Fighting Corruption in African Contexts : Our Collective Responsibility [1 ed.] 9781527554566, 9781527550391

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Fighting Corruption in African Contexts

Fighting Corruption in African Contexts: Our Collective Responsibility Edited by

Chris Jones, Pregala Pillay and Idayat Hassan

Fighting Corruption in African Contexts: Our Collective Responsibility Edited by Chris Jones, Pregala Pillay and Idayat Hassan This book first published 2020 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2020 by Chris Jones, Pregala Pillay, Idayat Hassan and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-5275-5039-7 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-5039-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Contributors ................................................................................. viii Acknowledgements ................................................................................... ix Foreword .................................................................................................... x Charity Hanene Nchimunya PART I 1. Ethics training at the level of Higher Education: The South African case............................................................................... 2 P. Pillay, E. A. Mantzaris and C. Mohamed Sayeed PART 2 2. The state of anti-corruption in Nigeria: 2015–2019 ............................. 22 Femi Badejo (Yintab Strategy Consults, Lagos, Nigeria) 3. The dignity of corruption? .................................................................... 37 Donald Katts (Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, South Africa) 4. The faces of corruption in Nigeria: Towards a new thinking in the reverse order ................................................................................... 52 Benson Igboin Adekunle (Ajasin University, Akungba-Akoko, Ondo State, Nigeria) PART 3 5. African Union and the political economy of corruption in Africa ........ 74 Samuel Oloruntoba (Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute, South Africa) 6. Framework for fighting corruption in the artificial intelligence age..... 93 Adeyinka Adedigba, Engr Folorunso and Abiodun Musa Aibinu

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PART 4 7. The challenges of autocratisation, impunity and corruption with reference to South Africa’s BRICS partners................................... 114 Chris Jones (Stellenbosch University, South Africa) 8. Perspectives on Sustainable Development Goal indicators to assess the impact of transnational fisheries crime on the blue economy and anti-corruption: The case of abalone in South Africa ...................... 133 Ivy Chen (Candidate attorney and research fellow in law and public policy) and C. de Coning (Professor Extraordinaire at the School of Government, University of the Western Cape and at the School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University, South Africa). 9. Corruption among youths aged 15–29 years in Nigeria: Its impact on our future ........................................................................................... 164 Arinola Bello (PANAFSTRAG, Nigeria) PART 5 10. Church and youth involvement in political violence: A need for reassessment for a better Nigeria ...................................................... 182 Ezekiel Kehinde Akano (Emmanuel Alayande College of Education, Oyo State, Nigeria) 11. An ethos of responsibility as a theological paradigm for anticorruption in Nigeria .............................................................................. 199 Kefas Umaru (Stellenbosch University, South Africa) 12. Christian activism as responsible citizenship: Towards an anticorruption discourse in African contexts ................................................ 214 Hassan Musa (ECWA Theological Seminary, Kagoro, Nigeria) 13. An Islamic perspective on corruption control in Nigeria.................. 224 Sajo Abdullahi Mohammed (University of Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria) 14. A Christian theological perspective on combatting corruption in Nigeria ................................................................................................ 236 Sunday Agang (ECWA Theological Seminary, Kagoro, Kaduna, Nigeria)

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PART 6 15. International Development Partnerships and the challenge of combating corruption in Nigeria ........................................................ 254 Kelechi Iwuamadi, Roland Okoli (University of Nigeria Nsukka, Nigeria) 16. Corruption versus probity, accountability and good governance: The place of literature and example of Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá in Ààre֌ -Àgò Aríkúye֌ rí ............................................................................ 272 Cornelius Onanuga (Tai Solarin College of Education, Omu-Ijebu, Nigeria) 17. Preventing and mitigating violence against women in Elections in Nigeria ................................................................................................ 284 Asmau Maikudi (INEC, Zamfara State, Nigeria) Addendum: Communique on the 2nd AU Anti-Corruption Conference (12-13, July 2019) .................................................................................. 296

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Editors Chris Jones Pregala Pillay Idayat Hassan

Co-Authors Adeyinka Adedigba Abiodun Musa Aibinu Sunday Agang Ezekiel Kehinde Akano Femi Badejo Arinola Bello Ivy Chen C de Coning Engr Folorunso Benson Igboin Kelechi Iwuamadi Chris Jones Donald Katts Asmau Maikudi Sajo Abdullahi Mohammed Evangelos Mantzaris Hassan Musa Charity Hanene Nchimunya Roland Okoli Samuel Oloruntoba Cornelius Onanuga Pregala Pillay Cheryl Mohamed Sayeed Kefas Umaru

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The realisation of a publication of this magnitude, is a team effort. We would like to extend our thanks to everyone who worked tirelessly to meet deadlines and produce chapters of high quality. Thank you for your willingness, ideas, time, academic skills and expertise to reflect on this highly relevant and urgent topic of fighting corruption in African contexts. For any book to be published, a lot of hard work is done behind the scenes. To all the members of the publishing team, for their kind and professional services as well their hard work and valuable input, a word of sincere gratitude. Thank you to Ginevra House for her very thorough proofreading of our manuscript. A word of sincere appreciation to the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), an Abuja-based policy advocacy and research organization with focus on deepening democracy and development in West Africa, of which Idayat Hassan is the director, Professor Pregala Pillay, and Mr. Naas van der Merwe (Ceres, South Africa) for their financial contributions towards this project. And lastly to my two co-editors, Pregala Pillay and Idayat Hassan, a word of deep appreciation. It was a blessing to work with you on this project. Thank you for all your support. Chris Jones

FOREWORD

“One finger cannot kill a louse” —African Proverb

Corruption, by its very nature and cross-border characteristics, is a very complex crime that requires concerted efforts from all stakeholders to fight it effectively. It is not possible for one individual, institution or sector to do so. And this, therefore, requires conscious decisions from all concerned to tackle it. As the above African Proverb suggests, lone and isolated efforts at fighting corruption will not work. From concerted efforts to report petty corruption to the passing of bills/legislation that curtail grand corruption and curb secrecy jurisdictions, everyone has a role to play. In recognition of this, and within the African context, the African Union has spelled out a framework for its people, institutions and networks to fight corruption in a holistic way. To enshrine the notion that fighting corruption is our collective responsibility, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC), as a normative framework, advocates for effective legal, institutional and policy interventions for combating corruption. In this regard, one of the objectives of the AUCPCC under Article 2 (3) is to “coordinate and harmonise the policies and legislation between State Parties for the purposes of prevention, detection, punishment and eradication of corruption on the continent”. The expectations are therefore that every African Union Member State and all State Parties to the Convention should work to ensure that policies and legislation are, to the greatest extent possible, coordinated in this common and collective battle against corruption. As the menace of corruption affects all the Member States and their citizens, albeit to varying degrees, the onus is on all of us, as Africans, to tackle it. In this regard, no one is exempt from this collective responsibility. At the apex of this collective responsibility lies a need for the demonstrable political will and moral leadership to fight corruption. Without this, efforts by other stakeholders will be in vain. This visible political will and leadership should inevitably be supported by effective legislation and strong institutional frameworks. It is abundantly clear that there can be no gains in the fight against corruption without strong and

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accountable institutions, as was aptly put by the 1992 Nobel Prize Laureate Rigoberta Menchu Tum, who observed that “without strong institutions, impunity becomes the very foundation upon which systems of corruption are built. And if impunity is not demolished, all efforts to bring corruption to an end are in vain”. Having effective legislation and strong institutional frameworks, in addition to demonstrated political will, is not enough by itself. It needs to be reinforced by an alert citizenry, investigative media houses, faithful clergy and responsible traditional leadership. Further, a vibrant and engaged youth cadre is an indispensable component in this collective action against corruption. In order to reach to this level, we need to start by inculcating ethical and moral values in our young generations, from as young as preschool age. From all these various dimensions, it is clear to see that for corruption to be effectively fought, we all need to be on board, each executing their responsibilities to the best of their abilities. I am certain that the various articles in this edition speak more of some of these dimensions of our collective responsibility to fight corruption and that they bring useful insights from which we can all benefit. In conclusion, as we strive towards the Africa we want, the Africa of Agenda 2063, let us each take it upon ourselves to contribute towards the fight against corruption in Africa. It is a common enemy which demands the concerted efforts of all stakeholders to fight it. It is our collective responsibility and we should not shy away from it. There are many avenues for each one of us to contribute to the fight against corruption, as it is agreed that it is a collective responsibility. It would be remiss of me if I ended this foreword without applauding the contributors and editors of this volume, who have once again shown us that there are plenty of ways we can all contribute to the fight against corruption. I salute them all for their individual stance against corruption and collective contribution in fighting it. Together we win! Charity Hanene Nchimunya Executive Secretary, African Union Advisory Board on Corruption

PART 1

CHAPTER 1 ETHICS TRAINING AT THE LEVEL OF HIGHER EDUCATION: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CASE P. PILLAY (ACCERUS, SCHOOL OF PUBLIC LEADERSHIP, STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY)

E. A. MANTZARIS (MANGOSUTHU UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY)

AND C. MOHAMED SAYEED (UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL)

Abstract There is almost unanimous agreement among political, administrative and private sector leadership figures throughout the world, that widespread corruption has become a structural rather than a functional reality and, that the struggle against it and its perpetrators, is as fundamental as the struggles for human rights and sustainable development. This means that the battle for honest and accountable governance is a struggle for democracy and against the lack of ethics and integrity among public servants and elected leaders. South Africa has been constantly in world news since 1994 because of its commitment to change. However, in the last ten years it has become the epicentre of corruption scandals in both the public and private sectors. This is despite the fact that there have been a number of measures implemented to combat corruption in all spheres of life through, among others, the promulgation of a rich and diversified legislation, the introduction of Treasury rules and regulations, an active Public Service Commission and a large number of anti-corruption agencies. Within this context, the debate over what contribution education, and especially higher education, can make as an important contributor to the struggle against corruption must be considered. This debate is aligned to questions about

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whether ethics pedagogy in higher education institutions is possible, and on how universities can prepare ethical future leaders through their academic qualifications for a career in the public service. The present contribution aims to expand the discourse on ethics within the university landscape, specifically within the South African context, and in so doing examines contemporary national and international Public Administration trends. This is done through a survey of diverse research in the academic literature, and a South African case study on the existing context of the nature and scale of corruption in South Africa. The chapter in its final analysis presents a holistic higher education programme on Ethics and Anti-Corruption for future use. Keywords: university; public sector; ethics; ethics education; corruption; integrity

Introduction There has been growing concern over the ethical behaviour of public servants in South Africa, Africa and internationally in recent years in response to the increase in corrupt incidents within the public sector. This raised awareness is linked to the rationale that an ethical and accountable public service is seen as instrumental in ensuring and enhancing democracy and good governance. This in turn raises the question whether ethics should be a key part of Public Administration curricula, as there is agreement that it will “offer an opportunity to raise the moral awareness, moral reasoning and moral quality of actions taken” by public officials (Mohamed Sayeed, 2016: 45; Beck, Montfort & Twijnstra 2010:22; Montfort, Beck, and Twijnstra 2013:119; Van der Merwe 2006:41–42). While there is recognition that ethics training will not completely eradicate corruption, it has shown to offer a strategy to increase awareness of roles, responsibilities (Beck et al. 2010:22; Montfort et al. 2012:119), and thus has the potential to promote an ethical and accountable public service. Within this context, higher education institutions potentially play a significant role in developing competent, capable and ethical public servants as a strategic stakeholder, in producing and disseminating knowledge through their curricula and engaging in research and innovation to tackle corruption. This key role cannot be underestimated as they are instrumental in producing the future leaders of a country, by engaging in the teaching and learning of its politicians and its public servants, who are most likely to be educated and trained in such educational institutions. While South Africa remains at an elementary level of development with regards to ethics in the public sector, the authors seek

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to investigate the teaching of ethics at higher education institutions in South Africa. The chapter starts with a short exploration of corruption in South Africa and a dissection of the significance of the theory and practice of moral development in relation to ethics, professional ethics and ethics within a public administration environment. It goes on to empirically examine existing programmes in South African universities and maps out a possible holistic higher education programme on Ethics and Anti-Corruption for future use.

The context: corruption in South Africa It has been calculated that South Africa has lost in excess of R700 billion to corruption in the last 21 years. Over R30 billion is lost every year from government coffers through its tendering system (Mantzaris 2015). It has been widely acknowledged that in the 25 years of the country’s democracy, South Africa has become one of the most corrupt societies in the world. This is despite the fact that the new democratic government has, over the years, introduced a highly comprehensive legislative and regulatory framework to guard against corruption, and has also put in place a multiple anti-corruption agencies system (Pillay and Isaacs 2015). The laws of the country have introduced a wide range of initiatives against corruption, including: constitutional institutions, namely the Auditor-General South Africa (AGSA), the Public Protector (PP) and the Public Service Commission (PSC); National Treasury bodies – the National Treasury (NT), the South African Receiver of Revenue (SARS) and the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC); and a wide variety of enforcement and investigation agencies such as the South African Police Service (SAPS), the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations (DPCI), the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), the Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU) and the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) (Woods and Mantzaris 2012). Despite these efforts, corruption has escalated. Over these two-and-a-half decades of democracy, there has been an extremely wide range of corrupt practices throughout the public and private sector terrains, including supply chain and procurement fraud, bribery, nepotism and the systemic looting of public funds. These well-reported acts have been seriously exacerbated by a chronic lack of central coordination of the agencies’ activities, perpetual infighting and corrupt leadership (Mantzaris 2018).

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It has been shown fairly conclusively that organisational ethics, accountability, openness and transparency are essential elements in the fight against corruption. The embedding of these features must be rooted in carefully planned and implemented policies to modify behaviour and bring about positive change in organisational culture to ensure the practice of good governance. The actions of key figures within an institution – for example, their attitude, leadership, management skills, experience and know-how – are critical to the success of policies aimed at pushing out corruption (Woods and Mantzaris 2012:112-123). This is where the role of teaching and training in ethics, ethical behaviour and the systems and components that support ethical organisations come into consideration.

Public service accountability, ethics and Kohlberg’s theory of moral development Hejka-Ekins (1988:885) correctly asserted that Woodrow Wilson’s politico-administrative dichotomy gave the illusion of a value-neutral public servant who was removed from “substantive value judgments resulting in a chronic neglect of the ethical foundations of the field and the absence of a coherent system of ethical standards to ground the administrative role”. The rise in the discretionary powers of public servants post-World War II increased concerns over public service ethics and was given further emphasis through the rationale of New Public Administration. The ethical and professional legitimacy of public servants thus has, over the years, been largely associated with the extent to which they are able to perform and be accountable. This is considered a critical part of reinforcing democracy and ensuring good governance within a country. There is, however, a growing concern amongst academics that a lack of ethics amongst public servants is the cause of large-scale corruption within South Africa, despite extensive legislative frameworks that guide the actions and activities of public administrators (Mantzaris 2018:277). We draw here upon Kohlberg’s theory, which defines three stages of morality, each split into two sub-levels, giving a total of six sub-levels. Stage one, “pre-conventional morality”, consists of: i) the “obedience and punishment orientation” where the “authority” sets fixed rules that ought to be strictly obeyed and morality is something “outside the individual”; and ii) the “self-interest” level, which is related to individualism and exchange, and involves recognition that there is not simply one correct view

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determined by the authority, but rather different opinions, attitudes and ideas amongst different individuals. Stage two, “conventional morality”, begins with iii) “good interpersonal relations” – the level at which young children start relating morality to their own relations with family, community and society, and come to see themselves as carriers of good feelings and honesty, able to live a life guided by good motives. The next level within stage two refers to iv) “maintaining the social order”, when there is a turn towards society as a whole. The individual comes to understand the societal rules and regulations associated with the legal system that must be obeyed, coupled with respect towards authority. This helps to maintain the social order and is achieved through honest and law-abiding behaviour. Stage three, “post-conventional morality”, begins with v) the “social contract and individual rights”, whereby people wish to live in a wellfunctioning society, even in cases where this might not necessarily be a “good society”, as the examples of Germany’s National Socialism and Russia’s authoritarian Communism have conclusively shown. In this context, a “good society” refers to the social contract, under which most people work for the “common good” despite the existence of economic, political or social differences. The “societal balance” in this instance is based on the existence of basic rights, such as freedom and respect for human life, fair and honest laws, and democracy. The second level of post-conventional morality is couched in terms of vi) “universal principles” according to which people, through the protection of human rights and the activation and maintenance of democratic processes, work towards the realisation of a “good society” that is based on the moral/ethical theories of philosophers such as Kant or Rawls (Crain 1985; Rest, Barnett, Bebeau, Deemer, Getz, Moon, Spickelmeier, Thoma, and Volker 1986; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma 1999). Within this context, it should be noted that Kohlberg’s theory has not been immune to criticism, especially with respect to its methodological omissions (Rest et al. 1986; Rest et al. 1999). However, it is used here because of the significance of its focus on moral development in a psychological Piagetian paradigm that resonates with what has been called the “public sociology of ethics” (Mantzaris 2013). Kohlberg’s understanding and analysis of moral thinking has opened (or re-opened) significant debates that have been raging for decades and that continue even today, albeit without the intensity of the past.

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This important contribution cannot be understood or implemented without a clear understanding of ethics.

Ethics Menzel (1997:11) notes that “to act ethically has been at the core of modern public administration ever since Woodrow Wilson issued his call for a “civil service cultured and self-sufficient enough to act with sense and vigour”. For Wilson, public servants are required to act in two complementary ways, namely, competently and responsibly. Within this perspective, Menzel (1997:11) suggests that an incompetent public servant is as unethical as an irresponsible one. The responsibility of preparing public servants to be competent and responsible within South Africa lies in the hands of higher education institutions. Menzel (1997b:224) notes that the idea of “getting the job done right meant for all practical purposes doing what was right or ethical”. For Stillman (1991), this meant being efficient, economic and effective. In an age of governance, public administrators are increasingly being called upon to analyse the normative and ethical implications of the decisions that they take. According to Pickus (2002:10), “it has become increasingly clear that the model of bureaucratic obedience and rationality that formerly characterised public administration has reached its limits. Ethical criteria are now as relevant to the decision-making of policy experts and administrative elites as they are to individuals serving in a more purely political capacity”.

Professional ethics Josephson (1989:2) described ethics as a “system or code of conduct based upon universal moral duties and obligations which indicate how one should behave; it deals with the ability to distinguish good from evil, right from wrong and propriety from impropriety”. Within this perspective, professional ethics thus provides a system of behaviour and norms governing how individuals ought to respond in various situations. Within public administration, public servants are guided by professional ethics and by citizens who interpret situations and make judgments based upon their personal ethics. The debates regarding the similarities and differences between personal and professional ethics continue, but within today’s challenging and multi-faceted societies these need to be set in their appropriate context. Personal ethics are the values, behaviours, attitudes and

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actions of an individual shaped by socialisation, culture, history and traditions that determine his/her codes of conduct. In this context, it has been widely accepted that family-based, educational and cultural socialisation are builders of respect, honest behaviour, responsibility, zest for knowledge and commitment. Such virtues or personal ethics have positive behavioural effects in a professional situation (Waibl and Herdina 1997:17). Professional ethics, on the other hand, essentially refers to the organisational codes of conduct upon which ethical and moral values and principles are rooted, and which each and every employee is obligated to respect and obey (Chadwick 1997:24). Adherence to professional ethics is based on the employee’s obligation to the public, because he/she must follow the dictates of the ethical code of conduct as the foundation of a solidly built and maintained professional environment, based on discipline, honesty, accountability and mutual respect. In such a setting, confidentiality, fairness, transparency and proficiency are considered key elements of ethical governance (Almond 1996:12). It is understood that both private and public sector organisations are governed by laws, rules, regulations, policies and procedures intended to ensure that leaders, managers and senior members, as well as everyone else in the entity, acts with the utmost integrity, objectivity and independence. All activities are thus guided by ethical codes of conduct that set up processes and procedures that can be assessed and monitored by specifically designated sections and leaders whose key responsibility is to ensure the implementation of and compliance with these policies and procedures meets the prescribed ethical standards.

Public Administration ethics Goss (1996:594) calls for a “congruency” between the ethical values of citizens, politicians and public servants if successful public administration is to be achieved. Public administration ethics cannot be visualised without planning and implementing a well-structured ethics management policy and programme epitomised by a code of ethics. It should be understood that a “code of ethics” cannot guarantee ethical behaviour unless the existing relationships within an organisation are determined by moral supervisory practices, appropriate leadership and managerial behaviour, and the existence of steady internal and external forces and influences. Such forces include the political, social and economic environments and the relationships amongst stakeholders and role players (Richter and Burke 2007:67). Such relations are determined, to a large extent, by attitudes and

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behaviours among leaders and decision-makers that lead to the erosion of power-struggle dynamics within the internal decision-making structure, and that underline the degree to which employees bear moral responsibilities (McDonald and Nijhof 1999:140–141). There is no possibility for ethical behaviour to exist within an organisation without a commensurate awareness of ethical issues, their dimensions, processes and outcomes. Awareness is the root of responsibility and accountability on the part of individuals. It is cemented by ethical reasoning, which leads to ethical consciousness coupled with the acquisition of appropriate knowledge and skills. This is the foundation upon which ethical action can take place without fear or favour (Hoffman 1994). Ethics programmes and codes of conduct cannot be operationally functional without a set of well-defined indicators and systems that are designed around a formal decision-making process that identifies duties, responsibilities and directives, resources, information, equipment and timeframes. The lack or absence of resources can negatively impact on the ability to act ethically (McDonald and Nijhof 1999:141). Public administrative leaders are the prime implementers of existing laws, policies, rules and regulations, bearing key responsibility for the promotion of ethical behaviour. It is for them to set a living example by maintaining high moral and ethical standards and embodying the organisational code of ethics. This “living document” is not only the foundation of implementing ethical employment conditions, but an issue of “transformed living” (Frey 2004:19). Leaders are under an obligation to enhance professionalism and ethics in the working environment through addressing ethical dilemmas on an on-going basis and responding systematically to those breaches of ethics which do arise. It is also their responsibility to establish administrative processes and identify roles that facilitate the management of professional ethics, as well as to provide for the continuous assessment and evaluation of ethics and ethical behaviour within their organisation (Icheku 2011:32). The creation of an ethics committee in conjunction with an ombudsperson, especially in the public sector, can be instrumental in planning, designing and implementing an ethics management programme. The committee’s roles might include training on policies and procedures, and the resolution of ethical dilemmas (Woods and Mantzaris 2012). Ethics are crucial for public administration because they are both the basis of and are determined by public trust. This means that public-sector leaders, managers and employees have a responsibility to citizens and the government to be honest,

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accountable, respectful and loyal to the people and the laws, rules and regulations, and to abide by all ethical principles above private gain. Ethical behaviour, when recognised by the citizens, creates and sustains complete confidence, trust and respect in the integrity of the administration. This can only be realised when employees maintain the highest standards of integrity in their dealings with citizens and communities, stakeholders and role-players, civil society, the private sector and other government officials (Chadwick 1997). Public ethics related to high standards of professionalism, coupled with impartial, fair and equitable service, are thus expected by communities and governments. These elements lead to the honest and transparent utilisation of resources in an efficient and effective way, as well as to the enhancement of public participation at all societal levels.

Ethics in South Africa With the introduction of codes of conduct and an overall commitment by the executive to reduce the levels of ethical violation, moral reform is necessary within the public service. Research has shown that the existence of a code of conduct does not guarantee that public servants will be familiar with its contents or adhere to them (Mackay 2007; Mle 2012). A number of researchers over the years have written that there are four main principles of public administration within South Africa: the Constitution and authority of Parliament, the values of society, the laws and the Batho Pele Principles that form the foundation of the country’s democracy and of developmental and sustainable service delivery (Mafunisa 2002; Mackay 2007; Matshiqi 2007; Kanyane 2014). The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa contains clear guidelines within which the government can determine its policies. It also sets out how public sector administration should be conducted. Chapter 10 of the Constitution states that public administration must be governed by the democratic values and principles contained in the Constitution, including: promoting and maintaining professional ethics; promoting the efficient and effective utilization of resources; development-oriented public administration; providing services impartially, fairly and equitably; responding to people’s needs by encouraging participation in policymaking; obtaining accountable public administration; and promoting transparency by proving the public with timely, accessible and accurate information.

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Within the context of public administration internationally and in South Africa, values refer to “what is fundamentally good and desirable, that individuals hold on to as a guide through their lives”. Values include elements of reasonableness and fairness, balance, truth, justice, thoroughness and efficiency (Mafunisa 2002; Mackay 2007; Matshiqi 2007; Kanyane 2014). The Constitution of South Africa is supplemented by the Public Service Regulations (2001), Chapter 4 Part VII on Ethics and Conduct, the Municipal Systems Act (Act 56 of 2003) which, as an addendum, contains an outline of a code deemed appropriate for all local government bodies, the Public Finance Management Act and the Municipal Finance Management Act. This code stipulates that there must be mandatory ethical management in all government institutions, with accounting officers being given special responsibilities to this end. Public ethics are a key characteristic of the Batho Pele (People First) principles. One of these principles is consultation, which can take a wide variety of forms, such as meetings with community groups, wards committees, non-governmental and non-profit organisations; research amongst communities on the key elements of service delivery needed; interviews with individual users; consultations with groups; and meetings with religious, cultural and other representative bodies (Kanyane 2014). Setting service standards is the cornerstone of establishing benchmarks to constantly monitor the extent to which communities and other societal stakeholders are satisfied with the services and products they receive from government departments. As an equal member of BRICS and the developing nations, South Africa is setting high standards and objectives when it comes to being globally competitive and benchmarking to internationally accepted standards. Increasing access to basic human rights such as shelter/housing, water, electricity and sanitation has been one cornerstone of development, as epitomised in the National Development Plan (NDP), the new developmental path to 2030. Batho Pele’s key objective is systematic, accountable, transparent and efficient service delivery that will rectify historical inequalities in the distribution of existing services. Ensuring courtesy requires empathy, consideration and respect towards citizens, as well as continuous, honest and transparent communication with them about services, products, information and problems. This is directly

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related to the continuous provision of information regarding all facets of planned and/or implemented service delivery. Redress emphasises a need to quickly and accurately identify when services are falling below the anticipated standards and to maintain procedures to rectify the situation. This should be done at the individual transactional level with the public, as well as at the organisational level, in relation to the entire service delivery programme. There is always an opportunity to encourage and welcome complaints as a means to improve services, and to deal with them such that any weaknesses in the system can be remedied quickly. Openness and transparency ensure that citizens know how their government, its layers and agencies operate, how well the available resources are being utilised, and who is in charge. Value-for-money means that resources are spent ethically, transparently and accountably and citizens are aware of the way they are utilised (Woods and Mantzaris 2012).

Teaching ethics Menzel, when referring to teaching ethics in US universities in the 1990s, argued that “colleges and universities have moved forward with courses and programs aimed at ensuring that we do not produce ‘a new generation of leaders who are ethically illiterate at best or dangerously adrift and morally misguided at worst’” (Menzel 1997:518). Within a context of increased calls for public servants to be ethical, this holds true for those institutions that feel the need to rise to the challenge. It is important to note at this stage that the idea of incorporating ethics into public administration curricula is not aimed at prescribing a set of moral truths, but at providing a platform where students are able to engage in discussions over ethical issues that are complex and perhaps challenge their traditions, culture and religious prescripts. As a result, the aim is to challenge students to think differently about the ethical issues they may encounter. Why adopt ethics into Public Administration courses in South Africa? Mafunisa (2008:81) notes that public servants “occupy a position of trust in society and [that] the promotion of the public interest is therefore their first priority”. According to a PricewaterhouseCoopers Report (2014:4) “Bribery and corruption has been the fastest growing economic crime

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category in South Africa since 2011”. Kuye et al. (2002:196) argue that “the training of public officials and political office-bearers [can] promote ethical and responsible conduct because these functionaries could then be informed what they should do to ensure that their conduct is ethical”. Clapper (1999:381) notes that in the pursuit of an ethical public administration that is informed by discretion, morality and virtue, the teaching of public servants must be combined with leadership and a complimentary ethics structure. Menzel (1997:517), when investigating ethics courses via a survey of representatives of the USA’s National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA), concluded that there is a “positive outcome in reinforcing, not changing, students’ basic value systems”. Ethics curricula cannot deny the vital significance of the theoretical foundations of the concept, but the myriad problems and challenges facing states and societies equally mean that such an initiative can only succeed through the marriage of theory and practice. This approach can be based on the understanding that a platform of intellectual and material unity, moving from Kohlberg’s research-based generalities to more specific explorations, will be rooted in the history and the future of social sciences. This means that teaching ethics can only be fruitful when existing theoretical paradigms are tested in relation to past or existing human and power relationships, cultures and traditions. Fundamentally, then, there cannot be an adequate or comprehensive ethics training that is divorced from serious critical engagement with international, continental, regional or national policy and practice, or with the particularities of local circumstances. An ethics course can only be successful if it combines – through an understanding of societal ethics and values and their relationship to context – the essence and alternatives of agency and structure.

Methodology The empirical component of this chapter is based on an analysis of the curricula of five higher education institutions in South Africa offering Public Administration, in an attempt to determine the extent to which they incorporate ethics into their curricula. Further data was obtained from existing secondary sources, along with telephone interviews with academic and research staff at five South African universities and the government-run school of government.

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The overall aim of the empirical section of the chapter is to comment on the extent to which higher education institutions are able to prepare students, through their academic qualification, for a career in public service.

Findings, challenges and the way forward All five universities offer undergraduate and postgraduate programmes in Public Administration, together with a range of other training programmes and/or short courses in Public Administration. One institution offers a fullyfledged module on Public Sector Ethics at undergraduate level, the other institutions offer ethics as a focus area in the course content of specific modules. The authors are of the view that ethics education is a necessity, given the range of challenges relating to bad governance, corruption and service delivery that abound in South Africa. Hence, it can be deduced that ethics should be taught more widely and comprehensively as a key module at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels. Furthermore, ethics education is straddled across several disciplines, thus requiring a multi-disciplinary approach. Innovation can be introduced to the teaching process by bringing on board experts from a range of professions – such as lawyers, theologians, sociologists, and psychologists – to help teach the relevant modules. Teaching ethics should no doubt be about improving behaviour, not simply improving reasoning. For the effect of teaching ethics in South Africa to be assessed, research into the impact of the learning is necessary. It is felt that given the national, continental and international situations, it is important for ethics to become a compulsory and wide-ranging part of the Public Administration curriculum both in South Africa and globally. A holistic curriculum such as this would be most likely structured around the following key themes:

Theories of Ethics and Moral Dilemmas This course aims to develop an understanding of human relations as they revolve around both the micro- (between individuals) and macro- (between professionals and society) ethical dimensions of individual and social/professional responsibility and codes of conduct.

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The knowledge acquired is embedded by inculcating a comprehensive understanding of various theories on ethics, enabling students to compare various ethical codes with respect to moral theory and moral dilemmas in individual, societal, professional and human relations. The objective of the course is to know and understand nonconsequentialist/deontological theories, consequentialist/utilitarian theories, virtue theory and care theory, and to comprehend their relationship to moral theory, morality and moral dilemmas (Callahan 1988; Davis and Stark 2001; Pritchard 2000).

National Ethics, Global Ethics, Human Rights and Accountability This course’s key objective is to introduce students to the combined normative and empirical approaches to international justice, organisations and processes. Hence the key aims of the course are: x to apply normative and empirical approaches to international justice, organisations and processes, by analysing global political institutions and policies and their relationship with human rights and accountability; x to be able to understand the relevance of the concepts of policy and how it is implemented, such as the economic, social and political benefits of good governance, and the need for codes of ethics for politicians and businesses, which have been high on the agenda of organisations such as the World Bank, the World Health Organisation and the UN as well as many multinational corporations (Kaufmann and Kraay 2008; Lee 2010; Menzel 2005).

Ethics and Professional Practice The aim of this course is to introduce the origins, influences and impact of ethical thought on people’s professional and personal lives. The objectives of the course are: x to inculcate the skills and practice frameworks necessary to enable individuals to perform ethically within the work environment; x to teach students how to identify, analyse and respond appropriately to a variety of ethical dilemmas and challenges which might arise within a work setting; x to familiarise students with the relevant codes of ethics and models of ethical decision-making (Allen and Bunting 2008; Blackburn and

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McGhee 2004; Markovits 2011; McDowell 2000; Oakley and Dean Cocking 2001; Pettifor and Paquet 2002; Rowson 2006).

Governance Problems in the Private and Public Sectors The main aim of this course is to develop an understanding of corruption and its causes, such that graduates will know what to do about it and how to do it. This will involve more than simply conveying a body of knowledge against which students are then tested at the end of the course. The exercise also requires that a basis for the practical skills referred to above has been effectively developed and incorporated. Any examination at the end of the course would need to demonstrate that students have fully absorbed these practical skills and can apply them in real-world situations. The objective of the course is to understand corruption, its consequences and ways to fight it (Davis and Stark 2001; Pritchard 2000; Hussmann et al. 2009; Kaufman 2005; Kaufmann et al. 2007; Sparrow 2000; UNDP 2008; UNDP 2009a; UNDP 2009b).

Conclusion Focusing on the thematic issues raised in the chapter, it is clear that South Africa must push ahead with ethics education, and this must be seen as a moral obligation against the backdrop of fulfilling its constitutional mandates. Furthermore, universities are strategically placed to make a difference, since education means the process of gaining knowledge, inculcating forms of proper conduct and acquiring technical competence. Tackling corruption involves instilling values and principles in the next generation, and demands the development of the relevant skills along with the achievement of individuals’ physical, mental and social development. Resources must be made available for universities to ensure the successful implementation of ethics courses into the curricula. Given the above responsibilities, the centrality of ethics management and the importance of promoting a culture of ethics cannot be overemphasised.

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References Allen, C. and Bunting, R. 2008. A global standard for professional ethics: Cross-border business concerns. Journal of Accountancy, 205(5), May. Almond, B. 1996. Applied ethics. In T. Mautner, The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy. United States of America: Penguin. Beck, L., Montfort, v A. and Twijnstra, A. 2010. Can Integrity be Learned? The Effectiveness of Integrity Training Programs for Municipal Officials. Amsterdam University: VU University Press. Blackburn, M. and McGhee, P. 2004. Talking virtue: Professionalism in business and virtue ethics global virtue. Ethics Review 5(4): 90 – 122. Callahan, J. 1988. Ethical issues in professional life. New York: Oxford University Press. Chadwick, R. F. 1997. Encyclopaedia of applied ethics. London: Academic Press. Catron, B. L. and Denhardt, K. G. 1987. Teaching ethics, teaching ethically. City Almanac 20: 32–35. Clapper, V. 1999. On seeing the Promised Land: Prospects for public sector right-doing. Journal of Public Administration 34(8): 380–381. Crain, W. C. 1985. Theories of development (2nd revised edition). New York: Prentice-Hall. Davis, M. and Stark, A. M. (eds). 2001. Conflict of interest in the professions. United States of America: Oxford University Press. Frederickson, H. G. 1999. Dwight Waldo and education for public administration. Journal of Public Affairs Education 1: 5–11. Frey, R. G. 2004. A companion to applied ethics. London: Blackwell. Goss, R. P. 1996. A distinct public administration ethics? Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 6(4): 573–597. Hejka-Ekins, A. P. 1988. Teaching ethics in public administration. Public Administration Review 48: 885–891. Hoffman, W. M. 1995. A blueprint for corporate ethical development in business ethics: Readings and cases in corporate morality (3rd edition). New York: McGraw-Hill. Husmann, K., Hechler H. and Penailillo, M. 2009. Institutional arrangements for corruption prevention: Considerations for the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption. Article 6, Issue 2009:4 U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. Icheku, V. 2011. Understanding ethics and ethical decision-making. Bloomington: Xlibris Corporation Press.

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Kanyane, M. 2014. Exploring challenges of municipal service delivery in South Africa. Africa’s Public Service Delivery and Performance Review 2(1): 90–110. Kaufman, D. 2005. Myths and realities of governance and Corruption. In, Global Competitiveness Report 2005–06, World Economic Forum, October. Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. 2007. Measuring corruption: myths and realities. In, Transparency International Global Corruption Report 2007, Cambridge University Press Cambridge. 318–323. Kaufmann, D. and Kraay, A. 2008. Governance Indicators: Where are we, where should we be going? World Bank Research Observer 23:1–30. Kuye, J. O., Thornhill, C., Fourie, D. J., Brynard, P. A., Crous, M., Mafunisa, M. J., Roux, N. L., Van Dijk, H. G. and Van Rooyen, E. J. 2002. Critical perspectives on Public Administration: Issues for consideration. Sandown: Heinemann Publishers. LaFollette, H. 2002. Ethics in practice (2nd edition). London: Blackwell Publishing. Lee, D. and Lee, E. 2010. Human rights and the ethics of globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mackay, K. 2007. How to build monitoring and evaluation systems to support better government. Washington, DC: World Bank. Mafunisa, M. J. 2002. Critical perspectives on public administration: Issues for consideration. Cape Town: Heinemann Publishers (Pty) Ltd. Mafunisa, M. J. 2008. The role of codes of conduct in promoting ethical conduct in the South African public service. South African Journal of Labour Relations 32(1): 81–92. Mantzaris, E. A. 2013. Towards a sociology of ethics: A South African case study. Keynote Address, International Conference on Local Government, Livingstone, Zambia. Mantzaris, E. A. 2018. Towards an evidence-based corruption index in South Africa: The first step. African Journal of Public Affairs 10(4): 271–294. Markovits, D. A. 2011. Modern legal ethics: Adversary advocacy in a democratic age. United States of America: Princeton University Press. Matshiqi, A. 2007. Public service performance: Towards a better life for all. Policy: Issues and Actors 20(5):1–21, Feb. McDonald. G. and Nijhof. A. 1999. Beyond codes of ethics: an integrated framework for stimulating morally responsible behaviour in organisations. Leadership and Organization, Development Journal 25(1):133–146.

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McDowell, B. 2000. Ethics and excuses: The crisis in professional responsibility. Quorum Books. Menzel, D. C. 2005. Research on ethics and integrity in governance: a review and assessment. Public Integrity 7(2):147–168. Menzel, D. C. 1998. To act ethically: The what, why, and how of ethics pedagogy. Journal of Public Affairs Education 4(1):11–18. Menzel, D. C. 1997. Teaching ethics and values: A survey of graduate public affairs and administration programs in the US. Political Science and Politics 30:518–524. Menzel, D. C. 1997b. Teaching ethics and values in public administration: Are we making a difference? Public Administration Review 57(3):224– 230. Menzel, D. C. 2005. Research on ethics and integrity in governance: a review and assessment. Public Integrity 7(2):147–168. Mohamed Sayeed, C. 2016. Beyond Codes of Conduct towards a Public Service Ethos: Lessons from Finland and Denmark. African Journal of Public Affairs, 9 (3): 39 – 50. Montfort, A., Beck, L. and Twijnstra, A. 2013. Can Integrity be taught in Public Organisations? The Effectiveness of Integrity Training Programs for Municipal Officials. Public Integrity, 15(2):117–132. Mle, T. R. 2012. Professional and ethical conduct in the Public Sector. Africa’s Public Service Delivery and Performance Review 1(1):21–31. Oakley, J. and Cocking, D. 2001.Virtue ethics and professional roles. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pettifor, J. L. and Paquet, S. 2002. Preferred strategies for learning ethics in the practice of a discipline. Canadian Psychology 43(4):260–269. Pickus, N. M. J. 2002. Rethinking the role of ethics in public affairs education. Journal of Public Affairs Education 8(1):9–23. Pillay, S. and Isaacs, D. 2015. Is multi- anti-corruption agencies a panacea to combat corruption: A South African perspective. ICPA Conference Presentation, Bandung, Indonesia, November, 2015. Price Waterhouse Coopers. 2014. PwC’s 2014 Global Economic Crime Survey February 2014: Confronting the changing face of economic crime. PWC: Johannesburg. Pritchard, M. S. 2000. Meaningful work: Rethinking professional ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. Rest, J., Barnett, R., Bebeau, M., Deemer, D., Getz, I., Moon, Y., Spickelmeier, J. Thoma, S. and Volker, J. 1986. Moral development: Advances in research and theory. NY: Praeger Publishers.

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Rest, J., Narvaez, D., Bebeau, M. and Thoma, S. 1999. Post conventional moral thinking: A Neo-Kohlbergian approach. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Rowson, R. 2006. Working ethics: How to be fair in a culturally complex world. London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers. Sparrow, M. 2000. The regulatory craft: Controlling risks, solving problems, and managing compliance. Washington DC: Brookings Institute. Stillman, R. 1991. Preface to public administration. New York: St Martin’s Press. UNDP. 2008. Corruption and development: a primer. New York: United Nations. UNDP. 2009a. A trainer’s manual on measuring corruption at the country level. New York: United Nations. UNDP. 2009b. User’s guide to measuring public administration performance UNDP Oslo. New York: United Nations. Van der Merwe, A. 2006. The Nature and Causes of Corruption: The Perceptions of KZN Public Service Managers and Anti-Corruption Agents. Journal of Public Administration 41(1):32–46. Waibl, E. and Herdina, P. 1997. Dictionary of Philosophical Terms vol. II, Hague: Walter de Gruyter. Woods, G. and Mantzaris E. A. 2019. Anti-corruption reader. July ACCERUS, Stellenbosch University.

PART 2

CHAPTER 2 THE STATE OF ANTI-CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA: 2015–2019 BABAFEMI A. BADEJO (FORMER HEAD OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, UNAMID, SUDAN)

Abstract Corruption is a major problem for Nigeria. A campaign by President Muhammadu Buhari to tackle corruption head-on was very much welcomed in the 2015 elections in Nigeria. How has he fared in his fight against corruption? What efforts have been made? What are the outcomes? What has been left undone? What are the challenges? What could still be done? These are the questions posed in this contribution. President Buhari made several declarations and put in place some technologically backed anticorruption measures. In addition, completion of the Nigerian AntiCorruption Strategy, along with a focused punitive approach, has brought hope to the anti-corruption struggle. However, a number of actions (or inactions) by the President and the ruling party have raised questions as to whether the anti-corruption measures were truly intended to go beyond the rhetorical level. We suggest that there is not much difference with respect to corruption before and during the Buhari era. Keywords: corruption; anti-corruption; public sector; private sector; social sector; Buhari administration; development; challenges; party; strategy; UNCAC; security vote

Introduction It is no longer news that corruption is endemic in Nigeria. It remains the major bane of the country, despite close competition for that title in the form of failure of leadership. Corruption is a significant threat to the corporate existence of Nigeria as a country. Many experts, journalists and even

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political leaders have recognised the scale of the damage being done to Nigeria by corruption. An inverse relationship between corruption and development is well established (Oluwalaiye and Awolaja, 2007; Nageri, Umar and Abdul 2013; Odubunmi and Agbelade 2014). In this vein, a summation by the current Chairman of Nigeria’s Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) is very apt: Today, corruption is a major threat to the corporate existence of Nigeria. It undermines public institutions, destroys investment climate, subverts the rule of law, perpetuates human rights abuses, erodes the quality of life and allows organised crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to flourish. (Owasanoye 2019:3)

President Muhammadu Buhari made anti-corruption the cornerstone of his campaign for office in 2015, offering a message that resonated well with the Nigerian public. Reading the writing on the wall, the then candidate Muhammadu Buhari summed up the situation with the conclusion that “if we don’t kill corruption, corruption will kill us.” His stance on corruption resonated far beyond Nigeria. The African Union selected President Buhari as its champion for the 2018 AntiCorruption Theme of the Year, adopting him as a role model of sorts. At the time of writing, Buhari has had four years in office and has started a new term. The pertinent question is how he has fared in his push against corruption. What efforts have been made? What outcomes can we see? What has been left undone? What are the challenges? What could still be done? These are some of the questions we try to grapple with in this study. However, it should be noted that this chapter will not include an analysis of corruption within any of the 36 states or the Federal Capital Territory. Rather, our focus would be on the leadership at federal level.

The conceptual problem A dominant problem in the war against corruption involves coming to grips with what it is and its varying manifestations in society. Attempts to define corruption have tended to operate on the assumption that a state (or government, as the expression of the state) exists to provide services as a common good. It is expected that government officials will be solely remunerated from budgetary allocations in a very transparent manner, and would not have to resort to extorting money from the public and/or skewing policies for private gains. Deviation from such norms results in a conception

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that sees corruption as “behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain private-regarding influence” (Nye 1967:419). The World Bank, in attempting to provide guidance on understanding corruption, follows the conception that emphasises immoral deviation by public officials as signifying corruption, treating corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain” (Bhargava 2006). The Transparency International (TI) version avoids direct mention of the public sector in its conceptualization of corruption, defining it as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International 2011). However, TI’s acceptance of the centrality of public officials in the measurement of corruption emerges when one examines the process used to calculate the corruption perception index, which offers a metric for perceptions of public officials by the business community (Badejo 2019). This bias against public officials in the analysis of corruption is seen among scholars and observers alike (Campbell and Page 2018:2). The clear focus on the public sector when defining corruption, as epitomised by the World Bank and Transparency International, as well as Campbell and Page, presents a limited focus. It is not only people entrusted with power in the public sector who are corrupt. Those in other positions of power and/or authority also use their influence for self-enrichment. It is also important to note that corruption can be for the direct benefit of a self and/or a third party. When it is for a third party, the benefit is not for “private gain”. For instance, corruption for the benefit of a member of a shared ethnic group is not unheard of. In such cases, the parties involved may not even know each other but the one in a position of power or authority benefits a fellow kinsman. Furthermore, the analysis of corruption cannot be limited to the public sector only. A great deal of corruption is also happening in the private sector, as we have argued elsewhere (Badejo 2019). When a bank manager in the private sector eases the processes involved in granting a loan in exchange for a percentage of the total amount being advanced, this is corruption in the private sector. The bank manager is making private gain at the expense of the bank’s shareholders, as well as the economy at large. Exploring this issue further, several studies on the banking sector in Nigeria have noted that senior managers in the banking sector, probably as a result of regulatory weakness or collusion, are giving out huge unsecured loans,

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sharing out the money and subsequently declaring the loans as bad debts (Badejo 2019). The funds of private depositors disappear as a result (Nwanze 2006; Kanu and Okorafor 2013). A 2015 study on illicit financial flows reasoned along similar lines, suggesting that focus on public officials alone is not enough when it comes to the conceptualization of corruption. The authors observed that, while public sector agents play an important part in corruption, private sector actors often initiate and benefit from such acts. We therefore wish to underscore the importance of promoting transparency in interactions between Governments and Business in Africa, and suggest the introduction of lifestyle audits as a routine legal requirement when there is evidence of unexplained wealth. (AU/ECA 2015:48)

The report pointed to several aspects of corruption in the private sector, including irregularities by multinational companies through tax evasion (ibid:48). Corruption has permeated society, and is beyond being limited to the public and private sectors; in fact, beyond the point where it is worth looking at it in terms of sectors alone. Corruption is rife in the home and in social institutions. A 2016 qualitative study on views of Nigerians reached a similar conclusion. In general, respondents suggested that wherever you have greedy individuals, corruption will take place. They pointed out that even non-governmental organisations (NGOs) easily procure receipts for money they need to account for (Ipadeola 2016). We have highlighted the inadequacy of elegant but insufficient definitions that fail to deal with the pandemic that corruption has become in many countries, and especially in Nigeria. Religious institutions and civil society organizations regularly manipulate their respective books to avoid taxation. Extortion from the populace at large, such as demanding tithes to guarantee a pleasurable life in the afterlife, constitutes corruption. In addressing the inadequacies of the existing definitions, we suggest that corruption should be looked at as “The abuse of power and/or authority, including manipulation of rules or opportunities, or extortion from another in the public, private or social realms for self or filial/familial relations or inducement (bribery), by another in furtherance of undue gain to the self or a desired third party”.

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Tackling Corruption under the Buhari Administration Earlier, we referred to President Muhammadu Buhari’s assessment of corruption in Nigeria while he campaigned for office. At least with regards to his public pronouncements, Muhammadu Buhari’s assessment did not change on assuming office. At the first World Economic Summit on corruption organised by the UK Government in January 2016, when David Cameron was Prime Minister, President Buhari stated that: when I came to office, corruption had become endemic and systemic, threatening the very foundation of our national life, security and democracy. As a result, I have demonstrated zero tolerance for corruption [and] corrupt practices by combating corruption head-on. We are determined to bring integrity to governance through leadership by example.

In setting about dealing with this scourge, President Buhari made use of a number of instruments that he inherited from his predecessors and improved the implementation of others. These include: x Corrupt Practices Decree of 1975, promulgated under the regime of Murtala Mohammed x Code of Conduct Bureau, established in 1990 x Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Decree of 1995, introduced by the Abacha regime and later re-enacted as the Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act, 2006 by Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration x Corrupt Practices and Money Laundering Act, 2004 x Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004 x Procurement Act, 2007 x Executive Order No. 6, 2018 These instruments were introduced alongside the establishment of anticorruption agencies and institutions such as: x Nigerian Extractive Industrial Transparency Initiative (NEITI) x Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) x Technical Unit on Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms (TUGAR) x Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)

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x Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit (BMPIU) which later transformed into the Bureau for Public Procurement (BPU) x Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) x Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption (PACAC) Other policies that had been under discussion in Nigeria, or were already agreed, were activated by the Buhari Government within this period. These include: x a whistleblowing policy x Bank Verification Number (BVN) – actually a Central Bank of Nigeria policy x Treasury Single Account Policy (TSA) x The National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) In August 2015, Buhari appointed the membership of the Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption (PACAC). The Committee was led by a reputable lawyer, Professor Itse Sagay, who had shown some inclinations towards anti-corruption activities. The same can be said of the first Executive Secretary of PACAC, Professor Bolaji Owasanoye, and several other members of the Committee, especially those who came from academia. This committee was to serve as a think-tank for the “President’s strategy to combat corruption in Nigeria. Its mandate includes promoting reform agenda[s] in anti-corruption, advising on the prosecution of the war against corruption, and implementation of reforms in criminal justice system” (see http://anticorruption-manifesto.org/statement.php?i=3andname=). The varying anti-corruption tools to which the administration has access have been playing different roles in the anti-corruption campaign. For instance, the Economic and Financial Crimes Committee (EFCC) has been pursuing a strong punitive approach towards curbing corruption. Three and a half years into Buhari’s time in office, Ibrahim Magu, Acting Head of EFCC, stated that he had secured 703 convictions of corrupt individuals. These include some senior military officers and politicians. Among the politicians were Governors Joshua Dariye and Jolly Nyame. The cases of the two former governors, who are now in jail, commenced under the preceding administration. In July 2007, Joshua Dariye – a twoterm governor of Plateau State from 1999 to 2007 – was dragged before the High Court for diverting around N2 billion into his and other private pockets. The amount included funds for the amelioration of ecological disaster in his state. He was only sentenced to 14 years in prison, on 12 June

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2018 (Punch, 13 June 2018), and his prison term was subsequently reduced to 10 years by the Court of Appeal. Similarly, former Governor Jolly Nyame – a two-term Governor of Taraba State from 1999 to 2007 – was sentenced to 14 years in jail for the misappropriation of N1.64 billion belonging to Taraba State, after an 11-year-long trial (Punch, 31 May 2018). The Court of Appeal subsequently reduced the prison term imposed by the Abuja High Court by two years (Daily Post, 16 November 2018). While it is possible to argue that the cases against the two Governors were not initiated under the Buhari administration, it is important to accept that a lacklustre prosecution on the subsequent takeover of both or either cases or outright withdrawal of the cases would have resulted in a different outcome. As we will show later, similar cases have been withdrawn. Varying large sums have been indicated as recovered as a result of the administration’s whistleblowing policy.1 In addition, a sizeable number of assets have been forfeited through court processes initiated by the EFCC. These include real estate holdings, such as those of Patience Jonathan, wife of the previous President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, and $40 million worth of jewellery which famously belonged to the former Minister of Petroleum Resources, Diezani Allison-Madueke (Sahara Reporters, September 10, 2019), as well as real estate purportedly belonging to her.2 The Nigerian National Assembly – with a Senate as its upper legislative chamber and a House of Representatives serving as the lower chamber – have not been exempt from scandal, with members taking as they like from the national treasury. The politicians voted to fix their respective emoluments at levels that are, comparatively speaking, among the very highest in the world. Many have procured resources to execute projects in their constituencies but proceeded to loot the allocations. However, the new leadership at the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) has been in pursuit of the embezzlers within the National Assembly. As Sadiq Radda, Executive Secretary of PACAC, stated in an interview at the 14th Anti-Corruption Situation Room in Maiduguri, the “ICPC has recovered about N900 billion [in] constituency projects funds from some National

1

Kemi Adeosun, then Minister of Finance in March 2018, stated the total was N7.8 billion (naira), US$378 million and UK £27,800. President Buhari, on 29 May 2018 indicated that a total of N 500 billion had been recovered. 2 The cases involving Patience Jonathan and Diezani Allison-Madueke are currently on appeal at the time of writing.

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Assembly members (https://www.sunnewsonline.com/fg-recovers-n900blooted-by-nass-members/). The general push for the recovery of stolen funds that took place under previous regimes, including the sums appropriated by former President General Sani Abacha, has only brought about a trickle of returns. The few payments from Abacha’s foreign accounts proves that President Buhari was wrong to refuse to acknowledge that the late President Abacha had stolen public funds (see This Day News Magazine 9 June 2008). The small receipts that are trickling in are being portrayed as an instrument of anti-corruption, and are said to be yielding resources for a school feeding programme and other Federal Government programmes such as the National Social Investment Policy. According to President Buhari, his implementation of the Treasury Single Account Policy (TSA), backed up with the introduction of the Bank Verification Number (BVN), has been yielding positive results. At his opening of e-Nigeria in Abuja on 5 November 2018, Buhari stated: The enforcement of the use of the policy on TSA, the integrated Payroll and the Bank Verification Number and the impact they have made on the administration’s public financial management reforms cannot be overemphasised.… In addition to the consolidation of accounts and elimination of ghost workers that resulted in a combined savings of about N24.7bn, the TSA facilitated the recovery of huge sums of money, including the recent N1.6bn from a single account. (Punch, 6 November 2018)

President Umaru Yar’Adua’s short administration in September 2009 embarked on the process of establishing a National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS). This development followed Nigeria’s signing of Article 5 (1) of the UN Convention Against Corruption, within which a sub-clause states that: Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, develop and implement or maintain effective, coordinated anticorruption policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the principles of the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability”. (UNODC 2004:9)

However, Yar’Adua’s successor, President Goodluck Jonathan, abandoned any further efforts beyond this initial action, and the situation remained unchanged until Buhari assumed office.

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PACAC and the Federal Ministry of Justice collaborated under the Buhari administration to realise the NACS, which was finally approved by the Federal Executive Council (FEC) on 5 July 2017 (see Waziri-Azi 2017). Following the FEC’s approval, the Federal Government constituted a 20member Committee with a mandate to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, which covered the period from 2017 to 2021. Also, an Inter-Ministerial Committee was established, comprising five ministers plus the Attorney-General of the Federation as coordinator. Being higher in rank to the monitoring and evaluation committee, this body is expected to play a moderating role and ensure the smooth running of the monitoring and evaluation committee. The implementation of the NACS 2017–2021 commenced with the identification of 26 pilot ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs).

Inability to tackle corruption under the Buhari administration Nepotism, commonly understood as filling public positions with family members and friends, is a form of corruption. Junaid Mohammed has detailed the ways in which President Buhari has been deeply involved with nepotism in office. In an interview in July 2016, Mohammed described nepotism under Buhari as the worst Nigeria has ever faced (Punch 23 July 2016). He described how the presidency revolves around an unelected nephew of President Buhari, while the son of the same nephew acts as Personal Assistant to the President. The President’s niece has been appointed as a Commissioner on the Independent National Elections Commission, the body responsible for carrying out competitive elections in Nigeria, including for the presidency. The immediate younger brother of this Commissioner currently serves as a Minister. The picture becomes even more grim when the focus is extended to people in public office in Daura and Katsina, President Buhari’s town and state in the Nigerian federation. His exclusionary style is clearly visible in the disproportionate number of other appointments – such as chiefs of security apparatuses and heads of parastatals – given to Muslim males from northern Nigeria. In his Special Press Statement of January 2018 on President Muhammadu Buhari, titled “The Way Out: A Clarion Call for Coalition for Nigeria Movement”, former President Olusegun Obasanjo, reflecting on the documented nepotism of the Buhari administration, highlighted the leader’s

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nepotic deployment bordering on clannishness and inability to bring discipline to bear on errant members of his nepotic court. This has grave consequences on [the] performance of his government to the detriment of the nation. It would appear that national interest was being sacrificed on the altar of nepotic interest. (Punch, 24 January 2018)

The problem of nepotism in governance is not limited to denying more capable hands the chance to be involved in running the affairs of the State. It is further compounded when familial or other close relationships result in the condoning of excesses that should be punished. On this, Obasanjo noted: There were serious allegations of round-tripping against some [members of the] inner caucus of the Presidency which would seem to have been condoned. I wonder: if such actions do not amount to corruption and financial crime, then what is it? [A] culture of condonation and turning blind eye will cover up rather than clean up. And going to justice must be with clean hands”. (ibid)

The problem of President Muhammadu Buhari’s acceptance of corruption is very broad. For instance, despite there being an arrest warrant out for the former Chairman of the Pensions Reforms Commission, Abdulrasheed Maina, with respect to allegations that he enriched himself to the tune of billions from the nation’s pensioners, he was allowed to quietly re-enter the country with the knowledge of President Buhari. The President remained silent on the matter, despite supposedly having been personally warned by the Head of the Civil Service. Former governors, ministers and other senior executives who have for years been under investigation by the EFCC over allegations of the misappropriation of funds have been welcomed by the President into the ruling party, the All Progressive’s Congress (APC), on the understanding that they will ensure the success of the President and the APC at the polls. Many of these figures, including appointed ministers, had properties that had formerly been seized returned to them when they were appointed to prominent positions within the government. A recent example was when the Office of the Attorney-General submitted a nolle prosequi to end a case, in clear exchange for support for the ruling party in the Senate. In the heat of a presidential campaign in Benin, Adams Oshiomole, Chairman of the ruling party, actually said: “We have quite a number of other leaders who have come.… in fact, once you have joined the APC, all your sins are forgiven” (http://saharareporters.com/2019/01/18/join-apc-and-all-your-sins-will-beforgiven-oshiomhole-declares).

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There is also a body of evidence that suggests extensive cherry picking when it comes to justice in the Buhari-led fight against corruption. Many senior APC members remain untouchable and cannot be investigated or charged in court by the EFCC, despite being the subject of petitions. Rather, it is petitions against their adversaries that receive speedy attention. None of the Nigerians named in the Panama or Paradise papers have been charged several years later (Badejo 2017). A relic of military rule in Nigeria is the provision for security votes in the budgets of the Federal and State governments. This is a slush fund that is very opaque and lacks accountability. According to Katherine Dixon, Director for Defence and Security at Transparency International, “the security vote is one of the most durable forms of corruption operating in Nigeria today,” (https://punchng.com/govts-fuelling-corruption-with-n241bnannual-security-votes-ti/). Rather than demonstrating the leadership needed to stop this blatant avenue for theft, President Muhammadu Buhari increased the vote in the 2018 budget by 43% over that of 2017 (ibid). A major ongoing corruption case has roots in the Goodluck Jonathan administration, which preceded Muhammadu Buhari’s ascension to office in 2015. A sum of approximately $2 billion was set aside to procure equipment for the military to effectively fight the Boko Haram insurgency. Col. Sambo Dasuki (retired), as President Jonathan’s National Security Adviser was charged with the management of the funds. After about six months in office, President Buhari ordered Dasuki’s arrest. According to a BBC news report, Dasuki was accused of awarding phantom contracts to buy 12 helicopters, four fighter jets and ammunition for fighting Boko Haram. Dasuki, who complained of not getting a fair chance to defend himself, denied any wrongdoing, dismissing the allegations as “politically motivated” (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-34973872). The Buhari administration accused the former National Security Advisor of sharing the money among friends and members of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the then ruling party. However, at the time of writing, Dasuki remains in detention despite being granted bail by four different Nigerian High Court judges.3 Many of those initially alleged to have received his largesse remain free, ostensibly for paying some of the 3 Some Nigerians suggest that the fact that Dasuki remains in detention despite the rulings of High Court judges may relate his earlier role in overthrowing Buhari as military Head of State. Nevertheless, the Attorney-General of the Federation has indicated that it is an issue related to security.

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money back. Some have joined the current ruling party having obtained freedom through opaque means. There may be a few in court or yet to be charged by the EFCC.4 The Auditor-General of the Federation is constitutionally required to submit audit reports to both Houses of the National Assembly on the activities of the public sector within 90 days of receipt of the AccountantGeneral’s financial statement. Each House is then required to pass the report on for consideration by a committee responsible for public accounts (Constitution of Nigeria, Section 85 [5]). According to Anthony Ayine, the Federal Auditor-General, the National Assembly has not considered any of the reports submitted to it since Nigeria ended the military dictatorship in 1999 (Premium Times, 8 April 2019). On 19 August 2019, Ayine made it clear that more ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) had been acting in corrupt ways under President Buhari than under previous administrations. In particular, he singled out culpable bodies that included the presidency, the EFCC, and the National Assembly. Without offering any explanation, the President declined to sign a bill that would have compelled MDAs to respond to the Auditor-General (The Guardian, 19 August 2019).

