Factionalism in Social Movements: The Case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood After 2013 (Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen Ostens) 3658415800, 9783658415808

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Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen Ostens

Nadia Aboushady

Factionalism in Social Movements The Case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood After 2013

Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen Ostens Reihe herausgegeben von Martin Beck, Institute of History, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark Cilja Harders, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany Annette Jünemann, Institut für Internationale Politik, Helmut Schmidt Universität, Hamburg, Germany Rachid Ouaissa, Centrum für Nah- und Mittelost-Studien, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Marburg, Germany Stephan Stetter, Institut für Politikwissenschaften, Universität der Bundeswehr München, München, Germany

Die Reihe beschäftigt sich mit aktuellen Entwicklungen und Umbrüchen in Nordafrika, dem Nahen Osten, der Golfregion und darüber hinaus. Die politischen, sozialen und ökonomischen Dynamiken in der Region sind von hoher globaler Bedeutung und sie strahlen intensiv auf Europa aus. Die Reihe behandelt die gesamte Bandbreite soziopolitischer Themen in der Region: Veränderungen in Konfliktmustern und Kooperationsbeziehungen in Folge der Arabischen Revolten 2010/11 wie etwa EuroArabische und Euro-Mediterrane Beziehungen oder den Nahostkonflikt. Auf nationaler Ebene geht es um Themen wie Reform, Transformation und Autoritarismus, Islam und Islamismus, soziale Bewegungen, Geschlechterverhältnisse aber auch energie- und umweltpolitische Fragen, Migrationsdynamiken oder neue Entwicklungen in der Politischen Ökonomie. Der Schwerpunkt liegt auf innovativen politikwissenschaftlichen Werken, die die gesamte theoretische Breite des Faches abdecken. Eingang finden aber auch Beiträge aus anderen sozialwissenschaftlichen Disziplinen, die relevante politische Zusammenhänge behandeln. This book series focuses on key developments in the Middle East and North Africa as well as the Gulf and beyond. The regions’ political, economic and social dynamics are of high global significance, not the least for Europe. The book series covers the whole range of the ongoing transformations in the region, such as new developments in regional conflict and cooperation after the uprisings of 2010/2011 including Euro-Arab and Euro-Mediterranean relations, or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On a (trans)national level, volumes in the series look at authoritarianism and reform, social movements, gender dynamics, Islam and Islamism, political economy, migration, as well as energy and environmental issues. The series focuses on innovative work in all sub-disciplines of political science and other social sciences disciplines that address political developments in the Middle East. Dr. Martin Beck ist Professor für gegenwartsbezogene Nahost-Studien an der University of Southern Denmark in Odense, Dänemark. Dr. Cilja Harders ist Professorin für Politikwissenschaft und Leiterin der „Arbeitsstelle Politik im Maghreb, Mashreq, Golf“ am Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft der Freien Universität Berlin, Deutschland. Dr. Annette Jünemann ist Professorin für Politikwissenschaft am Institut für Internationale Politik der Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Deutschland. Dr. Rachid Ouaissa ist Professor für Politik des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens am Centrum für Nah- und Mittelost-Studien der Philipps-Universität Marburg, Deutschland. Dr. Stephan Stetter ist Professor für Internationale Politik und Konfliktforschung an der Universität der Bundeswehr München, Deutschland.

Nadia Aboushady

Factionalism in Social Movements The Case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood After 2013

Nadia Aboushady Marburg, Germany Vom Fachbereich Gesellschaftswissenschaften und Philosophie an der PhilippsUniversität Marburg (Hochschulkennziffer 1180) als Dissertation angenommen am 19.11.2021 Tag der Disputation / mündlichen Prüfung 19.11.2021 1. Gutachter Prof. Dr. Rachid Ouaissa 2. Gutachterin: Prof. Dr. Eva Wegner

ISSN 2626-224X ISSN 2626-2258 (electronic) Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen Ostens ISBN 978-3-658-41580-8 ISBN 978-3-658-41581-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41581-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer VS imprint is published by the registered company Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature. The registered company address is: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany

Foreword

The reconfiguration of political Islam is one of the most significant outcomes of the so-called Arab Spring. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) came to power for the first time in the country’s history. Founded in 1928 and following an 80-year turbulent history of the world’s most important Islamist movement, the MB took power in Egypt in 2012 under the leadership of President Mursi. Since the ousting of President Mursi in 2013 and the crackdown on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) that followed, the group has been witnessing reconfigurations on many levels. This process of reconfiguration is not terminated yet and is expected to influence and shape not only the future of the MB, but also that of the Islamist movement in Egypt and in the world as a whole. The group was declared a terrorist organization for the first time in its history. Upon this, the MB and its political party, the Freedom and Justice party (FJP), went underground. By 2014, the MB’s cohesion was at stake: the leadership was unable to maintain control over its members inside and outside Egypt, and the organization became divided into at least two camps, each claiming legitimacy. In this highly inventive and valuable book, Nadia Aboushady analyses the reasons behind the Muslim Brotherhood’s factionalism post 2013 and defines the scope of disagreements and schism within the group. Ms Abou Shady examines the conflict lines and the cleavages within the movement. Nadia Abou Shady asks: “What are the causes of the formation of factions in the MB after 2013? And what were the reasons for the disagreements within the MB?” The repressive context post 2013 changed spatial modalities of interaction: the MB went underground, leading figures are either imprisoned or hiding or in exile. Yet, social media platforms, particularly the official website(s), reflect the “offline” factionalism process.

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This book sheds the light on the factions’ own narratives of the conflict in online statements. These confrontations were clearly manifested in the content and substance on the websites of both factions that became the main platforms for the internal conflict reproduction. This interaction in the online arena reflected the offline dimensions of the disaccord and were the beginning of a new era in the MB’s life marked by re-configurations on many levels. The research demonstrates that the conflict is between the Organizational bloc which has dominated the MB since the 1990s and a newly formed “Revolutionary” trend which did not adopt an “innovative revolutionary strategy” against the regime effectively, yet certainly succeeded in ‘making revolution’ inside the organization. While the Organizational bloc seeks to maintain the old configuration of the internal movement arena, the Revolutionary bloc is pushing for re-configurations. The scopes of the conflict do not only concern strategic choices, internal structures, power distribution or regulations but also other micro-structural dimensions, particularly the re-interpretation of cognitive frames (religious determinism) and collective identity (ikhwanism). Finally, the study suggests that emotional dynamics hinder the breaking away of either contender factions from the group or leading both to dispute the organization itself. In this sense, the factionalism is less an ideological or strategic conflict than it may appear. The best evidence that the conflict is less about a strategy or an ideological disaccord, as much as it is an internal revolt against the domination of the “Organizationalists” on the movement, is that after the establishment of two groups the “Revolutionaries” did not engage in violent activities. Instead, the focus was directed inwards at the organization itself: the “Revolutionary bloc” thus engaged in a comprehensive and serious re-organization of the internal structure. A new vision and new bylaws were molded after a process of self-critique and revisions. The new organizational structure and regulations seek to avoid the domination of a trend on the leadership of the group and to limit or counterbalance the Guidance Office and the General Guide’s powers to ensure more accountability of leaders. Marburg December 2022

Rachid Ouaissa

Acknowledgment

I would like to thank my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Rachid Ouaissa, who guided me in this process and kept me on track, and Prof. Dr. Eva Wegner for her constructive feedback and comments. This work wouldn’t have been possible without the support of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), and the Egyptian Ministry for Higher Education, which funded my stay and studies in Germany. My appreciation goes out to all my professors at Cairo University, especially Dr. Heba Raouf, Dr. Amal Hamada, Dr. Cherine Chams, and Prof. Dr. Amany Masoud. A special feeling of gratitude to my loving mother, who has been a constant source of love, support and encouragement during all the challenges I have faced in life. I am truly thankful for having her in my life. I also dedicate this dissertation to my dear father, who has always encouraged me to pursue post-graduate studies, to work hard for my goals, and to complete what I have started. Special thanks to my sister Nora, who has never left my side and is very precious to me. I will always appreciate all you have done for me, especially your support in the months before submitting the dissertation and the long hours you spent proofreading. Many thanks to my husband Ahmad, who supported me throughout this journey and encouraged me to pursue my dreams. I am also grateful for my dear friends: Sherif for the proofreading; Farah for the long discussions and insightful comments; Abdel Rahman for sharing his knowledge; Marwa, Salma, and Yasmine for always being there for me. Last but not least, I dedicate this work to my lovely daughters, Soraya and Amina. Both of you are my source of happiness and my biggest cheerleaders.

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Note on Transliteration

The transliteration style employed in the study does not distinguish between short and long vowels. It also doesn’t distinguish the “sin” from the “sad”, the “dal” from the “dad”, etc. So in these instances, the “sin” and “sad” are both represented by an “s”, “dal”, and “dad” are both represented by a “d”, and so forth. The “ayn” and the “hamza” are both represented by the symbol ’ (e.g. Badi’, jama’a, Ra’if) As for individuals’ names, the standard is to refer to the spellings used by the individuals themselves, when these were available or consistent. Otherwise, I have used the model above. I have chosen to always render the name Mohamed in that form and to always render the definite article as “al-”, instead of “el-” (Egyptian accent).

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Introduction

Background and Purposes After the 2011 uprising and the toppling of President Hosni Mubarak (1981– 2011), the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) gained unprecedented political power. To adapt to the political opening, the MB was forced to abandon the caution and self-restraint that had shaped its political behavior for decades. It sought appeasement with its historical enemy, the military, instead of aligning itself with the revolutionary activists. By July 2012, the MB had moved from the margins of the political sphere to its center: not only did the Brotherhood manage to secure the majority of seats in the parliament, but it also won the presidential election. However, its fall was as rapid as its rise. On July 3, 2013, one year after Mohamed Mursi’s election as president, the secular political forces, which had merged into the National Salvation Front, NSF ( jabhat al-inkaz al-watany) with the support of the military, succeeded in removing Musri from power. The ousting of Mursi and the clearing of the sit-ins in Raba’a al-Adawiya and al-Nahda squares on August 14, 2013 was accompanied by an intensive crackdown on the Brotherhood. Several hundred MB members and supporters were killed in the pro-Musri protests, thousands of MB leaders and members were imprisoned and their assets frozen and confiscated, many members and supporters were forced to go in exile, and the MB’s social and lucrative services were shut down. Furthermore, the MB’s activities were banned and the group was declared a terrorist organization for the first time in its history. Upon this, the MB and its political party, the Freedom and Justice party (FJP) went underground. By 2014, the MB’s cohesion was at stake: the leadership was unable to

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maintain control over its members inside and outside of Egypt, and the organization became divided into at least two camps, each claiming legitimacy. Indeed, the 2013 crackdown “shattered the Muslim Brotherhood in ways that have left the organization a fundamentally different political entity” (Lynch, 2016). For the first time in its history, the MB, which has been known for its robust internal organization, rigid hierarchical structure, tightly disciplined ranks and strict cohesion, has a dual organizational structure since the spring of 2016 and until the drafting of these lines. Until today, there are two “official” Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood groups, two “official websites”, two “official” spokesmen, two “legitimate” Shura Councils, two “elected” Guidance Offices, and two different bylaws and ‘visions’. Furthermore, each faction has its own allied administrative offices, supporters, rhetoric, and narrative of the conflict. All mediation attempts have failed to reconcile the contending factions. Since the beginning of the schism, the group’s tradition of secrecy and not exposing its internal affairs to the public nor to its ranks has been widely challenged. Contending leaders and spokesmen did not merely admit the existence of internal fissures, but they also promoted their own narratives of the conflict in online statements, and in media talk shows and sometimes even confronted each other in media debates. These confrontations were clearly manifested in the content and substance of the websites of both factions, which became the main platforms for the internal conflict’s reproduction. In fact, both factions engaged in a “statements battle” in which each statement published by one website engendered a counterstatement on the other website. This interaction in the online arena, reflected the offline dimensions of the discord, and marked the beginning of a new era in the MB’s life marked by re-configurations on many levels. Against this background, this research aims to answer two main research questions. Each question can be divided into further sub-questions: First, what are the root causes of the MB’s factionalism after 2013? • How did state repression affect the process of factionalism? • What effects did organizational and microstructural dynamics have on the schism? Second, what is the scope of disagreements within the MB? • How did the contending factions perceive and narrate the contention? • What is the conflict ‘really’ about? What are the implicit or unspoken dimensions of the factionalism?

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Significance and Scope of Research The objective of this research is to unpack the reasons for the MB’s factionalism post-2013 and define the scope of disagreements within the group. This work suggests that the Brotherhood is undergoing profound divisions along many lines, going beyond the dichotomies of young/old, peaceful/violent, revolutionary/conservative that are typically postulated by recent studies. It argues that the conflict is over power relations, strategies and tactics, organizational structure and regulations, cognitive frames, collective codes of identity and even over the organization itself. In this sense, MB factionalism is less of an ideological conflict than it may appear. In terms of methodology, the study resorts to a variety of sources to create an exhaustive overview and in-depth assessment of the MB’s internal schism post-2013. In addition to the classic literature, organizational documents, and MB leaders’ memoirs, which provide the essential foundation of this work, this study relies most importantly on regular visits for four consecutive years (from 2015 to 2018) of the two “official” Arabic websites of the Muslim Brotherhood; “ikhwanonline.info” and “ikhwan.site” (which became “ikhwanonline.com”) and some conducted in-depth interviews with MB supporters in Cairo in the spring of 2016. The research methodology extends beyond a content analysis to include an ethnographic approach to the analysis of MB’s online statements, allowing thus to identify the interaction between the contentious players in the cyberspace. This study thus contributes to the existing research on the Muslim Brotherhood in several ways. First, it provides a comprehensive overview of the internal schisms throughout the history of the MB, analyzing them in light of state repression. In this respect, this research is one of the very few works that uses primary sources in Arabic, particularly MB members’ memoirs, to account for the dimensions of previous factional conflicts. Second, this study contributes to the emerging research on the MB’s factionalism post-2013. Given the recency of this topic and the dynamism of the process, this work represents, to my knowledge, one of the first comprehensive academic contributions to the topic. Without a doubt, the organization is witnessing reconfigurations on many levels. This process of reconfiguration, which has not been terminated yet, is expected to influence and shape not only the future of MB itself, but also that of the Islamist movement as a whole, in light of the intra-movement competition between mainstream and militant movement organizations. This research is one of the very first works that uses primary sources, particularly documents and statements published by the contending factions, and combines different resources to account

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for the dimensions of the internal conflict as narrated and framed by the players. Moreover, many of these statements and documents have been deleted from the internet and do not exist anymore in public records, which constitutes another contribution of this work in preserving archives that do not exist anymore in open sources. Simultaneously, the study distinguishes between the players’ narratives and the implicit, yet core, dimensions of the conflict, that underlie the factional battle. It thus contributes to the reconstruction of the conflict’s narratives, which goes beyond the common dichotomous approach postulated by several researchers (young, violent vs. old, non-violent). At the theoretical level, this study contributes to the literature on social movement factionalism. Influenced by two approaches: the interactionist approach as stipulated by Fillieule (2012) and the configurational approach of Elias reintroduced by Ouaissa et al., (2021), this analysis introduces a new definition of factionalism that relies on an interactionist approach, where all variables are considered interdependent. In this respect, this study defines factionalism as a process, in which internal players interact with the aim of maintaining or restoring the existing organizational order. This means that factionalism implies the reconfiguration of internal organizational power relations and the players’ alliance structure. This process is neither triggered solely from within the social movement organization (SMO) nor solely from the outside. It is rather a complex process of interactions between dynamics at the macro- (environmental), the meso- (organizational) and the micro- (individual) levels of analysis. Adding the microstructural dimension, including emotions, to the analysis of factionalism is another contribution of this study, since it adds to the emerging line of the sociology of emotions.

Thesis Outline The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 1 provides an overview of the scant research on the topic of MB factionalism, before and after 2013. It highlights how existing conclusions on the MB are being revisited after the 2013 events. Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive review of the theoretical literature on social movement theory and social movement factionalism. It concludes with the synthesis of the conceptual framework that I will be using in this study to analyze internal schisms in the MB. Chapter 3 describes the methodological approach that was used in this study. It explains the research design and the details of the strategy of data collection and analysis.

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Chapter 4 presents an exhaustive historical overview of internal conflicts and schisms, focusing on the effect of repression on the group’s internal cohesion throughout the history of the MB. This chapter provides insights about the nature of these conflicts, their outcomes, and the unresolved matters that have been transmitted to the next generations. Meanwhile, Chapter 5 discusses the configuration and re-configuration of the alliance map of internal players before and after 2013. In its first part, this chapter highlights the heterogeneity of the MB and the configuration of internal players before 2013. In this respect, it suggests a new mapping of internal trends by disentangling these using several dimensions, such as political generations, jurisprudential, intellectual, socio-economic, and cultural. In a second part, it provides insights into the organizational adaptation attempts that the group sought to carry out in response to the crackdown since 2013, as well as the challenges and dilemmas it faced. It explains how the reconfiguration of the internal alliance map and the forging of new players, as well as the fissures over strategy paved the way for the current factional dispute. In Chapter 6, I observe and analyze the multiple dimensions of the contentious narrative of the internal conflict that occurred in the online sphere. In this respect, this chapter focuses on the “statements battle” which took place on the official Arabic websites of both factions. It argues that other aspects of the conflict are reflected in the factions’ narratives concerning the reasons for the schism, and that the conflict within the MB goes beyond strategic lines. In a second place, I construct an alternative narrative to that promoted by the MB’s contending parties. I also suggest a more complex, multilayered approach that includes microstructural dynamics, such as emotions, cognitive frames and collective identity. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes and provides insights into the future of the organization, while highlighting areas that could benefit of future research.

Contents

1 State of Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Research on the Muslim Brotherhood Schism Pre-2013 . . . . . . . . 1.1.1 Disparities and Splits in the Egyptian Islamist Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1.2 The Political Opportunity Structure and MB’s Transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Research on the Muslim Brotherhood Factionalism Post-2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1 Organizational Deficits and MB’s Decline . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.2 MB’s Adaptation Ability and Accommodation to Repression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3 Factionalism and Repression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Theoretical Debates and Novelties in the Study of Social Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Classic Approaches and Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1 Social Movements in the Twentieth Century: Theoretical Debates and Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2 Microstructural and Social-Psychological Approaches (Sociology of Emotions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Schism and Factionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1 The Effect of Internal Organizational Factors on Factionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 Environmental Facilitators of Factionalism and Schisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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2.2.3 The Repression- Dissent Nexus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Synthesis and Analytical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 Summary of Literature and Key Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3 Analytical Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.4 Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Researching an Underground Organization: Methodology and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 A Mixed Data Collection Approach in Search of the MB . . . . . . 3.1.1 The Limits of Conventional Fieldwork in High-Risk Research Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2 MBs’ Official Websites: A Virtual Field of Research . . . . 3.1.3 Primary Documentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.4 Interviews: Fieldwork and Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Data Analysis: Ethnography of the Written and the Virtual Word . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Categorizing Strategy and Content Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2 Connecting Strategy and Ethnographic Analysis . . . . . . . . 3.3 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Brotherhood’s Internal Conflicts and their Outcomes: Historical Overview (1928–2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Internal Conflicts and Factions during the Founding Phase (1928–1948) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1 Opposing al-Banna’s Leadership and Power . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.2 The Rise of the Militant Current . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Internal Divisions and Organizational Disarray (1948–1970) . . . . 4.2.1 The Post-Banna Power Struggle (1948–1950) . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Rising Opposition Against al-Hudaybi’s Leadership (1951–1954) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.3 The Great Ordeal: Divisions during the Prison Years (1954–1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Dissentions after the Second Founding (1970–2011) . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 Brotherhood’s Conflicting Currents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 Generational Divides and Tensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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5 The Brotherhood’s Organizational Re-configuration Amidst Political Turbulence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Players’ Configuration Pre-2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.1 Mapping Subgroupings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.2 Configuration of Internal Players: Alliance and Contention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 RE-configuration and Growing Schism Post- 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1 Adapting to Repression: MB’s Efforts and Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2 The Micro Dynamics of Raba’a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.3 Re-orientation and Re-organization of a Factional Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Beyond Strategic Divisions: MB Narratives and Microstructural Dimensions of Factionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Contentious Narratives of the Internal Disaccord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.1 The Strategic Dimension: The Stagnation and Adaptation Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.2 The Legitimacy Dilemma: Between Historical and Institutional Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.3 Internal Reform: Adjusting of the Bylaws and Vision . . . 6.2 Reconstructing the Conflict Narrative: The Implicit Dimensions in the Factional Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.1 Unpacking the Strategic Conflict: Fighting Against ‘Religious Determinism’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2 Re-Configuring the Brotherhood’s Collective Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.3 Disputing the Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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101 102 102 116 124 125 131 138 147 151 153 154 161 168 176 176 183 190 195

7 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Research Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Hypothesis: Discussion and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.1 The Causes of Factionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2.2 The Scope of Factionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Key Findings: Sum up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 Theoretical Impications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 Contributions and Suggestions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

199 199 201 201 204 207 209 211

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

215

Abbreviations

CMC FJP HAC MB NASL NSF RCC RMT SCAF SM SMO

Crisis Management Committee Freedom and Justice Party High Administrative Committee Muslim Brotherhood National Alliance to Support of Legitimacy National Salvation Front Revolutionary Command Council Resource mobilization theory Supreme Council of the Armed Forces Social movement Social movement organization

xxi

List of Figures

Figure 2.1 Figure 5.1 Figure 5.2.

Factionalism in an interactionist approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cross-dimensional configuration of MB players pre-2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MB’s re-configured map of alliances and factionalism in December 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45 103 143

xxiii

List of Tables

Table 3.1 Table 5.1

List of categories for content analysis of MB websites . . . . . MB internal currents’ disparities pre-2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

62 121

xxv

1

State of Research

This chapter presents scientific and research contributions that deal with the topic of MB schisms before 2013, as well as recent studies about MB’s factionalism post-2013. In fact, research focusing on the internal disaccords within the MB, before as well as after 2013, is relatively scant. Before 2013, most studies focused on the disparities within the wider Islamist movement in Egypt, but not specifically within the MB. In addition, several studies contribute to the moderation-inclusion theory. Few studies focus on the internal dynamics and conflicts within the group. These started mainly to emerge as of 2005. After 2013, MB factionalism grabbed the attention of several observers and researchers. Some reports and press articles provide a descriptive analysis of the chronological order of the internal dissents within the MB. Yet, few academic studies focusing on the internal divisions post-2013 have been published. This can be explained by the fact that the factionalism is a relatively recent and ongoing process, and its outcomes remain unclear. It is worth noting that when I began this work, no academic contribution to this topic had been available yet. The few studies that I review in the second section of this chapter only began to appear by 2016/2017 at the earliest.

1.1

Research on the Muslim Brotherhood Schism Pre-2013

Studies that deal with the MB’s internal splits and schisms before 2013 can be divided in two main bundles. The first bundle of research focuses on the disparities within the Islamist movement in Egypt. The second line of research is interested in the transformations of the MB in light of the political opportunity structure. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 N. Aboushady, Factionalism in Social Movements, Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen Ostens, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41581-5_1

1

2

1.1.1

1

State of Research

Disparities and Splits in the Egyptian Islamist Movement

This bundle of research can be divided in two research lines. The first research line accounts for the emergence of militant Islamist organizations in the 1970s. In this respect, several research focus on the ideological and doctrinal radicalization of Islamists. Such research was related to the emergence of a new ideology that filled the ideological gap during the 1960s. The schism within the Islamist movement was mainly caused by the different interpretations of Qutb’s book “Milestones” (Ma’alim fil-Tariq), which introduced four concepts considered as the core ideology of the militant Islamists: takfir, jahiliya, hakimiyya, and emotional isolation. These concepts were the focal point of several studies (Khatab, 2002; Shepard, 2003). Other studies reveal how the schism started to appear during MB’s prison years in the 1960s. The process of ideological radicalization goes back to the influence of Qutb’s ideas on young MB members who sought to reorganize the Brotherhood in the 1960s. When the Organization 1965 was uncovered, the state carried out a vast detention campaign. Inside the prisons, ideological radicalization intensified. Under torture, debates about Qutb’s ideas and heated discussions about Nasser and his regime and whether they were truly Muslim led to schism (Zollner 2007; Ramadan, 1993). The MB leadership intervened and expelled members who refused to abide by its interpretation of Qutb’s ideas. MB General Guide Hassan al-Hudaybi’s book “Preachers not Judges” was the ideological base counterbalancing takfiri Qutbis (Zollner, 2007; 2009). Research also focuses on the militant groups’ activism during the 1970s and 1990s, highlighting the divisions within the Islamist movement along ideological and strategic lines (Kogelmann, 1994; Kepel, 1985). These analyses tend to adopt the dichotomies of moderate/radical and confrontationist/accommodationist. What distinguishes moderate Islamists from militant groups, apart from ideological and strategic differences, is also their approach to addressing socioeconomic frustrations and their temporal framework for achieving their desired goals (AbedKotob, 1995). Radical militants are those who insist on a revolutionary change that is to be imposed on the society and regime, while moderate groups are those that call for gradual change from within the system. In addition to the perspectives that focus on ideational and strategic explanations of militant Islamists, or those that focus on the unstable psychological mentalities, grievances, and relative deprivation (Ibrahim, 1980), another school argues that Islamist violence is the result of tactical considerations, which are

1.1 Research on the Muslim Brotherhood Schism Pre-2013

3

affected by the realities of repressive contexts. Islamists engage in rational calculus about tactical efficacy and choose modes of contention that facilitate the realization of their objectives, protect their organization, or maximize their political gains. Violence is only one of the possibilities in repertoires of contention and becomes most likely when regimes carry out broad crackdowns on Islamists that leave few tactical alternatives (Hafez and Wiktorowicz, 2004). Indiscriminate repression promotes the “injustice frames” articulated by militants. Indiscriminate repression also adds justification to their violent tactics since non-violence is no guarantee against state persecution. Finally, the inability of moderate Islamists to expand their political influence through constitutional channels gives revolutionary Islamists “empirical credibility” (Hafez, 2003). The second research line focuses on the MB’s internal disparities, using a sociological approach mostly relying on Mannheim’s theory of political generations (1928). The generations are thus examined in terms of their political experience and how it affects their stances on a number of issues, including their political school of thought, intellectual current, and strategic preferences. Literature dealing with internal dynamics focuses on the mapping of the MB players, mainly in terms of political generations. Al-Anani (2007a; 2007b; 2009) develops an outline, dividing the MB into four generations: first, the old guard, who lived through the crackdown on the organization in the 1950s and 1960s and who are generally resistant to reformist ideas. Second, the pragmatists, who joined the group in the 1970s and have been active in the political arena since then. Third, the neo-traditionalists, who emerged during the MB’s clash with the Mubarak regime in the 1990s. Finally, the urban youth, who are generally reform-oriented and politically engaged. Wickham (2013) categorizes the MB into three main groupings according to the religious interpretations they embrace and their political agendas: the conservatives who control leadership positions, the reformists who were politically active as students in the 1970s, and the conservative pragmatists who share the background of the reformists but who are aligned with the conservative leadership. Other researchers focus on the disparities between the MB Youth, or the blogger generation, and the leadership (Lynch, 2007; al-Anani, 2007b) or address the “generational gap” within the group (Samir, 2018). The marginalization of MB Youth was also tackled by other researchers (Martini et. al., 2012). In addition, scholars point out to the internal ideological and strategic divisions, that led to the breakaway of al-Wasat party members in the mid-1990s (Tammam, 2010a; Wickham, 2002; 2004; 2013). Those members were also considered as “the New Islamists” (Baker, 2003). The internal ideological disaccords within the MB also

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State of Research

grabbed scholars’ attention on the occasion of the drafting of a hypothetical political party platform in 2007, which sparked contentious debates within the group (Brown and Hamzawy, 2008; Lynch, 2007). Tammam’s contribution with regards to internal disparities within the MB has been crucial. He elaborates the different intellectual currents, religious trends (2010a; 2011) and socio-economic disparities (2012) within the group. He analyzes the transformations of the MB, particularly in the light of two main processes of “salafization” and “ruralization”. These contributions indicated that the group, even after the breakaway of the more radical elements in the 1970s, was not as homogenous as it might appear.

1.1.2

The Political Opportunity Structure and MB’s Transformations

This bundle of studies can be divided in two research lines. The first research line is concerned with the inclusion-moderation theory. Since exclusion pushes Islamists to choose violent tactics, including them in the political sphere would likely enhance their moderation. In this respect, scholars agree that the MB has become a “moderate” group. Some argue that the MB underwent a tactical moderation, while others argue that the group underwent an ideological and strategic moderation. The Islamists’ acceptance of democracy and their potential for political participation also became a new dimension in the categorization of Islamists. Hence, schisms that have occurred within the MB have always been caused by conflicting approaches to political participation. In the 1970s, radicals who refused to participate through the constitutional channels broke away, while in the 1940s and 1990s, Brothers broke away to engage further in politics. In contrast to militant groups, the interaction with the society forced the MB to accept the ‘rules of the game’ and moderate further (Weber, 2013). Accordingly, the MB is considered “compatible” with democracy (Abed-Kotob, 1995). Not only is the MB a moderate group that rejects violence, but it also seeks to participate in the political system, unlike radicals who reject submission to authority. The MB is a highly pragmatic organization, that calls for the expansion of democracy, and its original vision even encompasses democratic ideals such as liberty, accountability, and socio-economic justice (Abed-Kotob, 1995). The MB is moderate: it stresses that democracy is compatible with its notion of gradual Islamization. Furthermore, the MB justifies democracy on Islamic grounds, stressing that the Muslim community is the source of political authority. This reflects the MB’s assertion that democracy is in their favor,

1.1 Research on the Muslim Brotherhood Schism Pre-2013

5

since an Islamic society naturally aspires to “Islamic leaders” and supports them in elections (Leiken and Brooke, 2007). Therefore, the MB’s strategy is based on the accommodation of the existing political system (Awadi, 2009), and relies in its activism through constitutional channels, including the representation in the Parliament and professional associations and trade unions (Wickham, 2013), and acquiring “societal legitimacy” (Awadi, 2004; 2009). Inside the Brotherhood itself, moderate and radical trends coexist. Hence, the breakaway of al-Wasat party is considered by Wickham (2004) as the split of the “moderates” who accept democracy and seek political inclusion, from the “radical leadership”, which rejects democracy and political participation. The breakaway is explained by the ideological moderation, strategic calculations, and political learning of a generation that benefited from limited political openings, generating new incentives and opportunities for political activism and strategic moderation. Similarly, Weber (2013) argues that “ideological moderation” in the MB is triggered in part by strategic calculations, but also by political learning of democratic practices, and the interaction with secular opposition leaders. Incentives and opportunities encourage ideological transformations, since “radical leaders” break out of their “closed” organizations and enter the public sphere and cross-partisan cooperation. Even during confrontation times, specifically when the regime promotes a negative discourse about the MB, the group undergoes a highly “selective ideological moderation” targeting specific issues mentioned in the regime’s discourse (Ranko, 2014). The second research line focuses on the effects of the limited group’s political participation—according to the rules set by the regime—on the group’s internal dynamics. In this respect, El-Ghobashy (2005) points out that the institutional rules of the semi-authoritarian electoral politics have prompted organizational and ideological metamorphoses within the group. Ideologically, the group shifted from “politics as a sacred mission to politics as the public contest between rival interests”. On the organizational level, the group’s political participation in electoral politics paved the way for splits along generational and strategic lines. Yet, she argues that the MB has successfully managed internal divisions, preserved its cohesion, and maintained the unique ideology and identity that it grants to its ranks. Simultaneously, the MB has become a “flexible political party” that is responsive to the calculus of electoral politics and to any political opportunity posed by political openings. Affirming the existence of internal splits, Hamzawy and Brown (2010) indicate that the MB encompasses a paradox: the more it participates efficiently in the political sphere, the more the Mubarak regime undertakes measures to exclude it from participation. Thus, a short-lived political opening is always followed by

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State of Research

an exclusionist policy. The shrinking political space, in its turn, affects the internal power relations inside the MB, in favor of the conservatives, who prioritize internal solidarity and social activism over political participation. This paradox was also observed by Awadi (2009), who argues that the regime’s policy toward the MB is closely interlinked with the success of the latter in providing social services via its well-organized structures and enormous network: the more the MB provides social services, the more it acquires de facto “societal legitimacy”, and the more the regime perceives its legitimacy as effectively menaced by the group and thus suppresses the MB with the aim of uprooting its influence. Scholars focusing on the effect of repression on organizational dynamics argue that repression does not always engender factionalism within the MB, but can also enhance its cohesion. Since the breakaway of the militant Islamists during the prison years in the 1960s, the MB was not only able to withstand repression and keep its organizational unity intact (al-Anani, 2016), but it even expanded and flourished (Wichkam, 2013). In this respect, Munson (2001) points out that the MB’s organizational, tactical, and ideological qualities, as designed by alBanna, allow the MB to withstand state repression. Since its early years, the MB’s emergence and growth have been linked to its ability to attract ordinary Egyptian citizens as well as overcome the state’s repressive policies, due to its internal structure, which was specifically designed to survive state repression. Linking the group’s beliefs to its activities and organizational structure enhanced the group’s resistance to repression and facilitated its diffusion. Under repression, internal conflicts can be channeled towards more positive outcomes, i.e. internal solidarity, which often outweigh dynamics of factionalism. The MB’s code of identity and the group’s legacy of secrecy and self-restraint enhanced the group’s unity (Tammam, 2010a). The shrinking political space has changed the internal power relations in favor of a trend that prioritizes internal solidarity and social activism over political participation (Hamzawy and Brown, 2010). This current succeeded in “enforcing” cohesion on the group (al-Anani, 2016). The MB’s internal dynamics, particularly its ideology, organizational structure, as well as its pragmatic political strategy, enabled it to participate effectively in elections and exploit opportunities (Wickham, 2002; al-Anani, 2016). The MB participated in all types of elections, from student unions to trade unions and parliamentary elections. Thanks to its diffused social services network, the MB also acquired societal legitimacy, even though it was denied legality (Awadi, 2004).

1.2 Research on the Muslim Brotherhood Factionalism Post-2013

1.2

7

Research on the Muslim Brotherhood Factionalism Post-2013

Divisions within the Muslim Brotherhood after 2013 grabbed the attention of several researchers. Existing understandings of the MB are being revisited after the 2013 events. The rapid rise and rapid fall of the Brotherhood between 2011 and 2013 encouraged researchers to revisit conclusions on the MB’s moderation as well as its ability to adapt to state repression. After 2013, some studies examine the reasons for the MB’s downfall. As of 2016/2017, a new emerging line of research, which remains scant, started to address the MB’s internal conflict after the coup. In this regard, scholars agree that the ousting of Mursi and the crackdown that followed mark a decisive stage for the MB, yet they disagree on the impact of repression on the organization’s internal cohesion.

1.2.1

Organizational Deficits and MB’s Decline

The first bundle of research suggests that the MB ultimately declined because of its very own political, ideological, and organizational failures. Despite the common belief that the internal structure was the reason for its success, critical deficits of the MB’s internal structure have always existed and determined the organization’s fate. Meanwhile, the crackdown on the group post-2013 had only accelerated the process. The Brotherhood’s leadership was neither able to appease the old institutions, i.e. the “deep state”, nor did it seek alliances with revolutionary elites and other political actors (El-Sherif, 2014). Al-Anani (2015) argues that, besides the role of the “deep state” and the regional hostility towards the Brotherhood, three factors related to the organizational dynamics contributed to the downfall of Mursi and the MB. These factors are the burden of the MB’s conservatism and the lack of a revolutionary progressive agenda; the organizational stagnation and its rigid decision-making process; and the incompetence and lack of governing experience among MB leaders. Similarly, Jaraba (2014) suggests that the MB’s miscalculations and erroneous strategic choices are the main reasons for the movement’s failure after 2013. Resistance by the “deep state” is only a minor reason for the Brotherhood’s breakdown. He suggests that the MB’s narrative focusing on blaming the old regime is a strategy to present the group as a victim of state repression, in order to avoid accountability and to convince supporters that the ousting of Mursi was inevitable.

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State of Research

In line with these suggestions, another group of researchers argues that it was not repression that accelerated the MB’s fall, but rather the sudden opening of the political structure after 2011. In this context, the MB was poorly equipped to deal with the new political environment after decades of facing authoritarian regimes. Thus, the 2011 uprising constituted more of a challenge than an opportunity (Lynch, 2016). The MB’s inclusion in the political system, as suggested by El-Ghobashy (2005), Wickham (2004), and Weber (2013) did not lead to the movement’s transformation into a moderate and democratic entity. Instead, longstanding political, ideological, and organizational deficits as well as the MB’s opportunistic behaviour and reluctance to undergo ideological and organizational reforms undermined the group’s ability to elaborate an “Islamic democratic project” (El-Sherif, 2014). In addition, the group’s newly established political party; the FJP was hampered by the pre-existing organization (al-jama’a) and its structure (al-tanzim). The MB’s domination over the FJP prevented the latter from obtaining autonomy and from adapting to the emerging rules of the political game after the 2011 uprising. Instead, the MB’s “undefined nature and opaque pattern of regulations” were reproduced within the party’s structure, paving the way for the delegitimization of both entities- the organization and the party- and eventually the political failure of the MB in the post-2011context (Vannetzel, 2017). These arguments thus constitute a serious challenge to the inclusionmoderation theory. This is because the MB were more prone to moderation under repression than under political inclusion.

1.2.2

MB’s Adaptation Ability and Accommodation to Repression

Another group of researchers argues that the MB did not break down but rather succeeded in adapting to the severe repression. For instance, Grimm and Harders (2018) suggest that the Brotherhood adapted to repression in the immediate postcoup period. Contrary to the widely accepted idea of the MB’s demobilization, the movement -in fact- reveals a tactical and organizational adaptation behavior. Grimm and Harders argue that in response to multiple episodes of repression, the MB immediately internalized mechanisms of tactical adaptation and innovation, which prevented the demobilization of the anti-coup movement. In other words, the deterrent effect of repression in the short term was contained by adaptative techniques of decentralization, diversification, and substitution. On the longer term, however, repression succeeded at decreasing anti-coup protests.

1.2 Research on the Muslim Brotherhood Factionalism Post-2013

9

Similarly, Zollner (2019) argues that the MB was able to survive al-Sisi’s systematic repression due to the preexisting characteristics of its organizational structure, its ideology, and consistent values. The internal structure is characterized by a centralized pyramidal hierarchy, a large and diverse cohort of high ranking members, diversified administrative processes, as well as a horizontal communication network. These characteristics kept the organization largely intact despite the regime’s intentions (and actions) to demolish it. In addition to the organizational structure, the organization’s ideology diffused through the cultivation and selection program created a devoted membership base that managed to act independently in times of crisis. Because administration and communication remained intact, the MB was able to continue enforcing its ideology and organizational unity through different media platforms, where it emphasized nonviolent resistance, reiterated the narratives of ordeal to encourage patience and persistence, and reaffirmed the need for internal unity. Ayyash (2019) argues that the MB’s organizational structure rather than its ideology is what ensures the Brotherhood’s survival in the face of fierce repression. In fact, the MB is unable to enforce its ideology, especially on MB detainees who interact with militant Islamists in prison. Several MB members in the highsecurity wards defect from the organization and join militant Islamist groups such as ISIS. Beside the unstable emotional state of the prisoners, intellectual fragility and triviality of religious knowledge among most MB members make them unable to resist militant ideologies. However, on the organizational level, transformations and adaptations of the MB inside the prisons enable it to regain control over its dissident members. In this regard, the MB referred to two strategies to assert its control over its detained members: it recalled the hierarchical relations and the principle of obedience by organizing elections inside the prisons, and it provided financial support to the families of detainees to appease them. Similarly, Biagini (2017) argues that the Muslim Sisterhood -the female wing of the MB- successfully adapted to the new political circumstances as of 2013 allowing thus the survival of the MB movement as a whole. As repression intensified post 2013, women’s leadership emerged. Not only did female members replace detained male members in their positions, but they also established networks assisting prisoners and financially supporting families and victims of the crackdown. Sisters being excluded from any crucial offices within the group and their activism relying on informal networks, the Sisterhood was able to survive the crackdown and to save the MB as a whole in the years following the 2013 events.

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1.2.3

1

State of Research

Factionalism and Repression

A third group of studies suggests that repression paved the way for organizational breakdown and internal schism (Ayyash and Willi, 2016; Lynch, 2016; al-Anani 2019). If, prior to 2013, the MB’s tightly hierarchical and structured organization was able to impose a high degree of ideological and behavioral conformity on its members (Kandil, 2015; al-Anani, 2016), current research shows that the organization faces internal opposition. According to this research line, the MB experiences a process of fragmentation and lacks a uniform strategy to face ongoing repression. The organization is struggling to remain united and to develop a clear stance towards the regime. Ardovini (2020) and al-Anani (2019) differentiate between the MB as an organization and its members. Both argue that there is a considerable strategic divergence between the Brotherhood’s organizational response to repression and that of its members. While the organization advocates for stagnation, its members are pushing for confrontation with the regime. Al-Anani (2019) suggests that the MB’s ability to survive repression and maintain organizational cohesion is related to structural, institutional, and individual factors. In this regard, al-Anani differentiates between the collective and individual responses to repression within the MB. Individual responses are largely affected by emotions and personal experiences. Furthermore, the scale of state repression affects the propensity of schism. If the MB was able to resilience repression and keep its unity intact before 2013 (al-Anani, 2016), the severe crackdown after 2013 led to contradictory responses within the movement leading to a split: while the leadership is inclined to adapt to repression, some of its members are leaning towards confrontation with the regime (al-Anani, 2019). Ardovini (2020) unpacks the lines of internal divisions and the related challenges that the organization faces as it tries to survive repression. He suggests that schisms occurred on many levels: a strategic level, a generational level, and a geographic level. In addition to these dimensions of schism, many individual members became dormant and alienated.

1.3

Concluding Remarks

In the decades before 2013, researchers indicated that under repression, the MB was not only able to withstand repression and to keep its organizational unity intact but even expanded and flourished. Its internal dynamics, particularly its ideology, organizational structure, and pragmatic political strategy enabled it to

1.3 Concluding Remarks

11

participate effectively in elections and exploit opportunities. The MB participated in all types of elections, from student unions to trade unions, syndicates, and parliamentary elections. Thanks to its diffused social services network, the MB also acquired social legitimacy, even though it was denied legality. After 2013, several studies examined the reasons of the MB’s downfall. In this regard, scholars agreed that the coup marked a decisive stage for the Muslim Brotherhood yet disagreed on the impact of repression on the organization’s internal cohesion. Some argued that the MB’s demise is explained by the group’s very own political, ideological, and organizational failures, while others considered that the group managed to survive the post-2013 state repression. A third group of researchers advanced the thesis that repression triggered internal schisms within the Brotherhood. Researchers disagreed on the level of schism: while some argue that it is mostly on strategic lines, others believe that the schism also includes a generational and geographic level.

