Forced Migration and Human Security in the Eastern Orthodox World 9780815394709, 9781351185233

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Forced Migration and Human Security in the Eastern Orthodox World

The conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the European refugee crisis have led to a dramatic increase in forced displacement across Europe. Fleeing war and violence, millions of refugees and internally displaced people face the social and political cultures of the predominantly Christian Orthodox countries in the post-Soviet space and Southeastern Europe. This book examines the ambivalence of Orthodox churches and other religious communities, some of which have provided support to migrants and displaced populations while others have condemned their arrival. How have religious communities and state institutions engaged with forced migration? How has forced migration impacted upon religious practices, values and political structures in the region? In which ways do Orthodox churches promote human security in relation to violence and ‘the other’? The book explores these questions by bringing together an international team of scholars to examine extensive material in the former Soviet states (Ukraine, Russia, Georgia and Belarus), Southeastern Europe (Turkey, Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania), Western Europe and the United States. Lucian N. Leustean is Reader in Politics and International Relations at Aston University, Birmingham, United Kingdom.

Routledge Religion, Society and Government in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet States Series Editor: Lucian N. Leustean Reader in Politics and International Relations at Aston University, Birmingham, United Kingdom

This Series seeks to publish high quality monographs and edited volumes on religion, society and government in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet States by focusing primarily on three main themes: the history of churches and religions (including, but not exclusively, Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism) in relation to governing structures, social groupings and political power; the impact of intellectual ideas on religious structures and values; and the role of religions and faith-based communities in fostering national identities from the nineteenth century until today. The Series aims to advance the latest research on these themes by exploring the multi-facets of religious mobilisation at local, national and supranational levels. It particularly welcomes studies which offer an interdisciplinary approach by drawing on the fields of history, politics, international relations, religious studies, theology, law, sociology and anthropology. 5 The Catholic Church and Soviet Russia, 1917–39 Dennis J. Dunn 6  Religion and Politics in the Orthodox World The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Challenges of Modernity, 1st Edition Paschalis Kitromilides 7 Orthodox Religion and Politics in Contemporary Eastern Europe On Multiple Secularisms and Entanglements, 1st Edition Edited by Tobias Koellner 8 Religion during the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict Edited by Elizabeth A. Clark, Dmytro Vovk 9 Forced Migration and Human Security in the Eastern Orthodox World Edited by Lucian N. Leustean

Forced Migration and Human Security in the Eastern Orthodox World Edited by Lucian N. Leustean

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 selection and editorial matter, Lucian N. Leustean; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Lucian N. Leustean to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-0-8153-9470-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-351-18523-3 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

To Elisabeta, in her memory

Contents

List of tablesix Notes on contributorsx Forewordxiv PAUL MOJZES

Acknowledgementsxx Abbreviationsxxii Introduction: Eastern Orthodoxy, forced migration and human security; concepts and policy perspectives1 LUCIAN N. LEUSTEAN

PART I

Religion, migration and human security in the former Soviet states

23

  1 Orthodox churches, nation-building and forced migration in Ukraine

25

VIKTOR YELENSKY

  2 The Russian Orthodox Church, human security, migration and refugees: concepts, strategies and actions

66

ALICJA CURANOVIĆ

  3 The state’s guardian angel? The Georgian Orthodox Church and human security

106

TORNIKE METREVELI

  4 The Russian–Ukrainian conflict and the European refugee crisis: the policies of state and church and civil society in Belarus ALENA ALSHANSKAYA

126

viii  Contents PART II

Religion, migration and human security in Southeastern Europe

145

  5 The impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on Turkey’s state capacity

147

KIVANÇ ULUSOY

  6 The Orthodox Church of Greece: church–state relations, migratory patterns and sociopolitical challenges

164

GEORGIOS E. TRANTAS

  7 The humanitarian engagement of faith-based organisations in Serbia: balancing between the Vulnerable Human and the (In)Secure (Nation)State

207

MARTA STOJIĆ MITROVIĆ AND ALEKSANDRA DJURIĆ MILOVANOVIĆ

  8 The Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the refugee crisis

229

DANIELA KALKANDJIEVA

  9 Policies and perspectives on human security and international mobility in the Romanian Orthodox Church

251

IULIANA CONOVICI

PART III

Eastern Orthodoxy and migration in Western Europe and the United States

273

10 From Orthodox migrants to the migration of the Orthodox church(es): making sense of the Orthodox presence in Western Europe

275

JEAN-FRANÇOIS MAYER

11 Hospitality for strangers? Policies and practices of Eastern Christian churches and charities in support of new migrants to the United States and refugees abroad

290

JERRY G. PANKHURST

Index307

Tables

I.1  Arrivals in selected European countries (2015–18) I.2  Stranded migrants in selected European countries (2015–18) I.3 Word frequency, nine interviews in Belgrade, Serbia (February 2018) I.4 Word frequency, 16 interviews in Kyiv, Ukraine (March–September 2018) 8.1  Migrant flows in Southeastern Europe (2015–17) 8.2 Comparative translations of the statement of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church on the refugee crisis, 25 September 2015

7 7 11 12 232 237

Contributors

Alena Alshanskaya studied Orthodox theology, religious studies and philosophy in Minsk (Belarus) and holds a PhD from the Department of East European History at Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz. She is the author of Der Europa-Diskurs der Russischen Orthodoxen Kirche (1996–2011) (Peter Lang, 2016) and co-editor with Andreas Gietzen and Christina Hadjiafxenti of Imagining Byzantium: Perceptions, Patterns, Problems in Eastern and Southeastern Europe (Römisch-Germanisches Zentralmuseum, 2018). Her research focuses on the history, legal culture and contemporary politics of the Russian Orthodox Church in relation to Belarus and the European Union. Iuliana Conovici holds a PhD in Political Sciences from the University of Bucharest and, since 2013, has been an Advisor to the State Secretary for Religious Affairs of the Romanian Government. She is the author of Ortodoxia în România postcomunistă. Reconstrucţia unei identităţi publice (Reconstructing the public identity of the Romanian Orthodox Church in post-Communist Romania), 2 vols. (Eikon, 2009–2010) and editor of Organizații cu profil religios în economia socială din România (Faith-based organisations in the social economy sector in Romania) (Polirom/FDSC, 2013). Alicja Curanović is Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Relations at the University of Warsaw. She holds a PhD in Political Science and her main research interests are international relations in the postSoviet area; Russian foreign policy; religious factor in international relations; perception, identity, image and status in politics. She has conducted research at Harvard University, Columbia University, Stanford University, the Russian State University for Humanistic Studies and MGIMO. She is the author of The Religious Factor in Russia’s Foreign Policy (Routledge, 2012) and has published journal articles in Politics and Religion, Nationalities Papers and Religion, State and Society. Aleksandra Djurić Milovanović is an anthropologist working as an Associate Research Professor at the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in Belgrade. Her area of expertise includes the relationship between religion, migration, human rights and minority

Contributors  xi

groups. She is the author of Double Minorities in Serbia. Distinctive Aspects of the ­Religion and Ethnicity of Romanians in Vojvodina (Institute for Balkan Studies SASA, 2015) and co-editor of Orthodox Christian Renewal Movements in Eastern Europe (Palgrave, 2017). Daniela Kalkandjieva is a Bulgarian scholar affiliated with Sofia University St Kliment Ohridski. She holds a PhD in History from Central European University (Budapest) and was a fellow of the Aleksanteri Institute (Helsinki), the Institute of Human Sciences (IWM, Vienna), and the Centre for Advanced Studies (Sofia). She is the author of The Russian Orthodox Church, 1917–1948: From Decline to Resurrection (Routledge 2015); ‘Russian Ecclesiastical Geopolitics between the Two World Wars’, CAS Sofia Working Papers Series, No. 10 (2018); ‘Eastern Orthodoxy and its Churches in Central and Eastern Europe’ in András Máté-Tóth and Gergely Rosta (eds.), Focus on Religion in Central and Eastern Europe: A Regional View (De Gruyter, 2016), ‘The Bulgarian Orthodox Church at Crossroads: Between Nationalism and Pluralism’ in Andrii Krawchuk and Thomas Bremer (eds.), Orthodox Christian Encounters of Identity and Otherness: Values, SelfReflection, Dialogue (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); and ‘А Comparative Analysis on Church-State Relations in Eastern Orthodoxy: Concepts, Models and Principles’, Journal of Church and State, 2011, 53(4), pp. 587–614. Lucian N. Leustean is Reader in Politics and International Relations at Aston University, Birmingham, United Kingdom. His publications include, as author, The Ecumenical Movement and the Making of the European Community (Oxford University Press, 2014) and Orthodoxy and the Cold War. Religion and Political Power in Romania, 1947–65 (Palgrave, 2008) and editor of Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First Century (Routledge, 2014) and Orthodox Christianity and Nationalism in Nineteenth Century Southeastern Europe (Fordham University Press, 2014). Jean-François Mayer holds a PhD in History from the University of Lyon. He is the author of ten books and numerous articles dealing with religious movements and religious developments in the contemporary world (for more details see, www.mayer.info). In 2007, he founded the Religioscope Institute in Fribourg, Switzerland. He is the editor of Religioscope (www. religion.info), an independent website offering news and analyses on the role and place of religion in our world, and an associate editor of Religion Watch, a newsletter monitoring trends in contemporary religion. Tornike Metreveli is an International Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of St Gallen, Switzerland. He holds a PhD in Sociology (magna cum laude) from the University of Bern where he received a Swiss Government’s Excellence Scholarship. Before joining the University of St Gallen, he was Swiss National Science Foundation research fellow at the Davis Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University, and a Hansard Society Fellow at the London School of Economics and the House of Commons

xii  Contributors

(UK Parliament). A student of nationalism, Tornike’s postdoctoral project examines the g­eopolitical implications of inter-confessional relations in Ukraine. His publications include ‘Rhyming the National Spirit: A Comparative Inquiry into the Works and Activities of Taras Shevchenko and Ilia Chavchavadze’, Nationalities Papers, 2019, 45 (5) and ‘An Undisclosed Story of Roses: Church, State, and Nation in C ­ ontemporary Georgia’, Nationalities Papers, 2016, 44 (5), pp. 694–712. Paul Mojzes is Professor Emeritus of Religious Studies and the former academic dean and provost at Rosemont College in Pennsylvania. He is a native of Yugoslavia and immigrated to the United States in 1957. He received an AB from Florida Southern College and has earned a PhD from Boston University, and has written or edited 25 books, dozens of monographs and over 100 academic journal articles. He was the co-editor of The Journal of Ecumenical Studies and is the founder and editor-in-chief of Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe. He is the author of Religious Liberty in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Before and after the Great Transformation (East European Monographs, 1992), Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans (Continuum, 1995), Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century (Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), and editor of North American Churches and the Cold War (William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2018). He served as interim director of the doctoral programme in Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Gratz College (PA) in 2017–18. Jerry G. Pankhurst is Professor Emeritus of Sociology and of Russian and Central Eurasian Studies at Wittenberg University, Springfield, Ohio, USA. He is a sociologist of religion and politics with a career-long interest in Soviet/Russian and Eurasian culture and politics. He was a Fulbright Scholar in 2012 and a visiting professor in 2015 at the University of Tartu, Estonia. His publications include, co-author with Alar Kilp of ‘Religion, the Russian Nation and the State: Domestic and International Dimensions: An Introduction’, Religion, State and Society, 2013, 41(3), pp. 226–243; co-editor with Victor Roudometof and Alex Agadjanian of Eastern Orthodoxy in a Global Age: Tradition Faces the 21st Century (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005) and with Sharon Houseknecht of Family, Religion and Social Change in Diverse Societies (Oxford University Press, 2000). He is currently working on a project that examines the pattern of leadership in the Russian Orthodox Church in adapting to the changing social and political conditions after 1991. Marta Stojić Mitrović is an ethnologist and anthropologist and works as an Assistant Research Professor at the Institute of Ethnography of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in Belgrade. In her work, she focuses on discourses and practices related to the topics of migration, citizenship, human rights and discriminations in Serbian, Balkan and European context. She is co-author with Barbara Beznec and Marc Speer of Governing the Balkan

Contributors  xiii Route: Macedonia, Serbia and the European Border Regime (Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Southeast Europe, 2016). Georgios E. Trantas is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow at Aston University, Birmingham, United Kingdom. He was a Predoctoral, D ­ octoral and Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Erfurt in the research programme ‘DFG-Graduiertenkolleg 1412, Cultural Orientations and Social Structures in South-Eastern Europe’. His research interest focuses on the p­ olitics of religion and cultural diplomacy, the exercise of soft power by churches functioning as international organisations, including the process of Europeanisation in conjunction with the notion of Europeanness, and by extension self-perception, nationhood, citizenship and cultural–political i­dentity. He researches intraEuropean migration and the formation of the s­o-called ‘religioscapes’ with a focus on religious art and culture as spatial markers of migrant communities in the public sphere. He is the author of Being and Belonging: A Comparative Examination of the Greek and Cypriot Orthodox Churches’ Attitudes to ‘Europeanisation’ in Early 21st Century (Peter Lang, 2018). Kıvanç Ulusoy is Professor of Political Science at Istanbul University. He was a Fulbright Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, a Jean Monnet Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, and a Fellow at the Madrid Diplomatic School. His areas of research include regime change and democratisation, Turkish politics and foreign policy, Spanish politics, American foreign policy and foreign policy of Israel. His publications include ‘Special Issue: Geopolitics of Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean’, The Journal of Balkans and the Near East, 2016, 18(4) and, as co-editor with Andreas Stergiou and Menahem Blondheim, Conflict and Prosperity: Geopolitics and Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean (Israeli Academic Press, 2017). Viktor Yelensky is Member of Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine and Head of the Parliament’s Subcommittee for Freedom of Conscience. He earned his MA (History) Diploma from the Kyiv State University and his Candidate of Science and Doctor of Science Diplomas from the Institute of Philosophy at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. He worked as a Researcher at the Institute of Sociology and the Institute of Philosophy in Kyiv and taught at the Ukrainian Catholic University and the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine. He was the editor of Lyudina i Svit (Human Being and World), the Ukrainian Journal for Religious Studies, and head of the Kyiv Bureau of Radio Liberty and the Ukrainian Association for Religious Liberty. He is the author of Religiya pislya komunismu (Religion after Communism) (Dragomanov National Pedagogical University, 2002) and Velyke povernennya: religiya u globalnyi polititsi I mizchnarodnih vidnosinah ­kintsya XX – pochatku XXI stolit (The Great Return: Religion in Global Politics and International Relation at the End of the 20th – the Beginning of the 21st Century) (UCU Publishing, 2013).

Foreword Paul Mojzes

Of the three major branches of Christianity – Eastern Orthodoxy, C ­ atholicism, and Protestantism – Eastern Orthodoxy suffered the most, especially in the last several centuries. Originally located in Eastern Europe and sections of Asia and Africa, it has become a worldwide community due to outward migrations, with its diaspora located on all continents. In the lands of its traditional location, due to the historic vagaries, nearly all of them had at one time or another fallen under hostile foreign control. Without even attempting a short historical survey, vast territories fell under centuries-long control of the Islamic Ottoman Empire. Countries of present-day Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania and Moldavia as well as Armenia, Southern Russia and the Near East1 remained, until the twentieth century, and in some cases, to the present day, under Islamic control. Ottoman oppression caused the Orthodox population of Serbia to migrate into lands of the Hapsburg Empire, such as the migration mostly from the region of Kosovo into the region of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina named Military Krajina and into predominantly Hungarian territories of present day Vojvodina as far as St Andrea in the vicinity of Budapest under Patriarch Arsenije Čarnojević in 1690 and under Patriarch Arsenije IV Jovanović in 1740. Another mighty central European empire, the Hapsburg, Roman Catholic, had long been a rival to the Ottoman Turks and conquered territories of Ukraine, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. Still further incursions into the Russian heartland were Polish–Lithuanian, Napoleonic and Germanic invasions, giving even the mightiest Orthodox Empire the experience of being under foreign control, which usually meant attempts at conversion and huge dislocations of the population. The Nazi German military invasion penetrated deeply into the Soviet Union creating, not only monumental losses in human life, but huge displacement of population and the capture of millions of Soviet prisoners of war carried into German camps. Most recently came the establishment of a Communist empire, first in the lands of Tsarist Russia, then Ukraine, Byelorus, Georgia, and Armenia, and post-Second World War Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. Only Greece succeeded in defeating a Communist insurrection, but even that

Foreword  xv

exposed it to long periods of instability and right-wing military dictatorship. It should be noted that the Russian Orthodox Church suffered by far the most thoroughgoing martyrdom and persecution of any Christian church in the 20 centuries of Christian history and was by the late 1930s brought to the brink of extinction. The Communist rule also caused huge outward migrations and difficulties in survival that prompted many waves of escapes and westward migrations. The Soviet empire and its satellite governments collapsed only as recently as 1990. These are the raw facts of the experience of persecution that resulted in mass deaths, persecutions, pressures to apostatise and atheise, loss of freedom and autonomy of entire nations, which then resulted – among other calamities – in massive outward migrations of Orthodox, as well as other populations. Using an oversimplified analogy that can be applied, not merely to the former Yugoslavia, but to the entire Southeast and Eastern European space, imagine that many cooks over an extended time decided to prepare a stew and used an oversupply of ingredients, some good and nourishing but some too salty, peppery, sour and bitter. The entire mixture did not taste good and caused indigestion and convulsions. The local religions possessed good ingredients to offer which could make the food delicious. Judaism offered tsedek, righteousness, Christianity offered agape, unconditional love, and Islam offered salam, peace – all are enticing, sweet as honey. But contrary to expectation, the stew remained bitter tasting. Why? The reasons are complex, but important ones are that the religious institutions fell short of practicing what they preached and that they were historically fierce rivals in which enmity prevailed over their kinder message. Thus, many of their followers, and even more importantly, many of their leaders, added ingredients that made the food harmful, even poisonous. What contributed to the difficult digestion? There are three main reasons. The first is the geographic feature. For great powers from outside the area, Eastern Europe provided desirable pathways offered by its river valleys. The terrain did not present great obstacles to military takeover. But the mountainous terrain was in the way for easy contact by local people with each other and prevented coalescing into a larger, more stable state structure that could rebuff the great powers. Tribal and later ethnic loyalties were more conducive to rivalries than to cooperation. The religious communities followed the archetypal arrangement of forming a symbiotic union between the people and the faith for which I use the term ­‘ethnoreligion’. Until the modern age, it was religion that provided the primary social identity, and so people called themselves Orthodox, Catholics, (and in cases of attempted mergers ‘Uniates’), Jews, Muslims, and Protestants. But with the rise of European nationalism, ethnicity or nationality became far more determinative for group and individual identity. Most definitions of religion claim that religion is one’s ultimate or absolute allegiance to God, but it seems clear in the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries that it is ideology and politics that elicit for many, if not for most, people their

xvi  P. Mojzes

primary commitment in life and in death. Religion is often reduced to a practical identity marker between these neighbouring but rival nationalities, lasting even in death, as most cemeteries are segregated. It is perhaps not surprising that the late Croat lawyer/sociologist, Željko Mardešić, better known under his pseudonym, Jakov Jukić, pointed out that in our time politicians often sound and behave like priests, while priests (or other religious leaders) behave and sound like politicians. Since most of these ethnic groups lived for centuries under different great powers, different cultural outlooks were imprinted into their collective psyche; their religious affiliation sometimes defended them from assimilation by their larger imperial neighbours. The second is that differences in their historical trajectory caused the different nationalities, which were being rearranged after the First World War, to either p­artition or merge into nation states with different expectations, aspirations and grievances. Two ideologies, extreme right-wing nazism/fascism and later extreme left-wing communism seemed to offer a chance for a more unified existence, but under the constraint of decisive repression of both religion and overt nationalism. Both ideologies crashed, offering a chance for democratic self-determination, that again appears to be threatened by the sirencall of authoritarianism. Third, during the post-Second World War period when all religions were unequally restricted, and even persecuted, religious communities began to seek ecumenical cooperation. Ecumenism in Eastern Europe coincided with the worldwide growth in the theory and practice of ecumenism and interreligious dialogue. However, it was a reluctant ecumenism, especially among the two largest churches, the Orthodox and the Catholic Church. Ecclesiastic and t­heological meetings did take place, the smaller Protestant churches were also ecumenically awakened, tentative outreach to Muslims took place, but much of it was more for external consumption than a genuine local enthusiasm for greater religious unity or cooperation. When members of a community met among themselves, thinking they were not heard by outsiders, often they would speak badly about the others. Few realised that dialogue is not merely a photo opportunity or ‘an empty social conversation’ but that it should be a verbal encounter aimed at listening and learning, a genuine give-and-take, a deeper perception and appropriation of truth. Dialogue which ‘does not lead to self-examination and self-correction is a foolish sham’.2 Whichever ecumenical relationships were created prior to the 1990s did not really hold up well when c­ ommunism imploded. Three multi-ethnic Eastern European states split up: The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, each of which had Orthodox populations. No war broke out between Czechs and Slovaks, but the other two countries did not avoid it. In the case of Yugoslavia, after Tito’s death the underground fissures started putting great stress on the federation, and within a decade a series of wars broke out. I do not wish here to lay blame, though I myself am convinced that all are to some degree guilty, but some are guiltier than others.3 Not only was the final result of the war bad – instead of one medium-size

Foreword  xvii influential E ­ uropean country with a good standing in the world community, Yugoslavia ended being partitioned into seven small countries with a fairly unenviable international reputation. But far worse than the final structural outcome, the wars, especially in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, were incredibly cruel and in several instances genocidal.4 There is lack of consensus as to who started it, promoted it, contributed to it, is responsible for it, etc., but particularly alarming is that there is a great deal of genocide denial by not more than a few political and religious leaders and citizens. Religious communities during these wars were both peacemakers and warmongers. There were several meetings by the top leadership with the Orthodox patriarch, Catholic cardinal and Muslim reis-ul-ulema issuing thoughtful, deeply religious and humane appeals for ending the war.5 These were eagerly promoted in the international circles but not very much domestically. The religious communities also contributed to charitable actions and some of the smaller Protestant churches and the Jewish communities acted nobly, even courageously, distributing aid, not only among their own members, but among all in need. However, one can read many documentary accounts but also see on the internet military and paramilitary units being blessed by religious leaders and then heading into action killing civilians, torturing, raping, stealing, harassing, deporting, etc. Some clergy themselves took up arms, and others issued statements such as ‘it is worse to forgive a murder than to commit it’.6 At the end of the wars only a small number of perpetrators were tried and punished and there are still significant segments of the population who claim that perpetrators of other religions and ethnicities did it and deserve to be punished, but not ‘our own heroic defenders’ of the homeland. Church leaders ‘were either running with the perpetrators or were at least complicit spectators of the genocide.…’7 The guilt that rests upon Christendom (and other religious communities) is more than the sum total of individual mistakes and has confronted the faith with a credibility crisis. Among outsiders, cynicism and atheism has been fortified. Among communicants and constituents, uncertainty and distrust prevail. The pronouncements of church leaders carry no special authority even among members, let alone in the nations at large.8 Both during the war by inciting their warriors and after the war by standing by them and defending even their genocidal deeds, the vast majority of the clergy provide unreserved support in the alleged defence of their own people. In doing so they exercised the priestly function of religious communities (even in Islam where there are no priests, imams and hodzhas functionally play this priestly role) of defending their flock, functioning as pastors or shepherds. What is missing in Balkan churches, mosques and synagogues are prophetic voices and sages who teach wisdom. The prophetic function is to be critical of the abuses in one’s own religion and the desire to return the people unto the right path. The writers of wisdom documents assess reality in a profound, rather than superficial, propagandist way. The rigidly hierarchical structure in

xviii  P. Mojzes

some of the churches tends to suppress the rise of dissenting voices in the lower ranks, due to the fear of disciplinary sanctions. In this area there were few, if any, religious leaders who would speak from a transnational or a transcendent vantage point. To briefly go back to my initial analogy, the prophets and sages did add some honey, but in much too small quantities whereas many ‘priests’ continue to pump additional bitterness into the stew. Exceptions are the few interreligious councils that developed dialogue and humanitarian assistance by providing medicine, food, clothing, lodging and so forth. The late President Boris Trajkovski of the Republic of Macedonia, beginning in 2001, promoted both international and local Jewish–Christian–Muslim dialogue, which worked effectively towards dialogue and reconciliation, but gradually ceased to function. A variety of efforts have been made since the end of military confrontation to work towards healing the wounds and the traumas, address the suffering, and earnestly explore avenues for repentance, forgiveness and reconciliation. Some progress has been made, but it seems that insufficient time passed to heal the deep human and material losses sustained in the wars of the 1990s and the continuously unresolved problems. As someone remarked ‘peace’ is viewed as another way to continue the wars of the partition of Yugoslavia. Vjekoslav Perica, one of the most well-informed and balanced observers of religious development in the region, has pointed out in two of his recent articles that ‘Political Catholicism’ in Croatia and ‘Political Orthodoxy’ in Serbia are moving in a direction of a very troubling symbiosis of hard-line, right-wing, chauvinistic nationalist politics and the official majority churches.9 Similar tendencies exist in Russia, Ukraine, Montenegro and Macedonia. Political and religious crises are far from over. This book is dedicated to emphasise issues arising of the large number of forcible and voluntary migrations over the span of many centuries. Largescale migrations are not a new phenomenon – similar migrations took place in the Middle Ages, then during the Balkan wars 1912–13, the First World War, after the Conference of Lausanne 1922–23, and even more so during the Second World War. Most of these deportations and migrations occurred during and immediately after wars or economic disasters, such as flight of Balkan Muslims to Turkey, flight of Jews to Israel, of Germans to Germany, Italians to Italy, Hungarians fleeing their homeland in 1956 in transit to the West by way of ­Austria and Yugoslavia, Bulgarian Turks and Pomaks being expelled to Turkey, Albanians fleeing Albania, usually to Italy, Greece, and the West by way of Yugoslavia, etc. Large exoduses of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, and mixed ­marriage couples from Bosnia and Herzegovina headed to Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, as well as to Western Europe. By and large Western countries were ­willing to absorb these enormous movements of population, though not without difficulties of adjustment. In the 1990s there were large exoduses of Serbs from Krajina and Bosnia, a large exodus of Albanians from Kosovo to Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro and then, subsequent to their return, the exodus of Serbs from Kosovo to Serbia.

Foreword  xix This is why it is amazing and ironic to see the resistance to the migrants from the Near East, especially Syria. Their ultimate goal seems to be the more affluent Western countries, but in their transit, there is sometimes angry rejection of these refugees. The problem in ex-Yugoslavia is that these migrations come so soon after these countries suffered great devastation, the number of refugees is so large and so sudden, and most of them are Muslims. Europeans are afraid of being overwhelmed, even ‘occupied’. It seems that the Balkan countries have greater justification for their concern than Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary, whose own refugees had been so generously welcomed in the West, and even by Yugoslavia, but who now show so little sympathy when a different group of people encounter similar or even greater threats to their lives. It is encouraging to read about volunteers who extend humanitarian welcome to these suffering people.

Notes 1 Not listed are other countries that were under Ottoman control that were not predominantly Eastern Orthodox. 2 Franklin Littell, The Crucifixion of the Jews: The Failure of Christians to Understand the Jewish Experience, Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1986, p. 3. 3 Paul Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans, New York: Continuum, 1995, pp. 152–175. 4 Paul Mojzes, Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century, Rowman & Littlefield, 2011, pp. 131ff. 5 Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno, pp. 147–148. 6 Cited in a newspaper report during the war the source of which I did not preserve. 7 Commentary by Frankiln Littell to the lead story by Simon Wisenthal in The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness. Ed. by Simon Wiesenthal, New York: Schocken Books, 1997, p. 199. 8 Ibid., pp. 199–200. 9 Vjekoslav Perica, ‘Power, Corruption and Dissent: Varieties of Contemporary Croatian Political Catholicism’, Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, 2015, 35 (4), Article 2: 5. And Vjekoslav Perica, ‘Serbian Jerusalem: Religious Nationalism, Globalization and the Invention of a Holy Land in Europe’s Periphery, 1985–2017’, Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, 2017, 37 (6), Article 3: 68, 75; available at http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/ (accessed on 26 March 2019).

Acknowledgements

The idea for this volume emerged from contradictory messages I encountered in the mass media regarding the ways in which religious communities responded to the refugee crisis in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and Southeastern Europe. Many reports indicated that religious communities provided shelter and support for those who fled areas affected by violence and crossed the Aegean Sea. At the same time, a number of reports referred to clergy who voiced concerns and expressed their dissatisfaction with migrants. The religious precept of ‘welcoming strangers’ is continually challenged by the politicisation of religion that feeds on fears. This volume draws extensively on the expertise provided by local scholars with linguistic proficiency in countries in Southeastern Europe and the post-Soviet space. I am very grateful to all of these scholars for their invaluable expertise. With the support of a British Academy grant (IC2\100047) for a project on ‘Forced Migration, Religious Diplomacy and Human Security in the Eastern Orthodox World’ (January–December 2018), I co-organised workshops in ­Belgrade (‘Religion and Migration in the Eastern Orthodox World’, June 2018) and in Kyiv (‘Religion, Migration and Social Change in the Eastern Orthodox World’, September 2018). I am very grateful to Dr Aleksandra Djurić Milovanović, Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts; Dr Vsevolod Samokhvalov, Liege University, Belgium; Professor Viktor Stepanenko, the Institute of Sociology, the National Academy of ­Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv; and Professor Viktor Yelenski, MP Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the National Pedagogical Dragomanov University, who ensured the successful logistics of organising these workshops. My thanks go to all workshop participants for their feedback and thoughtprovoking discussions and, in particular, to Dr Erin Wilson, University of Groningen; Professor Klaus Buchenau, University of Regensburg; Peter ­Pavlovic, the Conference of European Churches and the Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe, Brussels; Dr Biljana Sikimić, the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts; Dr Davor Džalto, American University of Rome; Professor Emeritus Grace Davie, Exeter University; Professor Paul Mojzes, Rosemont College, Pennsylvania; Professor Valentina Izmirlieva, Columbia University; Dr Andreas Önver

Acknowledgements  xxi

Cetrez, Uppsala University; Dr Tetiana Kalenychenko, the National Pedagogical Dragomanov University; Professor Liudmyla Fylypovych, the Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine; Dr Tymofii Brik, the Kyiv School of Economics; Dr Aram Vartikyan, Yerevan State University and Dr Alar Kilp, University of Tartu, for presenting their work. This volume has been completed during the autumn of 2018 and spring of 2019 thanks to a fellowship in residence at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS), Amsterdam. I am grateful for the constructive atmosphere and the feedback received from the NIAS fellows and members of staff, in particular to Professor Jan Willem Duyvendak, Dr Angelie Sens, Fenneke Wekker, Kahliya Ronde, Yvonne Stommel, Petry Kievit-Tyson, Dindy van Maanen, Charles Lambertus, Trinette Zecevic-Boulogne, Astrid Schulein and Annika Weites. My thanks go to Peter Sowden, his team at Routledge, and Tom Gale and Charlotte Parkins for their constant support throughout the publication process. Last but not least, my many thanks go to Deborah, Clara and Maia for accompanying me on my journeys despite not always being there physically. I dedicate this volume to the memory of my grandmother, Elisabeta, who passed away a few days before the Kyiv workshop.

Abbreviations

ACOB Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops in the USA ADRA Adventist Development and Relief Agency AIDROM Ecumenical Association of Churches in Romania AFAD Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (Turkey) AKP Justice and Development Party (Turkey) AUCCRO All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations BOC Bulgarian Orthodox Church CAT Christian Action and Networking against Trafficking CCME Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe CEC Conference of European Churches CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CROCEU Committee of Representatives of the Orthodox Churches to the European Union CRS Catholic Relief Services DPR Donetsk People’s Republic EPP European Peoples’ Party ERF European Refugee Fund ERP Ecumenical Refugee Programme (Greece) ESTIA Emergency Support to Integration and Accommodation ETSS Ethiopian Tewahedo Social Services EU European Union FMS Federal Migration Service (Russia) FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia GOARCH Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America GOC Georgian Orthodox Church ICEM Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration ICM Intergovernmental Committee for Migration ICMW Integration Centre for Migrant Workers (Greece) ICMW–ERP Integration Centre for Migrant Workers – Ecumenical Refugee Programme (Greece) IDP Internally displaced person IOCC International Orthodox Christian Charities IOM International Organization for Migration

Abbreviations  xxiii

IOPS Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society IS Islamic State KGB Soviet Secret Police KIZILAY Turkish Red Crescent KIRS Commissariat for Refugees and Migration (Serbia) LAOS Popular Democratic Rally (Greece) LGBTI Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans(gender) and Intersex LPR Luhansk People’s Republic LWF Lutheran World Federation MES Ministry of Emergency Situations (Russia) MoU Memorandum of Understanding NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NFSB National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria NGO Non-governmental organisation OCA Orthodox Church in America OCG Orthodox Church of Greece OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Greece) PE Polish Episcopate PICMME  Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movements of Migrants in Europe ROC Russian Orthodox Church ROCOR Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia RoOC Romanian Orthodox Church RRF Refugee Relief Fund SCOBA Standing Conference of Canonical Orthodox Bishops in the Americas SCOOCH Standing Conference for Oriental Orthodox Churches SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia SYRIZA Coalition of the Radical Left (Greece) TBB Turkish Bar Association TİSK Turkish Confederation of Employers Association TTB Turkish Medical Association UAOC Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church UGCC Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNGA United Nations General Assembly UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council UOC KP Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate UOC MP Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate UOC Ukrainian Orthodox Church USA United States of America USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

xxiv  Abbreviations

WCC WCRC WHO WLF WRPC

World Council of Churches World Communion of Reformed Churches World Health Organization World Lutheran Federation World Russian People’s Council

Introduction Eastern Orthodoxy, forced migration and human security; concepts and policy perspectives Lucian N. Leustean The November 2013–February 2014 Maidan demonstrations in Ukraine sent shockwaves across Eastern Europe. Peaceful demonstrators were killed amid unusual scenes taking place in the centre of Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. Crossing religious divides, clergy carried banners, blessed and confessed people in front of protesting crowds and the police. In March 2014, after Russia’s takeover of Crimea and the beginning of the conflict in the Donbas region, clergy condemned the occupation outside military barracks. Some helped the displaced population find shelter and support by negotiating safe corridors of travel between the conflict areas and the rest of the country. Similar scenes of religious mobilisation were visible in Southeastern Europe. In the summer of 2015, in what became known as the ‘European refugee crisis’, hundreds of thousands of migrants crossed the Aegean Sea and headed towards European Union (EU) Member States. Passing through predominantly Orthodox countries in the region, many religious communities mobilised their faithful to offer food and clothing. That autumn, after governments in the region closed their borders with the EU and migrants became stranded in camps along the Balkan route, some faith-based organisations continued to offer material and pastoral care.1 However, despite many cases of support, the involvement of religious communities with displaced populations in Ukraine and along the Balkans route has not always been positive. In the Donbas region, many local clergy praised separatist forces and condemned Ukrainian political authorities. Their rhetoric encouraged not only the appropriation of religious buildings but also the new political order to strengthen ties with neighbouring Russia. The largest church in Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate, denied the presence of foreign military troops and claimed that the Donbas conflict was a civil war rather than a clash between Ukraine and Russia. Across the Balkans, many Orthodox clergy encouraged nationalist discourses and condemned the arrival of migrants in their country. In Bulgaria, the highest religious authority in the Orthodox Church, the Holy Synod, even issued an official statement c­ondemning the government’s stance on immigration policy claiming that the arrival of migrants ‘has nearly turned into [a] true invasion’ that threatened the very existence of the Bulgarian nation state. In many cases, the public narrative expressed in mass media

2  L. N. Leustean ­utlets and political circles, which depicted the refugee crisis as a path o towards the ‘Islamisation’ of Europe, was endorsed by religious communities. The inconsistencies of many religious leaders in either welcoming migrants and displaced populations or condemning their arrival has had a deep impact on contemporary European politics and society.2 How have Orthodox actors (national churches, religious institutions, national and internationally affiliated organisations), religious communities and state bodies engaged with migrants and displaced populations in the former Soviet states and Southeastern Europe? What are the mechanisms of religious support towards forced displacement? How has forced migration impacted upon religious practices, values and political structures? In which ways do Orthodox churches promote human security in relation to violence and the ‘other’? This volume engages with these questions by drawing on extensive material in national languages and qualitative data with a wide range of actors in the region. It examines the responses of Orthodox actors, their religious counterparts and state institutions towards forced migration and human security in selected predominantly Orthodox countries in the post-Soviet space and Southeastern Europe.

Eastern Orthodoxy, migration and the ‘other’: reflections from Serbia and Ukraine3 Between February and September 2018 I conducted 25 semi-structured interviews (16 interviews in Ukraine and nine in Serbia) with three categories of people, namely clergy, academics and policy practitioners, all of whom were working with displaced populations. In Ukraine, the project enabled unprecedented access to interview high and low-ranking clergy, some of whom were involved in the exchange of prisoners between Ukraine and Donbas in December 2017. In Serbia, the interviews have been supplemented by data collection with refugees in the Principovac camp on the Serbian–Croatian border. My first trip to Belgrade took place in February 2018 at the time of local elections. The city, gripped by a snow storm, was full of electoral boards encouraging people to vote. The electoral poster of Vojislav Šešelj, a controversial political leader, who had been convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and was now president of the nationalist Serbian Radical Party, was particularly striking in its clear reference to religious symbols: Šešelj’s photograph was placed in front of the image of the Church of Saint Sava in Belgrade, one of the largest churches in Europe and a symbol of Serbian national identity. The particular resonance of the Church of Saint Sava was reiterated on 22 February 2018, when the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, went on a diplomatic visit to Belgrade to celebrate the 180th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between his country and Serbia. What at first seemed to be merely a courtesy visit soon became a significant event as the agenda denoted the close interplay between the religious and political authorities. After meeting the top Serbian leadership (Prime Minister Ana Brnabić, Foreign Minister Ivica

Introduction  3 Dačić and President Aleksandar Vučić), Lavrov held a joint news conference with Vučić to summarise the discussions: on the one hand, Russia officially welcomed Serbia’s intention to deepen relations with the EU; on the other hand, Russia was keen that Serbia would not become a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) member. Lavrov praised Serbian politicians who stood for military independence and criticised neighbouring countries that moved in a different direction. At the time, Macedonia was openly seeking NATO membership while in 2017 Montenegro had become NATO’s latest member.4 Lavrov’s visit was not only about reinforcing political alliances but also celebrated the existing close relations between the two countries. Thus, Lavrov gave a lecture to students at the University of Belgrade in which he restated the messages conveyed at the joint news conference. Serbia was presented as a model in Southeastern Europe and the leadership’s stance towards NATO was an example to follow. As a diplomat, Lavrov had previously visited Serbia, however, this was the first time when he directly addressed students, suggesting that engaging with the future intellectual elite was high on his agenda. Second, and most importantly, together with other dignitaries including President Vučić, Milorad Dodik (President of Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina), Alexander Valeryevich Dyukov (Chairman of the Management Board of Gazprom Neft) and Patriarch Irinej of the Serbian Orthodox Church, he went to the Church of Saint Sava in Belgrade, where he unveiled a new mosaic in the main dome. The basement level of the church, where ceremonies are held, was fully decorated, however, the nave was not. Weighing 40 tonnes, the mosaic, depicting the Byzantine figure of Christ Pantocrator, demonstrated impressive engineering and artistic skills. Produced in Moscow by Nikolai Mukhin, it was transported in trucks to Belgrade where it took a year to install. The overall cost of the project was €4 million, a gift from Gazprom, Russia’s largest energy company. The 70-metre-high dome thus became not only the highest point of the church, but would also act as a sign that the future of Serbia would be intrinsically linked to Russia. In other words, although religious and political leaders would come and go, Russia’s gift to one of the largest church buildings in Europe would prevail, confirmed by an inscription that the mosaic was a gift from Gazprom Neft. In a speech held under the dome, Lavrov continued his previous political discourse by declaring that ‘today’s event symbolizes spiritual and cultural closeness between our citizens, our Churches’. Without entering into details, he denounced ‘attempts […] made to involve Churches in political games in Ukraine, in Montenegro, or in Macedonia’ and ended his speech abruptly by stating that ‘I am also convinced that our churches will live through these difficult times with dignity, as Orthodox Christians have always done’.5 Although Lavrov’s speech seemed to decry the political use of Orthodox churches, only a few hours later it was followed by a contrasting message. Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev of Volokolamsk, Head of the Department of External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church who accompanied the Russian delegation to Belgrade, gave an interview in ­ Russian to the

4  L. N. Leustean Kremlin-​backed radio channel in Serbia, Sputnjik Srbija, whose website stated ‘Serbs are at a crossroads, they will have to choose’.6 The interview (which by March 2019 was viewed online by over 15,000 people) suggested a different agenda. Hilarion started by pointing out that the Serbian people are aware of the high price paid by the Russian people for the freedom of Serbia. Over the centuries Russia has protected Serbia and this friendship among our nations, which is still there, was paid for by the blood of Russian soldiers. He praised the close relations between Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and Patriarch Irinej of Belgrade who regularly visited each other, and announced that Irinej was offered an award, from the International Fund for Unity of Orthodox Peoples, granted annually to only one recipient.7 When asked by the reporter what Serbia could do in its relations with the European Union and Russia, ­Hilarion answered that, you should understand that if you intend to enter the EU one of the conditions is that Serbia abandon any pretensions to Kosovo and Metohija, i.e. to agree to renounce its historical territory, where Serbian holy places are located and where the Serbian people continue to live, although under great pressure due to the latest events and circumstances. In addition, in order to get a ticket to the European Union, Serbia will have to accept the laws that exist in the EU: to recognize the so-called ‘of the same-sex community’, to equalize them with marriage, to give homosexual couples the right to adopt children, and this will be the betrayal of not only the Serbian people, but also the betrayal of Orthodoxy […]. Now the Serbs are at a crossroads. We truly hope that the Serbian people will make their choices, first of all, starting from their history and starting from the Orthodox faith that actually created this people. When asked what Serbia could do to reconcile Orthodox communities in Kosovo, Hilarion stated that, If we look at the West’s policy towards Orthodoxy in general over the last ten years, then we can see that there is no support there. Moreover, active support for Islam is being carried out, even the artificial imposition of Islam, in traditional Christian territories. We are witnessing immigration policies that encourage the influx of representatives of this religious tradition into Europe, leading to a distortion of the balance established over the centuries. […] I think that this immigration policy that is now being led by some western countries is a kind of suicide, because the time will come, for example, for the Germans to wake up in their own country and realize that it is no longer their country.

Introduction  5 At first glance, Hilarion’s comments may seem to fit into the type of ‘­unorthodox Orthodoxy’,8 which depicts the EU in stark contrast with the Eastern Orthodox world thus putting the Serbs into the position of having to choose between Europe and Russia. However, his words also suggested that both Russia and Serbia shared the same future interests of their faithful. ­Serbia’s path towards the EU had been criticised by conservative clergy who feared that EU membership would automatically mean the loss of Orthodox communities in Kosovo. Hilarion’s criticism of the EU and prediction that migrants would change the demographic nature of Europe followed the view already expressed by many high-ranking conservative hierarchs. However, in the interviews that I conducted, his words stood in direct contrast to those of local clergy who were involved in the refugee communities. In May 2018, I visited the Principovac camp on the Serbian–Croatian border where I met both refugees and local people from the Orthodox parishes supporting those stranded in the country. A particular event stood out. One of the Orthodox priests who regularly went to the camp and helped the refugees arranged for some Syrian Orthodox refugees to go to his local church one Sunday morning. At the end of the liturgy, one of his parishioners came up to him and stated that ‘he could not believe that some refugees were so close to his faith; […] seeing the refugees near him in the church, he never prayed so hard in his whole life’.9 The difference between the discourse of the higher clergy, ‘imagining’ what a refugee looked like and the experience of this parishioner sharing the same worship space as refugees could not have been greater. However, not all of the clergy, particularly at the local level, encouraged such an open and positive view of migration. Many remained either indifferent to or actively condemned engagement with ‘the other’. In May 2018, I organised a workshop on ‘Religion and Migration in the Eastern Orthodox world’ in Belgrade where one academic recalled his frustration of working on the topic of reconciliation in the Balkans. He mentioned that a few years earlier, attending a Sunday mass in Dubrovnik, Croatia, he was surprised by the sermon of the Catholic priest who was preaching on the issue of forgiveness. To his surprise, the priest stated that Christ has said that people should forgive ‘seventy times seven times’ other people; he was right to say so and we should indeed forgive people for tragedies taking place in Africa and Asia; however, we can never forgive the Serbs for what they did to Croatians during the [Balkan] war [in the 1990s].10 The priest’s words were a reminder that violence, reconciliation and the fear of the ‘other’ are closely linked. At times, words uttered from the pulpit of an ordinary church are more powerful and resonate more deeply with local populations than any statements from the hierarchy. The examples provided above denote the thin line between religion and politics in the Orthodox world and, more particularly, between migration

6  L. N. Leustean and the concept of the ‘other’. Officially, many religious leaders have expressed support for those in need, condemned violence and encouraged acts of reconciliation.11 However, many others have criticised the arrival of migrants in inflammatory nationalist discourses. Statements encouraging dialogue and openness to those in need do not have an impact if both lower and top clergy preach that their religious community is unable to engage with people (and even pray for) outside the faith. Furthermore, the politicisation of religion, as regularly evident during national elections, has encouraged right-wing nationalism across the region. Statements made by foreign hierarchs that countries (such as Serbia in February 2018) have to choose between the EU and Russia and that the legal framework in the EU amounts to a veritable ‘betrayal of Orthodoxy’ add additional pressure on church–state relations. This type of discourse has had a direct impact on not only the ways in which churches relate to political authorities but most importantly on the lives of migrants on their journey across the Orthodox world.

A migrant’s journey across the Eastern Orthodox world. Data and concepts The data provided by international organisations on world displacement is startling. In 2015, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees declared that ‘One in every 122 humans is now either a refugee, internally displaced, or seeking asylum’.12 By 2017, forced displacement had reached 68.5 million people across the world, surpassing the figures of the Second World War.13 More importantly, forced displacement is not a smooth process of populations simply moving from one place to another. As Elena FiddianQasmiyeh et al. pointed out, as a general rule, ‘two-thirds of refugees and displaced persons continue to wait in exile for over five years, in some cases for generations, with no solutions in sight […]’.14 In Europe, in 2015, at the peak of the refugee crisis, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) recorded 1,059,044 migrants arriving in Europe, 857,363 of whom arrived in Greece. In contrast, 31,174 arrived in Bulgaria, 153,841 in Italy and 16,290 in Spain. Over the following years, after the agreement between Turkey and the EU was signed in March 2016, the refugee flow largely ceased. As Table I.1 shows, in 2018, Greece saw only 50,215 new arrivals and the focus shifted towards other Mediterranean countries (Spain recorded 65,325 people in 2018 and Italy 119,369 in 2017). Since 2015, when most refugees managed to reach West and North Europe, many have remained stranded in transit countries living in organised accommodation. The largest number of refugees are presently in Italy (135,858 in 2018),15 however, significant numbers remain in Southeastern Europe. In 2018, Greece recorded 60,083 people, Serbia 4,617, Bulgaria 690, Romania 385 and Cyprus 246 (Table I.2). The construction of a four-metrehigh barrier at the border between Serbia and Hungary in 2015 and regular acts of violence at the Serbian–​ Croatian–Bosnian frontiers led to the

Introduction  7 e­mergence of alternative routes. In 2018, 9,749 migrants and refugees ­registered in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Montenegro, a figure four times higher than that recorded in these countries in the previous year. Outside the EU, millions of refugees and displaced people are presently in neighbouring countries, particularly in Turkey and Ukraine. The Turkish Directorate General for Migration Management recorded 3.9 million people in December 2018, most of them Syrians registered under ‘temporary p­ rotection’ Table I.1.  Arrivals in selected European countries (2015–18) Arrivals in selected European countries, 2015–18

1,200,000 1,000,000 800,000 600,000 400,000 200,000 0

Greece

Bulgaria

Italy

Spain

Malta

Cyprus

Total

2015

857,363

31,174

153,841

16,290

106

269

1,059,044

2016

176,906

17,187

181,436

14,558

0

345

390,432

2017

35,052

2,562

119,369

28,707

0

1,078

186,768

2018

50,215

2,533

23,370

65,325

1,445

1,278

144,166

2015

2016

2017

2018

Data collected from four ‘Datasets on Europe on Mixed Migration Flows to Europe, Yearly Overview’ (2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018) available at https://migration.iom.int/

Table I.2.  Stranded migrants in selected European countries (2015–18) Migrants stranded in selected European countries, 2016–18 Bosnia and Herzegovina Romania Cyprus Hungary Slovenia Croatia Serbia North Macedonia Bulgaria Italy Greece

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

Greece

Italy

Bulgaria

North Macedonia

Serbia

2018

60,083

135,858

690

35

2017

52,225

0

973

40

2016

62,784

0

5,560

162

80,000

100,000

120,000

140,000

160,000

Cyprus

Romania

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Croatia

Slovenia

Hungary

4,617

326

266

137

246

385

4,291

3,979

508

228

552

297

0

0

5,633

624

339

460

0

0

0

2018

2017

2016

Data collected from four ‘Datasets on Europe on Mixed Migration Flows to Europe, Yearly Overview’ (2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018) available at https://migration.iom.int/

8  L. N. Leustean (3,622,366 people), while 368,230 people were asylum seekers and refugees from other countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Somalia. In June 2016, in Ukraine, the Ministry of Social Policy recorded 1,786,486 internally displaced people (IDPs) from Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. The numbers slightly dropped in December 2018 to 1,512,042 people. The change in the numbers of registrations has been due to the request from authorities that entitlement to a state pension for people from the Non-Government Controlled Areas be linked to IDP registration. Interviews with over 10,800 IDPs conducted by the IOM between July and September 2018 showed that less than half of IDPs managed to find employment in Ukraine and the majority (over 87 per cent) declared that ‘they have been facing difficulties when looking for a job, mainly because of the general shortage of vacancies and low pay for open vacancies’.16 Most importantly, 47 per cent of the IDPs interviewed were members of ‘inactive population’, namely retired, pensioners or carers of children or the elderly. Contrasting figures across predominantly Orthodox countries in the postSoviet space and Southeastern Europe show an emerging pattern, namely that religious communities (and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)) have particularly engaged with the ‘inactive population’. In Ukraine most IDPs fit this category and religious communities have been able to draw on close contact with state authorities to aid them. However, in the case of Orthodox churches the engagement with those in need faced a paradox. Orthodox churches lack a theology of social reflection on how to support populations in need. Instead, churches offered something that the state lacked in resources, namely mobilisation and organisation at the local level that benefited humanitarian emergencies. Mobilisation along pastoral lines, for example top hierarchs calling immediately lower clergy to provide support in areas affected by conflict and humanitarian emergencies, was evident in both Ukraine and Southeastern European countries, in particular in Greece and Serbia.17 Throughout Southeastern Europe and the former Soviet states, the concepts of ‘forced migration’ and ‘human security’ are interlinked.18 ‘Forced migration’ is defined as ‘migrants’, ‘refugees’, ‘asylum seekers’ and the ‘internally displaced population’. ‘Human security’ represents the ‘security for people, rather than security exclusively for states and/or governments’19 which brings together social and political actors at both the regional and state levels.20 These two concepts provide key insights into the ways in which religious communities respond to and engage with migrants as well as the ways in which they directly manage the survival, tolerance, transitory environments and resettlement of their communities. At times, religion is instrumentalised by state authorities for specific political goals, while, concomitantly, religious actors provide identity, support and comfort for displaced populations. The ambivalent force of religion is evident in endorsing violence, whether physical or symbolic, as well as finding the means of resilience, reconciliation and conflict resolution. These two contradictory components are integral parts of human security. From an institutional perspective, the engagement of Orthodox churches with both ‘forced migration’ and ‘human

Introduction  9 security’ has been directly connected to both protecting the faithful along national lines and advancing political messages. From the perspective of ‘lived religion’, the concepts of ‘forced migration’ and ‘human security’ have been evident in the ways in which Orthodox communities have engaged with ideas on violence and reconciliation as reflected by a wide range of local actors who have an impact on shaping values, such as religious courts, monastic settlements, pilgrimage sites and educational establishments. Agreeing the right terminology on forced migration is controversial.21 All major religions claim biblical roots with key religious figures who embarked on a process of migration.22 However, the Eastern Orthodox world stands out due to the lack of a systematic and widely agreed approach on how to engage with the concept of the ‘other’ and, thus, with migrants. Deciding the most appropriate term, either ‘migrant’ or ‘refugee’, illustrates this case. In its official statement on the refugee crisis in English, the Bulgarian Church used the word ‘migrant’, however, in Bulgarian the word is ‘refugee’. Similarly, the Russian Orthodox Church has issued statements on ‘migrants’ rather than ‘refugees’ mainly as the word appealed to national audiences as official numbers of those arriving from Syria and the Middle East is small. Russia instead remains one of main countries of destination for ‘illegal migration’, the fourth in the world, and church ambivalence in using ‘migrants’ rather than ‘refugees’ denotes national politics. The phenomenon of forced migration resulted due to the post-2011 Syrian refugee crisis and the post-2014 conflict in Eastern Ukraine has been both a crisis and an opportunity for Orthodox churches. It has been a crisis due to the lack of a theological reflection on humanitarian issues and social engagement with forced migration. As a result, some Orthodox clergy incited the masses in support of right-wing nationalism and populism dehumanising the displaced populations. It has also been an opportunity as some clergy began to question the validity of nationalist discourses from some of their top hierarchy and offered their own unsanctioned support to migrants. Orthodox churches have been divided between the most appropriate ways of dealing with forced migration and slowly a more liberal, open faction has started to appear in the public space. Albeit small, this faction is in direct opposition to the dominant perception of anti-Westernism and conservatism promoted by Orthodox churches.23 A migrant travelling from Greece through other Balkan countries aiming to reach Western Europe is dependent on the benevolence of the liberal faction of religious communities (and other NGOs) while at the same time facing directly national frameworks of church–state relations that characterise each country. In Greece, the point of entry for most refugees, close church–state relations have dominated the ways in which local authorities responded to forced migration. The Orthodox Church of Greece is one of the most influential societal actors in the country with the Constitution of Greece stating that ‘In the name of the Holy and Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity […]. The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of

10  L. N. Leustean Christ’ (Art. 3). Many Orthodox communities organised themselves in administering camps, food and spiritual comfort; the unprecedented joint visit of Pope Francis, Ecumenical Patriarch B ­ artholomew and Archbishop ­Hieronymos to the island of Lesbos in April 2016 attested to this high degree of cross-­ confessional mobilisation. The issue of forced migration has also had an international impact. In the first visit of a Turkish head of state to Athens in 65 years, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan questioned the validity of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which led to the forced displacement of Christian and Muslim populations from Turkey and Greece. In Bulgaria, in February 2016 thousands of refugees have been trapped on the Bulgaria–Serbia–Greece border in what Politico called ‘Europe’s most hostile port of entry’.24 Facilities in these camps were dire. In October 2016, in an unprecedented gesture, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the largest confession in the country, stood out as the first religious body to condemn its own government and the EU’s policy on migration and asylum, and demanded the authorities to reject any intake of Syrian refugees. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church remains a closed community that has repeatedly refused participation in international religious dialogue with its Western counterparts. In recent years, it has moved closer to Russia by supporting Russia’s narrative of the conflict in the Donbas region. It contacted the Ukrainian President to protest against what it perceived as Ukraine’s persecution of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate, an unprecedented gesture that defied diplomatic protocol, as religious bodies usually communicate via embassy channels rather than directly with the heads of other states. In Serbia, in 2018 after thousands of migrants remained stranded on the Hungarian–​ ­ Croatian–Serbian borders, the state organised 18 camps for refugees. Official figures show that 4,169 people lived in these camps, however, in my interviews conducted in February 2018, some respondents stated that it was highly likely that the number was much higher across the country, even up to 15,000. Reports of improvised squats near the Serbian– Croatian border and violence associated with illegal crossings regularly produce headlines in the mass media. Although the overall figure of migrants in Serbia is disputed, the public perception of forced migration remains tense. The Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church issued an unusual statement in support of migrants mainly due to its experience of engaging with humanitarian issues just a few months before the start of the refugee crisis when flooding affected large parts of the country. Serbia emerged as an independent state a result of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, a process that led to a considerable shift of population between Yugoslav territories. In the last two decades the church has played an active role in providing humanitarian support to the faithful that relocated to the country. The Serbian Orthodox Church set up a humanitarian department, Filantropia, which gained expertise in how to approach social issues. The department has worked with the Catholic Church to provide support for refugees in state-run camps, thus having a direct impact on the lives of many.

Introduction  11 As Table I.3 shows, in all my interviews in Serbia the issue of ‘migration’ has been closely linked to three key words, namely ‘Church’, ‘European Union’ and ‘Serbian state’. The interviewees regarded the involvement of the Serbian Orthodox Church as a national duty that would benefit not only migrants on their way towards the EU but also Serbia’s international stance. A key word in interviews was ‘Kosovo’, which as Table I.3 shows is closely linked to ‘Church’, ‘people’ and ‘Russia’. The Republic of Kosovo declared independence in February 2008 and was recognised by most EU Member States, with the exception of Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romania and Greece. Serbia’s claim that Kosovo remains an integral part of its sovereign territory has found a strong ally in Russia. It is, therefore, no surprise that the Serbian Orthodox Church’s support for state sovereignty in Kosovo is strongly reinforced by the Russian Orthodox Church. The narrative of forced migration presented by top Serbian and Russian hierarchs has been closely linked to the future of Kosovo. Furthermore, the involvement of Russian hierarchs in church affairs in Serbia is due not only due to traditional ecclesiastical and educational links between their countries, but also due to the conflict in Ukraine and the emergence of a united Ukrainian church outside Moscow’s jurisdiction. In Ukraine, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, two bodies that were previously outside communion with other Orthodox churches, united and received official recognition from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople on ­ 6 January 2019. The unification of the Ukrainian National Church has benefited Table I.3.  Word frequency, nine interviews in Belgrade, Serbia (February 2018)

12  L. N. Leustean from governmental support with President Petro Poroshenko actively involved in negotiations. However, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate, which remains the country’s largest church, condemned the process of reunification and instead reiterated its close relations with Russia. The unexpected support of the Ukrainian population towards the process of reunification of the national Ukrainian Church has been paralleled by the involvement of clergy on humanitarian issues by supporting both the military forces in Donbas and the large number of internally displaced people throughout the country. In addition to Orthodox churches, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church has been one of the most active actors from the first day of the process of displacement from Crimea and Donbas. However, while the Greek Catholic Church has benefited from financial support from West C ­ atholic bodies, it also led to fears of proselytism among Orthodox communities. As Table I.4 shows, in my interviews in Ukraine the word ‘migrant’ is missing. All interviewees mentioned the link between ‘church’ and ‘support’ towards internally displaced people with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate being closely associated with state authorities. The Kyiv Patriarchate is positioned between ‘Russian’ and ‘the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate’ as a sign of its increasing national influence and active involvement in humanitarian issues. Similarly to Kosovo, ‘Donbas’ has been a key word concerning the ways in which churches engaged and supported displaced population as a result of pro-Russian separatist forces. Table I.4.  Word frequency, 16 interviews in Kyiv, Ukraine (March–September 2018)

UOCKP is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate; UOCMP is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate.

Introduction  13 Russia has been directly involved in either starting or supporting an i­nternationally agreed solution to forced displacement in neighbouring predominantly Orthodox countries, namely Armenia (the Nagorno-Karabakh War, 1988–94), the Republic of Moldova (the 1992 Transnistria War), Georgia (the 2008 Russo-Georgian War) and Ukraine (after 2014 in Crimea and Donbas). Since 2015, Russia’s national security strategy has advanced the concept of ‘spiritual security’, granting a prime national role for the Russian Orthodox Church, and offering a diplomatic position for its religious leadership. Thus, the lines between the religious and the political realms are blurred. As previously described, top hierarchs regularly travel to other Orthodox countries condemning both the EU’s stance on the refugee crisis and NATO’s expansion. The Russian Orthodox Church provides one of the largest organised networks on social issues with the direct support of the state. The church has been involved in providing humanitarian aid not only to displaced populations from the Donbas region but also at an international level, particularly to Christian communities affected by war in Syria and the Middle East. The Moscow Patriarchate continues to enjoy close links with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate also due to financial support provided by entrepreneurs and oligarchs associated with both churches. In other predominantly Orthodox countries in the region, the topic of forced migration has largely been missing from the public space. With the exception of a few statements issued by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Orthodox Church of Greece, the Committee of the Representatives of the Orthodox Churches of the European Union and international religious organisations, some of whom have Orthodox members, there has been a general silence on forced migration.25 The silence has been evident not only in Eastern Europe but also among many Orthodox communities in Western Europe and the United States. When migration does become part of church discourse it is usually politicised. Romania has had a relatively small number of migrants since 2015, however, the Romanian Orthodox Church benefits from an active department, Diaconia, which engages on social issues aimed at local communities in both the country and neighbouring states with Romanian-speaking populations. In Moldova, the topic of migration made headlines during the 2016 presidential elections when the Orthodox Church under Moscow jurisdiction supported the claim that, if elected, the pro-EU candidate would agree to take in 30,000 refugees from Syria. After the pro-Russian candidate won the elections, the issue of forced migration disappeared from the public discourse. In all predominantly Orthodox countries, churches depend on national policies on migration. There is limited contact between social programmes run by churches, even between church departments working on social and humanitarian issues in neighbouring countries. The reliance on national policies on migration also means that state authorities influence directly the ways in which religious communities engage with migrants. For example, in Serbia churches do not offer support to those who have not officially registered as refugees and

14  L. N. Leustean live in state-run camps as by doing so they break the law. In Russia, Crimea and Donbas, churches act as human security providers only if they have support from local state authorities. The Ukrainian clergy were able to mediate the transfer of prisoners in December 2017 only after state authorities in Donbas and Russia asked them to do so. The involvement of church leaders at times of crisis on social issues has often been the result of public image that would benefit politically rather than displaced populations. At the same time, the failure of state authorities to provide support to populations in need encouraged religious communities to mobilise and take over state functions. In sum, Orthodox churches do not have an overarching social policy on engaging with forced migration. On the contrary, advancing financial opportunities, entrepreneurship and in many cases increasing their own public image and political manipulation have been the driving forces that have defined the involvement of Orthodox churches with forced migration in recent years.26 Are Orthodox churches solely to administer the faithful behind liturgical walls? Do they respond socially only when they benefit from political messages based on fear of the ‘other’ and promoting right-wing nationalism? Will forced migration increase the diversity of Orthodox ­ churches leading towards a more open dialogue? These are open questions.

Eastern Orthodoxy and forced migration: findings and policy perspectives27 The chapters in this volume do not advance a theoretical model on Eastern Orthodoxy and forced migration but instead offer a detailed analysis of the engagement of churches and other religious communities along national lines. Each chapter provides the latest research in the field and aims to provide insights to both academic and public policy communities.28 The findings of this project do not represent the official position of any individual, church or national/international organisation mentioned in this volume or interviewed; they are powerful examples of the interplay between Orthodox churches, forced migration and human security. In running this project I identified four findings pertinent to the former Soviet states and Southeastern Eastern. •

•

First, EU migration policies are highly contentious and have been politicised in predominantly Orthodox countries entailing a long-term impact on East–West relations. At times, the EU’s approach to migration has been presented as a sign of an ideological clash between East and West. Second, when states fail to offer support for populations affected by violence, religious communities have been one of the first actors to take over state functions and act as providers of human security. In the first months of the Russian–Ukrainian conflict, Christian and Muslim communities crossed the faith divide and mobilised themselves nationally in support of internally displaced people before the Ukrainian government issued a national strategy. In Serbia, faith-based organisations supported Syrian refugees ­following the

Introduction  15

•

•

Balkan route working with local authorities and the g­ overnment before an organised policy response. In many cases, authorities turned to religious communities to provide support for migrants as the state did not have the necessary mechanisms to address humanitarian emergencies. Third, in the Donbas region, the ‘buffer zone’ is not just between military forces but a spiritual and geographical space between religions not only generating violence but also supporting tolerance and reconciliation. The local Orthodox Church under Moscow’s jurisdiction regards the Russian–Ukrainian conflict as civil war and has been involved in the release of prisoners of war. In Ukraine, competing Orthodox churches have their own humanitarian networks supporting local populations and displaced population. Fourth, the competition between Orthodox churches continues to reverberate not only among religious communities but has also had a direct impact on state support and engagement with human security. The rivalry between the three national Orthodox churches in Ukraine, the support of the Ukrainian government for religious independence outside Moscow, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church’s unique condemnation of its government’s policy on migration and asylum, and the increasing anti-Westernism of Orthodox clergy faced by a dramatic number of Syrian migrants and migrant camps along the Balkan route, are directly linked to the ways in which state structures address and manage violence, security and social cohesion.

The project has four policy recommendations pertinent to this region: •

•

First, the politicisation of religion in the Eastern Orthodox world will continue to shape relations between Russia and the EU. Religious literacy among political elites in Europe would help counter the politicisation of religion. There should be wider public and policy awareness of the ways in which political messages are delivered by religious channels of communication. The ongoing conflict in Donbas and increasing regional instability will continue to lead to further employment of religious symbols. Second, there is no (or in a number of cases, very limited) dialogue between Orthodox churches and their social departments working on humanitarian issues. A refugee entering a country on the Balkan route or one of the former Soviet states experiences varied levels of religious and state solidarity and humanitarian support. The refugees I interviewed at the Principovac camp mentioned that their stay in Bulgaria was akin to imprisonment. Although living in cramped conditions with limited resources to cover their daily needs, they considered their stay in Serbia as an improvement. Cooperation between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church has produced a tangible result for the migrants based in this camp. In Ukraine, churches and religious communities have their own programmes helping internally displaced population in most cases without a coordinated approach. Interreligious cooperation on humanitarian issues should be encouraged and followed up not only internationally but also at the national level.

16  L. N. Leustean •

•

Third, religious education in this region should include more references to and examples of both violence and reconciliation. Many clergy depict the EU as an ideological bloc opposing Orthodox values. Opportunities should be funded encouraging the clergy and students from seminaries and national faculties of theology to travel and study in the EU, which would lead to greater openness and understanding among not only religious leaders but, more importantly, local communities affected by conflict. Fourth, religious communities remain key to both violence and reconciliation. Policy makers should be aware of the potential of religious communities to aggravate violence. They should work with both local and top level religious leaders to generate greater cooperation between state and religious structures benefiting populations in need. For example, the high degree of support since 2014 among the Ukrainian population for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate has been due not only to the church leadership’s alignment with European values but also due to its support for military forces in Donbas. The numbers of military chaplains accompanying the troops has been reflected by the population’s trust in the Kyiv Patriarchate at the expense of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate.

The structure of the volume The volume is structured into three areas covering key countries affected by forced migration from the Middle East and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, namely the former Soviet States (Ukraine, Russia, Georgia and Belarus), Southeastern Europe (Turkey, Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania) and Western Europe and the United States. The section on former Soviet states begins with a chapter on Ukraine that provides an overview of Eastern Orthodoxy as the central pillar of Russian– Ukrainian relations. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its support for separatist forces in Donbas led to unprecedented restrictions on religious freedom and persecution. The number of internally displaced people reached 1,786,486 people making Ukraine the country with the ninth-largest IDP group in the world. Churches have played a significant role in dealing with humanitarian issues. The chapter focuses on the political use of religion during the Russian–Ukrainian conflict by tackling the social and political means of strengthening Ukrainian statehood. The chapter on Russia demonstrates that the Russian Orthodox Church has been one of the most influential institutions in the Russian Federation with an impact on state interests and geopolitics. Close church–state relations led to the promotion of the concept of ‘spiritual security’ to the detriment of ‘humanitarian security’. ‘Spiritual security’ enables the church to combine its concern for the morality of the individual with state security and sovereignty as seen in its cooperation with state institutions at the central and local levels. The chapter on Georgia examines the ways in which the Georgian Orthodox Church engages with the concept of human security by focusing

Introduction  17 on religious narratives against minorities. It investigates church mobilisation in relation to forced migration and three protests led and organised by the church over the last decade, namely the debates on the Law on Registration of Religious Minority Organizations (2011) and the Anti-Discrimination Law (2014), as well as the violent rally against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans(gender) and Intersex (LGBTI) activists on the International Day against Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia, 17 May 2013. In all of these instances, the church justified social mobilisation as a response to an external threat against ‘Georgianness, Georgian identity and family values’. The chapter on Belarus shows that the government has instrumentalised the Ukrainian conflict and the European refugee crisis for its own political goals. At an institutional level, the Belarusian Orthodox Church has not provided a social response towards migrants and refugees; on the contrary, it supported the anti-European rhetoric of both Belarusian political authorities and the Russian Orthodox Church. The European refugee crisis led to discussions in the Belarusian society on the topics of multiculturalism and tolerance with many public intellectuals claiming that migrants represented a threat to Europe’s (Christian) identity. The European refugee crisis has been presented as evidence of Europe’s decline and an opportunity for Belarus’s international self-promoting strategy. The refugee crisis was reflected not only in Russian propaganda in the mass media, which remains popular in Belarus, but also among intellectual and church elites that multiplied negative statements against the West. The section on Southeastern Europe starts with a chapter on Turkey that investigates the impact of the refugee crisis caused by the Syrian civil war on Turkey’s ‘state capacity’. The ‘open door policy’ followed by Turkey since April 2011 brought an influx of people seeking protection and humanitarian assistance. In 2016, the open door policy was replaced by the policy of border protection. The chapter addresses the social response of Turkey in light of the Syrian crisis and discusses alternative policies to forced migration. The chapter on Greece demonstrates that the church has been a prominent actor in the making of the Modern Greek state. After the end of the Cold War, Greece changed from a country of ‘emigration’ to a country of ‘immigration’ with both church and state adapting to the new social reality. The European refugee crisis brought additional pressure with an unprecedented number of people transiting Greece along the Balkan route, leading to notable humanitarian challenges. The chapter on Serbia focuses on the humanitarian activities of five faithbased organisations that provide aid for migrants transiting the country on their way to the EU. It examines the official position of these organisations on forced migration and focuses on the ways in which faith-based organisations conceptualise notions of ‘human’, ‘human security’ and ‘vulnerability’. The chapter on Bulgaria analyses the attitude of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church towards refugees as expressed in public statements and official documents between 2015 and 2017. It discusses the role played by the church’s hierarchy in shaping the refugee debate in Bulgarian society and pays special

18  L. N. Leustean attention to the negative image of migrants. The analysis points to the failure of the Holy Synod to offer a theologically grounded position on the refugee crisis in line with the Christian commandment ‘Love your neighbour as yourself!’ (Matthew 22: 39). It addresses the emergence of new ­patterns of entanglement between religion and politics at national and international levels that allows the hierarchy to go beyond the purely religious sphere and exert influence over the political one. The chapter on Romania examines the limited engagement of the church with the European refugee crisis. Romania has mainly been a source of emigration, with millions of its citizens currently living outside its borders. The chapter focuses on the ways in which the Romanian Orthodox Church has engaged with human security, and in particular with international mobility issues such as human trafficking and emigration. The last section brings together two chapters on the limited Orthodox mobilisation in relation to forced migration in Western Europe and the United States. The chapter on Western Europe focuses on the ways in which Orthodox churches became part of the religious background in Western Europe due to successive waves of Orthodox migration in the last centuries. Orthodox communities are present in most European countries, many of which began to p­romote their own ecclesial structures with parallel Orthodox jurisdictions under traditional centres of ecclesiastical power. The chapter on the United States addresses the limited policies and practices of Eastern Christian churches, both Orthodox and Oriental, in welcoming migrants and assisting refugees abroad. It investigates relations between churches and philanthropic and governmental approaches to migrant aid in light of anti-immigrant policies under the Trump administration.

Notes  1 For Eastern Orthodoxy, politics and society see John Anderson, ‘Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church: Asymmetric Symphonia?’, Journal of International Affairs, 2007, 61 (1), pp. 185–201; Alicja Curanović, The Religious Factor in Russia’s Foreign Policy, London: Routledge, 2012; Tobias Koellner, Orthodox Religion and Politics in Contemporary Eastern Europe. On Multiple Secularisms and Entanglements, London: Routledge, 2018; Zoe Knox, ‘The Symphonic Ideal: The Moscow Patriarchate’s Post-Soviet Leadership’, Europe-Asia Studies, 2003, 55 (4), pp. 575– 596; Andrii Krawchuk and Thomas Bremer (eds.), Eastern Orthodox Encounters of Identity and Otherness: Values, Self-Reflection, Dialogue, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014; Lucian N. Leustean (ed.), Eastern Christianity and the Cold War, 1945–91, London: Routledge, 2010; Lucian N. Leustean (ed.), Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, 2014; Vasilios Makrides, ‘Orthodox Christianity, Modernity and Postmodernity: Overview, Analysis and Assessment’, Religion, State & Society, 2012, 40 (3–4), pp. 248–285; Christopher Marsh, ‘Eastern Orthodoxy and the Fusion of National and Spiritual Security’ in Chris Seiple, Dennis R. Hoover and Pauletta Otis (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Religion and Security, London: Routledge, 2013, pp. 22–32; Irina Papkova, The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011; Elizabeth Prodromou, ‘The Ambivalent Orthodox’, Journal of Democracy,

Introduction  19 2004, 15 (2), pp. 62–75; Daniel Payne, ‘Spiritual Security, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Russian Foreign Ministry: Collaboration or Cooptation?’, Journal of Church and State, 2010, 52 (4), pp. 712–727; Sabrina P. Ramet, Nihil Obstat: Religion, Politics, and Social Change in East-Central Europe and Russia, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998; Sabrina P. Ramet (ed.), Religion and Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe: Challenges since 1989, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014; Katja Richters, The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox ­ Church: Politics, Culture and Greater Russia, London: Routledge, 2013; Victor Roudometof, Globalization and Orthodox Christianity: The Transformations of a ­Religious Tradition, New York: Routledge, 2014; Victor Roudometof, Alexander Agadjanian and Jerry G. Pankhurst (eds.), Eastern Orthodoxy in a Global Age: Tradition Faces the Twenty-first Century, Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press, 2005; Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turcescu, Church, State, and Democracy in Expanding Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011; Kristina Stoeckl, The Russian Orthodox Church and Human Rights, London: Routledge, 2014.  2 For religion, politics and society in contemporary Europe see R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence and Reconciliation. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000; Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons for Power in Christianity and Islam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993; Peter Berger, Grace Davie and Effie Fokas, Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and Variations, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008; Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein, Religion in an Expanding Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006; Grace Davie, Religion in Modern Europe: a Memory Mutates, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; David Martin, A General Theory of Secularisation, Oxford: Blackwell, 1978; Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.   3 The subchapter expands the analysis in Lucian N. Leustean, ‘Flucht, Diplomatie und menschliche Sicherheit im orthodoxen Kontext’, Religion und Gesellschaft in Ost und West, Institut G2W, Zürich, November 2018.  4 ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions at a joint news conference following talks with President of the Republic of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić in Belgrade’, 21 February 2018, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, available at www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_ publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3088723 (accessed on 12 March 2019).   5 ‘Lavrov warns against involving Orthodox Churches in political games’, InterfaxReligion, 22 February 2018, available at www.interfax-religion.com/?act=news&​ div=14224 (accessed on 12 March 2019).   6 ‘Ruski mitropolit: Srbi su na raskršću, moraće da izaberu’ (Russian Metropolitan: Serbs are at a crossroads, they will have to choose), Sputnjik Srbija, 22 February 2018, available at https://rs-lat.sputniknews.com/intervju/201802221114665489ruski-mitropolit-ilarion/ and www.youtube.com/watch?v=P1lf81qtMkU (accessed on 12 March 2019).  7 The award ceremony took place on 23 May 2018 at the Church of Christ the Saviour in Moscow. ‘High award for Patriarch Irinej in Moscow’, The Website of the Serbian Orthodox Church, 25 May 2018, www.spc.rs/eng/high_award_­ patriarch_ irinej_moscow (accessed on 12 March 2019).  8 Aristotle Papanikolaou and George E. Demacopoulos, ‘Putin’s unorthodox Orthodoxy’, Public Orthodoxy, May 2014, available at https://publicorthodoxy.org/2016/ 09/15/putins-unorthodox-orthodoxy/ (accessed on 12 March 2019).   9 The author’s email with the Serbian Orthodox Church official who organised the trip to Principovac camp. I am very grateful for all support during the visit and for translating the conversation with refugees and local authorities. 10 The author’s email with the participant at the Belgrade workshop, 15 June 2018.

20  L. N. Leustean 11 For religion and violence see Grace Davie, Nancy T. Ammerman, Samia Huq, Lucian N. Leustean, Tarek Masoud, Suzanne Moon, Jacob K. Olupona, Vineeta Sinha, David A. Smilde, Linda Woodhead and Fenggang Yang, ‘Religions and Social Progress: Critical Assessments and Creative Partnerships’ in Rethinking Society for the 21st Century: Report of the International Panel for Social Progress, ­Cambridge University Press, Vol. 3, 2018, pp. 641–676. 12 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Worldwide displacement hits all-time high as war and persecution increase’, 18 June 2015 available at www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/6/558193896/worldwide-displacement-hitsall-time-high-war-persecution-increase.html (accessed on 12 March 2019). 13 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Report on ‘Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2017’, available www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf (accessed on 12 March 2019). 14 Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long and Nando Sigona, ‘Introduction and Forced Migration Studies in Transition’ in Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long and Nando Sigona, The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 4. 15 The Lombardia, Lazio, Campania, Sicilia and Emilia Romagna regions host 48 per cent of the stranded population. 16 Quarterly Regional Report. Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), October– December 2018, International Organization for Migration, February 2019. 17 For religion, migration and humanitarianism see Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011; James A. Beckford (ed.), 2016. Migration and Religion, 2 vols. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2016; Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher (eds.), Refugees in International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010; Alice Bloch and Giorgia Donà (eds.), Forced Migration. Current Issues and Debates, London: Routledge, 2019; Drew Christiansen, ‘Movement, Asylum, Borders: Christian Perspectives’, International Migration Review, 1996, 30 (1), pp. 7–11; Elizabeth Ferris, ‘Faith-based and Secular Humanitarian Organisations’, International Review of the Red Cross, 2005, 87 (858), pp. 311–325; Elizabeth Ferris, ‘Faith and Humanitarianism: It’s Complicated’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 2011, 24 (3), pp. 606–625; Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, ‘Introduction: Faith-Based Humanitarianism in Contexts of Forced Displacement’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 2011, 24 (3), pp. 429–439; David Hollenbach SJ, ‘­Religion and Forced Migration’ in Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long and Nando Sigona, The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 447–459; Luca Mavelli and Erin Wilson (eds.), The Refugee Crisis and Religion: Secularism, Security and Hospitality in Question, London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017; Peter Walker, Dyan Mazurana, Amy Warren, George Scarlett and Henry Louis, ‘The Role of Spirituality in Humanitarian Crisis Survival and Recovery’ in Michael Barnett and Janice Gross Stein (eds.), Sacred Aid: Faith and Humanitarianism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 115–139; Andrew Geddes and Peter Scholten, The ­Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, London: Sage, 2nd edition, 2016. 18 Amitav Acharya, ‘Human Security, Identity Politics and Global Governance’ in Helen James (ed.), Civil Society, Religion and Global Governance, London: Routledge, 2007, pp. 25–32. 19 Ibid., p. 26. 20 For religion, politics and human security see Robert M. Bosco, Securing the Sacred. Religion, National Security and the Western State, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2014; Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998; Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; Barry Buzan, An Introduction to the English

Introduction  21 School of International Relations: The Societal Approach, Cambridge: Polity, 2014; José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994; Jocelyne Cesari, ‘The Securitization of Islam in Europe’, Challenge Research Paper no 14, 1–14 April 2009; Stuart Croft, Securitizing Islam. Identity and the Search for Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002; Monica Duffy Toft, Securing the Peace. The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010; Thomas A. Farr, World of Faith and Freedom. Why International Religious Liberty is Vital to American National Security, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008; Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996; Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996; Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (eds.), Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, New York: Palgrave, 2003; James K. Wellman Jr. and Clark B. Lombardi (eds.), Religion and Human Security. A Global Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 21 For debates on terminology see James C. Hathaway, ‘Forced Migration Studies: Could We Agree just to “Date”?’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 2007, 20 (3), pp. 349–369; Roger Zetter, ‘Labelling Refugees: Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratic Identity’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 1991, 4 (1), pp. 39–61. 22 Hollenbach SJ, ‘Religion and Forced Migration’, p. 449. 23 For anti-Westernism in Eastern Orthodoxy see Vasilios Makrides, ‘Orthodox Anti-Westernism Today: A Hindrance to European Integration?’, International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, 2009, 9 (3), pp. 209–224; George Demacopoulos and Aristotle Papanikolaou (eds.), Orthodox Constructions of the West, New York: Fordham University Press, 2013. 24 Andrew Connelly, ‘Europe’s most hostile port of entry’, Politico, 29 February 2016, available at www.politico.eu/article/bulgaria-threat-to-refugees-migrantshuman-rights-​dangerous/ (accessed on 1 March 2019). 25 ‘Address by His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew at the 22nd Eurasian Economic Summit’ (Istanbul, 7 February 2019), The Website of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, available at www.patriarchate.org/-/ address-by-his-all-holiness-ecumenical-patriarch-bartholomew-at-the-22nd-eurasianeconomic-summit-istanbul-7-february-2019-; ‘Communique of Orthodox Churches of European Union on the Refugee Crisis in Europe’, 23 September 2015 available at http://orthochristian.​com/82640.html; ‘Refugees have a right to protection, affirms joint statement from WCC, ACT, LWF’, 31 January 2017, The Website of the World Council of Churches, available at www.oikoumene.org/ en/press-centre/news/refugees-have-a-right-to-protection-affirms-joint-statementfrom-wcc-act-lwf (accessed on 12 March 2019). 26 On the misuse of refugees see also Stephen John Stedman and Fred Tanner (eds.), Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2003; Kelly M. Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010. 27 The subchapter draws on Lucian N. Leustean, ‘Summary Report of the British Academy Project on “Forced Migration, Religious Diplomacy and Human Security in the Eastern Orthodox World” ’, International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, 2019, 19 (1), pp. 72–76. Other policy reports on migration relevant to this study are Elizabeth Prodromou, ‘Policy Brief: Religion and migration in the Mediterranean and Europe: Human mobility and pluralizing identities’, Henry J. Leir Institute, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, November 2018, available at https://sites.tufts.edu/ihs/files/2018/11/

22  L. N. Leustean Religion-and-Migration-in-the-Mediterranean-and-Europe.pdf (accessed on 12 March 2018) and Ben Ryan (ed.), Fortress Britain? Ethical Approaches to Immigration Policy for a Post–Brexit Britain, from a Christian Perspective, London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers; and Gemma Bird, Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik, Amanda Russell Beattie and Patrycja Rozbicka, ‘Rethinking refugee support: Responding to the crisis in South East Europe’, The Website of the Foreign Policy Centre, 22 February 2019, available at https://fpc.org.​ uk/rethinking-refugee-supportresponding-to-the-crisis-in-south-east-europe/ (accessed on 12 March 2019). 28 See the classic text, Barbara E Harrell-Bond, Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Part I

Religion, migration and human security in the former Soviet states

V. Yelensky

Ukraine

1 Orthodox churches, nationbuilding and forced migration in Ukraine Viktor Yelensky

By the end of the Brezhnev era, Ukraine was the second-largest republic in the Soviet Union with the highest concentration of Orthodox Christian parishes (around 4,000 out of 6,000) and one of the largest religious underground communities in Europe (mainly Ukrainian Greek Catholics, but also tens of thousands of Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Baptists and others). Confidential Communist Party reports regularly described the rising interest in religion, the growing popularity of religious programmes broadcast by ‘hostile radio stations’, an eagerness for religious literature and ritual, an increasingly respectful attitude towards the church and the rejection of ‘atheist education’. It was not uncommon for people to refuse to work on the 12 most important Orthodox Christian holidays; open clashes took place in many Western Ukrainian villages due to attempts by the authorities to prevent believers from praying in churches that had been ‘removed from registration’.1 According to official figures, the church was christening more than a quarter of new-born infants and accompanying the majority of the deceased on their final journey; the number of baptisms among school students and adults was also rising rapidly. Officially, only 3 per cent of marriages were consecrated in a church and over 40 per cent of the dead were buried with the assistance of a church.2 Interestingly, the figures on baptism and funerals performed by the Catholic Church in the Netherlands were strikingly similar to those in Ukraine.3 Generally, the Ukrainian figures were underestimated as they did not include baptisms and funerals conducted underground or by unregistered religious institutions and those conducted by clergy in private. These practices were common, especially in large cities. Believers demanded to be allowed to reopen churches that had previously been closed; petitions arrived in Kyiv and Moscow by the hundreds. In many cities, the number of adults who were baptised by the Orthodox Church even exceeded the number of baptised new-borns. The state-sponsored atheism was caricatured and ridiculed in urban folklore, while attributes of religious culture (icons, small crosses, Bibles etc.) appeared increasingly popular. The mood of the intelligentsia was changing: the ‘people of the 1960s’, the majority of whom had been indifferent towards religion, were giving way to a generation who did not believe in the ‘Leninist ideals purified from Stalinist

26  V. Yelensky perversities’.4 A church as an institution that was not linked to the Soviet state and opposed Communist ideology explicitly had continued to gain the trust of a wide spectrum of Soviet society. The Ukrainian Greek Catholics were a powerful force in the religious revival of the 1970s and 1980s. In parallel with the consolidation of the Greek Catholic priests, monks and nuns – who after 1946 had rejected forced unification with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) imposed by Stalin’s regime – those who had eventually switched to Orthodox Christianity carried out a ‘quiet Ukrainianisation’ of their faith. The results of this were to become fully manifest at the turn of the 1990s, when the Greek Catholics emerged from underground to discover – in a territory that before the Second World War had hardly any Orthodox Christian parishes – a large community of Orthodox Christians for whom ‘Moscow is not our mother, but neither is Rome our father’. At the end of the 1980s, Ukraine was a tangle of religious and political contradictions, and experts were sure that waves of religiously motivated violence were unavoidable. The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, upon its emergence from underground, demanded that justice be restored. At first, however, Orthodox Christians did not even wish to recognise the fact that this church had not been destroyed. Confrontations between the two confessions shook hundreds of villages and towns in Western Ukraine. The conflict between Orthodox Christians who wanted ‘their own’ autocephalous church, independent of the Moscow Patriarchate, and those who did not want to break with Moscow proved even more acute and developed into a real threat to the foundations of civic peace. Nevertheless, the tensions did not escalate into war: by the end of the 1990s, a fragile equilibrium had been established in relations among the chief actors in the country’s religious sphere. This equilibrium relied on a fine balance of forces; even in nominal terms, none of the churches that trace their history back to the Baptism of Kyivan Rus’ (the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches of the Moscow and Kyiv Patriarchates, the Autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church) could claim the allegiance of more than a quarter of the country’s adult population. In addition, Protestants and the religious communities formed by indigenous peoples (notably the Crimean Tatars) and ethnic minorities (Jews, Poles, Hungarians and Romanians) have traditionally held strong positions in Ukrainian society. According to the 2017 Razumkov Centre Survey, 26.5 per cent of those questioned belonged to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP), 12 per cent to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP), 7.8 per cent to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), 1 per cent to Roman Catholic Church, 0.9 per cent to various Protestant denominations and 12 per cent had no religion at all. Almost a quarter (24.3 per cent) of respondents claimed they were ‘merely Orthodox without belonging to any specific Church’s ­jurisdiction’ while 7 per cent said they were ‘merely Christian’.5 The lay of the land concerning institutions among the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine at the beginning of 2018 was as follows: the UOC MP

Ukraine  27 had 12,348 communities, more than 10,000 priests, more than 200 ­monasteries and convents and 18 theological training institutions; the UOC KP had 5,167 communities, 3,600 priests, 60 monasteries and convents and 18 theological training institutions; and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), which is a confederation of dioceses rather than a centralised church, had 1,167 communities, 693 priests, 12 monasteries and convents and eight theological schools.6 Given that the UOC MP had almost two-and-a-half times as many communities as the UOC KP, it is surprising to note that more than 14 per cent of the respondents to the aforementioned survey identified as adherents to the UOC KP. In fact – and this is not a uniquely Ukrainian phenomenon – the majority of those who identified themselves with Orthodox Christianity indicated their affiliation to a quite specific cultural and historical space and not to a religious confession or institution. In its most extreme form, this type of identity is embodied in the phenomenon of the ‘Orthodox atheist’, a figure ridiculed by journalists but understandable to sociologists and students of culture. By stating that they belong to the Kyiv and not the Moscow Patriarchate, these people, part of whom have rather weak ties to any specific parish, are displaying their ethnic–cultural and political identity. Throughout the second half of the 1990s and most of the 2000s, all sociological surveys without exception registered a substantial predominance of ‘Kyivans’ over ‘Muscovites’; only towards the end of the 2000s did their shares of the subsample of Orthodox Christian respondents converge. This was a time when the UOC, in union with the Moscow Patriarchate, began to be perceived as ‘our own Church’, even by Orthodox Christians with a marked Ukrainian identity. They believed that in this church, recognised by the ‘Fullness of Orthodoxy’, they would be able to stay inside the ‘fence of salvation’ and also remain Ukrainian. It is not by chance that the convergence in the proportions of believers saying that they belong to the UOC MP and to the UOC KP coincided in time with the development within the UOC MP of a special path of Ukrainian Orthodoxy rooted in a theological, cultural and even civilisational tradition distinct from that of Russian Orthodoxy. The people around the Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine Volodymyr (Sabodan) (1992–2014) and the Primate himself emphasised the special role played by the Kyivan metropolitans in the Russian Church and the special status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), insisting that it existed in union with and not in administrative subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate. The Metropolitan himself declared that the UOC was the sole heir to the Baptism of Prince Volodymyr and sole successor to the ancient Kyivan Church. In granting the UOC administrative independence, the Moscow Patriarchate did not there introduce anything new, but merely ‘restored the age-old tradition of the canonical existence of the Church of Kyivan Rus’.7 However, the outbreak of Russian aggression against Ukraine quickly started to change things for the worse for the UOC MP. Additionally, in July 2014, Metropolitan Volodymyr died8 and Metropolitan Onufryi (Berezovskyi) of Chernivtsi and Bukovyna

28  V. Yelensky was subsequently elected by the Council of Bishops as the new Primate. Known as a rather conservative hierarch and obstinate antagonist to the very idea of independence for the Ukrainian Church, Metropolitan Onufryi started diminishing the role of pro-Ukrainian c­ lerics in the UOC MP’s governing bodies and eliminated even the hint of Ukrainian autocephaly from the agenda. Simultaneously, he opened possibilities for the Moscow Patriarchate to strengthen its control over the UOC MP. Accordingly, marrying Ukrainian identity to allegiance to the UOC MP became increasingly difficult. In spite of the above, the competing churches managed to gain support on a comparable scale both in society and within the political establishment in just under two decades. They also learned how to compensate for the lack of one kind of resource by mobilising another: public support thus compensated for meagre material resources; if the central authorities were unsympathetic, they could reach agreements with local authorities. This too helped to establish a stable balance of forces. Declarations by one of the sides concerning the need to abolish the equilibrium were perceived as rhetorical formulas; no side was strong enough to do this, and the state recognised the importance of maintaining the status quo for the preservation of civic peace. A combination of pluralism and intense competition, a distinguishing feature of Ukraine’s religious landscape and a key to understanding the processes occurring in the country made it possible for Ukraine to achieve quite reasonable standards in the sphere of freedom of conscience.

Seeking the church’s independence: the Ukrainian autocephaly saga Despite what has been discussed previously in this chapter, the most painful religious and political problem facing Ukraine at the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries has been the issue of the autocephaly of the UOC and the associated schism in the ranks of Orthodox Christians. This issue generates heated debate among theologians, confrontations in Ukrainian society, clashes in the political sphere and unceasing conflicts between the Moscow and Constantinople Patriarchates; it also adds its share of rancour to Ukrainian–­Russian relations. Orthodox Christianity is the genuinely complex theme of these relations. On the one hand, Little Russia (Malorossiia) played a crucial role in the process by which Muscovite Orthodoxy was transformed into R ­ ussian Orthodoxy; the church reform of Peter the Great was implemented by a hierarchy in which 70 per cent of posts were filled by clerics from what are now Ukrainian and Belorussian lands.9 The Orthodox Church became the sole important institution in Ukraine that was at least partly integrated into the imperial structure as early as the first half of the eighteenth century, when the administrative practices, laws and systems of taxation and military service that ­prevailed in the empire had not yet been introduced into the Hetmanate as a whole. On the other hand, despite the systematic struggle of the Synod against ‘harmful and uniquely

Ukraine  29 Little-Russian customs’, ‘Ukrainianism within the Church’ proved ­ineradicable, and when the empire started to unravel, contemporaries were struck by the widespread nature of the striving for ‘our own Church’.10 In the twentieth century, this striving thrice led to a proclamation of the autocephaly of the UOC: in 1921, 1942 and 1990. The ‘first autocephaly’ was proclaimed during the short-lived independence of Ukraine after the fall of the Russian Empire, and the second during the Nazi occupation when new bishops for Ukraine were ordained. But each time the local Orthodox Churches refused to recognise this autocephaly, and even in Ukraine, Orthodox believers were divided between those who, to quote Vasilii Lipkivskii (1864–1937, head of the autocephalous movement in the early years of the century), ‘jumped out from under Moscow’ and those who remained loyal to Moscow. However, the decisive factor in the failure of both attempts was a lack of support for the stateless Ukrainians from their own State. The ‘third autocephaly’, which began with the Appeal of the Initiative Committee for Restoration of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (15 February 1989), grew rapidly with the support of Orthodox parishes in Western Ukraine. In June 1990, a Council of the UAOC took place in Kyiv and elected as its patriarch the 92-year-old Metropolitan Mstislav (Skripnik). A nephew of Ukrainian Peoples Republic’s Chief Otaman Simon Petliura (1879–1926) and participant in the war of 1918–21, Mstislav was ordained as a bishop in 1942 and had headed the UAOC in the diaspora since 1971.11 The UAOC was harshly criticised by the ROC and its Ukrainian exarchate. However, rapid political changes compelled Ukrainian exarch Metropolitan Filaret (Denisenko) to demand from the Moscow Patriarchate greater independence for the Ukrainian exarchate and, of course, for himself. In 1990, the Ukrainian exarchate became the UOC and acquired an independent administration, giving it near-autonomous status within the framework of the ROC.12 After Ukraine declared independence, the cause of a self-administered Orthodox Church in Ukraine obtained the support of the state. This precedent had earlier played a decisive role when the Russian, ­Serbian, Greek, Polish, Romanian and other churches each sought autocephaly for themselves. Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk resolutely supported the ‘humble’ request of the Council of the UOC, held on 1–3 November 1991, to the Moscow Patriarch to grant autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The Moscow Patriarchate, however, did not wish to grant autocephaly to the Ukrainian Church; the unyielding Metropolitan Filaret was stripped of all degrees of holiness (in 1997, a Bishops’ Council of the ROC would anathematise him altogether). The episcopate of the UOC elected a new primate, Metropolitan Vladimir (Sabodan) of Rostov and Novocherkassk, an ethnic Ukrainian who lost to Metropolitan Aleksii (­Ridiger) in the election of a Moscow Patriarch in June 1990 by 23 votes. As for Metropolitan Filaret, he found himself in a critical position and was forced to merge the section of the UOC that remained loyal to him within the UAOC. A Unification Council was held on 25–26 June, under the patronage

30  V. Yelensky of President Kravchuk and with the direct participation of ­parliamentarians, some of whom joined the governing bodies of the newly formed UOC KP. However, the overwhelming majority of UOC bishops did not follow Metropolitan Filaret; over time, it also became clear that a significant section of the UAOC also did not recognise the merger. As a result, three Orthodox Churches have existed in Ukraine since 1992: the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate, which has autonomous status within the ROC, and two churches that have declared themselves autocephalous, namely the UOC of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the UAOC. Metropolitan Filaret became a Deputy patriarch of the UOC KP; in October 1995, he was elected Primate of this church and elevated to the rank of patriarch. For more than 20 years, these churches have remained in a state of intense competition, but, at the same time, they have learned that they are unable to destroy one another and that they must therefore establish a system of mutual communication. It has to be stressed that when various countries in Central and Eastern Europe regained their independence in the late 1980s and early 1990s, their Orthodox churches were also tempted to seek independence or change their allegiance. While technically acceptable if not legitimate in terms of canon law, this wish was strongly resisted by some Orthodox capitals, and provoked an upsurge of nationalist feeling, creating new areas of conflict in Ukraine, Estonia, Moldova and Macedonia. The Ecumenical, Moscow, Belgrade and Bucharest Patriarchates as well as the Kremlin, official Kyiv, Tallinn, Skopje and Chişinău Patriarchates were engaged in this conflict to varying degrees. As historians and canon law experts do powerfully argue that the realities provided the framework for Orthodox Church independence or autocephaly, from the outset were political to which ecclesiastical ones usually adapted.13 The histories of Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Georgia, Serbia, Poland and Albania bear witness to the fact that the establishment of self-governed churches in these states coincided with the establishment of statehood, while the fall of statehood eventually led to the loss of autocephalous status.14 In another words, autocephaly, as John Meyendorff put it, the churches ‘came to be thought as the nation’s ecclesiastical equivalent’.15 In all these cases, along with the case of the disputed status of Orthodox Church of America, autocephaly was granted not on the basis of ethnic difference but on that of state independence. In many cases, the church’s role in gaining autocephalous status was not decisive, compared to the role of state authorities in this process. The situation at the turn of the millennium was almost identical to the nineteenth century: after gaining independence, nations were striving for autocephalous status for their Orthodox churches, while the church metropolis was opposed and reacted oversensitively to its weakening. New elites were more or less persistently pressing for independence of ‘their’ Orthodox churches. Because of the endless and acute quarrel between the Constantinople and Moscow Patriarchates, the issue of Ukrainian autocephaly, including a document on proclaiming autocephaly, were dropped from agenda of the Great and

Ukraine  31 Holy Orthodox Council in Crete (June 2016). However, although the U ­ krainian issue was not on the Council agenda (nor were any other controversial issues, it must be said), it was clearly materialised in its atmosphere. A statement by Serbian Patriarch Irenaeus that the issue concerns the entire Orthodox Plenitude, not only the Moscow Patriarchate, was quoted by journalists no less frequently than the Council’s documents on marriage or mission of the church.16 At the same time, while Patriarch Aleksyi II of Moscow and All Rus’ (1990–2008) had admitted the very possibility of autocephaly for Orthodox Church in Ukraine (albeit with objections and preconditions), his successor Patriarch Kirill urged that no reservation to the ‘unity of Holy Rus’ be permitted and no one within the ROC would have anything to do with ‘separatist thoughts’. In his first year in Patriarchal office, he argued that: Kyiv is the Southern capital of Russian Orthodoxy. Sometimes examples of other countries are cited for us as cases: there is [an] Autocephaly Church in [the] Czech [Republic] and Slovakia. There is [an] Autocephalous Church in Albania. But Czech [Republic] and Slovakia never have been a Jerusalem and Constantinople for anybody. And Tirana never served as a Jerusalem and Constantinople for anybody as well. Whereas Kyiv is our Jerusalem and our Constantinople; this is heart of our life!17 Moreover, Patriarch Kirill insisted that Ukrainian attempts to separate from the Moscow Patriarchate and create an autocephalous church were ‘not just a rejection of history but a rejection of Doctrine’. Along with promoting the ‘Russian World’ doctrine, Patriarch Kirill had, again during the first year of his pontificate, designated the main contours of his Ukrainian politics, which included an end to any autocephalous aspirations, however perfect they may have been in terms of canon law; destruction of ‘liberties’ gained by the UOC MP during the leadership of Patriarch Aleksyi II; and an end to all negotiations with the ‘Ukrainian schismatics’. Seven years later, in his address to the participants of the gathering in occasion of his 70th anniversary, Patriarch Kirill elevated the retention of Ukraine to the core element of the church’s politics: ‘We will never agree to changes in the sacred canonical boundaries of our Church. For [us] Kyiv is the spiritual cradle of Holy Rus’ in the same way as Mtskheta is to Georgia and Kosovo is to Serbia.’18 In July 2018, Patriarch Kirill stated once again that the Moscow Patriarchate will never accept the idea of granting independence to the UOC.19

The Ukrainian state, Orthodoxy and nation-building: the identity politics of Ukrainian presidents In the early 1990s, the Ukrainian ruling elite announced that it had a special policy on the religious sphere. The first President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk (1991–94), regarded the Orthodox Church as an efficient tool of political and cultural mobilisation and an important resource for nation-building.

