid by delivering ‘return gifts’, inalienable objects that they process. By doing so the division lines separating actors from each other have been strengthened and actors mutually accused each other (mostly governments vs. the pro-democracy NGOs and activists) of being illegitime or, even worse, foreign agents. The conflicting interests on the recipient side cannot be reconciled or united as long as donors pursue equally conflicting objectives by supporting the authoritarian status quo (stability) and promoting change (transition to democracy).

Returning contemporary foreign gifts: Trading threats, trading pains ‘[A]fter we finished the implantation of the project we send the final report to our donor, attached with some photos or documented short film about the project, in most of the cases we make a closing ceremony to the project, and we invite VIPs from the local community, and media cover, we put a banner with the donor’s name.’ (interview with a NGO leader, Gaza Strip, Summer 2015)

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Recalling Chapter 2, reciprocity per se assumes ‘exchanges of roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of others in such a way that good is returned for good, bad for bad’.1 As showed in Chapters 3 and 4, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the situation in Egypt and Jordan makes it possible to identify those ‘return gifts’ that ensure the constant inflow of foreign aid. The regional consequences of the ‘war on terror’ (initiated by President Bush long ago) and those of the Arab Spring help us conceptualize both ‘threats’ (the risk of instability) and ‘pain’ (the spectacle of suffering), among others, as return gifts. The first calls for more military assistance (and can be analysed via IR lenses), the latter invites ODA (and within that humanitarian and emergency) aid. As data collected in the Palestinian territories (and discussed elsewhere)2 illustrated, humanitarian and development knowledge – such as documenting stories and images of suffering, misery and pain (appeals and reports) – may well qualify as return gift in relations between implementing NGOs and their donors. Trading ‘pains’ is a somewhat delicate issue that is difficult to analyse via the disciplinary lenses of international relations as the actors involved (and interviewed) were individuals speaking on behalf of their organizations. It also must be emphasized that none of the respondents identified these ‘inalienable objects’ as return gifts per se. Rather, the way they explained the necessity of reporting in a transparent and credible manner implied that the very function of documentation is about returning the ‘gifts’ on one hand and ‘inviting’ further aid on the other, which strengthens and maintains friendly relations between the donor and the recipient. When donors ‘see the suffering’ in Palestine, ‘they give aid’. They can ‘see’ it by getting various documents, such as proposals, appeals, reports, photos, videos, etc. This ‘material’ can be ‘offered’ ex ante (to justify in advance why aid is needed, in appeals) and can be sent ex post as a return gift (to prove that aid was used properly and purposefully and to ensure the next instalment, in the form of reports to the donor). The common purpose is to justify the needs by building on various emotions (compassion, pity, solidarity) and sense of justice on the donors’ side. It is overtly used for fundraising purposes in the donor country: Many of our donor partners implemented big solidarity campaigns in their countries with us, we participated in these campaigns via

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Skype, we talked to the people there about our conflict, suffering and the destruction of Gaza.3 [A]fter these discussions and field visits, contacts with people, especially, with the beneficiaries of our programs activities, they [donors] feel and see the truth, which will have a positive influence on the donors (. . .) regarding the Palestinian cause in terms of knowing the truth about the conflict, it will encourage the donors to increase the support and their sympathy to the Palestinian people.4 [W]e implement the projects in a way that our donors like very much: we send the reports with photos and documented films for the activities, together with the financial report and vouchers. [O]ur donors like these documents and use them to fetch more funding for us and for other associations.5 The cause-effect logic implies that better the donors and the population in the donor countries are informed, the deeper the humanitarian and development knowledge is, the more generous their contribution will be. Since social and gift exchange theories do not identify reciprocity with the strict equivalence of benefits, the ‘pain for aid’ gift, that is, sharing stories of suffering, images of poverty and conflict can be understood as a(n) alternative means to return gift. But gift exchange is not simply about the objects, the relationship itself is at least as much important. As Palestinian NGO leaders emphasized: The partnership [between us and the Western donor] is based on confidence and friendly relations, it is not only a relation in order to get the fund, our donor partners support us with martial and moral support.6 [friendly relations are] established and built during the period of time for the implementation of activities and through regular meetings between us and these donors these friendship relations on basis of mutual respect, for example, we offered the congratulations on the occasions of the religious [and] national holidays and events; it is mutual between us and the donor partners, also there are private visits and meetings sometimes in the different occasions.7

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I think that [we] are true partners. The goals behind our work and the nature of their [donor] relationship with us [as recipients] prove not only their professionalism and commitment but also their investment in this relationship.8 Although (our) Palestinian respondents did not recognize documentation (appeals, reports) as return gifts (it is only my interpretation), the validity of the ‘exchange’ logic was acknowledged as illustrated by the quotes interpreting aid as investment: I have never encountered this [that a donor wanted to get anything in exchange for aid] . . . the [aid] system itself may want return for their ‘investment’.9 Many donors avoid this – [to invest in the development of Palestinian industrial zones that are close to Area C] – to prevent conflict with the Israelis. Others that are willing to invest are not willing to defend their investment in the face of Israeli aggression against their own investment (. . .) When the aid comes to infrastructure or industry or agriculture, Israel is always involved.10 Organizations that administer normalization programs [involving Israeli partners] are treated far better than all others – at the expense of more valuable programs that could raise awareness about abuse, rape, democratization, youth unemployment or any of the issues that are more important to everyday Palestinians.11 This ‘return of investment’ may involve the promise of stability (bought by security-related aid in Palestine, by military assistance elsewhere), cooperation with Israeli partners and Palestinian NGOs or political or economic reforms undertaken by the governmental sector in any of the concerned countries (the realm of development/economic assistance). Just as images of ‘threats’ and stories of ‘pain’ buys foreign aid on the donor side while it simultaneously strengthens the relations, foreign aid is a means, a different sort of currency that aspire to buy certain kind of ‘stability’, even smaller steps towards ‘democracy’ or human rights. Yet, the ultimate and perhaps the most valuable return gift is peace with Israel and stability alongside its borders (in case of Egypt), non-violence

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and sceurity cooperation with Israel (Palestine) and domestic stability (Jordan) from IR perspectives. Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Palestine are equally interested in maintaining relations with their external (Western) patrons or allies that are friendly and cooperative enough, so that they would remain eligible for further aid. Aid provides some sort of external legitimacy (See Chapter 3), a sort of guarantee that donors offer if and when the regime stability is threatened either internally (by radical Islamists for example) or externally. And indeed. As regional stability has been challenged by the war in Iraq, the expansion of ISIS and affiliated Islamic movements, the Syrian war and the refugees flooding the region, preserving order guaranteed by peace agreements between Israel and its Arab partners enjoys unanimous support from Western donors. However, too much stability and peace in interstate relations or too much political reform in intrastate affairs – in exchange for foreign aid – would clearly diminish the (too little? too much?) power aid stakeholders have in the region. It is particularly true in the case of countries being in close proximity to ‘the’ Middle East conflict. Israel on the one hand, Jordan and Egypt on the other know quite well how (much) they can bargain: a well-calculated, sufficient level of constant threat regarding the (in)stability of the region is always needed in order to secure external attention, further support, especially military assistance. It is illustrated well by the case when the pro-Israel lobby in Washington convinced the Obama-administration that it cannot terminate the military assistance to Egypt just because general Sisi and the military removed the democratically elected Morsi from power (mentioned briefly in Chapter 4). Associated risks threatening regional stability were delivered as ‘return gifts’ inviting further aid and strenghtening relations between the parties. To discuss not only objects of exchange, but the relations between the ‘trading’ sides, the relations between Israel and the United States are balanced and strengthened, among others, due to the US military assistance, cooperation and a lot else (this lot else is covered in the literature). The gains are common at least by and large, even if there are serious political debates between the countries. Exchanges between equals – such as military alliance and assistance between the US and Israel or the R&D cooperation (representing an atypical foreign aid/grant) between the EU and Israel – are mutually beneficial and

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may be based on either self-interest or on shared concepts of rights and duties, while the value of which exchanged may or may not be comparable. The nature of relations between the US and the Arab recipients of military aid is less obvious, partially because these regimes opt for returning ‘foreign gifts’ by ‘gestures’ alienating their own societies (see Chapter 3 and the next section in this chapter). Aid relations between Western donors and Arab states offer only little prospect of equivalent exchange. It does not mean that these relations cannot be mutually beneficial. In these cases reciprocity may characterize relations between unequals (patron, client) in which mutually valued, but non-comparable goods and services are exchanged and states do not have identical obligations.12 In these cases the (dominated) recipient’s dependence on the (superior) donor is created and maintained by gains the recipient can realize in exchange for certain benefits, foreign aid included.13 The power of the weak, discussed briefly in Chapter 2, cannot be fully ignored in the Middle East either. Illustrated by the Palestinian question, or by the Syrian refugees in the neighbouring countries, weakness (the combination of helplessness and injustice) coupled with the threat of regional instability that can be understood as ’power’, even if not as ’power over’ the donor,14 but at least ‘power to’15 secure foreign aid by promising favourable changes. ‘Donors’ would feel ashamed and humiliated, not least in front of their own public or electorate, if they did not try to alleviate suffering, mitigate the effects of injustice or prevent the escalation of regional tensions by means of foreign aid. While the former set of ‘threats’ can be offset by humanitarian and development assistance, the latter requires military assistance – at least in case of allies and friends. In case of enemies, the problem is solved by military intervention or war. Western interventions in Iraq (2003) or Libya (2011) illustrate well what happens when regimes concerned do not cooperate. Without inequality and dependence, that is, without influence, however little is that, there is no real chance for intervention in the recipient state. It is, however, not only the donor (country) that seeks influence in the recipient country – the aid recipient is also a donor offering gifts, of unusual nature, to the recipient. Recipients, after all, seek to avoid ‘indebtedness’, external influence and the ‘sense of humiliation’ as they themselves are interested in the constant circulation of foreign grants.16

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The ‘spirit’ of contemporary gift and the image of the ‘foreign agent’ The atmosphere of the Arab Spring didn’t skip Palestine/Israel, we were all with them in spirit – in the opposition to oppression, patriarchy, chauvinism and the perpetuation of the old system.17 (Maysaloun Hamoud, Israeli-Palestinian film director) Western donors attempted to contribute to economic development and prosperity as well as building stable and enduring, ‘deep democracies’ before the Arab Spring. They funded countless projects to help democratize the developing states, the Arab world included since the 1990s as mentioned earlier. However, as the general framework of any democratization process (decreasing authoritarian control, elections, uncertain transfer of power to liberal-democratic forces) posed serious risks concerning stability and migration in the Mediterranean, cooperation with the hidden ‘deep state’18 prevalent in the region was prioritized over ‘deep democracy’. Although this latter has never been a primary Western interest in the Middle East in historical terms,19 it cannot be claimed that Western aid and the conveyed ‘spirit’ did not have any impact in the region. The question of foreign funding is equally highly-politicized in the concerned countries too, where both the (authoritarian, oppressive, occupying) governments and their ‘public’ opposition (civil societies) equally benefited from external funding. All this provides ‘an easy vehicle for various political actors to try to manipulate public debate and advance their respective agendas’ not only in Egypt20 and Palestine, but in Israel and Jordan too.

Importing foreign (Western, global or neoliberal) ideas and its price In an era ruled by global social media – and global manipulation – it is extremely difficult to say to which extent the desire for democratic reforms is indigenous from that of the external influence,21 ideologies and technical, IT and communication expertise included. Yet, mapping the role played by individuals and intellectuals in revolutions, Michael Walzer emphasized long ago that ‘revolutionary thoughts nowhere develops indigenously.’22 The US, to some extent even the EU has done its best to prove that this claim is right (see the discussion on

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political reforms in Chapter 4). In a somewhat paradoxical way, fears of authoritarian governments – foreign funding to local NGOs is a Western political means to influence domestic politics, even to undermine the governing regime – resonate well with philosophy and practice. The constant transformative mission pursued by Western aid rarely takes into account how domestic impacts of aid-related activates complicate life in recipient countries. For example, foreignpromoted NGO projects designed in line with donor ambitions can easily lead to legitimacy problems as the associated norms and values may be deemed to be alien to the local customs and traditions by those that do not benefit from this aid. The Middle East is not an exception.23 A further typical problem with reference to aid cooperation in general, conditionality in particular is the abundance of norms and values accompanying aid (programmes, projects, technical cooperation or budgetary assistance). Recalling some local perceptions on the transformative power of foreign aid, the following examples can be cited to illustrate how it changes local norms and values: When asked about what they learned from their donors (in Summer 2015), Palestinian NGO leaders admitted that they benefited a lot by learning ‘discipline on respecting the time, organize the agendas and many other useful professional things’24 and ‘administrative subjects, the ways of thinking, the ethics, organization, planning, and work habits.’25 As one of them elaborated:26 Through daily interactions and communications (. . .) we have learned proposal and report writing; we had capacity building projects, personally I learned a lot through my work for many years with those experts (. . .) we have learned from the donors the modern management methods, every one of our staff has his own responsibilities, we are not working like others. The focus on modern management methods, proposal and report writing skills and related competences cannot be separated from the neoliberal ‘technicization’ and to ‘depoliticizing of the political’ struggle in Palestine.27 Since ‘passive’ recipients are usually unable to return gestures (foreign aid) in financial terms, they are seen as ‘expected to offer

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the only thing they had: control over some part of their lives’.28 Donors ‘control’ the recipients – both governmental and nonstate actors – by emphasizing partnership,29 by ‘teaching’ organizational skills and expecting transparency and accountability for the sake of aid effectiveness and, in a way, by alienating them from their fellows (as the citation above illustrates). Indeed, aid bureaucracy is rarely linked in an organic way to the domestic economy and labour market, so it is less finely tuned to understand people’s daily problems.30 This ‘sector’ however employs, or coopts, quite many local talents – speaking fluent English, being familiar with Western life-styles and norms due to family members or studies abroad – who are relatively well-paid. This way (Western-fed) aid bureaucracies, mostly in capital cities, not only ‘steal’ resources and talent from recipient societies, but they also trouble legitimacy on the recipient side. As norms and values coming alongside aid programmes and projects are seen as alien many times, the differences between the foreigner/donor and local/recipient – and they have, indeed, different passports offering different protection in hard times – affects the efficiency of both state and aid administration. The constantly changing procedures of various donors coupled with the attention which donors demand from the local employees simply deprives the recipient society and economy of time and energy.31 This way, ‘modern management and communication methods’ became the symbol of globalization, universalism, neo-colonialization or neoliberalism that operate at the expense of local resources, traditions and communities. The higher the transparency is, the weaker the manoeuvring ability on the recipient side is to counterbalance the impacts of foreign aid. It can even have a negative impact on legitimacy and on the coherence of indigenous value systems32 which are otherwise under constant attack due to the exposure to globalization. Beyond the seemingly technical skills mentioned above, social, political and cultural values also seem to be affected as illustrated by the following examples: We still maintain our values obviously, but we learn from their [Western] humanitarian dedication.33

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Dealing with donors, especially Western ones, changes, at least for a bit, one’s values. Perhaps if I didn’t do what I do, my reaction to cases of honor violence would be far more sympathetic.34 Every time we communicate and work together we exchange . . . values. We come from different environment. For example, we have different definitions of corruption.35 We, Palestinians, always considered throwing stones against Israeli soldiers as part of non-violent actions, but some INGOs consider it as violence. I see these changes [their influence on the Palestinian non-violent movement] as negative changes, [as this way] part of the national movement helps [the] Israeli occupation . . . so the Israelis managed to build the wall easily.36 Western expectations seem to continue to be a model towards which the ‘Rest’ must somehow adjust: even if our Palestinian respondents as individuals did not believe in the ‘supremacy of the West’, in order to talk about the relationship between the Western donor and the Palestinian (non-)recipient, they had ‘to adopt a position’ or ‘use a language’, as if they believed37 in the (Western/global/neoliberal) cultures of ‘business administration’ and ‘humanitarianism.’ Some of them definitely did, others rather criticized the process saying that Western values could spread at the expense of local norms, values and attitudes, behaviour patterns. As indicated by these examples the border between the social, cultural and political are not only blurred, but aid (implementation) even strengthens division lines and multiple legitimacies within the population. These include, but not limited to, the secular vs. Islamic rift and the urban vs. rural divide (beyond the gap, discussed earlier, between those employed by the aid industry and those that work on the ‘domestic’ labour market). First, beneficiaries of ‘neoliberal’ solidarity are in a very delicate position as indicated by the above cited examples from Palestine. The Palestinian, Egyptian, Jordanian societies are Muslim majority societies embedded in the Arab Middle East. It is not a coincidence that while Western donors usually prefer secular NGOs as implementing partners, Islamic donors give primarily to Islamic charity NGOs and not to those having strong Western (religious, ideological-political) affiliation.38 Since their projects could be realized only if they got funded, Islamic

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NGOs also had to comply with project-related requirements (from proposal writing to reporting and communication) vis-a`-vis their private (and/or regional) donors.39 Yet, even if there are bigger, moderate Islamic INGOs that receive Western ODA, the majority of Islamic charity organizations are simply bypassed by Western governmental donors. Interviews conducted in Palestine showed that accepting contemporary gifts implies a sort of (expected) complicity with external, donor values as Western donors prefer working with secular, liberal or Christian local partners marginalizing political dangerous Islamic civil society actors. We don’t get any support from European and American donors, these donors don’t deal with us, they are ashamed to deal with us. While they know that we are association providing services for wounded people, they think that the wounded people are military personnel; on the contrary, all the wounded people are civilians. They have been injured during the years of the Intifada and during the wars or the bombing of the Israeli army for many places and houses in Gaza. There is a kind of sensitivity regarding the word ‘wounded’ or ‘injured’ or ‘prisoner’ by those donors (European and American), these donors are boycotting all the Palestinian associations dealing with these category of people wounded or prisoners [in the Gaza Strip]40 This complicity is seen as ‘shame’, a stigma, that is, a danger to social order. By the same token, recipients of Western aid tended to feel ashamed and/or seen as humiliated within their Palestinian community if they accepted money from Western sources.41 It was particularly true in cases when ‘normalization’ with Israel is part of the story (see later, upon discussing the ‘foreign agent’). Palestinian NGOs have to pay a heavy price for cooperation with Israeli partners, which is all the more interesting that the official objective of Western aid is supporting the peace process (and keeping the two states idea alive). Secondly, the urban-rural division line is not the result of but has been definitely strengthened by the presence of international actors (donor agencies, NGOs) everywhere in the Middle East. Many of the so-called Western values have been absorbed by recipient societies,

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especially in larger cities, due to the mediating role played by foreign aid, donor employees and projects in the context of globalization, communication and technological progress. It has played a key role in weakening or damaging indigenous belief systems, old frameworks, traditions and a lot else – the loss of which is noticed only by those living somewhat further from capitals and urban centres. Labelled as Western, neo-imperialist, neoliberal, humanitarian, global or universal – depending who is addressed and by whom – these norms and values are in conflict, not necessarily with local values and norms, but with the daily problems people – bureaucrats, officials, beneficiaries – have to tackle in the recipient countries. Formulations like ‘EU support . . . is crucial . . . to the promotion of democratic institutions [and it] is more urgent than ever to help transitions’ or ‘the role of civil society is crucial in contributing to the democratic debate and to ensuring better public accountability’ clearly reveal the politically motivated transformative ambitions.42 As these ambitions are also shared (even initiated) by certain local civil society organizations, authoritarian governments perceive them as suspicious threats or risks. Elagati, discussing foreign funding in Egypt, drew attention to the manipulation and suspicion surrounding basically almost all foreign funding.43 Even if many of the local NGOs have a clear ambition and vision to improve the ‘local human conditions’ in line with the local values, in the very moment when they look for funding, they feel trapped. Civil society and grassroots organizations in the concerned Arab countries seem to experience ‘lost battles’ on financial fronts, due to the known material asymmetries, the scarcity of local resources and the overwhelming domination of foreign agendas and funds. As a Palestinian NGO leader put it self-critically:44 Working with donors has developed my critical look at myself on how the money can make us all lose our way. The fact that external donors have far more money than local philanthropists to fund and implement projects made the Palestinian anthropologist, Khalil Nakhleh wrote about ‘the national sellout of a homeland.’45 Other Palestinian scholars went even further in their criticisms:

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[T]he PA, Palestinian and foreign capitalists, and the cohort of international development organizations, humanitarian agencies, and financial institutions which were called upon to finance, sustain and oversee the settlement of the Palestinian question, have kept Oslo’s development model at all costs. These actors remain stubbornly committed to the main rhetorical claims of the accords: namely that the endless rounds of futile negotiations must continue, and that economic development will bring ‘peace’ to the region . . . two decades and more than 8 US$ billions later, the neoliberal development experiment that accompanied Oslo, and its technocratic and depoliticizing framework, remains largely unchallenged.46 Even if the grants and donations are mostly unreciprocated in financial sense, recipients seem to pay a price for accepting the heavy ‘spiritual essence’ of the gifts. The main price, in case of those Arab entities that signed peace agreements with Israel, is avoiding war and preventing violence vis-a`-vis Israel. It is supported by third parties (donor countries) that provide aid (contemporary gifts) for the return gift of stability, nonviolence and negotiated solutions. These are perceived as shameful in many Arab societies because the Palestinian question has remained unresolved since the beginning. Honour, shame, humiliation are important categories that have so deep social meaning that they may even structure political and social (and international) relations. Being related concepts, humiliation and shame are hardly separable in many situations.47 In Middle Eastern communities, they reflect not only subjective human feelings, but play a key role in maintaining the social order – or undermining it for that matter – by non-violent means.48 When the ‘merits’ of these traditional mechanisms are being questioned on ‘modern’ humanitarian grounds (taking the example of honour killings or the reluctance to participate in normalization projects with Israel), it becomes clear how the very cohesion of the society is affected by implementing foreign aid projects. The shamerelated perceptions on cooperation (with Western donors, with Israel in the case of Palestine) confirms the general argument that the recipient itself ‘becomes complicit in the material order that brings it down.’49 Foreign aid, it seems so, is always received with a ‘burden attached’: bonds with the donors have to be maintained in order to get further aid,

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while external norms and values attached to them cannot be escaped. But as the Western norms and values are neither consistent (rhetoric vs. practice), nor coherent, the belief in democracy and stability/order being equally strong, actors in recipient counties cannot but fight alongside these lines. And it is, usually, the authoritarian power that seems to win by accusing some civil society actors for betraying national interests. Taking into consideration that donors tend to call their NGO partners as their ‘local agents’, it is not that much surprising that authoritarian (like) governments label certain civil society organizations as ‘foreign agents’ or to deem their activities as serving the donor states’ vested interest.50

Punishing the foreign agent Discussing Mauss’ work, Sahlins argued that ‘the social fact of the sides is inescapable’ in (archaic) gift relations.51 It seems to apply to ‘contemporary gifts’ too. The donor and the recipient, let this latter be an official or a non-state actor, are separate entities, whereby the donor deliberately attempts to influence local and domestic affairs for various reasons and by various means. These attempts entail labelling NGO recipients as ‘foreign agents.’ The label ‘foreign agent’ deserves attention because it is frequently used in Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the PNA (and elsewhere too) to delegitimize voices critical to the governments’ actions. The current international system is composed of sovereign states, one being ‘foreign’ to the other. While talking about global governance, universal human rights or sustainable development goals is understandable from a normative perspective, reality suggests that the modern (nation)state’s control over its population and territorial sovereignty is a very lively experience. It is particularly true in the Middle East as not only the (semi-)authoritarian regimes are interested in claiming legitimacy and defending their national sovereignty, but people also demand dignity based on their distinct nationality. On the recipient side it is national self-determination and the right to self-determination (even if they are not necessarily identical to selfgovernment),52 that is one of the most frequent and strongest arguments formulated against foreign influence, intervention and aid. Criticizing foreign funding is not a new phenomenon and is not limited to any country in the region as the following Jordanian example, formulated in

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2010, illustrates well (the emphasis is on the rhetoric/style, not on the content): In all cases, those who give money want to win the loyalty of those who are being paid, which constitutes a violation of Jordanian sovereignty and is a kind of questionable neo-colonialism . . . The donors have dubious ties with Zionism and the CIA . . . They give hundreds of thousands of dollars to promote the normalization of relations between the Arabs and the Jews and to gather intelligence [information] connected to Arab countries’ national security.53 As mentioned before, pro-Western, pro-peace, pro-human rights or prodemocracy civil society actors had been supported both by the US54 and the EU before the Arab Spring.55 Hence, Western means of promoting democracy have annoyed most governments in the region56 and led to tensions especially between donors and recipient governments well before the Arab Spring as discussed earlier. However, it has become common, not only in the Arab countries, but in Israel too accusing certain local civil society actors of being agents of Western powers and more and more governments are stifling criticism by barring nongovernmental organizations from taking foreign cash worldwide.57 Many of the NGOs receive punishment for accepting money abroad from the oppressive governments, and enjoy the criticism articulated by fellow citizens. It is not a new phenomenon, not limited geographically, but reached unprecedented levels in the past few years. Suspicion surrounding their activities has had a serious impact on their cooperation with Western donors since the Arab Spring (and subsequent regional destabilization). Taking the Egyptian example,58 US donors face increasing suspicion from potential beneficiaries of civil society grants, as wearing the label ‘US recipient’ is considered by many civil actors as harmful to their reputation.’59 These experiences, as echoed by NGO and grassroots activists in all of the concerned counties, even in Israel, include the political risk not only of accepting foreign support,60 but also invitations to international conferences.61 Continuing with Egypt, despite the continuous inflow of American aid to Egypt, there has not been a single aspect of US-Egyptian relations that has received as much criticism from Egyptian officials as foreign aid.

