Forced Displacement and Migration: Approaches and Programmes of International Cooperation 3658329017, 9783658329013

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Hans-Joachim Preuß Christoph Beier Dirk Messner   Editors

Forced Displacement and Migration Approaches and Programmes of International Cooperation

Forced Displacement and Migration

Hans-Joachim Preuß • Christoph Beier • Dirk Messner Editors

Forced Displacement and Migration Approaches and Programmes of International Cooperation

123

Editors Hans-Joachim Preuß Institute for Political Science and Sociology University of Bonn Bonn, Germany

Christoph Beier GIZ, Good Governance for Local Development Tbilisi, Georgia

Dirk Messner German Federal Environment Agency Dessau-Rosslau, Germany

ISBN 978-3-658-32901-3 ISBN 978-3-658-32902-0 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32902-0

(eBook)

Translation from the German language edition which is a revised and updated version of: Globale Wanderungsbewegungen—Beiträge der internationalen Zusammenarbeit zum Umgang mit Flucht und Migration by Christoph Beier, et al., © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2020. Published by VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. All Rights Reserved. © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH part of Springer Nature. The registered company address is: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany

Foreword by Achim Steiner

Humans migrate for very different reasons. Eighty million people left their homes by force, through crisis, or from fear in 2019, pushing the total number of refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced people to over one percent of the world’s population. For that one percent, life in 2020 was extraordinarily difficult. Social distancing and hand washing are hard when you live in limbo in crowded camps with limited access to soap and water, while the COVID-19 pandemic was used as a justification by some to advance anti-migrant policies, close borders and halt administering asylum claims. But as this new book sets out, conflict and crisis are not the whole story of human mobility. In 2019, refugees and asylum seekers constituted one in ten of the 272 international migrants in the world. Nine out of ten people move by choice. They tend not to be the poorest people from the poorest places – travelling can be expensive. In fact, migration tends to be a reverberation of development progress, albeit progress that is uneven and not fast enough to meet people’s aspirations. Unless this duality is better understood, societies’ ability to respond to and benefit from human mobility will fall short. As part of the United Nations Network on Migration and with our partners at the International Labour Organization, the International Organization on Migration and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, the United Nations Development Programme supports countries in implementing the Global Compacts on Refugees and for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration in a way that expands freedoms and opportunities for everyone, as part of our commitment to human development. This is more important than ever today because, as our 2020 Human Mobility, Shared Opportunities report argues, public discourse around migration is increasingly polarized and negative. Changing the conversation starts with hearing more from migrants themselves – people about whom many assumptions are made but on whom, in fact, there is little primary data. That is why, in 2019, UNDP interviewed nearly 2,000 migrants from 39 countries in Africa who arrived in Europe not – in their own words – to seek asylum or because of persecution, but because their ambition had outpaced the opportunities available in their home countries. With the resulting Scaling Fences analysis, we found that getting a job was not the only motivation to move, that not all the irregular migrants were ‘poor’ in Africa, nor had lower education levels.

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‘Choice-lessness’ was a critical factor in their decision to leave, and only two percent said they would have done differently if they had known more in advance of the dangers and risks their journey would entail. They were, in short, determined. Walls, fences, barriers: they are not viable solutions to the challenges that arise from people’s determination to migrate – through whichever means they can; they will not help to end conflict so that displaced people who want to can return home; they will not mitigate the 100 extra days of extreme weather that poor countries may face each year from climate change. Rather, as this new book Forced Displacement and Global Migration sets out, an ambitious policy agenda built around the Sustainable Development Goals that creates the conditions for peace; tackles the root causes of climate change and advances safe, orderly and regular migration is needed. For example, opening legal pathways that make migration safer – and cheaper – is a key to fighting human trafficking. Lowering the costs of remittances can help communities back home build forward better from COVID-19. Access to essential services and the right to work mean migrants can focus on using their skills rather than being dependent. Investing in social cohesion can help migrants and host communities evolve new social norms, values and traditions together. These past months have reaffirmed migrants’ extraordinary contributions to society – as health and care professionals on the front lines and as essential workers in their communities. After a year of intermittent lockdowns across the world, one thing is clear: human mobility is not a problem to be solved; it is a value to be treasured, and after this pause it will continue to define our collective future, just has it has our past. I congratulate the authors and editors for giving clear voice to the complexities of migration and displacement and welcome this book for the conversations it will open. Achim Steiner Administrator, United Nations Development Programme New York, USA

Preface

In the period when this book was written, the Corona pandemic did not only dominate the media. Politics and society in almost all countries of the world had all hands full to deal with the health and, above all, the economic effects of the mass infection with the Covid-19 virus. Important topics with global reach receded into the background. At the same time, migratory movements continued worldwide, and new ‘hotspots’ such as Venezuela or Burkina Faso were added, while the situation of refugees and migrants in some regions of the world worsened, partly due to the pandemic. We expect that public attention and the need for political action will once again focus more on the issue of refugees and migration once there is a remedy against the pandemic. Because, on the one hand, new international agreements have been reached after the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015 and 2016, but their implementation has not yet begun everywhere. And, on the other hand, populist movements have narrowed the scope of action of governments, so that even in case of political goodwill, refugee and migration policies are more restrictive than originally planned. Public debate will then come in full swing. We hope that this book will contribute to a better understanding of the problems associated with flight and migration, to an undisguised view of the potential of migration movements, and to an improved overview of the possibilities of dealing with problems related to flight and migration in countries of origin, transit and destination, as well as the management of migration flows. We would like to thank our authors for taking on the task of preparing their contributions despite the difficult conditions. We as editors are grateful for the assistance of Peter Bonin, Tom Landes, Lena Ollenschläger, Louisa Sedjro, Maria Coral Weber and other colleagues of Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) for their helpful comments, careful preparation of the manuscripts and continuous maintenance of contacts between editors and authors. Bonn, Germany Tbilisi, Georgia Dessau-Rosslau, Germany

Hans-Joachim Preuß Christoph Beier Dirk Messner

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Contents

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Forced Displacement and Migration: Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hans-Joachim Preuß, Christoph Beier, and Dirk Messner

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Trends, Drivers, and Dynamics of Flight and Migration . . . . . . . . . Daniel Naujoks

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Displacement Crises, Fragile States and Development Cooperation: Why Governance Support is Needed to Reduce Reasons to Flee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jörn Grävingholt

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Humanitarian–Development Integration? Comparing ‘Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development’, ‘Early Recovery’, ‘Resilience’ and the ‘Triple Nexus’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dennis Dijkzeul and Annalisa Addis

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Entrepreneurship and Innovation: How Institutional Voids Shape Economic Opportunities in Refugee Camps . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marlen de la Chaux

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Beyond Emergencies: Towards a More Nuanced Understanding of the Various Impacts of Crises on Migrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Albert Kraler and Lukas Gehrke

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Better Migration Management – A Project implemented in the Horn of Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Martin Weiß and Stephanie Deubler

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Reconsidering the Partnership Approach in International Migration Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Kate Hooper

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Risk, Climate Change and Human Mobility in International Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 Koko Warner

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10 Displacement and Migration as a Foreign Policy Challenge . . . . . . 161 Christian Jetzlsperger 11 Legal Pathways for Low-Skilled Migrant Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Kathleen Newland and Andrea Riester 12 Community Sponsorship of Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 Jennifer Bond and Gregory A. Maniatis 13 Failed Asylum Seekers as Agents of Development? New Approaches to Voluntary Return and Sustainable Reintegration in Germany’s Post-2015 Migration Policy . . . . . . . . . 205 Jan Schneider 14 Welfare Effects of Regular and Irregular Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 David Benček, Tobias Heidland, Matthias Lücke, and Claas Schneiderheinze 15 Neither Fortress Nor Open Gate: Proposals for a Humane But Realistic Migration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 Theo Rauch 16 Better Migration Management: Rethinking the Development and Mobility Paradigms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 Michelle Ndiaye

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Hans-Joachim Preuß is Lecturer at the Institute for Political Science and Sociology at the University of Bonn, Germany. Prior to this, he was the Resident Representative of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung for Benin, Burkina Faso and Togo based in Cotonou, Benin. He previously was a member of the Board of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH in Bonn and Eschborn, and Secretary General of the Deutsche Welthungerhilfe. Christoph Beier was the Deputy Chairperson of the Board of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH and is currently heading the regional programme ‘Good Governance for Local Development, South Caucasus’ in Tbilisi, Georgia. Prior to this, Beier held various senior management positions within GIZ, where he headed the Planning and Development Department and various regional departments. He advised Indonesia’s Ministry of the Interior on decentralisation and worked as a research assistant at the Chair of Economic and Social Geography at the Ruhr University Bochum. Dirk Messner is President of the German Environment Agency (UBA) since 2020. He previously served as Director of the Institute for Environment and Human Security of United Nations University (UNU-EHS) in Bonn, Germany, and Vice Rector of the United Nations University (UNU). Prior to becoming Director of UNU-EHS in October 2018, Professor Messner had been Director of the German Development Institute from 2003–2018.

Contributors Annalisa Addis Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (IFHV), Bergamo, Italy Christoph Beier Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Tbilisi, Georgia

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David Benček Monopolkommission, Bonn, Germany Jennifer Bond Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada Marlen de la Chaux Geneva, Switzerland Stephanie Deubler Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Eschborn, Germany Dennis Dijkzeul Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (IFHV), Ruhr University Bochum (RUB), Bochum, Germany Lukas Gehrke Director Policy and Research, Deputy Director General, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Vienna, Austria Jörn Grävingholt Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, Bonn, Germany Tobias Heidland Forschungszentrum Internationale Entwicklung, Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW Kiel), Kiel, Germany Kate Hooper Migration Policy Institute (MPI), Washington, DC, USA Christian Jetzlsperger Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, Germany Albert Kraler Assistant Professor, Department für Migration und Globalisierung, Donau-Universität Krems, Krems, Austria Matthias Lücke Forschungszentrum Internationale Entwicklung, Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW Kiel), Kiel, Germany Gregory A. Maniatis International Migration Initiative, Open Society Foundations, New York, NY, USA Dirk Messner Umweltbundesamt, Dessau-Rosslau, Germany Daniel Naujoks School of International and Public Affairs/Columbia Law School, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA Michelle Ndiaye Représentante de l’Union Africaine en Republique Democratique du Congo, Union Africaine, Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo Kathleen Newland Migration Policy Institute (MPI), Washington, DC, USA Demetrios G. Papademetriou Migration Policy Institute (MPI), Washington, DC, USA Hans-Joachim Preuß Institut für Politische Wissenschaft und Soziologie, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Bonn, Germany Theo Rauch Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany Andrea Riester Deutsche Gesellschaft (GIZ) GmbH, Eschborn, Germany

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Jan Schneider Sachverständigenrat für Integration und Migration (SVR) gGmbH, Berlin, Germany Claas Schneiderheinze Forschungszentrum Internationale Entwicklung, Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW Kiel), Kiel, Germany Koko Warner UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Bonn, Germany Martin Weiß Deutsche Gesellschaft (GIZ) GmbH, Eschborn, Germany

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Forced Displacement and Migration: Introduction and Overview Hans-Joachim Preuß, Christoph Beier, and Dirk Messner

Abstract

In this first chapter, the editors introduce the topic and the related challenges for politics and society in countries of origin, transit and destination of migrants, give an overview of basic concepts and the extent of migration movements and present the contributions of the book.

1.1

The Political Challenge of Forced Displacement and Migration

How many ‘wake-up calls’ are necessary that the European Union (EU) and its member states, as well as the international community, are coming up with a convincing answer to questions related to forced displacement, flight and migration? How many migrants shall drown in the Mediterranean, how many refugees shall die from hunger, how many camps shall burn until the governments of countries that are able to provide protection, shelter and perspectives for those who have fled their homesteads because of terror, civil strife and poverty respect interH.-J. Preuß (&) Institut für Politische Wissenschaft und Soziologie, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Bonn, Germany e-mail: [email protected] C. Beier Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Tbilisi, Georgia e-mail: [email protected] D. Messner Umweltbundesamt, Dessau-Rosslau, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-J. Preuß et al. (eds.), Forced Displacement and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32902-0_1

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national conventions and develop appropriate measures to find solutions to a perceived ‘refugee crisis’ or a ‘migration crisis’? A crisis that is not the fault of migrants and refugees but that is due to the lack of responsibility, commitment, creativity and political will of policymakers worldwide, in the North and the South alike. At the time of writing this introduction, the European Commission (EC) released the long-awaited document ‘Migration. New Pact on Migration and Asylum’ that is “proposing a new start on migration: building confidence through more effective procedures and striking new balances between responsibility and solidarity” (EC 2020a). This pact was a promise of the new Commission. After the mass influx of refugees in 2015, the weaknesses of the so-called ‘Dublin System’ became obvious, because the responsibility to deal with the treatment of refugees and migrants was given to the first country of entry, i.e. mostly Southern European states which complained about the lack of solidarity of the other member states of the EU. There are now provisions to share the ‘burden’ and to act together. However, the EU will continue to strengthen the ‘Fortress Europe’ with accelerated asylum processes and the protection of its borders against ‘illegal’ migrants. Unfortunately, approaches related to ‘legal’ migration have been postponed and, as Commissioner Schinas pointed out when presenting the pact to the media on 23 September 2020, the topic is “divorced from discussions on irregular migration” (EC 2020b). At the global level, the United Nations (UN) has deployed many efforts to submit two major documents related to flight and migration within a short period, the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) and the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) which were adopted by the majority of the member states (UN 2018a, b). These compacts are non-binding and do, to a large extent, repeat commitments made at earlier stages of the discussion, on the one hand. On the other, a number of countries including the United States of America (USA) under the Trump administration retired from the entire process because they thought it would reduce their sovereignty.1 As there will be a follow-up process with new fora for discussion it is, however possible to raise the challenges of forced displacement and migration at the international level. It’s now far too early to assess the impact of the two compacts. Thus, neither at the international nor at the European level, we can see a breakthrough of policies and practices towards a more comprehensive approach to forced displacement and migration.

1.2

Migration is a Normal Phenomenon of Human Life

The history of mankind is a history of global migration movements, and almost all regions of the world are inhabited by migrants. If the descendants of Lucy, Ardi and the Turkana Boy had not come up with the idea and been able to leave the African 1

There are signs that the USA under Biden will re-validate its initial engagements. For a critical assessment of the two compacts, cf. Aleinikoff/Martin (2018) and Banerjee (2020).

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continent about 60–70,000 years ago2 under multiple deprivations, the human race would probably have been wiped out due to climatic changes. A look at the past shows that migration is not a phenomenon that ended after the stone age or started just at the beginning of the twenty-first century. People have always moved from one place to another for various reasons. The Old Testament is full of stories about people on the move. The period between the expansion of the Greek polis and the end of the Roman Empire is referred to as the ‘Great Migration’ in reference to the migratory movements that accompanied it. However, recent research reveals that what was considered to be an exceptional series of events within the history of antiquity, has been an almost omnipresent phenomenon throughout history – by no means a selective special development requiring explanation, but rather the normal state of affairs (Meier 2016; Lachenicht 2016). Between 1500 and 1800, migration was determined by movements of European settlers, administrators, artisans, entrepreneurs and convicted prisoners to colonized regions in the Americas, Asia, Africa and Oceania (Massey 2003). In his “History of the 19th century”, German historian Jürgen Osterhammel devotes an entire chapter to global migration under the heading ‘Sedentary and Mobile’ and compares his figures with today’s realities: “No other period in history was an era of mass long-distance migration to the same extent as the 19th century. Between 1815 and 1914, at least 82 million people voluntarily moved across borders. That was 660 migrants per million of the world population every year. By comparison, only 215 people per million were on the move between 1945 and 1980” (Osterhammel 2009: 235).3 If one includes the period between the beginning of the First World War and the end of the Second World War, the twentieth century can also be described as a ‘century of refugees’ (Oltmer 2016: 19; Crossette 2000; Kévonian 2013). In addition to refugee movements, which were essentially caused by these wars, there were also post-war migrations, especially from Russia, to Palestine and to Germany, as well as the migratory consequences of the Cold War and decolonization, when many Europeans began the journey back to their homelands – and had a hard time to re-integrate. There is a lot of evidence that the twenty-first century will be a ‘century of migration’, too. In view of increasing opportunities for mobility and greater willingness – and preparedness – to cross-national and continental borders, global migratory movements are likely to grow further. They offer persecuted persons the prospect of protection. They provide the poor with the perspective of a better life. They provide substantial monetary benefits in their home countries through migrants’ remittances. They make a measurable contribution to the economic performance of transit and destination countries which have a need for immigration as their working population declines or ages and labour markets are receptive. It This assumption is challenged by a growing number of scientists who believe that the ‘Out of Africa’ migration started as early as 120.000 years ago and was not a one-off event (cf. Bae et al. 2017: 1269). 3 Translation by the autors. Unfortunately, there is no English edition of this groundbreaking book. However, an excellent and extensive anglophone book review is provided by Vries (2010: 20–39). 2

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depends on politics whether a large portion of these movements shall be considered as ‘irregular’ or ‘illegal’. That’s a challenge. In many countries of transition and destination, not only in Europe, foreigners seeking protection and jobs are perceived as a problem if not a harm for the national culture, for employment and wellbeing of the local people. It must not be neglected that migration irrespective of whether it is forced or voluntary can cause distortions in countries of origin, transit and destination. Countries of origin forgo political, economic and social development through the departure of well-educated and cosmopolitan people, the so-called ‘brain drain’. On the way to their destinations, just as after their arrival, migrants often have to resort to illegal methods to raise the necessary subsistence and travel costs. Not only in poor regions do they intensify the competition for scarce resources and jobs. Lack of prospects makes them succumb to the whispers of radical fundamentalists, which can lead to considerable security problems and even support for terrorist activities. A massive influx of foreigners can overwhelm the local absorption capacity as well as educational institutions and social systems. The necessary integration is sometimes complicated by cultural repulsions on both sides. Thus the need for a better management of forced displacement and migration. Nationalist and populist initiatives and parties are fuelling the mood in the populations of industrialized and emerging countries. Governments and parties are under intense public pressure to present solutions. Development policy actors are judged by their financiers primarily on whether their measures are suitable for curbing global migration movements. The number of political initiatives in Europe and around the world aimed at preventing refugees and migrants from reaching their destination countries is increasing, especially in the Western hemisphere. Policymakers responsible for foreign and internal affairs, security and development lack convincing instruments to deal adequately and long-term oriented with the challenges of conflict management abroad and internally, integration of refugees and migrants and combating the causes of flight and migration in countries of origin. Crisis management, short-term treatment of symptoms and the desire for immediately visible effects of the measures introduced characterize to a large extent the political debate and political action.

1.3

Objectives

Since the peak of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015, public attention to issues related to flight, migration and integration has steadily declined. As an example, Fig. 1.1 shows how the German population’s interest in migration issues decreased significantly over the last 5 years. During the same period, interest in environmental and climate issues has grown strongly. At the beginning of 2020 and throughout the whole year, the Corona pandemic pushed all other problems off the agenda; with its foreseeable loss of attention when vaccinations prove to be effective, the issue of

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Environment/Climate/Energy Turnaround

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Fig. 1.1 Important problems from the perspective of the German public. Source Own draft based on data of Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (2020). © Preuß 2020. Note The question raised was “What do you think is currently the most important problem in Germany?” (translation by the authors). Public opinion poll as of 17 September 2020

flight and migration is once again coming to the fore – a trend that is likely to continue in view of current developments. And it will be publicly evaluated whether political decision-makers did address the right problems, conceive adequate measures and develop long-term visions for their countries. There are no easy answers, as the UN Secretary-General pointed out: “Migration is a historic and multifaceted phenomenon involving humanitarian, human rights and demographic issues. It has deep economic, environmental and political implications. It generates many different, legitimate and strongly held opinions. Not always the strongly held are legitimate; not always the legitimate are strongly held” (Guterres 2018). Flight and migration, i.e. cross-border migratory movements, generally follow the global prosperity and security gradients, i.e. against a background of widening gaps between developing, emerging and industrialized countries. Despite successes of international cooperation in the fields of foreign, development and security policy and the efforts made by many developing countries themselves, there is a growing number of very poor people who are threatened by violent conflicts and lack of perspectives. The pressure is growing. Isolation is not a viable option for the future. Nor is activism. We do not have a simple explanation for why people leave their villages and cities of origin. Some reasons are obvious: the violent expulsion from their homes; acts of war that make their survival seem uncertain; the search for economic prospects. Other reasons only become apparent when you delve deeper into the complexities of the matter: there are minors running away from home; young men

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who receive enticing pictures of Europe sent to their smartphones by their peers who have already emigrated; young women who have been offered the prospect of working as domestic help and end up in Libyan or Algerian brothels instead. Rarely does one factor alone explain the start of a shorter or longer hike into a supposedly better life situation. The decision to migrate is a highly individual one, and there are no simple patterns that would allow the rapid identification of measures to prevent flight and migration. On the one hand, it is claimed that it is mainly people without any basic education who migrate in order to escape absolute poverty. On the other hand, it is observed that especially well-educated citizens of developing countries pack their bags to earn a higher income outside their home country or to prove their skills elsewhere. Can we conclude from this that more or less education reduces or promotes migration? Does less education and greater poverty lead to migration so that this must be countered? Or is the opposite correct: is it only more education and a higher disposable income that create the conditions for successful migration? A further dilemma for international cooperation and development policy arises from the fact that the emigration of young, efficient and in part well-trained people in developing countries leads to a loss of physical and intellectual (‘brain drain’) human capital and, thus to reduced potential for economic development. On the other hand, for many developing countries, the remittances of emigrated migrants have become an economic factor that often exceeds the inflows of international development assistance; in some cases, governments siphon off a share of the remittances and thus improve their budgetary position. So should international cooperation support migration or try to prevent it? This book aims to help ensure that the current challenges facing policymakers can be met in an appropriate, targeted and long-term manner. It brings together the findings and experiences of renowned authors from political, scientific and implementation-oriented fields of work and action from Germany, Europe and the international context, and brings together the often divergent perspectives for addressing the challenge of migration management. It addresses the opportunities and problems associated with global migratory movements in countries of origin, destination and transit and develops proposals for action.

1.4

Definitions, Facts and Figures: Migrants and Refugees

1.4.1 Definitions Despite the public, political and scientific attention migration has gained after the increased influx of refugees from Syria and Iraq to Europe in 2014 and 2015 the terms ‘migration’ and ‘migrant’ have not yet been given an internationally binding legal definition. In this publication, we use‚ ‘migration’ as an overarching term that comprises international and internal movements: “The movement of persons away

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from their place of usual residence, either across an international border or within a State” (Sirona et al. 2019: 137). A migrant is according to the same terminology “a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons” (Sirona et al. 2019: 132). Usually, migration takes place when people start a new job in another country, take up studies at a foreign educational institution, or rejoin their families abroad. Forced displacement has gained in importance during the last decade, but is not yet the main reason for migration. Most UN organisations do not consider internal movements within a state as ‘migration’: “… an international migrant is defined as any person who changes his or her country of usual residence” (UN 1998: 9). However, as most migration movements – including questions related, e.g. to internally displaced persons (IDPs) in many regions of the world (see below) or refugees in Palestine who never crossed international borders – are more frequent than international movements, we agree to King/Skeldon (2010) who state that “… the distinction between internal and international moves becomes increasingly blurred, not only because of geopolitical events and the changing nature and configuration of borders, but also because migrants’ journeys are becoming increasingly multiple, complex and fragmented.” Irregular migration – the process – is the “Movement of persons that takes place outside the laws, regulations or international agreements governing the entry into or exit from the State of origin, transit or destination” (Sirona et al. 2019: 116). There are numerous reasons to be considered an irregular migrant (i.e. the status of a migrant), e.g. that he or she (a) enters a country without or with false documents or uses an illegal border crossing point, (b) resides in a country without a valid permit to stay, (c) is irregularly employed without having the right to work (IOM 2020). The group of concern is so-called ‘irregular migrant workers’ or ‘undocumented migrant workers’.4 A refugee – according to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees – is “a person who, owing to a well‐founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality” (UN 1951). Because this text is legally binding for destination countries to protect refugees stranded at their borders, it excludes the large mass of people who fled their homesteads for the same reasons as stipulated in the convention but did not – for a number of different reasons – cross an international border. They are considered to be ‘internally displaced’ (cf. below), a group that is even bigger than that of the recognized ‘refugees’, but who face the same and sometimes even worse conditions after their move to another location. 4

Since 1975, UN and many other bodies requested governments and media to avoid the term ‘illegal migrant’ (cf. UNHCR 2018). Perhaps the most striking comment came from Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, in 2010: “And let me be clear about my vocabulary too: illegal migrants do not exist. People may come to the EU and might be required to use irregular ways … but no human being is illegal” (EC 2010).

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Asylum-seekers are persons “seeking international protection. In countries with individualized procedures, an asylum-seeker is someone whose claim has not yet been finally decided on by the country in which he or she has submitted it. Not every asylum-seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, but every refugee is initially an asylum-seeker” (UNHCR 2006: 4). Finally, the term internally displaced persons relate to “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” (UNOCHA 2004). In this volume, we are focusing on the sub-groups of migrants whose recent movements have lead to an increased political, public and scientific debate: asylum-seekers/refugees and IDPs, and irregular migrant workers in an undocumented situation.5 However, according to the aforementioned definitions, a migrant might change his or her status several times depending on the legal situation and the application of (international) laws in the countries of origin, transit or destination.

1.4.2 Facts and Figures By the end of 2019, more than 26 million refugees were counted, of which 20 million were under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and another 5.6 million Palestinians were under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).6 Approximately 4 million Venezuelans have left their country of origin, heading to Colombia and other countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. However, due to the multitude of reasons why they had left their country they are not fully accounted for as refugees.7 More than two-thirds of these groups originated from only five countries: Syria, Venezuela, Afghanistan, South Sudan and Myanmar. Eighty-five percent of all these refugees are hosted in developing countries, with Turkey alone hosting 3.6 million persons. The OECD country with the most refugees was Colombia with 1.8 million people, followed by Germany with 1.1 million. Only a small proportion of the refugees has had the opportunity to claim asylum. In 2019, their number was approximately 4.2 million with 2 million new applications. According to UNHCR (2020), most asylum-seekers applied for asylum in industrialized countries, e.g. the USA (301,100), Germany (142,500), France (123,900) and Spain (118,300). 5

For a more comprehensive description of terms and concepts used by international organisations cf. UN (1998) and Sirona et al. (2019). 6 Detailed figures cf. UNHCR (2020) and UNRWA (2020). The next chapter of this book written by Daniel Naujoks presents data on trends and dynamics of the various migration movements. 7 Cf. Van Praag (2019).

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By far the biggest group of forcibly displaced people are those who are internally displaced. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre’s (IDMC)8 2020 global report on internal migration, there are more than 50 million IDPs of which 90 % fled their home because of conflict and violence, the remaining 10 % are the result of disasters (IDMC 2020a). The numbers documented have reached an all-time high in 2019; a decade ago the figures were only half as high. Of the approximately 33 million new IDPs in 2019, the vast majority are in Asia with India, the Philippines, Bangladesh and China as the frontrunners, mainly because of weather-related disasters (storms, floods, etc.). This pattern changes if we have a closer look to sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle East where a lower number of IDPs was recorded in 2019: here, most people are displaced because of local conflict and violence (IDMC 2020b: 9–14), the regional hotspots being Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and – due to the increasing number of armed attacks of violent extremists in the Sahel – Burkina Faso (UN Security Council 2020: 4–5).9 Finally, irregular migration has led to a very controversial discussion about its ‘root causes’, its various effects in countries of origin and destination, and how to deal with the – hypothetically – growing numbers of irregular migration workers in an undocumented situation. It is not easy to determine to what extent irregular migration takes place due to its informal and clandestine nature (Vespe et al. 2017: 26–27). Often, the figures are overestimated or present a wide range of guesstimates’ and projections. Additionally, there are numerous methodological challenges that make the collection and the aggregation of data on irregular migration a ‘mission impossible’ for researchers and administrations dealing with questions related to migration movements.10 Kraler/Reichel (2011: 97) conclude: “Wild assumptions, estimates and number games are made in regard to irregular migration flows.” With these disclaimers in mind, we can carefully argue that irregular migration constitutes only a small part of global migration movements; in 2009 (this was the latest figure), it was estimated at 50 million (UNODC 2010). Overall, international migration totalled 271 million in 2019 (UNDESA 2019: 8).

8

IDMC was established in 1998 as part of the Norwegian Refugee Council and is based in Geneva, Switzerland. IDMC releases annualy a Global Report on Internal Displacement. 9 By the end of 2020, IDMC has developed and released an Internal Displacement Index that combines the capacity of a given coutry to deal with the situation of internal displacement with its internal and external political and economic context (IDMC 2020b: 7). 10 Cf. EC (2009). The so-called ‘CLANDESTINO’ research project (‘Undocumented migration: Counting the uncountable. Data and trends across Europe’) which was discontinued in 2009 was the last attempt to develop a reliable database of irregular migration to Europe.

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The Structure of this Book

The structure of the book follows the routes of refugees and migrants. After describing the drivers and motives as well as the extent of global migration movements, the book outlines how the challenges on migrant and refugee routes, in refugee camps and in transit countries can be met in a systematic way. Migration management as a constructive way of dealing with migration movements then takes on a central role. In particular, it highlights the positive aspects of migration and outlines ways to achieve successful integration, reception and – if necessary – repatriation. Questions of governance at the European and international levels conclude this book. In this first chapter, the editors introduce the topic and the related challenges for politics and society in countries of origin, transit and destination of migrants, give an overview of basic concepts and the extent of migration movements and present the contributions of the book. In the second chapter Trends, Drivers and Dynamics of Flight and Migration, Daniel Naujoks provides an overview of current trends in international migration and displacement. Almost all countries in the world experience significant out- or in-migration. However, the majority of migrants reside in a few countries, while a few major emigration countries account for a large share of the global emigrant stock. In addition to a brief demographic profile, the chapter discusses drivers and migration motivations, climate and environmentally induced migration, categories of entry, irregular migration and unsafe migration routes. Among the most prominent reasons for flight and migration is fragility in its various dimensions. Jörn Grävingholt in his chapter about Displacement crises, fragile states and development cooperation: why governance support is needed to reduce reasons to flee illustrates what has to be done in fragile countries and failing and failed states in order to cope with the issue. When people flee their country, this usually indicates that their government has given up on parts of its population. In order to prevent displacement crises, this kind of state fragility needs to be countered. Fragility is a governance failure that cannot be overcome without transforming political institutions. Development cooperation must be geared towards addressing state fragility more comprehensively, with governance support playing a key role in this context. In many of these countries, the combination of measures of (short-term) humanitarian assistance and (long-term) development assistance is crucial for the success of often needed external interventions. Dennis Dijkzeul and Annalisa Addis examine the Humanitarian–Development Integration and compare the competing approaches ‘Linking Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development’, ‘Early Recovery’ ‘Resilience’ and the ‘Triple Nexus’. The debate about whether and how to integrate humanitarian action and development cooperation – also known as ‘bridging the gap’ – has been ongoing for several decades. A number of approaches to engendering integration have been tried. This chapter assesses the four main ones. First, Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) is mainly limited to the

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European Commission, while the second approach, Early Recovery, is specially used within the UN-led cluster system. And third, especially since the Kyoto Protocol, resilience seemed to offer an opportunity to bring together the two types of action. After the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit and the arrival of UN Secretary-General Guterres at the UN, the Triple Nexus came into vogue. This chapter examines and compares the deficiencies (or gaps) in knowledge about and institutionalization of humanitarian action and development that hamper – in overlapping, but different ways – the four approaches. They also look at the situation of South-Sudanese refugees in settlement camps in northern Uganda to assess to which degree these four approaches have functioned in practice. They conclude that it is unlikely that all the deficiencies can ever be overcome. During short-term emergencies and long-lasting protracted crises, refugee camps have to be established in order to meet the basic needs of displaced people. Very often, humanitarian organizations provide shelter, food, water and sanitation, energy, health services and so on leaving the inhabitants completely dependent on external inputs. Marlen de la Chaux gives an example of Entrepreneurship and Innovation: How Institutional Voids Shape Economic Opportunities in Refugee Camps. Refugee camps tend to be conceptualized as spaces that provide safety and aid to victims of forced displacement. Often overlooked, refugee camps are also vibrant spaces characterized by entrepreneurship, innovation and lively market activity. This chapter examines how refugee entrepreneurs build businesses despite social, normative and legal constraints of the refugee camp. She introduces three types of institutional voids that interface to constitute what she terms the Humanitarian Institutional Arrangement typical of refugee camps. The chapter then explains how refugee camp entrepreneurs navigate these institutional voids in order to create sustainable businesses. But even those who are not hosted in refugee camps or host communities are in danger when it comes to crises during their journey, in particular when they flee from one fragile country to another, how Albert Kraler and Lukas Gehrke illustrate in their chapter Beyond Emergencies: Towards a More Nuanced Understanding of the Various Impacts of Crises on Migrants. A number of recent conflicts and natural disasters have highlighted the particular vulnerability of migrants during crises in countries of destination and transit. A particular catalyst was the Libyan revolution of 2011 and the ensuing violence. In response to this and other crises a specific initiative – the ‘Migrants in Countries of Crisis Initiative’ (MICIC) – was launched to address such situations. Designed as an informal process the initiative aimed at developing guidance on how states and other stakeholders could address situations when migrants are caught by a humanitarian crisis in a destination or transit country. This chapter discusses the origins and focus of the initiative. Drawing on a dataset gathered in a study comparing six crisis situations the chapter highlights the need for a nuanced understanding of the impacts of crises on migrants. The chapter shows that there are indeed specific challenges migrants face when confronted with a crisis. These relate to general policies (such as migration policies) shaping experiences during crisis, specific responses to emergencies and societal conditions, including attitudes towards migrants.

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Stephanie Deubler and Martin Weiß in their contribution deal with comprehensive migration management in the Horn of Africa that addresses many of the aforementioned constellations using the example of the European Union-funded programme ‘Better Migration Management’. They underline that ‘migration management’ is often a controversial concept and approach in the development cooperation context, which makes it important to clarify and define precisely what is meant. Should development cooperation engage at all in this area? If so, in what way? What are the limits of this engagement? In 2016, the Better Migration Management (BMM) project confronted the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH with all these questions and challenges. Based on experience gained during the design phase of the project, a definition of the term ‘development-oriented migration management’ was created in order to provide guidance for future projects in this sector. Very often, programmes funded by donors of the Global North do not take into consideration the specific circumstances under which their Southern partners operate. We’d like to stress here that the current governance of international migration is characterized by a lack of co-operation. While the globalization of trade and finance rests on the principle of laissez-faire, migration policies tend to be restrictive. The main reason lies in the assumed asymmetry in the benefits derived from migration for high-income countries on one side and developing countries on the other. However, the lack of reciprocity is often more illusory than real. First, because restrictive migration policies are costly, not only for migrants and migrant-sending countries but also for the countries implementing restrictions. Second, because costly does not mean effective. Strict border controls indeed decrease migration flows occurring through formal channels but also typically translate into higher levels of irregular migration. Third, because countries of destination also benefit from immigration. Immigrants, for instance, help relieve sectors suffering from labour shortages and contribute in reducing demographic imbalance caused by population ageing. Fourth, because countries of immigration can leverage political negotiations regarding migration to help improve other key policy concerns. There is, therefore, more room for co-operation than generally admitted. As a result of usually asymmetric relationships, Demetrios G. Papademetrios and Kate Hooper plead for Reconsidering the partnership approach in international migration cooperation. In the last few years, the importance of cooperating on issues of migration has become ever more apparent. The 2015–16 migration crisis in Europe and successive surges in irregular migration at the US–Mexico border since 2014 have illustrated the limitations of acting unilaterally and demonstrated the role that cooperation can play in managing migration more effectively. As a result, governments in Europe and North America have invested significant resources and political capital in their relationships with key countries of origin and transit. But an initial review suggests that while recent partnerships on migration are distinguished by their scope and ambition, they raise similar questions to their predecessors: namely, how effective they are in achieving their goals and whether they constitute true ‘partnerships’ in the proper sense of the term.

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A more recent example how international cooperation and partnership address human mobility, forced displacement and migration are the outcomes of numerous international conferences on climate change, as Koko Warner describes in her chapter Risk, climate change, and human mobility in international policy. She examines observed and potential patterns of migration, displacement and planned relocation in the context of climate impacts and risks. International climate policy has framed human mobility as a risk management issue. The paper reviews the progress of the theme in the international climate policy period between approximately 2010 when Cancún Adaptation Framework paragraph 14(f) introduced human mobility and 2018 when the Task Force on Displacement delivered its recommendations to the Conference of the Parties (COP) 24. It then examines how issues of climate and disasters are treated in the Global Compacts on Migration and on Refugees, which also concluded at the end of 2018. The paper highlights some of the ways the work under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change complements the global compacts in preparing countries to manage adverse climate impacts which may affect people on the move. Foreign Policy, despite the main technical issues at international conferences and their impact on development, domestic and environmental policies, has an important role to play. Christian Jetzlsperger from the German Foreign Office focuses in his chapter Displacement and migration as a foreign policy challenge on the root causes of forced displacement and the role foreign policy can play in addressing them. The record numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons are a direct consequence of an increasing number of armed conflicts around the globe but in particular in Africa and the Middle East. These conflicts, while each of them has its specific origins, are aggravated by the fact that they take place in a changing international environment with increased great-power competition and shrinking influence of the ‘West‘. In addressing these conflicts, international actors have to overcome substantial obstacles both in the international arena and in their domestic politics. Results of international conflict-resolution efforts in the past 30 years are mixed at best. The author argues that successful intervention – on whatever scale – requires well-coordinated efforts and the flexible use of a wide range of instruments in support of a politically defined strategy. It requires the investment of political capital and sustained, often long-term effort. In the end, he concludes, all conflict resolution is political. Political will is crucial for allowing migrants to avoid illegal practices when crossing the borders of destination or transit countries. Kathleen Newland and Andrea Riester analyse the possibilities Legal Pathways for Low-Skilled Migrant Workers can offer for countries whose native-born workforce has become ever more educated and ever more concentrated in medium- and high-skilled industries. Many low-wage jobs that cannot be outsourced or automated – such as child and elder care, agriculture and construction – are filled by immigrants. Yet legal migration pathways are most readily available not to workers who might fill such positions, but to highly skilled professionals with formal qualifications. Where legal pathways for low-skilled migrants are too narrow to meet demand, employers and foreign-born workers alike often look to illegal migration to bridge the gap. The

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negotiation of a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration in 2018 represented a unique opportunity for states to take stock of what has and has not worked for low-skilled labour migration pathways in the past, as well as what might add value in the future. Among the key challenges, policymakers will need to address are the need to improve coordination between destination and origin countries, balance clarity of programme design with flexibility, and weave the protection of workers’ rights and the evaluation of impact into the fabric of new initiatives. Examples of how communities in destination countries can take care of refugees are presented in Jennifer Bond and Gregory A. Maniatis’ contribution Community Sponsorship of Refugees. They identify community sponsorship as a promising approach to refugee protection. It situates the potential of sponsorship within the global system; discusses the specific programmes that are emerging in Canada, the United Kingdom and Argentina; and explains the key policy settings that underpin each approach. It also notes growing global momentum around community sponsorship and sets out the history, objectives and evolving role of the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative. The piece concludes that although additional longitudinal and comparative research is necessary, a growing body of evidence supports the potential of community sponsorship to improve integration and strengthen host communities. It is clear, however, that not all seeking refuge in host countries will be granted asylum due to the lack of evidence of their request. The chapter Failed Asylum Seekers as Agents of Development? New Approaches to Voluntary Return and Sustainable Reintegration in Germany’s post-2015 Migration Policy tries to find out how returnees can play a more prominent role in the development of their countries of origin. Jan Schneider argues that since the 2015/2016 refugee crisis, the German Government has been under domestic political pressure to accelerate the process for returning failed asylum seekers to their countries of origin. However, repatriation efforts using regulatory instruments are proving insufficient. He describes how the development cooperation perspective has made inroads into this policy area and how a policy of voluntary and sustainable return can be elaborated further at German and European levels. When it comes to refugees and migrants, particularly the problems related to people on the move are highlighted. David Benček, Tobias Heidmann, Matthias Lücke and Claas Schneiderheinze analyse what Welfare effects of regular and irregular migration exist, and why it is preferable to have a sound migration policy at hand. The chapter examines the ways in which regular and irregular migration affects welfare. Net welfare effects concern migrants, countries of origin and host countries to varying degrees and are affected by migrants’ characteristics, especially their legal status. Irregular migration is more likely to result in welfare loss or smaller welfare gains due to unfavourable selection, high uncertainty and below-average labour market outcomes. In order to ensure overall beneficial welfare effects, migration requires governance through coherent cross-departmental policies.

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Keeping the results of the analysis in mind, it becomes clear that countries of destination should be Neither Fortress nor Open Gate. Theo Rauch submits Proposals for a Humane but Realistic Migration Policy because, as he argues, there is broad political consensus that neither closing European borders nor allowing unrestricted freedom of movement can be viewed as a feasible response to the increasing migration pressure around the world. But when it comes to the question of how to regulate migration in a way that adequately considers the legitimate interests of migrants, of the societies in the countries of destination and of the regions of origin, most political parties and academics remain silent if they are asked to be specific about the controversial question of ways and means to invite or restrict migration. Acknowledging that fighting the root causes of forced displacement is a necessary but not sufficient contribution, this article aims to contribute to a consolidated development and migration policy composed of the three main pillars of firstly reducing migration pressures in the regions of origin, secondly providing safe legal routes for migrants to Europe and thirdly defining the parameters, i.e. the limitations necessary to keep migration movements within the absorption capacities of the societies and labour markets in the countries of destination. The policy recommendations refer to all motives for migration. A plea for Better migration management: Rethinking the development and mobility paradigms concludes this book. The African diplomate Michelle Ndiaye says that although the outmigration of Africans to Europe has always been a subject of great concern, only in 2015 did the descriptor ‘crisis’ begin to be used to refer to one of the biggest movements of refugees and migrants since the Second World War. Efforts have been made by the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) to enhance the management of migration. However, there is an urgent need to rethink the predominant narrative and management approaches by the two bodies. Her chapter draws attention to some of the veritable opportunities for better migration management, such as reconceptualizing mobility and free movement as a political and societal solution to the migration crisis; improved cooperation amongst African countries in finding lasting solutions to migration; diaspora mapping and management; and the possibilities of the EU’s support to African countries and sub-regions for a development-friendly management of migration capable of protecting migrants and enhancing the positive effects of migration such as remittances or knowledge transfers and sustainable reintegration of returning migrants into the labour market.

References Aleinikoff, Alexander, and Susan Martin. 2018. Making the Global Compacts work: What future for refugees and migrants? Sydney: Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law. https:// www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/Policy%20brief_6%20final.pdf. Accessed 21 October 2021. Bae, Christopher J., Katerina Douka, and Michael D. Petraglia. 2017. On the origin of modern humans. Asian perspectives. Science 358(6368): 1269. https://science.sciencemag.org/content/ 358/6368/eaai9067.full. Accessed 6 September 2020.

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Banerjee, Kiran. 2020. Assessing the Global Compact for Migration: a ‘Milestone’ on the Long Pathway to Greater International Cooperation? Newsletter of the American Political Science Association’s Organized Section on Migration and Citizenship 7(2): 10–15. Crossette, Barbara. 2000. The World; The Century of Refugees Ends. And Continues. The New York Times, 31 December: Section 4, p. 4. https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/31/ weekinreview/the-world-the-century-of-refugees-ends-and-continues.html. Accessed 12 September 2020. EC. 2010. Cecilia Malmström, Member of the European Commission responsible for Home Affairs. The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change. Brussels: European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_10_699. Accessed 19 September 2020. EC. 2020a. Migration. New Pact on Migration and Asylum. Brussels : European Commission. Brussels : European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/new-pact-onmigration-and-asylum-package.pdf. Accessed 23 September 2020. EC. 2020b. Speech by Vice-President Schinas on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, 23 September. Brussels: European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/ detail/en/speech_20_1736. Accessed 21 October 2020. Forschungsgruppe Wahlen. 2020. Politbarometer. Politik II. Wichtige Probleme. Mannheim: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen. https://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen/Politbarometer/ Langzeitentwicklung_-_Themen_im_Ueberblick/Politik_II/. Accessed 26 September 2020. Guterres, Antonio. 2018. Secretary-General, at Migration Event, Urges Greater Cooperation, Well-Advised Policies to Protect, Assist People on the Move. United Nations Event ‘The Road to Marrakech’, New York, 26 September. New York: United Nations. https://www.un.org/ press/en/2018/sgsm19249.doc.htm. Accessed 13 September 2020. IDMC. 2020a. Global Report on Internal Displacement. Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/ documents/2020-IDMC-GRID.pdf. Accessed 19 September 2020. IDMC. 2020b. Internal Displacement Index 2020 Report. Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/ documents/Internal%20Displacement%20Index%20report_2020.pdf. Accessed 19 September 2020. IOM. 2020. Irregular Migration. Migration Data Portal, 9 June. https://migrationdataportal.org/ themes/irregular-migration. Accessed 19 September 2020. Kévonian, Dzovinar. 2013. Deux siècles de réfugiés : Circulations, qualifications, internationalisation. Pouvoirs 144: 17–32. https://revue-pouvoirs.fr/IMG/pdf/Pouvoirs144_p17-32_deux_ siecles.pdf. Accessed 12 September 2020. King, Russell, and Ronald Skeldon. 2010. ‘Mind the Gap!’ Integrating Approaches to Internal and International Migration. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36(10): 1619–1646. https:// doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2010.489380. Kraler, Albert, and David Reichel. 2011. Measuring Irregular Migration and Population Flows – What Available Data Can Tell. International Migration 49(5): 97–128. https://doi.org/10.1111/ j.1468-2435.2011.00699.x. Lachenicht, Susanne. 2016. Religion und Flucht im im spätmittelalterlichen und neuzeitlichen Europa. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 66(26–27): 10–17. https://www.bpb.de/apuz/229815/ religion-und-flucht-im-spaetmittelalterlichen-und-fruehneuzeitlichen-europa. Accessed 11 September 2020. Massey, Douglas S. 2003. Patterns and Processes of International Migration in the 21st Century. Paper prepared for Conference on African Migration in Comparative Perspective, Johannesburg, South Africa, 4–7 June. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.473. 925&rep=rep1&type=pdf. Accessed 11 September 2020. Meier, Mischa. 2016. Die “Völkerwanderung”. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 66(26–27): 3–10. https://www.bpb.de/apuz/229813/die-voelkerwanderung?p=1. Accessed 11 September 2020.

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Oltmer, Jochen. 2016. Kleine Globalgeschichte der Flucht im 20. Jahrhundert. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 66(26–27): 18–25. https://www.bpb.de/apuz/229817/kleine-globalgeschichteder-flucht-im-20-jahrhundert. Accessed 11 September 2020. Osterhammel, Jürgen. 2009. Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts. München: C. H. Beck. Sirona, Alice, Céline Bauloz, and Milen Emmanuel. 2019. International Migration Law. Glossary on Migration. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. https://publications.iom.int/ system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf. Accessed 12 September 2020. UN. 1951. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Geneva: United Nations. https://www. ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/refugees.pdf. Accessed 13 September 2020. UN. 1998. Recommendation on Statistics of of International Migration. Revision 1. New York: United Nations. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/seriesm/seriesm_58rev1e.pdf. Accessed 12 September 2020. UN. 2018a. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees. Part II. Global compact on refugees. New York: United Nations. https://www.unhcr.org/gcr/GCR_English. pdf. Accessed 21 October 2020. UN. 2018b. Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and and Regular Migration. New York: United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/73/195. Accessed 21 October 2020. UN Security Council. 2020. Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel. New York: United Nations Security Council. https://undocs.org/s/2020/585. Accessed 19 September 2020. UNDESA. 2019. International Migration Report 2019. New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/ publications/migrationreport/docs/InternationalMigration2019_Report.pdf. Accessed 22 October 2020. UNHCR. 2006. UNHCR Master Glossary of Terms. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.refworld.org/docid/42ce7d444.html. Accessed 13 September 2020. UNHCR. 2018. Why ‚undocumented‘ or ‘irregular’? Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/cy/wp-content/uploads/sites/41/2018/09/ TerminologyLeaflet_EN_PICUM.pdf. Accessed 19 September 2020. UNHCR. 2020. Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2019. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/5ee200e37.pdf. Accessed 14 September 2020. UNOCHA. 2004. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Second edition. New York. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/GPEnglish.pdf. Accessed 22 October 2020. UNODC. 2010. UNODC report presents data on smuggling of migrants from Latin America and Africa. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ frontpage/2010/July/unodc-report-presents-data-on-smuggling-of-migrants-from-latin-americaand-africa.html. Accessed 22 October 2020. UNRWA. 2020. Annual Operational Report 2019. Amman: United Nations Relief and Works Agenccy for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/ content/resources/aor_2019_eng.pdf. Accessed 14 September 2020. Van Praag, Oriana. 2019. Understanding the Venezuelan Refugee Crisis. Washington, D.C.: Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/understanding-the-venezuelan-refugeecrisis (Accessed 14 September 2020). Vespe, Michele, Fabrizio Natale, and Luca Pappalardo. 2017. Dat sets on irregular migration and irregular migrants in the European Union. Migration Policy Praktice 8(2): 26–33. http://www. eurasylum.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/MPP-30.pdf. Accessed 19 September 2020.

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Hans-Joachim Preuß was until mid-2021 the Resident Representative of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) for Benin, Burkina Faso and Togo and was the Head of the Cotonou Office in Benin. He is at present lecturer at the Institute of Political Science and Sociology of the University of Bonn, Germany. In previous positions, he was a member of the Board of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Secretary General of Deutsche Welthungerhilfe and Senior Policy Analyst of GIZ’s predecessor GTZ. Before this, he worked with GTZ for five years in Mauritania and Benin. He holds a PhD in Agricultural Economics from Gießen University. Christoph Beier was the Deputy Chairperson of the Board of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH and is currently heading the regional programme ‘Good Governance for Local Development, South Caucasus’ in Tbilisi, Georgia. Prior to this, Beier held various senior management positions within GIZ, where he headed the Planning and Development Department and various regional departments. He advised Indonesia’s Ministry of the Interior on decentralisation and worked as a research assistant at the Chair of Economic and Social Geography at the Ruhr University Bochum. Dirk Messner is President of the German Environment Agency (Umweltbundesamt, UBA) in Dessau, Germany, since 2020. He previously served as Director of the Institute for Environment and Human Security of United Nations University (UNU-EHS) in Bonn, Germany, and Vice Rector of the United Nations University (UNU). Prior to becoming Director of UNU-EHS in October 2018, Messner had been Director of the German Development Institute (DIE) from 2003– 2018. Messner is an internationally recognised expert on globalisation/global governance, transformation pathways to sustainability, decarbonization of the global economy, sustainability and digital change, and international cooperation and societal change. He has also been a member of a number of high-ranking policy advisory councils, including co-chairing the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) and the Sustainable Development Solutions Network Germany and is member of the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED).

2

Trends, Drivers, and Dynamics of Flight and Migration Daniel Naujoks

Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of current trends in international migration and displacement. Nearly all countries in the world experience significant out- or in-migration, however, the majority of migrants reside in a few countries, while a few major emigration countries account for a large share of the global emigrant stock. In addition to a brief demographic profile, the chapter discusses drivers and migration motivations, climate and environmentally induced migration, categories of entry, irregular migration, and unsafe migration routes.

2.1

Introduction

Human mobility is a multi-faceted field of study. Providing an overview of important trends, drivers, and dynamics of flight and migration requires acknowledging the various dimensions of spatial mobility. We can differentiate movements that cross internationally recognized borders and scenarios in which people move within countries. People may move from rural areas to cities or between urban centers. Distances matter too. Migration can consist of relocating a few miles across a border, moving to a country a few hundred miles away on the same continent, or crossing oceans to start a new life on the other side of the globe. It involves moves from a developing country to a more developed country, moves in the opposite direction, or moves between developing or industrialized countries. In addition to distances measured in kilometers or development indicators, ‘cultural distances’ may matter in terms of language, religious and cultural practices, and the ethnic composition of the population.

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-J. Preuß et al. (eds.), Forced Displacement and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32902-0_2

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Direction matters. Often migration is equated with immigration. But inflows in one country correspond to outflows in another. Some migrants only transit, some return to their countries of origin, and some move on and re-migrate. The routes migrants take to reach their destination can be direct or complicated; they can be safe or perilous. Movements can occur unaided or with the support of agents, smugglers, or other intermediaries. Some migrations are long-term, whereas others are short-term and temporary – by intention, actual duration, or legal status. People on the move may be young, in their prime working age or they may intend to retire. Some movements involve people with a high socio-economic status and recognized high skills, others see people and households with lower statuses for employment opportunities that are deemed more fungible and that often involve the so-called 3D jobs that are dirty, dangerous, and demeaning. Looking at the intensity and scale of migratory movements, we can discern individual movements of men or women, constant medium-sized migrations of households, major corridors, and sudden large-scale inflows and outflows. Some people are labeled and counted as migrants although they have never moved. In some cases, it is the border that changes position or children, and descendants of migrants and diaspora communities fall under the purview of migration narratives, counts, and policies. People move for different reasons and with different levels of agency. While the dichotomy between forced and voluntary migration may not neatly categorize all international movements, it is clear that people can determine to different degrees if, when, where, and how to go. While migration motives may in reality be a mix of several objectives, we can differentiate between those who relocate primarily in order to work, study, join their family, or seek protection from environmental degradation, disasters, war, violence, and persecution. Legal and policy categories matter in many cases. As such, internationally mobile populations can be categorized as regular or irregular immigrants – with greatly varying bundles of rights and opportunities attached to each status. States may provide persons with refugee status or they can move within specific ‘migration programs’ or in designated visa categories, which may or may not coincide with the movers’ motivations. While it would go beyond the scope of this chapter to address all the dimensions, it is important to stress the heterogeneous nature of human mobility and the need to go beyond oversimplified representations of the phenomena. In the remainder of this chapter, I will provide an overview of current trends with regard to international migration and refugees at the global and regional levels. While figures for internally displaced persons are also included in the profile of forced migration, the chapter focuses on international mobility only. Based on migrant stock data that shows the number of migrants in a given year, the next section will show that nearly all countries in the world experience significant out- or in-migration – many countries being simultaneously exposed to both, immigration and emigration. However, the majority of migrants reside in a few countries and a few major emigration countries account for a large share of the worldwide migration stock. A closer look at the regional level shows that intraregional migration remains the most important

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dynamic, especially in Europe, Asia, and Africa. The subsequent section provides key demographic information on migration stocks, especially with regard to sex and age. Following a preface on drivers and migration motivations, the chapter will then provide an overview of forced migration, climate, and environmentally induced migration as well as categories of entry. The chapter concludes with a discussion on irregular migration, issues about unsafe migration routes, and mixed migration flows.

2.2

The Global Picture: Nearly all Countries are Affected by Migration and Displacement

In 2019, there were 272 million international migrants globally, corresponding to 3.5% of the world population (UN 2019). This number includes refugees and persons in refugee-like situations.1 Developed regions (the ‘North’) hosted 56% of the world’s migrants, whereas 44% lived in countries in developing regions (the ‘South’). South–South migration accounted for 39% of all international movements, while migration from the global South to a country in the global North accounted for 35%. Yet another 21% of migrants moved between countries in the North. The remaining 5% were born in the North but now live in the South. Almost all countries in the world are affected by migration. As Fig. 2.1 shows, some countries are predominantly immigration or emigration countries, but the vast majority of countries are both, countries of immigration and emigration. The horizontal axis provides the ratio of immigrants per total population and the vertical axis, the respective ratio for emigrants. Each dot represents one out of the 232 countries and territories for which the United Nations (UN) collects data and their respective immigration and emigration rates. The countries clustering around the intersection of the two axes – the area marked ‘1’ in Fig. 2.1 – are countries without significant levels of either immigration or emigration. Only 22 countries have fewer than 3% of immigrants and 3% of emigrants, while the remaining 210 countries and territories have higher levels of immigration, emigration, or both. The countries located close to the horizontal axis are predominantly immigration countries (cluster 2), and countries located close to the vertical axis are emigration-only countries (cluster 3). In fact, in 120 countries, immigrants make up 5% or more of the population, and in 89 countries, more than 10%. Emigrants correspond to more than 5% of their country of origin’s population in 145 cases and more than 10% in 91 cases. Table 2.1 provides information on the top 20 immigration countries. The country with the highest proportion of foreign-born is the Holy See, where 98% of the resident population was born abroad. While the Holy See is a small country, and arguably, a special case, several Gulf countries have particularly high

1

For definitions cf. Preuß et al. in the introductory chapter.

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D. Naujoks 90%

80%

3

70%

Emigrants / populaƟon

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

1

2 1 10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Immigrants / populaƟon

Fig. 2.1 Global Immigration and Emigration rates (2019). Source Author’s calculations based on United Nations Population Division data. Notes Each dot represents both, the immigration and emigration rate for a single country. Immigration and emigration rates are calculated as immigrant/emigrant stock as share of the total population. Cluster 1 indicates countries that do not experience significant levels of out- or in-migration. Cluster 2 includes countries with significant immigration but low levels of emigration, whereas Cluster 3 encompasses countries that experience emigration but little immigration. Countries located outside the three clusters are both, immigration and emigration countries

immigrant-to-population ratios, led by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with 88%, followed by Qatar (79%), Kuwait (72%), Bahrain (45%), and Saudi Arabia (38%). When it comes to emigration, a high proportion of nationals from several Small Island Developing States live abroad. There are more than three times more people born in Montserrat or Niue living abroad than the current population of these island states in the South Pacific Ocean or the Caribbean, respectively. Apart from very small countries, high emigration rates are experienced by Guyana (66%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (50%), Syria (48%), Albania (42%), Jamaica (38%), Cabo Verde (34%), and Armenia (33%).

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Table 2.1 Top 20 countries and territories with the highest share of immigrants or emigrants (2019) Immigrants/Population Holy See UAE Qatar Kuwait British Virgin Islands Monaco Liechtenstein Sint Maarten (Dutch) Turks & Caicos Macao Bonaire, Sint Eustatius & Saba Andorra Falkland Islands US Virgin Islands Isle of Man Channel Islands Guam Luxembourg Oman Bahrain Source Author’s calculations based on

Emigrants/Population 98% Montserrat 88% Niue 79% Saint Kitts & Nevis 72% Tokelau 69% Cook Islands 68% Dominica 67% Saint Helena 67% Wallis & Futuna Islands 64% Turks & Caicos 62% Monaco 60% State of Palestine 58% Curaçao 56% Suriname 54% Tonga 51% Sint Maarten (Dutch) 49% Puerto Rico 48% Grenada 47% Guyana 46% Samoa 45% Antigua and Barbuda United Nations Population Division data

458% 347% 236% 169% 128% 110% 109% 103% 81% 81% 78% 75% 73% 71% 69% 68% 68% 66% 63% 57%

Figure 2.1 illustrates that many countries are at the same time countries of origin and destination, comprising the countries outside the marked clusters. In 82 countries, both immigration and emigration rates are above 5% and in 46 countries, above 10%. The small city-state of Monaco experiences exceptionally high levels of both emigration and immigration, where 69% of the population are immigrants, and those born in the country who now live elsewhere correspond to 81% of the current resident population. While there are no comprehensive global statistics on the numbers of migrants who enter or leave countries each year, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) collects such data for its members. Figure 2.2 shows that movements of permanent migration to OECD countries decreased during the economic crisis of 2009–2011 but have since been growing. The recent increase is also due to the larger number of entries seeking humanitarian protection as will be discussed later in this chapter.

Millions

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D. Naujoks 6

Other

Humanitarian

5 4 3 2 1 0 2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Fig. 2.2 Permanent migration movements to OECD countries (2009–2018). International Migration Database. Note 2018 data based on estimates

2.3

2017

2018 (e)

Source OECD

Concentration of Migrants: Few Countries of Origin and Destination Account for the Majority of Emigrants and Immigrants

While nearly all countries in the world are experiencing non-trivial levels of immigration or emigration, the majority of international migrants are concentrated in just a few countries. In 2019, ten countries alone hosted half of all international migrants. With 51 million immigrants or one-fifth of all migrants, the United States of America (US) hosts the single largest number of immigrants, followed by Germany and Saudi Arabia with 13 million each, and Russia with 12 million migrants. Other major immigrant-hosting countries are the United Kingdom (UK) with 10 million, the UAE with 9 million, and France and Canada with around 8 million each (Fig. 2.3). Analyzing shifts in migration patterns from 1960–2000, Czaika/de Haas (2014: 283) find that migration has become more diverse from the perspective of countries of destination, while “migrants from an increasingly diverse array of non-European-origin countries concentrating in a shrinking pool of prime destination countries.” The unequal distribution of migrants across the countries results clear from Fig. 2.4. The 59 countries with the highest number of migrants host 90% of all migrants in the world. The top 29 countries host 75% and the top ten countries, more than 50%. On the other hand, the 150 countries with the least number of immigrants jointly host just over 5% of the global migrant stock. A similar concentration is the case for countries of origin. Globally, half of all international migrants were born in 20 countries (47%) and one-third in the top ten sending countries alone (33%) (UN 2019). The list of major emigration countries is led by India with 17.5 million emigrants, followed by Mexico (12 million), Russia China (11 million each), and Syria and Bangladesh (8 million each) (Fig. 2.3).

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Trends, Drivers, and Dynamics of Flight and Migration

Countries of desnaon United States Germany Saudi Arabia Russia UK UAE France Canada Australia Italy Spain Turkey India Ukraine South Africa Kazakhstan Thailand Malaysia Jordan Pakistan

Countries of origin 50.7

13.1 13.1 11.6 9.6 8.6 8.3 8.0 7.5 6.3 6.1 5.9 5.2 5.0 4.2 3.7 3.6 3.4 3.3 3.3

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India Mexico China Russia Syria Bangladesh Pakistan Ukraine Philippines Afghanistan Indonesia Poland UK Germany Kazakhstan Palesne Myanmar Romania Egypt Turkey

17.5 11.8 10.7 10.5 8.2 7.8 6.3 5.9 5.4 5.1 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.5

Fig. 2.3 Twenty countries with the largest immigrant and emigrant populations (2019) (in million migrants). Source UN (2019)

Fig. 2.4 Distribution of international migrants across all countries (2019). Source Author’s calculations based on United Nations Population Division data. Notes The horizontal axis shows all 232 countries and territories for which the UN collects migration data, sorted by the share of all international migrants. The vertical axis displays the cumulative share of countries’ share of the world migrant stock

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D. Naujoks Europe

67%

Oceania

60%

Asia

60%

Africa

53%

Northern America LAC

28% 16%

Fig. 2.5 Share of migrants who remain in their region of birth (2017). Source Modified from UN (2017a). Note LAC refers to Latin American and the Caribbean

Further emphasizing the point previously made that countries are simultaneously sending and receiving, Russia, Germany, Turkey, Pakistan, and the UK are on both, the top 20 list of countries of destination and origin. These figures only refer to those who fall under the statistical definition of international migrants, namely, people living in a different country than they were born in or holding a foreign citizenship. For various reasons, a focus on the descendants of migrants can be warranted, though there are no global statistics on migration ancestry and diaspora populations.2 The bulk of international migrants stay within their regions of birth. Figure 2.5 illustrates that the vast majority of migrants still reside in the region where they were born. Thus, intraregional migration is much more significant than movements between regions of the world. For example, facilitated by the free labor mobility within the European Union (EU), more than two-thirds of migrants from Europe live in another European country (67%). In Oceania and Asia, 60% of migrants remain within the continent, while this holds true for more than half of the African migrants (53%). In Northern America, which only comprises Canada and the US, still, 28% of migrants move between the two countries. On the other hand, merely 16% of Latin American and Caribbean migrants remain in the region, while 70% live in Northern America. Thus, international migration remains first and foremost intraregional. However, it is worth noting that there are significant differences within these regions. The intraregional movements include flows from India, Bangladesh, and the Philippines to the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa, or from the Balkans, Ukraine, and Moldova to Western Europe.

2

Diasporic actors are all persons who originate from a certain country, self-identify with that country, and who maintain a meaningful cultural and social relationship with the country (Sheffer 2003; Naujoks 2013: 12). This includes both citizens and non-citizens of the home country, as well as first and second-plus generation emigrants.

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2.4

27

Demographic Characteristics of International Migrants

About half of today’s international migrants are women (48%) as shown in Fig. 2.6. However, there is a significant difference at the regional level. In Europe, Northern America, Oceania, Latin America, and the Caribbean, migrant women surpass the number of migrant men. On the other hand, countries in Africa and Asia host fewer female migrants. In Africa, 47% of international migrants are women and in Asia only 42%. This is mostly due to a large increase of migrant men whose number grew by 73% between 2000 and 2017 due to the heightened demand in the construction, service, and manufacturing sectors in the Gulf countries (UN 2017a). In fact, since 2000, the percentage of women among international migrants has increased in all world regions except in Asia where it fell by 4.2 percentage points. Figure 2.6 also provides migrants’ median age by region of the world. The global median age of international migrants is 39.3 years, up from 38.0 years in 2000. Thus, on an average, international migrants are getting older. The immigrants in Northern America have the highest median age, almost 44 years. On the other hand, migrants in Africa are the youngest, with a median age of 31. While the median age of migrants increased in most regions since 2000, it decreased in Latin America and the Caribbean from 38.8 to 33.8, in Asia from 36.5 to 35.6, and in Oceania from 44.6 to 42.9.

47.9% 39.3 51.6% 42.7 50.5% 43.5 50.4% 42.9 49.9% 33.8 47.0% 30.9 41.5% 35.6

Share female migrants

Median age

Fig. 2.6 Share of female migrants and the median age of all migrants by region of destination (2019). Source UN (2019)

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2.5

D. Naujoks

Drivers, Motivations, and Categories

There is a broad variety of reasons why people cross international borders. Some seek better opportunities for employment or education, some want to join their family members, while others are individually persecuted or seek safety from extreme poverty, wars, and violence or natural disasters. In some cultures, migration is a ‘rite of passage.’ When assessing the causes, drivers, and motives for migration, three differentiations are paramount. First, legal categories that correspond to an officially stated migration objective may only partially reflect the actual reasons for migrating. Thus, administrative records about work and student visas, family reunification, or refugee status can serve as a proxy for the underlying motivation. But it is problematic to infer the actual reasons for migrating from the stated motivation in legal procedures. This is because there may be mixed motives, because people may strategically use legal categories to pursue their migration goals, and lastly, because such records depend on the official approval by immigration officials who may adjudicate a migrant’s claim differently from the underlying request. Furthermore, such records are only available for certain groups of people. For example, within areas of freedom of movements, such as the EU, the Economic Community of West African States and others, countries do not collect entry-related information. As Fig. 2.8 shows, about one-third of international migration into OECD countries is based on such freedom of movement. Men and women exercising this freedom may do so primarily for work, to join their families, study, or other reasons, but we will not know from the records. Second, in spite of decades of work on migration theories and related empirical analysis, our knowledge about what specifically prompts migration decisions is still underdeveloped.3 The so-called push-pull factor framework assumes that factors in origin countries such as high population density, lack of jobs/livelihoods, political repression and lack of governance, war, crime, violence, and environmental degradation/disasters induce people to leave, while factors in countries of destination act as magnets, including higher income, political freedom, or the availability of jobs and land. While these frameworks have served as heuristics, they are too deterministic, lack an explanatory framework, and also do not explain several movements (de Haas et al. 2020: 45). Simplistic conceptualizations are problematic because they lend themselves to simplistic policy interventions. Based on the idea that youth unemployment, poverty, low economic development, and the lack of quality health services and education induce out-migration, an increasing level of official development assistance is devoted to address the ‘root causes’ of certain forms of human mobility. This may not only be ineffective, as increasing levels of economic production and income, generally, first lead to an increase in emigration, as more people can afford to pay the costs that are associated with international movements (Clemens/Postel 2018; Clemens 2020). Such attempts may equally redirect development funds and efforts to populations, countries, and areas for reasons other than development needs. 3

For an overview of migration theories, see de Haas et al. (2020, Chap. 3); Massey et al. (1993).

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In most cases, a variety of factors at the levels of the individual, household, community, and society at large are at work. Importantly, decisions to migrate are shaped by both, intentions to leave as well as means to act on them. This is at the heart of the aspiration/ability model that explains migration outcomes by the aspiration to move and the ability to turn one’s migration aspirations into actual migration (Carling 2002; Carling/Schewel 2018). The surveys asking migrants for their main objective or the cause of their migration decision may be an important element in furthering our understanding but they come with several limitations. Carling/Schewel (2018: 5) see a major challenge in “trying to capture complex phenomena through posing simple questions.” For this reason, it may not fully represent the intention to emigrate when 33% of the respondents to the Gallup World Poll in sub-Saharan Africa and 27% in Latin America and Caribbean expressed their desire to emigrate (Esipova et al. 2018). Often decisions are complex and involve mixed motivations. Further, depending on the context of surveys, migrants’ and refugees’ answers may be biased as they internalize narratives in destination countries’ social worlds. It is also a fallacy to think of the migration decision as an individual decision. In many cases, such decisions are taken at the household level, as shown by the literature on the New Economics of Labor Migration (Stark/Bloom 1985; de Haas et al. 2020: 54). This has implications for surveys that ask migrants only why they decided to move. Lastly, migrants may be able to state their main objective, but it is unclear how this is connected to deeper causes. For example, climate change often affects the lack of viable livelihood strategies, which in turn may increase out-migration without being easily tracked in survey responses. The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2017 (WEF 2017) conceptualizes risks and their interconnectedness based on a survey of key stakeholders. The large-scale involuntary migration is connected to several other risks, notably to the failure of national governance as well as regional and global governance, state collapse, profound social instability, interstate conflict, and unemployment. These risks in turn depend on the failure to adapt and mitigate climate change, food, and fiscal crisis (Fig. 2.7).

2.5.1 Climate and Environmentally Induced Migration4 In recent years, it has become clear that climate change and environmental impacts are key factors shaping human mobility in many ways.5 The sea-level rise threatens living conditions in river deltas and other densely populated low-lying regions in the world, which in some countries has already prompted internal relocation and displacement. The small island states may also lose significant parts of their territories to rising seas. The environmental changes may lead to increased droughts and 4

Cf. Warner’s contribution (Chap. 10) in this book. For an introduction, see, Piguet et al. (2011), Government Office for Science (2011), and Zetter/Morrissey (2014). 5

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D. Naujoks

Fig. 2.7 Global risks and their interconnections. Source WEF (2017)

desertification with negative impacts on the livelihoods of affected populations. In addition, climate change affects the frequency of extreme weather events and natural disasters, including cyclones, storms, and floods, which in turn lead to internal as well as cross-border displacements and affect migration decisions in the medium-to-long term. It is important to stress that while climate change and environmental factors are becoming increasingly important determinants of human mobility, they are rarely the sole cause for such movements. The focus on the immediate impact of sudden-onset disasters, such as floods, cyclones, or hurricanes, regularly hides the long-term effects created by slow-onset environmental degradation. In many cases, environmental factors first affect land productivity and the livelihood strategies, which in turn lead to migration that is perceived as economically driven. Furthermore, climate and environmentally induced resource

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scarcity can contribute to the onset of conflicts, leading in turn to massive displacements. Based on the analysis of weather variations in 103 source countries, Missirian/Schlenker (2017) find that higher temperatures in countries of origin translate into higher asylum applications to the EU, concluding that asylum applications are likely to increase as global temperatures rise.

2.5.2 Migration by Category of Entry The legal category of entry provides useful information on migration motives, though, as discussed above, administrative records remain a poor reflection of the actual intentions of mobile populations. While there is no global data on categories of entry, such data exists for OECD countries (cf. Fig. 2.8). In the period of 2015–2017, family unification6 accounted for one-third of all permanent migration to OECD countries (36%), followed by migration within areas of free movements (31%) especially within the EU, humanitarian protection (16%), and work immigration (17%). However, this excludes temporary migration, including student migration.

2.5.3 Forced Displacement and Refugees Since 2004, the total number of forcibly displaced persons has tripled – from 20 million refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), stateless and returned refugees and IDPs in 2000 to 79.5 million at the end of 2019 (UNHCR 2020 and Fig. 2.9). This increase is particularly due to the strong growth of IDPs from 5 to 45.7 million. Figure 2.10 shows the development of the number of refugees and asylum-seekers for the period 1951–2019. It clearly shows that the current levels surpass the peak in 1990–1992 leading to a record high. Over the last 14 years, refugee men and women constantly comprised each about half of the total population with an average of 47.9% women (UNHCR 2017: 55). While sex-disaggregated data are only available for 62% of refugees under the mandate of the United High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), in 2016, 49% were women and 51% were men, under 18 years. While the above graphs provide an overview of the stock of refugees, Fig. 2.11 depicts the development of new asylum applications in OECD countries. The EU countries accounted for the vast majority of claims. Of all applications since 1980, European countries received 70% – and 64% in the last 5 years alone. On one hand, there is a steady increase in new refugees and asylum-seekers, and on the other, more than three-quarters of today’s refugees live in protracted situations for 5 or more years in a given asylum country (UNHCR 2020), and protracted 6

Family migration encompasses four main subcategories, namely, family formation, accompanying family members of immigrating workers, family reunification, and international adoption (OECD 2017: 10).

