275 28 6MB
English Pages [226] Year 1998
Fi ndi ng Our Wo y►
R e t h i n k i n g €thnA nd rightly so. T h e idea that im m i grants should keep quiet and be grateful in the face o f discrim ination and prejudice is inconsistent w ith the spirit and the letter o f ou r ow n princi ples o f equality and hum an rights. T h at im m igrants— w ho may themselves have com e from societies w ith institutionalized inequalities and traditions o f deference to authority— have quickly adopted Canadian constitutional principles is in itself a sign o f how m uch they desire integration. B ut it means that the stakes in race relations are higher now than before. G overnm ent failure to address discrim ination is no longer grudgingly accepted: it is im m ediately seen as a violation o f justice and fundam ental rights. As a result, we simply have less tim e to tack le discrim ination, or to prove o u r good-w ill. R ace relations have in fact becom e an increasingly im portant goal o f the federal m ulticulturalism policy, a shift that started in the 1980s and con tinues today, reflected m ost recently in the establishm ent o f a Canadian R ac e R elations Foundation in O cto b er 1996. This is another example o f how the policy has shifted to m eet new conditions and needs, and to iden tify areas w here fair term s o f integration are m ost lacking. B ut the prob lems o f racism cannot be solved by the m eagre resources o f the federal m ulticulturalism policy alone. It will require a com m itm ent on the part o f all governm ents in Canada, and o f all Canadians.
,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Chapter 6
v_________________________________
Can Multiculturalism Be Extended to Non-Ethnic Groups?
Critics argue that m ulticulturalism has been a failure and should be scrapped. Since, in reality, ethnocultural relations in Canada have improved since the adoption o f m ulticulturalism , scrapping the policy now w ould make no sense. A m ore p ertinent question is w hether it should be extend ed to n o n -eth n ic groups. T h e demands o f ethnic groups for m ulticulturalism are part o f a broad er m ovem ent towards a ‘politics o f identity’, in w hich a w ide range o f pre viously disadvantaged groups seek public recognition o f their distinctive identities and needs. A m ong these groups are w om en, gays and lesbians, religious m inorities, and people w ith disabilities. All these groups seek not only the com m on rights o f Canadian citizenship, but also certain form s o f group-specific rights. T hey w ant not only freedom from discrim ination in the exercise o f their com m on rights, but also group-specific form s o f recognition, affirmation, and political participation. T here are obvious similarities betw een the struggle for m ulticulturalism and these other m ovem ents. In fact, in the U n ited States the term ‘m ulti culturalism ’ typically includes all forms o f identity politics. It encompasses any social group that has been excluded or m arginalized from m ainstream society. C an the m ulticulturalism m odel o f integration be extended from im m igrants to these n o n -eth n ic groups? In this chapter I will consider the similarities betw een ethnocultural groups and other identity groups, particularly gays and lesbians and people w ith disabilities. T here are im portant com m onalities betw een these groups in the ways they conceive o f their differences from the larger society. B oth gays/lesbians and the D eaf are increasingly m oving towards quasi-‘culturaF conceptions o f their group identity, and quasi-‘ethnic’ models o f group organization. T hey often com pare themselves to ethnic groups, and some gay groups have even adopted the language o f ethnic separatism and m inority nationalism (section 1). T h e demands o f identity groups thus raise m any o f the same concerns about divisiveness and the ‘fragm entation’ o f Canadian society as do the
Extending Multiculturalism to N on-Ethnic Groups?
91
dem ands o f ethnocultural groups. However, I will argue that despite the occasional adoption o f the rhetoric o f nationalism, these identity groups are in fact m uch closer to im m igrant groups than to national m inorities in their relations w ith the larger society. As w ith im m igrant groups, the sepa ratist option is neither desirable n o r feasible for gays/lesbians or people w ith disabilities (section 2). T h e challenge, therefore, is to find models o f inclusiveness and tolerance that recognize and affirm these diverse form s o f group identities and cul tural differences. T h e existing practice o f m ulticulturalism in Canada, based on the needs and aspirations o f im m igrant groups, is not sufficient for these o th er identity groups. Nevertheless, m any o f the lessons w e’ve learned through experience w ith im m igrant groups should help us in grappling w ith these broader debates (section 3). 1. N e w S o c ia l M o v e m e n t s
as
I den tity G r o u p s
In C anada, the status o f eth nocultural groups is usually discussed quite separately from that o f o th e r identity groups, such as gays/lesbians and the disabled. In particular, th e language o f ‘m ulticulturalism ’— and the official governm ent agencies and policies relating to it— is almost en tire ly focused on ethnocultural groups. W hile people often talk about a gay ‘co m m u n ity ’ or a D e a f ‘su b cu ltu re’, these groups fall outside the m ulti culturalism rubric, and are served by separate governm ent policies and adm inistrative agencies. Yet these n o n-ethnic identity groups share a num ber o f im portant fea tures w ith ethnocultural groups, and the tw o sorts o f groups have tended to converge in recent years in the way they describe themselves. In partic ular, b o th have increasingly defined themselves in ‘cultural’ terms. O n the one hand, groups like gays/lesbians and the D eaf increasingly view th em selves in quasi-‘ethnic’ or ‘cultural’ term s— that is, as sharing not only a medical condition or biological disposition, but also a com m on ‘identity’, ‘co m m u n ity ’, ‘history’, and ‘way o f life’. O n the other hand, ethnic groups have increasingly com e to define themselves in term s o f culture rather than race o r descent. M em bership in an ethnic group is n o t som ething fixed at birth by o n e ’s genes: it is a m atter o f socialization into, and identification w ith, a way o f life— a sense o f m em bership and belonging in a historical com m unity. And in b o th cases, groups are increasingly dem anding some form o f recognition for their com m unity and cultural identity. It is w orth exploring this convergence in m ore depth, starting w ith the n o n -eth n ic identity groups such as gays and people w ith disabilities. These groups are often described as ‘new social m ovem ents’ (along w ith peace groups, environm ental groups, hum an rights groups, etc.). W hat makes these social m ovem ents ‘n ew ’— w hat distinguishes them from traditional left-w ing or farm er-based political m ovem ents— is the fact that they are rooted n o t in a ‘com m on interest’ but in a ‘com m on identity’.1Traditional
92
The Merits o f Multiculturaliam
class-based political m ovem ents em erge w hen people w ho share a prior m aterial interest, based on a com m on class o r regional econom ic position, m obilize to protect their interests. T hey are defined, therefore, in term s of co m m o n material interests, a com m on social-dem ocratic ideology, and a com m itm en t to achieving electoral success. N ew social m ovem ents, by contrast, are n o t defined in term s o f any pre existing interest. R ather, these groups em erge because they provide a way for people to define their sense o f self and to shape a new way o f life and identity. T hey see themselves prim arily as ‘instances o f cultural and politi cal praxis through w hich new identities are form ed, new ways o f life are tested, and new form s o f com m unity are prefigured’.2A nd while these new social m ovem ents make dem ands on the state, they do not, individually or collectively, seek to form a governing party. This emphasis on identity is true o f m ost ‘new social m ovem ents’, including peace and environm ental groups. B ut it is especially true o f gays/lesbians and people w ith disabilities. T h e case o f gays is particularly interesting, since the changes that have taken place in recent years in both social understandings and self-understandings o f hom osexuality have been dram atic.3 Today we take for granted the idea o f a gay identity and gay com m unity, and yet this is in m any ways a historical novelty. As M ichel Foucault noted, w hile sodom y has always been a sin w ithin the JudaeoC hristian tradition, it was seen as a tem ptation, like adultery, that everyone was subject to. T here were hom osexual acts, but it was n o t until the nine teenth century that com m entators started talking about ‘hom osexuals’ as a separate group ‘o rien ted ’ exclusively to same-sex sexual relations. As Foucault puts it, ‘T h e sodom ite has been a tem porary aberration; the hom osexual was now a species.’4 B ut w hile hom osexuals were increasingly seen as a group, they w ere not yet seen as a ‘com m unity’, let alone a ‘culture’.T h ey were seen as simply a statistical group— the random pro p ortion o f individuals affected by the m edical ‘condition’ or biological ‘o rientation’ o f homosexuality. This con dition itself was view ed as an affliction o r disease; in fact, hom osexuality was officially defined as an illness by the A m erican Psychiatric Association until 1972, and by the A m erican Psychological Association until 1975. As hom osexual enclaves developed in m ajor cities, however, gays began to see themselves n o t ju st as a statistical group but as m em bers o f a co m munity, w ith their ow n separate institutions and hence their own culture.5 A nd in looking for a m odel to describe their new -found identity as a cul tural group, they naturally looked to ethnic groups. As Stephen Epstein puts it, gays in the 1970s increasingly came to conceptualize themselves as a legiti mate minority group, having a certain quasi-‘ethnic’ status, and deserving the same protections against discrimination that are claimed by other groups in our society.To be gay, then, became something like being Italian, black or
Extending Multiculturalism to Non-Ethnic Groups?
