Fichte: Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) nova methodo (1796–99) 9781501728983

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FICHTE Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) n(J(}a methodo (t7g6/gg)

Also translated and edited by Daniel Breazeale Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870s

FICHTE Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) Nova Methodo (17g6/gg) TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY

DANIEL BREAZEALE

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ITHACA AND LONDON

Cornell University Press gratefully acknowledges a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, an independent federal agency, and a subvention from The University of Kentucky, both of which aided in bringing this book to publication. Copyright© 1992 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 1992 by Cornell University Press First printing, Cornell Paperbacks, 1998 International Standard Book Number o-8014-8138-4 (pbk.) Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 92-5 2 745 Printed in the United States of America Librarians: Library of Congress cataloging information appears on the last page of the book. Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks and acid-free papers that are recycled, totally chlorine-free, or partly composed of nonwood fibers.

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For Rebecca Cecile (finally)

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments Editor's ·Introduction Principles of the Edition and Translation German/English Glossary Abbreviations Key to Symbols and Notes The Major Points of the Wissenschaftslehre of 1798-1799 First Introduction Second Introduction § 1 108 § 2 121 § 3 139 § 4 147 § 5 154 § 6 167 § 7 187 § 8 204 224 § 9 §w 234 § 11 250 §12 258 § 13 277 § 14 308 § 15 332 § 16 344 § 17 354 § 18 426 § 19 446 [vii]

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50 55 61 62 65 77 87

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Contents

Deduction of the Subdivisions of the Wissenschaftslehre Bibliography Index

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This translation project was begun in Munich in tg8s/86 under the auspices of a Senior Research Fellowship from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and was further facilitated by grants from the University of Kentucky and the Southern Regional Education Board. Final revisions were made possible by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities, an independent federal agency. For research assistance and access to original manuscripts, I am grateful to the directors and staff of the J. G. Fichte Archive and the Bavarian Academy of the Sciences. I also thank Felix Meiner Verlag and Friedrich Frommann Verlag (Gunther Holzboog), publishers of the two German editions of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, for permission to translate these texts into English. Most of all, I would like to acknowledge my personal debt to the following individuals: Reinhard Lauth, who originally encouraged me to embark upon this project, read the entire first draft of my translation, and has remained an invaluable source of expert guidance and advice; Erich Fuchs, who furnished me with essential philological and editorial information concerning both the manuscripts and the published texts of Fichte's lectures; Ives Radrizzani, whose outstanding French translation of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo frequently served as a guide to specific questions concerning the translation and interpretation of the German texts; Frederick Neuhouser, who read much of the second draft of the translation and made many useful suggestions that have been incorporated into this final version; Anthony N. Perovich, Jr., for his valuable corrections to the Editor's Introduction; Robert Rabel, for much-needed advice on the translation of passages from Latin and Greek; Leonard Peters, Acting Vice President for Research and Graduate Studies at the University of Kentucky, for his generous support of the publication of this volume; Yolanda Estes, for welcome editorial assistance; and finally, [ ix]

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Acknowledgments

Wolfgang Natter, whose patient and insightful corrections of the final draft of the translation were absolutely essential to the completion of this project. The extraordinary generosity with which these friends and colleagues have shared with me their time, their energy, and their expertise has been an unfailing source of encouragement and inspiration over the past five years. It is no exaggeration to say that without the support and assistance of the above-mentioned agencies, institutions, and individuals this book would never have seen the light of day. D. B.

Lexington, Kentucky

Note to the Paperback Edition I have taken the opportunity afforded by this paperback edition to correct minor errors in the first edition. I have also introduced a few small changes in the translation based upon correspondence with Erich Fuchs, editor of the original edition of K, as well as of the second, corrected edition of the same: Johann Gotdieb Fichte, Wissenscha.ftslehre nova methodo, 2. verbesserte Auflage. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1994· The pagination of the text of the second German edition and of the "philosophische Anmerkungen" is the same as that of first edition (1982). There is, however, a new "Vorwort zur zweiten Auflage," and both the "Einleitung" and "Bibliographische Hinweise zur WL nova methodo" have been revised and expanded. The second edition of K also includes a new set of "philologische Anmerkungen." Several of the alternate readings proposed in the first publication of this English translation have been accepted by Fuchs and incorporated in the second edition of the German text of K. Additional corrections to the second German edition ofK have been incorporated, without further comment, in this second edition of the English translation. Fuchs is also the editor of the forthcoming (third) edition of K, to be included in volume IVI 3 of AA, and he has provided me with a list of corrections to the German text. These most recent corrections and emendations have also been incorporated in this second, revised edition of the English translation. I would, of course, like to express my extreme gratitude to Dr. Fuchs for sharing this information with me. I also thank Curtis Bowman and Janet Roccanova for calling to my attention additional errors in the first edition of this translation.

FICHTE Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) nova methodo ( 1796/gg)

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

PART I The Origin and Publication of the First Presentation of the Basic Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre In the spring of 1794 Fichte chose "Wissenschaftslehre," a word composed of the terms for "science" (or "scientific knowledge") and "theory" (or "doctrine"), to designate his own, radically revised version of the transcendental or "Critical" philosophy inaugurated by Immanuel Kant. While conceding that his own version departed in many respects from the "letter" of the Kantian exposition, Fichte insisted that his new system-for all its novelty-was nevertheless true to the "spirit" of transcendental idealism. 1 Fichte arrived at his new philosophical standpoint during the preceding winter, in the course of a full-scale reexamination of the Kantian philosophy. The occasion for this reexamination was a review he had agreed to write for the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung of an anonymously published attack on the Critical philosophy by "Aenesidemus," a selfdescribed Humean skeptic. The book was widely recognized to be the work of a former classmate of Fichte's, G. E. Schulze (1761-1833), professor of philosophy at Helmstedt. True to its title, Aenesidemus, or concerning the Foundations of the Elementary Philosophy Propounded in Jena by Professor Reinhold, including a Defense of Skepticism against the Pretensions of the Critique of Pure Reason, 2 this lengthy work examined and criticized not I For Fichte's own interpretation of the relationship of his philosophy to Kant's, see, above all, the "Second Introduction" to An Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre ( 1797). In SW, 1: 453-518 = AA I, 4: 209-69; English translation by Daniel Breazeale, "Second Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre, "in /M,, pp. 36-105. See list ofabbreviations, p. 61. 2 Aenesidemus oder iiJJer die Fundamente der von dem Herm Professor Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementar-Philosophie: Nehst einer Vertheidigung des Skepticismus gegen die Anmassungen der Vemun.ftkritik (n.p.: n.p., 1792). For an English translation of an excerpt from Aenesidemus, see Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism, ed. George di

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Editor's Introduction

only Kant's own writings, but also the radically revised "system" of transcendental idealism developed by K. L. Reinhold under the name Elementarphilosophie. 3 Though Fichte had considered himself a Kantian ever since his first exposure to the Critique of Pure Reason in the summer of 1 790 and had also been profoundly influenced by Reinhold's project of recasting the Critical philosophy as a rigorous system based upon a single first principle, he had nevertheless come to harbor growing doubts concerning the adequacy of any of the existing presentations of transcendental philosophy. It was perhaps for this reason that Aenesidemus was the first work he asked to review after being invited to become a regular contributor to the influential Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung: in order to defend the Critical philosophy against Schulze's attack he would, as he no doubt realized, first have to confront and allay his own doubts concerning this same philosophy. Fortunately for Fichte, the task of reviewing Aenesidemus coincided with one of the rare periods of genuine leisure that he was ever to enjoy, the months immediately following his wedding in October 1793. Fichte and his bride spent the following winter and spring in Zurich, in the home of his new father-in-law, Hartmann Rahn, 4 and it was thanks to this opportunity that the young philosopher was, for the first time in his life, able to devote himself solely to philosophical reflection for an extended period. Accordingly, he turned the task of preparing his review into an occasion for reexamining his own previous philosophical commitments and for formulating a new systematic strategy of his own. 5

Giovanni and H. S. Harris (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), pp. 104-35. Regarding Schulze's skepticism, see Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosop~from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 266-84. Concerning Reinhold's "Elementary Philosophy" or "Philosophy of the Elements," see Beiser, The Fate of Reason, pp. 226-65, and Daniel Breazeale, "Between Kant and Fichte: Karl Leonhard Reinhold's 'Elementary Philosophy,'" Review of Metaphysics 35 (1982): 78_;;-821. Fichte first met his future wife, Johanna Rahn, while he was employed as a private tutor in Zurich in 1788/89, immediately before he spent three years in Leipzig, Konigsberg, and Warsaw. It was during the period between his first and second stays in Zurich that he not only became acquainted with Kant's writings, but also became personally acquainted with the author himself. By the time Fichte returned to Zurich in the summer of 1793, he had already begun to establish a literary reputation for himself on the basis of the astonishing success of his first book, the Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation and because of the controversy surrounding his (anonymously published) writings on the French Revolution and freedom of thought. For information concerning Fichte's career and writings before 18oo, see Daniel Breazeale, "Fichte in Jena," editor's introduction to EPW 5 Fichte's "Rezension des Aenesidemus" eventually appeared in February 1794 in Allgemeine Litemtur-Zeitung (SW, 1: 1-25 = AA I, 2: 41--67; English translation in EPW, pp. 5977). Concerning the significance of this text, see Daniel Breazeale, "Fichte's Aenesidemus Review and the Transformation of German Idealism," Review of Metaphysics 34 (1981): 545-68.

Editor's Introduction

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Thus it was in the context of a detailed, private reconsideration of Reinhold's system that Fichte first articulated the general outlines of his own systematic presentation of transcendental idealism. Two of its most striking features were ( 1) a dear-sighted recognition of the role of "practical reason" in the constitution of all experience, including its "theoretical" portion (that is, the portion that includes our everyday, as well as scientific, knowledge of the external world); and (2) an insistence that the sole adequate starting point for a "scientific" system of philosophy could only be the self-positing activity of the !. 6 Not until after he had arrived at this new standpoint did he find what he considered to be an appropriate name for it: Wissenschaftslehre, or "theory of scientific knowledge." 7 In the midst of this fruitful engagement with the writings of Reinhold and Kant, Fichte received an unexpected invitation to succeed Reinhold at Jena, beginning in the summer semester of 1794. His initial response to this remarkable offer, which he was certainly in no position to decline, was to request a postponement in assuming the post, on the grounds that it would be inappropriate for him to embark upon his new career without first possessing a well-articulated system of his own to "profess." To be sure, Fichte believed that he had already discovered the starting point and even the main outlines of such a system; yet, as he confessed in a letter to Reinhold of March 1, 1794, he also realized that "it is still far from being clear enough to communicate." When his request for a postponement was denied, Fichte believed that he had no other choice but to try to force his new system into some sort of communicable form, no matter how provisional. Thus, barely three months after his 6 See, above all, the fascinating, unpublished document prepared by Fichte for his own use during this period, "Eigne Meditationen tiber ElementarPhilosophie/Practische Philosophie" (AA II, 3: 1g-266). Concerning its relationship to Fichte's subsequent development, see Reinhold Lauth, "Genese du 'Fondement de toute Ia doctrine de Ia science' de Fichte a partir de ses 'Meditations personnelles sur I'elementarphilosophie,' " Archives de Philosophic 34 (1971): 51-79, a German version of which, "Die Entstehung von Fichtes 'Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre' nach den 'Eignen Meditationen tiber ElementarPhilosophie,' "is included in Lauth's Transzendentale Entwicklungslinien von Descartes bis zu Marx und Dostojewski (Hamburg: Meiner, 1989), pp. 155-79. See too Peter Baumanns, Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre: Probleme ihres Anfangs (Bonn: Bouvier, 1974), pp. 80-97. Compare this, however, with Fichte's own later account of the "sudden" nature of his new discovery, as reported by Henrick Steffens and by Fichte's nephew, Eduard Fichte, and quoted in Fichte im Gesprach, ed. Erich Fuchs, 5 vols. (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1978-), I: 63-64; English translation in EPW, pp. 12-13. Note too that Fichte himself sometimes claimed that the "basic insight" of the Wissenschaftslehre was discovered several years earlier, during his brief stay in Konigsberg. See, e.g., the version of this "discovery" reported in § 6 of the "Second Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre" (SW, I: 473 = AA I, 4: 25-26). 7 The name first appears in Fichte's March 1, 1794, letter to Karl Bottiger, in which he explains that the purpose of this name is to distinguish his system from the mere "love of knowledge," or "philosophy." Fichte's letters, which are here cited by date and recipient, are published in Reihe III of AA.

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Editor's Introduction

comment to Reinhold, he was installed at Jena, where he did his best to present the basic principles of his new system to his students. As a result of these events, Fichte had to compress into a few months' time the work of system building to which he had originally intended to dedicate several years of "uninterrupted leisure." The first opportunity to attempt to communicate his new systematic standpoint was not long in coming, thanks to an invitation he received to deliver a series of informal lectures to his friends and associates in Zurich. These lectures, which deserve to be called the first public presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre, took place in the late winter and early spring of 1794. 8 He himself created the next occasion to articulate some of the outlines of his new position by deciding to write a short book designed to furnish prospective students atjena with a general description of his enterprise and with an account of how such a philosophy was meant to relate to everyday life and to other forms of knowledge. This "invitational" work, titled Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre or of So-called Philosophy, was published in Jena in May 1794, just before Fichte arrived there. 9 Fichte had originally intended to offer during his first semester at Jena, in addition to his public lectures titled "Duties of Scholars,'' 10 two private courses: 11 one on "theoretical" and one on "practical" philosophy. He immediately abandoned this plan as overly ambitious, however, and concentrated instead upon presenting the "theoretical" portion of his new system, along with its first principles. In planning his lectures on "theoretical philosophy,'' Fichte was free to proceed as he pleased. As occupant of a chair devoted to "Critical philosophy,'' he might well have chosen to base his lectures upon readings from the published works of Kant or Reinhold. Or he might have dispensed with a text altogether and simply lectured from his own notes. Instead, he decided to write his own text; or, more precisely, he decided to have the text of his lectures printed and distributed to his students 8 No text of the body of these lectures has survived, though the concluding lecture was published by Fichte himself under the title Ueber die Wurde des Menschen (SW, 1: 412-16 = AA I, 2: 83-89; English translation, "Concerning Human Dignity," in EPW, pp. 83-86).

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Ueber den Beg;riff der Wissenschaftslehre oder der sogannten Philosophic (SW, 1:

29-

81 = AA I, 2: 107-63; English translation in EPW, 94-135). Note that though the work itself is about the Wissenschaftslehre (rather than a presentation of it), the original edition concluded with a brief "hypothetical account" of the overall structure of the new system. 10 The first five of these lectures were published in 1794 under the title Einige Vorlesungen uber die Bestimmung des Gelehrten (SW, VI: 291-346 = AA I, 3: 25-68; English translation, "Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar's Vocation," in EPW, pp. 144-84). 11 In contrast with their public lectures, which were free and open to the entire university community, professors at Jena (as at other German universities) also offered private classes, which were open only to officially enrolled, tuition-paying students. By law, professors were forbidden from exempting any student from this tuition charge (unless the student in question had been officially certified as indigent). Nevertheless, according to an anonymous report, Fichte routinely violated this law and never turned away a student because he was unable to pay the honorarium. See Fuchs, ed., Fichte im Gespriich, II: 101.

Editor's Introduction

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before each class, in order, as he explained, to allow his listeners to give their full attention to the topic at hand, without having to worry about taking notes. According to the original plan, these printed pages were to be distributed solely to the students attending Fichte's private lectures on theoretical philosophy and were not intended to be circulated among the general public. 12 Since the events and projects of the spring had left Fichte little time to prepare his lectures, he found himself in the difficult position of having to compose them as the semester progressed. Moreover, each portion of the manuscript had to be delivered to the printer far enough in advance so that the printed fascicles were available before the corresponding class meeting. The disadvantages of this method of composition became apparent to the author almost at once, leading him to complain that "no sooner had one sheet been read through than another had to appear, and thus I was forced to let it appear." 13 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine less congenial circumstances for the preparation and publication of a major philosophical treatise. In the years to come, Fichte himself frequently referred to these same extenuating circumstances to explain various shortcomings in the Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre, which is the title he gave to the printed version of his 1794f95 lectures. 14 By midsummer of 1794 he was already apologizing to an old friend: I am glad that you liked the style in which the invitational work [Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre] was written. Still, it makes me a bit uneasy that you concentrate so much upon the style. This text, and especially the preface to the same, was not written all at once; in order to be able to do this, one must have made the material entirely one's own, so that one can simply play with it and can freely bear the chains of the system, as if they were not chains at all. I have not mastered my own system in this manner, 12 See the previously mentioned letter to Bottiger, March 1, 1794: "I can now see for myself something I have known for some time: namely, how inconvenient for teacher and student alike it is to have to lecture without a textbook. This only serves to encourage the sort of thoughtless note-taking I would like to abolish entirely-at least so far as my own lectures are concerned. None of the available texts by Kant or Reinhold suits my purpose, nor can I write a textbook of my own between now and the end of next month. Thus the following expedient occurred to me: what if I were to distribute my textbook in installments during the course as a manuscript for the use of my listeners (since I absolutely wish to delay for a few years any presentation of my system for the public at large)? In any event, I would like to defy the usual sneers with which printed texts that are supposed to be treated as manuscripts are greeted. Isn't this the same as when a professor reads from his own lecture notes? In order to show that I am serious about this, the text should not be published in a regular trade edition at all, but should be distributed only on my instructions to my students and others whom I might designate to receive it." 13 Fichte to Goethe, September go, 1794. 14 Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre [henceforth GWL] (SW, 1: 8&-328 = AA I, 2: 251-461; translated into English as "Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge" by Peter Heath in SK, pp. 89-286).

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Editor's Introduction however, and it will be difficult for me ever to accomplish this, for it is profound. Nevertheless, I will wait for this to happen and will devote effort to the task. Concerning this same point, you will not be satisfied with the textbook I am now writing (which you can read when you arrive). To be sure, I could have written better, but I had to let it go as it stood, since the printer needed the manuscript and I needed a text for my lectures. 15

For some reason (quite possibly the welcome prospect of income from sales), 16 Fichte soon abandoned his original resolve not to issue a public edition of his printed lectures. Accordingly, in September 1794, the first half of the Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre (Parts I and II) was publicly advertised and offered for sale by the Jena firm of Christian Gabler, albeit with a title page that included the note "a manuscript for the use of his students." In the winter semester of 1794"95 Fichte offered two private courses: one in which he dealt with the "practical" portion of his new system (Part III of the Foundations) and another devoted to "specifically theoretical" aspects of the Wissenschaftslehre. 17 It appears that in these courses he continued his practice of having his text printed and distributed in installments to his students. In any case, by midsummer of 1795 both these two new texts (Part III of the Foundations, as well as the Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftslehre with Respect to the Theoretical Faculty) were available for public distribution and sale, 18 though, 15 Letter to F. A. Weisshuhn, July 1794. The same point is repeated in other letters of the period. See, e.g., Fichte's letter to Goethe of June 21, 1794, as well as his July 2, 1795, letter to Reinhold, in which he begs his correspondent to "bear in mind that what you have received so far is a manuscript for the use of my students. It was hastily written while I was busy with my lectures (in the winter semester I had three lecture courses, all of which had to be worked out almost completely) and with a thousand other diverse activities. I had to see that the written sheets came to an end at the same time as the lectures." 16 See the comment in Fichte's May 26, 1794, letter to his wife, in which, after complaining about his meager income, he went on to express his hopes of earning some additional money from his writings. After reporting that he was engaged "in writing a book for my lectures," he added that he had just received from his publisher a payment of "2 .;. louis d'or = 21 Zurich florins" for the first pages. A bit later in the same paragraph Fichte said he hoped to earn as much as 500 florins from his literary activities during the first semester. By June 14-17, 1794, in another letter to Johanna, he had already raised the estimate of how much he expected to earn from his textbook to "6oo florins." In this same letter he also divulged his plans to write two more texts ("Lehrbiicher"-Pt. III of the Foundations and the Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftslehre with Respect to the Theoretical Faculty) during the winter semester, the income from which would, he anticipated, alleviate his precarious financial situation. From these passages it appears, first of all, that Fichte almost immediately abandoned his original plan not to publish the Grundlage, and second, that purely financial considerations played at least some role in this decision. 17 Grundri{J des Eigentiimlichen der Wissenschaftslehre in Riiksicht auf das theoretische Vermogen [henceforth GEWL] (SW, 1: 331-411 = AA I, 3: 137-208; English translation in EPW, pp.

24~-306).

8 A one-volume edition of the Foundations, including all three parts, plus the preface to the whole, originally issued along with Part III, was published by Gabler in September

Editor's Introduction

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once again, their title pages bore the somewhat unconvincing disclaimer that they were "manuscripts for the use of his students." This caveat was repeated in the general preface to the Foundations, in which the author began with the reminder that "this book was not really intended for the public" and then went on to confess: I myself declare this presentation to be extremely imperfect and defective: in part, because it had to be published in individual fascicles, as I needed it for my lectures, and for the use of my students, where I could augment it through verbal presentation; and in part, because I have sought, insofar as possible, to avoid any fixed terminology-which is the easiest way for literalists to rob any system of its spirit and to transform it into a dried-out skeleton. I shall remain true to this maxim in future revisions of the system, · until I have arrived at the final and complete presentation of it. 19

From the very beginning, therefore, Fichte considered the Foundations nothing more than a provisional exposition of the first principles of the Wissenschaftslehre and anticipated that it would soon be replaced by a more adequate exposition. This point was reinforced by the advertisement (almost certainly written by Fichte himself) for the first half of the Foundations, in which the following passage occurs: The author believes he owes it to the public to declare explicitly that the present work, which stems from his lectures, is incomplete in his own eyes. It will still be several years before he can hope to present this work to the public in a worthy form. Until then, he requests that the book be considered no more than a manuscript the author had printed for the convenience of his students, considering that preferable to having them copy it down as he lectured. It is for this reason that he is reluctant to see it submitted to public criticism. 20

Nevertheless, by the fall of 1795 readers all over the German-speaking world were able to purchase and to study what everyone began referring to simply as "Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre." Fichte himself, however, never intended these published lectures to be an adequate presentation of his entire system; on the contrary, as the very title of the Foundations declares, this work is merely a presentation of the "foundations" or "first principles" of a much larger system, whereas the Outline (which attempts 1795. Note that Fichte himself always treated the Outline as an integral part of the system sketched out in the Foundations. Hence, when a second edition of the latter was finally published in 1802, it appeared in a single volume along with the Outline. 19 SW, 1: 87 = AA I, 2: 252. 20 This advertisement first appeared in the October 1, 1794, "lntelligenzblatt" of the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung and is reprinted in AA I, 2: 183.

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Editor's Introduction

to derive from these first principles what Fichte took to be the assumptions of the Critique of Pure Reason, namely, space, time, and the manifold of sensible intuition) represents an extension into the narrower field of "theoretical philosophy." Accordingly, for the next few semesters Fichte turned his attention almost exclusively to the elaboration of the "practical" portions of his system-specifically, to an examination and presentation of its implications for the theory of "natural right" (or natural law) and for ethics. 21 Fichte's Dissatisfaction with the Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre As we have seen, Fichte's own doubts concerning the published Foundations were apparent from the start, and these personal misgivings were quickly confirmed by the public criticism-indeed, ridicule-to which the work was subjected. Fichte's typical response toward any criticism of his system was to attribute it either to personal animosity or to sheer misunderstanding, and he seldom hesitated to blame the latter on the professional incapacities or moral failings of his critics. Nor did he consider failures of understanding to be limited to his adversaries; for, as he soon came to realize, some of the most serious and fateful misreadings of his philosophy were to be found among the more enthusiastic supporters and exponents of the Wissenschaftslehre. 22 Fichte always displayed a starkly ambivalent attitude toward his readers and toward what he considered to be the failure of friends and foes alike to understand and to appreciate his project-if not the execution thereof. Often, he appeared thoroughly exasperated by what seemed to him his readers' almost willful failure to understand his writings, which 21 See the two systematic treatises Fichte prepared during the period 1795197, treatises that, like the Grundlage, originated as private lecture courses: Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Principien der Wissenschaftslehre, published in two parts in 1796 and 1797 (SW, III: 1385 = AA I, 3: 313-460 and AA I, 4: 5-165) and Das System der Sittenlehre nach den Principien der Wissenschaftslehre (SW, IV: 1-365 = AA I, 5: 19-317). Both these important works were translated (albeit very inadequately) into English by A. E. Kroeger in the previous century: The Science of Rights (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1869) and The Science of Ethics as Based on the Science of Knowledge (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibner, 1897). 22 See, e.g., the following passage from an unfinished and unpublished essay written during the fall of 18oo, in which Fichte attempted to take stock of the public reception of his philosophy: "The Foundations of the [Entire] Wissenschaftslehre [ ... ]is useless, at least for those who have spoken in public about it. For, as I gather from almost all public judgments of my philosophy and from the reproaches of opponents who actually want the very same thing that I do, as well as from the objections to my philosophy and from the new efforts that are devoted to philosophy, no one yet possesses any knowledge whatsoever of what I am attempting to do. And anyone who does not already know this and has not learned it from the previously mentioned writings and treatises must necessarily misunderstand the Foundations completely, in which case the approval that this work has received here and there is an even worse sign than the disapproval it has encountered" (AA II, 5: 438).

Editor's Introduction

9

he defended as perfectly adequate in their own right. Sometimes, as in the unpublished "Report on the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre and the Fate of the Same so far" of 18o6, he defended his first presentation in just these terms; 23 more often, however, he displayed a more charitable attitude toward the readers of this work and assumed at least part of the responsibility for what he considered to be the well-nigh universal failure of readers to understand the Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre. Rather than defend the Foundations, he more often directed those who raised questions or objections concerning it to his other writings, even as he continued to chide his critics for failing to heed his warning that the work in question was "never intended for anyone" beyond his own students. 24 Ironically, Fichte's published and unpublished writings contain a far greater number of negative comments about this, his most famous and influential book, than about anything else he ever wrote. In attempting to account for the failure of the Foundations, Fichte tended to blame certain defects in the manner of presentation he had adopted in it. For example, in the preface to the first installment of his Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre (1797), immediately after rejecting all public criticism of his system as based upon nothing more than sheer misunderstanding, he added: "I am willing to bear all the blame for the latter, until such time as people have had an opportunity to become acquainted with the contents of my system in some other form, in which case they may find that the original presentation is not so totally inaccessible after all." 25 Consistent with this self-criticism, Fichte lost no opportunity during the next several years to rectify the inadequacies of his first presentation and to deflect attention from the Foundations. In pursuit of this aim, he directly addressed various criticisms and misunderstandings in a series of polemical essays, some of which include brilliant summaries of the overall gist and strategy of the Wissenschaftslehre. 26 Furthermore, he prefaced each of the two major systematic works he published in the 23 "The old presentation [the Foundations] is good and sufficient for the time being." Bericht ilber den Begriff der Wissen.schaftslehre und die bisherigen Schicksale derselben (SW, VI II: 368). 24 "What have you found unsatisfactory in my previous presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre? Surely not the principles? If you are dissatisfied with the manner of deduction, and if you are speaking of the published Foundations, then you are quite right to find much that is unsatisfactory. This text was never intended for anyone but my own students. Friend and foe alike have generally overlooked this" (Fichte to Schmidt, March 17, 1799). 25 SW, I: 420 = AA I, 4: 184. 26 An especially noteworthy example is provided by the Vergleichung des vom Herrn Prof Schmid aufgestellten Systems mit der Wissen.schaftslehre, which Fichte published in the Philosophisches Journal in the spring of 1796 (SW, II: 421-58 = AA I, 3: 235-66; partial English translation, "A Comparison between Prof. Schmid's System and the Wissen.schaftslehre," in EPW, pp. 316-4o).

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next few years (the Foundations of Natural Right and the System of Ethical

Theory) with succinct reformulations of the basic tenets of his philosophy.

Such essays and passages, however, were never intended to be anything more than provisional measures, temporary means for correcting the public's judgment of the Wissenschaftslehre until such time as he could replace the first, inadequate presentation of the foundations of the same with a more adequate and less easily misunderstood new presentation. Thus he frequently announced his intention to provide, at the first opportunity, an entirely new presentation in his private lectures. 27 Before turning to these new lectures, however, let us pause to consider more closely the nature of Fichte's dissatisfaction with his previous presentation. What did he consider to be defective about the Foundations, and how did he himself account for these shortcomings? The chief shortcoming of the first presentation of the foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre, according to its author, was a lack of systematic unity. "It gives off sfarks of spirit," he confessed to Reinhold, "but it is not a single flame." 2 In other words, his complaint concerned the form rather than the content of the presentation (though, of course, for anyone who attaches as much importance to "systematic form" as Fichte did, this is by no means an inconsequential objection). Fichte offered a variety of explanations for the formal inadequacy of the Foundations and the defective character of its presentation. First of all, as we have already seen, he called attention to the (admittedly selfimposed) external pressure he was under at the time, and specifically, to the deleterious effect of the deadlines dictated by the printer. And indeed, one would expect that a work written under such circumstances, in which the separate pages went to the printer before the ink had had time to dry and the first sections were printed and circulated before the later ones were even drafted, might well display a certain lack of formal unity. Second, he called attention to the fact that the Foundations was written at a time when the "discovery" of the Wissenschaftslehre was still fresh (if not still under way) and when the basic outlines, to say nothing of the details, of his system were not yet firmly fixed in his own mind. In this vein, he chastised Reinhold for paying too much attention to the pre27 See, e.g., the following passage from a letter written from Bremen in August 1796 by one of Fichte's ex-students, Johann Smidt, to J. F. Herbart, who was then attending Fichte's lectures in Jena: "Also write me something concerning Fichte's theory of freedom. I do not know how it looks now, since he has revised it at least three times. The last I heard from him in Jena was that he was no longer entirely satisfied with his previous ideas on this topic-though he himself did not at that time know what he would replace them with" . (Fuchs, ed., Fichte im Gespriich, I: 370). 28 Letter to Reinhold, March 21, 1797: "Your evaluation of my presentation, as it has appeared so far, is much too favorable. Or perhaps the content has allowed you to overlook the deficiency of the presentation. I consider it to be most imperfect. Yes, I know that it gives off sparks of spirit, but it is not a single flame."

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I I

sentation of 1794'95 and added: "Concerning the main points I am certain, but once someone has grasped these he does far better to rely on himself rather than on this very immature presentation. How much more clearly I understand this science now!" 29 Fichte makes a similar point at the very beginning of the Halle transcript of the Wissenschaftslehre nuva methodo, where he notes that the new exposition of the first principles of transcendental philosophy would be presented with "a liberty for which the author was not yet sufficiently self-confident at the time that he published his Wissenschaftslehre. "30 A third explanation that Fichte offered for the inadequacy of the Foundations concerns the specific theoretical context within which it was conceived and elaborated: namely, the context determined by (1) Kant's Critiques, (2) Reinhold's attempt to reconstruct the Critical philosophy in the form of a system derived "from a single principle," and (3) Schulze's skeptical criticisms of them both. Above all, it is the Foundations' close reliance upon some of the key ideas and even the terminology of the Elementarphilosophie which Fichte appears to have had foremost in mind when he later remarked that "my published Wissenschaftslehre bears too many traces of the time in which it was written and of the manner of philosophizing which then prevailed. This made it more obscure than a presentation of transcendental idealism needs to be."31 An example of what Fichte may have meant by this veiled reference is provided by Part I of the Foundations, which purports to present the three "first principles" of the new system. This entire discussion, which is heavily indebted to Reinhold's account of the nature and starting point of a philosophical system and, indeed, has its roots in the rationalism that dominated German philosophy before Kant, 32 is dispensed with entirely in the new presentation of 1796/99, which completely abandons all the talk about "first principles" that was so characteristic of the earlier presentation. Another example of how the presentation contained in the Foundations may have been unduly influenced by "the manner of philosophizing which then prevailed" is the organization of the work into a "theoretical" and a "practical" portion. A sharp distinction between theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy, which, of course, has its roots in Kant's distinction between the spheres of theoretical and Letter to Reinhold, July 4• 1797 · IV, 2: 17. See below, p. 86. 31 Letter to Friedrich Johannsen, January 31, 1801. 32 As Heinz Heimsoeth points out, "the demand for the 'supreme first principle' of all knowledge runs from Wolff to Kant and from Kant to Reinhold"; hence the demand for a "first principle," which is such a salient feature of the first presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre, is, at the same time, the most backward-looking aspect of it. "Fichtes Systementwicklung in seinen Jenenser Vorlesungen," Blatter fur Deutsche Philosophie 13 (1939): 168. 29

30 AA

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practical reason, was also a feature of Reinhold's Elementarphilosophie (though, the latter's treatment of practical philosophy was, as Fichte noted, perfunctory at best). One of the chief aims of the Wissenschaftslehre was to take seriously the celebrated Kantian dictum concerning "the primacy of practical reason" and to demonstrate not simply the practical primacy of practical reason, but its primacy within the theoretical sphere as well-to show that willing is a condition for knowing, and thereby to demonstrate the unity of theory and practice. Indeed, as Fichte boasted, the biggest advance of the Wissenschaftslehre over the letter (if not the spirit) of the Kantian philosophy was that, by choosing as its starting point the self-positing of the I, it was able to overcome the Kantian distinction between theory and practice and thus to unify in a single presentation speculative, theoretical, and practical reason, thereby displaying "the unity underlying all three Critiques." 33 The Foundations was intended to display this very unity in a revolutionary new manner. Unfortunately, however, many readers were prevented from recognizing this achievement precisely because of its form, more specifically, because of its division into "theoretical" and "practical" portions, a division obviously influenced by the author's intense engagement during 1793/94 with the writings of Kant and Reinhold. Nothing interfered more with the overall project of presenting "philosophy as a whole" 34 than this theoreticaVpractical structure of the first presentation. Yet another way in which the Foundations was indebted to Reinhold's Elementarphilosophie was in its method of presentation and in the overall path of the inquiry, which begins with an "absolute first principle" (that is, with something purely intelligible, the productive deed or Act of the I) and then proceeds to the "deduction" of the realm of empirical experience. Though such a method would present no particular problems to those familiar with the rationalistic systematic ideal underlying Reinhold's enterprise, Fichte discovered that many of his students and readers had great difficulty following the path of his argument; indeed, many professed to be unable even to locate its starting point. Accordingly, in his new presentation, he chose to follow what he himself described as a "much more natural path," one that reversed the direction of the previous presentation and proceeded from empirical experience ss Fichte to Reinhold, July 2, 1795. S4 This is emphasized in the paragraph that stands at the head of the Halle transcript of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo: "In the present lectures, however, the hitherto familiar division between theoretical and practical philosophy is not to be found. Instead, these lectures present philosophy as a whole, in the exposition of which theoretical and practical philosophy are united. This presentation follows a much more natural path, beginning with the practical sphere, or, whenever it would contribute to the clarity of the exposition to do so, transforming the practical into the theoretical, in order to explain the latter in terms of the former: a liberty for which the author was not yet sufficiently self-confident at the time that he published his Wissenschaftslehre" (AA IV, 2: 17; see below, p. 86).

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to intelligible conditions-from Tatsache to Tathandlung rather than vice versa. 35 Rather than having to begin their study of the Wissenschaftslehre by grappling with an "absolute first principle" asserting that "the I simply posits itself," readers of the new presentation would simply be asked to "think about the wall." To be sure, Fichte's frequent criticisms of the Foundations' form and manner of presentation were never intended to imply that it was false or invalid. Instead, he conceded merely that many readers had found his original presentation obscure and difficult to grasp. Accordingly, he always viewed the task of composing a new one as that of finding new wineskins for old wine and not as that of altering the actual content or principles of his system. In short, his reasons for wanting to replace the original presentation with a new one were entirely pedagogic. Finally, in addition to the external circumstances of its composition and its undue reliance upon outdated principles of presentation, Fichte sometimes attributed the Foundations' failure to meet with public approval (or at least understanding) to his own deficiencies as an author. More specifically, he blamed what he perceived to be his lack of empathy with his readers: "I am so little capable of placing myself in the frame of mind of the reading public; I always assume that many things are selfevident which hardly anyone else finds to be so."36 To the extent that this represents a fair description of Fichte's limitations as an author, it is difficult to see how he could ever hope to remedy them in any presentation of his system, no matter how "new." And indeed, as we shall see, it was his own growing self-awareness of this "deficiency" which, more than anything else, accounts for his later decision not to publish any of the many subsequent versions ofthe Wissenschaftslehre, but rather to confine himself exclusively to oral presentations, which permitted him more easily to "empathize" with his listeners and directly to address their doubts and questions. Fichte's Lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo Fichte did not lecture on the first principles of the Wissenschaftslehre during the 1795/96 academic year (when he was preoccupied with the preparation and publication of his treatment of natural right), though he had "long announced his intention to use a new manuscript as 35 "Prompted by the circumstances of the time, the primary aim of the earlier version was to show that all our consciousness has its foundation in the eternally valid laws of our thinking. In addition to this, however, this new presentation also provides us with the intelligible world as a solid substrate for the empirical one" (AA IV, 2: 150; see below, p. 314). Tatsache is the ordinary German word for "fact"; Tathandlung is a word Fichte invented to designate the (self-)productive deed of the I, and in this volume it is translated as "Act." 36 Letter to Reinhold, April 22, 1799·

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the basis for his lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre. "37 Accordingly, for the summer semester of 1796 he announced a private course on "the foundations of transcendental philosophy (or, in the vernacular, Wissenschaftslehre)."38 In fact, however, he canceled his classes for the summer semester of 1796 and did not lecture again until the winter semester of 1796/97. Though the reasons for this cancellation are unclear, at least one explanation may be that Fichte found himself unable to complete his total revision of the presentation of the first principles of the Wissenschaftslehre in time for the new semester and was unwilling simply to repeat his lectures of 1794/95. 39 Therefore, it seems likely that he devoted most of his effort during the summer to this "new presentation." In any event, the course catalog for the winter semester of 1796/97 announced that Fichte would be offering a private course on "the foundations of transcendental philosophy (the Wissenschaftslehre) according to a new method and in a more expeditious fashion, according to a manuscript, but based upon his books. [ ... ] During the vacation he will publicly announce the plan of his course on transcendental philosophy."40 Before the opening of the semester, which officially began on October 17, Fichte wrote to Reinhold that he was busy with "two courses I have taught before, but which I am working on as if I had never worked them out before." 41 That Fichte actually accomplished this total revision, at least insofar as his lectures on the foundations of transcendental philosophy were concerned, is confirmed by another letter to Reinhold written at the end of the winter semester (March 1797), in which he remarked: "I have completely reworked my presentation, just as if I had 37 J. F. Herbart to Johann Smidt, July 1, 1796. The passage from the letter in which this report is included is worth quoting at length, simply as evidence of how completely Fichte's better students were caught up in the spirit of his enterprise. Thus Herbart writes to his friend that "this summer I am chiefly occupied with the task of trying to come to terms once and for all with the Wissenschaftslehre-i.e. (though I say this in confidence), to construct one for myself. For the fact is that, even though I would never have amounted to anything at all without Fichte, I am unable to recognize the unqualified truth of even a single page of his book-in the form in which it now stands. I feel that it is permissible for me to whisper this candidly to a friend, and the best evidence that this is permissible is surely the fact that Fichte himself has long announced his intention to use a new manuscript as the basis for his lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre next winter (since the course was not offered this summer). Hence my desire first to seek my salvation on my own is all the greater" (Fuchs, ed., Fichte im Gespriich, I: 360). 38 In the advance course catalog (catalogus praelectionum), this course was described as "privatissime fundamento philosophiae transcendentalis (vernacule die Wissenschaftslehre)." For a complete listing of all Fichte's lectures at Jena, see EPW, pp. 46-49. 39 This is the explanation proposed by Ives Radrizzani in the preface to his French translation of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo: La Doctrine de Ia Science Nova Methodo, suivi de Essai d'une Nouvelle Presentation de Ia Doctine de Ia Science (Lausanne: Editions de l'Age d'Homme, 1989), p. 13. '' 40 "privatim: hora III-IV fundamenta philosophiae transscendentalis (die Wissenschaftslehre) nova methodo, et Longe expeditiori, secundum dictata adhibitis suis libris exponet. { . .. ] Publice per ferias rationem lectionum suarum in philosophiam transscendentolem reddet. 41 Letter to Reinhold, August 27, 1796.

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15

never worked it out at all and as if I knew nothing about the old presentation." In this, as well as in each of the two following winter semesters, Fichte lectured on the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo every weekday afternoon from three to four, from which one can calculate that the entire course was divided into approximately sixty one-hour lectures. 42 Before proceeding to discuss the two subsequent series of lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nava methodo, however, let us pause to address a question raised by the course catalog's description of the lectures of 1796/97: Why did Fichte continue to describe this profoundly different presentation of the first principles of his system as "based upon his books"? Two, by no means incompatible, answers suggest themselves. First, it is possible that by acquainting his students with two different versions of what he always insisted was only one and the same system, he meant to demonstrate a point often emphasized in his public and private comments on his various presentations of the Wissenschaftslehre: the importance of attaching as little value as possible to the "letter" of his system and of seeking instead to discover its underlying "spirit."43 In Fichte's estimation, it was by no means a disadvantage for a philosopher to alter the terminology in which his system was presented; instead, it was a clear virtue and, indeed, for an author such as Fichte, a virtual necessity. Hence he often called attention to his own, explicit decision to eschew any fixed terminology in the presentation of his system and frequently emphasized the fact that "the Wissenschaftslehre possesses no special terminology of its own." 44 And indeed, to the occasional despair of scholars and students, each successive version of his system ( 1793/94• 1794/95• 1796/99· I8o1/2, 18o4/5, etc.) possesses its own distinctive vocabulary and method of presentation. On the one hand, it is easy to imagine the extreme confusion that must have been produced in the minds of students attending Fichte's lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nava methodo when they turned to the Foundations of the Entire Wissenschoftslehre for assistance in unriddling the difficulties of the former! On the other hand, 42 See the discussion of this point by Erich Fuchs in the introduction to his edition of the Krause transcript: J. G. Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre noua methodo. Koller;no.chschrift Chr. Fr. Krause 1798/99 (Hamburg: Meiner, 1982), p. xii. 43 This point is emphasized in the brief preface that Fichte wrote in August 1801 for the second, one-volume edition of the Foundations and Outline: "The majority of the philosophical public still does not seem so well prepared for this new point of view that they will find it useless to have the same content available in two very different forms, nor will it be useless for them to learn to recognize this identity of content for themselves" (SW, 1: 85 = AA I, 2: 461; English translation, EPW, pp. 238-39). 44 Fichte to Reinhold, July 4, 1797. See too the previously quoted remarks on this topic contained in the preface to the first edition of the Foundations and in the preface to the second edition of Concerning the Concept, in which Fichte reaffirms his initial decision to present his system in a "a form that shuns the fixed letter" and "protects its inner spirit" (SW, 1: 36 = AA I, 2: 162).

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as Siegfried Berger observed in his pioneering work on the Wissenschaftslehre nooa methodo, "this difficulty into which Fichte plunged his listeners corresponded precisely with his pedagogic first principle: 'Think for yourself!' "45 A second possible explanation for Fichte's surprising decision to employ his old textbooks in conjunction with his new lectures is less exalted: perhaps he simply wanted the income from the sales of the older presentation, or perhaps he wished to deplete the existing stock of the older version to clear the way for the publication of a "new presentation" of the first principles of the Wissenschaftslehre. 46 In the light of Fichte's undoubtedly sincere conviction that the content of his earlier presentation remained valid, this explanation is perhaps not as cynical as it may appear; and many readers of the Foundations and the Wissenschaftslehre nooa methodo have discovered that the two presentations do in fact complement and illuminate each other-though this is hardly apparent upon a first reading. For the winter semester of 1797/gS, which began on October 16, Fichte once again offered a private course of lectures on the first principles of his system, this time described in the catalog as "foundations of transcendental philosophy on the basis of his books, The Foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre and the Outline of the Distinctive Character [of the Wissenschaftslehre with Respect to the Theoretical Faculty]."41 On the basis of this 45 Siegfried Berger, Ueber eine unverOJ!entlichte Wissenschaftslehre J G. Fichtes aenaer Kolleghandschrift der Halleschen Universitiitsbibliothek Y g 21.) (Marburg: Noske, 1918), p. 4· 46 In the fall of 1799, Fichte's publisher, Christian Ernst Gabler, reminded Fichte (who was then at work on his "New Presentation" of the Wissenschaftslehre) that "the original version is not yet completely sold out." After politely asking the author to bear this fact in mind while preparing his "New Presentation," Gabler then went on to suggest that the projected new book should include as many references as possible to Fichte's earlier writings-to help deplete the publisher's remaining stock. See Gabler's November 11, 1799, letter to Fichte. Anyone who studies Fichte's correspondence is likely to be astonished by how much of it is devoted to purely financial problems and questions, including lawsuits with publishers, inquiries about sales and royalties, and so on. To be sure, such a concern is quite understandable on the part of anyone in Fichte's extraordinary personal and financial circumstances. What is less understandable is how completely these same circumstances have been ignored by succeeding generations of Fichte scholars. This is unfortunate, since it is quite unlikely that one can obtain an accurate understanding of the genesis and evolution of Fichte's philosophy, and especially of the publication history of his writings, by willfully ignoring his peculiar personal circumstances. As an example of the possible distortions produced by such an "ideal" approach to the study of the history of philosophy, consider the claim made by Berger (and many others) that Fichte's decision in 1801 to authorize a second edition of the Foundations demonstrates that "despite his closer acquaintance with all its shortcomings, he must have still considered it to be correct in its fundamental thoughts" (Ueber eine unverOJ!entlichte Wissenschaftslehre, p. 95). Then again, as an unemployed ex-professor trying to earn a living as an author, he may have been more concerned with the extra income from a second edition of the Foundations than with reaffirming the "co~ctness" of a work whose manner of presentation he himself had criticized so sharply. 47 ''privatim: hora III-IV fundamenta philosophiae transscendentalis ex suis libris (Grundlage der Wissenschaftslehre, et, GrundrijJ des Eigenthiimlichen, etc.)."