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D. Naujoks Labor, 480, 11%

Free movement, 1 383, 31%

Accompanying family, 265, 6%

Family, 1 604, 36% Humanitarian, 712, 16%

Fig. 2.8 Permanent migration movements to OECD countries by category of entry, Annual average 2015–2017, in thousands and percent. Source OECD International Migration Database

90 80

Refugees under UNHCR mandate

Asylum-seekers

Returned refugees

IDPs of concern to UNHCR

Returned IDPs

Stateless persons

Others of concern

Venezuelans displaced abroad

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

Fig. 2.9 UNHCR Persons of Concern: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, IDPs, Stateless and Returnees (2010–2019) (in millions). Source UNHCR data (https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/)

refugee situations across the globe last an estimated 26 years on average (UNHCR 2016). This leads to specific human rights and development challenges as well as to challenges to end long-term displacement. At the end of 2019, Syrians were the largest group of refugees, followed by Venezuelans, Afghans, and South Sudanese (Fig. 2.12). The people from these four countries in combination accounted for more than half (59%) of all refugees worldwide.

Millions

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25 Refugees under UNHCR mandate

Asylum-seekers

20 15 10 5

1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019

0

Millions

Fig. 2.10 Refugees and Asylum-seekers (1951–2019). unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/)

1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0

EU

Source UNHCR data (https://www.

Non-EU OECD

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018

Fig. 2.11 New asylum applications in EU and non-EU OECD countries (1980–2018). Source OECD (2019), based on data from UNHCR and Eurostat

Syria Venezuela Afghanistan South Sudan Myanmar Somalia Dem. Rep. of Congo Sudan Central African Rep. Eritrea

6,617 3,676 2,729 2,235

1,078 905 807 735 610 505

Fig. 2.12 Main source countries for refugees and asylum-seekers (end-2019), in thousands. Source UNHCR (2020)

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Since the beginning of the exodus of Syrians, Turkey has become the largest refugee-hosting country in the world. At the end of 2019, it hosted 3.9 million refugees, 92% of which were from Syria. With 1.8 million displaced Venezuelans living in Colombia, the country, as many in the region, is a new refugee host state. Indeed, the Venezuelan and Syrian exodus has implications and poses policy challenges for the entire region in Latin America (Freier/Castillo Jara 2020) and the Middle East (Beaujouan/Rasheed 2019). Whereas Turkey and Colombia are relatively new hosts, other countries in the top ten list, such as Pakistan and Uganda, have done so for a long time. In fact, after living in exile for more than 40 years, the 1.4 million Afghan refugees living in Pakistan account for one of the longest lasting refugee situations (UNHCR 2020: 18). Contrary to the perception in public discourse or the media in the global North, the vast majority of refugees live in a country in the global South. Only 15% of the world’s refugees live in developed regions, while 85% live in a developing country. While the number of people seeking international protection has increased, refugees and asylum-seekers remain a small minority in most countries and regions. In 2019, both categories of groups in combination accounted for just one-third of one percent of the world’s population (0.38%), and only in the Middle East and North Africa refugees makeup 2% of the population. They represent 0.7% of the population in Europe and Central Asia, 0.6% in Sub-Saharan Africa as well as in Latin America and the Caribbean, 0.1% in South Asia and North America, and 0.03% in East Asia and the Pacific.7

2.5.4 Irregular Migration A significant number of international migrants reside in a country without having the immigration status that allows them to live there. While there are no reliable global estimates (UN 2017b; IOM 2020: 28)8 according to IOM (2018) estimates, 10–15% of all migrants in 2010 were in an irregular situation. Contrary to the public discourse in the global North, this phenomenon is not limited to more economically developed regions. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that irregular migrants constitute about one-third of all migration flows into developing countries (UNDP 2009).9 While some undocumented migrants cross the border illegally, many enter the countries of destination on a visa and then overstay. The irregular migration poses a number of challenges. Most prominently, irregular border crossings often endanger the life and safety of migrants, and undocumented migrants can be exploited on the way or once they are arrived by unscrupulous middlemen and employers. They often have difficulties – 7

Based on World Bank Indicator database from UNHCR and UNRWA data. In addition, existing estimates vary greatly in their methodologies, making the data hard to compare. IOM (2020: 28) highlights that some reports that includes global estimates are “based on a lack of understanding of migration and displacement policy, practice and normative settings.” 9 For a discussion of undocumented migrants in India and Malaysia, see Sadiq (2008). 8

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either by law or in practice – to access public services including health and education and access to justice (UN 2017b).

2.6

Unsafe and Deadly Journeys

The focus on migration and refugee stocks obfuscates the relevance of migration routes. While some people board a plane to quickly and safely arrive in their country of destination, for many of today’s migrants, the journey is long, costly, and most importantly, unsafe. Many migration routes are characterized by so-called mixed migration movements that include people who flee war and persecution as well as those who primarily seek decent work and better lives. The UNHCR stresses that migrants and refugees “increasingly make use of the same routes and means of transport to get to an overseas destination. If people composing these mixed flows are unable to enter a particular state legally, they often employ the services of human smugglers and embark on dangerous sea or land voyages, which many do not survive.”10 In 2015, more than a million migrants and refugees were recorded arriving irregularly in Europe – 94% of which by sea – while this number has dropped to fewer than 400,000 in 2016 and 120,000 in 2019 (EU 2020). The unsafety of migration routes is often related to the establishment of countries’ deterrence policies (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014; FitzGerald 2019) and the establishment of a ‘non-entrée regime’ that makes it very hard for those seeking international protection to reach countries of asylum (Orchard 2014, Chap. 8). In her report on Unlawful Death of Refugees and Migrants, the Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Council on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions (UN General Assembly 2017, para 6), deplores the mass casualties of refugees and migrants in the course of their flight, and highlights that “On their journeys, they may face rampant crime, detention under inhuman conditions, sexual violence, slavery, kidnapping and even murder.” The countries through which migrants and refugees transit on their way to their final destinations not only need to become key players to safeguard the rights and lives of transiting women and men; temporary transit stays may extend in time and constitute de facto immigration conditions. Whereas since 2013, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has started collecting and compiling the number of migrant deaths,11 there is a dearth of reliable data and reporting mechanisms in many parts of the world. The IOM estimates that over the last 20 years, more than 60,000 migrants were recorded as having died trying to reach their destinations (Brian and Laczko 2016: 1).

10

See UN (2017d: 3). Data sources include official records of coast guards and medical examiners, media stories, reports from non-governmental organizations and UN agencies, and interviews with migrants (IOM 2018).

11

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The IOM’s Missing Migrants Project documented over 30,900 women, men, and children who lost their lives while trying to reach other countries in the period 2014–2018 (IOM 2020: 32). For this reason, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development explicitly calls on all countries to facilitate safe migration, as expressed in target 10.7 of the Sustainable Development Goals (Naujoks 2018). While human smuggling is an important element of irregular border crossings, a sole focus on targeting smugglers without addressing the underlying reasons, protection needs, and other aspects of why people result to unsafe migration journeys is not likely to yield success, and has the potential of further endangering the lives of refugees and migrants (Tinti/Reitano 2017; UN General Assembly 2017; FitzGerald 2019).

2.7

Conclusion

This short overview of trends, drivers, and dynamics of flight and migration has shown that international migration is ubiquitous and multi-faceted. While migrants and refugees represent only a small proportion of the population in the vast majority of countries, human mobility has important impacts for migrants, the communities they leave, and the communities they live in. Migration has positive economic and social impacts and generally improves development outcomes for migrants and communities of destination and origin alike (Naujoks 2013, 2019). Migration can be empowering but it can also lead to considerable challenges for the lives, dignity, and living conditions of those engaged in international mobility. While forced migration has increased in the last years, especially, because of the conflicts in Syria, Venezuela, and South Sudan, refugees account for less than 0.5% of the world’s population. This puts our efforts to provide human rights-based solutions for those in need of international protection in perspective and questions those who fear that the international system to responsibly address the plight of the concerned population is overstretched. The actual numbers suggest that the international community has the means to effectively and humanely cater to the needs of those in need. Another trend in international mobility is the increasing importance of cities, not only in hosting migrants and refugees but also in adopting policies for such populations (Caponio et al. 2018). Thus, we not only need to go beyond the global and regional views to look at national differences but also need to include the role and relevance of sub-national entities. Making migration safe and increasing the regular pathways to countries of destination and asylum are critical for managing migration. But this chapter equally demonstrates that the majority of migrants today are regular migrants who move to work, study, or join their families abroad. While several countries have adopted normatively problematic policies to externalize their borders and deter migrants, the vast majority of countries do not want to reduce the level of immigration. All countries in Oceania and Northern America want to maintain or increase the current

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Trends, Drivers, and Dynamics of Flight and Migration

Oceania

94%

6%

NA

100%

Europe

LAC Asia Africa

37

32%

55%

6%

9%

76%

10% 4%

9%

23%

65%

Raise

Maintain

Lower

9% 2%

40%

13%

43%

5%

No policy

Fig. 2.13 Government policies to influence the level of immigration by region (2015). Source UN (2017c: 3). Note Based on 196 countries with available data. NA refers to Northern America and LAC to Latin America and the Caribbean

level of immigration. This is also the case for 87% of countries in Europe, 82% in Latin America and the Caribbean, 75% in Asia, and 47% in countries in Africa (Fig. 2.13). 32% of European countries, 10% in Asia, and 6% in Oceania have policies in place to actively increase immigration. And few countries have adopted policies to decrease immigration, as have 23% of countries in Asia (particularly in West Asia, where countries in the Gulf have particularly high levels of immigration), 13% in Africa, and 9% each in Latin America and the Caribbean and Europe. As most countries in the world are developing migration policies, we see a global proliferation of what Hollifield (2004) calls the ‘migration state’ that regulates migration to provide security and economic wellbeing of its citizenry.12 Looking at past migration trends and future prospects, migration is likely to increase in the near future, though it is unlikely that this will occur in the form of mass movements that migration critics often fear. And, the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to affect mobility in the short- and medium-term (Naujoks 2020). Although migration flows are projected to fall in the short term, migration stocks may not (Ratha et al. 2020). In terms of ground realities, the aftermath of the pandemic is likely to further increase vulnerabilities for migrants and displaced populations. In addition, the economic consequences may increase mobility pressures and needs. It is too early to predict to what extent the closure of borders, increases in nationalism, and economic protectionism will emerge triumphant from the crisis. A look at the drivers of mobility shows that it is important to address climate change, global inequality, conflict, violence, hunger, and poverty that will impact migration in the future. But until then, migration is one of the most powerful adaption strategies that humans have, and facilitating it will be beneficial for all involved – not the least for migrant men and women.

12

Adamson/Tsourapas (2019) expand on Hollifield’s conceptualizations and provide a classification for migration state regimes in the Global South.

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References Adamson, Fiona B., and Gerasimos Tsourapas. 2019. The Migration State in the Global South: Nationalizing, Developmental, and Neoliberal Models of Migration Management. International Migration Review 54(3): 853–882. https://doi.org/10.1177/0197918319879057. Beaujouan, Juline, and Amjed Rasheed, Eds. 2019. Syrian Crisis, Syrian Refugees. Voices from Jordan and Lebanon. London: Palgrave. Brian, Tara, and Frank Laczko. 2016. Introduction: Migrant deaths around the world in 2015. In Fatal Journeys. Volume 2. Identification and Tracing of Dead and Missing Migrants, Eds. Tara Brian and Frank Laczko, 1–30. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. https:// publications.iom.int/fr/system/files/fataljourneys_vol2.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2020. Caponio, Tiziana, Peter Scholten, and Ricard Zapata-Barrero. 2018. Routledge Handbook of the Governance of Migration and Diversity in Cities. London: Routledge. Carling, Jørgen. 2002. Migration in the age of Involuntary Immobility: Theoretical Reflections and Cape Verdean Experiences. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 28(1): 5–42. https://doi. org/10.1080/13691830120103912. Carling, Jørgen, and Kerilyn Schewel. 2018. Revisiting aspiration and ability in international migration. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 44(6): 945–963. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 1369183X.2017.1384146. Clemens, Michael A. 2020. The Emigration Life Cycle: How Development Shapes Emigration from Poor Countries. Washington DC: Center for Global Development. https://www.cgdev. org/sites/default/files/emigration-life-cycle-how-development-shapes-emigration-poorcountries.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2020. Clemens, Michael A., and Hannah M. Postel. 2018. Deterring Emigration with Foreign Aid: An Overview of Evidence from Low-Income Countries. Washington DC: Center for Global Development. https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/deterring-emigration-foreign-aidoverview-evidence-low-income-countries.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2020. Czaika, Mathias, and Hein de Haas. 2014. The Globalization of Migration: Has the World Really become more Migratory? International Migration Review 48(2): 283–323. https://doi.org/10. 1111/imre.12095. Esipova, Neli, Anita Pugliese, and Julie Ray. 2018. More Than 750 Million Worldwide Would Migrate If They Could. Gallup News, 10 December. https://news.gallup.com/poll/245255/750million-worldwide-migrate.aspx. Accessed 21 September 2020. EU. 2020. Irregular arrivals to the EU, 2008–2020. European Council Infographics, 11 September. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/irregular-arrivals-since-2008/. Accessed 18 September 2020. FitzGerald, David Scott. 2019. Refuge Beyond Reach. How Rich Democracies Repel Asylum Seekers. New York: Oxford University Press. Freier, Luisa Feline, and Soledad Castillo Jara. 2020. Regional Responses to Venezuela’s Mass Population Displacement. E-International Relations, 16 September. https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/ 87681. Accessed 18 September 2020. Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas. 2014. International Refugee Law and Refugee Policy: The Case of Deterrence Policies. Journal of Refugee Studies 27(4): 574–595. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/ feu030. Government Office for Science. 2011. Foresight: Migration and Global Environmental Change. Final Project Report. London: The Government Office for Science. https://assets.publishing. service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/287717/11-1116migration-and-global-environmental-change.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2020. de Haas, Hein, Stephen Castles, and Mark J. Miller. 2020. The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World (6th edition). London: Red Globe Press. Hollifield. James F. 2004. The Emerging Migration State. International Migration Review 38(3): 885–912. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2004.tb00223.x.

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IOM. 2018. World Migration Report 2018. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country/docs/china/r5_world_migration_report_2018_ en.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2020. IOM. 2020. World Migration Report 2020. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2020. Massey, Douglas S., Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor. 1993. Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal. Population and Development Review 19(3): 431–66. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2938462. Missirian, Anouch, and Wolfram Schlenker. 2017. Asylum applications respond to temperature fluctuations. Science 358(6370): 1610–1614. https://science.sciencemag.org/content/358/6370/ 1610/tab-pdf. Accessed 21 September 2020. Naujoks, Daniel. 2013. Migration, Citizenship and Development. Diasporic Membership Policies and Overseas Indians in the United States. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Naujoks, Daniel. 2018. Achieving the Migration-Related Sustainable Development Goals. In 2017 Situation Report on International Migration. Migration in the Arab Region and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Eds. UN and IOM, 73–122. Beirut: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www. unescwa.org/files/publications/files/2017-situation-report-international-migration-english.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2020. Naujoks, Daniel. 2019. The Mobility Mandala. A global framework linking human mobility, public policy and sustainable development. Paper presented at the migration research brownbag series, Center for Migration Studies, New York, 6 November. https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/134/2019/06/Naujoks_Mobility-Mandala-June-2019.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2020. Naujoks, Daniel. 2020. Multilateralism For Mobility: Interagency Cooperation In A Postpandemic World. In: Ibrahim Sirkeci and Jeffrey H. Cohen (eds.), Human Mobility and Pandemic: Understanding the pandemic and human Mobility: London Transnational Press, pp. 183–193. OECD. 2017. International Migration Outlook 2017. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. OECD. 2019. International Migration Outlook 2019. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Orchard, Phil. 2014. A Right to Flee. Refugees, States, and the Construction of International Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Piguet, Étienne, Antoine Pécoud, and Paul De Guchteneire, Eds. 2011. Migration and Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ratha, Dilip, Supriyo De, Eung Ju Kim, Sonia Plaza, Ganesh Kumar Seshan, and Nadege Desiree Yameogo. 2020. COVID-19 Crisis through a Migration Lens. Migration and Development Brief 32. Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/ 989721587512418006/COVID-19-Crisis-Through-a-Migration-Lens. Accessed 21 September 2020. Sadiq, Kamal. 2008. Paper Citizens: How Illegal Immigrants Acquire Citizenship in Developing Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sheffer, Gabriel. 2003. Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stark, Oded, and David E. Bloom. 1985. The New Economics of Labor Migration. American Economic Review 75(2): 173–178. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1805591. Tinti, Peter, and Tuesday Reitano. 2017. Migrant, Refugee, Smuggler, Savior. New York: Oxford University Press. UN. 2017a. International Migration Report 2017. New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/ population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2020.

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UN. 2017b. Irregular migration and regular pathways, including decent work, labour mobility, recognition of skills and qualifications. Issue Brief #6 for session on Irregular migration and regular pathways, including decent work, labour mobility, recognition of skills and qualifications and other relevant measures, Geneva, 12–13 October. https://www.rosanjose. iom.int/site/sites/default/files/Documents/globalcompact/ts6_issues_brief_0.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2020. UN. 2017c. International Migration Policies: Data Booklet. New York: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. https://www.un.org/en/ development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/international_migration_policies_data_ booklet.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2020. UN. 2017d. Mixed Migration in Asia and the Pacific. Bangkok: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia. https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/GCMPREP_4E_0. PDF. Accessed 21 September 2020. UN. 2019. International Migrant Stock 2019. New York: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/ population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.asp. Accessed 21 September 2020. UNDP. 2009. Human Development Report 2009. Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development. New York: United Nations Development Programme. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/ default/files/reports/269/hdr_2009_en_complete.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2020. UN General Assembly. 2017. Unlawful Death of Refugees and Migrants. Note by the Secretary General. New York: United Nations General Assembly. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/ 1303261?ln=fr. Accessed 21 September 2020. UNHCR. 2016. Global Trends – Forced Displacement in 2015. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2020. UNHCR. 2020. Global Trends – Forced Displacement in 2019. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/5ee200e37.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2020. WEF. 2017. The Global Risks Report 2017. 12th Edition. Geneva: World Economic Forum. http:// www3.weforum.org/docs/GRR17_Report_web.pdf. Accessed 21 September 2020. Zetter, Roger, and James Morrissey. 2014. The Environment-mobility Nexus. In The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies, Eds. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long and Nando Sigona, 342–354. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Daniel Naujoks is the director ad interim of the International Organization & UN Studies Specialization at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. He is the author of ‘Migration, Citizenship, and Development’ (2013) and his research focuses on global governance, migration, refugees, citizenship, multilateralism and global development. He regularly advises governments and the United Nations and serves as chair of the International Studies Association’s Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Migration Studies section.

3

Displacement Crises, Fragile States and Development Cooperation: Why Governance Support is Needed to Reduce Reasons to Flee Jörn Grävingholt

Abstract

When people flee their country, this usually indicates that their government has given up on parts of its population. In order to prevent displacement crises, this kind of state fragility needs to be countered. Fragility is a governance failure that cannot be overcome without transforming political institutions. Development cooperation must be geared towards addressing state fragility more comprehensively, with governance support playing a key role in this context.

3.1

Introduction

In today’s debates on displacement and migration, many actors see development cooperation as playing an important role. In view of the escalation of global conflicts in recent years, and with Europe being forced to deal with hundreds of thousands of refugees since 2015, the rich countries’ vested interest in the successful development of the poorer ones and in a more equitable globalisation is more obvious than ever. Consequently, development cooperation, that aspires to support such developments, enjoys high degrees of legitimacy in the political discourse.1 However, driven by the inherently justified demand for ‘tackling the root causes of displacement’, development policy actors risk making promises that may just be impossible to fulfil. The logic of political crises demands that the more urgent a problem is perceived to be, the faster its solution is expected to become

1

For more on the role of development policy as a catalyst for transformation processes in the global multi-level system, cf. Grävingholt (2016).

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-J. Preuß et al. (eds.), Forced Displacement and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32902-0_3

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visible. Yet, this is not how development cooperation works. In an ironic twist, the new level of public attention awarded to foreign aid in the wake of the global displacement crises might thus result in a new wave of disillusionment and fundamental criticism of development policy. It is therefore important to begin by formulating a realistic level of aspiration. For one thing, successfully tackling the root causes of displacement would not equate to reducing all migration flows. Experts increasingly point to the phenomenon of what has come to be termed ‘mixed migration flows’, which in retrospect often makes it impossible to clearly distinguish between forced migration and migration that is motivated by other considerations. Nevertheless, displacement is the consequence of a specific humanitarian emergency that would best be addressed by preventing it from occurring in the first place. Preventing people from being forced to flee is a humanitarian, political and economic imperative. The idea of preventing all other migration motives, on the other hand, would be problematic for several reasons. It would be ahistorical (migration has always been an essential feature of humanity), economically unconvincing (labour migration often benefits all stakeholders) and ethically questionable. There is a second aspect. In order to prevent displacement, one must preclude the conditions that give rise to it. These are, first and foremost, civil wars and other forms of massive armed conflict. The remaining section of this paper will set out how development policy can contribute to achieving this objective. By no means, however, does it aim to convey the impression that development policy alone could overcome this challenge. Rather, it must be emphasised from the start that preventing violent conflict is a political task in which development policy plays an important role, but by no means the only one. What is more, even with the best efforts of all stakeholders, actions aimed at defusing imminent or acute conflicts will often fail. That does not make them futile. Crisis prevention as an all-encompassing programme would already be successful even if only one violent conflict or another were avoided or broke out less violently than without this support. That alone would justify it on humanitarian grounds and – as recent studies have shown – also in economic terms.2 In the following section, I will begin by exposing the special importance of state fragility as a driver of violent conflict and displacement. I will then discuss the role that development cooperation can play in overcoming fragility and, hence, violent conflicts as triggers of forced migration and displacement. Promoting better governance plays a key role in this context. The concluding outlook discusses particular challenges that development policy in general, and efforts to promote good governance in particular, must meet in order to contribute more effectively to overcoming fragility and violent conflicts.

2

For more on the cost-effectiveness of prevention cf. UN and World Bank (2018).

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3.2

43

State Fragility as a Driver of Conflict and Displacement

All major cross-border migration movements are the consequences of massive violence. Civil wars, often with a significant international dimension, were responsible for eight of the ten largest refugee populations falling under the mandate of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2019. (Further drivers were the breakdown of the state in Venezuela and the forced displacement of the Rohingya people from Myanmar.) The ten states that had the largest numbers of displaced persons within their borders in 2019, and thus, accounted for more than 70 percent of all internally displaced persons worldwide, look back on an equally violent history (see Table 3.1). Civil wars are armed confrontations between the government and one or more rebel movements. Once set in motion, they develop a momentum of their own that can frustrate for decades efforts to permanently end violence. Yet, it all begins with a state that fails (or considers it unimportant) to give all significant segments of its population the justified assurance of being there for them, too, and also serving their fundamental interests – a ‘fragile’ state. State fragility is a relatively recent concept that did not acquire prominence in debates on foreign and development policy until the mid-2000s.3 The phenomenon of a collapsing political system, as observed in countries such as Haiti or Somalia after the end of the Cold War, was initially grasped by the terms ‘failed’, ‘failing’ or ‘weak’ states. The term ‘fragility’ then replaced these expressions because the concept was more open to different outcomes and also suitable for use in international organisations due to its less derogatory connotation.4 Although some have criticised the focus on state fragility for its alleged state-centredness, others have highlighted that the primary concern expressed in the concept is a government’s ability to perform basic functions for its population. Fragility thus captures a dysfunctional state–society relationship with respect to many key functions. These core functions of the state towards its population can be described in terms of three dimensions: authority, capacity and legitimacy (Grävingholt et al. 2015).5 Authority refers to the control, by the state, of unauthorised violence, or, in other words, the degree to which the state has a monopoly on the use of force. Capacity means the state’s ability to provide its citizens with basic livelihood opportunities by delivering services in areas such as health care and education or basic administration. Finally, legitimacy refers to the willingness of a society to accept the state’s claim to be the only actor that has the legitimate power to set and enforce rules that apply to everyone. While all three functions are crucial and mutually 3

Cf. for example Chauvet/Collier (2004), DFID (2005), OECD (2007). For more background information on the term see Faust et al. (2015). 5 In a recent paper, this author and his co-authors have used a slightly modified terminology, referring to the three core functions as violence control, implementation capacity and empirical legitimacy (Ziaja et al. 2019). For reasons of simplicity, this chapter employs the older, somewhat more established trinity of authority, capacity and legitimacy (see also Carment et al. 2010: 76ff.). 4

44 Table 3.1 Top international and internal displacement situations in 2019 (countries of origin)

J. Grävingholt International displacement Internal displacement (million persons) (million persons) Syria 6.735 Syria 6.498 Venezuela 4.470 DR Congo 5.680 Afghanistan 2.980 Colombia 5.578 South Sudan 2.240 Afghanistan 4.191 Myanmar 1.116 Yemen 3.635 Somalia 0.953 Nigeria 2.726 DR Congo 0.917 Somalia 2.649 Sudan 0.807 Sudan 2.406 Iraq 0.647 Ethiopia 1.804 Central African Rep. 0.626 South Sudan 1.598 Source Author based on data of UNHCR (2019) and IDMC (2019) Note International displacement excludes Palestine refugees, who are not under UNHCR’s mandate; internal displacement includes both conflict and violence- and disaster-induced displacement

reinforcing, they can still be present or absent to very different degrees in a particular country at a particular point in time. The German Development Institute (DIE) examined the empirical indicators of fragile statehood for 171 countries in an extensive data project covering the period from 2005 to 2015. The DIE team of researchers found that the three dimensions of authority, capacity and legitimacy translate into six empirically relevant constellations of state fragility (Ziaja et al. 2019; Grävingholt et al. 2018): dysfunctional states with very large deficits in all three dimensions stand in contrast to three groups of states that are mainly characterised by either low authority or low capacity or low legitimacy. Two further groups can be classified as semi-functional (with satisfactory values in all three dimensions) or well-functioning (no significant deficits). Thus, states that are fragile in the actual sense of the word are those in the first four constellations – even if the data show that semi-functional states are not immune to state fragility. If we link the fragility data analysed by DIE with the refugee numbers of UNHCR, it is easy to see which fragility constellations harbour a particular risk of resulting in major refugee movements. One measure of the intensity of a country’s displacement crisis is the proportion of people in the population who leave the country as refugees within a single year. If we enter the highest of these values for each country in the period 2005 to 2014 on a logarithmic scale and arrange the values in descending order, we obtain the picture shown in Fig. 3.1. The illustration shows that nine countries (represented by the dots in the top left of the graph) have lost more than one in every 100 inhabitants as a refugee in at least one of the ten years surveyed. In further 19 countries, the figure was between 0.1 and 1 percent. By contrast, not more than 0.1 percent of the population fled in any given year from the remaining 140 countries for which data has been available

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Fig. 3.1 Highest annual refugee quota between 2005 and 2014 by country of origin (number per 100,000 inhabitants). Source Author’s presentation based on data of UNHCR (2015). Note International displacement excludes Palestine refugees, who are not under UNHCR’s mandate. UNHCR population statistics has recently been moved to https://www.unhcr.org/refugeestatistics/. For statistical reasons, the data provided on this newsite may slightly vary from the data used for the above calculations andretrieved from http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/time_series/HIRoz3 (URL that is no longer valid). For practical reasons, the source quoted in the references leads to the new site allowing to access actual data of UNHCR. © J. Grävingholt

since 2005. Mass displacement, these figures demonstrate, is restricted to a limited number of countries. This becomes even clearer when we compare the three groups of countries formed on the basis of displacement intensity to the total number of all refugees. Seventy percent of the world’s refugees in 2014 (according to the UNHCR definition) came from the nine countries of Group I, which exhibited the highest displacement intensity between 2005 and 2014, and a further 19 percent came from the 19 countries of Group II with medium intensity. The remaining 11 percent came from 140 countries in Group III with the lowest intensity of displacement. In order to better understand the conditions leading to forced migration and displacement, it is worthwhile to examine the fragility profiles of those countries with the highest displacement intensity. Table 3.2 breaks down the countries of Groups I and II, and indicates their fragility type in 2005, that is, at the beginning of the period under investigation. First of all, it is not surprising to see that five of the nine countries of Group I as well as five to six other countries in Group II were dysfunctional states in 2005. Dysfunctional states are typically characterised by massive civil wars whose disastrous attribute is that they are usually fought for a long time or flare up again after a temporary cessation. It is therefore to be expected that a large number of countries that trigger massive conflict-driven displacement within a ten-year period are already in a state of civil war at the beginning of that period.

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Table 3.2 Countries of refugee origin in 2005–2014 and their statehood in 2005 Country

Maximum annual proportion of refugees 2005–2014 per 100,000 inhabitants

Displacement intensity

Fragility type in 2005

Syria 10,055 I low-LEG Iraq 4,579 I DYS-funct Central African Rep. 4,145 I DYS-funct Afghanistan 4,110 I DYS-funct Somalia 3,818 I DYS-funct Bosnia&Herzegovina 2,312 I low-LEG Mali 1,298 I low-CAP Eritrea 1,225 I low-CAP Colombia 1,144 I DYS-funct Togo 766 II low-CAP Côte d’Ivoire 669 II DYS-funct Rwanda 620 II DYS-funct Ukraine 486 II SEMI-funct Myanmar 448 II DYS-funct Mauritania 421 II low-CAP Sudan 415 II DYS-funct Bhutan 410 II low-CAP Serbia 274 II low-LEG Burundi 237 II DYS-funct/low-CAP* Chad 209 II low-CAP Pakistan 188 II low-CAP DR Congo 172 II DYS-funct Macedonia 168 II SEMI-funct/low-LEG* Croatia 150 II WELL-funct Laos 148 II low-CAP Cuba 130 II low-LEG Georgia 126 II low-CAP Gambia 125 II low-CAP Source Author’s calculations based on data of UNHCR (2015) and Ziaja et al. (2019) Population reference year: 2013; displacement intensity: I: 1–100%; II: 0.1–1% Fragility types: DYS-funct = dysfunctional; low-CAP = low capacity; low-LEG = low legitimacy; SEMI-funct = semi-functional; WELL-funct = well-functioning; *clear allocation to a fragility type not possible

By contrast, it is notable that two countries of Group I (among them the extreme case of Syria) and two other countries of Group II were states with low legitimacy in 2005. In the case of the two post-Yugoslav republics of Serbia and Bosnia, however, this allocation is the result of the number of refugees that was already high in 2005. In other words, it is primarily due to a prolonged exodus since the Yugoslav

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wars. Syria, on the other hand, exemplifies a development that hardly anyone would have deemed possible in 2005. Here, the collapse of the old regime in the wake of the Arab Spring in 2011 set in motion an escalation of violence that first drove hundreds of thousands and soon millions of people from their homes. (Similar developments of less dramatic proportions also took place in Libya, where the majority of displaced persons, however, remained in their home country.) The extent of the humanitarian disaster in Syria illustrates the enormous potential for violence that decades of repressive rule can generate, especially in heterogeneous societies. It reduces to absurdity the promise of stability with which regimes of that type seek to legitimise their exercise of power internally as well as externally. A glance at the countries with the highest displacement intensity also shows that two countries in Group I and eight of the countries in Group II belonged to the fragility constellation of states with low capacity in 2005. Low-capacity countries are often typical priority countries of development cooperation. Mali, for instance, was regarded as a prime example of successful development cooperation in the decade of the 2000s. In retrospect, this example demonstrates that socio-economic success alone is rarely a sufficient basis for a state to prevail in crisis situations. Instead, economic development needs to go hand in hand with the further development of political institutions with a view to improving social cohesion and the participation of all relevant parts of the population. The expectation that improved governance would follow economic development more or less automatically has proven wrong in many cases. True, socio-economic development helps to stabilise political liberalisation processes – if they occur. Conversely, however, improved governance, as a consequence of broader civic participation and co-determination rights, is actually the prerequisite for ensuring economic success in the long run. While one may think of examples to the opposite (China), they are too few, and too specific, to serve as a reliable model. Finally, what is surprising is the absence of typical states with low authority among countries with high and medium displacement intensity in the following decade. This observation suggests that violence alone is not a strong indicator of imminent refugee crises. Only in combination with comprehensive state failure, also in the dimensions of legitimacy and capacity, do the extreme crises arise that drive large portions of the population out of their country. When people flee, they do so because the state has given up on more or less large segments of its population. In order to prevent future displacement crises, such state fragility needs to be countered. The analysis conducted on the basis of the fragility constellations has demonstrated that the focus must be on two objectives: breaking the vicious circle of constant violent conflicts in dysfunctional states, and preventing the collapse of fragile states with particular capacity or legitimacy deficits.

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3.3

Promoting Good Governance to Strengthen Inclusive and Legitimate Statehood

Overcoming dysfunctional statehood and stabilising low-capacity and low-legitimacy states have a common denominator: in both cases, as numerous research findings of the past two decades have shown, the key lies in the area of governance. The World Bank’s World Development Report 2017 made the following basic observation: Ultimately, confronting the challenges faced by today’s developing countries – poor service delivery, violence, slowing growth, corruption, and the ‘natural resource curse’, to name a few—requires rethinking the process by which state and nonstate actors interact to design and implement policies, or what this Report calls governance (World Bank 2017: 2).

Fragility is a governance failure that cannot be overcome without transforming the political institutions, that is, the formal and informal rules of policy-making. Development policy must therefore devote its efforts to the objective of contributing to such a transformation by setting incentives where particular power interests block changes and by creating opportunities where otherwise perceived powerlessness paves the way to conflict escalation. Many studies now demonstrate that promoting socio-economic development as an objective in itself does not yet guarantee that fragility is overcome on a sustained basis. A recent study co-authored by the World Bank has even found that mere growth can be counterproductive if it cements the exclusion of entire population groups from political, social and/or economic participation. Preventing violent conflict requires support that is targeted to overcoming exclusion and remains committed to this goal in the long term (United Nations and World Bank 2018: 289). Discovered by the World Bank as a theme for the first time at the end of the 1990s, governance remains key to overcoming state fragility. But governance promotion6 is an area that does not enjoy an unblemished reputation. Agreeing on sound governance programmes with difficult partner governments is a tedious task and the outcomes often fall short of the expected or hoped-for results. What is often lacking is an honest commitment by the partner government – even in areas where constructive cooperation appears possible at the working level. Effectiveness gains may still be welcomed, but greater transparency of state action and civic participation touch on the question of a regime’s power, so that many governments quickly lose their enthusiasm about agreed reform agendas. Instead, they increasingly accuse the ‘donors’ of interfering in internal affairs and attempting to export unsuitable Western institutions. True, the claim that foreign actors seek to impose preconceived blueprints from the ‘West’ is sometimes 6

Many development organisations address the promotion of governance (and democracy) and the thematic area ‘crisis prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding’ in separate divisions. In substance, however, and particularly in the context of state fragility, they belong closely together and should generally be understood as a common field of activity – including where they affect the responsibilities of various government departments or ministries. Where I mention the promotion of good governance in the following, I refer to this entire field of activity.

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undeniable. These cases exist. Increasingly, however, such complaints are used as an instrument in the hands of uncompromising rulers who seek to prevent potentially opposing forces from becoming stronger as a (usually indirect) consequence of governance support from outside.7 Irrespective of such challenges, however, empirical research has recently yielded findings which show that promoting good governance works and makes sense. Jones and Tarp (2015), for example, demonstrated that, over a long-term average, an improved quality of political institutions can hardly be attributed to development cooperation funds overall but definitely to governance-related development support. In connection with peacebuilding as well, recent analyses show that the promotion of democracy and good governance can mitigate the short-term destabilising effects of democratisation processes in post-conflict societies (Mross 2019, 2020). The previously mentioned joint study by the United Nations and the World Bank on the prevention of violent conflict, based on numerous case studies, concludes that prevention that builds on inclusive societies and institutions works and is more cost-effective than any other alternative – not because each and every activity studied was a success but because even a modest success rate is worth all the effort in the end (United Nations and World Bank 2018: xix). What these findings mean for the objective of preventing forced migration and displacement is that while development cooperation can play an important role in countering the root causes of violent conflict, it would be a mistake to regard just any development cooperation as a means for tackling the root causes of displacement. For post-conflict countries, lessons can be learned from cases that succeeded in breaking out of the spiral of constant conflict recurrence and moving beyond the stage of dysfunctional statehood. Research conducted at the DIE shows that, in addition to stabilisation by international peacekeeping troops, civilian support for reforms in the security sector and external assistance in reforming political institutions have played a key role. The higher the risk of a renewed outbreak of hostilities is estimated, the more crucial is a concerted commitment in all of these areas of support (Fiedler et al. 2017). In the long term, it can also be seen that decentralisation reforms or other forms of territorial separation of powers have made an important contribution in practically all countries that have overcome violent conflict on a sustained basis (United Nations and World Bank 2018, S. 204ff.). Fragile states with low capacity are often ‘typical’ developing countries and are found primarily in Africa and southern Asia. Many of them are also highly dependent on external aid. Naturally, development cooperation with these countries traditionally focuses on the promotion of socio-economic development (health care, education, economic development, energy and agriculture) and capacity building in the governmental and non-governmental sector. The large proportion of these states among the ones that became dysfunctional and experienced massive refugee 7

For an unconventional but thought-provoking and constructive discussion of the challenges of promoting good governance, cf. Whaites et al. (2015).

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movements after 2005, however, is a reminder that the development of political institutions, aspects of economic participation and political representation must not be neglected. In the long term, this is the area that determines how social peace and, with it, the socio-economic progress that has been achieved can be secured. To enable this, it is necessary to persevere in providing support not just for socio-economic development but also for political institution-building. In fragile states with low legitimacy, the special challenge for international partners is to guard against the illusion which these ‘phantom giants’ create. States of this type often possess an administrative machinery that is deeply corrupt but still deemed relatively efficient. A good number of them also belong to the group of middle-income countries, so the threat of a breakdown of government order appears to be particularly remote. The example of the Arab Spring, however, has demonstrated that persistent authoritarian regimes whose power is underpinned by patronage and clientelism are sooner or later at risk of having too little scope for redistribution to satisfy the growing economic, social and political demands of their population by allocating resources based on paternalistic decisions. In these contexts, international support must be directed at laying the groundwork for political liberalisation processes while helping platforms for institutional negotiation to develop that are capable of constructively absorbing growing reform pressure. Such institutions, which may emerge in the contexts of parliaments, as part of a decentralisation process or in other forms, and may be formally legitimised in very different ways, must fulfil two functions in the long term. Those who are not part of the machinery of power must have the convincing experience that their interests are constantly being taken into consideration in the political process. And, those who are in power must be given credible assurance that they will not be threatened with the destruction of their social or even physical existence if they lose power. Ultimately, both sides need to have reasons to prefer compromise in the political process rather than resorting to violence.

3.4

Looking Ahead: Towards a Renaissance of Good Governance Promotion as a Means of Crisis Prevention

Development cooperation that aims to prevent violent conflict – and displacement crises that follow from it – must be more comprehensively designed to address state fragility than it has usually been the case in the past. Governance support in particular – as a comprehensive strategy that encompasses instruments of crisis prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding – plays a key role. It is true that the promotion of good governance has been a standard component of development cooperation for the past two decades. But in an era marked by anti-democratic populism and a technocratic focus on results, governance support needs new impetus in order to make the contribution that would be possible. Development cooperation should rise to the following challenges in particular:

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1. State fragility and approaches to overcoming it must be conceptualised in more political terms. For governance support, too, it is not enough to ‘somehow’ become active in fragile contexts. Technocratic approaches that regard the political power structures and power interests of the acting stakeholders merely as a given do not go far enough. Not until interests and incentive structures themselves are taken into account as elements of the very system that needs to be changed is there a chance of achieving necessary transformations. This also applies to certain tendencies to practice peacebuilding in post-war societies as a technique. Civil wars, too, as Australian political scientist Jasmine-Kim Westendorf (2015: 246) reminded us in a recent book, are basically political conflicts over power and resources. Overcoming them must therefore be approached at the political level. Most of all, however, development policy as a whole must heed the wake-up call of the World Development Report 2017 and the joint UN-World Bank 2018 ‘Pathways for Peace’ report and give priority in bilateral portfolios to governance support as a means to help overcome state fragility. 2. Overcoming state fragility calls for strategic patience … The trend towards ‘results orientation’ that has grown in development cooperation in recent years is certainly a positive development given the primarily input-oriented approach of previous times. In the area of governance promotion, however, this must not mean giving up working towards long-term objectives for the sake of results that are measurable in the short term. Systemic governance changes rarely occur as linear processes, and setbacks are inevitable, especially in politically volatile contexts. If we still want to provide support that helps prevent crises, we need to remain committed, and we must always be ready to modify the nature and scope of our commitment quickly yet on the basis of long-term considerations. We must also accept the fact that many of our efforts will fail because there can be no guarantees of success. This mixture of strategic perseverance and tactical flexibility poses a range of problems in the practice of development cooperation. It is an approach that is currently facilitated neither by public budgetary law nor by the principle of working with generalists and staff rotation in the controlling ministries or government agencies, nor by political leaders’ desire for visibility. However, none of this is unchangeable. If policy-makers in major ‘donor’ countries were to show leadership, they should improve the conditions for strategic governance support in fragile states by introducing the relevant reforms to their foreign aid structures and incentive systems. 3. … and exceptionally skilled personnel. The task of contributing to peace, overcoming state fragility and thus preventing major crises could hardly be more complex. Even if these efforts are usually more likely to fail than to succeed, most success stories are attributable not just to favourable conditions but primarily to the efforts of extraordinary women and men in the development cooperation organisations that contributed to them. It is true that contemporary scientific research has revealed a greater understanding than ever before of the conditions that favour or reduce state fragility, promote inclusiveness or exclusiveness and make peace more or less likely. Still, precise instructions on what to do cannot be derived from these findings. Countries, cultures and political contexts will always be so unique that

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translating general knowledge into concrete action is ultimately more of an art than a science, based more on insight gained through experience and intuition than logical deduction. Hence, the importance of providing personnel with the right set of skills and giving them the opportunity to pursue a career that is aligned with their skills profile. Specialist organisations, such as the German GIZ, the British DFID and others, are doing this to a certain degree. In the responsible ministries, by contrast, such specialised professional careers are the exception. Converting this exception into a rule would be one powerful way to increase the capabilities and probability of success of governance support in fragile states.

References Carment, David, Stewart Prest, and Yiagadeesen Samy. 2010. Security, development, and the fragile state. London: Routledge. Chauvet, Lisa, and Paul Collier. 2004. Development Effectiveness in Fragile States: Spillovers and Turnarounds. Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University. https://gsdrc.org/document-library/development-effectiveness-in-fragilestates-spillovers-and-turnarounds/ (Accessed 5 September 2020). DFID. 2005. Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states. London: Department for International Development. https://gsdrc.org/document-library/why-we-need-to-work-moreeffectively-in-fragile-states/ (Accessed 5 September 2020). Faust, Jörg, Jörn Grävingholt, and Sebastian Ziaja. 2015. Foreign aid and the fragile consensus on state fragility. Journal of International Relations and Development 18(4): 407–427. https://doi. org/10.1057/jird.2013.23. Fiedler, Charlotte, Jörn Grävingholt, and Karina Mross. 2017. Identifying Pathways to Peace: How Post-Conflict Support Can Help Prevent Relapse of War. Background paper for UN-WB Flagship Study ‘Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict’. Bonn: German Development Institute (DIE). Grävingholt, Jörn. 2016. Entwicklungspolitik im Gefüge einer “neuen deutschen Außenpolitik”. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 66(28–29): 38–43. Grävingholt, Jörn, Sebastian Ziaja and Merle Kreibaum. 2015. Disaggregating state fragility: a method to establish a multidimensional empirical typology. Third World Quarterly 36(7): 1281–1298. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1038340. Grävingholt, Jörn, Sebastian Ziaja, Constantin Ruhe, Patrick Fink, Merle Kreibaum, and Christopher Wingens. 2018. Constellations of State Fragility v1.0. German Development Institute (DIE). https://doi.org/10.23661/CSF1.0.0. IDMC. 2019. Global Internal Displacement Database. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data/ (Accessed 1 September 2020). Jones, Sam, and Finn Tarp. 2015. Does foreign aid harm political institutions? Vol. 094, WIDER Working Paper. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER. Mross, Karina. 2019. First peace, then democracy? Evaluating strategies of international support at critical junctures after civil war. International Peacekeeping 26(2), 190–215. https://doi.org/10. 1080/13533312.2018.1557052. Mross, Karina. 2020. Disaggregating democracy support to explain peaceful democratization after civil wars. Unpublished manuscript. Bonn. OECD. 2007. Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. UNHCR. 2015. UNHCR Population Statistics. https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/ (Accessed 5 September 2020).

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UNHCR. 2019. UNHCR Global Trends 2019. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2019/ (Accessed 1 September 2020). UN and World Bank. 2018. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Westendorf, Jasmine-Kim. 2015. Why Peace Processes Fail: Negotiating Insecurity After Civil War. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Whaites, Alan, Eduardo Gonzalez, Sara Fyson, and Graham Teskey, Eds. 2015. A governance practitioner’s notebook: alternative ideas and approaches. Paris: OECD. http://www.oecd.org/ dac/accountable-effective-institutions/Governance%20Notebook.pdf (Accessed 5 September 2020). World Bank. 2017. World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law. Washington, D. C.: World Bank. Ziaja, Sebastian, Jörn Grävingholt, and Merle Kreibaum. 2019. Constellations of Fragility: an Empirical Typology of States. Studies in Comparative International Development 54, 299– 321. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-019-09284-3.

Jörn Grävingholt is Senior Researcher at the German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) in Bonn. He is project lead on “‘Contested mobility’: Migration policy in countries of the global South” and co-leads the DIE data project “Constellations of State Fragility” (at https://statefragility.info). He has previously led research on post-conflict peace support, international aid to fragile states and non-state armed groups, among others. He is a long-standing member of the German government’s Advisory Council for Civilian Crisis Prevention and Peacebuilding, having served as one its two co-chairs from 2011 to 2018.

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Humanitarian–Development Integration? Comparing ‘Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development’, ‘Early Recovery’, ‘Resilience’ and the ‘Triple Nexus’ Dennis Dijkzeul and Annalisa Addis

Abstract

The debate about whether and how to integrate humanitarian action and development cooperation – also known as ‘bridging the gap’ – has been ongoing for several decades. A number of approaches to engendering integration have been tried. This chapter assesses the four main ones. First, Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) is mainly limited to the European Commission, whilst the second approach, Early Recovery, is especially used within the United Nations (UN)-led cluster system. And third, especially since the Kyoto Protocol, resilience seemed to offer an opportunity to bring together the two types of action. After the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit and the arrival of UN Secretary-General Guterres at the UN, the Triple Nexus came into vogue. This chapter examines and compares the deficiencies (or gaps) in knowledge about and institutionalisation of humanitarian action and development that hamper – in overlapping, but different ways – the four approaches. We also look at the situation of South Sudanese refugees in settlement camps in northern Uganda to assess to which degree these four approaches have functioned in practice. We conclude that it is unlikely that all the deficiencies can ever be overcome.

4.1

Introduction

The idea that humanitarian action and development cooperation should be better integrated in approaches to address chronic crises and forced displacement is intuitively appealing to many practitioners and scholars. Forced displacement in particular has traditionally been framed as a humanitarian problem, but short-term humanitarian measures have many shortcomings when displacement has become © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-J. Preuß et al. (eds.), Forced Displacement and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32902-0_4

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protracted. At the same time, in these contexts development cooperation approaches alone do not suffice to provide assistance to refugees and achieve permanent solutions. The debate about whether and how to integrate these two types of action has been going on for at least three decades. Humanitarian–development integration has been framed in different ways, such as ‘linking relief, rehabilitation and development’ (LRRD), ‘early recovery’ and, to some extent, disaster preparedness and ‘disaster risk reduction’. Despite decades of international debate and trial and error in the field, the humanitarian–development gap has yet to be bridged (Ruben 2013: 3; Mosel/Levine 2014: 1). In the 2000s, the concept of resilience gained traction in humanitarian and development debates, also as a way to achieve better integration – but its popularity appears to be fading. More recently, the ‘Triple Nexus’, combining development cooperation, humanitarian action and peacebuilding, has been presented as the main integrative concept (e.g. Howe 2019; Oxfam 2019). In the context of forced displacement, assistance to refugees has historically been framed as a humanitarian responsibility. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the definition of ‘refugee’ applied only to people displaced by the war in Europe, and therefore, had little to do with the emerging concept of development. This started to change with the launch of the first refugee programmes in Africa in the 1960s, when the notion that refugee aid could foster development in host countries started to gain currency (Crisp 2001: 168–170). Despite attempts to promote refugees’ integration in host communities and facilitate resettlement in their countries of origin, assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons remains to this day primarily a humanitarian concern. This means, among other things, that available funding instruments tend to have a short-term character, even if displacement is protracted over several years. Arguably, these displaced people would be better served through a combination of short- and longer-term interventions. In this chapter, we will provide an overview of the main four approaches – LRRD, early recovery, resilience and the Triple Nexus – to bridging the humanitarian–development gap, describe a case study of South Sudanese refugees in Uganda, and analyse the main reasons why integration remains so elusive and contested.

4.2

Background

Although humanitarian action and development cooperation are both concerned with providing assistance to people in need, there are substantial differences between the two. Humanitarian action aims primarily to save lives and reduce suffering during or after crises. Its provision is regulated by the four core humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. This is not to say that it always follows these principles in daily practice, but there is nonetheless a strong moral case to do so. Geared towards crisis response,

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humanitarian aid is traditionally understood as a short-term, stopgap measure of relatively short duration, which is reflected in funding arrangements that rarely go beyond 6 to 12 months.1 Development cooperation, by contrast, aims to promote structural change over a longer period. Although views and practices of development have changed considerably over time, political considerations have always influenced aid allocation as part of donor governments’ wider ‘external relations’ policies. Development cooperation is, therefore, neither inherently neutral nor impartial, which constitutes a potential source of tension with principled humanitarian action. This is why humanitarian action and development cooperation have been institutionalised as two distinct fields with different objectives, principles, organisational structures, budgets, timeframes and stakeholders. Nevertheless, development cooperation and humanitarian action often take place in the same contexts, with varying degrees of overlap and interaction. In some cases, development interventions cause internal displacement, as evidenced in large infrastructure projects, such as hydroelectric dams. They can contribute to conflict, as in Rwanda (Uvin 1998), or can be insensitive to acute shocks (Otto/Weingärtner 2013: 14). Conversely, humanitarian action can produce side effects that complicate the work of development actors, for instance by prolonging or fuelling conflict (Polman 2008). In the absence of effective exit and hand-over strategies, humanitarian action provides limited long-term benefits beyond ensuring the survival of aid recipients. Development cooperation and humanitarian action can also dovetail. Fulfilling the immediate needs of a community can enable it to safeguard its livelihoods and achieve better development outcomes. The fact that many organisations carry out both humanitarian and development work also blurs the boundaries between the two types of intervention. Examples of these so-called ‘multi-mandated organisations’ include non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Oxfam or Save the Children, and United Nations (UN) agencies such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) or the World Food Programme (WFP). By contrast, only a few organisations, in particular the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), carry out relief work in the more traditional, principled sense and keep a distance from development work.2 They have, however, dominated humanitarian debates and set the standards and principles for the humanitarian sector. Many other organisations are involved only in development cooperation and rarely, if ever, branch out into emergency relief work. 1

Even in protracted or chronic crises, many appeals are launched on an annual basis. In most humanitarian crises, joint annual plans, which used to be called consolidated appeals, have now evolved into humanitarian response plans. Flash appeals, issued shortly after a rapid-onset disaster or sudden outbreak of armed conflict or mass displacement, usually cover periods of up to six months. 2 Both ICRC and MSF pay considerable attention to understanding, respecting and advocating the principles. However, they do not necessarily do so in the same way. For example, ICRC is part of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, where the national societies and the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) can work more on development.

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While it has been present throughout the history of humanitarianism (Barnett 2011), the debate about humanitarian–development integration really took off in the 1980s, with reflections on the interplay between structural poverty and vulnerability to crises, and became more prominent in the 1990s (Buchanan-Smith/Fabbri 2005). Development, the argument went, should aim at reducing vulnerabilities, making relief work less necessary, while relief should try to reinforce development (Buchanan-Smith/Maxwell 1994). Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet bloc expanded the geographical area eligible for development cooperation, which had previously been limited mostly to support for fellow capitalist countries. The end of the Cold War also unleashed a period of instability, with ‘complex humanitarian emergencies’ posing several simultaneous challenges to humanitarian actors (Barnett 2011). Many humanitarian crises became protracted, so that humanitarians had to stay for longer periods of time. They could no longer just come in, save lives and leave. Consequently, the problem of linking relief and development was mainly framed as a ‘gap’ that had to be ‘bridged’ (Crisp 2001). Borrowing a conceptual tool from responses to natural disasters, relief and development were described as the two ends of a continuum, implying a linear progression from crisis through recovery to development (Frerks et al. 1995; O’Keefe/Kirkby 1997). In this model, crises were seen merely as temporary disruptions. Furthermore, the continuum metaphor appeared to suggest that external actors could engineer post-crisis transitions (Bradbury 1998), failing to recognise the complex endogenous and exogenous factors at play. Some observers suggested replacing the term ‘continuum’ with ‘contiguum’, implying that humanitarian and development action can take place simultaneously rather than sequentially (e.g. EC 1996; Lewis 2001). However, this concept never became popular. For some humanitarian groups, like MSF, attempts at broadening relief to include more development-oriented action are to be avoided, as they may lead to an erosion of humanitarian principles. Neutrality, they argue, may be put at risk by working with actors that are also party to a conflict (Macrae 1998; Bradbury 1998). Moreover, the principle of impartiality requires humanitarians to provide assistance solely based on needs. Development actors are not bound by this principle and can take decisions based on other considerations, including political and commercial factors. By shifting the focus towards development, needs might be disregarded, jeopardising the impartiality of an organisation’s interventions. As a result, access to people in need and the security of humanitarian workers and aid recipients could be compromised. In this vein, Macrae (1998) has portrayed broadening relief as an ‘attack’ on humanitarianism; however, this need not be the case. Considering that multi-mandated organisations display great diversity in their approaches, “there are moments and possibilities where a more ‘developmental’ or ‘peace-oriented’ kind of relief could usefully and successfully be offered” (Jackson/Walker 1999: 94). In sum, despite some narrowing of the humanitarian–development gap over the last few decades, the divide is still present in many respects. Indeed, the outcomes of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) culminated in a commitment to “transcend the humanitarian-development divide” through the New Way of

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Working, in which UN organisations would work much closer with each other than before (UN General Assembly 2016). A few years on, progress in mainstreaming this New Way of Working appears to be slow.

4.3

Approaches to Relief-Development Integration

Over the years, different approaches to promote the integration of humanitarian and development action have been formulated. In this section, we will analyse what we consider the four most significant approaches, although other terms have also been employed. The European Commission (EC) introduced Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) in the mid-1990s (EC 1996). With the addition of ‘rehabilitation’ between ‘relief’ and ‘development’ (Moore 1998), LRRD reinforces the problematic idea of a linear continuum from humanitarian relief to development. Indeed, despite rejecting the idea of a linear sequence (EC 1996), the EC used ‘continuum’ as a synonym for LRRD in its template for humanitarian project grants until 2011. Over time, though, LRRD has almost disappeared from the vocabulary of the aid community, with a few notable exceptions, in particular the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (Buchanan-Smith/Fabbri 2007), the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (EC 2008) and – albeit spelled out in full – in the revised Cotonou Agreement (EU 2010). Currently, even the EC is increasingly moving away from the use of the acronym LRRD. The concept of early recovery has been developed and used mainly within the UN system, particularly after the 2005 UN-commissioned review of the global humanitarian system, which highlighted a number of shortcomings in humanitarian response (Adinolfi et al. 2005). As part of the subsequent Humanitarian Reform, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery was formed at the global level, and early recovery clusters were set up in crisis areas. ‘Early recovery’ has thus become one of the 11 humanitarian clusters aimed at improving coordination between organisations involved in crisis response. Similar to LRRD, ‘early recovery’ has the drawback of implying an almost linear path from humanitarian action to development cooperation, but it focuses solely on the post-crisis phase. ‘Early recovery’ remains such a broad concept, in fact, that its cluster has been dubbed the “what else needs to be done during and after the crisis” cluster (Calvi-Parisetti 2013), and its added value is often not clear (Bailey et al. 2009). Interestingly, responsibility for early recovery rests with a development agency, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), whereas the linking debate has been taking place mostly in the humanitarian domain. In recent years, early recovery has also been subsumed under resilience. In 2012, UNDP published a background note on early recovery, which began, “Early recovery is a vital element of an effective humanitarian crisis response as a foundation for building resilience in post-crisis settings” (UNDP 2012: 1).

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The concept of resilience has gained popularity both in the humanitarian and the development arena as a potential framework for eventually bridging the gap between the two modes of action (IFRC 2012; Macrae 2012). Rarely used in aid debates before the 1990s, resilience has become an almost ubiquitous buzzword since the Hyogo Framework for Action (United Nations 2005), which aimed at “building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters”. The term was borrowed from ecology and psychology, where it refers to the capacity to bounce back (Manyena 2006: 433), although for crisis-affected people, going back to the status quo ante may be neither feasible nor desirable. Over time, the meaning of resilience has broadened. A commonly used working definition of resilience is “the ability of individuals, communities, organisations, or countries exposed to disasters and crises and underlying vulnerabilities to anticipate, reduce the impact of, cope with, and recover from, the effects of adversity without compromising their long-term prospects” (IFRC 2012: 7). In the context of international aid, ‘resilience’ is frequently used as shorthand for resilience building or resilience programming (e.g. Folkema et al. 2013; Mitchell/Harris 2012). Spanning from disaster preparedness to post-disaster development, resilience building can be considered an ‘integrative’ approach, despite not having been explicitly developed as such. Finally, the most recent concept is the so-called Triple Nexus, which expands the scope of humanitarian–development integration with the promotion of peace. When, at the WHS, the main representatives of the United Nations committed to the New Way of Working, they also intended to look more holistically at humanitarian and development needs in the same framework (WHS 2016). The new way of working was also informally referred to as humanitarian–development nexus or, in short, the nexus, expressions that had already been employed to refer to humanitarian–development integration since at least the 1990s (e.g. Berhe-Tesfu 1995: 229). Initially, the new way of working/nexus did not explicitly include peace – it was more of a reinforced commitment to LRRD – but this third element was added shortly afterwards, when António Guterres became Secretary-General of the UN. Upon taking his oath of office in late 2016, he stated that “[h]umanitarian response, sustainable development and sustaining peace are three sides of the same triangle” (Guterres 2016). Peace was subsequently integrated into the New Way of Working (e.g. ICVA 2017), and the Triple Nexus was born. While the concept of stronger links is clearly nothing new, the Triple Nexus focuses on reducing inequalities and increasing opportunities for participation in order to achieve peace and prevent violence. The importance of peace cannot be underestimated, and indeed, there are strong interrelations between extreme poverty and political fragility (e.g. OECD 2018). However, the Triple Nexus remains elusive and therefore, its usefulness and feasibility must be questioned. Moreover, one cannot help but note that in contexts where armed conflict is not a concern, the Triple Nexus does not add much to LRRD. Whether it will ever become successful as part of the New Way of Working remains to be seen.

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Gap Analysis of ‘Bridging the Gap’ Approaches

LRRD, early recovery, resilience and the Triple Nexus all promote collaboration between the humanitarian and the development sides. Yet, despite some narrowing of the divide, success has, up to this point, been limited. Below, we assess gaps (or deficiencies) among these approaches in an attempt to assess whether resilience could potentially be more successful. To do so, we build on Weiss/Thakur (2010), who identify five types of gap that prevent the solution of global problems: knowledge, normative, policy, institutional and compliance gaps. We examine here how the four approaches to integrating relief and development perform in relation to each of those gaps in an attempt to assess which one might be more successful (cf. Table 4.1 for an overview).

4.4.1 Knowledge Gaps The knowledge gaps concern the lack of “consensus about the nature, causes, gravity and magnitude of a problem” (Weiss/Thakur 2010: 8). Not only are all four approaches broad and rather vague, but also the relief-development divide itself has been insufficiently defined. In fact, there has never been a clear, commonly accepted definition of what exactly constitutes development cooperation or humanitarian action. They are essentially contested concepts, with many definitions used by different actors. If neither humanitarian nor development action is clearly delineated, the breadth and shape of the ‘gap’ between them also remains undefined. Furthermore, the frequently used ‘bridging the gap’ metaphor can be misleading. It implies that development cooperation and humanitarian relief are complementary activities, as if one bridge would suffice to link them – once again, the idea of a linear continuum. In practice, however, gaps may be narrower in some areas (reflecting better intra-sectoral links) and wider in others. The lack of clarity was particularly evident in relation to resilience. On the one hand, this makes it more appealing, as virtually everyone wants some kind of resilience. On the other hand, the vagueness of the concept is such that it risks becoming an empty shell (Grünewald/Warner 2012: 4). Further clarification of its content is needed in order to put it into practice, but this might reduce its popularity. The same holds true for the Triple Nexus. First of all, the concept is rather vague, given that its constituting elements (humanitarian action, development cooperation, peacebuilding) are not made explicit. In fact, there are other well-known three-pronged nexuses (such as the water-food-energy nexus), which could potentially create confusion among people coming from different backgrounds. Even if we were to ignore this first source of confusion, it remains a fact that the incorporation of peace makes the Triple Nexus broader than LRRD and certainly, Early Recovery. The Triple Nexus also differs from resilience which focuses more on prevention of and preparation for disasters, and emphasises the agency of local populations and institutions. In addition, while there is a general consensus that

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Table 4.1 Comparison of the three frameworks Origin

Knowledge gaps

LRRD

Early recovery

Resilience

Triple nexus

Developed by European Commission (EC) in 1996 in response to the growing number of complex emergencies after the end of the Cold War Vague definition

Developed by United Nations (UN) in 2005 as part of the Cluster system of humanitarian coordination

Borrowed from ecology and psychology; reached peak use in aid debates in the 2010s

Widely used since 2017 as a shorthand for humanitarian-development– peace–nexus (‘nexus’ had already been used as a synonym of LRRD since the 1990s)

Vague definition

Extremely broad and vague definition, not limited to aid

Normative gaps

No agreed norms; tension with humanitarian principles

Policy gaps

Lack of clear operational guidance No institution successfully ‘houses’ LRRD; even the EC maintains separate humanitarian and development arms Large

Institutional gaps

Vague and broader than LRRD (of which it appears to be the most recent incarnation). Unclear relationship between the humanitarian principles and promoting peace No agreed No agreed No agreed norms; even norms; tension norms; Tension more heightened tension with with with humanitarian humanitarian humanitarian principles principles principles is less marked but not absent Lack of clear Lack of clear Lack of clear operational operational operational guidance guidance guidance There is a No institution No institution has oversight Global Cluster is responsible and responsibility over the for global whole nexus, except the UN on Early in the broadest sense Recovery, but it resilience lacks influence. building, with At the country partial level, UNDP, a exception of the UN Office development organisation, is for Disaster Risk Reduction cluster lead

Compliance Large gaps Source Compiled by the authors

Large

Large

peace is a desirable aim, it is not clear which specific peace-promoting activities are worthy of inclusion in the nexus. This is the perennial question about whether ends can justify means. The labels of ‘peacebuilding’ and ‘peacekeeping’ have been used

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to refer to controversial military operations. Does the Triple Nexus include those, or is it limited to other ways of promoting peace? As long as there is no clarity about these points, the knowledge gap will remain wide open.

4.4.2 Normative Gaps A normative gap is a “disagreement over the best remedies and solutions” to tackle an issue (Weiss/Thakur 2010: 8). Possibly as a result of the knowledge gaps referred to above, none of the approaches sufficiently clarifies what should be done to bring about more integration. In practice, this often means adding further responsibilities to humanitarian action, such as risk reduction, crisis prevention and capacity building. Such growing breadth of scope is at odds with short implementation timeframes. A year, or even less, may be sufficient to meet basic needs of disaster-affected populations, but rarely is enough time to bring about long-term change in a participatory way. Despite the persistence of the humanitarian–development integration idea, there is little agreement on how to go about it. By contrast, the humanitarian principles are widely accepted as the norm with respect to humanitarian action. They not only guide humanitarian action but are also perceived to be essential to stay above the political fray. These principles are also a way of preventing, as far as possible, the instrumentalisation and politicisation of aid. Some ‘traditional’ humanitarian organisations, such as MSF, resist taking on additional activities, as this implies taking a political stance on the development of a conflict or society. MSF wants to be politically informed but not politically driven (Macrae 2001). For MSF, attempts to integrate mark a dilution, or even destruction, of their principled approach, which can endanger security and hinder access to people in need. LRRD, early recovery and more generally any form of humanitarian–development integration, would require new, broadly accepted norms. However, if – as is likely – these conflict with the humanitarian principles, which should prevail? This moral dilemma has yet to be solved. At the same time, multi-mandated organisations operate in both realms, with different operational arrangements and varying degrees of humanitarian–development integration. However, their operational arrangements are ad hoc rather than an expression of agreed rules and approaches. As resilience does not explicitly point toward a need for humanitarian action to become more developmental, it does not appear to openly challenge the humanitarian principles. Ultimately, however, resilience covers many activities, including strengthening local capacities – which are, strictly speaking, development work. The moral dilemma is not explicitly addressed, but it remains an issue nonetheless. The Triple Nexus covers considerable ground and is more explicit about politically changing society than LRRD, early recovery and resilience. On the one hand, there has been some progress with multi-mandated humanitarian agencies explicitly adopting development goals in their frameworks (Tronc et al. 2019: 27), even though transition strategies appear to be unclear and not sufficiently developed (CIC 2019b: 6). On the other hand, the inclusion of peace brings the moral dilemma to

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centre stage. It is not just that there is no agreement on which norms should prevail, but that some ways of ‘building peace’, notably those involving armed actors, are completely at odds with principled humanitarian action. Other forms of participatory conflict resolution and peace promotion, more akin to civil society mobilisation, could be more easily integrated, but they still focus on societal change and are not politically neutral, which may lead to opposition from armed groups. In short, they are different enough from humanitarian action to make it arduous (at best) to agree on a normative framework valid across the nexus.

4.4.3 Policy Gaps A consequence of the lack of agreed definitions and norms is the lack of clear operational guidance. In different ways, the four approaches emphasise local agency and capacity building. In practice, however, capacity building is hard to implement. The relationship between international donors and organisations on the one hand and national state institutions and local actors on the other is often marked by mutual distrust. Especially in chronic crises, warring factions as well as national or local elites regularly attempt to capture aid for their own benefit (DeMars 2005; DeMars/Dijkzeul 2015), and international “NGO involvement may … shift accountability towards donors instead of state structures, reinforcing citizens’ perceptions of incapability of their political leaders. States seeking to reinforce their role in service delivery frequently suffer from limited capacity to finance recurrent costs, lack qualified personnel and they may be ‘crowded out’ by NGOs or have their best staff ‘poached’ by those agencies that are supposed to be helping them” (Hilhorst et al. 2010: 1113). Hence, capacity building is sometimes based on untested assumptions about the capabilities of national and local actors and the scope for cooperation with them. Complementary tools that have been suggested include coordinated assessments; joint needs and capacity analyses; joint planning; adequate and flexible resource mobilisation; monitoring and corrective action; clear hand-over and exit strategies; better division of labour among donors in interaction with local actors; and stronger diplomacy to support peacebuilding (Calvi-Parisetti 2013: 28). Although these tools are highly valuable and likely to help close the policy gap, they are not yet widely accepted or used in a complementary, sustained way. The addition of peace in the Triple Nexus adds a further layer of operational complexity – how to bring the three legs together in one single framework remains unclear. It is very challenging to ‘just’ bridge humanitarian–development gaps, or those between development and peace. In other words, considering development as the integrative concept between humanitarian action and promotion of peace seems overly ambitious. When humanitarian and development action are coordinated, this is frequently attributable to fortunate circumstances, such as having committed staff in the right place at the right time. For example, such staff members would need to be able to negotiate successfully with one or more warring factions to obtain their consent for

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safe access to vulnerable groups and enhance security. Yet, skills such as being able to keep an open mind and ready to seize opportunities, while surely valuable for any humanitarian or development practitioner, are not specific enough to constitute a policy.

4.4.4 Institutional Gaps According to Weiss/Thakur (2010: 15), “if policy is to escape the trap of being ad hoc, episodic, judgemental and idiosyncratic, it must be housed within an institution that has resources and autonomy”. As far as frameworks for bridging the gap are concerned, there are currently no strong institutions. LRRD fares worst in this respect. Even the EC, which coined the concept, has not come up with an integrated framework. It actually maintains separate humanitarian and development directorates (Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) and Directorate-General for International Partnerships (INTPA), respectively), with different procedures and priorities. For early recovery, the Global Cluster on Early Recovery (CGER, formerly Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery) exists, but its role remains unclear at best. As humanitarian arrangements, clusters are discontinued once an emergency is declared to be over, which further reduces the impact they can have on development. An evaluation of its work (Murray et al. 2018) found that Early Recovery clusters, activated in some (but not all) humanitarian crises, have suffered from lack of resources and commitment from UNDP itself, and that they were generally not very well-accepted at country level. Similarly, there is a noticeable lack of an institution providing oversight for resilience building, with the partial exception of the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, whose mandate is to support the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 and of the subsequent Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, which both promote resilience. Nonetheless, these frameworks are more relevant to development cooperation (e.g. preventing natural disasters and building capacities for when they occur) than to humanitarian action. In this respect, it is also important to note that LRRD, early recovery and the Triple Nexus refer explicitly to aid practices, whereas resilience is a desirable characteristic of people and societies. In other words, there can be resilience without aid, but the other three concepts only make sense in the context of aid provision. With resilience, the onus of responsibility shifts to local communities and institutions (Chandler 2013), as the main agents in building their own resilience (Chandler 2012). This makes the establishment of an overarching institution in charge of resilience even more elusive.3 3

Ideally, the state would play this role, but in many crisis countries the state is either weak or unwilling to play such a role, so that aid agencies take on this responsibility (or parts of it).

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The Triple Nexus adds peace promotion to the mix and again, does not provide a clear framework for implementation, nor does it indicate an agency with clear oversight for linking the three elements. As noted in a recent report, there is a “[l] ack of clear transition strategies. Most plans and programs lack clear benchmarks for transitioning away from parallel services or for cultivating a growing role of the state over time” (CIC 2019b: 6), and “leadership mandate and functions” also remain unclear (CIC 2019b: 7). In addition, the only institutions that can exert both financial and (some) regulatory power over aid agencies are donor governments, and they generally replicate the existing humanitarian–development divides by keeping separate budget lines and funding mechanisms. Some donors, such as ECHO, fund only humanitarian projects, and others fund only development cooperation. Nevertheless, donors are becoming more and more receptive to the need for flexible funding, for instance, allowing ‘crisis modifier’ mechanisms that allow recipients of development project grants to use some funds for emergency response should a crisis arise (instead of starting lengthy negotiations to agree on budget changes). In particular, the 2016 WHS outcomes (UN General Assembly 2016), which endorsed the New Way of Working, also included a commitment to rethink the way aid is funded – the ‘Grand Bargain’ – promoting localisation of aid, multi-year funding and simplification of funding and reporting requirements when humanitarian organisations improve their accountability. In this respect, it is worth noting that a ‘workstream’ explicitly committed to humanitarian–development integration as part of the Grand Bargain has been subsequently closed and ‘mainstreamed’ into the other nine ‘workstreams’ – clearly a watering-down. Despite some progress, most humanitarian funding remains short-term in nature, even during chronic crises. Ensuring continuity of support remains a major challenge, even for multi-mandated organisations, because there is no guarantee that they will have resources for follow-up projects or for safety nets to prevent acute crises, let alone for promoting peace. Unfortunately, even maintaining the same levels of assistance year after year is a challenge, especially once public and donor interest in a certain issue or crisis wears off. Some humanitarian organisations play with jargon and with donor procedures, bending them to suit their operational needs. They talk about humanitarian needs to humanitarian donors and discuss development potential with development donors. They have outlined LRRD strategies in projects submitted to ECHO, attended early recovery meetings organised by the UN, sprinkled resilience throughout every reports, and are now referring to the Nexus. The degree to which integration happens in the field, or is promoted within organisations, currently depends more on the pragmatic – if not opportunistic – behaviour of humanitarian and development agencies than on anything else.