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Officials, intentionally or unconsciously, often acted ‘as though there were some kind of an obligation on the part of foreign donors, including the Unites States, to provide them with economic help.’62 This rightsbased approach, however, is often coupled with an ‘obvious reluctance to give public credit to the foreign donor,’ its public opinion and taxpayers.63 If the same donor (the US, or the EU) provides aid to democracy and human rights advocacy, NGO recipients are exposed not only to governmental criticisms, but they risk harassment, fines or imprisonment. While Egyptian non-governmental organizations have endured severe restrictions for the past decades, there have been periods when they could articulate critical views and even influence government policies.64 The Sisi-government, however, has gone much further in persecuting politically active NGOs and activists as accepting funding from foreign sources has become far more difficult than either under Mubarak (1981 – 2011) or Morsi (2012 –2013). The restrictions, originally, targeted Islamists that the regime considered too radical and dangerous to stability. Retaliation in Egypt, however, has targeted non-Islamist, liberal activists and any member of the civil society who engaged in the demonstrations or were critical towards the regime. It become severe especially since the military coup in July 2013. The NGO law was modified multiple times in the past years with the intention to discourage participation in politically sensitive activities. An amendment to the NGO law (article 78) threatens with life imprisonment anyone who receives funding or other support from a foreign source, with the intent to ‘harm the national interest’, ‘compromise national unity’, or ‘breach security or public peace’.65 A related recent legislation aims to prevent nongovernmental organizations from engaging in any human rights work by threatening them with fines up to $US55,000 and up to five years in prison.66 The long-standing government effort to keep civil society under tight control is well documented by Western donors and international NGOs: ‘human rights in Egypt have deteriorated far beyond the repression that existed before the country’s 2011 uprising’ and public criticism and peaceful opposition to the government remain effectively banned in 2016. All this lead to a situation when both leaders, staff and activists of politically conscious ‘advocacy’ organizations live in constant fear, being very cautious in sharing information with Western donors, participating

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in conferences, replying to emails or publishing reports. It culminates in a vicious cycle affecting the organizations’ income generating capacities from Western sources and contributing to their shrinking in size and quantity.67 Moreover, it further alienates the donors from the societies they aspire to serve. While the ‘developments’ obviously annoyed US lawmakers that initiated cuts both in military (by $US300 million) and economic assistance (from $US112 to 74 million for 2018) to Egypt in Autumn 2017,68 higher interests, however, may lead to reconsideration of the proposed cuts as it happened in the past (termination yes, but withdrawal of aid has never been an option as discussed earlier).69 The regime’s logic in Egypt is apparently the following: it does not matter which actor jeopardizes the status quo, it has to be persecuted and intimidated. No one is allowed to undermine the regime’s stability as its weakness will be taken advantage of by others, donors promoting democracy or economic prosperity included. It is much simpler to label anyone ‘foreign agent’, than let the system get collapsed. No surprise, that the ‘backlash’ or ‘pushback’ is not only an Egyptian specialty. The Jordanian society is more stable than the Egyptian and much less exposed to external pressure (such as the Israeli occupation) than the Palestinian society. Yet, the civil society institutions contrary to any reforms, remained more an instrument of state control than a mechanism of collective empowerment, not to mention, democratic changes.70 The Jordanian government’s position vis-a`-vis its civil society, however, has been less overtly repressive. International donors are expected to coordinate all their ‘innocent’ activities with the government and not to establish direct, non-supervised relationships with civil society organizations.71 The authorities do not allow civil society organizations to accept foreign funding without prior registration at the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) and its preliminary approval as ‘it is better for the EU too’, as a MOPIC employee explained, ‘if MOPIC controls the civil society organizations’.72 In Spring 2016 new amendments to the Law No. 51 on Societies (2008) were proposed by the Ministry of Social Development. The draft, if enacted, will further restrict the legal environment for civil society organizations in Jordan as it proposes, among others new requirements on local branches of international organizations, and restrictions on the foreign funding of Jordanian CSOs.73

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The situation in Palestine is perhaps the most complicated: not only Israel targets NGO operations in the Gaza Strip citing security concerns;74 but civil society institutions in Palestine have to face both Islamic and other Palestinian (self-)criticism that they are agents of ‘Western neoliberalism.’75 Beyond these accusations, the most delicate issues are participating in ‘normalization’ projects with Israel or signing the socalled ATC clause (see below). The majority of the Palestinian population continues to oppose normalization of relations with Israel,76 which illustrates well that the society can be as strong a ‘disciplining’ or ‘constraining’ force as the authoritarian government itself. The English term, used by Arabic speaking locals, is ‘normalization’ that is a dangerous path as illustrated by the following:77 Donor [demands] to interact with Israeli local institutions during the course of project implementation with Palestinian team are interpreted by Palestinian local institutions as normalization policy, and that’s very risky for them, because they can easily be considered as traitors in the eyes of Palestinian public opinion and become trapped in a public scandal. The stigma is so strong that certain organizations cannot afford participating in Israeli/Palestinian meetings as ‘any such activity didn’t quite fit without culture as an organization. We are for peace building, but this we could not participate in.’78 Organizations that cooperate with Israeli partners follow different strategies by denouncing the Israeli occupation but emphasizing human relations between Israelis and Palestinians and using a different vocabulary, such as the religious term ‘healing’ instead of normalization or cooperation.79 The same is true to the ATC-clause. US aid to Palestinian NGOs has long been conditional to the so-called ‘material support clause’ regulations. Examples are the Partner Vetting System and the Anti-Terror Certification, both of which aim to ensure the ‘clarity’ of the local implementing partners.80 Accepting aid with inconvenient conditions was perceived as a sort of stigma leading to legitimacy problems within the recipient society and affecting the NGO’s ability ‘to recruit participants, to build partnerships, and to achieve the impacts envisioned by donors and practitioners alike.’81 Many NGOs can choose between being labelled as ‘foreign agents’ or getting funds from Western sources.

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Grassroots organizations have long claimed that foreign aid goes not only to authoritarian Arab regimes oppressing their own people (in case of Israel, oppressing the Palestinians and blocking their free movement), but also to certain (international and local) NGOs and think tanks representing universal, neoliberal values or donor interests at the expense of legitimacy and local agency.82 The well-documented history of the Palestinian NGO sector illustrates well how foreign aid creates bonds at micro level and destroys indigenous initiatives and social relations simultaneously by stubbornly sticking to the Oslo Peace Process, the two-states solution, and the implied Israeli control and territorial expansion. These foreign NGOs not only seem to produce knowledge by speaking on behalf of and for the sake of the donors, but one of their main activities is to comply with the expectations defined in call for tenders and tender documents instead of being responsive to their alleged beneficiaries. This section cannot be concluded without referring briefly to the experiences of civil society actors in Israel. The differences between Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries are large enough even without the complex problem of the Israeli occupation. The current political regimes, however, can be compared by looking at their relations toward the pro-peace civil society actors. The liberal, leftist NGO sector promoting dialogue and cooperation with Palestinian partners gets smaller and smaller and the role they play in public thinking (as of today) cannot even be compared to the 1990s when Israeli-Palestinian peacebuilding partnerships and people-to-people programmes blossomed.83 The objectives and good intentions of the pro-peace, pro-Palestinian Israel NGOs have been challenged and organizations are expected to pay extra taxes on any money that they accept from foreign sources. The restrictions apply only to official (governmental) sources, not to donations from private persons, and their target is the EU/EEA and its members. The strongest Israeli legislation concerns the EU’s special guidelines (Article 15) that say that organizations dealing with the territories are eligible for funding only if they declare that their activities promote EU foreign policy.84 This latter refers to the fact that the EU does not recognize Israel’s sovereignty over any of the occupied territories (Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem). As a great part of the pro-peace NGOs’ funding comes from the EU – if their activities are in line with Brussels’s

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policies – they deserve the shameful label ‘foreign agent’ echoded by the Israeli government.85

The (im)possibility of foreign aid: Supporting stability vs. democratization Ultimately, peace and stability are the essential conditions for sustainable development. Without the funds to launch reconstruction at the first glimmer of peace, to support countries hosting refugees and to restore growth, the region will remain locked in a cycle of instability. The world came together to rebuild and invest in Europe following the destruction and devastation of the 1940s. Today, concerted and decisive action by the international community is critical in order to ensure that the future of the Middle East and North Africa is characterized not by fear, conflict and suffering, but instead by peace, opportunity, and prosperity. (communication posted on the World Bank’s website, 2015)86 Publications dealing with the ‘Arab Spring’ never fail to mention that it started with the self-immolation of a Tunisian boy and then they quickly start discussing how the events unfolded. Did Tarek el-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi know that his act will inspire a revolutionary wave sweeping through the region? Not very likely. But, in hindsight, his act has a dual meaning. First, it symbolizes the rebelling millions’ desire to defend their rights even by sacrificing their own lives. Secondly, it symbolizes the fate of the Arab Spring. Rights – human rights, political rights – could be sacrificed, but not necessarily attained by rebellion. Many of those that were ready to sacrifice themselves for a better future and democratic transition by participating in demonstrations were eventually ‘sacrificed’ by the regimes at the altar of stability. It was the Arab Spring and their regional consequences that made the Western powers recognize both the power of local public opinion (directed against their long-supported allies) and the existence of genuine demands for democracy.87 While it was easy to understand the social, political or economic demands, the sweeping call for ‘dignity’ was much more difficult to respond to. It was quite clear right from the

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beginning that the ‘dignity’ demonstrators were calling for had been missing not only due to the authoritarian governments, but their Western patrons too. Telhami, by providing a longitudinal analysis of Arab public opinion, identified those priorities and grievances that – having been ignored for decades – may have contributed to the Arab Spring. In his account, the main message of the Arab Spring was addressed not only to the corrupt leaders, but to the Western world too: ‘ [d]ecades of perceived humiliations at the hands of the West have left many Arabs with a wounded sense of national pride, but also a desire for political systems with elements of Western democracies’.88 It is hard not to recognize the ambiguity built in the longing for Western-style democracy, stability and prosperity and simultaneously in the judgement of the very same Western democracies that ‘plotted against’ the people living in the region. Regional violence, armed conflicts, peace treaties (with Israel) and generous foreign assistance affected not only regional stability; they also created conditions that increased the state’s capacity to maintain a monopoly on the means of coercion and survival in the name of stability. International support allowed the Egyptian, Jordanian regimes, as well as Israel, to manage a favourable internal balance of power and keeping the increasingly restless society (in the case of Israel and the Palestinians) away from it.89 Neither Amman, nor Cairo (nor Ramallah) could be very proud of the close working relations with the West in the field of military, security and intelligence cooperation in terms of human rights. The regimes have never been shy to use these means against their own population which clearly prevented greater political participation, real democratization and created so-widely cited ‘barriers of fear.’ (What has been achieved beyond stability, that is, the counter-terrorism activities are not part of this book; the same applies to violence committed by nonstate actors that do not carry the responsibility of states.) The dilemma (supporting democracy vs. strengthening stability) is still on the table. However, the quality of aid relationships – ties and bonds between the donor(s) and the recipient and ‘stability’ as return gift – matters more than officially stated goals, such as supporting transition to democracy. The unresolved Palestinian question and unfinished being of the Arab Spring have more in common than usually assumed. The relative weakness of pro-peace actors promoting nonviolence in Palestine and Israel can be explained by the strength of other

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actors resorting to violence (the Israeli army, the Jewish settler, the Palestinian terrorist/freedom-fighter). The weakness of pro-democracy demonstrators in Egypt and Jordan can be explained by ‘deep authoritarianism’ consisting of huge armies, intelligence services that are not afraid of defending their privileges by using power against the ‘inferior masses’. The ‘Arab Spring’ was not about the Israeli-Arab relations, but it illustrated the dilemmas donor countries had to face. Regional stability, one of the most important rationale behind military and development assistance had been challenged all of a sudden in 2011. Demonstrations during the Arab Spring mirrored well the level of popular illegitimacy and discontent with such policies and their domestic consequences not only in Egypt, but in Jordan and Palestine as well. They have had serious consequences in Egypt and may have contributed to the legitimacy crises in the region elsewhere too.90 The millions demonstrating on the Arab streets mostly targeted their own governments’ failures to bring prosperity and democracy to their population. But the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty and the Oslo Agreements on one hand and foreign support on the other equally failed to create truly democratic conditions in the region, normalization and ‘people to people’ relations between Israel and the Arab neighbours included. However, just as the negative Arab public opinion on Israel is neither simply the product of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, nor that of the the Israeli conduct/misconduct, the recent befriending between Israel and pro-Western Arab governments can also be explained by regional threats, such as the rise of ISIS and the Iranian nuclear threat. The aftermath of the Arab Spring, indeed, seems to indicate that foreign aid (especially military-, and security related aid) can indeed play a ‘bonding’ role between donors and ‘cooperative’ recipient governments pursuing common goals. The irony is that cooperation between Israel and the authoritarian, pro-Western Arab governments and the influence of the security-military establishments seem to provide enough stability to preserve order on the periphery of Iraq and Syria or in the light of the Iranian nuclear threat. But it will be the subject of another book written by someone else.

CONCLUSION

Sir Robert Chiltern:

Stop! You want me to withdraw the report and to make a short speech stating that I believe there are possibilities in the scheme?

Mrs Cheveley (sitting down on the sofa): Those are my terms. Sir Robert Chiltern (in a low voice): I will give you any sum of money you want. Mrs Cheveley: Even you are not rich enough, Sir Robert, to buy back your past. No man is. (Oscar Wilde, An ideal husband)1 We always used to say ‘[t]he poor Americans give a billion and a half a year and get nothing for it (. . .) well, the Emirates and the Saudis gave thirty billion dollars in two years and got nothing for it.’ (a European diplomat, cited in a New Yorker article, 2016)2 Could foreign aid, as a sort of contemporary gift, buy democracy, peace and stability? Peter Hessler, the journalist interviewing the anonymous European diplomat argued for the opposite: donor countries have received exactly what they paid for. The US wants peace between Egypt and Israel, and ‘the Gulf donors wants peace between Shiite and Sunni countries.’ In exchange for their support, the Egyptian government has fought Islamic extremism – and anyone else threatening this bargain

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between Cairo and its external patrons. As concluded by Hessler, if donors ‘truly desired social and political change, they wouldn’t direct the majority of their funding toward the [Egyptian, any] military, a conservative institution with no expertise in economics, education, or social and political policy.’3 No economic or development aid could challenge or counterbalance or change these perceptions. Even if EU and other OECD donors do not provide military assistance to Egypt (Jordan, PNA), they fail to change the rules of the game. Instead, they cooperate with implementing the US regional policies in many regards. Western donors are apparently not rich enough to change collective memories on historical events. Hence, they will always question the capacities and willingness of their recipients to design and implement policies that are in line with Western interests too. These mutual perceptions explain why it is much easier to ‘buy’ stability – in military-security sense – than waiting for democratic changes either in mental mindsets or at the macro-level institutions. The contemporary politics of Middle Eastern aid show that it can be exchanged for stability, but only if this latter is understood in a military-security sense and in authoritarian terms. This book focused on foreign aid chanelled for securing stability in those Western-oriented, Middle Eastern countries that are in close proximity to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The term ‘foreign aid’ covered military, development and humanitarian assistance and the central theme of the book has explored how gift theories can be applied to financially unreciprocated grants. Unreciprocity in financial terms matters a lot as cooperation between Western donors and local recipients has a long history. The length and complexity of aid relations raises some simple questions. Why do Western donors provide resources for free for so long? What do they gain in return? Who pays for this game? If Western donors risk their taxpayer’s money in the Middle East, they do so because they receive a double counter-gift: threats, such as conflict/war, images of regional instability, stories of misfortune, immigration and refugee flows within their own Western space coupled with the constant promise of stability, political reforms, economic development and cultural-societal transformations. As a result, contemporary ‘gift exchange’ strengthens the relations between the certain actors and weakens the relations between others. The main objective of this work has been to explore how Mauss’ gift exchange theory can be applied to contemporary foreign aid relations in

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the Middle East, how reciprocity works, what gestures, favours and services may qualify as return gifts, why and how the ‘spiritual essence’ of Western foreign aid complicates relations in aid recipient countries. To show how contemporary gifts are exchanged the Oslo Peace Process, the Israeli-Egyptian, and Israeli-Jordanian peace agreements were used as case studies. The concerned countries receive either military, or development (humanitarian) assistance to keep peace and keep the status quo (the idea of the two states solution in the Palestinian case) alive from their Western donors. This status quo, let us call it regional stability, is far from being democratic. Neither the concerned regimes, nor the relations between them are based on democratic principles as indicated by the initial Arab Spring demands for dignity. One may argue that the Israeli democracy cannot even be compared to the authoritarian regimes in Palestine, Egypt and Jordan. Acknowledging that there are meaningful differences across the cases, the subject of this book has been not a detailed analysis of domestic politics, rather the exploration of how foreign aid structures power relations in the recipient countries. In this regard, Israel as an authoritarian occupying power had to be included in the analysis as Palestinians – living under effective Israeli control – do not enjoy the benefits of the Israeli democracy. It is the lack of Palestinian sovereignty (one might say the prolonged Israeli occupation) on the one hand, and the contested relations between the rulers and ruled, the privileged and the inferior in the neighbouring Arab countries combined with the massive inflow of external funds on the other, which directly links the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the Arab Spring. If Mauss claimed that there is a magical force included in the given thing, Marcel He´naff argued that the implication of the donor in the given thing involves ‘a transfer of soul and of substantial presence’:4 The entire network of gift exchange consists on the fact that everyone must place something of himself at risk outside of his own place and receive something from others within its own space. There are ‘ideas’ travelling back and forth when aid is provided in the form of military equipment, technical assistance or as humanitarian projects implemented by NGOs. Western donors officially promote the idea that true peace between Israel and the Palestinians/Arabs is possible based on

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mutual interests. Both military and development assistance claim to advocate for it. In turn, people in aid recipient countries, state and non-state actors, claim that the idea of ‘justice’, let it mean anything, is more important than security and peace (agreements). Hence, the ‘return gift’ conveys the following message by placing them outside the Middle Eastern space: recipients deliver (images and threat of) instability, the (promise of) security, and (stories of) underdevelopment, poverty and conflict-related experiences. If foreign aid, especially development assistance, aspires to transform the recipient societies in political, economic and societal terms, actors in the recipient states aim to increase the amounts of foreign aid inflows for the constant promise of that transformation. Recipients can promise favourable outcomes only by conveying threats of poverty, instability, conflict and disclosing stories of sufferings, documenting pain as “return gifts”. With the active cooperation of aid agencies, INGOs, traditional and social media then draw attention to the material asymmetry between the rich and peaceful Western donors (being in the position to impose their values and norms by money) and the poor, conflict-ridden Eastern recipients (having no choice, but to get international aid), whether they live in Palestine, Egypt or Jordan. The Israeli case is somewhat different, but the logic is the same: Israel has been given military aid for its perceived vulnerability vis-a`-vis the Arab countries. A methodological problem is, however, that the return gift is hardly quantifiable. Moreover, contemporary exchanges create such complex political and social bonds (‘total international facts’ paraphrasing Mauss) that it is impossible to distinguish causes from consequences. Many argue that the Middle Eastern ‘mess’ and ‘the lazy and irrational’ oriental masses are the product of local culture and other social factors. Others doubt it, claiming that historical interaction with Western colonizers and contemporary political developments have a more important explanatory power. As Laura Nader quotes: Given our pride in our own colonial past, it is often difficult to relate to the Arab world’s reactions to their past: rage, shame, anger, the kinds of anger that erupted into protest marches, peasant revolts, strikes, terrorism, and guerilla warfare, which culminated in conflicts.

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Attaining power at any price – based on force and military strength, understood in local and regional terms – is one way of escaping the memories of oppression, shame, humiliation, fear, anger experienced either in the Middle East (colonialization, mandate system, Sykes-Picot, the Israeli occupation, Palestinian attacks and suicide bombings) or in Europe (Holocaust), or in both (wars, anti-semitism, ethnic hatred). Decolonization, independence and the subsequent international relations supported by foreign aid between Western donors, their Israeli and Arab friends also played their part in maintaining authoritarian politics, producing internal political tensions and violence both within and beyond the nation state.5 It applies to almost all countries in the region, Israel and the Arab states, their military elites and armies included. Military aid provided to Israel, Egypt and Jordan can buy the illusion of friendship and promise of regional stability, but not necessarily stability itself, definitely not in non-democratic settings. Development aid can buy the promise of democratic transformation in any country, but real political reforms require that authoritarian regimes, military establishments and security services do not benefit from military aid. If the do, they will continute to work on linking the survival of nondemocratic regimes to regional stability. Finally, humanitarian assistance may ‘buy’ stories of sufferings, may save lives, provide shelter and food for people in the Gaza Strip or Syrian refugees in Jordan, but if it deliberately fails to tackle the real, political causes of the problems, it cannot but be a constitutive element of political games. If the West – paraphrased as international community – can offer foreign aid, but not substantial help in the Middle East that is not because it does not have the needed knowledge, expertise or capacity to do so. International organizations and experts serving Western powers know far more about the region than would be desired by many locals. The problem, which is not properly understood in the West, is that today’s foreign aid will never compensate for the mistakes committed by the US and European great powers yesterday. Belonging and identity, perceptions on shame, dignity and legitimacy, matter more than what is assumed by advocates of foreign aid and rational choices. The anthropologist Maurice Bloch posed the question what the exposure to ‘foreign material’ means by recalling an old experiment. While he applied this expression to contemporary foreign media (television, soap

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opera) the argument definitely bears a broader significance in terms of the political, social and economic ambitions of donor policies. As claimed, the effect of ‘foreign’ inputs – the ‘spiritual essence’ of the gift in anthropology theories, the norms and values conveyed by external grants in our contemporary world – may not be so straightforward as it is assumed [by development specialists or aid officers] since people with a totally different cultural background need a considerable amount of time to absorb the conveyed ideas and concepts6 that are alien to the ‘cultural’ or ‘mental’ models individuals have in mind. Discussing the power of institutions, the main target of development interventions in the MENA region too, Douglass North also argued that ‘[foreign] ideas too far from the norms embodied in our culture cannot easily be incorporated into our culture.’7 If groups (communities, societies) have a shared culture,8 its members rather have beliefs,9 ‘cultural models’10 or ‘mental models.’11 The way people behave, make decisions and interact with each other is determined by these conscious and unconscious beliefs, ‘mental models’ or ‘cultural models’ they are habituated into during the course of their lives. The ‘cultural models’ are not only shaped by ‘social and historical processes’, but the term ‘culture’ or ‘cultural process’ can be understood as identical to ‘social, political or historical processes’ when one wishes ‘to understand the dynamic mechanisms by which information is passed on from one individual to another.’12 The point Bloch makes is that people can retain only ‘the type of thinking they have been habituated to’ and ‘what people’s schema [‘cultural’ or ‘mental’ models] enable them to retain from what they have been exposed to through time’.13 It complies well with North’s argument saying that ‘ideas are adopted if and when they share a kind of cohesion that does not take them too far from the norms [people] possess.’14 The existence of Israel in the region illustrates well the significance of the above written. The Arab public has been hostile towards it since the very beginning for various reasons, the most relevant among them is the Palestinian question and the Israeli occupation. Not only masses have been educated on ‘how Arab countries will drive Israel to the sea’ for decades, but Israel has done its best to be portayed as a cruel occupier of Palestinian territorries in many fora. The Israeli public, with rare exceptions, believe in the IDF as the most moral army in the world.15 The Arab public does not. The same (conflicting opinions) apply to the signing and ratification of the peace agreements, which has never been

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internalized at the level of public opinion for the Palestinian people has never gained independence. And here comes the very problem of foreign aid, namely, the foreign spirit of a given thing. Foreigners will remain foreigners, keeping different passports and enjoying different legal protection. Foreign aid, even if accepted, will also be looked upon with certain suspicion simply because of its ‘soul’ (hau following Malinowski and Mauss) conveys messages – peace without justice, stability without democracy – alien to the recipients. Recipients will continue to doubt the good intentions of their Western donors, even if they may make a difference between conscientous Westerner individuals working in the field and the states and international organizations they claim to represent. Western, international and regional donors equally require reciprocity and return gifts, not for the object itself, but for maintaining the bonds (good relations) between the donor and recipient. The game of the gifts does not require precisely defined demands or expectations. And just as with the Maussean gift, the timing and ‘how’ of reciprocitating depends on the givee. If the common objective is to keep peace and stability, each party involved will know what to do without the exact formulation of the ‘how’. Regarding development aid from OECD donors, recipients enjoy more and more freedom (‘ownership’, ‘partnership,’ ‘participation’ and other aid effectiveness principle) as long as they can keep their activities transparent and acknowledge generosity in line with their donors’ visibility and communication manuals. In similar vein, it is highly unlikely that Washington prescribes to Cairo, Amman or Ramallah to detain or torture N hundred people by X means after a joint security training for the sake of national security or regional stability and in exchange for foreign aid. It has, of course, never been the US Army, NATO or whatever EUsponsored forces that stood against the civil revolutionary forces in Egypt. But it was money of foreign origin, development assistance and military supplies provided by Western countries (and to some extent by regional powers) to authoritarian regimes throughout the decades and even since the Arab Spring was muted that has made a difference. Without the reserves and stocks piled for decades, neither the Egyptian military, nor the more moderate and pro-Western forces in Jordan and Palestine would have been able to secure ‘stability’. Not to mention the Israeli army. Gifts are symbols, in international relations too, the main objective of which is to maintain relationships. Their circulation (and the related

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communication) is supposed to ensure external legitimacy: the public recognition of the identities, norms and values of the exchanging partners. However, as Annalisa Furia argued, foreign (development) aid cannot work as an exclusively solidarity-based, Maussan gift ‘for it is constructed as a peculiar form of gracious gift’ failing ‘to create a space of reciprocal recognition.’ Accepting this interpretation, this book might have gone a step further arguing that like archaic gifts, foreign aid is indeed reciprocated: in a unique, non-materialized form. Contemporary international gifts – foreign aid – are returned by ‘inalienable objects’, such as the threat of conflict and violence and related promises to attain stability; images and stories of sufferings, poverty, misfortune mediated by media; partial and selective compliance with conditions, oil-related favours, security-oriented gestures offered by recipient governments’ armies and intelligence services. As they all may qualify as (return) gifts offered in exchange for (further) aid, the problem with foreign aid is not that it fails to recognize identities on the recipient side as argued by Annalisa Furia. It cannot even do so as there is no unity, no single legitimacy, no single identity in most recipient countries, our Middle Eastern cases tried to show. The problem with foreign aid is that it makes an equitation mark between the ‘inalienable objects’ (as return gifts) and the recipient’s very being: Western money channelled to the Middle East - in the form of arm transfers and any kind of foreign aid – has contributed to creating an image on the Middle East that, throughout the decades, became a reality in many locations: being poor, oppressed, occupied, persecuted or refugee – these experiences shape identities at least as much as attempts not to sacrifice one’s life by benefiting, in the absence of better alternatives, from foreign aid. One either conceptualizes the ‘inalienable objects’ (stories of pain and poverty; the threat of chaos and instability; the promise of stability, security, development) as return gifts or the recipient is deemed to be a parasite that, following Serres, always takes, but never gives. Since ‘the debt is not just victor’s justice’ but ‘it can also be a way of punishing winners who weren’t supposed to win’ (following Graeber), unreciprocated grants (unilateral gifts) and financial indebtedness may also be seen as a triumph of the recipient over the donor. As Keynes famously said long ago, ‘if you owe your bank a hundred pounds, you have a problem; but if you owe a million, it has.’

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In this sense, the Middle East owe ‘millions’ to the West in financial terms. Even if the concerned countries are indebted financially, they may redeem the debt in non-material terms by ‘sharing’ their misfortune or pains (‘to receive humanitarian assistance’), by posing a constant threat (‘to secure military aid for stability’) and simultaneously promising stability, fiscal discipline, good governance and development, that is, by complying with hidden or overtly stated conditions (‘to remain eligible for development aid’). Aid recipients are indebted and not at the same time. Financially, they do not redeem the debt (in the case of grants). Politically they have to do, even if conditions are not formally set by donors. The position and role of the MENA region in the global context has been undergoing significant transformations for the past few years.16 Hence, there is a lot that had to be left out of the analysis. Attention has been paid neither to the regional impacts of climate change, changing energy markets, nor to the recently evolving cooperation between Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia as opposed to Iran and the opposition movements (Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Muslim Brotherhood) manipulated by it in the region. Russia, its regional influence and cooperation with Iran and Turkey were also left out of the analysis. The portrayal of Iran as a major threat to regional ‘stability’ would definitely deserve more attention as it apparently offers more incentive for a serious Arab-Israeli reconciliation than the famous ‘dividend of peace’, that is, economic development supported by development aid. If recent cooperation between Israel and the Arab counties are constituted by shared norms, attitudes and virtues, two such factors can be definitely named: inclination to authoritarian policies and practices vis-a`vis certain segments of the population under control and violent attitudes towards violent (Islamist) terrorism. Time will tell how far Israel and the Arab states will go in terms of befriending and cooperation: will it include societies or only the elites benefiting from cooperation supported by foreign aid? Will the general Arab public in Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf countries subscribe to the idea that cooperation with Israel is not only needed to offset Iran, but even more important than the Palestinian selfdetermination? Will the nascent cooperation between Israel and the proWestern Arab countries further marginalize the democratic ideas supported by the US and the EU in the region?

ANNEX — INTERVIEW DETAILS

Data have been anonymized in line with the ethical requirements of the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD). Details of the data collection are described in the Introduction. A lot more thoughts (‘data’) could have been quotes from the interviews in the text, but it is quite space-consuming . . .