Challenges The efforts to fight corruption in Nigeria are far too feeble to handle the magnitude of the pandemic consuming the country. That every new administration pays lip service to the eradication of corruption in Nigeria is not in doubt (Badejo 2019). Yet it persists. An African proverb observes that “the fish rots from the head”. A corrupt society inevitably has a corrupt head or, if one prefers, leadership that condones corruption. A leadership that truly wants to change the situation can go a long way in managing and reducing the scourge of corruption. The President is unable to demonstrate true leadership by getting rid of corrupt politicians in his cabinet, despite wearing the mantle of a continental anti-corruption activist. Similarly, a citizenry that merely throws up its hands in helplessness constitutes a major challenge for the eradication of corruption. Knowing the importance of eliminating this scourge, many civil society organizations not 4

The Dasuki case and some of the charges and convictions support the fact that the military in Nigeria is awash with corruption, especially with many convictions, charges and petitions against former and serving service chiefs amongst others.

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currently involved in the malaise would be required to organise people against corruption. As can be seen, some minor technological efforts could offer the necessary small steps towards the radical reduction in corruption. In support of the BVN, for instance, more and stronger efforts should go into making Nigeria less of a cash economy, which would make it easier to follow the paper trail of payments. The Chairman of the ICPC has called attention to the onerous efforts involved in collaboration at the international level on the recovery of stolen funds, despite the internationally agreed position that states should assist one another (Owasanoye 2019). This is a major challenge that requires the collaboration of other countries. Of course, this situation is understandable given the fact that many powerful countries are major beneficiaries of illicit financial flows from Africa.

Conclusion The period from 2015 to 2019, which marked President Muhammadu Buhari’s first term as the executive head of Nigeria, witnessed some progress in the anti-corruption campaign. The publicity that accompanied these efforts has attracted an international response. For instance, the African Union selected Buhari as the 2018 anti-corruption champion of the organization. However, organizations like Transparency International appeared less impressed, and Nigeria’s position on the Corruption Perception Index remains low. There is no doubt that President Muhammadu Buhari could do more to reduce the pandemic of corruption in Nigeria. He needs to speak up more and make it clear that he does not condone corruption among those around himself or within the ruling party. Based on his actions, the President has yet to show clear leadership that recognises the unpalatable consequences of corruption. Individuals will continue to engage in corruption as long as the incentives to do so outweigh the disincentives. In effect, there is a need to apply vigorous punitive approaches to combatting corruption. Beyond punishment, however, there must be simultaneous efforts to pursue holistic prevention and recovery strategies. For instance, assenting to anti-corruption measures – such as boosting the Auditor-General’s role

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and pursuing the vigorous implementation of the NACS – is necessary. It is not enough to set up Committees and then forget about them. The lack of implementation of the NACS signifies a lack of seriousness on the part of the federal government. Pleas for international collaboration would be taken more seriously if partners are seeing concerted efforts to reduce corruption at home.

References Adeola, G. L. 2015. “The deepening culture of corruption in Nigerian society: Implications for governance, development and stability”. American International Journal of Research in Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences 9(3):221–229. Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria Act No. 4, 2010 and its subsequent amendments. Badejo, B. A. 2019. “Persistence of corruption in Nigeria.” In Sunday Bobai Agang et al., 2019, A multi-dimensional perspective on corruption in Africa: Wealth, power, religion and democracy. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Badejo, B. A. 2017. Africa avoids accountability to Panama Papers. https://medium.com/integrity-online/africa-avoids-accountability-onpanama-papers-e7964069b062 (accessed 8 March 2019). Badejo, B. A. 2017. From Panama to Paradise Papers. https://medium.com/integrity-online/from-panama-to-paradise-papers103ad1d3d343 (accessed 24 October 2018). Bhargava, V. 2006. Curing the cancer of corruption. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/Ch18.p df (accessed 3 April 2018). Buhari, M. 2015. Buhari’s speech to lawyers: Let’s see corruption in its true colours. http://thenewsnigeria.com.ng/2015/08/buharis-speechto-lawyers-lets-see-corruption-in-its-true-colours/ (accessed 3 April 2018). Buhari, M. 2016. Speech at the Anti-Corruption Summit, London. www.venturesafrica.com/president-buharis-speech-at-the-anticorruption-summit-in-london/ (accessed 4 March 2017). Campbell, J. and Page, M. T. 2018. Nigeria: What everyone needs to know. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Illicit Financial Flows. 2015. Report of the high-level panel on illicit financial flows from Africa, commissioned by the AU/ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development.

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Ipadeola, O. 2016. Qualitative study on the patterns, experiences and manifestations of corruption in Nigeria, UNODC Research Report. Kanu, I. S. and Okorafor, O. E. 2013. The nature, extent and economic impact of fraud on bank deposits in Nigeria. Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business, 4(9):253–265. Nwanze, C. 2006. Bank fraud expose: With cases and preventive measures. Lagos: CBN Press. Transparency International. 2011. https://www.transparency.org (Accessed 5 June 2018). Nye, J. 1967. Corruption and political development: A cost-benefit analysis. American Political Science Review 56(1):417–427. Odubunmi, A. S. and Agbelade, L. I. 2014. Corruption and economic growth in Nigeria. Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development 5(6):45–56. Oluwalaiye, O. B. and Awolaja, G. O. 2007. The impact of corruption on a national economy: Evidence from Nigeria, in A. D. Aina, (ed.) Corruption and the challenge of human development. Babcock University Press, Ilishan-Remo, pp. 217–228. Owasanoye, B. 2019. War against corruption and Nigeria’s foreign policy under the President Buhari Administration. Paper presented at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 31 January 2019. Nageri, K. I., Umar, G. and Abdul, F. A. 2013 Corruption and economic development: Evidence from Nigeria. Kuwait Chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review 3(2):46–56. UNODC. 2004. United Nations Convention against Corruption. New York: United Nations. Waziri-Azi, F. 2017. An evaluation of the Nigerian National AntiCorruption Strategy. European Journal of Research in Social Sciences 5(5):1–9.

CHAPTER 3 THE DIGNITY OF CORRUPTION? DONALD KATTS (FACULTY OF THEOLOGY, STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY)

Abstract Corruption has become a common word even amongst ordinary citizens. Some speak of a culture of corruption1 while others talk of individuals who are corrupt. While some join the struggle against any form of corruption, others, even those once considered to be respectable and who were initially against corruption, eventually decide to stop fighting and join the ranks of the corrupt, asking, why must I miss out? Whistleblowers are seen as disloyal, betraying the collective cause of self-advancement. When wrong behaviour becomes accepted and the majority starts to act in this kind of way, and when those who game the system are seen as role models or heroes, it raises the question: Is there dignity in corruption? This chapter examines this phenomenon by first looking at some definitions of corruption. It goes on to focus on why corruption seems so attractive to many people, either as a way to obtain the things they lack or redeem that which they feel they have been deprived of. Thirdly the paper will unravel the meaning and understanding of dignity. Keywords: Corruption; attractiveness of corruption; dignity; human dignity

1

According to Naudé, a “culture of corruption” refers to the situation when the atmosphere and mood is such that all people scramble for the highest personal benefits with the lowest possible efforts, and if such benefits are to be gained via improper and even illegal means, that is seen as fine (Naudé 2014:75).

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Introduction For more than a decade,2 acts of corruption, whether by high-profile persons, politicians or ordinary people, have featured on the front pages of many newspapers, especially in South Africa. Corruption seems to be a hot topic among most people and pops up in almost every conversation. The author thinks it is good that people talk about it in all spheres of life. But as we know, discussing corruption is not enough to combat it. Nevertheless, the fact that it is talked about shows that people are aware and worried – not only about the level of corruption, but also about the devastating effects it has on the economy, individuals, families, institutions, society, the country (in this case South Africa), and the world at large. Those who were initially against any form of corruption grow tired of fighting it and become despondent. Many are afraid to act, observing the fate of whistleblowers who are branded as disloyal and accused of betraying the collective cause of self-advancement, even treated as if they are enemies. Some individuals eventually decide to give up fighting and engage in corrupt activities themselves, asking why they should miss out when everyone else is benefitting. The old wrong becomes the new right, to use the words of Naudé. When wrong behaviour becomes accepted and the majority starts to act in such ways, and when those who game the system are seen as role models or heroes, it raises the question: Is there dignity in corruption?

Corruption – a definition Holmes (2015:29) argues that it is not easy to define corruption. Attempts to combat corruption have highlighted the fact that analysts cannot fully agree on what it is. At one end of the spectrum is the broad interpretation that corruption, like beauty, lies in the eyes of the beholder. At the other end is the legalistic approach, according to which an act or omission is corrupt only if explicitly identified as such in legislation. Holmes demonstrates this definitional confusion with the following examples. First, there is no definition of corruption in what the United Nations itself describes as “the only legally binding universal anticorruption instrument”, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 2 Holmes (2015:28) is of the opinion that corruption has existed and been a problem since the beginning of human history.

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(UNCAC). This is largely because those who produced UNCAC could not agree on a definition. Second, the world’s leading anti-corruption INGO (international non-governmental organization), Transparency International (TI), has for most of this century used two definitions, but now fudges the issue. Other scholars define corruption as the misuse of public office or a position of authority for private material or social gain at the expense of other people (Vorster 2012:133). According to the Collins English Dictionary (2009:383), the word corruption is derived from a Latin word; “corruption, which means moral decay, wicked behaviour, putridity or rottenness”. Holmes (2015:28) however, translates it as “spoil, pollute, abuse or destroy”, depending on the context. Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (1971:188) defines corruption as the “impairment of integrity, virtue of moral principles”, and as an “inducement to wrong by bribery or other unlawful or improper means”. For Dassah (2008:38) and Mafunisa (2007:261), corruption represents a departure from ethics, morality, tradition, law and civic virtue. Webb is of the opinion that corruption manifests itself as bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion, abuse of power and nepotism (2009:9). Anderson reminds us that corruption should not only be defined as those actions that are illegal in terms of the law of the country, but also those deeds that are regarded by the public as immoral, for an act regarded as immoral and illegal is an obvious case of corruption (Anderson 2008:198). Vorster however argues that corruption takes place as an intentional, illegal and immoral act with the purpose of gaining some kind of advantage (Vorster 2012:133). The Nigerian academic Osoba (1996:372) describes corruption as a form of antisocial behaviour by an individual or social group which confers unjust or fraudulent benefits on its perpetrators, is inconsistent with the established legal norms and prevailing moral ethos of the land and is likely to subvert or diminish the capacity of the legitimate authorities to provide fully for the material and spiritual wellbeing of all members of society in a just and equable manner.

The various definitions of corruption show that it covers a wide range of spheres and practices – from politics to ethics, from individuals to a group, from policies to procedures, from attitude to social behaviour, from unlawfulness to illegal practices and even violence.

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Now that we have an understanding of what corruption is more-or-less about, we turn to looking at why corruption seems so attractive for many as a way to redeem themselves from want, poverty and deprivation.

Attractiveness of corruption In this section we look at some of the possible reasons why corruption attracts people of all ages, colour, religion, status, cultures and profession. Treisman (2000:402) is of the opinion that corruption flourishes when people know that the risk of being caught and punished is low. This sense of security is further strengthened when the perpetrators know that the country’s legal system is ineffective. In other words, people’s willingness to partake in corrupt behaviour depends on the legal culture and the presence of effective anti-corruption mechanisms. Connected to this first condition for corruption is the existence of opaque, undemocratic political systems. Treisman argues that the risk of exposure is lower in such societies, making corruption more attractive. He goes on to observe that where religions3 become “state-religions”, the risk of nepotism and corruption rises, especially if the religious institution in question does not fulfil its responsibilities for monitoring and eliminating such practices.4 Treisman’s two points, however, are debateable in the 3

On the role of religion, Martin Luther King Jr stated that, “A religion true to its nature must also be concerned about man’s social conditions. Religion deals with both earth and heaven, both time and eternity. Religion operates not only on the vertical plane but also on the horizontal. It seeks not only to integrate men with God but to integrate men with men and each man with himself. This means, at bottom, that the Christian gospel is a two-way road. On the one hand, it seeks to change the souls of men and thereby unite them with God; on the other hand, it seeks to change the environmental conditions of men so that the soul will have a chance after it is changed. Any religion that professes to be concerned with the souls of men and is not concerned with the slums that damn them, the economic conditions that strangle them, and the social conditions that cripple them is a dry-as-dust religion. Such a religion is the kind the Marxists like to see – an opiate of the people” (King 1983:66). 4 Reflecting on the state of the South African Council of Churches (SACC), Niemandt (2010. www.beeld.co.za (accessed 5 August 2014),) paints an alarming picture. He expresses concern that the SACC has lost influence in South African society, highlighting its inability to develop a new identity after the struggle against Apartheid or act as a uniting force in the South African ecclesiastical sphere. He admits, however, that during Apartheid, the SACC provided a well-founded theological critique of the Apartheid system, unifying local church communities and mobilizing churches locally and internationally against the repressive political

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context of South-Africa, which has both a common law and an open, if young, democratic political system with a Constitution containing provisions to deal with corruption. Religion played, and still plays, a watchful role, especially in public affairs.5 Yet it seems that public officials, high-ranking politicians and even ordinary citizens are not afraid to be involved in acts of corruption or even to be caught. Even now, with former President Jacob Zuma’s involvement in the Gupta saga, he still asks the question, “What have I done wrong?” This kind of environment makes corruption attractive to people in all spheres of South African society. This trend, according to Naudé, is underlined by the fact that leaders’ unethical actions are hidden, condoned and, in the end, defended. Lies slowly turn into truths, wrong becomes the new right, and the true heroes are those who successfully game the system. Naudé argues that the more attempts there are to point out their wrongdoing, the higher such leaders seem to rise in people’s esteem, calling this the “cult of the counter-hero” (2014:79). Van der Merwe (2006:36) states that other causes of corruption, especially in South Africa’s public sector, are personal greed, poverty, poor

system. De Gruchy argues (1986:120) that the SACC took a leading role in the struggle against apartheid, producing the “Message to the people of South Africa”, which declared that Apartheid was an unjust political policy and contrary to the biblical message of reconciliation. Many hold the view that the SACC’s influence and public voice began to diminish soon after the transition to democracy. 5 Etzelmüller (2017:107-108) argues that the significance of religious communities in the evolution and preservation of the structures underlying civil society was emphasized in the nineteenth century by Alexis de Tocqueville. This has manifested most recently in the societal upheavals affecting Central and Eastern Europe. In the 1980s, the Catholic Church supported the independent Polish trade union Solidarnosc and its outspoken criticism of the state. With its highly sophisticated internal structures, the church was able to take a convincing stance against the totalitarian state and to function as the representative of Polish society as a whole. In the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany), the Protestant churches provided a protective roof under which oppositional groups promoting peace and environmentalism could assemble, as well as a public platform for the expression of their passionate criticism of the existing political system. But since the 1980s, churches and religious communities have figured increasingly as civil society actors in established democracies as well – as “a great movement for the defence of the human person and the safeguarding of human dignity” (John Paul III).

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checks and balances, poor salaries, a lack of ethics, and the decay of moral social values. To this Naudé adds the following explanation of how corruption came to be so prevalent. He points out that many people in government were deprived of a normal life by the Apartheid system. Some could not finish their schooling, others were not able to attend university, and quite a number had to go into exile, living under tough conditions in the fight for liberation. When liberation came, they had their first chance of gainful employment in political or state office. It is quite normal in any system of patronage that your networks give you a job. In such an environment, even those who are caught red-handed in corrupt activities are simply deployed elsewhere in the system, where they can lie low whilst continuing to benefit from the system. Some of the former freedom fighters may now argue that now is their “time to catch up”, to live the good life to which they had no access in the past. This is all overridden, Naudé argues, by the attitude that says, “I did not join the struggle to be poor” (2014:81–82). Naudé alludes to other contributing factors that sustain a corrupt society, such as the decline in family cohesion and substitute social groups where children can learn and see good values before the age of six. He also blames dysfunctional schools where children quickly learn that unprofessional conduct is the norm. He concludes by pointing out that many good people look around and realise that the only way to deal with corruption is to join the party – quickly (2014:86). Vorster notes that despite various court cases in which corrupt officials were exposed and sentenced, the wave of corruption has spread to all spheres of government. Bribery over the allocation of housing and infrastructure tenders by government officials is considered almost normal, with the term ‘tenderpreneurs’ used to describe people who enrich themselves by gaining contracts illegally or as a result of nepotism, political loyalties or pro-struggle credentials (2012:136). Vorster goes on to suggest that the underlying cause of corruption is to be found in an attitude of self-interest. Although self-interest is not immoral per se – it can be seen as an acceptable moral principle in business and in the administration of human rights – when it is based on immoral motivations or purposes or when self-interest roots in the misuse of public funds, it becomes theft. When it leads to greed and mere self-enrichment, it becomes a morally negative attitude. Self-interest becomes immoral when it leads to the exploitation of others. The danger is that corrupt officials can

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become so obsessed with the “self” that they totally disregard the interest of others, especially those with no voice such as the poor, the elderly, the sick, the disadvantaged and other people in need (2012:138). This attitude can lead to public officials who feel it is their right “to take from the system what is rightfully mine”. This, Vorster argues, can generate the perception that low-paid officials are taken advantage of, even exploited, and that they do not receive the recognition they deserve. In such an environment, public servants may steal from their department with the excuse that they are just taking what they in any case deserve. Such individuals defend their corrupt actions with the argument that they have a moral justification to enrich themselves at the expense of the exploitative system. Vorster offers another reason for corruption, where people argue that they are serving a “holy” purpose and that corruption, if it serves the purpose, can be justified (2012:139). This is seen in the appointment or promotion of individuals against the rules of fair access because those in charge are convinced that these appointees will best serve the ideology of the government or department. Even when corruption is done to help someone in need, it is for them fine and right, even justifiable, for example, where medical supplies are stolen from a hospital to treat patients who cannot afford medical treatment. This understanding of corruption – “taking what I deserve and stealing to help the needy” – portrays the idea that people see some form of dignity in corruption. Corruption has become a method to restore not just the individual’s own dignity, but that of deprived, marginalised and poor people. When people justify their corrupt actions as just and right, as holy, or as helping the less fortunate, people give dignity to corruption and thus see no wrong being done. In this way, corruption can become the norm, the acceptable way of doing things, even just. Naudé gives an example of this (2014:87- 88). A capitalist friend of his argues that if a poor and hungry young man steals your cellphone, for which he can get R100 to buy food for his family, he does not steal for himself, but for the survival of others. You do suffer, but that suffering cannot be compared with the pain of poverty and hunger. According to this argument, corruption may in some cases actually be good. The friend goes on to give an example of “speed money”. Say, for example, you need a passport or birth certificate urgently. When you get to Home Affairs, there are “runners”. If you pay them, they make sure your documents are processed

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faster than those of the people in the queue. They render a type of courier service. He argues the rule is the same as in normal life: if you have money, you can send your parcel fast. If you do not, it goes by snail mail. You have no control over whether the runners pay public officials a portion of your courier fee. Since you cannot control other people’s actions, you cannot be held responsible for what you do not know. He further argues that speed money is in line with the economic principle of efficiency. It creates jobs for people who probably lack the education to do something else. From the examples above, it is evident that corruption holds some dignity for people, and that this could be a driving force for people getting involved in corrupt acts. Some, as we have seen, blame apartheid; others blame economic inequality; and some argue it is “their time” and that they are due some benefits after a long life of deprivation, poverty and the struggle against racism. Others argue that they are simply helping themselves to what they need, or helping other people to get what they need to survive. Such arguments for dignity or the restoration of dignity are built on a premise of wrongdoing, and furthermore represent a failure to understand what dignity really is. In the following section we discuss the meaning and understanding of dignity.

The meaning and understanding of dignity Soulen and Woodhead (2006:3) state that the Christian tradition has used the term “dignity” with reference to human beings in many ways. They argue that the early Christian writers borrowed the term from Greco-Roman usage (Lat.: dignitas; Gk.: axioma), even as they put it to new uses in the context of Christian belief and practice. By the turn of the common Era, Cicero was using the term dignitas in two different senses, either as designating an individual’s distinctive rank in society, or as designating humankind’s distinctive place within the natural order. Thus, they are of the opinion that while Christians used the term in both ways, they tend to give greater emphasis to the second sense in light of their faith in God’s creative, redemptive and consummating purpose for mankind. Hoffman (2007:257) argues that because humans are created in the image and likeness of God, “humankind is given a permanent dignity which requires respect for human life (Gen. 9:6)”. To this, Spronk (2007:195) would add that if the human being – every human being – looks like God, we cannot think poorly of any individual. He argues that this quality is not

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lost with or through sin, because even after the first sin by Adam and Eve, we find the reference to humankind as the image of God repeated in Gen. 5:1 and 9:6. Watts (2006:254–255) admits that both theology and secular thinking posit human dignity as universal, but argues that they handle this in very different ways. In theological thinking, it is of great importance that human dignity should be seen as a gift.6 In secular thought, dignity and rights are closely intertwined. He argues that either it is because people have dignity that they have various rights, or else natural rights are taken as the basis of dignity. He holds the opinion that thinking theologically about dignity as gift represents a very different approach from the discourse about rights, to which dignity is often tied in contemporary thought. Therefore, he argues, to see dignity as a gift carries tasks and obligations appropriate to good stewardship of the gift, whereas treating it in terms of rights carries no such obligations. Watts (20006:249) further argues that the enlightenment idea that every human has dignity, and that the dignity of each human being is equal, is unsatisfactory theologically because it is too static. It leaves no room for eschatology, no scope for a dynamic unfolding of God’s purpose in relation to human dignity. He argues that we need to distinguish different senses of dignity. In one sense we have dignity already, but in another sense we do not yet have dignity in all its fullness. There is both a present actuality and a future potentiality about dignity. He continues to say that both are essential to an adequate theology of dignity. Koopman and Smith (2007:277), in their article “Public Witness in the economic sphere? On human dignity as a theological perspective”, pose a number of questions, starting with: What is human dignity? Can it be defined or described? Is it possible to give material content to the notion of human dignity? They describe how recent and contemporary discussions have shown that this is not really fully possible, even in those circles where people are deeply committed to the notion of and dedicated to serving and 6

Watts (2006:245–255) makes us aware of the different ways in which something can be experienced as a gift. It is possible for people to feel demeaned or patronized by being told that something is a gift when they feel it is a basic part of their nature or constitution, or something to which they are entitled. Alternatively, he continues, for people to be given a gift can be experienced as highly affirming and something very much to be welcomed. He also holds the view that when the Christian tradition speaks of something being a gift of God, though the latter is intended, sometimes, in the context of post-Enlightenment thought, it is heard as being patronizing.

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protecting human dignity. Nevertheless, they argue, it is possible to agree on certain characteristics, often defined negatively, for example in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, suggesting that human beings deserve to be protected from fear and want. They conclude their argument by saying that it is, however, helpful to link human dignity to freedom from fear and freedom from want, and to search for a means of common life, including economic life, that can contribute to the protection of human beings – very specific, concrete individuals and groups of human beings, under very specific and concrete conditions – from causes of fear and want that could indeed be prevented. Koopman (2007:177), however, holds the belief that to be human is to have dignity, that humanitas and dignitas are synonyms, and that to be human is to be fully a child of God. He further argues that this dignity is inalienable. It is indelible. It is a mark put on us by the love of God that permeates our being to the core. This dignity does not have to be earned. It cannot be lost. It is intimately ours and it is far more enduring than any of our characteristics. Taylor (1989:15) defines dignity as “the characteristics by which we think of ourselves as commanding (or failing to command) the respect of those around us”. De Lange (2007:214–215) holds the view that dignity in modern times has been personalised by becoming less and less a possession that is taken for granted, based on social standing. He argues that dignity and worth are obtained on the basis of personal talents and achievements which are highly estimated by modern culture that makes dignity far deeper rooted in personality than was the case in the aristocratic past. He secondly argues that dignity has also become a moral, more than only a social concept. Self-respect is the subjective expression of individual worth. He further states that dignity also became universalised. He explains this by saying that in the human rights tradition and the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) dignity no longer depends on one’s social status within a concrete community, but is based solely on one’s being human, whether understood as a rational agent (Kant) or as creature of God. Dignity transcends community membership, since one is a member of the human family. Being human suffices for having human dignity. Bouwer (2007:267), on the other hand, is in direct opposition to the above scholars and those who argue for dignity and human dignity, when he argues in favour of honour instead. He is of the opinion that honour is a more dynamic concept than human dignity, because it incorporates both acting and being. Additionally, the honour of man and the honour of God

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are not mutually exclusive, as seems to be in the case with dignity. Honour has two sides, namely dignity and self-respect. The meaning of dignity has shifted toward a kind of honour that is automatic rather than earned. He argues that in the current political discourse it is especially related to race, sexual orientation and national origin. Dignity thus comprises respect for others, in the sense of the objective, unbiased consideration and regard for their rights, values, beliefs and property. In this sense, dignity relates to the public and political existence of human beings in an organised society that acknowledges that all people in it are connected to one another by a common fate and destiny. Self-respect refers to the respect a person has for him or herself. This self-respect implies that one values oneself with generosity and leniency from the perspective of what one strives to become as the fulfilment of one’s personal destiny in life. He underlines this thinking by saying that, psychologically speaking, self-respect can be achieved only when one experiences an appropriate level of respect in all circumstances, regardless of whether or not the respecter feels that the person potentially respected has earned it. Only then does a person become dignified, he concludes. Koopman (2007:178) reminds us that dignity can be violated when and where the basic needs of humans are not met. He bases his argument on the three levels of needs identified by Abraham Maslow: primary needs, such as water, food, clothes, shelter, protection, medical care and education; secondary needs – the need for social relations and inclusion in the social, economic, political and cultural life of society; and tertiary needs – the need to develop and actualise one’s potential with regards to artistic, aesthetical, cultural, intellectual or other engagement. Tillich (1952:37–51) strengthens Koopman’s and Maslow’s argument when he depicts a life of anxiety might also be a way of describing a life in which dignity is not flourishing. Tillich identifies three types of anxieties, which he calls the anxiety of finitude and death, the anxiety of meaninglessness and purposelessness, and the anxiety of guilt and rejection. Koopman (2007:179) holds the view that since the South African Bill of Rights entrenches human dignity in both its preamble and clauses, dignity constitutes the foundation of the Bill of Rights, and should therefore be the guiding principle in all policies and practices in all walks of life in South African society. He further states that, based on the commitment to dignity, three dimensions of rights are articulated in the Bill of Rights: civil and political rights; social and economic rights; and developmental and ecological rights.

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Metz argues in his article, “An African theory of dignity and a relational conception of poverty” (2011:233–241), that dignity is to be found in the African concept of ubuntu, which expresses the idea that “a person is a person through other persons”. He argues that the sense of dignity he is interested in is the one that is thought to be equal among (nearly) all human beings and is plausibly taken as the foundation of human rights, as is done in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations 1948). The question he seeks to answer is: given the philosophical interpretation of ubuntu that prescribes prizing communal or loving relationships with others, which conception of dignity, as the basis of an equal moral worth among human beings warranting respect, does it underwrite? He suggests that the answer is to be found in the way one should develop one’s personhood, namely, “through persons, i.e. by entering into community with others”. One does not, he continues, become a real person by tending rose bushes or saving beached whales, given these actions have no bearing on the lives of other human beings. Instead, in typical South African thinking, one lives a genuinely human way of life only by communing with other human beings. What is it, then, about human beings that makes them the proper objects of community or love? His suggestion is that humans are the most important beings on the planet and demand our love in virtue of their superlative capacity to be part of a loving relationship. Human beings are sensibly deemed to have dignity insofar as they have a great capacity for communal relationships. An African ethic, as he interprets it, instructs us to respond to beings with a great capacity for community in a way that prizes community with them, that is, that draws out, or actualises, this capacity (2011:236–237). Wolbert, in his article “Human dignity, human rights and torture” (2007:167), argues that whatever has no equivalent cannot be weighed against something else. Whatever has a price can be exchanged, has some value, corresponds to some human need or taste.7 However, he holds thus that human dignity has no price, no equivalent, no quantitative dimension. Wolbert concludes by saying that the only presupposition of human dignity

7

Wolbert (2007:167), by way of example, argues that a shoemaker cannot offer an architect an equivalent in shoes for his house, and that money is an easily manageable equivalent, facilitating choices. Another example he gives is that of the “cost” of an action, the price we have to pay for it – in other words, the evil we have to “buy” to obtain a certain good. Similarly, one has to accept the side-effects of certain medicines, the (literal and metaphorical) price to be paid for one’s cure.

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is the “effort to be born”; thus even a criminal is not regarded as a secondclass citizen.

Conclusion Corruption has become the common enemy amongst those who are honest, just and ethical, and those who strive to build a humane, dignified and righteous society. Corruption seems to be growing in attractiveness among people in all spheres of society as a means to escape want, neglect, loss or being deprived of opportunities. When what was once considered “wrong” becomes the “new right way” to do things, and when corruption is seen as a way to find dignity, we all have to stand up and be counted. This perception – that corruption can generate or restore a person’s dignity – is false, wrong and a distortion of dignity, and more so of human dignity as understood by believers and unbelievers alike: namely that human dignity is inherent, it is a marker of humanity, its God’s mark put on us in and through His love. Corruption, as such, can never be seen as a means to gain or restore dignity, or worse, to claim human dignity. Corruption is not a vehicle that can actualise and operationalise a life of dignity. On the contrary, corruption is a betrayal of a life of dignity for all. It violates the esteem, honour, respect, reverence, worth and value that is implied in the notion of dignity. It betrays the moral vision, values, virtue, character, policies and practices that flow from dignity as the most foundational moral principle. Dignity – and at best, human dignity – is, as the above paragraphs argue, God-given and inalienable. Human dignity is not just a gift from God, it is a right to which every human creature is entitled. There is no replacement for it, it has no equivalent; it is priceless and precious and has to be respected and protected.

References Bouwer, J. 2007. Human dignity and HIV/Aids. Scriptura 95: 262–268. De Gruchy, J. 1986. The church struggle in South Africa. 2nd Edition. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmands Publishing Company. De Lange, F. 2007. “Having faith in yourself”: Self-respect and human dignity. Scriptura 95:213–223. Etzelmüller, G. 2017. ‘Religious communities, churches and civil society’. In M. Welker, N. Koopman and J. M. Vorster (eds) Church and Civil

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Society. German and South African Perspectives. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Sun Press. Hoffman, C. 2007. ‘The dignity of intimacy: Confessing it in order to rediscover it’. Scriptura 95:253–261. Holmes, L. 2015. Corruption: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. King, C. 1983. The words of Martin Luther King Jr. New York: Newmarket Press. Koopman, N. 2007. Some theological and anthropological perspectives on human dignity and human rights. Scriptura 95:177–185. Koopman, N. and Smit, D. 2007. ‘Public witness in the economic sphere/ On human dignity as a theological perspective’. In L. Hansen (ed.) Christian in Public. Aims, Methodologies and issues in Public Theology. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Sun Media. Metz, T. 2011. ‘An African theory of dignity and a relational conception of poverty’. In L. de Gruchy (ed) The Humanist Imperative in South Africa pp. 233–241. Stellenbosch: Sun Press. Naudé, P. 2014. Reading between the (head)lines. On life in South Africa. Rosebank. South Africa: Times Media Books. Niemandt, N. 2010. Broodnodig maar futloos. SA Raad van Kerke moet plan maak om weer gehoor te word. www.beeld.co.za (accessed 5 August 2014). Osoba, S. O. 1996. Corruption in Nigeria: historical perspectives. Review of African Political Economy, 23(69):371–386. Republic of South Africa. 1996. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Pretoria: Government Printers. Soulen, R. K. and Woodhead, L. (eds) 2006. God and human dignity. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Company. Spronk, K. 2007. The human being as the image of God and slaughtered in the name of God: A biblical subversion of ancient and modern concepts of human dignity. Scriptura, 95:195–201. Taylor, C. 1989. Sources of the self. The making of modern identity. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press. Tillich, P. 1952 repr. 1961. The courage to be. London: James Nisbet and Company. Treisman, D. 2000. The causes of corruption: A cross-national study. Journal of Public Economics, 76:399–457. Van der Merwe, A. 2006. The nature and causes of corruption: The perceptions of KZN public service managers and anti-corruption agents. Journal of Public Administration, 4191:32–46.

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Vorster, J. M. 2012. Managing corruption in South Africa: The ethical responsibility of churches. Scriptura 109:133–147. Watts, F. 2006. “Human dignity: Concepts and experiences.” In K. Soulon and L. Woodhead (eds) God and Human Dignity. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmands Publishing Company. Wolbert, W. 2007. Human dignity, human rights and torture. Scriptura, 95:166–176).

CHAPTER 4 THE FACES OF CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA: TOWARDS A NEW THINKING IN THE REVERSE ORDER

BENSON OHIHON IGBOIN1 (DEPARTMENT OF RELIGION AND AFRICAN CULTURE, ADEKUNLE AJASIN UNIVERSITY, AKUNGBA-AKOKO, ONDO STATE, NIGERIA)

Abstract Discourses on corruption and anti-corruption in Nigeria have, over the years, been viewed as a mere academic exercise because they have not involved any corresponding practical steps to deal with the scourge. Although solutions have been proffered at both national and international levels and anti-corruption agencies established, corruption evidently thrives healthily in almost every sector of the country. Even the current government, which has taken anti-corruption as its pivotal policy, has been so often indicted for corrupt practices that its anti-corruption refrains and ethos are regarded as meaningless. Consequently, it is argued in this paper that the various regimes in the country and the people who receive the blunt effects of corruption actually promote it in some ways. This paper analyses 20 ways in which Nigeria has been fostering corruption. It argues that the present thinking – that corruption should be sustained because it benefits some people directly or indirectly – must be reversed: corruption should be regarded as cancerous and be treated as such. It is suggested that political will should be driven by passion rather than rhetoric that presently dictates anti-corruption processes.

1 Academic Associate of the Research Institute of Theology and Religion, University

of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa.

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Keywords: Corruption; anti-corruption; “anti–anti-corruption”; political will; bribery; religionisation; spiritualisation; mediatisation; socialisation

Introduction There is an abundance of literature on corruption, even as corrupt practices reinvent themselves in evolutionary phases. The ever-evolving definitions and dimensions of corruption in scholarship and human societies have given rise to continuous debate, the tightening of legislation and technological intervention against corruption. Interestingly, corrupt practices never cease reinventing themselves in human societies. The causes, effects and solutions to corruption have dominated scholarship for good reasons. The extent to which these have been conceptualised, understood, appropriated and acted upon is open to debate, particularly in Nigeria. Although anti-corruption has become a refrain in religious and secular circles in Nigeria, this Chapter argues that there are complex and interrelated facets of corruption that have made it difficult to fight. The question “what is corruption?” has continued to attract variegated and polyvalent responses. This is so because corruption is a sly concept that has a tendency to mutate. Defining corruption is made even more complicated when viewed from different contextual lenses. One example of this is the concept of Nigerian or African corruption, as if there is something peculiarly Nigerian or African about corruption (De Maria 2009; Pierce 2016:5). The global uprising against corruption – that is, the drive for anticorruption – whether through commissions, agencies, policies or strategies, also adds to the complexity of defining corruption. This is because, as some scholars have argued, the term anti-corruption has, in several contexts, been used “corruptly” – for example, as a pre-condition for the dispensation of international aid or the formalisation of bilateral engagements, with the aim of gaining dubious concessions for some vested interests (Moyo 2009; Okonjo-Iweala 2012).2 Nevertheless, the very awareness of anti-corruption means the presence of corruption, and the reasons behind it, have to be fought. However, some have also argued that corruption should not be regarded as completely evil or negative. For this school of thought, corruption has a 2 Okonjo-Iweala does not view it this way, although a closer review of her book demonstrates this clearly.

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functionalist perspective that should be worked into the equation, not only in intellectual disquisition but also in praxis. Although the international movement against corruption would view this position as unhelpful in anticorruption crusades, there is, nevertheless, evidence demonstrating that corruption has not actually reduced in global scale, as the news media daily show. This leads to some salient questions about the nature of humanity and corruption. Do we assume that human beings are inherently good and will see the merit of avoiding graft and corruption because of its negative impact on society? Or, do we assume that people are inherently evil and that we live in a Hobbesian “state of nature” in which life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”? There are those who would argue that corruption, like prostitution and poverty, will never be eradicated and that, while bureaucracy and its rules are essential safeguards, there are special occasions when in order to make an omelette, many bureaucratic eggshells must be broken. (Brown 2007:xi)

One might also, however cite the Nigerian proverb which observes that the hen that lays the eggs that human beings use for omelettes feels some pain. Although difficult to define, one knows what corruption is when one sees it or is involved in it. According to Keefe (2015), the word “corruption” is derived from the Latin corrumpere, which can mean to bribe, but also to mar or destroy. Yet, on the available evidence, corruption has always permeated so many fields of human endeavour that it may be not a corruption of anything - but, rather, a regrettable feature of our natural condition. Accountable government is an ideal, to be sure. It may also be an aberration.

Indeed, as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime observes, “Corruption is a challenge that no country or sector can claim to be immune to” (UNODC 2014:2). Rick Stapenhurst, Niall Johnston and Riccardo Pellizo (2006) argue that if and when governments act according to the standards that are constitutionally demanded of them, especially in carrying out their oversight functions creditably, corrupt practices are greatly reduced. Edgardo Campos and Sanjay Pradhan (2007) provide empirical research backed with rigorous analysis to reveal the effects of corruption in various sectors of various nations. Rather than discussing corruption in ambiguous ways, they provide very incisive analyses of how corruption thrives in different sectors and the

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many ways it manifests. From this basis, they argue that anti-corruption efforts should be geared to tackle specific corrupt practices in particular sectors instead of applying a one-cap-fits-all approach. Smith (2007), Pierce (2016), Ellis (2016) and, to some extent, Rotberg (2017) have discussed the peculiarities of Nigerian corruption. They tend to argue that the culture of Nigeria may have something to do with the pervasiveness of corruption in the country. While they insist on culture as a precursor of corruption in Nigeria either from their anthropological, historical or political methodology, they deny the effects of colonial influence on Nigeria. Ellis even goes so far as to exonerate Lord Lugard from all colonial crimes and the inhuman treatment meted out to Nigerians. He refuses to admit the self-confession of a British octogenarian who revealed massive election rigging to favour a particular region of the country. The corrupt seeds sown by the British have continued to rob the country of peace and development (Igboin 2017). Pierce corroborates Ellis’s position: Nigerian corruption has a complex history woven around its culture. This same thinking vilifies precolonial Nigerian culture and treats gift-giving and receiving as part of the corrupt practices that we now look upon anew. While the existence of corruption in precolonial times cannot be denied (see Igboin 2016a), it would be a sheer naivety not to admit that colonialism embodied corruption, or to acknowledge its corruptive effects on Nigerian culture. One implication of insisting that corruption is a cultural matrix is that culture is not fought; yet attempts have been made to fight it. The other side of it is the demand for and supply of corruption, especially in the context of the widely discussed email scams. This is not to suggest that there is no corruption in Nigeria; it is rife and thriving. Rotberg is enthusiastic about the efforts of President Muhammadu Buhari to deal a heavy blow against corruption, as no other before him had done. Of course, it is all but certain that if he were writing this book today, after four years of the Buhari presidency, Rotberg would not say most of the things he said about Buhari’s integrity and commitment to fighting corruption. As he rightly argued, however, dealing with corruption requires political will, and more than that alone. Integrity is also important. Integrity is not just a label, as it is being flagged in Nigeria: it expresses a transparently honest life that matches with society’s shared principles. In the context of anti-corruption in Nigeria, one still wonders whether there is such a thing as perfect integrity (Igboin 2018a). Political will is required; integrity is the virtue that keeps the will above board, and passion for anticorruption is the vehicle that transports it to its destination. Okonjo-Iweala (2012, 2018) argues that integrity and political will are good, but are not

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enough to pursue a credible anti-corruption policy in Nigeria; that requires an unwavering and stubborn passion, as well as real powers to deal with what one could refer to as “anti–anti-corruption” forces in Nigeria. “Political will is absent when the big fish are protected from prosecution for corruption and only small fish are caught. Under these circumstances, the anti-corruption strategy lacks credibility and is doomed to failure” (Quah 2003:181). Having said that, this chapter analyses 20 points that form the faces of corruption in Nigeria. It is demonstrated that previous and present efforts to deal with corruption have not gone beyond these faces, and that underestimating them will further compound efforts to combat them. These factors are by no means exhaustive; they are also not chronological.

The faces of corruption in Nigeria 1. The religionisation of corruption Nigerians are said to be among the most religious people in the world. Religion seems to define almost everything they do: they love and hate religiously, kill and save religiously, rob and corrupt religiously (Igboin 2010). But beyond this, the religionisation of corruption refers to the efforts made by some religious leaders and institutions to shield their members from prosecution when caught in corrupt practices. In this sense, the argument is that corruption should not be fought because those who are involved in it belong to a particular religion. Religious solidarity and corruption form a formidable bulwark against anti-corruption efforts. Here, corruption cases are sometimes not determined by law but by recourse to the leadership of the particular religion to which the accused belongs. The “universal” brotherhood of (a corrupt) humankind under the same Fatherhood of God is invoked. Here, again, doctrines of uprightness, honesty, holiness and so on become subservient to the whims and caprices of religious politics. In public, the brotherhood of corrupt officials manifestly defends its own members when they are accused of corruption against others’ interests. Its leadership sometimes meets nocturnally with the authorities and begs them to end the prosecution of members of that brotherhood. We can observe that such cases typically take so long to proceed through the courts that they can become completely lost and forgotten in the judicial woods.

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2. The spiritualisation of corruption This argument makes recourse to metaphysical powers. Rather than admit responsibility for their corrupt behaviour, the corrupt confess that the “devil” pushed them into the act. Many normative questions arise at this moment: who is in possession of the corruptly acquired wealth, the person or the devil? Who should face the wrath of the law, the person or the devil? However, the widespread phenomenon of the devil theory is just one side of the coin. The other side has to do with those who testify that God has prospered by them having corruptly enriched themselves, in blatant disregard of the fact that they have denied others their legitimate access to the benefits that have been appropriated. Shamefully, many so-called spiritual leaders pray for these crooks and also provide safe haven for them. Some spiritual leaders have argued that until members who are so accused have been convicted by the courts, they remain innocent. While this explanation is legitimate, it is less than desirable against the backdrop of the famously tortuous legal trials in the Nigerian courts, especially in contexts where damning evidence abounds. Another form of the spiritualisation of corruption has to do with the use of juju. This is now prominently demonstrated in Yahoo Plus Plus, a euphemism that explains a combination of human rituals and technological (Internet) dexterity used to dupe people of their hard-earned money and (believably) make the culprits invisible to anti-corruption agencies (Smith 2007; Ololajulo 2015; Ellis 2016).

3. The ethnicisation of corruption In Nigeria, there is strong ethnic solidarity. Communities will often rally in support of officials from their group who are being investigated or tried for corruption. For example, some former Heads of State openly defended a certain notoriously corrupt late Head of State, General Sani Abacha, whose laundered money is still being returned from overseas several years after his demise. Their decision to rally around Abacha was an indisputable demonstration of ethnic solidarity for one of their own, despite the fact the whole world knew he was “incurably” or “fantastically” corrupt.3 They even 3 See “The Return of the Saints: Buhari, IBB & Abdulsalam,” Nigeria Village Square, http://nigeriavillagesquare.com/forum/threads/the-return-of-the-saints-buhari-ibbabdulsalam.20232/. Buhari was reported to have said the following about Abacha: “All the allegations levelled against the personality of the late Gen. Sani Abacha will remain allegations. It is 10 years now, things should be over by now.” It is on record that President Obasanjo’s administration fought to repatriate much of Abacha’s loot, which is well known globally. It is worthy of note that Buhari’s administration is

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argue that Abacha contributed immensely to national development. Ogungbemi (2007:46) also supports this view, suggesting that if corrupt officials build a cottage hospital for their community out of the proceeds of corruption, they should be celebrated and defended. It is a positive corruption! Ironically, President Muhammadu Buhari, who is one of those defending Abacha as incorrupt, has received two huge tranches of Abacha’s loot. The public defence of Abacha by a government that claims to prioritize anti-corruption raises critical questions about the integrity of the anticorruption efforts. For Abacha’s family, the pouring of such encomiums upon their father was a moral boost. Ellis (2016:91) says, in this regard, that “when caught with their hand in the till, they claim it was for the tribe, or [that] the person catching them is practicing tribalism.”

4. The professionalisation of corruption Akin to the ethnicization of corruption, people of the same profession have been observed forming pressure groups to lobby against the prosecution of members accused of corruption. The range of professionalisation is very broad: religious groups, military, civil and public services, artisanship, civil societies, and so on. The solidarity of their membership against anticorruption crusades is both subtle and subversive. Ellis (2016:90–91) gives an example about the military: “the coup-makers instituted a discourse of anti-corruption that was to be used by every military government that followed. Every subsequent military leader was to claim that only military discipline and the ruthless elimination of individuals identified as guilty could address the problem of corruption that was holding Nigeria back. In reality, successive military governments soon learned that the rhetoric of anti-corruption … was less a rule to be applied than a set of measures that could be invoked selectively, according to the political needs of those in power.” Even after the end of military regimes in Nigeria, the retired generals still often publicly defend their own when accused of corruption. The defence of the late General Sani Abacha by General Muhammadu now receiving some of the stolen public money by Abacha. According to Babangida, “It is not true that [Abacha] looted the public treasury; I knew who Abacha was because I was close to him.” Ironically, all the monies being returned from Abacha’s loot were stolen by Abacha from Abacha’s private purse rather than public treasury. Only Abdulsalam was slightly careful in his statements. Rather than defend Abacha, he defended his family: “It is quite unfortunate and unfair to accuse the family of the late Sani Abacha of looting public funds.” These northern rulers of the country offer a good example of how to defend a member of one’s ethnic and professional affiliation group.

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Buhari, the incumbent president, and General Abubakar Abdusalam, among others, is a quintessential example of this.

5. The politicisation of corruption Those in political office do not prosecute members of their political party alleged to be corrupt unless they are out to score cheap political points. Such scape-goatism may well be mere playing to the galley. Sources have shown that many of those attacked openly in this way may be rewarded secretly in other ways. In fact, sooner rather than later, many of the accused are seen occupying other high offices. Political witch-hunts in the name of anti-corruption crusades are one aspect of the politicisation of corruption. Members of the opposition who are alleged to be corrupt are prosecuted, but those who are smart enough quickly cross-carpet to the ruling party and assume the status of “political saints” overnight. The incumbent national Chairman of the ruling All Progressive Congress publicly said that those who cross-carpet to his party would have their sins forgiven automatically. Interestingly, this has been observed to be so. It has, however, been observed that the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari is the most notorious for shielding and politicising corruption at the turn of this democratisation process, unlike Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) who sacked some erring ministers and appointees, or Goodluck Jonathan (20112015) who also sacked at least two ministers and some appointees. Buhari, whose slogan has been anti-corruption, is yet to do so despite public outcry against some of his ministers. Indeed, he reappointed many of them to his cabinet in July 2019.

6. The historicisation of corruption Anyone who is conversant with the political history of corruption in Nigeria will realise that every incumbent government offers a long history of the corruption of their predecessors in office. Right from the first military intervention in the political history of Nigeria, the corrupt activities of past regimes have always been chronicled in public speeches. In fact, no government’s anti-corruption crusade has been free from this escapist stratagem, because none have truly faced the “monster” head-on. Right up to the end of their tenures, Nigeria’s leaders never stop rehashing the history of their predecessors’ corruption while glorifying themselves for the shallow scratches they have inflicted on the face of corruption. Falola and Dauda posit that using history in this way is actually a negative form of “historiotherapy”. According to them, “a number of politicians and Nigerian

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academic historians and historiographers have attempted to advance history to historiotherapy, just as psychiatrists and psychologists advanced their fields to psychoanalysis and psychotherapy” (Falola and Dauda 2017:65). While any incumbent government usually attempts to exploit historiotherapy in its favour, the people, more often than not, are not so easily fooled.

7. The rationalisation of corruption It is not uncommon to hear people say that the focus of anti-corruption agencies is on petty corruption while grand corruption is neglected. Some even opine that corruption coupled with the availability of basic amenities is better than anti-corruption and the absence of basic amenities. In 2016, when there was a dire scarcity of fuel and prices for food and other basic needs sky-rocketed, many Nigerians vociferously complained that corruption played a more important role in Nigeria’s economy than anticorruption. Another point of contention refers to plea-bargaining arrangements that grant individuals guilty of corruption on a grand scale the latitude to negotiate with government, while a man who steals a governor’s phone is swiftly sentenced to many years in jail. This is partly why Rotberg correctly describes Nigeria’s anti-corruption efforts as “Three Steps Forward, Four Backward” and describes Nigeria as “a special, tough and complicated case” (Rotberg 2017:136). Noonan, Jr (1984:554–555) captures this explicitly in the following submission: Among the academicians a spectrum of attitudes toward bribery was discernible. For a minority … it was a serious social issue. For the majority, attitudes ranged from formal and uninterested disapproval to acceptance and rationalization of at least some forms of the phenomenon. Theologians downplayed the topic, often provided an excuse for the bribegiver, relieved the bribetaker of the obligation to account to his principal; nonetheless, they considered bribetaking a sin, offensive to God, repugnant to justice. Legal scholars who did not care to investigate bribery still knew that it was a crime and to be shunned. Psychiatric writers, explaining bribery by childhood deprivations, understood involvement in it as a personality disorder. For anthropologists the concept was a zero, a blank. The social scientists found a positive value in some forms of bribery which were necessary to the functioning of the society – paradoxically for them corruption could, in some instances, be integrative. Journalists … [and] historians … were with the social scientists. The accusatorial aspect of bribery tradition, so prominent in authors … had no strong attraction for any of these observers of human relationships. They did not see their purposes served in arranging a group or an institution as corrupt. They found no gratification in judging particular individuals as faithless officials or destructive corruptors.

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8. The centralisation of corruption Many Nigerians believe that the Nigerian Federal Government is too powerful in comparison to the federated states. Those who support this argument argue that because of the central government’s access to massive resources from the states, those at the centre corrupt themselves absolutely. They hold that there should be a devolution of powers to the states, giving them control of a substantial amount of their resources. This argument is being pursued as though the states themselves are immune to corruption. It can be generally observed that many states in the Nigerian federation do not, in practice, do very much to tackle corruption. Apart from issuing statements against corruption and mouthing platitudes, almost nobody at the state level is prosecuted for corruption. One of the more obvious ways state officials engage in corruption is by pilfering the funds allocated to local government councils. In fact, many state governors have been indicted for enriching themselves through corrupt practices.

9. The Constitutionalisation of corruption According to Williams (2019), the Nigerian Constitution confers immense powers on the president. The president is “not accountable to anyone except God.” Williams argues that all the anti-corruption agencies are creation of the executive arm of government and they report to it. As can be currently observed in Nigeria, anti-corruption agencies such as the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Crimes Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) take directives from the presidency. These agencies are not independent, and thus cannot act as freely as they might wish (assuming they want to act independently).4 This lack of independence stifles their anti-corruption efforts. Rotberg (2017: 139) underscores this argument, calling the ICPC “a puppet of the executive.” The failure of the ICPC to deal with corruption led to the establishment of the EFCC, but “the appointing authority in this case was much the same as the ICPC; the president was at any time allowed to remove its chairman with notable cause. In many ways, too, the national attorney general also had a statutory right to interfere in the day-to-day workings of the commission” (Rotberg 2017:139–140).

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General Ishola Williams made this argument during the AU Anti-Corruption Conference in Abuja, Nigeria, 11–14 July 2019.

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10. The socialisation of corruption One alarming face of corruption in Nigeria is its growing acceptance in society. Many, including this writer, have argued that the home should be the bastion of hope to deal with the scourge of corruption. In both rural and urban spaces, however, it is being observed that many homes are involved in socialising their wards towards corruption. It is not infrequent to find parents impersonating their children in national examinations, bribing teachers so that their children go to the head of their class, or directly instructing offspring to be “smart” and “wise” – euphemisms for corruption. Unlike the traditional community setting, many contemporary families protect their wards when they are caught in corrupt practices. Smith (2007) suggests that the prevalence of corruption in both the public and private spheres could be described as culture of corruption – that is, a way of life which is not fought against, even though actions seem to be taken against it. Ellis (2016) is more stringent, citing Collin Powell’s assertion that corruption is a “natural culture” of Nigerians. Ellis seems to feel a need to interrogate the precolonial history of Nigeria – although, of course, there was no “Nigeria” until the arrival of the British. The point Ellis belabours is that acts of gift-giving, when properly studied, could pass for corruption. But the point he misses is that colonialism was a corruption of the Nigerian system of government (Igboin 2017). In addition, strings-attached development aid predicated on the receiving country’s anti-corruption activities is, in itself, a type of innate corruption which stereotypes Africans as culturally corrupt. De Maria (2009:357) warns that “the West’s construction of African ‘corruption’ is shallow, oblivious to cultural variance and ultimately designed to serve its own economic and geopolitical interests under the guise of eradicating something falsely portrayed as completely negative.”

11. The legal-moralisation of corruption Roughly understood, legal-morality is a theory that states that “whatever is legal is moral” (Lutzer 1993:63). Legality has recourse to enacted laws, but in practice it comes down to the opinion of the judges who interpret and pronounce what is legal and, therefore, acceptable and legitimate. Igboin (2007, 2016b) argues that most judgements from the courts do not reflect the spirit of the Constitution, but whenever they are made, they have to be obeyed. They are obeyed not because they in fact always reflect morality, but because this is demanded by the authorities of the state. Recourse to what is now popularly referred to as “technicalities of the law” in Nigeria is a clear demonstration of the legalisation and moralisation of corruption. A

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technicality of the law does not support the facts of a case or the morality of the community, but rather the interests of the powerful. Some of those who have been caught red-handed have been acquitted or had their cases discharged by the courts on technical rather than practical grounds, thus emboldening others to continue in the act of corruption. But whether their legal discharge translates into moral acquittal is a contentious issue. In its true sense, legality cannot define morality; thus, to always refer to legalmorality with regard to corruption is to give a false perception of corruption, especially in Nigeria, where the judiciary is largely susceptible to massive corruption.

12. Perceptions of corruption Ishaq Oloyede adds a critical aspect of how corruption is being perpetrated in Nigeria. He argues that there are emic (insider) and etic (outsider) sides to perceiving corruption. Usually, the etic viewpoint (of people outside of government) criticises the government for appointing and patronising obviously corrupt individuals who would, ordinarily, be swiftly prosecuted and jailed by any government that was truly serious about fighting corruption. The emic viewpoint (of those within government) tends towards the idea that to pull allegedly corrupt individuals out of government would undermine in critical ways the apparatus and functioning of government, and even undermine its anti-corruption efforts. This is because those individuals have entrenched themselves deeply into government and, like a “cabal”, can pull strings that would destabilise the entire government. Rather than tackle their corruption head on, the government instead choses to deal with such individuals systematically and slowly while keeping the government functioning.5 This kind of thinking is akin to what pharmacologists refer to as hormesis, “a small dose of a harmful substance [that] is actually beneficial for the organism, acting as a medicine” (Falola and Dauda 2017:64). Except for those who align with the party in power, most Nigerians perceive this style of fighting corruption as actually promoting it. This is what Ellis (2016:89) refers to as government corruption: “government corruption came to be seen as something close to patriotism.”

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Professor Oloyede made this position during the AU conference held in Abuja, Nigeria between 11 and 14 July, 2019.

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13. The promotion and celebration of corruption It may sound bizarre to non-Nigerians to say that the same Nigerian government that claims internationally to be fighting corruption is actually promoting and celebrating corruption and corrupt individuals. And yet, for instance, the ministerial list President Buhari sent to the National Assembly in July 2019 contains the names of nominees who are standing trial for grand corruption. Goje’s N25 billion case was dropped out of court on the order of the federal government after he was pressed not to stand for the Senate presidency against the candidate President Buhari was assumed to prefer. Akpabio’s N10 billion court case was dropped when he decamped to the President’s party, in which he is now a minister. Sylva’s N19 billion case was also dropped after he crossed the carpet to the President’s party; his 48 houses, which were previously confiscated by government, have been returned to him (Omokri 2019). Maina was dismissed for alleged commission of financial fraud to the tune of N100 billion in 2010, and was declared wanted by the EFCC. He was later restored to office, promoted and paid emoluments for the period he was dismissed (Akinkuotu 2017). Kperogi points to investigations that have revealed that some ministerial nominees paid as much as N2 billion to the President’s cabal. He asserts that “Buhari’s second term is also shaping up to be an unprecedented raucous celebration of corruption, injustice, depravity, and debauchery.”6 The US government also revealed that “there is a climate of impunity in the President Muhammadu Buhari government that allows officials to engage in corrupt practices with a sense of exemption from punishment.”7 Consequently, Fasan (2019) concludes “President Buhari is also guilty of corruption.”

14. The hierarchicalisation or classification of corruption Another curious observation has to do with how acts of corruption are hierarchicalised or classified. Major interests are invested in grand corruption rather than the petty type. In many instances, and depending on who is involved, it is not uncommon to read about how a person being prosecuted for stealing public funds is cited by some as actually having stolen less than another person who is not being prosecuted at all. Of course, there are arguments that grand corruption is more injurious to the development of a polity, but the way many Nigerians classify corrupt 6

Farooq Kperogi, “Ministership for Sale: Up to N2.5b Per Slot” @farroqkperogi See “EFCC rejects US Report on Corruption in Buhari Administration,” Sahara Reporters, 21 March, 2019.

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practices sometimes gives the impression of a euphemism suggesting that corruption is tolerable and excusable. Government disposition does not help matters either: those who are highly placed are protected, while commoners are vulnerable. The result is glaring: corruption is allowed to thrive.

15. The regionalisation of corruption This was recently taken to ridiculous dimensions when a governor in the northern part of the country reportedly said that the north is less corrupt than the south. It is beyond dispute that the colonial amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protectorates in 1914 was not successful in unifying the culturally diverse peoples of Nigeria. There are persistent tensions as well as simmering suspicions between the south and the north. Calls to either balkanise or restructure the country are vociferous in times of national agitation. Nevertheless, Ellis makes the following point against this kind of grandstanding: Any investigation in Nigeria into corruption in public life must be limited by the very pervasiveness of the corruption. This was certainly the case in regard to the Northern Region. Corruption in some quarters in the North was comparable in degree to that which existed in other parts of Nigeria … but … the various committees of inquiry did not want to deal harshly with people belonging to the traditional ruling class that wielded such power in the Region. (Ellis 2016:82–83)

However, according to Ellis (2016), only two Nigerians who have served in government can be said not to have been corrupt: one from the north, a Muslim man called Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, who is still alive, and a Christian woman from the south, now deceased, Professor Dora Akunyili.

16. The mediatisation of corruption There are several arguments simmering over how the Nigerian media have handled reports into corruption. Some scream out headlines on their front pages but do nothing more than that. Others rely almost exclusively on foreign media reports to explain what is happening in their domain. Another problem is that, depending on who owns the outlet or towards whom it bends, critical reportage relating to patrons’ spheres of influence is often omitted. Generally speaking, though, most Nigerian media outlets do not follow up on stories after the initial outbreak of a scandal. This, in its own way, enables corruption, by sparking the general public’s interest with

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breaking news stories as a way of killing interest in the prevailing corruption cases. Accordingly, Oyeyebi (2018:244) suggests: In order to combat corruption effectively therefore, the media have the onerous task to reverse their present thinking and handling of corruption in the country. No responsible media can continue to act as if corruption is neutral in its effects on the nation. This is why it is suggested that the Nigerian media should dispassionately follow up news with the mind to contribute to the anti-corruption crusade.

In addition, Oyeyebi notes that the phenomenon of “brown envelope journalism” is damaging to the integrity of the press: “Although Nigeria has a vibrant and (mostly) free press, brown envelope journalism is rife: for both media moguls and the journalists who work for them, accepting – or even soliciting – cash from politicians is a perquisite of the job” (2018:243).

17. The interconnection of corruption It has been observed that corruption in Nigeria usually involves interconnected agencies or individuals; it cannot be tackled as a standalone issue. At stake here is the position that known corrupt persons are involved in multi-layered corrupt practices involving financial, political, socioeconomic and/or security dimensions. Smith (2007) argues that there is no single thread defining what constitutes corruption in the everyday experiences of the majority of Nigerians. A web of questionable acts is woven together insofar as such acts violate the moral capital of the society. Pierce (2016) describes it as a multi-dimensional or “polyvalent” phenomenon, while Igboin (2019) draws attention to the ambiguity and ambivalence of corruption in Nigeria. All of this complicates the understanding of corruption because the synergy built by corrupt people makes it difficult to fight, assuming there is even a genuine effort to fight it in the first place.

18. Negotiation of/with corruption Plea bargaining is defined as: the process in criminal proceedings whereby the defendant and the prosecution work out a mutually acceptable disposition of the case, including the plea of the defendant to a lesser offence than that charged in the complaint or information and in conformity with other conditions imposed by the prosecution, in return for a lighter sentence than that for the higher charge, subject to the court’s approval. (Idhiarhi 2019)

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It is this process that I refer to as “negotiation with corruption”. Although plea bargaining is common in the US, its application in Nigeria since 2005 has trashed the spirit of the country’s law. Accordingly, “plea bargaining is usually employed in the trial of financial crime cases by making it part of the negotiation for the accused person to surrender some portion of money which he has embezzled and for which he is being tried. This is why some have described it as ‘celebrity justice’” (Adegbite n.d.). Thus far, it seems clear that government negotiations with those who have committed financial crimes only secure the return of part of the “loot” to the government, allowing the looter to keep the rest. This inevitably encourages people to engage in corrupt practices, with the hope that eventually a portion will be returned to them.