93
Jew ish... .This ‘ethnic’ self-characterization by gays and lesbians has a clear political utility, for it has perm itted a form o f group organizing that is par ticularly suited to the American experience, with its history o f civil-rights struggles and ethnic-based, interest-group com petition.6
Indications o f this ‘eth n ic’ self-identity can be traced back to the 1950s, but only in the late 1970s did it truly seem to correspond to the reality o f the burgeoning gay male com m unities. Gays increasingly form ed selfcontained ‘cities-w ithin-cities’ or ‘ghettos’ in m ajor cities like N ew York and San Francisco.7 In Toronto the levels o f residential concentration and institutional com pleteness o f the gay com m unity equal or exceed those o f m ost im m igrant groups,8 and in San Francisco those levels are greater still.9 In addition, gays, like ethnic groups, are developing a sense o f com m unal history, and a separate literature.10 In short, gays claim that they are as m uch a ‘cultural’ group as many eth nic groups. This shift from a ‘m edical’ to a ‘cultural’ definition is reflected in the way gays distinguish (cultural) ‘gayness’ from (behavioural) ‘h o m o sexuality’. N o t all people w h o engage in hom osexual acts participate in the gay com m unity and culture; m any hom osexuals and bisexuals view their sexual behaviour as totally separate from the rest o f their social and cultur al lives.Thus many com m entators distinguish betw een ‘hom osexual doing’ and ‘gay being’.11 As G ilbert H erdt and A ndrew Boxer p u t it: A hundred homosexuals do not, say we, a gay make. . . .‘Gay’, in other words, represents more than a sexual act, as ‘homosexual’ once did . . . it signifies identity and role, o f course, but also a distinctive system of rules, norms, attitudes, and, yes, beliefs from which the culture o f gay men is made, a culture which sustains the social relations o f same-sex desire.12
A similar shift from a medical category to a cultural identity has occurred am ong the Deaf. U ntil recendy, m ost people viewed the D eaf simply as a statistical category, defined by a com m on medical condition affecting a random percentage o f individuals. A nd this condition, like homosexuality, was view ed as an affliction or a disease. Today, however, com m entators increasingly see the D eaf ‘in a new “ethnic” light, as a p eo ple w ith a distinctive language, sensibility, and culture o f their ow n’.13 In fact, the claim o f the D eaf to be a distinct quasi-ethnic culture is in some ways even greater than for gays, since the D eaf have their ow n separate lan guage or, m ore accurately, languages— the family o f sign languages, m ost prom inently Am erican Sign Language (A SL).H T h e shift from a ‘m edical’ to a ‘cultural’ definition o f deafness is reflected in the way com m entators dis tinguish ‘the D eaf’ (as m em bers o f a linguistic/cultural group) from ‘the deaf’ (as people w ith a medical condition that prevents them from hear ing)— a distinction that parallels the one betw een ‘gays’ and ‘hom osexuals’.15 M oreover, the historical treatm ent o f sign language closely parallels the
94
The Merits o f Multiculturaliam
treatm ent o f other m inority languages. Sign language was first form alized in France in the 1770s, and was used as the language o f instruction for D eaf children for over a century in France and the U nited States. However, after the M ilan conference o f professional educators o f the D eaf in 1880, a co n certed effort was m ade to suppress the use o f Sign and force D eaf children to try to speak. H ence D eaf children were put into ‘oral’ schools, and were m ade to learn to talk as m uch as possible like other children. T h e use o f Sign was seen as interfering w ith the acquisition o f speech and lip-reading skills, and hence as inhibiting the integration o f the D eaf into the larger society. Providing schooling in Sign was seen ‘as perverse, as conducive to isolation and a set-apart p eople’.1'’ Sign language itself was seen as ‘p rim i tive’, incapable o f expressing sophisticated thoughts o r artistic creativity. This argum ent was precisely the same one used to deny education to national m inorities in their m o th er ton g u e.17 As O liver Sacks notes, the suppression o f Sign in the n ineteenth century was part o f a general ‘V ictorian oppressiveness and conform ism , intolerance o f m inorities, and m inority usages, o f every kind: religious, linguistic, ethnic. T hus it was at this tim e that the “little nations” and “little languages” o f the w orld (for example, Wales and Welsh) found themselves under pressure to assimilate and conform .’18T h e consequences for D eaf children were generally p ern i cious. It is extraordinarily difficult for D eaf children to learn how to speak, and as a result the average educational attainm ent o f D eaf children deteri orated dramatically follow ing the elim ination o f Sign as the language o f instruction. B ut w hile professional educators (and the general public) denigrated Sign, the D eaf themselves always retained a deep com m itm ent to it. Like m ost national m inorities, they resent being forced to use a language that is n o t their own. Sign rem ained the prim ary means o f com m unication am ong D eaf people and served as the vehicle for transm itting ‘the know l edge, beliefs and practices that make up the culture o f D eaf people’. R esidential schools w ere pivotal in passing on and developing the D eaf language and culture, since they exposed D eaf children bo th to each other and to adult signers. As Padden and H um phries p u t it, ‘this know ledge o f D ea f people is n o t simply a cam araderie w ith others w h o share a similar physical condition, but is, like m any o th er historical cultures, historically created and actively transm itted across generations.’19 M ore recently, the D ea f have begun to dem and greater recognition and use o f Sign in schools and governm ent institutions. T hey have been supported by recent studies confirm ing that ASL is a full-fledged language, capable o f express ing th o u g h t w hether abstract or concrete, poetic or rigorous, as effectively and grammatically as speech.20 H ence, as w ith gays, there has been a shift from a medical to ‘a “cultur al” view o f the D eaf as form ing a com m unity w ith a com plete language and culture o f its o w n ’.21 And, as w ith gays, there has been a gradual insti tutional elaboration o f this com m unity and culture. T here are D eaf schools
Extending Multiculturalism to N on-Ethnic Groups?
95
and clubs, theatre groups and service agencies. D eaf com m unities are p ri m arily found in big cities (as w ith gays), or near the residential schools established for D eaf children. As Sacks puts it, the experience o f D eaf res idential schools helped create the sense th a t‘they were no longer just indi viduals, w ith an individual’s plights or trium phs; they were a people, w ith their ow n culture, likes the Jews o r the W elsh’.22 However, to say that the D eaf themselves have shifted from a medical to cultural self-identity w ould be incorrect, for they never saw themselves as ‘disabled’. To the Deaf, the term ‘disabled’ refers to people w ith physical handicaps, n o t to themselves. As Padden and H um phries note, ‘know ing well the special benefits, econom ic and otherwise, o f calling themselves disabled, D eaf people have a history, albeit an uneasy one, o f alignm ent w ith o th er disabled groups.’ B ut this is n o t their prim ary self-identification: W hen D eaf people discuss their deafness, they use terms deeply related to their language, their past, and their community. Their enduring concerns have been the preservation o f their language, policies for educating deaf children, and maintenance o f their social and political organizations. The m odern language o f ‘access’ and ‘civil rights’, as unfamiliar as it is to Deaf people, has been used by D eaf leaders because the public understands these concerns more readily than ones specific to the D eaf community.23
N o t all people w ho are hard o f hearing participate in the D eaf com m uni ty and culture, or use the D eaf language (Sign). This is particularly true o f people w ho lose their hearing as adults because o f illness, trauma, o r old age. H aving been raised and educated entirely in a hearing world, these people often do view themselves as ‘disabled’.T heir prim ary concern is not to learn Sign and jo in the D eaf culture, b ut rather to re-establish their con nection to the larger society through m edical treatm ent, hearing aids, or learning to lip-read.24 For the D eaf as a cultural group, however, Sign is not only their m other tongue: it is also w hat unites them as a culture. In b o th o f the above cases, then, a n on-ethnic group has increasingly adopted a quasi-ethnic m odel o f group identity and group organization. These are n ot just ‘lifestyle enclaves’ defined by a ‘narcissism o f similarity’ in patterns o f leisure and consum ption.25 T hey are genuine subcultures, w ith significant degrees o f residential concentration, institutional co m plexity, and cultural distinctiveness, as well as a sense o f history.26 2. S h o u l d M
u lt ic u lt u r a lism in c l u d e
A ll C u lt u r a l G r o u p s ?
So far I have tried to show that certain identity groups are similar in im portant respects to ethnocultural groups. T hey are not ‘ethnic’, strictly speaking, since they are n o t defined by a com m on ethnic descent, but they are certainly ‘cultural’. Should o u r m ulticulturalism ideals and policies therefore be extended to them?
96
The Merits o f Multiculturaliam
This question has becom e m ore pressing because o f the way m ulticul turalism policies are typically defended today. As B rian W alker notes, there has been a trend w ithin liberal th o u g h t to justify greater accom m odation for ethnocultural groups (Walker calls this ‘liberal culturalism’). B ut the basis for this defence o f ethnocultural groups has almost invariably been the fact that m em bers o f these groups share a com m on culture, not that they share a com m on ethnic descent. T h e reason ethnocultural groups deserve recognition, liberal culturalists argue, is n o t that blood and descent are im portant, but rather that culture provides people w ith m eaningful options, and w ith a sense o f belonging and identity that helps them nego tiate the m odern world. As Walker notes, this view marks a significant shift from earlier accounts o f nationalism. P rior to the Second W orld War, defenders o f nationalism often appealed to the ‘social-Darwinist picture o f a struggle am ong races for scarce living space’. Since the war, however, this ‘racialist’ defence o f nationalism has given way to a ‘culturalist’ defence ‘based on the need to protect fragile cultures’.27 T h e extent o f this shift from race to culture varies from group to group. In the case o f Q uebec, for exam ple, until quite recently only the descendants o f the original French colonists were considered ‘true Q u éb éco is’. Yet today the overw helm ing m ajority o f the province’s peo ple, and all its m ain political parties, endorse a n o n -eth n ic definition o f ‘Q u éb éco is’ that accepts (indeed encourages) im m igrants and th eir chil dren to integrate into the francophone society and to think o f themselves as Q uébécois.28 As Jacques Parizeau’s fam ous com m ents after the O cto b er 1995 referendum indicate, the older ethnic definitions o f Q uébécois id en tity rem ain near the surface, and som etim es com e o u t in m om ents o f anger o r frustration. B ut the shift to a cultural definition appears to be irreversible, reflecting b o th the liberalization o f Q uebec society and the increasing num bers o f im m igrants w ith in the population. T h ro u g h o u t this book, then, I have used ‘Q u éb éco is’ in the cultural sense, to refer to any one w h o participates in the French-language society in Q uebec, regard less o f ethnic descent. A m ong A boriginal peoples, the adoption o f ‘blood quantum ’ m em ber ship rules by some bands is a notable exception to the trend towards cul tural definitions. In fact, such rules are controversial w ithin A boriginal com m unities, and are w idely seen as violating A boriginal people’s ow n understandings o f themselves as peoples and cultures rather than races. T he use o f blood quantum rules was also strongly criticized by the recent Royal C om m ission on A boriginal Peoples, w hich argued that it violated n o t only hum an rights b u t traditional Indian practiccs, and was actually co u n ter productive w ith respect to ensuring cultural survival.29 A ccording to Walker, the shift from racialism to culturalism is an obvi ous m oral im provem ent, and helps to explain w hy the demands o f eth n o cultural groups are n o t necessarily inconsistent w ith liberal-dem ocratic principles. But it raises the question o f w hy proponents o f m ulticultural-
Extending Multiculturalism to Non-Ethnic Groups?
