Failure of l'Action Libérale Nationale 9780773562875

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The Failure of I'Action liberate nationale

Although short-lived, the Action liberale nationale (ALN) of the mid19305 had a profound impact on the way Quebec politics and the Canadian federal system evolved. Born of the economic and political frustrations of francophone professionals and small businessmen in urban, industrial Quebec, the ALN'S depression-inspired program offering francophones of all classes a better life quickly won widespread lay and clerical support. Neither Alexandre Taschereau's ruling Liberals nor Maurice Duplessis's power-starved Conservatives could long ignore this reformist, nationalist challenge to the status quo. Unfortunately, the ALN'S rapid rise in popularity under its leader, Paul Gouin, masked serious internal weaknesses stemming, in part, from the ambivalent and varied responses to the advent of modernity in Quebec. Instead of providing Quebec with a reformed, francophone-directed socio-economic system, the ALN'S weaknesses resulted in a transfer of power from one defender of the status quo to another. Nevertheless, the ALN'S success had served to legitimize the idea of purely provincial Quebec parties. In the short run, this enabled Maurice Duplessis to distance the Quebec Conservative party from its harmful federal connections. In the longer run, it affected the way Quebec politics and the Canadian federal system evolved. The ALN'S full impact was, however, delayed for over a generation by its failure to survive within the Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin. Duplessis's ability to capitalize on francophone fears of alien ideologies and to meet the needs of significant sectors of Quebec's francophone community also help to account for the delay. So, too, do the deep wounds left by the bitter defeat of the ALN in the 19305 and the ambivalent francophone responses to modernity which continued to divide politically active nationalists and liberal dissidents. It was only after Duplessis disappeared from the Quebec political scene that power passed to men desirous of implementing some of the ALN'S nationalist and reformist policies. The Action liberale nationale's significance rests in the fact that it was a precursor of the marriage of liberalism and nationalism that affected the way society, politics, and the economy of Quebec operated and the Canadian federal system evolved in the post-Duplessis era. Patricia Dirks is an assistant professor in the Department of History, Brock University.

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The Failure of I'Action liberate nationale PATRICIA DIRKS

McGill-Queen's University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Buffalo

McGill-Queen's University Press 1991 ISBN 0-7735-0831-7 Legal deposit third quarter 1991 Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec

Printed in Canada on acid-free paper This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Social Science Federation of Canada, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Dirks, Patricia Grace, 1941The failure of 1'Action liberate nationale Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7735-0831-7 1. Action libe'rale nationale - History. 2. Quebec (Province) - Politics and government 1936-1960. I. Title. JL259-A515D47 1991 324-2?14'o93 091-090101-5 This book was set in 10/12 Baskerville by University of Toronto Press

For my parents

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Contents

Preface

ix

1 La Survivance in an Industrial Quebec 3 2 Socio-economic Change and Political Continuity: The Antecedents of the ALN 9 3 A Third Quebec Party Is Born 26 4 L'Action liberate nationale: The Initial Challenge 46 5 The Federal and Provincial Elections: Catalyst for Union 68 6 The Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin: Near Victory Breeds Disintegration 84 7 The Waning of ALN Influence within Duplessis's Union Nationale 106 8 Resuscitation Fails: The Demise of the ALN 9 Conclusion

146

Notes 155 Bibliography Index

193

179

125

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Preface

This book is a study of the rise and fall of the Action liberate nationale, a depression-born third party in Quebec that gave rise to the Union Nationale. The immediate impetus for the creation of the ALN was a combination of thwarted political ambition and fear among French Canada's clerical and lay elites that dissatisfaction with the status quo would lead to socialism unless francophones were provided with a safe alternative program for social reconstruction. The party's roots, however, are to be found in the socio-economic, ideological, and political developments that shaped the province during the opening decades of the twentieth century and in the difficulties French Canada's professional elites had experienced in coming to terms with changes wrought by industrialization and urbanization. As well, its origins can be traced to a growing perception among francophone professionals that their interests were closely linked to those of French-Canadian entrepreneurs. With the onset of the Great Depression, the idea gained popularity that the Liberal party's laissez-faire economic and social policies were the cause both of problems faced by francophone professionals and businessmen and of growing working-class alienation from the capitalist system. At the level of practical politics, the decision to form a third provincial party in 1934 arose from frustration caused by Taschereau's tight control of the Quebec Liberal organization, the federal Liberal loyalties of the ALN'S founders, and the Conservative party's continuing difficulties in Quebec during the federal administration

x Preface

of R.B. Bennett. The depression acted as a catalyst, drawing dissaffected Conservatives as well as Liberals into a third Quebec party whose leaders enjoyed the backing of prominent FrenchCanadian nationalists and dissident Liberals with connections to the francophone business community. The ALN'S platform was modelled on a program designed by lay and clerical associates of the Jesuitrun Ecole sociale populaire. Its dual objective - to create a francophone-controlled Quebec economy while preserving French Canada's traditional social order — assured the ALN of widespread church and popular support. Liberal efforts to maintain control of Quebec and Maurice Duplessis's struggle for power worked against such support, bringing victory to the ALN. The frustrated political ambitions and contradictory objectives of many members of the ALN, combined with French-Canadian society's fear of alien ideologies, made it possible for Duplessis to take over much of the support the new party initially garnered. Later attempts to resuscitate the ALN floundered because of reformist disillusionment with the direction the party took and schisms among Duplessis's former allies. A modified version of the original Action liberale nationale did field sixty candidates in the 1939 Quebec election, but they were of no consequence. This marked the demise of the Action liberale nationale but reverberations from the party's rise and fall continued to influence political developments in Quebec for years to come. My research into political developments in Quebec during the 19305 dates back to MA studies I did at Queen's University in the 19605, and in consequence I owe debts to many individuals who have provided me with assistance over the years. Professor F.W. Gibson of the History Department at Queen's University got me interested in this subject by arranging for me to have access to the ALN records Paul Gouin had deposited at the National Archives of Canada. The willingness of Paul Gouin and other former members of the ALN to grant me interviews allowed me to complement the material contained in this and other pertinent manuscript collections. Senator C.G. Power added considerably to what manuscript sources had revealed about federal Liberal involvement in the origins and demise of the Action liberale nationale. Although these interviews were conducted some time ago, they remain vital to an analysis of the course of Quebec political history in the 19305. This is also true of the interviews I conducted with Quebec Conservatives and some of Duplessis's Union Nationale associates when, with Ramsay Cook's encouragement, I prepared a doctoral thesis for the University of Toronto on the origins of the Union Nationale. La

xi Preface

Societe des Amis de Maurice Duplessis facilitated this work by allowing me unrestricted access to Duplessis's papers for the period up to 1939. Guy Hamel was equally helpful when I subsequently did research on the public power movement in Quebec during the 19305 as it related to the political career of his father, Dr Philippe Hamel. Much work has been done by social scientists and humanists on the francophone experience during the opening decades of the twentieth century since I first began to study the rise and fall of the ALN and its role in bringing the Union Nationale to power. The growing body of scholarship on how French Canadians were affected by and responded to the rapid economic and social changes Quebec underwent after 1900 contributes significantly to an understanding of political developments in that province during the Great Depression. A variety of theoretical approaches provide insights into why the Quebec party established by dissident Liberal reformers and nationalists in 1934 rapidly became a force to be reckoned with in provincial politics and, even more abruptly, lost influence.1 While no single theory accounts fully for the creation and demise of the ALN, my analysis has been enriched by the explanations historians, political scientists, economists, and sociologists have offered of the process of modernization in twentieth-century Quebec. Analyses of political modernization in Quebec which make use of developmental and dependency theories, for instance, provide useful insights into why certain francophones chose to create a purely provincial party in the midst of the Great Depression,8 as does Maurice Pinard's refined thesis concerning the rise of third parties.3 The work of Robert Boily on changes in the class make-up and career patterns of Quebec politicians in the 19305 adds another dimension.4 Studies by Marcel Fournier, Yves Lamonde, and Esther Trepanier on how Quebec responded to and was affected by the arrival of modernity make it possible to examine political developments within their proper cultural context.5 So, too, do the scholarly studies of the history of the Catholic Church in Quebec carried out by Jean Hamelin and Nicole Gagnon and by Nive Voisine.6 The time that has elapsed since I first undertook research on the ALN has both made a fuller analysis of the party possible and increased those people whose assistance I would like acknowledge. In addition to the debts noted above and in the notes for various chapters, I have received help from many archives in the process of completing this study. Grants from the Canada Council, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and Brock University have supported different stages of my research. Translations of French-language quotations have been provided with the

xii Preface

assistance of Michael Damato. Special mention should be made of the encouragement I received from both Fred Gibson and Ramsay Cook to persevere in my study of Quebec politics in the 19305. A suggestion S.F. Wise made a few years ago that the research I had done in this area should have resulted in publication influenced my decision to write this manuscript. Christopher Armstrong, who read and commented on an earlier draft of this work and then refused to stop asking when the manuscript would be completed, deserves some of the credit for its appearance. The support Donald Akenson of McGill-Queen's University Press offered throughout the process of turning my original manuscript into this book was a great help. I owe a special debt to Marion Magee whose careful copy-editing has much improved the final product. Any remaining imperfections and errors are my responsibility. My final thanks are to my family, especially to my husband, Gerry, who learned more than he ever wanted to know about Quebec politics in the 19308 early on in our marriage. PD August 1990

The Failure of VAction liberate nationale

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i La Survivance in an Industrial Quebec

The factors responsible for the creation of a new purely provincial Quebec political party in 1934 predated the advent of the Great Depression. As the process of large-scale industrialization favoured by successive Liberal regimes from the turn of the century progressed, elements of the francophone professional and business classes increasingly felt disadvantaged, even threatened, by the new economic order. Industrialization and urbanization had jeopardized the social and economic position of French Canada's traditional professional elites and worked against the interests of francophone business and commerce which were predominantly small. The prolonged collapse of this economic strategy in the early thirties encouraged discontented elements within the francophone lay and clerical elites and some businessmen to press for changes which would give them an increased role in and more control over the Quebec economy and society in general. The initiative behind this movement and its leadership lay largely with professionals in early middle age. As classical college students, they had been imbued with the message of the Association catholique de la jeunesse canadienne-franc,aise that they, as the future leaders of Quebec society, were duty-bound to bring about social improvement and to protect the interests of their nation and their church. Like Henri Bourassa before them, they believed that this task necessitated involvement in a political process which was itself in need of rehabilitation.1 The first step was to acquire the political power to put into effect their conviction that the interests of French

4 L'Action liberate nationale

Canadians from all walks of life would be best served by increased francophone involvement in and direction of a fairer capitalist system based on an expanded and improved agricultural sector. By the mid-19308 the strains of the depression combined with a situation of one-party dominance to turn this movement into a third Quebec party -L'Action liberale nationale (ALN). The party's socioeconomic, nationalist, and political roots, however, can be traced back to the warning of Honore Mercier in the late nineteenth century that Quebec's French Canadians must unite above party lines to protect their nation's interests within a confederation which bound them to an increasingly hostile Anglo-Protestant majority. French Canada's first line of defence was to shore up the powers and the financial resources of Quebec, the one government in Canada controlled by a francophone majority and therefore capable of acting in that nation's interest. The man who became the leader of the ALN, Paul Gouin, shared the conviction of Mercier, his grandfather, that the Quebec government should lead the struggle for French-Canadian survival. And, like his grandfather, he drew men from different political camps together in support of a program which gave expression to the traditional nationalist views of the day. The Action liberale nationale promised to use the power of the Quebec government to build an economic, social, and political system that conformed to French Catholic values and protected the interests of all classes of francophones. The appearance in 1934 of a party with the make-up and program of the Action liberale nationale can only be understood in light of the ambivalent responses of the Catholic Church and nationalist intellectuals to industrial and urban growth in Quebec. Although scholars have demonstrated that the clergy and the nationalists did not stand in the way of the province's industrial development, Quebec Catholics were well aware of the adverse affects industrialization had had on the church in Europe and elsewhere. They consequently feared a loss of church control when French Canadians moved to urban centres to work in factories, and they sought ways to maintain and extend that institution's power base in the face of economic and demographic change. To this end the church's monopoly in the fields of education and welfare services was jealously guarded despite claims that expanding and different needs in the urban environment required greater state involvement. The church also entered new fields such as labour organization in order to protect Catholic workers from the dangers of joining materialist, English-dominated trade unions. Quebec's Catholic leaders learned from and contributed to their church's

5 La Survivance in an Industrial Quebec

battle to retain its position and influence in a world in which economic interests made the decisions that were of utmost importance to urbanized workers. Without giving up the belief in the superiority of rural life styles, the church accepted the need to find ways to serve urban Catholics, particularly the working class. Fears that the church was losing ground in the effort to maintain clerical control had escalated during the economic boom of the mid- to late twenties. The prolonged failure of liberal laissez-faire capitalism after 1929 gave rise to the hope that the depression might mark the dawn of a new economic era in Quebec - one based on the tenets of Catholicism and controlled by French Catholics.2 Meanwhile, increasing numbers of francophone professionals and small businessmen had come to the realization that large-scale industrialization and urbanization were undermining the position of French Canada's traditional leaders. The economic collapse of the early thirties inspired dissatisfied elements within Quebec's francophone lay and church elites to join forces in an attempt to refashion their province's social, political, and economic order. Professionals and small businessmen, whose hopes for advancement had been frustrated even in the prosperous twenties, eagerly endorsed church-sponsored schemes for social reconstruction which favoured their interests. The fear that French-Canadian Catholics might embrace socialism or, worse still, communism as the depression wore on allowed Quebec's dissatisfied professional and business interests to garner widespread popular support for changes that were designed to save capitalism by eradicating the abuses of largescale, "greedy" capitalists and improving the lot of the "little guy." The various factors which contributed to the creation of the Action liberate nationale in 1934 were in some ways contradictory. The party owed its existence partly to a desire to recreate a world in which businesses were smaller and more closely linked to the rural economy and to end the dominance of a provincial party strongly opposed to this dream. Its origins were also related to the battle some francophones had been waging since the early twentieth century to modernize knowledge in Quebec so that French Canadians might be able to take full advantage of the opportunities created by industrialization. As in England and the United States, the arrival of large-scale industrialization brought demands in Quebec for modernization, especially of the school system. But even though a few pioneers had, with the co-operation of Lomer Gouin's government, provided the province with a number of specialized francophone educational institutions in the early years of the century, the advocates of modernity had failed to prevail in the face of strong opposition from

6 L'Action liberate nationale

the church. The conviction that the francophone educational structure had to be adapted to the economic realities of the modern industrial era was, nevertheless, reinforced by signs that the professions were becoming overcrowded. The economic collapse of the 19305 intensified the conviction that French Canada's failure to modernize had endangered national survival by limiting the career opportunities open to the educated elite, depriving francophones of economic power, and denying francophone workers the living standards and social security system that would keep them loyal to the capitalist system. Francophone advocates of modernity did not accept the claims of conservatives that the clock must be set back to ensure la survivance, but they nevertheless shared their desire to preserve social order and traditional French-Canadian Catholic values. Faced with economic conditions which had generated increased support for socialism and communism elsewhere, French Canadians embraced alternative solutions. Fear of anti-Catholic ideologies and social disorder coloured mainstream francophone demands for change throughout the 19305. The spectre of socialism raised by the founding of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) inspired many French-Canadian intellectuals to identify an alternative political platform, inspired by the Ecole sociale populaire (ESP), with progress. They saw the economic, social, and political strategies, including corporatism, which were worked out by discontented members of French Canada's traditional elites as providing for both progress and the preservation of established authority.3 The Action liberale nationale was thus born out of middle-class francophone dissatisfaction with the economic and political status quo and a conviction that the battle for la survivance would be lost unless they and French-Canadian workers were able to draw more benefits from industrialization. The boom of the twenties had done nothing to alleviate the problem of overcrowding in the professions francophones traditionally entered and had spawned a consolidation movement that hurt the interests of the small businesses and commercial establishments which were most likely to be owned by French Canadians. By the time the depression struck, increasing numbers of educated francophones were aware that their chances for advancement, if not for survival, in the new economic order were limited. Those who had recently entered the professions or were preparing to do so faced bleak prospects and were therefore attracted by schemes which offered them increased opportunities and confirmed that the survival of the French-Canadian nation depended upon their assumption of leadership positions. Church

7 La Survivance in an Industrial Quebec

leaders, concerned about losing control in an urban environment, were drawn to a party whose program was based on Catholic social thought and included measures which would shore up the church's position in French-Canadian society. Francophone businessmen, who had survived the consolidation movement of the late twenties only to face bankruptcy during the depression, had every reason to favour schemes which championed the cause of small industry. All could agree on the need for government action to end the abuses of large-scale capitalism so as to prevent destruction of the economic system supported by the Roman Catholic Church. The collapse of an economic system which had undermined the position of French Canada's professional elites and small business interests allowed its founders to gain support for proposals which would serve the interests of these groups while promising a better deal to workingclass francophones. The creation of the Action libe"rale nationale and its success in transforming a movement composed of disparate groups and ideas into an organized political party, however short-lived, owed much to the contemporary political situation in Quebec and in Canada. Although there is much more to the emergence of the ALN than a system of one-party dominance, its establishment can be explained in part by the lack of representation of certain groups in the party system. In particular, the refusal of Alexandre Taschereau's Liberal government to accommodate the supporters of the ALN'S tenets or to offer policies to respond to the fears of many francophones opened the way for the Action liberale nationale. Politically ambitious Liberals who disagreed with the direction in which the Taschereau regime was taking Quebec were convinced by the mid-thirties that a third political party was necessary to further their interests and those of the province's French-Canadian majority. The appearance of a purely provincial party on the Quebec scene in 1934 was also a function of the federal-provincial integration of Canadian parties. A solely Quebec party provided anti-Taschereau Liberals with the opportunity of remaining loyal to the federal Liberal party while campaigning to rid the province of a regime they regarded as detrimental to francophone interests. Quebec Conservatives, for their part, saw this option as a way out of the problems they faced because of the failure of the administration of R.B. Bennett to cope with the depression or to meet the expectations of francophone Conservatives. An alliance with Taschereau's Liberal and nationalist critics offered Quebec Conservatives the chance to distance themselves from their federal party. The system of oneparty dominance which led to the creation of the Action liberale

8 L'Action liberate nationale

Rationale in combination with the nature of the ALN program attracted dissatisfied Conservatives as well as Liberals to the new party. Reformers and nationalists in Quebec with both Liberal and Conservative ties thus joined forces in the hope of gaining control of the Quebec government and adapting the province's institutions to satisfy francophone economic and social needs as defined by the clerical and lay associates of the Ecole sociale populaire. The origins and appeal of the Action liberale nationale lay in the frustrated political and economic ambitions of elements of Quebec's francophone middle class and in the fear that an unreformed capitalist system would breed socialism. The difficulties that Quebec's francophone professionals, merchants, and small entrepreneurs faced during the 19305 were not limited to their ethnic group or province. The grievances of FrenchCanadian Quebecers and their preferred solutions to these problems were, however, different because of the economic inferiority of the province's francophone majority, the power of the Catholic Church, and Quebec's minority position within Confederation. The Action liberale nationale was born of the desire to put francophones in control of a unique social and economic system devised to meet the particular needs of the majority of Quebecers and to remove the design and implementation of that program from the constraints imposed by the federal-provincial links of the other provincial parties.

2 Socio-economic Change and Political Continuity: The Antecedents of the ALN

Power struggles within the Liberal and Conservative parties of Quebec in the interwar period and differences between federal and provincial politicians figured largely in the appearance, initial success, and ultimate failure of the Action liberate nationale. But, while this drama was played out on the political stage, it was the socio-economic and cultural changes brought on by industrialization and urbanization which shaped the policies and the personnel of the parties which competed for provincial power in Quebec during the 19305. THE QUEBEC ECONOMY: THE "ROARING" TWENTIES

The depression in Quebec after World War I had been followed by growing American investment, particularly in the province's resource sector. Increased demand, mainly from the United States, for pulpwood and minerals enhanced the importance of Quebec's immense forest resources, rich mineral deposits, and tremendous sources of hydroelectricity.l Alexandre Taschereau, who succeeded Sir Lomer Gouin as premier of Quebec in 1920, regarded industrialization by private enterprise and not government-fostered development schemes as his province's hope for the future. 2 Rather than concentrating resources on opening up new areas for settlement by Quebecers, his administrations expanded the traditional Liberal policy of providing grants of land, tax exemptions, and other

io L'Action liberate nationale

concessions to outside capital interested in developing Quebec's natural resources. The almost complete lack of government regulation in such areas as public utilities rates, corporation financing, and the sale of securities also helped to attract investment capital into the province. American capitalists willingly provided the huge amounts of money required for large-scale development. As a result, the value of Quebec's pulp and paper production, for instance, jumped from $75 million in 1922 to $130 million seven years later.3 Concentration had, in the meantime, extended anglophone control of the resource sector. Taschereau' s governments also backed growth in the manufacturing sector because expansion in this area provided many more jobs than resource industries did. Without increased opportunities at home, there was little hope of stemming the southward flow of Quebecers. A rising demand for consumer goods throughout Canada from about the mid-twenties was a stimulus for Quebec's manufacturing sector which continued to be dominated by light industries despite the expansion of resource-based production. Although food and beverages, clothing, tobacco, and textiles fell from over 50 to under 43 per cent of total gross value of production between 1922 and 1929, such industries remained important in terms of both value added and employment. At the same time the economic benefits of large-scale, monopolistic production had brought on consolidations. Where this had happened, in sugar refining, brewing, and distilling for example, control again rested with anglophones. Francophones were noticeably confined to areas like butter and cheese production where small enterprises and fierce competition predominated. By the late twenties it was clear that francophone entrepreneurs were, with very few exceptions, to be found among owners of smaller enterprises located primarily in the very competitive consumer goods sector. But, though French-Canadian businessmen, like other owners of small and medium-sized industries in Quebec, were marginalized by the concentration of business, many did survive the 19205 and some even enjoyed strong regional economic and political bases.4 It was obvious, nevertheless, that French Canadians had not reaped the biggest rewards from twentieth-century expansion and consolidation in either Quebec's manufacturing or its resource sector. The course of developments in the latter had actually worked against the growth of a francophone big business elite. In the hydroelectricity industry, for instance, geography along with economic, financial, and political factors had produced a few regionally based monopolies owned by Americans or the Montreal

11

Antecedents

anglophone big business elite. These private utility giants, which had divided up the provincial market, were skilful managers of the Quebec government even at the expense of domestic consumers. Their ownership of many of the province's greatest waterfalls even protected them from the limited efforts of the Taschereau government to control the industry. The 1926 ban on hydroelectricity exports, for instance, could not be applied to power produced from privately owned waterfalls. Quebec's francophone majority clearly neither owned nor controlled the province's large hydroelectricity industry.5 During the twenties the francophone presence in the pulp and paper industry, already weak, was further reduced. As long as smallscale enterprises had remained the norm in this sector, francophone entrepreneurs had been involved and one, J.-E.-A. Dubuc, had actually managed to turn his firm, the Compagnie du Pulpe de Chicoutimi (founded in 1898), into a major producer. With the escalation of investment in pulp and paper after 1915, the size of the most successful firms grew, causing francophone control to fall. Even Dubuc's company was among those swallowed up by larger enterprises with greater access to capital. Attempts to reduce competition in Quebec's overexpanded pulp and paper industry had, by the end of the twenties, spawned a few big concerns which were owned, like the hydroelectricity giants, by anglophones. Developments in new and traditional sectors of Quebec manufacturing alike also increased the number of large concerns owned, operated, and managed by an easily identifiable anglophone minority.6 In Quebec's retail marketing sector, French Canadians were well represented numerically, but, here again, the value of English-owned firms far exceeded that of French-owned ones because department and chain stores were predominantly financed by English-speaking capitalists. As the worth of individual businesses increased, the proportion of French-Canadian firms decreased. Similarly, as the importance of jobs in industry increased, the percentage of French Canadians holding such positions decreased. In spite of the natural preponderance of French-speaking employees in Quebec industries, few reached the managerial level and those who did worked mainly for small firms.7 Important positions in the industries developed in the 19205 went to English-speaking "imports" for the most part. Because English-speaking capitalists controlled Quebec's large-scale industry and commerce and Englishspeaking employees filled the executive and managerial positions, this minority came to dominate the economy as a whole. Although francophone businessmen were obviously not the prime

12

L'Action liberate nationale

movers in the provincial economy, many did profit from the expansion of big business. Construction and real estate were francophone-dominated, for example, and benefited directly from the opening up of areas like Rouyn-Noranda and the growth of Montreal and other older manufacturing centres. Moreover, while some francophone businesses had been swallowed up, many others had not only survived but done relatively well operating at the secondary level of the Quebec economy. The Taschereau government's road-building policies, for instance, provided local contractors, most of whom were French, with considerable business provided, of course, that they were of the proper political colour. Francophone entrepreneurs with strong regional bases, like Edouard Lacroix of Beauce county, continued to exercise economic as well as political and social power. Francophone entrepreneurs were nevertheless conspicuous by their absence from the major growth areas of Quebec's economy in the decade prior to the Great Depression. The twenties had not roared for francophone businessmen in the same manner or to the same degree as they had for Quebec's "foreign" captains of industry. Large-scale operations in both the resource sector and manufacturing in Quebec had become virtually the preserve of les Anglais. Of 22,108 businesses in Quebec in 1929, the 47 per cent with Englishspeaking owners enjoyed 86.6 per cent of the financial power. Francophones did own 40 per cent of the businesses, but these tended to be small trade and family enterprises and accounted for only 12 per cent of the total value of the province's businesses.8 Francophones, moreover, were not represented in any significant numbers on the boards of the larger corporations which operated in the broader Canadian and North American markets.9 But even though francophone entrepreneurs were increasingly marginalized during the twenties, this group still stood to lose if the opposition of the predominantly professional French-Canadian nationalist elite to the Taschereau regime's pro-business policies was able to slow the pace of development. As long as the boom continued, prosperity masked the fears and uncertainties small and medium-sized francophone entrepreneurs experienced in the face of the trend towards consolidation and anglophone domination of big business. Nevertheless, the minor role French Canadians played in Quebec's postwar industrial and resource development sowed the seeds of possible discontent and anger which might easily be directed against Taschereau as the chief architect of the policies responsible for the boom of the twenties. Moreover, it was becoming increasingly clear by the end of the decade that, if a choice had to

13

Antecedents

be made, the Taschereau regime would favour the interests of the big businesses which were controlled by anglophones over those of smaller francophone entrepreneurs, merchants, professionals, and ordinary consumers. The struggle of the Quebec Power Company to preserve its monopoly over electricity services in the provincial capital drove this point home. The fight over electricity rates in Quebec City, which heated up in 1929 just as the stock market crashed, brought the provincial government's unwillingness to champion the cause of middle-sized businesses and domestic customers out into the open. When a prominent member of the city's professional elite, Dr Philippe Hamel, launched a crusade to force the Quebec Power Company to lower electricity rates for the municipality and small consumers, the business community was quick to take sides. Local affiliates of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, the Retail Merchants' Association, and the Cercle des Voyageurs de Commerce all endorsed Hamel's campaign. The Board of Trade, to the contrary, argued that continued low rates for large industrial consumers were the key to future prosperity. Small business and commercial interests stood to gain if Hamel's populist-nationalist forces succeeded in their bid to force municipal and provincial politicians to use their political power to end monopoly control of a public utility. Taschereau's role in engineering Hamel's defeat demonstrated that the smaller business class, which tended to be francophone, was of secondary importance not only economically but in the opinion of the province's ruling Liberals. The struggle to end the Quebec Power Company's monopoly over electricity in Quebec City was inspired and waged by members of the francophone professional elite. Their efforts achieved little, but the campaign did show that a segment of this elite with Liberal as well as Conservative ties was prepared to champion the cause of non-monopoly capital in the interests of the francophone majority generally and of smaller businesses in particular.10 FRENCH-CANADIAN RESPONSES T O M O D E R N I Z A T I O N

The industrial development of the 19205 continued to draw rural dwellers out of the countryside, and the percentage of Quebec's population living in urban areas rose from just under 52 per cent in 1921 to almost 60 per cent a decade later. Francophones remained less urbanized than the province's British minority and immigrant groups, but the number living in cities and towns grew steadily. In

14 L'Action lib£rale nationale

spite of the opening up of new resource towns, Montreal remained the chief destination of rural Quebecers who helped to swell that city's population from 618,506 to 818,577 between 1921 and 1931.M By the end of the 19205 about one-third of Quebec's population lived in Montreal and surrounding municipalities. The fact that an ever growing proportion of French Canadians belonged to the urban, working class put greater pressure on existing social structures. Moreover, services had to be extended to the rapidly expanding towns spawned by resource development and to Montreal's ever growing suburbs. The Taschereau regime's policies, which gave more and more French Canadians the opportunity to leave their rural homes, contributed, meanwhile, to increasing tensions within Quebec society. French Canadians who moved into urban areas to work as labourers left a world of highly personalized relationships for one in which they worked in plants where English, and probably Protestant, foremen and managers put a premium on efficiency and communicated with them in a language they did not always fully understand. Bilingualism was infrequent among the English who held the positions of authority and got the more highly technical jobs.12 More and more French Canadians were joining the ranks of the proletariat in a capitalist system controlled and operated by "outsiders." At the same time the differentiation which accompanied industrialization was threatening the importance of the integrative social role the Catholic parish had traditionally played in French-Canadian society.13 Parish organizations and religious orders did expand to serve the growing numbers of urban French Catholics and continued to play a central role in the lives of recently urbanized francophones, most of whom lived in working-class parishes.14 Nevertheless, urbanization had detrimental implications for the church's position in society because the flight from the countryside to Montreal and other industrial centres undermined its traditional power base. The experiences of working-class French Catholics raised questions for which their church provided either inadequate or irrelevant answers while increased access to popular culture, American movies in particular, exposed them to values deplored by the church. Religious practice declined over time with urbanization while pressure mounted for the state to assume responsibilities in areas such as education and social services which the Catholic Church regarded as falling within its exclusive jurisdiction.15 Even though the Taschereau government's policies made few inroads into the traditional clerical domain during the 19205, the church had been forced onto the defensive. Government and church leaders

15

Antecedents

regarded one another with suspicion throughout the decade prior to the Great Depression. The ethnic division of labour in Quebec's new and established industries perpetuated and magnified the existence of "two solitudes" in the province. Most francophones, including middle-class professionals, had very little, if any, contact with the anglophone economic elite. The limited number of associations with both French and English members attested that class and culture kept most Quebecers in ethnically homogeneous separate spheres. The industrial growth Quebec enjoyed during the prosperous twenties made the agents of economic change stand out even more clearly as a culturally alien elite at a time when greater numbers of francophones were opting for careers in industry and commerce. The pace of this change was slow, but the Quebec government had, since Lomer Gouin's time, established a variety of specialized technical and commercial educational institutions which along with university science faculties graduated francophones equipped to fill professional and managerial positions in a modern industrial economy. As elsewhere, industrialization had inspired different social groups to develop strategies to maintain or improve their respective positions. Doctors, lawyers, and merchants operating in smaller communities, for instance, had to come to terms with continuing francophone migration to the Montreal area which deprived them of potential clients and customers. Because most French Canadians entered the industrial world as propertyless members of the working class, urban growth had resulted in reduced demand for the services of certain professionals such as notaries. Anglophone domination of the economy, meanwhile, limited the opportunities open to francophone lawyers. By the 19205 francophone boys whose fathers pursued such traditional FrenchCanadian professions as law and medicine were joining the sons of white-collar workers and small merchants in engineering and science courses which they hoped would lead to jobs as engineers, chemists, and physicists in industry and in teaching.16 In the interwar years Quebec was in a pioneering period with respect to the modernization process which was simultaneously regarded as a prerequisite for and a threat to la suruivance. Ambiguities abounded as battles to win cultural legitimacy for scientific activity and institutions were waged by men who remained committed to the tenets of traditional French-Canadian nationalism.17 The widespread conviction that the future of French Canada depended upon the persistence of the values and life style of rural Quebec caused clerical and lay nationalists alike to fear the pervasive

16 L'Action liberate nationale

economic and social changes of the 19205. An idealized vision of a pre-industrial era when, it was believed, French Canada's survival had been assured by large family units operating in an ethnically and religiously homogeneous rural setting coloured the responses of francophone leaders to industrialization and urbanization. Acceptance of economic change as essential to national survival went hand in hand with fear that the Taschereau government's encouragement of industrialization and its alienation of more and more of Quebec's natural resources to anglophones would undermine both the moral and the material well-being of the French-Canadian nation. Advocates of modernization as well as traditional nationalists and Conservative politicians warned that French Canadians must find ways to exercise control over the economy and society of this "new" Quebec. These ideas had very little appeal and no impact on developments while the boom lasted, but their exponents persisted in spreading the message that the Taschereau regime's policies spelled doom for French Canada. Abbe Lionel Groulx, the leading French-Canadian nationalist spokesman of the interwar period, used his position as editor of L'Actionfrangaiseto direct a relentless campaign against the fast pace of industrialization but also to deplore the inferior role being played by French Canadians in that development. He exhorted French Canadians to "cease to think like a vanquished and conquered people" and to "do otherwise than prepare the lion's share for the rival." But, what Groulx wanted was for French Canadians to become the "architects and builders" of a world where medium-sized businesses operated in a rural environment and control was exercised through a system of professional corporatism. National and social problems alike would be solved by a back-to-the-land movement and replacement of large-scale development by a simpler capitalist economy which small French-Canadian entrepreneurs could control. Not capitalism as such but foreign domination of Quebec's resources and the moral decay associated with the abandonment of rural life were what needed to be changed.18 Throughout the twenties nationalists condemned large-scale industrialization and the sale of French Canada's patrimony to foreign capitalists and championed small enterprise and a return to French Canada's rural roots. Experiences in other countries, meanwhile, had inspired the Catholic Church in Quebec to try to help its growing number of working-class parishioners adjust to and cope with urban life. The Jesuits, for their part, undertook to create a clerical and lay elite whose function would be to improve the lot of the working class.19

17

Antecedents

Steps were also taken to prevent French Catholic workers from adopting the materialist values associated with industrialization. Quebec's Catholic syndicates were born of the desire to protect French Catholic workers from the dangers posed by secular and, more particularly, international unions. Such syndicates had appeared in Quebec early in the twentieth century but enjoyed their greatest growth immediately after the First World War when protection of workers' interests clearly took precedence over questions of morality and religion. International unions retained their hold on the Montreal area, but Catholic syndicates succeeded in organizing workers in smaller centres employed in industries such as pulp and paper and textiles. They were not, however, any more successful than secular unions in holding their members as the twenties progressed, and membership plummeted from 14 per cent of wage earners in 1921 to a mere 1.3 per cent a decade later. On the eve of the Great Depression French Catholic workers were for the most part unorganized with no more than 12 per cent of Quebec's labour force belonging to any kind of union.20 In spite of its efforts to serve the needs of urban Catholics, the Quebec church shared the bias of French-Canadian nationalists in favour of rural life. Clerics regularly deplored the tendency of Quebec farmers to abandon their farms for jobs in the cities and resource towns rather than to respond to the increased demand for agricultural products by switching to specialty farming.21 They helped the Union catholique des cultivateurs, the Catholic farmers' union founded in 1924 to try to check the movement off the land, to enrol 18,000 members, only to see membership fall back to 8,000 by 1Q28.22 The Catholic Church's warnings about the dangers of industrialization and urbanization neither stemmed the tide of rural Quebecers to the province's growing cities nor persuaded the Taschereau regime to alter policies which encouraged this trend. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE: A HARBINGER OF POLITICAL CHANGE?

In the face of Premier Taschereau's preference for putting the government's support behind industry, opposition politicians continued to champion the cause of agriculture and colonization. However, the prosperity of the twenties coupled with the inability of the Conservatives to overcome their party's weaknesses in postwar Quebec meant that the opposition's criticism had no chance of influencing government policy. Weak leadership and internecine quarrelling perpetuated Conservative ineffectiveness. Even the

i8 L'Action lib£rale nationale

provincial party's 1922 declaration of complete separation from the federal Conservatives did little good in the face of internal weaknesses and a well-organized Liberal machine. Quebec's Conservatives continued to criticize the nature and the rate of the changes going on in their province, but Taschereau simply did not need to take such criticism seriously, let alone eliminate its causes.23 The Speech from the Throne opening the 1928 session of the Quebec Legislative Assembly has been described as a hymn of praise to industrial progress.84 There was no sign of change either in the government's pro-development stance or in its reluctance to increase the role of the state in society. Given the Catholic Church's suspicion of the Liberals evident in the vehement opposition to the 1921 Public Charities Act which made government grants available to private welfare institutions, Taschereau was understandably hesitant to take on new responsibilities in education or social services.85 Political considerations combined with the premier's deeply held personal values to produce minimal alterations in the largely privately funded system of social services in Quebec. Government expenditures on education and social services did not, consequently, increase in proportion to the needs created by the province's new economic order. Defence of French Canada's traditional values also allowed the Quebec Liberal government to save money by refusing to implement the old age pension scheme of the federal Liberal government. The government did pass legislation giving legal status to trade unions and the bargaining process in 1925 but went no further to strengthen the position of Quebec's industrial work force. In fact, when Taschereau introduced a bill in 1928 designed to amend workmen's compensation legislation in the light of changes in industry, even some Liberals believed that it favoured the insurance companies at the expense of workers. For instance, T.-D. Bouchard, one Liberal ML A who attacked his government's proposal, argued that the issue went beyond party interests. Taschereau, who had met opposite from his more independent Liberal deputies like Bouchard ever since assuming office, had little to fear, however. He controlled the rich and powerful Liberal organization and the official opposition posed no serious threat. The premier and his long-time associates simply did not have to worry about accommodating dissident Liberals or thwarting ambitious Conservatives as long as the postwar boom continued. There were younger men in both parties, nevertheless, who shared the dream of ending Taschereau's domination of provincial policy. Two of these, Paul Gouin of the Liberals and Maurice Duplessis of the Conservatives, would be

ig Antecedents

instrumental in turning this dream into reality by the mid-thirties. The contrast presented by their activities and career patterns during the 19205 provides insight into why the one, Paul Gouin, was rendered impotent by the other, Maurice Duplessis, once they had been pushed into joining forces to bring Taschereau down. THE AGENTS OF TASCHEREAU'S NEMESIS TAKE SHAPE

Paul Gouin personified in some ways the ambiguous responses of francophone professionals and nationalists to industrialization. Born in 1898 to Lomer Gouin and his wife, who was the daughter of Honor£ Mercier, Paul was seven when his father became the premier of Quebec. Throughout his days as a student at the Se"minaire in Quebec City and in law at the Universit£ de Montreal, Quebec was becoming more industrialized at least in part because of the policies of his father's administrations. The formative years of the future leader of the Action liberale nationale coincided with early attempts by concerned nationalists to see that industrialization and urbanization did not undermine the religious, linguistic, and economic bases associated with la survivance. Industrialization was preferable to francophone emigration but only if the Quebec government ensured that economic development did not undermine French Canada's rural-based, traditional Catholic social order. Although views on what the government should do were varied and often vague, the genuine fear among the professional elite that industrialization would be the death knell of French-Canadian society led to the establishment of organizations like the Association catholique de la jeunesse canadienne-franc.aise (ACJC) which were to provide French Canada with leaders committed to the implementation of nationalist policies based on the social teachings of the Roman Catholic Church.26 Paul Gouin's attitudes towards industrialization reflect the ambiguities and tensions produced by the economic trends which began during his father's premiership and escalated during the 19205. The career pattern of Sir Lomer's second son, moreover, suggests that he was among those younger members of the professional elite who did not benefit from Quebec's postwar economic boom and were denied access to political careers by the provincial regime which fostered it. His experiences could only have helped to shape his deep conviction that it was the duty of his generation to see that industrialization was made to serve the particular needs of French Canada's elites and those of Quebec's francophone majority in general.

2o L'Action liberate nationale

After interrupting his law studies to serve in the First World War, Gouin completed his course and practised law for a few years with the firm of Beaulieu, Gouin, Mercier, Gouin and Tellier.27 His particular interest, however, lay in the historic past of French Canada and in the preservation of its distinctive culture, and when he spoke to the Association de la jeunesse liberate in 1925, it was about old Quebec.28 The challenge for his generation of Liberals, in Gouin's view, was to find ways of allowing French Canadians to reap the benefits of industrialization without endangering the uniqueness and values upon which their national survival depended. By the end of the twenties Gouin had given up the practice of law to become president and general manager of a publishing house, Louis Carrier & Co Ltd, and had published a book on Quebec's past.29 Gouin was clearly out of step with the thrust of the economic policies of Taschereau's postwar governments which he was convinced were destroying French-Canadian society.30 At the same time he remained dependent on the Liberals for career opportunities. It was the premier, for instance, who turned down his petition for the position of curator at the Quebec Museum and blocked the way of Gouin and other young Liberals who wanted to run for political office. Without necessarily sharing Gouin's dedication to the preservation of old Quebec, many Liberals of his generation must have shared his frustration at being unable to stop Taschereau and the party's old guard from allowing anglophones to monopolize the benefits of the economic growth which was undermining their position in society. In contrast to Paul Gouin, Maurice Duplessis spent the 19205 gaining political experience and learning valuable lessons about how to make the political system operate to his advantage. The only son of Neree Duplessis, a Conservative lawyer from Trois-Rivieres who represented Saint-Maurice in the Legislative Assembly, Duplessis grew up as part of the francophone professional establishment in a small Quebec centre. He did, however, study at the College NotreDame in Montreal from 1898 to 1902 before entering the Seminaire in Trois-Rivieres from which he graduated in 1910. Following law studies at the Universite Laval, Duplessis returned to his home town and began practising law. Eight years older than Gouin, Duplessis had come to political maturity as industrialization began to change the face of Quebec and English Canadians demonstrated their rejection of Henri Bourassa's brand of bi-national Canadianism. Successful assaults on bilingualism and separate schools outside Quebec and the conscription crisis of the First World War coloured Duplessis's views of Confederation and, more particularly, the Canadian party system. A recognition of the Quebec government as

21

Antecedents

the sole defender of French-Canadian interests and the record of the federal Conservative party on conscription raised questions about the integrated nature of Canada's two major parties. Without favouring the dissolution of Confederation, Duplessis was determined to find ways of overcoming the disadvantages of being a Conservative in Quebec so that he might one day be in a position to defend provincial autonomy and the interests of Quebecers, as he saw them.31 In defining what these interests were, Maurice Duplessis looked to his father's strong ally, Bishop Lafleche of Trois-Rivieres, drawing upon that ultramontane nationalist's assumptions about French Canada's national mission in North America and the importance of preserving that society's agrarian base.32 But while he clearly believed that the Quebec government should protect French Canada's traditional rural base and values, he also accepted the necessity of industrial development. The pragmatism so characteristic of Maurice Duplessis's approach to politics is evident in his conviction that capital and entrepreneurs from outside should be encouraged to develop Quebec's rich resources. French Canadians would thus be able to find employment without leaving their homeland which would help both to preserve traditional values and to strengthen the Quebec government.33 Duplessis's Conservative heritage was a distinct disadvantage when the time arrived for him to launch his political ascent following World War I. In the first instance the threw his support behind federal Conservative efforts in Quebec in 1921, campaigning for that party's candidate in Three Rivers-St Maurice. The province's rejection of every Conservative candidate in that election was reflected in the 1922 decision of the Quebec party "to separate, unreservedly, Provincial from Federal politics."34 Duplessis never deviated from the position that the interests of the Quebec Conservative party and the advancement of his political career must take precedence over helping the federal party. His first bid to carry the riding of Three Rivers for the provincial Conservatives in the 1923 election failed, but the young lawyer had come within three hundred votes of defeating the Liberal candidate who enjoyed the backing of the powerful local member of parliament, Jacques Bureau. Before the next provincial contest, Duplessis had ensured a victory by exploiting Liberal divisions in the wake of Bureau's downfall in the federal customs scandal of 1926. The co-operative arrangement he worked out with Arthur Bettez, the maverick Liberal mayor of Trois-Rivieres, who had defeated both Bureau's chosen successor and the Conservative candidate in the riding in 1926 showed

22

L'Action liberale nationale

dramatically that party loyalty would not be allowed to impede attainment of Duplessis' s personal political objectives.35 The wisdom of entering into a mutual support arrangement with Bettez became clear on 16 May 1927, when Duplessis carried the riding of Three Rivers for the opposition in an election which saw Quebec voters reject all but nine Conservative candidates. Duplessis thus began his career as a Quebec ML A owing his success to a withdrawal of support from federal Conservative candidates in his riding after 1921 and the working out of a mutual support arrangement with a maverick Liberal. There were other practical lessons to be learned from the Taschereau regime's overwhelming victory in 1927. The Quebec Conservative party's increasing emphasis on economic nationalist themes had also been a source of difficulty. The stress on the need for French Canadians to regain control of the province's natural resources and the industries being developed during the 19205 had made it harder than it had been earlier for the Conservatives to raise funds for the 1927 campaign. The Liberals, to the contrary, had enjoyed the support of both St James Street and almost the entire Quebec press.36 Voters had made it very clear that, at least in prosperous times, warnings about the dangers of the alienation of French Canada's patrimony to "foreigners" fell on deaf ears. French Canadians did not agree with those Conservatives who saw Taschereau's co-operation with the big financial interests of St James Street as a threat to the future of their nation. The morale of the provincial Conservatives remained low in the months following the 1927 election. Their leader, Arthur Sauve, had announced his resignation, only to agree subsequently to stay on. By the time the Legislative Assembly opened in January 1928, R.B. Bennett had won the leadership of the federal party, but it was not clear what this might mean for Quebec Conservatives. Confusion reigned within Conservative circles as Maurice Duplessis embarked upon his career in the Quebec legislature. His parliamentary abilities were apparent from the outset, and he soon won recognition as the most impressive newcomer to the Conservative benches.37 Duplessis's legislative career got off to an equally auspicious start and he rapidly became his retiring leader's principal lieutenant. Despite attempts by the Liberal press to sow discord between the rising deputy and his discredited provincial chef, Duplessis served Sauve loyally, worked diligently to fulfil as many of his constituents' requests as possible, and protected his interests by refusing to get involved in meetings concerned with federal Conservative affairs.38 Although rumours abounded to the effect that Maurice Duplessis

23

Antecedents

would run for the provincial leadership at the Conservative convention scheduled for July 1929, the only declared candidate who campaigned prior to the convention was Camillien Houde. The popular Montreal mayor and Conservative ML A had been considered, as had Duplessis, a possible successor to Sauve ever since the latter's first attempt to retire from the leadership in 1927. Renowned for his aggressive attacks on the Taschereau regime, Houde's candidature was favoured by such diverse elements as the working-class voters of Montreal Island and the Conservative businessmen of St James Street. In addition, some influential Montreal Conservatives desirous of re-establishing close ties between the federal and provincial parties had long supported Houde. There was, nevertheless, strong opposition within Conservative circles to the selection of this very abrasive, relative newcomer to the party.39 Despite the misgivings of some Conservatives about Houde, convention delegates made it clear that they wanted a leader with a demonstrated ability to win at the polls. Camillien Houde had this prerequisite, and no other names were even put forward when the election for the provincial leadership took place on 10 July 1929. Supported by Conservatives who desired a more vigorous opposition to the Taschereau regime as well as by those who wanted a rapprochement with the federal party, the Montreal mayor became the leader of what remained a fragmented party. Duplessis lacked the connections and the qualities which catapulted Houde into the leadership of the Quebec party in 1929, but there was some feeling even then that he alone possessed the qualities necessary to lead the province's Conservatives.40 Should the unorthodox Houde fail to perform the electoral miracles his supporters anticipated, his leadership would come under serious challenge. Duplessis's performance in the legislature and in policy debates at the 1929 convention had clearly identified him as a safe alternative to Houde. His strong opposition to Armand Lavergne's attempt to amend a resolution dealing with the development of hydroelectric power made it clear that the Quebec business community had little to fear from Duplessis's support for FrenchCanadian nationalist causes. Lavergne had wanted the party to delete the assurance that no action would be taken with respect to hydroelectricity which either prejudiced legitimate rights or paralysed private initiative, so that the province might one day liberate itself from the grip of companies which, he claimed, had been robbing Quebecers for nearly forty years. Duplessis, in response, pleaded with Conservatives not to treat as scraps of paper engagements officially undertaken by the provincial government. In

24

L'Action liberate nationale

his view the original resolution was "in the best tradition of Conservatism," and he called upon delegates to reject Lavergne's nationalist-inspired amendment on the grounds that "those who invest money in the province have the right to expect that the contracts signed by the same province are worthy of confidence."41 Duplessis was sending a clear signal to the business community, to other Conservatives, and to Quebecers generally that his criticism of the Taschereau regime's policies did not imply state action to recover alienated resources. His views carried the day at the 1929 convention. The convention over, Duplessis laboured on as an active member of the opposition team, hosting a gigantic rally for Houde as he passed through Trois-Rivieres on his triumphant return to Montreal. He continued to try to reassure the business community, explaining in one by-election campaign that he was not opposed to the entry of American capital into Quebec. At the same time he assured French Canadians that he did not want "foreign capital to enter only to enslave the government and the people to foreigners." The Conservatives, according to Duplessis, wished foreign capitalists well and would render justice unto them but also wanted to protect the rights of French Canadians.42 Once the depression struck, Conservative attacks on Taschereau for failing to protect French Canadians increased the opposition's chances at the polls. In consequence, neither Duplessis nor Houde would have anything to do with the efforts of the federal Conservatives to make inroads into Quebec prior to the federal election of 1930. As long as the Conservatives remained out of power in Ottawa, Duplessis saw isolation from the federal party as a prerequisite of Conservative success provincially. Bennett's victory and the election of twenty-odd French-Canadian Conservatives put things in a different light, however. Duplessis was forced to seek patronage favours from Quebec's Conservative ministers, and when his federal Liberal ally, Arthur Bettez, died suddenly in January 1931, Duplessis saw to it that the candidate he favoured got the Conservative nomination for the necessary by-election.43 CONCLUSION

Thus matters stood in the summer of 1931 when Premier Taschereau announced that voters would go to the polls in a provincial election on 24 August. Duplessis would play a prominent role in the opposition's ultimately unsuccessful campaign while Paul Gouin, like other younger, less compliant Liberals, was denied the opportunity

25 Antecedents

of sharing the fruits of the Taschereau regime's return to power. Despite the efforts of Duplessis and others to counter Liberal attacks on Houde "as a vulgar person" who had "slandered" Quebec and insulted French Canadians, Conservative hopes were crushed once again under a Taschereau landslide.44 Even after two years of economic decline, Conservative attacks on Taschereau and the Liberals for having sold out Quebecers could not overcome the government's resources and Liberal loyalties. While Duplessis did just manage to hold his own seat, Houde went down to crushing defeat in two ridings.45 The keen disappointment Conservatives felt at Houde's utter failure to fulfil their expectations gave rise to immediate efforts to oust him. It would be two years, however, before the struggle for control of the Quebec party ended in victory for the proponents of an autonomous Quebec Conservative party who secured the election of their leader, Maurice Duplessis, as head of the party. By this time Quebecers had been suffering the ill effects of the Great Depression for four years and the Taschereau government's responses to their plight were costing the provincial party the support of even long-time Liberals. In the meantime Paul Gouin had taken on a leadership role in a movement of disgruntled Liberals and nationalists which by 1934 was threatening to destabilize Quebec politics and destroy Duplessis's hopes of monopolizing voter dissatisfaction with the Taschereau Liberals.