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17

description, some previous scholars, beginning with Hans Jacob, 48 concluded that in 1797/98 Fichte did not lecture on the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo at all, but instead based his course upon the 1794/95 presentation of the foundations of his system. All more recent scholars, however, agree that it is far more likely that in the winter semester of 1797/98 Fichte repeated his lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre nwa methodo from,the previous year, while at the same time making a greater and more concerted effort to emphasize the relationship between this new presentation of the foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre and the older one. This is also suggested by the following description of the course, written by Fichte himself and recently discovered among his papers: Many of my listeners have been unwilling to dispense with the convenience of a printed textbook for these lectures. In order to satisfy this desire, I will this time follow more closely my published books concerning the Wissenschaftslehre (Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschfl. u. Grundrif3 des Eigentiimlichen) than I did in my last lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre, though without dis-

pensing with whatever, as a result of further reflection, I can contribute to the greater clarity of this science.49

Fichte offered his lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre nwa methodo for one last time in the winter semester of 1798/99, when the course was described as "foundations of transcendental philosophy (the Wissenschaftslehre) according to a new method, but utilizing his books." 50 Though the semester officially began on October 15, 1798, Fichte apparently did not begin his private lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre nwa methodo until October 25. 51 The course ended on March 14, 1799, at the very moment when the so-called Atheism Controversy was reaching its denouement. By the end of the month Fichte had forfeited his position at the institution that had received him so warmly scarcely five years earlier. 48 See Jacob's preface to Fichte, Nachgelassene Schriften, Vol. II: Schriften aus den Jahren I79o-I8oo (Berlin: Junker und Diinnhaupt, 1937), p. xxix. Note, however, that the announcement of the 1798/gg lectures, which, thanks to the discovery of the Krause transcript, we can now be certain were devoted to a presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre nuva methodo, also mentions that in his lectures Fichte will be "utilizing his books" ("tamen sui Iibris"), though they are not mentioned by name. 49 AA IV, 2: 5· Commenting on this description, the editors of AA IV, 2 cautiously observe that it is quite possible that Fichte simply meant "to emphasize that he still adhered to the fundamental thoughts of the printed Wissenschaftslehre, so that the latter could still serve as a textbook for his lectures." 50 "privatim: hora III-IV Jundamenta philosophiae transscendentalis (die Wissenschaftslehre) nuva methodo, adhibitis tamen suis libris, exponet." 51 The evidence for this is a comment in an October 24, 17g8,letter from Krause to his father, in which he mentions that the class will begin the next day. The relevant passage is published by Erich Fuchs in his introduction to the Krause transcript, p. x.

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Plans to Publish a "New Presentation" of the Wissenschaftslehre From the very beginning, Fichte clearly intended to publish his new presentation of the first principles of his system. This time, however, he wished to avoid the mistake he had made by his decision to publish the first version prematurely. Instead, his plan was first to deliver a course of lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo and then to revise them for publication. 52 But rather than publish these revised lectures in a single volume, he intended to publish them first in installments in the Philosophisches journal einer Gesellschaft Teutscher Gelehrten, a Journal jointly edited by Fichte and his colleague F. I. Niethammer. 5 And indeed, between February 1797 and March 1798 two introductions to this new version, as well as its first chapter, appeared in four installments in the Philosophisches journal, under the general title "An Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre. "54 No further installments appeared, though Fichte did not abandon his plans for the eventual publication of this new presentation of his system, as he made clear in a public announcement he included in the preface to the second edition of Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre, published in the fall of 1798. Here he informed his readers: I will for the present proceed no further with the systematic elaboration of this system; instead, I will first try to elaborate more fully what has already been discovered and to make it completely clear and obvious to every impartial person. A first step in this direction has already been taken in the previously mentioned journal, and I will proceed with this project to the extent that my academic duties permit. I have heard from several sources that many persons have found these essays illuminating, and if the public attitude toward the new theory has not been more generally altered, this might well be due to the fact that the journal in question seems not to have a very wide circulation. With the same aim in mind, just as soon as time permits, I intend to publish a new attempt at a purely and strictly systematic presentation of the foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre. 55 Fichte explicitly reaffirmed this same plan a year later, in his March 17, 1799, letter to J. E. C. Schmidt, where he remarks: "For three years I have been working on and lecturing from a new version [of the Wissen52 One should recall that all the major systematic works Fichte published while at Jena (the Grundlage, the Grundri{J, the Naturrecht, and the Sittenlehre) were first presented to his students in the form of lectures. 53 See Fichte's March 21, 1797, letter to Reinhold, in which he remarks: "I intend to have this revised version published in our Philosophisches Journal." 54 Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wi.ssenschaftslehre (SW, 1: 419-534 = AA I, 4: 183281). 55 SW, 1: 37 = AA I, 2: 163.

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schaftslehre], the first chapter of which has been printed in the journal. I intend to have this new presentation published next winter. If you still take exception here and there, I would advise you to wait for this new revision." By the "next winter," however, Fichte had other things to worry about and was living in Berlin, where he had sought refuge in the wake of the Atheism Controversy. Since he had no academic appointment in Berlin, Fichte had to make plans to support himself purely from the proceeds of his literary activities, and among the literary projects to which he frequently referred in his correspondence of this period is the plan to publish the "New Presentation" of the first principles of the Wissenschaftslehre. Other, previously unanticipated projects, however-such as defending himself against the charge of atheism and writing The Vocation of Man (two projects that were, in fact, intimately related)-took priority during his first year in Berlin. In any case, in August 1799, shortly after he arrived in Berlin, Fichte wrote to his wife (who had remained behind to settle their affairs in Jena): "My plans are currently as follows: As soon as the printing of my Vocation of Man is finished, I shall return to Jena, where I will spend the winter working on my philosophy of religion and, so far as it proves possible, on the new version of my Wissenschaftslehre. I will publish the former by subscription. Even on the worst scenario, these works should earn enough for us to be able to live well from them for a few years." 56 In another letter to his wife, written a bit later in the fall of the same year, he returned to the subject of his literary projects and remarked: "In addition, I have on hand a fine manuscript, the new version of the Wissenschaftslehre, which can also be made salable with a minimum of effort and for which I also hope to fetch a good price. Thus there is no reason at all for you to be concerned about our support.'' 57 Such remarks indicate that, though Fichte had to postpone his plans for publishing the new version of the foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre, he had by no means abandoned them at this point. Furthermore, it is clear, first of all, that he believed that some revision would be needed before the text would be ready for the press, and second, that he did not anticipate that the needed revision of this "fine manuscript" would require much additional effort. By the beginning of the next year, however, other projects had intervened, and though Fichte still intended to revise the "New Presentation" for publication, this project appears last on a list of four he mentioned in a letter to his publisher, J. F. Cotta. 58 Here Fichte describes Letter to Johanna Fichte, August 20-24, •799· Letter to Johanna Fichte, October 28-November 2, •799· 58 Fichte to Cotta, January 13, 1800. In this letter Fichte lists his current projects in the following order: (1) a critique of the new French Constitution, accompanied by clearer 56 57

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the new version as "a new (much clearer and smoother) presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre (perhaps as a commentary or something similar, inasmuch as a new, generally unaltered reprint of the sold-out first Wissenschaftslehre is scheduled to appear). The manuscript has been finished for years; I used it in my lectures. It is desired by everyone who knows of its existence. It cannot appear, however, without a proper revision." From the last comment it appears that, Fichte's earlier assurances to his wife notwithstanding, he was beginning to have second thoughts about how much work would be needed to put the "New Presentation" into publishable form. As it turned out, Fichte devoted the first half of 18oo to projects not even alluded to in his january 13 letter to Cotta: an essay for the Philosophisches Journal, in which he once again stated his views on the relationship between religion and philosophy, 59 and an entirely new book on political economy, which was published in November under the title The Closed Commercial State. 60 Consequently, he was not able to return to the projected revision of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo until the fall of 1800, though he assured Cotta (in a letter of August 16, 1800): "This coming winter I hope to get to work for you on the editing of the new version of the Wissenschaftslehre, which has been finished for years." Even then, Fichte did not turn immediately to this oft-postponed project, but first composed a sharply critical review of C. G. Bardili's Outlines of Primary Logic, a project to which he was driven by Reinhold's unanticipated departure from his period of short-lived enthusiasm for Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre and conversion to the standpoint of Bardili's "rational realism."61 By the end of October 18oo, however, Fichte had finished the Bardili review and was at last ready to set to work in earnest on the task of revising the manuscript of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. It appears that Fichte's decision to dedicate the winter of 1800 to this effort was, once again, dictated at least in part by external circumstances, namely, by a request to give private lessons on the Wissenpresentation of his own views concerning the nature of a proper constitution; (2) a public reply to Jacobi's open letter to Fichte; (3) a popular introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre, to be titled A Crystal Clear Report to the General Public Concerning the Actual Essence of My Philosophy; and (4) the new presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre. Only the third of these projects ever came to fruition. Fichte's Sonnenlllo.rer Bericht an das GrOs.sere Publilrum iiber das Wesen der neuesten Philosophie was eventually published in the spring of 1801, albeit by a different publisher (SW. II: 323-420 = AA I, 7: 185-268; English translation by John Botterman and William Rasch in Philosophy of German Idealism, ed. Ernst Behler [New York: Continuum, 1987], pp. 3!r115). 59 Aus einemPrivatschreiben (SW,V: 377-96 = AA I, 6: 369-89). See IWL, pp. 156-76. oo Der geschlossene Handelstaat (SW, III: 387-513 = AA I, 7: 37-164). 61 The issue of the Philosophisches Journal containing Fichte's review ofBardili appeared in November 1800. "Rezension von Bardilis Grundriss der ersten Logik" (SW, II: 490503 = AA I, 6: 433-50).

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schaftslehre to a local banker, Salomon Moses Levy. Levy had first

approached Fichte with this idea at the beginning of the summer, but his business activities took him away from Berlin until the fall. Apparently, Fichte decided that it would be convenient to his own purposes to combine these private lessons with the task of revising the Wissenschaftslehre. Moreover, he also appears to have decided at about this same time that the new version of his system should be a strictly scientific (or, in Fichte's language, "metaphysical")62 presentation, one that would dispense entirely with the kind of "critical" discussion of the nature of philosophical reflection and the task of philosophy contained in the published introductions to the Attempt at a New Presentation. Instead, he decided to include all such material in a more "popular" companion volume, the previously mentioned Crystal Clear Report to the General Public, upon which he apparently continued to work during this same period. Thus, on October 21, 18oo, he wrote a letter to G. A. Reimer, the publisher of the Crystal Clear Report, requesting an extension of the deadline for delivery of the manuscript and explaining the del'!Y as follows: "Because of the arrival of someone to whom I am giving a private course on the Wissenschaftslehre I am now occupied with the latter. I had intended to spend this winter preparing a new presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre for the press. I will gain some time if I can proceed undisturbed with this project." Perhaps to make the delay more palatable to his publisher, he then added: "In this way it [the Crystal Clear Report] will also acquire a certain contemporary interest, since it will provide a practically inseparable introduction to the new presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre (for which I will provide no introduction at all, but will instead refer readers to the Crystal Clear Report)." Similarly, in letters written to Schelling during this same period, Fichte excused himself from collaborating on a proposed new "Critical Journal" on the grounds that "I would much rather edit my new version of the Wissenschaftslehre, which seems to me to put an end to all doubts and objections on the part of anyone who is not entirely demoralized."63 At long last, therefore, in the final months of 18oo, after repeated postponements, Fichte was able to clear his schedule of everything else and devote himself entirely to the task of presenting the foundations of his system to the public in a new and more adequate form. That he expected to complete this task in a timely fashion is apparent from his November 4, 18oo, letter to Cotta, in which he notified his publisher: "I am once again completely involved with the Wissenschaftslehre, and this time I promise to deliver to you something that should unquestionably please 62 See the preface to the second edition of Concerning the Concept (SW, I, 32-33 = AA l, 2: 1sg-6o). . 63 Fichte to Schelling, October 22, 1800. See too his letter to Schelling, November 15,

1800.

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you." Fichte then went on to recommend that the publisher make plans for a large edition of the work and to suggest that it might, at least initially, be published by subscription. Along with the letter to Cotta, Fichte included the text of a lengthy public announcement, which he wished to have published in appropriate journals. This neglected document, which is of capital importance for an understanding of Fichte's entire philosophical development, reads (in part) as follows: The Wissenschaftslehre has been lying before the German public for six years now. It has received a very mixed reception: for the most part, it has met with vehement and passionate opposition, though it has also attracted some praise from inadequately trained people and has even found a few gifted followers and co-workers. For the past five years, 64 I have had in my desk a new version of the Wissenschaftslehre, which I have been employing in my classroom lectures on this science. This winter I am busy revising this new presentation, which I hope to be able to publish this coming spring. I wish very much that the public would pr(Jl)isionally (that is, until such time as it becomes possible for them to convince themselves on this point) accept the following two assurances from me, and I hope that people will keep both of these points in mind while reading the new presentation: First of all, with the exception of a few individuals (not counting my own students and immediate listeners, to whom the present remarks are not directed), hardly any knowledge whatsoever concerning the Wissenschaftslehre is currently to be found among the educated public. Second, this science represents a thoroughly new discovery, the very Idea of which did not exist previously and can be obtained only from the Wissenschaftslehre itself. This new science can be judged only on its own terms. Concerning the first point: The text that appeared six years ago and was published as a manuscript for the use of my listeners, namely, the Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre, has, to the best of my knowledge, been understood by almost no one and has been made use of by hardly anyone at all, apart from my own students. This is a text that does not appear to be able to dispense very easily with oral assistance. It seems to me, however, that in my [Foundations oj] Natural Right and [System oj] Ethical Theory I have been somewhat more successful in presenting my thoughts concerning philosophy in general as well. Nevertheless, to judge by all the comments I have heard on this topic since the publication of these two works (including those comments that concern these very works), it would appear that even these books have not helped the public to advance much further in its understanding of the main point at issue. I am not sure why this is so-whether it is because people have usually skipped the introductions and the first sections of these two books, or whether it is because it is simply not really possible to provide the remote conclusions of my system (taken in isolation from the premises from which they are derived) with the same degree of 64 Taken literally, this would imply that the manuscript of the Wissenschaftslehre nuva methodo was first composed in the fall of 1795, a claim that is difficult to reconcile with all

the other evidence in favor of a somewhat later dating.

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self-evidence one can easily give to the first premises themselves. The only texts that seem to have been better understood and appear to have succeeded in raising high expectations concerning the Wissenschaftslehre on the part of many open-minded people are the two "Introductions" to the Wissenschaftslehre, as well as the first chapter of a "New Presentation" of this system, which appeared in the Philosophical Journal. At best, however, these essays can do no more than convey a preliminary concept of my project; the project itself, however, is by no means actually implemented and brought to completion in these essays. [ ... ] I have previously stated elsewhere65 that, for my part, I would be willing to shoulder all the blame for the nearly universal lack of understanding [concerning the Wissenschaftslehre] that has prevailed in the past, if, by doing so, I could only move the public to grapple anew with the issues in dispute. As a result of long practice with the most diverse types of individuals, the originator of this science believes he has at last acquired the facility to communicate his science to others; and he intends to do so in the form of a new system, one that was not discovered by means of any further elaboration of the previously existing version of this science, but was discovered in an entirely different manner. [ ... ] By means of this new presentation, which I guarantee will be intelligible to anyone who possesses the capacity for understanding science, I hope that the philosophical public will finally have an occasion to come to terms in all seriousness with the Wissenschaftslehre. [ ... ] In conclusion, I hope to make this new presentation so dear and so intelligible that it will require no further assistance in this respect and no newer and even dearer presentation will be needed. I will worry later about such matters as scientific elegance, the strictly systematic arrangement of the parts and the exclusion of any foreign elements, the adoption of a precise terminology, and the creation of a symbolic system of pure concepts (such as that "universal characteristic" which was already sought by Leibniz and which first becomes possible only subsequent to the Wissenschaftslehre). That is to say, I will attend to these matters only after I have found that the age is making some use of this new presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre and has thereby made itself receptive to a purely scientific presentation of the same. 66 Fichte continued to work on this new presentation throughout the winter, as is clear from comments in his letters. 67 At the same time, his "revision" of the new presentation was proving to be more timeconsuming that he originally anticipated and would, in the author's new In the Preface to "An Attempt at a New Presentation of Wissenschaftslehre." "[Ankiindigung: Seit sechsJarhren.]" (AA I, 7: 153-64). In a note from the publisher, which was appended to Fichte's text, Cotta announced that the work in question "will be published by our firm around the middle of this year" and invited interested parties to help enroll subscribers. As an incentive, he offered "one free copy for every six subscriptions." 67 See, e.g., Fichte's letter to Schiller, December 2, 1800, in which he reports: "I am presently working on a new presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre, which-so I hope-will be so clear that anyone with a scientific mind can be expected to understand it." See too the 65

66

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estimation, require something more than a simple editorial reworking of the existing manuscript of his lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. Abandonment of Plans to Publish the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo The first, albeit indirect, hint that Fichte was not progressing as rapidly as he had hoped in his revision of the new presentation is a comment in his December 26, 18oo, letter to Cotta, in which he somewhat tentatively asks his publisher whether it might not be better-allegedly, for purely commercial reasons (in order to obtain the largest possible advance subscription)-to postpone publication of the new presentation until sometime after the Easter book fair, or even to abandon the original plan to offer it by subscription. After receiving Cotta's approval for the delay, Fichte, in his next letter to the publisher (February 14, 1801) added: "I myself, on account of my work, very much wish that the printing of the Wissenschaftslehre can be postponed." And in fact, as this allusion to "my work" suggests, Fichte was encountering more and more difficulties in his efforts to revise the text of his lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo; indeed, it appears likely that by this point he had virtually abandoned his efforts to rework his manuscript of 1796/gg. In any case, he was increasingly preoccupied with other matters. Accordingly, in the spring of 1801 he directed his literary energies to three other projects: the completion of the Crystal Clear Report, a polemical reply to Friedrich Nicolai's increasingly vitriolic public campaign against Fichte,68 and a public reply to Reinhold's defense ofBardili and criticism of transcendental idealism. 69 A certain amount of confusion is created by the fact that throughout the next few years Fichte continued, both in his private correspondence70 and in his published writings, to make occasional reference to remark in Fichte'sjanuary 31, 1801,letter to Friedrich Johannsen: "I will soon publish my new presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre, which has existed in manuscript for four years and which I used to lecture on in Jena." 68 This work, Friedrich Nicolai's Leben und sonderbare Meinungen (SW, VIII: 3-93 = AA l, 7: 367-463), was apparently composed during the early spring of 1801 and was published in May of the same year. 69 J G. Fickle's Antwortschreiben an Herm Professor Reinhold (SW, II: 504-34 = AA l, 7: 291-324) was probably written at the beginning of April18o1. It was published at the end of the same month. 70 In his May g, 1801, letter to Cotta, Fichte suggested postponing publication of the "New Presentation" until the fall book fair, and then went on to add: "Since the greater public has no concept of what I actually want to accomplish in this book, they can also wait for it until after Michaelmas 1801." This ominous prediction was made explicit in Fichte's next letter to Cotta (August 8, 1801), which began as follows: "I have found so much to do in the new version-which actually, in many respects, represents a new discovery of the

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the long-promised "New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre. "71 The "new presentation" in question, however, was no longer the revised version of 1796/gg, but instead an entirely new version, the so-called Wissenschaftslehre of t8o1/2 72-which likewise failed to appear as promised. Let us now draw some conclusions from the evidence assembled so far and directly address the question, Why did Fichte first delay and then abandon his plans to publish the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo? The original delay, that is, the suspension of the plan to publish the Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre in installments in the Philosophisches journal, appears to have been directly connected with the Atheism Controversy that eru.gted shortly after the publication of Chapter 1 of the New Presentation. 3 This is not to suggest that the Atheism Controversy somehow caused Fichte to reevaluate the philosophical adequacy of his New Presentation and to suspend publication because he had become dissatisfied with the new version; instead, it appears that the public controversy concerning-and misunderstanding of-his article "On the Ground of Our Belief in a Divine Governance of the World" 74 caused him to reconsider the wisdom of submitting his new Wissenschaftslehre from a variety of middle points-that I cannot, without a certain amount of rashness in the presentation and expression of the same, tend to the printing in time for the Michaelmas fair. Therefore, it would be better for us to postpone it so that we can accomplish it with the fullest ripeness and leisure. It will certainly appear around the end of the year." This "new discovery" of the Wissenschaftslehre is also mentioned by Fichte in his May 31-August 7, 1801, letter to Schelling, where he predicts that it will be published by the end of the year. By November 28, 1801, however, Fichte had once again revised his estimate ofthe publication date of the "new version of the Wissenschaftslehre," which he assured Cotta "will be printed without fail in time for the Easter fair," a promise repeated in his December 29, 1801, letter to J. B. Shad, his January 15, 1802, letter to Schelling, and his January 23, 1802, letter to Cotta. But by April 1802 he informed his long-suffering publisher that "the new presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre can appear only after the fair. I have lectured on it, and, though this new engagement with it should prove useful for the contents themselves, it nevertheless prevents me from getting it ready for the printer." Finally, in a letter of June 3, 1802, he assured Niethammer that the "new exposition should certainly appear this summer." 71 What is apparently Fichte's last public reference to the "New Presentation" occurs in the new preface (dated "August 180 1") he wrote for the second edition of the Foundations/ Outline. This preface begins by confessing that "in the course of preparing a new presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre it has again become clear to the creator of this science that, for the time being, no new presentation will be able to make this first presentation superfluous" and concludes with the (unfulfilled) promise that "the new presentation will be published next year" (SW, 1: 85 = AA I, 2: 461). 72 A heavily edited version of the Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre aus dem Jahre 1801 was published by I. H. Fichte in SW, II: 3-163. For a reliable text, see AA II, 6: 129-324. 73 See Fuchs's introduction to the Krause transcript, p. vii. Chap. 1 appeared in the first number of vol. 7 of the Philosophisches Journal, which was published in March 1798. The articles by Fichte and Forberg which provoked the Atheism Controversy were published only six months later in the first number ofvol. 8 of the same journal. 74 Ueber den Grund unser.s Glauben an eine gfittliche wtltregierung (SW, V: 177-89 = AA I,

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presentation of the foundations of transcendental philosophy to the scrutiny of what he increasingly took to be an ill-informed and unsympathetic public. After all, in the preface to the first published installment of the Attempt at a New Presentation he had begged his readers to put aside any ideas concerning his philosophy which they may have obtained from his original presentation of its foundations and urged them to give a fair hearing to the new presentation, in which he promised "to take the utmost pains to achieve the greatest possible clarity." He then added: "I will continue this presentation until I am convinced that I write entirely in vain. But I shall be writin~ in vain so long as no one cares to examine my arguments and reasons." 5 One might, therefore, conclude that the public Atheism Controversy, when combined with the growing hostility toward Fichte's philosophy on the part of his professional colleagues, convinced him that, for the moment at least, he was indeed "writing in vain" and that this was why he refused to publish any further installments of the Attempt at a New Presentation. Furthermore, after Fichte (sometime in I 798) originally suspended his plan of revising the Wissenschaftslehre nuva methodo for publication in the Philosophisches journal, a series of other, more pressing projects immediately intervened to occupy all his time and energy for the next several years-beginning, in I 799, with his various public and private responses to the accusation of atheism, and continuing, in the following year, with his work on such projects as The Vocation of Man, The Closed Commercial State, the Bardili review, and the Crystal Clear Report. In addition to these literary projects, he was also occupied during the years I 799 and I8oo with various practical arrangements involved in the move from Jena to Berlin. 76 As a consequence of these projects and problems, the delay in returning to the work of revision proved to be much longer than he had originally anticipated, and during this period his thoughts about the nature of an adequate presentation of the foundations of his system continued to evolve. This last point proved to be the decisive one, the one that explains why revision and publication of the Wissenschaftslehre nuva methodo was not merely suspended but was finally abandoned altogether for a completely new attempt to expound the first principles of transcendental philosophy (in the unpublished "Wissenschaftslehre of I801/2"). By the time Fichte was able to return his full attention to the task of revising the Wissenschaftslehre nuva methodo (that is, by the fall and winter of I8oo) his own 5: 347-57; English translation, "On the Basis of Our Belief in a Divine Governance of the World," in IWL, pp. 142-54. 75 SW, I: 420 = AA l, 4: 184. 76 Fichte leftJena for Berlin in july 1799. In December he returned to Jena to dispose of his home and household possessions, a process that occupied much more time than he had anticipated. Thus he was unable to return to Berlin until March 18oo.

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understanding of what should-and what should not-be included in such a presentation had advanced to the point where it was no longer possible for him simply to revise the presentation of 1796/99. Indeed, the surviving manuscript of his unfinished attempted revision of 18oo, 77 with its much heavier emphasis upon the "intuitive" character of philosophical evidence (a point also stressed in the announcement of the new presentation, which Fichte wrote in November 18oo) and with its repeated new starts and asides, eloquently reveals just how difficult-and finally, impossible-the task of "revising" the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo proved to be. Though this document breaks off abruptly with the derivation of "feeling" (i.e., at a point corresponding roughly with § 6 of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo), it clearly demonstrates that Fichte was no longer satisfied with the overall method of presentation adopted in his lectures of 1796/99. 78 In short, whereas he had originally predicted that the manuscript of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo could be made publishable "with little effort," 79 this proved not to be the case at all. Just what were the changes in Fichte's views which account for his growing dissatisfaction with the presentation of 1796/99? Though there were various minor infelicities, such as the occasional "confusion of ideal and real activity" that Fichte mentioned in his November 15, 18oo, letter to Schelling, the underlying problem was more serious. It is hinted at in a letter to Schelling written at about the same time that Fichte was nearing his decision to abandon for good any attempt to revise the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. In this letter of December 27, 18oo, he alerted his erstwhile colleague to the pressing need "for an even wider extension of transcendental philosophy, even with respect to the very principles of the same." He added: "I have not yet been able to work out these more extensive principles in a scientific manner; the clearest hint concerning them is found in the third book of my Vocation of Man. As soon as I am finished with my new presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre, my first project will be to carry out this task. In a word, what is still lacking is a transcendental system of the intelligible world." The "intelligible world" is the Kantian name for the realm of free, moral agents, that is to say, the realm of "intersubjectivity." And in fact, as many scholars have noted, the account of intersubjectivity in the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, though consistent with the account given in Fichte's earlier Jena writings, 77 Neue Bearbeitung der Wissenschaftslehre (AA II, 5: 331-402). This manuscript was composed between October and December 18oo. 78 This is also the verdict reached by the editors of the Halle transcript of the Wissenschaftslehre nuva methodo, who conclude that "in his draft of the Wissenschaftslehre of October 1800, [Fichte] had already abandoned the systematic conception of the presentation nova methodo" (AA IV, 2: 11). 79 Fichte to Johanna Fichte, November 2, 1799.

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is incompatible with and superseded by the very different account of intersubjectivity provided in Book III of The Vocation of Man. Fichte returned to this same point in another letter to Schelling, written shortly after he had decided to make an entirely fresh start in his efforts to produce a new presentation of the first principles of the Wissenschaftslehre. In this letter of May 31, 1801, he explained that "the Wissenschaftslehre lacks nothing whatsoever insofar as its principles are concerned; yet it is incomplete. That is to say, the highest synthesis, that of the spiritual world, has not yet been achieved. The cry of 'atheism' was raised just as I was preparing to achieve this synthesis." By "synthesis of the spiritual world" Fichte was referring, as he explained in Book III of The Vocation of Man, to the role played within the intelligible world by the "lawgiver in the kingdom of ends"; that is, he was referring to God. What appears to have happened, therefore, is that sometime between the fall of 1800 and the late spring of 1801 Fichte decided that he could not simply tack his new "theory of the intelligible world" onto a revised version of the presentation contained in the Wissenschoftslehre nova methodo; instead, he concluded that such a theory, and especially its "highest synthesis," should occupy a central position in any new presentation of the first principles of his system. 80 This, however, as he apparently realized in the winter of 18ooii So 1, would require a thoroughly new method of presentation. From then on, therefore, Fichte presented the Wissenschoftslehre as a theory of the absolute and its appearances. We can merely speculate about what accounted for this change in Fichte's views. Though it is difficult to resist the thought that the striking differences between the Jena versions of the Wissenschaftslehre and the later versions are somehow connected with the Atheism Controversy, a close examination of Fichte's published and unpublished writings of the years •798-1801 suggests that the decisive turn in his own under standing of his system was already under way in Jena, and that this had at least as much to do with the inner, dialectical development of the Wissenschaftslehre as with any external events in the life of its author. 81 Nev80 Though the manuscript of the Neue Bearbeitung of 1800 shows that Fichte was still trying to follow the basic method of presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, it includes marginal comments and asides that plainly indicate that he was finding it harder and harder to avoid introducing his new theory of the intelligible world into his presentation of the first principles of his system. Thus he remarks at one point in the manuscript (AA II, 5: 385) that "the bond that holds together the entire intelligible world is God. Such an intuition simply must be demonstrated." See too the later, rather plaintive question (p. 400): "Is there not perhaps a pure intuition of God, by means of which my philosophy could all at once receive assistance?" When developed (as it is, for example, in the Wissenschaftslehre of 1801/2), this suggestion becomes the line of demarcation between the Jena Wissenschaftslehre and all subsequent versions. 81 There is, for example, dear evidence that Fichte had already reached a new understanding of the "synthesis of the intelligible world," that is, a new theory of intersubjectivity, by the spring of 1799. This is indicated by remarks in his Platner lectures ("Logic

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ertheless, it seems plausible that Fichte's interest in extending the Wissenschaftslehre in the direction of the philosophy of religion and the theory of the intelligible world should have been at least reinforced and intensified by the controversy over his alleged atheism, and especially by the criticisms in Jacobi's celebrated Open Letter to Fichte. 82 What is beyond dispute is that Fichte was preoccupied with just such questions in the period immediately after his departure from J ena and that, as a result, his understanding of the relationship between the "intelligible" and the "empirical" worlds was substantially altered. This is especially clear in The Vocation of Man, which Fichte began during the summer of 1799 and finished in November. He himself was well aware of this change in orientation and alluded to it in a November 5, 1799, letter to his wife, where he remarked: "In the course of working on my present book [The Vocation of Man] I have looked more closely into religion than ever before." A more striking reference to this change in his views appears in a letter composed almost a year later, where he admits: "I may have erred in some of the final propositions of my system, that is to say, in the derivation; and I will, no doubt, often do so again in the future. I myself have already discovered errors here and there and have publicly retracted them before my listeners, and I also retract them in public, to the extent that I teach something else in my other writings. (As I have, for example, in the Vocation of Man retracted the superficial argument of the Sittenlehre, p. 3oo-and I also did this a year and half ago before my students.)"83 To be sure, other "theoretical" influences were at work on Fichte at the end of 1800, and they too may well have added to his dissatisfaction with the presentation of 1796/gg. For example, he was growing more and more alarmed by Schelling's assertions regarding the relationship between transcendental philosophy and an a priori philosophy of and Metaphysics") at the end of the winter semester of 1798/99· As the editors of AA IV, 4 point out, Fichte's lecture notes, and especially his remarks on § 933 of Platner's book, provide dramatic evidence of a sudden change in his theory of intersubjectivity in the spring of 1798: whereas the old theory (similar to the one contained in the System of Ethics) is expounded in AA II, 4: 312-27, pp. 328-30 of the same text introduce the first version of the new theory (anticipating that contained in Book III of The Vocation of Man). Presumably, it was precisely this new understanding of "the intelligible world" which Fichte intended to expound in the lectures on philosophy of religion he announced for the summer semester of 1799. Unfortunately, because of the Atheism Controversy and ensuing events, these lectures were never delivered. 82 Jacobi an Fichte, March 3-21, 1799 (AA III, 3: 224-81). For a partial English translation of this document, which played a key role in the development of post-Kantian philosophy, see "Open Letter to Fichte," trans. Diana I. Behler, in Philosophy ofGermo.n Idealism, pp. 119-41· . 83 Fichte to Reinhold, September 18, 1800. The mention of a "retraction before my students a year and a half ago" is presumably a reference to the above-mentioned changes in the theory of intersubjectivity which Fichte introduced at the conclusion of his lectures on logic and metaphysics in the winter semester of 1798/99.

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nature, as well as by his claims concerning the allegedly "objective" character of intellectual intuition, and Fichte was becoming convincedhowever reluctantly-of the need for some sort of direct or indirect public exposure of Schelling's errors. Another philosophical motive that surely influenced Fichte while he was trying to revise his lectures was his desire to reply to Bardili's rejection of "intuitive evidence," with its attendant call for a philosophy based upon nothing more than "thinking qua thinking." Indeed, the draft of the Neue Bearbeitung of 1800 clearly shows how Fichte was trying to integrate a response to these two very different sorts of "dogmatism" within his new presentation-just as it also shows how difficult he was finding it to accommodate his existing manuscript to this purpose. Nevertheless, the evidence plainly suggests that the most important external philosophical impetus in the evolution of Fichte's philosophical conceptions during this period was Jacobi's public criticism, which not only endorsed the charge of atheism against the Wissenschaftslehre, but raised a new charge as well: nihilism. Similarly, the most important internal reason for Fichte's final abandonment of the 1 796/gg version appears to have been that it simply did not lend itself to a revision of the sort he now thought was required, and specifically, that it could not be readily modified in such a manner as to be consistent with his new understanding of the intelligible world-that is, with his new theories of interpersonality and of God. The history of Fichte's attempts to lay before the public an accurate, clear, and accessible presentation of the first principles of transcendental philosophy is a history of failure, a story of one broken promise after another. As we have seen, he realized at an early date that the struggle to provide an adequate exposition of his system would be long and frustrating, but he nevertheless hoped to make progress toward this goal. Thus he warned the readers of his first (and, as it turned out, only) public presentation of the foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre: "Having thoroughly reworked this system three times, and having found that my thoughts concerning individual propositions contained therein are differently modified each time, I can expect that as my reflections continue to develop, my thoughts will always continue to alter and to develop." 84 This prediction was only strengthened by the public reception of the Foundations, which convinced the author that a new presentation not only would be a desirable way of keeping the public informed concerning his "further reflections," but would be necessary to correct misunderstandings based upon the original presentation. As the goal of a "definitive presentation" of the Wissenschaftslehre continued to elude him, Fichte consoled himself with the thought that he 84

SW, 1: 8g = AA I, 2: 254.

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might be able to achieve his aim by providing the public with several different presentations of his system. Thus, immediately after exclaiming to Reinhold, in a letter of March 2 I, I 797, "How many more times will I revise my presentation!" he went on: "Nature has made up for my lack of precision by granting me the ability to view things in a number of different ways and by endowing me with a fairly agile mind." By this time, however, he had already come to realize that "the presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre will require by itself an entire lifetime. The only prospect that is able to shake me is the thought of dying before I have completed it."85 At the time that he made these remarks, Fichte still hoped to be able to publish a new presentation-or better, a series of new presentations-of the Wissenschaftslehre. And as we have seen, he continued to pursue this goal throughout his first years in Berlin. By I804, however, he had reached a momentous decision: to continue his striving for an ever more adequate, scientific presentation of his system, but to renounce for the foreseeable future any plans to publish these new presentations. His reasons for reaching this decision are nowhere stated more clearly and poignantly than in a document he drafted for the royal cabinet of ministers to the Prussian government on January 3, I804. 86 This document, which testifies eloquently to Fichte's determination to avoid any possible misunderstanding of his philosophy on the part of the public, and which also explains how and why he could continue to revise his presentations of his system until the year of his death, without any prospect of publishing them, is here translated in its entirety: Pro memoria:

A system, the external form of which has recently been brought to completion, is now available which prides itself on being completely selfcontained, unalterable, and immediately self-evident and is able to provide all the other sciences with their first principles and guidelines. This system thereby promises to eliminate forever all conflict and misunderstanding from the domain of science and to direct the human mind (which obtains its proper strengthening only within this system) toward the field within which it can make endless progress toward ever-higher clarity. This field consists of the empirical world, within which this system promises to provide the human mind with an infallible guide. Despite the fact that, under the name "philosophy," such a science has been obscurely anticipated and sought since the very beginning of all scientific endeavor, it is nevertheless obvious that such a science has never before existed nor even been attempted. Indeed, the entire wisdom and enlightenment of our own day consists in the bold denial of the very possibility of any such knowledge. Thus it is clear that, if this discovery is really 85 86

Letter to Reinhold, July In AA Ill, 5: 222-24.

2, I 795·

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what it claims to be, it paves the way for a rebirth of mankind and of all human relationships, a rebirth such as has never before been even possible. By observing the so-called literary public for many years, the discoverer [of this system] has become sufficiently confident that the conditions necessary for understanding a system of this sort have, for the most part, been destroyed by the academic method that has prevailed until now, and he is also convinced that more errors are in general circulation at the present time than perhaps ever before. Consequently, he has no intention of publishing his discovery in its present form and exposing it to general misunderstanding and distortion. He wishes to confine himself to oral communication, so that misunderstanding can thereby be detected and eliminated on the spot. Nevertheless, he does not wish to forego the advantages of the judgment of experts in such matters. Since he lives and lectures in a city where there is an academy of science founded by Leibniz, which still preserves among its members some with an interest in speculation, he cherishes the wish of having this same academy serve as his judge. Accordingly, if only so that this academy will consider the task of sufficient importance and will take it seriously, he proposes that it be charged by His Majesty the King with the task of examining the Wissenschaftslehre. Following the example of another academy (namely, the Paris Academy), the academy may then appoint commissioners to this task; and, in order for these commissioners to become acquainted with the object of their examination in the only way possible and in the only way I myself would consider conclusive, they would have to attend my lectures. I have moved the location of my lectures to my own lodgings, but if the commissioners-to-be should consider it beneath their dignity as public officials to come to my home, then I am prepared to hold my lectures in any appropriate place designated by the academy. In order to protect myself in advance against any negative judgment concerning the form [of my philosophy], I reserve the right to present, first to the academy and its commissioners, and then, if necessary, to the public, a universally comprehensible and immediately illuminating report concerning how the Wissenschaftslehre cannot be judged.

Though nothing came of this rather poignant proposal, Fichte continued to elaborate new presentations of his system in his private lectures. At the same time, he also lectured on more popular topics, such as religion, history, and politics. Meanwhile, his disappointment with the public reception of his writings grew ever greater, until finally, in the preface to his published lectures titled Directions for the Blessed Life ( 1806), he quite openly confessed his reluctance to publish these lectures and bluntly expressed his doubts concerning whether there was any longer any point at all in his attempting to address the public. In the light of the tangled (non)publication history of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, there is a note of undeniable pathos in Fichte's candid explanation of

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why he decided to publish his Blessed Life lectures in an unrevised form: for, as he explains, "given my way of working, the surest way of never finishing them would be to revise them again." 87

PART II The Discovery and Publication of Two Student Transcripts of the Wissenschaftslehre nuva methodo Given the importance that Fichte himself long attached to the Wissenschaftslehre nuva methodo, as well as its obvious significance for any understanding of the overall development of the Wissenschaftslehre, it is certainly regrettable that his own manuscript of these lectures has not survived (or, in any case, has not been discovered). Nevertheless, we do possess two different, detailed transcripts of Fichte's lectures, on the basis of which it is possible to gain a very good idea of the content of his 1796/gg lectures on "the foundations of transcendental philosophy." Before the era of tape recorders and duplicating machines, carefully transcribed and bound copies of lecture courses played an important role in German university life. Indeed, some students and ex-students amassed large private collections of these so-called Kollegnachschriften. This was especially true in Jena during the 17gos, when it was a common practice for several students to pool their energy and resources by contributing all of their class notes or transcripts from a particular course to the production of a polished, continuously written transcript of the lectures in question. From this final version it was then possible to make additional copies. Indeed, some students routinely augmented their income by preparing transcripts of lecture courses and selling copies. 88 Student transcripts of several of Fichte's courses from the Jena period (as well as even more from his later years) were already known to exist in the nineteenth century, and thus it was not unrealistic of scholars to 87

Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben oder auch die Religionslehre (SW, V: 39!r400).

A clear reference to this practice occurs in the August 13, 1799, letter of Hans Bostel to Friedrich Carl von Savigny, who had apparently asked his friend, Bostel, who was then a student in Jena, to obtain for him a transcript of Fichte's lectures. The relevant passage in Bostel's letter reads as follows: "I was unable to find a notebook on the Wissenschaftslehre; therefore, I commissioned a copy of one that is supposed to be very good and accurate. It will be very long, and thus the cost of copying it is 4 thalers-not including the cost of the paper. You will not mind that it is rather expensive, since it is so long. Another person, who also had a copy made by the same man, paid the same amount. I will pay for it out of what I owe you. Meanwhile, you will receive a portion of the text. More portions will follow on Saturday, and thus you will receive the entire text, little by little, over the course of the next three weeks." In Der Briefwechsel zwischen Friedrich Carl von Savigny und Stephan August Winkelmann (t8oo-t8o4) mit Dokumenlen und Briefen aus dem Freundeskreis, ed. Ingeborg Schnack (Marburg: Elwert, 1984), p. 278. 88

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hope that a transcript of his lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo might eventually turn up in some library or private collection. And indeed, early in the present century, one eventually did surface in the university library at Halle, which had acquired it in 1885 as part of a bequest from a local professor, Gottfried Moritz Meyer, whose fame rested largely upon his extensive collection of philosophical Kollegnachschriften. 89 The existence of this manuscript, tided "Wissenschaftslehre according to the Lectures of Professor Fichte," was brought to the attention of the great Fichte scholar Fritz Medicus, who duly reported the information in a remark in his six-volume edition of Fichte's Selected Worlts and included a few short quotations from the manuscript in his general introduction to Volume 1.9° Shortly thereafter, Siegfried Berger devoted his inaugural dissertation to a description and analysis of the contents of this "Halle transcript" of the Wissenschajtslehre nova methodo. Berger's dissertation, which included many direct quotations from the manuscript, was published in 1918.91 Longer excerpts from the same manuscript appeared in print durin~ the next decade, as appendixes to two works by Emanuel Hirsch. 9 Though these initial reports concerning and excerpts from the newly discovered manuscript excited a certain amount of interest among scholars,93 the full text of this transcript was not published until 1937, when Hans Jacob included it in Volume II (the only volume published) of his edition of Fichte's literary remains. 94 In part because of the war, this edition attracted little attention at the time (except in Italy, where the importance of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo has long been rec89 See G. von Goutta, "Gottfried Moritz Meyers Sammlung philosophischer Kollegnachschriften," Ko.nt-StuJ.ien 28 (1923): 198-200. 90 Fichte, Werke. Au.swahl in seeks Biinden, ed. Fritz Medicus (Leipzig: Meiner, 1908-12). See vol. I (1911), pp. lxxx n., cxxi, and cxlvi-cxlvii, and vol. VI (1912), p. 627n. 91 Ueber eine unveroffentlichte Wissenschaftslehre J G. Fichtes. 92 ( 1) "Ueberschrift und Schlu~ einer studentischen Nachschrift der WL a us dem Jahre 1798 (Fichtes System der philosophischen Wissenschaften)," in Emanuel Hirsch, Christentum und Geschichte in Fichtes Philosophie (Tiibingen: Mohr, 1920), pp. 62-67. This selection consists of the opening paragraph of H and the "Deduction of the Subdivisions of the Wissenschaftslehre" from H. (2) "Die unmittelbar fiir die Religionsphilosophie wichtigen Stellen" and "Fichtes Diktate," in Emanuel Hirsch, Die idealistische Philosophie und das Christentum. Gesammelte Aufsiitze (Giitersloh: Bertelsmann, 1926), pp. 291-307. This selection consists, first, of brief excerpts from §§ 9, 13, 16, 17, 18, and 19 and, second, of the assembled summaries, or "dictata," that occur at the end of each §of the transcript, supplemented by a few other passages. 93 In addition to the previously cited works by Hirsch, see Heinz Heimsoeth, Fichte (Munich: Reinhardt, 1923), the first effort to employ the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo as the basis for an overall interpretation of Fichte's philosophy, and Max Wundt, FichteForschungen (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1929), which devotes an entire chapter to "the Wissensc":{tslehre of 1797 ." "Wissenschaftslehre nach den Vorlesungen von Herr. Fichte," in Fichte, Nachgelassene Schriften, II: 341-611.