AI. Interviews conducted by the author . . . . .

. .

EU officer, EU Representative Office, WBGS, Jerusalem, 25 February 2014. EU officer, ECHO Regional Support Office, Amman, 23 February 2014. Head of EU Partnership and Programmes, MOPIC, Jordan, Amman, 23 February 2014. Two EU officers, Delegation of the European Union to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Amman, 23 February 2014. EU officer, EEAS, MD IV (2) A. Middle East II, desk: Israel, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Middle East Peace Process, Brussels, 17 February 2014. EuropeAid Officer, DEVCO F2, Brussels, Egypt Desk, 17 February 2014. EuropeAid Officer, EuropeAid, DEVCO F2, Brussels, 17 February 2014.

208 . . . . . .

.

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EuropeAid Officer, Delegation of the European Union to the State of Israel; Tel Aviv, 27 February 2014. Head of Middle Eastern Economic Affairs, MFA; Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, February 24, 2014. Palestinian businessman, Ramallah 26 February 2014. Palestinian academic person, Ramallah, 26 February 2014. Head of a Palestinian grassroots initiative, of American origin, 25 February 2014. Informal discussions (interview guides absent) that took place from 2005 to 2014 are not listed but contributed a lot to the understanding of the subject. Interviews conducted during my doctoral research from 2005 to 2007 are listed in my dissertation.

Male, 50

Male, 46 Male, 48 Male, 63

Male, Male, Male, Male, Male,

Male, 49 Male, 51 Male, 54

Focus group I.

2

3 4 5

6 7 8 9 10

11 12 13

14

38 32 53 65 50

Male, 48

Gender, age

international (non- Palestinian) employee coordinator director businessman, owner political activists, NGO leader PLC member, senior businessman, owner university teacher board member former advisor 3 participants (refugees)

administrative consultant; university lecturer journalist NGO activist director of local NGO tribal judge and public servant director

Occupation/Title

local NGO Palestinian Monetary Authority Dehesheh camp

owners of hotels, a textile company

Ayda refugee camp, Bethlehem PNA well known research centre in Bethlehem international donor organization international NGO PNA factories in Bethlehem and Hebron

Al Quds university and Open University Al Wihda local radio station

West Bank

Organizational affiliation

Interview particularities and participant profiles (West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2010).

1

AII.

Bethlehem, 17 August

Bethlehem, 7 August Bethlehem, 17 August Bethlehem, 17August

Ramallah, 3 August Ramallah, 3 August Ramallah, 3 August Bethlehem, 6 August Bethlehem, 6 August

Bethlehem, 28 July Bethlehem, 1 August Bethlehem, 2 August

Bethlehem, 28 July

Bethlehem, 27 July

Interview conducted

Continued

Male, 55

Male, 57 Male, 41 Focus group II. Focus group III.

4

5 6 7

9 10

Male Male

Male, 62

3

8

Male, 45 Male, 68

1 2

Gender, age

AII. Continued Organizational affiliation

PNA, Ministry of Public Works Al-Maghazi Refugee Camp

PNA, public school

Al-Quds Open University

Gaza Strip

MoH-employee; Hamas policeman; administrator of water management (municipality) Professor of political science Director Al Azhar University Palestinian NGO

Director General PNA, Ministry of Social Affairs director/owner Construction company refugees (tailor; vegetable seller; taxi driver)

university professor mukhtar retired headmaster mukhtar accountant, retired mayor

Occupation/Title

Gaza City, 17 August Gaza City, 19 August

Buraj Camp, 16 August

Al-Maghazi Refugee Camp, 9 August Gaza City, 8 August Gaza City, 12 August Gaza City, 14 August

Gaza City, 8 August

Gaza City, 7 August Gaza City, 8 August

Interview conducted

MGR; Dev: gender, equality, human rights MGR; Dev: education, youth, sport MGR; Dev: education, youth, sport MGR; Dev: advocacy, democracypromotion, HR MGR; Dev: gender, equality, human rights MGR; Dev: advocacy, HR PC; Dev: gender, equality, human rights MGR; Dev: institution building PC; Hum and Dev

WB1

WB12 FO; Hum and Dev: other (health)

WB10 MGR; Dev: advocacy, democracy- promotion, other WB11 MGR; Dev: cultural heritage

WB8 WB9

WB6 WB7

WB5

WB4

WB3

WB2

Position and field of activities

Nablus, 6 August, 2015 Ramallah, 10 August, 2015 Ramallah, 10 August, 2015 Ramallah, 1 September, 2015 Ramallah, 1 September, 2015 Ramallah, September 2015 (via email) Bethlehem, October 2015 (vvia email)

Nablus, 6 August, 2015

Bethlehem, 30 July, 2015

Hebron, 28 July, 2015

Bethlehem, 17 July, 2015

Bethlehem, 6 July, 2015

Place and date of the interview

MGR; Dev: advocacy, democracy-promotion, HR MGR; Dev: gender, equality, human rights MGR; Dev: agriculture, environment MGR; Dev: agriculture, environment MGR; Hum and Dev MGR; Dev: education, youth, sport PC; Dev: family, women MGR; Hum

MGR; Hum

Field of activities

–

–

GS10 MGR; Hum

GS8 GS9

GS6 GS7

GS5

GS4

GS3

GS2

GS1

ID

Interview particularities and participant profiles (West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2015).

ID

AIII.

Jabalia Camp, 21 Sep 2015

Gaza City, 1 Sep 2015 Biet Lahia, 13 Sep 2015

Gaza City, 11 Aug 2015 Gaza City, 16 Aug 2015

Khan Younis City, 5 Aug 2015 Khan Younis City, 7 Aug 2015 Gaza City, 10 Aug 2015

Gaza City, 3 Aug 2015

Gaza City, 26 June 2015

Place and date of the interview

Summay profiles of interview participants (2015)

Total

Organizational affiliation locally (registered) NGO (with some Western attachment, church included) grassroots organization, indigenous, Palestinian initiative (not overtly religious) grassroots organization, indigenous, Palestinian initiative (Islamic-related) other (aid-related, but not fund-raising; consultancy, monitoring, awareness-raising) Position or title leader (director, general manager, head) consultant, coordinator, advisor, fundraising officer Organizational profile humanitarian (relief, charity) development (education, youth, sport) development (advocacy, democracy-promotion, human rights) development (advocacy, gender, equality) development (arts, theatre, movie, cultural heritage) development (agriculture, environment) development (family, women) Other Respondent’s age (group) 26– 35 36– 45 46– 55 56– 65 Length of experience in the aid industry less than 3 years 3 to 5 years 5 to 10 years over 10 years Gender Male Female Level of highest education university (BA, MA level) PhD or similar level

22 6 9 3 4 22 18 4 22 5 3 3 4 1 2 1 3 22 1 6 14 1 1 2 2 17 22 12 9 22 20 2

Venue of studies (high school) Palestine, only West (Europe or North-America) Other (or we do not know) Palestine and abroad as well Venue of studies (university, if relevant) Palestine, only MENA region (Jordan, Egypt, Gulf, other), but not Palestine West (Europe or North-America), but not Palestine Other (or we do not know) Both Palestine and abroad Number of donors (past 5 years; 5–10 years), various sizes more than 10 less than 10

22 20 1 1 0 22 7 0 6 4 5 22 16 6

NOTES

Introduction

Contemporary Gifts

1. The term donor equally denotes official actors, civil society organizations and people acting as givers (donators) money or speaking on behalf of donor states and organizations. 2. Writing about Israel is not an easy task as almost any statement on it could be challenged on diverse grounds. When talking about it as a political entity, I refer to the territorries within the 1949-borders (green line), but the Israeli army obviously controls the Palestinian borders too and the Israeli administration controls the Palestinian population registry (in coordination with the Palestinian Authority). Its domestic political landscape is not less complicated and the diversity of actors and political opinions does not make it easy to talk about a ‘single’ Israel. The multiple and competing opinions concerning certain facts, Israeli and/or Jewish values, norms, and interests make even academic debates exhausting, sometimes even discouraging. 3. The term ‘Palestine’ is used frequently throughout the text denoting the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) established in the ‘West Bank and Gaza Strip’ (used frequently in international statistics) by the Oslo Peace Process. 4. I am grateful for this sentence – borrowed from review #2. 5. In academic terms the Arab Spring has not been a revolution as Theda Skocpol defined this concept as a rapid, structural transformation of the state; see Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud and Andrew Reynolds, The Arab Spring. Pathways of Repression and Reform (Oxford, 2015), p. 23. The term simply marks the popular uprisings (regardless to their outcome) in various countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), such as Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrein, Yemen, Iran, Oman, Syria, Libya, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority. It was ‘invented’ in January 2011; see for example Mark Lynch, ‘Obama’s Arab Spring?’ Foreign Policy, 6 January 2013; Dominique Moisi, ‘An Arab Spring?’, Project Syndicate, 26 January 2011. This book is concerned only with

NOTES

6.

7. 8.

9.

10.

11.

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developments taking place in Israel, Egypt and Jordan and Palestine within the broader context of Arab Spring (and regardless to the intensity or depth of the demonstrations). I will use the term Arab Spring throughut the text for the sake of simplicity, even if it is a Western invention, does not describe local understandings perfectly, and has been criticized strongly, see Khouri, Rami, ‘Drop the Orientalist term, Arab Spring’, The Daily Star (Beirut) 17 August 2011. The term WASA-uprisings, used in critical literature tries to express certain distance from the colonial past and legacies (such as ‘Middle East’); more on it Corinna Mullin and P. Pallister-Wilkins, ‘Introduction: The West Asian and North African Uprisings and the Limits of Liberal Governance’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 9/2 (2015), pp. 151– 161. Camp David Accords, The preamble of the ‘Framework for Peace in the Middle East’, 1978. For a critique of peaceful ways of peace-making in the Middle East see Nathan Thrall, The only language they understand. Forcing Compromise in Israel and Palestine. New York, Metropolitan Books, 2017. Israel is a democratic county, but it is by no means democratic in her relationship vis-a`-vis the Palestinians living in the West Bank, Gaza Strip (and East Jerusalem). The Israeli occupation is a complicated issue politically, legally and in academic terms too. By using this term, we refer to the Israeli measures and actions (walls, fences, border control, movement and access restrictions, the presence of military in or around the Palestinian territories) by means of which Israel prevents the Palestinian self-determination and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state. Even a brief summary of the pro and contra arguments concerning Israel’s responsibility as an occupying power would require citing volumes. To mention a few see Weizman E, (2007), Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation; Azoulay A. & Ophir A, (2013), The One-State Condition: Occupation and Democracy in Israel/Palestine; Kretzmer D, (2002), The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories; BarYaacov, Nissim, The Applicability of the Laws of War to Judea and Samaria (The West Bank) and to the Gaza Strip, 24 Israel Law Review 485, 492–93 (1990); Roberts, Adam, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights, 100 Am. J. Int’l L.580, 584 (2006). See for example Zsolt Rostovanyi, ‘The Effect of the “Arab Spring” on the Rearrangement of the Geopolitical Map of the Middle East,’ in Kinga De´ve´nyi (ed.) Studies on Political Islam and Islamic Political Thought (Budapest, 2013), pp. 267 –296. While the citation comes from Hazem Khairat, Egypt’s ambassador in Israel (November 2017), Sadat Knesset-speech laid the ground of this approach 30 years ago (‘We cannot attempt to achieve partial peace and export the whole problem to future generations’). Raphael Ahren: Egyptian envoy: Peace with Israel only ‘partial’ without the Palestinian State. Times of Israel, 22 November 2017. Marcel Mauss, The Gift. Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies (London, 1925/2002).

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12. Jacques Derrida, The Given Time (Chicago, 1992); Alan D. Schrift (ed.), The Logic of the Gift: Toward an Ethic of Generosity (New York, 1997); Marcel He´naff, The Price of Truth: Gift, Money and Philosophy (Stanford, CA, 2010); Olli Pyyhtinen, The gift and its paradoxes, beyond Mauss ( Farnham, Surrey, 2014). 13. Kolm, Serge-Christophe and Jean Mercier Ythier (eds), Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity (Amsterdam, 2006); Luigi Bruni, et al. (eds), Handbook on the Economics of Reciprocity and Social Enterprise (Edvar Elgar, 2013). 14. Tomohisa Hattori, ‘Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid’, Review of International Political Economy 8/4 (2001), pp. 633– 660. 15. Hattori, ‘Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid’; Annalisa Furia, The Foreign Aid Regime. Gift-Giving, States and Global Dis/Order (London, 2015); for further references see Chapter 2. The manuscript of this book was submitted to Tauris in August 2014 and Palgrave published Annalisa’s monograph in 2015. 16. Maysoun F. Succarie, Winning Hearts and Minds: Education, Culture and Control (Berkeley,2008) cited by Laura Nader, Culture and Dignity. Dialogues Between the Middle East and the West (Chichester, 2013), pp. 40 – 41. 17. Mauss, The Gift; Pyyhtinen, The gift and its paradoxes, beyond Mauss; Furia, The Foreign Aid Regime. 18. Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith (London, 2003/2014); Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development (Princeton, 2004/2011); Duffield, Mark, Development, Security and Unending War. Governing the World of Peoples (London, 2007); Ilan Kapoor, The Postcolonial Politics of Development (London, 2008), for further references see Chapter 2. 19. Alain Caille, ‘Anti-utilitarianism, economics and the gift-paradigm’, www. revuedumauss.com. 20. Cognitive scientists (social psychologists) define habituation as a likely result of repeated exposure to the same thing, see R. F. Thompson, ‘Habituation: A History’. Neurobiology of Learning and Memory 92/2 (2009), pp. 127– 134. 21. Nicolas Bardsley and Robert Sugden, ‘Human nature and sociality in economics,’ in Serge-Christophe Kolm et al. (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity (Amsterdam, 2006), 732–770. 22. Philip Mirowski, ‘Postface’ in Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (eds), The Road from Mont Pe`lerin. The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective (London, 2009), p. 424. 23. Michel Foucault (Naissance de la biopolitique: cours au Colle`fe de France, 1978– 79, Paris, 2004, p. 137) cited by Mirowski, ‘Postface’, p. 434. 24. Shimon Peres, The New Middle East (New York 1993). 25. Alain Caille, ‘Anti-utilitarianism, economics and the gift-paradigm’. 26. Bardsley et al. ‘Human nature and sociality in economics’. 27. A recent example is offered by Linda Tabar et al. Critical readings of development under colonialism: towards a political economy for liberation in the occupied Palestinian Territories (Ramallah, 2015).

NOTES TO PAGES 10 –12

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28. L. Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East (Princeton, 1984); Fred Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations (Cambridge, 2005); Louise Fawcett (ed.), International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford, 2013); Raymond A. Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East (Manchaster, 2003); Raymond A. Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (London, 2002, 2014). 29. Brown, International; Halliday, The Middle East. 30. Halliday, The Middle East, p. 286. 31. Sheila Carapico, Political Aid and Arab Activism. Democracy Promotion, Justice and Representation (New York, 2014), p. 65. 32. Chae-Han Kim, ‘Reciprocity in Asymmetry: When Does Reciprocity Work?’ International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations 31/1 (2005), p. 5. 33. Trump as a candidate promised the Egyptian president ‘strong support for Egypt’s war on terrorism’, and how under a Trump administration, the United States of America will be a loyal friend, not simply an ally that Egypt can count on in the days and years ahead. See Stephen Collinson et al, Clinton, Trump meet world leaders for very different reasons, CNN Online, 20 September 2016. 34. Shimon Peres, The New Middle East (New York 1993). 35. Recent research in the field of cognitive and behavioural sciences increasingly acknowledges the importance of people’s sociability and the role played by the social surrounding in maintaining identities, structuring social relations, shaping human thinking and decision-making. Some of the recent findings deserve particular attention: people think socially, think automatically and they use ‘mental or cultural models’ during the course of their private and public lives alike. It influences the formal and informal institutions and social norms regulating social life. The process, indeed, is a two-way one. Not only thinking, comprehension and behaviour are determined by human sociality, but social context, norms, expectations, recognition, patterns of cooperation, care of ingroup members, hostility towards out-group members all influence how people think and behave beyond ‘rationality’. In other words, the way people think, decide and behave is pretty much context dependent and to a large extent determined by the surrounding society and its detectable impact on the human mind and brain. As emphasized by the World Bank understanding how humans think (the processes of mind), how history and the surrounding society shape thinking can improve the design and implementation of development policies and interventions that target human choice and action – provided that one accepts that ‘development should be developed.’ See, for example: R. Damasio, Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain (New York, 1996); Douglas North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change (Princeton, 2005), pp. 23– 47; D. Franks, Handbook of Neurosociology (New York, 2012); F. Vander Valk, Essays on Neuroscience and Political Theory (London: 2012); Maurice Bloch, Anthropology and the Cognitive Challenge (Cambridge, 2012), p. 75 and 172; Mind, Brain and Society, The World Development Report 2015.

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36. Martin Wight (edited by Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter) International Theory: The Three Traditions (Leicester, 1991), p. 1. 37. Mauss, The Gift, p. 5. 38. For the Arab Spring context see, Shibley Telhami, The World Through Arab Eyes, Arab Public Opinion and the Reshaping of the Middle East (New York, 2013). 39. Asaad al-Saleh (ed.), Voices of the Arab Spring. Personal Stories from the Arab Revolutions (New York, 2015); Maytha Alhassen and Ahmed Shihab-Eldin (eds), Demanding Dignity. Young Voices From the Front Lines of the Arab Revolutions (Ashland, Oregon, 2012); Daniel Gumbiner, Diana Abouali, Elliot Colla (eds), Now That We Have Tasted Hope: Voices from the Arab Spring (San Francisco, 2012); Robert F. Worth, A Rage for Order: the Middle East in Turmoil, from Tahrir Square to ISIS (New York, 2016); Shelly Culbertson, The Fires of Spring. A Post-Arab Spring Journey Through the Turbulent New Middle East (New York, 2016); Paul Danahar, The New Middle East. The World after the Arab Spring (London, 2015). 40. It includes discussions with Egyptian participants at conferences and a report (Mohammed Elagati, Foreign Funding in Egypt After the Revolution. Fride Working Paper (Barcelona, 2013)) that collected and explored local perceptions on the various aspects of foreign funding. The semi-structured personal interviews were conducted in December 2012 in Cairo by the Arab Forum for Alternatives: in order to examine the local vision of foreign funds, a sample of 30 people involved in the various fields associated with foreign funding (10 from civil society, 5 from political parties, 5 from the media, 5 from funding organizations and 5 from relevant government institutions) were interviewed. The meetings attempted to explore their opinions on funding in general, the extent of their knowledge on the subject, and their opinions on funding-related issues, whether regarding funding for media, politics, or CSOs in Egypt. See Mohamed Elagati, ‘Foreign Funding in Egypt After the Revolution’, Fride Working Paper (Barcelona, 2013). 41. Paragi, Bea´ta, (2019, forthcoming) Matching empirical data with theories. SAGE Research Methods Cases. 42. Some the findings of the 2015 data collection (alongside a detailed description of data analysis) were published in the following papers: ‘Contemporary gifts. Solidarity, compassion, equality, sacrifice and reciprocity from the perspective of NGOs’, Current Anthropology 58(3): 317–339; Cultures of (dis)trust: shame and solidarity from recipient NGO perspectives. International Journal of Cultural Studies (2016, online first); ‘Hegemonic solidarity? Palestinian NGO perceptions on power and cooperation with their donors’ Alternatives 41(2): 98 – 115. Results of the pre-Arab Spring data collection (Summer 2010) were published as Beata Paragi, ‘First impressions and perceived roles: Palestinian perceptions on foreign aid’, Society and Economy 35/1 (2012), pp. 389– 410; Beata Paragi, ‘The Spiritual Essence: Palestinian Perceptions on Foreign Aid, Conditionality and Reciprocity’, Journal International Political Anthropology 5/1 (2012), pp. 3 –28.

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43. Data have been anonymized, but a list containing the date and location of the interviews (discussions) can be found at the end of the book.

Chapter 1

The Market, the Society and the Gift

1. Works applying the approach of methodological individualism: Peter M. Blau (ed.), Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York, 1964/2003); George C. Homans, Social Behavior. Its Elementary Forms (London, 1961); Alvin W. Gouldner, ‘The Norm of Reciprocity. A Preliminary Statement’, American Sociological Review 25/2 (1961), pp. 161– 178; Richard M. Emerson, ‘Social Exchange Theory’, Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 2 (1974), pp. 335– 362; Serge-Christophe Kolm and Jean Mercier Ythier (eds), Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity (Amsterdam, 2006) – and those emphasizing the independence of social-societal phenomena within the context of giving and exchange; Mauss, Marcel, The Gift, Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies (London, 1925/2002); Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (New York, 1944/2001); Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (Chicago, 1972); Luigi Bruni et al. (eds), Handbook on the Economics of Reciprocity and Social Enterprise (Amsterdam, 2013); Alan D. Schrift (ed.): The Logic of the Gift: Toward an Ethic of Generosity (New York, 1997); Mark Osteen (ed.), The Question of the Gift: Essays Across Disciplines (New York, 2002). 2. Mauss, The Gift, p. 59; Olli Pyyhtinen, The gift and its paradoxes, beyond Mauss (Farnham, Surrey, 2014), 18 – 19. 3. Blau, Exchange and Power; Homans, Social Behaviour; Emerson, ‘Social Exchange Theory’. 4. Blau, Exchange and Power; Homans, Social Behavior. 5. Thomas R. Chibucos, Randall W. Leite, David L. Weis (eds), Readings in Family Theory ( London, 2005), p. 137. 6. Chibucos et al, Readings in Family Theory, p. 138. 7. Ibid., p. 138. 8. Ibid., p. 138. 9. For example, Claude-Levi Strauss, Marshall Sahlins, Chris Gregory, Annette Weiner, Marilyn Strathern, James Carrier, and Maurice Godelier (anthropology), Pierre Bourdieu, Jacques T. Godbout, Helmuth Berking, David Cheal and Aafke E. Komter, Olli Pyyhtinen (sociology), Georges Bataille, Jacques Derrida, Marcel He´naff, Alan Schrift (philosophy). Common in their works is the challenge of market logic and the focus on social perspectives, see more in Osteen (ed.), The Question of the Gift. 10. Mauss, The Gift; Polanyi, The Great Transformation; Sahlins, Stone Age Economics. 11. Sahlins, Stone Age Economics; Gouldner, ‘The Norm of Reciprocity’. 12. Bataille, The Accursed Share. 13. Kolm et al, Handbook of the Economics of Giving; Bruni et al., Handbook on the Economics of Reciprocity.

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21 – 26

14. Schrift (ed.): The Logic of the Gift; Osteen (ed.), The Question of the Gift; Marcel He´naff, The Price of Truth: Gift, Money and Philosophy (Stanford, CA, 2010); Pyyhtinen, The gift and its paradoxes. 15. Caille, ‘Anti-utilitarianism, economics and the gift-paradigm’. 16. Chris Gregory, Gifts and Commodities (London, 1982), p. 20. 17. Ibid., pp. 100– 101. 18. Mauss, The Gift, p. 82; Gregory, Gifts and Commodities, p. 19. 19. Caille, ‘Anti-utilitarianism’. 20. Annalisa Furia, The Foreign Aid Regime. Gift-Giving, States and Global Dis/Order (London, 2015), pp. 11 –21. 21. Thomas D. Birch, ‘An analysis of Adam Smith’s Theory on Charity and the Problems of the Poor’, Eastern Economic Journal 24/1 (1998), pp. 25 – 41. 22. In the context of foreign aid the identification and separation of donor interests from recipient interests (by almost all actors, beneficiaries involved) make the contemporary gift ‘a buying act’ (ie. currency) or a ‘sacrifice’ (a sort of loss, cost incurred, a price to be paid) – as will be shown in later chapters. 23. Caille, ‘Anti-utilitarianism’. 24. Furia, The Foreign Aid Regime. 25. Derrida, The Given Time; Pyyhtinen, The gift and its paradoxes; He´naff, The Price of Truth. 26. Kolm et al., Handbook of the Economics of Giving, p. 25. 27. There are various forms of gift-giving – as opposed to market exchange transactions – motivated either by altruism, self-interest or their various combinations from individual perspectives. See Serge-Christophe Kolm and Jean Mercier Ythier (eds), Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity (Amsterdam, 2006); Luigi Bruni et al. (eds), Handbook on the Economics of Reciprocity and Social Enterprise (Amsterdam, 2013). 28. Kolm et al., Handbook of the Economics of Giving. 29. Joel Waldfogel, ‘The deadweight loss of Christmas’, American Economic Review 83/5 (1993), pp. 1328– 1333; Joel Waldfogel, Scroogenomics: Why You Shouldn’t Buy Presents for the Holidays (Princeton, 2009). 30. Michael Sandel, What money can’t buy? The moral limits of markets (New York, 2011). 31. Adam Graycara and David Jancsics, ‘Gift-giving and corruption’, International Journal of Public Administration 2016 (published online). 32. Joel Waldfogel, ‘Gifts, cash, and stigma’, Economic Inquiry 40/3 (2002), pp. 415 –427. 33. For further categorization see for example, Kolm and Ythier (eds), Handbook of the Economics of Giving. 34. Marcel He´naff, ‘I/You: Reciprocity, Gift-Giving and the Third Party’, META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 2/1 (2010), pp. 57 – 83: 65. 35. Sandel, What money can’t buy?. 36. Ibid., p. 107.

NOTES TO PAGES 26 –28

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37. On the relation between exchange and the parasite see Michel Serres (The Parasite, Baltimore, 1982, p80) saying that ‘the relation of exchange is always dangerous, why the gift is always a forfeit, and why the relation can attain catastrophic levels. It always takes place in a mine field.’ The exchanged things travel in a channel that is already parasited. The balance of exchange is always weighed and measured, calculated, taking into account a relation without exchange, an abusive relation. The term abusive is a term of usage.’ 38. Mauss, The Gift. 39. Bardsley et al., ‘Human Nature and Sociality in Economics’, pp. 732– 766. 40. Afke E. Komter, Social Solidarity and the Gift (Cambridge, 2005). 41. Steinar Stjernø, ‘The idea of solidarity’, European Journal of Social Law 3/n (2011), pp. 156– 176. 42. Francis G. Castles et al., The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State (Oxford, 2012); Stephanie Bo¨rner, Belonging, Solidarity and Expansion in Social Policy (New York, 2013); Vincent Jeffries, The Palgrave Handbook of Altruism, Morality, and Social Solidarity (London, 2014). 43. Peter Kropotkin, Mutual Aid. A factor of evolution (New York, 1902/1972). 44. Sally J. Scholz, Political Solidarity (Pennsylvania, 2008). 45. Lawrence R. Wheeless, ‘Self-disclosure and interpersonal solidarity: Measurement, validation, and relationships’, Human Communication Research 3 (1976), pp. 47–61; Michael Hechter, Principles of group solidarity (Los Angeles, 1988). 46. Nicholas Barr, ‘Economic Theory and the Welfare State’, Journal of Economic Literature 30 (1992), pp. 741– 803. 47. Komter, Social Solidarity and the Gift, p. 201. 48. Schrift (ed.): The Logic of the Gift; He´naff, The Price of Truth; He´naff, ‘I/You: Reciprocity’. 49. Marion Ellison (ed.) Reinventing Social Solidarity Across Europe (London, 2012); Lawrence Wilde, Global Solidarity (Edinburgh University Press, 2013); Janusz Salamon (ed.) Solidarity Beyond Borders: Ethics in a Globalising World (Bloomsbury, 2015).