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4.4.5 Compliance Gaps Even if all the other gaps were addressed, there could still be compliance gaps, which are failures to respect agreed norms or to implement existing policies. In the absence of common definitions, agreed solutions, clear policies and accountable institutions, it is unrealistic to expect strong compliance. The 2016 WHS outcomes look good on paper, but they are voluntary agreements without a binding enforcement mechanism. A recent report of the British Overseas Development Institute noted, critically, their lack of success (Metcalfe-Hough et al. 2020). In addition, one has to ask which other factors limit compliance. Humanitarian action often takes place in a context of destruction and violence that works against its success. Conflicts, inequity and power struggles regularly lead to different programme outcomes from those originally envisioned. This political economy of aid is difficult to understand because crimes and violence are rarely openly acknowledged by those who benefit from them (DeMars/Dijkzeul 2015). Although, the inclusion of peace in the Triple Nexus may seem a step in the right direction in this respect, the broadened scope of action increases the risk of non-compliance. No form of integration alone – nor any kind of aid, for that matter – will be able to overcome the structural geopolitical problems that contribute to or prolong humanitarian crises, widespread poverty and conflict. Regardless of conceptual clarification, norm production, crafting of guidelines and institutionalisation, actual improvements for crisis-affected people ultimately depend on factors that lie outside of the control of most humanitarian and development actors. For example, to what extent will donor governments adapt their own policies regarding migration and accepting refugees, arms sale, debt relief, agricultural and industrial protection and subsidies or inequitable trade policies? Without such complementary international political action, humanitarian crises remain likely to continue or recur, and concomitant development – let alone conflict resolution and integration – will remain elusive. Nevertheless, there are examples of rather effective interaction between humanitarian and development actors. This has been the case, for instance, for refugees in northern Uganda (CIC 2019b: 4). The next section discusses the extent to which and the reasons why this type of interaction has been relatively successful in this specific context.

4.4.6 The Uganda Case More than 1.4 million refugees, including almost 900,000 people from South Sudan, were living in Uganda as of August 2020 (UNHCR 2020). Except for self-settled refugees, most of whom live in Kampala, the great majority of South Sudanese live in Northern Uganda. The response of the Ugandan authorities to this humanitarian crisis is unique. They have allowed refugees to live in open settlement camps – not in closed camps – with or near Ugandan communities. The refugees receive their own patch of land, and are allowed to work and travel in the country.

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They also have access to health services, and their children can attend Ugandan primary education. However, the Ugandan government and Ugandan communities are buckling under the pressure of this huge refugee influx. The international community plays a crucial role in the response, which is coordinated by the Ugandan Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) in line with its National Development Plan (2015–2020). In order to address the humanitarian and development needs of both the refugees and the host communities, the UN Country Team, in particular the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Bank, designed a comprehensive strategy, Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHoPE), in support of the Ugandan Government (UN Country Team and the World Bank 2017).4 The core elements of the ReHoPE response are, first, multi-year and multi-sectoral area-based interventions to support both host communities and refugees and coordinated delivery under government leadership with local government and communities as key partners and, second, enhanced resilience and sustainability at three levels: household, community and systems. Both international and local humanitarian actors, as well as development organisations, are invited simultaneously to address the emergency and development needs of the refugees and host communities in the affected areas. The fixed formula is that 70 percent of the aid should go to the refugees and 30 percent to the host communities, in the hope of reducing tensions within and between both groups and facilitating the transition to local development. As this strategy was largely developed before Guterres added the peace-side to the triangle, ReHoPE does not mention the Triple Nexus, but concentrates on resilience. Nevertheless, ReHoPe pays considerable attention to peace, but mentions the humanitarian–development nexus only once. Implementing the ReHoPE strategy is not without challenges, however. The international community is providing insufficient resources, even though the inflow of refugees has been large, and Northern Uganda is a structurally poor area. The plots of land are too small for refugees to make a decent living if assistance were to stop. Many would suffer from malnutrition and even hunger without food aid and agricultural support (including seeds, tools and training). Nor do the rich countries help sufficiently with third-country relocation of refugees, despite the Geneva Conventions and the global compact on refugees (UNHCR 2017). Although, by and large, the local population shares resources with the refugees, stories of mutual Officially, “ReHoPE is a key component in the application of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), as stipulated in the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants (19 September 2016). It is a key building block of a comprehensive response to displacement in Uganda, led by the Government of Uganda and the United Nations (UN), in partnership with the World Bank, donors, development partners, national and international nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), civil society and the private sector, among others. This approach to delivering protection and social and economic development is envisaged to equally serve all refugees while they are in Uganda as well as when they eventually return to their countries of origin. ReHoPE forms a critical component of Pillar Three of the Ugandan CRRF model, with its focus on resilience and self-reliance” (UN Country Team and the World Bank 2017: vii). The New York Declaration of Refugees helped prepare the ground for the Global Compact on Refugees. 4

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abuse and conflicts abound. Unsurprisingly, many refugees struggle to access basic services, including food, water and shelter. Moreover, they have virtually no access to transport and financial services and to secondary education. Allocating parcels of land, building infrastructure and the search for firewood are also leading to rapid deforestation. In this context, UNHCR and international NGOs, such as Caritas, also work on building peace in three areas: (1) among South Sudanese refugees, because the conflict has pitted different ethnic groups against each other, who are now living in the settlement camps; (2) between refugees and the host communities; (3) every-day conflicts and tensions, such as divorce, crime and drug abuse. For example, Caritas trains leaders from the refugee and host communities in understanding and addressing different types of conflicts. Together with Ugandan sub-county leaders and a community development officer, these leaders engage in so-called peace dialogues with refugees and host community members on conflicts between their communities relating to water point use, firewood sites, food distribution centres, stone quarries, gender-based violence, alcoholism and land conflicts. In addition, Peacebuilding Committees are set up to address domestic violence, land wrangles with host communities, drug abuse in the settlements, as well as theft and violence at water points. The dialogues entail understanding of context and root-causes of conflicts and tensions, acknowledging abuses and crimes on both sides and mitigating or preventing potential conflicts. At the end of the dialogue, participants pledge to address tensions in a peaceful manner. In cooperation with OPM and UNHCR, Caritas also contributes to the peace weeks, in which refugees from different ethnic and religious backgrounds carry out joint activities in which they imagine what a peaceful future in South Sudan would look like. In addition, Caritas produces information, education and communication materials, as well as radio spot messages. In sum, although Uganda indeed has a rare and open refugee policy, which is remarkable given the high degree of resistance that refugees receive in almost all other parts of the world, the international community is not doing enough.5 And even though integration of humanitarian and development action, as well as peace activities, have made progress in this case, several gaps persist. The actual extent to which people’s resilience increases as a result of ReHoPE, and whether relief, development and peace actually have become better integrated, have not been studied in enough detail.

5 The relative success of the ReHoPE is currently increasingly under threat. In August-September 2020, the Ugandan shut down 208 international refugee NGOs, which could deprive refugees of essential aid. According to d’Orsi (2020), this suspension of aid agencies “is a signal that they must comply more strictly to the law and their mandates. It is an indication that the country needs better assistance than it has been receiving”.

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Case Analysis

So how does this Ugandan case study relate to the transitional approaches? First of all, this is a refugee situation in a relatively stable – albeit increasingly authoritarian – country. The refugees and humanitarian organisations do face violence in and around the camps, but not the high levels of insecurity and destruction that exist in South Sudan itself (and in many other countries, including Somalia, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo). This gives OPM, humanitarian organisations, refugees and host communities time to build capacities and address needs without recurrent waves of violent destruction. As there is no active armed conflict in northern Uganda, humanitarian organisations need to worry less about the humanitarian principles and can explicitly promote integration and transition, as well as local peace- and capacity-building, without fearing a backlash from warring factions. Under certain conditions – absence of armed conflict being the most important – respecting humanitarian principles is therefore not necessarily at odds with fostering development and peace.6 Secondly, the Ugandan state has clear policies and priorities, as well as institutions and capacities, and it does receive support from UNHCR and many international organisations. This cooperation is well structured. Longer-term perspectives are taken into account, for example, in the provision of land for refugees and in ReHoPE. In other words, the knowledge, normative and policy gaps are relatively narrow. The government and its international partners have, by and large, been able to apply a long-term perspective towards transition and local integration. As stated, resilience is an important part of the ReHoPE response strategy. The strategy is an example of how resilience has increasingly replaced early recovery and LRRD.7 The peacebuilding activities in the settlement camps, for their part, actually preceded the Triple Nexus. The institutional gap in terms of responsible organisations (OPM and UNHCR) is also narrow. Sadly, the funding gap is currently widening, despite the fact that, except for the availability of land (which is not, however, infinite), Northern Uganda is very poor and cannot address the needs of the refugees alone. As a result, despite the WHS outcomes, the compliance gap is simply too large. In sum, the aid architecture and security situation in Uganda are more conducive to transitioning towards longer-term solutions than those found elsewhere, and even then, not all gaps could be closed. This case study, together with some other relative success stories that have been documented (e.g. CIC 2019a, b) shows that under certain circumstances, integrating humanitarian, development and peace efforts may be feasible. However, it remains to be seen whether replicating this approach elsewhere, and ultimately making it mainstream, will ever be possible. Certainly, it will not happen as long as the international community lags behind.

6

This also implies that in the case of armed conflict, several humanitarian organisations will opt out of such integration because they want to respect the humanitarian principles. 7 Put differently, LRRD and early recovery are not officially part of the ReHoPE strategy.

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Conclusions

LRRD, early recovery, resilience and the Triple Nexus, each with their own characteristics, have all been suggested as ways to overcome the current siloed provision of aid, but all of them suffer from several deficiencies or gaps. Despite the popularity of resilience and, more recently, of the Triple Nexus in humanitarian and development circles, many of the issues that have crippled LRRD and early recovery still exist. Even the comparatively positive scenario of the refugees in Northern Uganda shows how difficult it is to close all the gaps. Yet, closing such gaps is necessary for integrative approaches (the ones analysed here or any others that may emerge in the future) to have a chance to affect daily practice. Moreover, resilience and the Triple Nexus also show a tendency to broaden organisations’ areas of engagement in response to a lack of success with earlier efforts. Resilience focused more on prevention and the responsibility of national governments and local communities, while the Triple Nexus incorporated peace activities. This broadening of areas of engagement is an attempt to become more effective by addressing issues that remained contextual factors in earlier approaches. However, the new, supposedly improved approaches are still running into similar problems. Due to their breadth, they remain rather vague. Clarifying them further, however, may reduce their popularity. In the final analysis, overcoming the humanitarian–development divide is not just a conceptual or normative dispute, but also involves the organisationally and politically vexed issues of reforming the international aid architecture and addressing geopolitical structural inequities. As a result, and despite great efforts, policy, institutional and compliance gaps remain. Not surprisingly, the ideal of integration has always been more appealing than its practical results, as replacing one buzzword with a more comprehensive one does not address the underlying issues.

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Guterres, Antonio. 2016. Secretary-General-designate António Guterres’ remarks to the General Assembly on taking the oath of office. New York: United Nations Secretary General. https:// www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2016-12-12/secretary-general-designate-ant%C3% B3nio-guterres-oath-office-speech. Accessed 28 September 2020. Hilhorst, Dorothea, Ian Christoplos, and Gemma van der Haar. 2010. Reconstruction ‘From Below’: A New Magic Bullet or Shooting from the Hip? Third World Quarterly 31(7): 107– 1124. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2010.532616. Howe, Paul. 2019. The triple nexus: A potential approach to supporting the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals? World Development 124(104629): 1–13. https://doi.org/10. 1016/j.worlddev.2019.104629. ICVA. 2017. The New Way of Working Examined. AN ICVA Briefing Paper. Geneva: International Council of Voluntary Agencies. https://www.icvanetwork.org/resources/new-way-workingexamined-icva-briefing-paper. Accessed 28 September 2020. IFRC. 2012. The Road to Resilience. Bridging Relief and Development for a More Sustainable Future. IFRC Discussion Paper on Resilience. Geneva: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. https://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/40792/1224500-Road%20to% 20resilience-EN-LowRes%20(2).pdf. Accessed 29 September 2020. Jackson, Stephen, and Peter Walker. 1999. Depolarising the ‘Broadened’ and ‘Back-to-Basics’ Relief Models. Disasters 23(2): 93–114. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ 1467-7717.00107. Accessed 29 September 2020. Lewis, James., 2001. Continuum or contiguum: Development for survival and vulnerability reduction. Paper presented to Fifth European Sociological Association Conference, Helsinki, September. http://www.dcscrn.org/cms/uploads/esa2001/lewies%20-%20continuum%20or% 20contiguum.pdf. Accessed 29 September 2020. Macrae, Joanna. 1998. The Death of Humanitarianism? An Anatomy of the Attack. Disasters 22 (4): 309–317. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7717.00094. Macrae, Joanna. 2001. Aiding Recovery? The Crisis of Aid in Chronic Political Emergencies. London: Zed Books. Macrae, Joanna. 2012. The Continuum is Dead, Long Live Resilience. VOICE Newsletter 15: 7–8. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/voice-out-loud-newsletter-issue-15-linking-reliefrehabilitation-and-development. Accessed 29 September 2020. Manyena, Siambambala Bernard. 2006. The Concept of Resilience Revisited. Disasters 30(4): 433–450. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0361-3666.2006.00331.x. Metcalfe-Hough, Victoria, Wendy Fenton, Barnaby Willitts-King, and Alexandra Spencer. 2020. Grand Bargain annual independent report. London: Overseas Development Institute. https:// www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/gb_2020_full_report_web.pdf. Accessed 28 September 2020. Mitchell, Tom, and Katie Harris. 2012. Resilience: A Risk-Management Approach. Background Note. London: Overseas Development Institute. https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odiassets/publications-opinion-files/7552.pdf. Accessed 29 September 2020. Moore, Jonathan, Ed. 1998. Hard Choices – Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Mosel, Irina, and Simon Levine. 2014. Remaking the case for linking relief, rehabilitation and development: How LRRD can become a practically useful concept for assistance in difficult places. London: Overseas Development Institute. https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/ odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8882.pdf. Accessed 29 September 2020. Murray, Julian, Finn Pedersen, and Soenke Ziesche. 2018. Evaluation of the Global Cluster for Early Recovery. New York: United Nations Development Programme. https://www.alnap.org/ help-library/evaluation-of-the-global-cluster-for-early-recovery. Accessed 28 September 2020. OECD. 2018. Development Co-operation Report 2018: Joining Forces to leave no one behind. Paris. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. https://www.oecd-ilibrary. org/docserver/dcr-2018-en.pdf?expires=1601369861&id=id&accname=guest&checksum= C767269ADD581CD851A830F76941C209. Accessed 29 September 2020.

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O’Keefe, Phil, and John Kirkby. 1997. Relief & rehabilitation in complex emergencies. Review of African Political Economy 24(74): 567–582. https://doi.org/10.1080/03056249708704282. Otto, Ralf, and Lioba Weingärtner. 2013. Linking Relief and Development: More than Old Solutions for Old Problems? The Hague: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. https://www. government.nl/documents/reports/2013/05/01/iob-study-linking-relief-and-development-morethan-old-solutions-for-old-problems. Accessed 29 September 2020. Oxfam. 2019. The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus. What does it mean for multi-mandated organisations? Oxford: Oxfam UK. https://oxfamilibrary.openrepository. com/bitstream/handle/10546/620820/dp-humanitarian-development-peace-nexus-260619-en. pdf;jsessionid=96E18AEEC44F8D58BBEC2D90135BCB77?sequence=1. Accessed 28 September 2020. Polman, Linda. 2008. De crisiskaravaan: Achter de Schermen van de Noodhulpindustrie. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Balans. Ruben, Ruerd. 2013. Preface. In Linking Relief and Development: More than Old Solutions for Old Problems? Eds. Ralf Otto and Lioba Weingärtner, 3–4. The Hague: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Tronc, Emmanuel, Rob Grace, and Anaïde Nahikian, A., 2019. Realities and Myths of the ‘Triple Nexus’: Local Perspectives on Peacebuilding, Development, and Humanitarian Action in Mali. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. https://hhi.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ haf_-_mali.pdf. Accessed 3 September 2019. UN. 2005. Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters. https://www.unisdr.org/files/1037_hyogoframeworkforactionenglish. pdf. Accessed 21 August 2020. UN Country Team and the World Bank in Uganda. 2017. ReHoPE—Refugee and Host Population Empowerment Strategic Framework Uganda. http://ug.one.un.org/sites/default/files/documents/ ReHoPE_Strategy-Report_2017_low-res.pdf. Accessed 25 September 2020. UNDP. 2012. UNDP in Early Recovery. https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/ crisis-prevention-and-recovery/undp-in-early-recovery.html. Accessed 29 September 2020. UN General Assembly. 2016. Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations. Outcome of the World Humanitarian Summit Report of the Secretary-General. New York: United Nations General Assembly. https://undocs.org/en/A/71/353. Accessed 28 September 2020. UNHCR. 2017. Towards a global compact on refugees: a roadmap. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/58e625aa7.pdf. Accessed 28 September 2020. UNHCR. 2020. Uganda - Refugee Statistics Map August 2020. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/ documents/details/78772. Accessed 13 September 2020. Uvin, Peter. 1998. Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda. West Hartford: Kumarian Press. Weiss, Thomas G., and Ramesh Chandra Thakur. 2010. Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. WHS. 2016. Transcending humanitarian-development divides. Changing People’s Lives: From Delivering Aid to Ending Need. Commitment to Action. https://agendaforhumanity.org/sites/ default/files/WHS%20Commitment%20to%20action%20-%20transcending%20humanitariandevelopment%20divides_0.pdf. Accessed 7 September 2020.

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Dennis Dijkzeul is Professor of Conflict and Organization Research at the Social Science School and the Institute of International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict at Ruhr University Bochum, Germany. He has carried out research projects on international and local organizations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and Afghanistan, and has worked as a consultant for United Nations (UN) organizations and Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Africa, Europe, Central Asia, and Latin America. His main research interests concern the management of international organizations (UN, NGOs, and diaspora organizations) and their interaction with local actors in humanitarian crises. His latest books are The NGO Challenge for International Relations Theory (2015, with William DeMars), The New Humanitarians in International Practice: Emerging Actors and Contested Principles (2016, with Zeynep Sezgin), Diaspora Organizations in International Affairs (2020, with Margit Fauser), and International Organizations Revisited: Pathologies and Therapies (2021, with Dirk Salomons). Annalisa Addis is Training Coordinator at the International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC) in Oxford (UK) and a former consultant on humanitarian action and development cooperation. In 2015 she earned a PhD in African and International Development Studies jointly awarded by the University of Cagliari (Italy) and the Ruhr-University Bochum (Germany) with a dissertation on Linking Humanitarian and Development Action in Ethiopia.

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Entrepreneurship and Innovation: How Institutional Voids Shape Economic Opportunities in Refugee Camps Marlen de la Chaux

Abstract

Refugee camps tend to be conceptualized as spaces that provide safety and aid to victims of forced displacement. Often overlooked, refugee camps are also vibrant spaces characterized by entrepreneurship, innovation, and lively market activity. This chapter examines how refugee entrepreneurs build businesses despite social, normative, and legal constraints of the refugee camp. I introduce three types of institutional voids that interface to constitute what I term the Humanitarian Institutional Arrangement typical of refugee camps. The chapter then explains how refugee camp entrepreneurs navigate these institutional voids in order to create sustainable businesses.

5.1

Introduction

Most forcibly displaced persons in refugee camps spend an average of nearly 20 years in exile (PRS Project 2014) in which life is characterized by frustration, boredom, alcoholism, domestic abuse, and violence (Rawlence 2016). As a result, refugee camps tend to manifest high crime rates and struggles with sexual and gender-based violence (Werker 2007). Engagement in entrepreneurial activity by refugees in camps seems however, to help improve both the socioeconomic prospects of refugees and the climate of the camp. Refugee camp entrepreneurs (RCEs) reduce aid dependency and in so doing, help to give life meaning for, and confer

M. de la Chaux (&) Rue Benjamin-Franklin 8, 1201 Geneva, Switzerland e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-J. Preuß et al. (eds.), Forced Displacement and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32902-0_5

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dignity on, the entrepreneurs.1 More broadly, RCEs have significant economic potential. For example, Dadaab, one of the world’s largest refugee camps based in Kenya, generates approximately USD 14 mn per annum for the host communities that surround the camp, and USD 25 mn per annum from refugee enterprises (Okoth 2012). However, the majority of refugees living in camps do not engage in entrepreneurial activity (Werker 2007); the average turnover per capita per annum at Dadaab is USD 50 (Okoth 2012; Turner 2005). In this paper, we explore why, despite the benefits RCEs bring to camps, entrepreneurial activity remains a minority activity. We propose that the explanation is rooted in the institutional architecture of refugee camps in that they are a type of institutional void (Mair et al. 2012) in which the formal rules of the game that guide social and economic interactions are not aligned with the rules in practice. The refugee camps are created on the assumption that they are temporary institutions – established in response to an emergency which will ultimately pass – and that refugees will continue to arrive and stay until safe return to their place of origin is assured. As refugee situations become protracted and the likelihood of swift safe return recedes, the rules of the game concerning temporary institutions do not reflect the reality of life in the camp: the extant rules of the game become paralyzed. We investigate how RCEs navigate the challenges resulting from institutional paralysis and conclude with suggestions for policy and practice.

5.2

Institutional Voids

5.2.1 Institutions Institutions are the finely-woven web of values, norms, perceptions, and routines which shape social interactions by creating behavioral expectations that guide individual behavior (DiMaggio/Powell 1983). Beliefs and values are said to be institutionalized when actors perceive them to unquestioningly be the only possible way to make sense of the world (Jepperson 1991). Non-compliance with institutional expectations result in normative sanctions, ultimately leading to a loss of legitimacy as perceived by other actors in our social world (Galaskiewicz 1997). The taken-for-granted nature of institutional expectations and the threat of sanctions for non-compliance collectively serve to assure behavioral conformity. Institutions are maintained through repeated endorsement by individuals in social interactions and become entrenched when actors perform the patterns of behavior encrypted in them until any other behavior becomes unthinkable (Seo/Creed 2002). A refugee camp is a physical space, typically fenced off, that is governed by formal rules and routines that differ from those of the host community in which they are situated. The camps thus constitute a distinct social world with unique patterns 1

Numerous examples of refugees’ skills and capacities are listed on the website of the Refugee Economies Programme of the University of Oxford: https://www.refugee-economies.org/.

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of interaction, habits, and routines (Turner 2005; Rawlence 2016). The three groups of actors typically associated with refugee camps include humanitarian organizations responsible for establishing and managing the daily operations in the camps; the forcibly displaced refugees; and the host community and government. Humanitarian Organizations The United Nations (UN) mandate the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to assume leadership in the coordination and management of humanitarian relief strategies for refugees (UN 1951). With the financial and political support of many governments and an annual budget of over USD 4 bn, the UNHCR possesses the resources and legitimacy to determine the formal institutional arrangements for refugees (UNHCR 2014; Natsios 1995; Bourdieu/Wacquant 1997). In practice, UNHCR also contracts other UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to implement humanitarian relief strategies (Natsios 1995). Thus, a range of humanitarian organizations is likely to be active in any one refugee camp. The Forcibly Displaced The refugee camps are created to accommodate the forcibly displaced who have fled their home country – often in haste and leaving behind all personal possessions. The shared feature of refugee crises is that the State in the home country does not, or cannot, offer protection (Goodwin-Gill/McAdam 2007). In its place, the refugee camp offers a safe space away from persecution, conflict, and killing (McConville 2014), although many refugees also live outside camps. In 2012, although some camps exceeded 250,000 refugees (Dadaab, Kenya), the average camp size was approximately 11,400 refugees (UNHCR 2013: 35; UNHCR 2020). Host Communities The government in the host country determines the geographical location of the refugee camp: a camp in a remote location is likely to have less interaction with other communities in the host country when compared to a camp adjacent to an urban center. The host country government will also specify the legal status of refugees in a camp: in countries where refugees are allowed to work, e.g., Uganda (Betts et al. 2012), interaction with communities in the host country will be higher than in countries where refugee mobility outside the camp is prohibited (UNHCR 2013; Werker 2002). Finally, NGO staff in the camp may reside outside the camp in the host country (Werker 2007) and travel to and from work daily. These three factors influence the permeability of the camp’s physical and social boundaries and in turn, the camp’s institutional expectations that guide refugee behavior.

5.2.2 Institutional Voids The institutional context is inherently pluralistic in that actors encounter a multiplicity of options for how to structure social interactions (Greenwood et al. 2011;

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Jay 2013; Battilana/Dorado 2010). Repeated interactions generally lead to the emergence of a dominant institutional arrangement, however, when this does not occur, a void exists, and the extant institutional arrangement remains poorly structured and highly fragmented (Mair et al. 2012). Although the term institutional void was initially employed to describe contexts lacking formal institutions (e.g., legal systems, codes of conducts, and regulations), an environment can never be entirely empty of institutions (Mair/Martí 2009): if laws and regulations are absent or weakly enforced, actors negotiate informal institutions to structure social interactions (Chakrabarty 2009). Rather than spaces lacking institutions, voids are therefore environments in which extant institutions are insufficient in guiding actors’ behavior (Mair et al. 2012). From the literature, we identified three types of institutional voids: paralysis, ambiguity, and incongruence. Paralysis Institutions persist through their continuous enactment by the majority of actors in social situations (Barley/Tolbert 1997) and, from repeated interaction, become embedded and limit behavioral variability (Seo/Creed 2002). If institutions become too entrenched however, they are less likely to be responsive to individual and environmental change. For example, formal institutions (e.g. laws) may be slow to adapt to changing environments and therefore lag behind social realities. Formal institutions that have rigidified and failed to adapt to the interests of actors create a void in which the rules of the game are disconnected from the social realities. We employ the label ‘institutional paralysis’ for contexts in which the formally institutionalized rules that proscribe behavior are ignored by actors but non-compliance does not lead to a loss of legitimacy. Ambiguity The absence of a formal, complete, and strongly enforced institutional arrangement might also lead to a void in which an abundance of different informal institutions co-exists (Luo/Chung 2012; Chakrabarty 2009). This may be the result of actors finding different ways of making sense of the social world around them. Particularly in contexts that bring together a heterogeneity of actors, differences in interests, characteristics, and aims may result in divergent ways of sense-making if a dominant institutional arrangement is lacking (Hoffman 1999). The actors are then no longer able to perceive which institutions are dominant, and it remains unclear which perceptions and behaviors are acceptable and which are to be sanctioned (Mair et al. 2012). Incongruence An institutional void may arise even when the expectations associated with institutions and the sanctions incurred from non-compliance are evident and clearly specified. Dominant institutional arrangements are essentially the outcome of a majority of actors agreeing on a way of making sense of the social world (Weick 1993). The higher the degree of agreement on the prevailing institutional arrangement among actors, the more entrenched and taken-for-granted it becomes

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(Seo/Creed 2002). However, minority groups of actors may be dissatisfied when their interests are overruled by the majority, and consequently, endorse parallel, competing institutions that they perceive to better serve their interests (Webb et al. 2009). The presence of field level heterogeneous interests thus results in complexity – a social environment in which institutions compete with each other (Greenwood et al. 2011). When actors’ interests directly contradict each other, incongruence may emerge (Webb et al. 2009). The conflicting understandings of legitimacy as well as power struggles among actors may ultimately lead to the emergence of complex environments in which incongruent institutions emerge, thus providing insufficient guidance to the field’s actors (Heugens/Lander 2009; Gioia/Chittipeddi 1991).

5.2.3 Camps and Institutional Paralysis We propose that refugee camps are characterized by institutional paralysis. The refugee camps are founded on the assumption that they provide a temporary space in a host country for forcibly displaced persons until a safe return to their home country is assured. This understanding is endorsed by a set of perceptions and behaviors which we term the Humanitarian Institutional Arrangement (HIA) (see below). However, despite the assumption of transience, nearly two-thirds of refugees – over 6 million – are in protracted situations in that they have spent at least five years in forced exile (PRS Project 2014). Furthermore, once refugees fall into the ‘protracted’ category, the duration of their displacement increases to just under twenty years (PRS Project 2014). However, the formal rules relating to refugee camps do not distinguish between short-term (less than five years) and protracted displacement (more than five years), and a void emerges in which the formal rules are not changed to accommodate the protracted displacement. The Humanitarian Institutional Arrangement From the literature, we identify four constructs that we collectively refer to as the HIA: temporary exile, local resentment, relief discipline, and lack of agency. First, the mission of UNHCR is to “protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide” (UNHCR 2013) and the primary aim is to protect the forcibly displaced until they can safely return to their home country. The implied temporary exile is endorsed by refugees: they leave their homes when “staying would mean certain death” (Buerk 1984) and with the expectation that they will return home after the humanitarian crisis ends (Minear 2002). The perception of temporary exile is taken-for-granted and resistant to change (Jepperson 1991; Turner 2005). Second, host country resentment results from the strain the refugee camp imposes on the resources and capacities of the host community, e.g., on local resource exploitation and waste processing and management (Werker 2002). Although host communities may benefit from an overspill of humanitarian support from the camp, more often than not refugees face local hostility and resentment (UNHCR 2012a). Third, and perhaps the most visible practice associated with HIA, is the ‘relief discipline’

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(Natsios 1995: 407): the distribution of food, shelter, potable water, and sanitation and medical services. These resources are provided by humanitarian agencies and refugees are little more than passive recipients (Betts 2013). Turner suggests that humanitarian aid turns refugees into “biological beings that simply need to be kept alive and healthy while they wait for the day they will return” (Turner 2005: 325). Finally, individual agency is curtailed in that, with few exceptions, refugees are expected to be docile and dependent: many host country governments deny refugees the right to work, run businesses, and own property (UNHCR 2012a). A journalist visiting a camp hosting Syrian refugees in Jordan describes how “just like in prison, you receive your daily portion of food and water and are asked to wait” (Abu Sarah 2013, para 18). In addition, camps tend to be isolated from the communities in their host country, and camp policies severely restrict the freedom of camp refugees to traverse the boundaries of the camp and interact with the institutions and peoples of the host country (Turner 2005). The forcibly displaced in protracted refugee situations thus face the prospect of leading lives characterized by “frustration and unrealized potential” (PRS Project 2014) in which “boredom and inactivity” prevail (Stearns 2011: 36). As the individual length of stay in the refugee camp passes the five-year benchmark, the prevailing HIA no longer reflects the lived reality of the refugees. A Rwandan refugee in a camp in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) described: “Feeling useless is the worst” (as cited in Stearns 2011: 39). The institutional expectations guiding social interactions for temporary exile no longer reflect the social and economic reality of protracted displacement.

5.3

Institutional Paralysis

The HIA assumptions of temporary exile, local resentment, relief discipline, and lack of agency suggest that refugee camps are unlikely places for fostering entrepreneurial activity. Temporary exile and local resentment may limit access to resources and markets, and the distribution of relief and lack of agency may reduce the incentives to risk the investment of time and resources in entrepreneurial activity (Down/Warren 2008). Yet, camps are prevalent with many small innovative refugee-led businesses such as bars, cafes, food stalls, hairdressers, and maintenance and repair shops (Cavaglieri n.d.). In Rwandan refugee camps in the DRC, “bustling markets appeared” (Stearns 2011: 35) and “a camp will have one or more trading centers” (Werker 2007: 462). Given that the dominant HIA is not conducive to the resources, agency, and incentives associated with entrepreneurial behavior, we are guided by the question: what barriers do refugee camp entrepreneurs face and how do they overcome them? Although a plethora of research has investigated the barriers to entrepreneurship in a variety of contexts, we know little about the unique challenges that RCEs face. However, as the majority of refugee camps are located in developing countries, we

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draw on studies that analyze barriers to entrepreneurship in developing country contexts to frame our analysis.

5.3.1 Institutional Barriers to Entrepreneurship From the literature on the barriers to entrepreneurship, we identified three institutional barriers: lack of functioning markets; inefficient legal and political systems; and insufficient infrastructure. Lack of Functioning Markets The access to finance and credit to buy resources is crucial for the success of entrepreneurial ventures (Pissarides et al. 2003). Without available and functioning mechanisms to secure seed money and external financing, entrepreneurs are forced to rely on personal savings or informal lending to fund their enterprises (Thornton et al. 2011). The assumed short-term nature of refugee camps is unlikely to be conducive to the creation of enterprise-oriented financial institutions and functioning markets for finance (Werker 2007). Instead, informal and poorly structured financial markets might emerge in which refugees rely on personal networks and informal financial agreements to fund their entrepreneurial ventures (Betts et al. 2012). Inefficient Legal and Political Systems The legal and political barriers to entrepreneurship include widespread corruption, slow and inefficient administrative procedures, and lack of property rights enforcement (Peci et al. 2012). Aidis et al. (2012) argue that corruption constrains entrepreneurship by deterring entrepreneurs unwilling to engage in corrupt practices and encouraging unproductive forms of entrepreneurship. Slow and inefficient administrative procedures may create an environment in which setting up a business becomes a lengthy and costly process that deters entrepreneurs. Finally, property rights have been found to “form the backbone of … the market economy” (Aidis et al. 2012: 122). However, the existence of property rights is insufficient for entrepreneurship (Sonin 2003) if the rights are not effectively enforced. In a study of the Kyangwali Refugee Settlement in Uganda, refugee entrepreneurs faced corruption and, most severely, lengthy administrative procedures when trying to set up a business (Werker 2007). In particular, the restricted freedom of movement means that entrepreneurs are forced to engage in a complex bureaucratic process if they wish to access external markets and gather market information. Insufficient Infrastructure Poorly developed physical infrastructures for transport, electricity, and water and lack of access to suppliers and consumer markets constrain to entrepreneurship in developing countries (Pissarides et al. 2003). In protracted refugee situations, wavering donor support may undermine confidence in the consistent provision of the physical infrastructure (Betts et al. 2012). Moreover, as explained above, access

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to suppliers and markets is inhibited by the physical isolation of the camp from its host communities (Werker 2007).

5.3.2 Organizational Barriers to Entrepreneurship Organizational barriers to entrepreneurship in developing countries include access to resources; access to finance; low market demand; and lack of market informationOrganizational barriers to entrepreneurship in developing countries include access to resources; access to finance; low market demand; and lack of market information. Access to Resources Entrepreneurs’ access to resources to create and market profitable goods or services is the foundation of any successful business. The land allocated for camps “does not tend to be of the highest quality” (Werker 2007: 472) and refugee camps are often located in deserts or other resource-scarce environments (UNHCR 2012a). Refugees are thus likely to face barriers to securing the raw materials required to create goods and services to sell. Access to Finance One of the most frequently cited barriers to entrepreneurship is poor access to affordable credit (Tagoe et al. 2005). In the context in which financial markets are poorly structured, loans may be associated with high interest rates as well as high depreciation and inflation rates (Robson/Obeng 2008). As a result, potential entrepreneurs may not be able to afford the costs of debt finance. In refugee camps, the majority of entrepreneurs are forced to rely on personal savings or remittances from their friends and relatives in order to start their business (Crisp 2003). Alternatively, opportunities for informal lending may be available from members of the surrounding host communities (Werker 2007). The absence of formal mechanisms to borrow money or attract seed funding, consequently, constrains entrepreneurs from setting up businesses. Without personal networks, it becomes nearly impossible to engage in entrepreneurial activity (Thornton et al. 2011). Low Levels of Demand In developing countries, the potential customer base may be limited due to low average levels of income and widespread engagement in subsistence activities such as farming (Orser et al. 2000). As a result, access to demand from multiple communities becomes a vital factor in assuring entrepreneurial success. Honig (1998), for instance, finds that entrepreneurs’ membership in various communities such as local churches or family clans helps generate a base of potential customers among those groups. The relief discipline of camps, however, reduces demand in the presence of freely available relief items. In addition, the costs incurred by refugee entrepreneurs

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when accessing an outside market may mean that they are no longer competitive: the fees and taxes incurred from the administrative procedures ultimately translate into higher prices of their products and services (Werker 2007). Lack of Market Information Access to market information is crucial for entrepreneurial success as it assures that products and services are tailored to consumers’ preferences and remain competitive with similar products (Jack/Anderson 2002). For refugee entrepreneurs, it is difficult to access external market information due to the remoteness of the camps and their separation from the broader environment (Werker 2007). Moreover, within the camp, market information may not be readily available. Sales may be disbursed over time and place and be mediated privately through personal networks (Stearns 2011). As a result, market information may be dependent on entrepreneurs’ family and personal networks (Thornton et al. 2011).

5.4

Navigating the Institutional Void

5.4.1 Refugee Entrepreneurs Navigating the Institutional Void Despite the institutional and organizational barriers typically faced by entrepreneurs in resource-constrained environments (Jack and Anderson 2002), the presence of numerous small ventures in all refugee camps (e.g., Betts et al. 2012; Werker 2007) suggests that RCEs have found ways to overcome the institutional and organizational barriers they faced. Institutional Barriers Lack of functioning markets, especially financial markets, may be overcome through lending groups. In Sudan, refugees formed mutual help associations in which the monthly saving contributions are lent to those in need and entrepreneurs requiring seed capital (UNHCR 2012b). The mutual help association thus provides a method for financing RCEs who may not have access to family savings or remittances. Inefficient legal and political systems may be navigated by avoiding the complex and costly bureaucratic procedures associated with setting up a business outside the camp. Instead, members of the surrounding host communities may enter the camp to purchase the goods and services marketed by RCEs. Stearns (2011) describes how markets appeared at the fringes of the refugee camp in order to allow the Congolese host community to access the products and services sold by Rwandan refugees’ businesses. Werker (2007) also commented on how regular markets allow members of the host communities to trade with refugees. Finally, RCEs may either improve the available infrastructure themselves – for example, by building power generators or rainwater collectors – or exploit the lack

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of infrastructure as a business opportunity, for example, by establishing internet cafes or mobile phone shops, which help create a virtual infrastructure that may, in turn, create new opportunities for refugee entrepreneurs (Crisp 2003). Organizational Barriers To overcome poor access to formal finance, refugees tend to rely on social networks, families, and remittances for funding (Crisp 2003). In addition, paid employment within the camp, e.g., employment with the UNHCR and NGOs may offer opportunities to accrue additional capital (Werker 2007). To overcome poor access to resources, RCEs may leverage human capital accrued prior to their refugee status, e.g., trained nurses may create health care businesses and tailors retail clothing, fabrics, and repair services. In addition, RCEs may employ relief items in innovative ways, for example, by creating bicycles out of the firewood. Low demand may be overcome by expanding the scope of customers targeted by entrepreneurs. In Kyangwali settlement in Uganda, refugees established a company, the Kyangwali Progressive Farmers Limited, to supply sorghum to a major Ugandan beverage company (Omata/Kaplan 2013). By combining modest individual agricultural output into a collaborative venture, RCEs were collectively able to reach an external market and create a profitable business-to-business entrepreneurial venture. Finally, lack of market information may be overcome by creating a novel virtual infrastructure from mobile phones and the internet. This would enable RCEs to gather up-to-date information on internal and external markets and exploit opportunities to tailor their products and services to customer demands.

5.5

Suggestions for Policy and Practice

The limited empirical data from refugee camps suggest that RCEs have found ways to navigate the institutional paralysis and the barriers to entrepreneurship they encounter. However, the dominant HIA effectively creates and maintains barriers to entrepreneurship, and entrepreneurship thus remains a minority activity in refugee camps. We identify five opportunities for policy makers to foster an environment conducive to entrepreneurship and legitimizing RCEs. Introduce Refugee Camp Livelihood Programs As discussed, the location of a refugee camp and the legal rights of refugees is determined by the host country government. In Uganda, for example, refugees are permitted to work and move relatively freely throughout the country (Werker 2007; Betts et al. 2012). In most other contexts however, refugee camps are located in remote, resource-scarce environments, and the freedom of movement of refugees is severely restricted (Crisp 2003). Within the camps, the HIA institutionalizes dependency and lack of self-determination. More recently, however, the UNHCR noted that ‘livelihood programming’ needs “to begin as early as possible after

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immediate humanitarian needs have been met and as people begin to settle” (UNHCR 2012a: 14). Although rarely executed in practice (Betts 2013: 10), the acknowledgement by the UNHCR of the need to introduce livelihood programs suggests that the HIA can respond to the expectations of refugees concerning agency and self-determination. One promising avenue to help refugees overcome barriers to entrepreneurship is through the introduction of cash-based aid programs. As recently piloted in Gore camp in Southern Chad, the transfer of cash aid to refugees is a source of capital for RCEs and also confers some degree of agency, independence, and autonomy over how cash is spent (Harvey/Bailey 2011). For cash-based aid to be effective, it is, however, crucial that the cash expenditure is completely free and not tied to specific businesses. Broaden Stakeholder Engagement Every refugee camp is unique, and market-based interventions require a detailed understanding of the specific economic, social, and environmental context of each camp. The UNHCR policies and operations are centrally planned in association with camp management teams, and widening the range of stakeholders included in consultation and planning processes would enable policies to be adapted to respond to the individual camp contexts. For example, include RCEs in initiatives to re-shape the HIA away from dependency and lack of agency to autonomy and self-determination. Similarly, protracted refugee camps tend to resemble small cities rather than transient settlements (Perouse de Montclos/Kagwanja 2000), for example, Za’atari refugee camp is Jordan’s fourth largest ‘city’ (Remnick 2013). As such, the infrastructure requirements are similar to those of medium-sized cities. Include urban planners in the early phases of the humanitarian emergency to design out future infrastructure problems. Establish Access to Financial Markets Although access to capital is crucial to any entrepreneurial venture, RCEs primarily rely on personal savings or remittances to finance their businesses. Initiatives such as the lending groups in Sudan remain the exception. Partnerships between the camp and local banks and micro-lending institutions would allow RCEs to access seed capital for their ventures. Another avenue to improve access to financial markets may be by increasing the presence of organizations that are specialized in the provision of financial services in camps’ humanitarian systems. Establish Refugee Camp Innovation Hubs Innovation hubs have been created in Nairobi and many other cities in Africa and India to provide a place for entrepreneurs “to meet, brain-storm, share ideas and collaborate through meet-ups, workshops, focus groups, hackathons and competitions” (Gathege/Moraa 2013: 16). RCEs currently operate with the institutionalized rules of most camps, and to foster the social and economic benefits that accrue from RCEs, establish innovation centers to provide access to business advice, marketing support, and seed capital. The idea of refugee innovation centers has also begun to

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feature on the agenda of humanitarian organizations and may provide a means by which potential refugee entrepreneurs are able to overcome the many hurdles to forming a profitable business (Betts et al. 2012). Encourage External Market Development Policies that restrict the freedom of movement of refugees to within the camp serve to constrain the development of markets inside the boundaries of the refugee camp. Resources are thus trapped in a closed circle. Examples of successful market development such as the refugee farmers in Kyangwali described previously are as yet rare (Omata/Kaplan 2013). Support Employment Creation Initiatives Policies that curtail refugee employment opportunities contribute to the high levels of boredom and frustration experienced by refugees. Opportunities to create employment, however, exist within the camp and between the camp and the host country. For example, in the Dadaab refugee camp, the social enterprise ‘Samasource’ has outsourced small digital tasks to refugees with basic computer skills (Betts et al. 2012). As a result, refugees have been able to save capital to start a business, develop social networks, meet like-minded individuals, and improve computer skills. Supporting employment creation opportunities may also help to reduce camp conflict and unrest. To conclude, as the number of forcibly displaced increases, the urgency to find solutions to redress the negative aspects of life in a refugee camp for those in protracted exile also rises. In addition to improving the dignity of refugees and the socioeconomic climate of a camp, new policies to support livelihood development, broaden stakeholder engagement, develop innovation hubs, develop genuine markets, and create employment opportunities may also make a positive contribution to the economy of the host country, and in so doing, help to reduce the local resentment experienced by those living in camps.

References Abu Sarah, Aziz. 2013. First person: Five things I learned in Syrian refugee camps. National Geographic, September. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/9/130920-syriarefugees-camps-war-children/. Accessed 10 September 2020. Aidis, Ruta, Saul Estrin, andTomasz Marek Mickiewicz. 2012. Size matters: entrepreneurial entry and government. Small Business Economics 39: 119–139. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-0109299-y. Barley, Stephen R., and Pamela S. Tolbert. 1997. Institutionalization and Structuration: Studying the Links between Action and Institution. Organization Science 18(1): 93–117. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/017084069701800106. Battilana, Julie, and Silvio Dorado. 2010. Building sustainable hybrid organizations: The case of commercial microfinance organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 53(6): 1419–1440. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2010.57318391.

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Betts, Alexander. 2013. Putting innovation at the heart of refugee protection work. The Guardian, 4 Jan. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/jan/04/ refugees-camp-innovation-creativity. Accessed 10 September 2020. Betts, Alexander, Louise Bloom, and Naohiko Omata. 2012. Humanitarian innovation and refugee protection. Oxford: University of Oxford. https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/files-1/wp85humanitarian-innovation-2012.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2020. Bourdieu, Pierre, and Loïc J. D. Wacquant. 1997. An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (2nd edition). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Buerk, Michael.1984. BBC Ethiopia Report 10/23/1984. Videoclip. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=XYOj_6OYuJc. Accessed 10 September 2020. Cavaglieri, Simona. n.d. Livelihoods & Micro-finance in Refugee Camps. http://www.gdrc.org/ icm/disasters/Livelihoods.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2020. Chakrabarty, Subratra. 2009. The influence of national culture and institutional voids on family ownership of large firms: A country level empirical study. Journal of International Management 15(1): 32–45. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intman.2008.06.002. Crisp, Jeff. 2003. No solution in sight: The problem of protracted refugee situations in Africa. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/afr/ 3e2d66c34.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2020. DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. 1983. The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review 48(2): 147– 160. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095101. Down, Simon, and Lorraine Warren. 2008. Constructing narratives of enterprise: clichés and entrepreneurial self-identity. International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research 14(1): 4–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/13552550810852802. Galaskiewicz, J. (1997). An Urban Grants Economy Revisited: Corporate Charitable in the Contributions Twin Cities, 1979-81, 1987-89. Administrative Science Quarterly 42(3): 445– 471. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2393734. Accessed 10 September 2020. Gathege, Duncan, and Hilda Moraa. 2013. Draft Report on Comparative study on innovation hubs across Africa. Nairobi: Hub Research. https://docplayer.net/44451843-Draft-report-oncomparative-study-on-innovation-hubs-across-africa.html. Accessed 10 September 2020. Gioia, Dennis A., and Kumar Chittipeddi. 1991. Sensemaking and sensegiving in strategic change initiation. Strategic Management Journal 12(6): 433–448. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj. 4250120604. Goodwin-Gill, Guy S., and Jane McAdam. 2007. The refugee in international law (3rd Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Greenwood, Royston, Mia Raynard, Farah Kodeih, Evelyn R. Micelotta, and Michael Lounsbury. (2011). Institutional Complexity and Organizational Responses. The Academy of Management Annals 5(1): 317–371. https://doi.org/10.5465/19416520.2011.590299. Harvey, Paul, and Sarah Bailey. 2011. Good Practice Review.Cash transfer programming in emergencies. London: Overseas Development Institute. https://odihpn.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2011/06/gpr11.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2020. Heugens, Pursey P. M. A. R., and Michael W. Lander. 2009. Structure! Agency! (And Other Quarrels): A Meta-Analysis of Institutional Theories of Organization. Academy of Management Journal 52(1): 61-85. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2009.36461835. Hoffman, Andrew J. 1999. Institutional evolution and change: environmentalism and the U.S. chemical industry. Academy of Management Journal 42(4): 351–371. https://doi.org/10.5465/ 257008. Honig, Benson. 1998. What determines success? Examining the human, financial and social capital of Jamaican microentrepreneurs. Journal of Business Venturing 13(5): 371–394. https:// doi.org/10.1016/S0883-9026(97)00036-0. HIP. 2020. Humanitarian Innovation Project. About Us. Online. Retrieved from: http://www.rsc. ox.ac.uk/research/humanitarian-innovation-project. Accessed 20 October 2020.

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Jack, Sarah L., and Alistair R. Anderson. 2002. The effects of embeddedness on the entrepreneurial process. Journal of Business Venturing 17(5): 467–487. https://doi.org/10. 1016/S0883-9026(01)00076-3. Jay, Jason. 2013. Navigating paradox as a mechanism of change and innovation in hybrid organizations. Academy of Management Journal 56(1): 137–159. https://www.jstor.org/stable/ 23414348. Accessed 10 September 2020. Jepperson, Ronald L. 1991. Institutions, institutional effects, and institutionalism. In The new institutionalism in organizational analysis, Eds. Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, 143–163. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Luo, Xiaowei R., and Chi-Nien Chung. 2012. Filling or Abusing the Institutional Void? Ownership and Management Control of Public Family Businesses in an Emerging Market. Organization Science 24(2): 591–613. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1120.0751. Mair, Johanna, and Ignasi Martí. 2009. Entrepreneurship in and around institutional voids: A case study from Bangladesh. Journal of Business Venturing 24(5): 419-435. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.jbusvent.2008.04.006. Mair, Johanna, Ignasi Martí, and Marc J. Ventresca. 2012. Building inclusive markets in rural Bangladesh: how intermediaries work institutional voids. Academy of Management Journal 55 (4): 819–850. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2010.0627. McConville, Kleran. 2014. We’re not acronyms, we’re people! Huffpost, 13 January. https://www. huffpost.com/entry/were-not-acronyms-were-pe_b_4577018. Accessed 10 September 2020. Minear, Larry. 2002. The humanitarian enterprise: dilemmas and discoveries. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. Perouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine, and Peter M. Kagwanja. 2000. Refugee Camps or Cities? The Socio-economic Dynamics of the Dadaab and Kakuma Camps in Northern Kenya. Journal of Refugee Studies 13(2): 205–222. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/13.2.205. Natsios, Andrew S. 1995. NGOS and the UN system in complex humanitarian emergencies: conflict or cooperation? Third World Quarterly 16(3): 405–420. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 01436599550035979. Okoth, Dann. 2012. IT entrepreneurs find surprise success in Kenya’s Dadaab refugee camps. The Guardian 4 July. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/jul/04/ entrepreneurs-kenya-dadaab-refugee-camps. Accessed 10 September 2020. Omata, Naohiko, and Josiah Kaplan. 2013. Refugee livelihoods in Kampala, Nakivale and Kyangwali refugee settlements. Patterns of engagement with the private sector. Oxford: University of Oxford. https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/files-1/wp95-refugee-livelihoodskampala-nakivale-kyangwali-2013.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2020. Orser, Barbara, Sandy Hogarth-Scott, and Allan L. Riding. 2000. Performance, firm size, and management problem solving. Journal of Small Business Management 38(4): 42–59. https:// www.researchgate.net/publication/274698692_Performance_Firm_Size_and_Management_ Problem_Solving. Accessed 10 September 2020. Peci, Florin, Enver Kutllovci, Qazim Tmava, and Venet Shala. 2012. Small and Medium Enterprises Facing Institutional Barriers in Kosovo. International Journal of Marketing Studies 4(1): 95–107. 10.5539/ijms.v4n1p95. Pissarides, Francesca, Miroslav Singer, and Jan Svejnar. 2003. Objectives and constraints of entrepreneurs: evidence from small and medium-sized enterprises in Russia and Bulgaria. Journal of Comparative Economics 31(3): 503-531. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0147-5967(03) 00054-4. PRS Project. 2014. The PRS project. Towards solutions for protracted refugee situations. https:// www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/policy/prs-project. Accessed 10 September 2020. Rawlence, Ben. 2016. City of thorns: Nine lives in the world’s largest refugee camp. London: Picador. Remnick, David. 2013. City of the lost. The New York Times, 19 August https://www.newyorker. com/magazine/2013/08/26/city-of-the-lost. Accessed 10 September 2020.

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Robson, Paul J. A., and Bernard A. Obeng. 2008. The Barriers to Growth in Ghana. Small Business Economics 30: 385–403. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-007-9046-1. Seo, Myeong-Gu, and W. E. Douglas Creed. 2002. Institutional Contradictions, Praxis, and Institutional Change: A Dialectical Perspective. The Academy of Management Review 27(2): 222. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4134353. Accessed 10 September 2020. Sonin, Konstantin. 2003. Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights. Journal of Comparative Economics 31(4): 715–731. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2003.09.005. Stearns, Jason K. 2011. Dancing in the glory of monsters: The collapse of the Congo and the great war of Africa. New York: Public Affairs. Tagoe, Noel, Ernest Nyarko, and Ebenezer Anuwa-Amarh. 2005. Financial Challenges Facing Urban SMEs under Financial Sector Liberalization in Ghana. Journal of Small Business Management 43(3): 331–343. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-627X.2005.00140.x. Thornton, Patricia H., Domingo Ribeiro-Soriano, and David Urbano. 2011. Socio-cultural factors and entrepreneurial activity: An overview. International Small Business Journal 29(2): 105– 118. https://doi.org/10.1177/0266242610391930. Turner, Simon. 2005. Suspended spaces: Contesting sovereignties in a refugee camp. In Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants and States in the Post-colonial World, Eds. Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, 312-332. Princeton: Princeton University Press. UN. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Geneva: United Nations Conference. https:// www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/StatusOfRefugees.aspx. Accessed 10 September 2020. UNHCR. 2012a. An introduction to cash-based interventions in UNHCR operations. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/uk/515a959e9.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2020. UNHCR. 2012b. Livelihood programming in UNHCR: Operational guidelines. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/publications/operations/ 4fbdf17c9/livelihood-programming-unhcr-operational-guidelines.html. Accessed 10 September 2020. UNHCR. 2013. Displacement. The New 21st Century Challenge. Global Trends 2012. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/51bacb0f9.pdf . Accessed 10 September 2020. UNHCR. 2014. What we do. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cbf.html. Accessed 10 September 2020. UNHCR. 2020. The Dadaab Refugee Camp Complex. https://www.unhcr.org/ke/dadaab-refugeecomplex. Accessed 10 September 2020. Webb, Justin W., Laszlo Tihanyi, R. Duane Ireland, and David G. Sirmon. 2009. You say illegal, I say legitimate: entrepreneurship in the informal economy. Academy of Management Review 34 (3): 492–510. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2009.40632826. Weick, Karl E. 1993. The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: the Mann Gulch disaster. Administrative Science Quarterly 38(4): 628–652. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2393339. Accessed 10 September 2020. Werker, Eric. 2002. Refugees in Kyanwali Settlement: Constraints on economic freedom. Kampala: Refugee Law Project. https://www.refugeelawproject.org/files/working_papers/RLP. WP07.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2020. Werker, Eric. 2007. Refugee camp economies. Journal of Refugee Studies 20(3): 461–480. https:// doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fem001.

Dr. Marlen de la Chaux is an honorary research fellow at the University of Cambridge Judge Business School, UK. Her research investigates how entrepreneurs create sustainable businesses in adverse environments. She has studied refugee camp entrepreneurs across seven countries and

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three continents, technology start-ups in Kenya, and female micro-entrepreneurs in Burkina Faso. Her research on refugee entrepreneurship was awarded the Academy of Management Discoveries Best Paper Award in 2019. Her work has been published in several peer-reviewed academic journals and books, and was featured by Huffington Post, Business Insider and The Conversation.

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Beyond Emergencies: Towards a More Nuanced Understanding of the Various Impacts of Crises on Migrants Albert Kraler and Lukas Gehrke

Abstract

A number of recent conflicts and natural disasters have highlighted the particular vulnerability of migrants during crises in countries of destination and transit. A particular catalyst was the Libyan revolution of 2011 and the ensuing violence. In response to this and other crisis a specific initiative – the ‘Migrants in Countries of Crisis initiative’ (MICIC) was launched to address such situations. Designed as an informal process the Initiative aimed at developing guidance on how states and other stakeholders could address situations when migrants are caught by a humanitarian crisis in a destination or transit country. This chapter discusses the origins and focus of the initiative. Drawing on data gathered in a study comparing six crisis situations, the chapter highlights the need for a nuanced understanding of the impacts of crisis on migrants. The chapter shows that there are indeed specific challenges migrants face when confronted with a crisis. These relate to general policies (such as migration policies) shaping experiences during crisis, specific responses to emergencies and societal conditions, including attitudes towards migrants.

6.1

Introduction1

A number of recent conflicts and natural disasters have highlighted the particular vulnerability of migrants during crises in countries of destination and transit. A particular catalyst was the Libyan revolution of 2011 and the ensuing violence in

1

The authors would like to express their gratitude to Aurelie Sgro and Maegan Hendow for their comments on earlier drafts of the paper.

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-J. Preuß et al. (eds.), Forced Displacement and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32902-0_6

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which migrants were caught and often also became targets of violence. The Libyan crisis triggered a major international humanitarian effort to assist international migrants caught by the crisis in the country. A devastating flood hitting Thailand in the same year contributed to the increasing policy interest in addressing the protection needs of migrants caught in a crisis. In response to calls to better assist and protect migrants during crises the ‘Migrants in Countries in Crisis’ (MICIC) Initiative was launched in 2014. Designed as an informal process the initiative aimed at developing guidance on how states and other stakeholders could address situations when migrants are caught by a humanitarian crisis in a destination or transit country. While the initiative ended with the launch of the MICIC Guidelines2 in mid-2016,3 its conclusions have been endorsed by the New York Declaration (UN 2016) adopted at the United Nations (UN) Summit on Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants and have also been incorporated in the Global Compact on Migration (GCM). While the current Covid-19 pandemic in many ways is quite different from the types of crises that the MICIC initiative focused on, it too highlights the particular vulnerability of migrants and continuing relevance of the MICIC agenda (Labovitz 2020). In the first part of this chapter, we trace the origins of the MICIC Initiative and locate it in three closely intertwined yet distinct debates: debates on migrants caught in conflict situations, migrants affected by natural disasters, and debates over stranded migrants in countries of transit. While the former two are firmly located in the humanitarian field, the debate on stranded migrants is also strongly linked to wider issues of migration management and in particular policies addressing irregular migrants. Like most recent migration-related initiatives on the global level, the MICIC Initiative has been firmly inscribed in liberal multilateralism and in what could be called ‘soft governance’, aimed at setting standards through guidelines and knowledge transfer through best practices. Its practical and operational impetus has arguably made it less vulnerable to recent changes in the political climate, the resurgence of national interest politics, and the declining support for multilateral policy frameworks by a number of states. In the second part of the chapter, we examine the impact of crisis on migrants, based on comparative research of six crisis situations conducted by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) in collaboration with the International Migration Institute at the University of Oxford and funded by the European Union (EU). For the purpose of the research, crisis was conceptualised as arising “when social, political, economic, natural or environmental factors or events combine with structural vulnerabilities and/or when the magnitude of those events or factors overwhelm the resilience and response capacities of individuals, communities, or countries”, following the definition of crisis adopted by the MICIC 2

Available at: https://micicinitiative.iom.int/guidelines. However, both capacity building and research activities launched in the context of the MICIC Initiative continued beyond this date and have – such as contingency planning or consular protection during crisis – also been mainstreamed into regular activities of major stakeholders such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

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Initiative (MICIC Initiative 2014). As our research shows and as is implied in the concept of crisis underlying the MICIC Initiative, crisis is to some extent also a relative notion, with impacts of crisis unevenly distributed across different groups of people who also differ in their perception of crisis and as a corollary, adopt different strategies in response to it. Apart from being a reflection of indeed very different crisis situations, this “diversity of outcomes” (Kraler et al. 2017) also highlights that crisis – and the ability to cope with a crisis and its consequences – is socially mediated, in other words, that crises affect different parts of the population very differently according, on the one hand people’s vulnerability to adverse effects of crisis, and on the other, their resilience to cope with effects of crises.

6.2

The Origins of the MICIC Initiative

The revolution in Libya in 2011 leading to the fall of the Gaddafi regime and the ensuing violence and instability created a protection crisis of a peculiar kind that is emblematic of the plight of migrants during emergencies. The crisis affected the entire population, generating large-scale internal and cross-border displacement. Yet Libya’s migrant population – estimated at between 1.5 and 3 million compared to a total population of just under 6.2 million4 in 2011 – was disproportionally affected by the violence. Indeed, xenophobic violence was an important feature of the violence in Libya (see Hendow 2017). What is more, in contrast to Libyans fleeing the country or refugees present in Libya migrants could not make claims to international protection if they had come to Libya for work.5 As citizens of another state they had to rely on the protection afforded to them by their country of citizenship. In addition, as labour migrants and citizens of another state, return to their country of citizenship was considered the default option. As a corollary, the expectation therefore was that migrants would return, and indeed, wanted to return under the circumstances prevailing in Libya at the time. While European countries were quick to evacuate their citizens, with the EU launching a large evacuation operation coordinated by the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) (Perchinig et al. 2017), many poorer countries of origin of migrants in Libya at the time did not have the capacities and resources to organise comparable operations or to provide other support to citizens affected by the crisis in Libya. In addition, citizens of those countries also tended to work in lesser skilled and often informal positions and could not, in contrast to more highly skilled employees of larger companies, or could only to a much lesser extent, resort to support from their employers, thus Population figures are taken from the World Bank database at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/ reports.aspx?source=2&country=LBY; estimates of migrants are taken from Zampagni et al. (2017). 5 Libya has long been an important transit country for refugees en route to Europe, primarily from sub-Saharan African countries, notably from the Horn of Africa, but also from elsewhere (Aiazzi et al. 2015; Zampagni et al. 2017). 4

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putting citizens of these states at an additional disadvantage. Finally, many migrants from poorer countries also lacked sufficient own means of bringing themselves into safety – because they had smaller incomes in the first place, but also because they could not access savings or indeed lost money and assets during the violence (Zampagni et al. 2017; Weerasinghe/Taylor 2015). In this context, a major international humanitarian operation targeting migrants stranded in Libya and neighbouring countries was launched, largely implemented through the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and funded through a variety of donors, including the EU. While an international response to specific needs of migrants caught by the crisis thus eventually materialised, the Libya crisis laid open the lack of a systematic framework for assisting and protecting migrants affected by the major crisis in their country of residence. Indeed, in many ways the response to the crisis in Libya was very much ad-hoc, with individual states of origin, international organisations, including the EU, as well as other countries having a stake in the crisis, very much developing responses ‘on the go’ which, not unsurprisingly, did not come without their own problems. For instance, coordination between various agencies, clear operational guidelines as well as funding mechanisms were lacking.6 Considerable number of migrants appear to have been unable to access assistance and had to return on their own accord often relying on family assistance in a context where fees charged by intermediaries and transport providers skyrocketed, while corruption and extortion by various militia were ripe. Countries of origin were often unaware where their citizens were located, or indeed, often did not know how many of their citizens were actually present in the country when the violence erupted, while assistance, including evacuations, was not available throughout the country (Hendow et al. 2016). Prompted by the experience of the Libya crisis as well as other recent crises, the specific needs of migrants and other non-nationals caught in a humanitarian crisis in countries of destination or transit was subsequently put on the table in several international fora, including the High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development in 2013. In parallel, the particular situation of international migrants had also started to attract growing political attention in the context of debates on the adverse human impacts of climate change, natural disasters and environmental degradation.7 In such contexts, migrants may face particular vulnerabilities – because of their 6

In response to challenges in providing fast and reliable emergency relief, IOM created an emergency funding mechanism that was designed to bridge the gap between the occurrence of a crisis and commitment of donor funding. See https://micicinitiative.iom.int/micicinitiative/iommigration-emergency-funding-mechanism-mefm. 7 The nexus between migration and environmental change had become an increasingly salient issue during the 2000s in the context of the mounting evidence on the impact of climate change on mobility (see Foresight 2011). In 2012, the Nansen Initiative was launched to address challenges related to disaster-related displacement across international borders. The initiative concluded its mandate in 2015 with the publication of the Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change. The latter specifically addresses the issue of foreigners abroad at the time of a disaster. The recommendations of this Protection Agenda are now being implemented by the Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD), see http://disasterdisplacement.org/. For a recent review of protection challenges in the context of migration and environmental change and implications for asylum and migration policies see Kraler et al. (2020).

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legal status, discrimination, lack of language proficiency and other disadvantages potentially reducing migrants’ ability to respond to and cope with calamitous events (see Bravi et al. 2017). Finally, in the context of irregular migration from Asian and African countries to the EU, increasing in particular after the Arab spring of 2011, stranded migrants in transit countries also had begun to receive more and more political attention. In 2005, IOM created a special assistance scheme – the ‘stranded migrant facility’ to assist such migrants (see Collyer et al. 2014). The humanitarian crises in Libya and Syria in the wake of the Arab spring and the surge of irregular arrivals from North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia put this category of migrants on the international agenda (Chetail/Braeunlich 2013). Deeply intertwined with concerns about irregular migration, the issue of stranded migrants became particularly salient after the European ‘migration and refugee crisis’ of 2015 that in turn created the impetus for the organisation of the UN Summit on Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants held in the fall of 2016 and the Global Compact process initiated by it that culminated in the adoption of the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration in 2018. The MICIC Initiative was created as a state-led process co-chaired by the United States (US) and the Philippines and supported by a number of other countries and stakeholders, born out of these different strands of debate. In terms of its design, the MICIC Initiative was very much modelled after the successful initiative promoting the development of a normative framework on internal displacement during the 1990s. Led by Francis M. Deng, the Special Representative on Internal Displacement, and supported by an independent project at the Brookings Institution, that process was concluded with the adoption of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in 1998. Subsequently, it became a model for a number of other ‘soft law’ initiatives, such as the Nansen Initiative on disaster-induced cross-border displacement (Cohen 2013).8 The MICIC Initiative too aimed at the development of non-binding guidelines – launched in 2016 (MICIC Initiative 2016) – although in contrast to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, these intended to provide practical rather than normative guidance. The initiative involved a series of wide and inclusive consultations with governments, civil society stakeholders, private sector representatives and international organisations. These consultations served two purposes: to collect input for the guidelines which were prepared in parallel, and at the same time, to generate awareness for the initiative. Complementing the consultations, the initiative involved substantial research activities as well as targeted capacity-building activities supported by projects funded by the EU

8

Roberta Cohen’s paper was commissioned by the Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM) at Georgetown University in the context of its crisis migration project in view of drawing lessons for the development of guidelines in the course of the MICIC project. ISIM’s migration crisis project was alongside ICMPD’s EU funded MICIC project the main source of research input to the MICIC Initiative. ISIM also was a member of the MICIC working group.

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and the US.9 The whole MICIC process is now recognised as an effective model to strengthen the governance of migration and propel cooperation. It is also heralded as a ‘building block’ in the effort to further clarify responsibilities towards migrants in vulnerable situations in the report of the then Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Migration, the late Peter Sutherland, following up on the outcome of the 2016 United Nations Summit for Refugees and Migrants (United Nations General Assembly 2017: 9). In substance, the MICIC Initiative examines the whole ‘crisis cycle’, including the pre-crisis, the emergency and the post-crisis phases. It covered a vast array of topics, ranging from issues around disaster management and crisis preparedness to xenophobia, consular protection, trafficking in human beings in context of crisis, return and reintegration, to name but a few. While the personal scope of the initiative with its focus on non-nationals (including both migrants and more temporary mobile persons) caught by crisis in a destination country was arguably relatively narrow, the broad thematic scope covered by the initiative allowed, as one expert involved in the initiative put it, “to conveniently package a number of important topics under one umbrella”10 and thus draw attention to a diverse set of topics that were worth highlighting in the nexus between humanitarian crisis, development and migration, including issues that otherwise were rarely addressed. In addition, the particular framing of the initiative allowed to link issues of humanitarian aid and disaster management with migration management issue in a way that helped to extend the fairly narrow attention to migration issues in the field of humanitarian aid beyond the assistance of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). In so doing, the MICIC Initiative was firmly inscribed in a human rights logic driven by the objective to address protection gaps and associated interest in extending (international) protection and related international obligations of states beyond core human rights standards in the context of migration, such as the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention.

6.3

Comparing Different Situations in Which Migrants Are Caught in Crisis

As noted above, the MICIC Initiative has emerged at a particular historical juncture as a result of specific experiences and associated debates. While the initiative could draw on rich practical experiences of various stakeholders involved in responding Two major research projects were funded in association with the MICIC Initiative, ISIM’s ‘Crisis Migration’ project (https://isim.georgetown.edu/Crisis-Migration) and ICMPD’s research on migrants in countries of crisis (see https://research.icmpd.org/projects/migration-governance/ micic/). In addition, several country-specific research studies, including on Mexico and Thailand were separately commissioned from IOM. Research on the topic is collated at the MICIC Initiative’s website at https://micicinitiative.iom.int/resources-and-publications/studies-and-research. 10 Personal communication of one senior expert involved in the initiative to one of the authors, March 2016. 9

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to Libya and other crises in which migrants were affected, there was little systematic research on the implications of crisis for migrants and policy responses to crisis at the time when the initiative was launched. To close this knowledge gap, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) in collaboration with the International Migration Institute (IMI) at the University of Oxford, as well as a network of local research partners, engaged in a two-year research study examining six crisis situations and involving fieldwork in 13 countries (Kraler et al. 2017; see also Hendow et al. 2016). The crisis situations studied included those occurring in: Central African Republic (civil strife in 2013–2014), Côte d’Ivoire (civil strife in 2002/3 and 2010/11), Lebanon (the 2006 war and the period up to 2016), Libya (2011 revolution and the subsequent conflict), South Africa (the 2008 and 2015 spates of xenophobic violence), and Thailand (flooding in 2011). In Lebanon, South Africa and Thailand, fieldwork was largely conducted in the country in question, with some research also conducted in Zimbabwe in the case of the South Africa case study. In the other three case studies, the research had a particular focus on migrants who had returned and fieldwork was therefore focused on countries of origin.11 Conceptually, the research focused on migrants, including refugees or asylum seekers, who were present in the countries experiencing crisis for a longer term.12 The project’s conceptualisation of crisis broadly followed the concept of crisis as adopted by the MICIC Initiative (see above). Overall, information from over 650 respondents – migrants, family members of migrants, government authorities, experts and private actors, civil society organisations and intergovernmental organisations – was collected. In the following, we briefly present key insights from the research.13 In our conclusions, we relate our findings to the MICIC Initiative and examine its achievements, as well as the potential and limits of a framework focusing on the experiences of migrants caught in crisis.

6.3.1 The Different Sides of Crisis Crisis as defined by the MICIC Initiative is very much a relational concept. It can be conceptualised as the result of the interplay of adverse events, the threat these pose to individuals’, communities’ and states’ resilience, and how individuals, communities and states respond to it. A crisis thus arises only when adverse events are experienced as a fundamental challenge to and a breakdown of social and political order, a threat to the well-being and physical integrity of those affected by crisis and individuals and communities’ ability to cope with adverse events. Our research shows that what is perceived as a crisis, how crisis is concretely understood and in what ways crisis is experienced varies considerably between respondents. Thus, acute crisis events in some contexts, such as in the case of In Tunisia, one of the countries in which fieldwork was conducted in the context of the Libya case study, migrants stranded in Tunisia were the focus. 12 The MICIC Initiative also covered other non-nationals, for example tourists who happened to be in a country when a crisis hit. 13 More detailed results of the study are presented in Kraler et al. (2017). 11

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xenophobic violence in South Africa, have been experienced as particularly extreme periods following longer periods of hostilities, including smaller scale attacks. In other words, the crisis event was experienced as a culmination of processes that have been in place for longer periods of time (Crush et al. 2017). Similarly, in situations characterised by state fragility, frail economies, generalised insecurity or recurrent waves of violence, crisis was similarly not necessarily experienced as any definitive period in the evolution of events but as an ongoing crisis with climaxes at different points in time, which have been experienced differently by different categories of people. For many of the Egyptian respondents of the study who had migrated to Libya, for instance, the initial period of violence in Libya in 2011 was experienced as less of a challenge compared to the resurgence of violence in 2014, in which Egyptians became targets, specifically of violence committed by Islamist groups. By contrast, for Sub-Saharan respondents already the initial crisis in 2011 had raised severe issues to their safety and physical integrity, prompting many of them to return to their country of origin or flee to neighbouring countries early on (Zampagni et al. 2017). The 2006 war in Lebanon is an example of a crisis where the perception of a crisis was not shared by migrant domestic workers (Mansour-Ille/Hendow 2017). For many of them, the challenges resulting from their precarious legal and social status as often relatively isolated migrant domestic workers have been much more significant. Rather than a tipping point, the crisis was experienced as a passing episode that for those affected highlighted the constraints and precariousness of their daily lives in Lebanon. While the 2006 war did trigger massive evacuations of non-nationals, these largely concerned non-resident non-nationals, often non-nationals of Lebanese origin who happened to spent their holidays in Lebanon at the time of the crisis (Jureidini 2011), highlighting widely differing perceptions of and experiences during crisis.

6.3.2 Agency, Resilience and Crisis As noted above, the impact of crises on migrants is to a large extent shaped by individuals’ capacity to act in the face of adverse events or adverse conditions. Even in such adverse conditions, there are different possibilities available to respond to and cope with crisis. However, these are not evenly distributed, and the extent to which these different options are indeed feasible depends on a variety of factors. Individual-level factors One first set of factors impacting on resilience and vulnerability relates to individual-level characteristics. These are important in shaping migrants’ perception of options. Relevant individual-level characteristics include the level and type of economic resources migrants have at their disposal, their level of education, familiarity with and knowledge of how to handle interactions with relevant institutions, and their language skills. These interact with situational characteristics that are socially mediated and therefore relate to the concept of social embeddedness (see below).