3 A Third Quebec Party Is Born

The onset of the Great Depression intensified the problems francophone professionals and businessmen had been experiencing in the 19205 and further limited their sons' opportunities. At the same time the misery created by spiralling unemployment called into question the very survival of the capitalist system which FrenchCanadian Catholics generally wanted to continue, although perhaps in an altered form. It was the disarray and social insecurity brought on by the prolonged economic collapse of the early thirties and the failure of liberalism to overcome the problems threatening their society that prompted reformist and nationalist elements within the francophone professional elite to take the lead in forming a third Quebec party. The natural resource sector of Quebec's economy was hardest hit by the depression, rendering inoperative the laissez-faire, prodevelopment policy in which Taschereau's governments had placed their hopes. Tariffs helped to cushion the blow for the province's consumer goods industries, but production still plummeted to the point where there were 24 per cent fewer employees in manufacturing in 1934 than there had been in 1929. It was in Montreal and its suburbs, home to over 60 per cent of Quebec's urban population by the 19305, that the devastating effects of the depression were most obvious. Francophone workers were particularly at risk because they were generally unskilled and were largely employed in exportrelated industries and the market-sensitive consumer goods sector. In 1933 it was estimated that fully one-third of Montreal's popula-

27

A Third Quebec Party Is Born

tion was receiving municipal aid. The problems of francophone workers quickly became those of the professional and business classes as reduced purchasing power undercut demand for the goods and services they offered. Large concerns with greater resources, such as chain stores, were steadily depriving small merchants and producers of a share of what business remained. The resentment of Quebec's "foreign" business elite among French Canada's small business class provided a link with the dissatisfied francophone professionals who took the lead in demanding changes which would allow them to exert control over a fairer capitalist system.1 Meanwhile, the depression made the plight of working-class Quebecers even more wretched, leading the province's traditional leaders to fear a radical revolt. To prevent any such development and to improve conditions for their own class and for francophones of other classes, reformist and nationalist elements from Quebec's traditional clerical and lay elites set out to reform the abuses of the capitalist system without destroying it or its values. To do this required, in the end, the creation of a purely provincial, third Quebec party. The dominance of Taschereau's Liberals and the loyalty of even dissident Liberals to the federal party weakened the opposition's chances of convincing voters that they should be entrusted with power at the provincial level. So, too, did the Conservative party's links with the increasingly unpopular Bennett administration. Nationalists disgruntled with the Taschereau regime could see little advantage in joining forces with a party which was led by a man whose commitment to economic nationalism was suspect and which was tainted by its federal wing's record of insensitivity to French-Canadian interests and sensitivity to those of anglophone big business. In these circumstances and under the strain created by the depression, the lack of representation of the interests of some social groups through the existing party system gave birth to a third Quebec party. ELECTORAL TRIUMPH BREEDS DISSENSION

In spite of the dimensions of Taschereau's 1931 electoral victory, the Liberal party suffered from increasing internal dissension as the depression worsened. Indeed the premier's huge majority actually contributed to tension within party ranks. Faced with the possibility of losing considerable support to the Conservatives prior to the 1931 election, Taschereau had made some effort to come to terms with more progressive elements within his party. While he steadfastly

28

L'Action liberale nationale

refused to allow some of the older Liberal backbenchers to be replaced by younger, more energetic candidates, he did promise to deal with such issues as old age pensions once the province's Royal Commission on Social Insurance submitted its report.2 Indeed Edouard Lacroix, the Liberal MP for Beauce, believed that the premier had agreed to fulfil his demands for provincial legislation to provide Quebecers with old age pensions, a provincial system of agricultural credit, and minimum wage standards.3 Other federal Liberals who were known to have differed with Taschereau, including Ernest Lapointe - MP for Quebec East and Mackenzie King's trusted lieutenant for the province — had lent the premier support when faced by a perceived threat to their party's hold on Quebec.4 Once the opposition forces had been crushed, however, the differences among Quebec's Liberals re-emerged and deepened in the face of the intransigence of an even more securely entrenched old guard. Conservatives also became even more divided in defeat as they fought over how to go about overcoming the obvious lack of voter confidence in their provincial party and the mounting unpopularity of Bennett's French-Canadian colleagues. The Liberals had nothing to fear from an already numerically insignificant opposition whose splits immediately became public in response to Houde's plans for a wholesale challenge of the 1931 election results. Taschereau did, as promised during the campaign, call the legislature into session before the end of 1931 to deal with the unemployment problem. It quickly became apparent, however, that the premier had no intention of fulfilling the post-election expectations of those Liberals whose views differed widely from his own. When Lacroix, for one, protested, it was pointed out that campaign promises simply had to be forgotten.5 The size of the Liberal majority, opposed as it was by a divided Conservative rump under an acting leader, C.E. Gault, enabled Taschereau to refuse to implement measures which elements within his party believed were essential to alleviate the deplorable impact of the depression on the lives of Quebecers from all classes. By the end of 1931 it was estimated that the fall in prices for agricultural products had put 35,000 farmers into bankruptcy, affecting 180,000 people. Much larger numbers of urban dwellers had been devastated by the loss of jobs, irregularity of work, or cuts in wages. The annual earnings of Montreal's industrial workers had fallen drastically from an average of just over $1,000 in 1929. Even those lucky enough to have jobs in 1931 fell far short of earning the estimated $1,500 required to provide a degree of comfort and adequate lodging in Canada's largest cities.6 Inadequate social services exacerbated the sufferings

2Q

A Third Quebec Party Is Born

of workers who bore the brunt of the economic collapse. More and more of the small and medium-sized businesses owned by francophones were facing bankruptcy. 7 The productive system was obviously not operating properly or fairly and yet Taschereau refused to abandon the ideology of economic liberalism. Despite increasing internal tension, especially among the younger Liberals, the party had little room for men whose views clashed with Taschereau's. As Quebec sank to the depths of the depression, the Taschereau administration had become a kind of family compact.8 The early thirties were, consequently, a frustrating period for concerned, ambitious younger Liberals. In the face of growing economic hardship, Taschereau's policies marked him ever more clearly as the champion of big business. Many Liberals came to share the fears of Oscar Drouin, the ML A for Quebec East and a Lapointe protege, that their party would be ruined in Quebec if it continued to be so solicitous of such interests during this period of high unemployment and widespread discontent.9 Any such failure would, of course, distress federal Liberals who counted on Quebec's continued allegiance to their party to ensure its return to power. But while continuing economic distress demanded immediate action, those Quebec Liberals who advocated policy changes were unable to attain positions of influence within the Taschereau administration. Ideological differences, thwarted political ambition, and fears about federal Liberal fortunes in Quebec, all contributed to growing discord.10 Splits within Quebec Liberal ranks consequently became increasingly obvious as the frustrations of advocates of state intervention on behalf of disadvantaged francophones of all classes grew. The premier's championship of the Quebec Power Company in its dispute with the city of Quebec during the first session of the newly elected legislature brought such divisions sharply into focus. The rift within party ranks was reopened and widened because of the alignment of forces in the controversy between the Quebec Power Company and the city of Quebec. This confrontation demonstrates why nationalist as well as reformist professionals came to play a leadership role in a movement advocating political action designed to meet what they saw as the needs of all classes of francophones. By 1931 a battle had been raging between the Quebec Power Company and the Quebec City Council for almost two years, with the public demanding either that the company charge rates comparable to those of the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario or that the city take over provision of electricity to its

30 L'Action liberate nationale

residents ("municipalization"). Electricity rates had arisen as an issue in Quebec City on the eve of the Great Depression when Dr Philippe Harnel, a prominent dentist, had been inspired by a personal grievance to launch an investigation into Quebec Power's operations. His findings had propelled him into a public campaign to rescue the city and its residents from the grip of the electricity trust by means of municipalization. An admirer of Abbe Groulx, Hamel's fight on behalf of Quebec Power's customers quickly took on the character of a crusade against greedy capitalists and their political protectors. Early in 1930 he had publicly warned the Liberals that, despite his past political loyalties and the friendship he felt for many members of Taschereau's government, he would be unable to support them if their party persisted in defending the exploiters of the people of Quebec. By spring he was attacking Quebec City's newly elected administration, headed by a well-known Liberal, Lt-Col H.-E. Lavigueur, for failing to address the rates issue. The city's council responded by appointing Hamel as the citizens' representative on a special investigatory commission on electricity rates. This commission's finding that all of Quebec Power's rates were excessive led the city's administrative committee to recommend that council terminate its contract with Quebec Power for street lighting and the supply of electricity when it expired and investigate the cost of constructing a municipal distribution system and of purchasing electricity from different generating companies. The breakdown of subsequent negotiations with the company put the city administration in the position of having to pursue municipalization or to capitulate to Quebec Power. Consequently, in late May 1931, the council undertook to secure provincial revision of the city's charter to remove all obstacles in the way of construction of a municipal system.11 This was where the matter had stood when the 1931 provincial election was called. Hamel, who had become a popular political activist in Quebec City, responded by entering the Conservative camp. Publicly repudiating his earlier Liberal allegiance, this singleminded advocate of public power urged voters in the district of Quebec to rid the province of the Taschereau regime because of its continued defence of the electricity trust at the expense of the public interest. He advised voters to take a chance on electing Camillien Houde and his supporters because of their willingness to establish a commission to end abuses in the electricity industry. 12 Hamel's advice went unheeded, and the crushing defeat that Houde's Conservatives suffered did not augur well for customers of Quebec Power. In the wake of Taschereau's electoral triumph, the company

31 A Third Quebec Party Is Born

sought revisions to its charter which would provide it with increased protection in the event of expropriation and municipalization. The Legislative Assembly's subsequent consideration of the competing requests of Quebec City and Quebec Power for charter revisions settled nothing but revealed the depth of the cracks in Liberal party unity. The company's attempt to improve its position met with opposition from that traditional Liberal critic of government policies on the electricity issue, T.-D. Bouchard, and from several other Liberal ML AS and legislative councillors. Oscar Drouin supported a Conservative objection that the company's proposal was not sufficiently specific. It was only after a stormy debate that the Quebec Power bill received second reading and even then five Liberals bolted. The only reason Drouin did not join the rebels was that he was absent from the legislature at the time of the vote presiding at a rally organized to protest the bill.13 With Taschereau so firmly entrenched in power, appeals to party unity could no longer prevent bolting when government members opposed to his generosity to big business interests found allies in such well-known Liberals as Lapointe, who was the counsel for the city, and Mayor Lavigueur. Their leadership of the city's fight against the company enabled dissident Liberals to present themselves as loyal party members in revolt solely against the Taschereau government's policy of concessions to companies like Quebec Power.14 The rebel element was small in numbers, but its appearance in the context of the worsening economic crisis facing Quebec was symptomatic of the level of dissension within Liberal ranks. But although party unity had broken down on this issue, Taschereau's position was supported by most Liberal members including the vast majority of MLAS from rural constituencies who shared his opposition to municipalization.15 The premier ultimately carried the day by convincing the company to withdraw its bill and persuading the Private Bills Committee to reject Quebec City's request in return for his promise to refer the matter to the Public Service Commission within the year. Those within the Quebec Liberal party opposed to Taschereau's pro-business bias had not succeeded in forcing the reversal of any established policies. They had, however, shown that they would go so far as to desert the Liberal party and join forces with Conservatives and anti-Taschereau activists such as Dr Hamel in a fight against the province's trusts. By the time the Quebec assembly reconvened in January 1933 with Duplessis firmly in place as opposition leader, Taschereau had to face increasing criticism from Liberal legislators. In the Legislative Council, Elysee Theriault, Philippe Hamel's brother-in-

32

L'Action liberate Rationale

law, castigated the provincial government for not paying its debts, particularly those due to men employed on road works as far back as 1931. Pointing out that Quebecers were insufficiently protected by social legislation and paid two or three times as much for electricity as did other Canadians, Theriault asked whether Quebec's credit, which remained excellent, was to be used to benefit its own people or to protect outside investors. To him, the answer was self-evident: a loan should be floated by the government to provide the young men coming of age each year with the funds they needed to establish themselves on the land. On behalf of the province's elderly, Theriault deplored the government's failure to provide them with an old age pension scheme.16 This attack from within Liberal ranks was reinforced by another dissatisfied legislative councillor, J.-C.-E. Ouellet. Recalled for an investigation of electricity rates in the province, sparking reports of a forthcoming motion to be presented by a Liberal member asking for government intervention to secure cheaper electricity not only for farmers but also for urban consumers.1? Dissension within the Quebec Liberal party had reached such proportions by late January that one Montreal MLA rose on a point of privilege to deny newspaper reports that weekly meetings of members from that city were aimed at replacing the provincial leader.18 Such affirmations of loyalty to Taschereau aside, the effects of the economic collapse on Montreal's middle and working classes were prompting more and more Liberals to criticize existing structures and demand changes. Jean Martineau, the son of Judge Paul Martineau who was well known for his advanced liberalism, gave voice to the frustration of many young and middle-aged Liberals at the Reform Club early in February 1933. The Montreal lawyer attacked governments at every level, Liberal as well as Conservative, for adopting policies dictated by the twenty-five bankers and financiers in control of the Canadian economy. The solution to the wrongs of the existing system, he told Quebec Liberals, lay in a return to "true liberalism ... to liberalism with leftist leanings, to[wards] socialism." While younger Liberals present applauded Martineau's attack on the monopolies in control of the sale of electricity, gasoline, coal, and even bread and milk in Montreal, many of the old guard were scandalized by the vehemence of his criticism of governments friendly to big financial interests and trusts. Accusing the Montreal Light, Heat and Power Company of charging inflated rates, Martineau went so far as to argue that such exploitation of consumers necessitated state intervention including nationalization of water power resources.19 In spite of his qualification that

33 A Third Quebec Party Is Born such action should include compensation to private companies already granted rights in this area, Martineau's views were heretical ones from the perspective of prevailing Liberal policies. Reiterating these ideas two weeks later, Martineau argued that a leftist liberalism was necessary, even it if involved the risk of being labelled socialist as he had been. In explaining why this did not worry him, Martineau called attention to the ties he felt to Lapointe who, as Martineau pointed out, had actually said that "during a difficult period a good liberal should not be afraid of passing for a socialist."20 Neither Martineau nor the reform-minded Montreal Liberals who shared his views wanted to create a socialist Quebec. Rather, their aim was to secure legislation which would ensure that francophones benefited from, and exercised control over, developments in the industrialized, urbanized province which had been produced by the policies of successive Liberal administrations.21 SOURCES OF LIBERAL DISSIDENTS'

IDEAS

Francophone advocates of modernization wanted to bring about increased French-Canadian involvement in and control over a fairer capitalist system while preserving the social system upon which the power and position of French Catholic Quebec's traditional elites rested. Fears that the economic collapse of the 19308 would result in more radical change turned advocates of modernization into supporters of a return to the old values. Even reformist Liberals like Jean Martineau spoke out in terms which reflected the views of Abbe Groulx and other traditional nationalist spokesmen. Like JeuneCanada, a nationalist youth movement founded in 1932 by Groulx's former students from the Universite de Montreal, they were determined to rid Quebec of the Taschereau regime and of foreignowned trusts. Middle-aged advocates of modernization could agree with Jeune-Canada's aim of taking charge of science, industry, and commerce and leading Quebec into the twentieth century.22 Given the seriousness of the crisis facing French Canadians, ideological differences among Taschereau's reformist and traditional critics were put aside. The control of much of the province's economy by outside capital served to unite anti-Taschereau Liberals and more conservative nationalists who also objected to the government's bias in favour of big business and to the fact that French Canadians did not fully share in the administration of capital in their own province.23 The depression years in Quebec were marked by the appearance of many organizations and journals focussing attention on the

34 L'Action libdrale nationale

economic inferiority of French Canadians within the province. Angry, confused, and frustrated, these groups demanded the reform of capitalism, the curbing of communism, and establishment of Christian corporatism. *4 The ideological roots of their demands may be traced to the version of Catholic social thought propounded by the Ecole sociale populaire.25 The Jesuits who controlled the ESP were also a dominant influence in many other French-Canadian national and religious organizations. The considerable overlap in both membership and doctrine among these associations virtually guaranteed that the initiatives of one would win the support of others. The ficole sociale populaire remained the most important source of social teaching in Quebec throughout the depression and provided Taschereau's reformist and nationalist critics in both the Liberal and the Conservative camps with a widely shared source of general precepts to draw upon in putting together an alternative program with broad popular appeal.26 French-Canadian Catholics did not all agree with the view that religion and nationalism were indivisible, but clergy of all ranks and orders were agreed on the evils and dangers of socialism and communism. The French-Canadian hierarchy both acknowledged the evils of unrestricted capitalism and endorsed the Papacy's position that "in seeking help for the masses, this principle before all is to be considered as basic, namely, that private ownership must be preserved inviolate."27 In early June 1932, the twenty archbishops and bishops of the ecclesiastical provinces of Quebec, Montreal, and Ottawa published a pastoral letter condemning excessive concentration of riches. At the same time, tendencies to a more violent reaction against capitalism within French Canada were inhibited by the repeated warnings of Cardinal Villeneuve and the bishops about the dangers of confusing capitalism with its abuses.28 The appearance of the CCF on the Canadian political scene had provoked Mgr Georges Gauthier, the coadjutor bishop of Montreal, to come out against this party on the grounds that it represented a step towards communism. French-Canadian Catholics were instructed that it was simply not possible to be both a good Catholic and a real socialist.29 Mgr Gauthier had earlier asked Father Joseph-Papin Archambault, director of the ESP, to prepare the Quebec church's defence against communism, and it was this body that took the lead in providing French Canadians with a Christian-inspired alternative to the CCF which promised to reform and thereby preserve the capitalist system.30 In the spring of 1933 Archambault had summoned thirteen ecclesiastics with expertise on social questions to Montreal to decide

35 A Third Quebec Party Is Born

on the underlying principles of such a program.31 Participants in this meeting endorsed an outline based on the social teachings of the Catholic Church adapted to suit the situation in Quebec. They agreed that capitalism was not in itself an evil system but that the abuses of modern capitalism engendered socialism and communism. Consequently, reforms were required to bring about a fairer distribution of wealth and to re-establish a proper rural-urban equilibrium. Rural life was glorified and colonization championed but so was the cause of urban workers who were entitled to security and a share in the ownership of property. An increased role for the state in matters of social security and the economy was accepted while a system of professional corporatism, as outlined by Pope Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno (1931), was endorsed as the solution to class conflict. Having come to agreement on the general principles upon which a program of social restoration should be based, it remained to translate them into practical solutions to the complex problems Quebec faced in the mid-thirties. To this end the Ecole sociale populaire brought together a group of laymen prominent in various Catholic action groups to draw up a set of proposals applying the principles of Quadragesimo Anno to the specific concerns of Quebec. Among the members of this commission were Albert Rioux, president of the Union catholique des cultivateurs and the man some Conservatives had wanted to succeed Houde as their provincial leader, Alfred Charpentier of the Confederation des travailleurs catholiques du Canada, Wilfrid Guerin, secretary of the Union regionale des caisses populaires, and Esdras Minville, a well-known professor at the Ecole des hautes etudes commerciales who was a new mentor to the nationalist movement.32 Convinced that only the reform of capitalism could forestall a socialist revolution, these men produced a series of answers to Quebec's socio-economic problems, published in the autumn of 1933 as "Le Programme de Restauration Sociale."33 This fourfold plan for social restoration which sought reform in the areas of agriculture, labour, trusts and finance, and politics reflected the main features of ESP doctrine - its concern with French-Canadian nationalism, its derivation from conservative European Catholicism rather than American or English-Canadian Catholicism, and its espousal of corporatism. While parts of the program were vague and idealistic, Esdras Minville and his associates had provided nationalists with concrete suggestions on how their economic, social, and political objectives might be achieved. The plan won prompt endorsement from several French-Canadian nationalist groups and Taschereau's political opponents. Resolutions adopted

36

L'Action liberate Rationale

at the Quebec Conservative convention in October 1933 echoed the plan's support for agriculture, its nationalist bias, and its championship of state control of the hydroelectricity industry.34 Within months this same program had become the basis of a manifesto issued by Paul Gouin and other Liberals who wanted to reverse the policy direction of the Taschereau regime but not to further the political interests of the Conservative party. Their chances of success were limited by the aging premier's refusal to accommodate party dissidents and by Maurice Duplessis's drive to gain control of the Quebec Conservatives. However, they had assured themselves of considerable church and nationalist support by making themselves the political arm of the ESP plan for social reconstruction. THE CONSERVATIVE WAR AGAINST THE TASCHEREAU

REGIME

Houde's crushing defeat in 1931 had opened up the possibility of Maurice Duplessis gaining control of the provincial party, but it took two years of careful manoeuvring and some tough political infighting before he achieved this objective.35 Until Houde resigned as provincial leader in September 1932, Duplessis had resisted pressure to move openly against him while making it clear that he would accept the leadership if drafted.36 He then had had to defeat an effort by some Conservatives to install Onesime Gagnon, one of Bennett's ministers, as Quebec leader. At a stormy convention tightly controlled by his supporters, he finally won official confirmation as Conservative leader in October 1933-37 Within a decade of first contesting the electoral district of Three Rivers for the Conservatives, Duplessis had attained the first prerequisite of any aspiring premier: leadership of a provincial party. His success, moreover, had come at a time when the intransigence of the Taschereau administration in the face of the steadily mounting misery of so many voters provided the Conservatives with their best chance of coming to power in Quebec since the turn of the century. Having struggled for years to reach this position, Duplessis was determined to turn Quebec's bad fortune into good fortune for his party at the polls. But, as his own political career and the 1931 election had demonstrated, a Conservative victory in Quebec would not come easily. To overcome one obstacle, disappointment with the Bennett government's utter failure to satisfy the demands of Quebec Conservatives, Duplessis reasserted the autonomy of the party he controlled. The unsettled provincial political environment, meanwhile, was putting new obstacles in the way of Duplessis's rise to power.

37 A Third Quebec Party Is Born

Signs of internal divisions among Quebec Conservatives abounded in the wake of Duplessis's decisive victory at the Sherbrooke convention. There were rumours that Aime Guertin of Hull would leave the Conservatives to ally with Houde in a third provincial party.38 The new leader had demoted the three Conservative ML AS, C.E. Gault, Aime Guertin, and Laurent Barre, who had sided with Houde and backed Gagnon at Sherbrooke, but all three still sat with the opposition when the legislative session opened early in 1934. The initial speeches of Duplessis and Guertin made it very clear, however, that the divisions within Conservative ranks were ideological as well as organizational. Duplessis's reply to the Speech from the Throne set forth once again the main themes of his earlier attacks on the Taschereau regime. The emphasis was on the central importance of agriculture to Quebec which was, he argued, essentially an agrarian province and ought to remain so. In his opinion a pro-agricultural policy was the only path to economic recovery and national survival for French Canadians. But while Duplessis accused the Liberals of having favoured big business interests without adequately protecting French Canada's national patrimony, he did not advocate a trust-busting campaign. Guertin's entire critique of Liberal policies, to the contrary, hinged on the necessity of trustbusting and of extensive social welfare legislation to offset a possible rejection of the capitalist system because of the way it operated in Quebec. Trusts, Guertin argued, had to be exterminated in the interests of preserving capitalism, while French Canadians had to emancipate themselves economically or perish as a nation.39 Duplessis and Guertin shared the conviction that Liberal policies had endangered the survival of both the capitalist system and the French-Canadian nation. But Guertin's proposed changes, despite his acceptance of French Canada as an essentially urban and industrial society, were closer to those espoused by Abbe Groulx's followers than were the moves advocated by the Conservative leader. Duplessis's defence of the agrarian character of French-Canadian society was in accord with Groulx's teachings, but his promised respect for all legally held rights to Quebec's resources and for the rights of "honest" capital would stand in the way of the measures desired by French-Canadian economic nationalists. Houde's successful recapture of the Montreal mayoralty in early April 1934 gave rise to speculation that anti-Duplessis forces were involved in plans which would see discontented Conservatives and Liberals joining together in a new nationalist party. No such party materialized, but dissatisfaction with Duplessis's refusal to endorse the immediate creation of the hydroelectric power commission called

38 L'Action liberate Rationale

for by the Sherbrooke platform, among other things, resulted in dissident Conservatives launching the Parti Franc or Square party in June 1Q34.40 Duplessis's monopoly of the opposition in depressionridden Quebec had been challenged by dissident members of his own party. Before many more weeks passed the tensions which had long been building within Liberal ranks would produce a much more serious threat to his chances of replacing Taschereau. PAUL GOUIN: THE PROMISE OF M O D E R N I Z A T I O N WITH TRADITION

Paul Gouin, the man dissident Liberals eventually chose to lead their assault on the Taschereau regime, had been active since the early thirties in the search for ways to overcome francophone economic inferiority and to preserve French Canada's traditional values and social organization. As early as 1931 he was holding meetings at his residence to study economic and social questions. He also participated in the Association catholique de la jeunesse canadienne-franc,aise and, as president of its Montreal committee on light industry, organized a month's program on that subject for June 1933.41 Gouin subsequently joined several members of the ACJC'S central committee to form the Comite des oeuvres economiques and, a few months later, was one of a number of men applying for a charter for the Societe Jean Talon whose members would devote their efforts to furthering the economic development of Quebec and, more particularly, to promoting the movement in favour of light industry.42 The prolonged collapse of Quebec's big business, laissezfaire economy provided men like Gouin with an opportunity to gain support for the view that what the province needed was a smaller scale development planned and operated by francophones. Gouin's answers to the problems facing French Canadians during the thirties were no less ambiguous than those of other advocates of change who remained committed to the preservation of traditional values and social norms. He, like many others, argued for the implementation of both modern measures to meet Quebec's needs and a system of professional corporatism. While he did not condemn progress, Gouin insisted that it must involve reversing the exodus of French Canadians from the countryside which had so wounded the soul of the nation as to require a national reawakening.43 The establishment of light industries figured prominently in attainment of this goal. Gouin believed that the systematic development of medium-sized industries, based on the resources of agricultural Quebec and owned and operated by French Canadians, was the

39 A Third Quebec Party Is Born

answer both to the economic difficulties caused by the depression and to the problem of the control of Quebec's resources by alien capitalists. In Gouin's assessment, the French Canadian's talents were suited to an agrarian-based economy which would support the development of medium-sized local or regional enterprises. Using the capital that would otherwise be drained off by big business, French Canadians could establish new industrial centres and create new markets which would make agricultural expansion possible and reduce unemployment.44 The crucial element for implementation of this vision was rural electrification because this alone, Gouin emphasized, could keep French Canadians on the land. Because the inflated rates Quebecers had to pay for electricity resulted from the overcapitalization of private companies, Gouin argued that state control might even become necessary if these companies could not find a way to lower rates. Without rejecting the decisions of earlier Liberal governments with respect to the development of Quebec's natural resources, Gouin castigated the Taschereau administration for failing to revise policies in the light of the province's contemporary needs. Although the leasing of Quebec's natural resources had been the only policy possible earlier, this was no longer the case. To the contrary, the time had come for the provincial government to modify its policies so as to ensure that Quebec's natural resources were exploited to the benefit of all French Canadians. Herein lay the key to the attainment of economic independence by French Canadians. By facilitating access to electricity, for instance, the Quebec government could foster "numerous small industrial centres across the province."45 Gouin presented no detailed blueprint for the implementation of his proposals. Rather he acknowledged the technical problems involved in economic direction by the state and proposed the establishment of a corporate system to overcome them. This change could be achieved easily, he maintained, through conversion of the Legislative Council into an economic council similar to those established in many European countries after World War I. Such a body, composed of men with specialized knowledge, would provide an overall plan co-ordinating the work of the various government departments and commissions.46 Gouin's rural-oriented conservatism and espousal of corporatism divided him from more pragmatic and urban-oriented anti-Taschereau Liberals, but his promotion of an active interventionist role for the Quebec state provided a basis of co-operation. His advocacy of corporatism could do no immediate harm and would protect Quebec's dissident Liberals from accusa-

40 L'Action liberate nationale

tions that they were leftist radicals inspired by "alien" ideas.47 It also assured him the sympathy of thousands of francophones who were enamoured of corporatist ideas in the 19308. MOVING TOWARDS A THIRD PARTY

The idea of independent political action did not suddenly occur to dissatisfied Liberals in 1934. Up to that time, though, the dissidents had followed the advice of one of those present at a small dinner organized by Paul Gouin at the Reform Club in Montreal in the autumn of 1930 and tried to operate as a political movement at the very heart of the Liberal party.48 As conditions in Quebec had steadily worsened and attempts from within Liberal ranks to alter the Taschereau administration's policies had repeatedly failed, however, the idea of forming a third party came increasingly to the fore. Liberals like Jean Martineau who had come to believe the economic reform would only be possible through political action were forced to consider the possibility that such action would require the formation of a separate party.49 Although the Quebec Liberal party would remain united until mid-1934, discontent was reaching crisis level within the group of young French-Canadian Liberals in Montreal determined to terminate Taschereau's domination of Quebec liberalism. The pressure that had been building within Quebec Liberal ranks throughout the depression came to a head in the middle of 1934. In the spring Gouin was publicly questioning whether or not the future of Quebec youth lay with the Liberal party. On 23 April he addressed the Association de la jeunesse liberale de Montreal on this very matter. Shortly thereafter, a number of restive Liberals attended a dinner meeting at the Reform Club of Montreal.50 In the weeks following, dissident Montreal Liberals held several meetings at Gouin's residence and office to decide on the proper course of action. This group took out a charter for an organization to be called "L'Action Liberale" and moved on to formulate its program. With their roots in the Lapointe wing of the Quebec Liberals opposed to control of the party by big business interests, the initiators of the Action liberale aimed to free their party from domination by the trusts. This objective naturally involved getting rid of Taschereau and his close associates. No decision to break away from the Quebec Liberal party had been reached by the time a program based on the ESP proposals for social restoration was adopted by the Action liberale. Discussion of how this program should be implemented soon revealed that while some members of

4i A Third Quebec Party Is Born the Action liberale were of the opinion that the formation of a separate political party would be the best means, others disagreed, and they withdrew from the movement.51 The Action liberale was reduced to those Liberals willing to risk splitting the provincial party to achieve their movement's goals. Many Quebec Liberals were uncertain about the course to follow in the spring of 1934. The dissident Montrealers involved in the Action liberale set out to discover how much support they could count on from within Liberal circles if they decided to form a separate political party. One of Gouin's close associates, Calixte Cormier, a lawyer whose rise from the working class implied a willingness to challenge accepted norms, discussed the Quebec situation with Gedeon Begin, a dissident Liberal from the Eastern Townships.52 Having broken with Taschereau in the previous decade over a local party controversy in Sherbrooke, Begin promised that he and another locally prominent Liberal involved in this dispute would support a party formed to oppose the dominant provincial Liberals. Begin also suggested that the Action liberale approach Edouard Lacroix, the federal MP for Beauce. Cormier met with Lacroix shortly after Gouin's speech in April 1934 and received a promise of support from him if a new provincial party were formed. Lacroix, in turn, brought Leonard Demers, a Liberal organizer and an influential Quebec district businessman, into contact with the Action liberale. Throughout the spring of 1934, T.-D. Bouchard, speaker of the Legislative Assembly (since 1930), continued his attacks on Taschereau's hydroelectric policies, encouraging hope that he would aid the Action liberale. A similar hope was generated when another well-known government critic, the Legislative Councillor J.-C.-E. Ouellet, expressed interest in the Action liberale's reform program.53 Thus, although the Taschereau government remained united on the surface until mid-1934, the Action liberale could count on support from some dissatisfied Liberals in the event of a break with the Quebec party. A wider base of support, however, was essential before such action could be taken. The possibility of getting significant backing from federal Liberals would remain remote as long as Taschereau retained the provincial leadership because they would be dependent on his organization in the general election which might be called at any time. In an attempt to gain allies in the district of Quebec City, the young Montreal Liberals at the centre of this revolt therefore arranged to meet with possible supporters from that region in June 1934. Dr Philippe Hamel, Rene Chaloult, a young nationalist lawyer and a

42

L'Action liberale nationale

great admirer of Hamel, and Dr Felix Roy, the editor of L'Action Catholique, along with dissident Liberals including Horace Philippon, a lawyer, and Louis-Philippe Morin, an accountant, comprised the Quebec City delegation to an initial meeting held in Trois-Rivieres. Although the Action liberale received the support a few of those present, including Morin, the group led by Dr Hamel refused to cooperate because of a desire to form a purely nationalist party.54 Attempts to gain the support of Hamel's group did not cease, however. Many of the Montreal group agreed with Morin's view that the graveness of the times required that "all patriots should unite to save the race from the great evil of the century, the economic dictatorship."55 Despite reservations some Montreal dissident Liberals had about an alliance with the Quebec City nationalists, whom they suspected of not being very progressive, their shared antipathy to the trusts provided a basis for collaboration. Jean Martineau's denunciation of the Taschereau government's resource management record was as impassioned as any delivered by Quebec City's anti-trust crusaders. Describing the cession of Quebec's natural resources to "a small group of financiers" at low prices as "one of the saddest pages in the history of the province," he would later declare: "The systematic and cynical exploitation of our entire population by a few small companies, an exploitation which has been accentuated since the crisis thanks to the complicity of our government, has made Mr Taschereau and his colleagues the most hated men of this generation."56 Dissident Liberals were also trying to enlist the support of other Liberals. Early in July, F.A. Monk explained to a meeting of the Association des organisations liberates that the Action liberale's goal was to band together people who shared their view "that during this crisis ... liberal measures have not been taken in order to wipe it out and that the first preoccupation has not always been to improve the lot of all classes of society in our province." It was to redirect Liberal government policies along "truly Liberal" lines that the Action liberale sought endorsement of its effort to get the party to adopt a program of new ideas.57 Speaking to the same gathering, Roger Ouimet, Lapointe's future son-in-law, emphasized that the members of the Action liberale were sincere Liberals who wished to see the triumph of true liberalism in Quebec. An evolution within the Quebec Liberal party would, however, be necessary before it could restore prosperity to the province.58 But while many Liberals may have shared these views, there was no reason to assume that they would endanger party unity in an effort to bring about the Action liberale's desired "re-liberalization" process.

43 A Third Quebec Party Is Born

In their search for allies, the initiators of the Action liberale arranged to meet again with Dr Hamel and Liberal dissidents in Quebec City in July at the home of the dissident legislative councillor, Elysee Theriault. Although there had not yet been an official break with the party, preparations were being made for an eventual split. It had become increasingly apparent that any attempt to reliberalize the provincial administration would force dissident Liberals out of the party. This made it all the more important to gain the support of well-known, potentially popular political figures. To this end, it was suggested at this meeting that "nationale" be added to the movement's original name so as to attract men with primarily nationalist aims.59 This compromise brought a number of Quebec City nationalists into co-operation with the Montreal group, although Hamel did not join for several more months. While some of the rebellious Montreal Liberals who did not attend this Quebec City meeting were reputedly alarmed by the implications of this name change, it was too late to draw back.60 Paul Gouin, meanwhile, had been officially chosen leader of the Action liberale in June, and work on its program had been proceeding. Gouin's reputation as a champion of social causes and an author of reform proposals aimed at re-establishing a simpler, fairer capitalist system, along with his family connections, made him an attractive leader of a reformist Liberal revolt. So, too, did his ties to the authors of the ESP'S Programme de restauration sociale. His persuasive delivery of the nationalist, anti-trust message would be an asset in a campaign to discredit the Taschereau regime and to convince Quebecers that dissident Liberals and nationalists, not Duplessis's Conservatives, should form the next provincial government. By mid-July such rebel Montreal Liberals as Jean Martineau, Calixte Cormier, and Roger Ouimet, now supported by Fred Monk, were convinced that the time had come to launch a separate political party.61 Gouin, therefore, was prevailed upon to take the risks involved in an all-out attempt to deprive Taschereau and the Liberal old guard of control over the destiny of the French-Canadian nation and the fortunes of Quebec Liberals.62 On 28 July 1934, the manifesto of the Action liberale nationale appeared on the first page of Le Devoir?* Very shortly thereafter the Liberal MP for Beauce, Edouard Lacroix, while affirming his faith in the leadership of King and Lapointe, made good his earlier promise and withdrew support from the Quebec Liberal government on the grounds that "only liberalism - but a liberalism unblemished with economic dictatorship - was capable of saving the country and the province from ruin."64

44 L'Action liberale nationale CONCLUSION The unity of the Quebec Liberal party had been destroyed by that nucleus of Montreal Liberals grouped around Paul Gouin to fight against the Taschereau regime. In the course of breaking party ranks, the Montreal element had sought as allies all Quebecers who shared their determination to rid the province of the kinds of policies favoured by Taschereau and his associates. The Action liberale nationale emerged out of the confusion of ideas and needs generated by the depression. The men who created the movement were deeply involved in the development of these ideas. However, there were many different streams of thought in French Canada during the depression years and not all adherents of the ALN came to the movement with the same convictions and priorities. Thus, the impact of the Action liberale nationale would depend, in part, on how successfully its leaders integrated individuals with diverse aims into a cohesive and disciplined party. More immediately, it related directly to the response of Quebecers to ALN proposals. To further their particular answers to Quebec's economic and social problems, a number of French Canadians from Montreal and Quebec City with varied political backgrounds had united around a new chef. Equipped with little more than an intense desire to improve the economic prospects of all Quebec francophones by implementing the reforms in the ALN manifesto and a fund of about forty thousand dollars, the nucleus of rebel Liberals from Montreal had persuaded Paul Gouin that the time had come to publish their platform for change. Once they had overcome Gouin's fears that such action would endanger his political career, the initiators of the anti-Taschereau movement faced the task of popularizing ALN proposals. In the ensuing attempt to do so, if reformist Liberals involved in the Action liberale nationale had any differences of opinion with Gouin and more conservative, nationalist members of the ALN, they kept them quiet. No one could fail to recognize that Gouin's close ties to various Catholic action and nationalist groups as well as his Liberal connections would be of great use to the movement. His political heritage and impeccably orthodox nationalist views forestalled attacks on the Action liberale nationale as a radical leftist movement not indigenous to French Canada. Gouin's views and past associations served to put the movement clearly in the mainstream of French-Canadian nationalist thought of the 19305. His message to Quebecers brought together the nationalist and socio-economic grievances of the province's francophone majority. What Gouin set out to do in the summer of 1934 was to convince

45 A Third Quebec Party Is Born

French Canadians that they should put aside traditional political loyalties and rally to the Action liberale nationale whose program would improve the economic and social well-being of francophones from all classes while preserving the traditional French Catholic values upon which their nation's survival depended.