32  V. Yelensky He also considered the subordination of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine to the Moscow Patriarchate as a direct threat to the Ukrainian statehood project and unconditionally supported the aspirations of the Ukrainian Church for independence from Moscow. When the Moscow Patriarchate refused to grant autocephaly for the Ukrainian Church, President Kravchuk sponsored the foundation of an independent UOC KP. Leonid Kuchma (1994–2004), who won the 1994 presidential election with the help of pro-Russian voters, criticised Kravchuk’s course towards a semi-­official national church, designated the UOC KP as a ‘nomenclatorial Church’ and gave his support to the UOC MP, which had backed him during the election campaign. Additionally, during his first years in office, Kuchma repeatedly manifested his ambivalence towards ideological issues and publicised his pragmatism in domestic politics. The priorities of church politics for President Kuchma from 1994–96 became centred around maintaining stability, ensuring the loyalty of the religious communities and gaining the support of the hierarchy for the consolidation of his presidential power. It was at the Pan-Orthodox Summit in Jerusalem marking the 2,000th anniversary of the Nativity of Christ, where Leonid Kuchma very clearly, through the language of the State Protocol and church ritual, noted the inferiority of the status of the UOC. In the company of the heads of the governments of Russia, Georgia, Romania, Bulgaria and other states, who were accompanied by ‘their’ church’s Primates, the Ukrainian President could not feel equal. Upon returning to Kyiv in January 2000, the president gave a speech about the importance of a national Orthodox Church, where he strongly criticised the forces standing in its way.20 Previously indifferent to religious issues, Kuchma appeared in the cathedral of all three Ukrainian Orthodox Churches for the Easter and Christmas liturgies, rebuilt the church in his home village, wrote letters to Presidents Yeltsin and Putin asking for their support, appealed to the Jubilee 2000 Bishops Council of the Russian Church, and met with patriarchs Aleksii II and Bartholomew. Undoubtedly, as was well understood in both Kyiv and Moscow, they were taking steps towards independence from Russia and the consolidation of Ukrainian sovereignty. In 2004, the Orange Revolution brought the leader of opposition, Viktor Yushchenko (2005–10), to the presidency. The ‘Orthodox issue’ played its own role in the extremely dramatic 2004 presidential election campaign. ‘Yushchenko’s discourse’ stressed the human dignity of the ‘little Ukrainian’, the European choice, the harmonisation of post-Soviet identities within the framework of all-Ukrainian identity and, additionally, articulated Christian symbolism without strong denominational connotation. By contrast, the discourse of his principal contender, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, was one of state paternalism, anti-Westernism, the Eurasian choice and endless appeals to ‘True Canonical Orthodoxy’. While Yuschenko’s discourse was saturated with mythological clichés and often contained archaic elements of traditional rural culture but never emphasised hostility towards ‘others’, Yanukovych’s discourse, especially in the final stages of the campaign, was

Ukraine  33 p­ ronouncedly exclusivist. This discourse removed everything seemingly ‘­non-Orthodox’ and non-canonical from Orthodoxy. The government and political consultants assigned the UOC MP an important role in their electoral strategy. This strategy embraced all levels of the church and included crude pressure and corrupt practices towards priests and hierarchs. Archpriests and clergymen organised (to a varying extent of voluntariness) numerous religious processions in support of the government candidate, disseminated flyers, papers and even texts of prayer for the ‘True Orthodox Candidate’. The third President of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, outlined his church– state preferences immediately after his inauguration on 23 January 2005. He reasserted his commitment to the principle of religious freedom, ordered the dissolution of the Ukrainian Committee for Religious Affairs and proclaimed his devotion to the idea of a Single Ukrainian Local Orthodox Church. Relations with Constantinople noticeably intensified, culminating in the Ecumenical Patriarch’s visit to Kyiv in summer 2008, where Patriarch Bartholomew was met with unprecedented honour. It was expected that the Constantinople Patriarchate would install his jurisdiction over the UOC and UAOC. If this were to happen, there would be two canonical Orthodox jurisdictions in Ukraine (under the auspices of the Moscow and Constantinople Patriarchates), which would be a ­violation of Orthodox canonical law and could potentially trigger a major all-­Orthodox crisis. But when the leaders of the ROC methodically torpedoed any realistic approach to the solving the ‘Ukrainian question’, this seemed the only viable solution for the millions of Orthodox believers who were labelled as ‘schismatics’ by the Moscow Patriarchate. The Constantinople scenario included immediate unification of the UOC KP with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UOAC), transformation of the newly formed church into the Kyiv Metropolitanate of the Constantinople Patriarchate, abdication of the Patriarch Filaret and the election of three candidates to the Kyiv throne, among whom Constantinople Patriarch had to choose a Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine. Both the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian State did everything they could to prevent such a scenario from unfolding. In an interview to the weekly publication Kommersant-Vlast, an unnamed Russian diplomat admitted that resistance to the unification efforts of Ukrainian Orthodox believers and to the recognition of a Unified Church allied with the Constantinople Patriarchate was considered in Moscow as a former goal of Russian foreign policy.21 But this scenario was decisively frustrated by Patriarch Filaret, who rejected the ecclesiastical scheme elaborated by Patriarch Bartholomew.22 During the elective Council of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2009, then locum tenens of the Moscow throne, Metropolitan Kirill, frankly admitted that summer 2008 was one of the most dramatic and dangerous moments in the post-Soviet history of the Russian Church. Despite the failure of this strategy, President Yushchenko did not lose his enthusiasm for explaining the importance of a national church for Ukrainian nation-building. The president did strongly believe (and broadly propagated his belief) that unification of Orthodox believers into a single national church would

34  V. Yelensky be a principal driver of nation-building. As it later transpired, President Yushchenko preferred his identity politics of a ‘uniting church’ to the systematic efforts for political, economic and cultural consolidation of the Ukrainian nation. Additionally, the politics of church unity favoured by the third Ukrainian president was demonised both domestically and abroad by his political rivals: the ROC’s spokesmen and high-ranking Russian governmental officials. Having expressed its ‘righteous anger’ on ‘State interference into internal Church’s affair’, they launched an ambitious campaign to reunite the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad with the Moscow Patriarchate. As one Russian clergy admitted, President Putin had played a key role in the reunion process.23 In 2009, Yushchenko, who failed to keep his promises to deliver radical political and economic changes, lost the election campaign that brought Viktor Yanukovych (2010–14) to the presidential office. The fourth President of Ukraine signalled his ‘new religious politics’ on his very first day in the office. His inauguration was prefaced by a religious sermon headed not by the Ukrainian hierarchs but by the Moscow Patriarch. Yanukovych’s new religious policy began with the restriction of religious freedom, undermining the principle of churches’ equality before the law, pressure over UOC KP and UGCC. The president (together with the prime minister) joined the Patriarchal Council of Economics and Ethics (no other head of state of countries within the so-called ‘canonical territory’ of the ROC did this) and took, in accordance with his constitutional duties on behalf of Ukraine, a number of steps that were intended to demonstrate the seriousness of changes in church–state relations. Another sign of the new policy was the pressure placed on priests and the communities of the Kyiv Patriarchate, who were strongly urged to join the Moscow Patriarchate and have a ‘special relation’ with only one church: the UOC MP. This policy invoked genuine delight in some circles of the UOC MP, confusion in others and suspicion in wider society. In late 2010, less than 30 per cent of people surveyed by the Razumkov Centre believed that ‘the government treats all religious organizations in Ukraine equally’. Instead, nearly a quarter said that ‘there is a church, which the government treats better than others’ and another 11.3 per cent believed that ‘the government is increasing the power of one church’.24 Viktor Yanukovych’s perception of the ‘Ukrainian Orthodox question’ was formed under different but unidirectional influences. One of the strongest impulses came from Yanukovych’s spiritual confessor, Schema-Archimandrite Zosima Sokur (1944–2002). His ‘Spiritual Testament’ is famous and broadly respected among antagonists of Ukrainian autocephaly because of the following statement: ‘[I]n the case of Ukraine departing from Moscow, no matter if the autocephaly is lawful or not, the tie with the Kyiv Metropolitan automatically breaks.’25 Another strong impulse proceeded from the hierarchs and spokespersons of the Moscow Patriarchate, who insisted that the Kyiv Patriarchate was resting solely upon the political support of ‘nationalists’ and would fall as soon as this support was removed. However, the pressure aimed at breaking the ‘schismatics’ during the short term and changing the entire system of

Ukraine  35 church–state relations in the long term was a failure, primarily due to the UOC KP, UGCC and public opposition and because the clergy and bishops of the UOC MP saw their church as the ‘leading’ one but were unwilling to share with the government the responsibility of discriminating against others. In mid-2011, the presidential administration recognised – not openly and without any apologies made to the offended, but recognised nonetheless – the failure of the church policies.26 Yanukovych’s administration had not abandoned permanent attempts to manipulate churches and religious organisations in order to promote its own agenda. In late February 2014, after the three-month-long, nationwide protests caused by Yanukovych’s decision to suspend the signing of an association agreement with the European Union (EU), he and dozens of the top governmental officials fled the country. During the days following Yanukovych’s flight, the Parliament of Ukraine reinstated the parliamentary system introduced in 2004. On 22 February, the Verkhovna Rada assumed political responsibility for the situation in Ukraine and elected one of the leading members of opposition, Oleksandr Turchynov, as Speaker of Parliament and Acting President until the presidential elections in May. Five days later, Arseniy Yatsenyuk formed the first government in the aftermath of the ‘Euro-revolution’. Almost immediately after his appointment, Turchynov met with representatives of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations (AUCCRO). Whereas he emphasised the importance of the religious community in promoting moral values and consolidation of the nation,27 the hierarchs and religious leaders expressed their support for the legitimate government of Ukraine and called on it to fully restore constitutional order and affirm citizens’ political, economic and other fundamental rights and freedoms. They also condemned any sort of discussion of a potential division of the country and any attempts at separatism.28 The fifth President of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, was known before his presidency as a parishioner of the rather conservative St Jonah monastery in the UOC MP. However, as President of Ukraine, he impetuously assimilated the rhetoric of his predecessors who had insisted over the formation of a united, administratively independent Orthodox Church in Ukraine. He reasoned that in the conditions of hybrid war, when Ukraine countered armed aggression from Russia, the enemy tried to use the religious factor for its own gain. As a matter of fact, Poroshenko used every meeting with church figures in order to stress the importance of a Single Ukrainian Local Orthodox Church for the preservation of national unity and ensuring Ukraine’s victory over the enemy.29

Ukrainian Orthodoxy and the Euro-revolution of winter 2013–14 President Yanukovych’s decision to suspend the signing of an association agreement with the EU on 30 November 2013 sparked protests in Kyiv, which soon widened and led to the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity.

36  V. Yelensky The revolution powerfully challenged the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine with moral, political and identity dilemmas. Churches could not ignore urgent issues such as European integration, blatant immorality and rapid criminalisation of Yanukovych’s clique and the firm resoluteness of Ukrainians to demolish a seemingly rotten political regime despite the real threat of bloodshed.30 Whereas unconditional support provided for protesters by the leadership of the UOC KP was perfectly natural, the stand of some UOC MP clergy appeared to be unexpected by the authorities. The increasingly unwell Primate of the UOC MP, Metropolitan Volodymyr, signed an appeal from AUCCRO (which his church was chairing on a rotation basis according to the Council’s Statute) regarding the use of force, the punishment of those responsible and the inadmissibility of violence. The Council called on the government to guarantee constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens, not to use force against peaceful assemblies, to take into account the demands of protesters and also to conduct impartial investigations into the provocations and violent confrontations and to punish the perpetrators. This is highlighted by the fact that on 30 November 2013, when the authorities ­feverishly searched the UOC MP for an authoritative person who would justify the beating of students, they found no one. Two weeks later, a group of UOC MP priests sent a message to all people of good will, in which they declared their desire to have closer ties with Christian Europe and share their fundamental Christian values with them, opposing all kinds of lawlessness and violence.31 Additionally, Metropolitan Volodymyr declared his will to provide space in his residence in the Kyiv Cave Monastery for the further dialogue between the government and opposition so that these holy walls can help Ukraine exit the political crisis. At the same time, a significant number of high hierarchs in the UOC MP, who were reliably controlled and unscrupulously manipulated by the presidential administration and were heavily influenced by the Moscow Patriarchate, publicly criticised the Ukrainian protesters in the media and in sermons.32 In turn, the hierarchy of the Kyiv Patriarchate criticised the authorities for launching violence instead of dialogue. According to Patriarch Filaret, the lack of a genuine dialogue between the sides of the conflict led more and more people to reason that methods of peaceful, non-violent resistance were ineffective. The church’s leader urged the president as head of state and the opposition to initiate direct, and most importantly fruitful, negotiations in order to get out of the crisis. The Primate of the UOC KP repeatedly insisted that the people could not be deceived. Throughout the year, the authorities fed the Ukrainians promises of a European future, and when the time came to sign an association agreement with the EU, the government turned its back on the people. Moreover, given that the root cause of the civil protest was the indefinite postponement of the Ukraine–EU Association Agreement, he called on the government for a speedy conclusion of the negotiations and the signing of the agreement. Reacting to the numerous unjust sentences issued by the Ukrainian courts to protesters, the Patriarch stressed that such

Ukraine  37 decisions could be considered sufficient to commit, especially during the middle of the night, forceful actions aimed at limiting the constitutional rights to the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of expression. As the Patriarch insisted: We should not forget that the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, the execution of martyrs of ancient and modern times, and numerous repressions of the twentieth century were all executions of court decisions, but this did not make these injustices just.33 Finally, after the shooting of protesters on 20 February 2014, the Holy Synod of the Kyiv Patriarchate voted to suspend the commemoration of the President and civil authorities of Ukraine during services in consequence of their use of firearms against the people who they had sworn to serve and protect.34 In general, religious communities played a significant role in 2013–14 Revolution of Dignity.35 Several thousand people meeting on Maidan Nezalezhnosti (literally ‘Independence Square’) were accompanied by Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant priests (some days up to 150 clerics of different faiths attended). Every Sunday, the rally on Maidan started with an ecumenical service. Dozens of clerics were with their faithful during the assault on the night of 10–11 December 2013 and on the barricades, and during the most dangerous and tragic days in late February 2014. They felt that the people needed them much more now than before; they were willing to stand between protesters and riot police, to serve, to profess and comfort people in the bitter cold and among the flames. Churches and clergy were active during every stage of the stand-off between the regime and its citizens. They led the crowd in prayer, mobilised awareness of injustice, played a vital role in shaping popular opinion, provided organisational and material support to the protesters and participated in negotiations between opposing parties. Furthermore, St Michael’s Monastery provided shelter to the protesters and became a hospital for the wounded, priests were with the protesters from the first day of protests and a tent chapel was erected on the Euromaidan. Prayer and worship on Maidan was the creation of a sublime spiritual space, which not only united and elevated those who were present, but also legitimised Maidan as a mature and integrated community of moral and highly responsible people.

Orthodoxy and two competing national projects: ‘The Russian World’ doctrine against the Ukrainian nation-building process Russian intellectuals understood as long ago as the second half of the nineteenth century that the all-Russian and Ukrainian nation-building projects would necessarily be competing projects and the independence of the UOC from St Petersburg or Moscow would be a heavy contribution to the latter.36

38  V. Yelensky Accordingly, the concept of a ‘Russian World’, an ‘imagined community’ based on Russian language, culture and Orthodoxy categorically denied the very foundation of the Ukrainian nation-building project. In the summer of 2009, Patriarch Kirill, recently installed to Moscow throne as the 16th Primate of the ROC, appeared spectacularly before a much-disappointed Orange team and rather pessimistic Ukrainian public. It was in Kyiv where the Patriarch had tested his own version of the ‘Russian World’ thesis before he proclaimed his doctrine at the opening address to the third Russian World Assembly in Moscow on 3 November 2009.37 During his 2009 visit to the Ukraine Patriarch, he persistently called on Ukrainians to re-examine their historical choice and asked them – both implicitly and explicitly – to consider the following course of reasoning: You are the historical centre of the Eastern European Orthodox civilization, ‘Russian world,’ you made a great contribution to the formation of the ­ All-Russian common identity, the Great Empire (Russian and Soviet) is your empire. If you recall this and elevate your historic memory to a new, 21st century level, you will transform yourself from a guided [people] to the leading [one]. Together we will stand against the West, which for you is foreign, sinful and poisoned by consumerism. Human rights and human dignity, democracy and supremacy of law are empty words, aimed at driving us from the enlightened path of realizing our mission.38 With the commencement of Russian aggression against Ukraine, the ‘Russian World’ doctrine has been turned into openly militaristic ideology. The Russian authorities, state-controlled propaganda and Moscow Patriarchy placed great importance to such an ideology and to Orthodoxy within this construct in their hybrid war against Ukraine. Patriarchal speakers have become a mouthpiece of the anti-Ukrainian campaign and have even tried to sanctify Russian aggression. In fact, the Moscow Patriarchate and Primate of the ROC took an expectedly hostile position against Ukraine. Speakers on behalf of the Patriarchate have lashed out against the pro-EU movement in Ukraine and called for interference to keep the country within ‘Eastern Christian civilization’. Patriarch Kirill himself headed the hybrid war’s religious battlefront. In August 2014, he issued a letter to the Primates of the Orthodox Churches, in which he accused ‘Uniates and Schismatic’ of waging religious war against ‘canonical Orthodoxy’. In May 2015, Patriarch Kirill announced that ‘godlessness is becoming the state ideology of Ukraine’.39 The Moscow Patriarchate gave its support to Kremlin policies against Ukraine in different ways. First, it strengthened its control over its semi-autonomous church in Ukraine (UOC MP) and indoctrination the flock of this church with the ideas of the Russian World agenda, anti-Westernism, Russia’s supremacy, Slavic unity and ‘Indivisibility of Holy Rus’. Second, the Moscow Patriarchate legitimised Russian foreign policy, glorified Russian militarism, neo-Imperialism and ­ justified

Ukraine  39 military action in Ukraine. Third, the ROC’s leadership went to considerable effort to discredit the Ukrainian State, specifically its church–state, ethnic and linguistic policies. This has led to Russian Orthodoxy being considered as a serious component of Russian soft power in Ukraine.40 It is not without reason that Ukrainians strove to extract themselves from the ‘Russian World’; ‘Orthodox nations’ are prone to support everything that is related to it. For instance, during the 2017 Pew Survey, only 22 per cent of Ukrainians agreed with the statement: ‘A strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West’, compared with 83 per cent of Armenians, 80 per cent of Serbians, 76 per cent of Belarusians, 70 per cent of Greeks, 61 per cent of Moldovans, 56 per cent of Bulgarians and 52 per cent of Romanians and Georgians. Similarly, only 38 per cent of Ukrainians polled agreed that Russia has an obligation to protect Orthodox believers outside Russia’s borders, while 79 per cent of Armenians and 74 per cent of Serbs took a similar stance. While 78 per cent of Serbians, 73 per cent of Russians, 71 per cent of Armenians, 70 per cent of Greeks, 65 per cent of Georgians and 52 per cent of Moldovans polled agreed that there is a clash between their own traditional values and those of the West, just 37 per cent of Ukrainians completely or mostly agreed with the statement: ‘There is a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the West.’41 It is understandable that the Russian invasion of Ukraine and almost unconditional support of Russian foreign policy by the Moscow Patriarchate forced the Ukrainian governmental and ecclesiastical circles to intensify their continuing efforts in gaining independence from the Russian Church. The Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) of the Eight Convocation (elected in 2014) has started its own campaign for Ukrainian autocephaly. On the eve of the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Churches, Parliament adopted the Appeal to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to convene under his auspices the Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Council on unification and issue the Tomos of Autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. This appeal gained the support of 245 parliamentarians (the minimum required for a majority is 226) and was perceived positively by society and negatively by the Russian Federation, Moscow Patriarchate, the leadership of the UOC MP and the pro-Russian Opposition Bloc parliamentarian fraction. Patriarch Bartholomew himself called the Parliament’s appeal ‘an important historical event’. On 17 April 2018, Petro Poroshenko invited the heads of all parliamentary factions to his presidential office to inform them that he had decided to ask the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to grant the Tomos of Autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine and asked that parliamentarians support his request. Two days later, Verkhovna Rada adopted a resolution in support of the presidential appeal to Patriarch Bartholomew. A total of 268 members of Parliament out of 334 registered in the session hall voted for the draft resolution. This issue has garnered enormous public attention in Ukraine and raised hopes for solving the problem of Orthodoxy in Ukraine. Explaining

40  V. Yelensky his engagement on the Orthodox issue, President Poroshenko emphasised that this was by no means interference by the state in the church affairs: I am a strong opponent of state interference in church affairs. Especially when this state is foreign. Especially when it is an aggressor. Especially when there is the announcement of the Ukrainian territory a canonical territory of the church of another state. This is an encroachment on our territorial integrity.42 At the same time, the Appeal to Ecumenical Patriarch of the Ukrainian President and the Parliament triggered a harsh reaction from the Russian State and the Russian Church. On the very day the Ukrainian Parliament voted for a resolution in support of the church’s independence, the Russian President’s Press Secretary, Dmitry Peskov, stated that the Kremlin could not support the creation of the independent UOC, calling it a ‘split’.43 On 7 June 2018, the chair of the State Duma Committee for Developing Civil Society, Public and Religious Organizations, S. Gavrilov, met in Athens with the Archbishop of Athens and All Greece Hieronymos and members of the Holy Synod of the Greek Orthodox Church in order to prevent the ‘Ukrainian scenario’.44 In July 2018, Greece expelled two Russian diplomats who tried to bribe Greek officials and church metropolitans. High-level diplomatic sources noted that the initiative followed numerous coordinated efforts to expand Russian influence in Greece including, among others, the activities of the Russian Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society.45 In trying to prevent the recognition of autocephalous status, the Moscow Patriarchate’s ‘foreign minister’ Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev) met the Patriarchs of Antioch,46 Jerusalem,47 Alexandria,48 Georgia49 and Romania,50 the Ambassadors of Greece51 and Bulgaria52 to Russia and the Archbishop of Cyprus.53 All these meetings took place in the month of May 2018. In August 2018, the Associated Press provided information about Russian hackers who were indicted by a United States (USA) special prosecutor for trying to steal the private correspondence of some of the world’s most senior Orthodox Christian figures, included top aides to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, in order to halt the process of granting autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine.54 In Ukraine, the pro-Russian political forces and leadership of the UOC MP spearheaded the fight against Ukrainian autocephaly. Both politicians and clergy threatened world public opinion with the ghosts of ‘civil war’ and a global split within world Orthodoxy.55 However, despite all these efforts, representatives of the Ecumenical ­Patriarchate released several statements in favour of Constantinople’s future decision on Ukrainian autocephaly in the months that followed the Appeal of President and Parliament of Ukraine to Patriarch Bartholomew.56 On 7 ­September 2018, Bartholomew appointed two exarchs of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Kyiv, Archbishop Daniel of Pamphilon (United States) and Bishop Ilarion of Edmonton (Canada) in the context of preparing for the

Ukraine  41 57

provision of autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. During the meeting with President Poroshenko, the exarchs stressed that the process of granting autocephaly to the UOC had arrived at the finish line.58 On 11 October 2018, the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which was held in Istanbul, made an improbably decisive move towards Ukrainian autocephaly. The Synod confirmed Patriarch’s Bartholomew readiness to grant autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine; indeed, it restored Constantinople’s ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the Metropolitan of Kyiv and the ­Primates of the UOC KP (Filaret), the UAOC (Makariy) and their faithful to the communion with the church and re-established the Stavropegion of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Kyiv.59 While Ukrainians triumphed and underlined through the words of their President that ‘the decision of the Ecumenical Patriarch and the Holy Synod has finally dispelled the imperial illusions and chauvinistic fantasies of Moscow’,60 Russian officials and clergy reacted aggressively to Constantinople’s decision. The day after this decision was publicised, Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed the situation around the ‘Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine’ with the permanent members of the Russian Security Council.61 Three days later, the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church decided to suspend Eucharistic communion with the Church of Constantinople.62 Despite enormous pressure from the Russian government and the Russian Church, on 19 November 2018, the Ecumenical Patriarchate proclaimed that it ‘reiterates its sacred decision to grant the Tomos of Autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine’ and that ‘the concrete date within December 2018, will be presented for the confirmation and announcement by the Holy and Sacred Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’.63 After four weeks of disputed and complex preparations, on 15 December 2018, 42 bishops from the UOC KP, 12 bishops from the UAOC and two bishops from the UOC MP, each followed by one cleric and one layman, gathered at St Sophia’s Cathedral in Kyiv for the Unification Council chaired by Metropolitan Emmanuel (Adamakis) of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. On the same day, the UOC KP and UOAC decided to dissolve themselves ahead of the Unification Council. Thousands of people from different corners of Ukraine awaited Council’s decision outside the Cathedral in St Sofia Square in a celebratory mood.64 After two rounds of voting, Metropolitan Epiphanius (Dumenko) of Pereyaslav and Bila Tserkva, a close associate and protégé of Patriarch Filaret, was elected the Primate of the newly constituted church named, according to its Charter, ‘The Orthodox Church of Ukraine’. The 39-year-old hierarch assumed the title of the Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine, as the only Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine recognised by the Ecumenical ­Patriarchate.65 Patriarch Bartholomew congratulated and blessed the newly elected Primate and invited him to Istanbul to concelebrate the liturgy and receive the Tomos on 6 January 2019. On the day after his election, Bartholomew commemorated Metropolitan Epiphanius for the first time during the liturgy, along with the other primates of the Local Orthodox Churches.

42  V. Yelensky On 5 January 2019, Patriarch Bartholomew signed the Tomos on the Autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The ceremony of signing and handing the scroll of the Tomos66 took place in the Patriarchal Church of St George in the presence of President Petro Poroshenko, Andriy Parubiy, Chair of the Verkhovna Rada, and other Ukrainian Government representatives.67 On 6 January, during the official ceremony granting the Tomos in St George’s Cathedral in Istanbul, Patriarch Bartholomew handed the scrolls of the signed Tomos to its Primate. This stage of the struggle over the Ukrainian Church’s independence led to great enthusiasm in Ukraine and unparalleled interest abroad. Liturgies and ceremonies from the Patriarchal cathedral in Istanbul were broadcast live by several Ukrainian television channels while leading world media highlighted the importance of this event.68 The word ‘Tomos’, widely unknown beyond the narrow circle of experts in church affairs until mid-2018, became the ‘Word of 2018’ in Ukraine.69 According to Google’s most popular searches of Ukrainian users in 2018, ‘Tomos’ ranked third after ‘bitcoin’ and ‘measles’.

Human security and fundamental freedoms threatened: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the annexation of the Crimea, the war in the Donbas region and proclamation of puppet quasi-states there, which were created and led from the beginning by Russian citizens, created a radically new situation regarding human security in Ukraine. According to the United Nations, as of June 2017, 10,090 people had died and 23,966 had been injured as a result of battles since the beginning of hostilities in 2014.70 Military operations led to a deterioration in the human rights situation in the territories controlled by the Government of Ukraine in the conduct of hostilities, while in the territories of self-proclaimed ‘republics’, violations have been reported on a mass and systemic level. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voted for a resolution on human rights in Crimea on 19 December 2017, entitled ‘Situation of human rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, Ukraine’. The resolution was initiated by Ukraine and supported by the UNGA Third Committee. The UNGA called on the Russian Federation, to take all measures necessary to bring an immediate end to all abuses against residents of Crimea, in particular reported discriminatory measures and practices, arbitrary detentions, torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment, and to revoke all discriminatory legislation.71 It also urged Russia to ‘immediately release Ukrainian citizens who were unlawfully detained and judged without regard for elementary standards of justice, as well as those transferred across internationally recognized borders

Ukraine  43 from Crimea to the Russian Federation’. Russia should also ‘address the issue of impunity and ensure that those found to be responsible for abuses are held accountable before an independent judiciary’.72 The UNGA also urged the Russian authorities to ‘create and maintain a safe and enabling environment for journalists and human rights defenders to perform their work independently and without undue interference in Crimea; to permit the reopening of cultural and religious institutions’. The UNGA called on Russia to ‘revoke immediately the decision declaring the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People an extremist organisation and banning its activities, and repeal the decision banning leaders of the Mejlis from entering Crimea’. The resolution was the first international document designating the Russian Federation as an occupying power and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol as a temporarily occupied territory. In addition, the resolution confirmed the territorial integrity of Ukraine and reaffirmed the non-recognition of the annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula. The annexation of Crimea by Russia put religious communities and believers residing on the peninsula in a situation that they could hardly have imagined in 2014. Religious persecution led to the expulsion of some of the religious leaders, pastors of Protestant communities, Islamic activists and priests and believers of the UOC KP from Crimea. Some (mainly Pentecostal) pastors were also deported. The deportations related to pastors who expressed pro-Ukrainian views, even in the softest form, and members of the communities who participated in the Orange Revolution of 2004 and the Revolution of Dignity of 2013–14.73 Those religious communities whose coreligionists in mainland Ukraine criticised Russia and its aggression towards Ukraine were also closely controlled by the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. For example, the entire Protestant congregation from the city of Balaklava was forced to emigrate together with a pastor.74 However, the main targets of the occupying power were the communities of the Kyiv Patriarchate and Muslim communities. In nine of the 15 communities of the Kyiv Patriarchate, which operated in Crimea until annexation, most of the priests were forced to leave. As regards the Muslim community, searches of mosques, the confiscation of literature perceived by Russia as ‘extremist’, the detention and arrest of Muslim activists, and judicial proceedings against members of the pan-Islamist international organisation Hizb-ut-Tahrir have become daily cases in the annexed Crimea. At least 26 people allegedly convicted of affiliation with Hizb ut-Tahrir – banned as an extremist group in Russia but not in Ukraine and most of Western Europe – have been arrested by Russian authorities in Crimea since 2015. These people were arrested for their beliefs, opinions and participation in religious ceremonies. They face sentences ranging from five years to life in prison. As Human Rights Watch stressed, the arrests are consistent with Russia’s practice of cracking down on Muslims who preach and study Islam outside official guidelines.75 In addition, the so-called ‘Yarovaya package’ (a law introduced by members of the Russian State Duma Irina Yarovaya, Aleksei Pushkov and Nadezhda

44  V. Yelensky Gerasimova together with Senator Victor Ozerov in 2016) was implemented in the Crimean territory. This package of laws essentially banned the missionary activity of all religious organisations except for the Moscow Patriarchate.76 The amendments add a new provision to Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, stating that ‘missionary activity’ may only be performed ‘without hindrance’ at churches and other religious sites (it is explicitly banned from residential buildings). Another example of a general violation of human rights and religious freedom was the banning of the activity of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia (this was particularly the case in Crimea). The ban was accompanied by workplace discrimination of believers, deprivation of civil rights and seizure of property belonging to religious organisations affiliated with the Jehovah’s Witnesses. So, for instance, in April 2017, the Military Enlistment Office in Bakhchysarai in Crimea warned a Jehovah’s Witness that an alternative service would be available for him only if he changed his religion; this conversion had to be confirmed by documentation upon request of chief enlistment officer.77 The situation in the occupied territories of the Donbas appears even more tragic and threatening. The preamble to the first edition of its constitution mentioned that, feeling itself like an integral part of the ‘Russian World’ as a Russian civilization, thinking about the indivisibility of fate of the whole ‘Russian World’ and still willing to remain its partakers, remaining dedicated to ideals and values of the ‘Russian World’ and honouring the memory of their ancestors we are confessing the Orthodox Faith (Christian Orthodox Catholic faith of Eastern Confession) of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and recognizing its cornerstone of the ‘Russian World’.78 This statement was followed by another almost entirely lifted from the Law Codex of Russian Empire: ‘In the Donetsk People’s Republic, the leading and dominant belief is the Orthodox faith (Christian Orthodox Catholic faith of Eastern Confession) professed by the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)’.79 Asserting that the Orthodoxy of the Moscow Patriarchate in the creation of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is irreconcilable with all other religions, the guerrillas have conducted pogroms against Protestant churches in the region,80 capturing these non-Orthodox believers even during their services in church and beating and murdering pastors.81 On 8 June 2014, after the festive Trinity Sunday service at the Transfiguration Church in Sloviansk, proRussian gunmen detained four members of the Evangelical Transfiguration Church. The men were brutally beaten and killed and their bodies were found in a mass grave after the guerrillas had left the city and the Ukrainian army took control.82 As it transpired, all four of the men were tortured and killed the following day (9 June). The pastor of the ‘The Assembly of God’ church

Ukraine  45 in Donetsk, Serhiy Kosyak, experienced eight hours of uninterrupted torture in the headquarters of terrorists in the occupied building of the Donetsk Regional State Administration. In the words of the victim, he was saved because a commander of the rebels who used to be the parishioner of that very church entered the room where he was being interrogated, after which the pastor was taken to hospital where ‘all those torn elements were sewn’. On 14 June 2014, in a terrorist attack on a bridge in Mariupol, DPR guerrillas killed Sergei Skorobahach, a pastor of the ‘Renewal’ church, who chaired the Council of Churches of the city. Dozens of Baptist, Pentecostal, Jehovah ­Witnesses, Halls of Kingdom and Mormon churches and Adventist prayer houses and school buildings were seized and confiscated by pro-Russian forces. Twenty people were taken captive in ‘The Evening Light’ rehabilitation centre in Donetsk; some of them were beaten, the building was sealed off and their minivan was seized. In Horlivka, the building of the ‘Church of Christ’ was taken away, all the property was removed and office equipment was taken away. In Snizhne, the liturgy in the ‘City of Faith’ church was broken up and the building sealed off. In Torez, gunmen with ‘Cossack Guard’ chevrons broke up the liturgy in ‘The Word of Life’ church, sealed off the building and threatened to shoot everybody if they gather once again. In Horlivka, armed rebels broke into the prayer house of the Seventh Day Adventist Church during the Holy Communion. They stopped the liturgy and forced people to leave. The attackers motivated their actions with the claims that ‘this is an Orthodox land, and there is no place for different sects in it’.83 In the occupied territories, ‘anti-sect’ moods are fomented: the self-proclaimed ‘head of the DPR’ promised ‘to severely fight against sects’,84 while his Luhansk ­‘colleague’ ordered ‘to take religious sects under special control’. As a matter of fact, authorities of the so-called Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) elevated ‘the struggle against harmful sects’ to the rank of ‘a state politics’.85 At the same time, Russian aggression against Ukraine, the illegal annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donetsk and Luhansk created a sufficient rise in patriotism, including in Orthodox milieu and consolidated Ukrainian society. The UOC KP and the UAOC (as well as the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, several Protestant denominations and the Jewish and Muslim communities) gave their unconditional support to the Ukrainian military forces and to all the efforts of the Ukrainian State to strengthen the country’s defence capability. Hundreds of priests, deacons and pastors have travelled to the front line to serve as a chaplains for Ukrainian military personnel.86 Furthermore, churches raised the necessary funds to assist military hospitals, forced displaced people, the wounded and families of fallen soldiers and officers. Members of the clergy even donated blood for the needs of servicemen. The Primate of UOC KP (Patriarch Filaret) and Head of UGCC (Major Archbishop Svyatoslav) have issued numerous addresses, statements and appeals in support of the Ukrainian Army and have made great efforts to mobilise international opinion with a view to assisting Ukraine in repelling the Russian invasion.

46  V. Yelensky However, high hierarchs of the UOC MP took an ‘earthly’ position that was poorly perceived by Ukrainian society. They continued to speak of a ‘fratricidal war’, alluding to the Ukrainian government as a culprit of hostilities, constantly criticising Kyiv and never Moscow. Indeed, they ignored the annexation of Ukrainian lands and the Russian invasion. Very often, the theses espoused by these hierarchs were a continuation of the pro-Russian Opposition Bloc propaganda, which in turn transmitted the statements of the Kremlin propagandists. The anti-patriotic stance of the UOC MP hierarchy incited massive public outcry. In more than 70 villages, members of UOC MP parishes voted to join the Kyiv Patriarchate because their priest refused to hold memorial services for deceased soldiers fighting in Eastern Ukraine or preached ‘Russian World’ ideas.

The world’s ninth-largest group of internally displaced people: the Ukrainian state and refugees from the East87 Almost two million people left their homes due to military operations in Eastern Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea, of which the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Ukraine reached 1,177,000, with more than 760,000 refugees fleeing the country’s borders. The vast majority fled Eastern Ukraine while around 20,000 fled Crimea. The nongovernmental organisation (NGO) Crimean diaspora estimates that between 50,000 and 60,000 people fled Crimea, though not all have been registered.88 The unprecedented intensity and mass character of the forced movement in Ukraine explains a high level of personal awareness about the problem among the host population: more than half of respondents in Luhansk and Donetsk regions and more than one-fifth in Kyiv count IDPs among people they know, including relatives and friends.89 At the end of 2015, only a quarter of IDPs included people capable of working; approximately 60 per cent of them were pensioners, 13 per cent were children and 4 per cent were disabled people. The IDPs tried to settle in big cities and industrialised regions where they could have more opportunities to find a job and do business. They were motivated by the way of life they had led before the beginning of war; up to 90 per cent of the Donbas population are urban residents. Most IDPs settled in regions that are located near or even adjacent to their former place of residence. At the same time, some of the displaced people intended to live permanently in other regions of Ukraine. For instance, among those who have settled in Western regions of Ukraine, 45 per cent are IDPs.90 As a result of displacement from the territories where military action has occurred, most of the IDPs lost their sources of subsistence and income. They found themselves in a position of ‘sudden poverty’, which had a negative impact on their psychological state. Neither the state nor society could have been prepared for such large-scale internal migration; Ukraine enjoyed a surprisingly long peaceful period between the Second World War and 2014. The Declaration of Independence

Ukraine  47 on 24 August 1991 was bloodless. After declaring independence and until 2014, Ukraine also managed to avoid violent scenarios during changes of government as well as armed conflicts with neighbouring states. Until 2014, the very threat of war was not considered to be in any way realistic either by the public, the majority of experts or state actors. Despite the obvious and often aggressive intentions of the Russian Federation to maintain and enhance its influence over Ukraine and to prevent Euro–Atlantic integration, despite the permanent trade and humanitarian ‘wars’, real military aggression by Russia towards Ukraine was not expected. The Kremlin constantly referred to the doctrine of ‘fraternal peoples’ in its official discourse, while the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation fixed the principle of strategic partnership, the recognition of the inviolability of existing borders, respect for territorial integrity and mutual commitment not to use its territory to harm the security of the other.91 The majority of public opinion polls showed that Ukrainians had rather friendly attitudes towards Russians.92 Ukraine’s military doctrines issued in 199393 and 200494 did not consider Russia a potential enemy, let alone a main adversary. Only in September 2015, after the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the armed conflict in Donbas – which was organised and implemented by Russia – the President of Ukraine approved a new military doctrine of Ukraine, which stated that the Russian Federation posed the greatest national security threat.95 Russia’s military aggression towards Ukraine was not only unexpected, but also a truly shocking event for Ukrainians. On the other hand, during the last quarter of the century, Ukraine did not differ significantly in terms of domestic migration. After gaining independence, the volume of internal migration in Ukraine decreased compared with the Soviet era; the practice of organised resettlement and recruiting of labour force inherent in the Soviet Union ceased. Whereas domestic migration turnover reached three million at the turn of the 1990s, in the 2000s it decreased by approximately three times. In 2005, for example, the coefficient of internal migration in Ukraine was 15.4 (meaning that 15.4 internal displacements were recorded per 1,000 population). This coefficient was lower than the USA (26), Sweden (20) and Great Britain (19).96 Not surprisingly, the Concept of State Migration Policy approved by the President of Ukraine in 2011 hardly mentioned internal migration among the strategic directions of migration policy.97 However, despite the initial unpreparedness of Ukraine to accommodate and integrate a large number of migrants, state agencies, non-governmental volunteer organisations and religious associations were able to quickly create the necessary legislative framework, social infrastructure and the minimum necessary conditions for people who left their homes in the Donbas. As early as 2014, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the law ‘On Ensuring of Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced Persons’, which provides for a specific set of rights for IDPs: protection from discrimination, forced displacement

48  V. Yelensky and return, assistance in voluntary returns and access to social and economic services including residence registration, health care and employment. Initially, the law established that, An internally displaced person is a citizen of Ukraine, permanently residing in the territory of Ukraine, who was forced or voluntarily left their place of residence as a result of or in order to avoid the negative impact of armed conflict, temporary occupation, situations of generalized violence, mass violations of human rights and disasters of natural or humanmade origin.98 However, amendments to the law from November 2015 included foreigners and stateless people who are entitled to permanent residence in Ukraine in its definition of an IDP. On 11 June 2014, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted the resolution ‘On Social Security Services for Citizens of Ukraine Displaced from Temporary Occupied Territory and Anti-terrorist Operation Areas’ and adopted an action plan. The plan was a move to resolving problems related to social protection, in particular providing restoration of all social benefits and employment assistance for displaced people from areas of military action, putting in place measures to ensure the maintenance of bank accounts of citizens of Ukraine in receipt of state support, pensions and salaries for those displaced from temporary occupied territory and anti-terrorist operation area, establishing a unified online database on social security services for these Ukrainian citizens, transporting those who could not move independently due to health problems or required constant care and accompaniment of a healthcare worker, allocating money from state budget reserve fund to pay for temporary accommodation of IDPs families, providing IDPs with necessary medical assistance and setting up a 24/7 hotline. Two weeks later, on 25 June 2014, the Ukrainian government issued a resolution ‘On Temporary Accommodation of Families Displaced from Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol’. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine resolved to allocate more than 25 million Ukrainian hryvnia to the regional and Kyiv state administrations for financial support on temporary accommodation of displaced families from the peninsula. On 5 November 2014, the government adopted a resolution on carrying out social payments to IDPs. In 2015, the law ‘On Amendments to Some Laws of Ukraine Concerning Strengthening of Social Protection of Internally Displaced Persons’ was passed by the Ukrainian Parliament,99 along with a number of government regulations, including: ‘On Providing Monthly Targeted Financial Support to Internally Displaced Persons to Cover Livelihood, including Housing and Utilities’, ‘On Providing Partial Payment for the Cost of Temporary Accommodation to Persons Displaced from the Temporarily Occupied Territory and the Region of the Counter-terrorist Operation’ and ‘On Providing Compensation for the Costs Associated with Temporary Disabilities Living in Sanatoriums and Other

Ukraine  49 Citizens Who Move Temporarily from the Occupied Territory and the Area of Counter-terrorist Operations’.100 In 2014, the government allocated 510 million hryvnia from the state funds for payment to IDPs, and a further 3.3 billion hryvnia in 2015. Over a five-year period (2014–18), a total of 13.5 billion hryvnia was allocated to the assistance of IDPs.101

‘Consequently, you are no longer foreigners and strangers …’102 religious communities in Ukraine addressing the world’s ninth-largest group of IDPs Due to an economic decline caused by the war and military action and deprivation of industrial resources in the Donbas, the state was unable to address the problems of IDPs without international assistance and active participation of non-governmental actors and millions of men and women across the country, despite the provisions listed above. As Natalia Karbowska, chair of the board of the Ukrainian Women Fund, put it, volunteers mobilised to support the army and those displaced by the fighting, raising millions of dollars for aid in a country with no culture of philanthropy.103 Churches and religious organisations have also played a role in this respect. As the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine reported in 2014, that, civil society organizations such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and churches carried the main responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance to IDPs. IDPs confirmed that this support continued and gave multiple examples of host communities’ ongoing assistance providing free accommodation, food, clothes and toys for children.104 The issue of IDPs, the number of which steadily grew due to the escalation of warfare in Eastern Ukraine, became a high-ranking issue in the sphere of social services of Ukrainian churches. During the meeting with the members of AUCCRO on 3 October 2014, Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk appealed to religious leaders to assist the authorities in supporting people who were forced to leave the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.105 On 31 October 2014, AUCCRO appealed to compatriots, calling on them to take part in goodwill and volunteer activities, including special care over forced resettlers from the Donbas. Religious leaders declared that in the context of the approaching winter, people in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea who were forced to resettle IDPs, people who had remained in cities and villages destroyed by military action, Ukrainian soldiers and volunteers would demand special assistance and support.106 Addresses, appeals and remarks of high hierarchs, religious leaders and ordinary clergy on migrants have been marked with solidarity, empathy and compassion. Such a stance was particularly noticeable in comparison with the rather firm attitude towards the problem of migration and migrants by the Primate of the ROC. Patriarch

50  V. Yelensky Kirill considered migrants in Russian cities as a ‘necessary evil’ for a growing economy, as a source of cheap labour and, at the same time, as a source of crime, a nourishing environment for ethnic criminal groups and a threat to the local culture. The Patriarch suggested his own ‘magic solution’ to the migration issue in Russia.107 To avoid the influx of millions migrants to Russia, the government should drastically reduce the abortion rate. As a result, according to the Patriarch, the additional labour force for Russia in the years to come would not be needed.108 As the Catholic Herald rightly argued by reviewing the remarks of Patriarch’s closest associate and the ROC’s ‘foreign minister’ Metropolitan Hilarion on this issue, immigration is perceived to be ‘a challenge or even a threat’, whereas ‘for Pope Francis it is the opportunity to welcome the stranger’.109 Religious organisations – among the most active are Caritas Ukraine, the Department of Social Service and Charity of the UOC of Kyiv Patriarchate, the Spiritual Board of Ukraine’s Muslims, the Cathedral of the Independent Evangelical Churches of Ukraine; the religious organisation ‘Church of Christian Hope’ and the Adventist Development and the Relief Agency Ukraine (ADRA Ukraine) – played an important role both in the early stages and today in providing settlers with essentials such as medicine, food and housing. The care of migrants by religious organisations is the most ­systematic because it is based on a preliminary assessment of their needs and the creation of a special database, which is the basis for providing specific and individual social services. For example, Caritas (the international network of charitable organisations) implements the programme of support for IDPs ‘Point of Emergency Aid’ through its subsidiary Caritas Ukraine. The purpose of the programme is to provide assistance to 6,500 IDPs in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The Charitable Foundation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Caritas-Lviv, launched a comprehensive programme for assistance to IDPs and demobilised military personnel, which aims to provide them with free legal, financial and psychological assistance. Thanks to the charitable activity of Caritas, about 220,000 people received assistance in three first few months of military conflict in the Donbas. The integration of internally displaced persons into a new social environment was accompanied by significant economic, cultural and psychological problems. From the very start of military intervention and the appearance of the first IDPs, the UGCC focused on providing assistance to the most vulnerable people. In the period 2014–15, the church helped 80,000 IDPs. These were primarily families with several children, disabled people, orphans, elderly people etc. The total sum of assistance over two years amounted to €8 million. Besides material assistance, the UGCC provided psychological assistance and held seminars on reconciliation both in Western and Eastern Ukraine. On 5 February 2015, the UGCC Synod made a public appeal to servants of the church of all ranks, in which they substantiated the foundation of the pastoral care in the conditions of war. In the appeal, particular attention was

Ukraine  51 paid to guardianship that the church was to provide the forced IDPs. The Synod of Bishops forewarned its faithful about attitudes and feelings towards IDPs and called on their solidarity. The bishops reminded their faithful that many of them were convicted by Russian courts for their beliefs and after they served their sentences of punishment they were not allowed to return to Western Ukraine. These people found their second small homeland in other regions of Ukraine, including in the East of the country, where the war is currently raging. Now was the time to show human kindness to the displaced people from that region. The Synod of Bishops called on priests to do everything possible so that the tragic times for Ukraine were manifested in the century-old motto aimed at the consolidation of the country: ‘East and West Together!’.110 In September 2016, the hierarchs of the UGCC addressed the words of support and solidarity to those who directly affected by war: combatants, wounded, families of the deceased and missing, those who have been forced to leave their homes and those living under occupation and at the boundary line had been living in an undeclared but bloody and devastating war for more than two years. Appealing to the millions of Ukrainians who were forced to leave their homes, the hierarchs noted that ‘becoming exiles in their own land and having lost almost everything’, they often felt forgotten, abandoned and helpless. The hierarchs assured the temporarily displaced persons that they could always find warm words of sympathy and brotherly support in their church communities. Bishops encouraged forced migrants to build new relationships of support and not be alone with the pain, while addressing those who had taken in IDPs, including helping them to find housing, work, and arrange their household, the hierarchs thanked that the people had opened their hearts and homes to ‘accept Christ himself’. Supreme Archbishop Emeritus Cardinal Lubomyr Husar (1933–2017), whose authority in Ukrainian society, even after his resignation from the post of head of the UGCC in 2011, remained extremely high, personally paid a lot attention to the problem of refugees. The cardinal emphasised that he himself was a wanderer during the Second World War and he still grateful to the people who helped his family: Those immigrants whom we will accept with heart will be apostles of Ukraine’s unity when they return to their homes. They will tell those who did not leave, that they found good people both in the Central and Western Ukraine […]. And they will bring this experience back to Donbas and talk about it, and will bear that gratitude in their hearts and tell their children how other Ukrainians helped them in a terrible hour.111 At the same time, the UOC of the Kyiv Patriarchate founded the Centre for the Defenders of Ukraine (‘Axios’), and the ‘Road to Home’ project,

52  V. Yelensky which aimed to help the military and emigrants with psychological trauma. In 2017, Axios assisted 250 veterans with employment, provided 200 of them with advancing training, provided 500 with legal advice and 2,000 with psychological counselling.112 Protestant denominations provided extraordinarily active assistance for IDPs. For example, the Ukrainian Church of the Evangelical Christians (Pentecostals), which has no more than 113,000 adult members, took 40,000 refugees from the combat zone and occupied territories. In the three years since the beginning of hostilities, IDPs received 4,500 tonnes of products, 1,500 tonnes of clothing and medicines, 300 cubic metres of building materials and hundreds of thousands of dollars of financial assistance from the church. The church also organised groups of volunteers who rebuilt houses destroyed during hostilities and chaplains who provided the settlers with psychological and moral support. ADRA took care of around 400,000 people in need and completed projects totalling more than two million dollars in 2014 and early 2015 alone. In the two years that followed, ADRA implemented a number of projects aimed at improving water supply, heat supply, food supply and the provision of medical care to IDPs. In 2017, ADRA equipped rooms for mothers and children in cities adjacent to the frontline, organised professional training for unemployed migrants and provided work for those IDPs who have undergone appropriate training. The humanitarian action ‘Pope for Ukraine’ initiated by Pope Francis was of great importance in helping the IDPs. On 3 April 2016, during the Divine Liturgy in Rome, Pope Francis called for help to those people in the territory of Ukraine who were affected by military action and those who were forced to leave these territories. Following a request by Pope Francis, Catholic churches in Europe organised a collection for the needs of the war victims in Ukraine on 24 April. Pope Francis also donated a significant personal contribution. The State Vatican Secretariat approved the Technical Secretariat and Technical Committee for the distribution of this fund on 1 September 2017 (the latter had been working from 20 June 2016–1 September 2017). During this period, more than 400 projects of large and small grants were examined and the key partners chosen for the further cooperation. The aid has helped tens of thousands of IDPs and significant amounts of money were spent to equip their houses and provide jobs, shelter for children, drinking water, food, medicines etc.113 More than half (51 per cent) of respondents in March 2017 supported the ‘Pope for Ukraine’ action. Only 1 per cent of respondents did not support it, and one-third had not heard about it. Generally, one-fifth of respondents asserted that church and religious organisations provided the best aid for all those who were victims of the war. The same quantity of respondents thought that only some churches and religious organisations provided the best aid, however.114

Ukraine  53

Conclusion From the very outset of Ukrainian independence, religion has played a key role in the sociopolitical and cultural processes taking place in the country. Furthermore, with the start of Russian aggression, the annexation of Crimea and occupation of part of the Donbas region, religion became an instrument of Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine and, accordingly, an acute national security issue. Controlled by the Moscow Patriarchate, the leadership of the UOC MP has been one of the most organised and influential centres in Ukraine justifying aggression against Ukraine and criticising its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The hierarchs have been following the general strategy of Kremlin vis-à-vis the West: to make maximum use of democratic institutions and procedures to undermine democracy and democratic values. They intensified the efforts of the Ukrainian state and religious actors to abandon church independence from the Moscow Patriarchate, which has been parroting the Kremlin’s policy towards Ukraine. The process of recognition of the autocephalous status of Orthodox Church in Ukraine by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which unfolded during 2018, elicited an extremely painful reaction from and strong resistance by the Russian State and Russian Church. The enormous efforts undertaken by Russian officials and diplomacy and intelligence agencies to prevent Ukrainian church independence have demonstrated the extreme sensitivity of this issue for Russia’s position in Ukraine and in the entire region. If there was any doubt about how far Russia would go to preserve its control over Ukrainian religious life, the events of 2018 should have set off alarm bells throughout the Eastern Orthodox world. At the same time, the war led to the consolidation of efforts of churches and religious organisations in Ukraine to provide social services, assisting military personnel and civilians, as well as those in need in society. With the outbreak of war, one of the most vulnerable social categories appeared to be the hundreds of thousands of people who were forced to leave their homes in the area of conflict. Despite the significant efforts of the international community and international agencies, governmental and NGOs, churches and faith-based communities to deal with the needs of the IDPs in Ukraine, these people still feel deep anxiety and uncertainty. Their fates are closely intertwined with the key problems of conflict resolution over the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The Russian annexation of Crimea and fulfilment of the Minsk agreement, the presence of Russian troops in the Donbas, the antiUkrainian and anti-Western disinformation war, the constant shelling of Ukrainian territory and the exchange of prisoners of war are all ‘matters of high politics’ that have affected ordinary people forced to leave their homes in 2014. Most of them face the following challenges: How long can they bear the designation ‘temporary’ in their social status determination? How long will this war last? What should the future be for the currently non-controlled territories of Donbas and annexed Crimea? In 2017, all participants in focus groups conducted by the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council and

54  V. Yelensky its partners across Ukraine commented on the state of uncertainty about their future, causing a great deal of stress three years after the start of the conflict.115 According to a World Bank survey, more than one-third of all IDPs, mostly young people, were considering their new place of settlement as permanent and had no plans to return, even if Ukraine were to restore control over the excluded territories.116 This feeling is further fostered by the fact that the attitude of local populations towards IDPs from the Donbas and Crimea is generally either positive or neutral: on the whole, 43 per cent of all Ukrainians said they had a positive attitude towards IDPs, while 47 per cent of those polled were neutral (thus 90 per cent were positive or neutral). Only 6 per cent expressed a negative attitude, while 4 per cent of respondents did not answer this question. In cities with the largest concentration of IDPs, the local residents have an even better attitude towards them: 58 per cent of local residents receive them positively, 34 per cent do so neutrally, 2 per cent do so negatively, and 6 per cent were undetermined in their attitude.117 Despite the goodwill of local people, the scale of forced migration – the movement of refugees and displaced persons is the largest in Europe since the Second World War – suggests an urgent necessity for a comprehensive and realistic strategy for integrating IDPs in local communities and to changing the social reality by reforming the country. As Caritas Ukraine project coordinator for assistance to IDPs, Gregory Seleshchuk stressed, the most important thing in addressing the problems of IDPs was to prevent them from being confined to a ghetto.118 At the same time, a particular strategy should be elaborated for people in the territories not controlled by the Ukrainian government, a more ambitious and more innovative strategy should be developed for those people who are waiting to return to Ukraine and the ‘hearts and minds’ of those who consciously voted in the pseudo-referendums in spring 2014 should be won back. Most of Ukrainian religious actors have responded to the situation with IDPs by providing humanitarian aid and spiritual support to refugees and by providing forced migrants with material and financial assistance, legal advice and professional reorientation. However, religion in the time of war is not only associated with benevolence, self-sacrifice and unequivocal commitment to human dignity. Religion is being used as an instrument of hybrid warfare and religious institutions; it is being used as a tool for the furtherance of geopolitical objectives and the Ukrainian state and society face dual challenges. On the one hand, the situation of war in which Ukraine finds itself requires quick, definitive and effective measures in order to prevent and remove threats to human security and civic peace in the country. On the other hand, all these measures cannot be irreconcilable with international law or contradict the accepted principles in the sphere of religious freedom. This problem, known as the ‘securitisation of religion’, is being increasingly discussed by scholars and practitioners.119 Evidently, there is a pressing need to develop a comprehensive strategy to combat the misuse of religion which has to be in accordance with

Ukraine  55 i­nternationally recognised principles of human rights and freedom of religion and beliefs. As we approach the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, this issue is a challenge to Ukraine more than any other country in Central and Eastern Europe and the European community is increasingly monitoring how Ukraine addresses it.

Notes   1 For an analysis of religion and the religious composition of Ukraine in the 1980s, see Viktor Yelensky, ‘The Revival before the Revival: Popular and Institutionalized Religion in Ukraine on the Eve of the Collapse of Communism’, in Catherine Wanner (ed.), State Secularism and Lived Religion in Soviet Russia and Ukraine, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 302–330.    2 Leading propagandists of the Communist Party of Ukraine Central Committee stressed that Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union oriented [local] Party committees towards a real decrease in the number of believers [in God], eradication of religious extremism and fanaticism, toward neutralize the influence of religious communities over families of believers [in God], children, youngsters, women, pensioners, and toward a steady decline of religious ritual rites. Aktualnye voprosi ateisticheskoi kontrpropagandi. Dlya sluchzebnogo polzovaniya (Pressing issues of atheist counter-propaganda. For confidential internal usage), Issue 2. Kyiv, 1984, p. 6; See, also on the Soviet system of replacement the religious rites by the so-called ‘new Socialist rituals’ in Victoria Smolkin, A Sacred Space Is Never Empty. A History of Soviet Atheism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018, especially pp. 165–193.    3 Lilian Voye and Karel Dobbelaere, ‘Roman Catholicism: Universalism at Stake’ in Roberto Cipriani (ed.), Religions sans Frontières? Present and Future Trends of Migration, Culture, and Communication, Rome: Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Dipartimento per l’Informazione e l’Editoria, 1994, pp. 83 and 92.   4 Valeryi Marchenko, Listi materi z nevoli (Letters to Mother from Captivity), Kyiv: Fundatsiia Ol’zhicha, 1994, p. 374.   5 Tserkva, suspil’stvo, derzchava u protystoyanni vyklykam i zagrozam syuogodennya (Church, Society, and State in the Confrontation to Nowadays Challenges and Threats), Kyiv: Olexander Razumkov Center, 2017, p. 34.   6 Zvit pro merezchu Tserkov i religiynyh organizatsyi v Ukraini stanom na 01.01.2018’, Report (of the Ministry of Culture) on the network of churches and religious organizations as of 1 January 2018, available at https://risu.org.ua/ ua/index/resourses/statistics/ukr_2018/70440/ (accessed on 4 August 2018).    7 ‘Ukrainskaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ segodnia: Doklad Blazhenneishego mitropolita Kyivskogo i vseia Ukrainy Vladimira na Arkhiereiskom Sobore Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi’ (Ukrainian Orthodox Church Today. Report of His Beatitude Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine to Bishops Council of the Russian Orthodox Church), available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1401848.html (accessed on 24 July 2018).    8 In 2009, Metropolitan Volodymyr withdrew his candidature to the election of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus’ in favour of Metropolitan Kirill (Gundyaev) of Smolensk and Kaliningrad. He followed his decision with the notable remark: ‘I prefer to stand before the Face of God not as the 16th Patriarch of Moscow but as the 121st Metropolitan of Kyiv’, Darya Horskaya, ‘Metropolit Vladymyr:

56  V. Yelensky Ya ne zahotel byt’ Patriarkhom Moskovskim. Hochu predstat’ pered Bogom Mytropolitom Kyivskim’ (I was not willing to be the Patriarch of Moscow. I would like to stand before the Lord as the Metropolitan of Kyiv), Fakty, 8 July 2014,availableathttps://fakty.ua/184423-ya-ne-zahotel-byt-patriarhom-moskovskimhochu-umeret-na-​Kyivskoj-kafedre-i-predstat-pered-bogom-mitropolitom-Kyivskim (accessed on 2 November 2018).    9 ‘They believed in Mohyla as a zealot of Orthodoxy’, Father John Meyendorff exclaimed in this connection, ‘but they did not believe in Patriarch Nikon!’ (Archpriest I. Meiendorf, ‘Ob izmeniaemosti i neizmennosti pravoslavnogo bogosluzheniia’, (On Variability and Permanence of the Orthodox Divine Service) in Russkoe zarubezh’e v god tysiacheletiia Rusi (Russian Abroad in the year of Millennium of Rus’ Baptism) Moscow: Stolitsa, 1991, p. 196).  10 The philosopher and church and public figure Archpriest Vasilii Zen’kovskii writes very expressively about this. Vasilii Zen’kovskii, Piat’ mesiatsev u vlasti; Vospominaniia (Five months of being in power, Memoirs), Moscow: Krutitskoe patriarshee podvorie, 1995, p. 39.   11 Metropolitan Mstislav died in 1993. Over the 3-year period 1990–3, he visited Ukraine six times, travelling in a wheelchair.   12 The new status entailed independent administration of the UOC and election of its primate by the Ukrainian episcopate, with the Moscow Patriarch merely giving him his blessing. The primate obtained the right to bear two panagias and the title ‘Most Blessed’; the Synod of the UOC obtained the right to elect and appoint bishops, establish and abolish dioceses, and create monasteries, convents, and theological training institutions within the borders of Ukraine.  13 See, among others, Jonathan Sutton and Wil van den Bercken (eds.) Orthodox Christianity and Contemporary Europe, Leuven: Peeters, 2003; Paschalis Kitromilides, Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy: Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of South-Eastern Europe. London: Variorum, 1994; Victor Roudometof, Alexander Agadjanian and Jerry Pankhurst (eds.) Eastern Orthodoxy in a Global Age: Tradition Faces the Twenty-First Century, Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2005.   14 See, among others, Victor Roudometof, Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria, and the Macedonian Question. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.   15 John Meyendorff, The Byzantine Legacy in the Orthodox Church. Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1982, p. 227.   16 ‘Serbskyi Patriarch: ukrainska problema – ne lishe ukrainska abo rosiys’ka. Patriarch Irynei vyslovyv spodivannya, scho vyrishennyu tsiei problemi spriyatyme Patriarch Varfolomei’ (Serbian Patriarch: Ukrainian problem is not Ukrainian or Russian problem. Patriarch Irenaeus expressed a hope that Patriarch Bartholomew would contribute to resolving this problem), available at www.religion.in.ua/ news/vazhlivo/33308-serbskij-patriarx-ukrayinska-problema-ne-lishe-ukrayinskaabo-rosijska.html (accessed on 24 July 2018).  17 ‘Patriarch Kirill: Prizivi k avtokefalii osnovani isklyuchitelno na politicheskih argumentah’ (Patriarch Kirill: Calls toward Autocephaly based upon purely political arguments), available at http://rusk.ru/svod.php?date=2009-07-30 (accessed on 31 July 2018).   18 His Holiness Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus addressed the participants of the gathering in the Church Assembly Hall of the Christ the Saviour Cathedral in Moscow, available at https://mospat.ru/en/2016/11/21/news138722/ (accessed on 31 July 2018).  19 ‘The Russian Orthodox Church to resist attempts to separate the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from it – Patriarch Kirill’, available at www.interfax-religion. com/?act=news&div=14397 (accessed on 31 July 2018).

Ukraine  57   20 Kuchma Leonid. ‘Netlinni i vichni khristians’ki tsinnosti: Vystup-pryvitannya na urochistyi akademii, prysvyachenyi 2000-littyu Rizdva Khristovogo’ (An incorruptible and eternal Christian values. Welcome address of the President of Ukraine to Festive Academy in occasion of the 2000 years of Nativity of Christ), Uryadovyi Kur’er (Governmental Messenger), 25 January 2000, p. 3.   21 See a talk with unnamed Russian diplomat in V. Solovyev, ‘No without pains but we saved Canonical Unity …’, in Kommersant-Vlast (Merchant-Power), 7 (861), 22 February 2010.  22 This scheme includes immediate unification of UOC KP with UOAC, transformation the newly formed church into Kyiv Metropolitanate of the Constantinople Patriarchate, the abdication of Patriarch Filaret, and the election of three candidates to the Kyiv throne among whom Constantinople Patriarch has to choose a Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine. See, ‘Kyivs’ka popravka’ (Kyiv correction. Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus’-Ukraine Filaret on Orthodoxy in Contemporary World’ and Role of Ukraine) in Ukrainskyi Tyzchden, 2009, 10 (71).   23 As protopriest Vladislav Tsypyn puts it: The care of the head of State for Russia [because you know] Church affairs are sufficient part of Russian life as a whole) perceived by him [President Putin] as a totally natural [issue], as a direct fulfilment of his duties. See, ‘Vossoedinenie – neobhodimoe uslovye dlya normal’nogo suschestvovaniya RPTsZ’ (Unification – necessary precondition for normal existence of Russian Orthodox Church Abroad. Conversation with protopriest Vladyslav Tsypyn), in Politicheskyi zchurnal, 15–16 (158–159), 21 May 2007.  24 ‘Tserkovno-religyina situatsiya i derzchavno-konfesyini vidnosini v Ukraini: pidsumki desyatilittya, tendentsii i problem. Analitichna dopovid Tsentru Razumkova’ (Church–Religious Situation and Church–State Relation in Ukraine: Summary of the Decade, Trends and Problems. Analytical Report of the Razumkov’s Center) in Natsionalna Bezpeka i Oborona (National Security and Defence), 2011, 1–2 (119–120), p. 71.  25 See, the text of the Testament on the official website of the Zosima NikoloVasilievsky Monastery, available at http://zosima-nikolskoe.ru/?chapter=articles&​ articles_id=1 (accessed on 23 July 2018).   26 Every position expressed in the church–state section of the Ukrainian president’s annual address to the Parliament (April 2011) was an antithesis to the policy that was implemented in the religious sphere in the previous 14 months. ‘Modernization of the country: Our strategic choice. Annual address of the President of Ukraine to Verkhovna Rada’, 2011, Kyiv, pp. 42–43, available at www.president. gov.ua/docs/Poslannya_sborka.pdf (accessed on 2 November 2018).  27 Oleksandr Turchynov, ‘Wisdom of the church should help revive the state and economy and guide the country along a path of well-being and normal life’, available at http://rada.gov.ua/en/news/top_news/88464.html (accessed on 17 August 2018).   28 Statement of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations following a meeting with Acting President, Oleksandr Turchinov, available at http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/03/07/statement-of-the-all-ukrainian-councilof-churches-​and-religious-organizations-following-a-meeting-with-acting-presidentoleksandr-turchinov/ (accessed on 17 August 2018).  29 See, ‘President Poroshenko issued an address to the Council of Bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’, available at http://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/ state/church_state_relations/62339; ‘President addressed Patriarch Filaret: Ukrainian people expect fulfillment of main case of your life – Ukrainian Single Local

58  V. Yelensky Independent Orthodox Church’, available at www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ prezident-patriarhu-filaretu-ukrayinskij-narod-chekaye-na-re-37090 (accessed on 16 October 2018); ‘Single local Orthodox Church will promote the unity of the country – President at the meeting with representatives of Ecumenical Patriarch’, available at www.president.gov.ua/en/news/yedina-pomisna-pravoslavna-cerkvadopomozhe-yednannyu-krayin-35726 (accessed on 16 October 2018); ‘President: We are grateful to Ecumenical Patriarch for constantly supporting Ukraine’, available at www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-mi-vdyachni-vselenskomupatriarhu-za-postijnu-pidt-36837 (accessed on 16 October 2018).  30 See, reflections over the role of churches on Maidan, Cyril Hovorun, ‘The Church in the Bloodland’, First Things, October 2014, available at www.firstthings. com/article/2014/10/the-church-in-the-bloodlands (accessed on 29 July 2018); Jeshua T. Searle and Mykhailo N. Cherenkov (eds.), A Future and a Hope. Mission, Theological Education, and Transformation of Post-Soviet Society, Eugene, OR: WIPF & STOCK, 2014.  31 ‘Pobezchdai dobro zlom. Obraschenie svyaschennosluzchitelei Ukrainskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi ko vsem lyudyam dobroi voli v Ukraine’ (Defeat evil by good. The appeal of clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to all people of good will in Ukraine), available at www.Kyiv-orthodox.org/site/events/4963 (accessed on 30 July 2018).   32 See, among others, ‘Mitropolit Pavel (Lebed’) schitaet uchastnikov Maidana nasmeschkoi nad tserkovyu’ (Metropolitan Pavel (Lebed’) considers protesters on Maidan as a mockery of a church), available at www.trust.ua/news/88881mitropolit-pavel-lebed-schitaet-uchastnikov-majdana-nasmeshkoj-nad-cerkovyu.html (accessed on 30 July 2018).   33 ‘Zayava Patriarcha Kyivskogo i vsiei Rusi-Ukraini Filareta’ (Statement of Filaret, Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus’-Ukraine), available at http://rivne-cerkva.rv.ua/ documents/11-ukazy/1603-sajava.html (accessed on 30 July 2018).   34 ‘Svyascennyi Synod vyznachiv prypiniti pominannya vladi za bogosluchzinnyam’ (Holy Synod decides to stop commemoration of civil authorities during a Divine Service), available at www.cerkva.info/church/sviashchennyi-synod-vyznachyvprypynyty-pomynannia-vlady-za-bohosluzhinniam (accessed on 30 July 2018).  35 ‘Maidan i Tserkva: Khronika podij ta ekspertna otsinka’ (Maidan and the Church: Chronology of Events and Expert’s Evaluations), Kyiv: Sammit-Kniga, 2014; Rob van der Laarse, Mykhailo N. Cherenkov, Vitaliy V. Proshak and Tetiana Mykhalchuk (eds.), Religion, State, Society, and Identity in Transition. Ukraine, Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2015, especially chapters III-IV.   36 Alexei Miller, The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the 19th Century, Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2003, p. 249.   37 ‘Opening address of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill to the 3rd Assembly of Russian World’, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1496028.html (accessed on 12 October 2018).   38 ‘Speech of Patriarch Kirill’ on ‘Inter’ TV channel. 28 July 2009, available at www. youtube.com/watch?v=WSWAeCAi-jk (accessed on 21 October 2018).  39 ‘Patriarch Kirill: Bezbozchie stanovitsya gosudarstvennoi ideologiei Ukraini’ (Patriarch Kirill: Godlessness becomes the state ideology of Ukraine), available at www.dw.com/ru/патриарх-кирилл-безбожие-становится-идеологией-украины/a18474013 (accessed on 26 July 2018).   40 Orysia Lutsevych, ‘Agents of the Russian world: Proxy groups in the contested neighbourhood’, available at www.chathamhouse.org//node/20653 (accessed on 21 October 2018).   41 Pew Research Centre, Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2017, pp. 50–51, available at

Ukraine  59 http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/05/15120244/CEUPFULL-REPORT.pdf#page=51&zoom=auto,-13,95 (accessed on 21 October 2018).  42 ‘The initiative to grant the Tomos of Autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is actively supported in the world’, available at www.president.gov.ua/ en/news/iniciativa-shodo-nadannya-tomosu-pro-avtokefaliyu-pravoslavn-47238 (accessed on 2 November 2018).  43 ‘Kremlin refuses to support creation of independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church, branding it “split” ’, available at www.unian.info/politics/10087304kremlin-refuses-to-support-creation-of-independent-ukrainian-orthodox-churchbranding-it-split.html (accessed on 6 October 2018).   44 ‘State Duma committee chairman meets with Primate and Holy Synod members of Greek Orthodox Church’, available at https://mospat.ru/en/2018/06/08/ news160808/ (accessed on 6 October 2018).  45 ‘Greece decides to expel Russian diplomat’, available at www.ekathimerini. com/​230551/article/ekathimerini/news/greece-decides-to-expel-russian-diplomats (accessed on 6 October 2018).   46 ‘Meeting between Metropolitan Hilarion and Primate of Orthodox Church of Antioch’, available at https://mospat.ru/en/2018/05/09/news159751/ (accessed on 6 October 2018).   47 ‘Metropolitan Hilarion meets with Patriarch Theophilos of Jerusalem’, available at https://mospat.ru/en/2018/05/09/news159760/ (accessed on 6 October 2018).  48 ‘Metropolitan Hilarion meets with His Beatitude Patriarch Theodorous of ­Alexandria’, available at https://mospat.ru/en/2018/05/06/news159681/ (accessed on 6 October 2018).   49 ‘Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk meets with the Primate of the Georgian Orthodox Church’, available at https://mospat.ru/en/2018/06/04/news160640/ (accessed on 6 October 2018).   50 ‘Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk meets with Patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church’, available at https://mospat.ru/en/2018/05/19/news160116/ (accessed on 6 October 2018).  51 ‘Metropolitan Hilarion meets with Greek ambassador to Russia’, available at https://mospat.ru/en/category/news/decr-chairman/page/7/ (accessed on 6 October 2018).  52 ‘DECR chairman meets with Ambassador of Bulgaria to Russia’, available at https://mospat.ru/en/2018/06/01/news160598/ (accessed on 6 October 2018).  53 ‘Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk meets with His Beatitude Archbishop Chrysostomos of Cyprus’, available at https://mospat.ru/en/2018/05/08/news​ 159702/ (accessed on October 6, 2018).  54 ‘Ungodly espionage: Russian hackers targeted Orthodox clergy’, available at https://apnews.com/26815e0d06d348f4b85350e96b78f6a8 (accessed on 6 October 2018).   55 ‘Opposition Bloc leader Novinsky warns of civil war if Ukrainian church granted autocephaly’, available at www.unian.info/society/10201500-opposition-blocleader-novinsky-warns-of-civil-war-if-ukrainian-church-granted-autocephaly.html (accessed on 6 October 2018).  56 ‘Patriarch Bartholomew affirms Mother Church’s right to resolve Ukrainian Issue’, available at https://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/confessional/orthodox_ relations/​72481/ ‘The Ecumenical Patriarch “will not leave his Ukrainian sons unprotected and abandoned” ’, available at www.archons.org/articles/-​­​­ /asset_ publisher/KXVQ8enfSiNH/content/the-​­ecumenical-​­patriarch-​­will-​­not-​­leave-​­his​­ukrainian-​­sons-​­unprotected-​­and-​­abandoned-​­?redirect=%2Farticles%2F-​­%2Fasset_ publisher%2FKXVQ8enfSiNH%​2Fcontent%2Fnews%2Fdetail.asp%3Fid%3D541

60  V. Yelensky &inheritRedirect=true; ‘Constantinople says Moscow has no grounds to organize celebrations of 10th century events that took place in Kyiv’, available at www. unian.info/society/10203759-c​­ onstantinople-s​­ ays-​­moscow-​­has-​­no-​­grounds-​­to-​­organize-​­ celebrations-​­of-​­10th-​­century-​­events-​­that-​­took-​­place-​­in-​­Kyiv-​­media.html; ‘Member of Ecumenical Patriarchate’s Synod: Moscow church is a daughter of the Ukrainian Church’, available at https://risu.org.ua/en/index/​all_news/confessional/orthodox_ relations/71791/ (accessed on 6 October 2018).  57 ‘Ecumenical patriarchate appointed exarchs in Kyiv, in Autocephaly preparation’, available at https://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/orthodox/constantinople_ patriarchy/​72543/ (accessed on 6 October 2018).  58 ‘Meeting of the President with the Exarchs of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Ukraine’, available at www.president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-priyihali-pracyuvati-naduzhe-virishenim-pitannyam-zustri-49646 (accessed on 6 October 2018).  59 ‘Announcement of the Holy and Sacred Synod (11th Oct. 2018)’, available at www. ec-patr.org/docdisplay.php?lang=en&id=2576&tla=en (accessed on 18 October 2018).  60 ‘Autocephalous Orthodox Church will be in Ukraine – Poroshenko’, available at https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/537667.html (accessed on 12 October 2018).  61 ‘Putin discusses Orthodox Church crisis in Ukraine with Russian Security Council’, available at https://sputniknews.com/russia/201810121068843182russia-ukraine-putin-security-council-orthodox-church-crisis/ (accessed on 12 October 2018).  62 ‘Statement by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church concerning the encroachment of the Patriarchate of Constantinople on the canonical territory of the Russian Church’, available at https://mospat.ru/en/2018/10/15/news165263/ (accessed on 18 October 2018).   63 ‘Communiqué (19/11/2018)’, available at www.patriarchate.org/-/communique-​ 19–11–2018 (accessed on 13 January 2019).   64 See, for instance, The Economist report from Kyiv on ‘Ukrainian Christians celebrate their first Christmas under an independent church. A religious split echoes geopolitical tensions’, available at www.economist.com/erasmus/2019/01/07/ ukrainian-­christians-celebrate-their-first-christmas-under-an-independent-church (accessed on 13 January 2019).  65 In his letter to Metropolitan Onufryi of UOC MP who also bore the title of ‘Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine’, Patriarch Bartholomew stressed that Addressing you as ‘His Eminence Metropolitan of Kyiv’, for practical use and kindness, we inform you that after the election of the primate of the Ukrainian church by an authority consisting of the clergy and laity, you will not be able to ecclesiologically and canonically bear the title of the Metropolitan of Kyiv.… ‘Patriarch Bartholomew explains Metropolitan Onufriy the reasons for Ukraine church’s autocephaly (Letter)’, available at www.unian.info/politics/10367883patriarch-bartholomew-explains-metropolitan-onufriy-reasons-for-ukraine-churchs-autocephaly-letter.html (accessed on 13 January 2019).   66 ‘Ecumenical Patriarch hands Tomos of Autocephaly over to leader of Orthodox Church of Ukraine’, available at www.unian.info/society/10400271-­ecumenicalpatriarch-hands-tomos-of-autocephaly-over-to-leader-of-orthodox-church-of-ukrainevideo-photos.html (accessed on 13 January 2019).   67 ‘Patriarch Bartholomew signs Tomos of Autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine’, available at https://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/orthodox/ constantinople_​patriarchy/74166/ (accessed on 13 January 2019).   68 ‘Ukraine: New Orthodox church gains independence from Moscow’, available at www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/05/ukraine-new-orthodox-churchgains-independence-from-​moscow, ‘Ukrainian Orthodox Church breaks away

Ukraine  61 from Russian influence’, available at www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ independent-ukrainian-orthodox-church-formalized-in-istanbul/2019/01/05/4848101810d8-11e9-8f0c-6f878a26288a_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c7253eb 13056. ‘Ukrainian Orthodox Christians formally break from Russia’, available at www.nytimes.com/2019/01/06/world/europe/orthodox-church-ukraine-russia. html. ‘Patriarch von Konstantinopel erkennt Spaltung der orthodoxen Kirche an’ (Patriarch of Constantinople recognises division of the Orthodox Church), available at www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/patriarch-von-­konstantinopel-erkenntneue-orthodoxe-kirche-der-ukraine-an-a-1246587.html. ‘Iglesia Ortodoxa de Ucrania se separa de la de Rusia’ (Orthodox Church of Ukraine separates from that of Russia) available at http://elestimulo.com/blog/iglesia-ortodoxa-deucrania-se-separa-de-la-​de-rusia/. ‘Nasce la Chiesa ortodossa ucraina, firmato a Istanbul il decreto dell’autocefalia’ (The Ukrainian Orthodox Church is born, the decree of the autocephalous signed in Istanbul), available at www.lastampa. it/2019/01/07/vaticaninsider/nasce-la-chiesa-ortodossa-​ucraina-bartolomeo-firmaa-istanbul-il-decretodellautocefalia-ZA3fNid3jESVT9XTi4ERTI/pagina.html, ‘Autokefalia Cerkwi ukraińskiej stała się faktem’ (The autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church became a fact), available at http://wyborcza.pl/7,75399,24334063, autokefalia-cerkwi-ukrainskiej-stala-sie-faktem.html?disableRedirects=true (accessed on 13 January 2019).   69 ‘Ukraine has identified the most popular word in 2018: Details – 24 Channel’, available at https://ktelegram.com/ukraine-has-identified-the-most-popularword-in-2018-details-24-channel/67280/ (accessed 13 January 2019).  70 ‘Conflict in Ukraine enters fourth year “with no end in sight” ’, available at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56958#.Wh7vZfll9PY (accessed on 6 October 2018).  71 Situation of Human Rights in the Temporarily Occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (Ukraine). New York: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2016.  72 Ibid.   73 ‘V Krimu prodolzchayut presledovat’ veruyuschih – expert’ (Believers in Crimea continued to be prosecuted, expert argues), available at https://ru.krymr. com/a/28256380.html (accessed on 6 October 2018).  74 Roman Lunkin and Inna Zagrebina, Religiya i pravo v sovremennoi Rossii (Religion and Law in Contemporary Russia), Moscow: Yurisprudentsiya, 2017, pp. 158–159 and 174–190.   75 ‘Crimea: Persecution of Crimean Tatars intensifies. Arbitrary detentions; separatism, terrorism charges’, 14 November 2017, available at www.hrw.org/ news/2017/11/14/crimea-persecution-crimean-tatars-intensifies (accessed on 2 November 2018).  76 The US Commission on International Religious Freedom strongly condemns this Law stating that it ‘Would grant authorities sweeping powers to curtail civil liberties, including setting broad restrictions on religious practices that would make it very difficult for religious groups to operate’. ‘Russia: USCIRF ­condemns enactment of anti-terrorism laws’, 8 July 2016, available at www. uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases/russia-uscirf-condemns-enactment-anti-terrorismlaws (accessed on 26 July 2018).  77 ‘The military Commissariat in the Crimea have demanded from the recruit to change his religion’, available at http://z-news.link/the-military-commissariat-inthe-crimea-have-demanded-from-the-recruit-to-change-his-religion/ (accessed on 30 October 2018).   78 ‘Konstitutsiya DNR (Constitution of DPR)’, available at http://anti-maidan.toch. ca/konstituciya-dnr-%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8%

62  V. Yelensky D1%82%D1%83%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F-%D0%B4%D0%BD%D1%80/ (accessed on 26 July 2018).  79 Ibid.   80 See, among others, ‘Statement by the Heads of Evangelical Protestant Churches of Ukraine on religious persecution in Donetsk and Luhansk’, available at www. irf.in.ua/eng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=420:1&catid= 34:ua&Itemid=61 (accessed on 12 October 2018).   81 ‘Kak v ORDLO podavlyayutsya konfessii’ (How confessions are suppressed in SDDLO (Specific Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts)), available at https:// humanrights.org.ua/ru/material/svoboda_sovisti_pid_chas_vijni_na_skhodi_ ukrajini (accessed on 31 July 2018).  82 Alexandra Novitchkova, Mariia Tomak, Svitlana Valko and Victoria Cooper (eds.), When God becomes a Weapon. Persecution Based on Religious Beliefs in the Armed Conflict in Eastern Ukraine, Kyiv: Centre for Civil Liberties and International Partnership for Human Rights in the framework of the Civic Solidarity Platform, April 2015, p. 15.  83 See the list of prayer houses, educational establishments and rehabilitation centres seized by DNR’s guerrillas as on September 2014, available at http:// vlasti.net/news/208997 (accessed on 31 July 2018); See also on Jehovah’s ­Witnesses property: ‘Religious buildings seized in Eastern regions of Ukraine’, availableatwww.jw.org/en/news/legal/by-region/ukraine/donetsk-luhansk-religiousbuildings-seized/ (accessed on 31 July 2018).  84 ‘Zapret na funktsionirovanie sekt v DNR’ (The ban on activity of sects in DPR), available at http://novorossiya.name/zapret-funkcionirovaniya-sekt-vdnr/ (accessed on 31 July 2018).  85 ‘Pravoohraniteli LNR presekli deyatel’nost’ Kyivskoi sekti baptistov’ (LNR’s law enforcement people stopped the activity of Kyiv’s Baptist sect), available at http://miaistok.su/pravoohraniteli-v-lnr-presekli-deyatelnost-Kyivskoj-sekty-­baptistovvideo/ (accessed on 31 July 2018).  86 The Ministry of Defence registered 591 clergymen and clergywomen who served on the battle line for Ukrainian militaries during the 2014–15. Among them, 295 were priests of UOC KP, 123 priests of UGCC and only nine were priests of UOC MP. See, interview Tetyana Shpiher with Colonel Ruslan Kohanchuk, available at https://apostrophe.ua/ua/article/society/2016-07-19/ kogda-svyaschennik-vyinujden-strelyat-realii-kapellanskogo-slujeniya-na-Donbase/ 6206 (accessed on 31 July 2018).   87 ‘UN names Ukraine ninth in the world by the number of internally displaced persons’, available at https://uawire.org/un-names-ukraine-ninth-in-the-worldby-the-number-of-internally-displaced-persons (accessed on 31 July 2018).   88 ‘Ukraine IDPs figures analysis’, available at www.internal-displacement.org/europethe-caucasus-and-central-asia/ukraine/figures-analysis/ (accessed on 31 July 2018).  89 Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska and Greta Uehling (eds.), Migration and the Ukraine Crisis. A Two-Country Perspective, Bristol: E-International Relations, 2017, p. 33.   90 ‘Pereselentsi ochima sociologiv’ (Displaced persons through the eyes of sociologists), available at http://24tv.ua/news/showNews.do?neprohani_zaprosheni_realnij_obraz_ pereselentsya_na_lvivshhini&objectId=540386 (accessed on 31 July 2018).  91 ‘Dohovir pro druzchbu, spivrobitnitstvo i partnerstvo mizch Ukrainoyu i Rosiis’koyu Federatsieyu’ (Treaty on friendship, cooperation, and partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation), available at http://zakon5.rada. gov.ua/laws/show/643_006 (accessed on 31 July 2018).   92 See, among others, ‘Ukraintsi vs Rossiyane: revolyutsiya ili evolutsiya otnoshenii?’ (Ukrainians vs Russians: revolution or evolution in relations?), available at www.

Ukraine  63 bbc.com/ukrainian/ukraine_in_russian/2016/01/160118_ru_s_ukraine_russia_atitude_ change (accessed on 19 August 2018). As a matter of fact, the data obtained through regular monitoring of public opinion in Ukraine between 2008 and 2013 confirmed a high level of positive attitudes towards Russia. Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine in 2014 became the determining factor in the rapid decline in the percentage of Ukrainian citizens who were positively inclined towards Russia. The decline was observed among residents in all regions of Ukraine with no exception. See, Ruslan Kermach, ‘Attitudes of Ukrainians toward Russia and Russians: Dynamics and main trends’ in Olexiy Haran and Maksym Yakovlyev (eds.), Constructing a Political Nation: Changes in the Attitudes of Ukrainians during the War in the Donbas, Kyiv: Stylos Publishing, 2017, pp. 183–199.   93 ‘Postanova Verkhovnoi Radi Ukraini vid 19 zchovtnya 1993 roku “Pro voennu doktrinu Ukraini” ’ (Resolution of the Supreme Council of Ukraine on October 19, 1993 ‘On Military Doctrine of Ukraine’), available at http://zakon0.rada. gov.ua/laws/show/3529-12 (accessed on 1 August 2018).   94 ‘Ukaz Presidenta Ukraini ‘Pro Voennu Doktrinu Ukraini’ (Decree of the President of Ukraine ‘On Military Doctrine of Ukraine’), available at http://zakon2. rada.gov.ua/laws/show/648/2004 (accessed on 1 August 2018).   95 Ukaz Presidenta Ukraini ‘Pro rishennya Radi Natsionalnoi bezpeki i oboroni vid 2 veresnya 2015 roku Pro novu redaktsiyu Voennoi doktrini Ukraini’ (Decree of the President of Ukraine ‘On decision of the National Security and Defense Council of September 2, 2015’ ‘On the New Edition of the Military Doctrine of Ukraine’), available at http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/555/2015 (accessed on 1 August 2018).   96 Olena Malinovska (ed.) Mihratsiya v Ukraini: tsifri i fakti (Migration in Ukraine: Numbers and Facts), Kyiv: International Migration Organization Representative Office in Ukraine, 2016, pp. 7–8. Also available at www.iom.org.ua/sites/ default/files/ff_eng_10_10_press.pdf (accessed on 2 November 2018).   97 ‘Pro kontseptsiyu derzchavnoi mihratsyinoi politiki’. Decree of the President of Ukraine on 30 May 2011, available at http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/​ 622/2011 (accessed on 1 August 2018).  98 ‘Ukraine. Law on Ensuring Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced Persons, 2014’, available at www.refworld.org/docid/5a7af1d54.html (accessed on November 2, 2018).   99 The Bill was passed by parliamentarians on 3 November 2015, although President Poroshenko vetoed the document and returned it to Parliament with his proposals. The Verhovna Rada passed the bill with the President’s amendments on 24 December 2015. 100 Law of Ukraine ‘On Amendments to Some Laws of Ukraine Concerning Strengthening of Social Protection of Internally Displaced Persons’, available at http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/921-19/paran7#n7; ‘Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 1 October 2014’, ‘On Providing Monthly Targeted Financial Support to Internally Displaced Persons to Cover Livelihood, Including Housing and Utilities’, available at http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/505-2014-%D0%BF; ‘Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 16 October 2014’ and ‘On Providing Partial Payment for the Cost of Temporary Accommodation to Persons Displaced from the Temporarily Occupied Territory and the Region of the Counter-terrorist Operation’, available at http:// zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1068-2014-%D1%80; ‘Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 15 April 2015’ ‘On Providing Compensation for the Costs Associated with Temporary Disabilities Living in Sanatoriums and Other Citizens Who Move Temporarily from the Occupied Territory and the Area of

64  V. Yelensky Counterterrorist Operations’, available at http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/ show/382-2015-%D1%80/print1390222018414656 (accessed on 1 August 2018). 101 ‘Viplati dlya VPO: yaku pidtrimku nadaye derzchava pereselentsam’ (Payments for IDPs: What kind of support does State provide for displaced people), available at www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1715589-viplati-dlya-vpo-yaki-pidtrimku-nadayederzhava-​pereselentsyam (accessed on 1 October 2018). 102 Ephesians, 2:19. 103 Gienger Viola, ‘Ukraine’s “invisible crisis”: 1.5 million who fled war with Russia pressures place welcome at risk’, 2015, available at www.usip.org/publications/2015/11/ ukraines-invisible-crisis-15-million-who-fled-war-russia (accessed on 1 August 2018). 104 Conflict-related Displacement in Ukraine: Increased Vulnerabilities of Affected Populations and Triggers of Tension within Communities. Published by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, July 2016, p. 8, available at www.osce.org/ ukraine-smm/261176?download=true (accessed on 2 November 2018). 105 ‘PM met with members of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and ­Religious Organizations’, available at http://old.kmu.gov.ua/kmu/control/ en/publish/article?art_id=247651557&cat_id=244314975 (accessed on 17 August 2018). 106 ‘Zvernennya Vseukrainskoi Radi Tserkov i Religiynih organizatsyi na pidtrimku blagodyinictva ta volonterskoi diyalnosti’ (Appeal of the All Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organization in support of charity and volunteering activity), available at www.vrciro.org.ua/ua/statements/419-statement-for-­ ­ support-volunteering-charity (accessed on 1 August 2018). 107 See, Patriarch’s statement, interview and comments on migration issue at https:// foma.ru/neobxodimo-skorejshee-preodolenie-demograficheskix-­problem-v-stranezayavil-patriarx-kirill.html?amp; https://newdaynews.ru/moskow/476921.html; https://tjk.rus4all.ru/city (accessed on 2 August 2018). 108 ‘Patriarch Kirill priznal neobhodimost’ Moskvi v gastarbaiterah (Patriarch Kirill has admitted the necessity of Moscow in Gastarbeiter), available at www.interfax. ru/moscow/584538 (accessed on 2 August 2018). 109 ‘The Russian Orthodox Church has issued a challenge to the West’, available at www.catholicherald.co.uk/commentandblogs/2017/09/26/the-russian-orthodox-church​has-issued-a-challenge-to-the-west/ (accessed on 2 August 2018). 110 ‘Zvernennya Sinodu episkopiv Kyivo-Galytskogo Verhovnogo Arhiepiskopstva do svyaschennikov UGKTs pro dushpastirstvo v umovah vyini’ (Address of the Bishops’ Synod of Kyiv and Halych Supreme Archbishopric to clergy of the UGCC on spiritual care during war time), available at http://ugcc.ua/official/official-­documents/ zvernennya/2015/zvernennya_do_svyashchenikіv_pro_dushpastirstvo_v_umovah_​ vіyni_​72892.html (accessed on 1 August 2018). 111 ‘Lubomyr Husar: Dopomozchit pereselentsam I voni budut’ apostolami ednosti Ukraini’ (Lubomyr Husar: Help internally displaced persons and they will be apostles of the unity of Ukraine), available at http://ua-reporter.com/novosti/162392 (accessed on 1 August 2018). 112 ‘Pershyi Forum z integratsii zahysnikiv Ukraini v mirne suspilstvo’ (The First Forum on integration of Ukraine’s Defenders into the peaceful society), available at www.kpba.edu.ua/publikatsii/all-news/news/2461-pershyi-forum­ vzaiemodii-z-pytan-​reintehratsii-zakhysnykiv-ukrainy-v-myrne-suspilstvo.html (accessed on 1 August 2018). 113 Pope for Ukraine, available at https://popeforukraine.com.ua/en/ (accessed on 1 August 2018). 114 ‘Tserkva, suspil’stvo, derzchava u protystoyanni vyklykam i zagrozam syuogodennya’ (Church, Society, and State in the Confrontation to Nowadays Challenges and Threats), Kyiv: Olexander Razumkov Center, 2017, p. 48.

Ukraine  65 115 The 2017 Participatory Assessment Report for refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced persons in Ukraine. The UN Refugee Agency, July 2017, p. 23, available at www.unhcr.org/ua/wp-content/uploads/sites/38/2018/05/2017-06-UNHCRUKRAINE-Participatory-Assessment-FINAL-EN.pdf (accessed on 2 November 2018). 116 ‘34% VPO ne hochut’ povertatisya dodomu’ (34% cent of IDPs would not like to return home), available at http://khpg.org/ru/index.php?id=1490955335 (accessed on 1 August 2018). 117 Ihor Burakovskiy, ‘Russian Aggression in the Donbas as a Factor in the Formation of Economic Sentiments in Ukraine’ in Olexiy Haran and Maksym Yakovlyev (eds.), Constructing a Political Nation: Changes in the Attitudes of Ukrainians during the War in the Donbas, Kyiv: Stylos Publishing, 2017, p. 89. 118 Iryna Naumets, ‘Ecumenical social week in Lviv: Church cannot remain indifferent to problems of IDPs’, available at https://risu.org.ua/en/index/­ exclusive/reportage/​64628/ (accessed on 1 August 2018). 119 See, among others, Robert M. Bosco, Securing the Sacred: Religion, National Security, and the Western State, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2014; Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, ‘The global securitization of religion’, available at https://tif. ssrc.org/author/elizabeth-shakman-hurd/; Sune Lægaard, ‘Religious toleration and securitization of religion’, available at www.academia.edu/31059407/­ Religious_​ toleration_and_securitization_of_religion; Agustín Motilla, ‘Security and religious radicalization. Securitization of Islam in Europe’, available at www. statoechiese.it/images/uploads/articoli_pdf/Motilla.M_Security.pdf (accessed on 12 October 2018).

2 The Russian Orthodox Church, human security, migration and refugees Concepts, strategies and actions Alicja Curanović People living during the twentieth century on the territory of today’s Russian Federation experienced several profound geopolitical shake-ups: two world wars, at least one revolution in 1917 (or as some scholars argue – a coup d’état), civil war (1917–22), local domestic conflicts (two wars in Chechnya, 1994–96, 1999–2009) – to mention just the most important ones. Brutal ­Bolshevik policies such as mass killings, imprisonment in gulags with a high mortality rate, forced relocation, in some cases even of entire ethnic groups (e.g. Tatars, Germans, Northern Caucasus people) or caused by centrallycoordinated mass famine had further catastrophic consequences for the population. According to estimations, 20 million people died during the Second World War, and an additional 66 million were victims of Soviet terror.1 Each time a political transformation took place, for example, from the Russian Empire to Bolshevik Russia or from the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation, people emigrated or found themselves suddenly living in a new country (such as 25 million Russians after 1991 who now live in Ukraine (eight million), Kazakhstan (3,619 million), Belarus (785,084), Uzbekistan (750,000) and other former Soviet republics). The Russian Empire in 1917 had a population of 184.6 million,2 the USSR in the 1930s had 161 million, while in 1990 the total population had risen to 288.6 million people.3 Today’s Russian Federation has a much smaller territory than either the Russian Empire or the USSR. The Soviet Russian Republic had 148,538,000 citizens the year when the Soviet Union collapsed.4 The most recent census of 2010 shows that 142.9 million people live in the Russian Federation, currently the ninth most populous country on earth.5 More than 185 ethnic groups live in Russia, while 81 per cent of Russian citizens identify themselves as ethnic Russians, 3.9 per cent of Russian citizens are Tatars, 1.4 per cent Ukrainians, 1.2 per cent Bashkirs, 1.1 per cent Chuvash and 1.0 per cent Chechens; 3.9 per cent of the population have not declared their ethnic origin.6 The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) shared much of the people’s misery in the twentieth century. Since the establishment of the Russian Empire by Peter the Great, the ROC functioned as one of the institutions subordinated to the state, a consequence of replacing the Patriarchate with the Holy Synod in 1721. Writing about this period in Russia’s history, Jerry Pankhurst noticed,

Russia  67 Appointments to the Holy Synod and the Synod’s agenda were ­supervised by a lay officer, the Over Procurator, who was himself an appointee and servant of the Emperor. Consequently, until the Revolution of February 1917, the Church structure was an arm of the government bureaucracy and the popular faith languished in its seventeenth century form.7 Inspired by Karl Marx’s take on religion as the ‘opium of the people’ the Bolsheviks aimed at marginalising religion as well as the church in the life of society. Their goal was to form a new type of atheist citizen guided by scientific materialism. Hence the revolution of 1917 was a harbinger of seven decades of persecution for the ROC. During this period the nature and brutality of the atheist policy fluctuated. There were three major anti-religious campaigns. The first took place immediately after 1917 while the second came during the period of forced collectivisation and at the zenith of the ­ Stalinist purges (1921–41). The third wave dates to Khrushchev’s time (1956–64). It is estimated that some 15 to 20 million Christians fell victims to the Soviet regime.8 The tentative liberalisation of state policy towards the ROC came only with Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms and the celebration of the millennium of the Baptism of Rus’ in 1988. The twentieth century saw a dramatic shift in the ROC’s status, from the official church of the majority and one of the pillars of the empire, to the persecuted religious community of a minority. However, this was not the only problem the ROC had to face. The disappearance of the Russian Empire affected the sheer size of the canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate and, as a consequence, the total number of the church’s population. Some parishes abroad did not recognise the so-called Sergianism9 and in 1927 this meant that the Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia (ROCOR) appeared. The ROCOR took over parishes in Western Europe, the Middle East and the USA.10 After the Second World War the ROC grudgingly recognised the establishment of the autocephalic Orthodox churches in Poland (1948) and Czechoslovakia (1951). It also lost parishes in China and Japan.11 Finally, the autocephalous Georgian Orthodox Church (since 1811 a part of the Moscow Patriarchate) was re-­established in 1943 (however, its independent status was ultimately confirmed only in 1990). In 1985–86, 6,806 churches operated in the USSR.12 According to polls conducted by the Levada Center in 1989 in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, 16 per cent respondents declared themselves Orthodox Christians, while 2 per cent identified as adherents to other religions and 75 per cent as non-believers.13 The collapse of the USSR presented a serious challenge to the Moscow Patriarchate. Aiming at preserving its canonical territory, the ROC argued that the change of political borders did not require a correction of the borders of canonical territory. The ROC’s position sums this up in the slogan ‘many states but one Church’.14 Despite some tension and local schisms (in Ukraine, Estonia and Moldova), the Moscow Patriarchate has succeeded in keeping its canonical territory intact. However, the prospect of a schism places the ROC in the same

68  A. Curanović boat as the Russian state. Namely, it sharpens the church’s tendency to think in terms of territorial integrity and geopolitics. The canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate covers all the former Soviet republics with the exception of Georgia and Armenia. Additionally, it includes China, Japan and Mongolia. In 2017, according to data presented by Patriarch Kirill, the ROC had 38,414 clerics, 36,878 churches and other places of worship and 462 male and 482 female cloisters.15 The Levada Centre polls from July 2017 showed that 84 per cent declared themselves to be Orthodox Christians. Among those, 9 per cent considered themselves to be very religious, and 44 per cent religious to some extent; 34 per cent admitted that religion plays an important part in their life, and 12 per cent practised religion at least once a month.16 As evident from the data above, the ROC has managed to recover noticeably from its Soviet misery. Eastern Orthodoxy is recognised as one of socalled traditional religions17 and the ROC is among the institutions which Russian society considers to be the most trustworthy.18 The ROC’s strong position in the public sphere is a consequence of its rapprochement with the ruling elite which started to develop gradually after the fall of the USSR in 1991. The important moment for close state–church cooperation was the Constitutional crisis in 1993,19 when Patriarch Aleksyi II (Ridiger) mediated between President Boris Yeltsin and the representatives of the Russian Parliament. Yeltsin sought the church’s support in order to strengthen his own legitimacy, while the church needed the government’s protection from the increasing activity of other religious organisations. The Constitutional crisis consolidated the view shared by the hierarchs and politicians that church– state rapprochement was beneficial for both parties. Today, the ROC is the most influential religious organisation not only in Russia but in the entire post-Soviet area. And, as the ROC likes to present itself, it is the most influential institution of Russian civil society. Since 2009, clerics have been allowed to work in the army and in prisons as chaplains. The ‘Return of Property of a Religious Character held by the State or the Municipalities to Religious Organisations’ Law passed in 2010 has provided the ROC with the right to regain its property lost after 1917. Due to the ROC’s persistent efforts, religion was introduced into the school curriculum in Russia in 2012.20 In 2013, with the ROC’s support, the State Duma passed a law criminalising offending a believer’s feelings. In Russia the church and state have established a kind of asymmetrical (to the advantage of the Kremlin) but nevertheless mutually beneficial partnership that is based on some shared views (e.g. the West as a threat) and interests (Russia’s dominance in the post-Soviet area). This partnership covers domestic as well as international affairs. The most serious challenge to this cooperation came with the wave of social protests from December 2012 and into 2013. During this time period, in several cities and towns of Russia, people protested against electoral fraud and voiced the need for political reforms. These protests presented the most significant crisis of political legitimacy since Vladimir Putin took over in 2000. In the face of the dilemma ‘society versus the ruling elite’

Russia  69 the ROC sided discreetly with the Kremlin. Bilateral contacts were again put to the test after the annexation of Crimea. The ROC has chosen a neutral stance abstaining from expressing vigorous support but not condemning the Kremlin’s policy. Since the ROC did not abandon the Kremlin in hard times, it is safe to say that the church–state partnership in Russia seems solid.