97
ism continue to focus on groups that are defined by a shared ethnic descent. If ethnocultural groups are w orthy o f recognition because they provide people w ith valuable cultural practices and group identities, and not because they are united by shared blood, then w hy n o t also include n o n -eth n ic groups that have developed a com m on culture, like gays o r the Deaf?30 This is a legitim ate point. However, as we have seen, ethnocultural group themselves take tw o very different forms: im m igrant groups and national m inorities. Insofar as identity groups are becom ing m ore like eth nocultural groups, are they m ore akin to im m igrants or to nations? Som e com m entators argue that gays/lesbians are adopting a distincdy ‘national’ identity. T hey have adopted nationalist labels (‘Q u eer N atio n ’) and a nationalist agenda o f separatist self-governm ent. For example, D ennis Altm an argues that the past decade and a half has seen the creation o f a gay and lesbian ‘nation’, much as nineteenth-century Europe saw the creation o f Czech and Rom anian ‘nations’. To be gay has taken on meanings that go far beyond sexual and affectional preference, binding us through a whole set of com munal, religious, political and social activities w ith other gays.31
M oreover, this ‘n ation’ has often been seen as having a territorial dim en sion focused on the gay ghettos, particularly in San Francisco. As Stephen Epstein puts it, even th ough the m ajority o f self-identified gays did n o t live in these com m unities, in the 1970s many o f them did make their pilgrimages to the ‘Gay M ecca’, or were exposed to it through the media. And beyond that, to use a different reli gious metaphor, San Francisco came to symbolize for gays around the U nited States what Israel represents for Jews around the world: a focal point for cultural identity that functions even for those w ho are not firmly inte grated into the culture.’2
This nationalist agenda is increasingly seen as neither feasible nor attrac tive. A ccording to Larry K ram er,‘For a w hile, San Francisco was the gays’ Israel. For decades, gays m igrated there, and in tim e they attained great pow er in the political structure o f that city.’ B ut the option o f m oving to San Francisco was never really available to m ore than a small m inority o f A m erica’s gays, and the idea o f m aking San Francisco a gay nation was seriously u n d erm in ed by AID S. K ram er concludcs that whereas Zionism represented ‘a hopeful haven from the w orld’s hatred’, such escape is n o t a realistic option for gays.33 Gays have no choice b u t to form a ‘com m u nity that is dispersed th ro u g h o u t society, fighting hom ophobia w herever it occurs’.34 T h e problem is not simply the lack o f a shared territo ry or historic
98
The Merits o f Multiculturaliam
hom eland for the ‘gay n atio n ’. A deeper problem is intergenerational con tinuity. M ost gays are b o rn to heterosexual parents, and gay parents usu ally have heterosexual children. Even if there w ere inducem ents for gays to m ove to a gay com m unity, one could m aintain a gay-m ajority tow n only by expelling the heterosexual children o f gay parents. A related problem w ith the nationalist co n cep tion is the fact that gays d o n ’t gen erally en ter the gay com m unity until their tw enties or thirties, after they have already been socialized in to a national com m unity. As Epstein notes, national identification is a form o f ‘prim ary socialization’ that is ‘co n ferred at b irth and transm itted through the fam ily’, w hereas entry into a gay com m unity constitutes a ‘secondary socialization’ o ccu rrin g later in life. Secondary socialization is typically less form ative than prim ary socialization, because it m ust deal w ith an already form ed self. Individuals being socialized in to a gay co m m u n ity ‘will already possess a variety o f cross-cutting identities’— ethnic, racial, class, gender, religious, occupa tional, and so o n — and these ‘may claim m uch greater allegiance and inh ib it the secondary socialization process’/ 5 For these reasons, gay id en tity can n o t really be seen as analogous to the sort o f cultural m em bership and national identity provided by a national culture. F rancophone gays in Q uebec, for example, are b o rn and raised to th in k o f themselves as Q uébécois, and to th in k o f th eir life-chances as tied up w ith participa tion in Q u eb ec societal institutions. E n terin g the gay com m unity in later life is unlikely to change this deeply rooted sense o f national identity, or the desire to continue to live and w ork in o n e ’s original national lan guage and culture. For this reason, the aim o f m ost gays is n o t to relinquish their original national m em bership, b u t rather to m ake their national com m unity m ore inclusive o f gays. In this respect, gays are m uch closer to im m igrant groups. As Epstein puts it, political m obilization around ‘gay ethnicity’, like the m obilization o f im m igrant ethnicity, does n o t aim at separatist nationalism , but rather involves ‘influencing state policy and securing social rewards on behalf o f the g ro u p ’ to assist in societal integration and acceptance. T he adoption o f a ‘n e o -e th n ic ’ form o f identity and organiza tion, together w ith a civil-rights political strategy, ‘implies that gays are asserting their differences partly as a way o f gaining entry in to the system. By consolidating as a group, they are essentially follow ing the rules o f the m o d ern A m erican pluralist m yth, w hich portrays a harm onious co m p eti tion am ong distinct social groups.’36 Like im m igrant groups, m ost gay groups aim to show that their m em bers are good citizens w ho are w illing to participate in the larger society and seek only fair accom m odations w ithin m ainstream institutions for their distinctive needs and identities. However, some gay activists and th e orists have concluded that the level o f h om ophobia in the larger society is so great that the ‘ethnic m o d el’ o f integration is unrealistic. As Cathy C o h en notes, surveys consistently show that
Extending Multiculturalism to Non-Ethnic Groups?
99
despite our many attempts at normality, service to our country, and good citizenship, gays and lesbians remain one o f the most hated and despised groups within this society. T he fact is that gays and lesbians, unlike purely white ethnic groups (Irish, Germans), encounter a level o f hatred and exclu sion that is more consistent with the experiences o f racial groups, in partic ular African Americans.”
Like African Am ericans, gays and lesbians face systematic attem pts by d o m inant groups and individuals to deny them ‘inform al equality, even w hen form al inclusion has been w o n ’. R ights may be secured in legal d ocu m ents, but these form al guarantees are always ‘up for grabs in the social, political, and econom ic interactions betw een individuals’. This raises the question o f w hether integration is a w orthw hile or realistic goal. As C o h en puts it,‘If we know that even w h en we are allowed form al inclusion it pro vides only m inim al protection against the daily decisions o f individuals w ho have the localized pow er to decide w h eth er ou r rights will be respected, then w hy expend political resources on such demands?’ Given this resistance to real equality, gays may have to acknow ledge that ‘no m at ter how norm al they attem pt to be, they hold a perm anent position on the outside.”8 T here is some tru th in this critique o f the ‘ethnic m odel’ o f inclusion.39As we saw in C hapter 5, it is far from clear that the path to inte gration taken by w hite ethnic groups is available to African Americans. And insofar as gays/lesbians face com parable barriers and prejudice, the ethnic m odel may n o t be sufficient for them either. Yet w hat is the alternative? Gay separatism is n o t viable. T here are gay ghettos in large cities, but m ost gays do n o t live in them , and despite the impressive institutional elaboration o f gay com m unities in recent years, gay culture remains far from institutionally com plete. T here are no gay univer sities o r governm ents, and gays lack the territorial concentration to create such institutions. Gays w h o w ant to becom e doctors, lawyers, police offi cers, teachers, or politicians, can do so only by entering mainstream schools and institutions.T here is no evidence that gays are w illing to give up these life-chances in order to live in a gay ghetto.40 In this respect, the institu tional completeness o f the gay com m unity is m uch less than that o f the Q uébécois. M oreover, m ost gays do n o t wish to give up their b irthright in the larg er society. For them , separatism is n o t the first option— it is simply a defen sive response to the hostility and prejudice that faces gays w ho have ‘com e o u t’ in the larger society. As M ark Blasius puts it: All laws, forms o f culture (rituals, symbols etc) and the most mundane social expectations make one an alien in the world. It is for this reason that the ‘gay ghetto’ exists. Gay and lesbian commercial establishments, social institutions, neighbourhoods, resorts, and cruising areas [etc.] constitute a ‘liberated zone’ where lesbians and gay men can feel at home in and at peace with the
100
The Merits o f Multiculturaliam
w o rld .. . . the ghetto exists because lesbians and gay men, to the extent that they come out, have been forced by societal rejection to find other means o f livelihood, other sources o f emotional sustenance, and other institutional frameworks within which to pursue their life objectives; the gay ghetto is significantly a manifestation o f forced ghettoization.41
Gays w ho com e o u t do not wish to sever relations w ith their friends, fam ily, and colleagues in order to move to a gay ghetto. Indeed, most gays are unw illing to sever these connections, and those w ho do move do so only as a last resort, in the face o f intolerable prejudice. H ere again the situation is very different from that o f national m inorities. T he reason Q uébécois w ant to live and w ork in their ow n language and culture is not that they have been rejected by anglophones. T hey cherish their separate culture simply because it is the one they were b o rn and raised in. By contrast, gay separatism w ould involve cutting oneself off from the culture one was raised in, and relinquishing o n e ’s sense o f national identity and cultural m em bership. Thus gay nationalism is neither feasible nor desirable for m ost gays. T h e task, therefore, m ust be to fight hom ophobia w ithin the larger society, to gain recognition and acceptance for gays and lesbians w ithin its schools, media, courts, businesses, and so on. In thinking about models o f gay inclusion, it is im portant— as w ith m odels o f im m igrant inclusion— to distinguish integration from assimila tion. Som e early hom osexual rights groups in the 1950s adopted an assimilationist agenda. T hey sought the decrim inalization o f homosexuality, and protection from jo b and housing discrim ination, but in return they were prepared to hide their hom osexuality— to treat it as a purely ‘private’ m at ter. For public purposes, hom osexuals w ould be invisible, and heterosexu ality w ould rem ain the sole publicly recognized form o f sexual identity. This is unacceptable to m ost gays today, w h o dem and n o t only protec tion from discrim ination but public affirm ation o f their identity through, for example, recognition o f gay marriages and positive portrayals o f gay lives in school texts.42 Like im m igrants, gays today w ant a change in pub lic attitudes so as to accom m odate new ways o f being a ‘good C anadian’ and new ways o f belonging to and participating in Canadian society.43 For b o th gays and im m igrants, therefore, integration will involve both a strong sense o f identity and an affective bond w ith their subgroup, together w ith concerted efforts to reform institutions and public perceptions w ithin the larger society. T h e situation o f D eaf people is rather different. For many D eaf chil dren, their prim ary socialization is into the D eaf culture and sign language. U nlike gays, many D eaf children are b o rn and raised in a D eaf culture, and so they exhibit the same tenacious com m itm ent to their first language that o th er national m inorities do. Even for those w h o have entered the D eaf com m unity later in life, after learning to speak (the ‘postlingually D e a f’), the fact is that they can interact w ith the hearing w orld only through
Extending Multiculturalism to N on-Ethnic Groups?