4 L'Action liberale nationale: The Initial Challenge

The destruction of even the facade of Liberal party unity in Quebec, with the publication of the manifesto of the Action liberale nationale in midsummer 1934, further confused the complicated political situation in that province. Not even those responsible for launching the movement were certain of the role the ALN would play in future political developments. In the belief that the solution to Quebec's pressing social and economic problems depended on "a political evolution" at the provincial level, the sponsors of the ALN introduced themselves to Quebecers as the spokesmen for a "movement ... founded on the need of decisive and constructive political action, which, while not detracting from the value of past accomplishments or the credit due to the authors thereof, insists nevertheless on dealing primarily with the present and the future. It recognizes the importance of adapting our provincial policy to the urgent needs of today."1 The severity of the economic crisis had brought some Quebec Liberals into open opposition against a provincial Liberal administration which had refused to accommodate them and their ideas. The care the dissidents took not to impugn past Liberal administrations served to highlight the fact that their quarrel was only with Premier Taschereau and those Liberals who shared his views.2 The desire not to alienate Liberals who, like them, abhorred the Taschereau regime was reflected in the presentation of the Action liberale nationale as a movement and not as a party. Nonetheless, those involved were well aware that the publication of the manifesto immeasurably increased the likelihood of the ALN

47 The Initial Challenge

functioning as a separate political party.3 There was, however, neither certainty nor unanimity within the movement as to its future course. Much would depend on the sources of future support, on the popularity of the manifesto, and on the reactions of existing parties to this movement whose backers included advocates of both modernization and perpetuation of traditional French-Canadian values. The public appearance of the Action liberale nationale naturally gave rise to questions concerning not only its relationship to dissatisfied Liberals but also to the Quebec Conservatives under Duplessis and to the Square party recently launched by rebellious members of that party. The relationship of the ALN to other politically active groups in Quebec was always important to the initiators of the Action liberale nationale. Their most pressing problem immediately after publication of the manifesto, however, was to find ways to win sufficient popular support to make the movement's potential electoral strength a factor to be reckoned with. The ALN had a leader and a platform in July 1934 but few of the other attributes of a viable political party such as local associations and experienced fundraisers. The founders of the Action liberale nationale had acted on the assumption that political power alone would enable them to achieve their aims. They generally agreed that the attainment of this goal would require endorsement by wellknown Quebec reformers willing to participate in a widespread publicity campaign. Questions about the ALN'S political alignment continued to complicate the search for such allies because the movement was largely seen as a Liberal offshoot. In the Quebec district, for instance, the dilemma was to find a way to accommodate two such influential individuals as Edouard Lacroix, a businessman and federal Liberal MP, and Dr Philippe Hamel, the nationalist crusader from Quebec City's professional elite. Even as the Action liberale nationale launched its publicity campaign at a rally sponsored by Lacroix in his riding of Beauce, the ALN was still struggling to reach an understanding with Hamel which would allow him to join the fight against Taschereau without becoming associated in any way whatsoever with the Liberal party.4 ALN leaders, consequently, stressed the non-partisan nature of the movement in their attempt to attract broader support. The hope was that the ALN'S churchinspired, economically nationalist, and reformist program would draw enough voters from the two old parties to undermine Taschereau's hold on Quebec and prevent Duplessis from turning the Conservative party into a viable alternative to the Liberals. The largely middle-class professional leadership of the Action

48 L'Action liberate nationale

liberate nationale realized from the outset that success depended upon convincing a variety of interests that the ALN could and would meet their particular needs. They were also aware that they were vying with Duplessis for the support of dissatisfied elements from all sectors of Quebec society including the church whose approximately 25,000 clerics and nuns not only ran the province's education and social service systems but also functioned as agronomists and even entrepreneurs. What the ALN had to do was to persuade the province's French Catholic majority that its party, not Duplessis's, offered the best chance of bringing about the economic, social, and political restructuring needed to right the wrongs of the Taschereau regime. The ALN'S endorsement of agriculture, small business, the co-operative movement, a better deal for workers, corporatism, and political reform assured the new party of a sympathetic hearing. The challenge would be to transform such sympathy into votes for ALN candidates in the next provincial election. LAUNCHING THE ALN

On 12 August 1934 Gouin launched the Action liberale nationale as a Quebec party in a speech calling upon his compatriots to put the national interest of French Canada before all else in view of the current crisis.5 The time had come, he declared, to implement the reforms that leading French-Canadian clerics and intellectuals deemed absolutely necessary to ensure the survival of their nation and its values. The Action liberale nationale had had to be formed because of the unwillingness, or inability, of Quebec's existing parties to institute these reforms. The ALN'S program was not, Gouin took great care to demonstrate, the product of alien, atheistic intellectuals. Rather, its very creation could be traced to a desire to put into effect papal injunctions requiring the state to reform the abuses of capitalism so as to prevent the violent overthrow of the entire social system based on private property. To substantiate this claim, Gouin pointed out that the framers of the ALN manifesto had taken the program of social restoration commissioned by the Ecole sociale populaire as their guide. Paul Gouin appealed for support in emotionally charged nationalist terms. Every French Canadian alive, he told the rally, had a "duty ... to rise above personal interests, the interests of the family, of class, and even of party, and to occupy himself with a single interest: the national interest." Honore Mercier's grandson declared that every generation of French Canadians since 1759 had successfully met a particular challenge to the nation's language, faith, or culture.

49 The Initial Challenge

It was now the "duty" of their generation "to assure a national and economic conquest for our people." This would involve not a complete reversal of the existing order in Quebec but only of the adverse effects of excessive industrialization. Beginning with the premise that the economic crisis being experienced by Quebec was "mainly due to faulty distribution of wealth, to financial greed and to the many abuses which have crept into the application of the democratic system," the ALN manifesto argued that it was "idle to hope that equilibrium will re-establish itself without the assistance of a well-defined line of action."6 Achievement of a proper balance required political as well as economic change along the lines of the transformation believed to be occurring in "the regenerated Democratic party" in the United States under Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Action liberale nationale had been organized to provide Quebecers with "a general plan which, even if imperfect, points the way to a combined political and economic evolution, sole guarantee of that fairer distribution of wealth which will eliminate unemployment and conquer the depression." The plan of the founders of the Action liberale nationale was an amplified version of the ESP program of social restoration, altered to fit their particular interpretation of French Canada's needs and to make it more practical politically. Proposed ALN reforms did not run counter to changes advocated by the earlier program, but the two plans differed in scope. In addition to economic and labour reforms which closely resembled the ESP proposals, the ALN advocated industrial, commercial, electoral, fiscal, and judicial reforms. "Rural reconstruction," however, remained the key to economic recovery and reform in Quebec as the opening statement of the ALN manifesto had emphasized. Industrialization was not rejected but change was required to link it to agricultural growth. The Action liberale nationale promised a vast colonization plan, rural electrification, increased agrarian subsidies, and more agricultural schools. Furthermore, an ALN government would set up a provincial system of agricultural credit, promote medium-sized industries, and establish a professional organization for farmers. A provincial commission of agriculture and colonization was proposed to plan and co-ordinate these various enterprises so that the nationalists' dual objective of preserving Quebec's agricultural character and increasing francophone involvement in industry might be achieved. The ALN program did not stop at the limits of the countryside. City workers were to be provided with a labour code. The recommendations of Quebec's Commission on Social Insurance would be

50 L'Action libdrale nationale

enacted, thereby protecting children, improving industrial hygiene, creating sickness and disability insurance, and providing old age pensions and allowances to needy mothers. Workmen's dwellings were to be built to facilitate slum clearance. A companion policy of more equitable remuneration for labour was intended to increase property ownership by workers. Proposals for legally guaranteed minimum wages and maximum hours, combined with the priority of wages over dividends, indicate a pro-labour, albeit paternalistic, bias in the ALN program. The first economic reform promised to serve the interests of small business and consumers, by "breaking], by all possible means, the grip of the great financial institutions, the hydro-electricity trust and the newsprint trust in our province and our municipalities." The new party was determined "to combat the coal trust, the gasoline trust, the bread trust, resorting to state competition if necessary." It was most appropriate that the Action liberale nationale should be launched at a rally in Edouard Lacroix's riding. Born in Beauce in 1889, Lacroix had been engaged in the lumbering trade in the United States and Canada for years, rising to be president and general manager of the Madawaska Company of Maine and of the woollen mill in Saint-Georges. His long-time opposition to the policies of the Taschereau regime had eventually convinced this regionally based, medium-sized francophone entrepreneur and politician to throw his weight and financial resources behind a party which promised to better the lot of francophone businessmen and consumers by curbing the power of big business. Whereas the program of the Ecole sociale populaire was concerned with social and economic reforms only, the ALN'S founders were interested in electoral reforms as well. Election expenses were to be reduced. If, as Paul Gouin believed, big business had been able to make the democratic system serve its interests rather than those of most of the people by contributing generously to party war chests, the limitation of campaign contributions would represent a large step forward in the resolution of Quebec's problems. The amounts of political subscriptions from both individuals and companies were to be restricted. Additional measures, such as the provision of identity cards, were suggested to eliminate voting irregularities. Gouin gave expression to a desire within the Action liberale nationale to purify as well as to modernize politics in Quebec.7 The influence of business over government was also to be reduced by legislation prohibiting ministers from being directors of banks and of trust, insurance, and railway companies. In the section on fiscal reforms, the ALN program included

51 The Initial Challenge temporary measures such as the repurchase of property alienated by sheriffs sales of mortgage loans as well as long-range plans to increase federal subsidies to the province. In line with its desire to redistribute income, the ALN promised to seek redistribution of both federal and municipal taxes to ensure a "more equitable levy on commercial corporations and certain classes of individuals, now enjoying unfair exemptions."8 Here, as throughout the ALN'S manifesto, one sees the combined influence of the papal encyclicals and the attitudes of contemporary French-Canadian nationalist intellectuals on economic questions. Some of the ALN'S members were primarily concerned to bring about the modernization needed to enable French Canadians to cope with and benefit from the industrialization which had transformed Quebec into a highly urbanized environment. The ALN program therefore contained proposals designed to achieve this objective, but rural rehabilitation and the readjustment of Quebec's rural-urban population ratio were the ALN'S cardinal remedies for the ills produced by Taschereau' s championship of economic liberalism and big business. The endorsement of a type of professional corporatism for Quebec, as the system best suited to the needs of a French Catholic society, mirrored the beliefs of Father Archambault of the Ecole sociale populaire who had launched a pro-corporatist campaign in 1Q34.9 Paul Gouin, in fact, devoted a considerable proportion of his initial public appeal for support at Saint-Georges-de-Beauce to a description of the ALN plan for corporatism. A twelve-member economic council would replace the Legislative Council and would decide, on the advice of various subcommittees, what action should be recommended to the government. The new council would be purely advisory, and all its recommendations were to be made public when transmitted to the government in order that public opinion could be brought to bear on the government if action was desired. Not surprisingly, Gouin's version of how corporatism would work differed from that prepared for the Ecole sociale populaire by Esdras Minville in which a coalition of social and national forces actually set government policy on economic and social matters. The ALN'S version nevertheless held out the hope that power would be more decentralized, to the benefit of non-governmental social entities and organizations. Intellectuals, liberal professionals, and various economic interests, among others, would be guaranteed access to the government policy-making process. Francophones from all walks of life and not the anglophone big business elite would be influencing the direction Quebec went in, economically and socially.

52

L'Action liberale nationale

By advocating a system of professional corporatism, the Action liberale nationale had become the political champion of a cause for which there was great support among French-Canadian nationalist intellectuals and the Catholic clergy. In mid-August 1934 French Canadians heard one group of young men give their version of the sources of the evils of the depression and offer an elaborate remedial program which promised to improve conditions for all classes of francophones. More than four years of increasing economic distress had created a receptive atmosphere for the ALN'S ideas. While the response of Quebecers to the new program remained uncertain, people throughout the province were clearly interested in hearing what ALN spokesmen had to say and speakers were requested in many parts of the province.10 Before the end of the year, a dozen ALN rallies had been held in ten counties stretching from the Gaspe to Lac-St-Jean, Shefford, and Portneuf. ll The ALN also made extensive use of radio so that many other areas were reached by regular broadcasts from Montreal and Quebec City. ALN leaders approached specialists in various fields early in the fall of 1934 to find out if they would be willing to collaborate with the new party.12 Although many well-known French Canadians agreed to take part in a study committee, records indicate that almost all of them would only co-operate on the condition that such participation did not involve official adherence to the Action liberale nationale. On this understanding, leaders of several Catholic action groups, including the Union catholique des cultivateurs, the Catholic syndicates, the ACJC, and the caisses populaires provided the ALN with advice and material for speeches.13 Albert Rioux, for example, made available an elaborate report on the reorganization of agriculture in Quebec. Others worked on the financial and labour reforms. Finally, Esdras Minville was reported to have agreed to study the manifesto as a whole and suggest supporting documentation for its proposals.14 The party could count on widespread popular sympathy within the network of Catholic action groups influenced by the Jesuits, the sponsors of the ESP program which dissident Liberals and nationalists had now turned into a political manifesto. From the perspective of the Catholic Church, the ALN was the Quebec party best suited to being its secular arm especially as the prolonged depression and the threat of socialism had convinced many clerics that the provincial government would have to assume more responsibility in the social and economic realms. Some members of the clergy - such as the Quebec City journalist and priest, Edouard Lavergne, and the Catholic syndicate chaplain, Pierre Gravel - actually went so far as

53 The Initial Challenge to denounce the Taschereau regime publicly, '5 foreshadowing the clerical involvement which became an issue in the 1935 election. Aware of the need to unify popular sentiment against the current government, ALN leaders focussed their appeals for support on nonpartisan, national issues. By mid-1934 French Canadians were certainly receptive to suggestions that the Quebec economy be revised in such a way as to increase francophone control. ALN members attempted, therefore, to identify the Taschereau administration with the economic subjugation and paralysis of the early thirties and to associate their movement with economic liberation and, consequently, la survivance. The Action liberale nationale presented itself as the champion of all French Canadians irrespective of party affiliation. Jean Martineau, among others, emphasized that political allegiances had to be put aside in view of the grave dangers facing French Canada. Only if French Canadians united behind the ALN to bring the Taschereau government down, would they ensure that their survival in Quebec would be something more than enslavement.16 ALN leaders set out to arouse public opinion in the summer of 1934 in an attempt to bring Taschereau's control of the government of Quebec to an end. They very quickly became convinced that to do this would necessitate coming out ahead of the Liberals and, of course, the Conservatives, at the polls in the next provincial election. Whether or not the Action liberale nationale could do this depended, in the opinion of one contemporary journalist, on the leaders of the movement proving themselves "not only from the intellectual and moral point of view ... but also from that of political strategy."17 THE ALN'S OPPONENTS RESPOND

The initial response of the Quebec Liberal party to the appearance of the Action liberale nationale was studied indifference, carried to the point where those newspapers closely identified with the provincial government were accused of attempting to smother the movement "by silence and by insinuation."18 But the Taschereau administration could not long afford to ignore a movement initiated by discontented Liberals under the leadership of a son of Sir Lomer Gouin. With the publication of the manifesto and the invitation to Paul Gouin and his associates from a federal Liberal MP to address his electors, the Quebec Liberal government took steps to protect its position. On the eve of the meeting in Saint-Georges-de-Beauce, Paul Gouin was offered a safe Liberal seat in the provincial legislature

54

L'Action liberate nationale

provided that he did not attend the rally.19 The bid to rob the ALN of its high-profile leader at the outset of the movement's initial bid for public support was only the first of the attempts made by the Taschereau administration to prevent the ALN from getting off the ground. In early August, just before the Beauce rally, the government announced that 10 million dollars was to be spent on colonization within Quebec and began preparations for a conference on this subject in the autumn.20 Steps were also taken to silence federal Liberals, including Ernest Lapointe, who were encouraging the ALN to criticize certain provincial Liberal policies.21 Within ten days of the initial ALN rally, for instance, the Quebec premier named a threemember commission to investigate problems involving hydroelectric power. Faced with Lacroix's repudiation, the Taschereau administration moved to silence Ernest Lapointe, its most renowned opponent on the power question and a known sympathizer with the aims of the Action liberale nationale, by appointing him to head this commission.22 Under Lapointe's leadership the investigation would presumably serve to keep at bay provincial Liberal critics of the administration's power policy including T.-D. Bouchard, who had for so long been at odds with Taschereau on this issue. Bouchard had been in close contact with the founders of the Action liberale nationale following publication of its manifesto,23 and there was even a rumour that he would, in fact, take over the leadership of the movement. Indeed, in early August 1934 Bouchard gave a dinner at his summer house which was attended by the Montreal founders of the ALN and two federal Liberal MPS, Cyrille Dumaine (Bagot) and Adelard Fontaine (Saint-Hyacinthe). Nothing came of this rumour, but it served to point up the degree of discontent within Liberal party ranks.24 The growing unease of the Taschereau Liberals led them to set about reactivating their organizational network in the province. Within days of the rally at Saint-Georges-de-Beauce, Taschereau announced the formation of an organization committee for Quebec to be headed by the government leader in the Legislative Council, Jacob Nicol.25 Before the end of August, Adelard Godbout and other prominent Liberals had held a rally at Donnaconna to answer the accusations levelled against the Taschereau administration by Gouin, Lacroix, and their supporters who now included the premier's nephew, Gerald Coote.26 As the ALN campaign gained momentum and met with an increasingly enthusiastic reception during the autumn of 1934, the response of the Quebec Liberals became more vehement. Focussed on personalities rather than issues, this counteroffensive impugned

55 The Initial Challenge

the character and motives of the men involved in the movement. Paul Gouin, by virtue of his family connections and his leadership of the ALN, was a prime target for abuse in the Liberal press. Le Soleil, for example, suggested that Gouin's realization that he had a duty to re-liberalize the party led by Taschereau dated from the premier's failure to fulfil his request for appointment as curator of the Quebec Museum. As proof, the paper offered a copy of Gouin's personal letter of request to Taschereau which the premier reportedly had released for publication.27 Other newspapers favourable to the administration attributed Gouin's disillusionment with the Liberals to his failure to receive the Liberal party's nomination in the ridings of Portneuf or Assumption in igsi. 28 In another attempt to offset any possible bad effects that the creation of the ALN might have on Liberal fortunes, Taschereau and his supporters attributed the founding of the movement to the Conservatives. According to the premier, Gouin and his followers had always been "unconscious Conservatives."29 Echoing this interpretation, Le Canada argued that the opposition had long been trying to create an effective political party by offering to join with the young "mecontents" supporting Paul Gouin.30 And, in a bitter attack on Gouin late in 1934, Le Soleil offered proof of his veniality and of the bleu connections of the movement he led, namely, the instructions issued to ALN speakers in the course of the autumn not to mention the Conservatives led by Duplessis, the Square party created by disgruntled members of his opposition, or the supporters of the federal Conservative MP, Onesime Gagnon, and the former provincial Conservative leader, Camillien Houde.31 Liberal insinuations notwithstanding, no Quebec Conservatives had been in any way responsible for the creation of the Action liberale nationale, nor were the leaders of any of its factions involved with the organization during its initial campaign. Indeed throughout the ALN'S initial appeal for support, the Quebec Conservative party under Duplessis's leadership went about its business displaying interest in neither the program nor the personnel of the Action liberale nationale. Now firmly entrenched as opposition leader, Maurice Duplessis was actually carrying on his own extensive speaking tour of the province. Concentrating on rural constituencies, Duplessis delivered his usual message that agriculture was not only French Canada's basic industry but also the safeguard of its "national and religious traditions."32 To ensure the survival of Quebec agriculture and, consequently, of French Canada, Duplessis advocated implementation of the Conservative plan for a system of long-term rural credits to be administered by an independent

56 L'Action liberate nationale

commission. The thrust of Duplessis's campaign was to attack the Taschereau administration's performance without putting the official Conservative platform forward as a solution for the ills suffered by Quebecers. This platform, adopted at the 1933 Sherbrooke convention, bore a marked resemblance to the reform program of the Ecole sociale populaire (and thus to the ALN'S program as well). Conservative leaders had doubts about its proposed increases in social legislation and suggested attacks on the trusts, and they were reluctant to give it prominence.33 With attacks on the Taschereau regime mounting steadily, Conservative hopes of victory in Quebec rose.34 Efforts were directed at taking advantage of Liberal problems in such a way as to ensure that, following the next provincial contest, Duplessis would form the first Conservative administration of the century in Quebec.35 In Duplessis's view, Conservative efforts should be concentrated exclusively on attaining that end. Until then, he refused to commit his party to the implementation of specific reforms.36 Those Liberals who were responsible for the break with Taschereau were, however, interested in alliances with others opposed to his administration. It was for this reason that ALN speakers had been advised not to mention Conservatives or to say anything that could be interpreted as indirectly attacking Duplessis, the Square party, or supporters of Houde and Gagnon.37 Negotiations between the ALN and the Square party had commenced by the time the initial ALN campaign got under way.38 These negotiations proved abortive but not because the Action liberale nationale was unwilling to be associated with dissidents whose roots were Conservative.39 Indeed, once they had decided to take the field against Taschereau, ALN leaders had sought to take advantage of the split in Conservative ranks.40 Discussions with Onesime Gagnon took place initially during the closing months of 1934, and it was hoped that he might become associated with the Action liberale nationale in such a way as to bring those Quebec Conservatives who supported him into the movement.41 The ALN'S position would thereby be strengthened in two ways - by additional adherents and by the depletion of Duplessis's supporters. At the same time, the possibility of reaching a cooperative arrangement with Duplessis was not overlooked. J.-C.-E. Ouellet of the ALN was anxiously seeking to discuss such matters with the Quebec Conservative leader late in 1934. Duplessis expressed a willingness to meet with Ouellet, but he did not share his sense of urgency.42 The importance to the ALN of securing Conservative allies increased as federal Liberals, at first sympathetic to the Action liberale nationale, moved back to Taschereau's side

57 The Initial Challenge

following Lapointe's nomination as chairman of the electricity commission. This shift, of course, reduced the threat posed by the ALN in general which may account for the fact that nothing came of these initial approaches to either Gagnon or Duplessis. Between Duplessis's speaking tour and the ALN rallies during the summer and autumn of 1934, Taschereau's government had, by the end of that year, come under heavy attack both for what it had done and for what it refused to do. The administration had not suffered any further defections from the ranks of its elected members, but Oscar Drouin and T.-D. Bouchard remained openly dissatisfied. It was even rumoured that when the provincial session opened in January 1935 Drouin, supported by a strong group of Liberals, would propose the adoption of a series of reforms similar to those advocated by the ALN and some Quebec Conservatives.43 The ALN campaign, furthermore, showed no signs of abating, with a series of radio broadcasts scheduled to spread the anti-Taschereau message across the province throughout the winter months. Once the provincial legislature reconvened, moreover, Duplessis would be back operating most effectively as leader of the opposition. Faced with these prospects, the Liberal attack on the Action liberale nationale, and on Paul Gouin in particular, intensified. As the year in which rebel Liberals had destroyed the Quebec party's unity drew to a close, Le Soleil reiterated charges that Gouin's break with Taschereau stemmed from his belief that he deserved a more prestigious and more profitable patronage appointment than the premier had offered him. In response, the ALN leader broke the silence which he had maintained in the face of Le Soleil's previous attacks. Addressing the Quebec people in the first ALN broadcast of 1935, Gouin attempted to turn the tables on the Liberals by implying that, on three separate occasions in the course of 1935, the Taschereau government had, without solicitation, tried to buy him off by offering him the position of parliamentary librarian for Quebec at the rank and salary of a deputy minister. He went on to reveal publicly the Liberal offer of a safe provincial seat in return for his absence from the ALN rally at Saint-Georges-de-Beauce and his endorsement of the Taschereau government's colonization policy.44 FROM M O V E M E N T TO PARTY: ESTABLISHING THE ALN'S IDENTITY

The anti-Taschereau, anti-trust campaign launched by the Action liberale nationale six months earlier escalated in the new year. As it

58 L'Action liberate nationale

had become clear that Taschereau did not intend to step down (willingly or otherwise) in spite of discontent with his leadership even at the cabinet level, some ALN leaders advocated dropping the re-liberalization plank.45 With the nature of Taschereau's attacks on the Action liberale nationale and Lapointe's refusal of Gouin's public offer of the ALN leadership in mid-January 1935, hope of being able to re-liberalize the Quebec party had clearly faded.46 By the beginning of February, battle lines were taking shape for what looked like a coming fight at the polls. The Action liberale nationale dropped any pretence of aiming merely at re-liberalization of the current administration and concentrated on convincing the province's voters to replace the Taschereau regime with one made up of members of the ALN. To this end, ALN leaders intensified their efforts to establish their party's identity. The anti-trust character of the Action liberale nationale was reinforced by the adherence of Dr Philippe Hamel in March 1935 (following ALN acceptance of certain policies on hydroelectricity, should it win at the polls). The Quebec City champion of the public power movement joined the founders of the ALN in a new political party in a province with long-established political traditions and a firmly entrenched Liberal government. They therefore devoted a great deal of their time and money to telling Quebec voters who they were, what they wanted to do, and why the creation of another provincial party had been necessary. The Action liberale nationale was, its spokesmen maintained, not a newly created third party because its roots dated back fifty years to Honore Mercier's party of Liberal nationalists. It was therefore Taschereau's party, and not Gouin's, that was Quebec's third party.47 To counter Liberal charges that the ALN was nothing but a group of "mecontents," the party carried on an extensive publicity campaign to persuade Quebecers that their party was deeply rooted in French Canada's past. ALN publicity, moreover, was aimed at convincing Quebecers that concern for their needs, not political ambition, accounted for the birth of the party. Gouin, for instance, told Quebecers that only the patriotism inspired by the lives of his ancestors and the self-denial made necessary by the economic crisis had brought him into politics. Jean Martineau, for his part, explained that the domination of the trusts in Quebec and the impasse in which French-Canadian farmers and workers found themselves in the thirties had forced "a group of sincere men" into politics to attempt a general restoration of the economic and political life of Quebec.48 Speeches and literature and La Province, the newspaper founded in the spring of 1935 to present

59 The Initial Challenge

the ALN viewpoint, expanded on this image of the party. They also presented the Action liberale nationale as the party concerned with the everyday concerns of ordinary people - food, clothing, and protection against sickness.49 The ALN was continually portrayed as the party in Quebec with a social and national purpose directed by disinterested men who shared the aim of improving the quality of life for all French Canadians. The economic crisis of the 19305 had brought together in the Action liberale nationale men who differed on the question of whether nationalist measures or social reform were of greatest importance to French Canada. Both camps, however, agreed with francophone nationalist intellectuals and scientists of the interwar era that French Canada's search for solutions to contemporary problems must respect, but could not be confined to, tradition and doctrine.50 With due regard for the past, the ALN proposed to govern Quebec according to modern ideas and not the obsolete notions of previous generations. Having adopted a program which married social reform to traditional values, it had to convince voters that the party had competent leaders who were offering an intelligent, progressive, yet safe alternative to Taschereau and Duplessis. The ALN continued to stress that its carefully prepared program was based on the ideas of the province's leading ecclesiastical and lay thinkers. Charges that their proposals were revolutionary were, therefore, groundless. The Action liberale nationale only planned to do for Quebecers what French Catholic intellectuals believed needed to be done, "to make necessary and urgent reforms," nothing more. Party spokesmen emphasized that the changes advocated would be neither so rapid nor so revolutionary as to overwhelm the society; progress, they assured French Canadians, was possible without a loss of faith.51 The economic problems of Quebec during the depression were closely associated with the collapse of foreign-owned enterprises, and French Canadians generally felt powerless and dispossessed. In response, the Action liberale nationale had adopted a double aim. It promised to institute policies that responded to Quebec's current economic problems, but it also pledged to adopt a "national policy" in governing Quebec.52 The need for such a policy was self-evident according to an editorial in La Province which endorsed Abbe Groulx's contention that French Canadians were "no longer anything more than carriers of water and hewers of wood in the country where [their] fathers had so valiantly carved out a glorious heritage."53 The ALN thus offered voters the economic reconquest of Quebec by French Canadians along with social justice. The breaking

6o L'Action liberate nationale

up of the trusts was necessary for the achievement of both aims. The time had come, the Action liberale nationale told Quebecers, to reverse the economic dictatorship of the province. From the outset, Edouard Lacroix and other ALN supporters had preached to French Canadians that they had a duty to fight big business interests which had built fortunes and power on the hardships of the workers. Action had to be taken against the numerous monopolies operating to the detriment of the labouring population. This theme, central to the ALN'S bid for support, was succinctly summarized by Gouin at a rally at Sainte-Agathe early in 1935. "The fact that certain low-ranking officers or directors of our large companies earn fifty or one hundred thousand dollars a year, whereas certain of our workers, shop assistants, and lumberjacks are shamefully exploited by their employers," was, he flatly declared, "unjust and criminal ... The grip of the monopolies and the trusts must be broken."54 By doing so, moreover, the Action liberale nationale would also realize its goal of transferring economic power into the hands of smaller, francophone entrepreneurs. The connection between the economic reconquest of Quebec by French Canadians and political power for the ALN was made very clear. The Taschereau regime was depicted as the friend of the trusts while the Action liberale nationale was presented as the champion of the people and the terror of the trusts.55 Although French-Canadian interests had been "sold out" by the Taschereau regime, all was not yet lost. The ALN would see that labour was treated at least as well as management and that payment of fair wages received priority.56 The aim, La Province declared, was "to drive out the thieves who are cutting the throats of our citizens and to replace them with true patriots who will know how to give the people of Quebec their real place in the sun."57 The Action liberale nationale also offered itself as the party of youth. ALN promoters were aware of the potent appeal that a party promising action in the face of obvious social injustices would have among young French Canadians who had not benefited from the process of industrialization and whose prospects had been destroyed by the depression. In the first issue of La Province, youth, which owed "nothing to its present rulers," was called upon to support the party that offered to save them. Young voters were urged to rally to the ALN and "present a united front the better to obtain that to which they have a right." If they responded to the challenge and rallied to the Action liberale nationale, young French Canadians would "know the grandeur of being masters" by giving themselves "leaders not servants!"58

6i

The Initial Challenge

The Action liberale nationale endeavoured as well to present itself as the champion of the "little guy," dedicated to defending the interests of consumers, small investors, and workers. The party did not, however, look to the mass of French Canadians to provide leaders in its crusade. The duty of leadership was assigned to the traditional elites of the community which must be awakened if French Canadians were "to preserve their national character."59 Although such appeals suggest that the ALN'S leadership intended it to function much like a traditional Quebec party, its very creation opened up a new avenue for political advancement to individuals who had been shut out of the Taschereau regime at a time when joining the Conservatives was a lost cause. Local input into selection of ALN candidates was ensured by the party's practice of consulting the mayor, leading merchants, and the cure in its search for the best men.60 But regardless of who actually ran for the Action liberale nationale, the role of the general populace remained simply to provide these candidates with the power the ALN needed to enact its program. Thus, the appearance of Quebec's first purely provincial party did not radically alter the way politics operated in the province, but it did bring about some modification by allowing a few merchants, small industrialists, and even workers into the system. It also gave rise to more active intervention in politics by social groups such as the clergy, unions, and youth organizations. QUEBEC LIBERALS MOUNT A REARGUARD ACTION: JANUARY-JUNE 1935

As the ALN campaign gained momentum during the early months of 1935, its political significance steadily increased. Although the party still lacked an outstanding spokesman in the Legislative Assembly when the 1935 session opened, Duplessis's violent attacks on all government proposals had the effect of reinforcing the ALN offensive against the Liberal party. The Taschereau administration's efforts to mollify dissatisfied supporters, moreover, were meeting with only limited success. While Oscar Drouin remained within party ranks, he acted in an increasingly independent manner. Speaking in the assembly soon after the session opened, he sounded more like an opposition member than a government supporter as he proposed the introduction of old age pensions, an unemployment insurance scheme, workmen's compensation legislation more favourable to workers, conversion of the Legislative Council into an economic council, and anti-trust legislation. Echoing one of the fundamental tenets of the ALN program, Drouin declared that Quebec faced new

62

L'Action liberate nationale

problems and it was time the province's legislators began to provide new solutions. To begin, he suggested steps should be taken to destroy economic dictatorship and to end the concentration of riches in the hands of a few.61 Drouin did not have to wait long for the Quebec Liberal party's response to his demands. The electricity commission, headed by his long-time political mentor, Ernest Lapointe, had held meetings in various Quebec centres during the autumn of 1934, and it reported late in January 1935. The report, which did not recommend state ownership, pleased St James Street business interests but increased dissatisfaction within the Liberal party. Drouin, T.-D. Bouchard, J.-N. Francoeur, and Joseph Samson all openly expressed dissatisfaction with the report's recommendations.62 Drouin's public criticism of Lapointe's report severely alarmed both provincial and federal Liberals. With a federal election fast approaching, and a provincial contest not unlikely, many Liberals sympathetic to the aims of the Action liberale nationale now rallied to Taschereau's side. In the face of what looked to be a significant threat to their hold on Quebec, the Liberal party closed ranks, demonstrating how Confederation and the way the Canadian party system operated limited the ability of federal and provincial politicians to act independently. Fear that Drouin might defect inspired the Club liberale Lapointe of Quebec City to organize a Liberal youth rally which both Lapointe and Taschereau would address in a display of party unity.63 While urging young French-Canadian Liberals to demand reforms constantly, Lapointe advised them to do so from within party ranks on the grounds that their aims could only be realized in this way. Destruction of Liberal unity would simply aid their opponents and accomplish nothing. Lapointe made a determined effort to offset any possible bad effects his well-known differences of opinion with the Quebec premier might have had on party solidarity. Attributing his lack of involvement in provincial politics to his role at the federal level, Lapointe declared that he was a Liberal in Quebec as he was in Ottawa and internationally. As Lapointe himself emphasized, and as his ringing appeal for party unity at all levels made so very clear, he was truly "a party man."64 His concern, widely shared by the leadership of the Liberal party in Quebec in the face of the ALN'S mounting anti-Taschereau, antitrust campaign, was to convince younger Quebec Liberals to follow his example and toe the party line. But while Lapointe could be counted on to act in the best interests of the Liberal party, it remained uncertain whether his disciples would follow his lead. The Taschereau administration suffered no

63 The Initial Challenge

defections from among its elected representatives before the provincial session ended in mid-May, but Lapointe's appeal for unity did not bring an end to the public airing of fights within the provincial party. The three bills designed by the Taschereau administration as a response to the Lapointe Commission's report caused one such dispute. To the surprise of many, Bouchard's lengthy speech on these bills, which began with terms reminiscent of his usual criticisms of government electricity policies, ended with a statement that he would support the proposed measures. Drouin, long one of Bouchard's chief allies in his fight against the electricity trust, split openly with him, declaring that the proposed legislation amounted to nothing more than a camouflage.65 The reason for Bouchard's unaccustomed quiescence was soon evident. In May 1935 a bill was introduced to create a Ministry of Industry and Commerce. On 6 June 1935 Bouchard, long the most outspoken critic of the Liberal government on economic matters and once a contender for the leadership of the Action liberale nationale, entered Taschereau's administration as the first minister of municipal affairs, trade and commerce. That Taschereau had been forced to create a cabinet position for his long-time critic attested to Liberal concern over developments since the inception of the ALN. OBSTACLES TO ALN SUCCESS

While the Action liberale nationale had made no alliance with any Conservatives prior to the announcement of the 1935 federal election, the spectre of a common opposition front in Quebec had been raised. Addressing the Conservative Club of Universite Laval in mid-March 1935 the federal solicitor-general, Maurice Dupre", praised the members of the ALN for their sincerity, hard work, and courage and advised them to join with the Conservatives who were fighting the same enemies in the hope of attaining the same objectives in both the provincial and the federal fields.66 Gouin rejected Dupre's advice on the grounds that the Action liberale nationale was "a strictly provincial movement" and would not "participate in any way in the coming federal battle."67 By the spring of 1935 the impending federal election was causing problems for the ALN. What federal Liberal support the ALN still had was threatened. In particular, Edouard Lacroix, a major source of ALN funding, warned that he would not remain in the ALN if it attacked Lapointe, as Gouin believed it would have to do sooner or later.68 The Action liberale nationale had emerged because discontented men with

64 L'Action liberale nationale

diverse ideas, interests, and political backgrounds had joined forces to rid Quebec of the Taschereau regime. The task of creating a unified party out of such a disparate group of politically dissatisfied individuals had proved a constant source of trouble for ALN leaders. The problem escalated, moreover, with every success the Action liberale nationale enjoyed in gaining adherents. The conflict between supporters of the ALN in Montreal and Quebec City, a divisive force even before publication of the manifesto, never disappeared. Ideological differences, regional tensions, and organizational rivalries all contributed to this problem. On the one hand, those who dominated the ALN in Montreal were mainly disenchanted Liberals concerned with the liberalizing aspects of the program. Anxious to see that the educational system, social welfare legislation, labour laws, and anti-trust acts corresponded to what they considered the real needs of an industrialized Quebec, these men had clashed with those Liberals in control of the provincial party who endorsed the laissez-faire policies of the Taschereau regime. The prominent members of the Quebec City group, on the other hand, were primarily concerned with those parts of the ALN program which related directly to their aims as French-Canadian nationalists.69 The unity of the Quebec Liberal party had ended when some of the discontented Liberals from the Montreal area had despaired of realizing their aims in time if they remained with the provincial party. The Action liberale had been formed in an attempt to reliberalize the Quebec party. The conversion of the original movement into the Action liberale nationale, a step taken in the course of trying to widen its base of support, had enabled the movement to gain the endorsement of such prominent men in the Quebec district as Dr Philippe Hamel and the mayor of Quebec City, Ernest Gregoire. However, this alliance was not without problems. Some leading ALN adherents in the Quebec City region were not liberals in the sense that the Montreal originators of the Action liberale were. Whereas there was an underlying trust among members of the Montreal group that allowed individuals to differ on particular questions without endangering the movement, there was no such understanding between the Montreal group and men like Gregoire, Hamel, and Chaloult in the Quebec City region. Distrust of these allies was not limited to the ALN leadership in Montreal. Horace Philippon, a former Liberal who became assistant ALN organizer in Quebec City, for instance, was always extremely suspicious of Hamel and his supporters.70 Although Hamel, Gregoire, and Chaloult accepted those parts of the ALN program which did not relate to

65 The Initial Challenge

their specific interests, they were thought to be less concerned about reforms in education, labour, and social welfare legislation.71 The complexion of the Quebec group was, in Jean Martineau's opinion, much more nationalist in the French-Canadian sense, than was the case in Montreal. Paul Gouin, who had been influenced by Abbe Groulx and the literary movement of the 19205, tended to be more nationalist than most of his Montreal colleagues, and it fell to him, as leader, to try to bridge the gap between the two groups. The suspicion with which the liberal and nationalist elements within the Action liberale nationale regarded one another caused problems from the very outset. As early as July 1934 Gouin received a complaint because La Presse had spoken of "!'Action liberale" and not "FAction liberale nationale." The suggestion that Gouin's close associate, Calixte Cormier, "and company" might have been responsible for the omission is some indication of how little trust existed between nationalist and liberal ALN members.72 Such distrust intensified differences that arose between the Montreal and Quebec districts in the course of organizing the ALN'S initial campaign. Gouin, as provincial leader, was called upon to soothe the feelings of his associates in the Quebec district during the first provincial tour in the fall of 1934. Apologizing for taking a decision without consulting the Quebec City wing, Gouin reminded his supporters there that "in an organization like ours, we must forget that we are from Quebec City or from Montreal in order to remember that we are above all members of the Action liberale nationale." Gouin recognized the organizational need for dividing the province into districts but hoped that "prejudices and susceptibilities" would not be permitted "to build impenetrable barriers between our various groups."73 His wish was unfulfilled, and the Montreal-Quebec City split persisted, intensified by the dissension within the Quebec group because of their varying political backgrounds. Allegations levelled against members of the ALN by its various critics and Liberal attempts to woo back its former supporters were to continue to feed the suspicions party adherents had of one another's ultimate political loyalties and objectives. CONCLUSION

Despite the party's internal tensions, the appeal of the Action liberale nationale for support was well received throughout Quebec between the autumn of 1934 and the spring of 1935. By late May the Quebec Liberal party had obviously decided that it must be crushed. In an all-out attempt to silence the rebels, Leon-Mercier

66 L'Action liberate nationale

Gouin took the field for the Liberals. While Paul Gouin's older brother did not attack the ALN leader personally, he did appeal to the dissident Liberals to return to the party fold, assuring them of Taschereau's sincere desire for their return. Le Soleil suggested that Quebec Liberals could take courage from this move, claiming that although the ALN had been patently unsuccessful, its humiliation was not yet ended.74 Le Devoir was quick to question this interpretation, suggesting that if the Action liberate nationale's failure was so very obvious, brother would not have been set against brother.75 In any case, the elder Gouin's plea fell on ears deafened by the applause of Quebecers who continued to flock to ALN rallies and to shout their approval of the increasingly vehement attacks on the Taschereau regime. This, then, was the state of affairs when R.B. Bennett called the 1935 federal election on 5 July. In spite of Liberal efforts, the Action liberale nationale had, within a year, established itself as a force to be reckoned with in Quebec politics. The initial ALN campaign had very definitely made an impression on French Canadians receptive to a campaign that emphasized the wrongs they had suffered and provided both a scapegoat, in the form of the trusts favoured by the Taschereau administration, and a plan of recovery and reform based on French-Canadian traditions and Catholic social thought. By blaming the Taschereau regime and its connections with "alien" capitalists for the miseries of Quebec, the Action liberale nationale made it possible for the people to believe that a government of French Canadians for French Canadians could solve Quebec's economic ills. Rumours of Taschereau's imminent fall increased as the ALN campaign gained momentum, but nothing had happened by the time the federal election campaign commenced. Although there had been no further defections from Quebec Liberal ranks by the time Bennett prorogued parliament, the ALN campaign had certainly established that party as a real threat to the Liberal position at the provincial level. Provincially at least, Liberals could no longer rely on French Canadians to recognize that what was good for the Liberal party was good for Quebec. Nor, however, could Duplessis and the Conservatives assume that rejection of the Taschereau regime would ensure their elevation to power. When the 1935 federal election was called, the Action liberale nationale was offering the provincial electorate a plausible alternative to both the established Liberal regime and the Conservative opposition. Within weeks of that election the following October, however, the Action liberale nationale had disappeared from the Quebec scene along with the provincial Conservative opposition, to

67 The Initial Challenge

be replaced by a body called the Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin. The internal weaknesses of the ALN, stemming in part from the diverse federal political loyalties of its adherents, and the repercussions of Bennett's defeat on the fortunes of Quebec Conservatives combined to create a situation in which a united effort against the incumbent regime was seen by organizers in both camps as the only hope of breaking the Liberal hold on the province.