Between the faithful and raison d’état: the Russian Orthodox Church’s approach to spiritual security The Moscow Patriarchate used the years well since the fall of the USSR in order to articulate its conceptual approach to the main contemporary problems. Among the documents adopted by the Sacred Bishops’ Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, ‘The basis of the social concept of the ROC’ (Osnovy Sotsial’noy Kontseptsii Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi) (9 June 2008) occupies a special place. As the title suggests, it covers the main areas of the church’s functioning in modern society, such as state–church relations, social activity, education, public health, ecology, the economy, family and the concept of just war.21 Another important document is ‘The foundations of the ROC’s teaching on human dignity, freedom and human rights’ (Osnovy ucheniya Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi o dostoinstve, svobode i pravakh cheloveka) (6 June 2008).22 Other documents are more subject-specific and hence often have a technical character (e.g. they include specific suggestions on how to organise work). Among such documents we should mention: ‘On the ROC’s participation in the process of the rehabilitation of drug addicts’ (Ob uchastii Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi v reabilitatsii narkozavisimykh (26 December 2012),23 ‘The concept of the ROC on enforcing sobriety and the prevention of alcoholism’ (Kontseptsiya Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi po utverzhdeniyu trezvosti i profilaktike alkogolizma (25 July 2014),24 ‘The ROC’s service in prisons’ (Missiya tyuremnogo sluzheniya Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi i penitentsiarnyye uchrezhdeniya (12 March 2013),25 ‘The ROC’s position on the reform of family law and the problems of juvenile crime’ (Pozitsiya Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi po reforme semeynogo prava i problemam yuvenal’noy yustitsii (4  February 2013),26 ‘On the principles of the social activity of the ROC’ (O printsipakh organizatsii sotsial’noy raboty v Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi (4 February 2011),27 ‘The ROC’s position on the current problems of ecology’ (Pozitsiya Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi po aktual’nym problemam ekologii (4 February 2013),28 ‘The Principles and Directions of the ROC’s Work with Migrants’ (Printsipy i ­napravleniya raboty s migrantami v Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi (13 November 2014).29 None of these documents mentions human security – a notion introduced in the 1994 Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Human security equates security with people rather than territories, with development rather than military and ‘seeks to deal with these concerns through a new paradigm of sustainable human development’.30 With the notion of human security, the emphasis is put on

70  A. Curanović factors affecting the quality of people’s lives, such as poverty, famine, environmental degradation, domestic violence and interethnic tensions. The ROC notes the social importance of these factors and tries to address them in its documents, without, however, referring specifically to the concept of human security.31 Instead the ROC uses the notion of ‘spiritual security’ (dukhovnaya bezopasnost), which has a different meaning. Referring to the core principle of ‘spiritual security’, the Bishop of Minsk and Slutsk, Philaret (Vakhromeyev) points to the following passage from the Old Testament:32 ‘And the soul that turneth after such as have familiar spirits, and after wizards, to go a whoring after them, I will even set my face against that soul, and will cut him off from among his people’ (Leviticus, 20:6).33 Bishop Hilarion (Alfeyev), the Head of the Synodal Department for External Church Relations (Otdel vneshnikh tserkovnykh svyazey), commented that ‘spiritual security’ is the ‘security of soul’.34 Patriarch Kirill (Gundyayev) argued that true security and sovereignty come with spiritual revival.35 As Orthodox publicist and consultant of the Moscow Patriarchate Valentin Radaev explains, spiritual security is about the stable spiritual revival of an individual. It is also about preserving the moral values of society – its tradition, original culture, sense of patriotism and humanism.36 Hence the concept of spiritual security sees moral revival as a foundation of a secure and stable society. True security (individual as well as collective) requires keeping the soul safe from sin. Spiritual security refers to similar factors to human security, e.g. ecology, demography and prosperity. The main difference between the two concepts comes from the fact that, in the ROC’s interpretation, the spiritual security of the people is always linked to the security of the state. Hence true security of the state requires keeping the soul of the nation safe from sin. The statist logic of spiritual security is especially clearly seen in its connection to another notion of ‘civilisational (humanitarian) sovereignty’. The World Russian People’s Council (Vsemirnyy russkiy narodnyy sobor) (WRPC), one of the most influential actors involved in the process of the conceptualisation and promotion of Orthodox projects,37 defined it as a set of cultural, religious, socio-psychological factors which enable a nation and a state to reproduce its own identity and to avoid a socio-­ psychological and cultural dependency upon external centres of influence. (…) It is the capacity to defend independence from the impact of soft power, which in the 21st century became the main instrument of the expansion of powers aspiring to global hegemony.38 As the WRPC’s statement shows, spiritual security and civilisational (humanitarian) sovereignty are both manifestations of the securitisation of culture and identity that can be observed in the narrative of the ROC and of Russian state institutions. This tendency to think about spirituality, tradition and identity in terms of security turns all of them into strategic assets of state policies. ‘The National Security Strategy’ (Strategia natsional’noy bezopasnosti

Russia  71 Rossiyskoy Federatsii) (31 December 2015) argues that the preservation and strengthening of traditional Russian moral and spiritual values are among the priorities of national security.39 The strategic significance of culture is also confirmed in ‘The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’ (Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii (30 November 2016) whose authors argue that ‘norms’ and ‘values’ have become the main sphere of international rivalry in the post Cold War era. Other traces of the securitisation of culture can be found in the statements of Vladimir Putin. One example is the oft-quoted Valdai Speech of 2013, when Putin noted that ‘striving for independence, for spiritual, ideological (…) sovereignty is an indispensable part of [the Russian] national character’.40 Another example came when Putin stated in 2016 at the meeting with members of the Association of Russian Philology (Obshchestvo russkoy slovesnosti), that the Russian language is a matter of national security.41 It is important to note that the hierarchs of the Moscow Patriarchate are attentive to such statements and have referred to them subsequently in their own public speeches.42 The notion of spiritual security reveals the ROC’s inclination to think about people and their spirituality in terms of state interests. This tendency is in turn a manifestation of the church’s habitus (in Bourdieu’s sense), which was shaped alongside the expansion of the Russian Empire. One of the formative experiences for the ROC was the Russian colonisation of the Caucasus in the ­nineteenth century.43 Christianisation of the local people was an instrument to establish and preserve Russia’s presence in the region.44 As part of a colonial project, the church approached people as a strategic resource of the empire. Converting locals to Christianity, providing religious services for Russian settlers, erecting new churches and establishing eparchies – all of these actions undertaken by the ROC were of strategic importance for the Russian state. This ‘imperial habitus’ can be observed in the way the ROC currently combines its concern about the moral condition of an individual with the national interest of the Russian state.45 In the ROC’s understanding, spiritual security always has a state dimension. The ROC’s efforts to balance between people’s security and the state’s security leave a strong imprint on the church’s approach to particular aspects of security issues. The social problems that the ROC sees as the most important, such as abortion and challenges to the traditional role of women within the family, are presented in the broader context of Russia’s problems with a shrinking demography and hence as a matter of the state’s security.46 Within this framework abortion is not only a sin but also a social phenomenon that threatens Russia’s existence. Furthermore, Russia’s recent problems with demography are interpreted by some hierarchs partly as a result of external influence. Maxim Obukhov, a priest and head of the Orthodox Medical Centre ‘Life’, noticed the negative interference of foreign non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that created pressure and strived for the implementation of solutions used in the West, namely allowing abortion and inviting immigrants to save the labour market. Meanwhile, as Obukhov argued, scenarios designed for France were bad for Russia.47 Another example of the

72  A. Curanović p­ersistence of securitisation and the geo­political approach comes with the Forum of Orthodox Christian Women (Forum pravoslavnykh zhenshchin). While addressing desirable roles for women in the twenty-first century, one of the factors that participants placed emphasis on was the need for women to take a firm stand against a unipolar world.48 Similarly, drug or alcohol addictions, apart from their sinful nature, are condemned because they undermine public health and so are also linked to national security. Close church–state relations are seen clearly in the area of education. One of the arguments in favour of introducing ‘The Foundations of Religious ­Cultures and Ethics’ (Osnovy religioznykh kul’tur i svetskoy etiki) to the school curriculum was national security.49 As Patriarch Kirill explained, the church insisted on this course because ‘it’s absolutely necessary, in the era of globalisation, for the sake of protecting the multi-ethnic Russian civilisation, the spiritual security of the Russian state, and the harmonious development of the individual’.50 Religious education, according to the church, is crucial in order to protect Russian youth from the influence of cults which are often supported by foreign governments and aimed at destroying Russian identity.51 The threat posed by cults is taken seriously in the most strategic area, i.e. the sector of nuclear technology. The head of the Rosatom State Atomic Energy Corporation,52 Sergei Kiriyenko, announced that the company had decided to build several Orthodox churches in so-called atom towns.53 As explained, the decision was motivated by reasons of spiritual security. Kiriyenko was convinced that the physical absence of Orthodox infrastructure would attract cults.54 In order to protect the soul of the nation (which is a key component of state security) the state is entitled, in the ROC’s opinion, to limit individual freedom. The example of this paternalist approach can be observed in the ROC’s stand on the freedom of the mass media. Many hierarchs support censoring the mass media for the sake of spiritual security.55 The church’s balance between the perspective of an individual and the state is present also in the sphere of the economy and ecology. In both cases the ROC clearly states that the core cause for ecological devastation as well as economic crises is the moral depravity of people. Writing about economics, the church prioritises social justice and the fight against corruption in order to protect citizens. Nevertheless, the ROC maintains the statist perspective. For example, the church calls for preserving strategic sectors of the economy under state control and for limiting the access of foreign investment.56 In the case of ecology, the ROC is concerned that ecology could be a matter of political manipulation. Therefore, the Moscow Patriarchate claims the right to its own critical judgement of ecologic initiatives – a formulation that allows the ROC to distance itself from Greenpeace actions that are unpopular with the Kremlin. In this context the actions of Greenpeace could be classified as ‘radical environmentalism’ – ­phenomenon criticised by the WRPC.57 Balancing between Christian concern for individual moral well-being and state security is particularly challenging for the ROC when it comes to migration. On the one hand the church emphasises the Christian obligation

Russia  73 to take care of newcomers (strannopriimstvo) regardless of their citizenship, race, religion or political views.58 On the other hand some hierarchs, such as Vsevolod Chaplin, have stressed that Russian society was concerned with the incorrect conduct of migrants and so called upon the state to fight illegal migration and pay attention to the rights of the Russian majority as a priority.59 The ROC’s dilemma in regard to migration is mirrored by the state’s dilemma – between economic arguments and interethnic stability.

The Russian Orthodox Church’s strategy towards spiritual security concerns and migration: partners and actions Since Kirill became patriarch, the church’s social infrastructure has grown rapidly. According to data from 2017,60 49 shelters for single mothers had been created in the previous eight years. There are a total of 53 such shelters in Russia and a further 65 shelters that house 1,300 orphans.61 One can conclude from the available sources that there is no standardised mechanism for accepting children into these institutions. The information on the website of the Holy Dmitri Children Centre names four categories of children who are entitled to this kind of care. These are: (1) children from families facing a crisis (e.g. single mothers in difficult life circumstances); (2) families with several children; (3) families of the former residents of the centre; (4) families with children who suffer from severe disabilities.62 The wording seems to imply that some sort of recommendation from a parish is needed in order to get a place in the centre. Another shelter, Elizabethan orphanage (Elizavetinskiy detskiy dom) (which cares for a maximum of 20 children) focuses on rehabilitation. A child can be admitted either by a recommendation from a state social care institution or on a parent’s request.63 The Centre for the Social Adaptation of Saint Basil the Great in St Petersburg cares for minors who have been sentenced for juvenile crimes. The centre is an alternative place to the state-run correction institutions. The Saint Basil Centre is the only non-state organisation in Russia with this profile. Fifty churches in the ROC offer mass in sign language (there was just one in 1991).64 The parish of Novokosino (Moscow) runs the only Orthodox Christian community in Russia of people (100) suffering from sclerosis.65 The ROC runs 95 shelters for the homeless, 40 almshouses and over 100 points for aid distribution.66 Sixty-three Orthodox parishes are involved in helping deaf and blind people. There are 200 church centres for drug addicts, of which 70 are centres for rehabilitation.67 To observe the church’s differentiated strategy, it is useful to analyse a specific issue such as the family, which includes various factors, including the role of women, abortion and domestic violence. One of the first steps was the creation of the necessary infrastructure, starting in 2011 with establishing ‘the Patriarch’s Commission on Family Matters, the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood’ (Patriarshaya komissiya po voprosam sem’i, zashchity materinstva i detstva), currently led by Archpriest Dmitry Smirnov.68 The Commission is responsible for setting up the church’s programme of family support and there should be a coordinator engaged in this programme in each eparchy.69

74  A. Curanović One of the ROC’s strategic goals is to reach out at the local level to f­amilies with several children. Parishes are expected to organise family clubs, points of distributing aid to such families (20 active), open parish kindergartens (30 active) and establish locations for family summer camps (20 active). The ROC aims to create regional centres for family matters in cooperation with local governments, where families would be provided with access to psychologists, lawyers and social workers. Another strategic direction of the ROC’s pro-family action is contacting pregnant women who might be considering abortion. In recent years, the church has managed to open ‘before abortion’ consultations in 25 eparchies. Preventing actions also mean shaping worldviews, and since 2009, as a pilot project in the Yekaterinburg eparchy, ten and 11 year-olds are taught the ‘Moral foundations of family life’ (Nravstvennyye osnovy semeynoy zhizni) at school, with support from the local government. Consultations (spiritual support) are also offered to people who are about to get married.70 An important aspect of the ROC’s actions is the social campaign against abortion and attacks on the family (i.e. the ideology of gender and the liberal notion of domestic violence). The ROC regularly organises seminars, round tables and conferences71 and also takes part in consultations on the drafting of relevant legal acts. One example of this was in October 2016, when Archpriest Dmitry Smirnov, head of the Patriarch’s Commission on Family Matters and the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood, participated in a debate in Parliament on the drafting of the document on the foundations of family law in Russia.72 To promote its agenda, the ROC works with various state institutions, such as the Council for Protecting Family and Traditional Family Values at the Children’s Ombudsman (Sovet po zashchite traditsionnykh semeynykh tsennostey pri Upolnomochennom po pravam rebenka)73 and the ‘Family Policy for Protecting Children’ Working Group at the Coordination Centre of the Presidential Administration (Rabochay gruppa ‘Semeynaya politika detstvosberezheniya’ Koordinatsionnogo soveta pri Prezidente RF).74 The ROC does not develop any specific programmes with these institutions, rather it seeks to ensure that state initiatives on families comply with the Eastern Orthodox tradition and do not become ‘corrupted’ by liberal concepts. The church acts as the guardian of Russian families – the core element of the spiritual security of each nation. This was the case in the drafting of the law on preventing domestic violence (O profilaktike semeyno-bytovogo nasiliya), which was discussed first in the Civic Chamber (Obshchestvennaya palata) in June 2015 and then in the State Duma in September 2016. During this period, the Patriarch’s Commission on Family Matters and the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood launched a public campaign against the drafted law which, according to the ROC, was aimed at destroying Russian families.75 On 12 March 2016, the Patriarchal Commission issued an appeal addressed to social activists and politicians. The Commission urged a rejection of the draft, arguing that family support ‘was of national importance, a goal which unites everyone’.76 Eventually, the law on domestic violence was not adopted. Additionally, on

Russia  75 7 February 2017, Vladimir Putin signed a law decriminalising cases of beatings within a family,77 which was welcomed as the right step by the ROC.78 The ROC understands the need to work closely with the state, but at the same time it supports creating Orthodox NGOs, such as the Association of Orthodox Christian Doctors (Obshchestvo pravoslavnykh vrachey Rossii im. svt. Luki Voyno-YAsenetskogo, established in 2007) the Forum of Orthodox ­Christian Women (Forum pravoslavnykh zhenshchin, established in 2009) or the Union of the Orthodox Christian Businessmen (Soyuz Pravoslavnykh Predprinimateley, established in 2014). These are all non-profit organisations whose main goal is to integrate Orthodox Christian believers outside their parishes and by doing so raise their public influence. In these institutions, clergy are present either as members (e.g. the Association of Orthodox Christian Doctors) or as spiritual leaders (in the case of the Union of the Orthodox Christian Businessmen, this is Archbishop Ambrosii (Ermakov) of Petergof). These organisations usually hold plenary meetings at least once a year. The most active one in terms of social matters is the Union of Orthodox Christian Businessmen, which is involved in various projects such as preparing multimedia materials to promote the Eastern Orthodox sense of entrepreneurship, sponsoring Orthodox cultural events, making relics of the saints publicly available, organising conferences and last but not least managing the Charity Fund ‘Our Future’ (Nashe Budushcheye).79 These Orthodox Christian NGOs enable the ROC to broaden the scope of its actions in the public sphere. Thus, the ROC is building up its own potential for agency: it develops local programmes and social campaigns and the church cooperates with the state and supports Orthodox non-government actors. Interestingly, the ROC is cautious in developing substantial cooperation with other religious organisations when it comes to social issues. The church organises conferences with the representatives of other denominations in order to, as is explicitly recognised, ‘learn about each other’s experience’. In January 2017, for instance, the ROC hosted an event attended by the Caritas and Evangelical Lutheran Church on helping women experiencing difficult life circumstances.80 However, these conferences rarely result in common projects.81 A reason for this could be connected to the ROC’s concern that social projects are easily turned into an instrument of proselytism. A trace of this concern can be found in the stand taken by Bishop Panteleymon. During the conference of the representatives of the ROC and the Polish Episcopate on church social service, held in Warsaw on 28–30 November 2013, Panteleymon noticed that: we can’t reunite in terms of theology but we can reunite in terms of good deeds. […] We, Russians don’t have to deal with rehabilitation of addicts in Poland, and you Polish don’t have to look for them in Russia.82 Panteleymon thus made it clear that although learning from each other’s experience was a good thing, each church should develop its social projects on its own canonical territory first and foremost.

76  A. Curanović

Ecology The ROC’s activity in the area of ecology is a recent development and it is worth stressing that its beginnings are to some extent triggered by the state’s initiatives. The year 2013 was declared the ‘Year of Ecology’ in the Russian Federation. One year earlier, the ROC debated the first draft83 of the document on the church’s position towards the issue of ecology, which was eventually issued in February 2013 as ‘The position of the ROC towards the current problems of ecology’ (Pozitsiya Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi po aktual’nym problemam ekologii).84 The presentation of the document was preceded and later followed by several conferences and roundtables organised by the ROC and mostly addressed to state institutions.85 During one of these events in the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation on 29 June 2012, a cooperation agreement was signed by three parties: the All Russian Association for the Protection of Nature (Vserossiyskoye obshchestvo okhrany prirody), the ROC, represented by the Synodal Department for the Cooperation of Church and Society, (Sinodal’nyy otdel po vzaimootnosheniyam Tserkvi i obshchestva) and the WRPC.86 The goals of the ROC include preparing a school course (‘Foundations of Ecological Culture and Ethics’) and including ecological issues in the curriculum of Sunday schools.87 The 2013 document resulted in the ROC establishing ‘the Day of Prayers for God’s Creation’. Celebrated on the first Sunday of ­September, the day includes special processions and prayers aimed at repenting for people’s sins against the world created by God.88 The main unit responsible for developing the ROC’s ecological agenda is the Synodal Department for the Cooperation of Church and Society. The ecological activity of eparchies is financed from the regular budget. In 2014, the Church–Social Organisation for Protecting Nature (Tserkovno-­obshchestvennaya prirodookhrannaya organizatsiya) was established with the aim of facilitating closer cooperation between the ROC, NGOs and state institutions. Its main goal is to build the ROC’s capacity to comment, evaluate and influence public discourse on ecology.89 One of the less political, more practical projects promoted by this body was to place bins for empty batteries in the Moscow parishes.90 In 2015, the first official institution for dealing with ecology within the structure of the patriarchate appeared.91 The Bishop of ­Melekessky and Cherdaklinsky Dyodor (Isaev) announced the launch of the Eparchial Office for Ecology and Actions in Support of Nature (eparkhial’nyy otdel po ekologii i prirodookhrannoy deyatel’nosti), led by Deacon Andrey Kilin. In 2015, Father Kilin and the ‘Clean Future’ (Chistoye Budushcheye) Association initiated a social action called ‘National Russian Tidying’ (Vserossiyskaya uborka) aimed at cleaning public spaces within parishes. Later that year, Father Kilin announced a competition on ecological films and established a shelter at his eparchy of Holy Basil for homeless animals. He also plans to encourage cloisters to develop bio-production. Father Kilin’s ideas are a kind of pilot project facilitated by another document: ‘Methodical Recommendations about the ROC’s Participation in Preserving Nature’ (Metodicheskiye ­rekomendatsii

Russia  77 ob uchastii Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi v prirodookhrannoy deyatel’nost, 13 July 2015).92 As the document indicates, the main reason for the current ecological crisis is man’s sinful nature manifested inter alia in untamed hyper-­ consumerism. The document also emphasises that ecology has become a distinct field of each parish’s activity and another platform of a close cooperation between the church and the state.93 The main goal of the ecological agenda is to raise the public visibility of the ROC. This is why the church organises or participates in conferences and social projects. It is significant that these events are often attended by the representatives of the government and members of the State Duma (e.g. the conference ‘The Christian World and the Ecological Practises in 21st Century’ held in Moscow on 18 May 2013).94 The ROC pays attention to being ­present in the mass media and wants to be consulted on state initiatives.95 Establishing permanent contacts with state organs on ecological matters is an important aspect of the ROC’s strategy. The ROC coordinates its agenda with that of the state. For instance, the year 2017 was another year dedicated to the topic of ecology in Russia. In reaction to this, the ROC organised a roundtable ‘Church and Ecology’ within the International Christmas Lectures (Mezhdunarodnyye Rozhdestvenskiye obrazovatel’nyye chteniya) in January 2017,96 and then in July the Synod of ROC passed additional recommendations for the ROC’s activity in the sphere of protecting nature.97 It is worth noting that the ROC has started to include ecology in its international agenda. In March 2015, the representative of the Department for External Church Relations met with representatives of the President of France in Moscow to talk about protecting nature.98 Another example is the annual meeting of the representatives of the ROC and Iranian ayatollahs (the Russian– Iranian Commission on ‘Eastern Orthodoxy–Islam’ Dialogue – Sovmestnaya rossiysko-iranskaya komissiya po dialogu ‘Pravoslaviye – Islam’), which in 2018 was dedicated to the topic of ‘Religion and the environment’.99 The participation in the international discussion on ecology is perceived by the ROC as an important means to strengthen its own image as a capable transnational actor. It also seems that there is one further reason for the ROC to develop its own ecological agenda. For years it has been the Ecumenical Patriarchate that initiated and led the debate about the attitude of the Eastern Orthodox Church’s attitude towards the contemporary problems relating to the preservation of nature. The ROC’s growing interest in ecological issues could be interpreted as an attempt to present its own concepts and solutions independently from the Ecumenical Patriarchate and thus send a signal about its ambitions to manifest informal leadership with the Eastern Orthodox community.

Migration According to official estimates, there are 8–9 million immigrants in the ­Russian Federation, half of whom are there illegally.100 The majority (over 90 per cent) come from the former Soviet republics, and in recent three years

78  A. Curanović the main countries of origin have been the Ukraine, Tajikistan, Kirgizstan and Kazakhstan.101 As stated in the International Migration Report for 2017 prepared by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the Russian Federation hosted the fourth largest population of migrants worldwide.102 However, as researchers at the Institute of Social Analyses and Prognosis (at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration) showed, the first half of 2017 was the first time since 2010 that more migrants left than came to Russia. The researchers were cautious not to speak about new trends in the migration flows into Russia but were confident in stating that the effects of the crisis in Eastern Ukraine, which had caused significant numbers to enter the Russian Federation in previous years, had diminished.103 Migration became one of the priority issues for the ROC after the socalled riots in Moscow’s Manezhnaya Square on 11 December 2010.104 Some hierarchs of the ROC, however, had raised this issue earlier. For example, before he became patriarch, Bishop Kirill spoke in an interview to ‘Rossyskaya Gazeta’ on 9 March 2007 (i.e. six months after ethnic riots that took place in Kondopoga)105 about the challenges presented by migration and suggested that the church should be involved in the state’s projects on migrants.106 Representatives of the ROC acknowledge that immigration has many ­benefits but only if it is well controlled (i.e. there is a selection of people with the right skills) and immigrants must learn the Russian culture, language and religious tradition. If these conditions are not met, illegal immigration poses a threat to Russian culture, its mentality and its spiritual core.107 In other words, migration could pose a threat to Russia’s spiritual sovereignty. In order for the state to launch cooperation with the ROC in the sphere of migration, the Kremlin had to change its approach, and this happened after Manezhnaya riots. The ‘Concept of the State Migration Policy of the ­ ­Russian Federation until 2025’ (Kontseptsiya gosudarstvennoy migratsionnoy politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii na period do 2025 goda) signed on 13 June 2012 by the President of the Russian Federation links migration to security. It aims to limit illegal immigration, to carefully select legal immigrants and invest in the adaptation process of the newcomers. The new migration policy contains an entire section on supporting the cultural adaptation and integration of immigrants and, crucially, mentions the necessity of including traditional religions. The ROC’s strategy towards migration combines three elements:108 cultural adaptation for migrants, spiritual upbringing for ethnic Russians and interfaith dialogue for religious communities. In pursuing its agenda, the ROC cooperates with state institutions and representatives of other traditional religions. Concerning migration, the ROC does not limit its actions to the territory of the Russian Federation. It develops cooperation on two levels: the domestic (within Russia) and international (within the Commonwealth of

Russia  79 109

Independent States (CIS)). In the post-Soviet era the ROC uses the p­ latform of the Interfaith Council of the CIS (Mezhreligioznyy sovet SNG), an institution established in 2004 that which integrates ‘traditional’ religions from CIS countries.110 For instance, the summit of the Interfaith Council in Yerevan in 2011 was dedicated to the issue of immigration. The Concluding Document (in a message coinciding with the position of the Moscow Patriarchate) stated that: Relations between immigrants and local people, minority and majority are one of the most important issues. On the one hand, immigrants show no respect to local tradition and order. On the other hand, xenophobia occurs and attempts to exploit cheap migrant labour. […] The State, society and business should help immigrants to learn the language, culture and religious tradition of the host country. Our religious communities are ready to help and they are already doing it.111 Within the territory of the Russian Federation, the main partner of the ROC is the state, represented by the Federal Migration Service (FMS), an institution established on 14 June 1992. It was significant that the common commission of the ROC and the FMO was established as early as June 2010, as this was before the Manezhnaya riots and the Kremlin’s appeal to ‘traditional’ religions to start working with immigrants. This specific chronology could indicate that the Commission was a result of the ROC’s previous persistent efforts to be included in the state’s projects on immigration. The Manezhnaya riots gave an additional impulse to this institution, newly established by the church and FMS. This bilateral cooperation has borne fruit: in 2011, the Commission announced the organisation of eparchial centres for the cultural adaptation of immigrants.112 In April 2013, both sides signed a memorandum on extending cooperation on adaptation programmes.113 In June 2013, another initiative of the Commission’s work came to fruition: a textbook for the Russian language and culture used in the courses for immigrants.114 On 13 November 2014, the ROC issued the ‘Principles and Directions of the ROC’s Work with Migrants’ (Printsipy i napravleniya raboty s migrantami v Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi).115 In this document, the ROC emphasise that migrants must learn the language and be educated about the history, culture and ethics of Russia. The ROC sees its duty as a ‘cultural mission’ aimed at promoting the traditional values of Russian society among migrants. Two pilot projects were launched as a result: centres for the adaptation of migrants were opened in Tambov and Orenburg. In the same year, another centre was established at the Belgorod State Institute for Culture and Art as a result of the common efforts of the Stavropol and Belgorod eparchies.116 In total, 724 migrants participated in the course in the six regions within the ‘Education: Language and cultural adaptation for migrants’ project cosponsored by the ROC.117 The most common mode is that the ROC provides the venue and the courses are held by laypeople (usually teachers from local universities).

80  A. Curanović It is also important to note that the ROC does not receive any additional ­external funding for this purpose; in 2015, the ROC ran 39 language courses in cooperation with local governments but received no state funding.118 The church also launched the ‘Academia’ programme which offers online courses on the Russian language and history aimed at migrants.119 The growing number of Moldovan migrants made the ROC establish masses in Moldovan for the Moldavian diaspora in Moscow parishes. In 2017, the ROC developed a special textbook on the church’s history for Chinese immigrants.120 Since 1 January 2015, migrants wishing to apply for a permanent legal stay in Russia must take an exam on their knowledge of the Russian language, history and culture; this only adds to the importance of the ROC’s actions and connects them to state policies.

Refugees and forcibly displaced people in the Russian Orthodox Church’s practice The ROC makes a (conceptual, not legal) distinction between migrants (migranty) and refugees (bezhentsy). The presence of migrants is connected to security. As the head of the Synodal Department for the Cooperation of Church and Society, Vsevolod Chaplin argued that Russia’s borders should be guarded from illegal migration. He was convinced that some processes connected to migration are dangerous because, along with migrants, potential terrorists are coming to Russia.121 The leading hierarchs of the ROC expressed criticism towards European migration policy. Bishop Hilarion for instance stated that Europe’s migrant policy is a mistake because it undermines European security.122 When the first refugees from Ukraine started to arrive in Russia in 2014, the ROC emphasised that they were not immigrants and did not need cultural adaptation but material support.123 The ROC stressed that refugees are people in need whom Christians should help. However, despite this ­self-­proclaimed moral imperative, the ROC was slow to develop effective mechanisms for providing help to forcibly displaced people. Chechnya It is striking how hard it is to find any substantial information about the church’s involvement in assisting people affected by the two wars in Chechnya. Among the thousands of materials published over the last 20 years on the website of the Moscow Patriarchate, there is just one document which refers to the times of the Second Chechen War (1999–2009). The then head of the Synodal Department for Church Charity and Social Ministry, Bishop Sergey (Thomin) briefly mentioned in one of his lectures in 2008 people ‘displaced from the Caucasus’ and ‘refugees from Afghanistan’.124 Bishop Sergey reported that in 2002–3 his department, together with the World Lutheran Federation (WLF) and the World Council of Churches (WCC), organised legal and psychological consultations for people from the

Russia  81 Caucasus who suffered from trauma. Interestingly, the phrase ‘war in Chechnya’ – or even just ‘Chechnya’ – is not found anywhere in this document. The most geographically specific information in the document concerned the delivery in 2003 of packages of religious books, candles and ­liturgical equipment to the parish of (Archangel) Michael in Grozny. The ROC did this in cooperation with the Forum of Organisations Dealing with Displaced People (Forum pereselencheskikh organizatsiy).125 In 2003, due to the support of the WLF and the WCC, a workshop in the Travitsky orphanage in the Astrakhan oblast was created for forcibly displaced people from the Caucasus. One can conclude from this scarce information that the ROC was not a leading aid provider and acted first and foremost in cooperation with foreign religious institutions.126 This pattern can also be observed in the case of the Slavic population who fled the Caucasus during this period. The ROC mostly assisted organisations that dealt with displaced people like ‘Common Home’ (Obshchiy dom), the Russian Fund for Helping Refugees ‘Sootechestvenniki’ (Rossiyskiy fond pomoshchi bezhentsam ‘Sootechestvenniki’) and the ‘Patriotic Alliance of Women’ (Patrioticheskiy soyuz zhenshchin). The reasons for the ROC’s low profile during the conflicts in Chechnya are not clear. It could be because the ROC was itself weak in the region (devastated infrastructure after the Soviet era, Christians were a minority in the population etc.),127 the church was reluctant to become politically involved or it did not have any significant experience with helping displaced people. The Russo-Georgian war The ROC’s involvement was much more conspicuous during the ­Russo-Georgian war of 7–12 August 2008. Interestingly, it was the Synodal Department for External Church Relations that was responsible for providing aid to refugees who came to Russia mostly from South Ossetia, with aid being delivered from 27 August (the fighting stopped on 12 August) in cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Health.128 Apart from aid products (all together 1.5 million tonnes of aid was collected), the ROC organised courses for local activists and priests in order to improve their pedagogic and psychological skills so they could work with people affected by the conflict.129 Three hundred and forty refugees from South Ossetia were relocated to the Republic of Adygea.130 Children from South Ossetia were put in the Rehabilitation Centre at the Bogoyavlensky Alansky Female Cloister,131 which became the main base for refugees.132 While promoting the cause of South Ossetian refugees, the ROC tried to engage all its canonical territory; symbolically, on 16 September 2008, an Orthodox Memorial Service (the first Panikhida since the Second World War) was organised for the victims of fighting in South Ossetia all over the ROC’s parishes throughout the world, (e.g. in Kyiv, ­Tallinn, New York).133 Under the aegis of the ROC, the Ossetians and Georgians living in Moscow collected aid together for the refugees from South Ossetia.134 The ROC outside Russia parish in Berlin provided aid to

82  A. Curanović the f­amilies of those who died in the Russo-Georgian war.135 At this time the ROC were also in contact with foreign organisations, in particular the Protestant ‘Actions by Churches Together’136 and Catholic ‘Caritas’ of Georgia. Refugees from Ukraine In the face of the Ukrainian crisis, the Central Office for Helping Refugees (Obshchetserkovnyy Shtab pomoshchi bezhentsam s Ukrainy) at the Synodal Department for Charity and Social Ministry was established in Moscow in July 2014. This office coordinated the delivery of aid to all the eparchies taking in refugees; the Synodal Department for External Church Relations was involved (just as in the case of the refugees from South Ossetia).137 In August 2014, a free phone-in line was launched and operated by members of Miloserdie (Charity). Since the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate was delivering most of the aid to the people living in the place of conflict,138 the ROC focused on collecting aid139 and helping the refugees who came to Russia. In doing so, the ROC supplemented the work of the state organs responsible for managing the influx of refugees. A certain modus operandi has been established. People who crossed the Ukrainian–Russian border would first be directed to temporary camps (tsenter razmeshcheniya, up to 450 people each) run by the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) in the border zone. These camps already provide the possibility for people interested in obtaining temporary refugee status or temporary asylum (vremennoye ubezhishche) to register with the local offices of the FMS, which during the peak of the refugee influx operated directly from temporary camps. From these camps, people were transported to the so-called points of temporary residency (punkt vremennogo razmeshcheniya) in different regions of Russia that received special federal funds to organise and sustain these facilities.140 Out of 570 points of relocation functioning at the end of 2014 (most of which were established in the Central Federal Okrug and the South Federal Okrug), 250 remained in December 2015, providing shelter for 10,000 people (a reduction of more than half from the previous year).141 Because of this strategy of dealing with the sudden influx of Ukrainians, the federal and local authorities are responsible for providing the necessary infrastructure and ‘distributing’ the incomers around Russia. The ROC plays a modest role in this particular task: small groups of refugees were divided between a few eparchies (Rostov, Voronezh, Samara, Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Ryazan, Nizhniy Novgorod, Kostroma, Yaroslavl and the Udmurt Republic). People were located in shelters run by the church or in church buildings or in private apartments belonging to volunteers or rented by the church on the territory of the Russian Federation. In addition, some monasteries (such as the Vyksunsky–Iversky Female Closter in Vykse142 and the ­Svyato-Preobrazhenskoye cloister in Priozersk)143 took in refugees.144 On rare occasions, the ROC would help refugees to buy a bus or train ticket so they could get to their relatives living in more distant regions of Russia.

Russia  83 The most significant part of the ROC’s engagement with refugees is c­ ollecting and distributing aid. In accordance with the aforementioned document regulating the cooperation between the MES and the ROC (signed on 5 July 2017), the MES provides the church with information and free access to all camps allowing the ROC to deliver aid and spiritual support to the refugees,145 and nine points of aid distribution were organised along the border crossings between Ukraine and Russia in cooperation between the Orthodox Service Miloserdie and the charity food bank ‘Rus’. The most affected eparchies were those in the border area: in Don (7,000 refugees) and Belgorod (14,000 refugees). In order to help these eparchies, an additional project named ‘Humanitarian aid for people who suffered during the conflict in the East of Ukraine’ was prepared by the Don eparchy and the Synodal Department for External Church Relations.146 The Samaritan’s Purse and the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association also participated in this project.147 Warehouses for stocking humanitarian aid were created in 32 eparchies. One of the biggest collecting points was located in Moscow in Novokosino and Marfo-Mariinsky Convent. The ROC is also involved in programmes that help to send the children of refugees to school.148 In nine cities149 within the so-called ‘People’s Dinner’ project, the ROC created points where packages of food products could be prepared. A total of 3,000 volunteers are engaged in this initiative.150 By the beginning of 2018, the peak of the influx of Ukrainians into Russia seemed to be over. According to data provided by that Russian state statistics service Rosstat,151 there were 598 people with refugee status living on the territory of the Russian Federation on 1 January 2017, of which 48.4 per cent were incomers from Afghanistan, while Ukrainians only made up the second-largest group with 31 per cent. The number of forced migrants (vynuzhdennyye pereselentsy) was calculated at 19,327 (Georgia, 32.3 per cent; Kazakhstan, 22.6 per cent; Uzbekistan, 10.2 per cent). Finally, 228,392 individuals received temporarily asylum (vremennoye ubezhishche), 99 per cent of whom were Ukrainian. In general, the number of Ukrainians coming to Russia seeking refugee status or asylum dropped significantly in 2017. It seems safe to say that before the Ukrainian crisis the ROC did not have a well-developed strategy for addressing a sudden influx of forcibly displaced people. It should be noted, however, that the ROC has learned its lesson from past experience. After its failure during the Chechen wars, it proved noticeably more capable at handling the refugees from South Ossetia in 2008, although this was arguably an easy task considering the relatively small numbers of people and the short duration of the conflict. The real test came with the Ukrainian crisis, not only because of the considerable numbers of people seeking the ROC’s help, but also because most of these people were adherents to the Moscow Patriarchate and because of the significance of ­Russian–Ukrainian relations for the status of the ROC as well as for the Russian government. In the initial months following the commencement of hostilities in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, the church tried to create instruments for the

84  A. Curanović purpose of getting information about the situation on the ground and ­mechanisms of collecting and distributing aid on an ad hoc basis. Gradually, the church managed to develop more specific programmes tailored to the needs of the Ukrainian refugees (e.g. sending children to schools). The cooperation agreement between the church and the MES signed in July 2017 provided the formal framework for the modus operandi worked out by the two parties as the Ukrainian crisis unfolded. This particular cooperation will speed up the institutionalisation of the ROC’s own actions towards displaced people. On all three occasions when the ROC faced the problem of forcibly displaced people, it had some contact with other religious charity institutions. However, it is hard to talk about a sustainable or advanced cooperation. These are usually ad hoc actions. This is usually not so much a cooperation per se – as in the aforementioned case of Caritas – but rather a parallel, vaguely coordinated, effort.152 What one could observe during the Ukrainian crisis, however, was the tendency to involve local enterprises at the eparchy or even the parish level in delivering aid. Establishing mechanisms of including local non-governmental institutions and representatives of the local business could be a promising tendency in the process of institutionalising the ROC’s actions towards refugees and forcibly displaced people.

Christians in the Middle East: the international alliances of the Moscow Patriarchate In contrast to the EU, Russia has not been receiving refugees from the Middle East in recent years.153 Nevertheless, the ROC is very much involved in the affairs of this unstable region. The Moscow Patriarchate has been delivering aid to Syria since the beginning of the crisis.154 In 2017, a Working Group for Providing Humanitarian Aid to People of Syria (Rabochaya gruppa po okazaniyu gumanitarnoy pomoshchi naseleniyu Sirii) was established at the Commission for International Cooperation, which is part of the Council for Cooperation with Religious Organisations at the Office of the President of the Russian Federation (Komissiya po mezhdunarodnomu sotrudnichestvu Soveta po vzaimodeystviyu s religioznymi ob’yedineniyami pri Prezidente Rossiyskoy Federatsii). This group gathers representatives of traditional religions and state ­officials and is responsible for collecting aid. This aid is delivered to Syria by aeroplanes provided by the MES155 and distributed there by the Russian Centre for Bringing Peace to Conflicted Parties (Rossiyskiy tsentr po primireniyu vrazhduyushchikh storon).156 Hence, in the process of delivering aid, the ROC has been cooperating closely with Russian state institutions. The ROC supports Russia’s military engagement in Syria. Patriarch Kirill compared Russia fighting so-called Islamic Sate (Daesh) to opposing fascism.157 The ROC is clear that in Syria, Russian troops are fighting the embodiment of evil. The issue at the top of the ROC’s Middle East agenda is occupied by the fate of Christians living in the region. In recent years, the ROC has become one of the most influential actors raising awareness at the global level about

Russia  85 158

the ongoing ‘genocide’ of Christians in the Middle East. The Moscow Patriarchate is motivated by humanitarian and, as the ROC has stressed, geopolitical reasons to aid the Christian minority, which it sees as a necessary ingredient for preserving regional balance and stability.159 The Middle East for the ROC is a humanitarian cause with a geopolitical edge. This issue of Christians in the Middle East reveals the considerable potential of the ROC to advance an international agenda and build international alliances. The Moscow Patriarchate’s main strategy has been to promote the cause in various international fora. The ROC, supported by the Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society (Imperatorskoye pravoslavnoye palestinskoye obshchest, IOPS),160 organised or participated in numerous conferences, round tables and seminars that tackled this problem in 2017 alone:161 on 8 March in Geneva, before the 34th session of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the WRPC initiated round tables on humanitarian diplomacy and the Syrian crisis;162 on 12 May, the ROC participated in the World Summit in Defense of Persecuted Christians in Washington, which gathered over 800 participants from over 135 countries;163 on 28 August, The Third International Christian Forum, held in Moscow, was dedicated to the problem of the persecution of Christians;164 and on 7 December in Vienna, the ROC took part in the discussion about the security of Christians in the Middle East at the session of ministers of foreign affairs from member countries of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, jointly organised by the Russian and Hungarian governments.165 The patriarch’s personal diplomacy also plays an important part in voicing the miseries of Middle East Christians. On the eve of the conflict of 12–15 November 2011, Kirill visited Lebanon and Syria. When the USA administration was discussing the possibility of an attack on Syria, Kirill issued a personal appeal to Barack Obama, Recep Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin to seek a peaceful solution.166 He made the fate of Christians the main point of his meetings with state officials, notably raising this issue with the then French president François Hollande in December 2016 in Paris.167 What makes the ROC’s strategy efficient is its ability to co-opt many partners, starting with the Kremlin and Russian diplomacy. In 2011, the ROC initiated Resolution 1957 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe: ‘On Violence against Christians in the Middle East’. On 12–13 December 2012, the ROC participated in the Dialogue of the High UN Commissar for Protecting Refugees in Geneva.168 In 2013, the Interfaction Group in Defense of Christian Values of the Russian Duma (Mezhfraktsionnaya gruppa v zashchitu khristianskikh tsennostey) issued an appeal to members of other European Parliaments to support the Christian minorities in the Middle East.169 On 14 November 2014, the Russian State Duma issued the declaration ‘On the Grievance and Mass Violation of the Rights of Religious and Ethnic Minorities in Connection with the Deterioration of the Situation in Syria and Iraq’.170 The Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society prepared the declaration ‘On Protecting the Christians of the Middle East and Northern

86  A. Curanović Africa’, which resulted in Russia, the Vatican and Lebanon bringing a common initiative to the debate at the UNHRC in 2015. A joint statement ‘Supporting the Human Rights of Christians and Other Communities’ has been signed by 65 states.171 The ROC has succeeded in making the persecution of Christians part of the agenda of the Council of Europe and the UNHRC. The next step, as presented by the ROC, is to create an international system of monitoring the persecution of Christians.172 In promoting the cause of Middle East Christians, the ROC also cooperates with other religious institutions. In recent years the ROC has become the main partner of the Patriarch of Antioch and representatives of Syrian religious communities. Patriarch Kirill hosted in Moscow a delegation of Syrian hierarchs in 2013,173 the Eastern Orthodox Patriarch of Alexandria and all Africa Theodor II in 2014,174 the Patriarch of the Syriac Orthodox Church Ignatius Aphrem II in 2015175 and the Pope of the Coptic Orthodox Church of Alexandria Tawadros II in 2017.176 Additionally, Bishop Hilarion met with leaders of the Yazidi community in 2015.177 The ROC’s role of the main addressee of the Middle Eastern Christians’ grievances is the result of the church’s close cooperation with the Kremlin. The ROC owes much of its international agency to Russian diplomacy. It shows the advantage of the ROC in comparison to the Patriarchate of ­Constantinople. Patriarch Bartholomew has no influence over Turkish foreign policy, whereas talking to Patriarch Kirill might help to gain the attention of the Russian government. A clear manifestation of Kirill’s influence was the meeting convened in Moscow in July 2014 when representatives of several Eastern Orthodox Churches met with President Vladimir Putin: the majority of participants were impressed by the fact that Russia was governed by ‘a president who is an Orthodox Christian’.178 When addressing the ROC’s cooperation with religious institutions, it is important to note that the ROC also seeks to include Islamic institutions. A good example of these efforts are Bishop Hilarion’s lectures on the persecution of Christians in key countries in the Middle East such as Egypt (a lecture at the University of Al-Azhar in Cairo in 2011)179 and Turkey (at the seminar with The Board for Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey in 2017).180 The ROC uses all its institutional channels with Islamic communities. In June 2015, Hilarion met with the head of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, Iyad bin Amin Madani, to discuss the hardship of Middle Eastern Christians.181 In September 2016, the Russian–Iranian Commission on ‘Eastern Orthodoxy–Islam’ Dialogue issued a communiqué expressing concern over the ‘genocide’ of Christians in the Middle East and Northern Africa.182 This issue was even debated during the round table attended by representatives of the traditional religions of Russia and China in Beijing in 2015.183 The fate of Christians is usually raised during Patriarch Kirill’s meetings with muftis from the post-Soviet region (e.g. the head of the Supreme Board of Caucasus Muslims (Upravleniye musul’man Kavkaza), Shaykh al-Islām Allahshukur Pashazadeh).184 The Interfaith Council of the ­Russian Federation

Russia  87 (Mezhreligioznyy sovet Rossii) has condemned persecutions of Christians on several occasions.185 The ROC seeks also additional channels of contacts with Muslim countries (e.g. in November 2014, Patriarch Kirill gave his first interview to a Muslim TV station (Egyptian Al Hayat TV)186 and in ­February 2017, in Bishop Hilarion met with diplomats of 11 Muslim countries in Moscow to discuss the situation of Christians).187 The most recent strategic partner of the ROC is the Catholic Church, with a symbolic moment taking place on 13 February 2016 when Patriarch Kirill and Pope Francis met at the airport in Havana.188 Following this historic meeting, the representatives of the ROC emphasised that their main incentive was to bring the fate of Christians in the Middle East to the world’s attention.189 The two churches established a bilateral working group to create a catalogue of destroyed Christian churches in the Middle East. The catalogue is intended to be the first step in the process of restoring religious sites. The representatives of the churches explained that rebuilding churches would encourage Christian refugees to return.190

Conclusion The upheavals of the twentieth century resulted in great suffering and distress for the Russian people. It was also a time of trial for the ROC, which fell from being one of the central institutions of the social and political life of the Russian Empire to become completely marginalised during the Soviet era. The post-Soviet building of democracy and capitalism turned out to be an opportunity for the ROC. In the 1990s, it sought the support of the state and bilateral contacts slowly developed into solid cooperation. Today, the ROC is one of the most influential societal actors in the Russian Federation. The closeness with the Kremlin reinforces the ROC’s imperial habitus, which manifests as thinking in terms of state interests and geopolitics. This statist logic is apparent in the notion of ‘spiritual security’, a concept that the ROC prefers to ‘humanitarian security’. Spiritual security allows the ROC to combine the concern for the morality of an individual with the security and sovereignty of the state. The practical realisation of spiritual security (i.e. the development of the church’s social activity) is possible due to cooperation with the state. The social sphere is the most important area for the church– state partnership. At the same time, this is the area where the ROC is trying to engage laypeople. It is a step in the right direction, however it is still too early to say whether it will bring tangible results. The ROC makes a conceptual distinction between migrants and refugees. While the former are a matter of national security, the latter are perceived as people in need whom the church must help. As regards migrants, the ROC offers programmes of ‘cultural adaptation’ and collaborates closely with the FMS. Organising and co-sponsoring courses on Russian history and tradition to mostly Muslim migrants puts the ROC in a position of not a religious but rather a semi-state (as opposed to religious) institution responsible for ­cultivating

88  A. Curanović and promoting Russian cultural heritage. The ROC is not just a church, but also an institution representing all ethnic Russians (regardless of their religious affiliation). The fact that it works with migrants, due to the specific topic of the courses as well as close cooperation with the state administration, makes the ROC seem like a part of the administrative apparatus. To the migrants attending the adaptive courses, the ROC is the emanation of the power of the Russian state. For refugees, however, the ROC is first and foremost a religious charity institution to which they can turn for support. The ROC is gradually shaping its capacity to act when confronted by humanitarian crises, focusing on mechanisms of collecting and distributing aid. The Ukrainian crisis sped up the process of institutionalising the ROC’s actions concerning forcibly displaced people. The church has become more successful in including local business leaders and activists in its own projects and thus strengthening local Eastern Orthodox communities. As in the case of the ROC’s social activity, it is too early to consider about the long-term impact and consistency of these efforts. It is important to remember, however, that regardless of whether the ROC is working with migrants or helping refugees, the state is always its main partner. The partnership with the state must seem to be the right strategy from the ROC’s perspective. In the current political climate in Russia, central state institutions are strong, and society is passive. This close partnership improves the ROC’s international agency. No other Orthodox church can benefit from rapprochement with a state that enjoys the status of a major power. The Moscow Patriarchate’s Middle East agenda shows its capacity to act as a transnational actor. The ROC is active in various international institutions. It has managed to build broad alliances with international organisations, states and religions. In fact, with the agenda on Middle East Christians, the ROC has mastered the strategy of pursuing its own strategic goals by including other actors. A good example of the ROC’s strategy of building sometimes-­ unexpected alliances comes from Poland. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) turned to the Polish Orthodox Church to help them learn how to protect the rights of believers in the face of ongoing mass violations in Ukraine. The representatives of the UOC MP consulted on this issue Polish experts, including people working for the Polish Parliament.191 Including Polish members of Parliament helped to put a subtle pressure on the Polish Episcopate (PE) and use this channel of the PE to send the message to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.192 The Moscow Patriarchate’s engagement in the Middle East has also had consequences for its position within the Eastern Orthodox world. The ROC did not participate in the ‘Holy and Great Synod of the Orthodox Church’ in Crete in 2016.193 However, this does not seem to have had a negative impact on its position within Eastern Orthodoxy. The situation of the three ancient patriarchates of Jerusalem, Alexandria and Antioch depends on the foreign policy of the ­Russian Federation in the region and the ROC remains a strategic partner.

Russia  89 Will there be a price to pay for the Russian Church for its overly close cooperation with the government? First of all, Ukraine comes to mind, where a section of Orthodox believers has accused the Moscow Patriarchate of being the Church of the Russian state, which does not represent believers from other countries. The ongoing crisis in Ukraine has undermined the ROC’s position in its canonical territory. The Patriarchate of Constantinople, in his decision to open the way for establishing a canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church independent from the Moscow Patriarchate, seems to have taken advantage of the current Russian–Ukrainian tensions. The Moscow Patriarchate officially stays neutral and does not take sides in the conflict, although it is telling that the ROC refers to it as a ‘civil war’. Even if some hierarchs of the ROC are aware of the risk of too close a rapprochement, still the ROC does not see a true alternative to the partnership with the Kremlin. Therefore, it seems that for the time being, in Russia, spiritual security continues to prevail over humanitarian security.

Notes   1 Viktor Luneev, Prestupnost’ XX veka: Mirovyye, regional’nyye i rossiyskiye tendentsii (The Crime of the 20th Century: Global, Regional and Russian Tendencies), Moscow: Wolters Kluwer, 2005.    2 In the second half of the nineteenth century in Russia there were 70.8 per cent Orthodox, 8.9 per cent Catholics, 8.7 per cent Muslims, 5.2 per cent Protestants, 3.2 per cent Jews, 1.4 per cent others. Michaił Heller, Historia Imperium Rosyjskiego (The History of the Russian Empire), Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 2000), p. 611.   3 ‘Population of Eastern Europe’, available at www.tacitus.nu/historical-atlas/­ population/​russia.htm (accessed on 2 December 2017).   4 ‘Russia population 2017’, available at http://worldpopulationreview.com/­ countries/russia-population/ (accessed on 2 December 2017). See also Tatiana Karabchuk, Kazuhiro Kumo and Ekaterina Selezneva, Demography of Russia. From the Past to Present, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017.   5 ‘Russia population 2017’, available at http://worldpopulationreview.com/­ countries/russia-population/ (accessed on 2 December 2017).   6 ‘Russia population 2017’, available at http://worldpopulationreview.com/­ countries/russia-population/ (accessed on 2 December 2017).   7 Jerry Pankhurst, ‘Religious Culture: Faith in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia’ (2012), available at https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?articl e=1006&context=russian_culture.   8 David Barrett, World Christian Trends, Pasadena, CA: William Carey Library, 2001.    9 The notion of Sergianism refers to the declaration (29 July 1927) of the patriarch Sergius in which he announced the ROC’s loyalty to the Soviet government.  10 The canonical union between the ROC and the ROCOR was restored on 27 May 2007 due to the personal engagement of Vladimir Putin.    11 Since 1858 missionaries of the Moscow Patriarchate could freely work in China and the first Orthodox community in Japan was established by Russian priests in 1860.  12 Jerry Pankhurst, ‘Religious Culture: Faith in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia’, (2012), available at https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?articl e=1006&context=russian_culture(accessed on 30 October 2018).

90  A. Curanović  13 Obshchestvennoye mneniye (Public Opinion), ‘The Levada-Centre Annual Report’ 2016, graph 19.2, pp. 167, available at www.levada.ru/sbornik-obshhestvennoemnenie/obshhestvennoe-mnenie-2016/ (accessed on 3 December 2017). See also Sergei Furman and Dmitry Filatov, ‘Religion and Politics in Mass Consciousness’, Russian Social Science Review, 1993, 34 (5), p. 20.   14 Yuriy Ryabykh, ‘Vneshnepoliticheskiye oriyentiry Russkoy pravoslavnoy tserkvi (1991–2000)’ (The Directions of Foreign Policy of the ROC), Pro et Contra, 2001, 6 (4), pp. 118–135.   15 ‘Svyateyshiy Patriarkh oglasil statisticheskiye dannyye o zhizni Russkoy Pravoslavnoy TSerkvi’ (Patriarch announced the statistics about the ROC), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5072750.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).  16 Obshchestvennoye mneniye (Public Opinion), The Levada-Centre Annual Report, 2017, pp. 139–149, available at www.levada.ru/sbornik-obshhestvennoemnenie/obshhestvennoe-mnenie-2017/ (accessed on 6 April 2018).   17 ‘The Law on Religious Freedom’ (1997) mentions four traditional religions, i.e. Christianity represented exclusively by the Russian Orthodox Church, Islam, Buddhism (only the Gelugpa school) and Judaism.  18 In 2017, 48 per cent respondents trusted the ROC. Ahead of the church was Vladimir Putin (75 per cent), the Russian Army (59 per cent) and the Federal Security Service (57 per cent). ‘Intsitutsional’noye doveriye’ (Institutional Trust) at The Levada Centre Polls, available at www.levada.ru/2017/10/12/institutsionalnoe-doverie-3/ (accessed on 2 December 2017).  19 A political conflict which took place 21 September–4 October 1993 between the President Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament. It was eventually resolved by using military force ordered by Yeltsin. According to the government’s estimates, 187 people were killed and 437 wounded, while the estimates from non-governmental sources put the death toll at as high as 2,000.   20 ‘Fundamentals of Religious Cultures and Secular Ethics’ is a national programme of spiritual and moral education for the public schools. Since September 2012, all pupils in fourth and fifth grades must take a total of 34 hours of the Fundamentals, designed to promote religious tolerance, patriotism and morality.  21 ‘Osnovy Sotsial’noy Kontseptsii Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi’ (The basis of the social concept of the ROC), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia. ru/db/text/419128.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   22 ‘Osnovy ucheniya Russkoy Pravoslavnoy TSerkvi o dostoinstve, svobode i pravakh cheloveka’ (The foundations of the ROC’s teaching on human dignity, freedom and human rights), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/428616.ht (accessed on 2 December 2017).   23 ‘Ob uchastii Russkoy Pravoslavnoy TSerkvi v reabilitatsii narkozavisimykh’ (On the ROC’s participation in the process of the rehabilitation of drug addicts), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/2674661.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   24 ‘Kontseptsiya Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi po utverzhdeniyu trezvosti i profilaktike alkogolizma’ (The concept of the ROC on enforcing sobriety and the prevention of alcoholism), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/3696047.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   25 ‘Missiya tyuremnogo sluzheniya Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi i penitentsiarnyye uchrezhdeniya’ (The ROC’s service in prisons), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/2843078.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   26 ‘Pozitsiya Russkoy Pravoslavnoy TSerkvi po reforme semeynogo prava i problemam yuvenal’noy yustitsii’ (The ROC’s position on the reform of family law

Russia  91 and the problems of juvenile crime), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www. patriarchia.ru/db/text/2774805.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   27 ‘O printsipakh organizatsii sotsial’noy raboty v Russkoy Pravoslavnoy TSerkvi’ (On the principles of the social activity of the ROC), Moscow Patriarchate, 2017, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1401894.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).  28 ‘Pozitsiya Russkoy Pravoslavnoy TSerkvi po aktual’nym problemam ekologii’ (The ROC’s position on the current problems of ecology), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/2775125.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   29 ‘Printsipy i napravleniya raboty s migrantami v Russkoy Pravoslavnoy TSerkvi’ (The Principles and Directions of the ROC’s Work with Migrants), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/460673.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).  30 ‘The Human Development Report’, 1994, available at http://hdr.undp.org/ sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf (accessed on 2 December 2017).   31 In the document prepared by the representatives of traditional religions before the G8 summit in Rome there was a reference to the ‘inseparable security’ which includes all relations between human beings and it refers to human dignity. ‘Itogovyy dokument IV sammita religioznykh liderov v preddverii sammita “Gruppy vos’mi” ’ (The conclusions of the fourth summit of religious leaders preceding the G8 summit), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/ 676393.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   32 ‘Mitropolit Minskiy i Slutskiy Filaret: “Ne teryat’ zdravomysliya i lichnoy otvetstvennosti” ’ (Metropolitan of Minsk and Slutsk Filaret: Don’t lose common sense and sense of an individual responsibility), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www. patriarchia.ru/db/text/435336.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   33 King James Version.   34 ‘Mitropolit Volokolamskiy Ilarion: My dolzhny vsemi vozmozhnymi sposobami protivodeystvovat’ rasprostraneniyu terroristicheskoy ideologii’ (Metropolitan Volkolamsky Hillarion: With all our forces we should prevent spreading the terrorist ideology), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/4919641.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).  35 ‘Svyateyshiy Patriarkh Kirill: “Glavnoye chudo Sergiya Radonezhskogo – on sam” ’ (Patriarch Kirill: The main miracle of Sergei of Rodonezh – is he himself), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/ 3693883.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   36 ‘Vklad russkoy pravoslavnoy tserkvi v dukhovnuyu bezopasnost’ strany’ (The ROC’s part in shaping national spiritual security), Perspektivy, available at www.perspektivy. info/rus/desk/vklad_russkoj_pravoslavnoj_cerkvi_v_duhovnuju_bezopasnost_​strany_​ 2007-01-31.htm (accessed on 2 December 2017). See Daniel S. Payne, ‘Spiritual Security, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Russian Foreign Ministry: Collaboration or Cooptation?’, Journal of Church and State, 2010, 52 (4), pp. 712–727.   37 The World Russian People’s Council was established at the initiative of Patriarch Aleksyi II in 1993. It is an international organisation under the ROC’s auspices that seeks to gather together people who are concerned over Russia’s fate. The Council’s sessions are attended by governmental representatives, leaders of public associations, the clergy, science and culture figures, and delegates of Russian communities from the near and far abroad.  38 ‘Sobornoye slovo XVII Vsemirnogo russkogo narodnogo sobora’ (The statement of XVI World Russian People’s Council), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3337081.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).

92  A. Curanović  39 ‘Doklad mitropolita Rostovskogo i Novocherkasskogo Merkuriya na kruglom stole “Vospitaniye i obrazovaniye: dukhovno-nravstvennyye aspekty” ’ (The lecture of Metropolitan of Rostov and Novocherkassk Merkuriy at the roundtable ‘Upbringing and education: Spiritual-moral aspects’), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4348624.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   40 See Putin’s 2013 Valdai Discussion Club Speech, available at http://en.kremlin. ru/events/president/news/19243 (accessed on 2 December 2017).   41 ‘Vystupleniye Prezidenta RF V.V. Putina na plenarnom zasedanii S’yezda Obshchestva russkoy slovesnosti’ (Putin’s speech at the Summit of the Russian Literature Association), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/4478782.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   42 ‘Mitropolit Volokolamskiy Ilarion: Mnogiye nashi pisateli, kompozitory, khudozhniki real’no uchastvovali v zhizni TSerkvi’ (Hillarion: Many of our writers, composers, artists took active part in the life of our church), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4550108.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   43 Michael Khodarkovsky, ‘Not by Word Alone: Missionary Policies and Religious Conversion in Early Modern Russia’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1996, 38 (2), pp. 267–293.  44 Michael Khodarkovsky, ‘Of Christianity, Enlightenment, and Colonialism: Russian in the North Caucasus, 1550–1800’, The Journal of Modern History, 199, 71 (2), pp. 394–430.   45 Already in 1995 The World Russian People’s Council stated that problems of state security are one of its priorities. ‘Dokumenty III Vsemirnogo Russkogo Narodnogo Sobora’ (The conclusions of III WRPC), the WRPC, available at https://vrns.ru/documents/56/1256 (accessed on 2 December 2017).  46 ‘Interv’yu Svyateyshego Patriarkha Aleksiya dlya ezhegodnika “Predstoyatel” ’ (The interview of Aleksyi II for the Magazine ‘Predstoyatel’), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/201152.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).  47 ‘Svyashchennik Maksim Obukhov: “Absolyutno nenormal’no nazyvat’ stranu svoyu Svyatoy Rus’yu, i pri etom zanimat’ lidiruyushcheye polozheniye v mire po chislu abortov …” ’ (Priest Maksim Obukhov: It’s not normal to call your country Holly Rus and at the same time be the leader of the world statistics on committed abortions), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/ db/text/118376.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   48 ‘Zayavleniye uchastnikov III Foruma pravoslavnykh zhenshchin’ (The statement of the III forum of Christian Orthodox Women), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3664449.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   49 ‘V Kazani proshel I S’yezd pravoslavnykh pedagogov Tatarstanskoy mitropolii’ (I summit of Orthodox Christian Teachers of Tatarstan Bishopry took place in Kazan), Moscow Patriarchate, available at http://eparchia.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/4629579.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).  50 ‘Slovo Svyateyshego Patriarkha Kirilla na otkrytii IV Rozhdestvenskikh parlamentskikh vstrech v Sovete Federatsii’ (Patriarch’s opening speech at IV international Christmas lectures at the Federation Council), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4362065.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).  51 ‘Vtoroy forum pravoslavnoy obshchestvennosti proshel v Sankt-Peterburge’ (II forum of Orthodox Christian Associations was held in Sankt Petersburg), Moscow Patriarchate, available at http://eparchia.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4665807. html (accessed on 2 December 2017).

Russia  93  52 Rosatom runs all nuclear assets of the Russian Federation, both civilian and military.   53 Locations with no clear facilities with restricted access for non-residents.  54 ‘Glava Rosatoma Sergey Kiriyenko predlagayet stroit’ khramy v zakrytykh atomnykh gorodakh’ (The head of Rosatom, Sergey Kiriyenko proposes to build chapels in the nuclear facilities), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www. patriarchia.ru/db/text/166474.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).  55 ‘Vstrecha Svyateyshego Patriarkha Kirilla s dukhovenstvom Tverskoy eparkhii. Otvety na voprosy’ (Patriarch Kirill meets with priests of the Tver Eparchy), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1212904.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   56 ‘Mezhreligioznyy sovet Rossii prinyal “Svod nravstvennykh printsipov i pravil v khozyaystvovanii” ’ (The Interfaith Council of Russia adopted ‘The Collection of Moral Principles and Norms in Entrepreneurship’), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.rian.ru/society/20041209/756107.html (accessed on 2 December 2017); ‘Zayavleniye Ekspertnogo soveta “Ekonomika i etika” pri Patriarkhe Moskovskom vseya Rusi v svyazi s obsuzhdeniyem strategii dolgosrochnogo razvitiya Rossii do 2020 goda’ (The statement of the patriarchal group ‘Economy and Ethics’ on the national strategy of Russia’s development until 2020), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/705080. html (accessed on 2 December 2017).  57 ‘Sobornoye slovo XXI Vsemirnogo russkogo narodnogo sobora po teme “Rossiya v XXI veke. Istoricheskiy opyt i perspektivy razvitiya” ’ (The Statement of XXI WRNS ‘Russia in 21st century. The Historic Experience and Prospects for Development’), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia. ru/db/text/5070652.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   58 ‘Printsipy i napravleniya raboty s migrantami v Russkoy Pravoslavnoy TSerkvi’ (The Principles and Directions of the ROC’s Work with Migrants), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/460673.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   59 ‘Net lyubvi bez pravdy’ (There’s no love without the truth), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3769807.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   60 ‘Statistika sotsial’nogo sluzheniya Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi’ (The statistics on the ROC’s social activity), Synodal Department for Church Charity and Social Ministry, available at www.diaconia.ru/statistic (accessed on 6 June 2018).  61 Ibid.   62 The data available at https://miloserdie.help/svyato-dimitrievskiy-detskiy-centr/ (accessed 6 June 2018).   63 The data available at https://miloserdie.help/elizavetinskiy-detskiy-dom/ (accessed 6 June 2018).   64 ‘Predsedatel’ Sinodal’nogo otdela po tserkovnoy blagotvoritel’nosti na III Mezhdunarodnom forume “Religiya i mir” podvel osnovnyye itogi sotsial’nogo sluzheniya TSerkvi za posledniye 25 let’ (The Head of the Synodal Department for Church Charity and Social Ministry presented the main results of the ROC’s social activity during past 25 years), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www. patriarchia.ru/db/text/4258640.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).  65 Another one is to be opened in Ufa. ‘Predsedatel’ Sinodal’nogo otdela po blagotvoritel’nosti posetil edinstvennuyu v Rossii pravoslavnuyu obshchinu bol’nykh rasseyannym sklerozom’ (The gead of the Synodal department for Church Charity and Social Ministry visited the only Orthodox Christian community of people suffering from sclerosis), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.​ru/db/text/5218210.html (accessed on 6 June 2018).

94  A. Curanović   66 ‘Statistika sotsial’nogo sluzheniya Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi’ (The statistics on the ROC’s social activity), Synodal Department for Church Charity and Social Ministry, available at www.diaconia.ru/statistic (accessed on 6 June 2018).  67 Ibid.   68 The official website: http://pk-semya.ru/ (accessed on 6 June 2018).   69 In 2017 such coordinators worked in 90 eparchies of the ROC.   70 ‘Episkop Smolenskiy i Vyazemskiy Panteleimon. Chto Tserkov’ mozhet sdelat’ dlya spaseniya sem’i’ (The Bishop of Smolensk and Vyazemsk Pantaleyemon: What the Church can do to save families?), available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/2334068.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).  71 ‘Rezolyutsiya napravleniya “KHristianskaya sem’ya – domashnyaya tserkov’ ” XXIV Mezhdunarodnykh Rozhdestvenskikh obrazovatel’nykh chteniy?’ (The resolution of XXIV International Christmas lectures ‘Christian family – home church’), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4361204. html (accessed on 2 December 2017).  72 ‘Predsedatel’ Patriarshey komissii po voprosam sem’i, zashchity materinstva i detstva vystupil na parlamentskikh slushaniyakh po semeynomu zakonodatel’stvu’ (The Head of the Patriarch’s Commission on Family Matters, the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood spoke at the Parliament session on the family law), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/4651227.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   73 ‘Predsedatel’ Patriarshey komissii po voprosam sem’i prinyal uchastiye v zasedanii Soveta po zashchite traditsionnykh semeynykh tsennostey pri Upolnomochennom po pravam rebenka’ (The Head of the Patriarch’s Commission on Family Matters, the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood took part in the work of the Council for Protecting Family and Traditional Family Values at the Children’s Ombudsman), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/ db/text/4016194.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   74 ‘Predsedatel’ Patriarshey komissii po voprosam sem’i prinyal uchastiye v zasedanii rabochey gruppy “Semeynaya politika detstvosberezheniya” Koordinatsionnogo soveta pri Prezidente RF’ (The Head of the Patriarch’s Commission on Family Matters, the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood took part in the work the ‘Family Policy for Protecting Children’ working group at the Coordination Centre at the Presidential Administration), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.​ru/db/text/4002795.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).  75 ‘Poyasneniya v otnoshenii otsenki Patriarshey komissiyey po voprosam sem’i, zashchity materinstva i detstva termina “nasiliye v sem’ye”, inykh analogichnykh terminov i svyazannykh s nimi kontseptsiy i podkhodov’ (The clarification of the Patriarch’s Commission on Family Matters, the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood’s attitude towards the concept of ‘Domestic Violence and Other Analogical Categories’), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/ db/text/3966785.html (accessed on 6 June 2018).   76 ‘Obrashcheniye Patriarshey komissii po voprosam sem’i, zashchity materinstva i detstva k obshchestvennym organizatsiyam i politicheskim deyatelyam’ (The appeal of the Patriarch’s Commission on Family Matters, the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood to the Politicians and Social Activists), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4651524.html (accessed on 6 June 2018).   77 Before this new regulation, the case when one family member was beaten by the other was considered a violation of the criminal code. Under the new regulations it’s an administrative offence. ‘Putin podpisal zakon o dekriminalizatsii poboyev v sem’ye’ (Putin signs the law on decriminalisation of family beating),

Russia  95 available at https://lenta.ru/news/2017/02/07/putinbeatings/ (accessed on 6 June 2018).  78 ‘Na kruglom stole v Obshchestvennoy palate RF predstavlen doklad Patriarshey komissii po voprosam sem’i, zashchity materinstva i detstva “Problema kriminalizatsii nakazaniy v sem’ye” ’ (The Patriarch’s Commission on Family Matters, the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood presented its stand at the roundtable organised by the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5154765.html (accessed on 6 June 2018).  79 The official leaflet about the goals and projects of the Union is available at http://союзпп.рф/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/SOYUZPP.RF.pdf (accessed on 6 June 2018).   80 ‘Predstaviteli raznykh konfessiy obmenyayutsya opytom konsul’tirovaniya zhenshchin, nakhodyashchikhsya v krizisnoy situatsii’ (The representatives of different religions learn about each other’s experience on helping women in difficult life circumstances), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/4784569.html (accessed on 6 June 2018).   81 Rather, such situations are extraordinary. One example was the terrorist attack that took place in Beslan on 1 September 2004. Bishop Theofan (Ashurkov) of Stavropol and Vladikavkaz met with the representative of the Caritas (the Russian office as well as the international office) to discuss Caritas’ participation in building of a rehabilitation centre for the victims of the Beslan terrorist attack. It is important to stress that the meeting was held on 2 February 2006, i.e. a year and a half after the attack which could suggest that this cooperation was born in pains. ‘Episkop Feofan provel vstrechu s predstavitelyami “Karitas” ’ (Bishop Theofan met with the Caritas), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia. ru/db/text/81389.html (accessed on 6 June 2018).  82 ‘Pravoslavnyye i katoliki v sluzhenii miloserdiya’ (Orthodox Christians and Catholics on social service), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia. ru/db/text/3409465.html (accessed on 6 June 2018).   83 ‘Proyekt dokumenta “Osnovy ekologicheskoy kontseptsii Russkoy Pravoslavnoy TSerkvi” ’ (The project of the document ‘The basis of the ROC’s concepts on ecology’), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/ 2255572.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).  84 ‘Pozitsiya Russkoy Pravoslavnoy TSerkvi po aktual’nym problemam ekologii’ (The position of the ROC towards the current problems of ecology), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/2775125.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).  85 ‘Kommyunike kruglogo stola “Ekologicheskaya deyatel’nost’ v tserkovnom sotsial’nom sluzhenii: opyt i potentsial” ’ (The communiqué of the roundtable ‘The ecological activity in the ROC’s social activity: The experience and the prospects), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/133831.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). ‘V Moskve proshla konferentsiya “KHristianskiy mir i ­ekologicheskaya praktika XXI veka” ’ (The conference ‘The Christian World and the Ecological Practises of 21st Century’ took place in Moscow), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/2979565.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   86 ‘V Obshchestvennoy palate RF proydet kruglyy stol “Ekologiya i Pravoslaviye: vozmozhnosti vzaimodeystviya” ’ (The roundtable ‘Ecology and Eastern Orthodoxy: Possible Cooperation’ will be held at the Civic Chamber), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/2310887.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).  87 Kommyunike kruglogo stola “Ekologicheskaya deyatel’nost’ v tserkovnom sotsial’nom sluzhenii: opyt i potentsial” ’ (The communiqué of the roundtable

96  A. Curanović ‘The Ecological Activity in the ROC’s Social Activity: The Experience and the Prospect), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/ 133831.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).  88 ‘V.R. Legoyda: Vera v Boga – stimul dlya uchastiya v ekologicheskoy deyatel’nosti’ (Legoyda: Faith in God is an impulse to undertake ecological activity), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/4602910.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   89 ‘Metodicheskiye rekomendatsii ob uchastii Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi v prirodookhrannoy deyatel’nosti’ (Methodical recommendations about the ROC’s participation in preserving nature), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www. patriarchia.ru/db/text/4158736.html (accessed on 6 June 2018).  90 ‘Pri moskovskikh khramakh mogut poyavit’sya punkty sbora ispol’zovannykh batareyek’ (Bins for empty batteries might be placed in the parishes of Moscow), available at https://prichod.ru/opyt-prihodov/22465/ (accessed on 6 June 2018).  91 ‘V Melekesskoy eparkhii uchrezhden pervyy v Rossii eparkhial’nyy otdel po ekologii i prirodookhrannoy deyatel’nosti’ (In the Eparchy of Melekessk the First in Russia Eparchic Office for Ecology and Actions in support of nature was established), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/4209832.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   92 ‘Metodicheskiye rekomendatsii ob uchastii Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi v prirodookhrannoy deyatel’nosti’ (Methodical recommendations about the ROC’s participation in preserving nature), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www. patriarchia.ru/db/text/4158736.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).  93 Ibid.  94 ‘V Moskve proshla konferentsiya “Khristianskiy mir i ekologicheskaya praktika XXI veka” ’ (The conference ‘The Christian World and the Ecological Practises of 21st Century’ took place in Moscow), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www. patriarchia.​ru/db/text/2979565.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   95 ‘Predstavitel’ Sinodal’nogo otdela po vzaimootnosheniyam Tserkvi i obshchestva prinyal uchastiye v vyyezdnom zasedanii Vysshego ekologicheskogo soveta Komiteta Gosdumy po prirodnym resursam’ (The Head of the Synodal Department for the Cooperation of Church and Society took part in meeting of the Higher Ecological Council of the State Duma Committee for Natural Resources), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/ 4060121.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).   96 This is the annual forum that gathers representatives of the Church and society. It has been organised in Moscow by the Synodal Department for Religious Education and Catechization in the beginning of each year since 1993. The multiple conferences, roundtables, lectures and other events that are held within the framework of the forum are dedicated to the issues of religious education, culture and social activity. The official website is available at https://mroc. pravobraz.ru/ (accessed 30 October 2018).  97 ‘Kruglyy stol “Tserkov’ i ekologiya” proshel v ramkakh Rozhdestvenskikh chteniy’ (The roundtable ‘The Eastern Orthodox Church and Ecology’ was held within the International Christmas lectures), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.​ru/db/text/4788394.html (accessed on 6 June 2018).  98 ‘Sostoyalas’ vstrecha zamestitelya predsedatelya OVTSS so spetsial’nym predstavitelem Prezidenta Frantsii po zashchite planety’ (The Head of the Synodal Department for External Church Relations met with the French President’s Special Representative for the Protection of the Envorioment), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4014683.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).

Russia  97  99 ‘V Tegerane zavershilos’ odinnadtsatoye zasedaniye sovmestnoy komissii po dialogu “Pravoslaviye-Islam”, posvyashchennoye problemam ekologii’ (XI Session of the Russian–Iranian Commission on ‘Eastern Orthodoxy–Islam’ dialogue was dedicated to ecology), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.­ patriarchia.ru/db/text/5192655.html (accessed on 6 June 2018). 100 ‘Ezhemesyachnyy monitoring sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo polozheniya i samochuvstviya naseleniya’ (The monthly monitoring of socioeconomic situation and the mood of the population) by the Institute of Social Analyses and Prognosis at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, 2017, p. 37, available at www.ranepa.ru/images/docs/monitoring/ekmonitoring/monitoring-insap_12-09-2017.pdf (accessed on 6 June 2018). 101 ‘CHislennost’ i migratsiya naseleniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 2016 godu’ (The size and movement of the population of the Russian Federation), Rosstat, available at www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17_107/Main.htm (accessed on 6 June 2018). 102 The International Migration Report 2017, available at www.un.org/development/ desa/publications/international-migration-report-2017.html (accessed on 6 June 2018). 103 ‘Ezhemesyachnyy monitoring sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo polozheniya i samochuvstviya naseleniya’ (Monthly monitoring of the socioeconomic situation and social mood of the population), available at www.ranepa.ru/images/docs/­ monitoring/ek-monitoring/monitoring-insap_12-09-2017.pdf (accessed on 6 June 2018). 104 After the killing of a fan of the Moscow Spartak soccer club by a young man from Northern Caucasus, thousands of Russian football hooligans and members of nationalistic groups started riots in Moscow, beating people who did not look ethnic Russians. As a result, 1,300 people were detained and 30 seriously injured. 105 On 29–30 August 2006, in Kondopoga (Republic of Karelia, the Northern part of the country) interethnic riots started with an incident in a restaurant involving Russians, Azeris and Chechens. A fight broke out that resulted in two deaths and several people badly injured. The next day an angry mob vandalised (including cases of arsoning) stalls that belonged to non-Slavic population while the local police passively watched the violence. 106 ‘Tratit’ den’gi na rebenka dolzhno byt’ estestvenno, a na dorogiye veshchi – stydno’ (To financially support a child should be cherished, while spending money on expansive things shameful), Rossyskaya Gazeta, available at www.rg. ru/2007/03/09/mitropolit.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 107 ‘Opublikovany rekomendatsii OVTSO v oblasti mezh·etnicheskikh otnosheniy i migratsionnoy politiki’, (The Synodal Department for External Church Relations published recommendation on policy on interethnic relations and migrants), Sova Center, available at www.sova-center.ru/religion/news/authorities/­ elections/2011/​01/​d20780/ (accessed on 2 December 2017). 108 Ibid. 109 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is an international institution established by the former Soviet republics in 1991. Formally, it serves as the main platform for coordination of actions for the majority of the post-Soviet countries, i.e. Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Ukraine (technically not a member, but de facto the level of involvement arguably meets that of members). 110 The Council includes the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Buddhist Traditional Sangha of Russia, the Georgian Orthodox Church, the Islamic Spiritual Board of Kazakhstan, the Islamic Spiritual Board of Kirgizstan, the Islamic Spiritual Board of Tajikistan, the Islamic Spiritual Board of Uzbekistan, the Central

98  A. Curanović Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia, the Coordinating Centre for Muslims of North Caucasus, the Russian Orthodox Church, the Council of Muftis of Russia, the Supreme Board of Caucasus Muslims, the Congress of Jewish Religious Communities and Organizations in Russia, the Federation of Jewish Communities of the CIS. 111 ‘Itogovyy dokument zasedaniya Mezhreligioznogo soveta stran SNG’ (The concluding document of the Interfaith Council of the CIS), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru./db/text/1787369.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 112 ‘Sinodal’nyy otdel po sotsial’nomu sluzheniyu pri uchastii FMS Rossii organizuyet eparkhial’nyye tsentry integratsii migrantom’ (The Synodal Department for Social Activity together with the FMS is to organise Centres for migrants’ integration), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/1407879.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 113 ‘Rossiyskoye obshchestvo ozabocheno nepriyatnymi posledstviyami rosta migratsii – patriarkh Kirill’ (Patriarch Kirill: The Russian society is concerned with the negative consequences of Migration), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www. interfax-​­ religion.ru/?act=news&div=50900 (accessed on 2 December 2017). ‘Soglasheniye o vzaimodeystvii Russkoy Pravoslavnoy TSerkvi i Federal’noy migratsionnoy sluzhby Rossii’ (The Agreement on Cooperation between the ROC and FMS), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/2917828.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 114 ‘V rezul’tate vzaimodeystviya Tserkvi i FMS Rossii razrabotan uchebnik po osnovam russkogo yazyka i kul’tury dlya trudovykh migrantov’ (The textbook on the Russian language and culture for labour migrants has been prepared as a result of cooperation of the ROC and the FMS), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3079945.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 115 ‘Printsipy i napravleniya raboty s migrantami v Russkoy Pravoslavnoy TSerkvi’ (The Principles and Directions of the ROC’s Work with Migrants), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/460673.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 116 ‘Belgorodskaya eparkhiya vystupila organizatorom tsentra adaptatsii migrantov’ (The Belgorod Eparchy organised the Centre for Adaptation of Migrants), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3721238.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 117 ‘Sostoyalos’ pyatoye zasedaniye Sovmestnoy komissii Russkoy Pravoslavnoy Tserkvi i Federal’noy migratsionnoy sluzhby Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ (V meeting of the Commission of the ROC and the FMS), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3682420.html accessed on 2 December 2017). 118 ‘Mitropolit Volokolamskiy Ilarion: Sozdat’ dlya immigrantov blagopriyatnuyu sredu – obshchaya zadacha TSerkvi i gosudarstva’ (Hillarion: To create a good environment for migrants – a common task of the church and the state), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3988757.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 119 ‘V ramkakh Rozhdestvenskikh chteniy na Krutitskom Patriarshem podvor’ye obsudili voprosy missii sredi trudovykh migrantov v Moskve’ (The church’s mission among labour migrants was discussed during the international Christmas lecture), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/ 3548903.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 120 ‘Mitropolit Volokolamskiy Ilarion: Sozdat’ dlya immigrantov blagopriyatnuyu sredu – obshchaya zadacha TSerkvi i gosudarstva’ (Hillarion: To create a good environment for migrants – a common task of the church and the state),

Russia  99 Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3988757.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 121 ‘Rossiya pered vyzovom terrora: dukhovnyy vakuum opasen’ (Russia faces the breakout of terror: Spiritual vacuum is dangerous), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4280672.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 122 ‘Oshibochnaya migratsionnaya politika Evropy – odna iz prichin teraktov, schitayut v Russkoy tserkvie’ (False migration policy of Europe is one of the reasons for the terrorists attacks says the ROC), Interfax, available at www.interfax-religion. ru/?act=news&div=65685 (accessed on 2 December 2017). 123 ‘Mitropolit Volokolamskiy Ilarion: Sozdat’ dlya immigrantov blagopriyatnuyu sredu – obshchaya zadacha TSerkvi i gosudarstva’ (Hillarion: To create a good environment for migrants – a common task of the church and the state), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3988757.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 124 ‘Doklad mitropolita Voronezhskogo i Borisoglebskogo Sergiya, predsedatelya Sinodal’nogo otdela po tserkovnoy blagotvoritel’nosti i sotsial’nomu sluzheniyu’ (The lecture of Metropolitan of Voronezh and Borisoglebsk Sergiy), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/427153.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 125 Established in 1996 with the goal to help Russians who after the fall of the USSR found themselves outside the newly formed Russian Federation. Official website http://migrant.ru/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). 126 This observation is confirmed by refugees from Chechnya (both Muslims and Christians) whom I consulted. The refugees have not mentioned the ROC’s providing aid but they recall Caritas’ activities. 127 ‘Russian Orthodox Church tries to keep ethnic Russians in Chechnya and ­Dagestan’, available at https://jamestown.org/program/russian-orthodox-churchtries-to-keep-ethnic-russians-in-chechnya-and-dagestan-2/ (accessed on 2 December 2017). Hierarchs emphasise that the ROC is the most important institution in persuading Slavic people to stay in the region. The presence of Orthodox churches equates with the presence of Russians and the Russian state. Аrtur Priymak, ‘RPTS beretsya okormlyat’ Kavkaz’ (The ROC is to take care of the Caucasus), Nezavysymaya Gazeta (Independant Newspaper), available at www. ng.ru/ng_religii/2016-12-21/3_412_caucasus.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 128 ‘Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov’ osushchestvila spetsial’nuyu programmu pomoshchi zhertvam voyny v Yuzhnoy Osetii’ (The ROC has prepared a special program for the victims of the war in South Ossetia), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/715751.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 129 ‘Otdel vneshnikh tserkovnykh svyazey osushchestvil programmu po okazaniyu srochnoy pomoshchi zhertvam gruzino-yuzhnoosetinskogo konflikta’ (The Synodal Department for External Church Relations prepared a programme of the immediate relief to the victims of the Georgian–South Ossetian conflict), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/471988.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 130 A federal subject of Russia, with its territory enclaved within Krasnodar Krai. 131 The cloister is located 2 kilometres from Alagir – the town in the Republic of North Ossetia–Alania. ‘Pogranichniki sobrali pomoshch’ detyam iz Yuzhnoy Osetii, razmeshchennym v Reabilitatsionnom tsentre pri Bogoyavlenskom Alanskom zhenskom monastyre’ (The border patrol units collected aid for children from South Ossetia from the Rehabilitation Centre at the Bogoyavlensky Alansky

100  A. Curanović Female Cloister), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/454445.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 132 On 29 August 2008, a meeting was held between President Eduard Kokoyty and Archbishop Theofan in this cloister. ‘Eduard Kokoyty i arkhiyepiskop Stavropol’skiy i Vladikavkazskiy Feofan obsudili plany okazaniya gumanitarnoy pomoshchi naseleniyu Yuzhnoy Osetii’ (President Kokoity and Archbishop Theofan discussed delivering aid to population of South Ossetia), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/453815.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 133 ‘Panikhidy po zhertvam gruzino-yugoosetinskogo konflikta proshli v pravoslavnykh khramakh raznykh stran’ (Panikhida in memory of the victims of the Georgian–South Ossetian War was held in Orthodox Christian churches of Russia), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/ 460819.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 134 ‘Osetinskaya i gruzinskaya diaspory Moskvy provedut sovmestnuyu gumanitarnuyu aktsiyu v pomoshch’ postradavshim v Yuzhnoy Osetii’ (The Ossetian and Georgian diasporas of Moscow will collect aid for the victims from South Ossetia), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/447738.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 135 ‘V Russkoy Zarubezhnoy TSerkvi prodolzhayetsya sbor sredstv dlya postradavshikh v khode boyevykh deystviy na Kavkaze’ (The Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia collected aid for the victims of the conflict in the Caucasus), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/461718.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 136 Official website: https://actalliance.org/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). 137 ‘Za posledniye tri nedeli Sinodal’nyy otdel po blagotvoritel’nosti peredal 102 tonny produktov mirnym zhitelyam Ukrainy’ (During last 3 weeks the Synodal Department for Charity handed over 102 tonnes of products to the people of Ukraine), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/ 4124444.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 138 The largest aid provider is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The process of collecting and distributing aid was coordinated by the Synodal Department for Social and Humanitarian Issues led by Vladislav Dikhanov. Between April and September 2014 UOC MP collected 300,000 tonnes of aid. UOC MP cooperates with secular organisations, e.g. Miloserdie biez kordonov (Charity without Barriers). Similar to the ROC, the UOC MP runs a free phone-in line of trust. ‘V Svyatogorskuyu lavru pribyl 11-y gumanitarnyy reyd iz Vinnitsy’ (XI humanitarian aid convoy from Vinnitsa reached Lavra of Svyatogorsk), Moscow Patriarchate, available at http://eparchia.patriarchia. ru/db/text/4844177.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 139 ‘Boleye 65 tonn produktov peredal Sinodal’nyy otdel po sotsial’nomu sluzheniyu mirnym zhitelyam vostochnoy Ukrainy v kontse oktyabrya i noyabre’ (The Synodal Department for Social Service handed over 65 tonnes of aid to the civilians in the Eastern Ukraine at the end of October and November), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4274401.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 140 ‘Kabmin RF uvelichil do 76 chislo regionov, poluchayushchikh subsidii na priyem bezhentsev s Ukrainy’ (The government of Russia increased up to 76 the number of rgions receiving subventions for taking in refugees from Ukraine), Tass Agency, available at http://tass.ru/obschestvo/2410233 (accessed on 6 June 2018). 141 ‘Punkty vremennogo razmeshcheniya dlya bezhentsev s Ukrainy prodolzhat rabotu’ (The points of temporary tesidency for the tefugees from Ukraine

Russia  101 c­ontinue to operate), Tass Agency, available at http://tass.ru/obschestvo/ 2534103 (accessed on 6 June 2018). 142 Nizhgorodksaya Oblast in the European part of Russia. 143 Leningrad Oblast in the European part of Russia. 144 ‘Bezhentsy. Chto sdelala dlya nikh Tserkov’?’ (The refugees: What the ROC has done for them?), The Russian Orthodox Christian Portal ‘Foma’, available at https://foma.ru/bezhentsyi-chto-sdelala-dlya-nih-tserkov.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 145 ‘Soglasheniye o sotrudnichestve mezhdu Ministerstvom Rossiyskoy Federatsii po delam grazhdanskoy oborony, chrezvychaynym situatsiyam i likvidatsii posledstviy stikhiynykh bedstviy i Russkoy Pravoslavnoy TSerkov’yu’ (The Agreement on Cooperation between the ROC and the MES), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4949134.html (accessed on 6 June 2018). 146 ‘Za posledniye tri nedeli Sinodal’nyy otdel po blagotvoritel’nosti peredal 102 tonny produktov mirnym zhitelyam Ukrainy’ (During last 3 weeks the Synodal Department for Charity handed over 102 tonnes of products to the people of Ukraine), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/ 4124444.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 147 ‘V OVTSS proshla press-konferentsiya po itogam krupnogo mezhkhristianskogo proyekta pomoshchi bezhentsam s Ukrainy’ (The Synodal Department for External Church Relations hold a press conference on the result of a major project of aid for the refugees), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www. patriarchia.ru/db/text/4211703.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). The ROC maintained contact with Billy Graham since his visit to the Soviet Union in 1959. 148 ‘V punkte sbora pomoshchi pri Sinodal’nom otdele po tserkovnoy blagotvoritel’nosti sobrali shkol’nyye prinadlezhnosti dlya detey ukrainskikh bezhentsev’ (In the point of collecting aid the school equipment was collected for the children of refugees), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/3745293.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 149 Rostov-on-Don, Moscow, Yekaterinburg, Petersburg, Voronezh, Veliky Novgorod, Nizhniy Novgorod, Smolensk, Tver. 150 ‘Tserkovnaya pomoshch’ bezhentsam s vostochnoy Ukrainy v regionakh Rossii’ (The church’s aid to the refugees from the Eastern Ukraine in the Russian regions), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3763601. html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 151 Avaiable at: www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b17_107/Main.htm (accessed on 6 June 2018). 152 ‘Mezhdunarodnaya blagotvoritel’naya organizatsiya “Karitas” pomogayet bezhentsam iz YUzhnoy Osetii’ (The Caritas helps the refugees from South Ossetia), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/447728.html (accessed on 6 June 2018). 153 According to some estimations, there were approximately 12,000 refugees from Syria in the Russian Federation in 2017, mostly people with some previous connection to Russia (e.g. education or relatives). Visam Mikdad, ‘Siriyskiye bezhentsy v Rossii’ (Syrian refugees in Russia), available at https://inosmi.ru/politic/ 20170821/240078354.html (accessed on 6 June 2018). 154 In 2012 the ROC collected over US$1.3 million of aid for Syria. In 2013 – aid worth US$1.3 million. In 2016, five tonnes of medicine and medical equipment. ‘V Moskve proshel kruglyy stol, posvyashchennyy polozheniyu khristian na Blizhnem Vostoke i v Severnoy Afrike’ (The roundtable on the situation of Christians in the Middle East and North Africa was held in Moscow), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3348339.html (accessed on

102  A. Curanović 2 December 2017). ‘Doklad predsedatelya Otdela vneshnikh tserkovnykh svyazey mitropolita Volokolamskogo Ilariona na Vsemirnom sammite v zashchitu gonimykh khristian’ (The lecture of Hillarion Urging to protect prosecuted Christians), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/4891505.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 155 ‘Iyeromonakh Efrem (Pashkov): Dukhovnyye lidery sposobny podderzhat’ siriyskiy narod’ (Efrem (Pashkov): The religious leaders are able to support the Syrian nation), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/2926754.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 156 ‘Vystupleniye predsedatelya OVTSS na mezhdunarodnoy konferentsii “V poiske podkhodyashchikh otvetov na krizis, kotoryy dolgo ne khoteli priznavat”  ’ (Hillarion at the international conference: Looking for answers to the crisis which has been denied for a long time), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www. patriarchia.ru/db/text/5033450.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 157 ‘Svia͡ teĭshiĭ Patriarkh Kirill: Zapad voshel v konflikt s nravstvennoĭ prirodoĭ cheloveka’ (Patriarch Kirill: The West has started a conflict with the moral nature of a human being), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/4697676​.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 158 In this way the ROC refers to the persecution of Christians in the Middle East. ͡ ͡ 159 ‘Bazisnye tsennosti ― osnova obshchenatsional ʹnoĭ identichnosti’ (The basic values – the Foundation of National Identity), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3503307.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 160 A non-governmental institution established originally in 1882 and reactivated in 1992. The IOPS, supported by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, organises centres for promoting Russian language and culture in the Middle East. 161 ‘V Moskve proshel kruglyy stol, posvyashchennyy polozheniyu khristian na Blizhnem Vostoke i v Severnoy Afrike’ (The roundtable on the situation of Christians in the Middle East and North of Africa was held in Moscow), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3348339.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 162 ‘Vsemirnyy russkiy narodnyy sobor vystupil soorganizatorom kruglykh stolov po gumanitarnoy problematike na sessii Soveta OON po pravam cheloveka’ (The WRNS organised roundtables during the session of UNHRC), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4830930.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 163 ‘Doklad predsedatelya Otdela vneshnikh tserkovnykh svyazey mitropolita Volokolamskogo Ilariona na Vsemirnom sammite v zashchitu gonimykh khristian’ (The lecture of Hillarion Urging to protect prosecuted Christians), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4891505.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 164 ‘Predstavitel’ OVTSS prinyal uchastiye v forume “Khristianskiy mir” v Khrame KHrista Spasitelya’ (The representative of the Synodal Department for External Church Relations took part in forum ‘The Christian World’ in Moscow), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4998663.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 165 ‘Predstavitel’ Russkoy Pravoslavnoy TSerkvi vystupil v OBSE na zasedanii vysokogo urovnya v zashchitu khristian’ (The representative of the Synodal Department for External Church Relations talked about the protection of Christians at the OSCE meeting), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.­ ­ patriarchia.ru/db/text/​5081654.​html (accessed on 6 June 2018). 166 ‘Gumanitarnaya tragediya siriyskikh khristian: vyzov vsemu tsivilizovannomu miru’ (The humanitarian tragedy of Syrian Christian: A challenge to all the

Russia  103 c­ivilised world), Moscow Patriarchate, www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/711217. html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 167 ‘Predstoi͡atelʹ Russkoĭ Pravoslavnoĭ T͡Serkvi vstretilsi͡a s kardinalom Kurtom Kokhom’ (The representative of the ROC met with Cardinal Kurt Koch), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4694175.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 168 ‘Tserkovnaya delegatsiya prinyala uchastiye v Dialoge Verkhovnogo komissara OON po problemam zashchity bezhentsev’ (The church’s delegation took part in the dialogue of the High UN Commissar for Protecting Refugees), Moscow ­Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/2651165.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 169 ‘Zayavleniye deputatov Gosudarstvennoy Dumy FS RF – chlenov Mezhfraktsionnoy gruppy v zashchitu khristianskikh tsennostey o tragicheskom polozhenii khristian v Sirii’ (The statement of the members of the State Duma – members of the interfaction group in defense of Christian values on the tragic situation of Christians in Syria), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/2926271.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 170 ‘Vystupleniye Svyateyshego Patriarkha Kirilla na otkrytii III Rozhdestvenskikh Parlamentskikh vstrech’ (Patriarch Kirill’s opening speech at the III Christmas parliamentary meetings), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/ db/text/3960558.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 171 ‘Vystupleniye ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V. Lavrova na zasedanii Soveta Imperatorskogo pravoslavnogo palestinskogo obshchestva’ (Lavrov’s speech at the IOPS), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/ 2623344.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 172 ‘Presledovaniya i diskriminatsiya khristian v sovremennom mire: prichiny, masshtaby, prognozy na budushcheye’ (The persecution and discrimination of Christians in today’s world: Reasons, size of the problem and prognosis), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1793360.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 173 ‘Svyateyshiy Patriarkh Kirill: My vosprinimayem stradaniya siriyskogo naroda kak svoi sobstvennyye’ (Patriarch Kirill: We perceive the suffering of the Syrian nation as our own), available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3290086.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 174 ‘Svyateyshiy Patriarkh Moskovskiy i vseya Rusi Kirill vstretilsya s Patriarkhom Koptskoy TSerkvi Feodorom II’ (Patriarch Kirill met with Patriarch of Alexandria and all Africa Theodor II), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia. ru/db/text/3817163.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 175 ‘Sostoyalas’ vstrecha Svyateyshego Patriarkha Kirilla s glavoy Siro-YAkovitskoy TSerkvi’ (Patriarch Kirill met with Patriarch of the Syriac Orthodox Church Ignatius Aphrem II), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/4268224.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 176 ‘Sostoyalas’ vstrecha Svyateyshego Patriarkha Kirilla s Patriarkhom Koptskoy Tserkvi’ (Patriarch Kirill met with the Patriarch of the Coptic Church), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4903265.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 177 ‘Predsedatel’ Otdela vneshnikh tserkovnykh svyazey vstretilsya s liderami ezidov iz raznykh stran mira’ (Hillarion met with the leaders of the Yazidi community), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4267725. html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 178 ‘Stenogramma vstrechi Prezidenta Rossii V.V. Putina so Svi͡ateĭshim Patriarkhom Kirillom, postoi͡annymi chlenami Svi͡ashchennogo Sinoda Russkoĭ Pravoslavnoĭ T͡serkvi i glavami delegat͡siĭ Pomestnykh Pravoslavnykh T͡serkveĭ’

104  A. Curanović (The stenographic record of the meeting of President Putin with Patriarch Kirill, Members of the Holy Synod of the ROC and the heads of the delegations of the Eastern Orthodox Churches), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.­ patriarchia.ru/db/text/3693190.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 179 ‘Doklad predsedatelya Otdela vneshnikh tserkovnykh svyazey mitropolita Volokolamskogo Ilariona na Vsemirnom sammite v zashchitu gonimykh khristian’ (The lecture of Hillarion urging to protect prosecuted Christians), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4891505.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 180 ‘Mirotvorcheskaya missiya religii v sovremennom mire’ (The peacemaking mission of religion in the contemporary world), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4954689.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 181 ‘Predsedatel’ OVTSS vstretilsya s general’nym sekretarem Organizatsii islamskogo sotrudnichestva’ (Hillarion met with the General Secretary of the OIC), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4115610.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 182 ‘Kommyunike X zasedaniya Sovmestnoy rossiysko-iranskoy komissii po dialogu “Pravoslaviye-Islam” na temu “Mezhreligioznyy dialog i sotrudnichestvo kak instrumenty dostizheniya prochnogo i spravedlivogo mira” ’ (The communiqué of X meeting of the Russian–Iranian Commission on ‘Eastern Orthodoxy– Islam’ dialogue on the issue ‘Interfaith dialogue and cooperation as instruments of creating a durable and just peace’), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www. patriarchia.ru/db/text/4627597.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 183 ‘Kruglyy stol predstaviteley traditsionnykh religiy Rossii i Kitaya proshel v Pekin’ (The roundtable of the representatives of the ROC and traditional religions of China was held in Beijing), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www. patriarchia.ru/db/text/4080283.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 184 ‘Sostoyalas’ vstrecha Svyateyshego Patriarkha Kirilla s predsedatelem Upravleniya musul’man Kavkaza sheykh-ul’-islamom Allakhsh·chkyurom Pasha-zade’ (Patriarch Kirill met with the head of the Supreme Board of Caucasus Muslims Pashazade), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4258716. html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 185 ‘Mitropolit Volokolamskiĭ Ilarion: Nasha obshcha͡ia zadacha – vsemi silami ͡ ʹ narodnoe edinstvo’ (Hillarion: Our common task is to strengthen ukrepliat national unity), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/​ 4665872.​html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 186 ‘Interv’yu Svyateyshego Patriarkha Kirilla egipetskomu telekanalu Al Hayat TV’ (Patriarch’s Kirill’s interview for Egyptian Al Hayat TV), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3710324.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 187 ‘Mitropolit Volokolamskiy Ilarion vstretilsya s poslami odinnadtsati arabskikh gosudarstv’ (Hillarion met with the ambassadors of 11 Arabic states), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4810102.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 188 ‘Sovmestnoye zayavleniye Papy Rimskogo Frantsiska i Svyateyshego Patriarkha Kirilla’ (The common statement of the Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4372074.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 189 Kirill was criticised by some Orthodox groups for this meeting. The arguments given by Hillarion in support of Patriarch’s decision to meet with the Pope are in ‘Vystupleniye mitropolita Volokolamskogo Ilariona v Moskovskoy dukhovnoy akademii 20 aprelya 2016 goda’ (Hillarion’s speech at the Moscow Theological Academy), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/4437783.html (accessed on 2 December 2017).

Russia  105 190 ‘Vystupleniye predsedatelya OVTSS na mezhdunarodnoy konferentsii “V poiske podkhodyashchikh otvetov na krizis, kotoryy dolgo ne khoteli priznavat” ’ (Hillarion at the international conference: Looking for answers to the crisis which has been denied for a long time), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www. patriarchia.ru/db/text/5033450.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). As a follow-up, in April 2016 a Catholic–Orthodox delegation from Russia went to Syria and Lebanon. ‘Sostoyalas’ vstrecha mitropolita Volokolamskogo Ilariona s iyerarkhami – predstavitelyami Livanskikh TSerkvey’ (Hillarion met with the representatives of the Christians in Lebanon), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5011235.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 191 ‘Blazhenneyshiy Mitropolit Varshavskiy i vsey Pol’shi Savva vstretilsya s ­rukovoditelem Predstavitel’stva Ukrainskoy Pravoslavnoy TSerkvi pri mezhdunarodnykh organizatsiyakh’ (Metropolitan of Warsaw and Poland Savva met with the representative of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church at the International Organisations), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5010213. html (acceesed on 6 June 2018). 192 ‘Predstaviteli Moskovskogo Patriarkhata prinyali uchastiye v soveshchanii OBSE po voprosam protivodeystviya diskriminatsii’ (The representative of the Moscow Patriarchate participated in the OSCE session on preventing discrimination), Moscow Patriarchate, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5010334.html (accessed on 2 December 2017). 193 Lucian Leustean, ‘Eastern Orthodoxy, Geopolitics and the 2016 “Holy and Great Synod of the Orthodox Church” ’, Geopolitics, 2018, 23 (1), pp. 201–216.

3 The state’s guardian angel? The Georgian Orthodox Church and human security Tornike Metreveli

A visit to a random Georgian town or even a village, not to mention a tour of the old part of the capital Tbilisi, reveals a significant presence of Orthodox Christianity in public space. Ornate Orthodox churches as well as numerous icon and candle shops echo culturally dominant status of the ­Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) in Georgian society. By far the largest religious organisation in Georgia in terms of parishes, the GOC leadership has enjoyed steady public trust ever since the collapse of Soviet Union.1 The exact number of Orthodox Christian parishioners is difficult to pin down due to a lack of systemic registration within the organisation of the church. However, available information suggests the GOC has roughly 3.5 million followers among the overall Georgian population of 4.6 million people.2 This means Orthodox believers represent 83.9 per cent of religious population. Other religious groups represent much smaller portions of the population, including Muslims (9.9 per cent), Armenian Gregorians (3.9 per cent), Roman Catholics (0.8 per cent), Baptists (0.3 per cent), Jews (0.25 per cent) and other forms of Protestants (0.25 per cent).3 The GOC has seven eparchies outside of Georgia: Western European, which covers France, Italy, Luxemburg, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and Denmark which is served by 13 ­clerics; Great Britain and Ireland with five clerics covering the UK and Ireland; Belgium and Netherlands, which are covered by two priests and an archbishop; Germany and Austria; which are covered by five clerics; North America, which is covered by 20 clerics; and South America and Australia, which are covered by two bishops.4 The GOC’s organisation is headed by Patriarch Ilia (Shiolashvili), while the administrative–operational part is conducted by the office of Patriarchate. The GOC organisation has 15 departments, which focus on a wide range of areas from missionary work to finance, economy, real estate, ecology and military. One department focuses on humanitarian and social issues; however, the official website of the patriarchate does not provide a report on or list of activities that this department is involved in. A report from Transparency International (TI) states that the Patriarchate owns five hospitals, three of which are part of the Georgian State’s Social Service Agency’s Referral Service scheme. This means those three hospitals are paid by the state for

Georgia  107 health care services provided to socially vulnerable citizens and those injured during natural disasters. The same report shows that the GOC’s Patriarchate’s office runs 90 education and social institutions (seminaries, schools and kindergartens) with 2,000 employees and approximately 18,000 children attending them. In addition, the GOC operates between seven to nine orphanages, which house between 1,200 to 1,500 children. Due to the Constitutional Agreement between the Georgian state and the GOC (which this chapter elaborates on later), the state institutions have no access to church’s organisations. Finally, the Patriarchate has 16 Charity and Development Foundations, ten of which focus on charity, education, and the construction and restoration of churches.5 Structurally, this chapter is divided into six sections and a conclusion. The first three sections reflect on historical and political contexts that shaped the GOC as an organisation over time. After presenting a historical account of the GOC organisation from its foundation to contemporary times, the chapter conceptualises the concept of human security. The fifth section demonstrates what factors the GOC interprets as being a threat to human security, while the sixth section scrutinises whether and how the ‘threat to human security’ narrative translates into mass mobilisation. On the one hand, this chapter is informed by the content analysis of the pastoral letters issued by the Patriarch Ilia II of Georgia during the 40 years since his enthronement. On the other, data gathered through textual analysis is contextualised through political events the GOC directly participated in. The chapter focuses on three protests led and organised by the GOC during the last ten years (2008–18), namely the debates on the Law on Registration of Religious Minority Organizations (2011) and the Anti-Discrimination Law (2014), as well as and the violent rally against LGBTI activists on the International Day against Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia on 17 May 2013.