Chapter 2

The Contemporary Gift

1. Georg Simmel, ‘The Poor,’ Social Problems 13/2 (1965), pp. 118– 140. 2. Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share (New York, 1988); Jacques Derrida, The Given Time (Chicago, 1992). 3. Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Oxford, 1990); Tomohisa Hattori, ‘Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid’, Review of International Political Economy 8/4 (2001), pp. 633– 660. 4. Deaton, Angus, The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality (Princeton, 2013). 5. If Rex Brynen argued in his Very political economy that foreign aid could not aim to ‘buy peace’ in Palestine, Anne M. Zimmermann emphasized the opposite claiming that the essence of US aid to Israel, Jordan and Egypt has been

222

6. 7. 8. 9.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16.

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buying stability, but its success depended on how the political survival strategies of incumbent leaders in Egypt, Israel, and Jordan shaped not only the type of aid that these countries received from the US, but also the broader developmental and geopolitical impact of aid. Anne Mariel Zimmermann, US Assistance, Development, and Hierarchy in the Middle East. Aid for Allies (New York, 2017). Carapico, Political Aid; Jonathan Benthall and Je´roˆme Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent. Politics of Aid in the Muslim World (London: I.B.Tauris, 2009). Douglas in Mauss, The Gift. Salamon (ed.), Solidarity Beyond Borders; Wilde, Global Solidarity. The activity is usually measured by development aid, a category known in international financial statistics as official development assistance (ODA). Although humanitarian assistance is intended to be impartial and neutral officially, it is part of the ODA statistically. They both aim to better the human condition on the recipient side, at least, at the level of official objectives. Humanitarian aid is always a grant unreciprocated in financial terms and provided in case of natural disasters or man-made conflicts, for example, war. The concessional loan or grant element of ODA is pretty much context dependent (any transfer with at least a 25 per cent grant element – the rest is concessional loan – qualifies to be ODA). For the sake of simplicity, the term ‘foreign aid’ and ‘foreign grants’ will cover both categories throughout the text – alongside private charity and military assitance – as they are discussed within the same framework. Rist, The History of Development; Escobar, Encountering Development; Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars; Kapoor, The Postcolonial Politics; Mosse, Cultivating Development. Stokke, ‘Aid and Political Conditionality’, p. 3. Ibid. Ibid. Lancaster, Foreign Aid. Hans Morgenthau, ‘Preface to a Political Theory of Foreign Aid’, in Robert H. Goldwin (ed.), Why Foreign Aid? (Chicago: 1963), pp. 70 – 89; Alfred Maizels and Machiko K. Nissanke, ‘Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries,’ World Development 12/9 (1984), pp. 879–900; David Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International Politics 1948– 1989 (Princeton, 1993), pp. 30 – 72; Ian M. D. Little and Juilet M. Clifford, International Aid. The flow of public resources from rich to poor countries (Chicago, 1966), pp. 78 –92; John DegnbolMartinussen and Paul Engberg-Pedersen, Aid: Understanding International Development Cooperation (London, 2003); Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid. Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics (Chicago, 2007). Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, 1990); Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty. Economic Possibilities for Our Time (New York, 2005); William Easterly, The Elusive Quest for Growth:

NOTES

17.

18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28.

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Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics (Cambridge, 2001); William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden. Why West’ efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good (New York, 2006); Nilima Gulrajani, ‘Transcending the Great Foreign Aid Debate: Managerialism, radicalism and the search for aid effectiveness’, Third World Quarterly 32/3 (2011), pp. 199– 216; Nancy Qian, ‘Making Progress on Foreign Aid’, Annual Review of Economics 2014/3. Submitted: 1 – 50; Channing Arndt, Sam Jones and Finn Tarp, ‘Aid, Growth, and Development’, UNU-Wider Working Paper 96 (2010). Arndt et al. ‘Aid, Growth’; Easterly, The White Man’s Burden; Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is Another Way for Africa (New York: Penguin, 2010); Angus Deaton, The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality (Princeton, 2013); Qian, ‘Making Progress’. Lancaster, Foreign Aid; Degnbol-Martinussen et al., Aid. The history of aid is critically discussed within the framework of gift-exchange theories by Annalisa Furia, The Foreign Aid Regime, pp. 37 – 81. Tomohisa Hattori, ‘The moral politics of foreign aid’, Review of International Studies 29/2 (2003), p. 234. In a somewhat ironic manner this thought does not stem from a postdevelopment aid critique, but from Peter Bauer, one of the most known neoliberal scholars. But at least it highlights that idea of neoliberalism and development are not identical, even if the development economics has a neoliberal branch. The original quote is cited in Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe (eds), The Road from Mont Pe`lerin. The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective (London, 2009), p. 363. Based on Steven W. Hook, National Interest and Foreign Aid (London, 1995), p. 35. and Lancaster, Foreign Aid. George Liska, The New Statecraft (Chicago, 1960), p. 14; others: Morgenthau, ‘Preface to a Political Theory’; Steven W. Hook, National Interest and Foreign Aid (London, 1995). Teresa Hayter, Aid as Imperialism (Oxford, 1971). David A. Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy: A Documentary Analysis (New York, 1966); Hollis B. Chenery, and Alan M. Strout, ‘Foreign Assistance and Economic Development’, American Economic Review 56/4 (1966), pp. 679– 733; R. C Riddell, ‘The Moral Case for Post-Cold War Development Aid’, International Journal 51/2 (1996): 191– 210. Lancaster, Foreign Aid, p. 4. Lumsdaine, Moral Vision, p. 3. Let them eat cake . . . whether it was said this way by Marie Antoinette, or not, donors are often perceived to be ignorant or indifferent to the real conditions and daily lives of ordinary people. Lawrence Wilde, Global Solidarity (Edinburgh University Press, 2013); Janus Salamon (ed.), Solidarity Beyond Borders: Ethics in a Globalising World (London, 2015).

224

NOTES TO PAGES 33 – 35

29. Donors and recipients, state and non-state actors, international organizations included, discussed the concept and principles of ‘aid effectiveness’ at various conferences (Rome 2003, Paris 2005, Accra 2008, Busan 2011); the current Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) was created at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011. 30. James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis, 1990); Kapoor, The Postcolonial Politics; David Mosse, Cultivating Development (London: Pluto Press, 2005); Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith (London: Zed, 2003/2014); Aram Ziai, “‘Development’: Projects, Power, and a Poststructuralist Perspectives,” Alternatives 34 (2009): 183– 201; Molly Kane ‘International NGOs and the Aid Industry: constraints on international solidarity’, Third World Quarterly 34/ 8 (2013), pp. 1505– 1515. 31. Hayter, Aid as Imperialism; Rist, The History of Development; Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development (Princeton, 2004/2011); Kapoor, The Postcolonial Politics., others. 32. Hattori ‘A Critical Naturalist Approach to Power’. 33. Keith David Watenpaugh, Bread from Stones. The Middle East and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism (Oakland, 2015); Lilie Chouliaraki, The Ironic Spectator. Solidarity in the Age of Post-Humanitarianism (London: Cambridge, 2013). 34. Rist, The History of Development; Escobar, Encountering Development; Duffield, Global Governance; Mosse, Cultivating Development; Kapoor, The Postcolonial Politics. 35. Hattori, ‘The moral politics of foreign aid’, p. 246. 36. Eyben, ‘The power of the gift and the new aid modalities’. 37. Furia, The foreign aid regime, p. 111. 38. Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine; Mosse, Cultivating Development; Eyben (ed.), Relationships for Aid. 39. Anne-Meike Fechter, The Personal and the Professional in Aid Work ( London, 2014). 40. Mary B. Anderson et al., Time to Listen. Hearing People on the Receiving End of International Aid (Cambridge (MA), 2012); in the context of humanitarian assistance the World Humanitarian Summit (2014) was preceded with extensive consultations, see Key Documents: https://www.worldhumanitariansummit.org/key-documents. 41. Serene H. Razack, ‘Stealing the Pain of Others: Reflections on Canadian Humanitarian Responses,’ Review of Education, Pedagogy and Cultural Studies 29/4 (2007), pp. 375– 94. 42. Khan F. R., Westwood R., and Boje D. M., ‘“I feel like a foreign agent”: NGOs and corporate social responsibility interventions into Third World child labor’, Human Relations 63/9 (2011), pp. 1417 –1438. 43. Contu, Alessina and E. Girei, ‘NGOs management and the value of “partnerships” for equality in international development: What’s in a name?’, Human Relations 67/2 (2014), pp. 205– 232.

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44. Nader Said, ‘Palestinian perceptions of international assistance’, in Michael Keating et al. (eds), Aid, diplomacy and facts on the ground (London, 2005), pp. 99 –107; Bea´ta Paragi, ‘The Spiritual Essence: Palestinian Perceptions on Foreign Aid, Conditionality and Reciprocity’, International Political Anthropology 5/1 (2012), pp. 3 – 28; Bea´ta Paragi, ‘First impressions and perceived roles. Palestinian perceptions on foreign aid’, Society and Economy 35/3 (2012), pp. 389– 410; Jeremy Wildeman and Alaa Tartir, ‘Unwilling to Change, Determined to Fail: Donor Aid in Occupied Palestine in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings’, Mediterranean Politics 19/3 (2014), pp. 431– 449; Joanna E. Springer, ‘Assessing Donor-driven Reforms in the Palestinian Authority: Building the State or Sustaining Status Quo?’ Journal of Peacebuilding and Development 10/2 (2015), pp. 1 – 19. 45. Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian et al., ‘Funding Pain: Bedouin Women and Political Economy in the Naqab/Negev’, Feminist Economics 20/4 (2014), pp. 164 –186. 46. Chouliaraki, The Ironic Spectator. 47. Khan et al., ‘“I feel like a foreign agent”; Benedict Korf, ‘Antinomies of generosity: Moral geographies and post-tsunami aid in Southeast Asia’, Geoforum 38/2 (2007), pp. 366– 378; Ivarsson Holgersson, C. The Give and Take of Disaster Aid. Social and Moral Transformation in the Wake of the Tsunami in Sri Lanka. PhD-thesis (University of Gothenburg, 2013); Beata Paragi ‘Contemporary gifts. Solidarity, compassion, equality, sacrifice and reciprocity from the perspective of NGOs’, Current Anthropology 58/3 (2017), pp. 317– 339; Contu et al., ‘NGOs management and the value of “partnerships”’. On the painful fund-raising experiences of Bedouin women living in Israel see Shalhoub-Kevorkian et al., ‘Funding Pain’. 48. James, C. Scott, Seeing like a State (New Haven, 1990), p. 313. 49. Interview with the leader of a Palestinian development NGO (Hebron, 28 July 2015). 50. Sam Jones and Finn Tarp ‘Does foreign aid harm political institutions?’, Journal of Development Economics 118 (2016). 51. Olav Stokke (ed.), Aid and Political Conditionality (London, 1995), pp. 1 – 87; Georg Sørensen (ed.), Political Conditionality (London, 1993); Sørensen, Georg, ‘Conditionality, Democracy and Development’, in Olav Stokke (ed.), Aid and Political Conditionality (London, 1995), pp. 392–409; Boyce, Investing in Peace. 52. Mosse, Cultivating Development; Easterly, The White Man’s Burden; Rist, The History of Development; Kapoor, The Postcolonial Politics; Moyo, Dead Aid; Deaton, The Great Escape. 53. Deaton, The Great Escape, p. 302. 54. Carapico, Political Aid. 55. Kapoor, The Postcolonial Politics, p. xv. 56. Furia, The Foreign Aid Regime, p. 112. 57. Druckman, ‘Social Exchange Theory’, p. 257. 58. Interview with a director of a Palestinian NGO (Ramallah, 1 September 2015).

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59. Hans Morgenthau, ‘A political theory of foreign aid’, American Political Science Review 52/2 (1962), p. 301; Morgenthau, ‘Preface to a Political Theory’. 60. William H. Mott, Military Assistance: An Operational Perspective (Westport, 1999). 61. Pyyhtinen, The gift and its paradoxes. 62. Mauss, The Gift, p. 53. 63. Mauss, The Gift, p. 5. 64. Mauss, The Gift, p. 76. 65. Tomohisa Hattori, ‘Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid’, Review of International Political Economy 8/4 (2001), pp. 633– 660; Natalie Karagiannis, Avoiding Responsibility. The Politics and Discourse of European Development (London, 2004); Tomohisa Hattori ‘A Critical Naturalist Approach to Power and Hegemony, Analyzing Giving Practices’, in Mark Haugaard and H. H. Lentner (eds), Hegemony and Power. Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics. (Oxford, UK, 2006); Ilan Kapoor, The Postcolonial Politics of Development (London, 2008); Emma Mawdsley, ‘The changing geographies of foreign aid and development cooperation. Contributions from gift theory’, Transactions 37/2 (2012), pp. 256– 272; Furia, The Foreign Aid Regime; Beata Paragi, ‘Foreign Aid and the Arab Spring,’ in Imad El-Anis and Natasha Underhill (eds) Regional integration and national disintegration in the post-Arab Spring Middle East (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2016), pp. 72 – 97; Beata Paragi, ‘Contemporary gifts’. 66. Rosalind Eyben, ‘The power of the gift and the new aid modalities’, IDS Bulletin 37/6 (2006), pp. 88 – 98; Rosalind Eyben (ed.) Relationships for Aid (London, 2006). 67. Caille, ‘Anti-utilitarianism, economics and the gift-paradigm’. 68. Ibid; Hattori ‘A Critical Naturalist Approach’, p. 158. 69. Hattori, ‘Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid’, pp. 635– 636. 70. Heiko Henkel and R. L. Stirrat, ‘The Development Gift: The Problem of Reciprocity in the NGO World’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 55/4 (1997), pp. 66 – 80. 71. Hattori, ‘Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid’, p. 637. 72. Ibid., p. 639. 73. Peter Kropotkin, Mutual Aid. A factor of evolution (New York, 1902/1972); Sahlins, Stone Age Economics; Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York, 1984/2006); Alan P. Fiske, Structures of Social Life: The Four Elementary Forms of Human Relations (New York, 1991). 74. Steven Feierman, ‘Reciprocity and assistance in precolonial Africa,’ in W.F. Ilchman et al. (eds) Philanthropy in the world’s tradition (Bloomington, 1998), pp. 3 – 24, p. 4. 75. Ibid., p. 4. 76. Birch, ‘An analysis of Adam Smith’s Theory on Charity’, p. 31. 77. The comparison is built on two works, Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, pp. 186– 187 and Headley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics (New York, 1977). There are, of course, other IR schools focussing on other

NOTES

78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91.

92.

93. 94.

95.

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elements and features of the state system and emphasizing shared international norms, the existence of international institutions, even the importance of global governance, but if sovereignty over a territory and population can be measured by the capacity to issue passports, the state remains the highest sovereign. Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions (Leicester, 1991). Marcel He´naff, The Price of Truth: Gift, Money and Philosophy (Stanford, CA, 2010); Afke E. Komter, Social Solidarity and the Gift (Cambridge, 2005); Olli Pyyhtinen, The gift and its paradoxes. Beyond Mauss ( Farnham, Surrey, 2014). Karagiannis 2004: 105. Sørensen, Georg, ‘Conditionality, Democracy and Development’, in O. Stokke (ed.), Aid and Political Conditionality (London, 1995), p. 394. Mauss, The Gift, p. 5. Headley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics (London, 1995). Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen (eds), Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches (Oxford, 2016), pp. 129– 156. Lancaster, Foreign Aid. Diplomacy. Lilie Chouliaraki, The Ironic Spectator. Solidarity in the Age of Post-Humanitarianism (London, 2013). Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin, 1963/1990); David Konstan, Pity Transformed (London, 2001). Chouliaraki, The Ironic Spectator. Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War; Chouliaraki, The Ironic Spectator; Furia, The Foreign Aid Regime. Anheier, Nonprofit Organizations. Fechter, The personal and the professional; Meytal Nasie et al., ‘Activists in Israeli Radical Peace Organizations: Their Personal Stories About Joining and Taking Part in These Organizations’, Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 20/3 (2014), pp. 313– 329. Uphoff, ‘Grassroots Organizations’; Anheier, Nonprofit Organizations; Tvedt, Angels of Mercy; Brian H. Smith, More than Altruism. The politics of private foreign aid (Princeton, NJ, 1990); Martens et al., The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid; Yaziji and Doh, NGOs and Corporations; Duffield, Mark, Global Governance. Henkel and Stirrat, ‘The Development Gift: The Problem of Reciprocity in the NGO World’, p. 76. According to Linz and Stephan (1996, 17) civil society refers to ‘that arena of the polity where self-organizing and relatively autonomous groups, movements and individuals attempt to articulate values, to create associations and solidarities, and to advance their interests. Cited by Daniela Irrera, NGOs, Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution (Cheltenham, UK, 2013), p. 9. On the meaning of this concept see, Piki-Ish Shalom, ‘Conceptualizing Democratization and Democratizing Conceptualization: A Virtuous Circle’ in

228

96.

97.

98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104.

105. 106.

107. 108. 109. 110.

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Christopher Hobson and Milja Kurki (eds), The Conceptual Politics of Democracy Promotion (New York, 2011), pp. 38 – 52. Terje Tvedt, Angels of Mercy or Development Diplomats? NGOs and Foreign Aid (London, 1998); Michael Yaziji and Jonathan Doh, NGOs and Corporations: Conflict and Collaboration (Cambridge, 2009); Anheier, Nonprofit Organizations. Habermas, Ju¨rgen, Faktizitat und Geltung; Between facts and norms (Cambridge, US, 1992/1996), p. 443; Norman Uphoff, ‘Grassroots Organizations and NGOs in Rural Development’, World Development 21/4 (1993), pp. 607– 622; Irrera, NGOs, Crisis Management; Anheier, Nonprofit Organizations. Gramsci, Antonio, Prison Notebooks (New York, 1992). Tvedt, Angels of Mercy; Irrera, NGOs, Crisis Management; Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War. Governing the World of Peoples (London, 2007). Zimmermann, Anne Mariel, ‘State as Chimera: Aid, Parallel Institutions, and State Power’, Comparative Politics 45/3 (2013), pp. 335– 356. Khan et al., ‘“I feel like a foreign agent”; Anderson et al., Time to Listen; Fechter, The personal and the professional in aid work; Contu and Girei, ‘NGOs management’. Martens et al., The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid. Douglas North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change (Princeton, 2005); Maurice Bloch, Anthropology and the Cognitive Challenge (Cambridge, 2012); Scott, Seeing like a State. Julian Lee, NGO Accountability: Rights and Responsibilities (Geneva, 2004); Lisa Jordan and Peter van Tujil (eds), NGO Accountability. Politics, Principles and Innovations (London, 2006); Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War; Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars, The Merging of Development and Security (London, 2001). Martens et al., The Institutional Economics, p. 176. The so-called micro-macro problem concerns capacities ‘to explain the relationship between the constitutive elements of social systems (people) and emergent phenomena resulting from their interaction (i.e. organizations, societies, economies)’, see Goldspink, Chris and Robert Kay, ‘Bridging the Micro – Macro Divide: A New Basis for Social Science’, Human Relations 57/5 (2004), p. 598. Paul Mosley, Overseas Aid: Its Defense and Reform (New York, 1987); Arndt et al. ‘Aid, Growth’. This frustration could also be sensed during the interviews conducted by the author of this book. Ibid., p. 21. MERIP 214, Critiquing NGOs. Special Issue. Vol 30 (2000); Sheila Carapico, Political Aid and Arab Activism. Democracy Promotion, Justice and Representation (New York, 2014), pp. 153– 57; Zimmermann, ‘State as Chimera’; Amaney A Jamal, Barriers to Democracy.

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111. Mott, Military Assistance. 112. Lancaster, Foreign Aid, p. 9. 113. Institutions can be defined as ‘rules endowed with an enforcement mechanism’; while formal institutions (constitutions, laws, regulations) rest on the state’s enforcement power, informal institutions (social norms or customs) are enforced by private actors, see Bertin Martens, Uwe Mummert, Peter Murrell and Paul Seabright, The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid (Cambridge, 2002), p. 112. For more on the role of the institutions see North, Institutions; B., U. Martens, P. Mummert, P. Murrell and P. Seabright The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Mary M. Shirley, Institutions and Development (Cheltenham, UK, 2008). 114. Neil Narang, ‘Assisting Uncertainty: How humanitarian aid can inadvertently prolong civil war’, International Studies Quartely 59/1 (2015), pp. 184– 195; Reed M. Wood and Christopher Sullivan, ‘Doing Harm by Doing Good? The Negative Externalities of Humanitarian Aid Provision during Civil Conflict’, The Journal of Politics 77/3 (2015), pp. 736– 748. 115. The literature on philanthropy, its religious roots and contemporary forms is too big to summarize here. With reference to institutionalized foreign aid, see for example Michael Walzer, ‘On Humanitarianism: Is Helping Others Charity, or Duty, or Both?’ Foreign Affairs 90/4 (2011), pp. 69 –72, 73 – 76, 77 – 80. 116. Michael Pugh, ‘Like it or not, humanitarians are political,’ Humanitarian Affairs (Winter 2002), pp. 5 – 7, cited by Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent, p. 6. Wiepking, P., F. Handy (eds.): The Palgrave Handbook of Global Philanthropy. London (Palgrave-MacMIllan), 2015. 117. Lori Allen, The Rise and Fall of Human Rights: Cynicism and Politics in Occupied Palestine (Stanford, 2013). 118. Henkel and Stirrat, ‘The Development Gift’; Hattori, ‘Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid’; Karagiannis, Avoiding Responsibility; Hattori ‘A Critical Naturalist Approach’; Eyben, Relationships for Aid; Kapoor, The Postcolonial Politics; Kelly C. Da Silva, ‘Aid as gift, an initial approach’, Mana, Estodos de Antropologica Social 14/1 (2008), pp. 141– 171; Robert Kowalski, ‘The Gift. Marcel Mauss and international aid’, Journal of Comparative Social Welfare 27/3 (2011), pp. 189– 203; Mawdsley, ‘The changing geographies of foreign aid; Paragi, ‘Contemporary gifts; Furia, The Foreign Aid Regime; Bea´ta Paragi, ‘Foreign Aid and the Arab Spring,’ in Imad El-Anis and Natasha Underhill (eds) Regional integration and national disintegration in the post-Arab Spring Middle East (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2016), pp. 72 – 97. 119. Marcel Mauss, The Gift, Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies (London, 1925/2002); Helmut Anheier, Nonprofit Organizations: Theory, Management, Policy (New York, 2014), p. 229. 120. Mauss, The Gift, p. 76. 121. Furia, The Foreign Aid Regime, pp. 47 – 62. 122. Alain Caille, Anti-utilitarianism, economics and the gift-paradigm.

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123. Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money (London, 1908/2004), p. 95. For a comparison between Mauss and Simmel see: Christian Papilloud, ‘Three conditions of human relations: Marcel Mauss and Georg Simmel’, Philosophy and Social Criticism 30/4 (2004), pp. 431– 444. 124. Derrida, The Given Time; Simmel, Soziologie, 1908 (1992), p 663n. 125. Gouldner, ‘The Norm of Reciprocity’, p. 171 cited by Martin S. Greenberg, ‘A Theory of Indebtedness’, in Kenneth J. Gergen (ed.), Social Exchange (New York, 1980), p. 4. 126. Baldwin, ‘Exchange Theory and’, pp. 141, 142. 127. Simmel, ‘The Poor,’ p. 138. 128. Bea´ta Paragi, ‘Contemporary gifts. Solidarity, compassion, equality, sacrifice and reciprocity from the perspective of NGOs’, Current Anthropology 58(3), pp. 317 –339. 129. Anderson, Time to Listen, p. 12. 130. Pyyhtinen, The gift and its paradoxes, pp. 12, 67. 131. Mauss, The Gift; Komter, Social Solidarity and the Gift, p. 47. 132. Power and its dynamics can be discussed via various disciplinary lenses from political science through philosophy to sociology and anthropology. In the field of international relations (foreign aid falls under its realm as long as it is part of the official relations between states and international organizations) the realist school argues for the central importance of power (guiding states’ actions), while the liberal (idealist) authors rather see it via the lenses of ideas and values. For Marx(ist social scientists), it should be framed in economicmaterial terms related to classes within the society; for Weber and his followers power is closely linked to the political concepts of legitimacy and authority. Foucault and his followers understood it as ‘power is everywhere’ embodied in knowledge, truth, everything which is created/produced by humans. Anthropologists describe power by exploring habits and rituals governing social relations, see for example, Mauss’ essay on the relations established by gift in archaic societies. In similar vein, the anthropology of development is concerned with the contemporary power rituals, such as the role played by NGOs, monitoring and reporting processes, etc, see Ferguson, The AntiPolitics Machine; Mosse, Cultivating Development. 133. Baldwin, ‘Exchange Theory and’. 134. Elizabeth Janeway, ‘On the power of the weak’, Signs 1/1 (1975), p. 105. 135. James C. Scott: Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of resistance (New Haven and London, 1985). 136. Both cited by Baldwin, ‘Exchange Theory and’, p. 142. 137. Mauss, The Gift, p. 3. 138. Ibid., pp. 16 – 17; 50 – 55. 139. Hattori ‘A Critical Naturalist Approach’, p. 157. 140. Baldwin quoted by Hattori ‘A Critical Naturalist Approach’; p. 157. 141. Lilie Choulariaki talks about a narcissistic solidarity. 142. Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, p. 169.

NOTES 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155.

156. 157. 158. 159. 160.

161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166.

167. 168. 169.

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See Chapter 1. Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, p. 80. and p. 95. Aafke E. Komter (ed.), The Gift: An Interdisciplinary Perspective (Amsterdam, 1996). Gouldner, ‘The Norm of Reciprocity’, pp. 161, 170. Polanyi, The Great Transformation; Gouldner, ‘The Norm of Reciprocity’; Sahlins, Stone Age Economics. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, p. 126. David Graber, Debt. The first 5000 years (New York, 2011). He´naff, The Price of Truth, p. 207. Greenberg, ‘A Theory of Indebtedness’, p. 4. Ibid., pp. 5 – 11. Ibid., pp. 11 – 21. Gouldner, ‘The Norm of Reciprocity’, p. 172. Ernst Fehr and Simon Ga¨chter, ‘Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (2000), pp. 159– 81; Ernst Fehr and Simon Ga¨chter ‘Altruistic punishment in humans’, Nature 415 (2002), 137– 40. Gouldner, ‘The Norm of Reciprocity’. Mauss, The Gift, p. 76. Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, p. 189. Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, p. 170. Robert Keohane, ‘Reciprocity in International Relations’, International Organization 40/1 (1996), pp. 1–27; David A. Baldwin, ‘Exchange Theory and International Relations’, International Negotiation 1998/3, pp. 139–149; Daniel Druckman, ‘Social Exchange Theory, Premises and Prospects’, International Negotiation 1998/3, 253–266; Russel J. Leng, ‘Reciprocity in Recurring Crises’, International Negotiation 1998/3, pp. 197–226; Chae-Han Kim, ‘Reciprocity in Asymmetry: When Does Reciprocity Work?’ International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations 31/1 (2005), pp. 1–14. Keohane, ‘Reciprocity in International Relations’, p. 3. Baldwin, ‘Exchange Theory and’, p. 140. Keohane, ‘Reciprocity in International Relations’, p. 4. Ibid., p. 1. Keohane, ‘Reciprocity in International Relations’, p. 6. The US military/security industry benefits extensively from the Israeli technology. Israeli contributions to US national interests is an old story and includes enhanced counter-terrorism, intelligence and technology useful in urban warfare. See for example, Robert D. Blackwill and Walter B. Slocomb, ‘Israel: A true ally in the Middle East’, Los Angeles Times, October 31, 2011. Keohane, ‘Reciprocity in International Relations’, p. 4. Specific reciprocity (even in IR) has more to do with market exchange (the realm of economics, not being the subject of this paper). Homans, Social Behavior. Its Elementary Forms (London, 1961), pp. 83 – 111, 283– 314, cited by Hattori, ‘A Critical Naturalist Approach’, p. 155.