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ognized and where an Italian translation of the Halle transcript was published in 1959). 95 Finally, in 1978, the entire text was reedited by Jose Manzana and others and published in Volume IV, 2 of the monumental new edition of Fichte's collected works sponsored by the Bavarian Academy of Science. 96 There has never been any serious dispute concerning the accuracy and general reliability of this transcript. Everyone familiar with it has concurred with Jacob's judgment that it represents "a carefully prepared" and "intelligently produced" fair copy of a transcript of Fichte's lectures, a transcript that, "with respect to its content and meaning, is a good and faithful one." Moreover, according to Jacob, the text adheres so closely to Fichte's own conventions regarding such matters as punctuation and use of emphasis that one can safely conclude that it was produced by someone intimately acquainted with Fichte's own writings and philosophy. 97 Since the transcript in question gives no indication of the name of the student (or students) responsible for its production, it is commonly referred to simply as the "Halle transcript" of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo and is herein identified as "H." Furthermore, it also fails to include any explicit indication of the date of the lectures it records. Consequently, scholars have been forced to comb the manuscript for internal clues to its date-with uncertain results, as we will see below. Meanwhile, in 1980, while on an exploratory expedition to the Sachsischen Landesbibliothek in Dresden, Erich Fuchs, a researcher and fulltime member of the editorial staff of the new Fichte edition, discovered another, hitherto unsuspected transcript of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. This manuscript was titled "Fichte's Vorlesungen iiber die Wissenschaftslehre, gehalten zu Jena im Winter 1798-1799," and its title page also provided the name of the student responsible for the transcription: Karl Christian Friedrich Krause, who had attended Fichte's lectures as a student during the winter semester of 1798/99, who later established a professional reputation of his own,98 and among whose 95 G. A. Fichte, Teoria della scienza 1798 "nova methodo," trans. Alfredo Cantoni (Milan: Biblioteca de "II pensiero," 1959). The dictata to H were translated even earlier by Luigi Pareyson as "La seconda dottrina della scienza ( 1798) di G. A. Fichte," Rivista di filosofia 41 (1950): 191-202. See too Arturo Massolo, Fichte e la filosojia (Florence: G. C. Sanzoni, 1948); Luigi Pareyson, Fichte-Il sisteme della libertiJ (Turin: Edizione di Filosofia, 1950; 2d, expanded ed., Milan: Mursia, 1976); Pasquale Salvucci, Dialettica e immaginazione (Urbino: Argalia, 1963); and Aldo Masullo, La communitiJ come fondamento: Fichte Husser[ Sartre (Naples: Libreria Scientifica, 1965). 96 "Wissenschaftslehre nach den Vorlesungen von Hr. Pr. Fichte," in AA IV, 2, Kollegnachschriften 1796-I8o4, pp. 1-267, ed. Reinhard Lauth, Hans Gliwitzky,Jose Manzana, Erich Fuchs, Kurt Hiller, and Peter Schneider (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt:Frommann, 1978). 97 Editor's "Vorbericht" to Fichte, Nachgelassene Schriften, II: xi, xxxi. 98 Krause (I781-1832) began his studies atJena in the winter semester of 1797/98, where he remained until 1801, studying theology, philosophy, and mathematics. Though

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literary remains the manuscript was discovered. Because of the extraordinary interest in this discovery, Fuchs published it only two years later as Volume 336 in Felix Meiner's "Philosophische Bibliothek" series99 and is currently reediting it for inclusion in the forthcoming Volume IV, 3 of the Bavarian Academy edition of Fichte's works. This second transcript, which is customarily called the "Krause transcript," is herein designated "K." As in the case of the Halle transcript, the general vocabulary and style of the Krause transcript are unmistakably Fichte's own. No other transcripts of Fichte's lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nuva methodo have yet been discovered, though there is good evidence that other copies or versions once existed. 100 Comparison of H and K As we have noted, Fichte first prepared his new presentation of the first principles or foundations of his system for use in his lectures during he attended lectures by Fichte, Schelling, and A. W. Schlegel, he appears to have been most profoundly influenced by Fichte, especially during the winter semester of 1798/99 (that is, when he was attending Fichte's lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo and preparing his transcript). On November 18, 1798, he wrote to his father (who greeted his son's report with understandable reservations) that he had decided to devote the semester "entirely to the study of Fichte's philosophy,'' to which he intended to devote eight hours every day (quoted by Fuchs in his introduction to the Krause transcript, p. x). From the time of his arrival in Jena, Krause, who came from a family of very modest means, seems to have hoped to earn some money by preparing copies of transcripts of lectures delivered by various professors. Krause was also responsible for preparing (presumably from notes taken by other students, since he himself did not enroll at Jena until the winter semester of 1797/98) the first third of the Nachschrift of Fichte's lectures "Logic and Metaphysics" from the summer semester of 1797, which is published in AA IV, I: 175-45°· Subsequently, Krause became an instructor in philosophy, first atjena, next at Dresden, then, following Fichte's death, in Berlin, where he tried in vain to become Fichte's successor, and subsequently in GOttingen and Munich. Krause went on to develop his own system of philosophy, which was heavily indebted to Fichte. (Krause's Nachschrift of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo contains many marginal, mostly critical, notations, indicating that Krause made frequent use of this manuscript in conjunction with his own lectures and writings. Indeed, according to Fuchs, some of Krause's later works reveal a direct debt to his transcript of Fichte's lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo.) Today, Krause is perhaps best remembered for his campaign to create a "purely German" philosophical vocabulary, as well as for his efforts to establish, within the framework of transcendental idealism, "a science of the art of living." His most lasting legacy, however, was his great influence upon progressive thinkers in late nineteenth-century Spain and Latin America. For further information about Krause's life, philosophy, literary achievements, and historical influence, see Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (I78I-I8J2): Studien zu seiner Philosophie und zum Krausismo, ed. Klaus-M. Kodalle (Hamburg: Meiner, 1985), which includes an extensive bibliography of writings by and about Krause. 99 J. G. Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre nuva metlwdo. Kollegnachschrift Chr. Fr. Krause 1798/99 (Hamburg: Meiner, 1982; 2d ed., 1994). IOO See, e.g., the previously quoted reference to the copy commissioned for Carl Savigny (above, n. 88).

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the winter semester of 1796/97, and he used the same text in his lectures during the the winter semesters of 1797/98 and 1798/9g--though he may well have revised the entire manuscript, or at least portions of it, during these later semesters. As was his custom, he planned to publish the text of his lectures, albeit in a revised form; and he began to do just this when he published the first four installments of the Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre in the Philosophical Journal in 1797/98. In the passages in his letters in which he mentions his plan to publish the new presentation, Fichte often referred to a single manuscript or set of notebooks ("Heft," or sometimes "Heften") that he employed in his lectures on this topic. Some of Fichte's lecture manuscripts have survived, and what they reveal is precisely what one would expect: that he did not always write out his lectures in complete detail and in finished form, though he sometimes did just that; instead, he often jotted down incomplete sentences, key words, abbreviations, and so on, which he obviously then went on to develop in an appropriate, extemporaneous manner during the actual delivery of his lecture. (This, of course, explains how equally faithful transcripts of the same course of lectures from two different semesters might differ in many details.) Nevertheless, Fichte's surviving lecture manuscripts are much more than sketches or mere "notes"; they are full-scale productions, in which, despite occasional syntactical gaps and stylistic lapses, the structure of the overall argument is always clearly evident, as well as many of its details. (This, in turn, explains how, for all of their differences, transcripts from different semesters could nevertheless have the same organization and repeat the same arguments, if not always in precisely the same words.) There can be no reasonable doubt that H and K are both transcripts of the same lecture course, and any reader who actually compares the two texts will reach this conclusion very quickly. The similarities are striking: Both manuscripts are roughly the same length; moreover, each is divided into nineteen §§, and each concludes with a separate section titled "Deduction of the Subdivisions of the Wissenschaftslehre." Furthermore, each individual § is divided into the same number of sections in both transcripts. The vocabulary and manner of expression are also the same; indeed, the two transcripts occasionally contain virtually identical passages. This is notably true of the important summaries that appear at the end of each §. Such congruence is not surprising, since these summaries, unlike the main body of the text of the lectures, were carefully and slowly dictated by Fichte to his students. Hence they are commonly referred to as the "dictata" to the Wissenschaftslehre nava methodo. The two manuscripts also exhibit the same range of references. Both make frequent reference to the "earlier presentation" contained in the Foundations and the Outline; both include references to Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right, as well as to his System of Ethical Theory (and in both

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cases, these references to the latter works occur only in the second half of the manuscript). Neither text, however, includes any reference to the published portions of the Attempt at a New Presentation of the Wissenschaftslehre. 101 In addition to Fichte's own writings, both transcripts make reference to the same works by Kant (and usually do so at exactly the same place in the manuscript). Finally, when one turns to the actual content of the two transcripts, the impression that they are simply different versions of the same course (though perhaps not from the same semester) is strengthened, for the argument is precisely the same in both versions. Striking as the similarities between the two transcripts are, there are nevertheless obvious and significant differences between them as well. To begin with, with the exception of the dictata, the two transcripts seldom correspond word for word, even where the detailed execution of the argument is exactly the same. Furthermore, in addition to the "second introduction" (which corresponds to the introduction to H), K also includes a "first introduction," for which there is no parallel in H. 102 Second, for the first three§§, K provides, in addition to the same dictata that appear in H, alternate dictata, which are identified within the body of the text as "(I 798)" and within the compilation of the summary paragraphs (titled by Krause "Major Points of the Wissenschaftslehre I 798I 799") with which K begins as "older versions" of the same. 103 Though H, unlike K, includes nothing without some parallel in the other tran101 The complete absence of any reference to the Attempt at a New Presentation (which began to appear in the Philosophisches Journal in April 1797 and which one might have expected Fichte to mention in his subsequent lectures on this subject) is something of a mystery. The editors of AA IV, 2 cite this fact as evidence that at least the first portions of H stem from 17g6/g7-though this does not necessarily mean H is a transcript of the lectures delivered during that semester, since it is surely possible that Fichte simply used lectures from 17g6/g7 at some later date, without bothering to update the references. In any case, since K also includes no reference to the Attempt at a New Presentation, this lack cannot be used to date either manuscript in relation to the other. 102 Concerning this "first introduction" (as well as its puzzling subtitle, "as presented in public lectures"), lves Radrizzani plausibly suggests that it did not form a part of Fichte's actual lectures on "the foundations of transcendental philosophy" (which was, as we have seen, a private course). Instead, Radrizzani suggests that this "first introduction" is a transcription of the text of a public lecture that Fichte delivered before the beginning of the winter semester and that, like the earlier Concerning the Concept, he intended as an "invitation" to attract prospective students to his private lectures on the subject. See the catalog description of the 17g6/g7 lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nuva methodo, which includes the announcement, "During the vacation he will publicly announce the plan of his course on transcendental philosophy." Though no such announcement is included in the catalog description of Fichte's lectures on this subject in subsequent semesters, the content of the "first introduction" of K corresponds precisely with this description. 103 In fact, K's two versions of the dictat for § 3 are virtually identical. Since the text of the "major points of the Wissenschaftslehre" with which Krause's manuscript actually begins does not differ substantially from the text of the dictata that appear at the end of each § within the main body of the transcript, Fuchs did not include them within the Meiner edition of the text. They will, however, appear in their proper place in AA IV, 3·

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script, the latter portions of H do include a great many recapitulations and summaries that do not appear in K. As for content, though the argument is the same in each version, the two manuscripts differ appreciably in the amount of space allotted to different portions of the presentation. As a general rule, the earlier portions of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo (especially §§ 1-6) are presented more copiously and clearly in K than in H, whereas the later portions of the presentation (especially §§ 13ff.) are developed in far greater detail in H. (The overall quality of K deteriorates sharply in the later sections, indicating perhaps that Krause was finally growing weary of devoting eight hours a day to the Wissenschaftslehre.) Indeed, this differential unevenness in the quality of the two manuscripts is one of the strongest arguments for producing a combined or conflated edition of the two, as has been attempted in this English translation. Dating the Krause Transcript Since the title page of the Krause transcript of Fichte's lectures on the foundations of transcendental philosophy clearly indicates their date ( 1798/gg), the only question concerns when the surviving manuscript was actually composed. Does it represent Krause's actual class notes or is it instead a more polished "fair copy," composed at some point after the lectures or even after the end of the semester? The evidence suggests that Krause himself attended all sixty or so of Fichte's lectures during the winter semester of 1798/gg, and he quite obviously took copious notes during each class period. In addition, he must have had access to transcripts of earlier versions of the same course, or at least to the dictata from some earlier version (as is indicated by the appearance within his transcript of "older versions" of the first three dictata). It is also possible that Krause may have had access to notes taken by other students attending the same 1798/gg lectures and that he may have consulted such notes in preparing a final version of his Kollegnachschrift. Though the experts are not in complete agreement on the matter, it seems virtually certain that K is a fair copy produced at some point after each of the actual lectures. 104 Thus, the question is not whether the 104 A small bit of evidence that K is a revised, fair copy of Krause's class notes is provided by what appears to be an obvious error of transcription in the first paragraph of§ 14 (K, p. 152), where the word "Erfolgs" occurs instead of the word "Gefiihls," which is clearly required by the context. As Fuchs points out (in a letter to the present translator), the words Eifolgs and Gefiihls are very similar in German script, especially when hurriedly written. Hence the most plausible way to explain the otherwise puzzling appearance of the former at this point in the text is to assume that K is a fair copy, which Krause transcribed at some later date from notes that he (or someone else) had previously (and hurriedly)

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transcript was composed after class, but rather, How much time elapsed between the actual lectures and the composition of K? On the one hand, Erich Fuchs argues that the preponderance of the evidence favors his hypothesis that K is a fair copy prepared between the end of the semester (March I4, I799) and August 25 of the same year; 105 Ives Radrizzani, on the other hand, questions the force of Fuchs's evidence and suggests that it is more likely that Krause recopied his notes from each lecture during the course of the semester and did not prepare the transcript all at once. (Indeed, Radrizzani wishes to leave open the possibility that the text of K was transcribed by Krause during Fichte's lectures-though he fails to offer any explanation of the presence within Krause's transcript of "older versions" of the first three dictata.)

In support of his hypothesis that K was completed by August 25, I 799, Fuchs calls attention to the fact that this date occurs in a marginal note near the beginning of § I 7, where Krause left several blank pages in his notebook with the explanation that "the missing period was not skipped. Instead, the text of the lecture was copied by mistake into another notebook and will be inserted later." In support of the hypothesis that the transcript was not actually begun until after the end of the semester, Fuchs cites a passage near the end of the "first introduction," which reads as follows: "We shall also discuss, in an explicit and thorough manner, the laws of reflection, in combination and in connection with what proceeds from these laws. (This promise could not be fulfilled because of a lack of time.)" According to Fuchs's interpretation, the sentence in parentheses represents a comment by Krause and refers to the "lack of time" available in I798/99, which Fuchs also suggests may be explained by recalling that the Atheism Controversy was in full bloom at this point and that Fichte may have had to cut short or even cancel some of his lectures because of external circumstances. In any event, if Fuchs's interpretation of this parenthetical remark is correct, then of course Krause could not have inserted this comment before the end of the semester, and hence one would have to conclude that K was composed at some point following the end of the winter semester of 1798/99· In disputing this claim, Radrizzani argues 106 that the reference to the missing portion of the notes and the decision to leave several pages blank for its later insertion, far from supporting Fuchs's conclusion, indicate that K, if it is not the actual notebook in which Krause transcribed Fichte's lectures in class, was at the very least composed during the course of the semester. After all, one would assume that if Krause had

taken in class. Further evidence that K was prepared after Fichte's actual lectures is the ap~arance therein of alternate dictata for the first three §§. 05 See Fuchs's introduction to K, pp. x-xi. 106 See Radrizzani's introduction to his French translation of the Wissenschaftslehre nuva methodo, pp. 27-32.

Editor's Introduction

41

been making a fair copy at the end of the semester, he would have had all his notes on hand and thus would not have been forced to leave several pages blank for later insertion of the missing lecture. On this interpretation, therefore, the date "August 25, 1799" represents merely the date when Krause finally got around to inserting the missing section, not the date he finished recopying the entire manuscript. As for Fuchs's other piece of evidence, the parenthetical remark about the lack of time, Radrizzani points out, first of all, that there is no reason why the uproar over atheism should have interfered with Fichte's lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, since these were presumably based upon a manuscript prepared several years before the winter semester of 1798/99. Nor is there any indication within the text of K that Fichte actually canceled or curtailed any meetings of his class during the winter of 1798/99. Radrizzani plausibly suggests that the remark concerning the lack of time might well represent a comment of Fichte's and not of Krause's. In this case, it would refer not to the 1798/99 lectures, but rather to the 17941'95 presentation of the "Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre." In support of this hypothesis, Radrizzani points out that the remark occurs in the context of an explicit comparison between the published Foundations and the new presentation to be developed in the 1798/99 lectures. The most plausible conclusion seems to be that K represents a fair copy that Krause made during the course of the semester, most probably recopying each lecture directly after each class meeting. This hypothesis simultaneously explains the presence of the "older versions" of the early dictata in the manuscript (which surely must have been added after Fichte's classroom lectures) as well as the blank pages reserved for the missing lecture (suggesting that at the time of K's composition Krause did not have convenient access to the missing notebook). 107 Of course, it still remains possible that the entire manuscript was prepared after the end of the semester and that, for some unknown reason, Krause had to wait until August to insert the missing portion. Dating the Halle Transcript As we have observed, it is not known who composed H or when it was written. A comparison with the handwriting of G. E. Meyer, the professor 107 Further evidence that K was composed during the course of the semester and not after the end of it is the fact (alluded to by Fuchs and stressed by Radrizzani) that an examination of the ink and handwriting of K clearly indicates breaks in composition corresponding more or less precisely to the conjectured beginning and ending of each of Fichte's individual lectures. In the latter portions of H, a horizontal line is often employed to mark the end of a day's lecture, and Fuchs notes that the variations in the handwriting of K match these breaks perfectly. See Fuchs, introduction to K, pp. xi-xii, and Radrizzani, La Doctrim de la Science Nova Methodo, p. 30.

42

Editor's Introduction

in whose collection of Kollegnachschriften H was discovered, reveals that it was not copied by Meyer himself, who was not a student of Fichte's and who appears to have acquired his copy of the transcript only in 1836. The age of this copy, as well as the date of the lectures it transcribes, thus remain open questions. According to Jacob, the paper and style of writing are consistent with the hypothesis that H was prepared at Jena during the late 1790s. 108 According to the editors of AA IV, 2, however, variations in spelling and punctuation suggest that H may have been an editorial compilation stemming from several different sets of notes, in which case it might have been composed at any time between the original lectures and Meyer's acquisition of it. The more important question, however, is not when the surviving copy of H was prepared, but which of Fichte's three sets of lectures on the foundations of transcendental philosophy it transcribes. Let us begin by considering the internal evidence. As noted above, H includes specific references to the System of Ethical Theory, which was not officially published until March 1798. From this, Hirsch originally concluded that H could stem only from Fichte's 1798/99 lectures. 109 In fact, however, printed fascicles of this text were distributed to students in Fichte's course on ethics in the winter semester of 1797/98 and were therefore available to students in his course on the Wissenschaftslehre during the same semester. 110 Accordingly, the presence of references to the System of Ethical Theory within H eliminates only the winter semester of 1796/97 as the source of the Halle transcript, which is consistent with the 1797/99 dating proposed by Medicus and Berger. 111 Indeed, the fact that 108 Nachgelassene Schriften, II: xxxi. Jacob also claims that the contents of H, in comparison with those of the published Attempt at a New Presentation, argue for a later date, since H gives clearer prominence to the fact of self-consciousness as the starting point of the Wissenschaftslehre than does the published Attempt at a New Presentation. In addition, he also purports to find a significant difference between the vocabularies of the two versions. Thus he maintains (p. xxx) that a comparison of H and the Attempt at a New Presentation reveals that the contents of the latter are further removed from the 1794/95 version than are those of the former. No other student of these texts, however, including myself, has found Jacob's claims on this matter to be convincing. 109

Fichtes Religionsphilosphie im Rahmen der philosophischen Gesamtentwicklung Fichtes (GOt-

tingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1914), p. 59 n. 3· Hirsch later changed his mind, however, and admitted that H could stem from either 1797/98 or 1798/gg (Christentum und Geschichte, p. 67n). 110 See editors' introduction to Das System der Sittenlehre, AA I, 5: 7-8. 111 See Berger, Ueber eine unveroffentlichte Wissenschaftslehre, p. g. Medicus, in the same note that first called the attention of scholars to the existence of the Halle Nachschrift (Fichte's Werke, 1: lxxx n), asserted that "the notebook stems, at the earliest, from the winter of 1797/g8, but perhaps from the last Jena semester, winter 1798/gg." See too Medicus's remark in the "Nachtrag" to Vol. VI of Fichte's Werke (p. 617n): "Future editors of Fichte's works are hereby notified that the university library at Halle [ ... ] has a transcript of a version of the WL which has not yet been published at all-presumably from the summer [sic] of 1798 (at the earliest from the winter of 1797/98 and at the latest from the winter of 1798/gg)."

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43

the references to the System of Ethical Theory appear only in the second half of the manuscript suggests that they were added during the winter semester of 1797/98 (rather than 1798/99), since Fichte began distributing sections of the printed text of the System of Ethical Theory to his students in December 1797 (that is, midway through the semester). 112 The most recent editors of H (the editors of AA IV, 2) insist upon a narrower dating, however, and conclude that the Halle transcript "must stem from the winter of 1798/99. at least in part." 113 As evidence for this, they call attention, first, to the fact that the technical term Potenz ("power") occurs in§ 16. According to the same editors, this term, which is closely associated with the Naturphilosophie of Schelling and J. W. Ritter, "so far as can be determined, was first employed in Jena in a purely philosophical sense only in the spring of •799·" 114 Moreover, they were unable to find any occurrence of the term Potenz in any of Fichte's published or unpublished writings before 1799, and thus they conclude that H is most probably a transcript of the lectures of 1798/99· Second, they note an elliptical reference in § 13 to "a Dutch scholar," whom Fichte praises for having raised a legitimate question concerning the difference between practical and speculative reason. Speculating that this is an allusion to Paulus van Hemert's Ueber die Existence der Principien eines reinen uneigniitzigen Wohlwollens im Menschen, a work that first appeared in German translation in the winter of 1798/99• the editors of AA IV, 2 take this reference to confirm their hypothesis that H could not be a transcript of lectures delivered before 1798/99· Nevertheless, it seems rather more likely that the bulk of H does in fact stem from 1797/98, and for the following reasons: First of all, the evidence purportedly furnished by the occurrence of the term Potenz has recently been undermined by the discovery that Fichte himself employed this term in precisely the same sense in his lectures "Logic and Metaphysics" in the summer semester of 1798.U 5 Hence one certainly cannot rule out the possibility that he also employed it a few months earlier in his "Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy" lectures during the winter semester of 1797/98. 112 On the other hand, references to the Foundations of Natural Right, which was certainly available before the beginning of the winter semester of 1797/98, are also confined exclusively to the second half of both H and K. In any case, the fact that Fichte's citations from the System of Ethics begin only in § 14 does not prove that H derives from the 1797/98 lectures, since the same is true of K as well. The only conclusion that one can safely draw from these references to the System of Ethics is this: they are equally compatible with the 17ftt98 and 1798/99 dates, though not with the date of 1796/97. I AA IV, 2: 6. 114 Ibid. 115 This is reported by Juha Manninen in his research paper, "Hoijer und Fichte. Ein Systemprogramm aus dem Jahre 1799," in Transzendentalphilosophie als System: Die Auseinandersetzung zwischen 1794 und 18o6, ed. A. Mues (Hamburg: Meiner, 1989). See especially pp. 269-73.

44

Editor's Introduction

Second, as for the alleged reference to van Hemert's book: if this identification is correct, then it of course follows that H must stem from I 798/99. 116 The allusion is sufficiently vague, however, to leave open the very real possibility that Fichte may have had some other, as yet unidentified, "Dutch scholar" in mind. 117 In any case, this appears to be a rather slim reed to cling to in order to defend the later dating of H. (It is worth noting, incidentally, that the corresponding passage in Kwhich certainly does spring from I798/9g--does not include any reference to "a Dutch scholar.") A final piece in this puzzle is provided by the notation "V 98," which appears early in§ II of H 118 and is written in a different ink and handwriting than that of the Nachschrift itself. The editors of AA IV, 2 suggest, quite plausibly, that this is a date, "May I 798." 119 If so, then the question becomes, What does this date represent? The editors of AA interpret it as evidence in support of their hypothesis that the text of H was composed of transcripts from different semesters, with the earlier portions stemming from an earlier 'semester and the later portions from a later one. Thus, they suggest that the notation indicates when the first portion of the manuscript (that is, up to the point where this date occurs) was copied, while the rest was added at some later date. According to their hypothesis, therefore, the first §§ of H might represent a transcript of the I797/98 (or even I7g6/97) lectures, whereas the latter portions could be a transcript of the I7g8/gg lectures. 120 116 As Radrizzani argues, however, even if one does take this vague remark of Fichte's to be a reference to van Hemert's book, it is still difficult to explain its presence at this point in H (§ 13). One can readily calculate that Fichte would not have reached this point in his lectures until the end of January, whereas, as Radrizzani notes, "one can seriously doubt whether Fichte would at this date have had sufficient time to become aware of the translation of van Hemert's book." 117 This is the opinion of Fuchs as well, who now considers the identification of van Hemert as the "Dutch scholar" in question to be "obsolete" (quoted by Radrizzani, La Doctrine de la Science Nuva Methodo, p. 35). 118 AA IV, 2: 116. 119 As Radrizzani, who also treats this notation as an important due for determining the date of H, remarks: "One cannot see what else it could be" (Radrizzani, La Doctrine de la Science Nuva Methodo, p. 36). 120 See AA IV, 2: 12. With the publication of K, it is possible to test this hypothesis by comparing the corresponding portions of the two transcripts. What one discovers thereby is that there is no difference between the earlier and later portions of the two manuscripts which would suggest that H is a composite transcript of notes from two different semesters; thus the hypothesis fails. Since K displays the same alleged discrepancies between its earlier and later portions that H does, these same discrepancies cannot be cited in support of the suggestion that whoever transcribed H was working with various sets of student transcripts. Even less compelling is the suggestion by the editors of AA IV, 2 (p. 12) that their "composite" hypothesis is supported by the words "nach den Vorlesungen" in the subtitle of H. The word Vorlesungen ("lectures") can just as easily refer to a set of lectures delivered in a single semester as to several different sets of lectures.

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45

If the notation represents a date at all, however, it could just as well represent the date at which a particular reader of the transcript had reached this point in the text. 121 At the very least, the presence of the date "May 1798" appears to refute the hypothesis that H stems entirely from 1798/99, while the "composite" hypothesis is seriously undermined by the fact that K shows a similar difference between its earlier and later parts. Thus, if one agrees that, on the basis of internal evidence alone, "the beginning parts appear to reproduce an older version and the later parts a more recent version," 122 then one also has to concede that the same could be said of K, which definitely stems in its entirety from 1798/ 99· Thus any alleged differences between the "older" and "more recent" portions of the presentations contained in H and K would in fact reflect a difference between those portions of Fichte's own lecture manuscript which were composed earlier (presumably, 1796/97) and those that were composed (or revised) at a later date (probably 1797/98). In short, there is no reliable internal evidence that any portion of the main body of the text of H can be traced to the winter semester of 1798/99. Finally, let us consider the evidence of the dictata. As has already been mentioned, these are virtually identical in the two transcripts, except for the additional presence of three "older versions" of§§ 1-3 in K, where they are also labeled by Krause "( 1798)." This date raises several problems. First, why should the "older versions" of the dictata to the first three §§ ,be dated "1 798," when this was obviously the date of the "newer versions" of the dictata for the first three §§ (October-November 1798)? The most likely hypothesis is surely that these alternate versions represent the dictata from the "previous presentation" of 1797/98 and that Krause copied them from someone else's notes, perhaps dated simply "1798" (which was, of course, when the previous presentation ended). 123 121 Of course, it might also indicate the date at which a particular copyist had reached this point in the transcription. But this would not explain the different ink and handwritinJZ, though it would support the 1797/98 dating of H. '~' 22 AA IV, 2: 12. 123 This is the view that Fuchs defends in his introduction to K (pp. xiv-xv). In contrast, Radrizzani proposes in La Doctrine de Ia Science Nuua Methodo (p. 26) that the versions dated "I 798" actually represent the "newer versions" of the first three dictata and that the undated versions are the "older" ones. It is, however, impossible to reconcile this hypothesis with the fact that, in the summary of the "Major Points of the Wissenschaftslehre" with which K begins, these "I798" versions are explicitly labeled "older versions." Radrizzani addresses this inconsistency by suggesting that Krause simply erred in identifying these passages as "older versions." But surely it is at least as likely that he erred when he identified them within the main body of his text as stemming from I 798. To buttress his hypothesis, Radrizzani calls attention to the fact that the two versions of the dictat to § 3, one of which occurs at the beginning of the paragraph and is labeled "( I798)" and the other of which occurs at the end of the same §, are virtually identical. Radrizzani interprets this puzzling fact as follows (p. 27): When Krause added the "older version" (according to Radrizzani, the version at the end of the §), he simply "failed to recognize" the striking similarities between the two versions, for "if he had, he would have become conscious of his error [that is, his error in thinking that these were two different

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Editor's Introduction

But if one accepts this hypothesis (and also believes that K and H stem from different semesters), then how can one explain the fact that same dictata appear in H and in K? If we assume that 1796/97 can be ruled out as the date of the lectures upon which H is based, then (according to the above hypothesis) we would expect that Krause's "older versions" of "1 798" would correspond to the versions of the dictata found in H. In fact, however, the dictata found in H are virtually identical to those found in K, and H contains nothing similar to the "older versions" included in K. How can this be explained? One possible explanation could be that H and K represent two different transcripts of the same 1798/99 lectures. To accept this explanation, however, one would have to reject all the other evidence in favor of an earlier dating of H; consequently, anyone who insists that the two transcripts derive from two different semesters must propose some other explanation for the appearance of the same dictata in H and in K. Fuchs, for example, suggests that whoever copied the final version of H had access to the dictata from 1798/99 (though, presumably, not to the Nachschrift of the lectures themselves) and simply substituted these "more recent" versions for the older ones. 124 Another possibility is that Krause simply erred in assigning the date 1798 to his "older versions" of the first three dictata, which might have come from an even earlier version of the same lectures (those of 1796/97), in which case it is quite possible that Fichte used the same dictata in 1797/98 and in 1798/99-which would explain the otherwise puzzling congruence of the two transcripts on this point. Admittedly, none of these possible explanations is entirely satisfactory, and there remains a certain amount of mystery concerning the precise provenance of the dictata in H and of the "older versions" inK. Despite the ultimately inconclusive character of all this evidence, it seems safe to conclude that H and K represent two different transcripts, deriving from two different semesters, of Fichte's lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. The main evidence for this conclusion was unavailable to the editors of AA IV, 2: namely, the many differences between H and K. Granted, such differences cannot be said to prove that versions of the dictat to § 31 and would have eliminated the parenthesis [that is, the date with which he labels the dictat at the head of§ 31·" Once again, however, this hypothesis is undermined by the text of the "major points," where the two (nearly identical) versions of the dictat to § 3 occur one after the other-making it extremely difficult to believe that Krause could have somehow "failed to recognize" the similarities between the two versions. 124 Introduction to K, p. xv. This suggestion is not as far-fetched as it might at first appear. There is ample evidence that copies of the dictata to Fichte's lectures circulated quite independently of transcripts of the lectures themselves. See, e.g., Smidt's letter to Herbart, August 10, 1796, requesting a copy of the dictata from Fichte's lectures on natural rights (in Fuchs, ed., Fichte im Gespriich, 1: 370).

"( 1 798)"

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47

the two texts stem from two different semesters; these differences may, however, be said to establish this beyond any reasonable doubt. As any experienced teacher can testify, different students can often produce strikingly different sets of notes from the same lecture; and one would expect this would be all the more true in the case of a lecturer like Fichte, who was noted for his rapid delivery. 125 Yet these Kollegnachschriften are much more than mere class notes. They at least attempt to approximate stenographic transcriptions of Fichte's lectures, and their very length suggests that few of Fichte's words went unrecorded. Yet when we compare the two manuscripts, we find that, with the exception of the dictata, they contain virtually no identical passages and often differ substantially. Not only do the wording and phrasing of the two texts vary to a greater or lesser degree, 126 but entire paragraphs, such as the many summaries that occur in the later portions of H, appear in one text but not in the other. Though the structure of the argument-both in its general outlines and in its detailed execution-is the same in the two texts, the examples that Fichte chose to illustrate his points are not always precisely the same. Nor are the same references always supplied in the two texts (as was noted above with respect to the controversial allusion to "a Dutch scholar"). Finally, though both texts include explicit comparisons between the new presentation of the first principles of Fichte's philosophy and the older version contained in the Foundations and the Outline, the comparisons inK are more frequent and more extensive than those in H. Thus I agree with my fellow editors, Fuchs and Radrizzani, in rejecting the hypothesis that H and K represent two different transcripts of 125 See the anonymous report on Fichte's style as a lecturer in Fuchs, ed., Fichte im Ge· spriich, II: g6: "He never spoke slowly, but was almost always in a hurry." This report, how-

ever, should be compared with other, later ones which appear to conflict with it and which emphasize the clarity of Fichte's lectures and the deliberateness of his style as a lecturer. See, e.g., Heinrich Kohlrausch's 1804 report (in Fichte im Gespriich, III: 217) and the following report, by August Twestan, on Fichte's 1810 lectures "On the Study of Philosophy": "His manner of lecturing is a model for academic teachers, and especially for teachers of philosophy. He speaks briefly, simply, and clearly, just as in the introduction to The Vocation of Man; and one can see that he speaks not in order to demonstrate his eloquence, but is concerned only with the subject matter. His speech is precise and is so well organized that it is impossible not to follow him. He knows how to make his lectures clear by means of frequent, but never extraneous, recapitulations and by repeatedly calling attention to how everything is connected to the overall thread of the argument. Furthermore, he speaks slowly and with appropriate pauses, so that it possible for everyone to retain an accurate memory of what he said and to reflect upon it" (Fichte im Gespriich, IV: 26g). 126 Though the technical vocabulary of the two presentations is in almost all cases the same, there is at least one exception worthy of note: In § 17 (H, pp. 194ff.) the term Inbe(Jriff occurs in H in many passages where K continues to employ the term Zweckbegriff ("concept of a goal"). The former term is never employed in this sense anywhere in K; indeed, the work "Inbegriff' occurs only once in K, in the First Introduction, where it has its usual sense of "substance" or "content" (K, p. g). This minor difference is best explained by the hypothesis that K and H are based upon lectures from two different semesters.

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the same set of lectures. 127 Moreover, since K undoubtedly comes from 1798/99, then H must be the earlier ( 1797/98) version-a conclusion that follows, as Fuchs notes, "despite all the other indications that have hitherto suggested a later dating for the Halle transcript." 128 At the same time, I also concur with the judgment of virtually all previous editors and scholars, that H and K can nevertheless be treated as two, slightly different transcripts of the same "new presentation" of the foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre. This conclusion, which is inescapably suggested by a careful study of the content of the two transcripts, is, in turn, reinforced by the fact that all the evidence clearly indicates that Fichte himself employed the same manuscript each time he lectured on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, 129 though, like most accomplished teachers, he probably made various revisions, emendations, and new notations in his manuscript each time he employed it, just as he surely added different extemporaneous comments on each occasion. Furthermore, the same evidence plainly suggests that the manuscript was first composed by Fichte in approximately 1796 and subsequently revised here and there in 1797/98 and possibly in 1798/99 as well. 13 Certainly the

°

127 See Fuchs's introduction to K, p. xiv: "The attentive reader of both transcripts will conclude from a comparison of the two that both can be traced to a common foundation, namely the lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo based upon 'notebooks'; the same reader, however, will also conclude that these transcripts themselves stem from two (or three) different courses of lectures. [ ... ] Despite all the agreement, with which we are now familiar, between the two versions of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo-agreement concerning content and structure, as well as concerning the order of the main thoughts, all the way to the occasional agreement of their formulations-one can with great confidence exclude the possibility that they were transcripts of one and the same set of lectures. The differences in content, dimension, word order, and execution of details are too great" (p. xiv). Radrizzani, though he quarrels with some of the evidence Fuchs cites, arrives at the same conclusion on pp. 35-36 of the introduction to his French translation: viz., that there is no positive proof that H stems from 1798/99• whereas there is considerable evidence that at least parts of H stem from 1797/98 and no reason not to assume that the entire transcript does as well. 128 K, p. xiv. 129 Hence the conclusion of the editors of AA IV, 2: "From a careful study of the Nachschrift, one gains the impression that Fichte's lectures became fixed in a written form over a long period of time, and also that at least the later portions were later revised" (AA IV, 2: 7). 130 There are, as already noted, minor discrepancies in Fichte's own remarks on this subject: in the "Public Announcement" (signed November 4• 18oo), he reports that he has had the manuscript on hand for "five years" (i.e, since November 1795!); in his letter to Schmidt, March 17, 1799, he says he has been working on the new version "for three years" (i.e., since the spring of 1796); in his January 31, 1801, letter to Johanssen, he claims that he has had the manuscript "for four years" (i.e., since the beginning of 1797). See the conclusion drawn by the editors of AA IV, 2: 9: "Most probably, Fichte began the first drafts in the winter of 1795/96 or in the spring of 1796. In the first part of 1796, however, he had so much to do in conjunction with his work on the Ethics that his work on the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo did not progress as he had hoped, and thus he had to cancel the projected course on the foundations of transcendental philosophy [originally announced for the summer of 1796]. In the fall of 1796 he could, once again, dedicate himself completely to work on this project. Assuming that he proceeded in his customary

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49

dictata were revised, as is confirmed by the presence in K of "older versions," and the references to the System of Ethical Theory must also have been added at some point after 1796/97. Consequently, though K is a transcript of the 1798/gg lectures and H can be traced back to 1797/98 with a fair degree of reliability, one is nevertheless entitled to speak of both these manuscripts as transcripts of the "Wissenschaftslehre of 1796/gg," or simply as two different presentations of "the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo." 131 Accordingly, the present translation treats K and H as two, complementary transcripts of two different sets of lectures deriving from a single manuscript or set of lecture notes. Though Fichte's own manuscript has apparently vanished, we can attempt to reconstruct it by combining in a single text the contents of K and H and, where necessary, emending each in the light of the other. Though some questions still remain concerning the precise wording of specific passages here and there, the general style, vocabulary, and manner of argument of these two transcripts are immediately recognizable as Fichte's own. When appropriately conflated, the two transcripts constitute a complete whole, with no gaps in the argument or any obvious shortcomings in the presentation-a whole that is, from the point of view of anyone trying to understand and analyze the Wissenschaftslehre of 1796/gg, clearly superior to either of the two transcripts considered by itself. The result, I believe, is the closest we are ever likely to come to an accurate and complete version of Fichte's jena lectures titled "Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) nova methodo." manner, it follows that his composition of the 'notebooks' was preceded by a preliminary draft, which could be what is referred to by the earliest dates mentioned (winter 1795/96, spring 1796)." Moreover, these same editors quite plausibly interpret the previously quoted passage in Fichte's March 17, 1799, letter to Schmidt, where Fichte reports that he has been working on the new version for three years ("seit drei Jahren habe ich eine neue Darstellung bearbeitet"), as evidence that he continued to work on it throughout this period. 131 This was also the conclusion drawn by the very first scholar to make a detailed study of the Halle transcript, Emanuel Hirsch (see Fichtes Religionsphilosophie, p. 59n). Hirsch subsequently reaffirmed this conclusion in Christentum und Geschichte, p. 67n, where he wrote: "From the winter semester 1796/97 on, Fichte's Jena lectures were always based upon a single notebook; consequently, with respect to its contents, we may treat the transcript [H] as representing the Wissenschaftslehre of 1796."

PRINCIPLES OF THE EDITION AND TRANSLATION

The Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo is a fascinating and important document that not only occupies a central role in the development of Fichte's philosophy but richly deserves and handsomely repays intensive study in its own right. Hence it is particularly unfortunate that no copy of this text in Fichte's own hand has survived. But this misfortune is at least partially rectified by the fact that we possess two different, though equally detailed, student transcripts of Fichte's lectures on this subject. Though each of these transcripts appears to be "complete," neither is entirely satisfactory, and each contains passages of extraordinary obscurity. Fortunately, the deficiencies of each are, as a general rule, remedied in the other. The first half of the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, for example, is presented more clearly and in greater detail in K, whereas H's presentation of the second half is generally preferable to that of K. Thus anyone who wishes to understand the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo is advised to study both texts. For this reason, the present translation represents a composite or conflated text of the two. Nevertheless, some readers may object in principle to placing so much authority in the hands of the editor and may wish to reach their own decisions concerning the adequacy or inadequacy of the two transcripts. Accordingly, the following text provides a complete translation of K, supplemented by the inclusion, within the main body of the text, as well as within the notes, of a great many passages from H. 1 Moreover, these additions from H are all clearly indicated (see below). Thus, with a bit of effort, any reader who wishes to do so can ignore all the insertions from H and can concentrate solely upon the text of K. 1 K has been chosen as the basis for the translation because, of the two transcripts, it exhibits somewhat greater systematic unity and is, on the whole, better written. This is also the judgment of lves Radrizzani, whose French translation follows a similar strategy of rendering K in its entirety, supplemented by passages from H. Nevertheless, well more than half of the entire text of H is included in the present English translation.

Principles of the Edition and Translation

51

Despite the complexity of the editorial apparatus, every effort has been made to produce an English text that is as accurate and as readable as possible (though these two goals are not always readily reconcilable). For the convenience of readers who may wish to compare the translation with the German originals, the pagination of both H and K has been provided in the margins, and in many instances the original German text is provided in the (numbered) footnotes. The specific principles and conventions governing this edition are as follows.

Intewation of K and H: The basis of the present edition is a complete and continuous translation of the entire text of K. In addition, a large number of passages from H have been incorporated within the main body of the text, where they are always enclosed within scroll brackets or braces. Additional passages from H are included within the notes. In order to distinguish them from the rest of the editorial apparatus, notes providing supplementary passages from H are always designated by superscripted capital/etters, rather than numbers. When one carefully compares the two transcripts, it is a relatively easy task to determine where the insertions from H should be made in the text of K. When and how often such insertions should be made is a more difficult question. Since the two texts are very rarely exactly the same, one must exercise editorial judgment in deciding which passages from H to translate, as well as which to include within the main text and which to relegate to the footnotes. The inserted passages from H include ( 1) those that have no direct parallel inK and (2) those that clarify, explain, and expand upon points that are inadequately or obscurely presented in K. In addition, H contains a few passages that appear to conflict with the text of K. All such passages are translated in the notes, as are certain passages from H which merely provide interesting alternate formulations of points presented inK. Editorial interpolations: Occasionally, each transcript contains gaps or ambiguities that cannot be remedied by incorporating material from the other transcript. In such cases, editorial interpolations have been inserted. Such interpolations are always placed within square brackets. Numbering of sections: In his manuscript, Krause experimented with various different ways of indicating the sections of each of the nineteen §§ into which the entire presentation is divided: sometimes employing letters, sometimes numbers; sometimes placing his section numbers at the left margin, sometimes indenting them, and sometimes arranging them as centered headings; sometimes enclosing the section numbers within parentheses, and sometimes not. H displays

52

Principles of the Edition and Translation

similar inconsistencies. The translation, in contrast, follows a single, consistent scheme of placing the section number in parentheses at the left margin of the first sentence of each section. Paragraphing: Whereas the text of H is broken into many short paragraphs, the paragraphs of K (like those of Fichte's own published writings) are typically much longer, though occasionally interrupted by dashes (Gedankenstriche). The translation follows the paragraphing of the original texts, with the following exceptions: ( 1) Paragraph breaks have sometimes been introduced where a dash occurs inK, and (2) new paragraph breaks have occasionally been introduced into the text of K in cases where the content (as can usually be confirmed by a comparison with H) clearly indicates a change of subject matter in the middle of a paragraph. Every paragraph break I have introduced is clearly indicated by the symbol ......~ Sentence structure: Though the English translation attempts to preserve the style and feel of the original German texts, the canons of English usage have sometimes made it necessary to break up some of the longer sentences in both H and K. Again, I have attempted to keep such departures to a minimum. Use of emphasis: The manuscripts of H and K are both written primarily in German script, though each employs Latin script on occasion as well. Though usually employed to transcribe foreign words or German words with a foreign root, the Latin script is sometimes used simply for emphasis. In addition, both K and H also employ underlining (and double underlining) as a mode of emphasis. 3 The published German texts of H and K preserve these distinctions by means of elaborate typographical devices (normal type to indicate normal German handwriting, italics to indicate terms underscored in the manuscripts, and small capital letters to indicate words and passages written in Latin script). Though the translation attempts to follow the originals in their use of emphasis, no effort has been made to preserve the distinction between Latin and German script. Thus the words written in Latin script are 2 The paragraphing of K is also interrupted on those occasions when a paragraph break is included within a passage from H which is inserted within a paragraph from K. 3 Neither K nor H is consistent in the use of either Latin script or underlining. For example, whereas Krause sometimes transcribed the entire text of a dictat in Latin script, on other occasions Latin script is employed only for the first line of the dictat, and sometimes the entire dictat appears in German script. Obviously, here again Krause was simply experimenting with various ways of composing his transcript. (The translation ignores these experiments and employs normal type for the dictata.) Or, to take another example, whereas the words Ich and Nicht-lch generally appear within H in Latin script, this convention is not always followed (especially in the latter portions of the text). In contrast, these same two words are almost always written in plain German script in K.