The emergence of the church in Georgian national narrative Georgia boasts its own unique language and a rich Christian tradition, and is in fact one of the oldest Christian nations;6 its connection to Christian culture dates to the third and fourth centuries.7 The church narrative and historical annals attribute the earliest traces of the evangelisation of Georgia with the apostles Andrew and Simon the Canaanite from the territories of modern Western Georgia. As early as the fourth century, Eastern territories of modern Georgia adopted Christianity. Politically speaking, embracing Christianity meant confrontation with non-Christian neighbouring powers (e.g. Persian, Arab, Mongol and later Ottoman empires) with the rare exception of Armenia, which was also one of the earliest Christian nations. Georgian history is a narrative of conquests, and church discourse often sacralises its own contribution in keeping ethnic identity congruent with religious faith in the situation of annexed statehood. In different periods of history, modern territories of Georgia have been

108  T. Metreveli c­onquered by Persian, Ottoman, Mongol, Arab and Russian empires. In times when the Georgian state did not exist, the church kept the historical memory of congruence between Georgia’s ethnic and religious identities. In contradiction to Christian teachings, the GOC (similar to other Orthodox churches) intertwined religion and nationalism, thus constructing the dominant narrative of religion as cultural guardian of Georgianhood. Given the longevity and complexity of church–state relations in Georgia, it is useful to divide it into three epochs that shaped the GOC as an organisation. The first epoch was an early period under King Mirian III (284–361) and Vakhtang I Gorgasali (447–522). The second epoch was the reign of David the Builder (1089–125), and the third epoch is the modern period until the establishment of communism. Under King Mirian III, the church received material support8 in addition to protection for the episcopates of the Orthodox Church. Even though Georgian literature is dominated by ­Christian hagiography, early forms of the church’s interaction with the ruling elites did not necessarily resemble the Roman/Byzantine style. Mainly because of the rural character of Georgian society, bishops were based either in the local monasteries or at the estates of aristocratic families.9 The church did not exist as an independent institution per se. Georgian churches in the Eastern parts of the country were under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Antioch, whereas the Western parts of Georgia adopted more Byzantine Christianity. The great revival of Georgian Orthodoxy dates back to King Vakhtang I Gorgasali (447–522) under whom the church began to flourish. The period of his reign constitutes the greatest revival of Christianity in the territories of modern day Georgia. Besides numerous translations of the texts and the architectural revival of Orthodox churches, King Vakhtang arguably laid the foundation for the autocephaly of the old GOC by establishing and deepening connections with Constantinople. Gradually with the acquisition of autocephaly (in 486), the Georgian church transformed into a more, ‘ethnically focused Kartvelian’ (in Georgian language, the concept emphasises the ethnic element of Georgianness).10 If the historical and theological texts encompassed the saintly biographies of non-Georgian (e.g. Syrian, Greek, Iranian) holy fathers and mothers, after the Georgian church acquired more autonomy and independence, the hagiographical texts tended to focus exclusively on ethnically Georgian saints, hence the ethnicisation of religion. In the second epoch, the reign of King David the Builder (1089–125) led to significant changes in church–state relations that reshaped the organisation of the GOC. King David was behind reforms related to the interaction between religion and state, both in terms of scale and content. Beyond addressing the issues of corruption in the highest hierarchies of the church by severely punishing the perpetrators, the monarch enforced the establishment of a secular structure by appointing the state vizier to oversee church affairs. Essentially, this institution became a quasi-intelligence department of the state. Thus, the monarch established full control over the resources of the church, its organisational structure, and appointment of the clergy. The church

Georgia  109 became subservient to the all-powerful secular leader. This was another major transformation for the GOC as it navigated in an absolute monarchy. With the invasion of Mongol Tamerlane a century later (1380s), the vast majority of Georgian Orthodox cultural artefacts were physically destroyed and the unified church divided. The Georgian church remained on Byzantine aid with no legal status under the Mongols. These circumstances both weakened and strengthened the church. The church weakened institutionally and materially (with its property confiscated and priests persecuted); however, it learned how to operate undercover as an alternative structure to the state. This strengthened the church’s informal ties with the nation through the ethnicisation of Christianity, which manifested in its establishment of the Georgian language as an element of ‘Georgian’ (national) Christianity.11 The church’s situation did not improve in the late eighteenth century when Georgia became protectorate of the Russian Empire. Despite sharing a similar religious background with Russia – both Georgians and Russians were Orthodox Christians – in line with Tsarist reforms, the Russian Empire abolished the remnants of the Georgian church’s autonomy in 1811 and appointed ethnically Russian metropolitans,12 banning religious service in the Georgian language.13 Only in 1917, in parallel with the Bolshevik revolution, was Georgian autocephaly unilaterally restored and the patriarch of Georgia elected. With the fall of Russian Tsarism, Georgia became an independent state in May 1918. Ironically, though tragic for Georgia, its ‘statehood’ lasted just three years. History repeated itself in 1921 when Georgia was again invaded, this time by the Communist Soviet Union. The head of the ­Georgian Orthodox Church was arrested and tried, and statehood was abolished for another 70 years.

The Georgian Orthodox Church under the Communist rule Another major sociopolitical event that shaped the GOC was Soviet communism. In line with the Marxist–Leninist interpretation of Communist society, religion was associated with the Imperial rule, which legitimised the old regime under revolutionary communism. The Bolshevik agenda of eradicating religion severely affected the GOC. For example, in 1921, before Sovietisation, Georgia had 15 eparchies and between 2,357–2,455 churches and monasteries;14 by 1928, there were 13 bishops and 1,110 priests in the country. In 1939, the number of bishops declined to three plus the Patriarch, with just 83 priests, three deacons and ten psalm-chanters. By 1944, Georgia had just two bishops and a Patriarch, 21 Orthodox churches (three of which were Russian), and a total of 83 priests.15 In the first six years of the Communist rule in Soviet Union, 8,100 Orthodox clergymen were executed around the country.16 The church–state relationship during the early post-revolutionary period (1917–29) fluctuated between a violent suppression strategy where clergy were physically attacked and infrastructure destroyed, and an economic, cultural and educational strategy, which incentivised scientific atheism and

110  T. Metreveli defied religious beliefs and lifestyle. Alongside state-led violence and ­persecution, Soviet Communists supported the schismatic groups within the church to suppress the rebellious priests. Clerics who were not supportive of the schismatic movement were labelled as traitors and were either deported to the far East of Russia or killed by state authorities. Patriarch Ambrose of the GOC resisted the regime and was arrested.17 During the period between 1929 and 1941 after the enactment of the Law on Religious Associations in April 1929, almost all types of religious activities were banned, ‘Religious associations were prohibited from teaching religion to children, holding special events for young people or women, holding lectures on the Bible or the Koran, engaging in charitable work, organising libraries or conducting a wide range of other activities.’18 These restrictions reflected the shifting approach of the church towards the state. Churches became more submissive and gradually (re)invented a new political theology to survive as organisations. This new approach meant, to some extent, intertwining Orthodoxy with communism in order to find a place in a political system. The period during the so-called Great Patriotic War (1941–5) is when Stalin turned to religion as public morale was low after the Stalinist repressions and an ongoing war. Churches and theological academies (and seminaries) reopened and religion gained some form of public presence. Along the lines of the anti-Stalinist campaign under Nikita Khrushchev rule (1953–64), repressive measures were reintroduced; however, certain dissident religious activity begun.19 The persecution of the clergy re-emerged, and by different estimates, the number of priests registered around the Soviet territories were reduced by half to 15,000, and monasteries were forced to close and significantly reduce the number of clergy.20 During the Brezhnev years (1964–82), the Soviet Union signed the Helsinki agreement of 1975 which (in theory) recognised religious liberty among other human rights. The Soviet government maintained total control over appointment of religious elites in order to reduce religious involvement in dissident movements. Religious elites considered ‘safe’ by the regime were given numerous privileges, especially in the foreign policy arena. For example, the current Patriarch of Georgian Orthodox Church, Ilia (Shiolashvili) II, served as the President of the World Council of Churches (WCC) (between 1978 to 1983), an ecumenical organisation which represented over 300 churches and constituted an alternative to the Roman Catholic Church-led council. The period from Andropov to Gorbachev (1982–91) fluctuated between intrusion of the state apparatus in religious life to a more gradual loosening of suppressive policy. With hundreds of political prisoners freed from labour camps, the church gained number of religious dissidents, some of which would become nationalist leaders during the wave of nationalism in the late 1980s.

Georgia  111

The Soviet collapse and the making of modern Georgia In 1991, Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union. A former Soviet dissident and ethnic–nationalist, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was elected President (in office between 14 November 1990 and 14 April 1991). His political agenda was based on three premises: the dramatisation of domestic danger due to demographic decline; the fear of Russian/Soviet military invasion; and the threat of territorial disintegration (the latter after acquiring independence).21 None of the three factors particularly matched the church’s policy preferences at the time. After supporting Gamsakhurdia during an anti-Soviet nationalist mobilisation, the GOC shifted its position, opposing him after his popularity fell and the country suffered a series of crises. The church gradually distanced itself from the ethnic nationalism of the ruling elites. Aligning itself with Gamsakhurdia’s fierce rival, Eduard Shevardnadze, became a matter of existential security for the church as the nationalist leader and the first president of independent Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, and his supporters were unsympathetic to the church’s leadership accusing them of collaborating with the KGB and their mild position over the April 9 Soviet massacre of Georgian youth.22 Church–state relations gradually formalised under President Eduard Shevardnadze (1995–2003), whose government signed a constitutional agreement between the Georgian State and the GOC in 2002. This document contained a number of other symbolic privileges, which exempted the GOC from taxes, freed religious clerics from military service and gave the patriarch of Georgia a special legal status.23 The document codified Orthodox priests as superior to other religious positions by allowing Orthodox clergy to exclusively enter prisons, maintain Christian corner inside the penitentiary system, and appoint teachers responsible for religious studies in public schools.24 Although not a legal inheritor of the Soviet Union, Article 5 of the constitutional agreement gave Georgian state, ‘responsibility for compensating part of the material damage’ inflicted on the church during the Soviet occupation of Georgia (between 1921 and 1990). This gave the GOC solid legal foundation to operate as an organisation within the state with almost state-like powers.

Conceptualising forced migration and human security Conceptualising forced migration carries a normative risk of putting the sub-­ category of forced migrants to a passive victim (involuntary category) as opposed to a voluntary category of a migrant.25 The concept is situational and contextual, which makes it even more vague to operationalise. On a conceptual level, when we talk about forced migrants, we deal with, ‘people forced to flee from one society and become part of another one’.26 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) counts 68.5 million people as forced migrants, with nearly 25.4 million refugees, over half of whom are under the age of 18.27 Depending on assumptions and ­definitions,

112  T. Metreveli the number varies between 100 and 200 million people.28 The causal factors for forced migration are numerous, including both existential (e.g. elementary security, hunger, pollution) and structural (violence, wars, famine) factors. In Georgia’s case, the largest share of forced migrants fled from the two conflicting regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the rest of Georgia as an ­outcome of three armed conflicts: the two conflicts over South Ossetia (1991–92), and the 2008 Russian invasion, and the armed conflict in Abkhazia (1992–93). A country of only 4.6 million people, Georgia has a population of 273,411 internally displaced persons (IDP) from South Ossetia and Abkhazia.29 With a number of methodological and ethical questions in consideration, this chapter uses forced migrants as an umbrella term for IDPs, which it operationalises as a sub-category of the people who were forced to migrate. The reason for this is both operational and conceptual. The literature takes for granted that IDPs do not cross international borders, while forced migrants often do.30 Although it is largely an accurate characterisation, the two major similar characteristics of forced migration and internal displacement cast doubt on the usefulness of differentiation. For example, causal factors for migration as well as the nature of movement for IDPs and forced migrants are often very similar. In practical terms as applied to the Georgian case, IDPs moved because of existential threats, organised violence, armed conflict and human rights abuses, all characteristics one can easily find in forced migrations from former Yugoslav states or ex-­Communist Eastern Europe. The nuances in terminology are less important for the conceptualisation of a larger phenomenon of involuntary movement whether crossing an international border or not. Equally complicated and vague is the concept of human security, which relates to forced migration in a number of ways. The term human security spans everything from physical security to psychological well-being. As some argued, the concept is ‘powerful precisely because it lacks precision’.31 The most widely cited and used definition of human security is from United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which describes it as encompassing seven main areas: economic security (e.g. freedom from poverty); food security (e.g. access to food); health security (e.g. access to health care and protection from diseases); environmental security (e.g. protection from such dangers as environmental pollution and depletion); personal security (e.g. physical safety from such things as torture, war, criminal attacks, domestic violence, drug use, suicide, and even traffic accidents); community security (e.g. survival of traditional cultures and ethnic groups as well as the physical security of these groups); and political security (e.g. enjoyment of civil and political rights, and freedom from political oppression).32 If one critically reflects on these core domains of human security, questions arise on the subjectivity of what is considered essential and how political these categories can be or might become depending on the political agenda of various institutions, states and organisations. From a normative perspective, any of ‘those domains of well-being that have been important enough for human beings to fight over or to put their lives or property at great risk’ are

Georgia  113 33

part of human security. However, the concept triggers the question of measurement – how to measure human security to properly operationalise it both as a concept and as a policy tool. If we approach human security as a category of research that ‘explores the particular conditions that affect the survival of individuals, groups, and societies’,34 the concept becomes a more useful analytical tool to examine its relationship with organised religion. This domain-specific focus allows capturing how agency of organised religion relates, negotiates, and shapes human security.

The Georgian Orthodox Church and human security Having briefly reflected on the history of the GOC and provided a basic conceptualisation of human security and forced migration, it is worth addressing how important these categories are for the GOC’s operational tactics before and after Georgia’s 2008 war with Russia. The impact of this war on human security in Georgia is significant; 151 new settlements are out of government’s control (135 in Tskhinvali region and 16 in Kodori Valley), and there are 26,885 new IDPs from South Ossetia.35 The five-day war between Russia and Georgia ended with the occupation of Georgia’s internationally recognised territories and was followed by Russia’s unilateral recognition of ­independence for Georgia’s two break-away regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Despite the significance of these events to the human security of Georgian citizens who were either forced to flee their homes or remained in the occupied territories, the church’s discourse over what constituted a threat to Georgian identity did not take the dimension of territoriality, but counterintuitively focused on minorities. If one looks at the topics over which the GOC organised mass mobilisation or was directly involved in daily politics, there is a prevailing theme of minorities. To understand the institutional logic behind the meaning of human security in the GOC’s discourse, a valuable starting point is the yearly pastoral letters36 of the Patriarch Ilia II of Georgia. As context, the patriarch issues two major pastoral letters per year. One is communicated to the parishioners on Easter, the other on Christmas. In the pastoral letter, the patriarch usually addresses themes that the church considers to be of the highest importance for its parishioners. Pastoral letters are communicated through a reading of the pastoral letter on the night of Easter and Christmas. Closer look at Easter and Christmas pastoral letters over the past 40 years since the enthronement of Patriarch Ilia II (1978–2018) reveal that forced migration/IDPs is referred to considerably less frequently than themes of human security. In the 1994 Christmas pastoral letter, the Patriarch encourages IDPs from Abkhazia and South Ossetia not to lose faith: I am addressing with the words of love and hope to refugees [not IDPs] from Abkhazia and Shida Kartli [how South Ossetia is referred in ­Georgian]: Do not lose faith, hope and love, do not be stumbled, pray

114  T. Metreveli and the Lord will definitely listen to your prayers. We believe, soon peace will be celebrated and you will return to your land.37 It is noteworthy that Patriarch refers to IDPs not as internally displaced, but rather as refugees. Whether or not the church situated IDPs in their concept of nationhood cannot be verified, but the sheer fact that internally displaced citizens of Georgia are referred to as refugees – a category of individuals who have been forced to flee their country rather than being internally displaced – leaves open the question of whether the church considered IDPs part of its national narrative. Similarly, in the 1995 Easter pastoral letter, Patriarch refers to the restoration of the territorial integrity, and expresses his hopes and prayers for ‘refugees’.38 In the Easter (1996) and Christmas (1997) Pastoral letters, together with a prayer for a return to Abkhazia, Patriarch elaborates the theme of overall well-being, as an element of human security.39 Often the ideas of territorial integrity and the return of IDPs to their homes in Abkhazia and South ­Ossetia are intertwined with the narrative of victimhood and restoration of spirituality. As the argument goes, the faster Georgia is spiritually complete, the sooner the lost territories will return to Georgian control: We want to keep peace with everyone but not at the expense of losing territories. I believe, sooner or later, Abkhazians and Ossetians will realize that their survival is in unity with Georgia and this the sooner will advance spiritually as a society, the sooner that day of unification will come further spiritual growth.40 An interesting pattern emerges in how the notions of material good and wellbeing are portrayed as by-products of hedonism, and are often opposed by primary higher goods, such as salvation of the soul. In this narrative, economic well-being is relative to the more abstract and mysterious cause of saving the soul: people who are free from the grief often resemble a desert. The threat of constant success and advancement is arrogance and strengthening of the feelings of independence, formation of a mistaken idea that one can move forward in life without God’s help.41 Basic references to elements of human security tell us little about the operational tactics of the GOC, yet it is useful to examine when more abstract narratives of threats to individual spirituality translated into calls for mass ­ mobilisation against minorities. In the Easter pastoral letter of 1989, Patriarch Ilia warns about the rapid technological progress and its side effects on spirituality, a theme evident in his pastoral letters for more than 20 years. However, the threat is more abstract, less personified: No one can stop scientific progress – that is the will of God. It is unfortunate that our spiritual growth considerably lags behind technological

Georgia  115 advancements. This created a great danger for both individual and entire world. If we truly want to move forward, we must gain spiritual values. All other attempts mean going backwards. We must be courageous, convincing, discreet, and reasonable. A number of unsettled issues should not distract us. Our wisdom is shown precisely in our ability to differentiate between primary and secondary, between mundane and eternal.42 The ‘threat to national identity narrative’ takes more concrete shape in the 1992 Christmas pastoral letter in which Patriarch elaborates on the theme of the moral inferiority of the West. The threats to identity come from the moral decay of West. In line with the moral inferiority of West and its apathy towards spirituality, one encounters certain spiritual superiority of Georgia: Georgia is not inasmuch threatened politically from the Western countries as morally and ethically. Their indifference to national and religious issues is also another obstacle for us. The Georgian people are characterized by their desire for mimicking others. This is good if you learn best experiences, or you have the talent of differentiating between black and white, but it is threatening that we often lose the ability to analyse, and unilaterally blindfolded we mimic the way of someone’s life or thinking.43 This narrative is not distinctively Georgian; the idea of Russkii Mir (Russian world) advocated by the Russian Orthodox Church grounds the argument of the uniqueness of the Russian world on the idea of moral superiority of ­Russian value system over a morally inferior West.44 The doctrine actively promoted by the current Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, Kirill (Gundyayev), culturally legitimises a profound and fundamental rejection of the Western values. Russkii Mir is both beyond and between national identity at the same time.45 Patriarch Ilia II emphasises how alien some of the Western values are to the Georgian mentality: Today, many discuss what shall be the way of our country’s development, where it should orient itself: towards east or west.… Of course, there are many good things in Europe, but they are alien to us and difficult to accept.46 However, the narrative of the West as being about hedonism and material possessions and threatening Orthodox believers evolves into personification of these threats. Patriarch’s pastoral letter of Christmas 1998 is a vivid manifestation of this transition in which religious minorities are painted as foreign threats to Georgian identity: It is time for everyone to realize what threat the raids of foreign religions and totalitarian sects pose to our country. Experience of past several years has clearly shown that they reject and offend our national feelings, our

116  T. Metreveli past, our history, and our sacredness, and they turn away thousands of people from the truth. It is true that each person is entitled to the right of freedom of choice, but the State is obliged to protect its citizen from spiritual aggression, especially when the actions of the sects has already taken anti-national, anti-state shape. We understand that all these events characterize the states in transition, but dangerous trends must be pointed out and eradicated.47 In a similar vein, religious sects are portrayed as sources of ‘spiritual aggression against Georgia’. Patriarch urges the state to take action and reminds it of its responsibility, and that the danger comes not from (Orthodox) Russia, as one perhaps might expect given the role which Russia played in Georgia’s territorial conflicts,48 but from small sects and neighbouring countries of foreign religion: based on what are some people preaching religious pluralism? Seemingly, they do not even think about otherworldly life and they do not believe in it, otherwise, why would they sacrifice themselves and their followers for making this diversity choice? This choice will sacrifice them for eternal death, won’t it? We have repeatedly emphasized the disastrous activities of sects. If the state does not take decisive measures in time, it will be too late tomorrow. The result is not yet seen.… Isn’t it alarming the sect of Jehovah’s Witnesses is forming an entire army against the interests of the state? [I]s not that actually dangerous for our small homeland that is surrounded by so many countries of foreign religion?49 As the narrative goes, threats come from minorities, but they are by-products of liberalism, which is dangerous unless the state has ‘a proper religious and national ideology’: liberalism inevitably will work in favour of enemies and will completely destroy the country. It pushes people to pseudo-democracy and false freedom, it devalues national values, violates the form and content of state life.50 Building on the theme of moral decay, in a pastoral letter written for Easter 2002, the danger of an unrestrained lifestyle associated with sexual liberties becomes a cause of moral decay: The danger that the whole attention is on achieving technical, economic and financial success seems obvious, while the moral side of the human relationships is completely forgotten. Moreover, it becomes almost imperative to degenerate morality. This creates a real danger of spiritual and physical destruction. God surely won’t forgive us establishment of unrestrained lifestyle and everyone should fully understand this.51

Georgia  117 The more the state institutionalised the public influence of the GOC, the more vocal the church’s calls for mass mobilisation became. With the Constitutional Agreement (2002), the church’s alarmist rhetoric translated into calls for action, such as increasing its role in public education in order to address immediate issues of human security: We will not deny the fact that moral ugliness has always been in place, but in the past, conversation about these themes was embarrassing. People realized this was a sin and many of them repented. Now all this is allowed, and it is considered as progressive phenomenon. There is one way out of this situation: we must to create an immunity and a solid moral basis among young people towards everything negative and immoral … there is a need of alliance between family, school and church. I think the government should be interested in it, because if the processes develop this way, this threat will touch both family and the state. First of all, we believe that legalization of pornography should be prohibited together with screening of movies depicting robbery and violence. In addition, we should not allow a separate subject on sexual education; in this regards, children can be given adequate knowledge of ethical norms on lessons of anatomy and general biology.52 In a nutshell, a few interrelated narratives prevail among all of Patriarch’s pastoral letters that pose an existential threat to human security and Georgian identity – the one of moral and ethical degradation associated with the ­ Westernisation of Georgia and relativising of ethics. These threats come from minorities who channel their agenda that endangers Georgian system of values in general and nationhood in particular. In the next section, this chapter focuses on three episodes when the church mobilised against minorities by portraying them as a threat to ‘Georgianness’ and calling for mass mobilisation.

The church and public protests Having reflected on how the church perpetuates its narratives on themes of human security, it is worth exploring whether and how those narratives translated into mass mobilisation. This chapter examines three episodes when the church directed and organised mass mobilisation over what it considered as human security themes. In all three episodes of recent Georgian history, the church either directly participated in activities to encroach upon the secular state’s activity, or organised a massive protest to challenge the state’s position. The first episode is the Georgian government’s initiative (1 July 2011), which allowed religious groups that had historic ties to Georgia or were defined as religions by legislation in Council of Europe Member States to be registered as legal entities of public law. Before this legal initiative, in order to receive legal status, all religious communities except the GOC

118  T. Metreveli r­egistered as non-commercial entities of private law. Being an entity of private law restricted financial and logistical operations of religious groups, and meant that religious minorities were not formally recognised as religions.53 The initial version of the law registered five religious communities as legal entities of public law. These communities were the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Evangelical Baptist Church, Islam and Judaism. These communities were singled out because they had close historic ties with Georgia. The government’s legal initiative coincided with the visit of the Armenian Patriarch Karekin (Nersisyan) II and the Armenia– Georgia discussion over the disputed immovable property and the status of Armenian Apostolic Church in Georgia. The debate surrounding mass mobilisation was over the church’s criticism of the Armenian position over the GOC status in Armenia. Ilia II urged that the GOC needed to have the same status in Armenia that Patriarch Karekin II intended for the Armenian Church in Georgia.54 Lastly, in the same written statement, Patriarch called for suspension of the law: We deem it necessary to suspend further approval of the draft law (with its second and third readings) and [it is necessary] to hold public debates (including live televised debates) in order to form broad public opinion and to reach a consensus with the Orthodox Church, because vast majority of the population is Orthodox Christian.55 Notwithstanding the GOC’s position, Parliament proceeded with the amending the civil code, which allowed those religious groups defined as religions by law to be registered as legal entities of public law. As some of the chief government officials reaffirmed, there was a disagreement between the GOC and government over the issue of Armenia. Specifically, the GOC required the Georgian state to engage in formal negotiations with foreign states regarding the protection and provision of care for Georgian churches in foreign lands (such as Armenia and Turkey as an example). Discussion between the church and state ended with a disagreement over the state protection clause, and Parliament passed the law that allowed religious groups to choose between registering as an entity of private law or as a legal entity of public law. The Patriarch responded in a statement: This law is so important and so dangerous that lawmakers should have thought about what its consequences might be in ten, hundred years.… We lack analytical thinking. Analysis should be made before doing something and not afterwards. You all know my [July 4] statement.… We are not saying that religious [minorities] should not be granted with [legal] status. We are saying that we should sit down, invite academicians, clerics and specialists and discuss it. It is regrettable that lawmakers were so in hurry that they passed [the legislative amendments] in one day.56

Georgia  119 The entire dynamic between the state and minority groups triggered the GOC’s protest. One of the main reasons for protest according to the GOC was that the Armenian Apostolic Church achieved its political and strategic objectives at the GOC’s expense through the Georgian government. As a result, what seemed to many to be a technical legal initiative (that met elementary requirements of religious minorities) caused a major protest among the clergy. Unable to agree with the government of Georgia over the latter’s role in advancing the church’s interest abroad, the GOC mobilised a few thousand people to march in protest against the legislative amendments with Patriarch Ilia stating: Cases of fighting against the Church and humiliating the Church are very frequent. Those who have ever humiliated the Church are punished and they will definitely be punished.… The Church will protect you and give you the strength. Historically the Church has always been protecting Georgia and our faith; the Church has always been a huge force and it still is a huge force. This force is not directed against anyone.… This force is for making people happy. So we should take care of the Church.57 The second episode of church’s mass mobilisation was in opposition to sexual minorities. Unlike the peaceful protest against religious minorities’ rights for equality, the protest on 17 May 2013 targeting LGBTI activists turned violent. Speaking in the name of Georgian citizens the day before the event, Patriarch Ilia II called on the city government not to allow the rally claiming it was in violation of majority rights: As it is known a rally of sexual minorities and their supporters is planned on the Rustaveli Avenue on 17 May, which aims not at resolving real problems of these people, but at speculating by this issue, because it is the fact that despite of traditions and way of thinking that is established in our country, they [sexual minorities] can live their private life without restrictions. It is also the fact that there are universal values, which are common across time and space – moral laws are among them. All the religions and scientific approaches (psychology and medicine) consider homosexuality to be anomaly and disease (of course we do not mean here newly created pseudo-scientific views). The Church considers people with such inclinations to be in a grave sin, which need help and spiritual assistance as a remedy for correction, instead of encouragement and especially imposing their condition on population. That would be similar to liking actions of a drug addict and making public display of drug addiction. Our people have different aspirations and for that reason it is understandable their sharp protest against this [planned on 17 May] and similar rallies. Our citizens view [such rallies] as a violation of majority’s right and as an insult to their traditions, religion and in general to way of thinking. We believe that the Tbilisi Mayor’s Office and the

120  T. Metreveli authorities should take into consideration these [factors] and revoke p­ ermission given to homosexuals for holding the rally, especially now when there is a nationwide mourning for fallen brave men [reference to three Georgian soldiers killed in Afghanistan].58 A rally consisted of a dozen of LGBTI activists who announced publicly and informed the government and media about the purpose and organisational agenda of the event that aimed to voice their concerns regards to the life of LGBTI people in Georgia on International Day Against Homophobia. On 17 May, the GOC amassed several thousand homophobic protesters at its counter rally with banners that read, ‘Stop Homosexual Propaganda in Georgia’. The protesters pushed police cordon defending LGBTI activists, and the events became uncontrolled. Despite heavy police presence, the mob consisting mostly of young men and a number of GOC clerics physically attacked the bus carrying the activists. Twenty-eight people were injured, 14 of which were hospitalised. The liberal groups, NGOs and members of civil society harshly condemned the church’s actions. In response, the state’s rhetoric was harsh, but its actions were weak. Only a few priests received administrative punishments, yet, as Amnesty International reported, perpetrators of violence were not fully and adequately punished.59 The Prime Minister condemned60 the violence, stating that sexual minorities were equal citizens and that society would, ‘gradually get used to it’.61 After the videos of violence went viral, ­Patriarch Ilia II distanced himself from the violence, and issued a statement calling for peace and mutual prayer, but warned about the threats of gay propaganda: We distance from violence. It’s something that should not be propagandized. We should know that this is a sin before the god. We can express our sorrow without interfering in anyone’s private life. I hope that everything will be calmed down. I call on our people on all sides to go from streets and return back homes and to pray for each other.62 By not allowing the LGBTI activists to rally, the GOC demonstrated to the state its power to mobilise masses. In the words of one senior cleric, ‘What happened today [on May 17] was the order coming from the nation’, adding later that ‘several millions would have come [into the streets] if needed’.63 A year later, the GOC protested against the Anti-Discrimination Law (17 April 2014). Anti-discrimination legislation was a precondition of the Visa Liberalization Action plan of the European Union (EU) for Georgia. The Law on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination legally codified protection against discrimination on the basis of race, colour, language, gender, age, citizenship, native identity, birth, place of residence, property, social status, religion, ethnic affiliation, profession, family status, health condition, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity, expression, political or other beliefs. Text of the law, which according to local non-government ­organisations (NGOs) had a number of flaws, was perceived by the clergy of the

Georgia  121 Orthodox Church as threatening. The GOC objected to the anti-­discrimination clause designed to protect sexual orientation and the wording around gender identity. As a response the patriarch’s statement read: Introduction of a notion of ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender identity’ – non-existent in the constitution – into this bill, important for development of our country, triggers a huge anxiety in the people, because personal rights of our citizens are already equally protected by the existing Georgian legislation. Proceeding from God’s commandments, believers consider non-traditional sexual relations to be a deadly sin, and rightly so, and the anti-discrimination bill in its present form is considered to be a propaganda and legalization of this sin.64 Here again, speaking in the name of people, the GOC interprets elements of human security as threating and anxiety-inducing to the people of Georgia. Interestingly, the EU is portrayed as a tolerant organisation, yet the law, which was initiated by the Georgian government to be in compliance with the EU regulations, is interpreted as conflicting with the EU’s values: We believe it [the bill] casts doubt on moral principles, recognized by all the religions; hence, it creates the threat of discrimination of a broader public. The EU represents diverse space unifying different nations and religions, which declares that it recognizes culture and traditions of various people and is ready to take into consideration and respect our values. But provisions of this bill are in conflict with these principles.65 Similar to previous initiatives, the GOC asked the Georgian Parliament to postpone the bill and engage broader public on this issue, this time in the name of European integration: We respectfully ask the Georgian Parliament to postpone adoption of the bill in its present form and to secure engagement of the Church and broader public in its discussion in order to reach an agreement and in order not to let hasty actions to have negative impact on our country’s European aspiration.66 The law passed. The speaker of Parliament commented that an anti-­ discrimination bill was a choice between acting like Europe or Russia, and the state opted for the former.67 The church protested again, but with only a few hundred protesters in the two cities.

Conclusion The historical context under which the GOC evolved as an organisation shaped its contemporary attitude towards the state and its positioning in society

122  T. Metreveli as the guardian of the nation. As shown in this chapter, depending on the political context and ruling regime, the church employed different tactics to survive and develop as an organisation. In times of all-powerful leaders, it deferred to the power of the monarchy. When the state did not exist, it carried the ethnoreligious memory. And, under communism, it learned when and how to compromise with the regime in order to survive as an organisation. The historical legacy of communism shaped the church after the Soviet collapse. Under the Constitutional Agreement between the church and state, the GOC’s symbolic power translated into political power, which later manifested itself in the GOC’s capacity to mobilise public protest. The topics that the church saw as spiritually threatening to Georgianness were connected to basic civil liberties of religious and sexual minorities. These categories have been framed through ethical discursive chains in which elements of human security and political security clash with community security. The community security is interpreted by the GOC as majority right to survival of tradition and ethnic group. This right may undermine the political and at times personal security of minorities. The tension manifested in the three episodes discussed in this chapter. One was the legislative project that allowed religious minorities living on Georgian soil to register as legal entities of public law. The church’s response to it went beyond critical public statements, and its inflammatory rhetoric translated into calls for mass mobilisation against the law. The negligence of the Georgian state towards the GOC’s demands to postpone or amend the law was challenged two years later when church rallied against LGBTI activists in 2013. The rally echoed the ‘identity threat’ narrative that the GOC had constructed. The LGBTI community activists were seen as a threat to community security (to Georgianness), and as ‘a guardian of nation’ the church had a duty to act in its defence. Despite the state’s selective response towards the perpetrators of violence, the church was unable to mobilise a massive rally against the Anti-Discrimination Law in 2014. Whether and to what extent the church’s failure to organise a mass protest might affect the GOC’s operational tactics in the future remains to be seen, but differing visions of what is considered essential for human security will likely shape organised religion’s relationship with the state.

Notes   1 ‘The Caucasus Research Resource Centres. Caucasus Barometer 2017’, available at http://caucasusbarometer.org (accessed on 5 October 2018).   2 Tamara Grdzelidze, ‘Georgia, Patriarchal Orthodox Church of’ in John Anthony McGuckin (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, pp. 264–275.  3 Ibid.  4 Eqzarqiebi utskhoetshi, (Exarches Abroad), the official website of the Patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox Church, available at http://patriarchate.ge/geo/­eparqiebi/ ucxoetshi/ (accessed on 15 November 2018).

Georgia  123   5 Transparency International, ‘The companies and other organizations related to the Georgian Orthodox Church’, 5 September 2014, available at www.transparency. ge/en/blog/companies-and-other-organizations-related-georgian-orthodox-church, (accessed on 14 November 2018).  6 Stephen Rapp Jr, ‘Georgian Christianity’ in Ken Parry (ed.), The Blackwell ­Companion to Eastern Christianity, Oxford: Blackwell, 2007, pp. 137–155.   7 Paul Crego, ‘The Georgian Orthodox Church’ in Lucian Leustean (ed.) Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, 2014, pp. 140–160; Stephen Jones, Georgia: A Political History since Independence, London: I. B. Tauris & Company, 2013.   8 Rapp, ‘Georgian Christianity’, pp. 137–155.   9 Ibid, p. 138. 10 Ibid, p. 144. 11 Jones, Georgia: A Political History since Independence, p. 2013. 12 Rapp, ‘Georgian Christianity’, pp. 148–150. 13 Tornike Metreveli, ‘Rhyming the National Spirit: A Comparative Inquiry into the Works and Activities of Taras Shevchenko and Ilia Chavchavadze’, ­Nationalities Papers, (forthcoming 2019, 45 (5)). 14 Grdzelidze, ‘Georgia, Patriarchal Orthodox Church of’, p. 274. 15 Sergo Ratiani, ‘Differing Political Theologies of Differing Eras’, Identity Studies, 2011, 3 (1), pp. 51–75. 16 Paul Mojzes, Religious Liberty in Eastern Europe and the USSR Before and After the Great Transformation, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, p. 60. 17 Felix Corley, Religion in the Soviet Union an Archival Reader, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1996, pp. 13–74. 18 Ibid, p. 75. 19 Andrzej Paczkowski, Jean-Louis Margolin, Jean-Louis Panné, Karel Bartosek, Nicolas Werth and Stéphane Courtois, The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. 20 Mojzes, Religious Liberty in Eastern Europe and the USSR, p. 72. 21 Stephen Jones, ‘The Rose Revolution: A Revolution without Revolutionaries?’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2006, 19 (1), pp. 33–48. 22 Silvia Serrano, ‘The Georgian Church Embodiment of National Unity or Opposition Force?’, Russian Politics and Law, 2014, 52 (4) (July–August), pp. 74–92. 23 Tornike Metreveli, ‘An Undisclosed Story of Roses: Church, State, and Nation in Contemporary Georgia’, Nationalities Papers, 2016, 44 (5), pp. 694–712. 24 Davit Chikvaidze, ‘Konstituciuri shetankhmeba sakartvelos sakhelmtsifosa da sakartvelos samotsikulo avtokepalur martlmadidebel eklesias shoris: komentarebi’ ­ (Commentaries on the Constitutional Concordat between the Government of Georgia and Georgia’s Apostolic Autocephalic Orthodox Church), 2005, available at www.orthodoxy.​ge/samartali/komentarebi/sarchevi.htm, (accessed on 12 November 2018). 25 David Turton, Conceptualising Forced Migration, Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper no 12, July 2003, pp. 1–19, available at www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/files-1/ wp12-conceptualising-forced-migration-2003.pdf, (accessed on 13 November 2018). 26 Ibid, p. 23. 27 UNHCR, Figures at a Glance, Statistical Yearbooks, 2018, available at www.unhcr. org/figures-at-a-glance.html (accessed on 8 October 2018). 28 Stephen Castles, ‘Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration and Social ­Transformation’, Sociology, 2003, 37 (1), pp. 13–34.

124  T. Metreveli 29 ‘IDPs figures’, Ministry of IDPs issues, available at www.mra.gov.ge/geo/static/55 (accessed on 29 October 2018); Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID), available at www.internal-­ displacement.​org/sites/default/files/2018-05/GRID%202018%20-%20Figure%20 Analysis%20-%20GEORGIA.pdf (accessed on 9 October 2018). 30 Turton, Conceptualising Forced Migration. 31 Roland Paris, ‘Human Security Paradigm Shift of Hot Air?’ International Security, 2001, (26) 2, pp. 87–102. 32 Ibid, p. 90. The United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 33 Gary King and Christopher J. L. Murray, ‘Rethinking Human Security’, Political Science Quarterly, 2001, 116 (4), pp. 585–610. 34 Paris, pp. 96 and 102. 35 ‘IDPs figures’, Ministry of IDPs issues, available at www.mra.gov.ge/geo/ static/55 (accessed on 29 October 2018). 36 Father Giorgi Zviadadze (ed.), Epistoleni (Pastoral Letters), Tbilisi: Exclusive Print +, 2012. The text has been published in Georgian (my translations). 37 Zviadadze, p. 198, sashobao 1994 (Christmas, 1994). 38 Zviadadze, pp. 214–220, saaghdgomo 1995 (Easter, 1995). NB: ‘Samachablo’ is a Georgian historical district within the disputed South Ossetia Region. This is how many Georgians refer to South Osetia. 39 Zviadadze, pp. 235–242, sashobao 1997 (Christmas, 1997). 40 Zviadadze, p. 415, sashobao 2009 (Christmas, 2009). 41 Zviadadze, p. 224, sashobao 1996 (Christmas, 1996). 42 Zviadadze, p. 134, saaghdgomo 1989 (Easter, 1989). 43 Zviadadze, pp. 176–177, saaghdgomo 1992 (Easter 1992). 44 Tornike Metreveli, ‘Russia’s wars and Russkii Mir – between and beyond statehood’, 9 August 2018, available at https://risu.org.ua/en/index/expert_thought/ authors_columns/tmetreveli_column/72161/ (accessed on 17 October 2018). 45 ‘Viystuplenie svjeteijshego patriarkha Kirila na torzhestvennom otkritii III assamblei ruskogo mira’ (Speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill at the opening ceremony of the 3rd Assembly of the Russian World), 3 November 2009, available at www. patriarchia.​ru/ua/db/text/1209822.html, (accessed on 13 November, 2018). 46 Zviadadze, p. 209, sashobao 1995 (Christmas, 1995). 47 Zviadadze, p. 257, sashobao 1998 (Christmas, 1998). 48 For Georgian-Abkhazian conflict see Ghia Nodia, Causes and Visions of Conflict in Abkhazia, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, 1997, available at http://iseees.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/u4/bps_/ publications_/1997_02-nodi.pdf, (accessed on 14 November 2018). 49 Zviadadze, p. 292, saaghdgomo 2000 (Easter, 2000). 50 Zviadadze, pp. 306–307, saaghdgomo 2001 (Easter, 2001). 51 Zviadadze, p. 319, saaghdgomo 2002 (Easter, 2002). 52 Ibid, p. 325. 53 ‘Georgian Church: Suspend legislative procedures on legal status of some religious groups’, 5 July 2011, available at https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23701 (accessed on 27 October 2018). 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 ‘Patriarch: Legislative Amendment on Religious Groups’ Status “Dangerous” ’, 7 July 2011, available at https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23716 (accessed on 29 October 2018). 57 ‘Protest march against law on religious minorities status’, 10 July 2011, available at https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23730 (accessed on 29 October 2018).

Georgia  125 58 ‘Georgian Church calls for gay rights rally ban’, 16 May 2013, available at https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26062 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 59 Amnesty International, ‘Georgia: Homophobic violence mars Tbilisi Pride event’, available at www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/05/georgia-homophobicviolence-mars-tbilisi-pride-event/ (accessed on 25 October 2018). 60 ‘PM comments on planned gay rights rally’, 14 May 2013, available at https:// old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26055 (accessed on 20 October 2018). 61 ‘Violence against anti-homophobia rally’, 18 May 2013, available from https:// civil.ge/archives/122862 (accessed on 20 October 2018). 62 ‘Patriarch calls for calm after Orthodox groups thwart gay rights rally’, 17 May 2013, available at https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26071, (accessed on 25 October 2018). 63 Ibid. 64 ‘Georgian Church speaks out against anti-discrimination bill’, 28 April 2014, available at https://civil.ge/archives/123664, (accessed on 31 October 2018). 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 ‘Usupashvili: Anti-discrimination bill is about choosing between Europe and Russia’, 30 April 2014, available at https://civil.ge/archives/123670 (accessed on 31 October 2018).

4 The Russian–Ukrainian conflict and the European refugee crisis The policies of state and church and civil society in Belarus Alena Alshanskaya After the Baptism of Rus’ in 988, the Orthodox Church marked its presence in the territory of the contemporary Republic of Belarus. Due to its geopolitical position, Belarus was not dominated by Orthodox culture alone in the intervening history; it was also strongly shaped and influenced by Catholic and Protestant communities.1 Orthodox believers were part of the Kyivan Metropolis and later the Moscow Patriarchate. Several attempts were made in the twentieth century to establish a national Belarusian Orthodox Church, independent from the Russian centre, especially during the German occupation and after the fall of the Soviet Union, none of which was successful.2 From 1978–2012, the Belarusian Orthodox Church was led by Metropolitan Filaret (Vachromeev), first as the Metropolitan of Minsk and then after 1989 as Patriarchal Exarch of All Belarus of the Russian Orthodox Church with modest rights of self-governing in comparison to other Orthodox churches (in particular, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church or the autonomous churches in the Baltic states, which are under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate).3 In 2013, Metropolitan Pavel (Ponomarev), who was previously the Russian Metropolitan of Rjazan, was appointed by Patriarch Kirill as the new Metropolitan of Minsk and Slutsk and Patriarchal Exarch of All Belarus. According to Belarusian religious legislation, the leader of a religious organisation has to be a Belarusian citizen. However, in this case, the legislation was not applied and Metropolitan Pavel remained a Russian citizen.4 Under his tenure, the dependency of the Belarusian bishops, priests and communities on the Russian centre become stronger.5 In 2016, the Belarusian Exarchate was composed of 15 dioceses, 1,612 parishes and 35 monasteries.6

Church–state relations in Belarus A brief period of genuine religious freedom in the early 1990s brought many possibilities for the Orthodox mission after a long period of atheistic repression. However, the competitive situation of the free and manifold religious market burdened the Orthodox Church. Therefore, similarly to the position of the church in the Russian Federation, the Orthodox Church was grateful to receive formal privileges from the Belarusian state. President Alexander

Belarus  127 Lukashenko of Belarus did not assign Orthodoxy the same crucial position in his ideological construct as his counterpart Vladimir Putin had done in Russia. Instead, he merely chose to emphasise its utilitarian role in a secular state (through the nurturing of patriotism and support of state power, for example).7 Belarus is known to be one of the most non-religious countries in the world (it was the most atheistic republic of the Soviet Union).8 According to various surveys, 73–80 per cent of Belarusians define themselves as Orthodox, while less than 60 per cent said they believed in God, a similar figure to other predominantly Eastern Orthodox countries.9 Official data provided by the Commissioner of Religions and Nationalities of the Republic of Belarus states that ‘58.9 per cent of Belarusians are believers and 82 per cent of those are Orthodox, 12 per cent are Catholic, 6 per cent represent other denominations’, which means that around 48.3 per cent of the total population is Orthodox.10 The main question that arises at this point is whether Orthodoxy plays any role in the everyday lives of people and whether it has the power to influence them to lead their lives according to Christian Orthodox doctrine. One can observe a tremendous discrepancy between public attitudes and church discourse in social issues such as abortion and new reproductive ­technologies – Belarus is one of the most liberal countries in Europe in this area – or the implementation of religious education in schools.11 The law ‘On Freedom of Consciousness and Religious Organisations’, adopted in 2002, was restrictive towards the so-called ‘non-traditional’ religious communities, e.g. Protestant churches, which were stigmatised as ‘sects’, and contained proposals favouring the Orthodox Church that were initiated by its leader Metropolitan Filaret.12 The preamble to the law implied the determining role of the Orthodox Church ‘in the historical formation and development of spiritual, cultural and state traditions of the Belarusian people’.13 This does not equate to absolute prioritisation of the Orthodox Church, as implemented in Russia, rather it was simply a tool for escaping the accusation of restricting the freedom of conscience with particular reference to Protestant churches. Alexander Lukashenko seemed to take the loyalty of the Orthodox Church for granted, whereas the Western-oriented and mission-devoted Baptists or even Catholics were and remain suspicious. Natallia Vasilevich, a theologian and political science scholar, called this law a ‘political investment of the government into the Orthodox Church in order to guarantee its loyalty’.14 The precarious position of the Orthodox Church explains why it sought to introduce a framework agreement for cooperation with the Belarusian state in 2003.15 The announced priority areas of cooperation showcased the areas in which the state was ready to tolerate the presence of the Orthodox Church. Some voices praised it as ‘fertile ground for the adoption of various programs’,16 however, in reality, it never surpassed the status of a formal declaration of readiness to cooperate, without necessarily implementing it. In the years that followed, additional agreements on cooperation between the church and different sectoral ministries, governmental departments and the National

128  A. Alshanskaya Academy of Science were signed, but most were rhetorical in nature and contained no p­ractical bilateral obligations. It remains uncertain whether these agreements ever helped to resolve conflict situations to achieve the best possible outcome or whether they only fixed the status quo and served as an administrative resource in the best-case scenario for the church spreading the Orthodox influence in the de jure secular state and state organisations.17 Therefore, most of the researchers and experts insist that the Orthodox Church in Belarus only enjoys the status of an official church, but does not have any privileges impacting everyday life.18 The Orthodox Church, which has thus been ‘domesticated’ by the Belarusian government, is seen as a tool for preserving or guaranteeing the stability of the regime. There were expectations from religious and political actors in Europe – both churches and political institutions – that the Belarusian Orthodox Church, which had suffered under the strong repression and human rights violations during the atheistic period, could become a stronghold for liberalisation and democratisation, as had been the case with the Catholic Church in Poland in the 1980s. However, these expectations were not met. In return for state recognition of its dominant and exclusive role, the Belarusian Orthodox Church became a hostage of state policy.19 It is important to mention here one example of the state strategy to engage with leading members of the church. In 2006, Metropolitan Filaret was granted the title ‘Hero of Belarus’: in recognition of his exceptional personal contribution to the spiritual revival of the Belarusian nation, the strengthening of friendship and fraternal ties between the peoples, promotion of the interfaith dialogue. […] Metropolitan Filaret has done a lot to establish constructive and fruitful relations between the church and the state.20 This shows how the formal preference or prioritisation can neutralise an institution like a church and prevent it from criticism in regard to the state, despite state policy obviously contradicting church doctrine. One of the issues in which the aims of both sides have more or less coincided is the concept of ‘spiritual security’. This has a special meaning for the Belarusian Church, namely removing or restricting the activities of competitive religious communities, which are often more engaged in missionary work and therefore more successful, especially concerning social work. For the state, it means the prevention of foreign influence as expressed in the National Security Concept.21 In 2001, Metropolitan Filaret demanded ‘that the state [should] ensure “spiritual security” and limit activities of destructive and pseudo-­Christian communities that destroy the spiritual, social and cultural unity of the Belarusian people’.22 Since then, speaking about spiritual security has been a constant of both religious and political repertoire.23 In 2012, the Belarusian Church published a book entitled Orthodoxy and Spiritual Security written by Aleksej Osipov, Head of the Philosophy Department of the National ­Academy of ­Sciences of Belarus. Against the background of various ­challenges

Belarus  129 regarding m ­ odernity such as the ‘lack of moral values’, ‘the lack of spirituality or false spirituality’ and ‘the decay of the institution of the family’, Osipov considers Orthodoxy as a ‘force able to bring back the spiritual and moral health of a person and society, to maintain unity and stability in the country’.24 For Osipov, ‘non-­traditional religiosity’ represents one of the main threats to Belarusian society and, thus, Orthodoxy could serve as a guarantee and protection from its destructive influence. One recent example of how spiritual security could be interpreted was the petition by some lay Orthodox believers to ban the premiere of the opera Salome in September 2018, which was planned to be performed on the eve of the day marking the beheading of John the Baptist. In an open letter to the government bodies and the Bishops of the Orthodox Church, the authors of the letter condemned the opera as ‘sacrilege’, ‘offending the feelings of the Orthodox believers’ and ‘a threat to the spiritual security of the state’.25 On the other hand, it is state policy to promote the multi-confessionality of the country, which theoretically guarantees the peaceful ‘mentality’ of ­Belarusians. Allegedly, a ‘pluralism of worldviews, which manifests itself in religious tolerance’ is characteristic of Belarussians.26 Moreover, the prioritisation of one confession has sometimes been considered a threat to the stability of society as ­presented in the collection of articles published by the Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences. According to Viktor Starostenko: Ideologies about the prevailing religiosity of the Belarusian population and their dominating adherence to the Orthodox confession are dangerous for social stability and the national spiritual security because they may serve as an ideological basis for ungrounded preference in the religious sphere, the discrimination of citizens on the grounds of their relationship to religion, attempts to de-secularize society and the state, theologisation of the state education, etc.27 It is therefore clear that it is only possible for the Orthodox Church to succeed when it resonates with state policy and rhetoric. After more than 20 years of Lukashenko’s regime, the Russian Orthodox Church in Belarus remains regressive and a passive social actor has not managed to profile as a civil society institution with its genuine and independent position.28 This is also evident in the case of the migrant problem. The following sections focus on the position of the Belarusian Orthodox Church with regards migrants and refugees after the beginning of the Russian–Ukrainian conflict in 2014 and during the European refugee crisis in 2015–16.

Migration in Belarus For many years, Afghans, who came to Belarus in the 1980s and 1990s, accounted for nearly 70 per cent of all the country’s refugees and have been highlighted as a positive example of immigrants adapting to life in Belarus.29

130  A. Alshanskaya More recently, the numbers of asylum seekers from the Middle East in ­ elarus have been rather modest because the country is not regarded as a B primary choice of destination; Belarus is difficult to get to and is not considered a particularly wealthy country. According to official statistics provided by the Ministry of the Interior, only 36 Syrians received refugee status in Belarus between 2013 and 2017.30 Both the Ministry of the Interior and the United Nations sponsored the arrival and accommodation for only three Syrian families in Belarus in 2015 and 2016. The state media has repeatedly released reports about the few Syrians living in apartments in the town of Gomel, in the Southeastern part of the country.31 The main aim of these reports has been to create a positive image of state policies and that the government is seemingly no less concerned about migrants than other European countries. Moreover, the reports repeatedly emphasised that authorities expected that the newcomers will integrate into Belarusian society.32 Belarus has never been a particularly attractive destination for migrants due to the modest financial support provided by the state, as evidenced by the fact that the authorities were under no obligation to provide accommodation or integrational courses (e.g. language tuition).33 Belarus has mostly been used as a starting point to reach the European Union (EU). Russian citizens from Chechnya and other parts of the North Caucasus usually cross the EU border from the territory of Belarus; thus, in August 2016, a ‘small-scale refugee crisis unfolded at the Belarusian-Polish border near Brest’34 when several thousand people attempted to cross the border claiming to be political refugees and suffering under the repressive regime in Chechnya. Most were refused entry to the EU, but they did not give up and repeatedly tried to enter on a daily basis, spending time in Brest. The grounds for these difficulties as regards crossing the EU border were as follows. The number of Chechen refugees in the EU had been rising increasingly until 2015. At that time, they did not face any problems entering the EU because their place of destination was not Poland, rather Germany or other countries. However, when the refugee crisis in Southern Europe intensified in 2015, Germany, challenged by the quantity of migrants, forced the Chechens to return to refugee camps in Poland.35 Coping with the Chechen migrants therefore became Poland’s responsibility. It is for this reason that the number of migrants allowed to enter was reduced and why they had to return to Russia or stay in Brest and try again. The Belarusian authorities did not consider this situation critical and described the migration situation in Belarus as ‘stable and controlled’.36 In January 2017, the EU promised to fund the construction of refugee camps in Belarus within the framework of the EU–Belarus Mobility Partnership Programme and that the European Commission would transfer some seven million euros to Minsk to finance the construction work. This step was necessary to help Belarus cope with illegal migration and, at the same time, ensure quick signing of the Readmission Agreement, which would oblige the Belarusian government to admit the individuals who had entered the EU

Belarus  131 i­llegally and were facing deportation. It would also mean that Belarus would be forced to deal with illegal migrants trying to enter the EU, who would have no success of receiving any asylum, whereas without this agreement, it could simply observe the attempts of refugees crossing the border and ignore what was going on or even hope to gain from it.37 The news about the reception centres only whipped up fears of deported migrants that would soon land in Belarus and the Belarusian population had visions of the hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants who had arrived in the EU in 2015; the images were constantly screened by the state media and were a part of the state’s mainstream anti-European rhetoric.38 However, these refugee camps are yet to be built and the Readmission Agreement has not been signed at the time of writing.

Ukrainian migrants On the other hand, Belarus remains an attractive option for Ukrainians forced to flee the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine since 2015. Belarus is desirable for them because they can easily integrate into society and its reputation as a country of ‘order and stability’ among neighbouring states. Furthermore, as Lizaveta Kasmach argues, ‘Ukrainian citizens from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions enjoyed preferential treatment from the Belarusian state. Simplified procedures for temporary and permanent residence applications helped to expedite formalities for migrants from Eastern Ukraine.’39 The number of Ukrainian refugees in Belarus remains unclear. In ­November 2015, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) stated that 160,000 people had fled Eastern Ukraine for Belarus. In December 2015, Andrea Wiktorin, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to Belarus, acknowledged these numbers by indicating that: It’s essential that humanitarian aid gets to all vulnerable people affected by the conflict in the Ukraine. There are around 160,000 refugees that have fled the conflict in eastern Ukraine to Belarus. The European Commission prides itself in giving humanitarian aid wherever needed, so the most vulnerable get the support they deserve.40 This figure resurfaced the following year, first in April when President ­Alexander Lukashenko mentioned the refugees,41 then at a press conference on 7 July 2016, when Vladimir Makei, the Belarusian Foreign Minister, pointed out that the numbers stopped. He stated that: The problem [of forced migration and refugees] should be resolved. We are feeling this ourselves, we have over 160,000 refugees from Ukraine. Now their numbers do not rise anymore and have stopped growing. But we duly had to undertake urgent decisions, which should have resulted in these people not feeling as if they were in trouble.42

132  A. Alshanskaya According to the Belarusian Ministry of the Interior, Ukrainian migrants prefer to become temporary or permanent residents, rather than apply for asylum.43 Despite these statements, it remains difficult to find any reliable data about Ukrainian migrants. The figure of 160,000 people includes refugees, of course, but also economic migrants and people with family ties in Belarus who could potentially apply for citizenship very quickly. As is the case in most countries in Europe, Belarus differentiates between refugees and people who emigrate for humanitarian reasons (subsidiary protection). According to the Department of Citizenship and Migration of the Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs, between 2014 and 2018, only 3,318 citizens of the Ukraine applied for refugee status or subsidiary protection in Belarus,44 which means international protection for persons seeking asylum who do not qualify as refugees. Only four were granted official refugee status and 2,690 obtained subsidiary protection. The vast majority of immigrants from the warring region of the Ukrainian Donbass have the status of migrant workers with temporary (one year) or permanent residence permit in Belarus. Overall, during the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2016, 38,171 such migrants were registered (according to the statistics of the Department of Citizenship and Migration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Belarus),45 and many of them were migrant workers from all over Ukraine, not just Donbass. Also, it should be noted that some were seasonal migrants coming to work in Belarus and then returning to the Ukraine. Consequently, the alternative expert estimate of the number of migrants from Donbass in Belarus amounts to approximately 25,000–30,000 people. The discrepancy between the figures casts doubt over the credibility of the figure of 160,000 people, which seems instead to be merely a topic for political speculation. As Denis Ivashin wrote, spreading false refugee-related information benefits the Belarusian government: ‘they are trying to secure a new status for Belarus as one of the leaders of accommodating forced migrants and, thus, strengthen Belarus’s role and reputation in the international community’. In his opinion, the tactics are clear: ‘after successfully serving as a “peace negotiator” both in the Karabakh and in Donbass talks, the desire for Belarus to become a nominal leader in refugee issues seems quite logical’.46 It can also be confirmed by the self-­ estimation of the Belarusian Foreign Minister, Vladimir Makei: ‘Europe starts to realize that Belarus is a donor of stability and security, not a troublemaker. Together with Europeans, we work on addressing joint challenges such as illegal migration, drug trafficking and international crime.’47

The aftermath of the Russian–Ukrainian conflict for Belarus and the reaction of the Orthodox Church and civil society The Belarusian government has been troubled by Russia’s interference in Ukraine and tried to distance itself from Russia. As Yaraslau Kryvoi and Andrew Wilson expressed, ‘although Belarus acted more as a broker than a

Belarus  133 genuine neutral party at the negotiations that produced the two “Minsk Agreements”, the government has profound doubts about Russia’s assault on its neighbour’s sovereignty’.48 Therefore, the expressions by the officials and the president on this topic are always ambiguous: they do not want to openly support Russia but are, nevertheless, eager to avoid conflict with Russia because Belarus is, first and foremost, economically dependent on loans and subsidiaries from Russia. In public, people are at pains to remain evasive on this issue and avoid expressing their opinion or take sides – Ukrainian or Russian. The Belarusian Orthodox Church – its top hierarchs as well as the priests – are in complete agreement with this strategy of the Belarusian government. Officially, the church praised the Minsk Agreements and steadily repeated abstract expressions such as ‘we support peace in the whole world’, neither determining the side of the guilty party nor that of the victim.49 This has also been the strategy adopted by the Russian Orthodox Church, which officially tried to stay above the conflict by not supporting either side, while describing the war in the Ukraine as a ‘civil war’.50 Two factors are thus determining the attitude of the Belarussian Church, which is too weak to adopt an independent position: the politics of the Belarusian government and the politics of the church in Russia. Thus, there are almost no initiatives or written documents, such as pastoral letters, by any church officials trying to mobilise Orthodox believers into helping at least their Ukrainian co-believers. Even the ­ document ­‘Principles and Directions of Work with Migrants in the Russian Orthodox Church’51 adopted by the Supreme Church Council of the Russian Orthodox Church was not republished on the website of the Belarusian Orthodox Church as is usually the case with such documents,52 testifying to the i­rrelevancy of this issue for the Belarusian Church.53 As an institution, the ­ Belarusian Church remains silent on the Ukrainian war and migration issues. Since August 2014, the only times when a local bishop directly showed support for Ukrainian migrants were in the diocese of Gomel. For example, with the support of the Red Cross and state authorities, essentials were provided and household appliances were distributed to those in need between December 2014 and January 2015.54 In other words, the diocese was not organising support, but acted as a conduit for the help provided by the state and international organisations. In addition, during the same period, a number of monetary collections for Ukrainian migrants were organised by the charity departments of the Vitebsk and Grodno dioceses.55 These limited activities mainly concerned the people already residing in Belarus. There has been only one initiative in Belarus aimed at helping those remaining in the conflict regions, which can be described as the enterprise of a single person: the Belarusian writer, Nikolay Gavrilov, who launched an aid programme at the beginning of the conflict in April 2014. He approached a church community in Minsk well known for social work and, with local support, started to collect clothes and essential items and took them to the Donbass region.56 The local priest also endorsed his actions and allowed the

134  A. Alshanskaya collection of items in his community. Moreover, this group of people regularly took children to Belarus during school holidays and provided them with medical help, entertainment and a ‘safe environment’. In interviews taken by this author with members of this parish in summer 2018, one of these activists spoke plainly about how difficult it had been to deliver collected items. First, in order to reach those in need the parish cooperated with the ‘Help to ­Novorossija’ Foundation, which is based in Russia,57 and for this reason the parish decided not to continue cooperating with it. The interviewees insisted on maintaining political neutrality and did not want to be employed by any side of the conflict.58 It was also interesting to discover that some priests had the capacity and were ready to provide monetary assistance, yet they did so under the prerequisite of remaining anonymous, so that they could not be accused of getting involved in political activities if they were seen to be helping people in Eastern Ukraine who were mostly associated with separatists. In conclusion, the Belarusian Church is not concerned with the problems of migrants at an institutional level. It proclaims that its mission is that of a social actor, but its social work is limited.59 Similarly, other Christian churches in Belarus are more interested in the ‘secular tendencies’ coming from the West than migration issues.60 On the other hand, Natallia Vasilevich argues convincingly that, despite the underdevelopment of the religious sector of civil society and unfavourable legal basis for its activities, combined with lack of organisational and human resources and narrow focus of activities, voluntary ­grass-root religious organisations possess motivation and potential for joint participation in civil processes. They do it independently of church corporations, state institutions or civil society organisations.61 However, there is a tremendous paucity even of such initiatives and they cannot provide systematic and enduring help for migrants or refugees. The Orthodox Church in Belarus lacks the ideological (theological) and organisational (financial) capacity to fulfil its propagated mission of hospitality.

The European refugee crisis Similar to other European societies, Belarus faces the problem of an ageing population and is in need of external migration. President Alexander Lukashenko admitted that migration could be a solution to demographic issues, but also expressed his concerns regarding the national security risks posed by unregulated migration flow, stating that ‘We are not about to start playing democratic games in these issues’.62 On 15 January 2016, he commented on the refugee crisis in the EU, noting that the latter is ‘drowning in the streams of migrants, accompanied with terror and criminality’.63 The Foreign Minister, Vladimir Makei, made a comparable statement by pointing out that

Belarus  135 Of course, the problem is global, but we, in Belarus, have resolved it at this stage. We hope that there will be no more such waves [of migration] in the future. But, we are observing what is happening in Europe from a distance, thinking that it is urgent to make rapid, clear-cut and concrete decisions, otherwise, the Europeans will soon have to reconsider retaining their European identity.64 Against the backdrop of the conflict in the Ukraine and the European refugee crisis, the president’s main strategy was to present Belarus as the last island of peace and stability in Europe or even the world and to stage himself as a reliable partner for both European countries and Russia. In his own words, ‘Belarus remains an island of peace, calm and order and this is our achievement’.65 This strategy was necessary for his interior politics to dissociate the president from economic issues in his own country and to calm possible public disturbance. As a whole, anti-European rhetoric has been an important tool in the self-sustaining strategy of the Belarusian political elites. An example of the ways in which anti-European rhetoric has been built alongside the instrumentalisation of the refugee crisis in Europe, not just in the state-controlled media, but also by intellectuals, is a performance at the state national theatre in Minsk in 2018. The original title of the play was God of Carnage, after the French Le Dieu du Carnage (2006), written by the French playwright Yasmina Reza. Roman Polanski directed an adaptation of the play in 2011 and shortened the title to Carnage. The play tells the story of two families of parents and children. The child of one family hurts another child in a public park. The families meet to discuss the matter as civilised people, however, as the evening unfolds, the parents become increasingly unstable and the whole situation turns into chaos. The Belarusian director, Nikolaj Pinigin, renamed the play Tolerance and made the starting point of the play directed against ‘European tolerance’. The meaning of the word ‘tolerance’ in the public rhetoric has shifted over recent years from an essential attribute of Belarusian identity66 to almost a swearword.67 The play was interpreted in correspondence with anti-refugee and anti-European rhetoric in Belarus and was presented in this way in state media.68 The play turned out to be a warning to Belarusian society against European tolerance by allowing Muslim migrants to come to Europe, which would ultimately result in the loss of European identity.69 The actions taking place in the play were accompanied by the news headlines broadcasted on a TV set on stage, where the two families were arguing. The headlines depicted violence in the Turkish, Japanese or Georgian parliaments or pictures from the European refugee crisis in Spain and Greece in 2015 and 2016. The play finished with a dramatic epilogue: instead of two quarrelling families, two Muslim couples sat in the room peacefully discussing daily affairs. At the end of their performance, the Muslims gave thanks to Allah. The director tried to show the contrast between the peaceful ­atmosphere of Muslim families, with God taking centre stage in their lives,

136  A. Alshanskaya and the hateful situation in the European families, who seem to be tolerant and praise tolerance and dedication to multi-culturalism. In fact, by doing so, they became even more intolerant than other peoples, not least because they lost their God and turned their back on religion. The image of a godless Western Europe is popular in many Eastern European countries. Moreover, the migrant crisis has been used to defame the European project and induce anti-European feelings. Unfortunately, mass media does not report on activities regarding refugee aid, which have often been inspired by the social vocation of the European churches. The Orthodox Church remains completely blind to arguments of Christian engagement towards refugees in Europe.

Conclusion The Belarusian Orthodox Church’s indifference to migrants and refugees has been affected by myriad complex factors. First of all, the Belarusian Church is not yet a fully independent actor as it depends both administratively and ideologically on two neighbouring powers, namely the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow and the Belarusian government. The church is limited in its actions, particularly if any activities might raise suspicion of opposition to the government or state policies (for example, financing the opposition). The state retains leverage over church affairs by ensuring that the church complies with the secular law of the Belarusian state and by denying public privileges. A main question is whether the Russian Orthodox Church as an institution, and the Belarusian Church as a part of it, considers social work as a field of its own responsibility. The Orthodox theology, at least in its modern and popular appearance, does not focus on the ‘earthly life’, but much more on the afterlife. From this perspective, the Orthodox believer should pay attention to salvation in their future life, which can be achieved through prayer, rather than focusing extensively on the earthly life. This view has been ­central to the lack of social engagement within Russian Orthodoxy in comparison to Western Christian churches. The Russian (and consequently ­Belarusian) Orthodox Church has not formulated a theology of hospitality. The Russian Orthodox Church historically has at no point been a driver of social change; on the contrary, it provided many examples that could be associated with xenophobia, nationalism and social segregation. There have been more (geo)political messages, than social or even theological ones made by Russian Orthodox speakers in public speeches. The number of social projects provided by the Social Department of the Russian Orthodox Church are still too few for such a big and powerful institution as the Moscow Patriarchate, which possesses large administrative and financial resources, especially in comparison to much smaller Catholic and Protestant communities in Eastern Europe. Moreover, social activities initiated by lay people are often not welcomed by Church authorities, because they do not match the official agenda of the Church. Russian Orthodox bishops are often not acquainted with

Belarus  137 d­ ay-to-day social problems. The patriarch’s image is that of avoiding contact with ordinary believers and is almost always seen surrounded by bodyguards, even during the liturgy.70 Hopefully, public awareness of the social work as a duty for all Christian believers could transform the Belarusian Orthodox Church as an institution in the future.

Notes   1 For more about confessional history on the territory of the contemporary Belarus, see Antoni Mironowicz, The Orthodox Church and Byelorussian People, Białystok: Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in the Poland 2001; Anton Miranovich, Pravaslaunaja Belarus’ (Orthodox Belarus), Białystok: Białoruskie Towarzystwo Historyczne, 2009; Valjancina Grygor’eva et al. (ed.), Kanfessi na Belarusi (kanec XVIII-XX st.) (Confessions in Belarus (from the end of XVIII century to the XX century)), Minsk: Ekaperspektyva, 1998; Elena Filatova, Konfessional’naja politika carskogo pravitel’stva v Belarusi. 1772–1860 gg. (Confessional Policy by the Tsar’s Government in Belarus), Minsk: Belorusskaja nauka, 2006; Barbara Skinner, The Western Front of the Eastern Church: Uniate and Orthodox Conflict in Eighteenth-­ Century Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press 2009; Andrej Kotljarchuk, ‘Ruthenian Protestants of the Great Duchy of Lithuania and their Relationship with Orthodoxy, 1569–1767’, Lithuanian ­Historical Studies, 2007, 12, pp. 41–62.   2 For the historical attempt to build the Belarusian Autocephalous Church during the Second World War, see Daniela Kalkandjieva, The Russian Orthodox Church, 1917–1948: From Decline to Resurrection, Oxford: Routledge, 2015, pp. 120–122; for the post-Soviet attempts, see Katja Richters, The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church: Politics, Culture and Greater Russia, London: Routledge, 2013, pp. 128–148; Nelly Bekus, ‘On the Political Mission of Orthodoxy in Belarus and its Consequences for the Church and State’ in Nelly Bekus, Michał Wawrzonek and Mirella Korzeniewska-Wiszniewska (eds.), Orthodoxy Versus Post-­Communism?: Belarus, Serbia, Ukraine and the Russkiy Mir, Cambridge, UK: ­Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016, pp. 71–158 (especially, pp. 135–139).   3 For example, the protocols of the Belarusian synodal sessions are to be published on its official website only after their confirmation by the Synod in Moscow, which represents very restrictive rule and degree of dependence. Petro Sivolap, . ‘Obrjad zavisimosti dlja Ekzarchata’ (The Rite of Dependence for the Exarchate), 28 October 2015, available at http://churchby.info/rus/articles/obryad-­ zavisimosti-dlya-ekzarhata (accessed on 21 October 2018).  4 For more see Natallia Vasilevich, ‘Glava BPC Mitropolit Pavel – grazhdanin Rossijskoj Federacii: pravovye posledstvija’ (Head of the Belarusian Orthodox Church Metropolitan Pavel – a citizen of the Russian Federation: Legal Consequences), 24 January 2014, available at http://forb.by/node/402 (accessed on 21 October 2018).   5 See especially pp. 174–177 in Natallia Vasilevich, ‘Religious Sphere: Prayer for Belarus, Prayer for Lukashenko?’ in Belarusian Yearbook 2016. A Survey and Analysis of Developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2015, Vilnius: Lohvinau, 2016, pp. 171–178.  6 The history and official information on the Belarusian Orthodox Church are available at http://church.by/belorusskiy-ekzarhat/ (accessed on 21 October 2018). For the post-Soviet period, see Sergei A. Mudrov, ‘The Belarusian Orthodox Church’ in Lucian N. Leustean (ed.), Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge 2014, pp. 334–356.

138  A. Alshanskaya   7 Bekus, ‘On the Political Mission of Orthodoxy in Belarus’, p. 109.  8 Steve Crabtree and Brett Pelham, ‘What Alabamians and Iranians have in common’, 9 February 2009, available at https://news.gallup.com/poll/114211/­ alabamians-iranians-​ common.aspx (accessed on 31 October 2018); and Steve Crabtree, ‘Religiosity highest in world’s poorest nations’, 31 October 2010, available at https://news.gallup.com/poll/142727/religiosity-highest-world-poorestnations.aspx (accessed on 31 October 2018).  9 Pew Research Centre, ‘Religija i nacional’naja prinadlezhnost’ v Central’noj i Vostochnoj Evrope’ (Religion and national adherence in Central and Eastern Europe), available at http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/ 11/2017/​05/10104852/CEUP-Overview-Russian-FOR-WEB.pdf (accessed on 31 October 2018); Natalja Balich, ‘Religiozno-kul’turnyj pluralism i tolerantnost’ sovremennogo belorusskogo obschestva’ (Religious and cultural pluralism and tolerance of the contemporary Belarusian society) in Аleksandr Kovalenja et al. (ed.) Hristianstvo v Belarusi: istorija i sovremennost’ (Christianity in Belarus: History and Today), Minsk: Belaruskaja navuka, 2014, pp. 463–469; Natalja Balich, ‘Religioznaja identichnost’ naselenija Belarusi i Krasnodarskogo kraja: sravnitel’nyj sociologicheskij analiz’ (Religious Identity of the Population of Belarus and of the Krasnodar Region: Comparative Sociological Analysis), Sociologicheskij al’manach 2016, 7, pp. 248–256; or a much more differentiated approach in Svjatlana K ­ arassyova, Alena Shkurova and Siargei Shatrauski, ‘Issledovanie religioznosti v Belarusi: krosskonfessional’nyj podhod’ (Studying Religiosity in Belarus: Cross-Confessional Approach), Filosofija i social’nye nauki, 2015, 1, pp. 53–58, available at http://elib.bsu. by/bitstream/​123456789/​118902/1/53-58.pdf (accessed on 31 October 2018). 10 Religion and denominations in the Republic of Belarus, 2011, available at www. mfa.gov.by/upload/pdf/religion_eng.pdf (accessed on 31 October 2018). 11 Natallia Vasilevich, ‘Unequal by Default: Church and State in Belarus in the Period of Consolidated Authoritarianism’ in Valer Bulhakau and Aliaksei Lastouski (eds.), Civil Society in Belarus 2000–2015. Collection of Texts, Warsaw: East European Democratic Centre, 2015, pp. 97–127 (especially, p. 117). 12 Katja Richters, The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church: Politics, Culture and Greater Russia, London: Routledge, 2013, p. 135. 13 Quoted in Vasilevich, ‘Unequal by Default’, p. 114. 14 Ibid. President Lukashenko, addressing Orthodox believers after the amended Law was signed, stated that in Belarus ‘secular authorities and the Church are united’, that the Orthodox Church ‘struggles with destructive forces’, ‘fruitfully cooperates with the state authorities’, is ‘not divided from the state’ and moreover, plays ‘the most significant role’, being a ‘cement’ that unites society’. ‘The Speech of the President of the Republic of Belarus in Holy Spirit Cathedral in Minsk at the Christmas worship’, 7 January 2003, available at http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ ru/view/vystuplenieprezidenta-respubliki-belarus-aleksandra-lukashenko-v-svjatoduxovom-kafedralnom-sobore-minskana-5816/ (accessed on 13 October 2018). 15 The full text of the Agreement on the cooperation between the Republic of Belarus and the Belarusian Orthodox Church is available at www.concordatwatch. eu/showtopic.php?org_id=3571&kb_header_id=13271 (accessed on 13 October 2018). 16 Bekus, ‘On the Political Mission of Orthodoxy in Belarus’, p. 110. 17 For more about some agreements and their implementation, see Natalia Vasilevich, ‘The Belarusian Orthodox Church in the Shadow of the State’, Russian Politics and Law, 2014, 52 (5), pp. 7–31 (especially pp. 14–15). 18 Bekus, ‘On the Political Mission of Orthodoxy in Belarus’, pp. 132–133. She states that ‘Favouring the Belarusian Orthodox Church is manifested not so much

Belarus  139 in supporting its activities, but in the restrictions which apply to the alternative religious choices for people in Belarus’ (p. 132–133). 19 Compare with Vasilevich, ‘Unequal by Default’, p. 117. She points out that ‘Declarative recognition of the Church’s status […] demands from the Church loyalty to authorities, since loyalty is the most precious resource for the ­government’ (p. 117). 20 See ‘Heroes of Belarus’ on the official website of the President of the Republic of Belarus, available at http://president.gov.by/en/heroes-of-belarus/ (accessed on 13 October 2018). 21 Vasilevich, ‘Unequal by Default’, p. 108. She emphasised that According to that Concept [National Security Concept], one of the main threats to the Republic of Belarus in the sphere of humanities is ‘the activity of foreign religious organisations and missionaries who attempt to monopolise the spiritual life of society (paragraph 7.2.6) while counteracting the negative influence of foreign religious organisations and missionaries and ‘monitoring of ethnical and confessional sphere’ were a security priority (paragraph 7.3.7)’ (italics in original) (p. 108). 22 Ibid. pp. 107–108. 23 Ol’ga Pavlovskaja, Svetlana Vinokurova and Tatjana Korotkaja (eds.), Bezopasnost’ Belarusi v gumanitarnoj sfere. Sociokul’turnye i duhovno-nravstvennye problem (The Security of Belarus in the Area of Humanities. Socio-Cultural and Spiritual– Moral Problems), Minsk: Belaruskaja navuka, 2010; Natalja Kozhich, ‘Pravoslavnye cennosti kak duhovno-mirovozzrencheskij aspekt nacional’noj bezopasnosti’ (Orthodox Values as a Spiritual and Worldwide Aspect of the National Security), Trudy BGTU, 2016, 5 (187), pp. 146–149; Dmitrij Beznjuk, ‘Nacional’naja i religioznaja bezopasnost’ Belarusi: sociologicheskij aspekt’, (National and Religious Security of Belarus: Sociological Aspect), Sociologija, 2006, 1, pp. 57–64. 24 Aleksej Osipov, Pravoslavie i duchovnaja bezopasnot’ (Orthodoxy and Spiritual Security), Minsk: Belorusskaja pravoslavnaja cerkov, 2012. For more on this book, see http://sobor.by/page/Vishla_v_svet_kniga_A_I_Osipova_Pravoslavie_i_ duhovnaya_​bezopasnost (accessed on 1 October 2018). 25 This open letter was sent to Presidential Administration, Prosecutor’s office and the Synod of the Belarusian Exarchate. In consequence, the premiere of the opera ‘Salome’ was postponed from 9–10 September 2018 (Russian Orthodox believers celebrate the John the Baptist’s beheading day on the following day, on 11 ­ September) to 18–19 October 2018. For more see: ‘Premjera “Salomei” Schtrausa perenesena na oktjabr’ (‘The Premiere of the opera ‘Salome’ was postponed to October’), 7 September 2018, available at www.sb.by/articles/premerasalomei-shtrausa-v-bolshom-teatre-belarusi-perenesena-na-oktyabr.html (accessed on 31 October 2018). The text of the letter is available here: www.odigitria. by/2018/09/05/iz-redakcionnoj-pochty-otkrytoe-pismo-pravoslavnyx-­grazhdanbelarusi-protiv-salomei/ (accessed on 31 October 2018). 26 Balich, ‘Religiozno-kul’turnyj pluralism i tolerantnost’, p. 465. 27 Viktor Starostenko, ‘Sovremennaja religioznaja situacija v Belarusi’ (Religious ­Situation in Belarus Today) in Ol’ga Pavlovskaja, Viktor Starostenko and Ljubov’ Vladykovskaja (eds.), Duhovno-nravstvennye cennosti v formirovanii sovremennogo cheloveka (Spiritual and Moral Values in the Formation of the Modern Human), Minsk: ­Belarusskaja navuka 2011, p. 340. 28 Alesia Rudnik, ‘Influential or influenced: the Belarusian Orthodox Church’, 22 March 2017, available at https://belarusdigest.com/story/influential-or-­ influenced-the-belarusian-orthodox-church/ (accessed on 1 October 2018).

140  A. Alshanskaya 29 Ryhor Astapenia, ‘Migrants from Eastern Ukraine put pressure on Belarus’, 3 August 2015, available at https://belarusdigest.com/story/migrants-from-­ eastern-ukraine-put-pressure-on-belarus/ (accessed on 1 October 2018). 30 The official website of the Ministry of the Interior, available at http://mvd.gov. by/main.aspx?guid=69883 (accessed on 14 October 2018). 31 See the report about Syrian refugees in Belarus on the official website of the ­Permanent Mission of the Republic of Belarus to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva, available at http://geneva.mfa.gov. by/ru/embassy/news/d7f3decfba712fa2.html (accessed on 14 October 2018) or the report in the state media about tree Syrian refugee families, available at https://news.tut.by/society/437325.html (accessed on 1 October 2018). 32 Lizaveta Kasmach, ‘Belarus learns to absorb tens of thousands Ukrainians’, 9 January 2016, available at https://belarusdigest.com/story/belarus-learns-toabsorb-tens-of-thousands-ukrainians/ (accessed on 1 October 2018). 33 Astapenia, ‘Migrants from Eastern Ukraine put pressure on Belarus’. 34 Lizaveta Kasmach, ‘Chechens struggle to enter the EU through Belarus’, 22 ­February 2017, available at https://belarusdigest.com/story/chechens-struggleto-enter-the-eu-through-belarus/ (accessed on 1 October 2018). 35 For more on Chechen migrants, see Anastasia Kirilenko, ‘Chechen refugees in Europe: Reasons why they flee Russia and Asylum problems’, 2017, available at https://legaldialogue.org/chechen-refugees-europe-reasons-flee-russia-asylum-problems (accessed on 13 October 2018); Marat Iliyasov, ‘Researching the Chechen Diaspora in Europe’, Interdisciplinary Political Studies, 2017, 3 (1), pp. 201–218; Marta Gawinek, Jessica Prue and Maryna Zhukovska, ‘Moving beyond statistics: Narratives of Chechen refugees in Poland’, available at www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/61-­moving-​beyond-​ statistics-​narratives-of-chechen-refugees-in-poland (accessed on 13 October 2018). 36 Kasmach, ‘Chechens struggle to enter the EU through Belarus’. 37 Ibid. 38 Natalia Makushina and Roman Goncharenko, ‘Fight over migrant centres in Belarus’, 24 January 2017, available at www.dw.com/en/fight-over-migrantcenters-in-belarus/a-37260516 (accessed on 13 October 2018). 39 Kasmach, ‘Belarus learns to absorb tens of thousands Ukrainians’. 40 ‘EU allocated €300,000 to Belarus to help Ukrainian refugees’, 14 December 2015, available at https://udf.by/english/soc/132016-eu-allocated-300000-tobelarus-to-help-ukrainian-refugees.html (accessed on 13 October 2018). 41 Alexander Lukashenko, ‘Poslanie belorusskomu narodu i Nacional’nomu sobraniju’ (Address to the Belarusian People and National Assembly), 21 April 2017, available at http://president.gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/ezhegodnoe-poslanie-kbelorusskomu-narodu-i-natsionalnomu-sobraniju-16059/ (accessed on 15 October 2018). 42 Interfax-Ukraine, ‘Belarusian FM reports over 160,000 Ukrainian refugees in the country’, Kyiv Post, 26 September 2016, available at www.kyivpost.com/ukrainepolitics/foreign-ministry-160000-ukrainian-refugees-belarus.html (accessed on 21 October 2018). 43 Kasmach, ‘Belarus learns to absorb tens of thousands Ukrainians’. 44 The official statistic data of the Ministry of the Interior, available at http://mvd. gov.by/main.aspx?guid=69883 (accessed on 14 October 2018). 45 The official statistic data of the Ministry of the Interior to the work migration available at http://mvd.gov.by/ru/main.aspx?guid=16721. 46 Denis Ivashin, ‘Ukrainian refugees – a topic for political speculation in Belarus’, 30 December 2016, available at https://informnapalm.org/en/ukrainian-refugeestopic-political-speculation-belarus/ (accessed on 13 October 2018).

Belarus  141 47 Makei, ‘Europe starts to realize that Belarus is a donor of stability and security’, 19 September 2015, available at http://eng.belta.by/politics/view/makei-europe-startsto-realize-that-belarus-is-a-donor-of-stability-and-security-86331-2015/ (accessed on 21 October 2018). 48 Yaraslau Kryvoi and Andrew Wilson, ‘From sanctions to summits: Belarus after the Ukraine crisis’, 5 May 2015, available at www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/ from_sanctions_to_summits_belarus_after_the_ukraine_crisis3016 (accessed on 1 October 2018). 49 Press conference of the Metropolitan Pavel (Ponomarev), 21 January 2015 available at https://minsknews.by/mitropolit-pavel-vse-resheniya-kotoryie-prinimaet-tserkovdolzhnyi-byit-v-duhe-edinomyisliya-bratskoy-lyubvi-i-soglasiya/ (accessed on 31 October 2018). 50 The address of Patriarch Kirill to the leaders of the local Orthodox churches regarding the situation in Ukraine, 2014, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/ text/3704024.html (accessed on 31 October 2018). Or the interview by Patriarch Kirill to Bulgarian journalists ahead of visit to Bulgaria, 2018, www.patriarchia. ru/db/text/5155533.html (accessed on 31 October 2018). 51 ‘Principles and areas of work with migrants in the Russian Orthodox Church’, 20 November 2014, available at www.patriarchia.ru/db/print/460673.html (accessed on 31 October 2018). 52 See the section on ‘All-church documents’, available at http://church.by/ru/ docs/obshhecerkovnye_dokumenty (accessed on 1 October 2018). 53 The same situation can be noticed with the document ‘Communique of the Committee of the Representatives of Orthodox Churches to the European Union on the refugee crisis in Europe’, available at www.orthodoxru.eu/index. php?content=article&category=news&id=2015-09-24-1&lang=en (accessed on 1 October 2018) adopted in September 2015, which was not published in Russian language even on the websites of the Representation of the Russian Orthodox Church to the European Institutions or the Moscow Patriarchate. 54 Examples of two such actions: ‘Podarki dlja bezhencev iz Ukrainy v derevne Korma Dobrushskogo rajona’ (‘Gifts for refugees from Ukraine in the village Korma, Dobrush region’), 20 December 2014, available at http://eparhiya.by/deyatelnost/98podarki-dlya-bezhencev-iz-ukrainy-v-derevne-korma-dobrushskogo-rayona.html; and ‘Gumanitarnuju pomosch’ sem’jam ukrainskih bezhencev peredal episkop Gomel’skij i Zhlobinskij Stefan’ (‘Bishop of Gomel and Zhlobin Stefan has distributed humanitarian aid for Ukrainian refugee families’), 26 January 2015, available at https://news. tut.by/society/432881.html (accessed on 1 October 2018). 55 ‘Semjam bezhencev iz Ukrainy okazyvajut pomosch’ v eparchial’nom Diakonicheskom centre’ (‘Families of Ukrainian refugees are provided with aid from the Diocesan diaconical centre’), available at https://vitprav.by/3526.html; and ‘Bezhency iz Doneckoj i Luganskoj oblastej obosnovalis’ na Schuchine’ (‘Refugees from the Donetsk and Lugansk regions have settled in Schuchino’), 26 January 2015, available at http://grodnonews.by/category/zhizn/news19804.html (accessed on 1 October 2018). 56 More details on this work can be seen here: https://vk.com/blrdonbassu. Also for other activities, see the section ‘Crisis in Ukraine’ on the website of the parish: www.sobor.by/news.php?selection=73&nyear=2018 (accessed on 1 October 2018). 57 The account of the Foundation ‘Help to Novorossija’ in the Russian social network ‘V kontakte’ is available here: https://vk.com/spasidonbass (accessed on 1 October 2018). 58 Oleksij Kovalenko, ‘ “Bez pomoschi ljudi by prosto ne vyzhili”: kak belorusy vozjat pripasy v ATO’ (‘People would not be alive without help’: How Belarusians

142  A. Alshanskaya bring essentials into the zone of ATO), 23 November 2015, available at https:// projects.platfor.ma/belato/ (accessed on 1 October 2018). 59 The so-called ‘Church asylum’ (Kirchenasyl) movement allows Catholic and Evangelical churches in Germany to offer asylum to people who failed to acquire asylum status by taking responsibility of their accommodation. The German Church asylum movement emerged as a network of Christian congregations in 1983, when church communities began to shelter people threatened with deportation. In 1991, in the Nuremberg Declaration, German churches criticised the government’s inability to secure support for political persecutions. Since then, the relevance of the church asylum diminished because the state coped better with migrants. In February 2015, the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) signed an agreement with Protestant and Catholic churches, which allowed church representatives to present ‘particularly hard cases’ to the BAMF for reconsideration. As a result, in 2017, churches managed to stop or delay 1,478 deportations. The Belarusian Orthodox Church as well as the Russian Orthodox Church are still far from such a work practice not to mention that both churches would never criticise their government. For more about church asylum inGermany,seewww.kirchenasyl.de/wp-content/​uploads/2013/12/Church-­asylumin-Germany1.pdf (accessed on 1 October 2018). 60 Other Christian denominations followed a similar attitude. The Archbishop of Belarus’s Catholic Church, Tadeuzsch Kondrusewitsch, wrote an open letter to President Lukashenko in June 2018 (https://catholic.by/3/news/belarus/8264artsybiskup-kandrusevich-prezidentu-belarusi-katalitski-kastsjol-gatovy-prymatsudzel-u-abmerkavanni-zakanada-chykh-praekta, accessed on 31 October 2018) on the eve of preparing to ratify the new law against domestic violence in Belarus, which he connected with anti-Christian family ideology and secular tendencies in the West. Reading this letter, one can only get the impression that there is either no problem with domestic violence in Belarus or it is just overestimated, but there are more urgent problems with homosexual marriages, however homosexuals are not even mentioned in the draft of the law. In ­September 2018, the Protestant Churches of Belarus signed a list given to the president (http://gospel.by/wp-content/uploads/​2018/08/Administratsiya-Prezidntaobrashhenie.jpg, accessed on 31 October 2018), evidently troubled about homosexual propaganda among teenagers in Belarus and the necessity to adopt a law similar to that in Russia. Not even one representative of these churches expressed a public statement on migrants or refugees from Ukraine. 61 Vasilevich, ‘Unequal by Default’, p. 127. 62 Kasmach, ‘Belarus learns to absorb tens of thousands Ukrainians’. 63 Ibid. 64 ‘Belarusian FM reports over 160,000 Ukrainian refugees in the country’, available at www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/foreign-ministry-160000-ukrainian-­refugeesbelarus.html (accessed on 13 October 2018). 65 ‘Address of the President to the Belarusian people and the National Assembly’, available at http://president.gov.by/en/news_en/view/belarus-president-to-addressnation-parliament-on-29-april-11303/ (accessed on 21 October 2018). 66 See the article by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Makei: ‘Peaceful multi-vector policy of Belarus: A conscious choice, responding to national ­interests’, 2016 available at http://mfa.gov.by/en/mass_media/e6b762399de8b998. html (accessed on 31 October 2018): ‘Tolerance naturally continues in peacefulness that equally distinguishes both our ancestors and our contemporaries. Long before gaining independence in 1991, Belarus carried out an active peacekeeping policy aimed at establishing a just world order’.

Belarus  143 67 See interview with the Director of the play: ‘European tolerance means, terrorists are ramming you on the streets and you keep accepting and accepting them …’, available at www.sb.by/articles/semeynyy-zverinets.html (accessed on 31 October 2018). 68 ‘Novyj spektakl’ “Tolerantnost’ ” predstavjat v Kupalovskom teatre’ (‘New play will be performed in the Kupała National Theatre’), 5 April 2018, available at https://ont.by/news/novij-spektakl-tolerantnost-predstavyat-v-kypalovskom-teatre (accessed on 1 October 2018). 69 ‘Interview with Director Nikolaj Pinigin’, Radio Sputnik, available at https://sputnik. by/radio/20180420/1034923990/pinigin-nazvanie-spektaklya-tolerantnost-mozhnotraktovat-po-raznomu.html (accessed on 1 October 2018). 70 As soon as one Belarusian priest criticised this episode during Patriarch Kirill’s visit to Minsk in October 2018, he was immediately suspended. For more see, Pete Baumgartner, Ales Dashchynski and Dzmitry Hurnievic, ‘Belarusian priest suspended for Facebook photos, amid Orthodox schism’, 17 October 2018, available at www.rferl.org/a/amid-orthodox-schism-belarusian-priest-defrocked-forfacebook-photos/​29549132​.html?ltflags=mailer (accessed on 31 October 2018).

Part II

Religion, migration and human security in Southeastern Europe

5 The impact of the Syrian refugee crisis on Turkey’s state capacity Kıvanç Ulusoy

The Arab Spring starting with a vegetable seller setting himself on fire in Tunisia brought tremendous challenges to the states in the Middle East and North Africa. Protesting the mistreatment by local police, Mohamed Bouazizi, a street seller of the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid, set himself on fire on 17 December 2010, paving the way for a wave of protests of peasants, workers, students and unemployed graduates in almost all parts of the Arab world. In countries such as Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, the regimes’ violent response was unsuccessful. The rulers were ousted from power initiating a process of regime changes. In Bahrein and Syria, the regimes were able to push back the protests through harsh crackdown leading to violent conflicts. One of the most crucial results of the Arab Spring was the people’s exodus from those countries posing challenges from migration to terrorism for geographically proximate countries including the European Union (EU) members. The Syrian civil war bringing almost five million people to the borders of neighbouring countries is of particular significance. Turkey, with a 911 km border with Syria has received an influx of refugees reaching more than 3.5 million by September 2019. This chapter argues that the migration crisis once regarded as a temporary security matter evolved into a transnational ‘social question’, causing problems of administrative capacity, social cohesion and integration in the neighbouring countries, difficult to manage by a single country. Based on interviews conducted between September 2016 and August 2018 in Turkey’s border provinces of Hatay, Gaziantep, Adana and Urfa with the representatives of civil society organisations, charities, local government officers, and refugees and reports published by think-thanks, academic research teams and civil society organisations, this chapter analyses the implications of the Syrian migration crisis on Turkey’s ‘state capacity’. The first section focuses on the concept of ‘state capacity’ coined by the sociologist Michael Mann, with respect to two forms of power: a ‘despotic’ and an ‘infrastructural’. While the former refers to effective public policies, the latter accentuates their legitimacy dimension. The second section details the impacts of the crisis on Turkey’s state capacity in areas from health and public administrations to housing and education. The chapter concludes that the migration crisis revealed the lack of deliberative content in policy making and implementation, reflecting a deep-rooted state-centric mentality in Turkey.

148  K. Ulusoy

A framework of analysis A broadly shared definition of the concept of the ‘state capacity’ refers to a state’s ability to make and implement policies together with social actors that would lead to a rational distribution of resources for human development. It refers to policy implementation without any normative quality regarding whether the policy is good or bad. The concept gained currency with the state failures in Africa, Middle East, Balkans and the Caucasus in the late twentieth century, and in the context of the implementation of the European Union’s acquis by the Central and East European countries along the accession. The World Bank links it with ‘human development’, measuring the state efficiency for the benefit of society. Indexes measuring effective governance and legitimacy such as Freedom House Index, Worldwide Governance Indicators and World Values Survey focus on the variables of ‘state capacity’, including political, coercive, administrative and deliberative. A refined approach includes the ‘legitimacy’ as an integral dimension of the state’s ‘strength’ in making and implementing policies. Michael Mann offers the earliest definition of the concept. Defining the state as a complex institution with societal function, Mann explains the ‘state capacity’ through two forms of power: ‘despotic’ and ‘infrastructural’. Referring to Weber’s definition based on bureaucracy, its centrally governed political relations, territorial domain and monopoly of force, Mann reformulates the ‘autonomous power of the state’, in these two interrelated forms of power. ‘Despotic power’, associated with the monopoly of force, refers to a government in which elites can take and implement decisions with ‘unlimited power’. The ‘infrastructural power’ refers to a government in which policy decisions are taken and implemented through ‘deliberation’ among social actors.1 While the ‘despotic power’ refers to the cases in which a state exerts its force ‘over’ society, the ‘infrastructural power’ deciphers how the state exercises its power ‘through’ society. Therefore, strong ‘infrastructural power’ brings strong rule making and implementation of capacity. For Mann, ‘despotic’ government and ‘infrastructural’ government are related in practice. The greater consistency the ‘infrastructural’ government demonstrates in making binding rules, the greater a ‘despotic power’ may be created over society including marginal political groups and minorities. Democratic countries are able to recognise and manage social demands through ‘infrastructural’ tools, while countries in the process of democratisation implement reforms with greater ease by utilising ‘despotic power’. Mann indicates that the ‘despotic’ government provides support in strengthening ‘infrastructural’ government along democratisation.2 The state’s strength, as underlined by Mann, involves a capacity to make decisions in a manner that binds all but requires the ‘political power’ generated through cooperation with civil society to implement them.3 Mann’s conceptualization, when supplemented by another novel concept, ‘deliberative capacity’, developed by John Dryzek, offers a stronger perspective that would help to

Turkey  149 mobilise resources to formulate robust public policies through involving relevant stakeholders.4 This is crucial for developing countries where the state institutions are relatively weak vis-à-vis vibrant societies. In addition to substantive contradictions in formulating public policies caused by deep frictions between tradition and modernity, a weak administration creates serious problems of implementation. In developing political contexts, deepening ‘deliberative capacity’ of the state could function as a tool for increasing policy legitimacy.