2

Theoretical Debates and Novelties in the Study of Social Movements

The question “why do movements split?” appears predominantly in social movement literature. The matter of factionalism appeared as part of the reflection on the causes and shapes of social movement failure and decline. As social movement theories developed over more than one hundred years, different hypotheses about movement factionalism and schism emerged. It is thus not possible to separate the development in the field of movement schism and factionalism, from the broader development that occurred in the field of social movement theories. Therefore, the first section of this chapter will be dedicated to the historical development of social movement theories. The passage from early psychological approaches, to structuralism and interactionalist approaches will be illustrated. The second section, will then review the literature on the different approaches to the question of movement factionalism. In this regard, a number of scholarly works reviewed the facilitating factors of movement split. Some attributed significance to internal organizational factors, while others stressed the importance of external factors as the main cause for split. A third bundle adopted an intermediate approach, studying a combination of both factors. Recent studies have analyzed the relationship between schism, state violence and organizational radicalism. Finally, I highlight the implications of the literature and illustrate the conceptual framework of this study.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 N. Aboushady, Factionalism in Social Movements, Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen Ostens, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41581-5_2

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2 Theoretical Debates and Novelties in the Study of Social Movements

2.1

Classic Approaches and Recent Developments

2.1.1

Social Movements in the Twentieth Century: Theoretical Debates and Synthesis

The first generation of social movement theory, the collective behavior theory, emerged in the early- to mid-twentieth century, and focused on the structural and psychological causes of mass mobilization. Grievance theories dominated this field: individuals’ participation in social movements is explained by the relative deprivation theory and the frustration-aggression theory, which are both key concepts in grievance theories. On the one hand, the relative deprivation theory suggests that feelings of deprivation result from comparisons of one’s situation with someone’s else situation or some cognitive standard. In other words, relative deprivation is produced by the divergence between what people think they are entitled to and what they actually get. What matters is -in fact- the perception of deprivation. It is not “absolute deprivation” but rather a subjective perception of deprivation with reference to people’s expectations (Gurr, 1970). Some theories explain collective action by fraternalistic relative deprivation. Double relative deprivation, which refers to the experience of both personal and group deprivation, is expected to increase the propensity of individual’s participation in collective action. On the other hand, the frustration-aggression theory assumes that feelings of frustration flourish when the achievement of some goals is blocked by an external agency. In this case, collective action might occur in order to lift the blockage or punish the agency for blocking goal achievement (Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2017). Gurr (1970) combines both theories in order to explain the linkage between relative deprivation and collective violence. He suggests that relative deprivation is a precondition of collective action. Moreover, the intensity and scope of relative deprivation affect the potential for collective violence. When deprivation increases, anger and frustration increase. This psychological state produces aggression or collective violence. Thus, the greater the deprivation, the greater the scale of contention. He suggests that the existence of institutionalized organizations lowers deprivation and provides non-violent means of expressing discontent. While there are different models of the early social movement theories, they all share four broad assumptions. First, crowds are conceived as “the heart of protest movements” (Klandermans, 2007). Crowds are emotional and irrational. Second, participation in collective actions is an irrational response to structural strains. The relationship between structural strains and collective action is a linear

2.1 Classic Approaches and Recent Developments

15

causal relationship. Various strains such as industrialization, modernization, or an economic crisis disrupt social life and produce psychological discomfort which, in turn, produces collective action. Third, social movements are mechanisms for easing psychological discomfort derived from structural strains. Individuals join social movements as a response to their growing sense of social anomie, isolation, despair, anxiety, and impotence in the face of broad societal changes. Movements are thus perceived as “escapist coping mechanisms through which individuals regain a sense of belonging and empowerment” (McAdam et al., 1996). Fourth, in these theories, society and culture are treated as descriptive historical contexts (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). In the mid-1960s and the 1970s, the scholarship on social movements flourished as a result of the emergence of a wide range of social movements in different geographic areas. New studies have criticized this approach for its simplistic formulation of the linkage between structural strains and protest. Instead, scholars turned to the rational-actor model. The crowd was not at the center of their approach anymore, but rather the organization. This shift in emphasis appeared in a new bundle of research on the organizational dynamics of collective action (e.g., Oberschall, 1993; McCarthy and Zald 1973; Tilly, 1973; Gamson,1975). The new school draws its inspiration largely from two distinct theoretical perspectives: the resource mobilization theory (RMT) and the political process model. As for the Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT), it was initially formulated by McCarthy and Zald (1977) and deals with the dynamics of social movement growth, decline, and change. It emphasizes the importance of mobilized resources, the relations between social movements and other groups, as well as between social movements and the authorities which aim to control them. RMT also puts emphasis on the significance of external support (individuals and organizations) for a social movement’s success. According to this approach, social movement tactics are influenced by interorganizational competition and cooperation. Mobilizing structures, such as formal social movement organizations (SMOs), are crucial to collectivize action. Thus, RMT scholars are interested in studying the structure of SMOs, their place in the political system and factors that influence their success or failure. According to RMT, individuals are not irrational or psychologically deprived actors mobilized by grievance, but rather rational actors mobilized by incentives. Consequently, movements are not seen as irrational eruptions intended to ease psychological distress, but rather as rational and organized manifestations of collective actions that distribute resources. The main question of this approach is not why people mobilize, as was the case in the early theories, but rather

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2 Theoretical Debates and Novelties in the Study of Social Movements

how they do it (Goodwin et al., 2000). In other words, this approach focuses on the intermediary variables that translate individual discontent into organized contention. For RMT, society is not treated as a descriptive historical context. Rather, “society provides the infrastructure which social movement industries and other industries utilize. The aspects utilized include communication media and expense, levels of affluence, degree of access to institutional centers, preexisting networks, and occupational structure and growth” (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). RMT puts in the center of its analysis the SMO. The latter is defined as “a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals” (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). SMO mobilizes resources, such as money, expertise, access to publicity, social control, and consequently determine the course of collective action. Lacking resources themselves, SMOs are dependent on the donation of time and money of their members and on political power by external sponsors like foundations, organized labor, and the government (Zald and Ash,1966; McCarthy and Zald 1973). The political process model is the second theoretical tradition to encourage work on the organizational dynamics of collective action. Its theorists (Eisinger, 1973; Tilly,1978; McAdam,1982; Tarrow,1983;1994) criticize RMT because of the emphasis it puts on the role of the elite in determining the course of a social movement. Political process theorists contend that aggrieved groups are likely to mobilize, not when powerful sponsors decide to assist them, but rather when political opportunities are exploited by people within indigenous networks or organizations. Political opportunities and constraints are determined by the broader political context in which social movements are embedded. Thus, the “political opportunity structure” (Eisinger, 1973) is determined by a number of dimensions: the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, the stability of elite alignments that support a polity, the presence of elite allies, and state repression. Changes in some aspects of a political system might create new opportunities or constraints for collective action. This concept has been employed in numerous case studies to explain the emergence of movements or a “cycle of protest” (Tilly,1978). Regarding the indigenous organizations, scholarly works documented the critical role of informal, grassroots mobilizing structures in facilitating mobilization. The political process approach thus challenges RMT in two aspects. First, the protesters are rational actors exploiting opportunities to pursue their interests. They are not dependent on the

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external support. Second, in emphasizing the role of informal mobilizing structures, the political process model rejects the centrality of formal organizations in social movements (McAdam, 1982). In the late twentieth century, the study of social movements underwent a serious cultural turn (Jasper, 2007). However, the beginnings of this turn can already be traced in McAdam’s concept of “cognitive liberation” which he considered as the third factor in his formulation of the political process theory. This term refers to “the process by which members of some aggrieved group fashion the specific combination of shared understandings that are thought to undergird emergent collective action” (McAdam,1982). Since the other two factors; the expanding political opportunities and the indigenous organizations, are more of structural components of the model, they only create a structural potential for collective action. It is only through cognitive liberation that this potential becomes real action. Indeed, “mediating between opportunity and action are people and the subjective meanings they attach to their situations” (McAdam, 1982). McAdam’s discussion of the importance of cognitive liberation as a precondition for mobilization was at that time the most explicit acknowledgment of the importance of ideas within the political process model. At the same time, European scholars introduced the term of “new social movements” to discuss cultural processes in social movements. New social movement theorists argued that as a result of the increasing penetration of technocratic power into all spheres of life, movements attempt to create or preserve spaces of autonomy rather than they seek material economic gain or greater participation in the system. In other words, these theorists view resistance mainly in terms of challenges to ideational codes (Goodwin et al., 2000). Against this backdrop, a new theoretical perspective emerged, calling for the necessity for “bringing culture back in”. It was the centrality of the cultural elements that marked the new social movements as discontinuous with the past. The new stream of works showed the growing discontent among movement scholars over how little significance the RMT attached to ideas and sentiments. It called for further attention to the role of ideas or culture in the emergence and development of social movements and revolutions. If the combination of political opportunities and mobilizing structures affords groups a certain structural potential for action, they remain, in the absence of the cognitive factor, insufficient to account for collective action. In other words, the shared cognitive meanings that people bring to their situation mediate between opportunity, organization, and action (McAdam,1982). New concepts asserting the key role of the cognitive and ideational dimensions of collective action emerged, which helped the scholars to understand the cultural

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dimensions of social movements. For instance, the concept of “collective identity” is considered an important factor for mobilization (Poletta and Jasper, 2001). “Narratives” is another concept that became popular in cultural studies (Kane, 2001). It assumes that cultural meaning always comes “packaged as stories”. “Discourses” also became a popular term for the development of cultural meanings. Yet, it is David Snow’s (2007) concept of “frames” that became the most significant. Frames were defined as “the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam et al., 1996, p. 6). In 1996, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald considered framing processes, political opportunities and mobilizing structures as the three building blocks of their new synthesis that could answer the questions about social movements. They emphasized the importance of these three broad sets of factors in analyzing social movement dynamics, as well as the emergence, development and decline of the latter. While they gave importance to the structure of political opportunity and constraints confronting the movement, as well as the forms of organization (informal and formal) available to insurgents, they emphasized the prominence of the collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action.

2.1.2

Microstructural and Social-Psychological Approaches (Sociology of Emotions)

Although the new synthesis of McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) was an important step towards understanding social movement dynamics, this model still denied the importance of the psychological aspect in collective action. Culture influenced (potential) activists by reshaping their understandings, not by stimulating their emotions. Emotions were only implicitly recognized in some structural and cultural concepts, such as “collective identity” (Tilly, 1978) and “cognitive liberation” (McAdam, 1982) and were partly integrated in the cultural framing process. Klandermans (1987) was among the first to observe that grievances are necessary but not sufficient conditions for participation in social movements and proposed social psychological mechanisms that do add sufficient explanation. He argues that there is much more available in social psychology than relative deprivation. In the late 1990s, a new line of research (e.g. Goodwin et al., 2000; Polletta and Jasper, 2001; Gould, 2001) sought to integrate collective psychology and social movement theory, arguing that “just as it is difficult to understand

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political action without addressing its cultural dimensions, so it is almost impossible to understand culture without including its emotional components” (Jasper, 2007, p. 85). The new approach was called “emotional sociology” by Goodwin and Pfaff (2001). By this term they mean a “sociology that recognizes the ubiquity of emotions, moods, and affect in social life and which treats emotions as potential causal mechanisms, or components of such mechanisms, and not simply as epiphenomena or defendant variables. [..] we believe that most of the key causal factors as social networks, grievances, collective identities, cultural frames and ideologies, even shifting political opportunity structures derive much of their causal power from the strong emotions that they embody or evoke among actors” (Goodwin and Pfaff, 2001, p. 283). The new focal point was the “psychology of contention” (Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2017). Social psychology is interested in how the social context influences an individual’s behavior. The prototypical social psychological question related to collective action is that of why some individuals participate in SM while others don’t and why some individuals decide to quit while others stay involved. The answers to these questions are given in terms of typical psychological processes. In other words, identity, cognition, emotions, and motivations are presented as the processes at the individual level that link collective identity and collective action. Like structuralist and cultural approaches, the new approach highlights the rationality of movement participants. Yet, the main difference between all the previous approaches, including the classical approach and the emerging school is that the latter does not approve the dichotomy between reason and emotions. According to the new approach, individuals are not driven by instrumental logic and calculations of costs and benefits of participation, but rather mobilized by emotions such as passion, pride, and anger (Goodwin et al., 2004). Emotional sociology scholarship can be divided into four broad research lines: The first research venue is interested in the mapping of emotions. Differentiating between urges, reflex emotions, affects, moods and moral emotions, this research line explores how different types of emotions affect political individuals’ ends and means (Goodwin et al., 2004; Jasper 2007; Steckelenburg and Klandermans, 2017). Goodwin et al. (2004) explain the different types of emotions. They demonstrate that there are precisely six reflex emotions: fear, surprise, anger, distrust, joy, and sadness. Reflex emotions arise immediately and involuntarily without cognitive processing. Reflex emotions are however not irrational and can rather be analyzed as strategic tools. For example, the fear of police violence is a strategy to eliminate protest, the anger of politicians leading to repression might

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undermine their legitimacy, etc. Contrarily to immediate reflex emotions, affective emotions, such as love, hate, respect, and trust, are longer-term emotions that people have toward other people, places, things, and ideas. Affects “are the reason we bother to participate in movements at all rather than sit on the sidelines” (Goodwin et al., 2004, p. 418). Social movements not only seek to create an identity for themselves, but they also seek to create affective bonds between their members. Identification, admiration, and trust in leaders are central affective emotions which affect organizational processes such as decision-making, coherence or factionalism. In other words, affective bonds define these networks. People have emotions towards each other that can range from trust to hostility. In this regard, they suggested that emotions can trigger two contradictory actions. The same emotion can weaken as well as strengthen a movement. For example, strong affective ties might strengthen solidarity between members, but they can also alienate other members who do not share them. Affective bonds can boost the internal coherence and participation of a group, but it can also motivate members’ disaffiliation and schisms (Goodwin and Jasper, 2006). Moods are “transportable emotions” that are carried from a situation to another. Movement organization creates specific emotional climates or moods depending on a number of factors. The identity of their potential participants, the cultural materials available, and the context in which they operate matter. For instance, if a movement targets traumatized groups, it would try to create a supportive mood. A movement in a highly repressive situation would not arouse in participants a feeling of hope or optimism but would rather arouse a mood of dignity and the courage to act. Moods depend also on the existence or absence of “cultures of resistance” and religious traditions encouraging resistance or rather accommodation (Jasper, 2007). Moral emotions are at the core of mobilization. They are complex moral and cognitive understandings. They are “our stances and reactions to the world that express how it matters for us. To some extent they are cognitive evaluations, but typically with psychological components.” (Jasper, 2007, p. 80). Jasper(2007) identifies three central moral emotions: moral shocks, deontological pride, and blame. He suggested that social movement organizers frequently seek expanding public compassion, building a case for pain, victimhood, and blame. Compassion is “a complex cultural feeling especially important to those altruistic movements with little overlap between activists and beneficiaries” (Goodwin et al., 2007, p. 422). Blame arouses outrage and indignation: “not only do we pity victims, we identify a perpetrator responsible for their suffering” (Jasper, 2007, p. 85). Indignation in its turn is a component of “moral shocks”, which are emotional

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responses to perceived injustice, that often lead individuals to reach out to protest groups. Acting morally is also accompanied by several emotions that are directly satisfying. “We feel pride when we follow what we think is moral, and we feel shame or guilt when we do not” (Goodwin et al., 2007; Jasper, 2007). This explains why movement organizations seek to create and reinforce moral emotions through narratives and discourses. Emotions are also “raw materials” for mobilization. Emotions which arise in individuals outside of movements are resources for movement’s existence at the first place. Goodwin and Jasper (2006), Traïni (2009) and Sommier (2010) consider emotions as causes and not merely as effects of mobilization. In this respect, they distinguish between active “protest emotions”, like anger, outrage, and pride which stimulate protest, and other “passive emotions” like shame and fear which stifle mobilization. “Emotional states that are dominant and active, such as outrage, anger, and excitement, are better spurs to political action than those that are vulnerable and passive, such as sadness” (Jasper, 2007, p. 87). Emotions can have contradictory effects on mobilization. For instance, pleasure, which arises from “the joy of collective activities, or “collective effervescence”, when pleasure is accompanied by pride it can motivate protest, even when success seems impossible. However, the pleasure of participation in collective action can also trigger “burnout” when accompanied by frustration, disappointment and fatigue. Other moral emotions, such as blame and moral shocks, are crucial to collective action. They either accelerate it, when outrage and indignation are engendered, or hinder it when sadness or denial is the outcome. Blame for instance can engender indignation, if people believe that the suffering could have been avoided by an individual or group. If suffering is framed as an act of God or nature, people are more likely to become sad, which is a hardly mobilizing mood (Goodwin and Jasper, 2006). The second research line is interested in emotions in movement’s internal dynamics. Emotions permeate protest at all stages: recruitment, sustained participation, and dropping out (Jasper, 1998). For instance, Steckelenburg and Klandermans (2007) focus on the participation of individuals in social movements. Their main question is: “why do some participate while others do not?” According to their model, participation in social movements is explained by a complex social psychological process, where an individual’s social identity, cognition, and emotions interact to shape one’s motivation. Motivation turns into real (collective) action when an identification of one’s motivations with the motivations of a group occurs (group identification). Thus “collective identity” forms. Collective identity and collective action are in constant interaction (see model in Klandermans, 2007, p. 161).

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Other studies were particularly interested in the role of emotions in recruitment. Movement recruiter’s role is to transform deactivating emotions into activating ones (Goodwin and Jasper, 2006). Many studies focused on the role of emotional identification in mobilization, challenging thus the political process theories which highlighted the importance of social networks in recruitment. According to these studies, people might develop emotional identification, leading them to join an organization in which they do not know anyone. For instance, Nepstad and Smith (2001) consider moral outrage as a driving force in the Central America peace movement of the 1980 s. They indicate that moral outrage is an emotional response of the American religious community to information about human rights abuses in Central America. The experience of outrage is the result of “an interactive process of information, culture, organizational and relational ties, and identity” (Nepstad and Smith, 2001, p. 159). In addition to moral outrage, the sharing of a collective religious identity was crucial in building strong social ties, affection and solidarity between the American religious community and the Central American Christians. This reveals how emotional and passionate commitment is crucial in high-risk activism, a process that cannot be explained by structural approaches. Some researchers further suggest that there are movements that are only based on emotional identification, such as “victim mobilization”. In victim mobilization, victimhood and private emotions of grief are sufficient to produce group mobilization. In a study about the mobilization of the relatives of collective action victims in France following two incidents in 1947 and 1991, Vilain and Lemieux (1998) highlight the specificity of these mobilized groups: the claiming-groups’ members have neither pre-existent relationships nor share socio-economic interests. These mobilizing groups are born of circumstances, or what the authors of the article called “groupe circonstanciel” (groups from circumstances). Although the constitution of this type of mobilized groups is only based on shared individual suffering, it can influence the legal and political sphere. Similarly, Walgrave and Verhulst (2006) analyze victim mobilization in different states. Their findings suggested the existence of a new type of social movement and mobilization, that they named “new emotional movements”. According to them, this kind of movements is triggered by random violence and is characterized by the central role of emotions and victimization in the mobilization and development of the movement. Thus, the victim identification process is a necessary condition for mobilization. In “new emotional movements” victimhood and the emotions created through the identification process are a necessary condition for the mobilization as they give the movement legitimacy and a public voice. New emotional movements can take two divergent tracks of development,

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displaying different organizational features depending on the type of the main emotion that triggers the mobilization and the role of victims in the mobilization process. In the identity-oriented variant, compassion is the main mobilizing emotion, the victims themselves are the movement’s leaders, there are no clear demands and, as a result, elite support and media support is general. In the instrumental variant, fear is the main mobilizing emotion and friends, or sympathizers are the leaders. Consequently, there are clear demands with the aim of preventing these things from happening again, and thus elite support is partisan because mostly the issue at stake is controversial. Less studies were interested in the role of emotions in activist’s disengagement process. In this respect, some scholars suggest that disengagement especially in high-risk and exclusive social movements is quite hard, since the psychological and material costs of disengagement are high (Sommier, 2010; Fillieule, 2015). Others, point out to the psychological fatigue, or “activist burnout” as a reason for disengagement. The “activist burnout” is defined as a “stress reaction, which refers to the loss of motivation, cynicism and depersonalization. Burnout is most frequently observed among the volunteers motivated by an ideal and whose commitment is based on unrealistic expectations” (Klandermans, 2005, p. 104). Bennani-Chraïbi and Fillieule (2003) indicate that individual disengagement and burn-out in repressive context are related to the legitimacy of the cause, as well as the sympathy that protestors as able to gain inside and outside of the country: “the consequences of repression in the short and medium term, also vary depending on the amount of sympathy that victims are able to gain inside and outside of the country. This capital depends on the degree of legitimacy of the cause, as well as the interest or disinterest that it arouses” (p. 84). Other scholars link disengagement to the emotion of political discontent that individuals experience, and which affects their strategies. Bajoit (1988) proposes that this emotional state of political discontent leads individuals either to “exit” or to “stay”. If individuals chose to stay, they either decide to protest or to retreat. There are two possible types of retreat: active retreat (loyalty), or passive retreat (apathy). In this regard, political regimes, particularly dictatorships, whose legitimacy is challenged, are sometimes unable to gain citizen’s loyalty neither to tolerate their apathy. Thus, individuals are encouraged to express their dissatisfaction by leaving the country (forced or voluntary exile). However, if loyalty as well as exile appear more difficult, individuals take refuge in “interior exile” (apathy), and eventually protest, when state repression becomes moderate. Exit can be also expressed through illegal immigration, commitment to external conflicts, participation in organized opposition supported by a foreign actor, retreat from any political activity, or even suicide (Bennani-Chraïbi and Fillieule, 2003).

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The third bundle of research in emotion sociology focuses on the role of emotions in the internal functioning of political groups (emotions as strategies). This research line focuses on the effect of emotions on the internal dynamics of a group, suggesting that emotions influence members’ interaction on three levels: with potential recruits, with one another, and with their leaders (Jasper and Goodwin 2006). Emotions are not only raw materials necessary for the emergence, recruitment or sustainment of engagement but are also movement strategies for forging and maintaining loyalty and collective identity in groups. Emotions are shaped, managed, transformed, and displayed within protest groups. Emotions affect the framing of causes, and the narratives of activists. In this respect, several scholars analyze the “emotion management”1 , which occurs within social movements and during contentious interactions with their opponents. Some scholars suggest that managing emotions is particularly important for recruiting members and for sustaining participants’ engagement. For instance, Goodwin and Pfaff (2001) argue that the management of fear is of particular importance in high-risk activism: fear must be relatively suppressed so that collective action becomes possible. Analyzing the management of fear in two high-risk movements; the U.S civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s and the East German civic movement of the late 1980s, Goodwin and Pfaff (2001) identified a number of “encouragement mechanisms” which served to mitigate fear in these movements. Among these mechanisms are for example the intimate social networks, the strong identification of activists with the movement, the shaming of individuals who do not participate in protest events, the procession of firearms, and divine protection. Similarly, Whittier (2001) deals with the emotion management and emotional display in the movement against child sexual abuse, suggesting that context shapes activists’ display of oppositional emotions: “Individual feelings, movement interpretative processes, the influences of allied and opposed social movements, and the state and other institutions all influence each other. Together, they shape movement’s construction and display of oppositional emotions” (p. 250). Some studies also integrate emotions in collective identity studies. For example, Polletta (2006) explores storytelling by women seeking gender equality in American courts. She analyzes the effect of victims’ narratives and storytelling 1

“Emotion management” or “emotional labor” is a concept introduced by Hochschild (1983) suggesting that individuals in their social interactions manage their emotions, whether by suppressing or inducting them, “in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others”. (1983, p. 7) The management of emotions can be both, conscious and instrument, or an unintended result of social interactions. Emotion sociologist applied this concept to a collective level.

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on the mobilization process. She suggests that stories not only foster emotional identification but can also discourage it “if told the wrong way.” She indicates that storytelling, particularly that of victims, not only affects the recruitment phase, but also produces new conceptions and practices during the mobilization. The fourth bundle of research in emotion sociology focuses on the emotional dynamics that arise from the interactions and conflicts among political groups and group participants. In this respect, some studies examine the emotional dynamics of protest. The hypothesis that underlies these studies is that moral emotions accompany collective action, such as moral shocks, deontological pride or the opposite the fear of doing the wrong thing. “We may fear public punishment for transgression, or we may fear internal punishment such as guilt or shame. [..] we may fear for our reputations among various relevant audiences” (Jasper, 2007). Other emotions underlie collective actions, such as hope, revenge formed out of hatred, and indignation. Blame is a moral and emotional concept crucial to collective action. Contrarily to the abovementioned studies focusing on the role of recruiters in transforming the emotions of potential protestors into action, this research line suggests that emotions are sometimes strong enough to the extent that individuals seek out for a protest organization or even form one on their own. Emotions that are associated with protest include anger, outrage, feeling of betrayal and the fear from perceived threats. These emotions can play a determining role in the emergence of activism. For instance, Gould (2001) shows how shame, fear, pride, grief, indignation, and anger shaped lesbian and gay responses to the AIDS epidemic. A shift in the “community emotion culture” and rhetoric about the AIDS crisis occurred as a result of the Hardwick decisions, announced in 1986, and which were perceived as a moral shock by the homosexual community. This event was a turning point, leading to a transformation in the latter’s political responses to AIDS. In response to this event, new militance grew, and emotions such as anger and hostility toward the government, the fear of death, and self-respect replaced emotions such as shame, fear of social rejection, and tranquil nobility in the face of death and government negligence. As a result, confrontational AIDS activism replaced community-based activism. This demonstrates that at the micro sociological-level, emotions are crucial determinants for political mobilization. Furthermore, some studies in this research line contribute to the debated relationship between repression and mobilization; the repression-mobilization nexus. Instead of thinking of repression as a cost; a logic in academic works that adopt the rational choice theory, the new approach integrates emotions, as well as the emotional responses to events and information, especially towards state repression (Kurzman,1996). Adding emotions to the analyses of repression’s effect on

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mobilization helps explaining why sometimes repression leads to growing mobilization, and in other cases deteriorates it. Again, the concept of moral shocks helps to explain why collective protest accelerates despite and because of repression. A moral shock refers to “the emotions involved in responses to perceived injustice. When we learn or experience something that suggests the world is not morally as it seems, our indignation has a strong visceral aspect. We feel betrayed by the world as well as by other people” (Jasper, 2007). In repressive regimes, the experience of police brutality is a transformative event for individuals, since it stimulates moral shocks engendering emotions such anger and indignation that function as revolutionary accelerators (Reed, 2004). The concepts of moral shocks and transformative events elaborate the emotional responses to specific events and information, and how emotional responses can prepare people to action. For instance, Brockett (1993) argues that the murder of relatives or of friends, promotes the mobilization of individuals hitherto passive. This is the same assumption made by Khawaja (1993) who ensures that the violation of social norms, such as dignity and honor that have cultural significance in the Arab world, may provoke individuals, leading them to join a protest movement. Gurr (1970) demonstrates that the state’s threat or use of negative sanctions can produce three different effects on collective action according to the emotions that repression engenders. The first scenario, he argues, is that imposed sanctions, or the threat of sanctions engender anger, and thus increase collective mobilization. The more severe the unjustified sanctions, the greater the extent of protest and violence. In other words, the first scenario is a positive linear relationship between repression and mobilization: a high level of state repression leads to a high level of challenger’s mobilization, since sanctions anger people (Gurr,1970). The second scenario, suggested by Gurr is that mild sanctions prevent collective protest in the short run, since they generate little anger. Severe sanctions generate intense anger, but fear of the sanctioned acts deters collective protest. In the case of the experience or anticipation of sanctions of intermediate severity, anger is likely to outweigh fear, and collective violence is expected. The third scenario is that violent sanctions (killing and injuring) is likely to be more immediately feared than non-violent sanctions (judicial processes). Intermediate levels of repression increase anger and hence the opposition of dissidents (Gurr, 1970; 2015). Similarly, Opp and Roehl (1990) argue that social and moral incentives determine the dynamics of the micro-mobilization process and the emotions produced by repression that either escalate or deter mobilization.

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In sum, some of the new concepts introduced by the emotion sociological approach fill the gaps in existing theories on social movements by highlighting previously unaddressed issues, or by complementing some of the existing explanations. Other concepts -however- challenge the explanations of previous theories. The research line defining and classifying emotions highlights the cultural approach to emotions without denying their physiological character. In doing this, it challenges the rationalist tradition of “cost and benefits”. Furthermore, the scholarship on emotions indicates that anger, indignation, fear, or a sense of moral obligation precede protest, challenging McAdams’s concept of cognitive liberation. It also adds to the debated repression-mobilization nexus by confirming that protest is not a simple calculation of the probabilities of success, or the costs and benefits (Polletta and Amenta 2001). Other emotion scholars also challenge the political process model, showing that mobilization does not depend neither on political opportunities, nor on prior networks (Nepstad and Smith, 2001), but rather on moral shocks and outrage, which make “a person [..] inclined toward political action, with or without the network of personal contacts” (Jasper, 1997, p. 106). Again, the concept of moral shock challenges the political process theories, contending that moral shocks can -contrarily to the opportunity structure modelaccelerate protest even when the political opportunity structure is closed (Gould, 2001). In addition, emotion scholars have highlighted that information is not enough for mobilization. Sympathy, emotional identification, movement framing and emotional display of a movement are all indispensable for mobilization (Nepstad and Smith, 2001; Whittier, 2001;Young, 2001). In addition to these theoretical challenges to the existing theories, the return of emotions and the microstructural approach it has adopted had further consequences. Analytically, this research line was interested in the micro-dynamics, i.e. individuals’ behavior and their life course that underlie collective action. This led to the emergence of literature on the biographical consequences of engagement, collective identity, collective memoirs, narratives, identification, engagement, and disengagement processes. Methodologically, the study of emotions paved the way for a “relational turn” and a “micro-interactionist framework” in the study of collective action. Dissatisfied by the classical “movement-centric” approaches, the emerging approaches focus on individuals as the center of analysis. Among the emerging approaches are the “interactionist approach” emphasizing the interplay between the macro-, meso-, and micro- dynamics in collective action (Fillileule 2012, Polletta 1998); the “strategic action fields” referring to the theory of fields elaborated by Pierre

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Bourdieu (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011); and the “strategic interaction perspective” focusing on the strategic dimensions of social movements (Jasper and Duyvendak, 2015).

2.2

Schism and Factionalism

Social movement theorists were interested in the reasons for movement growth, decline, and change/ transformation. In this respect, factionalism was addressed as a reason for SM and SMO decline, since it was considered as a sign of schism and splintering. In fact, the classical model, or the so-called Weber-Michels model associates movement decline to changes in goals and in structure. It suggests that the goals become more conservative and shift to organizational maintenance, and the structure becomes centralized, leading to oligarchization. Both processes-conservatism and oligarchization- increase apathy among members and lead to movement failure (Weber, 1946; Michels, 1925). The resource mobilization approach challenges the “iron laws” of oligarchy and conservatism and suggests that there are a variety of other transformation processes that might take place in SMs and SMOs (Zald and Ash 1966; 1987). These include coalitions with other organizations, organizational disappearances, factional splits, and increased radicalism rather than conservatism. The resource mobilization approach emphasizes the external variables’ effect on movement transformation. The emphasis on the external factors is sought to correct the inaccuracy of the classical model. Resource mobilization theorists suggest that while an organization adapts to its environment, it may require changes in goals and changes in the internal arrangement of the organization itself (Zald and Ash, 1966). Indeed, like McCarthy and Zald (1977) denote: “In accounting for a movement’s successes and failures there is an explicit recognition of the crucial importance of involvement on the part of individuals and organizations from outside the collectivity which a social movement represents.” According to Oberschall (1993), social movement decline can be triggered by internal weakness, state repression or movement success. Internal weakness stems from increased radicalism, factionalism, and weak mobilization capabilities. State repression leads to a significant withdrawal of external sponsors’ support and of media attention. Success is an institutionalization process, in which the social movement loses its movement character and becomes a pressure group (Oberschall, 1993).

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From a political process model perspective, movement decline is the last phase in a protest cycle. This model emphasizes the interplay between both internal and external processes in shaping the movement’s development or decline. The causes of decline vary. “Some movements are repressed successfully. Some fall apart because their resources disappear, the cost of participation becomes too high, or internal bickering splits them into competing factions” (Freeman, 1983, p. 277). Similarly, McAdam (1983) considers factionalism as a cause of movement decline. Miller (1983) agrees that factionalism is a cause of decline. However, he argues that factionalism can also be brought by success as well as failure, which, in addition to cooptation and repression, are both causes for movement or movement organization decline. He maintains that “if a movement fails, it fails; but even if it succeeds, it may fail” (p. 282). A successful organization grows and is prone to fissures between its new recruits and old members. “The price of immediate success sometimes is long-term failure” (Miller, 1983, p. 282). While most studies have considered SMO factionalism as a form of failure and decline, Miller (1983) suggests that factionalism can also be the result of success, which is a reason for movement decline. Yet, Balser (1997) questions the deterministic association between factionalism and organizational decline. She suggests that there are different trajectories of factionalized SMOs. Organizational failure, success, continued conflict, and maintenance are all possible organizational outcomes of factionalism. Factionalism and even schism are also sometimes necessary for organizational maintenance. Since many social movement theorists consider factionalism as one of many reasons for SM decline, factionalism itself as a process has received little attention. In general, studies on factionalism focused either on internal or external factors causing factionalism, without denying the importance of the other category. Some studies also tend to combine both factors in an attempt to develop a more comprehensive theory. In all studies, the effect of repression on factionalism is accentuated.

2.2.1

The Effect of Internal Organizational Factors on Factionalism

Several studies approach factionalism within SMOs as an internal response to an internal problem. According to this perspective, internal organizational factors are the main causes of factionalism and schism. For instance, some studies suggest that the structure of organizations (exclusive/inclusive) is related to the propensity

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of factionalism. Exclusive organizations are more likely to be affected by factionalism and schism than inclusive organizations. The latter have looser criteria of affiliation, reveal less doctrinal rigidity and are therefore more resistant to splits than exclusive organizations. Although exclusive organizations are more likely to experience splits and breakaways, splintering leads -at least for some time- to higher internal consistency and consensus. Contrarily, inclusive organizations are more schism resistant, but are internally destabilized: the preservation of internal factions and dissensions weakens their capacity for concerted action (Zald and Ash,1966). Other studies suggest that exclusive social movements are less likely to experience factionalism or disengagements. This is explained by the psychological barriers and material cost of disengagement: disengaging from exclusive organizations, especially in the case of high-risk activism, is rendered unlikely because of the activists’ material dependence on the organization, the high degree of socialization and the intensity of the social ties within the group. This makes activists increasingly isolated from the outside world, as they withdraw from social relations outside of the group. The absence of alternative networks and identity outside the group increases the emotional attachment to it (Sommier 2010; Fillieule, 2015). The leadership structure within a SMO is also considered as an important feature determining the likelihood of factional struggles. Several social movement scholars illustrate that organizations and movements with a factionalized leadership structure are more prone to organizational splits, than those with a unified leadership. This hypothesis is contradicting with the argument made in studies of political parties which assumes that the formation of factions in parties does not destabilize the party. Instead, it is an effective means of expanding the support base, enhancing the party’s mobility and its tactical flexibility. In political parties the existence of formal factions and factional leadership is a rational and beneficial necessity for securing the political gain rather than a sign of inevitable group schism (Park, 2001). In social movement organizations, however, a factionalized leadership structure increases the cost of maintaining organizational integrity significantly, and it is more likely that splits occur. “Organizations that have a factional leadership are much more likely to breakup” (Asal et al., 2012). Furthermore, Gamson (1975) argues that centralized organizational authority is more capable of controlling and managing organizational conflict and thus less likely to enhance organizational factionalism and splintering than a structure in which power is dispersed among the membership or subgroups. Similarly, Miller (1983) and Balser (1997) assert

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that the decentralization of institutional authority and of the decision-making processes might cause factionalism. In other words, groups with a single center of power are less likely to experience schisms. Miller (1983) argues that SMOs lack effective conflict management because of their inclination towards the expansion of member’s participation in the decisionmaking process. Thus, as membership grows, conflict grows, and the structure becomes unable to hold the conflicting factions together. Hence, SMO’s survival depends on adjusting its structure to its changing size. Asal et al. (2012) also suggest that organizations with a factionalized leadership structure are much more likely to split than organizations with a hierarchical and centralized leadership structure: even in cohesive organizations, factional and competing leadership allow for a plurality of potentially competing opinions, objectives, and priorities, and thus influence the tendency for these organizations to split under external stress. A change in the leadership style can also trigger SMO splintering. According to Zald and Ash (1966), the routinization of charisma is likely to conservatize the dominant core of a SMO while simultaneously producing increasingly radical splinter groups. Organizational heterogeneity is also an internal precondition for SMO split. The propensity for splintering is related to the ideological discordance within a group in two ways: First, divergent ideological strains can divide or even destroy movement organizations (Clément, 2009). Second, the centrality of ideology in a group affects the possibility of an internal factionalism. Ideological concerns, i.e., concerns with doctrinal purity, can lead to questioning the bases of organizational authority and the behavior of the leadership. The more the group’s ideology leads to a questioning of the doctrinal bases of authority, the greater the likelihood of factionalism and schism. In other words, the more a movement is concerned with theoretical matters and the “ultimate ideological truth”, the more likely it splits. Splits are less likely to occur in SMOs preoccupied with socio-economic issues (Zald and Ash 1966). In addition to ideological fissures, contending camps, factions, and leaders often dispute leadership styles, organizational power, local “rules of the game”, access to resources, action plans, strategies, and coalitional tactics. Beyond these explicit fissures, actors sometimes dispute the deeper symbolic meanings and practices of political values (Mische, 2015). Organizational cohesion is also related to the make-up of its social base. The heterogeneity of an organization’s social base is a major internal precondition for SMO factionalism and splits. Divergencies can be class-, demographic-, ethnicor generation-related (Gusfield, 1957; Zald and Ash, 1966; Ross, 1983; Clément 2009; Miller 1983). However, Zald and Ash (1966) suggest that the heterogeneity

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of a SMO’s social base does not cause factionalism itself. Rather, the possibility of factionalism is determined by the heterogeneity combined with the chances of attaining SMOs’ goals in the short term. The relationship between factionalism and the chances of attaining goals is curvilinear: The lover the short-run chances of attaining power, the more solidarity incentives act to hold subgroups (ethnic, class, generational) together. As a movement organization approaches gaining power, latent conflicts over means, ends, and the future distribution of power, which have been previously suppressed, rise to the fore, and factionalism becomes more likely (Zald and Ash, 1966). In other words, the biggest problems brought by success are the threats of factionalism and abortion (Miller, 1983). These threats usually affect a movement organization before it attains its goal and its demands are realized. For instance, a growing organization can encourage factional splits, as a result of increasing divergence between new recruits and older members. For instance, Ross (1983) emphasizes that the formation of “movement generations” within SMOs increases the likelihood of factionalism. According to his definition, a movement generation is a cohort of new recruits who develop an esprit de corps and morale, which is a sense of common identity and discipline. Ross (1983) proposes that personal relationships, in the form of clique and friendship networks, contribute significantly to the formation of movement generations. Generational consciousness is negatively related to the degree of integration of new movement generations in the groups they join. Therefore, movement generations are potential carriers of change in a social movement. A turbulent period with a swift pace of events may produce more rapidly discontinuous waves of new movement generations. These discontinuous waves of movement generations create internal change or factionalism (Ross, 1983). Although most SMOs experience internal frictions caused by political, ideological, or generational cleavages, or on ends and means, the real cause of factionalism is the organization’s poor internal conflict management (Miller, 1983). Factionalism and schism occur when the organization’s members do not agree over key issues like the organization’s goals and means, mostly established by the leadership (Gates, 2002), and are not able to engage in real negotiations with dissidents leading to breakaways. Coser (1956) points out that the severity of internal conflict is positively related to the silencing of internal dissent. Among the key issues that disrupt internal unity is the distribution of power and rewards within the organization. Gusfield (1957) links the distribution of power to generational issues. He argues that factionalism and schisms are the result of the conflict between agegroups over the distribution of power, prestige, and income. This conflict results

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in a certain “age-grade hierarchy”, which is significant for organizational instability. He distinguishes between two trends inside groups: “conviction oriented old-guard” and “public oriented” members. The conviction oriented old guard is inclined towards the continuance of established tactics and goals instead of policy adaptations. This generation acquires several sources of “generation power” which enable them to retain control over the organization and maintain their positions of power despite their tactical rigidity. This organizational oligarchization becomes possible through tenure and incumbency traditions and façade adaptations, which permit new personnel to fill key posts without disturbing the value positions of the incumbents. Organizational change becomes possible mainly through the death and illness of the old guard, or through splintering. When factionalism occurs, it may lead to organizational failure and decline, since resources are channeled into the internal dispute rather than toward pressing the SMO’s demands. In addition, organizations that experience factionalism discourage potential supporters and are less likely to win acceptance by others as a legitimate voice for their issues (Gamson, 1975).

2.2.2

Environmental Facilitators of Factionalism and Schisms

Some studies criticize the focus on internal deficits in explaining social movement factionalism and schism. According to this perspective, it is equally crucial to consider the influence of movements’ external circumstances on the likelihood of internal factional conflicts and splits. In other words, factionalism cannot be analyzed in isolation of its context, since contentious social movements and groups are affected by the environment they are embedded in. Although sharp conflicts over ideology, goals, priorities, strategies, political styles, as well as personal rivalries among leaders within movement organizations are not rare, Rucht (2007) suggests that a sense of solidarity usually outweighs potential internal dissent. However, environmental conditions have a profound impact on the extent, kind, and outcome of internal conflicts. Similarly, Balser indicates that “environmental factors may not directly cause schism, but they introduce constraints and contingencies, either creating or exacerbating internal conflict” (1997, p. 201). Among the external determinants for internal schisms are the society, the culture, and the political system in which social movements operate. Since social movements depend on external factors for resources, their context can impose constraints by defining their success, setting cultural expectations, influencing the internal power distribution, and thus creating internal frictions (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).