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Social embeddedness and responses to crisis On a meso- and macro level, a second factor relates to migrants’ overall social embeddedness in the country experiencing the crisis (Granovetter 1985). The concept of social embeddedness refers to the density and scope of individual’s connections to their immediate and wider social environment. In the case of migrants, relevant factors comprise migrants’ socio-economic integration, their length of residence, their legal status, their relationships and interactions with the local population, including discrimination and attitudes towards migrants, and the nature and scope of social networks that link migrants to the local population, co-nationals and families and communities in the country of origin. Social embeddedness and mobility Migrants’ social embeddedness is also a relevant factor when migrants return to their country of origin. Indeed, migrants’ decision to return to their country of origin or, conversely, their decision to stay in the host country or remigrate after an initial return in spite of crisis are influenced by their social embeddedness in either the country of destination or origin: whether they have family and other social ties to the country of origin that they can easily activate for support, and whether they can access employment or find other sources of livelihood in either of these countries. Migrants’ mobility choices in the face of crisis are thus not uniform. While they also at times reflect severe constraints, for example when individuals become trapped or stranded, they often reflect a significant degree of agency and migrants’ differential assessments of the options at hand.

6.3.3 Perceptions Perceptions are an important element of migrants’ ‘possibility spaces’, that is, the range of options that migrants’ see as possible and feasible (see on the concept of possibility space Vogel/Kraler 2017). Perceptions thus also constitute an important dimension in migrants’ mobility choices: their assessment of the risks and threats that exposure to crisis implies for them, their evaluation of conditions in their country of origin, as well as other subjective aspects, such as potential feelings of shame associated to the perception that a migrant’s migration project has failed. Finally, perceptions are also important for migrants’ strategies upon return and for reintegration.

6.3.4 Access to Information and the Importance of Adequate Communication Perceptions may be misplaced, for example, when migrants in an irregular situation do not access public emergency relief for fear of apprehension and deportation. Access to relevant information and effective communication to migrants is thus

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crucial. However, migrants often do not have access to relevant information, which may also contribute to the research’s identified mismatch between migrants’ perception of support and government and other actors’ claims of relief provided. Lack of knowledge of the local language is one major reason for the lack of access to relevant information. However, lack of effective means and strategies of communication on the side of aid organisations and governments is an important factor too, for example, by reaching out to areas with significant migrant populations or using mediators to reach hard to reach populations, including irregular migrants.

6.3.5 Institutional Responses to Crises The capacity of states to respond to crises is highly variable. In countries affected by conflict and internal strife, the integrity of the state itself is in question. As a result, state institutions may no longer function, collapse or become embroiled in conflict themselves and a source of violence and instability. In these contexts, our research suggests that other actors such as landlords, employers, migrant networks, faith groups and other actors filled important gaps especially for initial responses, including information, shelter, or food. In respect to countries of origin, the lack of capacity and resources has emerged as an important factor constraining state responses, although lack of political was also an issue, as was distrust by migrants vis-à-vis state officials. While international support has complemented and at times substituted limited country of origin support, this study also suggests that these efforts have not necessarily reached all who may have been in need, with considerable numbers of people having to return of their own accord without assistance, requiring migrants to draw on their own resources and family support. In this context, migrants’ families and other informal networks often step in to provide assistance – frequently in constrained circumstances. The limited assistance available, combined with the limited opportunities for income-generating activities and in various cases the experience of downward mobility, was an important reason for some migrants to consider re-migrating.

6.3.6 The Need for Coordination In all contexts, crisis response involved multiple actors, including civil society organisations, intergovernmental organisations and private sector actors, with governments and intergovernmental organisations being the most important players in terms of scale of operations. Coordination between different actors was often lacking. As a result, involved actors often did not have a clear understanding of their own and others’ roles in the crisis response, procedures in place to share information or agreements on how to cooperate and organise a division of labour, negatively impacting the delivery of relief and access to migrants in need of assistance. In part, the lack of coordination reflected an absence of prior contingency planning establishing coordination mechanisms and procedures.

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6.3.7 Return: The Challenge of Reintegration A common denominator for many returnees was that return often was return into a precarious setting, characterised by limited economic opportunities and, as a corollary, reliance on (extended) family support, aid and donations, which was not always available, especially for migrants who had been absent for longer periods of time or those born abroad. In rural contexts, access to land was also an important issue, showing the need to more carefully consider land issues in the context of large-scale returns. In this context, many of the factors that led to the initial migration often persisted and – albeit in a minority of cases – made remigration a desirable option, despite ongoing instability or violence in the country of destination. However, the research also documents instances of successful return and reintegration, and indeed entrepreneurship and innovation by returnees. While more far-reaching plans to assist returnees were initially adopted in several countries under study – such as in Chad or Liberia – these were sometimes superseded by pressing needs related to concurrent or subsequent other crises (notably the Boko Haram crisis in the Lake Chad Basin in the case of Chad or the Ebola crisis in the case of Liberia). Where state or international programmes to assist returnees existed, longer term support to returnees was generally more limited compared to support provided to refugees, due to a large extent to the better availability of international aid in their case. Given that all countries in this study that experienced large-scale return movements of nationals are relatively poor countries, the lack of availability of international support almost inevitably translated in relatively fewer resources committed to returnees also nationally. The differential availability of support for different categories of people, however, also raises broader questions. In particular, in a context of chronic economic fragility and widespread poverty, implementing longer term programmes that target a particular group to the exclusion of others raises issues in terms of equality in access to support and may in the end be counterproductive, suggesting, instead, a combination of territorial and sectoral approaches that consider a variety of target groups within such programmes but do not focus exclusively on any of these.

6.4

Conclusions

As the research shows, there are indeed specific challenges migrants face when confronted with a crisis. Some of these challenges relate to deeply embedded approaches and attitudes towards migrants that raise more general issues and go beyond the question of migrants caught in crisis, and indeed highlight crisis-specific consequences of more general policies and practices existing in host countries prior to the crisis, a point also taken up by the MICIC Guidelines in its recommendations

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concerning the pre-crisis phase.14 Other challenges more directly concern crisis response, and in particular the lack of preparedness of relevant stakeholders, including consular staff, humanitarian agencies or national institutions responsible for crisis management. In the framework of the MICIC Initiative several capacity-building activities15 have been initiated aimed at strengthening the awareness and response capacities of states and other key responders, which, after the formal end of the MICIC initiative have partly been mainstreamed in programmes run by stakeholders in the MICIC initiative. Some challenges identified by the research are not necessarily restricted to the target groups of the MICIC Initiative, for example challenges in reintegration, which concern migrants returning from a country affected by crisis as much as refugees who return after long periods of exile. As the chapter also shows, migrants’ social embeddedness is an important factor both in terms of their ability to cope with the immediate crisis and in terms of rebuilding their lives afterwards, whether in the host country or the country of origin. Overall, the empirical research highlights the importance of structural, social and individual mediating factors in shaping outcomes of crisis, or processes that relate to it (such as return). The findings of the research thus highlight the need for a nuanced and contextualised understanding of crises, how they play out and what their short and longer term consequences are for different categories of people. However, the research also highlights the limits of the notion of crisis as a category of both practice and analysis (Brubaker/Cooper 2000), i.e. as a category that helps both to understand the implication of arguably quite diverse crisis situations in which migrants might be caught and as a policy category informing policy development. While the MICIC Initiative has indeed succeeded in putting a focus on the specific situation of migrants present in a country affected by a conflict or a natural disaster, it is crucial to recognise issues and challenges equally affecting different categories of migrants even if normative frameworks and international obligations may differ between them. As the MICIC Initiative has itself recognised, its outcomes, including the research conducted on migrants caught by crisis in host countries, has implications and lessons for a broader set of migration scenarios, despite its arguably relatively narrow scope (See MICIC Initiative, n.d.). The – at the time of writing this chapter – ongoing Covid-19 pandemic and its impact on migrants proves the relevance of the body of knowledge created by the MICIC initiative for more effectively respond to crises situations and the specific needs of migrants caught therein and to promote the overarching objective of the Global Compact for Migration to promote safe, orderly and regular migration.

In fact, the majority – 8 out of the 15 principles of the MICIC Guidelines – focus on the pre-crisis phase. Of these 8 principles principle no. 3 (“Empower migrants to help themselves”) is specifically concerned with addressing structural barriers and issues that put migrants into a more vulnerable situation (see MICIC Initiative 2016). 15 For more information on capacity building activities see https://micicinitiative.iom.int/capacitybuilding. 14

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References Aiazzi, Erica,Vanessa Iaria, and Paola Monzini. 2015. Study on Smuggling: Case Study 1: Syria/Lebanon - Egypt - Italy. Brussels: European Commission, DG Migration & Home Affairs/ European Migration Network. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/ case_study_1_syrialebanon_-_egypt_-_italy.pdf. Accessed 8 September 2020. Bravi, Alessandra, Katharina Schaur, Alexander Trupp, Teeranong Sakulsri, Reena Tadee, Kanya Apipornchaisakul, and Sureeporn Punpuing. 2017. Migration and Natural Disasters – The Impact on Migrants of the 2011 Floods in Thailand. Migrants in Countries in Crisis. Thailand Case Study. Vienna: ICMPD. http://www.icmpd.org/fileadmin/2017/Thailand_CS_FINAL.pdf . Accessed 8 September 2020. Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper. 2000. Beyond Identity. Theory and Society 29(1): 1–47. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007068714468. Chetail, Vincent, and Matthias A. Braeunlich. 2013. Stranded Migrants: Giving Structure to a Multifaceted Phenomenon. Global Migration Research Paper No. 5. Geneva: Graduate Institute. https://repository.graduateinstitute.ch//record/283789?_ga=2.49277862.1446752459. 1599556597-1738829780.1599556597. Accessed 8 September 2020. Cohen, Roberta. 2013. Lessons Learned from the Development of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Washington DC: Georgetown University. https://issuu.com/ georgetownsfs/docs/isim_working_paper_series_-_roberta. Accessed 8 September 2020. Collyer, Michael, Franck Düvell, Hein de Haas, and Irina Molodikova. 2014. Transit Migrations and European Spaces. In Transit Migration in Europe. Eds. Franck Düvell, Irina Molodikova and Michael Collyer, 13–33. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. https://www.jstor.org/ stable/j.ctt12877m5.4?refreqid=excelsior%3A36e3724da8c05ad8464a25d5806f81ed&seq= 3#metadata_info_tab_contents. Accessed 8 September 2020. Crush, Jonathan, Godfrey Tawodzera, Abel Chikanda, Sujata Ramachandran, and Daniel Tevera. 2017. South Africa: The Double Crisis – Mass Migration From Zimbabwe And Xenophobic Violence in South Africa. South Africa Case Study. Vienna: International Centre for Migration Policy Development. https://micicinitiative.iom.int/sites/default/files/resource_pub/docs/sa_ case_study_final.pdf. Accessed 8 September 2020. Foresight. 2011.- Migration and Global Environmental Change. Final Project Report. London: UK Government Office for Science. https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/201401081 42600/http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/foresight/docs/migration/11-1116-migration-and-globalenvironmental-change.pdf. Accessed 8 September 2020. Granovetter, Mark. 1985. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology 91(3): 481–510. https://doi.org/10.1086/228311. Hendow, Maegan. 2017. Xenophobic violence during the 2011 Libya crisis. Paper presented at the 14th Annual IMISCOE Conference, Rotterdam, 28–30 June 2017. Hendow, Maegan, Robtel N. Pailey, and Alessandra Bravi. 2016. Migrants in Countries of Crisis. Emerging Findings. A Comparative Study of Six Crisis Situations. Emerging Findings. Vienna: International Centre for Migration Policy Development. https://micicinitiative.iom.int/sites/ default/files/resource_pub/docs/micic_emerging_trends_report_icmpd_imi_sept2016.pdf. Accessed 8 September 2020. Jureidini, Ray. 2011. State and non-state actors in evacuations during the conflict in Lebanon, July–August 2006. In The Migration-Displacement Nexus: Patterns, Processes and Policies, Eds. Khalid Koser and Susan Martin, 197–215. Brooklyn NY: Berghahn Books. Kraler, Albert, Oliver Bakewell, Maegan Hendow, Jenny Peebles, and Lucas Rasche, Eds. 2017. Migrants in Countries of Crisis. Comparative Report. Vienna: International Centre for Migration Policy Development. https://micicinitiative.iom.int/sites/default/files/resource_pub/ docs/comparative-study_on_migrants_in_crisis_situations_en.pdf. Accessed 8 September 2020.

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Kraler, Albert, Caitlin Kaitsificas, and Martin Wagner. 2020. Climate Change and Migration. Legal and policy challenges and responses to environmentally induced migration. Brussels: European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/655591/ IPOL_STU(2020)655591_EN.pdf. Accessed 8 September 2020. Labovitz, Jeff. 2020. Protection of Migrants in Crisis is More Relevant Than Ever in the Face of COVID-19. Four Years On from the Launch of the MICIC Guidelines. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. https://micicinitiative.iom.int/news/protection-migrants-crisismore-relevant-ever-face-covid-19. Accessed 8 September 2020. Mansour-Ille, Dina, and Maegan Hendow. 2017. Lebanon: Migrant Domestic Workers and the 2006 Crisis. Lebanon Case Study. Vienna: International Centre for Migration Policy Development. http://research.icmpd.org/fileadmin/Research-Website/Project_material/MICIC/ LEBANON-Case-Study-FINAL.pdf. Accessed 8 September 2020. MICIC Initiative. n.d. About MICIC. Approach. http://micicinitiative.iom.int/about-micic/ approach. Accessed 8 September 2020. MICIC Initiative. 2014. Frequently Asked Questions. https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/ What-We-Do/docs/MICIC-FAQs-Final-for-GFMD-5-8-2014.pdf. Accessed 8 September 2020. MICIC Initiative. 2016. Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disasters. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. http://micicinitiative.iom. int/sites/default/files/document/micic_guidelines_english_web_13_09_2016.pdf. Accessed 8 September 2020. Perchinig, Bernhard, Lucas Rasche, and Katharina Schaur. 2017. Humanitarian aid and civil protection policies in the European Union and the MICIC agenda. Summary Paper. Vienna: International Centre for Migration Policy Development. https://micicinitiative.iom.int/sites/ default/files/resource_pub/docs/micic_summarypaper_eu_responses.pdf. Accessed 8 September 2020. UN. 2016. Outcome document for 19 September 2016 High-level meeting to address large movements of refugees and migrants. New York: United Nations. http://www.un.org/en/ development/desa/population/migration/events/ga/documents/2016/1August2016/Outcome_ Declaration.pdf. Accessed 8 September 2020. United Nations General Assembly. 2017. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Migration. United Nations Seventy-first session, A/71/728. New York: United Nations General Assembly. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/ migration/events/coordination/15/documents/Report%20of%20SRSG%20on%20Migration% 20-%20A.71.728_ADVANCE.pdf. Vogel, Dita, and Albert Kraler. 2017. Demand-side Interventions Against Trafficking in Human Beings. Towards an Integrated Theoretical Approach. DemandAT Working Paper No.14. Vienna: International Centre for Migration Policy Development. https://www.icmpd.org/ fileadmin/user_upload/Demand-side_Interventions_Against.pdf. Accessed 8 September 2020. Weerasinghe, Sanjula, and Abbie Taylor. 2015. On the Margins: Noncitizens Caught in Countries Experiencing Violence, Conflict and Disaster. Journal on Migration and Human Security, 3(1): 26–57. https://doi.org/10.1177/233150241500300102. Zampagni, Francesca, Hassan Boubakri, Remadji Hoinathy, Leander Kandilige, Hamidou Manou Nabara, SaraSadek, Mohamed El Sayeh, Mahamadou Zongo, and Maegan Hendow. 2017. An UnendingCcrisis: Responses of Migrants, States and Organisations to the 2011 Libya Crisis. Libya Case Study. Vienna: International Centre for Migration Policy Development. https:// www.icmpd.org/fileadmin/2017/Libya_CaseStudy_FINAL.pdf. Accessed 8 September 2020.

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Albert Kraler is an Assistant Professor in Migration Studies at the Department for Migration and Globalization (DEMIG) at Danube University Krems (Austria). He has a PhD in Political science from the University of Vienna and a joint degree in Political Science and African Studies from the same university. Before joining DEMIG, he was a senior researcher at the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMD) in Vienna. At ICMPD, he coordinated the research component of the ‘Migrants in Countries of Crisis’ project, on which his contribution co-authored with Lukas Gehrke is based. His current research focuses on forced displacement, global migration and asylum governance, migration statistics, regularisation of irregular immigrants and family migration policy. Lukas Gehrke is Deputy Director General and Director for Research, Policy and Strategy at the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). In his function he is responsible for research, strategy development, knowledge management and external relations. Thematically, he covers migration management and migration governance, legal migration, international protection, border management, irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking, social cohesion, migrant integration and migration and development. Lukas Gehrke served as the project director of the Migrants in Countries of Crisis Project on which the chapter co-authored with Albert Kraler is based.

7

Better Migration Management – A Project implemented in the Horn of Africa Martin Weiß and Stephanie Deubler

Abstract

Migration management is often a controversial concept and approach in the development cooperation context, which makes it important to clarify and define precisely what we mean. Should German development cooperation engage at all in this area? If so, in what way? What are the limits of our engagement? In 2016, the Better Migration Management (BMM) project confronted the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH with these questions and challenges. Based on experience gained during the design phase of the project, a definition of the term ‘development-oriented migration management’ was created in order to provide guidance for future projects in this sector.

7.1

Development-Oriented Migration Management – Establishing a Definition on the Basis of the Example of Better Migration Management1

Migration did not start to be a topic for German development cooperation before Summer 2015 when hundreds of thousands of individuals seeking protection found their way to Europe and Germany. Although the potentials and risks posed by

1

Our thanks go to David Nii Addy, Michael Lilier, Valeska Onken, Dr Andrea Riester, Sabine Wenz, Elena Weber (all GIZ) for their extremely helpful comments and additional ideas on this chapter.

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-J. Preuß et al. (eds.), Forced Displacement and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32902-0_7

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migration have been addressed in the context of development since 2006,2 the increasing engagement of development cooperation in this field today raises questions about its independent role and core responsibilities in the overall field of displacement and migration. While initially the focus was on politically fairly uncontroversial issues, such as migrant remittances, and the promotion of the non-profit engagement of diaspora associations and entrepreneurship on the part of migrants returning to their countries of origin, the current debate frequently revolves around concepts like migration governance, migration policy and migration management. Migration management in particular is often associated in the public perception, in media and politics with security-policy issues such as border control, internal security, repatriation, etc. This raises the question of whether or not the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH has a role to play in this thematic area, and if so, which one? Where are the limits of development interest and thus what are the risks and limitations of engagement? It becomes apparent that a clear definition of the term ‘migration management’ from a development stance is needed. Without this, difficulties arise when we attempt to identify the development value of the overarching policy field of migration, and the pertinent core responsibilities. Development engagement in the context of migration in general and migration management in particular can result in misunderstandings and give rise to concerns and fears if we do not have clear definitions, thus calling into question the relevant activities of development organisations. This question became particularly urgent when the European Union (EU) and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) commissioned GIZ in early 2016 to implement the regional project ‘Better Migration Management’ (BMM), based in the Horn of Africa. BMM was devised in 2015 by those responsible for the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) and approved by the Operational Committee of the Horn of Africa Window shortly after the EU-Africa summit on migration in Valletta, Malta in November 2015. The project was to support the Khartoum Process,3 which was launched in November 2014 as an initiative of the EU and the countries at the Horn of Africa, with concrete measures to improve migration management in East Africa. Most of the eight countries covered by the Khartoum Process (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and, since 2017, Uganda) are some of the poorest on the African continent and face particular challenges in terms of displacement and migration: all of them are at once countries of origin, transit and

2 In 2006 the Sector Project Migration and Development (www.giz.de/migration) was commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) for the first time to investigate the migration and development nexus and to elaborate approaches for German development cooperation. One of the first studies to be published in Germany on this subject was the 2006 discussion paper ‘Egyptian, Afghan and Serbian Diaspora Communities in Germany: How Do They Contribute to Their Country of Origin?’ (Baraulina et al. 2007). 3 Also known as the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative.

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destination of refugees and migrants, with some 12 million people4 within the region alone seeking shelter, protection from conflict and persecution. When we speak of ‘better migration management’, the first question is precisely how, from a point of view of German development cooperation we would interpret this term? The implementation of this development project gives GIZ and all other project partners an excellent opportunity to define and apply the term ‘development-oriented migration management’, and thus to shape and establish it within the global debate on migration. Below, the authors propose a definition of the term ‘development-oriented migration management’ on the basis of the principles of German development cooperation, and experience gained in the planning and implementation of the BMM project.

7.2

Global Migration Governance: The Framework for Migration Management

In general, global migration governance is understood as international cooperation in the field of refugee and migration policy (Angenendt/Koch 2017: 5), or more specifically a more or less formal framework of standards, rules and regulations to regulate the way states deal with cross-border movements of people (Papademetriou 2011: 1). What is meant here is the wording and implementation of legal frameworks and policies that affect countries of origin, transit, and host countries. Migration and displacement must be looked at jointly in this context, even if different legal regimes are in place and even though the implications for legal practice are contradictory in some cases. But in fact most global migration movements, in the Horn of Africa as elsewhere, are mixed in nature, i.e. labour migrants and people wanting to study or to be trained in another country often use the same migration corridors as individuals categorized as refugees under international law or victims of human trafficking.5 Global and regional migration governance provide both the foundation and the framework for migration policy.

4

This number refers to refugees and internally displaced persons due to conflict and persecution (UNHCR 2020; IDMC 2020). 5 Trafficking in persons is defined as ‘the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs’ (UNODC 2004: 42). Smuggling of migrants is defined as ‘the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.’ (UNODC 2004: 54f.).

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Migration policy is generally seen as an area that falls within the core responsibility and authority of national states (Angenendt/Koch 2017: 5) and deals with the provisions that govern inward and outward migration, and the management of these (GIZ 2013: 5). Migration management regulates and shapes bilateral and regional relations between countries of origin, transit states and host countries of migrants (GIZ 2013: 5) and is also seen as the ability of a state to steer and shape immigration (Angenendt/Kipp 2017: 3). Migration management involves a large number of different actors: various government bodies (including the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Labour and the refugee authorities), regional organisations (e.g. the EU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)), development partners, civil society, data-gathering institutions (in the private and public sectors), etc. (IGAD 2012: 10). While migration was not mentioned in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),6 this changed with the introduction of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Migration has become a matter of development cooperation. Target 10.7., for instance, reads ‘Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies’.7 Migrants are seen as development actors, but also as a target group of development measures, like refugees and internally displaced persons. Global governance in the context of displacement is clearly regulated under international law by the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (this lifts the geographical restriction on the concept of refugees, which formerly applied only to Europe) (UNHCR 2010). In addition, regional agreements are in place for the African continent (OAU 1974), Latin America (UNHCR 1984) and Europe (EU DG Migration and Home Affairs 2017). The global framework for migration is less clearly defined. Article 13 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights lays out the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of a state and the right to leave and return to that country (United Nations 1948). This does not, however, cover the right to enter another state, which nation-states regulate individually. Several conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) (ILO 1949, 1975, 2011) and the United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (OHCHR 1990) cover the field of labour migration. The Migrant Workers Convention has been ratified primarily by the states of the global South. Of the countries that are part of the Khartoum Process, only Uganda has signed the Convention. Mention should 6

United Nations (2015) and a collection of essays on the subject: UNFPA (2005). Five other targets also deal with aspects of migration including migrant remittances, migration for education, labour migration for caring professions etc. while three targets aim to eliminate trafficking in persons and smuggling of people (e.g. target 5.2. ‘Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation’).

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also be made of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and two of the Protocols thereto, which provide a framework for addressing trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants (UNODC 2004). As of August 2020, 147 countries had signed the Convention, including all Khartoum Process states with the exception of Somalia and South Sudan. The global migration regime is essentially fairly fragmented. Since 2015, when major refugee and migrant movements exerted pressure on the general public in Europe too, it has become clear that the existing framework for global migration governance (including refugees) is no longer appropriate for this day and age (Betts and Collier 2017). For this reason, the United Nations Secretary-General called the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants in September 2016.8 The summit produced the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (UN 2016), on the basis of which a Global Compact on Refugees and a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration were launched in 2018. In this declaration, which refers to both the Valletta Action Plan and the Khartoum Process, the international community undertakes to strengthen global migration governance, in particular through the Global Compact for Migration.

7.3

Regional Migration Framework for the Horn of Africa

For the implementation of global migration governance, it is necessary to foster cooperation between and among neighbouring states, states along migration routes and within regional communities. Migration cannot be regulated unilaterally by any one state; that is why continental and regional governance frameworks for migration-related issues have been established under the fairly abstract global level. For the Horn of Africa, as well as the African Union’s (AU) Agenda 2063,9 it is primarily the AU’s Migration Policy Framework for Africa (AU 2006a; revised version: AU 2018)10 and the African Common Position on Migration and Development (AU 2006b) that are relevant at continental and African level, as well as the migration-specific provisions of the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (OAU 1969) and the Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children (AU 2006c).11 In addition, for the Horn of Africa, there is the regional organisation 8

More information is available on the summit website http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/summit (Accessed on 25 August 2020). 9 The AU’s Agenda 2063 provides the strategic framework for the socioeconomic transformation of the continent over the next 50 years. It was published in 2013 to mark the 50th anniversary of the founding of the OAU and lays out both a vision and seven aspirations that are intended to be pillars for sustainable development and technical progress on the African continent (cf. AU 2013). 10 The AU (2018) revised policy framework for Africa covers labour migration, border management, irregular migration, displacement, internal displacement, migration data, transnational and regional cooperation, etc. 11 For a more in-depth analysis of regional migration policy on the African continent (not specifically the Horn of Africa), see Fioramonti/Nshimbi (2016).

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IGAD which, has defined its own specific framework for migration issues, making it the first African regional organisation with a regional migration-policy framework (IGAD 2012: 5). In addition to a clear link to the African continental framework laid out by the AU (and thus alignment with the same thematic priorities), the IGAD migration policy framework comprises a separate chapter on migration and development, which addresses the loss of highly qualified individuals, known colloquially as the ‘brain drain’, and the question of migrant remittances, as well as dual citizenship and transnationalism.12 The following priority topics are also listed for the region: national and international security and stability; crisis prevention and conflict resolution; migrants’ rights; migration, poverty and conflict; migration, climate change, environment and adaptation; migration and gender; migration of vulnerable groups (IGAD 2012: 5). Migration, however, is not generally limited to individual regions – people migrate from one region to another. For the Horn of Africa, for instance, alongside intraregional migration, it is primarily the migration routes to the Gulf states, to South Africa and to Europe that are relevant (Marchand et al. 2017: 25). Although the European perspective is often different, for African states it is clear that the route towards Europe is no more relevant than the other routes (Maru 2015: 1). The Khartoum Process has an official mandate to monitor progress on implementation of the Joint Valletta Action Plan (EU and ICMPD 2016), which covers five priority domains: 1. the development potential offered by migration and addressing the reasons for irregular migration and refugee movements; 2. legal migration and mobility; 3. protection and asylum; 4. preventing and combating irregular migration, the smuggling of migrants and human trafficking; 5. return, readmission and reintegration. These five priority domains provide the framework for cooperation between the EU and African states in the field of migration (AU and EU 2015).13 The BMM project operates within this regional, transregional and global migration governance framework, and has the mandate to improve migration management within this framework. The following section looks at the practical implementation, including the challenges encountered.

12

See e.g. Pries (2011: 8), who defines transnationalism in migration theory as the creation of social spaces through migration above the level of nation states. 13 Information about the urgent need to pursue integrated approaches that go beyond an exclusive focus on security can be found in Vorrath (2017).

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Migration Management in Practical Development Work

7.4.1 Framework Data and Substance of the BMM Project In December 2015, BMM is one of the first projects approved for implementation by the Operational Committee of the Horn of Africa Window of the EUTF, shortly after the Valletta Summit. The EU’s action fiche, on the basis of which the project was planned and prepared, uses the term ‘migration management’ to cover almost all elements that are characteristic of a traditional technical cooperation project (e.g. the goal of strengthening the capacities of the partners and protecting the rights of the target groups). The project pursues the goal of making migration in the region safer, improving migration management, addressing the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, and in particular strengthening the rights of migrants and protecting them from violence, abuse and exploitation. Project activities are divided up into four components: 1. 2. 3. 4.

policy harmonisation; capacity development and training; protection; delivering information and advisory services.

The focus is on the following target groups: migrants, victims of human trafficking, refugees (especially in the context of refugees leaving the first country of asylum and moving on) and the population of the countries covered by the Khartoum Process. The project14 is an advisory project with a strong training and capacity-building focus. It uses capacity development to achieve its goals, developing both human and institutional capacities, and providing infrastructure and equipment to support this. It thrives on direct cooperation, discussion and direct engagement with partner countries and their ministries in order to identify the right and necessary approaches to improve regional migration management. The project addresses the macro level in the policy harmonisation component, offering advisory services on the legal and political framework for harmonised, standardised migration policy, based on human rights. This takes place at the level of the Khartoum Process member states and at inter-state level, to facilitate regional cooperation between the relevant countries. BMM addresses the meso level in all components, working with state and parastate authorities, organisations and civil society, in order to implement migration measures in partner countries. The project refers to the first commissioning phase of BMM (2016–2019) as the definition process of the term ‘development-oriented migration management’ took place during that time. BMM was commissioned for a second phase in 2019.

14

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The project also operates at micro level, in all components, establishing specific protection and support services for migrants and refugees with the support of international organisations like the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and bilateral development organisations like the British Council and Expertise France, and in cooperation with national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The information and advisory services component work almost exclusively with the target group. In initial discussions with the commissioning parties, EU and BMZ, and with the Khartoum Process Steering Committee, it became apparent that the project, as well as pursuing the substantive goals already laid out, would be tasked with developing the Khartoum Process, which is an element of regional migration governance. The member states of the Khartoum Process are confronted with specific issues by the project, for which they are required to elaborate politically and legally sound answers, so as to cope with the large-scale mixed refugee and migrant movements in the region. Because international migration per se at very least has a transnational or regional dimension, the pertinent potentials and challenges must be addressed as a cooperative effort of the countries involved at all levels (IOM and FOM 2004: 16). Particularly in a region in which not all countries affected maintain cordial relations with one another, regional organisations such as Djibouti-based IGAD and the AU, which is headquartered in Addis Ababa, play an important role.

7.4.2 Breaking New Ground – Devising and Implementing the Project Only shortly after the decision of the EUTF Operational Committee to implement BMM, it became clear that GIZ would break new grounds with this project. The decision was taken in 2015, at the peak of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’, as hundreds of thousands of asylum-seekers from crisis-affected parts of Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq and other countries sought protection in Europe. The so-called EU-Turkey deal (ECU 2016) had just been finalised and was being widely criticised. Public opinion was polarised and opinions were heated (Das Erste 2016a; Pro Asyl 2016; Jakob 2016; Deutscher Bundestag 2016a, b, c). Against this backdrop, the EU and BMZ decided to implement the BMM project in the Horn of Africa. The decision was quickly compared with the EU-Turkey deal and criticised accordingly. Criticism became even louder regarding an annex to the EU’s action fiche, listing the requests for support lodged by Khartoum Process states – and including requests for sealed interrogation cells, border fortifications and surveillance technology. The list was drawn up at a working group meeting of the Khartoum Process in the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheik in 2014 – long before GIZ was commissioned to implement BMM. The comparison with the EU-Turkey agreement, and the list of equipment requested was to prove a severe trial for the incipient project. In February 2016 a

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group of NGOs organised an event in Berlin to protest against the EU’s migration policy, the Khartoum Process and BMM. Under the banner ‘Aus den Augen aus dem Sinn – Auslagerung und Regionalisierung von Migrationskontrolle und Fluchtbewegungen’ (Out of sight, out of mind – outsourcing and regionalising migration control and refugee movements), some 120 participants came together to discuss Europe’s security-policy interests and the way these are linked to development projects, taking BMM as an example. This high-profile campaign against one of the German development cooperation’s projects was an entirely new experience for all parties – GIZ, BMZ and the EU. Below we will focus on a few key events to illustrate the new ground broken by the project and the lessons learned from this process. BMM in the public eye 14 May 2016 marked an important milestone in the public perception of BMM. On this Saturday an article was published in the German news magazine ‘Der Spiegel’ accusing the German Government of financing the establishment of sealed detention cells in Sudanese refugee camps with the help of BMM (Dahlkamp/Popp 2016). The only evidence given was statements made by a Sudanese official, who claimed that this had been pledged by a German government delegation. The article was picked up on a few days later by the current affairs programme ‘Report Mainz’ of the German public broadcaster ARD. On the programme an expert from a German NGO was highly critical of the EU’s cooperation with African states; she also took BMM as an example (Das Erste 2016b). BMM thus suddenly found itself at the centre of the public and political debate regarding the EU’s Africa and migration policy. Since then, political communication has become an integral part of the project’s work. It was not until November 2016, once the BMM steering committee had accepted the results of the appraisal phase and authorised the commission, that GIZ was able to provide the general public with detailed information about the actual objective and the substance of the project – and conversely about what is not part of the remit of BMM. In internal and external GIZ information and discussion forums, the project team created the transparency called for by the political arena, the media and civil society. By July 2017, 16 questions had been lodged by the parliamentary groups in the German Bundestag on the subject of BMM, and a large number of articles had been published in the press (see, e.g., Boyes 2016; Die Zeit 2016; Kirchner et al. 2016; Schlindwein 2016). An analysis of the media response indicates that reporting on BMM in 2016 led to a more overall critical perception of GIZ in the media. Lessons learned: There are many critics of the EU’s Africa and migration policy as adopted at the Valletta Summit, and its prospects of success are the subject of a heated debate within EU member states. One central criticism is that the EU cooperates with countries like Eritrea and Sudan, which are known to be responsible for perpetrating serious human rights violations, but which nevertheless cannot simply be ignored when we are dealing with migration management in Africa. Experience with BMM demonstrates that projects must be prepared for this sort of criticism and must respond to it. This means seeking close cooperation with

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those responsible at political level and with our commissioning parties. Clear communication regulations and rules of conduct must be laid down, and a proactive, transparent communication policy pursued in the political arena, in dealings with the media, and vis à vis the general public. We must listen to criticism and reflect on it within the scope of target group-specific events and at briefing sessions for the press; and events of this sort must become an integral part of project work. To this end, everybody involved in the project, and the implementing organisations from management to divisional level to communications experts, must be sensitised and brought fully on board. For the staff members of a project, it is indispensable to ascertain precisely what their duties and roles are before taking any action in this highly politically sensitive area. They must reflect on these duties and roles, ensure that they themselves are clear about them, and ascertain in dialogue with line managers and partners that common understanding exists on these points. BMM implementation principles The critical manner in which the project was seen and discussed within civil society and by well-informed members of the general public, particularly with respect to its development orientation, created uncertainty in the project preparation team. There were fears that BMM was to be instrumentalised, hijacked by European domestic policy considerations. Suspicions were voiced that there was a hidden agenda, particularly with respect to cooperation with border management and police institutions in Africa. Media reports and statements issued in particular by representatives of the Sudanese Government, portraying BMM as a measure to supply equipment, including detention cells for refugee camps, reinforced these doubts and self-doubts. Intensive discussions followed within the project team and with representatives of the commissioning parties, BMZ and EU, regarding the role and alignment of the project, and the principles to be used by BMM in implementing measures. The aim was to achieve a viable understanding of BMM’s development logic that could be clearly communicated to all stakeholders and partners in the countries covered by the Khartoum Process. The project preparation team had already drawn up a set of guiding principles for implementation before the controversy flared up. These were adopted by the steering committee and communicated to partners: 1. A holistic understanding of migration management, taking into account regional frameworks and international conventions. 2. A common understanding of the positive impacts of migration on regional development and stability. 3. Implementation of a context- and conflict-sensitive approach in line with the do no harm principle. 4. Compliance with all valid international laws and conventions and with national legislation. 5. Promotion of regional cooperation between partner countries, relevant regional organisations and advisory mechanisms.

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6. Promotion of national ownership on the part of partner countries and of a strong partnership with them. 7. Ensuring and promoting complementarity with other regional initiatives. 8. Promotion of innovative partnerships with civil society organisations. They were then incorporated into the project implementation, making them an integral part of the commission and a basis for drawing up the terms of reference for GIZ and all implementing partners. Lessons learned: Experience gained with the implementation of BMM indicates that it is vital to address risks and concerns in the project team and with commissioning parties and political partners openly and frankly, and to discuss these at the start of work to clarify the commission and devise the project. Project staff, who are very politically exposed need clarity and certainty if they are to perform their difficult and demanding work. Representatives of partner countries also need clarity as to the opportunities and limitations of cooperation within the framework of these projects. The framework must be clearly and securely defined for all stakeholders and must be communicated on an ongoing basis. Fighting human trafficking Is fighting criminal smugglers and human traffickers in the Horn of Africa the responsibility of BMM? Is it the job of development cooperation; and if so, what part can GIZ play and which core competencies can it contribute? These were the questions the project team brought to the first meeting of the steering group, which was mainly comprised of domestic policy and police representatives of the EU and the EU member states involved.15 Following initial discussions in the steering group, in particular once the results of the project appraisal became available, it was clear to all stakeholders that GIZ, with its core competencies in the field of capacity development for partner organisations embracing training and advisory services, was the right organisation to provide long-term advisory services for key actors and institutions including police forces, courts, public prosecutors, border management authorities, and migration authorities and operators of support and care facilities for migrants and refugees, thus improving their work. In the context of BMM, improving their work means making it human rights compliant, enabling them to act in a transparent manner and helping them be effective in the long term. Advising these institutions in the application of human rights and other principles of European development cooperation, also in the identification and prosecution of criminals, is a key area of activity of development cooperation. Lessons learned: Capacity development does not take place in a value-free vacuum. In the context of migration in particular, the protection of human rights (e.g. of migrants, particularly when they find themselves in situations of extreme 15

Only the representatives of EU DG DEVCO, Germany’s BMZ, and a DFID representative represent European development policy. Italy, France and Malta (later the Netherlands replaced Malta in the steering committee) are each represented by representatives of their ministries of foreign affairs and ministries of home affairs, and the EU also has one representative from DG Home.

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vulnerability such as irregular migration) and the violation of human rights (as perpetrated by human traffickers for instance) are often very closely interlinked. Development cooperation, with its methods and instruments, can make a tangible difference here. For development cooperation and the institutions in this sector, however, cooperating with security institutions is not risk-free. They must be prepared to face these risks to prevent them moving into areas where they are no longer able to impose their own definitions or where they run the risk of having to subordinate themselves to an unacceptable degree. Clear guidelines and management principles are needed, which make it easier for staff to identify fields of action and institutions that could exert an adverse influence over development cooperation or even try to instrumentalise it. Between the ROCK16 and a hard place At the very first meeting of the steering committee in February 2016, representatives of France proposed financing one or two training centres for the police force and border management forces in Khartoum and Cairo via BMM. It transpired that concepts already existed for these training centres, and that the French side had been seeking a way of supporting them for some time. The BMM steering committee was initially cautious and postponed a decision on the financing of these centres until the results of the project appraisal phase were available. When the appraisal design was discussed and adopted, GIZ was commissioned to include ROCK in the appraisal without any prejudice to the outcome. During the appraisal in Sudan it rapidly became clear that ROCK was not intended to be only a training centre but that the centre was also to house an extensive system of data and information sharing on refugees and migrants among the states in the Horn of Africa. To support this data sharing, high-ranking seconded police officers from African and European partner countries were to work at ROCK, whose mandate would go well beyond the implementation of a development project. The possibility of some national intelligence agencies being involved could not be discounted. The project appraisal team recommended that ROCK should not be financed or supported by BMM. GIZ submitted four main arguments to the steering committee: 1. In talks with the governments of other Khartoum Process states it was stated on several occasions that these governments (e.g. Kenya and Ethiopia) would not send their security forces to Khartoum for training. ROCK would therefore not be able to meet the terms of its training mandate without restrictions. 2. The sum proposed to finance ROCK would have accounted for a significant percentage of the entire project budget, meaning that the other planned project measures would have had to be scaled back considerably. 3. In the course of the appraisal phase, it was confirmed that at ROCK data was to be shared and compared by the security services of the Khartoum Process states, which would have posed a clear risk to the implementation of the entire project. 16

Regional Operational Centre in support of the Khartoum Process and AU-Horn of Africa Initiative (ROCK).

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BMM would not have been able to ensure human rights compliant use of data or prevent any misuse or abuse of data within the framework of its implementation principles. The project would not then have complied with the human rights standards of German development cooperation. 4. The critical perception of the work of BMM in Sudan would be further aggravated by the choice of Khartoum as a location, and by the potential for the misuse of ROCK which in GIZ’s view could not be adequately controlled. The political risk thus entailed would damage the work of BMM as a whole in the long term. The steering committee discussed the arguments intensively and critically. The final decision that ROCK would not be implemented within the scope of BMM for the above reasons was taken in July 2016 at the Khartoum Process meeting in Rome. Lessons learned: The discussion of the role of BMM in establishing and managing ROCK made it plain that with BMM and similar migration management projects, development cooperation is moving into an area that is neither transparent nor controllable, involving the security apparatus with police forces, intelligence agencies, possibly also the military and the concomitant political and economic interests of international stakeholders. Unlike international cooperation where the commission and mandate of GIZ is clearly defined, this is an area that GIZ cannot influence at all and where the commissioning parties themselves have very limited options for exerting influence, far less exerting a control function to ensure compliance with human rights principles on the part of security forces (e.g. during border controls and in dealings with (irregular) migrants). In the case of ROCK and BMM, this already non-transparent situation is compounded by the fact that the project cooperates with partner countries like Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and others that are not ruled in line with democratic principles. In situations like this, there is a huge risk that the project will be hijacked to serve the impenetrable interests of specific actors. When deciding to engage in these areas, our decisions must be guided by the instruments available to GIZ and its commissioning parties to influence the risk (e.g. implementation agreements, framework agreements and government arrangements on development cooperation). Information and advice17 Initially, this component appeared to be relatively easy to shape in comparison to the three other components. It involves devising information services for refugees in host countries, migrants, and the local population who could potentially become migrants, and providing this information material via partners. The aim should be to enable people to make a more informed decision for or against migration. The expectations regarding the content matter, however, varied enormously within The term ‘awareness raising’ in the context of migration often implies disincentives and information about the risks involved in migration; the term ‘information and advice’ is more neutral and endeavours to avoid this sort of slant. 17

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partner countries and within the steering committee. The term ‘information’ is used here to mean ‘articulated policy’. From communicating deterrents to putting the so-called ‘pull factors’ in the right light,18 all stakeholders wanted precisely their own messages to be conveyed to the target group by BMM, always with the goal of deterring people from leaving their homes and thus reducing migration, particularly migration to Europe. This was clearly in contradiction to the overall direction of BMM. The project team was able to convince the steering committee to adopt the following solutions: rather than communicating deterrents and disincentives, the actual situation in the relevant countries in the region in terms of income, employment, education and residence options would be communicated. Options for legal migration were also to be communicated, since the only real alternative to irregular migration movements is to expand the options for legal migration. The options vary from one BMM state to another, and a great deal of effort is often needed to identify them. Lessons learned: In order to identify the alternatives to migration and package these in an appropriate form it is important to refer to specific support programmes run by the partner countries involved and the donor community. Economic promotion programmes and upgrading measures that are also open to refugees and migrants must be incorporated into the design of information and advisory services. For many migrants themselves, but also for critics of European migration policy, the range of services can only be fully rounded off when there are realistic channels for legal migration – not only to Europe but also to other regions of choice and within Africa (BMM’s policy harmonisation component addresses the issue of creating legal migration channels). The quality of information and advisory services for refugees and migrants improves with the number of migration options available and with the chance of communicating specific credible legal migration options.

7.5

Conclusion

The experiences gained with the BMM project laid out here give an insight into the risks and challenges for German development cooperation in the field of migration management, but also point to the potentials. The risks for development cooperation engagement in this context must be clearly identified and specified so that a response can be formulated appropriately. If the general public is not fully informed in due time, there is a risk that uncertainty will take hold within civil society and on the political spectrum in Germany. What we plan to do, with which partners, and to what end must be made quite clear.

18

According to the Eritrean Government the welcome given by Germany to migrants in the summer of 2015 was one such ‘pull factor’.

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Human trafficking and smuggling of migrants are dominated by criminal networks. These are not transparent or to be influenced by development cooperation – but alongside state and civil society structures, they are crucially important actors in the migration management context. It is not easy to recognise or to address the possible involvement in these criminal networks of government representatives from countries in which development cooperation engages in migration management. Development interventions can exert little influence over the way partner countries act in security-sensitive areas, in particular where other less traditional actors in the development context are involved, including police forces, border management forces, etc. From a development cooperation stance, we must ask whether the classical development activities laid out above can in any way bring about the results desired by development cooperation, or whether an engagement in this area will do no more than scratch the surface. This is a risk for the implementation of projects of this sort, especially as regards achieving the development objective. At the end of the day, development cooperation must be particularly alert and clearly focus on its principles and refuse to depart from these, in order to avoid any form of instrumentalisation on the part of other political interests – both on the part of the EU and on the part of other implementation partners and partner governments in the countries affected. This means that there are certain limitations to development cooperation engagement in the field of migration management, which must be identified in the complicated discussion of political coherence in the field of migration. From the point of view of development cooperation, clear development principles must be pursued as laid out in the implementation principles of BMM. The role of development cooperation is thus to be found within the predefined limits and is based primarily on the enormous development potential that migration offers for all stakeholders. This development potential can only be leveraged with the help of robust institutions, which respect human rights, and accept the challenge of protecting migrants and refugees just as they accept the challenge of addressing the criminal networks of human traffickers and smugglers of migrants. This is where development cooperation has a natural starting point. For this reason, classic development tasks like policy advisory services, capacity development at individual, institutional and organisational level, and the promotion of dialogue are vitally important in this area. Against this background, an attempt can be made to define development-oriented migration management: Development-oriented migration management aims to foster the development potential offered by migration for the countries and individuals affected by addressing the risks involved in unregulated and irregular migration. It pursues a balanced approach with a clear focus on human rights standards and on enhancing the protection of the rights of migrants. Development-oriented migration management is facilitated by classic development cooperation approaches, including strengthening the capacities of partners and partner institutions, offering policy advisory services and promoting dialogue between different ministries and

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countries, but also between civil society and governments. The overarching goal in every instance is to improve the living conditions of the people on the ground, whether they are the local population, (potential) migrants or returnees. In order to pursue successful development-oriented migration management as a development cooperation organisation, we must pay special attention to three principles: 1. The project staff involved are working in a highly political, conflictual and very exposed environment. Proactive political communication, close cooperation with those responsible at a political level and a high level of sensitivity on the part of all project stakeholders are indispensable. 2. Cooperation with civilian security forces is unavoidable in the field of migration management. As the civilian security apparatus is often non-transparent and cannot be controlled by the development cooperation organisations, protective and security mechanisms must be in place to ensure that the development cooperation organisation can continue to act and make decisions, and to protect it from undue influence and from being instrumentalised. 3. Migration management goes far beyond border management. As well as making legal migration possible, migration management has a clear mandate to protect victims of human trafficking and other vulnerable groups in need of protection. Experience gained with BMM indicates the scale of the challenges involved – but it also confirms the opportunities offered by development-oriented migration management for partners, for development cooperation organisations, and for migrants and refugees.

References Angenendt, Steffen, and David Kipp. 2017. ‘Better Migration Management’. A Good Approach to Cooperating with Countries of Origin and Transit? Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2017C33_adt_kpp.pdf. Accessed 27 August 2020. Angenendt, Steffen, and Anne Koch. 2017. ‘Global Migration Governance’ im Zeitalter gemischter Wanderungen. Folgerungen für eine entwicklungsorientierte Migrationspolitik. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/ products/studien/2017S08_adt_koh.pdf. Accessed 27 August 2020. AU. 2006a. Migration Policy Framework for Africa. Addis Ababa: African Union. http://www. unhcr.org/protection/migration/4d5258ab9/african-union-migration-policy-framework-africa. html. Accessed 26 August 2020. AU. 2006b. African Common Position on Migration and Development. Addis Ababa: African Union. http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/cap_migrationanddev_2006.pdf. Accessed 25 August 2020. AU. 2006c. Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children. Addis Ababa: African Union. https://www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/ newsevents/workingdocuments/28041-wd-ouagadougou_action_plan_-_english.pdf. Accessed 25 August 2020.

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AU. 2013. Agenda 2063. Addis Ababa: African Union. https://au.int/en/documents/20141012/keydocuments-agenda2063. Accessed 26 August 2020. AU. 2018. Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action. 2018–2030. Addis Ababa: African Union. https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/35956-doc-2018_mpfa_english_ version.pdf. Accessed 27 August 2020. AU, and EU. 2015. The Africa-EU Partnership. 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration. https://africaeu-partnership.org/en/stay-informed/news/2015-valletta-summit-migration. Accessed 25 August 2020. Baraulina, Tatjana, Michael Bommes, Tanja El-Cherkeh, Heike Daume, and Florin Vadean. 2007. Egyptian, Afghan and Serbian Diaspora Communities in Germany: How Do They Contribute to Their Country of Origin? Hamburg: Hamburgisches Weltwirtschaftsinstitut. https://www. hwwi.org/publikationen/research-paper/publikationen-einzelansicht/holprige-erholung-derdeutschen-wirtschaft/egyptian-afghan-and-serbian-diaspora-communities-in-germany-how-dothey-contribute-to-their-country-of-origin.html?no_cache=1. Accessed 25 August 2020. Betts, Alexander, and Paul Collier. 2017. Refuge – Transforming a Broken Refugee System. Great Britain: Allen Lane. Boyes, Roger. 2016. Supping with the devil won’t solve the migrant crisis, The Times, 18 May. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/354a6e9e-1c60-11e6-bf22-78061c6f2b5c. Accessed 27 August 2020. Dahlkamp, Jürgen, and Maximilian Popp. 2016. Pakt mit Despoten, Der Spiegel, 18 May. http:// www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-144788048.html. Accessed 27 August 2020. Das Erste. 2016a. Konkretes Projekt zum “Migrationsmanagement” bestätigt MONITOR-Recherchen: EU-Kommission setzt auf Stärkung von Polizei und Grenzbeamten in afrikanischen Staaten. Monitor, 22 April. http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/extras/ monitorpresse-afrika-100.html. Accessed 28 June 2020. Das Erste. 2016b. Flüchtlingsdeal mit Despoten. Report Mainz, 17 May. https://www.swr.de/ report/fluechtlingsdeal-mit-despoten-deutsche-entwicklungshilfeorganisation-giz-koordiniertumstrittenes-grenzschutzprojekt/-/id=233454/did=17450240/nid=233454/e3lx15/index.html. Accessed 28 June 2020. Deutscher Bundestag. 2016a. German Government’s response to a question put by Uwe Kekeritz, Claudia Roth (Augsburg), Luise Amtsberg, other members of the German Bundestag and the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen parliamentary group in the German Bundestag, EU-Migrations- und Grenzmanagement in Afrika, Drucksache 18/8928, 23 June. http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/ 18/089/1808928.pdf. Accessed 28 June 2020. Deutscher Bundestag. 2016b. German Government’s response to a question put by Niema Movassat, Annette Groth, Heike Hänsel, other members of the German Bundestag and DIE LINKE parliamentary group in the German Bundestag. Drucksache 18/8384, 10 May. http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/083/1808384.pdf. Accessed 28 June 2020. Deutscher Bundestag. 2016c. German Government’s response to a question put by Niema Movassat, Heike Hänsel, Wolfgang Gehrcke, other members of the German Bundestag and DIE LINKE parliamentary group in the German Bundestag. Drucksache 18/9246, 20 July. http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/092/1809246.pdf. Accessed 28 June 2020. Die Zeit. 2016. GIZ hilft Diktatoren in Afrika beim Grenzschutz. 14 May. http://www.zeit.de/ politik/ausland/2016-05/fluechtlinge-giz-grenzschutz-afrika. Accessed 28 June 2020. EC. 2016. Implementing the EU-Turkey Agreement – Questions and Answers. Brussels: European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/it/MEMO_16_1494. Accessed 15 August 2020. EU DG Migration and Home Affairs. 2017. Common European Asylum System. Brussels: European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en. Accessed 28 June 2020. EU, and ICMPD. 2016. EU/Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative – Khartoum Process. Brussels: European Commission. https://www.khartoumprocess.net/about/the-khartoumprocess. Accessed 28 June 2020.

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Fioramonti, Lorenzo, and Chris Nshimbi. 2016. Regional Migration Governance in the Africant Continent. Current State of Affairs and the Way Forward. Bonn: Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden. https://www.sef-bonn.org/fileadmin/SEF-Dateiliste/04_Publikationen/Weitere_ Publikationen/Sonderpublikationen/sb_studie-2016_en.pdf. Accessed 26 August 2020. GIZ. 2013. Migrationspolitik – Orientierung für die Praxis. Bonn und Eschborn: GIZ. https:// www.cimonline.de/static/media/giz2013-de-handreichung-migrationspolitik.pdf. Accessed 27 August 2020. IDMC. 2020. Global Report on Internal Displacement – Sub-Saharan Africa. Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2020IDMC-GRID.pdf. Accessed 27 August 2020. IGAD. 2012. IGAD Regional Migration Policy Framework. Addis Ababa: Inter-Governmental Authority on Development. http://migration.igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/RegionalMigration-Policy-Framework1.pdf. Accessed 28 June 2020. ILO. 1949. Migration for Employment Convention (No. 97). Geneva: International Labour Organisation. http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100: P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312242:NO. Accessed 28 June 2020. ILO. 1975. Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provision) Convention (No. 143). Geneva: International Labour Organization http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB: 12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312288:NO. Accessed 28 June 2020. ILO. 2011. Domestic Workers Convention (No. 189). Geneva: International Labour Organization. http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_ INSTRUMENT_ID:2551460:NO. Accessed 28 June 2020. IOM, and FOM. 2004. The Berne Initiative. International Agenda for Migration Management. Common understandings and effective practices for a planned, balanced, and comprehensive approach to the management of migration. Berne: International Organisation for Migration and Federal Office for Migration. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iamm.pdf. Accessed 27 August 220. Jakob, Christian. 2016. Europäische Migrationspolitik in Afrika. Stillgestanden, Flüchtling! Kehrt um! Tageszeitung, 15 December. http://www.taz.de/!5367014/. Accessed 28 June 2020. Kirchner, Thomas, Moritz Matzner, and Isabel Pfaff. 2016. Europa verschiebt seine Außengrenzen nach Afrika. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 30 December. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ migrationspolitik-wie-europa-fluechtlinge-in-afrika-aufhalten-will-1.3314104. Accessed 28 June 2020. Marchand, Katrin, Inez Roosen, Julia Reinold, and Melissa Siegel. 2017. Irregular Migration from and in the East and Horn of Africa. Maastricht: Maastricht Graduate School of Governance. Maru, Mehari Taddele. 2015. Das Valletta-Dilemma. Warum afrikanische Migrations-Governance im Mittelpunkt stehen sollte. Bonn: Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden. https://www.sef-bonn. org/fileadmin/SEF-Dateiliste/04_Publikationen/GG-Spotlight/2015/ggs_2015-08_en.pdf. Accessed 27 August 2020. OAU. 1969. OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa. Addis Ababa: Organisation of African Unity. http://www.unhcr.org/about-us/background/45dc1a682/ oau-convention-governing-specific-aspects-refugee-problems-africa-adopted.html. Accessed 28 June 2020. OHCHR. 1990. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Geneva: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CMW.aspx. Accessed 28 June 2020. Papademetriou, Demetrios G. 2011. Council Statement from the 6th Plenary Meeting of the Transatlantic Council on Migration: The Governance of International Migration. Defining the Potential for Reform in the Next Decade. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. Pries, Ludger. 2011. Transnationalisierung der sozialen Welt als Herausforderung und Chance. In Transnationalismus & Migration. Dossier, Ed. Heinrich Böll-Stiftung, 8–18. Berlin: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. https://heimatkunde.boell.de/sites/default/files/dossier_transnatio nalismus_und_migration.pdf. Accessed 27 August 2020.

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Pro Asyl. 2016. Deals mit Despoten: Wie Europa seine Werte opfert, um Fluchtbewegungen zu verringern. Frankfurt: Pro Asyl. https://www.proasyl.de/news/deals-mit-despoten-wie-europaseine-werte-opfert-um-fluchtbewegungen-zu-verringern/. Accessed 28 June 2020. Schlindwein, Simone. 2016. Europas neuer Umriss. Tageszeitung, 22 October. http://www.taz.de/! 5347547/. Accessed 28 June 2020. UN. 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. New York: United Nations. http://www. ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/ger.pdf. Accessed 28 June 2020. UN. 2015. Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 2015. New York: United Nations. http:// www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. Accessed 28 June 2020. UN. 2016. New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. New York: United Nations. http:// www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/71/1. Accessed 25 August 2020. UNFPA. 2005. International Migration and the Millennium Development Goals, Selected Papers of the UNFPA Expert Group Meeting. New York: United Nations Population Fund. http:// www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdf/migration_report_2005.pdf. Accessed 28 June 2020. UNHCR. 1984. Cartagena Declaration on Refugees. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. http://www.unhcr.org/about-us/background/45dc19084/cartagena-declarationrefugees-adopted-colloquium-international-protection.html. Accessed 28 June 2020. UNHCR. 2010. Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/ 3b66c2aa10.pdf. Accessed 27 August 2020. UNHCR. 2020. Global Trends. Forced Displacement in 2019. Geneva: United Nations Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/5ee200e37.pdf. Accessed 15 August 2020. UNODC. 2004. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/. Accessed 26 August 2020. Vorrath, Judith. 2017. Containing Illicit Flows at African Borders. Pitfalls for Europe. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/containingillicit-flows-at-african-borders/. Accessed 27 August 2020.

Martin Weiß is the Country Director for Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH for South Africa, Lesotho and eSwatini. Before that he headed GIZ’s Supraregional and Horn of Africa Division, which is implementing the Better Migration Management (BMM) project. Martin Weiß managed preparations for the project and represented GIZ on the BMM Steering Committee. Stephanie Deubler is Senior Planning Officer on forced displacement and migration at GIZ’s sectoral department. She was a member of the first appraisal mission for the Better Migration Management (BMM) project, in which she was responsible for planning the information and advisory services component.

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Reconsidering the Partnership Approach in International Migration Cooperation Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Kate Hooper

Abstract

In the last few years, the importance of cooperating on issues of migration has become ever more apparent. The 2015–16 migration crisis in Europe and successive surges in irregular migration at the US–Mexico border since 2014 have illustrated the limitations of acting unilaterally and demonstrated the role that cooperation can play in managing migration more effectively. As a result, governments in Europe and North America have invested significant resources and political capital in their relationships with key countries of origin and transit. But an initial review suggests that while recent partnerships on migration are distinguished by their scope and ambition, they raise similar questions to their predecessors: namely, how effective they are in achieving their goals and whether they constitute true ‘partnerships’ in the proper sense of the term.

8.1

Introduction

Since the early 2000s, the ‘partnership approach’ has entered the lexicon of international migration governance as a way to pursue deeper – and crucially, more equal – cooperation on migration between destination and origin or transit countries (Newland 2011; Weinar 2011).1 This approach centres on the view that under the right conditions, destination and origin or transit countries can form partnerships

1

International discussions about migration started in the late 1990s; it was in the early 2000s, however, that several different high-level consultations were established to address the governance of international migration and other migration-related issues.

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that enable them to share responsibilities (and objectives) on migration in a way that can be mutually beneficial (Lavenex/Panizzon 2013: 4; Papademetriou/Fernandez de Castro 2001).2 Many countries have long recognized the value of cooperating on issues of migration. And even countries that view migration as a sovereign prerogative, such as the United States (US), Australia, Canada, and many others, recognize the limitations of acting unilaterally, particularly during times of crisis. For example, closing a border can divert, rather than stop, migration flows, pushing people to undertake more circuitous (and often, more dangerous) routes to reach their destination. Cooperation with other countries on migration management can attenuate some of these risks, in part by offering new opportunities to achieve some of their migration-related objectives. At the bilateral level, cooperation on migration management issues (such as visa facilitation, recruitment of labour migrants, or returns) in Europe dates back many decades (cf. Coleman 2009), while multilateral efforts date back only to the early 2000s. In the Western Hemisphere, for example, the US has developed mostly informal relationships with Mexico and, in the last few decades, some other countries. The US–Mexico relationship on migration spans the twentieth century – and in some instances, this cooperation even dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century. In the European context, while countries had long cultivated close bilateral relationships on migration and readmissions,3 the partnership approach formally became part of European Union (EU) policy in the 2005 Global Approach to Migration, which called for the EU to work with non-EU countries on tackling irregular migration (including returns), opening up legal migration opportunities, and investing in understanding better how migration can become a driver for development (Council of the European Union 2005). It was the 2015–16 migration crisis in Europe, however, that sparked a renewed interest in the role of partnerships in managing migration – not least because those chaotic events illustrated once more the importance of borders and the value of investing in relationships with key transit countries. As a result, over the past five years, European policymakers have dedicated unprecedented resources to build partnerships on migration with countries located along key migration routes to Europe. The most high-profile example is the EU-Turkey Statement, signed in March 2016, which was intended to curb irregular maritime migration flows from Turkey to Greece. And there are other examples. They include the EU’s migration partnership framework launched in 2017 with Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal, as well as a web of bilateral arrangements with key North and West African countries pursued by Germany, Italy, France, Spain and others. Lavenex/Panizzon (2013) define the partnership approach as “the belief that migration can be addressed in a spirit of cooperation between all affected countries… [and] that such ‘mutual benefits’ can be achieved on the basis of a shared responsibility for migration management, based on trust, dialogue, capacity building and technical cooperation.” 3 In Europe, bilateral readmission agreements date back to the post-World War II period but in many instances, go back to the inter-war period and even the turn of the twentieth century. 2

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These partnerships are distinguished both by their scope and ambition, reflecting a more determined effort by destination countries to manage migration in a broader and more collaborative way with key countries in their neighbourhood. However, the same questions that earlier partnerships had raised remain mostly unanswered, namely how effective these partnerships are in achieving their goals and whether these are in fact ‘partnerships’ in the proper sense of the term. A preliminary assessment suggests that despite the increase in available resources, the results of these partnerships are mixed: some have produced concrete results (such as a reduction in irregular migration), while others are not really implemented. One thing, however, is clear: there remains a real gap between rhetoric and practice in the partnership approach. Partnerships remain transactional and deeply asymmetrical – designed, steered and funded by destination countries, and (unsurprisingly) focusing on destination-country priorities, such as cooperation on controlling onward irregular migration and returns with little attention paid to origin or transit-country priorities such as expanding legal migration opportunities and deeper investments on issues that matter to them. This chapter examines the development of the partnership approach in international migration cooperation, exploring how the negotiating strategies and goals have evolved over time. It discusses the strengths and limitations of more recent approaches, drawing on examples from the European neighbourhood and North and Central America, and distils lessons for future partnerships.

8.2

How Have the Negotiating Strategies and Goals of Migration Partnerships Changed Over Time?

Partnerships with key origin or transit countries have long been a part of destination countries’ strategy to manage migration. Over the years, destination countries have developed close working relationships with certain countries in their immediate neighbourhood on migration-related issues, particularly those with whom they may have a shared history, share a common land or sea border, and/or are located on a popular migration route (examples include the US and Mexico, Spain and Morocco, or Italy and Libya or Tunisia.). Bilateral partnerships on migration-related issues in Europe have ranged from readmission agreements (the earliest of which date back to the nineteenth century (for a discussion of this history, cf. Coleman 2009)), to bilateral labour agreements between destination and origin countries (such as the guestworker agreements with Southern European countries and Turkey popularized in the 1950s and 1960s), to collaboration on managing shared borders (such as Germany’s agreement with Poland in the 1990s, where Poland would enforce its border with Germany in exchange for German support for Poland’s bid for EU membership). Spain and Morocco, Italy and Libya and Tunisia, and the US and Mexico all offer examples of countries that share a common land or sea border and, in most instances, have developed a close working relationship to better manage migration flows. Today,

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these relationships often touch on an array of different migration-related issues, including cooperation on security (see, for example, the post-9/11 US–Mexico relationship) and border protection. These relationships typically focus on financial and technical support to build enforcement capacity, joint patrols and sharing intelligence on most matters; cooperation on carrying out forced and voluntary returns; and often, opening up legal migration pathways, whether through labour agreements or liberalizing visa requirements. For Europe, the intensification of attention to these issues follows the 2015–16 migration crisis. Germany, for example, spearheaded negotiations with Turkey in the run-up to the EU-Turkey Statement, entered into agreements with Egypt, Afghanistan and Tunisia, among others, and stepped up its financial support for Africa (e.g. through its Marshall Plan for Africa and contributing to the EU Trust Fund for Africa and support for UN agencies). Italy meanwhile has led efforts to stem migration via the Central Mediterranean route through its controversial agreement with the UN-backed Libyan government. The EU has made cooperation on migration a priority since the early 2000s, building on a long history of bilateral partnerships undertaken by its Member States with key origin or transit countries in the European neighbourhood. Following the 2005 Global Approach to Migration, the EU launched Mobility Partnerships in 2007 that subsequently were signed with Cape Verde, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus.4 These partnerships combined cooperation on tackling irregular migration and returns with (some) expansion of labour migration opportunities in Europe (Gracía Andrade et al. 2015).5 But as migration has crept up the foreign policy agenda, the EU’s agenda for partnerships has become much more ambitious – though not much more successful. While the more recent partnerships still focus primarily on migration management, more resources are being devoted to the crucial question of how to expand opportunities at or closer to home for migrants (and therefore, create alternatives to these dangerous journeys). This is illustrated by the much deeper involvement of development and humanitarian actors, who are providing a large share of the resources mobilized as part of these new partnerships. For example, the EU’s Migration Partnership Framework, unveiled in 2016, draws much of its funding for investments from the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, whose budget has primarily drawn from European development funds (EC 2020a), while €2.4 billion of the funds committed under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey is humanitarian assistance (EC 2020b). There is also an emerging appreciation of the need to engage the private sector more fully, with efforts to foster greater private-sector investment including the EU’s European External Investment Plan and Germany’s ‘Marshall Plan’ for Africa. 4

The European Commission (EC) signed Mobility Partnerships with Cape Verde and Moldova in 2008, Georgia in 2009, Armenia in 2011, Morocco and Azerbaijan in 2013, Tunisia and Jordan in 2014 and Belarus in 2016. 5 The limited evaluations of Mobility Partnerships suggest less progress has been made on the latter point.

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And just as national policymakers have done, EU policymakers are also looking beyond the ‘usual suspects’ in North Africa and Eastern Europe to explore cooperation with new priority countries in sub-Saharan Africa and have increased substantially funds for implementing these partnerships. For example, the EU’s Migration Partnership Framework focused on Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal, while in 2018 the EU called for its legal migration pilot projects to target Ethiopia, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and The Gambia (ICMPD 2018). But in practice, the latter initiative has focused mostly on the ‘usual suspects’ in North Africa. These changes are clearly the result of shifting attitudes to migration, such as a growing focus on migration management; they are also a product of the crisis mode that European and North American policymakers have been in for the past few years, as spikes in irregular arrivals tend to prompt a renewed interest in migration partnerships. Over the years, examples include cooperation between Spain and Mauritania and Senegal in the mid-2000s to tackle rising maritime migration to Spain, or much greater US–Mexico cooperation following the 2014 surge in Central American families and unaccompanied children crossing their shared border – and even more so following the surges of 2018/2019, which expanded cooperation with the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (Papademetriou 2020; Chishti/Bolter 2020). But the scale of the unprecedented migration crisis in Europe created a much greater sense of urgency around these issues that now colours these negotiations (Papademetriou and Katsiaficas, forthcoming), and ultimately provided the impetus for the negotiation of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration in 2018. These trends reveal several lessons: • Looking beyond the ‘usual suspects’ with whom to partner. Destination countries are looking beyond the countries they share a common border with and are pursuing partnerships with origin or transit countries that are key stops on popular migration routes. This reflects a realization that destination countries cannot afford to wait until people are on their doorstep – that managing flows effectively requires working with countries that are ‘further downstream’ on these routes. The US decision to work closely both with Mexico and the three Northern Triangle countries illustrates this logic. • Broadening the scope of partnerships. The partnerships embarked on in recent years have been wide-ranging, bringing in different components of migration management. For example, the EU-Turkey Statement covered border enforcement, returns, and the drivers of irregular migration: it included provisions to enforce Turkey’s borders and curb irregular migration flows, return unauthorized arrivals from Greece to Turkey, and assistance for Syrian refugees in the form of additional resettlement places and support for education and livelihoods. This reflects a growing recognition that policymakers can no longer afford to address one small aspect of migration management in isolation – and that to engage partner countries, they will need to address their priorities too. At the international level, the need for collective action on migration led to the creation of the

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Global Compact for Migration, which for the first time set out a (non-binding) blueprint for facilitating mobility while minimizing its risks, including principles for pursuing effective partnerships (Papademetriou et al., forthcoming). • Allocating more resources to these partnerships. As migration has become a priority area in the foreign policy agenda, policymakers are allocating many more – and varied – resources to undergird these partnerships. Alongside traditional migration management funds and tools, these also draw on development, humanitarian, neighbourhood, foreign policy and trade resources. Consequently, some of the recent partnerships launched by the EU have involved much higher sums: for example, the EU-Turkey Statement provided for Turkey to eventually receive up to €6 billion in (mostly repackaged) EU funds, while the EU Migration Partnership Framework and other partnerships with priority countries in North Africa (such as Libya) draw on the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, which had €4.7 billion in EU and Member State funds as of the end of 2019 (EC 2020a). • Working across government on these partnerships. The concerns of migration management actors usually lead these migration partnerships – but the renewed focus on addressing the drivers of migration, coupled with the need to mobilize far greater resources to move the needle on this issue, has resulted in a much deeper engagement with foreign policy and development actors. However, efforts to engage trade actors in these efforts have produced fewer results to date. Policymakers are also thinking about how to engage employers and civil society actors, along with the diaspora, all of whom are crucial to effectively implement these agreements. The use of this expansive circle of actors, however, is only in the early stages of being organically incorporated into the common effort to address these issues.

8.3

What Do Migration Partnerships Need to Succeed?

Despite the political and financial capital poured into recent partnerships, their record remains mixed. Some partnerships have clearly achieved their primary objectives. The EU-Turkey Statement, for example, produced an immediate fall in maritime crossings from Turkey to Greece in 2016, although crossings picked up again in late 2019 and early 2020 as Turkey’s commitment to the terms of the agreement waivered, in part because of the limited progress made on certain components of the agreement (such as visa-free travel for Turkish nationals to the EU) (UNHCR 2020). But others have floundered early on, falling apart at the negotiation stage or never being fully implemented. Many bilateral and EU efforts to boost return rates fall into this latter category. One issue that bedevils these partnerships is the difficulty finding common ground. While destination countries tend to focus on migration management, the issues of controlling borders and removing unauthorized migrants and failed asylum seekers often run counter to the interests of partner countries. Moreover, many

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origin or transit countries may be less focused on migration altogether, particularly when they face broader governance, security, or economic issues. And their migration-related policy goals are very different from those of destination countries, focusing for example on issues such as expanding legal migration opportunities or facilitating the flow of remittances (and channelling them into investments), which can be difficult to reconcile with enforcement issues. As a result, returns can be a sensitive topic for origin countries, for whom remittances are a crucial source of family well-being. Another more fundamental issue is the power asymmetry inherent in these agreements. While the rhetoric surrounding the partnership approach emphasizes cooperation between equal partners, destination countries both select the would-be partners and provide the funds – and as a result set the priorities and conditions for cooperation, leaving their ‘partners’ with little influence (Axiotis/Bonin 2017). Successful partnerships thus need to do a lot of difficult things well. From the perspective of origin or transit countries, destination countries need to appreciate better the predicaments they face and be prepared to assist them. This includes capacity issues – in terms of weak government institutions and rule of law, corruption, and often tenuous control over ethnically or religiously diverse regions – and the trade-offs of cooperation, including the livelihoods ‘hit’ that families with migrants abroad will take in the form of losing the lifeline that remittances can represent. The question – and the negotiating issue – then becomes what destination countries can put on the table to address these concerns and offset some of their consequences. To avoid creating purely transactional partnerships that often prove impossible to implement successfully, destination countries thus need to address their partners’ concerns in a substantive way. This could include expanded legal migration pathways (which could encompass additional labour migration quotas, new programs or exchanges, visa facilitation, or substantial assistance (including resettlement opportunities for refugee populations that are hosted by the partner country)) or more thoughtful economic development initiatives, particularly those focusing on education and training that can encourage private-sector investment in partner countries to create greater livelihood opportunities. With these principles in mind, and the benefit of experience from past partnerships, it is possible to distil several lessons for destination countries.