Humanitarian challenge to state capacity The Syrian civil war resulted in one of the worst humanitarian crisis. Turkey, a border country, faced this with all its dimensions. This section analyses its implications on Turkey’s ‘state capacity’ in various areas of public policy and administrations. The Syrian crisis, with a sudden and massive flow of migrants into the neighbouring countries, has reached a dimension well beyond expected levels. Some data could be useful to show its impact on Turkey. The Fragile State Index provides us a perspective.5 Requiring an increased level of warning, Turkey’s status showed a slight change over the past years.6 The indicators related to asylum seekers and displaced persons shows that the Syrian civil war has also been linked to a sharp decline in Turkey’s state capacity.7 The international dynamics made it extremely difficult for Turkey to deal with the crisis. In a trans-border humanitarian crisis like this with tremendous implications beyond borders, domestic measures to strengthen the state capacity have limits. Clarifying the legal ground The EU placed pressure on Turkey to strengthen its legal arrangements in the areas of migration and asylum alongside the accession negotiations. The Syrian migration crisis made this even more urgent. Turkey strengthened the Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (AFAD),8 by establishing a new institution, the General Directory of Migration Management,9 and brought legal orders to deal with the crisis from April 2011 onwards. It aimed to resolve the initial confusion with regards to the status of Syrian migrants through domestic legal changes. The 1951 Geneva Convention defines ‘refugee’ with rights, responsibilities and geographical restrictions. The 1967 Protocol removes this geographical limitation. Turkey ratified both the Convention and the Protocol in 1962 and 1968 respectively, but maintains restrictions to ‘European countries’.10 Migrants from other countries can apply for asylum but they can only stay in Turkey until they find a third county to accept them as a refugee. However, they could stay in Turkey temporarily without any clear status. ‘Guest’ is not a status for those in temporary stay. Turkey issued the first specific arrangement regarding Syrians on 30 March 2012 with the Directive No. 62 on ‘Reception and Accommodation of Syrian Arab Republic Nationals and Stateless Persons’, clarifying the

150  K. Ulusoy p­rinciples of ‘temporary protection’ in cases of ‘mass asylum’.11 This ­directive had implementation problems. The EU asked for a single regulation from Turkey finally adopting the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (No. 6458).12 Birce Demiryontar claims this was a shift towards a policy of conditionality, a continuation of the EU-induced reform agenda.13 EU pressures coupled with the urgency of the situation in Syrian border were crucial in developing basic capacity to confront with the crisis. This Law (No. 6458) was critical in order to provide formation, duty, powers and responsibilities of the Directorate-General of Migration Management. It included the ‘non-refoulement principle’, guaranteeing the safety of the migrants. Article 4 states that No one within the scope of this of this Law shall be returned to a place where he or she may be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment or, where his/her life or freedom would be threatened on account of his/her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’. Article 91 defines the ‘temporary protection’, stating that [it] may be provided for foreigners who have been forced to leave their country, cannot return to the country that they have left, and have arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in a mass influx situation seeking immediate and temporary protection. Adopted from the EU’s Directive of 2001, this Law did not include details of action. Though contributing Turkey’s state capacity in this area, its ‘temporary’ character became problematic as the crisis continued. The EU, contributing the drafting process, supported its implementation through new ­institutions and the socialisation of domestic actors with EU rules and bureaucracy with twinning projects.14 The 2014 Temporary Protection Regulation refusing the possibility to grant them ‘refugee’ or ‘asylum seeker’ statuses (Art. 7) coupled with the increasing number of migrants pushed Turkey to make new arrangements. Article 9 underlined that the decision on this belonged to the Cabinet on the basis of a proposal by the Interior Ministry. Article 26 indicates from which public services Syrian migrants could benefit.15 However, the regulations became insufficientas the issues arising from the work permits for asylum seekers showed. The government issued another decree to prevent side effects caused by the massive rise of unregistered labour.16 The limits of domestic crisis management When the civil war started in Syria, Turkey followed an ‘open door policy’ and started to establish camps for migrants. From 29 April 2011, the date that the first group of Syrians arrived through Cilvegözü border crossing in Hatay

Turkey  151 province, to 2 May 2016, the number of Syrian refugees accommodated in 26 camps located in ten provinces reached 264,865.17 Compared to other countries affected by the Syrian refugee crisis such as Lebanon and Jordan, Turkey’s camps and accommodation centres, under AFAD’s coordination, were once described as ‘five-star’ by a refugee staying in the Kilis camp at the Southeastern border, and have been celebrated by the UNHCR.18 Visiting the İslahiye (Gaziantep) camp in December 2012, the UN Secretary, General Ban Ki Moon, praised Turkey for its ‘open door policy’.19 However, as the crisis prolonged it became difficult for refugees to continue living in the  camps. By 15 October 2018, after closing camps in several provinces, the numbers of in-camp refugees declined to 178,965.20 Most of them have been sheltered outside the camps. This mobilised the relevant ministries from the Ministry of Interior to Health and Education and other institutions such as the Turkish Red Crescent (KIZILAY), one of the key institutions providing humanitarian assistance to Syrians.21 KIZILAY’s contributions vary from funding the Syrians through cooperation with the UN Food Programme to vocational training and psycho-social support through its social centres.22 The Social Harmonisation Aid Programme sponsored by various domestic and international agencies, including the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, the World Food Programme, the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, also provides monthly aid to Syrians.23 Turkey’s policies towards the Syrian migrants have been criticised by various civil society actors because of inconsistencies and lack of transparency.24 Turkey’s obsession with the possible domestic political implications of the crisis situation which was almost out of control along the Southeastern border with Syria, reached such a level that, in May 2015, the government announced a ‘restriction on research on Syrians’ to protect ‘the right to privacy of the refugees’.25 Despite initial good treatment shown by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government with government claiming that it was Turkey’s duty to respond to the ‘temporary’ difficulties of its ‘Syrian brothers’, the issue soon became highly securitized. Turkey, with good intentions but without projections in regards to its long-term implications, provided services to all Syrian migrants regardless of where they are placed.26 Currently they live in all provinces, but, as the crisis in Syrian continued, the increasing number of refugees living in cities started to shake their administrative capacities and create tensions with locals.27 A threat to social cohesion Turkey’s policies towards the migrants, turning to be a bunch of ad hoc administrative responses, have been inevitably affected by the civil war in Syria where regional and global powers are involved. Gökalp-Aras and ŞahinMencütek highlighted that from the emergence of the crisis to its present

152  K. Ulusoy stage, the evolution of Turkey’s policies towards Syrians has evolved from an ‘open door’ approach (between 2011 and 2013) to internationalisation through the United Nations (between 2013 and 2015), and finally to the EUdriven opportunist approach, which means a de facto ‘closed door’ policy (from 2015 onwards). They claim that foreign policy priorities and security threats (real or perceived) played a crucial role in pushing Turkey to make radical changes in its policies.28 In fact, Turkey’s polarised politics is the major reason for the inconsistent government declarations and ineffective policies towards the migration crisis. Turkey’s political elite, both the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government and the Republican Peoples Party (CHP, the main opposition party), have failed to reach a consensus on this serious issue. Opposition parties and foreign observers criticised the government’s Syria policy because of its negative implications on domestic peace and social cohesion. It was criticised for having ‘too much involvement’ in the domestic affairs of a neighbouring country. Many academic experts, charity and international organization representatives interviewed for this study in the border towns argued that this would make Turkey import the sectarian politics affecting the Middle East. There was a widespread belief among observers that the AKP pursued a policy based on the promotion of Sunni Islam in Syria, which would affect Turkey’s social cohesion with a significant Alawi population.29 For instance, the ORSAM (Centre for Middle Eastern Studies), an Ankara based semi-official think-thank, report claims that kinship relations were of crucial significance for Turkey to absorb the intense wave of immigration. Turkish citizens living in border provinces such as Hatay or Gaziantep form their approach towards Syrians in accordance with their own ethnic, religious or political identities. Therefore, Syrians tend to move to places where they find people with similar ethnic, religious or sectarian identities.30 As the crisis deteriorated, this pattern started to change. Major towns in the West, such as Izmir or Istanbul, become targets for Syrians who had initially resided in border regions. This was mainly due to economic reasons and not because of identity concerns. However, this does not refute the fact that their situation deteriorates as they desperately wait for a day to return back home or move to prosperous European countries. Describing their situation of being in limbo, Jade Cemre Erciyes states, no matter if these people are seeking refuge in Turkey, waiting their turn to apply for asylum in a third country, using Turkey to transit to Europe via life-threatening journeys, or are ‘guests’ until the war in Syria is over, in Turkey, they are living in purgatory.31 The Syrian civil war started to threaten Turkey’s domestic peace, as these three deadly incidents demonstrated: 17 deaths through bombing at the Cilvegözü border crossing in February 2012; 46 deaths as a result of two car bombs exploded in the border town of Reyhanlı in May 2012; three deaths in Suruç through shells from the other side of the border where the Islamic

Turkey  153 State fighters (IS) and the Kurdish forces clashed. These and many other small incidents created a dense atmosphere, especially in the provinces where AFAD had located refugee camps, because of their multi-ethnic and multireligious character. A major incident took place in April 2016 in Kahramanmaraş, populated by ­Turkish Alawis. The police had to suppress a large protest caused by the government’s choice to locate the camp for 27,000 people near the Alawi villages. They expressed their concern that the IS militants could commit terrorist activities, claiming that the camp area was a pasture for animals. The locals asked the government to be careful in choosing locations for camps in order to avoid provoking denominational clashes. Citizens in other provinces such as Hatay, where there is a substantial Alawi population, were also sensitive to the government’s policies from a similar perspective of preventing social conflict. The abovementioned events reveal a broader issue in that ‘distancing’ or ‘othering’ are closely related to migrant and local identities not always interacting with each other in accommodative ways but also conflicting identities between Syrian refugees and Turkish citizens.32 A demonising language associating refugees with terrorists and a polarising attitude mostly dwells on religious dimensions depending on the outlet’s own point of view. The research conducted for this study underlines that misleading information put forward by the media undermines the state’s already weak capacity to deal with this problem. Deteriorating relations between refugees and citizens requires the AKP government to meticulously develop a communication policy – together with policies strengthening social cohesion and cultural engagement – to prevent polarisation between them.33 Overall, the interviews underline that the AKP government’s policies towards Syrian migrants lack sserious deliberation with citizens and civil society actors in their design and implementation. Especially at the initial stage of the crisis, the lack of public involvement in those policies appears to be vital to understand many failures. Not only the various opposition parties in the Parliament but also the wider public started to criticize the government as it became clearer that Syrians would stay longer than expected in Turkey. For the AKP the Syrians were ‘guests’ or ‘brothers’ who would soon return back. However, the feelings towards Syrians in the border provinces evolved into hatred that might even spill over into nationwide social protests. The societal displeasure showed itself in the latest local elections that took place in March 2019. The AKP votes faced a sharp decline due to its policies towards Syrians. Furthermore, the interviews conducted over the past two years in various border provinces showed that the lack of deliberative content in the ­government’s policies did not only affect ordinary citizens but also Syrian migrants. The international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and charities providing ­services to Syrians stared to criticize Turkey when their activities towards Syrians faced severe restrictions. The traditional reflex of Turkey’s policy makers was a deaf ear to concerns raised by civil society, but

154  K. Ulusoy a similar attitude towards the international organisations (including the ones formed by Syrians to deal with their own issues) – leaving aside developing joint action with them despite the magnitude and transnational character of the social question created by the refugee crisis – reduced support for AKP’s policies.34 This leaves Turkey in an awkward situation. Despite the massive burden carried out by the society at large, Turkey’s efforts have not been praised enough. Its agony has not been understood completely by the international community.35 A quest for a new perspective A growing number of incidents involving Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees in various locations resulted in the quest for a ‘right based approach’ with a long-term integration policy that would secure refugees’ rights through social and economic adjustments. For many experts studying the implications of hosting a rising number of Syrians for an indefinite period, this ‘right based approach’ would increase their social acceptance from and peaceful coexistence with Turkish citizens. Accentuating that the majority of refugees live outside the camps in cities such as Izmir and intend to stay in Turkey for a long time, Yildiz and Uzgören states that ‘the temporary protection regime does not provide the effective use of basic rights and also prevents developing effective integration strategies’.36 Considering the existence of more than three million non-camp Syrian refugees dispersed all around the country and the fact that the incidents taking place so far haven’t yet produced results on social cohesion, it is possible to argue that Turkey has a high ‘absorption capacity’ and the administration, including the security services, has been doing their best in terms of alleviating social tension. However, as eight years passed since the start of the crisis, there are signs that Turkey arrived to the limits of this absorption capacity. The optimistic perspective has been eroded not just from the point of view of the wider public but also from the perspective of national and international experts, policy makers and security institutions dealing with the crisis.37 Various surveys reveal that the government’s policies have not been garnering strong support. The German Marshall Fund reports that 66 per cent of respondents surveyed favoured a more restricted refugee policy and 77 per cent are worried about refugees.38 President Erdoğan, respected by his party and voters, was unable to convince them on the issue of granting citizenship to Syrians. A survey conducted in October 2015 underlined that public opinion finds the AKP’s Syria policy unsuccessful (56 per cent), Turkey partially responsible (50 per cent), and asks for revision through negotiating with Syrian leadership (60 per cent).39 Despite speculations about this matter provoking a deep public discontent, there is no general policy of granting citizenship to Syrians. The cases have largely been a result of ad hoc decisions for Syrians with established business in Turkey. However, as time passes, the demand for educated Syrians to get

Turkey  155 Turkish citizenship increases as their passports do not allow them to travel outside of Turkey, mainly to Europe.40 Parliament’s hurried motions about the migration crisis have been inadequate. A report by the Turkish Confederation of Employers Association (TİSK) concludes that the dimensions of the crisis have not been adequately understood.41 The report emphasised that the lack of strategic decision making decreases the motivation of public institutions, thereby resulting in a waste of resources and capacity. The crisis revealed the administrative deficiencies in public service providing and planning, and the effective usage of human resources. Initially praised by the international community mainly for its ‘open door policy’, the AKP’s handling of the crisis leaves many favourable points under shadow. Feelings arose against the government, criticising its incapacity to predict the implications of the Syrian crisis.42 The expectation that Syrians would return to their homes in a short span of time prevented registration from being dealt with as a priority issue. Though KIZILAY and AFAD took measures to organise aid distribution without abuse, transforming them into centralised and joint registers took time and no official registration took place until January 2013. As a result of this problem, clear information on Syrians staying in Turkey and those seeking asylum in other countries could not be obtained for a long time. While the Turkish Medical Association’s (TTB) health report reveals the inadequacy of coordination among institutions in registration, stating that different practices are carried out in different provinces.43 The Istanbul Institute of Opinion reports that in Istanbul, where the largest number of Syrians reside, local authorities had capacity problems in conducting systematic registration, leading asylum seekers to resort to illegal activities and abuse. The abovementionedTİSK report revealed that local administrators and NGO representatives do not trust the official figures. A questionnaire conducted in Istanbul revealed that 83 per cent of the respondents did not find the state figures on Syrians convincing.44 The problems of coordination between central and local governments emerges as the key issue. In addition to the security perspective dominating the migration issue and its multi-actor character involving the Directorate General of Security, Coastal Guard and Gendarmerie, there are implementation problems in various measures affected by the lack of a clearly defined role and budget for the municipalities and the necessity for legal arrangements in this context. There are other problems such as the lack of experience in the local branches of the Migration Directorate; the organisation of government expenditures along the ministerial lines from the Health to the Education; and separate provincial budgets. Faced with the Syrian migration crisis, the local governments in border provinces have been unwilling and also unable to be proactive. Preferring only to follow instructions from Ankara, local governments faced serious capacity problems when required to take action. In particular, the municipalities in the border provinces reached the limits of infrastructure expenditure in providing services from housing, water and sewage to public transport,

156  K. Ulusoy social assistance, education and funeral services to refugees. A reputable think-thank report states that ‘municipalities both play a role of actor of the humanitarian governance (by distributing first necessary goods) and social inclusion fostering actor, by easing the access to social services, the city’s life information and by dealing with ongoing social tensions’.45 Despite their success in ad hoc measures, the insufficient legal regulations on the spending of money allocated from the central authorities and their heavy financial burden creates serious capacity problems. Pushing municipalities to often act outside of their responsibilities without legal backing causes financial difficulties to arise as the budget channelled to them is based on the local population without taking into account the Syrians residing there.46 In the Southeastern province of Kilis, where the number of Syrian migrants currently exceed the local population, desperate problems of infrastructure including security problems have been voiced by residents.47 The tensions between citizens and refugees in Şanlıurfa and Gaziantep caused by overload city capacity reached such a level that the AKP local governments in other cities moved to assist them.48 The humanitarian services – health, education and aid – provided to Syrians both within and outside the camps vary according to provinces, revealing a lack of systematic perspective.49 In addition to the necessity of establishing a common database and coordination system with other municipalities (and other actors) to implement common standards, the local governments, making a grievance of being underrepresented in funds distribution, asked for the institutionalisation support initiatives hitherto made on an ad hoc basis and the full acknowledgement of their role as the key actors in migration management and social inclusion.50 The regulation for temporary protection outlines both the rules of providing food, accommodation, education and health, access to the labour market, social benefits and translation services to Syrian migrants. However, increasing deficiencies in public services such as health and education are due to large numbers and resulting capacity problems. One of the crucial areas are the health services provided to migrants. First, AFAD in September 2013, and later the regulation of ‘temporary protection’ in 2014, guaranteed and outlined the details of refugees’ access to nationwide healthcare services. The ORSAM report underlines that 30–40 per cent of the capacity of public hospitals in border provinces serve only Syrians. Hospitals experience a capacity problem in terms of human resources and physical conditions, and locals are increasingly unhappy, leading to frictions with civil servants and tensions with Syrians.51 According to AFAD, the state currently provides 34,501,808 polyclinic services, 1,423,844 hospitalisations, 302,470 births and 1,188,606 surgery services to Syrians.52 In addition to the overall deterioration in health services, the late payment of health expenses by AFAD causes difficulties in accessing services.53 The TTB reports that the border regions where Syrians refugees live in large numbers have already been below Turkey’s average in providing health services.54 The extraordinary situation following the migration crisis has made it worse. Despite improvements, Syrian migrants

Turkey  157 e­xperience problems in accessing health services due to language problems and their lack of knowledge of the Turkish health system. In order to overcome this capacity problem of hospitals and ease tension between citizens and refugees, the Ministry of Health and World Health Organization (WHO) worked together to provide fast-track training courses for Syrian doctors and nurses who were subsequently employed at the Migrant Health Centres opened across Turkey and funded by the EU.55 Turkey provides educational services to Syrian migrants in its education system, showing a great power of adaptation to this crisis. Batalla and Tolay claim that ‘Turkey’s approach to the education of Syrian refugee children provides the best evidence yet that Ankara is serious about facilitating the long-term settlement of Syrians in Turkey’.56 This was mainly because there is a wide understanding among that the education of Syrians would be key for Turkey to overcome the implications of the migration crisis on social cohesion.57 By June 2018 more than 60 per cent of students of school age (388,475) were registered in state schools compared to 18 per cent (40,000) in 2015. While around 20,700 students were enrolled in Turkish universities in the 2017–18 academic year, around 80 per cent of university students (16,944) are enrolled in undergraduate programmes. There was also a slight increase in the registration for two-year associate degree programmes, reaching 1,861 in June 2018.58 Turkey started to move away from the dual education system for Syrian refugees through closing down or incorporating the temporary education centres established from September 2014 onwards.59 Turkey, following this strategy as a result of concerns regarding the quality of education in these centres and the increasing isolation of Syrian children from Turkish society, faces the risk of triggering social tensions.60 Leaving aside uncertain procedures applied by different school administrations in different ways and insufficient classroom capacities, the incorporation of Syrian students in the education system requires an improvement in teaching, particularly in regards to teachers’ skills in performing in mixed classes. Turkey also needs to develop transparent data regarding how its own resources, including the infrastructure, have been incorporated by the budget provided by various international organisations and the EU; sharing this with the wider public would ease the tension directed towards Syrians. As the refugee crisis deepened, Turkey was required to become more transparent in terms of financial management, a key element of ‘state capacity’. So far, Turkey has failed to provide adequate information about forms of expenditure. Initially refusing to accept foreign aid to prevent foreign involvement in the Syrian crisis, Turkey disagreed with international organisations about distribution of financial resources. While the international organisations follow a p­ roject-based allocation of resources, Turkey claims that its economic burden is not limited to the state’s direct spending, but also includes the adverse economic effects of the refugee crisis on border provinces.61 Calculating the cost of camps, public order, health and education services, the

158  K. Ulusoy spending of municipalities and Turkish NGOs and individuals, Turkey’s estimated amount of spending totaled US$31 billion by December 2017.62 Foreign aid to Turkey for Syrians from summer 2015 onwards, when the EU, alarmed by the urgent situation of dead Syrian bodies sweeping the shores of Greek islands and thousands trying to cross the Aegean Sea to reach Europe, felt the necessity to mobilise the international community and, more importantly, talk with Turkey about how to contain the crisis triggered the signing of a joint action plan on 29 November 2015. The Plan was actually a disappointment for the Turkish government expecting a significant burdensharing mechanism and a commitment to rejuvenate accession negotiations.63 Taking it as a politicised form of cooperation without taking into account sensitivities of the crisis, Yildiz and Uzgören think Turkey has to call for more international solidarity, both in financial terms and in terms of absorbing this massive displacement of people. Without this, they state, ‘Turkey runs the risk of becoming an outsourced land of humanitarian protection and a hub for higher and higher number of stranded refugees’.64

Conclusion With the collapse of the optimistic expectations that the civil war in Syria would end soon, Turkey’s initial ‘open door’ policy evolved towards a de facto policy of ‘closed door’ under the pressures of the EU. As the civil war and the Syrians’ exodus continued, both Turkey and the EU had to take measures to contain the crisis situation. The November 2015 joint action plan between Turkey and the EU, which was no more than the EU’s externalisation of its migration and asylum policy, transformed Turkey’s approach towards its Syrian brothers. Moreover, Turkey had reached the limits of its ‘state capacity’ too and the crisis started to affect the country’s own social fabric. The migration crisis, initially perceived from a security perspective, has become a major ‘transnational social question’ requiring an international, coordinated response. Various problems of refugees, from health and housing to education, were simply beyond the capacity of a single country to deal with, let alone definitively resolve. The scale of the problem has been beyond Turkey’s capacity. The government’s good will has not been enough to deal with these massive social problems. This chapter has argued that Turkey’s own capacity problems made the situation much more urgent. The lack of coordination between government branches, the government’s inability to include civil society decision making and implementation, and the tension in society reveals structural problems in the Turkish state in terms of responding to these kinds of transnational problems. The lack of consensus among the great powers to reach a working solution for the Syrian crisis, the number of Syrian refugees reaching more than three million by the end of 2018, and the likely scenario that most of them will stay, conditioned Turkey to develop policies that would increase the legitimacy of its existing policies. This cannot be done unless there is

Turkey  159 more participation and deliberation with the domestic political opposition and civil society. This cannot be done without securing the solidarity of the international community, which could only be possible with the increasing transparency of Turkey’s own policies. The international humanitarian crisis that this chapter described as a ‘transnational social question’ as a result of the civil war in Syria could be an opportunity for Turkey to develop and strengthen its capacities in local administration, disaster management, humanitarian aid and border control. The migration crisis revealed Turkey’s capacity problems in education, health and housing. However, when analysed closely with the sharpening opposition towards the AKP government’s policies, the research conducted in the border provinces for this study arrives to some more substantive conclusions. The research underlines the inability of Turkey’s political system in developing participatory and deliberative policy making. This crucial point is valid not only for Turkey but also for the other countries neighbouring Syria, such as Lebanon and Jordan, where the migration crisis brought the public services to the brink of complete collapse. In the case of Turkey, the core weakness has been the state-centric and security oriented approach preventing any serious, transparent deliberation of the problems that everyone knows very well. As the civil war in Syria is prolonged and the refugees remain to stay indefinitely, the costs are getting higher threatening Turkey’s own social fabric and cohesion.

Notes  1 Michael Mann, ‘States, Ancient and Modern’, Archives europeennes de sociologie, 1977, 18 (2), pp. 262–298; Michael Mann, ‘The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results’, Archives europeennes de sociologie, 1984, 25 (2), pp. 185–213.  2 Michael Mann, ‘Infrastructural Power Revisited’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 2008, 43 (3), pp. 355–365.  3 Hillel Soifer and Mattias vom Hau, ‘Unpacking the Strength of the State: The Utility of State Infrastructural Power’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 2008, 43 (3), pp. 219–230. Jessica Fortin-Rittberger, ‘Exploring the Relationship between Infrastructural and Coercive State Capacity’, Democratization, 2014, 21 (7), pp. 1244–1264.   4 John Dryzek, Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 136–141.   5 The Index compares the countries in terms of security apparatus, clashes among groups, asylum seekers and displaced people, the legitimacy of the state, public services, human rights and the rule of law, and the polarisation between elites.   6 See, http://fundforpeace.org/fsi (accessed on 17 November 2018).  7 The European Union (EU), Progress Reports on Turkey (various years), Brussels. See www.ec.europa.eu (accessed on 8 November 2018).  8 The Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (AFAD) was formed under the Prime Ministry in 2009 (Law No. 5902).   9 The General Directory of Migration Management was established under the Interior Ministry in 2013 (Law No. 6458).

160  K. Ulusoy 10 According to the Conventions, the status of ‘asylum seeker’ is a temporary status, while ‘refugee’ refers to a permanent status in the country they reside. However, Turkey’s definition of ‘refugee’ is only limited to people from ‘European countries’. 11 Ayselin Yıldız and Elif Uzgören, ‘Limits to Temporary Protection: Non-Camp Syrian Refugees in Izmir, Turkey’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, (2016), 16 (2), pp. 195–211. 12 The technical discussions between Turkey and the EU about a credible migration policy actually started in 2004. They were reinitiated 2008 and concluded by in 2011 with a draft agreement including a roadmap about visa liberalisation in parallel to the readmission agreement. Finally, in December 2013 Turkey and the EU signed a deal on this subject. See, Turkey: Law No. 6458 of 2013 on Foreigners and International Protection (as amended 29 October 2016) [Turkey], 29 October 2016, available at www.refworld.org/docid/5a1d828f4.html (accessed 17 November 2018). 13 Birce Demiyontar, ‘European Union and Turkish Migration Policy Reform: From Accession to Policy Conditionality’ in İbrahim Sirkeci and Barbara Pusch (eds.), Turkish Migration Policy, London: Transnational Press, 2016, p. 74. 14 Alexander Burgin and Derya Aşıkoğlu, ‘Turkey’s New Asylum Law: A Case of EU Influences’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 2017, 19 (2), pp. 121–135. 15 The asylum seekers could benefit from the following public services: from health, education, access to labour markets, social benefits and services and translation. See, Geçici Koruma Yönetmeliği (Temporary Protection Directive), Official Journal, 22 October 2014, No. 29153. 16 Geçici Koruma Sağlanan Yabancıların Çalışma İzinlerine Dair Yönetmelik (The Procedure of Work Permits for Foreigners under Temporary Protection), Official Journal, 15 January 2016, No. 29594. 17 The 26 accommodation centres (container and tent camps) are located in the following border provinces: Hatay, Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Kilis, Mardin, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye, Adıyaman, Malatya and Adana. Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), Report: Syrian Guests in Turkey, Istanbul, AFAD, 2016. 18 Mac McClelland, ‘How to build a refugee camp’, New York Times Magazine, 13 February 2014, available at www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/magazine/howto-build-a-perfect-refugee-camp.html (accessed on 17 November 2018);. 19 UN News, ‘On visit to refugee camps, Secretary-General renews call for stop to killings in Syria’, available at https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/12/427732visit-­ refugee-camps-secretary-general-renews-call-stop-killings-syria (accessed on 17 November 2018). 20 Directorate General of Migration Management, Migration Statistics, Ankara: Ministry of Interior, 2018, available at www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/temporary-protection_​ 915_​1024_4748_icerik (accessed on 17 November 2018). 21 The Directorate-General of Security dealt with the issues of registration and identity cards. An administrative organisation under the deputy prime minister became responsible not only for camps and accommodation centres, but also for procedures regarding Syrian migrants outside camps. See www.afad.gov.tr (accessed on 17 November 2018). 22 Başak Yavcan, Turkish Red Crescent Community Center Project Needs Assessment Report, No: 200, Ankara: ORSAM, 2015. 23 Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay), Suriye İnsani Yardım Operasyonu Raporu (Report on Humanitarian Aid Operation in Syria), Ankara: Kızılay, 2016.

Turkey  161 24 Turkish Bar Association, Sığınmacılar ve Mülteciler Raporu (Report on Refugees and Asylum Seekers), Ankara: TBB, 2016; Turkish Medical Association, Savaş, Göç ve Sağlık (War, Migration and Health), Ankara: TTB, 2016; The Association of Human Rights and Solidarity with the Oppressed, Türkiye’de Suriyeli Mülteciler:İstanbul Örneği (Syrian Refugees in Turkey: the case of Istanbul) İstanbul: Mazlum-Der, 2013. 25 Jade Cemre Erciyes, ‘Guests, Asylum-seekers, Refugees or Transit Migrants? Syrians in Turkey in “Purgatory” ’, Human Geography, 2016, 9 (2), p. 26. 26 Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM). The Situation of Syrian refugees in the neighbouring countries: Findings, conclusions, and recommendations, Report No: 189, Ankara: ORSAM, 2014. 27 When the civil war in Syria started in 2011, the border towns like Şanlıurfa, Hatay and Gaziantep were among the top ten provinces hosting Syrian refugees. However, the recent data provided by the Directorate-General of Migration Management shows that İstanbul hosting with more than 500,000 becomes the leading target of the Syrian refugees. Directorate General of Migration Management, Migration Statistics, Ankara: Ministry of Interior, 2018, available at www. goc.gov.tr/icerik6/temporary-protection_​ 915_1024_4748_icerik (accessed on 17 November 2018). 28 Ela Gökalp-Aras and Zeynep Şahin-Mencütek, ‘From Assertive to Opportunist Usage of Mass Migration for Foreign and Asylum Policy: Turkey’s Response to the Refugees from Syria’, in İbrahim Sirkeci and Barbara Pusch (eds.), Turkish Migration Policy, London: Transnational Press, 2016, p. 93. 29 Ibid., pp. 100–103. 30 Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM). The Situation of Syrian Refugees in the Neighboring Countries: Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations, Ankara: ORSAM, 2014, pp. 15–17. 31 Jade Cemre Erciyes, ‘Guests, Asylum-seekers, Refugees or Transit Migrants? Syrians in Turkey in “Purgatory” ’, Human Geography, 2016, 9 (2), p. 32. 32 The author’s interviews with Turkish citizens in Kahramanmaraş and Hatay provinces in August 2018. 33 The author’s interviews with civil society representatives, local officials and citizens in border provinces of Kilis, Hatay and Gaziantep in August 2018 34 Center for Migration and Refuee Studies (İGAM), Sivil Toplum Örgütlerinin Türkiye’deki Suriyeli Mülteciler İçin Yaptıkları Çalışmalar İle İlgili Rapor (Report on the Works of Civil Society Organisations in Turkey about the Syrian Refugees), Ankara: Anıl, 2013; The Association of Human Rights and Solidarity with the Oppressed (Mazlum-Der), Türkiye’de Suriyeli Mülteciler: İstanbul Örneği (Syrian Refugees in Turkey: The Case of Istanbul), İstanbul: Mazlum-der, 2013. 35 The author’s interviews with the representatives of the international charity organisations and NGOs working on Syrian migrants’ problems in Gaziantep and Urfa in July–August 2017 and August 2018. 36 Ayselin Yıldız and Elif Uzgören, ‘Limits to Temporary Protection: Non-Camp Syrian Refugees in Izmir, Turkey’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2016, 16 (2), pp. 195–211. 37 The author’s interviews between September 2016 and August 2018 in various refugee neighbourhoods in the border towns of Turkey and Istanbul. These towns and neighbourhoods include Belen (Hatay), İslahiye (Gaziantep), Kilis, Gaziantep, Zeytinburnu and Fatih in Istanbul. 38 The German Marshall Fund, Transatlantic Trends: Mobility, Migration and Integration, Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund, 2014, p. 36.

162  K. Ulusoy 39 Metropoll, Seçimlere Doğru Türkiye’nin Nabzı: Seçimlere Doğru Terör, Suriye Krizi ve Medya (Turkey’s pulse: Terror, Syrian crisis and media), October 2015, available at www.metropoll.com.tr (accessed on 18 November 2018). 40 The author’s interviews with regular Syrians in various border towns and Istanbul. 41 Murat Erdoğan and Can Ünver, Türk İş Dünyasının Türkiye’deki Suriyeliler Konusundaki Görüş, Beklenti ve Önerileri (The Opinions, Expectations and Proposal of the Turkish Business Sector about the Syrians in Turkey), TİSK Yayın No. 353, Ankara: Matsa, 2015. 42 The author’s interviews with Turkish citizens living in neighbourhoods where Syrian refugees were placed in Belen, Antakya, Iskenderun in August 2018. 43 Turkish Medical Association (TTB), Savaş, Göç ve Sağlık (War, Migration and Health), Ankara: TTB, 2016. 44 Istanbul Institute of Opinion (IFE), Suriyeli Sığınmacılar Rapor: İstanbul Örneği (Report on Syrian Refugees: The Example of Istanbul), İstanbul: Fikir Enstitüsü, 2014. 45 United Cities and Local Governments-Middle East and West Asia (UCLGMEWA), Report: The Role of Municipalities of Turkey and Lebanon in the Syrian Migratory influx, Istanbul: UCLG-MEWA, 2016, p. 12. 46 Laura Batalla and Juliette Tolay, Toward Long-term Solidarity with Syrian Refugees? Turkey’s Policy Responses and Challenges, Washington DC, Atlantic Council, 2018, p. 11. 47 The author’s interviews with the residents of Kilis in August 2018. 48 Erdoğan, Murat. Türkiye’deki Suriye Algısı, İç Savaşın Dördüncü Yılında Türkiye’deki Suriyeli Sığınmacılar (The Perception of Syria in Turkey: Syrian Refugees in Turkey in the Fourth Year of the Civil War), ABKAD Yay. No. 2015–3, Ankara: ABKAD, 2015. 49 European Union: Council of the European Union, Report of the Fact-finding Mission to Turkey by Ambassador Tomáš Boček, Special Representative of the Secretary General on Migration and Refugees, 30 May–4 June 2016, 10 August 2016, SG/ Inf(2016)29, available at www.refworld.org/docid/58de48524.html (accessed on 17 November 2018). 50 The author’s confidential interviews with experts working at various municipalities in the border provinces of Hatay, Gaziantep and Kilis. See also, United Cities and Local Governments-Middle East and West Asia (UCLG-MEWA), Report: The Role of Municipalities of Turkey and Lebanon in the Syrian Migratory Influx, Istanbul: UCLG-MEWA, 2016, pp. 14–20. 51 Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM), Suriyeli Mültecilerin Türkiye’ye Ekonomik Etkileri (The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Turkey’s Economy), Report No: 196, Ankara: ORSAM, 2015. 52 Directorate General of Migration, Migration Statistics, Ankara: Ministry of Interior, 2018, available at www.afad.gov.tr/upload/Node/2374/files/15_10_2018_ Suriye_GBM_Bilgi_Notu_1.pdf (accessed on 17 October 2018). 53 Council of Europe, Report of the Fact-finding Mission to Turkey by Ambassador Tomáš Boček, Special Representative of the Secretary General on migration and refugees, 30 May–4 June 2016, 10 August 2016, SG/Inf (2016)29, available at www.­ refworld.org/docid/5a4cb0604.html (accessed on 24 November 2018). 54 Turkish Medical Association (TTB), Savaş, Göç ve Sağlık (War, Migration and Health), Ankara: TTB Yayınları, 2016. 55 The author’s interviews with local officials and doctors dealing with Syrian migrants in Hatay, Kilis and Gaziantep provinces in August 2018. 56 Laura Batalla and Juliette Tolay, Toward Long-term Solidarity with Syrian Refugees? T ­ urkey’s Policy Responses and Challenges, Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2018, p. 17. 57 The author’s interviews with mayors, teachers and experts in border provinces in August 2018.

Turkey  163 58 Gabriele Cloeters, Souad Osserian, Kristen Biehl, Wiebke Hohberger, Emre U ­ ckardesler, Hande Paker, Syrians in Turkey, Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center, 2018, pp. 16–19. 59 These temporary education centres followed a curriculum in Arabic similar to the one taught in Syria. In these centres initially receiving more than 80 per cent of the students in school age most of the teachers were Syrian. 60 The author’s interview with Turkish primary school teachers, Turkish students’ parents and Syrians in the border towns of Hatay and Gaziantep, and Fatih district of Istanbul between between June–August 2018. 61 İdil Bilgiç Alpaslan, Suriye Krizi Türkiye Ekonomisini Nasıl Etkiler? (How Does the Syrian Crisis Affect Turkey’s Economy?), Ankara: TEPAV, 2012; USAK, Suriyeli Mülteci Krizi ve Türkiye Sonu Gelmeyen Misafirlik (Syrian Asylum Crisis and Turkey Unending Sojourn), Ankara: Karınca Matbaacılık, 2013. 62 ‘Suriyeliler için harcanan maliyetin analizi’ (The analysis of money spent for Syrians), Anadolu Agency, 6 December 2017, available at www.aa.com.tr/tr/info/ infografik/8044 (accessed on 17 November 2018). 63 Başak Yavcan, ‘On governing the Syrian refugee crisis collectively: The view from Turkey’, available at http://nearfuturesonline.org/on-governing-the-syrian-­refugeecrisis-collectively-the-view-from-turkey (accessed on 17 November 2018). 64 Ayselin Yıldız and Elif Uzgören, ‘Limits to Temporary Protection: Non-Camp Syrian Refugees in Izmir, Turkey’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2016, 16 (2), p. 208.

6 The Orthodox Church of Greece Church–state relations, migratory patterns and sociopolitical challenges Georgios E. Trantas It is a historically incontestable fact that Greeks, before as well as after the founding of the Modern Greek state, diachronically demonstrated obvious emigrational tendencies for various reasons. Indeed, the history of Greek emigration dates back to the Hellenic past, when the first diasporic colonies were formed across the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. It was in the classical world that the term diaspora (Διασπορά) first appeared, meaning both dispersal and dissemination, i.e. ‘to sow widely’, and it by and large described the colonisation of the Mediterranean and Asia Minor during the archaic period, between 800 and 600 bc.1 The motivation behind the colonising population movement in the antiquity was, among other things, the notable demographic increase, trade growth, etc.2 However, the civilisational, ergo cultural, social and political paradigm of the aniquity was much different to, e.g. the post-nineteenth century Neo-Hellenic construct,3 which is an axiom that applies to the entire global structure – the very perception of the extent of the known world differed – and the corresponding state of affairs as well, and by extension to the migratory patterns of any given time. Accordingly, the term Diaspora has undergone reviews and retheorisations. To the classical notions, new categorisations have been added: victim diasporas, labour and imperial diasporas, trade and business diasporas emerged in the lapse of time as theoretical and analytical means of approaching the subject matter while taking into account the social, political and economic context of the time.4 Greek emigration has variable qualitative and quantitative characteristics and causes, and on that basis it can be distinguished in three broad periods: (a) from the mid-fifteenth century to the founding of the Greek state in 1830, (b) from then to the Second World War, and (c) thereafter up to the last decade of the twentieth century.5 In addition, there is a currently ongoing emigrational tendency, particularly since 2010, due to the outbreak of the Greek debt crisis. The causes of emigration vary greatly from one period to another and from one historical hermeneutic perspective to the other, with the most dominant schools of thought attributing emigration to either political reasons, such as Ottoman oppression during the first ­emigrational period, or in the following ones war, international unrest, civil

Greece  165 war, domestic turmoil and division, or, on the other hand, on social and economic reasons primarily. For instance the eighteenth-century emigrational pattern had notable trade and business contours and gave rise to the well-established Modern Greek communities of the time, which comprised a well-reputed, wealthy diaspora.6 It must be stated that neither approach is wrong, because both political and economic grounds apply, variably of course and depending on the context and particularities of the object under examination at any given time. However, before the London Protocols of 3 February 1830 that declared Greece’s sovereignty and independence, founding thus the Modern Greek state, it is more pertinent to refer to Greek communities settled outside the classical geographical Greek domain as the Greek diaspora rather than Greek immigrants, given that it was a pre-national era when such established communities abroad, in interethnic social configurations, were not uncommon; moreover many of them, albeit ethnic Greeks, either fleeing Ottoman oppression or expanding their businesses, were Ottoman subjects and adherents to the Rum Millet. In addition the causes of displacement varied immensely between those who were persecuted, or desperate and destitute, and those who were by and large esteemed in their host societies, socially and economically priviledged, comprising scholars, wealthy businessmen, or even nobles who stemmed from a Phanariot lineage.7 The priviledged ones, for instance, were dispersed in communities across the Danube, from Vienna to Bucharest and Jassy,8 which were among the most important diasporic hubs, together with those of Venice, Trieste, Budapest, Odessa, Mariopol, Alexandreia, but also Marseille, Amsterdam, London, etc.; in other words they were essentially active in most of the major European trading centres.9 In short, both political and socioeconomic grounds may apply; more to the point, they often overlap at the same time, therefore there is no reason to favour one school of thought over the other while analysing the formation of Greek diasporas. Of course, the history of Greek expatriation, dispersal, emigration and settlement continued, and in the twentieth century it was permeated by different characteristics. Still though, it was caused by political, social and economic reasons. Greek citizens continued to seek a new home abroad, primarily in the United States of America and Australia in the early and midtwentieth century, and then in Europe, with Germany being the most popular destination until the 1970s.10 Then an interval followed up to 2010, during which emigration subsided, but ever since a significant increase is noted due to economic reasons and for the first time within a European Union (EU) context. All in all, the emergent pattern has been diachronically one of emigration rather than immigration. With reference to the present endeavour, it would be more pertinent to make a distinction before and after 1830, which is the founding of the Greek state that subsequently established the autocephalous national church, i.e. the Orthodox Church of Greece (OCG) in 1833, which is the subject of this

166  G. E. Trantas chapter, particularly in relation to emigration and immigration, given that until then, any such population movement and establishment of Orthodox communities was exclusively the domain of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. It follows that this distinction is vital, not only because of the self-evident temporal ­constraint imposed by the founding of the OCG, but also because as a national church it had, and still has, to abide by its spatial jurisdictional restrictions. Hence, it has no say over the Greek Orthodox migrant communities abroad, but it does have a role, oftentimes a moral Christian duty, when it comes to returnees and incoming refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants, regardless of creed. Another crucial distinction would be the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. This constitutes a major watershed, given that it ushered in a new era in the international political state of affairs, which in turn triggered a migrational paradigm shift for Greece, its society, structures and institutions, including the OCG. Namely, in the 1990s Greece became for the first time a receiving country, a destination of Balkan peoples – mainly from Albania, but also Bulgaria and Romania, particularly following their EU accession – who either fled the poverty-​ stricken countries and the troublesome sociopolitical heritage of the previous Communist regimes, or later on ­ sought better opportunites abroad. Likewise, in conjunction with Greece’s consolidated place in the West and in structures such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the EU, the country was rendered a refuge for the ethnic Greeks of the Caucasus and the Black Sea. Then in the 2000s the migratory influx from Asia and Africa increased, and peaked in the early 2010s to date, in the form of the refugee crisis that has occupied the ­European politics and public sphere immensely. To Greece that meant that it was now, after successive waves of migratory influx, a receiving country – but not exclusively. The hypothesis is, then, that Greece has undergone a notable paradigm shift, owed primarily to external factors outside its control. Namely, it has become a country of both immigration and emigration, and the causal parameters behind this shift inevitably impose the involvement of the OCG, affect its own institutional organisation and policy, and trigger a corresponding shift in attitude and course of action. The purpose of this chapter is to explore how this actor has adapted to the new state of affairs, what has been reviewed and how it has been implemented, before and after the Cold War, how it has responded to significant population movements, particularly in light of the refugee crisis, and what its overall attitude has been towards change. Following a review of the Greek church–state relations and how those, directly or indirectly, affected the attitude, practices and rhetoric of the church to migratory issues before and after the Cold War, this chapter looks into the paradigm shift that transpired in Greece with regard to international migration and sheds light on the effects thereof; for, it becomes apparent that it has given rise to institutional changes, aimed to respond to the new reality and its emergent challenges. This is how the refugee crisis that still troubles

Greece  167 Europe comes into view, and thereby the response of the OCG to this c­ hallenge, among others. Accordingly, the stage of operationalisation comprised a qualitative archival research and content analysis of the relevant material found in Ekklesia, i.e. the official monthly bulletin of the OCG, as well as in the sources available via its online official website.11 In that way it was ensured that the sampling of primary and secondary sources would be representative of the OCG, that is, of the s­tructure and agencies therein. In addition, this was complemented by data found in Greek governmental sources such as the Ministry of Digital Policy, Telecommunications and Media, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) country reports and the European Commission communiqués and reports, so that to examine the theme in focus in the context and in relation to the broader – national and international – environment that the OCG has had to function, in conjunction with the relevant actors and agencies. It must of course be made clear from the outset that it is acknowledged that the issue of migration is ever ongoing, and that what is being dealt with here is its fluctuations in relation to the OCG, to the extent that the latter may intervene in any way or not, express views and engage socially and politically, assuming thus corresponding roles and duties. In addition, the complexities and limitations in doing so are also recognised, particularly as they dictate the scope and depth of its involvement and by extension its impact.

Church–state relations before and after the Cold War The OCG was founded amid the nineteenth-century currents of nationalism which gave rise to the nation state, particularly since the resurgence and selfdetermination of ethnic groups in the Balkans that took advantage of the decline of the Ottoman Empire while mutatis mutandis endorsing the paradigmatic lessons of the French Revolution, culminating thus in the formation of the corresponding Westphalian system as it evolved from the Central European Thirty Years’ War treaty (1648) and the fermentations thereafter.12 Namely, the compromise between the Great Powers resulted in the nomination of a Bavarian Prince, Otto von Wittelsbach (1815–67) as the first king of the newly founded Greece, ratified by the Fifth National Assembly of 1832 at Nafplion. Meanwhile, the regency comprising of Josef Ludwig von Armansperg (1787–1853), Karl von Abel (1788–1859) and Georg Ludwig von Maurer (1790–1872), would run the country from 1833 until Otto would come of age, in 1835. Von Maurer, in collaboration with Theokletos Pharmakides (1784–1860) – a scholar, theologian and governmental advisor on religious affairs, being likeminded in believing an autocephalous Greek Church the optimal choice, in line with the independent Greek state – ­unilaterally declared the founding of the Orthodox Church of Greece in 1833. In fact, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople did not recognise it until 1850, when a synodical tome acknowledged the OCG as ­ autocephalous and settled the

168  G. E. Trantas matter.13 Church and state were to be interwoven ­institutionally, socially and politically, with Orthodoxy being historiographically appropriated into the national narrative; moreover, the church was co-opted by the state while becoming an integral constituent element of the latter.14 Religion was a central determinant of identity in the region during the era of nation-building and afterwards, hence the transformation and institutionalisation of churches into purveyors of nationality and, by extension, statehood legitimation, via conflating – in part – the religious with the national affiliation. The un-canonical founding of the OCG falls within this inter-Balkan post-Ottoman ­ pattern, where the nineteenth-century modern synthesis as described in brief above, nationalised Orthodoxy and canonised the Hellenic– Christian construct in the collective Greek psyche.15 The historiographic ­cornerstone of this synthesis ought to be attributed to Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, who produced the authoritative work History of the Greek Nation, whereby the diachronicity and continuity of the Greek nation is attempted; divided in five distinct phases, he puts together a spectrum of Greek historic evolution, which, in its entirety, represents a continuum from antiquity to modernity. In that way he rehabilitates Byzantium so that to demonstrate organic intellectual, cultural, linguistic and geographical linkages between seemingly incompatible phases of history, while instrumentalising this schema to teleologically argue in favour of a Greek destiny; this has had a significant bearing on the Greek political thought.16 In Western Europe, the nation state emerged and evolved through processes and fermentations such as the Reformation, the Enlightenment, etc., and although some degree of religious legitimacy remained present, secularisation and by extension laïcité, entailed the abolition of a state religion and its replacement with state neutrality, in principle. However, even in Western Europe, the prominence of demographically and culturally predominant religious communities is still evident, and the privileges that churches enjoy have not been swept away entirely, as they still have a social sway and cultural– political authority and distinct visibility in the public sphere, despite their formal separation with the state.17 Be that as it may, the latter has been consolidated. Greece on the one hand draws from the Byzantine model of church–state relations, as it has been historically and culturally imprinted, while on the other, being, as a state, the outcome of Western political trends and influences, it adheres to modern secular principles. The antitheses are notable, considering that Eastern Orthodoxy never underwent the gamechanging historical experiences – e.g. the Enlightenment – that co-shaped its Western European counterparts.18 To be Orthodox Christian has been historically identified and conflated with being Greek in terms of the modern national identity perception. But this touches on the long-established social, political and economic culture, which has been shaped, for the most part, by the overarching Southeastern European particularities, owed to, among others, the post-Ottoman residual structural characteristics of the Millet system that permeate the relationship between church and state.

Greece  169 This, coupled with the nineteenth-century programmatic association of the Modern Greek state’s identity with Orthodoxy, has clearly played a formative role in the, now, diachronic emergent pattern of the church as an institution and the church as a community of believers being identified as one and the same, that is, an all-encompassing ecclesia.19 All in all, it would not be amiss to maintain that the state, already since its inception and to date, has been personified in a way by which religion has been definitive. Morality, intentionality, ultimately identity and by extension behaviour are part of a state’s personhood, and in the case of Greece, its state personhood has been, and mutatis mutandis continues to be, Orthodox. This has inevitably a bearing on the political culture and direction that pervades the ­institutions and structures thereof, including any given government that has been called upon to function in line with the collectively acknowledged state personhood.20 It must be noted, however, that this is not meant as an insinuation that the church may by and large determine the policies and polity of the state, but rather that it has a say in a relationship through which it legitimates policies while acknowledging, as the weaker party, that for the most part it is co-opted. That is, church and state have a cooperative relationship with the former being loyal to the latter, in exchange for a preferential treatment, which is typical of a dependency relationship, traces of which are easily identifiable in the Millet system, or in historical instances of the Byzantine symphony model. The church–state relationship in focus, however, falls into the category of ‘simple co-optation’, which means that more or less the entire church organisation is subordinate to the state.21 Within this context, during the Cold War one can discern two distinct periods, based on the main functions and behaviour of the OCG and its ­relationship with the Greek state: between 1945 and 1974 the OCG was permeated by a clear and active anti-Communist rhetoric and engagement, whereas between 1974 and 1991, with the rehabilitation of the Greek Left and its subsequent protagonistic role, the OCG fundamentally reviewed its orientation.22 The former period began with an extraordinary political development along with many others that took place at the same time: the regency of Archbishop Damaskinos (Papandreou) (1941–49) who served as Prime Minister in post-Second World War Greece. The alignment of the state with the Western powers meant the church’s orientation accordingly. Thus, during the Greek Civil War, subsequent to the Second World War, even though Damaskinos’ encyclicals were conciliatory, the church assumed an anti-Communist stance, openly backing the National Greek Armed Forces as opposed to the so-called ‘Democratic Army of Greece’.23 It is actually worth noting that even though the UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill (1951–55) initially considered Damaskinos a ‘pestilent priest, a remnant from the Middle Ages’,24 he was later converted to his supporter and admirer, due to his political role and course of action, although domestically the archbishop has been both criticised and praised, which reflects the social and ideological divisions of the time.25

170  G. E. Trantas Meanwhile the USA Marshall Plan, apart from the transfers of funds towards rebuilding Greece and the transfusion of Western political ideas, together with the country’s NATO membership in 1952, left little room for doubt as to where Greece’s loyalties lay. Anti-communism and conservatism were not ­person-dependent though. The co-optive church–state tandem, given the exigencies and circumstances of the time, meant that the Hellenic–Christian construct ought to be utilised as an ideological antipode – an ideologeme ­ perhaps – to communism, while the 1952 Constitution clearly favoured the OCG by establishing Orthodox Christianity as the prevailing religion; a privileged state religion in fact. Damaskinos was succeeded by A ­ rchbishop Spyridon (Vlachos) (1949–56) who continued the anti-­Communist legacy. While the state toughened its stance significantly by ­resorting to outright undemocratic approaches – violations of human and civil rights – ranging from censorship, social and professional exclusion and persecution, surveillance, incarceration, to exile and execution, and had the Communist Party outlawed (1948), the church contributed with its own means. It conducted a campaign that was intended to disseminate the corresponding frame of ideas via catechism, sermons, publications etc.,26 being thus in tune with the state and exerting its soft power domestically. To put it bluntly, it was an era of authoritarianism, suppression, and can be described as ‘Greek McCarthyism’.27 This was less than effective though as regards the public sentiment. In fact, it had the adverse effect as it partly gave rise to anti-Americanism and anti-­ Westernism. Yet, instead of democratisation, this climate culminated in the ‘Junta of the Colonels’ and their regime (1967–74), with the pretext of averting Greece’s impending turn to communism. The combination of the loosened political control over the military as a result of the 1963–7 political crisis and the failed democratisation process following the unhealed civil war trauma, led to the junta. However, there is no sufficient evidence to suggest that it was masterminded by the USA as it is popularly believed; still, it is true that the regime soon enjoyed the unconditional backing of the American government.28 Be that as it may, the OCG adapted and conformed to the new status quo. With Archbishop Hieronymos (Kotsones) elected (1967–73) at the helm of the church, and with the latter under the control of the regime, it follows that the institution would be used for propaganda purposes. Not to mention that it functioned as a source of legitimation, given the soft power that it wielded. After all, the motto of the time was ‘Hellas of Greek Christians’ (Hellas Hellēnōn Christianōn), and in that sense, the heavily regime-controlled church was instrumental.29 However, as soon as the dictatorship collapsed it took its ideology with it, as it was now delegitimised and vanished from the public sphere.30 The government of Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis31 (1907–98) and the party of ‘New Democracy’ (Nea Dēmokratia), albeit conservative, had the opportunity to make a fresh start and reposition themselves politically while breaking from the post-war mainstream right-wing politics. Notably, the draft constitution altered the status of the church, and from a ‘state institution’ (Nomokratousa Ekklēsia) it became an ‘established church’ (Epikratousa

Greece  171 Ekklēsia), while, from official state religion, Orthodoxy was now ‘the creed of majority’;32 an indication that the restoration of democracy and the ­emergence of the ‘Third Hellenic Republic’ would be proven pivotal, as it marked the passage to the aforementioned second phase of church–state relations during the Cold War and the rehabilitation of the Left in the public sphere. Even though Konstantinos Karamanlis exclaimed in 1981 that nation and Orthodoxy ‘have become in the Greek conscience virtually synonymous concepts, which together constitute our Helleno-Christian civilization’,33 the Socialist government of ­ Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)34 (1981–89) was poised to take legislative initiatives towards reviewing this ­relationship, aspiring to ultimately separate church and state, which was not the case though. The church, meanwhile, dissociated itself from the antiCommunist political past that was never fully endorsed by the OCG anyway, and managed to shed its previous image, since Archbishop Serapheim (Tikas) (1974–98) was conciliatory.35 It would not be off the mark to say that the 1980s was an experimental period for both Greece and the OCG, as they were in unchartered political waters. In this context it was also not an anticlerical period, despite frictions and antitheses; anti-Americanism and antiWesternism found common ground with the historical anti-Westernism of Orthodoxy. Within the climate of the, then, predominant ideological platform and the evident social inclination, leftist scholars and intellectuals were not hindered from engaging into dialogue with the Athonite spirituality and the Orthodox tradition. Thus, a sui generis left-wing intelligentsia emerged, the ‘Neo-Orthodox’, which opposed the uncritical Westernism, reactionary traditionalism and the Orthodox hard-liners alike.36 Even though they never became opinion leaders, one empirically discerns in Greek society, at a grassroots level, the comfortable combination of Marxian ideological traits and Orthodox values. The end of the Cold War self-evidently constituted a turning point for both the state and the church of interest. The 1990–93 conservative government of New Democracy and Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis (1918–2017), particularly in light of the radically shifting international political landscape, sought to mend the relationship with the USA. Among the many emergent issues of the time, Greece’s concerns were related to its immediate neighbours in the ­Balkans: the breakup of Yugoslavia entailed instability and challenges hidden behind the Iron Curtain until then, such as the lingering constitutional name dispute with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), as well as massive population movements that will be discussed later on in the chapter.37 The emerging state of affairs, from the collapse of communism, the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the significant migrant influx, the euro (€), the Europeanisation process, and the European Enlargement eastwards, entailed a reorientation of the OCG to match the new challenges.38 The church was valuable to the state in terms of its religio-cultural penetration as a soft power in the Balkans during the 1990s, which was acknowledged

172  G. E. Trantas by both Serapheim and the government of Andreas Papandreou (1993–96). Examples of this approach in practise are the endorsement of the Greek minority’s cause in South Albania – also commonly known as Northern Epirus in Greece, and particularly so as a Greek irredenta – while the OCG closely collaborated with the state in the organisation of demonstrations against the recognition of FYROM by its constitutional name, sided with the Serbs during the Yugoslavian secessionist wars while holding the West accountable, and thereby reclaimed and legitimised its place in the Greek social and political affairs.39 This was at odds, however, with the subsequent PASOK government of Kostas Simitis (1996–2004). Under his leadership the party’s physiognomy was now transformed, shedding the predominant populist characteristics. Instead, its trendsetters were deemed as modernisers, and often pejoratively so, as they wished to steer the country towards a pro-Western, European direction and introduce – in retrospect belated and much-needed – reforms.40 This policy framework regarding the state institutions, and, by extension, the spillover effect that it would have on the OCG, did not fare well with Archbishop Christodoulos (Paraskeuaides) (1998–2008). His ‘expressive interventionism’, i.e. the assertive outreach to the public by way of modern means, among others, in order to co-shape the public sphere and exert influence, was not compatible with the domestic political modernisation trends.41 ­Particularly since the OCG aspired to assume a central role and eventually claimed it, which entailed participation in the agenda formulation and a say on major state affairs, combined with weakened control of the state over the church. Indicative examples of this conduct would be domestic interventions in educational matters, the ‘identity cards crisis’,42 as well as issues pertaining to international politics, such as the ‘Cyprus Problem’, the ‘Macedonian Question’, and the developments in the Balkans. Moreover, Christodoulos entered a conflict with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople over jurisdictional matters, thus temporarily damaging a crucial relationship.43 It should be noted that this was part of a broader strategic thinking where the OCG’s scope exceeded its national bounds and advocated an international role, in line with the revised status quo that globalisation imposed and the opportunities that the EU had in store, which Christodoulos called a ‘geopolitical pastoral consciousness’; he did retreat from this assertiveness though, given that it had irritated the entire political system in Greece, regardless of ideological positioning.44 As regards the domestic affairs, amid an array of scandals that scourged the OCG, which the political system utilised in order to ‘teach him a lesson’, he had no other option but to shift his attention towards containing the damage and his assertiveness.45 Overall, his legacy can be best summed up as controversial.46 In contrast, Archbishop Hieronymos II (Liapes) (since 2008), who enjoys a much higher degree of acceptance by the political system, sought to reverse his predecessor’s transformation of the OCG, restore its credibility in society, contain the most extreme voices in the Holy Synod, depoliticise and democratise the church, as well as mend the relations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of

Greece  173 Constantinople, drawing from the social and religious legitimation that he enjoyed.47 Right from the outset, that is, his inauguration speech, he made clear that to him the role of the church was to be depoliticised and denationalised, claiming that it is not pertinent to interfere in political affairs, neither the international nor the domestic.48 Not long after his ascension to office though, in 2009, the Greek debt crisis – although debt is merely one of its aspects such as deficit, competitiveness, etc. – started to dawn, and it was to dominate the domestic state of affairs to date. Consecutive government changes are an indication of the instability that stems from the de-legitimation of the political system. Kostas Karamanlis,49 Prime Minister (2004–09) and Head of New Democracy (1997–2009), in light of the forthcoming unravelling of the economy, called a snap election in 2009, seeking a renewed mandate that never came as Georgios Papandreou50 became Prime Minister instead (2009–11), having won a sweeping victory with PASOK (party leader between 2004–12). His service in office was cut short though. Given the height of the sovereign debt and the downgrades of Greece’s credit rating by the major agencies – Fitch, Standard and Poor’s, and Moody’s – he resorted to a belated request for an international bailout, dispensed and managed by what is euphemistically called the ‘Troika’, i.e. the EU – with the supervision of the European Commission – the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In exchange for the bailout package, he had to take draconian measures, impose strict austerity and restructure the public finances. Amid social unrest he stepped down, only to be succeeded by a short-lived coalition government – it lasted six months – which ­consisted of PASOK, New Democracy and the Popular Democratic Rally (LAOS),51 a small right-wing populist party that is now defunct. This coalition was headed by Loukas Papadimos, the former governor of the Bank of Greece.52 In turn, this government was succeeded by yet another coalition that emerged from the 2012 elections in June: it comprised New Democracy, with Antonis Samaras53 as Prime Minister (2012–15), PASOK, and yet another small party that is in the Parliament no more, the Democratic Left. This marked the undoing of the typical two-party system. However, in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the government and the Troika, further austerity measures had to be taken, while the social conditions had already deteriorated due to the economic shock: unemployment rose from the usual 10–11 per cent to above 20 per cent, while in 2014 it reached 27 per cent; youth unemployment reached the astounding 60 per cent; consumer spending contracted, demand for goods and services plummeted, thus, by 2013 at least 40 per cent of the retail sector closed down in Athens alone, causing further unemployment. In addition, rising taxes, combined with significantly shrinking income, led to further exacerbation of the situation. The health system overhaul, dependent on employment, left at least 2.5 million people uninsured. Indicatively, the Organisation for Economic Co-­operation and Development (OECD) maintains that, by 2014, 30 per cent of the population lived below the poverty line in comparison with the Eurozone core states.54

174  G. E. Trantas The political landscape was deeply affected. Apart from the undoing of the two-party system, the debt crisis brought about a tendency towards the extremes of the spectrum. The far-right fascist party of ‘Golden Dawn’ (Chrysē Aygē) entered the mainstream political scene initially in 2009, only to eventually become the third strongest party in the Parliament, making use of a populist rhetoric against austerity and migration, while conducting its own ­ philanthropic activities – for Greeks exclusively. It must be noted that their violent tendencies have got them into trouble with the authorities; arrests of some of their prominent members and pending trials attest to that. On the other side of the spectrum – just as populist but with a different agenda in issues pertinent to their ideological platform – the rhetoric of the Left has widely resonated among the electorate. The Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA),55 a patchwork movement of several constituent smaller parties/organisations turned to one unitary party in 2012 and rose from the fringes and the 4.6 per cent of the vote in 2009 to a 36 per cent in 2015. This meant that it had the majority of seats in a hung parliament, and thus resorted to a coalition with the populist right-wing party ANEL,56 promising an end to austerity and the renegotiation of the MoU with the Troika, which they attempted to no avail.57 Within this climate of insecurity, instability and social unrest, the OCG has been very careful not to agitate while standing by its principles, which is a difficult balancing act. On the one hand the OCG opposes and rejects the Weberian Protestant Ethic and the socioeconomic model of Homo Economicus that subsequently emerged58 within the broader individualist Western paradigm, as that evolved from the distinct disparities between community (Gesellschaft) and society (Gemeinschaft);59 a transition that has never fully taken place in Greece. On the other hand, social peace was very fragile and Hieronymos II, while depoliticising and de-radicalising the church, did not wish to appear as an agitator. Still, the Holy Synod came forward and via the encyclical No. 2894 it expressed its own assessment of Greece’s predicament. Both society and the political establishment were the recipients of its critique: the former was criticised due to its eroded values that allowed for the imbalance between production and consumption, and the latter for the years of irresponsible management of the state’s affairs. However, its language was less restrained in the pamphlet ‘To the People’ (Pros ton Lao; Προς τον Λαό), where indulgence, corruption, clientelism and generally pathogenic aspects of the Greek socioeconomic moral fibre and structures were criticised, while in addition, implicit anti-Westernist elements surfaced, via a broad reference to those who allegedly profit from Greece’s troubles.60

Population movement and migratory trends before and after the Cold War As stated earlier, Greece has been predominantly and diachronically a country of emigration rather than immigration, but it has had its own experience of forced population displacement as well. The regional nationalisms of the nineteenth and early twentieth century have been responsible for extensive

Greece  175 population movements in the post-Ottoman Balkans, where displacement and ethnic cleansing coincided with territorial, national boundary changes. An example of refugee crisis that has been imprinted in the Greek collective memory would be that of the ‘Greek Catastrophe’ in Asia Minor. Following the First World War and the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), the Greek military expedition in the aforementioned Ottoman region, after the withdrawal of the Major Powers’ support, suffered a sweeping counter-offensive by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who pushed the Greek forces back to the Aegean coastline. The Greek minority in the region, including Smyrna, which was razed by fire in 1922, suffered a major humanitarian catastrophe; their only chance of survival was to flee to Greece.61 Greece, after a lengthy, costly, war campaign (Greco-Turkish war of 1919–22) that ended with a tremendously demoralising defeat and a political crisis,62 was unable to facilitate their proper support by itself. Hence the emergency was dealt with through the joint effort of the Greek government via its ad hoc Refugee Relief Fund (RRF) (Tameion Prostasias Prosfygōn) and with the support of organisations such as the Red Cross and Save the Children Fund. According to the 1928 census – although it is impossible to estimate the actual number of refugees given their uncoordinated flight in panic, the lack of an evacuation plan or initiative on behalf of the Greek government, as well as the rudimentary technical registration means of the time – they amounted to 1,221,849 people, but it was probably as high as 1.4 million. Notably, the entire Greek population was less than five million at the time.63 Greece’s inability to respond to the challenge, but also the lack of a solid international regime to regulate such issues is evident by the League of Nations International Loan Protocol, meant to provide the country with additional, emergency resources.64 Emigration on the other hand, during the interwar period, more or less ended in 1921 when the USA government lowered the incoming migrant quota significantly, and, even though the Greek government encouraged migration to countries such as Argentina and Brazil, few of the impoverished population – predominantly Greek refugees – were prepared to embark on that adventure.65 However, it would be more productive and pertinent to examine such occurrences from the post-Second World War period and onwards, when an international regime as such emerged, allowing for a clearer distinction, first and foremost between refugees and immigrants. That would be the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention,66 which, ratified by 145 countries, set the criteria by which one may qualify as refugee and defined the corresponding rights and obligations of the refugees and cosignatory states. The 1951 Convention is safeguarded and upheld by the UNHCR, which was established in 1950, following the aftermath of the Second World War. This means that immigration schemes and frameworks were distinguished thereafter, abiding by different regulations. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), established in 1951 amid the p­ost-war waves of population displacement, specialises in migratory, displacement, and refugee issues. It was initially founded as the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movements

176  G. E. Trantas of Migrants from Europe (PICMME), only to become the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) later in 1951. It was renamed to Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) in 1980, and upon the amendment and ratification of its 1953 Constitution in 1989, ICM became the International Organization for Migration (IOM), by which acronym it is known today.67 The latter, as PICMME, together with the World Council of Churches (WCC) and the Greek Chamber of Commerce of Alexandria (GCCA),68 had been involved in a Greek migration scheme in the 1960s concerning the ‘ethnic Greeks of Egypt’ (Aigyptiotes, Gr.: Αιγυπτιώτες). Apart from the unrest due to nationalism, decolonisation, the Egyptian Revolution of 195269 – which afterwards culminated in the 1956 Suez crisis – economic pressure and unemployment functioned as push factors as well. Literature refers to the departure of the ethnic Greeks of Egypt to Greece and other Greek diasporic destinations as ‘Exodus’. It began during the interwar period, became more intensive after the Suez crisis and peaked during the 1960s.70 Of the 60,000 people there in 1947, by 1967 there were about 17,000 left. This exodus of low-income persons functioned as a relief valve for the local community’s scarce employment opportunities, but it was seen as a potential threat by the Greek state, fearing, amid the anti-Communist national strategy, that they would be indoctrinated by the Left due to their working and lower class stratification; in addition, the state did not wish to receive them while at the same time it was promoting the emigration of a part of the existing unemployed population that it hoped to shed. Given though that the PICMME could not officially function outside its European jurisdiction, it was decided that its activities in Egypt ought to be covered by the WCC, which also functioned on behalf of the Greek government, helping the Greeks of Egypt to be relocated to other, existing Greek diasporic destinations, mostly to ­Australia. This, of course, exceeded the official functions and roles of the aforementioned organisations, but all the involved counterparts were in agreement.71 To better appreciate the impact of emigrational and immigrational tendencies and currents on Greece’s demographics, it would be helpful to take its population into account, which, between 1864 and 1947 was changing with the consecutive annexations of territory, given that Greece was expanding and reclaiming its classical territorial boundaries, mutatis mutandis of course. So, the overall population rose from 1,359,064 in 1864, to 5,531,474 in 1947.72 While taking that into consideration, one observes that despite the notable population rise, the emigrational numbers remain high. Generally, the emergent Greek emigrational pattern between the second half of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century, the main destinations were overseas, with the USA being by far the most preferred one as 488,192 emigrated there, while another 91,422 opted for other overseas destinations – primarily Australia. Even though post-1955 there is a significant turn to European countries (approximately 760,000 Greek emigrants),

Greece  177 of which 50 per cent set off to Germany, the overseas emigration did not completely cease, as 14.2 per cent went to Australia and 11.6 per cent to the USA.73 The causes behind this phenomenon up to the first quarter of the twentieth century are distinguished to both domestic and external – ­oftentimes overlapping – and they can be summed up to endemic economic weaknesses of an agrarian country, natural disasters, usury – especially in the rural areas – military conscription issues, the Eastern Question, the influx of refugees, the Balkan wars, the National Schism, etc.74 Another example of sizable emigration can be drawn from 1955 and onwards. While the West German economy was booming and experiencing its so-called economic miracle, the Wirtschaftswunder, it encountered a workforce shortage that called for flexibility in labour supply to cover the high demand of the industries. The West German government resorted to bilateral agreements with countries that had excess workforce and high unemployment, introducing thus the guest-worker (Ger.: Gastarbeiter) regime, the name of which was implicit of their transitory status in the country.75 Greece’s economy on the other hand was crippled by consecutive wars: destroyed infrastructure, farming, industry, unplanned urbanisation, lingering sociopolitical problems as mentioned earlier, civil war, and ultimately, economically inactive population with potential and a will to contribute, but no outlet as such. Greece signed this agreement on 30 March 1960 and advertised the new work opportunities. It is roughly estimated that two million people gradually emigrated between the 1950s and 1970s, with two-thirds of them to West Germany.76 The role of the Greek Orthodox Metropolis of Germany, under the aegis of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, is quite notable though, given that in their case the church helped build the community even though the most commonplace pattern is the opposite. Namely, long before the Greek Gastarbeiter could even consider Germany as their permanent residence, their Metropolis was founded as early as on 5 February 1963, and became a legal person in October 1974. As a proponent of the Greek communities there, it has actively contributed to their integration, and it continues to do so.77 As of November 1973, the government of West Germany put an end to the Gastarbeiter policy. The phenomenon of return migration dominated the rest of the 1970s as well as the 1980s, increasing thus the Greek workforce.78 The human capital they acquired in Germany was of little use to them in Greece though. Structural economic differences, uneven regional development and poor infrastructure hindered the reintegration of the returnees into the Greek economy, and in fact their unemployment rate was higher than the national average.79 The abject failure of the state to foresee the obvious return of a part of its guest-workforce and facilitate its reintegration created a vacuum that the OCG attempted to fill. The ‘Integration Centre for Migrant Workers’ (ICMW)80 was established as early as 1978 by the Holy Synod of the OCG, in order to provide support to returnees from German-speaking countries of Western Europe, so that they could better cope with issues such

178  G. E. Trantas as social insurance, and generally to help them reintegrate into the Greek society.81 Yet, with the fall of the Iron Curtain Greece experienced a paradigm shift as during the 1990s it became a receiving state; not only of ‘returnees of Greek descent’ (Palinnostountes) from Kazakhstan and Georgia, but of immigrants from the former Soviet Union as well, even though the former were seen as relatives in distress, linked to the First World War refugee population movement. But even so, their inclusion and integration has been by and large problematic, due to the lack of integration provision and processes, leaving them feeling more excluded than welcome.82 Still they were more welcome than the at least half a million legal and illegal immigrants from Albania, which was a cause of social resentment ‘that bordered on being a moral panic’.83 Those of the Greek minority in Southern Albania though, found it easier to interact with the Greek authorities and society, and they also had some support from the church. In fact, several cases of conversion of Muslim Albanians to Greek Orthodoxy via baptism have been recorded, for, this made the issuing of a visa by the Greek consulate easier and rendered betterpaid legal employment possible.84 Name-changing was another option, much more common than conversion, that helped them integrate better. It is safe to say that even though the 1990s’ Albanian immigration was not welcome, regardless of its contribution to the economy, their dispersion in the Greek cities and villages instead of an introvert ethnic population concentration, and their ‘social inconspicuousness’ are evidence of their successful gradual integration.85 By the mid-2000s, other, significantly smaller migratory trends from Africa, Asia and the Middle East had intensified, comprising approximately one million economic migrants when combined with the much larger number of people that had arrived by the year 2000. Integration and acculturation to a mutatis mutandis culturally homogeneous country, and in such demographic analogy to its population of ten million, has not been easy. Anti-immigrant sentiments were heightened and remain tense, and considering how controversial an issue migration in Greece is, this should come as no surprise.86 To that it ought to be added that apart from the documented migrants that exceeded 797,091 in 2001, the undocumented migrants – mostly of unknown origin, residence, employment or other personal details – amounted to another 200,000, approximately.87 Hence concerns about the demographics of the country, which have to do with its low birth rates combined with its total population of only 10,816,286 according to the census of 2011,88 ought to be factored in. In addition, since 2010 Greece is suffering yet again the loss of a muchneeded human capital amid the debt crisis; namely, from 2010 to 2015 alone, between 280,000 and 350,000 Greeks emigrated.89 The flight of human capital, also known as brain drain,90 is a major consequence of the crisis that can in sum be attributed to external and internal factors, such as poor monitoring by the global finance, EU and state institutions, uneven development

Greece  179 between the European ‘core’ and ‘periphery states’, endemic sociopolitical flaws, i.e. structural weaknesses, economic ‘informality’, political culture etc. In addition, the low competitiveness of the country is further amplified by lack of strategic planning in order to make the most of its highly educated and skilled human capital, which results in ‘brain waste’.91 In that way Greece creates a push factor and undermines its own developmental capacity at the same time. Moreover, not only are the effects of the brain drain still to date socially underappreciated, and not only is there no prospect of human capital return, but the phenomenon of brain drain is expected to intensify.92 Impressively enough, in a survey conducted in the spring of 2018 (16 April to 30 May) among Greeks with international work experience, the main reasons for choosing to work abroad were the endemic lack of meritocracy and corruption (44 per cent), followed by the economic crisis and insecurity (36 per cent), better prospects abroad (29 per cent), while the high unemployment rate of Greece was a push factor for only 16 per cent of the respondents.93 This indicates that to interpret the exodus of human capital through the prism of the debt crisis without taking the chronic, endemic shortcomings into account – and thereby the much-needed reforms that are still met with resistance – would be erroneous. In that respect the paradigm shift that the country has undergone is not sweeping; emigration still remains an option, an outlet, and in the final analysis it has renewed its place as a part of the collective imaginary, by ­generating narratives anew. However, the contemporary emigration differs significantly from past cases of outflux qualitatively. Greek emigrants’ primary destinations are other EU Member States, such as Great Britain and ­Germany; in that sense they remain within the bounds of their European home, making the most of the freedom of movement within it. Therefore, their circumstance is not as precarious and transitory as that of the Greek emigrants in the past, whose fortune depended on their visas, migration policies and bilateral state agreements. In addition to this, contrary to past emigrational waves, the current outflux equals to loss of a highly skilled ­ workforce, while the brain drain was not an issue in the past. At the same time, the rise in influx has indeed modified Greece’s migratory quantitative and qualitative typology and demographic synthesis. However, those who emigrate leave the OCG’s jurisdiction and for the most part they enter that of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, therefore the OCG could not put mechanisms in place to support emigrants; it can only do that domestically, for returnees, refugees, immigrants and asylum seekers. As stated earlier, the steady increase of the migrant population begins in the 1990s: indicatively, documented foreign nationals amounted to 167,000 in 1991, i.e. to 1.6 per cent of the total population, while in 2001 they comprised 7 per cent. The increase during the 2000s, although it continued, was not as high. In 2011 they exceeded 900,000 and they amounted to 8.4 per cent of the total population. As regards nationality, in the immediate post1991 period the migratory influx clearly came from European countries,

180  G. E. Trantas while in the decade of 2001–11 the emergent pattern was that of i­mmigration from Asia and Africa.94 Between 1991 and 2001, 70 per cent of the migrant population increase comprised Albanian citizens, 5,5 per cent Bulgarian and 3,8 per cent Georgian, out of an 86,4 per cent of European nationalities; whereas between 2001 and 2011, the foreign population increase of circa 150,000 immigrants comprised 44,321 Romanians, i.e. 29.6 per cent of the increase total, 42,815 Albanians, i.e. 28.6 per cent, and 40,813 Bulgarians, i.e. 27.2 per cent. It appears that there is a correlation between Romania’s and Bulgaria’s accession to the EU and the influx of corresponding populations to homodox and neighbouring Greece.95 At the same time there was an increase in influx from Asia by 48,859, i.e. 33.3 per cent of the total increase, and from Africa by 10,146, which amounts to 6.8 per cent. The main Asian countries of origin were Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh, by 23,047 (15.4 per cent), 6,540 (4.4 per cent) and 6,222 ­ (4.2 per cent) respectively. In the case of Arabic states, it was primarily citizens of Egypt (3,007, 2 per cent) and Syria (2,760, 1.4 per cent) that migrated to Greece. Therefore, again between 2001 and 2011 the migratory influx originated mainly from Europe with the numbers from Asia and Africa presenting an increase.96 Generally speaking though, it appears that the attractiveness of a destination country is not necessarily founded on actual facts regarding the economic potential for migrants; its broadly perceived economic development seems to determine the migrants’ preference as their perception of the potential host country’s economic particulars is oftentimes crude and uninformed. Other pull factors would be the historical colonial links, a shared common language, geographical proximity and centrality, as well as the existence of migrant communities and asylum seekers in the destination country.97 In the case of Greece though, geography is a decisive factor as the country is located at the crossroads of Europe, Asia Minor and Africa, therefore it constitutes a natural passageway between continents, and in that sense it may absorb significant migratory flows to Europe, particularly to the EU, given that it is a Member State. Thereby Greece had a protagonistic role in the migrant and refugee crisis that followed, yet it does not constitute a destination country per se, but rather a transit country. Of course, the refugee crisis has yet to be adequately analysed, as it is, after all, still ongoing and the policies applied have yet to yield results and be evaluated. At the time of writing this study, discord at the EU level attest to discord and friction between heads of state, as well as bilateral initiatives and Member State subgroupings – the issue is still far from resolved.98 The legislative framework that determined the classification, rights and obligations of third-country nationals in the EU was the so-called ‘Dublin II’ regulation of 2003, seeking to introduce a common EU policy on asylum and establish a Common European Asylum System.99 It was replaced by the ‘Dublin III’ regulation in 2013, where the basic principle, that the first EU Member State point of entry is responsible to process the asylum claimants’

Greece  181 100

application, is upheld. This has been a cause of friction and concern for Greece, given that at the peak of the migrant and refugee crisis it was the main entry point of their route to Central, Northern and Western Europe. The numbers are indicative of the weight that debt crisis-stricken Greece had to bear: in 2015 alone, 856,723 persons crossed from Turkey to Greece according to the UNHCR, and 872,519 according to the Hellenic Police Force, while in 2016 they amounted to 156,782 according to the UNHCR whereas the Hellenic Police Force recorded 176,127 cases, the majority of which, 90 per cent, came from some of the world’s top ten refugee countries of origin, mainly Syria (46 per cent), Afghanistan (24 per cent), Iraq (15 per cent), Pakistan (5 per cent) and Iran (3 per cent).101 Due to the overwhelming numbers and the consequent humanitarian crisis, the European Commission put forward the European Agenda on Migration in May 2015, and on 23 September the same year it defined its priority actions to be taken towards its implementation, which involved operational measures, budgetary support and implementation of EU law. Particularly the operational measures included: (a) the implementation of the ‘Hotspot Approach’, i.e. the effective migration ­management at the external borders under most pressure, so that to restore confidence in the system and the Schengen area freedom of movement; (b) the implementation of the ‘Relocation Scheme’, for people in Italy and Greece in clear need of international protection; (c) ‘Resettlement’ of people in clear need of international protection, directly from third countries; and the (d) effective ‘Return and Readmission’ of people who do not qualify as refugees to their home countries.102 Regardless of the action plan, according to the draft report of the rapporteur Ms Tineke Strik and the Committee on Migration, Refugees and ­Displaced Persons (Doc. 14082), the European response was in fact that of panic, which led to the abrupt closing of the ‘Balkan route’ in 2016, at the borders with the FYROM, leaving Greece with a disproportionate burden. The situation was further exacerbated by the chronic failings and shortcomings of the Greek asylum system, which had been identified as violations of the European C ­ onvention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights in 2011 and despite the progress made since then in various areas, the problems persisted. Namely, Strik’s report characterises the failings of the Greek asylum system as ‘an old problem’. By using the case of an Afghan asylum seeker’s treatment in Greece, she sheds light on deficiencies in the asylum application process such as, ‘excessively short deadlines, insufficient capacity within the asylum system, failures to proceed with examination of the application, to maintain contact and to provide information, unavailability of legal assistance and procedural delays before the Supreme Court’. Yet the report clearly states that the EU failed to provide adequate support to Greece, while acknowledging that the refugee crisis is a European and global problem, and not just a Greek one.103 In addition, this crisis coincided with Greece’s debt crisis, which has already been testing the strength of the OCG to cope with domestic humanitarian problems, such as increasing poverty,

182  G. E. Trantas malnutrition, homelessness, lack of access to healthcare, and many other c­ onsequences, which are still at large.104 The first ‘hotspot’ was established in October 2015 on the island of Lesvos. In February 2016 the hotspot of Chios was also operational, followed by another two in March 2016, on Samos and Leros, with the hotspot of Kos being delivered in June 2016.105 By 2017 the Greek state had managed to get better organised and put structures and hosting facilities in place, with the problem of overcrowding, however, on islands such as Lesvos, Chios, Samos and Kos remaining. To deal with the issue the government established hosting structures all over Greece so that to relieve the pressure from the overwhelmed islands of the Eastern Aegean that had a total capacity of 8,645 places. By 25 April 2017, according to the ‘Greek Central Coordinating Organization for Migration’ (Kentriko Epicheirēsiako Organo Metanasteysis; Κεντρικό Επιχειρησιακό Όργανο Μετανάστευσης), Greece had officially a maximum nominal capacity of 62,173 when combined with the places offered by the UNHCR and NGOs (20,631).106 In early 2018 the government estimated the number of asylum seekers in Greece at approximately 55,000. Lesvos, Samos, Chios, Leros and Kos are still the islands where the ‘Reception and Identification Centres’ operate, while another 22 temporary accommodation structures and hosting facilities are in operation in the mainland. Meanwhile the flows of refugees, asylum seekers and irregular immigrants have subsided significantly as an approximate reduction of 70 per cent between 2016 and 2017 is estimated.107 The UNHCR on the other hand estimates that the number of refugees, asylum seekers and irregular immigrants in May 2018 exceeded the number of 60,000, of which 14,000 on the islands of the Eastern Aegean.108 Moreover, according to the European Parliament briefing (PE 623.563) of June 2018, the total capacity of the aforementioned five hotspots of Chios, Kos, Leros, Lesvos and Samos is 6,338 places, while the total number of refugees, asylum seekers and irregular immigrants there is circa 16,500.109 One might notice that the numbers of nominal capacity may somewhat differ, depending on the date, which is to be expected given that the migratory issue is in a constant state of flux, and the source, i.e. the Greek state authorities as opposed to a third party, such as the EU institutions or the UNHCR; this is indicative of the difficulty to keep the migration crisis in check and respond to its challenges in a measured and timely manner. In short, the complexity of accurately measuring and appreciating the issue is telling of the difficulty to tackle it. Be that as it may, it is acknowledged that the phenomenon of overcrowded facilities causes as result more pressure on infrastructure, medical care and waste management, leading ultimately to poor living conditions. The latter, combined with stress and lack of information heightens the existing tension within the hotspots, which spills over the local communities, resulting in protests and unrest between migrants and locals.110 The need for hosting facilities and living conditions’ improvement is in part being covered by the establishment of a corresponding programme, the

Greece  183 Emergency Support to Integration and Accommodation (ESTIA). The EU Commission-funded ESTIA is run by the UNHCR in cooperation with the Greek ­government and the local municipalities and focuses on accommodation and cash assistance. It will continue to be funded by the EU in 2019 and the UNHCR will support the government, while playing an important, albeit secondary, role thereafter.111 Notably, within the framework of ESTIA, as of 27 February 2018, a total of 23,280 places of accommodation, comprising apartments, buildings, hotels, etc., was reached,112 while by late April 2018 they amounted to 24,487, in 21 cities across Greece, accommodating 21,002 people. Furthermore 44,753 eligible refugees and asylum seekers benefited from the programme, as they received financial assistance in cash, which amounted to the distribution of €4.5 million.113

Discourses, strategies and mechanisms on immigration Archbishop Christodoulos may have had a normative view of minorities and migrants which was different to the Western model, given that he regarded Greece an Orthodox Christian country and not a multicultural one, but he did take humanitarian initiatives to their benefit.114 It is worth noting though that his views spilled over his vision and future of the EU. In a speech of his to the MEPs of the European Peoples’ Party (EPP) in Brussels (8 October 2003), he rhetorically pondered ‘what kind of Europe do we want?’,115 referring not so much to the EU Constitutional Treaty but rather to the cultural demographic aspect of his broader rationale. While insinuating that a potential Turkish accession would be a mistake along these lines, he clearly opposed the prospect of a European melting pot.116 Moreover, in his letter to the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso (2004–14), he criticised the employment of immigrants with no workers’ rights in the place of employees with full rights as unfair to both and detrimental to social cohesion. By linking the latter with the problem of low birth rates and the shrinking European population, he suggested that the institution of family should be supported as an investment to Europe’s future. Further, even though he was fully in favour of supporting the migrants’ living conditions, he suggested that the problem of their welfare and quality of life ought to be tackled in their countries of origin instead.117 Within this context, he espoused interreligious dialogue, even though in his view it had yet to yield results; he did not consider the integration of Muslim populations in Europe possible, unless they reviewed their hermeneutic of the Koran and unless Europe made sure to safeguard its cultural foundations and Christian culture. However, opinions aside, he clearly supported a proactive assistance of Muslim migrants in need and solidarity.118 Hieronymos II has communicated a much different worldview, even though he too has his red lines. Concerning Greek citizenship for instance, even though he undoubtedly conceded that this is an affair of the state, he did suggest that the latter ought to take into account society’s national and

184  G. E. Trantas cultural sensitivities. Comprehending the currents of the time, he has not insisted on sociocultural homogeneity, nor does he think it possible. In light of globality and increased mobility, he accepts that contemporary societies are in a state of flux, which in turn requires that the church ought to adapt its strategy in a changing environment, and evolve through a healthy competition with other religions and cultures, which was not the case during its religiocultural monopoly.119 Still, the overall contribution of the OCG to the circulation of ideas and its participation in the discourse in the public sphere has been multifaceted and perhaps even ambivalent and it cannot be reduced to the archbishopric rhetoric; particularly when targeted strategies towards the safeguarding of human security have been established and pursued by the OCG. Special focus has been placed for instance on human trafficking. In 2002, the Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME)120 – a founding member of which is the OCG – created a network of religious organisations against human trafficking. That initiative was realised under the aegis of the European programme STOP, which was cofunded by the European ­Commission and in cooperation with Caritas Europe. It is known under the acronym CAT, which stands for ‘Christian Action and Networking against ­Trafficking’. CAT was continued after the expiry of STOP. During its first phase (CAT I), emphasis was placed on the exchange of good practices and the upgrade of services to the victims of human trafficking. The second phase (CAT II), from December 2003 to March 2005, focused on the collaboration of the network with public/state structures and institutions whose role is the support and protection of forced prostitution victims. The third phase (CAT III), as of November 2005, involved the expansion of the programme to further aspects of human trafficking such as work under conditions that resemble slavery.121 The Integration Centre for Migrant Workers (ICMW), has actively participated in those programmes with a focus on human trafficking, while representing the OCG. It has produced tangible output, such as a special guide on the way trafficking victims should be handled by civil society and church organisations dealing with such cases.122 Further, in line with the international programme ‘Combating Trafficking in Human Beings – Going Beyond’ which is supported by the European Commission, the ICMW has sought to facilitate a dialogue framework between academics, public services and civil society that specialise, research and deal with human trafficking, with its main foci being the aspects of work trafficking, ways of combating the phenomenon and supporting the victims, and the examination of redefining trafficking so that the notion reflects the ever-changing conditions that pervade it.123 Moreover, another focal point of the ICMW on behalf of the OCG would be the identification and facilitation of a framework of coexistence between cultures, with particular reference to the Muslim migrant communities. For instance, it produced an action plan aimed at raising awareness on equality and discrimination, the enhancement of social participation of ­underrepresented

Greece  185 communities, the promotion of a positive attitude to ­cultural differences, and the promotion of social cohesion via eradicating stereotypes and preconceptions.124 But most importantly, it conducted extensive research in the municipality of Athens, which was notably the first of its kind by a Greek institution, so that to better understand the Muslim migrants, in order to formulate and promote an agenda of coexistence. Whereby, informal places of worship were identified, documented and mapped, as well as their corresponding qualitative characteristics, such as ethnicity, nationality, language, denomination, etc. Notably, the research report criticises the diachronic research and knowledge vacuum of the state and by extension its corresponding lack of policy, resulting in a distinct lack of integration strategies.125 Within the context of the OCG’s strategies and the establishment of respective mechanisms, Archbishop Christodoulos met with High Commissioner António Guterres at the UNHCR headquarters in Geneva in May 2006, and discussed ways of increasing their cooperation towards tackling intolerance. Of particular interest was the issue of dealing in practice with the problems of asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants and the role and function of the church, the broadening of cooperation with the UNHCR as well as issues such as the monitoring of borders, but also the access of people in need to the respective refugee agency; and given Greece’s geographical location, the archbishop did not anticipate a decrease of the migratory influx.126 In 2010, amid the debt crisis, a new NGO of the church was founded, known as Apostoli (Αποστολή), i.e. ‘Mission’, intended to deal with the mounting domestic social problems due to exponentially increasing poverty.127 For instance, it has developed a programme called ‘The Church on the Road’ (Hē Ekklēsia stous Dromous), to counter poverty and social exclusion, whereby it distributes food every day of the year to homeless, drug addicts, but also immigrants – legal or not – without exception, at a central location in Athens.128 As of July 2011 Apostoli began the programme ‘The Church at Home’ (Hē Ekklēsia sto Spiti), which involves the daily distribution of groceries via parishional centres of the Holy Archbishopric of Athens to families that live below the poverty line.129 It runs nine ‘social markets’, i.e. the equivalent of food banks with affordable products.130 Among its numerous activities, initiatives and programmes intended to tackle social inequalities and poverty, Apostoli also has an accommodation facility for unaccompanied minors, within the framework of ESTIA. The facility has a capacity of 20. Apart from hosting the aforementioned asylum seekers and refugees and caring for their material needs, it also offers psychological support, social integration advice, Greek language and computer literacy courses, and it encourages their involvement with the local community via an array of ­ ­activities – sports, environmental, etc.131 However, the scope and target groups of Apostoli’s services are not the refugees and immigrants. Those are covered by the Ecumenical Refugee Programme (ERP) founded in 2012, thus replacing the old ICMW, active since 1978 and intended for the reintegration of returning Greek migrants as

186  G. E. Trantas mentioned earlier. From the latter, following the increasing immigration flows since the 1990s, the ERP emerged as a different department, dealing specifically and more effectively with issues concerning asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants, while being essentially an offshoot of the ICMW.132 To be accurate, the ICMW–ERP was founded on 6 July 2012 as a nonprofit, civil society legal person governed by public law, adherent to the OCG and represented by the President of the Holy Synod, his Beatitude the Archbishop of Athens and all Greece Hieronymos II, under the name ‘Integration Centre for Migrant Workers – Ecumenical Refugee Programme’ (Kentro Symparastaseos Palinnostounton kai Metanaston – Oikoumeniko Programma Prosfygon). Officially, its foreign distinctive title is ‘KSPM–ERP’, but instead the accurate acronym of its translated title is being used here, i.e. ICMW– ERP, to avoid confusion. Incidentally, its founding year (2012) coincided with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, and the founding of the ICMW–ERP was crucial considering the subsequent refugee crisis and the services that it provides. According to Article 3 of its statute, among the purposes of the ICMW–ERP is to, among others, advocate the justice, dignity and human rights of asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants; to observe and study migratory phenomena so that to formulate supporting programmes and services to its target groups; to inform, raise awareness and promote the intercultural understanding, acceptance and respect of otherness. Its resources come primarily from the Holy Synod of the OCG, the European Refugee Fund (ERF) and the UNHCR.133 Regarding its target groups, those would be asylum seekers, refugees, including those in need of additional protection, those adherent to a humanitarian regime, immigrants and foreigners of a refugee profile that are eligible for international protection, or are eligible of legalisation.134 Apart from the aforementioned, special emphasis is placed on cases that require additional and/or international protection and care, as well as on the socially vulnerable groups such as unaccompanied minors, single-parent families, ill or pregnant women, etc.135 Apart from its standard services as those are described in its statute, the ICMW–ERP takes part in ad hoc programmes and actions, particularly after the outbreak of the refugee crisis. To indicatively name a few examples within the timeframe of 2012 to 2016, as partner of the UNHCR it provided legal assistance, translation services and social support to asylum seekers, unaccompanied minors, and persons seeking family reunification in other European countries in line with the Dublin Regulation; similar services were provided via the ERF supported programme ‘Hope II’ as follow-up support in Greece’s changing legal framework on asylum, among others. Also, as operational partner of the UNHCR and with the funding of the latter, it implemented the programme titled ‘Family Reunification and Social Interventions for ­Children’, whereby most of the cases covered involved unaccompanied minors. Other examples concerning minors and family reunification in E ­ uropean states would be the programme ‘Family Reunification, Legal and Social I­nterventions for

Greece  187 Children, Syria Situation Response’, or the programme ‘Bringing Families Together’, which involved legal assistance and counselling for family reunification of Persons of Concern with Specific Needs (PCWSN); both were implemented by the ICMW–ERP under the auspices of the UNHCR, in line with the Dublin Regulation and within an EU procedural and legal context.136 The ICMW–ERP has also taken part in the ‘Safe Passage’ project, which is funded and coordinated by the CCME, and cofunded by the Evangelical Church of Rhineland. In light of the urgency of the situation, apart from covering compelling needs in terms of legal representation, relocation procedures and advocacy of policies, the ‘Safe Passage’ includes data collection on arrival trends and mixed migration flows, to enhance the services of support and referral mechanisms. The short-term goal of this programme was to make the crossing of Southern and Southeastern Europe safer, while in the long term it seeks to coshape the European migration and asylum policies so that the dangerous passage is rendered redundant.137 Some indicative and representative numbers would help to better appreciate the impact of those services. Ever since 2011 when the reform of the Greek asylum system began and up to June 2014, the ERP’s lawyers were present in tens of interviews as legal advisors and lawyers for those who were registered with the legal services of the ERP. The outcome in that period was 91 positive verdicts towards providing protection – including family members among some of them.138 Between January 2011 and June 2014 ERP’s legal services undertook the processing of 310 cases pertaining to the Dublin agreement that corresponded to 580 persons, of which 95 were unaccompanied minors and 131 families.139 Of the applicants, 78 per cent were Afghans and 8 per cent Syrians, with the major destination countries being Germany (65 per cent) and Sweden (16 per cent). Of the family reunification cases in which the ERP was involved in the aforementioned period, it accomplished 65 per cent of successful verdicts. Another example would be the programme ‘Ilisos 2012’, intended to serve 650 people eligible for international protection. In its 8-month duration it served 672 applicants, of which 43 were deemed eligible for international protection, while another 14 were deemed eligible for humanitarian protection.140 The ‘Bringing Families Together’ programme for 2015, in collaboration with the UNHCR, was initially intended to serve 150 applicants, yet with the notable increase of migratory influx it finally served 500, of which 48 per cent were Afghans, 30 per cent were Syrians and 11 per cent were Somalians. The main destination countries remained the same – Germany and Sweden. It is noteworthy, however, that in the second half of 2015, the newly arrived refugees and asylum seekers eligible to apply in order to be integrated into the programme, chose to set off to their destinations of choice via the ‘Balkan route’ instead of waiting for the formal procedures to be put into operation.141 Within the framework of ‘Bringing ­Families Together’, between January and June 2016, another 1,584 cases of family reunification were processed, clearly exceeding that target number of 1,000. The vast majority the applicants were Syrians

188  G. E. Trantas (60.73 per cent), while the second-largest group comprised Afghans (31.69 per cent).142 As regards the action ‘Legal Aid – New Arrivals’, it was a complementary initiative that was implemented with the cofunding of the CCME and the Protestant Church of Rheinland. This was intended to cover the immediate needs of vulnerable new arrivals that did not adhere to the family reunification programme, as well as backlog cases. During its 3-month implementation 90 people were served.143 However, both Greece and the OCG were overwhelmed by the refugee crisis, lacking the organisation and resources, which is no surprise, especially considering the magnitude of the problem. Not to mention that the economic crisis that was scourging the country at the same time had an impact on the capacity of the church to respond to its philanthropic duties, for, meanwhile, it has had to reduce its own operating costs.144 It was a matter of time until the OCG communicated its concerns for the economic and social impact of that unfortunate combination of crises. On 7 March 2013, the OCG clarified that it cannot overlook the obligations that stem from the Dublin Treaty regarding the relocation of immigrants to other European states as well, particularly given the serious economic crisis that scourges Greece, and it urged the EU Commission and the respective commissioner to deal with the issue.145 In the summer of 2015, when the influx of refugees across the Aegean peaked and the islands’ entry points could no longer cope, the OCG’s critique on the EU’s reaction was sharpened. Via a press release on 26 June 2015, the church maintained that despite the commonly agreed European agenda on migration of 13 May 2015 and its provision on relocation of migrants so that Greece and Italy would not have to manage the bulk of arrivals by themselves, several European leaders refrained from assuming their share of responsibility, leaving thus the entire burden on those two countries. Moreover, the policies of the West were identified as the root cause of the humanitarian crisis and emphasis was placed on the misfortunes of the refugees, albeit of no fault of their own, and hence accused the EU of distancing itself from its own ideals.146 What hindered the relocation programme to be implemented as initially agreed was the rise of populism. Expressed in many forms, via right-wing political parties, factions and movements across Europe as well as across the Atlantic, the common denominator among populist political–ideological platforms and programmes is the anti-migratory attitude. Namely, in the case in focus, the ‘Visegrád Group’ or ‘Visegrád Four (V4)’,147 as well as Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, refuse to receive their proportionate share of the refugees, while in addition, Hungary built a fence along its borders with Serbia; on that basis it has been assumed that there exists a distinct divergence between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Europe.148 One could counter-argue though that this might be an oversimplified assessment, given the ever expanding anti-migratory rhetoric in the West as well, and its yield in elections and referenda – ­consider Brexit, Marine Le Pen’s ‘Front National’, the ‘Alternative für Deutschland’, etc.

Greece  189 Be that as it may, regarding this refusal to cooperate and demonstrate solidarity in that respect, via its press release of 26 June 2015, the OCG expressed its indignation and disapproval of ‘the petty and historically uninformed’ attitude of the European leaders towards the refugees and the peoples of the European South, trying to respond to this challenge. In fact it was maintained that thereby, the EU failed a crucial test.149 On 7 October 2015, in his speech to the Holy Synod of the Hierarchy of the OCG, Metropolitan of Ilion, Acharnes and Petroupolis, Athenagoras (Dikaiakos) (2010–), who is the president of the governing committee of the ICMW–ERP, focused on the refugee crisis, the issue of immigration and the initiatives of the OCG via the ICMW–ERP, and while expressing the view of the church, he maintained that the composition of contemporary societies can no longer be ethnically, culturally and religiously homogeneous in light of globalisation, therefore the challenge is the comprehension of the new reality. In fact, his view was that phenomena such as racism and xenophobia, attest to ‘egocentrism, pathological phobia and necrosis of spiritual awareness’.150 He did acknowledge of course the limitations of the OCG, in conceding that the church cannot solve the crisis, but it can contribute according to its capacities: i.e. the cooperation with the Red Cross, the UNHCR, by providing food, medical supplies, social support and legal aid in order to assist in the asylum procedures, and by being in constant communication with churches and organisations in Europe, so that to inform and raise awareness regarding the refugee crisis.151 Likewise, instead of giving in to populism, the Holy Synod also stressed that Greece cannot cope with the refugee crisis on its own and urged for European solidarity and a review of the decision to raise fences, and find other deterrents instead.152 This was not the first intervention on behalf of the OCG on the matter but it was quite noteworthy, considering the position of the person who intervened, the fact that it was directed to the Holy Synod and that it was made with the refugee and migrant crisis at its peak. Communicational interventions as such have been rare, made only when deemed absolutely ­necessary, as the OCG’s focus was on the Greek debt crisis and its social dimension, which was prioritised; not to mention that it preceded the refugee crisis chronologically. Interventions for the most part, that is until the migratory influx peaked in 2015 with severe sociopolitical consequences, bringing Greece to the European limelight yet again, were made within the framework of an anticipated expression of EU solidarity to the Greek people. After all, the positions of the OCG were already known: for example, in a series of conferences and day-events between 2006 and 2011, via the Special Synodical Committee for Immigrants, Refugees and Returnees, it communicated the view of the immigrant as an image of God. In addition, the Holy Synod, post-2012, when the migrant Muslim population was on the rise in the centre of Athens, encouraged intercultural communication and exchanges and stressed the indiscriminate offer of help and charity to all in need of it,153 which it practised anyway via Apostoli as mentioned earlier, thus

190  G. E. Trantas setting an example in the public sphere. Yet if one were to single out one c­ommunicational instance of utmost gravity and global reverberation, that would have to be the joint statement of the Ecumenical Patriarch ­Bartholomew, Pope Francis and Archbishop Hieronymos II on the island of Lesvos on 14 April 2016. The event ought to be attributed to the initiative of Archbishop Hieronymos II who sought to highlight and internationalise the refugee crisis. The statement itself emphasised on the humanitarian tragedy, its causes, on the urgency to flee danger and persecution, and the self-evident aspect of human rights. Ultimately it was an appeal to the international public opinion, politicians included, for humanity and solidarity.154 This does not mean to say that the OCG has been indifferent to its diachronic identity concerns and priorities as a national church, nor to its ideal type of Europeanness.155 For example, in his speech at the extraordinary synodical meeting of 8 March 2016, Archbishop Hieronymos II, while advocating humanity and solidarity to those who cross the Aegean Sea while condemning the smugglers who take advantage of their desperation, he urged the EU partners to contemplate the future of Europe at the same time; and while steering clear of Islamophobia, he stood by the obligation to maintain a clear red line with regard to preserving identity, tradition, national and territorial integrity, Orthodoxy and Hellenic–Christian civilisation – the latter was intended for domestic audiences.156 This cannot be perceived as a deviation to populism but rather as a word of caution, indicative of a threshold of tolerance and of a degree of conditionality, dictated by the self-imposed obligation to safeguard an overarching identity paradigm, which must not be eroded. It must be noted though that neither the rhetoric of the OCG has strayed into the populist domain, nor has its humanitarian contribution wavered, despite the notable economic adversity that it is experiencing. With regard to international cooperation, the OCG has combated populism primarily as a member of the CCME, and the planned joint activities demonstrate that it should continue to do so. According to the CCME 2018–20 work programme, the humane predisposition of the three ­Abrahamic religions towards the ‘other’ shall be the cornerstone of its philosophy, together with the determination for closer cooperation with the Conference of European Churches157 and the World Council of Churches158 within an ecumenical context. The CCME, and by extension the OCG as cosignatory, has set a clear mandate to promote inclusiveness both nationally and Europe-wide, without making nativist-inspired distinctions. This entails the upholding of solidarity and openness for diversity, even in an adverse political climate, given that those are endorsed as fundamental principles in its programme. Moreover, the CCME has adopted the essence of the EU motto ‘united in diversity’, as, in light of the changing ecclesial landscape, diversity is a high ecumenical priority that requires close cooperation with migrant and ethnic minority churches.159 One distinguishes the contours of quite a powerful agenda with disregard to populist currents and potential cost in

Greece  191 political capital. Should the OCG stand by the collective CCME work p­ rogramme, the same impression will reflect on it as well. The Committee of Representatives of the Orthodox Churches to the European Union (CROCEU)160 has been another international cooperation platform via which populism has been addressed. For instance, in encouraging the EU citizens to vote in the European elections, the CROCEU listed among its priorities in its message of 9 March 2014, the humane and inclusive policies for migrants and refugees, as well as the curtailing of racism.161 Further, in the 2015 EU Annual Colloquium of Fundamental Rights, the CROCEU advocated the promotion of interreligious dialogue beyond the political and religious institutional domain, through education and the plethora of media, so that to overcome the discriminatory consequences of ­stereotypes and prejudice.162 More to the point, it issued a theme-specific communiqué on 23 September 2015 in view of the refugee crisis. Albeit acknowledging the unprecedented flow of arrivals to Europe and the implications that the social, economic, demographic, religious and cultural challenges entail, it harked back to the Christian principles and values in the face of human suffering; apart from the spiritual dimension, it reminded the catastrophe that befell the fleeing people, urged for solidarity and condemned xenophobia. However, the communiqué conveyed a form of conditionality: namely, the respect to European values on behalf of refugees was stated as a prerequisite – which is quite reasonable if a spirit of openness is to be effectively cultivated – while Europe on the other hand was invited to adopt a realist stance and design a coherent and far-seeing neighbourhood policy. What is more, the facilitation of conditions towards safe repatriation was encouraged. In sum Europe was invited to demonstrate ‘charity, solidarity and realism’.163 One detects there the Eastern Orthodox concerns over the bearing that such a demographic shift may have on the sociocultural dimensions of life in Europe, which are equally detectable in the regular domestic rhetoric of the OCG. Still, such positions are far from the rejectionist populist currents that are not necessarily concerned with applying humane solutions to, indeed, unprecedented challenges as such. The CROCEU’s ­ positions appear to rather reflect the complexity of the situation and a genuine desire to contribute to the public discourse with suggestions to a viable approach – both for the sake of the refugees and the cohesion of the EU. More to the point, they are well within the European Commission’s Agenda on Migration of 2015. Furthermore, the statements issued by the CROCEU by and large reflect the positions of the OCG. As seen earlier in the text, the latter has clearly been charitable and hospitable indiscriminately via its humanitarian institutions and initiatives, while at the same time some concern has been aired with regard to overwhelming demographic changes and the corresponding bearing that those may have on both the domestic and the European cultural identity and particularity. In any case the OCG’s views were identical to the CROCEU’s statements already before the latter were issued.