101
translators, o r via lip-reading, w hich works only for a lim ited range o f social circumstances. Insofar as they wish to participate in the social world, it will largely be through Sign. For this reason, the D eaf have attem pted to create an institutionally com plete societal culture based on signing. A lthough they have rarely adopted the rhetoric o f nationalism, there is an im portant sense in w hich they are genuinely separatist. As Oliver Sacks notes, ‘the deaf w orld feels self-sufficient, n o t isolated— it has no wish to assimilate or be assimilated; on the contrary, it cherishes its ow n language and images, and wishes to protect them .’44 In the nineteenth century, this sense o f self-sufficiency even led to a ‘D eaf Z ionism ’— dreams o f creating territorially based D eaf townships o r states. D eaf people, it was argued, ‘need to be n o t only one an o th er’s friends but one another’s neighbours, to create together n o t only a culture but a society’.45 B ut these dreams were not realistic. For one thing, D eaf people are too few in num bers, and ter ritorially too dispersed, to develop the necessary critical mass in a particu lar region.46 For another, any such com m unity w ould im m ediately face the same problem o f intergenerational continuity faced by gays: most D eaf children are born to hearing parents, and D eaf parents usually have hear ing children. Even if there were inducem ents for D eaf children to move to the com m unity, a D eaf m ajority could be m aintained only by expelling the hearing children o f D eaf parents. Nevertheless, for a D eaf culture to survive requires some degree o f ter ritorial concentration and institutional elaboration. T hus concerted efforts have been m ade to establish and support the residential schools that sustain a genuine D eaf com m unity. These schools were initially lim ited to ele m entary and secondary levels, but in the 1850s a D eaf college was created. This college— today know n as Gallaudet University— is one o f several offering college courses in Sign language.47 A nd around these residential schools and colleges a larger D eaf com m unity has arisen, w ith D eaf cafés, clubs, and so on. U nfortunately, recent ‘m ainstream ing’ laws in the U nited States are encouraging D eaf children to attend local rather than residential schools. As a result, D eaf children m eet few o ther D eaf children o r adult signers, and so gain only a lim ited com petence in Sign.This n o t only reduces their access to D eaf culture b u t retards their overall intellectual developm ent, since they are now m arginalized from bo th the D eaf and hearing cultures. As Padden and H um phries n o te ,‘the new social order o f “m ainstream ing”, instead o f introducing new worlds to deaf children, may well lead to a new kind o f isolationism.’48 This points to a profound difference in self-identity and group life betw een the D eaf and o th er people w ith disabilities, m ost o f w hom seek integration into the larger m ainstream society in w hich they were born and raised, and do n o t w ant their participation in their societal culture to be im paired by their disability. T hus the DisAbled W om en’s N etw ork (D A W N ), for example, works for ‘full equality and integration’ into the
102
The Merits o f Multiculturaliam
m ainstream o f Canadian society, w hile also fostering ‘a sense o f identity and p rid e ’.49 Such disability groups are pushing for ‘m ainstream ing’ in schools, and rightly so, since it helps break dow n their sociocultural m arginalization and isolation. For the Deaf, however, their ‘disability’ is n o t a source o f sociocultural isolation, but a defining feature o f their ow n separate societal culture. A nd so in their case the aim o f political m obilization is n o t p ri m arily to gain access to the m ainstream society, b ut to protect and enhance their separate institutions. T h ere are also im portant differences betw een gays and the Deaf. T h e latter are m uch closer to a genuinely ‘national’ form o f cultural separate ness, whereas the form er are closer to the im m igrant m odel o f integration. T h e reason for this difference is n o t that nationalism is m ore feasible for the D eaf than for gays; on the contrary, the D eaf are fewer in num ber than gays. T h e reason is that D eaf people were raised in a D eaf culture, and indeed this is the only culture they are effectively able to participate in. To pursue integration, therefore, w ould m ean abandoning their original lan guage and prim ary cultural identity. For gays, on the o th er hand, it is sep aratism that w ould require abandoning the national identity and cultural m em bership they acquired as children. T h e D ea f can never becom e a genuinely ‘national’ minority. T hey will always rem ain at best a quasi-national group, and will have a difficult tim e developing and m aintaining a com plete societal culture. A nd yet the cul tural nationalist aspirations o f the D eaf m ust be respected, and accom m o dated as far as possible, n o t only because this is the language and culture they cherish, but also because the obstacles to integration in the m ain stream are enorm ous— m uch greater than for im m igrant groups, or even for m ore traditional ‘national’ m inorities. 4. C o n c l u s io n In this chapter I have tried to show that certain identity groups have developed forms o f group identity and group culture similar to those o f ethnocultural groups. H ence they have the same need for recognition as ethnic groups, and pose m any o f the same challenges for m ulticulturalism regarding the balance betw een affirm ing group differences and prom oting societal integration. A nd w hile the existing m ulticulturalism policy does n o t provide a m agic form ula for these o th er groups, it does offer helpful insights and lessons about the requirem ents of, and obstacles to, social integration. T h e similarities in dem ands betw een these identity groups and ethnic groups should help dispel the m yth that m ulticulturalism is simply a pass ing fad, o r the artificial product o f ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ trying to m ilk the governm ent for money. T h e fundam ental issue raised by m ulticultural ism— defining fair term s o f integration into mainstream society for newly arriving or previously disadvantaged groups— is a ubiquitous and enduring one for all liberal democracies.
Extending Multiculturalism to N on-Ethnic Groups?
103
Should official m ulticulturalism policies therefore be am ended to include these identity groups? N o t necessarily. T here may be good adm in istrative and jurisdictional reasons w hy gays and the D eaf should continue to be served by different governm ent agencies and policies. In addition, to extend the notion o f m ulticulturalism to include all issues o f identity and cultural difference m ight create unnecessary confusion. M ulticulturalism in Canada has, to date, provided a m ore or less coherent fram ew ork for debate over the fair terms o f integration for im m igrant groups. E xtending this debate to include all issues o f diversity and pluralism m ight simply invite misunderstandings and false analogies. We can see this problem in the A m erican literature on ‘m ulticulturalism ’. Because in the U nited States all issues o f pluralism— n o t ju st questions concerning im m igrants and nation al m inorities, but even fem inism and gay rights— are discussed under the heading o f ‘m ulticulturalism ’, the latter has ceased to have any coherent meaning. It has becom e a vague label for a vast range o f disparate issues, w ith the result that im portant differences am ong groups are often ignored or downplayed in the A m erican debate.50 However, even if m ulticulturalism in Canada remains focused on im m i grant integration, it is im portant to ensure that the language used to explain it also prom otes recognition o f the w ider range o f groups that have a legitim ate claim for greater public recognition and acceptance o f their cultural identities and practices. M ulticulturalism should be seen as one part o f a larger struggle to build a m ore tolerant and inclusive society, w orking together w ith policies to prom ote the integration o f gays and people w ith disabilities.
Ctioptep 7
►
Towards a More Representative Democracy
+
M ulticulturalism is a policy in continuous evolution, involving an o n g o ing renegotiation o f the term s o f integration in Canada. Som e o f this renegotiation occurs on the street, as it were, in particular schools and workplaces. But in the end this renegotiation is overseen and regulated by the dem ocratic political process. It is o u r elected political officials w ho define the legislative and policy fram ew ork w ithin w hich m ore specific issues o f m ulticulturalism are settled on a day-to-day basis. T he co n tin u ing evolution o f m ulticulturalism in Canada m ust therefore be d eter m ined politically, by good-faith negotiations and the give and take o f dem ocratic politics. If the resulting decisions are to be seen as fair, the political process itself m ust be seen as open and inclusive. This requires, am ong o th er things, that the interests and perspectives o f all groups be lis tened to and taken into account. Yet increasing num bers o f Canadians today consider the political process ‘unrepresentative’ in that it fails to reflect the diversity o f the p o p ulation. A vivid illustration was the process o f constitutional negotiation leading up to the M eech Lake and C harlottetow n Accords, in w hich the fundam ental term s o f Canadian political life were being decided by eleven middle-class, able-bodied, w hite m en .1 A m ore representative process, m any said, w ould have included w om en, m em bers o f ethnic and racial m inorities, the poor, and people w ith disabilities. T h e constitutional negotiations were a specific and perhaps extrem e case, but under-representation o f w om en, visible m inorities, and other groups is a m uch m ore general p h en o m en o n .T h e 1991 Royal Com m ission on Electoral R efo rm exam ined statistics from the 34th Parliament (elected in 1988) and noted that although w om en constituted m ore than 50 per cent o f the population, they m ade up just 13 per cent o f federal MPs; that is, w om en had only o n e-q u a rte r o f the seats they w ould have had if their representation were p roportionate to their dem ographic weight. Visible m inorities constituted 6 per cent o f the population b u t only 2 per cent o f federal MPs (one-third). A boriginal people constituted 3.5 per cent o f the population but only 1 per cent o f federal MPs (less than one-third). People
Towards a More Representative Democracy
105
w ith disabilities and the econom ically disadvantaged were also signifi cantly under-represented.2 Studies o f the tw o m ost recent parliaments (elected in 1993 and 1997) show the same general trends, although the representation o f visible m inorities is slowly im proving (they now make up abo u t 10 per cent o f the C anadian population and approximately 6 per cent o f MPs) .3 T hese studies have led to several proposals for addressing the problem o f under-representation. For example, political parties could be made m ore inclusive by reducing the barriers that inhibit w om en, ethnic m inorities, or the p o o r from becom ing party candidates o r party leaders. This route was the focus o f the recent Royal Com m ission, w hich studied options such as caps on nom ination cam paign expenses; public funding o f nom ination campaign expenses, either directly o r through tax deductions for campaign contributions; the establishm ent o f form al search com m ittees w ithin each party to help identify and nom inate potential candidates from disadvan taged groups; and financial incentives to parties that nom inate o r elect m em bers o f disadvantaged groups.4 A nother approach w ould be to adopt the sort o f electoral system that is com m on in Europe: namely, a ‘party fist’ system. In its simplest form , each political party offers a single list o f candidates, and the num ber o f seats each wins depends on its percentage o f the popular vote nation-w ide. A party w ith 25 per cent o f the popular vote w ould gain 25 per cent o f the seats: thus in a 200-seat legislature, the first 50 names on its list w ould be elected. This system was intended to ensure fairer representation o f smaller political parties, but it has historically been associated w ith greater inclu siveness o f candidates as well. As Lisa Young notes,5 under ou r current sys tem o f single-m em ber constituencies and first-past-the-post elections, each p arty ’s local riding association can nom inate only one candidate. N om in atio n campaigns, therefore, are zero-sum : selecting a w om an (or a m em ber o f a visible m inority) means rejecting a m an (or a white). A party list system, by contrast, allows for and encourages ‘ticket-balancing’— m ak ing sure that the party list includes both m en and w om en, whites and vis ible m inorities. It also makes under-representation in the nom ination process m ore visible, and thus makes parties m ore accountable. U nder the curren t system, if nine o f ten local constituencies choose a w hite male, this may well be the unintended result o f ten independent decisions, none o f w hich was necessarily intentionally discrim inatory or exclusionary. U nder a party list system, however, if a party puts forward a list o f ten people for election w ith only one w om an o r visible minority, its decision not to field a m ore representative slate o f candidates is clearly deliberate. For these and other reasons, it is likely that a party list system w ould lead to a m ore rep resentative H ouse o f C om m ons than the current system perm its. Versions o f these proposals for cam paign finance reform and a party list system have been tried in m any countries. W hile they have helped, they have n o t entirely succeeded in elim inating the problems o f under-repre
106
The Merits o f Multiculturaliam
sentation.6 So a third, m ore radical, proposal is increasingly made: namely, that a certain num ber o f seats in Parliam ent be reserved for m em bers of disadvantaged o r m arginalized groups. D u rin g the C harlottetow n debate, for example, a num ber o f recom m endations for guaranteed representation were made. T he N ational A ction C om m ittee on the Status o f W om en (N A C ) recom m ended that 50 per cent o f Senate seats be reserved for w om en, and that proportionate representation o f ethnic m inorities also be guaranteed; the Francophone Association o f Alberta recom m ended that at least one o f the proposed six senators elected from each province represent the official language m inority o f that province; and various governm ent commissions have advocated A boriginal-only districts in either the H ouse o f C om m ons o r the Senate.7 M ore recently, w hen the constitution for the new te rrito ry o f N unavut was being draw n up, serious consideration was given to reserving 50 per cent o f the seats in the territorial assembly for w om en.8 Similar proposals to guarantee seats for w om en, Blacks, and other groups have been m ade in the U nited States and in Britain, and in some o th er countries such provisions are already in place. Unfortunately, m any Canadians have a knee-jerk reaction to the idea o f group representation, seeing it as further evidence o f ‘apartheid’ and ‘sepa ratism ’. In this chapter I will try to show that, on the contrary, proposals for group representation are serious attem pts to deal w ith a serious prob lem , and to do so in a way consistent w ith principles o f liberal dem ocracy and social integration. H ere again, my aim is n o t to defend or criticize any particular proposal, b ut rather to underline the im portance o f exam ining the idea o f group representation w ith an open m ind. At a tim e w hen Canadians are becom ing increasingly dissatisfied w ith their role as citi zens— as participants in the process o f dem ocratic self-governm ent— m ajor changes are required in the political process; w ith o u t them , the legitim acy and stability o f o u r dem ocratic institutions may well erode. 2. WHAT'S NEW ABOUT GROUP REPRESENTATION? Som e people believe that group representation is a radical departure from o u r existing con cep tio n o f representative dem ocracy, on e that threatens to u n d erm in e the cherished liberal-dem ocratic norm s o f individual rights and responsible citizenship. O th ers believe that group representa tio n is the logical extension o f existing principles and m echanism s o f representation, and is consistent w ith the long-standing aim o f C anadian political culture to balance individual and collective rights.T here is a cer tain am o u n t o f tru th in b o th views. O n the one hand, group representa tio n is a radical departure from o u r existing system o f single-m em ber, geographically defined constituencies. A nd it does pose a profound chal lenge to o u r traditional n o tio n o f representation, w h ich could have dra m atic im plications for C anadian politics; I w ill discuss som e o f these im plications in th e nex t section.