8.3.1 Lesson 1: No ‘One-Size-Fits-All’ Approach to Partnership Agreements The 2015–16 migration crisis prompted the EU and its Member States to pursue cooperation with countries at key points along the major migration corridors to Europe. This includes renewed efforts to collaborate with long-time partners, such as Turkey, Morocco, and Tunisia, but also to establish new working relationships with other countries in North and West Africa and the Horn of Africa. The different circumstances in each of these priority countries, however, clearly preclude any ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to cooperation.

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Following the EU–Turkey deal’s swift success in curbing irregular maritime migration from Turkey to Greece in 2016, the conversation quickly shifted to whether a similar deal could be introduced to reduce maritime migration along the Central Mediterranean route to Italy. Candidates included North African countries that were the last stop before reaching Europe: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt (Collett 2017). For example, in 2017, Austria informally proposed a plan with Tunisia where the EU would provide financial support in exchange for the Tunisian coastguard intercepting irregular maritime departures, while France convened a summit with Germany, Italy, Spain, the EC, and Chad, Niger and Libya to discuss cooperation on border management and protection (Samuel 2017). Meanwhile, the EU – led by Italy – continues to invest in building the capacity of Libya’s coastguard to curtail unwanted maritime migration and assist Libyan authorities in controlling Libya’s southern border (Collett 2017; Michael et al. 2019). But while the successes of the EU–Turkey deal and other examples of fruitful collaboration are instructive, they are difficult to replicate elsewhere. The EU– Turkey deal was negotiated between Germany and a middle-income EU–candidate country with strong institutions.6 Not only did the two partners share close political and economic ties, but the EU already provided significant financial support to Turkey (at both the Commission and Member State levels) that could then be repurposed as part of the agreement. Most importantly, Turkey had the institutional capacity and wherewithal to enforce the deal immediately, quickly closing maritime routes and enforcing borders, and agreeing to receive returned migrants, while continuing to host the world’s largest refugee population. And even then, implementing the deal has not been straightforward. While Turkey swiftly stemmed maritime flows, progress on other components of the deal – including returns, reopening Turkey’s EU accession bid, and exploring visa-free travel for Turkish citizens – has been anaemic. Frustration on the Turkish side about the level of EU support for its hosting of Syrian refugees has grown, while Turkey’s authoritarian turn and contentious actions (such as drilling for natural gas and oil in disputed areas) have made European cooperation much more politically fraught. Few of the countries with which the EU and its Member States are now prioritizing cooperation have the same characteristics as Turkey. Libya is the main departure point for migrants seeking to reach Italy, but it is still a failing state: rival governments, deep economic instability, and widespread insecurity and violence severely limits any prospects for successfully sealing borders, let alone a stable and relatively safe environment to which to return migrants. The reports of widespread human rights abuses in Libya’s migrant detention centres illustrate the perils of cooperating with a country where the lines between government, armed militias, and smugglers are so blurred (Michael et al. 2019). While its neighbours are much more stable partners, the limited protection infrastructure in Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia also precludes any serious attempts to intercept and return migrants.

German Chancellor Merkel was the architect of the final deal which was then presented to the other EU Member States pretty much as a fait accompli.

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Meanwhile, prospects for cooperation in Mali or Niger, for example, are constrained by extremely weak government control, particularly in border regions. Destination countries thus need to be realistic about what is possible. Partnerships in the model of the EU–Turkey deal are the exception, not the rule; issues such as a weak or corrupt central government or instability in other priority countries point to a more limited form of cooperation, unless donors are prepared to invest significant resources over the long term to address these broader issues that are far beyond the scope of migration alone. Forming a successful partnership will require both sides to set reasonable expectations, and weigh what support the partner country will need to deliver on these objectives, such as help to increase their commitment to transparency and the rule of law and thus to strengthen their institutions.

8.3.2 Lesson 2: Identify and Foster Shared Goals and Priorities Another crucial component to successful partnerships is identifying shared priorities. Most bilateral and multilateral partnerships on migration are almost by definition deeply asymmetrical, focusing on destination-country priorities. Even when partnerships claim to address the priorities of partner countries (often under the rubric of ‘addressing the root causes of migration’) this quickly falls behind other enforcement-related objectives that reflect the priorities of destination countries. For example, while the EU’s Mobility Partnerships were intended to tackle irregular migration, promote migration management, and open up legal migration opportunities, in practice, these partnerships have focused on the first two priorities, with EU Member States offering few temporary labour migration or visa liberalization opportunities (EC 2007). This was underscored by the making of participation in partnerships conditional on partner countries’ willingness to cooperate on irregular migration and returns (EC 2007; Axiotis/Bonin 2017). In part, this also reflects the formidable challenge of truly ‘addressing’ the systemic drivers of migration (such as poverty, weak governance, or corruption) in one country, let alone several.7 By providing the impetus (and resources) for these partnerships, and choosing who to cooperate with, donor countries by definition set the agenda for cooperation. The result is that for origin or transit countries, such partnerships become less of a vehicle for pursuing shared migration policy priorities than a way to secure the financial assistance that comes from political leverage. Not surprisingly, these asymmetrical agreements tend to yield disappointing results. Italy and Tunisia have cooperated on migration since the 1990s through a series of short-term agreements 7

Alleviating poverty, reducing, dramatically, the incentives for corruption, helping to build transparent institutions, helping set up an independent judiciary that can help the ‘rule of law’ establish roots, having honest and fair elections, etc., are very difficult to help establish and maintain in a single country; trying to do so in several countries is prohibitively expensive and requires extraordinary patience over an extended period of time. As a result, many analysts remain sceptical about efforts to address the root causes of migration.

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focused on the Italian priorities of border control and returns, in exchange for work visa quotas and investments. These agreements were typically implemented poorly – efforts to improve return rates, for example, were not very successful – and their short-term nature created incentives to allow more departures as leverage for renegotiating their terms (Lixi 2017). While in the short term, destination countries can use financial incentives to spur cooperation on enforcement, the costs of securing compliance only rise. As a result, destination country policymakers are moving towards more of a carrot-and-stick approach, by exploring alternative ways to leverage cooperation. One option favoured by some policymakers is negative conditionality, or a ‘less for less’ approach to (non-humanitarian) aid to countries that don’t cooperate. For example, in December 2016, Austria’s then Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz called for the EU to cut development assistance for countries that do not accept the return of their nationals (Brady 2016). However, sanctioning countries in this way is only effective if the assistance amounts are significant and cannot be substituted from other sources (for example, from other donors, or through remittances) (Collett/Ahad 2017). And efforts to leverage this aid must also be balanced against longer-term strategic considerations, as it risks undercutting not only development priorities but also poisons the well for cooperation in other matters of importance to donor countries, such as security cooperation and particularly terrorism. While destination countries can experiment with different incentives and harder policy tools (such as negative conditionality) to compel partner countries to comply, ultimately success lies in fully understanding and incorporating some key priorities of partner countries into these partnerships. Frank dialogue to identify common migration-related priorities is thus critical: Swiss migration partnerships have been praised for providing opportunities for regular dialogue, for example (Siegel et al. 2015). But more broadly, both sides need to commit to cooperate more fully on these issues and prepare to be flexible. For example, sustained progress on migration management in these partnerships is only possible if origin or transit countries also view this as being in their interest and are willing to take concrete steps to be tough on protecting their borders. Meanwhile, destination countries must be prepared to facilitate some of the priorities of partner countries, such as visa liberalization or expanding temporary labour migration opportunities, even if they are domestically unpopular. Partnerships in the true sense of the word imply mutual respect for each other’s priorities (and non-negotiable positions) – and will likely require both sides to commit and deliver on policy positions they and their publics may not always like.

8.3.3 Lesson 3: Invest in Supporting Real Economic Opportunities for People in Partner Countries (or Regions) Addressing the ‘root causes’ of migration is a growing rhetorical focus of recent partnerships, and this has been accompanied by substantial increases in resources to invest in partner countries. This reflects a growing recognition among destination

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countries that to respond effectively to migration challenges they must look beyond enforcement to think much harder about how they can invest in origin or transit countries to attenuate, over time, the conditions that fuel unwanted migration (Papademetriou et al. 2013). The underlying rationale is that strategic investments to address some of the factors that drive migration in these priority regions can gradually change people’s calculus and reduce their incentives to leave. Research suggests that these drivers include (Papademetriou/Hooper 2017): • Economic insecurity, including systemic un- and under-employment (particularly among young people); endemic poverty; and limited access to education or vocational training (particularly among women and girls); • Political instability that results in protracted violence or wider conflict; • Systematic discrimination against ethnic or religious minorities; • Demographic change that can create greater competition for scarce goods and services; • Severe and repeated climate events (such as flooding or drought) or environmental degradation resulting in food insecurity and displacement and, over time, climate change that makes parts of the world uninhabitable. In many of the fragile countries prioritized for assistance, weak government institutions and rule of law, corruption, and often tenuous control over ethnically or religiously diverse regions (among other issues) add to the challenge. European and US policymakers allocate significant resources to address the drivers of migration. In response to the surge in Central American families and unaccompanied children crossing its southern border in 2013 and 2014, the US coupled financial and technical support for Mexico to bolster its enforcement capacity with increases in development assistance to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to address the drivers of migration (Rosenblum 2015; Meyer et al. 2016). This aid has since been leveraged by the Trump Administration to obtain further commitments on curbing unauthorized migration to the US (Papademetriou 2020; Chishti/Bolter 2020; Trotta 2019). Meanwhile, the EU has mobilized resources to respond to migration challenges, for example through its Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, the Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (also known as the Madad Fund) and its Facility for Refugees in Turkey. EU Member States have also stepped up various forms of development assistance to affected countries. Between 2014 and 2017, for instance, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)’s budget increased by a third, with much of this channelled towards special initiatives targeting the ‘root causes’ of migration (Federal Ministry of Finance n.d.).8 And this 8

Overall allocations to the three Special Initiatives to address the root causes of migration, tackle hunger, and promote stability and development in the Middle East and North Africa rose from €159.9 million in 2014 to €685 million in 2017; overall, BMZ’s budget increased from €6.4 billion in 2014 to €8.5 billion in 2017.

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commitment continues. As of 2020, Germany had allocated €1.08 billion towards its special initiatives in its annual budget, and identified displacement and migration as a key theme for its 2030 development strategy (Federal Ministry of Finance 2020; Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2020). Moving the needle on this issue will require massive, long-term investments – with no guarantee of success. Development assistance can take a long time to effect change – and can be mismanaged, particularly in fragile countries with weak institutions and a history of endemic corruption and political instability. Although donors are starting to make more determined investments in these issues, these investments will need to be scaled up significantly and sustained over many years if they are to make a difference. Furthermore, research suggests that in poor countries, as household incomes grow, so too does the level of migration (at least, until they reach a certain level of development); thus, investments in poorer countries at first will likely spur, rather than reduce, migration (Clemens 2020). Results may therefore be disappointing for at least the short to medium term. Policymakers wishing to shift the calculus of would-be migrants and address the migration challenges facing partner countries will thus have to come to terms with the fact that their investments will likely only start producing results far beyond their own political lifecycle but such investments are necessary nonetheless; and in making them, the insights of partner countries – including national and local government actors, civil society, and the private sector – are key to understanding where to direct these investments (cf. Papademetriou/Hooper 2017).

8.3.4 Lesson 4: Evaluate What Works and What Does Not Building on the successes and failures of prior attempts at cooperation – and ensuring that policymakers do not simply reinvent the wheel each time they pursue a new agreement – is critical. Over the past two decades, a dizzying array of different frameworks and processes at the bilateral and multilateral levels to pursue cooperation on migration have sprung up. These range from bilateral agreements on issues such as circular migration or readmission, led by migration management actors, to projects to train and equip properly partner countries’ migration management and control bureaucracies, to efforts to boost the development benefits of migration to broader dialogues or consultative processes on migration led by groups of countries or international organizations. This presents great potential for economies of scale – but also carries a significant risk of repetition and overlap. Yet, even before the 2015–16 migration crisis erupted in Europe, partnerships were criticized for weak evaluation practices. A 2016 European Court of Auditors report criticized the EU’s spending on migration issues in southern Mediterranean and Eastern Partnership countries between 2010 and 2014 for vague objectives and a lack of clear indicators that made it difficult to assess the results of its investments (European Court of Auditors 2016). And although more recent evaluations of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey praised their flexibility and ability to distribute funds quickly, they levelled similar

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criticisms regarding weaknesses in tracking outcomes and value for money (European Court of Auditors 2018a; European Court of Auditors 2018b). Issues of poor evaluation and coordination are typically heightened during a crisis. Policymakers face immense public pressure to demonstrate their ability to manage migration, which can push them towards familiar terrain, including opting for the ‘low-hanging fruit’ (such as high-profile enforcement measures) that can rapidly produce visible results but do not address the drivers of migration. The need to respond rapidly also means that setting out the evaluation criteria and processes are often overlooked. What is needed is to find ways to ensure that these initiatives are designed so they collect contemporaneous data that can be evaluated independently, such as identifying clear outcomes and metrics for success, and can be monitored consistently. Establishing clearing houses of good practices that can offer guidance and insight to enhanced or new initiatives should also become a priority – so that policymakers can access and understand results, and thus select the best options based on the available evidence. In sum, understanding what works and what doesn’t in partnerships is crucial to the future success of cooperation, and it is vital that policymakers put in place clear metrics for success, carry out regular evaluations, and build on this feedback to improve partnerships.

8.4

Conclusion

The challenges posed by irregular migration will continue to prompt policymakers to revisit the role of partnerships in migration management both in terms of protecting borders or returning those without the right to stay, but also as a tool to address the intractable issues that drive people to move in the first place – such as poverty, insecurity, instability, or weak governance and corruption. This includes looking for new partners, broadening the scope of these partnerships, and exploring ways to work across government and with civil society and the private sector on these initiatives. Over the past five years, policymakers in fact have invested unprecedented political and financial capital in negotiating, signing and implementing partnerships with key origin or transit countries as a major component of their migration management strategies. The negotiations to adopt and subsequently implement the Global Compact for Migration are just the latest manifestation of these efforts. But the record on these partnerships remains mixed, with most efforts delivering disappointing outcomes. The basic issue is that it is extremely difficult to reconcile the competing policy priorities of destination and origin or transit countries on migration and avoid the typical asymmetrical – and transactional – partnerships that have defined such partnerships to date. This tension is exacerbated by the pressure policymakers face from their publics to ‘solve’ the crisis yet avoid unpopular policy choices, such as expanding legal migration pathways, in the case of destination countries, or accepting returns of their nationals, in the case of countries of origin. In the months and years ahead, this tension is likely to be dialled up as the

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economic crisis sparked by the COVID-19 pandemic makes publics in destination countries less receptive to expanding legal migration opportunities even as it may push more people in countries of origin to move. Part of the response includes thinking carefully about how to engage key constituencies at home on the merits of cooperation and ensuring that some of the priorities of both sides are incorporated into these partnerships. This includes being prepared to think much harder about how to invest in origin or transit countries over the medium to long term to alleviate the conditions that fuel unwanted migration. Policymakers must also think harder about how they can leverage cooperation, including by looking beyond financial incentives (the costs of which inevitably spiral upward) to consider using additional policy tools such as (non-humanitarian) aid or trade concessions. But more fundamentally, even the best thought-out partnerships will not succeed unless both sides are committed to cooperating on these issues and are willing to be flexible. Successful migration management will require all sides to concede on some issues that may be politically important to them to achieve benefits in the medium-to-longer term. This could, for example, require origin and transit countries to take concrete steps to enforce their borders and accept returns, or require destination countries to deliver on visa liberalization or offer additional labour migration opportunities. Forming lasting partnerships thus requires partners to take seriously each other’s priorities, and to be prepared to commit and deliver on these issues.

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Lixi, Luca. 2017. Beyond Transactional Deals: Building Lasting Partnerships in the Mediterranean. Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/ research/beyond-transactional-deals-building-lasting-migration-partnerships-mediterranean. Accessed 28 August 2020. Meyer, Peter J., Rhoda Margesson, Clare Ribando Seelke, and Maureen Taft-Morales. 2016. Unaccompanied Children from Central America: Foreign Policy Considerations. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43702.pdf. Accessed 28 August 2020. Michael, Maggie, Lori Hinnant, and Renata Brito. 2019. Making misery pay: Libya militias take EU funds for migrants. Associated Press, 30 December. https://apnews.com/ 9d9e8d668ae4b73a336a636a86bdf27f. Accessed 28 August 2020. Newland, Kathleen. 2011. Global Governance: Fear and Desire. In Improving the Governance of International Migration, Eds. Bertelsmann Stiftung and Migration Policy Institute. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. Papademetriou, Demetrios G. 2020. Sovereignty and Deep Bilateral and Regional Cooperation as Two Sides of the Same Coin: Navigating the New Realities in the U.S.-Mexico Relationship to Mutual Advantage. In Mexico and Central America: A Delayed Encounter, Ed. Axel Cabrera. Mexico City: Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales. http://www.consejomexicano. org/multimedia/1588777369-697.pdf. Accessed 28 August 2020. Papademetriou, Demetrios G., and Rafael Fernandez de Castro. 2001. Mexico-US Migration: A Shared Responsibility. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegie.ru/2001/02/14/mexico-u.s.migration-shared-responsibility-pub-623. Accessed 28 August 2020. Papademetriou, Demetrios G., and Kate Hooper. 2017. Building Partnerships to Respond to the Next Decade’s Migration Challenges. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute. https:// www.migrationpolicy.org/research/building-partnerships-respond-next-decades-migrationchallenges. Accessed 28 August 2020. Papademetriou, Demetrios G., Doris Meissner, and Eleanor Sohnen. 2013. Thinking Regionally to Compete Globally: Leveraging Migration & Human Capital in the U.S., Mexico, and Central America. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/ research/thinking-regionally-compete-globally-leveraging-migration-human-capital-us-mexicoand. Accessed 28 August 2020. Papademetriou, Demetrios G., Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan, and Kate Hooper. Forthcoming. Coming Together or Coming Apart? A New Phase of International Cooperation on Migration. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute. Papademetriou, Demetrios G., and Caitlin Katsiaficas. Forthcoming. Beyond Numbers: Europe’s Enduring Migration Crisis. Working Paper. Rosenblum, Marc R. 2015. Unaccompanied Child Migration to the United States: The Tension between Protection and Prevention. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute. http://www. migrationpolicy.org/research/unaccompanied-child-migration-united-states-tension-betweenprotection-and-prevention. Accessed 28 August 2020. Samuel, Henry. 2017. EU leaders offer support to Libyan coastguards, Chad and Niger to stem migrant flow at Paris summit. The Telegraph, 28 August. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 2017/08/28/eu-leaders-offer-support-libyan-coastguards-chad-niger-stem/. Accessed 28 August 2020. Siegel, Melissa, Katrin Marchand, and Elaine McGregor. 2015. Independent Evaluation of Swiss Migration Partnerships: Final report. Barcelona: United Nations University, Migration Network. http://migration.unu.edu/publications/reports/independent-evaluation-of-swiss-migrationpartnerships-final-report.html. Accessed 28 August 2020. Trotta, Daniel. 2019. U.S. restores aid to Central America after reaching migration deals. Reuters, 16 October. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-aid/us-restores-aid-to-centralamerica-after-reaching-migration-deals-idUSKBN1WV2T8. Accessed 28 August 2020.

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Demetrios G. Papademetriou is Distinguished Transatlantic Fellow and Convener of the Transatlantic Council on Migration, a signature initiative of the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) that brings together senior officials and prominent experts to discuss critical migration matters. He co-founded the Washington-based MPI, where he served as President from 2002 to 2014, and founded (2011) and served as President of the Brussels-based MPI Europe until the end of 2017. He is President Emeritus of both institutions. Dr. Papademetriou has published more than 270 books, monographs, articles and research reports on migration and related issues, advises senior government officials, foundations, and civil society organizations in dozens of countries and is co-founder and Chair Emeritus of Metropolis. He also convened the Regional (North American) Migration Study Group from 2011–2014 and has chaired the World Economic Forum’s Migration Council, the OECD’s Migration Group, and the Open Society Foundations’ International Migration Initiative. Kate Hooper is a Policy Analyst with the Migration Policy Institute’s International Program, where she primarily works with the Transatlantic Council on Migration. Her research areas include labor migration, migration and development, and refugee and immigrant integration policies, with a focus on Europe and North America. She holds a master’s degree with honors from the University of Chicago’s Committee on International Relations, and a bachelor of the arts degree in history from the University of Oxford. She also holds a certificate in international political economy from the London School of Economics.

9

Risk, Climate Change and Human Mobility in International Policy Koko Warner

Abstract

This chapter examines observed and potential patterns of migration, displacement, and planned relocation in the context of climate change impacts and risks. International climate change policy has framed human mobility as a risk management issue. The paper reviews the progress of the theme in international climate change policy period between approximately 2010, when Cancún Adaptation Framework paragraph 14(f) introduced human mobility, and 2018 when the Task Force on Displacement delivered its recommendations to the Conference of the Parties (COP) 24. It then examines how issues of climate change and disasters are treated in the Global Compacts on Migration and on Refugees, which also concluded at the end of 2018. The paper highlights some of the ways the work under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change complements the global compacts in preparing countries to manage adverse climate change impacts which may affect people on the move.

9.1

Introduction – Climate Change Policy Aims to Bolster Resilience and Sustainable Development

Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) outlines its ultimate objective as the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system … in order to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner” (UN 1992). Weather and climate change stressors interfere with many of the factors that facilitate a safe, dignified, sustainable life in some areas of the © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-J. Preuß et al. (eds.), Forced Displacement and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32902-0_9

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world. Extreme events, changing weather patterns, glacial melt, coastal inundation, desertification – interact with other factors that affect how well and where people can live (Wrathall et al. 2019) (Fig. 9.1). These stressors contribute to key insecurities in livelihoods, food systems, health, social stability and others that are often considered factors in migration, displacement and planned relocation (Sudmeier-Rieux et al. 2017). The paper highlights some complementarities between climate change policy and the global compacts in preparing countries to manage adverse climate change impacts and large-scale movements of people. To draw out the differences in policy framing – risk management and resilience under climate change policy and national border issues and protection under mainstream migration and refugee policy – the paper will examine international decision texts and documents under the UNFCCC, and how these complement the Global Compacts discussions. Following the introduction, section two examines observed and potential patterns of human mobility in the context of climate change impacts and risks. Section three looks at international decision texts and documents under the UNFCCC, particularly work under adaptation and loss and damage. Section four compares and contrasts work under the UNFCCC with the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), noting the value-added of the Paris Agreement and how climate change policy and the compacts might complement each other in the next decisive phases of implementation. Section five draws conclusions.

Fig. 9.1 Range of climate change impacts and anticipated risk of losses. Source UNFCCC n.d.

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9.1.1 Observed and Potential Patterns of Climate Change-Related Human Mobility This section examines human mobility patterns that may emerge with climate change impacts, vulnerabilities, and risks. Processes such as unexpected variations in weather patterns, extreme events and slow-onset processes increasingly affect human mobility patterns. Some of the most exposed and vulnerable regions include areas like low-lying islands and deltas, coastal zones, glacial-fed water systems and regions subject to persistent drought. Drawing on an expanding body of research, Fig. 9.2 illustrates potential patterns of climate change-related mobility. These patterns are emerging in empirical research today and conceptual, future-oriented research. These patterns offer a picture of how climate change may affect human mobility in combination with other factors. These stressors are: • Weather extremes, displacement and return. Extreme weather can threaten the safety and well-being of people, destroy infrastructure and can displace people. Once conditions return to normal and necessary services are re-established, displaced people may be able to return within a relatively short time period. Such displacement can happen within national borders, or cross-border. • Weather-dependent livelihood systems deteriorate, triggering movements in search of alternative employment. Changes in weather patterns can contribute to longer-term trends that affect precipitation and temperature. Such changes can negatively impact environment-related livelihoods including agriculture, forestry, and fishing. The availability of alternative livelihoods or other coping

Fig. 9.2 Potential patterns of human mobility with climate change stressors. Source Warner (2018)

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capacities in an affected area can affect the scale and pattern of human mobility. In cases where people have moved attain work, they may be able to send remittances home and may return in the medium term. If alternative livelihoods are not available within a reasonable time frame for a household considering moving away, migration may be a way to manage livelihood risks including in slow-onset situations. • Weather and climate change stress interacts with conflict-related movements. Some movements of people occur in circumstances of complex humanitarian crises. Climatic-related human mobility can amplify factors that undermine social cohesion. In recent decades, droughts and other climatic stressors have afflicted areas already torn by strife, contributing to complex movements of people, food insecurity, and situations where humanitarian assistance was required. The ability of people to return to their areas of origin depends upon (re) establishing safe conditions. • Deterioration of the habitability of regions could trigger population shifts. Life-sustaining ecosystems are coming under greater pressure to support human populations. Heat waves, rising sea levels that salinize and inundate coastal and low-lying aquifers and soils, desertification, loss of geologic sources of water such as glaciers and freshwater aquifers are expected to affect many regions of the world. Spatial population shifts at a large scale could occur over time as forces of climate change, demographic change, and technological change emerge. The research community and some finance institutions have already started exploring population retreat in the context of climate change (de Sherbinin et al. 2011; Hauer et al. 2020). These patterns foster discussion about risks and temporal dimensions of human mobility which the international community may face in the future (Table 9.1).

9.1.2 Climate Change Policy: Averting, Minimizing and Addressing Risks to Human Mobility International decision texts and documents under the UNFCCC, particularly in work under adaptation and loss and damage, frame human mobility as an issue of risk management. This risk framing became more apparent between the 13th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP13) in 2007 to the 24th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP24) in Katowice, Poland in 2018. By the mid-2000s the climate change discussions reflected an emerging recognition of the importance of adaptation to climate change impacts and risks, in addition to ambitious mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions. This was reflected in the IPCC fourth assessment report which was released in 2007. Also in 2007 at the 13th session of the Conferences of the Parties (COP13), the Bali Action Plan included consideration of vulnerable developing countries including least

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Table 9.1 Risks and temporal dimensions of departure and return Risks related to mobility and weather and climate change stressors

Temporal dimension of departures

Temporal dimensions of return

(Physical) safety from climate change-related extreme events Interactions of weather and climate change stressors on sustainable livelihoods

Conditions that can contribute to displacement, such as in emergency situations Conditions that contribute to movements of individuals and communities in which people seek new homes and livelihoods over an extended period of time as conditions in areas of origin change or deteriorate Conditions that contribute to movements of people, such as in emergency situations.

When circumstances return to pre-event levels

Interaction of weather and climate change stressors with complex conflict Interaction of weather and climate change stressors with habitability

Contribute to movements of individuals and communities in which people seek other places to live and work over an extended period of time as conditions in their communities change or deteriorate

When livelihood alternatives are available

When circumstances reach a degree of stability and non-conflict that people have safety and livelihood options Uncertain, may correlate with an array of parameters that affect how people can live in a particular location, such as availability of livelihoods, fresh water and functioning of ecosystems, provisioning goods and services, heat stress, severity and frequency of droughts and storms, and progression of slow onset phenomena like sea level risk and desertification

Source Author

developed countries, small island developing states, and countries in Africa affected by drought, desertification and floods (UNFCCC 2007). The Bali Action Plan set the stage for the UNFCCC discussions to create several adaptation-focused areas of work including integration in national plans, as well as work that would manage and put contingency arrangements for climate change impacts into place. Under this risk framing, human mobility was first recognized in international climate change policy was at the 16th session of the COP in 2010, when the Cancun Adaptation Framework was adopted (UNFCCC 2010). This framework included an invitation to all Parties “to enhance action on adaptation under the Cancun Adaptation Framework … by undertaking, inter alia, the following: …. (f) Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to

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climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at national, regional and international levels …”. Paragraph 14(f) laid out the range of movements people may take, what measures should be taken, and who should undertake these actions. Two years later at the 18th session of the COP in Doha, decision 3/CP.18 advanced understanding and expertise of “how impacts of climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility”, in a wider scope of comprehensive climate risk management strategies (UNFCCC 2012, para 6 and 7). Human mobility, had been absorbed into work on loss and damage, which was framed in terms of risk management from COP16 onwards (UNFCCC 2010, paras 25–28). Another step in integrating human mobility and international climate change policy happened in 2015 at COP21 in Paris with the establishment of a task force on displacement, under the auspices of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM), to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize, and address displacement related to the adverse effects of climate change. The WIM had been established in 2013 at COP19 in Warsaw. It was tasked to explore arrangements to avert, minimize and address adverse impacts of climate change, including those related to human mobility in developing countries, vulnerable populations and the ecosystems that they depend on. The WIM was created to have a catalytic and pioneering influence on promoting the implementation of approaches to address loss and damage in a comprehensive, integrated and coherent manner. The Executive Committee included human mobility as a theme in its rolling five-year work plan from 2018 onward and subsequently set up the Task Force on Displacement in early 2017. In Katowice during the 24th session of the Conference of the Parties, the COP deliberated on the outcomes of the Task Force on Displacement, provided in an annex to the Excom report and containing its recommendations (UNFCCC 2018). Box 9.1 highlights recommendations which included invitations to Parties of the UNFCCC on migration, displacement and planned relocation.

Box 9.1: Recommendations on integrated approaches to averting, minimizing and addressing displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change

1(g) Invite Parties: (i) To consider formulating laws, policies and strategies, as appropriate, that reflect the importance of integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change and in the broader context of human mobility, taking into consideration their respective human rights obligations and, as appropriate, other relevant international standards and legal considerations; (ii) To enhance research, data collection, risk analysis and sharing of information to better map, understand and manage human mobility related to the adverse impacts of climate change in a manner that includes the participation of communities affected and at risk of displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change;

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(iii) To strengthen preparedness, including early warning systems, contingency planning, evacuation planning and resilience-building strategies and plans, and develop innovative approaches, such as forecast-based financing, to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change; (iv) To integrate climate change related human mobility challenges and opportunities into national planning processes, as appropriate, by drawing on available tools, guidance and good practices, and consider communicating these efforts undertaken, as appropriate; (v) To recall the guiding principles on internal displacement and seek to strengthen efforts to find durable solutions for internally displaced people when working to implement integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change, as appropriate.Source UNFCCC 2018, pp. 43–44.

9.1.3 Complementarity of Climate Change Policy, Global Compacts on Migration, and on Refugees This section examines possible complementarities between the Global Compacts and recommendations of the UNFCCC Task Force on Displacement moving forward. During the years when climate change policy began including human mobility, countries were also calling for enhanced international coordination of cross-border migration and refugee movements. This was important because it gave countries a chance engage with the converging recognition that gaps in existing frameworks do not yet sufficiently avert emerging global trends that can exacerbate negative drivers of human mobility like climate change. The GCM is the first intergovernmental agreement negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations that addresses all dimensions of international migration. It will include improving the governance of all forms of migration, as well as to strengthen the contribution of migrants and migration to sustainable development. The GCM aims to optimise the benefits of migration while addressing the risks and challenges associated with it, including relating to weather and climate change stressors and disasters (UN General Assembly 2019, Objective 2). The GCR consists of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) and the programme of action, which facilitates the implementation of the CRRF. The CCRF provides a framework for hosting state responses, as opposed to an approach for addressing large onward movements of refugees from countries of first asylum. The CRRF is built “on the foundation of the international refugee protection regime” (para 2 with reference to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR 1951) and the 1967 Protocol (UN General Assembly 1967). It is complemented by international human rights (such as article 14 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948), and regional arrangements like the 1969 African Union Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee

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Problems in Africa (UNHCR 1969) and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (UNHCR 1984). The framework seeks to address the need for more predictable and equitable burden – and responsibility – sharing among States, together with other stakeholders (UNHCR 2018). The framework includes actions to ease pressure on host countries, enhance refugee self-reliance, expand access to third-country solutions and support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity (Türk and Garlick 2016). The GCR recognizes the need to address the root causes of forced displacement. In contrast to the GCM, the GCR focuses on host countries, sustainable support including finance, and durable solutions that include “strengthened focus on addressing root causes and planning for solutions, including voluntary repatriation and resettlement, from the onset of emergencies” (Türk and Garlick 2016). The GCM and GCR both refer to the contributing role that weather and climate change stressors and disasters play in migration and refugee movements. In both, climate change is couched in the context of disasters and humanitarian situations rather than a fundamental change in the baseline situations of countries of origin, transit, and destination. Three of the 22 objectives of the GCM allude to climate change and disaster risk. The second objective of the GCM is relevant to minimizing the adverse drivers that compel people to move (objective 2, para 16). Two-thirds of the twelve sub-paragraphs of objective 2 refer directly to climate change and disasters, evidence of the work of State and expert community contributions to cross-border displacement in the context of disasters and climate change, and that of similar communities of practice on the Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster. Mixed flows of people have given rise to questions about entitlements and protection, and intense debate about how to assign these when climatic and other environmental factors play a role in movements (see Objective 5, para 19(a)). The reference to those ‘displaced’ in the context of disaster, circumvented debates about definitions of ‘environmental migrants’ or ‘climate refugees’ and signposts efforts of the Platform on Disaster Displacement which reframed the discussion to what affected people need and what states do when disaster-related displacement arises (Guild and Tugba 2018). Finally, objective 7 of the GCM which aims to address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration. Both compacts make reference to mixed mobility not covered under current legal protection, such as migrants in vulnerable situations and climate change- and disaster-related displacement. In the GCR, Section 1 on reception and admission contains a part on preparedness, contingency planning, and early warning (Section 1.1, para 36). The same section gives UNHCR an advisory role on international protection gaps like measures to protect those displaced by natural disasters and climate change and the “establishment or strengthening of statelessness determination procedures” (Section 1.6, para 47). The next section about supporting communities calls for the inclusion of climate change mitigation and

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adaptation measures, and disaster risk reduction strategies in the context of refugee camp management (Section 2.2 paragraph 59). When considering geographically extensive consequences of climate change impacts, the GCM and GCR do not yet prepare States and the international community for the full spectrum of issues related to return migration. Without addressing such issues, States may be hesitant to commit to actions that facilitate regular migration or contribute to burden-sharing for hosting refugees. For example, under GCM negotiations, it is not clear whether states such as those where border control and return policies will be willing to increase legal pathways until they are more certain that irregular migrants will return to their areas of origin. The GCM places more attention on the process of return and post-return reintegration than the legal safeguards preventing return such as reference to the principle of non-refoulement if it is not safe for people to go back to their area of origin. One possibility for advancing this part of the discussion would be to make the link to contingency plans – what would countries and regions do in cases where return became less possible or likely? Exploring regional climate change scenarios of such issues would offer more concrete ways for countries to discuss arrangements that would contribute substantially to international preparedness related to large movements of people in relation to climate change impacts. An issue running through both global compacts deals with protecting people in precarious situations, and the commitment of countries and regions to incorporate the needs of these people in their regular planning processes. Both compacts make marked statements about protecting human rights, and modest reference to the gaps that arise when these people do not fit squarely into a category where international law currently offers protection. Both GCM and GCR gesture towards people who flee across borders and for whom return may not be possible, such as those affected by storms, floods, droughts, or other such disruptions. Paragraph 19 of the GCM mention access to protection in emergency situations, including providing “temporary or permanent protection and reception schemes for migrants compelled to leave their countries of origin temporarily or permanently in cases when return is not possible, due to sudden-onset natural disasters, slow-onset environmental degradation, emergency situations, and other life-endangering circumstances, including by providing humanitarian visas, private sponsorships, access to education for children, and temporary work permits” (para 19(f)). These provisions could go farther to focus on development and adaptation planning, including ex-ante measures that minimize risks of involuntary movements of people. In comparison, the language reflected in climate change policy (UNFCCC 2010, 2015 articles 7 and 8, and ongoing work under the WIM) aims to build the capacity of countries to avert, minimize and address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events and slow onset events, and the role of sustainable development in reducing the risk of loss and damage. The focus on pre-empting, planning for, and having contingency arrangements in place for such unfolding, fundamental challenges that affect where

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people live, their work, and their safety adds a missing piece needed to anticipate the needs for managing large scale movements of people.

9.1.4 Conclusions Climate change is a central issue of human welfare and sustainable development. The migration and refugee research community acknowledge that, at present, people that do move in relation to weather and climate change stressors mostly stay within their national borders. GCM and GCR mention climate change, yet any protection gaps remain for those governments with climate change-affected people within their national borders to address. With so many current challenges, countries struggle to keep up with the complexity of mobility today, let alone the future as the full impacts of anthropogenic climate change unfold. The recommendations of the Task Force and global compacts could help prepare the international community for an emerging reality of including climate change and large-scale movements of people. This will be affected by the degree to which countries devote efforts to pre-empting and reducing risk, planning, and putting contingency arrangements into place. Many of the challenges associated with the current and future interactions between climatic stressors and factors affecting migration, displacement and planned relocation fall outside of current governance arrangements for migration and asylum. Situations such as extreme storms, coastal inundation, heat waves or slow onset climatic processes like sea level rise, ocean acidification, glacier melt and desertification, could in the future contribute to such precarious situations and prevent people returning to their areas of origin because of threats to safety and livelihoods. Risks arise where these gaps leave countries without provisions to address the needs of people on the move in relation to climatic stressors, including when they may cross borders. Such risks span the three processes examined in this paper and have become more central to the discussions. All processes discussed here aim to align global governance of human mobility with the values embedded in the Sustainable Development Goals. The recommendations of the Task Force on Displacement and the GCM are relevant for countries already facing climate change impacts with associated human mobility. These recommendations accepted at the international level can be of use for those countries which chose to preempt, reduce and plan for, and put contingency arrangements into place for possible climate change-related human mobility. The Paris Agreement adds value to the fashioning of human mobility policy because it emphasizes averting and minimizing both climate change risks and risks stemming from not taking appropriate actions to manage climate change impacts on society. The IPCC Special Report on 1.5 degrees offers a preliminary set of climate change impact scenarios – those broadly expected in the range between 1.5 and 2 °C global average temperatures above pre-industrial levels. This range offers that

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may affect where and how people live and work, and a range of potential human mobility around which the international community can target its planning efforts. Ongoing work under the UNFCCC process, such as the Warsaw International Mechanism, aims to bolster the capacity of countries to make risk-informed decisions about preemptive activities, planning, and contingency arrangements that affect where and how people live. In some areas of the world, these plans already involve more flexible migration arrangements where people face weather and climate change stress, community-based relocations (Barnett/McMichael 2018). Climate change policy in the coming years seeks to foster adaptation options that will keep people safe and ensure livelihood and food security. The Paris Agreement provides a touchstone against which the global community can assess climate change trajectories and possible scenarios for impacts on society, including scenarios that may include movements of people including large movements of people over time. This future-oriented perspective of the climate change policy adds value to the global community by emphasizing risk management and a nuanced spectrum of options and solutions for affected people and countries.

References Barnett, Jon, and Celia McMichael. 2018. The Effects of Climate Change on the Geography and Timing of Human Mobility. Population and Environment 39: 339–56. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11111-018-0295-5 De Sherbinin, Alex, Marcia C. Castro, François Gemenne, Michael M. Cernea, Susana Beatriz, Philip Fearnside, Gary Krieger, Sarah Lamani, Anthony Oliver-Smith, Alula Pankhurst, Thayder Scudder, Burton Singer, Yan Tan, Gregory E. Wannier, Philippe Boncour, Charles Ehrhart, Graeme Hugo, B. Pandey, and Guoquing Shi. 2011. Preparing for resettlement associated with climate change. Science 334 (6055), 456–457. https://doi.org/10.1126/science. 1208821. Guild, Elspeth and Basaran Tugba. 2018. First Perspectives on the Zero Draft (5 February 2018) for the UN Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. London: Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies https://ssrn.com/abstract=3123876. Accessed 29 September 2020. Hauer, Mathew E., Elizabeth Fussell, Valerie Mueller, Maxine Burkett, Maia Call, Kali Abel, Robert McLeman, and David Wrathall. 2020. Sea-level rise and human migration. Nature Reviews Earth and Environment 1: 28–39. https://doi.org/10.1038/s43017-019-0002-9. Accessed 29 September 2020. Sudmeier-Rieux, Karen, Manuela Fernández, Ivanna M. Penna, Michael Jaboyedoff, and JC Gaillard, Eds. 2017. Identifying Emerging Issues in Disaster Risk Reduction, Migration, Climate Change and Sustainable Development. Cham: Springer. Türk, Volker, and Madeline Garlick. 2016. From Burdens and Responsibilities to Opportunities: The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and a Global Compact on Refugees. International Journal of Refugee Law 28(4): 656–678. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eew043. Accessed 29 September 2020. UN. 1992. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. New York: United Nations. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. Accessed 29 September 2020.

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UNFCCC. n.d. Online Guide on Loss and Damage. Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. https://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/groups_committees/loss_and_damage_ executive_committee/application/pdf/online_guide_on_loss_and_damage-dec_2017.pdf. Accessed 29 September 2020. UNFCCC. 2007. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth session, held in Bali. Bali Action Plan. Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. http:// unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf. Accessed 29 September 2020. UNFCCC. 2010. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010. Addendum. Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its sixteenth session. Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf. Accessed 29 September 2020. UNFCCC. 2012. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its eighteenth session, held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 2012. Addendum. Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its eighteenth session. Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2012/cop18/eng/08a01.pdf. Accessed 29 September 2020. UNFCCC. 2013. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its nineteenth session, held in Warsaw from 11 to 23 November 2013. Addendum. Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its nineteenth session. Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a01.pdf. Accessed 29 September 2020. UNFCCC. 2015. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015. Addendum. Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session. Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/2015/cop21/ eng/10a01.pdf. Accessed 29 September 2020. UNFCCC. 2018. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-fourth session, held in Katowice from 2 to 15 December 2018. Addendum. Part two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-fourth session. Bonn: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/10a1.pdf. Accessed 29 September 2020. UN General Assembly. 1967. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. New York: United Nations. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ae4.html. Accessed 29 September 2020. UN General Assembly. 2019. Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. New York: UN General Assembly. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/ generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_73_195.pdf. Accessed 29 September 2020. UNHCR. 1951. 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ae4.html. Accessed 29 September 2020. UNHCR. 1969. Key legal considerations on the standards of treatment of refugees recognized under the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.refworld.org/ docid/5a391d4f4.html. Accessed 29 September 2020. UNHCR. 1984. Regional Refugee Instruments & Related. Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, 22 November 1984. Geneva: Regional Refugee Instruments and Related. https:// www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36ec.html. Accessed 29 September 2020. UNHCR. 2018. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Part II Global compact on refugees. Geneva: United High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unhcr. org/gcr/GCR_English.pdf. Accessed 29 September 2020.

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Dr. Koko Warner manages the Vulnerability subdivision where she guides the UN climate secretariat’s adaptation knowledge hub, helping scale up adaptation action, and the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform. Warner is an IPCC lead author for the Special Report on Climate Change and Land, and 5th Assessment Report on climate impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Previously at UNFCCC, she supervised the loss and damage workstream, including operationalizing the Task Force on Displacement. Koko was a founder and Executive Director of the Munich Climate Insurance Initiative and head of research on environmental migration and social resilience at UN University in Bonn. The International Council of Science named Koko one of the top 20 in the climate change debate. She is a visiting fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House. She holds a PhD in economics and publishes in Nature journals, Climate Policy, Global Environmental Change, Journal of Population and Environment, Disasters, Environmental Hazards, Natural Hazards, and the Lancet.

Displacement and Migration as a Foreign Policy Challenge

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Christian Jetzlsperger

Abstract

The chapter focuses on the root causes of forced displacement and the role foreign policy can play in addressing them. The record numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons are a direct consequence of an increasing number of armed conflicts around the globe but in particular in Africa and the Middle East. These conflicts, while each of them has its specific origins, are aggravated by the fact that they take place in a changing international environment with increased great-power competition and shrinking influence of the ‘West’. In addressing these conflicts, international actors have to overcome substantial obstacles both in the international arena and in their domestic politics. Results of international conflict-resolution efforts in the past 30 years are mixed at best. The author argues that successful intervention – on whatever scale – requires well-coordinated efforts and the flexible use of a wide range of instruments in support of a politically defined strategy. It requires the investment of political capital and sustained, often long-term effort. In the end, all conflict resolution is political.

10.1

Introduction

At the end of 2019, almost 80 million people worldwide were displaced – more than at any time since the end of the Second World War. More than half of these women and men stayed in their own country in supposedly safer areas as internally displaced persons. The majority of cross-border displacement occurred in the immediate vicinity of countries affected by war and crises, particularly in Africa and the Middle East.

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The challenges are enormous for those countries that take in the majority of the refugees. Take Lebanon, for example. This small country on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean has always been marked by a fragile balance between Christians, Sunnis and Shiites – a balance that took a great deal of effort to restore after a civil war lasting 15 years (1975–1990) and that has become increasingly shaky in recent years. Two decades later, this equilibrium is put at risk by another civil war but this time in the neighbouring country of Syria. While the Government of Lebanon wants to prevent the conflict from spreading to its own country, the Shiites’ most important political paramilitary force – Hezbollah – is fighting on the side of the Syrian regime led by Bashar al-Assad. At the same time, more than two million Syrians have found refuge in Lebanon, putting immense strain on systems for general public services, health care and education, whilst also posing a latent threat to the hard-won social peace in Lebanon itself. In Europe, too, enormous refugee migrations of recent years have revealed cracks in the basic political and social consensus. Even though only a fraction of the 80 million refugees headed to Europe, the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 uncovered conflicts within European societies which had, up to that point, remained hidden. The massive influx of people from a region of the world with a different culture and religion acted as a magnifying glass, bringing to the surface a sense of loss and alienation felt by broad sections of the population. It led to a strengthening of populist movements in many European countries. Such groups are seeking a return to the nation-state (which is often understood as an ethnically defined community) and consider that the European Union is on the wrong track. They see the open borders of the Schengen Area as a threat and the integration of national economies – embodied by the Euro as the common currency – as the cause of unemployment and economic decline. They disparage representatives of the state, but also of business and the media, as out-of-touch elites who have lost contact with ‘the people’ – and in doing so call the foundations of a liberal democracy itself into question. This tremendous challenge facing the European post-war order can in no way be attributed to the ‘refugee crisis’ alone. Its roots go down deeper; there are multiple reasons; and it is a crisis of legitimacy that extends well beyond Europe and has in fact afflicted almost every ‘Western’ democracy. However, the ‘refugee crisis’ did act as a catalyst. ‘Managing’ it is therefore indispensable if European democracy is to reassert its legitimacy. The right way of ‘managing’ the ‘refugee crisis’ is the subject of hot debate. It would go far beyond the remit of this article to trace the path of this debate. This article is not intended to examine the (extremely important) question of how to integrate migrants and refugees with cultural, religious and social values that differ fundamentally from those of the host society. Nor will the (equally important) issues of immigration and asylum law be discussed. Instead, this article looks at displacement and migration through the lens of foreign policy practice. Seen against the backdrop of risks to stability and the associated secondary risks, the relevance of this topic for foreign policy is clear. The question is: What can foreign policy – and, in particular, German foreign policy – do to combat the root causes of displacement?

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10.1.1 Displacement and Migration Migration has been part and parcel of global change processes for millennia. In the 21st century, too, migration processes not only pose threats to stability; they also present development opportunities – for migrants and their countries of origin, as well as for host countries. Migrants benefit from access to education and employment markets; in their host countries, they help to alleviate the shortage of labour, pay taxes and make contributions to insurance systems. Migrants also contribute to the development of the economy in their countries of origin by sending back money and taking pressure off the employment market. A prerequisite for a win-win situation of this kind is improved international management. Regular migration needs to be actively shaped. To that end, in 2018 the international community adopted a Global Compact on Migration, the first international agreement aimed at addressing migration in all its dimensions. The necessary corollary to managing and opening up opportunities for legal migration is the prevention of irregular migration, stopping networks of traffickers while opening up prospects for legal migration. There is a limit to the extent to which such approaches can indeed shape and channel population flows. While migrants are seeking a better future for themselves and their children, refugees leave their homes because of immediate threats to their lives. While migrants decide to find opportunities elsewhere because of food insecurity, climate change and population growth, or purely because of the lack of economic and social prospects, refugees leave their homes because of war, persecution and violence. While migration can, in theory at least, be planned, decisions to flee are often made at very short notice, possibly in the face of a tangible threat to life and limb. A clear-cut distinction between the motives for displacement and migration cannot always be made. Nonetheless, they each require specific responses in respect of foreign, security and development policy (see Bundesregierung 2016b; Bundesregierung 2017).

10.2

Crisis Prevention and Conflict Management Challenges

Anybody wanting to eliminate the causes of displacement has to resolve acute conflicts and prevent future crises from escalating. This insight is quite simple. Putting it into practice, however, is not – for three main reasons: First, crises and conflicts are frequently not limited to a specific country or region, and they do not arise out of single, easily traceable causes. More often, they are symptoms of an ongoing transformation of the world order as a whole. The United States (US) is struggling with its role as the world’s only remaining superpower and is increasingly consumed by domestic polarisation and foreign policy fatigue. After two centuries of dependence, domination by foreign powers and resurgence, China is laying claim to its old position as the ‘Middle Kingdom’

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and is taking an increasingly powerful and self-confident stance in foreign policy. Russia is endeavouring to rectify its defeat in the Cold War; a period of rapprochement with the west has been replaced by a revisionist agenda, attempting to win back its spheres of influence and be an equal player. International law and the institutions on which the world order have been based since 1945 are being called into question in the process – sometimes aggressively, as with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in contravention of international law, and sometimes with the creation of alternative organisations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which was created and is dominated by China. The speed at which the familiar order is being eroded is accelerated by status quo powers themselves calling into question mainstays of the current system, as illustrated by the US’ new scepticism towards international free trade. The diminishing attractiveness of the’Western’ government and business model on the international stage, which is itself reflected within western societies, is compounding matters. The Syrian conflict reflects the multi-faceted nature of these upheavals. It started with peaceful protests against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, inspired by the Arab Spring revolutions and born out of the hope of more freedom and better living conditions. As a result of a bloody crackdown on the protests, it evolved into a brutal civil war in which radical forces increasingly gained the upper hand. Regional players and superpowers turned the conflict into a proxy war in which they felt they had to protect their fundamental interests. Multiple uses of internationally banned chemical weapons by Assad emphasise that even fundamental norms of international law of war are under threat. Second, the options available to outside parties to influence and resolve a conflict are limited. External actors can only marginally impact the interest calculations of parties to the conflict, and political structures, societal norms and values can, at best, be changed only in the long term. Furthermore, the available resources are not infinite: In democratic societies, the political appetite to engage in long term and extensive deployment of diplomacy, development cooperation and military is limited from the outset and diminishes the longer the conflict lasts. Decision-makers, who have to win elections at regular intervals, also have limited political capital that they can expend on any given international crisis (see Brozus et al. 2018). The international presence in Afghanistan illustrates this point: Since 2001/02, the international community has deployed unparalleled efforts in the Hindu Kush range. In spite of this, the country is still marked by instability and violence. Almost 20 years after the toppling of the Taliban regime, state institutions remain weak, and the government in Kabul has lost control of large areas of the country, which are either under the control of the resurgent Taliban movement or are being fought over. In spite of the presence of over 140,000 soldiers at the peak of international troop presence and the investment of billions in the development of the country (and notwithstanding remarkable successes in areas such as education and human rights), the results have fallen short of expectations. The security situation is poor in many parts of the country and the Human Development Index ranked Afghanistan 170 (out of 189) in 2019 (UNDP 2019). A peace agreement between the US and the Taliban concluded in 2020 has not sustainably stabilised the situation as intra-Afghan talks, at the time of writing, have yet to start.

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Third, early warning and conflict prevention can save human lives, prevent displacement and save follow-on costs for military interventions and reconstruction measures. However, in practice, they are particularly challenging in foreign policy (United Nations and World Bank 2018). On the one hand, it is difficult to identify emerging conflicts even if additional efforts are made. On the other hand, it is precisely in the early stage that there is a lack of the necessary instruments to avert a crisis: How do you convince the decision-makers that it is in their interest to avoid escalation – while not wielding any instruments of coercion? At the same time, when a crisis is about to erupt, there is usually a lack of political determination and international unity: While crises that have already broken out demand the attention of key political players as well as the international media, a crisis is a non-event before it escalates. There is no sense of urgency. In addition to that, in many instances there is no international consensus that there is indeed ‘a threat to international peace and security’ that would justify an intervention by the international community. Some permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council regularly threaten or exercise their veto, citing the sovereignty of the countries concerned. Take Burundi as an example: In contravention of the terms of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi in the year 2000, which attempted to limit conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis through institutional arrangements, then-President Nkurunziza sought an unconstitutional third term in office starting in 2015. This resulted in considerable tension in the country, with increasing signs of a possible violent escalation of the conflict. Over 400,000 Burundians fled to neighbouring countries and several hundred died in the course of demonstrations, an attempted coup and persecution by the government. States neighbouring Burundi, in particular, made efforts to defuse the conflict within the East African Community. However, more extensive intervention failed because of a lack of unity within the UN Security Council; the Nkurunziza regime refused to agree to concrete measures to resolve the conflict and to on-site mediation. The situation in Burundi never attracted greater international attention. Nkurunziza secured a further term of office in 2018 by changing the constitution. However, Nkurunziza himself announced he would resign in 2020 while assuming the function of ‘Supreme Guide of Patriotism’. Today, after Nkurunziza’s sudden death in June 2020, a fragile calm prevails in Burundi. Relations between ethnic groups have been severely strained, however. The prospects for peace in the country remain uncertain. Much will depend on Nkurunziza’s successor Évariste Ndayishimiye who was elected President in May 2020, and whether he will depart from his predecessor’s divisive policies.

10.2.1 Diplomacy and Its Toolbox In spite of all of the difficulties and shortcomings, the challenges arising from today’s massive population movements cannot be solved alone by measures to secure borders, by repatriating migrants without residence permits and/or the

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integration of refugees into the host society. What is really needed is a coherent foreign policy approach, focusing not on preventing displacement per se but on addressing its causes. First and foremost, this means that foreign policy must actively strive to prevent crises, manage conflicts and promote peace – and face up to the challenges described above. This realisation is not entirely new, even though the’refugee crisis’ has re-emphasised its urgency. Since the end of the Cold War, crisis engagement has become a core element of the foreign policy of ‘Western’ nations. With the collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR), many areas of limited statehood lost protection from this superpower. This first became clear in Somalia in the early 1990s when the USSR withdrew its support for the regime of Siad Barre and the Somalian state collapsed completely. Faced with famine and escalating violence in the capital Mogadishu, the international community decided to intervene – and failed. However, it subsequently became clear that chaos and violence would not remain limited to failing states like Somalia. The attacks of 11 September 2001, which were planned by Al-Qaida from Afghanistan, underlined the fact that state fragility and disintegration also jeopardised the security of the US and Europe. Since then, the international community has become engaged in diverse crises with varying scopes – expanding and sharpening its tools in the process. Whether in Afghanistan or in Iraq, Ukraine or Colombia, Libya or Yemen, in all these conflicts, external actors have endeavoured to defuse conflicts by: • Supporting reform processes to strengthen legitimate authorities, such as by providing advice and financial support for national dialogue processes and constituent assemblies; • Guaranteeing security, for example by sending police missions, training national security forces in the fight against terrorism and organised crime, reintegrating formerly armed resistance groups and reforming the security sector to increase transparency; • Restoring the rule of law, including through providing training and education for judges and prosecutors, facilitating access to justice, protecting human rights defenders and encouraging processes (both in and out of court) to come to terms with past atrocities (transitional justice); • Developing business opportunities, such as through employment programmes, infrastructure projects or trade promotion, but also to secure livelihoods through conservation and climate change measures; • Putting state services on a sustainable financial footing, for example by establishing a well-performing state (taxation) administration, combined with measures to fight corruption. In addition to such ‘positive’ contributions, the repertoire of active foreign policy obviously also includes restrictive measures. Sanctions can be an important instrument to induce a change of behaviour – in particular if they are linked with positive incentives.

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As a final resort, the international community can punish behaviour that is blatantly in contravention of international law by taking military action. Of course, the use of military means must not be limited to these extreme cases. Help with military training and equipment as well as monitoring ceasefires by blue helmet troops (with the agreement of the conflict parties) can also make an important contribution to de-escalation below the threshold of using military force.

10.2.2 Taking Stock A crucial factor for the success of external intervention is that the instruments are deployed at the right time and tailored to the relevant context. Most importantly, they need to follow a political strategy. All kinds of projects and measures can at best back up and underpin policy and diplomacy and lend them credibility. But they can never compensate for a lack of strategy. The ‘stabilisation’ approach takes this insight as a point of departure. Stabilisation measures should therefore support political processes for conflict resolution and provide incentives to the conflict parties to cease armed conflict or support legitimate political authorities as they offer the population a convincing political proposition that is more attractive than its ‘competitors’ – be they terror organisations, insurgents, or other groups with a claim to territorial power. The stabilisation approach is designed to combine foreign policy, security and development policy instruments in a flexible way in order to achieve defined policy objectives. There have been some (preliminary) successes. For instance, after a series of victories in 2014, the so-called Islamic State (IS) was driven back in Iraq. These military successes were consolidated through rapid, targeted measures to stabilise civilian life. In the towns, cities and regions of Iraq liberated from IS, resources were made available to repair the destroyed infrastructure such as water pipes and power lines, to rehabilitate schools and to provide local business with incentives to resume trading. This has brought visible success. Hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons returned to liberated areas within a few months. Nonetheless, when taking stock of international crisis engagement over the past three decades, the results can at best be described as mixed. In Afghanistan, deployment of international troops is entering its 20th year and yet still no lasting stabilisation has been achieved. In Syria – where the civil war has cost more than 400,000 lives – stability is no more than a chimaera under the brutal reins of the Assad regime. In South Sudan, the international community has not managed to stop the disputes between the government and the opposition or to consolidate the state, which was founded only in 2011. Even where peace processes have been successful, such as in the Balkans or most recently in Colombia, tensions still exist. And in Iraq, the positive example cited above, it remains questionable whether the successes international assistance has made possible, have really strengthened the legitimacy of the Iraqi state. Corruption and clientelism still abound. Widespread protests against government and political elites illustrate how difficult it is to achieve lasting legitimacy gains through outside intervention.

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There are various reasons for this ‘peacemaking crisis’. First and foremost is the aforementioned upheaval in the international order. The large number of crises at the start of the twenty-first century is a symptom of this upheaval, as is the inability to solve these crises. This is particularly true in places such as Syria where superpowers and their regional allies are actively intervening through their proxies. However, even in conflicts that tend to take place sheltered from high-profile international politics, the international crisis response is often hampered by a lack of unity among major international players – as evidenced by multiple blockades in the UN Security Council – and by the loss of credibility of what used to be the leading powers. However, there are further factors that hamper the ability to resolve conflicts and overcome acute crises. Let us consider three. First: Crisis prevention, stabilisation and post-conflict peacebuilding must be guided by conditions on the ground. On the one hand, this requires precise knowledge of the respective country’s history, culture and political structures and, on the other, the willingness to define ambitious and, at the same time, realistic targets for international involvement. Both are often lacking in national foreign policy discourse and at an international level. The result is unclear, changing and/or overambitious objectives and overloaded mandates, for instance for UN missions. Second: Internal political considerations play an important role here. In democratic societies, foreign policy involvement – in particular, when it contains a military element – requires broad support from the population; this is particularly true for Germany, where the deployment of the German Federal Armed Forces requires parliamentary approval. What can be tolerated from the point of view of internal politics competes with what is feasible for foreign policy; the need (of internal politics) to achieve fast and visible success is not a good match for the long-term stamina needed for effective peaceful settlement of conflicts. Finally: A further difficulty is the lack of coordination on both the national and international front. Different ministries each deploy their respective tools. Bureaucratic conflicts over responsibilities and resources are reflected in activities, projects and programmes on the ground; it is difficult to define a strategy for achieving a clearly defined foreign policy objective against a backdrop of departmental empire-building (this is true for every political system but particularly so for a country like Germany with pronounced departmental independence (‘Ressortprinzip’) and the lack of hierarchically structured coordination mechanisms such as a National Security Council). The lack of coordination is mirrored on the international level where a host of bilateral and multilateral actors regularly call for better coordination – calls that are not always met with a preparedness to get coordinated.

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169

Outlook: A Plea for a Coherent Foreign Policy

Dealing with the consequences of the massive population displacement in recent years, and preventing new refugee flows, is among the central political tasks of the coming years. Efforts to control migration movements and restrictive measures to secure borders are not sufficient. Humanitarian assistance for refugees and generous support for the states which have given them shelter are not sufficient, either, as important as they are, in order to prevent chain reactions and counteract the destabilisation of entire regions. Instead, the root causes of displacement must be examined. And that means it is important to find political solutions to conflicts through often painstaking peace processes. This includes the deployment of resources for crisis prevention, stabilisation and peacebuilding in the form of targeted projects that sustain and underpin peace efforts. It includes the restoration of destroyed infrastructure and the creation of long-term prospects through development cooperation measures. It can also include the deployment of armed forces in order to create the prerequisites for a political process in the first place and to safeguard this process by ensuring that the environment is safe. However, at its core, conflict resolution is a political endeavour. It presupposes a willingness to expend political capital, often involving high risk and considerable effort, over long periods of time and involving not only local parties to the conflict but also their regional and international allies. Conflicts can only be resolved if respected political leaders use their political weight, do not become despondent if there are setbacks and lead a political process that is backed up by diplomatic efforts at all levels, confidence building measures and incentives for the conflict parties yet also sanctions against those who thwart their efforts. Over recent years, Germany has repeatedly acknowledged that it wishes to take on more responsibility internationally. In spite of the baggage of history, as a prosperous, politically stable country in the heart of Europe, Germany has the respect and influence required to play a more significant role in international efforts to prevent crises, manage conflicts and promote peace. Together with France, Germany has led international efforts at solving the crisis in Eastern Ukraine where Russia-backed separatists have provoked armed conflict. The so-called ‘Normandy format’ that brings together Ukraine and Russia with France and Germany has helped stabilise the conflict, even though a comprehensive solution remains elusive. In 2019 and 2020, Germany also launched the so-called ‘Berlin process’ in support of a solution to the Libyan civil war, addressing in particular the influence of outside powers who are violating the UN arms embargo. Again, a full-fledged solution to the conflict has not yet been achieved. But at least, some progress appears to have been made. With its White Paper 2016 (Bundesregierung 2016a) and the 2017 Guidelines (Bundesregierung 2017), the German Federal Government has also submitted documents that spell out strategically the aspiration to take on more responsibility

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and foreshadows the path to more effective foreign, security and development policy in crises and conflicts. With a number of organisational measures – in particular the creation of a Department for Humanitarian Assistance, Crisis Prevention, Stabilisation and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Federal Foreign Office – professional structures have also been created that permit a fast and effective response to crises. However, cross-departmental structures and mechanisms require further improvement in order to fulfil the aspiration Germany has set itself. Effective crisis management must be coherent: the tools for diplomacy, development cooperation and military action must be intertwined in order to be successful. Conventional procedures for departmental coordination are still too cumbersome and urgently require reform. Furthermore, greater willingness is required to make a substantial and sustained commitment. In a democracy, this cannot be achieved without the support of voters. The foreign, security and development policy establishment will therefore increasingly have to make the case for the need for international engagement – and will also have to explain here that efforts to resolve international conflicts are extremely complex undertakings that require patience and stamina. Finally, foreign policy and conflict resolution are not without their costs. Increased funding for humanitarian aid and development cooperation is important but not enough on its own. Indeed, what is needed is for foreign policy to have stronger analytical and strategic capability. Broader collaboration with academia, research and civil society is therefore indispensable for this, as is investing the diplomatic personnel.

References Brozus, Lars, Christian Jetzlsperger, and Gregor Walter-Drop 2018. Policy. In The Oxford Handbook of Governance and Limited Statehood, Eds. Anke Draude, Tanja A. Börzel, and Thomas Risse: 584–604. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/ 9780198797203.013.29. Bundesregierung. 2016a. Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr. Berlin: Die Bundesregierung. https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/13708/ 015be272f8c0098f1537a491676bfc31/weissbuch2016-barrierefrei-data.pdf. Accessed 3 September 2020. Bundesregierung. 2016b. Strategie für Migration und Entwicklung: Aktionsplan für die Außendimension der Migrations- und Flüchtlingspolitik. Berlin: Die Bundesregierung. https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/216858/6c2b8d4f6eb95c507f0b6244d8cc32e1/ migrationentwicklung-data.pdf. Accessed 3 September 2020. Bundesregierung. 2017. Krisen verhindern, Konflikte bewältigen, Frieden fördern: Leitlinien der Bundesregierung. Berlin: Die Bundesregierung. https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/ 1213498/d98437ca3ba49c0ec6a461570f56211f/krisen-verhindern-data.pdf. Accessed 3 September 2020.

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UNDP. 2019. Human Development Report. New York: United Nations Development Programme. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/2019-human-development-index-ranking. Accessed 3 September 2020. United Nations, and World Bank. 2018. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/978-1-4648-1162-3_ch3. Accessed 3 September 2020.

Christian Jetzlsperger is a German diplomat. He is currently Head of Division for the United Kingdom, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein at the Federal Foreign Office in Berlin. Previous postings include Albania, Afghanistan, the Palestinian territories, Yemen, and the United States. From 2014 to 2017, he was in charge of the strategy and policy division at the Department for Humanitarian Assistance, Crisis Prevention, Stabilisation, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Berlin. The views expressed in this article are purely the personal views of the author.

Legal Pathways for Low-Skilled Migrant Workers

11

Kathleen Newland and Andrea Riester

Abstract

In countries whose native-born workforce has become ever more educated and ever more concentrated in medium- and high-skilled industries, many low-wage jobs that cannot be outsourced or automated- such as child and elder care, agriculture, and construction – are filled by immigrants. Yet legal migration pathways are most readily available not to workers who might fill such positions, but to highly skilled professionals with a formal qualification. Where legal pathways for low-skilled migrants are too narrow to meet demand, employers and foreign-born workers alike often look to illegal migration to bridge the gap. The negotiation of a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration in 2018 represented a unique opportunity for states to take stock of what has and has not worked for low-skilled labour migration pathways in the past, as well as what might add value in the future. Among the key challenges, policymakers will need to address are the need to improve coordination between destination and origin countries, balance clarity of program design with flexibility, and weave the protection of workers’ rights and the evaluation of impact into the fabric of new initiatives.

11.1

Introduction

On 19 September 2016, the Member States of the United Nations (UN) declared that they would “consider facilitating opportunities for safe, orderly and regular migration, including, as appropriate, employment creation, labour mobility at all skills levels, circular migration, family reunification and education-related opportunities” (UN General Assembly 2016 (emphasis added)). It is a fairly weak commitment to just consider and not necessarily take action. However, at the same © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-J. Preuß et al. (eds.), Forced Displacement and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32902-0_11

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UN General Assembly high-level plenary meeting on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, states also committed to negotiating a Global Compact on Migration by the end of 2018. The outcome document of that meeting, known as the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, said that one element of the Compact could be the “creation and expansion of safe, regular pathways for migration”. This has been repeatedly identified by states as part of the effort to achieve another of the possible elements of the Compact, namely the “reduction of the incidence and impact of irregular migration” (UN General Assembly 2016). Legal migration is much more easily available to highly skilled people with recognised qualifications than to workers without formal qualifications. The latter is usually called ‘low-skilled’, although they may have a rich endowment of acquired skills in fields such as horticulture, construction, traditional arts and crafts and care occupations. This paper will follow the convention of using the term ‘low-skilled’ for such workers, although it is more precise to call them ‘low-waged workers’. The paper will focus on the international migration opportunities available to them, the constraints on their movement and the development impact of these patterns. It will identify some arrangements that permit the international migration of low-skilled workers, some important gaps in governance and suggest some policy approaches to unresolved issues, including those that affect the quality of the migration experience for the low-skilled. Legal migration between countries, for the purposes of this paper, is migration authorised by the laws and regulations of the countries of origin and destination and conforming to the terms and conditions of stay in the destination country and to the requirements of international law. Most irregular migration is illegal because migrants do not have permission to enter or stay from the authorities of the destination country.1

11.2

International Law and Labour Migration

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognises that ‘[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country’ (UN General Assembly 1948, Article 13.2). Otherwise, international law has little to say about the right to migrate – outside the framework of refugee law – although it has much to say about the rights of migrants. Migrants, of course, are covered by the core human rights treaties that apply to all human beings as well as International Labour Organization 1

Illegal migration that violates the laws of the origin country is primarily migration that is organized by criminal actors or is undertaken with the intent to evade a legal obligation in one’s own country – such as conscription, avoiding a criminal sentence or evading taxes. Of course, characterization of these actions as criminal is often controversial: conscription in some circumstances may be seen as akin to involuntary servitude (conscription in Eritrea is often seen in this way), criminal charges may be brought for political reasons, and taxes may be levied in a discriminatory way. Any of these conditions may be grounds for claiming refugee status. But in normal circumstances, refusing permission to leave a country is seen as inconsistent with agreed human rights norms.

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(ILO) conventions and standards that cover all workers. However, only 39 countries have ratified or acceded to the core human rights treaty that specifically addresses the rights of migrant workers, the UN Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (UN General Assembly 1990). None of them are major destination countries although some, such as Mexico and Morocco, are at once origin, transit and destination countries. An additional 15 countries (none of the major countries of destination) have signed the Convention, indicating an inclination to apply it, although signing it does not create a binding commitment. Even fewer states have acceded to most of the ILO conventions concerning migrant workers. Convention No. 97 of 1949 concerning Migration for Employment has 49 ratifications (ILO 1949); all the other migrant-specific conventions have fewer. Other ILO conventions that are not specific to migrant workers nonetheless have great relevance to them because of the number of migrants employed in the fields they address, for example, conventions on nursing, domestic workers, and safety and health in agriculture. ILO conventions, even those with few ratifications, are regarded as labour standards that establish principles even if they are not binding. Lastly, parts of international criminal law are aimed at organised crime syndicates that count migrants among the ‘products’ that they transport illegally across international boundaries. Two protocols to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000 are directly germane to migrants: the Protocol Against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children. These two protocols are the most ratified treaties specifically dealing with migration issues other than the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. There are, in addition to these international instruments, a plethora of regional, bilateral and unilateral frameworks, laws and statements of principle that protect the rights of migrant workers at all skill levels and, in some cases, legal pathways open to low-skilled migrants. Few instruments, however, provide easily accessible legal remedies to low-skilled migrant workers. The workers who most need such protection are, in general, least able to benefit from legal remedies at the international, regional or national levels.

11.3

Why Legal Pathways for Low-Skilled Migrants?

Interest in legal pathways for low-skilled migrants has risen in parallel with the increasing numbers of migrants entering without authorisation, overstaying or violating the terms of their visas in high-income countries. The Mediterranean migration movements of 2015 pushed the issue of ‘irregular’ migrants to the top of the policy agenda in Europe and more broadly. It is doubtful, for example, that the UN high-level plenary on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants held on 19 September 2016 would have taken place if not for the policy panic engendered by the crisis in the Mediterranean.

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The search for work is the primary motive for the majority of the world’s international migrants.2 The ILO estimated, using 2013 data, that more than 150 million of the world’s approximately 232 million international migrants are in the labour force and makeup almost three-quarters of the working-age migrant population (ILO 2015). Policy-makers need a realistic view of the benefits of legal channels for low-skilled migrant workers. The value of opening more legal pathways for migrants is construed in three ways. First, it is seen as a migration management tool that could replace chaotic, unplanned entries with orderly and predictable arrivals, by diverting migrants from irregular channels into regulated ones. Second, it is presented as a humanitarian response to the terrible dangers that unauthorised migrants endure on their journeys, which resulted in the deaths of at least 5,085 migrants in the Mediterranean in 2016 alone (IOM 2017). Finally, opening a larger number of opportunities for low-skilled migrants to enter and work legally in a wealthier country is seen as a development instrument, as it is all but guaranteed to raise migrants’ wages by a significant margin over what they could earn at home and offers other benefits, such as skills augmentation, technology transfer and access to global networks of knowledge and economic partnership, to countries of origin. Countries of destination also benefit through the importation of skills, the satisfaction of labour needs and the release of native-born workers for higher productivity jobs. In the migration management framework, it is often asserted that opening legal pathways will reduce the need and the temptation for workers to move without authorisation through channels that are illegal and often dangerous, thus increasing both orderliness and safety in international migration. This is the hoped-for, long-term outcome of international cooperation on labour migration, but many twists and turns on the road toward it may be expected. In the short term, expanded legal pathways may actually increase unauthorised migration, as it thickens the networks that help many people to migrate (with funding for the journey, information about the job market at destination and help with accommodation and sustenance upon arrival) and exposes more people in the country of origin to the benefits of successful migration. The reduction of unauthorised migration in the medium term will likely depend on the capacity of legal pathways to accommodate the number of people who have the means and the motivation to emigrate but lack permission to enter their desired destination country. Long-term reduction of unauthorised migration depends on many complex factors in both countries of origin and countries of destination. In countries of destination, the inadequacy of legal means to fill the demand for migrant labour is the major factor driving unauthorised migration, but other policies in areas such as family reunification and access to asylum may also affect unauthorised flows. In the 2

It should be noted, however, that while labour migration is the dominant form of international migration, it is not the only one. People also move to escape violence or persecution, to join family, or to broaden their horizons through study or other kinds of non-work experience. In many cases, these international movements are closely connected to labour migration, and are also in need of legal pathways.