5 The Federal and Provincial Elections: Catalyst for Union

Liberals and Conservatives from Quebec who were active in federal politics shared the concern of their provincial counterparts at the enthusiastic response to the anti-trust, anti-party themes stressed by members of the ALN. They were not reassured by repeated declarations from ALN leaders that the party operated solely at the provincial level and that, consequently, support for it need not conflict with national party loyalties. Federal Liberals feared the repercussions of the prolonged anti-Taschereau campaign if they faced a test at the polls before voters had had an opportunity to express their discontent provincially. While the Liberal party in Quebec had closed ranks in the face of the threat posed by the Action liberale nationale, the underlying causes of discontent remained. Bennett's decision of late June 1935 to continue to lead the Conservatives in the election in the autumn intensified the already serious problems faced by his party in Quebec. H.H. Stevens's announcement the day after Parliament was prorogued on 5 July that he would participate in the 1935 campaign at the head of a new party with aims similar to those of the ALN and some Quebec Conservatives further complicated matters. Bennett's decision and the emergence of the Reconstruction party magnified tensions within both the Action liberale nationale and the Conservative party in Quebec. From its inception, the Action liberale nationale's bid for support in Quebec had been cast within the context of the federal election due in 1935. To attract voters from different federal political camps,

6g

Elections as Catalyst for Union

ALN leaders had always stressed that their efforts were related solely to provincial politics. Quebecers were assured that adherence to the Action liberale nationale need not affect federal party loyalties. Stevens's decision to launch a national party with a platform espousing measures similar to the economic reforms advocated by the ALN clouded that distinction. The anti-trust position taken by the Reconstruction party matched that of the Action liberale nationale. The new party shared entirely the ALN'S concern for the interests of the small capitalist and the consumer. ALN leaders were thus faced with the problem of deciding what attitude to adopt towards Reconstruction candidates in the federal campaign. The issue first arose at the July meeting of the Action liberale nationale in TroisRivieres, and opinion varied widely as to what course the ALN should follow. Edouard Lacroix favoured supporting the Liberal party federally, but others were inclined to have the ALN line up with Stevens's forces. The decision taken at this point was that Lacroix should run again as "a King candidate." This, however, did not settle the issue. Following publication of the Reconstruction party platform some members of the ALN, who were also Stevens supporters, exerted further pressure on the Action liberale nationale to aid Reconstruction candidates. These men were sufficiently influential to warrant the calling of an emergency meeting of ALN leaders to reopen this issue, but the majority remained of the opinion that "it would not be in the interests of the Action liberale nationale to enter the battle alongside the Stevenists."1 Various factors contributed to this decision. The Action liberale nationale had from the outset appealed for support as a purely provincial party and any assistance rendered to Reconstruction candidates would undermine the validity of this appeal. Furthermore, many of the most influential ALN leaders were strong supporters of Ernest Lapointe and remained loyal to the Liberals federally.2 Thus, to maintain unity at the leadership level and to avoid alienating supporters before they had even had a chance to cast ballots for the ALN, it was decided that that party should remain neutral throughout the forthcoming campaign and withdraw temporarily from the political arena in the month prior to voting.3 In the meantime, it would persist in its efforts to bring down Taschereau and his associates. By the summer of 1935 the Action liberale nationale campaign to rid Quebec of the Taschereau regime had attracted considerable attention. ALN leaders had spread their party's message by holding over eighty rallies, making forty radio broadcasts, and establishing a newspaper, La Province. This successful publicity campaign had

70 L'Action liberate nationale

not, however, been coupled with the development of any substantial provincial organization to convert attention into votes. Nothing had been accomplished beyond the setting up of ALN offices in Montreal and Quebec City in the autumn of 1934 and the appointment of organizers for each district. Party leaders had for several months acknowledged the necessity of developing a grassroots organization, but limited resources had severely restricted what they could accomplish. The ALN had suffered from a chronic shortage of funds right from the beginning. Most of those involved in the new party had little money to contribute to its activities.4 As early as September 1934, Louis-Philippe Morin, the ALN organizer in the Quebec City region, was informing Gouin that lack of money had brought party activities in his area to a halt.5 The following spring Edouard Lacroix worked out an arrangement with unnamed sources to finance the Quebec district office throughout the summer months, but these plans fell through.6 The ALN'S financial and organizational problems worsened as the summer of 1935 wore on, even though Oscar Drouin, who had finally left the Liberals to join the ALN, had been named organizer for the whole province in mid-August. Indeed, by the end of that month a shortage of funds was threatening to require cancellation of ALN rallies throughout the province.7 The cost of publishing La Province, which had been a drain on funds from its inception in the spring of 1935, continued to tax the party's limited resources.8 In September 1935, therefore, the ALN launched a public appeal for funds. In line with its populist appeal, donations of any amount, no matter how small, were solicited on the grounds that "a dollar given to the Action liberate nationale ... is a dollar against the trusts."9 By the beginning of October several hundred dollars had been collected in the Montreal region mainly in contributions of a few dollars each. The very expensive radio broadcasts, which had had to be cancelled earlier in the autumn, were only able to be rescheduled because a group of Montreal supporters had agreed to finance twenty-six programs beginning in late October.10 The Quebec district, however, enjoyed less success in overcoming its financial problems. The ALN office had been threatened with closure in September until J.-L. Demers, a Quebec City businessman who had been brought into the ALN by Lacroix and who had become president of the party's finance committee, agreed to keep it going until the public subscription campaign could raise the funds required.11 Before very long, though, Gouin was expressing dissatisfaction with the financial campaign being carried out in the

71

Elections as Catalyst for Union

Quebec City area and chiding organizers there for slowness.12 Disagreements over money bred by financial difficulties only exacerbated the intra-party tensions which had weakened the Action liberale nationale since its inception. The ALN'S Montreal-based leadership had not, during the party's first year, been able to alleviate the sensitivity of the Quebec City wing to perceived slights from headquarters. Communication between the two districts still left much to be desired, and the appointment of Oscar Drouin of Quebec City as provincial organizer added yet another dimension to this persistent problem. Only a month into his new job, Drouin was complaining to Gouin that he could not deal with difficulties in the Montreal region because the ALN office there had not even answered requests for information which he claimed to have made weeks earlier.13 It is not surprising that Drouin, who commenced his organizational efforts in the early fall, had accomplished little with respect to creating parish or county organizations prior to the federal election. In late September, Gouin painted a gloomy picture of the actual state of ALN organization for his new provincial organizer, even though he pointed with pride to the result of the party's appeal for popular support. Members of the ALN had "to date done an enormous job of propaganda" and "created ... a legion of friends in all corners of the province who are doing a job of latent organization." But, as Gouin went on to explain: "the majority of our supporters who have no contact with each other are disturbed, wrongly, but yet they are disturbed, by our lack of organization." It was, consequently, essential that the Action liberale nationale give "outward expression" to its organization so as to reassure existing supporters and win others.14 DUPLESSIS ATTEMPTS TO MONOPOLIZE ANTI-TASCHEREAU SENTIMENT

The ALN was not alone in attacking Quebec's Liberal administration during the summer of 1935. Liberal dominance had produced a third provincial party but not because the Conservative opposition had abdicated. To the contrary, Maurice Duplessis was engaged in an all-out effort to convince Quebecers that his Conservatives were the only viable alternative to Taschereau's corrupt and misguided Liberals. Just as soon as the provincial session ended in mid-June, Duplessis had shifted his scathing indictment of the government from the legislature to the province at large. Inaugurating an extensive

72

L'Action liberate nationale

provincial tour in Montreal on 19 June, the opposition leader reiterated his charge that the Taschereau regime had magnified the miseries of the depression for Quebecers by neglecting their interests in favour of those of capital and of trusts in particular. While "honest capital" would have nothing to fear from his government, Duplessis pledged prosecution of "the exploiters, the monopolies and the oppressors of the people, regardless of their political colourings." He condemned the Liberal practice of granting tax reductions to Dominion Stores and other alleged trusts and promised Quebecers an administration which would increase the opportunities for the province's youth. Duplessis's message to Quebec's FrenchCanadian majority was that his adminstration would make the province's economy work to its advantage without adversely affecting "honest" capitalists. In the process, it would ensure reasonable wages and an efficient workmen's compensation scheme, reduce the number of ML AS and cabinet ministers, convert the Legislative Council into an economic body, reduce administrative costs by 20 per cent through the abolition of sinecures, safeguard natural resources, provide a sound colonization policy, put agriculture in its proper place by means of a provincial system of rural credits, and provide Quebecers with company laws preventing their victimization by watered stocks and debentures. Duplessis promised to do many of the things nationalist intellectuals and Catholic social thinkers argued should be done so that French-Canadian values might be preserved in a reformed economic and social order. At the same time he appealed for the support of all Quebecers. "The oppressors and tyrants will have no more formidable enemy than the new Government," Duplessis declared, calling on all right-minded citizens of both languages, including "all sincere Liberals," to stand behind him in his fight against "tyranny" and "despotism."15 Despite the unpopularity of the federal Conservatives, the Quebec opposition leader was determined to convince voters that they would be foolish to take a chance on the inexperienced ALN at the provincial level, when the Conservatives were offering similar, if slightly less extreme, policies. Duplessis carried his denunciation of the Taschereau regime to ridings across the province as the summer of 1935 wore on. Leaving the federal Conservatives and the Reconstruction party to their own devices, Duplessis concentrated on advancing the interests of the party he led. To this end he urged his supporters to take steps to prevent the province's dissident Liberals and nationalists from reaping the benefits of long-standing Conservative opposition to Premier Taschereau's government. While those in the ALN might be

73

Elections as Catalyst for Union

sincere and well-meaning, Duplessis kept reminding Quebecers that the Conservatives had long been in the van in denouncing Liberal abuses. In fairness, he argued, voters should take this into consideration when they were eventually given the chance to cast their ballots against Taschereau.16 In the meantime Duplessis persisted in his determination to keep his party aloof from the ALN, a policy that elicited a generally favourable response from his supporters prior to the federal election. As one explained, in advising against the Conservatives lending support to the ALN : "the best thing to do is to fight as Conservatives and to make the most of the advantages which a divided party offers."17 While claiming that he would accept ALN supporters into opposition ranks, Duplessis warned Conservatives against succumbing to their advances on the grounds that while there were some sincere men among the members of the Action liberale nationale, there were others who did "not inspire as much confidence." The latter, he predicted, would be likely to join with the Liberals after the provincial election.l8 Duplessis was always deeply suspicious of the maverick Liberals whose creation of the Action liberale nationale posed an additional threat to realization of his dream of heading a Conservative government in Quebec. As the summer of 1935 progressed, however, political developments at various levels forced Duplessis to modify his position with respect to joining forces with the ALN. OPPOSITION FORCES MOVE TOWARDS UNION

In July 1935 the most prominent Liberal MLA to adhere to the ALN, Oscar Drouin, publicly advocated a union of all opposition groups against Taschereau. Explaining his departure from the Quebec Liberal party in a radio broadcast, Drouin praised Duplessis and declared that "the greatest necessity of the moment" was "to unite all groups for the final battle." Moreover, Drouin asserted that "the people want, insist on, demand a close union between the groups in order to being an end to the political trust which governs us." In his view what voters did not want were several opposition candidates in each riding. The ALN organizer naturally feared that a proliferation of anti-Taschereau candidates would ensure a Liberal victory. To avoid this, Drouin urged that all Conservatives support Duplessis and all dissatisfied Liberals rally to the ALN and that a union, but not a fusion, of opposition groups be worked out.19 Le Journal, a Conservative newpaper, expressed misgivings about Drouin's proposed united front. 20 It soon became evident, however,

74 L'Action liberate nationale

that some Conservatives could see no reason for not joining forces with the ALN to achieve commonly held goals. At an ALN rally in Joliette early in August, Mayor J.-C. Perrault, a former federal Conservative candidate, declared that he approved of the ALN program. A lifelong Conservative, Perrault also expressed approval of Duplessis's program which, he claimed, was "identical" to the ALN'S. "Those who support Mr Duplessis," he concluded, "should also support the Action liberale nationale."21 At midsummer Conservatives were obviously divided on the crucial question of an alliance with the ALN. Duplessis's June appeal that "all sincere Liberals" rally to his standard to bring Taschereau down had changed to a declaration of willingness "to co-operate sincerely with all groups who had the same aim in view, to overthrow the corrupt Government presided over by the Premier, and to bring in reforms that were a crying necessity for the province."22 But, while his public stance on co-operation with anti-Taschereau Liberals had shifted, Duplessis still agreed privately with those Conservatives opposed to such an alliance. He remained as suspicious as ever of the ALN'S members and advised a supporter worried about an alliance with them that he was "right to disapprove of the tactics of certain socalled opponents of the Taschereau regime."23 It took the repercussions of the federal election results to bring Duplessis and his supporters into an electoral alliance with the party created, and for the most part run, by dissident Liberals. Conservative and Reconstruction candidates alike went down to defeat at the hands of their Liberal opponents in Quebec in the October 1935 federal election. A higher proportion of Quebecers than Canadians generally knew that they did not want another five years of Conservative government under R.B. Bennett. Support for the Conservative party in Quebec sank below the 1926 level, with the Conservatives holding on to only the four Montreal ridings won in that election and one other riding.24 Not even Solicitor-General Dupre survived in the Quebec district. Even if the Reconstruction vote in Quebec had gone to Conservative candidates, which would have improved upon their showing in comparison with that of 1926, the vast Liberal majority would not have been substantially reduced.25 The Liberals at the federal level had regained their solid grip on the province of Quebec. It remained to ensure that this recovery in Ottawa was not followed by a setback in the provincial contest due within the year. Encouraged by the failure of Quebec voters to elect either Conservatives or third party candidates, Liberals were anxious to crush the mounting opposition to the Taschereau administration. The Quebec Conservatives and the ALN,

75

Elections as Catalyst for Union

meanwhile, were discouraged, albeit for different reasons, by the voting pattern of Quebecers in the 1935 federal election. Conservative forces in Quebec, plagued by financial and organizational problems throughout the federal campaign, were further weakened by the outcome. Although Duplessis and the provincial party had not been directly involved in the federal contest, many of its members had worked for individual candidates and emerged demoralized.26 Duplessis gave no sign of discouragement, however, and Le Journal claimed that the general discontent with existing governments which it believed to be responsible for the federal Conservative loss ensured Taschereau's defeat at the hands of the opposition. These responses notwithstanding, the federal election results convinced many Quebec Conservatives of the necessity of joining forces with the Action liberale nationale.27 Although the Action liberale nationale had remained aloof from the federal campaign, the results were also alarming for Quebec's splinter party. Those in the ALN who had favoured supporting Stevens's anti-trust campaign were crushed by his party's utter failure. Even those with strong Liberal loyalties federally were disturbed at the fate of minority parties in the 1935 election. Party records noted that "some highly placed individuals feared that the Action liberale nationale might meet the same fate as Stevens's party."28 Faced with intra-party tensions, serious financial problems, and the huge task of building up a network of local party organizations, some ALN leaders, particularly those from the Quebec City region, reacted to the federal results by questioning the value of further efforts. Their despondency prompted Gouin to promise to make an effort to replenish party funds. 29 Duplessis, meanwhile, was being pressed to ally with the Action liberale nationale. Two days after the federal election, Edouard Asselin, an influential Quebec district Conservative, informed the provincial leader that a rapid analysis of the federal vote revealed, among other things, that "opponents of the same regime or of the same party work to the benefit of their common adversary and commit suicide by dividing their forces." Asserting that the simultaneous presence of a Bennett and a Stevens candidate had ensured the election of about fifty Liberals across Canada, Asselin predicted that Quebec Conservatives would suffer the same fate as the "bennettistes" and "stevenistes" in a three-way fight at the provincial level. In the face of the lessons to be learned from the federal contest, he asked if there was not "good reason to try to come to an understanding with the Action liberale nationale immediately and to make all possible concessions in order to attain that goal." Answering

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his own question, Asselin informed Duplessis that he saw no chance of victory otherwise and that this was a generally held opinion. In conclusion, he reminded Duplessis of the party's immediate need to raise funds and argued that an alliance with the ALN would facilitate this process by increasing Conservative chances of success.30 Other Quebec Conservatives active in federal politics were urging the same course on Duplessis. An emissary from Ottawa delivered the news that Maurice Dupre, Onesime Gagnon, Lucien Gendron, and Samuel Gobeil, among others, were prepared to do everything in their power to bring Duplessis victory in Quebec. All agreed, however, that the Liberals would carry the day in the next election if the Conservatives had to split the anti-Taschereau vote with the ALN. Their advice was to work out an arrangement whereby Conservative candidates would not run in ridings where Gouin's nominee stood a chance of winning and vice versa.31 At the provincial level, meanwhile, even some of Duplessis's strongest supporters went ahead and allied themselves with the ALN. One who had earlier advised against co-operating with the new party wrote on 26 October to apologize for breaking with Duplessis over this issue: "As I am of the opinion that each citizen ought to do everything in his power to overthrow the Taschereau government, I have communicated with the 'Liberal-National' organization and ... [been] assured that those among our people who would like to join the movement will be treated on a footing of perfect equality, and that the merits of each will be recognized. After having consulted with my friends, we have decided to abandon our political colours in order to wage a war without mercy upon the trust-mongers and the monopolists."38 Despite such pressures, Duplessis continued to tell Conservatives that there would be no understanding between his party and the Action liberale nationale.33 He remained as reluctant as ever to enter an alliance with the ALN when he met with his principal lieutenants in Quebec City and Montreal in late October to make plans for the anticipated provincial campaign.34 Duplessis tried to push forward the organizational activity which an election required and which had been delayed by the federal campaign, but the fact was that some ridings did not move to nominate candidates.35 Conservatives who supported Duplessis's opposition to allying with any "LiberalNational" candidates complained about inactivity on the part of their party's organizers. Others, however, argued against selecting candidates in ridings where a Conservative would lose his deposit while a candidate jointly backed with the ALN could defeat Taschereau's candidate.36 The Action liberale nationale meanwhile faced the refusal of almost all its potential candidates, but especially those in

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Elections as Catalyst for Union

rural areas, to run in three-cornered contests because Liberals would, it was feared, win the needed plurality.37 Thus matters stood on 29 October 1935 when Premier Taschereau announced that a provincial election would be held on the twenty-fifth of November, the earliest date possible. THE ELECTION CALL PROVOKES UNION AMONG THE OPPOSITION

The decision of the Quebec Liberals to capitalize on that party's success federally by calling a snap provincial election put those members of the Conservative party and the ALN who favoured a united assault on the Taschereau regime into the ascendant. With the Liberals safely returned to power federally, those in the ALN who remained opposed to any alliance with the Conservatives could no longer argue as effectively against those in favour of a combined effort. And with thirty-seven years in opposition behind them, many Quebec Conservatives did not want a three-way fight just when the Liberal hold on the provincial administration seemed to be weakening. Edouard Masson, the chief Conservative organizer, and many of his workers shared the ALN'S willingness to investigate the possibility of reaching an accord in the wake of the election call.38 Despite persistent resistance within both the Action liberate nationale and the Conservative party, the proponents of a combined assault on the Taschereau regime prevailed. Jean Martineau, for one, believed that an alliance with the Conservative opposition was the wisest course of action for the ALN in the circumstances of November 1935 as long as certain terms were met. He and another ALN representative, Hector Langevin, represented the party in preliminary negotiations with Masson and one other Conservative.39 The express purpose of their meeting was to reach an agreement which would ensure "the cohesion and concentration of opposition forces." Following this meeting, Paul Gouin and Senator Joseph Rainville, the federal Conservative organizer for Quebec in 1930 and 1935 and a party fundraiser, agreed to hold "a secret caucus of the principal leaders of the two groups." As a result, Paul Gouin, Roger Ouimet, Fred Monk, Edouard Lacroix, Calixte Cormier, Jean Martineau, Hector Langevin, J.-Leonard Demers, Philippe Hamel, Oscar Drouin, and A. Raynault journeyed to Lucien Dansereau's chalet in the county of Argenteuil on the weekend of 2 and 3 November to work out the basis for an alliance with the Conservatives.40 Duplessis was not present at this meeting. Discussion of the terms of an alliance began at ten o'clock on

78 L'Action lib£rale nationale

Sunday evening, and for several hours the ALN group negotiated with the Conservative representatives, Joseph Rainville, Lucien Dansereau, Edouard Masson, Onesime Gagnon, Maurice Dupre, Lucien Gendron, Antoine Rivard, Henri Beique, Dr Lafortune, and Auguste Boyer.41 Gouin reportedly maintained initially that he would consent to an alliance with the Conservatives if Duplessis ceded his leadership to Gagnon who was running provincially in Dorchester and with whom the ALN had tried to come to terms on more than one occasion previously.42 Gouin did not get his way on this issue, which suggests that the ALN'S need for Conservative allies would force him to team up with a leader about whom he obviously had doubts. Negotiations continued throughout the night with debate at times becoming so bitter that the meeting almost broke up. Although agreement on the need for united action against the Taschereau regime was reached in principle, the two sides remained divided on the precise terms of the alliance. The division of constituencies was a major stumbling block with Conservatives wanting to get all they could.43 Despite difficulties, two draft resolutions had been prepared by dawn. One related to the division of ridings and the other contained certain premises which would serve as the basis of an entente to be reached later. The Conservatives left to deliver these resolutions to Duplessis who had chosen to stay away and refused to commit himself.44 Indeed, in a letter of 4 November the Conservative leader assured a concerned party member that "there is no alliance between us and the Action liberale nationale."45 It was to be expected that Duplessis would resist the idea of joining forces with a party which he resented on several grounds. His antagonism toward the ALN was based in part on the continuing suspicion that some of its adherents were Liberals waiting to return to that party once Taschereau was removed. In the meantime, their formation of the Action liberale nationale had jeopardized the realization of his long-time dream of becoming premier and had robbed him of the right he believed he had earned to give the province a Conservative government. To make matters worse, the men he was being asked to co-operate with had a record of trying to woo away local Conservative organizers and to make deals with Conservatives opposed to his direction of the Quebec party. Many of the latter, moreover, were strong advocates of an alliance with the ALN. Duplessis had been struggling hard ever since Houde's debacle in the 1931 election, to establish complete control over the Conservative party. The fact that Conservatives like Onesime Gagnon whom Duplessis had outmanoeuvred at the 1933 provincial

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Elections as Catalyst for Union

convention favoured an alliance with the ALN could not but have aroused Duplessis's suspicions as to their ultimate objectives. Assurances from Ottawa that Dupre, Gagnon, Gobeil, and Gendron among others held the Quebec leader "in the highest esteem" did nothing to erase memories either of earlier Conservative clashes or of past ALN efforts to undercut Duplessis's base of support by luring away disgruntled Conservatives. But while Duplessis may have been angry at the prospect of having to collaborate with dissident Liberals, he was not able in the circumstances of early November 1935 to withstand the combined forces of the proponents of a united assault on the Taschereau regime. Having never led the Conservatives in an election campaign, Duplessis was no match for party organizers and financiers who were unwilling to provide men and money for what looked to them like a losing battle. In the face of Duplessis's apparent hesitation about coming to terms with the ALN, there were reports that Senator Rainville was refusing to provide the $150,000 he had promised to deliver for the provincial campaign. In the opinion of the Liberal press, the official opposition's chances were so slim that Conservative ML AS and party leaders saw a Conservative-ALN alliance as the only hope of carrying "enough seats to at least constitute an opposition."46 While Conservatives naturally would not have agreed with this analysis, a goodly number of them throughout the province were breaking party ranks. Defections at the local level, pressure from top Conservative organizers and financiers, and reports from across the province that the ALN might win the coming election or hold a balance of power if a deal were not worked out with Paul Gouin forced Duplessis into an electoral alliance with the ALN on that party's terms. There were further negotiations between the ALN and Duplessis and the Conservatives in the days immediately following the weekend meeting in the Laurentians. In the end, ALN representatives witnessed Duplessis's signing of their party's program and of an agreement assigning two-thirds of Quebec's ridings to their candidates.47 This opened the way for the Duplessis-Gouin alliance to be made public, and on 7 November 1935 the two leaders issued a joint press release. They told Quebecers that "the desires of the Quebec electorate" had been responsible for the decision of the two parties to present "a united front" in the approaching election "against the common enemy of the people of the province of Quebec: the Taschereau regime."48 In consequence, a single official opposition candidate, either a member of the ALN or a Conservative, would contest each riding. The agreement on the division of the

8o

L'Action liberate nationale

ridings between the two groups was not made public. However, in a letter dated 7 November 1935, Duplessis assured Gouin that it was "understood that during the approaching election there will be from twenty-five to thirty provincial Conservative candidates, and for the balance, Action liberale nationale candidates."49 Opposition candidates would all run on the ALN platform which, as the official announcement of the alliance pointed out, was based on the same principles as the platform of the Conservative party. The joint leaders of the Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin further declared that "after the defeat of the anti-national and pro-trust Taschereau regime, the Conservative party and the Action liberale nationale will form a national government whose program will be that of the Action liberale nationale." Duplessis would be premier of this national government, but Gouin would choose a majority of the cabinet from among ALN deputies.50 RESPONSES TO F O R M A T I O N OF THE DUPLESSIS-GOUIN ALLIANCE

The Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin had come into existence despite the doubts of the Conservative leader about the political objectives of some of the ALN'S dissident Liberals and about the policy implications of the anti-trust zeal of some of its nationalist members. The terms of the agreement suggest that Liberal and nationalist members of Gouin's party also had doubts about Duplessis. His record of opposition to proposals advocated by nationalist, anti-trust, and urban-oriented elements within his own party might be cause for concern in the long run. The guarantees extracted from Duplessis indicate that ALN representatives were indeed conscious of a need to ensure that their party's views would prevail within the Union Nationale. That is no doubt why they had secured the Conservative leader's signature on the ALN program and a written agreement on the ALN running candidates in approximately two-thirds of Quebec's ridings and on Gouin's right to name the majority of the members of a Union Nationale government. The ALN accepted that the opposition leader's legislative experience had earned him the right to head such a government but clearly wanted safeguards against objections he might raise to using power to put into effect the reformist and nationalist agenda of the ALN. Those in the ALN who harboured suspicions about the Conservative leader's sincerity with respect to implementing their party's program certainly received no reassurance from Duplessis in his introduction of the alliance to the people of Quebec. He simply did not focus on

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Elections as Catalyst for Union

how the platform would be implemented. The purpose of the alliance, as he explained it, was to rid Quebec of the Taschereau regime. Addressing Quebecers as co-leader of the newly created Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin in a radio address on 7 November 1935, Duplessis stressed the social and economic ills fostered by the Liberals which the combined opposition forces would correct. He severely criticized the Taschereau government's concentration on industrial concerns at the expense of farmers' interests, a policy which both Duplessis and the ALN contended had contributed greatly to the agricultural depression. Duplessis also attacked Taschereau for refusing to co-operate with Prime Minister King on the old age pension bill. He castigated the Quebec Liberals for having "pitifully sacrificed" the elderly, "odiously betrayed" the young, and "inexcusably forgotten" vitally needed social legislation. He justified the predominantly negative character of his introduction of the Union Nationale on the grounds that public men had a duty to make known the true situation so that the causes of these social and economic ills could be discovered and rectified. This, in his view, was the task the Union Nationale had been formed to perform. The alliance of the Conservatives and the ALN was a "union to struggle against autocracy, tyranny, economic dictatorship, its henchmen, its slaves, and its beneficiaries." Because the alliance had adopted the ALN program, French Canadians of all classes could look forward to benefiting from the rebuilding of Quebec society along the lines advocated by their intellectual, nationalist, and church leaders. It remained, Duplessis argued, for "all men who have the good of our beloved province at heart" to collaborate and help the Union Nationale achieve the "patriotic goal" of ridding the province of the evils of the Taschereau regime. While the Conservative leader was specific about what support for the united attack against Taschereau would bring to an end, he was vague about how the Union Nationale would actually bring about change. The particular message he delivered to Conservatives was that they would be serving their party's interests, as well as the province's, by supporting the new electoral alliance. After citing the view of "an English statesman" who had once said that "he serves his party best, who serves his country first," Duplessis went on to declare: "It is by serving our province that we shall serve our party best."51 Paul Gouin, in his radio broadcast the same day, introduced the Union Nationale by explaining that it was to be "a united front from the point of view of organization as well as of candidature." Unity would prevail after as well as before victory because "in an unforget-

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table gesture, in an entirely patriotic and national gesture, the newly elected ... have promised one another ... to respect the pact entered into, and to form a national government." The ALN leader went to great lengths as well to place this alliance in its proper historical context. "As in 1885, under Honore Mercier," he told Quebecers, so in 1935 "Conservatives and Nationalist Liberals, remembering that they are first and foremost French Canadians, have rejected all idea of a fraticidal battle and united against the common enemy of [their] nationality: the trusts and their allies, the Taschereau regime." But the roots of the Union Nationale went even deeper into French Canada's "glorious past." Gouin compared formation of the Union Nationale to developments in 1837 when "there were neither Conservatives nor Liberals" in Quebec but rather "on one side there were patriots and, on the other, bureaucrats." Driving his point home, he continued: "Today ... the same redeeming gesture is being repeated. On the one side, our side, there are nothing but patriots, on the other, that of Mr Taschereau and his 'family compact,' there is nothing but bureaucracy; the most cynical and brazen tyranny that our province has ever known: the trusts."52 In an official statement on the alliance, La Province echoed the high moral tone taken by both Duplessis and Gouin. The ALN newspaper highlighted Gouin's role in bringing about the formation of a "national party" and played down Duplessis's leadership of the Conservative party. Gouin had held "his hand out to the oppositionist group of Maurice Duplessis to form a NATIONAL PARTY" so that Quebec might be saved from trusts and financiers responsible for "squeezing it dry for sixteen years thanks to the self-seeking connivance of the politicians who are slaves to party interests."53 While Quebecers listened to the rhetoric designed to sell the antiTaschereau alliance to voters, the forces behind the ALN program were both encouraged and apprehensive about its implementation. The formation of the Union Nationale greatly increased the chances of a government being formed that was committed to a restructuring of Quebec society according to the social teachings of the Catholic Church and the ideas of leading French-Canadian nationalists and intellectuals. Nationalists like Abbe Groulx, however, had doubts about Duplessis's commitment to trust-busting and the economic reconquest of Quebec by French Canadians. They remained hopeful, nevertheless, that enough dedicated members of the ALN would be elected to ensure that Duplessis would have to remain faithful to the party program. The immediate task was to see that the Union Nationale got the power it needed. To this end francophones who favoured economic nationalism joined forces with

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Elections as Catalyst for Union

reformers who wanted a modernized Quebec within which the position of French Canada's traditional elites was protected in an all-out attack on the Taschereau regime. The premier soon made it very clear that the Union Nationale would need all the help it could get in the battle for the hearts, minds, and votes of Quebecers. Voters were quickly provided with a strong antidote to the high-minded interpretations Duplessis, Gouin, and La Province put on the formation of the Union Nationale. The day after its appearance, Premier Taschereau described the Duplessis-Gouin alliance as a "morganatic marriage" which would have been "utterly laughable," had it not been "deeply saddening, from the point of view of political principles." What it amount to, he informed voters, was a sell-out of political principles by both Duplessis and Gouin for no reason other than a desire for the spoils of office. Maurice Duplessis had betrayed his Conservative friends by promising cabinet positions to the rebellious Liberals while Paul Gouin's alliance with the provincial Conservatives simply verified Taschereau's opinion that the ALN leader and his followers had always been "unconscious Conservatives." The premier called upon Quebecers to cast their ballots in such a way as to end the "farce" being attempted by the co-leaders of the Union Nationale.54 CONCLUSION

With less than three weeks in the Quebec election campaign, voters were being prevailed upon to write the final acts of two very different plays. On the one hand, Conservative and ALN candidates claimed to be appearing in a morality play and appealed to voters to bring the curtain down on Taschereau who was cast as the devil. The premier, on the other hand, told Quebecers that Duplessis and Gouin had turned the election campaign into a bad farce which should not be taken seriously. The scripts for both plays were predictable, and supporting casts quickly learned their lines. On 25 November 1935 the votes of Quebecers would indicate which troupe had put on the more convincing performance.

6 The Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin: Near Victory Breeds Disintegration

Once Conservative and ALN organizers had successfully negotiated the terms of a common front, they launched a united effort to dislodge the Liberals. Their chances of success had been greatly increased by what each leader brought to the alliance. Duplessis's genius for politics and Gouin's success in assuming leadership of the forces for renewal within French Catholic circles made the Union Nationale formidable. The Conservative leader could deliver the votes of his party's traditional supporters as well as those of some of the forces Houde had attracted while Gouin had the sympathy of the church, various Catholic associations, the nationalist elites, and a significant proportion of urbanized Quebecers. For the last ten days of the campaign Duplessis and Gouin appeared together at rallies all across the province calling upon their voters to unite as they had done.1 Accompanied by Edouard Lacroix and Onesime Gagnon, the two leaders asked Quebecers to back the Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin in order that they might free the province from the ills of the Taschereau regime. At the local level, Conservatives threw considerable support behind ALN candidates and vice versa.2 Alliance candidates also benefited from the help of members of a wide variety of nationalist and economic interest groups with grievances against the Taschereau regime. The Union catholique des cultivateurs, Catholic syndicates and other professional organizations, patriotic societies, and associations for youth as well as French-Canadian businessmen and merchants could all see the Union Nationale as furthering their

85 The Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin

needs and goals. That this was true also of the church was clear from the degree of clerical involvement in this election campaign. With this kind of support and with the widespread dissatisfaction over Liberal responses to the distress brought on by the prolonged economic collapse, it is not surprising that over 48 per cent of voters opted for the Duplessis-Gouin alliance on 25 November 1935. At dissolution, the Legislative Assembly had contained sixty Liberals, nine Conservatives, one Independent Conservative, and one Independent Liberal, and there were nineteen vacancies. Although the Liberals received only 5 per cent less of the popular vote than they had in the previous election, the total number of seats they won dropped from seventy-seven in 1931 to forty-eight in 1935. The Conservatives had won 44.2 per cent of the vote in 1931 but only eleven of their candidates had been victorious. Running under the Union Nationale banner in 1935, Conservatives received 18.6 per cent of the vote and elected sixteen ML AS. The remaining 29.6 per cent of the opposition vote went to candidates running as members of the ALN, twenty-six of whom were elected. Together, Union Nationale candidates had won 48.2 per cent of the popular vote, electing forty-two members. The Taschereau organization had not been able to maintain its previous vast majority, and the Liberal party appeared to be in grave danger of losing its long-standing hold on the province. Whereas 55.6 per cent of the vote had won the Liberals 87.7 per cent of the seats in the Legislative Assembly in 1931, 50.2 per cent gave them only 53.3 per cent of the seats in 1935-3 The over-representation of rural areas in the distribution of Quebec's ridings had narrowly saved the Liberal government. Despite the Union Nationale's emphasis on the need for rural rehabilitation, most of its votes were garnered in the distressed urban areas of Montreal, Quebec City, Sherbrooke, and TroisRivieres, and in the Saguenay region. The Liberals enjoyed their greatest success in the rural areas of the province, the lower St Lawrence and the Gaspe in particular, where traditional party loyalties proved a more serious obstacle to the Union Nationale's bid for support.4 Working-class discontent and internecine warfare among Liberals seriously hurt the government in more urban ridings. The ALN'S promise of a better deal for workers and the popularity of the former Conservative leader, Camillien Houde, among the working class won votes for opposition candidates. So, too, did the fact that many urban francophones were either recent rural emigrants or first-generation city dwellers who responded positively to the ALN program's championship of the agrarian way

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L'Action liberate nationale

of life and the social teachings of the Catholic Church.5 Liberals were elected in only four of the fifteen Montreal Island constituencies, with Union Nationale candidates wresting eight ridings from them including two held by cabinet ministers. The Conservatives added Laval, Maisonneuve, and St James to the three seats previously held in Montreal, while the ALN captured five others. In addition FrenchCanadian workers rejected the government in three Quebec City ridings. Merger candidates also defeated Liberals in Sherbrooke, and three ridings in the Lac-Saint-Jean region. Overall, although it managed to win five seats it had not held in 1931, the Liberal party still lost thirty-five seats: eight to Conservatives, twenty-six to the ALN, and one to an Independent Liberal. The surge to the Action liberate nationale had been province-wide, with its candidates being elected not only on Montreal Island and in Quebec City, but also in the Eastern Townships and the mining and lumbering northwest. The common front of Conservative and ALN candidates had come within six seats of defeating the Taschereau regime in late November 1935. As expected they had received help from within the Catholic Church. The widespread sympathy the ALN enjoyed among the clergy and within various Catholic and nationalist organizations had not been undermined by the alliance with Duplessis. The Conservative leader had, in fact, gained favour with the Catholic press earlier in 1935 by responding to the report of the Lapointe electricity commission with the argument that Montreal religious institutions should be exempt from the 2-per-cent tax on bills over $2.50. 6

The Liberals, who had gone into the 1935 campaign convinced that the province's priests and religious orders favoured the opposition, had had their worst fears confirmed. Although the church remained officially neutral, Liberals could point to a number of instances of open clerical involvement. While only a few Quebec priests went so far as to speak out publicly in favour of opposition candidates, the sermons of many more clearly implied that the church and society generally would benefit from a change in government.7 One Montreal priest, who had been restrained by Mgr Gauthier from delivering a speech attacking the Liberal government, had his reasons for asking voters not to cast their ballots for Liberals published in a letter to certain newspapers. In the Quebec district more than one priest took advantage of Cardinal Villeneuve's absence to come out against the Taschereau regime in the pulpit and on the hustings. Not surprisingly, the Liberals' near defeat in November 1935 spawned accusations and counter-charges concerning undue clerical

87 The Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin

involvement.8 The premier himself complained to Cardinal Villeneuve about the conduct of certain priests and, although the damage had been done, a pastoral letter was issued the following January affirming that neither the church nor its clergy ought to be involved in politics. The cardinal also issued a warning to priests against addressing political questions in the pulpit or even indicating their party preferences on the grounds that to do otherwise could bring harm to the church. The publication of Villeneuve's confidential letter by Liberal newspapers helped to keep this controversy alive, and there were charges in the Catholic press that the Liberals were usurping the hierarchy's right to discipline priests who overstepped the bounds of proper conduct. Taschereau, in fact, used the opening of the Legislative Assembly in March 1936 to defend the Liberal record on respect for church jurisdiction. POLITICAL INSTABILITY ESCALATES

Liberal fears about clerical involvement in future elections were exacerbated by the uncertainty generated by the outcome of the 1935 election. The Union Nationale's near victory threw the political situation in Quebec into a state of flux, and opposition groups throughout the province went to work mobilizing public opinion in an attempt to force the government's resignation. While Liberals held no meetings following the 25 November results, party organizers were reportedly active and the Liberal press set out to undermine public confidence in the Union Nationale.9 Rumours, meanwhile, abounded of dissension within both the Liberal party and the Union Nationale, and of the imminent break-up of both. Prior to the November 1935 Quebec election the Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin was not a single party but a united front formed by the Conservative party and the Action liberale nationale. The basic question was whether this pre-election alliance could be converted into an effective opposition. The expectation that the Union Nationale would be able to bring Taschereau down in the near future certainly provided the impetus to do just that. So, while the Liberals took stock of their party's position in the aftermath of the election, prominent ALN members and Conservatives issued statements assuring Quebec voters that the united assault on the Taschereau administration would not end until that government had been brought down.I0 Two days after the election, the Conservative organizer, Edouard Masson, announced that the Union Nationale organization would be made permanent.11 Following a joint Conservative-ALN caucus, ALN spokesmen Calixte Cormier and Oscar

88 L'Action liberate nationale

Drouin declared that "our forces are more united than ever and no amount of pressure will see the capitulation of any of our candidates to the government forces."12 And Maurice Dupre, who had been called to the caucus by Paul Gouin, reported privately that the meeting was "very satisfactory" and concluded that "all our friends are holding together."13 Nevertheless, reports of dissension within Union Nationale ranks received wide coverage in Liberal papers. Le Canada, for instance, reported on several occasions that one group within the ALN refused to accept Duplessis as their leader and counted on the support of Gouin who did not want to serve under a Conservative leader. According to Le Canada, Duplessis could not forgive his "young colleague" for demanding his departure as Conservative leader, while Gouin was dissatisfied because Duplessis was "the chief and he was only "the young colleague."14 These rumours of the imminent collapse of the Union Nationale proved premature, but the seeds of future problems within the alliance were germinating. Despite the preponderance of ALN supporters among elected alliance members, Gouin's position deteriorated. His chief backers in the Montreal district had been defeated, depriving him of important support in caucus. In addition, the most prominent ALN members elected in Quebec City - Philippe Hamel, Ernest Gregoire, and Oscar Drouin - saw faith in Duplessis as their best course in view of the lack of experience among the new deputies. By midDecember Duplessis had received assurances that they "seemed willing to let [him] ... pilot the ship and to submit to the directions that [he] ... gave them."15 At the same time, "to put an end to rumours," Gouin issued a statement that he would "never accept a proposition contrary to the principles expressed by the Action liberale nationale ... or to the alliance ... struck with the Conservatives."16 Attending a Union Nationale meeting in Quebec City with the ALN leader later in December, Duplessis warned Quebecers against the Liberal press. "There are no traitors among us," he declared, "despite what some ministerial papers say, since nobody among us wants to betray the race. We have been united in battle ... and shall be united in victory because the well-being of our province depends upon this union.17 The Conservative leader, moreover, assured Quebecers that the Union Nationale program remained unchanged and would be put into effect following the Liberal defeat. Opposition groups, meanwhile, were at work throughout the province mobilizing public opinion in an attempt to force the government's resignation. The Conservative alliance with the Action liberale nationale had

89 The Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin

brought Duplessis to the brink of power. He was determined, therefore, to see that the Union Nationale not only fulfilled its goal of ridding Quebec of Taschereau but also put him into the premier's office. The achievement of this latter objective would, however, be threatened should members of the ALN with ties to the Liberals be enticed back into that party's fold. Under these circumstances, the connections which had made Paul Gouin an attractive leader for the ALN would turn into a liability for the alliance. Taschereau's narrow victory had alarmed both federal and provincial Liberals by raising the spectre of Quebec falling under the control of an anti-Liberal coalition which Duplessis might well dominate. But while Liberals shared a desire to maintain their traditional stronghold, they were by no means agreed on a course of action. There was some feeling that Taschereau and all he stood for must go in the interests of the Liberal party. In the wake of the election the premier's resignation was widely expected, and rumours about who would succeed him abounded.18 Ernest Lapointe, while refusing to comment on reports that he was about to take over from Taschereau, argued privately that the time had come to make peace with the dissident Liberals because "unity must be achieved within the party." Urging that past differences be put aside and efforts made "to bring peace among the diverse factions," Lapointe expressed the hope "that little by little ... liberal principles will serve as a connecting link among those who were divided in the past."19 The fact that Mackenzie King personally discussed the post-election situation with Edouard Lacroix and Leonard Demers of the ALN attests to the concern of the federal party. While no concrete suggestions were made to the Liberal MP for Beauce and his associate, the possibility was discussed of forming a Liberal government in Quebec not headed by Taschereau which Gouin could support.20 The federal-provincial conference of December 1935 provided Liberal MPS, Ernest Lapointe and C.G. ("Chubby") Power in particular, with an opportunity to discuss developments in Quebec with Liberals from that province. Shortly thereafter Power went to Quebec to meet with Paul Gouin to see if reunification would be possible. Although Taschereau was aware that Power was going to talk to Gouin, the federal emissary was not authorized to make any offers to the ALN leader. According to Power, he met Gouin at the home of a Quebec City Conservative without having any specific proposal in mind for reuniting Quebec Liberals. The underlying aim of these discussions was to ensure that a predominantly Liberal government containing some of Taschereau's associates would be

go L'Action lib£rale nationale

maintained in Quebec. Power and Gouin apparently considered the possibility of a government made up of traditional Liberals, ALN representatives, and Duplessis supporters. Honore Mercier, J.-N. Francoeur, and Adelard Godbout were deemed possible Liberal representatives in such a government. The federal Liberals were, according to Power, not too concerned about convincing Taschereau to resign if one of his cabinet ministers was to succeed him. The premier, in Power's opinion, did not enjoy widespread support either among rank and file party members or within his cabinet. Discussion hit a snag, however, because Gouin gave Power the impression that it would be very difficult to have anyone but Duplessis as premier of a government which included any of the recently elected opposition ML AS. An administration headed by the former leader of the Conservative opposition was not, however, acceptable to the Liberals. Power also reviewed the situation with Lacroix and Demers at Levis, but nothing concrete came of these meetings.81 Jacob Nicol, chief Liberal organizer in Quebec, was also involved in attempts to win back dissidents before the legislature was convened. Less than a month after the election, Oscar Drouin informed Gouin that Nicol had discussed the Liberals' problems with a friend of his. At that time, Nicol reportedly believed that Taschereau would probably resign and favoured "a combination which would keep Godbout and Franceour in a Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin ministry."" Because his friend had asked him to do so, Drouin approached Gouin and Duplessis to see if they would meet with two of King's Quebec ministers to discuss this possibility, but he made his own opposition to the scheme very clear. Although it is unlikely that this particular meeting occurred, Paul Gouin did journey to Ottawa in early January to meet with Lapointe.23 This conference proved to be no more successful than others in improving the Liberal position in Quebec. All efforts to work out some realignment of political forces in Quebec before the Legislative Assembly convened foundered on Gouin's insistence that any government containing ALN deputies would have to be headed by Duplessis.84 Although members of the ALN were divided in their attitude towards the Union Nationale in the post-election period, Gouin's conviction that the party's ML AS would insist on Duplessis's leadership was well founded. A letter from Drouin to Gouin dated 18 December warned him against the self-interested attempts of federal Liberals to break the Duplessis-Gouin alliance by co-opting some or all of its ALN supporters. On the basis of discussions with Jean Martineau and F.A. Monk among others, Drouin had concluded that, while Quebec's Liberal ministers had "no desire to save

gi

The Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin

Taschereau or the majority of the ministers ... they do want to save the provincial Liberal party as an entity." For this reason, he warned Gouin to beware of the efforts being made to divide the ALN, particularly by federal Liberals who, he claimed, feared that the federal Conservatives might "take advantage of our movement." Referring to the suggested realignment whereby all Taschereau's ministers except Francoeur and Godbout would be replaced by Union nationale MLAS including Duplessis and Gouin, under the premiership of one of the remaining Liberals, Drouin declared that he did not know a single opposition member who would support such a proposition. More specifically, Drouin stated that his unwillingness to accept such an arrangement was shared by Gregoire and Hamel. Even if "the federal Liberals would ... accept Mr Duplessis as prime minister as a last resort," provided that Godbout and Franceour were included in the cabinet and Onesime Gagnon excluded, Drouin remained opposed. The presence of two important Taschereau ministers in a Union Nationale government was clearly unacceptable because it would impede both investigations of past Liberal regimes and implementation of reforms. Drouin denounced what he described as "an even more insidious proposition on the part of certain federal Liberals," which involved destroying the Duplessis-Gouin alliance in order to reconstitute a Liberal block in the Quebec legislature composed of ALN and Liberal MLAS, leaving Duplessis alone in opposition. Although Drouin expressed a belief that Gouin would be loyal to the alliance with Duplessis, he claimed that some of the ALN leader's close friends seemed to favour such a proposal. Like Drouin, Jean Martineau was opposed to ALN deputies accepting cabinet positions in a ministry containing representatives of the Taschereau regime because he doubted that any such ministry would implement the ALN reforms. Drouin and Martineau believed that it was in the best interests of the Action liberale nationale not to be associated with any members of the Taschereau regime. Arguing that their movement represented something "new," Drouin warned against giving anyone an excuse to accuse the ALN of "making pacts with the past" or "striking compromises with the men of the old regime."25 The scheming of federal Liberals had clearly aroused the suspicions of those in the ALN who shared Drouin's faith in the Union Nationale and feared the effects Liberal negotiations with Gouin and Lacroix might have on that alliance. Dissension within ALN ranks was exacerbated because other ALN leaders were equally suspicious of the Conservative element within the Union Nationale. Louis-Philippe Morin and Horace Philippon, ALN officers in the

92

L'Action liberale nationale

Quebec City region, openly feared Conservative motives and intrigues. Philippon had opposed the alliance from the outset, warning Gouin that it would bring the ALN into conflict with greedy Conservatives who would want to run as many candidates as possible, hoping for victories where defeat was certain without ALN help.26 After the election, Morin expressed concern about the aims of the Conservatives within the Union Nationale and of the powerful business interests connected with the Conservative party. Referring to a proposal to bring "the principal leaders of the ALN to the fore," he claimed that this would be "the best way to protect the Union Nationale from the pro-trust, Conservative wing." No purpose would be served by delivering Quebec from Taschereau if it were simply handed over to "Webster, L'Esperance, and Company."27 Morin became even more suspicious of Conservative intentions after hearing a Union Nationale radio broadcast, whose text had not been submitted to either Philippon or himself. Its strong emphasis on Duplessis's position as leader of the Union Nationale made him question the speaker's motives. By mid-February, relations within the Union Nationale in Quebec City had deteriorated to the point where Morin informed Gouin that he feared a complete rupture unless Drouin succeeded in setting up a special committee suggested by the ALN leader "to research a formula which would unite the two leaders and the two groups once more and in a permanent way." Although Gouin expressed his concern, he could only advise Morin not to lose heart because some Conservatives were being difficult.28 The situation, however, worsened. On 10 February Oscar Drouin had decided that although he had earlier agreed to submit his radio speeches to Gouin before broadcasting, such censorship was against his principles and would have to come to an end.29 By month's end, Morin was warning Gouin to beware of the "Duplessis men" within the Union Nationale, including Drouin whom he had heard say that implementation of the ALN program was "subordinate to the raising of a certain gentleman to the office of prime minister." Claiming that "true" ALN adherents in Quebec City did not share this view, Morin noted that it confirmed their earlier doubts about Duplessis's readiness to bring their program to fruition. Already suspicious that the Conservative element within the Union Nationale would not honour the division of ridings agreed to in November 1935, he advised that a caucus of a dozen or more men from each side of the alliance should be convened to determine the extent of Duplessis's respect for "this famous agreement." Drouin could no longer be trusted to preserve the division of constituencies agreed to originally.30