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53

here printed in italics only in cases where the Latin script seems to have been employed for the sake of emphasis and not simply to transcribe a word with a foreign root. Words underlined in K and H are here printed in italics, except in cases where the context clearly argues against this or in cases (such as citation of names or "mention" of terms) where English employs different conventions from German. In the latter cases, the emphasis is either dropped altogether or else replaced with quotation marks. No new emphasis has been introduced in the English translation. In short, the translation follows the German originals in the use of emphasis, though not slavishly, and is somewhat more consistent in its use of italics for such things as titles, headings, and so on than either of the German texts. Annotation: As already mentioned, lettered footnotes provide supplementary passages from H. Numbered footnotes provide a variety of different sorts of historical and philological information: ( 1) Some notes identify or provide further information concerning persons, works, circumstances, and events that Fichte mentioned or alluded to in the text of his lectures. (2) Some notes indicate proposed corrected readings of the text-whether based upon a comparison of the printed text with the original manuscript, 4 upon a comparison of H and K, or simply upon considerations of context and content. (3) Many of the notes address specific issues of translation and include, wherever it would be helpful, citations from the German text) (Note that these quotations reproduce the often eccentric orthography of the originals.) (4) On rare occasions, the notes include a few words of explanation or commentary, but only where the ambiguity of the text makes such commentary indispensable. Page numbers of the German text: The page numbers of the Felix Meiner edition of the text of K are supplied in the left margin of the text. Page numbers of H (as published in AA IV, 2) are supplied, within parentheses, in the right margin. 5 Page references to H are also supplied, again in parentheses, following each of the supplementary passages translated in the notes. Translation: While my goal has been to make these texts of Fichte's lectures as readable and as accessible as possible to a broad Anglophone audience, I have also attempted to address the more specialized concerns 4 I am especially grateful to Erich Fuchs for his invaluable assistance in identifying such errors of transcription in the Meiner text of K. 5 Marginal page references to H are supplied only where material from H appears within the body of the translation. That is, a page reference to H is provided at the point of the first occurrence within the text of the translation of a passage from that particular page of H.

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of scholars and of readers with some knowledge of the German language: hence the large number of citations from the original German text. Every effort has been made to preserve as much consistency and univocity as possible in the rendering of key terms (indicated in the German-English glossary), though, of course, a sensitive and accurate translation demands a certain latitude and flexibility in this regard as well. As a general rule, long-standing conventions for rendering certain technical, philosophical terms into English (e.g., Vorstellung = "representation" and Anschauung = "intuition") have been respected, though there are some exceptions. For example, Ich is here rendered as "I," rather than as "ego" or "self," and Vermogen is translated as "power" or "ability," rather than as "faculty." Furthermore, Wissenschaftslehre, which means "theory" or "doctrine" of "science" or of "scientific knowledge," and which is customarily-albeit quite inaccurately-rendered as "Science of Knowledge," is here treated as a term of art and is not translated at all. In this case, as in every other, translation remains a matter of compromise and interpretation. This fact, however, is as much of an incentive as an obstacle to the philosophically inclined translator, who may take some comfort in the fact that Fichte insisted that "my theory should be expounded in an infinite number of ways" and conceded that "everyone will have a different way of thinking this theory-and must think it differently, in order to be thinking this very theory. " 6 This, therefore, is the underlying goal and purpose of the present volume: to assist those who wish to "think" Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo in a new and different way-that is, in English. 6

Letter to Reinhold, July

2,

•795·

GERMAN/ENGLISH GLOSSARY

abbilden ableiten die Absicht der Accident afficieren die Agilitat der Akt anerkennen an hal ten ankniipfen anschauen das Anschauen das Anschauende die Anschauung die Ansicht auffassen die Aufforderung der Aufgabe aufhalten aufheben aufnehmen aufstellen die Ausdehnung (sich) aussern das Beabsichtigte die Bedingung die Begierde begreifen

to portray to derive intention accident, accidental property or feature to affect, to have an effect on agility act to acknowledge, to recognize to arrest, to bring to a halt to attach, to connect, to tie or to hold together to intuit intuiting, act of intuiting the intuiting subject intuition view, point of view, opinion, way of looking at, appearance, aspect, perspective, the way something looks to grasp, to interpret, to construe (to pick out) summons task, assignment to bring to a halt, to arrest to cancel, to annul to assimilate, to take up, to absorb, to accommodate to present, to exhibit, to display, to set up expansion to express what is intended condition (for the possibility of) desire to comprehend, to grasp, to grasp in or by means of a concept

[55 1

56

German/English Glossary

das Begreifen das Begreifende die Begrenztheit der Begriff die Beharrlichkeit das Beruhen die Beschaffenheit die Beschranktheit die Beschrankung bestehen bestimmbar die Bestimmbarkeit bestimmen das Bestimmen bestimmt die Bestimmtheit das Bestimmtsein beweglich die Beweglichkeit der Beweis beweisen das Bewusstsein das Bild bilden binden die Causalitat der Charakter darstellen die Darstellung das Dauerende die Denkart den ken das Denken das Denkende der Denkzwang der Drang die Einbildungskraft die Einschrankung einwirken die Einwirkung empfinden die Empfindung der Endzweck

(act of) comprehending, comprehension the comprehending subject limitation, state of limitation concept constancy (state of) rest structure, constitution, (set of) properties limitation, state of limitation limitation to subsist (to endure) determinable determinability to determine, to specify determining, specifying, act of determining determinate, determined, specific determinacy, determinate state, precision determinate being movable, mobile, changeable mobility proof, argument to prove, to demonstrate consciousness, act or state of consciousness image to form or entertain images, to shape, to form to constrain, to bind causal power, causality characteristic feature, feature, character, nature to present, to expound, to exhibit, to portray presentation, exposition, portrayal that which endures way or manner of thinking to think, to conceive of thinking, act of thinking the thinking subject intellectual compulsion, feeling of being compelled to think in a certain way impetus (power of) imagination limitation, restriction to exercise an effect on effect, influence, efficacious action to sense, to have a sensation sensation final goal

German/English Glossary entgegensetzen entschliej3en der Entschluj3 entwerfen erblicken ergreifen erkennen das Erkennen die Erkenntnis erweisen die Evidenz fixiert das Fixiertsein die Folge die Forderung fortdauern das Fiihlbare das Fiihlende fiir sich gebunden die Gebundenheit das Gefiihl das Gefundene der Gegensatz gegensetzen das Gegensetzen der Gegenstand das Gehaltene der Geist geistlich das Gemiith das Gesetztsein die Gewalt der Glaube glauben das Glied die Grenze die Groj3e der Grund die Grundeigenschaften die Haltbarkeit halten handeln das Handeln die Handlung hem men

57

to oppose, to posit in opposition to resolve, to decide decision to construct, to project to view, to catch sight of, to observe to apprehend to cognize, to recognize cognizing, cognition cognition to demonstrate, to show self-evidence fixed, stabilized, arrested fixedeness sequence, consequence, result demand to endure what can be felt the feeling subject for itself, by itself constrained, bound constraint, constrained state feeling what is found or discovered opposite, opposition to oppose, to posit in opposition (act of) opposing, (act of) opposition, (act of) positing in opposition object that which is brought to a halt mind, spirit mental, intellectual, spiritual mind being-posited power belief, faith, confidence to believe, to have confidence in, to trust, to think element, member, term, link limit, boundary magnitude, quantity ground, foundation, basis, reason elementary qualities stability to bring to a halt, to arrest, to restrain to act acting, instance (mode or type) of acting action to curb, to obstruct, to restrict

58

German/English Glossary

herausgreifen herausrei~en

hervorbringen das Hinderniss das Ich die Ichheit die Idee die Intelligenz kennen die Korperwelt die Kraft die Lehre lei den das Leiden losrei~en

mach en das Machen das Machende mannigfaltig das Mannigfaltige die Mannigfaltigkeit das Material die Materie das Merkmal nachbilden nachmachen nachweisen das Nichtdiirfen das Nichtlch das Objekt das Objektive die Praxis das Prinzip rassonieren das Rassonnement realisieren das Recht die Reflexion die Rube ruhend die Sache der Satz schweben die Selbstandigkeit das Selbstgefiihl

to select, to choose to wrench out of to produce, to generate obstacle, hindrance the I I-hood Idea intellect, intelligence to be acquainted with, to know corporeal world force, energy theory, account (philosophy, system) to be passively affected passivity, passive state, state of passivity to wrench away, to tear away to produce, to make productive activity, act of producing, productive act the productive subject or agent manifold, multiple manifold, multiplicity multiplicity material, content matter, content attribute, distinctive feature to copy to imitate, to copy to establish, to show prohibition the Not-I object objective (element) practice, practical activity principle, first principle to argue, to calculate, to reason argumentation, argument, line of reasoning to realize, to make real, to bring into being right, law, justice (act of) reflecting, (act of) reflection repose, state of repose, passive state, stability in a state of repose, passive, stable content, matter, subject proposition, principle to hover, to oscillate self-sufficiency self-feeling, feeling of self

German/English Glossary die Selbsttiitigkeit die Sensibilitat setzen das Setzende der Sinn die Sinnenwelt sinnlich die Sinnlichkeit die Sittlichkeit stehend stetig die Stetigkeit die Stimmung der Stoff der Sto~ das Suchen die Tat die Tathandlung das Tatige die Tatigkeit der Trieb das Tun das Uebergehen iibersinnlich die Unbestimmtheit die Verbindung die Vereinigung das Verfahren verkniipfen das Vermogen die Vernunft versinnlichen der Verstand verstandlich das Vorbild das Vorhandsein vorschweben vorstellen das Vorstellende die Vorstellung wahrnehmen die Wahrnehmung wechselwirken

59

self-activity, spontaneous self-activity sensibility to posit the (actively) positing subject sense sensible world sensible, sensuous sensibility, sensuousness morality stable constant, continuous continuity mood, disposition matter, material, content, object, stuff impact, stimulus quest deed, act Act the active subject or being activity drive doing, instance or type of doing, act of doing something movement of transition, passage, movement, transition supersensible indeterminacy, state of indeterminacy connection, bond unification, union process, operation to connect, to tie together power reason to make sensible, to sensibilize understanding intelligible model, ideal prefiguration presence, being present to hover before, to have (something) m mind to represent, to have or to entertain representations the representing subject representation to perceive perception to interact, to stand in a relationship of reciprocal interaction

6o

German/English Glossary

die Wechselwirkung widerstehen der Wille die Willkiir wirken das Wirken wirklich die Wirklichkeit wirksam die Wirksamkeit die Wirkung WlSSen

die Wissenschaft das Wollen das Ziel (in sich selbst) zuriickgehend das Zusammenfassen der Zusammenhang zusammensetzen zusehen der Zustand der Zweck

(reciprocal) interaction to resist will choice, free choice, power of (free) choice to act efficaciously, to operate, to have an effect upon, to affect efficacious acting, accomplishment actual actuality effective, effectively efficacy, efficacious power effect to know science willing, act of willing goal, object self-reverting act of combining, combination combination, connection to combine, to assemble, to posit together, to compose to witness, to observe, to look at state goal, end (aim, purpose)

ABBREVIATIONS AA

EPW

GE"M.

G"M. H

lWL K

KGS

KRV SK

sw

"M.nm

J

G. Fichte: Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Ed. Reinhard Lauth, Hans Jacob, and Hans Gliwitzky. StuttgartBad Cannstatt: Frommann, 1964-. (This definitive edition is published in four parts, each of which consists of many separate volumes. Cited by section, volume, and page number.) Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings. Ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. J. G. Fichte. Grundri.ft des Eigentiimlichen der Wissenschajtslehre in Rilcksicht auf das theoretische Vermiigen (1795). (Cited according to the pagination of the edition in SW, I.) J. G. Fichte. Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschajtlehre (1794/95).(Cited according to the pagination of the edition in SW, 1.) The "Hallesche Nachschrift" of ID.nm ( 1797 I 98?). (Cited according to the pagination of the edition in AA N, 2.) Introductions to the Wissenschajtslehre and Other Writings. Ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994· The "Krause Nachschrift" of ID.nm (1798/99) = Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Wissenschajtslehre nova methodo. Kollegnachschrift. K. Chr. Fr. Krause. Ed. Erich Fuchs. Hamburg: Meiner, 1982; zweite verbesserte Auflage, 1994. Kants gesammelte Schriften. Ed. Koniglich PreuBischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin: Reimer/de Gruyter, 1902-. (Cited by volume and page number.) Immanuel Kant. Kritik der reinen Vernunft (First ed. [A], 1781; second ed. [B], 1787). Fichte: The Science of Knowledge. Ed. and trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982 (orig. 1970). johann Gottlieb Fichtes siimmtliche Werke. Ed. I. H. Fichte. Berlin: Veit, 1845-46. (Cited by volume and page number. The SWpagination is also indicated in the critical editions of many of Fichte's writings in AA, as well as in the English translations of Fichte's writings in EPW and SK.) J. G. Fichte. Wissenschajtslehre nova methodo (1796/99). (Usually cited as Kor H, above.)

KEY TO SYMBOLS AND NOTES

{}

All material enclosed with braces or scroll brackets is inserted into the text of K from H.

[]

Everything within square brackets is added by the editor/translator.

A

Footnotes marked by a superscripted letter provide additional, supplementary passages from H. Footnotes marked by a superscripted number provide philological and other information and are added by the editor/translator.

•

This solid square at the beginning of a paragraph indicates a paragraph break introduced into the text of K by the editor/translator.

The numbers in the left-hand margins refer to the page numbers of the text of K, as published by Felix Meiner. The numbers in the right-hand margins (within parentheses) refer to the page numbers of the text of H, as published in AA IV, 2 (and are provided only where material from H appears within the main body of the English text).

Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) Nova Methodo

(1796/gg)

The Major Points of the Wissenschaftslehre of 1798-1 799 Fichte's Dictata to His Lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre Winter Semester 1798-1799 (his last lectures on this topic) 1 §

1

The Concept of the I. Intellectual Intuition. (newer version)

Postulate: Construct the concept of the I and observe how you accomplish this. It was claimed that if one does what one is asked to do one will discover that one is active and will discover in addition that one's activity is directed upon one's uum active self. Accordingly, the concept of the I comes into being only by means of a self-reverting activity; and conversely, the only concept that comes into being by means of such an activity is the concept of the I. By observing oneself while engaged in this activity, one becomes immediately conscious of it; i.e., one posits oneself as selfpositing. As the sole immediate form of consciousness, this immediate 1 This is Krause's title for the general summary he placed at the beginning of his Nachschrift. Krause's subtitle notwithstanding, this was not to be the last time that Fichte lectured on the Wissenschaftslehre. He began a new series of lectures on the topic in Berlin only a year after his departure from Jena and continued to deliver new lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre at various intervals throughout the rest of his life. This was, however, his last series of lectures on the topic at Jena. The following summary of the "major points" or "chief propositions" (Hauptsiitu) of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, with which Krause's manuscript commences, is simply a compilation of the carefully dictated summaries ("dictata") that occur at the end of each of the nineteen §§ into which the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo is divided. For this reason, perhaps, Erich Fuchs did not include this preliminary section in his published edition of Krause's transcript. Though there are some minor differences between the versions of the summaries which appear within the text of the lectures and the transcriptions assembled here, only those changes that seem to involve some shift of meaning are explicitly noted. The translation of these "major points" departs from Krause's manuscript in several

[ 6s

l

66

Major Points of the Wissenschaftslehre

consciousness of oneself must be presupposed in the explanation of all other possible varieties of consciousness. It is called the original intuition of the I. (The word "intuition" is here employed in both the subjective and the objective sense. For intuition can mean two different things: (a) it can refer to the intuition which the I has, in which case the I is the subject, the intuiting subject; or (f3) it can refer to that intuition which is directed at the I, in which case the intuition is objective, and the I is the intuited object.) One will further observe that one is unable to posit oneself as acting without positing a state of repose in opposition thereto. Whenever a state of repose is posited, a concept is produced-in this case, the concept of the I. (older version of § 1) All consciousness is accompanied by an immediate self-consciousness, which is called intellectual intuition, and this immediate self-consciousness must be presupposed if one is to be able to think at all. Consciousness, however, is an activity, and self-consciousness, in particular, is the selfreverting activity of the intellect, or pure reflection. Remark: Everything follows as a consequence of carrying out the indicated self-observation. This pure act of reflection, viewed as a concept, is thought of by the I. Accordingly, I posit myself simply by means of myself, and all other consciousness is conditioned by this act of self-positing. §

2

Relation of the I to the Not-1. (newer version) It was claimed that when one constructs the concept of the I one will also discover that one cannot posit oneself as active without positing this activity as self-determined, and that one cannot do this without positing a movement of transition from a state of indeterminacy or determinability-

minor respects: ( 1) The page layout is different. Krause arranged his content headings (which, presumably, derive from Krause himself and not directly from Fichte) in a column on the left side of his pages and the summaries themselves in a column on the right side of the same pages. (2) As in the main body of the Nachschrift, two virtually identical versions of § 3 are also included in the "major points," and here too only one of these (the "more recent" version) is translated. (3) The second paragraph of Fichte's summary of § 17 is not included in Krause's compilation of "major points" but has been included here. (4) As in the main body of the text, words and passages are occasionally inserted from the text of the dictata appearing at the end of each § of H. Such insertions are always enclosed within braces or scroll brackets.

Major Points of the Wissenschaftslehre

67

which movement of transition is itself the very activity one is here observing (see sections 1 and 2 above). Similarly, one cannot grasp the concept {of the I} which comes into being by means of the determinate activity without determining this concept by means of an opposed Not-1. What is determinable is the same as what was previously called the state of repose (§ 1), for it becomes determined precisely by being transformed into an activity. Moreover, that which, in relation to the intuition of the I, is a concept of the I, is for the Not-Ian intuition. More specifically, it is the concept of the act of intuiting (section 4). As a consequence of this opposition, the Not-I can be characterized as the {real} negation of activity; that is, it can be characterized as "being," which is the concept of canceled activity. The concept of being is thus by no means an original concept, but is a negative one, derived from activity. (older version of § 2) When this very activity of reflection, through which the intellect posits itself, is intuited, it is intuited as a self-determining agility; and this agility is intuited as a movement of transition from a state of passive repose and indeterminacy, which is nevertheless determinable, to one of determinacy. This determinability here appears as the power to think either of the I or of the Not-I, and thus the concept of determinability necessarily involves the concepts of the I and the Not-I, which are posited in opposition to each other. Accordingly, whenever one engages in self-active reflection each of these concepts appears as something independent of this act, and the characteristic feature of the Not-I is being, i.e., a negation. §3 Actual Consciousness. Freedom. One will find that this movement of transition (from what is determinable to what is determinate, § 2) possesses its foundation utterly within itself. The action involved in this transition is called real activity and is opposed to that ideal activity which merely copies the former, and the overall activity of the I is thereby divided between these two types of activity. In accordance with the principle of determinability, no real activity can be posited without also positing a real or practical power. Real and ideal activity mutually condition and determine each other. Neither is possible without the other, nor can one comprehend what either of them is without also comprehending the other. In this act of freedom the I itself becomes objective. An actual consciousness comes into being, and from now on anything that is to be an object of consciousness at all

68

Major Points of the Wissenschaftslehre

must be connected to this starting point. Freedom is therefore the ultimate ground and the first condition of all being and of all consciousness.

§4

The Character of the I as the Identity of Practical Power and Intellect. Free self-determination is intuitable only as a determination to become "something," of which the self-determining or practical {power} must possess a {freely constructed} concept. A concept of this sort is called "the concept of a goal." Consequently, for the intuiting subject, the same subject who possesses practical power at the same time possesses the power to form concepts, just as, conversely, the comprehending subject, or {the power of} the intellect, must necessarily be practical. Practical power and intelligence are inseparable. Neither can be thought of apart from the other. The {true} character of the I thus lies in this identity. §5

Intuitability of the Activity of the I by Means of the Synthesis of Resistance. For intuition, what is determinable becomes an infinitely divisible manifold, because it is supposed to be the object of a free choice on the part of absolute freedom. This must also be true of what is determinate, since it is a part of this manifold. What is determinable and what is determinate are, to this extent, similar. What distinguishes them is this: In the first case, the action intuited is merely possible, i.e., an action posited by an intellect that is oscillating between opposites; in the second case, the action intuited is {actual, i.e.,} an action posited by an intellect that is bound to a determinate series of the manifold. Action2 is activity that is constantly resisted, and it is only by means of this synthesis of resistance {with activity} that an activity of the I becomes intuitable.

§6

Drive and Feeling. A free action is possible only if it is guided by a freely constructed concept of this action (§ 4); consequently, in advance of all action, the free 2 Reading "Handlung" for "Hemmung." The summary of§ 5 which appears within the text of the lectures (in both K and H) reads "action" (Handlung) instead of "constraint" (Hemmung), a word that makes little sense in this context and is presumably an error in transcription on Krause's part. In fact, the context makes it clear that what Fichte is referring to here is neither "constraint" nor "action" per se, but rather "constrained action."

M~or Points of the

Wissenschaftslehre

6g

intellect must be acquainted with the possibilities of action. Such an acquaintance can be explained only by assuming the presence within the I, prior to all action, of a drive, within which, precisely because it is only a drive, the inner activity of the I is limited. Since nothing pertains to the I which it does not posit, the I must also posit this limitation, and an original limitation that is posited in this way is called a ''feeling. "3 Since a free choice or selection is supposed to take place, a manifold of feelings must be present, and these various feelings can be distinguished from one another only through their relationship to the general system of feelings, a system that is likewise originally present.

§7 Feeling of the Object and Intuition of the Ideal. An intuition is necessarily connected with every feeling; for feeling is limitation, but a limitation that is not opposed to an activity is nothing. That within the I which necessarily remains an activity, however, is its ideal puwer. The point of union between feeling and intuition is this: even as the I feels itself to be limited (in its real aspect), it also feels itself to be engaged in intuiting (in its ideal aspect). To the extent that intuition is directed at the limitation, this limited state of the I becomes a mere object, with no relation to a subject, and the intuition is felt to be constrained in the depiction of the object. A feeling of this sort, however, is impossible apart from an opposed feeling of freedom; consequently, the intuition is also, in another respect, felt to be free, and to this extent it is an intuition of the ideal.

§8

The Concept of the I and the Concept of the Not-I. An intuition of the I is necessarily connected with an intuition of the Not-I, and only through the former does the latter become an intuition at all. In order to explain this intuition of the I, however, one has to assume an alteration in the state of [the I's] feelings, i.e., a limitation of its limited condition, through which the I itself becomes limited in the intuition of the Not-1. From this alteration there arises a feeling of this particular limitation of the ideal activity, from which there then arises an intuition of the same. The ground of the union of the intuition of the I and the intuition of the Not-1 is this: no constraint can be posited within the 3 "so etwas nennt man ein Gefiihl." The translation interprets K's "so etwas" in the light of the parallel passage in H: "(so ein setzen der urspriinglichen Beschrankung)."

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intuition of the Not-/ without also positing freedom in opposition to it. All freedom, however, pertains to the /, and only by means of freedom does the intuition of the I become an intuition of the I. But an intuition accompanied by a consciousness of the intuiting subject is called a "concept." Therefore, the concept of the I and the concept of the Not-/ both arise from the postulated alteration in the system of feeling.

§g The Thing and the Representation of the Thing. The act of comprehending is a free act of reflection upon the previously derived intuition, and it is posited as a free act. The freedom of the act of reflecting upon intuition cannot be posited, however, unless this act of reflection4 is itself posited as such. Accordingly, we obtain a twofold view of the act of reflection, and along with this, a twofold view of the object of the same. (That is to say, the double aspect of the act of reflection is present for the philosopher, whereas what is present for the I is the double aspect of the object.) In the first instance, [we are concerned with] the act of reflection as such, without any further reflection thereupon, and this furnishes the object that is present without any help from the I. In the second instance, [we are concerned with] the act of reflection as a particular determination of freedom, which is itself reflected upon, and this furnishes the representation of the thing. § 10a Acting as Drawing a Line. Space.

The act of comprehending is posited as a freely occurring act; this means that {it} is posited by the intellect as an act that can either occur or not occur, and indeed, as a specific mode of acting in general (for otherwise nothing at all would be posited). Consequently, acting as such or in general is posited, and it is posited as something that can occur or not occur-though acting is not possible "in general" unless one or another 4 "aber die Freiheit der REFLEXION auf sie kann nicht gesetzt werden, aufkr in wiefern sie selbst iiberhaupt gesetzt ist." The antecedent of the second sie in this clause is uncertain and might be either "the act of reflection" (die &flexion) or "the intuition" (die Anschauung), though the context appears to support the former. Indeed, the corresponding passage in H (p. g8) explicitly refers to both and states that "the freedom of this act of reflecting upon intuition cannot be posited except insofar as these (i.e., the act of reflection, as well as intuition itself) are already posited as such." It should be noted, however, that this same passage in H ("aufkr er inwiefern die[se] (REFLEXION, Anschauung selbst) iiberhaupt schon gesezt ist"), with its plural subject and singular verb, also appears to be defective.

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specific mode of acting is posited. Consequently, this "acting in general" exists for the intellect only as an instance of free acting-but no instance of "free acting" can be present for the intellect without "acting as such" or "in general" being present for it [as well]. However, the I intuits its sheer acting, considered as such, as an act of drawing a line, and hence it intuits its indeterminate power to act in this way as space.

§lOb Matter in Space.

Since the positing of the object and the positing of acting are necessarily united within the I, the former (the object) and the schema of the latter [i.e., space] must necessarily be united as well. But uniting an object with space is the same as filling space; consequently, all objects necessarily occupy space, that is, they are material. The freedom of the intellect consists in (i.e., expresses itself in) the synthesis of an object, which is determined by the predicates of feeling, with a place in space, which is determined by spontaneity; and, in this way, space becomes continuous, and space, as well as matter, becomes infinitely divisible. The determinacy of the latter (the intellect), without which the former (freedom) is impossible and which is not possible without the former, consists in this: that the object must be posited in some sface or another, 5 and that space must be filled with some sort of matter. There is no space without matter, and vice versa. This is a matter of necessity; but it is a matter of freedom that this object is not situated just in this space and that this space does not belong just to this object. §u

A Rational Being Posits Itself in Space as a Practically Striving Being.

Every object obtains its place in space from its relation to the representing subject, and, apart from this relationship, no determination of place is possible. Anything that is supposed to determine the position of another thing in space, however, must itself be in space. Accordingly, a rational being posits itself in space as a practically striving being. This internally felt striving, which obtains the form of intuition through the act of intuiting the object (an act that is necessarily united with feeling), 5 6

"in einen Raum iiberhaupt": that is, "in space as such or in general." "mit Materie iiberhaupt." ·

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is the original and immediate standard of measure for every determination of place. It is not possible to posit anything in space without also discovering oneself to be in space, but one cannot discover that one is in space unless one posits an object in space.

§ 12 Real External Efficacy. Our striving, or our practical acting, is, according to the preceding§, the standard of measure for all spatial determination. Inner or pure force is the efficacy of willing, as intuited immediately and therefore intellectually. Through such willing, the entire free power of the I is focused upon a single point. Outer or physical force is this same energy, but extended by sensible intuition in a temporal series, in which series the manifold of the power of feeling, as determined by the causality of the will, is brought into a relationship of dependence; and it is only through this relationship of dependence that this manifold can be assimilated to the unity 7 of consciousness. A physical force of this sort, however, can be posited only in [the context of] some real efficacy, from which it follows that any determination of the place of things-and thus consciousness itself-is possible only in consequence of some real efficacy. § 13 The Intelligible Pure Will. The Feeling of "Ought." The I as an Individual in the Realm of Rational Beings.

Real efficacy is possible only in accordance with a concept of a goal; a concept of a goal is possible only on the condition of a cognition; and such a cognition is possible only on the condition of a real efficacy; consequently, consciousness would not be explained by this circle. There must therefore be something that simultaneously is an object of cognition and is efficacious. 8 All these features are united in only one thing: in pure will, which must be presupposed prior to all empirical willing and to all empirical cognition. This pure will is something purely intelligible, but it can express itself through a feeling of "ought," and in this way it becomes an object of thought. To the extent that this occurs, pure willing is assimilated into the overall form of thinking as something determi7 Reading, with the version of this paragraph which appears at the end of § 12 in both K and H, "Einheit" instead of "Freiheit" ("freedom"). 8 Reading, with the version of this paragraph which appears at the end of § 13 in both K and H, "das Object der Erkenntnip und Wiirksamkeit" for "das Object der Erkenntnip und der Wirksamkeit" ("an object of cognition and of efficacy").

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nate in opposition to something determinable. In this way, /, the willing subject, become an individual, and there comes into being for me a realm of rational beings, as what is determinable in this case. Consciousness in its entirety can and must be derived from this pure concept.

§ 14 Willing and Doing. Unification of Cognition of the Object with the Will. The pure will is the immediate object of all consciousness and of all reflection (§ 13). Reflection, however, is discursive; consequently, the pure will must be a manifold. It is not originally manifold, but first becomes so by being related to its own {original} limitation, by means of which it {first} becomes a will. This relation of the pure will to its own limitation occurs within the act of reflection itself, which is absolutely free; and the freedom and entire essence of this act of reflection consist precisely in this act of relating9 {the pure will to the original limitation}. The freedom of this act consists, in part, in the fact that such a relationship is established at all and, in part, in the fact that it occurs in this or that way. Insofar as it is simply thought of, this act of reflection appears as an act of willing; insofar as it is intuited, it appears as a "doing." This same act of reflection is the foundation of all empirical consciousness. In an individual act of such reflection, a rational being views itself in two different ways or under two different aspects. On the one hand, it views itself as limited; on the other, it views itself as active in describing this limitation. The former is its outer aspect, the latter is its inner one; and, as a result, it ascribes to itself a general organ {(a body)} consisting of an inner and an outer organ. Feeling is the relation of limitation to reflection. The source of the limitation is something that exists only for the ideal activity engaged in thinking about the real activity, and the immediate union of cognition of an object with the will is thereby explained.

§ 15 The I's Task of Limiting Its Will by Itself. But a limitation is not a limitation of the I, and does not exist for the I, unless it is one the I assigns to itself. Accordingly, the original limitation of the will can signify nothing but a task for the 1: the task of limiting its own will. The distinctive harbinger of this task within empirical 9

Reading, with H, "Beziehen" for K's "Beziehung" ("relation").

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consciousness can be nothing other than a concept that demands a specific self-limitation, and it is by grasping this concept that feeling and intuition first arise. Consequently, all consciousness begins with the act of thinking of something purely intelligible. § 16 The Summons to Engage in Free Activity, Coming from a Rational Being 10 Outside of Us. Viewed from another side, this task of limiting oneself is a summons to engage in a free activity (for it does not appear to come from the individual; instead, it appears to come from a rational being outside of us). We cannot determine ourselves, however, unless our act of selfdetermination is accompanied by an actual act of willing; consequently, consciousness of an actual act of willing is inseparably linked with this perception of a summons to freedom.

§ 17 In its Activity upon Itself the I Discovers II Itself as a Willing Subject. As we know, the I is what acts upon itself, 12 and, by virtue of this selfdirected activity, it is a willing subject. "The I discovers itself': this obviously means that it discovers itself to be engaged in acting upon itself. The I discovers 13 itself to be a willing subject in this self-directed activity, because its original nature-which cannot be derived from anything· higher, but must instead be presupposed for {the possibility of} any explanation-consists in an act of willing. Every object of {the I's} free reflection upon itself must consequently become its own willing. Every act of reflection is an act of self-determining, and the reflecting subject immediately intuits this act of self-determining. But it intuits this act through the medium of the imagination, and, accordingly, it intuits it as a sheer power of self-determination. By means of this abstract act of thinking (as a power) the I arises for itself as "something"-something purely spiritual, 14 something exclusively ideal-and becomes conscious "einer Vernunft." Reading, with the text of the summary that appears at the end of§ 17 in H, "findet" for K's "fiihlt" ("feels"). 12 Reading, with H, "das auf sich selbst thatige" for K's "das durch sich selbst thiitige" ("what is active through itself"), a reading that is confirmed by the rest of this paragraph. 13 Reading, with H, "findet" for K's "fiihle." 14 "ein rein Geistiges," i.e., something purely "intellectual." 10 11

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of its own activity of pure thinking and willing, and becomes conscious of it as such, {that is, as an activity}. This act of reflection, however, is an act of self-determining; but the previously described act of imagination is an act of the I, and it is therefore determinate. Consequently, in one and the same undivided act, pure thinking is made sensible by the imagination, and what is made sensible by the imagination is determined by pure thinking (reciprocal interaction of intuiting and thinking). This determination produces a self-contained power of the I as a sensible force, as well as a determinacy of this power 15 (concept of substantiality). An object is added in thought to the determinacy of this sensible force, and the latter determines the former in an act of thinking (concept of causality).

§ 18

The I in Opposition to Reason and Freedom Outside of Itself as well as in Opposition to Things Outside of Itself. Since the I, when engaged in the act of intuiting its own act of pure thinking, is at the same time determinate, this same pure act of thinking (that is to say, the I as a product of this act of thinking, the I as a free being) necessarily becomes something determinate for the I. But a free being, as such, can be determined only by the task offreely determining itself. When the I thinks of this, it proceeds from a general sphere of freedom as such (as what is determinable) to itself (as what is determinate within this sphere) and thereby posits itself as an individual, in opposition to a {realm of} reason and freedom outside of itself. In this determinate act of thinking, the I is at the same time free, and it thinks of what is determinate only insofar as it does so with freedom; consequently, it also confers freedom upon what is determinate. But freedom within mere determinacy (as in nature) is independent being. 16 In this manner, a being that is independent of the I is attributed to the Not1, which first becomes a thing thereby. Insofar as the Not-I possesses this type of being, it is what endures and is determinable throughout all the different determinations it receives through the freedom of the I. The act of thinking of the I as a free but limited being and that of thinking of the Not-/ as a self-subsisting thing 17 mutually condition each other. The I intuits its own freedom only in the objects of its acting, and it intuits these objects only insofar as it freely acts upon them. Reading, with H, "derselben" for K's "desselben"("of the 1"). More literally: "being through itself' or "selfsupf.?rted being." 15

16 "IST SEYN DURCH SICH SELBST."

"ALS FUR SICH BESTEHENDEN DINGES."

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§ 19 Articulated Body. Organized Nature. When the limitation of the I is made sensible and is perceived, it appears as a summons to act freely. What is perceived in this case appears to us as a limitation of our physical force-assuming that we confine ourselves to ourselves. Accordingly, a physical force outside of us is posited as what determines this limitation. The physical force in question is governed (this is to be understood practically, that is, only in the sense of positing it as engaged in real activity) 18 by the will of a free individual outside of us, an individual who is determined and characterized by this will. (I.e., the individual in question is this determinate will, from which the existence of a rational being is first inferred.) What is determinable in this case {(what is determined by the freely determining agent and is, for us, a determinacy) 1 ~ provides us with the concept and the perception of an articulated body, a person, outside of us. This, the body, is a product of nature and consists of parts, which constitute this determinate whole only in their union with one another; therefore, nature contains within itself the law that its parts must necessarily unite to form wholes, which, in turn, constitute one single whole. Nature is both organized and organizing; insofar as a sensuous, rational being outside of me is posited, nature is thertfore posited. This exhausts the sphere of what must necessarily be present within consciousness. Remark: Nature is {a complete whole and is} explicable {through itself} only insofar as it is both organized and organizing. Otherwise, one will be driven further and further afield by the law of causality, {if one assumes this law as one's explanatory rule}. 18

"(ist praktisch zu verstehen, nur im wirklichen Activitatsetzen)." Bestimmbare davon (von dem freyen bestimmenden, das fiir uns Bestimmtheit

19 "Das

ist)."

3

First Introduction (presented in public lectures) 1

This introduction will address the following three questions: I. What is philosophy? II. How will philosophy be dealt with within the context of the system of the Wissenschaftslehre? III. How has the previous version of this system2 been altered, and how will the Wissenschaftslehre be dealt with in this series of lectures? Re. I: No mere definition of philosophy will be provided, no mere formula that would simply stand in the way of any further thought. Instead, we will show what philosophy is by proceeding in a genetic manner. That is to say, we will describe how it happens that the human mind begins to philosophize. We will take it for granted that one assumes that things exist outside of oneself. In support of this assumption one appeals to one's own inner state. It is from within oneself that one obtains this conviction: one is conscious of an internal state from which one infers the existence of objects outside of oneself. But of course, one is conscious only insofar as 1 Fichte's course oflectures on the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo [henceforth WLnm] was a private course, i.e., one open only to officially enrolled (and paying) students. Public lectures, in contrast, were free and open to the entire university community. Fichte obviously intended this "public introduction" to the Wissenschaftslehre to attract prospective students to his course of private lectures and to provide them with some idea of what to expect. The numbers in the left margin of this translation refer to the page numbers of the German text of Krause's typescript as edited and published by Erich Fuchs (K). 2 GWL and GEWL. Together, these two published works constitute the "previous presentation" to which Fichte makes frequent reference throughout the present text. Fichte's own page references are to the first editions of these two works, but the translation substitutes references to the texts contained in the first volume of the readily available SW. The translations of GWL in SK (pp. Sg-286) and GEWL in EPW (pp. 243-306) provide marginal page references to SW, I, as do the editions of GWL and GEWL included in AA I, 2 and I, 3·

[ 77]

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one entertains representations; 3 hence all one can say is that one is conscious of representations of things outside of us, and in fact, one really asserts no more than this when one says that there are objects outside of us. No person can immediately affirm that he senses anything, but merely that he is compelled to assume something of the sort. Consciousness is concerned only with what can be found within consciousness-and these are representations. • 4 Nevertheless, we do not content ourselves with this, but quickly introduce a distinction between the representation and the object; and we assert that beyond the representation there lies something else, something real or actual. 5 As soon as we become aware of this distinction between the representation and the object, we say that they both exist. All rational beings (even idealists and egoists, so long as they are not standing behind a lectern) continuously affirm the existence of an actual world. Any person who has raised himself to the level of reflecting upon this phenomenon occurring within the human soul must be astonished at the inconsistency this appears to involve. Hence one poses the following question: Why do we assume that actual things exist, beyond and in addition to our representations? Many people do not raise this question, either because they do not notice the distinction between representations and things, or simply because they are too thoughtless to raise such a question. But anyone who does pose this question has thereby raised himself to the level of philosophical inquiry. The aim of philosophical inquiry is to answer this question, and the science that answers it is philosophy. Whether there actually is such a science is a question that must remain undecided for the moment. It is, however, well known that much effort has already been devoted to attempts to answer the previously indicated question; for this has always been the task of philosophy. In trying to answer this question, however, most philosophers have proceeded in a one-sided manner, and hence their answers had to be one-sided as well. They thought, for example, that all they had to do was to inquire s What Fichte actually says is that insofar as one is conscious, one is a "representing creature" or a "representing being" (ein vorstellendes Wesen). Throughout this translation, all technical occurrences of the term Vorstellung have been rendered as "representation." Fichte's employment of this term is derived from Kant (and Reinhold), for whom it designates the immediate object of consciousness, i.e., that which is "placed before"-vorgestellt-the mind (cp. Locke's "ideas" or Hume's "perceptions of the mind"). Thus the verb vorstellen, which is somewhat awkwardly rendered here as "to represent" or "to entertain representations," means no more than this: to have something "on one's mind," i.e., to be conscious of anything at all. 4 All paragraph breaks that have been introduced into the English translation of K are marked by the symbol "•." 5 "liege noch etwas wiirkliches." The adjective wirldich, which is often rendered as "real" but is normally translated in this volume as "actual," derives from the verb wirken, the root meaning of which is "to have an effect." Fichte fully exploits this intimate etymological connection between efficacy and reality ("actuality").

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79

whether God, immortality, and freedom exist, i.e., whether there is anything actual outside of these representations and corresponding to them. But the question philosophy has to answer is not whether these particular representations possess any reality, but rather whether any of our representations possess any reality whatsoever. In maintaining that something else exists in addition to a particular representation, one asserts the objective validity of that representation. Thus, to inquire concerning the objective validity of the Deity means to investigate whether God is merely a thought, or whether there is something else, beyond this thought, which corresponds to it. The question concerning the objectivity of the world is every bit as interesting as those concerning the objectivity of the Deity and of immortality, and if one has not answered the former question one cannot answer the latter ones. Philosophy is thus something that is at least conceivable; that is to say, it is conceivable that one might ask about the objectivity of our representations, and it is worthy of a rational being to ponder the answer to this question. The Idea of philosophy6 is thereby demonstrated, but the only way in which its reality can be demonstrated is by actually constructing a system of philosophy. Just as the human mind can pose these questions, so can it also pose many other ones, which it can then proceed to answer or to attempt to answer. If this occurs in conformity with specific laws it is called "reasoning,"? and a science comes into being thereby, but not yet philosophy, which is devoted solely to answering the previously indicated question. Re. II: To be sure, people also philosophized in former times, but only in an obscure manner, not yet based upon any clear concept. The question concerning the objective validity of our representations has been particularly insisted upon by the skeptics. It was one of the greatest of these skeptics, Hume, who awoke Kant. 8 Kant, however, constructed no 6 "Die Idee der Philosophie." "Idea" (or "transcendental Idea") is a term Kant employed to designate a "necessary concept of reason to which no corresponding object can be given in sense-experience" (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A327/B383 [henceforth KRV and cited according to the pagination of both the first (1781 = A) and second (1787 = B) editions; English translation by Norman Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason (New York: Macmillan Press, 1963)]). Kant's examples include the concepts ("Ideas") of God, freedom, and immortality. In order to remind readers of the technical, Kantian background of this term, "Idea" is capitalized throughout this translation. 7 "so wird RAESONNIRT." 8 See Kant's famous remark in the Preface to his Prolegumena zu einer jeden kunftigen Metaphysik ( 1783) about being awakened from his "dogmatic slumbers" by his reading of Hume. In Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Konigliche PreujJischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (1go2-10; rpt., Berlin: de Gruyter, 1968) [henceforth KGS], IV: 260. English translation by Lewis White Beck, Prolegumena to Any Future Metaphysics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950).

So

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First Introduction

system, but only wrote Critiques, i.e., preliminary inquiries concerning philosophy. 9 Yet when one grasps in a systematic matter what Kant says, especially in the Critique of Pure Reason, one can see that he correctly conceived the question philosophy has to answer, which he expressed as follows: "How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" 10 His own answer was that, in producing representations, reason acts with a certain necessity and in accordance with certain laws, and whatever is brought about by means of this necessity and through these laws possesses objective validity. Kant, therefore, is not concerned with things in themselves, with some sort of existence possessing no relation to a representing subject. • It was a great misunderstanding to think that what Kant presented in his Critiques constitutes a system. The following objections may be raised against those who believe this: (1) All the human mind's modes of acting, II as well as the laws governing the same, are not systematically established by Kant, but are merely picked up from experience. Consequently, one cannot be certain: (a) that Kant's list of the laws governing the human mind's necessary modes of acting is exhaustive, since he has not proven them. (b) how far their validity extends. (c) According to Kant, the most remarkable expressions of the human mind-namely, thinking, willing, and feeling pleasure or pain-cannot be traced back to a first principle, but are merely coordinated. (2) The most important task of all, namely, to prove that and how our representations obtain objective validity, has not been accomplished. Kant proves his philosophy only by means of induction and not through deduction. His philosophy states that consciousness would be explained if one were to assume the operation of this or that law, and thus it possesses only hypothetical validity. To what extent may one acquiesce in such a philosophy, and to what extent should one refuse to be content with it? Why must one go any further? A person who ingenuously surrenders himself to the dictates of his own reason has no need of philosophy. Would it not then be better to dispense with philosophy altogether, and indeed, to advise anyone who no longer surrenders himself in this naive manner to his own reason to retain his faith in the truth of his own consciousness? For Kant's own affirmation of precisely this point, see KRV, A1IIB25. Kant, KRV, B1g. 11 "Das gesammte Handeln des menschlichen Geistes." In order to preserve the distinction between "das Handeln" and "die Handlung," the former is normally translated as "acting" (or occasionally, as here, "mode[s] of acting" or "instance[s] of acting"), whereas the latter is always rendered as "action." 9

10 See

First Introduction

7

81

• It is a good thing to have an ingenuous confidence in the dictates of one's own consciousness, but such is not the vocation of mankind; instead, it is mankind's destiny to strive constantly for well-grounded cognition. 12 We are ceaselessly driven to seek well-grounded conviction; and anyone who has arrived at the point of philosophical doubt cannot be sent back along the path he has already traversed, but will always seek to resolve his doubts on his own. Such a person finds himself in a painful state, which not only disturbs his inner peace, but also interferes with his external acting; for him, therefore, such a state is practically harmful. The idealist who denies the reality of the corporeal world nevertheless never ceases to rely upon this world just as much as the person who believes in its reality. Although the idealist's doubt has no immediate effect upon his life, the contradiction between his theory and his practice is still unseemly. Skepticism can also lead one astray concerning belief in God and immortality, and this has an effect upon one's peace of mind and disposition. One may indeed take some temporary comfort in an incomplete and superficial philosophy; but as soon as one discovers the inadequacies of such a philosophy, one then comes to doubt the very possibility of philosophy itself, and this doubt transports one into a state of even greater distress. The practical goal now is to resolve these doubts and to bring man into harmony with himself, so that he can trust his own consciousness from conviction and on the basis of good reasons-just as he previously trusted it from the instinct of reason. (The overall goal of human education and cultivation is to employ labor to make man what he previously was without the need of any labor at all.) This [practical] goal has been completely achieved by the Kantian philosophy. It is a proven philosophy, and everyone who understands it must admit that it is true. But it is not our vocation to be satisfied with this. We are destined for complete and systematic cognizance. It is not sufficient that our doubts be resolved and that we be consigned to tranquility; we also want science. Human beings have a need for science, and the Wissenschaftslehre offers to satisfy this need. The conclusions of the Wissenschaftslehre are therefore the same as those of Kant's philosophy, but the way in which these 12 "die Bestimmung der Menschheit ist es nicht, sie geht unaufhorlich fort auf gegriindete ErkenntniiJ." The word Grund means "ground" or "basis" or "foundation" or "reason." (The German name for the "principle of sufficient reason," for example, is Satz des Grundes.) A well-grounded cognition is thus one that has its basis or foundation in some previous one, whereas the ultimate Grund of all knowledge cannot be derived from anything higher, but must be somehow self-evident. The task of the Jena Wissenschaftslehre is to demonstrate, via a genetic deduction or "derivation," the connection between ordinary experience and its ultimate "ground." Thus it is the aim of Fichte's philosophy finally to satisfy the perennial human quest for "well-grounded knowledge." For a detailed discussion of the vital connections among "philosophy," "science," "system," and "ground," see Fichte's important "programmatic" work of 1794, Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre (SW, 1: 27-81 = AA I, 2: 107-63; English translation in EPW, pp. 84-135).