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country of origin, reductions in unauthorised migration can be traced to developments such as demographic change, greater economic opportunity, improvements in governance and sustained peace and security. Above all, it depends on confidence among potential migrants that their situation at home may improve rather than deteriorate over time. It is important to keep in mind that the majority of international migrants do move through legal channels. In North America and Europe (excluding Eastern Europe), where half of the world’s labour migrants reside, the widest existing legal pathways are through family unification, humanitarian admissions, student programmes and highly skilled employment. The channels for low-skilled workers are narrower. Correspondingly, low-skilled migrants in search of work are more likely to resort to illegal migration, and they become the primary targets of enforcement action to deter or prevent unauthorised entries and to remove migrants who are not authorised to stay. The humanitarian impact of legal pathways for low-skilled migrants is also bounded by the breadth of those pathways: whether they give enough opportunity to enough people to diminish irregular flows significantly. Many of the legal channels inspired by humanitarian concerns are, quite rightly, directed toward refugee populations, such as the European Commission’s proposal to resettle 50,000 refugees from Africa in order to deter irregular migration and disrupt the business model of human trafficking (Nielson 2017). But many of the migrants trying to reach Europe via North Africa or the United States via Mexico are not likely to be recognised as refugees, but as ‘economic migrants’, although many have been forced to leave their homes owing to circumstances beyond their control, such as organised criminal violence, class-based oppression or environmental degradation that undermines livelihoods. Humanitarian pathways of legal migration are not likely to accommodate many low-skilled migrants seeking work. The development rationale for opening legal pathways to low-skilled migrants has a broader application. There is ample evidence that authorised migration is more beneficial for migrants than unauthorised migration, as migrants with legal status are able to get better jobs and are less prone to exploitation. Legal status comes with protections which, even if imperfect, are superior to those available to unauthorised workers. The ability to work in a developed country is clearly associated with poverty reduction in the country of origin as migrants remit money to their families,3 some of which is invested in health, education, productive assets and business development (Newland 2013). Poverty reduction, better health and increased access to education are themselves markers of development and build a base for sustainable economic and human development. Migrants’ remittances also have a major impact on the macroeconomic stability of many developing countries, as the major source of foreign exchange inflows supporting the balance of payments. In the longer term, diaspora communities of migrant origin may open new 3

Aggregated cross-country data compiled by World Bank researchers showed that a 10% increase in international migrants as a share of population led to a 1.9% decline in the number of poor people in the country of origin (Ratha 2013).

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trading relationships, make or channel investments, transfer technology and connect their homelands with networks of knowledge and influence if the environment in the country of origin is conducive to such developments. It is clear, however, that migration alone cannot solve structural obstacles to development, such as lack of infrastructure, unresolved ethnic or religious divisions and low standards of governance, as measured by corruption, lack of transparency and inability to implement laws and policies. Development cooperation can address these obstacles and strengthen the potential contribution of migrants to the development of their countries and communities of origin.

11.4

The Dimensions of Legal Pathways for Low-Skilled Migrants

Admissions of low-skilled workers vary along several dimensions: time, geography and sector.

11.4.1 The Temporal Dimension Permanent admissions of low-skilled migrant workers are rare. Most people without formal qualifications who are able to obtain permanent legal status with work authorisation in a wealthier country do so indirectly through family or humanitarian channels. Some countries that receive a large number of refugees or admit relatives of legally residing immigrants on liberal terms may be able to fill most of their labour market needs in low-waged occupations with people who arrive through these programmes, although restrictions on the ability of refugees, asylum seekers or family migrants to work can block this channel. One risk of indirect channels for low-waged work is that some of the migrants who occupy those positions may not actually be low-skilled but have skills or qualifications that are not recognised in the country of destination (Batalova et al. 2016). This can lead to ‘brain waste’, an outcome that reduces the benefits of migration for countries of origin and destination as well as for over-qualified migrants and their families.

11.4.2 Countries of Destination Countries of destination generally prefer low-skilled migrants to enter through temporary employment programmes, preferring not to add low-waged workers who are likely to be poor in local terms to their permanent populations (even though the wages earned in the country of destination may put them in reach of middle-class status in the country of origin). As a consequence, most OECD countries have some kind of temporary migration programmes for low-skilled workers, the most common being programmes for seasonal work.

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Temporary labour migration programmes are often criticised for failing to safeguard the rights of migrant workers. At best, such programmes inhibit the integration of migrants into the country of destination; indeed, that is often part of their purpose. But temporary status is problematic for temporary workers who remain marginalised despite long or frequently repeated stays in the country of destination. On the other hand, a temporary stay can enable a major increase in income for the migrant worker without a long-lasting separation from family and community. Some migrants may prefer this pattern, especially if a temporary stay can be repeated if the migrant so wishes. The back-and-forth movement across the US-Mexico border before border enforcement was stepped up in the 1980s indicated, as do other examples, that when migrants can circulate freely, they do (Newland et al. 2008). New Zealand has been a pioneer of seasonal migration within a development frame through its Recognized Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme. The RSE programme started in 2007, with support for effective recruitment coming from New Zealand’s development assistance and labour ministries. In a much-cited example of good practice, evaluation was built into the design of the scheme, with two economists, John Gibson and David McKenzie, gathering baseline data and then conducting surveys over four years to trace the effect of the scheme on participating households in two countries – Tonga and Vanuatu – that provided about half of the RSE workers. The income gains for households with an RSE worker were in the region of 40%. In addition to higher income and even higher subjective feelings of economic welfare, the participating households were more likely to open bank accounts, improve their housing, purchase durable goods and, in Tonga, see more of their children aged 15-18 attend secondary school (Gibson/McKenzie 2010). Michael Clemens and Hannah Postel from the Center for Global Development have argued that short-term overseas work authorisation could be incorporated into development assistance programmes and that it compares favourably to more traditional forms of aid. They studied the impact of a small pilot programme for Haitian temporary agricultural workers in the US. They were able to compare the workers selected for the programme with similar workers, who applied but were not selected, and observed that the monthly income of the migrant workers was 15 times that of those who were not able to migrate. Between one and two months of work in the US was enough to double the annual income of the participating workers. Temporary work had two additional advantages: it brought economic gains in the country of destination as well as the country of origin and most of the benefits went directly to poor families, as the temporary workers brought more than 85% of their income back to Haiti. There, the money they spent generated multiplier effects equal to twice the workers’ direct expenditures (Clemens/Postel 2017). Structured temporary work programmes may be beneficial for migrants and their employers and, by extension, for countries of origin and destination, as the examples above illustrate. But in many cases, temporary work visas present problems of protection and fairness. They often tie the worker to a single employer, giving the worker limited recourse if the employer is abusive or does not live up to the terms of a contract. When the demand for work abroad exceeds the supply of

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visas, unscrupulous middlemen, such as recruiters, travel agents and legal advisors, can skim off considerable parts of the difference between what the employer is willing to pay and what the migrant is willing to accept. This kind of arbitrage can result in migrants getting trapped in debt bondage, with high fees absorbing nearly all their earnings abroad for some period of time. To avoid human rights problems of this kind and achieve development dividends, temporary migration programmes must be carefully designed and monitored and their terms enforced. For example, the recruitment of Haitian workers in the small temporary agricultural work programme studied by Clemens/Postel (2017) was handled by two agricultural workers’ cooperatives in Haiti, which did not arbitrage the earnings of the migrants. Several countries have enlisted the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to assist with recruitment in the context of bilateral agreements, such as Ecuador and Spain, and Canada and its partners in the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP). Other countries recruit through state agencies. None of these patterns are immune to problems of corruption, misleading claims and excessive fees, but the problems are worse when there are many recruitment agents and sub-agents operating in a lightly or ineffectively regulated environment where the demand for jobs abroad far outstrips supply. For policy-makers in countries of destination, temporary migration of low-skilled workers has the advantage of achieving a compromise between filling labour market needs for the low-waged jobs that most native-born workers shun and avoiding an increase in permanently resident foreign workers (who may be quick to move out of the low-wage sectors for which they were recruited if they have the opportunity). Thus, South Korea has a programme that provides temporary work permits for 55,000 workers per year from 16 Asian and Pacific countries (Park 2017), and Canada’s Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program admits about 18,000 workers for up to eight months of work in a given year, the majority of whom return for work in subsequent seasons (Canadian Council for Refugees et al. 2016). The US H-2A visa programme for temporary agricultural workers more than doubled in the five years to 2016, when 135,000 visas were issued, although unauthorised migrants still far outnumbered H-2A visa holders in the agricultural sector (Martin 2017). For many labour rights advocates, temporary status is inherently problematic because migrant workers on temporary contracts face limits on their access to civil, political, economic and social rights. In some programmes, rights accumulate with the length of stay or successful repetition of cycles of temporary work, but this is exceptional. Most low-skilled temporary migrant workers, for example, cannot enjoy the right to family life when they work abroad and most cannot participate fully in national politics. In some countries, they are forbidden to join trade unions. They can be sent home or be ineligible for contract renewal in case of an economic downturn in the country of destination. In most cases, the right to reside is tied to employment. Spain’s arrangement with Ecuador is an example of good practice in those migrant workers who successfully complete four cycles of temporary employment (and return home between cycles) are eligible for permanent resident status (Newland et al. 2008).

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11.4.3 The Sectoral Dimension Certain categories of work cannot be outsourced or automated but remain relatively low-productivity in conventional economic terms: child care and elder care, domestic service, many forms of agricultural labour, food preparation and service, construction, hospitality, landscaping, low-skilled health care jobs and many others. In many Western industrialised countries, jobs in these sectors are dominated by immigrants. Higher levels of education among the native-born, increasing affluence in some countries, aging societies, pressure on public expenditures, the decline of the extended family and the increased participation of women in the formal labour force are among the trends that have both increased the demand for the goods and services produced in these sectors and reduced the supply of native-born workers willing to provide them at prices most people can afford. In many countries, restrictions on the immigration of low-skilled workers and the failure to organise other means of delivering needed care and services has meant that low-waged jobs are often filled by unauthorised migrants (Triandafyllidou 2017). The contours of low-waged labour are deeply gendered by sector: domestic work, food service and direct personal care (child care, elder care and nursing assistance) are dominated by women, and agriculture, landscaping, construction and semi-skilled manufacturing by men. Avenues of admission for low-skilled migrants, which as noted above are mainly temporary, are more common for male-dominated jobs, particularly seasonal jobs in agriculture, landscaping and construction. Of course, there are exceptions to these patterns: strawberry pickers in Spain, for example, are mostly Moroccan women (González Enriquéz/Reynés Ramón 2011). There is some logic in offering temporary admissions for temporary jobs, but the sectors in which women make up most of the workforce are for the most part not seasonal or temporary. People who hire a migrant woman to care for their children or elderly relatives, for example, do not want to have to develop a relationship with a new employee every six months or every year (although low pay and difficult working conditions may encourage high turnover in personal services or domestic work). The lack of legal channels for migrants to fill low-paid, in-demand jobs that are traditionally thought of as ‘women’s work’ creates particular vulnerabilities. Unauthorised migrants who provide domestic and care services within an employer’s household are among the least protected workers in high-income countries.

11.4.4 The Geographical Dimension Migration between neighbouring countries is most common. More than a third of international migrants from the South go to another country in the South, and 80% of them to a neighbouring country (Ratha/Shaw 2007). Among the largest South-South flows are those between India and Bangladesh, Thailand and Myanmar, Indonesia and Malaysia, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, and Mozambique and South Africa. Other huge flows between neighbouring states are US-Mexico,

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Germany-Poland, Spain-Morocco and Russia-Ukraine cross-border movements. Long-standing cross-border movements often persist even after legal regimes change. For example, a large-scale guest worker regime in the US designed to replace US labourers with Mexicans during World War II and extending into the 1960s (the ‘Bracero Programme’) established patterns of low-skilled labour migration that continued, often illegally, for decades after the programme was ended (Martin 1989). After the break-up of the Soviet Union, labour migration continued, encouraged within a new legal framework, from the less developed former Soviet Republics into the Russian Federation. Migration geography is also shaped by historical/colonial ties and the dense networks of family and community ties that follow, sustaining flows from Indonesia/Suriname to the Netherlands, from Ecuador and Colombia to Spain and from former colonies in Africa to France, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom (UK). The linguistic ties between metropolitan powers and countries in their spheres of influence facilitate quick labour market integration. Managing temporary labour programmes is more complicated for countries whose languages are not widely spoken abroad, such as Norway or even Germany; the effort required to teach and learn a new language may not offer a good return on investment if the only migration options are temporary. Other migration flows are shaped by supply and demand, such as those from South and Southeast Asia to the Gulf, with the added dimension of preference for visible minorities (rather than migrants from populous Arab countries nearby) who are less likely to be able to integrate locally. Some labour migration programmes are set up independently of geographic or historical ties, recognising legal pathways for low-skilled migrant workers as a policy instrument in one or more domains – migration cooperation and development assistance being the most common. The circular migration scheme between Mauritius and Canada was motivated in part by the desire to provide opportunities for labour migration to the people of a well-governed but physically isolated country (Government of Mauritius 2012). The European Union’s ‘Neighbourhood Policy’ expands the concept of neighbourhood beyond immediately contiguous countries and extends it to low and middle-income countries with which EU members have a migration relationship. Opening opportunities for legal migration is one way of enhancing and rewarding cooperation on migration issues with countries of origin; reducing them is a potent expression of dissatisfaction with migration cooperation.

11.5

The Architecture of Legal Pathways

The most permissive architecture of legal migration can be found in areas of free movement, which include both bilateral and regional agreements. Citizens of Australia and New Zealand, for example, can move between and work in both

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countries with very few restrictions. Citizens of EU Member States are considered ‘EU citizens’ and similarly have the right to reside and work throughout the Union. Other broad regional arrangements include MERCOSUR in South America, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), covering 11 states formerly part of the Soviet Union, and ECOWAS in West Africa, which accord the citizens of member states varying degrees of free movement. MERCOSUR and the CIS have some labour market dimensions. For countries with low rates of labour force growth or difficulty in attracting native-born workers to low-wage jobs, expanding free movement and the right to work to a broader area with a lower wage scale is one way to fill labour market needs. It can, however, cause a backlash, as was seen in the salience of intra-EU migration in the UK’s Brexit vote. Free movement can also be difficult to sustain in high social protection states, as residents must either bear the costs of extending full social protection to low-earning migrant workers or live with the discomforts (both moral and relational) of a poorly integrated and underprivileged class of residents. Some countries opt for explicit or de facto ‘soft borders’ that permit cross-border labour movements without formally adopting such a policy. This was the reality of the US-Mexico border in the past and of the Romania-Moldova border currently. Romanian citizenship law is permissive toward Moldovans, so that many Moldovan migrants to Romania may not appear as such in immigration statistics. The ambiguity in soft border arrangements may create tensions between the countries involved if the policy is unilateral and leaves migrants vulnerable to sudden shifts in policy implementation. Some trade agreements also have a migration dimension. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is one such, but its labour dimension is confined to highly qualified migrants, as are many similar agreements. Global agreements on trade under the auspices of the World Trade Organization include the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), a treaty signed in 1995, which makes provision for the movement of persons to provide services, known as GATS Mode 4. Implementation requires the negotiation of specific agreements which, in theory, could provide for the movement of low-skilled migrants. Developing countries have pushed for such agreements, but in reality almost no deals have been agreed under GATS Mode 4 covering low-skilled workers. Effectively, GATS Mode 4 has a very limited application, and even that applies almost exclusively to highly qualified employees, chiefly those who are being transferred to a different location within the same company (Chanda 2009). Bilateral agreements are the preferred path for many governments. Unlike GATS Mode 4 agreements (which operate under the ‘most favoured nation’ norm) or even regional arrangements, bilateral pacts can be tailored to the specific needs of the destination country’s labour market and can take account of particular historic or linguistic affinities with countries of origin. Admission of migrant workers can be, and frequently is, packaged with other issues such as cooperation in efforts to suppress unauthorised migration or acceptance of the return of nationals to the country of origin (or even of transit migrants). As some of the examples described above show, bilateral agreements on legal pathways can be designed as part of a

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development assistance strategy. Because they involve only two countries, bilateral agreements are simpler to negotiate and monitor and compliance issues can be more easily addressed. In addition, bilateral agreements are normally non-binding (unless they are part of a treaty) and can be changed or ended if circumstances so require (Chanda 2009).

11.6

Conclusions and Recommendations

Legal pathways for low-skilled migrants have proven their worth in terms of migration management, humanitarian response and development assistance, and yet the channels remain narrow for most migrants without advanced skills and qualifications. The major exception to this rule is the Gulf, where low-skilled migrants outnumber the local population in many countries but operate within a regime of severely restricted rights. The experience with legal migration channels for the low-skilled has shown some expectations fulfilled and others disappointed. There should, at this time, be few surprises. Legal migration reduces the severity of poverty – although not necessarily its incidence – and often promotes human capital development in countries of origin. It may underwrite the stability of families in settings where traditional livelihoods are being undermined by structural economic change or environmental degradation. This has been the experience of workers from Pacific islands affected by rising sea levels, who work seasonally under New Zealand’s RSE scheme, for example. Low-skilled workers may be exposed to new practices and technologies (drip irrigation, for example) that can contribute to development in the country of origin when returning migrants implement them at home. Women migrants or women who assume de facto head-of-household roles when men migrate may overturn restrictive gender roles that hold back development. But there are disappointments associated with existing legal pathways as well. In the first place, they do not stop irregular migration. This has always been an unrealistic expectation, but experience shows that both legal and unauthorised migration slow and eventually stabilise when complex economic, political and social factors converge. Migration improves the ability of migrants, their families and their countries of origin to weather the storms of economic transformation, but it can also have negative social consequences for low, high and middle-skilled migrants, chiefly relating to family separation. Low-skilled migrants, however, are the least likely to be allowed to bring families with them when they migrate or to be able to afford to support families in the country of destination on a low-wage job. Migration without family may be the best of a limited range of choices for these migrant workers, and the choices they make deserve respect. Policy-makers dealing with low-skilled migration need to continue giving attention to the regulation of recruitment, since low-wage workers are especially vulnerable to the arbitrage of middlemen. The governments of countries of origin

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need to improve the protection of migrant workers, especially those on temporary contracts. Access to justice and improved protection are areas in which countries of origin and countries of destination benefit from cooperation; sub-standard wages and working conditions for migrant workers undermine protection and earnings for the native-born as well. On the assumption that bilateral agreements will continue to be the preferred mechanisms for establishing legal pathways for low-skilled migrants, it is important to identify the characteristics of agreements that have proven beneficial to countries of origin, countries of destination and migrant workers – the famous but elusive ‘triple win’. The general qualities of satisfactory agreements, which may be found in regional and multilateral pacts as well as bilateral ones, are clarity, transparency and detailed specificity. Ambiguities should, as far as possible, be eliminated in the definitions of the categories of workers, jobs, terms and conditions of employment, minimum wages, length of stay, transfer from one employer to another, recruitment, quotas, the possibility of adjustment to permanent residence and a host of other characteristics covered in a labour agreement. Once the details are pinned down, implementation should be flexible, taking account of individual needs and changing labour market conditions. While agreements have to be detailed, the bureaucratic burden of meeting requirements for hiring migrant workers and demonstrating compliance with the conditions of work must not be so onerous that both employers and migrant workers prefer unauthorised channels. Implementing legal pathways calls for close cooperation between the countries of origin and destination. They must each be able to maintain confidence in the actions of partner countries, placing a premium on the institutional integrity of both private and public sector actors across the migration spectrum. A national or binational (or multilateral in the case of regional or cross-regional agreements) ombudsman’s office could be an effective instrument for maintaining transparency and investigating abuses. Several countries have built in a role for IOM in the implementation of bilateral agreements, and this is a capacity that could be further developed and utilised. It would be wise for more countries to follow the good practice of New Zealand and build impact evaluation into the design of legal channels for low-skilled migrants. For this and other forms of monitoring, an investment in high-quality data is essential. Direct and indirect calls for legal pathways to facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration have proliferated: they can be found in Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the Sutherland Report and the New York Declaration, to name just some of the most recent. The Global Compact on Migration can also be expected to give a central place to this ambition. Translation from words into reality requires a commitment to cooperative action that is simultaneously broader in scope and more specific in content.

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References Batalova, Jeanne, Michael Fix, and James D. Bachmeier. 2016. Untapped Talent: The Costs of Brain Waste among Highly Skilled Immigrants in the United States. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/untapped-talent-costsbrain-waste-among-highly-skilled-immigrants-united-states. Accessed 3 September 2020. Canadian Council for Refugees, Affiliation of Multicultural Societies and Service Agencies of BC, Alberta Association of Immigrant Serving Agencies, and Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants. 2016. Migrant Workers: Precarious and Unsupported. A Canada-wide study on access to services for migrant workers. http://ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/migrant-workers2016.pdf. Accessed 3 September 2020. Chanda, Rupa. 2009. Mobility of Less-Skilled Workers under Bilateral Agreements: Lessons for the GATS. Journal of World Trade 43(3): 479–506. Clemens, Michael, and Hannah Postel. 2017. Shared Harvest: Temporary Work Visas as US-Haiti Development Cooperation. Washington DC: Center for Global Development. https://www. cgdev.org/publication/shared-harvest. Accessed 3 September 2020. Gibson, John, and David McKenzie. 2010. The development impact of a best practice seasonal worker policy. Washington DC: World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813–9450-5488 González Enríquez, Carmen, and Miquel Reynés Ramón. 2011. Circular Migration between Morocco and Spain: Something more than agricultural work? Florence: European University Institute. http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/19727. Accessed 3 September 2020. Government of Mauritius. 2012. Circular Migration: More Mauritian workers to take employment in Canada. http://www.google.de/url?sa = t&rct = j&q = &esrc = s&source = web&cd = 1&ved = 0ahUKEwjW2_XCmNXaAhWGEywKHQkHADwQFgguMAA&url = http%3A %2F%2Fwww.govmu.org%2FEnglish%2FNews%2FPages%2FCircular-Migration–MoreMauritian-Workers-to-take-Employment-in-Canada.aspx&usg = AOvVaw2JbuukF0CuFT5iultW_o1r. Accessed 3 September 2020. ILO. 1949. Migration for Employment Convention (Revised). C097. Geneva: International Labour Organization. http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:: P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312242. Accessed 3 September 2020. ILO. 2015. ILO Global Estimates on Migrant Workers. Geneva: International Labour Organization. http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/publications/WCMS_436343/lang– en/index.htm. Accessed 3 September 2020. IOM. 2017. Migrant Deaths and Disappearances Worldwide: 2016 Analysis. GMDAC Data Briefing Series. Issue No. 8. https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/gmdac_data_briefing_ series_issue_8.pdf. Accessed 3 September 2020. Martin, Philip L. 1989. Labor Migration and Economic Development. Washington DC.: Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development. https://books.google.bj/books?id=V24PAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=de&source= gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false. Accessed 3 September 2020. Martin, Philip L. 2017. Immigration and Farm Labor: From unauthorized to H-2A for some? Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/ immigration-and-farm-labor-unauthorized-h-2a-some. Accessed 3 September 2020. Newland, Kathleen. 2013. What We Know about Migration and Development. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/what-we-know-aboutmigration-and-development. Accessed 3 September 2020. Newland, Kathleen, Dovelyn Agunias, and Aaron Terrazas. 2008. Learning by Doing: Experiences of circular migration. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute. https://www. migrationpolicy.org/research/learning-doing-experiences-circular-migration. Accessed 3 September 2020.

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Nielson, Nikolaj. 2017. EU proposes to resettle 50,000 African Refugees. EUobserver. September 28. https://euobserver.com/migration/139191. Accessed 3 September 2020. Park, Young-bum. 2010. South Korea carefully tests the waters on immigration, With a focus on temporary workers. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy. org/article/south-korea-carefully-tests-waters-immigration-focus-temporary-workers. Accessed 3 September 2020. Ratha, Dilip, and William Shaw. 2007. South-South Migration and Remittances. Washington DC: World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6733/400060PUB 0REPL00Box317534B00PUBLIC0.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y. Accessed 3 September 2020. Ratha, Dilip. 2013. The Impact of Remittances on Economic Growth and poverty Reduction. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/impactremittances-economic-growth-and-poverty-reduction. Accessed 3 September 2020. Triandafyllidou, Anna. 2017. A Sectorial Approach to Labor Migration: Agriculture and Domestic Work. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. https://publications.iom.int/books/sectorialapproach-labour-migration-agriculture-and-domestic-work. Accessed 3 September 2020. UN General Assembly. 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. New York: United Nations. www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. Accessed 3 September 2020. UN General Assembly. 1990. International Convention on the Protection of the rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. New York: United Nations. http://www. ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CMW.aspx. Accessed 3 September 2020. UN General Assembly. 2016. Outcome document of the High-Level Plenary Meeting on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants: The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. New York: United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/ population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_71_1.pdf. Accessed 3 September 2020.

Kathleen Newland is a Senior Fellow and Co-Founder of the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) in Washington DC, United States of America (USA). Her work focuses on the governance of international migration, the relationship between migration and development, and refugee protection. Prior to MPI’s establishment in July 2001, Newland co-directed the International Migration Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. Earlier, she was a Lecturer in international political economy at the London School of Economics (1988–92) and Special Assistant to the Rector of the United Nations University (1982–87). She has worked as a consultant to the International Labor Organization, the International Organization for Migration, the Office of the Secretary General of the United Nations, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the World Bank. Newland is a Member of the Board of Directors of Kids in Need of Defense (KIND), a nonprofit organization that provides pro bono legal services to unaccompanied children caught up in the US immigration system. She has served on the Boards of Directors of the International Rescue Committee, the Stimson Center, USA for UNHCR, and the Foundation for the Hague Process on Migrants and Refugees. She is also a Chair Emerita of the Women’s Refugee Commission. Newland is the author or editor of nine books, including most recently All at Sea: The Policy Challenges of Rescue, Interception, and Long-Term Response to Maritime Migration. She has also written more than 50 policy papers, articles, and book chapters. Newland is a graduate of Harvard University and the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University. She did additional graduate work at the London School of Economics.

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Having worked on migration issues for 14 years at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Andrea Riester is currently working as Departmental Advisor for the Head of Department for procurement and contracting, property and language services at GIZ in Eschborn, Germany. Before joining GIZ in 2004, she worked at the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Migration Department in Paris. In 2011, she received her PhD from Martin-Luther University Halle/Wittenberg in cooperation with the Max-Planck Institute for Social Anthropology for a thesis on the reintegration of Burkinabè labour migrants displaced from Côte d’Ivoire.

Community Sponsorship of Refugees

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Abstract

This chapter identifies community sponsorship as a promising approach to refugee protection. It situates the potential of sponsorship within the global system; discusses the specific programs that are emerging in Canada, the United Kingdom and Argentina; and explains the key policy settings that underpin each approach. It also notes growing global momentum around community sponsorship and sets out the history, objectives, and evolving role of the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative. The piece concludes that although additional longitudinal and comparative research is necessary, a growing body of evidence supports the potential of community sponsorship to improve integration and strengthen host communities.

12.1

The Potential of Community Sponsorship1

In this moment of historically high levels of displacement and a growing deficit of political support for meaningful refugee protection, one promising approach has captured imaginations around the world: giving local citizens primary responsibility for welcoming and integrating refugees arriving to their communities via government-facilitated pathways. Canada, which pioneered this approach by establishing a robust ‘community sponsorship’ program in the 1970s, has proven

1

We owe thanks for research and editorial support to Dr. Eliza Bateman, Ania Kwadrans and Sezgi Karacan. All errors and omissions are of course our own.

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-J. Preuß et al. (eds.), Forced Displacement and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32902-0_12

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the model’s potential, and millions of Canadians across the country have directly supported more than 327,000 refugees over the past forty years (IRCC 2019a). Motivated by a shared goal of seeing community sponsorship grow in other countries, the Government of Canada, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the Open Society Foundations announced the formation of the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative (GRSI) on 18 September 2016 on the margins of the United Nations (UN) Summit on Refugees and Migrants. The new partnership aimed to encourage and support the establishment of community sponsorship programs around the world. The Giustra Foundation2 and the University of Ottawa joined the GRSI before it was formally launched in December 2016. During its first year of operations, the GRSI responded to significant interest in community sponsorship and began working with government officials and civil society champions from around the world, including in the United Kingdom (UK), Argentina, New Zealand, and Ireland (GRSI 2017, p. 1). In the same year, Pope Francis made a public call for more countries to adopt community sponsorship programs (Holy See Press Office 2017), and Amnesty International began explicitly promoting sponsorship as part of its global ‘I Welcome’ campaign (Amnesty International n.d). Momentum around community sponsorship has continued to grow. Fourteen countries outside of Canada have now announced sponsorship pilots or programs, and the GRSI is actively supporting dozens of governments and community organizations studying, designing, or implementing initiatives. It has also formed a dedicated GRSI Sponsorship States Network, aimed at providing a platform for sharing best practices and resources. This network is currently co-chaired by Canada and the UK. Further, the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) (UN General Assembly 2018)3 has explicitly encouraged states to “establish private or community sponsorship programmes” (UN General Assembly 2018, p. 38), and the UNHCR has identified sponsorship as a means of supporting all three goals in the corresponding Three-Year Strategy on Resettlement and Complementary Pathways: growing resettlement, advancing complementary pathways, and building welcoming societies (UNHCR 2019a). Perhaps most significantly, there are now tens of thousands of active and enthusiastic refugee sponsors in communities all around the world (GRSI 2019a). We helped form the GRSI and are encouraged by this progress. We also recognize that neither community sponsorship nor the broader structure of legal pathways to which it attaches can provide full solutions to the myriad of profound challenges facing the global refugee system. Some of the underlying limitations are obvious: opportunities are restricted to the relatively small number of individuals who both meet a technical assessment for refugee status and are fortunate enough to be selected for participation in a government-facilitated pathway; encouraging long-distance movements from regions of origin is expensive, logistically and morally complicated, and fraught with the challenges associated with familial and 2

Formally the Radcliffe Foundation. See: https://giustrafoundation.org/about/. The GCR is the international community’s most recent multilateral framework for addressing refugee situations and realizing international responsibility sharing commitments. 3

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cultural separation; and even if current efforts to grow various legal pathways for refugees are dramatically scaled (which we believe they should be), there will always be political and pragmatic restrictions to the number of individuals who will benefit from these forms of protection. Nonetheless, government-facilitated pathways do provide long-term solutions for tens-of-thousands of refugees each year, many of whom are suffering in countries of first asylum. They constitute legal, ordered forms of migration that offer significant control to the receiving state (destination countries have the luxury of selecting and screening refugees abroad, and are able to anticipate and plan for arrivals), while simultaneously facilitating some degree of genuine responsibility-sharing amongst global actors. The significance of the latter point is evidenced by the fact that while countries in developing regions host an astonishing 85% of the world’s refugees (UNHCR 2020a, p. 2), the top five resettlement countries in 2019/2020 are prosperous members of the G20 (UNHCR 2020b, p. 16).4 At a time when the international community has explicitly acknowledged that the rapidly growing refugee and migrant population requires “global approaches and global solutions” (UN General Assembly 2016, p. 2), dramatically expanding legal pathways can, and must, be part of the strategy to fundamentally re-align how the overall protection system operates. Within this broader context, we believe that community sponsorship presents one of the most significant opportunities to help scale government-facilitated protection pathways, in part because the model can leverage a broad base of public and private resources, is less restricted by the availability of professionalized services, and can lead to better integration outcomes for refugees. Even more significantly, community sponsorship has the potential to engage a wide range of citizens and bring together host communities in meaningful ways, which can, in turn, create broad and diverse constituencies supportive of welcoming newcomers (Macklin et al. 2018; Bond 2020). From our perspective, the prospect of expanding this base of community-level support is one of the most important potential benefits of pursuing community sponsorship programs, since more grassroots champions can ultimately drive both an expansion of legal pathways and a reanimation of the broader protection agenda—critical and paramount considerations in today’s highly politicized environment (Yudkin et al. 2019). The great potential of community sponsorship is not merely hypothetical. While some of the positive outcomes we believe are possible will require nascent sponsorship initiatives to mature and scale, Canada’s long-running sponsorship program demonstrates the power of the model. The next section offers a glimpse into this flagship 4

It is estimated that between 2009 and 2019, 86% of all UNHCR resettlement submissions were made to the United States (55%), Canada (20%) and Australia (11%) (UNHCR 2020a). Further, the UNHCR reports in its Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2021 report that: “[a]lmost 50 per cent of resettlement cases were submitted to the USA and Canada in 2019 (39,461). The third highest number of submissions were to Germany with 9,640, which represents a 125 per cent increase from the previous years. Also, in the top five countries receiving submissions in 2019 were Australia (7,048) and Sweden (5,408), with increases of 67 per cent and 9 per cent respectively compared to 2018” (UNHCR 2020b, p. 16).

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program, as well as into newer sponsorship initiatives in the UK and Argentina. The final section elaborates on the formation and objectives of the GRSI and its work to support the growth of community sponsorship programs around the world.

12.2

Three Models of Community Sponsorship

12.2.1 Canada: A Well-Established Sponsorship Program Canada’s community sponsorship system has evolved significantly since its inception in the late 1970s (Molloy et al. 2017),5 and today it comprises a number of unique program streams. The most well-known and largest stream is the Private Sponsorship of Refugees (PSR) program, which allows Canadian sponsors to ‘name’ or ‘nominate’ the specific refugees they wish to bring to Canada (IRCC 2019a).6 There is also a Blended Visa Office Referred (BVOR) program, which facilitates the sponsorship of UNHCR-identified refugees, as well as a number of more boutique sub-programs, including the Joint Assistance Sponsorship (JAS) program, which focuses on sponsorship of refugees with particularly acute needs, and the Rainbow Refugee Assistance Partnership (RRAP), which focuses on sponsorship of refugees persecuted on the basis of their sexual orientation or gender identity (IRCC 2019b). Innovative community groups also use Canada’s PSR program as the basis for a wide range of unique initiatives targeted to particular refugee populations or objectives. These include dedicated and sophisticated programs focused on the sponsorship of refugee students (WUSC 2020),7 refugee workers (RSTP 2019a),8 survivors of torture (Lamp, Lifeboat, Ladder n.d.)9 and many others. Canadian sponsorship groups can be formed by five or more eligible Canadian citizens or permanent residents (‘Groups of Five’), or by qualifying organizations, The programme was operationalized in response to the mass exodus of people fleeing Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. 6 Nominated individuals must meet the definition of ‘refugee’ under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or fall within Canada’s Country of Asylum class, which extends protection to individuals (a) outside their country of origin and (b) seriously affected by conflict or denied basic human rights on an ongoing basis. 7 For example, the World University Service of Canada Student Refugee Program supports the sponsorship of over 130 refugee students per year through active partnerships with over 95 Canadian university campuses. WUSC reports that “crucial to the program’s success is its unique youth-to-youth sponsorship model which empowers young Canadians to play an active role in the sponsorship of refugee students” (WUSC 2020). 8 For example, the Fairmont Whistler Resort Project, in which a major Canadian hotel chain partnered with local refugee sponsors to provide jobs in hospitality for qualified refugee newcomers sponsored to the community. 9 For example, Lamp, Lifeboat, Ladder, a public-private project that facilitates the resettlement to Canada of 90 refugee families who are torture survivors (approximately 500 newcomers in total). This is a first-of-its-kind partnership agreement between the Canadian government, global law firm Reed Smith, the Canadian Center for Victims of Torture (CCVT) and other Canadian and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 5

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associations, or corporations. Certain entities may also seek to enter into special agreements with the Government of Canada to undertake numerous or repeat sponsorships. These groups become known as ‘Sponsorship Agreement Holders’ (SAHs),10 and once certified they benefit from more lenient assessments of both group eligibility and capacity to sponsor for each individual case. Many SAHs are faith-based organizations or ethno-cultural groups, a number of which helped found Canada’s original PSR program and have been sponsoring consistently over decades. Sponsorship groups across all of Canada’s streams undertake to provide settlement support to newcomers, which includes finding and furnishing housing; supporting orientation to the community and relevant services; providing income assistance (the exact amount varies by program); assisting with employment searches; and registering newcomers for relevant programs including language training, school, and health insurance. Sponsors are also responsible for providing emotional support, cultural orientation, and friendship to their new neighbours (RSTP 2019b). Each year, the Government of Canada announces overall immigration targets which delineate how many individuals it plans to admit through each of its legal pathways for refugees, including those supported by sponsorship groups. Before disruptions relating to COVID-19, the Canadian Government anticipated welcoming approximately 10,700 newcomers as Government Assisted Refugees (GARs) and 21,000 newcomers through its various sponsorship streams (1,000 as BVORs and 20,000 as PSRs) in 2020 (IRCC 2020a). The Canadian experience has demonstrated that community sponsorship can both protect refugees and animate communities. A variety of studies have presented consistent longitudinal data demonstrating that sponsored refugees tend to integrate comparatively quickly,11 even when pre-arrival differences in education, age, and language abilities are controlled for (Kaida et al. 2020).12 Sponsors also consistently report that the act of sponsoring brings their own communities together, with residents developing new friendships and creating large, supportive, and diverse groups that are able to work together on a common project even before the newcomer arrives (Eggertson 2016). Sponsorship has also provided opportunities for rural communities to revitalize (Kumin 2015, p. 20; Cronkite et al. 2017), and for 10

There are currently more than one hundred SAHs across Canada (IRCC 2020b). Within five years of arrival, approximately 70% of PSRs have fulltime employment, compared to 57% of GARs. Twenty years after arrival, the median income of PSRs is also higher than the median Canadian income, while the median income of GARs is almost as high as the median Canadian income (1993–2013 cohort) (Mehler Paperny 2016). In the twelve months following their arrival, only 25% of PSRs reported social assistance usage, compared with 93% of GARs (IRCC 2016; Kaida et al. 2020). 12 The study focuses on the integration outcomes of individuals who landed in Canada as PSRs or GARs, aged 20-54 between 1980 and 2009. The study does not take into account difference attached to the various categories of sponsored refugees (such as Blended Visa Office-Referred refugees) “because of small sample sizes or stark differences in characteristics which would make comparison difficult” (Kaida et al. 2020, p. 10). This reflects a general constraint in the Canadian data, which provides limited comparisons between sponsored and un-sponsored UNHCR-referred refugees. For a nuanced discussion on these and other limitations in Canadian comparative data on integration, see Hyndman and Hynie (2016) and Hynie et al. (2019). 11

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previously sponsored refugees to become members of future sponsorship groups—a feature that was powerfully visible in 2015 when many Vietnamese-Canadians who had been sponsored in the 1980s welcomed Syrian refugees (Stewart 2016). Canada’s sponsorship program has also demonstrated the potential for scale and thus broader political impact. Over two million Canadians from approximately 400 communities sponsored refugees between 2015 and 2018, and an additional seven million people had a personal connection to a sponsor during that same period (Environics 2018, p. 35). While at the time of writing there are no studies directly linking these figures to Canadian views on immigrants and refugees writ large, it is noteworthy that approximately one-third of Canadians have either directly engaged with a refugee-newcomer, or know someone who has. In addition to these personal connections, Canadian media networks regularly profile stories of refugees and their sponsors from primarily positive perspectives (Mahboob 2016), influencing the overall public narrative across the country. This contrasts with the situation in many other countries, where citizens are regularly confronted with overwhelmingly negative media narratives about newcomers (Huggler 2017) and also lack any direct contact with those supporting refugees in their own communities. The ability of sponsorship to generate direct connections and positive, local stories about refugee newcomers is a critical feature of the Canadian program that we believe is intimately connected to the model’s powerful potential.

12.2.2 The UK: A New Sponsorship Program in a Well-Established Resettlement Country The UK is an experienced resettlement country that has welcomed refugees for decades through various government-facilitated pathways, some of which have relied heavily on volunteers working with established community agencies (Refugee Council 2020). In 2015, then Home Secretary Theresa May announced that the government would add a new dimension to the country’s approach to resettlement by developing a formal “community sponsorship scheme … to allow individuals, charities, faith groups, churches and businesses to support refugees directly” (EIN 2015). The resulting ‘Community Sponsorship Scheme’ formally launched on July 19, 2016, initially as part of an overall UK commitment to resettle 20,000 refugees impacted by the Syrian conflict and 3,000 vulnerable children from the Middle East and North Africa (Rudd and Home Office 2016). In 2019, the UK government announced a renewed commitment to refugee resettlement and the continuation of its community sponsorship scheme. It also specified that sponsorship would begin providing additional protection spaces on top of the spaces that would be delivered through the government’s traditional resettlement program13 (Javid and Home Office 2019). COVID-19 suspended arrivals to 13

From 2020, the new resettlement scheme will consolidate three existing UK programmes: the Vulnerable Persons’ Resettlement Scheme (VPRS), the Vulnerable Children’s Resettlement Scheme (VCRS), and the Gateway Protection Programme into a global scheme (UNHCR 2019b).

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the UK and delayed formal transition to the updated commitments, but the new program structure is expected to commence soon after normal operations resume. UK sponsorship groups are required to partner with a registered charity, create a settlement plan and safeguarding policy, secure furnished housing, and obtain various permissions from their local authority. Groups must also include, or be partnered with, at least one individual who has direct experience working with vulnerable persons (Home Office and UK Visas and Immigration 2017, p. 1). As in Canada, UK sponsorship groups are responsible for assisting newcomers with language and cultural supports, providing community and social orientation, and offering friendship and overall support (Phillimore and Reyes 2019, p. 8). Once the UK Home Office approves a sponsorship application, the group is assigned a refugee family from a cohort identified and referred to the UK by the UNHCR (Home Office 2018, p. 10). As with the Canadian BVOR program, sponsors then begin to prepare to welcome and support the new arrivals, including making arrangements to meet them at the airport and take them to their new homes. At the time of writing, thousands of sponsors across the UK have welcomed more than 420 refugees (Wilkins 2020; Home Office 2020). There is also a vibrant ecosystem of dedicated sponsorship organizations committed to growing the country’s sponsorship program, including Reset Communities and Refugees, Sponsor Refugees, UK Welcomes Refugees, Charis Bible College, and the Salvation Army (Phillimore et al. 2019, p. 4). Early studies of the UK community sponsorship scheme have noted positive outcomes. For example, a multi-year study by the University of Birmingham’s Institute for Research into Superdiversity (IRiS) identified several distinct benefits of community sponsorship for both refugees and sponsors, finding a pattern of deep friendships and high levels of personalized support across welcoming communities (Phillimore et al. 2020). Sponsors also reported that the program provided an opportunity to open up their communities, encouraged them to learn from different cultures, and increased respect for immigration and diversity (Reyes and Phillimore 2020). While still preliminary, overall findings from early evaluations of the UK community sponsorship scheme show the same encouraging trends as those noted in the Canadian program over the past four decades.

12.2.3 Argentina: A New Sponsorship Program in a New Resettlement Country Although Argentina has a long history of welcoming newcomers,14 it is not a traditional resettlement country, making its 2016 announcement that it intended to 14

Argentina’s history over the last two centuries has been characterized by waves of immigration. Of note, in the period spanning the late 19th century to early 20th century (1880-1930), known as the era of mass immigration, Argentina received the second highest number of European immigrants worldwide, falling only behind the United States. In the 20th century, migration trends to Argentina shifted from predominantly European in origin to continental migration, with people settling in Argentina from nearby and neighboring countries. This trend has continued into the 21st

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resettle a minimum of 3,000 Syrian refugees particularly welcome by the international community. There have since been significant efforts to support the development of a new resettlement program in Argentina, including via dedicated programs managed by the UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration. Argentina’s nascent resettlement program relies entirely on community sponsorship (Aldwinckle 2017). Refugees are eligible to be resettled if they are persons in need of international protection who are impacted by the Syrian conflict and are: (i) outside Syria and (ii) registered as asylum seekers or recognized refugees either by their country of asylum or by the UNHCR.15 The program facilitates the sponsorship of both named and UNHCR-referred refugees. The Argentinean program allows sponsorship by individuals, groups of three or more citizens, or NGOs (DNM 2019). Individuals can only sponsor refugees with whom they have family links, whereas groups of three and NGOs may sponsor eligible refugees absent kinship ties. In all cases, sponsors must provide furnished accommodation and a living allowance for at least twelve months and, as with the UK and Canadian programs, are also responsible for providing general social and cultural orientation, friendship, and overall support. Sponsorship applications are screened and approved by the Government’s National Migration Directorate. Over 400 newcomers have arrived to sponsorship groups across Argentina since the program began (GRSI 2019b). There is government and community enthusiasm for continuing to resettle refugees, but recent national financial instability, pressures from the Venezuelan migration crisis, and the challenges of COVID-19 have created capacity constraints, particularly at the community level. In 2019 at the Global Refugee Forum, Argentina’s government reaffirmed its commitment to growing its refugee sponsorship program, and at the time of writing, a vibrant network of well-organized community organizations (named ‘Red Argentina de Apoyo al Patrocinio Comunitario de Personas Refugiadas’) is in the process of developing a comprehensive strategy for addressing the challenges, mobilizing more sponsors, and working with the Government to scale the program (Patrocinio Comunitario n.d.).

12.2.4 The Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative The GRSI has been encouraging and supporting the development of community sponsorship programs around the world since it began operations in 2017. The partnership was formally launched as part of three days of consultations that engaged more than 100 participants. Delegates were carefully selected with the century, with the majority of immigrants arriving to Argentina coming from bordering countries (Meter 2014; Organization of American States 2015). 15 Countries of residence are restricted to those mostly affected by the Syrian conflict: Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar. Note that at the time of writing, proposed legislation would extend the Argentinean program to offer protection for refugees from other parts of the world, including those who have no connection to the Syrian conflict.

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objective of convening both experts who understood community sponsorship from a wide range of perspectives and a diversity of international stakeholders with the potential to champion the approach in their own countries. The GRSI also sought to ensure representation from a mix of government, NGOs, and private sector actors, reflecting a shared belief that successful sponsorship programs require engagement and ownership across a wide range of diverse stakeholders. State and community representatives from nine countries attended the GRSI’s initial meetings, as did a number of philanthropic and corporate groups. By the conclusion of the launch events, the GRSI had solidified three over-arching objectives and four primary activity streams that would underpin its first phase of operations (GRSI 2020): Objectives: 1. Increasing refugee resettlement opportunities and improving refugee integration outcomes by engaging governments, community groups, individuals, philanthropists, and businesses in resettlement efforts; 2. Strengthening host communities that come together to welcome newcomers; and 3. Promoting welcoming and inclusive communities and improving the narrative about refugees and other newcomers. Activity streams: 1. Creating accessible and comprehensive policy modules for government and community actors; 2. Recognizing and supporting champions who are willing and able to promote community sponsorship in their local contexts; 3. Providing technical and strategic advisory services to interested parties; and 4. Working with local partners to develop capacity and partnerships in support of new community-based sponsorship programs. With the benefit of these initial consultations, the GRSI began its work. The partnership has since organized many dozens of workshops and bilateral missions aimed at informing both government and community stakeholders about the nuances and potential of community sponsorship and providing technical support for policy development and implementation strategies. As new programs started to take root across the world, the GRSI’s work began to emphasize exploring variations in policy design; connecting stakeholders from different countries with each other; and encouraging peer-to-peer learning opportunities for governments, community organizations, and sponsors themselves. The GRSI has worked to create a global community around community sponsorship. The GRSI has also produced a variety of concrete tools, including various films featuring sponsorship stories from a number of countries, a technical guidebook aimed at supporting stakeholders with detailed policy design relevant to their specific national contexts, and a white label sponsor-training package that brings

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together best practices from around the world. These and other materials aimed at supporting the introduction and growth of community sponsorship programs are available in multiple languages at www.refugeesponsorship.org. Since the GRSI began its work, multiple countries have announced pilot or permanent community sponsorship programs, including Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, and the UK. Political support for sponsorship has also grown, and in 2018 and 2019, respectively, immigration ministers from multiple countries issued joint statements in support of growing community sponsorship programs in their own countries and globally.16 Although we continue to lack longitudinal, comparative, and large-scale studies on the impacts of sponsorship, a growing body of research from across a variety of countries supports the positive potential of these programs for refugees, sponsors, and receiving communities (see for example: Bond and Kwadrans 2019; Bond 2020; Alraie et al. 2018; MBIE 2019; Reyes and Phillimore 2020; Fratzke and Dorst 2019). It is critical to further build on this nascent evidence base, and we applaud increasing commitments to both structured program evaluations and longitudinal government and academic studies. While the formal data around the impacts of community sponsorship continues to accumulate, the programs themselves are already creating local champions, generating positive stories of community-led welcome, and providing glimpses into the potential of the model. A recent UK sponsor explains: “Here in Merton (UK) we have seen the community really come together to support us and the family, and in the process, we’ve made connections that we didn’t previously have… The family always tell us how welcome they have felt here, which is wonderful—and their warmth and bravery are an inspiration to us every day. We’ve grown close to the family and our support for them will never just stop. They’re part of the community now for as long as they want to be” (Salvation Army 2017).

Words like these have been heard for decades in communities across Canada. Now, they are also being heard in the UK, Argentina, and many other countries around the world. The scale of the current displacement crisis demands that we listen and recognize their power and potential.

16

Ministers from Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Argentina, Spain, and New Zealand signed the first GRSI Ministerial Statement on 16 July 2018 (IRCC 2018). The statement underlined State support for community-based refugee sponsorship in advance of the 2018 UN General Assembly and the agreement on the Global Compact on Refugees. Statements made by Ministers in support of sponsorship can be found here: https://refugeesponsorship.org/% 5Fuploads/5b4ca01e5c883.pdf. Ministers from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and Spain signed the Joint Ministerial Statement to underline support for community-based refugee sponsorship at the first Global Refugee Forum in Geneva, December 2019 (GRSI 2019c).

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References Aldwinckle, Jack. 2017. Escaping war at home, Syrian couple start over in Argentina. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2017/4/ 58e4b61a4/escaping-war-home-syrian-couple-start-argentina.html. Accessed 15 September 2020. Alraie, Mahdy, Hannah Collins, and Andrea Rigon. 2018. A comparison of community sponsorship and government-led resettlement of refugees in the UK: Perspectives from newcomers and host communities. London: University College. https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/ development/sites/bartlett/files/comparisonukresettlement_schemes_fullreport.pdf. Accessed 15 September 2020. Amnesty International. n.d. I Welcome: join the movement of people who welcome refugees. https://www.amnesty.org/en/get-involved/i-welcome/. Accessed 4 September 2020. Bond, Jennifer. 2021. The Power of Politics: Exploring the True Potential of Community Sponsorship Programs. In Research Handbook on the Law and Politics of Migration, Ed. Catherine Dauvergne: Edward Elgar Press, 155–171. Bond, Jennifer, and Ania Kwadrans. 2019. Resettling Refugees through Community Sponsorship: A Revolutionary Operational Approach Built on Traditional Legal Infrastructure. Refuge 35(2): 86-108. https://doi.org/10.7202/1064822ar. Cronkite, Meghan M., Eleni Galatsanou, and William Ashton. 2017. Refugees in Manitoba: Small Centre Settlement: Roundtable Discussion Summary. Brandon: Brandon University. https:// www.brandonu.ca/rdi/files/2017/05/RDI-Refugees-in-MB-May17.pdf. Accessed 15 September 2020. DNM. 2019. Disposición 1025/2019. Buenos Aires: Dirección Nacional de Migraciones. https:// www.boletinoficial.gob.ar/detalleAviso/primera/202666/20190301. Accessed 15 September 2020. Eggertson, Laura. 2016. The Two Solitudes of Canada’s Refugees. Policy Options. https:// policyoptions.irpp.org/fr/magazines/mai-2016/the-two-solitudes-of-canadas-syrian-refugees/. Accessed 4 September 2020. EIN. 2015. Home Secretary uses Conservative Party conference speech to warn UK needs to have an immigration limit. Electronic Immigration Network, 6 October. https://www.ein.org.uk/news/ home-secretary-use-conservative-party-conference-speech-warn-uk-needs-have-immigrationlimit. Accessed 4 September 2020. Environics. 2018. Canada’s World Survey 2018. Toronto: The Environics Institute. https://www. environicsinstitute.org/docs/default-source/project-documents/canada's-world-2018-survey/ canada's-world-survey-2018—final-report.pdf. Accessed 4 September 2020. Fratzke, Susan, and Emma Dorst. 2019. Volunteers and Sponsors: A Catalyst for Refugee Integration? Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/ research/volunteers-sponsors-refugee-integration. GRSI. 2017. Five countries working on new refugee sponsorship programs, Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative (GRSI) launches Guidebook to share best practices. http:// refugeesponsorship.org/_uploads/59bff91a4ec65.pdf. Accessed 4 September 2020. GRSI. 2019a. Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative at a glance, Vol. 27. Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative. https://refugeesponsorship.org/_uploads/5e260c15a0b8e.pdf. Accessed 4 September 2020. GRSI. 2019b. Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative at a glance, Vol. 19, April 2019. https:// refugeesponsorship.org/_uploads/5cc7356402392.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2020. GRSI. 2019c. Joint Ministerial Statement. https://refugeesponsorship.org/_uploads/5dfa8966255e3. pdf. Accessed 23 September 2020. GRSI. 2020. Who We Are. https://refugeesponsorship.org/who-we-are. Accessed 4 September 2020. Holy See Press Office. 2017. The Pope receives the participants in the 6th International Forum on Migration and Peace, 21 February 2017. Holy See Press Office. http://press.vatican.va/content/ salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2017/02/21/170221a.html. Accessed 4 September 2020.

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Home Office. 2018. Community Sponsorship: Guidance for Prospective Sponsors. GOV.UK. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ file/764990/2018-12-04_Community_Sponsorship_Guidance.pdf. Accessed 14 September 2020. Home Office. 2020. National Statistics: how many people do we grant asylum or protection to? GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-statistics-year-endingdecember-2019/how-many-people-do-we-grant-asylum-or-protection-to. Accessed 4 September 2020. Home Office and UK Visas and Immigration. 2017. Refugees of all nationalities fleeing Syria are now eligible for resettlement in the UK. GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ refugees-of-all-nationalities-fleeing-syria-are-now-eligible-for-resettlement-in-the-uk. Accessed 4 September 2020. Huggler, Justin. 2017. Migrant crime in Germany rises by 50 per cent, new figures show. The Telegraph, 25 April. Hyndman, Jennifer, and Michaela Hynie. 2016. From Newcomer to Canadian: Making Refugee Integration Work. Policy Options, May 17: 1-7. https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/may2016/from-newcomer-to-canadian-making-refugee-integration-work/. Accessed 16 September 2020. Hynie, Michaela, Susan McGrath, Jonathan Bridekirk, Anna Oda, Nicole Ives, Jennifer Hyndman, Neil Arya, Yogendra B. Shakya, Jill Hanle and Kwame McKenzie. 2019. What Role Does Type of Sponsorship Play in Early Integration Outcomes? Syrian Refugees Resettled in Six Canadian Cities. Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees/Refuge: revue canadienne sur les réfugiés 35(2):36-52. https://refuge.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/refuge/article/view/40600. Accessed 17 September 2020. IRCC. 2016. Evaluation of the resettlement programs (GAR, PSR, BVOR and RAP). Ottawa: Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/ migration/ircc/english/pdf/pub/resettlement.pdf. Accessed 15 September 2020. IRCC. 2018. Joint Ministerial Statement - Ministers from Canada, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Argentina, Spain and New Zealand underline their support for community-based refugee sponsorship in advance of the 2018 United Nations General Assembly and agreement on the Global Compact on Refugees. https://refugeesponsorship.org/_uploads/5b4ca01e5c883.pdf. Accessed 12 July 2021. IRCC. 2019a. Thank You Canada. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. https://www. canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/40-years-psr.html. Accessed 14 September 2020. IRCC. 2019b. Canada announces new initiative to support LGBTQ2 refugees. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/ news/2019/06/canada-announces-new-initiative-to-support-lgbtq2-refugees.html. Accessed 23 September 2020. IRCC. 2020a. Notice - supplementary information 2020-2022 Immigration Levels Plan. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigrationrefugees-citizenship/news/notices/supplementary-immigration-levels-2020.html. Accessed 4 September 2020. IRCC. 2020b. Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program—Sponsorship Agreement Holders. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigrationrefugees-citizenship/services/refugees/help-outside-canada/private-sponsorship-program/agreementholders/holders-list.html. Accessed 14 September 2020. Javid, Sajid, and Home Office. 2019. New global resettlement scheme for the most vulnerable refugees announced. Home Office. UK.GOV. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/newglobal-resettlement-scheme-for-the-most-vulnerable-refugees-announced. Accessed 4 September 2020. Kaida, Lisa, Feng Hou, and Max Stick. 2020. The Long-term Economic Outcomes of Refugee Private Sponsorship. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/pub/ 11f0019m/11f0019m2019021-eng.pdf?st=EPmiLkhh. Accessed 17 September 2020.

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Kumin, J. 2015. Welcoming Engagement: How Private Sponsorship Can Strengthen Refugee Resettlement in the European Union. Washington, DC: The Migration Policy Institute. https:// www.migrationpolicy.org/research/welcoming-engagement-how-private-sponsorship-canstrengthen-refugee-resettlement-european. Accessed 23 September 2020. Lamp, Lifeboat, Ladder. n.d. https://lamplifeboatladder.org/. Accessed 10 September 2020. Macklin, Audrey, Kathryn Barber, Luin Goldring, Jennifer Hyndman, Anna Kortweg, Shauna Labman, and Jona Zyfi. 2018. A Preliminary Investigation into Private Refugee Sponsors. Canadian Ethnic Studies 50(2): 35-57. Mahboob, Tahiat. 2016. 12 stories about Syrian refugees in Canada that warmed our hearts. CTV News. https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/12-stories-about-syrian-refugees-in-canada-that-warmedour-hearts-1.3167273. Accessed 3 September 2020. MBIE. 2019. Community Organisation Refugee Sponsorship Category Pilot - Process Evaluation. Wellington: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/ assets/d3cedd12c2/community-organisation-refugee-sponsorship-category-pilot-processevaluation.pdf. Accessed 17 September 2020. Mehler Paperny, Anna. 2016. Refugees out-earn millionaires‚ business class immigrants years after arriving in Canada. Global News. https://globalnews.ca/news/2468922/refugees-out-earnmillionaire-business-class-immigrants-years-after-arriving-in-canada/. Accessed 4 September 2020. Meter, Alejandro. 2014. Argentina in the Era of Mass Immigration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199766581/obo-97801 99766581-0163.xml. Accessed 23 September 2020. Molloy, Michael J., Peter Duschinsky, Kurt F. Jensen, and Robert J. Shalka. 2017. Running on Empty: Canada and the Indochinese Refugees, 1975-1980. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Organization of American States. 2015. International Migration in the Americas. https://www.oas. org/docs/publications/SICREMI-2015-ENGLISH.pdf. Accessed 22 September 2020. Patrocinio Comunitario. n.d. We are a network of civil society organisations linked to the community sponsorship of refugees in Argentina, in particular, to the Syria programme. http:// www.patrociniocomunitario.org/en. Accessed 17 September 2020. Phillimore, Jenny, and Marisol Reyes. 2019. Community Sponsorship in the UK: from application to integration, formative evaluation (interim) report. University of Birmingham. https://www. birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/social-policy/Misc/CS-UK-IRiS-June2019.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2020. Phillimore, Jenny, Marisol Reyes, and Sara Hassan. 2020. Community Sponsorship in the UK: Formative Evaluation (2017-2020). Birmingham: University of Birmingham. https://www. birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/social-policy/iris/2020/communitysponsorship-general-report.pdf. Accessed 4 September 2020. Refugee Council. 2020. Refugee Resettlement Facts. https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/ information/refugee-asylum-facts/refugee-resettlement-facts/. Accessed 17 September 2020. Reyes, Marisol, and Jenny Phillimore. 2020. Like pebbles in a pool: the effect of community sponsorship on knowledge about, and attitudes to, refugees in less-diverse communities. Birmingham: University of Birmingham. https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/collegesocial-sciences/social-policy/iris/2020/community-sponsorship-case-study-report.pdf. Accessed 4 September 2020. RSTP. 2019a. Checking in: helping sponsored refugees work (video). Refugee Sponsorship Training Program. http://www.rstp.ca/en/resources/videos/checking-in-helping-sponsoredrefugees-work/. Accessed 4 September 2020. RSTP 2019b. Overview of Sponsorship Responsibilities. Refugee Sponsorship Training Program. http://www.rstp.ca/en/sponsorship-responsibilities/responsibilities. Accessed 4 September 2020. Rudd, Amber, and Home Office. 2016. Community sponsorship scheme launched for refugees in the UK. GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/community-sponsorship-schemelaunched-for-refugees-in-the-uk. Accessed 4 September 2020.

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Salvation Army (UK). 2017. Refugee family supported by Salvation Army meet Home Secretary to mark one-year anniversary of Community Sponsorship of Refugees. https://www. salvationarmy.org.uk/news/refugee-family-supported-salvation-army-meet-home-secretarymark-one-year-anniversary. Accessed: 22 September 2020. Stewart, Briar. 2016. Former Vietnamese refugee pays it forward by sponsoring Syrian family. CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/vietnamese-refugee-pay-it-forwardsyrian-family-1.3464777. Accessed 3 September 2020. UN General Assembly. 2016. New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. New York: United Nations. http://undocs.org/a/res/71/1. Accessed 4 September 2020. UN General Assembly. 2018. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Part II. The Global Compact on Refugees. New York: United Nations. https://www.unhcr.org/ gcr/GCR_English.pdf. Accessed 17 September 2020. UNHCR. 2019a. The Three-Year Strategy (2019-2021) on Resettlement and Complementary Pathways. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/ 5d15db254.pdf. Accessed 4 September 2020. UNHCR. 2019b. UNHCR welcomes meaningful new UK commitment to refugee resettlement. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/ 2019/6/5d07830e4/unhcr-welcomes-meaningful-new-uk-commitment-refugee-resettlement. html. Accessed 4 September 2020. UNHCR. 2020a. Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/5ee200e37/unhcrglobal-trends-2019.html. Accessed 4 September 2020. UNHCR. 2020b. Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2021. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. https://www.unhcr.org/protection/resettlement/5ef34bfb7/ projected-global-resettlement-needs-2021.html. Accessed 4 September 2020. Wilkins, Hannah. 2020. Refugee Settlement in the UK. London: House of Commons Library. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8750/. Accessed 23 September 2020. WUSC. 2020. About: Student Refugee Program. World University Service of Canada. https://srp. wusc.ca/about/. Accessed 4 September 2020. Yudkin, Daniel, Stephen Hawkins, and Tim Dixon. 2019. The Perception Gap: How False Impressions are Pulling Americans Apart. New York: More in Common. https://www. moreincommon.com/media/0fmblxb3/the-perception-gap.pdf. Accessed 3 September 2020.

Jennifer Bond is the Founder and Managing Director of the University of Ottawa Refugee Hub and Chair of the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative. She holds degrees in law, literature, and business and has been called to the Bars of Ontario and British Columbia. Professor Bond served as Special Advisor to Canada’s Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship on the country’s national Syrian Refugee Initiative. She also co-founded the Refugee Assistance Project and the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers; served with the UNHCR in Damascus, Syria; and has published and lectured widely on a variety of refugee related topics. Professor Bond clerked at the Supreme Court of Canada and the Alberta Court of Appeal. She has been awarded the International Commission of Jurist’s Tarnopolsky Award and appointed to the Order of Ontario for her contributions to refugee protection. She is based in Ottawa. Gregory A. Maniatis is the director of the Open Society Foundations’ International Migration Initiative. Previously, he served as senior advisor to Peter Sutherland, the UN Special Representative for Migration, from 2006 to 2017, and from 2003 to 2016 served as senior fellow at the Migration Policy Institute in Washington. Mr. Maniatis has worked closely with the European Commission, the European Parliament, EU member state governments, civil society groups, and international organizations on all aspects of migration and integration policy. His reportage and commentary have also appeared in many publications, including the New York

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Times, the Wall Street Journal, New York Magazine, and the Washington Post. He is a graduate of Princeton University, attended the Institut d’Etudes Politiques in Paris, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Mr. Maniatis was instrumental in founding and leading the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative. He is based in New York.

Failed Asylum Seekers as Agents of Development? New Approaches to Voluntary Return and Sustainable Reintegration in Germany’s Post-2015 Migration Policy

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Jan Schneider

Abstract

Since the 2015/2016 refugee crisis, the German Government has been under domestic political pressure to accelerate the process for returning failed asylum seekers to their countries of origin. However, repatriation efforts using regulatory instruments are proving insufficient. This article describes how the development cooperation perspective has made inroads into this policy area and how a policy of voluntary and sustainable return can be elaborated further at German and European levels.

13.1

Introduction

13.1.1 Background: From Culture of Welcome to Discourse on Return During the night between 4 and 5 September 2015, German Chancellor Angela Merkel decided in consultation with some of her cabinet and the Austrian and Hungarian heads of state to arrange for several thousand asylum seekers who had spent days waiting at Budapest’s Keleti station without sufficient supplies to travel on to Germany. This step, often wrongly characterised as a ‘border opening’ and accompanied by a broad ‘culture of welcome’ on the part of civil society, saw Germany permit the unhindered entry of asylum seekers primarily from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, provide these individuals with refuge and make large-scale use of what is known as the sovereignty clause under the Dublin III Regulation with regard to asylum applications. The move is generally seen as marking the beginning

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of what has been termed the refugee crisis in Germany (see the chronology of events in Blume et al. 2016; Alexander 2017). Almost exactly a year to the day after this decision, Chancellor Merkel outlined at a meeting of the Executive Board of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the German Bundestag what she considered the most important task in refugee policy for the following months: ‘Repatriation, repatriation and more repatriation’ (according to Spiegel Online 2016). Within a short space of time, German Government policy had shifted from taking in asylum seekers in an effort to prevent humanitarian crises to ending the residence of those same individuals. What had happened? In 2015, the authorities registered over one million asylum seekers, a new record. At the same time, the failure of the European Union’s (EU) refugee policy came to light. The EU had not only failed to create legal migration channels for asylum seekers, but also pushed to one side the question of the sharing out of responsibility, clinging instead to the Dublin principle that places the main burden for taking in refugees on external border states. Numerous EU member states took unilateral steps with considerable reach to manage and/or prevent the massive increase in irregular immigration by asylum seekers (see Hailbronner/Thym 2016; Schneider 2017), one of which was to open up the Western Balkan route. There had already been a significant increase in the number of asylum applications in Germany since 2013, primarily as a result of the civil war in Syria. At the same time, the recognition rate, that is, the proportion of all asylum seekers granted asylum upon conclusion of the process, rose significantly from 26.4% in 2013 to 68.8% in 2016. Despite this, the absolute number of failed asylum seekers also increased sharply with the overall rise in the number of asylum seekers. Some 56,000 asylum applications were rejected by the relevant administrative authority each year in 2013 and 2014. This figure doubled in 2015, almost exceeding 108,000, once again in 2016 to 197,000, and climaxed in 2017, reaching almost 253,000 rejections.1 The initial mood, which was overwhelmingly positive, had already been dampened by late 2015 due to federal states and municipalities throughout Germany being overstretched as a result of the admission of refugees. The involvement of groups of young asylum seekers from the Maghreb countries in sexual assaults on women in Cologne and other German cities on New Year’s Eve of 2015, something which only became public several days later, was the contingent event that marked a turning point in the media and public discourse on the admission of refugees, with the short-lived ‘culture of welcome’ ending rather abruptly (see Conrad/Aðalsteinsdóttir 2017). 2016, the year in which the right-wing populist

1

First instance decisions on applications according to the Eurostat database [migr_asydcfsta] (https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asydcfsta&lang=en. Accessed 17 September 2020). However, there was in this context a continual exit of failed asylum seekers, and appeals were often lodged against the first instance decisions of BAMF with the result that the actual number of foreign citizens with an asylum background obligated to leave Germany who had not been granted a temporary stay of deportation remained in the lower five-digit range (see Vollmer et al. 2017, p. 86f.; German Bundestag 2018b).

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‘Alternative für Deutschland’ party won many votes in federal state elections with its strong anti-refugee rhetoric, was characterised by intensive and largely restrictive legislative activity with regard to refugees (see BAMF 2017). The 2016 Berlin Christmas market terror attack, perpetrated by a criminal failed asylum seeker who had been obligated to leave Germany, further increased the domestic political pressure to implement measures for repatriating failed asylum seekers. Following Angela Merkel’s announcement in early 2017 of a ‘national effort’ to repatriate foreign citizens obligated to return to their countries of origin (FAZ 2017), a decision on repatriation policy was reached with the majority of the heads of government of the federal states (responsible for return measures) on 9 February 2017.2 This agreement, implemented in part in a law on the improved enforcement of the obligation to leave Germany (BGBl 2017, p. 2780ff.), was designed to make repatriation significantly easier. The decision covered the introduction of a requirement for asylum seekers without any prospects of remaining in Germany to take up residence in reception centres, efforts to provide nationwide government-sponsored counselling on return at an early stage, and the establishment of a support centre to assist with repatriation questions in operational cooperation between the German Government and the federal state governments. Additional funding to promote voluntary return3 was announced for 2017, including EUR 50 million for programmes to reintegrate migrants following their return to their countries of origin. Although specific questions concerning the design of reintegration policy did not initially play any role in the decision (see Sect. 13.3), the considerable use of funds for the reintegration of failed asylum seekers was a turning point and marked the beginning of a significant shift in our understanding of sustainable return (see Sect. 13.4.1), a shift that requires a coherent and cross-sectoral policy approach.

13.1.2 Limitations of Regulatory Policy: Perceived Failure of Deportation Policy The awareness of obstacles to the deportation of failed asylum seekers meanwhile was nothing new. A working group on removals has been in place within the German Conference of Interior Ministers since 1993 (Kreienbrink 2007, p. 13), addressing issues with the enforcement of Germany’s policy on mandatory returns. 2

Meeting of the Federal Chancellor with the Minister-Presidents of the federal states, decision of 9 February 2017. (https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/resource/blob/1830100/394654/f55cc78e90ab 64d6a89ec620b1f4f1a7/2017-02-09-abschlussdokument-treffen-bund-laender-data.pdf?download=1 ) (German only). Accessed 8 July 2021. 3 The term (assisted) voluntary return is used here with an awareness that, for failed asylum seekers, even such repatriation is compulsory. After all, there is no alternative legal option available and, as such, we cannot speak in the strict sense of voluntary return for persons obligated to leave the country (Davids/van Houte 2008: 182; Noll 1999). Nonetheless, if we look at the terminology in the relevant literature and in state funding programmes, we find frequent use of the terms ‘voluntary departure’ and ‘voluntary return’.

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These issues can be placed in four main categories (see also Unterarbeitsgruppe Vollzugsdefizite 2015): 1. Refusal to cooperate on the part of individuals obligated to return to their countries of origin (e.g. destruction of identity documents or false information, disappearance, physical resistance); 2. Overstretching of the immigration authorities responsible for repatriation; 3. Lack of support from diplomatic representations of the countries of origin (e.g. with the provision of passport replacement documents) or the governments of those countries (e.g. refusal to readmit individuals obligated to return to their countries of origin)4; 4. Exertion of influence on the deportation enforcement process by civil society and policy-makers in support of those obligated to return to their countries of origin (e.g. through protests, hiding individuals or the issuing of discretionary instructions to halt removal processes by municipal decision-makers; see Rosenberger et al. 2018).5 Added to this, repatriation measures implemented against the will of those involved are often found to be ineffective when those individuals unlawfully (and, in some cases, repeatedly) re-enter the country from which they were deported (see Kohls 2014, p. 17ff.) and thus render the measures non-cost-effective.6 By contrast, the – admittedly patchy – statistics indicate that the majority of persons required to leave Germany do so voluntarily – that is, without direct compulsion (German Bundestag 2018b). Against this backdrop, a perception emerged in public discourse during 2017 in particular that forced repatriation had failed (see Vollmer et al. 2017; Leubecher 2017; Lohse 2017).7 During this phase, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) launched a joint initiative on voluntary return and reintegration in early 2017. This marked the start of the urgently needed conceptual development of 4

The Moroccan Government, for example, refused collective repatriations and only accepted a maximum of five deported Moroccan nationals per scheduled flight from the EU (see Parliament of North Rhine-Westphalia 2017). 5 Since 2017, the legislator has primarily attempted to remove the obstacles to deportation in the first and fourth categories by means of two ‘Laws for better enforcement of the obligation to leave the country’ (BGBl 2017, p. 2780; BGBl 2019, p. 1294). It remains to be seen whether and to what extent it will be possible to carry out more deportations of foreigners who are obliged to leave the country. 6 According to a media report, for example, one Moroccan national had been deported from Germany ten times within just a few years, returning again in each case (see Hamburg Parliament (2016). 7 While the ratio between third country nationals ordered to leave and those effectively returned outside the EU has never been particularly low in comparative perspective, political and media discourses have repeatedly scandalised Germany’s policy on repatriation as a total failure. As a rather recent example: Germany’s weekly ‘Der Spiegel’ devoted its front page and cover story to the issue in early 2019 and coined repatriation a ‘German disaster’ (Abschiebung – Ein deutsches Desaster; Der Spiegel of 2 March 2019).