Towards a More Representative Democracy
107
But it is also true that group representation is consistent w ith certain long-standing features o f the electoral process in Canada. For example, it can be seen as an extension o f the familiar practice o f draw ing the b o u n d aries o f local constituencies so as to correspond to ‘com m unities o f inter est’. W hile constituencies in Canada are supposed to be o f roughly equal size, they are not intended to be random collections o f equal num bers o f citizens. R ather, constituency boundaries are drawn so far as possible in such a way that the people w ithin the constituency will share certain inter ests— econom ic, ethnic, religious, environm ental, historical, o r other— that can then be represented in Parliament. In b oth Canada and the U nited States, district boundaries have been draw n so as to create predom inantly rural ridings; in an increasingly urban ized society, rural and agricultural interests m ight n o t otherw ise be heard. T he practice o f prom oting the representation o f com m unities o f interest is not only widely accepted, but required by law un d er the Electoral B oundaries R eadjustm ent Act (1964) and the R epresentation Act (1985). It was affirm ed by the Royal Com m ission on Electoral R efo rm in 1991: When a community of interest is dispersed across two or more constituen cies, its voters’ capacity to promote their collective interest is diminished accordingly. Their incentive to participate is likewise reduced because the outcome has a lesser relevance to their community o f interest. When this occurs, especially if it could have been avoided, the legitimacy of the elec toral system is undermined.9 In this passage the com m issioners had in m ind territorially concentrated com m unities o f interest, and o f course these are the very groups for w hich boundary-draw ing techniques can w ork. B ut their argum ent here w ould seem to apply equally to n o n -territo rial com m unities o f interest. If special measures should be taken to ensure the representation o f com m unities dis persed across two constituencies, w hy not take measures to ensure the rep resentation o f com m unities o f interest that are dispersed across the entire country, like w om en, people w ith disabilities, visible m inorities, o r the poor?10W ould such measures n o t be similarly justified by the goals o f rep resentation, efficacy, and legitimacy? T h e com m itm ent to representing com m unities o f interest shows that politics in Canada has never been based on a purely individualistic con ception o f the franchise o r o f representation. O n the individualistic view, all that m atters is that each individual has an equal vote w ithin equal constituencies.This is all that is required to conform to the principle that each individual has an equal right to vote, and it should be a m atter o f indiffer ence how these boundaries are draw n, so long as constituencies are o f equal size. B ut this position ignores the reality that Canadians vote as m em bers o f com m unities o f interest, and wish to be represented on that basis. As the C om m ission’s report p u t it:
108
The Merits o f Multiculturaliam
neither the franchise nor representation is merely an individualistic phe nomenon; both also take expression through collective or community func tions. The individualistic perspective is based upon a partial and incomplete understanding of the electoral process and representation. In advancing the ideal of equally weighted votes, it does promote a critical constitutional right. But in ignoring the community dimension, this perspective is unreal istic at best; at worst it ignores the legitimate claims of minority groups." Even the U nited States, often view ed as the epitom e o f an individualistic polity, accepts the need to deviate from a strictly individualized franchise in order to represent com m unities o f interest. A nd in both countries the underlying logic o f these practices can be extended to defend the princi ple o f (non-territorial) group representation.12 Similarly, demands for group representation by disadvantaged groups can be seen as an extension o f long-standing dem ands by smaller regions for increased Senate representation. M any people in A dantic Canada and the West have sought to reform the Senate and use it as a forum for increased regional representation at the federal level. T hey have dem anded an A m erican-style ‘T riple-E Senate’, in w hich each province w ould elect an equal num ber o f senators regardless o f its population. T h e intent is to ensure effective representation for smaller provinces that m ight be neglect ed in the H ouse o f C om m ons, w here the m ajority o f m em bers com e from the tw o m ost populous provinces, O n tario and Q uebec. Som e Canadians have com e to believe that if m arginalized regions need special representation, then so do disadvantaged or m arginalized groups such as w om en or the poor. H istorical evidence suggests that these groups, even m ore than smaller provinces, are likely to be under-represented in Parliam ent and ignored in political decision-m aking. A nd so w hile groups like the N ational A ction C o m m ittee on the Status o f W om en have not opposed the idea o f increased Senate representation for smaller provinces, they have argued that similar measures are needed to ensure increased Senate representation for disadvantaged and m arginalized groups, particu larly w om en and visible m inorities.13 Som e long-tim e proponents o f increased regional representation have resented this attem pt to broaden the Senate reform debate to include group representation; they accused NAC and o th er proponents o f group representation o f ‘hijacking’ the Calgary constitutional conference in January 1992 and displacing the intended topic o f debate— namely, how to improve regional representation in the Senate.14 In fact, though, we m ight well ask w h eth er the tw o topics can be severed, or w h eth er the proponents o f regional representation aren’t com pelled, by the logic o f their argu m ents, to accept group representation. T h e traditional argum ent for increased regional representation— made repeatedly by the Canada West Foundation, for example— assumes that (a) the significant econom ic and cultural differences betw een C anada’s regions
Towards a More Representative Democracy
109
leads to different and som etim es conflicting interests; (b) the interests o f smaller o r poorer regions may n o t be effectively represented under a pure system o f m ajority rule; and (c) m ajority rule is legitim ate only ‘in a set o f governm ental structures that ensure adequate sensitivity to the concerns o f m inorities’.15 But each o f these claims can also be m ade for n o n -te rrito ri al groups: the diverse conditions and experiences o f m en and w om en, w hites and Blacks, able-bodied and disabled, rich and p o o r give rise to dif ferent and sometim es conflicting interests; and the interests o f smaller or poorer groups may n o t be represented under a system o f m ajority rule. T h ere are, then, im portant aspects o f political life in Canada that lend support to the idea o f group representation. This suggests that the demands for such representation that surfaced during the m ost recent round o f negotiations on constitutional reform should n o t be dismissed as m o m en tary aberrations. In the end, o f course, the C harlottetow n Accord rejected m ost propos als to guarantee Senate representation for w om en o r other social groups, and instead focused on increased regional representation. T h e one excep tion was a proposal for guaranteed A boriginal seats. However, the Accord allowed each province to decide how its senators w ould be elected, and three o f the ten provincial prem iers im m ediately said they w ould pass provincial legislation requiring that 50 per cent o f the Senate seats from their province be reserved for w om en. A lthough the Accord was defeated, it seems likely that any future proposal for Senate reform will have to address group as well as regional representation. 3. W h y G ro u p R e p r e s e n t a t io n ? T he idea that the existing political system is ‘unrepresentative’ is w ide spread. B ut w hat exacdy does this mean? W hile the eleven w hite m en w ho negotiated C harlottetow n were n o t demographically representative o f the population at large, they were the elected representatives o f the population at large, and in m any cases had broad electoral support from m inority and disadvantaged groups. T h e claim that m inority groups were n o t represent ed in the negotiations, therefore, seems to presuppose that people can be fully ‘represented’ only by som eone w ho shares their gender, class, ethnic ity, language, etc. This idea is som etim es referred to as ‘m irror representation’: a legisla ture is said to be representative o f the general public if it m irrors the eth nic, gender, and class characteristics o f the public. O r, to put it another way, a group o f citizens is represented in a legislature if one o r m ore o f the assembly’s m em bers are the same sort o f people as the citizens.“ This idea contrasts w ith the m ore familiar principle that defines representation in term s o f the procedure by w hich office-holders are elected, rather than their personal attributes. O n this traditional view, a group o f citizens is rep resented in the legislature if they participated in the election o f one or
110
The Merits o f Multiculturaliam
m ore m em bers o f the assembly, even if the elected m em bers are very dif ferent from them in their personal characteristics. W hy are the personal characteristics o f representatives so im portant? Som e com m entators argue that people m ust share certain experiences or characteristics in order to truly understand each o th ers needs and interests. O n this view, a m an simply cannot know w hat is in the interests o f a w om an: ‘no am ount o f th o u g h t or sympathy, no m atter how careful or honest, can ju m p the barriers o f experience.’17This is a radical claim about the limits o f representation, and I will dispute it below. Nevertheless, it’s im portant to understand w hy questions about the personal characteristics o f representatives are so m uch m ore com m on now than in earlier left-w ing m ovem ents. This issue did n o t arise for traditional left parties, w hich focused on material interests o r social-dem ocratic ideology. To m em bers o f these parties, it did n o t seem very im portant that working-class people themselves serve as representatives o f the m ovem ent. T h e relevant question was simply w ho could best articulate the m ovem ent’s ideology and defend its interests. N o t surprisingly, highly educated academics, lawyers, clergy, and social workers have tended to dom inate the leadership o f traditional labour-based political parties. Identity groups, however, are n o t based on m aterial interests o r politi cal ideologies. R ather, as w e have seen, both ethnic and non-ethnic iden tity groups define themselves in term s o f culture, and em phasize com m unity and identity. This helps explains w hy the personal characteris tics o f representatives are so relevant in today’s social movem ents. W h en groups define themselves in term s o f a com m on sense o f ‘identity’ and ‘co m m unity’, and organize around the public recognition o f this identity, then it seems m ore plausible to say that only people w ho are actually m em bers o f the group should speak on its behalf. O n this view, to u nder stand w hy certain policies are, o r are not, acceptable to a group, it is not enough to understand econom ic theories or political ideologies; one must understand the lived experiences o f the group— the indignities it has suf fered and the hopes it clings to. This need for group-based representation leads to w hat A nne Phillips calls the ‘politics o f presence’, as distinct from an earlier ‘politics o f interests’ or ‘politics o f ideas’.18 A nother argum ent for focusing on the personal characteristics o f repre sentatives it that even if w hite m en can understand the interests o f Blacks o r w om en, they cannot be trusted to prom ote those interests. For exam ple, C hristine Boyle argues that because m e n ’s interests differ from w o m en ’s in term s o f incom e, discrim ination, legal rights, and child care, ‘it seems reasonable to conclude that it is impossible for m en to represent w om en.’T h e reason is n o t necessarily that m en d o n ’t understand w o m en ’s interests, but rather that ‘at some point m em bers o f one group feel that som eone belonging to another group has such a conflict o f interest that representation is impossible, or at least unlikely.’19 T h e same argum ent has been m ade in the context o f w hite representation o f African A m ericans.20
Towards a More Representative Democracy
111
T here is som e truth to b o th these arguments; ou r ability to p u t ourselves in o th er people’s shoes is lim ited, however sincerely we try— and m ost o f us are n o t willing to try terribly hard. N onetheless, the idea o f m irror rep resentation is seriously flawed, and few proponents o f group representation defend it as a general theory o f representation. For one thing, the idea that the legislature should m irror the general population, taken to its logical conclusion, leads away from electoral poli tics entirely towards selection o f representatives by lottery or random sam pling. As H anna Pitkin notes, ‘selection by lot, o r a controlled random sample, w ould be best calculated to produce the m icrocosm o f the w hole body o f the people.’21Yet m ost proponents o f group representation w ould see such a system as abandoning the dem ocratic principle that representa tives should be authorized by, and accountable to, the public. Second, the claim that m en cannot understand the needs and interests o f w om en, o r that w hites cannot understand the needs o f Blacks, can eas ily becom e an excuse for w hite m en not to try to understand or represent the needs o f others. This is precisely w hat critics say has happened in N ew Zealand, w here the M aori have been guaranteed certain seats in the Parliam ent and non-M aoris have interpreted this guarantee as absolving them o f any responsibility to take an interest in M aori affairs.22 T hird, the claim that m en cannot understand the interests o f w om en cuts both ways— im plying that w om en cannot understand and therefore repre sent m en. This idea (with w hich some m en may agree) carries w ith it the unattractive suggestion that m en were right, historically, to resist represen tation by w om en, and, m ore generally, that people can speak only for their ow n group. Some proponents o f group representation are willing to accept this result; according to Beverley Baines,‘if the tru th be know n, w om en [are not] particularly interested in representing m en.’23 Still, m ost proponents o f group representation do not favour ‘the kind o f politics in w hich people [are] elected only to speak for their ow n group identity o r interests’.24 T hese objections do n o t prove that the m em bers o f one group can in fact understand and therefore represent the interests o f the m em bers o f o th er groups w ho have significandy different experiences or characteris tics. B ut the claim that m em bers o f one group cannot represent m em bers o f o th er groups is surely too strong, for it m ust apply w ithin groups as well as betw een them . Every group has subgroups, each w ith its ow n distinctive experiences and characteristics. If m en cannot represent w om en, can w hite w om en represent w om en o f colour? A nd w ithin the category o f w om en o f colour, can Asian w om en represent A frican-C aribbean wom en?25 C an middle-class heterosexual able-bodied Asian w om en represent poor, les bian, or disabled Asian w om en? Taken to its logical conclusion, the princi ple o f m irror representation seems to underm ine the very possibility o f representation itself. If ‘no am ount o f thought or sympathy, no m atter how careful or honest, can ju m p the barriers o f experience’,26 how can anyone represent anyone else?