19. The otherisation of corruption Even though corruption is rife in Nigeria, obviously corrupt individuals present themselves as saints when they have opportunity of addressing an audience. Today, certain former governors and ministers who have been indicted for corrupt practices speak as though they had never been involved in it. This attitude is rightly described as moral hypocrisy - taking a public position that one is not morally bankrupt despite the widely known facts to the contrary. According to this mindset, it pays to appear upright and to cast others as less moral than one’s self. As Begley (2008:21) pertinently argues, people have learned that it pays to seem moral, since it helps avoid censure and guilt. But even better is appearing moral without having to pay the cost of actually being moral. No wonder, as Noonan (1984) observes, that “no one writes an autobiography in which he recalls the bribes he has taken or the bribes he has paid.” In particular, these same moral hypocrites do not focus on themselves as corrupt but, on the contrary, they speak often and copiously about others who are allegedly corrupt. This otherisation of corruption is observed in every government in power at both federal and state levels, especially if the incumbent government is of a different party than its predecessors.

20. The confrontation of anti-corruption Finally, we turn to the reaction against anti-corruption crusades, where “corruption is fighting back”. In other words, there are what we shall call vehement “anti–anti-corruption” forces bent on making efforts to fight corruption less productive. Some point out that this fightback is actually a recognition, firstly, that corruption is being fought by the incumbent

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government, and secondly, that the perpetrators are feeling the pinch. Okonjo-Iweala (2018) argues in this regard that “fighting corruption is dangerous” because the “anti–anti-corruption” forces are formidable, even deadly, and will stop at nothing to achieve their goal of paralysing anticorruption strategies. Her own efforts to confront these forces resulted in the kidnap of her then 83-year old mother and led to demands that she should resign as Finance Minister and leave the country. One observes, however, that every incumbent government that claims to have even a shadow of anti-corruption activity also claims that corruption is fighting back. It is indeed a cycle of rhetoric and legitimacy-seeking strategies, rather than a demonstrable commitment to fighting the anti–anti-corruption forces. As Okonjo-Iweala (2012; 2018) suggests, Nigeria needs an unwavering political will to deal with these forces. Unfortunately, she appears not to have experienced such political will in action.

Conclusion This chapter has argued that although corruption is difficult to define conceptually, it is easy to experience practically, as the case of Nigeria in particular has demonstrated. Efforts at anti-corruption are a welcome development, but require new tactics for countenancing corruption than are currently being deployed. Although political will is critical to the anticorruption drive, it is nevertheless insufficient: integrity capped with passion, which thus far has not been witnessed in Nigeria, is needed. This cannot be a borrowed integrity, or one that is eroded with corruption by proxy. It demands a passion that hates corruption and fights it in all its manifestations, no matter whose ox is gored. If this minimum standard is enforced by any government committed to anti-corruption in Nigeria, a new vista in the conception and handling of corrupt practices would come into view. This must be a top-down process and not otherwise.

References Adegbite, K. n.d. “Plea bargaining in Nigeria: Any legal foundation?” https://www.thelawyerschronicle.com/plea-bargaining-in-nigeria-anylegal-foundation/ (accessed 31 July 2019). Akinkuotu, E. “Reabsorbed ex-pension team boss, Maina still wanted, says EFCC.” The Punch, 22 October 2017. Begley, S. 2008. “The science of hypocrisy.” Newsweek, 14 June 2008, 21.

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Brown, D. R. 2007. “Foreword.” In S. Bracking (ed.) Corruption and development: The anti-corruption campaigns, pp. ix–xi, Palgrave: Houndmills. Campos, E. and Pradhan, S. 2007. The many faces of corruption: Tracking vulnerabilities at sector level. The World Bank, Washington DC. De Maria, W. 2009. “Does African ‘corruption’ exist?” In M. F. Murove (ed.), African ethics: An anthology of comparative and applied ethics. University of KwaZulu-Natal, Scottsville. Ellis, S. 2016. This present darkness: A history of Nigerian organized crime. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Falola, T. and Dauda, B. 2017. Decolonizing Nigeria, 1945-1960: Politics, power, and personalities. Pan-African University Press, Austin. Fasan, R. “President Buhari is also guilty of corruption.” https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/02/president-president-is-alsoguilty-of-corruption/ (accessed 31 July 2019). Idhiarhi, S. 2019. “Practice and procedure of plea bargain under ACJ Act,” The Punch, 9 February 2019. Igboin, B. O. 2007. “A critique of legal-morality in impeachment in Nigeria’s democracy”. In I. Odimegwu, G. Ezeani and F. Aghamelu (eds.) Philosophy, Democracy and Conflicts in Africa 2:42-51, Department of Philosophy, Awka. Igboin, B. O. 2010. “On Dopamu’s ‘God loves variety and hates monotony’: A review”. In A. K. arap Chepkwony and P. M. J. Hess (eds), Human views on God – variety not monotony: Essays in honour of Ade P. Dopamu, pp. 7–14. Eldoret: Moi University Press. Igboin, B. O. 2016a. Traditional leadership and corruption in pre-colonial Africa: How the past affects the present. Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae: Journal of the Church History Society of Southern Africa 42(3):142–160. Igboin, B. O. 2016b. The legal-morality of the politics of deportation of the destitute in Nigeria. Spectrum: Journal of Contemporary Christianity and Society 1(1):7–32. Igboin, B. O. 2017. Stephen Ellis. 2016. This present darkness: A history of Nigerian organised crime. African Studies Quarterly 17(1):117–119. Igboin, B. O. 2018a. The corruption cure: How citizens and leaders can combat graft. African Studies Quarterly 17(4):143–145. Igboin, B. O. 2018b. “The theological and moral economy of corruption”. In B.O. Igboin (ed.), Corruption: A new thinking in the reverse order, pp. 120–147, Oyo: Ajayi Crowther University Press. Igboin, B. O. 2019. “Unpacking the holiness spaces in Africa: A radical quest for praxis of holiness and accountability in Africa”. In J. K.

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Ayantayo, B. A. Adedibu and B. O. Igboin (eds.), African Pentecostalism: Probity and Accountability, pp. 224–261, AkungbaAkoko: Adekunle Ajasin University Press. Keefe, P. R. “Corruption and revolt: Does tolerating graft undermine national security?” New Yorker 19 January 2015. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/19/corruption-revolt (accessed 23 August 2015). Lutzer, E. W. 1993. Twelve myths Americans believe. Chicago: Moody Press. Moyo, D. 2009. Dead aid: Why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa. Farrar, Straus Giroux, New York. Noonan Jr, J. T. 1984. Bribes: The intellectual history of a moral idea. University of California Press: California. Ogungbemi, S. 2007. Philosophy and development. Ibadan: Hope Publications. Okonjo-Iweala, N. 2012. Reforming the unformable: Lessons from Nigeria. London: The MIT Press. Okonjo-Iweala, N. 2018. Fighting corruption is dangerous: The story behind the headlines. Cambridge: The MIT Press. Ololajulo, B. O. 2015. “‘Yahoo Boys’: Disoriented knowledge and national security in Nigeria.” In I. O. Albert, B. O. Ololajulo and O. Aremu (eds), Knowledge economy and Nigeria’s national security: Essays in honour of Basorun Seinde Arogbofa. Society for Peace Studies and Practice, Abuja. Omokri, R. 2019. “General Buhari sent the list he should have sent to EFCC to the Senate.” ThisDay, 28 July 2019. Oyeyebi, O. 2018. “Press reportage of corruption: The role of agenda setting in press reporting of corruption in Nigeria.” In B. O. Igboin (ed.), Corruption: A new thinking in the reverse order, pp. 229–244. Oyo: Ajayi Crowther University Press. Page, M. 2018. “A new taxonomy for corruption in Nigeria.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 17 July 2018. https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/07/17/new-taxonomy-forcorruption-in-nigeria-pub-76811 (accessed 31 July 2019). Pierce, S. 2016. Moral economies of Nigeria: State formation and political culture in Nigeria. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Quah, J. S. T. 2003. “Singapore’s experience in curbing corruption.” In A. J. Heidenheimer, M. Johnston and V. T. Levine (eds), Political corruption: A handbook. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

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Rotberg, R. 2017. The corruption cure: How citizens and leaders can combat graft. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. Smith, D. J. 2007. A culture of corruption: Everyday deception and popular discontent in Nigeria. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. Stapenhurst, R., Johnston, N. and Pellizo, R. 2006. The role of parliament in curbing corruption. Washington DC: The World Bank. UNODC. 2014. National anti-corruption referral: Key contacts in vigilance and anti-corruption desks across India. New Delhi: UNODC.

PART 3

CHAPTER 5 AFRICAN UNION AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION IN AFRICA SAMUEL O. OLORUNTOBA (THABO MBEKI AFRICAN LEADERSHIP INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA, PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICA AND VISITING SCHOLAR, INSTITUTE OF AFRICAN STUDIES, CARLETON UNIVERSITY, OTTAWA, CANADA)

Abstract More than fifteen years after the adoption of the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and thirteen years after it came into force, corruption remains pervasive in Africa. Reports from various agencies within and outside the continent show how, despite pretensions to the contrary, pillaging of the commonwealth continues apace. The effects of this have included increased poverty and inequality, social dislocation and conflicts, leading to increasing numbers of people resorting to extreme measures, such as irregular migration, to escape these conditions. Whereas the dominant narrative of corruption tends to focus on public officials, there is increasing evidence that the private sector, through multinational companies, fuels much more corruption through illicit financial flows. Apart from the African Union, various regional economic communities and national governments in Africa have established protocols and agencies to deal with corruption. However, a lack of institutional capacity, manipulation for political ends by politicians, and compromises made by anti-corruption agency staff and corrupt members of the judiciary have weakened the efforts at curbing corruption in Africa. This chapter examines the political economy of corruption in Africa within the context of the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Crime. It takes an institutional approach to analyse how the unequal distribution of resources, subordination to the logic of global capitalism, and survival

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instincts of ordinary citizens, along with debased value systems, have accentuated corruption. Keywords: African Union; anti-corruption; political economy; citizenship anger; development; governance

Introduction Since gaining political independence in the period from the late 1950s to the early 1990s, many countries in Africa have remained at the margins of the global economy in terms of their share of international trade, investment, finance and technology. Poverty and inequality have also continued apace, with many countries on the continent occupying the lowest rung on the United Nations Human Development Index. Although the early post-independence economic performance of several of these countries provided some level of hope, this quickly disappeared as the contradicting interests of internal and external forces contributed to a decline in their economic fortunes. Of all the factors that have contributed to underdevelopment in Africa, the most significant is corruption, which manifests in primitive accumulation by state officials. Scholars have examined the nature of the political economy of corruption and how it affects developmental outcomes in Africa (Joseph 2015). The view also exists that that states have remained captured by entrenched interests and weakened by compromised bureaucracy and non-functional institutions. Most of the states on the continent have played along with the international community, under the good governance agenda, to establish anti-corruption bodies. However, the success of these institutions has been limited due to political interference and corruption within the judiciary (Open Society for Southern Africa, 2016). The limited capacity of the state to address corruption is a manifestation of the lack of a well-defined ideology of development, the absence of a clear vision for transformational leadership, and insufficient courage to tackle a big monster. Concerned by the grave implications that corruption has on Africa, the continental body, the African Union, established the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC). This protocol was adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State in Maputo, Mozambique, in 2003, which is dealt with in greater detail in the penultimate section of this chapter. This chapter examines corruption and development in Africa, using the African Union anti-corruption framework as a point of departure. It asks what its contribution has been, since its adoption almost two decades ago,

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to the reduction of corruption on the continent. It also examines how corruption has contributed to underdevelopment in Africa, asking what the drivers of corruption are and how the AU’s 2003 protocol on corruption can be activated to address this social problem? In section two, corruption is contextualised in terms of meaning and typologies. Section three examines the theoretical foundations of corruption in Africa. In section four, the link between corruption and underdevelopment in Africa is established, while section five offers a political economy-based analysis of corruption. In the penultimate section, the AU Protocol on corruption is examined, while the final section concludes with a discussion of ways forward in addressing corruption in Africa.

Contextualising Corruption and its typologies in Africa Corruption is widely regarded as being pervasive in Africa. The continent occupies a prominent position in the annual corruption perception index published annually by Transparency International. Although there are limitations to the corruption index’s policy relevance (UNECA, 2016), it does offer a guide to understanding the incidences and pervasiveness of corruption in Africa. Conceptually, corruption refers to the misuse of public or private position for the purposes of accumulation and personal benefit. In other words, corruption involves the misappropriation of both economic and noneconomic items for personal use and it occurs in both the private and public sectors. Osoba (1995:371) defines it “as antisocial behaviour conferring improper benefits contrary to legal and moral norms, and which undermines the authorities’ capacity to secure the welfare of all citizens”. Given the changing norms of society in many parts of Africa, where commoditization and the unbridled pursuit of material wealth have become paramount, Osoba’s definition of corruption needs to be placed in its proper context. Contrary to the past, when acts of corruption were generally abhorred and considered to be antisocial behaviour, it has now become accepted as a means of survival in the intensely competitive and exclusionary peripheral capitalist economies of Africa. As we shall show in the section on the political economy of corruption, many currently hold the view that misappropriating public funds can be considered a way of redistributing resources. The general acceptance of corruption in many parts of Africa is evidenced by the number of corrupt individuals that are celebrated or even elected into political offices. This is why, Lumumba (2019) argues, until

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citizens tire of corruption, the monster cannot be eradicated from African societies. Khan (2008) provides some understanding of the concept of corruption, particularly in relation to governance and the transformation of the economy. He argues that corruption is a phenomenon that is “closely linked to poor governance” and that “pressure to reduce corruption and move towards good governance is both necessary and desirable, but these ends cannot be achieved unless attention is also given to other governance capacities, required for accelerating and sustaining growth” (216-244). Weak institutions and compromised bureaucracy have led to high incidences of corruption in Africa, although a few countries, including Botswana, Cabo Verde, Mauritius, Namibia, the Seychelles and South Africa, made progress in 2011 and 2014. While discourse on corruption in Africa has largely been focused on the public sector, where corruption typically manifests in the form of the misappropriation of public funds by elected and unelected public officials, scholarly attention is increasingly focused on the role of the private sector in directly fostering corruption through illicit financial flows or by aiding and abetting corruption in the public sector through bribery (Global Financial Integrity 2017). The history of corruption in post-independence Africa is awash with stories of how corporations from the West bribe government officials in order to secure contracts. In the case of Nigeria, for instance, the German-based engineering company Siemen and the US-based oil company Haliburton have both been at the centre of legal proceedings and incurred heavy fines and penalties for paying bribes for contracts (Driver 2009). The mining sector in Africa is particularly notorious as an enclave of corruption, as it provides an avenue for the political elites and the executives of oil and other mineral-exporting companies to connive to defraud the state through rents, bribery and kickbacks. Despite the establishment of the Extractive Transparency Initiative, this challenge remains very pertinent in Africa. Corruption has both domestic and international dimensions. Under the capitalist regime of accumulation, corruption has become an art of trade for members of the Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC, Robinson 2010, 2004). This class includes national-level elites, transnational corporations and international financial institutions. While national elites misappropriate state resources through direct pilfering from the public purse and take kickbacks from clients of the state through rents, transnational companies engage in corruption through the subversion of extant rules on the payment

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of taxation, import duties and royalties on minerals. Corruption also occurs at the micro-level through involvement in examination malpractices, falsifying age, hiding files, contract splitting and so on. Aside from the material aspects of corruption, political corruption occurs in Africa through the subversion of electoral processes, compromised judiciaries and untrustworthy state security apparatuses. The political economy of corruption manifests itself when political offices are used as a means of patronage to retain power, co-opt critics and silence voices of dissent. Scholars have noted that corruption is caused by many factors, including greed for power, materialist desires, power and political monopolisation, an ineffective civil society, low levels of political transparency, and weak institutions which result in low levels of democracy. Other factors include inefficient or compromised bureaucracies (which are often beholden to the political elites) and a lack of press freedom. The next section examines various theories of corruption in the context of Africa.

Theories of corruption in relation to Africa Several theories have been developed to explain the occurrence and practice of corruption in Africa. These include the “two publics” theory, principal-agent theory, patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism, and prebendalism. In his theory of two publics, Ekeh (1975:91) locates postcolonial African societies according to the manner in which colonialism reshaped and redefined relations between citizens and political institutions. In this regard, he argues that colonialism has “led to the emergence of a unique historical configuration in modern postcolonial Africa: the existence of two publics instead of one public, as in the West”. Given this connection between the past and the present, Ekeh further argues that there are “dialectical relationships between the two publics”. He distinguishes between the public and the private sphere in relation to the moral foundation of postcolonial African societies. While there is a common thread between the two realms in the West, this is not quite the case in Africa, where there is no such thing as a “unitary moral foundation of state and society in the public and private realm” (Adebanwi 2017:75). Although the colonialists succeeded in creating the two publics (public and private) in ways that obliterated the distinctions that existed between the two in precolonial Africa, the private realm survived the new rationalities and mentalities of colonial governmentality (ibid.). In Ekeh’s view, the imposition of Western governmental structures on indigenous forms of governance led to the emergence of a primordial public realm which is made up of primordial

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groupings, ties and sentiments, which inform individual public behaviour as they “impinge on the public interest” (Ekeh 1975:92). In his examination of the link between Ekeh’s two publics thesis and Foucault’s analysis of governmentality, Adebanwi (2017:65) notes that Ekeh’s thesis can be productively elaborated in understanding the question of rule and power relations in the postcolony … because postcolonial interpenetration of the apparatuses of governmentality and sovereign power – as manifested in the split and contradictions of the civic and primordial publics – has had fatal consequences for the lives of most Africans, who are still largely governed as population [emphasis in the original] rather than as people in the postcolonial era.

“Governing as population” connotes the same colonial logic of citizens and subject (see Mamdani 1996). Thus, political elites in Africa use state power as a means of personal accumulation, rather than acting as trustees for the people that they govern. Another related theory through which corruption has been explained is prebendalism. Joseph (1987), while not adopting Ekeh’s thesis wholesale, lays out a theoretical framework which relates to how state officials use public office to appropriate resources for self, family and members of the same ethnic group. In this seminal book, Joseph argues that “according to the theory of prebendalism, state offices are regarded as prebends that can be appropriated by officeholders, who use them to generate material benefits for themselves and kin groups” (Joseph 2013:264). He further argues that, whereas there can be some stability under a primordial order where a king, feudal lord or chieftain exercises authority, a prebendalised system is inherently unstable. This is because the “aspiration to build a capable state, a democratic system and a coherent nation are ultimately foiled by prebendal practices” (Joseph 2013:3). Even though Joseph used Nigeria as the case study for testing this theory, the same logic of using the office as a means of personal accumulation exists throughout Africa. From Mobutu Sese Seko of the Democratic Republic of Congo, to General Sani Abacha of Nigeria, through to al-Bashir of Sudan, many postcolonial African leaders have predated on the state by siphoning off state resources for personal ends. Another pair theoretical formulations that have been used to explain corruption in Africa are patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism (Bratton and

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van de Walle 2000; Mkandawire 2015). Bratton and van de Walle define patrimonialism thus: In patrimonial political systems, an individual rules by dint of personal prestige and power; ordinary folk are treated as extensions of the “big man’s” household, with no rights or privileges other than those bestowed by the ruler. Authority is entirely personalised, shaped by the ruler’s preferences rather than any codified system of laws. The ruler ensures the political stability of the regime and personal political survival by providing a zone of security in an uncertain environment and by selectively distributing favours and material benefits to loyal followers, who are not citizens of the policy so much as the ruler’s clients.

Inherent in patrimonialism is the use of office by the incumbent to deploy patronage to the client of the principal, usually to curry favour, support and unbridled loyalty. In postcolonial Africa, the need to accommodate intra-elite competition and build a support base from critical segments of society reinforced the practice of patrimonialism. But while this practice is more-or-less synonymous with autocratic regimes, it has been refined and incorporated into democratic regimes. In their article on rethinking patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism, Pitcher, Moran and Johnston (2009) took exception to what they regard as the misreading of Weber’s use of patrimonialism. Rather than seeing patrimonialism from the point of view of buying patronage, they argue that Weber’s use of the term “delineated a legitimate type of authority, not a type of regime, and included notions of reciprocity and voluntary compliance between rulers and the ruled” (2009:125). In this characterisation, the clients or the ruled are not just passive recipients of patronage but active “subjects who check the actions of rulers” (:123). The authors argue that rather than imposing Weberian classifications of authority and regime type and the ways in which power relations are established in Africa, a careful reading and interpretation of various indigenous modes of governance is required. In establishing their points of departure from the dominant perspective on patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism in Africa, they draw on age-old imageries and metaphors in which ritual and the appeal to solidarity and consensus as foundational underpinnings of governance structures remain applicable in contemporary Africa. This insightful contribution breathes some fresh air into the scholarly discourse on how political elites misappropriate state resources for personal ends. The challenge that these authors pose to other scholars could be located within the resurgent decolonial (re)interpretation of modes of governance in

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Africa. In other words, could it be that narratives on corruption in Africa are loud because of the uncritical acceptance or partial reading of the Weberian idea of what connotes patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism? How has the clash of ideas on mode of governance from the West and Africa contributed to the challenges of the use and misuse of state resources in Africa? Is it the case that patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism exist “as a consequence of the continued existence of premodern cultural norms, or as an effect of colonialism”? (:130). Mkandawire (2015) agrees with this critique of the dominant conception and application of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism in Africa. He argues that while “neopatrimonialism can be used to describe different styles of exercising authority, idiosyncratic mannerisms of certain individual leaders, and social practices within states, the concept offers little analytical content and has no predictive value with respect to economic policy and performance”. Furthermore, he sees neopatrimonialism as a “marriage of tradition and modernity with an offspring whose hybridity generates a logic that has had devastating effects on African economies”. Mkandawire’s objection to the popular narrative on neopatrimonialism is based on the idea that the theory was instrumentalised, within a larger market agenda underpinned by neoliberalism, to read cultural determinism into the economic challenges faced by the continent. In other words, Africa did not work because the culture and modes of governance were at a stage which accommodated the binary of modernity and tradition (Rostow 1961).

Corruption and Underdevelopment in Africa Despite the abundance of natural resources and mineral deposits, Africa remains the poorest continent in the world, measured in terms of human development indicators such as access to quality education, good healthcare, clean water and sanitation, and other types of infrastructure (UNDP 2018; World Bank 2016). Over the course of five decades since gaining political independence, the continent has lost trillions of dollars through corruption in the public and private sectors. While the public sector is associated with the loss of money to political elites who misappropriate power for their own ends, the private sector has contributed through involvement in illicit financial flows and the payment of bribes to state officials (AU High-Level Panel 2014; Global Financial Integrity 2015, 2017). Official assistance in the form of aid from developed countries has not led to the desired transformation on the continent. Apart from fostering dependency, as Moyo (2008) would argue, the donors have not adopted a

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demand-driven approach in their assistance to African countries. In what Easterly (2006) refers to as the White Man’s Burden phenomenon, official assistance has been designed in ways that reflect the interests of the donors rather than those of the recipients. In many instances, donor funding was not only siphoned off by state officials, but used to pay the salaries and consultancy fees of so-called experts from the donor countries. Scholars have argued that due to its pervasiveness, corruption is detrimental to social, political and economic development. It also contributes to poverty, arrested development, a lack of trust in government, increased costs of doing business, insecurity, miscarriages of justice, and an increased debt burden, as well as reinforcing a culture of corruption that only leads to further infringements (Awojobi 2014; Fieldhouse 1986). In a related manner, corruption contributes to the lack of legitimacy in governments that dot the landscape of African politics. This is often evidenced by the way elections are conducted. In a country such as Nigeria, there have been cases of voter inducement and the outright purchase of votes by politicians across the main political parties. In many instances, institutions critical to sustaining democracy, such as electoral bodies, security agencies and the judiciary, are complicit in undermining electoral processes, with the result that those candidates with the most money are declared the winners of elections. Godfatherism – where retired politicians with sufficient financial resources recruit and field candidates for elective posts on the understanding that they will pay financial returns to the “godfather” – is a form of political corruption that is increasingly prevalent in Africa (Obi 2011; Oloruntoba 2018). Through this practice, African citizens lose the ability to hold their leaders accountable, especially in instances where they sold their vote to the highest bidder, or are waiting in line to be selected to contest elective posts in the future. The overall effects of corruption in fostering underdevelopment can be seen in how it creates additional costs for doing business, leading to reduced profits and limited room for businesses to expand. This, in turn, affects the possibility of creating new jobs. Similarly, corruption leads to inadequate healthcare and a low life expectancy, as well as low productivity among citizens. It leads to the diversion of funds from high-yielding investments to low-yielding ones in a way that guarantees the payment of rents and bribes to those who hold the levers of power. It perpetuates underinvestment in critical infrastructure and social services. Lastly, it affects our dignity, as people of Africa. In this connection, there is a link between corruption and the number of African migrants that are dying as they try to cross to Europe. The shame that is associated with seeing people take such perilous journeys underscores the

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indignities that corruption fosters. The majority of these youths could have stayed back and contributed to the development of their respective countries, had they possessed the right kind of education or were the cultural climate more conducive to finding or creating jobs. The implication of corruption on the identity of Africans is underpinned by the general stereotypes that exist abroad about corruption in Africa. Given the pervasiveness of this malady and the obvious incapacity of the state to tackle the problem – whether due to a lack of moral capital or unwillingness among the political elites – and the resultant low level of development that is fostered by corruption, Africans are impelled to prove themselves over and again in order to be accepted into other societies as normal human beings. The indignity associated with corruption is compounded by the apparent general acquiescence from the wider society. For instance, whereas the political elites give little or no consideration to the implications of stealing national resources, many African citizens, regardless of their level of education, have tended to rationalise corruption on the basis of the tribal, religious or national identification with those so accused. There have been instances, where politicians who have been jailed for their corrupt acts end up being celebrated after serving out their prison term. The cases of Chief Olabode George (convicted in Nigeria) and James Ibori (Nigerian, convicted in United Kingdom), who were celebrated by their supporters after serving out their terms were very illustrative of this argument. These politicians were arrested, tried and found guilty of misappropriating or laundering state money. However, the same people who suffered from their criminal acts celebrated when the criminals were released from the prison. Today, they continue to call the shots in their political parties. This leads to the next section on the political economy of corruption in Africa.

The political economy of corruption in Africa Drawing from the theories of the two publics, prebendalism and (neo)patrimonialism, one can deduce that there is a political economic dimension to corruption in Africa. As Ake (2000) argues, politics has become a zero-sum game in Africa. It is the most profitable venture that pays the highest rate of returns. Rather than a means of rendering public service, the nature and the character of the state in Africa have led to politics being seen as a primary means of accumulation. In the first decade of political independence, many African states became the main source of job creation through the expansion of their civil service (Soludo and Osita

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2004). The limited capital base of the emerging indigenous business elite also made it mandatory for governments to establish state-owned enterprises in countries like Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia, Cote d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Tanzania, Ethiopia and many others; this still holds true in contemporary times. The structural contradictions within the domestic economies of these countries, as well as in the global economy, weakened their productive bases. From the early 1960s, military rule became the fad across the continent, with very few exceptions (Iroanya 2018). The presence of the military in politics undermined all forms of accountability. The global commodity crisis of the 1980s led to structural disarticulation in the economies of most African states. The imposition of structural adjustment programmes by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, worsened an already critical situation. In the process, inflation rates became prohibitively high, thus eroding the purchasing power of the civil servants (among others). Despite repeated protests and strikes by labour unions for better wages, the increases have not been able to keep up with inflation. The question then remains, how can workers who work and live in urban areas with expensive rents and many dependent relatives survive? In order to survive, many civil servants have perfected the art of creating hurdles to accessing government services. Faced with no other option, citizens who need government services are forced to pay bribes. In other instances, contractors who need government patronage are also forced to part with a certain percentage of the contracted sums. These processes lead to a vicious circle of corruption in society. At the political level, faced with pressures from civil society organisations and international communities, many of the military regimes began to democratise, with some of the former military leaders transforming themselves into civilian Presidents or Prime Ministers. Constitutions were drafted which favoured the massive allocation of state resources to the management of political office holders. While doing this, the level of poverty continued to grow, with the result that many citizens became dependent on and subservient to the political elites. Thus, rather than frowning at the excesses of the emergent political elites, following the third wave of democratisation, many citizens fawned on them and continue to do so, just to be able to survive from the crumbs that fall from the tables of the kleptocratic political elites. As incumbent political leaders change their country’s constitutions to elongate their terms in office, neopatrimonialism becomes increasingly rife. In many instances, members of opposition are induced with positions or

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bribes to support such courses of action. Where inducements fail, opposition members may be framed and detained for long periods of time or even killed outright. Nevertheless, there are civil society organisations that challenge this kind of misuse of power by state elites, with varying degrees of success. As Obi (2010) argues, in the case of the Niger Delta and the role of international oil companies, there is an international political economy dimension to the crisis of underdevelopment in Africa. These companies work to expropriate as much profit as possible, without regard to the environment or the local economies of the oil communities. They also work in concert with the state to silence voices of dissent, as the case of Shell and the killing of the Ogoni environmental activists show (Oloruntoba 2011). As long as the state in Africa remains captured by special local and international interests, corruption will continue to fester. It was in the light of the need to adopt a more holistic approach to the challenge of corruption that the African Union established the African Union Protocol on Preventing and Combating Corruption in 2003, to which we now turn in the next section.

African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption This protocol was adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State in Maputo, Mozambique, on 11 July 2003. It came into force on 5 August 2006 (www.au.int/en/treaties/african-union-convention-preventing-andcombating-corruption). The Convention covers all segments of society, including the public and private sectors, civil society, multinational companies and international organisations. It is aimed at curbing corruption in its various forms. It also prescribes ways through which those accused of corruption can be extradited from one country to the other. Article 2 of the Convention includes the following objectives: x To promote and strengthen the development in Africa by each State Party of mechanisms required to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related offenses in the public and private sectors; x To promote, facilitate and regulate cooperation among the State Parties to ensure the effectiveness and actions to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related offenses in office; x To coordinate and harmonise the policies and legislation between State Parties for the purposes of the prevention, detection, punishment and eradication of corruption on the continent;

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x To promote socioeconomic development by removing obstacles to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights; and x To establish the necessary conditions to foster transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs. There is no doubt that these objectives are laudable. Since the establishment of the Convention, several countries have established anticorruption institutions (figure 1). There have also been a few convictions at the national level. However, a general assessment of the Convention will show that it has not fulfilled its objectives. African countries continue to score poorly in the Transparency International Index (Table 1). Although the Convention also covers the private sector, illicit financial flows have continued unabated on the continent, with the Global Financial Integrity Group showing that the scale of such transactions has grown to well over $70 billion per annum (GLF 2017, 2015). Furthermore, the Convention itself remains in limbo, as not all member countries of the African Union have ratified it. Article 15 (2) of the Convention requires 15 ratifications before it can come into force. As of September 2019, while 49 countries had signed, only 41 countries had ratified the Convention. Schroth (2005) analysed the Convention and provided critiques on the various translations into Arabic, French and Portuguese and the implications of these on the understanding of the Convention. The author also raises concerns about the extent to which the various provisions of the Convention can be effective, given the fact that their interpretation is subject to the national laws of the State Parties to the Convention. Subjecting the Convention to national laws surely limits its effectiveness. But this is an indication of the challenges that supranational or intergovernmental organisations confront in bringing about reforms among member states. The image of the leaders of State Parties to the Convention loom large, in the sense that they lack any incentive to enforce the terms of the Convention. The interference of certain political leaders in Africa in the operation of anticorruption bodies attests to their culpability and half-heartedness in ensuring that national and continental frameworks or protocols on anticorruption can work. The lack of commitment is due primarily to the nature of politics, where access to and control of state institutions facilitates accumulation, power and influence. Thus, while it may be convenient to establish anti-corruption agencies or ratify regional and international conventions, ensuring that these institutions work effectively is the more difficult task.

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As with other conventions and protocols of the African Union, the implementation and enforcement of the AU Convention against Corruption still represent major challenges. Even though the Convention came into force in 2006, this has not led to any significant reduction in cases of corruption in various parts of Africa. Indeed, corruption has increased to the extent of being considered an acceptable social norm in some countries. With very few exceptions, leaders continue to steal state resources, siphon money abroad and live extravagantly at the expense of the majority of citizens. The inability of the continental body and national governments to rein in corruption has necessitated a new question on why corruption persists in Africa, despite the existence of anti-corruption laws, institutions and a continental convention. The ambivalence of the state towards addressing corruption has necessitated the involvement of the citizens, whose options and participation in the fight against corruption constitute the next section of this paper.

Combating Corruption in Africa: The Citizens’ Option In his book, From Poverty to Power: How active citizens and effective states bring change, Green (2008) shows the pervasiveness of inequality and poverty in the developing regions of the world and the roles that citizens have played in changing the course of history. He argues that “in an unequal society, elites find it easier to ‘capture’ governments and other institutions and use them to further their own narrow interests, rather than the overall economic good” (:50). In making case for active citizenship, he highlights instances where “pressures from below and enlightened leadership from above has produced some remarkable exercises in redistribution” (:10). Green states that, by active citizenship, we mean that combination of rights and obligations that link individuals to the state, including paying taxes, obeying laws, and exercising the full range of political, civil and social rights. Active citizens use these rights to improve the quality of political or civic life, through involvement in the formal economy or formal politics, or through the sort of collective action that historically has allowed poor and excluded groups to make their voices heard. (:10-11)

The centrality of citizen action in the fight against corruption is underscored by the fact that the citizens are the primary bearers of the consequences of corruption in the form of social deprivation, joblessness, poverty and inequality. Leaders also emerge from within society. Thus, if the majority of citizens are sufficiently concerned and well-educated about

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the negative impacts of corruption on development, the emergent leaders will likely share the same ideals and orientation. Given the magnitude of the socioeconomic and political costs of corruption to the citizenry and society, it becomes imperative to consider it in a similar way to the socioeconomic challenges of the past – such as colonialism, apartheid and military rule – that the people of the continent successfully confronted and overthrew. Africans developed a collective resistance against these systems because of the negative effects they had on their existence.

Collective anger against corruption: a moral imperative Past and ongoing efforts at combating corruption have been largely based on legal jurisprudence, in which the state serves as the arbiter. However, in most instances, state actors are the perpetrators of corrupt acts, and hence only pay lip-service to the fight against corruption. Furthermore, neoliberal globalisation processes have limited the effectiveness of the state in mediating between competing interests and protecting the rights and welfare of the citizens. As Green (2008) further argues, “after twenty years of erosion by deregulation, ‘structural adjustment programmes’, and international trade and aid agreements, many states are weak or absent”. The effectiveness of the state approach to fighting corruption in Africa has also been undermined by the contradictions of modernity and traditionalism. The postcolonial state in Africa has striven to be like the metropoles in various respects. This has undermined the traditional mores and values that acted as checks and balances in precolonial African societies. Collective anger was one of the strategies that precolonial African societies adopted to resist abuse of power by rulers. The prevalence of values of integrity, honesty and dignity ensured that communities were generally opposed to any dictatorial tendencies from their leaders. This type of anger was also demonstrated during the struggle for independence from colonial rule, and later from military rule, in various parts of Africa. In order to stem the tide of corruption, citizens must take the lead through mobilisation against corrupt public and private officials. One of the earliest manifestations of collective anger in recent times was the public assault on the former Deputy Senate Leader of Nigeria, Ike Ekreweremadu, who was beaten by members of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), a sociocultural group from southeast Nigeria, when he was visiting Germany to attend a sociocultural meeting of the Igbo people. IPOB members were angered by what they considered his lack of responsiveness to their demands when he was at the helm of affairs in the nation’s parliament, as a

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result of which he was publicly assaulted. The organisation also threatened that any member of the political class from that part of Nigeria who travelled out of the country would be given the same treatment (The Punch, 17 August 2019). Although this kind of behaviour falls well below the standards of modern decency, it portends the danger that political elites are faced with and the price they may have to pay for perceived unresponsiveness in governance. Bamidele Funmilayo-Olateju (2019) provides a comprehensive analysis of the attack, linking it to a broader level of dissatisfaction among the citizens. Citizen anger may not necessarily lead to physical assault, but it can provide the required basis for mobilisation that can bring about a change in the way political elites conduct themselves in Africa. This can also lead to the building of institutions that can hold leaders accountable for the misuse of state resources.

Conclusion This chapter has examined the political economy of corruption in Africa. It showed that corruption is a structural problem which negatively affects economic prospects and development outcomes on the continent. The domestic and the international dimensions of corruption were brought to the fore. The African Union Convention against Corruption was used as an example of the severe limitations of the legal approach to fighting corruption. For example, even though 41 member countries ratified the Convention, many still occupy the lowest rungs of the Corruption Perceptions Index. This chapter aimed to go beyond the normal narrative, which tends to focus on corruption in the public sector at the expense of examining privatesector sleaze. The massive corruption in the private sector, in the form of illicit financial flows and illegal engagement with state actors to manipulate the systems of governance for private interests, were highlighted. The concept of collective anger was introduced to denote the need for the citizens to be more positively engaged in the fight against corruption in Africa, as they were in the fight against oppressive regimes such as colonialism and military rule. The micro-dimension of corruption which takes place at the household level was also highlighted. The need for a thorough reorientation and attitudinal changes from the familial to the societal level is critical. Religious and educational institutions should also play vital roles in changing the value systems of the society from that of crass materialism to contentment. Lastly, to avoid the temptations that

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comes with corruption, workers in the public and private sectors should be paid decent wages, along with other incentives, such as shares and bonuses.

References Adebanwi, W. 2017. Africa’s ‘Two Publics’: Colonialism and Governmentality. Theory, Culture and Society 34(4):65–87. Ademola-Olateju, B. 2019. ‘Ekweremadu: Elite attack as expression of looming “ressentiment”’, Premium Times, 20 August 2019. https://opinion.premiumtimesng.com/2019/08/20/ekweremadu-eliteattack-as-expression-of-looming-ressentiment-by-bamidele-ademolaolateju/ (accessed 17 September 2019). African Union Convention on Corruption on Combating and Prevention Corruption. 2003. Addis Ababa: African Union. www.au.int/en/treaties/african-union-convention-preventing-andcombating-corruption (accessed 16 September 2019). Ake, C. 2000. Democracy and development in Africa. Baltimore: Brookings Institution. Awojobi, O. 2014. Corruption and underdevelopment in Africa: A discourse approach. International Journal of Economics, Commerce and Management 2(10):1–14. Bratton, M. and Van de Walle, N. 1994. Neopatrimonial regimes and political transitions in Africa. World Politics 46(4):453–89. Driver, A. (2009) Halliburton to pay $559 million to settle bribery probe, Reuters, BUSINESS NEWSJANUARY 26, 2009. Ekeh, P. 1975. Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: A theoretical statement. Comparative Studies in Society and History 7(1):91–112. Easterly, W. 2006. The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fieldhouse, D. 1986. Black Africa: 1945–1980. Economic decolonisation and arrested development. London: Routledge. Green, D. 2008. From poverty to power. How active citizens and effective States can change the world. Warwickshire and Oxford: Practical Action Publishing and Oxfam. Iroanya, R. 2018. “Coups and Countercoups in Africa” in Oloruntoba, S. O. and Falola T. (eds), Palgrave Handbook of African Politics, Governance and Development, pp. 243–258. New York: Palgrave. Joseph R. (2013) Epilogue. In: Adebanwi W., Obadare E. (eds) Democracy and Prebendalism in Nigeria. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

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Joseph, R. 2013. Prebendalism and dysfunctionality in Nigeria. Africaplus 26 July 2013. www.africaplus.wordpress.com/2013/07/26/prebendalism-and dysfunctionality-in-nigeria/ (accessed 12 September 2019). Joseph, R. 1987. Democracy and prebendal politics: The rise and fall of the Second Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Khan, M. 2008. “Building growth-promoting governance capabilities. Background Paper for The Least Developed Countries Report 2008.” UNCTAD: Geneva. http://mercury.soas.ac.uk/users/mk17/Docs/Building%20Growth%20P romoting%20 Governance.pdf (accessed 05 May 2018). Lumumba, P. 2019. Why corruption persists in Nigeria. The Punch Newspapers, 11 September 2019. Mkandawire, T. 2015. Neopatrimonialism and the political economy of economic performance in Africa: Critical reflections. World Politics pp. 1–50. Mkandawire, T. and Soludo, C. 1999. Our continent, our future, Africa perspectives to the structural adjustment programmes. Ottawa and Dakar: International Development Research Centre and Council for the Development of Social Research in Africa. Moyo, D. 2009. Dead aid: How aid is not working and why there is a better way for Africa. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Ndikumana, L. 2013. Capital flight and tax havens: Impacts on investment and Growth in Africa. Contributions to the European Development Network (EUDN) Conference on Finance and Development, Berlin, 1113, December. Obi, C. 2011. Taking back our democracy? The trials and travails of Nigerian elections since 1999. Democratization 18(2):366–387. Obi, C. 2010b. The petroleum industry: A paradox or (Sp)oiler of development? Journal of Contemporary African Studies 28(4):443–457. Oloruntoba, S. O. 2018. “Political parties and democratic development in Africa: Nigeria and South Africa in comparative perspectives”, in Adejumobi, S. (ed.) Voices and Power in Africa Democracy: Institutions, Participation and Accountability. London: Routledge. Oloruntoba, S.O 2011. The State and the Governance of Multinational Corporation, Shell petroleum company in the Niger delta in A. Paddok and T. Falola (eds), Economics and Environment in Nigeria, New York: Routledge, 143-159. Osoba, S. O. 1995. Corruption in Nigeria: Historical perspectives. Review of African Political Economy 69:371–386.

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Pitcher, A., Moran, M. and Johnston, M. 2009. Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa. African Studies Review 52(1):125– 156. Robinson, W. 2010. Global capitalism theory and the emergence of transnational elites. Working Paper No. 2010/02, Finland: World Institute for Development Economics and Research, United Nations University. Robinson, W. 2004. A theory of globalisation capitalism: Production, class, and state in a Transnational world. Baltmore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Schroth, P. 2005. The African Union Convention on preventing and combating corruption. Journal of African Law 49(1): 24–38. Soludo, C. and Ogbu, O. 2004. The politics of trade policy in Africa. In C. Soludo, O. Ogbu and H-J. Chang (eds.). Politics of trade and industrial policy in Africa: Forced consensus? Ottawa, Canada: IDRC Books, pp. 111–134. The Punch, August 17, 2019. I was attacked by IPOB members in Germany, Ekweremadu confirms. https://punchng.com/i-was-attacked-by-ipobmembers-in-germany-ekweremadu-confirms/ (accessed 17 September 2019).

CHAPTER 6 FRAMEWORK FOR FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN THE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AGE

ADEYINKA PEACE ADEDIGBA, TALIHA ABIODUN FOLORUNSO, ABIODUN MUSA AIBINU (DEPARTMENT OF MECHATRONICS ENGINEERING, FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY, MINNA, NIGERIA)

Abstract Nigeria, the most populous black nation in the world, is blessed with both natural and human resources. However, she has been crippled in achieving her full potential due to the ingrained corruption in all her multifaceted sectors. Seeing corruption as a threat to national development, many Nigerian heads of state and presidents have formulated and institutionalised various approaches to fighting and ending the menace of corruption, but have made no tangible headway. Instead, Nigeria has witnessed serious moral decadence which has led to the accommodation of corruption as a social norm. In this chapter, collective action against corruption is not only encouraged but empowered through the use of advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence and big data analysis. The framework for putting these technologies to use is presented, along with detailed implementation strategies. This framework includes an eprocurement and open data policy which enables all citizens to access and analyse public data on the awarding of contracts, public procurement and other transactions, allowing them to report any corrupt practices they might uncover. However, to guard against false information from citizens, reports are first passed through artificial intelligence algorithms for preliminary analysis to flag any fake information. By means of this framework, citizens,

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as well as government anticorruption agencies, can work together in putting an end to corruption in Nigeria. Keywords: artificial intelligence; big data; collective action; corruption; moral disposition

Introduction Nigeria is the most populous black nation in the world, sometimes referred to as the giant of Africa, with a population of over 190 million people – about 47% of West Africa’s population. Eighty-seven per cent of Nigeria’s population is of working age, with about 69 million vibrant, talented and hardworking youths (more than the entire population of the UK). In addition, Nigeria is blessed with abundant natural resources: it is the biggest oil exporter and has the largest natural gas reserves in Africa. It has fertile expanses of farmland that produce crops such as cocoa in the southwest, groundnut in the north, yam, beans and rice in the central belt, and palm oil in the east. Yet despite this natural prosperity, Nigeria is faced with many challenges, such as high poverty levels, low per capita income, underemployment, income inequality, heavy dependence on oil, insurgencies and insecurity. These challenges have been associated with corruption, such as the misappropriation of public funds and assets by elite and high-profile government officials (Hoffmann and Patel 2017). In 2007, the United Nation’s Office on Drugs and Crime reported that approximately $400 billion of public funds were misappropriated between 1960 and 1999 (UNODC 2017). Between 2005 and 2014, Illicit Financial Flow (IFF) from Nigeria totalled up to $183 billion, according to Global Financial Integrity (Hoffmann and Patel 2017). This misappropriation of public wealth has led to wide investment gaps, increased borrowing, and dilapidated public infrastructure such as roads, power stations and hospitals. Significantly, corruption in Nigeria is multifaceted because it comes in different forms and shades, including the misappropriation of public funds, bribery, graft, fraud, manipulation, indiscipline and nepotism. Thus far, anticorruption battles in Nigeria have been centred on misappropriation of public funds and graft, leaving other forms of corruption to flourish unchecked. Bribery, which is the most prevalent corrupt practice in Nigeria, has been left untouched, resulting in the deformation of social norms and a nonchalant attitude among the citizenry towards combatting corruption. According to a survey carried out by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime on

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the prevalence of bribery in Nigeria, just under one-third of Nigerian adults (32.3%) who had contact with public officials between June 2015 and May 2016 had to pay, or were requested to pay, a bribe to those public officials. Approximately, N400 billion is spent on bribes each year and bribe-payers in Nigeria spend an eighth of their salary on bribes. Despite various measures set up by the government to counter corruption, these statistics are on the rise due to the high levels of impunity among corrupt public servants in Nigeria. Unsurprisingly, corruption thrives when people know that the risk of being caught and being punished is low (Treisman 2000). Thus, it is safe to say that the degradation of moral standards and social acceptance of corruption in Nigeria is due to the high degree of impunity granted to corrupt public servants. In this chapter, after showing the impotency of the government’s institutionalised approach to fighting corruption, we present a citizencentric approach which guarantees the rapid detection and exposure of corrupt practices at all levels of government, especially with regard to processes such as public procurement, tendering and the carrying out of contracted work. We therefore hope that by increasing the risk of being caught, the citizenry’s moral disposition towards fighting corruption will be restored.

The Institutionalised Approach to Fighting Corruption Corruption and the fight against corruption has a long pedigree in Nigeria, dating back to the establishment of the rudiments of its modern public administration by the British Colonial Authorities (Tignor 1993). The first major fight against corruption was championed by General Murtala Muhammed’s administration through a series of “clean-ups”, which involved the dismissal of hundreds of civil servants and other public officials and the recovery of thousands of dollars from corrupt ministers and civil servants. However, Gen. Murtala Muhammed failed in his attempt to re-orientate the moral disposition of the populace towards personal discipline, accountability and integrity (Ocheje 2018; Ekpo et al. 2016). After the death of Gen. Murtala Muhammed, Nigerians’ moral disposition continued to degrade up until the administration of General Ibrahim Babangida, who, through laxity towards corruption, institutionalized it by removing most of the institutional checks and balances that were the bulwark of ethical behaviour among civil servants. His administration was characterised by the abandonment of ethics, leading to open theft and the mismanagement of public funds. This led to great cynicism about the state-

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society relationship among the populace (Ocheje 2018). He was succeeded by the kleptomaniac reign of General Sani Abacha, who stole enormous amounts of money from the public purse – estimated after his death to have been approximately $5 billion (Ocheje 2018; Ogbeidi 2012). President Olusegun Obasanjo, in his first term as civilian president, made the fight against corruption his top priority. He not only made public speeches against corruption, he established two anti-corruption bodies, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Offences Commission (EFCC) – an institutional approach to anti-corruption similar to Gen. Murtala Muhammed’s. However, at the end of his administration, he and his ministers were charged with many allegations of corruption (Ocheje 2018). President Muhammadu Buhari, following the institutionalised approach of his predecessor in fighting corruption, has shown more sincerity in his commitment to enforce transparency (Ekpo et al. 2016). His methods are slightly different from those of Obasanjo and Muhammed. They include consolidating government payments and receipts by implementing a Treasury Single Account (TSA); strengthening whistleblowing incentives and protections; high-profile investigations of prominent individuals for large-scale theft of public funds; and the recovery of billions of naira by Nigeria’s anti-corruption agencies. However, even though his administration is not yet over, he has been labelled the most nepotistic president in the history of the nation, and it has been suggested that his fight against corruption is a selective one (Onya and Elemanya 2016; Eme and Onuigbo 2016). Thus, scholars such as Salaudeen and Machina have boldly called out to President Buhari to show his honesty in the fight against corruption by refraining from selective punishment of corrupt public figures (Salaudeen and Machina 2017). Thus far, Nigeria’s approach has been an institutionalised anti-corruption strategy which emphasises the need to reform public procurement rules and public financial management systems. This approach has resulted in the promulgation of a substantive body of anti-corruption legislation, and in the establishment of various agencies tasked with preventing corruption and punishing those who engage in it. Yet, as seen in the Murtala, Obasanjo and Buhari administrations, this approach has only led to the revelation of more names of corrupt ministers who have looted funds. It has failed to purge the moral decadence of the citizens or restore personal discipline, accountability and integrity (Ocheje 2018). In describing the institutionalised approach taken by the government, General Ishola Williams observed that “our

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leaders are not fighting corruption because they believe in it, but to look good before the West” (Folarin 2009). Furthermore, it can be shown that the institutionalised approach to anticorruption – enforcing legal rules and administering punishment to corrupt officials – is both costly and impossible to undertake for every single incidence or each individual wrongdoer. Not everyone who has benefited from corruption in Nigeria will be punished, nor every corrupt transaction prosecuted. There has been a conspicuous absence of systematic efforts to go beyond legal and institutional frameworks in order to better understand corruption as a social practice and to identify the underlying causes of citizens’ decisions to engage in – or avoid – corrupt activity. As shown in Onya and Elemanya (2016), not everyone who engages in or benefits from corruption in Nigeria will be punished, nor will every corrupt transaction be prosecuted, if the nation continues fighting through the institution alone – things need to be done differently to obtain better results. In light of this, we argue that citizen-centric methods for fighting corruption will be more effective at curbing corrupt practices in all agencies. This is because citizens witness and suffer directly from every corrupt transaction taking place in the country. Building on the thesis that corruption grows in proportion to the rate of impunity, a citizen-centric approach can increase the rate at which corruption is detected and exposed; thereby lowering levels of impunity. This will have the additional advantage of raising the collective morality of the citizenry as well as preserving the country’s moral standards for the upcoming generation.

An artificial intelligence-based, citizen-centric anticorruption framework Artificial intelligence (AI) comprises a wide spectrum of “intelligent” computational technologies aimed at developing algorithms or computational agents that behave optimally (intelligently) and improve with time and data. Many of these algorithms are modelled on the way the human nervous system and physical senses interact in order to learn, reason and behave in an optimal way. Some are designed to identify optimal solutions for executing tasks by taking clues directly from how nature evolves. AI has become a very dynamic field of study, attracting researchers from a wide range of fields such as psychology, neuroscience, computer science,

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mathematics, control engineering, economics, social science and anthropology. The United States National Science and Technology Council recognises AI as a transformative technology which offers tremendous unexploited societal and economic benefits (Biegel and Kurose 2016). AI has been and will continue to revolutionise our cultural paradigm, affecting how we live, work, learn, discover, communicate and relate with each other (Gil and Selman 2019). Researchers in the field have produced cutting-edge solutions that are of enormous benefits to society, industry and government. AI systems have been developed to aid natural language translation across multiple languages, identify objects of interest in images and videos, highlight patterns within multidimensional and voluminous datasets, and carry out time-series predictions with high accuracy, with results already being applied to great effect in medical diagnostics, agriculture, manufacturing processes, economics and crime control. It helps to see AI as a constellation of mainstream technologies that has tremendous impact on everyday lives. Stanford University’s “One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence”, launched in 2014, predicts that the use of AI will increase substantially in the future, especially in the domains of security, medical diagnostics, education, employment and workspace management, crime demographics and forensics, and e-governance (Stone et al. 2016). It is therefore evident that AI can also perform well in detecting unethical, illegal and corrupt practices. The recent upsurge of internet coverage has seen a steady migration from text-based communication to richer data such as images, videos and interactive maps and their associated metadata (descriptions of the data contained within a file). This has led to the big data phenomenon. Furthermore, the developments in information and communication technology (ICT) which gave birth to social media/networking services such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and so on, have equally led to paradigm shifts in citizen-government relationships (Nam 2012). This trend has in turn led to a new style of governance called Government 2.0, which revolves round the concept of citizen-sourcing (Nam 2012; Chun et al. 2010; Bonsón et al. 2012). Breul defines citizen-sourcing as the citizencentric methods used by government agencies and departments to obtain information needed to carry out and improve their mission delivery processes and determine how those decisions are reached (Breul 2010). The current trend of ever-widening use of the internet and social media has set

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the stage for collective action, even a revolution, against corruption in Nigeria. We propose a three-stage citizen-centric anti-corruption framework (shown in Figure 1). The implementation flow of this framework (shown in Figure 2) begins with the establishment of an e-procurement and open data policy; the second stage centres on the development of citizen-centric corruption monitoring and reporting platform; and the third stage employs AI-based big data analysis in order to guarantee the authenticity of citizens’ reports and flag false reports.

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Figure 1: Concept diagram of an AI-based citizen-centric anticorruption framework

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Figure 2: Implementation of the AI-based citizen-centric anticorruption framework

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e-Procurement and Open Data Policy Most Nigerian government agencies rely on face-to-face interactions which are vulnerable to corrupt practices such as bribery and manipulation, not to mention substandard processes which undermine the nation’s development. Thus, the first step in this framework is the formulation of a policy that mandates full digitization of government transactions at all levels – from federal to state to local government – and that requires all transactions to be carried out on e-procurement portals. E-procurement and digitally-based transaction processes do not in themselves guarantee fairness if not accompanied by an open data policy that conforms to global transparency standards and constraints (Sunlight Foundation 2014). Open (government) data is defined as publicly available records which can be readily used and distributed by anyone without constraint, subject only to attribution and share-alike requirements (Sunlight Foundation 2014). By implication, public data should be published in an easily accessible and reliably available way. The data should be available in a structured machine-readable format suitable for further analysis. This would enable universal participation by citizens, civil society groups and institutions. Complete and comprehensive policy guidelines are provided by the Sunlight Foundation (2014; Carl Malamud 2007), including policy recommendations on what data should be open, how it should be made open, and how to implement an open data policy. The benefits of open public data include: transparency and democratic control, increased participation and a sense of joint ownership, improved effectiveness and efficiency of government services, and new knowledge based on research/analysis of the data, which can provide essential feedback to the government. For example, the British website “Where does my money go?” increases transparency by showing how the UK government spends taxes (https://app.wheredoesmymoneygo.org). Thus, in implementing this framework, the first requirement is a strong policy that allows public contracts, transactions and payments to be published in conformity with global open data standards such that they can be tracked, monitored and analysed by all citizens. The more information on government contracts and transactions can be made public, the quicker the change in social norms and attitudes towards corruption.

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Development of a citizen-centric monitoring and reporting platform Another prerequisite to the realization of this framework is a reporting platform. Once public data (especially on public contracts, transactions and payments) has been made available under an open data policy, citizens should be empowered to channel their analytical findings and opinions to the appropriate quarter through a platform that is also subject to an open data policy and available to all citizens. For example, after Denmark established an open government system, a group of citizens created a web portal (Folketsting) to make it easier to track activities in parliament. This has resulted in the wide dissemination of new government policies (on economy, health, transport and so on) and provides information on the implications of these policies. Similarly, five mayors in Mexico signed an open government “Supercivico covenant” which led to the creation of Los Supercivico mobile app that allows citizens to create a government-verifiable profile and contribute by reporting problems in public infrastructure. By leveraging the power of social media, which has become a means of gathering evidence of illegality and demanding political and judicial redress, a central database for reporting illegal and corrupt practices across the country could be created. The fight against corruption can be taken beyond endless ineffective discussions on social media by empowering citizens’ voices. For example, in partnership with MIT Media and Civic Lab, a Brazilian group created Promise Tracker, a project that enables citizens to monitor the progress of public projects in their vicinity and report deficiencies in quality, such as the use of substandard materials. Similarly, Nigeria can take advantage of the rapid spread of the internet, smartphones and social media to create a reporting platform to track and tackle corrupt, illegal and unethical practices in government agencies and among public servants. For instance, road construction projects in Nigeria have typically been plagued by the use of substandard materials, incomplete implementation and poor finishing. In many such cases, the contractor is nevertheless paid in full after bribing the monitoring and evaluation team or making a video that shows only good portions of the road. An open data platform would give citizens the opportunity to challenge the contractor’s claims, flag the false video, and disprove it by posting their own pictures/videos demonstrating the poor quality of the contractor’s work. Similar approaches could be used to tackle shady procurement procedures

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and public spending, as well as other unethical practices carried out by government agents, politicians and public servants. However, in shifting the power to fight corruption to citizens, care must be taken to ensure the reliability of the information they give. To what degree can we trust information provided by citizens about a corrupt public servant? Is the information verifiable? And how can we guide against fake news, or fake pictures/videos? This is where artificial intelligence-based big data analysis is necessary.

Big Data and AI Analysis Datasets are not perfect: they are affected by issues such as missing data, input errors, conflicting schema, prejudices and others (Elish and Boyd 2018). Manually sorting through pictures, videos or text-based corruption reports from the citizenry would be extremely laborious and practically infeasible. However, the detection of false information is extremely important. Thus, methods for sorting out truth from lies (a process known as data verification) are an essential component of the proposed framework.

Figure 3: AI-based big data analysis pipeline

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Figure 3 shows the analytical processes that should be carried out on reports before they are uploaded to the database and displayed on the portal to the general public. Regardless of the form in which citizens present their reports, data cleaning is the first analytical process to be performed on the data. Subsequently, depending on the type of data (text-based, image or video) sentiment analysis (SA) or image/video analysis is carried out. What each of these analytical methods entails is presented below. Data Cleaning: The proposed framework will make it very easy for citizens to post their opinion/analysis of corrupt practices they witness around them and this, in turn, will generate a huge database. This will not only be handy in fighting corruption but serve as a feedback mechanism for the government – in other words, it will enable Nigeria to join the ranks of countries that have implemented “Government 2.0”. However, data quality is a major concern, since false information (or dirty data) leads to injustice where false decisions are made and the innocent are punished. Data cleaning is the process of preparing data for subsequent analysis by removing or modifying inconsistent, incomplete, irrelevant, duplicated or incorrectly formatted data. In its most basic form, data cleaning involves removing problematic data and ensuring consistent spelling and formatting. Advanced data cleaning involves ensuring all the data conforms to a standard structure (applicable in structured databases for easy searching and other analysis) and identifying features that summarize the entire dataset (which allows data compression with little to no loss in information). Automatic methods of data cleaning involve integrity constraints (Bohannon et al. 2005; Chiang and Miller 2011; Chu et al. 2013; Cong et al. 2007; Geerts et al. 2013; Song et al. 2014), statistical analytics (Mayfield et al. 2010; Andritsos et al. 2006; Chu et al. 2015) and machine learning (Cong et al. 2007; Mahdavi et al. 2019; Yakout et al. 2013; Li et al. 2019). Sentiment analysis (SA): One question that arises is how to extract useful information from raw reports sent by citizens. Another is how to prevent inconsistencies arising from the expression of opinions, prejudices and personal preferences, which can adversely affect data integrity. Sentiment analysis is a powerful computational technique used to harvest useful information and insight from unstructured text-based sources. It uses natural language processing (NLP), text analysis and computational linguistics to identify, extract and quantify emotional states in subjective sources such as text-based reports. It comprises algorithms that automatically identify and

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categorise opinions by analysing the emotional “tone” behind each word choice, in order to determine the attitude of the writer of the text. Driven by the rising popularity of social media and microblog sites, sentiment analysis has attracted a great deal of research and recorded a number of useful breakthroughs. Further information on sentiment analysis is presented in Pang and Lee (2008) and Liu (2012), and an interactive demonstration is available online (Angam Parashar 2017). Image and video analysis: In a TED Talk on “Fake videos of Real People – and how to spot them”, Supasorn Suwajanakorn demonstrates the generation of “deepfake” videos that look so real that their veracity is almost impossible to confirm by the naked eye (Suwajanakorn 2018). The existence of deepfake technology potentially presents a serious challenge to the proposed framework for a collective campaign against corruption. Defensive strategies must be in place to prevent corrupt actors from weaponizing the very tool being proposed to fight corruption. For example, it could be used to blackmail a politician or public figure, by means of uploading a doctored picture video. So, how can we find out whether an image or video is authentic? Fake images or videos can be generated by manually editing the original using image or video editing software. In such cases, digital image processing techniques can be employed to detect small deviations in prominent features compared to real images (Rössler et al. 2019; Carvalho et al. 2015; Amerini et al. 2011; Lu et al. 2006; Bo et al. 2010). However, images or videos created by sophisticated synthetic algorithms, such as those discussed by Supasorn Suwajanakorn, are more difficult to detect. These kinds of images are synthesised using a “deep learning” technique called a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN), first introduced by Ian Goodfellow (Goodfellow et al. 2014). A GAN uses two Artificial Neural Networks that compete with each other: the first tries to fool the other, while the second tries to detect fakes. The end result is a synthetic image that is difficult for a human to detect as fake, but can be easily recognised by a network architecture similar to that used to create the fake. GAN has been developed to identify fake images or videos and include Deep-Fakes (DeepFakes 2018), Face2Face (Thies et al. 2016), Face Swap (Kowalski 2018) and Natural Texture (Thies et al. 2019). In summary, given a robust e-procurement and open data policy, citizens can monitor and analyse public data. The creation of a reporting platform or portal would enable citizens to make a meaningful contribution to government

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processes and, especially, to combat corrupt practices by providing accurate information to the anti-corruption agency. However, to avoid the pitfalls of fake news, fake reports and data prejudices, AI-based big data analysis techniques can be used to identify irregularities and spurious data where presented. With all these tools in place, the framework will be set for deployment.