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Balser (1997) suggests that there are four external categories which interact with SMO’s internal structure, facilitate intraorganizational conflict and lead to factionalism. These categories define the political opportunity structure, particularly the political access of a group, social control mechanisms, external resources, and relationships with other organizations. As the political opportunity structure becomes more closed, a SMO reevaluates its strategy and tactics. Differing opinions are likely to emerge, and conflict can arise and might lead to schism. As opportunities expand, SMO members must decide how to react, creating the potential for conflict to occur. For instance, an increasing degree of responsiveness of the political system to the group’s demands, and thus an opening in the political opportunity structure can also facilitate internal conflict, since it engenders a decrease in the role of the SMO in public affairs. In other words, a relative success can engender factionalism. Asal et al. (2012) focus on organizational legality as a measure of access to political opportunities. Lacking legality means compromised rights, a lack of protection, and prohibition against openly obtaining material and human resources. In addition, illegal organizations are likely to face heightened state repression, which could trigger factionalism and challenge organizational development and maintenance. Balser (1997) also highlights the role of influential allies in internal conflict. Allies can motivate challengers to engage in protest activity. They can also influence the organization’s choice of tactics and strategies. Unstable political alignments, also trigger conflict within SMOs, as the latter might question their tactics and strategies. Since organizations depend on their external relationships with other entities for critical resources (McCarthy and Zald, 1977), the access to external resources by competing factions affects the organization’s factionalism. In the competition for organizational power, when a faction within an organization acquires more resources than its contending faction, internal conflict is exacerbated (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Balser, 1993). External support is an important aspect, particularly for ethnoreligious and ethnopolitical organizations’ survival and growth. The groups are sponsored by states as well as nonstate entities such as diaspora, refugees, advocacy groups, and other non-state entities. These actors are important financial providers as well as providers for human resources to ethnopolitical groups. However, the groups’ dependence on external support can also lead to factionalism. External entities’ ability to control the allocation and usage of an organization’s resources is a form of external control that may facilitate factionalism, through at least two mechanisms (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). A faction within an organization may

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gain more power than another faction by interacting with external support groups, which leads to shifts in organizational power, intraorganizational competition and internal conflict. Additionally, there might be an alignment of goals between external support groups and ethnopolitical groups, which could produce tension. The more the numbers of external resource providers, the greater the propensity of organizational conflict and factionalism (Asal et al., 2012). From a strategic perspective, external actors who are pursuing their interests play a role in factional battles. Among these actors are the police, government agencies, other movement groups, and the media. These external actors usually push movement groups into making certain choices that divide group members. Movement groups cannot avoid potential divisive internal conflicts since external actors’ actions are difficult to anticipate (Polletta and Kretschmer, 2015). The government sometimes brings into play cooptation strategies: when movement leaders are offered rewards that advance them as individuals while ignoring the collective goals of the movement, conflicts erupt, and the propensity of factionalism and decline rises (Miller, 1983). The state can also affect internal dynamics by enforcing social control mechanisms. These range from repression to channeling and infiltration. Repression might be the most rapid strategy for triggering factionalism, but it puts the state’s legitimacy at stake. Institutional channeling is equally powerful in creating a debate around the tactics and strategy used by organizations and therefore is influential in facilitating internal conflicts in SMOs. Channeling takes for example the form of providing resources to an organization. The decision to accept these resources is often a source of conflict. Institutional channeling is thus equally powerful in facilitating internal conflict in SMOs. Infiltration by outside organizations also accelerates the conflict between factions over ideological beliefs and tactics, and engenders suspicion and tension. It is thus a source of internal conflict and schism (Balser, 1997). Media can also influence internal fissures. According to Polletta and Kretschmer (2015), the media covers the strategic choices of movement groups, including choices that can create sharp conflict. Group members’ statements in the press can alienate other members, allies, funders, and providers of legal support. In addition, government agencies’ actions may create conflict both by reinforcing a certain group within an organization that did not have much power in the past and by confronting movement groups with difficult and divisive strategic choices. “Agents provocateurs” sent by the government can deepen a gap between moderates and radicals within a movement organization (Rucht, 2007).

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Other movements have an impact on internal conflicts in a group through their disengaged members. When a group recruits members from other movement groups, these new members may bring along values that are foreign or undesirable to the original group members, contributing thus to factionalism (Polletta and Kretschmer, 2015). Similarly, Balser (1997) indicates that factions that have backgrounds in other SMOs have an indirect effect on their new movement organizations. They influence the values and tactics which shape the faction’s conflicting positions regarding several of the fundamental principles. There is also an interplay between a social movement and its individual organizations. Miller (1983) claims that conflicts within a social movement negatively affect the harmony of its individual organizations. Growing divisions within a movement reduce the possibility of cooperation between the individual organizations and trigger internal organizational debates about the cooperation matters, leading to factionalism. SMO factionalism, in its turn, drains the organization of the unity needed to sustain protest activity. Factionalism and encapsulation might clear some SMOs and leave the field open for more creative and successful ones. But, beyond a certain point, the failure of individual organizations can leave the movement without effective groups. When this happens, the social movement itself declines (Miller 1983).

2.2.3

The Repression- Dissent Nexus

The effect of repression on social movements and social movement organizations is addressed in most of the research concerned with factionalism and decline. Repression is considered an important determinant or at least an accelerator of organizational splits, deterring thus mobilization and dissent. Tilly (1973) defines repression as any action by the government which raises the contenders’ cost of collective action. An action which lowers the group’s cost of collective action is a form of facilitation. McAdam (1983) denotes that repression can range from infiltration to intimidation, harassment, surveillance, arrest, to violent confrontations. He also denotes that the scope of state repression differs. Repression is not always directed at the whole movement, but sometimes targets a specific wing of the movement, or a specific movement organization or leaders. Miller (1983) suggests that repression occurs when agents of social control use force to prevent movement organizations from functioning or prevent people from joining them. Repressive tactics include accusing activists of criminal

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charges, using infiltrators to spy on or disrupt groups, physically attacking members and offices, harassing members and potential recruits by threatening their access to jobs and schools, spreading false information about groups and people, and any other actions that make it more difficult for the movement to spread its views. Repressive actions can be defined as “legitimate” by the state when the latter passes laws banning a social movement. However, state repression is never legitimate from the perspective of the movement. For both the state and the movement, the population is the most important judge of legitimacy. If the public opinion approves repressive tactics seeking to stop social movements and protests, the repression of protestors can be carried out easily (Miller, 1983). The repression-dissent nexus is mostly concerned with the effect of repression on the dissent organizations, mostly in terms of their tactical response (escalation or demobilization). Yet, the linkage between repression and the group’s internal cohesion was addressed in research on factionalism, even in studies which consider factionalism a result of organizational deficits. In this respect, scholars agree that repression can accelerate the process of organizational disruption, even if the main reasons lie in internal variables (Zald and Ash, 1966; Miller, 1983). Studies looking at the environmental factors of schism, considered repression as an important determinant which affects internal organizational dynamics, leading to factionalism. (Lichbach, 1987; Balser, 1997). Recent research adopting the contentious politics paradigm or a strategic approach to the study of factionalism also considers the important role of police and other repressive agents in organizational factional conflicts and schism. While scholars adopting different approaches agree that state repression is an important external factor effecting an organization’s internal unity, the nature of this effect was disputed. Some scholars argued that repression does not always lead to factionalism. Instead, it can enforce internal cohesion (al-Anani, 2016). Under repression, internal conflicts can be channeled towards more positive outcomes; i.e. internal solidarity, which often outweigh dynamics of factionalism. “Unjust governmental repression may suddenly unite a movement that was at the brink of breaking apart” (Rucht, 2007, p. 206). Yet, the majority of studies considered repression as a source of external pressure that increases the propensity for factionalism and schism occurrence. For instance, McAdam (1983) suggests that repression, even at its lowest levels (infiltration), can lead to internal fissions, as the increased government surveillance and the fear of informers generate a climate of suspicion and distrust which can trigger serious internal conflicts. Repression influences the likelihood of group schism, even if the main causes remain related to organizational deficits and ineffective strategies. While internal factors, such as the emerging bureaucratic

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structures, internal ideological factions and leadership styles are the main causes for factionalism, external events can accelerate the process of splitting (Zald & Ash 1966). Similarly, Asal et al. (2012) point out that splits arise in the wake of destabilizing or major political events. Balser (1997) suggests that the level of state repression is positively related to organizational schism. The more repressive the state is toward the organization, the more likely an organization is going to splinter. In the absence of repression, internal dissent can be tolerated. However, when repression intensifies, the group unity becomes a predominant request. A previously factional group must resolve the internal conflicts. This is mostly possible through the exit of one of the contending factions. The exit of a faction helps the organization to effectively deal with the external pressures. SMO thus survives despite and because of repression and schism. Many scholars argue that repression creates internal disagreement over the strategic and tactical choices made by the group. To achieve their goals, SMOs adjust their tactical choices in response to external opportunities and pressure. According to Lichbach (1987), groups that initially adopt non-violent tactics may approve tactical violence as a response to increasing state repression. “An increase in a government’s repression of nonviolence will reduce the nonviolent activities of an opposition group but increase its violent activities” (Lichbach 1987). Thus, a group that previously renounced the use of violence might be forced to rearticulate its tactics in response to state violence. Such strategic change triggers conflict among group members: some members will favor violent strategies, while others will prefer peaceful tactics. Internal disagreement over organizational strategies and tactics in response to state repression is usually a reason for serious internal debates, which can end up in organizational factionalism, or increase the possibility of splintering (Asal et al., 2012). As external pressure escalates, groups with poor conflict resolution management tend to silence internal conflict over strategic choices, which leads to an escalation in internal conflicts and paves the way to schisms (Coser, 1956). In other words, groups that are not accustomed to containing internal dissent -by engaging in internal discussions- are more likely to factionalize or split under repression. Police and other repressive agencies confront movement groups with difficult and often conflict-producing strategic choices. Under repression, activists differ on whether to adopt less or more assertive strategies (Polletta and Kretschmer, 2015). In an attempt to understand the puzzling effect of repression on internal dissent, Miller (1983) suggests that the degree of repression affects the internal cohesion. A weak repression might help organizations to hold together by increasing solidarity among members “who share the burden of repression”. Beyond a

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certain level of repression, the costs of participation are extremely raised beyond what members are ready to pay, and a SMO or even an entire SM fails. Failure at the organizational level takes two forms: factionalism and encapsulation. Factionalism occurs as a result of conflicting strategies and positions, while encapsulation occurs when a group develops an ideology or structure that restricts the recruitment of new members. Encapsulation is the outcome of the group’s efforts to prevent infiltration and thus cutting off the recruitment of new members. In addition, under repression, group members can develop a strong tie among themselves that outsiders become unwelcome. Members can also develop an ideology that is internally coherent but unintelligible to potential recruits (Miller, 1983). Studies on contentious politics add another aspect to the repression-dissent nexus: radicalization. For instance, Tilly (1978) hypothesizes that state repression increases the cost of protest and involvement and can encourage conflict between those willing to pay a high price for their participation and those who are not. Since some tactics are more likely to trigger repression than others, strategy and tactics become the focus of the internal fractures. The more violent the organizational tactic becomes, the more likely is organization’s splintering occurrence. Tarrow (2011) indicates that disruptions split movements into a moderate majority tending towards convention and militant minorities tending towards violence. He suggests that radicalization is a common outcome of factionalism: “competition may arise from ideological conflict, from competition for space in a static organizational sphere, or from personal conflicts for power between leaders. Whatever its source, a common outcome of competition is radicalization: a shift of ideological commitments toward the extremes and/or the adoption of more disruptive and violent forms of contention” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 207). Recent studies adopting the contentious politics paradigm, focus both on the effect of repression on factionalism and schism, and on the effect of the latter on the propensity for radicalization. In other words, these studies relate fragmentation both to repression and radicalization processes: SM and SMO schisms occurring in a repressive context usually imply radicalization. This means that the dynamics of radicalization are the result of internal dynamics (schisms) as well as an external context (state repression). The volume “Dynamics of political violence: a process-oriented perspective on radicalization and the escalation of political conflict” (Bosi et al., 2014) is a pioneering contribution to this matter. It analyzes factionalism and radicalization processes through a relational field approach that includes state, counter-movements, audiences, groups, and organizations which belong to the same movement and are linked by asymmetrical power relations. Della Porta (2014) suggests that radicalization is activated by competitive escalation, which refers to intra-organizational or intra-movement

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competition over the best strategies to adopt when repression intensifies. Under repression, SMs and SMOs tend to split on the issue of violence. Internal conflicts are often about leadership as well as over strategic and tactical issues. A faction usually chooses more radical strategies and tactics than the rest of the group. Therefore, radicalization tends to develop from splinter groups coming from within traditional non-violent actors. After factionalism, splinter groups undergo further radicalization, due to two mechanisms: imitation and outbidding (Della Porta, 2014). Similarly, De Fazio (2014) argues that intra-movement competition and political outbidding are two key internal mechanisms leading to radical contention. When both processes (intra-movement competition and political outbidding) are combined, a social movement or a group is more likely to radicalize. According to him, the concept of outbidding refers to the attempts of one player to “bid higher” than other competitors. Political outbidding is engendered when a more radical faction of a political group uses extreme claims to protect its members and its interests and formulates accusations of treason against more moderate factions. In order not to lose ground against their radical competitors, moderate groups with a reformist agenda are obliged to compete with the radicals, announcing more uncompromising goals and tactics. During this process of factionalism combined with radicalism, groups constantly evolve and transform. Some groups can radicalize further as a result of a “backfire mechanism” (Lindekilde, 2014), while other groups may deradicalize even in prisons (De Vito, 2014).

2.3

Synthesis and Analytical Framework

2.3.1

Summary of Literature and Key Gaps

The social movement theory has developed over the past hundred years. In the early 20th century, scholars focused on collective psychology and irrational actions of crowd behavior at political protest rallies. Crowd-based theories dominated protest research until the 1960 s, combining vague macrostructural strains with psychoanalytic views of participants and their emotions. Emotions and irrationality were considered the driving force of all political action that occurred outside institutions. This scholarship was criticized for portraying activists as irrational actors led by their emotions alone. In the 1960s and 1970s, scholarship on social movements flourished as a result of the emergence of a wide range of social movements. In an attempt to correct the early psychological approach to social movements, scholars focused on the rationality of actors and denied

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their emotional side. A number of structuralist approaches emerged: The resource mobilization approach emphasized the importance of the mobilizing structure and the distribution of resources in the emergence of social movements. The political process model focused on the political opportunity structure of social movements. In the late 1990s, social movement studies started to focus on how individuals and groups perceived these material conditions and political opportunities. At the same time, a social psychological perspective emerged to emphasize the individual’s role in social movements. This approach brought emotions back into the analysis after years of exclusion. However, emotions were denied their irrational notion. Today, there is a considerable body of literature on social movements. However, the question “why do movement organizations factionalize?” was attributed relatively little attention in social movement studies. Factionalism and split were considered in most studies as a cause of movement decline (Miller, 1983; Zald and Ash 1966). Other studies consider factionalism and schism as a necessity to ensure movement survival (Simmel 1955; Balser 1997; Polletta and Kretschmer, 2015). Scholars also differ on the reasons of SM and SMO factionalism. The first bundle of research argues that movements and groups are responsible for their own factionalism. This perspective considers the influence of external factors on factionalism to a small degree and focuses mainly on organizational structure and deficits. Yet, the research has produced contradictory findings. Some scholars argue that groups with participatory democratic structures are more likely to face factionalism because they lack a central authority to suppress dissent (Gamson, 1975; Miller, 1983), while other scholars argue that a centralized structure is more likely to engender schisms because of its rigidity and inability to contain new issues (Park, 2001). The propensity of factionalism was considered greater in exclusive organizations, since the latter require greater ideological coherence (Zald and Ash, 1966). Others contend that exclusive organizations are less vulnerable to factionalism since their activists become isolated from the outside world and are extremely emotionally attached to their group. This makes disengagement and schism harder (Sommier, 2010; Fillieule, 2015). Other studies focus on internal deficits such as uneven power distribution (Gusfield, 1957) or a weak conflict resolution management (Coser, 1956; Miller 1983). Another bundle of research argues that the focus on organizational internal factors is a deficient perspective, contending that SM and SMO factionalism is a dynamic process and that external factors must be added to the analysis (Balser 1997). It is the interplay between external and internal factors that determines the organization’s trajectory. Among the external factors that should be added to

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the analyses are state agencies, allies and opponents, funders, and the press (e.g., Balser, 1997; Polletta and Kretschmer, 2015). Scholarship on the repression-dissent nexus examines -among others- the effect of repression on internal unity. While some theorize that repression leads to the reinforcement of internal solidarity (Rucht, 2007; al-Anani, 2016), the majority argues that repression is a determinant of factionalism and schism. Miller (1983) suggests to consider the degree of repression when analyzing the latter’s effect on SMOs. Law and moderate levels of repression may increase solidarity among a social movement organization. Yet, when repression intensifies, an organization and sometimes an entire social movement disrupt. Studies adopting a contentious politics paradigm established a relationship between repression, dissent, and radicalization (Tarrow 2011; De Fazio, 2014; Della Porta, 2014). Others contend that repression can evoke unity and group exit, group solidarity and schism simultaneously. These three are not mutually exclusive alternatives, and schism is sometimes essential for group survival (Balser, 1997; Mische, 2015). In sum, scholars argued over the effect of repression on social movements and groups. In this regard, the effect of repression on the decline or mobilization of protest has been attributed great attention. Yet, the effect of repression on social movement and group internal unity was only granted a limited amount of scholarly attention. These contributions suffer three key gaps: First, the literature treats the causes of factionalism either as internal or external to the organization. Existing scholarship does not go far enough- I argue- in capturing the interactional processes involved in factionalism. Recently, a minor emerging line of research (Bosi et al., 2014; Mishe, 2015; Poletta and Kretschmer, 2015) suggests thinking less in terms of organizational and external conditions and proposes a more interactionist/relational approach. Second, the interplay between organizational and external factors is essential in understanding the effect of repression on internal dissent. Yet, they are not the sole factors that determine the process of factionalism. Micro-dynamics, such as emotions, moral shocks, and collective identity must be included in the analysis. The effect of repression on individuals- who are the key players in the contentious movement arena- cannot be ignored. The literature doesn’t explain why some members tend to favour violent escalation while others tend to more compromising responses. What shapes these factions and individuals’ behaviours? Micro-dynamics, such as personal experiences and activism career, collective identity and memory are important factors to understand the different responses to repression. The third shortcoming is related to the overemphasis on the organizational dynamics when analysing the response to repression. Factional conflicts triggered

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by repression are about leadership matters, strategy, and tactics. The emotional dynamic is integrated in a way to explain processes of radicalization, violent escalation, backlash, intragroup competition, and outbidding, leading to the creation of a militant wing and a non-violent wing at risk of undergoing radicalization. Yet scholarship largely ignores the fact that micro-dynamics and emotions underlie factional conflict itself. Competing factions do not only dispute power, strategy, and tactics (organizational dimensions) but also collective identity, collective memory and narratives (micro dimensions). Thus, my research contributes to filling the key shortcoming in the existent literature on movement and groups’ factionalism, first by contributing to the relatively scant literature on the repression-dissent nexus focusing on factionalism. It helps understand the puzzling outcome of repression on intragroup dissent and to answer the question: why does repression sometimes lead to group solidarity and in other times to internal dissent? Second, this study aims to address the analytical gap in the existing literature on movement factionalism and splits. While literature often makes an analytical distinction between the levels of analysis: organizational (macro), environmental (meso), and individual (micro), I rely on a multilevel interactionalist approach (Della Porta, 1995; Fillieule, 2012; Elias, 2004; Ouiassa et al., 2021) linking between the macro-, meso-, and micro-dynamics in the analysis of the complex process of factionalism. Third, this work integrates the micro (emotional)-dynamics not only in triggering internal fissures regarding the response to repression (radicalization of a faction) but also in the shaping of the conflict itself and its scope and severity. Hence, I consider internal movement players in a contentious social movement arena as ideologic, strategic and emotional players. Factional disputes may be on leadership matters, on strategic, ideological, or “emotional” matters. They may be emotional but expressed as any of the latter (strategic, ideological, or power related). They may be all of them at the same time. Therefore, I argue that it is important to be aware of the difference between what the factional conflict “is really about” and what contending factions claim it is about. In other words, the root causes and scope of factionalism are not necessarily identical with the conflict narrative produced by the contending factions. A researcher’s role- in my opinion- is to reconstruct the narrative of factional disputes.

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2.3.2

2 Theoretical Debates and Novelties in the Study of Social Movements

Conceptual Framework

This study is influenced by two conceptual approaches: the interactionist approach and the re-configurational approach. The interactionist approach as proposed by Fillieule (2012) articulates the prominence of three levels of analysis that influence social movement dynamics: the micro (tendencies, socialization), the meso (organizational molding) and the macro (political context, repression, and opportunities). Instead of looking at these three levels of analysis separately, the interactionist approach focuses on the interplay between the three levels and offers an explanation of the way these three levels affect one another over time. This approach is comparable to the re-configurational approach (Ouaissa et al., 2021), which is a new conceptual framework that builds on the notion of figuration processes of Elias (2003). Similarly, to the interactionist approach, the configurational analysis as developed by Elias interrelates macro-, meso-and micro dynamics and describes social community in the sense of a social network of mutually dependent individuals. The re-configurational analysis describes the complex relationships between actors forming interdependent networks marked by an unstable balance of forces. The re-configuration of a political arena designates a process of both conflictual and cooperative interactions seeking to re-establish or uphold the old order (Ouaissa, 2021). The re-configurational approach highlights the interdependencies between actors and groups as well as the resulting restructuring of power relations in political, social, and cultural arenas. Various interdependencies between actors -situated within continuous dynamics of repositioning- lead to a constant re-configuration and reinterpretation of symbolic or material power relations. Against this background and referring to the definition of re-configuration as postulated by Ouaissa et al. (2021), I suggest that players in SMs and SMOs are situated within continuous dynamics of repositioning. The various interdependencies between players and their norms, placed in a complex political and organizational context, lead to a constant re-configuration and to the formation of new (material and symbolic) power relations. Consequently, I suggest that factionalism is a form of re-configuration which expands beyond conventional approaches of transformation, and which leads to the formation of new power relations, including cooperation and conflict. Thus, in factionalism there are no monocausal explanations, neither dependent nor independent variables, but rather a complex interplay between various dynamics on the macro-, meso- and microlevels. Factionalism is a process that is built up over a period of years before “formal schism” occurs (Balser, 1997).

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Cognitive orientations (socialization, tendencies)

Collective Identity (group identification, affective ties, etc.)

Emotions (anger, indignation, blame)

Individual Dynamics (micro)

FACTIONALISM

Organizational Dynamics (meso)

Structural Dynamics (macro)

Internal regulations (bylaws, subculture)

SMO-State Dynamics (political context, repression, opportunities)

Organizational molding (structure, hierarchy, leadership style etc.)

Intra-movement Dynamics (competition or support)

Degree of homogeneity (generational, intellectual divisions etc. )

External Dynamics (external sponsors, other political actors, potential recruits)

Figure 2.1 Factionalism in an interactionist approach

Internal cohesion is a result of a certain internal configuration, which in turn, is the result of perpetual -collaborative and conflicting- interactions between internal players in the context of organizational molding and in a certain political environment. When players engage in a factional conflict, there is usually a faction that aims to maintain the “old” configurations and another faction that seeks to restore them (re-configuration).

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Thus, I define factionalism as a process, in which internal players interact with the aim of maintaining or restoring the existing organizational configuration. This process is neither triggered solely from within the SMO nor solely from the outside. It is rather a complex process of interaction between the macro (external), the meso (organizational), and the micro (individual) dynamics. Figure 2.1. demonstrates factionalism in an interactionist approach. It illustrates the interaction and effect of individual (micro), organizational (meso) and external (macro) dynamics on internal factionalism. In my study, I will exclusively focus on the SMO-State dynamics; the structural dimension, which includes opportunities, repression and political environment. I will also consider repression as a starting point, which -as illustrated in the figure- falls under the sub-component of SMO-State dynamics. Repression, as an important determinant of the state-movement dynamics, not only affects the movement’s internal cohesion directly (as postulated by previous research on the repression-dissent nexus), but also through its constant interaction with factors falling under the categories of organizational and individual dynamics. In this respect, the scale and degree of repression are decisive. It is important to note that the full effect of repression on organizational factionalism can only be captured by including not only the meso- but also the micro-levels of analysis. A mild-to-moderate repression can engender cohesion since it encourages identification among players. Meanwhile, severe repression might engender factionalism, as it might generate moral shocks, and thus engender anger, indignation and blame for those who are considered as the responsible for the sufferings of the group. To conclude, factionalism is a dynamic complex process that develops over time in response to the interaction between individual, organizational and structural dynamics. Although factionalism evolves over the years, it usually appears to the public in its “extreme” form in the aftermath of a transformative event, which often engenders strong emotional responses (Balser, 1997). Factionalism can occur among ideological concepts, strategic lines, internal structural arrangements and collective identity constructions.

2.3.3

Analytical Concepts

This study refers to a number of concepts, that will be defined in the following lines:

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Factionalism: Social movement scholars have considered factionalism as a form of organizational change. Yet, they differ on the definition of factionalism and its conceptual and analytical distinction from schism and group defection. In the context of new religious movements, Rochford (1989) distinguishes between individual and collective forms of disengagement. He asserts that “on an individual level, there are fringe members, dissidents, and apostates; on a group level, oppositional factions, schismatics, and ex-member support groups” (Rochford, 1989). While individual defection results from the cleavage between a member’s ideological and/or cognitive values and beliefs and those of the group, collective disengagement in its various forms (factionalism, schism, group defection) is rather linked to internal conflicts (Rochford, 1989). Zald and Ash (1966) propose that “a faction is an identifiable subgroup opposed to other subgroups; a split occurs when a faction leaves a MO.” Similarly, Balser (1997) denotes that schism is equivalent to mass exist. Gamson (1975) however defines factionalism differently. He believes that the existence of divergent subgroups is a common feature of SMOs. Factionalism happens only when a subgroup officially leaves the mother organization and forms a challenging organization. Thus, Gamson (1975) defines factionalism in terms of formal splintering of the organization. “The measure of factionalism used here is formal schism. Many challenging groups have vigorous internal opposition, sometimes leading to the expulsion or resignation of individual members. If these disgruntled former members proceed to set up a rival challenging group, the original challenging group is classified as factional; if, like good soldiers, they accept their fate and slowly fade away, the group has escaped factionalism as defined here […]. Factional splits are the primary manifestation of the failure of the group to solve the problem of internal conflict. All groups experience internal disagreement but only some divide” (p. 101). Polletta and Kretschmer (2015) contend that factionalism does not necessarily cause movement decline. Although factional battles “absorb activists” energies and undermine the group’s esprit de corps [and] communicate to supporters and the public that the organization is conflicted and fragile, and perhaps not worth supporting […], they can help to clarify the group’s agenda and organizational schisms can lead the expelled organization to reach out to new constituencies” (p. 38). While social movement scholars have differed on the definition of factionalism, most of them agreed that factionalism is a sign of inevitable schism and thus a form of movement failure and a cause of movement decline (McAdam, 1982; Piven and Cloward, 1977; Miller, 1983; Zald and Ash, 1966). For other scholars, factionalism and schism were sometimes a necessity to ensure movement survival (Balser, 1997; Polletta and Kretschmer, 2015).

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I argue that factionalism does not necessarily lead to a formal schism or split. I define factionalism as a process, in which internal SMO players are divided in subgroups interacting with one another with the aim of maintaining and/or restoring the existing organizational configuration. In other words, a factional group consists of two or more subgroups, that can be divided in two trends: a trend aiming at maintaining the old configurations, and another aiming at restoring the latter. This process is neither triggered solely from within the social movement organization nor solely from the outside. It is rather a complex process of interaction between macro (structural), the meso (organizational) and the micro (individual) dynamics. Factionalism does not necessarily indicate group or movement decline or failure. It is sometimes functional for group survival. While a group might split up due to a factional conflict, the newly formed group might increase internal harmony and solidarity. Group solidarity and schism are not mutually exclusive alternatives. They can exist simultaneously. Factional conflicts have uncertain outcomes and can take several forms. They can be “official” or not. “Official” schism takes the form of a breakaway group or mass exit. Factional conflicts do not necessarily end up in official schism since sometimes members dispute over the organization itself and insist each on representing the organization legitimately. Even in the case of factions that have broken away, breakaway and mother organization can end up enjoying collaborative relationships, or re-merging. I suggest that the scope of factional conflicts depends on the aspects that contending movement players wish to maintain or restore (re-configure). These aspects can include any or all of the following dimensions: (1) The group’s ideology and objectives. (2) The relationship between the movement and the society (means of collective action, strategies). (3) The internal organizational dynamics regulating the relationship between the organization and its members (membership and affiliation rules, structure of incentives). (4) The relationship between the components of the organization itself, such as organizational structure, organizational roles, power relations, hierarchy, patterns of leadership, regulations. (5) The collective identity (subculture, norms, values, cognitive frames). Players can dispute one of the dimensions or all of them. This defines the scope of the rift. Players are not permanent. They are constantly reinventing themselves. They redefine each other through their interactions and conflicts (Jasper 2015). Their political behaviour and strategic choices are affected by “where they come from”. Socialization, norms, rules and cultural notions preceding interactions do count. “Players are not formed overnight, nor do they totally change in the interaction itself” (Duyvendak and Fillieule, 2015). They are not uniquely ideological

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actors, nor strategic calculators. They are affected by both structural and psychological factors. Players’ rationality does not exclude their emotional side. Emotions not only motivate individual or collective disengagement processes but also help create and define factionalism. Group identification (collective identity) makes people share ideas, feelings, and interests. A growing awareness of shared grievances and a clear idea of who or what is responsible for those grievances might lead to factionalism (Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2017). The concept of re-configuration implies conflictual and cooperative interactions, negotiations and struggles aimed at the building of new alliances (Ouaissa, 2021). Thus, the internal re-configuration of players refers to the constellation of actors within a movement, their conflictual and cooperative interactions aimed at restoring or maintaining the existing order by building new alliances. Collective identity is a “shared sense of we-ness” (Hunt and Benford, 2007, p. 440). It is an “individual’s cognitive, moral and emotional connections with broader community, category, practice, or institution” (Polletta and Jasper, 2001, p. 81). Collective identity is constantly under construction and collective action is one of the factors that shape collective identity (Steckelenburg and Klandermans, 2017). Collective identity is “an interactive, shared definition produced by several individuals that must be conceived as a process because it is constructed and negotiated by repeated activation of the relationships that link individuals to groups” (Melucci, 1995, p. 44). Collective identity differs from ideology, since it carries positive feelings for other group members and is expressed in “cultural material”, such as narratives, symbols, clothing, verbal styles and rituals (Polletta and Jasper, 2001, p. 81). Collective identity construction implies: (1) Setting boundaries by emphasizing cognitive, affective and behavioral differences between a collective self and a collective other: “us” vs. “them”. (2) Forging an “oppositional consciousness” and solidarity through emotional work and narratives. (3) Negotiating the set of shared meanings to produce common cognitive frames, since collective identities are not rigid but rather shared meanings produced and reproduced, negotiated and renegotiated, in the interaction between members of a group (Hunt and Benford, 2007, p. 447). “Narratives”. Narratives refer to “sequential logic and consecutive mode of producing meaning” (Tanner, 2016, p. 137). Their effects result from “a complex interaction with an audience, which is conditioned by specific “reading, listening, and viewing habits” (p. 138). Narratives are usually charged with emotions (Polletta, 1998) and reflect cognitive frames and collective identities (Hunt and Benford, 2007). I suggest that narratives and counter-narratives within the same group reveal the existence of conflicting cognitions, and can attempt to

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re-negotiate or re-frame existing norms, values, or a group’s collective identity. Narratives and counter-narratives are also used in factional battles to address group members with the aim of gaining their support and allegiance. These narratives, are usually contradictory, and threaten the coherence of a group and can increase the propensity of schism. This is what I refer to as “contentious narratives”. Finally, I refer to cognitive orientations/frames as a complex belief system, or core ideological convictions that are conscious or unconscious, rational or irrational, and which affect the construction of social meaning and the development of political traditions and formal ideologies. They shape and reshape activist understandings of the world and organizational values. They are affected by collective identities and collective memories (Kinna, 2016).

2.3.4

Hypothesis

Despite the fact that this study relies on the interactionist approach, where all variables are considered endogenous or interdependent, I will consider repression the starting point or as the main external environmental factor. In an authoritarian context, the question is not that of the existence or absence of repression but rather its scope and scale. The scope and scale of repression affect the severity of disagreements. Applying the abovementioned framework on the MB, I suggest that: In the case of the MB factionalism post-2013, state repression constituted the main change in the structural dynamics. On the one hand, fierce repression affected organizational dynamics directly by imprisoning leading figures, disrupting the communication chain, and creating multiple power centers (macro-meso dynamics, in Figure 2.1.). On the other hand, the brutal dispersal of the pro-Mursi sit-ins and protests generated a moral shock for members, and engendered emotions such as indignation, anger and blame, which were not only directed at the regime (micro-macro dynamics, in Figure 2.1.), but also directed at the organization itself and its leadership (micro-meso dynamics, in Figure 2.1.). As a result of repression, these emotions, combined with the changes in the organizational molding led to the interaction of internal players in a way that led to a factional conflict, in which several aspects were disputed, such as internal arrangements, political strategy, and collective identity. This interaction between a subgroup that aims at maintaining the old order, and a subgroup that seeks to restore it took the form of a long lasting factional conflict that did not-yet- end up in an official schism.

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To summarize, I rely on the following hypotheses throughout my study: 1. MB’s organizational dynamics are determinant causes of factionalism. The MB– besides other organizational dynamics—reveals multidimensional disparities between its members and has a history of unresolved conflicts, which makes it prone to factional conflicts. 2. The scale and level of state repression against the MB are related to the severity of internal factionalism and the propensity of schism. A moderate level of repression helps MB members to hold together through emotional identification, injustice frames, victimization etc. Meanwhile, a high level of repression directly challenges the organizational setup, and sparks diverse emotions and responses in individuals. While some tend to adapt and restrain their activism, others are inclined towards confrontation and challenge, leading to divisions along strategic lines. 3. MB factionalism goes beyond strategic lines and is focused on institutional arrangements and internal reform. The current conflict opened the door for raised doubts among MB members on the efficiency of the long-standing intact institutional arrangements and the groups’ collective identity in achieving desired goals. When these goals became the subject of intraorganizational conflict, the search for the cause of and the solution to the conflict became focused inward on the organization itself, putting the organizational arrangements and the collective identity at stake. 4. The factional conflict goes beyond the declared causes of fission. Emotions, cognitive frames, and a re-negotiation of collective codes of identity underlie factionalism and constitute its hidden, yet core, dimension. Finally, the repressive context post 2013, changed spatial modalities of interaction: the MB went underground, leading figures are either imprisoned, hiding, or in exile. Yet, social media platforms, particularly the official website(s), reflect the “offline” factionalism process, which will be addressed in detail in the next chapters.

3

Researching an Underground Organization: Methodology and Limitations

This study follows an interactive approach of qualitative research design as defined by Maxwell (2012). According to this methodological approach, the research design is the outcome of a flexible, nonsequential approach and a reflexive process which accompanies every stage of the project. Hence, “the activities of collecting and analyzing data, developing and modifying theory, elaborating or refocusing the research questions, and identifying and dealing with validity threats, are usually going on more or less simultaneously, each influencing all of the others. In addition, the researcher may need to reconsider or modify any design decision during the study in response to new developments or to changes in some other aspect of the design” (Maxwell, 2012, p. 215). The idea of this research originated back in 2014, when a significant number of Islamists and MB members started to settle in Turkey, which was never an immigration destination for Egyptians. As a political science researcher, interested in social movements, I started to reflect on the effects of repression on individuals’ lives and careers. After exploring the literature, I drafted the first research proposal, which focused on two dimensions: the impact of repression on activists’ lives and trajectories after 2013 and on the MB as a social movement organization. The main questions that I was interested in were how did the political activism change MB members’ lives and how the MB’s ideology is going to develop in exile. Yet, by 2015 it became clear that the MB was factionalizing in two blocs. The question of why the MB factionalized and what the internal conflict was about became more relevant. I thus decided to focus on the effect of repression on the Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41581-5_3. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 N. Aboushady, Factionalism in Social Movements, Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen Ostens, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41581-5_3

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internal cohesion of the group and explore the root causes of MB factionalism. I adjusted my research question and decided to focus on the internal disagreements within the MB, specifically in light of the new political circumstances. In this chapter, I discuss the methodology, research design and details of the strategy of data collection and analysis, and how these were reconsidered and modified throughout the project.

3.1

A Mixed Data Collection Approach in Search of the MB

While it is customary to leave the issue of methodological challenges to the end of the chapter, I find it important to start this section with these challenges since the difficulties of the research context shaped my methodological choices for this study. On the one hand, the prevalence of repression, fear and mistrust limited my scope of choice of data collection methods. On the other hand, the “migration” of activists into the virtual sphere opened new and interesting spaces of observation, that I decided to exploit. In the following sub-sections, I present in more detail the limitations of the data collection method as well as the mixed approach that I developed to overcome the challenges.

3.1.1

The Limits of Conventional Fieldwork in High-Risk Research Environment

The original research methodology was based on conducting ethnographic fieldwork in Turkey, allowing me to observe and interview MB members and leaders from both disputing factions, in addition to conducting online and/or offline interviews with activists who live in Egypt or were expelled. Thus, I joined a closed group on Facebook- called “tajamu’ al-misryin fi turkiya” (Gathering of Egyptians in Turkey), which was, at the time, one of the very few groups assembling Egyptians in Turkey.1 I contacted the admin and explained my purpose for joining the group and he accepted my membership request. I observed this group for several months: members were supporting each other in finding Arabic speaking mosques, language centers to learn Turkish, sharing tips to find jobs, asking questions related to paperwork, searching 1

Today, there are tens of groups on Facebook for the Egyptian community in Turkey.

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for apartments for rent, selling furniture and so on. Members of the group did not share or discuss any political matters. However, I considered it a good entry point for potential interviewees. With the help of my social network, I established contacts with exBrotherhood members in Turkey who were willing to provide me with more contacts for my interviews and help me during a prospective fieldwork trip. Before heading to Turkey, I decided to conduct my first interviews in Cairo. In February 2016, I arrived in Cairo for the first round of interviews to find MB members subjected to systematic repression and continuous surveillance. Finding candidates was a serious challenge, given the fact that MB activism went underground and the feeling of fear and mistrust among its members and accusations of leaking insider information was growing. When I called my first potential interviewee to introduce my topic and to request an interview, neither of us felt safe about disclosing certain information on the phone call, in fear of surveillance of calls, messages, social media profiles and online chat platforms. This made communication particularly challenging, as even mentioning the topic of the interview itself carried this risk. The increased polarization in the Egyptian society as well as the increasing repression added another layer of difficulty, since many who had initially agreed to participate at an interview (including those residing outside Egypt) stopped responding to my communications. Even though the call was supposed to be through Signal, which was at the time the only communication platform that offered end-to-end encryption, many did not feel comfortable about talking to a stranger fearing that I might be informing on them. My positionality as an outsider to the group, but at the same time as part of the conflict- being an Egyptian national myself- who in the context of a polarized society had to be either with or against the MB—made any communication with MB activists challenging. Despite these challenges, I managed to conduct nine long, in- depth interviews with young MB members and supporters. Not only the challenging fieldwork, but also the high-risk research environment presented a second difficulty that I had to encounter. As of 2013, Egypt has become a high risk and repellent environment to researchers, especially in the field of political and social sciences. Against this background, I was concerned with holding contact with MB members. Making interviews in Turkey or even online interviews on encrypted platforms was less likely to solve the main problem, as holding contact to MB members and supporters constituted a risk in itself and could put me under legal liability, the MB being declared a terrorist organization.

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It was obvious that I could count less on “traditional” qualitative methods; fieldwork, interviews, and observation, and that I needed to find alternative ways to collect the necessary data. Since I followed the interactive process of qualitative research design (Maxwell, 2012), I was able to adjust my data collection strategy. In what follows, I explain my alternative data collection method in more detail.

3.1.2

MBs’ Official Websites: A Virtual Field of Research

While the challenging research environment affected my methodological choices, it was an eye-opener to new methodological alternatives. To substitute for potentially missed interview opportunities, I turned to the MB’s Arabic official website, which became the main platform reflecting the offline disagreements of a group that had gone underground and its members shattered. As of 2013, the MB’s official website, “ikhwanonline.com” became a significant communication and mobilization channel for the group. When internal disagreements started to forge by August 2014, the website also became an important tool in the internal factional battle. In December 2015, the original website “ikhwanonline.com” was replaced by two websites, each claiming to be the official and legitimate representative of the organization. The two websites are “Ikhwanonline.info”, representing the Revolutionary bloc and “Ikhwan.site”, later replaced by “Ikhwanonline.com”, representing the Organizational bloc. The disagreements between both factions on the online space were nothing but a reflection of the offline disagreements between two contending blocs post-2013. Both websites were used by the contending blocs as platforms to disseminate their own narrative of the conflict, to mobilize support and defy their counterpart. Both wings interacted on the virtual space in a “statement’s battle” by declaring organizational decisions and defending their legitimacy and strategic choices. I followed the statements and news on both websites for four consecutive years (2015–2018) on a daily basis and documented the relevant statements by printing them before the online content disappeared. In fact, one of the websites (Ikhwan.site) was shut down later. I viewed all statements issued by the official spokespersons or leaders of the respective groups. The title of the statements usually began with “bayan min” meaning a statement by. This facilitated the survey of the websites. Especially the website “Ikhwanonline.info” was easier to survey, as it declared in its first statement that the website will only publish official statements related to the Egyptian case and the internal matters of the group. On the contrary, “ Ikhwan.site” and “Ikhwanonline.com” content was very

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much wider. In addition to official statements related to the Egyptian case and the organizational conflict, opinion articles, cultivation material and reports on MB’s history were published. The content was not solely focused on the Egyptian affair, but also on international and regional matters. Indeed, the primacy given to the Egyptian case and MB’s internal conflict reflect one aspect of the internal conflict as it will be explained in chapter 6. In total, I have gathered and analyzed 143 relevant statements, among them 62 published on Ikhwan.site and Ikhwanonline.com, representing the Organizational bloc and 81 released on Ikhwanonline.info representing the Revolutionary bloc. To hold the comparison and capture the development of the conflict as well as the virtual interaction of both wings on the online platforms, I archived the data that I had gathered from each website separately and ordered the statements chronologically. Not only did I rely on the content analysis of the selected statements from MB websites, but I also invested time in observing and analyzing the interactions occurring between the different players on these virtual platforms. A detailed explanation of the analysis method of MB websites is provided in the following subsections.

3.1.3

Primary Documentation

In addition to the MB official websites, this study relies on existing documentation that can be divided into four axes: existing scholarship, recent reports and press articles, MB leaders’ memoirs, and MB organizational documents. In my study, I referred to the existing literature on the MB. More specifically, I was interested in studies focusing on the MB’s internal dynamics before 2013. This scope of research was only covered by a few scholars, as I have pointed out in Chapter 1. When I started my research at the end of 2015, there were only a few press articles and reports. Until today, there is a limited number of academic papers focusing on the MB’s internal schism after 2013. Some press articles were retrieved from independent media organizations, such as “Noon post” and “Mada masr”. Essays and working paper series were found at the “MENA Direkt” series and “CARNEGIE Endowment for International Peace” essay series. In addition to the secondary sources, I referred to primary sources in Arabic that are not accessible to many Western academics. In this respect, MB leaders’ memoirs were an important source for my study especially for Chapter 4, in which I account for the previous internal disputes. In these memoirs, the authors reported about the internal divisions and disagreements which they had witnessed. They also accounted for their experience in prison and the general mood and

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ideological struggles behind bars. Memoirs reflected the MB’s narrative of internal conflicts, clarified the political experience of authors, and gave insight into the characteristics of political generations within the movement (see the list of memoirs in the Bibliography). I also referred to MB’s important organizational documents, such as the internal bylaws (al la’eha al ama). Al-Banna’s Letters (Rasa’el al-Banna) were also an important document, helping to unpack MB’s doctrinal base and codes of collective identity as explained by its founder, Hassan al-Banna. In addition, I have analyzed the recently published document “Vision 28” (Ru’ya 28) and the new bylaws of 2016/17, which have been developed by the Revolutionary bloc and which reflect significant aspects of the internal disagreements.