112
The Merits o f Multiculturaliam
These difficulties suggest that the idea o f m irror representation should be avoided as a general theory o f representation. N o doubt there are lim its to the extent to w hich people are able and willing to ‘ju m p the barri ers o f experience’. B ut the solution is n o t to accept those limits. R ath er we should fight against them , in order to create a political culture in w hich people are m ore able and m ore w illing to put themselves in other people’s shoes and truly understand (and therefore becom e able to represent) their needs and interests. This is no easy task. It w ould require changes to our education system, to the media portrayal o f various groups, and to the political process. A nd even then there w ould still be no guarantee that the m em bers o f one group w ould understand the needs o f another. B ut to renounce the possibility o f cross-group representation is to renounce the possibility o f a society in w hich citizens are com m itted to addressing each o th er’s needs and sharing each o th ers fate. T hus few proponents o f group representation endorse the idea o f m ir ror representation as a general theory o f representation. Instead, group rep resentation is defended on m ore contextual grounds, as an appropriate m echanism for representing certain groups under certain conditions. In the Canadian debate, these contextual argum ents for group representation fall into tw o m ajor categories: systemic discrim ination and self-governm ent. G roup representation rights are often defended as a response to some systemic disadvantage o r barrier in the political process that makes it impossible for the g ro u p ’s views and interests to be effectively represented. For example, Iris Young, w ritin g in the A m erican context, argues that spe cial representation rights should be extended to ‘oppressed groups’: In a society where some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, insisting that as citizens persons should leave behind their particular affilia tions and experiences to adopt a general point of view serves only to rein force the privilege; for the perspective and interests of the privileged will tend to dominate this unified public, marginalizing or silencing those of other groups.27 A ccording to Young, oppressed groups are at a disadvantage in the politi cal process, and ‘the solution lies at least in part in providing institutional ized means for the explicit recognition and representation o f oppressed groups.’28These measures w ould include public funds for advocacy groups, guaranteed representation in political bodies, and veto rights over specific policies that affect a group directly. T he point here is n o t that the legisla ture should m irror society, but rather that the historical dom ination o f some groups by others has left a trail o f barriers and prejudices that makes it difficult for historically disadvantaged groups to participate effectively in the political process.29 A version o f this argum ent for the group representation o f w om en in Canada was made by C hristine Boyle in 1983. She argued that the 65 years
Towards a More Representative Democracy
113
o f experience since w om en obtained the vote have shown that ‘the inclu sion o f w om en into a system that was developed by m en for use by m e n ’ does n o t provide adequate representation for w o m en ’s interests.30 Because the system was ‘developed by m en for use by m en ’, w om en are at a disad vantage w ith respect to their ability to participate (e.g., because o f their family responsibilities) and to get their perspectives taken seriously (e.g., because o f sexist prejudice and stereotypes). G uaranteed seats for w om en w ould lead to real ‘pow er-sharing’ betw een m en and w om en. This in tu rn w ould lead to various systemic reforms, so that one day the system could be seen as one developed by both m en and w om en for use by both m en and w om en. Insofar as guarantees o f group representation are adopted as a response to oppression or systemic disadvantage, they are m ost plausibly seen as tem porary measures on the way to a society w here the need for special representation w ould no longer exist— as a form o f political ‘affirmative action’. Society should seek to remove the oppression and disadvantage, thereby elim inating the need for these guarantees. In Canada, however, the issue is com plicated by the fact that special representation for groups is som etim es defended n o t on grounds o f overcom ing systemic discrim ina tion, but as a corollary o f the right to self-governm ent. As I noted in the introduction, the term ‘self-governm ent rights’ refers to demands by A boriginal peoples and the Q uébécois to govern themselves in certain key matters so as to ensure the full and free developm ent o f their cultures in the best interests o f their people. Self-governm ent w ould set limits on the authority o f the central governm ent over Q uebec or A boriginal reserves. A nd as we will see in Part 2, these limits m ight be asymmetrical: that is, full recognition o f rights to self-governm ent m ight m ean that some federal laws that apply elsewhere in Canada w ould n o t apply to Q uebec o r to A boriginal com m unities. Such limits on federal authority are not seen as a tem porary measure, n o r as a rem edy for a form o f oppression that we m ight (and ought) someday to eliminate. O n the contrary, the right o f selfgovernm ent is often described as ‘in h erent’, and thus perm anent (w hich is one reason why supporters o f self-governm ent seek to have recognition entrenched at the constitutional level). I will explore the logic and dynamics o f self-governm ent claims in C hapters 9 to 13. T h e question here, however, is the relationship betw een self-governm ent and guaranteed representation. This connection is quite com plicated, and adds a new dim ension to the m ore familiar debate over group representation as a rem edy for discrim ination. O n the one hand, insofar as it would reduce the jurisdiction o f the federal governm ent over Q uebec or A boriginal reserves, self-governm ent seems to entail reduced influence (at least on certain issues) at the federal level for the self-govern ing group. For example, if self-governm ent for the Q uébécois leads to the asymm etrical transfer o f powers from O ttaw a to Q uebec, so that the fed eral governm ent w ould be passing laws that w ould n o t apply to Q uebec,
114
The Merits o f Multiculturaliam
it seems only fair that Q uebecers n o t have a vote on such legislation (par ticularly if they could cast the deciding vote). It w ould seem unfair for Q uebec MPs to decide federal legislation on im m igration if the legislation does n o t apply to Q uebec. T h e same principle w ould apply to any A boriginal MPs elected by specially created A boriginal districts voting on legislation from w hich A boriginal people w ould be exem pt. O n the other hand, the right to self-governm ent does entail the right to guaranteed representation on any body that can interpret or modify these powers o f self-government. It w ould seem to be a corollary o f self-governm ent that Q uebec, for example, be guaranteed representation on the Supreme C ourt, since the Supreme C o u rt resolves conflicts over the divi sion o f powers betw een the federal governm ent and Q uebec. And indeed Q uebec is guaranteed three o f the nine seats on the C ourt. Similarly, Aboriginal people insist that they be represented on any judicial bodies (e.g., land claims courts) that resolve disputes over their self-governm ent rights.31 To oversimplify, then, self-governm ent entails guaranteed representation on judicial or inter-governmental bodies that negotiate, interpret, o r modify the division o f powers, but reduced representation on federal bodies that legislate in areas o f purely federal jurisdiction.32 It is a mistake, therefore, to argue (as the B eaudoin-D obbie Com m ission did) that ‘guaranteed aborig inal representation in the Canadian Senate will be a logical extension o f aboriginal self-governm ent.’33 If anything, the logical consequence o f selfgovernm ent is reduced representation. T h e right to self-governm ent is a right against the authority o f the federal governm ent, n o t a right to special influence in the exercise o f that authority. It is for this reason that some Indians w ho support self-governm ent oppose guaranteed representation in the C om m ons, since this m ight give the central governm ent the idea that it has the right to govern Indian com m unities.34 O f course, Aboriginals may also claim special representation in the fed eral legislature on grounds o f systemic disadvantage. Claims o f an inherent right to self-governm ent do not preclude claims based on tem porary dis advantage. However, it is im portant to know w hich claim is being made, since they apply w ith different force to different governm ental bodies, over different tim e-fram es, and to different subgroups w ithin A boriginal com m unities.35 Since the claims o f self-governm ent are seen as inherent and perm anent, so too are the guarantees o f representation that follow from that self-governm ent, w hereas claims based on disadvantage are in princi ple temporary. 4. EVALUATING GROUP REPRESENTATION I have tried to show that the idea o f group representation cannot be dis missed. It has im portant continuities w ith existing practices o f representa tion in Canada, and w hile the general principle o f m irror representation is untenable, there are tw o contextual argum ents that can justify certain lim
Towards a More Representative Democracy
115
ited form s o f group representation under certain circumstances: namely, overcom ing systemic disadvantage and securing self-governm ent. These argum ents provide grounds for thinking that group representation can play an im portant, if lim ited, role w ithin the system o f representative dem ocra cy in Canada. However, any proposal for group-based representation must answer a num ber o f difficult questions. In this final section, I will simply flag some o f these questions, to indicate the sorts o f issues that need to be addressed w hen developing or evaluating any specific proposal for group representation.