Conclusion Corruption in Nigeria is like the Hydra: cut off one head and two heads replace it. The traditional institutionalised approach is only good at identifying corrupt officials and politicians, and those charged with ensuring integrity are themselves soon infected with the virus they are fighting. However, by enabling the citizens who suffer the direct consequences of corrupt practices to fight it, and by facilitating collective action against corruption, it can be brought to an end. This chapter has presented one means of leveraging the power of the internet and social media in fighting corruption at all levels of government, especially with regards to public contracts and procurement, by means of the shrewd use of technological innovations.

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Folarin, S. 2009. The anti-corruption war in Nigeria: A critical appraisal of the role of the ICPC and EFCC. Nigerian Journal of Economic and Financial Crimes, 1. Folketsting. https://www.folketsting.dk/category/politik/ (accessed 26 August 2019). Geerts, F., Mecca, G., Papotti, P. and Santoro, D. 2013. The LLUNATIC data-cleaning framework. Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment, 6:625– 636. Gil, Y. and Selman, B. 2019. A 20-Year Community Roadmap for Artificial Intelligence Research in the US. Computing Community Consortium (CCC) and Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI). Goodfellow, I., Pouget-Abadie, J., Mirza, M., Xu, B., Warde-Farley, D., Ozair, S., Courville, A. and Bengio, Y. 2014. Generative Adversarial Networks. ArXiv e-prints (June 2014). arXiv preprint arXiv:1406.2661, 1406. Hoffmann, L.K. and Patel, R.N. 2017. Collective action on corruption in Nigeria: A social norms approach to connecting society and institutions. Chatham House London, UK. Kowalski, M. 2018. Face Swap - Github. https://github.com/MarekKowalski/FaceSwap/ (accessed 28 August 2019). Li, P., Rao, X., Blase, J., Zhang, Y., Chu, X. and Zhang, C. 2019. CleanML: A benchmark for joint data cleaning and machine learning [Experiments and Analysis]. arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.09483. Liu, B. 2012. Sentiment analysis and opinion mining. Synthesis lectures on human language technologies, 5:1–167. Lu, W., Chung, F.-L. and Lu, H. 2006. Blind fake image detection scheme using SVD. IEICE transactions on Communications, 89:1726–1728. Mahdavi, M., Neutatz, F., Visengeriyeva, L. and Abedjan, Z. 2019. Towards automated data cleaning workflows. Machine Learning, 15:16. Malamud, Carl 2007. 8 Principles for open government data https://opengovdata.org/ (accessed 26 August 2019). Mayfield, C., Neville, J. and Prabhakar, S. 2010. Eracer: a database approach for statistical inference and data cleaning. Proceedings of the 2010 ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Management of Data, 2010. ACM, 75–86. Nam, T. 2012. Suggesting frameworks of citizen-sourcing via Government 2.0. Government Information Quarterly, 29:12–20. Ocheje, P. D. 2018. Norms, law and social change: Nigeria’s anti-corruption struggle, 1999–2017. Crime, Law and Social Change, 70:363–381.

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Ogbeidi, M. M. 2012. Political leadership and corruption in Nigeria since 1960: A socio-economic analysis. Journal of Nigeria Studies, 1. Onya, R. R. M. and Elemanya, A. V. 2016. Analysis of President Buhari’s anti-corruption policy: A reality or an illusion? International Journal of Advanced Academic Research Social and Management Sciences, 2. Pang, B. and Lee, L. 2008. Opinion mining and sentiment analysis. Foundations and Trends® in Information Retrieval, 2:1–135. Rössler, A., Cozzolino, D., Verdoliva, L., Riess, C., Thies, J. and Nießner, M. 2019. Faceforensics++: Learning to detect manipulated facial images. arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.08971. Salaudeen, A. and Machina, I. M. 2017. War against corruption and the political will to wage it: A case study of President Muhammadu Buhari's two years in office. Proceedings Book, 370. Song, S., Cheng, H., Yu, J. X. and Chen, L. 2014. Repairing vertex labels under neighborhood constraints. Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment, 7, 987–998. Stone, P., Brooks, R., Brynjolfsson, E., Calo, R., Etzioni, O., Hager, G., Hirschberg, J., Kalyanakrishnan, S., Kamar, E. and Kraus, S. 2016. Artificial intelligence and life in 2030. One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence: Report of the 2015-2016 Study Panel, 52. Sunlight Foundation. 2014. Open Data Policy Guideline. https://sunlightfoundation.com/opendataguidelines/ (accessed 26 August 2019). Suwajanakorn, S. 2018. Fake videos of real people — and how to spot them. https://www.ted.com/talks/supasorn_suwajanakorn_fake_videos_of_re al_people_and_how_to_spot_them/transcript?language=en (accessed 28 August 2019). Thies, J., Zollhöfer, M. and Nießner, M. 2019. Deferred neural rendering: image synthesis using neural textures. arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.12356. Thies, J., Zollhofer, M., Stamminger, M., Theobalt, C. and Nießner, M. 2016. Face2face: Real-time face capture and reenactment of rgb videos. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2016. 2387–2395. Tignor, R.L., 1993. Political corruption in Nigeria before independence. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 31(2), 175-202. Treisman, D. 2000. The causes of corruption: a cross-national study. Journal of Public Economics, 76:399–457. Unodc, U.N.O.O.D.A.C. 2017. Corruption in Nigeria bribery: public experience and response. Vienna: United Nation Office on Drug and Crime.

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PART 4

CHAPTER 7 THE CHALLENGES OF AUTOCRATISATION, IMPUNITY AND CORRUPTION WITH REFERENCE TO SOUTH AFRICA’S BRICS PARTNERS

CHRIS JONES (FACULTY OF THEOLOGY, STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY, SOUTH AFRICA)

Abstract This chapter examines three important studies and indexes measuring authoritarianism, impunity and corruption, with an especial focus on the socalled BRICS-countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). It begins with a reflection on the emergence of a new era of growing autocracy around the world, based on the recent findings of Anna Lührmann and Staffan Lindberg, who analysed annual data on the democratic health of every country on earth in order to map the state of global democracy as completely as possible. The next section focuses on the Global Impunity Index-2017 (GII), which aims to quantify impunity worldwide and measure its direct effect on other issues such as inequality, corruption and violence. The GII is the most important international academic effort to measure impunity levels worldwide, based on the analysis of countries’ security, justice systems and respect for human rights. The following section focuses on the Corruption Challenges Index 2019 (CII), which indicates the world’s most and least challenging places for foreign investors in relation to corruption levels. The CII is an essential guide for businesses conducting work globally, ensuring awareness of where corruption challenges lie.

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Findings from these three studies are applied to understand the state of – and what needs to be done about – corruption and impunity in the BRICS countries, of which South Africa, this author’s own country, is a member state. Keywords: autocratisation; impunity; corruption; democracy; authoritarian; Africa; Latin America; Asia; Russia

Introduction The enigmas of transparency, accountability and probity can hardly be limited to governments. There is a need to encourage other institutions to interrogate, critique and practice transparency, accountability and probity in the quest for economic and socio-political transformation, since they all grapple with similar issues of leadership, good governance, (financial) probity, equity and integrity. The significance of leadership and corporate governance lies in its contribution to prosperity, peaceful co-existence, moral regeneration and accountability. These goals require appropriate rules and regulations, codes of conduct, values and behaviour to make (human) development and transformation viable.

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Our new era of rising authoritarianism1

Data from a new study shows the number of democracies and autocracies worldwide since 1900. Anna Lührmann and Staffan I. Lindberg It is generally accepted that the history of modern democracy has played out in what could be described as five chapters. “Three of these chapters document what political scientist Samuel Huntington2 referred to as ‘waves of democracy’” (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019:1102).

1

This section of the article (with a few exceptions) was published in the Mail & Guardian in June 2019, under the headline “Democracy still rules – for now”, by C. Jones and based on Lührmann and Lindberg’s 2019 article, “A third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it?” 2 See also: S.P. Huntington’s 1991 book, The Third Wave of Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. However, Lührmann & Lindberg deviated slightly from Huntington’s original approach in order to reflect their conceptual and methodological innovations.

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The first pro-democracy wave occurred during the nineteenth century and took democracy to most parts of the West. The second wave came after the Second World War, and the third lasted from the mid-1970s to the mid1990s. The latter was driven mainly by the collapse of colonialism and the end of the Cold War. The other two chapters document the decline of democracy. The first decline was during the 1920s and 1930s, when democracies were overthrown by fascists; the second wave came in the 1960s, when the Cold War resulted in a series of coups and military takeovers (Fisher and Taub 2019:n.p.). In their fascinating (new) academic study, two Swedish political scientists, Anna Lührmann and Staffan Lindberg, point out that we are currently in the sixth chapter of the world’s democratic history. A third wave of democratic decline has hit us, the largest to date (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019:1096-1098). Among the many countries that have autocratised (in other words, slipped away from democracy) over the past two to three decades are India, Russia, Turkey and Venezuela (ibid.).3 Brazil could also be included. I refer specifically to these countries because three of them belong to the BRICS bloc,4 with China of course also far on the spectrum of autocracy. Another interesting point is that, according to the 2017 Global Impunity Index, India, Venezuela, Brazil and Russia are among the countries in the world where impunity is the highest or most prevalent (Global Impunity Index 2017:9). Consequently, there seems to be a link between autocratisation and impunity. According to Lührmann and Lindberg, the third wave of autocratisation has been building since 1994 – long before most people noticed it. What is worrying is that for the past 25 years, 75 countries worldwide5 have been moving in this direction (2019:1103). This particular finding is based on a year-by-year collection of data that gives a clear picture of the state of democracy from each country in the world. The collected data includes, among other parameters, the credibility of elections, the independence of courts and the freedom enjoyed by 3

Also see Lührmann et al. 2018:1321–1340. BRICS is an acronym denoting a block of five major emerging economies, namely Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 5 According to Lührmann and Lindberg, 48 cases occurred in between the waves. 4

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opposition parties. The impressive aspect of this study is that Lührmann and Lindberg calculated each country’s score, for every year from 1900 to 20176 (182 countries and 18,031 country-years). Based on this, they were able to determine how the scores of each country changed on an annual basis, but also over longer periods (2019:1100). This shift away from democracy to autocracy is sometimes hidden, because such a move does not necessarily take place overnight as, for example, with a coup. Nowadays, countries are more likely to move gradually in this direction – often in a way that appears to be democratic. One example is Turkey, where President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has strengthened his power over the past decade by holding regular elections which were only intended to sanction his growing authority in a democratic way. Lührmann and Lindberg observe that current autocrats have “mastered the art of subverting electoral standards without breaking their democratic facade completely” (2019:1097).7 These efforts are not always led by charismatic personalities such as Erdogan, but often by “faceless” political parties and bureaucracies, or by governments that shy away “from sudden, drastic moves to autocracy and instead mimic democratic institutions while gradually eroding their functions” (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019:1096). Another interesting finding by these two researchers is that the typical form of autocracy today is not dictatorship, but something they refer to as “electoral autocracy” (ibid.:1098-1100). This means elections are still held – people can vote freely and votes can be counted accurately – but under circumstances that do not promote democracy. Examples of the latter would be intimidating the opposition, weakening transparency, overturning key legislation, restricting media freedom, and establishing prominent platforms which are used for propaganda (ibid.:1098-1100). However, the two authors point out that these findings do not necessarily demand a widescale panic, because we are still living in a democratic era. Democracy remains the world’s most popular form of government – perhaps the most popular ever in the history of humanity. Today, more than half of all countries (53%) still qualify as democracies.

6 7

See Coppedge et al. 2018 and Dahl (1971). See also Schedler (2013).

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Yet, it must be pointed out that there has been a significant backsliding towards autocracy recently, where certain strong democracies have become poor democracies, and that some authoritarian states have become more authoritarian. In my opinion, the reason for concern lies in the following paragraph of Lührmann and Lindberg’s study: About a third of all autocratisation episodes (N = 75) started during a democratic dispensation. Almost all of the latter (N = 60; 80%) led to the country turning into an autocracy. This should give us a great pause in the spectre of the current third wave of autocratisation. Very few episodes of autocratisation starting in democracies have been stopped before countries become autocracies. (2019:1102)

So any democracy that even just starts to slip back slightly to autocracy has an 80% chance of slipping all the way to complete autocracy. In 2017 alone, 24 countries in the world have become more autocratic, and more are on the threshold. For these countries, two scenarios are plausible: Because autocratisation is more gradual, democratic actors may remain strong enough to mobilise resistance. This happened for instance in South Korea in 2017, when mass protests forced parliament to impeach the president, which reversed the prior autocratisation trend. Conversely, initial small steps towards autocracy brought other countries – such as Turkey, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Russia – on a slippery slope deep into the authoritarian regime spectrum. (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019:1108)

These autocratisation episodes affected about 2.5 billion people. In addition, there were 24 countries that showed positive aspects of democratisation, but these were mainly countries with smaller populations. It must be noted here that in Africa, 60 episodes of autocratisation took place, [m]ost of which occurred in electoral autocracies where autocratisation dissipated initial democratic gains. For instance, three autocratisation episodes in Sudan (1958–1959; 1969; 1989–1990) followed military coups disposing [of] presidents elected in less-than perfect elections. (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019:1102)

The concern is, as already suggested, that autocratisation leads to a massive decline in people’s claim to rights and freedoms.

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Somewhat reassuring, these researchers conclude: “As it was premature to announce the end of history in 1992, it is premature to proclaim the ‘end of democracy’ now” (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019:1108).

Impunity Long before Transparency International (TI) started its popular annual Corruption Perceptions Index, followed by a Bribe Payers Index, corruption was a major challenge for most societies. As I argue in an earlier publication (Jones 2019), summarised over the next few paragraphs, corruption has worsened under various ideological and social systems, even though religious and cultural norms / values forbid it. Countries have sought to prohibit corrupt practices using different measures. In line with international standards, particularly those of the United Nations’, many countries have established written and unwritten laws, codes and charters aimed at reducing corruption. However, legal frameworks have not stopped this phenomenon, only provided various forms of punishment for the corrupt minority in society. While in most Scandinavian countries there is little tolerance for corruption, no matter who you are, there are other parts of the world where corruption is rampant and where, to a great extent, the law is not respected, and where all are not equal before the law. In short, impunity reigns in these parts of the world. By impunity, we mean that there is no respect for rule of law and the laws of a country and decisions of the courts are not enforced. Impunity breeds lawlessness and anarchy and it can often, if not dealt with, lead to destabilization of countries and civil war. The definition of impunity found in the glossary of Global Impunity Index 2015 is as follows: Lack of punishment; the impossibility of bringing the perpetrators of violations to account – whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings – since they are not subject of any inquiry that might lead to them being accused, arrested, tried, and if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making reparations to their victims. (:10)

Accordingly, in countries where there is no rule of law, and where the opportunity for corruption exists because of impunity, the phenomenon becomes more severe due to the corruption of politically exposed persons and senior public officials. In the end, checks and balances do not really

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work, as there is a critical transparency and accountability deficit in the governance of those countries. Nigeria, South Africa and most other African countries belong to this category. In order to prove to the world that Africans want good, ethical governance with its fundamental elements of integrity, transparency and accountability, we must not only encourage whistleblowers and ensure their protection, but also apply a policy of zero tolerance for impunity among corrupt politically exposed persons, public officials and cronies in the private sector. One of the questions we have to ask is: how can we encourage equality before the law, whistleblowing, and zero-tolerance for impunity, along with suitably deterrent punishment for corrupt citizens in all walks of life? One may tend to agree with retired Major-General Ishola Williams’ pronouncement that: (i) Courts should not entertain plea-bargaining; (ii) There should be [a] fixed time for corruption cases to be concluded; and (iii) There should be strong protection for whistleblowers with [a] credible public complaints systems and consumer protection. There is no doubt, there is the need for reform in terms of empowerment and capacitation of citizens in order to ensure equity for all citizens with genuine grievances. (Williams 2017, by email)

In addition to encouraging the public to report corruption at all levels and to protect them while doing this, an Impunity Index for especially Africa, according to Williams, should be looked at to allow countries to monitor the number of politically exposed persons, public servants and corporate officials and clerics who are abusing their positions and influence to evade the law, and are thus deemed untouchable. This Africa Impunity Index (AII) could be based on existing reports and cases, combined with a survey of ordinary citizens’ opinions focusing on the extent to which institutions are seen as enabling the elite and the middle classes to avoid punishment under national laws, especially for corrupt acts (Williams 2017:n.p.). These thoughts were further developed and refined during an Africa Impunity Index Workshop held on 14 July 2019 in Abuja, Nigeria. It was a follow-up to the two-day Impunity Colloquium in Abuja (see addendum 1 for communiques on this second AU Anti-Corruption Conference) with

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various partners from across Africa. Participants discussed a framework for monitoring, measuring, and informing the public and private sectors about impunity and its negative impact on national and global efforts to curb corruption in the African context. The following indices were proposed: power and governance structure; law enforcement and judiciary; impunity; and political accountability with emphasis on audits of the public sector. At the end of these deliberations, it was agreed that the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) in Abuja and Panafstrag-Lagos (the Pan African Strategic and Peace Research Group) would lead the project and set up an Africa Impunity Index for West-Africa (WAII) as a pilot. The initial agreed stages included seeking and selecting partners in key West African countries, with balanced linguistic representation, to form the WAII Project Team; seeking the support of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and the UN regional office in Dakar; finding a host for a methodology workshop to develop the indicators; and putting together a funding proposal. It was agreed that the proposal should include a visibility plan, and that the West Africa Impunity Index should be evidence based. I, however, proposed that Africa rather be part of the Global Impunity Index, as I do not see an Africa Impunity Index being able to secure adequate resources for the project to succeed. I want Africa to be a global player and therefore to instead become part of the GII. Three African countries are already included (see below). Why would donors support an extra, separate Africa Impunity Index? I want African countries to be measured on the same level, according to the same criteria, as other countries. I insist on African Union participation in this regard. MajorGeneral Williams, however, was convinced that resources are there for Africa to initiate and own the impunity index for ourselves and for others. This was agreed upon by most of the attendees of the workshop. But let us briefly return and focus on the already existing Global Impunity Index (GII) – which, as already indicated, I think more African countries should be encouraged to participate in. It was created in Mexico in 2015 and has become a fundamental academic reference worldwide, used by civil society organizations, companies and international media. It highlights the lack of authentic rule in failed states, which leads to social distortions, high levels of violence, human rights violations, socioeconomic inequality and corruption. Failure to pay attention to these problems leads to a spiral of impunity and corruption that is hard to change. A lack of accountability means that little can be done to prevent exploitation, and where human rights are violated, it aggravates corruption and impunity

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levels and deepens social cracks across generations. The GII, as a quantitative measure of a country’s impunity, can provide the first step in breaking this cycle (Global Impunity Index 2015).

Worldwide results The GII-2017 covered 69 countries. For the first, time three African countries were included, namely, Algeria, Cameroon and Kenya. The report noted that: A total of 124 countries that are member states of the United Nations lack sufficient information on security and justice in order to compare them with other countries included in the Index … this could be due to the lack of capacity or lack of will to report this information. (Le Clercq Ortega and Sánchez-Lara 2017:8; Agang, Pillay and Jones 2019:74)

The report’s findings are summarised below. Low impunity: The following ten countries had the lowest impunity index scores: Croatia, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Sweden, Norway, Montenegro, Czech Republic, Greece, Germany and the Netherlands. Intermediate impunity: 27 countries fell in this category, including Ireland, Latvia, Iceland, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Spain, Switzerland, Italy, Algeria. High impunity: The following 13 countries had the highest impunity scores: the Philippines, India, Cameroon, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Nicaragua, the Russian Federation, Paraguay, Honduras and El Salvador. One of the most interesting and important findings of the GII-2017 was the very low levels of impunity in Eastern Europe, as well as the very high impunity levels found in Latin America (Agang, Pillay and Jones 2019:74; Le Clercq Ortega and Sánchez-Lara 2017:8–9; GII2017:32). The three African countries included in GII-2017 represent different levels of human development. Algeria has the highest index of human development among the three, at 8, putting it in 83rd place worldwide. Kenya has a low-intermediate index of human development, ranking 146th 8

See footnote 6, GII-2017:40.

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worldwide. Cameroon has a low index of human development, ranked 153rd out of 167 countries. As my colleagues and I noted in a previous publication, “although it is difficult to get reliable information about many African countries, particularly in terms of their criminal justice systems, it is of fundamental importance that more nations from this continent are assessed in future GII reports” (Agang, Pillay and Jones 2019:75). We now turn to the important Corruption Challenges Index of 2019.

Risk Advisory’s Corruption Challenges Index 2019 (CII) This index is an “essential guide to the world’s most and least challenging countries for foreign investors in relation to corruption levels” which identifies countries and territories which pose the most - and the fewest corruption challenges for foreign investors. [The] scores are based on many factors such as levels of FCPA (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) enforcement action and local industry risks, as well as how information flows affect a company’s ability to understand who exactly it’s dealing with. (https://www.riskadvisory.com/campaigns/corruption-challenges-index2019)

Risk Advisory, the organisation that compiles the index, further states that: Businesses need to be aware of which countries have a significant risk of corruption. The Corruption Challenges Index is an essential guide for businesses conducting work globally, ensuring awareness of where corruption challenges lie and why you should conduct thorough due diligence before investing in such a country. (ibid.)

Its key features are: x

x x x

Three interactive maps - revealing the highest and lowest threats posed (corruption threat), the availability of information (opacity) and the overall challenge of doing business in each country (Corruption Challenges Index map) Top 10 league tables - indicating the most and least challenging countries Top 3 sectors - exposed to corruption in each region and globally Regional viewpoints - interpretation from our global team of experts, highlighting trends and themes. (ibid.)

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According to Chris Rowley, Head of Business Intelligence and Investigations of the Risk Advisory’s Corruption Challenges Index, they have looked at a number of factors above and beyond the simple perceived local corruption threat, to give a more nuanced and balanced evaluation of where the real challenges of negotiating corruption risks lie. These factors include such things as levels of FCPA enforcement action and local industry risks, as well as how information flows affect a company’s ability to understand who exactly it’s dealing with; how media reporting can be slanted according to the publisher, for example, or the willingness of people to talk openly about the likelihood and frequency of requests for bribes. (Rowley 2019:2)

Examining the Corruption Challenges Index 2019 reveals that none of the BRICS countries are numbered among the ten most challenging countries – that is, those with the highest corruption threat and the greatest opacity (i.e. poor availability of information). On the other hand, neither are they to be found among the least challenging countries in terms of corruption threat, although India does make it into the top ten for least opaque countries, ranked 8th out of 187 for transparency. This might seem surprising, as many people would agree that India has an endemic problem with corruption, but the research shows that India is one of the “more transparent [countries] for us to work in” (Rowley 2019:2).

Global key findings According to Rowley’s introduction to the 2019 Index, “Africa … will have no fewer than seven polls this year [2019], including two of the continent’s most important economies, Nigeria and South Africa” while in South America, recently elected President Jair Bolsonaro’s “promise to clean up corruption in Brazil will be monitored closely” (Rowley 2019:7). He continues by making the point “that the laws against corrupt activity are only as strong as the institutions and individuals whose job it is to enforce them.” They know how “corruption can corrode a country from inside, and how the failure of politicians, judges and police to hold criminals to account can bring a society to the brink of collapse.” But enforcement officers cannot do it alone. They need help from businesses that “insist on transparency and accountability, both in their own organisations and from their counterparties … to call out wrongdoing” (Rowley 2019:7).

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The top three sectors exposed to corruption globally, according to the CCI, are construction and development; infrastructure (airports, ports, storage); and oil and gas (Rowley 2019:7).

Africa Hannah Gilkes, Head of Business Intelligence Africa, points out that four of the top ten most challenging jurisdictions to work in, are subSaharan African: Somalia, DRC, Eritrea and South Sudan. In Somalia and South Sudan ongoing violence, effectively non-functioning governments, and almost non-existent private sectors saw no discernible change compared to the 2018 scores. (Gilkes 2019:8)

The Index further confirms that all is not doom and gloom in Africa. Although the continent suffers from negative perceptions of corruption, certain realities do not match this poor international image. For example: it scores “Namibia’s jurisdiction challenge on a par with Switzerland; Botswana and South Africa are easier to operate in than Luxembourg; and Mauritius, Africa’s favourite offshore jurisdiction, has a lower corruption risk than the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas or Cyprus” (ibid.:8). The business possibilities for the continent are clear. “It continues to be resource-rich, growing in consumers and increasingly industrialising. Protectionist policies are also relaxing, as evidenced by Ethiopia’s privatisation plans among others.” However, “tension continues to build in those pockets of the continent where the slow transition from postindependence leaders has led to unrest and dissatisfaction” (ibid.:8). The top 3 sectors exposed to corruption in Africa according to the CII’s analysis, are: infrastructure (airports, ports, storage); construction and development; and transportation. Nevertheless, “targeted intelligence provides a crucial nexus between business, politics, governance and security” (Gilkes 2019:8).

Latin America Eric Wheeler, Head of Business Intelligence Latin America, says that corruption in Latin America continues to be a serious source of concern for many of the region’s economies. The worst of these is still Venezuela, where successive political scandals, weak institutions, and the introduction of sanctions on national oil company

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PDVSA have led the country to the brink of collapse. Recent developments have seen a challenge to the incumbent administration’s legitimacy from a parliamentary leader and another failed coup d’état, this one organised by members of the country’s increasingly divided military establishment. (Wheeler 2019:10)

Elsewhere in South America, according to Wheeler, the corruption investigation known as Lava Jato, which began in Brazil, has continued to metastasize to other countries in the region, where they have contributed to the removal of a Peruvian president and implicated many of the country’s leading businessmen. Offshoots of that investigation are also under way in Ecuador, as well as leading to the implication of several leading businessmen in Argentina. In addition to Lava Jato, another potentially significant investigation into widespread bribery and other corruption threatens to impact Argentina later this year. (ibid.:10)

Central America continues to be a difficult region for businesses to work in. Nothing came of an UN-sponsored investigation that was supposed to lead to political reform in Guatemala. “The activity of organised criminal syndicates in El Salvador and Honduras has created physical security risks and heightened concerns that banks in the region will continue to be used as conduits for money laundering and other financial crime associated with the international drug trade”. There are also “comparatively weak anti-money laundering controls in Belize and Panama” that have “drawn the attention of anti-corruption investigative bodies and law enforcement agencies in the US and elsewhere” (ibid.:10). According to Wheeler “each of the South American economies referenced above has taken concrete steps to combat corruption and prevent the incidence of similar scandals in the future. In Brazil, for example, transparency in licensing processes has increased remarkably … and access to reliable corporate and regulatory information has improved.” He further suggests that “introducing more stringent anti-corruption legislation should bode well for continued investments in these countries.” However, the “incidence of corruption in Latin America has not lessened in the last year. The fate of countries like Venezuela continue to be dictated by widespread corruption and cronyism” (ibid.:10). The top three sectors exposed to corruption in Latin America, according to the Index, are: construction and development; oil and gas; and infrastructure (airports, ports, storage) (ibid.:10).

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Asia Brendan McGloin, Head of Business Intelligence Asia, reasons that Asia Pacific, North Korea and Laos feature in the global top ten most corrupt countries, but the most important growth markets in the region for foreign investors continue to present pervasive corruption risks. In South Asia, India is a case of extremes in our survey. The country’s relatively high standards of corporate disclosures make it easier to acquire reliable information on potential business partners than in many first-world countries. (2019:11)

However, despite India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s focus on anticorruption, “bribery remains entrenched in many sectors, particularly, as our work has shown in the past year, in real estate, infrastructure and defence” (McGloin 2019:11). From the Index’s assessment, “India’s Corruption Challenge score is relatively low. Although the Corruption Threat level is comparatively high, source information is readily available and of good quality; hence offsetting India’s overall Corruption Challenges score which is somewhat low, and therefore it is a country which is relatively straightforward to do business in” (ibid.:15). In North East Asia, China is a shade darker this year [2019] on our corruption map, reflecting the increasing difficulty of gathering reliable information on companies, a challenge we also highlighted last year. The common use of proxies in ownership structures … makes identifying the real owners behind businesses much more time-consuming. On a more positive note, the government continues to prioritise the prosecution of corruption. (ibid.:11)

With the exception of Singapore, Hong Kong and Japan according to McGloin, “corruption is pervasive across the key growth markets favoured by foreign investors in Asia” (ibid.:11). The top three sectors exposed to corruption in Asia, according to the Index, are: construction and development; infrastructure (airports, ports, storage); and energy generation and distribution (non-oil and gas) (McGloin 2019:11).

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Russia (Eastern Europe and Eurasia) In the words of Dmitry Sachkov, Head of Business Intelligence Russia, “all countries in the former Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc continue to suffer from high levels of corruption, even though most of them have declared war on graft. Even in the more advanced, EU-member countries, such as the Baltic states, corruption scandals continue to rock local government” (2019:14). Sachkov further reasons that while Russia has had (and will probably continue to have) its own fair share of graft investigations, it is positive developments in regulations and enforcement that have mainly caught our attention, along with a relatively low Corruption Challenges Index score. In 2018, a small IT company was exempted by a court from a fine imposed for bribery. The company proved that it had proper anti-corruption procedures in place and that the attempted bribery was the personal initiative of a rogue employee. We regard this as an important precedent which will motivate more companies of all sizes to improve anti-bribery compliance. Additionally, an article in the country’s Code of Administrative Violations on fines for bribery was amended to relieve companies from financial sanctions if they report attempted bribery and extortion and cooperate with the investigative authorities. (2019:14)

The top three sectors exposed to corruption in Russia (Eastern Europe and Eurasia), according to the Index, are: construction and development; banking and finance; and oil and gas (ibid.:14).

Concluding remarks South Africa’s BRICS partners are all slipping (further) away from democracy and becoming increasingly autocratic. They have (very) high impunity levels that can easily lead to/allow corruption. They furthermore face all sorts of corruption challenges that have been highlighted and that we must be aware of. South Africa faces its own challenges in this regard: It is still a democracy – for now – but the country does not yet participate in the GII. Meanwhile, it is still facing high levels of corruption (as highlighted in the testimonies before the Zondo Commission of Inquiry9). However, in the 9

This is a judicial commission of inquiry instituted by then President Jacob Zuma on 23 January 2018 to investigate allegations of state capture. It is led by deputy chief justice Ray Zondo. The official proclamation of the commission in the

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meantime, we should continue to do business with our BRICS partners – and exploit and develop existing potential – whilst remaining on the lookout for the serious pitfalls and dangers of corruption and impunity. We all hope that the BRICS countries will continue to strive to implement the appropriate rules and regulations needed to empower all stakeholders to engage in monitoring and evaluation to reduce corruption and impunity, and to follow-up on all actions highlighted in audits of public sector activities. We hope to see work towards establishing the codes of conduct, values and behaviour that are much needed in order to address corruption and impunity, and enable economic growth, (human) development and transformation. Any country that does so will consequently become more transparent and accountable. We need good management and governance, control, ethical leadership, and moral regeneration (probity and integrity). Furthermore, the hope is expressed that the four BRICS countries that have slipped away from democracy will realise its importance and revert back to true democracy, in their own, but also the world’s interest. Democracy remains the best means of governance, particularly when it comes to curbing corruption and fighting impunity. This must be done because corruption destroys human dignity, while impunity compounds this destruction. Furthermore, corruption is a human rights issue – and not only an African, but a global issue which requires holistic and collective action. We must continue to emphasise our intolerance for impunity through responsible citizenship. We know that weakness in governance has its roots in weak structures and irregular audits at all levels of governance, with rare or no follow-up action on audit queries or recommendations by the appropriate bodies.

References Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Skaaning, S.- E., Teorell, J. and Altman, D. 2018. “V-Dem Dataset v8.” Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute. Corruption Challenges Index 2019. https://www.riskadvisory.com/campaigns/corruption-challenges-index2019/ (accessed 2 July 2019).

Government Gazette instructed the commission to inquire, investigate and make recommendations into any and all allegations of state capture, corruption and fraud in the public sector.

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Dahl, R. A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Fisher, M. and Taub, A. 2019. The Interpreter. The New York Times March 7, 2019. Gilkes, H. 2019. “Africa.” In Corruption Challenges Index 2019, Transparency International. https://www.riskadvisory.com/campaigns/corruption-challenges-index2019/ (accessed 10 July 2019). Global Impunity Index, 2017. University of the Americas Puebla, Mexico. Huntington, S.P. 1991. The third wave of democratization in the late twentieth century. London: University of Oklahoma Press. Jones, C. 2019. “Corruption and impunity—with focus on the Global Impunity Index—(GII) 2017.” In Agang, S., Pillay, P. and C. Jones (eds) A Multidimensional Perspective on Corruption in Africa: Wealth, Power, Religion and Democracy. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp. 61-81. Jones, C. 2019. Democracy still rules – for now. Mail and Guardian, 21 to 27 June 2019, p.30. Le Clercq Ortega, J.A., and Sánchez-Lara, G. 2017, Global Impunity Index, University of the Americas Puebla, Mexico. Lührmann, A. and Lindberg, S.I. 2019. A third wave of autocratization is here: What is new about it? Democratization 26(7):1095–1113. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2019.158202 9/ (accessed 5 April 2019). Lührmann, A., Mechkova, V., Dahlum, S., Maxwell, L., Olin, M., Petrarca, C. S., Sigman, R., Wilson, M.C. and Lindberg, S.I. 2018. “State of the World 2017: Autocratization and Exclusion?” Democratization, 25(8):1321–1340. McGloin, B. 2019. “Asia.” In Corruption Challenges Index 2019, Transparency International. https://www.riskadvisory.com/campaigns/corruption-challenges-index2019/ (accessed 10 July 2019). Rowley, C. 2019. “Welcome and global key findings.” In Corruption Challenges Index 2019, Transparency International. https://www.riskadvisory.com/campaigns/corruption-challenges-index2019/ (accessed 10 July 2019). Sachkov, D. 2019. “Russia, Eastern Europe and Eurasia.” In Corruption Challenges Index 2019, Transparency International. https://www.riskadvisory.com/campaigns/corruption-challenges-index2019/ (accessed 10 July 2019).

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Schedler, A. 2013. The politics of uncertainty: Sustaining and subverting electoral authoritarianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wheeler, E. 2019. “Latin America.” In Corruption Challenges Index 2019, Transparency International. https://www.riskadvisory.com/campaigns/corruption-challenges-index2019/ (accessed 10 July 2019). Williams, O. I. Email correspondence, 19 July 2017.

CHAPTER 8 PERSPECTIVES ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL INDICATORS TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF TRANSNATIONAL FISHERIES CRIME ON THE BLUE ECONOMY AND ANTI-CORRUPTION: THE CASE OF ABALONE IN SOUTH AFRICA

IVY XQ CHEN1 AND C DE CONING2

Abstract It’s clear from the recent literature that environmental governance related to marine resources and especially transnational fisheries crime in the blue economy and corruption are receiving increasing attention and that a need exists to improve our understanding of how these factors impact on the attainment and measurement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The relative scope, size and impact, both positive and negative, that transnational fisheries crime in the blue economy and corruption have on the achievement of the SDGs are vastly underestimated. This chapter argues that a need exists to develop monitoring and evaluation systems that can articulate such SDG impacts, using specific outcomes and indicators for this purpose. This chapter has selected three (3) SDGs to illustrate the importance of further indicator development in this field. These include SDG 14 (Life below water), SDG 17 (Strengthen and revitalize global partnerships) and SDG 16 (Peace, justice and strong institutions). Although 1

Dr Ivy XQ Chen is a candidate attorney, high court interpreter and research fellow in law and public policy with a focus on M&E and development study. 2 Prof Christo De Coning is a Professor Extraordinaire at the School of Government, University of the Western Cape, as well as a senior researcher at ICSSD, UWC.

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it is not possible to cover all existing indicators in the field of transnational fisheries crime in the blue economy and corruption, a specific emphasis has been placed on SDG indicators that involve partnerships with communities to address especially poaching in coastal areas and a case study of the South African Abalone situation will be presented. This study examines the nature of transnational fisheries crime in the blue economy and in anti-corruption and its socio-economic consequences on a regional, national and international level with respect to the SDGs. An effort will be made to analyse the SDGs with respect to transnational fisheries crime and corruption to determine a framework for the assessment of socio-economic benefits and costs with respect to the SDGs. This study examines the socioeconomic consequences of crime and corruption in transnational fisheries in the blue economy on a regional, national and international level and attempts to develop a framework for the assessment of progress being made towards eliminating it, based on existing SDG indicators and some new ones we propose for this specific end. Keywords: Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); environmental fisheries crime; socioeconomic indicators; illegal abalone poaching; community of practice (CoPs); transnational organised crime; anti-corruption; monitoring and evaluation (M & E); local economic development (LED); illegal unreported unregulated (IUU) fishing

Introduction and background The United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) emphasise the need to stop illicit poaching and trafficking of wildlife, with a focus on implementation, preservation and promotion of the sustainable use of ecosystems. Nevertheless, nearly 7,000 species of animals and plants are still traded illegally in a market that involves 120 countries (UNODC 2016:3). This and other statistics that show a significant failure to achieve the SDGs warrant an emphasis on the development of national monitoring and evaluation systems, in order to provide evidence-based information on the nature and scale of wildlife crime. The particular focus of this chapter is transnational fisheries crime and its effects on under-sea marine resources. A need exists to establish a way of measuring the impact of these crimes on achieving the SDGs, using selected SDG indicators for this purpose. This chapter presents the case for a shift from regarding transnational fisheries crime and illegal abalone poaching as a purely criminal activity, arguing that a sustainable marine management solution needs to be found that provides socioeconomic alternatives to poaching communities. It is thus

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imperative that SDG indicators also include ways to assess the positive outcomes of the successful management and regulation of illegal unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, including abalone poaching, in such communities. Such community-based indicators have also been proposed for inclusion in an SDG indicator framework to quantify the effects of poaching on marine resources. It is important that research, as well as data from monitoring and evaluation of the maritime sector, are effectively utilised as a basis for policymaking, thereby narrowing the gap between research and policymaking on a wide range of maritime challenges facing Africa as a continent, which is emerging as a global economic actor in the twenty-first century.

Fisheries crime in Blue economy and anti-corruption According to the World Bank, the blue economy is the “sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth, improved livelihoods, and jobs while preserving the health of ocean ecosystem." The Blue Economy can only be sustainable when we also succeed in creating a sustainable economy on land – that is, an economy that restores, protects and maintains diverse, productive and resilience ecosystems, and that is based on clean technologies, renewable energy, and circular material flows (UNDP 2015:9). A worldwide transition to a low-carbon, resource-efficient Green Economy will not be possible unless the seas and oceans are a key part of these urgently needed transformations. Environmental crime covers activities ranging from illegal logging, trade in ozone-depleting substances and dumping hazardous waste, to unreported fishing. It often includes a transnational dimension, which makes it highly profitable. It poses serious threats to the environment, contributing to poverty and food insecurity. It can damage the state by supporting organised crime and corruption (Transparency International 2012:3). The recent joint UNEP and INTERPOL Environmental Crime Crises report describes illegal ¿shing as a “rapidly rising threat to the environment, to revenues from natural resources, to state security, and to sustainable development” (UNEP 2014; De Coning, E. and Witbooi, E. 2015:1). Fisheries crime refers to a range of serious offences committed along the entire fisheries value chain. Offences occur both on- and off-shore, at one or more stages along the value chain, and frequently in combination. These

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crimes extend into the trade, ownership structures and financial services associated with the fishing sector at the top but also local communities and criminal syndicates at the local level (Witbooi 2014:293). The various types of offence associated with transnational fisheries crime, such as corruption, fraud, forgery, tax and customs evasion, undermine the vital role of the fisheries sector by depriving states of valuable sources of income. This adversely affects coastal communities’ livelihoods, and undermines fisheries management and conservation efforts, resulting in overfishing and the depletion of fish stocks (International Symposium on Fisheries Crime 2019:7). Figure 1 advocates for the classification of IUU fishing as a type of fisheries crime, together with illegal transnational organised fishing and related offences. The African Union’s Integrated Maritime Strategy identi¿es illegal ¿shing as one of the key threats to and vulnerabilities in the African maritime domain, while the 2014 Africa Progress Report highlights the billions lost to illegal and “shadowy” ¿shing practices on the African continent (De Coning, E. and Witbooi, E. 2015:6). A very articulate and descriptive perspective on the term “fisheries crime” has been provided by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)’s report on The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture (2018:2), which describes it as encompassing: a range of serious offences that can occur at each stage of the fisheries value chain. The crimes extend to activities not directly linked to fishing, for instance fraud and forgery, money-laundering and financial services. Investigating corruption can sometimes be the best way to accumulate proof that these crimes have been committed, as documentary evidence and money trails are left in the wake of certain types of large-scale corruption in the fisheries sector. The creation and implementation of regulatory and law enforcement frameworks assume good governance but is often undermined by the existence of corruption. If resources are allocated to these frameworks but do not address corruption effectively, the potential impact of those resources is diminished significantly. In many jurisdictions, penalties for corruption convictions are much greater than those associated with illegal fishing convictions, and consequently, successful prosecution and sentencing of cases involving corruption can have the benefit of acting as a deterrent for future criminal behaviour. Additionally, the corruption that facilitates fisheries crimes will often take place on land, within a single jurisdiction, which makes investigation, prosecution and conviction more achievable. This is in contrast to illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which often takes place in international waters across multiple jurisdictions. (FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2018:2)

Perspectives on Sustainable Development Goal indicators to assess the impact of transnational fisheries crime on the blue economy and anti-corruption Figure 1: IUU fishing as a type of transnational organised fisheries crime

Source: Santosa M. A. 2018:15. Combating IUU fishing and fisheries Crime.

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Corruption can also be considered as a catalyst for environmental crime. In particular, corruption plays an important role in facilitating the practice of IUU fishing. Corruption, in this case, may affect a variety of actors, including local communities, local gangs and crime syndicates, customs officials, the police, shipping firms, and exporters/importers. In the case of South Africa, poaching, corruption and organised crime are all implicated in the abalone trade.

Overview of SDGs and selected priority areas Although all SDGs relate directly to transnational fisheries crime in the blue economy and illegal abalone poaching, this chapter has selected three (3) SDGs to illustrate the importance of further indicator development in this field. These include SDG 14 (Life below water), SDG 16 (Strengthen and revitalize global partnerships) and SDG 17 (Peace, justice and strong institutions). These SDGs are briefly discussed below. Progress on achieving the SDGs is measured according to specific indicators (https://indicators.report/overview/). This chapter proposes some additional specific indicators focused on transnational fisheries crime that could be considered for inclusion in the assessment of the above SDGs, including: x Outcome-based indicators for organised fisheries crime and corruption and linked to anti-poaching activities and local communities; x Specific indicators focused on the role of coastal communities in poaching and economic partnerships linked to local economic development (LED); x The need to establish a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system that goes beyond national governments to include the regional and international levels, encouraging multilateral cooperation between organisations.

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Table 1: Selected SDG priority targets for transnational fisheries crime in the blue economy SDG 14 Life below water

14.2 By 2020, sustainably manage and protect marine and coastal ecosystems to avoid significant adverse impacts, including by strengthening their resilience, and take action for their restoration, to achieve healthy and productive oceans 14.4 End overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing 14.6 Prohibit fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, eliminate subsidies that contribute to IUU fishing 14.7 By 2030, increase the economic benefits to small island developing states (SIDS) and least developed countries (LDCs) from the sustainable use of marine resources, including through sustainable management of fisheries, aquaculture and tourism

SDG 16 Peace justice and strong institutions (SDG 16 = enabler for many other SDGs) SDG 17 Global partnerships for the goals

16.3 Improve the rule of law and access to justice 16.4 Reduce illicit financial and arms flows, organised crime 16.5 Reduce corruption and bribery 16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions 16.10 Access to information and fundamental freedoms 17.6 Enhance North-South, South-South, and triangular regional and international cooperation on and access to science, technology, and innovation, and enhance knowledge sharing on mutually agreed terms, including through improved coordination among existing mechanisms, particularly at UN level, and through a global technology facilitation mechanism when agreed 17.16 Enhance the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, complemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in all countries, in particular developing countries 17.17 Encourage and promote effective public, public-private, and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships 17.18 By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for LDCs and SIDS, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts

Source: UN Working Group 2014 “Compiled list of potential indicators”; InterAgency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators (IAEG-SDGs), 2016, Final list of proposed Sustainable Development Goal indicators

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SDG goal 14: Life under water – conservation and sustainability of oceans, seas and marine resources Figure 2: Company prioritisation of the SDGs

Source: PwC, SDG Reporting Challenge 2018 Base Companies priority SDGs

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Figure 2 illustrates that Goal 14 (life below water) has been identified as least relevant of the goals, or is given the least priority by companies (PwC Reporting 2018:362). This neglect is surprising because, other than its relevance to key issues regarding the conservation and sustainable use of marine resources, this goal also is integral to the global fishing industry, an indispensable source of nutrition that represents an important food safety net in many vulnerable regions globally. The fishing industry is one of the largest employers in the world and the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation has estimated that almost 80 million people are employed in this industry (FAO 2014:3). It is therefore clear that the conservation and sustainable use of marine resources should be seen as pillars in achieving the SDGs. However, illegal fishing and other forms of criminality in this sector are causing major harm to marine resources. At the same time, such activities have become a part (albeit an illegal one) of the livelihoods of many communities, providing employment and a much-needed food source to impoverished communities. This is a major consideration, given that the FAO concluded that up to 75% of the world’s fish stocks are either fully exploited, overexploited or depleted, attributing this fact largely to the practice of IUU fishing. (UNCTAD / FAO / UNEP 2018:6). The practice depletes fish stocks; destroys natural habitats, leading to species becoming seriously threatened; reduces biodiversity, which in turn causes imbalances among species; and adversely affects ecosystems. This may lead to a reduction of human food sources due to a scarcity of fish, hindering the achievement of Goal 2, namely, ending hunger and achieving food security (UNCTAD / FAO, UNEP 2018:3). By far one of the most neglected areas of environmental crime, illegal fishing is also probably one of the most extensive in geographical terms. It is estimated that the annual global IUU fishing catch represents up to 26 million tonnes, which equates to more than 816 kg of wild fish stolen from our seas every second. In purely economic terms, the value of this annual catch has been estimated at US$10–23 billion. As much as 30% of the total catch in some fisheries, as well as 50% of the landings in some ports, may consist of IUU fish (UNODC 2015:9). The UNODC reported that about 50% of fish exports derive from developing countries, where IUU fishing undermines legitimate fishing competition, adversely affecting the livelihoods and economies of coastal communities, thereby impacting poverty reduction goals and causing mass

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overfishing, to the point that it is estimated that 75% of the world’s fish stocks are overexploited (UNODC 2015:6). As is illustrated by the case study on abalone presented later in this chapter, the poaching of endangered marine species has reduced stocks to alarming levels. Perversely, the exploitation of a species to the point of existential threat can actually increase the attraction of that species to organised crime syndicates. The illegal fishing industry has been extensively linked to other serious forms of organised crime, and also linked to human rights issues (UNODC 2011:3). The factoring in of all of these variables in measuring the attainment of the SDGs is, therefore, no easy task. One of the building blocks in addressing this challenge is the development of monitoring and evaluation systems than can produce credible and trustworthy information in this field.

SDG 16: Peace, justice and strong institutions – the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies and the building of institutions at all levels It is clear that organised crime is linked to illegal fisheries and that the negative impacts on marine resources and the environment are substantive. In this process the functioning of the judiciary, together with the presence of accountable and effective institutions, are important factors in ensuring peaceful societies. The United Nations has consistently emphasised the critical importance of strengthening and consolidating security and justice from the perspective of the rule of law, as being a pre-cursor and necessary condition for achieving stable and peaceful societies (UNDP, PBSO, DPKO, RoLUnit and others 2014:16). It is also noteworthy that the UN Secretary-General’s statement in 2004 – which highlighted the “inextricable link” between security, human rights and development – has formed an important basis for focusing on this dimension with respect to the SDGs. This dimension also concerns cycles of conflict, poverty and human vulnerability linked to the above (UNDP, PBSO, DPKO, RoLUnit and others 2014:13; IAEG-SDGs 2016:5). Then UN General Assembly has also confirmed the link between the rule of law and broader development goals: We are convinced that the rule of law and development are strongly interrelated and mutually reinforcing, that the advancement of the rule of law at the national and international levels is essential for sustained and

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inclusive economic growth, sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and hunger and the full realization of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development. (UN General Assembly 2012:9)

In the long-term, a global strategy based on partnerships and cooperation is needed to counter organised crime. This will promote a more strategic and coordinated approach to counter organised crime by facilitating action at the national, regional and international levels (UNDP 2015:5). As this study demonstrates, the challenge is multifaceted, with impacts across a range of domains, from humanitarian to developmental, yet there are currently limited institutional arrangements that facilitate collaboration between the stakeholders. The South African abalone example presented here shows that poaching, corruption and organised crime are linked. At the same time, the communities involved in poaching are in need of local economic development (LED) opportunities, generating alternative sources of income, if a viable solution to poaching is to be found. For such arrangements to work, local partnerships between the community, local government, and other agencies need to be facilitated.

SDG 17: Partnerships for the goals – strengthening, implementing and revitalising global partnerships Much of the debate on organised crime has been about the regulation and enforcement of laws prohibiting such practices. When it comes to transborder issues, national governments have often not seen eye-to-eye on mutual responsibilities or collaborative approaches. A need, therefore, exists for continued cooperation at the strategic level, and to assess the impacts such partnerships have on attaining the SDGs. As the above discussion of SDG Goal 16 highlighted, corruption and organised crime have clearly exacerbated the problem of poaching, while the existing institutional arrangements are insufficient and do not allow for innovation and experimentation (UNDP, PBSO, DPKO, RoLUnit and others 2014:16). The debate on the above-mentioned anticipated outcomes of SDG 17 shows that a need exists for those states most affected by the impacts of organised crime to engage in partnerships that can collectively address these challenges, as well as to cooperate on M & E and evidence-based decisionmaking. Debates around organised crime also require a much broader range of stakeholders to be present and engaged, including greater involvement of

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the private sector and cooperation with civil society, in order to secure sustainable partnerships. It will be necessary to strengthen the means of implementation through partnerships with local communities that are involved in fisheries crime in order to find viable solutions to poaching and sustainable solutions for the environment. Local partnerships depend on cooperative partnerships with national government and other agencies for their implementation. Successful implementation, in this respect, is therefore dependent on recognition of the context, support for local economic development, and the creation of antipoaching programmes with good content, adequate capacity and commitment from all stakeholders and coalitions, as well as good coordination and communication, with reference to the 7C Protocol for implementation (Cloete, F., De Coning, C., Wissink, H. and Rabie, B. 2016:9).

Additional indicators proposed for fisheries crime, corruption and poaching of marine resources This section provides a summary of the proposed additional indicators according to SDG subsections. ƒ SDG 14 (Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development) o Indicator 14.2 (By 2020, sustainably manage and protect marine and coastal ecosystems to avoid significant adverse impacts, including by strengthening their resilience, and take action for their restoration in order to achieve healthy and productive oceans). The additional indicators proposed in this area include: ƒ % of surface areas where cooperative partnerships have been agreed by local communities to resolve (minimize) poaching. ƒ % of protected marine and coastal ecosystems where cooperative partnerships have been agreed by local communities to resolve (minimize) poaching. ƒ % of protected marine and coastal ecosystems areas where resilience has been strengthened. ƒ % of protected marine and coastal ecosystems areas where successful restoration has taken place. ƒ % increase in states and countries where the proportion of national

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exclusive economic zones are promoted and managed using ecosystem-based approaches (UN SDG14.2.1). o Indicator 14.6 (By 2020, prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, eliminate subsidies that contribute to IUU fishing and refrain from introducing new such subsidies, recognizing that appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing and least developed countries should be an integral part of the World Trade Organisation fisheries subsidies negotiation). The additional proposed indicators in this area include: ƒ % increase in states and countries that are implementing international instruments aiming to combat IUU fishing successfully (UN SDG 14.6.1). ƒ % decrease in fishery subsidies which contribute to over-fishing. ƒ % decrease in subsidies that contribute to IUU. ƒ % of new subsidies introduced. ƒ % increase in income-generating activities for local communities involved in poaching. ƒ % increase in subsidies to increase local economic development. o Indicator 14.7 (By 2030, increase the economic benefits to SIDS and LDCs from the sustainable use of marine resources, including through sustainable management of fisheries, aquaculture, and tourism). The additional proposed indicators in this area include: ƒ % increase in the economic benefits to small communities along with coastal areas. ƒ % increase in GDP relates to sustainable fisheries of small communities. ƒ SDG 16 (Promote peaceful and inclusive societies and the building of institutions at all levels) o Indicator 16.3 (Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all).

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The additional indicators proposed in this area include: ƒ % decrease in the proportion of victims of violence in the previous 12 months who reported their victimization to competent authorities or other officially recognized conflict resolution mechanisms (UN SDG16.3.1). ƒ % decrease in unsentenced detainees as a proportion of the overall prison population (UN SDG16.3.2). o Indicator 16.10 (Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements). The additional indicators proposed in this area include: ƒ % increase in accurate statistics related to fisheries crime and corruption. ƒ % increase in public access. ƒ % of the country and states where fundamentals of freedoms and national legislation, and International agreements have been protected. ƒ SDG 17 (Strengthen, implement and revitalize global partnerships for the goals) o Indicator 17.6 (Enhance North-South, South-South and triangular regional and international cooperation on and access to science, technology and innovation and enhance knowledge sharing on mutually agreed terms, including through improved coordination among existing mechanisms, in particular at the United Nations level, and through a global technology facilitation mechanism). The additional indicators proposed in this area include: ƒ % increase in the number of partnerships aimed at preventing fisheries crime and corruption. ƒ % increase in the number of Organised Crime (OC) units partnering to combat fisheries crime and corruption. ƒ % increase in the number of international partnerships to combat fisheries crime and corruption.

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ƒ % increase in partnerships that increase knowledge sharing and innovative technology. ƒ % increase in partnerships where coordination has improved among existing mechanisms, in particular at the UN level, and through a global technology facilitation mechanism. ƒ % increase in partnerships in science and/or technology cooperation agreements and programmes between countries (UN SDG 17.6.1). ƒ % increase in science and/or technology, cooperation agreements and programmes between countries, by type of cooperation (UN SDG 17.6.1). ƒ Number of countries reporting progress in multi-stakeholder development effectiveness monitoring frameworks that support the achievement of sustainable development goals (UN SDG 17.16.1). o Indicator 17.17 (Encourage and promote effective public, private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships). The additional indicators proposed in this area include: ƒ % increase in public, private and civil society partnerships to combat fisheries crime and corruption. ƒ % increase in civil society partnerships with coastal communities involved in poaching. ƒ % increase in civil society partnerships with municipalities to agree on Local Economic Development Plans to offer alternative incomegenerating opportunities. ƒ % increase in available funding committed to public, private and civil society partnerships. ƒ % increase in interagency cooperation within states and all countries. ƒ % increase in partnerships that promote collaboration with respect to the interface between blue and green economic growth. o Indicator 17.18 (By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including LDCs and SIDS, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics). The additional indicators proposed in this area include:

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ƒ % increase in the proportion of sustainable development indicators produced at the national level with full disaggregation (UN SDG17.18.1). ƒ % increase of countries that have established M & E systems to improve data monitoring and accountability to measure fisheries crime and corruption. ƒ % increase in countries that have established national M & E systems to measure fisheries crime and corruption to improve evidence-based decision-making. ƒ Number of countries with a national statistical plan that is fully funded and under implementation, by the source of funding (UN SDG 17.18.3).

Case study on abalone in South Africa In South Africa, illegal ¿shing takes place in both the commercial sector and in small-scale ¿sheries. The case study used in this chapter (also published in Chen & Lovell 2014:55; Chen 2018:3) shows that abalone poaching provides an apt example of the latter category. The abalone ¿shery in South Africa is recognised as one of the most dif¿cult ¿sheries to manage, due to a combination of factors including its inshore nature, the adverse impacts of ecological factors on stocks, the product’s high value and, importantly, the growth in organised black-market trade in abalone since the 1990s. The combined effects of these factors led to an 88% decrease in the total allowable catch (TAC) of the species from the 1995/1996 season to the 2007/2008 season and culminated in the complete closure of the ¿shery in 2008. Attempts to curb illegal harvests in this sector have been largely unsuccessful, in part due to the problematic socio-political history of abalone rights in the country, where traditional ¿shers were deprived of legal harvesting rights under the former Apartheid regime (De Coning & Witbooi 2015:3). Links with organised criminal networks, with the resultant entrenchment of criminal elements in local ¿shing communities, have further complicated matters, demanding that solutions be sought outside the normal ¿sheries management sphere. Initial efforts, which focused primarily on bolstering enforcement, were subsequently supplemented by increasingly progressive (at least theoretically) access policies that sought to facilitate community involvement in, and (partial) ownership of, the management of coastal resources.

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It is estimated that the illegal abalone trade is worth $440 million annually – more than 10 times the size of the legal market. Due to increased levels of illegal poaching, South African abalone was listed on the CITES Appendix III in 2007, until it was withdrawn three years later. The estimated number of illegally harvested abalone has risen from 4 million a year in 2008 to 7 million in 2016. Hong Kong is the epicentre of the global abalone trade. From 2010 to 2015, around 76% of the imported abalone was sold locally, with the rest being re-exported to China, Indonesia or other Asian countries. South Africa has one of the oldest commercial abalone fisheries in the world. It ranks as one of the top ten wild abalone fisheries, behind Australia and Japan. It employs about 27,000 people and produces shellfish with a total wholesale value of over $100 million. SA and the surrounding waters host 16% of the total amount of marine fish species in the world. Unfortunately, most of these have at some time or other been overexploited. Although this chapter does not deal with details of the various stages of abalone poaching (see Chen & Lovell 2014:66 and Chen 2018:5 for a detailed discussion of this), it argues that a sustainable solution for abalone poaching will only be found if partnerships are entered into with local communities that provide for alternative sources of income for the households involved in the trade.

Monitoring and evaluation (M & E) systems for transnational fisheries crime in the blue economy and anti-corruption Existing M&E systems are largely to be found at the head of national governments. Transnational fisheries crime in the blue economy also requires M&E systems at the global level in order to track monitor transnational fisheries crime and corruption at a global level, also for SDG purposes. The discussion above shows that the establishment of M&E systems in this field is an important priority and that global partnerships to develop such operational partnerships to cooperate and to coordinate such efforts are inadequate. M & E has become prominent in the last two decades as a valuable discipline, together with policy analysis and knowledge management (KM), in the provision of evidence-based information. M & E focuses on outcomes and impacts rather than relying on information management only. In this

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respect, practitioners have largely used the approaches of Kusek & Rist (2004:23), as well as evaluation experts such as Clarke and Fetterman (Kusek and Rist 2004:31; Cloete et al. 2016:67). Valuable theoretical frameworks and conceptual approaches exist in the field of M & E as applied to public and development management (Cloete, Rabie and De Coning 2014:33; Cloete et al. 2016:89). .

The establishment of M & E systems requires the advancement and development of indicator frameworks, agreement on the M & E process by major stakeholders, and the adoption of necessary institutional arrangements to manage such a system (Cloete, Rabie and De Coning 2014:65). Although the debate on anticipated outcomes and indicator development has been active, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the establishment of an actual M & E system that operates beyond those of national governments remains an important priority. Not only is there a lack of capacity and transparency from some national governments to manage such systems efficiently, but in most instances, illegal fishing and corruption are simply beyond the control or influence of national governments. This chapter does not allow for a full exploration of such systems and their establishment; the reader is referred to the existing body of knowledge as contained in the sources referenced above.