93 The Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin

While only sixteen of the forty-two opposition members elected in 1935 were officially identified as Conservatives, that party's position within the Union Nationale had steadily improved in the months following the election. After Masson's announcement on 27 November that the Union Nationale organization would become permanent, Conservative organizers had lost no time extending their control and Conservative associations quickly became Union Nationale ones.31 The Conservatives had also worked to ensure the continued loyalty of all opposition MLAS to Duplessis. Well-informed about Liberal efforts to reconstitute the government of Quebec, Duplessis courted the favour of ALN deputies and other leaders.32 He reportedly promised Oscar Drouin, Rene Chaloult, and Philippe Hamel cabinet positions and offered a future post to Roger Ouimet, a prominent member of the ALN, in return for his support.33 Nor did the Conservative leader neglect the interests of less well-known ALN adherents, and he took particular care to woo the ALN deputies in the months following their election.34 Duplessis's supporters were also keeping close tabs on both Conservative and ALN members. One report claimed that a Conservative ML A had sworn to vote with the Taschereau government and advised Duplessis to have the appropriate organizer "remind him of his duty." Another notified Duplessis that efforts were being made to verify a rumour that Ernest Gregoire had spent two days in Montreal staying with Gouin.35 The Conservative leader obviously remained suspicious of all his associates and especially of his "young colleague" whom he was determined would not rob him of power. Yet any threat Gouin had once posed to Duplessis steadily deteriorated and not only because of the Conservative leader's success in wooing the ALN deputies and the failure of Liberal efforts to do so. The ALN leader permitted Duplessis to handle Union Nationale affairs and even referred delegations to him on the grounds that the Conservative leader knew much more about political matters. Gouin was warned that his unwillingness to "begin sharing the spoils with anyone" was jeopardizing the position of the Action liberale nationale in the alliance because of Duplessis's superior knowledge of "how to exploit this more human side of politics."36 The pressures the Liberals brought to bear on Gouin in the early months of 1936 put him under considerable emotional strain. So, too, did the divisions within the ALN and his lack of political experience. Faced with the complexities of the post-election scene, Gouin appears to have virtually abdicated leadership of the Action liberale nationale. His failure to take a more active role facilitated Duplessis's takeover of the Union Nationale. Gouin's

94

L'Action libe"rale Rationale

passivity contrasted sharply with Duplessis's energetic handling of party affairs and preparation for the final assault on the Taschereau regime. Whether motivated by nationalist idealism or political ambition it became clear to ALN deputies that Duplessis offered them their best chance of continuing in public life and of bringing to fruition whichever parts of the ALN program they wanted to see enacted. Taschereau's delay in calling the Quebec legislature into session gave the split within the Union Nationale time to grow. By early February, Elysee Theriault felt it necessary to ask Bona Dussault, a former Liberal who had carried Portneuf for the ALN, not to tell Duplessis about some suggestions he had made, because differences of opinion between the Union Nationale leaders might cause Duplessis to accuse him "of aiding and abetting his enemies."37 That Dussault promptly forwarded Duplessis a copy of Theriault's letter is indicative of the level of intrigue within opposition ranks. Dussault also informed the Conservative leader of a meeting that Gregoire Belanger, the successful ALN candidate in Montreal-Dorion, had invited him to attend and promised to advise him of its purpose. Although he later assured him it was "nothing extaordinary," he did note that the eight ML AS present (which did not include Gouin) had "firmly decided to pursue the ALN program in its entirety with no compromise of any sort."38 All Duplessis had to do to retain the support of ALN deputies was to give assurances that a Union Nationale administration would implement their platform, and this he was more than willing to do as long as he remained in opposition. Taschereau's announcement, following a cabinet meeting on 19 February, that he would continue as premier and meet the legislature in late March brought action from members of the ALN who were concerned lest tensions within the alliance destroy the opportunity of bringing the regime down. Philippe Hamel attempted to promote harmony at the leadership level and urged Duplessis to attend an intimate dinner at which Gouin had agreed to be present on the understanding that the Conservative leader would also be invited. If Duplessis so desired, the two leaders along with Gregoire, Drouin, and Hamel could use this meeting to "get our violins into tune" so that when the battle was joined in the legislature there would be harmony in the opposition ranks.39 Drouin, meanwhile, admonished his fellow dissident Liberals not to underestimate their debt to the Conservatives who had provided the Action liberale nationale with a party organization. He believed firmly that neither the Conservative party nor the Action liberale nationale could bring the Taschereau regime down alone.40 ALN adherents generally

95 The Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin

agreed that Duplessis, who was hard at work preparing for the approaching session, was essential to their defeat of the Liberals.41 Thus, although internal and external pressures placed severe strains on the unity of the ALN-Conservative alliance during the months between the election and the opening of the legislature, the very real possibility that continued co-operation would bring down a weakened Taschereau government held the opposition forces together. TASCHEREAU VERSUS DUPLESSIS: T H E 1 9 3 6 S E S S I O N

Once the efforts of federal Liberals to exploit the tensions in the Union Nationale and bring Taschereau's critics back into the party fold failed, Quebec Liberals had, of course, taken steps to avert their downfall. Taschereau drastically reorganized the cabinet and brought in new men, partly in an attempt to satisfy the discontented young Liberal element and partly to ensure the continued loyalty of rural Quebec. Hector Authier, the member for Abitibi and one of the early settlers of Amos, replaced Irenee Vautrin, who had been defeated, as minister of colonization. E. Cote, the MLA for Bonaventure, took over J.E. Perrault's portfolio as minister of roads when the latter replaced Taschereau as attorney-general. J.-N. Francoeur, former minister of public works, game and fisheries and acting minister of labour, became minister of mines, while Edgar Rochette, the member for Charlevoix-Saguenay, was named minister of labour, game and fisheries. Cleophas Bastien, the member for Berthier, became minister without portfolio. The need for young Liberal support was also recognized in the appointment of Lucien Dugas, the youthful member for Joliette, as speaker of the Legislative Assembly.42 The loyalty of rural Quebec to the Liberal party was both rewarded and protected in the Speech from the Throne which promised easier loans for farmers. But, as it had been made clear that the needs of urbanized French Canadians who worked in factories could not be ignored with impunity, the government's program included proposals for additional unemployment relief and strict observance of Sunday as a holiday. The Liberal hold on Quebec had slipped badly and the Taschereau administration sought to recoup its losses. With opposition MLAS united behind him, Duplessis set out to complete the destruction of Taschereau's regime and to end the Liberal monopoly of power in Quebec. The bitter duel between Taschereau and Duplessis that marked the opening of the legislature was characteristic of the session. Arguing that the government had outlived its usefulness and would

96 L'Action liberate nationale

soon be discarded, Duplessis attacked the Speech from the Throne for failing to meet the real needs of the province and accused the administration of economizing only on truth. Union Nationale members rose one after the other to denounce the Taschereau regime bitterly and at great length. Drouin was quick to deny the premier's claim that, should the need ever arise, Liberals would be able to re-liberalize their party from within.43 Gouin, however, was silent. When he finally did speak a month after the session began, his attack reinforced Duplessis's claims that the Liberal program provided only temporary remedies and not fundamental reforms. Reiterating his conviction that the only solution for French Canada's economic and social problems was an overall plan based on firsthand knowledge of conditions throughout Quebec, Gouin argued that the ALN program, constantly revised by experts from every field organized in an economic council, was that plan. The Action liberate nationale and not the Liberal party possessed the experience required to solve Quebec's problems, and Gouin called upon all Liberal ML AS who privately condemned the Taschereau regime to have the courage of their convictions and to help the ALN achieve implementation of its program.44 Duplessis's ever increasing prominence within the Union Nationale and Gouin's poor showing as ALN leader since the November election had, however, killed any chances of Liberals accepting this challenge. Duplessis shared Gouin's desire to see the Taschereau government turned out of office but did not look for support from Liberal members to achieve this end. For several weeks prior to the session, he had had expert accountants studying the public accounts records for proof of scandals during the long Liberal administration. Their discoveries meant that Duplessis was well prepared to launch a vicious attack on the Liberals when, on his insistence, the Public Accounts Committee began sitting early in May. The government was put on the defensive at the outset when Duplessis levelled charges against a former ML A, a former cabinet minister, and several high public officials. The revelations of scandals within the Taschereau administration and the opposition's refusal to pass the budget or allow the government any interim supply during the hearings of the Public Accounts Committee brought the fall of the regime ever closer. By the beginning of June, Taschereau advised Ernest Lapointe that the only way to defeat the opposition's move to force his government to resign by refusing to pass the budget was for Ottawa to provide him with the funds needed to carry on until September.45 However, Duplessis's subsequent success in forcing the premier's brother, Antoine Taschereau, the accountant of the

97 The Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin

Legislative Assembly, to admit that he had misappropriated the interest on government funds in his possession, ended any hope for the Taschereau administration.46 These sensational revelations early in June sparked a tumultuous session of the Legislative Assembly with the deputy speaker unable to maintain order as Taschereau and Duplessis hurled challenges at each other over the howls of their respective followers.47 The opposition alliance was about to achieve its first objective - the end of the Taschereau regime. To this point the Action liberale nationale had remained in the Union Nationale in the expectation that the alliance would soon be in a position to fulfil its second purpose - implementation of the ALN program. All was not well, however, within the Union Nationale. Differences between certain ALN leaders and the Duplessis group had grown during the session because of their contradictory aspirations for the Union Nationale. Whereas La Province, the ALN newspaper, had maintained as the session opened that "the Action liberale nationale shall remain the Action liberale nationale under its valorous leader, Paul Gouin," Ulllustration Nouvelle, a Conservative paper, had reported that "it had been decided to fuse all opposition forces into one single group."48 Even Duplessis's excellent performance as leader of the combined opposition forces in the legislature had failed to dispel discontent within ALN ranks. Gouin's almost total silence in the Assembly and rare attendance at the hearings of the Public Accounts Committee were attributed to his disapproval of the lengths to which Duplessis was going in attacking the Liberals.49 By late May, Edouard Lacroix was complaining to Gouin about Duplessis and suggesting ways that their group might "regain lost ground" in the Quebec district.50 Other Quebec City ALN members, including Drouin, Hamel, and Gregoire who had won seats in 1935, remained firmly committed to the Union Nationale as it was operating under Duplessis. Tensions within the alliance escalated as the distinct possibility of Quebec being lost to the Union Nationale brought renewed and strengthened Liberal efforts to reunite their forces in that province.51 The expectation of Taschereau's resignation provided an excellent opportunity for re-absorbing at least some dissident Liberals into the party, and attempts to secure defections from Union Nationale ranks recommenced with the search for his successor. Jean Martineau and F.A. Monk were reportedly both offered ministries under a new Liberal premier -Mercier, Francoeur, or Godbout. While Monk was, in Martineau's estimation, drawn to the Liberals, the Montreal group generally felt that Mercier and Godbout would both be controlled by the Liberal party organizers against whom Martineau and his

98 L'Action lib£rale nationale

supporters had been fighting for several years. Although the Martineau group was not as certain about Francoeur, the Liberal offers were all rejected because Quebec Liberals refused to accept any member of the ALN as Taschereau's replacement.52 The suspicion remained that the Liberal organization wanted a premier who could be controlled and was not interested in an administration that would implement the policies the Montreal Liberals responsible for launching the Action liberate nationale believed were absolutely essential. As late as two days before Taschereau stepped down, however, there were press reports that Lacroix would replace the premier and form a coalition government including four ALN members - Gouin, Monk, J.-H.-A. Pacquette, and W.-E. Lauriault, —but excluding Duplessis and his associates.53 There were, however, serious obstacles in the way of such a scheme even if the ALN deputies concerned had agreed to it. A new government would be expected to take charge immediately, to bring the budget to a vote, and to pass certain widely supported social legislation before proroguing the legislature until the autumn. The possibility of this ever happening was remote because the Duplessis group could block government measures for weeks. Certain of victory at the polls, Duplessis's supporters would do all in their power to force an immediate election. Moreover, Quebec Liberals by no means unanimously supported this scheme. While there was talk in Liberal circles of Lacroix succeeding Taschereau prior to the premier's resignation, the MP for Beauce reportedly enjoyed very little support among either federal or provincial Liberals.54 By 10 June it was reported that the federal minister of public works, PJ.A. Cardin, and Joseph Simard of Sorel, who had been conducting Liberal efforts to construct a coalition, had given up, "admitting that it was quite impossible to give satisfaction to demands made from all sides for political preferment and patronage."55 The next day Taschereau announced the resignation of his government, requested an immediate dissolution, and asked the lieutenant-governor to call upon Adelard Godbout, the retiring minister of agriculture, to form the new government. There were still stories of efforts on Godbout's part to obtain the co-operation of some opposition members, but the ALN had clearly demonstrated its unwillingness to enter an administration headed by a former Taschereau minister and negotiations were soon reported to have broken down.56 The Union Nationale had seemingly won its chance to seek power from the voters with its ranks intact. And yet within a few days, Paul Gouin, without even consulting the ML AS elected under the ALN banner, announced suddenly that the Action liberale

gg The Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin

nationale was opposed to "the two old tory, pro-trust parties, that of the honourable M. Godbout and that of M. Duplessis."57 Quebecers, including members of the ALN, were left to speculate about why Gouin had chosen, apparently unilaterally, to withdraw the party he led from the Union Nationale at this juncture and to denounce Duplessis as the leader of a party which, like the Liberals, favoured the interests of "tories and trusts." As leader of the ALN, Paul Gouin had always maintained that the defeat of the Taschereau regime was the prerequisite to all reform in Quebec. In November 1935 the alliance of the Action liberale nationale with the Conservatives had been justified on the grounds that such an association would hasten the fall of this nefarious regime. Within six months, on 11 June 1936, Taschereau had resigned, bequeathing the extremely difficult task of forming the next Liberal government to one of his former ministers. Exactly one week later, Paul Gouin announced that the Action liberale nationale was opposed to the parties led by both Adelard Godbout and Maurice Duplessis. The explanations provided for this seemingly sudden withdrawal of the Action liberale nationale from the Union Nationale on the eve of the 1936 election campaign vary as widely as did the loyalties, interests, and ambitions of the men involved. AFTERMATH OF COLLAPSE

Paul Gouin told Quebecers that the alliance had been broken not by the Action liberale nationale but by Maurice Duplessis, who had refused to respect the conditions upon which it had been established. Without explaining precisely what Duplessis had done since November 1935 to undermine the entente, Gouin emphasized that the Conservative leader's refusal to honour the secret agreement whereby the ALN was entitled to run candidates in two-thirds of the constituencies had forced him to call a separate caucus for 19 June, the day before the next scheduled Union Nationale caucus.58 According to Jean Martineau, Duplessis was agreeable to the ALN'S leaders running in the approaching election but maintained that the agreement concerning the division of ridings made prior to the November contest had pertained solely to that particular election.59 Although there was nothing concerning future elections in Duplessis's letter of 7 November 1935 to Gouin outlining the division of constituencies, the ALN leader and several of his associates took the position that the 1935 arrangements should prevail until the Union Nationale defeated the Liberals at the polls. Gouin appears to have seized upon the Conservative leader's insistence upon control of

ioo L'Action liberate nationale

more ridings in the 1936 election to attempt to convince the members of the ALN that they must follow him out of the Union Nationale so that the Action liberale nationale might remain true to its aims. Those members of the ALN who remained with Duplessis and Conservatives naturally argued that the 30/60 division of ridings agreed to in November 1935 referred only to that year's election.60 Whatever the intent of the original agreement, the Conservative leader did refuse to abide by its terms in the 1936 campaign because of his strengthened position. Within six months of Duplessis's rather reluctant consent to the formation of the Union Nationale, he could be fairly certain that, if forced to make a choice, all but three or four ALN deputies would desert Gouin to run under his banner. The ALN leader's loss of support in the months following the Liberals' near defeat enabled Duplessis to act as he did in June 1936. No longer did the Conservative leader have to accept the terms ALN leaders had been able to insist upon in November.61 Philippe Hamel and Oscar Drouin, who were with the Duplessis group on the night of 18 June when Gouin announced his party's withdrawal, were reportedly distressed by this turn of events partly because they were unsure that Union Nationale candidates would be elected without the alliance with the Action liberale nationale. Duplessis, however, dismissed their fears, happy to see the dual leadership brought to an end.62 After months of political uncertainty the transformation of the Union Nationale from an alliance into a traditional, leaderdominated Quebec party was well under way. In the meantime, Gouin's announcement threw the confused Quebec political scene into even greater disarray. On the day his statement was released, Gouin wired ALN deputies and a few Conservatives summoning them to "an extremely important caucus of ex-deputies of the Action liberale nationale." The telegram said he was "absolutely counting" on their presence at the meeting scheduled for 8:30 PM on Friday 19 June 1936 in his office.63 Dr J.H.-A. Pacquette, N.-E. Lariviere, C. Rochefort, W.-E. Lauriault, R. Lorrain, V. Cliche, F.A. Monk, J.T. Larochelle, J.-G. Belanger, H. Choquette, A. Castonguay, P. Tardif, F.A.L. Pouliot, and Laurent Barre -all Union Nationale ML AS -were reported to have attended the caucus along with Jean Martineau, Hector Langevin, Leonard Demers, Edouard Lacroix, Roger Ouimet, Henri Moquin, Horace Philippon, Louis-Philippe Morin, and A. Raynault.64 Of these fourteen MLAS, two, Laurent Barre and F.A.L. Pouliot, were listed as Conservative members within the Union Nationale.65 Although the wording of his press release, issued on 18 June, indicated that

ioi

The Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin

Gouin expected the ALN deputies to follow him out of the alliance, not quite half of the other twenty-five ML AS who had been elected under the ALN banner appeared at the emergency caucus on 19 June. Of those not in attendance, only six are recorded as having excused themselves. ALN records contain no account of what transpired at the caucus in Gouin's office, but presumably an explanation was offered of why the announcement of the decision to withdraw from the Union Nationale had been made with no prior consultation with the ALN deputies. Gouin's justification of why the ALN deputies must quit the alliance with Duplessis was obviously not very convincing, as all but a few attended the Union Nationale caucus in Sherbrooke the following day.66 For a couple of days the question uppermost in the minds of Quebec's political leaders was whether or not the ALN deputies would follow Gouin out of the Union Nationale. Duplessis refused to issue a detailed response to Gouin's announcement before consulting with "the members of the former legislature and partisans of the groups of Liberals, Conservatives and Independents loyal to the Union Nationale." He had, however, denied the validity of many of Gouin's claims and promised that the inquiry launched before the Public Accounts Committee would be "continued without fear and without consideration for anyone." Every thief, whether "blue, red, or of the ALN," would be "denounced, condemned, and punished with the greatest severity."67 The attitude of the ALN members attending the Union Nationale caucus in Sherbrooke on 20 June, which Duplessis had called for that day before Gouin's announcement, made it very clear that they supported Duplessis. According to a report in Le Devoir, twenty-one of the twenty-six ALN deputies were present, and all "declared themselves to be furious that certain people had swayed Mr Gouin, head of the Action liberale nationale, without their having even been consulted." Rather than following Gouin's lead these ML AS decided in favour of maintenance of the Union Nationale in principle and fact. It remained their view that Conservatives and Liberals should no longer worry about their party allegiances in the provincial domain but form an alliance called the Union Nationale.68 The decision of more than twenty of the ALN deputies to remain with the Union Nationale seriously undermined the significance of Gouin's announcement that the Action liberale nationale had re-entered politics as a separate entity opposed to both old-line parties. As Oscar Drouin was quick to point out, the Union Nationale emerged more formidable than ever, strengthened by the fact that there were, by late June, thirty-seven MLAS under one leader instead of forty-two under two.69

1O2 L'Action liberate nationale

The reasons that most ALN members with former Liberal ties opted to stay with Duplessis in June 1936 are not difficult to discern. These men had obviously not been able to realize their political ambitions under the party organization during the Taschereau era. Their chance at a political career had come through the ALN whose candidates for the 1935 election had been selected after consultations with local citizens and political, economic, and religious leaders. Many had been elected with the help of the Conservative party, with whom some had had previous connections, and a variety of nationalist and economic interest groups. Once Gouin broke with Duplessis, staying with the Union Nationale offered them their only chance of political advancement and the access to power they needed to meet the demands of their local supporters.70 Even those like Philippe Hamel who were motivated not by interest in a political career but by an intense desire to implement particular aspects of the ALN platform which the Union Nationale had adopted had to quell any reservations they had about Duplessis, given Gouin's apparent retreat into the political wilderness in June 1936. Ideological and career goals combined to limit the impact Gouin's withdrawal had on Union Nationale deputies. What the ALN members who decided to stay with Duplessis had to do was to ensure that the support Gouin had brought to the alliance remained with them. The ALN leader and those who had remained loyal to him were just as determined that this support should not go to their former allies. "Mr Duplessis Breaks the Union to Pieces," declared La Province on 20 June, and the former Conservative leader remained the culprit in the official ALN version of the destruction of the alliance which Quebecers had been promised time and time again would defeat the Liberals and create a new and better life for them.71 Gouin's press release and the position adopted by the Action liberale nationale made it impossible for ALN deputies to remain loyal to their party leader without leaving the opposition forces led by Duplessis just when it appeared that the Liberals could be defeated in Quebec for the first time in forty years. Officers and deputies of the Action liberale nationale had been forced to make a choice and subsequently sought to justify their decisions. The same day that Gouin's statement appeared in the newspapers, Ernest Gre"goire spoke over the air for Oscar Drouin, Philippe Hamel, and himself, to explain that "L'Action Nationale" would survive in spite of defections and that they three would be staying "until the end with Mr Duplessis, the hero of the last session, the

io3 The Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin

officially recognized leader of the Action Nationale." Gregoire left no doubt where he stood in Quebec politics. Having praised Duplessis's work in bringing about the downfall of the Taschereau administration, he attributed Gouin's stand to "jealousy of the laurels conquered by Mr Duplessis at the Public Accounts inquiry, the true grave of the Taschereau regime." Carrying the personal attack on Paul Gouin farther, Gregoire noted that Sir Lomer Gouin had carried the stain of having been involved in a palace conspiracy against his leader, Simeon-Napoleon Parent, and declared that his son had added to this family record: "treason towards a loyal ally whom he c[ould] reproach only with his valour, his courage and his intelligence."72 It was natural for those within the ALN who chose to remain with Duplessis to place the blame for the destruction of the alliance on Gouin. The nature of the attacks like Gre"goire's, nevertheless, embittered relations among the founders of the Action liberale nationale. The controversy over who was responsible for the rupture in the Union Nationale raged on in newspapers, over the radio, and at political rallies, with both groups claiming that virtue was on their side. In response to Gregoire's attack on Gouin, Horace Philippon declared that Duplessis's repudiation of the 7 November 1935 agreement was proof that "he wanted to reconstitute the old Tory party to the detriment of the Union Nationale." Rene Chaloult countered Philippon's exposition of the official ALN version of the split by accusing Gouin and his supporters of flirting with the Liberals.73 Quebecers were told that Gouin and his associates had been attempting to undermine the Duplessis-Gouin alliance ever since the election and had never ceased "to negotiate with the enemy" behind the backs of both Duplessis and Taschereau. Hamel, Gregoire, and Drouin had been excluded from such negotiations because "they were considered too loyal to Mr Duplessis and to the Union Nationale."74 Announcing that "the betrayal is complete," Le Journal argued that the Union Nationale had not been dissolved but rather had been abandoned by a few traitors.75 Divisions deepened as the controversy raged on, and Gouin's former allies in the Action liberale nationale attributed the collapse of the alliance to his personal failings. Chaloult, for instance, told Quebecers that Gouin, whose negligence, abstentions, and compromises had alienated him from other members of the caucus, had intended to go against the pact and choose his "cronies" as candidates in 48 ridings so as to create for himself a "court" of weaklings who, like him, would be "favourable to shady alliances with the enemy and hostile to inquiries."76

io4 L'Action liberale nationale CONCLUSION Not all members of the ALN who remained loyal to Gouin agreed with the decision to break with Duplessis prior to the 1936 election. Jean Martineau, for one, disputed the wisdom of withdrawing from the Union Nationale just when it looked as if the leaders would soon have a chance to enact their proposed reforms.77 Edouard Lacroix had not accepted Gouin's announcement without protest. He had wanted to succeed Taschereau as premier of Quebec, thereby destroying the power of Taschereau's supporters in the Liberal party organization.78 When this failed to happen and Taschereau placed the yoke of office firmly on Adelard Godbout's shoulders, the maintenance of the Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin became, in his view, the best thing for Quebec because the possible enactment of the ALN program was too important to be jeopardized. While most former ALN deputies were declaring their loyalty to Duplessis in Sherbrooke, Lacroix told Quebecers that he regretted the speed with which sides were being taken. He remained hopeful that the agreement could be renewed within a few days and advised people against hasty decisions.79 Duplessis, however, no longer needed an alliance with Gouin. Paul Gouin, surrounded by a few loyal supporters including Jean Martineau, Roger Ouimet, Horace Philippon, and Louis-Philippe Morin, stood isolated in Quebec political circles. Lacroix, however, was not willing to admit defeat. Early in July, he announced that the Action liberale nationale would run enough candidates in the August election to hold a balance of power in the legislature.80 Assisted by Leonard Demers, Horace Philippon, and F.A. Monk, Lacroix organized two rallies in Beauce county. The Action liberale nationale appeared to be in the running, and Monk promised that Gouin would make a statement to that effect within two or three days. Gouin, however, delayed any comment on the ALN'S position for some time only to announce on 16 July 1936 that he, as leader, had decided that the ALN would not run candidates in the approaching election. The Action liberale nationale had, he maintained, accomplished its first purpose, namely, the bringing down of the Taschereau regime, and was about to embark on the fulfilment of its second aim which was "to adapt provincial legislation to the problems of the present hour and to bestow upon Quebec a national policy ... one conforming to the needs, the aptitudes, and the aspirations of the majority of the population, which is French Canadian. This second aim could only be achieved following an

105 The Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin

educational campaign which, for the time being, had to be carried on outside the realm of electoral politics.81 Other comments by the ALN leader, however, make it clear that he placed the blame for the absence of the Action liberale nationale from the 1936 campaign at the feet of traitors such as Hamel, Drouin, and Gregoire. As Gouin explained, "the Action liberale nationale had been reduced to this extremity" because a significant number of its "soldiers," including Philippe Hamel, "had deserted their leader" and then gone on to commit "the supreme felony of stabbing [him] in the back." The deserters' efforts to make Gouin "carry the responsibility for their own treachery" had, moreover, so disturbed people that the ALN leader had not been able to raise the help required "to carry on a serious campaign."82 Duplessis's success in convincing ALN deputies that he could bring them to power and would implement their program left Paul Gouin without a viable political party. The former Liberal's distrust of Duplessis and his dislike of the lengths to which he carried his antiTaschereau campaign had contributed to Gouin's downfall and to Duplessis's establishment as sole leader of opposition candidates in the 1936 Quebec election. So, too, had Gouin's passivity within the Union Nationale prior to the election call in mid-June. The ALN leader's months of near paralysis and indecision following the November 1935 election doomed to failure his last-minute efforts to persuade supporters of the Action liberale nationale program to run for that party in August 1936.

7 The Waning of ALN Influence within Duplessis's Union Nationale

Paul Gouin's withdrawal of the Action liberate nationale from active politics meant that on 17 August 1936 Quebec voters would have a choice between a supposedly reformed Liberal party led by Adelard Godbout and an alliance of former Conservatives and Liberals united behind Maurice Duplessis. Despite desperate efforts to avoid such a situation, the Liberals faced the task of defending their party's record against attacks from a party which included almost all the dissident Liberals who had been elected as ALN representatives the year before. The refusal of most ALN deputies to follow Gouin out of the Union Nationale suggested, moreover, that the Liberals could not count on Quebecers who had traditionally voted for their party to return to the fold now that Taschereau was gone. There was little reason for the ALN'S reformist or nationalist supporters to desert Duplessis in the 1936 election because the Union Nationale platform remained the one the ALN had drawn up. The party could, therefore, continue to be identified with progress and modernization as well as economic reconquest and the preservation of traditional values. Duplessis's strong defence of provincial autonomy and his deeply rooted commitment to protecting the position of the church and the place of agriculture within FrenchCanadian society made it possible to cast him as a proper nationalist chef. And/ even though the Liberals had chosen an agronomist to lead them, the Union Nationale could still present itself as the party which had long recognized the errors of the Taschereau regime's

107 Waning Influence

economic policies and put agriculture and small business at the very centre of its plans for lifting Quebec out of the depression. Duplessis's attacks on trusts held out the hope that smaller enterprises, which French Canadians were much more likely to own, would benefit under any administration he headed. He also appeared sympathetic to the desire of young francophones for greater participation in the higher echelons of industry in Quebec, suggesting that he would not do any less than the Liberals had to advance the cause of professional education within the French-Canadian system. In fact, Duplessis might well have been expected to accomplish more in this sphere, given French Catholic suspicion of Liberal initiatives produced by that party's history of clashes with the church over educational issues. The Union Nationale's adherence to the original ALN program, moreover, ensured opposition candidates of continued widespread support from within the Catholic Church, even though the overt clerical involvement of the previous November might be less evident.1 Such support would presumably help the Union Nationale to break the Liberal hold on rural Quebec and build on the success alliance candidates had enjoyed in urban areas in the 1935 election. The fact that the Union Nationale alliance included segments of the old financial powers tied to the Conservatives further enhanced the opposition's chances of making a breakthrough in Quebec politics in August 1936. The diversity and breadth of Union Nationale backing meant that the party would draw votes from a wide variety of groups with differing strategies for improving conditions generally and their own economic and social positions in particular. THE 1936 CAMPAIGN

Duplessis, however, left nothing to chance in the summer of 1936. He worked hard throughout July and August to undermine Liberal efforts to woo back anti-Taschereau supporters and to persuade voters, especially rural ones who had remained loyal to the Liberals the previous November, that it was absolutely essential to give Quebec an entirely new government. In mid-July he embarked on a whirlwind campaign with at least one rally a day until the election. The Union Nationale leader repeatedly reaffirmed that he would lead a "national" government "not in order to raise again or to bring low one party or the other, but to restore that which had been destroyed by a harmful regime."8 The Godbout government, he warned, was merely a replica of the Taschereau regime. Mr Godbout

io8 L'Action liberate nationale

was the "heir" of Premier Taschereau and, as such, had to accept the "debts" of his legacy. Voters, Duplessis advised, could best serve their interests by giving power to men not tainted with the sins of past Liberal regimes.3 To drive home this advice, Duplessis used the findings of the Public Accounts Committee to demonstrate Liberal corruption which he claimed represented only a small fraction of what future investigations by a Union Nationale government would bring to light. The Liberals, he argued, had to go to save the honour of the province of Quebec. The Union Nationale leader did promise that his government would carry out its proposed reforms once the extent of the rot caused by past Liberal regimes had been discovered and rooted out. He echoed assurances by former ALN supporters like Oscar Drouin who had declared: "we are the same men as on 25 November, and we have the same program as that of the Action liberale nationale, just as it was adopted by the Union Nationale in the 7 November agreement."4 Nevertheless, Duplessis's campaign concentrated primarily on exposing ills which had resulted from corrupt Liberal policies and practices. He did reiterate the ALN'S traditional antitrust position, but his focus was on denouncing past Liberal regimes and addressing the particular concerns of the voters to whom he happened to be speaking. He made it clear, however, that "good" capitalists had nothing to fear from any government he headed. Only after declaring that he had "never been against honest capital," did Duplessis claim that one of his "national cabinet's first duties" would be to carry out his intention of bringing "an end to the abuses of the trusts."5 Thousands of Quebecers flocked to hear Duplessis's message in the summer of 1936. A crowd of 10,000 gathered in the blazing afternoon sun at the race track in Saint-Eustache north of Montreal to listen to him propose the abolition of the exorbitant tolls on Quebec's bridges as soon as possible after his party was given power. Measures to better the position of Quebec farmers would, however, come before all else. Duplessis pledged that a Union Nationale government would establish a system of rural credit with rates of 3 or 4 per cent and take steps to secure control of the Montreal market for the province's farmers. In the evening Duplessis reiterated these promises at nearby Saint-Jerome where the crowd overflowed from the arena into the surrounding streets. In addition to proposals designed to meet the needs of farmers, the Union Nationale leader promised improvements in the administration of the old age pension law and reasonable wages for workers. An end would be put to abuses by trusts and an inventory made of the

log Waning Influence resources of the province, but no more specific actions were outlined. The important thing, Duplessis impressed upon Quebecers, was to rid their province of the nefarious Liberals.6 Moving on to Montreal, Duplessis addressed what was estimated to be the largest crowd ever at the Montreal Stadium just five days before voters went to the polls. Entering to a triumphant welcome and later given a sixteen-minute ovation before he began speaking, the Union Nationale leader took care to demonstrate how his party would meet the particular concerns of Montrealers. Suggesting that a Union Nationale administration might abolish the metropolitan commission which the Liberals had forced on the city, Duplessis promised that no new modes of administration would be implemented without reference to the wishes of Montrealers. With respect to slum clearance, the Union Nationale leader said that he would immediately look into this matter as it affected health, hygiene, and future generations. Montreal consumers could also look forward to the abolition of the municipal sales tax if the Union Nationale attained power. Duplessis took care to present the Union Nationale as the champion of francophone economic interests, pointing out that his party would favour and encourage small property ownership, protect smaller merchants, make chains like Dominion Stores pay their taxes, and end tax exemptions such as that enjoyed by the coal cartel of Senator Lome C. Webster. Small property owners, moreover, would have an easier time under a government led by Duplessis as he gave his word to abolish the law allowing sale of their holdings by the sheriff upon non-payment of taxes for two years. Even his pledges of assistance to Quebec's anglophone resource developers would bring economic benefit to local francophone businesses. While Duplessis did warn "hard-hearted trusts and large companies that the days of the exploitation of human misery are over," he also proposed to help Montreal financiers and businessmen by building roads to northern Quebec's mining districts which, he claimed, would further that city's interests in the way northern Ontario's development had helped Toronto.7 The Union Nationale's development policies for Quebec offered something to a broad spectrum of the province's most influential interest groups. They would of course have economic spin-offs at the local level for the construction industry and real estate firms which francophones often controlled. Improved transportation would also open up new areas to lumbering and settlement. Resource development might not create a lot of new jobs but it would benefit business and commerce

no

L'Action liberate nationale

in areas outside as well as within Montreal and further the cause of the colonization movement. Because Quebec's position within Confederation clearly continued to affect the operation of politics at the provincial level, Duplessis sought to convince Quebecers that he was in complete control of a solely provincial party. At the outset of his Montreal speech, for example, he emphasized the Union Nationale's independence from federal politics and his own position of authority within the party: "I am the chief and that I intend to be. I will not tolerate that a Minister commits any prevarication nor meddles in Dominion politics ... There will be no party politics. I, for one, ... am not for King, I am not for Bennett. We're interested in provincial affairs and to me right now they are more important than those of the Federal administration." He concluded his speech with an impassioned plea for the election of his Union Nationale party "for the honor of our race, in honor of our glorious traditions of the past, and to assure this province we love so well with honest government - for a change."8 The Liberals, meanwhile, were fighting desperately to retain control of the Quebec government and, as Duplessis's declarations of independence from federal politics suggest, Godbout' s supporters had looked to Ottawa for help. At the urging of Liberals who feared the repercussions of Quebec falling into Duplessis's hands, federal politicians quickly became involved in the provincial campaign.9 Although Ernest Lapointe and Chubby Power would be away at the Vimy memorial celebrations until shortly before the election, they were expected to join King's other Quebec ministers in support of Godbout at the end of the campaign.10 P.J.A. Cardin, the minister of public works, left Quebecers in no doubt as to the motivation behind open federal involvement, declaring bluntly: "We have come to save the interests of the Liberal party."11 The zeal of the secretary of state, Fernand Rinfret, in pursuit of this goal led him on several occasions to intimate "that it was with the knowledge and approval of Mr King that he was appealing to the electors to support Godbout."18 Such claims prompted a Union Nationale threat to attack the federal Liberal administration which was followed by a last-minute disavowal from the prime minister of any "official" federal intervention in the Quebec contest.I3 King's declaration that federal ministers who participated in provincial campaigns did so as individual citizens did nothing to change the fact that all of his Quebec ministers were working for Godbout and his candidates as the campaign drew to a close. Conservatives in Quebec had also worked throughout the summer

in Waning Influence of 1936 to further the interests of the Union Nationale despite Duplessis's solemn declarations of independence. The composition of the Union Nationale and the unpopularity of the federal Conservatives, however, made it advisable to suppress evidence of such links which did not, in any case, extend to the organizational or leadership levels.14 The wisdom of this policy was underlined in early July 1936 when officers of the Young Conservative clubs throughout the Montreal district advised Duplessis of their desire to take the name "Jeunesse Nationale." They wanted to be known as Duplessis's supporters and were unwilling to bear the Conservative name so long as Bennett remained the federal leader.l5 Duplessis could easily comply with this request for he had voiced these same sentiments in declaring his complete separation from Bennett and the federal Conservative party.16 Despite this repudiation of the federal party by Duplessis and his supporters, Bennett's FrenchCanadian colleagues strongly supported the Union Nationale. Like Maurice Dupre, who referred to the Union Nationale as "our provincial party," they presented that party as an alliance of some insurgent Liberals with the Conservatives under a former Quebec Conservative leader.17 According to such Conservative stalwarts as C.A. Smart, the former MLA for Westmount, and R.S. White, the MP for Mount Royal, Conservatives had joined with dissident Liberals in November 1935 to bring down the Taschereau regime. Having successfully done so, the twenty-two best Liberals had joined with Duplessis to form the Union Nationale which all good Conservatives should support.18 By August 1936 Quebec Conservatives saw Duplessis's success as the only hope for their federal party in that province despite the Union Nationale's declarations of independence. They were, consequently, just as anxious to see the Union Nationale come to power in Quebec as federal Liberals were to prevent this from happening. Duplessis's decision to distance his party from the federal Conservatives was a part of the price they were prepared to pay for a Union Nationale victory; raising money to finance his fight against Quebec's Liberals was another part of that cost. Quebecers were being urged to vote Union Nationale in August 1936 for many different reasons. Paul Gouin's attempted withdrawal of the Action liberate nationale from the Union Nationale had left Duplessis with popular, anti-trust allies in Quebec City. The nationalist crusaders against the electricity trust, Philippe Hamel and Ernest Gre"goire, were valuable electoral assets albeit potentially troublesome future colleagues. Gouin's withdrawal from the alliance with Duplessis brought pressure to bear on Hamel

112

L'Action liberate nationale

from French-Canadian nationalists who were worried lest the Union Nationale abandon those parts of the ALN program dear to their hearts. Abbe Groulx, for one, warned Hamel of the danger that Duplessis might lead the Union Nationale away from the goals they shared. While their break with Gouin had not lessened public confidence in him and Gregoire, Groulx voiced his concern about whether the Union Nationale, without the ALN leader, would "preach a national policy frankly." Would the "new" party have the courage, as Paul Gouin had had, to speak out for a French-Canadian policy? Groulx suggested that "upon this point, Duplessis does not inspire absolute confidence." Although he was willing to espouse a national policy, the Union Nationale leader, in direct contrast to Gouin, appeared "more worried about reassuring the English than about stimulating French Canadians." Groulx, naturally, deplored this perceived decrease in nationalist fervour on the part of the Union Nationale and expressed the view that it could cost the party votes.19 Within a few days of receiving this letter, Hamel returned from a tour of the Gaspe with Duplessis to open his own campaign and reported that the Union Nationale leader had been received everywhere "as a liberator."80 Denying that the Union Nationale had received any money from the trusts, Hamel claimed that the party was poor and depended on popular subscriptions. The battle being fought, he maintained, was not one of "bleus" against "rouges" but a national one. Although the tone of Duplessis's 1936 campaign did nothing to allay the suspicions of nationalists like Abbe Groulx, they had no choice but to put their faith in candidates like Hamel and Gregoire and hope that, under their leadership, nationalists within the Union Nationale would be in a position to impose their will on Duplessis following the defeat of the "vendu" Liberal regime. Paul Gouin's advice to Quebecers in August 1936 was that they should disregard party lines and vote for the best candidates. This recommendation could not have been very well received by FrenchCanadian nationalists in the light of his desertion of them on the eve of the election campaign and the Union Nationale's revelations of Liberal "sins."21 Although he did not take an active part in the 1936 campaign, the ALN leader nevertheless made his views known to Quebec voters over the radio. Despite a few members of both the Union Nationale and the Liberals who belonged to a "new" school of politics in Quebec, Gouin concluded that both parties would be controlled by the views of the many more members of the "old" school. Neither Godbout's Liberals nor the Union Nationale under Duplessis had dared to adopt the program of the Action liberale

ii3 Waning Influence nationale in full, and voters, consequently, were left to choose the lesser of two evils. The proof of the venality of both parties was to be found in the fact that neither was seeking subscriptions from voters and yet both seemed to have lots of money. Gouin's conclusion was that they must have derived funds from the trusts which he emphasized were anxious to protect the interests of big business no matter which party they supported. Neither Adelard Godbout nor Maurice Duplessis had "adopted as his own, the doctrine of Abbe Groulx which alone," Gouin claimed, "can assure national and economic independence" to the French-Canadian people.22 The decision of Paul Gouin to take to the air waves late in the 1936 election campaign to tell Quebecers why the Union Nationale would never fulfil the November 1935 platform increased pressure on Hamel and Duplessis's other nationalist supporters. All they could do prior to the election was to reiterate their assurances that a Liberal defeat would result in pro-francophone, anti-trust actions and portray Gouin as a traitor to the nationalist cause. To this end, Dr Hamel seized upon the opportunity presented by Duplessis's rally in Quebec City on 10 August to reply to charges Gouin had made against him and the Union Nationale in a radio address the preceding evening. With Duplessis at his side, Hamel went to some lengths to counteract "enemy" charges that the Union Nationale was "a movement of Conservatives." He assured voters that Union Nationale members all worked "in perfect harmony for the triumph of the true national cause" despite their diverse political backgrounds. They were united in their desire to put an end to economic dictatorship in Quebec which favoured companies at the expense of the French-Canadian nation and ordinary consumers. Paul Gouin, to the contrary, had deserted the cause for purely personal reasons. Hamel told voters that the ALN leader was a traitor of the worst sort; he had played the role "of a general who leads the troops to the assault but who, at the height of the battle, not only runs off and leaves the battlefield but also takes a sinister pleasure in felling his own soldiers." Laying the blame for Gouin's flight from his leadership responsibilities on his personal weaknesses, Hamel made the case that those in the ALN who had refused to follow him out of the Union Nationale were the true defenders of the ALN program and they remained committed to seeing it implemented in its entirety.23 Hamel made it very clear to French-Canadian voters and to his new leader that he and his nationalist allies would insist upon fulfilment of all aspects to the ALN program following a Union Nationale victory. Quebecers from various walks of life supported Duplessis and the

ii4 L'Action liberate nationale

Union Nationale in the summer of 1936 in the hopes that their perceived needs would be met after the election.24 A group describing its members as young patriots, for instance, informed Duplessis that they looked to him and his associates to "open better horizons" for them.25 They spoke for the thousands of francophones in the professions, commerce, and industry whose prospects had been undermined by industrialization even before the Great Depression had wreaked havoc with their chances of having secure, satisfying, and profitable careers. The unemployed of all ages turned to the Union Nationale leader so that he might improve their prospects; people generally counted on him for "deliverance."26 Power had to be given to the Union Nationale so that its leader could show Quebecers of all classes that he was capable of doing what they believed he would be able to do.27 Duplessis capitalized on the confidence many Quebec voters had in the summer of 1936 that he would implement a program which would mean justice for everyone. He pledged agriculture "all the assistance necessary" and promised the working class "the social legislation demanded by Christian sociology: an old-age pension law as perfect as ... humanly possible; allowances to needy mothers; reasonable salaries and humane working conditions; protection for large families; a minimum wage; encouragement of healthy housing."28 With years of economic and social hardship behind them, Quebecers responded positively to Duplessis's promises. Following Gouin's departure, the Union Nationale dealt with the corporatist aspect of the ALN program by emphasizing the defensive rather than the offensive aspects of the scheme. This caused the party little trouble because by the summer of 1936 most lay and clerical critics of the Liberals were primarily concerned to see that Quebec got a government which would respect the position and teachings of the church while implementing measures deemed immediately necessary to prevent the growth of widespread opposition to the capitalist system. Even the Ecole sociale populaire and its allied organizations had, with the support of Cardinal Villeneuve, recently been giving priority to the anti-communist aspect of corporatism over the advocacy of concrete social reforms. Advocates of corporatism agreed that primacy must be given to electing a government committed to using the power of the Quebec state to do battle against the threats posed by communism, socialism, and international labour unions. Like militant nationalists who had been attracted to the ALN by its espousal of Abbe Groulx's brand of economic nationalism, they could still see the Union Nationale as offering the best chance of achieving at least some of their objectives.29