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170. Mauss, The Gift, pp. 162– 163. 171. Claude Le´vi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship (Boston, 1969), p. 67. 172. Described first by George Bateson ‘double bind’ refers to situations in which ‘two or more persons, one of whom can be designated as the “victim” are involved and the “victim” – the person who becomes psychotically unwell – finds him or herself in a communicational matrix, in which messages contradict each other and the contradiction is not able to be communicated on and the unwell person is not able to leave the field of interaction’, see Paul Gibney, ‘The Double Bind Theory: Still Crazy-Making After All These Years’, Psychotherapy in Australia 12/3 (2006), pp. 48 – 55. 173. He´naff, ‘I/You: Reciprocity’, p. 70. 174. Quoting Le´vi-Strauss (The Elementary Structures of Kinship, p. 552) ‘the wife who goes to the other group is “the gift par excellence” and illuminates the prohibition of incest, which is above all a positive imperative of reciprocity . . . ‘ cited by He´naff, ‘I/You: Reciprocity’, p. 70. In Levi-Strauss’s world human life consisted of three spheres: language (exchange of words), kinship (exchange of women), and economics (exchange of things), which were connected by the fundamental law of reciprocity. 175. Mauss, The Gift; Komter, Social Solidarity and the Gift, p. 200. 176. Pyyhtinen, The gift and its paradoxes, p. 63. 177. Cited by Sahlins, The Stone Age Economics, p. 175. 178. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Vol. 1 (London, 1918). 179. Charter of the United Nations, available at http://www.un.org/en/sections/uncharter/chapter-i/index.html (accessed 12 January 2017). 180. Mauss, The Gift. Following Serres (The Natural Contract, 1995, p. 83.) Pyyhtinen warns that that ‘violence’ and ‘war’ are not identical concepts, war is being a more sophisticated ‘innovation’ compared to primitive or unregulated violence. Recalling M. Serres’ argument war and exchange stand on the same side as opposed to uncontrolled and irrational violence. It is also true that in our post-Cold War (‘democratic peace’) era, the meaning of war has changed a lot, now being much closer to the concept of violence than before. According to the modern humanitarian law all forms of violence and war are unacceptable. 181. Cited by Allan Stoekl, ‘Bataille, Gift-Giving and the Cold War’ in Alan D. Schrift (ed.), The Logic of the Gift: Toward an Ethic of Generosity (New York, 1997), p. 250; Di Benjamin Noys, Georges Bataille: A Critical Introduction (New York, 2000). 182. Annalisa Furia, The Foreign Aid Regime. Gift-Giving, States and Global Dis/Order (London, 2015), p. 42. 183. Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars; p. 9. 184. David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, 1985); Hattori, ‘Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid’; Kapoor, The Postcolonial Politics; Furia, The Foreign Aid Regime. 185. Scott, Seeing like a State.

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186. Antonio Gramsci (Selections from the Prison Notebooks (1971), p. 260) cited by Mark Haugaard, ‘Conceptual Confrontation’, in Mark Haugaard and H. H. Lentner (eds), Hegemony and Power. Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics (Oxford UK, 2006), p. 6. 187. Ziai, ‘“Development”: Projects, Power, and a Poststructuralist Perspective’. 188. Antonio Gramsci (Selections from the Prison Notebooks (1971), p. 260) cited by Haugaard, ‘Conceptual Confrontation’, p. 6. 189. Scott, Seeing like a State, p. 91. 190. Easterly, The White Man’s Burden. 191. War and violence is not identical in legal or philosophical terms, ‘regulated’ war is rather a solution to the problem of ‘unregulated’, primitive violence, see Michel Serres, The Natural Contract (Ann Arbor, 1995). 192. Mauss, The Gift; Komter, Social Solidarity and the Gift, p. 200. 193. Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War. 194. Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, pp. 149– 160. 195. Mauss, The Gift, pp. 15, 16. 196. Jacques T. Godbout and Alain Caille, The World of the Gift (Montreal, 1998). 197. Mauss, The Gift, p. 16. 198. Martens et al., The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid; Shirley, Institutions and Development. 199. Karagiannis, Avoiding Responsibility, pp. 112– 113. 200. Institutions can be defined as ‘rules endowed with an enforcement mechanism’; while formal institutions (constitutions, laws, regulations) rest on the state’s enforcement power, informal institutions (social norms or customs) are enforced by private actors, see Uwe Mummert, ‘Embedding externally induced institutional reforms’ in B. Martens et al., The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid (Cambridge: 2002), p. 112. The challenge is to understand how formal institutions work when they are staffed with private actors that do not distinguish the private sphere from the public by extensively using social norms and customs in office (hours) (for the social context of corruption, see WDR, Mind, Society, Behaviour, World Development Report 2015, p. 60.). The ‘do not’ is better understood as ‘cannot’ inasmuch as ‘cultural models’ guiding behaviour are not necessarily conscious productions of the brain/mind, see Bloch, Anthropology and the Cognitive Challenge, p. 172; WDR, Mind, Society, Behaviour). 201. Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine; Mosse, Cultivating Development; Easterly, The White Man’s Burden; Kapoor, The Postcolonial Politics; Deaton, The Great Escape. 202. Kolm et al., Handbook of the Economics of Giving, p. 72. 203. Overlooked by Mauss, but identified by Sahlins and Derrida, see: Pyyhtinen, The gift and its paradoxes. 204. Komter, Social Solidarity and the Gift, p. 70. 205. In economics, negative externality occurs when the cost of an action (decision) is greater (and paid by someone else, the public for example) than the cost that is paid by the customer that made the concerned decision.

234 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228.

229. 230. 231. 232.

233. 234.

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Derrida, The Given Time. Ibid., p. 24. Osteen (ed.), The Question of the Gift. Derrida 1994; Kolm et al., Handbook of the Economics of Giving; Pyyhtinen, The gift and its paradoxes. Pyyhtinen, The gift and its paradoxes, pp. 21, 22, 23. Ibid., p. 25. Ibid., p. 25. He´naff, The Price of Truth. Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, pp. 73, 77. Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, pp. 80. Pyyhtinen, The gift and its paradoxes, p. 25. He´naff, The Price of Truth. Morgenthau, ‘Preface to a Political Theory’; Lumsdaine, Moral Vision, pp. 30–72; Hook, National Interest and Foreign Aid; Little and Clifford, International Aid, pp. 78–92; Degnbol-Martinussen et al., Aid, pp. 7–25. Paragi, ‘Contemporary gifts’. Stokke, ‘Aid and Political Conditionality’, pp. 31 – 32. Zimmermann, ‘State as Chimera’. Stokke, ‘Aid and Political Conditionality’, pp. 31 – 32. Karagiannis, Avoiding Responsibility, p. 110. Ibid. See endnote #29, Chapter 2. Stokke (ed.), Aid and Political Conditionality; Sørensen, (ed.), Political Conditionality. Sørensen (ed.), Political Conditionality, p. 1. Formal peace agreements are usually followed by pledges for aid which are usually made in donor conferences. In many cases the signing of the accord itself is a precondition for getting aid, just as the subsequent disbursement of aid is conditional of the adherence of the concerned parties to the commitments undertaken by them upon signing the peace agreement, see James K. Boyce, Investing in Peace: Aid and Conditionality After Civil Wars. Adelphi Paper 351 (Oxford, 2002), p. 9. Ibid., p. 9. Stokke (ed.), ‘Aid and Political Conditionality’. Baldwin, ‘Exchange Theory and’, p. 145. Anderson et al., Time to Listen; Mohammad Elagati, ‘Foreign Funding in Egypt After the Revolution’, Fride Working Paper (Barcelona, 2013); Wildeman and Tartir, ‘Unwilling to Change, Determined to Fail’; Paragi, ‘The Spiritual Essence.’ Pyyhtinen, The gift and its paradoxes, pp. 15 – 38. Peter Uvin, ‘“Do as I Say, Not as I do”: the Limits of Political Conditionality’, in G. Sørensen (ed.), Political Conditionality, pp. 63 – 84 (London, 1993), p. 68.

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235. Stokke, ‘Aid and Political Conditionality’, pp. 11 – 12. 236. Kolm et al., Handbook of the Economics of Giving, p. 29. 237. Blau, Peter M. (ed.), Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York, 1964/2003), p. 6. 238. Gouldner, ‘The Norm of Reciprocity’, p. 171.

Chapter 3 Traditional, Religious and Contemporary Gifts in the Middle East 1. Nora Murad, ‘Donor Complicity in Israel’s Violations of Palestinian Rights’, Al Shabaka Policy Brief, 2014 and Nora Murad, ‘An alternative to international aid’, blog post, March 9, 2014. Available at http://www.noralestermurad.com/. 2. Pyyhtinen, The gift and its paradoxes. 3. I use the terms colonialization and colonialism in this book, even if the territorry of the Middle East and most of North Africa was ‘only’ mandate area after World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, the British and French officials talked about and administered the concerned areas/countries as if they had been their propery by drawing stateborders, manipulating local political movements, structuring power relations and managing social order. 4. Dawn Chatty, ‘The duty to be generous (karam): Alternatives to rights-based asylum in the Middle East’ Journal of the British Academy 5: 177– 199. 5. Yusuf Kamal, The Principles of the Islamic Economic System (Cairo). 6. Ibid; Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent. 7. Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent, p. 9. 8. Ibid; Monzer Kahf, ‘Zakat: Unresolved Issues in Contemporary Fikh’, Journal of Islamic Economics 2/1 (1989), 1 – 22. 9. Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent. 10. Ibid., pp. 13, 14.; Kahf, ‘Zakat’. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid., pp. 13, 14.; Kahf, ‘Zakat’. 13. Frederick B. Bird, ‘A Comparative Study of The Work of Charity in Christianity and Judaism’, The Journal of Religious Ethics 10/1 (1982), pp. 144– 169; Heilman, Samuel, ‘Tzedakah: Ortodox Jews and Charitable Giving’, in Barry A Kosmin and Paul Ritterbrand (eds) Contemporary Jewish Philanthropy in America (Savage, Maryland, 1991), pp. 133– 51; Michael J. Broyde, ‘The Giving of Charity in Jewish Law: For What Purpose and Toward What Goal?’ In Y. Prager (ed.), Toward a Renewed Ethic of Jewish Philanthropy (New York, 2010), pp. 241– 275; Gardner, Gregg, The Origins of Organized Charity in Rabbinic Judaism (Cambridge, 2015). 14. Samuel Heilman, ‘Tzedakah: Orthodox Jews and Charitable Giving’, in Barry A Kosmin and Paul Ritterbrand (eds) Contemporary Jewish Philanthropy in America (Savage, Maryland, 1991), pp. 133– 51; Broyde, ‘The Giving of Charity in Jewish Law: For What Purpose and Toward What Goal?’

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15. Rainer Barzan, ‘The Meaning Of “Tzedakah” For Jewish Self-Organization Within A Non-Jewish Environment’, In Iggud (2005): Selected Essays in Jewish Studies, Volume 2: History of the Jewish People and Contemporary Jewish Society, pp. 7 – 17. 16. Ibid; Rachel Avraham, ‘Gift giving in Jewish Culture’, op-ed, Jerusalem Online. 17. Interview with a Palestinian businessman, Bethlehem, 6 August 2010. 18. Jacques T. Godbout and Alain Caille, The World of the Gift (Montreal, 1998). 19. Pyyhtinen, The gift and its paradoxes, p. 6. 20. Ibid., p. 6. and The Dark Side of the gifts (pp. 101– 103) and The Poor: Gift versus Right (pp. 103– 108). 21. Marie Juul Petersen, For Humanity of for the Umma? Aid and Islam in Transnational Muslim NGOs (London, 2016). For more on the contemporary challenges of Muslim philanthropy see the special issue of Alliance Magazine (September 2018, Muslim Philanthropy at Crossroads: https://www.alliance magazine.org/magazine/issue/september-2018/). 22. Interview with a Palestinian NGO leader, Bethlehem, 6 August 2010. 23. Carapico, Political Aid, p. 199. 24. Petersen, For Humanity of for the Umma?. 25. Keith David Watenpaugh, Bread from Stones. The Middle East and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism (Oakland, 2015), pp. 3 – 4. 26. Watenpaugh, Bread from Stones; Carapico, Political Aid; Jamal, Barriers to Democracy; Brynen, A very political economy, etc. 27. Watenpaugh, Bread from Stones, p. 6. 28. Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1978). 29. Malcolm Kerr ‘Edward Said and Orientalism’, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 12 (1980) pp. 544– 47. 30. William J. Burns, Economic Aid and American Policy toward Egypt, 1955–1981 (Albany, 1985); Gerd, Nonneman, Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East (London, 1988); Mohammed Rabi, The politics of foreign aid, U.S. foreign assistance and aid to Israel (London, 1988); Viktor Lavy and Eliezer Sheffer, Foreign aid and development in the Middle East (New York, 1991); Abdul-Karim Bangura, The effects of American foreign aid to Egypt, 1957–1987 (Lewiston, 1995); Alasdair, Drysdale, ‘Foreign aid to the Middle East’, in Richard Grant and Jan Nijman (eds), The Global Crisis in Foreign Aid (Syracuse, NY, 1998); Rex Brynen, A Very Political Economy. Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza (Washington, 2000); Michael Keating (ed.), Aid, Diplomacy and Facts on the Ground. The case of Palestine (London, 2000); Anne Le More, Political Guilt, Wasted Money International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo (London, 2008); Tagdishi-Rad, Sahar, The political economy of aid in Palestine, relief from conflict or development delayed? (London, 2011); Dimitris Bouris, The European Union and Occupied Palestinian Territories, State-building without a state (London, 2014); Sheila Carapico, Political Aid and Arab Activism. Democracy Promotion, Justice and Representation (New York, 2014); Anna Newby, ‘U.S. Civil Society Assistance to Egypt: Thinking Long Term’, Digest of Middle East Studies 21/2 (2012),

NOTES

31.

32. 33.

34.

35.

36. 37.

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pp. 327–352; Maha Abdel Rahman, ‘The Politics of “Uncivil” Society in Egypt’, Review of African Political Economy 29/1 (2002), pp. 21–35. Brown, International Politics and the Middle East; Brynen (ed.), Political liberalization; Niblock and Wilson (eds), The Political Economy; Tessler et al. (eds), Area studies and social science; Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, The Foreign Policies; Halliday The Middle East; Louise Fawcett (ed.), International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford, 2013). Brynen (ed.) Beyond the Arab Spring, p. 265; Burns, Economic Aid; Nonneman, Development; Lavy and Sheffer, Foreign aid and development. The best examples can be found in the documents describing the agendas, objectives and means of cooperation between the EU and Jordan (and Egypt, Palestine) respectively, such as the association agreements, (country) strategy papers, national indicative programmes, action plans (2007 – 2013), Single Support Framework for EU support to Egypt (2014 – 2015). As, for example, the association agreement between Egypt and the EU said “[t]he political dialogue shall cover all subjects of common interest, and, in particular peace, security, democracy and regional development” (article 4). Telhami, The World Through Arab Eyes. Chapter 6 (New York, 2013); Tahani Mustafa, ‘Damning the Palestinian Spring: Security Sector Reform and Entrenched Repression’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 9/2 (2015), pp. 212 –230. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to summarize the main arguments of the literature why and how MENA countries have resisted democratic changes and how the question is related to Islam; the question emerged decades ago only to become dominant after Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’, see Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics. The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven, 1977; Khair El-Din Haseeb et al., The Future of the Arab Nation: Challenges and Choices (London, 1991); Ghassan Salame´ (ed.), Democracy without democrats? The renewal of politics in the Muslim world (London, 1994); Rex Brynen (ed.), Political liberalization and democratization in the Arab world, Vol. I-II (Boulder, 1998); John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics (Syracuse, N.Y, 1998); Mark Tessler et al. (eds), Area studies and social science: strategies for understanding Middle East politics (Bloomington, 1999); Amin Saikal and Albrecht Schnabel (eds), Democratization in the Middle East. Experiences, Struggles, Challenges (New York, 2003); Larry Diamond et al., Islam and Democracy in the Middle East (Baltimore, 2003); Shireen T. Hunter and Huma Malik (eds), Modernization, Democracy and Islam (London, 2005); Francesco Cavatorta and Frederic Volpi (eds), Democratization in the Muslim World: Changing Patterns of Authority and Power (London, 2007); Abou El-Fadl: ‘Islam and the Challenge’; Kjetil Selvik and Stig Stenslie, Stability and Change in the Middle East (London, 2011). Laura Nader, Culture and Dignity. Dialogues Between the Middle East and the West (Chichester, 2013). Bernard Lewis, Faith and power: religion and politics in the Middle East (New York, 2010).

238

NOTES TO PAGES 86 – 93

38. Khaled Abou El-Fadl: ‘Islam and the Challenge of Democratic Commitment’ Fordham International Law Journal 23/1 (2003), p. 7. 39. Tessler et al. (eds), Area studies and social science; Andrea Teti, ‘Bridging the Gap: IR, Middle East Studies and the Disciplinary Politics of the Area Studies Controversy’ European Journal of International Relations 13/1 (2007), pp. 117 –145. 40. L. Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East (Princeton, 1984); Fred Halliday The Middle East in International Relations (Cambridge, 2005); William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder, Co, 2013); Mehran Kamrava, The Modern Middle East. A political History since the First World War (Berkley, 2013); Michele Penner Angrist, Politics and Society in the Contemporary Middle East (New York, 2013); Mark Gasiorowski (ed.) The government and politics of the Middle East and North Africa (New York, 2014); Arthur Goldschmidt with Aomar Boum, A Conscise History of the Middle East (Boulder, 2016). 41. Salamey, Imad and Frederik Pearson, ‘The collapse of Middle Eastern authoritarianism: breaking the barriers of fear and power’, Third World Quarterly 33/5 (2012), pp. 932– 934: 932. 42. Luciani, Giacomo (ed.), The Arab State (Berkley, 1990); Tim Niblock and Rodney Wilson (eds), The Political Economy of the Middle East. Vol. 1 –6 (Northampton 1999). 43. James H. Lebovic and William R. Thompson, ‘An Illusionary or Elusive Relationship? The Arab-Israel Conflict and Repression in the Middle East,’ The Journal of Politics 68/3 (2006), pp. 502– 518. 44. Brynen (ed.) Beyond the Arab Spring, pp. 258– 261. 45. On habituation see Introduction, endnote #20. 46. On how the environment (culture) shapes the individual mind and behaviour, and how the latter affects the former see Mind, Society, Behaviour, World Development Report 2015. 47. For a graphic image on MENA’s relative share in global comparison (ODA/capita and ODA volume) see the OECD map: http://www. compareyourcountry.org/aid-statistics?cr¼302&cr1¼oecd&lg¼en&page¼1. 48. Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi, ‘Globalization and the restructuring of State Power in the Arab World’, International Spectator 42/4 (2007) cited by Brynen (ed.) Beyond the Arab Spring, p. 274. 49. Theohary, Catherine A. Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2008– 2015 (Washington, 2016), Summary page. 50. Brynen (ed.) Beyond the Arab Spring, p. 262. 51. cited by Brynen (ed.) Beyond the Arab Spring, p. 262. 52. See the Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the State of Israel (26 March 1979); the current memorandum of understanding between Washington and Israel was signed by the Bush-administration for the period 2009– 2018 (fiscal years).

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53. Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the State of Israel (26 March 1979). 54. Egypt, Jordan and the PNA have equally received loans (billions of dollars) from the big international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank) and regional organizations for decades. These concessional loans were more concerned with conditions for economic and financial stability in historical terms, than with the political context or implications in terms of social costs. More recently, both the IMF and the World Bank seem to place more emphasis on issues of social and economic inclusion and protection. Their post Arab Spring activities in Egypt and Jordan (among others) are summarized (and criticized by Hassan Sherry, ‘Debunking the Myth of a Changing IMF: Unpacking Conditionality in the Arab Region Post-Uprisings’ Policy Brief (Beirut, 2017). For offical details see the official websites of IMF and the World Bank, and the following piece: Ahmad M. Awad, ‘The International Monetary Fund and World Bank Intervention in Jordan,’ Policy Brief (Amman, 2017). 55. William Ian Miller. Humiliation: And Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort, and Violence (Ithaca NY.: Cornell University Press, 1995). It should be noted that many countries in the region received aid in the form of loans, not only grants, whereas the very fact of accepting foreign aid, repayment of loans and its economic, social consequences led to political discontent in the region; see Carapico, Political Aid and Arab Activism; Challand, ‘Revisiting Aid’; Mullin and Patel, ‘Governing Revolt’. Since both ways (getting Western aid ‘for free’ or ‘with liabilities and conditions attached’) are perceived rather negatively in many countries in the region, Hattori is probably right in saying that ‘what foreign aid is’ is more important than its stated objectives or effectiveness. 56. Paragi, Bea´ta, ‘Contemporary gifts’. 57. Druckman, ‘Social Exchange Theory’, p. 255. 58. Mauss, The Gift. 59. Brynen (ed.) Beyond the Arab Spring; David Lesch and Mark L. Haas (eds) The Arab Spring. Change and Resistance in the Middle East (Boulder, 2012); Paul Amar and Vijay Prashad (eds), Dispatches from the Arab Spring. Understanding the New Middle East (Minneapolis, 2013); Khair El-Din Haseeb (ed.), The Arab Spring. Critical Analyses (London, 2013); Kjetil Fosshagen (ed.), Arab Spring. Uprisings, Powers and Interventions (New York, 2014); Efraim Inbar (ed.), The Arab Spring, Democracy and Security (London, 2013); Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud and Andrew Reynolds, The Arab Spring. Pathways of Repression and Reform (Oxford, 2015). 60. Mansoor Moaddel, The birthplace of the Arab Spring: values and perceptions of Tunisians and a comparative assessment of Egyptian, Iraqi, Lebanese, Pakistani, Saudi, Tunisian, and Turkish Public. MEVS Report (College Park, 2013), p. 11. 61. Brynen (ed.) Beyond the Arab Spring, p. 3. 62. Federica Bicchi and B. Voltolini, ‘EU Democracy Assistance in the Mediterranean, what relationship with the Arab Uprisings?’ Democracy and

240

63.

64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

69.

70.

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Security 91/2 (2013), pp. 80 –99; Bicchi, Federica, ‘The Politics of Foreign Aid and the European Neighborhood Policy Post-Arab Spring: “More for More” or “Less of the Same”’, Mediterranean Politics 19/3 (2014), pp. 318– 332; Amin 2014; Carapico, Political Aid; Challand, ‘Revisiting Aid’; Steven Heydeman, ‘America’s Response to the Arab Uprisings: US Foreign Assistance in an Era of Ambivalence’, Mediterranean Politics 19/3 (2014), pp. 299– 317. Brynen (ed.) Beyond the Arab Spring; Lesch and Haas (eds) The Arab Spring; Timo Behr, ‘Talking about the Revolution, Narratives on the Origin and Future of the Arab Spring,’ IEMed Papers #9 (Barcelona, 2012); El-Din Haseeb (ed.), The Arab Spring; Telhami, The World Through Arab Eyes; Amar and Prashad (eds), Dispatches from the Arab Spring; Lynch, ‘Obama’s Arab Spring?’ Alcaro and Haubrich-Seco (eds), ‘Re-thinking Western Policies’, p. 13. Brynen (ed.) Beyond the Arab Spring, p. 274. For philosophical arguments see Albert Camus, The Rebel (1951), for historical examples, Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge, 1979). Samaa Gamie’s story (‘The fall and rise of Egyptian Uprising’) collected by Asaad al-Saleh, Voices of the Arab Spring. Personal Stories from the Arab Revolutions (New York, 2015), p. 101. For the concept of legitimacy see for example: entries of Blackwell Encyclopedia and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy discussing Talcott Parsons (ed.): Max Weber. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York, 1964); Christopher Francis Gelpi, The Power of Legitimacy, Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining (Princeton, 2003). This Chapter does not deal with legitimacy concerns in Israel that defines itself a (Jewish and) democratic country (’the only democracy in the Middle East’). Yet, recent governmental decisions and related public debates on legitimacy and (de)legitimization reminds to debate-patterns in the neighbouring Arab countries. For illustration see: ToI staff, ‘Israel publishes blacklist of BDS groups to be barred from country’. Times of Israel, 7 January 2018. Available at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/ israel-publishes-blacklist-of-bds-groups-to-be-barred-from-country/ (accessed 18 October 2018). Burston, B. ’Blacklist: Top 13 Delegitimizers Who Should Be Denied Entry Into Israel’, Op-ed. Haaretz, 16 October 2018. Available at: https://www. haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-blacklist-top-13-delegitimizers-who-shouldbe-denied-entry-into-israel-1.6568304 (accessed 18 October 2018). Weatherford, M. S., ‘Mapping the Ties That Bind, Legitimacy, Representation, and Alienation’, The Western Political Quarterly 442 (1991), p. 261; Nicholas Lemay-He´bert, ‘Statebuilding without Nation-building? Legitimacy, State Failure and the Limits of the Institutionalist Approach’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 31 (2009), pp. 21 – 45. Gelpi, The Power of Legitimacy; Olivier Schlumberger, ‘Opening Old Bottles in Search of New Wine. On Nondemocratic Legitimacy in the Middle East’, Middle East Critique 193 (2010), p. 235.

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71. The opposite of participation can be described as ‘alienation’ (Weatherford, ‘Mapping the Ties That Bind’) or ‘marginalization’ or ‘social exclusion’ (Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cambridge (MA), 1970)). However, but it would be too simple to say that non-participation in political life equals to denying legitimacy (Mark Sedgwick, ‘Measuring Egyptian Regime Legitimacy’, Middle East Critique 193 (2010), p. 253). 72. Blackwell Encyclopedia. 73. G. H. Razi, ‘Legitimacy, Religion and Nationalism in the Middle East’, The American Political Science Review 841 (1990), pp. 69 – 91. 74. Carapico (Political Aid and Arab Activism) provides a great overview on the differences between NGOs, GONGOs, DONGOs, etc. in the region (see Chapter 4, Denationalizing Civic Activism; in particular pp. 153– 157). 75. Discussing the concerned Middle Eastern countries, the notion that legitimacy (and its measurement) is mainly a matter of framing and formulation is accepted, see Sedgwick, ‘Measuring Egyptian Regime Legitimacy’; Schlumberger, ‘Opening Old Bottles in Search of New Wine.’ The term will be used throughout the rest of the text as a ‘state of appropriateness’ ascribed to an entity (actor, system, structure, process, action) stemming from its integration with ‘socially constructed norms, values and beliefs’, see Mark C. Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’, Academy of Management Review 203 (1995), p. 574. 76. Parsons (ed.): Max Weber. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, p. 382. 77. Sedgwick, ‘Measuring Egyptian Regime Legitimacy’; Schlumberger, ‘Opening Old Bottles in Search of New Wine’. 78. Religion and nationalism serve as main sources of macroloyalty, whereas the family, clan, various sects, associations, occupations constitute the main sources of microloyalty. These latter, in the absence of strong and shared religious or nationalist values may generate social conflicts (Razi, ‘Legitimacy, Religion’). 79. Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics. The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven, 1977); Razi, ‘Legitimacy, Religion’. 80. Michael Humphrey, ‘Emergency Law and Hypergovernance. Human Rights and Regime Change in the Arab Spring’, in Kjetil Fosshagen (ed.) Arab Spring. Uprisings, Powers and Interventions (New York, 2014), p. 58. 81. Khaled Abou El-Fadl, ‘Islam and the Challenge of Democratic Commitment’, Fordham International Law Journal 23/1 (2003), p. 253. 82. Rex Brynen et al., Beyond the Arab Spring. Authoritarianism and Democratization in the Arab World (London, 2012), 96 – 104. 83. Brynen et al., Beyond the Arab Spring, pp. 96 – 104. 84. Sedgwick, ‘Measuring Egyptian Regime Legitimacy’, p. 255; Schlumberger, ‘Opening Old Bottles in Search of New Wine’, pp. 327– 244. 85. Barry Rubin, ed., The Muslim Brotherhood. The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement (New York, 2010).