Conclusions and recommendations Although environmental governance related to marine resources and especially transnational fisheries crime in the blue economy and corruption are receiving increasing attention, the ability of the international community to address these issues are limited to the actions and discretion of individual governments. In addition to institutional arrangements to govern and regulate the fishing industry and various other important political, economic and social factors, a need also exists for improved monitoring systems in order to provide evidence-based information for decision-making, also to support multi-lateral efforts to address this aspect, also as related to the attainment and measurement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This chapter has argued that the impact, both positive and negative, that transnational fisheries crime on the blue economy and corruption have on the achievement of the SDGs is vastly underestimated. This chapter argued that a need exists to develop monitoring and evaluation systems that can articulate such SDG impacts, using specific outcomes and indicators for this purpose. This chapter also selected three (3) SDGs to illustrate the

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importance of further indicator development in this field. These include SDG 14 (Life below water), SDG 17 (Strengthen and revitalise global partnerships) and SDG 16 (Peace, justice and strong institutions). Although it is not possible to cover all existing indicators in the field of fisheries and transnational fisheries crime in the blue economy and corruption, a specific emphasis have been placed on SDG indicators that involve partnerships with communities to address especially poaching in Coastal areas and a case study of the South African Abalone situation was presented. It is recommended that: x Further outcomes-based indicators development be undertaken to establish a coherent and comprehensive compendium of indicators for transnational fisheries crime in the blue economy and corruption also with reference to coastal communities and associated poaching. x Such an indicator framework should address the nature of transnational fisheries crime in the blue economy and corruption not only from a regulatory point of view but as a major force in socioeconomic development, impacting on poverty and livelihoods in developing countries. x A collaborative approach is followed in establishing a multi-lateral M&E system to facilitate cooperation and ensure coordination of the establishment of such a system. x An approach is supported that promotes M&E systems that transcend the present scope on national government level only so that seamless monitoring may be achieved by establishing an M&E system at the regional level, such as the AU and international level with respect to the SDGs at the level of the UN.

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14.4 By 2020, effectively regulate harvesting and end overfishing, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and destructive fishing practices and implement science-based management plans, in order to restore fish stocks in the shortest time feasible, at least to levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield as determined by their biological characteristics

Anticipated outcome 14.2 By 2020, sustainably manage and protect marine and coastal ecosystems to avoid significant adverse impacts, including by strengthening their resilience and taking action for their restoration in order to achieve healthy and productive oceans

Proposed indicators — % of land area where cooperative partnerships have been agreed by local communities to resolve (minimise) poaching — % of protected marine and coastal ecosystems where cooperative partnerships have been agreed by local communities to resolve (minimise) poaching — % of protected marine and coastal ecosystems areas where resilience has been strengthened — % of protected marine and coastal ecosystems areas where successful restoration has taken place — % increase in states and countries where the proportion of national exclusive economic zones are promoted and managed using ecosystem-based approaches (Source: UN SDG14.2.1) Indicators of political will — Number of States with national legislation that addresses in an effective manner all aspects of IUU fishing (National legislation should address, inter alia, evidentiary standards and admissibility including, as appropriate, the use of electronic evidence and new technologies) (Source: FAO, national legislation and reporting) — Number of regional, bilateral, and/or multilateral agreements addressing in an effective manner all aspects of IUU fishing (Source: Regional and international reporting, NGO reporting, media reporting) — Number of States and/or regional organisations utilising the Oceans Compact or other guide to regulate maritime activity, to strengthen the implementation of UNCLOS (Source: UN reporting, national and regional reporting) — Number of States that have adopted appropriate trade-related measures, consistent with the WTO, that deter IUU fishing. This includes stock or species-specific trade-related measures to reduce or eliminate the economic incentive for vessels to engage in IUU fishing (Source: WTO, national legislation and reporting).

Appendix: SDGs 14, 16, 17 Proposed Indicators Summary

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14.6 By 2020, prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, eliminate subsidies that contribute IUU fishing and refrain from introducing new such subsidies, recognising that appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing and

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Indicators of effective prevention and protection — Percentage increase of market share of fish subject to managed-catch regimes (Source: consumer groups, market research surveys, environment and food ministries) — Number of countries and private and international partners monitoring and collecting data on fishing (Source: FAO, national reporting, NGO reporting) — Number of alternative sustainable livelihoods options offered in littoral nations, by State (Source: national and NGO reporting) — Number of States with comprehensive and effective monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) of fishing from its commencement, through the point of landing, to final destination (Source: FAO, national reporting) Indicators of successful prosecution — Number of cases brought under UNCLOS for illegal fishing (Source: UN-Legal Affairs, UNCLOS Secretariat) — Number of perpetrators of IUU fishing adjudicated, convicted and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State (Source: national criminal justice records) — Number and frequency of major ports visited and inspected by fishing fleet inspection teams (Source: national reporting, media reports) — % increase in states and countries that are implementing international instruments aiming to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing successfully (UN SDG 14.6.1) — % decrease in types of fishery of subsidies which contribute over capacity and over fishing — % decrease in subsidies that contribute to IUU fishing — % of new subsidies that encourage sustainable fishing that have been introduced — % increase in legal income-generating activities for local communities involved in poaching — % increase in subsidies to improve local economic development

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Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels

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16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of Organised crime indicators 16.4.1 Total value of inward and outward illicit financial flows (in current US dollars)

14.7 By 2030, increase the economic benefits to small island developing States and least developed countries from the sustainable use of marine resources, including through sustainable management of fisheries, aquaculture and tourism 16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all

least developed countries should be an integral part of WTO negotiations on fisheries subsidies

Indicators of political will — Number of States that have ratified and fully implemented the UN Transnational Organised Crime convention (UNTOC) and its protocols. (Source: UNODC) — Number of States that have ratified and fully implemented the Arms Trade Treaty without reservation (Source: UN Office for Disarmament Affairs) — Number of States that have created intergovernmental and regional partnerships to fight money laundering (Source: media reports, official press releases)

— % decrease in victims of violence in the previous 12 months who reported their s to competent authorities or other officially recognised conflict resolution mechanisms (UN SDG16.3.1) — % decrease in unsentenced detainees as a proportion of overall prison population (UN SDG16.3.2)

— % increase in economic benefits to small communities along coastal areas — % increase in GDP relating to sustainable fisheries in small communities

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16.5.1 Proportion of persons who had at least one contact with a public official and who paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked

16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms Indicators

16.4.2 Proportion of seized small arms and light weapons that are recorded and traced, in accordance with international standards and legal instruments

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Indicators of effective prevention and protection — Number of States with local, national and/or regional focal points to coordinate efforts to stop SALW trafficking at their respective levels (Source: UN agencies, regional intergovernmental bodies, national police forces and ministries, media reports) — Number of public-private partnerships to help victims of SALW, by State (Source: national and NGO reporting) — % increase in the number of people and organisations/agencies monitoring restorative and retributive justice (Source: national justice records and budgets) — Number of States which have created intergovernmental and regional partnerships to fight money laundering (Source: media reports, official press releases) Indicators of successful prosecution — Number of perpetrators of SALW trafficking arrested, adjudicated, convicted, and serving sentences (by type of sentence) and by State (Source: national criminal justice records) — Number of perpetrators arrested, adjudicated, convicted, and serving sentences (by type of sentence) for committing financial crimes or engaging in illicit financial flows, by State (Source: national criminal justice records) — Number of States that have established money-laundering and asset-seizure protocols (Source: reports and rankings from FATF, Egmont Group, and regional associations) Indicators of political will — Number of States that have ratified the UN Convention Against Corruption without reservation (Source: UN Secretariat, UNODC) — Frequency with which relevant legal instruments and administrative measures are evaluated by States, regional, and international organisations to determine their adequacy to prevent and combat corruption (Source: national and regional reporting, UNODC)

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16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels Indicators

16.5.2 Proportion of businesses that had at least one contact with a public official and that paid a bribe to a public official, or were asked for a bribe by those public officials during the previous 12 months

for a bribe by those public officials, during the previous 12 months Indicators of effective prevention and protection — Number of States with specialised national bodies in place, with the necessary independence and sufficient resourcing to combat corruption (Source: national reporting) — Number of States with practical anti-corruption training programmes in place, and frequency of training (Source: national legislation and reporting) — Number of civil society coalitions and lobbying bodies to advocate for and denounce cases of corruption (Source: national, NGO reporting) — Number of countries and international partners monitoring and collecting data on corruption related to Organised crime (Source: Transparency International, national reports) — Number of mechanisms through which citizens can report corruption, by State (Source: Transparency International, national reporting) — Number of States with robust protection from all forms of retaliation for whistle-blowers who report corruption related to organised crime (Source: Transparency International, national reporting) Indicators of successful prosecution — Value of assets seized or frozen in relation to corruption, by State (Source: national justice records) — Number of individuals arrested, adjudicated, convicted, and serving sentences (by type of sentence) for corruption offences, by State (Source: national criminal justice records) — Number of instances of international cooperation or mutual legal assistance in transnational corruption cases relating to organised crime (Source: national justice systems, police records) Indicators of political will — Number of States that have improved their World Governance Indicators scores (Source: World Bank) — Number of States that have improved their overall Rule of Law Scores (Source: Transparency International) — Number of States which ban anonymous donations to political parties and candidates

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16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements

16.6.2 Proportion of the population satisfied with their last experience of public services

16.6.1 Primary government expenditures as a proportion of original approved budget, by sector (or by budget codes or similar)

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(Source: national and regional reporting, NGOs, watchdog organisations, IDEA) Indicators of effective prevention and protection — Number of public-private partnerships to increase citizen oversight of local governance (Source: national and NGO reporting) — Number of countries that solicit – and, when warranted, act on – input from civil society in the process of developing and approving national budgets (Source: national reports of organisations consulted, corroborated by reports from the organisations themselves) — Number of States with effective external communication systems in place allowing for open communication with the private sector (Source: national, non-governmental organisation, and private sector reporting) — Number of States assessed as having a free press (Source: Freedom of the Press Ranking, NGO reporting) Indicators of successful prosecution — % increase in finance provided to institutions enforcing political finance regulations, by State (Source: IDEA, national budgets) — Number of perpetrators of illicit political financing and strategic violence arrested, adjudicated, convicted, and serving sentences (by type of sentence), by State (Source: national criminal justice records) — Number of States and international partners monitoring and collecting data on illicit political financing and strategic violence (Source: IDEA, Transparency International, national reports) — % increase in information related to fisheries crime and corruption. — % increase in public access — % of states where fundamental freedoms and national legislation and international agreements have been protected

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Goal 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development

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17.6.1 Number of science and/or technology cooperation agreements and programmes between countries, by type of cooperation

17.6 Enhance North-South, South-South and triangular regional and international cooperation on and access to science, technology and innovation and enhance knowledge-sharing on mutually agreed terms, including through improved coordination among existing mechanisms, in particular at the United Nations level, and through a global technology facilitation mechanism Indicators

Technology — % increase in the number of laws aimed at fisheries crime and corruption — % increase in the number of different organised crime units participating in partnership to combat fisheries crime and corruption — % increase in the number of international partnerships to combat fisheries crime and corruption — % increase in partnerships that increase knowledge sharing and innovative technology — % increase in partnerships where coordination has improved among existing mechanisms, in particular at the UN level, and through a global technology facilitation mechanism — % increase in partnerships in science and/or technology cooperation agreements and programmes between countries

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— Number of countries reporting progress in multi-stakeholder development effectiveness monitoring frameworks that support the achievement of the sustainable development goals (UN SDG 17.16.1)

Multi-stakeholder partnerships — Amount in US dollars committed to public, private and civil society partnerships — % increase in public, public-private and civil society partnerships to combat fisheries crime and corruption — % increase in civil society partnerships with coastal communities involved in poaching to combat fisheries crime and corruption — % increase in civil society partnerships with municipalities to agree on Local Economic Development Plans to offer alternative income-generating opportunities — % increase in available funding committed to public, private and civil society partnerships — % increase in inter-agency cooperation within states and all countries — % increase in partnerships that promote collaboration with respect to the interface between blue and green economic growth

17.17 Encourage and promote effective public, public private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships

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17.16 Enhance the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, complemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilise and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in all countries, in particular developing countries

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Data, monitoring and accountability 17.18 By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts — % increase in the proportion of sustainable development indicators produced at the national level with full disaggregation (UN SDG17.18.1) — % increase of countries that have established M&E systems to improve data monitoring and accountability to measure fisheries crime and corruption — % increase of countries that have established results-based M&E systems that are linked to their national M&E systems to improve evidence-based decision-making to measure fisheries crime and corruption — Number of countries with a national statistical plan that is fully funded and under implementation, by source of funding (UN SDG 17.18.3)

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Source: Methodology from the UN Report and various sources. The indicators above are proposed/developed as the authors’ contribution made through this study.

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References Cloete, F. Rabie, B. and De Coning, C. 2014, Evaluation Management in South Africa and Africa. Sun Media. Stellenbosch. Chapter 7. Cloete, F., De Coning, C., Wissink, H. and Rabie, B. 2016. Improving Public Policy: From Theory, Practice, and Review. Van Schaik, Pretoria. Chapter 9. De Coning, E. and Witbooi, E. 2015. Towards a fisheries crime paradigm: South Africa as an illustrated example. The Norwegian National Advisory Group against Organised Fisheries Crime and IUU Fishing (FFA), Norway Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, South Africa. FAO. 2014. The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture: Opportunities and Challenges, Rome (2014). Available at: http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/231522/icode/. FAO 2018, State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture, Committee on Fisheries, Thirty-third Session Rome, 9–13 July. Rome. Available at: www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/COFI/COFI33Documents/MX204 en.pdf. Inter-Agency and Expert Group on SDG Indicators (IAEG-SDGs). 2016. Final list of proposed Sustainable Development Goal indicators (E/CN.3/2016/2/Rev.1), Annex IV, developed by and agreed to, as a practical starting point at the 47th session of the UN Statistical Commission held in March 2016. The report of the Commission, which included the global indicator framework, was then taken note of by ECOSOC at its 70th session in June 2016. Kusek, J., and Rist, R. 2004. Ten steps to a results-based Monitoring and Evaluation System. The World Bank. Washington. PwC, 2018, SDG Reporting Challenge, Base Companies priority SDGs. Santosa M. A. 2018, Combating IUU fishing and fisheries Crime , presentation at the 4th International Symposium on Fisheries Crime Coordinator of the Special Advisors of the Presidential Task Force to Combat Illegal Fishing (SATGAS 115) Fisheries Crime, 15 October 2018, Copenhagen. Transparency International. Martini, Maira. 2012. U4 Expert Answer: Environmental crime and corruption. Available at: https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/environmental_crime _and_corruption. UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 2011. Transnational Organised Crime in the Fishing Industry. Focus on: Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling of Migrants, Illicit Drugs Trafficking. Vienna. Available at:

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https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/2011/issue-papertransnational-organised-crime-in-the-fishing-industry.html. UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 2015. International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS), Version 1.0. Available at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/iccs.html. UNODC 2016. World Wildlife Crime Report Trafficking in protected species. With the support of the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC) CITIES, World Bank Group, INTERPOL, WORLDCUSTOMS ORGANIZATION. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/wildlife/ World_Wildlife_Crime_Report_2016_final.pdf. UN Environment Programme (UNEP). 2012. Avoiding Future Famines: Strengthening the Ecological Foundation of Food Security through Sustainable Food Systems. A UNEP Synthesis Report. Available at: http://mahb.Stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/2012-UNEPAvoiding-FaminesFood-SecurityReport.pdf. UN Environment Programme (UNEP). 2012. Avoiding Future Famines: Strengthening the Ecological Foundation of Food Security through Sustainable Food Systems. A UNEP Synthesis Report. Available at: http://mahb.Stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/2012-UNEPAvoiding-FaminesFood-SecurityReport.pdf. UNEP 2014. Nellemann C., Henriksen R., Raxter P., Ash N., Mrema E., editors. The Environmental Crime Crisis – Threats to Sustainable Development from Illegal Exploitation and Trade in Wildlife and Forest Resources. UN Working Group (UNDP, PBSO, DPKO, RoLUnit and others). 2014. Compiled list of potential indicators (Reference: 1st and 2nd Master List). Available at: https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Gover nance/Virtual%20Network%20on%20Goal%2016%20indicators%20%20Indicators%20we%20want%20Report.pdf. UN General Assembly, 2012. Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels. 30 Nov. 2012. Available at: https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/A-RES-67-1.pdf. UN General Assembly, 2014. Report of the Open Working Group of the General Assembly on Sustainable Development Goals, A/68/970, 12 August 2014. Available at: http://undocs.org/A/68/970. UNDP. 2015. Concept Note: Virtual Network of Stakeholders for the Development of Indicators on Peaceful Societies, Justice and

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Institutions for Sustainable Development Goal 16, a parallel event of the Inter-Agency and Expert Group Meeting, 2 June 2015, New York. UNCTAD / FAO / UNEP. (2018). Achieving the targets of Sustainable Development Goal 14: Sustainable fish and seafood value chains and trade. Background Note for the Second Oceans Forum 16–17 July 2018 Geneva, Switzerland. Available at: http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/Background-NoteSecond-Oceans-Forum-July2018-v4.pdf. Witbooi, E. 2014. Illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing on the high seas: The Port State Measures Agreement in context. International Journal of Maritime and Coastal Law 29:290–320.

CHAPTER 9 CORRUPTION AMONG YOUTHS AGED 15–29 YEARS IN NIGERIA: ITS IMPACT ON OUR FUTURE ARINOLA SURURAH BELLO, PAN AFRICAN STRATEGIC AND POLICY RESEARCH GROUP (PANAFSTRAG)

Abstract A well-known slogan says “the future belongs to the young”. As future leaders, young people are meant to take full responsibility for their cultural, social, political and economic wellbeing. However, in Nigeria, youths are currently living in an environment that is not conducive to their wellbeing, for several reasons, with corruption being paramount. This chapter examines the moral, social, cultural and economic malaise among our youths, defined for our purposes as those aged 15–29 years. Within this age group, many middle-class youths are contented to stay in the parental home and play games, rather than exploring the world or trying to make their way in it. Many in lower classes would apparently rather engage in cybercrime, like the infamous “Yahoo Boys”, and dupe innocent people of their hardearned money rather than tough it out and make a living the hard way. This chapter will look at the causes of the moral, social, cultural, and economic malaise affecting Nigeria’s youth and its consequences on the country’s development. It also looks at how we can provide solutions to reorient the attitude of the typical youth that there can be no gain without pain. Keywords: Development; youths; millennials; corruption; impunity

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Introduction Corruption, in simple terms, means taking advantage of a situation to harness certain benefits that should not accrue to the beneficiary. Corruption may mean “cheating”, a phenomenon which is not only limited to the school examination hall but involves all forms of cheating, bullying, stealing and other vices, with negative effects on the perpetrator’s own persona as well as all around them. Corruption manifests itself in various aspects of life, and it is therefore hard to give a precise and comprehensive definition. However, at the core of most definitions is the idea that a corrupt act implies the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. Classic examples include bribery and embezzlement. Other often more subtle and sometimes even legal examples of corruption include lobbying and clientelism/patronage. At the higher level of corruption, which cuts across the social strata of public and private life, the examples mentioned above are very prominent. More often than not, if children have high morals, they will be able to speak out in the face of injustice and turn around the status quo, thereby reducing impunity, a phenomenon which often leads to corruption. This means everyone is held responsible and accountable, irrespective of their age, position or experience. Culturally, this situation is somewhat difficult to achieve in the African context, due to the common belief that a younger person should not question the actions of an older one. This means that when younger individuals find themselves witnessing corruption, they are unable to speak out for fear of being labelled or even attacked, especially in contexts where corruption is the status quo. On the other hand, where citizens have freedom of expression, where they are not discriminated against on the basis of age, tribe, religion, experience, status, wealth or gender, people feel freer to express themselves and hold one another accountable. This fosters openness and the unbiased exchange of opinions and ideas amongst civil society groups. Until recently, the category of “youth” was defined as 18 to 35 years old in Nigeria – an 18-year interval. This was recently shortened to a 15-year interval and moved forward, to define 15–29-year-olds. The latter definition is used in this chapter. Most youths at the lower end of this spectrum are exploring their teenage years and experience a lot of peer pressure influence. Young minds are, at this age, very easily influenced, especially those without proper guidance. Youth can be understood as a stage of transition between childhood and adulthood. Nearly half of all people in the world today are under the age of 31 (ICRW 2001).

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The current state of youths in Nigeria At the launch of the Revised National Youth Policy in May 2019, the Minister of Youth and Sports Development, Solomon Dalung, announced that the age bracket for the classification of youth in Nigeria was being revised downward from 18–35 years to 15–29 years, to cover the mid-teen to pre-adulthood years. At this age, many middle-class youths appear contented to remain in the parental home playing games rather than exploring the world or trying to make their way in it. Many below the middle-classes would apparently rather engage in cybercrime – like the now famous “Yahoo Boys” who scammed innocent people of their hard-earned money – rather than struggle and make a living the hard way (Oludayo 2016). “These cases attest to the pervasive nature of internet fraud in Nigerian Universities”. Oludayo who is a lecturer of criminology at the University of Ibadan in Oyo State, Nigeria gave instances of young school leavers being arrested for committing internet fraud. The encroachment of western institutions and moral standards has had far reaching consequences for life generally and crime particularly in Nigeria. More specifically, the capitalist economic society, western education and urbanization have considerably contributed to the weakening of the extended family and other traditional social bonds, such as communal sharing and the practice of each individual “being his brother’s keeper”. These old social norms have been replaced by the new culture of individualism which prioritises the private accumulation of wealth, with disastrous consequences for order and social control (Ninalowo 2004; Awosika 2006; Ekpeyong et al. 2012). In this environment, cybercrime is the most accessible form of crime, because the barrier to entry is very low. A cybercriminal can run his operations entirely from a business centre with nothing more than a modem and a computer, or even just a smartphone. From small beginnings, it is now operating on an industrial scale: there are cybercrime factories housing rows and rows of young men and women in huge spaces dedicated to online criminal activity on computers. The damage to the nation has been incalculable. One problem with tackling cybercrime is that, while other crimes are domiciled within Nigerian borders, cybercrime is a global phenomenon. Its impact, however, is fully felt domestically, with Nigeria being systematically shut out of the global economic system because of the activities of these aberrant “cyberpreneurs” (Leke 2012). We cannot buy

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some airline tickets online because of these cybercrimes. You will have to go through a third party or travel down to the closest available airline office. The current generation of youths, often referred to as Millennials, were born in the twenty-first century, or the preceding decade. Many of them still live with their parents, on whom they rely for food and shelter, and therefore do not feel any need to be concerned about many issues beyond being youngsters enjoying their youthfulness. Millennials were born into the era of mobile phones, laptops, tablets and all sorts of devices. To those who did not grow up with such devices, their use in social situations can make it seem that the person poking at their phone is not paying attention. Electronic devices facilitate multi-tasking, but can leave users easily distracted. Millennials tend to be comfortable with using social media like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and the like to criticize only verbally without taking much action. Few use technology and social media to support causes such as anti-corruption, to circulate online petitions, or to fight against unacceptable acts. …[S]ome of the poorest countries have yet to experience even the equivalent of the rapid industrialization wrought by the Second Industrial Revolution. But they, too, will be affected. Some will be able to take advantage of new technologies, allowing at least parts of their economies to leapfrog into the future; but others may suffer, as automation eats into their competitive advantage of low-cost, low-skilled labour. (UNICEF 2017)

This simply implies that some youth don’t even have access to android devices that will enable them have online presence. Their realities are different from actual realities and they generally believe they should get things as soon as they ask; giving them a high sense of entitlement and believing if little or nothing at all in delayed gratification. They do not see the need for delayed gratification as they have grown with gamification which gives instant rewards like trophies, tokens and the likes for achievements. They often don’t view failure as something healthy. Short attention span is a major characteristic of most youths as they move swiftly from one to another activity which often sets them up for easy boredom as soon as those activities are unavailable. They have become more impatient over time and complain from boredom from time to time. “… Many parents and teachers worry that immersion in screens is making

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children depressed, creating internet dependency and even contributing to obesity” (UNICEF 2017). Many young people are currently out of jobs because they are not willing to settle for any job. Unlike our parents’ time where most people were working immediately after secondary school education, more youths with Post-graduate certification are contented to be out of jobs since their parents are willing to take care of them. They will rather stay home without jobs than seek entrepreneurial activities to raise additional income. Early sexual interactions often impact on the life of the girl-child more negatively than the boy child. If a teenage girl is impregnated, her education and substantial parts of her life are disrupted, while the boy child leaves her behind. “Barriers to girl-child education in Nigeria especially in the north have been tied to several factors such as poverty, early marriage, cultural and religious misconceptions or misinterpretations, as well as teenage pregnancy” (Tyoakaa, Mvendaga L., et al July-Aug 2014). On the other hand, if she seeks abortion, it could be a positive outcome (the girl child may survive the experience without complications) or otherwise. In 2008, an estimated three million girls under 20 years sought abortions in countries where abortion is illegal and unsafe (WHO 2011). According to the WHO, half of all adolescent births occur in just seven countries: Bangladesh, Brazil, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria and the United States. This is especially a girl-child issue and has long-term implications. Such girls may turn to poor jobs and thereby remain in poverty for the rest of their lives, as young fathers are often unwilling to take responsibility. “To a great extent, parents determine whether their children marry at a young age. Addressing parental expectations and values is critical to delaying both marriage and adolescent pregnancy” (UNFPA 2015).Those that want to settle down and start a family later in life may find out after having an abortion they are unable to bear another child because of permanent damage to the uterus as a result of a botched abortion. For young people of both genders, another major issue is gang culture, which often leads to other problems like alcoholism and drug addiction. The devastating effects of addiction have the potential to destabilise the lives of young people in their very prime, leaving those affected unable to focus on their education or other important issues in their lives. Many addicts turn to petty theft and other vices to maintain the habit, which can become a lifelong affliction if not addressed early.

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Some innocent youths are also unknowingly lured into cult groups by so-called friends who often want to take advantage of them, either because they are intelligent or because they come from wealthy families and will be able to assist the cause financially or otherwise. They sometimes search for social identity: “There are also students who join cult groups for popularity. They want to make name and to be regarded as powerful people. For these students, to belong to a cult group is a way of achieving prestige and greatness” (Oyewole 2019). In the midst of all these challenges and threats, there are still many youths who make it through school morally and socially upright and who apply their skills to new ideas and inventions. This set of youths could play a major role in influencing their peers in a positive way. This will go a long way to creating a balance and ensuring the growth and development we all seek.

The actual challenges There are various factors influencing the moral, social, cultural and economic malaise afflicting Nigeria’s youth. The challenges are abundant, and only a few of them will be discussed in this chapter. They are, however, not insurmountable if careful and consistent attention is paid to finding and applying ways to redress them. Some of these challenges stem from the family home, which is the first point of contact for the child. Most children shape their values based on those experienced in the home. When parents lie, cheat, fight, or engage in other negative vices, the child is watching. The parent is the first role model; children generally take what parents do as the acceptable standard. The school is another place of socialization. In Nigeria, for instance, once a child is two years old, he or she may be enrolled in a creche, nursery or pre-school group, with school typically starting at the age of five. The child’s teachers, classmates, assistants/attendants and other personnel become a new set of role models, so the child also picks up from them what he/she sees or is taught as the norm. This is why a small child will come home and challenge a parent, saying: “My teacher said that …” Religious organizations, as places the child visits from time-to-time and interacts with others, are also avenues for socialization. As the child grows older, there is less supervision by parents; the child has to venture out on his or her own with the values picked from the primary sources of socialization.

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The company the child keeps determines his/her level of exposure and subsequently influences his/her opinions about situations. As children grow older, they find that the system perpetuates a lot of impunity, which often leads to corruption. When parents, in connivance with other authorities, either aid or fail to abate corruption, for example through falsification of age, state of origin or educational certificates, it sets a poor example for their children. In such an environment, youths may come to feel that they, too, might get away with these sorts of crimes. It can be a long time until the law catches up with them, as often seen with our political office holders in Nigeria, for instance. And even these officials are often investigated only as a vindictive strategy by opposition parties seeking to remove the incumbent to leave the field clear for their own candidates. Parents and other officials who help students to pass exams by any means possible, either through paying teachers to assist the student or by employing an impersonator to take exams on their behalf, are also culpable. Impersonators are often paid handsomely to sit exams for students, allowing the youngster to receive accolades for no effort at all. However, various means are currently being devised by the examining bodies to reduce this type of malpractice and fight the massive corruption in the education sector. “Godfatherism” – where an influential leader helps another to climb the ladder but expects a financial return for their patronage – is also common amongst both public and private office holders. The godfather and his devotees protect each other’s interests and cover one another’s tracks so as to ensure that no crimes are linked to them. This, in most cases, also encourages impunity and corruption and undermines accountability. Another problem is nepotism, where powerful families use their personal influence to assist their children/wards, typically by securing them prominent job positions or contracts. This is usually at the expense of better qualified individuals/companies that do not have the same level of influence, undermining equal opportunities. All these are reasons for the moral, social, cultural, and economic malaise experienced by Nigeria’s youth. Through these examples, young people can see that they will not be held accountable, and so do whatever they like, without recourse to any authority – especially if they are being supported by immoral, antisocial individuals pursuing the same life of decadence.

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Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2019 ranks Nigeria as 146th out of 180 countries – on a par with Iran, Honduras, Guatemala, Bangladesh, Mozambique and Angola (www.transparency. org/cpi2019). This places it in the lowest quintile according to perceived levels of corruption in the public sector. Many other countries in this quintile are also within Africa, suggesting a problem with corruption across the continent. However, there are various means that can be used to address this cankerworm, as discussed in the concluding part of the chapter. However, the CPI also highlights a small number of countries in the region that are seen as doing quite well in addressing the scourge of corruption, where fewer people have to pay bribes or where citizens feel that they can contribute to stopping corruption. Citizens in Botswana, Lesotho, Senegal and Burkina Faso tend to have a more positive view of their country than those in other countries in the region (Pring 2015). Table 1: Corruption by institution in Nigeria, 2015 vs 2019 Percentage of respondents who think that most or all people in these institutions are corrupt

President / Prime Minister Members of Parliament Government officials Local government officials Police Judges and magistrates Religious leaders NGOs Business executives Traditional leaders

2015 54% 61% 63% 58% 72% 45% 28% nil 45% 36%

2019 43% 60% 54% 55% 69% 51% 20% 40% 44% 35%

Source: Pring and Vrushi 2019:49

The table above briefly shows the perception of respondents from a survey conducted to measure the level of corruption across various sectors in Nigeria between 2015 and 2019. The table records significant fall in the level of corruption in some sectors like the Presidency, among Government officials, among Judges and Magistrates, and among Religious leaders.

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Other sectors like Members of Parliament, Local Government Officials, Police, Business Executives and Traditional leaders had very minimal fall in corruption during the 5year comparison. What this implies is that if more deliberate measures are taken to abate corruption, the scourge may be significantly reduced thereby re-instilling the good values and positive virtues we want.

The current role of Nigeria’s youth The challenges of instituting the values of good governance, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human and humanitarian rights, intra-African solidarity, gender equality, and respect for African culture and protection of African cultural heritage remain considerable. There are also challenges relating to enforcing the African Union’s legal instruments, as well as challenges in encouraging active participation and the contribution of all segments of African society to the continent’s development and integration (AUAB 2011). One aim of the African Union Advisory Board on Corruption’s strategic plan is to create awareness of corruption, increase networking and improve monitoring and evaluation. A lot can be achieved with the younger generation in this regard if the necessary tools are put in place. Many young people use social media as a platform to voice their opinions on corrupt practices. Tools such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram are currently being harnessed to speak out against corrupt public officials and hold them accountable. Furthermore, as highlighted by Transparency International, social media celebrities are playing pivotal roles in helping the anti-corruption message gain more momentum. Thought leaders, such as Japhet Omojuwa, are spreading the #AfricaAgainstCorruption campaign to millions of young people online, giving everyone a necessary sense of belonging, while promoting a new culture of anti-corruption (Akorede 2018). Other tech tools are also used to create awareness among citizens. On the front line of this action is BudgIT. Founded by two young men, Oluseun Onigbinde and Joseph Agunbiade, this civic organization empowers people in Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Ghana to fight corruption in the public space. This is achieved by simplifying budgets and public finance information using technological tools. BudgIT specialises in data mining to curate stunning, relatable infographics that help citizens make sense of budget figures, question authorities and hold them to account. It is also turning citizens into real-life anti-corruption stars, with a tool called Tracka, an e-

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platform on which citizens can share updates on budgetary and development projects in their communities (Akorede 2018).

Possible impacts of corruption on our future Transparency International is “a global movement with one vision: … a world free of corruption.” To this end, it works “together with governments, businesses and citizens to stop the abuse of power, bribery and secret deals” (www.transparency.org/about). More locally, Afrobarometer is a “non-partisan, pan-African research institution conducting public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, the economy and society in 30+ countries”. It aims to be “the world’s leading source of high-quality data on what Africans are thinking” and has conducted 145 surveys across 37 African countries in 115 languages over six years, as well as over 200,000 interviews (https://www.afrobarometer. org/about). The results of the Global Corruption Barometer-Africa (GCB) show that more than half of all citizens think corruption is getting worse in their country and that their government is doing a bad job at tackling it. The GCB found more than one in four people who accessed public services, such as healthcare and education, paid a bribe in the preceding year. This equates to approximately 130 million citizens in the 35 countries surveyed. The GCB also reveals how corruption is hitting the most vulnerable people the hardest. For example, the poorest are twice as likely to pay a bribe as the richest people in Africa. Paying bribes for essential public services means poorer families have less money for basic necessities like food, water and medicine. Despite this, the GCB raises hope for positive change. More than half of the Africans surveyed think that citizens can help stop corruption (Pring and Vrushi 2019:4). There are many potential impacts of corruption, should it be allowed to continue unabated. Some of these are explored below. Declining standards of education are a major feature of corruption. Education is the foundation of every economy; if the youth of today are not equipped to solve the problems of tomorrow, how will they cope both at home, across the African continent, and in the global space? The worst of our secondary school graduates are often sent to the Teachers’ Training

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College to learn how to teach the next generation. Annual mathematics results have continued to decline over the last decade. Complete restructuring of the education sector is ongoing to ensure that only competent teachers remain, so as to maintain a high standard for students at all levels. Poor leadership and weak followership are the bane of the day. Many of the so-called democratically elected officials are not competent to fill the positions they are elected into. The day-to-day policies and activities of the government seems to condone corruption. Or at least, it appears that the fight against corruption is no longer government’s top priority as was preached during the era of President Obasanjo. During the time of late President Yar’ dua, although the fight was on, his closed-door affinity with top politicians who were already being investigated by the EFCC, and his melancholic method of fighting the blight under the auspices of ‘due process and rule of law’ weakened the forte with which his immediate predecessor fought the bane. This led to prolonged trials in court and even disinterest in some of the high profile cases. And during the present government, this fight is even becoming obscure. (Unuoha, 2011)

Some of them do not have the certification and experience required to carry out their office, and often they reach office surrounded by aides who are also not competent to assist them in directing the affairs of the country. Hence, governance has been deteriorating over the years. Those who are competent to hold elective positions, however, are deterred by the huge sums of money needed to become a party member, as well as by cultural expectations and the threat of violence. The continued decline in the state of Nigeria’s economy we are now witnessing is a warning sign. High inflation, high unemployment, low GDP and declining per capita income do not bode well for the future of any developing economy. We seem to be focused more on consumerism than productivity. Our industries have all been crippled while our exports continue to dwindle. We need leaders who will be willing to look inward and chart a new course for our many youths, who should be trailblazers. We have abundant resources which can be fully mobilised in our industries. Continued declining standards of living due to low per capita income is an obvious sign that the economy and the polity is not improving. The average household cannot afford basic essentials like housing, food and access to health amenities. More safety-net programs of the sort recently introduced by the Buhari Administration, if well managed, will allay

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citizens’ fears and go a long way towards helping people meet their basic needs. Political instability and unrest due to terrorist attacks, kidnappings and cases of ritual killings do not portray the country in a good light. These incidences undermine the credibility of our security and intelligence experts, who are often portrayed as highly trained agents with access to sophisticated weaponry to launch counter-attacks on intruders that want to disrupt Nigeria’s security and stability. The incessant kidnappings have also affected Nigeria’s image abroad and damaged attempts to develop a viable tourism industry, which is impossible as long as visitors are regularly warned by their own governments to be wary of visiting. Many would-be investors have also stayed away for fear of being kidnapped (Inyang and Ubong 2013). It is no longer news that this once respected nation has been “blacklisted” by most foreign nations, especially America, as a hotbed of terrorism (This Day 2013). Technological backwardness is a major hindrance to growth and development. Where the global stage is advancing in the development of drones and artificial intelligence to address key issues in various sectors of the economy such as agriculture, security and otherwise, we should not only embrace importing such as drones for our immediate use but look at empowering our abled-bodied youths to go into fixing, and possibly manufacturing the same to enhance the theoretical knowledge learnt in school. Large sums of funds for science and technology which could have been used for technological advancement is been embezzled by corrupt leaders. When these leaders are not called to order, this degrading act to our economy will continue and increase our technological backwardness. “This is so because, it is not enough to write and talk against corruption but in practice, the reverse is the norm. Moreso, the youths and children are great imitators, on whom lies the future and hope of our great nation” (Triumph n.d.). These are a few of the various implications of the long-term effects of corruption if left unchecked.

Solutions to the problem of corruption from the perspective of Nigeria’s youths It is important that both youths and their parents/guardians should be on board with respect to fighting the scourge of corruption, as it is well known that some parents/guardians aid and use their children/wards to perpetrate

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all sorts of undesirable acts. It is therefore important in proffering solutions to corruption that all stakeholders are on the same page. Corruption can be countered preventively and punitively. The preventive approach is used to stop something undesirable from happening. It can take many forms, such as embedding anti-corruption policies in public institutions; establishing anti-corruption units within organizations to carry out internal monitoring/cleansing; making public procurement more transparent; educating the public about corruption; and improving public access to information and making it easy for people to report transgressions. Punitive measures relate to the imposition of punishment or sanctions on corrupt individuals or organisations, such as jail terms, fines, suspensions, disqualifications, and the freezing or confiscation of proceeds/assets (Abass n.d.). In some contexts, encouraging youth to stand up to corruption without ensuring a safe environment can put people in danger. The Youth Integrity Surveys conducted by Transparency International’s Asian chapters show that a significant proportion of the young people interviewed (more than 15%) would refrain from reporting corruption for personal security reasons (Transparency International Korea 2012; Towards Transparency Vietnam 2011). This shows that security and safety are important issues to take into account when engaging youth in anti-corruption drives. In 2019, over 40% of Africa’s 1.3 billion people were under the age of 15, while another 44.5% were between 15 and 45. The median age is 19.4 (https://www.worldo meters.info/demographics/demographics-of-africa/). Africa is a continent of youths. The youths must take the decision on how to act because they cannot be bystanders. Across Africa, there is a growing wave of civic action against corruption, alongside a push for greater inclusion for young people in politics and governance. Anti-corruption activists are leading mass demonstrations in South Africa, Kenya, Malawi and several more countries. Celebrity superstars, such as Innocent Idibia, ONE Campaigns’ anticorruption ambassador, are throwing their weight behind the movement. Young people have a critical role to play in the war against systemic corruption, and in democratic reforms in general (Akorede 2018). They should be engaged at the communal, local, state and federal level. This will give them a sense of belonging and the feeling that their voices do matter. Areas like art and photography can also be adopted to further give young people more options of creative self-expressions.

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Organisations and government agencies focused on the orientation and reorientation of the masses, such as the National Orientation Agency (NOA), as well as civil society organisations, could be set up for the purpose of training youths about their civic duties and responsibilities. The reorientation of our civil and public service officials is also important at this stage. These public officials should be reminded that they are employed to serve the people and their state/country. The AU Anti-Corruption Advisory Board on Corruption at the continental level and the UN Convention on Anti-Corruption (UNCAC) at the global level are two official agencies that can assist with youth engagement. Early exposure to debate on corruption, from primary school to university, can also help inform the next generation. Encouraging volunteering and community service as part of learning about civic responsibility also encourages young people to put others before them. For school drop-outs, public places like motor garages, cinemas, clubs and bus stops are good targets for outreach and advocacy work, with the aim of encouraging those who are falling through the cracks in the system to learn about the implications of corrupt practices. Private institutions, such as schools, training institutions, serviceoriented institutions, hospitals and others can, also play a role by engaging both staff and users alike. As agents of change, they can use posters, talks and the media to disseminate information in multiple languages to all stakeholders. Religious organizations’ involvement is very important, as most people are affiliated to at least one, typically Christianity or Islam. Officials of these organizations can be co-opted to serve as agents of change while calling their members to order and enlightening them on the consequences of corrupt practices. These organizations can also help by monitoring young people and potentially pre-empt the escalation of any problems they may be facing. Exposure to the consequences of corrupt acts is essential, as is the equal treatment of all youths when they err, irrespective of gender, religion or social standing. Equality before the law ensures anyone who is culpable faces the consequences. We can also “name-and-shame” or hand down community service orders – in other words use punitive methods to deter others.

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In summary, according to Richard Branson, “Nations will never live up to their true potential as long as the right of people to speak their mind, to seek knowledge and to debate their views is not guaranteed” (https://virg.in/wPN; hashtag#defendmediafreedom). Let our youths’ voices be heard, for the future belongs to them.

References Abbas, I. n.d. The role of youths in fighting corruption. https://www.academia.edu/2398076/NIGERIA_THE_ROLE_OF_YO UTHS_IN_FIGHTING_CORRUPTION/ (accessed 30 October 2019). Africa Demographics. 2020. https://www.worldometers.info/demographics/demographics-of-africa/ (accessed 31 March 2020). Akorede, S. 2018. Here are three ways Africa's youth are defeating corruption. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/11/here-are-three-waysafricas-youth-are-defeating-corruption/ (accessed 4 May 2019). AUAB. 2011. African Union Advisory Board on Corruption: The 2011 – 2015 Strategic Plan. http://akb.africa-union.org/auc/handle/AKB/2622 (accessed 0 July 2018). Awosika, L. 2006. Impact of globalization on education and cultural values in Nigeria. Education and regeneration of our traditional values in Nigeria. Edited by Oyekanmi F. and Nwabueze N. Department of Sociology University of Lagos Akoka, Lagos, Nigeria. p. 198. Ekpeyong, S., Raimi, L. and Ekpeyong, A. 2012. Urban poverty and juvenile delinquency in Nigeria: Through the lens of Port Harcourt Remand Home Inmates. Research on Humanities and Social Sciences, 2(8):127–131. Inyang, J. and Ubong, A. 2013. The social problem of kidnapping and its implications on the socio-economic development of Nigeria: A study of Uyo Metropolis. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 4(6): July 2013. Leke, A. 2012. Nigeria’s Yahoo Yahoo image. Punch Newspaper, 2012. Ninalowo, A. 2004. Essays on the state and civil society. First Academic Publishers Ltd. Apapa Lagos. Oludayo T. 2016. Meet the ‘Yahoo boys-Nigeria’s undergraduate conmen’ University of Ibadan. The Conversation. Oyewole, A.T, 2019 Cultism, Why, Effects And How to Curb the Menace in our Tertiary Institutions.

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Pring, C. 2015. People and Corruption: African Survey 2015. https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Joint/partner% 20publications/ab_joint_pubs_people_and_corruption_africa_survey_2 015.pdf (accessed 9 November 2018). Pring, C. and Vrushi, J. 2019. Global Corruption Barometer Africa 2019: Citizens’ Views and Experiences of Corruption. https://www.africaportal.org/publications/citizens-views-andexperiences-corruption-africa- (accessed 09 September 2019). This Day Live. 2013. 2013 Budget and Nigeria’s Fiscal Consolidation Target. This Day Live 3 March, 2013 www.thisdaylive.com/articles/2013-budget-and-nigeriasfiscalconsolidation-target/141996/ (accessed 5 September 2013). Triumph P.A. (n.d.). Corruption In Nigeria: Why It Is Still Pervasive And Recommendations. Tyoakaa, Mvendaga L., Amaka, Ifeanyichukwu J. And Nor July-Aug 2014 Problems and Challenges of Girl-Child Education in Nigeria: The Situation of Kalgo Local Government Area (L.G.A) Of Kebbi State: IOSR Journal of Research & Method in Education. UNFPA, 2015. Girlhood, Not Motherhood: Preventing Adolescent Pregnancy. Published by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), New York. UNICEF 2017. The State of the World’s children 2017: Children in a Digital World.

PART 5

CHAPTER 10 CHURCH AND YOUTH INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICAL VIOLENCE: A NEED FOR REASSESSMENT FOR A BETTER NIGERIA EZEKIEL KEHINDE AKANO (CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS STUDIES DEPARTMENT, EMMANUEL ALAYANDE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, OYO STATE, NIGERIA)

Abstract One of the obstacles to Nigeria’s progress is violence, especially during political campaigns. Innocent lives have been wasted in the process of political campaigning in Nigeria. Many youths, who should have been the leaders of tomorrow, have lost their lives. Houses and motor vehicles are often set ablaze. This does not take place in a vacuum: rather, youths have been identified as tools to be used by politicians. This chapter seeks to ascertain the involvement of youths in political campaigns and also the role the church should play to prevent young people from getting involved in political violence and thuggery. The mechanisms of youth involvement in political violence were revealed through historical analysis, a descriptive analytical survey and oral interviews with church leaders, youths and Christians. The findings revealed that youths are involved in most insurgencies and political violence, and that most young perpetrators are unemployed, hungry or idle. The chapter therefore recommends that the church should devote more time to properly nurturing and educating its young members, such that their actions are always an epitome of love, obedience and respect for life. Government should also partner with and fund non-governmental agencies, such as religious bodies, to deliver effective support to youths. Keywords: Youths, political campaign, violence, Church.

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Introduction Political violence in Nigeria is as old as the first republic. Ever since Nigeria’s independence, there has been a move by those desiring to hold political office towards the use of violence to achieve their aims. This has caused the loss of many lives. The majority of perpetrators directly involved in political violence are youths who have been misled by these kinds of ambitious politicians, to the detriment of national development. Nigeria has been greatly affected by political violence, in which youths are always at the forefront. Political violence, according to Aver (2013:261) is a process whereby politicians recruit, train and empower youths to harass, intimidate and manhandle perceived political opponents and those whose views go against their political ambitions. Abdulmajeed (2013:239) avers that the political class continues to arm youths, and then employs and deploys them to commit heinous crimes. Youth, as defined by Ushe, is from 18 to 24 years of age, a period between childhood and maturity when a person is in the early period of their growth and development (2018:17). This category represents the most active, volatile and vulnerable segment of the population – socioeconomically, emotionally and in other respects. A major feature of youth is the search for one’s own identity, which might include being rebellious, shy, politically minded, self-centred, sexobsessed, hardworking, drug-addicted or destructive or sporty. Young people are normally pressed between good and bad; they are not fully matured physically, socially, economically or emotionally. In this period, young people experiment with breaking away from the home, trying to stand on their own. The problems of dependence and independence, status, the realities of life, and authority often arise. It is a time of strong will, imagination and powerful emotions, typified by courage over timidity, appetite for adventure over the desire for an easy life. Some Nigerians have been affected by the political system of the country today, namely, the politics of “do or die”. Politicians employ the services of youths, whom they equip with arms and instruction to eliminate whoever stands against their personal interest. This type of politician is always unconcerned to see lives and properties wasted. The individuals used by such politicians are mostly unemployed young men and women. They intimidate members of the public, rig the elections and protect their sponsors

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from similar attacks in exchange for the promise of money or even employment. Many of these young people end up losing their lives prematurely in the process, leaving their families and church with indelible marks of pain. The involvement of youths in political violence and electoral violence should act as a clarion call to the church, demanding immediate action (Ushe 2018:18). Youths are the powerhouse of the church; the church should be harnessing their strength and enthusiasm and empowering them to make disciples of all nations (Davis 1980).

Christians in politics Many things have been said about politics. It is truly an inevitable process or system through which human society is governed. To some people, considering the Christian faith and its implications for the true adherents of Jesus’ teachings, it is better to stay away from anything that could bring about corruption of the mind or make one’s faith grow weak. However, many others are of the opinion that if the state is left to its own devices, without a witness from among those who possess the light of God, human society and the whole social order will be plunged into ruin and eventually collapse. Charles Davis (1980:52) submits that the Christian faith should be expressed through political processes. To him, Christianity is of no relevance if it cannot in any way positively affect the social structure upon which society is organised (ibid.:40). He also maintains that the Christian faith should be harnessed to bring total emancipation for human society and that contemporary politics should manifest itself as a genuine commitment to struggle for the liberation of men and women in society. He adds that contemporary politics in its various forms demands an option for social change, and that the Christian faith is only genuine when it includes a commitment to the struggle for liberation for all (ibid.:52). Daniel R. Grant opines that humans have roles to play in the running of the social and political affairs of the society. He observes that the world is run directly by people and it is only a flimsy excuse for them to fold their hands under the pretence that God is the Ruler of human life. He continues by asserting that God is responsible for the running of the affairs of the world only in the very indirect sense that He has willed man to have this freedom. The world is run directly by humans and the extent to which this

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coincides with the direction of God is determined by the free choice of humans (Grant 1968:10). It should be noted that Grant wrote on the premise of correcting the bias Christians have regarding the political process, which has been labelled the most corrupt structure of human society. Regardless of the social, economic, political or even faith background of key players in the political order, some people had blindly and erroneously jumped to the conclusion that nothing good can come out of this system. In Grant’s view, corruption is said to abound in all spheres of human social order: to limit its recognition only to politics is not fair and, in fact, hypocritical. He maintains that corruption should not be used to scare Christians away from politics, because the responsibility to provide social welfare should be paramount (Grant 1968:13). It is true that difficulties exist in applying Christianity to politics, and that problems will surely ensue when a Christian becomes actively involved in partisan politics. He thus concludes that Christian participation in politics can be fraught with ambiguities, pitfalls and frustration, but that a Christian should learn to depend on God to succeed (ibid.:96). Enda McDonagh’s writings on social justice posit the idea that the goal of the Christian calling should be the formation of the community of God’s people and the emergence of the social reality of the kingdom of God (cited in Grant 1968:69). For this reason, every individual in society has civil rights and obligations through which he or she can contribute meaningfully to the social wellbeing of his community, state or nation. To abdicate such a right on the grounds of being a Christian is, therefore, considered an unjustifiable decision. It is only through such participation that a Christian becomes a personal subject in the society, not simply an object of social and historical forces or a unit under state control. McDonagh maintains that it is morally wrong to deny any group of people the opportunity to participate in politics, for whatever reason and on whatever grounds (ibid.:35). McDonagh goes on to suggest that rather than using the negative characteristics of human society as a basis for withdrawing from one’s political responsibilities, such concerns should rather strengthen the resolve of Christians to engage. He remarks on the fact that “Most political orders are established by violence and certainly use violence or the threat of violence to maintain themselves” (cited in Grant 1968:69). Kudadjie and Aboagye (1991:53) submit that it is clear that a Christian has dual citizenship. As such, he must be ready not to fail God nor disappoint mankind. He must strive for relevance at all times. Writing on

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Christians and national politics, the authors define the word politics as follows: The word politics commonly refers to the art of governing people. It also has to do with citizenship. Doing politics means both the active engagement with the possible holding of a political office and the ordinary exercise of one’s civic rights relating to the machinery of government. (Kudadjie and Aboagye 1991:53)

However, there are diverse opinions on this concept and this has always been the reason for the varying attitudes towards politics, most especially among Christians. Clifford suggests that there are basically three schools of thought on the attitudes of Christians in politics, which can be characterised as rejection, acceptance and indifference. The first urges believers to isolate themselves completely from the process. The second teaches that the church should seek to influence society for Christ from a position of balance, but that the church as a body should abstain, although individual Christians may be involved in politics. The third approach is maintaining overall a middle position of neither accepting politics as worth participating in, nor rejecting it outright (Clifford 1971:115). The first position is rejection. This category of people feel that politics is evil and a worldly practice and that Jesus Christ warned Christians not to be part of the world. The rejectionists therefore hold that Christians should not involve themselves in politics. They also consider the political environment to be imbued with practices that do not facilitate righteousness, justice, order or service. Politicians are seen as undisciplined people who are only looking for their own interests (Monsma 1984:56). These Christians see politics as a game of compromise, based on the observation that one cannot excel politically without compromising on one’s principles and policies. The church is also advised to stay away from politics, which is regarded as a dirty game, in order to maintain her integrity and purity (Monsma 1984:46). The acceptance position is the opposite of the rejectionist stance. Christians in this category see politics as a means of streamlining and eradicating problems in the polity. Christians are seen as instruments of service and good governance. Politics is seen as a means of representing the people and it is believed that the Christians and the church exist in society. This category also cites the teachings of Apostle Paul when he spoke favourably about Christians’ involvement in politics, for example, in Romans 13:1: “Let every soul be in subjection to the superior authorities.” He underlines the fact that God sets in motion all authorities and obedience

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to them is seen as directed to God. Therefore, the acceptance position is that Christians should participate in politics (Monsma 1984:46; 81). Christians holding the middle position are indifferent in their attitude towards politics, neither accepting politics as a thing that is worthy of participating in, nor rejecting it outright. Christians holding this position include those who speak out about the evils done in the political system, but resist direct participation in politics so as to eradicate these ills (Monsma 1984:58). It is pertinent to say that there is a need for Christians to get involved in politics. The bible states that when God created man in His own image, He gave man authority to rule over the fish of the sea, the domestic animals and all the earth and every moving animal that moves upon the earth (Gen. 1:26– 28). This message implies that the government of the world was instituted by God Himself. Christians are described as the light and salt of the world (Matt. 5:13– 14). Jesus expected Christians to improve their society by being its salt and light. Salt is for preventing decay and light for dispelling darkness. Society is decaying and in need of light. The book of Proverbs 1:34 proposes that it is righteousness that exalts a nation; unless the right people are called to participate in the politics of a nation, that nation will witness all sorts of crises. Though Jesus, in a practical sense, did not participate in politics, He did not forbid his disciples from participating in politics. Contemporary Christians need not shy away from political participation, because to do so would make them irrelevant in society. Ojo posits that the concept of the separation of church and society must be interpreted in light of Christ’s demand that God’s kingdom manifests through His disciples. He is of the opinion that the biblical and theological bases for church involvement in holistic transformation serve as bases also for a minister’s engagement in the social transformation and economic development of society (Ojo 2010:23). Ojo adds that the church should work for change in the political and economic systems such that there is capacity for the poor to both attain and exercise their legitimate rights. He also argues that Christians should work with all groups who seek to gain access to the levers of power and try to operate them for the benefit of the poorest. He describes Christians’ involvement in politics as a way of bringing hope to the hopeless in the nation (2010:23).

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J. I. Packer (1985) argues that to try to improve society is not worldliness but love. To wash one’s hands of society is not love but worldliness. He suggests that being involved in politics does not make Christians unrighteous, as some Christians think. Rather, the more profoundly one is concerned about heaven, the more deeply one cares about God’s will being enacted on earth. Christians should help to usher in a society where the fear of God, love of one’s neighbour, justice and fair play rule, taking the example of notable personalities in the Bible like Joseph, Esther and Daniel, who became agents of change without becoming contaminated. Moses participated in nation-building, like Elijah when Ahab collected Naboth’s vineyard. Other people in the Bible, such as Amos, Hosea, Micah and Jeremiah, also contributed their share towards the building of their nation. Politics in the early church was seen as a worldly affair in which Christians should not engage. This assumption was somehow brushed aside with the conversion of Constantine in AD 321 which led to a kind of alliance between the church and the state (Gonzalez 1984:113). This, however, has not been deeply rooted in the present Christians who still adhere to the teachings of the early Church that advocate for being apolitical. Contemporary Christians should accept their social responsibility to be actively involved in the politics of their nation so as to ensure good governance. Religion aside, political violence can be a major force in turning people away from politics. The next section therefore examines the concept of political violence (Aver, Nnorom and Aondowase 2003:262).

Concept of political violence In the view of David and Shadrack (2007:20), conflict – the pursuit of incompatible interests and goals by different groups of people – is an intrinsic and inevitable part of human existence. Violence is the illegitimate and unauthorised use of force to effect decisions against the will or desire of other people in society (Aver, Nnorom and Aondowase 2003:262). Political violence refers to all forms of attack within a political community against the political regime, its policies, its incumbents and other actors, including competing political groups (ibid.). From the foregoing, there is a correlative relationship between the two concepts. In fact, they are complementary. Aver points out that violence is the means through which thugs achieve their aims (Aver 2013:263). Conflict is a clash or disagreement, often violent, between two opposing groups or individuals. Abah-Akpowoghaha (2013:70) defines violence

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(conflict) as any random or organised attack that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence a process. It can take the form of threats, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced protection, blackmail, destruction of property and assassination, among others. Political violence is viewed as any act of violence perpetuated in the course of political activities, including before, during and after an election (Alanamu 2010:2). Common tactics involve the use of force or threats of violence to disrupt political meetings and rallies, intimidating voters at polling stations, or using the threat of violence to deter people from voting (Alanamu 2010:2). With diverse experience of political violence, this work centres on electoral violence carried out by youths during pre-election, election (votecasting) and post-election periods.

Causes of youth involvement in political violence Every existing issue has a reason for its existence. So, why are youths seen as the frontrunners in most violent political activities in Nigeria? There is usually a driving force propelling these young people into political violence. It has been said that one of the immediate causes of political violence in Nigeria – in both past and present political regimes – is the lack of transparency during primary elections, leading to the imposition of candidates on party members (Ekemenah 2011:8). It is obvious that political violence exists even within each party. Other causes of political violence include weak democratic institutions, the prevailing political mind set of “do or die” and “winner takes all”, as well as weakness and/or partisanship among law enforcement agencies during election times. Problems are compounded by the lack of prompt judicial response to cases of electoral fraud, as well as the general socioeconomic meltdown that has remained largely unaddressed over the years (ibid.:16). Nigeria’s youth experiences great social and economic hardship. Many are unable to find employment, and over 70%, including university graduates, are in extreme poverty. The roots of this malaise can be traced to the bad governance of the country. Alongside this, the misinterpretation of religious tenets, religious intolerance and fanaticism have become the terms of the day. All these have contributed to political violence, which arguably

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culminated in the emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency the nation today faces. The Boko Haram insurgents claim that the widespread influence of western education is a problem for the nation and that this is what they are fighting against. The problem is not western education, but the high rate of corruption and bad governance, which are responsible for joblessness and unemployment among young Nigerians. In Nigeria, government directives are wilfully distorted and services rendered to citizens are systematically commercialised or sold as commodities (Ikegwuoha 2011:14). The principal personalities and behavioural traits linked with youth violence are: hyperactivity, impulsiveness, poor behavioural control, attention problems, early aggressive behaviour and low educational achievement. The home environment can also be an influence in the development of violent behaviour among young people. Factors in the family home associated with adolescent violence include: poor supervision by parents, harsh physical punishment, parental conflict or separation in early childhood, and a low level of attachment between parents and children. Associating with delinquent peers has also been linked to violence in young people (www.who.it/violenceinjuyprevention). Guns and drugs are a potent mixture, and easy local access to them has been found to increase the likelihood of youth violence. Low levels of social cohesion within a community have been linked to high rates of youth violence (Ogbeide 2013:1–2). The quality of a country’s governance, its laws and the extent to which they are enforced, and its policies for social protection all have an important effect on violence. Ekemenah points out that factors such as income inequality, rapid demographic changes in the youth population and urbanization have all been positively linked with youth violence (Ekemenah 2011:8). Unemployment is one of the dark clouds threatening the future of the nation and leading many youths to deviate from the mission of joining hands for peace; instead, the reverse is the case. Cultures that promote non-violent means for resolving conflicts appear to have lower rates of youth violence. Tactics range from public information campaigns and community policing to improving public spaces such as schools and hospitals. Legislative, judicial and educational reforms are also needed, along with other policy reforms designed to mitigate the effects of rapid social change and tackle gun violence among youths.

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The effects of political violence by the youths on national development In Nigeria, political violence has become highly disruptive to social life, thereby causing division in families and communities as well as causing antagonism within social groups. Nigerians have witnessed several cases of political violence in the form of assassinations, bomb-blasts, intimidations, murders, destruction of properties in the past and even on the increase today. The effect of this menace in Nigeria is tending in some respects towards social disaggregation into its constituent ethnic and sub-ethnic group divisions. Adeniyi (2003:57) lamented that killing, harming and intimidating electorates during elections in order to destroy ballot boxes in areas where the perpetrators lack support or in order to snatch ballot boxes so as to stuff them with ballot papers illegally obtained and thumb-printed which often leads to inconclusive elections in Nigeria often creates division and enmity in Nigeria. The current surge of political violence is a disturbing trend towards social progress and prosperity. Political violence is creating difficulties in the living standard of Nigerians. For instance, some people cannot live in the Northern part of the country (Nigeria), where violence has become a way of life. Political violence resulting in conflict has become the order of the day.