3.1.4

Interviews: Fieldwork and Media

The two main sources of interviews were self-designed and conducted interviews and interviews aired in MB media, such as TV channels aired from Turkey and Qatar. In fact, I conducted seven interviews with young MB members and supporters in the period between March and December 2016 (for the table of interviews, see Appendix A provided in the Electronic Supplementary Material). Among these interviews were five “face-to-face” interviews that I conducted in Cairo in March and April 2016, and two via Skype. The interviewees’ affiliations and profiles differ. Some of them were MB affiliates or affiliated to the MB through working network. Others were affiliated to MB breakaway parties (al-Wasat, Misr al Qawiya); others cooperated with MB activists after the Raba’a and Nahda dispersals. Some were independent, with no political affiliations. The common trait between all interviewees is their participation in the pro-Mursi sit-ins and/or the anti-coup protests between 2013 and 2016. The interviewees agreed to participate under the following conditions: anonymity, meeting in private places, non-disclosure of voice recordings to third parties, or no recordings at all. The interviews took place in private places (at my house, the interviewee’s house, or a common friend’s house), since meeting in public areas, i.e. cafés, was too risky. Most of the interviewees agreed that I could record the interview, under the condition that I would delete the records once I was done with the transcription (for security reasons). The duration of each interview was between two and three hours. The interviews were transcribed, and content analysis was conducted.

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In addition to these interviews, I conducted one expert interview via Messenger in May 2019. The researcher that I have contacted is Abdelrahman Ayyash, who is an Egyptian young man and a former MB member. He has resided abroad since the ousting of the MB regime, has a wide network of contacts within the MB, and is aware of internal dynamics. I also collected interviews with MB’s leading figures and spokesmen on different channels, transcribed them, and analyzed them. These interviews helped me better understand their narratives of conflict. Channels that frequently hosted MB leaders to talk about the current conflict are al-Jazeera, as well as the MB channel Mekamelin. In these interviews, leaders from both blocs created their own narrative of the conflict, the scope of the conflict, and critiques of the counter-bloc. These interviews supplemented my research but were not principal.

3.2

Data Analysis: Ethnography of the Written and the Virtual Word

Several scholars have suggested that online fieldwork does not radically differ from traditional fieldwork, and that it does not require methodological innovation, since cyberspace is not disconnected from or opposed to “real life” (Pastinelli, 2011). Like traditional ethnography (Bray, 2008), virtual ethnography refers to the study of social interactions, behaviors, and perceptions that occur within groups, with the aim of providing rich insights into actors’ views and actions, through the collection of detailed digital observations and interviews. The ethnography of the virtual differs from traditional ethnography in the absence of the physical layout of the place. In other words, virtual ethnography “extends traditional notions of the ethnographic study from situated observation and face-to-face researcherparticipant interaction to technologically mediated interactions in online networks and communities” (Reeves et al., 2008). Yet a virtual ethnography would not have lowered the security risks related to communicating with an underground group designated by the regime as terrorist. While the virtual sphere reflected MB’s internal conflict, a content analysis of MB’s official websites was not enough to capture the real causes of disagreements. To overcome the limits of content analysis, I decided to apply some aspects of the ethnographic research approach to the content analysis. In other words, I used ethnography as a methodological approach. Building on the suggestion that a field can also be virtual, I considered MB’s online platforms as the field of study and analyzed the primary data collected from MB’s websites by giving the content analysis an ethnographic depth.

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Applying the ethnographic approach to the content analysis is inspired by the ethnographic content analysis as postulated by Altheide (1987;1996). The latter defines ethnographic content analysis as “an integrated method, procedure, and technique for locating, identifying, retrieving, and analyzing documents for their relevance, significance, and meaning. The emphasis is on discovery and description, including search for contexts, underlying meanings, patterns, and processes, rather than mere quantity or numerical relationships between two or more variables” (Altheide, 2004, p. 325). The key here is that I have conceptualized MB’s websites as my field of research, and analyzed the statements and documents published online reflexively rather than statically. I was thus moving between the data collection, the analysis, and the re-conceptualization (Altheide, 1987). Inspired by the ethnographic content analysis as an analytical tool, I applied a mixture of two main strategies in this study: categorizing and coding; and connecting and observation. While categorizing and coding allowed for the identification of the scope of disagreements within the MB, the connecting and observation strategy helped me identify the different dimensions of the conflict narratives as postulated by each faction as well as observe the interaction between the contending wings in the virtual sphere. Through both strategies, I was able to reconstruct the conflict narrative and analyze the reconfiguration of the movement arena. Adding the ethnographic approach allowed me to overcome the limits of the conventional content analysis. In fact, in content analysis, the categorization of the data can sometimes lead to the neglect of contextual relationships among the data (Maxwell and Miller, 2008). In my research, particularly relationships based on contiguity rather than similarity were important since the research question is about the different dimensions of the internal disagreements as well as the conflict’s narratives produced by each faction. In addition, in content analysis, the significance of a statement would be lost when removed from the context of other statements. Yet, the escalation of MB’s internal conflict as well as the increasing challenge and competition between both factions can only be identified when each statement is analyzed in view of its context. Finally, the categorizing strategy on its own is not enough in my research to unpack the “real” aspects of the internal disagreement since both factions adopt very similar discourse and stances on their websites. In this regard, it is important not to forget that the online statements represent a conscious and strategic discourse directed at the same constituency. For example, both websites have published statements emphasizing the faction’s commitment to the “revolutionary path”. Yet, these statements must be placed in their context. i.e. analyzed

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in view of other statements and documents in order to understand each faction’s “real” stance on the revolutionary strategy. Hence, a critical reflexive analysiswhich the ethnographic approach allows- is essential to overcome the “impurity” of the data (Schwartz, 1993).

3.2.1

Categorizing Strategy and Content Analysis

The goal of categorization was to “fracture” the data and rearrange it into categories that help me develop a general understanding of what is going on inside the MB and what the conflict is about. The unit of analysis of the gathered data ranged from a sentence to a paragraph. I generated themes and categorized the data based on the aspects of the conflict. I applied the same categories to all the gathered data. Some of these categories were derived from my pre-assumptions about the scope of conflict (based on existing reports), while other categories were inductively generated during my research. In total, I categorized the data in eight categories. These are as follows:

1. Administrative issues: data concerning the bylaws, the organization of internal elections, the appointment of new leaders, the promotion of members, and organizational adaptations; for instance, the creation of new committees, the merging of existing committees, and the definition of committees’ powers and limits. 2. Objectives and strategies: data clarifying the group’s objectives throughout different phases as well as its strategies to overcome the crackdown and undermine the coup. 3. Mobilization and protest: statements mobilizing for collective action and protest activities. 4. Political stances and positioning: statements opposing the regime’s political, social or economic policies, as well as statements supporting or denouncing national events. (e.g. assassination attempts in Egypt). 5. Revisions: data concerning self-critique, ideological revisions, or bylaw reform. 6. Reactions and counterstatements: data that clarify a political, strategic, or ideological stance in response to declarations, critiques, and accusations from the counter faction. 7. Emotional display: data displaying emotions such as revenge, outrage, blame, and victimization. 8. Collective identity and memory: data referring to the group’s collective identity, such as obedience, patience, and other pillars of MB’s oath, and its

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collective memory, such as the Raba’a and Nahda dispersal, the 2011 Uprising, the ordeal phase, especially the Nasserist crackdown. Table 3.1. indicates the categorization system and examples for the eight generated categories. It is important to note that the objective of categorization was not frequency count, but rather to understand the scope of disagreement between the factions and to facilitate the comparison between their stances and perceptions.

Table 3.1 List of categories for content analysis of MB websites Category

Code Example

Administrative issues

1

“The Shura Council had met and created four committees: an interim Administration Office, an investigation committee, a vision committee, and an elections committee. The elected Administrative Office responsibility is to manage the group until the completion of the elections of both the Shura Council and an interim Guidance Office according to the amended bylaws as approved by the Shura Council” (Ikhwansite, April 3, 2016).

Objectives and strategies

2

“We call upon all revolutionaries to forget about the differences and bitterness of the past and combine the efforts towards achieving a common national goal, by which we overthrow the ruling gang” (IkhwanInfo, August 14, 2018).

Mobilization and protest

3

“This regime has committed massacres, arrests, torture, and rape. Scholars have clarified the religious duty to resist this coup by all means until it falls and until the legitimacy is restored, and they have clarified the right to legitimate defense of oneself, of one’s honor and money. The MB is committed to working for Islam in its totality, it followed jurisprudential duties that Islam founded, and does not retreat from this path, no matter what the sacrifices are” (IkhwanInfo, May 28, 2015).

Political stances and positioning

4

“We condemn the bloodshed of innocent citizens, and we equally condemn shedding the blood of the army and the policemen” (IkhwanSite, January 23, 2016).

Revisions

5

“The MB’s failed to predict the revolution or act according to its strategies” (Vision 28/1, 2017, p. 45). (continued)

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Table 3.1 (continued) Category

Code Example

Reactions and 6 counterstatements

“It is not permissible for any institution or individuals within the group to speak on behalf of the committee or to issue decisions that are within the powers of the administration committee” (IkhwanInfo, December 15, 2015). “Decisions issued by its head Abdelrahman Al-Mursi are individual acts that do not represent the Committee and violate the group’s institutionalism” (IkhwanInfo, December 18, 2015).

Emotional display

7

“It was necessary to correct and reform the structure of the organization and its management methods […]. The leadership [..]was also able to introduce these reforms if it wanted and intended to. However, this required to overcome the sanctity of the organization and the guardianship of those who advocate for it” (Vision 28/2, 2017, p. 8).

Collective identity and memory

8

“A Brother’s commitment is based on the pillars of his bay’a (oath). Holding to the bay’a is the trial [from God] and the savior from fitnah (temptation)” (IkhwanSite, December 15, 2015). “What happened on that day in Raba’a and al-Nahda squares are not just events that have passed, and they cannot be narrated as a history. [..]It is a transformative day that will not be forgotten” (IkhwanInfo, August 13, 2018).

3.2.2

Connecting Strategy and Ethnographic Analysis

The categorization strategy was combined with a connecting strategy, in order not to lose insight about the relationships among the data (Wilson, 2006; Maxwell 2012). Applying aspects of the ethnographic research methodology as an approach to content analysis allowed me to overcome the limits of the categorization strategy, notably the fragmentation of the data. The rationale for an ethnographic approach to the analysis of online statements and documents is thus similar to the rationale of conventional ethnographic research; i.e., connecting and observing. Indeed, “an ethnographic perspective can help delineate patterns of human action when document analysis is conceptualized as fieldwork” (Altheide, 1987). The ethnographic approach to content analysis allowed a critical reflexive analysis of the data in three ways:

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First, identifying relationships among the data and analyzing each statement in view of other statements on the same website helped recognize the narratives produced by each faction. In other words, beyond the categorization of the data in the above mentioned categories, I “connected” the data in order to identify the narratives produced by each faction. These narratives included the perception of the contender (defying its legitimacy and strategy), and the self-perception, including how each bloc defines itself (i.e., youth, revolutionaries, legitimate leadership), which principles they stand for, their strategy for undermining the regime, and tools for managing the organization. Analyzing the statements in light of the main narratives helped identify a more comprehensive image of the conflict’s dimensions. Second, contextualizing the data into a coherent “whole” allowed me to observe the escalation of the conflict between the factions. The significance of statements published on one website was highlighted when its context was placed in the center of analysis, i.e. when analyzed in view of statements published on the contenders’ website around the same time. Third, observing the interaction between the two blocs in cyberspace, or what I called “the statements battle”, allowed me to identify the implicit yet core dimensions of the conflict. Not only did I rely on the analysis of the statements published on the websites, but I also invested time in observing and analyzing the “virtual” interactions occurring between the different players on the virtual platforms. Through these connecting strategies, I constantly discovered emergent narratives and counter-narratives, and identified different patterns of interaction between the contending factions. This enabled me to reconstruct the conflict narrative and unpack the dimensions of internal disagreements.

3.3

Concluding Remarks

While typical fieldwork was neither doable nor safe for the context, the ethnographic content analysis of the online documents allowed me to reconstruct an accurate image of the factional conflict within the MB. I considered the MB websites as digital arenas for the contention, where I could observe action and reaction, i.e., statements and counterstatements. In other words, I considered the MB websites as ethnographic fields and materials in the ways in which they reflect and shape the offline reality. To complement my sources, I used the interview material that I had gathered in Egypt, in addition to multiple other sources, such as MB leaders’ television

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interviews, and material gathered by desk research, notably existing research on the MB, primary documents of the group and memoirs of MB leaders. This study relies on a mix of two methods: content analysis and ethnography. In other words, I gave the content analysis an ethnographic depth by applying two strategies; the categorizing strategy and the connecting strategy. The rationale behind this mixed method is that the integration of ethnographic methods with the traditional content analysis of virtual platforms was indispensable in developing a rich and comprehensive understanding of the MB’s current conflict, given that more advanced fieldwork was not possible.

4

Brotherhood’s Internal Conflicts and their Outcomes: Historical Overview (1928–2011)

Analyses dealing with the current factionalism inside the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood often compare it to previous internal conflicts. Yet, researchers have considered the current schism as the “deepest internal rift” the Brotherhood has ever experienced throughout the years. Since its founding in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood has undergone several internal conflicts and divisions. Throughout the years, the leadership’s responses to internal conflicts varied between resolving issues, enforcing cohesion, silencing and sometimes expelling dissidents. The causes of internal divisions were diverse; ideological, strategic, tactical, structural, and administrative. These divisions were sometimes stimulated by state repression. However, the Brotherhood was able to survive through long periods of persecution. Not only did it adapt to state repression, but it also managed to enforce its organizational coherence. In this chapter, I neither intend to draw comparisons between the current schism and previous conflicts, nor do I seek to classify the conflicts by their enormity. Instead, the objective of this chapter is to account for the most important internal conflicts which the Brotherhood has experienced since its founding in 1928 and until the 2011 Uprising. This chapter provides insights about the nature of these conflicts, their outcomes, and the unresolved matters that have been “transmitted” to the next generations. It also elaborates how the larger political context shaped the organization and affected its internal unity. Specifically, it unpacks the effects of repression on the trajectory and development of internal divisions. I believe that it is important to start this study with a historical overview of internal contentions for two reasons. First, schism is a long process that does not occur suddenly (Balser, 1997), and the outcomes of previous disagreements affect recent struggles. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 N. Aboushady, Factionalism in Social Movements, Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen Ostens, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41581-5_4

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Second, previous internal conflicts shape what Jasper (2006) calls “tastes in tactic” of actors involved in today’s contention. These are accustomed ways of responding to internal challenges. Indeed, actors’ performances in the current dispute “are more than just freely exercised choices; they are also skills and routinized practices learned through previous trajectories through particular political and institutional contexts” (Mische, 2015). This long period under study will be divided into three phases. Each phase is given a section in this chapter. The rationale of this division is based on the state’s policy towards the Brotherhood. Thus, the first section deals with the internal conflicts during the “founding phase” (1928–1948), a phase during which the Brotherhood was attributed legality and was able to engage in political life publicly. The second section emphasizes the internal struggles during a time characterized by harsh repression, or what is known in the Brotherhood narrative as “mihna” (ordeals or hardships). For this reason, I call this phase “the ordeals phase”. It begins in 1949 with the dissolution of the Brotherhood and the failure of negotiations between al-Banna and the Sa’dist government, and ends in 1970 when President Sadat started to release Brotherhood prisoners. Finally, the third section is dedicated to the “accommodation phase” (1970– 2011). This phase is characterized by a dual policy towards the Brotherhood: On the one hand, the Brotherhood’s existence was generally accepted, yet it was denied official approval as a legal organization. It is in this way “accommodated” by the regime and finds itself in a state between toleration and repression. On the other hand, the state’s policy towards the Brotherhood shifted constantly, according to the perceived threat it posed to the regime. Thus, the accommodation phase was interrupted by phases of mid-scale suppression.

4.1

Internal Conflicts and Factions during the Founding Phase (1928–1948)

The founding phase is marked by the leadership of the first General Guide and founder of the organization Hassan Al-Banna. It starts in 1928 when al-Banna officially established the Muslim Brotherhood and ends with its official abolishment in December 1948. During this phase, the Brotherhood operated in an open political structure. It was attributed legality and was not exposed to state repression in any way, even in times where the relationship with the regime was tense. Although it is widely believed that internal conflicts only started after al-Banna’s

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death, a closer examination of the Brotherhood’s early years indicates that the inner contention existed during al-Banna’s era. During this era, al-Banna established the organization’s ideology, strategy, concepts, financial system, and collective identity. He also produced seminal literature in the form of letters and articles in the organization’s journal, which are considered the most important references for the organization until today. AlBanna also established the principles and strategies of the Brotherhood through the speeches he held at the General Conferences, especially the Fifth General Conference, 1939. Between the years 1932 and 1936, the Brotherhood successfully expanded. The increasing organizational power as well as the favorable political scene in Egypt and the region encouraged the organization to move towards political activism. On the one hand, enthusiastic Brothers were keen to act. On the other hand, the Palace encouraged groups like the Muslim Brothers, Young Egypt and the Green Shirts in return for their support against al-Wafd 1 (Mitchell, 1969). On the regional level, the conflict in Palestine between the Arabs, the Zionists and the British escalated between 1936 and 1939. The Brotherhood supported the Palestinians to maintain the Arab strike and was committed to the defense of their cause through fundraising, demonstrations, speechmaking, and pamphleteering. This was not only the Brotherhood’s first officially recognized political activity; in May 1938, al-Banna announced in the Brotherhood’s weekly journal al-Nazir, the beginning of the movement’s involvement in “the external and internal political struggle”. A few months later, during the Fifth Conference in 1939, al-Banna defined the Brotherhood as a “political organization” (Mitchell, 1969). It is in this context that the MB’s Special Apparatus, which will become the reason for internal divisions in the upcoming years, became prominent. As the Brotherhood grew more powerful and institutionalized, its rover and battalion systems, which put emphasis on discipline as well as physical and spiritual training developed into the Special Apparatus. This apparatus was initially set up for warfare in Palestine. It also carried out operations against British colonization in Egypt. After the Second World War and during an era of turbulent politics, the Special Apparatus, became involved in political violence activities, including political assassinations.

1

King Faruq, was at the time influenced by Shaykh Mustafa al-Maraghi, head of al- Azhar, and Ali Mahir, an old friend of the Royal family. Both individuals were known for their panArab and even pan-Islamic nuances and anti-Wafd politics.

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Opposing al-Banna’s Leadership and Power

The fact that al-Banna was a charismatic leader did not prevent some MB members from questioning his leadership. Al-Banna sometimes managed to hold internal factions together, and at other times lost control over dissidents, especially when state repression intensified. Most of the time, internal conflicts took place when anger accumulated against al-Banna’s leadership style. Dissidents frequently criticized his top-down approach and boundless power. It was him who promoted members and decided upon the political stances of the movement as well as the use of its funds. MB’s First Internal Dispute After founding the Muslim Brotherhood in al- Ismailiyah, al-Banna’s primary goal was to extend the membership of the group and to enlarge it geographically. Thus, al-Banna founded branches in the Delta (Northern Egypt) and established contact in Cairo. The contact person in Cairo was Abdelrahman al-Banna, one of Hassan al-Banna’s younger brothers, and head of the Cairo-based Society for Islamic Culture. In 1932, Hassan al- Banna moved to Cairo where his and his brother’s groups merged to form the first branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo. The first internal dispute blew out in 1932 when al-Banna nominated a deputy to replace him in al-Ismailiya as he moved to Cairo. According to Mitchell’s account (1969), al-Banna’s nominee was accepted in a general meeting. However, the supporters of a rival candidate to the post complained that the meeting had been unconstitutional. When a second meeting confirmed the original appointment, the dissidents started a campaign against the new appointee. They also legally accused al-Banna of misusing the organization’s funds by distributing them to the newly created branches, specifically the Cairo branch. However, the public prosecutor cleared al-Banna of charges, and the dissidents resigned before al-Banna could dismiss them. Soon, these dissidents initiated a campaign about the secret work of the organization, the threat it constituted for the Egyptian society, and above all, al-Banna’s arbitrary power and the organization’s denial of freedom of opinion (Mitchell, 1969). The First Breakaway Group The second dispute, known as “Fitnat-shabab-Muhammad” (fitna means riot here) occurred in 1939. This time, the consequences were not limited to the resignation of the dissidents. For the first time in the history of the Brotherhood, a splinter group was formed: the “Society of our Master Muhammad’s Youth” (Jam’iyat Shabab Sayyidina Muhammad).

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The split was the result of accumulative anger over three major issues. The first of these issues concerned, again, the use of funds. In fact, al-Banna, with the approval of the majority, spent some of the funds initially raised in support of the Arab strike in Palestine on the branches of the Brotherhood across Egypt. His argument was that increasing financial support to the branches should make the organization itself more effective in supporting the Palestinian case (Abdelhalim, 1994a). The second issue concerned the Brotherhood’s alliances with established political forces. In fact, one of the organization’s principal virtues was to avoid involvement with notables and parties. However, al-Banna’s friendly relationship with Ali Mahir (a politician and old friend of the royal family) and the Palace provided an occasion for the dispute. Al-Banna’s opponents criticized this relationship, especially since it allowed the Brotherhood to become one of the tools used by the Palace to fight against al-Wafd party. Al-Banna refused the opponent’s request to dismiss his deputy, Ahmad al-Sukkari, who was considered the informal political liaison officer of the organization, especially with the Palace (Mitchel, 1969). Internal tensions increased as the third and most important issue of the dispute, i.e., the organization’s strategy, came into force. Opponents demanded commitment to the movement’s ultimate mission; the “defense of Islamic values”, even if this involves the use of violence, or in their expression “the force of the hand”.2 AlBanna rejected the literal application of the organization’s mission and described his opponents as “the hasty and the anxious” in his famous speech, which he gave at the Fifth Conference held in 1939 (al-Banna,1990). Upon this, a relatively small group defected from the Brotherhood to form the “Society of Our Master Muhammad’s Youth”. More defections to the new group followed in 1940 (Mitchell, 1969). The 1947 Crisis The defection of 1939 and the complications it raised did not seriously affect neither the Brotherhood’s recruitment capacity nor its political influence. In fact, the war years and their political and economic consequences for Egypt added to the MB’s advance. However, opponents still requested that al-Banna would endorse real reform. Mitchell (1969) reports that some regulations were formulated in 2

Mitchel (1969) explains that the group turned in this dispute to the Prophetic tradition which says: “He among you who sees an abomination must correct it with his hand; if he is unable, then with his tongue; if he is unable, then with his heart. The last of these is the weakest of faith”. Al-Banna in this dispute, rejected the application of the Tradition in favor of the Quranic verse “Call upon the way of thy Lord with wisdom and fair exhortation, and reason with them in the better way.” (16:125)

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1945, paving the way for “a gradual abdication by al- Banna of his position, and the distribution of his power and functions to appropriately established governing units.[…] However, the process did not occur fast enough”(Mitchell, 1969, p. 54). In 1947, the opponents’ discontent was revived, and two conflicts erupted. Both conflicts can be considered as a “rebellion against al-Banna’s continued exercise of arbitrary power” (Mitchell, 1969, p. 19). The first conflict goes back to 1945, when an investigation was initiated upon complaints against Abdel Hakim Abidin, the Secretary General of the MB and al-Banna’s brother-in-law. He was accused of having abused his position to his personal advantage. A committee of investigation appointed by al-Banna could not reach agreement on the validity of the charges. However, it urged that Abidin should be dismissed from the organization “as a measure of purification”. Thus, the Guidance Office decided to dismiss Abidin. However, all accusations were dropped upon al-Banna’s interference. In response to this questionable attitude, Ibrahim Hassan, one of al-Banna’s oldest companions and second deputy, resigned in protest (Zollner, 2009). A few months after Hassan’s resignation, the other deputy, al-Sukkari, whom al-Banna refused to dismiss in 1939, was expelled by al-Banna himself. After the end of the Second World War, al-Banna and al-Sukkari disagreed about the Brotherhood’s relation with al-Wafd party: al-Sukkari sought to establish a union between the Brotherhood and al- Wafd as he perceived the latter as the “spiritual fulfilment” of the former. Al-Banna accepted, in principle, the idea of a coalition with al-Wafd if it would adopt the values of the Brotherhood. Apart from this disagreement about the relationship with al-Wafd, it seems that al-Sukkari saw himself as the real “political thinker” of the Brotherhood, while al-Banna was more of a “spiritual guide” (Mitchell, 1969; Abdelhalim, 1994a). Intervening again, al-Banna persuaded the MB’s General Assembly 3 to dismiss al-Sukkari from the Brotherhood. Salih Ashmawy, the leader of the Special Apparatus, succeeded al-Sukkari as a General Guide deputy, and the leadership of the Special Apparatus was passed on to Abdel Rahman al-Sanadi (Zollner, 2009). The 1947 events produced serious internal crises on both the administrative and moral levels. Al-Banna’s choice to appoint the head of the Special Unit as a successor to his two expulsed deputies indicated the transformation of power centers from the “political” to the “military” within the organization.

3

The General Assembly “al-Hay’a al Ta’sisiyya”, is the equivalent of the Shura Council today. It was elected by direct vote of the Brotherhood’s general members.

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This transformation will have serious consequences for the Brotherhood’s internal configurations and its unity in the years to come.

4.1.2

The Rise of the Militant Current

The organizational gap after the 1947 crisis and the resulting administrative changes as well as the transformation of power centers in favor of the militants led to the increasing power of the Special Apparatus inside the movement. While the leadership was paralyzed, the deputy’s influence grew. This can be explained by al-Sanadi’s good relations with Ashmawy rather than those with al-Banna (Abdelhalim, 1994a; Mitchel, 1969). It is widely believed that al-Sanadi, in accordance with Ashmawy, transformed the Special Apparatus into an “autonomous combat unit” (Zollner, 2009) which, as of 1948, started to frequently act without directions from the organization’s Supreme Guide (Salah, 1987; Abdelhalim, 1994a; Mitchel, 1969). Duality in leadership Although, the Brotherhood’s official position was against the use of violence, it is a matter of fact that the organization was engaged in violent acts that were planned and carried out by the Special Apparatus. It remains unclear whether al-Banna ordered the apparatus to engage in these violent activities or not. However, it is widely believed among historians and researchers that the Special Apparatus had started to act by that time without al-Banna’s consent. Indeed, within only two years (from 1947 to 1949) the influence of al-Sanadi and Ashmawi grew steadily, and the Special Unit achieved a dominant position within the Brotherhood. This can be explained by three interrelated factors. First, the transformation of power centers in favor of the militants, as described above. Second, the participation of the Special Apparatus members in the Arab Israeli war in 1948 strengthened the Apparatus and enforced its dominant position within the movement. Third, the growing clash with the ruling Sa’dist government under Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi made al-Banna move into the final stage of his organizational planning, thus reinforcing the paramilitary wing which was considered as the vanguard of the organization. By that time, the Special Apparatus had become fully structured; it had its own rules, functions and responsibilities. It also had its special symbols, oath, and equipment. The increasing recruits included army officers, some of whom were

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among the Free Officers who later led the 1952 coup. Al-Banna was technically the supreme leader of the Special Unit, but he communicated with the unit through its head, al-Sanadi (Mitchell, 1969). At the same time, al-Banna tried to limit al-Sanadi’s power4 , without directly clashing with him or dismissing him, since he feared the reaction of the Special Apparatus members. However, it seems that al-Banna’s efforts failed, and that the apparatus gradually ceased to be under his control and became, to a great extent, an independently acting group (Shady, 1987; Mitchell, 1969; Zollner, 2009). The struggle over the Special Apparatus The year 1948 was marked by the beginning of the Brotherhood’s violence. It was certainly a reflection of the power struggle within the organization. The militant faction grew stronger, and al-Banna lost control over it. This was demonstrated in the conflict between al-Banna and al-Sanadi, which blew up on the occasion of the assassination of the respected judge Ahmad al-Khazindar, who had sentenced a young MB member to prison for his attack on British soldiers. The assassination was operated by members of the Special Unit and by the command of al-Sanadi without the approval of al-Banna. In an attempt to reassert his control over the Special Unit, al-Banna dismissed al-Sanadi and assigned Sayed Fayez to its leadership. Fayez was aligned with al-Banna and sought to reform the Special Unit and to gain control over its members (Shady, 1987). Despite the dismissal of al-Sanadi, the Special Apparatus’ members remained loyal to him. In early December 1948, the government put together a case against the Brotherhood 5 with accusations of illegal possession of arms and training, terrorism by its secret military unit, and planning to overthrow the political order. The government dissolved the Brotherhood, surrounded its headquarters, and arrested all 4

According to Shady’s account, in his attempt to limit al-Sanadi’s influence, al-Banna assigned Mahmoud Labib to supervise the army members affiliated to the Special Apparatus, and appointed Salah Shady to be the liaison between the Brotherhood and the rebellious army groupings that were not affiliated to the MB’s Special Apparatus. (Shady, 1987, p. 139) 5 A number of events led the government to file a case against the Brotherhood: First, the confiscation of bombs and cases of arms in al Muqattam hill in Cairo, in January 1948. Second, the assassination of al-Khazindar in March 1948. Third, the Special Apparatus was accused of being behind anti-Jewish violent incidences that occurred after Egypt joined the Palestine War. Fourth, the government discovered in October 1948 a cache of arms and munitions in Ismailiyah on the estate of Shaykh Muhammad Farghali, the leader of the Brother’s battalions in Palestine. Fifth, the “jeep case” in November 1948; papers and documents were coincidentally found in a jeep used by members of the Special Apparatus, which provided the first public revelations of the existence of what the government named the “Secret Apparatus” of the MB. (For more details see: Mitchell, 1969; Abdelhalim, 1994b; Ramadan, 1993).

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leaders except al-Banna (Abdelhalim, 1994a). The dissolution in December 1948 completely shattered the chain of communication within the organization and led to al-Banna’s isolation. With the assassination of Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi on December 28, 1948, it was clear that al-Banna had completely lost control over the militant wing. While the latter was trying to calm the situation and negotiate with the government, the imprisoned Secret Unit leaders, recruited a young man to assassinate the Prime Minister (Mitchell, 1969). Following al-Nuqrashi’s assassination, alBanna tried once more to make peace with the new Prime Minister Ibrahim Abdel Hadi by taking part at a “mediation committee” including both parties. Under the government’s consent, al-Banna also wrote a pamphlet entitled “Bayan-unlil-nas” (announcement to the people), where he renounced the assassination of al-Nuqrashi, and made a public appeal to “those young ones” to cease from committing acts of violence. He also declared that “any further violence committed by MB members would be considered violence directed at his person” (cited in Mitchel, 1969, p. 68). On January 13th , 1949, and despite al-Banna’s efforts to stop violence committed by the militants, a member of the Special Apparatus made an attempt to bomb a courthouse6 . Towards the end of January of the same year, the negotiations between al-Banna and Abdel Hadi collapsed. New widespread arrests took place. Al- Banna, giving up hope for a settlement with the government, wrote a small pamphlet, “Qawlun Fasl”7 , where he denied all charges made against the organization in the decree of dissolution, and expressed sorrow for the violence committed by Brothers. However, he recalled that these were individual acts and that the leadership was unable to assert its control as a result of the dissolution decree: “There was no society to be questioned, no leaders to plan, for they were either in prison or under surveillance; it was the reaction we feared” (cited in Mitchell, 1969, p. 70).

6

The records of the “jeep case” investigation were kept in this courthouse. However, the bomb was discovered and exploded outside the court, killing several pedestrians. It is worth noting that this operation is one of the most mysterious ones. It is not clear who gave the order for this operation. In his memoir, Shady (1987) states that al-Banna found out, that al-Sanadi, who was arrested and accused in the Jeep case, was planning for this operation. Al-Banna ordered Shady to stop this operation. Shady passed on al-Banna’s orders to Fayiz, who supposedly passed it on to the members of the Special Unit. For a long time, the operation was believed to have been executed by al-Sanadi’s men. However, according to Shadi’s account, the actors of the operation confirmed that they received the orders for the execution of the operation from Fayiz himself. (See: Shady, 1987, p. 138.) 7 This pamphlet was al-Banna’s last written work. It was clandestinely distributed, and cannot be retrieved today.

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Internal Divisions and Organizational Disarray (1948–1970)

The dissolution of the Brotherhood in 1948 and the imprisonment of many of its members marked the end of a phase where the MB enjoyed legal status. The adoption of a hard line against the Brotherhood threatened the very existence of the organization. The government’s objective was not just to break the Special Apparatus, but to spell the end of the Brotherhood. The dissolution order in 1948 thus marks the start of a new phase known in the MB narrative as “al-mihna” (the ordeal, referring to state repression), a state that lasted until the mid-1970s. The experience of fierce repression affected the Brotherhood’s collective memory and identity and created a culture of victimhood. Furthermore, the ordeal narrative became a key narrative that forms the movement’s identity code, “ikhwanism” (al-Anani, 2016). This era was marked by successive waves of repression in 1948/9, 1954, and 1965, and by the intensification of internal clashes.

4.2.1

The Post-Banna Power Struggle (1948–1950)

By the end of 1948, members of the Brotherhood all over the country were detained, while only al-Banna and two members of the Guidance Office, Ahmad al-Baquri and Munir Dalla, remained free. After the failure of negotiations with the government, al-Banna planned to leave Cairo since he believed that the failure of the government to arrest him was his “official death warrant” (Abdelhalim, 1994b). Al-Banna thus appointed Al-Baquri to replace him in running the organization with the help of Dalla and the lawyer Hassan Al-Ashmawy (Shady, 1987). The first ordeal On Feburary 12, 1949, al-Banna was shot on the street outside the building of the Young Men’s Muslim Association and died in a nearby hospital, where he was left to bleed until his death. It is widely believed that the assassination was an act planned by the government with the probable support of the Palace and executed by members of the political police. Some argue that al- Banna was killed by the Special Apparatus men, who were outraged by his condemnation of their actions (Mitchel, 1969). Al-Banna’s murder case was reopened after the 1952 coup. Those believed to be involved, from the political police, were brought to

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trial. Al- Banna went to his grave, escorted by security forces. Only close family members were permitted to attend his funeral. During the year 1949, several Special Unit cells were uncovered, and another wave of arrests took place. The last major operation of the Secret Apparatus after al-Banna’s death occurred on May 5, 1949. Bombs were falsely dispatched at the car of the head of the Lower House of Parliament, Hamid Juda instead of that of Prime Minister Abdelhadi. The failed attempt on Prime Minister Abdelhadi and the near killing of Juda led to more arrests. Four court cases were set in motion: the “jeep case”, the Nuqrashi murder case, the cells case, and the Hamid Juda case ( Shady, 1987). Since a state of martial law had been declared, MBs were summoned to military trials and faced harsh punishments (Abdelhalim, 1994b, Mitchel 1969). Al-Banna’s assassination, the dissolution order, the persecution of Brothers and the military trials left the organization in a deep crisis. The survival of the organization was at stake: the organization operated in secrecy, without an officially designated leader, and with key administrative members behind bars. However, there have already been some suggestions about al-Banna’s successor. Potential successors at the time included four prominent figures, three of whom were still in prison. From inside the prison, the three candidates were Abdel Rahman-al-Banna (Hassan al- Banna’s brother), Ashmawy and Abidin. The fourth candidate was Ahmad al-Baquri.8 However, the election of a General Guide was postponed since the vast majority of Brothers were detained (Shady, 1987; Abdelhalim, 1994b). The General Guide dilemma Holding elections of the General Guide was not only logistically impossible but it was also threatening the organizational coherence. In fact, the leading circle was aware that holding the elections under these circumstances would bring ideological and strategic divisions to the fore and put an end to a unified and coherent organization (Zollner, 2009). Furthermore, the leading circle’s most immediate concern was to focus on the legalization of the Brotherhood. Yet, the legalization was also dependent on the outcome of the trials pending against the Brotherhood. In July 1949, the political context changed in favor of the Brotherhood: Al-Wafd, 8

Shady (1987) indicates that three more figures were considered but were not as prominent as the other four. These were Abdel Aziz Kamel, Mustafa Mu’min and Said Ramadan (p. 122). Zollner considers Mostafa Mu’min, who was the leader of the Brotherhood’s student organization, as the fifth of the potential successors for the post. She claims that the Guidance Office opted to expel Mu’min in favor of the others, since Mu’min stood for a more democratic distribution of power and was ideologically close to al- Wafd.

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who opted for a reconciliation with the Brotherhood, replaced the Sa’dist government. The new government ended the state of emergency, which permitted the MB trials to go to civil courts (Zollner, 2009). The verdicts cleared the MB from the accusations of being a terrorist organization and the group regained its financial assets and properties, including its headquarters. Having fought off the legal accusations, the MB’s leading circle sought to return to legality and to elect a new leader. However, the rift inside the leading circle was deep, and the disagreements were both ideological and strategic. On the one hand, General Guide deputy Ashmawy who was likely to be the successor of al-Banna, represented the military wing of the organization. This wing was inclined toward confrontation with the regime and the potential use of violence. On the other hand, the Guidance Office represented the accommodative wing. It sought to reconcile with the regime and return the Brotherhood to legality (Zollner, 2009). In an attempt to avoid schism, in the beginning of 1950, a prominent figure, Munir al-Dalla called for a meeting between the four potential nominees for the vacant post of General Guide. His objective was to reach an agreement inside the leading circle about the nomination of the new Guide and to avoid any disagreements that could lead to serious divisions inside the organization (Shady 1987; Abdelhalimd, 1994b). It was in this meeting that al-Dalla proposed the name of Hassan al-Hudaybi for the vacant post9 . This nomination appeared to be the only way out of the serious strategic disagreements and possible fragmentation within the organization. At the same time, al-Hudaybi lacked influence within the Brotherhood, meaning that the de facto leaders could preserve their influence and continue to act. Al-Hudaybi was a well-respected public figure with connections to the Palace, and therefore seemed to be able to restore the Brotherhood’s public image, support the reconciliation with the regime and assure the continuity of the Brotherhood as a legal mass or organization (Zollner, 2009). Al-Hudaybi’s nomination was kept secret for two years. It was in 1951 that he was officially nominated by the General Assembly10 . 9

Al-Hudaybi was al-Banna’s personal advisor since 1945. Whether he had joined the organization by this time is not clear. Al-Hudaybi either kept his association with the Brotherhood secret, since the Egyptian law banned members of the judiciary from membership in political organizations, or he never was a member of the organization. (For more details, see Zollner, 2009, p. 22) 10 Al-Hudaybi’s nomination was not in accordance with the MB’s internal bylaws. First, the bylaws dictate that the General Guide must have been a member of the General Assembly for at least 5 years and that he must be elected from among the members of the Assembly, at least 80% of the Assembly’s’ members should be present in the meeting on the day of the

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Rising Opposition Against al-Hudaybi’s Leadership (1951–1954)

Soon after his nomination, internal opposition against al-Hudaybi’s leadership broke out. Led by Ashmawy and al-Sanadi, opponents strongly criticized and resisted al-Hudaybi’s plans to dissolve the Special Apparatus. The strong personal bonds among the Special Apparatus members and their loyalty to al-Sanadi ensured the failure of Hudaybi’s efforts to dissolve it. Al-Hudaybi’s positive relationship with the Palace was another issue criticized by the opposition (Zollner, 2009). Internal tensions were intensified when the Free Officers took over the power in July 1952. At that time, Brothers were suffering from internal alienation, al-Hudaybi had not yet managed to consolidate his power within the organization, and the question of dissolving the Special Apparatus was still unresolved. For alHudaybi’s opponents, especially Ashmawy, it was an opportunity to regain the MB’s leadership. Furthermore, the new political setup brought new controversial matters into question such as the future role of the Brotherhood, its official status, and its relationship with the new regime (Abdelhalim, 1984; Zollner, 2009). Political party or religious movement? In September 1952, the “Revolutionary Command Council” (RCC) ordered all political parties to register themselves. This order triggered new internal divisions on the status of the organization. The question was whether the Brotherhood defined itself as a political party or as a religious association (Abdelhalim, 1984). In this regard, the Brotherhood’s General Assembly recommended registration as a political party. Al-Hudaybi, opposed the Assembly’s recommendation, and insisted that the Brotherhood was a religious association. It is not clear whether al-Hudaybi threatened to resign in protest, whether he managed to convince the Assembly, or if he simply ignored their vote. In all cases, the Brotherhood was registered as a religious association. The relationship with the Free Officers In 1952, al-Hudaybi and Nasser, who was in charge of the RCC’s dealings with the Brotherhood, declared friendly cooperation between both (Zollner, 2009). Soon, political disagreements broke out. There were four main aspects on which election, and the candidate should acquire at least 75% of the votes. Al-Hudaybi was not a member of the General Assembly, nor did he receive the necessary majority of the quorum. The Assembly was not attended by the obligatory number. His nomination had actually been determined by the de facto leaders of the MB, and the Assembly’s role in the election process was to legitimate the leader’s decision (For more details see: Zollner, 2009, pp. 20,21)

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al-Hudaybi and Nasser disagreed. First, Nasser ignored al-Hudaybi’s request for the application of the general principles of the Islamic Shari’a in Egypt. Second, the Brotherhood advocated for the separation between the political and military spheres and was determined that the military should “return to its barracks”. RCC members who wished to participate in politics were expected to leave the military. Third, the Brotherhood wished to establish a democratic regime with a parliamentary system or what the Brothers called a “constitutional regime”. Fourth, the Brotherhood disagreed with the RCC on the scope of land reform (Abdelhalim, 1984). Besides the conflict between the RCC and the Brotherhood, Hudaybi’s stance on the previously mentioned issues became an occasion for internal divisions within the Brotherhood’s General Assembly. One bloc held onto al-Hudaybi’s vision and believed that the RCC and the Brotherhood had fundamentally different views on the state system and that these ideological differences could not be overcome. This bloc mistrusted Nasser. They wanted the Brotherhood to continue as a non-aligned pressure group, acting in the future in opposition to Nasser’s influence on the RCC. The second bloc stood for cooperation with Nasser. The head of this faction was the Brotherhood’s second-in-command, Deputy General Abdel Qadir Ouda. This bloc argued that the Brotherhood should provide Nasser with its absolute support. There was no reason to distrust Nasser, who gave the oath of allegiance (al-bay’a) to the Special Apparatus a few years ago11 (Abdelhalim, 1984). When Al-Hudaybi failed to gain the support of Ouda in this matter, he created the post of Vice Leader “na’ib al-murshid” which ranked higher than the position of Deputy General. While keeping Ouda in his position, Khamis Humayda, who was aligned with al-Hudaybi, was appointed Vice Leader (Abdelhalim, 1984). However, this measure did not end the conflict. Opposition to al-Hudaybi’s leadership sharpened when the latter rejected the RCC’s proposal to offer the Brotherhood some ministries in the new cabinet under Naguib. Prominent leader al-Baquri,

11

The Brotherhood had recruited army officers in its Special Apparatus, and supported other opposing groups inside the military. Nasser was among those Officers who gave oaths to the Special Apparatus, and was thus considered a fellow Brother. Most influential members in the opposing bloc knew Nasser personally and trusted him. Personal links between these officers and a number of Brothers extended back to the Palestine War period. Evidence of this tie can be found in several memoirs written by members of the RCC; the most important sources to describe this relationship are those of al-Sadat and Muhi al-Din, and MB leader Shady (see also: Zollner, 2009, p. 26).