242

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102 –104

86. Schlumberger, ‘Opening Old Bottles in Search of New Wine’. 87. Uriel Abulof, ‘“Can’t buy me legitimacy”: the elusive stability of Mideast rentier regimes’, Journal of International Relations and Development (online only). 88. Mark Sedgwick, ‘Measuring Egyptian Regime Legitimacy’, Middle East Critique 193 (2010), p. 255. 89. Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, The Foreign Policies. 90. Ibid., p. 3. 91. Gelpi, Christopher Francis, The Power of Legitimacy, Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining (Princeton, 2003), p. 12. 92. Hurd, Ian, ‘Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics’, International Organization 53/2 (1999), p. 388. 93. following Marcel Mauss, The Gift, Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies (London, 1925/2002), see Chapter 1. 94. Tomohisa Hattori, ‘Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid’, Review of International Political Economy 8/4 (2001), pp. 633– 660; Tomohisa Hattori ‘The moral politics of foreign aid’, Review of International Studies 29/2 (2003), pp. 229– 247; Tomohisa Hattori, ‘A Critical Naturalist Approach to Power and Hegemony, Analyzing Giving Practices’, in Mark Haugaard and H. H. Lentner (eds), Hegemony and Power. Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics (Oxford UK, 2006); Annalisa Furia, The Foreign Aid Regime. Gift-Giving, States and Global Dis/Order (London, 2015), for the theoretical discussion see Chapter 2. 95. Douglas 2002: ix in Mauss, The Gift; Komter, Social Solidarity and the Gift. 96. Paul F. Camenisch, ‘Gift and Gratitude in Ethics’, The Journal of Religious Ethics 9/1 (1981), pp. 1 –34: p. 3. 97. Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith (London, 2003/2014); Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development (Princeton, 2004/2011); Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War. Governing the World of Peoples (London, 2007); Mosse, Cultivating Development; Ilan Kapoor, The Postcolonial Politics of Development (London, 2008). 98. Benoit Challand, ‘Revisiting Aid in the Arab Middle East’, Mediterranean Politics 19/3 (2014), pp. 281– 298. 99. On how the European Union serves as a legitimizing power for the PNA (and in a way to Israel too), see Anders Persson, ‘Defining, Securing and Building a Just Peace: The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’ (Lund University, 2013). 100. Salamey and Pearson, ‘The Collapse of Middle Eastern Authoritarianism: Breaking the Barriers of Fear and Power’; Telhami, The World Through Arab Eyes; Mustafa, ‘Damning the Palestinian Spring’. 101. Hudson, Arab Politics; Razi, ‘Legitimacy, Religion’; Schlumberger, ‘Opening Old Bottles in Search of New Wine’; Sedgwick, ‘Measuring Egyptian Regime Legitimacy’. 102. Giacomo Luciani (ed.), The Arab State (Berkley, 1990); Feisal Z. Ahmed, ‘The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income. Aid, Remittances and Government Survival’, American Political Science Review 106/1 (2012), pp. 146– 165;

NOTES TO PAGES 104 –106

103.

104. 105. 106.

107. 108. 109. 110.

243

Giacomo Luciani, ‘Oil and Political Economy in the International Relations of the Middle East’, in Louise Fawcett (ed.) International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford, 2013). Analysing the effects of ‘unearned foreign income’ by econometric means (sample of 97 countries between 1975 and 2004), Faisal Z. Ahmed argued that foreign aid and remittances led to policies that resulted in reducing government expenditures on ‘welfare goods’ in order to fund patronage. The established mechanism identified a combined effect: a fraction of foreign aid finances patronage directly (income effect), whereas the remittances permit the government to divert expenditures from the provision of welfare goods to patronage (substitution effect) due to the fungibility of money (Ahmed, ‘The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income’). Fungibility is the property of a good or a commodity, the units of which are capable of mutual substitution. Money is typically fungible, foreign aid alike (even in-kind assistance can be sold on the market in exchange for money or other goods). Unearned foreign income was defined as ‘income generated from outside a country’s border than can change (either directly or indirectly) a government’s revenue base’, foreign aid is ‘understood as a transfer of funds from the donor government to the recipient government’, whereas remittances represent a ‘transfer of funds from individuals abroad to individuals (households) in the home country.’ Project aid, more specifically, development and humanitarian assistance which is channelled from foreign government to non-governmental or civil society organizations (NGO, CSO) is not part of Ahmed’s model. However, taking into consideration such aid is mostly spent either on salaries (consumption of goods) and on providing ‘public’ services (mainly health care and education), one can assume an effect similar to that of the remittances (Ahmed, ‘The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income’). Federica Bicchi, ‘The Politics of Foreign Aid and the European Neighborhood Policy Post-Arab Spring: “More for More” or “Less of the Same”’, Mediterranean Politics 19/3 (2014), pp. 318–332; Mullin and Patel, ‘Governing Revolt’. Carapico, Political Aid. Carapico, Political Aid, Chapter 4, Denationalizing Civic Activism; in particular p. 153 – 157. On the dilemmas NGOs face in the region, see MERIP 214 (Vol. 30, Spring 2000): http://www.merip.org/ mer/mer214/. Maha Abdel Rahman, ‘The Politics of “Uncivil” Society in Egypt’, Review of African Political Economy 29/1 (2002), pp. 21 – 35. Zimmermann, ‘State as chimera’ Carapico, Political Aid, p. 155. Sheila Carapico, ‘Foreign Aid for Promoting Democracy in the Arab World’ Middle East Journal 563 (2002), 379– 395; Timo Behr and Aaretti Siitonen, ‘Building bridges or digging trenches? Civil society engagement after the Arab Spring’. Working Paper 77, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs (Helsinki, 2013).

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106 –110

111. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, ‘The Troubled Triangle: Populism, Islam and Civil Society in the Arab World,’ International Political Science Review 19/4(1998), p. 383. 112. Nixon, Ron, ‘U.S. Groups Helped Nurture Arab Uprisings’ The New York Times, 14 April, 2011. 113. These are well documented by NGO monitors, such as The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law or the Global Trends in NGO Law, various issues, http://www.icnl.org/research/trends/. 114. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2014, p. 4. 115. Mary Proctor, ‘For Egypt and Syria, Elections Are a Test of Obedience’, Freedom House Blog Post, 11 June 2014. Accessed Sept 29, 2014. 116. Carapico, Political Aid and Arab Activism. 117. Asaad al-Saleh (ed.), Voices of the Arab Spring. Personal Stories from the Arab Revolutions (New York, 2015); Maytha Alhassen and Ahmed Shihab-Eldin (eds), Demanding Dignity. Young Voices From the Front Lines of the Arab Revolutions (Ashland, Oregon, 2012); Daniel Gumbiner, Diana Abouali, Elliot Colla (eds), Now That We Have Tasted Hope: Voices from the Arab Spring (San Francisco, 2012). 118. It is interesting that the long-term intergenerational impacts of domestic violence (on the individual’s life, mind, brain) is widely researched and basically not doubted, but the link between political oppression and domestic violence, their impact on human cognition included, is much less of academic and public discourse.

Chapter 4 In Search of Peace, Stability and Democracy in the Middle East 1. Daniel Druckman, ‘Social Exchange Theory, Premises and Prospects’, International Negotiation 1998/3, p. 259. 2. Boyce, Investing in Peace. 3. Arthur Goldschmidt with Aomar Boum, A Conscise History of the Middle East (Boulder, 2016), p. 314. 4. Stephen Walt, ‘The United States Should Admit It No Longer Has a Middle East Policy’, Foreign Policy Magazine, 26 January 2016; Heydeman, ‘America’s Response to the Arab Uprisings’. 5. On the history of US aid policies see: Lavy and Sheffer, Foreign aid and development; Rabi, The politics of foreign aid; Burns, Economic Aid; Nonneman, Development, Administration; Sullivan, ‘American Aid to Egypt, 1975– 96: Peace without Development’, Middle East Policy 4 (1996), pp. 35 – 49; Phyllis Bennis, ‘U.S.-Israel Policy’, FPIF Note, 1 November 1996. 6. Walt, ‘The United States Should Admit It No Longer Has a Middle East Policy’, Heydeman, ‘America’s Response to the Arab Uprisings’. 7. Burns, Economic Aid; Rabi, The politics of foreign aid; Lavy and Sheffer, Foreign aid and development; Bangura, The effects of American foreign aid;

NOTES

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16.

17. 18. 19.

20.

21. 22.

TO PAGES

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Drysdale, ‘Foreign aid to the Middle East’; Sharp, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel; Sharp, Jordan, Background and U.S. Relations; Sharp. Egypt, Background and U.S. Relations. Walt, ‘The United States Should Admit It No Longer Has a Middle East Policy’. Nonneman, Development, p. 83. Burns, Economic Aid, p. xii. Ibid. Stephen Walt, ‘The United States Should Admit It No Longer Has a Middle East Policy’, Heydeman, ‘America’s Response to the Arab Uprisings’. Ibid.’ Data Source: OECD DAC Statistics, Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a] (accessed 26 January 2017). It does not include funding from the Defense Department to Jordan for costs associated with the Syrian civil war and Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State; Jeremy M. Sharp, U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2016 Request (Washington, 2016) p. 12. Stephan McInerney and Cole Bockenfeld, ‘The Federal Budget and Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2015, Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa’, Pomed Paper (Washington, 2014). Stephan McInerney and Cole Bockenfeld, ‘The Federal Budget and Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2017, Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa’, Pomed Paper (Washington, 2016). Cordesman, ‘The Egyptian Military’. Sharp, Jeremy M., U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel. Congressional Research Service (Washington, 2014), p. 27; Jim Zanotti, Israel, Background and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service (Washington, 2015), p. 33. Israel is not eligible for ODA since 1996 (1997) as its GNI/capita is higher than the eligibility threshold since then. Phyllis Bennis, ‘U.S.-Israel Policy’. Foregin Policy in Focus, 1 November 1996, Available at https://fpif.org/us-israel_policy/ (accessed 12 March 2017). More on the Israeli-US relations: Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Friends in Deed: Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance (New York, Hyperion Books, 1994); Robert Owen Freedman, Israel and the United States: Six Decades of US-Israeli Relations (New York: Routledge, 2012); Dennis Ross, Doomed to Succeed: The U.S.-Israel Relationship from Truman to Obama (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2016); Jeremy R. Hammond, Obstatcle to Peace. The US Role in the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict (New York, 2016). John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York, 2007). Noa Amouyal, Security experts discuss ‘vital bond’ between U.S. Jewry and Israel. The Jerusalem Post, 24 January 2018.

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23. Bennis, ‘U.S.-Israel Policy’. 24. Unlike with Israel and Jordan, currently there is no US – Egyptian memorandum of understanding specifying a specific amount of total US aid pledged to Egypt over a certain time period in the present/future. As summarized by Jeremy Sharp “in July 2007, the Bush Administration had announced, as a part of a larger arms package to the region, that it would begin discussions with Egypt on a proposed $13 billion military aid agreement over a 10-year period. Since Egypt was already receiving approximately $1.3 billion a year in military assistance, the announcement represented no major change in US aid policy toward Egypt. Since then, no such bilateral MOU on US military aid to Egypt has been reached either by the Bush or Obama Administrations with the Egyptian government”. See Jeremy M. Sharp. Egypt, Background and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service (Washington, 2015), p. 11. 25. A USAID telegraph (1967) cited by Burns, Economic Aid, p. 2. 26. Stephen Walt, ‘The United States Should Admit It No Longer Has a Middle East Policy’, Heydeman, ‘America’s Response to the Arab Uprisings’. 27. The former USAID director Michael Stone (1982– 84) cited by Nonneman, Development, p. 84. 28. cited by Nonneman, Development, p. 115. 29. Brynen (ed.) Beyond the Arab Spring, p. 265; Heydeman, ‘America’s Response to the Arab Uprisings’. 30. El-Anis, Imad, Jordan and the United States (New York, 2011). 31. Sharp, Jeremy M. Jordan, Background and U.S. Relations. Congressional Research Service (Washington, 2014), p. 17. The cited data does not include funding from the Defense Department to Jordan for costs associated with the Syrian civil war and Operation Inherent Resolve against the Islamic State. When grants provided for hosting Syrian refugees are counted, the US ODA provided for Jordan was almost 1,2 billion USD (see data in and behind Table 4.1.). 32. Ken Silverstein, ‘U.S., Jordan Forge Closer Ties in Covert War on Terrorism’, Los Angeles Times (11 November 2005). 33. US GOV, The United States and Jordan Sign a Memorandum of Understanding on U.S. Assistance (Washington, 2015). 34. Brynen, A Very Political Economy; Le More, Political Guilt; Bouris, The European Union. 35. Brynjar, Lia, Building Arafat’s Police. 36. Amaney A. Jamal, Barriers to Democracy, p. 23. 37. Dag Taustad, ‘Hamas-PLO relations before and after the Arab Spring’, Middle East Policy 20/3 (2013), 86 – 98; Bjo¨rn Brenner, Gaza under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance (London, 2016). 38. Jeremy Sharp, U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2016 Request (Washington, 2016), p. 13. 39. Brynjar, Lia, Building Arafat’s Police; Brynjar, Lia, Police Force without a State; Jessica Purkiss and Ahmad Nafi, ‘Palestinian security cooperation with

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41. 42.

43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

48. 49.

50. 51.

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Israel’, Middle East Monitor 2015; ‘Ahmad Melhem, Why Israel will not halt security coordination with PA,’ Al-Monitor, 13 January, 2017. On the role played by Norway see the following papers from Hilde Henriksen Waage, ‘The “Minnow” and the “Whale”: Norway and the United States in the Peace Process in the Middle East,’ British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 34/2 (2007), pp. 157– 176.; ‘Norway’s Role in the Middle East Peace Talks: Between a Small State and a Weak Belligerent,’ Journal of Palestine Studies 34/4 (2005), pp. 6 – 24; ‘Explaining the Oslo Backchannel: Norway’s Political Past in the Middle East’, Middle East Journal 56/4 (2002), pp. 597– 615; ‘How Norway Became One of Israel’s Best Friends,’ Journal of Peace Research 37/2 (2000), 189–211. Nonneman, Development, pp. 84 – 85. Gerd Nonneman (ed.), The Middle East and Europe. The search for stability and integration (Brussels, 1993); Christopher Piening, Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs (Boulder, CO, 1997); B.A: Robertson, The Middle East and Europe. The power deficit (New York, 1998); Søren Dosenrode and Anders Stubkjær, The European Union and the Middle East (London, 2002); Gerd Nonneman, Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and the relationship with Europe (Abington, 2005); Rosemary Hollis, ‘Europe in the Middle East’ in Louise L. Fawcett (ed.), International Relations of the Middle East (New York: 2005), pp. 307– 326. Brynen, A Very Political Economy; Le More, Political Guilt; Bouris, The European Union. EEAS, ‘Middle East Peace Process’ (Brussels, 15 June 2016). Available at https:// eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/middle-east-and-north-africa-mena/337/ middle-east-peace-process_en (accessed 12 November 2016). Ibid. Ibid. The EU-Israeli relations are not the subject of this book, see for example, Sharon Pardo, Normative Power Europe Meets Israel: Perceptions and Realities (Lanham, MD, 2015); Sharon Pardo and Joel Peters, Uneasy Neighbors: Israel and the European Union (Lanham, MD, 2010); Lior Herman, ‘An Action Plan or a Plan for Action? Israel and the European Neighbourhood Policy,’ Mediterranean Politics 11/3 (2006), pp. 371– 394. Federica Bicchi, ‘Europe under occupation: the European diplomatic community of practice in the Jerusalem area’, European Security 25/4 (2016), pp. 461–477. Nonneman (ed.), The Middle East and Europe; Piening, Global Europe; Robertson, The Middle East and Europe; Dosenrode and Stubkjær, The European Union and the Middle East; Nonneman, Analyzing Middle East; Hollis, ‘Europe in the Middle East’. Hollis, ‘No friend of democratization’, p. 81. Driss, ‘The EU Response to the Arab Uprising’, p. 100.

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52. Volker Perthes, ‘Europe and the Arab Spring’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 53/6 (2011), pp. 73 – 84; Ricardo Alcaro and Miguel Haubrich-Seco (eds), Re-thinking Western Policies in Light of the Arab Uprisings. IAI Research Paper (Rome, 2012); Rosa Balfour, ‘EU conditionality after the Arab Spring’, IEMed Papers 16 (Barcelona, 2012); Timo Behr, ‘The European Union’s Mediterranean Policies after the Arab Spring: Can the Leopard Change its Spots?’ Amsterdam Law Forum 4/2 (2012), 76 – 88; Sylvia Colombo and Nathalie Tocci, ‘The EU Response to the Arab Uprising: Old Wine in New Bottles?’ in Alcaro and Haubrich-Seco (eds), Re-thinking Western Policies, pp. 71 – 96; Andrea Teti, ‘The EU’s first response to the Arab Spring: A critical discourse analysis of the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’, Mediterranean Politics 17/3 (2012), pp. 266– 283; Ahmed Driss, ‘The EU Response to the Arab Uprising: a Show of Ambivalence’, in Alcaro and Haubrich-Seco (eds), Re-thinking Western Policies, pp. 97 – 110; Rosemary Hollis, ‘No friend of democratization: Europe’s role in the genesis of Arab Spring’, International Affairs 88/1 (2012), pp. 81 – 94; Bicchi and Voltolini, ‘EU Democracy Assistance’; Sally K. Isaac, ‘Rethinking the New ENP: A Vision for an Enhanced European Role in the Arab Revolutions’, Democracy and Security 9/1– 2 (2013), pp. 40 – 60; Nathalie Tocci, ‘EU and the Arab Spring’, Seminar with Nathalie Tocci from the Istituto Affari Internazionali on the EU’s response to the Arab Spring (Oslo, 11 April 2013); To¨mmel, ‘The New Neighborhood Policy of the EU’; Andrea Teti, D. Thomson and C. Noble, ‘EU democracy assistance discourse in its “New Response to a Changing Neighborhood”’, Democracy and Security 9/1 – 2 (2013), pp. 61– 79; Richard Gillespie, ‘The European Neighborhood Policy and the challenge of the Mediterranean Southern Rim’ in Mario Telo and Frederik Ponjaert (eds), The EU’s Foreign Policy: What Kind of Power and Diplomatic Action? (Farnham, 2013), pp. 121– 133. 53. Ingeborg To¨mmel, ‘The New Neighborhood Policy of the EU: An appropriate response to the Arab Spring?’ Democracy and Security 9/1– 2 (2013), pp. 19 – 39. 54. Throughout the text foreign aid and related conditionality is understood as a lever ‘to buy and maintain friendship, forge alliances’ and to promote objectives being different from the jointly agreed objectives of the (development, humanitarian) co-operation. Its key component is ‘the use of pressure, by the donor, in terms of threatening to terminate aid, or actually terminating or reducing it’ if the conditions are not met by the recipient, see, Olav Stokke (ed.), Aid and political Conditionality (London, 1995), pp. 3; 11–12. 55. EU, A new response to a changing Neighborhood. A review of European Neighbourhood Policy. 56. EU, A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean; EU, A new response to a changing Neighborhood; Teti, ‘The EU’s first response to the Arab Spring’; Teti et al., ‘EU democracy assistance discourse’. 57. EU, A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, pp. 3, 5.

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58. Isaac, ‘Rethinking the New ENP’, p. 48. 59. EU, The Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Egypt. Foreign Affairs Council meeting (Brussels, 21 August 2013). 60. Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, 1789– 1848 (New York, 1996). 61. EU/EEAS, Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) – 2014– 2020, Single Support Framework 2014– 2016, Egypt. 62. Tariq Dana, ‘Palestinian Society. What went wrong?’ Al Shabaka Policy Brief (Ramallah, 2014); Bouris, The European Union; Alaa Tartir, Criminalising Resistance, Entrenching Neoliberalism: The Fayyadist Paradigm in Occupied Palestine. PhD Thesis, London School of Economics (London, 2014). 63. On the civil society in Gaza Strip see: Sara Roy, Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza. Engaging the Islamist Social Sector (Princeton, 2011). 64. Colombo and Tocci, ‘The EU Response to the Arab Uprising’; Behr, ‘The European Union’s Mediterranean Policies’. 65. For Egypt see Khaled Amin, ‘International Assistance to Egypt after the 2011 and 2013 Uprisings: More Politics and Less Development’, Mediterranean Politics 19/3 (2014), pp. 392–412; for Palestine see Jeremy Wildeman and Alaa Tartir, ‘Unwilling to Change, Determined to Fail: Donor Aid in Occupied Palestine in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings’, Mediterranean Politics 19/3 (2014), pp. 431–449; Joanna E. Springer, ‘Assessing Donor-driven Reforms in the Palestinian Authority: Building the State or Sustaining Status Quo?’ Journal of Peacebuilding and Development 10/2 (2015), pp. 1–19. 66. Balfour, ‘EU conditionality after the Arab Spring’, pp. 17, 19. 67. Tabar et al. Critical readings of development under colonialism. 68. With reference to IR, the realist school asserts that people’s opinion is constantly changing, elusive, hardly reflects substantial knowledge on foreign policy issues and it is almost impossible to structure the various views (and as such it can be ignored for the higher good of the state) on the one hand. On the other hand the liberal way of thinking is convinced about its consistency and stability (and as such public opinion is needed for democratic decision-making even in the field of foreign relations), see Chris Demaske, Modern Power and Free Speech: Contemporary Culture and Issues of Equality (Lanham, 2011), p. 11. The EU and most of its member states can be found on the liberal end, although certain member states are famous for their realist foreign policy approach. This ‘mixture of beliefs’ has been well-illustrated by the EU’s vague and indefinite reactions given to the demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt in January 2011. 69. Ole, R. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor, 2009). 70. Nadia Molenaers, ‘The Great Divide? Donor perceptions of budget support, eligibility and policy dialogue’, Third World Quarterly 33/5 (2012), p. 798. 71. Helen V. Milner and Dustin Tingley, ‘Public Opinion and Foreign Aid: A Review Essay’, International Interactions. Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations 39/3 (2013), pp. 389– 401; Robert A. Zimmermann,

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72. 73.

74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80.

81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91.

92.

NOTES TO PAGES 128 –132 The determinants of foreign aid. An inquiry into the consequences of welfare state institutions and public opinion. (Amsterdam, 2007). Polly, J. Diven and John Constantelos, ‘Explaining generosity: a comparison of US and European public opinion on foreign aid’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies 7/2 (2009), pp. 118– 132. Eurobarometer, ‘Attitudes towards Development Aid’, Special Eurobarometer 222 (Brussels, 2005), p. 44. Results cited in this section/subchapter were published as Beata Paragi, ‘Eastern and Western Perceptions on EU Aid in Light of the Arab Spring’ Democracy and Security 11/1 (2015), pp. 60 – 82. Eurobarometer, ‘Making a Difference in the World’, Special Eurobarometer 375 (Brussels, 2011). Eurobarometer, ‘Making a Difference in the World’, pp. 28 – 34; 56 – 57. Eurobarometer, ‘Europeans and Development Aid’, Special Eurobarometer 280 (Brussels, 2007), p. 7; Eurobarometer, ‘Making a Difference in the World’, p. 13. Eurobarometer, ‘The European Year for Development – Citizens’ views on development, cooperation and aid’, Special Eurobarometer 441 (Brussels, 2015). Eurobarometer, ‘The European Year for Development’ (2015). Eurobarometer, ‘The European Year for Development’ (2015). On public opinion, the determinants and weakness of civil society organizations in Central Europe, see Marc Morje´ Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge, 2003) and Balazs Szentiva´nyi and Simon Lightfoot, ‘Determinants of civil society influence: the case of international development and humanitarian NGOs in the Czech Republic and Hungary,’ Comparative European Politics 14/6 (2016), pp. 761– 780. Eurobarometer, ‘EU Development Aid and the Millennium Development Goals, 2013’, Special Eurobarometer 405. (Brussels, 2013). Eurobarometer, ‘European development aid and the Millennium Development Goals, 2010’, Special Eurobarometer 352 (Brussels: 2010), p. 8; Eurobarometer, ‘EU Development Aid and the Millennium Development Goals, 2013’. Eurobarometer, ‘The European Year for Development (2015)’. Khouri, ‘Drop the Orientalist term, “Arab Spring”’. Chouliaraki, The Ironic Spectator. Chouliaraki, The Ironic Spectator. Ibid. Sørensen (ed.), Political Conditionality, p. 4. Behr, ‘Talking about the Revolution’, p. 85. B. A. Robertson, The Middle East and Europe. The power deficit (New York, 1998), p. 82. Bridoux, J. and M. Kurki, ‘Cosmetic agreements and the cracks beneath: ideological convergences and divergences in US and EU democracy promotion in civil society’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 28/1 (2014), pp. 55–74. Mullin and Patel, ‘Governing Revolt’, p. 169.

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93. It is not only mirrored by local perceptions, but also observed by diplomats and journalists alike, see for example: “While the EU is neither able nor willing to seriously challenge the US’ seat at the head of the negotiating table, Europe does have an important role to play as an ‘outrider’ to create conditions favourable to a future US peace push, even more so if Washington takes a back seat in the short term” (Levitt 2015). 94. On this subject see SIPRI’s research programme (Macroeconomics of Security Programme), http://www.sipri.org/media/newsletter/essay/milante_nov13. 95. Chorley 1945 cited by Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge, 1979), p. 289. 96. On the military balance between Israel and its neighbours see for example Antony Cordesman, ‘The Egyptian Military and The Arab-Israeli Military Balance. Conventional Realities and Asymmetric Challenges’, CSIS Paper (Washington, 2010), on military expenditures see the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database which offers data on military expenditure by country as percentage of government spending; military expenditure per capita by country; military expenditure by country as percentage of gross domestic product; military expenditure by country. 97. Brown, International Politics and the Middle East; Halliday The Middle East in International Relations; William L’Cleveland and M. Bunt, A History of the Modern Middle East; Kamrava, The Modern Middle East; Penner Angrist, Politics and Society in the Contemporary Middle East; Gasiorowski (ed.) The government and politics; Goldschmidt with Boum, A Conscise History of the Middle East. 98. Conference to Support the Middle East. Co-Sponsors Summary (Washingon, 1993). More on international support and foreign aid channelled to the PNA since the early 1990s see, among others, Brynen, A Very Political Economy; Le More, Political Guilt; Tagdishi-Rad, The Political Economy of Aid in Palestine. 99. Brynen, A Very Political Economy; Le More, Political Guilt; Tagdishi-Rad, The Political Economy of Aid in Palestine. 100. Khalil Nakhleh, The Myth of Palestinian Development. Political Aid and Sustainable Deceit (Jerusalem, 2004); LeMore, Political Guilt, Wasted Money; Taghdisi-Rad The Political Economy of Aid in Palestine; Said,‘Palestinian perceptions of international assistance’, in Keating (ed.), Aid, Diplomacy; Mandy Turner, ‘Aid and the “Partners For Peace” Paradigm in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ Bulletin of the Council for British Research in the Levant 6/1 (2011), pp. 35 – 42; Wildeman and Tartir, ‘Unwilling to Change’. 101. Two legislative elections were held in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since the beginning of the Oslo Peace Process, the first in 1996, the second in 2006. In the January 2006 Parliamentary elections Hamas (as List of Reform and Change) won a decisive majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council (it gained 74 seats of the 132) defeating the PLO-affiliated Fatah party, the main partner for peace with Israel and partner for cooperation with the donor community. Reactions from Israel and the Western (OECD DAC) donor community led to governmental crisis and the split between Hamas (gaining

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102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108.