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results are established is quite different. Kant does not derive the laws of human thinking in a rigorously scientific manner. But this is precisely what the Wissenschaftslehre is supposed to do. It provides a derivation of the laws that apply to any finite rational being whatsoever. Because it is based merely upon experience, the Kantian system merely asserts the laws of human reason, but the Wissenschaftslehre proves these laws. "I prove something to someone" means that I lead him to the point where he recognizes that he has already conceded the truth of some proposition simply because he has previously conceded the truth of some other proposition. Every proof thus presupposes that the person to whom one wishes to prove something accepts something else as already proven, and two people who can agree on nothing are unable to prove anything to each other. Accordingly, since the Wissenschaftslehre wishes to provide a proof of the laws in accordance with which a finite, rational being generates its cognitions, it must base this demonstration upon something. And since it wishes to provide a foundation for our knowledge, 13 it must begin with something that every person will concede. If there is no such . thing, then systematic philosophy is impossible. The Wissenschaftslehre calls upon every person to reflect upon what he does when he says "1." According to the Wissenschaftslehre, what happens when one says "I" is this: one supposes that one posits oneself, and that one posits oneself as a subject-object. One cannot think "I" without doing this. The identity of the positing subject and the posited object 14 completely exhausts the concept of I-hood, 15 insofar as this concept is postulated by the Wissenschaftslehre. We do not here import into this concept anything else that one might otherwise think of in conjunction with self-positing. The Wissenschaftslehre can do nothing with a person who will not concede this identity. This is the first thing that the Wissenschaftslehre demands of everyone. In addition, it asks one to consult one's own consciousness once again; and it claims that if one does so, one will discover the following: that one not only posits oneself, but also posits something else in opposition to oneself-i.e., that one opposes some13 Reading, with Krause's MS, "WijJen" forK's "Wesen." Thanks to information supplied by Fuchs, I have been able in this English edition to correct some mistranscriptions that ap~ear in the Meiner edition of the German text. 4 "die Identitat des Setzenden und Gesetzten": i.e., the identity of the actively positing subject and what is posited by means of this act. This is the same identity that, in the 17941 95 version of his system, Fichte tried (rather unsuccessfully) to convey by the term Thathandlung. The verb setzen (here translated throughout as "to posit") is a basic term in Fichte's philosophical vocabulary and is employed to designate the act of being aware or conscious of anything whatsoever. The root meaning of setzen is "to place" or "to put," and thus it designates the reflective act in which the I "places" something before itself and thereby attends to it. Though this term does indeed call attention to the action involved in all consciousness, it does not, taken by itself, imply that the conscious subject somehow creates the object of which it is conscious. 15 "Ichheit."

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thing to oneself. 16 What is thereby posited in opposition is called "Not1," for the only thing said about it is that it is posited in opposition to the I. One cannot yet call it "an object" or "the world," because, before one can do so, one must first show how it becomes an object and a world. Otherwise, ours would be nothing more than yet another variety of Popular Philosophy. 17 Everything else is derived from these presuppositions. Reason lies within the I, finitude in the Not-1. The Wissenschaftslehre maintains that everything that follows from this is valid for all finite, rational beings. The Wissenschaftslehre then proceeds to exhibit the conditions that make it possible for the I to posit itself and to oppose a Not-1 to itself, and this is what proves its correctness. These conditions are the human mind's original ways of acting. Whatever is required in order for the I to be able to posit itself and to oppose a Not-1 to itself is necessary. The Wissenschaftslehre demonstrates these conditions by means of a deduction. A deductive proof proceeds as follows: We can assume that it is the very nature of the human mind to posit itself and to oppose a Not-I to itself; but if we assume this, we must also assume much else as well. This is called "deducing," i.e., deriving something from something else. Kant merely asserts that one always proceeds in accordance with the categories, 18 whereas the Wissenschaftslehre asserts that one must proceed in accordance with the categories-just as surely as one posits oneself as an I. The conclusions are the same, but the Wissenschaftslehre connects them to something higher as well. ( 1) Thus the Wissenschaftslehre seeks to discover within the inner workings of finite, rational being as such 19 the foundation of all the thinking that exists for us. This can be briefly expressed as follows: The essence of reason consists in my positing myself; but I cannot do this without positing a world in opposition to myself, and indeed, a quite specific world: 16 "da~ man sich nicht nur selbst setze, sondern da~ man sich auch noch etwas entgegensetze." The reader should keep in mind that when the verb "oppose" occurs in this translation, it always means entgegensetzen, "to posit in opposition" (hence the term "counterposit" coined by Peter Heath and John Lachs in their translation of The Science of Knuwledge). By "opposition," therefore, Fichte does not always (or even usually) mean formal, logical opposition. Indeed, the meaning of "opposition" in this text is often closer to simple "difference," in the sense that, in order to posit or to recognize a difference between x and y, we must oppose them to each other. 17 The so-called Popular Philosophers formed a distinct movement in late eighteenthcentury German intellectual life and were frequent objects of Fichte's derision. "Popular Philosophy" of this sort was characterized by a distrust of formal rigor, an inclination to cultivate philosophy as a form of belles-lettres, and frequent appeal to the tribunal of "healthy common sense." For information concerning this long-forgotten (though, in another sense, perennial) philosophical movement, see chap. 13 of Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1g6g), and chap. 6 of Beiser, The Fate of Reason. 18 See, e.g., Kant, KRV, A8o/B 106. 19 "in dem inneren Verfahren des endlichen Vernunftwesens iiberhaupt."

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a world in space, within which appearances follow one another sequentially in time. This all occurs in one single, undivided act. When this first act occurs, all the others occur simultaneously. But philosophy, and especially the Wissenschaftslehre, wishes to become minutely acquainted with this single act. One never becomes acquainted with anything exactly and in detail, however, except by disassembling and dissecting it, and this is also how the Wissenschaftslehre deals with this single action of the I. We thereby obtain a series of interconnected actions of the I; for we are unable to grasp this single action all at once, since a philosopher is a being ·who must do his thinking within time. In this manner, the need for science is satisfied, and we then obtain a cognition that is not merely discursive and pieced together from experience, but systematic, in the sense that it all can be derived from a single point to which everything else is connected. The human mind strives for systematic cognition, and hence it should follow the promptings of this striving. Anyone who says it is impossible to obtain this says no more than that it is impossible for him personally to obtain it. The method followed in the Wissenschaftslehre also has advantages in respect of clarity, since what hangs together in such a way that everything can be easily surveyed from a single point is always clearer than a diverse aggregate of things, each of which must be perceived separately. (2) Kant did not answer the question, How is it that we come to ascribe objective validity to certain representations? But the Wissenschaftslehre succeeds in answering just this question. We attribute objective validity to a representation whenever we affirm that, in addition to the representation itself, there also exists some thing that corresponds to the representation but is independent of it. What distinguishes the representation from the thing is that I have produced the representation, but I have not produced the thing. The Wissenschaftslehre asserts that, when we are dealing with representations that are supposed to be present within us necessarily, we are simply forced to assume that something external corresponds to them; and it demonstrates this in a genetic manner. There are two fundamental actions of the 1: one is that act by means of which it posits itself, along with all that is required in order to do sonamely, the entire world. The other action Is a reiterated positing of what has already been posited by the first act. Thus there is an original positing of the I and of the world, and, in addition to this, there is a positing of what has already been posited. The first action makes consciousness possible in the first place, and thus it cannot itself occur within consciousness. The second, however, is consciousness itself. Thus the second action presupposes the first one; and accordingly, in the second action something is found to be present without any assistance from the I, which then reflects upon what it has found. The thing, which is the

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result of the first act and which is thus actually a product of the I, makes its appearance in this second act. 20 Consequently, we must distinguish the original thesis, or rather synthesis (since a manifold is posited in this original thesis), from the analysis of this synthesis, which occurs when one reflects upon what is contained in the original synthesis. Experience in its entirety is thus nothing but an analysis of this original synthesis. We can never actually be conscious of the original act of positing, for it is itself just the condition for the possibility of all consciousness. Such, in brief, is the substance, the essence, and the distinctive character of the Wissenschaftslehre. Re. III: (1) The investigations that make up the Wissenschaftslehre will here be conducted in a new manner, just as if they had never been conducted before. This revised version will profit from the fact that, since the time of the original version, the first principles have been further developed and extended, and this facilitates a clearer understanding of those principles themselves. 21 Moreover, from his conversations on the subject with various people, your instructor has discovered the reason why many still find his earlier statements to be unclear. All the same, consideration will be given to the first presentation as well. (2) The first presentation was made somewhat awkward by the fact that the discussion of the conditions for the possibility of the principles did not present these conditions in their natural order, but was instead divided into a "theoretical" part and a "practical" part. As a result of this division, many directly related issues were separated too widely from one another. This will no longer occur in the present version, [which will follow] {a method of presentation that is just the opposite of that followed by the author in his compendium of 1794, where he proceeded from the theoretical portion of philosophy (i.e., from what had to be explained) to the practical part (i.e., to what was meant to serve as the basis for explaining the former). In the present lectures, however, the hitherto familiar division between theoretical and practical philosophy is not to be found. Instead, these lectures present philosophy as a whole, in the 20 "Das erste dessen Resultat das Ding ist; dadurch zeigt sich, was eigentlich das Product des Ich ist." This sentence, which is incomplete or incoherent as it stands, is construed by Radrizzani to read: "The first act [that is, the act of self-positing], the product of which is the thing, reveals what is really the product of the 1." 21 This is presumably an allusion to Fichte's two major works that intervened between the original 1794/95 presentation of the first principles of his system (in GWL and GEWL) and the present, revised version: the Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Principien der Wissenschaftslehre ( 1796I 97) and the System der Sittenlehre nach den Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre -(1798), in which (as the full titles of the two books declare) the principles ofFichte's philosophy are "extended" into the fields of natural right (or natural law) and ethics.

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exposition of which theoretical and practical philosophy are united. This presentation follows a much more natural path, beginning with the practical sphere, or, whenever it would contribute to the clarity of the exposition to do so, inserting the practical into the theoretical, in order to explain the latter in terms of the former: a liberty for which the author was not yet sufficiently self-confident at the time that he published his Wissenschaftslehre.} 22 We will also discuss, in an explicit and thorough manner, the laws of reflection, in combination and in connection with what proceeds from these laws. (This promise could not be fulfilled because of a lack of time.) 23 "To reflect" means to direct the ideal activity of the mind at something; this can occur only in accordance with certain laws, and this determines the specific character of the object of reflection. In the course of these lectures, your instructor will be following a certain path of inquiry, and those who do not think along with him will obtain nothing at all from these lectures, which can be of use only to persons able to think along with them. For those who do not make such an effort to think along with him, the instructor might just as well deliver his lectures in Arabic. 22 Though H contains nothing comparable to the "first introduction" to K, and begins instead with what, in K, is the "second introduction," this introduction is preceded in H by the short paragraph here translated. The first page of H begins with the title, "WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE, according to the lectures of Prof. Fichte," which is immediately followed by the paragraph translated above, the first words of which are "N .B. And moreover, according to a [.... )" Page references to the text of H (as published in AA IV, 2) are henceforth supplied, within parentheses, in the right margin of the translation. 23 There is some controversy concerning the author of this parenthetic remark. See "Dating the Krause Transcript" in the Editor's Introduction.

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( 1) These lectures will be concerned with the first and deepest foundations of philosophy. {Wissenschaftslehre and philosophy are one and the same.} Philosophy is not a collection of propositions that can be studied and memorized as such; instead, it is a certain way of looking at things, {a way of viewing things in accordance with certain principles, 1} a particular way of thinking, which one must generate within oneself. Anyone who is not yet able to state correctly what philosophy is concerned with still lacks a correct concept of philosophy. As Kant said, it is an advantage for a science when its task can be expressed in a single formula. Kant himself reduced the task of philosophy to answering the question, "How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?" {(Synthesis occurs when we go beyond our representations and connect something to them: what has to be shown is that one is impossible without the other.)} Your instructor phrases the same question as follows: "How do we come to assume that something external to us corresponds to the representations within us?" These two questions are the same. I know that I am conscious of a representation of something. In addition to this, I also maintain that there exists a thing corresponding to this representation, a thing that would exist even if I did not entertain a representation of it. Yet the connection between the representation and the thing is itself, in turn, nothing more than a representation, i.e., something within me. Nevertheless, we do not merely assert that we entertain representations; we also maintain that things outside of these representations correspond to these representations themselves. Accordingly, the representation of the connection between representations and things would be a necessary representation. In this case, therefore, a connection has already been made; and even though we are not yet aware of the act of connecting, such an act is necessary nevertheless. 1

"Geschichtspunkt nach gewissen Principien."

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This process, by means of which I go beyond the mere representation to the representation that there actually are existing things, is something that occurs necessarily. All rational beings proceed in this way. Necessary representations are therefore present within a thinking being. Philosophy inquires concerning the basis or reason for these necessary representations within the intellect. 2 ·A (2) Not philosophy itself, but the philosophical task, the tendency toward

philosophy, has its origin in the fact 3 that we are conscious, {which cannot be and does not need to be proven}. 8 Among those determinations and states of our consciousness, which we designate under the general name "representations," there are some that are accompanied by a feeling of necessity, while others depend purely upon our own free choice. 4 {This is equally undeniable.} ( 1) No one doubts this fact. There can be no question whatsoever about it, and anyone who still demands a proof of it does not know what he is asking. (Example: Tiedemann,5 who, in his Theaetetus, wishes to prove that he entertains representations.) (2) Pay careful attention to how this fact is stated: It is asserted that there are representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity, that {we are compelled to assume that} there are things that correspond to these representations. It is not claimed that things {are or that they} exist. We can be conscious only of the objects of our consciousness. (3) Something else is now attached to this indubitably certain fact, namely, the Idea of a ground or foundation. 6 The philosopher asks the following question: What is the foundation of those representations of mine that are accompanied by a feeling of necessity? That there is some foundation is taken for granted. The question is simply, What is this foundation? "fragt nun nach dem Grunde dieser nothwendigen Vorstellungen in der INTELLIGENZ." The task of philosophy as a whole may be expressed in the following question: What is the basis of what occurs in consciousness accompanied by a feeling of necessity? (Or, what is the basis of the necessary representations within the intellect?) (p. 18). [Lettered footnotes supply supplementary passages from H. Unlike the passages enclosed within scroll brackets in the text itself, which generally go beyond or clarify the text of K, these supplementary passages represent alternative-and sometimes conflicting-formulations of points and arguments elaborated inK.] 2

A

3 "FACTO."

Philosophy begins with the fact that we are conscious of ourselves, which cannot be and does not need to be proven (p. 18). 4 "Willkiihr." 5 Dietrich Tiedemann (1748-1803) was a professor of philosophy at Marburg and author of a work entitled Theiitet, oder iiber des menschliche Wissen, ein Beytrag zur VemunftKritik, which appeared in 1 794, the same year as the first part of Fichte's Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre. Tiedemann's work remained a favorite target of Fichte's scorn throughout his Jena period, though, as Radrizzani has pointed out, Fichte's criticism of Tiedemann in this passage appears to be based upon a distorted reading. 6 "die Idee eines Grundes." 8

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8g

{For example, a blow from behind (fact) forces me to look around for the cause (necessary representation) (since it is possible that I might not have received this blow or that I might have received a weaker or a stronger one). What, however, is the reason that I act in this manner? Why am I forced to infer that there is something lying beyond and corresponding to these necessary representations of mine? Why does what is contingent appear within my consciousness in just the way that it does and not in some other way? This indicates and is the foundation.} A synthesis is already contained in the very task that all philosophy assumes, for philosophy proceeds from a fact to its foundation. {Now, however, one can raise a second question:} But how do I ever arrive at the point of proceeding from a fact to its foundation? {Or, how is philosophy possible?} This is an important question, for philosophical inquiry consists precisely in posing and in answering just such questions; and, since this question lies at the foundation of philosophy itself, in order to answer it one has to philosophize about philosophy. The question concerning the possibility of philosophy is thus itself a philosophical question. Philosophy provides an answer to the question concerning its own possibility. Accordingly, one can demonstrate the possibility of philosophy only by arguing in a circular fashion, or, philosophy requires no proof and is simply and absolutely possible. We must now ask how one arrives at the previous question. What is one doing when one raises 7 this question [concerning the foundation of representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity]? The question concerning the foundation 8 is itself one of our necessary representations. c One seeks a foundation only for contingent things. Philosophy as such, however, seeks the foundation of necessary representations; therefore, it must consider such representations to be contingent. It would be absurd to inquire concerning the foundation of something one did not consider to be contingent. "I consider something to be contingent" means that I am able to think that it might not have existed at all or that it might have been altogether different than it is. Our representations of the universe are contingent in this sense; we think that the earth might very well have been different than it is, and we can imagine ourselves on Reading, with Krause's MS, "aufwirf" for K's "streift." "Die Frage nach dem Grunde." This might be better translated as "the demand for a reason." Throughout this entire section, Fichte capitalizes on the multiple senses of the word Grund (both "foundation" and "reason"). Thus, in a previous passage discussing the presence within us of representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity, when he asks "welches ist dieser Grund?" his question might just as easily (and more naturally) be rendered, "Why do we have such representations?" Once again, it might be helpful to recall that the German name for "the principle of sufficient reason" is Satz des Grundes. c But this very question already belongs to the domain of what appears [within consciousness] accompanied by a feeling of necessity (p. 19). 7

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another planet. 0 Whether we might still be able to exist without such representations is a question to he answered by philosophy; in any case, it is certain that we consider the universe to be something contingent, for otherwise we could not ask about its foundation, that is, why it is as it is. 9 Experience in its entirety is such a fact. To proceed beyond the facts, i.e., to go beyond experience as a whole {and to connect something thereto, something that by no means lies within the domain of facts or of experience-that is, to specify the ground of experience}: this is philosophy and nothing else, {or it is metaphysics, which is the same thing as philosophy}. A ground or foundation does not lie within what it establishes. Thus the ground of experience lies outside of experience, and philosophy, which establishes the ground of experience, raises itself above experience. Physics encompasses all experience. Philosophy, which goes beyond experience, is therefore metaphysics. Philosophy adduces not a single fact or experience. This assertion has recently been contested by those who talk about basing philosophy upon facts. Philosophy, along with everything that occurs therein, is a product of the pure capacity for thought. Philosophy itself is not a fact; instead, its task is to provide a foundation for the fact of experience.E {Philosophy is a product of the power of free thought, or is the science of experience, which everyone has to produce within himself.} It is doubly unfortunate that some of these philosophers who appeal to facts style themselves "Kantians," 10 for Kant said, "I ask about the possibility of experience." 11 To be sure, before I can ask about the possibility of something, I have to be acquainted with it; but the basis for the possibility of the thing in question lies beyond the thing itself. That philosophy should raise itself above the level of experience is, therefore, something that has already been explicitly asserted by Kant himself. To ask how we are able to raise ourselves beyond experience to the level of philosophy is to call into question the very legitimacy of philo0 Our representations of the world and of the things around us are, of course, contingent, and yet they are nevertheless necessary. This apparent contradiction can be explained as follows: An individual representation, e.g., my representation of the table standing before me, is accompanied by a feeling of necessity; but it is a contingent fact that precisely this representation should be generated within my consciousness. Something other than precisely this table might have stood in this place (p. 19). 9 "denn nur darum konnen wir nach dem Grunde de~lben fragen." E Facts and experience have no place, as such, within philosophy, for what is to be provided with a foundation is not itself the foundation (p. 19). 10 E.g., Fichte's colleague at Jena and bitter philosophical opponent, Christian Erhard Schmid (176I-I812). For Schmid's system and Fichte's devastating critique thereof, see Fichte's 1796 polemic, Vergleichung des vom Herm Prof Schmid aufgestelltm Systems mit dem der Wissenschaftslehre (SW, II: 42o-58 = AA I, 3: 235-66; translated in EPW, p. 316-35). II See, e.g., KRV, A•58/B•g7.

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sophical inquiry; i.e., it is to call into question the entire process 12 of reason which makes us search for a foundation for everything contingent. Philosophy itself is supposed to provide an answer to this question, and to this extent philosophy is self-grounding. {Corollary to this section: What is present within consciousness and accompanied by a feeling of necessity is experience in its entirety. Insofar as we inquire about the foundation thereof, we assume the existence of something lying beyond all experience, something that is only produced by pure thought for the purpose of providing a necessary foundation for experience. The legitimacy and necessity of seeking such a foundation has its original roots within reason itself, and this is first deduced within philosophy.} Thus the first and highest condition for all philosophical inquiry is to bear in mind that one will encounter absolutely nothing at all within philosophy unless one produces from within oneself everything about which one reasons. Philosophical Ideas cannot be given to anyone; they have to be generated within one's own mind. (3) {The question just raised can be answered in two diametrically opposed ways: (A) One can treat the representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity as products of presupposed things in themselves: dogmatism. (B) One can treat them as products of a presupposed representing subject: idealism.} The dogmatist assumes that there are things that exist in themselves; he postulates their existence, for they are not contained within the fact of my consciousness. No dogmatist claims to be immediately conscious of things in themselves, {which are not supposed to be facts of consciousness}. The dogmatist merely claims that one cannot explain the facts of consciousness without presupposing the existence of things in themselves. Neither dogmatists of the old-fashioned variety, nor those Critical dogmatists who consider the material of representations to be something given, 13 seem to appreciate this fact about their own position; for they inveigh loudly against any attempt to go beyond consciousness, even though this is just what they themselves are doing. The idealist accounts for representation on the basis of a representing subject, whose existence he presupposes. This representing subj~ct is not an immediate object of consciousness either, {for the representations of which we become conscious are mere determinations or states of consciousness (that is, of the representing subject) and are not the representing subject itself}. Ordinary consciousness is always preoccupied Reading, with Krause's MS, "Verfahren" for K's "Verstehen." "die sich noch Stoff geben lafkn." "Critical dogmatism" is Fichte's name for the kind of "Kantianism" that explains representations as products of things in themselves. 12

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with representations of things outside of us. If a representation of the representing subject is to arise, this must first be produced by an act of self-reflection. I am conscious of nothing but consciousness and its determinations, and these too are representations. All that can appear within consciousness is a representation of the representing subject, not the representing subject itself. • Consequently, both idealism and dogmatism go beyond consciousness. The dogmatist begins with a lack of freedom and ends with the same thing. For him, representations are products of things, and the intellect or subject is something merely passive.F Freedom of acting is sacrificed as well, and a dogmatist who affirms free will is either inconsistent or else a hypocrite. {(The instructor does not know whether any dogmatisteven Spinoza-was ever consistent.)} For my own free acting is something I am conscious of by means of representations; but if representations are impressions produced within us by things, then it follows that my representation of myself as acting freely is likewise dependent upon some thing. {Dogmatism is equally irrefutable from the side of speculation (objectively) and from the side of innermost feelings (subjectively). It rejects out of hand all the idealist's principles and postulates.} One cannot get at the dogmatist by speculative means, for he rejects out of hand all the principles by means of which one might be able to refute him. One has to refute him on the basis of those principles with which he himself begins. The idealist begins with the consciousness of freedom, which the dogmatist interprets as a delusion. The only objections one can raise against the dogmatist, and in respect of which the idealist has an edge on him, are these: The dogmatist does not explain everything he is sup}.!osed to explain. Moreover, one can also say that he is indeterminate; 4 for he cannot deny that we are conscious of freedom, and therefore he has to explain this as an effect of things-which is impossible. Finally, he is unable to offer a clear account of how representations could be produced within any sort of creature by the influence of things. He is unable to provide a genetic account of the intellect, whereas the idealist can do just this. {Hence dogmatism is a very arbitrary and problematic way of thinking. G Dogmatism is equally irrefutable from the side of innermost feeling (subjectively); for there is no arguing with anyone who, as a person, has F Since, according to this system, our soul operates in a purely passive manner, there is no place forfreedom within the dogmatic system, so long, that is, as the dogmatist wishes to be consistent (p. 20). 14 "unbestimmt." G Dogmatism is also indeterminate. It cannot explain what is supposed to be explained: What is an intellect? It presupposes something that does not appear within consciousness at all, namely, a thing in itself. Moreover, it cannot explain how a representation can be understood as an "effect" of something (p. 21).

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not yet been cultivated to the point where he has come to feel that our representations are products of our I or who denies this feeling.} Thus the place to begin a confrontation with dogmatism is not from the side of speculation, but rather from that of innermost feeling. Dogmatism is intolerable to a noble and superior soul, for whom the most lofty and important thought is the thought of self-sufficiency and freedom. {This is the aspect of dogmatism which respectable persons find most shocking: that it denies the feeling of freedom or spontaneous selfactivity.} Our consciousness includes the feeling of freedom as well as the feeling of constraint. The former is the consequence of our infinitude; the latter is the consequence of our finitude. The former leads us back into ourselves, whereas the latter directs us toward the world. A person who confounds these two feelings is inconsistent. The human species, as well as the individual, begins with the feeling of constraint. We all begin with experience, but then we are driven back into ourselves, where we discover our own freedom. Everything depends upon which feeling is predominant in a particular person, upon which he will refuse to allow to be taken from him {- the feeling of dependency and constraint (as in the case of dogmatism) or the feeling of freedom and self-sufficiency (as in the case of idealism)}_H The conflict between dogmatism and idealism is, in fact, not a proper philosophical conflict at all, for the two systems share no common ground whatsoever. If they remain consistent, each denies the principles of the other, and a philosophical conflict can arise only when both parties agree upon the same principles, while disagreeing merely about what these principles imply. Instead, we have here a struggle between two different ways of thinking. The consistent dogmatist provides himself with his own antidote, for he cannot endure this way of thinking for very long. {The best way to cure a dogmatist and to win him over is to let him remain consistent with himself; for his system must eventually lead him to fatalism, and thereby he will finally be won over to idealism and will transfer his allegiance to the side of the latter.} (4) {According to the preceding section, the system of idealism begins by presupposing the activity of the representing subject; whereas dogmatism considers the behavior of this same subject to be passive. Idealism begins with the representing subject; dogmatism begins with the thing. Granted, the idealist does not discover the feeling of the freedom and self-activity of his I to be immediately present within his consciousness; H Depending, therefore, upon which of these feelings is dominant in a particular person-the feeling of dependency and constraint (as in the case of dogmatism) or the feeling of freedom and self-sufficiency (as in the case of idealism)-one will be attracted to one of these two systems and will silence the other, opposed feeling (p. 21 ).

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nevertheless, he knows how to locate this feeling within himself and how to produce it through a free act of self-positing. The dogmatist, on the other hand, explains this same feeling as illusory and thereby denies the reality of freedom itself.} The dogmatist's presupposition [the thing in itself] is nothing but a mere thought. Moreover, his presupposition cannot be justified, for it does not even explain what it is supposed to explain. As soon as there appears another system that does explain everything, then there can no longer be any place for the dogmatist's presupposition. The idealist says: Think about yourself, and pay attention to how you accomplish this. You will thereby discover a self-reverting activity. 15 {I.e., you will discover that you determine yourself through your own activity. The idealist starts with this determination of self-activity.} The idealist thus adopts as his foundation something that actually occurs within consciousness, whereas the dogmatist's foundation is something { = the thing in itself} that one can merely think of as lying outside of all consCiousness. To this one could object as follows: Everything the idealist demands from me is nothing but a representation of my self-reverting activity; it is therefore not a self-reverting activity "in itself," which occurs apart from my representation of it. {This objection is raised by Aenesidemus. 16} Response: We are not talking about anything more than the occurrence of this representation! 1 It would be futile to try to introduce a distinction between a self-reverting activity and a representation of the same. For an activity of representing apart from representing would be a contradiction.17 Every active substance should be treated as substance; philosophy has to show where this substrate comes from and where it occurs. Here we are dealing with nothing but an immediate positing of the I, and this is a representation. 15 "eine in dich zwiickgehende Thatigkeit." 16 A reference to G. E. Schulze ( 1761-1833), professor of philosophy at Helmstiidt, who

raised this objection against Kant and Reinhold in 1792 in his anonymously published work entitled Aenesidemus oder iiJJer die Fundamente der von dem Herm Professor Reinhold in Jena ~lieferten Elementar-Philosophie. Nebst einer Vertheidigung des Slcepticismus ~ die Anmaasun~ der Vernun.ftkritik. Fichte responded to Schulze's criticism in his own "Review of Aenesidemus"(1794) (in SW,I: 3-25 = AAI, 2: 41-67; English translation inEPw,pp. 5977· An excerpt from Schulze's Aenesidemus is translated by di Giovanni in Between Kant and Hegel, pp. 104-35). For further information concerning Schulze/Aenesidemus, see chap. 9 of Beiser's The Fate of Reason. 1 Response: We are not and could not be speaking of any such self-reverting activity in itself and apart from all representation. All representation ceases at this point. What, for example, could "writing" mean if I were to abstract from everything that is required in order to write? (p. 22). 17 "Denn eine Thatigkeit des Vorstellens auser dem Vorstellen ware ein Widerspruch." The text of K appears to be corrupt at this point. A possible emendation, suggested by the parallel passage in H, is to substitute "des Vorstellendes" for "des Vorstellens," in which case the sentence would read: "An activity of the representing subject other than an act of representing would be a contradiction."

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The idealist's principle is present within consciousness, and thus his philosophy can be called "immanent." But he also finds that his principle does not occur within consciousness on its own; instead, it occurs as a result of his own free acting. In the course of ordinary consciousness, one encounters no concept of the I, no self-reverting activity. Nevertheless, one is able to think of one's I when a philosopher calls upon one to do so; and then one discovers this concept by means of free activity, and not as something given) Every philosophy presupposes something, something that it does not demonstrate and on the basis of which it explains and demonstrates everything else. This is also true of idealism. Idealism presupposes the previously mentioned free activity as its first principle, on the basis of which it must then explain everything else; but this principle itself cannot be explained any further. {To be sure, each of these two systems postulates something. But the idealist does not presuppose anything outside of his own consciousness; he merely postulates that this free activity of his I is that principle that cannot be derived from anything else. The first, immediate principle with which he begins is his consciousness of freedom.} Dogmatism is transcendent; it soars beyond consciousness. Idealism is transcendental; for though it remains within consciousness, it shows how it is possible to go beyond consciousness. That is to say, it shows how we come to assume that there are things outside of ourselves which correspond to our representations. Whether one embraces or rejects such a philosophy is something that depends upon one's inmost way of thinking and upon one's faith in oneself. A person who has faith in himself cannot accept any variety of dogmatism or fatalism. This is what Kant often refers to as "the interest of reason." He speaks of an interest of speculative reason and of an interest of practical reason and opposes these two to each other. 18 From the perspective of Kant's philosophy this is correct, but it is not correct in itself; for reason is always one and has only one interest. The interest of reason lies in confidence in one's own self-sufficiency and freedom, and reason's interest in unity and coherence is a consequence of this prior interest. One could call the latter "the interest of speculative reason," because it demands that the whole be constructed upon a single foundation and be connected therewith. K Idealism is more compatible with this interest than is dogmatism. J His [the idealist's] principle is not something given, but is discovered through a free exercise of activity, in the free action of self-positing (p. 22). 18 See, for example, KRV, A462/B4goff. and A8o4fB832ff. K The idealist's system thus rests upon his faith in himself or in his own self-sufficiency, or upon what Kant called "the interest of reason." That is to say: for which of these two systems will reason decide when they are weighed against each other? For our reasontheoretical as well as practical-has but a single interest, and this is unity. Thus, when Kant speaks of "two interests," these are merely different modifications of one and the same interest (p. 23).

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(5) {The idealist indicates within consciousness that activity of the representing subject which he will use to explain representations. But it goes without saying that he accomplishes this not by referring to a representation that is necessary and therefore discovered within consciousness, but rather by means of a representation that has to be freely and actively generated within consciousness. (It would be contradictory for this free act of self-representation and self-positing to be somehow given.) Against the dogmatist, who treats this same activity as derived from something else (and thus, not as an activity at all), the idealist cannot prove that this activity of the representing subject should be treated as the ultimate foundation of consciousness, nor can he prove that this activity cannot be derived from something higher and that it must instead be treated as the highest principle from which everything else must be derived. On the contrary, the necessity of making this assumption is based upon nothing beyond the idealist's own manner of thinking.} If one is ever willing to concede the truth of idealism's claim and to accept this assertion as one's principle {(i.e., as something that is certain in itself, and not merely as something that is true),} then everything that occurs within consciousness can be strictly derived therefrom. But whether one will, in fact, concede this principle is something that depends upon one's own manner of thinking. [This demonstration of the idealist's system or derivation of the contents of consciousness proceeds as follows:] {The representing subject (or I) is a consciousness of many different representations, including representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity (this is the fact in question). But whatever the representing subject may be, it is so only by means of its own self-activity (this follows from the principle); hence it likewise follows that it is also only by means of self-activity that it (the representing subject) is a consciousness of representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity; that is to say, all representations, and specifically, those representations that are accompanied by a feeling of necessity, are products of this representing subject. Insofar as the propositio major (that the representing subject is a consciousness of manifold representations) is concerned, it is simply a matter of differing linguistic usage whether one says "is a consciousness" or "possesses consciousness." The latter, however, is a consequence of dogmatism; for "our I" or "the representing subject" or "consciousness" are all one and the same. Our I is nothing other than consciousness itself. The most important thing is not to misunderstand the propositio minor: "the representing subject is whatever it is only by means of self-activity." This proposition should not be taken to suggest any creation of representations, or the presence of some sort of substrate; it asserts merely that the I posits itself, i.e., that a self-reverting activity is the essence of the I.

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This activity produces the concept of the I. The I is all that it is only because it posits itself.} One says, "I possess consciousness"-as if consciousness were an accidental property of the I. This distinction between consciousness and the I is introduced rather late, and philosophy must explain the basis for making such a distinction. It is true that I must ascribe to myself other determinations or predicates in addition to consciousness, but still, it is only by means of representations that we become conscious of any actions. Therefore, nothing can exist for us except insofar as we possess a consciousness of it. 19 One can see at first glance that it is correct to say, "My consciousness is I, and I am my consciousness." To be sure, consciousness includes representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity; or rather, the representing subject is conscious of what is present accompanied by a feeling of necessity. But whatever the representing subject might be, it is such only by means of its own spontaneous selfactivity,20 and thus, even those representations that are accompanied by a feeling of necessity are products of self-activity. It is not correct to think that the I becomes conscious by means of something else. The I is nothing but its own activity. The representing subject is identical with its own self-activity, which constitutes its very essence; and thus, in every specific situation, its essence consists in a certain, specific self-activity. The I posits itself: this means that it is a selfreverting activity. A person who cannot abstract from all objects is incapable of ever becoming a philosopher who can penetrate to the foundation of things. Later on we shall see that one must also add [to the I] the thought of a substrate; but until then, we must abstract from this. Since everything the representing subject is supposed to be has to owe its existence solely to self-activity, it follows that those representations that are accompanied by a feeling of necessity are also produced by the representing subject. (6) The foregoing demonstration would be quite sufficient to justify a categorical assertion that those representations that are accompanied by a feeling of necessity are products of the activity of the I, but it does not provide us with a detailed understanding of huw this occurs. A sufficient 19 "aber aile Handlungen gehen doch durch die Vorstellung hindurch. Alles was fiir uns sein soli, ist doch nur ein Bewustsein." More literally: "but still, all actions pass through representation. Everything that is supposed to exist for us, therefore, is only a conscious-

ness."

20 "nun aber ist das Vorstellende ... durch Selbstthatigkeit." Though normally translated simply as "spontaneity" or "spontaneous activity," Selbstthiitigkeit is here usually rendered, more literally, as "self-activity" (or "spontaneous self-activity") in order to emphasize its quite special significance within the context of the Wissenscho.ftslehre. Note that Fichte's claim in this passage is not that the I "makes the world," but rather that all consciousness involves and springs from an element of free spontaneity.

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explanation of this would have to display in its entirety that previously postulated act by means of which a representation is produced. If id~ alism is to be a science, then it must be able to accomplish just this task {of explaining how the act of representation occurs}. Let us here consider, in a preliminary manner, how idealism might be able to accomplish this task successfully. Philosophy is concerned, above all, with those representations that are accompanied by a feeling of necessity. Unlike dogmatism, which explains such representations in terms of passivity, idealism explains them with reference to the acting of a free being. And this must be a necessary mode of acting, for otherwise it would be of no use for explaining the representations that need to be explained. At first, one doubts whether such representations could be products of a self-activity, because one is not conscious of any such activity. When most people hear the words "activity" or "acting," they think of an instance of free acting. But there can also be a necessary mode of acting. But should necessary acting still be considered "acting" at all? Would it not be better to call it a state of passivity? (The true dogmatist, who must also be a fatalist, is unable to deny our consciousness of freedom, but he explains this as a delusion. For him, acting occurs only in consequence of some external influence. See Alexander von Joch's-i.e., Hommel's-discussion of the Turkish laws concerning reward and punishment.) 21 The necessity of the necessary mode of acting is conditional on the occurrence of an instance of free acting. It is not necessary as such, for then it would be indistinguishable from a state of passivity. The first, absolutely free and unconditioned instance of acting {considered within idealism} is the self-positing of the 1. 22 Another type of acting might then follow as a necessary consequence of this first acting; and if so, one could then say that this second type of acting is "necessary"-not absolutely necessary, to be sure, for its necessity would be conditioned. L 21 Karl Ferdinand Hommel (1722-81) was a jurist and professor of law at Leipzig. In 1770, under the pseudonym Alexander von Joch, Hommel published a book entitled Alexander von ]och beyder &chte Doctor iiber Belohnung und Strafe nach Tiirkischen Gesezen, in which he not only defended metaphysical determinism, but also denied that he had any personal feeling of his own freedom. In 1793 Fichte included a criticism of Hommel's "fatalism" in the second edition of his own Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung (SW, V: 45 = AA I, 1: 139; English translation by Garrett Green, Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978], p. 45). 22 "das Sezen des Ich durch sich selbst." L As a science, idealism has the additional task of explaining lww the act of representation occurs. Philosophy as a whole is concerned with necessary representations, which are to be explained on the basis of a type of acting-which must, therefore, be viewed as necessary. To be sure, idealism does not consider the necessary acting of the representing subject to be unconditionally necessary. Its necessity is only conditional; insofar as the first act

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Freedom and necessity are already present in the first type of acting, that is, in the act of self-positing. It is possible for one to reflect upon objects rather than upon oneself. I am free to do either, but when I do reflect upon myself, I can do so only by means of a self-reverting activity. {When I posit myself, which is possible only by means of an activity that reverts back upon myself, there arises, purely from this, the concept of the I and no other concept. Hence this concept is necessary, even though it is also free, because the act through which it arose, which preceded it and was therefore first, is a free act. (In contrast, many concepts arise through an outwardly directed activity: e.g., the concept of the world, of heaven, of the earth, of the wall, of the stove, etc.)} This much is already contained in the principle; and thus it might well happen that we will encounter an entire series of necessary actions, all of which are conditioned by the positing of the I. If so, then the proposition, "the I is what it is through and by means of itself," which heretofore has been treated as a merely formal condition, would obtain objective validity as well. {Through this proof that all representations are products of the representing subject23 idealism has not yet done enough to satisfy the wellfounded demands made upon it by science, namely, the demand that it show huw, through the acting of the representing subject, precisely these determinate representations appear within consciousness. If it presents itself as a science, then it must show how this can be explained from the principle it presupposes. It can do this only by means of the following inference: The representing subject can posit its own self-activity only in a certain manner, which is demonstrated within cons.ciousness (namely, only through a self-reverting activity). The other (necesssary) representations follow from this. All the necessary actions may be deduced in this way, and the manner in which the representing subject acts is thereby subjected to laws. Idealism thereby becomes Critical or genuine idealism,24 in contrast with that completely groundless variety of idealism which begins with free and lawless acting. Accordingly, this section [ = (6)] would contain within itself the entire system of idealism; and once one has conceded the idealist's principle or major premise, then all that has to be proved is the minor one: that the I cannot posit itself without also engaging in other actions as well. of the representing subject is an instance of free acting, then the entire series of its actions or representations is also free-even if it is at the same time conditioned. These acts and representations must indeed occur in the sequence in which they do occur, because they proceed from the first act. But they are nevertheless free acts, because the first act is free (p. 24)· 23 "Durch diesen Beweis, dafJ iiberhaupt es so sey." The translation supplies the missing description of the general conclusion that is already supposed to have been established. 24 "ein KRITISCHER oder REELLER IDEALISMUS."

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This proof is based upon on one's own intuition of oneself: Observe all the conditions of your self-reverting activity, and you will discover that many other activities are necessary in addition to the first one-namely, a second, a third, etc.} The I is what it is, because it posits itself through itself. This act of self-positing is possible only in a certain way; and thus this act of selfpositing presupposes another [act of positing], which, in turn, presupposes another, etc. In order to talk about anything mental or spiritual one has to make use of sensible expressions, which gives rise to many misunderstandings, for the signs employed are often arbitrary. Therefore, when one employs a sign, one must first provide an explanation of it. But when one has to explain something for which the words are lacking, one then has to explain the thing itself, i.e., one must explain it genetically. I posit myself, and, in doing this, I pay attention to the fact that I posit myself in a particular manner and that I can posit myself only in this way. Perhaps, however, there are also many other things I can accomplish only in some particular way, in which case we can speak of a "law"; and this is the sense in which one speaks of "laws of intuition," "laws of thinking," etc. Such necessary ways of thinking are the same as laws of thinking. In fact, laws really apply only to an active being, whom we normally consider to be free; and just as we say [to the latter] "you must behave in such and such a manner," so, in an analogous way, we say that a rational being must behave in this way or that, and these constitute the laws of reason. {"This is the manner in which our reason necessarily operates"; in other words, "these are the laws of thinking," and, if this is true, then the results of these laws must agree with experience. For example, theresults of these laws of thinking must be that objects are in space, appearances are in time, etc.} The broader task of idealism may thus be described as follows: We have already seen that the positing subject and what is posited are one and the same. I can posit the I only in a certain way; but I cannot do this without also positing a second thing, which, in turn, I cannot posit without also positing a third thing, etc. In this manner we might be able to derive from the first act all those laws that explain how there comes to be a world for us. This is what idealism has to demonstrate.

21

(7) Most idealists before Kant claimed that representations lie within us because we produce them within ourselves. As they understood the matter, representations were something they could either produce or not produce. This sort of idealism is groundless. One can imagine two different paths along which one's reasoning might proceed. One path starts with the familiar structure of the world, i.e., with those necessary representations that occur within conscious-

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ness. This way of proceeding amounts to no more than feeling one's way by trial and error. This is not a satisfactory method, since the results are always undecided and merely pending, even in one's own eyes. The other path starts with a description of the way in which a representing being acts, and then proceeds to show how certain representations come into being in accordance with the laws that govern the acting of such a being. In this case, all one is observing is the manner in which something comes into being. When one proceeds in this manner, one abstracts from everything actual. If one has the correct first principle and if one has inferred correctly from this principle, then the results of one's deductions must agree with ordinary experience. If they do not, this failure does not directly imply the incorrectness of the entire enterprise, but indicates only the presence of a faulty inference somewhere therein-which one must then try to discover. What has to be shown is that the I could not posit itself without also positing much more as well. Like the first law, which established that I can posit myself only in this specific manner, these additional conditions must be established exclusively within self-intuition. This is the path our system will follow. Remark: The system can only call upon everyone to look within himself while observing how this is accomplished. Nevertheless, it lays claim to universal validity and asserts that every rational being must behave in the manner it describes. This claim is justified; for if one supposes that the essence of reason really does consist in self-positing, then all of those actions whose necessity is established by showing that they follow from this act of self-positing can equally be said to follow from the nature of reason itself, and therefore, every rational being must acknowledge the correctness of the system. M Moreover, in order to understand this system, one has to reproduce within oneself all the actions examined here. For the system does not enumerate a series of facts, which are simply given as such; instead, it presents a series of actions, while at the same time observing that upon which this series depends. The philosopher is not a mere observer; instead, he conducts experiments with the nature of consciousness and turns to himself for answers to his specific questions. This is a system for persons who are able to think for themselves. {One of the features of this system is that it cannot be learned in a historical manner.} It cannot be grasped merely by reading and study. Every person must produce it within himself, particularly since no fixed terminology will be introduced. Kant produced so many mere imitators precisely because he did adopt a fixed terminology. {Unlike Kant's, this system does not have any special terminology of its own, M This system possesses univeTSal validity; it is based upon the nature of all rational beings, and it is absolute-possessing its foundation within itself-for it is founded upon our self-activity (p. 25).