192  G. E. Trantas

Conclusion It would not be amiss to maintain that Orthodox Christianity in Greece is embedded in the collective psyche as an integral, constituent element of identity, and in turn, it is acknowledged as such by the entire political system across the spectrum. After all, it functions as a source of legitimacy, and as such it cannot be easily disregarded. In fact it is a co-determinant of state personification, which reflects on the relationship between church and state diachronically. In that sense, it plays a multifaceted role in the country’s political life. In the lapse of time, regardless of the changes, either in international regimes and states of affairs, or domestic polity and predominant ideological platforms and types of co-optation, the place of the church in the public sphere and its prominent role, fluctuations notwithstanding, has been consolidated. Indeed, the weight of the past, which has been exhaustively discussed in the relevant literature, coupled with the formative narratives that have given rise and legitimation to this tandem, has been decisive. Orthodoxy was one of Greece’s vital founding constituent elements of personhood and statehood. Moreover, for more than a century it was constitutionally a ‘state institution’, and institutionally, being co-opted, it has ­oftentimes functioned as an arm of the state apparatus. Even when that constitutional arrangement ceased to be the case, in essence the Helleno-­Christian construct remained embedded and consolidated in the collective imaginary and the church–state relations. This parameter inevitably affected the latter diachronically, both before and after the Cold War, and it still does. In the former period however, the OCG has had to conform to the international status quo, which in turn determined national alignments within a bipolar international political order, that is, the state configurations on the basis of the Iron Curtain’s ideological divide. In retrospect however, the church gained little from this; it alienated a part of the population and contradicted its own diachronic anti-Westernist attitude typology. Yet it was later rehabilitated. Almost a decade before the end of the Cold War (1981), the rise of a Socialist government to power, i.e. PASOK under Andreas Papandreou, ushered in a conciliatory – but by no means frictionless – era, during which anticlericalism subsided. After all, seemingly incompatible schools of thought, Orthodoxy and socialism, came together within the framework of anti-­ Westernism and anti-Americanism. With the fall of the Iron Curtain the OCG further solidified its place in the Greek sociopolitical state of affairs. From the early 1990s it was realised that apart from domestic political legitimacy, the church could be a key actor in the advancement of the Greek interests in the Balkans, particularly among Orthodox peoples, where creed was the common denominator that could facilitate the exercise of soft power. Archbishop Christodoulos, who succeeded Serapheim, inherited this new direction and invested politically in it. He actively pursued an upgraded role for the church, both nationally and internationally. Along these lines he did not shy away from challenging the state and the Ecumenical Patriarchate,

Greece  193 given that his aspirations overlapped and conflicted with their jurisdictions and domains. However, the succeeding archbishop, Hieronymos II, made sure to contain the antagonistic attitude and to mutatis mutandis depoliticise the church, without of course rendering it apolitical and asocial. All in all, the typology of church–state relations in Greece is variably permeated by co-optation, interrelation, and to some extent interdependence, given that although this relationship is unequal the OCG never ceases to be a source of legitimacy and a potent actor with deep social sway. To assume that the state wishes a clean separation between the two while the church clings on to the status quo would be an oversimplification. The former, time and again, out of political necessity, has resorted to making use of the influence that it had over the church in this co-optive relationship. On the other hand, the church considers itself a state institution due to the dimensions of identity perception that it presumes to infuse and co-shape. It wishes to be treated as a significant actor rather than a civil society addendum and it considers itself entitled to a special relationship with the state. This is a constant when examining the church as a structure, while the variable in this relationship would be the degree and tone of the church’s politicisation, depending more often than not on the personality of the archbishop in office, but also on the political particularities and context of any given time; not to mention that it does play an active domestic role and sets the tone with its rhetoric, and this also applies to migratory issues. Up until the end of the Cold War, Greece was a country of emigration exclusively, notwithstanding the rare influx of refugees, largely due to regional conflicts or intense political frictions. In the very unique case of the returning G ­ astarbeiter though, impressively enough, the OCG replaced the absent state in order to help the reintegration of the returnees into the Greek society and state structures. The paradigm shift in Greece’s migratory pattern with the end of the Cold War found the state unprepared to deal with the corresponding challenges domestically, given that until then it was used to shedding unemployed population instead of effectively facilitating its full socioeconomic utilisation. The church on the other hand had only structures capable of helping returnees reintegrate, while, until the mid-2000s it was primarily concerned with the identity erosion that the demographic changes could bring about – not unlike the mainstream point of view. More to the point there is no evidence to suggest that adequate state structures were put in place in order to receive the migrants from the Balkans and help them integrate. The same applies to the church, and in fact society was also unprepared for cultural and demographic changes. Moreover, the influx of Asian and African immigrants who stemmed from much different cultural backgrounds made the institutional vacuum even more evident. And yet again there are examples where the church replaced the state institutions. Ever since the eruption of the Greek debt crisis Greece has had to deal with a multifold issue that among other things triggered an emigrational t­endency anew, albeit this time with diametrically different qualitative ­characteristics. In

194  G. E. Trantas that respect it should not be attributed to the crisis alone, which is s­ymptomatic of endemic and external shortcomings and failures. The flight of highly skilled human capital towards primarily intra-European destinations, due to both push and pull factors, has yet to be thoroughly assessed. Still it is already detrimental to Greece’s economic recovery. This renders the migratory paradigm shift that Greece has partially undergone, in the sense that the diachronic typology of a purely emigrational country has not been reversed. ­Emigrational tendencies are reanimated time and again; with intervals of significant decline in outflux. The new element therein is the steady influx of immigration ever since the end of the Cold War, from a range of directions. Yet one observes that for the Balkan immigrants Greece has constituted for the most part a destination, while for Asian and African immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees, it has predominantly been a point of entry to the EU, therefore a transit country on the way to the most popular destinations of Central and Northern Europe. Tens of thousands, if not more, have had to stay in Greece though as the exit routes have been blocked. And even though the OCG cannot put mechanisms in place to support Greek emigrants, as they leave its jurisdiction and enter that of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, it can do so domestically, for returnees, refugees, immigrants and asylum seekers. Indeed the ICMW has taken part in numerous programmes and initiatives in line with the new approach that was introduced in the mid-2000s. As immigration was on steady increase, particularly from more distant cultures as opposed to the much more culturally familiar Balkan migratory influx in the 1990s, the OCG identified the vacuum in knowledge, structures and policies, and attempted to fill it in part. Noteworthy actions to that end, such as an extensive research on the Muslim communities in Athens or the closer cooperation with the UNHCR, attest to that. Even Apostoli, an NGO intended to tackle the increasing poverty as the debt crisis had a serious impact on the median quality of life in Greek households, diverted part of its means and resources to tackle migrant poverty. In fact it has already adapted its scope and agenda, considering that, for instance, it takes part in the ESTIA programme, in cooperation with the Greek authorities and the UNHCR, an urban housing and integration initiative. The replacement of the old ICMW with the ICMW–ERP in 2012 was another crucial step in the direction of institutional review and renewal on behalf of the OCG. As the humanitarian emergency was assuming all the more greater dimensions and the refugee crisis was now ante portas, its focus and specialisation, according to its statute, in par excellence refugee’s and asylum seekers’ affairs would soon be proven useful. Furthermore, its extensive international cooperation with the UNHCR, the ERF, the CCME, etc. in numerous corresponding programmes, is indicative of the adaptation of a formerly nationally and domestically focused NGO to the relentlessly ever-changing context, particularities and exigencies of the post Cold War era. However, the Greek debt crisis, followed by the refugee crisis, was a herculean task beyond the capacity of both church and state institutions. Through

Greece  195 this test though, the state was often found wanting by the EU i­nstitutions whereas the church emerged reinforced. While the former demonstrated deficiencies and shortcomings, the latter was making sure to meet its targets, establish the necessary structures so that to provide much-needed services to refugees and immigrants and complement the state. Its international collaborations with organisations such as the UNHCR secured for the OCG further recognition as an actor, which applies to its international, ecumenical, humanitarian networking as well. Moreover, it demonstrated a degree of maturity and much-needed restraint and made sure to contribute to the social peace, given that Greece’s economic predicament had given rise to increasing social unrest, which could easily be encouraged further with careless rhetoric. Likewise, the OCG has placed emphasis on the humanitarian aspect of the refugee crisis and has maintained a reasonable tone. While raising some concerns over the potential identity erosion that the Greek society could undergo, this was expressed carefully and diplomatically, non-­representative exceptions notwithstanding. In fact, claiming the moral higher ground, it rebuked the EU policies for being below par – implicitly for having succumbed to populism, thus contradicting its very principles and values. The OCG has been adamantly positioned, at least at a top hierarchy level, against racism, xenophobia and populism. In fact it has demonstrated an unprecedented level of maturity in recognising the futility in seeking social, ethnic, cultural and religious homogeneity in the contemporary times and has urged for more realism. These positions have been maintained consistently by the OCG, both domestically and abroad, as a member of the CCME, the Conference of European Churches (CEC), the WCC and the CROCEU. It is also noteworthy that the OCG does not deviate from the EU principles and values as regards its attitude to cultural diversity. Overall, the OCG has undergone a significant transformation vis-à-vis international migratory currents and population movement before and after the Cold War, which applies to Greece as well as to the broader international environment. It gradually moved from the introvert national model of dealing with returnees, to engaging the consequences that stem from international humanitarian crises. In that context it has not only reviewed and renewed its corresponding structures to match the new, emergent challenges, but it has also done so with its overall stance towards identity perception and multiculturalism. As regards the former, to be sure, organisational and structural adaptations can be challenging, especially when deliverables are imperative in view of the immense pressure that a refugee crisis puts forth. However, those gradually took place, mainly between the mid-2000s to date, which has allowed some degree of flexibility in order to research the contemporary particulars and requirements and adjust accordingly. New and restructured church institutions now cover a broad spectrum of actions and initiatives, ranging from addressing basic material needs to providing translation and legal services. Of course, the fact that Greece was, and to some extent still is, experiencing two simultaneous crises affected the impact that the OCG’s

196  G. E. Trantas initiatives could have had; material limitations apply for it is a difficult period to be generous. Internationally, it is political limitations that apply; those translate mainly into lack of cooperation and the in-practice abandonment of the EU relocation programme due to the populist resurgence. As regards its broader worldview and its adaptation to globalisation, population movement and national identity perception, as stated earlier the OCG has demonstrated clear signs of realism. Its leadership does not resort to the rhetorical typology of the 1990s to mid-2000s when the primary concern was the preservation of the domestic national, religiocultural identity, whereby migration was by and large perceived as a threat; nor does it insist in projecting an ideal type of Europeanness, which during the aforementioned period was deemed exclusively Christian. Of course, there, one may detect a degree of ambivalence, considering that concerns of identity erosion have also been aired, but this should be seen within the context of a fermentation that the OCG is undergoing while coming to terms with the new reality. Moreover, the perception of being part of a greater, European whole has matured. Extensive intra-European cooperative projects under the aegis of heterodox and homodox international, interecclesiastical organisations, as well as constant interaction with humanitarian counterparts such as the UNHCR, has instilled a degree of internationalisation into the self-understanding of the OCG, which is reflected in its concern of the EU’s commitment to its own values. Surely there is a hint of utilitarianism in seeking to relieve the pressure on Greece via the relocation programme for instance, but even so the OCG makes a positive contribution to the broader discourse on the EU and its future policies. When all is said and done, the OCG has consolidated its place as a humanitarian actor amid the debt and refugee crisis, both nationally and internationally. It has emerged as an adaptable organisation, in touch with the contemporary state of affairs and mutatis mutandis willing to renegotiate its role therein. Moreover, the church’s rhetoric and praxis concerning migration shall probably remain more or less unaltered, with minor adaptations in accordance with the exigencies of any given migratory influx variations; which entails the continuation of international cooperative initiatives and a complementary yet distinctive humanitarian role domestically.

Notes   1 Robin Cohen, ‘Diasporas and the State: From Victims to Challengers’, International Affairs, 1996, 72 (3), pp. 507–520.    2 See Gocha R. Tsetskhladze, Greek Colonisation: An Account of Greek Colonies and Other Settlements Overseas, Volume 1, Leiden: Brill, 2006 and by the same author, Greek Colonisation: An Account of Greek Colonies and Other Settlements Overseas, Volume 2, Leiden: Brill, 2008.   3 The emergence of this construct, i.e. the historic reconciliation of the Greek antiquity with the Byzantine times and the overall conceptualisation of the Greek history as an organic, unitary continuum, ought to be attributed to historian Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos (1815–91) and his multi-volume History

Greece  197 of the Greek Nation. See Paschalis M. Kitromilides, ‘On the Intellectual Content of Greek Nationalism: Paparrigopoulos, Byzantium and the Great Idea’ in David Ricks and Paul Magdalino (eds.), Byzantium and the Modern Greek Identity, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, pp. 25–33, as well as Paschalis M. Kitromilides, ‘Paradigm Nation: the Study of Nationalism and the Canonization of Greece’ in David Ricks and Paul Magdalino (eds.), The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, And the Uses of the Past (1797–1896), Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009, pp. 21–31.   4 Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction, 2nd edn, London: Routledge, 2008.   5 Dimitris Tziovas, ‘Introduction’ in Dimitris Tziovas (ed.), Greek Diaspora and Migration since 1700: Society, Politics and Culture, Farnham: Ashgate, 2008, p. 1. Ioannis K. Chasiotis, Olga Katsiardi-Hering and Euridice A. Ampatzi (eds.), Oi Hellēnes stē Diaspora, 15os–21os Ai (The Greeks in Diaspora, 15th–21st Centuries), Athens: Hellenic Parliament, 2006, pp. 19–20.    6 Chasiotis, Katsiardi-Hering, and Ampatzi, Oi Hellēnes stē Diaspora, 15os–21os Ai, pp. 17–18.    7 Millets were a distinction made by the Ottoman administration between social groupings by the criterion of creed, with the Rum being the Eastern Orthodox Christians. See Victor Roudometof, ‘From Rum Millet to Greek Nation: Enlightenment, Secularization, and National Identity in Ottoman Balkan Society, 1453–1821’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 1998, 16 (1), pp. 11–48. The classical definition of diaspora is that of dispersed populations from their homelands, but it has undergone reviews since it was challenged by the constructionist school of thought, particularly as regards the notion of homeland. On diasporas’ definition and classification see Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction (2008).   8 Olga Katsiardi-Hering and Maria A. Stassinopoulou (eds.), Across the Danube: Southeastern Europeans and Their Travelling Identities (17th–19th C.), Leiden: Brill, 2016. Also, Paschalis M. Kitromilides, ‘Cultural Change and Social Criticism: The Case of Iossipos Moisiodax’, History of European Ideas, 1989, 10 (6), pp. 667–676.    9 Chasiotis, Katsiardi-Hering and Ampatzi, Oi Hellēnes stē Diaspora, 15os–21os Ai.   10 Tziovas, ‘Introduction’.  11 The official website of the Orthodox Church of Greece is available at www. ecclesia.gr/main_next.html (accessed on 30 October 2018).   12 Jürgen Osterhammel, Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts, 6th edn, München: C.H. Beck, 2011, see pp. 566 and 570.   13 Andreas M. Wittig, Die Orthodoxe Kirche in Griechenland: Ihre Beziehung zum Staat gemäß der Theorie und der Entwicklung von 1821–1977, Würzburg: Augustinus-​ Verlag, 1987, pp. 32–34, 79 and 107.   14 Effi Gazi, ‘Revisiting Religion and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Greece’ in Roderick Beaton and David Ricks (eds.), The Making of Modern Greece: Nationalism, Romanticism, and the Uses of the Past (1797–1896), Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009, pp. 95–106, (especially p. 101).  15 Victor Roudometof, ‘The Evolution of Greek Orthodoxy in the Context of World Historical Globalisation’ in Victor Roudometof and Vasilios N. Makrides (eds.), Orthodox Christianity in 21st Century Greece: The Role of Religion in Culture, Ethnicity and Politics, Farnham: Ashgate, 2010, pp. 21–38, (especially pp. 25, 27, 32).   16 Kitromilides, ‘On the Intellectual Content of Greek Nationalism’.   17 Vasilios N. Makrides, ‘Between Normality and Tension: Assessing Church-State Relations in Greece in the Light of the Identity (Cards) Crisis’ in Vasilios

198  G. E. Trantas N. Makrides (ed.), Religion, Staat und Konfliktkonstellationen im Orthodoxen Ost- und Südosteuropa, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2005, pp. 137–178, (pp. 144–145).   18 Ibid. p. 167.   19 Victor Roudometof, ‘Eastern Orthodox Christianity and the Uses of the Past in Contemporary Greece’, Religions, 2011, 2 (2), pp. 95–113, (pp. 97 and 103–104).   20 Georgios E. Trantas, Being and Belonging: A Comparative Examination of the Greek and Cypriot Orthodox Churches’ Attitudes to ‘Europeanisation’ in Early 21st Century (Erfurter Studien zur Kulturgeschichte des Orthodoxen Christentums – BAND 16), Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang, 2018. The notion of state personification stems from the Hobbesian ‘Artificial Man’ and in its contemporary form it refers to a unitary diachronic identity that is representative and determinant of state behaviour. See Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, as well as Alexander Wendt, ‘The State as Person in International Theory’, Review of International Studies, 2004, 30 (2), pp. 289–316.   21 Pedro Ramet, ‘Autocephaly and National Identity in Church-State Relations in Eastern Christianity: An Introduction’ in Pedro Ramet (ed.), Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century, London: Duke University Press, 1988, pp. 3–19, (pp. 7 and 18).   22 Vasilios N. Makrides, ‘The Orthodox Church of Greece’ in Lucian N. Leustean (ed.), Eastern Christianity and the Cold War, 1945–91, London: Routledge, 2010, pp. 253–270, (p. 254).   23 Ibid, p. 255. In addition, regarding the Greek Civil War, albeit its beginning is contested, can be assumed to have started during the Nazi occupation, mutating to a proxy war after the Second World War while being an expression of the domestic social divisions at the same time. It ended in 1949, with the defeat of the guerrilla insurgents. See Stathis N. Kalyvas, Modern Greece: What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 83–84.   24 Theofanis G. Stavrou, ‘The Orthodox Church of Greece’ in Pedro Ramet (ed.), Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century, London: Duke University Press, 1988, pp. 183–207, (p. 193).   25 Ibid, p. 194.   26 Makrides, ‘The Orthodox Church of Greece’ in Eastern Christianity and the Cold War, pp. 255–256.  27 Minas, Samatas, ‘Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative Assessment of Greek Post-Civil War Repressive Anticommunism and the U.S. Truman-McCarthy Era’, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, 1986, 3 (3–4), pp. 5–75.   28 Kalyvas, pp. 107–109.   29 Makrides, ‘The Orthodox Church of Greece’ in Eastern Christianity and the Cold War, pp. 256–257.   30 Roudometof, ‘Eastern Orthodox Christianity and the Uses of the Past’, p. 98.  31 Four times Prime Minister (1955–58, 1958–61, 1961–63, 1974–80) and twice President of the Hellenic Republic (1980–85 and 1990–95).   32 John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, Greece: The Modern Sequel. From 1821 to the Present, London: Hurst and Co., 2002, p. 150.   33 Stavrou, p. 184.   34 ‘Panhellenic Socialist Movement’ (Panellēnio Sosialistiko Kinēma).   35 Makrides, ‘The Orthodox Church of Greece’ in Eastern Christianity and the Cold War, pp. 257–259.  36 Vasilios N. Makrides, ‘Byzantium in Contemporary Greece: The Neo-­ Orthodox Current of Ideas’ in David Ricks and Paul Magdalino (eds.), Byzantium and the Modern Greek Identity, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, pp. 141–153.

Greece  199   37 Thomas Gallant, Modern Greece: From the War of Independence to the Present, 2nd edn., London: Bloomsbury, 2016, pp. 300–301.   38 Roudometof, ‘Eastern Orthodox Christianity and the Uses of the Past’, p. 98.   39 Vasilios N. Makrides, ‘The Orthodox Church of Greece’ in Lucian N. Leustean (ed.), Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, London: ­Routledge, 2014, pp. 181–209, p. 184.   40 Ibid, p. 186.  41 Vasilios N. Makrides, ‘Scandals, Secret Agents and Corruption: the Orthodox Church of Greece during the 2005 Crisis – Its Relation to the State and ­Modernization’ in Victor Roudometof and Vasilios N. Makrides (eds.), Orthodox Christianity in 21st Century Greece: the Role of Religion in Culture, Ethnicity and ­Politics, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2010, pp. 61–88, (pp. 65–66).   42 The privacy and data protection act of the year 2000 required the removal of religious convictions from public documents, particularly from the citizens’ identity cards, which was vehemently opposed by the OCG, which even conducted an unofficial referendum to that end, albeit to no avail. See Makrides, ‘Between ­Normality and Tension’.   43 Makrides, ‘Scandals, Secret Agents’, pp. 70–71.  44 Trantas, Being and Belonging.   45 Makrides, ‘Scandals, Secret Agents’.   46 Makrides, ‘The Orthodox Church of Greece’ in Eastern Christianity and Politics’, p. 195.  47 Konstantinos Papastathis, ‘Authority and Legitimisation: the Intraecclesial Strategy of Archbishop Hieronymos of Athens’, Religion, State and Society, 2011, 39 (4), pp. 402–419.   48 Makrides, ‘The Orthodox Church of Greece’ in Eastern Christianity and Politics’, p. 196.  49 Born in 1956, nephew of the earlier mentioned Prime Minister and ­President ­Konstantinos Karamanlis.  50 Born in 1952, son of the former Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, ­grandchild of Georgios Papandreou Sr. (1888–1968).  51 Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos, i.e. ‘Popular Democratic Rally’. Note that laos (Gr.: λαός) means ‘people’ in Greek.  52 Gallant, Modern Greece: From the War of Independence to the Present, pp. 310–311.   53 Born in 1951, head of New Democracy between 2009 and 2015.  54 Gallant, Modern Greece: From the War of Independence to the Present, pp. 312–314.   55 The ‘Coalition of the Radical Left’ (Synaspismos Rizospastikēs Aristeras).   56 The ‘Independent Greeks’ (Anexartētoi Hellēnes).  57 Gallant, Modern Greece: From the War of Independence to the Present, pp. 314–317.   58 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by Talcott Parsons, 3rd edn. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1950. Also, Daniel Cohen, Homo Economicus: A (Lost) Prophet of Modern Times, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014.   59 Tönnies Ferdinand, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundbegriffe der reinen Soziologie, vierte und fünfte Auflage, Berlin: Karl Curtius, 1922.  60 Archimandrite Kyrillos Misiakoulis, ‘Theologikē Theōrēsē tēs Oikonomikēs Kriseōs (Egkyklio 2894)’ (Theological Reflection on the Economic Crisis (Encyclical 2894)), Ekklesia, 2010, (3), pp. 150–152. Also, The Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, ‘Hē Ekklēsia apenati stē Sygchronē Krisē’ (The Church vis-à-vis the Contemporary Crisis), Ekklesia, 2010, (11), pp. 837–839.

200  G. E. Trantas  61 Renée Hirschon, Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe: The Social Life of Asia Minor Refugees in Piraeus, New York: Berghahn, 1998, pp. 8–9.   62 See Koliopoulos and Veremis on the Asia Minor debarcle, pp. 89–100.   63 Renée Hirschon, Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe, pp. 36–37.   64 League of Nations, The Settlement of Greek Refugees Scheme for an International Loan Protocol, [Arranged by the League of Nations and signed at Geneva on 29 ­ September 1923. Amended by the Additional Act signed at Geneva on 19 September 1924, C. 524. M. 187. 1924. II], Geneva: League of Nations, 1923.   65 Koliopoulos and Veremis, Greece: The Modern Sequel. From 1821 to the Present, p. 205.   66 United Nations General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, 1951, www.unhcr.org/ uk/3b66c2aa10 (accessed on 4 November 2018).   67 International Organization for Migration, ‘IOM History – 1950s’ in International Organization for Migration, (2018), www.iom.int/1950s (accessed on 5 June 2018). Also, International Organization for Migration, ‘IOM History – 1980s’ in International Organization for Migration, (2018), www.iom.int/1980s (accessed on 5 June 2018).  68 Hellēniko Emporiko Epimelētērio Alexandreias.  69 Selma Botman, Egypt from Independence to Revolution, 1919–1952, New York, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991.  70 Aggelos Ntalachanis, ‘Metaxy Paroikias, Mētropolēs kai Diasporas. Stratēgikes Metanasteusēs gia tous Hellēnes tēs Aigyptou, 1945–1956’ (Between Colony, Metropolis and Diaspora. Migration Strategies for the Greeks of Egypt, 1945– 1956), Mnemon, 2010, 31, pp. 187–214. Also see Giannis D. Sakkas, Hē Ellada stē Mesogeio, 1950–2004: Exoterikē Politikē kai Perifereiakes Sygkrouseis (Greece in the Mediterranean, 1950–2004: Foreign Policy and Regional Conflicts), Athens: SEAV, pp. 24–28.   71 Ibid., See Ntalachanis as well as Sakkas.   72 Alexandra Tragaki, Christos Bagkavos and Dimitris Ntounas, Peri Dēmografias kai Plēthysmiakōn Exelixeōn (On Demography and Population-Related Developments), Athens: ΣΕΑΒ, 2015, pp. 156–159.   73 Ibid., pp. 224–227.   74 Pantelis Georgogiannis, ‘Metanasteutika Kinēmata apo tēn Ellada sto Exōteriko. Aitia kai Exelixē tous’ (Migratory Movements from Greece to Abroad. Causes and Their Development) in Pantelis Georgogiannis (ed.), Themata Diapolitismikēs Ekpaideusēs (Issues of Intercultural Education), Athens: Gutenberg, 1997, pp. 19–35, (pp. 22–23).  75 Hans-Joachim Braun, German Economy in the Twentieth Century, London: ­Routledge, 1990, pp. 165–169.  76 Dimitris Charalambis, Laura Maratou-Alipranti and Andromachi Hadjiyanni, Recent Social Trends in Greece, 1960–2000, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004, pp. 165, 174.   77 Georgios E. Trantas and Eleni D. Tseligka, ‘Where the Byzantinesque meets the Urbanesque: Architectural and Hagiographic Elements of Greek Orthodox Urban Reterritorialisation in Germany’, Zeitschrift für Balkanologie, 2016, 52 (2), pp. 241–260 (pp. 255–256).  78 Charalambis, Maratou-Alipranti and Hadjiyanni, Recent Social Trends in Greece, 1960–2000, pp. 165–166.  79 Alessandra Venturini, Postwar Migration in Southern Europe, 1950–2000, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 181–182. Also, Petras E. ­ McLean and Maria Kousis, ‘Returning Migrant Characteristics and Labor Market

Greece  201 Demand in Greece’, The International Migration Review, 1988, 22 (4), pp. 586–608, (p. 591).  80 Kentro Symparastaseōs Palinnostountōn Metanastōn.  81 Orthodox Church of Greece, ‘Kentro Symparastaseōs Palinnostountōn Metanastōn – Oikoumeniko Programma Prosfygōn’ (Integration Centre for Migrant Workers – Ecumenical Refugee Programme), on the Official Website of the Church of Greece, www.ecclesia.gr/greek/koinonia/kspm.html (accessed on 16 September 2017).   82 Koliopoulos and Veremis, Greece: The Modern Sequel. From 1821 to the Present, p. 208.  83 Gallant, Modern Greece: From the War of Independence to the Present, p. 302.   84 Koliopoulos and Veremis, Greece: The Modern Sequel. From 1821 to the Present, p. 207.   85 Kokkali Ifigeneia, ‘Albanian Immigrants in the Greek City: Spatial “Invisibility” and Identity Management as a Strategy of Adaptation’ in Hans Vermeulen, Martin Baldwin-Edwards and Riki van Boeschoten (eds.), Migration in the Southern Balkans, Heidelberg: Springer, 2015, pp. 123–142.   86 Koliopoulos and Veremis, Greece: The Modern Sequel. From 1821 to the Present, p. 209, as well as Gallant, Modern Greece: From the War of Independence to the Present, p. 316.   87 Ruby Gropas and Anna Triandafyllidou, Migration in Greece at a Glance, Athens: ELIAMEP – Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, October 2005, p. 7.   88 Hellenic Statistical Authority, Greece in Figures: January–March 2018, Piraeus: Statistical Information and Publications Division, 2018.   89 Lois Labrianidis and Manolis Pratsinakis, ‘Outward Migration from Greece During the Crisis’, Final Report of the London School of Economic’s Hellenic Observatory, 2014, available at www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/CMS% 20pdf/Research/NBG_2014_-Research_Call/Final-Report-Outward-migration-fromGreece-during-the-crisis-revised-on-1-6-2016.pdf, p. 8 (accessed on 30 October 2018).   90 On brain drain see Michel Beine, Frédéric Docquier and Maurice Schiff, ‘Brain Drain and its Determinants: A Major Issue for Small States’, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit, IZA Discussion Paper No. 3398, 2008, as well as Viem Kwok and Hayne Leland, ‘An Economic Model of the Brain Drain’, The American Economic Review, 1982, 72 (1), pp. 91–100.  91 Lois Labrianidis and Nikos Vogiatzis, ‘The Mutually Reinforcing Relation Between International Migration of Highly Educated Labour Force and Economic Crisis: The Case of Greece’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2013, 13 (4), pp. 525–551.   92 Lois Labrianidis and Nikos Vogiatzis, ‘Highly Skilled Migration: What Differentiates the “Brains” Who are Drained from Those Who Return in the Case of Greece?’, Population, Space and Place, 2013, 19 (5), pp. 472–486, (pp. 482–483).  93 Kostas Ζoulias, ‘Apotelesmata Ereunas Brain Drain’ (Brain Drain Research Results) in ICAP People Solutions 4th Human Capital Summit, 2018 available at www.icap.gr/Images/Conferences/HCS18_Brain%20Drain_Draft%20presentation_ June%207th.​pdf (accessed on 24 August 2018).  94 Tragaki, Bagkavos, and Ntounas, Peri Dēmografias kai Plēthysmiakōn Exelixeōn, pp. 230–231.   95 Ibid, p. 233.  96 Ibid.  97 Eric Neumayer, ‘Asylum Destination Choice: What Makes Some West ­European Countries More Attractive Than Others?’, European Union Politics, 2004, 5 (2), pp. 155–180 (pp. 174–175).

202  G. E. Trantas  98 Chase Winter, ‘Chancellor Merkel confirms bilateral migrant agreements with Spain and Greece’, in DW News, 29 June 2018, available at www.dw.com/en/ chancellor-­merkel-​confirms-bilateral-migrant-agreements-with-spain-and-greece/ a-44463424 (accessed on 29 June 2018).   99 Official Journal of the European Union, Establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national [Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003], Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union, 2003. 100 Official Journal of the European Union, Establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013], Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union, 2013. 101 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for Europe – Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkans Route January to December 2016 (Revision May 2016)’ in United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, available at www.unhcr.org/577220cf7. pdf (accessed on 9 September 2017), p. 3 and p. 45. Also, Hellenic Police Force, ‘Statistika Stoicheia Paranomēs Metanasteusēs 2016’ (Statistical Data on Illegal Migration 2016), on the Official website of the Hellenic Police available at www. astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=%27..%27&perform=view &id=55858&Itemid=1240&lang= (accessed on 4 November 2018). See also, ‘Prosfygikē Krisē Fact Sheet’ (Refugee Crisis Fact Sheet), the Hellenic Republic, the General Secretariat for Media and Communication, January 2017, available at https://government.gov.gr/wp-content/​uploads/2017/04/gr_fact_sheet_refugee_ print_19_01_2017-2.pdf (accessed on 4 November 2018). 102 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the ­European Council and the Council, ‘Managing the Refugee Crisis: State of Play of the Implementation of the Priority Actions under the European Agenda on Migration’, Brussels, 14 October 2015 COM (2015) 510 final, pp. 2–6. 103 Tineke Strik, ‘Refugees at Risk in Greece’, in Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe (Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons, Doc. 14082 07 June 2016), https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en. asp?fileid=22827&lang=en (accessed on 4 November 2018). 104 Elizabeth H. Prodromou and Nathanael Symeonides, ‘Orthodox Christianity and Humanitarianism: An Introduction to Thought and Practice, Past and Present’, The Review of Faith & International Affairs, 2016, 14 (1), pp. 1–8 (p. 3). 105 UNHCR UK, ‘Greece’, in UNHCR UK – The UN Refugee Agency, 22 June 2018, available at www.unhcr.org/uk/greece.html (accessed on 3 July 2018). Maria M. Mentzelopoulou and Katrien Luyten, Hotspots at EU External Borders – State of Play, European Parliament BRIEFING (EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service PE 623.563 – June 2018), p. 3. 106 Hellenic Republic – Ministry of Digital Policy, Telecommunications and Information, ‘Refugee flows 25–04–2017’, in Mindigital.gr available at http:// mindigital.gr/images/prosfygiko/REFUGEE_FLOWS-25-04-2017.pdf (accessed on 28 June 2018). 107 Secretariat for Crisis Management Communication, ‘Newsletter on the RefugeeMigration Issue’, Ministry of Digital Policy, Telecommunications and Media, 2018, (1), p. 4, available at www.greeknewsagenda.gr/index.php/fact-sheets/6717-newsletteron-refugee-migrant-situation-in-greece (accessed on 4 November 2018). 108 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘UNHCR – Greece’, in UNHCR – The UN Refugee Agency, available at www.unhcr.org/uk/greece.html (accessed on 3 July 2018).

Greece  203 109 Mentzelopoulou and Luyten, Hotspots at EU External Borders – State of Play, p. 3. 110 Ibid. 111 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘UNHCR – Greece’ in UNHCR – The UN Refugee Agency, available at www.unhcr.org/uk/greece.html (accessed on 3 July 2018). 112 Secretariat for Crisis Management Communication, ‘Newsletter on the RefugeeMigration Issue’, Ministry of Digital Policy, Telecommunications and Media, 2018, (1), p. 5, available at www.greeknewsagenda.gr/index.php/fact-sheets/6717newsletter-on-refugee-migrant-situation-in-greece (accessed on 4 November 2018). 113 Secretariat for Crisis Management Communication, ‘Newsletter on the ­Refugee-Migration Issue’, Ministry of Digital Policy, Telecommunications and Media, 2018, (2), p. 5, available at www.greeknewsagenda.gr/index.php/fact-sheets/ 6764-june-newsletter-on-the-refugee-migrant-situation-in-greece (accessed on 4 November 2018). 114 Makrides, ‘The Orthodox Church of Greece’ in Eastern Christianity and Politics, p. 191. 115 Christodoulos, Archbishop of Athens and All Greece, ‘Omilia stous ­Eurovouleutes tou Europaikou Laikou Kommatos’ (Speech to the MEPs of the ­European Peoples Party), Ekklesia, 2003, 80 (10), pp. 694–696, (p. 694). 116 Ibid. 117 Christodoulos, Archbishop of Athens and All Greece, ‘Letter to the President of the European Commission about the Social Problems of Europe’, Ekklesia, 2005, 82 (6), pp. 462–464, (pp. 463–464). 118 Christodoulos, Archbishop of Athens and All Greece, ‘Islam, ta Oria tēs Provlēmatikēs’ (Islam, the Constraints of Problematics), Ekklesia, 2007, 84 (5), pp. 341–343, (p. 343). 119 Makrides, ‘The Orthodox Church of Greece’ in Eastern Christianity and Politics, pp. 197–200. 120 The CCME, founded in 1964, is an international, ecumenical organisation that promotes humanitarian and inclusive approaches to migration. See Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe, ‘The History of the CCME’, on the CCME Official Website, www.ccme.be/who-we-are/history/ (accessed on 21 September 2017). 121 Euaggelia Dourida, ‘Ekthesis peri tēs Symmetochēs tēs eis tas Enarktērious Ergasias tēs tritēs Faseōs tou Programmatos Diktyoseōs tōn Ekklēsiastikōn Organōseōn Katapolemēseōs tēs Emporias Anthrōpōn (CATIII)’ (Report on the Participation in the Inaugural Works of the third Phase of the Networking Programme of Church Organisations on Combating Human Trafficking (CATIII) ), Ekklesia, 2006, 83 (8), pp. 627–630, (p. 627). 122 Antonios K. Papantoniou, ‘Diethneis Paremvaseis tēs Ekklēsias tēs Ellados epi Thematōn Metanasteuseōs’ (International Interventions of the Church of Greece on Issues of Migration), Ekklesia, 2005, 82 (10), pp. 821–823, (p. 821). 123 Euaggelia Dourida, ‘Hē Ekklēsia tēs Ellados synergazetai gia tēn Katapolemēsē tēs Emporias Anthrōpōn’ (The Church of Greece Cooperates for the Combating of Human Trafficking), Ekklesia, 2011, 88 (4), pp. 229–231, (p. 229). 124 Euaggelia Dourida, ‘Synoptikē Parousiasē tou Schediou Drasēs “Anazētōntas Topous Synyparxēs” ’ (Concise Presentation of the Action Plan “Seeking Commonplaces of Coexistence”), Ekklesia, 2008, 85 (1), pp. 13–16, (pp. 13–14). 125 Antonios K. Papantoniou, ‘Mousoulmanoi Metanastes stēn Athena’ (Muslim Immigrants in Athens), Ekklesia, 2009, 86 (5), pp. 348–359, (pp. 348–351). 126 Jennifer Pagonis, ‘UNHCR and Greek Orthodox Church discuss cooperation on refugee issues’, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, (30 May 2006),

204  G. E. Trantas available at www.unhcr.org/uk/news/latest/2006/5/447c59d22/unhcr-greekorthodox-church-discuss-cooperation-refugee-issues.html (accessed on 18 September 2017). 127 Ekklesia, ‘Hē Nea MKO tēs Archiepiskopēs “Apostolē” egkainiastēke stis 23 Noemvriou 2010’ (The New Archbishopric NGO ‘Mission’ was Inaugurated on 23 November 2010), Ekklesia, 2010, 87 (11), p. 901. 128 Apostoli, ‘The Church on the road’, Apostoli NGO, available at http://mkoapostoli. com/en/activities/programs/the-church-on-the-road/ (accessed on 10 June 2018). 129 Apostoli, ‘The church at Home’ Apostoli NGO, available at http://mkoapostoli. com/en/activities/programs/the-church-at-home (accessed on 10 June 2018). 130 Apostoli, ‘Social markets’, Apostoli NGO, available at http://mkoapostoli.com/ en/activities/social-markets (accessed on 10 June 2018). 131 Apostoli, ‘Accommodation facility for unaccompanied minors “Estia”, Agios Dimitrios’, Apostoli NGO, available at http://mkoapostoli.com/en/activities/­ facilities/accommodation-facility-for-unaccompanied-minors-estia-agios-dimitrios/ (accessed on 10 June 2018). 132 Orthodox Church of Greece, ‘ “Kentro Symparastaseōs Palinnostountōn kai Metanastōn – Oikoumeniko Programma Prosfygōn”, Istoriko’ (‘Integration Centre for Migrant Workers – Ecumenical Refugee Programme’, history) on the Official Website of the Church of Greece, available at www.ecclesia.gr/ greek/koinonia/kspm.html (accessed on 20 September 2017). 133 Orthodox Church of Greece, ‘ “Kentro Symparastaseōs Palinnostountōn kai Metanastōn – Oikoumeniko Programma Prosfygōn”, Organōsē kai Dioikēs’ (‘Integration Centre for Migrant Workers – Ecumenical Refugee Programme’, organisation and administration) on the Official Website of the Church of Greece, available at www.ecclesia.gr/greek/koinonia/kspm_organosi.html (accessed on 20 September 2017). 134 Orthodox Church of Greece, ‘Katastatiko Astikēs mē Kerdoskopikēs Etaireias me tēn Epēnymia “Kentro Symparastaseōs Palinnostountōn kai Metanastōn – Oikoumeniko Programma Prosfygōn” ’ (Statute of the non-profit organisation with the distinctive title ‘Integration Centre for Migrant Workers – Ecumenical Refugee Programme’) on the Official Website of the Church of Greece, available at www.ecclesia.gr/greek/koinonia/kesypame_katastatiko.pdf (accessed on 2 July 2018). 135 Orthodox Church of Greece, ‘ “Kentro Symparastaseōs Palinnostountōn kai Metanastōn – Oikoumeniko Programma Prosfygōn”, Omades Stochou’ (‘Integration Centre for Migrant Workers – Ecumenical Refugee Programme’ target groups) on the Official Website of the Church of Greece, available at www. ecclesia.gr/greek/koinonia/kspm_omades.html (accessed on 20 September 2017). 136 Orthodox Church of Greece, ‘ “Kentro Symparastaseōs Palinnostountōn kai Metanastōn – Oikoumeniko Programma Prosfygōn”, Drastēriotētes’ (‘Integration Centre for Migrant Workers – Ecumenical Refugee Programme’, activities) on the Official Website of the Church of Greece, available at www.ecclesia.gr/greek/ koinonia/​kspm_drasi.html (accessed on 20 September 2017). 137 Efthalia Pappa, ‘Ecumenical perspective on the global migration crisis, the Safe Passage project (Athens 19 June 2015)’ on the Official Website of the Church of Greece, available at www.ecclesia.gr/greek/koinonia/kspm_docs/backgr_ webinar_062015.pdf (accessed on 19 September 2017). See also Ibid. 138 Efthalia Pappa, ‘Ekthesē Drastēriotētōn tou Oikoumenikou Programmatos Prosfygōn/ERP – Gia tēn Periodo apo 1ēs Septemvriou 2013 eōs 31ē Avgoustou 2014’ (Activities report of the Ecumenical Refugee Programme/ERP – for the

Greece  205 period from 1 September 2013 to 31 August 2014), (Athens, 18 September 2014) in ‘Kentro Symparastaseōs Palinnostountōn kai Metanastōn – Oikoumeniko ­ cumenical Programma Prosfygōn’ (Integration Centre for Migrant Workers – E Refugee Programme), available at www.ecclesia.gr/greek/koinonia/kspm_ 2013_2014.pdf (accessed on 5 July 2018), p. 7. 139 Ibid, p. 10. 140 Ibid, pp. 14–15. 141 Efthalia Pappa and Euaggelia Dourida, ‘Ekthesē Pepragmenōn: Chronikē ­Periodos apo 1 Septemvriou 2015 eōs 31 Augoustou 2016’ (Progress report: Covering period from 1 September 2015 to 31 August 2016) (Athens, 18 ­September 2016), in ‘Kentro Symparastaseōs Palinnostountōn kai Metanastōn – Oikoumeniko Programma Prosfygōn’ (Integration Centre for Migrant Workers – ­Ecumenical Refugee Programme) available at www.ecclesia.gr/greek/koinonia/ etisia_2015_2016.pdf (accessed on 5 July 2018), p. 7. 142 Ibid, p. 9. 143 Ibid. 144 Lina Molokotos-Liederman, ‘The Impact of the Crisis on the Orthodox Church of Greece: A Moment of Challenge and Opportunity?’, Religion, State and Society, 2016, 44 (1), pp. 32–50. 145 The Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, ‘Koinē Dēlōsē tou Oikoumenikou Patriarcheiou kai tōn Ekklēsiōn Ellados kai Kyprou (8.7.2013)’ ( Joint statement of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and of the churches of Greece and Cyprus (8.7.2013)), Ekklesia, 2013, 90 (7), p. 520. 146 The Ecumenical Refugee Programme ICMW-ERP, ‘Hē Apotychia tēs Europēs na analavei tis Euthynes tēs apenanti sto Prosfygiko Provlēma stē Mesogeio, afēnoun Ellada kai Italia mones tous na antimetōpisoun tēn Krisē sta Nēsia’ (The failure of Europe to assume its responsibility of the Refugee problem in the Mediterranean, leaves Greece and Italy alone to deal with the Crisis on the islands), Press release 26 June 2015 on the Official Website of the Church of Greece, available at www.ecclesia.​gr/greek/koinonia/kspm_docs/26062015.pdf (accessed on 19 September 2017). 147 Namely, the Central European regional cooperation emerged in 1991, with the meeting of the heads of Czechoslovakia – now Czechia and Slovakia – Poland, and Hungary, Václav Havel, Lech Wałęsa, and József Antall in Visegrád, Hungary. Ever since it has evolved from a post-Soviet, Western-oriented structure, to a regional coalition that pursues common and overlapping interests and policies, within the context of a multi-layered cooperation, between various governmental, non-governmental and private stakeholders. See Milan Nič, ‘The Visegrád Group in the EU: 2016 as a Turning–Point?’, European View, 2016, 15 (2), pp. 281–290, (pp. 283–284). 148 Mahama Tawat, ‘Towards an Ever “Closer” Union? Refugee Policy and Social Cohesion in Eastern EU Member States’, East European Politics, 32 (2), pp. 277–284. 149 Ecumenical Refugee Programme ICMW-ERP, ‘Hē Apotychia tēs Europēs na analavei tis Euthynes tēs apenanti sto Prosfygiko Provlēma stē Mesogeio’ (The Failure of Europe to Assume its Responsibility of the Refugee Problem in the Mediterranean). 150 Athenagoras, Metropolitan of Ilion, Acharnes and Petroupolis, ‘To ­Metanasteutiko Provlēma: Poimantikē kai Koinonikē Antimetōpisis Autou’ (The Migration Problem: Pastoral and Social Management), Ekklesia, 2015, 92 (10), pp. 778–787, (pp. 778–780). 151 Ibid., p. 781. 152 The Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, ‘Ιera Synodos tēs Ekklēsias tēs Ellados – Oi Ergasies tēs D.I.S. tēs 1.3.2016’ (The Holy Synod of the Church of Greece – The Works of the RHS of the 1.3.2016), Ekklesia, 2016, 93 (3), pp. 316–317, (p. 316).

206  G. E. Trantas 153 Ioel, Metropolitan of Edessa, Pella and Almopia, ‘Hē Ekklēsia mprosta stēn Krisē tou Topou mas’ (The Church before the Crisis of our Country), Ekklesia, 2012, 89 (3), pp. 147–157, (p. 153). 154 Ekklesia, ‘Hē Koinē Dēlōsē tōn Prokathēmenōn stē Lesvo’ (The Joint Statement of the Heads of Churches on Lesvos), Ekklesia, 2016, 93 (5), pp. 494–495. 155 See Trantas on the pillars of Europeanness as a quality, which partly overlaps with the Hellenic–Christian constructs’ constituent sociocultural historical elements, of which the safeguarding has been the OCG’s raison d’être for more than a century. 156 Hieronymos II, Archbishop of Athens and All Greece, ‘Eisēgēsē stēn Ektaktē Sygklisē tēs I.S.I’ (Speech to the Extraordinary Convening of the HSH), Ekklesia, 2016, 93 (3), pp. 237–238, (p. 237). 157 Founded in 1959, comprises approximately 115 Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant and Anglican churches of Europe, and another 40 partner National Council of Churches and Organisations; its scope is European and deals with issues of common concern. See Conference of European Churches, ‘History’ on the Conference of European Churches Official Website, available at www. ceceurope.org/history/ (accessed on 21 September 2017). 158 Founded in 1948; in 2013 memberships amounted to 345; namely, Orthodox, Anglican, Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist and Reformed churches. See World Council of Churches, ‘History’ on the World Council of Churches Official Website, available at www.oikoumene.org/en/about-us/wcc-history (accessed on 21 September 2017). 159 Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe, ‘Work Programme 2018–2020’ in CCME – Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe, available at www.ccme. be/fileadmin/filer/ccme/70_DOWNLOADS/25_Work_Programmes/201706-30-CCME_Work_Programme_2018-2020_as_adopted.pdf (accessed on 21 September 2017), pp. 4–9. 160 Founded in 2010, CROCEU comprises the Eastern Orthodox offices of representation to the EU and is concerned with European affairs. See Lucian N. Leustean, ‘Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First Century: An Overview’ in Lucian N. Leustean (ed.), Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, 2014, pp. 1–20, (p. 15). 161 Committee of Representatives of the Orthodox Churches to the European Union, ‘Strength comes out of unity – CROCEU statement in view of the European Elections 22–25 May 2014’ on the website of the Representation of the Romanian Orthodox Church to the European Institutions, available at www.orthodoxero.eu/media/George/Documente/Strength%20comes%20out% 20of%20unity.pdf (accessed on 21 September 2017). 162 Committee of Representatives of the Orthodox Churches to the European Union, ‘Contributions for the annual colloquium on fundamental rights’, European ­Commission, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/events/colloquium-fundamental-​ rights-2015/files/contributions/croceu-committee_of_representatives_of_the_ orthodox_​ churches_to_the_european_union_en.pdf (accessed 21 September 2017). 163 The Committee of Representatives of the Orthodox Churches to the European Union, ‘Communiqué of CROCEU on the refugee crisis in Europe’, Basilica News Agency, 2 October 2015, available at http://basilica.ro/en/communiqueof-croceu-on-the-refugee-crisis-in-europe/ (accessed on 21 September 2017).

7 The humanitarian engagement of faith-based organisations in Serbia Balancing between the Vulnerable Human and the (In)Secure (Nation)State Marta Stojić Mitrović and Aleksandra Djurić Milovanović The transit migration along the Balkan route only began to make headlines in 2015, during what became known as the ‘summer of migration’.1 However, the Balkan route, which connects Asia Minor and Central Europe, is in fact an old migratory path with migration taking different forms over time as a result of changes to borders, inter-state relations, alliances, animosities and economic circumstances. The dissolution of the Eastern Bloc and the fragmentation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) at the end of the twentieth century accelerated migration processes both within and from the Balkan region. During the 1990s, Serbia became a host country for more than half a million people from the other Yugoslav republics.2 At the same time, economic hardship and social insecurity, which were often embedded in nationalist discursive frames, led to increased emigration. These processes placed Serbia in a dynamic migratory situation as it became host to a large number of displaced people and a state of origin for people heading further into Western Europe and to the United States, Canada and Australia. The large numbers of displaced people and urgent humanitarian needs pushed the state to establish a specialised national institution, the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration (Komesarijat za izbeglice i migracije Republike Srbije) (KIRS), which was responsible for distributing aid and assisting with the entrance of people fleeing conflicts.3 The establishment of KIRS coincided with other international organisations providing refugee support in Serbia. The 1990s was therefore the period when the religious and state actors relevant to this research began their activities. The relations, experiences and discourses established at the time were revived in 2015, when the discourse surrounding the migrant/refugee crises became widely accepted and the Serbian state directly faced human, political and economic challenges. This chapter examines the role of humanitarian faith-based organisations in supporting migrants in Serbia. It draws on five qualitative semi-structured interviews with representatives of key faith-based organisations that have an active presence of believers and a network of religious institutions across the country, namely Čovekoljublje – Dobrotvorna fondacija Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve

208  M. Stojić Mitrović and A. Djurić Milovanović (­Philanthropy – The Charity Foundation of the Serbian Orthodox Church), ­Caritas Serbia and the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) of the Roman Catholic Church, the Gajret organisation of the Islamic Community of Serbia and the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA). In addition to interviews and online data, the chapter draws on the reports on migration in Serbia published by national and international organisations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Médecins Sans Frontières. A large number of faith-based organisations played a role in supporting migrants (e.g. Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund, the Jesuit order, and the Islamic humanitarian organisation Merhamet from Bosnia), however, the chapter focuses on the five religious communities due to their continuous presence in Serbia and influence in migrant-supporting structures. The chapter presents their activities and relations with other civil society organisations, the general public and state authorities by addressing the following questions: ‘What is human?’, ‘What is human security?’, ‘What is endangering human, biological and social lives?’, ‘What is making people vulnerable’ and ‘What is empowering people?’. The aims of this chapter are twofold: highlight the role of faith-based humanitarian organisations in migration support and present their activities. Special emphasis is placed on the concepts of ‘human security’ and ‘vulnerability’ related to human rights, refugees and asylum. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section presents the religious map of Serbia with a special emphasis on the five faith-based communities, and the second section discusses the qualitative material by investigating the experiences of these organisations in several stages: the beginning of their involvement with humanitarian programmes supporting migrants, the expansion of their activities and the impact on society in Serbia. By focusing on conceptualisations of security and vulnerability, the chapter ends with the ways in which the changes of migration policies in Europe and Serbia influenced how these organisations operate.

The religious map of Serbia and the international outreach of religious communities Paul Mojzes has described the ‘religious topography’ of Eastern Europe as a veritable mosaic of communities: In this belt of countries, stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic and Black Seas, four great clusters of religious communities meet – and collide. Eastern Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, Islam, and Protestantism vie for the loyalty and adherence of, and even provide identity to, the rainbow of nationalities who have migrated, settled, and subjugated one another.4 After the fall of communism, churches and religious communities faced numerous challenges, especially regarding the number of believers due to the religious freedom that followed decades of state repression. Serbia fits into

Serbia  209 this pattern of church–state relations. Commenting on the main problems facing churches in post-Communist countries, Ina Merdjanova argued that mainline churches found themselves in a complex situation. After a period of spiritual and institutional stagnation under communism, churches had to adapt to religious pluralism.5 Other sociohistorical events had an impact on religious composition, such as the breakup of Yugoslavia (1992–95), when ethnic and religious communities underwent significant changes. From a formerly multi-ethnic and multi-religious state with a large proportion of atheist-oriented citizens, comparatively distinctly ethnic and religiously homogeneous states and entities emerged. Sociological studies have shown that the post-Communist religious revival has been an expression of national identification and belonging.6 According to the 2011 census, Orthodox Christians made up approximately 84.6 per cent of the Serbian population, whereas Roman Catholics accounted for 5 per cent, Muslims 3.1 per cent, Protestants 1  per cent and other religions 2.2  per cent. Atheists and those who did not identify themselves in religious terms accounted for 5.3  per cent of the population.7 Today, the 2006 Law on Churches and Religious Communities of the Republic of Serbia (hereafter the ‘2006 Law’) recognises the status of traditional ‘churches and religious communities’ to seven communities with ‘centuries of historic continuity’ in the country, namely the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Slovakian Evangelist Church, the Christian Reformist Church, the Evangelist Christian Church, the Islamic Religious Community and the Jewish Religious Community.8 The 2006 Law has received much criticism and objections from scholars, European institutions and civil rights protectors in addition to religious organisations themselves.9 The laws on religious communities have restrictive conditions for registration that are hard to fulfil, especially the new religions. In particular, neo-Protestant communities have faced difficulties registering with the Serbian authorities; some even refused to register. The difference between the seven official churches and religious communities and other confessional communities relates to state funding, access to media, and religious education. In addition to ‘traditional’ communities, the 2006 Law recognised 16 registered confessions, which include neo-Protestant communities. Three organisations (the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church and the Islamic Religious Community) included in this research are related to ‘traditional’ ­religious communities, while ADRA is one of the recognised confessional communities. It is important to make a historical digression on political outcomes in the Balkans: in the period of the existence of the SFRY, religious communities played a minor political role. However, after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, religious communities became one of the major symbolic points for ethnonational identities. Belonging to a particular religious confession was the basis for disputing group loyalty to the prescribed ethnonational identity.

210  M. Stojić Mitrović and A. Djurić Milovanović The Serbian Orthodox Church, as the predominant confession, has ­parishes across the whole territory of Serbia and its diaspora. The charitable fund of the church, Čovekoljublje, is ‘registered in Serbia as a local non-profit foundation, with the main purpose of performing humanitarian activities’.10 Čovekoljublje has regional offices in Serbia as well as in the ex-Yugoslav republics where members of the Serbian Orthodox Church are present. The Islamic community of Serbia is one of the oldest organised religious communities in the country, particularly present in the South and divided into three territorial units (­Meshihats) with Gajret its most active organisation involved in helping migrants. Catholic believers are mostly concentrated in Northern Serbia among ethnic minorities in Vojvodina.11 Caritas Serbia and the CRS are two Roman Catholic humanitarian organisations that work under the leadership of both the Roman Catholic and the Greek Catholic Churches. Religion has been one of the main ethnic identity markers and played a ­central role in drawing ethno/national boundaries, dividing groups according to their confessional identity (the Serbs and Romanians as Orthodox, the Slovaks as Lutherans, the Hungarians as Calvinist, the Croats as Catholics, etc.).12 In addition to ‘traditional’ religious communities, a small minority of the population (less than 3 per cent) belongs to Protestant and neo-Protestant churches. In ethnic terms, Protestant churches are mainly present among the Hungarian and Slovak minorities.13 Neo-Protestant communities such as Nazarenes, Baptists, Methodists, Pentecostals and the Seventh Day Adventists are mainly present in the ethnically-mixed areas of Vojvodina.14 With believers from different ethnic backgrounds and religious services conducted in several languages, neo-Protestants tend to be transnational and open to cultural influences. Neo-Protestant communities place special emphasis on humanitarian aid provided through their faith-based organisations such as ADRA. To summarise, while Čovekoljublje and Gajret are nationally oriented organisations, Caritas Serbia, the CRS and ADRA have a strong international outreach and benefit from global transnational networks.

The emergence of faith-based organisations in Serbia Together with Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia, Serbia was one of six constitutive republics that comprised Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia belonged to the non-alignment movement and balanced between the Eastern and Western Blocs during the Cold War period. During the Socialist regime, religion was not prominent in public life and was restricted to the private sphere.15 With the dissolution of the SFRY, religion acquired an important role in the development of political structures.16 During the 1990s, the activities of faith-based organisations were ­concentrated on the direct provision of humanitarian aid to refugees and internally-displaced people as victims of wars in Yugoslavia.17 Faith-based organisations were founded by churches or religious communities with funding from both believers and national and international bodies.

Serbia  211 In an interview with a representative from Čovekoljublje, we were told that: Čovekoljublje was established in 1991 as a response of the church on the

beginning of wars on the territories of ex-Yugoslavia. As the other faithbased organizations, it has special funds from donations that can be used promptly. Other NGOs have a much slower response mechanism and cannot react immediately.18

Caritas Serbia began with informal volunteer activities at the end of the 1980s in Catholic parishes and was officially established in Serbia in 1995. Throughout the early 1990s, due to the need of humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally displaced people, Caritas extended its work but was unregistered with state authorities and only officially registered as a civil society organisation in 2000. In our interview with their representative, we were told that: Caritas Serbia had a slightly different developmental line than it usually has: usually it begins from the local level, through some initiatives, later to become diocesan, regional Caritas and then national. But due to immediate urgency of the situation in the territory of Serbia, first was established national Caritas and then all the others. Caritas Serbia belongs to confederations of Caritas Europe19 and Caritas Internationalis.20 One of their demands to send the humanitarian aid at all was to establish national Caritas in the first place.21 A similar position was experienced by the other Catholic faith-based organisation, the CRS.22 According to their representative: [T]he CRS came to Serbia in 1996. We always come following the invitation of a local Catholic Church. The Archdiocese of Belgrade invited us in that moment and we opened our office in 1996 in Belgrade. […] Wherever we come we try to improve capacities of local Caritas and local faith-based organizations, but also to help secular organizations.23 ADRA Serbia, with headquarters in Belgrade, is one of 130 national offices of ADRA International and has been active since 1990. Their representative summarised the organisation as follows: ‘As soon as Slovenia separated from the rest of Yugoslavia, a national office of ADRA began operating in Serbia which corresponds with the establishment of the national offices of ADRA in other states.’24 During the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, ADRA played a significant role in providing humanitarian relief in Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of the ethnic and religious affiliation of the people in need.25 In the regions affected by war, ADRA was accepted in Sarajevo as a religiously neutral organisation. The emphasis on ethnic and religious equality within neo-Protestant communities and their faith-based organisations enabled them to work in areas where other organisations had difficulties entering.

212  M. Stojić Mitrović and A. Djurić Milovanović Unlike the above organisations, which were established as organisations oriented towards humanitarian support, Gajret was a cultural society for ­Muslims living in Serbia. It was established in 1923 alongside other national cultural societies for Serbs and Croats. The word Gajret translates from the Arabic as ‘being different’ and one of its colloquial meanings is ‘to endure’. When it was established, the main purpose of Gajret was the fight against illiteracy among the Muslim population. The organisation was closed down in 1953 and revived in 2006. Today, it remains committed to the promotion of Muslim culture and resorted to individual charity and volunteers.

Supporting migrants and supporting the state The number of migrants and the manner of transiting through the territory of Serbia has significantly changed since 2008. This year is taken as a threshold, since the national asylum system, based on the 1951 Geneva Convention on the protection of refugees, came into force and Serbia began using concepts and institutionalised mechanisms of migration control based on EU legislation and administration.26 For example, 77 people were designated asylum seekers in 2008, 275 in 2009, 522 in 2010, 3,132 in 2011, 2,723 in 2012, 5,066 in 2013 and 16,490 in 2014.27 The Commissariat for Refugees was established by the 1992 Law on Refugees.28 The 2008 Asylum Law gave the Commissariat responsibility for the accommodation of asylum seekers.29 In 2012, the Commissariat changed its name to ‘The Commissariat for Refugees and Migrations’, highlighting its new role as the central organisation for managing migration in Serbia.30 The topic of transit migration was underrepresented in mass media until 2011, when the first presence of people transiting the country became visible to the general public.31 This migration was the consequence of several developments, such as the EU’s strengthening of the control of maritime routes in the Mediterranean Sea, the economic and sociopolitical crisis in Greece, and political upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East. For the most part, the faith-based organisations presented in this chapter did not become involved with transit migration until 2015. Gajret was the only body to engage with migrants earlier, after 2011, when people from Tunisia began to arrive in Serbia.32 According to a Gajret representative: [The m]igration crisis has not started with masses of people at railway stations. They have been asking for help in the mosque from the time of protests in Tunisia. Already in that period we have begun with accommodation and support with scarce means that we had on disposal. We referred them to other institutions that could help them. At the moment it was only the Red Cross as the institution. At that moment the Commissariat was concentrated on displaced persons from Kosovo and other refugees. No legal act, law, decision or anything was defining the status of these persons. They were foreigners and not refugees. We  accommodated

Serbia  213 them in mosque but with caution because we heard rumours about the Islamic State (ISIS). We needed to be cautious and you cannot help everyone, but people who work by the mosques cannot ask visitors for IDs. And you give aid to anyone who asks for it. At that moment we had to be cautious because they had no legal status, we could have been punished for keeping there some person with no legal status and you don’t know who that person was and you could be charged in helping him in some activity. Syrian people began to arrive in 2014, but they were not that visible, probably they were more affluent and paid for private accommodation. In 2015, the number increased and the migration became obvious to everyone.33 From 2011 to 2015, other organisations were engaged in transit migration ­projects.34 In spring 2014, Serbia was affected by a natural catastrophe with floods affecting 1.6 million people with extensive damage to property and infrastructure. Thirty-two thousand people had to be evacuated and around 5,000 were placed in organised shelters.35 The Commissariat for Refugees and Migration was the state institution responsible for people displaced by flooding and their experience dealing with this natural disaster was an asset used by civil society organisations. Faith-based organisations had an advantage over the other organisations willing to provide support, as explained by the CRS representative: We as an agency are lucky because we have ‘unlimited funds’; otherwise you usually write a project than you apply on calls posted by governments or other agencies. The so-called ‘unlimited funds’ are finances received through individual donations collected in churches. Right after the rain stopped in May 2015, we went to the field to access the situation. Then we had a meeting with Caritas and Čovekoljublje and we gave them money so they could begin with aid distribution immediately. Other organizations go in the field to access the situation and go back to their office and write project proposals. It is a much longer process. The use of money from ‘unlimited funds’ is not a priory prescribed. You have freedom to choose on what to spend it in a given moment. From that moment on we have created a specific methodology with Čovekoljublje and Caritas, not to distribute food and non-food items, because other organizations would do that, but to focus on cash cards.36 From 2008–15, several local NGOs worked with migrants, such as the Asylum Protection Centre,37 Group 48438 and the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights.39 The activities of these three organisations were mostly confined to legal aid and the occasional distribution of clothes and food to the asylum centres run by the Commissariat for Refugees in Banja Koviljača and Bogovadja. Most NGOs with international support only recently began working in Serbia (e.g. Médecins Sans Frontières after 2014).

214  M. Stojić Mitrović and A. Djurić Milovanović As a general rule, the lack of infrastructure and coordinated state response to cope with the arrival of the large numbers of migrants was evident. From late spring 2015, state authorities began to gradually build a more organised response. In the words of the Čovekoljublje representative: Sometime in June 2015 the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration called a meeting, at which invited around ten organizations which had already established contacts and experience from previous responses on the refugee crises, to think together about the first steps to make. KIRS informed us the means, possibilities and contacts with potential donors the state of Serbia had at its disposal at that moment. The most important was that they informed us what the gap was, that is, the areas which were lacking support at that moment.40 The Čovekoljublje representative emphasised that due to the lack of human and financial means, state authorities were heavily dependent on civil society organisations willing to help migrants. Caritas Serbia was in a slightly different position, as it already relied on a network of persons from the flooding disaster: We’ve only redirected [our network] to help migrants […]. Unlike the floods which were a one-time event, in 2015 begun the well-known refugee crises. Already in March we began noticing a lot of unfamiliar people in proximity of railway stations. The government was not very well prepared; no one anticipated it. Support for both migrants and the state was necessary.41 The Commissariat invited Caritas Serbia and the CRS to a meeting in ­Belgrade to ask if they could help to defuse tense interethnic relations in Kanjiža, in the north of the country.42 ADRA had a slightly different experience: In July 2015 we began supporting migrants. It started in Belgrade, in the parks, with the distribution of food and the other items, then it spread mostly to the eastern borders, where we already had our local church with volunteers, members of the church. That is the logic we followed: we have people from local communities, who are embedded in local communities. This happened in Zaječar and Negotin (towns in eastern Serbia). Soon after that we have decided to enter the human rights protection sector. Together with UNHCR, ADRA financed the establishment of the Asylum Info Centre in Belgrade, which operated from July 2015 until November 2016, with the following partners: the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights (the UNHCR’s implementation partner), the Municipality of Savski Venac (a municipality in the city of Belgrade),

Serbia  215 and the NGO KlikAktiv. Our activities were crossing through different sectors, from humanitarian aid to legal assistance, we had translation, internet access, and safe corner for women and children, etc. At one moment we practically started to work as a police service: our translators were often assisting the department for foreigners. Similar spectres of services were also provided in Preševo camp (between November 2015 and December 2016).43 When the ‘organised corridor’ (also known as the ‘humanitarian corridor’) was formed, state authorities opened new accommodation centres on the route, in addition to the existing asylum centres in Banja Koviljača, Bogovadja, Sjenica, Tutin and Krnjača. These centres included Preševo (on the border with Macedonia) and Dimitrovgrad (on the border with Bulgaria) for registration at entry points, and transit camps at exit points in Subotica (on the border with Hungary) and the Šid region (on the border with Croatia).44 The majority of people ­transited the territory of Serbia within a day. For example, as the Caritas Serbia representative mentioned: Caritas Luxemburg which was present in southern Serbia in the municipality of Vranje begun supporting the Preševo camp by distributing food to migrants. The organizations recognized the need to support the state. After the images of Belgrade’s park in which migrants stayed on their way to European Union spread around the world, the international network of Caritas Europe and Caritas Internationalis became interested in situation in Serbia. Caritas Serbia explained them that the Serbian state had experience and will to help refugees but had not sufficient means and needed aid. In cooperation with state institutions, KIRS and the Ministry of Labour,45 we began the activities of food and personal hygiene items distribution.46 The Caritas Serbia representative added that the organisation also operated at the exit points of the corridor, first in Subotica and Kanjiža and, when the humanitarian corridor changed, in Šid. This proved to be an opportunity to include local Catholic dioceses. Constant changes of circumstances also demanded constant transformations of the approach and concrete activities, which was recognised and accepted by donors. In the first period, aid was adjusted to the fast transit of not just individual parcels of food and hygiene items, clothes, but also larger items such as washing and drying machines at the Krnjača centre. All organisations cooperated with local authorities and civil society organisations. For example, when Čovekoljublje began its activities supporting migrants at the Preševo camp in 2015, it employed 40 people from the local area in a matter of weeks. Similarly, ‘From the beginning Caritas Serbia tried to involve other civil society organisations with whom they cooperated in

216  M. Stojić Mitrović and A. Djurić Milovanović the past (for example, food was prepared by an organisation which dealt with women affected by domestic violence, “Tradicija juga”)’.47 The CRS representative made a similar statement: We worked on the topic (of migration) both directly [with migrants] and with partner organizations, such as, in addition to Čovekoljublje and Caritas, the Divac Foundation, the Balkan Centre for Migration and Humanitarian Activities, Atina, etc. Not only that these organizations worked directly with migrants, they also worked on strengthening the capacities of the state.48 Similarly, the ADRA official stated that: ADRA works with local partner organizations which are well organized but don’t have resources and especially and local government open to collaboration. The aim of ADRA is to find and connect local actors and strengthen local capacities in a manner that when ADRA withdraws, they can continue with their activities by themselves.49 The Gajret representative commented a different experience in engaging with migrants: In Islam it is advised not to emphasize your aid, it is done discretely. The only public distribution of food is during Kurban Bajram. We do not have a developed network as Čovekoljublje and Caritas have with the infrastructure, organization, managers. We work more or less quietly. Our most public work with migrants was when we could not meet the needs with our own means. Then we asked other institutions for support. I especially praise the Catholic Relief Services. Through our migrants who moved to Canada we managed to collect money and rent a hostel. We rented it for six months, until November 2016. Migrants occupied the mosque. They also slept in the building of the Islamic Faculty behind the mosque. Without any financial means, we gathered women in Belgrade to distribute dry food during the week and on Fridays we cooked meals. All of these activities were done voluntarily and unfortunately without any support, except that from the CRS. We also distributed food to the border with Croatia.50 The closure of the humanitarian corridor in March 201651 returned the migration flow to the pace and modes from previous transit periods, when people were stuck in Serbia for a long time: improvised settlements were formed autonomously, sometimes by migrants themselves near the borders with Hungary (the Subotica ‘jungle’ and ‘transit’ zones) and Croatia (the Šid region), but also in the proximity of the asylum centre in Bogovadja (2012–15) and the so-called Belgrade ‘barracks’ (2016–17).52 Apart from these

Serbia  217 large and visible settlements, which sometimes hosted thousands of people on a daily basis, migrants also stayed individually or in smaller groups in less visible places such as hostels, rented accommodation, aid distribution spots and abandoned buildings. In order to cross the border into Hungary or Croatia, people were either using the increasingly high cost of smugglers’ services or were involved in ‘the game’,53 self-organised attempts to cross the borders, often ending in injuries, beatings, dog bites and sometimes death.54 The state opened reception centres in different parts of Serbia, and by 2017, 18 centres were operating throughout the country.55 Faith-based organisations operated inside most of these centres helping each other; for example, Čovekoljublje and Caritas Serbia combined resources and jointly distributed food in the same camp (Caritas Serbia providing breakfast and lunch and Čovekoljublje supper). As presented, faith-based organisations have been vital for the functioning of organised migrants’ support in Serbia, since they provided the daily needs of migrants regarding food, clothes, education, entertainment, legal and medical aid and sanitation. As migrants began to remain in Serbia for longer periods of time, organisations started to become involved in other types of ­activities, such as the enrolment of children in primary schools, language classes and crafts courses for teenagers and adults and organising social and educational workshops. The relationship between the state and faith-based organisations is one of mutual interdependence, even though the cooperation has been sometimes ­ challenging. One notable example of this was in November 2016, when state officials sent a letter to all major humanitarian aid providing organisations suggesting that they stop distributing food and non-food items outside the state-run camps.56 This decision has been discursively framed as the attempt to discourage the existence of the parallel migrant support system external to that of the state. For example, while talking about having regularly employed members of staff rather than volunteers, the Caritas Serbia representative mentioned that: It was difficult to include volunteers because they conducted their activities in state-run camps and each and every employee needed a permission from the Commissariat to enter camps. We had volunteers in ­Belgrade parks, the Miksalište distribution centre until the state recommended to stop supporting migrants outside the state-run centres, in order to avoid creation of a ‘parallel system’.57

Being a vulnerable human: human security, the United Nations and Serbia The conceptualisation of the protection of people in a nation state has changed over time. Civil society organisations were formed to support both the migrants and the state in (transit) migration and received funding to implement ‘migration emergency relief’ projects,58 most of which focused on

218  M. Stojić Mitrović and A. Djurić Milovanović the predefined vulnerable categories of women and children, unaccompanied minors and victims of trafficking. The relationship between the concept of the universal human rights and the nation state aims to transcend religious, ethnic and political divisions. Human rights are protected and implemented above all by nation states through legislation, institutions, appointed officers, budgets and national strategies.59 The concept of universal human rights evolved in particular historical, economic and sociopolitical settings in the process of the creation of civil societies within nation states. As Hanna Arendt has emphasised, ‘human’ is not just defined as an abstract ‘universal human’, but in relation to a (nation) state, as a citizen and/or national.60 The system of human rights protection was created on an ad hoc basis to solve concrete problems after the wars in Europe, such as the dissolution of empires, the establishment of nation states, the protection of national minorities and the world wars with millions of displaced people.61 Similar to the evolution of the human rights protection system and, in particular, the refugee protection system in the former Yugoslavia and Serbia, which was fundamentally influenced by international relations and the country’s position in-between the blocs, the notions of ‘refugees’ and ‘persons needing protection’ resonated political developments. In the 1980 Law on the Sojourn and Movement of Foreigners in the SFRY,62 the concepts of asylum and refugee are distinctively defined. Asylum was reserved for ‘foreigners who had been prosecuted for his/her support of democratic ideas and movements, social and national liberation, freedom and rights of human personality or for the freedom of scientific or artistic creation’,63 while the refugees were those who ‘left the country whose nationality he/she holds or in which he/she has permanent residence in order to avoid prosecution due to his/her progressive political strivings or national, racial or religious affiliation’.64 The political framework for protection is evident not only from words such as ‘democratic ideas and movements’ and ‘progressive political strivings’, but also from the analysis of people and groups who were granted protection: political dissidents with strong Socialist provenience and groups arriving after political upheaval in countries with which the SFRY had political relations. Dissidents and refugees were thus directly portrayed as political allies of the state. The influence of current political relations and especially the nationalist turn in the 1990s were reflected in the administrative conceptualisations of persons in need of protection and humanitarian assistance. According to Article 1 of the 1992 Law on Refugees,65 a refugee is defined as a Serb, or citizen of other ethnicity who, due to the pressure of the Croatian authorities or the authorities of other republics, threats of genocide as well as prosecution and discrimination based on their religious or national affiliation or political beliefs, were forced to leave their residences and flee to the territory of the Republic of Serbia. The protracted refugee situation in Serbia from the

Serbia  219 1990s led to the normalisation of the conceptualisation of a refugee as a person who speaks a language familiar to the one spoken in the state of the refugee and demonstrated a similar cultural upbringing. From a legal perspective, the perception of refugees changed fundamentally in 2007–8 when Serbia adopted international legislation and began institutional implementation following the 1951 Geneva Convention. ‘People in need’ were administratively defined as foreigners, nominally irrespective of their state of origin (and bilateral relations with the government of that state) or their ethnic, linguistic and cultural background. Furthermore, in previous decades, the people who sought protection came mostly from neighbouring states, and these administrative transformations also influenced the prevailing geographical determinants. These changes at the institutional level had a specific reflection for the Serbian public: almost ten years after the adoption of the Geneva Convention, people who asked for asylum in Serbia as the first step towards obtaining refugee status were colloquially (by politicians or residents in the mass media) called azilanti, while the word ‘refugees’ was usually reserved for people displaced by the 1990s wars. In 2015, the UNHCR organised a worldwide campaign to depict people arriving in large numbers in Europe as refugees (and not as economic migrants). The campaign, together with the arrival of humanitarian organisations accustomed to the UN definition of ‘refugees’, and foreign media reporting about the situation in Serbia, opened the door for the use of the word ‘refugees’ for people other than those coming from the states of the former Yugoslavia. The official discourse on transit migration underwent substantial changes in 2015 and 2016. In 2015, the humanitarian discourse was dominant. This depicted transit migrants as vulnerable persons in need of immediate humanitarian assistance while Serbian institutions and ordinary people were described as human, helpful and full of understanding (this image was often juxtaposed with the treatment of migrants by other states on the Balkan route). Empathy was frequently evoked by referring to the experience of Serbian refugees in the 1990s. However, in 2016, the perception changed with the issuing of the European migration policy, and a decisive securitarian approach to migration took precedence. Nevertheless, the new approach was more visible in practice, with increased deterrence techniques (preventing border crossings), stricter control of migration movements (trend of putting together all the migrants into state-run camps) and solidarity practices (banning humanitarian distribution outside state-run camps), then as the presentation of migrants as a direct (potential or actual) threat to the nation state and its residents. In general, the public conceptualisation of state security potentially under threat by certain groups was not directly related to migrants but to national and ethnic minorities and mostly neighbouring states, (i.e. essentially the same actors as in the 1990s). From an institutional perspective, Serbia has been gradually integrating into the EU security frameworks (strategies and organisations) and consequently

220  M. Stojić Mitrović and A. Djurić Milovanović adopted the EU ­discourses on migration.66 Among the local groups living in the proximity of state-run camps, border zones or other places where migrants have been more frequently present, discourses have sometimes appeared in which migrants have been depicted as a threat for the local population, in particular to their health (migrants as contagious disease carriers), physical vulnerability (patriarchal migrant males sexually harassing women and children), culture, religion and history (Muslim migrants versus Christian Orthodox defenders), and safety (Muslim extremist migrants as terrorists).67 As interpreted by the Human Security Unit of the United Nations, the conceptualisation of human security by the Commission on Human Security68 moves from state-centric conceptions of security that focus primarily on the safety of states from military aggression, towards the security of individuals by enabling their protection and empowerment and drawing attention to a multitude of threats that cut across different aspects of human life. The interface between security, development and human rights promotes an integrated, coordinated and people-centred approach to advancing peace, security and development across nations. At the European Council meeting held on 14 December 2017, the concept of security was presented as the protection of state territory in the first instance, f­ollowed by the protection of external borders and the stopping of illegal migration, whereas protection of the human rights of foreigners was framed through the discourse of those who were more deserving of protection than others.69 The question of what to prioritise first, the state or human security (including the human rights of foreigners), had a special political tone in Serbia: the nationalist past, coupled with poverty and state institutions struggling with the lack of human and financial resources, echoed in policies related not only to the protection of refugees, but also to the protection of minorities residing within its ­territory. The rule of law and human rights protection remain one of the main issues in the negotiation process with the EU. Reports regarding human rights and freedoms in Serbia still note serious problems, particularly related to the position of the Roma, the treatment of minorities, press freedom, a hostile environment for human rights defenders and war crimes accountability.70 Therefore, conforming to human security protection as indicated above remains a distant goal which has to date only been addressed fragmentally. Humanitarian organisations have played a crucial role in supporting the state. Some representatives interviewed for this research saw the concept of human rights as central to achieving a more just society, which would go beyond discrimination on the basis of national origins. For example, while talking about vulnerable categories, the ADRA representative described the church’s role and mission in society by citing Psalm 146: ‘The Lord protects the strangers; He supports the fatherless’.71 This comment seems to represent a shift in ADRA’s rationale for supporting refugees as its previous focus on the concept of mercy was set aside. Aid and support for vulnerable groups are

Serbia  221 therefore a matter of social justice while human rights are something that must be protected and strengthened. Interestingly, some of the representatives interviewed noticed that security practices together with humanitarian regimes have produced a whole new spectre of insecurities and threats for the well-being and lives of migrants. The majority of people stuck in Serbia are impoverished. They are people who borrowed money to start their journey and therefore feel that they cannot give up at this stage. In addition, there are people who managed to reach Serbia but are now left without financial resources. Consequently, their forced stay in Serbia has impacted their mental health. As the Čovekoljublje representative commented, ‘What they need is something that we cannot provide for them, neither we as a humanitarian organisation nor the state of Serbia as such’.72 The representative also noticed that vulnerabilities are produced and deepened by state discourses that depict Serbia as a transit state only, resulting in treating migration as a transient, emergency-like phenomenon. The representative predicted that integration will inevitably have to take place and the system must adjust so as to prevent people from being left without support. The closure of borders resulted in the unwanted stay of migrants in Serbia. They regard their stay in Serbia as temporarily and therefore, as the representative emphasised, it has been difficult to inspire them not only to follow the standard asylum procedure, but also to take part in activities, such as language or crafts courses. The representatives interviewed also noticed the inadequacy of predefined vulnerable categories, which excluded certain sections of the population in need of assistance. For example, women, children, the Roma, the homeless or victims of natural disasters have usually been the focus of aid programmes. Unaccompanied minors, women and families are in an especially difficult position and the first to experience violence, either due to often hidden domestic violence or due to communicational problems. One of the representatives explained that young adult males are a category that tends to be excluded from organised aid, especially in situations when aid is limited and providers are forced to ration it. All representatives interviewed emphasised that they provided aid irrespective of people’s national or ethnic origins and avoided discrimination on any grounds. ‘We do not access the administrative status of people we help’, said the CRS official.73 Similarly, the Gajret representative emphasised the openness of the mosque to all people regardless of whether they are Muslim: When you provide help to those who need it, it should be in silence, discrete, so you are not putting people in uncomfortable situation. You should never say loudly to whom you are giving. In Islam, one of the major postulates is to give, to share. This is a rule, to give zakat, it is a religious obligation to help those who are extremely poor. We help those who are in need, who are poor, not able to earn by themselves. Only this is accepted by God.74

222  M. Stojić Mitrović and A. Djurić Milovanović

Conclusion Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, a number of faith-based organisations began supporting refugees, vulnerable groups and migrant populations by developing religious networks. While the predominant confession remains the Serbian Orthodox Church, the religious map of the country is far from mono-confessional. The presence of other churches and religious communities accompanied the multitude of faith-based organisations working with migrants. This chapter focused on five selected faith-based organisations that make up the main religions present in Serbia (Čovekoljublje, Caritas Serbia, the CRS, ADRA and Gajret). Caritas Serbia, the CRS and ADRA have a strong international network, whereas Čovekoljublje and Gajret are organisations that only operate in Serbia. Faith-based organisations have an important role in the migration support system in Serbia. The beneficiaries of their services are twofold: first, migrants are direct beneficiaries as they receive food, legal advice, training for various occupations etc.; second, the representatives interviewed emphasised that their actions enabled the functioning of the official reception system and thus helped the state and its institutions. Faith-based organisations approach humanitarian work in their particular way, and in most cases with unspecialised provision of aid. They work with vulnerable people (refugees, the poor, people affected by flooding, victims of domestic violence etc.) and from this perspective supporting migrants is just one of their activities. The conceptualisation of vulnerability corresponds, therefore, to universal vulnerability resulting from the factors that an individual cannot (easily) change. Such a conceptualisation does not always correspond to the vulnerabilities established by state institutions or the media. The special role played by faith-based organisations has been highlighted by the problematisation of vulnerabilities and opportunities which require immediate action whereas other national organisations usually encounter obstacles in tackling social issues. In some cases, independence from state influence opened the door to providing assistance, a clear example of this being ADRA in Sarajevo which, by virtue of not being linked to any of the parties involved in the conflict, was given access to beneficiaries from all sides. Sometimes it was exactly the embeddedness of faith-based organisations in local structures that enabled the change of the perception of vulnerability, as in cases where faith-based organisations have been intermediaries between state, community and migrants. In cases when the local population refused state projects to open reception centres in their midst or begin integration projects that would involve regular contact between local and migrant populations, faith-based organisations have been present to mediate, challenging and altering the entrenched fears and xenophobic behaviour of local groups. The officials interviewed noted that work in the civil sector often involved taking predefined categories of victims and thus excluding those who do not meet these criteria. This action primarily relates to the focus of assistance

Serbia  223 p­ rojects on women and children of migrants, whose product is the exclusion of men, especially those who are young and seem healthy. Observing vulnerability through the perspective of a universal human being has another consequence for the difference between faith-based organisations and the state administration in relation to security: the security provided by faith-based organisations is above all human security, a security of human beings, and not confined to the security of a designated group of people inside a specified territory (citizens of one country at the national level). As we were told by an interviewee: ‘When we help someone, we do not ask for status, whether the person is legally here or not […] [w]e cannot ask someone for an ID card or passport’.75 In addition to directly helping migrants and supporting the official reception system governed by the state, faith-based organisations play a role at the social level. Their perceived major success lies in linking local communities and migrants through joint activities or conflict resolution. The cooperation between organisations associated with different religious denominations, which take into account their previous contacts developed during the 1990s, has been a good basis for attempting to overcome xenophobic and nationalist discoursers. The influence of faith-based organisations resides in the ability to change national or regional migration policies. Unlike their social influence, faith-based organisations do not advance direct political influence. Although they work closely with state structures, faith-based organisations engagement with politics is limited and restricted to an operational nature, namely supporting state authorities, which have the final word on refugee policy.

Notes  1 Bernd Kasparek and Marc Speer, ‘Of Hope. Hungary and the long summer of migration’, 9 September 2015, available at http://bordermonitoring.eu/ ungarn/2015/09/of-hope-en/ (accessed on 22 May 2018).  2 ‘After the War Was Over’, Refugees, 2005, 3 (140), available at www.unhcr. org/433bded34.pdf (accessed on 22 May 2018).   3 The official website of the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration is available at www.kirs.gov.rs/articles/aboutus.php?lang=ENG (accessed on 22 May 2018).  4 Paul Mojzes, ‘Religious Topography of Eastern Europe’, Journal of Ecumenical Studies, 1999, 36 (1–2), pp. 3–4.   5 Ina Merdjanova, ‘Religious Liberty, New Religious Movements and Traditional Christian Churches in Eastern Europe’, Religion, State and Society, 2001, 29 (4), pp. 265–304.   6 Mirko Blagojević, ‘Empirical (Re)evolution of Revitalization of Orthodox Christianity’ in Danijela Gavrilović (ed.) Revitalization of Religion, Niš: YUNIR, 2009, p. 16; Djordjević Dragoljub, O religiji i ateizmu: prilozi sociologiji religije (On Religion and Atheism: Contribution to the Sociology of Religion), Belgrade and Niš: Gradina, 1990; Dragoljub Djordjević, ‘Religiousness of Serbs at the Beginning of the 21st Century: What is it About?’ in Danijela Gavrilović (ed. ), Revitalization of Religion. Theoretical and Comparative Approaches, Yugoslav Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Annual – Year XVI, Niš: Yugoslav Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, 2009 pp. 57 – 64; Kuburić Zorica, Verske zajednice u Srbiji i verska

224  M. Stojić Mitrović and A. Djurić Milovanović ­distanca (Religious Communities and Religious Distance in Serbia), Novi Sad: Centar za empirijska istraživanja religije, 2010; Angela Ilić, ‘Church and State Relations in Present Day Serbia’, Religion in Eastern Europe, 2004, 14 (6), pp. 8–33.  7 Popis stanovništva, domaćinstava i stanova, 2011 – Veroispovest, maternji jezik i nacionalna pripadnost, Podaci po opštinama i gradovima, Beograd: Republički zavod za statis­ eligion, Mother tiku (The Population Census of the Republic of Serbia, 2011 – R Tongue and Nationality, Data by Municipalities and Cities), ­Belgrade: Republic Institute for Statistics.   8 Law on Churches and Religious Communities in the Republic of Serbia, available at www.vere.gov.rs/KSCVZ/uploads/Dokumenti/ZakonOCrkvamaI­Verskim Zajednicama.pdf (accessed on 4 December 2017).   9 Danijel Sinani, ‘Dawn by Law. Alternative Religious Concepts and the Serbian Law on Churches and Religious Communities’, Antropologija, 2010, 10 (3), pp. 121–132. 10 The official website of Čovekoljublje is available at www.covekoljublje.org/e_ ocove.html (accessed on 12 December 2017). 11 Law on the Rights and Freedom of National Minorities in Serbia, 2009, available at www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_zastiti_prava_i_sloboda_nacionalnih_manjina. html (accessed on 13 December 2017). 12 Aleksandra Đurić-Milovanović, Dvostruke manjine u Srbiji. O posebnostima u religiji i etnicitetu Rumuna u Vojvodini (Double Minorities in Serbia. Distinctive Aspects on the Religion and Ethnicity of Romanians in Vojvodina), Belgrade: Balkanološki institut SANU, 2015. 13 Angela Ilić and Luka Ilić (2008). ‘Protestant Identity in an Orthodox Context: the Example of Serbia’ in Eduardus Van der Borght (ed.), Christian Identity (Studies in Reformed Theology), Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2008, pp. 467–480. 14 Aleksandra Đurić-Milovanović, ‘How Long Have You Been in the Truth? Expressing New Forms of Religiosity: Romanian Neo-Protestants in Serbia’, Ethnologia Balkanica, 2012, 16 (1), pp. 163–179. 15 Stella Alexander, Church and State Relations in Yugoslavia since 1945, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979; Radmila Radić, Država i verske zajednice 1945–1970 (State and Religious Communities 1945–1970), Belgrade: INIS, 2002; Sabrina Petra Ramet (ed.), Protestantism and Politics in Eastern Europe and Russia, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1992. 16 Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 17 For more details on faith-based organisations see Zorica Kuburić and Ana Zotova (eds.), Humanitarni rad verskih zajednica (Humanitarian Work of Religious Communities), Novi Sad: Ceir, 2014. 18 Interview with Čovekoljublje representative, 1 December 2017, Belgrade. 19 The official website of Caritas is available at www.caritas.eu/ (accessed on 13 December 2017). 20 Ibid. 21 Interview with Caritas Serbia representative, 6 December 2017, Belgrade. 22 The website of the Catholic Relief Services at www.crs.org/our-work-overseas/ where-we-work (accessed on 13 December 2017). 23 Interview with CRS representative, 7 December 2017, Belgrade. 24 Interview with ADRA representative, 25 October 2017, Belgrade. 25 The official website of ADRA Serbia is available at http://adra.org.rs/who-weare/?lang=en (accessed on 13 December 2017).

Serbia  225 26 Marta Stojić Mitrović, ‘Serbian Migration Policy Concerning Irregular Migration and Asylum in the Context of the EU Integration Processes’, Etnoantropološki problem, 2014, 9 (4), pp. 1105–1120; Barbara Beznec, Marc Speer and Marta Stojić Mitrović, Governing the Balkan Route. Macedonia, Serbia and the European Border Regime. Research Paper Series No. 5. Belgrade: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung for South-eastern Europe, 2016. 27 Report of the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights ‘Pravo na azil u republici Srbiji – Right to Asylum in the Republic of Serbia’, available at www.bgcentar.org.rs/ bgcentar/​wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Pravo-na-azil-u-Republici-Srbiji-2014. pdf (accessed on 22 May 2018). Annual reports with statistical data on nationality, gender, age, etc. for the period between 2012 and 2018 are available on the website of the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights at http://azil.rs/en/annual-reports/ (Asylum Annual reports); for the period between 2010 and 2011 the report ‘Azil u Srbiji – Asylum in Serbia’ of the Asylum Protection Centre at www.apc-cza. org/images/publikacije/APCCZA%20brosura%20O%20Azilu%202010-2011.pdf and for the period between 2008 and 2013 ‘Azil info – Asylum Info’ of the Asylum Protection Centre at http://apc-cza.org/azil-u-srbiji/images/publikacije/ azil_info.pdf (accessed on 22 May 2018). 28 Zakon o izbeglicama Republike Srbije (Law on Refugees of the Republic of Serbia), available at www.kirs.gov.rs/docs/Zakon_o_izbeglicama.pdf (accessed on 22 May 2018). 29 Zakon o azilu Republike Srbije (Law on Asylum of the Republic of Serbia), available at www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_azilu.html (accessed on 22 May 2018). 30 Zakon o upravljanju migracijama Republike Srbije (Law on Migration Management of the Republic of Serbia), available at www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/ archive/files/lat/pdf/zakoni/2012/3118-12Lat.pdf (accessed on 22 May 2018). 31 Marta Stojić Mitrović, ‘Presenting as a Problem, Acting as an Opportunity: Four Cases of Socio-political Conflicts Taking the Presence of Migrants as a Focal Object in Serbia’, Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnography SASA, 2014, 62 (1), pp. 67–82; Marta Stojić Mitrović, ‘Eksternalizacija granica Evropske Unije i pojava improvizovanih migrantskih naselja u Srbiji’ (The Externalisation of Borders of the European Union and the Emergence of the Improvised Migrants’ Settlements in Serbia), Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke (Matica Srpska Journal for Social Sciences), 2012, 139 (2), pp. 237–248. 32 Serbia and Tunisia have visa free regime. 33 Interview with Gajret representative, 12 December 2017, Belgrade. 34 Izveštaj o proceni potreba za oporavak i obnovu posledica poplava (Post-disaster needs assessment on floods in Serbia, 2014), available at www.obnova.gov.rs/ uploads/useruploads/Documents/Izvestaj-o-proceni-potreba-za-oporavak-i-obnovuposledica-poplava.pdf (accessed on 22 May 2018). 35 https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20140715-serbia-rna-report_0. pdf, see particularly page 15 of the Report on the 2014 floods in Serbia (accessed on 22 May 2018). 36 Interview with CRS representative, 7 December 2017, Belgrade. 37 The Asylum Protection Centre official website is available at www.apc-cza.org/ en/o-nama.html (accessed on 22 May 2018). 38 The Group 484 official website is available at http://grupa484.org.rs/en/group484/ (accessed on 22 May 2018). 39 The website of the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights is available at www. bgcentar.org.rs/bgcentar/eng-lat/ (accessed on 22 May 2018). 40 Interview with Čovekoljublje representative, 1 December 2017, Belgrade. 41 Interview with Caritas Serbia representative, 6 December 2017, Belgrade.

226  M. Stojić Mitrović and A. Djurić Milovanović 42 In Kanjiža most people are Roman Catholic believers. 43 Interview with ADRA representative, 25 October 2017, Belgrade. 44 Emina Buzinkić and Marijana Hamersak, Kamp, koridor, granica: studije izbjeglištva u suvremenom hrvatskom kontekstu (Camp, Corridor, Border: The Refugee Studies in the Contemporary Croatian Context), Zagreb: Institut za etnologiju i folkloristiku, Centar za mirovne studije i Fakultet političkih znanosti – CEDIM, 2017. 45 In June 2015, the Government of the Republic of Serbia decided to establish a special body to deal with migration, the so-called ‘Working group for solving the problems of mixed migration flows’. It was composed of officials from the Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veteran and Social Policy (which chaired the Working group), the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry in charge of European Integration, the Ministry of Health and the EU Delegation to Serbia. 46 Interview with Caritas Serbia representative, 6 December 2017, Belgrade. 47 The official website of Caritas Serbia is available at http://caritas.rs/ caritas/?p=3310 (accessed on 15 December 2017). 48 Interview with CRS representative, 7 December 2017, Belgrade. 49 Interview with ADRA representative, 25 October 2017, Belgrade. 50 Interview with Gajret representative, 12 December 2017, Belgrade. 51 Statewatch Observatory, ‘Refugee crisis: latest news from across Europe’, March 2016, available at http://statewatch.org/eu-med-crisis-2016-03-mar.htm (accessed on 25 May 2018). 52 For example, the settlements on the so-called ‘no man’s land’, between the official border crossings between Serbia and Hungary, have been formed when the formalised corridor was closed and people gathered in front of the ‘gates’ to socalled ‘transit zones’, which serve as the only legal entry points for prospective asylum seekers in Hungary. People slept rough or in self-made tent-like shelters while waiting to be admitted into the transit zone. The specific position inbetween of the two states made the deliverance of aid extremely challenging. No state claimed direct right/responsibility for the people stranded there. However, the Serbian state tried to bring together the people into official camps, by promising to coordinate with Hungarian officials lists according to which people could enter Hungary. See more at https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details. aspx?ObjectId=090000168075e9b2#_Toc494960718 (accessed on 25 May 2018). 53 ‘ “If you go, you succeed. If you don’t go, you lose. That’s why they call it a game”, said 20-year-old Afghan migrant Ahmad Shakib who made it to Serbia from Bulgaria after three ‘games’ in Lin Taylor and Valeria Cardi, ‘The smuggling game: Playing with life and death to reach Europe’, Reuters, 28 March 2017, available at www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-serbia-smuggling/the-smugglinggame-playing-with-life-and-death-to-reach-europe-idUSKBN16Z190 (accessed on 25 May 2018). 54 Médecins Sans Frontières, ‘Games of violence. Unaccompanied children and young people repeatedly abused by EU member state border authorities’, 2017, available at www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/serbia-games-of-violence-3.10.17. pdf (accessed on 25 May 2018). 55 The overview of the capacities and conditions of all centres in Serbia is regularly updated on UNHCR’s database, available at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/ download/55034 (accessed on 25 May 2018). While the Commissariat for Refugees and Migrations is responsible for the majority of camps in Serbia, the Ministry of Labor, Employment, Veteran and Social Policy is responsible for three camps in the South of Serbia, near the border with Macedonia. The number of migrants present in Serbia is constantly changing and UNHCR is also regularly reporting on this. In the end of January 2018, 4,000 persons were

Serbia  227 encountered (see, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/56091), in the end of April 2018 the number was around 3,500 (see, https://data2.unhcr. org/en/documents/download/63416), in the end of April 2017, for example, more than 7,300 (see, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/56091) (accessed on 25 May 2018). 56 ‘Protection monitoring report 16 October–30 November 2016’, available at www.praxis.org.rs/index.php/en/praxis-in-action/migration/item/1138-protectionmonitoring-​report-16-oct-30-nov-2016 (accessed on 25 May 2018). 57 Interview with Caritas Serbia representative, 6 December 2017, Belgrade. 58 The UNHCR also uses this emergency/post emergency dichotomy to present migration in Europe prior and after the closure of the corridor on 7 March 2016, and the agreement on the start of the implementation of the EU – Turkey deal on 18 March 2016 (see, for example, http://donors.unhcr.gr/en/unhcr-greecefactsheet-may-2017/ accessed on 25 May 2018). 59 Anne Gallagher, ‘Making Human Rights Treaty Obligations a Reality: Working with New Actors and Partners’ in Philip Alston and James Crawford (eds.), The Future of Human Rights Treaty Monitoring, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 201–227. 60 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: World Publishing, 1979. 61 Gerard Daniel Cohen, ‘Between Relief and Politics: Refugee Humanitarianism in Post-War Europe’, Journal of Contemporary History, 2008, 43 (3), pp. 437–450; Gerard Daniel Cohen, In War’s Wake: Europe’s Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012; Gil Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1993. 62 Official Gazette SFRY No. 56/80, available at www.podaci.net/_z1/8126847/ Z-kbstra02v8056-05A1.html (accessed on 25 May 2018). 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Official Gazette RS, No. 18/92 at www.kirs.gov.rs/docs/Zakon_o_izbeglicama. pdf (accessed on 25 May 2018). 66 The official site of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, the text about the negotiations between the EU and Serbia on actions of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), available at www.ecre.org/frontex-2-0-deployingarmed-groups-on-the-balkan-route/ (accessed on 25 May 2018). 67 Marta Stojić Mitrović, ‘How Dangerous are Migrants’ Bodies? Narratives about Disease and Public Health and Techniques of Government’, Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnography SASA, 2017, 65 (3), pp. 593–609. 68 to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity. (The Commission on Human security, 2003, available at www.un.org/humansecurity/ sites/www.un.org.humansecurity/files/­human_security_in_theory_and_practice_ english.​pdf (accessed on 25 May 2018) ). 69 On the change of the dominant discourse in Europe in the direction of securitisation see the text of a Croatian migrants’ support society ‘Welcome! Initiative’,

228  M. Stojić Mitrović and A. Djurić Milovanović available at http://welcome.cms.hr/index.php/hr/2017/12/17/svjedocanstva-opush-back-ovima-i-dalje-pristizu/, as well as the Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 14 December 2017, available at www.consilium.europa.eu/ media/32179/14-final-conclusions-en.pdf (accessed on 25 May 2018). 70 ‘Human Rights Watch report on Serbia 2015’, available at www.hrw.org/worldreport/2016/country-chapters/serbia/kosovo; ‘The US embassy human rights report on Serbia 2016’, available at https://rs.usembassy.gov/wp-content/ uploads/sites/235/2017/07/Serbia-2016-human-rights-report.pdf; ‘The Amnesty International report on Serbia 2017/2018’, available at www.amnesty.org/en/ countries/europe-and-central-asia/serbia/report-serbia/; ‘The European Commission report on Serbia 2016’, available at https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_serbia.pdf (accessed on 25 May 2018). 71 Interview with ADRA representative, 25 October 2017, Belgrade. 72 Interview with Čovekoljublje representative, 1 December 2017, Belgrade. 73 Interview with CRS representative, 7 December 2017, Belgrade. 74 Interview with Gajret representative, 12 December 2017, Belgrade. 75 Interview with CRS representative, 7 December 2017.

8 The Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the refugee crisis Daniela Kalkandjieva

The recent refugee crisis presented a serious challenge to European societies and their political elites. To cope with the mass influx of people from the Middle East and North Africa, the European Commission and the national governments in Europe had to develop specific policies addressed not only to the immigrants but also to their citizens. In accordance with the ­Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1951 Geneva Convention on the protection of refugees, national governments are obliged to provide humanitarian aid to migrants coming from regions affected by military conflict and other areas where their lives have been under threat. European authorities also need to ensure the human dignity of the newcomers and even prevent their humiliation on ethnic, religious or other grounds. Parallel to this, they have to develop long-term programmes for dealing with the migrant crisis, the international protection of asylum seekers and their integration in the host societies. In this regard, special attention should be paid to Regulation No. 604/2013 of the European Parliament, which aimed to improve the European Union (EU) system for examining the applications of immigrants and their resettlement in EU Member States. In particular, it clarified that ‘the first Member State in which the application for international protection was lodged shall be responsible for examining it’.1 It also envisioned a resettlement of refugees on the principle of solidarity if one or more Member States have suffered substantial pressures on their asylum systems. From a historical perspective, the refugee crisis that erupted in 2015 differs from previous crises experienced by European societies. The fact that only a small number of the recent asylum seekers identify as Christian, traditionally the dominant faith on the continent, with the remainder being Muslim, naturally placed the issue of religious identity at the heart of public debate on the migrant crisis. At the same time, the terrorist attacks committed by supporters of so-called Islamic State (Daesh) in various European cities during the climax of the refugee crisis quickly shifted the focus of the discussion from the realm of cultural diversity to politics. These acts had a far-reaching impact on the local population: they not only spurred resentment against terrorists, but also sowed suspicion towards ordinary Muslims.