109. 110. 111.

112. 113.

114. 115.

116.

NOTES

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135 –138

control over the Gaza Strip) and Fatah (keeping its position in the West Bank). In June 2007, Mahmoud Abbas dismissed the government led by Ismail Haniye, and appointed Salam Fayyad as a prime minister. This move and the reforms implemented by Fayyad (and financed by the donor community) led to further rifts between the leadership sponsored by the international community and the PLO/Fatah. Turner ‘Aid and the “Partners for Peace” Paradigm’, Jamal, Barriers to Democracy. Yezid Sayigh is quoted by Brynen (ed.) Beyond the Arab Spring, p. 59. ECA, ‘European Union Direct Financial Support to the Palestinian Authority’, European Court of Auditors Special Report 14 (Luxembourg, 2013). Brynen (ed.) Beyond the Arab Spring, p. 57. Interview with an NGO director, Gaza City, 10 August 2015. Le More, Political Guilt; Tagdishi-Rad, The political economy; Bouris, The European Union. Nakhleh, The Myth of Palestinian Development; Khalil Nakhleh, Globalized Palestine. The National Sell-Out of a Homeland (Trenton (NJ), 2013); Dana, Tariq, ‘Palestinian Society. What went wrong?’ Al Shabaka Policy Brief (Ramallah, 2014); Nora Murad, ‘Donor Complicity in Israel’s Violations of Palestinian Rights’, Al Shabaka Policy Brief (Ramallah, 2014); Alaa Tartir, Criminalising Resistance, Entrenching Neoliberalism: The Fayyadist Paradigm in Occupied Palestine. PhD Thesis, London School of Economics (London, 2014). Interview with an officer at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, 24 February 2014. US GOV, ‘Consolidated Appropriations Act’ 2010, P.L. 111 – 117, Sec. 7039 (b). Toi staff, ‘US envoy blocked check of IDF human rights record as part of military aid review’. The Times of Israel, 16 June, 2018. Available at: https:// www.timesofisrael.com/us-envoy-blocked-check-of-idf-human-rights-recordas-part-of-military-aid-review/ (accessed 12 September 2018). Balanga, Yehuda, ‘Vultures over the Nile’, p. 232. Sharp, Egypt. Background and U.S. Relations; Balanga, Yehuda, ‘Vultures over the Nile: US-Egypt relations between Hosni Mubarak to Abdel-Fatteh al-Sisi’ in Efraim Inbal and Jonathan Rynhold (eds) US Foreign Policy and Global Standing in the 21st Century (New York, 2016), p. 232. Al Monitor has an interesting site containing the history and track record of MENA lobbies in Washington: Competition between countries (lobbying): http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/lobbying. AIPAC Memo, 27 March 2014. Available at http://www.aipac.org/, /media/ Publications/Policy%20and%20Politics/AIPAC%20Analyses/Issue%20Memos/ 2014/AIPAC%20Memo%20-%2035th%20Anniversary%20Israel-Egypt% 20Peace%20Treaty.pdf (accessed 12 December 2016). Balanga, Yehuda, ‘Vultures over the Nile’, p. 232– 238; Nakhleh, Globalized Palestine.

NOTES

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117. Sharp, Jordan, Background and U.S. Relations, p. 17. 118. US, The United States and Jordan Sign a Memorandum of Understanding on U.S. Assistance (Washington, 2015). 119. Brynen (ed.) Beyond the Arab Spring, pp. 48 – 49. 120. Shane Harris, ‘The Mouse that Roars’, Foreign Policy, September 12, 2014; Siraj Davis, ‘Dead Mice, No Roars: The Jordanian Intelligence Service (Mukhaabaraat)’, Foreign Policy, 12 August 2016. 121. Ahmed Hidji, ‘Why recent calls for protests failed to materialize in Egypt’, Al Monitor 11 November 2016. 122. More about the Israeli intelligence services: Ian Black and Benny Morris Israel’s Secret Wars: A History of Israel’s Intelligence Services (New York, 1991); Andrew Cockburn and, Leslie Cockburn Dangerous Liaison: The Inside Story of the U.S.-Israeli Covert Relationship (New York, 1991); Hazi Karmel Intelligence for Peace: The Role of Intelligence in Times of Peace (New York, 1998); Michael BarZohar and Nissim Mishal, Mossad. The Greatest Missions of the Israeli Secret Service (New York, 2012). 123. It is worthwhile to cite Siraj Davis (‘Dead Mice, No Roars: The Jordanian Intelligence Service (Mukhaabaraat)’, Foreign Policy,) saying ‘Western “scholars” cull the banal and specious tautology that Jordan’s dearth of significant terrorist incidents in a decade of turmoil in the war-torn region is an acclimation of the Mukhaabaraat’s efficacy.” 124. Lesch, Ann M., Egypt’s Crackdown on the Human Rights Community. FPRI E-notes (Washington, 2016); Davis, ‘Dead Mice, No Roars’; Harris, ‘The Mouse that Roars’. 125. Owen L. The Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the Mukhabarat, 1910–2009 (New York, 2010); On this subject see also Ephraim Kahana and Muhammad Suwaed, Historical Dictionary of Middle Eastern Intelligence, Historical Dictionaries of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (Lanham, 2009); U.S. Department of Defense, Egypt: Security, Political, and Islamist Challenges (Washington, 2000). 126. JIJ, Hidden Injustices: A Review of Palestinian Authority and Hamas Human Rights violations in the West Bank and Gaza, Jerusalem Institute for Justice (Jerusalem, 2015). The Palestinian ICHR (The Independent Commission of Human Rights) publishes reports on violations against human rights and freedom (committed mostly by Israeli actors). See its website: http://ichr.ps/en/1. 127. Bjo¨rn Brenner, Gaza under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance (London, 2016). 128. Lia Brynjar, Police Force without a State: A History of the Palestinian Security Forces in the West Bank and Gaza (Reading, U.K, 2006); Lia Brynjar, Building Arafat’s Police: The Politics of International Police Assistance in the Palestinian Territories after the Oslo Agreement (Reading, 2007); Owen L. Sirrs, The Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the Mukhabarat, 1910– 2009 (New York, 2010). 129. F. Gregory Gause, ‘Regional Influences on Experiments in Political Liberalization in the Arab World’, in Rex Brynen et al. (eds) Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World (Boulder, 1995), p. 287.

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130. Carapico, Political Aid, p. 5. 131. Dunne, Michele and Amr Hamzawy (2008) ‘The ups and downs of political reform in Egypt’ in Marina Ottaway and Julia Choucair-Vizoso (eds) Beyond the Facade: Political Reform in the Arab World (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for Democracy, 2008). 132. On how the Sisi-administration works and interacts with Western diplomats/ politicians see Peter Hessler, ‘Letter from Cairo. Egypt’s Failed Revolution,’ The New Yorker 2 January 2017. 133. EU, The Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Egypt. Foreign Affairs Council meeting (Brussels, 21 August 2013). 134. EU, The Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Egypt. Foreign Affairs Council meeting (Brussels, 10 February 2014). 135. MEM, ‘Egyptian foreign ministry slams EU Council Conclusions’ Middle East Monitor, 11 February 2014. 136. Two chambers of the US Congress rarely agree. For example, in September 2017, the US Senate voted to slash $300 billion in military aid to Egypt while cutting economic aid by $37 million on account of Cairo’s implementation of an NGO law allegedly designed to crack down on independent civil society groups. The House of Representatives, however, voted to maintain Egypt’s annual $1.3 billion military aid package while increasing economic aid to $150 million. See Bryant Harris, ‘EgyptianAmericans launch human rights push ahead of Sisi re-election’, Al-monitor, 14 March 2018. Available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/ 2018/03/egyptian-americans-launch-human-rights-push-sisi-election.html# ixzz59qoJXzAo (accessed 16 March 2018). 137. IMF Executive Board Approves US$12 billion Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility for Egypt. 11 November 2016, https://www.imf.org/en/ News/Articles/2016/11/11/PR16501-Egypt-Executive-Board-Approves-12billion-Extended-Arrangement (accessed 12 February 2017). 138. Maha Abdelrahman, Policing neoliberalism in Egypt: the continuing rise of the ‘securocratic’ state. Third World Quarterly 38(1) 185– 202. 139. Choucair-Vizoso, Julia (2008) ‘Illusive reform: Jordan’s stubborn stability’, in Marina Ottaway and Julia Choucair-Vizoso (eds) Beyond the Facade: Political Reform in the Arab World (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for Democracy, 2008), pp. 56 – 57. 140. Ibid. 141. Interview with officials working at the EU Delegation Office, Amman, 23 February 2014. 142. Interview with a Jordanian official working at the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Amman, 23 February 2014. 143. The EU’s bilateral assistance to Jordan under the ENI (2014 –2017) focusses on three priority sectors, reinforcing the rule of law for enhanced accountability and equity in public delivery; employment and private sector development, renewable energy and energy efficiency, see EU/EEAS,

NOTES

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145.

146. 147. 148. 149. 150.

151. 152. 153. 154.

155. 156. 157.

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Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), 2014– 2020, Single Support Framework 2014– 2017, Jordan. For recent details on the EU-Jordan (development) cooperation see the EU’s official website: https://ec.europa.eu/ neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/jordan_en. Mustaq Husein Khan, George Giacaman and Inge Amudsen (ed.), State Formation in Palestine. Viability and Governance during Social Transformation (New York: 2004); Nigel Parsons, The Politics of the Palestinian Authority. From Oslo to al-Aqsa (London, 2004). No surprise that there are diverging views in the literature on the EU’s role. See for example Persson, Anders, ‘Defining, Securing and Building a Just Peace: The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’ (Lund University, 2013) or the more critical Bouris, Dimitris, The European Union and Occupied Palestinian Territories, State-building without a state (London, 2014). Saad Eddin Ibrahim, ‘Civil Society and the Prospects of Democratization in the Arab World,’ in A. R. Norton (ed.): Civil Society in the Middle East (Leiden, 1995), pp. 27 – 54. Amaney A. Jamal, Barriers to Democracy (New Jersey, 2007), p. 8. Elie Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture (Washington, 1992), p. 9. Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture, p. 8. Augustus R. Norton, ‘The Future of Civil Society in the Middle East,’ The Middle East Journal 47/2 (1993), pp. 205– 216; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, ‘The Troubled Triangle: Populism, Islam and Civil Society in the Arab World,’ International Political Science Review 19/4 (1998), pp. 373– 385. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, ‘The Troubled Triangle’. Kinzer, ‘We’ve been hacking elections for more than a century’. Walt with Marc Trachtenberg, ‘Stealing Elections Is All in the Game’. The American government has been involved in influencing elections and overthrowing governments in anti-US regimes since the 1980s. This is achieved by providing funding, training and strategic advice to opposition groups, political parties, journalists and media outlets, see: David Ignatius, ‘Innocence Abroad. The New World of Spyless Coups,’ The Washington Post, 22 September 1991, p. C4.; Ron Nixon, ‘U.S. Groups Helped Nurture Arab Uprisings’ The New York Times, April 14 2011, p. A1; Jenny O’Connor, ‘NGO, The Guise of Innocence’, Irish Foreign Affairs 25/6 (2011) and more recently Stephen Kinzer, ‘We’ve been hacking elections for more than a century’, Boston Globe, 8 January 2017; Stephen Walt with Marc Trachtenberg, ‘Stealing Elections Is All in the Game’, Foreign Policy Magazine, 10 January 2017. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway, Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion (Washington, 2000). Sheila Carapico, ‘Foreign Aid for Promoting Democracy in the Arab World’ Middle East Journal 563 (2002), 379– 395. Cooperation with local civil society organizations, even if limited in its scope, has been the only opportunity to meet the demands of the Western

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158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167.

168.

169.

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public (expecting their democratically elected governments to deliver results for aid. Carapico, ‘Foreign Aid for Promoting Democracy’, p. 384. Salamey and Pearson, ‘The Collapse of Middle Eastern Authoritarianism: Breaking the Barriers of Fear and Power’, pp. 934–941; Carapico, Political Aid. Gamal M. Selim, The International Dimensions of Democratization in Egypt: The Limits of Externally-Induced Change (Berlin, 2015), p. 87. For facts about the Palestinian civil society see ICNL: http://www.icnl.org/ research/monitor/palestine.html. Brynen, A Very Political Economy; Keating (ed.), Aid, Diplomacy; Le More, Political Guilt; Tagdishi-Rad, The Political Economy; Bouris, The European Union. Karma, Nabulsi ‘The state-building project: what went wrong?’ In Michael Keating et al. (eds) Aid, diplomacy and facts on the ground (London, 2005), pp. 117 –128. Keating (ed.), Aid, Diplomacy; Le More, Political Guilt; Tagdishi-Rad, The Political Economy. Nabulsi ‘The state-building project’, p. 122. Jacob Høigilt, ‘The Palestinian Spring that Was Not: The Youth and Political Activism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories’ Arab Studies Quarterly 35/4 (2013), 343–359. Human Rights Watch suggested that ‘[t]he PA should take action against the responsible police officers or the US and EU should find another use for their taxpayers’ money (. . .) The US and EU should suspend aid to Palestinian Authority forces unless the Palestinian authorities take appropriate measures to end such abuses and allow Palestinians to enjoy their rights to freedom of assembly and expression.’ See HRW: ‘Palestinian Authority: End Violence Against Egypt Demonstrators’, Human Rights Watch, Feb. 4, 2011, at http:// www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/03/palestinian-authority-end-violence-againstegypt-demonstrators (accessed 2/3/2015). There are publications discussing how much the occupiation may cost for the Israeli and Palestinain society: Yehuda Litani, ‘The Price of Occupation,’ Journal of Palestine Studies 17/1 (1987), pp. 183– 185; Shlomo Swirski, The Price of Occupation The Cost of the Occupation to Israeli Society. Executive summary of a study on the economic price that all Israelis are paying for 37 years of occupation (2005); UN-ARIJ-PNA, The economic costs of the Israeli occupation for the occupied Palestinian territory (2012); Shlomo Swirski, The Cost of Occupation (2012, ADVA Center); Shir Hever, How Much International Aid to Palestinians Ends Up in the Israeli Economy? (2014, Aid Watch Palestine), UNCTA, The staggering economic cost of occupation (2016). Michelle Pace and S. Wolff, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy and Islamist actors in the southern neighbourhood’ in T. Schumacher, A. Marchetti, and T. Demmelhuber (eds), Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy (Abingdon, Oxford 2013), pp. 507–518.

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170. Dana, ‘Palestinian Society. What went wrong?’; Hanafi, Sari ‘The Social Sciences Research in Palestinian Territories. The Dilemmas of the Production of the Research Outside of the Universities’ (UNESCO portal, no year indicated). 171. On Egypt see Selim, The International Dimensions, pp. 86 – 87. 172. On Egypt see Gamal M. Selim, The International Dimensions of Democratization in Egypt: The Limits of Externally-Induced Change (Berlin, 2015); Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain, Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Digital Media and the Arab Spring (Oxford, 2013). 173. Howard, Philip N., Howard and Muzammil M. Hussain (eds), Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Digital Media and the Arab Spring (Oxford, 2013). 174. EU, A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. Joint Communication of European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (Brussels, March 8, 2011, COM(2011) 200 final); EU, A new response to a changing Neighbourhood. A review of European Neighbourhood Policy. Joint Communication by the High Representative of The Union For Foreign Affairs And Security Policy and the European Commission (Brussels, 25 May 2011). 175. Bicchi and Voltolini, ‘EU Democracy Assistance’; Bicchi, ‘The Politics of Foreign Aid’; Mullin and Patel, ‘Governing Revolt’. 176. Hattori, ‘Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid’; Kapoor, The Postcolonial Politics; Furia, The Foreign Aid Regime. 177. Interview with an NGO leader, Gaza City, 11 Aug 2015. 178. Interview with Biet Lahia, Gaza Strip, 13 Sep 2015. 179. For example, humanitarian aid to the Palestinians within the UNRWA framework or aid to Jordan for hosting Iraqi and Syrian refugees since the early 2000s, etc. The allocation principles are different, but from a statistical perspective humanitarian and emergency aid is part of OECD DAC (ODA) statistics. 180. Allen, Human rights. 181. Lilie Chouliaraki, The Ironic Spectator. Solidarity in the Age of Post-Humanitarianism (London, 2013); Lilie Chouliaraki, ‘Humanitarian communication beyond a politics of pity’, International Journal of Cultural Studies 13/2 (2010), pp. 107–126. 182. Watenpaugh, Bread from Stones, p. 78. 183. Human rights abuses against Palestinians are committed not only by Israeli soldiers or settlers, but by radical Palestinian individuals (Islamists, nonIslamists) and PNA (security) forces as well (see JIJ, ‘Hidden Injustices’ above). In similar vein, abuses committed against Palestinians are criticized not only by donors and Palestinians, but by Israeli activists too. 184. Nakhleh The Myth of Palestinian Development, p. 33. 185. Issandr El Amrani. In Transition: The abusive Egyptian-Saudi Relationship. Arabist.net, 15 October 2016. 186. Brynen (ed.), Beyond the Arab Spring, p. 184.

258 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195.

196.

197. 198. 199. 200.

201. 202. 203.

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Brynen (ed.), Beyond the Arab Spring, pp. 204; 212. Brynen (ed.), Beyond the Arab Spring, p. 200. Ibid., p. 203. Nonneman, Development; Lavy and Sheffer, Foreign aid and development; Le More, Political Guilt; Carapico, Political Aid. Challand, ‘Revisiting Aid’, p. 283. Michel Chatelus, ‘Policies for Development’, p. 103, in Giacomo Luciani (ed.): The Arab State (Berkeley, 1990). Chatelus, ‘Policies for Development’, p. 101. Ibid., p. 102. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have also injected billions of dollars into Egypt’s economy since the army toppled President Mohamed Morsi (Muslim Brotherhood) in 2013. In Spring 2016 Egypt and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement to set up a 60 billion Saudi riyal (ca. $16 billion) investment fund to strengthen the Egyptian economy by boosting economic growth. Ali Abdelaty, ‘Egypt, Saudi Arabia sign 60 billion Saudi riyal investment fund pact’ Reuters, April 9, 2016. Qatar (but at least Qatari individuals) is frequently accused by supporting Islamist forces that aspire to destabilize the pro-Western regimes in the Middle East. Israel welcomes its presence in the Gaza Strip provided that its money helps the population and does not benefit Hamas. Toi Staff, Israeli minister: ‘Qatar making true effort to stop Gaza aid from boosting Hamas’, Times of Israel, 16 March 2018. Luciani cited by Olivier Schlumberger, ‘Opening Old Bottles in Search of New Wine. On Nondemocratic Legitimacy in the Middle East’, Middle East Critique 193 (2010), p. 245. Amar and Prashad (eds), Dispatches from the Arab Spring, p. 33. IMF, Arab Republic of Egypt and the IMF. Available at http://www.imf.org/ external/country/egy/ (updated 23 January 2017). EU, A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean. Joint Communication of European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (Brussels, March 8, 2011, COM(2011) 200 final), p. 3. Beata Paragi, ‘First impressions and perceived roles: Palestinian perceptions on foreign aid’, Society and Economy 35/1 (2012), pp. 389– 410. ADGC 2011: 24; Mohamed Younis and Ahmed Younis, ‘Egyptian Opposition to US and other foreign aid increases’, Gallup Survey Results, 29 March 2012. EU Neighbourhood Barometer (NB) aimed to generate an analysis tool for EuropeAid and the EU delegations in the neighbouring territories about the population knowledge and perception of the EU, ENP and its co-operation programmes. Between 2012 and 2014 five waves of opinion polls were conducted in the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood. Details on data collection (date of survey, polling institute, sample size) can be found at: https://www.gesis.org/

NOTES

204. 205. 206.

207. 208. 209.

210. 211.

212. 213. 214. 215.

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angebot/daten-analysieren/weitere-sekundaerdaten/weitere-internationale-daten/ eu-neighbourhood-barometer/ (accessed 13 September 2018). Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2014. Middle East and North Africa (Washington, 2014). Arab Barometer, Public Opinion Survey, Wave II-III, 2010– 2011 and 2012– 2014. Data files available at: http://www.arabbarometer.org/. Neighbourhood Barometer. South, Wave 1 – 2, Spring and Autumn 2012 (Brussels: TNS Opinion); Neighbourhood Barometer. South, Wave 3 – 4, Spring and Autumn 2013 (Brussels: TNS Opinion); Barometre du voisinage de L’UE. Sud de la Me´diterrane´e. Printemps 2014. South, Wave 5, Spring 2014 (Brussels, 2012 – 2014), https://www.gesis.org/angebot/daten-analysieren/weiteresekundaerdaten/weitere-internationale-daten/eu-neighbourhood-barometer/, data files were provided by TNS Opinion (upon authors’ inquiry). Contrary to the labels (Spring, Autumn) the surveys were carried out during the Summer months (between May-August depending on the year and country) and early Winter (between November and January, mostly in December). Hanaa Ebeid is quoted by Soha Bayoumi, ‘The External Image of the European Union. The Report on Egypt’, Garnet Report 17/2007, p. 4. Arab Barometer Wave IV (2017) Country Reports, Egypt and Jordan. The semi-structured personal interviews were conducted in December 2012 in Cairo by the Arab Forum for Alternatives: in order to examine the local vision of foreign funds, a sample of 30 people involved in the various fields associated with foreign funding (10 from civil society, 5 from political parties, 5 from the media, 5 from funding organizations and 5 from relevant government institutions) were interviewed. The meetings attempted to explore their opinions on funding in general, the extent of their knowledge on the subject, and their opinions on funding-related issues, whether regarding funding for media, politics, or CSOs in Egypt (Elagati, ‘Foreign Funding in Egypt’). To the author’s best knowledge, neither quantitative, nor qualitative data were collected to measure the Jordanians’ opinion on foreign aid, except for the above cited NB. þ 972 Blog, Everything you need to know about Israel’s “NGO law”, 12 July 2016; Eugene Kontorovich, ‘Why Critics of Israel’s New NGO “Transparency Law” Are Wrong’, The Tablet Magazine, 13 July 2016; Carlstrom, G. ‘Israel Declares War on Gaza’s NGOs’, Foreign Policy Magazine. Sirai, Davis ‘Dead Mice, No Roars: The Jordanian Intelligence Service (Mukhaabaraat)’, Foreign Policy, 12 August 2016. Benoit Challand, ‘Revisiting Aid in the Arab Middle East’, Mediterranean Politics 19/3 (2014), pp. 281– 298. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge, 1979), p. 289. Salamey, Imad and Frederik Pearson, ‘The collapse of Middle Eastern authoritarianism: breaking the barriers of fear and power’, Third World Quarterly 33/5 (2012), pp. 931– 948.

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216. Giacomo Luciani (ed.): The Arab State (Berkeley, 1990); Ahmed, Z. Feisal, ‘The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income. Aid, Remittances and Government Survival’, American Political Science Review 106/1 (2012), pp. 146– 165; Giacomo Luciani, ‘Oil and Political Economy in the International Relations of the Middle East’, in Louise Fawcett (ed.) International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford, 2013).

Chapter 5 The (im)possibility of Contemporary Gifts 1. David A. Baldwin, ‘Exchange Theory and International Relations’, International Negotiation 1998/3. 2. For a detailed description of the data collection and analysis see, Paragi, Contemprary gifts. 3. Interview with a Palestinian NGO leader, Gaza City 10 August 2015 (GS5). 4. Interview with a Palestinian NGO leader, Gaza City, 25 June 2015 (GS1). 5. Interview with a Palestinian NGO leader, Jabalia Camp, 21 Sept 52015 (GS10). 6. Interview with a Palestinian NGO leader, Khan Younis, 5 August 2015 (GS3). 7. Interview with a Palestinian NGO leader, Gaza City, 25 June 2015 (GS1). 8. Interview with a Palestinian NGO leader, Nablus, 6 August 2015 (WB6). 9. Interview with a Palestinian NGO leader, Ramallah, 10 August 2015 (WB7) 10. Interview with a Palestinian NGO leader, Ramallah, 1 September 2015 (WB9). 11. Interview with a Palestinian NGO leader, Hebron, 28 July 2015 (WB3). 12. Robert Keohane, ‘Reciprocity in International Relations’, International Organization 40/1 (1996), pp. 6, 7. 13. Baldwin, ‘Exchange Theory’, p. 145. 14. Janeway, ‘On the power of the weak’. 15. It must be kept in mind that the rights-based approach (right for aid) can be tracked both in the (Western) ‘international aid philosophy’ and in IslamicArab traditions, for comparison see: Marie Juul Petersen, For Humanity of for the Umma? Aid and Islam in Transnational Muslim NGOs (London, 2016). With reference to the question how the concept and practice of ‘power’ relates to that of ‘right’, the Greek historian, Thucydides formulated the relation between the two quite briefly: ‘right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power’ (Melian Dialogue, Chapter XVII, History of the Peloponnesian War). 16. Kapoor, The Postcolonial Politics, 31. 17. Matar, Haggai, ‘The Palestinian director bringing her generation to the big screen’, 972.mag.com, 5 January 2017. 18. The term ‘deep state’ comes from Turkey and denotes to the complex layers of military, political and bureaucratic power commanding and regulating the lives of ordinary citizens, a key element of which is the ‘presence’ of the intelligence services in people’s lives (see Chapter 4).

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19. Dimitris K. Xenakis, ‘Order and change in the Euro-Mediterranean System’, Mediterranean Quarterly 11/1 (2000), pp. 75 – 90. 20. Elagati, ‘Foreign Funding in Egypt’. 21. Stephen, Kinzer, “We’ve been hacking elections for more than a century” Boston Globe, 8 January 2017. 22. Walzer, Michael, ‘Intellectuals, Social Classes and Revolutions,’ in Theda Skocpol (ed.), Democracy, Revolution and History (Ithaca, 1989), p. 129. 23. Gerd Nonneman, Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East (London, 1988), p. 114. 24. Interview with a Palestinian NGO leader, Gaza City, 26 June 2015 (GS1). 25. Interview with a Palestinian NGO leader, Gaza City 3 August 2015 (GS2). 26. Interview with a Palestinian NGO leader, Gaza City 10 August 2015 (GS5). 27. Ronit Lentin, Thinking Palestine (London, 2008); Nakhleh, Globalized Palestine; Tartir, Criminalising Resistance; Tabar et al. Critical readings of development under colonialism. 28. Peter M. Blau (ed.), Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York, 1964/2003) cited by Paul F. Camenisch, ‘Gift and Gratitude in Ethics’, The Journal of Religious Ethics 9/1 (1981), p. 4. 29. Contu and Girei, ‘NGOs management’. 30. Gerd Nonneman, Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East (London, 1988), p. 114. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Interview with a Palestinian NGO leader, Betlehem, 30 July 2015 (WB4). 34. Interview with a Palestinian NGO leader, Nablus, 6 August 2015 (WB5). 35. Interview with a Palestinian NGO leader, Nablus, 6 August 2015 (WB6). 36. Interview with a Palestinian NGO leader, Ramallah 10, August 2015 (WB8). 37. Stuart Hall, ‘The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power’, in Stuart Hall, D Held, D. Hubert, and K. Thompson (eds) Modernity: An introduction to modern societies (Malden, MA, 1996), p. 202. 38. Jonathan Benthall and Je´roˆme Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent. Politics of Aid in the Muslim World (London: I.B.Tauris, 2009); Marie Juul Petersen, For Humanity of for the Umma? Aid and Islam in Transnational Muslim NGOs (London, 2016). 39. Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan, The Charitable Crescent; Petersen, For Humanity of for the Umma?. 40. Interview with a Palestinian NGO leader, Jabalia Camp, 21 Sept 5 2015 (GS10). 41. Elagati, ‘Foreign Funding in Egypt’; Paragi, Cultures of (dis)trust: shame and solidarity from recipient NGO perspectives. International Journal of Cultural Studies (2016, online). 42. EC, EU’s response to the “Arab Spring”: The State-of-Play after Two Years, European Commission Memo, Brussels, 8 February 2013. 43. Elagati, ‘Foreign Funding in Egypt’.