The role of the church in preventing youth involvement in political violence The church, as an institution ordained by Christ Jesus, is assigned with the Great Commission to go into the world to make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. The church also has a role in bringing about social peace and the progress of the nation. It is therefore important, at this juncture, to take a look at the role the church has to play in curbing youth involvement in political violence. Young people need to be ministered to in diverse ways so that they can themselves learn to minister to the needs of others. The local church needs to understand young people very well if it is to prevent them from becoming involved in political violence during electoral campaigns. This goes a long way towards developing spiritual fervour, which can lead people to become better Christians and citizens of the nation (Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, n.p.). Hence, the church should

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train youths and get them involved in missions so that they, in turn, can effectively minister to their peers. The church should therefore work towards doing the following in order to help prevent youths from engaging in political violence. The church should prayerfully consider ways they can give youths a sense of identity in their faith community so as to nurture them to a lifestyle that reflects Christian values, and that honours and upholds the individuality and cultural diversity that exist in their faith community (Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, n.p.). The church should provide opportunities for social interaction in order to create relationships among youths. In order to create relationships among youths in the church, the context for developing social and relational skills should be provided by the church to enable youths to appreciate their role in the growth of the church and the nation at large (Cumming 1954:50–55). The church should address symptoms of disinterest and disconnection among young people (Eph. 4:14–19) with a view to inspiring them to share God’s love, acceptance and forgiveness in real and relevant ways. The church should also address real-life issues in sermons, devotion and Bible studies, giving people of all ages opportunities to consider personal and biblical examples and emulate them (Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, n.p.). The church should work towards preventing youths from participating in violent political campaigns by providing adult leadership – that is, people who can guide and guard them in their formative years. The adult leadership provided by the church should try to understand the changing needs of youths and make efforts to meet them. The church should be conscious of the changing nature of youths and be patient with them. The church should accept her youths, even if she disagrees with their actions (Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, n.p.). The church should work towards moulding young lives and curbing antisocial behaviour. There should be no compromise in the standards of God. This will go a long way towards ensuring the proper spiritual upbringing of youths (Cumming 1954:55). According to Cumming, the church should make young people feel more comfortable in their place of worship, as God wants the local church to be like a home where people will feel relaxed (1954:55). The church should be a place where gifts and talents should be harnessed for God’s glory. The church should discuss topics like violence and its effects with youth and adult bible study groups, consider

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ways to address situations that might precipitate violence, and encourage mentoring relationships and cross-generational friendships that will help members and specific peer groups to increase their sensitivity to others and equip young people to go beyond clichéd conversation or token acts of kindness and respond in honest appropriate ways (Cumming 1954:52). For the church to be able to prevent youths from engaging in violent political campaigns, there is the need for parents to expose their children to godliness, showing them how to be good citizens and making them promoters of peace in the nation (Luqman 2018:4). The church should recognise the strengths of the youths in her congregation and community as well as the challenges they face. It must identify practical ways to embrace them, and stock the church library with resources that will help nurture their growth (Luqman 2018:4). There are many other things the church can do to prevent youths from engaging in violence. The church should work to build relationships with the youths. The leadership of the church should help meet the spiritual needs of youths and encourage them on issues concerning social life and activities such as political violence and its disadvantages. The church should show love and concern to the youths to generate in them a sense of belonging. It should nurture their life, happiness, security and optimism, which are qualities of healthy growth among youths. Both single and married youths should be cared for, as this will motivate them to keep away from all forms of social vice, including political violence. The church needs to organise a dynamic programme capable of meeting their needs. For instance, discipleship programmes should be put in place for the youths of the church. Discipleship is a non-formal educational activity designed to help all Christians grow in the areas of knowledge, spiritual matters and Christian activities. The church should spend more time discipling young people in the church to train them in the fundamentals of the Christian faith. Having this knowledge will encourage youths to willingly volunteer to participate in church programmes instead of getting involved in political violence and fighting in the community. The church should counsel her youths. She should not leave her youths to wallow in ignorance, confusion and depression, but seek to advise and support them in handling life’s problems. The church should carry out her counselling by encouraging, exhorting and enlightening youths in love.

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The church should provide the guidance needed by youths to gain maturity in the Christian faith. A confused and unstable believer cannot live a worthy life. Many of the youths that become involved in political violence do so out of ignorance of the principles and doctrines of the Christian faith. Proper counselling would help them greatly.

Conclusion and recommendations This study has revealed that the church plays a vital role in preventing young people from becoming involved in political violence. It found that youths are among the ingredients needed in the church’s ministry. They constitute the engine room for the church’s growth and development. The church thus sets out various strategies aimed at giving young members a sense of belonging; such strategies are allowing them to participate in weekly, quarterly and annual programmes without interruption from any quarter. Young members are educated by the church on the effects of political violence on the church, family and society at large, through sermons and teachings. The church also provides opportunities for social interaction where youths can raise issues that are answered by the church pastor and elders. One major problem is that some churches are not sensitive to the plight of their young congregation, but rather always focused on spiritual needs and the construction of gigantic church buildings and pastoriums, forgetting that material needs are as important as spiritual needs. The results of the analysis of the selected churches showed that some churches are playing their role in preventing young people from engaging in political violence, while others are not fully cognizant of the urgency of this endeavour. It was also discovered that there are areas where the church can help youths to fulfil God’s purpose. However, there is a need for more. The following findings were revealed: a. Most youths are participating in political violence. The church has a key role in preventing youths from engaging in political violence, and the most effective agents of socialisation are discipleship and enlightenment programmes. However, some churches have neglected their role in taking care of youths, and that is why they are engaging in political violence. Henceforth, the church should find a way of empowering young people and creating in them the fear of God and showing them how to trust in Him for everything.

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b. The majority of youths interviewed agreed that the church gives them a sense of belonging and also provides them with social and relational skills and opportunities, reducing the unemployment rate (which is one of the major reasons for engaging in political violence). c. A good number of the youths interviewed also agreed that the church provides comfort for them when they go through hard times and depression, by fortifying and encouraging them always. The church has had a great impact with regards to preventing youths from engaging in political violence. They are economically empowered through sincere participatory acquisition and employment generation schemes. Socially, they are empowered through civil orientation and education to enable them understand their roles (rights and duties) in society. They should be empowered politically through meaningful political socialization and constructive participation in politics. They should be made aware that they are the potential leaders of tomorrow and that no ambitious politician is worthy of shedding blood for. Youths, as the doorways to a peaceful society, must be exposed to peace education by the church. It is expected that peace education will help to redress the culture of violence and aggression and inculcate the values of peaceful co-existence and non-violence among young persons and adults alike. Young people need to know what peace is and how to guard themselves against embracing or being used to foment violence. The place and position of youths in any society is crucial. They are the yardstick for measuring the growth of any nation. However, the government does not have the right focus on young people. As a result, there is a great deal of deviant behaviour among society’s youth. This work upholds the view that there should be a general change in attitudes and motivations on the part of the government, families and intellectuals in society towards a meaningful mobilization of youths for national development in Nigeria. Young people should be seen as a community responsibility; such an attitude would hopefully ensure bright future prospects and progress in the society. Preparing Nigeria’s youth for the widespread improvement of society must involve church engagement, through organizing regular youth seminars, parent seminars, counselling services and parent information meetings.

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Recommendations The role of the church in preventing youth involvement in political violence cannot be over-emphasised. It is therefore imperative to make the following recommendations. 1. The church should give more time to ensuring that young members are properly nurtured and groomed in the Word of God, so that their actions will be an epitome of love, obedience to God and His Word. 2. Young people should appreciate the fact that God has blessed them with the virtue of strength, abilities, gifts and talents which are to be used for the glory of God; they are to be models in action and behaviour. 3. More social and relational skills training should be organised by the church in order to help youths apply their talents to make meaningful living for themselves and also to reduce the high rate of unemployment. 4. Youths should be encouraged by the church to engage in private activities that will enable them to support their families and make better progress in the home, church and community at large. 5. Technical and vocational education should be taken seriously. Most youths who use force to get what they want could become gainfully employed if technical and vocational education was provided free of charge by the government. A skilled workforce is necessary for the country’s development and growth. The issue of youth empowerment should be seriously considered by the government and all stakeholders. 6. Churches should make more efforts to care for destitute youths. Proper counselling should be given to them. 7. The school curriculum prepared by the government should be geared towards self-employment. The Nigerian educational system, especially at the tertiary level, needs to pursue education for employment. The call for this type of education is necessitated by the volume of unemployed university graduates in society. The government should increase budgetary allocations for education so that higher education institutions have the funding they need for programmes and facilities that help prepare graduates to face the challenges in the society. 8. Youths should avoid idleness, laziness, and find things to do. The popular saying, “No food for a lazy man” should be taken with all seriousness.

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9. The government should put in place mechanisms to deter factors such as non-performance, embezzlement, kickbacks and other corrupt practices applied when seeking contracts or credit. This would start with enabling legal penalties for anybody violating the code of conduct. Laws stipulating long jail sentences and forfeiture of all acquired properties outside the country, as well as blacklisting, should be strictly adhered to. 10. Government should partner with and fund experienced agencies, for example, religious bodies, to offer effective support for youths, along with adequate monitoring after successful completion of courses.

References Abaah-Akpowoghaha, N. G. 2013. Theoretical Understanding of Conflict and Violence in Nigeria: the Niger-Delta Militants and Northern Islamic Sect Boko Haram in Perspective. Public Policy and Administration Research 3(10):69–78. Abulmajeed, B. H. 2013. Causes and Dynamics of Political Violence in Nigeria: Islamic Views on the Solutions. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 3(17). Adeniyi, E. 2003. “Effect of Political Crises on Women: Towards the Management of Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts.” In M. Kwanashie (ed.) Politics and Political Relation in Nigeria. Lagos: Dat and Partners Logistics Ltd. Alanamu, A. S. 2010. Political Violence: An Introductory Note, Issues in Political Violence in Nigeria. Ilorin: Hamson Printing Communications. Aver, A. Theophilus. 2013. Political Violence and Its Effects on Social Development in Nigeria. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 3. Aver, J. T., Nnoeom, K. C. and Aondowase, T. 2003. Political Violence and Its Effects on Social Development in Nigeria. International Journal of Humanities and Social Studies 3(17). Clifford, Anderson V. 1971. The Christian and Social Concern. Illinois: Harvest Publications. David, F. and Shadrack, G. B. 2007. Peace and Conflict Studies: An African Overview of Basic Concepts. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd. Davis, Charles. 1980. Theology and Political Society. New York: Cambridge University Press. Ekemenah, A. 2011. Democracy with Blood Face: Political Violence and National Security. Business World, 8.

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Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. “Lively Engagement in Faith and Life: Help Prevent Youth Violence.” n.d., n.p. Gonzalez, Justo L. 1984. The Story of Christianity. San Francisco: Harper and Row Publishers. Grant, Daniel N. 1968. The Christian and Politics. Chicago: Broadman Press. Ikegwuoha, Bernard Thompson. 2011. “Why Corruption Persists in Nigeria.” The Punch, 5 December 2011, 14. Kudadje, J. N. and Aboagye, R. K. 1991. The Christian in National Politics: Christian Social Ethics for Every Man. Accra: Asempa Publishers. Luqman, S. 2018. Agent of Destruction: Youth and the Politics of Violence in Kwara State, Nigeria. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 4. Monsma, Stephen S. 1984. Pursuing Justice in a Sinful World. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans. Cumming, O. 1954. Guiding Youths in the Church. USA: The Judson Press, 50–55. Ogbeide, F. O. 2013. Youths’ Violence and Electoral Process in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. International Journal of Education and Research 1. Ojo, John. 2010. A Ministerial Ethics for Christian Ministers. Ogbomoso: Adebayo Calvary Printers. Packer, J. I. 1985. “How to Recognise a Christian Citizen.” Christianity Today 19 April 1985. Ushe, U. M. 2018. Christian Youths and Politics in Nigeria: Implications for Sustainable Development.” Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 16(8). “Violence Injury Prevention.” http:///www.who.int/violenceinjuryprevention (accessed 6 March 2019).

CHAPTER 11 AN ETHOS OF RESPONSIBILITY AS A THEOLOGICAL PARADIGM FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA

KEFAS KURE (PHD STUDENT, STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY, SOUTH AFRICA)

Abstract The increase in the rate of corruption has been a chief concern for the Nigerian state with many efforts being made to curtail the spread of this menace. Two anti-corruption agencies, namely the Economic Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), were established by the Nigerian government to control the persistent spread of corruption, yet they have thus far failed to do so. This calls for further critical reflection on emerging possible ways to speak and act against corruption in Nigeria. This chapter proposes an ethos of responsibility, in the form of a theological paradigm, as a contribution to the ongoing anti-corruption campaign in Nigeria. Keywords: Corruption, ethics of responsibility, theology, Nigeria, human dignity, morality, EFCC, ICPC

Introduction Corruption has become a household word in contemporary society, particularly in Nigeria. Both at the global and local levels, corruption cases are heard and yet this menace continues to increase and spread. Media outlets, academic bodies and other organizations are not excluded from the discourse concerning corruption. Thus, one could say, it is no longer an issue of debate whether or not corruption exists, but rather a matter of intentionality – the will to ask concrete and powerful questions about what

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is going on in order to arrive at what must be done, here and now, to reduce corruption’s spread. The increasing interest in the war against corruption indicates the revitalization of moral consciousness that was, at certain times, almost muted, particularly in Nigeria. It also suggests, the possible emergence of a hopeful, purposeful and flourishing future where integrity will triumph over distrust and dishonesty. Corruption has become a threat to global public morality; it has spread like wildfire to the extent that there is hardly a society that has not felt its effects. In some spheres it has begun to gain acceptance, despite being a massive causal factor in the perpetuation of underdevelopment and maladministration, resulting in the abuse of human dignity. Although these effects have led to efforts to curb its influence, it continues to spread in Nigeria and elsewhere. There is a need for further thought on new ways of waging war against corruption and new strategies for enforcing and strengthening the existing bodies already doing battle against this menace. In the case of Nigeria, government-instituted agencies, civil society organizations, and religious institutions are waging war against corruption, yet it continues to spread uncontrollably. Although agencies have recorded significant successes, they, in turn, have been accused of being corrupted, leading to a questioning of their effectiveness as anti-corruption crusaders. In this context, there is an urgent need for other ways to address this menace. One of these ways proposed by this paper is to create an “ethos (ethics, character) of responsibility” in both the general public and the existing anticorruption agencies. Corruption has been defined in both formal and informal dictionaries, painted differently, but essentially providing familiar definitions. Some argue that the experience of corruption varies from context to context and from person to person, necessitating a multifaceted definition and meaning (Igboin 2018:4). Yet despite its many variations, we cannot deny the fact that the different manifestations of corruption have features that are similar: that it causes undeniable harm and undermines all efforts to enhance the integrity of human life. Given this complexity, I have chosen not to dwell too much on the various definitions of corruption, which will already be familiar to most readers. I invite the community, rather, to think beyond definitions and towards the personal activities and attitudes that are linked to corruption:

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the kinds of activities we do and attitudes we express in our daily lives. If we understand and accept that a human being, as seen in the biblical injunctions, is born a sinner, it nullifies the sociological view of tabula rasa, which holds that a human being only becomes corrupted by society. The tabula rasa view argues that a human is born like a clean slate that only becomes contaminated with societal ills through interaction with the environment (Duschinsky 2012). As important as this theory might be, the premise of this chapter holds that a human only becomes justified by their maker, which is a product of both divine selection and choice on the part of the person. In terms of corruption, then, all human beings can become corrupt or indulging in acts of corruption, thus should live knowing that they will face judgement for their choices. Hence, “those who are corrupt are corrupt only by the consequences of the moral choice they make and are not to blame God or the society” (Igboin 2018:10). Although corruption is usually defined as the abuse of public power or resources for personal gain, I have chosen to go beyond this (Obuah 2010; Benson, 2018). For the sake of this chapter, I define corruption as the selfdenial and abuse of one’s conscience. It is the instant when a person consciously denies their human worth and chooses to abuse it for material gain. Consciously, the perpetrator often thinks less of him/herself to the point of allowing his/her conscience to be deceived into doing what he/she consciously knows is the wrong thing to do. For example, one might choose to be unsatisfied with one’s earnings and start to dwell upon needs or desires that are beyond the means of one’s current salary. During this kind of thinking, temptation may arise. But yielding to this temptation by taking for one’s self what belongs to the public – claiming it as one’s due or a dividend of hard work or as a result of one’s intellectual gain (as some choose to call it) – is a form of abuse of the mind. At such a point, the individual becomes blinded to the needs and concerns of others who should be cared and catered for. That way of thinking and acting has become the norm in societies where corruption is parading. It is propagated from individuals who choose to become the means of promoting the immoral acts of corruption. Although one could choose to be a model by setting principles, rules or ethics guiding them to enable proper living and action. Yet, the order of the day in corrupt societies is the contrary, where everyone in the place of opportunity do what they deem fit in their eyes. Such an attitude deadens one’s moral fibre from moral judgment and discernment which has become one of the reasons why our time is called “the time of many worlds” (Schweiker 2004) where human beings, in particular, give no thought to the effect of their actions on

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others, whether those “others” are here and now or in the future. Instead, what prevails is the human quest for self-gratification and a form of consumerist ideology which has spread far and wide and manifests itself with material possessions. In such kind of world, Stanley Hauerwas declares, things that used to be unthinkable, unacceptable and uncommon have all become things that people like and do. In such situations, he laments, it becomes difficult to maintain good moral judgment because “we feel pulled in different directions by our various roles and convictions, unsure of any coherence to our lives and so become divided selves and more easily tempted to violence” (1983:6). The results of corruption are such that it is not just the present that is harmed: the wellbeing of future generations is also at stake. This is because we seek to consume both what we need and what we could survive without, while choosing to think less and perhaps even care less about how future unborn generations will live. As a result of such attitudes, the resources needed to build infrastructure for the survival of the present generation are being consumed through corruption, to the extent that future reserves are already being eyed. This could either have future generations applaud the choices we make here and now or see us as disgraced by our culture of consumerism. Put simply, the consequences of our actions here and now may either serve as springboards allowing future generations to live flourishing lives, or the contrary. Living with such self-evaluative readiness and awareness focuses our sense of morality not on only our own concerns, but on those of others. How to live with and respond to the “other” – those beyond our personal circle but who are nevertheless fellow human beings – would become our guiding principle. With these discussions in mind, let us turn to the war against corruption in Nigeria. It is clear that while Nigeria is known for its high rate of corruption, at the same time, much conscious thought is going toward reducing this scourge. It is commendable that the federal government of Nigeria, through constructive deliberations, came up with the idea of establishing anti-corruption agencies. Over the decades, several Nigerian regimes have established various anti-corruption agencies, but for the sake of this paper I have chosen to evaluate only two out of the many. My reason for choosing them is simply that they seem to be popular anti-corruption agencies, known to the average Nigerian. Below, I evaluate their mandates, their effectiveness and their weaknesses. From this basis, I go on to discuss an ethics of responsibility that would ensure that people in authority, as well as the general public, are held accountable and act as responsible stewards – not only with regards to public resources but also information. Further,

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this chapter discusses how such an ethos of responsibility could be an effective model contributing to the ongoing anti-corruption crusades in Nigeria.

Evaluating the existing anti-corruption agencies This section introduces the reader to two of the many anti-corruption agencies operating in Nigeria. The establishment of various anti-corruption agencies indicates that the nation of Nigeria, through its leaders, has shown some level of concern toward decreasing the spread of the scourge of corruption (Anazodo, Igboko-Ibetu and Nkah 2015:41). This chapter mainly evaluates the activities of two agencies: the Economic Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC). In this evaluation, a few things will be considered, namely, how the agencies were established; their mandates; their achievable goals; and the challenges posed by some of the criticisms they have received.

The EFCC The first anti-corruption agency evaluated here is the EFCC. Following many attempts at fighting corruption by several regimes, history took another turn in 1999, during the early years of the return of democracy in Nigeria. A few years into his first tenure as elected president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo became determined to take on the fight against corruption, which had become a hindrance to growth and development in the country. This determination was ostensibly in response to pressure from the international community, which ranked Nigeria among the world’s most corrupt countries. Of concern was the accusation that Nigeria was not cooperating with the fight against money laundering (Raimi et al. 2013:106). At this time, then, the zeal to establish an anti-corruption agency at the internal governmental level was matched by pressure from international allies. The EFCC was established in 2003 to tackle the lack of accountability among those who occupied positions of authority, which was resulting in a great deal of corruption, often with no consequences for the perpetrators (Raimi et al. 2013:111). In his inaugural speech, Obasanjo declared war against corruption (Nwoba and Monday 2018:94), and the subsequent creation of the EFCC was a concrete expression of that intention (Nwaodu

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et al. 2014:143). Obasanjo put in place more anti-corruption institutions than any of his predecessors (Nwoba et al. 2018:98). This was a step taken by a courageous and determined leader who, despite the odds, intended to reduce or possibly bring an end to the scourge of corruption in the Nigerian state. This initial step was followed with an executive bill that expressed the determination to not spare any “sacred cows” concerning corruption-related cases (Nwoba et al. 2018:98). These steps suggest that there was an honest intention on the part of the authorities to bring about a drastic reduction in corruption cases. The EFCC’s stipulated mandates are vital to our evaluation of its activities. It is worth bearing in mind that corruption goes beyond financial theft, and that defining it solely in terms of monetary gain would, in my opinion, denote a myopic and disintegrative perspective. In support of this, I turn to the thoughts of Agang, who describes corruption as terrorism, a killer disease, a form of destructive violence against humanity by all human systems that are its stakeholders. It is a monster that has been destabilizing peaceful co-existence in Nigeria in recent times (Agang 2016:4). The seriousness of all forms of corruption are recognised in the mandates of the EFCC, which go beyond hunting those suspected of financial crimes. Having said that, one of the EFCC’s responsibilities is, of course, the investigation of all financial crimes, including advance-fee fraud, money laundering, counterfeiting, illegal transfer charges and others (Nwoba et al. 2018:98; Nwaodu et al. 2014:161). Further, as a financial intelligent unit, it is mandated to coordinate the various institutions involved in the fight against money laundering and the enforcement of all laws dealing with economic crimes, including the broadest and most current laws against financial crimes and terrorism in Nigeria. It also has the power to investigate persons suspected of breaching the provisions of the 2002 Act (Obuah 2010:27) and is responsible for the monthly publication of revenue distributed from the federal account to the various tiers of government (Raimi et al. 2013:112). However, the powers bestowed on the EFCC extend beyond investigating financial fraud. It has the power to investigate terrorism and terrorist offenses, including the arrest, detention and indictment of those involved and the recovery of stolen resources used to fund terrorism (Obuah 2010:42). Related crimes include the wilful provision or collection of money to or from anyone, directly or indirectly, to perpetrate an act of terrorism; committing or attempting to commit, participate or facilitate the commission of a terrorist act; and making funds, financial assets or

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economic resources available for use by anyone intending to carry out such an act. The broadest and most current laws against terrorism in Nigeria fall within the mandate of the EFCC (2010:41). This, to me, is an interesting form of power given the current rising concerns over terrorism in the country. One might question what the agency is doing to stop the perpetrators of terrorism versus its efforts against the perpetrators of money laundering. This already leads to imagining the failure of the stated intention to permit “no sacred cows” in the fight against corruption. These examples of how the agency’s power is applied in practice suggest that the EFCC would have greater success in making the Nigerian polis a corruption-free zone if it fulfilled its mandate in an appropriate and robust way. The EFCC has recorded some successes in dealing with various manifestations of corruption. On one occasion, the agency launched a crackdown on certain politicians, bank officials and private investors who were suspected of amassing wealth illegally through corrupt dealings (Nwaodu et al. 2014:161). Another laudable example is its involvement in the development and distribution of software to detect keywords used in “advance-fee” email fraud, a scam which involves offering the victim a large amount of money in return for a small up-front payment required by the fraudster to “release” the greater funds (ibid.). More recently, the agency established a whistleblowing strategy that allows Nigerian citizens to take part in the fight against corruption by voluntarily disclosing information on the misuse of state assets and funds (Nwoba 2018:99). Furthermore, a number of high-profile convictions have taken place, including members of the political class and security chiefs (Ajie and Gbenga 2015:224). Some of these convictions have even led to jail sentences (2015:231), proving that a lofty position is insufficient to stop the agency from convicting the guilty. Another responsibility of the EFCC is the recovery of looted funds (Nwaodu et al. 2014:161; Obuah 2010:42). The EFCC’s activities in this regard have increased the nation’s revenue profile by recovering huge sums of money lost to broken contracts under which resources for developing pubic infrastructure were syphoned off into private hands (Ajie and Gbenga 2015:231). As a result of these activities, the agency has sensitised the general populace and politically exposed persons to the ills of corruption (Nwoba et al. 2018:100). Its exposure of once honoured and respected individuals for acts of corruption has made the general public better informed.

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However, these successes notwithstanding, there have been challenges to the effectiveness of the EFCC’s activities, and it has not escaped without criticism of its practices. Beginning with the challenges, the agency has had to battle with individuals claiming immunity from prosecution (Obuah 2010:45). A related challenge is political interference, which generally leads to a lack of compliance (Nwoba et al. 2018:102). These problems are associated with a culture of impunity and the lack of political will to fight corruption. They are facilitated by loopholes in the justice system that make corruption cases difficult to prosecute (Nwoba et al. 2018:102; Obuah 2010:46). Taken together, these two problems have, in many ways, undermined the effective operation of the agency. One further prominent challenge is keeping up with the latest technological advances, which are used to facilitate online theft and other fraudulent activities. The rapid pace of progress makes it hard to combat corruption that takes this form, and poor technical know-how can render the agency’s efforts ineffective (Obuah 2010:46). There have also been criticisms of the EFCC’s operative model. Prominently among the critics are those who claim that the agency is a tool in the hands of the executive arm of government, used for witch-hunts against political opponents and perceived or imagined enemies (Nwoba et al. 2018:101). Furthermore, the EFCC has been accused of acting with outright disregard for the rule of law and infringing upon the fundamental human rights of those accused (2018:101). Finally, it has been accused of being selective as to who it chooses (and who it does not choose) to investigate, arrest and prosecute. Such an attitude suggests there are still untouchable “sacred cows” in Nigerian society irrespective of the seriousness of their crimes. Due to these criticisms, the agency’s actions have come under intense scrutiny, and have been described as not so much a fight against corruption as a fight against the manifestation of corruption.

The ICPC Another anti-corruption agency discussed here is the ICPC. Following the zeal to curb the scourge of corruption, the establishment of this agency by the leadership of the Nigerian Fourth Republic became a reality. As mentioned above, President Olusegun Obasanjo, on assumption of office, signalled his readiness to tackle the menace of corruption head on, declaring, in his inaugural address, that no society could achieve anything near its full potential if it allowed a societal vice like corruption to become the full-blown cancer it had become in Nigeria (Salawu 2008:391). It is a

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widely held belief that corruption is a way of life in Nigeria and that it is responsible for the broken promises and dashed hopes which have characterised the lives of most Nigerians (Moyosore 2015:23). This led to the leadership of the Fourth Republic declaring that for a society to survive and develop it must ensure orderliness, reasonableness and a predictable manner of life (Salawu 2008:395). To ensure effective compliance with the aim of stopping the spread of corruption, the ICPC was established. The rationale behind the ICPC’s function was not very different from that of the EFCC (Raimi et al. 2013:112). It emerged as a policy response from the federal government to fight and curb the corruption that has tragically increased to monstrous proportions and permeated all levels of society (2013:113). Its establishment further cemented the government’s attempts to combat the menace of corruption in the country (Odo 2015:188). Collectively, as an anti-corruption agency, the ICPC received the following mandates. Firstly, it is responsible for receiving and investigating allegations of corrupt practices from members of the public and prosecuting offenders (Salawu 2008:395). Secondly, it is responsible for instructing, advising and assisting any officer, agency or parastatal on ways by which fraud or corruption may be eliminated or minimised (Raimi et al. 2013:113). Thirdly, it was given the job of educating the public about corruption and related offenses, with a view to fostering public support and enlisting citizens’ support in the fight against corruption (Igbaekeman, Abbah and Gaidem 2014:149). One difference between the ICPC and the EFCC is that the former is not only responsible for the investigation, arrest and prosecution of those alleged to be corrupt but also for corrective, preventive and educational duties (Salawu 2008:395). If these functions were being carried out effectively, then presumably the attempts to wipe out corruption or reduce it to the barest minimum would be quite successful. However, the agency’s songs, messages and speeches about anti-corruption have had little or no concrete results, judging by the intensity at which corruption grows. This may suggest that the teaching, preventive, and corrective measures are more theoretically emphasised than applied in practice. That said, the ICPC’s achievements since its inception cannot be ignored. Based on the level of awareness of its activities among the population, the commission seems to have gained public acceptance and expectations surrounding its activities are high. It has tried, though not sufficiently, to meet all the expectations, and has scored some success

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stories. It has been actively involved in raising public awareness of corruption and its effects, disseminating the important message that the money being stolen is the public’s and it is therefore the duty of each citizen to report officials who behave corruptly (Igbaekemen et al. 2014:154). Equally, the ICPC, alongside other anti-corruption agencies, has provided a corridor of integrity for foreign investors who seek to do business in Nigeria (Odo 2015:189). The agency has also worked to create links with other government institutions by establishing anti-corruption units in federal ministries and parastatals (ibid.). In fact, its activities have not been onesided, but have cut across many strata of life (ibid.:156). Looking at these and many other achievements, it is not possible to say that nothing positive is happening at all. It may seem insignificant, but progress is being made. On the other hand, despite these achievements, corruption has continued to increase massively, and the agency has therefore been under scrutiny (Salawu 2008:395). Hence, we are led to evaluate a few of those criticisms. One of the failures of the ICPC relates to a perceived selectiveness about which perpetrators it investigates, with accusations of corruption involving national assembly members and other senior public figures, such as former or serving governors, ministers and other government appointees, receiving less attention (2008:396). Similarly, the agency’s failure to follow up on complaints against some deeply corrupt public officials – even after the immunity granted them becomes invalid – has been observed. This strongly suggests that there are still “sacred cows” when it comes to the fight against corruption, and this hinders the agency’s ability to reach the desired targets. There are some specific mechanisms which are responsible for either supporting or undermining the effectiveness of government agencies like the ICPC. The most important of these is the judiciary. The courts are key to any serious attempt to fight corruption, but in Nigeria they have been identified as a major barrier to the success of the ICPC (Salawu 2008:396). A complacent judiciary can completely undermine the activities of anticorruption agencies, as can be seen in South Africa, which faces a similar struggle (De Villiers 2010:7). As with the EFCC, the ICPC has also encountered some interference from government officials who expect to be treated as an exception to the law. This undermines the widely accepted stance that all people and humans should be seen as equal in the eyes of the law. These evaluations show that there are missing links that need to be bridged if attempts to wipe out corruption are to succeed. With regards to attaining this goal, I am neither suggesting a total U-turn away from the

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existing agencies, nor proposing a new anti-corruption agency; rather, I wish to make a contribution toward strengthening the existing agencies by bringing to the fore the question of how ethics can be applied in dealing with corruption.

An alternative paradigm? Since corruption manifests itself in various forms, it makes sense that many models are required to combat it. It is vital to note that effective new ways of doing things can come from those that are already well established. In the case of corruption, suggesting a new anti-corruption paradigm would imply that loopholes have been found and that tackling them could bring some effective and meaningful results. The new contribution proposed here is based on an “ethos of responsibility”. It is underpinned by two frameworks, namely, responsible action and responsible living. These are prerequisites for the effective implementation of the anti-corruption policies propagated by both the EFCC and the ICPC, because if corruption is to be effectively fought against, the appropriate shared terms and concepts must be applied by leaders, anti-corruption agencies and citizens involved in the struggle (Igboin 2018:9). Responsibility is a concept that has been highlighted on various academic and moral platforms.1 It connotes, primarily, the notion that one must answer for one’s actions or inactions, especially when asked. It is similar to accountability and transparency. From the root sense of the word, responsibility has been defined as answerability; the ability to respond to questions when asked (Lucas 1993). When an agent’s actions are in line with the interests of his/her followers or dependents, he/she can be said to be acting responsibly. If the agent acts in a way that conflicts with the interests of those he/she represents, this is irresponsible.

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The notion of responsibility was first developed by the German sociologist, Max Weber. In philosophy, it has been developed further, one of the proponents being the philosopher Hans Jonas, whose focus has been on technological advancement and its effect on the future generation. Several theologians (again from Germany) have also developed the concept, most notably Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Wolfgang Huber. In the US, the Niebuhrian brothers and William Schweiker have done some work on the topic. On the African continent, a South African theologian by the name of Etienne de Villiers has done some helpful work in this field as well.

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An ethos of responsibility would interrogate the activities of the existing anti-corruption champions while seeking to inculcate a responsible attitude in dealing with corruption cases. This would mean treating every perpetrator of corruption equally, without selective judgment, as has been the case with the EFCC and the ICPC. It would also mean embedding the concepts of responsible action and responsible living. We live according to various motivations that inform our mission and the value we place on people and things. While our goals in life tell us what we should aim for, our mission is accomplished by dint of what propels us. In the case of a nation that is plagued with corruption, the goal is surely to ensure that this menace is eliminated or reduced to a minimum. For that to happen, however, those with a similar vision must get involved and for everyone to adhere to the guiding rules. This begins with officeholders acting as responsible agents, knowing that their actions or inactions are under surveillance and could be challenged. This calls for an ethos of doing and living, underpinned by a new and vibrant determination that can be applied in the fight against corruption. As anti-corruption actors, the EFCC and the ICPC have mandates for ending corruption; they should serve representatives and intermediaries between the government and the governed and as saviours of the entire nation from the scourge of corruption. As mediators, they must not represent the interests of one party or individual over another, not even themselves. They must become what Bonhoeffer calls vicariously responsible agents (2005). Any attempt, Bonhoeffer asserts, to either dissociate from acting for a just cause or remaining silent when the case demands a public challenge is a denial of responsibility. Put simply, any organisation that acted in such a way would be an irresponsible mediator (2005:254). As responsible anticorruption agencies, both the EFCC and the ICPC have a responsibility to prosecute without apology or pity, regardless of any affiliation to a party, religion, tribe or region. With this, they become responsible anti-corruption actors who spare no “sacred cows”. An ethos of responsibility invites us to think and plan for the future responsibly while we live in the present. This is known as prospective responsibility, a perspective which looks to the future consequences of present actions. Prospective responsibility is ascribed to a person or an institution that has a mandate to actively prevent future harm to humans and nature by taking necessary action steps in the present (De Villiers 2002:17). Corruption and other social vices are detrimental to our development and wellbeing not only here and now, but in the future too. We owe the next

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generation a better Nigeria, a country where milk and honey flow, a place that they can proudly call their own. Living responsibly suggests, however, that we live not only for ourselves but for others whose destinies we have no idea about. Our prospective responsibility, in the context of corruption in Nigeria, is to stand and face the fight against it here and now and to make a corruption-free Nigeria a possibility. Such action would take respect for all humans as a mandate for everyone, from government officials to citizens. It is a paradigm that invites all citizens to live as responsible agents, able to exhibit sound moral judgment for themselves and for others. This means that everyone can become an active anti-corruption agent with a role in reducing the continued spread of corruption and all its ramifications. This point helps us to not identify with but instead dissociate from certain behaviours that should not be part of our society. Corruption, for instance, should be perceived as something intolerable to responsible Nigerians. When that is done, we become those citizens living responsibly.

Concluding remarks In this chapter, we have evaluated the activities of two anti-corruption agencies that currently operate in Nigeria and seen that despite their successes they have rightly drawn some criticism for their failings. Although their existence has brought to light some of the efforts of the government in the fight against corruption, the concern is that the scourge continues to spread. In the effort to help bridge some of these shortcomings, the chapter argued for the inculcation of a different attitude toward anti-corruption efforts, both by the existing agencies and the general populace. This paradigm is twofold, encompassing responsible action and responsible living. In responsible living, the emphasis is more on the populace, as it requires a collective effort of all individuals, not just the agencies. Already, one of the responsibilities of the ICPC is to educate the populace about the perils of corruption, which suggests the notion of responsible living is already in play, hopefully spurring people toward a different philosophy of living. Responsible action, on the other hand, is concerned more with the agencies than the individual. Both the EFCC and the ICPC have come in for criticism over the selective arrest and prosecution of corrupt individuals. If both achieved their stated positions as truly independent entities, the issue of prejudice would be reduced.

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Responsible action and living, carried out within an overall ethos of responsibility, would equip the ongoing anti-corruption crusade more effectively in the war against the menace that is corruption. This would lead to a nation and society where justice reigns, integrity is regained, honesty is restored and societal vices like corruption lose their prominence. In conclusion, we both need a new attitude (ethic) to underpin both our actions and lives in a corrupt society like Nigeria. The fight against corruption demands a collective sense of responsibility from anti-corruption agencies and individuals alike. It calls for all to stand firm and say no to any corrupt activity.

References Agang, S. B. 2016. Globalization and Terrorism: Corruption as a case to Ponder. Pyrex Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution, 2(1):1–8. Ajie, H. A. and Gbenga, O. 2015. Corruption and economic growth in Nigeria: An Empirical Analysis 1996–2103. European Journal of Business and Management, 7(5):224–243. Anazodo, R. O., Igboko-Ibetu, C. J. and Nkah, B. C. 2015. Leadership, corruption, and Governance in Nigeria: Issues and categorical imperatives. Africa Research Review: An International Multidisciplinary Journal, Ethiopia, 9(2):41–58. Bonhoeffer, D. 2005. Ethics (Works of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Volume 6). Minneapolis: Fortress Press. De Villiers, E. 2002. Who Will Bear Moral Responsibility? Communicatio, 28(1):16–21. De Villiers, E. 2010. Prophetic Witness: An Appropriate Mode of Public Discourse in Democratic South Africa? Theological Studies 66(1):1–8. Duschinsky, Robert. 2012. Tabula Rasa and Human Nature. Philosophy, 87(4):509–529. Hauerwas, Stanley. 1983. The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics. Notre Dame, London: University of Notre Dame Press. Igbaekemen, G. O.; Abbah, M. T.; and Geidam, M. M. 2014. The Effects of Corruption on the Socio-Economic Development of Nigeria. Canadian Social Science, 10(6):149–157). Igboin, Benson Ohihon (editor). 2018. Corruption: A New Thinking in the Reverse Order. Oyo: Ajayi Crowther University Press. Lucas, J. R. 1993. Responsibility. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Nwaodu, N., Adam, D. and Okereke, O. A. 2014. A Review of Anticorruption Wars in Nigeria. Africa’s Public Service Delivery and Performance Review, 2(3):153–274. Nwoba, M. O. E. and Monday, N. P. 2018. Appraisal of the EFCC in the Fight Against Corruption in Nigeria Between 2007-2017. The Social Sciences, 13(1):94–104. Obuah, Emmanuel. 2010. Combating Corruption in a ‘Failed’ State: The Nigerian EFCC. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa, 12(1):27–53. Odo, Linus. 2015. The Impact and Consequences of Corruption on the Nigerian Society and Economy. International Journal of Arts and Humanities, 4(1):177–190. Raimi, L., Suara, I. B. and Fadipe, A. O. 2013. The Role of EFCC and ICPC at Ensuring Accountability and Corporate Governance in Nigeria. Journal of Business Administration and Education, 3(2):105–122. Salawu, Bashiru. 2008. Towards Solving the Problem of Corruption in Nigeria: The ICPC under Searchlight. Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences, 5(5):391–398. Schweiker, William. 2004. Theological Ethics and the Global Dynamics: In the Time of Many Worlds, Main street, Malden: Blackwell Publishing.

CHAPTER 12 CHRISTIAN ACTIVISM AS RESPONSIBLE CITIZENSHIP: TOWARDS AN ANTI-CORRUPTION DISCOURSE IN AFRICAN CONTEXTS 1 HASSAN MUSA (ECWA THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, KAGORO, NIGERIA)

Abstract The problem of corruption has been a fundamental one across the world, not least in our African contexts. This problem has been pervasive throughout almost all spheres of life, whether in politics, religion or social life. This article aims to present an argument that could serve as one of the decisive moves in Africa against the growth of corruption. In terms of methodology, it will be a theological reflection at the boundaries of other disciplines, in order to stress the fact that theology cannot be done in isolation from other existing voices. Nevertheless, the notion of Christian activism will be closely explored across international contexts like Germany, America, South Africa and Nigeria. The chapter will discuss Christian activism as a fundamental element of responsible citizenship toward the subversion of corrupt structures, networks and values in African contexts. It is based on a lecture dedicated to the first memorial of the Rev. Dr Musa Asake who was a great voice that advocated for truth, justice and equity in Nigeria from the church and socio-political contexts. Keywords: Christian activism; public theology; responsible citizenship; anti-corruption

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A paper presented at the African Union (AU) Anti-Corruption Conference in Abuja, 11 to 14 July 2019

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You are the light of the world. A town built on a hill cannot be hidden. In the same way, let your light shine before others, that they may see your good deeds and glorify your Father in heaven. (Matthew 5:14, 16)

Introduction The problem of corruption is common to many African countries and Nigeria is not an exception (Turaki n.d.:1, 107, 128; Turaki 2002; 2006; Aguma 2018:13f; Dudley 1968; Kukah 1993; 1999). In one of my recent essays, I highlighted the confirmation of the fact that “each Senator receives N13.5m monthly as a running cost,”2 based on data that was finally published in 2018. Furthermore, Senator Shehu Sani confessed that, “what you are given to spend without any accountability is N750,000.00.” It is fair to say that almost everything in Nigeria’s social system has been highly monetised, which effectively means it has been reserved for the rich alone.3 This is because Nigerian citizens have, in many ways, succeeded in normalizing corruption to the detriment of the internal and international integrity of the country. My question here is: how can we learn to live differently from the dominant narrative of corruption in our midst? It is interesting to note that one of the aims of the African Union is to explore the extent to which Africa can be self-developed, especially in the years following colonization and democratisation. The fundamental challenge is not just to think about what corruption is or who is corrupt but, for me, more about considering how to live a life that will be a subversion of corruption, however it may be defined. That is why this chapter argues the case for Christian activism as one of the key ways of standing up against all forms of corruption in both the church and the state. The term corruption, for me, means the state of being dishonest, unaccountable, greedy, uncaring and actually selfish. In terms of methodology, I employ theological-ethical 2

Daily Trust newspaper, Monday 12 March 2018, p.3. According to the Daily Trust, Friday 2 March 2018 (p. 10), Jide Omokore used money connected to a $1 billion oil deal to gift Adamu Mua’azu, the former PDP Chairman, and others multiple cars. Mu’azu received 23 assorted cars, while Uche Secundus was given 10 white Hilux Jeeps. Others who received luxury cars (made by Mercedes Benz, Lexus and Range Rover among others) as gifts include: SPOG, 15 cars; Atlantic Energy, 19; and Albert Bassey, 9. Okey Ezenwa, Tom Ikimi, Nneka Briggs, David Mbanefo and others also received at least one car. 3

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criticism to call for a form of advocacy that will be active in naming and dismantling corruption in all its discernible guises. Nigerian citizens hear lots of discussions and political pep talks against corruption. This is not a new thing in the history of Nigerian politics. Many leaders of Nigeria from the military regime – for example Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, Olusegun Obansanjo and now Muhammadu Buhari (especially in his second term) – have talked about dealing with corruption in Nigeria (see Kukah 1999; Gwamna 2014; Aguma 2018). President Buhari’s commitment to anti-corruption could have earned him a good legacy, based on what he has already done and continually claims to have done, were there not some serious contradictions and controversies involving the present government. There appears to be a clear party bias, with those who claim to be in his party allowed to escape corruption charges and go free. There have also been many allegations of financial fraud that have either not been investigated, or where legal action appears to have been suspended indefinitely. To give some examples, Sambo Dasuki has been accused of diverting over $2 billion during the Goodluck Jonathan administration, yet details of the case remain ambiguous and even elusive to many Nigerians. Despite the fact that Nigeria’s auditor general recently revealed that $16 billion of oil revenue went missing in 2014 (Aguma 2018:72), there has been no news about it to date. On the positive side, we can note that the Buhari administration has succeeded in recovering over £9 billion in cash and property (Aguma 2018:71; see also Eze and Agena 2016:780–81; Emeka 2015:38–47). Despite this, most still languish in poverty under the Nigerian economic system. Critical governors, such as Ayo Fayose of Ekiti State, have questioned the government’s accountability and integrity, asking, for example, what happened to the $43 million discovered in an apartment at Osbourne Towers, Ikoyi, Lagos; who is the mysterious owner of the N448.8 million in cash found in the Legico Shopping Plaza; and what happened to the investigation into accusations that the Minister of State for Petroleum Resources, Ibe Kachikwu, had treated the awarding $25 billion in contracts as a “family affair” (Aguma 2018:73–74)? We can only wonder why the national budgets from 2016 to 2019, which led to the towering figures of N9 trillion, are still not satisfying the economic needs of Nigerians and why we are still fighting corruption in the same country. Here and now, the question of how much the present government has actually done to stop corruption is still a matter of debate between those who see its actions as

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predominantly frivolous political chatter and those who recognise progressive moves towards a socio-political revolution against corruption. The problem of corruption in the form of dishonesty and greed is not seen only in the political sphere but also in the church. This has caused some members of the church to lose faith in their leaders and look for alternatives. Tragically, the feeling is that the church has monetised spirituality by suggesting that the more one gives, the more spiritual one is reckoned to be. This could be mere speculation, yet it has been seen in many churches around the world in situations where pastors are granted total autonomy and cannot be questioned or held to account by the members. In our attempt to call for a form of Christian advocacy against corruption in Nigeria and Africa at large, we must recall the Christian voices of the past and present that have been inspiring and influential in providing us with an ethics of public life that encourages responsibility and accountability. The late Rev. Dr Musa Asake is known throughout Nigeria and beyond as such a critical voice. Asake was active as a church leader in Evangelical Church Winning All (ECWA) and the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) at the national level, advocating for the human rights and dignity of Christians and all Nigerians. He spoke up for truth, justice and equity throughout his years of leadership. At his funeral service on 8 June 2018, people from many different walks gave eulogies and reflected on his commitment to being a voice for the voiceless and defender of the poor, weak and vulnerable. To his loving memory I dedicate this chapter, with the hope that it will be a stimulation for the rise of another Musa Asake who will continue the campaign for justice and equity in Nigeria from a Christian perspective, and bring this message into the context of public life of Nigeria and all of Africa.

Modelling anti-corruption in Africa One of the best ways, I believe, that we can fight corruption in Nigeria, and in Africa more generally, is through efforts to provide excellent role models. This means we need people of “character” and “good company,” as Stanley Hauerwas describes them in his work on theological ethics (Hauerwas 1981). We need people who will actively lead lives that confront and subvert the notion that a “normal” life is one of greed and aggrandizement – a notion that we struggle with in Nigeria and across much of Africa. I wish to briefly highlight some crucial examples of people who, during their lifetimes, modelled what one might call an anti-corruption life network from the Christian perspective. Their lives challenge those of us

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living today to evaluate our own existence and see how much we need to move and do in order to make life a joy and always worth living. One of these anti-corruption leaders was Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Bonhoeffer was a young theologian in Germany when his influence came to the fore in the 1930s during the Third Reich. He became a force to reckon with in the rise of confessional theology against the corruption of Hitler and the Nazis (see De Gruchy 1996:345–366; 2014:63–68). Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s life became an example of Christian responsible citizenship. He was not seduced or engulfed by the cult of the Nazis but instead was willing to surrender his life for the freedom of the church, for an alternative vision of life and for action against the racially motivated crimes of his day. Bonhoeffer’s convictions are best seen in his involvement with the conspiracy to assassinate Hitler, in order that others might be free and live in the glory of God. He was a great advocate of God’s truth; he welcomed the Kingdom of God around him and promoted its growth with his life. Today he is remembered not just as an active theologian and Christian leader but also as a martyr. Another Christian leader who became a martyr for the freedom of his people is Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. Like Moses, he saw the promised land of freedom but was not allowed to live in it. In his magisterial speech, “I have a Dream,” Luther dreams of a new society that is not precisely a utopia but that will dismantle the terror of race and embrace the humanization of life based on character, not skin colour. He lived for such ideals and he died for them. His death was a tragedy, not in despair but in hope, for he saw the new life that his advocacy had given to his people and died as a great legend who made history for the coming generation. In South Africa, Beyers Naudé was an active voice, especially in his sermons and messages published in Pro Veritate in the 1960s, which called white South Africans away from the evil of Apartheid into the new life of God’s love, forgiveness and embrace (see Vosloo 2015:12). Willie Jonker, in like manner, also taught and preached of his dream of a different world from the Apartheid paradigm (see Naudé 2014). Naudé and Jonker suffered the torment of criticism at home in order to give a voice to those who were considered lesser people than the white, male elements in society. Jonker’s advocacy led to the great confession of the sin of Apartheid and the practice of forgiving and the embracing of former enemies. It is true that there is no future without forgiveness (Tutu 1999).

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From the political perspective, Nelson Mandela, has made a name for himself in his quest for the promotion of peace and equality in South Africa. He campaigned against segregation and for recognition of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa, remaining a great inspiration from grass to grace. His 1990 bibliography is titled, The Struggle is My Life. Mandela is now a monumental figure, for he chose to lead a life that made life possible for others, even those who hurt and dehumanised him. The late Steve De Gruchy has also been remembered, especially within the circles of South African theologians with an interest in public life, and also by his own father John De Gruchy (De Gruchy 2013; 2014:149–166). During his lifetime, he was a tireless advocate for the justice needed to restore peace and progress in South Africa. He worked against the tyranny of the few for the sake of the many by confronting political policies that were not helpful to the poor. He became a champion of the poor, arguing for the recognition of their innate humanity and their right to live a joyful life and be actively cared for. He also became an enthusiastic advocate for the earth through his ecological theology. He was a public theologian who cared for life in church and in the ordinary environment that was created and given by God. In a similar way, I also wish to remember the life of Russel Botman, who was the late Vice-Chancellor and Rector of Stellenbosch University and the first black South African to occupy that position. He made history through his activism, dynamic leadership and spirituality (Smit 2015). Botman believed strongly in the spirit of life for all African people, over and against the delusion of colonial heritage and the effects it brought in its wake (Botman 2002). Botman was a man of hope, and he brought hope to his projects. He campaigned for greater justice in helping the needy, and for the opportunity of growth in life and education in South Africa and beyond. From Nigeria, we reflect on the lives of the late Bishop Joseph Bagobiri (the late Catholic Bishop of Kafanchan Diocese) and Rev. Dr Musa Asake (the late General Secretary of ECWA and CAN) both of whom died in 2018. These men were remarkable in their advocacy for the freedom and justice of the Nigerian people. They were mindful of sociopolitical corruption in Nigeria which more often than not feeds on violence and gives people reason to believe that they are not good enough to live. These great men stood their ground and fought to the end. They left a vacuum in the Nigerian church that is yet to be filled. We cannot bring back those we love but we can honour their memories. In my opinion, the best way to honour their memories is to continue their good legacies for the coming generation. This

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is what I see at the heart of Christian activism in connection to an African renaissance.

Christian Activism for an African renaissance Allan Boesak, is a well-known Christian activist in South Africa. It is important to note that Christian activism may easily be misunderstood as fanaticism or the hatred of the other, but in this context, activism is a courageous act to stand witness for the common good. Allan Boesak wrote his book, The Tenderness of Conscience (2005), as a commentary on Thabo Mbeki’s call for an African renaissance. His discourses are deeply rooted in the provision of a “spirituality of politics” that can sustain the vision for an African renaissance – a concept which, to me, does not just mean the revitalization of everything that is African, but the activity of creating, constructing and reconstructing an Africa that is true, good and just. The slogan of the young whites who see “yesterday” as “a foreign country” remains a major challenge in bringing this vision to fruition (Boesak 2005:1–4). This is why, instead of the revitalization of Africa, we need to dream and call for the renewal of Africa as a continent of truth and justice, to seek for political righteousness beyond political correctness, and to receive life as a joyful gift, not a hustle to make ends meet. Boesak’s quest for spirituality calls for a politics that is rooted in the ideals of God’s justice and freedom, and which can continually inspire us towards active hope. In his article celebrating John de Gruchy, he advocated for a hope that is not willing to take things as they are (Boesak 2014: 1055–74). In this book, Boesak argued for a Christian hope that is true, sensitive, sensible and responsible for the life of everyone. This is how we can move away from corruption into the freedom of joy, good fellowship and growth.

Conclusion: Activism for responsible citizenship for Africa’s sociopolitical development Hannah Arendt is one of the best-known European-American political philosophers of the twentieth century. Her influence will continue to reverberate through the history of social and political thinking (Canovan 1992; Benhabib 1996). Arendt was born in Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century. She grew up as a Jewish-German in the hostility of Hitler’s tyranny, which inspired her life and work. She became a formidable voice against the tyrannous policies of the Nazis, but had to flee Germany in the 1930s. Her book, The Origins of Totalitarianism, among other works describes the impetus for her political activism against the totalitarian

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regimes that were rising in Europe (Arendt 1958). Her other influential work, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil (Arendt 1963), remains controversial among her critical contributions. In The Human Condition (Arendt 1958) she gave the optimistic message that humanity cannot be continually downtrodden and abused but must rise in hope to realize the state of being truly human. Similarly, Yusufu Turaki considers the “African Condition” in The Tribal Gods of Africa (1997), in which he carefully discusses the unfortunate socio-political diseases that destroy Africa, namely, ethnicity, racism and tribalism. In Aleida Assmann’s words, these are the vices of the regimes of our modern time which keep us captive and further alienate us from each other (see also in Vosloo 2015: 5; Lorenz and Bevernage 2013:39–56). These are the vices that remain active in the “creative destruction” we can see in Africa today. Nevertheless, in Russel Botman’s words, the despair we face in many forms should not be “the end of hope” but rather the “new horizon of hope.” Botman sees hope as life’s daring engagement against all that would destroy it (Botman 2002). In this, he remains hopeful for Africa as a continent. Wolfgang Huber, also provided a motto for life when he said “Meine Hoffnung ist größer als meine Angst” (my hope is stronger than my fear) (Huber 1996; 2015). This is the best way to live and to advocate for justice and righteousness against corruption in Africa. We need to live in a hope that is stronger than our fears. We should not expect the government to do everything for us. The failure of government promises should not be given as a reason for our own failure. We can rise and move beyond that, paving the way for the formation of an ethos that will be generative and transformative for our lives and the lives of all others. Elna Mouton calls for the promotion of the Christian ethos of responsibility in both the church and secular contexts (Mouton 2008). Such an ethos will help shape us into people of character whose ethics will be centred around a theological engagement with life and the world as God’s gift – a gift which must be managed with a deep sense of responsibility and accountability. Sunday B. Agang calls for a political spirituality that can stand against the ongoing sociopolitical hostilities that we suffer in contemporary Africa and Nigeria in particular (Agang 2016). We need to move beyond the culture of violence which is an integral part of the tyranny of our modern times. But beyond that, we need to develop a good sense of practical responsible citizenship in which the cardinal virtues of love, faith and hope rule our lives. Oliver O’Donovan sees the central presence and active roles of these virtues in making us the true people of God who are ethically responsible and spiritually informed and transformed (O’Donovan 2013). This will not be the end but only the beginning of life for the common good.

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References Agang, S. B. 2016. When Evil Strikes; Faith and the Politics of Human Hostility. Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick Publications. Aguma, D. U. 2018. Financial Corruption in Nigerian Politics. Gorki: JCEE Business. Arendt, H. [1958] 1962. The Origin of Totalitarianism. Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company. Arendt, H. [1958] 1998. The Human Condition. 2nd ed. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Arendt, H. [1963] 1964. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: The Viking Press. Benhabib, S. 1996. The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Boesak, A. 2005. The Tenderness of Conscience; African Renaissance and the Spirituality of Politics. Stellenbosch: Sun Press. Boesak, A. 2014. “A Hope Unprepared to Accept Things as They Are: Engaging John De Gruchy’s Challenges for ‘Theology at the Edge.’” NGTT DEEL 55, SUPPLEMENTUM 1, 1055–74. Botman, R. H. “The end of hope or new horizon of hope? An outreach to those in Africa who dare hope.” DEEL 43 NOMMERS 1 and 2 MAART and JUNIE (2002), 22–31. Canovan, M. 1992. Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. De Gruchy, J. W 2013. Led into Mystery: Faith Seeking Answers in Life and Death. London: SCM. De Gruchy, J. W. 1996. “Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Transition to Democracy in the German Democratic Republic and South Africa,” Modern Theology 12(3):345–366. De Gurchy, J. W. 2014. A Theological Odyssey; My Life in Writing. Stellenbosch: Sun Press. Emeka, N. 2015. “EFCC and ICPC the Anti-Corruption Fight,” Global Journal of Applied Management and Social Sciences 10:38–47. Eze, R. C. and James, Agena E. 2016. “International Cooperation and Collaboration as an Effective Tool in Buhari’s Administration War on Corruption in Nigeria,” American Journal of Social Issues and Humanitarian 16:765–782. Gwamna, J. D. 2014. Religion and Politics in Nigeria. Bukuru: ACTS. Hauerwas, S. 1981. A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

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Huber, W. 1996. Meine Hoffnung ist größer als meine Angst. Ein Bischof zu Glauben, Kirche und Gesellschaft. Interviews von Stefan Berg, Berlin. Huber, W. 2015. “Why Ethics?” Inaugural Lecture as Honorary Professor of Stellenbosch University. Stellenbosch: SUN Media. Kukah, M. H. 1993. Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Kukah, M. H. 1999. Democracy and Civil Society in Nigeria. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Lorenz, C and Bevernage, B (eds). Breaking Up Time: Negotiating the Borders Between Present, Past and Future. Gottingen: Vandenhoek and Ruprecht. Mandela, N. 1990. The Struggle is My Life. London: IDAF Publications. Mouton, E. 2008. “Christian Theology at the University: On the Threshold or in the Margin?” HTS 64(1):431–445. Naudé, P. J. 2014. “‘Public Theology’ from within the Church? A Reflection on aspects of the theology of W. D. Jonker (1929–2006),” Verbum et Ecclesia 35:1–8. O’Donovan, O. 2013. Self, World, and Time. Ethics as Theology 1. An Introduction, Michigan and Cambridge: Grand Rapids and William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. Smit, D. J. “Making History for the Coming Generation—On the Theological Logic of Russel Botman’s Commitment to Transformation.” In: The First Russel Botman Memorial Lecture. Stellenbosch: Sun Media, (2015) 3– 13. Turaki, Y. 1997. Tribal Gods of Africa; Ethinicity, Racism, Tribalism and the Gospel of Christ. Jos: Cross Roads Media. Turaki, Y. 2002. The Politics of Religion and Ethnicity in Northern Nigeria; National Round Table on “Democracy and Nation Building: The Challenge of Our Time.” ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja, Nigeria, 7–10 April. Turaki, Y. 2006. “Democracy.” In: T. Adeyemo (ed.) Africa Bible Commentary. Nairobi: Word Alive Publishers. Turaki, Y. 2010. Tainted Legacy: Islam, Colonialism and Slavery in Northern Nigeria. MacLean: Isaac Publishing. Turaki, Y. n.d. Historical Roots of Ethno-Religious Crises and Conflicts in Northern Nigeria, Challenge Press, Jos. Tutu, D. 1999. No Future Without Forgiveness. London: Rider. Vosloo, R. 2015. “Time in our Time” On Theology and Future-Oriented Memory,” Presented as Inaugural Lecture on 5 May, at the Faculty of Theology, Stellenbosch University. Stellenbosch: Sun Media.

CHAPTER 13 AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE ON CORRUPTION CONTROL IN NIGERIA1 SAJO, ABDULLAHI MUHAMMAD (PHD CANDIDATE, FACULTY OF ARTS, DEPARTMENT OF RELIGIONS AND PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF JOS, NIGERIA)

Abstract Corruption is a universal problem for all societies and governments. However, its magnitude seems to be at a peak in African countries generally, and specifically in Nigeria. Unfortunately, this menace affects both the leadership and the led. This is rooted in the moral and religious laxity of the majority of the adherents to Islam, Christianity and traditional religions. Corruption has permeated the fabric of Nigerian society, causing myriad political, social, economic and cultural problems. It has thrived in an atmosphere that is unrepentant about this social ill. Efforts made by the Nigerian government to fight corruption have not been completely successful. To fight corruption is not only an existential necessity but also a divine imperative, in view of the evil this practice exerts on both the physical existence and the spiritual development of humanity. Religion therefore has a crucial role to play in the fight against this obnoxious practice. Corruption in Islam refers to a broad spectrum of human behavioural digressions which are not compatible with Islamic principles and threaten the social, economic and ecological balance of society. It covers a wide range of illegal practices which undermine fear of Allah the Almighty, morality, harmony, peace, progress and development. Using qualitative research techniques, this chapter examines the effects of 1

A paper presented at the 24th National Annual Conference of the Nigerian Anthropological and Sociological Practitioners Association (NASA), Bayero University, Kano.