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and thus it does not encourage mere imitation. Instead, one can grasp the truth of this system only by reproducing these actions for oneself and producing these self-observations within one's own consciousness. Consequently, it is a system suited only for independent thinkersthough it can also serve to promote independent thinking, especially among young men.} Not that a person already has to be an independent thinker in order to gain entrance into this system: all that is required is an admiration for independent thinking. It is unlikely that young people will already have fallen into those mental ruts that make one incapable of thinking for oneself. One can encourage independent thinking in others by providing them with material for thought. By thinking things throu~h in advance, one may be able to lead them to reflect for themselves. 5

Relation of This System to Experience. Within experience, which this system is supposed to deduce, one encounters objects and the various properties of the same; within the system, however, one encounters the actions of rationality itsel£26 and those modes of action which are involved in the production of objects, for idealism shows that no other means of arriving at objects makes any sense. The philosopher asks how representations of things outside of us arise-as well as how the representations of duty, God, and immortality originate. This amounts to asking how we arrive at those objects that are supposed to correspond to these representations. One could thus call necessary representations "objective representations," for necessary representations are representations that are referred to objects. This applies to the representations of duty, the Deity, and immortality as well. One can in this way inquire concerning the origin of an object for us. Accordingly, philosophy encompasses a system of those actions by means of which objects come into being for us. But do these actions described by idealism actually occur? Do they possess reality, or are they merely invented by philosophy? To begin with, idealism only postulates a series of original actions. It does not affirm that such a series actually exists. To do so would be in violation of the system, which asserts merely that the first action cannot 25 "Man kann zum Selbst[denken] anfiihren; [dadurch] dajJ man Stoff giebt woriiber gedacht werden soli, dajJ man vordenke, and dadurch zum Nachdenken erwecke." Unfortunately, most of the virtuoso wordplay in this sentence has been lost in translation. 26 "die Handlungen des Vernunftwesens." The term Vemunftwesen refers not to any concrete, rational individual, but rather to "rationality as such," that is, to the essence or structure of rationality, which is shared by all self-conscious subjects.

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exist without a second one, etc. The actions in question thus do not occur separately; for the one action is not supposed to exist without the other. In a single stroke, I exist and the world exists for me. Within the system, however, what is really only one action has to be treated as a series of actions, for this is the only way in which we are able to think about it at all; for we are able to grasp only parts, and indeed, only quite specific parts. N If a rational being experiences things in accordance with certain laws, and if he must proceed in this fashion, then he must also proceed in this fashion within the domain of philosophy as well. One thought must be linked to another. One must therefore request a person who asks the above question concerning the reality of the actions described by idealism to consider what he is really asking thereby. What does he mean by "actually"? What does "reality" mean to him? According to idealism, these terms designate whatever necessarily occurs within consciousness. The question then is, Do these actions occur? Where? How? Not within the realm of experience; for if they did, then they would themselves be items of experience, and, as such, they would not belong within philosophy, which is supposed to display the foundation of experience. Therefore, these actions do not possess the sort of actuality that experience does; nor can one say that they occur within time, for only appearances have temporal reality. {The series of necessary actions of reason disclosed by Critical idealism possesses no reality except this: if one is to succeed in explaining what one is trying to explain, then one necessarily has to assume that these actions do occur. But they require no other sort of reality, for in this system there is no other sort of reality at all except for reality of the sort indicated (i.e., necessity of thinking).} Professor Beck, 27 who has understood the Critique of Pure Reason, still does not want to go beyond experience. But in this case, all philosophy-including his own-would be abolished. Kant, however, does not share Prof. Beck's opinion on this matter; for Kant asks how experience is possible, and with this question he raises himself above experience. {The question has been raised whether the system of Critical idealism also possesses actual reality, that is, whether the actions of reason it describes actually exist. N On account of our limitation, the idealist's cognition is, and can never be anything but, discursive; that is to say, he develops his concepts little by little and infers one from the other. Thus he develops his system step by step, even though this constitutes but a single act within our consciousness. I posit myself and a world at the same time-in a single stroke (p~. 26-27). 7 J. S. Beck (1761-1841) was professor of philosophy at Halle and author of the celebrated, three-volume Erli.iuternden Auszugs aus den critischen Schriften des Herrn Prof Kant ( 1793-96). An excerpt from Vol. III, The Standpoint from which the Critical Philosophy is to Be Judged, is available in an English translation by di Giovanni, in Betwen Kant and Hegel, pp. 204-49·

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In answering this question, we must distinguish two different senses of the phrase "actually to exist." If one thereby means to refer to a being within experience, an occurrence in space and time, then the answer to the question is no. Reality of this sort by no means applies to the actions described within philosophy, for the foundation or ground, i.e., what I connect with experience (which is what is here provided with a ground), is not itself identical with what is grounded thereby. The philosopher does indeed go beyond all experience.} What does not lie within the realm of experience possesses no actuality in the proper sense of the term; it cannot be considered to be in space and time. Instead, it must be thought of as something that is necessarily thinkable, as something ideal. The pure I, for example, is, in this sense, nothing actual. The I we encounter within experience is the person. Thus anyone who objects to the philosophical concept of the pure I on the grounds that it does not occur within experience does not know what he is demanding. {The question can be truly answered yes only in the sense that the assertions of the idealist possess reality for the philosopher and are themselves the results of necessary thinking.} These actions do possess reality for the person who raises himself to the philosophical level; that is, they possess the reality of necessary thinking, and it is for necessary thinking that reality exists. 28 Experience possesses this sort of reality as well. As certainly as we exist and live, there must be experience. As certainly as we engage in philosophical inquiry, we must think of these actions. Something that does not occur as such within ordinary consciousness is thus present within the consciousness of the philosopher. {The philosopher may and must elevate his consciousness above all experience. (Did not Kant, and, along with him, Prof. Beck himself, engage in rational inquiry concerning the possibility of experience?)} The philosopher's consciousness expands, and {the system of idealism} thereby becomes comprehensive and complete. 29 His thinking extends just as far as thinking can go. One can ask questions that go beyond experience; and indeed, we do ask such questions. But one cannot rationally ask questions that go beyond philosophy; {that is to say, one cannot adduce any reasons or grounds in abstraction from all reason. Such a demand is self-contradictory.} For example, a question such as, "What is the foundation of limitation in 28 "Wer sich zur Philosophie erhebt, fiir den haben diese Handlungen Realitat, nehmlich die des nothwendigen Denkens und fur dieses ist Realitat." 29 What the text of K actually says is that "the philosopher's consciousness thereby becomes comprehensive and complete [ein vollstiindiges, vollendetes]." The text of H, however, makes it clear that by expanding his consciousness to the limits of thinking, the idealist "finishes and completes" his system and not his own consciousness: "dadurch sein BewuBtseyn erweitem, soweit als das denken nur irgend gehen kann, und damit w. das System des ld. geschloBen und vollendet."

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itself?"30 is self-contradictory, and thus is an absurdity. A question of this sort requires an application of reason in abstraction from all reason. Human beings naturally progress from reality to reality, from one level of consciousness to another, and here we may recognize the following three levels: ( 1) One connects the objects of experience with one another in accordance with laws, but without any conscious awareness of doing this. Every child and savage searches for a reason for every contingent event, and thereby judges it in accordance with the law of causality, though he is not conscious of this law. (2) One reflects upon oneself and notices that one proceeds in accordance with these laws, and one thereby becomes conscious of these concepts. At this second level it often happens that one takes the results of these concepts to be properties of things. Accordingly, one says things like "things in themselves are in space and time" {-origin of dogmatism}. (3) The idealist observes that experience in its entirety is nothing but an acting on the part of a rational being. 0

25

(8) Idealism begins with the self-positing of the I, or with finite reason as such {and proceeds from there to the individual}. But when we talk about anything "as such," we are employing an indeterminate concept. Thus idealism starts with an indeterminate concept. The idealist then observes the way in which reason becomes determinate when it is limited; and, by means of this act of determination, he allows a rational individual to come into being-an actual rational being, which is something quite different from the indeterminate concept of the I. This individual also observes the world and the things in it, and as he does so, his way of viewing the world is itself observed from the viewpoint of idealism. The idealist observes how there must come to be things for the individual. Thus the situation is different for the [observed] individual than it is for the philosopher. The individual is confronted with things, men, etc., that are independent of him. But the idealist says, "There are 30 "was der Grund der Beschrii.nktheit, an sich sei." The reason such a question is "absurd" is because something can-by definition-be "limited" only by something else. And thus it is an analytic truth that limitation can never possess its foundation "in itself." 0 The reason for the different points of view and for the differing opinions and systems that thereby ensue is contained in the following gradations in the progress of our reason and in the development of our consciousness. First level: Mankind acts in conformity with the laws of theoretical reason that govern thought, but without being conscious of these laws: e.g., the child, the savage-the common man. Second level: Men reflect upon themselves and become conscious of themselves in accordance with universal rules. They form concepts, but they take the results of these concepts to be things in themselves-origin of dogmatism. Third lt!Vt!l of consciousness, at which consciousness represents its own representations and concepts to itself as an acting of the representing subject, which acts in accordance with specific rules--idealism (p. 116).

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no things outside of me and present independently of me." Though the two say opposite things, they do not contradict each other. For the idealist, from his own viewpoint, displays the necessity of the individual's view. When the idealist says "outside of me," he means "outside of reason"; when the individual says the same thing, he means "outside of my person." The viewpoint of the individual can be called "the ordinary point of view," or "the viewpoint of experience." Considered from an a priori perspective and within the context of its place within a genetic account, this same ordinary viewpoint is found to arise in the course of acting, and thus it can also be called "the practical point of view." No abstraction occurs in acting; but philosophical speculation is possible only insofar as one engages in abstraction. Thus the philosophical viewpoint can also be called "the ideal point of view." The practical viewpoint lies beneath the idealistic viewpoint. {Hence one must distinguish the idealistic or transcendental viewpoint from the ordinary or practical viewpoint, which appears within the course of ordinary life or in acting. The former commences with the I and takes as its object nothing but the 1; 31 in contrast, the world remains present for the ordinary standpoint, which concerns itself with a rational individual. Viewed from the idealistic standpoint, the practical standpoint appears to be subordinate, and this enables one to see why and to what extent the ordinary view is true and why one has to assume that a world exists. Speculations do not disturb the idealist within the course of his active life and do not cause him to commit errors. He is a man like any other; he feels pleasures and he suffers like anyone else, for he possesses the proficiency to transport himself from the speculative viewpoint to that of life. One has not yet achieved a dear understanding, has not yet obtained the true philosophical view of things, and has not yet reached the correct standpoint so long as one continues to think and to expect that daily life is something altogether different [from the standpoint of life as it is characterized from the speculative standpoint].} When the philosopher adopts the practical point of view, he behaves just like any other rational being and is not disturbed by doubt, for he knows how he arrived at this point of view. Only someone who has just begun to speculate, but has not yet reached the point of clarity in his speculations, can be disturbed by speculation. This cannot happen to the Critical philosopher, for the results of experience and speculation are always in harmony. But in order to shift back and forth from one point of view to the other, one needs proficiency; 32 and this is precisely 31 "Beym ersten fangt das len an u. ist bios das Ich der Gegenstand." Literally: "The I commences with the former, and only the I is the object." s2 Reading, with H, "Fertigkeit" for K's "Festigkeit" ("stability").

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what the beginner, whose speculations are disturbed by realistic doubt and whose acting is disturbed by speculative doubt, often lacks. {It is by no means the case that idealism disturbs any actual person's belief in the reality of external things. On the contrary, idealism is much more likely to strengthen this belief against all doubt engendered by confused speculation; for idealism indicates the point of view from which one believes in the reality of things and shows why such a belief is necessary so long as one occupies this viewpoint.} {So much for the prolegomena.}

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Preliminary Remarks (1) The attempt to establish a first principle within philosophy has recently encountered strong objection. 1 Some base their objections upon arguments of their own, while others are simply going along with current fashion. Those who maintain that we should not seek any first principle might mean by this that one should not attempt to philosophize in a systematic manner at all, because it is impossible to do so. {[That is, they might mean that] no systematic connection is possible in philosophy; instead, one must here and there accept an unproven proposition. Philosophy is nothing but an aggregate of individual propositions.} The way to remove this objection is by actually constructing a system. Or else they might mean something like this: Every proof begins with something unproven. What does it mean "to prove" something? Anyone with a clear concept of what is involved in a proof will admit that to prove something means to connect the truth of one proposition with that of another, and to do so in such a way that I transfer the truth of some previously known proposition to another one. But if this is what "proof' means, then human beings must possess some truth that neither can nor needs to be proven and from which all other truths can be de1 At the time these lectures were first delivered, the attempt to establish a philosophical first principle had recently been subjected to harsh criticism in two essays that appeared almost simultaneously in the Philosophisches journal einer Gesellschaft Teu.tscher Gelehrten (to which Fichte himself was a regular contributor and of which he was soon to become coeditor). Presumably, these are the two "recent objections" that Fichte has in mind, though neither is mentioned by name anywhere in these lectures: (1) Paul johann Anselm Feuerbach, "Ueber die Unmoglichkeit eines ersten absoluten Grundsatzes der Philosophie" Philosophischesjoumal2, 4 ( 1795), and ( 2) Karl Christian Erhard Schmid, "BruchstOcke aus einer Schrift fiber die Philosophie und ihre Principien," Philosophischesjoumal3, 2 ( 1795).

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rived. If not, then there is no truth at all, and we are driven into an infinite regress. 2

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(2) Neither of these opinions seems to have been shared by the better thinkers who reject [this attempt to discover a first principle]. 3 Prof. Beck also lashes out against the attempt to discover a first principle and contends instead that philosophy must begin with a postulate. 4 But a postulate is also a starting point, which is not further proven, and thus it is a first principle. A first principle is any cognition that cannot be further proven. Thus anyone who states a postulate also states a first principle. Within the expression "first principle," Prof. Beck places the emphasis upon the word "principle"; accordingly, he declares that a first principle has to be something objective, something that simply has to be "discovered" and then can subsequently be analyzed. But who called upon him to explain the meaning of a "first principle" in this manner? Philosophy cannot be established by attending to what is simply "given"; instead, it can be established only by proceeding synthetically. According to Reinhold, the "principle of consciousness" states a fact, and he claims that philosophy in its entirety should be generated merely by analyzing what is contained within this principle. 5 It is appropriate to find fault with such a procedure. The Wissenschaftslehre begins with an I. But the point is not to analyze this I, for this would produce a purely empty philosophy. Instead, the Wissenschaftslehre allows this I to act in accordance with its own laws and thereby to construct a world. This is no analysis, but instead a "wir werden ins Unendliche getrieben." "Keine von heiden Meinungen scheinen die bej'kren die sich dagegen auflehnen zu haben." 4 An insistence that every systematic philosophy must begin by "postulating" something is a central feature of J. S. Beck's "Theory of the Standpoint," as developed most fully in the third volume of his Ertauterenden Auszugs, entitled Einzig-moglicher Standpunct, aus welchem die critische Philosophie beurtheilt werden mull ( 1796). In English, see the excerpt translated in Giovanni and Harris's Between Kant and Hegel, pp. 2o6-49· 5 Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1758-1823), Fichte's immediate predecessor atjena, was an influential early popularizer of Kant's philosophy who also developed his own, highly original systematic reformulation of transcendental idealism. Reinhold called his system "Elementary Philosophy" or "Philosophy of the Elements." He first expounded it in 1789 in his Versuch einer neuen Theorie des menschlichen Vorstellungsvt!TmOgens and subsequently elaborated it in Vol. I of his Beitriige zur Berichtigung bisheriger MifJverstiindnisse der Philosophen (1790) and Ueber das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens (1794). (In English, see the excerpt from the latter, The Foundations of Philosophical Knowledge, translated by di Giovanni in Between Kant and Hegel, pp. 52-103.) The "principle of consciousness," the "first principle" of Reinhold's system (i.e., the principle from which all the other propositions of his system are to be derived), states that "in consciousness, the subject distinguishes the representation from the subject and the object and relates it to them both." For further information about Reinhold's "Elementary Philosophy" and Fichte's criticism of it, see chap. 8 of Beiser, The Fate of Reason, as well as Breazeale, "Between Kant and Fichte." 2

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continually progressing synthesis. It is thus correct, after all, that philosophy must begin with a postulate, {but one that is grounded in an Act6 and not in a fact. (An "Act" is what occurs when I let my I act within itself and observe what happens. A "fact," in contrast, is present within consciousness as something already given or discovered, which can only be analyzed subsequently.)} The Wissenschaftslehre proceeds in this manner as well, and it employs the term "Act" to designate its postulate. This term was not understood; but it means no more-and is meant to mean no more-than this: one is supposed to act internally7 and observe what one is doing. This means that if one wants to communicate this philosophy to someone else, one has to ask the other person to perform the action in question. In this sense, one does have to postulate something. A fact is something that is simply found to occur in a certain way within experience, where it is accompanied by a feeling of necessity. 8 All one can do with such a fact is to begin to analyze it-if, that is, one wishes to remain consistent and does not wish to assume something else as well (as Reinhold does with his "principle of consciousness"). 9 • The first principle is a postulate. Just as geometrical instruction begins with the postulate that one describe space, so too must the reader or student of philosophy begin by doing something. Anyone who understands the first proposition is put into the proper frame of mind for philosophy. Postulate:

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Think the concept "I" and think of yourself as you do this. Everyone understands what this means. Everyone thinks of something thereby; one feels one's consciousness to be determined in a particular manner, and it is by virtue of this that one is conscious of something specific. Now let us observe what one does when one thinks of this concept. Think of any object at all-the wall, for example, or the stove. The thinking subject is a rational being; 10 but, in thinking of this object, this freely thinking subject forgets about itself and pays no attention to its own free activity. But this is just what one has to do if one wishes to lift oneself to the viewpoint of philosophy. In thinking about an object, one 6 "Thathandlung." This is a word of Fichte's own coinage and is a key term for understanding the 1794"95 version of the Wissenscluiftslehre. It is, however, virtually absent from the Wissenschaftslehre oova methodo (it appears only once in K and three times in H). 7 "man soli innerlich handeln." 8 "Eine Ursache ist etwas nur so gefundenes in der Erfahrung mit Nothwendigkeit vorkommendes." Reading, with H, "Thatsache" ("fact") for K's "Ursache" ("cause"). 9 In his 1794 review of Aenesidemw Fichte criticized Reinhold for assuming (without any argument) that every representation must consist of two elements: form and matter (or content) (SW, 1: 17-18 = AA I, 2: 58-59; English translation inEPW, pp. 59-77· See Breazeale, "Fichte's Aenesidemw Review." 10 "Das denkende ist das Vernunftwesen."

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disappears into the object; one thinks about the object, but one does not think about oneself as the subject who is doing this thinking. For example, when I am thinking about the wall I am the thinking subject and the wall is the object of thought. I am not the wall, nor is the wall I. The thinking subject and the object of thought are thus distinguished from one another. But now I am supposed to think about the I. When I do this, as when I think of anything at all, I am an active subject. {From this we can see that, whether we are concerned with a representation of an object or with a representation of the I, we are active in both cases. Without engaging in the activity of thinking we cannot entertain any thought at all. This is what these representations have in common.} With the same freedom with which I think about the wall, I now think about the I.U I am also thinking about something when I think about the I; but in this case the thinking subject and the object of thought cannot be distinguished from each other in the way they could be while I was still thinking about the wall. The thinking subject and the object one is thinking of, the thinker and the thought, are here one and the same. When I think about the wall my activity is directed at something outside of myself, but when I think about the I my activity is self-reverting; i.e., it is directed back upon the I. (The concept of activity requires no explanation. We are immediately conscious of it; this activity is in an act of intuiting.) A n Henrik Steffens, who was present as a student for some of Fichte's lectures during the winter semester of 1798/ 99· included in his memoirs the following amusing account of the listeners' reaction to these instructions: "I cannot deny that I was awed by my first glimpse of this short, stocky man with a sharp, commanding tongue. Even his manner of speaking was sharp and cutting. Well aware of his listeners' weaknesses, he tried in every way to make himself understood by them. He made every effort to provide proofs for everything he said; but his speech still seemed commanding, as if he wanted to dispel any possible doubts by means of an unconditional order. 'Gentlemen,' he would say, 'collect your thoughts and enter into yourselves. We are not at all concerned now with anything external, but only with ourselves.' And, just as he requested, his listeners really seemed to be concentrating upon themselves. Some of them shifted their position and sat up straight, while others slumped with downcast eyes. But it was obvious that they were all waiting with great suspense for what was supposed to come next. Then Fichte would continue: 'Gentlemen, think about the wall.' And as I saw, they really did think about the wall, and everyone seemed able to do so with success. 'Have you thought about the wall?' Fichte would ask. 'Now, gentlemen, think about whoever it was that thought about the wall.' The obvious confusion and embarrassment provoked by this request was extraordinary. In fact, many of the listeners seemed quite unable to discover anywhere whoever it was that had thought about the wall. I now understood how young men who had stumbled in such a memorable manner over their first attempt at speculation might have fallen into a very dangerous frame of mind as a result of their further efforts in this direction. Fichte's delivery was excellent: precise and clear. I was completely swept away by the topic, and I had to admit that I had never before heard a lecture like that one" (Fuchs, ed., Fichte im Gespriich, II: 8). A What distinguishes them [the representation of the I and that of an object] is that, in the case of the representation of my I, the thinker and the thought are one and the samein the concept of the I. I am the object of thought as well as the thinking subject. In the case of other representations, the activity is directed outside of me, but in this case it is directed back upon myself.

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The concept or thought of the I arises when the I acts upon itself, and the act of acting upon oneself12 produces the thought of the I and no other thought. The two expressions mean exactly the same: The I is what it itself posits, and it is nothing but this; and what posits itself and reverts into itself becomes an I and nothing else. {Thus it is [only] insofar as I act upon myself and posit myself, [only] insofar as my activity reverts back upon me, that the I arises and that I think about my I. "I am I," and "I posit myself as I": these two propositions mean exactly the same thing.} Self-reverting activity and the I are one and the same. These two expressions have precisely the same meaning. This assertion could present difficulties only if one were to understand more by the term "I" than it is supposed to mean in the present context. {Here it is to be noted that we are concerned only with the I for me, or with the concept of the I for me, insofar as I form it through immediate consciousness. We are not at all concerned here with any other sort of being the I might have-as a substance, a soul, etc. Here we must abstract from all other sorts of being, without presupposing any of them. We are here concerned solely with the concept of the 1.} The I is not the soul, which is a type of substance. In co~ unction with the thought of the I, everyone surreptitiously thinks of something else as well. One may think, "Before I can do anything at all [for example, before I can think of the I], I first have to exist." But this notion must be discarded. Anyone who makes such a claim is maintaining that the I exists independently of its actions. Or one may also say, "Before I could act, there had to be some object upon which I could act." But what could such an objection really mean? Who makes this objection? It is I myself. I thereby posit myself as preceding myself. Thus this entire objection could be rephrased as follows: "I cannot proceed to posit the I without assuming that the I has already posited its own being." 13 The concept of the I arises through my own act of positing myself, by virtue of the fact that I act in a way that reverts back upon myself. What has one done when one has acted in this manner, and how did one manage to do this? {Hitherto, people reasoned as follows:} I am conscious of some object, B. But I cannot be conscious of this object without also being conscious of myself, forB is not I and I am not B. But I can be conscious of myself This activity cannot be defined; it rests upon immediate intuition and consists in my beimmediately conscious of myself (p. 29). 2 "ein Handeln im Handeln auf sich selbst." 13 "lch sezte mich also vorher selbst, und der ganze Einwurf lie!Je sich so ausdriicken: ich kann das Setzen des lch nicht vornehmen, ohne ein Gesetztsein des Ich durch sich selbst anzunehmen." Unfortunately, Fichte's play on vurnehmen and annehemen is lost in translation. in~

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only insofar as I am conscious of consciousness. Therefore, I must be conscious of this act of consciousness; i.e., I must be conscious of this consciousness of consciousness. 14 How do I become conscious of this? This series has no end, and therefore consciousness cannot be explained in this manner. The chief explanation for this impossibility is that consciousness has always been treated as a state of mind, 15 i.e., as an object, for which, in turn, another subject is always required.B {Until now, this piece of sophistry has lain at the foundation of every system-including Kant's.} Had previous philosophers only realized that they were reasoning in this manner, then perhaps this realization would have helped them arrive at the correct point. The only way to avoid this objection is to discover some object of consciousness which is at the same time the subject of consciousness. One would thereby have disclosed the existence of an immediate consciousness, i.e., an object to which one would not have to oppose a new subject. We can now answer the previously raised question concerning how we become conscious of acting. We observed ourselves and became conscious of doing so, even while we were acting. While I was acting, I became conscious that I was acting. Through immediate consciousness, the self-consciousness of the acting subject is identical with its consciousness of acting. {I posited myself as positing-this is intuition; I represented myself as engaged in the act of representing; I acted and was conscious of my acting: these were one and the same.} While I was thinking, and along with my thinking, I became conscious thereof; that is to say, I posited myself as an actively thinking subject. Thus, in this very act of consciousness, I posited myself as both the subject and the object of consciousness, and we have thereby discovered the immediate consciousness we have been seeking. I simply posit myself. 16 Such consciousness is 14 "Ich mu~ mir also bewust sein des Actes des 8, des Bewustseins vom Bewustsein." Though "B" could refer to the previously mentioned object (B), it makes more sense to assume that here, as elsewhere in K, it is an abbreviation for Bl!lUUSstsein (consciousness). 15 "als Zustand des Gemiiths." 8 Hitherto, people reasoned as follows: We cannot be conscious of things posited in opposition to us, that is, of external objects, unless we are conscious of ourselves, i.e., unless we are an object for ourself. This occurs by means of an act of our own consciousness, of which we are able to become conscious only insofar as we, in turn, think of ourself as an object and thereby obtain a consciousness of our own consciousness. But we become conscious of this consciousness of our consciousness only by, once again, turning it into an object and thereby obtaining a consciousness of the consciousness of our consciousness, and so on ad infinitum. Our consciousness, however, would never be explained in this manner. Or else one would have to conclude that there is no consciousness at all-so long, that is, as one continues to treat consciousness either as a state of mind or else as an object; for in proceeding in this manner one always presupposes a subject, which, however, one can never discover (p. 30). 16 "Ich setze mich schlechthin." This recalls the famous, oft-quoted formula with which the 1794"95 Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre begins: "das Ich setzt sich selbst schlechthin." Though commonly (and misleadingly) translated "the I posits itself absolutely," this sentence does not imply that the I posits itself in a special (and mysterious)

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called "intuition;" 17 and intuition is an act of positing oneself as positing, not a mere act of positing. 18 Every act of representing is an act of self-positing. Everything begins with the I. The I is not a component part of the representation; instead, all representation proceeds from the I. All possible consciousness presupposes immediate consciousness and cannot be comprehended in any other way. The identity of the posited object and the positing subject is absolute {and is what makes all representing possible in the first place}. It is not learned; it is not derived from experience. Instead, it is what makes all learning and all experience possible in the first place. The I is by no means a subject; instead, it is a subject-object. If it were a mere subject, then consciousness would be incomprehensible. If it were a mere object, then one would be driven to seek a subject outside of it-which one will never find. "I," "subject," "soul," and "mind": these are not the same. The I is a subject insofar as it posits something in a representation. {The I becomes an I only by means of an act of self-positing. It is not already a substance in advance of this act of self-positing; instead, its very essence is to posit itself as positing. These are one and the same. Consequently, the I is immediately conscious of itself} The I simply posits itself, {that is to say, without any mediation at all. It is at once subject and object}. In other words, that the I posits itself within immediate consciousness as a subject-object is itself something that occurs immediately, 19 and no reasoning can go beyond this. Reasons can be provided for all the other specific determinations that occur within consciousness, but no reason can be given for immediate consciousness. Immediate consciousness is itself the ultimate reason or foundation upon which everything else is based and to which everything else has to be traced back, if our knowledge is to have any foundation. We must possess some knowledge of this ultimate ground, for we are able to talk about it. We obtain this knowledge through immediate in"absolute" manner. Instead, the force of the adverb schlechthin is to emphasize ( 1) that the sole, or distinctive, activity of the I qua I is to posit or be aware of itself ("the I is nothing but this act of self-positing"), and (2) that this activity is immediate or unconditioned, in the sense that it occurs spontaneously and cannot be inferred from anything else ("the I simply posits itself'). 17 "Anschauung." This is one ofthe most common terms in Fichte's technical vocabulary, and, like his use of "representation," it is direcdy derived from Kant. In the first Critique, Kant defines "intuition" as the means by which objects are "given" to us and thus the means by which a cognition is "immediately related to objects" (see KRV, A1g/B33). Like Kant, Fichte employs the term Anschauung to designate both the mental activity (or power) by virtue of which such "immediate" representations are possible and the "content" of such acts: "intuitions." 18 "ein sich selbst setzen als solches, kein blofks Setzen." 19 "da~ es sich im unmittelbaren Bewustsein als Subjectobject setze, ist unmittelbar."

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tmt10n. We immediately intuit, in turn, our immediate intuition itself. I.e., we have an immediate intuition of intuition. Pure intuition of the I as a subject-object is therefore possible. Since pure intuition of this sort contains no sensible content, the proper name for it is "intellectual intuition." Kant rejected intellectual intuition, 20 but he defined the concept of intuition in such a way that intuitions could only be sensible; and therefore he said that these sensible intuitions cannot be intellectual. Against those, such as Platner, 21 who claim to intuit the I as a thing, or against those who believe they can intuit an immediate revelation within themselves, Kant is correct. What is intuited in sensible intuition is fixed, passive, and ordinarily in space; but all that is intuited in our intellectual intuition is an acting. Kant too had such an intuition, but he did not reflect upon it. Indeed, his entire philosophy is a product of this intuition; for he maintains that necessary representations are products of the acting of a rational being and are not passively received. But this is something he could have come to realize only by means of intuition. c Kant recognizes that self-consciousness occurs, i.e., a consciousness of the act of intuiting within time. 22 How could he have arrived at such a recognition? Only by means of an intuition-and such an intuition is certainly intellectual. Less rational than Kant's denial of the possibility of intellectual intuition is the behavior of those who have continued to reject intellectual intuition even after it has been deduced in their presence (e.g., the author of the review, published in 1796 in the Allgemeine LiteraturZeitung, of Schelling's On the I). 23 People of this sort will never become conscious of their own freedom of thinking. Anyone who has ever thought of the I has also had a concept of it. How does this concept of the I come into being? 20 For Kant's denial of the possibility of "intellectual intuition," see, e.g., KRV, Bxlff.n., 868, B72, B158, and B3o7. 21 Ernst Platner (1744-1818), a professor of philosophy and medicine at Leipzig, is best remembered for his critique of Kantianism and for his defense of a skeptically tinged variety of "common sense" empiricism. Fichte chose Volume I of Platner's Philosophische Aphorismen ( 1793) as the text for his introductory course "Logic and Metaphysics," which he first taught in the winter semester of 1794'95 and subsequently offered every semester he remained at Jena. In relation to the present point, see Fichte's comment in his lectures on Platner (as transcribed by Krause): "In consciousness I appear to myself not as a real thing, but rather as really acting" (AA IV, 1: 225). c Kant, in his system, merely failed to reflect upon this type of intellectual intuition. His system, however, does contain the result of this intellectual intuition: [in the recognition] that our representations are products of our self-active mind (p. 31). 22 "Bewustsein des Anschauens in der Zeit." 23 The author of this anonymously published review was Johann Benjamin Erhard (1766-1827), a physician-philosopher from Niirnberg who had been one of Fichte's earliest supporters. Erhard's highly critical review of Schelling's (utterly Fichtean) treatise of 1795, Vom /ch als Prinzip der Philosophie oder iiber das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen, appeared in the October 11, 17g6, issue of the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung.

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In order to be able to perceive myself as ~siting myself, I must presuppose that I have already been posited. 2 I transport myself from a state of repose and inactivity to the activity of self-positing, and I oppose this activity to my previous state of repose and inactivity. Otherwise, one would be unable to notice the representation of activity, which is a wrenching away from a state of repose and a movement of transition to activity. 25 {It is only by wrenching ourselves away from a state of repose and transporting ourselves into the opposite state that we are able to obtain any consciousness (i.e., any intuition) of our activity. Only through this opposite state do we obtain a clear awareness of what "acting" is (for this is something we are quite unable to define). We are able to think about activity only by means of what is fixed, only by means of a state of repose; and conversely, we are able to think about stability only by means of activity.} Consequently, it was only by means of opposition that I was able to become clearly conscious of my activity and to obtain an intuition of it. Acting is, so to speak, "agility," a movement of inner or spiritual passage. 26 Within consciousness, this agility is opposed to a passive state of stability or rest. On the other hand, I can be conscious of this state of repose only to the extent that I am conscious of activity. One must, therefore, observe acting and repose simultaneously in order to be able to observe either of them individually. Indeed, it is only through opposition that it is possible to obtain a specific and clear consciousness of anything whatsoever. 27 Here, however, we are concerned not with this proposition in its general form, but only with the specific, individual case before us. Let me now turn my attention to the state of repose, within which what is really an activity becomes something posited. 28 It no longer remains an activity; it becomes a product, but not, as it were, a product 24 "Urn mich selbst als mich selbst setzend wahrnehmen zu konnen, miiflte ich mich schon als gesezt voraussetzen." This sentence provides a good example of some of the features of Fichte's presentation which are lost in translation. Though "presuppose" is, for most purposes, the best and least problematic way of rendering vorawsetzen, it fails to display the connection between "positing" (setzen) and "presupposing" (vorawsetzen, i.e., "positing in advance"). Yet it is just this connection that one must appreciate in order fully to understand the point of Fichte's claim in this sentence. 25 "sie ist ein Loflreiflen von einer Rube, von welcher zur Thatigkeit iibergegangen wird." 26 "AGILITAET, Uibergehen im geistigen Sinne." 27 Though this principle of "determination through opposition" has its roots in the dialectical tradition, Fichte acquired his understanding of it through his careful study of the writings of Salomon Maimon. Elsewhere Fichte refers to it as "the law of reflective opposition" (§ 2) or "the principle of determinability" (dictat to§ 3). Maimon (1752-1800) was one of the most acute critics of Kant's Critical undertaking-as well as one of its most original interpreters. For more information concerning Maimon's skeptical Kantianism, see cha.P. 10 of Beiser's The Fate of Reason. 2 "in dieser Rube wird das was eigentlich ein Thatiges ist, ein Gesetztes." The ordinary meaning of the adjective gesetzte is "calm," "composed," or "steady," and this is certainly part of the meaning of the term in this sentence. But gesetzte is also derived from the past

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separate from the activity itself. It does not become any sort of matter 29 or thing that could precede the I's representation [of it]. What happens is simply that acting, by being intuited, becomes fixed. Such [an instance of stabilized acting] is called a "concept," in opposition to an intuition, which is directed at the activity as such. The subject and the object collapse into each other within this selfreverting activity when it is intuited as a state of repose, and this produces something positive and stable. Neither this coincidence of subject and object, nor the manner in which an intuition is thereby transformed into a concept can be intuited; this is something that can be grasped only by means of thinking. Only intuition can be intuited rather than thought. Thinking can only be thought; it cannot be intuited. Indeed, every expression of the mind can be grasped only through itself. This confirms the theory of consciousness we have just been discussing. Being conscious of intuition is what is meant by "philosophical genius." All thinking begins with intuition; accordingly, all philosophizing must also begin with intuition. Kant calls philosophy "rational cognition by means of concepts."30 But this cannot be right, even according to Kant himself; for he says that every concept without intuition is empty. 31 In addition, Kant also talks about transcendental imagination, and this is something that can only be intuited. The concept arises in one and the same moment with the intuition and cannot be separated from it. It seems to us as if the latter would have to precede the former, 32 but it seems this way to us only because we refer the concept back to an intuition. 0 participle of setzen, "to posit," and as such it means "that which is posited." Both senses are combined in Fichte's use of das Gesetztes: in contrast to the activity of positing, what is posited within this activity becomes fixed and passive. Note too the relationship between these terms and the usual German word for "law," das Gesetz-again, "that which is posited." 29 "Stoff." 30 KRV, A7I!JIB74I. 31 KRV, A51/B75· What Kant actually says in this celebrated (and frequently misquoted) passage is that "thoughts without content are empty, and intuitions without concepts are blind." 32 The text of K reads: "Der Begriff entsteht mit der Anschauung zugleich in demselben Moment, und ist von ihm unzertrennlich. Es scheint uns als ob der erste eher hatte sein miijkn." This passage appears to be corrupt, and thus two corrections have been introduced in the translated text: (1) "von ihr" ("from the intuition") is substituted for "von ihm" ("from the moment" or, even less plausibly, "from the concept"); and (2) "der letzte" ("the latter") is substituted for "der erste" ("the former"). 0 Applying this [general principle of determination via opposition] to the self-positing or internal acting of the I, we obtain an inner intuition of the stability or state of repose of the same and, at the same time, an inner intuition of its activity-an intuition of it as both acted upon and acting. These coincide. Within this state of repose, however, the positing of the activity is transformed for us into something posited, into a product, into a concept. That is to say, when one considers this very same activity, first of all, not as an instance of acting,

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Cf. § I of the printed Wissenschaftslehre, 33 where the same thing is said in a different manner; for there we proceeded from the concept to the intuition, whereas the path followed here is just the reverse. {Comparison with the instructor's book, Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre (I 794): § 1. The absolute first principle can only be sought out; it can be neither frruuen nor determined. Within the context of the Wissenschaftslehre, to "determine" something means the same as to limit it, and indeed, to restrict it to a certain region or sphere of our knowledge. But the absolute first principle embraces the entire sphere of our knowledge. This principle is always valid in relation to any consciousness whatsoever. "I posit myself as positing myself." This presupposes that something has already been posited, which can only be inferred and grasped by means of thinking. But this is immediate consciousness, and the I itself consists in just this harmony. "I simply posit myself." This means: "I am conscious of myself, first as the object of consciousness, and then again as the subject, i.e., the subject who is conscious." The discovered and the discoverer are here one and the same. The I is identical with immediate consciousness. "I am." In this context, "to be" means "to be the object of a concept." In contrast to this, "becoming" signifies an acting. When considered as a state of repose, this acting, this activity, is a concept, a being, indeed, a specific being, which the I portrays as a fact-a concept, something simply found. Here we began with the Act and arrived at the fact; but the method of the book is just the reverse. By the expression "in a state of repose" I mean that I find the I to be something posited, a product, something discovered.

but as something stable and fixed, and glimpses and intuits it accordingly as a state of repose (since otherwise we would be unable to intuit it as engaged in acting, as active), thisproduces a product, namely, the concept of the I. The concept of the I can only be thought of and cannot be intuited, since only activity that is engaged in acting is intuition. Such an intuition, however, is impossible without simultaneously thinking of its opposite-that is, without thinking of the same activity as previously in a state of repose, i.e., without a concept. Consequently, both are always connected with each other; concept and intuition coincide (pp. 31-32). 33 GWL. See SW, 1: 91-101.

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One has to begin with being and infer self-positing therefrom, and vice versa. Similarly, one must infer the intuition from the concept, and vice versa. Both must be present together. A state of repose must be connected with the intuition of activity. I obtain the concept only by means of intuition and I obtain intuition only by means of the concept, for both occur simultaneously in the free act of the self-reverting activity. Nothing precedes this act; no "something in itself' is presupposed as the foundation of this act.}

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Postulate Construct the concept of the I and observe how you accomplish this. It was claimed that if one does what one is asked to do one will discover that one is active and will discover in addition that one's activity is directed upon one's own active self. Accordingly, the concept of the I comes into being· only by means of a self-reverting activity; and conversely, the only concept that comes into being by means of such an activity is the concept of the I. By observing oneself while engaged in this activity, one becomes immediately conscious of it; i.e., one posits oneself as self-positing. As the sole immediate form of consciousness, this immediate consciousness of oneself must be presupposed in the explanation of all other possible varieties of consciousness. It is called the original intuition of the I. (The word "intuition" is here employed in both the subjective and the objective sense. For intuition can mean two different things: (a) it can refer to the intuition that the I has, in which case the I is the subject, the intuiting subject; or (~) it can refer to the intuition that is directed at the I, in which case the intuition is objective, and the I is the intuited object. Here the word is employed in both senses at once.) One will further observe that one is unable to posit oneself as acting without positing a state of repose in opposition thereto. Whenever a state of repose is posited, a concept is produced-in this case, the concept of the I.

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(dictated 1 798) 34

All consciousness is accompanied by an immediate self-consciousness, which is called "intellectual intuition," and this immediate 34 Every § in K concludes with a paragraph of recapitulation and summary, indicated (as in the preceding summary paragraph) by a repetition of the § number. These summaries

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self-consciousness must be presupposed if one is to be able to think at all. Consciousness, however, is an activity, and self-consciousness, in particular, is the self-reverting activity of the intellect, or pure reflection. Remark: Everything follows as a consequence of carrying out the indicated self-observation. This pure act of reflection, viewed as a concept, is thought of by the I. Accordingly, I posit myself simply by means of myself, and all other consciousness is conditioned by this act of selfpositing. In this course we will be conducting experiments. I.e., we will compel reason to provide us with answers to specific, systematically calculated questions; then, for the purpose of science and as an aid to memory, we will formulate the results of our experiments in concepts. or dictata were apparently, as the name indicates, carefully "dictated" to the class by Fichte himself, so that the students could transcribe them as accurately as possible. Consequently, though the text of H differs in many respects from that of K, the summary paragraphs are virtually identical in the two versions (though H customarily places the dictata at the beginning rather than at the end of each §). § 1 and § 2 of K each include, in addition, a second summarizing paragraph, with the heading "dictated 1798." Presumably, Krause obtained these alternate dictations from someone who had attended one of Fichte's two earlier courses of lectures on the WLnm, most probably that of the winter semester 1797/ 98. These additional, earlier summaries do not appear in H, nor do they continue in K after § 2 (though § 3 repeats the same summary-it appears once at the beginning and once at the end of the §).

§ 2

From the moment we began the Wissenschaftslehre, we have been trying to characterize the I solely in terms of activity and to see how this can be accomplished; for idealism appeals to the acting of the I in order to explain everything that is present within consciousness, and Critical idealism explains this in terms of law-governed, necessary acting. Our present goal is to show as dearly as possible that the activity characteristic of the I is not just any sort of activity, but must be a self-reverting activity. Thus we did not say that the concept of the I comes into being by means of any acting whatsoever, but only by means of a quite specific mode of acting. {The question with which we are concerned remains, How was this process of self-intuition constituted? If A came into being by means of B, then what is the foundation of B, etc.? Thus we always proceed genetically, i.e., by self-observation of the "how."} Let us now reflect upon this. ( 1) Something else needs to be noticed concerning what was postulated in § 1. We were there concerned with a specific mode of acting, in con-

trast with or in opposition to another, quite conceivable one. We focused our attention upon that act by means of which the concept of the I is brought into being-and upon no other act. We took note of this restriction, and only insofar as we did so were we conscious of the activity in question. Indeed, the act we were concerned with was itself this very act of turning away from all other possible objects and concentrating upon one specific one. Accordingly, all acting can be thought of as a kind of restricting or limiting to a specific sphere. All consciousness of spontaneous self-activity is a consciousness of our own restricting of our own activity; but I cannot intuit myself as restricting my activity in this way without also positing a transition from indeterminacy to determinacy, and thus without at the same time positing this state of indeterminacy and opposing it to the determinate [ 121 ]

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condition. 1·A {Nothing determinate is possible apart from what is determinable, i.e., without intuiting the one along with the other.} Much depends upon this point. Limiting ourselves to the thinking of the I, what is determinate is posited as an activity and is present to consciousness as such, and thus it is only by means of activity that we become conscious of what is indeterminate as well. Since what is indeterminate is posited in relation to and along with what is determinate, let us call it "what is determinable."2 As noted above, activity cannot be intuited apart from stability or a state of repose. Nor can activity be intuited except as a determinate activity; but the concept of a determinate activity is impossible without intuiting a determinable one. • The following objection might occur to someone: Granted that it has been shown that the I can be posited only by means of a self-reverting activity, and granted too that an activity can be posited only in opposition to a state of repose and that a determinate activity can be posited only by positing something determinable: it is still fallacious to infer from this the general principle that there can be nothing determinate apart from something determinable, for one cannot derive a universal from a particular. [Reply:] All consciousness is mediated by the selfpositing of the I, and everything that occurs [therein] is a product of the I's activity. Therefore, whenever a determinate product is encountered, it must be the product of a determinate activity of the I. And thus, since no determinate activity of the I can be posited without positing a determinable activity, the above principle does indeed possess universal validity. (2) {Here too one must avoid that rashness which is such a temptation within a transcendental philosophy, and must not become transcendent. 1 "Alles Bewustsein der Selbstthiitigkeit ist ein Bewustsein unseres Einschriinkens unserer Thiitigkeit, nun kann ich mich nicht anschauen als beschriinkend, ohne ein Uibergehen von der Unbestimmtheit zur Bestimmtheit zu setzen, also ohne die Unbestimmtheit mit zu setzen, und dem

Bestimmten engegenzusetzen." A We abstracted from all [other] possible ways of operating and focused our reflection upon a single point: namely, upon ourselves. We restricted our activity to our own I. Thus it was by means of this passage from what is undetermined-in other words, from what is determinable to what is determinate, from what is unlimited to what is limited-that we became conscious of our own activity and obtained an intuition of it. Just as we found above that no intuition of the activity of our I was possible without also intuiting the I in a state of passive repose, so here as well: the movement of transition from what is determinable to what is determinate is not possible unless one also and at the same time intuits or posits something determinable. No intuition or concept of our own activity is possible unless these two spheres are posited in opposition to each other: the sphere of what is limited and the sphere of what is unlimited. The two must be connected with each other (p. 34). 2 "welches wir, weil es in Beziehung auf das Bestimmtsein und mit ihm zugleich gesezt wird, das Bestimmbare nennen wollen."