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who accepted the post of Minister of Religious Endowments in defiance with the leadership’s decision, was forced to leave the organization.12 The failing relationship between al-Hudaybi and Nasser had severe implications for the organization’s internal harmony. On the one hand, it widened the rift between the Brotherhood and the RCC, leading to the fierce suppression of the group since 1954. On the other hand, it sharpened the internal divisions within the movement and reflected the fundamental division between the Brotherhood’s general membership and al-Hudaybi concerning the future role of the organization. In addition, al-Hudaybi’s leadership was questioned. He was considered by his opponents as an obstacle in the path of cooperation with the new regime, an incompetent leader, and even an “intruder” to the organization. Al-Hudaybi’s topdown approach in dealing with internal conflicts led to alienating the membership from him even further. The internal upheaval of 1953 In 1953, the MB was extremely polarized. On the one hand, al-Hudaybi was supported by the majority of the Guidance Office and had a loyal wing inside the Special Apparatus as well as an aligned bloc inside the General Assembly. On the other hand, the inner opposition seemed to have grown stronger. Opponents formed an alliance seeking to have al-Hudaybi removed from his position. This alliance was composed of two divergent internal blocs, the military bloc and the reformist wing, and was externally supported by Nasser. The reformist wing was concerned with the structure of command and administration of the Brotherhood. They opposed the hierarchical structure of the Brotherhood and opted for internal democracy. They criticized al-Hudaybi’s top-down approach, which he used to undermine his opponents. They also requested a time limit of three years on the General Guide’s term of office, which would have meant an imminent end to al-Hudaybi’s leadership (Zollner, 2009). The military wing, led by Ashmawy and al-Sanadi, opposed al-Hudaybi since the latter was determined to dissolve the Special Apparatus (Abdelhalim, 1984). This wing mobilized disenchanted radical members, especially among the younger generation, to join the opposition against al-Hudaybi. Furthermore, Nasser supported the dissidents within the organization. Both shared the same goal; to force al-Hudaybi to resign and to facilitate the cooperation between the Brotherhood and the regime (Zollner, 2009). Al-Hudaybi fought back his opponents. He managed to hinder the attempts to limit his term of office, successfully dismissed Ashmawy from the Guidance 12

AL-Hudaybi gave al-Baquri the choice either to accept the post and leave the MB or to decline the post and remain in the MB (see: Shady, 1987).

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Office in the new election and expelled al-Sanadi and other influential figures from the Special Apparatus (Abdelhalim, 1984; Shady, 1987).13 The expulsions of al-Sanadi and Ashmawy resulted in a backlash: on the 27th and 28th of November 1953, a group invaded al Hudaybi’s residence, while a second group occupied the Brotherhood’s main headquarters in Cairo. The aim of the rebels was to force al-Hudaybi to resign, and reverse the expulsions. However, al-Hudaybi’s supporters managed to regain control and disperse the dissenters. Following this incident, several opponents were expelled from the Brotherhood, including leading figures such as Ashmawy. It seemed that alHudaybi had regained authority over the Brotherhood (Shady, 1987; Abdelhalim, 1984; Zollner, 2009).

4.2.3

The Great Ordeal: Divisions during the Prison Years (1954–1970)

The failed relationship between al-Hudaybi and Nasser paved the way for the “great ordeal”, al-mihna al-kubra. On January, 14 1954, the RCC ordered the dissolution of the Brotherhood. Al-Hudaybi and supporting MB leaders were accused of betrayal and were arrested. A press campaign was launched against the organization (Abdelhalim, 1984). It seemed that al- Hudaybi was the prime target of the dissolution order and that the RCC intended to rebuild the Brotherhood under a more cooperative leadership. According to Shady (1987), negotiations between Nasser and Ouda took place between January and March 1954. Ouda demanded the release of the imprisoned MB members and Nasser required alHudaybi’s removal from his position and the dissolution of the Special Apparatus in return. At the same time, al- Hudaybi aligned himself with Naguib, who was still officially head of the RCC and President of the Republic. In an open letter to Naguib, al-Hudaybi accused Nasser of intending to establish a dictatorship.

13

These figures were charged with obstructing the dissolution of the Secret Unit. The killing of Fayiz, Head of the Secret Unit, on November 20th 1953 by a letter bomb, was the proof that the military group ceased to be controllable. Although it is impossible to prove who was behind the murder, it is believed that Fayiz was killed by the members of the Secret Unit that he was leading. Supposedly, the motive for his assassination was that he allied himself with al Hudaybi.

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After months of power struggles between Nasser and Naguib, and with the support of the Brotherhood, Naguib reasserted his control over the RCC.14 As Naguib regained power in March 1954, the Brotherhood’s dissolution order was withdrawn, Brothers were released from prisons, and al-Hudaybi gained the support of several opposing figures, including Ouda. Al-Sanadi, Ashmawy and other dissidents who were dismissed in 1953 after their attempt to remove al-Hudaybi, declared regret and returned to the MB. By the end of the month, however, the decisions of March were canceled. Naguib resigned from his post as Prime Minister, and Nasser took over the cabinet. The conflict between Nasser and the Brotherhood escalated when al-Hudaybi criticized the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement signed by Nasser in July 1954 (Abdelhalim, 1984). Al- Manshiyyah incident The Brotherhood was divided again into two currents: a confrontational current led by al-Hudaybi, opting for direct opposition to the regime, and a reconciliatory current opposing al-Hudaybi’s escalation. This internal rift led the organization to a dead end (Abdelhalim, 1984). During this time, a new wave of detentions commenced, communication between members and the leadership was interrupted, and the Brotherhood was forced underground. Zollner (2009) points out that the idea of the Special Apparatus was revived at that time, and that al-Hudaybi wanted the Special Apparatus to continue its recruitment and training under his surveillance. The conflict with Nasser reached its peak when a Brotherhood member attempted to assassinate Nasser during his speech at al- Manshiyyiah Square in October 1954. The question of whether al- Mansihyyah incident was a plot against Nasser or a conspiracy against al-Hudaybi cannot be answered with certainty15 . However, there is no doubt that these events were in favor of Nasser. In fact, this incident did not only enable Nasser to eliminate the Brotherhood, but also to ultimately deny Naguib all his mandates. The Brotherhood was abolished, and a new wave of arrests was launched against its members. Vast detentions included leaders, members, and affiliates of the MB. Only a few managed to 14

In March 1954, protesters led by the MB gathered in Abidin square against the Free Officers. Protestors only left when Naguib gave a speech promising the return of democratic elections. 15 The official account suggests that the assassination attempt was planned and executed by the MB. According to the MB, the incident was organized by Nasser himself, to undermine the Brotherhood. A third hypothesis suggests that al-Hudaybi’s opponents from within the MB could have planned the incident in accordance with Nasser to get rid of al-Hudaybi. (See: Zollner, 2009.)

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flee into exile (Shady, 1987). Seven leaders were condemned to death, including General Guide al-Hudaybi, whose verdict was altered to life imprisonment16 . The crackdown on the Brotherhood in 1954 had a significant impact on the organization’s internal unity. Between 1954 and 1976, the Brotherhood was behind bars, where it underwent several ideological struggles. The re-organization of the Brotherhood: al-tanzim al-jadid Until 1957, the organization seemed to have come to an end. Internal communication was distorted and there was neither an underground movement nor a Special Apparatus. Inside the prisons, there were neither groupings nor an exchange of ideas. Memoirs of MB members describe the hardship of imprisonment, the torture and the injustice inflicted upon them. A mood of desperation, victimization and silence mark these years (Zollner, 2009). By the year 1958, the government had loosened its policy of repression: several Brothers, mostly younger and lower ranking members, were released. Al- Hudaybi was pardoned and put under house arrest. The release of Brothers revived the organization. During the year 1958, two small groups emerged independently of one another. One group gathered around Abdelfattah Ismail, who was just released, and another group around Ali Ashmawi and Ahmad Abdel Majid, young MB members who were never detained. Eventually, the leaders of the two groups met and decided to merge, with the objective of reorganizing the Brotherhood. The new group also re-established contact with al-Hudaybi and sought his approval of the reorganization of the Brotherhood. According to alGhazaly (1999) and Abdelmajid (1991) al-Hudaybi did not object to the project, but advised the group to “act in accordance with the order of dissolution.” The new group “tanzim al-jadid”, which is also known as “Organization 1965”, started recruiting members from outside the MB, and in a number of governorates. Relations with the Brothers in exile were also re-established. Brothers in Saudi Arabia became the financial supporters of the group. Links were also established with Sayyid Qutb, who became the ideologue and spiritual leader of the group. When Qutb was released in 1964, the mood of despair among Brothers had been replaced by a new spirit of activism. Nasser was seen as the prime cause of the ordeal. He was considered a tyrannical and anti-Islamic leader. Supposedly, there were talks about assassinating the president and/or state officials, but without any concrete plans (Ashmawy, 2006). 16

The seven members condemned to death included the assassin, Mahmoud Abdel Latif, five leaders among them Ouda, and the General Guide al-Hudaybi. The death sentences were carried out, with the exception of that of al-Hudaybi.

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The MB leadership detained in al-Wahat prison, objected to the existence of the group. They feared a new wave of arrests which would not only target the members of Organization 1965 but also the wider circle of Brothers. Another crackdown on the Brotherhood could put an ultimate end to the organization and aggravate the detention conditions of MB prisoners (Ashmawy, 2006; Abdelmajid, 1991). In July 1965, these fears became true: the Organization was uncovered, and a new wave of detentions began. Anyone who was suspected of being a member of the Brotherhood was arrested. The main charge against the detained Brothers was high treason, the attempt to assassinate Nasser and planning to overthrow the state system. The military trials announced hundreds of prison sentences, as well as several death penalties. Among those condemned to death were Qutb, al-Hudaybi, Isma’il, and Yusuf Hawash. The sentences against Qutb, Isma’il and Hawash were carried out in August 1966. Al-Hudaybi’s sentence was again suspended and then altered to life imprisonment. Meanwhile, imprisoned Brothers were severely tortured, humiliated, and killed (Ra’if, 1985; al-Ghazaly, 1999). Ideological struggles behind bars Brothers’ memoirs accounting for the year 1965, report that the conditions in the prisons were appalling and that the torture and abuse were systematic (eg. Ra’if, 1985; al-Ghazaly, 1999; Abdelmajid, 1991; Ashmawi, 2006). This time, however, the mood of the new prisoners was different. They were not speechless or desperate, like in 1954. It seems that the short revival of the Brotherhood has left its mark on the Brothers. Ideological differences were not evident at the time. Brothers had a strong sense of collective identity and resistance. It is reported that Brothers who were sentenced, were celebrated as heroes upon their return to their prisons from court sessions. Similarly, the enforcement of the death penalty on Qutb made him a martyr for the Islamic cause. (Zollner, 2009) However, shortly after the execution of Qutb, a debate among Brothers was raised. The focal point of this debate was related to the concept of jahiliyya (the state of pre-Islamic ignorance) as well as the perception of Nasser and his regime. Ideological differences started to appear. The debates were aggravated by two events: first, the “awareness campaigns and petitions” initiated by the regime inside the prisons, and second, the Egyptian defeat by Israel in 1967. The result of these debates was the appearance of three trends inside the MB which will be explained subsequently. By 1967, the conditions inside the prisons had improved and torture had ceased. Instead, a new method was applied: the “awareness campaigns”. Awareness sessions began inside the prisons, shortly before the war in 1967. Ulama’

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(knowledgeable men in religious matters) were invited to organize sessions about Islam and politics in front of an audience of Brothers’ prisoners. Brothers were obliged to actively participate in these discussions and were promised that they would be released from prison if they were to regret their activism in the Brotherhood, and to support the regime. As proof of their remorse, they were requested to write and sign petitions supporting Nasser’s international politics. This matter caused controversies among prisoners. The majority decided to sign the petitions, considering their act as “taqiya”; a practice in Islam permitting adherents to conceal their religion under threat of persecution or the threat of life. Only few Brothers, who by that time were called “the Qutbists” refused to sign the petitions. This group denied that it was legitimate to support Nasser under any circumstances. Influenced by Qutb’s writings, this faction considered Nasser an illegitimate leader, and their struggle against his regime was comparable to the struggle of the first Muslims against the infidels. They saw themselves as the “vanguard “ that Qutb spoke of and decided to live in a state of inner hijra (flight) until they were ready for the struggle against the Jahiliya. Their aim was to establish a society submitting to God’s absolute sovereignty (hakimiya). This group distanced itself from fellow Brothers, avoided them, and was eventually separated by prison personnel in special cells at Liman Turrah. The disagreements between these two factions of MB prisoners were more pronounced after the Egyptian defeat in the 1967 war by Israel (Ra’if, 1985) Heated discussions arose when Brothers diverged on the matter of supporting Nasser in his fight against Israel. While the first group opposed Nasser’s regime but still considered Nasser a Muslim whom they would support against a nonMuslim enemy, “Qutbists” believed that Israel was not the immediate enemy of Islam, but rather Egypt’s leadership. They interpreted the Egyptian defeat as a sign of God’s punishment of Nasser. Thus, “Qutbists” broke away on a jurisprudential and ideological level from mainstream Brothers. Spatially, they were separated from the rest and were concentrated in Abou Za’bal prison as of 1967 (Ra’if, 1985; Abdelmajid, 1991). Among the Qutbists, were Muhammad Qutb (Sayyid Qutb’s brother), Ali Ismail (Abdelfattah Ismail’s brother, who was executed with Sayyid Qutb), and Shukri Mustafa. While most Qutbists renounced takfir (blasphemy) in prison, Shukri Mustafa was the only remaining Qutbist advocating for the idea. Upon his release from prison in 1971, Mustafa established the militant group “jama’at al-muslimin” (Muslim Society), also known as al-takfir wal hijra.

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Fighting against radicalization Before the 1965 crackdown, Qutb’s ideas had reached the imprisoned Brothers. By that time, the MB inmates were dispersed among different prisons17 . However, the hospital at Turrah prison provided a platform for the exchange of information and ideas among prisoners who were sent there for treatment. When Qutb’s ideas reached Brothers in other prisons, a new debate flared. In al- Qanatir prison, Brothers were divided into supporters and opponents of Qutb’s ideas. Younger Brothers were particularly inspired by Qutb. Those who were released in 1958, like Abdelfattah Ismail, joined the group (Zollner, 2009). Meanwhile, others were skeptical about the source of the ideology and refused to approve Qutb’s ideas unless they were accepted by the leadership in al-Wahat prison. From its side, the leadership in al-Wahat prison was worried about the radicalization of Qutb’s ideas, which affected the ideological make-up of younger Brothers (Shady, 1987). After his execution, heated discussions about Qutb’s ideas intensified. Brothers across diverse prisons addressed questions to al-Hudaybi concerning his stance on Qutb’s ideology. Al- Hudaybi’s answers came in the form of seven public letters, gathered under the name “Saba rasail men sijn-Turra” (Zollner, 2009, p. 45). Al-Hudaybi also gave a speech in Liman Turra, in which he distanced himself from the radical ideas of Organization 1965. This speech marked the beginning of a fundamental disagreement on the organization’s ideological and strategic premises. During this phase, al-Hudaybi and the “old guard” tried to regain control over the organization by fighting the emerging radical trend. A distinct group, which previously opposed al-Hudaybi’s management of the group, supported alHudaybi in his fight against the radical faction. Hence, the MB’s leadership held trials for its members inside the prisons. The objective of these trials was the correction and filtration of the Brotherhood’s ideology and basic foundations. In these trials, Brothers had to answer questions about Nasser and about their perception of activism. It was important to identify whether members considered

17

Law rank MB members were imprisoned in al-Qanatir prison, and leaders were held in alWahat prison. Qutb, who became the spiritual leader and ideologue for the new tanzim stayed most of the time in the Liman-Turrah hospital-because of his poor health- It was there that he wrote and revised his important works “Fi Zilal al-Quraan” (In the shadows of al-Quran) and “Ma’alim fi al- Tariq”(Milestones). The latter was supposedly written to provide “Organization 1965” with spiritual guidelines. It was smuggled out of the prison hospital with the help of Qutbs’ sisters and handed over to al-Ghazaly and the leading committee of the new group. (See: al-Ghazaly, 1999, Ashmawy, 2006, Zollner, 2009.)

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Nasser a Muslim or a kafir (infidel), and whether they supported militant or reformist opposition (Zollner, 2009; Ramadan, 1993). In fact, Qutbists represented the militant revolutionary trend, and believed that the establishment of an Islamic state was an immediate duty that could only be realized through violence. Jihad was therefore perceived as a proactive method. The moderate counterpart represented a rather reformist trend advocating for gradual change towards the establishment of an Islamic state. This was only possible through cultivation (ta’lim) and proselytization (da’wa). It is important to mention that the trials were not a decision for or against Qutb. His writings could have been interpreted either way. In fact, Qutb remained a respected scholar for both radicals and moderates. While reformists focused on the priority that Qutb assigned to education and proselytization, Qutbists were more influenced by the concepts of jahiliya and hakimiya (Ramadan, 1993; Zollner, 2009). It was during these ideological and strategic divisions that the book “Du’ah la Qudah” (Preachers not Judges) was co-authored by al-Hudaybi and his son Ma’mun al-Hudaybi in Liman Turrah. Other members of the Guidance Office, such as al-Tilmisani, and Mashhur also supported al-Hudaybi in this effort. “Du’ah la Qudah” reflected the efforts exerted by the old guard to contain the radical thinking of Qutbists, and draw the path for the Brotherhood’s future development as a peaceful mass movement (Zollner, 2009).

4.3

Dissentions after the Second Founding (1970–2011)

This section covers the “accommodation phase” that starts with the decease of Nasser in 1970 and ends with the toppling of Mubarak in 2011. The “accommodation phase” reveals two main characteristics: first, it is characterized by a dual policy towards the Brotherhood: a general appeasement with the Brotherhood as a mass movement representing mainstream moderate Islamists, coupled with the denial of its legal status. Second, the state’s policy towards the Brotherhood shifted constantly, according to the perceived threat it posed to the regime. In other words, the general “hands-off approach” (Wickham, 2013) was interrupted from time to another by phases of mid-scale repression and harassment. In September 1970, Nasser died suddenly, and his Vice President, Sadat, was nominated to succeed Nasser. Sadat adopted a policy of appeasement towards the Brotherhood without approving its legal status. As of 1970, Brotherhood members were released from prison. After their release, Sadat encouraged their activities to counterweigh his rivals on the left. It was in this context that the Brotherhood

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was re-established (the Second Founding). Generally, the MB enjoyed a greater margin of freedom during Sadat’s era. The relationship between the Brotherhood and Sadat can be divided into two phases: a phase of “peaceful coexistence” from 1970 to 1978, and a “phase of confrontation” from 1978 to 1981. The latter was marked by tension due to disagreements regarding the Egyptian Israeli Peace Treaty and the Iranian Revolution (Aly and Wenner, 1982; Ibrahim, 1982). Under Sadat, the “new” Brotherhood became an active participant in political life. It altered its political tactics: it engaged in institutional politics (for example, in the People’s Assembly) and accepted democracy as a political system. In fact, the Brotherhood joined other secular opposition groups in demanding a free and competitive party system and greater democratic freedom. After the assassination of Sadat in October 1981 by the hands of militant Islamists, Mubarak was nominated President. Mubarak followed Sadat’s political line towards the Brotherhood. His era can also be divided into “accommodation” and “confrontation” phases. During the first decade of his rule (1981–1990), the regime adopted a “cautious tolerance and accommodation” strategy towards the Brotherhood (Campagna, 1996). The latter was allowed to participate in parliamentary and local government elections. While its status remained illegal, it was able to form alliances with legal parties. In return, the Brotherhood distanced itself from militant Islamists and did not question Mubarak’s legitimacy. Instead, its criticism targeted the ruling party and ministers, as well as specific policies and reforms (Hafez, 2003). From 1990 up until 2011, the relationship between the Mubarak regime and the Brotherhood was characterized by tensions. During this “confrontation phase”, the regime was concerned by the growing power of the Brotherhood and the informal legitimacy it gained in the society. This “societal legitimacy” or “service-based legitimacy” (Awadi, 2005; 2009) constituted a threat to the regime’s legitimacy and explains the change in Mubarak’s policy towards the Brotherhood. The confrontation phase was interrupted by two years of a greater margin of freedom (2005–2007), a phase during which the confrontation policy was to some extent reduced. The shifting policy during the Mubarak era affected the Brotherhood’s internal dissensions. In fact, the Brotherhood had developed two contentious blocs: The Conservative and the Reformist bloc. Furthermore, generational tensions and divisions appeared. Generally, open-minded progressive youth challenged the old conservative leadership. The interplay between these currents and generations was clearly affected by the shifting state’s policy.

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Brotherhood’s Conflicting Currents

After the Brotherhood’s release from prisons, it was clear that the organization chose the peaceful reformists path. According to Ashmawy (2006), prior to their release from prison, Sadat had conducted negotiations with the MB leaders, who clearly affirmed their commitment to non-violence. In line with al-Hudaybi’s document “Preachers not Judges”, ideas implying accusations of takfir (blasphemy) and violence were rejected. It was thus during al-Tilmisani’s era (1976–1986), that the MB entered the field of institutional politics, accepted the state regime and played by its rules. Since the 1980’s, the Brotherhood has been keen to distance itself from the militant Islamists and reaffirm its commitment to pluralism, gradualism, and non-violence whenever necessary (Hafez, 2003). During the Sadat era, the MB did not experience internal divisions and managed to keep its internal unity intact. During Mubarak’s era, particularly in the mid 1980’s, the compromising regime policies enabling the Brotherhood’s participation in political life contributed to the flourishing of reformist ideas. In this context, two currents emerged: the Reformist and the Conservative current. The Reformist current was composed of public work-oriented members, mainly consisting of members who have joined the Brotherhood in the 1970’s, and the Conservative current consisted of organization-oriented members mainly consisting of the organization’s old-guard18 . The interplay between these currents was affected by the regime’s policy towards the Brotherhood. While the Reformist current flourished in times of relative political openness, the Conservative current dominated in times of increasing tension and confrontation with the regime. The interplay between these two blocs, and the resulting tensions were exposed on a number of occasions, particularly in al-Wasat crisis, the political party platform, and the internal elections in 2009. Al-Wasat crisis By the mid 1980’s, reformist activists, headed by Aboul Ela Madi, formed “al-Wasat group” (the Center). The group perceived itself as a distinct generation from that of the Brotherhood’s leadership. Indeed, this group was mainly composed of the middle generation activists, i.e. the student activists of “aljama’at islamiya”, who merged with the Brotherhood in 1976. According to Madi, “al-Wasat members were formed as a group inside the Islamic movement and constituted a major part of it. Joining the Brotherhood was a phase in their 18

These trends within the MB will be addressed in detail in the next chapter.

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political career but not its beginning. This generation was thus aware of the Brotherhood’s flaws concerning its ideology, its legal status, and its strategies” (Tammam, 2010a, p. 121). Al- Wasat founders were intellectually affected by al-Wassatiyyah school based in Egypt, and the platform of the Tunisian al-Nahda party. Al-Wasat was especially influenced by Rached Ghannouchi’s viewpoints on the comprehensive nature of the Islamic organization. According to this view, the comprehensive nature of Islam should not necessarily be reflected in the scope of activism of Islamic organizations (Tammam, 2010a). Indeed, this idea challenges alBanna’s multi-faced definition of the Brotherhood, as “a salafi call, a sunni approach, a sufi truth, a political institution, an athletic group, a scientific and cultural society, an economic organization and a social idea” (al-Banna, 1990). The generational and intellectual differences between al-Wasat group and the Brotherhood’s conservative leadership, were reflected in the contention which revolved around two key issues. The first issue concerned the legal form and character of the Brotherhood. Like in the 1950s, the question of whether the MB was a reform-oriented religious movement, or a competitive political actor came to the fore. Al-Wasat founders advocated for the transformation of the MB into a political party, or at least the creation of a separate party. They developed a platform for a “civic party based on Islamic faith” (Tammam, 2010a). The group also endorsed pluralism and equal citizenship rights for women and non-Muslims. The second issue concerned the matter of legality, which was tightly related to the party issue. While the Brotherhood’s leadership did not seek obtaining a legal status since 1954, al-Wasat group was convinced that the Brotherhood should seek legality by forming a separate political party. Legality was important in view of al-Wasat founders, since it was the only way to become integrated in the political and social spheres. They were convinced that the regime benefited from the MB’s illegal status by harassing midlevel cadres and leaders with the pretext of adhering to an illegal organization aiming to overthrow the regime, and by excluding the MB from “national dialogues”, which were periodically organized (Tammam, 2010a). Moreover, becoming a political party was perceived by al-Wasat founders as consistent with the Brotherhood’s new strategy of institutional political engagement. Indeed, the Brotherhood had been politically active since the 1980s, and by the mid-1990s it was represented in the Parliament, professional syndicates, university staff clubs, and student unions (Kandil, 2011). However, the conservative leadership strongly opposed the political party initiative. According to the leadership, the idea of forming a party was accepted in principle. Yet, the timing was not “right”. Creating a legal political party was not only useless, but also dangerous. Given the “zero-tolerance approach” applied by

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towards the MB since the beginning of the 1990s, the regime would not only reject legalizing the MB’s political party, but it would also rush a clash with the organization, putting its survival at stake. Al- Wasat founders believed, however, that the old guard opposed their initiative since it constituted a challenge to their authority and control over the organization (Wickham, 2013). They blamed the organization’s old guard for hindering all attempts to legalize the Brotherhood since illegality allowed the organization to escape the rule of law, accountability, and overall transparency. Being subject to the judicial system and the public opinion would certainly limit the leadership’s freedom of action (Tammam, 2010a). Al-Wasat founders also accused the leadership of being two-faced; publicly seeking to form a political party and to legalize the status of the organization, while hindering all real attempts to form a political party.19 Hence, the regime was not the only obstacle in the path of legalizing the status of the Brotherhood, but the Brotherhood’s leadership itself. In 1996, the conflict between al-Wasat group and the MB’s leadership reached its peak. After submitting their proposal to the Political Parties Committee, Ma’mun al-Hudaybi, General Guide at the time, forced al- Wasat advocates to leave the Brotherhood. The Political Parties Committee rejected the proposal. Al-Wasat activists were denied the license to form a political party and the membership of the Brotherhood. The group became active in the Egyptian Association for Culture and Dialogue, headed by Selim al-Awwa. Al- Wasat crisis did not only expose the internal conflicts to the public opinion, but it also uncovered the top-down approach in dealing with the internal opposition. Internally, the expulsion of al-Wasat group weakened the remaining Reformist current inside the Brotherhood. The political party platform crisis The short-lived political openness (2005–2007), seemed to have inspired the MB to draft a political party platform. In 2007, the draft was distributed to a group of intellectuals. Yet, this draft paved the way for a contentious debate within the group and brought ideological and intellectual disparities to the fore (Brown and Hamzawy, 2008). In fact, the original draft was prepared by the Reformist trend, which had grown stronger as a result of political openness between 2005 and 2007. Motivated by the American reform programs and inspired by the Justice and 19

There was an intitiative to form a political party “al-Shura party” under the leadership of Tilmisany, and “al-Islah party” after his death.

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Development Islamic party in Turkey, the Reformists revised some of the previous opinions of the Brotherhood, notably those regarding the participation of women in political action and the matter of Copts. The reformist trend proposed a shift toward partisan activism, a separation between the proselytization and the political aspects of the group, and the approval of equal citizenship (Tammam, 2011). These views annoyed the Conservative bloc and the Salafi cluster inside the movement, which criticized the draft’s visions for being too liberal. Thus, the Conservative bloc made radical changes in the original draft, making it less progressive: women and Copts were prevented from running for elections, and religious supervision (majlis al-ulama) was placed on top of the Parliament (Brown and Hamzawy, 2008). These contradictory positions indicated in the initial draft and the final political party platform exposed the rising ideological and intellectual disaccords within the MB. When the final platform was published in 2007, conflict erupted between the Reformists and the Conservatives. Yet, the political inflexibility that followed the short-lived political openness (2005– 2007), allowed the Conservative stream to assert its control over the organization, delegalize the Reformists and marginalize its leaders. The internal elections crisis Internal tensions between the Reformists and Conservatives culminated again in 2009, when General Guide Mahdi Akef, threatened to resign and delegate his powers to his first deputy; Habib. The crisis started when the Guidance Office (led by the Conservatives bloc) refused Akef’s decision to promote the reformoriented leader Esam al-Eryan to the Office’s membership, although the bylaws gave him the right to do so. The dispute between Akef and other members of the Guidance Office forced Akef to threaten to resign. Al-Anani (2009b) denotes that Akef who had managed to contain the internal tensions between the Reformist and the Conservatives, could no longer resist the growing power of the latter. The internal tensions heated up as Akef declared in 2009 that he would step down at the end of his term in January 2010. The Conservatives were determined to control the organization. The Guidance Office elections in 2009, which were the first elections since 1995, resulted in the victory of the Conservative bloc.20 The sixteen seated Office was dominated by Conservative leaders, the two Reformists Habib and Aboulfotuh were eliminated from the Guidance Office, and 20

The term for each member is six years. The term is extended if elections are delayed which is often the case because of security reasons.

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Eryan’s reformative tendencies were contained (Hamzawy and Brown, 2010). The General Guide elections, followed the Guidance Office elections. The leadership disagreed about the scheduling of the elections. The new Guidance Office rushed the election of a new General Guide despite internal tensions, between Reformists and Conservatives. In January 2010, Mohamed Badi’, who also belonged to the Conservative stream, was elected as the eighth General Guide of the Brotherhood. The internal elections produced a dramatic turn towards the conservative trend. The results of the internal elections led to some objections from reformist figures. For instance, Habib publicly insisted that the election process was not legitimate (Lynch, 2009). Al-Qaradawy declared that “the reformative stream [was] under siege” (cited in Tammam, 2011).

4.3.2

Generational Divides and Tensions

In the mid- 2000s, a new generation within the MB came to prominence. The new generation consisted of independent-minded young urban activists who were affiliated to the Brotherhood. This generation was referred to by scholars as “MB Youth” or “the Blogger” generation since it consisted of MB youth who used social media platforms, especially blogs, to discuss social, political, and religious affairs, as well as MB’s internal affairs (Lynch,2007; Anani, 2009a). Among the prominent figures of this generation were Mustafa al-Naggar, Abdelrahman Ayyash, Islam Lufty, Muhammad al-Qasas, and Ibrahim al-Hudaiby, grandson of Mu’min al-Hudaybi the sixth General Guide. In the beginning, the leadership underestimated the impact of the blogger’s online activism. However, they soon realized that the bloggers challenged their authority and caused internal tensions. Indeed, “these online discussions were a manifestation of a new trend among young Muslim Brothers and a dynamic new force inside the organization” (Lynch, 2007). Because the leadership could not risk the defection of this constituency in the years prior to 2011, they opted to contain the tensions through the organization of discussions with the young bloggers. However, after the 2011 uprising, the leadership crowded this generation as well as the Reformists out, and several splinter parties were formed. The bloggers challenge MB bloggers were different from their leadership in many ways. They opposed the secrecy of the organization and advocated instead for the exchange of ideas with other groups from other ideological orientations (for more details, see 5.1.1).

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Furthermore, they were inclined towards political activism and were comfortable with cross-partisan cooperation. Confronted with the growing conservatism within the organization, the young MB activists used the blogosphere to criticize some of the Brotherhood’s organizational practices and positions. Exposing the Brotherhood’s internal affairs on social media caused tensions and challenged the image of the Brotherhood as a coherent organization. For instance, in 2005, growing tensions between the bloggers and the leadership were revealed. The young bloggers increasingly demanded internal democracy. They addressed issues concerning the criteria for promotion to higher positions and requested a set of transparent guidelines for the internal decisionmaking process, as well as rules for accountability. They also demanded greater freedom of debate as well as an increasing inclusion of women and youth within the Brotherhood (El-Sherif, 2012; Samir, 2018). Internally, the blogger generation was criticized for being “impatient and inexperienced” and for adapting “too” liberal ideas. In 2007, MB bloggers’ criticism extended to the political party platform, which was considered not progressive enough. The media attention that the bloggers had gained by that time forced the leadership to manage meetings with the bloggers to discuss their critiques and concerns. Upon these discussions, the leadership decided to withdraw the draft party platform for revision. The final draft, however, as mentioned before, reflected more conservative ideas than the initial draft. In the same year, generational tensions erupted again over the organization’s response to the regime’s repressive policy. In 2007, the regime’s backlash to the Brotherhood’s success in the 2005 Parliamentary elections included electoral law reforms, the freezing of MB assets, confiscation of property, the shutting down of Brotherhood owned businesses, imprisonment of hundreds of members and leaders, harassment of Brotherhood students in Egyptian universities, and a harsh media campaign against the Brotherhood. In response to the repressive policy, the Brotherhood leadership opted for a less confrontational reaction towards the regime, even if it meant withdrawal from political activity. The young bloggers, however, pushed towards increased involvement in representative politics and challenging the status quo. While reformist figures were left marginalized after the 2009 internal elections, the leadership was unable to silence the bloggers who had mobilized a new generation of MB youth that openly challenged the organization’s structure, bylaws, tenets, and leadership stances (Lynch, 2007; Martini et al., 2012). It was this generation of MB youth that pushed the reluctant leadership to join the protests that toppled Mubarak in 2011 (Martini et al., 2012; Wickham, 2012).

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Post-2011 defection and breakaway parties Prominent youth figures played a key role during the 2011 uprising and during the transition phase that followed. For instance, Lutfi and al-Qasas were chosen as MB representatives in the “Youth Revolution Coalition”, which was formed to coordinate the efforts between the youth and the transitional authorities in the early days after the uprising. While the MB youth expected a greater role in the group’s decision-making, they were confronted with the same rigid organizational structure, the leadership’s top-down approach and marginalization, particularly when it came to their views regarding the Brotherhood’s newly formed political party, Hizb al-Hurriyyah wal‘Adala (Freedom and Justice Party-FJP). In fact, the leaders of the MB’s FJP boycotted the conference, which the youth had organized in April 2011 with the aim of articulating their agenda and suggestions for the MB’s political party. The Brotherhood’s conservative leadership refused to implement any of these suggestions, in fear of alienating their more conservative constituency- which are majority- and pushing them towards the newly formed Salafi political parties, such as al-Nur Party (El-Sherif, 2012). The leadership’s rigidity in face of internal reform prompted a number of Reformists and young prominent figures to resign, including al-Hudaybi, and alNaggar. Others have been expelled from the Guidance Office following an official investigation of their “violations of group regulations.” For instance, Lutfi and alQassas, were dismissed after having formed the Egyptian Current Party, which was considered a violation of the Brotherhood’s policy allowing its membership to adhere exclusively to the organization’s own political party, the FPJ. In May 2011, prominent reformist leader and previous member of the Guidance Office Aboulfotouh was suspended from the Brotherhood after having announced his intention to run for president of Egypt, challenging thus the Brotherhood’s official stance not to nominate a presidential candidate. Some young Brotherhood members also defied MB warnings by joining Aboulfotouh’s presidential campaign. Disenchanted with the conservative leadership, and the FJP’s “extremely timid agenda of reform” (El Sherif, 2012), prominent ex-Brotherhood figures formed their own political platforms. In 2011, five breakaway parties were formed by ex-Brothers. These were al-Wasat (the Center), al-Nahda (Renaissance), al-Salam wal Tanmeya (Peace and Development), al-Reyada (Pioneer) and al-Tayar al-misry (the Egyptian current). In 2012, after his expulsion from the Brotherhood, Aboulfotouh founded Hizb Misr al-Qawia (Strong Egypt Party). In 2014, al-Tayar al-Misri merged into Misr-al-Qawia (Martini et al., 2012). These breakaway parties, or what Bayat (2013) called post-Islamists, tended to be more “reformist” than the Brotherhood. They adopted relatively progressive

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positions on democracy, religious freedom, female empowerment, inclusion of religious minorities, and interpretations of Islamic law (Martini et al., 2012). Concerning the inclusion of the youth, splinter parties were slightly younger than the Brotherhood, except for the Egyptian Current which was led by ex-Brotherhood youth. Inspired by Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), MB’s splinter parties focused on the separation of their political and proselytizing activities, and recognized the multiplicity of cultural identities in Egypt. In this regard, the FJP adopted a similar discourse: it promised to separate religious activities from its political activism and accepted Copts as members of the FJP (Martini et al., 2012). After all, the breakaway parties’ influence was not comparable to that of the FJP. The latter had secured the majority of seats in the 2012 parliamentary elections.

4.4

Concluding Remarks

This chapter accounts for the most important divisions that occurred within the Brotherhood throughout its history. Internal tensions and divisions were analysed in view of their larger socio-political context. In this regard, I attributed special attention to state repression, dividing the long period under study into three phases. Each phase is characterized by a different state policy towards the organization, either providing opportunities or posing threats to the Brotherhood. The first phase accounts for the period between 1928 and 1948, when the Brotherhood was granted legality. The second phase examines the period between 1949 and 1970, characterized by turbulent events and successive waves of fierce repression. Finally, the third phase lasts from 1970 to 2011, and reveals fluctuating state policies towards the MB. The regime neither attributed legality to the Brotherhood, nor severely suppressed it. It was a phase where the state’s policy ranged from accommodation to confrontation, according to the regime’s perception of the threat posed by the Brotherhood. Looking at internal tensions and schisms during these three phases, two conclusions can be drawn: First, the change in the scope of internal disputes is associated with changes in the state’s policy towards the Brotherhood. Changes in the political environment brought up different questions and different topics, causing controversy. For instance, during the periods where the Brotherhood was attributed legality (1928–1949 and 1952–1954), internal tensions were related to divergent political stances and requirements for internal reform (internal regulations, leadership pattern/style, internal democracy). Politically, internal players disagreed on questions

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related to the relationship with the governing regime, the scale of participation in representative politics and political coalitions. Internally, reformist-oriented members usually addressed matters related to the leadership pattern, the hierarchal organizational structure, and the separation between the political aspect of the movement and its proselytization activities. Except for these two periods, the Brotherhood was not granted legality. The state policy towards the Brotherhood ranged from accommodation to confrontation and repression. In times of repression, strategic divisions on how to respond to repression blew out. In this regard, the Brotherhood was divided between two main currents: confrontational and reconciliatory currents. For instance, in 1949, the crackdown on the Brotherhood led some Special Apparatus members to carry out violent actions against the Sa’adi government, while al-Banna was opting for self-restraint and a peaceful resolution of the conflict. In 1954, when repression intensified, the confrontational current within the MB grew stronger. The confrontational stance against Nasser resulted in the regime’s backlash in the form of more severe repression. This was also the case during the 1960s, when a group of released Brotherhood prisoners and enthusiastic young members sought to reorganize the Brotherhood. On the one hand, the new group, known as Organization 1965, inspired by Sayyid Qutb’s ideology, adopted a confrontational and non-compromising stance against Nasser’s regime. On the other hand, the group’s old guard, fearing the dismantling of the organization, was inclined towards adaptation to repression. When Organization 1965 was uncovered by the regime, the state carried out a new wave of unprecedented repression against the Brotherhood. The organization’s response resulted not only in strategic disagreements but also in intensive ideological and jurisprudential divisions among imprisoned Brotherhood members over the use of violence against the regime. In the face of the heated debates and the formation of radical breakaway parties, the leadership forced members to embrace its ideology and strategy. The MB gave up on violence as a conscious strategy and adopted a program of peaceful gradual social change. These views were highlighted in the work “Preachers not Judges” co-authored by alHudaybi during the prison years. Members who insisted on views disapproved by the leadership were expelled from the Brotherhood. After their release from prisons starting 1970, the Brotherhood re-emerged and witnessed unexpected success. The Brotherhood increased its participation in representative politics and societal services. During the Sadat and Mubarak eras, the Brotherhood’s existence was generally tolerated by the regime. During times of appeasement, the Brotherhood seemed to increase its political participation,

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and withdrew from direct political activity while maintaining its religious and social activities during times of increased tensions. Second, the scale and degree of state repression against the Brotherhood affect the severity of internal schisms. Severe repression creates different responses in individuals. While some tend to adapt and restrain their activism, others are inclined towards confrontation and challenge, leading to breakaways. Organizational coherence becomes at risk since the organization’s communication chains are interrupted, and the leadership finds it harder to assert control over its membership, as was the case in 1948 and in the 1950s and 1960s. Under a moderate degree of repression, disagreements on the right response to the state’s policy also existed. However, the leadership was able to assert control over its members and enforce organizational coherence. Dissidents were either silenced or expelled from organizations. For instance, during Mubarak’s era, the Brotherhood’s accommodative strategy towards the regime enabled it not only to adapt to repression, but also to use it for its own benefit. Thus, between 1970 and 2011, the Brotherhood was able to keep its unity and flourish under authoritarianism. Until the year 2011, the Mubarak regime’s policy was a mixture of accommodation and defiance, which enabled the Brotherhood to become the most powerful and influential opposition movement in Egypt for three decades. While the MB’s accommodative strategy silenced internal dissidents, matters of contention remained unresolved. These conflicts re-emerged in times of repression. In the absence of repression, members who were disenchanted with the organization and its leadership were certain about their decision to leave and their ability to eventually create new platforms to express their views. For instance, after the 2011 uprising and the openness of the political structure, the MB failed to enforce cohesion. The stances and official positions of the leadership throughout the transition phase have alienated Reformists and MB Youth and pushed them over the edge. Therefore, a disengagement wave took place. If the cost of defection from the Brotherhood was high prior to the 2011 uprising, the open political structure after the toppling of Mubarak encouraged disenchanted Brothers to disengage from the organization. Prior to the uprising, defection would cost members exclusion from their social network in an environment that did not allow the establishment of new channels of activism. Certainly, the experience of al-Wasat, the last breakaway group of reformists which had failed for more than a decade to obtain legal authorization to form a political party, intimidated internal MB opponents to defect. Instead, it made potential reform from within the organization appear easier and more efficient.

5

The Brotherhood’s Organizational Re-configuration Amidst Political Turbulence

While the Brotherhood grew stronger since the 1980s and reemerged as the most influential and powerful political mass organization, the internal set-up of the movement was not without conflicts. During the years, with the changing of the regime’s policy toward the group, conflicts emerged. However, the organization was in most cases capable to silence dissenting voices and kept the group’s organizational unity intact. The top-down approach in dealing with dissent succeeded in enforcing cohesion, yet it hindered the group from engaging in internal reform. In the first section of this chapter, I address the internal configuration of the MB before 2013. I show how the MB is on multiple levels a heterogenous group, including the intellectual, generational, and socio-cultural levels. Despite its heterogeneity, the group was mainly divided into two main blocs: A wellorganized conservative bloc (also called the organizational bloc), dominating the organization until 2013, and a marginalized reformist trend, which lost many of its members and leading figures to breakaway parties, especially after the 2011 uprising. In 2012, the MB—in defiance of its long-standing policy of caution and selfrestraint—rushed to power. Yet, one year later, it moved from the center of power to its margins once again. This time it was designated a terrorist organization for the first time in its history, with thousands of its leaders and members put behind bars and more in exile, and at least a thousand members killed in only one day. Therefore, the second section of this chapter focuses on the adaptation attempts that the group sought to carry out in response to the new environment, as well as the challenges and dilemmas it faced. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41581-5_5. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 N. Aboushady, Factionalism in Social Movements, Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen Ostens, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41581-5_5

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One of the group’s strategic dilemmas was whether it should widen its definition of peaceful activism in order to contain its enraged ranks. I explain how the forging of new militant groups, a new generation of young leaders and the multiplicity of power centers inside Egypt and in exile, as well as the fissures over the strategy paved the way for a factional conflict. As a result, struggles and negotiations between two contending factions erupted. The conservative bloc’s domination, which has lasted since the 1990s, was undermined by its newly formed contender: the “revolutionary current”. By 2016, the movement’s internal arena had starkly changed: two factions had been established, each claiming legitimacy.