W h ich g ro u p s should be rep resen te d ? H ow do we decide w hich groups, if any, should be entitled to group-based representation? M any critics o f group representation believe that this is an unanswerable question— or rather, that any answer to it will be arbitrary and unprincipled. B ut the argum ents above suggest that there are ways o f draw ing principled distinctions betw een various groups. A group has a claim to representation if it m eets one o f tw o criteria: either (a) its m em bers are subject to systemic disadvantage in the political process or (b) its m em bers have a claim to self-governm ent. O f these two criteria, self-governm ent is the easier to apply. In Canada, only A boriginal peoples and the Q uébécois form ed self-governing nations prio r to their incorporation into Canada. T he criterion o f systemic disad vantage is m ore com plicated. M any groups claim to be disadvantaged in some respect, even though they may be privileged in others, and it is n o t clear how we can measure overall levels o f disadvantage. A ccording to Iris Y oung,‘O n ce we are clear that the principle o f group representation refers only to oppressed social groups, then the fear o f an unw orkable prolifera tion o f group representation should dissipate.’36 However, her list o f ‘oppressed groups’ in the U n ited States appears to include four-fifths o f the population. As she puts it elsew here,‘in the U n ited States today, at least the follow ing groups are oppressed in one or m ore o f these ways: w om en, blacks, Native Am ericans, Chicanos, P uerto R icans and other Spanish speaking Americans, Asian Am ericans, gay m en, lesbians, working-class people, p o o r people, old people, and m entally and physically disabled peo ple’37— in short, everyone but relatively well-off, relatively young, ablebodied, heterosexual w hite males. Even if the list o f oppressed groups were shorter, it is hard to see how Y oung’s criterio n w ould avoid an ‘unw orkable proliferation’, since each o f these groups has subgroups that m ight claim their ow n rights. In the case o f B ritain, the category o f ‘B lack’ people obscures deep divisions betw een the Asian and A fro-C aribbean com m unities, each o f w hich in tu rn can be broken dow n into finer distinctions betw een m any different ethnic groups. G iven the alm ost endless capacity for fragm entation, vve m ight ask, w ith Phillips, ‘W h at in this context th en counts as “adequate” ethnic representation?’38
116
The Merits o f Multiculturaliam
O n the other hand, as Young notes, m any political parties and trade unions have allowed for special group representation w ithout entering a spiral o f increasing (and increasingly fragmented) demands. '9 In addition, we already have some experience w ith this issue in the context o f affirmative action programs,4" and the Supreme C o u rt already faces the task o f devel oping criteria for identifying historically disadvantaged groups in interpret ing section 15(2) o f the C harter o f R ights and Freedoms.41 T h e problem is formidable— and certainly none o f the proposals for group representation to date has addressed it in a satisfactory way— but it is not unique to issues o f political representation, and it may not be avoidable in a country w ith C anadas political and legal com m itm ent to redressing injustice. Generally speaking, w hite ethnic groups have show n litde interest in group representation. T hey prefer to w ork w ithin existing political parties to make them m ore inclusive, rather than try to get guaranteed seats in leg islation.42This is n ot surprising, since statistics show that they are n o t in fact disadvantaged in the political process. Visible m inorities, however, w h o are clearly under-represented in Parliam ent, have expressed interest in the idea o f group representation.
H ow m a n y seats shou ld a g ro u p have? If certain groups do need special group-based representation, how many seats should they have? T here are tw o com m on answers to this question that are often conflated but should be kept distinct, since they lead in dif ferent directions. O n e view is that a group should be represented in pro portion to its num bers in the population at large. For example, NAC proposed that w om en be guaranteed 50 per cent o f Senate seats (w om en made up 50.7 per cent o f the population in the 1991 Census). T he second view is that there should be a threshold num ber o f representatives, sufficient to ensure that the g ro u p ’s views and interests are effectively expressed. T h e first view follows naturally from a com m itm ent to the general principle o f m irror representation; but, as w e’ve seen, m ost proponents o f group representation do n o t em brace that principle. And once we drop the idea o f m irror representation in general, there seem to be no grounds for dem anding exactly proportional representation rather than a threshold level. For example, A nne Phillips rejects the underlying premise o f m irror representation that one has to be a m em ber o f a particular group in order to understand o r represent that g roup’s interests. However, she goes on to say that ‘in querying the notion that only the m em bers o f particular disad vantaged groups can understand or represent their interests [one] m ight usefully tu rn this question round and ask w hether such understanding or representation is possible w ith o u t the presence o f any m em bers o f the dis advantaged groups’.4’ H er argum ent is that w ith o u t a threshold num ber o f seats, others will not be able to understand, and so be able to represent, the interests o f a disadvantaged group. In practice, the rule o f a threshold num ber o f seats may lead to results
Towards a More Representative D em ocrat
117
quite different from exact proportional electoral representation. In the case o f w om en, the threshold num ber o f seats necessary to effectively present w o m en s views is arguably less than the proportional num ber o f seats. T he president o f NAC defended the guarantee o f 50 per cent Senate seats for w om en on the ground that this w ould ensure w om en a ‘place at the table’44; that is, she dem anded proportional representation, but defended it in term s o f the need for threshold representation. B ut does having a place at the table require having half o f all the places? In o th er cases, however, the threshold num ber o f seats necessary for effective representation may be greater than the proportional num ber. Evidence suggests that if there are only one o r tw o m em bers from a m ar ginalized or disadvantaged group in a legislative assembly or com m ittee, they are likely to be excluded, and their voices ignored.45T hus proportional representation for some disadvantaged groups, such as A boriginal people or visible m inorities, is likely to am ount to only such token representation. T he num ber o f seats necessary for effective presentation o f their views, therefore, may exceed the num ber o f seats required for proportional elec toral representation. Given these possible divergences betw een the tw o goals o f threshold and fully proportional representation, proponents o f group representation m ust decide w hich is truly im portant.46
H o w a re g ro u p re p re s e n ta tiv e s held a c c o u n ta b le ? W hat accountability mechanisms can be p u t in place to ensure that the MPs o r senators w h o hold reserved seats in fact serve the interests o f the groups they are supposed to represent? H ow do we ensure that group ‘rep resentatives’ are in fact accountable to the group? H ere again we need to distinguish two very different answers. R ec en t proposals for guaranteed A boriginal representation, based on the M aori m odel in N ew Zealand, involve setting up a separate electoral list for A boriginal people, so that some MPs or senators are elected solely by A boriginal voters.47This m odel o f group representation does n o t try to specify the characteristics o f the candidate; it is possible, if unlikely, that A boriginal voters w ould elect a w hite MP. W hat m atters here is n o t w h o is elected, but how: an MP elect ed by Aboriginal people w ould be accountable to them . Such proposals recall the practice, discussed earlier, o f drawing con stituency boundaries so that they largely coincide w ith a ‘com m unity o f interest’. It is safe to assume that these com m unities will tend to use their electoral strength to elect ‘one o f their o w n ’. B ut they can, and sometimes do, elect som eone w ho is n o t a m em ber o f their group. This does n o t u nderm ine the value o f accom m odating com m unities o f interest, because the justification for the practice is n o t m irror representation (which could be secured by a lottery o r random sample). R ather, the justification is to prom ote the representation o f the g roup’s interests by m aking an MP accountable to the com m unity. In the US, some defenders o f ‘affirmative gerrym andering’— a process used to create districts w ith a Black or
118
The Merits o f Multiculturaliam
Hispanic m ajority— insist that they are m ore interested in accountability than m irror representation: affirmative gerrymandering is, in my view, misconceived if it is seen as a mechanism to guarantee that blacks will be represented by blacks, Hispanics by Hispanics, and whites by whites; rather, the proper use of affirmative ger rymandering is to guarantee that important groups in the population will not be substantially impaired in their ability to elect representatives of their choice.4» T h e M aori m odel attem pts to provide the same sort o f accountability for smaller or m ore territorially dispersed groups. In m ost proposals for group representation, however, there are no sepa rate electoral lists. M ost proposals focus entirely on the characteristics o f the candidates rather than the characteristics o f the electorate. For exam ple, w hile the NAC proposal required that 50 per cent o f senators be w om en, they w ould be chosen by the general electorate, w hich contains as m any m en as w om en. A nd w hile the NAC proposal w ould guarantee a pro portional num ber o f seats for visible m inorities, these senators too w ould be chosen by the general electorate, w hich is predom inandy white. In this m odel, group representation means having MPs o r senators w ho belong to a particular group, even tho u g h they are n o t elected by that group. It is unclear, however, in w hat sense this is a form o f representation, for there are no m echanisms in this m odel for establishing w hat each group wants, o r for ensuring that the ‘representatives’ o f the group act in accor dance w ith w hat the group wants. T h e representative is n o t accountable to the group, and so may simply ignore its views. Indeed, given that the gro u p ’s ‘representatives’ are chosen by the general electorate, it m ight be unwise for representatives to act in ways that displease dom inant groups. As Phillips puts it,‘A ccountability is always the other side o f representation, and, in the absence o f procedures for establishing w hat any group wants or thinks, we cannot usefully talk o f their political representation.N9 In o th er words, guaranteed seats w ould n o t ensure that w om en’s inter ests o r needs or perspectives were ‘represented’.T h e idea that the presence o f w om en senators w ould by itself ensure the representation o f w o m en ’s interests, even in the absence o f any electoral accountability, makes sense only if one thinks that there is ‘som e fundam ental unity betw een w om en, some essential set o f experiences and interests that can be represented by any interchangeable com bination o f w o m en ’.50 This is implausible, not only in the case o f w om en, b u t also in the case o f ethnic, national, or racial m inorities, given the heterogeneity o f interests and perspectives w ithin each o f these groups. So here again we have conflicting models based on conflicting ideals. T h e A boriginal m odel guarantees that som e representatives w ould be accountable solely to A boriginal voters, although it does n o t guarantee that
Towards a More Representative Democracy
119
the representatives themselves w ould be A boriginal— that the representa tive w ould ‘m irror’ the electorate. T h e NAC m odel guarantees that repre sentatives w ould m irror im portant groups in the electorate, but it does not guarantee that the representatives w ould be accountable to the group they m irror. O f course, m any proponents o f guaranteed representation for w om en firmly believe in the need for accountability, and w ould like to find some way o f m aking sure that w om en representatives are accountable to w om en. To date, however, the ideals o f m irror representation and dem oc ratic accountability have n o t yet been adequately integrated. Even if these problems can be solved, critics o f group representation will object that institutionalizing group differences, and ascribing political salience to them , w ould have serious im plications for C anadian unity.They believe it w ould encourage a ‘politics o f grievance’, or a ‘mosaic madness’, and inhibit the developm ent o f a shared sense o f citizenship and national purpose. Critics have claim ed that group representation w ould be a source o f disunity that could lead to the dissolution o f the country, or, less drasti cally, to a reduced willingness to make the m utual sacrifices and accom m odations necessary for a functioning democracy. However, we need to keep in m ind the distinction betw een the tw o grounds for special representation: systemic disadvantage and self-govern m ent. Generally speaking, the dem and for representation rights by disad vantaged groups is a dem and for inclusion. Groups that feel excluded w ant to be included in the larger political process, and group representation is intended to facilitate this. As w e’ve seen, this sort o f special representation can be considered an extension o f the long-standing practice o f defining geographic constituencies in such a way as to ensure representation o f ‘com m unities o f interest’. It can also be seen as an extension o f the tradi tion o f giving smaller regions extra seats in the Senate. These practices are n o t seen as threats to national unity. O n the contrary, they are rightly seen as p rom oting civic participation and political legitimacy, and as alleviating the ‘sense o f injustice’ that arises w hen com m unities and regions lack effec tive representation.51W hy then should guaranteed representation for n o n territorial com m unities o f interest be regarded as a threat to unity, rather than as evidence o f a desire for integration? Claims based on self-governm ent, by contrast, are n o t aim ed at integra tion, b ut rather at preserving a separate and culturally distinct society. W hereas demands for representation by disadvantaged groups seek greater inclusion into the larger political com m unity, dem ands for self-governm ent reflect a desire to w eaken the bonds w ith the larger com munity, and to assert the prim acy and inherence o f the m in o rity ’s national rights. B ut w hile claims o f self-governm ent raise deep problems for social unity, w hich I will discuss at length in Part 2, it appears that the particular aspect o f self-governm ent we are considering here— guaranteed represen tation at the federal o r inter-governm ental level— clearly serves a unifying function. T h e existence o f such group representation helps reduce the