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More specifically, one must not presuppose the existence of any "activity in itself," and then imagine that one is able to think of this "activity in itself'' only in the modified form produced by the colored glass of representation. Instead, the activity that concerns us here is nothing but the transition from determinability to determinacy. The "activity in itself' is simply the concept, which, however, is not presupposed; instead, this concept arises merely by means of and along with the intuition of the activity. This activity itself is both concept and intuition.} Moreover, this determinate activity is not a determinate activity as such or in general (which would be self-contradictory); instead, it is a particular determinate activity. (Nothing can be anything at all without being determined in a certain way. In an abstract context one may well talk as if this were not so, but here we are dealing with intuition, not with abstraction.) This act of limiting oneself, positing oneself, immediately intuiting oneself, and becoming conscious of oneself is one single act: the act of intuiting oneself. But the determinate activity may not be posited unless the opposed activity, from which the determinate activity is extracted, is also posited along with it. An act of self-positing can [not] be understood unless an act of non-self-positing is posited along with it. This follows from what was said above; but it is also a consequence of the nature of intuition itself. One does not and cannot think clearly of anything at all without also thinking at the same time of its opposite, {i.e., without negating its opposite by thinking "it cannot and should not be this." (To be sure, within everyday life this usually occurs only tacitly. But when we are dealing with difficult objects and are engaged in sublime and abstract meditations, this [explicit] way of proceeding promotes uncommon clarity.)} This will not be proven here, but anyone who thinks clearly of anything will discover this truth within himself. Therefore, in connection with the act of positing the I, one necessarily has to think about the act of not positing the I as well. In accordance with our postulate, the activity that previously had to be posited as determinable activity in general has now been posited as Not1, i.e., as an activity directed at what is opposed to the I. {An act of nonself-positing is therefore posited in opposition to the act of positing the I; a Not-1 is opposed to the 1-A minus A. In the case of the act of selfpositing, the activity is directed back upon itself. This act of positing the Not-/ is determined by opposition. In the former case, the activity is directed at the subject that actively posits itself as positing, i.e., at what is active (subjectively and objectively). In the latter case, the activity is directed not at a self-positing subject, but rather at something positedsomething stable, in a state of passive repose-which is present without any assistance.} Thus, as surely as the I is posited at all, a Not-I must be posited along with it. The character of the Not-1 emerges directly from this

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opposition, for the activity by means of which I arrive at the Not-! is the sole means I possess for characterizing it. Let us note, first of all, that the activity that posits the I and that which posits the Not-! are similar, inasmuch as activity of the I is present from start to finish [in both cases]. 3 I am the thinking subject in each case. But they are different in that, in the first case, the I's activity is directed within itself and has as its object that self whose act is this very activity; whereas, in the second case, the activity of the thinking subject must have as its object something in a state of repose, something that does not posit itself (at least not in the same sense in which the I posits itself). (Whether self-positing might still pertain to it in some other sense is not a question that needs to be addressed at this point.) 4 This object is something that is present for the self-positing I we are currently considering. The self-positing I simply encounters it. It does not find it to be a product of its own activity. Instead, the I finds this object to be a product of necessity, though the necessity in question is itself conditional, since it arises only because the I has first posited itself. 8 (In order to think dearly about the I, I require something to be the Not-1.) {This necessary opposition of spheres, without which no dear intuition-[and hence no clear] thought-is possible, is what Kant calls "synthesis." This is the process of going beyond intuition and connecting concepts thereto. Accordingly, we here proceeded beyond the !-considered as self-positing-and beyond the intuition of its spontaneous selfactivity. By means of this act of opposing, we obtained the concept of the 1-considered in a state of repose, as something posited.} The concept ofthe Not-I is not a concept derived from experience. It can be derived only from the very action through which it is constructed. The Not-1 is something merely posited, and "being" is its sole determination. (The concept of being will later5 be derived from the concept of activity, which itself admits of no further explanation.) (3) Let us now reflect a bit upon what we have just discovered and consider how we were able to do this. Every act of connecting something with the I, i.e., all synthesis, depends upon something posited in opposition thereto (as we saw in this and the previous §). Before I can intuit 3 "Zuforderst, dafl die Thatigkeit des lch durch gehe, darin sind beide gleich." Krause later emended this passage by replacing durch gehe ("permeates" or "is present from start to finish") with daraufgehe ("is directed at"). 4 See below, § g, where a variety of (unfree) "self-positing" is attributed to nature itself. 8 To be sure, activity is present in the latter case [that is, when the Not-I is posited] as well, since the activity of the I relates itself to it; and, in this respect, they are similar. The I is [in this latter case] the representing subject, but it is not at the same time what is represented (the object). Accordingly, this second, opposed activity is a product not of freedom, but rather of necessity-albeit a conditioned necessity, since it is conditioned by the fact that the I is posited. It has the character of a being and not of a becoming (p. 35). 5 In sect. 4 of the present §.

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and think anything, I must posit something in opposition to it.-This act of opposing 6 provides the basis for all instances of going beyond the I, whether this is a matter of going beyond intuition (as in the previous §) or of going beyond the I itself (as in the present§). In the previous§ we began with intuition and then connected the concept to it; in this § we began with the posited I and then went beyond it to posit a Not-1. The question now arises, Does our argument to this point constitute a deduction, or has something once again, as in the previous§, been presupposed? Have we demonstrated that a Not-I must be united with the I? Or have we once again presupposed something; and if so, what? We reached this conclusion by means of the law of reflective opposition, 7 and we established this law within intuition.c Thus it could not have been this law that we have presupposed. Instead, we have presupposed the following: We began with the thought that if the I itself is to be, in turn, an object of our consciousness, then a Not-I must be posited. But does the I have to become an object of consciousness? This has not been proven. {The only thing we have provisionally postulated is that we are conscious of something. Thus it remains undecided whether immediate consciousness must itself be represented, i.e., whether it must be viewed as an object in turn, i.e., whether a transition from the posited I to the pure I is required. This will be dealt with at the appropriate time.} In the previous § we proved that all consciousness must be preceded by immediate consciousness; this immediate consciousness, however, is never something objective, but is always the subjective factor 8 within all consciousness. The consciousness upon which our present argument is based is therefore not immediate consciousness; it is a representation of immediate consciousness, but it itself is not immediate consciousness. Immediate consciousness is an Idea9 and does not appear within consciousness.0 {[It is present] only in the reciprocal interaction of opposed activities-where it is simultaneously subject and object.} The first act of 6 "Dieses Entgegensetzen," that is, this act of positing something in opposition to whatever I posit. 7 "das Reflexionsgesez des Entgegensezens." c The reality of this law was demonstrated in intuition (p. 35). 8 "ist nie ein objectives, sondern immer das Subjective." 9 "Es ist REPRAESENTATION des unmittelbaren, aber es selbst nicht. Das unmittelbare ist Idee." For the term Idee ("Idea"), see n. 6 to the First Introduction. 0 When the I in a state of repose becomes, in turn, an object of consciousness-that is to say, insofar as the I has passed into a passive state and is thought of as a mere objectthen it is at the same time the Not-I as well; neither can exist without the other. But this consciousness is not immediate; it is mediated or indirect. An immediate consciousness is never present as an object. The I as an object is a mere Idea 10 and is never present within consciousness (p. 35). 10 Note the conflict between this assertion and the corresponding passage in K, according to which it is the immediate I that is an Idea, not the "I as object." Surely the text of H is either corrupt or in error at this point, since the I, as we will see, can certainly be an object of consciousness (albeit not insofar as it is "immediate").

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thinking of the I was an instance of free acting, but a 11 necessary mode of acting follows from this. We have proven that there is no consciousness of the I without consciousness of the Not-1. We could indeed introduce a postulate at this point [that is, we could simply postulate that the I has to become an object of consciousness], but if we were to do so, we would also have to announce that it is a postulate, in which case it would become part of the first principle we are presupposing. When we have ascended higher 12 we will learn whether it is necessary to introduce such a postulate. [So far] we have neither established nor proven the existence of the Not-1. What we have demonstrated is the reciprocal interaction of the I and the Not-1.

39

(4) We must now compare the new synthesis with the previous one and attach this new link to our chain of inferences. In the previous § we remarked that one is unable to posit an activity without opposing thereto a state of passivity. In the present § we have observed that one cannot posit a determinate activity without opposing thereto a determinable one. Thus the procedure by means of which we accomplished the transition from one term to the other was the same in both inquiries. The action we have now deduced is the same as the previous one; we have simply become better acquainted with it. {By comparing this synthesis with the previous one, we can see that the same thing happens over and over again. The action that occurs is always the first action; indeed, at bottom there is only one action. Only within the system of a Wissenschaftslehre is this single action presented as a series of actions.} And if the action is the same, then that to which the transition is made must also be the same; i.e., the state of repose must be the same thing as determinability, and the latter must be included in the former; for it is precisely when an activity is still determinable as such that it can be characterized as a state of repose and not as an activity. One could call this state of repose or this determinability an "ability" or "power." 13 A power is not the same as that whieh possesses it; i.e., it is not a substance. We say that a substance possesses a certain power, which is 1 1 Reading "daraus folgt ein nothwendiges" for K's "daraus folgt kein nothwendiges." What the text actually states is that no necessary acting is implied by the occurrence of the first, free act of self-reflection, but this contradicts the entire argument of this section. But perhaps the text is not corrupt and should be interpreted to mean merely that we have not yet demonstrated that some other act must necessarily occur in order for the I to posit itselfs~ifically, that it must become conscious of itself. 12 Fichte frequently employs metaphors of ascent and descent to describe the overall structure of the M-nm. §§ 1-13 constitute the "ascent" to the axial point of the entire presentation, from which all the subsequent§§ "descend." 15 "Man konnte diese Ruhe oder diese Bestimmbarkeit Vermogen nennen." Vermogen (rendered here as "power") is an important term in Kant's philosophical vocabulary, often (albeit misleadingly) translated into English as "faculty" (e.g., by Norman Kemp Smith in his influential translation of the Critique of Pure Reason).

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thus one of its accidental properties. 14 Nor is a power the same as an activity. A power is not an action; it is that by means of which action first becomes possible. When an activity is grasped by means of concepts it is transformed into a state of ,repose. Power, repose, and determinability are one and the same. {The I in a state ofrepose is the same thing as (activity considered as) determinability, for a passive state of repose has the same character as a determinable activity. If one removes what is determinate from an activity, then it remains merely determinable; in other words, it is a power-that is to say, that which makes an action possible-or an activity in a state of repose that cannot be further explained but can only be grasped conceptually. This is how activity becomes a state of repose or a puwer or determinability.} Thus the positing that occurs in the first act [that is, the act of positing a state of repose in opposition to an activity] is the same as the positing that occurs in the second [that is, the act of positing a determinable activity in opposition to a determinate one]. When an activity is intuited in a state of repose it becomes a concept. One could also express this the other way around and note that the situation is the same with determinability. But in this case one must note that this concept [of a determinable activity] is a concept only in relation to the intuition ofthe I; in relation to the Not-I, it is itself an intuition. 15 In the intuition the activity is in action, whereas in the concept it is not in action; there it is a mere power! 6 When this activity in the form of a concept is related to the Not-I, however, it is then an intuition.E Thus we may obtain two sorts of intuition: inner and outer, that is, intellectual intuition and another sort, which refers to the Not-1. The state of mind with which we are presently concerned contains two separate spheres: the sphere of what is intended and the sphere of what is necessarily {conjoined with this, or a sphere of what is} found, which we will call the sphere of "the given." 17 {Remark: In this context "given" 14 "die Substanz hat Vermogen; es ist AcciQENS." Fichte uses this Latin term in the sense in which it was employed within Scholastic philosophy, to designate what has no independent existence of its own and can exist only within (or as a modification of) something else, namely, a substance. The English reader should resist the temptation to read this term as implying contingency. Some "accidents" (or "attributes") are indeed contingent, but others are necessary (or, as the Scholastics called them, "proper"). 15 As a comparison with the corresponding passage in H reveals, this sentence is misleading. It is not the concept of the determinable activity that is an intuition in relationship to the Not-1, but rather the determinable activity itself. (In the seconded. ofK, Fuchs replaces "dieser Begriff" ("this concept") with "diese Bestimmbarkeit" ("this determinability").) 16 "In der Anschauung ist die Th1tigkeit in AcTION, im Begriffnicht, sondern da ist sie bioSes Vermogens." E This determinable activity is therefore something passive, something that can be grasped only conceptually; and thus, insofar as it is opposed to intuition, it is an act of comprehending or a concept. In relation to the Not-l,on the other hand, it is an intuition (p. 36). 17 "die eine ist die des Beabsichtigten,die andere die des nothwendig gefunden,welches wir nennen wollen das Gegebne." The clause inserted from the parallel passage in H

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means not "given from outside," but rather "encountered by means of the laws of reflection that govern our reason."} Our intention was to posit an activity, and this activity was found to be accompanied by a state of repose. Moreover, our intention was to posit a determinate activity, and this was found to be accompanied by a determinable one. The first sphere thus includes (1) real, self-reverting activity =A, and (2) that which has come into being by means of this activity = B. The sphere of the given likewise includes (1) determinable activity (i.e., activity that is determinable, in the sense that it can turn into actual acting, though it may itself be determined in other respects) = C, and (2) the Not-I that is produced by means of this determinable activity = D. F {Our terminology is thus as follows: A. The real determinate activity Both as intended. B. The concept of the I C. The determinable activity Both as given. D. The Not-1.} Let us now investigate these in the light of the above account of intuitions and concepts. All consciousness begins with the previously indicated immediate consciousness (see § 1). {Immediate consciousness is the foundation of all consciousness. We have postulated this, since immediate consciousness never appears as an object of consciousness. Instead, it is the subjective factor in all consciousness, the factor that constitutes the conscious subject. It is merely the representing subject 18 of consciousness.} The A that posits itself in and by means of this consciousness is a representation of immediate consciousness, a representation that we who are engaged in philosophical inquiry have freely chosen to produce. (This immediate consciousness is the conscious subject in every act of consciousness, but it is not the subject of which we are conscious. {Nothing that we can be conscious of is immediate consciousness itself; instead, it is present within all consciousness and lies at its foundation, but only as the sub-

} }

("EINE SPHARE DES NOTHWENDIG DAMIT VERBUNDENEN oder des GEFUNDENEN NEN") helps to clarify the meaning of "necessarily" in this sentence.

oder GEGEBE-

F

To the sphere of what is intended (subjective) pertain: Activity Determinate activity The concept of the I

To the sphere of what is given (objective) pertain: Repose What is determinable The concept of the Not-1

Let us call the real, determinate activity that lies within this sphere, i.e., the activity in agility, "A." And let us call what comes into being thereby, i.e., the concept of the I, "B."

Let us call the determinable activity in a state of repose that lies within this sphere "C." And let us call the Not-1 that is produced thereby "D."

18 "REPRESENTATIO."

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jective factor, the Idea, something posited in accordance with the laws of reflection.} What the eye sees in this case is the seeing of the eye. {The eye looks at seeing: the eye is immediate consciousness, and seeing is all other consciousness. Consciousness is no more the same as immediate consciousness than is the eye the same as seeing.}) We freely chose to generate this representation, and, if we had wished, we could have concerned ourselves with something else; thus we have left to one side the question of whether there might be some other respect in which such a representation might be necessary. • This A, this observing of the act of self-positing, is an intuition; more precisely, it is an inner, intellectual intuition {or intuition of the I acting within itself-of the A-[an intuition] of the intuited act of self-positing or of self-reverting activity-A}. We have already discovered (in the first §) that no intuition-including intuition A-is possible apart from a concept. What concept must be connected with intuition A? Could it be [the concept of] what is intended ( = B)? Obviously not, {for this intended I is supposed to present itself within consciousness as active, as engaged in intuiting, and thus as self-positing and produced by A,} [and,] since the concept we are seeking must lie within the sphere of what is given, {which is not produced before my very eyes, it must lie in C}. Accordingly, the concept we are seeking must be the one that conditions intuition A; i.e., it must be C = what is determinable, or the activity in a state of passive repose. {The determinable activity, or activity in a state of repose, is thus the concept that lies at the basis of all intuition, for repose can be grasped-can be thought or posited-only in relation to activity. Thus what is given to me by means of C is the concept of the I, for in order for me to be able to posit myself, a movement of transition from repose to activity must occur.} Thus, in relationship to intuition A, C is the concept that determines A. But in the context of a different relationship, this same concept C can also be called an intuition. {But where does this concept C come from?} It is immediate consciousness itself, which is not intuited but is comprehended or grasped through concepts-and comprehended not as an activity, but as a state of repose. {For activity in a state of repose is a mere concept, which can never appear in intuition and can never be an object of intuition; instead, as a concept or a power, i.e., as something posited, C is based upon immediate consciousness, or rather, C is itself immediate consciousness and therefore is an immediate concept. In this concept the I discovers itself as substance, as something posited, as the determinable, active C, which lies at the foundation of every determinate activity and of every consciousness.} This concept is what is copied in intuition A. (Every act of intuition is an act of copying.) This concept is the most immediate and highest concept, and it is grounded upon intellectual intuition, which, as such, never becomes an object of consciousness, though it does become an

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object of consciousness in the form of a concept. c In and by means of this concept the I discovers itself and appears to itself as something given. I can conceive of myself [that is, I can grasp myself conceptually] in no other way than as an I, i.e., as self-positing, and thus as intuiting. The concept in question is thus the concept of an act of intuiting, and this is the sense in which this concept itself can be called an "intuition." The I is self-positing (a self-positing eye), 19 and it is comprehended as such; i.e., it is conceptually grasped as an intuition. Thus, in relation to A, C is a concept; but it is an intuition in relation to some possible X. I discover myself to be intuiting inasmuch as I discover myself to be intuiting something =X. (For Kant, both outer and inner intuition are merely sensible. Thus, according to him, the I appears to itself only as a determinate object, but I maintain that it appears to itself as a determining subject.) {Accordingly, the I is both a concept and an intuition. This is precisely the point that distinguishes this system from others-including the Kantian system.} In the previous §, C was only a concept; here it is both a concept and an intuition. Later on it will be an intuition. Thus it can mean different things, depending upon the different contexts within which it is posited. In C, the I was found to be self-positing, but it was not found to be active; instead, it was there found to be in a state of repose, something posited as self-positing. Its activity is canceled as such; it is an activity in a state of repose, which nevertheless is and remains an intuition. Since it is always true that an intuition stands over against a concept and is possible only by means of this opposition, this is the case here as well. What is posited in opposition to C is what we previously called D. The characteristic feature of all concepts is repose; but C, considered as an intuition, is already in a state of repose. Thus, since D is now supposed to be a state of repose in relationship to C, D must be a state of repose in a state of repose." What then is D? G This immediate concept of the I ( = C) becomes an intuition only insofar as it is comprehended or grasped conceptually. That is to say, the I cannot comprehend itself without positing itself as an intuiting subject. What is comprehended is thus an act of intuiting. In order to arrive at the concept of the I-indeed, in order to arrive at any concept at all-an activity has to be opposed to the I's state of repose; this is thus necessary if the I is to be discuvered through intellectual intuition, if it is to be grasped clearly and perspicuously, i.e., if it is to be comprehended. The concept itself, however, can be grasped only through thought (p. 38). 19 "eine sich selbst sezendes Auge." Radrizzani plausibly suggests that "sezendes" may well be a mistranscription of "sehendes," in which case the phrase could be rendered "an eye that sees itself." This emendation is supported by the corresponding passage in H. " Although C, in relationship to A, is an activity in a state of repose, it nevertheless is and remains an act of intuiting, and indeed, a passive intuiting: namely, in relationship to what is opposed to it ( = D). This concept D also possesses the character of passive repose, for it is something given.

42

Insofar as C is opposed to D, C is, to be sure, an activity [in a state of repose], one that can be summoned into actual activity by means of free self-determination. In its essence it is an activity. (C is the activity of the I, considered as a substance. We will explain this in more detail below; at this point it is nothing more than a figure of speech.) {As activity in repose, C is the concept of the I as a substance. But it is only relatively passive; i.e., it is passive only in relation to A. Thus C can also be considered to be active in relation to X. But if this occurs, then a passive state of repose must again be opposed to C. This state of repose which is posited in opposition to what is already a state of relative repose cannot itself be relative, i.e., a mere privation or denial of activity.} D, which is the opposite of this activity, would thus have to be the real negation of activity, not merely the absence or privation of the same. It would have to cancel and annihilate activity; thus it is not zero, but is instead negative magnitude, 21 {something more than nothing}. This is the true character of. actual being, the concept of which has incorrectly been considered to be a primitive, immediate concept; for the sole immediate concept is the concept of activity, {and this concept cannot be explained. In contrast, [the concept of] being can be derived. Being is a negative concept:} In relation to an active subject that is posited as lying outside of being itself, being negates; being cancels productive activity: What is cannot be produced or made. 22 {It must first be annihilated, for positive productive activity presupposes negative productive activity, i.e., an act of annihilation. Thus being also negates whatever exists; 23 it negates becoming. Before anything can become, it must cease to be.} In relation to the positing subject, being negates goals: I cannot become what I am. Without realizing it, ordinary common sense has always understood this point: Refusing to be content with the existence of the world, it ascended to [the thought of] a creator. Being is the characteristic feature of the Not- I. Activity is what characterizes the I. Dogmatism begins with being, which it interprets as something primitive and immediate. Insofar as the activity of the I is in a passive state of repose inC, the I's activity is annihilated by the Not- I. This activity within C, which is not real activity, but which can be called the "substance" of the I, shows itself to be an activity at least to the extent that it is an intuition. In contrast, Even as an intuition, C is already in a state of repose, for it has been posited in opposition to A; and D is also in a state of repose, because it is something given. Therefore, to the extent that D is the product of C, it is a state of repose in a state of repose. 20 (p. 38). 20 "Rube der Rube."

Grofle."

21 "NEGATivE "Sein NEGIRT

in Beziehung auf ein auser dem Sein geseztes Thatiges; durch Sein wird Machen aufgehoben. Was ist kann nicht gemacht werden." 25 "Das SEYN negirt also auch das SEYENDE." 22

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§2

what is opposed to C [ = D] could not be an intuition, but would have to be the real negation of intuiting; i.e., it would have to be something intuited-and this would have to be true of the Not-I as well. {This is the true character of the Not-1: as what is intuited it must always be related to an intuiting subject (namely, to C).} This is why it is absurd to treat the Not-1 as a thing in itself. It must always be related to an intuiting subject. (5) We saw above how the entire mechanism of the human mind is based upon the necessity of positing one thing in opposition to another. But these opposing terms are one and same, merely viewed from different sides. The I, which lies within the sphere of what is intended, and the Not-I, which lies within the sphere of what is discovered, are one and the same. These simply represent two, inseparably linked, aspects or ways of looking at the same thing, for the I must be a subject-object. Everything follows from this last claim. Two series arise from the original intuition: the subjective series, or the series of what is intended, and the objective series, or the series of what is found. These two series cannot be separated, for neither can exist without the other. To say that these are both aspects of the same thing, i.e., to say that the subjective and the objective [series] "coexist," is to say that they are not merely inseparably linked within reflection, but that they are also one and the same object of reflection. The activity that reverts into itself and determines itself is none other than the determinable activity. These are one and the same and are inseparable. 1 {Thus, for example, B and C are one and the same. B is the concept of the I produced by A. C is the concept of the I, considered as something given; for in order to be able to posit myself as active ( = B), I have to presuppose a transition from a state of repose to one of activity, and this presupposes an activity in a state of repose as such, i.e., a power to become active in one way or another, and this passive, determinable activity is the concept of the I in C. The difference between B and C is simply this: B is the concept of the I which A produces in consciousness before our very eyes; in contrast, C is the concept of the I which is discovered by intuition to be present within consciousness, and hence C belongs to the sphere of what is "given" or "objective." Accordingly, B is produced through freedom, whereas C is produced through original intuition. 24} 1 One can call what is intended "subjective" and what is given "objective," since both are originally present within consciousness. Not only are they always together within reflection, but they are also inseparable as an object of reflection, or as what is reflected upon. There can be no determinate activity without a determinable one, no activity of the I as I without the same as a state of repose, as Not-I. This is always one and the same activity (p.}g). 2 The translation of this sentence corrects what appears to be an error in the transcription of H, which reads: "Eben so ist A durch Freiheit hervorgebracht, B hingegen durch die urspriingliche Anschauung." In the translation, B is substituted for A, and C for B.

§2

43

133

The Not-1 is thus nothing other than another way of looking at the I. When we consider the I as an activity, we obtain the I; when we consider it in a state of repose, we obtain the Not-1. One cannot view the I as active without also viewing it in a state of repose, i.e., as Not-1. This is the reason why the dogmatist, who does not think of the I as engaged in activity, has no I at all. His I is an accident of the Not- I. Idealism has no Not-1; for the idealist, the Not-1 is always simply another way of looking at the I. Within dogmatism, the I is a particular type of thing; within idealism, the Not-I is a particular way of looking at the I. {In idealism, therefore, the Not-I is nothing but an accident. Actually, idealism recognizes no Not-1; its Not-1 is only a particular way oflooking at its I. That is to say, it first views its I in intellectual intuition as active, and this furnishes idealism with its I. However, it also views the I in intellectual intuition as passive, and this furnishes idealism with its Not-1. Remark: This is only one way of looking at the Not- I. There is, however, also another way of looking at it, which we will examine later.}

§

2

(Dictated 1 798)

When this very activity of reflection, through which the intellect posits itself, is intuited, it, is intuited as a self-determining agility; and this agility is intuited as a movement of transition from a state of passive repose and indeterminacy, which is nevertheless determinable, to one of determinacy. This determinability here appears as the power to think either of the I or of the Not-1, and thus the concept of determinability necessarily involves the concepts of the I and the Not-1, which are posited in opposition to each other. Accordingly, whenever one engages in self-active reflection each of these concepts appears as something independent of this act, and the characteristic feature of the Not-I is being, i.e., a negation.

§ 2

It is claimed that when one constructs the concept of the I one will also discover that one cannot posit oneself as active without positing this activity as self-determined, and that one cannot do this without positing a movement of transition from a state of indeterminacy or determinability-which movement of transition is itself the very activity one is here observing (see sections 1 and 2 above). Similarly, one cannot grasp the concept {of the I} which comes into being by means of the determinate activity without determining this concept by means of an opposed Not-1; and what is determinable is the same as what was previously called the state of repose (§ 1 ), for it is determined precisely by being transformed

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44

§

2

into an activity. 25 Moreover, that which, in relation to the intuition of the I, is a concept of the I, is, in relation to the Not-1, an intuition. More specifically, it is the concept of the act of intuiting (section 4). As a consequence of this opposition, the Not-1 can be characterized as the {real} negation of activity; that is, it can be characterized as "being," which is the concept of canceled activity. The concept of being is thus by no means an original concept, but is a negative one, derived from activity.

{A few more words of explanation: The concept of activity which occurs here and which underlies all that has been said consists in nothing but the muvement of transition from what is undetermined to what is determinate; i.e., it consists in an act of wrenching away from a state of repose and a transition to acting. But just as soon as this activity acts in some determinate manner-i.e., once it is "in action"-it is no longer an activity, but is instead the I. This is where the concept of the I enters the picture. For this reason, this activity does not permit of any explanation, but has its foundation entirely within consciousness and must be copied in intuition. Furthermore, concerning the law of reflection which governs all our cognition (namely, the law that states that we cognize nothing-in the sense of knowing what it is-without at the same time thinking of what it is not): this law was not a postulate that we proposed, but was instead a matter of intuition. And it is precisely this sort of cognition, i.e., cognizing something by means of opposition, that is called "determining" something. To be sure, the system still rests upon a postulate, and this is certainly something that should be noticed. What we have postulated is our cognition as such, insofar as this is grounded in immediate consciousness, considered as an object. In short, what we have postulated is the movement of transition from the posited I to the pure I. We will discuss this at its proper time.}

Comparison with §§

2

and 3 of the compendium. 26

Had we postulated anything here, it would have been a general cognition of the transition from the I to what is represented. That this cog"wei! es eben zur Thatigkeit bestimmt wird." I.e.,§§ 2 and 3 of GWL (see SW, 1: 101-23). As always, K and H cite the first, 1794"95 edition of GWL, for which this translation substitutes page references to the text in SW, I. 25

26

§

2

135

nition must be determined objectively is something that is established within intuition. 27 From this necessary determinacy we deduced determinability, and from determinability we deduced the Not-1. The portion of the compendium corresponding to this section proceeded in the diametrically opposite direction. It began with the act of opposing28 the Not-I [to the I], and this opposition was posited as absolute(§ 2). The act of determining was then derived from this act of opposing(§ 3). Both paths are correct, since the necessary determinacy of the I and the necessary being of the Not-I bear a reciprocal relation to each other. One can proceed from either to the other. Either path is possible. But our present path has this advantage: that the determinacy of the I is also what links the I with the Not-0 What we have here spoken of as the "relationship between determinacy and determinability" is called "quantity" (or sometimes "quantifiability") in the book. 29 This has given rise to some misunderstandings, for many have taken this to imply that the I is something extended. In fact, all that really possesses quantity is the positing subject itself. K But here we are not yet concerned with this. The third § of the previous exposition would thus correspond to the second §of this one, and vice versa. Another path has also been pursued here with respect to the Not-I, which is no longer postulated immediately, but is instead postulated indirectly. {The Not-I is also derived in a different manner in § 2 of the book, in which the absolute opposition is supposed to be established by means of Note that the pagination of SW, I is also provided in the critical edition of the same text included in AA l, 2, as well as as in the English translation included in SK. 27 "Hatten wir hier etwas postulirt, so ware es das [sic] Erkenntni~ iiberhaupt des Uibergehens vom lch zum Vorgestellten[.] Da~ diese Erkenntni~. die~ objective bestimmt sein mii~, ist in der Anschauung nachgewiesen." This obscure passage demands some emendation, which is only marginally facilitated by the parallel passage in H: "Zwar beruht das System auf einem PosTULATE [ ... ] nehmlich; unsere[r] Erkennti~ iiberhaupt, in sofem sie sich auf dem unmittelbaren Bewu~tseyn als Objekt betrachtet-griindetkurz der Obergang von dem gesezten len zum reinen leu." ("To be sure, this system rests upon a postulate [ ... ], namely: our knowledge as such, insofar as this is grounded upon immediate consciousness, considered as an object-in short, [what we have postulated is] the transition from the posited I to the pure 1.") 28 Reading, with Radrizzani, "Entgegensetzen" forK's "Entgegengesezten" ("what was opposed"). fThe path followed in the compendium is the opposite of the one we are presently following. In § 2 of the book we started with the Not-I, and from § 3 on we progressed to what is determinable, and finally to what is determinate. Each of these two methods is correct in itself, since they are reciprocally related to each other. Nevertheless, the present method is preferable since it doubles the connection. The determinacy of the I, with which we begin, is also at the same time what connects the I and the Not-1 (p. 41 ). 29 See SW, 1: IOB-9. K What § 3 calls "quantity" is the relationship between determinacy and determinability, and refers to the necessary corYunction of two opposites, which must nevertheless be viewed as opposed to each other. Thus "quantity" designates the entire range of activityincluding both determinable and determinate activity (pp. 41-42).

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the logical principle "-A is not =A." Everyone will concede this principle itself at once, but how do I know that it is true? From experience? This is insufficient, for how could this be known from experience? Instead, this [logical] opposition is absolute-because I posit something in opposition and must do so. 3~ p. 1 o 1, no. 1. This proposition establishes the absolute act of opposing as such. p. 103, no. 6. "The act of opposing [etc.]." One cannot posit acting without also positing a state of repose, nor something determinate without something determinable, nor an I without a Not-1. This is the origin of the unity of acting as well as of the unity of consciousness. p. 104, no. g. The act of absolute opposing is here demonstrated. If this act were impossible, then how could anything be opposed to anything? The I is posited absolutely; hence what is absolutely posited in opposition is the Not-1. {If something is supposed to be absolutely opposed, then the question arises, opposed to what? To nothing else but the I, for this is what is immediately posited. Thus the only possible immediate act of opposing is an act of positing something in opposition to the I. This absolute act of positing in opposition is absolute; thus it cannot be learned from experience, but first appears within experience in the form of something that is opposed [to the I's self-positing], and only then does experience become possible.} p. 105, § 3· "with every step, etc." This is meant simply as a clarification of what occurs within us. {"To prove" means the same as "to establish within intuition." We can analyze only what occurs within us, what is already in us.} The older method continued in this manner and then merely analyzed what occurs. p. 106, no. 1. "insofar as [etc.]." This "insofar as" already includes within itself what is to be derived. To this extent, "insofar as" means "quantity" or "sphere." One could say that if the Not-I is posited, then the I is not posited. Yet both the Not-1 and the I have to be present within one and the same consciousness, for without an I, the Not-1 posits nothing. One cannot understand an opposite without positing its opposite as well. {Instead of "insofar as, [etc.]" it would have been better to say: "if the Not-I is posited," etc. The Not-1 is supposed to appear as a certain quantity or sphere of our activity. But this is not possible unless its opposite, the I, also appears within consciousness at the same time; and within this identity, the I must be simultaneously posited [along with the Not-1], for the Not-1 is nothing at all. But what is posited and what is posited in opposition thereto cancel each other out, and this is therefore a contradiction. 30

"dieses entgegensetzen ist absolut--weil ich entgegensetze, und entgegen setzen mult"

§

2

137

pp. 107-9. Resolution of this contradiction.} p. 107, no. 1. If opposites are now to continue to exist alongside each other, the I must possess the power to posit opposites together in one and the same {state or} act of consciousness, {namely, in intuition,} for neither is possible without the other. {No I without a Not-I, no activity apart from repose, etc. This is one and the same act. Neither term is a part of the act, but both originate at the same time and accompany each other.} The I thus possesses the power to proceed synthetically. "To synthesize"31 means "to posit together" or "to combine." But only things posited in opposition to each other can be posited in combination. 32 {In order for an act of combining to occur, opposites must be able to occur alongside each other in one and the same act of consciousness.} Thus, if these terms are to be combined in a single act, then the I must be able to bring opposites-and hence, a manifoldinto being within a single act, and such an act must therefore possess a certain scope or range. 33 {Therefore, insofar as we assume that our activity possesses a certain range or scope, a unified manifold has to exist. 34 For, as the conscious subject, I have to discover that I am active; but this is impossible unless I think of myself as engaged in a movement of transition from repose to activity.} This range of this act within which a manifold is combined and through which the manifold becomes possible is called "the capacity for quantity" in the book. Consciousness of this mode of acting includes that from which the transition is to be made and that to which it is to be made, as well as the acting itself. {The activity consists in this very movement. I thereby obtain both (1) what is discovered, i.e., that from which I make a movement of transition, and (2) that which is, as it were, produced before my very eyes, i.e., what is intended. The activity binds together both of these, what is discovered and what is intended; and in this way makes them both immediate objects of consciousness. To be sure, they are only indirectly glimpsed within the activity; both are included within the same action, which, as such, is merely their vehicle, as it were. Consciousness, however, includes all three: that from which the transition is made; that to which it is made; and the movement of transition, or the activity itself.} Consciousness is not an act; it is a state of repose and includes a multiplicity-at the same time that it is led to go beyond it. Within consciousness, everything is simultaneously united and separated. This is the meaning of "limits," "divisibility," and the "capacity for quantity," p. 108, no. 8. Reading, with Krause's MS, "Synthesiren" forK's "Synthesis." "Synthesis soli heifkn zusammensezen; nun kann aber nur zusammengesezt werden, was [et]was entgegengesetzt ist." Rather than emend the first "was," as Fuchs does, Radrizzani suggests that the second "was" represents merely a careless repetition of the first. 33 "einen Umfang haben." 34 "Es muf:l also ein Mannigfaltiges daseyn, das in Einem beisammen ist." 31

32

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p. 109, no. g. "I as well [as Not-1], etc." This might give rise to some misunderstanding. I and Not-I are only parts of the manifold. They lie within the same consciousness and are not separable from each other; they are partes integrantes. 35 The act of limiting is based upon this: what the one is, the other is not. But this does not mean that either the I or the Not-I is to be further divided. What this passage should say is that consciousness is divisible into an I and a Not-1. p. 109. "Only now ... something." To say that the I and the Not-I are now both "something" means that we can now ascribe predicates to them, which occurs only by means of opposition. The only way that anythini can be "something" is by being posited in opposition to something else. {p. 109. "Consciousness contains all reality": I.e., consciousness is that which witnesses acting. All determinability, everything that can subsequently be posited, is included within this act.} pp. 109-10, D. All that has been proven is that if the I is to attain consciousness, then it must posit a Not-I; but it has not been proven that the I must attain consciousness. {Concerning this remark, there remains a gap that needs to be filled: namely, we have to provide a deduction of the postulate upon which everything that has been established so far rests. The postulate states: The I appears outside of itself, as it were, and makes itself into an object. Why should and why must the I do this?} (p. 36) "integral parts." For anything to "be something" means that one can ascribe a predicate to it, albeit only by means of opposition: What is I is not Not-1 (p. 43). 35 L

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§ 3

47

The I's action of self-positing is a movement of transition from indeterminacy to determinacy. 1 We must now reflect upon this action in order to discover how the I passes from indeterminacy to determinacy. {What is it that mediates this action of self-positing, that is, this movement of transition from what is determinable to what is determinate?} ( 1) No grounds can here be adduced for this action, for we have reached the limit of all reasons. 2 All one has to do at this point is to observe what is there to be seen. Everyone will see that nothing mediates [this movement of transition from indeterminacy to determinacy]. The I undertakes this movement of transition because it undertakes this movement of transition; it determines itself because it determines itself. It accomplishes this transition by means of a self-grounding act of absolute freedom, and this is a creation out of nothing, an act of producing something that did not exist before, an absolute beginning. {The I passes from what is determinable to what is determinate in, as it were, a single bound.} The state of indeterminacy does not contain within itself any foundation or reason for the ensuing determinacy, for each of these two states cancels the other. At moment A, I was undetermined, and this indeterminacy constituted my entire nature. 3 At moment B, I am determinate; something new is present, and it has arisen from me. This passage [from indeterminacy to determinacy] is accomplished by means of a self-grounding act of freedom. 1 In K, § 3 begins with a summary paragraph under the heading "§ 3 ( 1798)." Since this paragraph is virtually identical to the summary paragraph that concludes § 3, it has been omitted from the translation. See below, n. 24. 2 "Hier giebt es keine Griinde; wir sind an der Grenze aller Griinde." There can, in princiJ>Ie, be no Griinde (reasons) for the ultimate Grund (foundation). 3 "denn beide heben sich auf. Im Moment A war ich unbestimmt, mein ganzen Wesen wurde in dieser Unbestimmtheit aufgehoben." The last clause could also be rendered "and this indeterminacy canceled my entire nature."

[ 139]

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(2) The activity that expresses itself in this freely initiated movement of transition is called "real activity," {for it is an act of generating or creating something on its own. Unlike its opposite, namely, that act of intuiting, which we will call "ideal activity," this real activity was not produced from the preceding state of indeterminacy. This act of absolute freedom is not the content, but rather the form of the act of transition from determinability to determinacy.} The act in which this transition is accomplished is called a "practical act"; and the field within which it expresses itself is called "the field of the practical." We observed this act and are continuing to do so. The activity in which such observation occurs is called "ideal activity." As an idealiter4 active, intuiting subject, I now discover this act of absolute freedom. But I can neither discover nor describe it without positing something in opposition to it. "I determine myself': this means that I transform a possibility into a reality, a power5 into an activity. I accomplish this absolutely free act of self-determination by means of a {practical} power to determine myself through absolute freedom. A The term "power" signifies the possibility of activity. But one cannot understand this unless one sets forth the law of reflection through which the concept of power originates. Power is nothing but another way of looking at activity. Any particular act can be intuited only when it is explained with reference to a power, and this also applies to the act of absolute freedom. There is no power apart from activity and no activity apart from power. They are one and the same thing, simply construed from two different sides: construed as an intuition, it is an activity; construed as a concept, it is a power. {Something can be said to possess a "practical power" if it possesses the possibility of becoming something else-insofar as this possibility is thought of as in a state of repose, apart from activity. The power we are here concerned with would thus be the concept of absolute freedom, while the actitselfwould be the intuition [of freedom]. This concept and this act determine each other reciprocally. }

48

(3) The sharp difference between ideal and real activity can be easily stated. Ideal activity is an activity in a state of repose, an act of positing 4 "IDEALITER." Fichte employs the Latin terms idea/iter ("in an ideal sense") and rea/iter ("in a real sense") to designate actions, respectively, of the "ideal" and the "real" powers discussed in the previous section. To act rea/iter is thus to engage in practical, efficacious action. To act idea/iter is to become aware of the previous sort of action rea/iter. 5 "ein Vermogen." A Since no act can be clearly intuited unless something is posited in opposition to it, we will posit in opposition to this act of absolute freedom a practical power of absolute freedom (p. 44)-

in a state of repose, an act that loses itself in the object, an act of intuiting, which is fixed in the object. 6 Real activity is true activity, which is an instance of acting. {Real activity consists in agility, in the transition to acting, and contains within itself the reason why it is determined in a particular way. Thus it is not anything fixed, but is self-determining.} Ideal activity can also be in motion and can also be a movement of transition; indeed, when engaged in intuiting freedom, the ideal activity really is such a movement of transition, but what makes an act of intuiting a movement of transition is not anything that lies within the act of intuiting itself, but is instead derived from the object intuited, which, in this case, is freedom. The intuiting subject obtains only an image or copy [of its object]. Unlike real activity, ideal activity does not possess within itself the ground of its determinate being, and this is why it is in a state of passive repose. The ideal activity has its foundation in the reality 7 that lies before it. {The real activity produces something real 8-it is the condition for the possibility of all intuiting. The ideal activity is only an act of mirroring or copying, an act of observing the productive act-an act of representingof grasping something through concepts. It is not our real goal.} These two activities can be comprehended only in opposition to each other. (4) Let us specify more clearly the nature of the ideal and real activities by contrasting them with each other. (A) There can be no real activity of the I apart from ideal activity, for it is the essence of the I to posit itself. In order for the I's activity to be real, it must be [posited] by the I, 9 but it is posited by means of the ideal activity.B We ascribe force to a natural object; but, since such an object lacks consciousness, we do not say that it possesses this force "for itself." Only the I possesses force for itself. (B) Conversely, there is no ideal activity of the I apart from real activity. An ideal activity is a [real] activity that has been posited by the I 6 "eine in die Rube sezen, ein sich im Objecte verlieren, ein im Objecte fixirtes Anschauen." The translation follows Fuchs's alternate reading of this passage, which substitutes "in der Rube" for "in die Rube." 7 "in dem realen." 8 "Die REALE bringt etwas REELLES hervor." 9 "so muP sie durch das Ich sein." It appears likely, especially in the light of the next sentence, that the word gesezt ("posited") should be inserted in this sentence, between "lch" and "sein." Without this interpolation, the sentence could be translated: "In order for the I's activity to be real, it must be produced by the 1." 8 There is no real activity (qua activity of the I) without ideal activity; for the selfpositing of the I is impossible without ideal activity, and the act of self-positing is precisely the 1-hence the I too 'would not exist if the ideal activity did not exist (p. 45).

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and has then itself become an object of reflection and is, in turn, represented by means of ideal activity. Otherwise, the I would be like a mirror, which indeed "represents" things, but does not then turn around and represent itself. • That the ideal activity itself becomes an object in turn is something postulated along with the I. But it is made into an object by real activity. Thus if there is no real activity, then there can be no self-intuition of the ideal activity. Without the real activity, the ideal activity would have no object, nor would it be anything if the real activity had not placed something before it.c {Thus, without real activity, there would be no activity of the I as an object. Ideal activity is the product of the practical power.} (C) Without noticing it, we have already {filled the gap} indicated above; 10 that is, we have shown that immediate consciousness is no consciousness at all, but is a hollow self-positing that produces nothing, an intuition in which nothing is intuited. Thus we have discovered the answer to the question, How is it that the I goes beyond immediate consciousness and forms consciousness within itself? 11 For ifthe I is to exist at all, then immediate consciousness must, in turn, be posited through absolute freedom. 0 This act of placing oneself before oneself through absolute freedom is a free act; but, if the I is to exist, this same act is also necessary. Accordingly, the ideal activity would be a product of the practical power, and the practical power would be the existential foundation of the ideal activity. Nevertheless, one should not think of these as separated from each other. The ideal is the subjective aspect of the practical; it is that which witnesses the practical; and, since nothing exists for the I except what is observed by the I, it is therefore only thanks to the ideal activity that anything exists for the I. {In §§ 1 and 2 the task was to produce the I. The task of § 3 is to discover the basis for the I's movement of transition from what is determinable to determination. The former task was based upon the ideal activity, the latter upon the real activity. The former witnessed the productive activity; the latter is the productive activity itself. This real activity is thus the condition for the possibility of all intuiting, for there is no intuiting without acting. Real activity is therefore the foundation of c Conversely, there is no ideal activity apart from a real activity of the I. It is by means of the real activity that the I itself, in turn, becomes an object for itself (p. 45). 10 The "gap" left open by our previous failure to answer the question, "Why must the I apr.;ar to itself as an object?" 1 "wie kommt das Ich dazu aus dem unmittelbare Bewustsein herauszugehen, und in sich das Bewustsein zu bilden." n How then can the I proceed beyond immediate consciousness? It does this by positing itself, which occurs when immediate consciousness becomes consciousness. This occurs through the act offreedom, that is, through an act in which consciousness places itself before itself and produces itself out of itself- i.e., by means of spontaneous self-activity, which constitutes the essence of the I (p. 45).

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ideal activity. The ideal activity is the product of the practical power. At bottom, however, these are but one and the same action, simply considered from different points of view. Therefore, if one is what is grasped conceptually, 12 the other is what is intuited, and vice versa. Neither can exist apart from the other, without which it is nothing at all.} I, the subject who acts realiter, 13 affect myself. First I am undetermined, and then I become determinate. I accomplish this by myself. I grasp and lay hold of myself realiter. Since this is an act of a self-affecting I, this act of [self-]affecting is accompanied by an ideal activity, by an act of intuiting-in short, by consciousness. Precisely because it becomes consciousness, this consciousness becomes an intuition of itself. {An image of this real activity is that of a river that continues to flow even while it mirrors itself in our eye. What our eye does when it observes the river corresponds to the ideal activity. Real activity is also what in ordinary life is called "exerting oneself'i.e., generating, from out of ourselves, as it were, a new effort that exceeds our customary effort.} To say that self-intuition is a product of the practical power means: insofar as I affect [myself] realiter, I observe myself; and this act of observation constitutes self-intuition.