115 Waning Influence A F T E R M A T H OF THE UNION NATIONALE VICTORY

On 17 August 1936 the Union Nationale won seventy-six of the ninety seats in the Legislative Assembly.30 In terms of popular vote, the Liberals slipped less than 7 per cent but carried only fourteen ridings in the 1936 election compared with forty-eight in the 1935 contest. The anomalies in the electoral map had worked to the advantage of Union Nationale candidates in August 1936, for it had taken only 4,211 votes to elect one of them and 16,083 to elect a Liberal.31 Of the seventy-six Union Nationale deputies elected in 1936, twenty-eight had run for the ALN in November 1935-32 Twenty of the twenty-six ALN candidates elected the previous fall won re-election in August under the Union Nationale banner. In addition, eight ALN candidates who had lost in November won seats the summer following as Union Nationale deputies; two other unsuccessful ALN candidates from the earlier contest went down to defeat again as Union Nationale candidates.33 While the Union Nationale ran eighty-eight candidates in August compared with eighty-six the previous November, the number of ALN supporters running had fallen from fifty-three in the autumn of 1935 to thirty the following summer. Moreover, only twenty-two of the successful Union Nationale candidates in 1936 were former Liberals, while thirty-nine were former Conservatives, and sixteen were of unknown previous affiliation.34 Under these circumstances and with his popularity still intact, Duplessis moved swiftly before assuming office to consolidate his position within the Union Nationale. Former members of the ALN whose views on what the Union Nationale should do with power might clash with Duplessis's were either excluded from his first cabinet or vastly outnumbered.35 The most notable omissions from the roster of Union Nationale ministers were Philippe Hamel and Ernest Grdgoire, the former ALN supporters who had so vehemently opposed Gouin's break with Duplessis. It appears that Duplessis carefully orchestrated his successful exclusion of Dr Hamel from his first cabinet. This move should have come as no great surprise, given that the premier-elect disliked popular leadership rivals and had long been on record against even altering the terms of existing government contracts with private electricity companies.36 Dr Hamel's widespread support and his championship of public power therefore lay at the root of Duplessis's move to undermine his power base by depriving him of the benefits of political office while co-opting his chief ally, Mayor Gregoire. All Duplessis had promised prior to the 1936 election was

n6 L'Action liberate nationale

that a Union Nationale victory would be followed by an investigation of the province's trusts. Only after the results of this investigation were available would the new government decide upon appropriate action. Hamel, to the contrary, insisted upon immediate fulfilment of his campaign promise that the Beauharnois Power Company would become the property of the province very soon after the Union Nationale was voted into office. This, Duplessis argued, was a project Quebec was too poor to undertake.37 Gregoire's account of how the Union Nationale leader approached him with the offer of a major ministry suggests that Duplessis outmanoeuvred Hamel's supporters by leaving negotiations concerning Quebec City's cabinet representation to the last minute. The swearingin ceremony was set for a Wednesday, 26 August, and, according to Gregoire, it was the evening of the twenty-fourth before Duplessis arrived in Quebec City and contacted him. The next morning Duplessis asked Gregoire to give up the mayoralty of Quebec and to assume the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, Industry and Commerce. Only during this meeting did it become apparent to Gregoire that Hamel would not be offered a cabinet post if Duplessis had his way. The timing of the approach to Gregoire and Duplessis's repeated demands for further meetings with him even when no agreement seemed possible suggest that the Union Nationale leader wanted to ensure that Hamel's supporters in caucus did not have enough time prior to the announcement of the cabinet to organize opposition to his exclusion. Duplessis's sustained efforts to convince Gregoire to accept a major portfolio indicate a desire to avoid the charge that, once elected, the Union Nationale leader was shutting all the prominent, anti-trust former members of the ALN from Quebec City out of power. By coopting Gregoire, Duplessis would have also effectively silenced a potentially dangerous opponent, the mayor of Quebec City who favoured public power. Gregoire's refusal to enter the cabinet without Hamel did eventually lead to the latter being offered a ministry without portfolio despite Duplessis's estimation that he lacked the "political sense" needed by government members.38 The premier-elect, however, remained firm in his refusal to move immediately to nationalize Beauharnois. Duplessis responded to Gregoire's efforts to force him to accede to Hamel's demands by gambling on forming a government without two of his most popular Quebec City deputies. He took this chance knowing that his government's policies with respect to the electricity trust in particular would never satisfy the province's nationalist proponents of public power. The Union Nationale leader's attempt to divide and weaken his most prominent anti-trust associates by denying office to Hamel while

117 Waning Influence

offering Gregoire a major portfolio had failed. This failure could, however, be perceived as a victory for Duplessis because it saved him from having to deal in cabinet with two potentially popular ministers with whom he disagreed profoundly on fundamental issues. The announcement of the make-up of the Union Nationale cabinet did bring vigorous criticism of the exclusion of Hamel and Gregoire but to no avail. Addressing a meeting held to protest his absence from Duplessis's government, Dr Hamel explained that he had refused to enter the cabinet because the Union Nationale leader would not comply with his request for immediate action on the question of trusts. The ML A for Quebec Centre attributed his failure to be offered an appropriate cabinet position on his terms to successful efforts by unnamed "trusts" to gag him and his anti-trust associates. Their success would, according to Hamel, be limited because he planned to "remain a simple soldier" fighting on "to bring down the trusts."39 As J.-C.-E. Ouellet explained, he and Gregoire were in a similar position: both had refused to be part of a ministry which did not include Hamel because they did "not want the new government to fall back into the rut that the old government was in." Gregoire emphasized that they were not deserting the Union Nationale cause but reiterated their desire that Hamel's views should triumph.40 Duplessis refused to yield to pressure to include Hamel and Gregoire in his cabinet and thereby, according to one report, crushed an incipient revolt within the ranks of the Union Nationale.41 His action could also be seen as a refusal to submit to pressure from radical idealists who lacked the political sense required to get Quebec out of the mess the Liberals had left it in and whose extreme measures might do more harm than good. Quebecers who had voted for the Union Nationale, like the majority of Canadians in other provinces by 1936, wanted a better deal for their particular interests and a reformation of the prevailing economic and social system with as little disruption as possible. Duplessis read the electorate correctly in assuming that the immediate nationalization of Beauharnois was a high priority to very few Union Nationale supporters. Four of the fourteen ministers in the Duplessis cabinet - Oscar Drouin, minister of lands and forests; Bona Dussault, minister of agriculture; John Bourque, minister of public works; and J.-H.-A. Pacquette, provincial secretary - had run as ALN candidates in the November 1935 election. However, at least one of these men, Pacquette, had had former connections with the provincial Conservatives, having run for that party in 1931. Drouin was the sole former Liberal appointed to Duplessis's first cabinet. Onesime

n8 L'Action liberate nationale

Gagnon was elected in Matane and appointed minister of mines, game and fisheries. Seven of the other ministers, including Duplessis, had sought election as Conservatives within the Union Nationale in November 1935. The two remaining ministers, J. Bilodeau and G. Layton, had not run previously.42 Responses to the composition of Duplessis's cabinet and to the absence of Hamel and Gregoire, in particular, reflected all the various party and nationalist perspectives. While a Conservative paper like Le Journal complimented Duplessis for including any former Liberals in his cabinet as his vast majority would have allowed him to do otherwise, Eugene L'Heureux, the editor-in-chief of L'Action Catholique, claimed that a shadow had been cast over the swearing-in ceremony by "certain inexplicable absences ... deplored by an almost unanimous public." That of Dr Hamel in particular had, in L'Heureux's opinion, been responsible for this pall because the whole electorate had seen him as "a celebrated right arm for ... Prime Minister Duplessis, a true architect of the new order called for on every hand."43 The editor of Le Droit was also disappointed both with Duplessis's failure to appoint a French-Canadian treasurer and with his exclusion of Hamel and Gregoire from his government. Le Droit considered the latter move "especially regrettable inasmuch as the majority of independent thinkers only openly declared themselves in favour of the Union Nationale because Mr Duplessis was flanked by these two men in whom they had full confidence."44 As this editorial implies, Duplessis's critics were concerned to get across the message that his actions had aroused suspicions among at least some supporters of the Union Nationale which could, presumably, only be put to rest when he fulfilled his party's pre-election promises. L'Heureux spoke for many of Hamel's disappointed followers when, in early September, he followed up praise for certain Union Nationale administrative reforms with the hope the new government would "keep its word" from "the national and social points of view."45 Pro-Union Nationale journalists were equally busy trying to convince Quebecers that "the Gregoire-Hamel affair" was of little consequence and had not harmed Duplessis in any way. Their argument was that the premier had demonstrated good judgment and displayed his leadership abilities by refusing to be intimidated by irresponsible and inexperienced zealots. Maurice Dubrule, for instance, sought to undermine the credibility of nationalists like Hamel and Gregoire by arguing that any politically informed person would realize that nationalization of Beauharnois would take years to resolve from the legal standpoint alone. While he agreed that

ng Waning Influence companies which exploited Quebec's natural resources had been given exaggerated powers by past Liberal regimes, he pointed out that most rights had been granted through legal contracts which "could not possibly be abolished overnight."46 Quebec's new premier should, presumably, be seen as holding the line against the unreasonable, illegal demands of politically naive nationalist zealots, so as to protect the province's true interests. Even Louis Francoeur, who spoke highly of Dr Hamel and attributed his quarrel with Duplessis to differences over the methods to be employed in the achievement of commonly held objectives, praised the premier for asserting his leadership and declared that "the cause of the triumphant Union Nationale has not been weakened by this incident."47 Duplessis himself gave no sign of concern that his exclusion of Hamel and Gre"goire might cost him popular support and weaken the Union Nationale. To the contrary, he concurred with the view that he had simply acted responsibly and sanely. "I was the leader. I am the leader, and I will remain the leader. Nobody is going to coerce me into giving them portfolios ... I believe in a government of stability, security, confidence, decency and honesty. I don't intend to waver from this promise, and I do not intend to be influenced by fanatics or extremists."48 Some within his party were, however, worried about the possible fallout of a split between the premier and the very popular champion of the cause of Quebec's "little guys" against the trusts. One man spent several days in Quebec City meeting with Hamel and Gre"goire to ensure that they would not escalate the controversy by attacking Duplessis during radio addresses in which they put their case before Quebecers. It is not surprising that his efforts to bring about an entente between these men and the premier failed. After agreeing to an interview, Duplessis refused even to discuss the affair with him, on the grounds that "there were too many things of very considerable importance to be settled."49 In fact, Duplessis did not need to spend time and effort appeasing Hamel and Gre"goire because both had declared their continued "recognition" of his leadership and "adherence" to the Union Nationale. Although critical of both Duplessis and the party for the stand taken on the electricity issue, the two Quebec City ML AS still hoped that the government would see the error of its ways and "take the necessary steps to subdue, control and eliminate the 'trusts.' "5° Until the Union Nationale demonstrated that it would not do so, they had decided to endorse Duplessis publicly and support his party while continuing to fight against the electricity trust "to the bitter end." Hamel's private correspondence indicates, however, that despite his

12O L'Action liberale nationale

public declarations of continued loyalty to Duplessis's government, he strongly suspected that the premier's lack of commitment to the nationalist cause - and his pride - would lead to a complete break between the two. As early as 10 September Hamel was agreeing with Abbe Groulx's impression that Duplessis could "improve the old regime, but ... is incapable of bestowing ... a new one in which the economic dictatorship will become the servant of the people." Hamel was doubtful about being able to reach an accord with Duplessis whose pride, he feared, would prevent the premier "from putting right his errors!" Hamel assured Groulx that he would "remain implacable" unless his demands for "drastic measures against the monopolies" were met.51 Duplessis had won the first round, but the fight was far from over as far as Quebec's anti-trust forces were concerned. Hamel's loss of faith in the Union Nationale leader gave rise immediately to the question of whether, when the expected split with Duplessis came, his supporters would be willing or able to reunite with their erstwhile ALN allies under Paul Gouin. Not surprisingly, Gouin and those who had followed him out of the Union Nationale regarded the make-up of Duplessis's government as proof that he had been justified in withdrawing from the original alliance. According to La Province, the post-election distribution of positions to "bleus" demonstrated that "Paul Gouin [had] grasped the matter perfectly and [spoken] the truth when he told the population to be on its guard against the Conservative party, reborn from its ashes thanks to a usurped national idea."52 In September 1936 Gouin told Horace Philippon that "recent events" had begun to justify their actions and advised that the time would come to strike again, once more such incidents had opened the public's eyes. The Action liberale nationale had clearly not withdrawn from politics permanently, but Gouin felt it was "too soon to capitalize safely on the Hamel incident [and] ... equally too soon to begin our radio talks again."53 Throughout the remainder of 1936 and the first six moths of 1937, Gouin continued to advise his loyal ALN supporters to wait patiently for the right moment for the Action liberale nationale to re-enter politics. La Province echoed Gouin's opinion and advised its readers that the Action liberale nationale's battle plan was unfolding as it should.54 Some, such as Philippon, worried that French Canadians would lose confidence in the ALN if it remained dormant for very long but Gouin nevertheless refused to reactivate the party for several months after the Union Nationale's victory.55 Although the differences of opinion within the ranks of the Union Nationale persisted, no former ALN supporters broke with Duplessis during the emergency session of the legislature in the autumn. They

121 Waning Influence

still looked to the Union Nationale administration to implement what one Duplessis supporter had referred to as "the beautiful program which the population of the province has approved of in an unequivocal manner."56 In late November, Oscar Drouin expressed satisfaction with what had been accomplished in three months and assured Quebecers that the Union Nationale administration intended to continue its work without fear of the trusts or of large companies.57 Hamel and Gregoire were less satisfied but still congratulated the minister of lands and forests for having obtained a reduction in Quebec electricity rates. Hamel remained convinced of the necessity of government ownership and maintained that he committed no act of disloyalty against the party by insisting upon ideas which he had long advocated and been elected to implement. Within weeks, however, it was apparent that such views might well not be compatible with Union Nationale membership. Duplessis's assertion, as the opening of the first regular session of the legislature drew near, that this government intended "to take all the steps necessary to bring down the trusts whatever they might be" had been qualified by the assurance that "no one will make us commit acts contrary to the best interests of our province."58 Given Duplessis's past differences with nationalists on this very issue, this caveat boded ill for future harmony within the ranks of the Union Nationale. By mid-February rumours of Oscar Drouin's impending resignation were rampant.59 When Drouin's break with Duplessis finally came on the eve of the session, the premier's most prominent ALN colleague made clear that his differences with the Union Nationale leader extended beyond the electricity question. On 22 February 1937 Drouin informed Duplessis that their differences of opinion "as regards the general policy of the Government during the coming session" remained unresolved and tendered his resignation. According to Drouin, he could not remain in a cabinet which did not share his conviction that "the people had imposed on us the obligation of applying immediately the program presented by us and which triumphed at the elections of 17 August."60 Drouin's views had been made very clear to the premier in a memorandum which he had sent to Duplessis early in February.61 The minister of lands and forests explained that he was unable to accept Duplessis's views or those of his colleagues on the electricity issue in particular. In Drouin's estimation, the assurances that the ALN program would remain the basis of Union Nationale policy, which had been given at the time of Paul Gouin's exodus, committed Duplessis's government "to create immediate competition by the state against the electricity trust." As a consequence, Drouin felt that

122

L'Action liberate Rationale

he would have to resign if the Union Nationale government did not propose the immediate establishment of a provincial hydro system at the next session. The cabinet's refusal to accede to this ultimatum left Drouin with no option but to resign. Within days of Drouin's departure, Duplessis had moved against the other insurgent members of his party, excluding not only Drouin, but also Philippe Hamel, Ernest Gr£goire, Ren£ Chaloult, and Candide Rochefort from the Union Nationale caucus.68 Only months after their vehement opposition to Gouin's break with Duplessis, Drouin, Hamel, Grdgoire, and Chaloult had all become disillusioned with the Union Nationale. Duplessis, according to Drouin, no longer wanted to pursue the social, economic and political improvements advocated by the ALN; he had "abandoned, denied, and torn up our long elaborated, well-thought-out program." The Duplessis government would not wage war against big business in Quebec but would perpetuate the old regime, "that most arrogant economic dictatorship," which the Action lib£rale nationale had promised to destroy.63 Equally disenchanted with Union Nationale policies and excluded from the caucus, Hamel and Gre"goire announced the withdrawal of their support for Duplessis before the session began. Gouin's response was to maintain that Duplessis would not have been able to ignore his promises to implement the ALN program if these men had remained loyal in June 1936, when he had insisted that Duplessis honour the agreement assigning twothirds of the constituencies to ALN candidates.64 DUPLESSIS'S UNION NATIONALE IN OPERATION

Duplessis began his first regular session as premier unencumbered by prominent supporters of the ALN'S anti-trust policy. Before the August election, Duplessis had assured Quebecers: "we have the same program as in 1935, the same program from A to z and we are going to carry it out."65 Addressing the province ten days after the Union Nationale's victory, he had stated that his government had been given an explicit mandate and that its aim was to carry out all elements of the unionist program of November 1935 which was the same as that of August 1936.66 Such assurances suggest that Duplessis saw the espousal of ALN policies as important to the attainment of victory. Six months later, however, Duplessis was no longer making any pretence of complying with those ALN policies with which he disagreed. While this course of events confirmed the worst fears of some of the ALN supporters who had remained loyal

123 Waning Influence

to Duplessis in June 1936, it was of less significance for the many Quebecers who saw their interests being better served by implementation of less radical planks in the Union Nationale platform. Francophone farmers, small businessmen, and even advocates of modernization were not convinced that nationalization of hydroelectricity should be given priority over other reforms. The turbulent events since the Action liberate nationale had formed its alliance with the Quebec Conservative party in 1935 had, meanwhile, left leading advocates of the original ALN platform too deeply divided and disorganized to oppose Duplessis effectively. The government's implementation of certain of the reforms promised in its 1936 election platform made it difficult for Duplessis's critics to mobilize the widespread support they had been able to rally against Taschereau. Indeed, some of the government's actions were in line with the offensive character of a corporatist system while others could be seen as furthering the promise of economic restructuring.67 For instance, Duplessis's policies with regard to the agrarian sector of the economy went quite far in implementing ALN proposals. Several measures were passed which assisted Quebec farmers, including the promised establishment of a system of agricultural credit with low interest rates. Some agricultural schools were established and the back-to-the-land movement, dear to the hearts of conservative French-Canadian nationalists, lay and clerical, was greatly expanded.68 Such policies were politically wise in a province where less than half the population living in rural areas controlled 63 per cent of the seats in the legislature. As well, they could be carried out without interfering with powerful business interests in the province. This was also true of aid to scientific and technical education which did not diminish under Duplessis.69 On the other side of the ledger, many of the economic, financial, and labour reforms promised in the Union Nationale program of 1935 had posed a grave threat to big business interests in the province. Businessmen, who were anxious to have the laissez-faire economic and social policies of the Taschereau regime continue, received swift reassurances from Premier Duplessis that his government was impelled by no merely anti-English nor anti-capitalist bias. Its subsequent record demonstrated clearly that the province's business elite had nothing to fear from a Union Nationale administration dominated by the former Quebec Conservative leader. Only limited legislation concerning industry, commerce, and finance was passed during the first Duplessis administration. Steps were, however, taken to address those concerns of French Canadians which could be met without seriously challenging the economic or

124 L'Action liberate nationale

social status quo. Certain pledges which favoured the interests of small and medium-sized francophone business interests were fulfilled. The expansion of the caisses populaires was a case in point. Even Paul Gouin, among many others, could agree wholeheartedly with the Union Nationale's contention that these organizations were among "the principle instruments of the economic liberation" of French Canadians. Early in his mandate Duplessis obtained an annual subsidy of $40,000 for five years from the provincial legislature to encourage "saving by the people and the Desjardins credit unions" and, in 1939, $150,000 was granted to the co-operatives "to ensure their success."70 These policies pleased small French-Canadian businessmen while leaving big, largely English-owned, companies free to exploit Quebec's natural resources and cheap labour supply unhindered by government interference. The few pieces of social welfare legislation passed during the first Duplessis administration similarly met the needs of many French Canadians without seriously challenging the status quo. Improved old age pensions, allowances for destitute mothers, and pensions for the blind were implemented in 1936 and 1937, but no attempt was ever made to fulfil planks in the Union Nationale program which had promised slum clearance, health insurance, and a labour code. Quebec workers actually faced more restrictive labour legislation from the Duplessis government in the form of two important labour bills both of which operated to the detriment of the employees.71 This administration failed also to revise and extend the minimum wage act, to regulate working hours, and to force priority of wages over dividends. CONCLUSION

On the whole, Union Nationale legislation failed to implement those parts of the ALN program which involved significantly altering French-Canadian institutions and existing power structures so that the real economic and social interests of Quebec's population - in particular its urban citizens - might be better served. As the legislative record of the pre-war Duplessis administration indicates, the government took steps to preserve the status quo and to silence proponents of alternative ideologies who, it was widely feared, might lead French Catholics astray in the extraordinary situation created by the prolonged economic crisis of the 19305. Divisions among Duplessis's critics and the care the Union Nationale took to protect the interests of French-Canadian farmers and businessmen, as well as their allies within the church and the professions, worked to prevent the development of an effective opposition.

8 Resuscitation Fails: The Demise of the ALN

The departure of Hamel's group, and of Drouin, from the Union Nationale immediately raised the possibility of a reconciliation between the supporters of Gouin and Hamel. The bitterness caused by the reciprocal attacks of the two groups between Gouin's break with Duplessis and the 1936 election had created barriers between these forces, but the ALN leader had remained on good terms with Hamel and had not ruled out the possibility of a rapprochement.1 His refusal to attend a banquet given for Philippe Hamel in November 1936, on the grounds that it was up to his former Quebec City allies "to make the first attempts at reconciliation," suggests, nevertheless, that Gouin's injured pride might stand in the way of a renewed affiliation.2 He did, however, oppose his supporters taking any action that might impede an understanding, once Hamel and his followers had broken completely with Duplessis. It was for this reason, at least in part, that Gouin disagreed with Edouard Lacroix's sponsorship of Vital Cliche's candidature in the Beauce byelection of March 1937. The time had not yet come, in Gouin's estimation, for the Action liberale nationale to re-enter active politics, and he advised that Cliche "should clear the way for the Hamel group by withdrawing in favour of his candidate."3 Despite this advice, no accord had been reached with Hamel and his associates when Gouin decided, two months later, that conditions warranted the relaunching of the Action liberale nationale as an active political party.

ia6

L'Action liberate nationale

RESUSCITATING THE ALN: THE NON-POLITICAL PHASE, AUGUST

1Q37

Those members of the ALN who had remained with Gouin in the June 1936 split with Duplessis, including Jean Martineau, were convinced a year later that developments favoured an appeal for support by the Action liberale nationale. The Duplessis government was deemed vulnerable to charges of having failed to carry out its election promises except for establishing a provincial system of agricultural credit. Furthermore, ALN leaders were of the opinion that Duplessis was drinking heavily during this period.4 The Liberals, whose leader Adelard Godbout had not won his seat, were providing an ineffective opposition. Early in June 1937 Martineau wrote to Louis-Philippe Morin, a former ALN organizer in the Quebec City region, suggesting that party stalwarts organize a nonpolitical rally for Paul Gouin as the first step in a reorganization of ALN forces. Morin promised his full support to the Montreal group and agreed completely with a projected "subscription" which would "allow ... our friend, Paul Gouin, to continue his work."5 A midsummer event was therefore planned with the ostensible purpose of providing Gouin with the funds to carry on his struggle to see that the ALN program was implemented. Whether or not this campaign would involve Gouin's re-entry into politics as leader of a renewed ALN was purposely not made explicit.6 A new dimension in the task of resuscitating the ALN arose in late June, when Philippe Hamel, Ernest Gregoire, Oscar Drouin, Rene Chaloult, Ernest Ouellet, and Elysee Theriault announced the creation of yet another Quebec party - Le Parti National. Like Gouin's supporters, they were convinced that Duplessis would never fulfil his promise to enact the ALN program to which they remained committed. But while Hamel and his associates in the Parti National freely admitted that they had been wrong to put their faith in Duplessis, personal animosities and competing leadership ambitions kept them from a reunion with their former ALN colleagues.7 Any reactivation of the Action liberale nationale would, consequently, have to take on three opposing provincial parties. In preparing for Gouin's August rally, Martineau was assisted by a planning committee in which such dissident Liberals as LouisPhilippe Morin, Hector Langevin, Horace Philippon, Roger Ouimet, and Philippe Ferland were prominent. Support for the rally was organized in every county. In late July, Cleophas Dubeau, coorganizer of the event, issued a statement to the press clarifying its nature and purpose. It was not, as had been rumoured, a banquet

127 Resuscitation Fails

or a picnic, but simply a "non-political assembly on the occasion of which the friends of Paul Gouin, leader of the Action liberate nationale, will ... present him with a purse intended to help him pursue the work of reconstruction which he has undertaken."8 Dubeau also announced that the central planning committee had had encouraging reports of support for the rally from all parts of the province. (Two ALN members had been dispatched from Montreal to assist in organizing this support.) Jean Martineau had met with Oscar Drouin in an attempt to secure Parti National backing for the Gouin rally. According to Drouin, neither man saw any great urgency for the merging of the two groups although both recognized that a union might help to ward off a return of dissident Liberals to that party's fold. In the end they proved unable to achieve even a limited degree of co-operation.9 Their efforts simply could not overcome the obstacles thrown up by past differences. Drouin's Quebec friends were certainly as suspicious as ever of the Liberal ties among the ALN adherents who had remained loyal to Gouin. They also knew that many of these men did not share Gouin's commitment to corporatism.10 Independence seemed, therefore, to offer the Parti National the best guarantee of remaining what L'Unitt, the voice of the corporatist movement, claimed it was at the outset, Quebec's "integrally national party." Restricted by the movement's non-political nature from going so far as to officially endorse the Parti National, L'Unite's editor urged individual members to back this "idealistic, pure, incorruptible, determined, energetic party" which, he argued, would realize Oscar Drouin's cry of "Quebec for the French Canadians."11 Even if these ideological differences could be worked out, Drouin, who favoured a combined assault against the Liberals and the Union Nationale by the Parti National and the ALN, felt that personal animosities presented a greater obstacle to union. Gouin's insistence upon a public apology from Gregoire for his personal attack on Sir Lomer Gouin in his radio broadcast on the night the ALN leader announced the termination of the Duplessis-Gouin alliance blocked the way to collaboration.18 From the ALN leader's perspective, Hamel's insistence that he must have ultimate control in the Quebec district created an equally formidable stumbling block on the road to cooperation among Duplessis's former allies.13 Not surprisingly, even Drouin's suggestion that the two groups issue a joint statement declaring that they were going to collaborate without merging got no support. Drouin did, nevertheless, attend Gouin's August rally as the representative of the Parti National. Nationalist suspicions of the ALN'S Liberal component and the doubts of liberal ALN members

128 L'Action liberate nationale

about conservative Quebec nationalists exacerbated the personal and regional rivalries which had earlier helped Duplessis to undermine the unity of the Action liberale nationale and ensured that his former supporters remained apart in the summer of 1937. On i August 1937 several hundred Quebecers gathered at L'Assomption to show their support for Paul Gouin.14 Those who spoke included Roger Ouimet and Jean Martineau, founding Liberal members of the Action liberale; Josaphat Poulin, mayor of the Saint-Georges-de-Beauce, where the ALN had inaugurated its first campaign; Horace Philippon, a former Liberal from Quebec City; Oscar Drouin, the Parti National spokesman; and, of course, Paul Gouin. Press reports noted the presence on the platform of Paul Gouin's older brother, Leon-Mercier Gouin, a prominent Quebec Liberal. While family ties presumably brought the elder Gouin to the rally, it was the commitment of Sir Lomer Gouin's younger son to corporatism and the economic reconquest of Quebec by French Canadians that had won him the sympathy of such groups as the Jeunesses Patriotes which sent Walter O'Leary and Pierre Chaloult to represent their Montreal and Quebec districts respectively. Le Devoir reported that the two hundred people in attendance from Quebec City included Paul Bouchard, the anti-liberal nationalist editor of La Nation. In all, between three and four hundred people listened to the speeches inside the College de I'Assomption while several hundred others heard them over loudspeakers. The rally opened with a presentation to Paul Gouin of a purse of $4,752 donated by "citizens of the province" who wanted the ALN leader to carry on his work for the cause of French-Canadian nationalism. The purpose of the rally, Jean Martineau maintained, was to encourage Gouin "in a practical way" to continue his costly "campaign of national education." In his speech, the ALN leader made it very clear that he had no intention of converting the meeting into a political rally. While recognizing that his analysis of social, economic, and national problems would raise policy issues, Gouin insisted that he would be speaking "of policy in the largest sense of the word ... of national doctrine." This non-partisan approach may have permitted men of differing political convictions to lend support to Gouin's rally; it did not, however, obviate the fact that the rally did serve a political purpose: it brought the Action liberale nationale back into the public's view. Neither Gouin's analysis of the causes of social and economic dislocation in Quebec nor his proposed solutions had changed. He still espoused the economic nationalist ideas of Abbe Groulx and championed causes advocated by the francophone intellectuals

lag Resuscitation Fails associated with the Ecole sociale populaire. Concentration of economic power in the hands of a minority, gross inequality in the distribution of income, and overcentralization of population remained the chief evils of Quebec society. The only solution was to decentralize economic power, wealth, and population. The Duplessis government, in Gouin's opinion, was failing to deal with many of Quebec's problems, and the effect of the measures it did enact was minimized by the failure to anchor them in an overall plan. Taking the law establishing a provincial system of agricultural credit as a case in point, Gouin claimed that while the law was good in itself, the rebuilding of Quebec's agriculture required all eleven agricultural reforms outlined in the ALN program. Moreover, these changes would have to be carried out in conjunction with the implementation of a system of professional corporatism which would provide francophones with more opportunities to exert control over the entire provincial economy. Quebec still needed a provincial economic council, composed of experts from every walk of life, to undertake an elaboration of the original ALN program. Gouin also remained convinced that economic recovery ought to be accompanied by a French-Canadian nationalist education campaign. To this end, Gouin declared that the Action liberale nationale would mount such a campaign and complete a revision of its program. The latter exercise would enable the Action liberale nationale to come before the electorate "in due course" with "solutions to its most urgent problems ... and to put these solutions into practice as well" in the event of an ALN victory. While Gouin made it very clear that long-range ALN policies would be formulated only after further research, he did take a positive stand on some of the immediate challenges facing French Canadians. The examination of the foundations of Confederation by the federal government's Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations made it necessary for Quebec to be on guard against a shift of power towards Ottawa. Gouin spoke out strongly against those who wanted to centralize legislative power in Canada to the detriment of the provinces and, more especially, of French Canadians in Quebec. Although he disagreed with Duplessis on what the provincial government should use its power to achieve, he shared the Union Nationale leader's fear that an interventionist federal state would further limit the ability of francophones to determine how society and the economy operated in the only province which they could possibly control.15 The seriousness with which Gouin viewed this threat is attested to by the fact that the resuscitated ALN was not going to remain silent on federal issues, even though the Liberals

130 L'Action liberate nationale

now ruled in Ottawa. The King government's slow shift toward Keynesian economics with its centralizing implications made it impossible for even a purely provincial party to remain uninvolved in national issues So, too, did the increasing threat of war in Europe. Gouin clearly identified the possibility of Canadian participation in another war to defend the British empire as a serious threat to Confederation. "If our English-speaking compatriots ardently and sincerely desire the preservation of Confederation," he declared, "they will have to abandon any idea of centralization. They will also have to put aside any notion of making us participate in the defence of the empire in any way."16 Gouin's non-political rally was a clear signal that the Action liberale nationale had hopes of capitalizing on the dissatisfaction Duplessis's abandonment of much of the ALN program had bred among conservative nationalists and liberal reformers alike. It was evident that Gouin and his remaining ALN associates had every intention of trying again to win power in Quebec. Their chances of attaining this goal depended, in part, on resolution of the differences which divided the ALN from its former colleagues in the Parti National. Although Drouin argued strongly for union in his speech at the August rally, on the grounds that it would help bring about "the triumph of those ideas ... dear to ... [both] groups: the establishment in the province of Quebec of a pro-French-Canadian brand of politics," no accord was reached.1? To the contrary, by midOctober in 1937 Hamel's party was proceeding to organize a Montreal wing without the co-operation of the ALN. A few months later Paul Gouin was expressing the view that he could not see how the men of the Parti National "could constitute a truly solid, truly enduring popular national front."18 Meanwhile, the Action liberale nationale had not had much success in creating such a movement either. There had been negotiations between the ALN and Paul Bouchard, editor of La Nation, but they had proved abortive.19 Bouchard was interested in forming a broad national front in French Canada. His entry into federal politics before the end of 1937, however, ended any possibility of a formal agreement between the group supporting La Nation and the ALN. Z O While these negotiations with Drouin and Bouchard were being pursued, Paul Gouin had launched the promised educational campaign, with the aim of informing the traditional FrenchCanadian elite about social and economic questions, so that more of them might understand why the Action liberale nationale offered the best solutions to Quebec's problems. Late in October 1937, Gouin announced that weekly luncheon meetings sponsored by La

131 Resuscitation Fails

Province would be held at a Montreal hotel.21 At these meetings specialists on various economic and social problems would deliver short speeches. Similar meetings were to be organized in all principal centres throughout the province. He emphasized that these meetings were not part of a political movement but of "a purely social and economic" one whose first goal was the establishment of an official economic council. "All sincere men, no matter what political party they belonged to," were invited to help provide French Canada with "an organized, disciplined, and resolute elite" which would operate above politics to provide the "well-defined and well-thought-out plan of action" needed to mould public opinion. The Action liberate nationale did not intend to carry on a widespread publicity campaign, but francophones of all classes were assured that the party's basic principles remained unchanged. It would continue to demand a government that would strive to loosen "the hold of both foreign and domestic monopolies" and achieve justice for all. Such a government would understand that agriculture and colonization, and the industries they fostered, were essential to French Canada's survival. In the months following Paul Gouin's promise that ALN candidates would run in the next provincial election, party leaders concentrated on winning converts among French Canada's professional and entrepreneurial elites. At the same time they continued to argue that attainment of francophone control of all aspects of life in Quebec depended upon French Canadians from all walks of life uniting above party lines.zz More than the ALN'S campaign tactics had changed between 1934 and 1937. And, despite Gouin's assurances that the movement stood for the same principles that it always had, some of his original associates were becoming alienated by the direction they perceived the resuscitated party to be taking. At the beginning of 1938 Roger Ouimet, for one, was expressing regret at what he described as Gouin's insistence upon dissociating his movement from its origins and suggested that it might be due to the "advice" of the ALN leader's "new confidants." Ouimet's remarks seem to have been directed against Gouin's association with right-wing advocates of corporatism and economic reconquest who, he warned, would deprive the Action liberale nationale of the liberal support the party required "to save the masses and shake them from their apathy." The course Gouin's movement had followed over the preceding ten months clearly did not meet with the approval of Ouimet who still claimed to be "a reformist at heart." He had, however, come to the view that "to achieve an admirable goal, one must sometimes close one's eyes to those imperfections common to both men and

132

L'Action lib£rale nationale

parties."23 Ouimet was obviously seeking to justify his return to the Liberal fold which had begun as early as the 1936 election campaign.24 Nevertheless, Ouimet's disillusion with the direction taken by the ALN, especially over the preceding year, boded ill for the Action liberate nationale,25 if his warning that others shared his views proved true. Ouimet's criticism of the Action liberale nationale and the withdrawal of men like Edouard Lacroix and F. A. Monk highlighted Gouin' s loss of support among many of those who had figured prominently in the ALN'S earlier campaign.26 By the spring of 1938 the loss of his Liberal backers had weakened and narrowed the appeal of Gouin's forces, just when growing dissatisfaction with the Union Nationale called for a well-organized anti-government offensive. The ALN'S failure to rebuild its former reformist liberal-nationalist coalition meant that the party simply could not launch such an offensive. Voters disappointed with the first Duplessis administration's lack of coherent policies and inability to meet the expectations it had aroused would have no reason to put their faith in Paul Gouin with his tarnished leadership record and diminished support. If the ALN were ever to make an effective second bid for power, recruits would have to be found who could strengthen its organization, improve its financial position, and broaden its popular appeal. Such a development was remote, not only because of the ALN'S obvious weaknesses but also because of the continuing efforts of federal politicians to ensure that Quebec politics served their particular party's needs at the national level. The creation of the Action liberale nationale and Duplessis's subsequent takeover of the alliance it entered into with the Conservatives had introduced a new element, the purely provincial party, onto the Quebec political scene. In the long term, this did not, however, much affect the way the political process operated. Developments at the provincial level continued to be influenced heavily by Quebec's position within Confederation. QUEBEC PROVINCIAL POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL CONTEXT

Quebec parties were all in a state of flux by mid-1938. Conservatives active at the federal level were still struggling to come to terms with Duplessis's conversion of "their" provincial party into the supposedly "independent" Union Nationale. Hopes of establishing an integrated Conservative organization in Quebec had risen because Georges Heon had been elected in March in a federal by-election in Argenteuil with the aid of the Union Nationale and publicly

133 Resuscitation Fails

acknowledged Duplessis as his provincial leader.27 While this worried federal Liberals who were anxious that their party regain Quebec, it encouraged those Conservatives who wanted to see a closer relationship develop between the Union Nationale and their federal party. The election of R.J. Manion, the candidate favoured by most Quebec delegates, to the federal leadership in July 1938 raised Conservative hopes of rescuing their party from the desperate straits into which it had fallen. It did not, however, take the new leader long to realize that Quebec was "a very difficult Province to deal with."28 Liberals, nevertheless, did have reason to worry because of Manion's success in establishing a cordial relationship with Duplessis in the months after he became leader.29 Although no formal association of the federal Conservative party with the Union Nationale was ever achieved, Manion had by the summer of 1939 received assurance "of the entire support of the Duplessis Government" in Quebec whenever the next federal election was called.30 Liberals could not help but worry about the possibility of just such a link. Despite signs since early on in the Union Nationale administration of dissatisfaction with both Duplessis's policies and leadership style, the premier had managed to stifle opposition and mollify important sectors of Quebec society. The broad acceptance of the Union Nationale's all-out war on communism was, for instance, confirmed by the refusal of the federal Liberal administration to disallow the Padlock Law. The Duplessis government's assistance to agriculture and colonization was popular with a broad crosssection of francophone society. The Union Nationale legislation which so angered working-class leaders mattered little to Duplessis's supporters, including many francophone workers of recent rural origin who remained very suspicious of organized labour.31 Duplessis had also taken steps to see that Union Nationale backers realized that he, personally, was responsible for bringing them the fruits of office in Quebec. Rumour had it that the premier's sudden dismissal of his minister of roads, Francois Leduc, reflected his disapproval of this minister's policy of awarding contracts irrespective of political affiliation. Leduc's expulsion from the cabinet was also linked to his leadership of growing opposition within Union Nationale ranks to Duplessis's attempts to dominate party affairs.32 The premier's desire to have full control of the expenditure of the $50 million recently voted for the building of new roads was seen as an example of his general determination to make all decisions involving the distribution of government funds.33 By dismissing his most obvious rival once again, Duplessis maintained his position as undisputed leader of the Union Nationale. He had ensured not only

134 L'Action liberate nationale

that patronage changed colour under the Union Nationale but also that credit for government favours would clearly be owed to him. He was consequently free to determine both the policies and the political tactics of the party he had forged. The Union Nationale's opponents, meanwhile, continued to be too weak to exploit the troubles of an inexperienced provincial administration confronted with long unfulfilled desires for patronage and the problems of the persistent economic depression. Quebec's Liberals had, however, taken steps to overcome their party's weaknesses by calling a convention for June 1938 to choose a permanent leader and adopt a new program.34 Should party officials succeed in alleviating long-standing sources of discontent and thereby win back dissident Liberals, Paul Gouin's support would be further eroded. The federal Liberals had not flagged throughout the 19305 in their efforts to keep their party in power in Quebec. King's Quebec colleagues had endeavoured for weeks following Taschereau's near defeat in November 1935, and again just prior to his resignation, to realign forces to prevent the defeat of their provincial allies. Their failure had contributed to the crushing reversal suffered by the Quebec Liberals in August 1936. By the spring of 1938 the federal party was once more at work trying to ensure the return of a Liberal majority in the next Quebec election. King's ministers were again acting as arbitrators between provincial organizers and dissident Liberals. Divisions among the dissidents complicated their task but also made it easier to woo at least some back to the party fold. The decision by Quebec's Liberals to adopt the provincial Conservatives' 1933 tactic of calling a party convention raised hopes of reuniting Liberal forces in Quebec. But, as F.A. Monk who had resigned as president of the Montreal section of the ALN the previous summer warned King, achievement of this objective was by no means assured. If, as Monk suspected, the group of Montreal politicians "mainly responsible for the party's loss of prestige in recent years" was going to control the organization of the convention, it would be "impossible for those who combated that very element to line up with it." A "tremendous opportunity" to reunify Quebec's Liberals would, consequently, have been "sabotaged by a small group who would rather see the party in opposition than give up their grip on its control."35 Resolutions adopted late in April 1938 by "a meeting of various Liberal groups representing youth, organized labour, and different dissident elements of the party ... from the regions of Quebec, Three Rivers, the Eastern Townships, and Montreal" echoed Monk's sentiments and substantiated his

135 Resuscitation Fails

conclusions. Delegates called for a reorganization of the convention committee because it had been appointed without consultation with various groups within the party and for the selection of a leader who had no connections with the former Liberal regime. They gave expression to the frustrations of young Liberals, who still felt shut out of the decision-making process, by demanding that each county be represented by a guaranteed number of youth delegates at the convention and that all committees include members from this element of the party. Labour's dissatisfactions brought forward a request for a promise from the Liberals that if they formed the next government no labour laws would be passed without prior consultation with the concerned parties. The groups represented obviously found their party's organization unrepresentative and unresponsive. But, like Monk, they declared that their call for change was intended to unify, not divide, Liberals in the province of Quebec.36 Opposition within Liberal party ranks to a convention organized by men associated with the Taschereau regime drew King's Quebec ministers into a search for compromise. By early May Ernest Lapointe, Chubby Power, P.J.A. Cardin, and Fernand Rinfret were meeting with Adelard Godbout and Edouard Lacroix in Ottawa in an attempt to reach agreement on the organizers for the June convention. On the one hand, the discontented Liberals represented by Lacroix objected to some of the men Adelard Godbout and T.-D. Bouchard had suggested as members of the executive committee of the convention because of their connections with the Taschereau regime. Old guard Liberals, on the other hand, would balk at being displaced by men whom they considered to be traitors. The appointment of Elie Beauregard, esteemed in all camps, as president of the convention's executive committee satisfied at least some dissident Liberals who responded positively to his immediate promise that they would be welcome not only at the convention but as members of various planning committees.37 In endorsing Lacroix's decision not to seek the provincial leadership in the interests of preserving party unity, Monk claimed that his action "reflected] the attitude of all those Liberals who were sufficiently sincere and courageous to lay their grievances before the party leaders." "We accept," he continued, "the invitation made to us to co-operate with the other Liberals in Quebec in making the approaching convention a stepping stone to Liberal success through the application of Liberal principles."38 The mediation of federal Liberals had gone some distance towards reuniting Quebec's Liberals. Their efforts to secure the co-operation of Paul Gouin and his supporters as well as of the dissident Liberals in the Parti National met with less success.