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Germany’s repatriation policy and a joint approach to dealing with the issue of return assistance by German ministries, which had previously operated largely independently of one another. This development is the subject of this chapter. First, the chapter sets out how, in many respects, the domestic policy and development policy ‘camps’ have handled the issue of repatriation in isolation from one another (Sect. 13.2.1) before outlining the specific measures of BMZ and BMI’s new initiative (Sect. 13.2.2). It then examines international research findings on return and reintegration that could be of potential use to German policy-makers and practitioners (Sect. 13.3). The next section summarises the key goals for the design of this new policy from the author’s perspective. This includes the agreement of a practicable and up-to-date definition of sustainability to guide all reintegration steps (Sect. 13.4.1), the gearing of all measures to the context of the country of origin and to the individual requirements and needs of the returnee (Sect. 13.4.2), the need for greater standardisation of return policy and the associated advisory services at all levels aimed at ensuring potential returnees are adequately prepared (Sect. 13.4.3), and the need for a substantial Europeanisation of policy for promoting voluntary return and reintegration (Sect. 13.4.4). The latter would appear indispensable, not least in the light of negotiations on a future Common European Asylum System and a European (foreign) policy on migration. The chapter ends with a brief conclusion (Sect. 13.5).

13.2

Reforming Return Policy in Germany: From ‘Voluntary Return’ to ‘Sustainable Reintegration’

13.2.1 Regulatory Policy and Development Cooperation as Two Separate Worlds In recent decades, when it comes to policy development at national and European level alike, migration policy has been embedded almost exclusively in domestic policy discourse. This was due on the one hand to the emphasis being placed on issues of national sovereignty, territorialism, security and, by extension, conventional regulatory policy, and these issues being correspondingly standardised in legislation. On the other hand, development policy had for a long time tended to associate migration with negative consequences for the countries of origin, such as the risk of brain drain, which explains why corresponding proactive measures were rarely a focus of development cooperation. In asylum policy logic, the right to protection upon recognition of corresponding grounds is inextricably linked to the duty to return to one’s country of origin in the event of an asylum application being rejected. Against this backdrop, measures and programmes to assist with repatriation are primarily elements of a policy geared towards preventing undesired immigration or unauthorised residence on the part of third-country nationals. The goal in this context is not (or at least not primarily) successful return and reintegration with positive effects for those involved and

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those around them in the country of return, but rather voluntary departure on the part of these individuals in order to protect or uphold state sovereignty and the credibility of that state’s legal standards. Accordingly, return assistance programmes have been critically coined as ’pay-to-go schemes’ in international research (Black et al. 2011; Collyer 2018). The situation is different when we adopt a development policy perspective in which repatriation is closely linked to questions of integration and potential development effects in the country of origin. This logic views (legal) returnee migrants primarily as agents of political change and innovation. It ascribes to them a positive role, principally due to the fact that, by returning to their countries of origin, they transfer knowledge, new ideas and an entrepreneurial spirit to those nations, which are still in the process of development. Positive development impetus from return migration is seen primarily in the form of remittances, opportunities for brain gain, and transnationalism driven by diaspora activities (de Haas 2010; Hunger 2011). To this end, German development cooperation has been running the Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM) in cooperation with government employment agencies since 1980. CIM’s ‘returning experts’ programme provides targeted support for the professional integration of university graduates interested in returning to their countries of origin and of experienced experts from developing countries, emerging economies and transition countries who completed their professional training in Germany. As such, development cooperation was primarily concerned with reintegrating these ‘experts’, that is highly qualified individuals, and placing them in jobs in order for them to serve as direct agents of development. It was only when the German Agency for International Co-operation (GIZ) set up the Sector Project on Migration and Development that practical development cooperation programmes began to consider aspects of migration on a cross-cutting basis (see Baraulina et al. 2012, p. 17). Crudely speaking, the two ‘camps’ and the German Government ministries behind them coexisted peacefully as follows: Domestic policy-makers were largely indifferent towards the experts faithfully funded as part of development cooperation, not least because these experts were primarily returnee migrants. Conversely, development-policy actors had no interest whatsoever to deal with failed asylum seekers, who were often poorly educated and had numerous problems, and whom Germany’s Ministry of the Interior was seeking to remove from the country as quickly as possible and prevent from returning again. According to this logic, until recently, the German Government simply provided foreign nationals required to leave the country with a monetary incentive to depart via the REAG/GARP programme (see Schneider and Kreienbrink 2011, p. 61ff.; for an international comparison, see Black et al. 2011). Until 2014, declarations of intent and initial considerations aside, there was no inter-ministerial cooperation on issues of forced return, the readmission of individuals required to leave the country/the voluntary return of such individuals (see German Bundestag 2014, p. 4). This is all the more remarkable, given that voluntary departure by means of repatriation and start-up assistance has been practised in Germany since 1979 as part of the REAG/GARP programmes administered by the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

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Beginning in 1989, there have been up to 10,000 funded departures each year, and as many as several hundred thousand as part of the repatriation of refugees who had fled the Yugoslav Wars (see Schneider and Kreienbrink 2011, p. 29f.). IOM itself was one of the early exponents of a return policy that incorporated aspects of reintegration and development, but this did not ‘rub off’ on Germany’s official policy on development cooperation.

13.2.2 Third Country Nationals Required to Leave Germany – A New ‘Business Area’ of Development Cooperation: ‘Perspektive Heimat’ In establishing their joint initiative during the ‘repatriation crisis’ in early 2017, BMI and BMZ were both entering into relatively uncharted territory. With the setting up of a state secretary working group on international migration, headed up by the German Federal Foreign Office and BMI and with the involvement of BMZ, in 2014, efforts had already been undertaken to cooperate on a general basis across ministries in addressing migration issues. The goal was to devise a ‘Strategy for migration and development’ and enshrine it in the coalition agreement (see German Bundestag 2014). However, the work of this state secretary group was suspended without any concrete results by the next year as the emerging refugee crisis shifted policy priorities massively. Having begun their cooperation in early 2017, the ministries responsible for repatriation attempted in the space of a few months to coordinate the existing structures and measures in their sphere of influence more effectively with one another and supplement them with new components. The new, cross-departmental approach involved supporting individuals required to leave Germany and opting for voluntary assisted return beyond the moment of leaving German territory, and not only financially, but also by means of advisory, educational, training and employment-promotion services that benefit the local population as well. In addition to the repatriation advisory and support services already offered in Germany (see Graff/Schneider 2017), these primarily included • the establishment and expansion of migration advisory centres in relevant third countries; • the secondment of GIZ reintegration scouts (country specialists) to the federal states in order to build a bridge between the repatriation advisory services offered by state and non-governmental agencies in Germany on the one hand and the development cooperation projects locally on the other, and to get in touch with points of contact in the country of origin prior to departure; • cooperation with organised civil society by promoting projects that provide supplementary support for the reintegration of returnees; • activation of an information hotline at the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) for voluntary return;

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• the launch of two online portals providing information on funding programmes and returnee advisory centres and details on countries of origin and/or reintegration programmes (www.returningfromgermany.de; operated by the BAMF), as well as information on country-specific options for voluntary return and reintegration, in each case with links to existing advisory centres in the countries of origin (www.build-your-future.net, renamed into www.startfinder.de in early 2019; operated by GIZ).8 Some EUR 150 million in budgetary funding has been earmarked for the measures of the ‘Perspektive Heimat’ initiative (which could translate as ‘Homeward Bound’), financed out of the BMZ budget item. Provided for a four-year period from 2017 to 2020 (averaging EUR 37.5 million per year), this funding is intended for a total of 13 destination countries (Kosovo, Albania, Serbia, Tunisia, Morocco, Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, Pakistan and The Gambia). Compared with the subsidies previously provided by the German Government for programmes offering assistance for voluntary return (primarily REAG/GARP), which, for example, came to some EUR 10 million for 2016, these are considerable sums.9 The establishment of 11 migration advisory centres can be considered as being at the heart of the initiative, besides increasing the already existing government programmes and support measures for projects of non-governmental organisations. Some of these centres originate from the German Information Points for Migration, Vocational Training and Careers Advice (DIMAK), set up progressively by CIM (see Sect. 13.2.1) since 2015. The centres provide: • Advice for those returning from Germany to assist them with reintegrating into their country of origin; • Advice on channels for legal migration to Germany and an explanation of the perils of irregular migration; • Advice on prospects at local level. There were around 80 members of staff (see German Bundestag 2018a; 2019b) working at the ten advisory centres already up and running in April 2019, which marks a 50 percent increase over one year; simultaneously, there were around 20 8

A point of criticism to be made here is that, although both portals were developed and expanded largely in parallel, they have significant overlaps. Together with the website www.integplan.de, which lists returnee advisory centres in Germany, and the Information Centre for Voluntary Return (ZIRF), which itself has a separate online database and an IOM-managed access portal for individual queries, this creates an extremely confusing picture for professionals engaged in repatriation assistance work as well as for those interested in returning to their countries of origin. Against the backdrop of different portals that are not very user-friendly, require resource-intensive maintenance and contain some overlap in the information they provide, there is an urgent need for more integration. 9 This budget item for ‘return assistance’ was also massively increased in 2017 to over EUR 64 million, as part of the introduction of the temporary special return assistance funding ‘StarthilfePlus’ (see http://germany.iom.int/de/starthilfeplus. Accessed 24 June 2019).

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‘reintegration scouts’ deployed in Germany. As transnational agents for sustainable return, these ‘scouts’ are in direct contact with the advisory centres in third countries and provide information about opportunities for reintegration to the return counselling structure in Germany. One was likely to expect a significant increase in the demand for reintegration scouts as the re-elected government coalition announced an expansion of the nationwide advisory services for asylum seekers in early 2018, including counselling for returnees. As a matter of fact, a highly personalised advisory approach for reintegration requires tailored solutions that should be prepared before departing from Germany and are most likely to require more than just some 20 scouts.10 Nevertheless, in the space of just a few months, German policy on return assistance and reintegration has begun to be realigned as part of an inter-ministerial initiative. We have only been able to take an introductory look at the key facts of this reform here. This realignment offers a basis for gearing return policy with regard to failed asylum seekers more strongly to the goal of voluntary return and sustainable, pro-development reintegration.

13.3

Reintegration Following Obligatory Return: Research Findings

The extent to which the new return and reintegration policy achieves its goals can only be determined by a consistent supporting evaluation of the measures and the regular collection and economic analysis of data on returnees (post-return monitoring). Research findings for Germany in this area are somewhat patchy (see Baraulina 2013). And there is also room for improvement when it comes to international research in this area. It has not yet been possible to conduct in-depth quantitative research projects with larger cohorts of returnees, which is why it is also not possible to clearly define the conditions for the success of such programmes. Nonetheless, there are a number of interview studies and qualitative analyses from which initial insights can be drawn;11 numerous findings originate in particular from research into the return of (recognised) refugees following long-term displacement and the establishment of peace in their home country (see Black and Gent 2006; Harild et al. 2015; Crisp and Long 2016). In this context, 10

For the time being, however, there are no plans to expand consulting structures at large scale. In the second half of 2018, the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community launched a rather blatant multilingual poster campaign entitled ‘Your country. Your future. Now!’. It provided incentives for asylum seekers and potential returnees from 45 countries of origin to return from Germany: Voluntary returnees who registered their departure by the end of 2018 could be granted the assumption of considerable housing costs in addition to the regular return assistance (for a summary of the program see German Bundestag (2019a) as well as https://www.bmi.bund.de/ SharedDocs/faqs/EN/topics/migration/dein-land-deine-zukunft-jetzt-en/faq-liste-en.html (Accessed 20 September 2020); critical of the overall approach Feneberg 2018). 11 For reasons of space, it is not possible to go into more depth on the matter in this chapter; the position is based largely on the study and the literature report by Koser and Kuschminder (2015).

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so-called ‘look-and-see’ or return visits, during which potential returnees can test reintegration conditions and see how they feel in their old surroundings on a non-binding basis, have been described as promising as they can provide a solid evidence base for making an informed decision on return after a long sojourn in a destination country (see McMichael et al. 2017; Black and Gent 2006, p. 21). However, for obvious reasons this option is not available for failed asylum seekers required to leave Germany. But even for individuals who may have been absent from their home country for shorter periods of time and have been unsuccessful with their asylum applications in the EU, repatriation usually represents a major challenge. Based on the findings of their research project, Carling et al. describe the picture of a straightforward return process as a myth: ‘There is a major discrepancy between the conceptual simplicity of return migration and its real-life complexities’ (Carling et al. 2015, p. 3). For returnees under pressure to leave Europe due to having no residence right, the research findings regarding successful and sustainable reintegration, while they are contradictory, are hardly encouraging: • Successful reintegration or ‘re-embedding’ depends on many different factors of an economic, social and cultural/identificational nature (Davids and van Houte 2008); the post-return process can present very similar challenges for the individual to those that arise when integrating into a new society following initial migration (Carling et al. 2015). • In almost all studies, individual and family safety are identified as absolutely essential, but not always sufficient, conditions for sustainable return. A lack of protection against terrorist and war-based violence, as experienced by numerous individuals who have returned to Afghanistan (see van Houte 2016, p. 156ff.), undermines the prospects of successful reintegration. In a similar manner, this applies to situations of economic threat: If the primary motive for migration was to ’escape’ from poverty and lack of prospects, a return will hardly be sustainable if there are no improvements compared to the status quo ante in the country of origin – such as, for example, integration into the labour market or the establishment of a business. • Other compounding factors include a lack of support for and acceptance of returnees by local and national governments in the countries of return. Rejection of and discrimination against these individuals by the indigenous population often has this effect too. At the same time, social networks prove to provide good conditions for successful reintegration. • Even after they experience the termination or ‘failure’ of their actual migration project (to obtain a right of residence in Europe via the asylum process), voluntary returnees face a more difficult social and cultural reintegration process and are at higher risk of unemployment. Conversely, individuals who consider their migration project to have largely succeeded appear to stand a better chance of sustainable reintegration. This most likely has to do with the perception of returnees by third parties (friends, acquaintances, potential employers).

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• There are also some paradoxical findings in this context. According to the study by Black et al. (2004), following their return to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, young single men found the employment conditions more favourable than all other groups, yet they also had the greatest tendency to take the risk of attempting to re-migrate to their (former) host country. • The sustainability of repatriation is generally determined by a combination of personal and structural factors found in both the destination country and the country of origin. As a result, living conditions in the European host countries have a significant influence on the chances of sustainable return and, as such, can be influenced (see Ruben et al. 2009). • High levels of debt with people smugglers, family and friends can also pose an obstacle to sustainable repatriation. An example would be if, due to corresponding fears and concerns, an individual migrates elsewhere within the same country or over the border to another country, or attempts to earn an income by dishonest or self-exploitative means.

13.4

Repatriation and Reintegration as Part of a Development-Oriented Migration Policy: Key Areas of Action

The aforementioned reforms from 2017 represent the first step towards a more coherent repatriation policy in Germany. They require regulatory and migration(control) policy actors, who have previously operated largely in separate spheres, and development cooperation actors to pursue common goals. Against the backdrop of voluntary return and reintegration, actors should focus in particular on four primary strategic tasks in their work to develop this common policy over the coming years: (1) foster a common understanding of sustainable return as a basis for developing programmes and measures; (2) design reintegration programmes for specific countries of origin and adopt a subject-oriented advisory approach; (3) work within Germany’s federal system of government to ensure greater consistency in the delivery of advisory services and make voluntary return a clear priority, and (4) strengthen the concept of European coherence, which has been largely neglected to date.

13.4.1 Define Sustainable Repatriation The classic regulatory policy perspective on repatriation manifests itself in the form of ‘permanent departure from Germany’. The development cooperation perspective, on the other hand, emphasises ‘successful reintegration’. Correspondingly, there are still a very wide range of views among the different actors in this field in the Federal Republic of Germany when it comes to the goals of the return policy and its sustainable implementation. In this context, domestic-policy actors, in particular,

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must discard the notion that repatriation is sustainable simply because a person required to leave Germany remains in their country of return on a permanent basis. While earlier definitions of sustainable return were certainly linked to criteria such as a desire for further migration or the intention to re-migrate (see Black et al. 2004), a more recent definition by Khalid Koser and Katie Kuschminder (2015, p. 49) considers repatriation to be sustainable in particular when the individual has reintegrated into the economic, social and cultural processes of the country of origin and feels that they are in an environment of safety and security upon return.12 This definition has a number of unique features (Kuschminder 2017, p. 5): first, it separates the reintegration process from any timetable. Arrival and reintegration processes depend largely on migrants’ individual characteristics, the qualifications, skills and social capital they bring with them, and the contingent conditions in the region of return (e.g. housing market, employment situation, demographic structure). Second, it focuses on returnees’ personal perceptions of safety and protection locally, rather than on an abstract security situation described externally by government authorities or on a comparison with the security perceptions of the more established population. Third, reintegration is described as the key basic condition for successful repatriation; if the former is achieved in the eyes of the returnee, then, in the near future at least, he or she will not be exposed to any impetus for repeated remigration. Fourth (and at the same time, however), the absence of renewed migratory intentions is not used as a relevant indicator for successful reintegration. Other definitions go even further, conversely viewing it as an indicator of sustainable repatriation if, one day, a migrant migrates again, but this time via legal channels as a result of the skills and autonomy of action he or she has acquired or regained in the reintegration process (see IOM 2015, p. 19). According to these definitions, in the case of both voluntary and involuntary forms of return, the sustainability of repatriation should be measured not based on the criterion of permanent settlement in a return context (and thus the immobility of returnees): ‘Both returnees who consider themselves to have succeeded and those who are dissatisfied can become interested once more in international migration for a number of different reasons. International mobility is also facilitated by the presence of economic resources and cross-border social relations, regardless of the type of return. Against this backdrop, it can be concluded that that it is opportunities for social mobility in the regions of return rather than the permanency of settlement that […] should be made the focus of discussion on the sustainability of return decisions’ (Baraulina 2013, p. 60f., translation by the author).13

Davids and van Houte (2008) take a similar approach with their ‘mixed embeddedness’ concept. In addition, empirical findings indicate that the willingness of those obliged to leave the country to effectively return decreases if the prospects for future mobility deteriorate (see Flahaux 2017; on the significance of options for circular migration for development, see also Miller Scarnato 2018, p. 10). 12 13

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13.4.2 Taking Account of Country of Origin and Individual Needs There are major differences between the countries of origin of failed asylum seekers, and not only when it comes to the structural, diplomatic and political conditions upon which implementation of the repatriation assistance programmes largely depend; the empirical findings of returnee surveys also illustrate the central importance of the country-specific perspective. For instance, one comparative research project on returnees in different countries conducted by the Peace Research Institute in Oslo showed that a lack of security and the complex situations of social conflict in Afghanistan led to a particularly high degree of rejection of return measures on the part of Afghans and to new remigration endeavours (Oeppen and Majidi 2015; see also van Houte 2016). Similarly, de Haas, with reference to both assisted voluntary and forcefully repatriated Moroccan returnees, stressed the sheer futility of successful and pro-development reintegration, as there was a widespread intention on the part of returnees to migrate again, and the psychosocial issues of returnees, in particular, could not be adequately addressed (de Haas 2016, p. 29). This raises another key aspect that has not been adequately explored by researchers and practitioners to date, namely the particular contexts and subjective needs of each individual concerned with regard not only to accommodation, education, training and employment, but also and in particular to the psychosocial welfare and/or disorders (for a comprehensive account, see Vathi/King 2017). With reference to the conditions for successful return and reintegration programmes, this suggests that a far greater focus should be placed on the specific context of each country. Norway is a relevant example in this context, having developed specially tailored programmes for the countries of origin of Iraq, Afghanistan and Ethiopia, supported by comprehensive research work (see Brekke 2015; Strand et al. 2016). At the same time, it is necessary, wherever possible, to use a trustworthy system of customised advisory services, based, for example, on the social-work principle of case management (see also Whyte/Hirslund 2013; Haase/Honerath 2016).

13.4.3 Coherence Throughout Germany? Voluntary Action Based on Nationwide, Open-Ended Advisory and Preparatory Services for Returnees In order to encourage return decisions without enforcement measures, the authorities should avoid primary reference to forced deportation as a means of deterring individuals required to leave the country from remaining there, following the expiry of their deadline for departure.14 Instead, they should invest more in providing monetary, non-material and organisational assistance for independent departure and 14

At the same time, researchers and practitioners are all in agreement that, in a number of cases, the threatening backdrop of forced deportation plays no small role in motivating individuals to register for voluntary assisted return (see Black et al. 2011).

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reintegration into countries of origin. Voluntary return is in the first instance more cost-effective (see Türköne 2010, p. 9; Graff/Schneider 2017, p. 28) and humane, as it involves fewer acute hardships. And when combined with upstream advisory services and downstream reintegration measures, each to be financed separately, then it creates a far more attractive overall picture for those concerned. Thus, it is not without reason that the theoretical and empirical studies on (mandatory) remigration stress the importance of preparedness (see Cassarino 2004; 2008; Ruben et al. 2009; Strand et al. 2016). Looking at the landscape of repatriation advisory services and return and reintegration support in Germany (see Graff/Schneider 2017), which still lacks coherence across the country, efforts should be made to ensure that individuals required to leave Germany are dealt within a consistent manner. This involves not only providing the necessary resources throughout Germany, but also making an unequivocal commitment to prioritising voluntary return over deportation, and to proactively providing comprehensive advisory services to foreign nationals required to leave Germany, incorporating the reintegration services offered in the countries of return. Guidelines are already in place for the nationwide provision of repatriation advisory services (Bund-Länder-Koordinierungsstelle Integriertes Rückkehrmanagement 2015). Implementation of these guidelines will presumably require far more vertical and horizontal networking between the key actors (BAMF, federal states, local authorities, GIZ and non-governmental and international organisations) than is seen at present. At the same time, it will be necessary to further increase staffing levels and use interpreters and other language professionals (i.e. primarily for the agencies responsible for repatriation advisory services and reintegration support). The focus needs to be on providing individuals under latent pressure to leave Germany with the most realistic information about conditions in their countries of origin, ideally supported by online communication platforms, which could replace look-and-see visits (see Sect. 13.3). An example from the Netherlands illustrates the effectiveness of a comprehensive approach to repatriation policy. The country saw a rapid increase in the number of repatriations and cases of voluntary return between 2005 and 2011. By statistically analysing the data of over 15,000 returnees, Leerkes et al. (2017) show that this increase could, among other things, be traced back primarily to the availability of mother-tongue advisors, greater financial support for reintegration, the growing risk of deportation and, presumably, the introduction of a systematic case-worker principle for failed

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asylum seekers.15 The Dutch example illustrates that, when it comes to return assistance, coherent policy reforms can create economies of scale. Such coherent policy reforms are more difficult to achieve in Germany’s federal system than in a centralised state, as responsibility for implementing asylum policy rests with the national government, while responsibility for policy on foreign nationals (including, if necessary, their repatriation) resides with the 16 federal states. Nonetheless, current efforts to expand advisory services for the repatriation and asylum processes to cover the whole of Germany promise to pave the way for better leveraging the potential of voluntary assisted return, though more still needs to be done.

13.4.4 Coherence at European Level: Repatriation Policy as Part of a Common EU External Migration Policy Back in 2002, the European Commission presented a green paper on a community return policy on illegal residents that adopted a coherent approach to linking regulatory, foreign and development policy perspectives. Among other things, the paper assumed that countries of origin would show a greater willingness to cooperate on repatriations if these nations had a vested interest in the return of the migrants, and proposed that community financing instruments be further developed to create an independent European Return Programme (see EC 2002, p. 11, 22). However, this impetus was largely lost in negotiations on the Returns Directive (Directive 2008/115/EC); aside from the declamatory priority of voluntary return over deportation, there is still a gap in EU law when it comes to a policy on supporting repatriation and reintegration (see Schneider 2012a, p. 259f.). Accordingly, the member states have created structures and general conditions for supporting voluntary return (and, more rarely, for sustainable reintegration) in isolation from one another, for the most part, leading to a funding situation more akin to a patchwork quilt. The only reason that these funding initiatives can be compared to some extent is that almost all of them have commissioned the IOM as a service provider with their implementation (see EMN 2011). Only when it comes to the organisation of deportations, and not only since the adoption of the Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624) in 2016, have significant efforts been seen on the harmonisation and synergy fronts. Frontex has been organising and financing collective deportations, in which member states can 15

In Germany, too, there was a significant increase in the number of repatriations and voluntary departures in 2015 and 2016; however, this increase can presumably be attributed to the higher absolute numbers of foreigners obliged to leave the country, especially nationals from the states of the Western Balkans, for which increased repatriation efforts were undertaken by the German Federal States following the determination of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia as safe countries of origin. In 2017 and 2018, fewer persons subject to deportation returned, although their absolute number continued to increase moderately. This can be explained in part by the fact that a much larger proportion of those who are obliged to leave the country now come from countries to which repatriation is more difficult to achieve (see SVR 2019, p. 87ff.).

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participate, since 2006 (see Schneider 2012b, p. 61f.); according to the agency, it deported over 10,000 third-country nationals in 2017 (Frontex 2017). However, it is precisely because there is currently no fundamental deviation from the Dublin principle on determining responsibility that there is now a greater need than ever to develop a stronger European approach to addressing the complex issue of repatriating failed asylum seekers. If the member states in which asylum seekers first arrive in EU territory are the states with primary responsibility for taking in these individuals and examining their asylum applications, then they are also responsible for repatriating failed asylum seekers,16 primarily by means of voluntary return combined with effective long-term reintegration services. To this end, the EU should strive to ensure the better sharing of good practices and aim to agree on EU-wide, adapted funding principles to ensure that returnees can receive comparable assistance services, regardless of the member state from which they are being repatriated (see EC 2017a, p. 6f.). In this context, cross-border AMIF projects such as the European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) Programme, in which twelve EU member states as well as Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom are participating, are a good approach. In an endeavour to ensure the long-term reintegration of returnees in their countries of origin, ERRIN is working to improve the social and professional support offered to returnees and ensure that financial reintegration assistance is offered on a consistent basis. Additionally, since 2018 the European Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament have been examining options for a recast Return Directive (Directive 2008/115/EC) as part of the further development of the Common European Asylum System. A reformed legislative act, which may need to take the form of a regulation, thus making it directly legally binding, could (1) standardise how, when and in what form repatriation advisory services are to be provided, (2) determine binding minimum standards for the termination of periods of residence, including options for voluntary assisted return and (3) define principles of repatriation and reintegration assistance. Against the backdrop of the research findings on the key factors involved in the voluntary repatriation of returnees to their countries of origin and their reintegration in those nations, there is a need to rethink the 7- to 30-day time limit for reaching an official or legal decision on repatriation. After all, it is necessary in individual cases to prepare the returnees, a process that is often far more time-consuming than the act of booking an airline ticket and packing the suitcase. The first step involves the individual developing a willingness to return (either of Launching the idea of ‘return sponsorship’ in its New Pact on Migration and Asylum (EC 2020), the European Commission introduced a new paradigm into the debate on responsibility sharing within the CEAS. Allowing for ‘flexible solidarity’, member states who would object to admit asylum seekers or beneficiaries of international protection within the EU framework of solidarity should be able to ‘compensate’ by becoming return sponsors for those member states who are under pressure to return a high number of failed asylum seekers. Thus, the supporting member state would assume full responsibility for repatriating, or in other ways dealing with, third country nationals who become obligated to leave another member state. In case this proposal, against all odds, was implemented, this would mark a watershed, as those member states opposing refugee admission could become the ‘official bouncers’ of the EU, thus manifesting the division of at least two camp, which could further counter European integration.

16

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their own volition or after receiving advice), followed by the second step of mobilising the necessary resources in the form of the returnee’s existing social capital and/or by means of support structures. It is only then that the individual is prepared for the actual process of returning home, dependent on conditions in the host country and country of origin (see Cassarino 2004, p. 271f.).17 Practical experience in Germany also shows that, in many cases, voluntary return requires a longer preparation period than is permitted by the 30-day departure deadline that is typically set, and, as such, the immigration authorities, provided they have an adequate understanding of the personal circumstances of the individuals required to leave Germany and are prepared to assist them with the voluntary return process, use their discretion and set a longer deadline (see Graff and Schneider 2017, p. 32; Grote 2015, p. 59). In this way, awareness could be raised significantly across the EU of the need to tackle the task of both the obligatory and the voluntary return of failed asylum seekers on a truly joint basis as part of a harmonised asylum system. Ultimately, a common repatriation policy must be mainstreamed in the larger context of the EU’s increasingly externalised migration policy, within which multiple package deals are emerging that require coherent action on the part of the member states. The countries of origin and transit countries, which are expected to carry out migration control duties for the EU and at the same time readmit their citizens who have been required to leave their host countries, will call for attractive offers. Last but not least, this will also include new options for legal migration to the EU, in addition to well-financed measures for the comprehensive and sustainable reintegration of returning migrants.18 The EU will only achieve credibility and success in its negotiations with these states if it adopts a whole-of-government approach that wisely combines demands and offerings in migration control with foreign-, development- and economic-policy cooperation (see Angenendt/Bendel 2017).

17

While in Germany, the departure deadline is set at 30 days pursuant to Section 38 (1) of the Asylum Act (AsylG) (unless the asylum application is unlawful or clearly unsubstantiated: in such case, there is a one-week deadline pursuant to Section 36 (1) AsylG), the European Commission has appealed to member states to set the ‘shortest possible period for voluntary departure needed to organise and proceed with the return’ (EC 2017b, clause 18/19). According to the current version of the Return Directive (2008/115/EC), this period is seven days; according to the European Commission's plans to revise the Directive, which were submitted in September 2018 (but not agreed on between the European Parliament and among the Member States), the minimum period is to be completely eliminated under acceleration aspects (see EC 2018). However, this reflects a rather narrow view of repatriation, presenting it as a mere ‘logistical problem’ and thus ignoring the sustainability necessary for properly preparing the reintegration process. For a thorough critical appraisal of the length of the time limit for voluntary departure in the member states’ legal systems and jurisprudence see Brandl (2020). 18 Examples in this context include the measures carried out by the European Commission in cooperation with the IOM (see EC 2017c) as part of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (see Castillejo 2016).

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Conclusion

Can we make the case that coordinated measures of return assistance and reintegration support will convert the repatriation of persons obliged to leave Germany, following an unsuccessful asylum claim, into a positive development impulse in the countries of origin? The connection initially seems rather unlikely, and empirical evidence from return processes – such as, for example, in the case of mandatory returnees from the United Kingdom to Sri Lanka (Collyer 2018) – points more to the failure of sustainable reintegration. Nevertheless, it is not only German development policy that has committed itself to this goal (see BMZ 2019); in the academic context, too, the possibility of positive connections between the voluntary return of those obliged to leave the country and the associated opportunities for development is certainly seen (Miller Scarnato 2018). From a pragmatic perspective on migration management, which is committed to the regulatory goal of repatriating those who are obliged to leave the country but is not indifferent to the fate of returnees, the approaches of a policy integrated into development cooperation to promote the voluntary return of rejected asylum seekers, point in the right direction. Such a policy goes way beyond limiting support to monetary incentives in the form of ‘return assistance’ and the covering of travel expenses for returnees, just to get them ‘out of the country and out of sight’. It accepts repatriation as an inevitable collateral effect of sovereign regulatory policies dealing with migration. Yet, instead of short-term action, it frames the issue in sustainable terms by supporting the process of individual (economic, social and cultural) reintegration of returnees in their countries of origin and improving local conditions (e.g. by creating educational and advisory structures that benefit the whole community). Governmental and non-governmental organisations for the promotion of co-development, some of which have been engaged in the respective countries of origin for years, might be the best-suited actors to support the ‘embeddedness’ of return and reintegration. At the same time, this type of policy means expanding the responsibility taken on by the ‘repatriating’ state for migrants who cannot be granted asylum or any another residence right. This responsibility no longer stops with the provision of financial support for return or the upholding of basic rights during deportation. It extends to the subsequent life of the returnees and those around them during the post-return phase, based on their connection to Germany, and can ultimately be classified in normative terms as the expression of the global ethics of responsibility. However, the combination of ‘tough’ policies geared at terminating unlawful residence and ‘soft’ development policy has a high price: in the eyes of critics, development cooperation sells its humane soul and becomes the ‘henchman’ of restrictive domestic policy. For one, from a development cooperation perspective, there are indeed noticeable shortcomings in coherence, since alternative measures (such as training in Germany) would have a far greater developmental impact on those affected than a quick ‘voluntary’ departure and monetary support through reintegration programmes. On the other, the outcome of the measures – not least in relation to the financial effort involved – seems rather meagre (see Feneberg 2019).

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The measures of Germany’s ‘Perspektive Heimat’ programme have been up and running for about three years now. While they have not yet been sufficiently evaluated, there is some evidence and data. According to the Federal government, more than 20,000 people were placed in employment through the various components of the programme in the first two years (until May 2019), including a good 2,000 returnees from Germany and a good 1,000 returnees from other countries; the local population at the locations of the migration advisory centres benefited from the remaining 17,000 placements (German Bundestag 2019b, p. 10). Compared to the number of voluntary departures and removals from Germany,19 a relatively small number of returnees were placed in employment. Furthermore, evidence on reintegration outcomes of failed asylum seekers is still rather patchy and cautions against too much optimism: Owing to the frequently high degree of social, economic and, in some cases, medical marginalisation and alienation experienced by returnees during the migration process and following their return, it is especially difficult for these individuals to become agents of change back home (see de Haas 2016, p. 29). Thus, fulfilling their individual obligation to leave Germany will initially provide hardly any direct developmental effect, and there is a lot more work to be done. In a first study evaluating the Federal Government’s special return and reintegration programme ‘StarthilfePlus’ it was found that in a sample of more than 1,300 returnees who had received multiple assistance (with an average time of 8 months upon return), about 39 percent were employed but no more than 15 percent were able to make a living on their job; only 40 percent claimed that they were satisfied with their life after return (Schmitt et al. 2019). However, the debate on deficiencies in the repatriation process for failed asylum seekers in the wake of the 2015/2016 refugee crisis has managed to overcome silo thinking with regard to the consequences of displacement and migration. Through joint programming and the creation of advisory centres and structures for reintegration, the responsible departments were able to lay the foundations for a comprehensive approach. This may also yield greater coherence in German migration, repatriation and mobility policy, which had previously been almost exclusively rooted in domestic politics. If cooperation on return, reintegration and development were to be intensified in the future and to cover all countries with development needs on a sustainable and comprehensive basis, this could mean a completely new approach in German development cooperation without having to throw its principles overboard – on the contrary: By creatively shaping the basically limited opportunities for successful reintegration of forced returnees, new approaches are opened up to support the local population on the ground as well – be it through advice on the possibilities of legal migration, training and adaptation measures for labour market integration, or community-related services offered to returnees in the context of self-employment. The principles of ‘Do No Harm’ and community orientation can be strictly observed. Even though there is still a long way to go 19

The Federal Government registered about 29,500 voluntary departures in 2017 (16,000 in 2018 and 13,000 in 2019), while 24,000 foreign nationals were deported in the same year (23,600 in 2018 and 22,000 in 2019) (see German Bundestag 2020).

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before a comprehensive and effective infrastructure for developmentally sensitive reintegration is in place, the current approach is certainly an opportunity for development cooperation, not least because it gives the responsible actors a stage to tell new (success) stories of development cooperation and to shake off the stigma of approaches that have often been perceived as ‘failed’. At the same time, it opens up the possibility for development cooperation to be perceived more strongly as an actor in migration policy, for example by highlighting the positive connections between legal migration or circular mobility and development. But even domestic policy can acquire a ‘friendlier’ face if it is able to link its regulatory goals to the issue of human development: Repatriation policy linked with reintegration policy. In terms of development policy goals, a consistent further development of the ‘classic’ AVR (Assisted Voluntary Return) programmes could lead via AVRR (Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration) programmes to ‘AV3R programmes’ (Assisted Voluntary Return, Reintegration and Retention). These programmes could have their role in gradually improving living conditions in such a way that fewer young people would find an incentive to leave their country of origin in danger and by irregular means in order to apply for asylum in Europe with limited chance of success.

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Jan Schneider is a political scientist and has been Head of the Research Unit of the Expert Council on Integration and Migration (SVR) since 2013. He has previously worked for the European Migration Network (EMN) National Contact Point at the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), the Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI) and the German Federal Agency for Civic Education (bpb). He completed his doctoral studies on advisory processes in German migration policy at the Institute of Political Science at Justus Liebig University in Giessen. His main research interests include asylum and migration policy at national and at EU levels. This text solely reflects the personal opinion of the author.

Welfare Effects of Regular and Irregular Migration

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David Benček, Tobias Heidland, Matthias Lücke, and Claas Schneiderheinze

Abstract

This chapter examines the ways in which regular and irregular migration affects welfare. Net welfare effects concern migrants, countries of origin and host countries to varying degrees and are affected by migrants’ characteristics, especially their legal status. Irregular migration is more likely to result in welfare loss or smaller welfare gains due to unfavourable selection, high uncertainty and below-average labour market outcomes. In order to ensure overall beneficial welfare effects, migration requires governance through coherent cross-departmental policies.

14.1

Introduction

Continuously increasing migrant numbers around the world increase the importance of economic and social integration. In this chapter, we examine how the welfare and real incomes of all concerned parties are affected by regular and irregular migration. This includes the migrants themselves, the population remaining in the countries of origin as well as the local population in the host country. We also take into account the immaterial aspects of an individual’s welfare (e.g. security, access to education or general opportunities). From a neoclassical point of view, individuals decide to migrate because it improves their welfare. Based on differences in labour demand and supply across countries which result in wage differentials, people are induced to migrate until factor prices reach equilibrium. While the impact on migrants themselves is large, this process also affects the countries of origin and destination in the ways that are discussed below. Positive individual welfare effects strongly depend on successful labour market integration, which in turn relies on a skill set that is in demand in a destination country. © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-J. Preuß et al. (eds.), Forced Displacement and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32902-0_14

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Since labour is not homogeneous, not everyone can expect to benefit from migration. Therefore, it is not a random sample from the pool of potential migrants in low-income countries with a large labour supply that eventually decides to migrate. Rather, individuals self-select to migrate based on their expectations of success. People with longer formal education or vocational training should have more reason to be optimistic about their labour market prospects in a host country. But this rationale is a relative one. Even low chances of success may seem worth taking if prospects at home are bleak (a classic illustration is given in Harris/Todaro 1970). Ultimately, this circumstance leads people to migrate even without legal pathways. However, welfare effects differ distinctly between regular and irregular migration. Because of the higher risks and poor prospects that go along with irregular migration a different kind of self-selection process leads to economically desperate migrants without formal education, who often hold misguided expectations. Their chances of successful labour market integration in destination countries are low and thus the overall welfare effects for themselves and their families, and also for the host country, are more likely to be negative. In the following sections, we discuss the potential welfare effects of migration in more detail. We point out significant differences between regular and irregular migration and discuss the crucial role of migrant characteristics for welfare outcomes in all dimensions. We first examine the ways in which migrants’ personal welfare is affected and review empirical results from the research literature. Then we look at the impact of migration on countries of origin and consider the potential loss of human capital as well as the effects of remittances and return migration. Finally, we review the literature on the labour market and fiscal effects of migration in host countries.

14.1.1 Welfare Effects on Migrants At first sight, it seems clear that migrants nearly always benefit from migration; otherwise, they would either return to their home countries or not set off abroad in the first place. Clemens et al. (2008) have shown that for a wide range of low-income countries a worker migrating to the United States will see her income increase sharply – between two- and four-fold, depending on her level of education. By moving to a rich country, migrants benefit from the so-called ‘place premium’ based on living in a high-productivity environment, with higher capital endowments, better technology, sound legal frameworks, better institutions and many other factors. Milanovic (2015) supports this view by showing that more than half of the world’s income distribution is solely determined by the country of residence and its national income distribution. Yet on second thought, the situation is more complex and a range of influences needs to be considered. For one, migration is not costless and can – depending on distance, the existence or absence of legal pathways in addition to bureaucratic hurdles – require substantial resources. Furthermore, migrants rarely have complete information or directly transferable skills and labour market experience. Controlling

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for different characteristics such as education, language skills and work experience, Hanson (2006) estimates an increase in annual income of about USD 10,600 for Mexican migrants to the United States (US). Still, this estimate remains disputable because positive selection on observed and unobservable migrant characteristics cannot be ruled out with the applied methodology. The econometric techniques used by Clemens et al. (2008) control for self-selection; applying their results to the Mexico–US case leads to an estimated gain in the range of USD 6,700 to USD 8,000 – still a very significant average increase in income for migrants given typical pre-migration incomes. However, for individual migrants, subjective experience and personal income gain are far more relevant than such population-wide average benefits. In this regard, disparities between expected and actual income after migration may play a decisive role in overall welfare effects. One reason why incomes may turn out to be lower than anticipated is ‘downgrading’ in the labour market. A lack of sufficient language skills, certification issues, and technological differences may render a migrant unable to build on her skills and experience and work in a similar occupation to before. Secondly, initial expectations about life in potential destination countries may be seriously biased by impressions based on selective media consumption as well as information from returning migrants. Accordingly, many migrants expect to earn wages similar to natives in the destination country. Hoxhaj (2015), for example, shows that four in five irregular Albanian immigrants in Italy systematically overestimate their wage gains and that this biased perception is especially prevalent among low-skilled migrants who rely on information from personal contacts. By contrast, McKenzie et al. (2013) find that male Tongan emigrants to New Zealand actually underestimate their earning potential. In both cases, relatively small sample sizes and a focus on minor bilateral migrant corridors raise questions about the external validity of the results. Generally, experiencing negative disparities between actual and anticipated income may – even though migrants are objectively better off due to higher incomes – result in frustration and the subjective impression of ‘failed migration’. This can happen if the negative psychological effect of falling short of one’s expectations outweighs the measurable and perceived benefits from migration. Dissatisfaction may not only be caused by unrealistically high expectations about income, though. Often the costs of migration in a broader sense can be underestimated. While the monetary cost for travel and transfer to a destination country might be high, it is nevertheless manageable and only occurs once. By contrast, the psychological effects of being separated from home and family, enjoying lower social status or even facing discrimination, are lasting and potentially dominate the overall evaluation of migrating.1 1

Asylum seekers and refugees are a special group of migrants, whose main motive for migration is increased security from war and persecution. Achieving security often trumps any other concerns about welfare in the short term. The social and economic dynamics of income can, however, still unfold for a given individual over time, determining long-term outcomes, return decisions and the potential onward migration from a country of first asylum (Chin and Cortes 2015; Echevarria and Gardeazabal 2016).

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Happiness or life satisfaction may seem to be helpful indicators of migrants’ own perception of welfare effects. Subjective perceptions should, however, be kept separate from objective indicators such as the absence of absolute poverty, and only the latter should guide policy design. One important insight regarding the relation between material and psychological wellbeing as objective indicators and subjective experience is that income gains and other objective improvements do not necessarily translate into higher subjective wellbeing. Beyond a particular income threshold additional material wellbeing does not on average result in more happiness or life satisfaction (the ‘Easterlin paradox’ or sometimes also called ‘happiness treadmill’, see, e.g. Bartram 2013 or Simpson 2013). As Hendriks (2015) notes, an important aspect to the sustained happiness of migrants is successful integration. This may in part be related to the comparison groups migrants have. Initially, the reference point may be one’s own previous income and that of former neighbours. Relative post-migration income would then be high, indicating large gains. Over time migrants will start comparing themselves to their new neighbours. If these are better off, subjective wellbeing can fall even for an economically successful migrant, resulting in ‘frustrated achievers’ (Olgiati et al. 2013). Successful integration in the host society is vital to enable migrants to climb the social ladder and thereby compensate for this initial frustration. Language skills are crucial to this. Barriers to integration and contact with the native population should, however, not be underestimated and are especially relevant for migrants from culturally distant countries of origin. A migrant’s legal status (i.e. regular vs irregular) can affect her welfare in several ways. Firstly, irregular workers tend to earn significantly less (Rivera-Batiz 1999; Dustmann et al. 2017). Secondly, amenities such as better access to public goods and improved personal security may increase subjective wellbeing considerably, but access to public goods and other amenities is mostly limited or even impossible for irregular migrants. Thirdly, irregular migrants live highly uncertain lives due to the constant threat of deportation. This results in short-term planning and low investment in skills and thus exacerbates difficulties with integration. Most migrants would therefore prefer regular over irregular migration. Still, if legal migration is impossible due to migration policy, irregular migration will often still be preferred to remain a non-migrant, in particular, if the expected benefits of such irregular migration are biased. Taken together, this brief overview highlights the complex interaction of numerous determinants of migrant welfare. As we observe rising numbers of migrants around the world, we can presume that average net effects are positive. But since there are clearly obstacles to overcome in order to benefit from migration, we can identify some characteristics that render it more likely that a migrant will successfully improve her welfare – some of which can become the basis of policy interventions. Most importantly, migrants need reliable, extensive information: not only about modes of travel and entry regulation but also about access to labour markets, bureaucratic processes and general employment chances. Finding legal pathways to a destination country and avoiding unrealistic expectations about economic opportunities serve as a good starting point for such an important

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decision. Destination countries should therefore support information campaigns in emigration countries about legal migration opportunities for education or work and about the risks involved in irregular travel. It is in their interest to thwart biased perceptions and receive well-informed migrants. Additionally, of course, migrants increase their labour market chances by having a formal education, labour market experience and relevant language skills (which often affect the destination choice) or at least a focus on learning the language fast. By requiring achievements such as successful investment in language skills, integration policy can play a crucial role in steering migrants towards higher welfare in the long term even if this implies short-term sacrifices of welfare that they might otherwise be unwilling to make.

14.1.2 Welfare Effects on Countries of Origin When migrants leave their country of origin, their decision can have repercussions on the family left behind, their neighbours and society at large. The welfare effects on countries of origin can be subsumed under three major categories: the physical absence of migrants, financial remittances, and social remittances. These have welfare effects both in the short and long term. The potentially significant effects of the physical absence of migrants have given rise to the ‘brain drain’ and ‘brain gain’ literature. The term brain drain refers to the exodus of highly skilled individuals or high emigration rates in specific professions that are considered important for development. Brain drain decreases the stock of human capital, can endanger the provision of public goods and burden national budgets. Those worrying about the brain drain typically do not worry about emigration per se but about the loss of the highly educated. A ‘brawn drain’ would typically not be considered problematic because most countries with high emigration rates are also affected by high unemployment, low local incomes or a combination of both. The highly skilled, however, are far scarcer, presumably important for development and their training is often very costly. This is particularly the case for groups with excellent outside options such as physicians. The impact of a brain drain is determined by two factors – the emigration rate and how much more likely the highly skilled are to emigrate than the low-skilled. Generally, emigration rates tend to decrease as the country’s population size increases and its level of economic development rises (Docquier et al. 2007). It is thus small, poorly developed countries in particular that see large parts of their skilled workforce leave the country. These are not only the countries that offer their highly skilled citizens the lowest wages, thus making emigration particularly attractive; these countries can also least afford the loss of skilled people. While being aware of the risk of brain drain helps guard against further exacerbating affected countries’ shortages of skilled workers, the opportunity of skilled people to emigrate can also have beneficial effects. Due to highly restrictive skill-selective policies for labour migration in most potential destination countries, obtaining an education can be a way to gain the opportunity to emigrate. This

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incentive to become highly skilled can increase the incentive for education considerably. If not all those who are thus induced to become highly educated eventually migrate, there can be a net gain for the country of origin, the so-called ‘brain gain’. The recruitment of Gurkha men from Nepal for the British Army is a prime example of the brain gain effect raising the level of formal education. Each year 25,000 men of Gurkha ethnicity apply for 300 positions in the British army. They are motivated by a monthly payment that is 50 times greater than the wages of average employees in Nepal. In 1993 a selection criterion was introduced: eight years of formal education (extended to 10 years in 1997). Such a selection criterion is similar to skill-selective immigration policies that are widely prevalent today. In consequence, education became more profitable and the share of young eligible Gurkha men with at least 10 years of education increased from 16% to nearly 26%. As only 1.2% of them were actually able to join the army, the stock of human capital increased by about 9%. Such brain gain can have significant positive effects. In the case of Nepal additional schooling translated into 68% higher earnings and a shift towards higher-quality formal jobs in non-agricultural sectors (Shrestha 2017). Generally, the net effect of skilled emigration on the human capital stock in the origin country is ambiguous. Specifically, countries with very low initial levels of human capital and low-to-medium emigration rates benefit, whereas countries with already higher levels of human capital and high rates of highly educated emigrants (>20%) are most likely to suffer from decreasing human capital. Beine et al. (2008) show for many small poor countries the effect is negative because the rate of emigration is very high. Another important factor for the positive welfare effects of migration on sending countries is international remittances. This refers to the money that is sent to households by migrant workers from abroad. For many developing countries remittances are the most important source of foreign currency. Globally, the total sum of remittances is actually higher than official development aid to the developing world (Adams 2011). Due to their magnitude and anti-cyclic nature, remittances have a crucial impact on the receiving households and developing countries as a whole. Their foremost role in developing countries is reducing poverty in terms of level, depth and severity (Adams/Page 2005). Remittances not only positively affect consumption, resulting in better nutrition and food security (Zezza et al. 2011), they can also improve health outcomes in countries where health care is not free. Further, education will be positively affected by remittances if these finance the schooling of those left behind (Yang 2008; Licuanan et al. 2015). If the level of poverty before migration is high and the gain from remittances thus particularly influential, these positive income effects of remittances can compensate for the negative psychological effects of separation from the migrant, which can be particularly detrimental to children and the elderly (Böhme et al. 2015). If, however, the increase in income is very small, for example, because the migrant is unable to send money back, the result may be negative consequences on those left behind. Negative psychological effects are often lower if those left behind remain in contact with the migrant. The internet, new communication technologies and social media have made the lives of transnational families much easier. International

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cooperation to facilitate more (regular) circular migration would also help transnational families to stay in touch. Successful integration, which can be improved by legal status, and supporting migrants’ sending of remittances to their countries of origin can thus make migration more beneficial for countries of origin. Legal status, which allows visits to the country of origin, can help keep transnational links alive and thus have long-lasting positive effects in the countries of origin. Remittances and thus many welfare effects in countries of origin depend on the migrant-receiving a higher income in the destination country and consequently benefit from the same characteristics that determine successful integration. The size of remittances, however, also depends on the strength of links with the network of remaining family and friends at home. Since remittances are typically not taxed, they affect public coffers only indirectly. Increasing import demands from receiving households can boost public income from corresponding taxes. These constitute substantial income sources for many developing countries. In addition, large-scale remittances can increase the demand for locally produced goods and services, thus raising real incomes and potentially increasing tax revenue. Besides that, remittances can supplement public expenditure if they take the form of ‘collective remittances’, that is groups of migrants collectively investing in the infrastructure of a specific place in the country of origin, often the village they come from. Such collective remittances are sometimes seen as a form of philanthropy that can have only little influence overall; the individual beneficiaries of the investment may, however, benefit considerably. This can also help spread the effect of remittances more widely, which otherwise often increase inequality in countries of origin and can thus have a negative effect on the subjective wellbeing of inequality-averse non-recipients. Diaspora policies that improve the conditions for collective remittances while taking into account the sustainability of these financial flows can thus help improve the welfare effect of migration in countries of origin. This inequality-increasing effect of remittances is due to typically low economic short-term impacts on people outside of the migrant’s personal network in the country of origin. Remittances have not yet been shown to systematically increase macroeconomic growth, which is not unexpected, given that they are mostly consumed. Partly, however, this lack of evidence is also due to a paucity of high-quality data (Bazzi/Clemens 2013). Nonetheless, remittances are often invested in credit-starved rural environments (Woodruff/Zenteno 2007) and can create employment and welfare gains for the wider society in the long term. In the context of natural disasters, they can provide a lifeline and steady income from the outside world (Gröger/Zylberberg 2016). In addition to making economic contributions, migrants also transfer home new experiences, beliefs and values. This phenomenon is called ‘social remittances’. Recent research has shown that the exposure to new economic systems, political institutions and cultures not only shapes migrants’ values but also those of their relatives at home. Through their social networks, migrants wield influence on attitudes towards social, economic, religious and political institutions even if they

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do not return. The influence of migrants on preferences for electoral accountability, democratic parties and good governance is backed up by quantitative evidence (Spilimbergo 2009; Barsbai et al. 2017). Hence, migrants can induce institutional improvements in their home countries. This can contribute to economic development in the medium and long term and thus improve welfare in the countries of origin.

14.1.3 Welfare Effects on Destination Countries The widespread perception of immigration as a threat to national welfare has a strong impact on policies around the world. Still, quantitative studies paint a much more mixed picture. Aggregate impacts of immigration on host country economies are usually relatively small or insignificant. Actual welfare effects have to be distinguished from attitudes. Negative attitudes towards immigrants and the perception of negative welfare consequences are more accurately explained by the way people construct their national identities. While large parts of society hold a civic identity (based on common fundamental values), some instead derive their identity from ethnicity (Hainmueller/Hopkins 2014). In the former case, successful integration of immigrants improves attitudes and promotes unrestricted inclusion in the host country’s society; in the latter case, a deep-seated fear of being uprooted can outweigh all potential benefits from integrating migrants. Ultimately, policy considerations regarding the welfare effects of migration should be based on measurable socio-economic consequences. From a welfare perspective, migration’s effects on the incomes of nationals via labour markets and productivity effects, fiscal consequences and security are perceived by many as the most pressing aspects. Generally, immigration can both harm and favour the status of national workers. The actual impact is highly context-specific and depends simultaneously on the characteristics of the local economy and of the migrants. Hence, universal narratives do not capture the complexity of the relationship. Yet it is possible to make some general points that hold in most contexts. Usually, the aggregate impact of immigrants on the income of nationals is small but can differ by subgroup. It depends on the characteristics of the immigrants in relation to the host country and local population. Generally, similarities between natives and immigrants foster competition across groups. Complementarities improve welfare effects on the local population. Owners of capital benefit more strongly from rather low-skilled immigration and highly skilled individuals are also likely to realise net benefits. Low-skilled nationals are more likely to suffer economically from immigration but positive wage effects have been demonstrated even for this group (Docquier et al. 2014). The groups most at risk from immigration are previous immigrant cohorts that already reside in the host country. This is because they face the most intense competition due to their relatively much higher similarity in skills and education with the new arrivals.

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Migrants have skills and experiences that are typically not identical to those of non-migrant workers. Immigration thus provides the opportunity for specialisation in tasks and occupations that fit a person’s ability best and thus for specialisation gains. For this effect to be beneficial migrants do not need to have skills that are absent in the host population. Any differences in the skillset can be beneficial. For example, if the choice for low-skilled workers is between working in more manual occupations or in more communication-intensive occupations, native workers are likely to be relatively more productive in communication-intensive occupations than immigrants due to fluency in the host country’s language. Immigration of low-skilled workers thus not only increases the pool of available labour, but it also provides incentives for native workers to specialise in occupations that are more suited to their comparative advantage and thus increase productivity (Peri/Sparber 2009). Consequently, both natives and immigrants can benefit from specialisation. However, such gains from specialisation are only realised by regular immigrants. Irregular immigrants are restricted to informal employment and thus face a constrained set of choices, which severely limits the options for specialisation in tasks. In addition, it may benefit other workers with complementary skills such as highly skilled workers. Moreover, immigration can help to overcome skill shortages, which can have important positive welfare effects for natives. If firms have competitive advantages from employing immigrants, native workers employed in the same firms may benefit, too, since most of them will not be competing for the same jobs. Firms can also benefit from immigrants’ greater mobility within the destination country. Being less attached to a particular location, they are faster to react to geographical misalignments between labour supply and demand. They thus make economies more dynamic and can also speed up sectoral adjustments (for a historical example, see Braun/Kvasnicka 2014). Hence, the actual income effects of immigration on natives depend crucially on the skillset of migrants and their ability to find jobs that match their skills and experience. Labour market policies and regulation thus matter greatly. Migrants cannot take up suitable jobs if they face labour market restrictions, discrimination or difficulties regarding the recognition of their formal qualifications. In this case, they will instead compete with low-skilled natives for unsophisticated jobs in the formal and informal sectors. This is especially severe for irregular immigrants. Without work permits, they are restricted to the informal sector where they often outstrip nationals due to higher skills and lower reservation wages. Beyond that, migrants are in most cases positively self-selected and therefore exhibit higher motivation, ambition and skills than corresponding non-migrants. As a consequence, migrants are more likely to be entrepreneurs than their native peers (Chiswick 1999). With the right skills and legal circumstances, this can create employment for native workers. New products and varieties that immigrants’ firms create can have positive welfare effects by increasing choice for all citizens (Aubry et al. 2016). Studies in economics and business studies, furthermore, indicate that increased diversity of the workforce can improve innovation within firms, creating additional positive effects.

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The fiscal impact of immigration on host countries is another controversial issue. While pessimists assume rising welfare payments, security and other public expenses, optimists expect migrants to compensate for these costs by paying taxes, paying for the retirement benefits of native workers, and contributing to social security. The fiscal net effect depends on the characteristics of the average immigrant and the integration into the labour market. Young well-educated immigrants who speak the local language are most likely to be net contributors to the government budget. Labour market integration and realised incomes are the natural determinants of the fiscal net effect. Since networks and in-depth knowledge of the destination country matter for the labour market outcomes of migrants, integration and positive welfare effects for the destination country go hand in hand. In addition, the higher fertility rates of immigrant families from many countries can help to ease demographic transition in ageing societies. For this, early investment into the education of immigrant children, especially those with low-skilled parents, is needed to achieve long-term welfare effects. Accurate empirical estimations of the fiscal net effect remain difficult due to the dynamic nature of any economy and uncertainty about future developments and thus rely on fragile assumptions. For that reason, the average impact on the fiscal balance cannot be pinned down to a single number. While even the sign of the effect remains controversial, the vast majority of studies agree in one respect: the fiscal impacts of immigration are rather small. The effect, whether positive or negative, rarely exceeds 0.5% of GDP in a given year (OECD 2013). In addition to education and age, return migration plays an important role in the net effect. Generally, most fiscal contributions are derived from the working-age population, whereas children and pensioners cause net costs. Due to return migration (and labour immigration) migrants are oversampled in the working-age populations of all OECD countries (OECD 2013). In the end, the impact of any immigrant population on the fiscal balance depends on its composition. Negative fiscal effects of low-skilled immigrants can be counterbalanced by better educated, ideally young, migrants. Hence, immigration policy can be employed to govern the fiscal effects by attracting well-educated labour migrants. If that is successfully done, migration can benefit all parties concerned. Despite considerable concerns from many host country residents and ensuing negative attitudes towards immigration, empirical research does not support a positive relationship between immigration and violent crime rates. In some countries, immigrants are less likely to commit crimes than natives; in others, they are slightly more likely to do so. Self-selection, success in integration and migrants’ incentives explain many of the differences in experience between countries. While there may be slight upticks in property crime, this effect can entirely be explained by controlling for low income and education level of immigrants (see Bell et al. 2013; Borjas et al. 2010; Butcher/Piehl 1998). Much seems to depend on what economic outside options immigrants have (Piopiunik/Ruhose 2017). Successful integration can thus reduce the adverse welfare effects of immigration related to security. Since it also improves the economic outcomes for migrants and their economic impact via the labour market, productivity and taxation, successful

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economic and social integration are the crucial ingredients to achieve positive welfare effects from immigration in host countries.

14.1.4 Conclusion In this chapter, we have discussed the fact that overall the welfare effects from migration are on average positive unless policy framework and other conditions are adverse. The largest benefits are reaped by the migrants themselves, who tend to achieve very large income gains if migrating from poor countries to richer ones. The exact level of welfare improvements strongly depends on their personal characteristics in relation to the host country’s economy (e.g. educational background, vocational skills, and the ability and willingness to integrate into their chosen destination country), their legal status and other regulation in the host country. Most of the potentially negative effects that irregular migrants face stem from restricted, or even no, access to labour markets and social security systems, as well as from general uncertainty in the light of a constant threat of deportation. Developing countries of origin on average experience rising stocks of human capital, on the one hand from increased investment by aspiring migrants and on the other hand from returnees who have obtained education and work experience abroad. However, some countries suffer from brain drains. Remittances not only have a significantly positive impact on the lives of migrants’ families but can create wider macroeconomic benefits. Finally, effects in host countries tend to be rather limited but altogether positive. Labour markets in large destination countries easily absorb the additional labour force at typical immigration numbers and macroeconomic effects are thus negligible. Though there can be exceptions in extreme cases such as the very large inflow of Syrian refugees to Lebanon. If labour market integration is successful, the increased diversity of human capital, as well as the higher mobility of migrants, can create complementarities with natives, improve the vitality of the economy and promote productivity growth. While average effects may be positive, efforts to curtail the adverse effects from irregular migration should still be expanded. Due to its widespread impact, migration requires firm governance by all states involved in order for migrants, countries of origin, and countries of destination to benefit from this process. If major destination countries succeed in opening up legal pathways for regular migration and at the same time limit the incentives and possibilities for irregular migration, the personal welfare of migrants as well as the social welfare in countries of origin and destination would increase. This requires coherent sets of policy on immigration and labour markets as well as economic cooperation and development.

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Neither Fortress Nor Open Gate: Proposals for a Humane But Realistic Migration Policy

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Theo Rauch

Abstract

There is broad political consensus that neither closing European borders nor allowing unrestricted freedom of movement can be viewed as a feasible response to the increasing migration pressure around the world. But when it comes to the question of how to regulate migration in a way that adequately considers the legitimate interests of migrants, of the societies in the countries of destination and of the regions of origin, most political parties and academics remain silent if they are asked to be specific about the controversial question of ways and means to invite or restrict migration. Acknowledging that fighting the root causes of forced migration is a necessary but not sufficient contribution, this article aims to contribute to a consolidated development and migration policy composed of the three main pillars of firstly reducing migration pressures in the regions of origin, secondly providing safe legal routes for migrants to Europe and thirdly defining the parameters, i.e., the limitations necessary to keep migration movements within the absorption capacities of the societies and labour markets in the countries of destination. The policy recommendations refer to all motives for migration.

T. Rauch (&) Institut für Geographische Wissenschaften, Freie Universität Berlin, Private: Schlossstr. 67a, 14059 Berlin, Germany © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-J. Preuß et al. (eds.), Forced Displacement and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32902-0_15

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The Problem: Forced Migration and no Safe Legal Ways into Europe1

Thousands of people drowning in the Mediterranean Sea and persistently scandalous conditions in refugee camps on Lesbos, in Libya and elsewhere are clear indications that the European Union (EU) is a long way from managing the issues of refugee movements and immigration. Germans may be proud of their (partial) integration achievements after 2015, but the pathway to Europe continues to be a catalogue of disasters and human tragedy. Our efforts to realise a humane refugee policy and an immigration policy based on a consensus within European societies that meets the standards of open society have hardly advanced since the 2015 crisis, neither in Germany nor at the EU level. Some people tend to argue that “the situation is not that dramatic, bearing in mind the declining numbers of arriving immigrants, which are easily manageable with a bit of goodwill” (cf. Kappel 2018). This perception tends to ignore, however, that the number of those who fail to reach the safe harbour of the European fortress is much higher: people who did not manage to get across the walls established by politicians like Orban or Salvini, or those who were scared away by the inhumane conditions in overcrowded camps. It is not that the migration pressure has weakened. Rather, it is that the risks and the costs of the journey to Europe have become prohibitively high (Rauch 2018). Therefore, we cannot continue to hide behind the walls of an inhumane deterrence policy. Nor is it enough to blame that policy without offering feasible alternative options because this would mean hiding one’s head in the sand. The failure to offer convincing humane and realistic migration policy perspectives tends to lose credibility among a European public oscillating between openness and scepticism. Consequently, the big challenge for European and international policy is to arrive at a conclusive concept for (im)migration and development policies that are guided as much by the principles of humanism and openness as by realism. A concept that considers equally the legitimate interests of migrants, those of their countries of origin and those of the societies in their countries of destination (cf. introduction of Preuß et al. in this volume). At present, international development policies as well as migration policies are far from meeting that challenge. Development policies have not succeeded in significantly reducing the political, economic and environmental pressures to migrate, while EU migration policies have failed to provide safe, legal and affordable ways into Europe for migrants from non-member countries, with the exception of qualified professionals. Instead, most migrants, whether politically persecuted individuals, war refugees or less qualified jobseekers, are forced to opt 1

This article has undergone a broad-based and controversial discussion process. Special thanks for their constructive and partly critical contributions go to: Uli Alff, Wolfgang Fischer, Peter Filius, Ingrid Jacobsen, Sabine Jungk, Bernd Leber, Harald Löhlein, Birga Maier, Rigmar Osterkamp, Hans-Joachim Preuß, Fred Scholz, Bernd Schubert, Sabine Speiser, Rolf Speit, Maria Tekülve, Sondra Wentzel und Ulli Weyl. They do not necessarily agree to the contents.

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for illegal, dangerous, costly routes to Europe and either submit to a complicated, painful and expensive asylum procedure which was never designed for most of them or have to remain in illegality. Within that context, humanitarian efforts in support of refugees/migrants are little more than an attempt to achieve a slightly more generous application of the same inappropriate procedure. Thus, the problem is a threefold one: ongoing migration pressures accompanied by a lack of safe migration routes and the absence of a credible immigration regime in the EU. This paper aims to stimulate discussions about a combined development and migration policy concept which is able to address this threefold problem.

15.2

Migration Policy Principles: Balance of Interests

A world in which nobody is forced to migrate and where all those who chose to migrate can do so without any restrictions remains a long-term vision. Within the near future, the number of people without a chance of decent survival in their home regions exceeds by far the number of decent opportunities in the regions of destination on a global scale. Consequently, migration needs to be regulated in a shortto mid-term perspective, considering the legitimate interests of migrants, of the people in their areas of origin and of those in the areas of destination. Such regulation should consider the following principles and basic assumptions: • Migration should be a choice, not a necessity. • Migration tends to have positive as well as negative impacts on migrants, regions of origin and regions of destination (Collier 2013). • The freedom to migrate needs to be balanced, therefore, with the legitimate interest of communities/societies in destination regions, with a view to keeping immigration within the limits of absorption capacities. Thus, migration needs to be regulated (Hassel 2018). • In order to avoid eradicating the achievements of the social state, that regulation should not be left to the (labour) markets alone. Instead, democratically legitimated public regulation is required. • Borders are ambivalent: they are exclusive for some and protective for others. • In accordance with international human rights, the appropriate balance between openness and protection in the case of immigration countries should follow the principles of a) unlimited and indiscriminate access for politically persecuted people (in line with UN refugee agreements) and b) access for labour migrants in line with the requirements and absorption capacities of labour markets. This implies differentiating between migrants primarily looking for protection and those primarily looking for a better living.

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Consequently, migration policies imply searching for a balance between partly conflicting and partly complementary interests. It is due to those partly diverging interests that they tend to generate beneficiaries and losers within the societies of origin and of destination. Therefore, the strategy proposed in this paper tries to reflect the necessity of balancing conflicting interests.

15.3

Double Strategy: Addressing the Root Causes of Migration While Providing Safe and Regulated Routes

Fighting the root causes of enforced migration is a must. Nobody should be forced to leave his or her home region for survival (Müller 2017). But it is a task that cannot be achieved within a short-term perspective in the prevailing global economic and political environment. Therefore, providing safe migration routes for those in need to leave their home regions as well as for those looking for more promising opportunities elsewhere is a must as well. Firstly, in order to comply with international human rights’ obligations and secondly, in order to make use of the opportunities of migration. But that is also not a route towards a sufficient solution to the migration challenge. The number of those looking for better opportunities exceeds the global number of decent opportunities by far. Consequently, any strategy aimed at improvement needs to combine the two approaches by 1. Fighting the root causes of enforced migration in the regions of origin. This includes political, economic and environmental causes. 2. Providing legal, safe, but regulated routes to decent opportunities in the countries of destination (here: EU states) for great numbers of people seeking protection or jobs. This double strategy is based on the three hypotheses that • fighting the root causes, e.g., assisting in creating decent living conditions in the areas of origin, deserves priority, but is not sufficient to solve the problem of forced migration – at least not in the short-run2; • creating legal ways is thus a necessity in order to prevent people from taking the irregular and dangerous routes;

2

Some authors even assume that success in reduction of poverty might increase the number of international migrants (‘migration hub thesis’) as it is not the very poor, but the middle-class who can afford to migrate oversees (cf. Braunsdorf 2019; Martin-Shields et al. 2017). This argument tends to neglect, however, the interlink between internal poverty migration and the transmission of the migration pressure to urban better-off people towards international migration (‘migration cascade’ thesis, cf. Rauch 2017).

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• however, legal, less dangerous, less expensive and therefore more attractive pathways will only align with the absorption capacities of countries of destination and with the labour requirements of the countries of origin if the movements on these routes can be limited. There is widespread political consensus about the necessity of fighting the causes of migration (at least as far as forced migration is concerned). And there is a certain consensus among a liberal mainstream in western EU countries to establish broader corridors for legal immigration on the one hand but to regulate and restrict the movement on these corridors on the other.3 That consensus ends, however, if we try to specify the details of these approaches. As far as ‘fighting the root causes of migration’ is concerned, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) as the German lead agency for that task has at its disposal plausible concepts and substantial resources for supporting war refugees within the first country they enter. If it comes to the root causes of labour migration, however, the consensus ends in stating that creating jobs might be a good idea (BMZ 2017). But even professional specialists for economic promotion in Africa fail to agree on the chances of success of such efforts and on appropriate tools. As far as legal routes with ‘crash barriers’ are concerned, all left-wing political parties in Germany tend to support that idea in principle. But none of them dare to define the nature of the limitations. This is a taboo. This is not surprising as it would require an ethical debate about borders and about exclusion associated with borders (cf. Nida-Rümelin 2017). Opting for limitation of movement means opting for exclusion. Without breaking this liberal taboo of designing limitations, however, there is no chance to engage in an honest debate about a humane and realistic migration policy. But without such a humane and realistic, credible migration policy, we will not succeed in preventing a split within immigration societies between cosmopolitan and communitarian milieus (cf. Bröning and Mohr 2017; Merkel 2017; Stauffer 2019). When it comes to drawing up borderlines and conditions, however, the devil is in the details. It means moving through a minefield of explosive contradictions. Which restrictions are legitimate from a human rights and non-discrimination perspective? Which of them are realistic, bearing in mind that, for many, borders are there to be overcome? Without engaging in debates on these touchy topics, there is no chance of proceeding towards a solution. Failing to do so, however, means not only a continuing disaster for migrants but also a continuing disaster for European societies and for Europe as a whole.

3

This consensus is opposed by strategies focussing on closure and deterrence favoured by right-wing political parties on the one side and by movements in favour of a ‘human right of migration’ (or freedom of movement), e.g. abolishment of territorial states and all kinds of borders, on the other side of the political spectrum.

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Strategy Components

The proposed double strategy (cf. Fig. 15.1) consists of five components: Components 1 and 2 relate to the root causes of migration, subdivided into causes of flight and causes of labour migration, including all migration movements aimed primarily at securing an improved livelihood. Components 3 to 5 relate to the legal routes of access for three different categories of migrants and their restrictions. None of these components has a chance of resolving the problem of the absence of a conducive migration policy on its own. Only by combining them can we hope to get closer to a solution. Not all the proposals are new or innovative. They are rather a combination of ongoing practices, of known but so far not yet implemented strategies, and of new proposals. The components differentiate between dominating motives of migration, in the awareness that many people decide to migrate due to a combination of different motives. Nevertheless, different motives constitute different rights according to international law and they require different solutions.

15.4.1 Fighting the Causes of Flight for Politically Persecuted People and War Refugees This component is expected to reduce the number of people forced to migrate either due to political persecution or as a result of being affected or threatened by armed conflicts. The root causes of those population movements are related to wide and complex fields such as human rights policies, rule of law and democratisation in the case of persecution or forced evictions for political, religious, gender or tribal issues, and to likewise complex topics like conflict management and peace policy in the case of (civil) wars. In the context of this paper, I can only shortly refer to the relevant issues on a general level. 1. Global enforcement of human rights and the rule of law is a prerequisite for reducing the number of political refugees (cf. contribution of Grävingholt in this volume). Taking the historic nature of democratic transformations of societies into account, this tends to be a long-term task, rather than the subject of some international declarations only. 2. Peaceful conflict resolution and observance of international war law are political requirements of global governance and diplomacy for minimising the number of war refugees and forced evictions. This includes quite different issues such as bans on aggressive wars, on the export of arms to conflict regions, prevention of wars through United Nations (UN) Security Council and international mediation, protection of civilians and education for peace. In all these fields there has been some limited progress, but there is much scope for improvement. Due to limited success in fighting the root causes of politically and conflict-enforced migration, many efforts are directed towards preventing secondary migration from the first country of asylum to EU countries and towards encouraging and facilitating the reintegration of refugees within their regions of origin.