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(5) It is here taken as established that there is nothing except what is in consciousness. We have seen that there is no consciousness apart from real activity, i.e., without absolute freedom. Everything that can exist exists only in conjunction with and by means of absolute freedom. Without absolute freedom there is nothing. {We began with the proposition, "nothing exists except what is within consciousness." But there is no consciousness without freedom; therefore, freedom is the standpoint of all philosophy, as Kant correctly remarked somewhere, 14 although he does not call attention to this within his own system.} Thus freedom is the ground of all philosophizing, as well as the foundation of all being. Take your stand upon your own self, upon freedom: you will then possess a firm standpoint. Consciousness is immediately connected with freedom; indeed, there is nothing else with which it could be connected. Freedom is the first and immediate object of consciousness. All consciousness reverts into itself. Ordinary common sense recognizes this when it says, "I am conscious of "das Begriffene." "Ich afficire mich selbst, ich der realiter thiitige." See above, n. 4 of this §. 14 See Kant's description of the concept of freedom as "the keystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even of speculative reason" in the Preface to his Kritik derpraktischen Vemunft (1786, KGS, V: 3-4; English translation by Lewis White Beck, Critique of Practical Reason [Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956], pp. 3-4), as well as his characterization of the Idea of freedom as the "Archimedean point" of reason in his 1796 essay, "Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie" (KGS, VIII: 403). 12

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something/or me." 15 Nothing is explained if we think of the I as a mere subject, for we will then have to seek a new subject for this subject, and so on ad infinitum. Consequently, we must think of the I as a subjectobject. Such an ideal subject-object, however, does not explain anything either; something else must be added, something that, in relation to this subject, can be a mere object, the object of which I am conscious. But from where can such an object come? The dogmatist says that the object is "given." Or, if he wishes to combine criticism with dogmatism, he says that the material content 16 is given. But this explains nothing; it is a mere empty word rather than a concept. The idealist says that the object is "produced." Stated in this way, however, this answer does not explain anything either. For even if it is true that the object is the product of the I, insofar as the I engages in real activity, it is equally true that, insofar as the activity in which the I engages is "real" activity, 17 the I is not an ideal being at all, and hence the product produced by the efficaciously acting I 18 would have to be "given" to the representing subject-and we would thus be back with the dogmatism with which we began. • Our question can be answered only as follows: The intuiting subject and the productive subject are immediately one and the same. {Above, we have deduced this identity as a product of our ideal power, by virtue of which our I is for itself an immediate subject-object, and thus, we have exhibited an immediate consciousness, which cannot, in turn, be made anew into an object-which is how the dogmatist becomes entangled in an endless circle. Instead, our I, as an immediate subject-object, is the fixed point beyond which philosophy cannot and may not go. I act because I act. I am immediately aware that I am conscious because I am aware that I am conscious-so here as well: We must have something that is the immediate object of this ideal [power], for otherwise such ideal activity would be an empty Idea; and the object in question is freedom, productive activity, the intuiting subject, /-hood in its entirety.P 9 The intuiting subject witnesses its own productive activity. The immediate object of consciousness is no object as such, but is rather the productive activity 15 "Ich bin mir etwas bewuflt." Unfortunately, the point of this sentence depends upon a particularity of the German language (or is it a particularity of German common sense?): that the verb "to be conscious" always takes a reflexive, dative object. 16 "Stoff." A feature of K. L. Reinhold's "Elementary Philosophy" is its distinction between the "content" (given) and the "form" (produced) of experience. For Fichte's critique of Reinhold's way of making this distinction, see his 1794 review of Aenesidemu.s (SW, I: 17-18 = AA I, 2: 58-6o; English translation in EPW, pp. 71-72). 17 "in wiefern es REALthatigen Wesens ist." 18 "das wirkende Ich." 19 "Ich bin mir daher unmittelbar bewuflt, weil ich mir bewuflt bin.-so auch hier. Wir miiflen etwas haben, das in Beziehung auf dieses !DEALE UNMI'ITELBARES OBJEKT ist weil sonst jene !DEALE Thatigkeit LEERE IDEE ist-u. dieses ist die Freiheit, das MACHEN-das ANSCHAUENDE-die ganze ICHHEIT."

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itself-i.e., freedom. The sentence, "the I posits itself," thus has two inseparably linked meanings: an ideal and a real meaning, which are simply united in the I. There is no ideal positing without real spontaneity,20 ·E and the converse is also true. There is no self-intuition without freedom, and vice versa. Nor is there any consciousness without self-intuition. Prior to the act of freedom, there is nothing; everything that exists comes into being along with this act of freedom. But the only way we are able to think of this act is as a movement of transition from a preceding state of determinability to one of determinacy. Thus, from whichever side we look, we are always speaking of the same thing, though we view it in two different ways, and the axis around which everything turns is the act of freedom. But this free act in itself is not possible unless it is accompanied, on the one hand, by determinability or immediate consciousness and, on the other, by what is supposed to be produced, i.e., the intuited 1. 21 Neither of these two is separable from the other, and both depend upon absolute freedom. No person can point to the first act of his consciousness, because every moment [of consciousness] is a movement of transition from indeterminacy to determinacy, and thus every moment always presupposes another one. 22 {Accordingly, this act of freedom lies originally at the foundation of everything that exists. All that exists does so by means of this act. But if this is so, then why are we only now calling attention to this origin? Should this not have been presented in § 1? Reply: As finite intellects we are able to think only discursively; and therefore, in order to describe and to intuit this act of freedom, we had to employ the help of something determinable. We could make our immediate consciousness into an object only indirectly-i.e., by means of determinacy-and therefore we had to discuss this first.} Selbstanfangen." No ideal self-positing apart from a real act of affecting or limiting oneself (p. 46). 21 The translation here represents a rather free rendering of the German text, a more literal version of which would be: "Thus, whether we go forward or backward, we are always speaking of the same thing, though we view it in two different ways, and the axis around which everything turns is the act of freedom. The act of freedom, however, is itself impossible if there is nothing on the right (determinability, immediate consciousness) and nothing on the left (what is supposed to be produced, the intuited 1)." Radrizzani plausibly suggests that Fichte, in this passage, was referring to a diagram drawn on the blackboard-which would explain the otherwise puzzling references to "left," "right," "forward," and "backward." 22 See Fichte's announcement of this conclusion in his letter to Reinhold of July 2, 1795: "The surprising result is now revealed [ ... ]: namely, that there is no A that is absorbed into consciousness first, nor can there be. Instead, however high one ascends, something higher is always presupposed. For example, every intuition is necessarily posited in the present point in time; but there is no present point in time without a past one. Hence there is also no present intuition without a past intuition to which it is joined, and there is no first moment, no beginning of consciousness." 20 "REALES

E

What is actually first, realiter, is freedom. But freedom cannot come first in the order of thinking, and that is why we had to begin with the investigations undertaken so far, which lead us to [an investigation of] freedom.

One will find that this movement of transition [from what is determinable to what is determinate] 23 (§ 2) possesses its foundation utterly within itself. 24 The action involved in this transition is therefore called "real activity" and is opposed to that ideal activity which merely copies the former, and the overall {activity of the} I is thereby divided into these two types of activity. In accordance with the principle of determinability, no real activity can be posited without also positing a real or practical power. Real and ideal activity mutually condition and determine each other. Neither is possible without the other, nor can one comprehend what either of them is without also comprehending the other. In this act of freedom, the I itself becomes an object for itself. An actual consciousness comes into being, and from now on anything that is to be an object of consciousness at all must be connected to this starting point. Freedom is therefore the ultimate ground and the first condition of all being and of all consciousness. 25 These bracketed words appear in the copy of this paragraph which Krause included in the summary of the "Major Points of the Wissenschaftslehre of 1798/gg," with which the manuscript of K commences. 24 The otherwise nearly identical, alternate version of the summary paragraph for § 3 begins somewhat differently: "This movement of transition, as such, is intuited as possessing its foundation utterly within itself" (K, p. 46).

§ 4

Through absolute freedom, which has just been described, I determine myself to become "something." 1 I engage in an act of positing, and in this condition of determinacy I have a concept. Acting is always 2 guided by some concept; thus I act freely whenever I spontaneously construct for myself a concept. Our present task, however, is to obtain a clear understanding of the foundations [of this process]. 52

( 1) In the previous § the act of mere self-affection was construed as real activity. 3 This activity was then intuited and was seen to include the proper act of the real activity. The ideal activity is now supposed to witness the I engaged in this act of self-affection; but, at least according to what we know about it so far, it is unable to do this. The real activity of the I could be viewed only as a movement of transition from determinability to determinacy-i.e., [what is observed is] not an act of pure selfaffection, but determinability and determinacy, and both at the same time. What is determinate allows itself to be cognized only as follows: it is not what is determinable. 4 What is determinate must be intuitable; for only if it is intuitable is freedom possible, and freedom is the condition for the possibility of consciousness. {Absolute freedom-self-determination, practical power-must be intuitable; for, as real activity (i.e., as practical power in action), it must produce something real-a "something," a "being"-and, therefore, "bestimme ich mich zu etwas." That is, I determine myself in a certain way. Reading, with Krause's MS, "immer" for K's "nur." 3 "REALE Thiitigkeit." 4 "Das Bestimmte liif3t sich nur so erkennen, daf3 es das Bestimmbare nicht ist." The translation of this obscure sentence-indeed, of this entire paragraph-is conjectural. As Radrizzani remarks, the attention of the student transcribing Fichte's lecture appears to have wandered somewhat at this point. 1

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something intuitable. In the following § we will examine what this "something" might be. For the time being, let us call it "X." I affect myself; I take hold of myself; I wrench myself away from a state of indeterminacy and transform myself into something determinate = X: I am really active precisely thereby, and it is through this product = X that the real activity can itself be intuited.} The ideal activity is, by its very character, however, constrained and arrested and can occur only subsequently to a real activity. Something must be posited in opposition to this ideal activity, something that brings it to a halt; this is something real, 5 and, to this extent, something determined as such.A (This is not yet the place to explain how what is determinate becomes "something.") Let us call this "something" "X," which designates a being, which the ideal activity merely copies, something that annihilates true activity. {Nevertheless, this ideal activity is necessary; for without it, I would not be conscious of the acting of the real activity. The ideal activity is the subject; the real activity is the object. But both acts have their foundation in a single subject, the I; indeed, the identity and the essential character of the I consists precisely therein: namely, in the fact that it can be, for itself, subject and object at the same time, that it posits itself.) It will become apparent that this being [which is copied by the ideal activity] has to be taken in some sense other than as what cancels real activity. Thus we obtain two different senses of "being," and the sort of being with which we are here concerned will turn out to be the sort of being possessed by the concept of a goal. {This operation of the practical power, by means of which what is established becomes an I,6 presupposes the concept of a goal, which the practical power must construct for itself before it can engage in real activity. The subject of the practical power is thereby transformed into a puwer to form concepts. 7} (2) This X is itself a product of absolute freedom. That is to say, spon-

taneous self-activity must contain within itself the ground that explains why, on the one hand, there is anything at all that exists with this connection to consciousness, and why, on the other, what exists is precisely "X'' and is not "-X." "eine REELLES." In observing the acting of my real activity, the ideal activity is purely passive; it is thus constrained and fixed, and it vanishes into this observation, that is, into its object (p. 47). 6 "wodurch das begriindete zum Ich wird." Note that the corresponding passage in K replaces das begriindete ("what is established") with das begriindmde ("the grounding subject"), which seems to make better sense in this context. 7 "zu einem VeriiiOgen der Begriffe." 5

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(The term "ground" must here be explained only to the extent that its meaning becomes clear. Later on, the meaning of this term will be deduced.) The ideal activity is constrained in two ways: first of all, by the fact that any X at all exists for it, 8 and second, by the fact that this X is determined in a specific way. To this extent, the ideal activity is passive. 9 [Thus] something else needs be thought of in addition [to the ideal activity and X]: something that constrains or binds the ideal activity and, specifically, binds it to X. This is not X itself, but is freedom. It is freedom that has produced X itself; this means that freedom contains within itself the ground of X. Why is it then that, in this case, the grounding subject 10 is posited as an I? It is the ideally active [power] II that engages in this act of positing and that posits the practical [power] as itself. The ideally active [power] must operate in this way because it is acquainted only with what lies within itself. Since it is engaged in forming images, it must posit the practical [power] as similarly engaged. It, as it were, "projects" an image-forming activity into the practical [power], and it is by means of this image [thereby attributed to the practical power] that the ideal discovers itself in the latter. 12 This attribution of intuition [to the practical power] is the point that unites them. 13 The practical [power], however, insofar as it is freely able to initiate action, is not engaged in any activity of mere copying. Consequently, the image formed of the practical [power] is not a copy; it is a prefiguration or model. 14 {To prove this, one need only examine the meaning of freedom. "I act freely": that is to say, "I spontaneously construct for myself a concept of my 8 Although Krause's MS reads "da!J sie fiir ein X da ist," the translation here follows the published text of K ("da!J fiir sie ein X da ist"), which seems to make more sense in this context. 9 "leidend." I.e., it is affected by something else. 10 "das Begriindende." I.e. the freely active subject, here considered as providing the "ground" or "foundation" for the constraint (and hence for the determinacy) of the ideal activity. 11 "das ideale ist [es]." Throughout this entire paragraph, Fichte refers repeatedly to "das ideale," "das praktische," and "es," without ever specifying precisely how these terms are to be taken. Though das ideate might here refer to the I itself (das Ich), i.e., to the "ideal I," the corresponding passage in H clearly suggests that the reference is to the "ideal" (and "practical") puwer (das Vermiigen) of the I, a reading that is confirmed by the dictat to in H. 2 "Es ist bildend, es mu!J das praktische sonach auch sezen als bildend. Es sieht gleichsam ein Bilden in das praktische hinein, und die!J Bild ists, wodurch das praktische dem idealen zu sich selbst wird." 13 Reading "sie" for K's "es." 14 "Nun aber ist das praktische als frei anfangend kein nachbilden,jenes Bild des praktischen ist daher kein Nachbild sondern ein Vorbild." Though the term Vorbild is usually translated here as "model," this translation obscures the connection among Bild ("image"), Nachbild ("copy"), and Vorbild. The last-named designates an image that is not copied from some previously existing reality, but instead precedes it.

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action." Therefore, the concept of a goal must always underlie every free action. The product ( = some X) is what I am supposed to achieve by means of my own free action. My I, considered as the subject of my practical power (i.e., as forming an image of itself and developing itself accordingly, 15 as self-initiating, and as consciously acting), must therefore always construct for itself in advance the concept of this goal. It requires, as it were, a "model," 16 the realization of which is the goal of the real activity.} The intuiting subject is constrained by its very nature; i.e., it can act only in consequence of something else. The subject that acts realiter is absolutely free; it cannot be a consequence of anything else, but must, with absolute freedom, construct a concept for itself, and such a concept is "the concept of a goal" 17 or "an ideal." One does not claim that anything corresponds to such a concept; instead, one claims that something should be produced in consequence of it. The only way we can think of an instance of free acting at all is to think of it in this way, that is, as an acting that occurs in consequence of a [freely] constructed concept of acting; and when we think of it in this manner, we ascribe intelligence to the practical power. Freedom cannot be thought of apart from intelligence; freedom cannot exist without consciousness.B To deny consciousness is to deny freedom, and similarly, to ascribe consciousness is to ascribe freedom. The ground of one's ability to act freely lies within consciousness. {For without consciousness no spontaneous movement of transition to an opposed condition is possible. Absolute spontaneity or freedom is present only in such a movement, which simultaneously-and consciously-serves as the foundation for one being and, at the same time, as the foundation for another. In nature we also find movements of transition from one state to another, opposed state: e.g., a tree in winter and in spring. But such transitions are necessary and have their foundation in the laws of nature; they occur without consciousness and therefore without freedom. Thus consciousness contains within itself the reason why we are able to think of freedom. No acts of self-affecting are to be found among the operations of external nature-which includes nothing that interacts with itself in order to become its own opposite, no self-reverting activity, no self-determination. Why then does this occur within the I?} The I determines itself. The little word "self' refers to "the 1." The I determines itself; in determining itself it already possesses an awareness "als selbst bildenden." "ein Vorbild." 17 "ein Zwekbegriff." 8 Without intellect-i.e., without something that has a concept, a consciousness, of its own activity-there is therefore no freedom (p. 48). 15

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of itself. Anything that is to determine itself must possess an awareness of itself, and what possesses an awareness of itself is an intellect. 18 The I is aware of its own existence. Here the I appears as something double-and indivisibly so. Such indivisible duality, however, is precisely what constitutes subject-objectivity, or consciousness. Consciousness alone originally possesses synthetic unity. Everything else is synthetically unified only {through it}.c A self-determining being exists for itself, and therefore we ascribe freedom to the intellect. {Therefore, "I determine myself" means the same thing as "I am, for myself or in relation to myself, an intellect [aware] of my practical power." Conversely, it also means the same as "no consciousness or ideal activity or intellect can be thought of apart from freedom or real activity."} Intelligence cannot be separated from the practical [power], but the intellect too must be practical. There can be no consciousness without real freedom. The unity of intellect and practical power is a necessary unity. Consciousness (see § 1) is an act of positing itself idealiter. 19 The term "ideal" simply refers to "an act of positing." All positing is selfpositing; all positing begins with and is mediated through self-positing. The I, as described by previous philosophers, is a mirror. But a mirror does not see, and this is why these philosophers are unable to explain "seeing" or intuition. All they posit is the concept of mirroring. {This remark reveals the basis of all the errors of other philosophical systerns-the Kantian system included.} This error can be rectified only by means of a correct concept of the I. The I of the Wissenschaftslehre is not a mirror; it is an eye. (We can always find some external image to illustrate everything that occurs within our mind.) A person who is unacquainted with the I also lacks knowledge of what an eye is. The traditional view makes it impossible to understand how the eye is able to see anything at all. The eye, however, is a self-mirroring mirror. 20 It is the 18

"das sich bestimmen soil, mup sich selbst haben, and was sich selbst hat, ist eine In-

telligenz." To make sense of this sentence, one must insert the word was between das and sich. The verb translated here as "to be aware of its own existence" (sich haben) might be

more literally rendered as "to possess itself." cOne need only analyze what is involved in saying "the I determines itself'': In this phrase the I is doubled. It appears as "I'' and as "itself." Only what is aware of its own existence can be "for itself." And whatever is aware of its own existence also possesses consciousness; it is an intellect. I (the determining subject) determine myself (the I); thus I determine I. These two aspects are therefore indivisibly linked: the I is subject-objectivity, or consciousness. This unity is synthetic; everything else is unified only through it (p. 48). 19 "Die Vereinigung zwischen Intelligenz und praktischem Vermogen ist nothwendiges Bewustsein (§ 1) ist ein sich selbst idealiter sezen." This sentence requires some additional punctuation. Fuchs and Radrizzani both insert a period after Bewustein. The translation, however, guided by the corresponding passage in H, puts the period after notwendiges (and also alters its ending, so that it can modify die Vereinigung). 20 "In der gewohnlichen Ansicht soil das Auge nicht sehen, etwas d[ur]ch das Auge ist ein sich selbst abspiegelnder Spiegel." This sentence demands some emendation. The

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very essence of the eye to be an image for itself, and to be an image for itself is also the essence of the intellect. By means of its own seeing, the eye itself-like the intellect itself-becomes an image for itself. An image is reflected in a mirror, but the mirror cannot see the image. The intellect, in contrast, becomes an image for itself. What is in the intellect is an image and nothing else. But an image refers to an object: wherever there is an image, there must also be something that is portrayed [by this image]. 21 {An image is something that is only subjective. The ideal activity therefore requires an object, something that it copies; and this is the real activity.} The ideal activity has also been described, therefore, as an act of imitating or copying. Whenever a consciousness is assumed, an object of consciousness is also assumed. This object can be nothing but the acting of the 1,0 for the acting of the I is the sole, immediately intuitable object of consciousness; everything else is intuited only indirectly.22 Everything we see, we see within ourselves. We see only ourselves, and we see ourselves only as acting, only as passing from what is determinable to what is determinate. The I is neither the intellect nor the practical power; instead, it is both at once. {The I becomes a real I by acting and observing its own acting, thereby providing the practical power itself with a basis for intuition; that is, the I becomes a real I insofar as it is simultaneously subject and object and simultaneously possesses both ideal and real power.} If we want to grasp the I, we have to grasp both of these; separated from each other, they are nothing at all. {That to which self-activity determines itself-the freely constructed concept of its goal-is thus a "something" = X. Otherwise it would not be possible to intuit the self-determination.} Everything is thus included within the practical !-practical activity 23 as well as intuition. We now have a real I, not the mere Idea. We must begin with what is real, and thus from now on we will be observing the actual acting of an actual I. This is an actual fact: the I determines itself by means of its concept. Both practical power and intelligence are to be ascribed to the I. translation inserts a period after etwas and simply ignores the next word (the reading of which is only conjectural anyway, as Fuchs notes). 21 "wo ein Bild ist, muP etwas sein das abgebildet wird." 0 Thus the opposite inference is also correct: There can be no ideality of reality, no ideal activity (consciousness or intellect) apart from practical power or real activity; for the immediate object of the intellect (or ideal activity) is the acting of the I, namely, the movement of transition from determinability, etc. This mode of acting, however, is a product of the practical power; that is, it is a real activity (p. 49). 22 "alles Handeln des Ich ist nur unmittelbar anschaubar, alles iibrige nur mittelbar." The meaning of this sentence is clarified by the parallel passage in H: "Nur dieses is UNMITI"ELBAR anschaubar," etc. 25 "PRAXIS."

Free self-determination is intuitable only as a determination to become "something," of which the self-determining or practical {power} must possess a {freely constructed} concept. A concept of this sort is called "the concept of a goal." Consequently, for the intuiting subject, the same subject who possesses practical power must also possess the power to form concepts, just as, conversely, the comprehending subject, or {the power of} intellect, must necessarily be practical. 24 Practical power and intelligence are inseparable. Neither can be thought of apart from the other. The {true} character of the I thus lies in this identity. 24 "Sonach werde dem Anschauenden das Subject des prakt[ischen] Verm[ogens] zugleich zu einem Vermogen der Begriffe, so wie umgekehrt das Subject des Begriffs oder die Intelligenz nothwendig praktisch sein mujJ."

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Anything that can be intuited is "something." "Something" and intuition are reciprocal concepts. A What spontaneous self-activity determines itself to become is "something." What kind of "something" is this? This will be the object of our present investigation. (1) Up to this point in our inquiry we have been reflecting upon a particular state of the intellect, {namely, upon an intuition of the movement of transition from determinability to determinacy}. Determinability, movement, and determinacy: all these were contained within this simple fact. 1 But how does it happen that what is determinable and what is determinate are intuitable? Such a question could not even be raised within the context of that state of mind with which we were previously concerned; there they were simply intuitable. When I now ask about the possibility of this fact, I thereby go beyond it; I raise myself above it and make what was previously an act of reflection into the object of a new reflection. {Thus this intuition provides us with the object of a new reflection.} At this point, certain questions still remain open: for example, the question concerning how it is possible to raise oneself above the first act of reflection will remain open. Here we will freely execute this [second, higher-order] act of reflection, 8 and if this provides us with [further inA "Something" designates whatever can be related to an intuition-what is intuitable (p. 49)· 1 This represents a somewhat free rendering of the text of K, which is defective at this point and contains several short illegible words ("Es [ ... ] war Bestimmbarkeit, Uibergehen und Bestimmtheit, diefllag im einfachten FACTUM"). Presumably, the "simple fact" in question is the state of the intellect upon which we have been reflecting = the intuition of the movement from determinability to determinacy. 8 We will leave unanswered the question of whether this apparently free operation may not also be at the same time necessary-as it may well prove to be in what follows. Here again, in the meantime, a gap will remain (pp. 49-50).

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formation concerning] the necessary conditions for consciousness, then we will have obtained a great deal. But how are we able to do this? Eventually, we will have to establish the foundation of the act of reflection we are now going to describe, for otherwise our act of understanding would be of no use. Here we will proceed just as we did above {in§ 1 and§ 2}, where we began with a description of original consciousness as an ideal act of self-positing. We then posited the I in this state of self-positing; and though it seemed that all this occurred with complete freedom, we showed that these actions had to occur if an I was to be possible at all. (2) The question now is, How can something that is generated through absolute spontaneity nevertheless become intuitable? That is to say, what is it really? We saw above that the question "what?" always signals an opposition. When I ask "what is X?" I have in mind a sphere containing a manifold, any one of the elements of which might be X. I want to know which of these is X, and thus [before we can answer our present question] we first have to know what is supposed to be posited in opposition to what is produced through self-determination. Determinability and determinacy are related to the ideal activity, which is constrained, and thus is not a deed, 2 but is instead a state of the I. Consequently, what is intuited in this case can be characterized as something that restrains [the ideal activity] or brings it to a halt3 and can be related to the intuition. Perhaps it will turn out to be the case that everything intuitable is something restraining, because ideal activity is the sort of activity which can occur only as a result of something else. The sole thing to which ideal activity is immediately related is real activity. Consequently, whatever it might be that restrains ideal activity, the ideal activity can surely be related to it only indirectly. Accordingly, if the ideal activity is to be explained, then the practical activity has to be constrained; therefore, all limitation that appears within consciousness must spring from the practical activity. Thus, in order to explain the constrained state of the ideal activity, we have to examine the real activity.c 2 "ist nicht That." As Fuchs notes, this might also be an abbreviation for Thiitigkeit, ("activity"). 3 "sonach ist der Cha[rak]ter des hier angeschauten ein haltendes." c What is determinable is referred to the ideal activity, though this occurs indirectly and by means of real activity (for the ideal activity is directly and immediately directed at the real activity, and by means of this it is also directed at what is determinable, that is, at the sphere of real activity). Ideal activity is therefore constrained or halted as such by what is determinable; thus, this activity is not a deed, but is merely a state of the I. Hence what is determinable is what stands in opposition to the product of the ideal activity. What is determinable is what brings the intuition of the ideal activity to a halt or restrains it, and ideal activity is what is restrained or halted thereby. Ideal activity is fixed, brought to a halt, and constrained by the acting of the real activity within the sphere of what is determinable;

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(A) As was previously shown, 4 the practical I constructs for itself a concept of its own activity, and such a concept is called "the concept of a goal." 5 The {real} activity of the I is a passage from pure determinability to determinacy. The latter is wrenched out of the total sum of the former, and this part that is wrenched out is the part that is comprehended or grasped through a concept. 6 "The I determines itself": this means that it makes a selection or choice from what is determinable, and this choice is guided by the concept; and to this extent, the I (considered as an intellect) was not free. Let us think of what is determinable as "something." This is an appropriate predicate, since what is determinable is intuitable. Absolute freedom makes its selection from this "something" lying within the sphere of the determinable. It cannot be constrained in making this choice, for then it would not be freedom. It can go on like this endlessly-choosing more or less [of this "something"]. No part is prescribed to absolute freedom as the last. This infinite divisibility will have many consequences (concerning space, time, and things). Everything [within this sphere] is infinitely divisible, because it is a sphere for our freedom. 0 The practical activity is not constrained in making its selection, for then it would cease to be freedom; it is constrained in this sense, however: i.e., in that it has to make its selection exclusively from what is determinable. What is determinable does not appear as something that has been produced, either by ideal or by real activity; instead, it appears to be something given for our selection. To say that it is "given" does not mean that it is given to the I as such or in its totality, but rather that it is given to the choosing, practical I. We have seen above7 that what is deconsequendy, the ideal activity is related to this sphere purely passively-as a product, a mere observing, an intuition-not as something real. But this intuition would not occur if there were not something to bring the intuition to a halt, i.e., a sphere within which the real activity could show itself to be effectively active; and this sphere, this "something" that restrains intuition, is what is determinable. But precisely because the general character of what is determinable is to be something that fixes the ideal activity and brings it to a halt, it is intuitable-i.e., it is "something." A "something," therefore, is what stands opposed to the ideal activity, what brings it to a halt and constrains it (p. 50). 4 See sect. 2 of § 4· 5 "welcher der Zweckbegriff heilk" 6 "der herausgeri!Jne Theil is der der begriffen wird." n What is determinable is therefore irifinitely divisible. It is a sphere that contains a manifold and cannot be simple, precisely because a selection is supposed to be made from it; and, since this selection is supposed to occur with absolute freedom, this manifold must be infinite. If what is determinable were to contain even a single part that could not be further separated or divided, then there would be no absolute freedom. [rhe character of] what is determinable is therefore entirely and unconditionally dependent upon freedom (Pf· 5o-51). See sect. 1 of§ 2.

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terminable arises from the laws of ideal activity. Thus one could say that it is given by virtue of the nature of reason. E Freedom consists in this: that one can choose from among everything. Constraint consists in this: that the selection must be made from this total sum. Here we obtain the concept of a determinate sum from which freedom makes its selection. A jart of this total sum is called a "determinate activity" or an "action." Remark: (1) We here obtain [the concept of] the total sum of what is determinable. We obtain this by reflecting upon our previous act of reflection, which is now construed as a determinate state of mind; but everything that is included therein thereby constitutes a complete whole. In § 1 there was no mention of the totality of what is determinable; nor could there have been, since the intuiting subject there lost itself in the sphere of what is determinable. (2) We have here obtained the concept of an action. The act of selfaffection (as described in § 3) was possible in only one way. But now that this act is posited as a passage from determinability to determinacy, it must be possible for this act to occur in a variety of different ways. Selfaffection is an act that has an impact upon itself, 10 and if any diversity is present therein, then something must be posited in consequence of this. Self-determination is supposed to be posited as something manifold; consequently, something has to be posited by means of which it appears as a manifold, and this is acting.F (B) Let us call the action that is selected "X." X is a part of the total sum just discussed, and thus the predicate that applies to this total sum must apply to X as well: action X must be infinitely divisible. But, as always, this chosen part X is characterizable and intuitable only insofar as it is something determinate. X must thus be opposed to what is E But what is determinable is, by virtue of the nature of reason, given to freedom; therefore, freedom, 8 which is thereby dependent only upon itself, constructs for itself the concept of its own mode of action, and is thus free (p. 51). 8 "sie." Though it is here construed as referring to "freedom" (die Freiheit), this pronoun could also refer to "reason" (die Vernunft). 9 "eine bestimmte Thatigkeit oder eine Handlung." 10 "Die Selbstaffection ist Sto~ auf sich selbst." F Remark: (a) Where do we obtain this concept of a total sum? In reflecting upon our previous act of reflection, we construed it as a completed 11 state of our mind, and thereby the preceding determinability and determinacy became complete for us as well-became a tatality for us. This does not mean [that we construe this state as] something (absolutely) infinite, as if I could determine myself in only one way; instead, it means that what must occur as a consequence of this act of self-affection, i.e., acting, is infinitely manifold and is possible in an infinite number of ways. (~)For heaven's sake, one certainly should not think of what is infinitely divisible as any sort of matter, space, etc.! (y) The great advantage of placing absolute freedom at the apex of theoretical philosophy as well [as at the apex of practical philosophy] is now evident (p. 51). 11 "vollendeten." That is to say, it was construed as a self-contained or "complete" state of consciousness, one that was not dependent upon any other state; and thus, in this sense, it could be called a "totality."

determinable, for only on this condition is everything that has been required up to this point possible. 12 {The action of the I is the whole, and this is infinitely divisible. X is a part of this whole; it is what is determinate and is intuitable as such, in opposition to what is determinable. What is determinate is thus distinguished from what is determinable in that the whole ( = what is determinable) is intuitable only on the condition that what is determinate is intuitable. What they have in common must thus be that both are divisible. Therefore, if what is determinate ( = what is intuitable) is divisible, then it is also "something."} What now is the overall character of what is determinate? What distinguishes it from what is determinable? The real activity determines itself to act, and this real activity cannot be intuited: it is not "something"; it is not divisible; it is absolutely simple. {Only acting can be intuited; what is determinable cannot be intuited.} Accordingly, that to which the I determines itself when it affects itself-i.e., acting-must be intuitable. This, however, is not possible unless freedom is constrained in the course of the acting of the practical activity. Yet this freedom must not simply be canceled; it must be and must remain an activity, and thus it must be simultaneously constrained and not constrained; both must occur.G An instance of acting, 13 therefore, would be something within which the real activity would be both constrained and not constrained. What is constrained in this case is the real activity itself, and this passivity on its part indicates the presence of something that arrests its activity and brings it to a halt. Intuition becomes 14 possible only insofar as freedom is arrested. Let us call this action "X." This X must be intuitable; but since acting is freely determinable, it possesses infinite divisibility, 15 and therefore X can be divided into [parts] A and B, each of which can be further di12 This conclusion follows from the aforementioned "principle of determinability": something (in this case, the determinate state or action of the I) can be "determined" or "specified" only by being "opposed" or "posited in opposition" to something else-that is, it can be defined only with reference to its "opposite" (in this case, to "what is determinable"). G Acting (or the movement of transition [from what is determinable] to what is determinate, to "something") cannot be intuited unless freedom is constrained. But this does not mean that freedom is thereby canceled, nor does it mean that (like the ideal activity) it [the real activity] will turn out to be nothing more than an act of imitating something else. Instead, in order for the real activity to be an object of the ideal activity, i.e., in order for the acting of freedom to be intuited, it must limit itself to some portion of the whole. But this constrained freedom must also still remain an activity (pp. 51-52). 13 "ein Handeln." 14 Reading, with Krause's MS, "wird" for K's "ist." 15 The translation here follows Radrizzani's proposed emendation and substitutes Teilbarkeit for K's Bestimmbarkeit ("determinability"). This substitution not only makes more sense in the context, but is supported by the parallel passage in H and by the summary paragraph at the end of this § of K.

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vided, and so on, ad infinitum. Even if one were to continue this process of division forever, one would never encounter a single point that would not contain both activity and a hindrance to activity. This is what constitutes continuity, 16 a continuous line of acting; and whatever progresses in a continuous line is called "acting."" (We are not yet concerned with time.) 1 Freedom is absolute self-affection and nothing more; but freedom is not something manifold, and therefore it cannot be intuited. A product of freedom is here supposed to be intuitable, however, and thus, in this manner, freedom itself is supposed to be indirectly intuitable. This can occur only if several different acts of self-affection are posited, and these various acts of self-affection would be distinguished from each other only by the multiple forms of resistance posited in opposition to them. But a resistance is nothing apart from an activity; and to the extent that a resistance is overcome, it is absorbed into the I. 18 The I can see nothing but itself, but it can see itself only insofar as it is engaged in acting. But when the I acts it is free; i.e., it is engaged in overcoming resistance) "Stetigkeit." Constraining 17 is a real arresting of activity, and thereby we obtain an intuition of what is constrained (B), that is, of freedom, as well as an intuition of what constrains it (A). (A) What constrains ( = X) must be something intuitable, since, as an action, it is surely a part of what is determinable. It is a quantum, a manifold, and must, like the totality of which it is a part, be infinitely divisible. That is to say, I can divide part X into A and B, A into C and D, C into E and F, etc. When I proceed in this way I am, to be sure, self-active, but my self-activity is restricted by A and B, and then by C and D, etc. I always proceed from one point to the next. Each of these points arrests my self-activity somewhat and hinders it in its forward progress, but none of them halts it once and for all and in its entirety; instead, my self-activity overcomes the resistance of A, and then moves on to B, etc. Thus there is no point within X which does not include both activity and hindrance-i.e., in which constrained and unconstrained freedom are not simultaneously present. Every possible point contains both. Acting is thus what progresses in a continuous line-continuity (p. 52). 17 "Das BINDEN." 1 In discussing this forward motion, one should abstract from any concept of time, for the latter arises only as a result of connecting several different points, one after another, to form a series. But no particular points are present in the case of a continuous line; instead, such a line is the schema of the contents of time. Continuous activity does not progress in fits and starts, that is, in a series of individual surges, through which the activity is, as it were, repeated and carried forward; instead, such activity continues without any interruCtion (p. 53). 8 "kommt er ins Ich." More freely: "the I becomes aware of it." J (B) Freedom is supposed to be posited, i.e., intuited. But it cannot be intuited; for, as an act of self-affection, it is not a quantum, not a manifold. I can affect myself in only one way. Thus it must be intuitable as an action indirectly, through its product. This can occur only on the condition that several acts of self-affection are posited, but these various acts can be distinguished from one another only through the resistance that freedom overcomes; consequently, the I becomes free 19 only if some resistance is posited in opposition to freedom and only if freedom overcomes this resistance. Only in acting does the I see itself. Freedom becomes intuitable by the I through acting, since it is only by overcoming resistance that acting is free-and only in this way do we become conscious of our own freedom (p. 52). 19 "kommt diese ins IcH." 16

H

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• Freedom extends its influence continuously, while resistance continuously gives way before it20-granted that some resistance must always remain. (The forward thrust of a movable body in space provides us with an image of this.) Every moment includes both resistance and acting. This acting does not proceed in fits and starts, but continues as a single, constant motionY It remains one and the same act of self-affection, which extends itself further and further by means of intuition. When the act of self-affection is intuited, the simple point of self-affection is extended to a line. K • In following this line, we obtain a sequence of determinate parts. The reason these are "parts" and are construed as such is to be found in the act of reflection, i.e., in the fact that A, B, C, D, etc., were posited in this line, {for the act of dividing depends upon reflection}. But the reason they were grasped in this particular order and not in the reverse order is not to be found in the act of reflection, for this can occur only as a consequence of an act of the subject that acts realiter. Nor is the reason to be found within the real activity, for this multiplicity is precisely what hinders and opposes the real activity. Thus the real activity is constrained in relation to this sequence, and this is what distinguishes what is determinable from what is determinate. • In constructing a concept of its own efficacy, 22 the practical I (which is the sole23 basis of our explanation) appears to be free in regard to the ordering of the manifold: this constitutes the freedom of the choice. But once this concept has been constructed and has been employed to guide acting, then the sequence [of determinate parts of the manifold] no longer depends upon the practical I, which is itself now constrained in relation to this sequence. In the first case (that is, while the concept is still being constructed), the intuition-which is constrained by its very nature-is set into motion by the practical I and oscillates between opposites, between being and not-being. In the second case (that is, when acting is occurring), the intuiting subject is constrained by the fact that the practical I is itself constrained, and thus it is itself constrained as well. The determinacy of the intellect has its foundation in the deter20 "die Freiheit wirkt ununterbrochen fort; der Widerstand giebt ununterbrochen nach." 21 Reading, with H, "ruckweise" forK's "riickwarts" ("backward"): "Dieses Handeln geht nicht [ruckweise] sondern in einem fort." K This acting of the real activity is "continuity": i.e., self-affection proceeds from only a single point; it encounters resistance, which then gives way. Freedom always proceeds forward without interruption, although it is always accompanied by some resistance-which it constantly overcomes. The whole is therefore a constant progression of acting, always one and the same act of self-affection, which is extended by intuition into a continuous line (pp. 52-53). !l2 "Wiirksamkeit." 2 ~ Reading, with Krause's MS, "all forK's "alle."

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minacy of the practicali.L In the first case, {that is, so long as the practical power is still engaged in choosing,} we are concerned with the concept of a merely possible action; in the second case, {that is, to the extent that the practical power is constrained and the sequence is determined,} we are concerned with the concept of an actual action. The question "What is X?" has now been answered. X is an actual action, in opposition to one that is merely possible.

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Corollaries: (1) These concepts {of possibility and actuality} are particular determinations of the intellect in relation to the practical power that must necessarily be thought of in connection with the intellect. When the practical power is posited as itself engaged in creating concepts {of a goal, and hence, as free}, then the intellect itself is free as well, and from this there arises the concept of "the possible." When the practical power is posited as actually acting, then it is constrained in relation to the sequence of the manifold, and the intellect is constrained along with it, {and thus there arises the concept of "the actual"}. (2) Everything actual and possible is actual and possible only in relation to the action of the I, for we have derived these concepts of actuality and possibility from the intuition of acting. All intuition-and thereby all consciousness-is conditioned by the intuition of what is actual. Consciousness-or intuition-of what is actual is called "experience"; therefore, all thinking begins with experience and is conditioned thereby. Only through experience do we become something for ourselves; subsequently, we can abstract from experience. Intuition of what is actual is possible only through an intuition of an actual instance of acting on the part of the I; therefore, all experience begins with acting, and only thereby is experience possible at all. 24 If there is no acting, then there is no experience; and if there is no experience, then neither is there any consciousness. How are objects, which are supposed to be external to us, simultaneously supposed to be within us? The Wissenschaftslehre answers this L The practical I or real activity appears as free only while it is-through acting, through ordering [the manifold]-busy constructing a concept of its goal, which pertains to the sphere of what is determinable. The practical activity, in cooperation with the intellect, arranges those parts it wishes to remove from the sphere of what is determinable, and [while it is engaged in doing this it] oscillates between being and not-being. But once it has affected itself, the sequence of acting is then determined for it in the concept of the manifold: things must now proceed in a certain order. The practical activity is then constrained to a fixed series of parts-and the intuition of the intellect is similarly constrained along with it (p. 53). 24 "also aile Erfahrung geht aus vom Handeln, es ist nur durch sie moglich." The pronoun es in this sentence appears to have no antecedent. The parallel passage in H suggests that the reference might equally well be consciousness (das BI!TJfU{Jtsein) or the I (das lch). Another possibility, adopted in the translation, is to transpose the two pronouns ("sie ist nur durch es moglich").

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question as follows: This occurs when we connect what is supposed to be external to us with the immediate object of our consciousness, that is, with everything that is active and free within us. I can be conscious only of my own activity, but I can be conscious of this only as a limited activity.M {This prevents a world of errors and at the same time exposes the nakedness of all previous philosophical systems. Even the Kantian system merely enumerates the logical laws governing our thought of objects (the categories); 25 but in doing this, it always leaves unanswered the question, "Why should we and why must we posit any objects at all?" The Wissensckaftslehre is now able to answer this question: [We posit objects] precisely because we have posited an absolute acting, to which the objects of our experience refer and by means of which these objects are given to us. For it is only by means of such acting-and moreover, only insofar as it is a hindered or arrested activity-that we obtain any consciousness whatsoever of what is actual. Only thereby is experience possible. The Critique of Pure Reason begins with representations and attempts to develop the laws of the same within logic, in conformity with our mind's original forms of thought. But it leaves unanswered the question, "Why do I have any representations of anything at all? How do I obtain a representation?" The Wissensckaftslehre answers this question as follows: [I have representations] because I discover myself as acting. The I posits itself as acting-as absolutely free. It26 catches sight of the world within itself. Its ideal activity does not exist apart from real activity.} The Wissensckaftslehre provides the following, superior explication of the Kantian proposition that our concepts refer only to objects of experience: 27 Experience refers to acting. Concepts originate through acting and exist only for the sake of acting; only acting is absolute. Kant does not maintain that experience is absolute; he insists upon the primacy of practical reason, but he has failed to show decisively that the M The result of the preceding is that both concepts [of possibility and of actuality] exist only in relation to the acting of freedom: all consciousness is consequently conditioned by consciousness of what is actual, i.e., experience. All consciousness begins with experience, because all experience begins with acting and is possible only insofar as it is related to the acting of the I, just as it is only through the intermediary of acting that the I is able to think of itself-or to posit itself, or to intuit itself-as free. For the I can become conscious of its activity only insofar as it acts, i.e., only insofar as it is limited and its activity is hindered; and thus freedom becomes the immediate object ofthe I only to the extent that the I has indirectly intuited its freedom through this acting and has discovered this acting to be absolute (p. 54). 25 See KRV, A8o/B 1o6ff. 26 Reading (with Hans Jacob's 1937 text of H) "Es" for the "Er" that appears in the AA version of H. 27 See KRV, A511B75 and A66/Bg1ff.

practical is the source of the theoretical. In the essay "Concerning a Presumptuous Tone," which he has recently published in the Berliner Monatsschrift, he does insist upon the supremacy of freedom. 28 Those who claim that human beings can be representing subjects without also being active ones propound a groundless philosophy. It is in the course of acting that I first encounter objects. Here it becomes quite dear what it means when we say that "the I sees the world in itself," or "if there is no practical activity, then neither is there any ideal activity," or "if there is no acting, there is no representing."

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(3) The only sort of action that can be intuited and is, in this respect, really actual is twofold and contains both freedom and limitation, both activity and the cancellation of activity; moreover, both of these are united in every moment of acting. This limitation of acting will eventually lead us to a Not-I-not, to be sure, to anything that is present "in itself," but rather to something that must necessarily be posited by the intellect in order to account for this limitation. More specifically, we may also find that all possible actuality originates from one single actuality. The original source of everything actual is consequently the interaction, or union, of the I and the Not-I. Accordingly, the Not-I is nothing actual unless it is related to an instance of acting on the part of the I, 29 for only on this condition and only by this means does it become an object of consciousness. The "thing in itself'' is thereby abolished once and for all. Moreover, the same thing is true of the I as well: It appears in consciousness only in relation to a Not-1. The I is supposed to posit itself, but it can do this only by acting; acting, however, involves a relationship with the Not-1. The I is something only to the extent that it interacts with the world; both the I and the Not-I are [first] encountered within this relationship. Once one has discovered them, one can then separate them; but each of them, even when considered in isolation from the other, still preserves its original character and can be represented only in relation to the other. N 28

"Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vomehmen Ton in der Philosophie" (May 1796)

(KGS, VIII: 39