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corruption and the various ways of curbing it in Islam, and proffers a likely solution using the Islamic model as exemplified in the glorious Qur’an and Sunnah of the noble Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). The chapter concludes that an Islamic approach which looks at corruption holistically and calls for the fear of Allah the Almighty is one of the best approaches to solving the corruption problem in Nigeria. The success of every society, both in this world and the hereafter, is built upon the fear of God and belief in accountability, which should be a pillar in controlling the menace of corruption in Nigeria. Keywords: Islam; corruption control, Nigeria

Introduction Corruption has economic, social and environment dimensions as well as ethical ones. The definition of corruption depends on the context in which it is being used (Myint 2000:33). Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon which has been with societies throughout the ages. It has caused political and economic instability in societies and, depending on the scale, has led to societal conflict and violence as competing groups vie for state power over the distribution of resources and other amenities (Odunuga 2000:55). Evidence of corruption is apparent from the way many Nigerians today seem to live above the means enabled by their visible legitimate incomes. It is a worrisome fact that corruption has permeated the ranks of security personnel and even religious leaders, whose role it is to instil a sense of honesty, sincerity, truthfulness, integrity and forthrightness in people (Ali 2002:26). Corruption saturates all aspects of public life and the entire Nigerian society due to the general belief that public and private business and even religious matters cannot make progress without indulging in some corrupt practices. Many strategies have been put in place to fight corruption in Nigeria but none have been effective so far (Liman 2018:14). Certainly, corruption can be said to have shaped Nigeria’s political culture from colonization through independence and military rule and up until today. Corruption is a complex, persistent and cancerous global phenomenon. In Nigeria, corruption by public officials in the form of misappropriation, bribery, embezzlement, nepotism, money laundering, inflation of contracts, kickbacks and so on has permeated the fabric of the society. It remains prevalent because of the soaring indiscipline perpetrated by virtually every segment of the political system, including public authorities, private organizations, individuals, citizens and religious bodies.

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The impacts of corruption present a great number of challenges to the development of the country. The aim of this chapter is to look at corruption from Islamic perspective and explore ways of stemming it. As such, the study argues for the application of religious guidelines in the fight against this epidemic. To this end, it looks at the meaning of corruption from the Islamic viewpoint and explores its antidote from the same perspective.

Concept of corruption In light of the points raised in the introduction, it is pertinent to clearly define corruption and its various forms, so as to understand what it actually means. Corruption has received considerable attention in developed societies, and perhaps due to the fact that it has been over-flogged in academic circles, it has been given varied definitions in the literature. It has broadly been defined as pervasion or change from good to bad (Obuah 2010:25). Specifically, corruption or corrupt behaviour has been described as the violation of established rules for personal gain and profit (Shah 2012:35); the effort to secure wealth or power through illegal means; private gain at public expense; or the misuse of public power for private benefit (Lipset and Lenz 1999:201–202). Thus, corruption means any abuse of a position of trust in order to gain an undue advantage. It involves poor conduct on both sides: both from the person who abuses his position of trust and from the person who seeks to gain undue advantage through this abuse. Corrupt practices range from small favours in anticipation of a future advantage to the payment of large sums of money to senior members of government. Political corruption is a state of affairs where politicians formulate policies to benefit themselves (Doig and Theobald 2002:86). It is a form of corruption perpetrated by elected officials entrusted with responsibility for making policies who subvert public interest to the benefit of the elite. It includes all efforts to acquire power or control over the state apparatus unconstitutionally. Thus, all attempts to undermine the integrity of the electoral process are termed political corruption. Bureaucratic corruption, on the other hand, refers to corrupt practices perpetrated by public administrators when implementing public policies either for their personal ends or to serve the interests of their political masters (Isma’il 2014:202).

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Causes of corruption The causes of corruption in Nigeria, according to Umar, are broadly political instability, weak legislative and judicial systems, and institutional inefficiency (cited in Koko 2017:215). Therefore, corruption’s prevalence in Nigeria can be attributed to the following factors: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)

Inefficient and non-self-enforcing rule Lack of devotion to public interest Absence of commitment to public service Relatively low public service compensation Economic woes and chronic poverty Indiscipline and inefficiency.

On the strength of the above submission, one could agree with the Transparency International Country Study Report (2004) which locates the causes of corruption in Nigeria within the following listed cases (Isma’il 2014:204). 1. Prolonged military rule and the institutionalisation of a culture of impunity. 2. Absence of commitment on the part of government to fight corruption, as evidenced by the “Sacred cow syndrome”, as well as failure to investigate and prosecute glaring cases of corruption. 3. Weak anti-corruption and watchdog agencies and other enforcement mechanisms. 4. Inadequate legal frameworks and lack of freedom of information and whistleblowing legislation. 5. The effects of tribalism/ethnicity and religion on national politics. Ethnicity and religion breed divisive tendencies, making it difficult to nurture true cohesion and to build resistance to corruption. 6. Elastic tolerance for corruption fostered by sociocultural norms and attitudes towards public property that were nourished under colonialism. 7. Distortion of African principles of hospitality and exchange of gifts. 8. Poverty and death of public service, infrastructure and utilities, leading to the corrupt diversion of the nation’s resources. 9. Mismanagement of oil resources, as evidenced by the ostentatious lifestyles and flaunting of wealth by the political elite and their apologists.

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The World Bank report also documents that corruption occurs when individuals, groups or firms in both public and private sectors influence the formation of laws, regulation, decrees and other government policies to their own advantage, by means of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private benefits to public officials (kickbacks). It can also occur when changing and altering existing laws, rules and regulations to provide advantages to either state or non-state actors.

Implications of corruption on Nigeria Corruption is, however, not limited to public officials: private sector players are neck-deep in it too. Nigeria’s private sector is beleaguered by bank distress, fraud, insider trading, dirty foreign exchange, false declarations of profits, creative accounting and the concealment of liabilities as a ploy to deceive existing and prospective shareholders. Indeed, the private sector is actively involved in a fair proportion of the corruption that goes on in government circles. The impacts of corruption on Nigeria are legion. It undermines national growth when politicians and other highly-placed individuals steal money from Nigeria and invest it abroad, thereby contributing to those countries’ economic growth at the expense of the nation. The country has also suffered from extensive corruption in its electoral process, through massive vote rigging, resulting in widespread political instability. Corruption in the education sector has also been witnessed. Above all, the rich in Nigeria continue to be rich, while the poor continue to be poor, because the wealth of this nation is perpetually being placed in the wrong hands, leading to the uneven distribution of amenities. In Nigeria, corruption became the principal means of private accumulation during the decolonization period, and all subsequent regimes, be they military or civilian, have been pervaded by corruption. Aided and enhanced by oil revenues, this has created a deepening crisis of kleptocracy (corrupt and dishonest government), which has been extreme since 1984. This results in a combination of scandalous wealth among the ruling class and growing poverty, misery and degradation among the mass of Nigerians. Political life has been dominated by “winner-takes-all” factional struggles, political cynicism and violence, while the economy and social institutions have been driven into decay. Corruption has thus become a way of life in Nigeria, one which the existing government neither wishes to, nor can control. Combating corruption requires a popular participatory

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democracy able to monitor and hold to account those in charge of the state and the treasury.

The Islamic concept of corruption Justice is a central value in Islamic teaching and is considered to be the foundation for all God’s creation (Surty 2007:170). According to the teachings of the Qur’an, any deeds of mankind that flout justice are an act of corruption on earth. Therefore, Qur’anic teachings focus on promoting and enforcing a code of ethics and morality for human behaviour. Social justice is central to the concept of development in Islam (Dugbazah 2009:34). In Islamic teaching, social justice includes the fair and equitable distribution of wealth, the provision of basic necessities, and the protection of the weak against economic exploitation by the strong (Badawi 1976:196). Furthermore, values of fairness, honesty, ethics and mercy should be evident in the application of justice, regardless of race, colour or creed (Khan et al. 2009:207). Therefore, all behaviours that undermine those values and distort the Islamic moral framework are not acceptable in Islam.

The Qur’anic exposition of corruption Under Islamic law, corruption refers to a broad spectrum of human behavioural digressions which are not compatible with Islamic principles and threaten the social, economic and ecological balance of society and individuals, as can be deduced from its broad meaning and usage in the Qur’an. Thus, this section will look at the explanation of the word fasad (corruption) as used in the Qur’an and the works of the exegetes. In Arabic, fasad means unlawful warfare or crimes against law and order in the Muslim community (Liman 2018:14). Allah the Almighty said: And when it is said to them, make not mischief on the earth, they said we are only peacemakers. Verily! They are the ones who make mischief, but they perceive it not.

In the Tafsir of Ibn Kathir, Fasad fil ard (mischief or corruption in the land/on earth) is an act of disobedience to God (Ibn Kathir 2000:133). In his Tafsir, As Suyudi notes that Ibn Abbas and Ibn Mas’ud commented, “Do not make mischief on earth”, that is, do not engage in disbelief or acts of disobedience. Abu Ja’afar said that Al-Rabi’i bin Anas said that Abu AlAliyah said that Allah’s statement, “And when it is said to them, Do not make mischief on the earth,” means “Do not commit acts of disobedience on earth. Their mischief is disobeying Allah, because whoever disobeys

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Allah on earth or commands that Allah be disobeyed, he has committed mischief on earth. Peace both on earth and in the heavens is ensured (and earned) through obedience (to Allah)” (Ibn Kathir 2000:133). Similarly, Allah the Almighty said: And (remember) when your Lord said to the angles, verily, I am going to place (mankind) generations after generations on earth. They said will you place therein those who will make mischief therein and shed blood, while we glorify you with praises and thanks (exalted be You above all that they associate You as partners) and sanctify You. He (Allah) said, I know that which you do not know. (Qur’an 2:30)

And Allah the Almighty states that: And of mankind there is he whose speech may please you (O Muhammad SAW) in this worldly life, and he calls Allah to witness as to that which is in his heart, yet he is the most quarrelsome of the opponents. And when he turns away from you his effort in the land is to make mischief therein and to destroy the crop sand the cattle and Allah likes not mischief. (Qur’an 2:204– 205).

Allah the Almighty said: And O my people! Give full measure and weight in justice and reduce not the things that are due to the people, and do not commit mischief in the land, causing corruption (Qur’an 11:85).

Analysis of the few verses quoted above, among many others dealing with corruption, reveals that the word corruption in its broad sense comprises assorted crimes which include hypocrisy, the spilling of innocent blood, destruction of crops and livestock, theft, armed robbery and depriving people of what is legally theirs. All these crimes have the capacity to ground a nation completely (Liman 2018:16).

An Islamic approach to controlling corruption The quality of a society depends largely upon the qualities of its members. As seen in the discussion above, corruption encompasses all acts of wrongdoings. As such, the first step in the fight against corruption is to appeal to our personal character. Both men and women were endowed with the capacity to carry out Allah’s commands on issues of social and religious responsibility, as the Qur’an establishes in Chapter 9, Verse 71:

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The believers, men and women, are Auliya2 of one another, they enjoin [the people to] Al-Ma’aruf,3 and forbid Al-Munkar,4 they perform salat, and give the Zakat, and obey Allah and His Messenger. Allah will have His mercy on them. Surely Allah is all-mighty, all-wise.

Islam lays great emphasis on the consciousness of God, Taqwa. Taqwa refers to an attitude of mind, the awareness of God and consciousness of one’s responsibility to him; it could also be translated as piety. As such, it is mentioned in the Qur’an as being the foundation of a Muslim’s character. Allah states in the Qur’an, Chapter 49 Verse 13: O mankind! We have created you from a male and female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know one another. Verily, the most honourable of you with Allah is that believer who has Taqwa.

A Hadith of the Prophet SAW narrated by Abudllah Ibn Mas’ud also states: “the Prophet SAW has said if, through fear of God, tears, even a small drop, fall from any believer’s eyes, he will be kept away from Hell by God”. What this means is that Islam places great emphasis on humility, modesty, control of passions and desires, truthfulness, integrity, patience and steadfastness. As Muslims, we are enjoined to fulfil all our promises and contracts, to keep all trust, to meet our agreements and to repay our debts (Liman 2018:17–18). As for those in leadership, the Islamic approach to fighting corruption is through transparent and honest leadership with strong emphasis on restraining from illegal enrichment and any other form of corrupt practice proscribed by Islam. A leader is a role model and can only fight vices when he demonstrates exemplary leadership skills. He must understand the overarching objectives of Islamic law which are: establishing justice, educating followers, upholding morality in public and private, preventing hardship among followers and preventing oppression in the society (Liman 2018:18). The acceptance speech of Caliph Abu Bakr Siddiq (RA) is very apt to drive home this point:

2

Helpers, supporters, friends, protectors. Islamic Monotheism and all that Islam orders one to do. 4 Polytheism and disbelief of all kinds, and all that Islam has forbidden. 3

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Chapter 13 I have been given the authority over you and I am not best of you. I have never sought this position nor has there ever being a desire in my heart to have this in preference to anyone else. If I do well, help me, and if I do wrong, set me right. Sincere regard for truth is loyalty and disregard for truth is treachery. The weak among you shall be strong with me until I have secured his rights. If God will and the strong among you shall be weak with me until I have wrestled from him the rights of others, if God will. Obey me so long as I obey Allah the Almighty and His messenger (PBUH). But if I disobey Allah and His messenger you own me no obedience. Arise for your prayer, God have mercy upon you. https://www.facebook.com/notes/patnubay-online/caliph-abu-bakr-siddiqa-great-leader/508175125899433/

This is the kind of leadership that Islam preaches and that which Nigerians should inculcate and exhibit. One measurable form of corruption rocking Nigeria’s public domain is bribery. Islam sees bribery as epitomizing corruption when something is given by the briber and received by the bribed, irrespective of whether it is a material or a moral thing, money or boon, in order to gain advantage over others that have an equal claim. Thus, having canvassed the opinions of Muslim scholars, we can describe corruption as covering matters of governance, decision-making, laws and public responsibilities. It can be seen in the abuse of the trust placed in officials by the state through acts such as accepting gifts, outright theft of public funds, and the undermining of rules in exchange for bribes, or due to family and tribal loyalties (Liman 2018:19). Under Islam, individuals in general are prohibited from making recommendations in exchange for gifts, as such behaviour falls under rishwah (bribery). The Prophet (PBUH) used to appoint a number of his companions as collectors of zakat (alms in the form of a religious tax) during the Madinah period. They were to make a proper assessment of items on which zakat was payable, collect the due amount and distribute the funds to recipients in the same locality. One of these zakat collectors came back and told the Prophet (PBUH): “This amount is I have collected, less what I have distributed to the rightful recipients, but this is mine.” The noble prophet (PBUH) was very upset and rebuked him, saying “What right have you to put aside something that does not belong to you? If you were to remain in your father’s house, would you get what you are taking?” (Bukhari 2015:286). The noble Prophet (PBUH) is also reported to have said, “If you receive from the people because of your position, it is bribery. Would you get it if you were not holding that position, or if you stayed in your father’s house?”

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These Hadith provide us with a strict definition of bribery and corruption in Islam. Gifts can be considered as bribery if they are meant to oblige us to abuse our position or power. However, if it is customary for those in power to receive gifts because of the respect, love and services that they have rendered to the people, then of course, it cannot be regarded as bribery. We know that the noble prophet (PBUH) himself used to accept gifts in various forms from heads of states in his time. He also used to give similar gifts to others. This is surely not bribery because it is customary to do so. Moreover, such gifts are often given out of love and respect for the person. On the strength of the divine guidance on corruption, Muslims are advised to live between Kwaf (fear) and Rajaa (hope). This means fear of Allah the Almighty and hope of his bounty and providence. Muslims should be contented with what they have. Islamic ethics, which give no room for a confirmed liar, hypocrite or criminal to be entrusted with any political power or give testimony in a court of law, should be adopted in this country (Sulaiman 2017:518).

Conclusion It is clear that corruption in Nigeria is the bane of good governance. Corruption remains endemic, pervasive and systemic in virtually all areas of our public and corporate life. Its consequences continue to be devastating for the nation, as it is destroying the polity religiously, economically, politically, socially, morally, culturally, educationally and psychologically, resulting in unjustifiable under-development all round. It is pertinent to understand that living in accordance with the laws of Allah brings peace, harmony and stability to the individual, no matter what his circumstances may be. For human society, then, adherence to these principles has the effect of transforming people from self-seeking greedy, proud, unjust and dishonest individuals into a community of brothers and sisters living together in mutual respect. Harmony, cooperation and consideration of one another’s welfare, cooperation rather than conflict, and mutual consultation rather than domination are the grounding principles of Islam in social, economic and political affairs, and we can see a clear example of these ideals in the way of life of the prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and his companions.

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References Ali, M. U. 2002. “Islam and Corruption” A service paper submitted to Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC) Jaji Kaduna State. Badawi, A. 1976. “Islamic Teachings,” In: I. N. Cowa, The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Writer Arabic. 3rd Ed. Halifax: Islamic Information Foundation, Albam 4. Bukhari, I. M. 2015. “Translation and Commentaries of Sahih al-Bukhari” Kasuwan Kurmi, Kano, Nigeria. Doig, A. and Theobald, R. (eds). 2002. Corruption and Democratization. London: Frank Cass. Dugbazah, J. 2009. “The Relationships between values, religious teaching and development concepts and practices: A preliminary literature review.” University of Birmingham. Ibn Kathir. 200. “Tafsir Ibn Kathir” 1, Sheykh Shafi’ur Rahman AlMubarak Puri et al. (trans.). Riyadh: Darussalam, 133. Print. Islamail, M.B. n.d. “Sahih al-Bukhari 9.89 Hadith Number 286. Beirut: Dar Al-Arabiya. Isma’il, Y. 2014. “Corruption, political culture and democratization in Nigeria.” In B. Ahmed et al. (eds) Issues on Nigeria Peoples and Culture. Zaria: ABU Press. Khan, A., Tahmazov, I. and Abuarqub, M. “Translating Faith in to Development.” Available at http://www.islamicrelief.com/indepth.2009 (accessed 20 June 2015). Koko, K. M. 2017. “Corruption in the Education Sector in Nigeria: Challenges and Solutions.” Paper presented at the 1st International Conference, Faculty of Arts Nasarawa State University Keffi. Liman, S. H. 2018. “The Role of Muslim Women in Curbing Corruption in Nigeria.” NATAIS Journal vol. 21. Lipset, P. C. and Lenz, K. 1999. “Corruption Among the Youth in Nigeria” A service Paper submitted to the National Defence College (NDC) Abuja. Myint, U. 2000). “Corruption: Causes, Consequences and Cures.” Asia Pacific Development Journal, 7(2):35. Odunuga, S. (2000) “The impact of Corruption and Organised Crime.” Asia Pacific Development Journal, 7(2):55. Print. Obuah, E., (2010) “Combating Corruption in a Failed State at The Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)”. Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 12(1). Shah, A. 2012. Corruption: A third World Perspective. Lahore: Aziz Publications.

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Sulaiman, A. A. 2017. “Corruption and Corruption Control from Islamic Discourse: Nigeria in Focus.” In the proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Humanities and the Burden of Governance in Africa. Faculty of Arts, NSUK. Surty, M. 2007. Islam, the Qur’an Overview. UK, QAF: Qur’anic Arabic Foundation. Uzochukwu, P. P. 2005. Challenges of Corruption in Nigeria. Piambco Prints, Abuja.

CHAPTER 14 A CHRISTIAN THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON COMBATING CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA SUNDAY BOBAI AGANG (PROFESSOR OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS, THEOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY, ECWA THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, KAGORO, NIGERIA; ASSOCIATE RESEARCH FELLOW IN SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY AND ECCLESIOLOGY, FACULTY OF THEOLOGY, STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY, SOUTH AFRICA)

Abstract The problem of corruption is multifaceted. Can Christian theology enhance our understanding of corruption and how to heal it? This is the question that this chapter seeks to address. By so doing, the chapter seeks to fill an important gap in corruption discourse in Africa: the theological perspective. In sub-Saharan Africa, religion and corruption simultaneously grow together. This paradoxical scenario calls for a theological reflection that can help us ascertain why this is the case. For religion is often believed to instil moral character and moral vision, which creates not only the fear of God that enables humans to do what is right and hate all forms of evil, but also enables religious adherents to develop, grow and nurture virtues of character, such as love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, faithfulness, justice, honesty, respect for human dignity, compassion, selflessness and selfcontrol. Thus, this chapter is primarily concerned with why, in spite of the phenomenal growth of Christianity and Islam across Africa, corruption is still able to keep on ruining the continent and its inhabitants. The key issue, therefore, is what and how Christian theological reflection can contribute to the efforts toward naming and possibly dislodging corruption in Nigeria’s socioeconomic, socioreligious and sociopolitical life, so as to enable the eventual realization of the human quest for a humane society – one which is characterised by a robust and sustainable political economy as well as

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moral development and transformation. To reach this goal, the chapter attempts to analyse Nigerians’ conception of corruption by considering the nature and scope of corruption and its theological definition. It offers a theological reflection on the origin of human corruption and provides a biblical perspective on why the anti-corruption battle in Africa is a necessity; and then briefly concludes. Keywords: corruption; theology; religion; morality; ethics; democracy; economy; war; violence; policy

Introduction No one can doubt the existence of corruption and impunity in Nigeria. One of the key indicators is the fact that there is violence everywhere – one kidnapping after another, one murder after another and so on. That is why our country is in mourning mode and the masses are wasting away. One of the problems is that corruption is not only associated with the elites’ pursuit of wealth and prosperity to the detriment of the poor, but also with its attendant consequences – conflict and insecurity. One of the common problems our leaders and the people they lead share is that they all crave material wealth. This approach to life has made our leaders and us, the people, foolish to the extent that, despite our traditional culture of shame and honour, elected leaders and those who support them are no longer concerned with honour. Rather their attitude and behaviour clearly shows that they love shame more than honour. This is why they have become thieves of public resources. If they were concerned about honour, they would not engage in corrupt practices. Thus, to infuse a new consciousness in both our leaders and the citizens of Nigeria, this chapter primarily seeks to stimulate us to think not only scientifically, but also theologically about the matter of corruption in Nigeria. It engages us in a search for God’s purpose and direction so that we will have a robust and purposeful engagement with the root causes of corruption and the possible solutions to it.

The nature and scope of corruption Corruption is like a mountain of moral evil and sin. To win the fight against it is not a simple task. Therefore, anti-corruption campaigns achieve success not only through what can be achieved by human strength – legal force, military might or political power – but by God’s Spirit and empowerment (see Zechariah 4:6).

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It has been repeatedly shown that corruption benefits the few and harms the many. Corruption is indeed what the African American social and political critique, Cornel West called “The night side of our undeniable human darkness – the persistence of power, greed, conflict and coercion beneath the surface of order; the fury of self-righteousness; the apathy of despair; and the need for a genuine hope” (cited in Niebuhr 2013:xi). Corruption is gradually bringing Nigeria to the brink of “a barbaric century of genocide, total war, fascisms, totalitarians, and institutionalised hatreds on a global scale” (Ibid.). This is because the few that benefit from corruption do not want their corrupt mindset to be transformed. So, whenever there is an effort toward reforming the structures that feed corruption, the powerful few resist it. In other words, we need to recognise that combating corruption is a possibility, but it is not a simple task, as is a social, spiritual and moral matter. Based on the Genesis account of the Fall of Man (Adam and Eve), corruption is rooted in our human sinful nature (Genesis 3:1–24). Thus, Nigeria, as a nation, is dealing with several correlated and integrated critical issues today: agitation for restructuring, IPOB secession agitation, cybercrimes, human trafficking and baby factories, secret societies and cultism, climate change and environmental degradation, the collapse of buildings, looted public funds, the Boko Haram insurgency and other forms of terrorism, hate speech, clashes between herders and farmers, the Ruga settlement crisis, fake drugs, the selling and consumption of narcotics, miracle centres, kidnapping and so on. For theology to be relevant and helpful, not only to the church but also to society, it must address these issues. But they cannot be addressed in a single chapter. Thus, in this chapter I seek to situate the ongoing discourse on the phenomenon of corruption within the confines of Christian theology, ethics and morality. The reason is that our Christian worldviews, values, virtues (character) and beliefs “based on God’s character and nature, form the basis for our Christian social and moral vision. The goal of our moral vision as Christians is to transform the moral values and lives of people in our societies to reflect the divine will” (Nkansah-Obrempong 2013:6). We need this moral vision to be able to overturn some of the inherent assumptions that are destroying and ruining our country and continent. To do that we need to grasp what corruption is.

The definition of theology and corruption The term theology comes from the Greek theologia (theos = god and logia = study) meaning “an account of the gods” or “one discoursing on the

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gods” (https://www.etymonline.com). Thus, generally speaking, theologians define theology as the study of God. As this paper focuses on a theological reflection on corruption, it argues that theology is more than just the study of God. Rather, the definition should include the idea of studying how God interacts with his creation, the human race and the non-human race. Over the years, scholars have defined the term “corruption” in various ways. By and large, people are in a hurry to talk about the devastating effects of corruption and the solutions to it rather than carefully delineating its definition. In 2015, President Mohammadu Buhari declared that “Corruption is endemic, Nigerians must kill corruption or else corruption will kill Nigeria”. Yet, as far as I know, nobody has cared to ask what he meant by corruption. In other words, do the executive, legislators, the judiciary, military, para-military and ordinary Nigerians really understood what he meant by corruption? Do they, for instance, think that Boko Haram, Killer Fulani herdsmen, kidnappers, unemployment, human trafficking, environmental degradation and so on are associated with the widespread corruption in the country? I am not sure they do. If they did, we could have succeeded in killing corruption four years into the Buhari administration (2015-2019). The fact that corruption still holds sway in Nigeria means that our conception or perception of what corruption is remains profoundly fuzzy. This begs the question: when our intellectuals or the biblical and Christian theologians and ethicists talk about corruption, what do they have in mind and does it match what our ordinary Africans and politicians think? Invariably, Africans, particularly Nigerians, tend to talk about corruption in an abstract manner, which reveals a particular problem: they do not grasp the fact that corruption is rooted in our human nature and that its sinful tendencies seek to gratify the lust of the flesh: selfishness, nepotism, greed, self-interest, the will-to-power and so on. They do not see it in the terms defined by the acclaimed Anglican theologian, biblical expositor and social critic John Stott. He situates corruption within the capacity of each one of us to do two paradoxical things. Although we are capable of doing tremendous good, we are also equally capable of doing tremendous evil (Stott 1996:12). Corruption is the negative side of human capacity. It is an unclean spirit that inhibits the human mind to the extent that all those (whether elites or ordinary citizens) who allow it to control them are not truly in their right mind. The unclean spirit of corruption and possession hampers their moral and logical sense of reasoning. For example, in his article, “The root cause of corruption in Nigeria”, Col. Noel D. Nyam

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observes that “Corruption has without doubt become systemic in Nigeria.” To Nyam, corruption is a problem of the elites. He states, The political-economic system has been so soaked in the blood of graft that even the social and cultural ways of many powerful Nigerians in the corridors of power have indeed become the ironic role models of bent officials. They have been the culprits that have led us into the deep end of corruption which the average citizenry finds him or herself. [Consequently] every facet of Nigerian public and private institutions has become compromised. (Nigerian Tribune, 21 October 2017)

Such analysis or definition is very unhelpful. It does not offer a comprehensive grasp of the problem of corruption. Mike Uzochukwu displays a similar sentiment. He defines corruption as “dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those in power, typically involving bribery”. According to him, corruption refers to the giving of a bribe to an official so that the truth will not be told. It also includes the embezzlement of public funds for personal use and any act which is considered to be criminal according to the law of a particular society (2017). The point here is that we fail to realise that corruption is not just the sin of those in leadership or the sin that the rich commit, it is the sin of all of us – the rich, the poor, the leaders and the led. It is this failure to grasp the all-embracing meaning of corruption that is responsible for the lack of headway made by evangelical Christian theology in Africa, and particularly in Nigeria, in contributing positively to the fight against corruption. Alex Cuffy (2010) defines corruption more broadly by identifying two nuances or senses. Regarding the first, he states that “Corruption is the act of impairing integrity, virtue, or moral principle.” He further observes that in Liberia, “Corruption appears to have permeated every fabric of the society to the extent that our minds, attitudes and the way we do things appear entangled in corruption. There is corruption in the homes, communities, churches, and schools.” Regarding its second form, he asserts that “Corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain. This includes embezzlement, nepotism, bribery, extortion, influence peddling, and fraud”. Although Cuffy’s definition gives a bigger picture, it is not quite clear whether or not he grasps the biblical view of corruption. Rob Bellingham (2000) identifies three evils that make it necessary for Christian theology to be extremely concerned about corruption and to go beyond just talking about it to proffering concrete solutions on how to

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actually dislodge it from any institution or system in which it is discovered. He points out the following concerns: First, corruption serves the interests of the rich and powerful and disadvantages the poor for whom the Bible has a special concern. Second, it breeds inefficiency. Where services are only rendered after the payment of bribes or business can only be transacted with “under the table” payments, time is wasted, bureaucracies proliferate, and costs escalate. Third, money gained by corrupt means is not taxed, is often spent on ostentatious luxury items, may finance criminal activities, or may be diverted into foreign bank accounts. The proceeds of corruption seldom serve national interests or the social good and often work directly against them. (Bellingham, cited in Moreau 2000:233)

He further observes that the Bible contains ten Hebrew words and one Greek word and their derivatives in eighty references to describe corruption. Some refer specifically to decay of the body, usually after death, others refer to breaking of God’s Law (Nehemiah 1:7) and lack of social morality. In Genesis 6:11, 12, God sends the flood because, from his viewpoint, all were corrupt or corrupted. In the Sermon on the Mount Jesus asserts that on earth “a corrupt tree (person) cannot produce good fruit” and “moth and rust corrupt earthly treasures” (Matthew 6:19, 43) and promises a time and a kingdom, inaugurated by the resurrection, when there will be no more corruption of any kind. (Matthew 6:20, 1 Cor. 15:53-54). (Bellingham, cited in Moreau 2000:233)

An etymological definition of these biblical terms may help us get a better sense of what corruption entails in the context of the bible. The Hebrew words mishchath, mashchath, mashchith, and their Greek equivalents, phthora, and diphtheria, with numerous derivatives and cognate verbs, imply primarily physical degeneration and decay (John 17:14; Acts 2:27, etc.). The term shachath, which the King James Version translates as “corruption” in Jonah 2:6, ought to be rendered “pit,” as in Psalms 30:9; 35:7. Shachath in Isaiah 38:17 means “the pit of nothingness,” that is, of destruction. As a verb, to corrupt means to change from good to bad, physically or morally (Eccl. 7:7; 1 Cor. 15:33; Titus 1:15; James 1:27), while corruption as a noun means the impairment of integrity, virtue or moral principle; depravity or decay (2 Pet. 1:4, 2:19) (Orr 1915). So it is hard to know what someone means when they are talking about corruption. It seems that when the Buhari administration and many

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Nigerians talk about corruption, their idea of it is limited to dishonesty. This is where Christian theology needs to contribute to the discourse and take it beyond its present usage. In this chapter, I use the term to mean corruption of the human heart – characterised by an egocentric mindset. The quest for fulfilment and the preservation of satisfaction leads us to act in our own selfinterest, in pursuit of not only human needs but also endless human wants. Corruption illustrates how the battle in the human heart goes beyond human needs to include greed and wants. Every human society then suffers from the egocentric attitudes of its citizens, which are characterised by selfinterest, the desire for power and a tremendous obsession with material wealth (Niebuhr 2013:1). Therefore, Jesus tells us that corruption is not from outside us. As a matter of fact, “What comes out of a man [or woman] is what makes him ‘unclean’. For from within, out of men’s hearts, come evil thoughts, sexual immorality, theft, murder, adultery, greed, malice, deceit, lewdness, envy, slander, arrogance and folly. All these evils come from inside and make a man [or woman] ‘unclean’ [corrupt]” (Mark 7:20– 1). As we reflect on the meaning of corruption, we need to deal with the question of who decides what corruption is all about. In other words, one of the theological issues we are dealing with is the question of who determines what morality is and the definition of corruption? This is an issue because there is something profoundly wrong with our thoughts, particularly with the way we see ourselves and the world. Rob Harrison has noted that “Many of our assumptions twist and slant the truth, convincing us that they are the truth. Even though they directly oppose the Bible, we find difficulty in convincing ourselves that they are wrong” (www.rome4christ.com 5 October 2017). Whoever decides morality determines the definition of corruption. Corruption is when the truth is twisted, slanted, distorted and/or eclipsed. Corruption has remained evasive because, as Yusufu Turaki observes, “Truth is a scarce commodity in both our private and national life” (2017). Similarly, Rob Harrison notes that “Times change. New customs evolve. Standards of morality change. Society accepts behaviour today that it would not tolerate yesterday. Yet, society does not determine acceptable behaviour. God does!” Prophet Jeremiah confessed a profound truth when he says, “O Lord, I know the way of man is not in himself; it is not in man who walks to direct his own steps” (Jeremiah 10:23). These statements stress the significance of Christian theology in the context of socioeconomic,

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sociopolitical and socioreligious corruption. Whatever we do, if it is not rooted in a godly character we can be sure that it will not change Nigerians: A godly character can only be sustained by a disciplined moral lifestyle. Training in righteousness and in moral discipline produces a moral and disciplined lifestyle (2 Tim.3:16-17). The key ingredient of all humans’ behaviour and practice is their moral character. The moral decay of nations, peoples, or social institutions is usually as a result of their ungodly and wicked beliefs, behaviours and practices. (Turaki 2017)

In summary, God determines what corruption entails.

God: The ground of being and a theological reflection on the origin of human corruption Some theologians refer to God as the ground of being. As we have pointed out in the section on the definition of theology, God interacts with his creation and creatures, particularly the human race. Thus, if God is interacting with his creation, in what way is he doing so in our African society? It is grasping this idea of God’s involvement in human and nature’s affairs that saves us the trouble of worrying about our livelihood to the extent of being fundamentally undermined by fear. Such fear tends to compel us to pursue and to be particularly concerned with the satisfaction of our human “self-interest and the will-to-power,” a general and leading cause of the human disposition toward greed and self-centredness. In Satan’s encounter in serpent form with our first great grandmother, Eve, the idea of corruption was introduced and birthed: “[A]nd you will be like God…”! (Genesis 3:5b GSB). To be like God here means to be able to do everything humanly possible, unhindered, with utter autonomy. It means to overcome all scarcity, all impediments, all human limitations, to be free of all natural and human tragedies and calamities. That is the false hope of experiencing what one can call “the mother of all freedoms”: lacking nothing at all in terms of security, ability, strength, power and authority. Human beings often want a situation whereby they can do and undo. They want to achieve all the desires of their heart without any hindrance and without any reference to another transcendent being. This is the assumption that still colours many of our interactions and relationships in this world. As a matter of fact, it is the quest to be like God that pushes humans to disregard God in their relationship with each other, with wealth and with the material world, especially money. No wonder, in the world and in Christian circles, there is tremendous value placed on money in human transactions, to the

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extent that money has overshadowed “God’s incomparably great power that is at work in us” (Ephesians 1:19–20). Believing Satan’s biggest lie – “And you will be like God” - has caused us to not only eclipse, but to reduce human relationships, dignity and integrity to mere monetary value. In the Garden of Eden, Satan presented the fruit of “the tree of the knowledge of good and evil” as something capable of transforming humanity’s so-called “lower status” to a transcendent status: that of God. Today, he has successfully presented money and its promise of material wealth as the thing that is capable of enabling us to achieve the goal of becoming like God. Although Adam and Eve later discovered that the serpent’s promises were not true and that the tree’s fruit instead brought them shame, dishonour and death, we, their descendants, still continue to believe Satan’s lie. We assume that if we can acquire or accumulate a certain amount of wealth, we will be able to live comfortably like God the rest of our lives. We will experience the promised paradise, where there will be no more tears, no more death, no more mourning, no more pain and no more ageing (Rev. 21:4). In other words, with money, science and technology we can remake our own world. Both leaders and the led get trapped in this human drama. In sum, corruption reveals something that is beyond the commonly acceptable explanation of it: humanity’s preoccupation with itself. This has affected our consciousness such that we no longer realise that we come from God, exist by his power and that he intends us for his glory. Today we (Christians) have no reason to continue to believe Satan’s lie. Jesus reveals God as unequivocally good and not evil. He is not indifferent, but friendly to humans. Jesus calls him good and merciful. As Hans Küng observes, These qualities do not play any part as objective predicates. They are qualities of his activity for man and the world: they make God what he is, not intrinsically or independently, but for man and world, they explain how he acts on man and world. They are predicates, not of a being “in itself,” but of his relationship to us. It is only in God’s acts that his actuality is revealed: in action on man and world, so that to speak of God we must speak simultaneously of man. For Jesus God does not merely act in a “supernatural” sphere, but rules in the midst of the world and provides for the great and small world of man. God’s care thus renders superfluous man’s anxious preoccupation with himself. (Küng1976:303–304)

From Kung’s explanation above, we can safely say that Christian theology heals our blindness to the true source of human dignity and honour. For instance, Jesus makes two profound statements that are precursors to

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the centrality of human dignity and honour: “Man does not live by food alone, but by every word that proceeds out of the mouth of God” (Matt. 4:4) and “Man is not made for the Sabbath, but the Sabbath for man” (Mark 2:27). These two profound statements from Jesus imply that human existence does not depend on the amount of wealth a person possesses. Rather, human life depends on fidelity and obedience to the will and purpose of the Creator. That is, our obedience to God’s revealed will and purpose is what gives us (humans) true meaning in life, a future with hope, and true joy in this life. Equally true is the fact that humans were not created for (or to be enslaved by) material resources such as financial wealth. Rather, material or financial possessions are meant to be at the service of humans. In other words, money and power are meant to serve us, not us to serve them. Today, however, corruption has turned the tables on this: it now appears as if humans were made for financial and material wealth. No, we are not made for financial and material wealth – material and financial wealth are made for us. We have no reason to allow anything in this world – money, power, prestige and so on – to enslave us. To escape this enslavement, we need to grasp how Nigerians’ devotion to money and power has eclipsed their religiosity, morality, ethics and theology. To this end, taking a theological perspective on corruption in Nigeria provides a helpful framework for grasping a bigger picture than the narrow and unhelpful one we are often presented with. A one-sided view of corruption will not allow Nigerians to realise that since the Fall of Adam and Eve, the planet earth and all there is in it has been corrupted, disfigured, distorted and depraved. Therefore, in this chapter we argue that corruption is not what some people do, rather it is who we are.

Biblical and theological perspectives on the fight against corruption Biblical theology gives us the history of the human moral condition before and after the Fall of Adam and Eve (Genesis 3). Prior to the Fall, man and woman had the capacity to consider the interests of others before themselves. Although even after the Fall they still are capable to doing so, the introduction of an evil nature into humanity has tended to undermine that capacity. The American theologian, social and political analyst, Reinhold Niebuhr, asserts that “Individual men may be moral in the sense that they are able to consider interests other than their own in determining

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problems of conduct and are capable, on occasion, of preferring the advantages of others to their own.” They can do so because, They are endowed by nature with a measure of sympathy and consideration for their kind, the breadth of which may be extended by an astute social pedagogy. Their rational faculty prompts them to a sense of justice which educational discipline may refine and purge of egoistic elements and they are able to view a social situation, in which their own interests are involved, with a fair measure of objectivity. (Niebuhr 2013:xxix)

Niebuhr succinctly places his finger on what the Bible means by human depravity, the consequences of which have affected our relationships in terms of our interests and those of others. We are using corruption in the context of a situation in which we allow our self-interests to possess us to the extent that we no longer give priority to the interests of others: God’s interests or the interests of our fellow humans. We have observed in the section on the definition of corruption that the hardest part of any discourse on any subject is clarity and precision. Its epistemological definition needs to be grasped if we want to do justice to the task of unravelling its meaning and its universal power. For instance, despite the emphasis placed by Mohammadu Buhari’s administration on fighting corruption, it is possible that the Nigerian people may not be well informed about the theological and biblical meaning of corruption. To participate in this process, which is aimed at changing the narrative of the Nigerian people, it is worthwhile to submit the discourse on corruption to theological scrutiny. In Zechariah 4:6, God told Zerubbabel that he will not be able to remove an obstacle which stands before him by physical or intellectual might or power, but by God’s Spirit alone. Technically, the fruit of the Spirit is a biblical term that sums up nine divine attributes: love, joy, peace, patience, kindness (compassion), goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control. In other words, the fruit of the Spirit is God’s divine will at work in humans that is rooted in God’s Agape (love), which produces and causes joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control to be evident both in our private and public interactions and in horizontal and vertical relationships (Galatians 5:22–23). The fruit of the Spirit is God’s special and common grace that enables humans to transcend their selfinterest and think of the interests of their fellow brothers and sisters. This means for any anti-corruption campaign to yield lasting improvements, it

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needs to take into account these nine attributes and their implications for human society. Any human society that has been overrun by corruption manifests signs of decaying moral virtues, in which the nine godly attributes play a central role. As Olusola Igabri observes, The New Testament portrays corruption as something that affects every aspect of the personality (Eph. 4:22; II Peter 1:4). Corruption is expressed in the mind and consciousness (1 Tim. 6:5, Titus 1:15) and also in character (1 Cor. 15:33). The New Testament affirms that only true righteousness and holiness of God can give solution to corruption. (Igabri 2016)

Corruption is not just a violation of God’s moral law, but also violation of democratic principles (Bellingham 2000:233). Thus, Jesus and his apostles preached and taught as people who believe in the possibility of eradicating corruption in human affairs. God, the Creator, created humans in his image and likeness and thereafter declared man and woman to be “very good” (Genesis 1:27, 31). Hence, Jesus and the Apostles knew that we are not only capable of doing tremendous evil, but that we are also capable of doing enormous good. That is why Nigerian theologians and scholars need to approach corruption discourse in such way that it enables us to actually give people the hope that it is possible to overcome the challenge of corruption in this life and to live for God’s renown, joy, praise and honour.

Why is there an anti-corruption battle in Africa? Africa is at war. This war is not a conventional war where weapons of mass destruction are deployed to fight the enemy. The enemy that is waging war against Africa on all fronts is corruption. Throughout the colonial, postcolonial and neocolonial eras, every single country in Africa has been eaten from within by this salient and subtle enemy. We have corrupt religious institutions (mosques, churches) and corrupt societies (civilian, military, paramilitary, politicians and traditional rulers). Corruption has taken over all levels of our societies, high and low. The fact that corruption is so widespread means that there is nowhere to run. It is possible to escape one form of corruption but still be guilty of another form. Corruption has continued to spread its tentacles to every sphere and stratum of African society. Corruption has caused the tactics of war to change. Instead of using conventional weapons of mass destruction, our executive, legislative and judicial bodies have been penetrated, along with

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the military, paramilitary, parliament, civil bodies and government institutions, as well as private businesses. Consequently, corruption is poisoning every institution (religious, political, social, intellectual, economical and so on) and governmental system. Today, corruption has turned justice to poison. The fight against corruption has not been sincere. Many of our elites are the agents of the devil. They worship money instead of God. The social class that is fighting corruption is at the same level as the people involved in corruption. Policymakers make policies that will protect their own individual interests instead of the national interest, or policies they know they are never going to ever implement. In this way, they engage in a cynical game of deception.

Hope for people or a country riddled with corruption God’s door – of confession, repentance, forgiveness, and restoration – stands open (Revelation 4:1). First, the restoration of those who have been convicted of the sin of corruptly enriching themselves to the detriment of the masses demands self-confession and repentance. Since humans are capable of doing tremendous good and not only tremendous evil, such people should be encouraged to repent and be assured of God’s and society’s forgiveness and embrace (1 John 1:8–10). Second, to kill corruption in any African country, we can learn from what South Korea did three decades ago when its political and religious leaders discovered that corruption was rife. South Korea is where it is today because when its leaders realised that corruption was their biggest enemy, they decided to fight it to a standstill so that their citizens could be free to fully grow and nurture an economy that would allow every citizen to participate in the global economic market as a dignified human being. To bring reform and transformation, South Korea learned from Singapore and Hong Kong in important ways. First, its leaders realised that democratization would provide checks and balances to power, a lack of which leads to corruption. Second, the government understood that providing these checks and balances would require significant resources. And third, its leaders saw that for democratic accountability to succeed, there must be a strong political will to implement it with rigour. South Korea’s leaders – both temporal and spiritual – in every sphere of society embraced this approach. Today, the country is a global economic player and a viable economic hub in the global community (Quah 2004).

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For Nigeria or any African country to successfully tackle corruption, its leaders need to realise that the anti-graft wars across the global community are not just a political rhetoric, but also a matter of deep theological concern. For, since the Fall of our parents, Adam and Eve, corruption has been the major problem and concern of God and all human societies across the centuries. Almost every social ill is linked to this sin. Rebellion, violence and injustice towards our fellow human beings is rooted in corruption. It was the primary reason that led God, in His wrath, to almost destroy the human race with a flood (Genesis 6). To heal Nigeria of endemic corruption requires attitudinal change – infusing a new consciousness. As things stand today, the few elites who are the beneficiaries of corruption do not accept that corruption is destructive. “They do not suffer enough from social [economic] injustice to recognise its peril to the life of society” (Niebuhr 2013:165). That is, corruption is caused by a wrong perception of what a good life entails, leading to obsession with the desire to accumulate wealth for oneself only. We know this is a wrong perception because the Scriptures give us a different narrative, an alternative moral mindset: that a good life is a life spent following and serving God and his people with love, contentment, justice and compassion. This implies a life lived for God’s renown, joy, praise and honour. That is what Jesus alluded to when he said, “Seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness” (Matthew 6:33). However, the reality before us is that Christian theology in Africa is facing the challenge of human beings’ abuse of their God-given moral agency. God created humans with the capacity to choose. The ability to choose has made us both capable to choose to do tremendous good or to choose to do tremendous evil. For instance, whenever, fail to allow love, compassion and justice to guide our human choices, we will lack compassion and thereby become those who steal, kill and destroy their fellow human beings. Indeed, love, compassion, justice and so on are attributes of God that humans can exhibit because humanity is created in the image of God, to be like God. Theologically, the entire creation is rooted in God’s love, compassion, mercy, and justice. It is the transcendent vision that, if grasped, can enable any human being to escape the base instincts of the human race: the impure spirit of selfishness, self-interest, the will-to-dominate others, devotion to greed and obsession with material wealth. This spirit often controls the public and cooperative sector of the productive economy of our societies.

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Conclusion Corruption can be seen as a person’s choice to use the dark side of his/her capacity as if that is all there is. However, the Christian theological perspective provides a liberating framework which helps us to realise the paradox of human history: all human beings – Christians and non-Christians – are capable of doing both tremendous good and tremendous evil (Stott 1996:12). To infuse a new and transformational consciousness, Christian theology needs to help us to avoid believing Satan’s lie: that materialism has the last word. In reality, it does not. Only God’s truth has the last word. Therefore, to heal our country of its slavery to corruption, Christian theology needs to point us to a form of wellbeing which is not rooted in what we possess but solely in love, fidelity, justice, compassion, endurance and gentleness, whose fruit is rooted in love and characterised by joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, humility and self-control. Corruption illustrates Nigeria’s elites’ and citizens’ utter devotion to the god of money – materialism (Wallis 2005:212). Both Christians and nonChristians claim to be godly, but their private and public ethics and morality indict them. Attitudinal change is the sure way to overcoming our country’s and continent’s biggest enemy: corruption!

References Ayittey, George B. N. 1998. Africa in Chaos. New York: St Martin’s Griffin. Ayittey, George B. N. 2005. Africa Unchained: The Blueprint for Africa’s Future. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Bennett, John (ed.). 1966. Christian Social Ethics in a Changing World: An Ecumenical Theological Inquiry. New York: SCM Press. Coetzer, W. and Snell, L. E. 2013. “A Practical-theological perspective on corruption: towards a solution-based approach in practice” in Acta Theological, 33:1–14. ISSN 2309-9089. Corruzione, Lotta. 2006. “The Fight Against Corruption” in Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, held in the Vatican on 23 June. Accessed 10 March 2019 www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents /rc_pc_justicepeace_doc_20060921_lotta-corruzione_en/. Cuffy, Alex. 2010. “Corruption in Liberia”. Accessed 10 February 2019, http://www.theliberainjournal.com/index.php?st=details&rid-1443/.

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Igabri, Olusola. 2016. “Poverty and Corruption in the New Testament Perspective.” Open Access Library Journal 3(8):110. Accessed 19 January 2019 http://www.oalib.com/articles/5272053/. Jones, Charles O. 2009. “Corrupt Practices” in The World Book Encyclopaedia. Chicago: World Book. Johnston, Michael. 2005. Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kung, Hans. 1976. On Being a Christian, translated by Edward Quinn. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, INC. Iwuji C. Paulinus, 2007. Beyond Africa’s Democratic Experiment: An Odyssey Towards Inclusive and More Humanised World. Milton Keynes, UK: Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse. Morau, Scott (Gen.) (ed.). 2000. Evangelical Dictionary of World Missions. Grand Rapids: Baker Books. Ouah, Danny, 2004. Flat World, Big Gaps: Economic Liberation, Globalisation and Inequality. n.p.c. Zed Books. Ogun, Bayo. 2007. Corruption in Black Africa. Lagos, Nigeria: The Guardian Press. Orr, James (Gen.) (ed.). 1915. “Corruption,” entry in International Standard Bible Encyclopaedia. Accessed 20 May 2019 from www.biblestudytools.com. Niebuhr, Reinhold, 2013. Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics. Louisville, Kentucky: John Knox Press. Nyam Noel (Col.). 2017. “Root Causes of Corruption” in Nigerian Tribune, 21 October 2017. Accessed at http://www.tribuneonlineng.com/rootcause-corruption-nigeria/ on 19 October 2019. Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1999. Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smit J., Hansen, D. and Hansen, L. (eds). 2015. Hermeneutics and Social Transformation: A Selection from the Essay of Bernard Lateran. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Beyers Naude Centre Series on Public Theology. Turaki, Yusufu. 2012. The Trinity of Sin: Self-centredness, Pride, Greed, Lust, Anxiety and Fear. Nairobi, Kenya: HippoBooks. Turaki, Yusufu. 2017, “Independence Day Message” at the National Ecumenical Centre, Abuja, Nigeria, 10 October. Uzochukwu, Mike, 2017, “Corruption in Nigeria: Review, Causes, Effects and Solutions” Soap Boxie, 2 April pp.1–11. Accessed 20 March 2019, http//:soapboxie.com/world-politics/Corruption-In-Nigeria/.

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Wallis, Jim, 2005. God’s Politics: Why the Right Gets It Wrong and the Left Doesn’t Get It: A New Vision for Faith and Politics in America. New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers.

PART 6

CHAPTER 15 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIPS AND THE CHALLENGE OF COMBATING CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA KELECHI C. IWUAMADI (INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA ENUGU CAMPUS)

AND ROWLAND C. OKOLI (DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, GODFREY OKOYE UNIVERSITY, ENUGU)

Abstract Extant reviews of global partnerships targeted at combating corruption in sub-Saharan Africa suggest that recipient countries depend on international development partners for anti-corruption prescriptions that are donor driven regardless of the political economy context of the country. The phenomenon of globalisation has made the global war against corruption intractable despite the proliferation of international frameworks and, more importantly, the huge support from international development partners in the fight against corruption. In this context, why have global partnerships on anti-corruption failed to effectively combat corruption in Nigeria? This Chapter relies on a variety of secondary sources for documentary evidence and data, which were descriptively analysed. The chapter adopts a Marxian political economy-centred approach to underpin the context of global corruption and anti-corruption reforms in Nigeria occasioned by global partnerships. The study argues that despite the proliferation of global anticorruption frameworks and partnerships against corruption, countries like Nigeria still face an existential crisis arising from endemic corruption within its political economy. There have been several efforts by successive governments and development partners in Nigeria aimed at addressing the

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issue of corruption, yet the actions of state and non-state entities are yet to yield sustainable results. The chapter further contends that global partnerships aimed at tackling anti-corruption have failed to effectively address the problem, largely due to the fact that the giver (donor) and taker (recipient) are both primarily interested in their own survival and enrichment. To this end, the chapter concludes that international development practice has failed to address corruption in Nigeria; rather it has become masked under a façade of compliance with global anti-corruption protocols and the demands of international development partners. Keywords: Global partnership; international development; corruption; anti-corruption; political economy

Introduction Transparency International conceptualises corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Transparency International 2019). Corruption has been described as a major problem which stifles development in postcolonial African states (Economic Commission for Africa [ECA] 2010; Okonjo-Iweala 2012; Orock and Mbuagbo 2012). There is ongoing debate as to whether corruption is a cause or symptom of underdevelopment, and whether corruption as a phenomenon is an invention of the West in Africa and a metaphor employed to exclusively describe misrule in Africa (Apata 2018; Iwuamadi 2016; Khan 2019). Yet international partnerships in the fight against corruption have proliferated between Western and African countries. The extant literature on the political economy of this global interaction and its role in setting anti-corruption agendas reveals that the obvious vulnerability which confronts recipient countries is the economic conditionality of the donor approach, which may very often be misconceived or arbitrary. The international development partner’s approach in this regard has economy-wide effects on the dependent state. One problem is the effects of what is basically a qualitative measure, which leads to various interpretations of corruption. Not only is development assistance tied to measurements of the perception of corruption, it also affects the functioning of recipient governments. For example, Ivanov (2007) rightly observed that, if a state is seen as systemically corrupt, the pursuits of objectives such as decolonisation, empowerment and indigenisation, which may involve widespread wealth redistribution, are inevitably viewed as illegitimate acts of graft, punished by international investors and the international financial institutions. In short, legitimising redistributive economic policy becomes a

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problem when one’s polity and economy are seen as inevitably corrupt (Ivanov 2007:28–45). This situation apparently affects repatriation of the funds carted away to foreign countries. In light of the difficulties experienced by a number of countries in the Global South in securing repatriation of stolen funds deposited in overseas banks in the Global North, it is proposed that a solution to the problem lies in the establishment of an International Court for Economic Crimes (ICEC). This would make the prosecution of economic criminals more effective, speed up the recovery of stolen assets and deny those convicted of corruption sanctuary in foreign countries. What is clear is that powerful national-level economic criminals can become part of an internationalised system of corruption, such that the current emphasis by donors on countrybased solutions fails to adequately regulate these international networks (Okojie and Momoh 2007:117). The international development partners’ anti-corruption agenda tends to represent itself as a grassroots movement, giving a voice to ordinary people around the world who are victims of corruption. Transparency International, self-consciously styled after the international human rights movement, has long featured on its website images of protesters carrying banners against corruption. Likewise, foreign ambassadors, especially from the United States, often speak in the name of the host country’s population when they denounce corruption. In the view of former World Bank president James Wolfensohn (1996), “in country after country, it is the people who are demanding action on this issue”. This implies that anti-corruption does enjoy popular appeal, which explains why it is a tempting topic for academics, journalists and politicians. As a result, the global anti-corruption agenda struck a chord with the masses in many parts of the world, partly because of the semantic elasticity and affective load of “corruption”. However, the emergence of a Global Anticorruption Agenda (GAA) was not the work of banner-waving protesters. The origin of the GAA lies in the interests of the superpower nations, like the US, as well as multinational companies and multilateral donors, which have constituted themselves into global anti-corruption hegemonies. Over time, the universally negative connotation of the term “corruption” has helped to enlist a wider constituency with seemingly shared goals. Based on the foregoing context, this chapter contends that there are levels of atrocities within these international engagements which frustrate development and obscure the main objectives in the fight against corruption. The chapter adopts a Marxian political economy-centred approach in critically assessing and bridging the lacuna in the extant literature in terms

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of proving adequate data and empirical evidence which reveals the intricacies of international support for anti-corruption in nations like Nigeria. In addressing this, the chapter recognises international development partners’ support for national anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria, with a particular focus on the European Union (EU) as the international donor agency, the United Nations Office on Drug Control (UNODC) as the international implementing agency, and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) as the recipient national anticorruption agency.

The efficacy of international development partnerships: literature review Reports on the efficacy of international development partnerships (IDPs) for developing countries present two key explanations for their ineffectiveness at addressing the development crisis and, particularly, the orgy of corruption in developing countries. The first explanation is that IDPs orchestrated between developing countries and donor countries/agencies are ineffective because they provide an avenue for international partners to pursue their global political economy interests and implement projects which reflect their own worldview of development and anti-corruption. In line with this, Fraser (2005) argues persuasively that donor agencies collude with non-state actors, particularly civil society organizations (CSOs) operating in developing countries, to implement “development” programmes that reflect the interest of donors while undermining the sovereignty of African states in charting a self-determined path to development. Using Nigeria as a case study, Ifeka (2001) opined that the failings of IDPs involved in the fight against corruption reflect the failure of international partners – particularly the European Union, the World Bank and the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) – to fully understand the domestic political economy of Nigeria. Guided by their misconstrued view of Nigeria’s political economy, they implement anti-corruption projects that achieve little more than deploying taxpayers’ money to reward corrupt domestic leaders in the name of reforming state institutions. The second explanation advanced by existing scholarship for the ineffectiveness of IDPs is the prevalence of weak domestic structures and poor governance in developing countries. In this regard, Smith (2010) argues that elite capture of the relationship between Nigeria and IDPs creates a vicious cycle of corruption. Hence, Urtuzuastigui (2019) proposes that international partners should implement development projects through

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non-state actors, since they are usually more effective, being unburdened by the poor governance structures that undermine the capacity of state actors. While existing studies on the inefficacy of international partnerships in the fight against corruption are not necessarily wrong, they remain insufficient for understanding the underlying factors driving the proliferation of IDPs, and fail to explore how the anti-corruption agenda pursued by such partnerships shapes domestic anti-corruption campaigns in Nigeria.

Understanding international anti-corruption partnerships in Nigeria through the lens of Marxian political economy Despite international disapproval of corrupt practices, business contracts founded on graft continue to flourish, particularly in international networks linking developed and emerging countries across the globe. According to estimates by the World Bank Institute, more than $1 trillion a year is paid in bribes (Van 2004). Similarly, in 2015, the report of the High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, led by Thabo Mbeki, revealed that on average about $50 billion is lost annually in Africa as a result of corruption (AUC/ECA 2016). Corporate organisations from Europe and the US were, until recently, allowed to treat bribes in foreign countries as taxdeductible expenses, while economic criminal gangs function between jurisdictions and exploit deficiencies in regulation. In spite of the criminalisation of some economic crimes under the new United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime (Articles 15–42), its deterrent effect on economic criminals remains limited because of defects in the structure of the Convention. It maintains a distinction between mandatory and non-mandatory crimes, such that the latter can be ignored and not incorporated into domestic law, making double criminality (required for an international claim) impossible to establish (Okojie et al. 2007; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC] 2004). With increased awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption on development outcomes, strategies to fight corruption are now a top priority in policy circles around the world. In fact, the fight against corruption has become a major industry, involving major international organizations, including Transparency International (TI), the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Organization for

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Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Médard 2002; MungiuPippidi 2006). There are arguments that Marx focused mainly on capitalism and not corruption, and that corruption is under-represented in Marxist theory, but these arguments fail to understand that Marx in his early writings sees capitalism as a mode of corruption, at least in the literal sense of the term. As Turley (2012) rightly observes, the major trends in Marxist political economy set out to prove that even under the best imaginable conditions, the system does not work because corruption, while it appears phenomenally as one thing, from a Marxist perspective comprises many different practices with distinct functions. Using Marxian political economic theory, we argue that there are irregularities associated with international support to anti-corruption in Nigeria. The intrigues we observed take place at two levels – the international implementing agency (foreign development partner) and the national beneficiary (Nigeria) levels. The specific foreign development partners we focus on in this chapter are the EU and UNODC, while the national beneficiary is the EFCC. The primary reason we chose these institutions and agencies is that in 2005, the EU brought the sum of US$32.2 million to support the Government of Nigeria’s fight against economic and financial crimes by providing technical assistance to the EFCC (UNODC 2011). The implementing agency was UNODC, another international development partner. Despite spending this huge amount between 2005 and 2009, corruption remains intractable in Nigeria. We argue that this is because of the traffic of influence and problems with the process of selecting national and international beneficiaries. The Marxian perspective explains that the issue of corruption revolves around politics and economics, in which the state and IDPs are the principal actors in this case. More importantly, political economy, as explained by the League for the Fifth International (2006), is not only about the relationship between commodities, prices, supply and demand: it is first and foremost about people and the social relationships between them – about the owners of wealth and how they use it to exploit others. Within this context, the international donor (the EU) and development partners (UNODC) are the owners of wealth while Nigeria (EFCC) is the exploited recipient. Another perspective we can draw upon is the self-representation of development practice by donor governments and international financial institutions which inflate their own moral consistency and effectiveness. As

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indicated by Brown and Cloke (2005:626), international donors prefer not to talk about corruption and not to be reminded of the sanctions they once threatened to impose when other geopolitical and strategic concerns prevail. Such inconsistencies have historically served to maintain many a dictatorship, but they sit more uneasily with the current norms of neoliberalism as they are more difficult to justify transparently. Corruption may also be overlooked if it involves multinational corporations and domestic firms of the donor states (Bracking 2008:245-247) or if it highlights the more morally questionable features of the global political economy. There have been several efforts by successive governments and development partners in Nigeria aimed at addressing the issue of corruption, but the actions of state and non-state actors involved in these international partnerships have left much to be desired, with anti-graft initiatives seeming to portray the very opposite of what they proclaim in terms of achieving sustainable results. Arising from the basic propositions of Marxian political economics, this study therefore poses the following question: why have global partnerships failed to effectively combat corruption in Nigeria? To address this question, we first present the key drivers of global partnerships for combating corruption.