262

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44. Interview with a Palestinian NGO leader, Ramallah, 1 September 2015 (WB9). 45. Nakhleh, The Myth of Palestinian Development; Nakhleh, Globalized Palestine. 46. Tabar et al. Critical readings, p. 11. 47. Miller, Humiliation, p. 133. 48. Laura Nader, Culture and Dignity. Dialogues Between the Middle East and the West (Chichester, 2013). 49. Hattori, ‘A Critical Naturalist Approach, p. 160. 50. Elagati, ‘Foreign Funding in Egypt’, p. 11. 51. Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, p. 189. 52. ‘The essence of the Wilsonian concept of self-determination consisted of the notion of self-government of peoples’, see M. K. Nawaz, ‘The Meaning and Range of Self-Determination’, Duke International Law 14/1 (1965), pp. 82 – 101, p. 84. 53. Saleh Armuti, an Islamist and head of Jordan’s bar association, cited by Hassan Meki, ‘Foreign Funding of NGOs, Global Policy Forum, 11 September 2000. 54. Carapico, ‘Foreign Aid for Promoting Democracy’; Carapico, Political Aid. 55. Bicchi and Voltolini, ‘EU Democracy Assistance’. 56. Samir Karam, ‘US Priorities in Egypt: Military or Democratic?’ Al Monitor 7 February 2012. 57. Donors: keep out, The Economist, 12 September 2014. 58. Anna Newby, ‘U.S. Civil Society Assistance to Egypt: Thinking Long Term’, Digest of Middle East Studies 21/2 (2012), pp. 327– 352. 59. Mohammad Elagati, ‘Foreign Funding in Egypt After the Revolution’, Fride Working Paper (Barcelona, 2013), p. 13. 60. Of course, not all NGOs receive money from abroad and the views on them are dependent on various factors. 61. Tariq Dana, ‘Palestinian Society. What went wrong?’ Al Shabaka Policy Brief (Ramallah, 2014); Elagati, ‘Foreign Funding in Egypt’; Carapico, Political Aid and Arab Activism, p. 190. 62. Burns, Economic Aid. 63. Ibid., p. xv. 64. Ann M., Lesch, Egypt’s Crackdown on the Human Rights Community. FPRI E-notes (Washington, 2016). 65. ICNL, NGO Law Monitor, Egypt. Available at http://www.icnl.org/research/m onitor/egypt.html. 66. Bryant Harris, ‘Senate Panel slashes military aid to Egypt’ Al-Monitor 6 September 2017. 67. Marlene Spoerri, ‘Outrage over Egypt’s arrest of NGO workers, but US would have done the same’, Christian Science Monitor, 13 February 2014; Mohannad Sabry, ‘How Egypt’s protest law brought down the revolution’ Al-Monitor, 9 September 2014; Joe Stork, deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch in HRW, Egypt: Consolidating Repression Under al-Sisi, HRW Newsletter, 12 January 2017; szerzo, cim, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse

NOTES

68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

86. 87. 88.

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/originals/2017/11/egypt-social-media-campaign-backfire-human-rights-sisi. html#ixzz4xUkHvAYm. Harris, ‘Senate Panel slashes’. Reuters, ‘U.S. will consider resuming halted military aid to Egypt’, 20 September 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-egypt-aid/u-s-willconsider-resuming-halted-military-aid-to-egypt-trump-idUSKCN1BV2ZP. Quintan Wiktorowitz, ‘Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan’, Comparative Politics 3371 (2000), pp. 43 – 61. Janine A. Clark, ‘Relations between professional associations and the state in Jordan’, in Francesco Cavatorta, ed., Civil Society Activism under Authoritarian Rule (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 158– 180. Interview with a Jordanian official working at the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, Amman, 3 February 2014. ICLN, Civic Freedom Monitor: Jordan. Updated 4 January 2017. Carlstrom, G. ‘Israel Declares War on Gaza’s NGOs’. Linda Tabar et al. Critical readings of development under colonialism: towards a political economy for liberation in the occupied Palestinian Territories (Ramallah, 2015). See for example results of the third wave of the Arab Barometer, 2012– 14. Interview with a Palestinian activist, by email, Bethlehem, October 2015 (WB12). Interview with a Palestinian activist, by email, Bethlehem, October 2015 (WB12). Landau 2003. Lazarus and Gawerc, ‘The Unintended Impacts of “Material Support”, p. 68. Interview with a Palestinian activist, by email, Bethlehem, October 2015 (WB12). Elagati, ‘Foreign Funding in Egypt’; Jamal, Barriers to Democracy; Nakhleh, Globalized Palestine; Dana, ‘Palestinian Society’; Carapico, Political Aid and Arab Activism, p. 167. Lena, C. Endresen, Contact and Cooperation: The Israeli-Palestinian People-toPeople Program. Fafo Paper 3 (2001).; Gawerc, Michelle I., Prefiguring Peace: Israeli-Palestinian Peacebuilding Partnerships (Lanham, 2012). þ 972 Blog, Everything you need to know about Israel’s “NGO law”; Kontorovich, ‘Why Critics of Israel’. Kontorovich Eugene, ‘Why Critics of Israel’s New NGO “Transparency Law” Are Wrong’, The Tablet Magazine, 13 July 2016; the EU guidelines are available at https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/israel/documents/relatedlinks/20130719_guidelines_on_eligibility_of_israeli_entities_en.pdf. See: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/12/15/financing-topromote-peace-and-stability-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa. Brynen et al., Beyond the Arab Spring; Khair El-Din Haseeb, (ed.), The Arab Spring. Critical Analyses (London, 2013). Telhami, The World through Arab Eyes. Dignity is important as in the Middle Eastern cultures many members of the society consider shame and humiliation

264

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as important elements of their identities, lives and social order. See Laura Nader, Culture and Dignity. Dialogues Between the Middle East and the West (Chichester, 2013). 89. Ibid., pp. 262– 266. 90. Telhami, The World through Arab Eyes; Imad Salamey and Frederik Pearson, ‘The collapse of Middle Eastern authoritarianism: breaking the barriers of fear and power’, Third World Quarterly 33/5 (2012), pp. 931– 948.

Conclusion 1. The story is about Sir Robert, a prestigious member of the House of Commons, and his wife that are hosting a dinner party. During the party, one of the quests, Mrs. Cheveley attempts to blackmail Sir Robert into supporting a fraudulent scheme (’a commonplace Stock Exchange swindle’) to build a canal in Argentina by recalling how Sir Robert made his fortune with some illicit money earned when the Suez Canal (a ’very great and splendid undertaking’ that had ’imperial value’ and ’was necessary that we [the UK] should have control’) was built. Mrs. Cheveley has the letter to prove his old crime. No more spoiler, but a digital copy is available at the following link: http://www.gutenberg.org/ files/885/885-h/885-h.htm (accessed 15 October 2018). 2. Source of citations: Peter Hessler, ‘Letter from Cairo. Egypt’s Failed Revolution,’ The New Yorker 2 January, 2017. 3. Source of citations: Peter Hessler, ‘Letter from Cairo. Egypt’s Failed Revolution,’ The New Yorker 2 January, 2017. 4. Marcel, He´naff, The Price of Truth: Gift, Money and Philosophy (Stanford, CA, 2010), p. 126. 5. Rex Brynen et al., Beyond the Arab Spring. Authoritarianism and Democratization in the Arab World (London, 2012). 6. Maurice Bloch, Anthropology and the Cognitive Challenge (Cambridge, 2012), p. 75. 7. Douglas North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change (Princeton, 2005), p. 28. 8. The literature on the meanings of culture is vast offering various definitions both for academic and practical (political) purposes (social and cultural psychology, sociology, cultural sociology, political science, anthology and economics). There are disputed definitions and competing arguments whether values, attitudes or behaviour determine the ‘culture’ of a particular person or a group depending on the disciplinary context. For Douglas North (new institutional economics) culture ‘consist of intergenerational transfer of norms, values and ideas (North, Understanding, p. 50). The sociologist Ann Swidler defined it as a loose ‘tool-kit of habits, skills and styles’ guiding everyday activities and interactions, which is instrumental in providing flexible ‘strategies for action’ in practical situations (Swidler 1986). In political science the term culture is understood as ‘semiotic practices’ referring to the processes of meaning-making (Wedeen 2002) that

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9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

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goes beyond the traditional understanding (Verba) of ‘political culture’. Cultural and social psychologists claim that (individual) mind and (shared, social) culture are inseparable and mutually shape each other. Anthropologists, by debating the meaning of ‘culture’, ended up fighting in the ‘culture and nature’ war (Anthropology and the Cognitive Challenge, 24–78). To sum up the common points, adaptation to the surrounding social environment is of crucial importance in understanding the meaning of culture, the role of solidarity and related ‘cultural or mental models’ guiding individual actions. North, Understanding, p. 23. Bloch, Anthropology and the Cognitive Challenge, p. 172. Mind, Brain and Society; David Inglis, Handbook of Cultural Sociology (New York, 2016), pp. 118– 123. Bloch, Anthropology and the Cognitive Challenge, pp. 172– 182. Bloch, Anthropology and the Cognitive Challenge, p. 175. North, Understanding, p. 27. For a counter-opinion see: Yizhar Be’er, ‘The Israeli media has kept us in the dark for 50 years,’þ972.mag.com, https://972mag.com/the-israeli-mediahas-kept-us-in-the-dark -for-50-years/128535/. La´szlo´ Csicsmann, Erzse´bet N Ro´zsa and Ma´te´ Szalai, The Mena Region in the Global Order: Actors, Contentious Issues And Integration Dynamics. MENARA Methodology and Concept Papers No. 4 (2017), pp. 2 – 23.

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INDEX

accountability, 25, 46, 72, 79, 145, 187 advocacy, 29, 124, 147, 191 agent, foreign, 15, 106, 124, 171, 173, 182, 187, 189, 192, 193, 195 agent, local, 172, 189 aid, see also assistance, development humanitarian and military aid effectiveness principles, 33, 224 (Notes to Chapter 2, n29), see accountability, ownership, participation, transparency aid, political, 105, 107 aid, termination of, 111 ‘aid for pain’, 17, 52, 94, 176– 78, 201, 205, see also documentation, stories of suffering and return gift AIPAC, see lobby Al-Sisi, Abdel Fattah, 117, 143, 180 alienable objects, 22, and see inalienable objects alliance, 22, 42, 54, 59 – 60, 104 allies, 61, 94, 107, 111– 112, 180 allocation, of aid and of resources, 24, 39, 47, 67, 104, 111, 128 altruism, 9, 23, 28, 32, 35, 53 Amman, 193, 204 anti-semitism, 202 anti-terrorism clause, see ATC

apartheid (state), 156 Arab League, 116–17 Arab Spring, 4, 7, 85 – 86, 89, 95, 102, 106, 112, 122– 127, 142– 143, 150–151, 162, 165, 168, 182, 195–197, definition: 214– 215 (notes to Introduction, n5) Arab unity, 5 Arab-Israeli conflict, 1, 15, 74, 84– 86, 92 Arafat, Yasser, 119, 144 armed forces, 91 arms trade (delivery, purchase weapons, import, export), 87 – 92, 154, 162 transfer agreement, 89, 91 transfer, 91 assistance development, 33, 47 –49, 124, 141– 152 from the EU, 120– 122 from the US, 109– 120 humanitarian, 48, 152– 157 military, 115– 120, 137– 140, see also assistance, from the US ATC, anti-terrorism clause, 193 authoritarianism, 4, 11, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 95, 97, 100, 141, 173, 175, 197

INDEX balance of power, 196 barter, 22, 110 bonds colonial-historical, 120 international, political, 111, 117, 131, 132, 139, 141, 188, 194, 195, 197 international, social, 8, 13, 23– 24, 26, 30, 38, 50, 54 – 55, 70, 175, 201 bribes, 24, 25 burden attached, 38, 50, 65, 66, 126 Cairo (capital of Egypt), 93, 116, 143, 196, 199, 204 Camp David Accords (1978), 4, 11, 14, 93, 116, 118 chaos, 51, 52, 59, 74 charity charity, 28, 29, 41, 43, 48, 52, 60, 66, 82, 156 religious (Islamic, Jewish), 77, 79, 185, 186, see also sadaqa, tzedakah chimera state, 45, 71, 106 CIA, 118, 190 civil society actors, 43 – 45, 105– 107, 145– 150 colonization, 1, 37, 63, 83, 87 complicity and complicit, 5, 49, 137, 156, 173, 186, 188 conditionality in general and political, 2, 70 – 75, 94, 142, 152 EU, 123, 126– 127, 130– 131, 135, 136, 144 peace, 14, 109 consent, 98, 104, 127, 146, see also obedience contemporary gift, 1 – 2, 8, 27, 38 – 75, 81 – 97, 176– 181, 182– 194, see also assistance control colonial, 10

293

of foreign aid (or: control by foreign aid), 8, 25, 30, 31, 33, 49, 62 – 64, 92, 184 Israeli, 7, 59, 76, 139, 194, 200 military and/or regime, 12, 47, 89, 91, 102, 103, 124, 134, 139, 141, 151, 191 over Palestinians, 119, 165 corruption, 24 – 25, 49, 67, 83, 161, 172, 185 counter-gift, see return gift cynicism, 4, 49, 156 decolonization, 2, 32, 83, 111, 202 deep state, 139– 140, 182, definition: 260 (Notes to Chapter 5, n18) democracy, 72, 97, 99 – 100, 127, 128, 175, 182 and Islam, see Islam and democracy lack of, 132 promotion or building by means of foreign aid, 1, 4, 12, 53, 66, 80, 84, 89, 96, 97, 102, 106, 107, 115, 118, 123, 130, 137– 139, 144, 145, 148 –151, 168, 179, 182, 190, 191, 196– 197, 198 democratic transition, see transition to democracy dependence, 20, 22, 23, 49 – 50, 54, 57, 67, 172, 181, 182 development assistance, see assistance, development dignity, 1, 3, 5, 7, 12, 49, 124, 131, 173, 189, 195– 196, 200, 202 dilemmas of foreign aid, 2, 7, 10, 15, 175, 197 documentation and documenting (stories and images of suffering, project implementation), 4, 51– 52, 72, 74, 130, 157, 176–179, 194, 201 dominance, 8, 30, 41, 47, 52 – 53, 62, 72, 82, 124, 181, 187, see also ‘control’

294

FOREIGN AID IN

domination, symbolic, 15, 28, 37, 40 donation, see also aid and gift private, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 59, 79, 155, 194 donor motives, 30, 32, 44, 57, 71, 83, 110, 120 donor state, see assistance, from the US, from EU double bind, 59, 173 Egypt, 93 – 97, 115– 117, 137– 152, 190– 192 elections, 107, 148, 182 Egypt, 142 Palestinian, 126, 134– 135, 138 elites, local, 33, 36, 63, 138 equal, equality, 14, 19, 27, 38, 52, 53, 55, 58, 72, 98, 180 EU policies Mediterranean Policy, 120 Middle East Peace Process, 120– 122 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 120, 126 exceptionalism (of the Middle East), 86, 87, 92, 115 exchange gift, 21 – 23, 25, 55, 58, see also contemporary gift money or monetary, 19 –23, 25, 26, 55, 73, 116 social, 13, 18 – 21, 25, 36, 55, 57, 58, 75 Extended Fund Facility (EEF), see macroeconomic stability fairness, 12, 49, 67, 98 fear, 41, 46, 52, 62, 78, 95, 107, 143, 149, 150, 183, 191, 195, 196, 202 foreign agent, see agent, foreign foreign aid, see assistance, development, humanitarian and military friendship, see allies, alliance fundamentalism, Islam, 1, 6, 84, 86, 93

THE

MIDDLE EAST

Gaza Strip, 2, 35, 85, 96, 111, 119, 124, 126, 135, 140, 142, 150, 156, 164, 186, 193, 194, 202 generosity, 23, 26, 32 – 33, 35, 50, 67, 70, see also altruism, gratitude GID (General Intelligence Directorate, Jordan), 118, 140 gift archaic, 24, 25, 38, 42, 56, 60, 64, 67, 189, 205 Christmas, 23 contemporary, see contemporary gift impossibility of, 67 – 75, 195– 197 merits, 22, 54 object, 38, 55, 43, 47 – 48, 80 relation, 49 – 54, see also bonds government, revolutionary, 97 grassroots organizations, 43, 44, 45, 100, 105, 149, 151, 187, 191, 194 gratitude, 33, 50, 54 – 55, 64, see also generosity Gulf states, 111, 112, 198, 206 Hamas, 84, 102, 105, 119, 126, 134, 135, 136, 137, 140, 142, 206 Holocaust, 77, 202 human rights, 49, 118, 121, 124, 126–127, 137 human rights abuses, 85, 137– 140, 150, 151, 190 –191 human suffering, 51, 94, 157 humiliation, 5, 49, 52, 54, 56, 94, 181, 188, 196, 202 identity, 49, 70, 77, 87, 100, 203, 202 illusion, 8, 50, 62, 130, 147 of stability, 3, 108, 202 imprisonment, 47, 191 inalienable objects, 22, 35, 51 – 52, 61– 62

INDEX indebtedness, 12, 23, 53, 55 –57, 58 – 59, 74 – 75, 181, 205 independence, 22, 67 political, 91, 100, 105, see also decolonialization Palestinian, 10, 93, 121 inequality, 14, 25, 34, 39, 42 (unequal), 50, 57, 58, 60, 71, 181, see also equality injustice, 51 sense of, 94, 130, 141, 181, see also justice instability regional, 4, 6, 15, 86, 107, 110, 115, 181, 195 threat of, 40, 52, 61, 74, 94, 120, 177, 181, 201 intelligence (services), 64, 86, 102, 116, 118, 139, 140, 141, 158, 190, 196, 197, 205 intervention, military, 84, 94, 181 intervention aid-related, 3, 62, 71, 103, 105, 156, 172, 181, 203 external, 10, 42, 87, 132, 146, 189 IR schools and theories, 10, 17, 31, 37, 103, 71 Iran, 4, 6, 85, 93, 94, 102, 111, 152, 172, 175, 197 Islam and democracy, 86 – 87 Israel, 11, 87, 93, 110, 115, 138, 194 Israel lobby, see lobby Israeli army (Israeli Defense Forces, IDF), 119, 137, 157, 186, 197, 203 occupation, 2, 5, 10, 14, 85, 104, 121– 22, 133, 149, 175, 192, 193, 194, 200, 202, 203, definition: 215 (notes to Introduction, n8) donor complicity and the Israeli occupation, 5, 14, 49, 137, 156, 173, 185, see also complicity

295

Jerusalem, 121, 194 Jordan, 6, 11, 102, 112, 118– 19, 138–140, 143–145, 192 justice, 6, 10, 12, 67, 98, 99, 130, 161, 177, see also injustice King Abdullah, of Jordan, 139 King Hussein, of Jordan, 139 knowledge humanitarian and development, 177, 178, 194, 202 local, 35, 63 production, 63, 92 legitimacy, 67, 81, 98 in authoritarian regimes, 98 –100 in the MIddle East, 100– 103 external or international, 15, 103– 108 leverage, political, 111, 139 liberalization, political or economic, 6, 86, 139, 143, 147 lobby, pro-Israeli, 138, 142, 180 local context, 35, 49 loyal(ty), 8, 12, 41, 47, 48, 56, 107, 190 macroeconomic stability, support for (EEF, Extended Fund Facility), 94, 143, 165 Marshall Plan, 29, 33, 61, 111 memorandums of agreement, of understanding, 93, 118 me´tis, 35, see also knowledge, local micro-macro paradox, 46 militarization of politics, 6, 87, 135 military assistance, see assistance, military military alliance review, 137 military coup in Egypt, 138, 140, 191 military expenditure, 89, 116 monetary obligations, 12, 13, 73 ‘more for more’, EU conditionality, 123 Morgenthau, Hans, 37

296

FOREIGN AID IN

Morsi, Mohammed, 138, 180, 191 Muslim Brotherhood, 89, 102, 138, 140, 142, 145, 164, 106 nakba, 77 neoliberalism, 10, 15, 102, 127, 184, 193 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 43 – 47, 145– 152, 182– 186, see also civil society actors non-monetary obligations, see monetary obligation non-violence, non-violent, 121, 135, 141, 150, 156, 185, 188 normalization (with Israel), 179, 186, 188, 190, 193, 197 obedience, 19, 51, 98, 101, 121 obligation of rivalry occupation, see Israeli occupation oppression, 7, 33, 77, 87, 93, 94, 107, 157, 182, 202, see also domination and humiliation Oslo Peace Process, 4, 84, 104, 115, 118, 134, 137, 149, 194, 200 ownership, 33, 35, 36, 40, 49, 54, 55, see also participation pain, see ‘aid for pain’ and stories of suffering Palestine, 118– 119, 121, 134– 137, 144– 145, 149– 151, 156, 190– 194, definition: 214 (notes to Introduction, n3), see also PNA Palestinian question, 2, 5, 92, 143, 144, 188 state, 121, 134, 136, 143 parasite, 52, 94, 205 participation local, 33, 36, 44, 49, 72, 204 political, 145, 147, 191, 196

THE

MIDDLE EAST

peace agreement Israel-Egypt, 4, 11, 13, 85, 93, see also Camp David Accords Israel-Jordan, 4, 11, 85, 93, 118, 139 peace process, see Oslo Peace Process perceptions methodology, 16 – 17 on aid, local, 21, 34 – 35, 46, 73, 132, 134, 136, 138, 155, 183 on justice, 5, 6, 10, 12, 49, 67, 81, 98, 161 persecution, of the political opposition, 47, 59, 102, 106, 165, 191, 192 philanthropy, see charity PLO Palestine Liberation Organization, 4, 6, 12, 93, 134 Charter, 5 PNA, Palestine National Authority, 1, 11, 13, 102, 105, 112, 115, 118–19, 135, 149 political reforms, see also reforms, liberalization politics of exceptionalism, see exceptionalism post-colonial perspectives, 29, 33, 66 post-development, 33, 34, 37 poverty, 16, 27, 30, 35, 51, 52, 64, 129, 205 poverty reduction, 8, 37, 46, 48, 80, 126 power of the weak, 52 –53, 181 power over vs. to, 52 prestige, 28, 56, 60, 64, 100 price, 19, 20 of non-monetary nature, 71, 73, see also reciprocity, non-material to be paid by donors, 69, 150, 152 of getting foreign aid, to be paid by recipients, 24, 50, 67, 69, 70 – 75, 188 promise, 3, 35, 37, 40, 51, 63, 70, 94, 108, 118, 133, 137, 179, 201, see also illusion

INDEX public opinion measured by Arab Barometer, 84, 165–168, 172– 173 Eurobarometer (EB), 128– 130 Neighbourhood Barometer (NB), 166– 171 proposal, see documentation Quartet, 135 Ramallah, 149, 196, 204 reciprocity, 8, 11, 19, 23, 54 – 63, 176– 181, see also indebtedness and return gifts non-material, 53, 54, 57, 94, 205 recognition, 13, 28, 50, 55, 56, 59– 60, 68, 70, 110, 122 reforms, political, 3, 6, 14, 45, 48, 82, 85, 94, 105, 107, 115, 119, 141– 145, 161, see also democratization and liberalization regime stability, 3, 95, 105, 146, 152 relief (organizations), 82, 126, 126, 156 global poor, 62 Jewish poor, 79, see also tzedakah rent, 104, 157– 158, 161 rentier state, 158 repayment, 56, 73 reputation, 128, 190 resource and resource scarcity, 48, 103, 158 return gifts, 50 –54, 137, 138, 176– 181 revolt, 28, 51, 59, 201 revolution, 97, 124, 133, 142, 145, 173, 182 rivalry, obligation or principle of, 43, 50, 81 sacrifice, 15, 67 – 70, 78, 139, 165, 195 sadaqa, 79 Sadat, Anvar, 116, 117

297

Saudi-Arabia, 89, 102, 111, 131, 142, 149, 152, 162, 164, 172, see also Gulf states SCAF (Supreme Council of Armed Forces, Egypt), 117, 139, 164 secret service, 118, see also intelligence security cooperation between Israel and the PNA, 118– 119, 138, 168 security, Israeli, 11, 93 105, 110 self-determination, 1, 131, 189 Palestinian, 7, 175 self-interest, 9, 20 –23, 50, 54, 129, 181 shame (ashamed, shameful), 52, 54, 78, 86, 104, 171, 181, 186, 188, 195, 201– 02 slave, slavery, 53, 98 social bond, see bond, social exchange, see exchange, social relation, 10, 13, 18 – 20, 22, 38, 55, 57, 194, see also gift solidarity, 25, 26, 42, 46, 57, 60– 62, 64, 103 kinship, 41 international or global, 7, 13, 27, 29, 30, 33, 35, 45, 49, 80, 121, 127, 130, 178 Islamic, 77 – 79, 80 sovereignty, 7, 12, 32, 72, 109, 151, 189, see also intervention Palestinian, 6, 86, 94, 126, 144, 162, 200 over the occupied territories, Israeli, 194, see also 214 n2 and 215 n8. Notes to the Introduction spirit of the gift, 65, 67, 204 spiritual essence, 66, 67, 85, 150– 151, 188, 200, 203 stability political, 104 regional, 3, 11, 15, 40, 85, 89, 93 – 94, 109, 120, 152, 158, 180, 202

298

FOREIGN AID IN

sticks and carrot, 74, 123 stigma, 24, 25, 186, 193, see also shame stories of suffering, 17, 35, 52, 71, 178– 179, 202, 205, see also documentation and ‘aid for pain’ struggle between nobles, 43 subsidies, 98, 102, 141, 146, 158, 161 substitute for war, 8, 26, 37, 54, 59 – 61, 62 – 64, 95, 134 suspicion, suspicious, 187, 190, 204 symbolic domination, 15, 28, 40 Syrian refugees, 112, 124, 130, 143, 152, 154– 156 war, 4, 84, 85, 115, 118, 139, 144, 154– 156, 180 tax (tax exemption), 25, 107, 158, 194 threat, 40, 52, 133, 181, 201, 205 torture, 47, 101, 204 trade-off, 59, 83, 105, 134, 158

THE

MIDDLE EAST

traditions, 77, 79, 81, 183, 184 transition to democracy, 66, 84, 147 transparency, 25, 46, 72, 79, 184 Turkey, 139, 156, 206 tzedakah, 79 – 80 UN Charter, 91 United Arab Emirates, 142, 152, 162, 164, see also Gulf states USAID, 37 US Middle East Policy, aid included, 109–118, 131–156, see also EU policy on Middle East Peace Process violence, 87, 121, 135, 196 welfare (services, goods), 45, 106, 148 West Bank, 2, 85, 96, 102, 104, 105, 111, 112, 119, 126, 143, 156 zakat, 78 – 79