5.1

Players’ Configuration Pre-2013

The MB is a heterogenous movement. It has always revealed different generations, intellectual trends, and political schools. Furthermore, the MB has a history of unresolved controversial issues. This is related to al-Banna’s definition of the group as a comprehensive Islamic organization, which should avoid disagreements and divisions, considered as fitnah; sedition (al-Banna, 1990). The diversity of the sub-groupings within the MB can also be understood as a pragmatic choice: increasing the group’s constituency and facilitating the adaptation to the changing political opportunities. Indeed, this heterogenous internal make-up allowed the group to “capitalize on the space made available to them by rulers to garner popular support, while continuing to nurture their pious vanguard to take power when chances allowed” (Kandil, 2015, p. 131).

5.1.1

Mapping Subgroupings

The Brotherhood is composed of members belonging to distinctive intellectual tendencies, ideological commitments, cultural backgrounds, activist trajectories, and political experiences. These sub-affiliations influence players’ political inclinations, views, and practices. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the categorization of internal players into sub-factions and subcategories is a simplification for the sake of analysis in two ways. First, it is not easy to separate the different subgroups within the movement since they often overlap. Second, MB members, in real life, do not belong to a single subgroup. Like all individuals, they have several affiliations (cultural,

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generational, ideological, etc.), leaving little room for a straightforward categorization. In my analysis, I focus on three dimensions to analyze sub-affiliations: intellectual (political activism and jurisprudential), generational, and socioeconomic. Figure 5.1. demonstrates the MB’s cross-dimensional configuration pre-2011.

Socio-economic / cultural

Rural

Urban

alwassayyah

al-Banna

Political activism

Jurisprudential WahabiSalafist

Qutbist

Historical leadership (Bannawis, Special Unit)

Organizaon1965

Pragmasts (70’s generaon)

Neotradionalists

MB-youth

Generational Organizaonal Bloc Public Work Current (Reformists) MB-Youth Generaon

Figure 5.1 Cross-dimensional configuration of MB players pre-2011

Intellectual currents One can divide the MB according to the main intellectual currents within the organization. Since its founding, the Brotherhood was influenced by four main schools of thought: al-Banna school, the Qutbist school, the Wahabi-Salafist school,

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and al-Wassatiyah school. While al-Banna and Qutbist schools provide different interpretations of political consciousness and activism, the Wahabi-Salafist and al-Wassatiyah schools rather represent different jurisprudential convictions or intellectual trends (Tammam, 2010, 2011; Samir, 2018). Starting with the political activism trends, al-Banna school is based on the principles of Sunni Islam and the early reformist Salafist movement that emerged at the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries. It reflects a “moderate” Islamic school seeking to “purify” the Muslim belief system of heresies. The foundations of this school can be traced back to the Brotherhood’s General Conferences held during alBanna’s era. Other important references are the letters and pamphlets that al-Banna wrote in addition to his political positions. There are mainly two important characteristics of this school: First, its reformist approach. Politically, al-Banna school is a reformist-activist school that adopts a gradual strategy emphasizing the necessity of reforming the individual (Muslim self), followed by the Muslim family, then the society, before ultimately building the Muslim state (al-Banna,1990). The reform is to be achieved through the tools of education, learning, and even political participation without resorting to violence or hastening the outcome of reforms.1 Acts of political violence that were committed at the time of al-Banna were considered strategic choices rather than ideological orientations. They were also linked to a certain political era, where political violence was a common tool used by all political actors, given the British occupation and the Palestinian affair. As for the vision of the organization, al-Banna adopted a comprehensive vision and a holistic definition of the organization as a “Salafist message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political institution, an athletic community, an educational and cultural association, an economic organization and a social idea” (al-Banna, 1990, p. 98). This definition reflected al-Banna’s inclination towards the creation of wide areas of agreement and reconciliation. He aimed at creating an organization that would unify various intellectual and political currents, where unity is to be maintained, and disagreements avoided. In fact, his inclination towards unity is the reason why he opposed political parties, which he saw as a means of dividing the Muslim community (Samir, 2018). This perception of the Brotherhood was influenced by the corruption of political parties at al-Banna’s time. However, his inclination towards reconciliation increased the confusion among members. It also made his views often

1

Al-Banna accepted political activism and was convinced of the necessity of engaging in it. Al-Banna personally was about to run for parliamentary elections twice, but withdrew at the last moment.

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ambiguous (such as his position on revolution and jihad, which al-Hudaybi sought to clarify in his contribution “Preachers not Judges”). Al-Banna’s school of thought has mainly influenced Brothers who joined the movement, not its Special Unit, during its founding phase, and were close to alBanna, such as Omar al-Tilmisany, Hassan al-Hudaybi, Hassan-al-Ashmawy, Munir al-Della. The second school, the Qutbist school, is associated with Sayyid Qutb, whose intellectual contribution was shaped during his imprisonment in the 1950s. Qutb’s controversial work “Milestones” is the most important reference for this school. While militant Qutbists left the Brotherhood or were expelled during the prison years, a “latent” Qutbist stream that rejected violence remained within the organization.2 Like al-Banna school, the Qutbist stream believes in reform. However, this school differs from al-Banna school in two ways: first, contrary to al-Banna school, this stream does not advocate for societal engagement, but rather for the creation of what Qutb called the “Islamic vanguard” or the “unique Quranic generation”. Second, the reform is to be implemented by the “Islamic vanguard” since the society is immature and incapable of reforming itself as it has been affected by the ills of the authorities and other political actors. Thus, the “Islamic vanguard”, which consists of MB members, should be emotionally isolated from the jahili (ignorant) society in order to be able to endure reform (Qutb, 1979). The reform is to be achieved through the tools of proselytization (da’wa). Although strategically not different from al-Banna school, this trend represents, however, a different set of ideas that combine a sense of superiority and hostility towards the society. The Qutbist stream within the MB consists mainly of members of the new tanzim, or the 1965 subgroup, which Qutb mentored. Many of them never met alBanna, and mostly joined the Brotherhood during the imprisonment of its leadership in the 1950s. They were politically engaged during Nasser’s crackdown on the Brotherhood and spent their youth behind bars. Thus, the intellectual and political consciousness of this group developed differently from the group that had been close to al-Banna and that had witnessed the years of legality and freedom. The latent Qutbist stream combined militantism, secrecy and Qutbism (Qutb’s ideology). Many members of the Qutbist trend have held key positions in the Muslim Brotherhood since the 1980s. Until today, Qutbists dominate leading positions, such as the current General Guide Mohammed Badi’, Mahmoud Ezzat (acting General Guide from 2013 to 2020), and Ibrahim Munir (acting General Guide since 2020).

2

The “latent Qutbist stream” within the MB is referred to as the “Qutbist stream”, or the “Qutbists”, since the militant Qutbist stream left the group and acquired new names.

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As for the two competing jurisprudential schools inside the Muslim Brotherhood, there is the Wahhabi-Salafist school and al-Wassatiyyah school. The WahabiSalafist school differs from the Salafism of the 19th century. The latter is rooted in the work of the pioneers of the renewal of Islamic thought, such as Jamal al-Din al Afghani and Mohamed Abduh, which had inspired al-Banna to form the Muslim Brotherhood. Wahabi Salafism, or Wahabism, is rooted in the reform movement of the 18th century Arabian theologian Muhammad Ibn Abdel-Wahab, who advocated for the restoration of “pure” monotheistic worship and a more literal interpretation in approaching holy texts. In addition, Wahabi jurisprudence stresses on the matters of outer appearance, which is considered as “outward piety” (al-huda al- zaher)3 , as much as it stresses on the fundamental issues related to a’qida (belief). Thus, Wahabism focuses on outer appearance and daily practices, such as Muslim women’s costume (head cover hijab and whole body cover niqab), men’s beards, the relationship between men and women and the necessity of separating them, the banning of mixed education in schools and universities, the sinfulness of music, arts, watching television programs and attending football games, etc. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood experienced a process that Tammam (2011) described as tasaluf (salafizaion). This is a process in which the MB gradually underwent a Wahabi-Salafi turn on the cultural and ideological levels. In fact, the Egyptian Brothers came for the first time in close contact with Wahabism during the 1950s and 1960s, when several MB members fled to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of Nasser’s crackdown on the organization. They could not resist Wahabism and absorbed many of its ideas. Tammam (2011) also points out that the Wahabi expansion reached the Brotherhood inside Nasser’s prisons; a number of Wahabi writings were included in the Brotherhood’s curricula among the books to be studied in prisons. In the 1970s, additional Brotherhood members who lost their jobs in Egypt settled in the Kingdom after their release from Egyptian prisons. Influenced by Wahabi ideas, these Brothers started to consider some of the actions of al-Banna schools’ advocates as an abandonment of the fundamentals of Islam. Wahabi ideas did not only penetrate the MB, but also the Egyptian society. A considerable number of Egyptians that worked in Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf countries after the oil boom were gradually influenced by the Wahabi lifestyle and transferred these ideas to Egypt upon their return. Wahabi groups such as “Ansar El-Sunna El-Mohammadiah” were founded. In Egyptian universities, Wahabism seemed to be filling the void which the MB had left. The student movement “Islamic 3

Al-huda al-zaher or “outward piety” refers to the sunni values related to the outward appearance such as men growing beards and women’s dress code.

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groups” (al-jama’at al-islamiyya) was increasingly affected by Wahabism thanks to the support provided by the religious Saudi institutions to the student groups. This support mainly took the form of lectures given by Saudi Wahabi scholars, the free distribution of Wahabi books, and free group trips to Mecca. In the second half of the 1970s, MB leaders actively recruited the Islamic group’s activists, since the organization was in need of “fresh blood”. Influenced by Wahabism, the young activists disagreed with the definition of Salafism outlined by al-Banna. In order to convince the young activists to join the organization, MB leaders had to concede to their demands, especially those related to the “outward piety”4 , like women’s dress code, growing beards and the attitude towards arts and literature (Tammam, 2010b). Hence, figures heading the negotiations like Mostafa Mashhour who was later General Guide, Abbas El-Sissy and others followed the pattern set by the Islamic groups’ youth regarding matters of outward piety. In the Brotherhood magazine issues, the MB adopted a more Wahabi Salafist discourse, addressing topics like the implementation of shari’a, dealing with ahl-al dhimma (non-Muslims living in Muslim states), the obligation to wear hijab (headscarf) and the sinfulness of music and arts (Tammam, 2011). If Wahabi Salafism first infiltrated the MB due to the interaction of its members with the religious environment in Saudi Arabia, the Wahabi expansion in the Egyptian society accelerated the “process of salafization” of the Brotherhood. Thus, a hybrid form of the Brotherhood’s Salafism and Wahabism emerged, producing a Wahabi-Salafist trend inside the Brotherhood (Tammam, 2011). Although powerful, the Wahabi Salafist school could not monopolize the Brotherhood and had to compete with the emerging al-Wassatiyyah trend. Al-Wassatiyyah school is a centric Islamic stream, rooted in the works of the 19th century reformists, such as Abduh and al-Afghani, and the Islamic interpretation of al-Azhar. It places itself mid-way (al-wassat) between two extremes: on the one hand, institutional Islam scholars and Wahabi Salafists who focus on individual salvation, and on the other hand, militant Islamists who sought to reform their societies and regimes using violence. Al-Wassatiyyah school is thus a centrist current between these two extremes; rejecting the passivity of the religious quietists as well as the violence of Islamists, seeking to reintegrate Islam into public life through moderate, peaceful means, and advocating a gradual centric Islamic reform (Scott, 2012). Its core concept evolves around a comprehensive understanding of the higher purposes of Islam (al-maqasid al’ulya). It relies on a rational interpretation of the sacred texts; the Quran and the Sunnah, and of fiqh, as well as an interpretation of 4

MB leaders listened to music, played instruments, smoked, and their female family members did not necessarily wear hijab.

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Islamic heritage in ways responsive to the contemporary realities (Scott, 2012). This school views Islam “not only as a system of religious beliefs but also an intellectual and cultural reservoir, an instructive experience of political, economic, and social history, and a moral and practical guide for the improvement of life” (Baker, 2003, p. 13). The pioneers of this school are a group of Islamist intellectuals rooted in Egypt, who call themselves the “New Islamist Trend”. This group first formulated its manifesto in the early 1980s and published it in 1991. The central figures of this school include Yusuf al-Qaradawy, Fahmy Huwaidy, Muhammad Selim al-Awa, Tareq alBishri, Muhammad al-Ghazaly, Kamal Aboulmagd, Muhammad Emara, and Sayyid Sabiq (Baker, 2003). Most of al-Wassatiyyah intellectuals are academically and/ or professionally linked to al-Azhar. This might be the reason why this school is referred to by some researchers as “al-Azharite school” (e.g. Samir, 2018). Although the distinction between al-Wassatiyah intellectuals and Azharite scholars isn’t clear cut, al-Wassatiyah school constitutes a separate school from “al-Azharite school”. Both schools adopt a centric interpretation of Islam, yet differ in their stances on political and social issues. Al-Azhar, which has been dominated by the state since the 1950s reflects the “official Islam” and is therefore silent on most political and social matters, unlike al-Wassatiyah school, which is constituted of independent Islamist intellectuals, or “the new Islamists” (Baker, 2003) known for addressing political and social issues. Al-Wassatiyah school is also sometimes confused with al-Banna school (e.g. Samir, 2018), since both do not differ in terms of their overall view of Islam and provide an “enlightened” interpretation of Islamic law. However, both schools emerged in different cultural, political, and intellectual climates. Al-Banna school was shaped throughout the 1930s and 1940s, a period during which the intellectual and political life in Egypt was rich and diverse, and al-Azhar was an independent and wellrespected institution. Al-Wassatiyah school, emerged during the second half of the 20th century, a period characterized by the penetration of conservative Wahabism into the Egyptian society, the state’s domination of al-Azhar, and the existence of Islamist militants. The Muslim Brotherhood both inspired and was influenced by al-Wassatiyah school. On the one hand, al-Wassatiyah school was enriched by the Brotherhood’s organizational and intellectual work. In fact, the legacy of al-Banna’s social and political activism is the most enduring expression of this centric Islamic mainstream (Baker, 2003). On the other hand, al-Wassatiyah school attracted numerous activists, including Brotherhood members, and thus helped develop a centric Islamic trend within the Brotherhood that counterbalanced the growing power of the Wahabi

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stream inside the organization. In this regard, the campaign of Ijtihad led by alWassatiyah intellectuals challenged the stiff interpretations of Wahabi Salafism, or what Al-Ghazali called “Bedouin fiqh”. New Islamists provided jurisprudential interpretations which protected the participation of Islamists in public work, accepted the formation of political parties, addressed the matter of women, and solved the problems related to non-Muslims through the concept of citizenship and the refusal of their categorization as “Dhimis” (Tammam, 2011). Generational structure Brotherhood members can be examined in terms of generations in the sense of Mannheim (1952 [1923]). Thus, they can be divided according to their “generational location”, which points to their formative political experience and a “certain definite modes of behavior, feeling and thought” (Mannheim, 1952, p. 291). Generations are “stamped” by certain events, mostly the ones that they experienced during their youth. Consequently, the basis for the “generational” categorization is not age groups, but rather political events, and formative experiences. A political or social movement generation is not the same as a biological one. “Youth experiencing the same concrete historical problems may be said to be part of the same actual generation; while those groups within the same actual generation which work up the material of their common experiences in different specific ways, constitute separate generation units.” (Mannheim, 1952, p. 304) Some have urged that the term “cohort” be used instead. A cohort is defined as individuals who “experience the same significant event within a given period of time” (Pilcher, 1994, p. 483). Regardless of the term, Spitzer’s (1973) definition is still applicable. The latter defines generations as “groups of coevals stamped by some collective experience that permanently distinguishes them from other age groups as they move through time” (p. 1358). Even if one generation would be stamped by a certain current, the categorization on a generational basis is not rigid, and there is, to a certain extent, interaction and a transmission of ideas among members and political generations (Pilcher, 1994). Yet Ross (1983) points out that “the swift pace of events in a turbulent period may produce more rapidly several discontinuous waves of new movement entrants” (p. 178), risking the coherence of a movement. Many researchers pointed out to the existence of different political generations inside the MB (see Section 1.1.1). Yet, they differed on their number. I suggest that until 2011, five large generations existed within the group. The first generation, the “historical leadership” was socialized under al-Banna, and is divided into two generation units. The first generation unit included Brothers recruited in the “ordinary” organization, the so-called “al-Bannawiun” (the Bannawis). These were interested in public work, politics and elections. Al-Hudaybi, Omar al-Tilmisany,

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Farid Abdel Khalek and Abas al-Sissi are prominent figures of this generation. The second generation, “jil al-nizam al khas”, consists of the quasi-militant Special Apparatus members. This generation was affected by the experience of secret militant operations of the Special Apparatus in the pre-1952 era, where they inherited a culture of secrecy and obedience. Mustafa Mashhur and Kamal al-Sananiry are two prominent figures of this generation unit. Ideologically and jurisprudentially, both generation units share al-Banna’s definition of Salafism, yet disagree on the tactical character associated with the concept (Tammam, 2011). The second generation is “generation 1965”, or the “latent Qutbists”. This generation includes Brothers who joined the organization in the period between the two ordeals of 1954 and 1965, and were detained by 1965 (al-Anani, 2007a; 2009a). This means that the formative political experience of this generation was during an era of harsh state repression. In many works, this generation is referred to as the “traditional leadership”, “old-guard” or the “veteran generation” since they lived through the Nasser crackdown and experienced imprisonment and torture at a young age. Most members of this generation have never met al-Banna. Instead, their intellectual and ideological orientations were formed by Qutb, their spiritual leader and ideologue of Organization 1965. Members of “generation 1965” continued down the path set by Qutb when they secured a majority in the Guidance Council four decades later (Kandil, 2015). “Latent Qutbists” have reached a hard equation: they endorsed al-Hudaybi’s concepts elaborated in “Preachers not Judges” without giving up on Qutb’s ideology and concepts, while distancing themselves from the radical interpretations adopted by the militant Qutbists. However, those members kept some of the Qutbists’ viewpoints that did not make accusations of disbelief, pre-Islamic paganism (Jahiliya) and divine sovereignty (hakimyah). For them, Qutb emphasized the emotional detachment from the society, the latter having drifted away from the righteous path of Islam. He also stressed on the gradual path of change, the importance of socialization (tarbiyya), as well as the formation of the “distinctive Quranic generation” (al-jil al-qurani al-farid). “Generation 1965” held on to secrecy tendencies even during periods with greater margins of freedom. Their experience during the Qutb era, gave primacy to preserving the unity and solidarity of the Brotherhood as an organization, and ensuring its sustainability by forming the “distinctive Quranic generation” or the “vanguard of believers”. Major figures of the 1965 generation inside the MB include Brotherhood leaders such as Gum’a Amin, Sabri Arafa Alkumy, Mahmoud Ezzat, Ibrahim Munir, General Guide Mohammad Badi’.5 5

Ezzat and Badi’, were in their early twenties when arrested in 1965, while Munir was 28 years old. They were members of Organization 1965 and were recruited by Abdel Fattah

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The 70s generation points to the third generation; a generation that enabled the MB’s return to the political life in the mid-1970s. This generation is sometimes referred to as the “pragmatists” (al-Anani, 2007a; Lynch, 2007). After their release from Egyptian prisons, Brothers sought to recruit students of the Islamic Group al-jama’a al islameya, who were active in Egyptian universities. Recruiting these groups was not only necessary to revive the Brotherhood, but also to coopt the Salafist students instead of competing with them. After several negotiations, most of these young Islamists accepted to merge with the Brotherhood.6 This merging had major consequences for the organization. The massive number of newly recruited young Islamists constituted a new generation with different aspirations, political experiences, religious and intellectual views. In fact, students of the Islamic groups were mainly adopting a Salafist approach. They were exposed to a variety of intellectual and jurisprudential Salafist references ranging from the centric stream represented in the contributions of al-Wassatiyah pioneers such as al-Ghazali and al-Qaradawy, to the Wahabist stream, represented in the interpretations of Saudi ulama. Young Islamists who joined the Brotherhood were mainly affected by the centric stream, yet still had Salafi-Wahabist religious sensibilities, like the prominence of external piety and outer appearance. Strategically, these groups sought to put pressure on the regime to implement some “Islamic laws”, such as legal sanctions on the consumption of alcohol and usury. Therefore, they acted in a similar way to pressure groups. Affected by their activism experience in the university campus, this generation was pragmatic, highly professional, and “masters of organization, mobilization and public engagement” (Lynch, 2007). Unlike the “latent Qutbists”, this generation openly interacted with its political rivals and with the society (al-Anani, 2007a; 2009a). The “70s generation” influenced the Brotherhood in many ways. On the one hand, this generation enhanced the formation of a Salafi cluster inside the MB, as explained before. On the other hand, strategically, the “70s generation” revived the Brotherhood and enabled its return to the Egyptian social and political life. Members Ismail. Ezzat lived in the same cell with Hawash, the companion and second man after Qutb. Hawash and Qutb were executed in 1966. 6 The person targeted for the merger negotiations was Abdel Mon’iem Aboul Fotuh, the most prominent member of the Islamic Group. Aboul Fotuh managed to convince the majority of Islamic group activists to join the Muslim Brotherhood. Those who refused to merge with the Brotherhood were divided into two groups: The first group adopted Wahhabi Salafism as an ideology and formed the school of Salafi call (al-Da’wah al-salafiya) in Alexandria in 1976. The second group was affected by the Qutbist stream and by al-Mawdudi’s political ideas. This group adopted a revolutionary paradigm which took shape later with Saleh Sareyah and Abd El-Salam Farag in the organizations of Jihad and Jama’a (Tammam, 2010b).

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of this generation also played a leading role in the MB’s engagement in civil society and electoral politics as of the mid-1980s. Furthermore, it was the political activism which this generation put forward that stressed the MB’s rejection of violence and its separation, ideologically and strategically, from militant Islamist organizations (Kandil, 2015). Prominent figures of this generation include Isam al-Eryan, Aboul Fotouh, Muhammad Habib and Aboul Ela Madi. The neo-traditionalists are a political generation made up of MB members who mostly joined the Brotherhood during the 1980s and early 1990s. This generation joined the Brotherhood during an era where the MB offered more Wahabi-Salafist notions and conservatism. This was the result of the Wahabi infiltration of the Egyptian society as well as the existence of a Salafist cluster inside the MB (al-Anani, 2007a). This generation’s formative political experience was during the era of the Mubarak regime’s tensions with the Brotherhood in the early 1990s. This era started with the Salsabil case in 1992 and culminated with the military trials of MB leaders in 1995. This repressive context reinforced the “neo-traditionalists’” inclination towards a closed culture and secretive work. Like the “traditional leadership”, the “neo-traditionalists” favored ideological outreach and proselytization over public work. Unlike the 70s generation (the “pragmatists”), this generation was narrowminded and conservative both intellectually and religiously. They also share with the old guard their caution and orientation towards the organization (Wickham, 2013). Thanks to their qualities, the “neo-traditionalists” managed to preserve the Brotherhood’s organizational structure during the security crackdown in the 1990s and the imprisonment of many leaders (Samir, 2018). The “neo-traditionalists” are sometimes also called the “bureaucrats”, since they are characterized by a bureaucratic rather than a political orientation. As al-Anani (2009a) denotes, “they do not put great stock in political action, which is seen as ineffective and undesirable”. The neo-traditionalists dominated most of the MB’s administrative bureaus in the provinces and other mid-level leadership positions throughout the organization nationwide. Figureheads of this generation are Muhammad Mursi, Mahmoud Hussein, Abdelrahman al-Mursi. Finally, the MB Youth or “shabab al-ikhwan” consisted of Brotherhood urban youth who rebelled against many of the Brotherhood norms. This generation is sometimes called “MB bloggers” since they have used the blogosphere to criticize some of the Brotherhood’s organizational practices and positions. The generation’s influence on the Brotherhood was considerable, and their impact was particularly remarkable in the period between 2005 and 2011. However, it is important to keep in mind that this generation only represented a minor trend inside the organization. This

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generation is made up of a fairly small number of urban open-minded youth7 , who— despite their insignificant absolute number—were politically active and influential. In contrast, their peers who constitute the vast majority of Brotherhood’s young people were, at least until 2011, more conservative and unconcerned with politics. The divergence between the “MB Youth” as a political generation and the major trend among Brotherhood young affiliates, was reflected in 2007. While the MB Youth harshly criticized the MB’s political party platform and requested a more progressive document, the vast majority of youth—particularly in provinces outside of Cairo and Alexandria—criticized the draft’s more liberal positions, and called for a more “Islamic” document (Lynch, 2007). Certainly, as Lynch (2007) indicated, “Outside of Cairo and Alexandria [..], the vast majority of Brotherhood youth seem to be traveling in a different direction, toward a more conservative, religious orientation unconcerned with politics.” Like the 70s generation, the MB Youth began their political activity as students, particularly in the universities of urban cities. Many of these young people were in charge of the Brotherhood’s student divisions. During the late 1990s, Brotherhood-affiliated students were the largest and best-organized faction of the student movement. They were technically under the supervision of the Guidance Council, but they exercised a considerable degree of autonomy in practice. The Brotherhood’s young activist generation was inclined towards cross-partisan cooperation and political activism. For instance, they started cooperating with secular groups at universities in the early 2000s when a “coordinating council” for political activities on campus was formed. Together with socialist student leaders, they organized a series of protests against the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and conferences against Zionism were held annually. This council included several figures who later emerged as key organizers of the January 2011 uprising. The MB Youth, like their counterparts from secular parties and human rights defense networks, were more inclined than their respective leadership to confront the Mubarak regime and thus more eager to participate in anti-regime protests. Egyptian young activists, regardless of their political affiliations, seemed to agree on this matter more with each other than with their respective leaders. The cooperation that started in university campuses and which continued at least until 2011, enabled them to forge ties of friendship and trust among each other, and—most importantly— a sort of generational consciousness. The MB youth, together with other opposition young activists, considered themselves part of the “Mubarak generation” or the

7

Lynch suggested that the reform-minded MB Youth only constituted about 15 percent of their age cohort (2007).

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“emergency-law generation”: a generation that had lived their entire life under the emergency law declared by the only president they have known (Hassabo, 2009). In contrast to the MB Youth, the Brotherhood’s top leaders remained largely isolated from other opposition groups and continued to act in line with the Brotherhood’s practices of caution and self-restraint. Nevertheless, the MB Youth kept lobbying the Guidance Office to give them the green light to join cross-partisan protest activities, or demonstrations organized by other political forces. Thanks to their lobbying, the Guidance Office allowed them on many occasions to participate in protest activities in the name of “shabab al-Ikhwan” (MB youths) and not as official representatives of the Brotherhood. This was the case in 2005, when young MB leaders joined the Kefaya (Enough) movement, shabab men ajl-al taghir (Youth for change), tulab min ajl-al taghir (Students for change), and the demonstrations on April 6th 2008, organized by the 6 April movement in support of a workers’ strike in al-Mahalla al-Kubra (Gharbia governorate), as well as the subsequent protests held on the same day in 2009 and 2010. In 2011, the MB leadership also refused to participate in the demonstrations organized on January 25th by the Facebook page “Kulina Khalid Said” (We are all Khalid Said). After lobbying the Guidance Office, MB Youth were allowed to join the demonstrations, representing themselves and not the MB. The decision of the MB to officially join the protests on January 28th was swiftly made thanks to the MB Youth’s early contributions in the planning of the January 25th demonstrations and the pressure they exercised on the leadership to participate in the protests (Martini et al., 2012). Prominent figures of this generation were al-Gawwad, Qassas, Lutfi and alNaggar (Wickham, 2013). Most of these pioneer leaders left the Brotherhood after the 2011 uprising to join or form more “progressive” parties (see Section 4.3.2). Socio-economic and cultural disparities Tammam (2012) was the first to categorize Muslim Brotherhood members according to their socio-economic and cultural background, highlighting the divide between members from urban and rural backgrounds. In fact, Egypt was increasingly becoming an even more centralized state with widening gaps between centers (such as Cairo and Alexandria), and peripheries (especially rural governorates). The urban/ rural divide was exacerbated by increasing political and economic marginalization, unequal access to human development opportunities, and the proliferation of internal migration as the only way to social ascension. This divide was reflected in the overall cultural inclination towards conservatism on both religious and political levels. Ultimately, the rural members resorted to conservatism as the closest reflection of their identity and ideas.

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Given its geographic diffusion and organizational configuration, the Brotherhood was established as an urban organization and remained so throughout the years. The urban character of the organization was clearly reflected in the significance of the institutional and regulatory structures governing the decision-making process. Yet, the organization has undergone a “rural turn”, or what Tammam (2012) called “tarieef ”8 , or “ruralization” since the late 1990s. By the years 2008 and 2009, the “ruralization” of the Brotherhood was evident: not only in terms of diffusion in the countryside, and growing membership among rural inhabitants, but also and most importantly the “ruralization” occurred on the internal organizational levels. In fact, the internal configuration of players changed drastically with the increasing promotion of rural leaders inside the Brotherhood’s important bodies. The change in the identity of central players led to the emergence of a new culture inside the Brotherhood, characterized by “the spread of a new culture and a new pre-institutional pattern of relations, rooted in primary loyalties” (Tammam, 2012). The pre-institutional pattern of relations is reflected most in MB’s internal elections, where the respect of the internal regulations organizing the elections is not always guaranteed. Instead, what counts most is the respect for the leadership’s will and the absolute trust in it (Tammam, 2013). On the level of internal political norms, ruralization had its political consequences on the organization. The violation of internal regulations was clear in the internal elections of 2008 and 2009. Sub-loyalties also occurred inside the Brotherhood as part of the ruralization phenomenon: some regions or governorates were considered as the “region of influence of a certain leader”, where it wasn’t possible to implement an organizational matter without the acceptance of that person. Another example of sub-loyalties at the geographical level is that middle rank leaders can only be promoted if they have connections and are loyal to “regional leaders”. This new culture also meant that middle ranking leaders were chosen according to their sub-loyalties to act as “gatekeepers” of ideas and to contain the expansion of reformist ideas. This explains why the reformist trend could not reach and influence the younger MB generations. This also explains why the “MB bloggers’ generation” was only a marginal urban cohort that evolved differently from the majority of MB youth. According to Tammam (2012), this rural culture was also reflected in the wide use of “rural terminology” accompanied by old-fashioned behavior mostly emphasizing patriarchal values, such as kissing the foreheads and hands of the leaders, expressing absolute obedience and aversion to disagreements, the concepts of reward and punishment, the preference of preaching over critical thinking, uniformity over diversity, and the distrust of all “others” from outside the organization. 8

The word “tarieef” comes from “reef” which is the Arabic word for countryside.

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5.1.2

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Configuration of Internal Players: Alliance and Contention

In fact, the above-mentioned subgroupings did not each operate separately. Instead, they formed alliances which can be understood as a result of their interactions and conflicts inside the movement. By the mid-1990s, it was clear that the Brotherhood was dominated by two main currents: The “Organizational current” and the “Public Work current” (Tammam, 2013), in other words, the Conservatives and the Reformists (Wickham, 2013). First, I suggest that these currents generated from a mutual consent regarding the approach towards the society and the regime. In other words, these alignments revolved around a set of beliefs and concepts concerning the interaction with the regime and society, as well as a preference for a certain type of activism. However, inside each current, the aligned subgroups did not necessarily share religious, ideological, or intellectual orientations. Thus, Muslim Brotherhood currents did not represent separate ideological units but rather strategic players. Second, although interactions and conflicts between those currents occurred within the movement, they are certainly not isolated from the external environment. These internal dynamics were affected by political opportunities, challenges and constraints posed by the regime. This explains why the prominence of either current was ebbing at times and flowing at others, according to the political opportunity structure. The Organizational bloc The organizational bloc, al-tayyar-al-tanzimi, or the “Organizationalists” (altanzimiyin) represented the conservative bloc inside the Brotherhood. This current emerged in the early 1990s as a well-organized internal trend. Its members were well connected and coordinated and put forward their own lists of candidates in internal elections. Among the influential figures of this current were Mahmoud Ezzat, Khayrat al-Shatir, Muhammad Badi’, Muhammad Mursi and Rashad Bayoumi (Wickham,2013). One can imagine this bloc as a tripartite alliance between the latent Qutbist stream dominating high ranking leadership positions since the mid 1990s, the middle-ranking neo-traditionalists, and the Salafi cluster inside the Brotherhood (see Figure 5.2 in 5.1.1). Like its name indicates, the “organizational bloc” gives primacy to preserving the organization (al-tanzim) and the organizational structure. In fact, the latter is perceived as a precondition for the survival of the organization itself (Samir, 2018). Intellectually, the Organizational bloc is dominated by the latent Qutbi stream.

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Salafism constitutes its main religious trend. In terms of political generations, the alliance is cross-generational, with a dominance of the 1965 generation and the neo-traditionalists. Geographically, this bloc is cross-regional, but has relied increasingly since 2007 on the support of rural leaders and figures with organizational power in provinces (Tammam, 2012). This bloc succeeded in dominating the middle ranking positions, as well as the main bodies of the organization, notably the Guidance Office and the Shura Council. Most importantly, “Organizationalists” managed to dominate the cultivation programs and curricula to pass on their ideas to younger generations, and to gatekeep and filtrate ideas before they could reach the younger generations. In fact, Qutb’s writings remained “the main stock of every cultivation curriculum and the bread and butter of the cultivators on all levels” (Kandil, 2015, p. 130). The best summary of the organizationlists’ set of beliefs and concepts can be traced back to the memoirs of Abdelmajid (1991), who was a leading figure in Organization 1965 (see Section 4.2.3). In his reflections about the lessons learned from the Organization 1965 experience, he identified a set of principles for what he called “the right activism” (1991, pp. 344–390). These can be summarized as follows: (1) The prominence of the organization: the existence of an Islamic organization is a precondition for building an Islamic state. It is the individual duty of each Muslim to join the organization working for the sake of Islam. If this organization does not exist, a Muslim is responsible for seeking its creation.9 (2) Activism and dormancy: Organized activism is possible even under authoritarian regimes, given a high degree of restraint. Dormancy is sometimes crucial in order to protect the organization and thus ensure future activism. (3) Proselytization (al-da’wa): The first stage of activism is proselytization and bringing up individuals with strong faith. Proselytization remains important in further stages of activism. (4) Cultivation (al-tarbiya): Cultivation is the second stage after proselytization. It is a long process, but guarantees a gradual change. Bringing up individuals in an Islamic way automatically leads to the Islamization of families, societies, and ultimately states. Abdelmajid denotes that “Cultivation itself needs time. But it needs double of it when it occurs inside an ignorant society (mujtama’ jahili), that suffers from corruption in every aspect, and is governed by an ignorant 9

This logic is derived from the Sunnah. Prophet Muhammad created an Islamic society (mujtama’ islami), or an Islamic organization (jama’a islameya) before establishing the Islamic State in Medina.

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(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

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government (hukuma jahiliya) which fights Islam through all institutions” (p. 353). The vanguard (al-tali’a): During the first phase of activism, it is important to create a “unique Quranic generation” ( jil-Qurani-farid). This is a unique generation both in its upbringing and its education. This generation, thanks to its strong faith, will be able to “carry the burden of activism”.10 Obeying the leadership: The Islamic organization should be ruled by shari’a and guided by a wise and experienced leadership. Ordinary members must “listen to and obey” their leaders. They should be able to give advice when needed, and to refuse to obey their leaders only in cases of religious wrongdoing. Rejecting the use of violence: Violence, in all its forms and degrees, is not to be used against the jahili regime. Islam should not be implemented by force, but rather by the gradual change of individuals and eventually of the society. Abdelmajid points out that “the Islamic method does not count on regimes. It does not give prominence to toppling those regimes. This is a matter left to military coups that coercively govern people. The right path is what Prophet Muhammad took, namely the path of cultivation” (p. 377). Patience and self-restraint: Cultivation is a long process that takes more than two generations until the “solid Islamic base”—capable of implementing the Islamic state—is established. The phase of cultivation needs patience and thus requires prudence and avoiding disproportionate battles. Yet, this is the shorter way to attain the Islamic state. “Some Islamists mistakenly think that implementing Islam by force is the shorter way. Yet, it is in fact the longest. They will be imprisoned and persecuted, and they give the regime the opportunity to do so. Young enthusiastic Islamists think that this is jihad. Jihad has phases, conditions, and needs preparations. […] When Muslims are still weak, there is no other path than patience” (p. 379). Secrecy and public work: Both secret and public work are required, according to the political circumstances and phase of activism. During the founding phase, secrecy provides the opportunity to recruit and cultivate the “unique generation”. Hence, the cultivation process can occur without being consumed by conflicts with the regime. Secrecy also teaches individuals important values such as patience, reticence, prudence, restraint, and disguise. Public work is needed for the sake of proselytization in future phases. However, the organization must always preserve some secrecy as a backup. For instance, it is

According to Abdelmajid, the idea of the vanguard is derived from al-Sunnah. Prophet Muhammad converted 200 individuals during his 13 years of proselytization in Mecca. The first 200 Muslims were those who carried on His message and diffused Islam. This argument can be found in Qutb’s writing too.

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(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

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advisable that some members remain unknown to the public and to the government. Secrecy is a guarantee to avoid a complete crackdown on the organization in times of repression. Emotional isolation: “Nations that do not obey God are not nations for Muslims. A Muslim nation is where Islam and Muslims are, where belief, not soil, bounds them”. Thus, the Islamic organization should focus on its organizational matters, mainly proselytization, cultivation, and preparation of the vanguard. During this phase, nothing else should be in focus; “national matters should be left to nationalists” (p. 349). Political engagement: The organization’s focus should be on proselytization and not on playing politics. Playing politics, such as running for elections, distracts the organization from its original objective. Overlooking internal disagreements: Ideological divisions must be put aside. Internal conflicts are fitna (unrest, sedition) and must be “postponed”. The focus should be on the similarities instead of the differences. Thus, the organization should be neither exclusive, nor impose a certain ideology on its members. In cases of conflict, members should trust and obey the experienced leadership. If conflicts cannot be resolved, disputing parties should return to the Quran and Sunnah. Cooperation with Islamists: The organization should be alert to national and international “conspiracies and plots against Islam”, and thus seek to recruit other Islamists, or at least cooperate with them with the aim of protecting Islam.

These concepts, or what Tammam (2012; 2013) called “organizational ideas”, were accepted by the neo-traditionalists. On the one hand, the neo-traditionalists’ set of beliefs is conservative on the ideological, political, and religious levels, and thus coherent with organizational ideas put forward by the Qutbist stream. On the other hand, the neo-traditionalists, like the Qutbists, were more interested in proselytizing than in playing political games, since their conservatism made it harder for them to positively interact with the changing political scene (al-Anani, 2007a). Salafis as well adopted, or at least did not oppose, these organizational ideas. To a large extent, Wahabi-Salafi religious interpretations are in line with organizational ideas. While organizational ideas entail a sense of distinctiveness of its members, Salafi interpretations similarly entail a feeling of differentiation stemming from the responsibility of saving the society from its non-Islamic order and wrongdoing (Abdelmajid, 1991). Salafists share with the latent Qutbist stream the belief in the importance of proselytization in the society. At the same time, the Salafist cluster took the Organizational bloc in a more conservative direction and produced, in

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addition to its religious discourse focusing on the outward piety, a political discourse addressing controversial issues such as the Islamic Caliphate, the categorization of Copts as ahl al-dhimma (non-Muslims living in a Muslim state), jizyah (imposing a tax on non-Muslims living in a Muslim state), etc. The Public Work Stream The “Public Work Stream” (tayar al- ‘amal al-‘am) or the Reformist current (altayar al-islahi) did not constitute a solid bloc. It was rather an “unorganized alliance”, or a merger between two schools of thought: al-Banna activist school and al-Wassatiyah intellectual school. It included two political generations: the elderly Banna’s generation “al-Bannawiyun” who were released from prison by the early 1970s, and the “70s generation” from Islamist groups that merged with the Brotherhood in the mid-1970s. The Public Work Current emerged between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s (Tammam, 2011). However, this current was not organized and lacked institutional connection with the Brotherhood’s wider ranks (Wichkam, 2013). The Public Work Current opposed “organizational ideas” in many ways. The Public Work Current gave importance to the participation in electoral politics rather than proselytization. The reformists also supported a clearer separation between the group’s proselytization and political activism. This current does not share the organizational current’s vision focused on preserving the organization. Instead, they seek to integrate the Brotherhood into the Egyptian society. Unlike the Organizationalists, they are not committed to secrecy, but place a greater priority on obtaining legal status. They are not suspicious towards political and social forces but instead opt for cross-partisan cooperation and are willing to cooperate with liberal and secular forces. As Wickham (2013) denotes, the Reformist current stands for “free political, intellectual, and cultural expression” in contrast to the Organizational current, which is conservative on these three levels. In the domain of internal affairs, the Reformist current called for internal reform and greater transparency. It requested a stricter separation of power between the Brotherhood’s executive branch (the General Guide and the Guidance Bureau) and the legislative branch (the Shura Council). Reformists advocated that the Shura Council should have the authority to hold the Guidance Bureau accountable instead of offering mere advice, and that an independent judicial authority should be established in order to prosecute group leaders in cases of misconduct (Wickham, 2013). It is important to note, that there was no alliance between the Reformists and the MB Youth generation. Although the “MB Youth” share with the Reformists, their critique of the Organizational current’s set of values, their inclination towards

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political activism and cross-partisan cooperation, and are intellectually influenced by al-Wassatiyah school too, they differ in terms of strategy and degree of openness. Indeed, the MB Youth generation “is more dynamic, more progressive and more open to new ideas than past-cohorts of youth” (Lynch, 2007). Young members had reformist thoughts via “revolutionary tools” creating a gap between them and the Reformists, and making them a unique intellectual generational unit, and a minor trend within the group (Samir, 2018). Yet, MB Youth respected Reformists and were inspired by some of their prominent figures, such as Aboul Fotouh. Table 5.1. sums up the main disparities and between the Organizational bloc, the Public Work Current, and the MB Youth generation.

Table 5.1 MB internal currents’ disparities pre-2011 Organizational Bloc

Public Work Current

MB Youth generation

Conservative. Secrecy; Self-restraint; Caution.

Reformist. Open; Public.

Revolutionary. Open (++) ; public

Stance towards the society

Emotional Isolation.

Open.

Open (++).

Relationship with other political actors

Suspicion.

Cross-partisan cooperation.

Cooperation with youth opponents.

Priority

Preserving the organization.

Inclusion in the political sphere

Changing the status-quo.