230  D. Kalkandjieva This atmosphere was used by many far-right and populist political parties to expand their influence among European citizens by using anti-Muslim and anti-refugee rhetoric. Furthermore, the religious identity of the refugees challenged the widely ­secularised European political elites. On the one hand, the flows of migrants intensified the debate on issues such as the dress code of Muslim women or the religious training of the Europe-based imams and inspired the introduction of new regulations in the religious sphere. In 2015, the Dutch and Italian governments approved a partial ban on the face-covering Muslim ­ veils.2 A year later, Bulgaria did the same.3 On the other hand, the refugee crisis contested the apparently unquestionable boundaries between the secular and the religious in Europe; more specifically, it has stimulated a growing attention of the European legislative bodies on the role of religion in the private sphere (e.g. the recent debates on male circumcision).4 In a similar way, the refugee crisis contributed to a change in the role of Christian churches in the debate on the relationship between religion and state. In particular, they began unilaterally as well as together with Muslim and Jewish minorities to take a more active stance on issues such as abortion, homosexuality and parental rights regarding children. Finally, the large-scale influx of refugees from majority-Islamic areas highlighted the capacity of Christian churches to influence the attitudes of host societies towards immigrants. This feature is well demonstrated in a series of statements made and initiatives organised by various Christian churches in response to this challenge. In this regard, the Lutheran and Reformed pastors in Austria addressed their congregations on 2 September 2015 with a document entitled ‘Open your hearts and doors’.5 The Lutheran and Reformed churches in H ­ ungary, Germany and the Scandinavian countries expressed similar attitudes. These local initiatives of the local congregations were soon endorsed by the World Communion of Reformed Churches (WCRC) and the Lutheran World Federation (LWF). They invited the member churches not only to raise their voices and to offer aid to those in need but also ‘[to] call those in power to do the same’.6 The Catholic Church also reacted to the unfolding crisis. After a series of appeals to believers to give genuine hope to asylum seekers, Pope Francis went a step further on 6 September 2015 by inviting every Catholic parish and monastery to take in a refugee family.7 Similarly, German Cardinal Reinhard Marx, president of the Brussels-based Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community, stressed that the aspirations of war and poverty refugees are legitimate and the political disputes over the distinction between the two have no place when human life is at stake.8 Yet, some Catholic prelates from the Visegrád states took a different stand. Archbishop Henryk Hoser of Warsaw-Praga expressed concerns that Polish people lacked experience in accepting refugees. In his view, the integration of Muslims in Polish society would be problematic as these people do not share Christian values.9 Therefore, he pleaded that priority be given to those asylum seekers who ­

Bulgaria  231 belonged to Christianity. In a similar way, Archbishop Jan Graubner of ­ lomouc only wanted Christian refugees to be allowed to settle in the Czech O Republic,10 while the Slovak Catholic bishops supported the decision of the national government ‘to bar Muslims who might “not feel at home” in a predominantly Catholic country’.11 As regards the Hungarian church, the bishops of Szeged-Csanád and Kaposvár, László Kiss-Rigó and Béla Balás, perceived the refugees as mostly economic immigrants and compared their behaviour with an intrusion. Their colleague Bishop Gyula Márfi of Veszprém even predicted an ‘Islamisation’ of Europe.12 The refugee question was also addressed by the Orthodox churches. Due to their decentralised structure, their acting as self-governing bodies and some inter-church tensions, it has been more complicated for the Orthodox churches to reach an agreement on the refugee question. One of the first steps in this direction took place in April 2016, when the ­Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople visited the Moria Refugee Camp in the island of Lesbos together with the Archbishop Ieronymos of Athens and All Greece and Pope Francis. In a joint declaration, the three church leaders expressed their compassion and ‘profound concern for the tragic situation of the numerous refugees, migrants and asylum seekers who have come to Europe fleeing from situations of conflict and, in many cases, daily threats to their survival’.13 Another important step was made on 26 June, when the Pan-Orthodox Council convened in Crete and issued an appeal to ‘the Orthodox Christians in the countries in which the persecuted are taking refuge’ with a request to offer help the asylum seekers.14 However, not all Orthodox churches attended this forum and correspondingly did not join its declaration. One of them was the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC), whose Holy Synod adopted a different stance on the migrant issue. In contrast to the participants in the Crete forum, the BOC’s hierarchs placed the emphasis on the danger posed by the refugees to the Bulgarian state and nation. However, the other three Orthodox absentees from the Pan-Orthodox Council (the patriarchates of Russia, Georgia and Antioch) did not make similar statements. Therefore, the BOC’s deviation calls for special attention. In an attempt to reveal the causes of this deviation, this chapter discusses the nature of the migrant flow through Bulgaria and the challenges it has posed to its society. It also comments on the response of the Bulgarian Synod to the migration challenge from the perspective of Christian teaching and moral ethos as well as from that of the BOC’s historical ­experience. Finally, it discusses some new church-related developments highlighted by the refugee crisis.

The refugee crisis in Bulgaria: an overview Situated to the North of Turkey and Greece, Bulgaria has become one of the routes used by migrants to escape the perils of war and find a more secure

232  D. Kalkandjieva place to live. This location, however, makes Bulgaria a special case, as its boundary with Turkey is also an external border of the EU, while its border with Greece is an internal one. Therefore, according to the Dublin Regulation, Bulgaria is the first EU country for refugees arriving from Turkey, but not for those coming from Greece. Correspondingly, the two groups of migrants were subject to different ways of registration. In general, the refugees from Turkey had to be registered in Bulgaria. In this case, it also became possible to return some of them on the grounds of the refugee agreement concluded between the EU and Turkey in March 2016.15 Meanwhile, the Bulgarian authorities were able to return to Greece migrants who had originally been registered in Greece but then smuggled to Bulgaria and detained there. Another specificity of the Bulgarian case is the smaller migration flow registered in this country. This is a product of several factors, the most significant being that Bulgaria is not directly surrounded by areas of military conflicts. In addition, most migrants regarded it as a transit country because it has a lower standard of living than the more prosperous Western and Northern European states. Neither has Bulgaria been a final destination for those refugees who already have relatives settled in other European countries. Furthermore, many migrants avoid Bulgaria because their registration here would complicate their future resettlement in Western Europe. For example, hundreds of those who had been initially fingerprinted in Bulgaria and who had succeeded (illegally) in leaving the country, but who were then detained in Western Europe, were returned to Bulgaria.16 As a result, the majority of migrants who arrived in Greece preferred the Western Balkan route via non-EU Member States like the Republic of North Macedonia and Serbia (see Table 8.1). Table 8.1  Migrant flows in Southeastern Europe (2015–17)

Refugee arrivals in Europe Refugees by land to Europe Refugees by sea to Europe Bulgaria Greece Serbia North Macedonia

Census 201117 201518 Population in Refugee flow numbers

201619 Refugee flow

201720 Refugee flow

–

1,046,599

387,379

186,768

–

34,887

24,338

14,406

–

1,011,712

363,401

172,362

31,174 857,363 579,518 388,233

15,962 176,906 98,975 89,771

2,562 35,052

7,364,570 9,904,286 7,186,862 2,059,794

– –

Bulgaria  233 Furthermore, many refugees could find Bulgaria unattractive because of its model of a family economy where women contribute equally with men to the household budget. Established within the framework of the gender equality policy of the former Communist regime, it aimed to indoctrinate women by the means of their active engagement in the national economy. At the same time, it reduced their role in the upbringing of children, which was subsequently entrusted to kindergartens, nurseries and creches. This allowed the Communist regime to achieve an additional goal, namely interrupting the transmission of religious beliefs from mothers and grandmothers to new generations. At the same time, the end of totalitarian rule in 1989 did not bring about significant changes in the role of women in the family and economy. Therefore, considering the refugees were coming from countries where the husband bears chief responsibility for the family’s income and the wife takes care of children and the house, they feel uneasy about the domestic structure in Bulgaria. Another key factor that has determined the choice of whether refugees remain in Bulgaria is the attitude of the local population. Initially, the local population displayed relative ambivalence to the issue of refugees, however the situation changed in 2013 when the flow of migrants started to grow rapidly. According to national statistics, about 1,100 migrants per year sought asylum between 1993 and 2012. In 2013, 2014 and 2015, however, this number increased to 7,144, 11,081 and 24,391 respectively.21 At the same time, the Bulgarian authorities registered growing numbers of migrants detained at the border or inside the country, most of whom came from Turkey. The most critical moment came in September 2015, when about 5,000 men, women and children entered the country, compared with about 1,000 migrants in the first few months of the same year.22 Although these numbers were far inferior to those in Turkey and Greece, Bulgarians felt anxious about the future. They had no clear idea what would happen if the refugee flow continued to grow at the same rate. They were also upset by the refusal of some EU Member States to accept refugees resettled from the countries of their initial registration. Therefore, ordinary Bulgarian citizens started doubting the effectiveness of the Dublin Regulation and its implementation.23 Statistical data collected by the Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees, established in 1992, did not give grounds for optimism among the local population. According to the agency, at the end of 2016, only 23 per cent of the migrants over the age 14 had secondary or higher education, while the rest had only primary (26 per cent), elementary (30 per cent) or no education (21 per cent). In addition, the majority of the migrants were men (59 per cent), with women and children underrepresented.24 Furthermore, it transpired that most migrants who had entered Bulgaria during the peak of the refugee crisis did not come from regions of conflict in the Middle East but from Afghanistan. In fact, the majority of Syrian and Iraqi refugees arrived in the country before the climax of the refugee crisis. In 2013, 63.1 per cent of

234  D. Kalkandjieva the refugees were from Syria, while those from Iraq and Afghanistan were 3.5 per cent and 4.3 per cent respectively. In 2015, however, the number of Syrians dropped to 31.1 per cent, while the proportions of Iraqi and Afghani migrants grew to 33.6 per cent and 29 per cent respectively.25 According to the Bulgarian Agency for Refugees, the three most popular countries of origin for asylum seekers from 1993–2016 were Afghanistan (24,016 migrants), Syria (19,893 migrants) and Iraq (18,235 migrants). This profile of the migrants inspired many politicians to appeal to the national and EU authorities to develop different policies for those who fit the definition of ‘asylum seekers’ and those who can be defined as ‘economic migrants’. Media publications about the thousands of euro paid by migrants to be illegally smuggled across borders gave additional credit to this approach. It also inspired the negative attitude of the local population, the majority of whom received below the average salary in the country (about €420 during the peak of the refugee crisis).26 It was also nurtured by rumours that the state spent up €600 per immigrant, fuelling the complaints of many Bulgarians.27 These claims, however, are without foundation. Asylum seekers do not live better than the poorer sections of the Bulgarian population: according to the ­Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees, the monthly expenditure per refugee in 2018 was 385 levs (around €192).28 Furthermore, in light of the war against Daesh and terrorist attacks that took place in some European cities, many Bulgarians perceived the Muslim religious identity of the migrants as especially dangerous. The fact that the majority of them came from Turkey became another source of concern due to the parallels drawn by nationalist media and political formations between the fourteenth-­century Ottoman conquest of the Bulgarian Kingdom and the present mass migration. This rhetoric easily gains ground because the adherents of Islam are often presented in folk songs, literature, art and even historiography as aliens who destroyed the Bulgarian statehood and caused much suffering to Bulgarians in the past. Although this image emerged naturally in the course of the struggle for Bulgarian emancipation and during the process of building their modern state after the Liberation of 1878, it became subject of politicisation by Communist historiography during the Cold War confrontation between ‘Socialist ­Bulgaria’ and ‘imperialist Turkey’. At the same time, the negative image of Muslims was additionally reinforced by the religious veneration of the so-called ‘new martyrs’. They formed a group of Orthodox men and women who were murdered by the Ottoman authorities during their rule over the Balkans.29 Suppressed under communism, their public commemoration was revived in 2011, when the BOC canonised as martyrs the Bulgarians in the villages of Batak and Novo selo killed by Ottoman bashi-bazouk squads during the 1876 April Uprising. In 2015, the BOC also revived another custom interrupted by the Communist regime: church processions dedicated to the commemoration of St George of Sofia the Newest, who had chosen to suffer martyrdom instead of betraying his Christian faith.30 In this regard, it is necessary to point out

Bulgaria  235 that in contrast to the civil ceremonies of remembrance of national heroes, the religious commemoration of martyrs does not simply bridge the past and the present but blurs the boundary between them as if Orthodox believers continue to be subjects of Muslim persecution. From such a perspective, the BOC, whose adherents account for 85 per cent of Bulgarian citizens, emerged as an important actor in determining the attitude of the latter towards the refugees.31

The church debate on the refugee crisis32 The debate on the BOC’s attitude to the refugee crisis was opened by Metropolitan Nikolay of Plovdiv. Born in 1969, he belongs to the new generation of B ­ ulgarian hierarchs who received their theological education after the fall of communism. Yet, upon his election as Metropolitan of Plovdiv (2007), he became known for his intolerance of heterodox Christians, criticism of Western culture and outspoken support for the traditional values promoted by the Russian Orthodox Church.33 In August 2015, he advanced the thesis that the refugee flow is changing the demography of Europe. In this regard, he described the fact that the majority of migrants from the Middle East were Muslim as ‘bizarre’, while the primary goal of Daesh was the extermination of the Christians in that region. Metropolitan Nikolay also considered that the problem had been created by external forces and so it was not fair to ask Bulgarians to pay for the bad deeds of others. Therefore, he appealed the national authorities to interrupt the entry of new migrants into the country. Concerning those who had already come, Nikolay said that Christian religious tradition obliges its adherents to show humanity and compassion not only to the refugees who belonged to the same faith but to all.34 This statement stirred public interest in the BOC’s attitude to the migrants, causing another Orthodox hierarch to take to the floor. This was Metropolitan Antonii, who administrates the BOC’s Central and Western European Diocese. On 12 September, as a guest in the ‘Faith and Society’ programme on Bulgarian national television, he expressed a more moderate position on the refugee question. Like the Metropolitan of Plovdiv, Antonii stressed that the care of the needy is part of the Christian ethos and that the Orthodox Church has always called for mercy and compassion, but did not appeal directly to the state authorities to stop the migrants from entering Bulgaria. In his view, it was a duty of the national government to devise a strategy for resolving the refugee question, while the church would only subsequently offer help through its believers. In this regard, Antonii referred to the German practice where church aid for refugees is provided via lay networks such as Caritas and Diakonisches Werk. He also underlined that the German churches had already experienced similar crises after the Yugoslav wars, while the BOC lacked such experience. Finally, he commented that the successful integration of refugees depended on the economic potential of the host states as well as requiring a distinction between refugees and

236  D. Kalkandjieva ­economic migrants.35 In the days that followed, individual Orthodox clerics and laypeople joined the discussion, calling on the BOC’s Holy Synod to take a position on the refugee issue.36 Finally, on 25 September 2015, the BOC’s leadership issued the Exclusive Synodal Address on the Refugee Crisis (Izvanredno obrashtenie na Sv. Sinod na BPTs-BP po povod krizata s bezhantsite).37 As the official English translation of the Synodal Address shows some deviations from the Bulgarian original, this chapter cites an alternative version that is closer to the original, with points of comparison clearly marked (Table 8.2). The main difference between the two is the more assertive tone of the Bulgarian text in comparison with its official translation (e.g. ‘want’ becomes ‘would like’). In addition, the word ‘refugees’ (present in the Bulgarian version) is replaced in the official English version by the broader term ‘migrants’. In this way, the Address does distinguish between those who have fled to avoid the perils of war and persecution and those who have left their homelands in search of better economic and social conditions of life. At the same time, foreign readers could be confused by the translation of the Bulgarian word ‘duhoven’ as ‘spiritual’. In fact, this term means something pertaining to religion (and in the Bulgarian context, to Orthodox Christianity), and not to the spirit or soul, as could be understood by readers of the English version. In general, the Synod repeated Metropolitan Nikolay’s thesis that the refugees from military conflict areas in the Middle East and Northern Africa present a potential danger to the existence of the Bulgarian state, as well as other key points from his August interview.38 Widely supported by the Orthodox priests39 – who depend on the Synod not only in the terms of their religious duties but also administratively and financially – the Address was strongly criticised by individual Orthodox laypeople and civil society activists.40 The reaction of foreign media was similarly negative.41 Although this debate was about the position of an Orthodox church, it was not grounded in the Holy Scriptures and contained only vague theological references to Christian love, compassion and humanity. Meanwhile, placing an emphasis on secular issues such as national security and cultural identity meant that the theses in the Synodal Address did not differ significantly from those made by secular agencies. Finally, this church document did not result in an engagement of Orthodox non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with the humanitarian needs of refugees. In fact, the Bulgarian branch of Caritas became the main religiously affiliated structure that took care of the asylum seekers. Furthermore, although affiliated with the Catholic Church, it welcomed volunteers from the whole religious spectrum. Another peculiarity of the BOC’s vision of the refugee crisis is that it was elaborated in isolation from the various international ecumenical organisations. The BOC withdrew from the World Council of Churches in 1998 (the Georgian Orthodox Church withdrew in 1997). In 2016, the isolation of these two churches was further deepened by their refusal to take part in the Holy and Great Council in Crete. As a result, the Bulgarian Synod did

Alternative Version (edited by the author)

continued

Special address of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church Exclusive address of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox – Bulgarian Patriarchate with reference to the migration crisis Church – Bulgarian Patriarchate with reference to the refugee crisis BELOVED BROTHERS AND SISTERS, BELOVED BROTHERS AND SISTERS, The stand of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church upon the so-called migrant issue has The stand of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church upon the so-called refugee issue has been set many times in the previous months as a point of public comment. been set many times in the previous months as a point of public comment. As it As it usually goes our Church is being laid again under the charge of passivity. usually goes our Church is being laid again under the charge of passivity. That is That is to say passivity in terms of lack of clear stands as well passivity in terms to say passivity in terms of lack of clear stands as well passivity in terms of lack of of lack of action. Let it be beyond doubt that the Orthodox Church, in its action. Let it be beyond doubt that the Orthodox Church, in its thousands of thousands of years of experience, jumps to no hasty decisions prompted by years of experience, jumps to no hasty decisions prompted by transitory transitory situations. Neither does it take resolutions which are put forward just situations. Neither does it take resolutions which are put forward just for populist for populist considerations or simply because they would be popular, being considerations or simply because they would be popular, being intended to intended to pander to someone’s opinion which might be considered pander to someone’s opinion which might be considered authoritative at some authoritative at some specific moment. In view of its nature the Orthodox specific moment. In view of its nature the Orthodox Church is obliged to Church is obliged to assume its considerations in Scripture terms as well as in assume its considerations in Scripture terms as well as in terms of the Divine terms of the Divine Commandments and history, this approach being meant Commandments and human history, this approach being meant to provide to provide good pondering over any of the Church stands and resolutions with good pondering over any of the Church stands and resolutions with a view of a view of the consequences of certain events as well as of the effect on the the consequences of certain events as well as of the effect on the Orthodox Orthodox people and our flock entrusted to our caring by the Lord Jesus people and the congregation members entrusted to our caring by the Lord Christ. Such an approach is strongly fitting the requirements of a situation of Jesus Christ. Such an approach is strongly fitting the requirements of a situation the type we see with the migrant crisis. A situation which, by its very nature, of the type we see with the migrant crisis. A situation which, by its very nature, sets on the agenda not only the passing problems with the material shepherding sets on the agenda not only the passing problems with the material shepherding and [omitted adjective] solidarity with the people coming in here but also the and material solidarity with the crowds coming in here but also the issue about issue about the stability and existence of the Bulgarian state itself. Furthermore, the stability and existence of the Bulgarian state itself. Furthermore, it concerns it concerns the issue about the type of religious context and religious the issue about the type of spiritual context and spiritual environment which environment which are to be provided for the life of the Bulgarian Orthodox are to be provided for the life of the Bulgarian Orthodox people if this stream people if this stream of people goes on to the point of disordering the existing of people goes on to the point of disordering the existing ethnical balance on the ethnical balance on the territory of our fatherland Bulgaria which is given by territory of our fatherland Bulgaria which is given by God to be inhabited by our God to be inhabited by our Orthodox people. We have seen during the last Orthodox people. We have seen during the last months a tide of crowding months a tide of crowding people from the broken Middle East states and people from the broken Middle East states and Northern Africa who are looking Northern Africa who are looking to find refuge in the European countries. And to find refuge in the European countries. And this crowding has turned nearly this crowding has turned nearly into true invasion. into true invasion.

Official English Translation

Table 8.2 Comparative translations of the statement of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church on the refugee crisis, 25 September 2015

Alternative Version (edited by the author)

Let it be undoubtedly clear that the Orthodox Church nourishes sympathetic Let it be undoubtedly clear that the Orthodox Church nourishes compassion feelings for all those people who have already come here in our lands and for all those people who have already come here in our lands and who truly, who truly, not allegedly, need caring and support in accordance with our not allegedly, need caring and support in accordance with our resources. But resources. But let it be clear, too, that the Orthodox Church is unquestionably let it be clear, too, that the Orthodox Church is unquestionably against war, against war, as it proves to be the major reason for the current human disaster. as it proves to be the major reason for the current human disaster. The The Church has always examined the very causes of the disaster, calling Church has always examined the very causes of the disaster, calling thereupon thereupon for the elimination of these causes. If the causes for this process for the elimination of these causes. If the causes for this process would not be would not be eliminated, the struggle with the effects of it would be doomed eliminated, the struggle with the effects of it would be doomed to failure. We to failure. We are helping and we would go on helping the migrants who are helping and we would go on helping the refugees who have already have already come to our Fatherland, distinguishing them not by faith and come to our Fatherland, distinguishing them not by faith and ethnical or ethnical or national traits but still we consider that our government should on national traits but still we consider that our government should on no account no account admit any more migrants to our country. Being Orthodox admit any more refugees to our country. Being Orthodox Christians and as Christians and an Orthodox society, we are obliged to care for the ones who an Orthodox society, we are obliged to care for the ones who have already have already arrived here, doing that in accordance with our scarce resources arrived here, doing that in accordance with our scarce resources but nothing but nothing more beyond that. The one who has set the ground of this more beyond that. The one who has set the ground of this problem should problem should also be the one who needs to resolve it, yet it is not proper also be the one who needs to resolve it, yet it is not proper that the Bulgarian that the Bulgarian Orthodox people would be the ones who are to pay the Orthodox people would be the ones who are to pay the penalty at the cost of penalty at the cost of letting our state to disappear. letting our state to disappear. Proceeding from this view of the situation, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church calls Proceeding from this view of the situation, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church upon the Bulgarian government, if it stands as a government of an Orthodox calls upon the Bulgarian government, if it stands as a government of an state, to start submitting definitely and emphatically for active discussion in all Orthodox state, to start submitting definitely and emphatically for active of the forums and international organizations it joins the issue of immediate discussion in all of the forums and international organizations it joins the issue cessation of the hostilities in the Middle East and North Africa as well as of of immediate cessation of the wars in the Middle East and North Africa as the elimination of the causes which have brought about the banishment of well as of the elimination of the causes which have brought about the millions of men from their native lands. The cessation of the military banishment of millions of men from their native lands. The cessation of the hostilities is the primary and most binding condition and this cessation ought wars is the primary and most binding condition and this cessation ought to to be a major duty of every government which is willing to prove its be a major duty of every government which is willing to prove its philanthropy and observation of the European norms of humanity. philanthropy and observation of the European norms of humanity.

Official English Translation

Table 8.2 Continued

Alternative Version (edited by the author)

Next, we are explicitly demanding that our government would submit for Next, we are most categorically demanding that our government raise the discussion the issue of whether there are apparent facts of religious question whether there are apparent facts of religious cleansing of extermination of Christianity on these territories and in what way these Christianity on these territories and in what way these facts fit the decrees of facts fit the decrees of the interethnic and interreligious tolerance. We would the interethnic and interreligious tolerance. We want our government to like that our government would bring for discussion in the international bring the issues of the safeguarding of religious tolerance in Egypt, Syria, organizations the issues about the ways of safeguarding the religious tolerance Iraq, etc. before the international organizations and the precautions which in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, etc. and about the types of precautions that the global the world democratic community will undertake to guarantee the respect democratic community would support for safeguarding that principle in to this principle in those countries. these countries. We consider that the Bulgarian government should concentrate its foreignWe consider that the Bulgarian government must concentrate its foreign-policy policy resources upon, as we mentioned above, the cessation of military resources upon, as we mentioned above, the cessation of wars rather than hostilities rather than just manifesting solidarity with [omitted phrase] their just manifesting solidarity with the consequences of their endless endless continuation. Furthermore, it should provide for and take in continuation. Furthermore, it must provide for and take in consideration consideration that it would be much better if the migrants who would that it is fine if the refugees who would possibly be received in accordance possibly be received in accordance with some quota and who would be with some quota and for whom the Bulgarian Orthodox Church welcomed with open caring by the Bulgarian Orthodox Church to expresses her readiness to take care of to be people who would feel be people who would fit well our environment. That is to say people who well among us. That is to say people who would not take as moral would not take as moral impediment or some other handicap the fact that impediment or some other handicap the fact that they would be cared for by they would be cared for by members of an Orthodox Christian community. members of an Orthodox Christian community. For if they would hesitate For if they find this Orthodox support as something blocking their to accept support that comes from a Christian community, this will progress, then the Christian community itself in the years to come would signify that Christian community itself in the years to come will face a be even more blocked than we can imagine now. more serious problem than we can imagine now.

Official English Translation

240  D. Kalkandjieva not find it necessary to join the Council’s appeal of 26 June 2016 to ‘the Orthodox Christians in the countries in which the persecuted are taking refuge to continue to offer help to the limit or even beyond the limit of their abilities’.42 Still, it seems that this document had some impact on individual Bulgarian hierarchs. In September 2016, the Metropolitan of Ruse, Naum, referred to his flock with a word of criticism against ‘radical acts’ of discrimination against refugees, yet his warning was limited to those migrants who in one or another way had ‘already found asylum’ in Bulgaria. The Metropolitan also instructed believers to assist those ‘who, despite their belonging to another faith, are sincere in their requests and distinguishable in their infirmity’.43 In this regard, it is worthy to mention that Naum of Ruse did not refer to God’s general commandment to ‘Love your neighbour as yourself’ (Matthew 22:39), but quoted Jesus Christ’s invitation to his disciples to love each other (John 13:34–35), a verse that could be interpreted to include only Christians. Thus, the Metropolitan’s call sounds more as an attempt to prevent the extremist behaviour of some Orthodox laypeople and priests rather than as an effort to inspire compassion for immigrants. Besides, in November 2016, the same hierarch did not oppose the decision of his colleagues to repeat and confirm the 2015 Synodal Address on the migrant crisis.44 Similarly, Kipriyan, elected as Metropolitan of Stara Zagora on ­ 11 ­December 2016, left no doubt about his support for the Synodal position; he ­commented in his first interviews that refugees deserve respect and assistance, ‘but not at any price and not at the expense of the territorial integrity’ of Bulgaria.45 Moreover, he juxtaposed them to the needy Bulgarian citizens who merit special care as ‘our Bulgarian brothers, our Orthodox Christians to whom we have the God’s blessed duties of love, charity, and peace-making’. At the same time, the Synod’s attitude towards refugees placed the Orthodox Church at odds with the other Christian denominations in ­Bulgaria. The 2015 BOC Address was not supported by the local Muslim, Protestant, Evangelical or Catholic communities, whose religious ministers expressed deep compassion to the refugees not only in words but also in deeds. The most striking case is that of Father Paolo Cortese from the Roman Catholic parish in Belene. At the beginning of March 2017, following the appeal of Pope Francis, he offered asylum to a family of Syrian refugees. Soon after their arrival, however, one of the municipal councillors organised protests against the newcomers, claiming that they presented a danger to the local people.46 As a result, the refugees were moved elsewhere. Father Cortese also left the country for a couple of months after receiving threats on his life.47 All this fuelled new debates.48 In response, the conference of the Catholic bishops in Bulgaria issued an official statement in support of their cleric. They denounced the attempts of parts of the media to distort the facts about the case and declared that the local Catholic Church will continue to follow the Pope’s appeal regarding refugees.49 The Orthodox community was split in its reaction. Some of the laity expressed strong resentment about the Belene case

Bulgaria  241 and called in vain the Holy Synod to reconsider its attitude towards refugees.50 Instead, on 14 March, an article by an Orthodox priest appeared on the BOC’s website, depicting father Paolo as ‘fake righteous’. According to the author, by leaving his parish the Catholic priest had betrayed his pastoral duties and demonstrated a lack of love for his flock. It was also claimed that father Paolo and his supporters ‘had an aversion for the Bulgarian people’.51 This is the first time such allegations have appeared in Bulgaria since the anti-Catholic show trials organised by the former Communist regime in 1952. Finally, on 16 March 2017, the Holy Synod repeated its position on the refugee question for the third time and declared that it remained unchanged.52

Beyond the debate on the Synodal Address Although the decline of the refugee crisis has silenced the debate on the Synodal Address, this act points to new developments within the BOC that deserve special attention. The first such development concerns the failure of the church’s hierarchs to present a theologically grounded position on refugees: their Address contains no concrete references to the Holy ­Scriptures; even the Gospel’s call to Christians to love their neighbour as themselves (Matthew 22:39) is not mentioned. Similarly, the commented text discloses an abating role of the Christian ethos in determining the BOC’s attitude towards the religious Other. At the same time, the claim that the territory of Bulgaria ‘is given by God to be inhabited by our Orthodox people’ suggests that the non-Orthodox population is alien to this land, people and state. In this way, despite the avoidance of explicit references to concrete non-Orthodox religious communities, the Synodal Address demonstrates an exclusivist attitude towards those Bulgarian citizens who do not belong to Orthodoxy (Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, Jews, non-believers etc.). From a historical perspective, the aforementioned features are at odds with the behaviour of the pre-Communist generation of Bulgarian metropolitans, who stood up in defence of Jews during the Second World War. To justify this endeavour, they relied not only on the Christian moral code but also quoted the Bible, especially Romans 10:12 and Galatians 3:28. The Synodal proceedings from that period disclose that the then acting Bulgarian hierarchs perceived that challenge as an opportunity for their church ‘to play a peaceable role and to emphasise the might and the greatness of its Godly mission by becoming a defender of the innocent persecuted Jews’.53 At first glance, the 2015 Synodal Address continues this line of behaviour. However, in contrast to their predecessors who treated peace and philanthropy as a responsibility of their church, the contemporary Bulgarian hierarchs regard these tasks as ‘a major duty of every government’. Another point of difference stems from the 1943 appeal of the Bulgarian Synod to the national government, where it asked for respect to the basic human rights of Jews without regard for their belonging to Orthodoxy or Judaism.54 In this regard, the wartime

242  D. Kalkandjieva hierarchs were convinced that there was no security without morality55 and that the church’s most important mission was ‘to welcome all people with open arms’.56 Neither of these views is presented in the 2015 Synodal Address. Instead, it offers only conditional assistance to the asylum seekers. The expressed concern about ‘material solidarity’ with refugees also sounds strange. Finally, by comparing the flow of refugees with an invasion, the Synodal Address evokes in the minds of Bulgarians an allusion to the fourteenthcentury Ottoman conquest of their medieval kingdom. In this way, it implies a negative attitude to the immigrants as potential enemies. In short, the BOC’s contemporary leaders failed to employ the legacy of their predecessors in its position on the refugee crisis. From this perspective, their attempts to present themselves as bearers of the legacy of the wartime generation of ­Bulgarian hierarchs seem awkward. For example, the BOC’s contemporary leaders welcomed the BOC’s nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013, 2017 and 2018 as if this religious organisation continued to promote the same care of the religious Other as it has done it during the Second World War.57 This lack of continuity seems to be a product of a generational change closely linked to the political engineering undertaken by the former atheist rulers of Bulgaria in the religious domain. More specifically, under communism, the BOC’s hierarchy was not allowed to promote the most qualified churchmen to the roles of its deceased members. Instead, this process occurred under the control of the Bulgarian Communist Party. As a result, only churchmen who obeyed totalitarian rule were promoted. In 2012, this pattern was additionally highlighted when the declassification of files of the Communist security services disclosed most of the then acting members of the BOC’s Synod as their agents.58 Although the fall of the totalitarian rule in Bulgaria has allowed the BOC’s Synod to independently appoint its new members, it seems that the church’s doors are opened only for likeminded churchmen. Another striking feature of the Synodal Address is the demonstrated disregard for the secular character of the Bulgarian state and for the constitutional separation between the state and religion. In particular, the church’s hierarchs tend to treat state authorities as ‘the government of an Orthodox state’. They also ‘most categorically’ demand that the national government, at various international forums, launch an inquiry into whether Christianity in the Middle East has become a subject of religiously motivated genocide as well as what measures have been undertaken to safeguard religious and ethnic tolerance in the region. In addition, the BOC’s hierarchs offered concrete policy recommendations regarding state foreign policy. Although there is no evidence about a real effect of these instructions on Bulgaria’s international activities, the Synod’s behaviour deserves special attention as it sets a precedent from both the present-day and historical perspectives of the refugee debate. On the one hand, no other contemporary Orthodox church’s leadership has demonstrated such an attitude to its state authorities. On the other hand, the BOC’s past leaders also did not allow themselves to instruct the

Bulgaria  243 national government on how to proceed on the international scene in such a straightforward manner. In this regard, it is necessary to mention that from the Liberation of Bulgaria (1878) to the fall of ­ communism (1989), the BOC’s communication with the state authorities was mediated either by the Ministry of Foreign and Religious Affairs (pre-1948) or by the Directorate of Religious Denominations (post-1948). On the rare occasions when the Synod referred directly to the government, it did not demand but asked, appealed, informed or implored ‘in a most insisting way’.59 In this regard, it is also appropriate to point to the most recent innovation of the BOC’s leadership in the sphere of international affairs: its direct communication with foreign governments. For example, the Bulgarian Synod addressed the President of Ukraine in December 2015 with a request not to allow the transfer of the Kyiv–Pechersk Lavra from the autonomous Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to the autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kiev Patriarchate, which lacked canonical recognition.60 In domestic terms, it is impossible to neglect the impact of the Synodal Address on Bulgarian society.61 On the one hand, it had a direct effect on many Orthodox Bulgarians by determining their attitude towards immigrants. On the other hand, this document also played an indirect role in domestic politics. More importantly, its key points were in tune with the refugee threat thesis advanced by the local nationalist parties, namely the ‘Ataka’ party, the National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB), and the Bulgarian National Movement (VMRO).62 In addition, the Synod and the leaders of the aforementioned parties shared a similar approach to the refugees, who were not treated ‘as a humanitarian problem but as a threat to national security and identity’.63 At the same time, the timing of the issuance, repetition and confirmation of the BOC’s Address reveals intriguing parallels with important political events. More specifically, its first announcement on 25 September 2015 coincided with the start of the national campaign for municipal elections, its reissuance on 26 November 2016 took place shortly after the Bulgarian presidential elections, while its confirmation on 16 March 2017 happened days before the parliamentary elections (26 March).64 In the case of the confirmation, the Synod’s act was also a response to the new wave of criticism provoked by the attacks against Catholic priest Paolo Cortese discussed above. At this point, it is difficult to make judgements about the nature of this partnership. On the one hand, the registered parallelism between the (re)issuance of the Synodal Address and national elections could be a natural result of the overlapping conservative and nationalist views of the church’s leadership and the national populism of certain political leaders. In this case, the Synodal Address signifies the potential of the BOC’s leadership to act as a body of power that can impose certain views on Orthodox Bulgarians and exert influence over the state authorities and their domestic policies. On the other hand, the discussed parallelism between the (re)issuance of the Synodal Address and the elections could indicate a purposeful misuse of the BOC’s social impact for political ends. Both cases hint at the emergence of

244  D. Kalkandjieva new patterns of entanglement between religion and politics as well as between the national and the international that require further research.

Conclusion The analysis of the position of the BOC’s leadership on the refugee crisis points to a set of problems not only in the religious but also in the secular sphere of social life. It seems that not only the BOC’s hierarchs but also many key Christian leaders in the Visegrád group of states have been inclined to abandon Jesus’ commandment to ‘Love your neighbour as yourself’ for the sake of narrowly understood national interests. At the same time, the fact that leading Christian leaders such as Pope Francis and the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew took the side of the migrants as humans in need demonstrates that the positions of the Christian churches to the refugee crisis is not determined by their denomination (Catholic, Orthodox or Protestant). Therefore, it would be wrong to claim that the representatives of one denomination are more altruistic than the others. From such a perspective, it is more plausible to seek the factors that determine the attitudes of Christian church leaders to the refugee crisis in the historical experience of their own communities. In this regard, the difference in the BOC’s reaction and that of the Orthodox churches p­ resented at the Pan-Orthodox Council in Crete (2016) hints at a priority of recent historical experience (from the Cold War) over more distant experience (from the Ottoman era). At the same time, considering the similar approaches demonstrated by the BOC’s Synod and many Christian prelates from the Visegrád group of countries, it is also possible to posit that their behaviour stems from patterns thats roots go back to the Communist era. Furthermore, the study of the BOC’s case points to the impact of the refugee crisis on domestic church–state relations. Under the new conditions, the Synod was able to play a key role in shaping public opinion on issues that go beyond the purely religious sphere. More specifically, its thesis on refugees as a threat to the nation state increased the support for the church’s leadership among the country’s main political parties, especially during the campaigns for the municipal (2015), presidential (2016) and parliamentary (2017) elections. At the same time, this chapter downplays possible criticism against the Synod’s position, as the voices of dissent could be easily interpreted as ones against national security or against the freedom of religion. In short, the refugee crisis intensified the interplay between religion and politics at a national, European and global level.

Notes   1 ‘Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013’, Official Journal of the European Union, L 180/31, 29 June 2013, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELE X:32013R0604&from=en (accessed on 30 October 2018).

Bulgaria  245   2 ‘Dutch cabinet approves partial ban on Islamic veil in public areas’, Guardian, 22 May 2015, available at www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/22/netherlands-islamicveil-niqab-ban-proposal-dutch-cabinet (accessed on 30 October 2018). Rebecca Perring, ‘Now Italy says ENOUGH: Lombardy bans the BURKA after Europe’s terror attacks’, Express (UK), 14 December 2015, available at www.express.co. uk/news/world/626410/Lombardy-Italy-ban-­burka-burqa-Islam-Muslim-womenface-covering (accessed on 30 October 2018).  3 Angel Krasimirov, ‘Bulgaria bans full-face veils in public places’, Reuters, 30 September 2016, available at www.reuters.com/article/us-religion-burqabulgaria/bulgaria-bans-full-face-veils-in-public-places-idUSKCN1201FV (accessed on 30 October 2018).  4 Gökçe Yurdakul, ‘Jews, Muslims and the Ritual Male Circumcision Debate: Religious Diversity and Social Inclusion in Germany’, Social Inclusion, 2016, 4 (2), pp. 77–86; Harriet Sherwood, ‘Iceland law to outlaw male circumcision sparks row over religious freedom: Jewish and Muslim leaders condemn first European country to propose ban’, Guardian, 18 February 2018, available at www.theguardian.com/society/2018/feb/18/iceland-ban-male-circumcision-firsteuropean-country (accessed on 30 October 2018).  5 ‘European member churches respond to refugee crisis’, the Lutheran World ­Federation’s website, 4 September 2015, available at www.lutheranworld.org/ news/european-member-churches-respond-refugee-crisis (accessed on 30 October 2018).   6 ‘European churches and ecumenical organizations respond to refugee crisis’, the World Council of Churches’ website, 16 September 2015, available at www.­oikoumene.​org/en/press-centre/news/european-churches-and-ecumenicalorganizations-respond-to-refugee-crisis (accessed on 30 October 2018).  7 Andras Mate-Toth and Krisztina Barcsa, ‘ “The Hungarian Religious Leaders”, Statement from the Beginning of Migration’, Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, 2016, 36 (3), pp. 1–2.  8 Jonathan Luxmoore, ‘Church agencies highlight growing urgency of Europe’s refugee crisis’, Catholic News Service, 4 September 2015, available at www.­ catholicnews.com/services/englishnews/2015/church-agencies-highlight-growing-urgencyof-europes-refugee-crisis.cfm (accessed on 30 October 2018).  9 Ibid. See also Natalia Ojewska, ‘Why is Catholic Poland so reluctant to help Muslim refugees?’, Middle East Eye, 30 September 2015, available at www.­ middleeasteye.net/news/catholic-poland-reluctant-help-muslim-refugees-2091168202 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 10 Luxmoore, ‘Church agencies highlight growing urgency of Europe’s refugee crisis’. 11 Jonathan Luxmoore, ‘Eastern Europe’s church leaders face growing criticism over refugees’, National Catholic Reporter, 9 March 2017, available at www.ncronline.org/ news/world/eastern-europes-church-leaders-face-growing-criticism-over-refugees ​ (accessed on 30 October 2018). 12 Andras Mate-Toth and Krisztina Barcsa, ‘ “The Hungarian Religious Leaders”, Statement from the Beginning of Migration’, pp. 5–6. 13 ‘Joint Declaration of Pope Francis, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and Archbishop of Athens Hieronimos’, Orthodox Christianity, 17 April 2016, available at http://orthochristian.com/92572.html (accessed on 30 October 2018). 14 Message of the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church, 26 June 2016 (Crete), available at www.holycouncil.org/-/message (accessed on 30 October 2018). 15 ‘The EU–Turkey refugee agreement: A review’, Deutsche Welle, 18 March 2018, available at www.dw.com/en/the-eu-turkey-refugee-agreement-a-review/a43028295 (accessed on 30 October 2018).

246  D. Kalkandjieva 16 Samuil Dimitrov and Svetoslav Ambrosiev, ‘ES e vernal v Balgaria nad 400 migranti za po-malko ot godina’ (EC has returned to Bulgaria over 400 migrants for less than a year), Sega, 5640 (169), 26 July 2016, available at www.segabg. com/article.php?id=815273 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 17 The data for the 2011 national censuses is extracted from the websites of the corresponding national statistical agencies: Bulgaria (www.nsi.bg/census2011/ PDOCS2/Census2011final_en.pdf); Greece (www.statistics.gr/en/2011-censuspop-hous); Serbia (http://popis2011.stat.rs/?lang=en); FYROM (www.stat.gov. mk/Publikacii/Mak_Brojki_2012_A.pdf) (accessed on 30 October 2018). 18 The data for 2015 is extracted from the website of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). See, ‘Mixed migration flows in the Mediterranean and beyond: Compilation of Available Data and Information. Reporting period 2015’, available at http://doe.iom.int/docs/Flows%20Compilation%202015%20 Overview.pdf (accessed on 30 October 2018). 19 The data for 2016 is extracted from the IOM’s website. See, ‘Mixed migration flows in the Mediterranean and beyond: Compilation of Available Data and Information. Reporting period 2015’, available at http://migration.iom.int/ docs/2016_Flows_to_Europe_Overview.pdf (accessed on 30 October 2018). 20 The data for 2017 is extracted from the IOM’s website. See, ‘Mixed migration flows in the Mediterranean and beyond: Compilation of Available Data and Information. Reporting period 2015’, available at http://migration.iom.int/ docs/2017_Overview_Arrivals_to_Europe.pdf (accessed on 30 October 2018). 21 Albena Nikolova and Nina Chernicherska, Refugees in Bulgaria: Labor Market and Budgetary Costs, Ministry of Finances of the Republic of Bulgaria, August 2016 (p. 34), p. 9. 22 ‘Chislata – Informatsia za bezhantsite v Balgaria’ (The numbers – information about the refugees in Bulgaria), 2017, available at http://zakrila.info/числата/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). 23 The text of the Dublin Regulation is available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/­ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2014:039:0001:0043:EN:PDF (accessed on 30 October 2018). 24 Albena Nikolova and Nina Chernicherska, Refugees in Bulgaria: Labor Market and Budgetary Costs, pp. 9–11. 25 Ibid., p. 11. 26 Information about the average monthly salary in Bulgaria for the period 2006– 2017 (in Bulgarian levs) is available at http://bica-bg.org/wp-content/ uploads/2017/07/2017_07_24_Tablichni_Danni_za_AOBR_preskonferentziya-% D0%91%D0%A2%D0%90.pdf (accessed on 30 October 2018). 27 Denitsa Georgieva, Valeria Ilareva, Martina Bogdanova, Simona Mokreva, and Irina Borova, ‘Myths and Facts about Refugees: Reasons for Irregular Border Crossing and the Truth about Social Assistance’, International Comparative Jurisprudence, 2017, 3 (2), p. 235; ‘Nad 1,000 dushi protestirat sreshtu bezhanski tsentar v ­Boyanovo’ (Over 1,000 men protest against the opening of a refugee centre in the village of Boyanovo), published in new.bg, 29 October 2016, available at https:// news.bg/politics/nad-1000-dushi-protestirat-sreshtu-bezhanski-tsentar-v-boyanovo. html (accessed on 30 October 2018). 28 ‘Informatsia za bezhancite i tarseshtite zakrila kam 30 April 2018’ (Information for the refugees and the asylum seekers (by April 30, 2018)), available in Bulgarian at http://zakrila.info (accessed on 30 October 2018). 29 Konstantinos Nihoritis, Sveta gora – Aton i balgarskoto novomachenichestvo (The Holy Mount of Athos and Bulgarian New Martytdom), Sofia: BAN Marin Drinov, 2001; Olja Grigorova, ‘Sofiyskite machenitsi ot XVI vek v tamnitsa’ (The Sixteenth Century Sofia Martyrs in Dungeon), Balkan Forum, 2012, 3, pp. 71–75;

Bulgaria  247 Leonidas J. Papadopulos and Georgia Lizardos, New Martyrs of the Turkish Yoke, Seattle, WA: St Nectarios Press, 1985. 30 ‘Litiyno shestvie v pamet na sv. Georgi Nay-novi Sofiyski’ (Church procession commemorating St George of Sofia the Newest), Pravoslavie.bg, 25 May 2015, available at www.pravoslavie.bg/България/литийно-шествие-в-памет-на-св-георги-со/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). 31 According to the national censuses of 1991 and 2001, held after the fall of communism, 85 per cent of Bulgarians are Orthodox. According to the methodology used, they linked the religious affiliation of the interviewed citizens with the religious belonging of their parents or grandparents. The 2011 census adopted a new methodology and citizens were not obliged to declare their religious affiliation. As a result, only 4,374,135 citizens out of 7,364,570, i.e. 59.40 per cent of the ­Bulgarian population registered themselves as Orthodox. See ‘2011 Population Census – Main Results’, available at www.nsi.bg/census2011/PDOCS2/Census2011 final_en.pdf (accessed on 30 October 2018). 32 This section of the chapter is partially based on a paper presented by the author at the international conference ‘Religious Pluralism and the Refugee Crisis: Local, National, and Global Perspectives’, organised by Study of the US Institute on Religion in the U.S.: Pluralism & Public Presence (Berlin, 5–8 January 2017). 33 In 2002, serving as the vicar of the Metropolitan of Sofia, Nikolay opposed the visit of Pope John Paul II with the argument that the latter was a ‘heretic’. Dimitar Peev ‘Vladika na(d) kanona’ (A hierarch above the rule of canons), Kapital, 11 July 2008, available at www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/ obshtestvo/2008/07/11/525105_vladika_nad_kanona/?sp=1#storyst (accessed on 30 October 2018). Nikolay repeated this statement in an interview, given upon his election as Metropolitan of Plovdiv, ‘Mitropolit Nikolay: Papata e eretik’ (Metropolitan Nikolay: The Pope is heretic), published in Plovdiv24.bg, 14 ­ February 2007, available at www.plovdiv24.bg/novini/plovdiv/MitropolitNikolai-Papata-e-eretik-23805 (accessed on 30 October 2018). Nikolay is also a zealous supporter of the traditional values: ‘Mitropolit Nikolay nagrazhdava za borba sreshtu homoseksualizma’ (Fighters against homosexualism awarded by Metropolitan Nikolay), Darik Radio, 20 August 2010, available at https:// dariknews.bg/novini/bylgariia/plovdivskiqt-mitropolit-nagrazhdava-za-borba-sreshtuhomoseksualizma-576950 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 34 ‘Po hristiyanski’. Nikolay Plovdivski: ‘Ne puskayte poveche bezantsi’ (In a ­Christian Manner. Nikolay of Plovdiv: Do not let in any more refugees), ClubZ. bg, 3 September 2015, available at https://clubz.bg/27261-po_hristiqnski_ nikolaj_plovdivski_ne_puskajte_poveche_bejanci (accessed on 30 October 2018). 35 ‘Milost ili ogradi za bezhantsite?’ (Mercy or fences for the refugees), Vyara i Obshesvo (Faith and Society), broadcasted on Channel 1 of Bulgarian National Television on 12 September 2015, available at www.bnt.bg/bg/a/milost-ili­ ogradi-za-bezhantsite (accessed on 30 October 2018). 36 Zornitsa Stoilova, ‘Zashto Tsarkvata malchi za bezhantsite’ (Why does the Church keep silence about the refugees), Kapital, 18 September 2015, available at www. capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/obshtestvo/2015/09/18/2612280_zashto_curkvata_ mulchi_​za_bejancite/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). 37 Address of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church – Bulgarian Patriarchate with Reference to the Migration Crisis, published on the BOC’s website on 25 September 2015, available in English at http://bg-patriarshia.bg/index.php?file=​ appeal_​ 20. xml. It is also available together with a version in Bulgarian at www.bg-patriarshia. bg/news.php?id=184530 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 38 The resemblance between Nikolay’s position and the Exclusive Synodal Address was commented by many observers, e.g. ‘Pozitsiata na Svetiya Sinod savpada s

248  D. Kalkandjieva izakzvane na mitropolit Nikolay’ (The Synod’s position overlaps with an interview of Metropolitan Nikolay), Nova Televisia (nova.bg), 26 September 2018, available at https://nova.bg/news/view/2015/09/26/125278/позицията-насветия-синод-съвпада-​с-изказване-​на-митрополит-николай; ‘Prof. Yanakiev: ­Pozitsiata na Svetiya Sinod za bezantsite e antitsarkovna’, Interview for the BTV (Bulgarian national TV network), 28 September 2015, available at https:// btvnovinite.bg/bulgaria/politika/prof-janakiev-pozicijata-na-sinoda-za-bezhancitee-anticarkovna.html; Goran Blagoev, ‘Namirisva na “pravoslaven natsionalizam” ’ (A smell of ‘Orthodox fundamentalism’), Sega, 30 September 2015, www. webcafe.bg/id_1413691102/fpage_2/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). 39 Metropolitan Josif of the USA, Canada and Australia, ‘Potava li koraba na ­Pravoslieto u nas?’ (Is Orthodoxy’s ship sinking?), Dveri.bg, 30 September 2015, available at https://dveri.bg/9hca4; Angel Karadakov and Sveshenik Stoyan ­Berbatov, ‘Sv. Sinod izrazyava edna chestna, otkrita i yasna pozitsiya’ (Interview with Father Stoyan ­Berbatov: ‘The Holy Synod expresses an open, sincere and clear position’), Dobrotolyubie, 29 September 2015, available at https:// dobrotoliubie.com/2015/09/29/свещеник-стоян-бербатов-св-синод-изра. (accessed on 30 October 2018). 40 Kalin Yanakiev, ‘Pozitsiata na Svetiya Sinod bezhantsite e antitsarkovna’; Goran Blagoev, ‘Namirisva na “pravoslaven natsionalism”; Valentin Kozhuharov, ‘  “Nasheto” Hristiyanstvo i bezhantsite u nas’ (‘Our’ Christianity and the refugees in Bulgaria), Proekt Svoboda za vseki, 27 September 2015, available at http://­svobodazavseki.com/blog/item/196-%E2%80%9Enasheto%E2%80%9C-hristiyanstvoi-bezhantsite-u-nas.html?​ tmpl=component&print=1 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 41 ‘Apostolos Nikolaidis: “Refugees have the support of the Christian Church” ’, Deutsche Welle, 14 April 2016, available at www.dw.com/en/apostolos-nikolaidisrefugees-have-the-support-of-the-christian-church/a-19189890 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 42 Message of the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church, issued in Crete on 26 June 2016, available at www.holycouncil.org/-/message (accessed on 30 October 2018). 43 ‘Rusenski mitropolit Naum: Da badem chovekolyubivi kam nashite sabratya-­ drugovertsi’ (Metropolitan Naum of Ruse: Let’s be philanthropic to our brothers of different faith), Dveri, 11 September 2016, https://dveri.bg/wdrd9 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 44 ‘Svetiyat Sinod prizovava da ne se dopuskat poveche bezhantsi v stranata ni’ (The Holy Synod call no more refugees to be allowed to enter in the country), Trud Online, 28 November 2016, available at https://trud.bg/?s=Светият+синод+призов ава+да+не+се+допускат+повече+бежанци+в+страната+ни or https://trud.bg/ Светият-​синод-призовава-да-не-се-допуска/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). 45 Angel Karadakov, ‘Da pomognem na bezhantsite, no da ne zabravyame balgarite’ (Lets help refugees but not to forget Bulgarians), Standart, 15 December 2016, available at http://paper.standartnews.com/bg/article.php?d=2016-12-15&article​ =271023 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 46 ‘Row in Bulgarian town of Belene over church sheltering Syrian refugee family’, Sofia Globe, 7 March 2017, available at http://sofiaglobe.com/2017/03/07/row-inbulgarian-​town-of-belene-over-church-sheltering-syrian-refugee-family/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). 47 ‘Roman Catholic priest who sheltered Syrian refugees at Belene is leaving ­Bulgaria’, Sofia Globe, 10 March 2017, available online at http://sofiaglobe. com/2017/03/10/roman-catholic-priest-who-sheltered-syrian-refugees-at-beleneis-leaving-bulgaria/ (accessed on 30 October 2018).

Bulgaria  249 48 ‘Protest held in Sofia over Roman Catholic priest recalled from Bulgaria after death threats for sheltering Syrian refugees’, Sofia Globe, 12 March 2017, available at http://sofiaglobe.com/2017/03/12/protest-held-in-sofia-over-roman-catholicpriest-recalled-​from-bulgaria-after-death-threats-​for-sheltering-syrian-refugees/. 49 Stanovishte na Katolicheskata tsarkva v Bagaria (Statement of the Catholic Church in Bulgaria), 7 March 2017, available at www.catholic-news.bg/?p=73940 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 50 ‘Protest held in Sofia over Roman Catholic priest recalled from Bulgaria after death threats for sheltering Syrian refugees’. 51 Vladimir Doychev, ‘Tezi, koito ne izbyagaha’ (Those, who did not run away), BOC’s website, 14 March 2017, available at www.bg-patriarshia.bg/reflections. php?id=621 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 52 ‘Otnovo za krizata s migrantite i bezhantsite’ (Again on the migrant and refugee crisis), BOC’s website, 16 March 2017, available at www.bg-patriarshia.bg/news. php?id=229734 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 53 Albena Taneva and Vanya Gizenko (eds.), The Power of Civil Society in a Time of Genocide: Proceeding of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church on the Rescue of Jews in Bulgaria (1940–1944), translated by Alex Tanev, Sofia: Sofia University Press St Kliment Ohridski, 2005, p. 53. 54 Ibid., pp. 142–148. 55 Ibid., p. 114. 56 Ibid., p. 57. 57 ‘Balgarskata pravoslavna tsarkva – nominirana za Nobelova nagrada za mir za 2013 g’. (The Bulgarian Orthodox Church – nominated for Nobel Peace Prize for 2013), BOC’s website, 16 March 2013, available at http://bg-patriarshia.bg/ news.php?id=103839; ‘Nomination of Bulgarian Orthodox Church for Nobel Prize focus of talks between Patriarch and Jewish leaders’, Sofia Globe, 16 February 2017, available at http://sofiaglobe.com/2017/02/16/nomination-of-bulgarianorthodox-church-for-nobel-prize-focus-of-talks-between-patriarch-and-jewishleaders/; ‘Otnovo predlagat Balgarskata pracoslavna tsarkva za Nobelova nagrada’ (The Bulgarian Orthodox Church nominated again for Nobel Prize), Darik Radio, 8 November 2017, available at https://dariknews.bg/regioni/varna/otnovo-­ predlagat-bylgarskata-pravoslavna-cyrkva-za-nobelova-nagrada-2059594 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 58 See Decision No. 298, issued on 17 January 2012 by the Committee for disclosing and announcing affiliation of Bulgarian citizens to the State Security and intelligence services of the Bulgarian National Army. A copy of the decision is retractable in B ­ ulgarian at https://comdos.bg/Начало/Decision-View/p/ view?DecisionID=384 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 59 Taneva and Gizenko, The Power of Civil Society in a Time of Genocide: Proceeding of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church on the Rescue of Jews in Bulgaria (1940–1944), pp. 94, 107, 153. 60 ‘The Bulgarian Orthodox Church calls on the President of Ukraine to prevent the possible transfer of the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra to schismatics’, published on the website of the Department for External Relations of the autonomous Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate on 21 December 2015, available at http://vzcz.church.ua/en/2015/12/21/bulgarian-orthodox-church-calls-on-thepresident-of-ukraine-to-prevent-the-possible-transfer-of-kyiv-pechersk-lavra-toschismatics/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). 61 ‘Otnovo za migrantite i bezhantsite’ (Once more on the issue of migrants and refugees), BOC’s website, 16 March 2017, available at www.bg-patriarshia.bg/ news.php?id=229734 (accessed on 30 October 2018).

250  D. Kalkandjieva 62 Nikolay Tsekov, ‘Za bezhancite i balgarskite smetki’ (On refugees and the ­Bulgarian considerations), Deutsche Welle, 19 September 2016, available at www. dw.com/bg/за-бежанците-и-българските-сметки/a-19560786 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 63 Anna Krasteva and Nebojša Vladisavljević, ‘Securitisation versus Citizenship in the Balkan States: Populist and Authoritarian Misuses of Security Threats and Civic Responses’, Global Campus Human Rights Journal, 2017, 1 (1–2), p. 377. The article is available online at https://globalcampus.eiuc.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11825/ 423/10_art._GC_Journal%202017_2.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed on 30 October 2018). 64 Tsekov, ‘Za bezhancite i balgarskite smetki’.

9 Policies and perspectives on human security and international mobility in the Romanian Orthodox Church Iuliana Conovici Romania is one of few countries in the European Union (EU) that has not been substantially affected by the latest migration wave from the Middle East. The country has been dealing with the consequences of its own migration crisis, during which millions of Romanians have chosen to leave the country and find better-remunerated work in other European countries. While experiencing a period of economic growth, the country has yet to deal with widespread poverty, poor infrastructure and ineffective social equity policies. In the Romanian context, theoretical reflection and practical action on human security issues developed separately. This chapter assesses the key conceptual and policy developments with respect to the various dimensions of human security: how (and if) the concept itself has been internalised; what have been the main policies and actions undertaken by the Romanian Orthodox Church (RoOC) concerning the principal dimensions of human security (human dignity, equity, development, sustainability, social care, migration and the environment); and what developments are to be desired by both the church and the state. The focus of the chapter remains, however, the question of migration and other international mobility-related phenomena: how does the RoOC deal with these in relation with the state, both in an ecumenical context and based on its experiences in other areas? The chapter draws on an overview of church–state relations, the RoOC’s post-Communist reconstruction of its social care and educational network, and its engagement with the social economy sector in order to see how discourses and practices in some areas influence discourses and practices in other areas, including migration. The main purpose of this chapter is to understand to what extent the church’s discourse and practices are coherent and coordinated, reactive or proactive, and to what extent the RoOC and the state have been able to learn institutionally, from these experiences. A sketching of the historical background of church–state relations in Romania and the place the notion of human security occupies in public discourse may help us better understand the historical and current social context for the development of these discourses and practices.

252  I. Conovici

The historical background: church and state entangled The Romanian state emerged following the double election of Prince ­Alexandru Ioan Cuza to the thrones of Wallachia and Moldova in 1859. With the support of the local likeminded nobility and emerging middle class, Cuza undertook the modernisation of the Romanian principalities through sweeping administrative, land and legal reforms. One of the measures adopted was the inventorying and subsequent secularisation of Orthodox Church property, coupled with an attempt to forcefully extricate the church from the control of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and place it under the direct authority of the state. In exchange, the state offered protection and some form of compensatory support. At the time of the reforms, the RoOC was one of the largest property owners in both principalities and was the primary owner or administrator of schools, hospitals, pilgrims’ houses and public charities. Modernisation came with secularisation of the state, which, as a modern state, aimed to establish its own monopoly in the fields of law, education, health etc. The RoOC, treated as a backward-looking institution with purely ceremonial functions, was required to fall in with the requirements of the modernisation programme and become, at least to some extent, an annex (if not directly a part) of the state apparatus. Its revenues had been progressively taken over by the state itself, first indirectly through the establishment of a distinct church budget, with a large part of its revenues being directed to the financing of public schools, then by the outright confiscation of this ‘separate’ budget by the state.1 The dynamics changed following the First World War, during which Romania endured catastrophic human losses, and the 1918 Great Union that incorporated the provinces of Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bukovina (and with them a high percentage of ethnic and religious minorities) into the country. The state moved away from the single established church model and granted various degrees of recognition to the most prominent religious denominations in the country.2 The RoOC was reorganised following the quasi-democratic Transylvanian model drafted by Metropolitan Andrei Șaguna, which co-opted, among others, the laity in church administration, but adapted it to suit the more traditional hierarchy-centred traditions of the Romanian Kingdom. Church–state relations were reorganised to allow for the recognition of the existing religious pluralism. The significant experience of churches in Transylvania with social and charity work, as well as with education, coupled with the dramatic losses in population Romania had suffered during the war gave a substantial boost to the Orthodox Church’s involvement in the organisation and administration of charity, social work, and in building its own educational projects.3 The Orthodox Church experimented with the various emerging possibilities of missionary and social work, including, through the creation of large associations, participating in the construction of co-operatives and similar organisations. Furthermore, with the help and support of the state, it developed a

Romania  253 network of parishes beyond the country’s borders, coupling pastoral care with the all-embracing ‘national idea’.4 Romania emerged from the Second World War with a substantially diminished territory and population: it lost Bessarabia and part of Bukovina to the USSR and some of the earlier acquired territories South of the Danube had to be returned to Bulgaria. As a result, an exchange of populations took place, which in fact amounted to significant population displacement, with the Romanian population of Southern Dobrogea mostly relocated to Northern Dobrogea. The considerable number of refugees from Bessarabia, following its annexation by the USSR, also had to be dealt with. At the end of the war, Romania was in political turmoil, preparing the grounds for Communist takeover. The Communist regime marginalised and persecuted religion, excluding it from all sectors of social life (including social care and education, and from the wide-audience media), except for the liturgical space proper and a limited number of internal and international instances that also served – directly or ­indirectly – the regime’s propaganda purposes. The regime reinforced state ­control over church activities. With severely limited, albeit still substantial resources, the RoOC, in exchange for institutional cooperation with the regime, managed to preserve a reduced institutional structure (including a number of monasteries and theological education institutions), on which it was, however, able to build after the fall of communism.5

Post-communism: disentanglement and new concepts After 1989, the state withdrew from its position of ‘surveillance and control’ of religious communities, which it had held since its foundation as a modern state, and religions were eventually allowed to govern themselves without state interference. While eager to proclaim its autonomy from the state, it was clear that the RoOC was aiming not for a complete disentanglement from the state structure, but for a new model of church–state relations that would allow for an acknowledgement of its de facto dominant position in the religious life of the country. Its success in this endeavour was limited, however, considering the substantial religious pluralism of the country and in particular the country’s efforts for European integration, which required greater legal acknowledgement and respect of the rights of minorities. During the renegotiation of church–state relations that followed the fall of communism, the RoOC progressively abandoned its traditional rhetoric of symphonia between church and state in favour of a more updated, though equally vague principle of ‘partnership’ and ‘cooperation’ with the state, as enshrined in Law no. 489/2006 on religious freedom and the general status of denominations.6 High levels of religiosity and the readiness of the RoOC to take on a variety of social roles enabled the development of a flexible concept of partnership between church and state, depending on the policy area under discussion. The RoOC gained a high level of visibility in the

254  I. Conovici public eye and, reputedly, a great deal of political influence, but in fact this influence has largely been informal and thus dependent on the willingness of political decision makers to submit to it. Since the early 1990s, religious communities, particularly the RoOC, have progressively taken up the task of creating a distinct social net that would take over some of the functions of the failing public social aid and health systems. It also got involved in developing their own education institutions and projects.7 The RoOC’s interest in dealing with issues relating to migration can be traced back to the same period. It emerged in an ecumenical context with the establishment in 1991 of the Ecumenical Association of Churches in Romania (AIDROM), a joint project of the RoOC, the Reformed (Calvinist) and Lutheran Churches, as well as the Evangelical Presbyterian and Armenian Apostolic Churches,8 thus creating the foundations for the development of practical expertise in the area. The establishment of this association, focused on inter-confessional and international issues, also signified the interest of the RoOC in engaging with issues such as human ­ trafficking and migration. AIDROM became one of the principal organisers of migration-related projects and awareness-building events involving RoOC structures, as presented below.

Human security between church and state: a concept and its uses When investigating the RoOC’s engagement with the various aspects of human security, it is important to examine the manner in which the concept itself is understood in the wider Romanian context, and within the church in particular. And since in many areas the RoOC tends to respond to shifts in the state’s agenda rather than propose its own, distinctive policies,9 it is necessary to observe how the concept of human security has been shaping the public discourse and action of state institutions. Only then can it be possible to understand how this concept has come to operate (if at all) within the church itself. In order to assess the impact of the conceptual framework of human security on state policies, this chapter analyses state discourse as it appears in several relevant public security documents, namely the National Security and National Defence Strategies (from 2001 onwards), as well as in the National Sustainable Development Strategy. What became apparent was a conceptual and ideological fracturing between and the subsequent compartmentalisation of policies and visions that we had otherwise observed in the RoOCs discourse. Thus, for example, when examining Romania’s consecutive National Security (2001, 2007)10 and National Defence Strategies (2010, 2016),11 it appears that the notion of human security itself is entirely absent. The basic tenets of the notion of human security – the idea that economic, social, internal and international political conditions are interdependent and form a part of the wider concept of security – however, do make up a substantial part of the Strategies of 2001, 2007, 2010 and 2016, though to varying degrees, with the first and the last being the most inclusive, and the others

Romania  255 reflecting a perspective more focused on traditional concepts of security. Only the National Sustainable Development Strategy,12 drafted by the Ministry for Development in cooperation with the United Nations (UN) institutions, actually uses the notion of ‘human security’ and propounds specific economic and social policy directions to be followed in order to achieve sustainable development. All of the documents acknowledge the interdependence between traditional defence and the economic, social, environmental and cultural elements of security and development. They also advocate the integration of these dimensions in the further development and application of all public policies. However, the language used in the National Sustainable Development Strategy appears to be completely disjointed from the terminology used in the aforementioned National Security and National Defence Strategies. This in turn points to a de facto perpetuation of the compartmentalisation of public policies due to a lack of coordination between the different institutions. Turning to the public discourse of the RoOC’s hierarchy, one can easily observe that the notion of human security itself is all but absent; it only appears in the context of some inter-institutional conferences organised by the church in cooperation with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and public authorities. Though not very visible in the public space, the main organisation involving the RoOC actually using the terminology of human security has been the Ecumenical Association of Churches in Romania (AIDROM). The latter’s discourse and actions in the field of human security do not appear to be well connected to the RoOC’s general public discourse, rather they are of limited use in a distinctive area and by distinctive organisations and so are not fully integrated with other church policies. This is not a singular occurrence. Built almost from scratch since the early 1990s, the RoOC’s responses to the various social, political, economic and international challenges have been largely experimental and often suffered from the same ‘compartmentalisation effect’13 plaguing the development of public policy in Romania. The distinct approaches of the RoOC to these various aspects of human security have been addressed in detail elsewhere, and for the purposes of this chapter it is only necessary to summarise a few points here. Human rights The area of human security on which the RoOC has articulated the most original and coherent doctrine is that of human rights. Rooted in Christian anthropology, there are several instances of departure from what it deems the ‘secular’ doctrine of human rights. Human dignity and the absolute value of human life are at its core. However, at the core of human dignity is the notion that man has been created in God’s image; the Creation continues to rely on its Creator for its continued existence, and God is perceived as present and active in the world. While acknowledging that man was created free, freedom

256  I. Conovici is not seen primarily as individual autonomy from God or from other men, but first and foremost as freedom from sin. Sin itself, as a form of separation from God and His law, is not an expression, but a renunciation of freedom.14 This has far-reaching consequences when one discusses the Orthodox Churches’ position on various policy and social issues, including on migrationrelated issues.15 This interpretation of human rights is not singular to the RoOC, but appears to be shared by all Orthodox churches.16 The environment Concern over environmental issues has remained, to this day, a rather marginal theme for the RoOC institutionally, and it is seldom discussed in official church discourse. While common messages of inter-Orthodox events (the meetings of the Orthodox Churches’ Primates, the Great Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church and occasional joint messages of Orthodox members in various international and inter-confessional instances) do indeed regularly include passages on the ecological crisis and the need for a deeper ‘care for the Creation’,17 these appear to stem from the determined ecological commitment of the ‘Green Patriarch’ Bartholomew and the Church of Constantinople, and is a type of discourse that is of limited use in the RoOC public discourse outside inter-Orthodox or inter-confessional events. When Patriarch Daniel, at an international conference, spoke of the importance of education, legislation and the mass media in ‘cultivating an ethics or a spirituality of the co-responsibility of all peoples for the future of the environment and of human life on Earth’,18 he was using this very language. The Encyclical of the Great Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church, which spoke in 2016 of the ‘spiritual and moral roots of the ecological crisis’, of a necessary return to the ascetic ethos of the church and refraining from abusing the Earth’s resources19 nearly match the vision the Ecumenical Patriarch has been advocating since at least the early 1990s. The RoOC, however, is yet to propose a distinctive theoretical reflection on this issue. Social care The engagement of the Orthodox Church in the area of social care has been and still is highly experimental: overall theoretical reflection on social issues is grounded in the traditional theology of philanthropia (charity) but has yet to take into account the structural changes that the professionalisation and bureaucratisation of faith-based social projects carry with them. Top-down approaches (such as the ‘social care’ departments attached to all parish and higher-level church structures, or the attempts to federalise Orthodox social care-oriented NGOs that led to the formation of the Philanthropia Federation) are imperfectly enmeshed with organic, grassroots initiatives.20 Unpredictable funding (or the cessation thereof after the initial stages) is an obstacle

Romania  257 to the creation of long-term social projects. Despite centralisation efforts on the part of RoOC hierarchy, the majority of structures do not form actual networks. Instead, they work independently, connecting only occasionally, which in turn limits the potential pooling of resources. Church hierarchy encourages the development of local professionalised education and social care projects, but occasional, low-key, unspecialised and informal projects are the most numerous, and as such the impact of the RoOC’s engagement in social projects is difficult to assess. Positive findings include the willingness of the RoOC to mobilise (and train, where possible) its human resources – including a significant number of volunteers (at least for short-term projects) – as well as to enter the dynamic field of social economy.21 Since care for victims of human trafficking and support for migrants and refugees are recorded in RoOC public reports as part of its overall social care network, this chapter will address whether and to what extent such general findings may be verified in these particular areas.

International mobility: human trafficking, emigration, immigration As has been stated above, since the country was and is not situated on the main migration routes from the Middle East towards Europe, the RoOC has not been severely challenged by the most recent mass migration wave, nor did it have to get very actively involved in dealing with it. Nevertheless, the church does not entirely lack the capacity and the intellectual instruments to deal with this and other connected phenomena. The following paragraphs deal with each issue relating to international mobility chronologically, as they emerged as areas of concern in the Romanian public sphere and as they captured the attention of the RoOC. Human trafficking In the late 1990s, as the RoOC and the entire Romanian society were undergoing steep political, social and economic transformations, one of the challenges of this often-chaotic process was the aggressive advancement of human trafficking – notably of prostitution – networks in the former Communist countries. Trafficking networks publicly advertised for victims in daily newspapers, phrasing their announcements as job offers for ballerinas and showgirls for Western Europe, Israel or the Arab countries. The public authorities eventually clamped down on the phenomenon, and the RoOC and other religious communities were explicitly invited to play a role in solving this problem. In this period, the RoOC also signed, on various occasions, protocols of cooperation both with national authorities such as the Ministry of Home Affairs and international organisations such as the International Organization for Migration,22 with the church’s mission being primarily one of prevention of human trafficking and related criminal activities through education.

258  I. Conovici Representatives of the RoOC attended, but also organised, a significant number of conferences and debates on the topic, and warnings against the dangers of human trafficking were repeatedly heard from the pulpit.23 Thus, in the context of a 2008 ecumenical conference on human trafficking, ­Patriarch Daniel pronounced an unequivocal, theologically grounded condemnation of human trafficking (particularly child trafficking) as ‘a crime against the future of humanity’. He argued that human trafficking ‘alters the integrity of the image of God’, as it ‘deprives victims of their freedom, violates their dignity as persons, crushes their ability to think, deprives them of their will and makes a mockery of their sentiments’, and added that ‘God has given no-one the right of life and death over other men and nobody has the right to objectify the human person, transforming it into a source of profit’. He also pointed to the need for spiritual – in addition to physiological and psychological – recovery of victims, and to that end, the Patriarch argued, the state should cooperate with the churches. The latter could not only provide the much-needed spiritual care for victims, but also act as important awareness-building actors, including at grassroots (parish and school) levels, thus helping ‘in the defense of human dignity and in healing social life’.24 Human trafficking – but also migration generally – were important areas of interest and action for inter-confessional charitable organisations such as AIDROM, which has over the years been the principal organiser of the various events and projects hosted, attended or involving various local bodies of the RoOC. The organisation has also been offering counselling and has its own emergency centre for human trafficking victims.25 For the Romanian public however, these warnings seemed to be part of an internal policy debate concerning the repeated law projects aiming to decriminalise and to ‘normalise’ prostitution, with the RoOC being the most vocal and unequivocal opponent of all such proposals.26 In more recent years, the RoOC continued to get involved, though not substantially, in addressing the question of human trafficking. The RoOC created several centres for hosting victims of human trafficking (two such centres were reportedly functioning as early as 2007). Furthermore, the RoOC also instituted a ‘Sunday of Romanian Migrants’ in 2009, aimed at raising awareness on the needs of migrants and their families.27 The church also marks the European Day Against Human Trafficking (18 October),28 as well as the International Day of the Refugee (20 June),29 by organising conferences and debates and mentioning these questions in public sermons. The function of these events was primarily to build awareness and create informal networks of cooperation.30 It should be mentioned here that the RoOC has not been the only denomination concerned by human trafficking, migration and similar issues. The Catholic Church, particularly through its Caritas network and the Jesuit Refugee Service, but also the traditional Protestant, the Adventist and other churches have also been involved with these issues throughout this period, but their actions fall outside the scope of this analysis.

Romania  259 Emigration The RoOC has been dealing with the phenomenon of migration primarily as an issue of emigration. This is an issue affecting its own believers, who have been migrating en masse from Romania to Western and Southern Europe. According to the UN International Migration Report 2017, the number of Romanians living outside the country’s borders amounted to 3.71 million.31 The vast majority of these had migrated to Spain and Italy and other ­European countries since the early 2000s, and Romanians currently represent the largest European migrant community within Europe.32 According to Eurostat data, at the end of 2016 they were the largest migrant communities in Italy, Spain and Hungary, but they also formed substantial communities in Germany, the UK, Austria, Portugal etc.33 The RoOC has been dealing with this issue primarily by an exponential expansion of its institutional structure throughout Europe: today, the church has two metropolitanates in Western Europe (Paris and Nuremberg), with five bishoprics, several hundred parishes and several monasteries and sketes. Furthermore, the parish network of the RoOC also extends to the Republic of Moldova, where it reactivated the Metropolitanate of Bessarabia in 1992, and to the Romanian minority in Hungary (Bishopric of Gyula) and the Serbian Vojvodina (Bishopric of Dacia Felix), where it supports several parishes (these, however, are not migrant communities, but indigenous Romanianspeaking communities).34 The RoOC also includes a US-based Metropolitanate of the A ­ mericas, as well as a diocese in Australia. In this respect, the outreach of the RoOC is far wider and its capacity to keep in contact with the migrant Romanian communities far outweighs the Romanian state’s ability to establish support networks for its beyond-the-borders citizens. Aware of this fact, public authorities allocate, through the State Secretariat for Religious Affairs, an annual fixed sum (€200,000) towards the partial financing of the salaries of the RoOC clergy outside of Romania.35 The state can (and does) also partially fund the construction and repairs of churches for Romanian Orthodox parishes abroad, the most recent and prominent case being the Romanian Orthodox Cathedral in Madrid, built to a vast extent with financial support from the state budget. The RoOC also cooperates, especially for its cultural activities, with the Ministry for the Romanians Beyond the Borders.36 The RoOC became – and is to this day – a direct actor in the very process of emigration from Romania, and part of the Romanians’ experience of migration as a whole. The massive displacement of the Romanian population to Europe and beyond has been accompanied by a partial ‘displacement’ of the church itself, which, due to its specific character as a ‘national’ church – that is, a Christian church with a universal vocation, but at the same time closely intermeshed with nationality and language – put the RoOC in an interesting position. In practice, the church is the most prominent partner of the state in the preservation of the Romanian identity of the Romanian migrants. Yet its

260  I. Conovici role in the Romanian communities abroad is multifaceted and, at least on the surface, at times contradictory. On the one hand, as a ‘preserver of nationality’, it greatly contributes in the preservation of the national identity of Romanian migrants: it is a medium for the use of the Romanian language; it has specific cultural and educational programmes focused on Romanian religious and folk tradition; it runs Romanian language courses; liturgically, the RoOC promotes the cult of ‘Romanian’ saints; some parishes organise excursions and pilgrimages to various places in Romania; parishes are meeting places and hubs of information for the Romanian-speaking communities; and they may also occasionally serve as points of contact with Romanian public authorities. In the words of Patriarch Daniel: [W]herever there are Romanian communities, the Romanian Orthodox Church is trying to build not only the inner church of the soul, but also places of worship, so that each Christian Orthodox Romanian may hear the holy services in their mother tongue, receive communion in a Romanian Church and thus preserve their connection with their Mother Church in Romania.37 A comparatively new instrument for creating connections between second-­ generation migrants and migrant Romanian youths with their country of origin are the national and international Orthodox Youth Meetings the RoOC has been organising since 2013 (in Baia Mare, Cluj-Napoca, Bucharest, Iași and Sibiu). Delegations of participants from the various RoOC bishoprics include delegations of the diaspora dioceses, thus creating and consolidating a sense of connection and solidarity with their country of origin.38 On the other hand, the RoOC also acts institutionally as a factor of integration of Romanians in the community of residence: they serve as hubs for finding new jobs, some facilitate access to local information, employment and administrative resources;39 when needed, they act as defenders of the rights and freedoms of the Romanian migrant community; finally, as the number of mixed marriages and second-­generation migrants increases, they progressively adopt the official language of the country of residence as a (usually secondary, but in a few parishes, primary) liturgical language, and may also cater to the needs of converts to Orthodoxy.40 They also help revive and, to a degree, reinvent local traditions, namely the cult of local saints of the first millennium. Many parishes have dual protectors: a traditional ‘Eastern Orthodox’ saint (possibly a Romanian saint) and a local saint of the first millennium (St Germain of Auxerre, St Foy, St Leger, St Genevieve, St Piat, St Ludger, St Patrick, St Columba, St Brigit of Kildare, St Walburga, St Ansgar, St Kilian etc.).41 While the RoOC’s institutional expansion into Western Europe has worked out relatively smoothly, with the RoOC institutionally accompanying the Romanian emigration trend, the church has also had to deal with the problems emerging from emigration, such as the psychological and behavioural issues of children of emigrant parents, which it initially dealt with through its

Romania  261 usual channels, namely spiritual assistance. Other emerging issues, such as depression and burnout issues (the ‘Italy syndrome’) have also come to the attention of the RoOC.42 More recently, some bishops and other Orthodox public figures have started to take up this issue, alarmed by the severity of consequences to children of their parents’ economic migration. Thus, a consequence of this partial ‘displacement’ of the RoOC beyond the borders is its internationalisation and resulting institutional diversification. No longer only a national, majority church, it gathers in as well the experiences of a migrant, minority church, fighting to survive with a precarious institutional and social status. As such, it is also pushed into more frequent contact and cooperation with other Christian churches, particularly with the other Orthodox churches abroad, in an overall more competitive, ecumenical and secular environment. Throughout the years, the RoOC, which still defines itself in its statutes as a national and majority church, has been gaining substantial experience as a minority, migrant communities’ church. Along with the other Orthodox churches in the so-called ‘diaspora’, it has come to experience the unique status of minority, emigrant churches having to adapt to new legal, institutional and social contexts. The RoOC celebrates its international dimension inasmuch as it signals the church’s capacity to ‘cater to its own’ and helps raise its profile in the Christian, and particularly the Orthodox, world. Nonetheless, the experience of the Great Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church in Crete in 2016 demonstrated the limits of the integration of the ‘minority church’ dimension of the participating churches in the overall self-definition of the church itself. The dominant paradigm, as illustrated in the common Message of the Great and Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church, demonstrated the continued prevalence and indeed strengthening of the ‘national church’ paradigm, the ‘diaspora’ Orthodox Bishops’ Assemblies being still confined to their consultative role, though their existence is acknowledged as an expression of the Orthodox principle of synodality and – still – a hope for the future.43 Yet, despite the somewhat conservative stance of the Great Synod, the growing experience of the various Orthodox churches as ‘migrant churches’, and their progressive rerooting in the country-of-residence societies and traditions are changing the face of the Orthodox churches, as well as their internal dynamic: they can no longer be classified as fully ‘Eastern’ churches, but rather as internationalised, ­Europeanised churches, with a voice to be heard in the concert of European – and global – faith communities. This in turn may have an impact on the evolution of inter-Orthodox relations, a theme that has yet to be explored. Immigration As has been pointed out, the experience of the RoOC with immigration (migration towards or through Romania) has been comparatively slight, and a topic of minor interest in comparison with other Orthodox churches in the region such as like Greece, Serbia or Bulgaria. Due to its geographical and

262  I. Conovici geopolitical location and environment, Romania has not to date been a favoured route for migrants coming from the Middle East.44 A ‘Romanian route’ would have entailed, for migrants, longer periods of travel just to eventually reach the same (eventually blocked) Hungarian border. Furthermore, while Germany’s argument on refugee quotas per country prevailed in the EU, Romania initially opposed mandatory quotas, invoking its lack of facilities to host the required number and even suggesting its willingness to use the quota issue as leverage for obtaining Romania’s admission to the Schengen area.45 Public opinion was, however, much inflamed at the time. At first, this inflammation was limited to contamination from European mass media and social media. Then, in May 2015, following bilateral talks with the Turkish Government, the Romanian Government granted the traditional (­Turco-Tatar) Muslim Community 6,000 square metres of land in Bucharest for the building of a mosque that would cater to the needs of the 10,000-strong Muslim community in the capital. The mosque would have been at least partly sponsored by the Turkish state. Following an imprudent statement by the Great Mufti of the Muslim Community, who claimed this would be ‘the largest mosque in a European capital’,46 a scandal flared up in the mass media, with politicians (including President Traian Băsescu) helping to fuel it. Concerns over the ‘mega-mosque’ and alarmist calls against the ‘Islamisation of the country’ in the public space fostered xenophobia and in particular anti-Muslim feeling, with the prime minister being accused of ‘selling out’ the country to Turkish interests.47 The government defended the legitimacy of the project48 and announced street protests did not attract more than 150–200 people. It was in this hostile political and media climate that Romanians followed the news concerning the growing refugee wave and the eventual breakdown of the Schengen space open border system. At the height of the crisis in ­September 2015, representatives of several religions in Romania issued statements on the topic. The first to speak out was the local Catholic Church: it followed Pope Francis’ lead in expressing the responsibility of Christians to welcome unconditionally the Other in need and informed the public of the actions it was already taking in giving support to refugees through Caritas and the Jesuit Refugee Service.49 The Reformed (Calvinist) Bishop Kato Bela called the dramatic situation of refugees a ‘disgrace’ for Europe, and recalled the need for compassion towards the refugees, and affirmed that ‘at least for the moment’, there was no risk of an Islamisation of Europe.50 Similar statements were issued by leaders of the Pentecostal and Baptist churches. The RoOC was prudent in its official statements, expressing both sympathy with the refugees themselves and concerns about the significance of what the new migration wave would mean for the country. One of the first church figures to speak up, the Metropolitan of Cluj-Napoca Andrei Andreicuț, expressed compassion with the plight of migrants, who ‘leave their homes not because their lives there were good, but rather bad’, as they were ‘under the terror of the Islamic state’, and called in particularly on the

Romania  263 youth to receive migrants with compassion. He also recalled the persecution of Christians in the Middle East. At the same time, he emphasised the Christian roots of Europe, and commented that ‘the spiritual configuration of Europe should not change’.51 The comments of the Press Officer of the Romanian Patriarchy made the position of the church even clearer: Christians should help all people in need, ‘whatever their faith or culture’, and the church would be ready to ‘support public authorities when Romania should receive refugees’.52 The latter also recalled the fundraising campaigns the RoOC had already organised in the previous year in support of the efforts of the Orthodox Church of Antioch’s efforts to deal with the relocation of refugees issue from the conflict area.53 There were, however, also negative comments that were hostile to refugees from various bishops and some church figures. This included several public intellectuals close to the church, including Teodor Baconschi, a former foreign minister, who starkly stated that ‘Islamophobia is legitimate, because Islam and democracy are incompatible’, and thus argued that the wave of migration from Muslim countries posed a clear threat to European identity and values.54 A joint Orthodox statement on 23 September 2015 came from the Committee of the Representatives of the Orthodox Churches to the EU (Churches of Constantinople, Moscow, Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Greece), which also made a clear, but still prudent, statement arguing that ‘in the face of the reality of human suffering, as disciples of our Saviour Jesus Christ, we are called to help, with open hearts, to alleviate the sufferings of the innocent victims of […] conflicts’. Rejecting all forms of xenophobia, the statement also called for a reflection on the consequences of mass migration and reminded refugees themselves that they should ‘express a willingness to respect European values’ and that rights were to be coupled with responsibilities.55 Later, representatives of the RoOC attended and organised several conferences on the topic and, in regions hosting refugee centres, proceeded to the organisation of some form of help for the residents of these centres, generally in the form of direct food and clothing donations.56 The situation of refugees became a topic that would occasionally spring up in the public sermons of the Romanian Church hierarchs. On 27 December 2015, Patriarch Daniel recalled that Christ himself had lived among refugees, and ‘is a friend of the poor, one with the refugees and with those exiled in foreign lands, close to those who are marginalised and despised, as He sees in all the infinite value of each human being’.57 The Encyclical of the Great and Holy Synod of Crete in 2016 was unequivocal in its plea for hospitality to the refugees, and called on the public to accept the incoming refugees, but also to ‘eradicate’ the its causes, and concluded its remark with a straightforward appeal: We appeal therefore first of all to those able to remove the causes for the creation of the refugee crisis to take the necessary positive decisions.

264  I. Conovici We call on the civil authorities, the Orthodox faithful and the other citizens of the countries in which they have sought refuge and continue to seek refuge to accord them every possible assistance, even from out of their own insufficiency.58 In Romania, AIDROM continues to be the most active charity organisation where the RoOC is participating that has been systematically offering support to incoming migrants. Their projects range from food and clothing donations to professional social and legal assistance to refugees, asylum seekers etc. and to organising – in partnership with bishoprics, with local authorities and various NGOs – awareness-building events on migration-related topics in various places in Romania. Indeed, refugee-oriented services have been the main focus of the organisation’s programmes in the past few years.59

Conclusion One can conclude from the above that the involvement of the RoOC in dealing with the refugee crisis has been proportional to the direct impact of the migration wave on Romania. Since the number of refugees welcomed by the country since 2015 has remained small (fewer than 2,000 people in 2015 and 2016, then dropping in the following years to just a few hundred), the RoOC honoured its promise to offer support to public authorities, although it did not need to allocate major resources for dealing with the issue, but rather continued to delegate it to specialised organisations like AIDROM. It did, however, continue its policy of supporting both these organisations and the public authorities involved. Despite the caution of the public statements made at the height of the crisis, the RoOC has demonstrated a willingness to go against popular and media opinion and, jointly with the other Orthodox churches, defines and expresses a common position with respect to this issue. As has been highlighted, the RoOC has addressed the refugee crisis in a primarily reactive way, dealing with problems as they come along: starting with traditional, unspecialised support, and developing other coping mechanisms en route. The professionalised AIDROM has served as an important source of information, contacts and know how. This attitude has had the advantage of allowing the church a flexibility of reactions, allowing for the recognition of new, specific needs and the development of creative responses to such needs. On the other hand, despite the development of a substantial understanding of the need to tackle the causes of the refugee crisis in order to alleviate their effects, a reactive response allows little room for future planning or for gaining a thorough understanding of the larger picture. As a positive element in the Romanian context, the state does and has for some time acknowledged the churches, along with faith-based NGOs, as useful partners on humanitarian issues, and as things evolve it may encourage their further involvement in dealing with migration-related issues. It remains an open

Romania  265 question whether the RoOC will, as the Greek Orthodox Church has done, build on its experience with Romanian emigrants to develop policies for non-Romanian refugees.

Notes  1 Paul Brusanowski, Stat şi Biserică în vechea Românie între 1821–1925 (State and Church in Old Romania between 1821 and 1925), Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2010.  2 State Secretariat for Religious Affairs, State and Religions in Romania, Bucharest: Litera, 2015.   3 Ioan Vicovan, ‘Filantropia practică în Ţările Române’ (Practical Philanthropy in the Romanian Principalities) in Istoria Bisericii Ortodoxe Române (A History of the Romanian Orthodox Church), vol. II, Iaşi: Trinitas, 2002, pp. 270–305; Brusanowski, op. cit.   4 Ioan Vicovan, Ibid.; Lucian N. Leuștean Orthodoxy and the Cold War. Religion and Political Power in Romania, 1947–65, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009, pp. 24–56.  5 Cristian Vasile, Biserica Ortodoxă Română în primul deceniu comunist (The Romanian Orthodox Church in the first decade of Communism), Bucharest: Curtea Veche, 2005; Leuștean, 2009; Anca Șincan, ‘Of Middlemen and Intermediaries. Negotiating the State Church Relationship in Communist Romania. The Formative Years’, PhD Thesis, Budapest: Central European University, 2011; State Secretariat for Religious Affairs, State and Religions in Romania, 2015.   6 Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turcescu, Religion and Politics in Post-Communist Romania, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007; Iuliana Conovici, Ortodoxia în România postcomunistă. Reconstrucţia unei identităţi publice (Reconstructing the Public Identity of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Post-Communist Romania), 2 vols, Cluj-Napoca: Eikon, 2009–2010.   7 Ioan Conovici, Ortodoxia în România postcomunistă, pp. 543–584.   8 See the Association’s official website at www.aidrom.ro/despre-aidrom/ (accessed on 30 October 2018).   9 Ioan Conovici, Ortodoxia în România postcomunistă, 2010. 10 Strategia de securitate națională a României (The National Security Strategy of Romania), 2001, available on the Chamber of Deputies official website at www. cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=31060 (accessed on 30 October 2018); Strategia de Securitate Națională a României (The National Security Strategy of Romania), 2006, available on the official website of the President of Romania, at http://old.presidency.​ro/static/ordine/CSAT/SSNR.pdf (accessed on 30 October 2018). 11 Strategia națională de apărare (The National Defence Strategy), 2010, available on the Ministry of Home Affairs website at http://ccpic.mai.gov.ro/docs/Strategia_ nationala_de_aparare.pdf; Strategia națională de apărare pentru perioada 2015–2019 (The National Defence Strategy for 2015–2019), 2015, available on the official website of the President of Romania at www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Strategia_ Nationala_de_Aparare_a_Tarii_1.pdf (accessed on 30 October 2018). 12 Strategia Națională pentru Dezvoltare Durabilă a României. Orizonturi 2013–2020– 2030 (The National Sustainable Development of Romania. Horizons 2013–2020– 2030), available on the Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development website at www.mmediu.ro/beta/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/2012-06-12_ dezvoltare_durabila_snddfinalromana2008.pdf (accessed on 30 October 2018). 13 Iuliana Conovici, ‘  “Social Theology” and Social Work in the Romanian Orthodox Church: A Paradoxical Development?’ in Katya Tolstaya (ed.),

266  I. Conovici Orthodox Paradoxes. Heterogeneities and Complexities in Contemporary Russian ­Orthodoxy, Leiden: Brill, 2014, pp. 169–183. 14 Human rights have been a topic of extensive reflection and debate in the ­Romanian Orthodox Church, and its various representatives have been attending and/or (co-)organising a number of events on the topic, whether in ecumenical or in various international contexts. A series of conferences on ‘Human rights. Spiritual dimension and civic action’, started in 1997 by the Roman–Catholic Bishopric in Iași and the Romanian Institute for Human Rights was soon joined by the Orthodox Metropolitanate in Iași and the Alexandru Ioan Cuza ­University, and became a regular event throughout the years 2000, reaching its eleventh edition in 2008: ‘Drepturile omului din perspectivă creștină’ (Human rights from a ­ Christian perspective), 21 October 2008, available at http://­ basilica.ro/­ drepturile-omului-din-perspectiva-crestina/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). As Metropolitan of Moldova, and later as Patriarch Daniel of the Romanian Orthodox Church, one of the church leaders to propose the most elaborate reflections on human rights attended and organised various human rights events: see for example his Address on the anniversary of the UN Universal ­Declaration of Human Rights, at the Symposium ‘Dignity and justice for all’ (Patriarchy Palace, Bucharest, 13 December 2008), available at http://basilica.ro/­drepturileomului-din-perspectiva-crestina/ (accessed on 30 October 2018); or his Message for the 20th anniversary of the Romanian Ombudsman, 21–22 September 2017, available at http://basilica.ro/apararea-drepturilor-si-libertatilor-cetatenesti-actiunede-­promovare-​a-​demnitatii-umane/ (accessed on 30 October 2018); or his speech upon the reception of the title of Doctor Honoris Causa of the ‘Titu Maiorescu’ University in Bucharest on 10 December 2015, available at http://basilica. ro/originea-religioasa-a-dreptului-­secularizarea-lui-si-nevoia-actuala-de-dialoginterdisciplinar/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). 15 See for example the 2011 Address of Patriarch Daniel to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on ‘The religious dimension of inter-cultural dialogue’, in Romanian and French, available at http://basilica.ro/dimensiuneareligioasa-a-dialogului-​intercultural/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). 16 Conovici, ‘ “Social Theology” and Social Work in the Romanian Orthodox Church: A Paradoxical Development?’. 17 Conovici, Ortodoxia în România postcomunistă, 2010; Conovici, ‘  “Social ­Theology” and Social Work in the Romanian Orthodox Church: A Paradoxical Development?’, 2014. 18 ‘Criza ecologică este o consecință a crizei spirituale’ (The ecological crisis is a consequence of the spiritual crisis), 16 June 2011 available at www.basilica.ro/crizaecologica-este-o-consecinta-a-crizei-spirituale (accessed on 30 October 2018). 19 On the official website of the Pan-Orthodox Council, available at www.­ holycouncil.org/-/encyclical-holy-council (accessed on 30 October 2018). 20 Iuliana Conovici, Ortodoxia în România postcomunistă, pp. 543–584. 21 Iuliana Conovici (ed.), Organizații cu profil religios în economia socială din România (Faith-based Organisations in the Social Economy Sector in Romania), Bucharest: Polirom/FDSC, 2013. 22 Such protocols of cooperation existed since January 2002, and have since been renewed (See for example: ‘Participarea Bisericii Ortodoxe Române la prevenirea și combaterea traficului de ființe umane’ (The participation of the ­ Romanian Orthodox Church in the prevention and combating human ­trafficking), ­Basilica.ro, 10 June 2003, available at http://basilica.ro/participarea-­bisericii-ortodoxe-romanela-prevenirea-​ si-combaterea-traficului-de-fiinte-umane/ (accessed on 30 October 2018) ). In 2007, the RoOC Social–philanthropic Department of the Romanian Patriarchy reported its continued partnership with the IOfM, whereby the Romanian

Romania  267 Patriarchy ensured the personnel catering to the IOfM’s hospice for victims of human trafficking (see http://patriarhia.deveu.com/ro/opera_social_filantropica/ biroul_pentru_asistenta_social_filantropica_1.html (accessed on 30 October 2018) ). 23 Between 2012 and 2015 AIDROM was a partner in the EU-funded Fine-Tune Project against exploitation through work (see www.aidrom.ro/proiecte/ impotriva-exploatarii-prin-munca-fine-tune-project/(accessed on 30 October 2018) ). 24 Address of Patriarch Daniel of the RoOC to the International Seminar ‘Christian Action Against Human Trafficking’, Patriarchal Palace, Bucharest, 28 March 2008, available at www.episcopiacaransebesului.ro/arhiva-stire.php?readmore=392 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 25 AIDROM has also been offering counselling, and has its own emergency centre for human trafficking victims ‘Prevenirea si Asistenta Victimelor Traficului de Persoane’ (Prevention and assistance to victims of human trafficking), www. aidrom.ro/proiecte/prevenire-trafic-de-persoane/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). 26 Conovici, Ortodoxia în România postcomunistă, 2010, pp. 565 and 682–696. 27 Gheorghe Anghel, ‘Duminica Migranților Români’ (The Sunday of Romanian migrants), available at http://basilica.ro/duminica-migrantilor-romani-3/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). 28 This has been marked at least since 2012, not only in Bucharest, but also in other dioceses of the Romanian Orthodox Church, at least since 2012, as shown in a Report of the Bureau for social–philanthropic assistance of the Romanian ­Patriarchy, available at http://patriarhia.deveu.com/ro/opera_social_filantropica/ biroul_pentru_asistenta_social_filantropica_1.html (accessed on 30 October 2018); for 2017 see also Sorin Ionițe, ‘18 octombrie – Ziua Europeană de luptă împotriva traficului de fiinţe umane’ (18 October – The European Day of Combatting Human Trafficking), 18 October 2017, available at http://basilica.ro/ 18-octombrie-ziua-europeana-de-lupta-impotriva-traficului-de-fiinte-umane/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). 29 At least since 2008: ‘20 iunie – Ziua internațională a Migranților’ (20 June – the International Day of Migrants’), 20 June 2008, available at http://basilica.ro/ 20-iunie-ziua-internationala-a-migrantilor/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). 30 Examples of such events are the conferences: ‘Together against human trafficking’, Patriarchy Palace, Bucharest, 27 March 2006 (organised by AIDROM with the National Agency for Human Trafficking Prevention, the Romanian ­Patriarchy and other organisations); ‘Churches against human trafficking. Consolidating ecumenical actions against the current dynamics of the human trafficking phenomenon’ at the Patriarchy Palace in Bucharest, 8 October 2009 (organised by AIDROM and Caritas Romania), etc. 31 ‘United Nations international migration report 2017. Highlights’, available at www. un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/ docs/MigrationReport2017_Highlights.pdf (accessed on 30 October 2018). 32 Eurostat, ‘Migration and migrant populations statistics’ (March 2018), available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migration_and_ migrant_population_statistics (accessed on 30 October 2018). 33 Eurostat, ‘Main countries of citizenship and birth of the foreign/foreign-born population, 1 January 2017’, available at https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/­statistics-explained/ images/6/60/Main_countries_of_citizenship_and_birth_of_the_foreign_foreign-born_ population%2C_1_January_2017_%28in_absolute_numbers_and_as_a_percentage_of_​ the_total_foreign_foreign-born_population%29.png (accessed on 30 October 2018).