120
The Merits o f Multiculturaliam
threat o f self-governm ent, by reconnecting the self-governing com m unity to the larger federation. It is a form o f connection that remains, and can be draw n upon, w hen o th er connections are being weakened. This is true, I think, o f Q u eb ec’s representation on the Suprem e C o u rt, and o f proposals for Aboriginal representation in the Senate. 5. C o n c l u s io n Any proposal for group representation m ust answer the difficult questions o f how to identify the truly disadvantaged groups and how to hold their ‘representatives’ accountable. T h e debate in Canada has barely begun to address these questions, but they need to be exam ined seriously because dem ands for group representation will n o t go away. Proponents o f group representation appeal to some o f the m ost basic practices and principles o f Canadian representative dem ocracy to defend their proposals, and some form s o f group representation may be able to play an im portant, if lim it ed, role w ithin the C anadian political system. O f course, issues o f representation cannot be reduced to the com posi tion o f the legislature. R epresentation in the H ouse o f C om m ons or Senate needs to be situated w ithin the context o f other mechanisms for representing the views or interests o f a group, such as legal challenges to unfavourable legislation in the courts and interest-group advocacy. Any assessment o f the need for group representation m ust take these alternative routes to representation into account. Yet m any o f the barriers that affect w om en, visible m inorities, and o th er disadvantaged groups in the electoral process also affect their access to these alternative m echanisms o f represen tation. M oreover, Parliam ent has a special symbolic role in representing the citizens o f the country. Citizens w ho do n o t see themselves reflected in Parliam ent may becom e alienated from the political process and question its legitimacy.52 If n o t the only route to representation, legislative represen tation is a uniquely im portant one. T hat is a rather vague conclusion, I’m afraid, and I have not tried to define or defend any specific m odel o f group representation. Indeed, it may n o t be possible to say m uch m ore at the general level. D em ocracy involves a com m itm ent to the principle o f political equality, b ut it is n o t possible to deduce the single best system o f representation from that abstract princi ple.53T here are m any ways o f achieving political equality, and the results of particular electoral mechanisms are notoriously context-specific. All I have tried to show in this chapter is that group representation is not inherently illiberal o r undem ocratic. It is a plausible extension o f ou r existing dem o cratic traditions, and there may be some circumstances in w hich it is the m ost appropriate way to ensure an adequate voice for m inority interests and perspectives. Since it is vital that m inorities have a fair hearing in the political process, proposals for group representation themselves deserve a fair hearing.
►
A Truce in the Multiculturalism Wars?
*
T he preceding chapters have covered a lot o f ground. If there is a single them e that unites them , however, it is that neither side in the debate over multiculturalism as it is currently being conducted has helped us to under stand the real issues. O n the one hand, increasing num ber o f critics argue that official m ul ticulturalism is encouraging ‘ghettoism ’ and ‘apartheid’ am ong ethnic groups in Canada, and im peding their integration into mainstream society. As w e’ve seen, there is no evidence to support this claim. A nd once we sit uate m ulticulturalism w ithin the larger context o f governm ent policies that influence ethnocultural relations, we can see that the claim is not just fac tually incorrect, but w rong in principle. W hy then have critics dismissed these policies so quickly, w ith o u t exam ining the evidence? T h e answer appears to be that they simply assume from the start that defenders o f m ulticulturalism are m otivated by w hat N eil Bissoondath calls a ‘psychology o f divisiveness w ith o u t limits’,1 or w hat R ich ard G w yn calls ‘the new cultural creeds’ o f'm o ral absolutism and cultural apartheid’.2 If one assumes that such divisiveness is the real m oti vation behind m ulticulturalism policies, then there is no need to check the evidence about their actual results: one can simply assume that such poli cies are by nature incapable o f prom oting integration. B oth these assumptions, o f course, are unfounded. T here is no evidence that Canadians today are m otivated by a psychology o f divisiveness w ith out limits o r a creed o f cultural apartheid. A nd there is positive evidence that ethnic groups are m ore thoroughly integrated into Canadian society today, in term s o f participation in com m on societal institutions and adher ence to com m on political values o f dem ocracy and individual rights, than they were before the adoption o f m ulticulturalism in 1971. Dem ands for m ulticultural accom m odations, o r proposals for new m ulticulturalism pro grams, are n o t manifestations o f an irrational virus o f ‘identity politics’ or w hat G w yn calls ‘identity anger’.3 T hey are serious attem pts to deal w ith serious issues: W hat are fair term s o f integration? H ow can we counteract the trend towards an oppositional subculture am ong Blacks? H ow can we make o u r dem ocracy m ore representative? N o t all o f the proposals I’ve dis-
122
The Merits o f Multiculturaliam
cussed are feasible o r desirable; I have tried to point o u t the lim itations and uncertainties involved. B ut they are w orthy o f genuine consideration as thoughtful attempts to deal w ith real problems in ways that are consistent w ith social integration, individual rights, and dem ocratic justice. O n the other hand, the defenders o f m ulticulturalism have been strangely inarticulate in explaining or justifying the policy. T hey have not explained the limits o f m ulticulturalism , in term s either o f social integra tion o r o f respect for individual rights. Even worse, they have responded to critics o f m ulticulturalism by accusing them o f intolerance, perhaps even racism. Such accusations are equally unfounded. Indeed, to say that critics o f m ulticulturalism are m otivated by intolerance is ju st as absurd as to say that defenders o f m ulticulturalism are m otivated by a psychology o f divi siveness. T h e fact is that m ost Canadians, including m ost critics o f m ulti culturalism, believe in tolerance and racial equality. B ut as Canadian citizens they have the right— and the responsibility— to ask hard questions about the limits o f diversity, and about the im pact o f m ulticulturalism on com m on values and institutions. A nd too often their valid questions have been ignored o r dismissed. T hus we have a debate in w hich m isinform ed critics and inarticulate defenders simply exchange equally unfounded accusations. Needless to say, it is impossible to make any progress w hen the debate is conducted in such term s, and nothing can be learned from it— except perhaps that Canadians have trouble listening to each other. I w ould like, therefore, to propose a truce in the w ar over m ulticulturalism .W hat we need is a new debate, on new terms. In particular, I w ould suggest the following. First, we should assume (until show n otherwise) that participants in the debate, on b o th sides, are reasonable. We should assume that Canadians share basic com m itm ents to social integration and liberaldem ocratic values, and we should interpret any dem ands o r questions they raise about m ulticulturalism in this light. We should assume that debates over m ulticulturalism are debates about how best to understand and inter pret these shared goals o f integration, hum an rights, and democracy. If som eone dem ands new m edia regulations regarding ethnic stereo types, then, we shouldn’t ju m p to the conclusion that, deep dow n, they believe in cultural apartheid. A nd if som eone questions w hether m ulticul turalism leads to clitoridectom y, we shouldn’t ju m p to the conclusion that they are racist and intolerant. N o d oubt there are a few people on both sides w h o are genuinely intolerant o r absolutist. B ut w e shouldn’t assume that in advance. We should begin w ith the assum ption that our fellow cit izens, on both sides o f the debate, have legitim ate concerns that deserve a fair hearing. Second, we should be m ore specific about the policy options. ‘M ulticulturalism ’ is an um brella term for a w ide range o f policies, and we need to be clear about w hich particular policy w e are criticizing or defending. A ccepting some o f these policies does n o t entail accepting all o f
A Truce in the Multiculturalism Wars?
123
them , and each should be assessed on its ow n merits. We also need to know m ore about w hat critics see as the alternatives to multiculturalism. H ow else m ight we ensure that the term s o f integration are fair? H ow else m ight we deal w ith disturbing trends in race relations? H ow can we make our dem ocratic system m ore representative? These questions are dealt w ith quite differently in Germany, France, and the U n ited States. If critics d o n ’t like the Canadian approach, w hat o th er models do they propose? W ith o u t some sense o f the alternatives, it is impossible to evaluate criticisms o f m ul ticulturalism. Finally, we should see w hat evidence is available on the im pact o f these different policies. As it happens, there is actually a great deal o f inform ation available. O n e o f the results o f the federal m ulticulturalism policy has been, in Freda H aw kins’ words, ‘a bonanza o f remarkable opportunities’ for soci ologists w orking in this area in Canada.4 Since the 1970s, governm ent funding has helped make ethnic relations one o f the m ost intensively stud ied aspects o f Canadian life, and there is now a large literature on m ulti culturalism and integration in C anada.5 M oreover, Statistics Canada, w hich is w idely recognized as the best governm ent statistics agency in the world, has excellent census data bearing on many o f these questions, data that are easily available in public libraries and now even on the Internet.6 We also have considerable evidence about the success o f other policy approaches in other jurisdictions; we know a great deal about w hat works and w hat doesn’t. O f course, looking up the evidence involves m ore w ork than arm chair speculation does. B ut at some point speculation m ust be tested against the facts. It seems that the usual standards o f objectivity and evidence are often not applied in m edia treatm ent o f m ulticulturalism . For example, ju st as I was finishing a draft o f this book, The Globe and Mail published a tw o-page feature story on m ulticulturalism that repeated virtually all the myths and m isconceptions outlined in earlier chapters, and described the policy as a failure w ithout citing any evidence.7 H ad this article been w ritten on any oth er public policy, surely the author w ould have been expected to pro vide some evidence for such a claim. D o n ’t the same standards apply to dis cussions o f m ulticulturalism policy? I am n o t encouraging m edia self-censorship on this issue; we have already had too m uch self-censorship about m ulticukuralism . N o r do I m ean to suggest that we should avoid dis cussing objections to m ulticulturalism . O n the contrary, w e should investi gate them — in o th er words, check the evidence. If we conducted the debate along these term s, I suspect that m ulti culturalism w ould em erge as a w ell-founded policy for m anaging e th n o cultural relations. O n the o th er hand, perhaps the debate will uncover o th er approaches that have proven m ore successful. If so, all the better. M y co n cern is less to defend m ulticulturalism per se than to get a m eaning ful debate going in w hich Canadians can discuss the real issues in an inform ed way.
Port Two
The U nhappy Marriage o f Federalism and N ationalism
ç-
►
- - - - - - - - - Chapter 9
Prologue: Taking Nationalism Seriously