Strategy

Proselytization, Social services.

Public work, Participation in electoral politics.

Political protest, anti-regime mobilization.

Political tendencies and values

(++).

The Domination of the Organizational bloc As mentioned in the previous chapter, MB’s power relations or ‘center of gravity’ shifted according to the regime’s policy towards the group. In other words, the interplay between the Organizational bloc and the Public Work Current was affected by the ever-shifting rules of Mubarak’s semi-authoritarian regime. While the Reformist current flourished in times of relative political openness, the conservative current dominated in times of increasing tension and confrontation with the regime. This can be explained by the paradox that the MB encountered in Mubarak’s semi-authoritarian regime: the better the group played the political game, the more

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it was excluded from the political arena. Using the words of Hamzawy and Brown (2010) “the more the group presents itself as a credible force for political reform, the less reform is likely”. This paradox affected the internal power relations inside the MB. A shrinking political space was in favour of the Organizationalists, whose call for prioritizing internal solidarity over political participation and refocusing the group’s efforts on its educational, religious, and social agenda, acquired more validity. In fact, the Organizational bloc used repression to enforce organizational coherence and unity. Certainly, “repression served as a binding tool that created solidarity among the movement’s rank-and-file, strengthened organizational coherence, and generated public support” (al-Anani, 2019). In addition, repression validated the Organizational bloc’s calls to retreat from political participation which was considered divisive, distracting, and self-defeating (Hamzawy and Brown, 2010). It also validated the leadership’s excuses to postpone any internal reform required by Reformists. In fact, the growing power of the Conservative current started during the mid1990s, especially under the leadership of Mustafa Mashhur. This became clear when al-Wasat group members, including prominent reformist figures Madi and Sultan, were expelled from the MB. By the end of the 1990s and until 2011, Conservatives controlled the Brotherhood and consolidated their grip over the movement. This phase was interrupted by a short-lived period of balance between the Conservatives and the Reformists, upon the relative opening of the political system (2005–2007). As of 2007, the Conservatives, particularly two prominent leaders, Mahmoud Ezzat and Khayrat al- Shatir, implemented a strategy within the group seeking to promote MB loyal middle-rank leaders in the organization’s important bodies, particularly in the Shura Council and the Guidance Office, with the objective of shrinking the influence of the Reformist bloc inside the Brotherhood. In this respect, the Organizational bloc had two strategies that constituted a backdoor to promote its aligned members to the Guidance Office. The first strategy was, that whenever seats were free in the Guidance Council due to death or imprisonment, loyal members to the Organizational bloc were designated to fill the vacancies. These members were designated by the Shura Council, without running elections. Among them are ousted President Mursi, who was appointed to the Guidance Office’s membership in 2008 and Mahmoud Hussein, a prominent figure in the post-2013 conflict, who was appointed to the Guidance Office in 2004. The second strategy was to promote rural leaders through their relocation to Cairo so that they would be considered in the Cairo share in the Guidance Council, although they were representing other areas shortly before the elections. This strategy guaranteed the promotion of as many loyal rural leaders as possible and hindered

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the competition between loyal members from the same governorate. This is what happened, for instance, in the case of the previous President Mursi, who was a leader in al-Sharkeya governorate, and was promoted without being elected to the Guidance Office in 2008. In 2009, Mursi was elected as a Cairo leader, because he moved to Cairo. His election as a Cairo leader was intended to prevent his competition with another loyal leader in al-Sharkeya (Tammam, 2012; Kandil, 2015). Furthermore, the leadership introduced amendments to the internal bylaws, allowing the redistribution of the relative proportions of each governorate in the Shura Council. Particularly loyal rural leaders were targeted by this policy: the new amendments gave more seats to rural governorates than urban governorates. For example, al-Dakahleya governorate, where Ezzat had organizational power, was attributed ten seats, while the total of seats granted for Cairo and Alexandria together did not exceed eleven. This meant that Cairo, had less seats in the Council than alDakahleya. In addition, and despite the opposition of the Reformists, the Organizational bloc succeeded in passing more amendments to the bylaws, allowing the Guidance Office to designate 20% of the Governorates’ Shura Council members (Majles shura al mohafazat), as well as members in the Shura Council itself (Tammam, 2012). These measures thus permitted the promotion of loyal members in the Shura Council and paved the way for the domination of the Guidance Office in 2009; the latter being elected by the Shura Council according to the bylaws. The elections of the Guidance Office—which was the first to be elected since 1995—resulted in the elimination of the Reformist leaders Aboulfottuh and Habib, and promoted 17 members adhering to the Conservative bloc, among them Badi’ who was elected as a General Guide in 2010.11 It is worth noting that Badi’ was the first General Guide adhering to the 1965 generation, and who had never met al-Banna. By 2010, the MB’s most important bodies and positions were thus controlled by members “based on loyalty and allegiance to the movement’s leadership more than their personal merits or qualifications” (al-Anani, 2019). The domination of the 11

The Guidance Office, made up of seventeen members, was ruralized, embracing ten members from provinces. The ten rural leaders were: Muhammad Badi’ (al-Gharbiya), Muhammad Mursi (al-Sharqiya), Saad al-Katatni (al-Minya), Muhammad Abdelrahman al-Mursi (al-Daqahliya), Mahmoud Abu-Zeid (al- Daqahliya), Mahmoud Hussein (Asyut), Mohyi Hamed (al-Sharqiya), Sa’ad al-Husseini (al-Gharbiya), Abdelrahman al-Bar (al- Daqahliya), Mustafa Ghoneim (al-Gharbiya). City residents with a rural background were: Esam al-Erian (from the suburbs of Giza), Osama Nasr (from the suburbs of Alexandria), Rashad al-Bayumi (who lived in Cairo but was raised in and frequently returned to Suhaj), Mahmoud Ezzat (a Cairo resident linked to al-Daqahliya and still had organizational influence there). Urban members were Mahmoud Ghozlan (Cairo), Khairat al-Shatir (Alexandria), and Gom’a Amin (Alexandria) (See: Tamam, 2012; Kandil 2015, p. 187)

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Organizational bloc on the group, meant that salafization, ruralization and conservatism were entirely consolidated and empowered. This was internally reflected in the rigid and centralized decision-making process, the top-down approach in dealing with internal opposition and the reliance on the “listen and obey” principle. It was at this moment, where the “organizationalists” ideas predominated the group, that the 2011 uprising broke out. After almost two decades of tensions between the Conservatives and the Reformists, the 2011 uprising constituted a final stage in their struggle. Reformist figures either were expelled or broke away from the Brotherhood, forming their own political parties (see: Section 4.3.2). MB Youth prominent figures defected or were expelled from the leadership, despite their major role in promoting the public image of the MB during the uprising (by pushing the leadership to take part in the demonstrations) and thus securing the MB’s role in the political life after the ousting of Mubarak. In 2012, the Organizational bloc attempted to adapt to the new political environment. Its political rhetoric only became more revolutionary, and it rushed to power, giving up on its long-standing policy of caution and self-restraint. Yet, internally, the MB failed to elaborate a new ideological or strategic program. It also continued managing the group the same way as before the uprising. Important decisions, such as running for presidential election, were taken within a narrow power center. Opponents were silenced, and the ranks were expected to trust and obey their leaders. Even the choice of Mursi to run for the presidency, after al-Shatir was excluded on legal grounds, reflected that the Organizational bloc was still following the same criteria for promoting members, that being loyalty and allegiance to the old guard. Similarly, most of the Organizational bloc’s leaders became governors and ministers during Mursi’s rule. The ascendance to power through parliamentary and presidential elections in 2011 and 2012 constituted the ultimate victory of the Organizational bloc.

5.2

RE-configuration and Growing Schism Post- 2013

After Mubarak’s ouster in 2011, the Brotherhood benefited from unprecedented legal recognition and formal institutional power. The new political reality, pushed the Brotherhood and its newly established political party the FJP into the formal political sphere. During the transition phase (2011–2012), the MB lost the support of “revolutionaries”, especially after the events of “Muhammad Mahmoud street” in November 2011, and after the group’s decision to place a candidate for

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presidency, after it had previously announced that it would not do so. Revolutionary forces accused the group of aligning itself with the “deep state”, including the military, with the aim of undermining the revolution. Yet, the MB ascended to power through parliamentary and presidential elections. Even though the MB was the largest social movement in Egypt, and the most powerful political player during the transition phase, it failed to effectively govern the country. Mursi’s attempts to assert control over state institutions were portrayed by anti-MB media as “Brotherhood-ization” of the state ( akhwana-t al-dawla). The MB was thus “forced” to ally with Islamists, including Salafist groups and ex-Jihadists, at the expense of liberal and revolutionary forces. This contributed to the group’s downfall. In June 2013, only one year after Mursi assumed power, the NSF, backed by several state institutions, particularly the military and the media, toppled Mursi from power. This was followed by an unprecedented crackdown on the Brotherhood; the repression was unprecedented in terms of degree and scale.12 Yet, the Brotherhood attempted to adapt to the new repressive policy, implementing modifications in its strategy, tactics, and organizational structure. However, the failure of its efforts to undermine the coup, as well as the persistent repression against it led to the destabilization of the configuration of the group’s internal arena. This paved the way to the reconfiguration of the internal movement’s arena; i.e. a process of both conflictual and cooperative interactions, where one faction aimed at restoring the old order, and the other at maintaining it. The outcome of these negotiations and struggles took the form of severe factionalism.

5.2.1

Adapting to Repression: MB’s Efforts and Challenges

Until 2011, the Brotherhood’s exceptional ability to adapt to the changing state policy and alter its strategy to cope with new challenges and benefit from opportunities, enabled the group to survive repression and flourish under authoritarianism (al-Anani, 2016; Awadi, 2004). In 2013, when the regime carried out a wave of harsh repression against the Brotherhood, the latter sought to adapt to the new environment, by carrying out organizational, strategic and tactical changes. 12

Several hundred MB members and supporters were killed either by excessive force against its protesters at sit-ins or marches or by extrajudicial killing. Thousands of MB leaders and members were detained under appalling conditions of detention: torture of prisoners, deprived of medical treatment, and family visits, Moreover, freezing the Brotherhood’s financial assets, confiscating their educational and medical centers, and taking over thousands of their social associations (See: Human Rights Watch, 2014; 2015).

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Although these changes reflected the MB’s ability to cope with new challenges and maintain its activism in a high-risk environment, they failed to undermine the regime’s power. Strategic and Tactical innovation As of the beginning of the crisis in the summer of 2013, the Brotherhood relied on two tactics. First, it sought to widen its circle of allies, by creating a coalition of Islamist parties and groups who reject Mursi’s removal from power; the “National Alliance to Support Legitimacy”, NASL(al-tahaluf al-watany le da’m al-shar’eya).13 Second, the MB decided to mobilize its members and supporters to join protests against the dismissal of Mursi. Sending its members and supporters to the streets was meant to achieve two objectives: on the one hand, to maintain the unity of the group and sustain the solidarity among the rank and file. On the other hand, it sought to create “a revolutionary/anti-coup momentum” which could change the status-quo in the MB’s favour (al-Anani, 2019). The MB thus began to organize preemptive demonstrations to support the president’s rule. Immediately, after the calls for the June 30th protests, and a few days before the ousting of Mursi, the Brotherhood called for the sit-ins in Raba’a and al-Nahda squares in Cairo and Giza to support the president’s legitimacy and counterbalance the NSF-organized protests. By July 3, pro-Musri protestors came from all over Egypt to join the sit-ins in Raba’a al-Adaweya and al-Nahda squares. Simultaneously, the Brotherhood organized daily marches across the nation. Protestors were met with excessive violence from both security forces and civilians (thugs). Yet, the Brotherhood was determined to continue mobilizing on the ground, even after the violent dispersal of the Raba’a and al-Nahda sit-ins on August 14, 2013. As of the dispersal, pro-Mursi demonstrations became significantly tense and confrontational; the regime responded to protests violently, and protesters, particularly the youth, were more defiant and determined to challenge the regime. The regime backlashed; all Brotherhood activities were banned by a court decision in September 2013, the media campaign against the group escalated, and the persecution of MB supporters and protestors continued. The ban forced the movement underground. As the movement went underground, the leadership came up with a “strategic multiphase/threefold plan” for its underground existence in Egypt, with the end goal of overthrowing the new regime and “restoring the rule of legitimacy” (al- Tellawy,2016a). In the first phase, al-irbak, the MB would “spread confusion”. In the second phase, al-inhak it would “exhaust” 13

Among these parties in the alliance were the Brotherhood’s FJP, Al-Wasat Party, AlGamaa Al-Islamiyya’s Construction and Development Party, and the Salafi Al-Watan Party.

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the regime. In the final decisive phase, the MB would carry out the “strong arm project” (al thira’ al-qaweya) which consists of a number of effective and “specific operations” against the regime. The matter of “specific operations” will be detailed later in this chapter. This new strategy was considered a “revolutionary innovation” compatible with the new context. The first two phases relied on the holding of regular protests across Egypt. Organizing protests on different days, and in different places, at different times, as well as the diffusion of protest activities in several cities, suburban areas, and rural areas, was meant to confuse the security forces. To avoid leaking information, the weekly schedule of protests was announced on Friday to supporters. In addition, it seemed that the MB had clearly illustrated the logic behind its threefold strategic plan to both members and supporters. In an interview with a young activist who was not affiliated to the MB, she clearly explained the importance of protests, using the same words mentioned in the MB’s new strategy, “irbak”(confusion) and “inhak”(exhaustion): “When I knew that there was a march, I would go. I would get beaten and go back home. So why do I participate? I wanted to tell “them” that I exist. That I will not let them rest. I was making them (the security forces) stand in the streets from 6 o’clock in morning to 12 o’clock in the evening. We were “exhausting them” (inhak)… the ministry of interior. This “exhaustion” prevented further series of detentions. I would participate in a protest for two hours in a day, but they, the policemen, they are standing in the heat and running behind us the whole day. It was not about Mursi; he will not return to his post. At least not through protest. Protest was rather a tactic to exhaust (inhak) the ministry of interior to prevent further detentions” (author’s interview, March 3, 2016). Yet, with time, protests in the street decreased because of police brutality. Therefore, universities became new arenas for MB’s continued protests. The movement encouraged university students to organize marches to maintain “revolutionary activism” (al-hirak al-thawry). Not only did the MB mobilize its constituencies at universities, but it also gave instructions to its students to “revolutionize” other students and mobilize people to join the protests. The mobilization was led by the Brotherhood’s mid-level cadres and graduate students, who operated under the umbrella of a network called “Students Against the Coup” and—not the Brotherhood—with the aim of widening the support base in Egyptian universities (al-Anani, 2019). This network organized daily protests in every faculty. However, by November 2013, the security forces had been installed on the campuses of state universities, as well as Al-Azhar University, in order to quell student protests. The next month, the Brotherhood was designated a “terrorist organization” by the government. The MB official website (at the time still unified) adopted

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a defiant discourse. Its aim was to mobilize for protests on January 25, 2014, in the occasion of the third anniversary of the 2011 uprising. On January 25, 2014, the security forces used excessive violence against the protesters, killing on that day at least 64 protestors across the country (Human Rights Watch, 2015). As police violence against protesters increased, peaceful protest seemed ineffective, and its cost became increasingly high. Even Islamists who had previously participated in the pro-Mursi sit-ins started to disengage and question the relevance of the protest. An Islamist indicated: “I stopped participating in demonstrations as of January 25, 2014, when I found out that it’s not worth it. It was not an effective strategy” (author’s interview, April 9, 2016). The MB’s strategic plan seemed to have failed. Protest seemed impossible after declaring the MB a terrorist organization. Instead of undermining the regime’s power, and mobilizing more opponents, protest activities led to more detentions, extrajudicial killings, and disengagement among supporters. Against this background, significant divisions started to appear within the MB over how to respond to regime repression. A tense debate arose within the group on whether to use “selfdefense tactics” to protect protesters from police attacks. The movement’s leadership rejected any use of violence and insisted on peaceful protest (Anani, 2019; Grimm and Harders, 2018). By the end of 2014, the NASL, which was formed to reverse the ouster, had failed. Many of the parties withdrew from the alliance since it failed to achieve its objectives (Lübben, 2015). The detention campaign against MB members, supporters and even secular opposition, expanded. Hundreds of MB members were sentenced to death among them Supreme Guide Badi’, and ousted President Mursi. Former Defense Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi who led the coup was elected President. At the same time, the MB’s options in dealing with the regime became limited and the leadership’s control over its rank and file was significantly weakened. Organizational downsizing and metamorphosis During the Raba’a sit-in, the Brotherhood’s Shura Council had met twice to discuss possible scenarios if security forces dispersed the sit-in and arrested the leadership. The meetings concluded with the formation of a “Crisis Management Committee” (lajna-t-idara-t-al-azma) tasked with leading the group for six months. In addition, the Shura Council made a contingency plan in case the sit-ins were dispersed and the leaders arrested. Some leading figures such as Mahmoud Hussein were instructed to leave Egypt, as part of the contingency plan (Hamama, 2016). Shortly after the dispersal of the Raba’a and al-Nahda sit-ins, the MB reorganized its rank and file. The remaining Guidance Office members who had escaped the crackdown were Mahmoud Ezzat, Mahmoud Ghozlan, Abdelrahaman al-Barr, Muhammad Abdelrahman

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al-Mursi, Mohamad Saad Elewa, and Mohamad Kamal. While Ezzat, Ghozlan, al-Barr and al-Mursi went underground, Elewa and Kamal together with the remaining members of the Crisis Management Committee (CMC) assumed the de facto leadership of the group. Along with the new strategic plan and the mass mobilization tactic, the Brotherhood made some organizational changes in order to adapt to the post-coup environment. The first measure taken was the promotion of new figures to fill the gap left by arrested leaders both in the Guidance Council and the Shura Council. Mohammed Badi’, arrested since August 2013, continued to be recognized as the General Guide. Yet, the effective leadership of the group passed to his First Deputy Mahmoud Ezzat—hiding since August 2013—who became the Acting General Guide. In early 2014, the weekly meetings resumed within “the families” (al-usar) as the MB’s smallest educational units. As of 2013, the composition of usar was constantly changing because of death, detention, or expulsion, and was replaced by new ones. For security reasons, the weekly usar meetings ceased to take place in mosques, and members were not able to gather at someone’s home, out of fear that neighbors would inform on them. Adapting to the new repressive environment, MB usar started to meet in public places, including gardens, beaches or even cinemas (author’s interview, April 3, 2016). It seems that “Sisters” usar were able to resume their weekly meetings at small faculty mosques and even recruited new members (author’s interview, March 22, 2016). Furthermore, the MB reformed its organizational structure: some committees were combined, new ones were created, and the functions and tasks of others changed. For instance, the Charity Committee, which was responsible for the Brotherhood’s social service provision, became the “Committee for the Affected”. The latter’s task was to provide for the families and members who lost their income or income provider because of death, detention, or expulsion from Egypt. The Proselytization Committee responsible for the propagation of the MB’s ideology became the “Awareness Committee” and focused on anti-regime mobilization. The Students’ Committee was combined with the Youth Committee and became “Students Against the Coup”; the network responsible for mobilization at schools and universities. The Muslim Sisters corps was eliminated (Ayyash and Willi, 2016). Furthermore, new committees were formed. In fact, by the end of 2013, the mandate of the Guidance Office was officially terminated. In February 2014, the CMC called on the remaining Shura Council members to hold internal elections. The elections resulted in the election of a new “Crisis Management Committee” based in Egypt, which became later known as “the February Committee” and was headed by Abdelrahman al-Mursi. The committee represented all geographic sectors (qitaa’)

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and was tasked with managing the events on the ground. It assembled six leading figures, three from the Guidance Office and three from the Shura Council. Since the Supreme Guide, Badi’ was under arrest, the effective control of the rank and file in Egypt passed to Mohamed Taha Wahdan, who was previously heading the Committee of Cultivation (lajna-t-al- tarbiyya) (Ayyash and Willi, 2016). In the same year, a new group consisting of MB exiles in Turkey formed a new base of operations; the “Office for Egyptians Abroad” emerged in Istanbul. It was headed by Ahmed Abdelrahman, a member of the Shura Council and included leading figures such as Amr Darrag and Yahya Hamid, both ministers during Mursi’s presidency. The purpose of the Istanbul-based Office was to manage the Brotherhood members in exile, unite the efforts opposed to the regime within a single entity and maintain relations with external donors and foreign governments. In London, the MB International Office, (also called al-rabita), headed by Ibrahim Munir the MB’s official spokesman in the West since 2010, was still active. These structural changes reveal, on the one hand, the Brotherhood’s ability to adapt to repression and to maintain its activism, even in a highly repressive context. The communication chain between leaders and members who went underground was kept intact thanks to the movement’s strong sense of organization and discipline as well as the strong networks and personal ties between members. Holding elections for underground leadership positions confirmed that the Brotherhood was still strong. The Brotherhood did not only revive the old structures, but it also reshaped them for the new environment. On the other hand, however, these organizational changes, particularly the downsizing of the organization, reflected the leadership’s awareness of the frustration of its rank and file. The latter were increasingly pushing for a more assertive strategy against the regime, especially after the peaceful protest seemed to be ineffective. Downsizing the organization was not only a strategy aiming to adapt to repression, but it also seemed to be a tactic to appease the growing confrontational trend within the movement, and a means to enforce unity among the frustrated rank and file. The remolding of the structure did not only rush organizational recovery, but it also confronted the organization with new challenges. For instance, at the higher administrative level, the MB generated new structures, without dissolving the old ones. For instance, Guidance Office members who managed to escape the crackdown in Egypt still assumed power and considered themselves as the “official leadership”. Simultaneously, members in the Crisis Management Committee, were the “effective leaders” on the ground. Similarly, the Turkey-based office was an innovation. Yet, the older International Office of the Brotherhood complained about the new “competitive” group (Ayyash and Willi, 2016).

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The multiplication of power centers and parallel structures inside and outside Egypt led to confusion, as well as the overlapping of efforts and the competition between the groups over resources. For the first time in its history, the MB was challenged to realize a balance between external and internal power centers.

5.2.2

The Micro Dynamics of Raba’a

“Raba’a was an Islamic utopia”, “Raba’a was my comfort zone”, “everyone in Raba’a was alike. It was the perfect Islamic society”. This is how Islamist youth described Raba’a, two years after its dispersal (authors’ interviews, 2016). In fact, the pro-Mursi sit-in gathered all kinds of Islamists as well as a few Independents who opposed the coup. In addition to MB, Salafists and non-affiliated Islamists there was a large group of Islamist militants who had spent many years in prison and who were released during the rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) after the 2011 uprising. Some MB young affiliates, and other non-militant Islamists spent time with Jihadis in Raba’a, interacted, exchanged ideas and built friendship ties with them (Hamama, 2015). I suggest that a sort of cross-fertilization resulted from the cooperation between the MB and other Islamists, including more radical groups, who were the MB’s only allies during the sit-in and after its dispersal. In addition, a process of identification between Islamists, who had previously competed against each other, might have forged as an outcome of the high-risk engagement and the common experience of fierce repression. This meant that “the Brotherhood no longer sets itself off so sharply from the rest of the opposition camp” (Brown and Dunne, 2015). At the same time, the Raba’a dispersal had a “Karbala-like impact on the organization’s members. This massacre has become a founding moment through which both the past and the future are perceived. From this moment onward, Brotherhood supporters have become the righteous party” (al-Houdaiby, 2015). While the older generation has been through many ordeals, Raba’a was an extraordinary event for the younger generation. Raba’a dispersal constituted a moral shock especially for the younger generations, and engendered rage and indignation. The enduring state-driven violence against Islamists in the aftermath of Raba’a, stimulated different individual responses. While some members defected, because of fear, burnout or apathy, others remained committed to the organization. While some members endorsed an innovative violent tactic against the regime, others defected to join established conventional radical groups.

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Individual responses to repression: from apathy to militantism During the Raba’a sit-in, specifically after the killing of 51 Islamist protesters in the clashes in front of the Presidential Guards headquarters (al-haras al-jumhuri), on July 8, 2013, discussions were prompted among Islamists, including higher and middle ranking MB members, on the use of violence (Hamama, 2015). The leadership decided to form “deterrence committees” (lijan al-rad’) in response to the repeated attacks on pro-Mursi demonstrations. These committees are not a novelty. Deterrence committees used to accompany MB public activities such as conferences, electoral campaigns, and student demonstrations. Members of deterrence committees tend to be physically well-built and enthusiastic. Their main responsibility is the physical defense of the participants in a collective action, and the coordination of activities during gatherings (Hamama, 2015). Discussions arose about the need for weapons. Several young MB members and Islamists believed that the “deterrence committees” needed what is more than physical strength to protect protestors from thugs and police attacks during demonstrations. Yet, the discussion about the use of violence did not develop into organizational decisions. An Islamist, who is not an MB member but closely connected to MB youth, believes that one of the MB’s mistakes was that the protestors in Raba’a were not armed. “I didn’t see weapons in Raba’a, but I know that there were weapons. Most of the weapons were removed before the dispersal, probably by MB leaders. On the day of the dispersal there were minimal amounts of white arms, which was extremely provocative. Weapons were necessary for self-defense” (author’s interview, April 9, 2016). After Raba’a, peaceful protests were also fiercely attacked. Ongoing state-driven repression led to a common conviction among many protestors: peaceful marches would only lead to their assault. The MB’s approach had failed to confront the challenges of the new environment and affected members in different ways. After the Raba’a dispersal, several members started to reconsider their activism. On the one hand, some MB members stopped following the leadership’s instructions, and several Islamists defected because of fear, burnout or apathy. For instance, a young MB member explained to me why he stopped participating in MB protests. He said: “I stopped participating because I am very angry. The last time I participated in MB protests was on January 25, 2015. On that day, the degree of violence was terribly high. Of course, it was not as violent as on the day of Raba’a dispersal. But I was tired. There were too many marches. I didn’t know where to go, or who to help. I am bored of politics. I need to have a life now, a decent life. I need to provide for my family. I need a stable job, and a regular income” (author’s interview, April 3, 2016).

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Others defected because of fear. A student previously affiliated to Misr-al-Kawiya party told me: “ During the last march, all I was thinking about was that I would get killed. Everyone around me was getting killed. I was terrified. I kept regretting joining the protests. After that day (Ramsis protest on August 18, 2013) I never participated again” (author’s interview, March 22, 2016). Another independent sympathizer who participated in the Raba’a sit-in explained that fear and the ineffectiveness of protest made him disengage: “I participated in marches after Raba’a. But it was so violent, so I stopped. The last time I joined a protest was on October 6, 2013. That day, I became convinced that it was not useful at all. My voice doesn’t even reach the people, the voice of the police siren is louder. I was afraid of getting arrested, I was afraid of humiliation, I was afraid about my parents and my wife” (author’s interview, April 4, 2016). On the other hand, others were enraged by state repression, and many Islamists, among them MB affiliates, doubted peaceful change and the down-top approach. A young Islamist, who is not a member of the MB but is close to the MB youth and collaborates with them, said “Raba’a constituted a turning point for me on the ideological level. It proved that change comes from above, not from the base. Strategically speaking, maybe the use of weapons would have been a better strategy. Many youths agree on this” (author’s interview, April 9, 2016). This might partially explain why in the aftermath of Raba’a defected MB members and other Islamists decided to join militant groups, like “Ansar Bayt al Maqdes”, or other militant groups in Syria. The “effective violence” adopted by Jihadi militant groups along with the state’s inability to crush these groups, encouraged several MB members to join them (Ayyash and Willi, 2016). The media’s campaign linking MB to militant Jihadists, and the repressive regime policy that does not differentiate between moderates and radicals pushed many to turn to violence, since they had nothing more to lose (Brown and Dunne, 2015; Hashem, 2015). It is also worth noting that several MB members were recruited from militant groups inside the prisons (Ayyash, 2019). MB breakaways and new Islamist militantism By the end of 2014, several militant cells were formed. These groups, assembled young Islamists, including MB affiliates, who alleged to “defend the revolution”. It is likely that these groups were formed on the basis of individual initiatives and were unrelated to one another. These groups gathered defected MB young affiliates, particularly students and deterrence committees’ members. They sought to recruit angry Islamist youths, young fighters returning from Syria and those who failed to travel there in the first place (Hamama, 2015). A former Islamist, who now adheres to the secular wing and who participated in the Raba’a sit-in and the post-Raba’a protests, stated: “In 2014 and 2015, I was approached by two different friends who

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are both affiliated to the Brotherhood, with the aim of recruiting me in their newly formed cells. These cells carried out violent operations against the regime” (author’s interview, May 12, 2016). The trials against Mursi and the group’s leaders, in addition to the lack of legal recourse, the ongoing state driven repression, and the failure or irrelevance of MB’s leadership strategy, enhanced the appeal of violence as a tactic. Al-Houdaiby (2015) suggests that this kind of activism emerged in a moment where the sudden absence of the leadership and of the organization as an ideological feed after Raba’a, led enraged MB members to open up more to their Islamist allies and their discourse. Similarly, Brown and Dunne (2015) denote that the opening up of MB youth to sympathizers from outside the movement can be explained by the fact that the demonstrations following Mursi’s ouster “have cemented some personal bonds and created a deep sense of injustice over the violence inflicted. Now, influence comes from deeds and grievances, substituting for the time when organizational dedication and history were the main currency in the movement.” The new militants established a new unconventional form of Islamist militantism. These groups did not adopt the orthodox Jihadi discourse. In fact, the ideological conviction was not a focal point for these groups. Violence was a tactical choice and a revolutionary strategy rather than an ideological affinity. It seems that these Islamists, younger members and students, were rather inspired by Che Guevara than by militant Islamists (Hamama, 2015). The scope of violence also differed from that adopted by militants. Instead of carrying out indiscriminate violent activities, these new groups adopted a tactic based on targeted violence (al-unf al muwajah) or “smart violence” (Ayyash, 2015). This type of violence has, according to these groups, a “jurisprudential rooting” (ta’sil fiqhi). This meant that the militants set general criteria to identify their targets “in compliance with Shari’a”. Attacks targeted certain elements of the regime, particularly certain police officers and thugs who were engaged in the torture of MB prisoners and attacks—particularly sexual assaults— on male and female protestors. In other words, the new groups perceived themselves as “retaliatory” organizations carrying out “revenge operations” (author’s interview, February 6, 2019). According to them, it was the selective violence and the compliance with the shari’a that made their engagement in violent activities resistance, not terrorism. Among these groups are the “Hasam movement” (Harakit sawa’id misr, which translated to “movement of Egypt’s forearms”, and shorty Hasam also means decisiveness), the “Revolutionary punishment movement” (lajnat al-ikab al-thawry) and “Liwaa al-thawra group”. The Hasam movement is a prototypical model for the new militant groups. First of all, its name does not indicate its affinity to Islamism. The only hint on the

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movement’s website (which has been removed since 2017) that links it to Islamism is the use of some Quranic verses on jihad. Its slogan, “with our hands we protect our revolution”, clearly indicated that it was a “retaliatory” organization, that aimed at “protecting the revolution”. In addition, it rejected violence against civilians, including Christians. The movement condemned on its website the bombing of an Orthodox church in Cairo on December 10, 2016. It accused the regime of organizing the attack on the church to incite sectarian fissures (ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack later). Hasam also described Egyptian Muslims and Christians as “the descendants of one nation” (Hasam, December 11, 2016). Furthermore, the movement described the regime as a “corrupt, cruel and unjust military occupation”. In this sense, it significantly differs from orthodox Jihadists who announce their aim at ousting apostate regimes, installing an Islamic state, and adopting a hostile discourse and violent activities towards non-Muslims. Between 2015 and 2016, Hasam movement and Liwaa al-thawra groups claimed responsibility for armed attacks on regime officials and security personnel, mainly through bombings and drive-by shootings. For example, the Hasam movement declared its responsibility for the failed assassination attempt on the former grand Mufti Ali Gom’a, who approved the death penalty for Mursi and other MB leaders and members including the Supreme Guide. The forging of a new generation At least until 2011, there were two trends among the MB’s younger generation. As indicated above (see Section 5.1.1), there is considerable evidence that the majority of the young generation was intellectually and religiously conservative. The minor trend consisted of young activist Brothers; the “MB Youth” or the “Bloggers generation”, who mostly defected after the 2011 uprising. In stark contrast to the “MB Youth” generation, the major trend of the same age cohort lacked the experience of cross-partisan cooperation, and the exposure to diversity. They were cultivated at the hands of the Organizational bloc inside the Brotherhood, which controlled the cultivation programs and educational curricula. Thus, religiously, the major trend among MB young affiliates was inclined towards Salafism and was particularly conservative on both social and political stances. The majority of MB young affiliates were less concerned with politics, and rather interested in Islamic proselytizing. Similar to the leadership, they were committed to secrecy and were suspicious of other political and social forces. Yet, the youth, previously unconcerned with politics, increasingly became involved in the political life as of January 28, 2011, when the MB leadership decided to mobilize its rank and file to join the popular protest. After the 2011 uprising and until the dispersal

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of the Raba’a sit-in in 2013, the vast majority of MB youth remained committed followers of the MB and to its principle of “listen and obey”. The experience of Raba’a dispersal in August 2013, was decisive for several youth: It constituted a “moral shock” (Jasper, 1998) for many and engendered, besides indignation and anger, generational consciousness. A new generation unit, which I suggest calling the “Raba’a Youth” started to emerge. This rising generation is distinctive, partly due to its formative experiences from 2011 to 2013, but also because it seems to be a product of the growing blame to the leadership, accompanied by the growing power of this generation within the movement (Brown and Dunne, 2015). For this generation “everything changed after Raba’a…Blood has always been a turning point” (author’s interview, April 3, 2016). “Raba’a Youth” is a generation that was outraged by the regime’s uncompromising position, by the society’s support of the bloodshed, by failing MB leaders’ strategies and by the MB leaders themselves to whom they had previously remained loyal soldiers, followed and trusted, but who have led the group from the center of power to the margins once again. A MB young man explained: “I was against the MB’s decision to place a candidate for presidential elections. I was not convinced. But when the leadership made the decision, I had to follow them. I obeyed. I elected Mursi. I believed, and many of the youth believed that maybe these men (the leaders) have information that we don’t have, maybe they see what we don’t see. They certainly understand what we can’t understand. So, we followed them. [..] By the end of 2012, I was sure that we were going in the wrong direction. I saw a catastrophe coming. My friends too. But we were sure that the leaders see what we saw. They assumed power, they had an intelligence agency. So, of course, we were not the only ones who were aware of this. We were sure the leaders were acting. But we found out that they were illusioned” (author’s interview, April 3, 2016). Blame towards the leadership, self-critique, and the re-evaluation of MB mistakes post -2011 uprising and until the Rab’a dispersal in 2013, is in fact focal in the recent conflict, and will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. What matters here is recognizing the shift in the perception of the youth towards the leadership; i.e. from submission to denunciation. Simultaneously, the crackdown on the Brotherhood, the detention of leaders, and the Brotherhood’s organizational adaptation led to the emergence of a new line of leadership among the “Raba’a Youth” who began to operate independently from the old leadership. They became responsible for organizing protests, mobilizing members and supporters and supervising the functioning of various committees.

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Indeed, “with the absence of the movement’s senior and old members, young members became responsible for maintaining the Brotherhood’s existence and running its daily activities for the first time in the movement’s history” (Al-Anani, 2019). Another important aspect that is distinctive about the new generation is that they were reaching out to other Islamists who were not affiliated with the MB (Brown and Dunne (2015). I also made the same observation. An Islamist young man who is a member of a small Islamist group said: “We are a network or a group that is intellectually closer to the Salafiyya of Sheikh Hossam al-Bokhary, and strategically close to the MB, as we also focus on da’wa. We have been collaborating with the MB youth since the calls for the anti-Mursi protest on June 30, 2013, as well as during Raba’a and afterwards” (author’s interview, April 9, 2016). A student at Cairo University and former affiliate in Misr al-Qaweya (Strong Egypt Party) also mentioned that she and other members from Strong Egypt Party were allowed to join the MB weekly meetings after the dispersal of Raba’a: “The MB girls welcomed us in their meetings and tried to coopt us. We didn’t feel like strangers. In fact, it was impossible for anyone to attend MB meetings, but for us it was an easy task since we are Misr-al-Qaweya girls, and we have been very close to MB girls since Raba’a” (author’s interview, March 22, 2016). The new emerging generation adopted a more confrontational discourse than its leaders. This can be explained partly as a reaction to the state’s fierce and ongoing repression, since 2013. It also reflected the growing rage, and discontent with the nonsensical leadership’s strategy of peaceful protest. In addition, the confrontational discourse can also be explained by the cross-fertilization resulting from the cooperation between the MB and other Islamists, including more radical groups and ex-Jihadists, who were the MB’s only allies during the sit-in and after its dispersal. This new generation, the “Raba’a Youth” was also recognized by the leadership and was referred to as “Jil al-shabab” (Youth Generation) in the official statements. (IkhwanInfo, January 24, 2015). The idea of empowering youth also became a focal issue in the contention. Finally, while the ban of MB activities and its declaration as a terrorist organization, as well as the failed strategies to undermine the regime’s power, added to the frustration of members and the growing distrust in their leadership, the new generation of “Raba’a Youth” field leaders became popular among the rank-and-file because of their confrontational discourse.