136 L'Action libeYale nationale

Although the Action liberale nationale was no longer the force it had once been in Quebec, its reabsorption into Liberal ranks could only benefit the provincial party. For some time during the spring of 1938 Gouin's future role in Quebec politics appeared uncertain. In April he had been encouraged to attempt to seek the Liberal leadership by Horace Philippon who was confident Gouin could win.39 Late the following month, according to Gouin, several independent Liberals had also wanted him to run for the leadership.40 Nothing came of such suggestions but, in mid-June, LouisPhilippe Morin informed Gouin that the hesitations of their "exassociates" made him favour an intelligent alliance with Liberals, the younger ones in particular. By replacing their "restive friends" with "less perfect but more human and more loyal" Liberal allies, he believed they would increase their chances of actually bringing about reform.41 The ALN leader disagreed, pointing out that Liberal MLAS, defeated candidates, and Liberal MPS and senators from Quebec were all entitled to vote at the convention. In his estimation "all these inveterate defenders of the Taschereau regime ... still dominate, officially and unofficially, both the Liberal party and its next congress."42 Agreement could not, in the end, be reached between the Quebec Liberal organization and the Action liberale nationale. Those in the ALN insisted upon a program conforming to their views, a new provincial leader who had no connections with the Taschereau regime, and extensive changes in the organizational framework of the party. The Liberals, meanwhile, would only join with the ALN supporters if they returned to the party "unconditionally" and agreed to accept its official policies.43 The Liberals were equally unsuccessful in coming to terms with members of the Parti National. Oscar Drouin had spelled out the conditions under which that group would co-operate with the Liberals at the beginning of May. The convention should be impartially organized and should offer a choice of candidates for the leadership and a program which would unite not only Liberals but independent groups and uncommitted voters. What Drouin wanted was "a coalition of all the truly national political forces [that] could turn the tables on the Union Nationale."44 Once Gouin announced his reasons for not participating in the convention, Drouin and his associates believed that their presence would look strange in view of the ALN'S absence. The Parti National's former Liberals had fought against Godbout and others in the party connected with Taschereau's "old gang" in 1936 and could not now justify co-operation with this element.45 Another reason for the Parti National's willingness to follow

137 Resuscitation Fails

Gouin's lead may have been the negotiations aimed at a union with the Action liberale nationale which were in progress. In addition to informing Gouin of the Parti National's position vis-a-vis the Liberal convention late in May, Drouin reported that his party had accepted the principle of an alliance with the ALN. As before, its implementation hinged upon a resolution of the "Gouin/Gregoire" affair, for which Drouin held out little hope. Acknowledging that it would be difficult to secure a public apology from Gregoire, he also noted that the Parti National did not feel it could not abandon him.46 The Parti National's subsequent rejection of a suggestion from Gouin that a committee composed of three men chosen by each party should settle this problem, brought negotiations to a halt.47 In addition, Dr Hamel's continued insistence upon autonomous control in the Quebec region clashed with Gouin's belief in the importance of a single leader.48 It was in this context that Louis-Philippe Morin had suggested that the Action liberale nationale might achieve more reform by finding new allies in the ranks of Quebec's younger Liberals.49 Morin's views did not, however, carry the day within the ALN despite the breakdown of negotiations with the Parti National in June 1938. The dissident parties could not achieve a bilateral union but neither had been persuaded to enter the Liberal fold. SOREL 1938: REBIRTH OF THE ALN

Gouin's response to these continuing differences among Duplessis's opponents was to launch a direct appeal to dissatisfied members of all provincial parties to regroup around a leader of their choosing and to draw up a plan of political and electoral action. In a radio address on 31 May, opposition groups were "all ... invited to collaborate" in organizing and choosing delegates to a convention to be held in late July. The selected delegates were to have freedom of action and influence in the choice of a common leader, the setting forth of dissident desires, the establishment of general lines of conduct, and the design of a strategy for winning political power.50 With Godbout's leadership reaffirmed at the June 1938 provincial Liberal convention and negotiations with the Parti National stalled, the ALN leaders badly needed allies. The return of F.A. Monk and Roger Ouimet to the Liberals had detracted from the party's appeal and deprived it of badly needed organizational skills. Edouard Lacroix's withdrawal had cost the ALN both popular support and financial resources in the Quebec region where personal animosities and power struggles kept Gouin's forces separated from their former allies in the Parti National. It was from a position of

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considerable weakness therefore that Paul Gouin undertook to realign and reorganize Quebec's anti-establishment forces in the summer of 1938. The first step his remaining supporters took was to organize the convention which Gouin had proposed. It was made very clear that this convention, scheduled for Sorel in late July, was not for adherents of the ALN alone. Jean Martineau and Horace Philippon were named ALN organizers for the Montreal and Quebec City regions respectively, but Philippon emphasized that these appointments and this division of counties concerned only the Action liberale nationale. All other groups were free to organize in their own manner. The Sorel congress was to have a special organizing structure in which each co-operating opposition group would be represented.51 Scheduling the congress for the end of July, however, hampered implementation of this aim because a great deal of organizational work had to be done in a very short period of time. Declarations about co-operation aside, Martineau and Philippon did most, if not all, of this work. Mimeographed instructions were sent out to all counties in which there were to be assemblies of opposition groups to appoint organization committees for the Sorel congress.5S Known ALN supporters were used to organize those who wanted to participate into provisional committees at the parish and county levels.53 Each county was to elect seven delegates and three substitutes who would have to pay their own way to the congress because it was operating on a tight budget.54 Despite these constraints, on 23 July 1938 several hundred delegates, representing all but two Quebec counties, met at Sorel to choose a leader and draw up a reform program.55 The ALN'S records do not note which groups officially participated in the congress but a wide variety of organizations was represented. Almanzor Goulet, secretary of the Ligue des Patriotes de Quebec, Jacques Sauriol of the Mouvement Corporatiste, and Joseph Menard, editor of Le Patriote, the Fascist party's organ, were all present.56 Horace Roy, a Parti National official, led a delegation of sixteen of that party's members including Antonio Bourdeau, president of the Jeunesse Nationale of Quebec East, Fernard Desrochers, an officer of this same organization, and J.-Alphonse Lapointe, past president of the Unite" Nationale in Limoilou.57 The presence of representatives of extreme right-wing nationalist groups and of the corporatist movement lent credence to Ouimet's claims that the Action liberale nationale had undergone significant changes in composition and character. At the same time control remained firmly in the hands of men long at the centre of the Action liberale nationale. At the

139 Resuscitation Fails

inaugural meeting of the Sorel congress Jean Martineau and Horace Philippon were chosen as presidents of the congress along with Horace Roy of the Parti National. Philippe Ferland and Roger Duhamel were named secretaries and Louis-Philippe Morin was appointed chairman of the resolutions committee.58 With the exception of Roy, these men had been actively involved in the ALN'S initial bid for power. Paul Gouin's candidature for the leadership of the opposition groups at Sorel was unopposed. The drawing up of the program for the "new" party which, it was decided, would be called the Action libe"rale nationale, occupied most of the time of delegates. The measures presented to the congress had been prepared in advance by subcommittees composed of experts on various social and economic questions.59 Differences between the original ALN manifesto of 1934 and that drafted in 1938 came not from changes in policy, but from the addition of more detailed reforms.60 The congress was primarily concerned to do battle against the trusts.61 State intervention in the economy as a means of destroying their power in Quebec was recommended throughout the program. "Etatisation," however, was seen only as a means of breaking the trusts and not as a step towards the eventual establishment of a socialist state, underlining just how pervasive the fear of communism and the faith in economic liberalism both were in Quebec throughout the 19305. Delegates again favoured recourse toco-operatives as the best method of combating unfair competition from trusts. The third article in the section on economic reforms made it quite clear that co-operatives were preferred to state-controlled economic activities wherever possible. What the Action liberale nationale of 1938 promised was to "bring to their senses the coal, gasoline, and bread trusts by the establishment of co-operatives or, if necessary, by subjecting them to Government competition."62 As Philippe Ferland made clear, the message the organizers of the Sorel congress wanted to get across was that Gouin and his associates were "returning to politics ... supported by the same sincerity and the same impartiality, inspired by the same program and the same doctrine."63 Dominated by prominent founders of the original ALN, the 1938 congress of "oppositionists" launched a party which shared the name, the leader, and the objectives of its namesake. This party, however, did not enjoy the support of the many Liberals who had contributed significantly to the reformist thrust of the initial ALN attack on the status quo in Quebec. It also lacked the populist nationalist element associated with Philippe Hamel's crusade against the electricity trust. These deficiencies, coupled with fewer financial

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backers, weakened the chances of the Action liberale nationale winning widespread support and would contribute greatly to the fact that Paul Gouin's second attempt to bring about change in Quebec met with considerably less success than his earlier effort. So too, of course, did his abdication of leadership within the Union Nationale following the November 1935 election and his poor showing in the Legislative Assembly. Even voters who agreed with the ALN'S policies might be expected to have doubts about Gouin's ability to implement that party's plans for the economic and social restructuring of Quebec. When the Action liberale nationale was reconstituted in July 1938 it had been without party machinery for more than two years. Gouin's earlier experience is reflected in the emphasis he now put on the importance of organizational work at the grassroots level. Directives giving instructions to local ALN supporters on how to go about establishing parish, county, and regional branches were sent out in the autumn following the Sorel congress. Party workers were directed to make it "a point of honour and a duty" to cultivate ALN committees in every parish. The absolute necessity of a network of local organizations had been recognized, and attempts were being made to provide the Action liberale nationale with such a system, but not much could be accomplished with the limited resources available.64 It was evident from the outset of the ALN'S 1938 appeal for support that insufficient funds and volunteers were to prevent the resuscitated party from reaching the public in the way the earlier version of the Action liberale nationale had been able to do. Following the Sorel gathering in July, the Action liberale nationale did not even have the means to fill the requests for speakers which came from across the province. As the money and men required to meet these demands exceeded the ALN'S resources, the party had to opt for a few regional rallies instead of many local ones.65 This retrenchment greatly reduced the number of Quebecers reached directly by the new ALN'S appeal for support. Moreover, even this limited schedule of rallies had to be curtailed on occasion for financial reasons. As early as September 1938 Philippon was informing Gouin that expenditures on a rally in Beauport coupled with "the almost complete silence, to date, of prospective subscribers" had created financial problems for the Quebec district ALN which made it impossible even "to think of organizing other assemblies."66 The lack of funds also prevented the resuscitated ALN from undertaking the extensive radio broadcasts which had been so effective in 1934 and 1935. Nor could La Province, the official party

141 Resuscitation Fails

newspaper which had ceased publication early in 1938, be revived. By August of 1939 financial problems had brought ALN rallies to a halt, at least temporarily, in the Quebec district. The party's "finances being completely exhausted," organizers had felt "obliged to suspend ... Sunday assemblies" and to make yet another effort to secure funds to meet the deficit they had been carrying for some time.67 When Duplessis decided to call a snap election a few weeks later in the wake of Canada's declaration of war, the ALN'S postSorel leaders did not have in place the organizational and financial base for a serious third party challenge to the Union Nationale and the Liberals. THE DEMISE OF THE ALN: THE 1939 ELECTION

On 24 September 1939 Duplessis announced that Quebecers would go the polls on 25 October. Ten days earlier, Senator Arthur Sauve had informed the Quebec premier of a conversation among Liberals which he had overheard in the Chateau Laurier. In the course of this conversation, Sauve reported, the suggestion that the Union Nationale leader might call an election that autumn had produced the exclamation: "Oh! great, that would just crown it all nicely. How could we even show ourselves?"68 Calling to mind Sir Lomer Gouin's snap election of 1919, Sauve advised Duplessis that some people thought he would be within bounds to seek a new mandate because of the exigencies created by the war. Canada's entry into the war would provide Duplessis with an opportunity to fight a campaign on an issue other than his administration's record. Many factors, including dissatisfaction with Union Nationale legislation, particularly in the field of labour relations, and distress over the vastly increased provincial debt which had doubled since Duplessis had come to power, made this an attractive prospect. The Union Nationale's request for a renewed mandate from Quebecers to resist attempts by the federal government to use the war effort to weaken provincial autonomy meant that the campaign was unlikely to be limited to strictly provincial issues. The intrusion of the question of Canada's participation in the war into the Quebec campaign caused problems both for federal parties and for the Action liberale nationale. In calling the provincial election shortly after Canada declared war, the leader of the Union Nationale asked voters to give his government a mandate to resist war measures such as the ban upon borrowing abroad and the censorship of the press and radio which

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were being forced on Quebec to the province's detriment.69 Duplessis claimed the King government was using the war as an excuse for seizing powers that rightfully belonged to the provinces. Given Duplessis's strong opposition to Ottawa's adoption of centralizing interventionist economic policies since 1936, his appeal for a renewed mandate on these grounds had serious implications for federal politicians. His chances of success, moreover, had presumably been increased by the fact that Canada's involvement in another European war had revived French-Canadian fears of conscription. The timing of the Quebec election and Duplessis's charges against the King government convinced Chubby Power that Quebec's federal ministers must become directly involved in the provincial contest. This view did not meet with immediate acceptance, but federal Liberals did intervene quickly to subvert Duplessis's attempt to fight the election solely on the issue of provincial autonomy. Adelard Godbout was advised "to ignore the federal issue as far as possible" and to issue an immediate manifesto "emphasizing purely provincial issues, particularly extravagance, maladministration, approach of bankruptcy and probability of heavy increases in taxation, especially on the poorer section of the community."70 As Duplessis would have to meet attacks from both Gouin's ALN and Hamel's Parti National on the autonomy and war issues, it was felt that Quebec Liberals should "keep strictly to provincial issues." The Liberal party had "too little to gain and too much to lose to risk turning the contest into a Federal Election in Quebec."71 Adopting a similar policy, Norman Lambert of the National Liberal Federation informed Quebec Liberals that "the N.L.F. would not be brought into it" and refused a request for an immediate loan of five million dollars. Power, to the contrary, saw Duplessis's action as a direct challenge to Quebec's federal ministers and one which they must meet.72 Once Power had persuaded his cabinet colleagues that Quebec's ministers had to become directly involved in the provincial election, he took over the organization for the district of Quebec and Cardin did the same for the Montreal district.73 Ernest Lapointe announced that King's Quebec ministers regarded it as their duty to take up Duplessis's unprovoked challenge and that they would resign unless the Liberal party received a vote of confidence from Quebecers at the provincial level. At the same time, the justice minister pledged that neither he nor any of his colleagues from Quebec would remain in any ministry which tried to introduce military conscription.74 With the assistance of the federal Liberal members, King's Quebec cabinet

143 Resuscitation Fails

colleagues widely publicized the view that a vote for Godbout was a vote against conscription. Federal Liberals used every resource available to turn to their advantage the Union Nationale leader's attempt to capitalize on Quebec's opposition to Canadian involvement in another European war and on its fear of centralization. Duplessis's decision to go to the polls so soon after war had been declared provided federal Liberals with an opportunity to help their provincial counterparts regain control of the Quebec legislature before the war effort had got them into difficulties in their home province. In so doing, they were of course attempting to improve Liberal chances of winning the federal election due within the year. With the same end in view, the federal Conservatives, who hoped to make gains in Quebec under their new leader, Robert Manion, did not get involved in the 1939 campaign for fear of alienating party supporters in other provinces and reducing Duplessis's chances.75 The intrusion of the war issue into the Quebec campaign had divided the province's Conservatives more deeply than ever and weakened the Union Nationale effort. Duplessis's stand angered traditional Conservative party financiers who, in other circumstances, would have backed the Union Nationale campaign.'6 In the province the increasingly apparent marginality of dissident support and persistent divisions among various groups had undermined the possibility of a serious third party challenge, as indeed had the intrusion of federal issues into the campaign. The Liberals continued to regain supporters at the expense of both dissident parties and the Union Nationale. Oscar Drouin's decision to split with Hamel's Parti National and return to the Liberal fold was not without significance, despite charges that his party loyalties were directly related to his dependence on the financial returns of political office. Nor was Drouin the only former Union Nationale cabinet minister among Liberal candidates in 1939, for Francpis Leduc had also chosen to run for the Liberals.77 But while Quebec's Liberals could point to the reunifying effects of Godbout's leadership, attempts to amalgamate dissident groups continued to meet with failure. Ren£ Chaloult, whose earlier efforts to reunite Hamel and Gouin had come to naught, secured Godbout's agreement to giving dissident forces 20 to 25 counties, presumably to ensure Duplessis's defeat, only to see this plan wrecked by Gouin's refusal to go along with it. Godbout's attacks on Gouin following his rejection of Liberal overtures in the spring of 1938 had fuelled the ALN leader's determination to mount a separate campaign against Duplessis in 1939. Quebec's dissident political activists were in such disarray that Hamel and Gre"goire retired from the 1939 contest,

144 L'Action liberale nationale

although their younger colleague, Rene Chaloult, ran in Lotbiniere as the semi-official Liberal candidate.78 This left the Action liberale nationale as the sole third party in the 1939 Quebec election. Even this could not make the ALN a significant factor in that election. Financial and organizational problems limited the party to running only sixty candidates which meant that it entered the race with little chance of forming a government.79 Under these circumstances ALN assertions that their party offered Quebecers, French Canadians in particular, the only chance of bringing "the economic dictatorship" of their province to an end fell on deaf ears. Moreover, while Gouin might be perceived as a man of principle, his record as ALN leader suggested that he lacked the skills required to lead a government. Gouin had given francophones no reason to have confidence in his ability to ward off either federal encroachments on provincial autonomy or the threat of conscription. The vehement anti-war campaign mounted by the ALN, including threats to take Quebec out of Confederation to avoid conscription, simply heightened fears about the possible repercussions of compulsory military service without offering any guarantees against its introduction. Quebec voters looking for an alternative to the Union Nationale in October 1939 had little reason to put their faith in the Action liberale nationale. Quebec's Liberals were free, consequently, to concentrate the resources which the federal party made available to them in the fight against Duplessis's forces.80 CONCLUSION

Duplessis had called a snap election for 25 October 1939 in the expectation that Quebecers would respond positively to his cry that the Union Nationale needed a mandate to resist efforts by King's government to use the war as an excuse for implementing its centralizing policies. The response of the federal Liberal party to Duplessis's challenge forced the Union Nationale to fight on two fronts during the ensuing campaign. In addition to defending the record of the Duplessis administration against attacks from both Godbout's Liberals and Gouin's ALN, Union Nationale candidates had to counter the federal Liberal offensive which was compounded by Conservative defections brought on by the war and the conscription issue. Duplessis's refusal to campaign over radio because of wartime censorship regulations made it even more difficult to get the Union Nationale message across. The magnitude of Duplessis's miscalculation in deciding to call an election with almost two years left in his mandate became clear soon after the polls closed.

145 Resuscitation Fails

Quebec's Liberals emerged from the 1939 contest with fifty-four more seats that they had had at dissolution. The Union Nationale had garnered only 39.2 per cent of the popular vote and elected only fourteen ML AS, down from seventy-three when Duplessis had called the election. With 54.2 per cent of the vote, the Liberals had elected sixty-nine members.81 Fewer than 25,000 votes went to ALN candidates in 1939 despite strong individual candidates including reformists of Jean Martineau's stature. This lack of support signified that this particular third party was truly dead. The causes of its demise were many and varied. Political inexperience and ineptitude as well as personality clashes and the impossibility of divorcing Quebec politics from the federal context had all played roles in denying the Action liberale nationale the opportunity to implement its program of extensive economic and social restructuring. So, too, did the fact that important segments of the ALN'S original support base turned out to be satisfied with much less drastic changes than the original ALN manifesto had proposed. Measures to help agriculture, the colonization movement, and small industries like construction combined with a strong stance against communism and stiff resistance to the interventionist initiatives of the federal government apparently satisfied many Quebecers following the Liberal defeat in 1936. The ease with which the Union Nationale set aside the interventionist, economically nationalist, and liberal reformist aspects of the original ALN manifesto suggests that support for that party's rejection of laissez-faire liberalism in the interests of economic reconquest was not deeply rooted. The desire of the Action liberale nationale to ensure that the power of the Quebec state should be used to give French Canada's traditional elites control over a capitalist system which treated all francophones more fairly and respected traditional values, did not, however, disappear. The ambivalent and often contradictory aspirations of the ALN'S reformist and nationalist founders lived on and contributed to the success Duplessis subsequently enjoyed in keeping the forces which had given rise to the Action liberale nationale at bay.

9 Conclusion

The stresses Quebec's middle-class professionals and small businessmen faced as the province industrialized and became increasingly urban in the early decades of the twentieth century were ones their class had experienced elsewhere in North America and in Europe. Francophone responses to the onset of modernity were coloured by the ethnic division of labour within Quebec and the prevalence of the belief that French Canada's national survival depended upon preservation of the Catholic faith, the French language, and the rural way of life. Lay and clerical elites wanted to ensure that they and their successors would occupy positions of power in a new Quebec which remained true to its French Catholic origins. Economic reconquest and the preservation of traditional social norms were both necessary to the survival of French Canada's professional class. More and more members of this class, however, had come to the conclusion by the interwar period that their future well-being was inextricably linked to that of francophone entrepreneurs whose small businesses were seen as the key to the revitalization of Quebec agriculture and industry. Once the depression set in, more and more of Quebec's clerical and lay leaders also became convinced that the very survival of their class and nation depended upon implementation of a program which promised workers economic betterment within a system that respected traditional French Catholic values. The program of Quebec's depression-born third party, L'Action libe"rale nationale, addressed many of the fears twentieth-century economic and social developments had raised within the province's

147

Conclusion

traditional elites. And, in spite of the party's commitment to expansion of French Canada's rural base, there was much more to the ALN'S challenge to the status quo than simply a desire to turn the clock back in Quebec. For liberal reformers and conservative nationalists alike, the Action libeYale nationale was a vehicle for implementing measures designed to purify politics, shift economic control into francophone hands, increase job opportunities for educated French Canadians, and assure Quebec's francophone majority an increased share of the profits of a fairer capitalist system. The ALN was the product both of political and economic conditions in Quebec during the Great Depression and of the traditional struggle of French-Canadian society for survival in a modern urban industrial environment. In the atmosphere of crisis brought on by the inability of business and political leaders to solve the economic problems of the early thirties, even the ALN'S liberal wing was prepared to accept professional corporatism as part of the reform package their party promised would improve the lot of francophones from all classes. The liberal professionals responsible for the creation of the Action liberate nationale saw their interests as being best served by changes which would also benefit small business, agriculture, and urbanized workers. Their objective was to see that French Canada's traditional lay and clerical elites and a new class of highly trained francophone technocrats occupied positions which would give them power over all aspects of life in the province. They wanted to refashion capitalism in ways which would both allow these groups to continue to play a central role in a modern Quebec and also expand the career opportunities open to future generations of educated francophones. Their proposals for doing so involved shoring up Quebec agriculture and furthering the cause of small business at the expense, if necessary, of trusts and monopolies. Although rural rehabilitation was at the core of the movement for social restoration which gave birth to the ALN, the interests of urban workers were not ignored. The men behind the Action liberale nationale intended to see that the needs of francophone workers were met within a system that was based on French-Canadian religious, national, and social values. Those who worked for Quebec's reconstituted economic elite as well as their rural cousins were promised that they too would benefit from the refashioning of the province's power structure along lines which would extend the influence of francophone professional and business leaders. The prolonged economic collapse of the early thirties had limited the already restricted career opportunities available to young

148 L'Action libdrale nationale

francophone professionals and raised the spectre of working-class rejection of the capitalist system and traditional French-Canadian Catholic values. Fears of social disorder, the refusal of the securely entrenched Liberal regime of Alexandre Taschereau to accommodate dissident Liberals and nationalists or their ideas, and the unwillingness of these men to join forces with the Conservatives under Duplessis brought the ALN onto the Quebec political scene in mid-1934. It was a political vehicle for the expression of class bitterness on the part of the professions, non-monopoly francophone business and commercial interests, urban workers, and farmers toward the province's pro-big business, laissez-faire economic and political establishment. The appearance, program, and initial success of the Action liberale nationale demonstrate that Quebec's traditional francophone elites were not apolitical in the 19305. The liberal professionals who ran the ALN were acting as the political arm of a church-inspired movement for social reconstruction which enjoyed the wide support of Catholic action groups and garnered financial backing from within the francophone business community. The widespread support the Action liberale nationale got from the Catholic Church, professional associations, and nationalist organizations made possible the party's rapid rise in popularity and indicates clearly that a broad cross-section of Quebec's lay and clerical leaders recognized the importance of the political realm and of control thereof. What these various elements were supporting was a cross between a leader-oriented, populist movement party of extra-parliamentary origin and a value and program-oriented one. The programoriented character of the Action liberale nationale, however, was closely related to the distinctive regional customs and preferences associated with a leader-oriented populist movement party.1 The ALN'S origin was clearly extra-parliamentary even though the rebel Liberals responsible for its creation did have the backing of a prominent federal Liberal MP, Edouard Lacroix, and the sympathy of several Quebec ML AS and legislative councillors, a few of whom later joined the new party. Paul Gouin, like his grandfather Honore Mercier, had provided francophones with a program which offered different things to different elements within the francophone population. The commitment to French Canada's agricultural base and to colonization both pleased traditional nationalists and clerics and echoed the reaction of many francophones to the prolonged economic collapse of the 19305. Proponents of modernization were attracted by the ALN'S promise of political, social, and economic reform while the party's

149 Conclusion

trust-busting stance attracted non-monopoly francophone entrepreneurs and nationalist advocates of economic reconquest. Urban workers were asked to put their faith in a party which would give them a better deal and ensure their nation's survival. Even though the ALN'S program was clearly designed to serve French-Canadian interests, ALN leaders tried, as Mercier had done, to reassure Quebec's anglophones that their party was not anti-English but opposed to laissez-faire liberal capitalism. The broad acceptance enjoyed by the political platform the Action liberate nationale had fashioned out of the social teachings of the Quebec Catholic Church and the traditional doctrines of FrenchCanadian nationalism helped the party in its initial bid to unite the diverse anti-Taschereau forces. This very success, however, would contribute to the ALN'S ultimate demise by giving rise to factional strife which Maurice Duplessis, the leader of the Quebec Conservative party, was able to capitalize upon in his effort to consolidate opposition ML AS under his leadership in the months following the near victory of the Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin in November 1935. Duplessis's success in this endeavour was due in part to the presence within the ALN of men whose commitment to their party's program differed greatly, depending on the aspect under consideration. This lack of cohesion combined with weak ALN leadership and organization and federal Liberal efforts to break up the Union Nationale in the wake of Taschereau's near defeat assisted Duplessis in his effort to incorporate electorally valuable members of the ALN into a purely provincial party of which he alone would be the leader. The formation by Liberal dissidents of a provincial party claiming to speak for the interests of all elements of Quebec's francophone community disturbed federal Liberals and Conservatives alike, just as creation of the Parti National had done in the late i88os. Pragmatic political considerations and the belief that the interests of Canada's French-Canadian minority would be best served by Quebec remaining the key to Liberal power at Ottawa brought that party's Quebec establishment out in full force against the Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin following the November 1935 election. As soon as the ALN'S alliance with Duplessis raised the spectre of dissident Liberals bringing the Conservatives to power in Quebec, Mackenzie King's French-Canadian ministers launched an effort to wean Liberals from the Union Nationale. Federal Conservatives, for their part, could only hope that they might benefit if Duplessis succeeded in his efforts to retain enough ALN support to destroy the Liberal hold on Quebec. Their chances of doing so increased when federal Liberal efforts to reintegrate ALN members into a restructured

150 L'Action liberate nationale

provincial party failed and Paul Gouin's attempt to lead ALN deputies out of the Union Nationale misfired. The refusal of most ALN adherents to abandon the alliance with Duplessis added weight to Union Nationale claims in the 1936 election campaign that Gouin's departure did not in any way imply rejection of the ALN program. Duplessis came to power, therefore, as the leader of a party pledged to implement policies designed to perpetuate and reinforce the social status of French Canada's traditional professional elites and favour the interests of small and medium-sized francophone merchants and entrepreneurs. Duplessis's political skills and his ability to use them to destroy the ALN, weakened as it was by poor leadership and Liberal party intriguing, won him the power he wanted so desperately in the summer of 1936. So, too, however, did his record as a competent Quebec politician who could be trusted to play by the established rules of the game in that province. The man who was holding out the promise of improvement to various classes of francophones in August 1936 was a politician with a record which clearly signalled that Quebecers were not inviting radical change by electing him to head the provincial government. Maurice Duplessis won the premiership of Quebec by convincing diverse elements which favoured implementation of the program for social restoration drafted by the Ecole sociale populaire that attainment of this goal depended upon his coming to power. From the time he won the leadership of the Quebec Conservative party in 1933 he had attempted to convince Taschereau's reformist and nationalist critics inside and outside the Catholic Church that he should be regarded as the champion of their causes. He had denounced the operation of trusts in Quebec, advocated a return to the land, and condemned the lack of government backing for colonization. He had walked a careful line in order to win favour among francophone advocates of economic reconquest and social restructuring without unduly alarming the province's anglophone business elite and traditional Conservative supporters.2 Deeply resentful of the ALN'S widespread popular acceptance, Duplessis had moved quickly to make the November 1935 electoral alliance into which Taschereau's Conservative and ALN opponents had been forced work to his advantage. From the outset Duplessis tried to convince ALN ML AS that he was the key to their future political success and to realization of their party's platform. His declarations of loyalty to the original ALN manifesto, moreover, ensured that the sympathy and support the Catholic hierarchy, many of the clergy, and nationalist associations had given first to the

151 Conclusion

ESP'S program for social restoration and then to the ALN remained with the Union Nationale in ig36.3 Duplessis's subsequent success in holding on to much of this support while refusing to consider nationalization of even part of the electricity trust implies widespread acceptance of liberal capitalism and satisfaction with the Union Nationale's selective implementation of the ESP and ALN proposals. Duplessis was counting on the fulfilment of promises made to rural voters, measures such as mothers' allowances and the expansion of programs such as roadbuilding, to bring the Union Nationale future success at the polls. His abandonment of plans for economic reconquest and professional corporatism cost him some support, as did his rejection of measures advocated by reformist liberal members of the ALN. The battles he waged against centralizing federal politicians and communist infiltrators more than compensated for these losses. Many francophones, including some supporters of the Ecole sociale populaire and Cardinal Villeneuve, agreed with Duplessis that priority after 1936 had to be given to implementing the strong measures required to protect Quebec's French Catholics from the twin threats of Keynesian economics and communism. ALN supporters including clerics and nationalists were more deeply committed to protecting Quebecers from outside influences than they were to those parts of the ALN program abandoned by Duplessis. The ease with which Duplessis was able to turn the Union Nationale into a vehicle for perpetuating the economic and social policies associated with the Taschereau regime suggests that support for economic and social restructuring of any kind was both limited and soft. Moreover, his government did implement many policies advocated by traditional nationalists. In addition, even advocates of modernization found it possible to accommodate themselves to an administration under which government funding for higher education and research did not suffer and prestigious scholars like Esdras Minville were appointed to positions such as the province's office of scientific and industrial research.4 The Action libe"rale nationale reflected the ambivalence with which French Canada's traditional elites had greeted the spread of industrialization in early twentieth century Quebec. The ALN'S founders shared both the fear that economic progress would undermine the power of French-Canadian leaders and the belief that modernization, if properly controlled, could be made to serve the needs of all elements of Quebec's francophone majority. The creation of the ALN was part of a continuous effort by elements within French Canada's lay and clerical elites to have the Quebec

152

L'Action liberate nationale

government implement policies which would protect the interests of their particular class and of the nation as they interpreted them. Quebec's depression-born third party came into existence because of the realization that unbridled laissez-faire capitalism had narrowed the avenues for advancement open to francophones and raised the spectre of a socialist revolt. What the Action liberate nationale offered French Canadians was a vision of the capitalist system restructured in such a way as to perpetuate the power base of French Canada's traditional elites and increase the possibilities for francophone economic advancement. Factionalism within the ALN and the political inexperience and ineptitude of most members had helped Duplessis to ensure that there would be no radical departures from existing political, economic, or social norms under a Union Nationale government. That those in the ALN who became disillusioned with Duplessis proved incapable of re-uniting against their common enemy highlights the fractious nature of anti-establishment forces in Quebec during the Great Depression. Duplessis had little to fear from disgruntled former ALN allies during his first administration because they continued to quarrel among themselves. Personal animosities, mutual suspicions, competing leadership ambitions, regional tensions, and divergent objectives all played a part in preventing the re-emergence of a cohesive party opposed to the status quo in Quebec. By mid-193 7 popular dissatisfaction with the course adopted by the Union Nationale convinced some in the ALN that the time had come to regroup. Divisions, however, plagued attempts to mount a serious challenge to Quebec's two existing parties. When Canada's declaration of war appeared to present the Union Nationale with the opportunity to win a renewed mandate as the champion of Quebec's autonomy, Duplessis seized it. In the circumstances of October 1939 French-Canadian voters rejected Duplessis's claim that control of Quebec's government by an autonomous provincial party offered the best defence of their interests. They were even less favourably impressed by a resuscitated ALN'S promises of reform and of noncompliance with the war effort - to the point of secession should conscription be implemented. The electorate's almost total rejection of the Action liberate nationale in 1939 marked its disappearance from the Quebec political scene. The Union Nationale did not suffer the same fate following its crushing defeat because of the way in which Duplessis responded to the loss and the inability of Quebec's reformers and nationalists to overcome the divisions which had contributed to and been exacerbated by the collapse of the ALN.

153 Conclusion

The Action libe"rale nationale had played an influential role in transferring power in Quebec from Taschereau to Duplessis in 1936 without significantly changing the way the economy or society generally operated in that province. Its appearance did, however, serve to legitimize the idea of purely provincial Quebec parties. In the short run this enabled Maurice Duplessis to distance the Quebec Conservative party from its harmful federal connections. In the longer run it would help to change the way Canadian political parties operated and were organized. Though short-lived, the Action liberale nationale had a long-term impact on the way Quebec politics and the Canadian federal system evolved. The slowness of this impact is accounted for, in part, by the ambivalent and varied responses to the advent of modernity in Quebec which had weakened the Action liberale nationale and continued to divide politically active francophone nationalist and liberal dissidents for decades to come. It is also a function of the deep wounds left by the bitter defeats of the 19305, of Duplessis's ability to capitalize on traditionalist francophones' fear of a loss of power to alien idealogies or the federal government, and of the Union Nationale's ability to meet the needs of significant sectors of Quebec's francophone community without alienating the anglophone minority. It was not until Duplessis had disappeared from the political scene late in 1959 that power in Quebec passed to younger men desirous of implementing some of the ALN'S nationalist and reformist policies. To this extent the Action liberale nationale can be seen as a precursor of the marriage of reformist liberalism and nationalism that affected the way society, politics, and the economy of Quebec operated and the Canadian federal system evolved in the post-Duplessis era.

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Notes

ABBREVIATIONS

CAR ELP FDPH FMLD PGP

Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs Ernest Lapointe Papers Fonds Dr Philippe Hamel Fonds Maurice LeNoblet Duplessis Paul Gouin Papers PREFACE

1 For a synopsis of contemporary approaches to and analyses of the Canadian party system see Gagnon and Tanguay, eds., Canadian Parties in Transition. Although most of the articles in this collection concentrate upon the post-World War II period, much of the analysis is applicable to events discussed in this work. 2 See, for example, Bernier, "Le cas que"b£cois et les theories du deVeloppement politique et de la d£pendance," in Orban, ed., La modernisation politique, 19—54; McRoberts, Quebec, 11-25. 3 See Blais, "Third Parties in Canadian Provincial Politics," 422-38; Pinard, "Third Parties in Canada Revisited," 439-54; Gagnon, "Third Parties: A Theoretical Framework," 37-63. 4 Boily, "Les partis politiques que'be'cois," 27-68, and Boily, "Les hommes politiques du Quebec," 93-117. 5 See Fournier, L'entre'e dans la moderniti\ Lamonde and Trepanier, eds., L'avenement de la moderniU.

156 Notes to pages 3-16 6 Hamelin and Gagnon, Histoire du catholicisme, I; Voisine et al, Histoire de VEglise catholique. CHAPTER ONE

1 Behiels, "L*Association catholique de la jeunesse canadiennefranc,aise," 35. 2 Hamelin and Gagnon, Histoire du catholicisme, I, 419—20, 432, 443. 3 Fournier, L'entree dans la modernite", 23, 31, 35. CHAPTER TWO

1 Data for this chapter have been drawn from the following secondary sources: Linteau et al, Quebec; Roby, Les Qutbecois; Rumilly, Histoire, xxiv, xxv, xxx; Thompson with Seager, Canada, 7922-^939; Trofimenkoff, Action fran$aise; Vigod, Taschereau. 2 Vigod, Taschereau, 77, 178. 3 Linteau et al, Quebec, 310. 4 Ibid., 309, 322-9, 405; Quinn, Union Nationale, 33; Thompson with Seager, Canada 1922-59, 84. 5 Armstrong and Nelles, Monopoly's Moment, 300; R. Armstrong, Structure and Change, 278-9; Dales, Hydroelectricity, 29-33, 185-6; Linteau et al, Quebec, 310. 6 Hughes and McDonald, "French and English in the Economic Structure of Montreal," 496; Linteau et al, Quebec, 399—405. 7 Hughes and McDonald, "French and English in the Economic Structure of Montreal," 495, 500-3. 8 Saint-Pierre, "Le deVeloppement de la societe que"becoise," 109 and 114, as cited in Moniere, Ideologies in Quebec, 206. 9 Pi£dalue, "Les groupes financiers au Canada," 3-34. 10 For an extended analysis of the public power movement in Quebec City, see Dirks, "Hamel and the Public Power Movement," 17-29. 11 Canada, Seventh Census, igsi, 349. 12 Hughes, French Canada in Transition, 83, 109; Linteau et al, Quebec, 309, 362, 402-7. 13 Falardeau, "Changing Social Structures"; Hughes, French Canada in Transition, 99; Gerin, Le type economique et social des Canadians, 149. 14 Tremblay, "La crise economique des annees trente," 34-5. 15 Hamelin and Gagnon, Histoire du catholicisme, i, 443; Voisine et al, Histoire de VEglise catholique, 64-5, 72. 16 Lamonde and Trepanier, eds., L'avenement de la modernite, 196, 202. 17 Fournier, L'entree dans la modernite, 19, 24. 18 Robertson, "Variations on a Nationalist Theme," 109—19; L'Action

157

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

Notes to pages 16—27

franfaise, as quoted in Wade, The French Canadians, 879; Leger, "Aspects of French-Canadian Nationalism," 317; Trofimenkoff, Action frangaise, 61-3, 65-6, 68-9. Voisine et al, Histoire de VEglise catholique, 60. Rouillard, Histoire de la CSN, 62, 123; Rouillard, Les syndicats, 119, 221, 231-40. Minville, Labour Legislation and Social Services, 25. Rumilly, Histoire, xxx, 40, 98; Trofimenkoff, Action frangaise, 69. For elaboration, see Dirks, "Union Nationale," 19-29, 55-6. Rumilly, Histoire, xxx, 20. Dupont, "Taschereau et la legislation sociale," 402-3; Vigod, "Ideology and Institutions in Quebec," 167-82; Vigod, Taschereau, 80-92. Behiels, "L*Association catholique de la jeunesse canadiennefrangaise," 27-9. PGP, biographical notes for Roger Ouimet. La Presse, 4 mars 1925. PGP, "Oeuvres: medailles anciennes, 1927." Ibid., biographical notes for Roger Ouimet. Le Devoir, 22 mai 1933; Le Journal, 6 octobre 1933; Dirks, "Union Nationale," 190-1, 203, 300—1. Rumilly, Duplessis, I, 9-11, 22-3. Dirks, "Union Nationale," 89-90, 202-3, 207-8. CAR, 1922, 695; FMLD, Duplessis a A. Sauv6, 2 feVrier 1940. Rumilly, Duplessis, i, 53-4. Rumilly, Histoire, xxiv, 81. Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph, 20 January 1928. Le Devoir, 17 fevrier 1928; FMLD, A. Bettez a Duplessis, 17 avril 1929, and Duplessis to L. Bell, 28 June 1929. R.B. Bennett Papers, Senator P.E. Blondin to Bennett, 7 June 1929. Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph, 17 July 1929. Montreal Daily Star, 10 July 1929. Le Devoir, 25 septembre 1929. For elaboration, see Dirks, "Union Nationale," 156-67. Montreal Gazette, 22 and 24 August 1931; Le Devoir, 22 aout 1931. Le Devoir, 26 aout 1931. It was possible to contest more than one riding in a Quebec provincial election in 1931. Houde ran in two and was defeated in both. CHAPTER THREE

i LeVesque, Virage a gauche interdit, 15; Vaillancourt, "L'heritage des ann^es trente," 312, 313; Linteau et al, Histoire du Quebec depuis 1930, 54, 76.

158 Notes to pages 28—33 2 Interviews with Senator C.G. Power, 24 June 1965 and 9 August 1966; Vigod, Taschereau, 166—7. 3 Rumilly, Histoire, xxxn, 193-4. 4 Interviews with Power, 24 June 1965 and 9 August 1966; Vigod, Taschereau, 166. 5 Rumilly, Histoire, xxxn, 219. 6 Levesque, Virage a gauche interdit, 21—2. 7 Vaillancourt, "L'he'ritage des ann£es trente," 312. 8 Interview with Power, 24 June 1965. As organizer of the 1931 provincial Liberal campaign in Quebec, Power had become very aware of this problem as well as with the difficulty experienced in getting some of the older Liberal ML AS re-elected. He consequently suggested to Taschereau that some of these older members be replaced by promising young Liberals when possible. Taschereau, however, refused to follow this course of action on the grounds, according to Power, that younger members would raise controversial issues in the legislature and cause him a great deal of trouble whereas the older MLAS simply attended the session and kept quiet. See also Le Devoir, 11 Janvier 1933; Dion, "Party Politics in Quebec," 118; Vigod, Taschereau, 188-90. 9 Rumilly, Histoire, xxxn, 147. 10 Vigod, Taschereau, 154, 162. Vigod argues that anti-Taschereau sentiment can be linked to the unrealized expectations of dissident Liberals such as J.-C.-E. Ouellet and Elyse"e Theriault, but this does not negate the fact that many other factors, including ideological differences, contributed to the growth of Liberal dissatisfaction with the Taschereau regime. 11 Dirks, "Hamel and the Public Power Movement," 19-22; Vigod, Taschereau, 189-90. 12 FDPH, Hamel aux Messieurs les Electeurs du district de Quebec, 17 aout 1931, 6p. 13 Dirks, "Hamel and the Public Power Movement," 23-4; Vigod, Taschereau, 190; Rumilly, Histoire, xxxin, 28-9; Le Devoir, 15 Janvier 1932. 14 Vigod, Taschereau, 190-4; Le Devoir, 25 Janvier 1932. 15 Rumilly, Histoire, xxxin, 28-30. 16 Montreal Daily Star, 12 January 1933; Ottawa Morning Citizen, 12 January 1933. 17 Montreal Daily Star, 12 January 1933. 18 Montreal Gazette, 28 January 1933. 19 Le Devoir, 6 feVrier 1933. 20 Ibid., 21 fdvrier 1933. 21 Interview with Jean Martineau, 14 June 1966. Martineau emphasized

159 Notes to pages 33-8

22 23 24 25 26

27 28 29 30 31 32 33

34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

43

that the measures he and his associates considered necessary did not include the introduction of socialism into Quebec. Hamelin and Gagnon, Histoire du catholicisme, I, 419. Vigod, Taschereau, 206—7; Trudeau, "La province de Quebec," 19. Quinn, "The Bogey of Fascism in Quebec," 302-3. Barnes, "Quebec Catholicism and Social Change," 56; Frigon, "Catholicism and crisis: L'Ecole sociale populaire," 57. Vigod, Taschereau, 207-9. According to Vigod, Taschereau believed that partisan considerations were behind the Jesuit Order's reform proposals and clerical support for dissident Liberals in general. Pius XI, Quadragesima Anno, article 22. Oliver, "Social and Political Ideas of French-Canadian Nationalists," 243Baum, Catholics and Canadian Socialism, 124; Rumilly, Histoire, xxxn, 197, and xxiv, 20. Baum, Catholics and Canadian Socialism, 177; Rumilly, Histoire, xxxin, 172; Hamelin and Gagnon, Histoire du catholicisme, i, 377. Hamelin and Gagnon, Histoire du catholicisme, I, 433, 437Ibid., i, 435. Soucisse, "Revolt in Quebec," 40. "Le Programme de Restauration Sociale" was printed in Le Devoir, 30 septembre 1933. The signatories listed were: Esdras Minville, Dr Philippe Hamel, Albert Rioux, V.-E. Beaupre", Dr J.-B. Prince, Anatole Vanier, Arthur Laurendeau, Alfred Charpentier, Wilfrid Guerin, and Rene Chaloult. Le Devoir, 4 octobre 1933. For elaboration of the following account, see Dirks, "Union Nationale," 174—5, 184-203. FMLD, J. Rousseau a Duplessis, 17 avril 1932; Duplessis a G. Jobidon, 8 avril 1932; Duplessis a J. Rousseau, 8 avril 1932. Ibid., P. Bertrand a Duplessis, 17 octobre 1933. Le Devoir, 5 octobre 1933; Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph, 5 October 1933. Le Devoir, 12 Janvier 1934. Ibid., 10, 13, 27 avril, and i6juin 1934; Montreal Herald, 16 June 1934. PGP, C. Cormier, "Notes sur sa carriere." Ibid., "Socie"t£ Jean Talon." This file includes a record of the formation of the Comit£ des oeuvres £conomiques. The men listed as belonging to this committee were Paul Gouin, lawyer; Paul Riou, chemist; Esdras Minville, professor; Albert Rioux, agriculturalist; and Paul Dubuc, publicist. Ibid., Gouin, "Industrie comple'mentaire," pp 54-60 of Extrait du cours d'faonomie politique et sociale donne's au Cercle d'Etudes sociales du Grand se^ninaire de Montreal, 22 February 1934, 57.

160 Notes to pages 39-42 44 Gouin, "La petite Industrie," 112-13. 45 PGP, "Discours et conferences de Paul Gouin en 1933," speech delivered by Gouin over CKAC under the auspices of the Union catholique des cultivateurs, 21 April 1934. 46 Ibid., speech by Gouin to the St Lawrence Kiwanis, 30 May 1933. According to Gouin, the Action liberate nationale developed because he realized that efforts to convert the Legislative Council into an economic council would be insufficient and that a broader reform program was needed: interview with Paul Gouin, 20 July 1965. 47 Martineau said that he and such dissident Liberals as F.A. (Fred) Monk, Roger Ouimet, and Philippe Ferland did not agree with Gouin's ideas on professional corporatism or small industry but saw no harm in his support of these ideas: interview with Jean Martineau, 14 June 1966. 48 PGP, Cormier, "Notes sur sa carriere." 49 Interview with Gouin, 20 July 1965. In this interview Gouin expressed the opinion that among the men involved in the attempt to "re-liberalize" the Quebec party, those who had been active in politics had begun, by 1933—4, to think that political action was necessary, but they tried political education as an alternative to please others in the movement like F.A. Monk who did not want to form a separate party. 50 PGP, Cormier, "Notes sur sa carriere." This memorandum contains the only written account in the PGP of the events preceding the formation of the Action liberale nationale. The following account is, therefore, based on this source supplemented by interviews with several of the participants. Those noted as attending this dinner meeting were Paul Gouin, Calixte Cormier, Fred Monk, Jean Martineau, Roger Ouimet, Andre Montpetit, A. Desrosiers, Robert Dufresne, Iidouard Rinfret, Rene Theberge, Gaston Lacroix, Claude Prevost, and Maurice Trudeau. 51 Ibid. Claude Prevost, Gaston Lacroix, Maurice Trudeau, Edouard Rinfret, Andre" Montpetit, and Rene" Theberge withdrew at this juncture. 52 Black, Duplessis, 72, 98. Black identifies Calixte Cormier as an industrial worker who had managed to work his way up and become a successful lawyer. As such he had become associated with Paul Gouin. 53 PGP, Cormier, "Notes sur sa carriere." 54 Ibid. Louis-Philippe Morin, Seraphin Vachon, and Emile Boiteau pledged their support to the Action liberale. 55 La Province, 26 avril 1935. 56 Ibid., 27Juin 1935. 57 L'Action Catholique, 12 juillet 1934.