Legal Pathways

Fighting Root Causes

Individual Asylum-Proceedings in Accordance with Rule of Law (supervised) within Regions of Origin (accessible, safe transfer)

„Resettlement“: Needs-based Generous Contingency Solutions for Temporary Protection in Communitybased Self-managed Settlements

FLIGHT

War Refugees

Peace Policy; Conflict Resolution

Improved Care for Refugees within the Region (Finance)

Reintegration and Reconstruction Support as Part of Peace Agreements

Public Infrastructure Policy; Development Policy; Climate and Natural Resource Policies LABOUR MIGRATION

Trade Policies; Investment Promotion; Land Policy;

Employment-oriented Shifts of:

Semi- and unskilled workers

Skilled Professionals

Fig. 15.1 The strategy: fighting root causes and providing legal pathways (with Restrictions)

Politically persecuted

Human Rights Policy; Governance

Irregular Routes

Restricted Application Opportunities within EU Immigration of Skilled Workers Act (existing); Bilateral Agreements; Long-term Integration Perspective

Access in Line with Migrants’ Needs and Absorption Capacity of Destination Countries

Temporary Work Contracts and Temporary Resident Permits in Accordance with ILO Norms for Labour Migrants Looking for Temporary Employment

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3. Supporting refugees and local population within the first countries of destination. This is usually done by financing accommodation and infrastructure in refugee camps. Much more can and needs to be done in terms of promoting economic activities (cf. contribution of de la Chaux in this volume), training and education as well as social life in order to make these camps a place worth staying in and provide prospects for a better future. Refugee support can only be successful if it is accompanied by programmes to improve the overall economic and social situation in the wider region. 4. Improving opportunities for the reintegration of returning refugees through financial support for reconstruction and economic promotion for returning migrants, and also for those who have stayed at home. While the fields of action nos. 3 and 4 are the subjects of ongoing development cooperation programmes (requiring much more international funding to cope with the magnitude of the challenge), nos.1 and 2 have to be considered as permanent ongoing political tasks and struggles. Partly, there is harsh resistance to them from powerful interest groups (e.g., the arms industry). Partly, they are subject to contradictions and dilemmas: A prominent example would be human rights-oriented regime change interventions (Iraq, Libya, etc.), which were meant to reduce the number of political refugees, but instead resulted in protracted civil wars causing huge numbers of war refugees. Conclusion: The great challenge for global governance and for an international peace and human rights movement which aims to minimise the number of people threatened by physical violence is to find good compromises in the tense area between human rights-oriented and peace-securing international politics. Limiting efforts to better care and reintegration of refugees is a necessary contribution, but it is little more than emergency aid after a humanitarian disaster.

15.4.2 Fighting the Root Causes of Enforced Labour Migration The term ‘labour migration’ is used here for any migration that is predominantly motivated by the desire for (better) income opportunities. This includes people whose livelihood is threatened or diminishing because of market forces, loss of access to land or deteriorating natural resources, including effects of climate change. The focus of a strategy of fighting root causes needs to be directed towards migrations caused by necessity, i.e., movements enforced by existential distress and a lack of survival prospects in the home region, rather than towards voluntary movements in search of greener pastures – being aware that it is not always easy to draw the line between dominance of push- versus pull-effects. Like any economic promotion and environmental policy, improving the opportunities for a decent living in the regions of origin within low-income countries is a long-term task under the joint responsibility of national governments and international cooperation partners. At the centre of that task is the creation or

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improvement of income opportunities (including subsistence) by creating jobs and by improving the conditions for self-employment. Social security can play a complementary role, particularly for population groups who are not able to work. Improving income and employment opportunities in low- and lower-middleincome countries characterised by high degrees of under-employment4 depends on a fundamental reorientation of trade, investment, development, environmental and population policies towards the objective of their impact on employment.5 This requires coherent national or regional employment initiatives, supported by international ‘compacts for employment’ with international economic partner regions (in the case of Africa with the EU and China). Such compacts need to include the following: 1. Trade agreements that allow for the well-targeted protection of those labourintensive industries in low-income countries which have a good chance of becoming internationally competitive against cheap imported commodities, instead of destroying such local industries in the interests of protecting export-oriented industries in high- and middle-income countries. These trade agreements should not only protect already existing industries but also guarantee protection for new trades envisaged in the ‘compacts for employment’ (cf. Rauch 2021). This requires a revision of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and the ACP states6 to take a present-day example of immediate political relevance. 2. An investment promotion policy in the countries of origin that is guided by the national employment initiative of that country. The policy needs to be oriented towards the principle of creating a positive net-employment effect, i.e., it has to create more income opportunities than it is destroying by rationalisation or replacement of existing local businesses. Publicly subsidised private investments (as part of ‘public–private-partnerships’) should go towards generating new innovative business opportunities rather than replacing existing economic activities (cf. Rauch 2018). This refers equally to land investments whereby labour-intensive smallholder farming is frequently replaced by capital-intensive large-scale agriculture. This policy recommendation addresses existing German development initiatives such as the ‘Compact with Africa’ and the ‘Marshall Plan with Africa’ which claim to promote jobs for Africa while relying implicitly on the wrong assumption that foreign direct investment results per se in a positive employment effect. 3. A climate and environmental policy which seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and other kinds of the destruction of the natural environment and Under-employment is not reflected by the official unemployment figures, which only refer to formal employees registered as unemployed. The dimensions of the problem of under-employment are better reflected by the fact that, in sub-Saharan Africa, only 2 million formal jobs are available for the 15 million people reaching working age each year. 5 The term ‘employment’ is used here for any income opportunity. Thus, ‘impact on employment’ includes any impact on income- or subsistence-generating activity. 6 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries associated with EU by trade and development partnerships. 4

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instead promotes the sustainable utilisation of natural resources while – at the same time – enabling affected users of such resources to adapt to ongoing environmental change. Such an environmental policy helps to maintain existing natural resource-based income opportunities and to reduce the frequency of natural disasters and related displacements. This proposal addresses the ongoing struggle in favour of more consequent implementation of agreed climate policies (e.g., ‘Fridays for Future’). 4. A development policy in support of national employment initiatives. This implies supporting the identification of competitive and sustainable productive employment opportunities and enabling local institutions and people to make better use of such opportunities. Promoting professional skills development without corresponding employment opportunities, however, would just serve as a springboard for migration. This proposal addresses the ongoing debates on the nature of rural transformation and industrial promotion policies. 5. A population policy which assists families – with particular emphasis on women – in making use of appropriate family planning practices can contribute to a reduction in population and migration pressures. Such interventions realistically need to consider that the adjustment of fertility rates to declining mortality rates usually tends to take one generation, taking the rationale of family-based social security in rural societies into account. 6. Programmes for labour-intensive construction and rehabilitation of public infrastructure based on seasonal employment should be part of internationally supported national employment initiatives. Such programmes can create broad-based seasonal employment opportunities, particularly for the members of smallholder families, wherever the creation of competitive private-sector jobs cannot catch up with the urgency of the demand for jobs. International financial cooperation needs to provide long-term funding facilities for such programmes. While it is obvious that these recommendations relate to long-term political battlefields and that – even in case of their political approval – it will take some more time until a significant impact on employment can be seen, we are not talking about distant visions, but about present-day debates and decision-making processes. Conclusion: Development policy can contribute to mitigating the root causes of labour migration, if it consistently targets at the employment-oriented reorientation of focus and if it is complemented by equal employment-oriented changes in trade, investment promotion, environmental and public infrastructure policies. This, however, requires not only a shift in economic (agricultural, industrial) policies within the countries of origin but also a fundamental transformation of European (and German) trade and climate policies.7 Such transformations are part of ongoing 7

The present EU trade policy still has some way to go to create a conducive environment for protecting labour-intensive manufacturing in Africa. The net-employment effects of the Private– Public Partnership programmes of Germany’s BMZ are not examined. The prevailing concepts of rural transformation for poorer countries tend to promote labour-saving rural mechanisation and take a ‘grow or vanish’ approach towards smallholders without being able to offer alternative sources of livelihood (cf. Rauch et al. 2016).

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debates and struggles and should not be regarded as hopeless (Herbert/Schönhagen 2020). To succeed and to show impact, they will, however, take longer than migrants can afford to wait. Consequently, fighting the root causes is necessary, but not sufficient. It needs to be supplemented by a pro-active immigration policy on the part of the countries of destination.

15.4.3 Safe Routes to the EU with a Long-Term Perspective for Politically Persecuted People This component refers to politically persecuted people and expellees according to the Geneva Refugee Convention, Chap. 1. This category of refugees is entitled by international law to have unlimited access to safe countries. At present, the possibility to claim this right is restricted to those who manage to reach the border of a safe country.8 These rules tend to exclude the majority of persecuted people, who cannot afford the journey to safe harbours. Whereas many people who seek access to wealthy countries for other reasons but have no alternative way of entering them are practically forced to use the gate of ‘asylum’. This inappropriate procedure, which forces the intended beneficiaries of the refugee convention as well as those who clearly do not comply with the criteria to opt for a dangerous and expensive route to their destination, needs to be replaced by a better targeted, less risky and less costly process. Access to the asylum procedure should be made easier for those protected by the asylum legislation, while application opportunities within EU countries for other migrants should be restricted in favour of alternative legal corridors (cf. components 4.4 and 4.5): safer routes for more of those in need of protection against more restrictions regarding access to asylum procedures accompanied with more appropriate routes for all others. This overarching guideline needs to differentiate between persecuted or expelled individuals and larger groups (like Yazidi and Rohingya): 1. Persecuted individuals should have the opportunity to apply for asylum at EU application centres within their region of origin (including neighbouring countries) or in selected transit countries. There, they should be entitled to an asylum procedure in conformity with the rule of law, controlled by the United High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and civil society organisations, supported by UNHCR-certified lawyers with financial assistance during the process and – needs-related – travel allowances for those accepted. The distribution of successful applicants to EU countries should be settled according to an agreed key.9

8

These rules are related to the post-war situation, where the right of asylum was meant for refugees from communist countries seeking asylum in the West. 9 It is assumed that an agreement on such a key will be easier if it relates to approved refugees rather than to unknown numbers of uncontrolled immigrants.

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2. EU states remain application points only for asylum seekers from neighbouring countries (e.g., Morocco, Turkey, Belarus), for those arriving at airports and for those already in EU countries who are at risk of persecution after they return home. Any other migrants still arriving at EU borders on irregular routes should go through an efficient, legal-based asylum procedure within Southern Europe border countries with accepted applicants being sent to willing EU countries and rejected candidates being retransferred to countries of origin on basis of migration agreements with those countries (cf. Knaus 2020). 3. Persecuted or expelled larger groups of people (e.g., ethnic or religious minorities) should be dealt with by special arrangements based on international negotiation guided by UNHCR. For them, contingency solutions without an individual asylum procedure seem to be an appropriate answer. 4. As it can be assumed that political refugees need unlimited protection, accepted individuals should receive an unlimited residence status with all the rights provided by the Geneva Refugee Convention. Their economic and societal integration should be actively promoted. The proposals made under this component constitute improved access to asylum for a higher number of people in need of protection. The restrictions for those who are obviously not entitled are justified and feasible only as part of the package of all components, which provides better opportunities in the regions of origin (component 2) plus easier alternative ways to reach the regions of destination (components 4 and 5). They are necessary, as a continued possibility of unrestricted access to the EU for all migrants on the basis of the asylum process would result in the continuation of the present problems relating to irregular immigration or all the problems to be expected from a policy of open borders. Conclusion: An easily accessible and constitutional asylum procedure within the proximity of their countries of origin is supposed to form a feasible alternative to the dangerous and expensive irregular pathway to Europe for those entitled. For those migrants guided by other motives, other safe and affordable gates to Europe need to be provided so as to prevent them from taking the irregular routes. These gates are the subject of the next chapters.

15.4.4 Temporary Protection Within a Humane and Promoting Environment for Contingents of War Refugees War refugees do not seek protection as individuals but as groups of people affected by general violence and destruction. Caring for war refugees is not about dealing with individual applications, but about organising effective solutions for thousands (sometimes hundreds of thousands) of people fleeing from violence in a certain place or region. According to the Geneva Refugee Convention, war refugees are supposed to receive ‘subsidiary protection’, which does not imply the same unlimited residence status as enjoyed by politically persecuted people. They are to

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be catered for within the proximity of their home region, ideally in neighbouring countries, but under the responsibility of the international community. Shelter and necessary facilities are usually provided in refugee camps. If the absorption capacities of neighbouring countries are overstretched, resettlement in other countries needs to be negotiated. For war refugees, in contrast to politically persecuted people, the prospect of reintegration in their region of origin is in the foreground. Accordingly, the following strategy proposals are guided by the objective of ensuring a protective, humane and enabling environment with the promotion of possibilities to secure a decent living, while maintaining the prospect of reintegration after the end of the violence. Accordingly, the proposed measures are widely in line with present UNHCR rulings and related EU guidelines, but they deviate from a focus on integration as favoured by most migration support organisations in Germany: 1. Priority for settlement in the proximity of the region of origin: The cost per refugee can thus be kept low and the number of refugees benefitting from protection can be increased compared to accommodation in remote high-cost countries. Cultural proximity can reduce the need for integration efforts and help to keep the wish alive to return. 2. Better financial support from the international community: To ensure reliable and adequate funding for a decent accommodation in places of destination, the international community has to enter into legal financial commitments based on economic strength. Contributions to UNHCR need to be provided in the case of a refugee crisis through a system of fixed distribution quota without the need for case-by-case negotiations. The EU should – in its own interest – take the initiative towards setting up such a system in cooperation with the United Nations. 3. Resettlement: At present, the EU countries are neither ready to provide sufficient finance for accommodating refugees decently in neighbouring countries nor prepared to agree to generous resettlement solutions for those who cannot be assisted there anymore in an acceptable manner. As a result, these underfinanced and unwelcome war refugees try to get across the sea to seek asylum. To avoid the unbearable conditions on the various refugee routes without giving up efforts to regulate immigration, it is necessary to proactively invite and collect contingents of refugees who cannot be cared for anymore in countries of the first destination in line with the principle of subsidiarity: Settlement close to the place of origin as far as possible, resettlement to far away destinations as far as necessary. Opening safe, inexpensive and unbureaucratic ways for inviting selected numbers of people in need instead of tolerating the indiscriminate influx of people on dangerous and expensive routes ending up in an unnecessary cumbersome individual asylum selection procedure, that is the underlying rationale of this proposal (cf. Rauch 2020). 4. Time-limit: The residence status of resettled war refugees should in principle be restricted in terms of time and place in order to maintain the prospect of return and reintegration after the end of the threat of violence at the place of origin. Taking the uncertain duration of many civil wars into account, the status of

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residence should be checked through independent international analysis at regular intervals. 5. Self-managed community-settlements: In accordance with the priority for return and reintegration and the proposed time limit, the contingents of war refugees should be accommodated jointly as self-managed local communities, rather than being directed towards a path of integration into the society of the host country. These communities should be – as far as possible – homogenous groups in terms of culture and language. They should be provided with basic social infrastructure (schools, clinics), possibly with their own staff and be supported in starting economic activities related to community needs. In order to avoid the negative effects of parallel societies, initiatives for mutual exchange with the local neighbourhood should be encouraged: a sort of ‘welcome culture’ is equally important for those in need for temporary protection as it is for immigrants. Individual efforts towards a stronger integration aiming at a shift towards the status of a labour-migrant should, however, be tolerated. 6. Right to social contribution: Unlike political refugees, who should be fully integrated into the labour market and related social systems of the countries of destination, temporary war refugees require a different set of social contributions such as grants for self-managed educational, health and transport services, free accommodation, water and electricity. The principle of equal treatment is to be interpreted in the sense of “equal but different” in that case. The specific rulings must be in line with UNHCR guidelines. 7. Pro-active reconstruction aid focussed on the regions of origin of the refugees needs to accompany the process of the jointly organised return of the refugees. Supporting the reconstruction of communal public infrastructure and the individual promotion of reintegration need to go hand in hand in order to open up promising prospects for returning refugees. Through the combination of these proposals, better care for war refugees in their first places of destination would be accompanied by safer and uncomplicated access for those who cannot be appropriately catered for in these countries. These improved possibilities for access to a more humane level of protection come up against restrictions regarding the residential status of the members of the protected communities. These restrictions are at odds with strategies for the fast and permanent integration of war refugees into host societies. The controversial issue is why impose such restrictions in the case of Western European countries that are undeniably immigration societies? The answer is that the need for immigration and the legal obligation of protection follow different logics: successful integration is related to the labour market requirements of countries of destination, while the right to be protected is related to the needs of the migrants. Those in need are not necessarily those who are needed (cf. Münkler and Münkler 2016), but they may be needed by society in their countries of origin after the end of the violence. In order to give more people in need of protection a chance to get it in the future and to provide opportunities for those migrants in need of employment, it is justified to restrict the period of protection for war refugees – in principle – to the timespan in

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which their lives are threatened at home. This is further justified by the fact that the prospect of integration in democratic and wealthy societies would create a strong disincentive for reintegration in difficult post-war situations, thereby contradicting the principle of giving priority to reintegration. And it would tend to reduce acceptance for welcoming refugees within the host societies, where a majority may be in favour of providing protection to people in urgent need but only a minority may be in favour of permanent integration of those people. Conclusion: More war refugees are supposed to be provided with safe, decent and self-managed accommodation plus economic opportunities on the basis of a more adequate system of international financing, regulated temporary resettlement facilities for communities accompanied by reintegration support. The absorption capacities of countries providing protection can be significantly increased if protection from a temporary threat to life is not linked with the issue of permanent immigration.

15.4.5 Safe and Regulated Routes for Labour Migrants While fighting the root causes of labour migration – even when done successfully – can reduce but cannot eliminate migration pressure, at least not within the next one or two decades (components 1 and 2), safe pathways for refugees – as proposed in components 3 and 4 – will not improve the freedom of migration for labour migrants. They need a separate gate. To cater for migration needs in a socially inclusive way (‘leave no one behind!’), two gates are even required: one for skilled workers and professionals who are in high demand in many EU states, and the other one for unskilled or semi-skilled labourers who are also needed in the industrially advanced countries, but who have to find their way on irregular routes and end up in precarious informal employment until now. 1. Skilled workers and professionals are the only categories of migrants whose access to major EU countries is regulated in a satisfactory manner. A recent example is the German ‘Fachkräfte-Zuwanderungsgesetz’ (“immigration of skilled workers act”) approved in 2020. This law interlinks private sector employment contracts and criteria-based (e.g., educational and language requirements) residence permits. Successful implementation of this law will be subject to a pro-active recruitment procedure associated with flexible bureaucratic procedures especially for the acknowledgement of qualifications from countries of origin. Furthermore, bilateral government agreements are necessary in order to ensure that brain drain through recruitment of scarce professionals is avoided and that poor countries are compensated for their investment in education costs. As a rule, skilled workers and professionals need to be provided with the prospect of unlimited residence and integration in order to ensure that the high level of integration efforts (in particular in countries with high language barriers like Germany) pays off for all involved.

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2. Opportunities for temporary labour migration for semi-skilled and unskilled workers. There are few opportunities for legal access to formal EU labour markets for jobs requiring lower skills levels (cf. The Expert Councils’ Research Unit and Migration Policy Institute Europe 2019). On the other hand, there is considerable demand in EU countries for unskilled or semi-skilled labour in those locally rooted economic sectors which cannot be automated easily (such as construction, agriculture and a wide range of services). And there are millions of informal (‘black market’) labourers in EU countries engaged under miserable conditions. One might conclude that some EU industries are not unhappy about the prevailing system of informal migration and employment of unskilled labour. In order to address this unbearable situation and the scandalous circumstances around the Mediterranean that are associated with it, the provision of safe, affordable legal ways for unskilled and semi-skilled labour to enter socially sound and controlled EU labour markets is a must. If legal ways are to have a chance to contribute significantly to a reduction in movements on irregular routes, and if the migrant workers are not to be permanently withdrawn from their home regions, temporary forms of labour migration seem to be the most appropriate option for all parties involved. Temporary labour migration for unskilled and semi-skilled segments of the labour market is acceptable • from the perspective of the regions of origin, as it releases the pressure on local labour markets, generates foreign exchange revenues and increases or stabilises family incomes via remittances (for examples, with figures see the article of Newland and Riester in this volume); • from the perspective of migrants, as it provides safe ways and – compared to the income levels in their home regions and on the illegal labour markets – highly attractive income opportunities without forcing them to abandon their family ties, • from the perspective of the countries of destination, as these countries can fill gaps in labour supply without having to cope with the challenge of integrating so many people on a permanent basis. Such temporary forms of labour migration for low-skill jobs seem to be feasible as well: • The regions of origin, but also the big cities of those countries usually have a huge surplus of unskilled labour. Job seekers are on the move anyway, but usually without succeeding. Unlike in the case of skilled workers there is no threat of brain drain. • The migrants and their families are used to living in trans-local livelihood systems (Steinbrink and Niedenführ 2018) anyway.10 So, it is quite common that 10

This is in contrast to the situation of Turkish migrant workers in the 1960s, many of whom preferred to stay, as they had lost their access to land and other resources in their home areas.

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family members are living in different places, but remain closely interlinked. It is not temporary migration as such that is perceived as a problem, but only unsuccessful migration. The higher the wage level, the shorter the necessary migration period for a certain savings target, e.g., for establishing a household or a family business.11 • In European countries of destination, there is an increasing demand for unskilled labour for activities in sectors not suitable for rationalisation. These activities, in contrast to jobs with higher skill requirements, do not need high efforts in terms of training and acquiring language skills. These aspects count in favour of arrangements with mutual benefits for all parties involved. But there are disadvantages as well: • Temporary labour migrants enjoy a lower-level residence status with limited rights compared to citizens. Temporary residents are, by definition, second-class citizens. • They are often accommodated in deplorable social conditions and are at a high risk of being exploited. • Their jobs are highly vulnerable to fluctuations in business cycles. • From the viewpoint of the society in the countries of destination, co-existence with a poorly integrated and underprivileged population group constitutes a moral and political challenge (cf. Newland and Riester in this volume). How far the advantages can be realised and the possible disadvantages minimised depends on the concrete design of such migrant labour systems. This is outlined using the following set of proposals: 1. National Migration Pact in the countries of destination on the basis of public– private-civil society cooperation: Recent scandals in the German meat industry have shown that labour migration should not be fully entrusted to the private sector. A context-specific and socially acceptable design of work contracts and residence permits has to involve all relevant stakeholders such as employers, trade unions, labour offices, migration authorities, development cooperation agencies, representatives of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), of civil society organisations and of countries of origin. A National Migration Pact as a result of this consultation process should regulate numbers of jobs by sector, outlines of employment contracts and related residency permits, qualification requirements and recruitment procedures, social packages (including accommodation, catering, training opportunities and cultural facilities), tools of public control and agreements on abolishing informal employment in the sectors covered by the pact. 11

The wage level for unskilled labour in West African cities is around 4 euros a day as opposed to 25 euros in rural Southern Europe and 75 euros in Western Europe. If accommodation and catering costs can be kept to a modest level, comparatively high rates of savings and remittances can be achieved.

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2. International Migration Agreements: These should be negotiated on the basis of the national migration pacts. These may be made on a bilateral or multilateral level (e.g., like the Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and regional economic communities in Africa). 3. Recruitment and selection: As it can be safely assumed that the number of applicants will far exceed the number of jobs available, recruitment and selection procedures in the countries of origin are a delicate issue. It is very likely that recruitment agents will want a cut for approving applications, thereby making this route to the EU nearly as expensive as paying illegal human traffickers is at present. There are various options to avoid corrupt selection practices: One is to ensure a transparent multi-stakeholder procedure guided or supervised by the IOM. Another option is a system proposed recently by the German Sachverständigenrat für Migration und Integration (2020). It is based on payment of a security to the embassy of the country of destination, which is to be refunded after the return of the migrant. This could prevent corrupt practices while at the same time providing an incentive for return. The disadvantage is its social selectiveness, as only better-off families would be able to afford the substantial amount needed to fulfil the purpose. Still, it would be less selective and fairer than the ongoing exploitation on illegal routes. 4. The social minimum standards to be observed in the employment and visa conditions need to be in line with ILO minimum standards. These include adhering to national minimum wages, freedom of movement and participation in public life, socially acceptable and affordable communal accommodation and canteens provided by the employer, and access to further education, cultural and recreational facilities, inter-cultural exchange and to savings promotion schemes supported by public and civil society resources. 5. The setting of time limits needs to be adjusted to sector-specific requirements (e.g., seasonal arrangements for agriculture or tourism-related activities). The periods for employment contracts and residence permits should be aligned. Prolongation of contracts should be the exception, which can be granted, e.g., for workers who have qualified for a higher level of employment by doing further training. 6. Magnitudes: Taking the numbers of additional annual job seekers in the major regions of origin in West and North Africa, the estimated numbers of informal African employees in EU countries and the requirements of relevant labour markets into account, a magnitude of approximately 1 million temporary unskilled workers per year could be absorbed by the relevant European labour markets on a 2-to-3-year basis. Opportunities of such a scale might be sufficient to reduce the attractiveness of irregular routes significantly. 7. Necessity of testing: Due to the high degree of uncertainties of the assumptions underlying this proposal, it is necessary to start with closely monitored test programmes with selected partner countries. A powerful counterargument against the recruitment of additional low-skilled workers (in particular in Germany after the massive influx of refugees in 2015) is

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that it is difficult enough to provide employment for refugees who are already in the country. The problem with this line of argument is, however, that it implies that the receiving societies will continue to care predominantly for those who have managed to arrive there, while neglecting those in need of jobs who have not yet embarked on the path of irregular immigration. From the perspective of unskilled job seekers, this would suggest that the only way to get Europeans’ attention is by getting in their face and illegally entering their territory. That kind of “out of sight – out of mind” policy implies only tends to perpetuate the present lamentable state of affairs. Conclusion: Broad legal routes for unskilled and semi-skilled workers into European labour market segments in need of them are a necessary short-term prerequisite to reduce migration pressure on the dangerous and expensive irregular routes and to abolish existing incentives in favour of making inappropriate use of the asylum procedure. Consequently, this is the key to a regulated immigration policy. It has a high potential of scoring a ‘triple-win’ by relieving the labour surplus in countries of origin, by providing a guaranteed and comparatively attractive income opportunity on safe routes for migrants while allowing them to maintain close links to their families, and by meeting EU labour requirements in labour market segments where migrant workers do not compete with the local labour force. These benefits in absolute terms for people in urgent need of jobs tend to justify the problematic (but manageable) implication for European societies of having to live with a poorly integrated and relatively underprivileged group of migrant workers.

15.5

Final Conclusion

Resolving the scandalous humanitarian catastrophes at the Southern and South-Eastern borders of the EU requires a conclusive and humane migration policy that provides safe legal ways for different categories of migrants to enter the EU without allowing an unregulated massive influx of people beyond economic and societal absorption capacities. Such a migration policy needs: • to reduce politically and economically enforced migration; • to provide safe and regulated ways of entry for politically persecuted individuals, war refugees, skilled and unskilled workers; and • to restrict access on the one hand to those who actually need protection for the period they need it and on the other hand to those who can find employment. The numbers of legal immigrants can thus be kept in line with the absorption capacities of the countries of destination. In order to provide sufficient space for more people looking for protection or work in the future, the prevailing European concept of permanent integration of immigrants needs to be replaced by concepts of temporary shelter and temporary employment in accordance with the actual need

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for protection and the need for temporary labour migration in trans-local livelihood systems. It is preferable to offer safe access for more people in need in the future than to offer unique opportunities for permanent integration to those who were only in need of temporary shelter or jobs. I am far from suggesting that the proposals presented in this paper are ideal solutions. To be accommodated far from home in camps or settlements is just as far from being a desirable prospect as being forced to contribute to family income whilst living far away from family members. Moreover, one cannot deny that labour migration – despite the benefits from remittances – tends to preserve post-colonial economic structures rather than transforming them. Any enforced migration, whether for political, economic or climatic reasons, is an evil which needs to be fought. As long, however, as this struggle is not yet over, the necessity will exist to open up legal and safe ways in order to render the dangerous irregular ways superfluous. Even if that is not possible without imposing limits. This concept is not about a vision, it is about ways out of a dilemma. It is necessary and worthwhile to debate about details of the proposed restrictions. But we should never lose sight of the necessity to establish and regulate safer ways into Europe.

References BMZ. 2017. Africa and Europe – A new partnership for development, peace and a better future. Cornerstones for a Marshall Plan with Africa. Berlin: Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung. http://www.bmz.de/en/publications/type_of_publication/ information_flyer/information_brochures/Materialie270_africa_marshallplan.pdf. Accessed 28 August 2020. Bröning, Michael, and Christoph P. Mohr, Eds. 2017. Flucht, Migration und die Linke in Europa. Berlin: Dietz. Collier, Paul. 2013. Exodus. Integration and Multiculturalism in the 21st Century. London: Oxford University Press. Hassel, Anke. 2018. Die linke Antwort: Migration regulieren. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 63(10): 33-36. Herbert, Ulrich, and Jakob Schönhagen. 2020. Vor dem 5. September. Die „Flüchtlingskrise 2015“ im historischen Kontext. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschehen 70(30–32): 27–36. Kappel, Robert. 2018: Kommen immer mehr Afrikaner nach Europa? China betreibt eine erfolgreiche Migrationspolitik mit Afrika und Europa nicht. Blog Weltneuvermessung. https:// weltneuvermessung.wordpress.com/2018/02/01/kommen-immer-mehr-afrikaner-nach-europachina-betreibt-eine-erfolgreiche-migrationspolitik-mit-afrika-und-europa-nicht/. Accessed 28 August 2020. Martin-Shields, Charles, Benjamin Schraven, and Steffen Angenendt. 2017. More Development – More Migration? The “Migration Hump” and its Significance for Development Policy Co-operation with Sub-Saharan Africa. Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik. https://www.die-gdi.de/en/briefing-paper/article/more-development-more-migration-the-migrationhump-and-its-significance-for-development-policy-co-operation-with-sub-saharan-africa/ . Accessed 6 October 2020. Knaus, Gerald. 2020. Welche Grenzen brauchen wir? Zwischen Empathie und Angst – Flucht, Migration und die Zukunft von Asyl. München: Piper.

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Merkel, Wolfgang. 2017. Kosmopolitismus versus Kommunitarismus – ein neuer Konflikt. In Flucht, Migration und die Linke in Europa, Eds. Michael Bröning and Christoph P. Mohr, 299-313. Berlin: Dietz. Müller, Gerd. 2017. Unfair! Für eine gerechte Globalisierung. Hamburg: Murmann. Münkler, Herfried, and Marina Münkler. 2016. Die neuen Deutschen. Ein Land vor seiner Zukunft. Berlin: Rowohlt. Nida-Rümelin, Julian. 2017. Über Grenzen denken. Eine Ethik der Migration. Hamburg: Körber-Stiftung. Rauch, Theo, Gabriele Beckmann, Susanne Neubert, and Simone Rettberg. 2016. Rural Transformation in Sub-Sahara Africa: Conceptual Study. SLE-Discussion Paper 01. Berlin: Seminar für Ländliche Entwicklung. Rauch, Theo. 2017. Can Development Co-operation Help Reduce International Labour Migration? Rural 21 51(04): 39–42. https://www.rural21.com/english/news/detail/article/can-developmentco-operation-help-reduce-international-labour-migration-1.html?no_cache=1 . Accessed 6 October 2020. Rauch, Theo. 2018. Zur Not Europa. Notwendigkeit, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer Bekämpfung von Migrationsursachen in Sub-Sahara Afrika. Blog „Weltneuvermessung“. https:// weltneuvermessung.wordpress.com/2018/05/11/zur-not-europa/. Accessed 28 August 2020. Rauch, Theo. 2020. Ausweg aus dem Flüchtlingsdilemma. Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 24 March. https://www.ipg-journal.de/regionen/europa/artikel/detail/ausweg-aus-dem-fluechtlingsdilemma4185/. Accessed 28 August 2020. Rauch, Theo. 2021. Plädoyer für einen Migrations- und Beschäftigungspakt mit Afrika. WeltTrends, 175(05/2021): 32–36. Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Migration und Integration. 2020. Gemeinsam gestalten: Migration von Afrika nach Europa. Jahresgutachten 2020. Berlin, https://www. svr-migration.de/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/SVR_Jahresgutachten_2020-1.pdf. Accessed 28 August 2020. Stauffer, Beat. 2019. Maghreb, Migration und Mittelmeer. Die Flüchtlingsbewegung als Schicksalsfrage für Europa und Nordafrika. Basel: NZZ Libro. Steinbrink, Malte, and Hannah Niedenführ. 2017. Afrika in Bewegung. Translokale Livelihoods und ländliche Entwicklung in Subsahara-Afrika. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag. The Expert Councils‘ Research Unit, and Migration Policy Institute Europe. 2019. Legal Migration for Work and Training. Mobility Options to Europe for those not in Need for Protection. Berlin: Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration. https://www.svr-migration.de/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/SVR-FB_Study_Mobility_Options_ to_Europe.pdf. Accessed 27 August 2020.

Better Migration Management: Rethinking the Development and Mobility Paradigms

16

Michelle Ndiaye

Abstract

Although the outmigration of Africans to Europe has always been a subject of great concern, only in 2015 did the descriptor ‘crisis’ begin to be used to refer to one of biggest movements of refugees and migrants since the Second World War. Efforts have been made by the African Union and the European Union (EU) to enhance the management of migration; however, there is an urgent need to rethink the predominant narrative a nd management approaches by the two bodies. This article draws attention to some of the veritable opportunities for better migration management, such as reconceptualizing mobility and free movement as a political and societal solution to the migration crisis; improved cooperation amongst African countries in finding lasting solutions to migration; diaspora mapping and management; and the possibilities of the EU’s support to African countries and sub-regions for a development-friendly management of migration capable of protecting migrants and enhancing the positive effects of migration such as remittances or knowledge transfers and sustainable reintegration of returning migrants into the labour market.

16.1

Introduction

Migration is a consequence of several human actions; either positive; i.e. under guided and secured conditions in developed countries and well-organized settings; and inactions which result in underdevelopment, wars, injustice, and so on. It is an important feature of inter-national and inter-continental affairs, particularly in the twenty-first century when globalization continues to increase opportunities for mobility as well as the basis for comparison of development indices among countries. Although migration has always been a subject of great concern for © Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2022 H.-J. Preuß et al. (eds.), Forced Displacement and Migration, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-32902-0_16

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Europe, it was the massive influx of refugees and migrants into Europe in 2015 that triggered a wider and more thorough debate on the phenomenon at the policy level and on relations between the European Union (EU) and Africa. Only in 2015 did the descriptor ‘crisis’ begin to be used to refer to one of the biggest movements of refugees and migrants since the Second World War (UNHCR 2016a; Ruz 2015). With the increased attention given to migration, particularly irregular migration, in policy and academic dialogues between Europe and Africa, it has become crucial to reposition the debate about the socio-economic drivers of change and mobility dynamics. With this in mind, this contribution seeks to augment ongoing efforts by making critical observations on the underlining drivers of migration flows, the existing migration governance challenges, the responses and incentives, and the way they relate to development policy, socio-economic pro-poor transformation and mobility dynamics. This contribution also questions the existence of an African narrative on migration1 and the will of the continent’s governing institutions to demonstrate leadership in dealing with the consequences of ‘undocumented migration’ rather than focussing only on the incentives. The paper is divided into four sections after this introduction and before the conclusion. The first section focuses on a conceptual analysis of the issues of migration in the context of available literature, as well as the question of when the phenomenon became a crisis. The second section assesses the migration governance frameworks and approaches by the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU). It also considers the possibilities of changing the predominant narrative for a better understanding of the phenomenon of migration. The third section is on ‘Making mobility work’. It is a brief presentation of historical samples of contexts where a reconceptualization of migration as a form of relatively necessary mobility has resulted in more progressive outcomes. The fourth section outlines three common dangers that hinder viable long-term solutions to migration and mobility.

16.2

Migration and The ‘Migration Crisis’

Migration is not new to humans. What seems to be new in its manifestation in the twenty-first century is how the interweaving structures of globalization and global conditions of human beings in this century have boosted it, eased it, and buttressed its casualties. The 2019 International Migration Report recorded that about 272 million people reside outside their countries of birth. This figure is around 47% more than an estimated 120 million people who resided outside their countries of birth in 1990 (UN 2019). The estimate also suggests that about 3.5% of the world population is accounted for by international migrants.

1

There exists already a common African position on migration since 2006, and efforts had been made towards a new common African position for the UN global compact on migration (AU 2017; Abebe 2018). This common African position addresses irregular migration and protection of migrants. Moreover, there is the new African Migration Policy Framework for Africa with recommendations for member states also on the topic of irregular migration (AU 2018).

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While migration can be simply defined as the movement of people from one country to another, often for permanent settlement, a broader definition presents it as the movement of people from one location to another within or beyond their country of birth/normal residence, and permanently or temporarily. Some of the questions that have guided the attention of scholars and policymakers on the issue of migration are as follows: What are the reasons for the movement: economic, political, social, environmental, and so on? Is the movement a permanent or temporary one? Is the movement voluntary or involuntary/forced? Under what circumstance is a migrant considered as a refugee and therefore within the special coverage of international migration policies/ protocols for forced migrants? When can a movement be qualified as irregular or illegal migration, and are the two qualifiers the same? Some of the responses/positions in relation to each of these questions will be assessed in the lines that follow. Most of the discourses on brain-drain in the 1970s and now called brain circulation from Africa are attempts to respond to the first two questions which focus on ‘why the movement’ and ‘for how long’. The common supposition is that migration is the result of unfavourable economic, social, political, or environmental situations in the migrant’s country of birth. These factors can either serve as individual determinant factors or complicate each other. For instance, poor economic conditions such as underpaid jobs, poor health systems, and so on in a country can result in a prolonged challenge of the political class. In a society that is deeply divided along ethnic lines, the latter factor can complicate the situation, leading to inter-ethnic wars. However, there are possibilities that a single factor may be responsible for why an individual decides to migrate from his/her country/region of birth to another with the hope of getting a more favourable living condition.2 Again, the complexity of the reason for the movement usually determines whether the movement is intended to be permanent or temporary. Thus, whereas temporary migrants perceive their home country as so important to be returned to when the circumstances that warranted the emigration improve, permanent emigrants move with the intention to remain (naturalize) in their destination country on the supposition that the circumstances which they are fleeing from are not likely to improve so much as to warrant their return to their home country (Akokpari 2000). With regard to the issue of residence or permanence, there is also a related distinction between ‘long-term migrants’ and ‘short-term migrants’ whereby the former captures those who move to a country/countries other than that of their usual residence for a period of at least a year (12 months) so that the country/countries of destination effectively become their new country/countries of usual residence. A short-term migrant, on the other hand, is defined as a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least three months but less than a year (cf. IOM 2017a, p. 299).

Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny/Rocca (2019) had argued that “The main reasons Africans consider leaving their country are to find a job (44%) and to escape poverty (29%), with another 6% who want to pursue their education. In a word, for opportunity that they can’t find at home”.

2

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Choosing to return to one’s home country or make the movement a permanent stay in the destination country projects the issue in the third question: Is the movement voluntary or involuntary/forced? It is not always the case that they literally choose to leave their countries of birth. In situations of war and widespread conflict, or massively destructive environmental hazards and the resultant health and economic crises, it is almost unnecessary, except for the purely abstract philosophical assessment of human actions, to question whether those involved in such situations are to migrate voluntarily or by force. Voluntary migrants are therefore those who relocate mostly because they want to live in countries that are comparatively better off than their home countries in terms of economic and socio-political opportunities. On the other hand, involuntary or forced migrants relocate either proactively or reactively because of conditions beyond their control, such as wars, persecution, drastic environmental conditions, and so on. The seeming helplessness of the latter group is the idea behind the group of emigrants that receive quicker attention as migrants, those generally known as refugees. This takes us to the fourth question. Under what circumstance is a migrant considered as a refugee and therefore within the special coverage of international migration policies/protocols for forced migrants? According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. Most likely, they cannot return home or are afraid to do so. War and ethnic, tribal and religious violence are leading causes of refugees fleeing their countries (UNHCR n.d.). But then, under what circumstances can a movement be qualified as irregular or illegal migration, and are the two qualifiers the same? This question is the reason why migration can be considered as a crisis in the first place since it involves migrants entering or staying in their destination countries against the norms of entry or stay. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the term ‘irregular migration’ does not have a simple definition. However, it suggested that it can be broadly defined as a “movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries”. From the perspective of a destination country, irregular migration may imply entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations. From the perspective of a sending country, irregularity implies not fulfilling the administrative requirements for leaving the country or leaving such country without a valid passport or travel document (IOM 2017a, p. 300). Destination or host countries, therefore, need to answer the question of whether to consider economic refugees as forced migrants or simply as irregular migrants. There are two responses to this question. The first holds that economic refugees are not covered by international protocols which imply that migration caused by declining opportunities is purely voluntary since existing international instruments do not classify economic crises among the phenomenon or events that may ‘seriously disturb public order’ and therefore warrant migration. Thus, economic refugees who fail to procure the relevant migration documents are often referred to as ‘illegal’ emigrants by the host country precisely because, in terms of the

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immigration laws, they are unauthorized entrants (Akokpari 2000). This category of emigrants is often, sometimes wrongly, associated with criminal activities and becomes the object of pursuit by the security establishment in the host country. The second position supposes that poor economic conditions that result in dehumanizing conditions of the living amount to a violation of the basic human rights of those living under such conditions. Since such conditions threaten human lives and rights, the position argues, those fleeing such countries qualify as refugees too; they are forced to migrate from their countries, and therefore they qualify as refugees. Considering the development crises in many countries in Africa, the most common view is that most economic migrants are from Africa, and since they are still not covered within the international framework explained in the first characterization, they easily fall within the scope of irregular migrants and are the targets of border-control and security personnel (Akokpari 2000). There are three principal ways migrants can enter their destination country irregularly: (i) entering without proper authority, either through clandestine entry (such as under the control of smugglers and traffickers) or with fraudulent documents; (ii) entering with authorization but overstaying that authorization; and (iii) deliberately abusing the asylum system (cf. Kuschminder et al. 2015; Koser 2005, 2009). In a more elaborate categorization, Morehouse/Blomfield (2011, p. 4) rather highlight eight ways in which non-nationals become irregular or unauthorized migrants: illegal entry (illegal border crossing); entry using false documents; entry using legal documents, but providing false information in those documents; overstaying a visa-free travel period or temporary residence permit; loss of status because of nonrenewal of permit for failing to meet residence requirements or breaching conditions of residence; being born into irregularity; absconding during the asylum procedure or failing to leave a host state after a negative decision, and the failure of a state to enforce a return decision for legal or practical reasons (toleration). These classifications imply that some migrants are considered irregular because of the means by which they entered, whereas some others become irregular because of the conditions of their stay. In the first case, the migrant who is irregular by conditions of entry may later acquire regularity and therefore become regular; whereas in the latter case, they entered as regular migrants but became irregular by overstaying the entry conditions, such as holders of expired visa who have overstayed (cf. de Haas 2008). Being an irregular migrant ‘by stay’ occurs in the fourth reason for irregularity presented by Morehouse and Blomfield (2011). These categorizations can be further explained based on the report that prior to 2014, the majority of irregular migrants in the EU had a regular entry, but by overstaying their visas or taking up employment in violation of their visa restrictions, they became irregular migrants (cf. Kuschminder et al. 2015).

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Fig. 16.1 People living outside their birth country by country of origin. Source Connor (2018)

Several assessments3 have looked at irregular migration from Africa to Europe as constituting a security problem since it is largely linked to terrorism and several other forms of international crime and trafficking. Looking at migration from this prism has resulted in national and intracontinental efforts to control migration and to treat the migrant as a security threat and as a crisis. Figure 16.1 reveals that as of 2017, sub-Saharan countries trailed only Syria in the growth of emigrant population (that is, people living outside their birth country) worldwide. This means that of the 10 countries whose emigrant stock grew fastest in 2010–2017, Syria is the only non-African country on the list. Over the same period, the share of sub-Saharan emigrants who live in the United States (US) climbed from 2 to 6%, making African immigrants a fast-growing component of the overall immigrant population in the US. As of 2017, nearly 1.5 million sub-Saharan immigrants lived in the US, according to United Nations (UN) data. More substantially, the share of sub-Saharan migrants living in EU countries, Norway and Switzerland rose from 11% in 1990 to 17% in 2017 (Connor 2018). It has also been reported that whether their destination is a neighboring country, Europe or the US, many sub-Saharan emigrants face obstacles to relocating. Hundreds of thousands of emigrants from the South of the Sahara have been reported to gather in Libya in hopes of crossing the Mediterranean into Europe. Many live in 3

See e.g., de Haas (2007); Castles et al. (2014); Cuttitta (2007, 2014); IOM (2008); Lutterbeck (2006); Goldschmidt (2006).

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overcrowded, crime-ridden camps while they wait to make the journey, with some being sold in slave auctions (Elbagir et al. 2017; Alabi, 2017; Loprete, 2017). Traditionally, there are three main migration routes that bring refugees and migrants from Africa to Europe irregularly: the Western Mediterranean Route (usually via Morocco to Spain), the Central Mediterranean Route (usually via Libya to Italy) and the Eastern Mediterranean Route (usually via Turkey to Greece) (UNHCR 2017). The Central Mediterranean Route (CMR) currently accounts for the largest number of people crossing by sea to Europe (Titz 2017). This came about following the controversial deal between Turkey and the EU in March 2016 (European Council 2016), which shut down boat journeys across the Aegean Sea (Molenaar and El Kamouni-Janssen 2017), largely succeeding in preventing refugees from reaching Europe through the Eastern Mediterranean Route. With the implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement, Europe saw a dramatic drop in Mediterranean arrivals to 360,000, with half of them taking the CMR, mostly via Libya, which grew in significance after the EU-Turkey deal.4 The 28 EU heads of state and Turkey negotiated this deal on 18 March 2015 to address the flow of irregular migrants traveling across the Aegean from Turkey to the Greek islands by allowing Greece to return to Turkey “all new irregular migrants” arriving after 20 March (Collett, 2016). Under the deal, the EU in return will increase resettlement of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey, accelerate visa liberalization for Turkish nationals, and increase financial support for Turkey’s refugee population (Collett 2016). Flows along the CMR have grown drastically in the past few years with 181,436 refugees and migrants arriving in Italy in 2016, a record high 18% increase compared to 2015 (UNHCR 2017, pp. 46–47). The CMR is the main route for refugees and migrants coming from Africa to Europe, as other routes used by this population to get to Europe in the past have largely been closed (UNHCR 2017). Thus, the focus has now turned to the CMR also because this route is known to be particularly deadly (UNHCR 2016b). As arrivals to Europe, in general, fell in 2016, deaths related to Central Mediterranean crossings spiked in December 2016, passing 5,000 per year (UN 2016). In addition to deaths at sea, incidences of death in overland locations are also a major, and possibly higher, the risk for those on the move with 1,245 deaths recorded in Libya (870), Sudan (295), and Egypt (80) between 2014 and 2016. These figures are not different from the recent figures in 2019. 4

However, as one observer notes, the relationship between the changes in migration patterns along the more dangerous CMR and the Eastern Mediterranean route, and the degree to which the two are linked, is a highly complicated one. The majority of refugees and migrants that have taken the CMR since the beginning of 2017 are nationals from parts of Africa that had made up only a tiny share of those crossing the Aegean Sea during the refugee crisis. At the same time, the share of refugees from the Middle East, particularly Syria, passing through Libya is smaller today than before summer 2015 – partly due to restrictions on Syrians residing in Turkey imposed in the context of the EU-Turkey deal to leave the country. Conversely, migrants from Northern Africa made up a significant share of those taking the Eastern Mediterranean route during the crisis. Because of the EU-Turkey deal, they are now forced to again take the more dangerous CMR. For details see Weber (2017, p. 9).

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Despite being particularly dangerous, Libya is by far the preferred jumping-off point for refugees and migrants from Africa hoping to reach Europe. Although boats have left from Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria in 2016,5 90% of those that use the CMR pass through Libya to arrive on Italy’s shores (EC 2017, p. 3). This is due not only to Libya’s strategic location but also because the fragile security in the country has weakened border control and allowed smuggling networks to flourish (UNHCR 2017, p. 14). Most sub-Saharan refugees and migrants arrive irregularly in Libya through Sudan (for those from East Africa), Niger (for those from West and Central Africa), and, to a lesser extent, Algeria (for those from West Africa). Routes through Sudan sometimes cross into Chad; and routes through Niger in some cases pass through Algeria (UNHCR 2017, p. 14). Migrants and refugees using the CMR to reach Europe mainly leave their home countries because of war, conflict, politics, joblessness and poverty (IOM 2017b, p. 8). There are three loose categories of African migrants and refugees arriving in Libya: (1) nationals of neighbouring countries (Niger, Chad, Sudan, Egypt and Tunisia) mostly travel to Libya for economic reasons often intending to stay in Libya as opposed to reaching Europe; (2) nationals of West and Central African countries (mainly from Nigeria, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Senegal, Ghana, Mali and Cameroon), with most reporting having left for economic reasons; and (3) nationals of East African countries (Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan) report having left their countries because of political persecution, conflict, and economic distress, tending to transit quickly through Libya on their way to Europe (UNHCR 2017, pp. 15–16). There is a marked change in the profiles and nationalities of arrivals in Libya over the past few years; there seems to be a decrease from East Africa but an increase from West Africa. Although about half of those coming to Libya wishes to remain there either permanently or temporarily due to attraction to the country’s job opportunities, the lack of stability, security and rule of law, the economic crisis, widespread abuse and exploitation in Libya push some of these to also attempt to reach Europe (UNHCR 2017, pp. 15–16). Almost all refugees and migrants coming to Libya irregularly, uniformly use smugglers or criminal networks. The smuggling industry has been dynamic in its evolution and is currently undergoing rapid expansion in Libya and increasingly becoming more professional (UNHCR 2017, pp. 15–16). This context amply demonstrates the complexity of migration management and highlights how interconnected countries of origin, transit and destination are, and how they should think constructively about long-term holistic solutions.

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In 2016, 7%, 0.5% and 0.6% of migrants who reached Europe by sea departed respectively from Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria. See EC (2017, p. 3).

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Competing Interests, Competing Migration Governance Frameworks and Approaches

Migration receives different levels of attention and urgency in Africa and Europe: high on the European agenda, and comparatively low in Africa (Koch et al. 2015). This often impedes finding common grounds between the EU and African actors. In the sections below, the approaches employed by the EU and the AU and the Regional Economic Communities in managing migration are discussed.

16.3.1 African Approaches Within the AU, the overarching migration policy frameworks are the African Common Position on Migration and Development (AU 2006a) and the AU Migration Policy Framework for Africa (AU 2006b), both adopted by the Executive Council of the AU in 2006. As a follow-up, the AU has launched several key flagship programmes in relation to various aspects of migration. One flagship programme is the 2009 AU Commission Initiative against Trafficking (AUCOMMIT) Campaign (AU 2011), with the implementation of the 2006 Ouagadougou Action Plan (AU 2006c) at the centre of its objective. To strengthen these efforts, in 2014, the AU Commission established the African Union Horn of Africa Initiative (AU-HOAI) on human trafficking and smuggling of migrants (AU 2014), in direct response to irregular migration while also addressing migration flows within and from the Horn of Africa to different destinations. The AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in June 2015 adopted the AU-HOAI as a flagship programme. It involves the so-called ‘core countries’ (Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan) and neighbouring countries (Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia and South Sudan) (AU 2014). In January 2015, the AU Assembly adopted the Labour Migration Governance for Integration and Development in Africa, also known as the Joint Labour Migration Programme (JLMP), within the Framework of the Declaration and Plan of Action on Employment, Poverty Eradication and Inclusive Development. Still in 2015, the AU established a Common Position ahead of the Valletta Summit (AU 2015). The process culminated in a Common Perspectives Paper that presents six themes: labour migration, human trafficking and smuggling of migrants; international protection; trade in goods and services and integrated and coordinated border management; education and human capital development; and diaspora and partnerships. The main emphasis of the Common Position lies in intra-African facilitation of labour mobility and protection of migrants and refugees. To ensure that migration policies address the right issues in the right manner, it is utterly important to understand the drivers of migration at a deeper level in the first place.6 6

In related terms, Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny and Rocca (2019, p. 2) had submitted that”… policy makers interested in addressing the complex issues around migration …”, need to “… understand who, where, and why and therefore what appropriate and targeted response might look like.”.

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The AU’s long-term vision, condensed in Agenda 2063 and adopted in 2015, does not specifically mention migration (Aggad-Clerx and El Fassi 2014). Yet, it does have, as one of its priorities, easing free movement of people within Africa. Its ambition is to have all visa requirements for intra-African travel waived by 2018 and a legal framework adopted by 2023 for the issuance of the African Common Passport (AU 2016). The JLMP is anchored in the AU Migration Policy Framework and aims to support objectives of Agenda 2063 and Agenda 2030 (UN 2015). However, a careful analysis of the AU's approach indicates that Africa gives the impression of being placed on a ‘receiver’ stand and not as an actor who takes responsibility for the human, economic (transit countries that become host countries have to face the socio-economic needs of migrants) and the security challenges posed by migration flows. Where are the Africans? What is their narrative? This ‘wait and see’ approach does not provide a reliable platform for a constructive conversation on the matter. The policy response from the AU, evidenced in the series of frameworks, is viewed as a lack of political and economic will to address the issue, with Member States opting for bilateral agreements instead of a common position that would make them stronger when negotiating with the EU. Platforms such as the Rabat and Khartoum processes7 or the more global ones led by the IOM are, however, indications of commitment for political and practical solutions and exchanges on the migration phenomenon. A lot has been said about the success of these platforms. The greatest achievement of the Rabat Process, for instance, is the creation of a framework for political dialogue between European and African countries with a large degree of consensus unknown in other Euro-African fora. The fact remains that different visions of the migration phenomenon confront each other. The differences not only are political but also exhibit a gap in the appreciation of histories, cultural intersections and paradoxes, as well as the political motives of these approaches. However, these platforms are perceived, their roles should not be limited to advancing the understanding of the opportunities and challenges of migration but should more importantly focus on tangible and practical policy decisions to respond to cyclic crises as well as the long-term needs of the parties involved.

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The Rabat Process, set up in 2006, includes 57 countries: 27 African countries, 28 member States of the European Union, Norway, Switzerland, with Algeria as an Observer, as well as the European Commission and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It aims to establish a migratory dialogue, which has been consolidated over time as one of the most solid dialogues in the Euro-African area. EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, known as the Khartoum Process is a high level, inter-continental political process that harmonizes existing African Union (AU) and EU-led frameworks. For detailed information visit https://www.iom.int/ eu-horn-africa-migration-route-initiative-khartoum-process and https://www.iom.int/regionalconsultative-processes-migration.

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16.3.2 A Look at EU Responses and Approaches A most polarizing issue in the national elections in France, the Netherlands, and Germany in 2017 was immigration, with increased pressure on the EU and its member states to stem migrant flows in the short term. This has manifested itself in attempts to start discussions on ‘Turkey-style’ deals with North African countries such as Libya (Knoll 2017), as well as through seeking cooperation with Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt. The cooperation aims to curb the arrival of irregular migrants into Europe by ensuring that asylum seekers are either hosted in North Africa where they can receive protection and apply for asylum to Europe or returned to their countries of origin when possible (Abderrahim 2017; Abderrahim/Knoll 2017a, b, c; EC 2017). The cooperation is broadly aimed at stepping up collaboration on border management issues, ensuring a comprehensive asylum and migration policy, as well as ensuring better cooperation on return and readmission (EC 2017). The EU, in return, offers incentives through financing these activities, giving trade concessions, facilitating the procedures for visa application, and so on (Abderrahim/Knoll 2017a). Besides entering into a deal with Turkey in 2015 to close off the Eastern Mediterranean front to address irregular migration, which resulted in a drastic reduction in the number of arrivals, the EU has also adopted a complex and multifaceted response, now loosely organized under the 2015 European Agenda on Migration (EC 2020; Molenaar/El Kamouni-Janssen 2017). A 2015 agreement known as the Valletta Agreement (European Council 2015) guides the EU’s implementation of its Agenda on Migration in Africa. The Agreement’s key areas are (1) addressing the root causes of migration; (2) enhancing the protection of migrants and asylum seekers through maritime operations; (3) tackling the exploitation and trafficking of migrants; (4) improving cooperation on return and readmission; and (5) establishing and organizing legal migration channels (European Council 2015). In June 2016, the EU launched a Partnership Framework to further mobilize and focus EU actions in these areas under which the EU agrees on tailored ‘compacts’ with developing countries that outline financial support and development and neighborhood policy tools to reinforce local capacity-building, including for border control, asylum procedures, counter-smuggling and reintegration efforts (Molenaar/El Kamouni-Janssen 2017, pp. 11–12). This is in addition to the EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (2015–2020) which implements the fight against migrant smuggling as an EU priority (EC 2015). It is under the Partnership Framework launched in June 2016, and with parallel developments of the EU-Turkey deal in response to the Syrian refugee situation, that the EU sought cooperation with North African states (Abderrahim and Knoll 2017a). This signifies that Europe’s external focus is predominantly about forging new deals and partnerships with non-EU countries to reduce the flow of irregular migrants and asylum seekers (Laferrère/Knoll 2016). However, this cooperation has been criticized as one that is at least in part motivated by a desire to control movement and displacement within the region (Maple 2016; Rollins 2017). For instance, the €1.8

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billion EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (ETF) set up in 2015 to aid stability and address root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa makes clear that a goal of the project is to improve migration management, “including containing and preventing irregular migration.”8 The implementation of the Valletta Action Plan and the EU Migration Compact for cooperation on migration is not perceived by the Africans as balanced or as being conducted in a spirit of true partnership by all parties, which in turn risks undermining the EU’s image as a partner in the area of migration and development and may undermine principles of a balanced partnership (Laferrère/Knoll 2016). The lack of nuance and balance in Europe’s approach to migration is apparent when one considers that, in reality, smuggling networks form part of larger political economies and cannot be addressed effectively without taking into account the extent to which state authorities are involved in and/or capable of controlling irregular migration (Molenaar/El Kamouni-Janssen 2017, p. 2). Although human smuggling networks are the main facilitators of irregular migration, they are but one link in a complex migratory patchwork in which they have to contend with other groups, including state actors, armed groups, criminal organizations and the local communities directly or indirectly involved in the irregular migration industry (Molenaar/El Kamouni-Janssen 2017, p. 2). Policies that do not adequately account for these local realities are doomed to be inefficient and ineffective at best, and counterproductively strengthen one of the root causes of migration at worst because it overlooks the intricate links that exist between migration, conflict, and stability in the region (Molenaar/El Kamouni-Janssen 2017, p. 2).

16.3.3 Changing the Narrative for Understanding the Migration Phenomenon An extensive study published in 2017 on the implications of irregular migration on Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending by Europe shows that short-term political pressures in response to the migration crisis have undermined the aid effectiveness of donor agencies (Knoll/Sherriff 2017). There is a rising concern that current responses to irregular migration are not always sufficiently and systematically applying principles highlighted by discussions on development effectiveness or good partnership in fragile states (Knoll/Sherriff 2017). The study further notes that high-level political pressure to implement and disburse funds has a negative impact on relationships with local partners in developing countries, on analysis and quality control of development spending, and on identifying starting points for interventions, which sometimes seem to reflect external partners’ considerations without sufficiently taking into account contextual factors (Knoll/Sherriff 2017). The migration crisis, which has pushed substantive engagement on migration up the priority ladder for development cooperation, has led to a situation in which there is more focus in European political discourse on the challenges of migration and 8

Detailed information on the website of the ETF: https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/index_en.

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development (such as smuggling, addressing irregular migration and displacement) whereas, on the overall, previous debates on maximizing the positive impact of migration on development in Europe appears to have lost political traction (Knoll/Sherriff 2017, p. 24). It has also led to a focus on refugees and displacement, support for addressing smuggling and border governance, return and reintegration, and addressing ‘root causes’, rather than a broader migration agenda including, for example, support for mobility and the facilitation of migration (Knoll/Sherriff 2017, p. 24). The EU’s new approach of “no longer looking at migration through the lens of development cooperation, but at development cooperation through the lens of migration” (Laferrère/Knoll 2016) has put pressure on the core principles of development cooperation characterized by openness, trust, and mutual respect and learning. Given that the African continent has been widely described as a continent in which poverty and violent conflicts have resulted in massive displacement and forced migration of millions towards Europe (Black et al. 2006). The picture of the destination of these migrants, that is, towards Europe, is the predominant idea in the migration narrative. A joint study by Afrobarometer and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation submitted that most of the reports on the issue of outmigration from Africa have been rooted in what they termed “ …’strong borders’ and … simplistic, one-size-fits-all ‘solutions’” which are based on reports that “… are not necessarily false … but … are not a good basis for helpful action”. This description serves to qualify the predominant approaches by the EU on the issue (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny/Rocca 2019, p. 2). Contrary to the predominant narrative that warrants such options, the report submitted that “linked to the continent’s demographic growth rate, the total number of migrants from Africa has increased by almost 80.0% since 1990. However, at the same time, the proportion of migrants over the continent’s total population has decreased from 3.2% in 1990 to 2.9% in 2017. Many Africans are considering and planning to migrate yet the reality is far from the image of a mass exodus. In 2017, only 14.1% of the world’s migrants were from Africa, much less than Asia’s (41.0%) and Europe’s (23.7%) shares” (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny/Rocca 2019, p. 2).9 Another feature of the report is that contrary to sweeping suppositions, most of the migrants from Africa are not the poorest, but the youngest and the best-educated. Figure 16.2 shows that more than half (51%) of those involved in the study who had post-secondary qualifications said that they have thought about emigrating. Thus, while the predominant narrative is that migrants are unskilled criminals; this current report on who is mostly involved in actual migration also highlights the possible benefits of such class of migrants, benefits that are often ‘overlooked in anti-immigration rhetoric in Europe and the United States’, after all, it is this same class of human beings that industrial countries need in several sectors of their economies. Besides, the same report submitted that contrary to common presentations, the majority of those who responded to the questions for the study would prefer to stay closer to home: 29% cite another country within their region as 9 See also UN (2017):”In 2017, of the 258 million international migrants worldwide, 106 million were born in Asia. Europe was the region of birth of the second largest number of migrants (61 million), followed by Latin America and the Caribbean (38 million) and Africa (36 million)”.

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Fig. 16.2 Representation of socio-demographic movement of African migrants (2016–2018). Source Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny and Rocca (2019). Note Respondents were asked: “How much, if at all, have you considered to move to another country to live?”.

their most preferred destination, while 7% look elsewhere on the continent. Thus, contrary to the predominant narrative, while 29% of African migrants would prefer to move to another country within the region, a fewer number (27%) would prefer to go to Europe while 22% would prefer North America.

16.4

Making Mobility Work

Discussing the opportunities and challenges of migration means also looking at solutions that seem utopian and asking the ‘taboo’ question: What if mobility is reconceptualized as the political and societal solution to the migration crisis? This assertion, of course, suggests a more fundamental debate and the acceptance of mobility as a fundamental right of every human being. In a globalized world, people’s relationships and quests for better wellbeing are becoming more and more complex. These quests are no longer confined to movements from one geographical point to another but include social manifestations that the advancement of

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technologies has made possible. Replacing the debate in this context will simply mean accepting mobility as a natural human factor. This also means a realignment of the above frameworks, dialogue platforms, incentive schemes, and needs to suit such a progressive move. The example of schemes such as the rotational seasonal workers for non-qualified migrants (the Spanish scheme), qualified or non-qualified migrant quotas based on the needs of the departing and receiving countries (the Canadian scheme), refugees and migrants’ insertion (the German example), or more importantly visa facilities for professionals travelling for business based on clear criteria (the most needed but almost unachievable scheme) should be at the centre of the migration debate today. As there are no viable solutions to migration without development, resolving the migration equation without integrating mobility as part of the solution is simply unsustainable. Thus, the debate on mobility initiated by the AU should not only be addressed from one side of the aisle. Mobility within the African continent could also be a solution to Africa’s population surge in response to young people’s lack of prospects, migration, and challenges faced by refugees. Mobility can be viewed from the angle of freedom of movement and regional integration, which also looks into the possibility of a common African passport. Issues of migration and mobility have pre-occupied the minds of African leaders for quite some time now. The centrality of human movement within Africa for continental integration has revitalized the African perspective on mobility. According to the baseline study on the free movement of Africans published in 2013 by the Centre Citizens Participation in the AU (CCP-AU), there are several impediments to the continent achieving Free Movement of People (FMP). These are among others: stringent visa requirements, poor infrastructure, restrictive migration policies, xenophobic tendencies, and economic and security concerns at AU member state levels. This calls for a real debate on the opportunities and challenges of FMP; a necessary debate that African youth are ready to be involved in.

16.5

The Three Dangers!

The debate on migration has always been tainted by emotional responses despite the will to find suitable solutions in times of crisis. There are three factors that hinder any viable, long-term solution to the crisis around migration and mobility.

16.5.1 The Danger of Securitizing Migration As already alluded to above, EU migration approaches and responses start from an isolated view of the human smuggling networks facilitating migration as criminal networks. Africans are looking for a more developmental approach to migration. The AU response is referred to as a limited paradigm as smuggling networks do not operate in isolation from the larger political economy in the region. It is such a

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security-focused approach that results in EU policies such as the EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling proposing technical solutions to counter smuggling practices (Molenaar/El Kamouni-Janssen 2017, p. 20). The short-term security-focused political pressures in response to the EU migration crisis have also undermined the aid effectiveness of donor agencies (Knoll/Sherriff 2017, p. 23). Many of the EU’s policies outlined above that strongly emphasize security measures – such as anti-smuggling operations and border control, the relationship between irregular migration and regional (in)stability, and questions about whether and how migration-mitigating measures might influence this relationship – have taken backseats in favour of short-term results (Knoll/Sherriff 2017, p. 23). It is precisely this lack of nuance in the EU’s approach to migration, in that it fails to account for the politics of irregular migration in a region that is already highly unstable, that will contribute to the ineffectiveness of the EU’s responses in the medium to long term (Knoll/Sherriff 2017, p. 23). The EU partnership approach with Africa as it stands now seems imbalanced and biased due to the EU’s focus on return and readmission, predominantly in the EU’s interests. This approach reflects a lack of prioritization of other aspects such as creating legal routes for migration (Laferrère/Knoll 2016). Instead of cooperation focusing on migration and development, this approach has led to a gradual narrowing of the agenda towards dealing with irregular flows and returns by giving financial concessions (Laferrère/Knoll 2016) or making migration a pure security threat.

16.5.2 ‘The Danger’ of the African Demographic Dividend The demographic boom on the continent, perceived as a threat by most European countries, is looked at as a dividend in most African policy circles. There is a need therefore to understand the demographics of communities vis-à-vis their mobility, and the motives for migration/mobility among members of communities in situations of a population surge. There is a significant difference in demographics between Africa and Europe. While most European countries are grappling with declining birthrates and aging populations, Africa is experiencing youth booms of staggering proportions. More than half of Egypt’s labour force is younger than age 30; half of Nigeria’s population of 180 million is between the ages of 15 and 34. In Angola, Chad, Niger, Somalia, and Uganda, more than two-thirds of the population is under the age of 25 (Lord 2016). It is estimated that by 2050, Europe’s population will have dipped to an aging 707 million while Africa’s population will be 2.4 billion people, with more than half of global population growth between 2015 and 2050 expected to occur on the continent. The population in 11 out of 54 African countries is projected to increase at least fivefold by 2100. Young people under 24 years are more than 40% of the adult population. African states have the highest proportion of populations aged 0–14 and 10–24 years compared with the global average, as well as twice the global average for fertility rate. Africa is expected to produce 53% of the global population by

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2050 with further ‘youthening’ of the continent’s population expected to continue for another decade at least (Obasanjo 2017). Seen as a real danger for some and as a genuine opportunity for economic development in the long run for a majority of Africans, population growth in the poorest countries will translate into challenges for governments to create opportunities for employment; tackle poverty, inequality, hunger and malnutrition; expand education enrollment and health systems; improve the provision of basic services; and implement other elements of a sustainable development agenda. Such challenges will mean more migration from source countries in Africa into Europe. A lot needs to happen in order to allow the continent to take advantage of the demographic dividend. It is equally true that Europe can re-orient its migration approaches in a way that will enable it to take advantage of this demographic as well to meet its ever-increasing labour demands as its population shrinks and ages.

16.5.3 (Mis)Understanding the Role Remittances Play Another factor adding to the cacophonic dialogue on migration is certainly one that is the most difficult part of the equation to solve. As the appeal of sending money back home is one of the main reasons or pull-factors that attract many migrants, remittances can be identified as one of the key factors of migration, especially from Africa to Europe. There is also a need to look further into the dynamics of remittances that come from migrants. It is important to further explore this aspect as a positive factor of migration that legitimizes the sacrifices of African migrants and their families/communities and one that gives pride to the migrants and brings them acknowledgment by their communities back home. The remittances to African countries are higher than ODA by international partners as well as higher than Foreign Direct Investments which means that migration of Africans out of their continent is also an incentive for African countries. In this regard, a 2019 report (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny/Rocca 2019, p. 7) reveals that remittances make up about three times the amount of foreign aid countries of origin of migrants receive and that in 2018, remittances to sub-Saharan Africa increased by about 10%, to $46 billion. The negative impact of this, we think, is that it can also act as a push factor as those that remain in the communities feel they are missing out on enriching themselves, their families and communities. This is also a source of income and community solidarity that African countries are not ready to forfeit for long-term development aid and its conditionalities (World Bank 2020).

16.6

Conclusion: Rethinking Responses and Incentive Schemes

There is significant room for improvement in the current approaches and responses to migration. There is a need to rethink and reorient cooperation models in ways that better respond to the realities on the ground. One way of doing this is by making sure

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that trust is built and genuine cooperation is sought, and frank discussions are had on where mutual interests lie and where they diverge by being open to different narratives that find more resonance with African partners (Vimont 2016). A re-balancing act towards investing in mutual processes with partners and moving away from the current predominant focus on getting results for the EU’s own objectives will be crucial (Vimont 2016). The EU and AU states should try to find some common ground and reorient their partnerships around a more consensual concept of shared responsibility, rather than stressing the conditionality imperative (Vimont 2016). In this regard, the Spanish model of migrant workers’ rotational mobility has incentivized migration for both communities, in West Africa and in Spain for employers.10 The EU global strategy (EEAS 2016), released on 28 June 2016 by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, takes a more even-handed approach towards the migration partnership by emphasizing the importance of working “with our international partners to ensure shared global responsibilities and solidarity” (EEAS 2016). It is also important to concede, as one commentator notes, that a veritable window of opportunity for better migration management and development perhaps lies in enhancing intra-regional migration and effective cooperation within the sub-region and with the EU (Adaween 2016). There is a need to focus more on promoting effective cooperation amongst African countries in finding lasting solutions to the factors that continue to sustain irregular migration (Adaween 2016). The EU should also support African countries and sub-regions to better manage migration within the African continent in a development-friendly way by establishing or strengthening migration regimes and institutions capable of protecting migrants and enhancing the positive effects of migration such as remittances or knowledge transfers (Adaween 2016).

References Abderrahim, Tasnim. 2017. North Africa, Europe’s Last Resort on Migration. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/68097 . Accessed 4 October 2020. Abderrahim, Tasnim, and Anna Knoll. 2017a. The EU’s migration cooperation with North Africa: will the carrot and stick approach work? Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management. https://ecdpm.org/talking-points/eu-migration-cooperation-north-africa/ . Accessed 4 October 2020.

10

The Spanish policy for regular immigration is basically based on the so-called contingent for contracts of foreign workers (contingente anual de trabajadores extranjeros in Spanish). This policy establishes a number of jobs to be filled by foreign workers in the country of origin accordingly to the needs of the Spanish labour market. These needs are identified by the Spanish Government, well in consultation with Spanish regions and the employers’ and employees’ more representative organisations through the so-called Tripartite Labour Commission for Immigration (Comisión Laboral Tripartita de Immigración in Spanish), intended to manage the migratory inflows. It is worth also stressing that there are a number of public subsidies intended to favour those institutions assisting in these contingent-based policies (Eurofound 2016).

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Michelle Ndiaye is the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of Mission of the African Union in the Democratic Republic of Congo. She is a former Director of the Africa Peace and Security Programme at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University and Head of the Tana Forum Secretariat.