Key drivers of global partnerships for combating corruption The creation of global partnerships for fighting corruption is driven by the existence of many political and economic challenges connected to the transnational character of corruption. These factors include: Illicit Financial Flows: Undoubtedly, corruption fuels illicit financial flows, as evidenced by the fact that money stolen by public officials or through tax evasion by multinational companies find its way beyond the national borders via illicit means. Illicit financial flows represent a major global threat for both developed and developing countries. While they entrench poverty and undermine development in the country of origin, they also have deleterious effects in the destination countries, since such funds can be used to support other forms of criminality including people trafficking, drugs and arms smuggling, and financial sector fraud. It is estimated that Africa alone has lost over $1trillion in the past five decades and is currently losing $50 billion annually to IFFs (AU/ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 2015:13).

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Financing terrorism: The very fabric of transnational terrorism is underpinned by utilizing complex financial sources and linkages. Thus, there exists a complex relationship between transnational terrorism and transnational organised crime. Empirical evidence has shown that corrupt regimes and individuals involved in cross-border organised crime often serve as sponsors of terrorist organizations. Similarly, terrorist organizations indulge in various transnational organised criminal activities to fund their activities and conceal sources of funding. For instance, corrupt regimes in Afghanistan and Sudan have been reported to have sponsored terrorist organizations and created safe havens for figures such as Osama Bin Laden to utilise companies and banks in order to pursue global terrorist objectives (Yepes cited in Schneider and Caruso 2011). Irregular migration: The economic underdevelopment of countries in the Global South, coupled with perennial violent conflicts that has plagued many of these countries, have continued to generate a surplus of individuals seeking to migrate to other countries, usually via irregular means. Consequently, human smuggling has become a major illicit activity across the Sahel, generating more than US$100 million in illicit financial flows for West Africa year-on-year (OECD 2018). The activities of human traffickers, usually acting in collusion with corrupt border security officials in Africa, leads to the arrival of thousands of irregular migrants on the shores of Europe annually. This irregular migration has contributed to the need for partnership to address its root causes connected to corruption.

The global anti-corruption agenda and international development partnerships The adoption of a global anti-corruption agenda built around consensus on the need to fight corruption has engendered the proliferation of international partnership in the fight against corruption. Such partnerships are necessitated by the increasing globalisation of corruption and the need for global strategies and mechanisms to combat this menace. Since the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War and the spread of democracy, there has been a continuous push for inclusion of corruption on global policy agendas, especially with the emergence of Transparency International in 1993 and the launch of its Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in 1995. The adoption of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) on 15 November 2000 and its entry into force on 29 September 2003 served as a milestone in the journey towards the establishment of an international framework and partnership to combat

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corruption. Specifically, the UNTOC was adopted to address transnational organised crime arising from corrupt practices which are endemic mainly in the Global South but have serious political economy implications for the Global North. Thus, the UNTOC focused on three key areas, leading to adoption of three respective protocols: x The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Person, Especially Women and Children. This entered into force in 2003. x The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. This entered into force in 2004. x The Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition. This entered into force in 2005. The UNTOC gave impetus to the articulation of a global anti-corruption agenda through the creation of a comprehensive international protocol which focused specifically on combating corruption. Hence, in December 2000, the United Nations General Assembly, through Resolution 55/61, established an ad hoc committee for negotiation of an effective international legal instrument to combat corruption. By October 2003, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) was adopted as the first comprehensive international protocol on anti-corruption, complementing the UNTOC. The UNCAC stands as a landmark international anti-corruption protocol negotiated by and legally binding for United Nations member states. It focuses on the cross-border character of corruption and emphasises the importance of international partnerships in the fight against corruption in the public and private spheres. It aims, among other things, to reduce embezzlement and money laundering, facilitate international partnerships and offer technical assistance in combating corruption and recovering international assets. Adoption of the UNCAC and other international anti-corruption instruments catalysed the proliferation of international partnerships due to the belief that corruption can be more effective fought through global cooperation. Secondly, the emergence of the international instruments brought corruption to the front burner and proselytised anti-corruption as a global agenda which must be pursued by all countries. Thirdly, global partnership in the fight against corruption is anchored on a consensus, led by international development partners, which informs the strategies and interventions, as well as the yardsticks for measuring commitments by national governments. The various points of consensus, as set out in the UNCAC and other international protocols, include:

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Consensus on anti-corruption legal frameworks/institutions: For anticorruption to be effective, national governments must establish legal and institutional frameworks for effectively combating corruption. These legal and institutional frameworks must be consistent with the provisions of the international protocols. Specifically, Article 6 (1a and b) of the UNCAC provide that: Each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, ensure the existence of a body or bodies, as appropriate, that prevent corruption by such means as: (a) Implementing the policies referred to in article 5 of this Convention and, where appropriate, overseeing and coordinating the implementation of those policies; (b) Increasing and disseminating knowledge about the prevention of corruption.

Consensus on anti-corruption in economic sphere: Article 17 of the UNCAC provides for the criminalization of “embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official”, while Article 20 provides for the criminalization of illicit enrichment. Pursuant to the criminalization of acts of embezzlement and illicit enrichment, there is also a consensus among development partners that the proceeds of illicit enrichment should be confiscated or seized, as enshrined in Article 31 of the UNCAC. Consensus on anti-corruption in governance and the political sphere: In order to effectively combat corruption in the governance and political spheres, there is an agreement that national governments must articulate codes for public officials as contained in Articles 8 and 15 of the UNCAC. More so, the funding of political parties must be transparent and regulated by national governments. Article 7(3) of the UNCAC highlights the need for state parties to enhance transparency in the funding of political parties and candidates for elective positions in government. Consensus on civil society participation in anti-corruption: Civil society organizations have gained international recognition from development partners in the fight against corruption due to their role as watchdogs of government. To this end, the contemporary consensus on anti-corruption stresses the need for national governments to enhance the participation of civil society in a whole gamut of anti-corruption initiatives. Article 13 of the UNCAC notes the need for civil society participation in the fight against corruption and highlights measures to be taken by national governments to enhance this. Consensus on international collaboration in anti-corruption: Given, the transnational nature of corruption occasioned by the complexity of

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globalisation, international development partners agree that the fight against corruption cannot be effective without strong international collaboration among and between states, including international development partners, in the areas of extradition, technical assistance and the recovery of assets. Chapter IV of the UNCAC stresses the need for international cooperation, while chapters V and VI provide for cooperation in the areas of asset recovery and technical assistance. What is clear from the above is that corruption has emerged as a global agenda, leading to the adoption of international protocols which emphasise the need for international partnerships in the fight against it. More so, the international protocols reflect a global anti-corruption agenda anchored on a multilateral consensus on effective anti-corruption strategies and intervention mechanisms. This consensus shapes the character of international development partnerships involved in fighting corruption, particularly with regards to the relationship between international development partners (donors) and developing countries (recipients).

The global anti-corruption agenda as applied in Nigeria Apart from domestic legislation against corruption, Nigeria is a signatory to several international conventions and protocols against corruption. These include the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC) and the Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the Fight against Corruption. These conventions and protocols enjoin the signatory states to, among other things, institute specific measures to prevent corruption; criminalise corrupt practices; prosecute and punish all who indulge in acts of corruption; and seize, confiscate and return stolen national assets to the state. The conventions and protocols also contain elaborate provisions on measures that will facilitate the active participation of civil society in preventing and combating corruption. The Commonwealth Framework expressly makes the requirement of independence a prerequisite to the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions. Paragraph 21 of the Framework states that “independent anticorruption agencies such as ombudsmen, inspector-generals, and anticorruption commissions can be effective if they are genuinely free from being influenced by the executive branch of government and where there is a strong judiciary in place”. The World Bank identifies four categories of anti-corruption institution on the basis of function and the branch of government to which the institution is accountable. But it is UNCAC (2000)

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which contains the most comprehensive provisions on the requirement of independence (Economic Commission for Africa 2010). Article 6(2) of the UNCAC provides that: each state party shall grant (preventive anti-corruption body or bodies) the necessary independence, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, to enable the body or bodies to carry out its or their functions effectively and free from any undue influence. The necessary material resources and specialised staff as well as the training that such staff may require to carry out their functions should be provided.

Article 36 of the UNCAC reiterates this in relation to anti-corruption law-enforcement bodies. It states that: each state party shall in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, ensure the existence of a body or bodies or persons specialised in combating corruption through law enforcement. Such a body or bodies or persons shall be granted the necessary independence, in accordance with the fundamental principles of the legal system of the state party, to be able to carry out their functions effectively and without any undue influence. Such persons or staff of such body or bodies should have the appropriate training and resources to carry out their tasks.

Nigeria is a signatory to UNCAC. It has been domesticated through the creation of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) in 2000 and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2004. There is also the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) created under the Constitution of Nigeria in 1999 to manage the declaration of assets by public officers. Other complimentary anticorruption bodies include the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) and the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP), created in 2007, in the same year as the Nigerian Extractive Industries and Transparency Initiative (NEITI). Following from this, the EU provided support to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to the tune of €24.7 million ($32.2 million). Specific interventions aimed at strengthening the operational capacity of the agency included the provision of specialised training for staff and management, the delivery of basic operational equipment and the building of the EFCC Training and Research Institute, as well as the creation of a forensic laboratory and the mentoring of its staff (Du Plessis, Iwuamadi and Omotoso 2011).

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EU-UNODC support was meant to provide the EFCC with a state-ofthe-art IT system and to help in developing and implementing a custommade specialised database application which would include government office anti-money laundering software (goAML) and government office case management software (goCASE) used in case-management, financial intelligence analysis and donor coordination. Moreover, support was also supposed to have been provided for the development of a national anticorruption strategy; the establishment of a national network of civil society organisations advocating for anti-corruption and governance reforms; as well as the development of specialised non-conviction-based asset forfeiture legislation to further enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement action against corruption. Unfortunately, these ideas have not translated into results. The reasons for this include the posture and attitude of IDPs in their engagement with the recipient country.

International development partnerships and the challenges of combating corruption in Nigeria Despite the ratification and domestication of various international anticorruption protocols and the numerous international development partnerships established to implement these, the fight against corruption remains an uphill struggle for Nigeria. Indeed, the problem has remained endemic in the country, undermining development and the consolidation of democracy. One key challenge undermining these efforts is that the Nigerian state often appears to be more concerned with accommodating the various international protocols in order to satisfy its international development partners than actually eradicating corruption. With the return to civil rule in 1999 and the efforts by President Olusegun Obasanjo to obtain debt relief from the Paris Club, the anti-corruption crusade was given serious attention in order to woo creditors and other international development partners. This was aptly captured by Okonjo-Iweala (2012:87) when she noted that: The president understood that he would not be able to realise one of the main objectives of his administration – obtaining debt relief – unless Nigerian authorities were seen to be serious about fighting corruption. No creditors would want to forgive or cancel any debts if they believed that the proceeds of cancellation would end up in corrupt hands.

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Apparently, in the context of Nigeria’s developmental crisis and the carrots dangled by international development partners who promise to deliver various cargos of development, successive administrations in Nigeria have implemented anti-corruption programmes not necessarily due to the need to eradicate corruption but mainly because of the political and economic benefits of aligning with IDPs. These range from gaining international and local legitimacy to attracting development aid, to name just two. This pursuit of self-serving interests by the Nigerian state further explains the creation of anti-corruption agencies with overlapping functions. Corollary to the above is the absence of political will to fully implement the ratified protocols on anti-corruption. Due to the systemic nature of corruption and the interests of the political leadership in Nigeria, which are rooted in the neopatrimonial character of the Nigerian political economy, there has been haphazard or selective implementation of anti-corruption programs, with a focus on methods that do not jeopardise the interests of the incumbents or their cronies. For instance, various attempts to address the endemic corruption in the Nigerian Customs Service during Olusegun Obasanjo’s regime failed to win the President’s support due to vested political interests. The same was true when efforts to address malpractice in rice importation failed during the same administration, as they were seen as jeopardizing President Olusegun Obasanjo’s bid for a second term (OkonjoIweala 2012). In most other cases, anti-corruption programmes have been pursued as a component of populism. Ruling political parties usually adopt anti-corruption programmes to further their populist agenda of demonizing their political opponents.

Conclusion and recommendations The key finding of the Chapter is that the global war against corruption, as regards international donor support for recipient countries, has not adequately or effectively addressed the issue of corruption in Nigeria. Using a Marxian political economy approach, we argue that the global war against corruption has become difficult to resolve because the giver and taker are both interested in survival and enrichment; thus the war against corruption has become intractable. From the above analysis, it could be concluded that the self-representation of development practice by donor governments and international financial institutions negatively affects their moral consistency and effectiveness in the course they set out to achieve.

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We further observe that many corrupt culprits have been publicly accused of corruption, yet no sustainable deterrent actions have been taken against them even in the midst of external collaboration. The application of Marxian political economic theory leads the author to conclude that there are problems associated with international support for anti-corruption in Nigeria. The failings we observed operate on two levels – the international implementing agency (foreign development partners) and the national beneficiary (Nigeria). However, discussion of these important issues is lacking in the literature. In the light of these arguments, we contend that global partnerships for anti-corruption have failed to effectively address the problem, largely due to concerns that the giver (donor) and taker (recipient) are both more interested in maintaining the appearance of action than doing anything that might affect their own interests. To this end we conclude that international development practice has failed to successfully tackle corruption in Nigeria; rather, empty and half-baked efforts have been masked under a façade of compliance with global anti-corruption protocols and the demands of international development partners. Having examined why the global war against corruption has remained intractable, we proffer the following key recommendations: x The globalization of corruption demands new options and effective strategies for Nigeria to address the problem. To do this, the state needs the expertise and experience of international anti-corruption agencies in gathering information, enforcement, and the creation and implementation of a strategic plan to deal with corruption. This collaboration between international anti-corruption bodies and Nigerian legislators must be founded on the capacity and political will of the legislature to assert responsibility and power. x Global best practice, modelled on the least corrupt countries, suggests that institutionalised political will is most effective when it is inclusive and incorporates the interests of a wide range of constituencies. The powers of institutions and officials are not dependent upon personality or the good nature and intentions of a particular person. Society works to curb corruption when it supports a reform paradigm that removes control from individuals and popularises the mandate for accountability with effective citizen involvement. x The study suggests that donor agencies must pay attention to two key areas in their anti-corruption programmes: procurement and political

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will. Procurement regulations are not adhered to in Nigeria by donor partners. There are procurement laws in place but their implementation and enforcement by government remains a problem, particularly in the public sector. On political will, many Nigerians believe that the political will to deal with corruption is lacking in Nigeria. The failings of the legislature, judiciary and executive have disillusioned Nigerians, who raise doubts about their willingness to combat corruption. This also accounts for the lackadaisical attitude of government agencies, like the National Planning Commission, who sign up to national agreements with international donor partners but rarely follow up on the implementation of the projects and programmes they are signatory to.

References Abbass I. M. 2007. “Corruption: Bridging the Communication and Collaborative Gap between Nigerian Legislatures an International Anticorruption Agencies.” Paper presented at the National Conference of Anti-Corruption Committees in Nigerian Legislatures and Heads of Anti-corruption Units in Government Establishments on the Role of Anti-Corruption Committees of Nigerian Legislatures and AntiCorruption Transparency Monitoring Units (ACTU) in the fight against Corruption, Awalah Hotel, Bauchi, 13–15 February. Apata, G. O. 2018. Corruption and the postcolonial state: how the West invented African corruption. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 37(1):43–56. Illicit Financial Flows. 2015. Report of the high-level panel on illicit financial flows from Africa, commissioned by the AU/ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. Bracking, S. (ed.). 2008. Corruption and development: the anti-corruption campaigns. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Brown, E. and Cloke, J. 2005. Neoliberal Reform, Governance and Corruption in Central America: Exploring the Nicaraguan Case. Political Geography, 24:601–30. Du Plessis P., Iwuamadi, C. K. and Omotoso, B. 2011. Final evaluation of the European Union - NGA S08 project - support to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Nigerian judiciary. Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). 2010. Report on assessing the efficiency and impact of national anti-corruption institutions in Africa. Fraser, A. 2005. Poverty reduction strategy papers: Now who calls the shots? Review of African Political Economy. 104(5):317–340.

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Ifeka, C. 200.1 Playing civil society tunes: corruption and misunderstanding Nigeria's ‘real’ political institutions. Review of African Political Economy, 28(89):461–465. Ivanov, K. S. 2007. “The limits of a global campaign against corruption.” In: S. Bracking (ed.) Corruption and Development: The Anti-corruption Campaigns, pp. 28–45. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Iwuamadi, K. 2012. “Nigeria”. In: G. Badet et al. (eds), Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Agencies in West Africa, pp. 153–202. New York: African Minds. Johnston, M. 2005. Syndromes of corruption: wealth, power, and democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Khan, F. 2019. Neopatrimonialism and corruption: towards a new common sense. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 36(4):553–562. Klitgaard, R. 1988. Controlling corruption. Berkeley: University of California Press. Lawson, L. 2009. The politics of anti-corruption reform in Africa. Journal of Modern African Studies, 47(1):73–100. Mungiu-Pippidi, A. 2006. Corruption: Diagnosis and treatment. Journal of Democracy, 17(3):86–99. Okojie, P. and Momoh, A. 2007, “Corruption and reform in Nigeria.” In: S. Bracking (ed.), Corruption and Development: The Anti-corruption Campaigns, pp. 103-120. Basingtoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Okonjo-Iweala, N. 2012. Reforming the unreformable: Lessons from Nigeria. Cambridge: The MIT Press. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2018. Illicit financial flows: the economy of illicit trade in West Africa. http://www.oecd.org (21 December 2018). Orock, R. T. E. and Oben, T. M. 2012. ‘Why government should not collect taxes’: Grand corruption in government and citizens’ views on taxation in Cameroon. Review of African Political Economy, 39(133):479–99. Polzer, T. 2001. Corruption: deconstructing the World Bank discourse, Destin Working Paper Series, No. 01–18. http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/DESTIN/pdf/WP18.pdf (accessed 13 May 2019). Schneider, F. and Caruso, R. 2011. “The (Hidden) financial flows of terrorist and transnational crime organizations: A literature review and some preliminary empirical results.” Economics of Security Working Paper 52. Shah, A. 2007. “Tailoring the Fight against Corruption to Country Circumstances.” In: A. Shah (ed.), Performance Accountability and Combating Corruption, pp. 233–254. Washington DC: World Bank.

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Smith, D. J. 2010. Corruption, NGOs, and Development in Nigeria. Third World Quarterly, 31(2):243–258. Tesh, S. 1999. “A Short History of Anti-Corruption Activities in the World Bank.” Society Newsletter, no. 70, Jan/Feb. Transparency International. 2019. What Is Corruption? Turley, J. 2012. “Reflection on corruption.” In: C. Robin (ed.) Black Money: On Marxism and Corruption. http://www.corryrobin.com (11 July 2019). United Nations Office on Drug Control. 2004. The Global Programme. UNODC, Vienna, Austria. Urtuzuastegui, G. A. 2019. Bilateral aid in sub-Saharan Africa: Are donor delivery tactics stimulating economic growth and development? Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 37(1):128–147. Van Z. E. 2004. A Black and White Issue. http://www.adb.org/Documents/Periodicals/ADB_Review/2004/vol36 _3/black_white (accessed 18 June 2019). Wolfensohn, J. D. 1996, Speech to the World Bank/IMF Annual Meeting. Washington, DC: World Bank. Wolfensohn, J. D. 1999, Remarks at a global forum on fighting corruption. Washington, DC: World Bank.

CHAPTER 16 CORRUPTION VERSUS PROBITY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: THE PLACE OF LITERATURE AND EXAMPLE OF BASࡦOࡦҒRUN OҒGÚNMÓࡦLÁ IN A̖ÀRE֌-A̖GÒ ARÍKÚYE֌RÍ

ONANUGA, CORNELIUS OLUWAROTIMI (CHIEF LECTURER AND FORMER DEPUTY PROVOST NIGERIAN LANGUAGES DEPARTMENT, TAI SOLARIN COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, NIGERIA)

Abstract Corruption involves but is not restricted to greed and the abuse of established processes, structures and values. It has remarkably negative effects on the wellbeing of any society within which it is endemic. Despite this, there is a tendency to cover up corrupt practices and this usually requires the active connivance of the leadership or oversight agencies. The overarching assumption in this study is that lack of good leadership is a significant factor in the continued spread of corrupt practices (Gorai 2016:11). In resolving this concern, I appropriate literature as a tool to plausibly remedy the situation. Literature is taken in this sense as a reflection of society, as opined by Duhan (2015:200) and as a tool for speaking of societal ills. Through the exemplification of Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá in Ààre֌ -Àgò Aríkúye֌ rí, written by Lawuyi Ogunniran (1977), as an upright ruler surrounded by corrupt lieutenants, I submit that probity, accountability and good governance, if displayed appropriately by leaders, may significantly contribute to stemming the tide of corruption in Nigerian society. Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá’s example of uprightness is recommended for

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emulation in a society desirous of good governance, such as democratic Nigeria. Keywords: corruption; probity; accountability; good governance; Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá; Ààre֌ -Àgò Aríkúye֌ rí; Nigeria; corrupt leaders; justice; Ibadan

Introduction The menace of corruption is global. It is not limited by boundaries of nations, race or creed. Its effects are very grave, and so there is always the desire to reduce or eliminate it outright. Curiously, as much as corruption is decried and abhorred by citizens of all nations, efforts to curb the tendency do not appear to match its preponderance. It has been observed that, for Nigeria as a nation, corruption is one of the major drawbacks debarring its progress. Despite the very obvious manifestations of widespread corruption and publicised attempts to tackle it, successive governments have barely scratched the surface. The visibility of the danger of corrupt practices reached a level where fighting corruption became a major political campaign point for political parties jostling for elective positions. Indeed, the quote “If Nigeria fails to kill corruption, corruption will kill Nigeria”, ascribed to the current President, Muhammadu Buhari, became popular and was contributory to his ascension to power in 2015. Combating corruption usually requires the availability of certain structures and practices. For this, justice and good governance come into play and are inextricably linked. Whereas the product of the former is the latter, the absence of both has corruption as a veritable product. In addition, corruption is a bane to both justice and good governance. Good governance cannot thrive in an environment where justice is miscarried, for whatever reason, and miscarriages of justice cannot occur for any good reasons. Sound philosophy dictates that there must be good reasons for any good actions taken. As noted by Kukah (2004:4), justice must flow to the accused, to the victim and to the community at large. In view of this, justice and good governance cannot be experienced in the abstract, but must be palpable enough for all to experience. It must, however, be pointed out that justice can be maintained or miscarried under any form of government. That is why the system of government portrayed in the text under focus, Ààre֌ -Àgò Aríkúye֌ rí, is not the kernel of our discussion. Neither is it suggested that the style of adjudication employed in the book is perfect and the only option possible. Rather, the focus is on the forthrightness and exemplary figure of Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá, a character in the drama who displays transparent honesty in order to ensure that justice prevails in his society. This valiant

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conduct and the courage to expose corruption and punish corrupt individuals, even in high places, are notable virtues that current leaders must imbibe if efforts to ensure good governance and consign corruptive tendencies to incineration are to come to fruition.

Corruption versus probity, accountability and good governance Corruption, when left untamed, will eventually destroy the very fabric of probity and accountability, subsequently ruining good governance. One of the causes of corruption is lack of good leadership (Gorai 2016:11). It involves an unexplainable appetite for amassing wealth by seeking to circumvent established procedures, regulations, structures, institutions and values. Examples of high-profile individuals who have been arrested, charged to court, tried and found guilty readily come to mind. The case of a sitting Inspector-General of Police who was sent packing from office before being jailed is an example. State governors have also been jailed, having been stripped of official immunity after leaving office. Some such officers who escaped punishment in Nigeria, their home country, have faced their comeuppance overseas. Even where efforts are successful, the individuals convicted often keep quiet to protect the identities of violators that occupy notable positions. A retired high-ranking police officer who was later elected into the National Assembly pointedly said there were many corrupt people sitting in the hallowed chambers at any given time. When the heat was turned on him to name names, he recanted for fear of his life. Sometimes, in recent times, ridiculously light punishments have been meted out to erring individuals in the name of “plea bargaining”. How can such cases serve as a deterrent to others? Corruption by public figures or public office holders is of interest to this study. The interest is born out of the realization that such practices affect the generality of the people, most often negatively. Unfortunately, not all cases of corruption are prosecuted. They are instead covered up or talked about in hushed tones. Such a cover-up usually involves the active connivance of the leadership or those who should effectively control or stem the obnoxious trend. When those given the authorization to lead the people and ensure that the ordinary masses are not short-changed are themselves pilferers, what then is the fate of the weak and vulnerable within the society? Our contention is that a high level of probity, accountability and good governance is needed in order to counter corruption. From within society, there are remedies waiting to be tapped for use and in this case recourse to

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literature, among other measures, is one possible solution. Literature is taken in this sense as a reflection of the society (Duhan 2015:200). It can be taken as source material to understand the wellbeing or otherwise of a society in the period of time when the literary piece came to being. In addition, such literary texts stand a chance of becoming a reference point later and historical status can be conferred on them. There is a very great deal to be gained if we learn from the past in order to ensure that the errors of history are avoided and to place the future on the right, progressive track.

The place of literature in fighting corruption Literary texts have been described as reflecting the “economics, family relationships, climates and landscapes, attitudes, morals, races, social classes, political events, wars and religion” of the society that produces them (Albretch 1954:426). One should therefore be able to correlate the literature of any age with other important aspects of national activities of the time. Literature is widely recognised as a way not only of mirroring a society (Dubey 2013:84), but also of adjusting and influencing it. Literature, in regulating society, is capable of arresting the wrongs or mistakes that occur within it and also of making amends going forward. It further gives insight into how social actions reshape a society and provides information about that society, particularly with regards to the culture from which it has emanated. This helps redefine the landscape of the society by further entrenching noble deeds or calling attention to areas needing change. Literature, in any of its forms of presentation, goes beyond the level of appreciation and comprehension. It is capable of impacting on human society in many ways. Apart from being a product of the society itself, it returns to society those values it taps. This is why one needs to be careful about the type of literature being produced, such that it will not become counter-productive, yielding negative impacts and inflicting further harm on society.

Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá in History Using the authoritative The History of the Yoruba by Johnson (1921:134) as a reference, a few relevant issues will be highlighted. Johnson notes that the term “Ààreࡦ -Àgò” describes “one who has just succeeded to the headship of a great house”. This was the title of Ògúnrìndé Ajé, and he is portrayed in this position in the novel too. The historical figure of Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá and his activities as the head of government in Ibadan are

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discussed extensively by Johnson, who notes that “Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá was distinguished for his tact and diplomacy” (ibid.: 310). When Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá died, Johnson wrote, “Ibadan lost in him a wise and just administrator, and a veteran leader and successful soldier” (376). Johnson touches the crux of the matter when he makes the following comments about Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá’s high sense of probity and incorruptibility: As an administrator, he was very just, and was never influenced by bribes. On the contrary, if money was brought to him to prejudice his mind in a case to be heard, after patiently hearing the case, if it went against the man who attempted to bribe him, he would disgrace him openly for what he had attempted to do, bring out the bribe in public and the fine would be more than the bribe. (Ibid.: 373)

The import of citing Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá as recorded by history is to show that beyond the literary ambit of imaginative colouration that Lawuyi Ogunniran, the author of Ààre֌ -Àgò Aríkúye֌ rí, might have put into his work, he relied heavily on the traits of this leader as he was in real life. Both Okubote (2009:212-217) and Morgan (n.d. 83, 93,103) speak in similar vein about Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá, with Okubote (2013:313) describing his tenure as peaceful while Morgan paints him as a stormy petrel. Morgan says of him: Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá, who later became a famous warrior in Ibadan, was a Private when Oluyole was Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run. Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá had one drummer who sang his praises and, on some days, he would command this drummer to sit on a tree in front of his house and to beat out on his talking drum a challenge to Oluyole to come out and fight. Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá himself would sit on an empty keg of gunpowder, holding a knife in his hand while his drummer says with his talking drum: “Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá, ‘tis in a street fight you’ll die for sure; you are rolling kegs of gunpowder with careless abandon; you hold a knife in your hand and stare death in the face! (n.d.:83)

That was how fearless and daring Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá was, even before the mantle of leadership of the Ibadan settlement fell on him. To the extent that both history and literature have painted Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá as one who was accountable and offered good governance to his people, we may say that Ogunniran’s Ààre֌ -Àgò Aríkúye֌ rí is not a mere utopian presentation which cannot be realistically or pragmatically emulated. We need to emphasise this because many Nigerians today appear to be so disheartened with the system that they have become utterly pessimistic, believing that it is a near impossibility for the nation to produce a just and incorruptible leader of Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá’s type. It is necessary to counter the common opinion that corruption is inherent in all human beings and that

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it is barely possible not to be corrupt. Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá, from both literature and history, has proved otherwise. This is why we are recommending the type of good governance highlighted in Ààre֌ -Àgò Aríkúye֌ rí to leaders at all levels of government in Nigeria.

The historical novel Ààreࡦ -Àgò Aríkúyeࡦ rí Ààre֌ -Àgò Aríkúye֌ rí was written by Lawuyi Ogunniran. It is a Yorùbá historical novel. Ààreࡦ -Àgò Ògúnrìndé Ajé (variously called “Ààreࡦ -Àgò” or “Ajé” in the book), a highly respected war lord and chieftain of Ibadan, is portrayed in the novel as a gallant warrior of Ibadan who was renowned across the entire Yoruba lands in his day. He was well known for his various contributions in times of dire need. While valiant during times of war, he would retire home in times of peace. It is needless to say that how a military leader conducts himself at the battlefront is substantially different from when he is at home in times of peace. He may be ruthless during war, but he is required to be civil once the war is over. Ààreࡦ -Àgò Ògúnrìndé Ajé married three wives: Asiyanbi, Fatola and Adepele, in that order. Unfortunately, he was quite tactless in his visible display of love and preference for Fatola over the other two wives. Jealousy cannot but run deep in such an environment. The level of jealousy could only be expected to become unbridled when one considers the fact that only the third wife, Adepele, gave birth to his male children, a fact of significant import in a society which remains heavily patrilineal. When it happened that one after the other, and in quick succession too, the three male children borne by Adepele – Taye, Kehinde (twins) and Idowu – died, Ògúnrìndé became furious and impatient. This is because in Yoruba tradition, a high premium is placed on the possession of male children. Ààreࡦ -Àgò Ògúnrìndé Ajé had to “adjudicate” in this matter. But he did so in fury. Like the warrior that he was, without proper enquiry, relying on the concocted information supplied by both Asiyanbi, the cunning first wife, and Adepele, the gullible bereaved mother, he decided that Fatola, the favourite wife, was responsible for the deaths. The motive supplied by the other two wives was that Fatola had killed the children out of jealousy, because she had not borne a son for Ààreࡦ -Àgò Ògúnrìndé Ajé. In a rage, he shot Fatola with his bow and arrow, leaving her dead. This scenario presents a classic case of miscarriage of justice. The elements that make injustice thrive include the gullibility of the victim(s), the cunning nature of the person(s) brought before the throne of justice and

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the impatience of those in whom the power has been vested to adjudicate or ensure maintenance of justice. When Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá, as head of Ibadan settlement, subsequently conducted a proper inquiry, he found that Asiyanbi was responsible for the deaths of the children: she had wanted to eliminate Fatola because the latter had become the favourite of her husband.

Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá and his adjudication in Ààre֌ -Àgò Aríkúye֌ rí For unjustly killing Fatola, his wife, Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá and his Council of Chiefs summoned Ààreࡦ -Àgò Ògúnrìndé Ajé to appear before them. Amongst them in this council were the Balogun, Otun, Osi, Asipa and the women’s leader, the Iyalode. But Ògúnrìndé Ajé, displaying the warrior in him, refused to heed their summons. After a few attempts, he was forcibly arrested, bound and dragged before the court of Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá and his chieftains. There, Ògúnrìndé Ajé stated his case. At the end of the first sitting, all the Ibadan chiefs in the council were unanimous in their opinion that he had erred, and that he must be dealt with so that justice might prevail. The panel thereafter adjourned because the day was far advanced, asking the defendant to come with his two surviving wives to the next sitting. Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá’s lieutenants went to their various homes, ready to reconvene the following day to conclude the case. Ògúnrìndé Ajé was granted bail, in recognition that, as a high and powerful chief in the town, he deserved some respect. The following day, the sitting re-convened. Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá meticulously prosecuted the case and set out some salient facts that Ògúnrìndé Ajé had failed to unearth. The court thereafter proceeded to conclude the matter, as previously agreed. The expectation was that Ògúnrìndé Ajé would be roundly condemned and dealt with accordingly, as reflected in the meeting held on the previous day, especially by the powerful chieftains in the Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá’s council. But during the preceding night, Ògúnrìndé Ajé had visited the chiefs and bribed them to ensure he would escape justice and not be punished. As a result, in a dramatic shift, one after the other, the chiefs in the council submitted that Ògúnrìndé Ajé be pardoned. There was consternation everywhere. Unbeknown to the chiefs, however, these intrigues were known to the incorruptible Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá, who revealed that Ògúnrìndé Ajé had actually bribed the chiefs, both men and women, so that justice might be subverted. Rather than concur with his chiefs, Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá stood his

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ground to ensure that justice was not miscarried. He meted out punishment to all erring parties, including the chiefs and lieutenants who had agreed to corruptly use their positions to subvert justice. This he did without undue sentiment. It should be noted that the perversion of justice was not restricted to a particular gender: the Iyalode, the women’s leader acted no better than her male counterparts. It was soon discovered, however, that Ààreࡦ -Àgò Ògúnrìndé, the central figure of the entire story, had escaped. Since he was considered to be a powerful warrior and man of substance in the town, it had been argued that he should not be subjected to undue ridicule and suffer execution the same as any ordinary citizen. Ògúnrìndé Ajé made a strong appeal against a death sentence. He was given the opportunity to return home, where he was expected to commit “a strong man’s suicide” in line with the dictates of Yoruba tradition at that time and in recognition of the “honour” accorded him. There was a precedent for this, when Ajagunna had been given the same treatment during the reign of Olugbode (Ogunniran 1977: 91-92). In that case, however, Ajagunna complied, committing suicide as expected of him. Ògúnrìndé Ajé was given until noon of the day he was sentenced to undertake what was necessary. But instead of following this “honourable” path, he absconded. The sentencing of the other people involved in the case was as follows. The four individuals who couriered the bribes from Ààreࡦ -Àgò Ògúnrìndé Ajé to the members of the adjudication panel – which included Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá’s two close acquaintances, one of his warriors and a younger sibling of his wife – were to be enslaved. Two were to be sold to the Fulani and the Dahomey people and the other two to merchants from Kutuwenji. Personal relationships, it can be seen, mattered a little before Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá, because the course of justice must prevail (Ogunniran 1977: 96– 97). Asiyanbi was to be publicly executed (Ogunniran 1977:97), while the chiefs who had accepted bribes were heavily censured, lambasted and convicted. The bribes were confiscated and placed in government coffers, while each of the bribe recipients was to pay in kind to the government 10 dane guns, a keg of gunpowder, 20 slaves and a bottle of imported spirit. They were also suspended from overseeing the vassal territories under their respective supervision. Three things guided Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá in giving his judgement: the fear of and respect for the nation, the urge to maintain a good and unblemished name or fear of tarnishing one’s image, and the fear of God (Ogunniran 1977: 104–105). Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá showed exemplary

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character in never hesitating to speak the truth. He did not accept the oppression of the masses by the high and mighty. As a result of these events, Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá repealed the customs which granted powerful individuals in the town discriminatory treatment. Rather than permitting privileged individuals the opportunity to put their homes in order before death, the rules that applied to common folk were thenceforth applicable to all. With this, it could truly be said that the law had no respect for status. Could we, in light of this turn of events, indeed regard Ààreࡦ -Àgò Ògúnrìndé Ajé as a man of valour? This situation, in a way, emphasises our thinking that no matter how concerted the efforts to entrench corruption and undermine justice, focus should not be lost. The main concern should remain how to maintain a high level of probity and how to guarantee the kind of sound justice espoused by Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmólá. It is significant to note that important people in government in Nigeria continue to escape justice – even flee to foreign countries – thanks to the loss of this focus by those in positions of authority. It should also be pointed out that, in as much as the high and mighty should not be allowed to escape justice, there is no license for less visible citizens to be corrupt in their own “little ways”.

The implications of Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá’s example Some issues emanate from the story in Ààre֌ -Àgò Aríkúye֌ rí that we have highlighted. The first is that corruption is not gender-specific. Both men and women are capable of being corrupt. The Iyalode, a female high-ranking chief, joined her male colleagues – the Balogun, the Otun, the Osi and the Asipa – in receiving bribes from Ààreࡦ -Àgò Ògúnrìndé Ajé’s emissaries. Any crusade for probity and accountability should therefore involve both sexes. The leadership must have a way of monitoring itself to avoid “leakages”. The leadership in itself is a major threat to the fight against corruption. When people who have access to power, or directly wield power themselves, promote corruption, circumvent probity and avoid transparency – all which are pivots upon which good governance rest – there is little hope for a thriving, enabling environment where other noble attributes of statesmanship can be engendered. It is apparent that subordinates under the superintendence of an otherwise upright leader may frustrate any meaningful war on corruption. This is when corruption is said to fight back against the system. A good leader must find means of watching members of his or her cabinet. This is because corruption from within will tend to frustrate the sincere efforts of others. There is, therefore, a need to be

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vigilant so that the leadership itself is not brought into disrepute by some unscrupulous members. If there are bad eggs, there must be an internal process for singling them out, punishing them without fear or favour, stripping them of their portfolios and showing them the way out, as Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá does in Ààre֌ -Àgò Aríkúye֌ rí. In Ogunniran’s novel, Ààreࡦ -Àgò Ògúnrìndé Ajé flees from justice. This is not very different from what is experienced today when corrupt officials, after looting the budgets in their care, flee to safe havens outside their country. This must be prevented by learning from previous historical events. In addition to the above, there is a need for leaders to have a clear focus and be determined. They must be courageous and undaunted if they are to make headway in the midst of sycophants and uncooperative corrupt lieutenants. Otherwise, the possibility of good aims being frustrated cannot be ruled out. Most countries, including Nigeria, are run on a constitutional basis. There are no separate laws for the leaders and the led. Discriminatory treatment for the high and mighty and another set of rules applied to the powerless is, in itself, corruption. The step taken by Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá to repeal the discriminatory convention of giving more leeway to the powerful is the correct way to proceed. He put in place a new regulation indicating that the laws of the land treat all equally, emphasizing that even he should not be exempt were he to be involved in a crime. Finally, nepotism should have no place in good governance. It is notable that Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá meted out heavy punishment upon the couriers of the bribe, all of whom were very close to him – one was a soldier under him, two were his acquaintances and the fourth a younger to his wife. Favouritism cannot be displayed: it undermines the good governance that is needed to eliminate bribery and corruption. As long as there are no sacred cows who appear to be above the law, fairness will be ensured and justice shall prevail.

Conclusion It is clear that literature has a role to play in providing insight into how transparency, accountability and probity can be applied to curb corruption and bring about good governance. The example of Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá in Aare-Ago-Arikuyeri shows that literary texts need not be seen as mere cold print, incapable of bringing desired changes to society. If literature is a

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reflection of the society at large, then it should not be impossible to follow the example of Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá in our body politic today. It is not only literature, but history that recorded Basࡦ oࡦ Ғ run Ògúnmoࡦ ғ lá as a fearless but fair administrator in his lifetime, therefore applying such strategies should not constitute an impossible task. To uphold such examples, there is a need to encourage literature that portrays good governance to our reading public. Similar historical dramas in the Yoruba language include Efunsetan Aniwura (1979), and Olu Omo (1983), both historical in nature, and both written by Akinwumi Isola. Apart from encouraging the reading of such books, authors should also be encouraged to write similar novels that emphasise characters’ positive attitudes towards probity, transparency, accountability and good governance. It is further suggested that, in order to attain a wider circulation, texts like these should be adapted and turned into screenplays. Finally, morality cannot be divorced from good governance. Therefore, moral rectitude should form part of the upbringing of all Nigerians. To ensure a better tomorrow, ideals that form the kernel of good governance must be inculcated in the young, upcoming citizens of the nation. In light of this, it is also recommended that, in addition to the use of literary texts, history and citizenship education should be taught as a requirement at all the levels of education in the country.

References Albrecht, M. C. 1954. The Relationship of Literature and Society. American Journal of Sociology 59:425–436. Dubey, A. 2013. Literature and society. IOSR Journal in Humanities and Social Science (IOSR-JHSS) 9:84-85. Duhan, Roshni. 2015. The relationship between literature and society. Language in India 15(4). Gorai, M. J. 2016. Foundational understanding of corruption’ The Ethics and Anti-Corruption, Kenya. Isola, A. 1979. Efunsetan Aniwura. Ibadan, Nigeria: University Press Ltd. Isola, A. 1983. Olu Omo. Ibadan, Nigeria: Onibonoje Publishers. Johnson, S. 1921. The History of the Yoruba. Lagos: C.S.S. Bookshops. Kukah, M. H. 2004. Truth, reconciliation, justice and national integration: Matters arising. Journal of Arts and Social Sciences 7:1–6. Morgan, K. n.d. Akinyele’s Outline History of Ibadan, Part One revised edition. Ibadan Caxton Press (West Africa) Ltd., Ibadan Nigeria.

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Ogunniran, L. 1977. Aare-Ago Arikuyeri. Ibadan, Nigeria: Macmillan Nigeria Publishers. Okubote, M. B. 2009. Iwe Itan Ijebu. Ibadan, Nigeria: Third World Communications Ltd. Okubote, M. B. 2013. The History of the Ijebu. Ibadan, Nigeria: Third World Communications Ltd.

CHAPTER 17 PREVENTING AND MITIGATING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA ASAMA’U SANI MAIKUDI (INEC, ZAMFARA STATE, NIGERIA)

Abstract Women constitute slightly more than half of the world population. Their contribution to the socio-economic development of societies is also more than half as compared to that of men by virtue of their triple roles in the productive, reproductive and community management spheres. Yet their participation in formal political structures and processes, where decisions regarding the use of societal resources generated by both men and women are made, remains insignificant. Violence against women is prevalent in every country in the world and is probably more intense in Africa. Violence is a common feature of Nigerian politics. Female candidates and their families have routinely faced various forms of violence before, during and after elections. This chapter examines the various types of violence against women in elections and how women are disenfranchised. It goes on to enumerate causes of violence against women in elections, which include culture and economics. It describes the various forms of violence exhibited in the pre-election, election and post-election periods and explores the motives behind such acts. Mass education of the electorate in favour of women in politics, support for women in elections, the neutrality of independent domestic monitors from partisan politics, peace messages during campaigns, and the recruitment of youths into peace programmes are among the recommendations. Keywords: Violence against women; pre-election stage; election stage; post-election stage; training and education; conflict resolution; legislation; electoral campaigning

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Purpose of the study The origins of violence against women in politics can be traced to the very beginning of the human race, as culture, tradition and religion have been the greatest bane to the full realization of women’s potential in the field of politics (Ugwu 2013). Written in the wake of the 2019 General Elections in Nigeria, the purpose of this Chapter is to: i. ii. iii.

assess why, how and when women suffer from election violence; identify the types of election violence women face in the preelection, elections and post-election periods; and suggest a way forward.

Introduction Violence against women is used to reinforce traditional social and political structures by targeting women leaders who challenge patriarchy and the prevailing socioeconomic expectations and norms. Violence, whose other name could be brutality, is an exhibition of destructive traits such as powerfulness, strength, wildness, mercilessness, roughness and pitilessness towards another person with deliberate aim of harming, injuring, killing or depriving that person of their right to achieve their life’s desires. The World Health Organization defines violence as: the intentional use of physical force or power, against oneself, another person or a group of communities resulting in injury, death, maldevelopment or deprivation. (Bekoe 2012)

Election violence is an aspect of political violence. Among the many features of election violence are election rigging, harassment and/or intimidation of voters, and vote buying and selling, all of which deter women from participating within the political sphere. When violence is targeted and used as a destructive tool in various ways through the electoral cycle to prevent women from participating as candidates, voters, election officers, observers or activists, this is known as violence against women in elections. Violence against women in elections can also be seen as any act of gender-based violence that is directed primarily at women as a result of their aspiration to seek political office or because of their political activities, which might include working as election officials, attending campaign rallies or simply giving a commitment to vote (Charles 2018; Bralton 2007). Kumari, Khan and Singh, in a study on

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violence against women in politics in India, Nepal and Pakistan, define it as: Any act of violence that results in, or is likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women politicians, including threat of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty in public or private life. (2014:8)

Violence against women in elections is a violation of women’s fundamental human rights and freedoms, and is the manifestation of the historically unequally power relations between men and women in private and public life.

Types of violence against women in elections Elections provide means by which competition in a society can be channelled into a constructive process with common rules to choose representatives of the people. When it is done well, elections bring social peace, but since it is a process of competition for power, elections can also be a catalyst for conflict and violence. According to Omengala (2018), Bekoe (2012) and Abdullahi (2013), violence against women in elections appears in three forms. These are: 1. Self-directed violence where, out of pressure, the woman nurses suicidal thoughts or self-abuse, especially after losing an election in which she had invested heavily or that someone else financed. 2. Collective violence committed against women in elections by organised groups within or outside their party, often by mobs or even terrorists. 3. Interpersonal violence associated with elections committed against women by family figures such as husbands or intimate partners. Mambula (2009), Abdullah (2013) and Bekoe and Stephanie (2017) contend that violence against women in elections can manifest in several other ways such as abuse, threats, physical assault, blackmail, assassination, kidnapping of the victim or her relations, hate speech, sexual harassment, mental harm and negative media propaganda. Another possible manifestation is the arbitrary deprivation of liberty in public or private life, such as where marriages are broken or alliances not approved due to party differences.

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The list of types of violence against women in elections is endless and are all reinforced by discriminatory cultural, social and economic structures in the society. The resultant effects of these negative attitudes devastate lives, fracture communities, and stall both the economic and political development of the nation.

Causes of violence against women and challenges facing women participating in elections in Nigeria Since time immemorial, women have traditionally been viewed as second class citizens, a weaker sex that must be under the domination of men. In most African societies, patriarchal attitudes have dictated that women be considered men’s property, good for bearing children and not much more. Gabriel (2015) contends that over the years, Nigerian women have continued to record very poor performances in elective political offices. This, she continues, is largely due to the sentimental attachment on feminine gender. Although they have been playing crucial roles in political life of the country, this has not yielded results in terms of their performances when it comes to elective offices. She attributes this to: The psyche of the Nigerian man is often predominated by a chauvinistic disposition that decision making is exclusive for the menfolk while women are to be instructed on what to do. The preoccupation that women play the number two role at homes is playing itself out in their political life.

One issue that came up in the course of writing this chapter was that men always dominate women due to the belief that women are lower-class citizens and that the men are the heads of the families. Some women agreed that the man is the head but opined that it is men’s fear of women’s capacity to excel on a level playing ground that makes them uncomfortable. Still, Omengala (2018) rhetorically asks whether it is the combined assets of beauty and high intelligence in a woman that makes a man uncomfortable? Or is it her perceived prowess at communication? Or is man still living in anger at being made to eat the apple? Or could it be a psychological fear of a possible further defeat in the future? Economically also, it is believed that men do not want women to be rich because such women will be less dependent and controllable, hence the violent attitude of some men towards independent women and the

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interpersonal violence women face from their families and intimate partners. In practice, unfavourable party rules and hate speeches given during campaigns and other political meetings also make women easy targets and generate apprehension about becoming involved in politics. Access to education is another challenge faced by women. Nine years of compulsory education in Nigeria is not enough to enable women take up leadership positions within political party structures and government. Unfortunately, this is the highest compulsory age of education for the majority of women in Nigeria. Some women drop out due to pregnancy, truancy, death of parents or the negative attitude of some parents towards women’s education. This lack of access to education leaves many women at a competitive disadvantage compared to men. Although Nigeria has a National Gender Policy (2004) and an Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) Gender Policy (2014), the provisions in these policies have not been implemented, mainly due to a lack of robust mechanisms to ensure compliance. Another challenge to women in politics is the lack of comprehensive civic and voter education on the evils and trauma of violence faced by women in elections. Sexual exploitation, sexual harassment and rape are some of the challenges that women face in politics. The high costs of electioneering, nomination form fees, campaign expenses and so on, represent great impediments to women’s active participation in politics. Scholars like Omengala (2018), Adebayo (2016), Maikudi (2015) and Charles (2018) et al. identify three stages of violence against women in elections, namely, the pre-election stage, the election stage and post-election stage.

Pre-election stage The pre-election stage is the period not less than 18 months before election. It is a period that is associated with party formation, the appointment of party leaders, stakeholder engagement and strategizing among members on manifestos that will benefit the people. This period is associated with the selection of candidates for elective positions. The desire to be chosen may lead to the following antisocial acts towards women such as: i. ii.

slander and defamation of character; harassment by fellow politicians, family members, friends, associates and even the media;

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hate speech, insults, abuse, threats, blackmail and false accusations; equating women’s participation in politics with immoral behavior; incitement to commit violence; pressure or coercion; economic control or delay in providing financial resources; and being undermined by influence of incumbents and “godfatherism” (granting of favour by those in power in expectation of future returns).

Violence is deliberately caused at this level with the aim generally being to deter female candidates, activists, voters and election officials from carrying out their duties; to prevent women from being elected; to discourage their active participation in the election process; and to increase male domination power. In order to reduce violence against women in elections at the preelection stage the following possible solutions have been suggested: i.

ii. iii.

iv. v.

Electoral education, which should include sensitizing the political class to the importance of appropriate conduct when selecting representatives and following the guidelines of this stage of the election. Civic education on why politicians should not give hate speeches. Women should first seek the support of their spouses. This is important because women politicians need the support of a husband who is willing and able to support and protect them, as a pillar and catalyst for their eventual success. Resolve all conflicts with the family, community and party as soon as possible. It is believed that women face less violence if their families and communities support their decision to enter politics. Engage with stakeholders to ensure free and fair primaries before the elections.

Election Stage This is the period when the actual voting takes place. Violence involved at this stage has been known to include murder, assault, kidnapping, rape/sexual assault and voter intimidation/suppression. These acts are usually carried out by both inter- and intra-party followers. The aims of violence against women at this stage are:

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to stop women from being elected at all costs; to deter women from active participation in the future; and to intimidate the supporters of female politicians into not voting for them.

In view of the importance of election day and in order to reduce violence against women in elections, women are advised: i. ii. iii. iv. v.

to visit the voting centre early wearing nothing that shows their party affiliation; to be able to identify the symbols of their party’s emblem; to ensure that they vote correctly and avoid any confrontation with any one at the voting area; to avoid comments on the conduct of the ongoing election; and to report any cases of fraud she might observe to the law enforcement agents that should be overseeing proceedings.

Further, women serving as party agents should conduct themselves as prescribed by electoral laws.

Post-election stage This is the period in which votes are counted and the results are announced. In terms of violence against women, it has been associated with threats of kidnapping, assassination, the condemnation of every action of elected women, and conspiring against or using legal structures to undermine elected women. This is a very tense period, and the aims of the violence against women are: i. ii. iii.

to promote inter or intra party conflicts; to present women as ineffective political leaders; and to maintain the status quo of women’s subordinate role in society.

In addition to the above, women in politics and elections need to be very focused, ensure peace among themselves and maintain the trust of their coworkers, especially those working for their success, by carrying them along and being transparent. They must walk the extra mile to ensure the trust and acceptance of all their party members (Abdullahi 2013). Party agents and party leaders should also stay neutral and must ensure a level playing ground for all candidates.

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Suggested four-week programme on curbing violence against women in elections We have seen that violence against women is rooted in gender-based discrimination, social norms and gender stereotypes. Given the devastating effects violence has on women, the best way to stop it is to prevent it from happening in the first place by addressing its roots and structural causes. Many efforts have been and continue to be made to address this menace. For instance, United Nations Women, in partnership with the World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts (WAGGGS), has developed a global non-formal education curriculum to engage young people in efforts to prevent and end violence against girls and women. A first of its kind, “Voices against Violence” is a co-educational curriculum designed for various age groups ranging from 5 to 25 years. It provides young people with tools and expertise to understand the root causes of violence in their communities, to educate and involve their peers and communities to prevent such violence, and to learn about where to access support if violence is experienced (https://www.unwomen.org). In line with the above, the following four-week programme to address the violence that women face in elections in Nigeria is proposed.

Week 1: Training and education Education is the key for the sustainable development of all nations. The aim is to educate participants on existing electoral laws and gender sensitive legislation. The module should also examine the nature and origin of electoral conflicts and reflect upon the consequences of violence in elections. Citizens’ civic responsibilities should also be embedded in the curriculum to enable all participants to understand their duties and obligations.

Week 2: Conflict resolution Conflicts are bound to occur in all human endeavours. The module therefore discusses methods and processes that facilitate the peaceful resolution of conflict and put an end to retribution. It should discuss the importance of involving the general population in mission to bring about electoral peace. It would also cover the need for robust statistics on the types

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and nature of electoral conflicts, in order to identify zones prone to such conflicts and swiftly address such problems. This module should also expose participants to various mediation and arbitration methods. It should teach participants how to identify early warning signs of potential conflicts and discuss strategies to avoid their escalation.

Week 3: Legislation Laws about violence against women give additional support to women and families affected by violence. The aim of this module is to teach participants about the legal policies available to support them and how to ensure compliance by all the relevant stakeholders. Punitive measures should be included.

Week 4: Electoral campaigning, voting operations and verification of results The aim of this module is to nurture in individuals the idea that elections must involve healthy competition and reconciliation. It should cover how participants on the course can go back and inform their communities about the need to avoid conflicts which lead to violence, cause physical and psychological trauma, and fracture societies. There is also a need to engage with the media about the importance of equal and balanced presentation. The backbone of any democracy is independent, professional and responsible media. Their role is to inform, criticize and stimulate debate. The media must be credible, take responsibility for getting the facts and offer balanced reportage that avoids provocative sensationalization of issues that could lead to conflict or violence in the society (Adebayo 2016).

Recommendations Violence against women in elections is a problem in many countries around the world and a serious human rights violation that must be addressed at its roots. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999, as amended), the National Gender Policy (2004) and the INEC Gender Policy (2014) all give equal rights to women and do not restrict them from contesting elections. They all represent legal procedures that enshrine

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women’s rights to participate in politics. However, the country does not have any legislation that deals strictly with violence against women in elections. It is therefore recommended that women should be educated about their political rights through capacity-building workshops structured around the three critical abovementioned periods of the electoral cycle. In order to address the issue of violence against women in elections, election partners and political parties must have effective programs and policies in place that empower women’s participation, whether registering as candidates, campaigning or voting. Independent domestic election monitors should not be partisan. They must be neutral and be seen to be neutral in their assignments. It is also necessary to put in place an early warning system and to map areas that are hotspots for violence, as a first step towards the effective monitoring and control of such areas. Peace messaging during campaigns must be adhered to by all political actors. The current policy of making political parties and their candidates sign peace accords before the elections should continue and any infraction(s) should be dealt with robustly. This will give strength to the peace accords and serve as deterrent to unsavoury political actors. It is also recommended to engage with and recruit young people into peace programs organised by the political parties. The country must also undertake a review of all institutions related to the electoral process in order to promote effective participation in politics and provide sanctions for noncompliance. It must create and formalise an effective complaint mechanism. The Electoral Commission should go beyond its Gender Policy, taking steps to recognise, protect, promote and ensure that political parties abide by the policy. Omengala (2018) posits further that mentorship workshops and capacity building with humanitarian organizations is advised to help mobilise a more robust and gender-sensitive legal framework. Men should be educated on the value of involving women in politics. Most women are breadwinners, good administrators, positive builders of the society, good mobilisers of the electorate and compassionate in nature. There is need to break the existing cycle of violence against women in elections, which is fuelled by gender discrimination and a culture of silence within political parties, electoral bodies, government agencies and, more broadly, the entire society.

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Conclusions The marginalization of women in Nigeria has been a huge barrier to its efforts to grow as a stable, democratic nation. Any democratization process that fails to incorporate a gender perspective is flawed. Any sensitive democratization must create and ensure access for women to engage in politics as voters as well as candidates, in order to reduce violence against them. Whenever women are not allowed to participate in elections, it has critical implications for the integrity of the whole electoral process, as women’s political and civil rights to participate in democratic processes by voting, campaigning or being voted for are being denied. It is recommended that the “Violence against Women in Elections Program” outlined above should be an integral part of the national policy in Nigeria. Every man and woman, starting from ward level right up to the presidency should receive compulsory awareness training on violence against women. By so doing, violence against women in elections in Nigeria would be mitigated. Finally, cultural and social shifts are also needed in Nigeria in order to truly implement gender-sensitive legislation and to ensure any future constitutional gender quotas can be honoured.

References Adebayo, J. O. 2016. Fostering non-conflict sensitive reportage of elections. African Security Review 25(3):303–315. Abdullahi, A. L. 2013. A Life free of Violence Against Women as a Women’s Right. Kaduna: Yomi Destiny Press. Akinade, E. A. and Adedipe. 2004. Behaviour Modifications: Principle and Practices. Lagos: Babs Olatunji publishers. Bralton, M. 2007. Vote Buying and Violence in Nigerian Elections Campaigns. Electoral studies 27:621–632. Bekoe, D. and Stephanie, M. B. 2017. The Contradictions of Pre- election Violence. Africa students review 60 (2):73–92. Bekoe, D. (ed.) 2012. Voting in fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Sahara Africa. Washington DC: Institute of Peace. Barcelona International Peace Centre, 2011. “European Commission enjoins task force on Electoral Assistance: Thematic workshop on

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elections, violence and conflict prevention: Summary Report.” June 20– 24. Barcelona Spain: MontJuk. Charles, T. 2018. “Shared Security Shared Elections: Best Practices for the Prevention of Electoral Violence.” American Friends Service Committees. Gabriel, C. 2015. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/05/elective-positionswhy-nigeria-records-more-women-losers-than-winners. https://www.unwomen.org › What we do: Ending violence against women | UN Women. Kumari, R., Khan, V. and Singh, S. 2014. “Violence Against Women in Politics: A Study Conducted in India, Nepal and Pakistan.” www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2014/6/violenceagainst-women-in-politics (accessed 24 February 2020). Maikudi, A. S. 2015. “Women, Politics and 2015 General Elections in Nigeria.” Paper presented at the Department of Political Sciences International Conference, ABU, Zaria. Mambula, M. A. 2009. Leadership: Facing and Overcoming the Storm of Stress. Kaduna: Prudent Universal Press & Publishing Co. Ltd. Omengala, A. 2019. “Violence Against Women in Elections.” Paper presented at Green Scenery Hotels, Gusau. Organized by INEC Gusau, Zamfara State.

ADDENDUM COMMUNIQUE ON THE 2ND AU ANTI-CORRUPTION CONFERENCE (12-13, JULY 2019)

PanAfrican Strategic and Policy Research Group-PANAFSTRAG in collaboration with and support from the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) organised the 2nd of its five-year commitments with the Faculty of Theology, Stellenbosch University, South Africa to AU AntiCorruption Day Commemoration and Colloquium from the 11-13 July 2019 in Abuja. The commemoration was marked by the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Presidential Advisory Committee on Corruption (PACAC) with CDD and PANAFSTRAG. The Commemoration on 11 July brought together experts in two panels to deliberate on the challenges faced by FG institutions in recovering assets of kleptocrats and corrupt individuals. There is a separate Communique for the event to be released by ICPC. The keynote speaker was Prof. Pregala Pillay of Stellenbosch University in South Africa. She was accompanied by Dr Chris Jones, who organised the 1st Commemoration Day and Colloquium in Stellenbosch in July 2018 and Dr Donald Katts. Other participants, including paper presenters, were the Director of CDD; Registrar, JAMB; a representative from the Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute of South Africa; faculty members from some Nigerian universities; a professor from London South Bank University; a representative from the private sector; the CEO of Yintab Strategy Consults (YSC); a retired ambassador; an architect, postgraduate students, and a sustainable development specialist. The participants identified corruption with a focus on how tolerance for impunity can continue to make it a global scourge but with different degrees of impact on each continent, with Africa being the worst hit. They further observed that:

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x Corruption abound in public and private governance as well as in the social sectors. x Corruption destroys human dignity, while impunity compounds this destruction. x Corruption is a human rights issue. x It is a global issue which requires holistic and collective action. x We must give emphasis to intolerance for impunity through responsible citizenship. x Weakness in accountable and transparent governance has its roots in weak structures and irregular audits at all levels of governance with rare or no follow-up action on audit queries and recommendations by the appropriate bodies. x Most public bodies, private sector organisations or CSOs in Africa are yet to see the above as the cornerstone of transparency and accountability in governance. x Gender equity is key in the anti-corruption crusade. The Colloquium made the following recommendations: x All stakeholders from Primary to Tertiary levels as well as CSOs must be empowered and engaged in monitoring and evaluating follow-up action on all aspects of audits in the public sector in reducing corruption and impunity. x Religious organizations must do some in-house cleansing and then re-strategize their roles in this cause. x We must engage African cultural and traditional institutions for fighting corruption and eliminating impunity. x Anti-corruption agencies and cultural institutions have to work together and not in silos for more gains in rebuilding intolerance for corruption and impunity on the continent. x Beyond prosecution, a holistic approach, including popular mobilization against the scourge is necessary and could involve a determined crafting and implementation of National AntiCorruption Strategies in sync with the UN Convention Against Corruption. x The Colloquium saw the need for the development of an African Impunity Index. x The above led to a workshop of TMALI, CDD, Stellenbosch University and PANAFSTRAG; which concluded that the Index be started in West Africa by CDD and PANAFSTRAG with other partners in West Africa; yet to be confirmed. 13 July 2019