161 Notes to pages 42-51 58 Ibid, 12 juillet 1934. 59 PGP, Cormier, "Notes sur sa carriere." 60 Interview with Martineau, 14 June 1966. Martineau explained that Gouin had agreed to add the word "nationale" to the original name "Action libe"rale" at a meeting with Dr Hamel and others whom Martineau did not name to satisfy the demands of the Quebec City group. Martineau also mentioned that Gouin agreed to this change without consulting the Montreal group. He said that he and some of his associates were very angry over this addition and would have withdrawn from the movement at that time, if they had not been so deeply involved by then. 61 Interview with Gouin, 20 July 1965. 62 PGP, Cormier, "Notes sur sa carriere." It is asserted in this memorandum that Gouin, who was at his summer residence in late July 1934, had had to be persuaded that the manifesto should be published at that particular time. The memorandum further claims that Gouin was afraid that doing so would endanger his political career. 63 Le Devoir, 28 juillet 1934. This version of the ALN program is reprinted in Quinn, Union Nationale, 206-11. 64 L'Action Catholique, 30 juillet 1934. CHAPTER FOUR

1 PGP, "Manifesto of L'Action libe"rale nationale," July 1934. This is the English text of their manifesto issued by the ALN. 2 Ibid., C. Cormier, "Notes sur sa carriere." This memorandum notes that the manifesto was, for example, shown to Paul Gouin's older brother, Leon-Mercier Gouin, prior to publication to ensure that it would not offend the Quebec Liberals who were critical of the Taschereau administration. 3 Ibid., Jean Martineau a Gouin, 26 juillet 1934. Martineau reiterated this opinion in an interview with the author, 14 June 1966. 4 Ibid., Cormier, "Notes sur sa carriere." Hamel's refusal to become associated with the ALN in July 1934 had been explained on the grounds that he could not see his way clear to joining a movement or party linked in any way with the Liberal party. 5 Ibid., text of the speech delivered by Gouin on 12 August 1934 at the initial ALN rally, Saint-Georges-de-Beauce. This mimeographed copy is dated 13 aout 1934. 6 Ibid., ALN manifesto, July 1934. 7 Ibid., Gouin, "Emission radiophonique de 6 Janvier 1935." 8 Ibid., ALN manifesto, July 1934. 9 Interview with Jean Martineau, 14 June 1966. Martineau said that he

162

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

19 20 21 22 23 24 25

26 27 28 29 30 31 32

Notes to pages 52—5

and some other Montreal Liberals did not agree with this emphasis on rural reconstruction but considered the social welfare, labour, and education reforms to be the most important ones. See also, Hamelin and Gagnon, Histoire du catholicisme, i, 441. PGP, Cormier, "Notes sur sa carriere." Ibid., "Liste des assemblies de 1'Action liberate nationale, aout 1934-aout 1935-" Ibid., "Caucus 1934-36." Ibid., "Organisation Quebec, 1934-35." Ibid., "Caucus 1934-36." Hamelin and Gagnon, Histoire du catholicisme, i, 444. La Province, 17 mai 1935, report of a speech by Jean Martineau, and 27 juin 1935, article by Martineau. Le Devoir, 13 aout 1934, editorial by Omer HeYoux. L'Action Catholique, 5 novembre 1935. "E.L." levelled this accusation against Le Soleil in response to an attack in that paper on the accuracy of an account in L'Action Catholique of an ALN rally at Saint-Cassinier. PGP, Cormier, "Notes sur sa carriere," and Gouin, "Emission radiophonique de 6 Janvier 1935." L'Action Catholique, 9 aout 1934; CAR, 1935—6, 276; Vigod, Taschereau, 179, 203. Le Soleil, 12 juillet 1934; Vigod, Taschereau, 202-3. L'lllustration, 10 aout 1934; L'Action Catholique, 22 aout 1934; Vigod, Taschereau, 195-9. PGP, Cormier, "Notes sur sa carriere"; Vigod, Taschereau, 194-6. PGP, Cormier, "Notes sur sa carriere." It was later suspected within the ALN that Bouchard had attempted to usurp Gouin's place. Vigod, Taschereau, 203. In discussing Taschereau's moves to strengthen the Quebec Liberal party's organization, Vigod reveals that the premier had tried unsuccessfully to pressure Chubby Power into heading a revived provincial organizing committee by having Le Soleil make such an announcement prematurely. See also Le Devoir, 15 aout 1934. Le Journal, 24 aout 1934; Rumilly, Histoire, xxxiv, 65. Rumilly points out Coote's relationship to Premier Taschereau. Le Soleil, 22 octobre 1934. Le Canada, 24 octobre 1934. Ibid., 17 mai 1935, report of a speech delivered in the Legislative Assembly by Taschereau. Ibid., 17 mai 1935, article by Rend Garneau. Le Soleil, 22 ddcembre 1934. Le Devoir, 18 juin 1934.

163 Notes to pages 56-60 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

40 41

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51

52 53 54 55 56 57

Goldenberg, "Quebec - The Political Scene," 5. FMLD, F. Dorion a Duplessis, 31 decembre 1934. Ibid., J.-L. Guillemette a Duplessis, 28 juin 1935. Ibid., Duplessis a Philippe Hamel, 27 novembre 1934, and Hamel a Duplessis, 29 novembre 1934. PGP, Gouin a A. Marion, 20 novembre 1934, "Notes pour les orateurs." Ibid., Cormier, "Notes sur sa carriere." Interview with Paul Gouin, 20 July 1965. According to Gouin, the ALN refused to ally with the Square party because its leaders did not regard the dissident Conservative party's campaign as a serious one. Aime" Guertin, however, claimed that the ALN had approached the Square party whose leaders held back from any alliance because of a fear that the Action liberate nationale would return to the Liberal fold: interview with Aime Guertin, 13 June 1969. PGP, L.-P. Morin a Gouin, 8 mai 1935. Ibid., S. Vachon a Gouin, 20 aout 1934. Vachon wrote at length about offers of aid from federal Conservatives of the Quebec district opposed to Duplessis and speculated that they had the formation of a national cabinet in mind for the future. FMLD, J.-C.-E. Ouellet a Duplessis, 18 decembre 1934, and Duplessis a Ouellet, 21 decembre 1934. Le Journal, 21 decembre 1934. Le Soleil, 28 decembre 1934; PGP, Gouin, "Emission radiophonique de 6 Janvier 1935." Montreal Gazette, 2 February 1935. Le Devoir, 14 Janvier 1935. Ibid., 18 octobre 1935. Ibid., 2 novembre 1934. La Province, 27 juin 1935. Fournier, L'entree dans la modernite, 25. PGP, Gouin, "Emission radiophonique de 6 Janvier 1935.; La Province, 27 juin 1935, article by J. Belanger; Le Devoir, 22 octobre 1934, report of speech by P. Cote" at an ALN rally at Granby. La Province, 20 juin 1935, report of speech delivered by Gouin. Ibid., 5 avril 1935, editorial. PGP, "Discours et conferences, 1935 (i) janvier-aout," speech delivered by Gouin, Sainte-Agathe, 27 Janvier 1935. La Province, 18 avril 1935 and 27 juin 1935, article by F.A. Monk. L'Action Catholique, 12 Janvier 1935, report of Gouin's speech delivered at an ALN rally in Quebec City. La Province, 4Juillet 1935; interview with Jean Martineau, 14 June

164 Notes to pages 60-6

58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

69 70

71 72 73

74 75

1966. Martineau claimed that the ALN was not anti-English in principle. However, the nature of Quebec's economic development made it very difficult to keep an anti-trust campaign from also being antiEnglish. La Province, 5 avril 1935, article by J. Rodrique entitled "La politique et les jeunes"; 3 mai 1935; and 20 juin 1935. Ibid., 18 avril 1935. Parent, "The Quebec Provincial Elections of 1935," 115. Le Devoir, 16 Janvier 1935. Rumilly, Histoire, xxxiv, 165-6. Ibid., 167. Le Devoir, 4 mars 1935. Ibid., 2 mai 1935; Vigod, Taschereau, 198-9. Le Devoir, 18 mars 1935, report of Dupre"'s speech to the annual meeting of the Conservative Club of Laval. Ibid., i avril 1935, report of Gouin's speech at Saint-Jean. PGP, Edouard Lacroix a Gouin, 27 avril 1935, and Gouin a Lacroix, 7 mai 1935. Lacroix had received a letter from Gouin to the effect that sooner or later it would be necessary to attack Lapointe and expressed his difference of opinion with Gouin on this point and asked for sufficient warning before this policy was adopted to permit him to withdraw from the ALN. Gouin's response was that as long as Lapointe remained neutral in the event of a provincial election, the Action libeYale nationale would not go to battle against him. Interviews with Paul Gouin, 20 July 1965, Martineau, 14 June 1966, Seraphin Vachon, 11 August 1966, and Roger Ouimet, 24 June 1966. PGP, Horace Philippon a Gouin, 11 novembre 1935. Philippon warned Gouin that, in the Quebec City region, "certain of their colleagues lacked either the firmness or the loyalty" needed to support the ALN position. Interviews with Martineau, 14 June 1966, and Vachon, 11 August 1966. PGP, Seraphin Vachon a Gouin, 31 juillet 1934. Ibid., Gouin a L.-P. Morin, 12 octobre 1934. Because Gouin's office was in Montreal there are no written records of organizational problems concerning the Montreal district of the Action liberate nationale. Although it is reasonable to assume that there were organizational disputes in this district as well as in the Quebec City region, these would not have been compounded by the suspicion of an absent chief and his staff. Le Soleil, 22 mai 1935, as quoted in Le Devoir, 25 mai 1935. Le Devoir, 25 mai 1935.

165 Notes to pages 69-74 CHAPTER FIVE 1 PGP, C. Cormier, "Notes sur sa carriere." 2 Interviews with Paul Gouin, 20 July 1965, Jean Martineau, 14 June 1966, and Roger Ouimet, 24 June 1966. 3 PGP, Cormier, "Notes sur sa carriere." 4 Interviews with Gouin, 20 July 1965, and Martineau, 14 June 1966. Both men discussed the ALN'S shortage of funds for the campaign against Taschereau and emphasized that most of those involved in the anti-Taschereau movement had little money to contribute to it. 5 PGP, L.-P. Morin a Gouin, 4 septembre 1934. 6 Ibid., L.-P. Morin a Edouard Lacroix, 24 aout 1935, and Lacroix a Morin, 10 septembre 1935. 7 Ibid., Gouin a O. Drouin, 22 aout 1935. 8 Ibid., L.-P. Morin a Gouin, 31 mai 1935. Vachon, former editor of La Province, said that the newspaper was a drain on party funds: interview with Seraphin Vachon, 11 August 1966. 9 Le Devoir, 14 septembre 1935. 10 PGP, Gouin a J.-L. Demers, 23 septembre 1935 and i octobre 1935. Gouin did not, however, name these supporters to Demers. 11 Ibid., L.-P. Morin a Gouin, 23 septembre 1935. 12 Ibid., Gouin a J.-L. Demers, 23 septembre 1935, and i octobre 1935. 13 Ibid., O. Drouin a Gouin, 19 septembre 1935. 14 Ibid., Gouin a O. Drouin, 28 septembre 1935. 15 Montreal Daily Star, 20 June 1935. 16 Ibid., 20 June and 29 October 1935. 17 FMLD, J.-L. Guillemette a Duplessis, 28 juin 1935. 18 Ibid., Duplessis a F. Coulombe, 9 aout 1935. 19 Le Journal, 11 juillet and iSjuillet 1935. 20 Ibid., i aout 1935. 21 La Presse, 5 aout 1935. 22 Montreal Daily Star, 19 August 1935. 23 FMLD, Duplessis a L.-P. Rioux, 28 septembre 1935. 24 Cohen, Quebec Votes, 64. Only 28.2 per cent of Quebec voters supported Conservative candidates compared with 30 per cent for the nation as a whole. The Conservatives' popular vote in Quebec dropped 6 per cent. 25 Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1936, 266—349. The Reconstruction party's 9 per cent of the popular vote in Quebec, if added to that received by Conservative candidates, would have given the Conservatives 37 per cent, a 3-per-cent increase over 1926. However, in only seven ridings would the combined Conservative and Reconstruction vote have given the riding to the Conservatives.

i66 Notes to pages 75-7 26 Interview with Antoine Rivard, 22 October 1969. Rivard pointed this out, and accounts of Conservative rallies in Le Journal, 29 mai 1935 and 6 juin 1935, substantiate this claim. 27 Ibid. Rivard expressed the opinion that Quebec Conservatives reacted this way to the results of the 1935 federal election. See also Montreal Daily Star, 23 October 1935, and Le Journal, 25 octobre 1935. 28 PGP, Cormier, "Notes sur sa carriere." 29 Ibid. 30 FMLD, E. Asselin a Duplessis, 16 octobre 1935. 31 Ibid., J.O. Montplaisir a Duplessis, 25 octobre 1935, and L. Coupal a Duplessis, 28 octobre 1935. 32 Ibid., J.-L. Guillemette a Duplessis, 26 octobre 1935. 33 Ibid., Duplessis a J.H. Tremblay, 4 novembre 1935. 34 Le Journal, 31 octobre 1935, and Montreal Daily Star, 25 and 26 October 1935. 35 FMLD, J. Mercier a Duplessis, 29 aout 1935. 36 Ibid., A. Fortin a Duplessis, 23 octobre 1935, L. Coupal a Duplessis, 28 octobre 1935, and E. Couland a Duplessis, 31 octobre 1935. 37 PGP, Cormier, "Notes sur sa carriere." The memorandum notes that immediately after the federal election there was a general demand in opposition ranks, especially in the rural areas, for an electoral alliance. In an interview on 20 July 1965, Gouin said that many candidates simply refused to run if there was to be a three-cornered fight because the victory could go to Taschereau. Interviews with Rivard (22 October 1969), Bona Arsenault (23 October 1969), and Fr£de>ic Dorion (7 July 1969) -all active in Conservative affairs in Quebec — confirmed that Conservatives were also reluctant to run in threecornered fights when Taschereau called the election. 38 FMLD, E. Tardif a Duplessis, 24 octobre 1935, and L. Coupal a Duplessis, 28 octobre 1935. 39 PGP, Cormier, "Notes sur sa carriere." This memorandum contains no indication of which party approached the other. Both Paul Gouin and Jean Martineau said in interviews that Taschereau's 1935 election call forced the ALN to seek an alliance with the Conservatives. Antoine Rivard felt the members of the Conservative party and the ALN alike recognized the necessity of an alliance in the November 1935 but claimed that the meeting at Lucien Dansereau's chalet was at the request of the ALN. Interviews with Gouin, 20 July 1965, Martineau, 14 June 1966, and Rivard, 22 October 1969. 40 Ibid. There is no account of these negotiations in the Gouin Papers. There are no letters in either the political or general correspondence files discussing the alliance until after the provincial election. Press reports speculated on the possibility that an alliance existed but added

167 Notes to pages 78-88 no details about meetings beyond those in the Gouin Papers. 41 Ibid. 42 ELP, newspaper clipping, 15 novembre 1935. The most recent attempt to persuade Gagnon to give up federal politics and join the ALN had been made in July 1935: see PGP, Cormier, "Notes sur sa carriere." 43 Interview with Rivard, 22 October 1969. 44 PGP, Cormier, "Notes sur sa carriere." 45 FMLD, Duplessis a J.-H. Tremblay, 4 novembre 1935. 46 Le Canada, 7 novembre 1935, and interview with Arsenault, 23 October 1969. 47 Interview with Martineau, 14 June 1966. 48 Le Devoir, 8 novembre 1935. 49 This letter was later published in Le Canada, i aout 1936. 50 Le Devoir, 8 novembre 1935. 51 Ibid., report of Duplessis's radio broadcast delivered on 7 November 193552 Ibid., report of Gouin's radio broadcast delivered on 7 November 193553 La Province, 14 novembre 1935. 54 Le Devoir, 8 novembre 1935. Taschereau's communique" to the press on the Duplessis-Gouin alliance. CHAPTER SIX

1 Montreal Daily Star, 15 November 1935, and Le Journal, 15 novembre 19352 Parent, "The Quebec Provincial Elections of 1935," 41. 3 Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1936, 616-619, and Cliche, "Les elections provinciales," 345. There had been two independent Liberals elected in 1931. 4 Cliche, "Les elections provinciales," 347; Massicotte, "L'incidence partisane des ine"gallic's," 155-70. 5 See, for example, Tremblay, "La crise economique des anne"es trente," 34-40. 6 UAction Catholique, 11 mars 1935, as cited in Dupont, Les relations entre I'Eglise et I'Etat, 312. 7 Dupont, Les relations entre I'Eglise et I'Etat, 320—3, 328—9. 8 Ibid., 324-5, 328. 9 Montreal Daily Star, 19 December 1935, and Le Canada, 9 Janvier 1936. 10 Le Devoir, 2 decembre 1935. 11 Ibid., 27 novembre 1935. 12 Ottawa Citizen, 29 November 1935. 13 R.B. Bennett papers, M. Dupre to Bennett, 13 December 1935.

168 Notes to pages 88-94 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

25 26 27 28 29 30 31

32

33 34 35 36 37 38

Le Canada, 11, 12, and 14 decembre 1935. FMLD, T. Tremblay a Duplessis, 11 decembre 1935. Le Devoir, 16 decembre 1935. Le Journal, 20 decembre 1935. R.B. Bennett Papers, M. Dupre" to Bennett, 13 December 1935, and L'Illustration, 7 decembre 1935. ELP, Lapointe to Dr E. Tremblay, 11 decembre 1935. Interviews with Senator C.G. Power, 24 June 1965 and 9 August 1966. Ibid. Senator Power stated that his meeting with Gouin took place at the home of Antoine Rivard. PGP, O. Drouin a Gouin, 19 decembre 1935. Ibid., Gouin a E. Lapointe, 8 Janvier 1936. Interviews with Power, 24 June 1965 and 9 August 1966, and Paul Gouin, 20 July 1965. The former ALN leader said that he made it clear to Power that any government containing ALN deputies would have to be headed by Maurice Duplessis. PGP, O. Drouin a Gouin, 18 de'cembre 1935; interview with Jean Martineau, 14 June 1966. PGP, H. Philippon a Gouin, 13 novembre 1935. Ibid., L.-P. Morin a E. Lacroix, 7 Janvier 1936. The men cited by Morin represented pro-big business interests which he believed controlled the Quebec Conservative party. Ibid., L.-P. Morin a Gouin, 11 fevrier 1936, and Gouin a Morin, 14 feVrier 1936. Ibid., O. Drouin a Gouin, 10 fevrier 1936. Ibid. L.-P. Morin a Gouin, 24 fevrier 1936. Le Journal of 13 December 1935, for example, carried a report that the Conservative association of Quebec West had voted to change its name to the Saint-Sauveur Union Nationale. Interview with Frederic Dorion, 7 July 1969. Interviews with Antoine Rivard, 22 October 1969, Martineau, 14 July 1966, S£raphin Vachon, 11 August 1966, Roger Ouimet, 24 June 1966, and Gouin, 20 July 1965. Interview with Ouimet, 24 June 1966. Interviews with Gouin, 20 July 1965, Martineau, 14 July 1966, Vachon, 11 August 1966, and Ouimet, 24 June 1966. FMLD, J. Mercier a Duplessis, 26 feVrier 1936. PGP, L.-P. Morin a Gouin, 11 feVrier 1936. FMLD, E. Theriault a B. Dussault, 13 fevrier 1936, copy. Ibid., B. Dussault a Duplessis, 16 feVrier 1936. The MLAS who attended this supper meeting were its organizer, W.-E. Lauriault (ALN Montreal-St Henri) J.-G. Belanger (ALN Montreal-Dorion),

169 Notes to pages 94-100

39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

47 48 49

50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62

J. Bourque (ALN Sherbrooke), D. Sauve (Conservative Beauharnois), H. Choquette (ALN Shefford), Dr Z. Lesage (ALN Montreal-Laurier), C. Rochefort (ALN Montreal-Ste-Marie), and Bona Dussault (ALN Portneuf). Ibid., P. Hamel a Duplessis, 26 fevrier 1936. Le Journal, 21 fevrier 1936. Montreal Daily Star, 24 February 1936. CAR, 1935-6, 278. Ibid., 279, and Le Devoir, 27 mars, i avril, and 13 avril 1936. Le Journal, i mai 1936, reprint of Paul Gouin's maiden speech in the Legislative Assembly, 28 avril 1936. ELP, Alexandre Taschereau a Lapointe, 2 juin 1936. John Thomas Taschereau, Premier Taschereau's nephew and Antoine Taschereau's son, told the Public Accounts Committee that until the beginning of 1936 his father had deposited in the bank where he was manager large sums of money belonging to the Legislative Assembly in his own name. The interest on that money was paid into Antoine Taschereau's personal account. J.T. Taschereau further testified that this had been a regular practice since 1867. Montreal Daily Star, 5 June 1936. La Province, 28 mars 1936, and L'lllustration Nouvelle, 23 mars 1936. Montreal Daily Star, 19 June 1936; interview with Martineau, 14 June 1966. In a statement which appeared in La Presse on 19 April 1937, Paul Gouin claimed that he had never been opposed to the investigations of the Public Accounts Committee but had been against the manner in which they were conducted. Gouin went on to accuse Duplessis of using the inquiry to serve solely his own ends and of acting at the same time as accuser, witness, and judge - Gouin said he found this demagogic behaviour revolting. PGP, E. Lacroix a Gouin, 27 mai 1936. Montreal Daily Star, 6 June 1936. Interview with Martineau, 14 June 1966. Martineau was unable to name the men involved in these negotiations. Montreal Daily Star, 9 June 1936. Interview with Power, 9 August 1966. Montreal Daily Star, 10 June 1936. Ibid., 13 and 15 June 1936. Le Canada, 19 juin 1936. Ibid. Interview with Martineau, 14 June 1966. Le Journal, 26 juin 1936. Interview with Rivard, 22 October 1969. Interview with Rivard, 22 October 1969. Interview with Noel Dorion, 24 October 1969.

170 Notes to pages 100—10 63 PGP, telegram from Gouin to ALN deputies and a few Conservatives, 18 juin 1936. 64 Le Devoir, 20 juin 1936. 65 PGP, "Session 1936, Comic's." 66 Le Devoir, 22 juin 1936. 67 Le Journal, 19 juin 1936. 68 Le Devoir, 22 juin 1936. 69 Ibid., 29 juin 1936. 70 Boily, "Les hommes politiques du Quebec, 1867-1967," 625-6. 71 La Province, 20 juin 1936. 72 L'Action Catholique, 20 juin 1936. 73 Le Journal, 26 juin 1936. 74 Le Canada, 22 juin 1936. 75 Le Journal, 19 juin 1936. 76 Ibid., 26 juin 1936. 77 Interview with Martineau, 14 July 1966. 78 Interviews with Power, 25 June 1965 and 9 August 1966. 79 L'lllustration Nouvelle, 21 juin 1936. 80 Le Devoir, 6 juillet 1936. 81 Ibid., 16 juillet 1936. 82 PGP, "Discours et conferences, 1936-37," speech delivered by Gouin, 12 aout 1936. CHAPTER

SEVEN

1 Vaillancourt, "L'heritage des anne"es trente," 315; Dupont, Les relations entre I'Eglise et I'Etat, 319-33; Rumilly, Duplessis, I, 204, 209. 2 Le Journal, 26 juin 1936. 3 Montreal Gazette, 2 and 20 July 1936. 4 Le Journal, 7 aout 1936. 5 Ibid., 24 juillet 1936. 6 Montreal Daily Star, 10 August 1936. 7 Ibid., 13 August 1936. 8 Ibid. 9 ELP, Judge Choquette a Lapointe, 16 juin 1936, and memorandum prepared by L. Trepanier urging federal Liberal involvement in the Quebec campaign. This memorandum was forwarded by C.-O. Lacroix to Lapointe on 20 June 1936. 10 Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph, 10 August 1936, and Montreal Daily Star, 13 August 1936. 11 Le Journal, 15 aout 1936. 12 W.L.M. King Papers, memorandum to the prime minister: E.A. Pickering to King, 13 August 1936.

171 Notes to pages 110-15 13 Ibid. The memorandum noted that Edouard Masson, the Union Nationale organizer, had telephoned on 13 August requesting that King publicly deny authorizing Rinfret's claims. Only such a statement from King would forestall an attack on the prime minister and the federal government. The King Papers also contain a press release dated 14 August 1936 in which the prime minister stated that federal ministers who intervened in provincial campaigns did so as individual citizens. Such intervention, according to King, "should not be construed as implying federal participation." 14 Interviews with Antoine Rivard, 22 October 1969, and Frederic Dorion, 7 July 1969. Rivard said that on the advice of Oscar Drouin and Philippe Hamel, prominent Conservatives and federal Conservative MPS were asked not to take an active part in the campaign. All those who were openly connected with the federal Conservative party were, according to Rivard, not welcome Union Nationale supporters until 1944 although workers at the constituency level overlapped. Dorion stated that as chief federal Conservative organizer, he could not go to provincial meetings in 1936 but that he could, and did, give aid to the Union Nationale. He also said that Union Nationale workers were Conservative workers. See also R.B. Bennett Papers, M. Dupre" to Bennett, 26 June 1936. 15 Montreal Daily Star, 2 July 1936. 16 L'Illustration Nouvelle, 3 juillet 1936. 17 Montreal Daily Star, 15 August 1936, and R.B. Bennett Papers, Maurice Dupre to Bennett, 26 June 1936. 18 Montreal Daily Star, 15 August 1936. 19 FDPH, Abbe" Lionel Groulx a Hamel, 30 juin 1936. 20 L'Action Catholique, 3 juillet 1936. 21 Le Journal, 13 aout 1936. 22 Montreal Daily Star, 10 August 1936. 23 FDPH, "Re"ponse a Paul Gouin," 10 aout 1936. 24 See, for example, Rumilly, Duplessis, i, 249-63. 25 FMLD, group of "jeunes patriotes" from St Vincent-de-Paul, Laval, a Duplessis, 25 juillet 1936. 26 Ibid., W. Dufour a Duplessis, 18 aout 1936, and J.O. Martineau a Duplessis, 12 aout 1936. 27 Ibid., P. Charest a Duplessis, n.d. 28 Ibid., L. Barras a Duplessis, 7 aout 1936, and Duplessis's printed appeal to French-speaking voters in the riding of Three Rivers, dated 11 August 1936. 29 Vaillancourt, "L'he'ritage des anne"es trente," 316; Rumilly, Duplessis, i, 256. 30 CAR, 1935-6, 284.

172

Notes to pages 115-19

31 W.L.M. King Papers, analysis of Quebec election results, 1936, with comparisons to the results in 1935 and 1931. See also Massicotte, "L'incidence partisane des ine'galite's," 155-70. 32 Interviews with Paul Gouin, 20 July 1965, and Jean Martineau, 14 June 1966. Both Gouin and Martineau said that some candidates recorded as ALN in November 1935 were actually Conservative. Neither provided names of such candidates. However, three of the MLAS listed as elected for the ALN in 1935 - Dr J.-H.-A. Pacquette, Rom£o Lorrain, and Romulus Ducharme - were designated Conservatives by the Canadian Parliamentary Guide for 1936. 33 Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1936, 616-19. 34 W.L.M. King Papers, analysis of Quebec election results, 1936; CAR, 1935-6, 284; Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1936, 619; Le Devoir, 22 novembre 1936. 35 Interviews with Bona Arsenault, 24 October 1969, and Rivard, 22 October 1969. Arsenault maintained that Duplessis excluded Hamel, Gregoire, and Chaloult because of his dislike of sharing power. Rivard attributed Duplessis's break with Hamel to the former's support for private enterprise and opposition to all sorts of socialism. According to Rivard, Duplessis was afraid of Hamel because of the latter's support for nationalization of electricity in Quebec. Similarly, he feared that Chaloult would go too far in pursuit of his nationalist aims. Rivard also attributed Duplessis's split with Hamel to fear that Hamel posed a threat to his power and to his position as leader. In Rivard's opinion, Duplessis did not want strong men too close to him. 36 Montreal Daily Star, 10 July 1929. For elaboration see Dirks, "Union Nationale," 89-90. 37 Le Journal, 27 aout 1936, and Montreal Daily Star, 27 August 1936. 38 Fonds J.-E. Gregoire, copy of a speech Gregoire delivered over CKCK, 23 May 1937. Gregoire delivered this radio broadcast in May 1937 because of claims Duplessis had made in the legislature to the effect that Gregoire had wished to become a minister in the first Union Nationale cabinet while retaining the mayoralty of Quebec City in order to collect both salaries. 39 Le Journal, 27 aout 1936. 40 Ibid., and Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph, 9 September 1936. 41 Montreal Daily Star, 27 August 1936. 42 CAR, 1935-6. 284. 43 L'Action Catholique, 8 septembre 1936. 44 Le Droit, i septembre 1936. 45 L'Action Catholique, 8 September 1936. 46 L'Illustration Nouvelle, 28 aout 1936. 47 La Patrie, 30 aout 1936.

173 Notes to pages 119-26 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

71

London Advertiser, 28 August 1936. FDPH, J.U. Gauthier a Hamel, 4 septembre 1936. Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph, 3 September 1936. FDPH, Abbe" L. Groulx a Hamel, 4 septembre 1936, and Hamel a Groulx, 10 septembre 1936. La Province, 5 septembre 1936. PGP, Gouin a H. Philippon, 4 septembre 1936. La Province, 20 aout 1936. PGP, H. Philippon a Gouin, 20 novembre 1936. FMLD, P.-L. Dupuis a Duplessis, 18 aout 1936. Le Journal, 26 novembre 1936. Ibid., 9 feVrier 1937. Montreal Daily Star, 19 February 1937. Ibid., 23 February 1937, copy of O. Drouin's letter of resignation, 22 February 1937. Ibid., reprint of memorandum from O. Drouin to Duplessis, 9 February 1937. Ibid., 25 February 1937. Le Devoir, 27 feVrier 1937. La Province, 6 mars 1937. Le Devoir, 13 aout 1936. Montreal Gazette, 27 August 1936. Vaillancourt, "L'heYitage des annees trente," 317. Quinn, Union Nationale, 79; Rumilly, Duplessis, 1, 277. Fournier, L'entrte dans la modernite, 64. Bouchard, L'administration de la province de Quebec, n, 28. For a detailed analysis of the social and economic context in which caisses populaires developed in Quebec, see Rudin, "In Whose Interest?" 157-77CAR, 1937-8, 230. Bills 19 and 20 gave the government power to abrogate at will any collective labour agreement between employers and employees without consultation with the interested parties and to establish wages and working conditions in any industry or trade. CHAPTER EIGHT

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

FDPH P. Gouin a Hamel, 6 mai 1937 and 7 juin 1938. PGP, Gouin a H. Philippon, 24 novembre 1936. Ibid., Gouin a V. Cliche, 11 mars 1937. Interview with Jean Martineau, 14 June 1966. PGP, L.-P. Morin a J. Martineau, 14 juin 1937. Interview with Martineau, 14 June 1966. Le Devoir, 23 juin 1937.

174 Notes to pages 127-33 8 9 10 11 12

13 14 15

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

30

31

La Presse, 22 juillet 1937. PGP, O Drouin aj. Martineau, 2 juillet 1937. Interview with Martineau, 14 June 1966. L'Unite, i juillet 1937. Interview with Paul Gouin, 20 July 1965, and PGP, Gouin a H. Philippon, 7 Janvier 1938. Gouin informed Philippon that even tentative moves toward rapprochement would be useless as long as the "Gregoire incident" remained unresolved. Interview with Gouin, 20 July 1965. Le Devoir, 2 aout 1937, gives a detailed report of the proceedings. For elaboration see Boismenu, "L'Etat f£d£ratif et Ph£t£rogeneite de 1'espace," 82-4, and Bourque and Duchastel, "L'Etat canadien et les blocs sociaux," 145, 148-9, 151-3. Le Devoir, 2 aout 1937, speech by Gouin. Ibid., speech by Drouin. PGP, Gouin a H. Philippon, 7 Janvier 1938. Ibid., P. Bouchard a Gouin, 20 octobre 1937. Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1939, 370. Bouchard ran as an Independent Liberal in the Lotbiniere by-election, 27 December 1937. PGP, "Organisation 1934-36," an undated speech by Gouin elaborating upon the launching of the weekly luncheon meetings of La Province. Ibid., "Dejeuners-causeries 1937-38," P. Gouin, "L'unit£ nationale," 12 Janvier 1938. Ibid., R. Ouimet a Gouin, 26 Janvier 1938. Ward, ed., Memoirs of Chubby Power, 342. Interview with Roger Ouimet, 24 June 1966. PGP, L. Sault a Gouin, 16 juin 1937. Montreal Daily Star, i March 1938. RJ. Manion Papers, Manion to G. Dunn, 26 January 1939. See also Naugler, "RJ. Manion and the Conservative Party," 129-37. R.A. Bell recalled being present at such meetings late in 1938. Senator Josie Quart said that Manion met unofficially with Duplessis in the latter's office on several occasions during visits to Quebec City. Frederic Dorion, the federal Conservative organizer for the Quebec district in 1939, also reported that Manion and Duplessis met privately in this period. Interviews with Bell, 2 April 1969, Quart, 17 June 1969, and Dorion, 7 July 1969; see also Naugler, "RJ. Manion and the Conservative Party," 251-2. RJ. Manion Papers, T.H. Onslow to Manion, 5 August 1939,. enclosing T.H. Onslow to RJ. Robb, 4 August 1939, as quoted in Granatstein, The Politics of Survival, 26. Montreal Daily Star, 13 April 1938; Linteau et al, Histoire du Quebec depuis igso, 125.

175 Notes to pages 133-9 32 FMLD, "Entente Duplessis-Hepburn," typed copy of a news story dated "Montreal, 5 aout," no year. 33 Ibid., and Montreal Daily Star, 8 July 1938. 34 Montreal Daily Star, 28 July 1937. 35 ELP, F.A. Monk to W.L.M. King, 16 April 1938. 36 Fonds T.-D. Bouchard, "Caucus de divers groupes de libdraux en vue de la prochaine convention pour elire un chef du parti liberal dans la province de Quebec," Montreal, 24 avril 1938. 37 Le Devoir, 16 mai 1938. 38 Montreal Daily Star, 16 May 1938. 39 PGP, H. Philippon & Gouin, 19 avril 1938. 40 L'Action Catholique, i juin 1938. 41 PGP, L.-P. Morin & Gouin, 12 juin 1938. 42 La Presse, i juin 1938. 43 Le Devoir, 2 mai 1938. 44 Ibid. 45 PGP, O. Drouin a Gouin, 28 mai 1938. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., O. Drouin £ Gouin, 14 juin 1938. 48 Interview with Gouin, 20 July 1965. Gouin said that Hamel wanted complete control of the Quebec region if an alliance were made and that he had refused, telling Hamel to contest the leadership of all opposition groups at the Sorel convention if he wanted to be leader. 49 PGP, L.-P. Morin a Gouin, 12 juin 1938. 50 La Presse, i juin 1938. 51 L'Action Catholique, 9 juin 1938. 52 PGP, "Organisation, 1937-39," mimeographed form outlining procedures for electing delegates to Sorel and dated 13 July 1938. 53 L'Action Catholique, 9 juin 1938. 54 PGP, Gouin a E. Vaillancourt, 6 juillet 1938. Gouin sent Vaillancourt, treasurer of the Quebec organization for the Sorel convention, a cheque for $500 and advised him to practice "une seVere economic" as this was all the money that would be available for the Quebec region. 55 Le Devoir, 25 juillet 1938. 56 Le Canada, 25 juillet 1938. 57 Le Devoir, 7 juillet 1938. 58 Ibid., 25 juillet 1938. 59 The evidence available does not indicate whether the various opposition groups were proportionately represented on these subcommittees. 60 PGP, manifesto of the Action libe"rale nationale, Sorel, juillet 1938. 61 Le Devoir, 5 juillet 1938.

176 Notes to pages 139—44 6s? PGP, manifesto of the Action libe"rale nationale, Sorel, juillet 1938, section vi, article 3. 63 Ibid., "Communiques, 1936—39," P. Ferland, "Le congres de Sorel," 27juin 1938. 64 Ibid., a form letter signed by Gouin and dated 17 October 1938. Material related to party organization by county between 1937 and 1939 fills several volumes. While considerable attention was given to organizing the Action libe"rale nationale at every level, the evidence available gives no indication of how broad the basis of support behind this local organizational framework was. 65 Ibid., Gouin a C.-A. Gilbert, 3 aout 1938. 66 Ibid., H. Philippon a Gouin, 6 septembre 1938. 67 Ibid., H. Philippon a Gouin, 8 aout 1938. Again, as with the Action liberate nationale's first organizational effort, written records document the Quebec district's financial problems because headquarters was located in Montreal. However, the fact that the Montreal district was unable to help the Quebec district out suggests that adequate funding was a problem there as well. 68 FMLD, A. Sauv 144; ALN leader, selection as (1938), 139; attacks on, by former ALN allies, 103, 113; and Canadian involvement in war, 130; and convention of opposition groups (1938), 137-9, 175 n4^; corporatism, support for, 38-9, 51, 127—9; dissidents, leader of, 25, 36, 38—40, 44; and Duplessis's government, 120, 129; early career, 20; education and formative influences, 19; and CX-ALN members, 103, 105, 122, 125-7, 137, 174 ni2, 175 n48; and family, 4, 19, 66, 128; industrialization and agriculture, views on, 19-20, 38-9, 129; and launch of Quebec's third party, 40-5, 48, 51, 53, 160 n46, 160 n4g, 161 n62; leadership, strengths of, 43-4, 84; in the Legislative Assembly, 96-7; Liberal attacks on, 55, 57; Liberal offers to, 53-4, 57; Liberal pressures on, 89-91, 93, 97, 168 n24; nationalist ideology of, 38—9, 48, 65, 112, 128-30; and Parti National, attitude towards, 130, 137; and provincial autonomy, 129—30; and Quebec election (1936), 104-6, 112-13; and Quebec Liberal convention (1938), 135-6; rejection by Taschereau, 20, 24-5, 55, 57; support for (1937-9), 126-8, 132, 134; UND-G, exodus from, 98—105, 126, 150, 169 n4g; UND-G, introduction of, 81—3; UND-G, loss of support within, 88, 90-5, 100-5; UND-G, negotiation of, 77-80 Grdgoire, Ernest, 88, 93, 94, 105, 112, 121, 127, 137, 143; exclusion from Duplessis's cabinet, 115-19, 172 n35, 172 n38; exclusion from UN caucus, 122; joins ALN, 64; and Parti National, creation of, 126; and Quebec election (1936), 111; support for Duplessis's UN, 102-3, Il9'> support for UND-G, 91, 97 Groulx, Abbd Lionel, 16, 30, 37, 59, 113, 128; and Duplessis, doubts about, 82, 112, 120; influence on reformist Liberals, 33, 65 Guertin, Aime", 37 163 ngg Hamel, Philippe, 30, 47, 77, 88, 93, 105, 137, 143; ALN, adherence to, 58, 64; ALN, creation of, 41—3, 161 n4; disillusionment with Duplessis, 120—2, 126; and electricity trust, campaign against, 13, 31; exclusion from Duplessis's cabinet, 115—19, 172 n35; exclusion from UN caucus, 122; nationalist pressures on (1936), 111-13; and Parti National, creation of, 126; and Paul Gouin (1937-9), 125, 175 n48; and Quebec election (1936), 111-13; support for Duplessis's UN, 100, 102-3, 119; support for UND-G, 91, 94, 97 Houde, Camillien, 37, 55, 56, 84, 85; and federal Conservatives, 23—4; and Quebec election (1931), 25, 28, 30, 36, 78; as Sauv^'s successor, 23-4 Hydroelectric industry, 10, 11, 23, 32, 39, 54; and Lapointe commission, report of, 62—3; and UN government, 115-16, 121—3, 151 Industrialization: ALN policies on, 49, 60; Liberal support for, 3, 9, 10; and modernization, 5, 15; and la survivance, 6, 16—17, 19> H6; traditional francophone elites, impact on, 3-6, 15, 146, 151 Jeune-Canada, 33 Jeunesses Patriotes, 128 King, W.L. Mackenzie, 81, 89, no, 134, 171 ni3 Lacroix, Edouard, 12, 28, 47, 50, 60, 77, 84, 90, 91, 97, 98, 100, 104, 125, 135; and ALN, 41, 70, 89, 132, 137, 148; federal Liberal loyalties of, 63, 69, 164 n68; split with Taschereau regime, 43, 50, 54 Langevin, Hector, 77, 100, 126

197

Index

Lapointe, Ernest, 96, no, 135, 142; and ALN, 58, 69, 89, 164 n68; electricity commission chairman, 54, 57, 62; reformist Liberals, influence on, 33, 62—3; Taschereau regime, relations with, 28, 31, 54, 62-3 Lavergne, Armand, 23 Liberal party (federal): and ALN, negotiations with, 89-91, 93, 95, 98, 134-5, 149—50; and anti-Taschereau sentiment, 62, 68, 74, 89-91; electoral triumph in Quebec (1935), 74; and Quebec election (1936), involvement in, no, 170 ng, 171 ni3; and Quebec election (1939), involvement in, 142-4, 176 n7a; and Quebec Liberal convention (1938), 134-5; Taschereau regime, relations with, 18, 28-9, 41, 54, 56, 62; and UN, fear of, 133 Liberal party (provincial): and ALN, responses to, 53-5, 57, 62-3, 65-6, 97-8; clerical opposition to, 86—7, 107; convention of (1938), 134—7; economic policies of, 3, 9—13, 18, 20, 26, 31, 95, 123; increased support for (1939), 143, 144, 145; internal dissension, 18, 27-33, 36, 40-4, 46, 54, 57-8, 61-4, 66, 68, 85, 87, 91, 98, 134—5; performance in opposition, 126; and Quebec election (1935), 85-7; and Quebec election (1936), 106—8, no, 115; social policies of, 18, 123; struggle to retain power (1936), 95-8, 102, 104, no; support, loss of, 2 5> 85-6, 95-7; Taschereau regime, grievances against, 7, 13, 33, 84, 148, 158 nio; and UND-G, 87-91, 93 Manion, R.J., 133, 143, 174 n2g Martineau, Jean, 40, 43, 53, 65, 77, 90, 91, 97, 98, 100, 145; and ALN resuscitation (iQS?). 126-8; attack on trusts and Taschereau regime, 32-3, 42; and Duplessis, alliance with, 77; objectives of, 33, 58, 158-9 n2i, 160 n47, 161-2 ng, 163-4 n57; and Sorel convention (1938), i38-g; and UND-G, collapse of, gg, 104, 126 Masson, Edouard, 77, 78, 87 Mercier, Honore', 4, 19, 48, 58, 82, 148, 149 Minville, Esdras, 35, 51, 52, 151 Modernization, 47, 148, 151, 153; aims of advocates, 33, 51; supporters and opponents of, 5-6; and la survivance, 15-16, 146; and UN, 106, 123 Monk, F.A., 42, 43, 77, go, g7, g8, 100, 104, 160 n4g; and ALN, withdrawal from, 1 3%> !34; and Quebec Liberal convention (ig38), 134—5; return to Liberal party, 137 Morin, Louis-Philippe, 42, 70, gi, 100, 104, 126, 136, 137, isg National Liberal Federation, 142, 176 n72 Nationalists, 33, 127, 128, 130; and industrial development, 4, 15-16, ig; rural basis of, 16-17; and Sorel convention (ig38), 138; and Taschereau regime's policies, 16, 27; and UN (ig36), 112-13, 116-21. See also ALN: and FrenchCanadian nationalists Natural resources, g, 10, 14, 16, 22, 24, 26, 37, 3g; and Program for Social Restoration, 35; protection of, Duplessis's promises about, 72; and UN, log, iig. See also hydroelectric industry; pulp and paper industry Nicol, Jacob, 54, go Ouellet, J.-C.-E., 32, 41, 56, 117, 126, 158 nio Ouimet, Roger, 42, 43, 77, g3, 100, 104, 138; and ALN, break with, 131-2; and ALN resuscitation (1937), 126, 128; return to Liberal party, 137 Parti Franc, 38. See also Square party

198 Index Parti National, Le, 126; and ALN, negotiations with, 136-7; and ALN resuscitation (1937), 127, 130; and Quebec election (1939), 142; and Sorel convention (1938), 138; and Quebec Liberal convention (1938), 135-7 Philippon, Horace, 42, 64, 91, 100, 103, 104, 120, 136, 140; and ALN resuscitation (iOS?). 1*6, 128; and Sorel convention (1938), 138-9 Power, C.G. ("Chubby"), no, 135, 142, 158 n8, 162 nztj, 176 n72j and ALN, Liberal negotiations with, 89-90, 168 n2i, 168 n24 Programme de Restauration Sociale, Le, 35-6, 159 n33 Province, La (newspaper of ALN), 58, 59, 69, 70, 82, 83, 97, 102, 130, 131, 140, 141, 165 n8 Public Accounts Committee (1936), 96-7, 101, 103, 108, 169 n46, 169 n^g Pulp and paper industry, 10, n, 17 Quebec, economy of: anglophone dominance of, 9-12, 15; collapse, impact of, 3-7, 26-9, 32-4, 38, 59, 146-8; demands for greater francophone control of, 3, 53, 128-9; expansion of (19205), 9-10; francophone role in, 10-12, 14-15. See also hydroelectric industry; pulp and paper industry Quebec Power Company: and fight with Quebec City, 13, 29-31. See also hydroelectric industry; antitrust sentiment Rainville, Joseph, 77, 78, 79 Raynault, A., 77, 100 Reconstruction party, 68, 69, 72, 74, 165 n25 Rinfret, Fernand, no, 135 Rioux, Albert, 35, 52 Rochefort, Candide, 100, 122 Roy, Horace, 138, 139 Sauve", Arthur, 22, 23, 141 Socialism, French-Canadian fear of, 5, 6, 8, 34 Sorel convention (1938), 138-9 Square party, 38, 47, 55, 56 Stevens, H.H., 68, 75 Taschereau, Alexandre, 46, 56, 57, 59, 92, 104, 123, 153; big business, support for, 22, 31, 60; economic views of, 9, 12, 29, 51; leadership, decline of, 53, 62-3, 66, 69, 73, 78, 85, 87, 89-91, 94-8, 103; legacy of, 107-8, 134-6; Liberal party, control of, 7, 18, 20, 27-9, 31, 40, 44, 54-5, 58, 71, 82, 104, 148, 158 n8; and Quebec Catholic Church, 14-15, 18, 87, 159 n26; and Quebec election (1935), 77, 81, 83, 166 n37; resignation of, 97-9, 106; and legislative session (1936), 95-7 Taschereau, Antoine, 96-7, 169 n46 The"riault, Elyse"e, 31, 43, 94, 126, 158 nio Union catholique des cultivateurs, L', 17, 35, 52, 84 Union Nationale, L': and ALN deputies, retention of, 101-6; cabinet, composition of (1936), 117-18; caucus of (20 June 1936), 101, 104; defeat of (1939), 145, 152; divisions among opponents, 123, 124, 132, 134, 136-7, 143; economic and social policies of, 122-4, 133, 145, 151; and legislative session (1937), 122-4; opposition to, growth of, 132, 141, 152; platform of (1936), 102, 106-9, 113—14, 121—2, 124, 150; provincial nature of, no—n, and Quebec election

igg Index (1936), 106-15, 150; and Quebec election (1939), 141-5; support for, 106-14, 123-4. 133. 150-1 Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin, L': campaign of (1935), 84-5; collapse of, 97, 99-101; conversion into UN, 101-3; creation of, 67, 73-9, 166 nsg; degree of unity within, 87—95, 97~ 1O2 an