268  I. Conovici 34 A detailed description in the 2017 Report on the RoOCs ‘foreign affairs’ at: ‘Activitățile externe ale Patriarhiei Române; comunitățile bisericești externe; Biroul Protocol 2017’ (Activities of the Romanian Patriarchy beyond the borders; church communities beyond the borders; the Liaison Office, 2017), available at http:// patriarhia.ro/activitatile-externe-ale-patriarhiei-romane-comunitatile-bisericesti-externebiroul-protocol-2017-2871.html (accessed on 30 October 2018). For an overview of the RoOC’s institutional network in Europe, see the websites of the two Romanian Orthodox Metropolitanates for Western and Southern Europe (www. mitropolia.eu) and, respectively, for Central and Northern Europe (www.mitropoliaro.de) (accessed on 30 October 2018). 35 State Secretariat for Religious Affairs, State and Religions in Romania, 2015, p. 5. 36 In his speech on the occasion of the 2018 Sunday of Migrants, Patriarch Daniel quoted a Protocol of cooperation with the Ministry for ‘programmes and actions aiming to support Romanian communities beyond the borders in the preservation of their ethnic, cultural, and religious activities’ (‘Unitate de credință și unitate de neam, în anul Centenar’ (Unity in Faith and National Unity in the Centennial Year), 18 August 2018, available at http://basilica.ro/unitate-de-credinta-si-unitate-de-neam-in-anul-centenar-text-integral-2/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). 37 ‘Unitate de credință și unitate de neam, în anul Centenar’ (Unity in faith and unity in nation, in centenary year), available at http://basilica.ro/unitate-de-­ credinta-si-unitate-de-neam-in-anul-centenar-text-integral-2/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). 38 See for example the website of the Orthodox Youth Meeting 2018, available at www.ito2018.ro (accessed on 30 October 2018). International youth meetings function, in fact, as a means of creating and strengthening national bonds and solidarities, but they also giving a sense of the international, ecumenical appeal of Orthodoxy and its diversity. 39 Thus, for example, a Romanian Orthodox Church in Paris offered an administrative guide to incoming students as early as 2004: ‘Informații utile și recomandări pentru studenții români la Paris’ (Useful information and recommendations for Romanian students in Paris), available at http://egliseroumaine.com/noi-dvs/ nouvenit/studenti.htm (accessed on 30 October 2018). The same church offered both Romanian and French language courses. 40 Thus, for example, some parishes in France, at Montpellier, Nîmes, Besancon and other are styled ‘Franco-Romanian parishes’, and another, in Louveciennes (see the profile of the parish website: www.sagesse-orthodoxe.fr/la-paroisse/ qui-sommes-nous, accessed on 30 October 2018), caters primarily to French-speaking converts. H. E. Marc Alric, Assistant Bishop to the Romanian Orthodox ­Metropolitan for Western Europe since 2005, is himself French, as are a number of the priests serving in the Western Europe Archbishopric (as can be seen on the ­Metropolitanate’s official website, available at www.mitropolia.eu (accessed on 30 October 2018) ). 41 See for example the lists of parishes for France available at www.mitropolia.eu/ ro/site/169/ and Germany: www.mitropolia-ro.de/index.php/parohii/parohiigermania (accessed on 30 October 2018), on the respective websites of the two metropolitanates. The Romanian Orthodox Metropolitanate of Central and Northern Europe website also includes a section on ‘Western’ saints of the first millennium of Christianity, available at www.mitropolia-ro.de/index.php/ sfintii-apusului (accessed on 30 October 2018) with the explicit aim to foster their renewed veneration in the local Orthodox parishes. A wider survey of the names of the patron saints of Romanian Orthodox parishes abroad reveals even more interesting aspects, denoting the complex positioning of the Romanian

Romania  269 communities abroad: the coupling of Romanian and country-of-residence saints is a relatively new tendency; some parishes opt for more ‘international’ twentieth century saints coming from other Orthodox traditions, such as St John ­Maximovich, St Siluan the Athonite or St Nectarios of Egina – pointing to the supranational dimension of Orthodoxy; and there are differences between the RoOC parishes in different countries, with France and Germany, for example, being more prone to opt for locally ‘anchoring’ their parishes through the choice of a local, first-millennium Western patron saint than parishes in Italy. 42 For example, Cristina Zamfirescu, ‘ “Sindromul Italia”. Depresia româncelor plecate în străinătate’ (The ‘Italy syndrome’. The depression of Romanian women living abroad), published on 23 January 2018 in the Romanian ­Patriarchy’s daily newspaper Lumina (The Light), available at http://ziarullumina. ro/­sindromul-italia-depresia-romancelor-plecate-in-strainatate-130028.html (accessed on 30 October 2018). 43 Message of the Great and Holy Council of the Orthodox Church, available at www.holycouncil.org/-/message (accessed on 30 October 2018). 44 According to the TEMPO-Online database of the National Institute for Statistics, the ‘permanent immigrants’ in Romania (that is, the number of migrants actually established in Romania) originating from countries other than Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Moldova, Ukraine or the USA, went from 2,715 persons in 2012 to 1,044 in 2013, a peak of 13,212 in 2014, 4,276 in 2015, 5,456 in 2016 and 11,347 in 2017 (available at http://statistici.insse.ro/). Annual reports of the General Inspectorate for Immigration of the Ministry of Home Affairs (available at http://igi.mai.gov.ro/ro/content/analiza-activitatii, accessed 20 November 2018) point to an annual growth of the number of asylum seekers in Romania (1,446 in 2014, 1,226 in 2015, 1,886 in 2016, 4,820 in 2017), and from 2014 onwards point to a significant increase in the numbers of asylum seekers from Syria (616 in 2014, 541 in 2015, 816 in 2016, 945 in 2017), Afghanistan (277 in 2014, 96 in 2015, 80 in 2016, 257 in 2017) Irak (212 in 2014, 214 in 2015, 472 in 2016, 2,742 in 2017), and later Pakistan (47 in 2014, 31 in 2015, 93 in 2016, 247 in 2017). The vast majority of immigrants to Romania (87 per cent) remain, however, Romanian citizens (87 per cent in 2016, according to Eurostat data, ‘Migration and migrant population statistics’, available at https://ec.europa. eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migration_and_migrant_​population_ statistics#Migration_flows:_2_million_non-EU_immigrants (accessed on 30 October 2018)). 45 ‘Klaus Iohannis: România a comunicat că poate primi 1.785 de refugiaţi. Mai mult nu! România nu e în Schengen, nu poate intra nimeni aşa cum doreşte!’ (Klaus Iohannis: Romania communicated it may accept 1,785 refugees. Not more! Romania is not part of Schengen, no-one may just come in as they please), Digi24 September 2015, available at www.digi24.ro/stiri/externe/mapamond/ TV, 7 ­ klaus-iohannis-romania-a-comunicat-ca-poate-primi-1-785-de-refugiati-mai-multnu-romania-nu-e-in-​schengen-nu-poate-intra-nimeni-asa-cum-doreste-435666 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 46 See, for example: Sinziana Ionescu, ‘Cea mai mare moschee din Europa se ridică la București. Detaliile unui proiect uriaș, fără “propagandă fundamentalistă” ’ (The greatest mosque in Europe to be built in Bucharest. The details of a gigantic project, without the ‘fundamentalist propaganda’), Adevărul (The Truth), 10 June 2015, available at https://adevarul.ro/locale/constanta/cea-mai-mare-moschee-europa-­ crestina-​ridica-bucuresti-detaliile-unui-proiect-urias-propaganda-­fundamentalista1_5576fce9cfbe376e35196fc7/index.html (accessed on 30 October 2018). 47 Sinziana Ionescu, ‘Război total între musulmani și Băsescu, de la marea moschee din București …’ (Total war between Muslims and Băsescu, concerning the great

270  I. Conovici mosque in Bucharest …), Adevărul (The Truth), 6 July 2015, available at https:// adevarul.​ro/​locale/constanta/razboi-total-musulmani-basescu-moscheea-bucurestistramosii-luptat-​razboaie-romania-nu-talibani-1_559a711ff5eaafab2c4b5a0f/index. html (accessed on 30 October 2018). 48 ‘Povestea marii moschei de la București. 25 de ani de negocieri și multe declarații contradictorii’ (The story of the great Mosque in Bucharest. 25 years of negotiations and many contradictory statements), Digi24 TV, available at www.digi24. ro/special/reportaje/reportaj/povestea-marii-moschei-de-la-bucuresti-25-de-anide-negocieri-si-multe-declaratii-contradictorii-416228 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 49 ‘Biserica Romano-Catolică. Anunț despre criza refugiaților’ (The Romanian Catholic Church. Announcement concerning the refugee crisis), Știri pe surse (news portal), 1 September 2015, available at www.stiripesurse.ro/bisericaromano-catolica-din-Romania-anunt-despre-criza-refugiatilor_96542.html (accessed on 30 October 2018). 50 ‘Biserica Reformată din România despre refugiași: este o rușine ce se întâmplă’ (The Reformed Church in Romania concerning the refugees: What is happening now is a disgrace), Știri pe surse (news portal), 1 September 2015, available at www. stiripesurse.ro/biserica-reformata-din-romania-despre-refugiati-este-o-rusine-ce-seintampla_​965711.html (accessed on 30 October 2018). 51 ‘Prima reacție la vârful Bisericii Ortodoxe în cadrul crizei refugiaților. Sfatul Mitropolitului Clujului pentru români’ (A first reaction at the top of the ­ Orthodox Church on the refugee crisis. The advice of the Metropolitan of Cluj to the Romanians), Gândul (The Thought), 2 September 2015, available at www. gandul.info/stiri/prima-reactie-la-varful-bisericii-ortodoxe-in-cazul-crizei-refugiatilorsfatul-mitropolitului-clujului-pentru-romani-14697542 (accessed on 30 October 2018). The comments section of the article is telling for the xenophobic inflammation of the public opinion at the time. 52 ‘Biserica Ortodoxă Română, gata să ofere ajutor refugiaților’ (The Romanian Orthodox Church is ready to help the refugees), Jurnalul (The Newspaper), 3 September 2015, available at www.jurnalul.ro/stiri/observator/biserica-­ortodoxaromana-gata-sa-ofere-ajutor-refugiatilor-695601.html (accessed on 30 October 2018). 53 See also, in preparation of the campaign: ‘Colectă pentru creştinii din Siria în primele trei duminici după sărbătoarea Sfintelor Paşti’ (Fundraising for Christians in Syria on the three Sundays following the Holy Pascha), available at www.­ patriarhia.ro/colecta-pentru-crestinii-din-Siria-in-primele-trei-duminici-dupa-­ sarbatoarea-sfintelor-pasti-5601.html (accessed on 30 October 2018). Following their meeting in Phanar on 6 March 2014, Orthodox Church leaders also made a firm appeal to peace in the Middle East, and expressed their concern for the fate of Christians in the Middle East, the support for the Patriarchate of Antioch, and the general concern over the war tragedy in the region, available at www.basilica. ro/sinaxa-intaistatatorilor-bisericilor-ortodoxe-fanar-6-9-martie-2014-mesaj/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). 54 See for example: Teodor Baconschi, ‘Islamofobia e o crimă?’ (Is Islamophobia a crime?), available at www.ziare.com/invazie-imigranti/romania/islamofobia-e-ocrima-1381641 (accessed on 10 September 2015). 55 Communique of the CROCEU on the site of the Romanian Orthodox Church Representation to the European Institutions, available at www.orthodoxero.eu/ pages/posts/30092015-comunicat-al-croceu-despre-criza-refugiatilor-in-europa725. php (accessed on 30 October 2018).

Romania  271 56 Several such events, particularly in the Bucharest area, are documented on the Romanian Patriarchate’s news portal, basilica.ro. It is notable that the first such news on occasional charity events in favour of refugees date back to 2001. 57 ‘Vedem cum Dumnezeu schimbă răul în bine’ (We see how God turns evil into good), 27 December 2015, available at www.Basilica.ro/vedem-cum-dumnezeuschimba-raul-in-bine (accessed on 30 October 2018). 58 Encyclical of the Holy Council of the Orthodox Church, 2016, available at www.holycouncil.org/-/encyclical-holy-council (accessed on 30 October 2018). 59 A list of projects and conferences are available at www.aidrom.ro (accessed on 30 October 2018), such as ‘Migration policies in times of economic crisis’ (Church Commission for Migrants in Europe, AIDROM), Patriarchal Palace, 17 June 2011; ‘Christian Churches in Romania respond to the phenomenon of Migration’ (AIDROM, The Metropolitanate of Banat), 16 October 2015 (with representatives of the CCME and UN Agency for Refugees, as well as police, local authorities and local centre for refugees governing board attending); and the public debate: ‘Religion and conflict. The refugee crisis’ held at The Faculty of Orthodox Theology in Bucharest, 12 April 2016.

Part III

Eastern Orthodoxy and migration in Western Europe and the United States

J.-F. Mayer

Western Europe

10 From Orthodox migrants to the migration of the Orthodox church(es) Making sense of the Orthodox presence in Western Europe Jean-François Mayer The Orthodox Church has become a faith with a global presence, in a comparable manner to other religious traditions. But a Pew report released in 2017 underlines that, in contrast with the southward evolution of Catholic and Protestant Christianity, ‘Orthodoxy remains largely centred in Europe’.1 Apart from areas with a long historical presence of Orthodox believers, only the United States and G ­ ermany are reported to have an Orthodox population of above one million.2 Orthodox countries did not rule overseas colonies as some states did, and this colonial presence partly laid the ground for the growth of various Christian denominations outside of Europe. Orthodox missionary work did occur during the past two centuries, however, and not only in the vast spaces of the Russian Empire, as the Orthodox presence in Alaska reminds us to this day. Missionary work continues to be a contemporary reality, as one can observe when visiting Orthodox parishes in some African countries or in Indian Bengal. Sometimes, such Orthodox presence has been the result of local initiatives by indigenous groups seeking connections with Orthodox Christianity: in places as varied as Mexico or Uganda, independent local groups have joined the Orthodox Church. These fascinating episodes of the global spread of Orthodoxy lie beyond the scope of the present study. The focus of this chapter will be on migrations from countries with an Orthodox population, their settlement in other parts of the world, and the creation of Orthodox parishes and dioceses in these new areas,3 with special attention to Western Europe.4 These remain under-studied phenomena, especially if one compares the limited volume of research conducted on Orthodox churches in the West with the massive academic interest in the Muslim presence there. This discrepancy is to be regretted in light of the fact that comparisons between those two types of religious migrations and their adjustment to new environments could offer a range of fruitful insights into both migrations. The chapter will deal exclusively with the migration of churches belonging to the ­Byzantine tradition. The Oriental Orthodox presence in the West has been rapidly growing in recent decades – beside the earlier Armenian p­ resence – with the arrival of a

276  J.-F. Mayer number of Coptic, Syriac, Ethiopian and Eritrean believers, but this phenomenon would require a separate investigation.

The historical variety of Orthodox migrations to the West The current Orthodox presence in the West is the result of successive waves of migration that continue to this day. Leaving aside isolated instances of earlier Orthodox places of worship for Greek merchants, Russian travellers, and even a few converts in England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,5 or in Amsterdam and Vienna in the second half of the eighteenth century, or even earlier in the Italian Peninsula, the initial stages of the current Orthodox presence in Western Europe mostly started in the nineteenth century with the first purpose-built Orthodox churches (many of which remain active to this day), as well as temporary chapels serving various groups such as Greek businessmen, Russian aristocrats or Romanian students.6 Refugees from various backgrounds followed in the twentieth century, with the largest single movement being that of Russians fleeing the Bolshevik revolution, followed by other waves of migrants after the Second World War as communism spread to more Eastern and Central European countries. Subsequent waves of migration occurred for economic reasons, with the most recent being skilled people leaving Greece during the economic crisis in that country that started in 2010.7 In addition, one should not forget ‘spiritual migrants’, i.e. those of Western origins who convert to Orthodoxy and contribute to the diversity of Orthodox parishes in the West, but clearly remain a tiny minority of the Orthodox population of European countries.8 Orthodox migration to the West remains a phenomenon in flux. For instance, three-quarters of the 355 Orthodox parishes in Italy have been established since 2000 (and only 10 per cent before 1980).9 This is due largely to the many Romanians who have moved to Italy since the 1990s, creating a huge demand for church structures. The Romanian Orthodox Church has been quick to follow these migrants and managed to obtain official recognition (with associated privileges) from the Italian government in 2011. Among Russian or Serbian migrants, the political refugees who made up the majority of their parishes in Germany after the Second World War are now a minority of the faithful in those parishes following the fall of the various Communist regimes.10 But not all the new immigrants are pious believers who flock to church on Sundays: in most cases only a minority of the potential members regularly participate in church life. In the case of Romanian parishes in France, it is estimated that about 10 per cent of the Romanian immigrants practice on a regular basis.11 Many more will visit parish churches only on special occasions. These initial observations tell us something about the variety of the migrants and their experiences. Within the same national communities, different waves brought people with different social statuses and expectations, making newly

Western Europe  277 arrived groups not always welcomed by earlier migrants. In Belgium, Lina Venturas describes how the earlier, more prosperous migrants did not initially welcome working-class Greek coal miners who arrived in their parishes in the late 1950s.12 Different historical and cultural legacies could also create tensions. At least initially, parishes of ‘White Russian’ exiles were sometimes suspicious of the ‘new Russians’ who had been raised in the former Soviet Union and inevitably brought with them experiences, habits and vocabularies that originated from that environment. Even today one may occasionally hear a remark by a descendant of the ‘old emigration’ about the use of a word betraying a Soviet background by a parishioner coming from Russia. Some parishes are not enthusiastic about putting new, less cultured immigrants in control of their affairs. During the present author’s discussion with a member of the council of a Russian parish in France in May 2018, the latter admitted to being uneasy about deliberately avoiding appointing a member of the significant contingent of Moldovan parishioners to the parish council, but nonetheless felt that these relatively newly arrived parishioners would not understand the intricacies of the parish management system (as well as its legacy from the earlier emigration, presumably). The Moldovans are welcome to take part in the parish’s religious life, but the descendants of the founders of the parish prefer to keep control over it for the time being. While this may primarily have to do with a realistic assessment of the complexities of parish management, another agenda may well be present. A possible additional factor may pertain to issues of perceived authenticity. The present author once witnessed a Russian visitor interacting uncomfortably with parishioners at an ‘old emigration’ parish and being eager to leave after the liturgy instead of socialising, since – in the view of this person – the members of the parish were ‘playing at being Russian’, in contrast to the ‘real Russia’ the visitor was coming from. Thus different circumstances and cultural legacies mean that it is sometimes difficult for different generations of migrants to find common ground. This is striking when recalling that the old émigrés had envisioned their mission to be that of keeping the Russian flame alive in the difficult circumstances of exile. Nicolas Zernov tells the story of taking an English friend to various Russian churches in Paris on Good Friday in 1937. He concludes these moving pages with the following remark: Back home I asked myself where had I and my English friend been and what had we experienced? The answer was: we had been in Russia, and this was no dream or fantasy but a genuine encounter with my native land.13 Many Russian Orthodox believers of the 1920s in forced exile had indeed brought to the new countries that they lived in a religious and cultural background that they strove to preserve. Preserving the legacy of ‘Holy Russia’ was a sacred duty for them, especially at a time when a godless regime was attempted to erase the past, and this sense of duty was reinforced by the hope

278  J.-F. Mayer that their exile would only be a temporary one and that a return to their homeland would soon be possible.14 Not that all of them were religiously inclined, however, at least initially. For believers of any faith, emigration can result in their faith being discarded or changed – but also discovered or rediscovered. The latter was the case for several Russian intellectuals in exile after the turmoil of the Bolshevik revolution.15 In other ways, and in very different circumstances, this is sometimes true of the fourth wave of emigration from the former Soviet Union, after decades of state-enforced atheism until the collapse of the Soviet system, which allowed them to leave Russia. Many ­Russians who came to Western Europe at that time became familiar – to some extent – with the pre-Soviet religious traditions of their homeland once in the West.16 Some members of other national groups whose faith was only lukewarm in their home countries undergo a kind of ‘conversion experience’ that turns them into fervent believers in the country to which they have moved.17

Organising Orthodoxy: one church, several churches The establishment of Orthodox parishes in the West was not – in most cases – the outcome of missionary efforts, but rather a response to migrants’ need for pastoral care. This means that the migrants came first, and the churches ­followed, except in those few cases when migrants had the good fortune to find already existing parishes that had been established in the nineteenth century. But while some of the beautiful Russian churches across Europe became the spiritual homes of Russian exiles, many of them had to adjust to much more modest liturgical surroundings, with garages or basements being turned into chapels. Where it was possible, pious migrants joined already existing Orthodox ­parishes if they happened to be in the area in which they found themselves, or organised parishes when the existence of a group of faithful allowed them to ask for the services of a priest and the establishment of a church. Not all churches responded in the same way or at the same pace. For a long time the Georgian Orthodox Church had no parishes of its own abroad,18 but is now building an organised presence in several Western countries. In 2017, in a French city where there was not yet a Georgian Orthodox parish, the present author observed a ­ Georgian priest concelebrating at a Russian Orthodox Church where a majority of the faithful were probably of Georgian descent (a recent development). Some prayers were offered in Georgian, and then the priest gathered the Georgian believers in a nearby square after the liturgy to teach them the faith in Georgian. It was obvious that this was only a temporary arrangement and that the Georgian group would organise a parish of their own when they could afford it. In the last few decades most Orthodox churches have come to establish or are in the process of establishing a presence in a number of Western countries. Due to the organisational pattern followed by these churches, this is creating a complex situation that may be puzzling to those who are not

Western Europe  279 19

familiar with it. Migration gives rise to new issues and fresh challenges. The most obvious is the superimposition of several Orthodox jurisdictions instead of clear territorial divisions of the kind that the Orthodox ecclesiology would require. When speaking of ‘the Orthodox Church’ one must acknowledge that its various member groups share the same faith and are mostly in communion with one another, although there are exceptions such as the ­Macedonian Orthodox Church, some segments of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and the small, but active branches of Old Calendarist churches in the West.20 However, while sharing the same faith, they answer to different church leaderships in their ‘home countries’. Moreover, they do not all follow the same calendar and thus do not celebrate Christmas and other holy days on the same day. This may seem quite perplexing to outsiders. While each jurisdiction remains jealous of its own independence, the need to present a common face to local society – which is more important than a pressing need to offer a common witness – encouraged the creation of representative structures. In his 1998 book on Orthodox life in France, the late Fr. Jean-Claude Roberti (1936–2018) mentions the revealing fact that the first attempts at coordination among Orthodox bishops in France were not aimed at harmonising religious life across jurisdictions, but took place in order to have chaplains appointed for the Orthodox in the military (1939) and, later, to coordinate ecumenical efforts (1967).21 Orthodox jurisdictions have been forced to work with each other in practical ways in order to resolve specific issues. Both the state and established churches in Orthodox churches’ ‘host countries’ expect them to show a common face for practical reasons and in order to be able to negotiate the terms of their participation in these countries’ religious/cultural lives in various fields.22 Understandably, these issues have been discussed at meetings to foster inter-Orthodox cooperation, especially the preparatory gatherings that took place over a long period in preparation for the Pan-Orthodox Synod that met in Crete in June 2016.23 The search for a solution to the problems of the ‘Orthodox ­ diaspora’ was the central topic of the Fourth Pre-Conciliar ­Pan-Orthodox Conference held in June 2009 at Chambésy (near Geneva, ­Switzerland), with preparatory meetings starting as early as 1990. The most practical consequence of the June 2009 meeting was the creation of ­ Orthodox episcopal assemblies in various countries as a first step towards creating some kind of order in the confusing landscape of overlapping Orthodox jurisdictions and to reflect unity among Orthodox churches, although such assemblies should be seen as provisional measures and not as presenting a real canonical solution to the dilemmas these churches face. Interestingly, following a proposal of the Romanian Orthodox Church, the original list of proposed assemblies of Orthodox bishops that had been prepared in 1993 was extended to new regions at the 2009 meeting, ‘taking into consideration the new realities of the Orthodox diaspora following the massive migration of Orthodox believers towards countries outside the canonical territories of the Orthodox Church’.24 The six assemblies added to the list were all located in

280  J.-F. Mayer Western Europe. The fact that the list had to be extended only 16 years after it had been first drawn up says something about the vigorous, continuing migration movements from ‘Orthodox countries’ to Western Europe. The Assemblies of Orthodox Bishops were established in the following years, either as new bodies or as replacements for previously existing assemblies. They do not all seem to have the same level of activity, which can vary from one country to another. At the time of writing the crisis around Ukraine raises questions about the representative nature and future of such assemblies, if the current break is not overcome soon. One cannot ignore the interference of national and political factors in the lives of Orthodox churches in the West, due to the strong links between most jurisdictions and national identities. This has definitely not decreased in the post-­ Communist period, as the pace of emigration from the various home countries grew. The interest of post-Soviet Russia in ‘compatriots’ abroad after years of suspicions towards Russian émigrés in exile is well known beyond the territories of the former Soviet Union.25 The symbolic role of churches in the post-­ Communist national representations was emphasised by the active role played by Russian president Vladimir Putin in encouraging the reunion of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia. The organisation of Orthodox life in Western Europe is impacted by such developments.

Between ethnicity and universality In his 2002 article on the situation of the Orthodox in the United States, Alexei Krindatch remarks that Because of this forced pattern of immigration, it had become common for the Orthodox in the United States to view themselves as ethnic communities dispersed from the motherland. The same perspective historically coloured the understanding of the nature of the O[rthodox] C[hurche]s in North America. Each jurisdiction came to see itself as a ‘Diaspora’ church and/or as a geographic extension of the Mother Church. Consequently, instead of being a church serving American people, the purpose of each Orthodox jurisdiction was to care for ‘its people.’ Their parishes have become the centers not only of religious but also of social life.26 The arrival of new waves of migrants means that this situation may persist for longer than some had expected. Migration thus created a double dynamic for Orthodox believers. First, as all migrants tend to do, new arrivals are eager to find fellow believers with the same cultural and linguistic background who offer migrants the ability both to retain their identity and learn about their new environment. As Michel Bruneau remarks, a local Greek community is really constituted only when it opens its church,27 so close are the links between the Orthodox Church and the preservation of an individual’s identity, for historical reasons we are all aware of. Second, since it would not

Western Europe  281 always be possible for the Orthodox of the various nationalities to have their own parish in each place, it also made some parishes – at least temporarily – into religious homes for people of various national backgrounds. There were striking examples in times of crisis. Smith observes how in camps for displaced people after the Second World War, Russian émigré bishops endeavoured so to broaden the definition ‘Russian’ as to make it a synonym for ‘Slav’. From the moment their internment they strove to bring under their jurisdiction refugee congregations of Ukrainians, Carpatho-Russians, Balts, Lithuanians and, in Austria at least, Romanians and Serbs as well.28 Those were, of course, chaotic circumstances after a major conflict characterised by huge flows of refugees of various origins. However, this did not mean that believers were willing to sacrifice their respective national identities. In fact, Timothy Smith speaks of an ‘intensified sense of nationality’29 and remarks that attempts to create non-ethnic Orthodox congregations at that time ultimately ‘gave way before the determination of each nationality to manage its own religious life’.30 However, even where places of worship of their own were available, some of the faithful preferred to attend a church under another patriarchate (and some still do so today). This decision may be a matter of friendships, the charisma of a particular priest or the love for a specific place of worship, but also at times the feeling of having found the most authentic or most balanced expression of the Orthodox faith. Thus, migratory settings can both encourage a strong affirmation of migrants’ own national Orthodox identity and expose believers to other expressions of Orthodoxy, potentially encouraging them to stress the panOrthodox dimension, while still being appreciative of their respective traditions. The multiplicity of jurisdictions on the same territory is likely to remain in place for the time being, but in practice there are often friendly relations across parishes and among parishioners of different parishes under different jurisdictions, as well as local or regional groups in which the clergy of different jurisdictions have opportunities to meet one another. In the daily lives of many Orthodox the jurisdictional diversity is not perceived as a real problem, but unintended consequences can result. For instance, if a conflict arises between a parishioner or even an entire parish and its bishop, this situation offers the option to switch jurisdictions, which would not really work in most countries with an established church, unless one was willing to join a fringe group. One comes across parishes of one national tradition that function under another bishop, even though the jurisdiction of the ‘Mother Church’ is available.31 When property is involved, the availability of other jurisdictions provides leverage. In 2017, in the Diocese of Western Europe of the Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia, a conflict between the bishop and the laypeople in charge of the management of the cathedral in Geneva led the latter to write a letter to the Synod threatening to transfer the historical cathedral to another jurisdiction if the bishop was not removed.32 The bishop was indeed removed and, while other reasons also played a role, the use of the threat to switch jurisdictions was a telling argument.

282  J.-F. Mayer This case illustrates the role that laypeople have come to play in the lives of many parishes in migration settings. Smith stresses the role of lay leaders in the post-war ‘barracks congregations’ of the camps for displaced persons,33 but this role did not disappear in more settled environments. Nicholas ­Ferencz states that ‘the ‘modified congregationalism’ which typifies the structure of Orthodox parishes in America, is the basic cause of the problems that beset American Orthodoxy today’.34 He writes that ‘the split structure of clerical/spiritual authority versus lay/material authority is … espoused by the hierarchy of many jurisdictions as the proper mode of parochial governance’, even if it is hidden behind the euphemistic adjectives ‘conciliar’ or ‘synodal’.35 There can obviously be no Orthodox churches without bishops and priests (probably no Orthodox church member in the West dreams of becoming a priestless Old Believer!), but the practical reality of migration (as well as the legal framework in local contexts) may result in much power being given to lay figures at the parish level, or at least in tensions arising between clerical and lay power.36 This context may also mean a different experience of the church and its life, which occasionally leads to divergent views, as evidenced by the crisis in the British diocese of Sourozh at the beginning of the twenty-first century.37

Interaction with Western European Christianity For any group of migrants, the initial and most pressing religious concern is usually to find ways of organising themselves in order to preserve their cultural heritage and faith in an alien environment. This tends to absorb much energy and requires considerable effort: Orthodox parishes are no different in this regard from mosques or other similar religious settings that attract migrants in the West.38 In such circumstances most groups do not see the mission as a primary goal. But being a migrant also involves – at least for some – confronting questions about the purpose of having gone to a foreign country, whether for economic or political reasons. Inevitably, some of them conclude that the deeper reason for their presence in their new home is to share the treasures of their faith in their new environment.39 As early as the period between the two world wars some Russian émigrés in France were not only eager to promote the veneration of Western saints among the Orthodox, but in 1925 also founded the Brotherhood of St Photios in order ‘to save western Christianity by helping it to rediscover the orthodoxy it had long since lost’.40 Indeed, coming to the West, with its Christian legacy, raises questions that would not be the same if Orthodox migrants were to find themselves in a Buddhist country, for instance. Not only have Western Christian churches retained relations with Orthodox churches, but there is a shared legacy, since the first centuries of Christianity in the West are seen as centuries of Orthodox Christianity before the schism. This also involves a rediscovery of local saints, whose icons are painted and whose shrines are visited. There are official endorsements from church hierarchies: one of the most recent

Western Europe  283 instances was the April 2018 decision of the Assembly of Bishops of Spain and Portugal to insert in the calendar a feast day for the Synaxis of the Saints of the Iberian Peninsula, with 200 saints on the list.41 This also leads the ‘Mother Churches’ to add Western saints to their official calendars. In 2014 the Moscow Patriarchate created a commission to carry out such work. In March 2017 St Patrick, the enlightener of Ireland; St Alban of Britain; St Genevieve of Paris; St Vincent of Lerins; and 11 other Western saints were added to the calendar of the Russian Orthodox Church.42 In May 2018 St Gall, the enlightener of Switzerland; St Columban, abbot of Luxeuil Abbey; and St Fridolin of Säckingen, enlightener of the Upper Rhine, were included in the Russian calendar. It is worth noting that one of the reasons for adding them is explicitly stated as ‘their present veneration in foreign dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church and other Local Churches’.43 This represents one of the instances in which the development of Orthodox parishes in the West has an impact on the ‘Mother Churches’ as well. Western churches had often been sympathetic to the plight of the Russian refugees fleeing the Bolshevik revolution. This also had roots in the sympathy of sections of the Anglican Communion for Orthodox and Oriental churches, with an inclination to see them as Eastern counterparts that were neither Protestant nor Roman Catholic. But Catholic circles also proved to be supportive,44 although long-term strategic considerations for a future Catholicisation of Russia were not entirely absent at the time and led to tensions and suspicions. Russian Catholic places of worship offering Byzantine rites were opened in some cities. Conversions of Russian Orthodox refugees to the Catholic Church were few, and the immediate goal was not to convert as many as possible, since unionist dreams were still alive at that time. Too many conversions would have countered a strategy that envisioned the entire Russian Church moving closer to Rome.45 Despite greatly disparate methods, this was not a one-way process: as early as the 1920s some Catholics were also attracted to the Orthodox faith. Today, with unionist dreams fading, Orthodox churches in the West are welcomed as partners in ecumenical relations and celebrations. To this day the encounter with Western Christianity continues to bring tangible benefits to Orthodox migrants. During a recent update of a list of all the currently active Orthodox parishes in Switzerland46 it was striking to see how many had been welcomed in Roman Catholic or Reformed places of worship, which greatly assisted groups of Orthodox migrants to develop their own religious lives.47 In several countries there has been a trend in recent years of Western Christian denominations selling church buildings that are no longer needed to Orthodox parishes, often at prices below market value. The development of Orthodox parishes across Europe has also made Orthodoxy an option for religious seekers, with backgrounds ranging from active membership in Western Christian churches (including clergy) to atheism. Converting to the Orthodox faith, however, means in practical terms being willing to join one of the Orthodox jurisdictions, with its links to a specific national legacy.

284  J.-F. Mayer Berit Thorbjørnsrud perceptively remarks that a migrant with a secular background coming from Eastern Europe to the West and starting to discover Orthodoxy there will often not be seen by native Orthodox parishes as a convert in the full sense of the word, even if he/she had been an atheist or had never had a religious practice, while a Westerner, even if he/she had been a practicing Christian before embracing the Orthodox faith, would definitely be seen as a convert.48 According to Thorbjørnsrud’s observations in the Norwegian context, new Orthodox believers with an Eastern European background are often spared the period of catechumenate expected from Western converts. She sums this up as follows: ‘They seem to be considered as already inside, as if they are intrinsically Orthodox’.49 But Amy Slagle rightly observes that categories cannot always be clearly demarcated between ‘ethnic’ Orthodox and converts, and that seekers are not the only type of converts. This is illustrated by the not uncommon cases of Christian interfaith marriages in which non-Orthodox spouses make their own religious choice of embracing the Orthodox faith due to deep inner convictions, or not, as the case may be: The stories and experiences of intermarriage converts … defy this simple dichotomization of Orthodox church life into recent, seeker-driven ‘­converts’ and lifelong ‘ethnic’ Orthodox Christians. Beyond this sharp, oversimplified contrast between what seems to be competing patterns of ecclesial affiliation, intermarriage conversions appear as ‘tricks of the eye’ in embodying aspects of both and occupying a ‘betwixt and between’ position in the conceptual firmament of local church life.50

Conclusion As this chapter has shown, the realities of migration have revealed the challenges facing Orthodox churches resulting from their organisation on national lines. In theory, it would have been possible to establish different linguistic parishes under one bishop on a territorial basis. Instead, a mixture of historical circumstances and national feelings have led to dioceses being established side by side, led by bishops with their separate church structures headquartered in the same cities. Thus migration has become one more step in cementing the nationalisation of Orthodoxy. But in the future this situation may well open the path to a confrontation with changing circumstances. With the passing away of older generations the diaspora model often used to describe Orthodox churches in the West and elsewhere is bound to become increasingly problematic, even if it might well persist for reasons that have little to do with ecclesiological considerations. Although this was definitely not what migrants had envisioned, their move to new e­ nvironments has started the process of creating an Orthodox presence that will not permanently remain the mere replication of ‘Mother Churches’ in another environment – or at least not entirely.51 However, the form that this new ­dispensation will take will

Western Europe  285 depend on various factors, including new waves of migrants who might be seen as renewed justifications for perpetuating the same model. Future developments will also depend on the policies of the ‘Mother Churches’, since the development of local Orthodox churches in the West can be perceived as a threat that undermines efforts to keep a mixture of faith and patriotism alive.52 While Vassilis Pnevmatikakis is correct in stating that the current system of organisation of Orthodox churches in the West should be seen as temporary (and is certainly bound to change over time), it is not clear how it could escape the tension between ‘the institutional reality of a jurisdictional exclusivism which sustains its multiple identities and the ecclesiological ideal of a local catholicity transcending those same different identities’.53 The need to respond to migrants’ expectations of pastoral care, the prestige derived from an international presence and the political interests at stake create major hurdles, notwithstanding the stated resolve of the Fourth Pan-Orthodox Preconciliar Conference in 2009 to resolve the issue of the ‘diaspora’ in accordance with canonical rules and the generalisation of the model of episcopal assemblies in such areas. As Maria Hämmerli convincingly argues, Orthodox communities outside their traditional areas do not coalesce into one single Orthodox diaspora, despite the shared faith they demonstrate on occasions such as common services by Orthodox hierarchs on the Sunday of Orthodoxy.54 This does not mean that the situation cannot evolve. A number of Orthodox believers in the West are keen to emphasise and promote what Orthodox believers have in common, with the long-term aspiration of establishing a truly local church. But the institutional realities remain strongly marked by the background of migrations. Like all religious groups of migrants, Orthodox churches are expected to fulfil a triple role: first, to help migrants to find their way in new environments and to integrate into the societies in which they find themselves; second, to preserve their religious heritage and identity; and, third, to find proper ways to enculturate – insofar as is possible – their tradition into another environment. As long as new flows of migrants arrive, this triple role will persist. But the challenges of adjusting church structures in the West to the canonical rules of the Orthodox tradition will also become more acute. Migration may represent an opportunity for rethinking one’s own personal identity, and sometimes reassessing or reaffirming one’s religious beliefs. But it also opens a path to remodelling collective religious identities in new settings, and it raises questions that are relevant beyond the migrant groups themselves.

Notes   1 Pew Research Center, ‘Orthodox Christianity in the 21st century’, 8 November 2017, p. 6, available at www.pewforum.org/2017/11/08/orthodox-christianityin-the-21st-century/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). This report also places ­non-Chalcedonian, Oriental churches in the ‘Orthodox’ category, thus including Ethiopian Orthodox (14 per cent of the Orthodox world population, according to Pew) and Copts in the total. If it were not for them, the percentage of

286  J.-F. Mayer Orthodox Christians living in Europe (77 per cent of Orthodox believers, compared to 91 per cent in 1910) would be still higher.  2 Pew Research Center, ‘Orthodox Christianity in the 21st century’, p. 21. According to research conducted in Italy by CESNUR, a Turin-based research centre and the editor of an encyclopaedia of religions in Italy, the number of Orthodox Christians in Italy is also above a million, available at www.cesnur. com/il-pluralismo-religioso-italiano-nel-contesto-postmoderno-2/ (accessed on 30 October 2018).  3 ‘In all, nearly two-thirds (64 per cent) of U.S. Orthodox Christians are either immigrants (40 per cent) or the children of immigrants (23 per cent), the highest such share of any Christian denomination in the United States’ (Pew Research Center, ‘Orthodox Christianity in the 21st century’, p. 25).   4 A useful overview of the situation of Orthodox Churches in Western Europe by the mid-2000s was provided by the small volume by Christine Chaillot (ed.), A Short History of the Orthodox Church in Western Europe in the 20th Century, Paris: Inter-Orthodox Dialogue, 2006.  5 See the first three chapters in Christopher Birchall, Embassy, Emigrants, and ­Englishmen: The Three-Hundred-Year History of a Russian Orthodox Church in London ( Jordanville: Holy Trinity Publications, 2014).  6 There were a few hundred Romanian students in Paris in the mid-nineteenth century, and there was a Romanian parish in the French capital since 1853, see Jean-Michel Lemonnier, ‘L’Eglise orthodoxe roumaine en Europe occidentale: territoires et “diaspora” ’, Annales Universitatis Apulensis: Series Philologica, 2017, 18 (1), pp. 367–368, available at www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=600323 (accessed on 30 October 2018).  7 The sometimes-difficult situation for Christians in countries with a Muslim majority also contributes to the migration of both Orthodox Christians from the Byzantine tradition and members of non-Chalcedonian churches.   8 The share of converts among Orthodox clergy is, however, disproportionate in several Western European countries: by the mid-2000s more than 40 per cent of Orthodox clergy in Great Britain were Western converts, in comparison with a much lower total percentage of converts in Orthodox parishes, see Kallistos Ware, ‘The Orthodox Church in the British Isles’, in Chaillot, A Short History of the Orthodox Church in Western Europe, p. 58.  9 Giuseppe Giordan, ‘Orthodox Christianity in Italy: Historical Continuity and Social Discontinuity’, Religion, State and Society, 2015, 43 (3), p. 271. 10 Nikolaj Thon, ‘Ethnische Vielfalt und Einheit im Glauben: Die Orthodoxe Kirche in Deutschland und ihr historischer Weg zu einer Bischofskonfenrenz’, in Thomas Bremer, Assad Elias Kattan and Reinhard Thöle (eds.), Orthodoxie in Deutschland, Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2016, p. 53. 11 Lemonnier, ‘L’Eglise orthodoxe roumaine’, p. 385. 12 The arrival of immigrant workers in the coal-producing areas in the late 1950s gave rise to conflicts and animosity among the Greeks in Belgium. The majority of the earlier expatriates did not receive the Greek coal miners with feelings of solidarity. It seems that they even resented their consorting with workers during religious services, claiming that ‘the church has become full of coal dust.’ Some of them feared that the Belgian society would equate them with their socially inferior compatriots, which would jeopardize their prestige and impede the processes of upward social mobility for themselves and their offspring. Lina Venturas, ‘Greek Immigrants in Postwar Belgium: Community and Identity Formation Processes’, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, 2002, 28 (1), p. 51, available at http://adapt.it/adapt-indice-a-z/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/venturas_lina. pdf (accessed on 30 October 2018)

Western Europe  287 13 Nicolas Zernov, Sunset Years: A Russian Pilgrim in the West, London: The ­Fellowship of St Alban & St Sergius, 1983, p. 45. 14 Sylvain Bensidoun, ‘La diaspora russe dans le monde (1919–1939)’, Revue ­Historique, October–December 1990, 284, fasc. 2, no. 576, pp. 408–409. 15 Bensidoun, ‘La diaspora russe’, pp. 410–411. 16 Isabelle Nicolini, ‘Les rites liés à la religion orthodoxe russe en France’, Anthropos, 2009, 104 (1), p. 79. 17 Daniela Iancu, ‘Tradition et changement chez les émigrés roumains pendant les fêtes d’hiver à Paris’, Revista de Etnografie şi Folclor/Journal of Ethnography and Folklore, 2014, 1–2, p. 109. 18 The Georgian Orthodox parish of St Nino in Paris represented a unique case, having been founded in 1929, but remaining to this day under the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The other Georgian Orthodox parishes in the West are all recently established ones. 19 See the description of the US situation given by Alexei D. Krindatch, ‘Orthodox (Eastern Christian) Churches in the United States at the Beginning of a New ­Millennium: Questions of Nature, Identity, and Mission’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, September 2002, 41 (3), pp. 533–563. 20 The final version of this chapter was completed in the week when the Moscow Patriarchate decided to break communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate over the issue of Ukraine. Thus the chapter reflects the situation as it was before this decision, the consequences of which are uncertain. 21 Jean-Claude Roberti, Etre Orthodoxe en France aujourd’hui, Paris: Hachette, 1998, pp. 52–53. 22 In countries where official recognition is possible, state authorities may prefer to grant recognition to the Orthodox Church as a whole rather than to individual Orthodox ‘denominations’. In Belgium, where the Orthodox Church has been officially recognised since 1985, the metropolitan or archbishop at the head of the Diocese of the Ecumenical Patriarchate is recognised as representing the entire Orthodox Church in the country according to Article 1 of the Royal Decree of 15 March 1988. 23 This gathering was supposed to be a Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church, but the last-minute absence of the churches of Bulgaria, Antioch, Georgia and Russia precluded such an all-embracing title (even more so after the October 2018 break between Constantinople and Moscow), although only time will tell what the status of the 2016 Synod will be for Orthodox churches around the world. 24 Viorel Ionita, Towards the Holy and Great Synod of the Orthodox Church: The Decisions of the Pan-Orthodox Meetings since 1923 until 2009, Basel: Friedrich Reinhardt Verlag, 2014, p. 96. 25 See the interesting terminological observations by Marina Sorokina, ‘Émigration, étranger ou diaspora? Réflexions sur la transformation des termes et des concepts dans l’historiographie russe contemporaine’, Revue d’Etudes Comparatives ­Est-Ouest, 2014, 45 (1), pp. 69–93. 26 Krindatch, ‘Orthodox (Eastern Christian) Churches in the United States’, p. 551. 27 Michel Bruneau, ‘Une immigration dans la longue durée: la diaspora grecque en France’, Espace, Populations, Sociétés 2–3, 1996, p. 49, available at www.persee.fr/ doc/espos_0755-7809_1996_num_14_2_1775 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 28 Timothy L. Smith, ‘Refugee Orthodox Congregations in Western Europe, 1945– 1948’, Church History, September 1969, 38 (3), p. 319. 29 Smith, ‘Refugee Orthodox Congregations’, p. 326. 30 Ibid, p. 321.

288  J.-F. Mayer 31 For instance, in Switzerland there are a few small parishes of ‘free Romanians’ under the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 32 Extracts from this letter were quoted in an article by Nadezhda Sikorska, ‘Arhiepiskop Zhenevskij i Zapadno-Evropejskij Mihail vremenno otstranen ot dolzhnosti’ (Archbishop Michael of Geneva and Western Europe suspended from office), Nasha Gazeta, 2 October 2017, available at http://nashagazeta.ch/news/ ma-suisse/arhiepiskop-zhenevskiy-i-zapadno-evropeyskiy-mihail-vremenno-otstranenot-dolzhnosti (accessed on 5 November 2018). 33 Smith, ‘Refugee Orthodox Congregations’, pp. 321–322. 34 Nicholas Ferencz, American Orthodoxy and Parish Congregationalism, Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2015, p. vii. 35 Ferencz, American Orthodoxy, p. 5. 36 See the interesting case study by Berit Thorbjørnsrud, ‘Orthodox Priests in Norway: Serving or Ruling?’ in Maria Hämmerli and Jean-François Mayer (eds.), Orthodox Identities in Western Europe, Farnham: Ashgate, 2014, pp. 191–210. 37 See Maria Hämmerli and Edmund Mucha, ‘Innovation in the Russian Orthodox Church: The Crisis in the Diocese of Sourozh in Britain’, in Hämmerli and Mayer, Orthodox Identities in Western Europe, pp. 291–302. 38 Once again, fruitful comparative work could be done between Orthodox and Muslim migration to the West, even if it is obvious that the Orthodox are generally perceived as a non-threatening minority, which makes a major difference to their experience compared to that of Muslims. 39 This can be observed among various groups of migrants. African or other nonEuropean churches coming to the West not infrequently develop such views as well, even if the impact of their outreach efforts sometimes remains quite limited. 40 Jonathan Seiling, ‘Exiled Russian Orthodox Leaders in Paris and the Struggle to Establish a Home away from Home (1925–1944)’, in Historical Papers 2005: Canadian Society of Church History, Brian Gobbett, Bruce L. Guenther and Robynne Rogers Healey (eds.), London, Ontario: University of Western Ontario, 2005, p. 74, available at https://historicalpapers.journals.yorku.ca/index. php/historicalpapers/article/view/39204 (accessed on 30 October 2018). See also Vasileios Pnevmatikakis, ‘L’émigration russe et la naissance d’une orthodoxie française 1925–1953’, Slavica bruxellensia 8 (2012), available at http://slavica. revues.org/1068 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 41 ‘New Feast of All Saints of Iberian Peninsula to be proclaimed in October’, Basilica.ro, 26 April 2018, available at http://basilica.ro/en/new-feast-all-saints-­ iberian-peninsula-proclaimed-october/ (accessed on 30 October 2018). 42 ‘St Patrick of Ireland and other Western Saints officially added to Russian Orthodox Church calendar’, Orthodox Christianity, 10 March 2017, available at http://orthochristian.com/101734.html (accessed on 30 October 2018). 43 ‘Ancient Georgian and Western saints officially added to Russian Church calendar’, Serbian Orthodox Church, 16 May 2018, available at www.spc.rs/eng/ ancient_georgian_and_western_saints_officially_added_russian_church_calendar. (accessed on 30 October 2018). 44 Ralph Schor, ‘Solidarité chrétienne? Orthodoxes russes et catholiques français dans les années 1920’, Cahiers de la Méditerranée 63 (2001), pp. 157–167, available at http://journals.openedition.org/cdlm/18 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 45 See Laura Pettinaroli, ‘Difficultés et fécondités d’une rencontre: catholicisme et orthodoxie à l’épreuve de l’émigration russe’, in Sylvie Martin (ed.), Parcours de l’Emigration, 1917–1945: Culture et Histoire, Lyon: Institut Européen Est-Ouest, 2012, pp. 289–309.

Western Europe  289 46 See Orthodoxie.ch, ‘Répertoire des paroisses orthodoxes en Suisse’, 2018, available at https://orthodoxie.ch/p/paroisses-orthodoxes-suisse (accessed on 30 October 2018). 47 This also applies to other countries: in the Italian case, ‘in 73 per cent of cases it is the Catholic Church which makes a venue for worship available to the Orthodox ‘with gratuitous renewable commodatum’ (the Catholic parish lends it free)’ (Giordan, ‘Orthodox Christianity in Italy’, pp. 272–273). 48 Berit Thorbjørnsrud, ‘Who Is a Convert? New Members of the Orthodox Church in Norway’, Temenos, 2015, 51 (1), pp. 71–93, available at https:// journal.fi/temenos/article/view/49447 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 49 Thorbjørnsrud, ‘Who Is a Convert?’, p. 76. 50 Amy Slagle, ‘In the Eye of the Beholder: Perspectives on Intermarriage Conversion in Orthodox Christian Parishes in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania’, Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation, Summer 2010, 20 (2), p. 234, available at https://doi.org/10.1525/rac.2010.20.2.233 (accessed on 30 October 2018). Still, it is worth noting that in almost all of the cases in Slagle’s study, ‘Orthodox Christianity was the dominant family religion while the non-Orthodox spouse was typically left to practice her faith alone’ (p. 252). 51 One might revisit from such a perspective the (failed) proposal made in 2003 by Patriarch Aleksi II of Moscow: The patriarch expressed the view that the time of unity had arrived and that it was therefore time for the different branches of the Russian Orthodox Church abroad to reunite with their Mother Church, the Patriarchate of Moscow. However, he realised that the jurisdictions outside Russia had developed very differently from the one in the Soviet Union and proposed a unified Metropolia for all Orthodox bishops, dioceses and parishes of Russian tradition in Western Europe. This structure would remain under the canonical jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Moscow but be accorded wide autonomy. (Sebastian Rimestad, ‘The Russian Orthodox Church in Western Europe: One or Many?’ Religion, State and Society, 2015, 43 (3), p. 231) 52 See the remarks on the efforts of the Russian Church to counter these trends in an article by Kristina Stöckl, ‘Orthodoxe Kirchen als Migrations- und Minderheitenkirchen: Herausforderungen und Chancen’, in Jürgen Nautz et al. (eds.), Öffentliche Religionen in Österreich: Politikverständnis und zivilgesellschaftliches Engagement, Innsbruck: Innsbruck University Press, 2013, p. 191. 53 Vassilis Pnevmatikakis, ‘La territorialité de l’Eglise orthodoxe en France, entre exclusivisme juridictionnel et catholicité locale’, Carnets de Géographes, 2013, 6, p. 50, available at https://journals.openedition.org/cdg/918 (accessed on 30 October 2018). 54 Paradoxically, what unites these communities, their belonging to the Orthodox Church, is also a point of separation, because churches reproduce ethnic differentiations. Religious belief does not federate these communities in a unique diaspora coalesced around shared faith. It is rather a co-habitation of national diasporas with their respective churches who are nevertheless aware of their religious affinity. (Maria Hämmerli, ‘Orthodox Diaspora? A Sociological and Theological Problematisation of a Stock Phrase’, International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, May–August 2010, 10 (2–3), p. 101)

J. G. Pankhurst

United States

11 Hospitality for strangers? Policies and practices of Eastern Christian churches and charities in support of new migrants to the United States and refugees abroad Jerry G. Pankhurst The problem of the fate of forced migrants around the globe is demonstrably dire. According to Alexander Aleinikoff, Director of the Zolberg Institute on Migration and Mobility at the New School for Social Research, the numbers are staggering: ‘65, 66 million displaced people by conflict, about a third of them are refugees outside their country of origin. This is the highest number we’ve seen since World War II. […]’1 The Christian churches and other faith communities of the United States might reasonably be expected to be deeply engaged in the struggle of immigrants worldwide given their humanitarian social doctrines and their relatively great wealth which could be used in support of those suffering from forced migration of one or another sort. Experts have recognised ‘the important role that the faith community plays in keeping alive the refugee system’ and the fact that ‘the religions of the United States are on the right side on the values side on migration’.2 Furthermore, in practice, all refugees entering the USA must enter via one of nine refugee resettlement agencies, six of which are based in religious organisations.3 Among Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox believers in the USA, there is quite a bit of discussion about the role of immigrant support, churches as sanctuary locations for asylum seekers, sanctuary cities and the like. The most recent statement of the organisation of Orthodox bishops of the USA clearly references the problem of refugees and immigrants in the second point of the official report of its October 2018 conference. We express our compassion and support for refugees and their families, who face immense suffering and encounter severe displacement throughout the world and even in our own country. Additionally, we denounce all violence […] Orthodox Christians are called to demonstrate their solidarity with and hospitality to all people, irrespective of race and religion, to welcome and embrace the image of God in the least of our brothers and sisters, as instructed in the parable of our Lord (c.f. Matt. 25:40–45). Our God is a God of love and forgiveness, of reconciliation and fellowship.4 Excepting the Native American population, all other Americans are immigrants or from immigrant family backgrounds. The question of forced

United States  291 ­ igration would seem to be most urgent for Eastern Orthodox Christians m whose roots of faith are more directly celebrated as coming from what are now areas of great strife causing forced migration streams. Indeed, the confluence of Orthodox faith interest, even among the very diverse American Orthodox traditions, was clearly represented by a prayer service in New York City on 8 November 2017. Convened as the annual recognition of the value of the global service of the United Nations and its workers, the event in 2017 joined official representatives of 13 Eastern Orthodox jurisdictions and six Oriental Orthodox jurisdictions in the USA in worship aimed to intercede for migrants and refugees. As host for the gathering in the Greek Orthodox Cathedral in New York, Archbishop Demetrios (Trakatellis) stated in his welcoming remarks, ‘We come together to grow in love and charity for the least of our brothers, especially for those who find themselves on the move because of conditions beyond their control’.5 Such cooperative worship, alongside clear statements of commitment by Orthodox bishops and priests, is growing. Conversely, the distance between the multiple Eastern faiths is shrinking as the common strife in the historical seats of Eastern Christianity is thrown into relief by the drama of the local ­conflicts – ranging from the former Yugoslavia to Ukraine to Syria, Iraq and the rest of the Middle East and North Africa – and the seeming lack of adequate humanitarian support coming from the United States government. The USA, in turn, is experiencing what is increasingly seen as a ‘humanitarian catastrophe’ in its dealing with immigrants, particularly children separated from their families along its Southern borders.6 The political debate about government policies and their implementation for immigrants highlights the overall issues about which this book is focused. The particularity of the question for the Orthodox is stressed in a July 2018 entry in the blog of Fordham ­University’s Orthodox Christian Studies Center which states: ‘Orthodox Christians must draw on their histories to speak credibly to the anxieties of migration, the human toll of detention and deportation, and the negative implications of immigration restrictions, entry quotas, and normalised xenophobia.’7 Before exploring how this charge can be understood, the makeup of ‘­American Orthodoxy’ must be clarified. According to Alexei Krindatch, the research director for the Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops in the USA (ACOB), there are 820,000 adherents in the USA of American Orthodox churches, with ‘regularly participating church members’ numbering about one-quarter of that total.8 These numbers merge adherence and membership of some 12 jurisdictions, however, and each jurisdiction has a unique ethnic or national heritage. Because global Eastern Orthodoxy is organisationally structured by nationality, the diverse heritage of Orthodox faithful in the USA has led to seemingly endless conflicts over jurisdictional boundaries and membership.9 The largest Orthodox jurisdiction in the USA by far is the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America (GOARCH), which exists under the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarch. Also under the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarch are the American Carpatho-Russian

292  J. G. Pankhurst Orthodox Diocese, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the USA and the Albanian Orthodox Diocese. The other American Orthodox j­urisdictions are subordinated to historic patriarchates based in several nations. These are the jurisdictions under the patriarchates of Antioch, Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Serbia and Moscow. The Moscow Patriarchate in the USA entails two parts: the 35 parishes directly subordinate to Moscow and the parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia (ROCOR) which entered communion with the Moscow Patriarchate in 2007.10 The twelfth member of ACOB is the independent Orthodox Church in America (OCA), which gained its autocephaly from the Moscow Patriarchate in 1970. Besides the Canonical Orthodox jurisdictions, there are also an undetermined number of adherents and members of six Oriental Orthodox jurisdictions. The Standing Conference for Oriental Orthodox Churches (SCOOCH) includes these member jurisdictions: the Syrian Orthodox Church of Antioch; the Coptic Orthodox Church; the Malankara Syriac Church; the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church; The Eritrean Orthodox Tewahedo Church; and the Armenian Church.11 The efforts of one group of the Oriental Orthodox, Ethiopians in Columbus, Ohio, to address the needs of immigrants and refugees will be described below.

How American Orthodox faithful show ‘hospitality for strangers’ There is no question but that most Eastern Orthodox parishes of any size in the United States recognise and honour the biblical principle directing Christians to show hospitality towards others, whether Christian or not. ­ Parishioners and hierarchs alike often site Matthew 25:35, ‘For I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me drink’.12 Almost all parishes have some kind of outreach to local communities in the form of soup kitchens for the hungry, aid to the homeless and needy, emergency relief in the face of natural disasters, and similar local efforts to address the difficulties of neighbours, including those who are strangers to the Orthodox faithful. In the parishes of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America this task is handled first by branches of the Philoptochos Society in every parish. Its mission statement says its purpose is ‘To promote charitable, benevolent and philanthropic outreach to preserve the sanctity of life and family and to perpetuate and promote our Orthodox faith and traditions’.13 Similar social service committees or organisations are found in almost all Orthodox parishes of any size and maturity in other Orthodox jurisdictions, and they are often linked up with parish youth programmes in order to help develop an ethic of public service with a Christian motive. It is frequently the case that the service outreach is coordinated with other Orthodox parishes and with local or regional ecumenical or interfaith collaborations. These social service groups serve local ‘strangers’ in the first place, but the parish Philoptochos Societies and similar groups are often the bodies that

United States  293 connect the parish with programmes of assistance for strangers who are more distant, like those who are experiencing forced migration or displacement abroad. The local parish groups channel funds for international humanitarian assistance to the International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC), an organisation created in 199214 by the Standing Conference of Canonical Orthodox Bishops in the Americas (SCOBA), the ecclesiastical organisation that has now been replaced by the Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops in the United States of America (ACOB). IOCC’s original purpose was to provide food, clothing and other survival supplies for people living in the countries of the former Soviet Union, which were undergoing extreme economic deprivation at the time.15 In the twenty-first century, IOCC’s mission has broadened to encompass emergency relief and development assistance worldwide. In its global efforts, it often joins together with the ecumenical relief NGO called ACT Alliance,16 which includes 151 churches or churchrelated organisations such as Lutheran, Anglican and various Protestant organisations that are members of the World Council of Churches or the Lutheran World Federation. Philanthropic arms of other Eastern Orthodox Churches, including the Russian and Serbian Churches, are members, and member churches of the Oriental Orthodox traditions sponsor organisations that are active members of the ACT Alliance.17 American Eastern Christian philanthropic programmes for refugees and forced migrants, then, form a multi-tiered system of support. Starting at the parish level money is gathered and then sent upward to the American IOCC level, which in turn supports and joins in efforts of ACT Alliance and other international organisations. An approach to understanding this structure is the ‘Social World Model’, which can help to clarify and provide context for what is happening at various levels of society and culture.18 According to the Social World Model, understanding any social behaviour – that would include charitable efforts and social problem solving – requires attention at all analytical levels of social life. Analysis should start at the level of individual and personal interactions, the micro level, and then move up to consideration of larger-scale interactions of organisations and bureaucracies at the meso level, and then move up to the macro analytical level of national or global relations. If cause and effect processes at all three levels are not taken into account fully, part of the process of understanding will be missed. Furthermore, there are interactions across and between the levels that must be understood in order to see the whole picture. For the image of Orthodox charitable support for refugees or forced migrants, the Social World Model sees three levels of contributions with international contributions at the end of an upward trajectory in which the contributions can be taken out of the trajectory path at any previous level. Aggregating individual or parish contributions from the micro level cannot be understood as a simple cumulative process but rather as a contingency process as individual and collective energies and money move through various optional paths to the end result of aid for migrants internationally.

294  J. G. Pankhurst At any of these levels, interests may branch out to serve specific needs at that level. Thus, much parish energy is expended on local projects and programmes and does not reach the national or international level.19 Furthermore, Krindatch found that the general level of social activism among Orthodox parishioners is relatively low. In a 2015 study, he concluded that social justice work has never been a high priority in the Orthodox Church and results of the survey confirmed this fact. Only 25 per cent of Orthodox parishes agreed that they “are working for social justice” to contrast with 66 per cent of the Roman Catholic parishes, 58 per cent Oldline and 37 per cent Evangelical/Black Protestant congregations.20 Thus, although there are many parish-level activities going on, they may not centre on service to immigrants or refugees as much as is the case for other faith traditions. In interviews with several Orthodox anthropologists, sociologists and religious studies scholars, none could name significant projects in aid to refugees among Orthodox parishes. One reason for this relative lack of activity in this regard is the general ethic emphasised in the churches that does not focus on social justice issues. This is not, however, to deny the contributions Orthodox individuals and parishes make towards the collective IOCC efforts. Besides programmes for refugees, significant charitable funding is taken out of the stream of support upward at the regional or national level for addressing natural disasters like hurricanes or floods or other meso level demands; then remaining funding is devoted to relief of Middle Eastern, European, African or other problems. Of course, some donors (individuals or collective entities) may contribute directly at the meso or the macro levels, skipping the micro level altogether. It also must be noted that the situation today is likely different from what was the case in previous eras. The breakup of the Soviet Union, which caused waves of migration in several directions, caused clear outflows of charitable funds in support of migrating Orthodox Christians and others, most of whom were experiencing great deprivations at the time.21 This migration pattern, however, has slowed, and informants indicate that the more recent immigrants from areas of the former Soviet Union tend to be better off than the early post-Soviet migrants and are often arriving under family reunification visas that give them a ready-made support system upon arrival in the United States or elsewhere. Similarly, some migration routes have changed significantly as countries in Eastern and Central Europe have become more stable and prosperous. One Orthodox Christian informant, who is a sociologist and leader of the Ukrainian Association in a large Midwestern city but who often worships at the Greek cathedral because there is no Ukrainian Orthodox Church nearby, stated that the Ukrainian Association sends aid to poor and needy people in Ukraine, and the Greek Orthodox send similar assistance to Greece – especially active during the disastrous fires in Greece recently. On the other hand, there are no organised

United States  295 support programmes for refugees based in the Greek church or the Ukrainian community (including the Ukrainian Byzantine Catholic Church in the city). Looking at the situation of immigration from Ukraine over the last several years, she indicated that the tendency is for Ukrainians to escape the strife in that country by going to Poland rather than further abroad in the hope that they might return to Ukraine when the danger there subsides. Poland provides a nearby welcoming locale with similar cultural patterns that make migration there less difficult than the longer and more culturally divergent pattern of the early post-Soviet years. Interestingly, this informant also noted that there continues to be a strong support programme for refugees among nearby Ukrainian Baptist and Pentecostal Christians. The energy for this programme seems to be based in the greater commitment of these groups to evangelical conversions and support for growing the evangelical faith. It seems that the general lack of evangelical outreach aimed at conversions among the Orthodox reduces the sense of urgency towards support for immigration.22

American policies and politics related to refugees and immigration Brief historical note Except for the native American Population, which was decimated by the ­European imperial expansion to the Americas starting in the late fifteenth century, all people living in the United States are immigrants. Some were brought by force as slaves or indentured labourers, but many came as refugees fleeing religious or political persecution or criminal prosecution. The early core European migrants from Northern Europe and Iberia were augmented from the start by African peoples brought to the Americas as slaves. The importation of black slaves from abroad lasted until a series of acts banned it, the first in 1807 and other legislation growing more decisive through the 1823 declaration of slave trading as piracy, a capital crime. Some Asians arrived in North America in the mid- to late 1800s and early 1900s – mostly Chinese and ­Japanese to work on the railroad expansion westward and in mining in the West – but exclusionary laws ended both Asian streams of immigration by the early twentieth century. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries successive waves of migrants arrived from Germany, Ireland, Greece, Poland and elsewhere in Europe. Each group faced significant prejudice and discrimination from older waves of immigrants until they adapted to and assimilated into American society and culture. Assimilation was realised through English language acquisition and adoption of ‘American’ culture in a significant range of areas from dress to living arrangements to food preferences. However, the 1924 National Origins Act deeply cut immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe and kept nonWhites out of the United States. In the nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries,

296  J. G. Pankhurst the largest groups of immigrants came to the USA overwhelmingly from ‘White’ Europe. These European migrants came to the USA to escape economic dislocations and seek a better standard of living, or to find suitable homes after disasters such as the Irish Potato Famine destroyed their livelihoods. The USA Slavic population was increased in significant measure during this period as Poles came to the USA seeking economic betterment and relief from the conflicts of their homeland. In addition, the 1917 Russian Revolution and the simultaneous dislocations of the First World War brought many Russians, Byelorussians and Ukrainians to American shores. By the time of the run-up to the 1924 Nationality Act, the questions of immigration had become a major political issue in the media and the campaigns for public office at the time. Movements to end or greatly decrease immigration to America had grown considerable political strength by the early twentieth century, but the Orthodox at the time nevertheless sought to serve new Orthodox arrivals, most of whom were Russians. Aram Sarkisian found that the Russian Immigrant Society, which was founded in 1908, ‘assisted over 3,700 immigrants in its first year, and over 50,000 across its history’.23 He concludes his essay on immigration with this: ‘Recalling how newly-arrived Orthodox Christians were clothed, fed, and supported in their past hours of need, how can today’s faithful hesitate to express solidarity with the thousands of migrant families experiencing similar traumas in America today?’24 Sarkisian’s essay is both (1) a call to American Orthodox Christians to get involved more fully and effectively in improving the conditions for immigrants in the USA and (2) a critique of the USA policies and practices regarding immigrants. It was only in 1965 that passage of the Federal Immigration and Nationality Act abolished regulations that excluded immigrants by nationality, country of origin or race and opened the USA borders to a more diversified inflow of immigrants. By 2018, however, the laws and procedures of immigration faced new challenges and the demands for government involvement are now shaped by new forces. Attempts at national immigration policy reform for the twenty-first century Quotas of immigrants from given countries have been abolished since the 1965 law change, and the result has been a truly new complexion for the American population. The Hispanic population of the United States is becoming its second-largest ‘minority’ displacing African Americans in that status. And the growth of the number of residents and citizens from East and South Asia and Africa has changed the culture in profound ways. As diversity has become a catchword, however, resistance and fear of non-Euro-­ American immigration has grown. Cross-border criminality, especially related to the drug trade, has become a major issue in public opinion and politics (even though the data show a long-term decline in criminality among new immigrant populations) and fear of terrorism since the attacks of

United States  297 11 ­September 2001 (referred to as 9/11) has injected a special urgency into questions of i­mmigration policy. At the same time, the legislative stalemate in national politics has led to failures of bipartisan efforts to craft a revised policy on immigration that could address the developing challenges and yet honour the growing commitment to diverse public life in the USA. The three presidents before Donald Trump and several ad hoc and legislative groups of social and political leaders have tried mightily to write l­egislation that would modernise our immigration policies in a way that could win general public acceptance and Congressional passage. But to no avail. The biggest thorn in the side of these efforts has been finding a way to agree on the treatment of the large number of immigrants who are resident in the USA but did not enter by legal means. Whether they have caused problems while in the USA or, on the other hand, have been successful taxpayers and contributors in their communities, these ‘illegal aliens’ present a difficult quandary for law enforcement and citizenship. Especially in Puritan-founded America, there is a strong belief among many that these immigrants cannot be allowed to go unpunished, but there is no consensus on how severe such punishment should be. The problem is confounded by the issue of young people who may have been bought into the USA by parents when they were minors, or who were born to their immigrant parents after they arrived in the USA. How should these ‘innocents’ be dealt with fairly?25 The political failures and complex social forces that have complicated the situation for immigrants and confused the public came to a head with the 2016 election of Donald Trump as President. Trump’s campaign was built solidly upon a nationalistic appeal that played on fear of racial and ethnic diversity and, especially, on the call to shut down immigration. In order to ‘Make America Great Again’ we needed to ‘Build the Wall’ on the Southern border to keep immigrants out. At the same time, Trump advocated a conservative social agenda that appealed to Christian Evangelicals and many Orthodox Christians. The appeal of anti-immigrant politics is clearly partisan, as the Pew Research Centre report released in June 2018 has shown.26 Democrats and independents tend to favour increasing legal immigration more than do Republicans, and Republicans are more likely than Democrats to desire decreasing immigration to the USA. However, there tends to be a great over-estimate on the part of all social groups and parties (though less for Democrats than Republicans) of the level of illegal immigration, and many link illegal immigration to criminality despite the data. The 2016 Trump campaign played on the anti-immigrant views of a minority of the population to craft his winning electoral strategy. Although Trump opened his campaign with charges that the Mexican border admitted rapists and gang criminals, etc., his arguments then and later have also undermined the ability of the USA to grant effective support to immigrants from elsewhere.27 One clear policy of the Trump administration has been enmity towards Syrian immigration to the USA. There has been a strong suspicion nurtured by the president that any opening for immigration

298  J. G. Pankhurst from the Middle East will open a window for the entry of bad actors, in ­particular, Muslim terrorists, into the United States. Even though there is no evidence that the vetting of Syrian refugees is not strong enough to keep bad actors out, Trump has insisted that it would be dangerous to open that window. His fear even covers Christians from the region as they have been excluded in the same way as Muslim refugees. Trump is remembered as campaigning to implement a ‘Muslim ban’ on entry to the USA, a promise that he has put into practice as an ‘executive order’ several times as courts have turned it aside as unconstitutional in whole or in part. According to ­Alexander Aleinikoff, an American university professor who served as UN Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees from 2010 to 2015, [T]he first executive order stopped all Syrian refugees from coming into the country – 5 million Syrian refugees in the world, that was prohibited – 120-day suspension on refugee admissions while the system was looked at to make sure it was secure, and then a reduction in overall refugee admissions. Under Obama in his last fiscal year he had put the number at 110,000 – the president sets that every year. Trump cut that to 50,000 without explanation, just cut that number.28 The administration has shown no sympathy for any other migrant populations either. President Trump has strongly criticised the so-called ‘family migration’ options and closed off many of the avenues by which even wellestablished American citizens might bring in relatives from their ancestral homelands. Aleinikoff stated that ‘the administration has sharply reoriented the goals and practice of the immigration system, seeking to reduce both illegal and legal immigration in ways the United States has not seen in a century’.29 Some argue that he abuses his bully pulpit to pursue undesirable goals related to immigration. Kelly Greenhill states that Trump ‘has shown himself to be a master practitioner of [psychological] manipulation’ in the debate about immigration and refugee policy, with ‘skilled use of deception and extra-factual information […]’.30 The result has been major confusion and related administrative problems in immigration matters, increased strife for those involved in immigration, and a public uproar that has been in full flower during the run-up to the November 2018 mid-term elections for the USA Congress and has remained in the headlines.

How the American Eastern Orthodox Christian world is related to forced migration populations One could argue that Eastern Orthodox Christians should be expected to have especially strong concern about the upheavals in the Middle East, North Africa, Ukraine and Orthodox Europe because these are the homelands of their churches. The legacy of national identity is preserved, it would seem, in the ethnic customs and traditions that are frequently celebrated in Orthodox

United States  299 churches in the Americas. In my hometown of Columbus, Ohio, one of the entertainment highlights of the summer is the Greek Festival, a weekend of Greek food, music and dancing centred on the Greek Orthodox cathedral and planned by the parishioners there for the whole year prior to the event. A good proportion of the city’s population takes part and, in the process, learns about Greek traditions and Eastern Orthodoxy to boot. Alexei Krindatch, Research Director for the Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops in the USA, has shown through survey research among American Orthodox that preserving ethnic cultural identities is very strong among this population.31 It may, in fact, deflect some of the faithful from paying full attention to the plight of the co-religionists abroad. Given the general success of adaptation to America of the Orthodox, they do not identify as much as they might with the chaos and deprivations of displaced or forced migrant populations. Devoting oneself to the preservation and propagation of ethnic or national subcultural traditions may, in a sense, sap off the energies that might otherwise be given to helping ameliorate suffering abroad. Nevertheless, there are several dimensions of the situation that we need to clarify in order to understand the commitment of American Orthodox to fighting the ills of forced migration. First, the opportunity to sponsor immigrants from Syria and other lands of strife is severely limited by the unwillingness of the USA Federal government to permit entry of larger numbers of migrants from these lands. The limitations of number of permits for refugees and the expectation of negative results for asylum applications mean that the number of persons and families who could be helped by American Orthodox support in America is diminished. It does seem to be the case that the presence of needy persons nearby and within the direct reach of charity from a parish in the local community or region can stimulate such support. The active involvement of many Orthodox parishes in outreach to homeless people and poor people in their communities is apparent, but such direct engagement with immigrants is not possible if there are no eligible needy immigrants nearby. Although the Ecumenical Patriarch pursued an effort to reorganise the American Orthodox jurisdictions in a more effective way to make a clear path to the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church that occurred (incompletely) in 2016, American Orthodoxy remains splintered along the lines of national heritages and special interests.32 For example, even though the Moscow Patriarchate has recognised the canonical legitimacy and autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in America, and it has accepted the parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia,33 a splinter church formerly seen as schismatic, into its communion, it also maintains 35 parishes under its direct jurisdiction in the United States.34 The bigger argument between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ecumenical Patriarchate has had its reflections in the relations among Orthodox jurisdictions and exacerbated the relations among the Orthodox churches. Indeed, one of the central points of discussion among Orthodox believers is about the level of influence their foreign heritage and

300  J. G. Pankhurst jurisdictional leaders have on their everyday affairs and the directions for their futures. Such controversies and, in fact, scandals, divert attention and energy from problem solving at all levels, including addressing the international problems of migration and displacement.

An exemplary programme from the Coptic Orthodox Church A successful programme that witnesses to the importance of showing hospitality to strangers and of concrete and real service to refugees is one begun by Ethiopian Orthodox immigrants to the United States who settled in Columbus, Ohio. Not every Eastern Christian community or parish could do what this programme has done, but its example serves as a synthesis of several aspects of concern about service to refugee populations. Over the last few decades, Columbus has become a significant place for resettlement of refugees and immigrants from various areas of Asia and Africa. Growing out of the need to assist the Ethiopian migrant community, an active group of people serve immigrants from abroad in full and effective ways. While this programme does not operate in the homeland of the faith of immigrants, it has become central to the resettlement process for immigrants of many faith traditions and connects new arrivals with their homelands through the life experience of those who have moved to Columbus.35 Columbus’s four congregations of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church are the original base of support and creation for Ethiopian Tewahedo Social Services (ETSS).36 ETSS began in 2000 as the Foundation for Ethiopian Families and Children, an effort to provide social service to the Ethiopian Community.37 It enlarged its scope in 2002 when it received part of a Faith Based Initiative award together with Jewish Family Services, and began a broader outreach to the Columbus community. After changing its administrative structure into ETSS in 2004, it incorporated as a non-profit entity in 2005 and was selected for a grant and technical assistance by the Columbusbased Capacity Building Initiative, a project of the Columbus Foundation, the Franklin County Commissioners, United Way38 and other funders. Subsequently, it developed a network of dispersed offices to serve the separated locations of immigrant settlement in the city, and in 2009 expanded its local collaboration pattern by founding the Grassroots Services Coalition Group together with other important migrant groups also in Columbus: the Somali Bantu Social Services, Somali Banadir National Network, Bhutanese-Nepali Community of Columbus, Burmese Community of Columbus and members of the Federation of African Organizations in Ohio. Over the next several years, ETSS partnered with other civic agencies and communities for adoption services, a youth summit, the celebration of a ‘New American Festival’ and other projects. It also linked strongly with local hospitals and health service agencies in order to better assist its clients. Today, alongside its fundraising activities, ETSS operates (1) several youth programmes at 11 locations around

United States  301 the city, including after school programmes, summer camp and the youth summit, and assistance with summer employment and internships for young people from immigrant backgrounds; (2) adult programmes, including language teaching, job training and placement, and citizenship classes; (3) family programmes to fight domestic violence, to advocate for families and children in legal treatment situations, and family education; and (4) programmes of community involvement ranging from community gardens to public media activities to combat negativity towards immigrants to collection of funds for hurricane relief efforts. According to their 2017 Annual Report, ETSS Youth Programmes served 1,435 young people; Adult Programmes served 6,341 people as walk-ins at ETSS sites. In the Family Care Programme, 1,251 clients were served by the Community Health Navigator, a collaborative project aimed first at reducing infant mortality rates among focus populations and then to train residents on health resources in the community. Although the number for 2017 is not available, in 2016, ETSS claims that ‘9,280 people came through our doors at 12 locations in Central Ohio’.39 It is important to note that many of the professional staff of ETSS are people who first came to ETSS as seekers and receivers of services from ETSS. The assistance clients receive, then, is often given back in large, as well as smaller ways. ETSS represents a model programme of service by an Eastern Christian community to its own members and also to the much broader population. It operates in cooperation with other faith groups, secular NGOs, as well as government agencies. It has developed an admirable range of successes, for which it has been recognised by the major community foundation in Columbus as one of the ‘Five Non-profits to Watch’ in Central Ohio because of its excellence in service to people in the region and because of its success with fund raising and management. And some of the credit for these achievements must go to the charismatic leader of the effort, Seleshi Ayalew Asfaw, who serves as Executive Director of ETSS.

Conclusion Protopresbyter Vitaliti Voroboy, in a list of the ‘concrete forms’ of ‘the Gospel of love’ in the ancient Christian churches, includes ‘care and hospitality for strangers’ as one of the ancient practices in Diakonia.40 Moreover, according to Nicholas Sooy, the hierarchs of the church have declared the same in their Mission document from the 2016 Crete council and in the Basis of the Social Concept from the 2000 Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church.41 In his ‘primer’ on Orthodox social principles, Sooy provides an extended statement about the obligatory good treatment of immigrants based on these canonical statements, with special attention to the response needed from American Orthodox believers and churches. The Orthodox Church has a legacy of welcoming strangers. In the ­Byzantine Empire, alongside hospitals there existed ‘xenons,’ which were

302  J. G. Pankhurst public hospices for strangers, foreigners, and refugees who had no place to go. The fathers repeatedly recommend ‘philoxenia,’ (hospitality, love of stranger), the opposite of xenophobia.   In America, Orthodox Christians are relatively recent immigrants, with most coming in the 20th century. As such, American Orthodox Christians have been fairly pro-immigrant. St. Alexis Toth,42 for example, spoke out against ‘the ‘nativists’, who are always ready to look for means to injure people’ and those who ‘lobbied in the Congress to pass a law against further immigration.’   Orthodox Churches in America have been very active in aiding with the resettlement of refugees, and the global Church likewise calls for the support of refugees:   ‘We call on the civil authorities, the Orthodox faithful and the other citizens of the countries in which they have sought refuge and continue to seek refuge to accord them every possible assistance, even from out of their own insufficiency’.43 One of the most beloved icons of the Eastern Orthodox tradition is the one called ‘The Hospitality of Abraham’. In hosting three strangers who have appeared at his camp, Abraham comes to understand he is, in fact, hosting the Holy Trinity. Analogously, in welcoming the immigrant or refugee stranger, Orthodox believers, it would seem, should see a complement of their faith in God. Sooy’s summary statement points not only to direct service to immigrants and refugees, but also to support for the appropriate civil policies that would foster the welcome of refugees. In a country populated overwhelmingly by people with relatively recent immigrant experiences in their backgrounds, this call could not be more apposite.

Notes   1 Public debate at the Council on Foreign Relations as part of the CFR Program on Religion and Foreign Policy: Council on Foreign Relation, ‘The immigration debate’. 9 May 2018, available at www.cfr.org/event/immigration-debate (accessed on 13 January 2019). Also see the report of the ACTAlliance at the end of 2018, ‘Highlighting protection for migrants and refugees’, which states ‘There are 65.6 million forcibly displaced persons including over 22.5 million refugees in the world today’, available at https://actalliance.org/act-news/highlighting-­ protection-for-migrants-and-refugees/ (accessed on 13 January 2019).   2 Aleinikoff in Council on Foreign Relations, ‘The immigration debate’.  3 See the comment by Robertson in Ibid. Also see Council on Foreign Relations. ‘The global refugee response: Priorities and prospects for reform’ From Religion and Foreign Policy Series, 19 November 2018, available at www.cfr.org/event/ global-refugee-​response-priorities-and-prospects-reform-0 (accessed on 13 January 2019).   4 ‘Message of the 9th assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops of the United States of America’, 4 October 2018, available at www.assemblyofbishops.org/news/2018/ message-ninth-assembly-of-canonical-orthodox-bishops (accessed on 13 January 2019).

United States  303  5 Orthodox Church in America, ‘OCA participates in Tenth Annual Orthodox Prayer Service for UN community’, 9 November 2017, available at https://oca. org/news/headline-news/oca-participates-in-tenth-annual-orthodox-prayer-servicefor-un-community (accessed on 13 January 2019).  6 Caitlin Dickerson, ‘Shelters Near Capacity as More Youth Migrants Are Detained Than Ever’, New York Times, 13 September 2018, p. A18. Also see the New York Times editorial in its International Edition: Editorial Board, ‘Don’t Let Migrant Children Rot’, New York Times, 12 September 2018, p. 14.   7 Aram G. Sarkisian, ‘ “For you were aliens in the land of Egypt”: Why Orthodox Christians cannot remain silent on United States immigration policies’, Public ­Orthodoxy (blog), 6 July 2018, available at https://publicorthodoxy.org/2018/ 07/06/for-you-were-aliens-in-the-land-of-egypt-why-orthodox-christians-cannotremain-silent-on-united-states-immigration-policies/ (accessed on 13 January 2019).   8 Alexei Krindatch, ‘Ten facts about US Orthodox Christian churches from 2015 FACT study’, a section of research and analysis published online at ‘Research on Orthodox Christian Communities in the United States’, available at www. hartfordinstitute.org/research/orthodoxindex.html (accessed on 13 January 2019).   9 ACOB was created to begin reorganising the various jurisdictions in the USA to overcome some of the persistent problems. Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops, ‘About the assembly of Bishops’, available at www.assemblyofbishops. org/about/ (accessed on 19 January 2019). The Orthodox Church in America noted some of the issues and the proposed solutions on its website: ‘Assembly of Bishops concludes three-day meeting, issues statement to all faithful’, 13 ­September 2012, available at https://oca.org/news/headline-news/assemblyof-­ bishops-concludes-three-day-meeting-issues-statement-to-all-fai (accessed on 19 January 2019). 10 A list of parishes directly subordinate to the Moscow Patriarch can be found at www.mospatusa.com/parishdirectory.html (accessed on 19 January 2019). Details of the agreement of communion between ROCOR and the Moscow Patriarchate can be found at www.synod.com/synod/indexeng.htm (accessed on 19 January 2019). 11 See the website of the Standing Conference of Oriental Orthodox Churches, available at www.scooch.org (accessed on 19 January 2019) for details and variant forms of the names of the member churches. Besides those Orthodox believers who are adherents of the formally recognised jurisdictions counted by Krindatch, there are also an undetermined number of American Christians who consider themselves part of the Orthodox faith but have split off from membership in one or another canonical or Oriental jurisdiction on account of ideological or other reasons such as rejection of local hierarchs. One informant identified such Orthodox as belonging to ‘fragments’ of the ‘splinters’ that make up the diversity of American Orthodoxy. 12 Victoria Sielaff, writing for the Christian Century blog ‘The Exchange with Ed Stetzer’, writes: The review of Deuteronomy 10:18–19; Exodus 20:10, 22:21, 23:9; Leviticus 24:22; Psalms 146:9; Ruth; Jonah; and Matthew provides a biblical pattern of support for a response of embracing the refugee in one’s community. Furthermore, throughout the Old and New Testaments, the nation of Israel and the Early Church are dutiful in caring for the needy and vulnerable, whether this includes the impoverished, widows, orphans, or others who are not only vulnerable to economic and social exploitation, but also in great need.

304  J. G. Pankhurst 13 The mission statement is quoted from www.philoptochos.org (accessed on 19 January 2019). The formal name of the society is the ‘Greek Orthodox Ladies Philoptochos Society, Inc.’. 14 John H. Erickson, Orthodox Christians in America, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 126. 15 Theodore Theophilos, ‘The IOCC and the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s lifeline to Russia’. Public Orthodoxy (blog), 9 November 2018, available at https://publicorthodoxy.​ org/2018/11/09/iocc-lifeline-to-russia/#more-4801 (accessed on 13 January 2019). 16 For information on the structure and purposes of this organisation, see www.­ actalliance.​org (accessed 19 January 2019). This website states, ACT Alliance is a coalition of 150 churches and church-related organisations working together in over 125 countries to create positive and sustainable change in the lives of poor and marginalised people regardless of their religion, politics, gender, sexual orientation, race or nationality in keeping with the highest international codes and standards. 17 ‘The members of the ACT Alliance’, available at https://actalliance.org/about/ list-of-members/ (accessed on 13 January 2019). 18 Jeanne H. Ballantine, Keith A. Roberts and Kathleen Odell Korgen, Our Social World: Introduction to Sociology, 7th edn, Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publishing, 2019. 19 The parish-level entities that structure charitable activities may be ignored by Orthodox individuals or micro-level groups like families or small groups who contribute individual volunteer energy and money directly to the needs of special interests by these micro-level actors. Indeed, part of the Orthodox effort encourages individual commitment to service, and this might include activities on any of the levels of understanding even outside formal Orthodox organisations. 20 Krindatch, ‘Ten facts about US Orthodox Christian Churches from 2015 FACT study’. By ‘oldline’ congregations, Krindatch is referring to Protestant ‘mainline’ churches such as Presbyterian, Methodist, Episcopal, Lutheran and similar churches. 21 Ellen Motoviloff Miller provides a guide for refugee support from the perspective of the Orthodox Church in America in 1993, before the IOCC programme was in place. See Ellen Motoviloff Miller, ‘Helping to resettle refugees’. Orthodox Church in America, 15 April 1993, available at https://oca.org/parish-ministry/ commservice/helping-to-resettle-refugees (accessed on 13 January 2019). 22 Ironically, support for migrants from the conflict in Eastern Ukraine is complicated by the jurisdictional battles there over the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. It is difficult for Ukrainians to support migrants who have fled to Russia to escape the dangers in Donbas, for example. The Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate does carry out such support for Ukrainian refugee who have sought safety across the Russian border, and the ROC has extended its long cooperation with the Billy Graham Evangelical Association and the related charity Samaritan’s Purse to serve the needs of these refugees. ‘Joint DECR-American humanitarian action continues in Belgorod region’, 26 April 2015, available at https://mospat.ru/en/2015/04/26/news118316/ (accessed 19 January 2019); ‘Christ’s love shines in the midst of Conflict’, 28 July 2015, available at www.samaritanspurse.​org/article/christs-love-shines-in-the-midst-of-­ conflict/ (accessed 19 January 2019). Similarly, as some internally displaced persons (IDPs) sought shelter from the Ukrainian conflict in the Svyatogorsk Monastery in the Donetsk region, the Russian Church Abroad, an affiliate of the Moscow Patriarchate, mounted a campaign of assistance. ‘Russian Church Abroad raises funds in aid to refugees who found asylum in Svyatogorsk

United States  305 ­ onastery’, 13 ­September 2016, available at https://mospat.ru/en/2016/09/13/ M news135703/print/ (accessed 19 January 2019). 23 Sarkisian, ‘ “For you were aliens in the land of Egypt”: Why Orthodox Christians cannot remain silent on United States immigration policies’. 24 Ibid. 25 This is the basis for the ongoing debate about DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) policies and legislation that is a counterpoint to the broader negativity towards immigration. 26 Pew Research Centre, ‘Shifting public views on legal immigration into the US’, 28 June 2018, available at www.people-press.org/2018/06/28/shifting-publicviews-on-legal-immigration-into-the-u-s/ (accessed on 13 January 2019). 27 Council on Foreign Relations, ‘The global refugee response: Priorities and prospects for reform’, from Religion and Foreign Policy Series, 19 November 2018, available at www.cfr.org/event/global-refugee-response-priorities-and-prospectsreform-0 (accessed 13 January 2019). 28 Aleinikoff in Council on Foreign Relations, ‘The immigration debate’. 29 Ibid. Also see Priscilla Alvarez, ‘America’s system for resettling refugees is ­collapsing’, The Atlantic, 9 September 2018, available at www.theatlantic.com/­ politics/archive/2018/09/refugee-admissions-trump/569641/ (accessed on 19 January 2019). 30 Kelly M. Greenhill, ‘How Trump Manipulates the Migration Debate’, Foreign Affairs, 5 July 2018. 31 Alexei Krindatch, ‘Usage of English language, ethnic identity and ethnic culture in American Orthodox Christian churches’, a section of the research and analysis published online at ‘Research on Orthodox Christian communities in the United States’, 2011, available at www.hartfordinstitute.org/research/orthodoxindex. html (accessed on 13 January 2019). 32 Reservations regarding the planned reorganisation are expressed by the Orthodox Church in America in a position paper published in 2015: Orthodox Church in America. ‘Holy Synod releases position paper on Canonical regional planning’, 15 October 2015, available at https://oca.org/news/headline-news/holy-synodreleases-position-paper-on-canonical-regional-planning (accessed on 13 January 2019). 33 Also sometimes referred to as the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCA), which is an earlier designation of this group. See www.synod.com/synod/­ indexeng.htm (accessed on 19 January 2019). 34 See footnote 9 above. Moscow Patriarchal parishes in the USA are listed at www. mospatusa.com/parishdirectory.html (accessed on 19 January 2019). 35 It may be significant to note that Ethiopia, the homeland of the people of this case description and a country that has had its own internal strife, is a major provider of temporary care settlement for several populations under threat in Africa. UNHCR counts 928,663 registered refugees and asylum seekers being provided for in several locations in Ethiopia. 36 Pew Research Centre in 2017 found that ‘Ethiopia has the largest Orthodox Christian population outside Europe, and, by many measures, Orthodox Ethiopians have much higher levels of religious commitment than do Orthodox Christians in the faith’s heartland of Central and Eastern Europe’ (www.pewresearch.org/ fact-tank/2017/11/28/ethiopia-​is-an-outlier-in-the-orthodox-christian-world/) This religious zeal may partly undergird the energies of ETSS in Columbus. 37 See the ETSS website for full information: www.ethiotss.org/home.html (accessed on 13 January 2019). More ETSS programme descriptions and details of activities can be found at www.govserv.org/US/Columbus/135012566547355/ Ethiopian-Tewahedo-Social-Services-ETSS (accessed 19 January 2019).

306  J. G. Pankhurst 38 The support of the major charitable foundation in Columbus and of the county commissioners for the development of ETSS indicates how the engagement of both the religious-based organisation and the major community NGO and ­government broadens the purpose and provides a greater basis for the success of the programme. Details about the Columbus Foundation are found at https:// columbusfoundation.org/ (accessed on 19 January 2019). The United Way is a national non-profit organisation with chapters in virtually every large city in the USA. It consolidates charitable giving by the public in each locale for a select list of community initiatives and social service groups, and its contributions are often made through voluntary withdrawals from regular paychecks. For details, see www.­unitedway.org/ (accessed on 19 January 2019). 39 ETSS website: www.ethiotss.org/history.html (accessed on 19 Janary 2019). 40 Vitali Borovoy, ‘Diakonia in the early church’, Orthodox Diakonia; Portal on the History, Theology and Challenges of Social Service in the Orthodox Church, available at www.iocc.org/orthodoxdiakonia/index.php?id=3 (accessed on 4 May 2018). 41 Nicholas Sooy, ‘Orthodox social thought: A primer’, Public Orthodoxy (blog), 14 March 2017, available at https://publicorthodoxy.org/2017/03/14/orthodoxsocial-thought-primer/ (accessed on 13 January 2019). 42 Canonised by the Orthodox Church in America in 1994 as St Alexis Toth of Wilkes-Barre, available at https://oca.org/fs/st-alexis-toth (accessed on 19 January 2019). 43 Sooy, ‘Orthodox social thought’. Ibid. The last sentence is a passage from the Encyclical of the 2016 Great and Holy Council held in Crete, which Sooy quotes here.

Index

Index

Index

Abkhazia 112–14 Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), 50, 52, 208–11, 214, 216, 220, 222 Aleinikoff, Alexander 290, 298 Andropov, Yuri 110 Albania xiv, xviii, 7, 30–1, 166, 172, 178, 180, 292 All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations 35, 57 Andrei, (Andreicu) Metropolitan of Cluj-Napoca 262–3 Antonii, Metropolitan of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church’s Central and Western European Diocese 235 Arendt, Hanna 218 Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops in the USA 291, 293, 299, 303 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal 175 Athenagoras, (Dikaiakos) Metropolitan of Ilion, Acharnes and Petroupolis 189 Baconschi, Teodor 263 Balás, Bishop Béla 231 Barroso, José Manuel 183 Băsescu, Traian 262 Belarus 17, 39, 66, 97, 126–43 Bosnia and Herzegovina xiv, xviii, 3, 6, 7, 208, 210–11 Bouazizi, Mohamed 147 Brezhnev, Leonid 25, 110 Brnabić, Ana 2 Bruneau, Michel 280 Bulgaria xiv, xviii, 1, 6–7, 9, 10, 15–17, 30, 32, 39–40, 166, 180, 215, 229–50, 253, 261, 263, 287, 292 Bulgarian Agency for Refugees 234

Caritas 50, 54, 75, 82, 84, 95, 184, 208, 210–11, 213–17, 222, 235–6, 258, 262 Chaplin, Vsevolod 73, 80 Chechnya 66, 80–1, 99, 130 Christian Action and Networking against Trafficking 184 Christodoulos, (Paraskeuaides) Archbishop of the Orthodox Church of Greece 172, 183, 192 Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME) 184, 187–8, 190–1, 194–5, 203, 271 Churchill, Winston 169 Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) 174 Conference of European Churches 190, 195 Conference of Lausanne (1922–3) xviii, 10 Commissariat for Refugees and Migration (Serbia) 207, 212–14 Committee of the Representatives of the Orthodox Churches to the European Union 13, 191, 195, 206 Cortese, Father Paolo 240–1, 243 Council of Europe 85–6, 117 Crimea 1, 8, 12–14, 16, 26, 42–4, 46–9, 53–4, 69 Croatia xiv, xvii–xviii, 2, 5–7, 10, 210, 215–18 Cuza, Alexandru Ioan 252 Dačić, Ivica 3 Damaskinos, (Papandreou) Archbishop of the Orthodox Church of Greece 169 Daniel, Archbishop of Pamphilon (United States), 40 Demetrios, (Trakatellis) Archbishop 291

308  Index Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (Turkey), 149, 151, 153, 155– 6, 160 Dodik, Milorad 3 Donetsk People’s Republic 44–6, 49–50, 131, 304 Dryzek, John 148 Dyodor, (Isaev) Bishop of Melekessky and Cherdaklinsky 76 Dyukov, Alexander Valeryevich 3 Ecumenical Association of Churches in Romania 254–5 Ecumenical Patriarchate 11, 13, 40–1, 53, 77, 166–7, 172, 177, 179, 192, 194, 252, 287–8, 299 Ecumenical Refugee Programme (Greece) 185–7, 189, 194 Emmanuel, (Adamakis) Metropolitan of the Ecumenical Patriarchate 41 Emergency Support to Integration and Accommodation 183, 185, 194 Epiphanius, (Dumenko) Metropolitan 41 Erciyes, Jade Cemre 152 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 10, 85, 154 Ethiopian Tewahedo Social Services 300–1 European Convention on Human Rights 181 European Peoples’ Party 183 European Refugee Fund 186 European Union 1, 4, 11, 35, 120, 130–1, 147–8, 165, 191, 215, 229, 251 Federal Migration Service (Russia) 79, 82, 87 Ferencz, Nicholas 282 Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Elena 6 Filaret, (Denisenko) Metropolitan 29 Filaret (Vachromeev), Metropolitan of the Belarusian Orthodox Church 126 Forum of Orthodox Christian Women 72, 75 Fourth Pan-Orthodox Preconciliar Conference 285 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad 111 Gavrilov, Nikolay 133 Georgia xiv, 13, 16–17, 30–2, 39–40, 67–8, 81–3, 106–25, 135, 178, 180, 231, 236, 278, 292 Gorbachev, Mikhail 67, 110

Greece xiv, xviii, 6–11, 13, 16–17, 30, 40, 135, 164–206, 212, 231–3, 263, 276, 294–5 Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America 291–2 Greenhill, Kelly 298 Guterres, António 185 Hämmerli, Maria 285 Hieronymos, (Kotsones) Archbishop of the Orthodox Church of Greece 170 Hieronymos II, (Liapes) Archbishop of the Orthodox Church of Greece 10, 40, 172, 174, 186, 190, 193 Hilarion, (Alfeyev) Metropolitan of Volokolamsk 3–5, 40, 50, 70, 80, 86–7 Hizb-ut-Tahrir 43 Hollande, François 85 Holy and Great Orthodox Council in Crete (2016) 31, 88, 231, 236, 244, 256, 261, 263, 279, 301 Hoser, Archbishop Henryk 230 Ilarion, Bishop of Edmonton (Canada) 40 Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society 40, 85 Integration Centre for Migrant Workers (Greece) 177, 184–7, 189, 194 Integration Centre for Migrant Workers – Ecumenical Refugee Programme (Greece) 186 Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration 176 International Fund for Unity of Orthodox Peoples 4 Internally displaced person 8, 46–54, 112–14 International Organization for Migration 6–8, 175–6, 257 International Orthodox Christian Charities 293–4, 304 Islamic State 213, 229, 262 Jehovah’s Witnesses 25, 44, 116 Jesuit Refugee Service 258, 262 Justice and Development Party (Turkey) 151–6, 159 Karamanlis, Konstantinos 170–1 Karamanlis, Kostas 173

Index  309 Karbowska, Natalia 49 Kasmach, Lizaveta 131 Kilin, Deacon Andrey 76 Kiss-Rigó, Bishop László 231 Khrushchev, Nikita 67, 110 Kosovo xiv, xvii–xviii, 4–5, 11–12, 31, 212 Kosyak, Serhiy 45 Kravchuk, Leonid 29–32 Krindatch, Alexei 291, 294, 299 Kryvoi, Yaraslau 132 Kuchma, Leonid 32 Kiriyenko, Sergei 72 Kipriyan, Metropolitan of Stara Zagora 240 Lavrov, Sergei 2–3 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans (gender) and Intersex (LGBTI) 17, 107, 119–20, 122 Lipkivskii, Vasilii 29 Lubomyr, (Husar) Supreme Archbishop Emeritus Cardinal 51 Luhansk People’s Republic 45–6, 49–50, 131 Lukashenko, Alexander 126–7, 129, 131, 134, 138, 142 Lutheran World Federation 230, 293 Macedonia, (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) xiv, xviii, 3, 7, 30, 171–2, 210, 215, 232, 279 Madani, Iyad bin Amin 86 Mann, Michael 147–8 Makei, Vladimir 131–2, 134–5 Mardešić, Željko xvi Márfi, Bishop Gyula of Veszprém 231 Marx, Cardinal Reinhard 230 Marx, Karl 67 Minsk Agreements 53, 133 Ministry of Emergency Situations (Russia) 82 Mitsotakis, Konstantinos 171 Mojzes, Paul xiv–xix, 208 Moldova, Republic of 13, 30, 67, 252, 259, 266, 269 Moon, Ban Ki 151 Mstislav, (Skripnik) Metropolitan 29 Mukhin, Nikolai 3 National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria 243 Naum, Metropolitan of Ruse 240

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 3, 13, 166, 170 Nikolay, Metropolitan of Plovdiv 235–6 Obukhov, Maxim 71 Onufryi (Berezovskyi), Metropolitan of Chernivtsi and Bukovyna 27–8 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 173 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 49, 85 Orthodox Church in America 292, 299, 303, 305–6 Osipov, Aleksej 128–9 Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) (Greece) 171–3, 192 Papandreou, Andreas 192, 199 Papandreou, Georgios 173, 199 Paparrigopoulos, Konstantinos 168 Parubiy, Andriy 42 Pashazadeh, Shaykh al-Islām Allahshukur 86 Patriarch Aleksii of the Russian Orthodox Church 29, 32 Patriarch Ambrose of the Georgian Orthodox Church 110 Patriarch Aphrem II of the Syriac Orthodox Church Ignatius 86 Patriarch Arsenije Čarnojević xiv Patriarch Arsenije IV Jovanović xiv Patriarch Bartholomew of the Ecumenical Patriarchate 10, 32–3, 39–42, 86, 190, 231, 244, 256 Patriarch Daniel of the Romanian Orthodox Church 256, 258, 260, 263, 266–8 Patriarch Ilia Shiolashvili of the Georgian Orthodox Church 106–7, 113–15, 119–20 Patriarch Irinej of the Serbian Orthodox Church 3–4 Patriarch Karekin (Nersisyan) II of the Armenian Apostolic Church 118 Patriarch Kirill Gundyayev of the Russian Orthodox Church 31 Patriarch Theodor II of Alexandria and all Africa 86 Pankhurst, Jerry 66–7, 290–306 Pavel, (Ponomarev) Metropolitan of the Belarusian Orthodox Church 126 Perica, Vjekoslav xviii Petliura, Otaman Simon 29

310  Index Pharmakides, Theokletos 167 Philaret, (Vakhromeyev) Bishop of Minsk and Slutsk 70 Pinigin, Nikolaj 135 Pnevmatikakis, Vassilis 285 Polish Episcopate 75, 88 Pope Francis 10, 50, 52, 87, 190, 230–1, 240, 244, 262 Pope Tawadros II of the Coptic Orthodox Church of Alexandria 86 Popular Democratic Rally (Greece) 173 Poroshenko, Petro 12, 35, 39–42, 63 Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movements of Migrants in Europe 175–6 Putin, Vladimir 32, 34, 41, 57, 68, 71, 75, 85–6, 127, 209, 280 Radaev, Valentin 70 Red Cross 133, 175, 189, 212 Refugee Relief Fund 175 Reza, Yasmina 135 Roberti, Father Jean-Claude 279 Romania xiv, 6–7, 11, 13, 16, 18, 26, 29–30, 32, 39–40, 166, 180, 210, 251–72, 276, 279, 281, 286, 288, 292 Russia xiv, xv, xviii, 1–6, 9–18, 26–9, 31–4, 37–47, 50, 53, 66–105, 108–10, 113–16, 121, 126–43, 231, 235, 275–8, 280–3, 287, 289, 291–3, 296, 299, 301 Şaguna, Metropolitan Andrei of

Transylvania 252 Samaras, Antonis 173 Sarkisian, Aram 296 Seleshchuk, Gregory 54 Šešelj, Vojislav 2 Serapheim, (Tikas) Archbishop of the Orthodox Church of Greece 171, 192 Sergey (Thomin), Bishop 81 Shevardnadze, Eduard 111 Skorobahach, Sergei 45 Simitis, Kostas 172 Slagle, Amy 284 Smirnov, Archpriest Dmitry 73–4 Sokur, Zosima, Schema-Archimandrite 34 South Ossetia 81–3, 112–14 Soviet Secret Police 111 Soviet Union (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) 25, 47, 55, 66, 106, 109–11, 126–7, 178, 277–8, 280, 289, 293–4

Spyridon, (Vlachos) Archbishop of the Orthodox Church of Greece 170 Standing Conference of Canonical Orthodox Bishops in the Americas 293 Standing Conference for Oriental Orthodox Churches 292 Strik, Tineke 181 Svyatoslav, Major Archbishop of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church 45 Syrian refugees 10, 14, 151, 153–4, 157–8, 240, 298 Thorbjørnsrud, Berit 284 Trajkovski, Boris xviii Trump, Donald 18, 297–8 Turchynov, Oleksandr 35 Turkish Confederation of Employers Association 155 Turkish Medical Association 155 Turkish Red Crescent 151, 155 Turkey xviii, 6–7, 10, 16–17, 86, 118, 147–63, 181, 231–4 Ukraine xiv, xviii, 1–3, 7–13, 15–16, 25–65, 66–7, 78, 80, 82–3, 88–9, 131–5, 243, 269, 280, 287, 291, 294–5 Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church 11, 27, 33, 41 Ukrainian Church of the Evangelical Christians 52 Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church 12, 25–6, 45, 50, 88 Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate 11, 16, 26–7, 30, 32–6, 41, 43, 45, 57 Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate 1, 10, 12–13, 16, 26–8, 31–6, 38–41, 46, 53, 60, 62, 88, 100 United Nations 42, 130, 152, 217, 220, 255, 291 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 69, 112 United Nations General Assembly 42 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 6, 111, 131, 151, 167, 175, 181–3, 185–7, 189, 194–6, 208, 214, 219, 226, 305 United Nations Human Rights Council 53 United States of America 40, 165, 207, 275, 280, 286, 290–306

Index  311 Vasilevich, Natallia 134 Venturas, Lina 277 Vladimir, (Sabodan) Metropolitan of Rostov and Novocherkassk 29 Volodymyr, (Sabodan) Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine 27 Voroboy, Protopresbyter Vitaliti 301 Vučić, Aleksandar 3 Wiktorin, Andrea 131 Wilson, Andrew 132 World Bank 54, 148 World Council of Churches 80–1, 110, 176, 190, 195, 236, 293 World Communion of Reformed Churches 230

World Health Organization 157 World Lutheran Federation 80–1 World Russian People’s Council 70, 91 Yarovaya package 43–4 Yugoslavia (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) xiv–xix, 2, 10, 171–2, 207, 209–11, 218, 222, 291 Yatsenyuk, Arseniy 35, 49 Yanukovych, Viktor 32, 34–6 Yeltsin, Boris 32, 68, 90 Yushchenko, Viktor 32–4 Zernov, Nicolas 277