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Re-orientation and Re-organization of a Factional Movement

MB’s leadership was conscious of the developments on the ground. It was aware that it could not assert control over its membership which was either disengaged, radicalized, or pushed towards confrontation against the regime. Although the tactical approach to violence was strange to the core of MB’s doctrine, it increasingly gained support among the group’s ranks. Meanwhile, the leadership did not tolerate the engagement of its members in militant groups. It assured on several occasions that it was committed to non-violence, that it was not considering a reconciliation with the regime, and that it was determined to undermine the coup and restore the rule of legitimacy. When the violence dilemma reached the CMC, an internal conflict erupted. Between 2014 and 2016, the leadership struggled at times, and at others negotiated. Yet, by 2016, the movement had split into two competing factions, each promoting a different strategy and assuming legitimacy. Redefining the concept of “pacifism” As of June 2014, tension inside the CMC had become visible. Several dilemmas emerged. The most focal dilemma during the “escalation phase” (2014–2016) concerned the definition of “pacifism” (al-silmiyya) which shaped the MB’s ideological and strategic stances. Unlike, the common assumption suggesting that at this point the MB underwent an ideological turn towards radicalization, and that it was prompting violence, I contend that the re-definition of pacifism did not reflect an ideological radicalization as much as it was seeking a strategic adaptation, aiming first at undermining the coup and “revolutionalizing” the street, and second and most importantly, to keep the organizational coherence intact. In fact, the unprecedented crackdown on the group undermined the organization’s control over its members; there was a general feeling among members—as well as other allied Islamists—that the MB leadership’s approach and pacific strategy either failed or were no longer relevant. The leadership’s fear of losing the ground was increasing; it was aware that it could no longer contain the fuming youth, and that peaceful activism would not remain an option for long. Against this background, in early 2014, some leaders, headed by Guidance Office member Mohamad Kamal, started a discussion within the CMC about the effectiveness of the group’s strategy in dealing with the regime. These leaders, who became known as the “Kamal Front”, recognized that the organizational coherence was at stake. While the Kamal faction was, more or less, ideologically committed to nonviolence, it sought to prevent the disengagement of its members, or their engagement in violent acts by redefining “pacifism” (al-silmiyya). In this regard, the Kamal Front

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advocated for a strategy that is convenient with the “revolutionary momentum,” which required a wider definition of the concept of pacifism (al-Houdaiby, 2015). In convenience with the Guide’s famous declaration during the Raba’a sit-in “our peacefulness is stronger than bullets”, Kamal’s front suggested that “anything short of bullets is peaceful” (kul ma dun al rusas silmiyya). This new definition, meant that “there are many levels of pacifism, and many levels of violence” (al silmiya darjat wal ‘unf darajat). Kamal’s front was convinced that this definition should shape the group’s “innovative revolutionary strategy” (al-manhaj al thawri al mubdi’), which should replace the outdated strategies. The new definition of pacifism meant that all attacks on facilities, burning cars, and destruction of infrastructure were acceptable (Ayyash, author’s interview, February 6, 2019). This was also declared by MB leader Ashraf Abdel Ghaffar in a TV broadcast on AlThawra TV channel (July 12, 2015). Yet it is not clear, whether attacks against personnel were also tolerated. In fact, this strategy was not new. It was nothing else but the realization of the third decisive phase—the strong arm project—of the threefold strategic plan, which the group adopted when the movement was forced underground after its banning in September 2013.14 The MB’s exiled Guidance Office, particularly Ezzat and Hussein, did not refuse this hypothetical definition of pacific activism, nor did they withdraw the previously approved “strong arm project”. Yet, they differed with the Kamal front on two matters: developing special committees, and the timing of when to carry out this type of operations (Hamama, 2015; al-Telawy, 2016a). As leaders of the Organizational bloc, the latter gave primacy to preserving the organization. Therefore, they believed that violence should be completely avoided to maintain what is left of the organization and the limited international human rights support the group was receiving. Any escalation against the regime would legitimize state repression and increase the support and funds it gets to eliminate the Brotherhood (Hamama, 2015). As the disagreement within the CMC escalated, the disconnection between the Brotherhood’s leadership and ranks grew. The leadership’s attempt failed to prevent more members from developing increasingly violent tendencies. In the following months, a number of militant groups were founded by some MB youths and other Islamists and announced their responsibility for some of the attacks on security forces and state officials as aforementioned. Furthermore, the Brotherhood’s ability to acquire public support and rebuild its public image has been weekend, especially since the MB was linked to the violent attacks. 14

The threefold strategy is comparable to al-Banna’s strategy declared in the fifth general Conference in 1939, upon which the first splinter group left the movement. Vandalism was also a strategy that Qutb approved for Organization 1965 in its opposition against the Nasser regime. (See: Ashmawy, 2006)

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Between negotiations and struggles: the formation of a new alliance Since the discussions about the definition of “the innovative revolutionary strategy” started, the CMC became increasingly factionalized. Kamal’s front within the CMC assembled three leaders: Mohamad Kamal, Ali Batikh, and Hussein Ibrahim. This front was supported by the new field leaders; the “Raba’a Youth”. Together, these two groups formed the base for a new alliance: “the Revolutionary bloc”, headed by Kamal. In this respect, I refer to this new alliance as “revolutionary” for three reasons. First, this is how the new alliance framed its cause. The newly-formed alliance claimed that its goal was to accomplish the 2011 uprisings’ objectives. The “Revolution” was the most prominent notion reflected in its rhetoric and was the group’s main source of legitimacy. In addition, this generation was inspired by the mass mobilization in 2011, and sought to re-create this “revolutionary momentum” to reverse the coup. Therefore, it pushed for the implementation of a “revolutionary strategy”, and for the empowerment of the “revolutionary” youth within the group. Finally, this bloc clearly “revolted” against the domination of the Organizational bloc within the MB, its set of values and its practices. The Revolutionary bloc challenged the group’s long-standing principles that have established a pattern of relationships between affiliate members and leaders based on submission and obedience. The first round of the fissions started in mid-May 2015, when President Mursi and over one hundred other senior MB leaders, including the General Guide Badi’, were sentenced to death. A few days later, Abdelrahman al-Mursi, the head of the CMC complained to acting General Guide Ezzat that Kamal and his supporters approved, in a secret meeting, and in defiance of the group’s decision, the launching of the “strong arm project”. According to him, the Committee itself became ineffective as a group led by Kamal were making unilateral decisions about the organization (IkhwanSite, December 12, 2015). Upon this accusation, acting General Guide, Ezzat dissolved the CMC, and transferred the three dissident leaders, Kamal, Batikh and Ibrahim, to an investigation committee. What added to the tensions is that the London-based “old guard” leader Ibrahim Munir, head of the MB’s International Organization, declared in the same month the suspension of several leaders who aligned themselves to the Kamal front. Among these leaders were activists in the “Office for Egyptians Abroad” based in Istanbul. The latter had actually announced one month earlier, that it had formed a “Crisis Management Office for Egyptians Abroad” (maktab idarat al-azma lilMasriyyin fi al-kharij) under the leadership of Ahmed ‘Abd al-Rahman (Ayyash and Willi, 2016). By that time, it became clear that two fronts were competing. On the one hand, it seemed that the Organizational bloc, mainly assembling exiled Guidance Office

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members, sought to restore the pre-2011 configuration, i.e. returning to the “organizationalist” set of ideas, adapting to state repression, giving primacy to preserving the group and returning to caution and self-restraint. On the other hand, the Kamal Front or the Revolutionary bloc, pursued a reconfiguration of the internal movement arena by redefining the concept of pacifism and adapting an innovative revolutionary strategy. In June 2015, the Shura Council met and took some decisions to conciliate between contending factions. By October 2015, it seemed that a settlement had been reached: the investigation and freezing of the memberships of Kamal and his supporters were withdrawn and a new “High Administrative Committee” (allajna al- idariyya al’‘uliya, HAC) was formed to replace the Crisis Management Committee. The new Committee was headed by Abdelrahman al-Mursi who was aligned with the Organizationalists, and regrouped both the old-guard’s supporters as well as leaders aligned with Kamal. In an attempt to appease the enraged members at the base, the old guard promoted younger activists, the “Raba’a youth” cadres who are known for their confrontational posture against the regime. These young cadres were promoted from the smaller administrative divisions (shu’ba) to the command of the regional sections (qism) of the Brotherhood. The young activist Montasser (Montasser is probably an alias) became the MB’s spokesman. In addition, a “Crisis Cell” of only three leaders was formed. This cell was headed by Kamal, and was given a time frame of six months to propose responses to several issues facing the MB, among them elaborating the MB’s strategy to the ranks and reforms to the internal bylaws (IkhwanSite, December 19, 2015). Yet, the conflict erupted again in December 2015, when the British government published its review of the MB, which stated that “by mid 2014 statements from Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood-linked media platforms seem to have deliberately incited violence [..] aspects of Muslim Brotherhood ideology and tactics, in this country and overseas, are contrary to our values and have been contrary to our national interests and our national security” (British Government, December 17, 2015). This review led to the eruption of an internal conflict once again. The Organizational bloc declared control over the movement. It announced on the newly launched website “IkhwanSite” (which was removed in January 2016) that the Guidance Office is, according to bylaws, the only body leading the organization. It also dismissed Montasser, Kamal and other members who were considered responsible for pushing the group towards violence through their confrontational discourse and strategy. They were transferred to an investigation committee whose members were appointed by the Organizationalists. The reasons declared for their

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suspension were administrative transgressions, disrespect of the Shura Council decisions, the aim to monopolize the decision-making, as well as leaking information to the media (IkhwanSite, December 19, 2015). In addition, the London-based Office declared the dissolution of the Istanbul-based Office (IkhwanSite, December 21, 2015). These decisions triggered an immediate response from the Revolutionary faction, who proclaimed control over the HAC, which they considered as the highest administrative body in the group, since they were elected by the Shura Council after the Guidance Office’s mandate was terminated. In other words, the Revolutionary bloc considered the HAC to be the new elected Guidance Office. The Revolutionary bloc also established their own website, “ikhwanonline.info”, in which they declared that the HAC did not issue any orders suspending Kamal or Montasser as spokesman, and that therefore both remained in their positions. The Istanbul-based Office declared its allegiance to the Kamal Front, which it considered as the legitimate leadership in Egypt. It also formed a committee to investigate the performances of Secretary General Hussein, who was aligned with Ezzat, and the London-based International Office (IkhwanInfo, December 16, 2015). Figure 5.2. demonstrates the new map of alliances within the group, and the deep factionalism it has caused. The figure shows that by the end of 2015, the MB’s leadership bodies; the Guidance Office and the Shura Council were paralyzed due to death and detention of their members. In addition, General Guide Badi’ and his first Deputy al-Shatir were detained since 2013. The second General Guide Deputy, Mahmoud Ezzat became the head of the group (acting General Guide), and was supported by exiled “official leaders”; i.e. members of the MB’s last elected Guidance Office in 2009 who had escaped the crackdown in Egypt. These included, Mahmoud Ghozlan, (arrested in May 2015) and Secretary General Mahmoud Hussein who resides in Turkey. This group is internally known as “al-Mahamid”, or the Mahmouds, since the three leaders’ surnames are Mahmoud (author’s interview, February 6, 2019). The HAC was factionalized in two fronts: Ezzat’s front (the Organizational bloc) and Kamal’s front (the Revolutionary bloc). Meanwhile, the head of the HAC, al-Mursi aligned himself with Ezzat. The London-based International Organization of the MB, (al-tanzim aldawli), also known as “Rabita-t al-misrying bil kharej” (the Association of Egyptians Abroad) headed since 2010 by Munir, who lives in exile since 1981 and has served as the MB’s “official spokesperson in the West”. Munir is an old comrade of acting General Guide Ezzat, and the detained General Guide Badi’. The three adhere to the Qutbist political generation, and were arrested in 1965. Munir aligned himself

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General Guide (Badi´)

Deputy 2 (Ezzat)

Deputy 1 (al-Shater)

London-based InternaonalOr ganizaon

Shura Council

Spokesman Commiee

Turkey-based Crisis Management Office for Egypans Abroad

Secretary General (Hussein)

Administrave Office

Sectors (Qita´)

Guidance Office

Head of HAC (al-Mursi) High Administrave Commiee

New Militant Groups

Governorate (Mohafza) District (Manqa) Revoluonary bloc

Division (Shu´ba)

Organizaonal bloc

Detained

Family (Usra) Suspected relaonship

Figure 5.2. MB’s re-configured map of alliances and factionalism in December 2015

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with Ezzat and the exiled Guidance Office members and represented together the remaining leaders of the Organizational bloc, also known as Ezzat’s Front. Members of the HAC who challenged the Organizational bloc, consisted of high ranking and mid-level cadres who remained in Egypt after the crackdown. They formed the Revolutionary front headed by Kamal within the HAC. Other prominent figures in this group are Batikh, Ibrahim, and Wahdan. These cadres reorganized the ranks after few months of the crackdown and were supported by younger emerging leaders among the “Raba’a generation”. The latter were promoted to leading positions within the group in May 2015 to appease the enraged ranks. The Istanbul-based “Crisis Management Office for Egyptians Abroad”, consisted of MB exiles, such as Amr Darrag, Yahya Hamed, and Ahmad Abdelrahman, who formed a new base of operations, “the Office for Egyptians Abroad” in Istanbul as of 2014. The Istanbul group aligned itself with Kamal’s faction in Egypt. Together they formed the Revolutionary bloc, also known as Kamal’s Front (for prominent figures in the factionalism, see Appendix B provided in the Electronic Supplementary Material). The Revolutionary bloc, particularly the local leadership, was supposedly linked to the new militant groups that became active in 2015 and 2016. This relationship cannot be confirmed with certainty; however, its existence is highly likely. It is widely believed that the Kamal front formed two committees during a secret meeting in January 2015: the “Committee of Revolutionary Punishment” (lajnat al-ikab alsawry) and the “Front for Popular Resistance” ( jabhat al mokawma al-sha’biyya) (Hamama, 2016; al-Tellawy, 2016b).15 The groups’ tactics are compliant with the new definition of pacifism as defined by Kamal’s Front, and can be considered as the realization of the “strong arm project” which consisted of a number of effective operations against specific targets (Ayyash, author’s interview, February 6, 2019). The selective violence adopted by these new militant groups is in fact compatible with the “innovative revolutionary strategy” that the Kamal Front advocated for. At the same time, there is no evidence whether these groups acted under the command of Kamal, and if they were funded by his front, or whether they acted on their own initiative. In early 2016, the MB was a deeply factionalized movement. The spokesmen committee split into two fronts, each supporting one of the contending blocs. The different administrative offices allied themselves with one of the two fronts. It is reported that in February 2016, at least 10 governorate administrative offices out of a total of 27, announced their support to the Revolutionary current led 15

As an evidence, both researchers argue that violent attacks were committed in governorates where Kamal’s Faction had organizational influence.

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by Kamal. The fragmentation extended all the way down to the “divison level” (shu’aba). This meant that even within the same “district” (mantiqah) different “divisions” were aligned with different factions (Hashem, 2016). The factionalism became even deeper when some local divisions started to split. In Alexandria, for instance, two parallel divisions were formed: one supported Ezzat’s faction, while the other was loyal to the Revolutionary bloc. This situation led some younger members to form their own “third body” which didn’t follow either of the two factions. These members distanced themselves from the internal conflict and focused in their usra meetings on studying and discussing religious matters (author’s interview, April 3, 2016; Hashem, 2016). Many members were enraged, when Ezzat’s faction, which asserted control over the funds, stopped providing financial support to the administrative offices that supported Kamal, as well as for the families of martyrs and imprisoned youth who either supported or were associated with Kamal’s group (authors’ interviews, April 3, 2016; February 2, 2019; Ayyash, 2019). One roadmap, dual administrations The Islamist scholar Yussif al-Qaradawy sought to mediate between the contending factions. Al Qaradwy’s proposed reconciliation roadmap to end the dispute relied on carrying out internal elections and reforming internal bylaws. Yet, the mediation attempt failed. The failure of al-Qaradawy’s mediation efforts deepened the rift between both factions, as these began to implement al-Qaradawy’s roadmap separately. This led to the forging of dual administrations representing each faction. In fact, by the end of January 2016, Kamal’s Front announced its adoption of al- Qaradawy’s roadmap; i.e internal elections and reforms. It declared that it has started to arrange “comprehensive and complete elections for all administrative levels, starting from branches Offices (shu’ba) to the Guidance Office, and from branches’ Shura Councils to the General Shura Council” (IkhwanInfo, January 26, 2016). Similarly, the Organizational bloc declared that it had approved al-Qaradawy’s roadmap. Yet, it rejected to include the “dissidents” in the process. It thus started implementing the roadmap separately: it announced that a committee was already established for reviewing the bylaws and developing a vision (IkhwanSite, February 7, 2016). In March 2016, Ezzat’s faction announced that the Shura Council had met and created four committees: an interim Administration Office, an investigation committee, a vision committee, and an elections committee. The elected Administrative Office’s responsibility was to manage the group until the completion of the elections of both the Shura Council and an interim Guidance Office according to the amended bylaws as approved by the Shura Council (IkhwanSite, April 3, 2016).

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Realizing the severity of the rift, the Revolutionary bloc, opted for a reconciliation with Ezzat’s faction. On May 7th , 2016, the Revolutionary bloc announced a “roadmap to end the internal dispute”, calling all Brothers to accept free elections on all levels of the group in order to “fill the gap of more than 90% of vacant positions due to killings, detentions, isolation and persecution”(IkhwanInfo, May 7, 2016). The statement encouraged the quick holding of elections, inside and outside of Egypt, to build strong and effective institutions and enhance the ability to manage the group. The settlement included the following requirements: 1. All current leaders withdraw and give the chance to a new generation elected by Brothers to lead the group. As a sign of good will, Kamal announced his resignation from the HAC. He assured that he would not run for any leadership positions in the next elections.16 2. Organizing comprehensive elections according to the old bylaws. 3. Postponing the approval of the new bylaws until a new elected Shura Council convenes. 4. The election of seven leaders representing the seven geographic sectors (qita’at) by the newly elected Shura Council. These seven leaders would form the new elected administration committee; an interim Guidance Office, acting in alignment with the old regulations until the Shura Council approves the new bylaws. The interim Guidance Office can nominate others to its membership, given the approval of the Shura Council. The elected interim Guidance Office should start working immediately without waiting for any delayed governorates or geographic sectors. As soon as these complete their local elections, they may join the Shura Council. 5. The HAC withdraws and hands in all projects to the interim Guidance Office, including the vision and the new bylaws projects. Ezzat’s faction refused the settlement and suspended the membership of Kamal and his supporters. It announced that these leaders were suspended since they did not respect the decisions taken by the groups’ institutions, particularly challenging the Shura Councils’ decisions of Raba’a 2013, February 2014, June 2015, and March 2016 (IkhwanSite, May 20, 2016). Yet, the Revolutionary bloc was determined to carry out its roadmap. The Revolutionary bloc, decided to reform the bylaws according to the suggestions of the administrative offices and the ranks. A special committee was also 16

Kamal’s speech in which he announced his withdrawal, is considered by the Revolutionary bloc to be a “historical” speech. See: IkhwanInfo, May, 10, 2016.

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responsible for drafting a new vision (al- ru’ya al-jadida). The next step was rebuilding the group’s institutions. Comprehensive elections were organized. Simultaneously, the Revolutionary faction called Brothers in Egypt and abroad to send their suggestions regarding the bylaws and security measures allowing the holding of elections to the “Development Committee” in charge of reform. The latter made significant changes in the Brotherhood’s administrative rules and bylaws similar to those required by the Reformist wing pre- 2011, and developed a new vision. The newly elected Shura Council was to review the vision and the new bylaws and eventually approve them. By July 2016, Kamal’s faction had terminated the elections: a new Shura Council was elected. The new regulations were approved by the Shura Council. A new (interim) Guidance Office composed of 11 members was elected. At the same time, the Shura Council decided that arrested Guidance Office members and the General Guide Badi’ maintain their positions, until the ousting of the coup. As of this moment, two Muslim Brotherhood organizations existed, each had its institutions, its bylaws and its vision. The MB became represented by two “legitimate” leaderships, two “official” websites, as well as two “official” spokesmen. In October 2016, Kamal was killed by security forces.17 Yet, the factionalism has continued until today. The Turkey-based Office continued reshaping the organization’s internal bylaws, but it seems that the Organizational bloc had to some extent retained control over the group (al-Anani, 2019). Finally, the internal conflict was reflected in the MB’s absence from the public initiatives and in the diminishing of protests in Egypt.

5.3

Concluding Remarks

The MB is an umbrella organization containing divergent trends and currents. This goes back to the inherited inclination towards the avoidance of disagreement, which al-Banna had rooted. This concept had two effects on the movement: on the one hand, it increased the group’s ranks and sympathizers; on the other hand, the non-resolution of controversial issues weakened the organization’s uniformity. Members differed on a large scale of issues, including goals, strategy, schools of activism, intellectual and religious views. The heterogeneity of the base was

17

In October 2016, the security forces killed Mohamed Kamal, who was considered behind the attacks on regime officials and security personnel during 2015 and 2016.

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compensated by a unified strategic choice; i.e. gradual non-violent path, and a culture of obedience and trust in the leadership. Since the 1990s and until 2013, these differences can be classified mainly into two competing currents: the Organizational current, and the Reformist current. The state’s policy towards the group affected the relative power and the power balance between these two trends. In general, repression facilitated the domination of the Organizational bloc on the organization, whose ideas of selfrestraint and withdrawal from the political sphere became were validated in times of repression. It triggered solidarity among members, and postponed conflicts since the time was never considered “right”. As of 2009, the Organizational bloc monopolized the leadership of the group. It centralized the decision-making process, adopted autocratic means to undermine internal opposition, and promoted members based on their loyalty to the leadership. After the 2011 uprising, the MB led by the Organizational bloc rushed to power. It gave up on its long-standing principles of self-restraint and caution and sought to benefit from the sudden political opening. Thus, it moved from the periphery of the political system to its center, especially after its candidate was elected president. When President Mursi was ousted, the MB did not only lose its political gains of the previous year, but all it had achieved in 40 years. The factionalism after 2013 can only be explained by the interplay between the three levels: the macro (repression), the meso (organizational), and the micro (individual). Repression paved the way for factionalism, by triggering the reconfiguration of the group’s internal arena. In this respect, repression “directly” challenged the group’s internal set-up (macro-meso dimension), and “indirectly” through its effects on individuals (macro-micro dimension). In fact, following the coup, the group sought to adapt to the new environment, by introducing a new strategic and tactical plan. It also made some transformations in the organizational structure; new committees were created, and others were combined or dissolved. The MB tried to maintain a “revolutionary momentum” through the mobilization of its ranks. Yet the metamorphosis of the internal structure failed to adapt to the repressive environment. Repression did not only affect the organizational configuration directly, by creating gaps in leadership positions or forcing it underground, but also by affecting its grassroots and provoking certain emotions. One year after the ousting of Mursi, it was evident that the group was in a state of disarray. Repression triggered the emergence of new players within the movement and re-configured the internal set-up. The previously disciplined organization, with a unique centralized power center in the hands of the conservative Organizational bloc drastically changed. Multiple power centers forged inside and

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outside Egypt, some members defected, others joined established Jihadi groups, while others formed their own militant groups, adopting “smart violence”. Furthermore, several members who remained committed to the group pushed for a more assertive stance against the regime. New de facto leaders developed a consciousness as a distinctive generation; a new generation of “field leaders” was forged; the “Raba’a generation”. This generation’s non-compromising stance against the regime and confrontational discourse gained support and popularity among many members, particularly those who were disenchanted by the leadership’s strategic failures after the coup. Moreover, repression engendered debates about the group’s strategy. After the coup, a new current attempted to stretch the definition of “peaceful social change” to include more assertive and effective tactics. This did not reflect an ideological turning point. It was a strategic means to keep the organizational coherence intact and assert control over the disenchanted ranks. By the end of 2015, the leadership was divided along strategic lines. Conflict arose about the definition of pacifism as well as the strategy relevant to the phase. While a faction argued that the group should adopt a more assertive stance in order to assert control over its ranks, the other faction believed that any escalation against the state would put the organization’s survival at stake. While both groups remained, more or less, ideologically committed to non-violence, the first faction represents a “Revolutionary bloc” ideas, while the second group represents the “Organizational bloc”, with its ideas of caution and self-restraint. When the Organizational bloc, recognized that it was not able to appease the Revolutionary leaders; the mid-rank cadres and Raba’a Youth generation leaders neither to contain the frustration of its base, it sought to enforce cohesion through the top-down approach. This approach had always been used by the Organizational bloc against its contenders. While it had succeeded pre-2013 in undermining internal opposition, this time it led to the splitting of the group. Ezzat’s attempt to dismiss Kamal and his supporters from leadership positions led to further escalation: the Revolutionary current proclaimed its legitimacy and control over the group. The group became “vertically” factionalized: from the highest administrative level to the smallest administrative level “divisions”. By 2016, the group was deeply factionalized and continued to drift further apart. All mediation attempts, including from the Islamist scholar al-Qaradawy, have failed to reconcile the contending factions. Instead, each faction started to implement al-Qaradwy’s recommendations separately. These included comprehensive elections and internal reform of the bylaws. This process ended up with the formation of two separate organizational structures.

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Finally, while the conflict flared up because of the strategy dilemma, more dimensions were added to the conflict making the scene more complex: the tools and methods that manage the organization, and the dilemma of legitimacy. All these aspects of the fight became visible in the online “statements battle”, which will be addressed in detail in the next chapter.

6

Beyond Strategic Divisions: MB Narratives and Microstructural Dimensions of Factionalism

This chapter analyses the dimensions of the factional conflict as narrated by the contending fronts. It suggests that the factional conflict within the MB goes beyond strategic lines. In this respect, I argue that other aspects of the conflict are reflected in the faction’s narratives concerning the reasons for the schism. Yet, I contend that the declared causes of the schism and the players’ narratives of contention only reveal the tip of the iceberg. Cognitive frames, emotions, and codes of identity underlie the factional conflict and constitute its implicit -yet coredimension. This means that the efforts to maintain the old configurations, and the counter efforts to impose a re-configuration of the group do not only concern the strategy, the power distribution or the internal structures and regulations but also micro-dimensional aspects, such as collective identity, organizational norms, and cognitive frames. When the conflict erupted in December 2016, the old guard sought to rely on the top-down approach, which has been constantly, and most of the time successfully, used against internal dissidents. Therefore, the leadership suspended several members supporting the dissent. In addition, it stopped providing financial support to the administrative offices and members aligned with Kamal’s Faction, shut down its TV channel “Misr Ala’n” for airing statements by Kamal and Montasser, and instead launched a new channel named “Watan” to replace it. Similarly, it shut down the Brotherhood’s official website “ikhwanonline.com”, which was operated by Kamal’s supporters (Hashem, 2016), and instead launched a new page, “ikhwan.site”. Montasser was removed from his post as the group’s spokesman and was replaced by Talaat Fahmi who is loyal to the old guard. Yet, the “revolutionary current” escalated further. It launched its own website, “Ikhwanonline.info”, and announced that Montasser remained the official

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 N. Aboushady, Factionalism in Social Movements, Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen Ostens, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41581-5_6

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spokesman of the group and that they represented the “legitimate” leadership (IkhwanInfo, December 15, 2015).1 As of December 15, 2015, the MB’s factionalism was clearly established. Since that date, each of the contending factions established its own group, while assuming the legitimate representation of the Muslim Brotherhood. As of this moment, there were two “official” Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood groups, two “official websites”, two “official” spokesmen, two “legitimate” Shura Councils, and two Administrative High Committees. Furthermore, each faction has its own administrative offices, supporters, rhetoric, and narrative of the conflict. The first section of this chapter deals with the contentious narrative of the conflict that took place in the online sphere. In this respect, the Arabic website “ikhwanonline.info” became the official website representing the Revolutionary bloc. “Ikhwan.site” became the Organizational bloc’s website until it was shut down in September 2016 and replaced by “Ikhwanonline.com” which carried the website’s name pre-factionalism. From the early stages of factionalism, a “statements battle” between both factions began on these websites, especially during the phase between December 2015 and the end of 2017, when the statements and counter-statements became quite observable. This phase constituted the battle over the organization: each faction proclaimed legitimacy, the effectiveness of its strategy, and undermined the contender. Not only did the contending factions declare publicly the existence of internal conflict, but they also narrated the details of the divergence. This was considered an exceptional moment in the MB’s history. It was for the first time that the group itself admitted the existence of internal factionalism and published details about it. The focus of the “statements battle” mainly concerned the strategy issue and the legitimacy dilemma. As of the spring of 2016, each faction focused on publishing its roadmap, stressing on the re-establishment of the group’s institutions and the reform of its internal regulations and bylaws. This notion will be further investigated in the first section of this chapter. The second section is concerned with the implicit dimension of the factional conflict. Indeed, the online migration of the conflict was itself a turning point. It is not only considered an unconventional behaviour from a group like the MB, which had previously prohibited its members from taking notes in internal meetings fearing the leaking of internal information, but most importantly this behaviour reflected the eruption of the MB’s collective identity. Joining the 1

To clear up any confusion, statements from the website “ikhwanonline.info” will be referred to as IkhwanInfo. Statements from “ikhwan.site” will be referred to as IkhwanSite, and statements published on “ikhwanonline.com” (before and after the factionalism) will be referred to as IkhwanOnline.

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group required primarily giving an oath of allegiance and commitment to the group and its leaders. Absolute trust, loyalty and submissiveness to the leadership are expected from a “Brother”. Indeed, the unspoken dimension of the conflict concerned the Brotherhood’s code of identity.

6.1

Contentious Narratives of the Internal Disaccord

In the beginning of the year 2000, the MB website was launched and was one of the most important sources for news for MB affiliates and non-MB members until the Uprising in 2011. There is also an official English website, “ikhwanweb.com”, which is controlled by Ibrahim Munir, head of the MB’s International Organization. Following the Uprising in January 2011, the MB founded the Freedom and Justice political party, which had its own magazine and website. Yet, like other partisan media platforms, it did not have any considerable influence. Following the coup, the FJP magazine (hardcopy) was discontinued, while the website still exists (http://fj-p.net) and is controlled by the Organizational bloc. As of December 2015, leaders and spokesmen actively engaged in media talk shows, and sometimes even confronted each other in media debates. These confrontations were clearly manifested in the content and substance of the websites of both factions, which became the main platforms for the internal conflict’s reproduction. Not only, did each faction narrate the conflict according to its perception and undermine its contender, but both factions also engaged in a “statements battle”, where each statement published by one website engendered a counterstatement on the contender’s website. This interaction in the online arena reflected the offline dimensions of the conflict. Indeed, as of December 2015, the websites became the predominant platform for these contentious narratives of internal discordance. Therefore, I analyze how each faction framed and narrated the conflict, as well as the online interaction between both groups in respect of these contentious narratives. Against this backdrop, I identified three main dimensions of the conflict narrative: the strategic dimension, the legitimacy dimension, and the renovation/reform dimension.

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The Strategic Dimension: The Stagnation and Adaptation Dilemma

State repression provoked two different responses among the MB: one wing was inclined towards an accommodative strategy, while the other wing advocated for a more confrontational posture. This strategic discord was narrated differently by both factions: each faction portrayed itself as adapting to the new circumstances. While the old guard preferred to begin a dormancy phase and portrayed selfrestraint as the optimal adaptation strategy, the revolutionary current contended that both tactics rather reflected stagnation. It argued that an innovative revolutionary strategy was what the group needed in order to adapt to the unfamiliar circumstances and survive repression. Dual discourse: between accommodation and confrontation The strategic conflict was publicly visible on online platforms whenever tensions erupted between both wings, even before the launching of two different websites. Before the escalation of conflict in December 2015, the group’s controversial statements reflected ongoing tension. It seems that the controversial statements were not only the result of internal strategic divisions, but also a deliberate dual strategy carried out by the old guard. On the one hand, the Organizational bloc was committed to non-violence. On the other hand, it toned down its criticism of confrontational and violent discourse. The toleration of violent discourse was not new; this was also the case during the Raba’a sit-in, when the group accepted the confrontational discourse of its more radical allies. For example, during the Raba’a sit in, Safwat Hegazy, a Salafist figure, threatened opponents saying: “whoever sprays Mursi with water will be splashed with blood”. Simultaneously, the General Guide, Badi’, assured that the resistance would remain peaceful: “our peacefulness is stronger than bullets”. After the dispersal of the pro-Mursi sit-in, the Organizational bloc was caught again between the confrontational statements of many of its members and its conventional, more cautious rhetoric. However, it seems that it accepted the confrontational rhetoric to appease its furious ranks. Thus, the conflict between the MB and the regime was framed as a war on Islam, and it was necessary to resist the coup and restore the “rule of legitimacy” at all costs. Yet, the leadership tolerated the confrontational discourse on the group’s website to a certain limit. Statements with vocabulary indicating an abandonment of the path of non-violence, were either removed from the website or were responded to through counter statements indicating the group’s commitment to peaceful resistance. At the same time, the old

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guard’s statements calling for patience and self-restraint sometimes triggered confrontational announcements. This strategic disaccord led to great confusion and a dual discourse regarding the group’s official stance, especially at the time when both wings were disputing the strategy on the same website, i.e., before December 2015. It is reported that in 2014, a statement was published on the website stating that the group was at “the beginning of a new phase where [we] summon our strength and evoke the meaning of jihad. [We] prepare ourselves, our wives, our sons and daughters, and whoever follows our path for relentless jihad where we ask for martyrdom” (cited in Ayyash and Willi, 2016). This statement was deleted later since it clearly reflected the abandonment of non-violence. Furthermore, it was followed by an article written by Hussein, the Secretary General, and published on the group’s website stressing the group’s commitment to non-violence as one of MB’s “constants” (thawbit) that shape its understanding and activism. Hussein also indicated in his article that the path of non-violence represented “the group’s vision and not an individual vision”, adding that “whoever adheres to the group must adopt its approach. Whoever calls for something else or plans for another path, then he is not from the group and the group is not for him, no matter what he says or does, and the group is innocent of his deeds” (IkhwanOnline, April 9, 2014). Similarly, the group announced in January 2015, that “all the structures and mechanisms of action within it are now working in a revolutionary manner. It does not retreat from the revolutionary path. The current crisis can only be solved by eliminating the coup and empowering the revolution and [its heart beating through] its youth” (IkhwanOnline, January 24, 2015). This dual discourse lasted until December 2015, when the internal conflict took another turn. In the phase between May and December 2015, the narratives of pacifism, and that of self-defense started to appear, paving the ground for factionalism in December 2015. Pacifism and the self-defense narrative This strategic conflict was reflected in a number of statements and counterstatements from both conflicting fronts, before factionalism took place. The lack of consensus on the strategy was reflected in the groups’ controversial official statements in response to state repression. The condemnation to death of Mursi along with more than one hundred MB leaders (including the General Guide) on May 16, 2015, triggered the escalation of the strategic conflict within the HAC. On May 19, 2015, more than one hundred Islamist scholars, including MB affiliates based in Turkey and others who supported the group, declared an announcement entitled “About the unjust death sentences for President Mursi and those with him”, which clearly promoted escalation against the regime. Few days later, the strategic

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disaccord among the HAC appeared in the online sphere. In fact, upon this declaration, the official spokesman of the group (at the time, Ghozlan) who was in Cairo trying to reassert control over the ranks, published an article emphasizing the group’s commitment to non-violence. This article was published on a MB linked website on May 22, 2015, and was supposedly written in the occasion of the 87th anniversary of the MB’s founding. In this article, Ghozlan (2015) stressed that “whoever believes in the MB’s call and mission must adhere to the general principles of Islam and the commitment to the MB’s constants.” These constants are collective action, gradualism and cultivation as a strategy for change, pacifism and peaceful activism, commitment to shura (consultation), rejection of tyranny and individual arbitrary power whether within the group or outside it, and the rejection of apostacy claims against Muslims (takfir). He then indicated that “people are not alike. Some of them believe in these constants in times of prosperity and keep believing in them and praising them even in times of distress and great misfortune. Others might disrespect some of these constants or their totality, thinking that they [the constants] are the cause of the ordeal and that abandoning them will put an end to the ordeals quickly. While in fact, adhering to the principles and constants and being patient is in itself a victory from God”. Ghozlan (2015) accounted for the group’s history of rejecting apostacy and violence. He narrated the previous ordeals and the General Guides’ resistance to injustice and radicalization at the same time, as well as the fate of radical breakaway groups whose “enthusiasm vanished and [they] disappeared from the society and their case ended”. He also reported on the failure of experiences in other countries where Islamists adopted violent strategies and pointed out to the success of peaceful revolutions. Ghozlan highlighted the group’s commitment to peaceful change, and that its main strategy remains peaceful protest against the regime: “The renunciation of violence is our principle that we will not deviate from or neglect. It is the most difficult choice, but it is the best. Non-violence was one of the reasons why the group survived for 90 years and grew stronger. It was one of the reasons why people rally around our call and sympathize with us. It paves the way for our future despite the hard circumstances and the harshness of reality. We realize that adhering to non-violence is like holding coals on fire, but we consider the interest of the country, and we strive to miss the opportunity for the coup to drag revolutionaries into violence and ignite a civil war”. He reminded of Badi’s famous slogan “our peacefulness is stronger than their bullets” and admitted that “the cost will be high, but it is necessary. The MB trusts that victory is from God alone and they strive and wait for victory from Him. They adhere to the Islamic law and its rulings, on top of which the sanctity of life and blood, and that killing is one of the greatest of sins[..] and therefore the MB cannot be involved in the shedding

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of blood or loss of innocent souls”. He communicated with the revolutionaries to unite and cooperate against the coup explaining his awareness that “state repression against the revolutionaries may push some young people to disbelieve in democracy and aspire to respond to violent policy with violence. Yet, the Brotherhood and the majority of the Egyptian people are patient, adhere to their peaceful approach and continue their revolution with innovative means to ouster the coup” (Ghozlan, 2015). On May 27, 2015, in defiance of Ghozlan’s call for patience and self-restraint, the Turkey-based scholars published a declaration entitled “Nida’ al-Kinana”, or “Egypt’s Call”. This document was composed of their previous declaration of May 18 and a newly drafted declaration called “About the crimes of the coup in Egypt and the duty towards it”. This document sets a religious duty to resist the regime, which was portrayed as “a criminal regime that engaged for two years in the killing of innocents, the destruction of properties, the destruction of the country, the displacement of people, the blatant hostility towards Islam and Muslims, killing its scholars, attacking its values, constants and sanctities, showing loyalty to its enemies and hostility to its guardians”. It added “any leaders, judges, officers, soldiers, media figures or politicians, and anyone [else] who has definitely proven to be involved, even if only through incitement, in violating the honor of women, shedding the blood of innocents and unlawful killing [all these] are murderers according to the shari’a, and must be punished according to it”. The declaration also stated that it is Muslims’ religious duty to resist the current regime and to work to eliminate it by all legitimate means: “defending, by any legitimate means, oneself, honor and money is not only a legitimate right, but rather a religious duty. It is a right that no one can deny or grant. The victim has the right to resist the aggressor without transgression or negligence” (Nida’ al-Kinana, 2015). The following day, the Brotherhood endorsed the “Egypt’s Call” statement. The MB Revolutionary faction, which was at the time managing the website, announced that “the Muslim Brotherhood received the statements of the honorable scholars with all appreciation and that it approves the fatwa (religious order) which has virtuously described the criminal case of the violent coup. This regime has committed massacres, arrests, torture, and rape. Scholars have clarified the religious duty to resist this coup by all means until it falls and until the legitimacy is restored, and they have clarified the right to legitimate defense of oneself, one’s honor and money. The MB is committed to working for Islam in its totality, it followed the jurisprudential duties that Islam founded, and does not retreat from this path, no matter what the sacrifices are” (IkhwanInfo, May 28, 2015). Approving “Egypt’s Call” was significant, since it framed the struggle between the group and the regime as a struggle between Islam and its enemies. The announcement set the jurisprudential base for

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the approval of the use of violence. The MB’s approval of the announcement represented a defiance of the group’s long-standing principle of non-violence in the name of the right to self-defense. In fact, the right to self-defense was among the important narratives used by the revolutionary current in order to defy the narrative recalling the group’s “constants” used by the Organizational bloc. Similarly, after the killing of thirteen MB leaders who were reportedly meeting to discuss the financial support of detained members’ families, the group responded to the incident by issuing a statement criticizing the regime for “moving Egypt towards a new and dangerous phase where no one can control the rage of the oppressed people” (IkhwanInfo, June 16, 2015). Yet, the group quickly condemned the assassination of Egypt’s prosecutor general, stating that “the Brotherhood is affirming its refusal to all killings” (IkhwanInfo, June 29, 2015). These conflicting statements certainly reflected, on the one hand, the controversial views on the strategic issue and, on the other hand, how each front started to frame its own narrative concerning the matter of strategy. Adapting to repression: gradualism or revolution? When the disagreement reached its peak in December 2015, leading each front to launch its website, the strategic disaccord became apparent in their narrative of the conflict. The old guard framed the conflict as a strategic conflict between pacifism and violence, emphasizing its respect to the group’s “constants” (thawabit). Among the important constants is commitment to non-violence; “the MB announces its full commitment to pacifism and non-violence as an original principle and a consistent strategy” (IkhwanSite, March 6, 2016). Its narrative focused on drawing examples from the past and narrating the hardships and ordeals that the group overcame due to its commitment to non-violence and gradualism. The Organizational bloc, thus, sought to change the situation via gradualism, i.e., through a political solution. For instance, on the occasion of the 5th commemoration of Raba’a, the old guard published on their website a statement called “Raba’a: the resistance” in which they maintained the group’s commitment to the peaceful strategy and gradualism. The statement indicated that “pacifism has deep roots in the Brotherhood’s approach and history and is consistent with the group’s firm principles that the group gains from its understanding of Islam and Islamic legislation that affirms the sanctity of blood, money and honor, and does not permit any attack on it in any way” (IkhwanOnline, August 13, 2018). It insisted that peaceful change was also the strategy that the Egyptian people adopted in the 2011 uprising, and that the MB commits itself to the strategic choice of the people.

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The Organizational bloc was keen to denounce “the sinful assaults on security forces” (IkhwanSite, May 8, 2016) each time a violent attack occurred. It affirmed its rejection of “all forms of violence and bloodshed” (March 6, 2016), and condemned the killing of “innocent people, whether from the police, the army or citizens” (January 23, 2016). In addition, it also distanced itself from these attacks denoting that “the Brotherhood has repeatedly emphasized its adoption of the peaceful revolutionary approach to resisting the coup, as well as their clear rejection of violence and of the use of weapons against all Egyptians [..] we condemn the bloodshed of innocent citizens, and we equally condemn shedding the blood of the army and the policemen” (IkhwanSite, January 23, 2016). Yet, it was the regime that “bears full responsibility for this failure to preserve the lives of Egyptians” (May 8, 2016). At the same time, statements affirmed the group’s commitment to the legitimacy of President Mursi and described al-Sisi’s regime as a regime that “committed crimes of high treason against the homeland”. Yet, it affirmed its “strong commitment to the state and its institutions, including the national military”, which should “remain devoted to protecting the borders of the country and the security of the people, and should distance itself from the intervention in political and economic life” (IkhwanOnline, August 13, 2018). The Organizational bloc’s strategy to overthrow the coup was therefore based on its requirement for “the return of the army to its barracks” and “calling the regime to adopt all means to restore the democratic path” (IkhwanSite, November 8, 2016). The solution to the current conflict was framed as a shared responsibility of all political actors who should engage in a process of self-critique, participate in a national dialogue, agree on a new social contract, and attain transitional justice (IkhwanOnline, August 13, 2018). Furthermore, the old guard stressed on many occasions that “victory is only from God”, and that the injustice will end one day, regardless of whether the current generations experience this day or not. This narrative was present both in the official online statements as well as in media interviews with prominent leaders. The old guard also seemed to reassure the ranks that they would not negotiate or reconcile with the regime. It has been announced on several occasions since the factionalism that they “do not retreat from the revolution, do not negotiate over bloodshed, and do not negotiate over Mursi’s legitimacy and the totality of rights” (IkhwanSite, May 27, 2016). The Revolutionary bloc opposed the old guard’s narrative. It contended that the conflict was not between violence and pacifism, since “pacifism does not contradict the right to self-defense”. The strategic conflict was rather between revolution and gradualism. Batikh, a prominent leader in the Revolutionary bloc declared in an interview on the MB channel “Mekameleen tv” that “one current learns from the street and from the revolution and chooses the revolutionary path, and another

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current disregards the revolution [..] and puts forth a strategy based on the return to gradualism, reform, patience and the stress on injustice frames (al- mazlumiyah)” (Mekameleen tv, June 21, 2016). Kamal’s Front insisted on denying the pacifism/violence narrative of the strategic conflict. It repeatedly denied in online statements that it was seeking to “militarize the revolution” and stressed that violence was against the principles of the group. It maintained the stance that had been announced in February 2014 and what the elected Shura Council of December 2016 has approved. The revolutionary strategy was not related to violence. Instead, it meant to “accumulate all tools of victory [..] based on the legitimate civil resistance approved to all people around the world and accepted by all international institutions to overthrow the military dictatorship [..]. These tools also include building a new map of political alliances with revolutionary, young, and liberation movements and the communities defending freedom and human rights all over the world” (IkhwanInfo, January 11, 2017). Similarly, the Turkey-based office declared that “portraying the matter as a dispute revolving around the peaceful revolution and its armament is not true and only serves the military regime and the counter-revolution” (IkhwanInfo, December 18, 2015). While the Organizational bloc constructed its narrative around the concepts of patience, pacifism and gradualism, the revolutionary front adopted a more assertive discourse and a narrative emphasising the importance of revolt, resistance, and retribution. For instance, it declared that “people’s patience with injustice, poverty and oppression will not last long. The injustice will be the fuel of the renewed revolution, and its fire that does not extinguish. The revolution continues and its path is long. [..] The people will continue their revolution until they seize their freedom and dignity” (IkhwanInfo, July 3, 2016). Yet, the revolutionary current endorsed a discourse that nurtured the old guard’s narrative of the strategic conflict. Many statements seemed to be inciting violence. For instance, official statements published on the website highlighted on several occasions that the group’s administrative structure has been developed in a manner that allowed a “more effective execution of ground operations to uphold the revolutionary work”. Statements also focused on many occasions on the idea that the regime is responsible for further escalation, warning that the ongoing repression engenders anger among the ranks that the group cannot control. The spokesman also announced that the group could not control its members since “these young people were taking up their legitimate right to self-defense” (IkhwanInfo, July 1, 2015). In addition, the group issued statements focusing on the duty to resist the regime and the necessity to work to “eliminate it by all legitimate means”, describing the military institution as a “criminal gang”, a “militia” and a “military occupation

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force”, which engaged in a war against Islam and “betrayed the homeland when they fought religion and identity” (IkhwanInfo, May 28, 2015). Although the Revolutionary faction declared that it was not promoting violence, it never condemned, unlike the Organizational bloc, any violent attacks on the Egyptian military or police security forces, while condemning violent attacks occurring outside Egypt. The revolutionary current also challenged the gradual approach of the old guard, arguing that Raba’a dispersal indicated the beginning of a new phase which certainly needed an innovative strategy, and that gradualism was outdated since Egypt was undergoing a revolutionary momentum. Instead of patience, statements were loaded with intense emotions, especially anger and revenge, particularly the group’s yearly statements in commemoration of the Raba’a dispersal. This group also required from political actors to “forget about the differences and bitterness of the past and combine the efforts towards achieving a common national goal, by which we overthrow the ruling gang”, calling for a Revolution, instead of a national dialogue, and warning the regime that “the silence of people will not last” and to “prepare for that day, for only then justice will speak” (IkhwanInfo, August 14, 2018).

6.1.2

The Legitimacy Dilemma: Between Historical and Institutional Legitimacy

The strategic disagreement was emphasized by the conflict narrative produced by the Organizational bloc. Several observers and researchers adopted this narrative too, missing the existence of other dimensions of the fissions. For instance, the legitimacy matter was an important dimension of the conflict and was particularly highlighted by the revolutionary current. The legitimacy dilemma started to appear online as of December 2015. Until the end of 2016, it was the main narrative of the conflict produced by the Revolutionary bloc to undermine the old guard’s legitimacy. In this respect, the Revolutionary current focused on three aspects: first, the legitimacy according to the already existing bylaws, second the legitimacy derived from the elections, and third, the legitimacy derived from the representation of the group’s ranks and youth in Egypt. Each faction portrayed itself as the legitimate representative of the organization relying on their interpretation of the existing bylaws and/or organizational norms.

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Contended bylaws and norms On December 15, 2015, al-Mursi, head of the HAC, aligned with the Organizational bloc, issued a statement on the newly launched website “ikhwan.site” in which he stressed on Ezzat’s legitimacy as a deputy and acting General Guide, and suspended Kamal, Montasser and others. Additionally, the statement reminded members of the bay’a, pledge of allegiance, which they gave to the group’s ideology and principles as well as the oath of loyalty to its legitimate leadership. The statement also reminded members that the commitment to their oath was a religious duty. The statement indicated that “throughout its history, the MB has been through many crises and pressures, from the days of al-Banna until this day. Uniting around the leadership of the group and adhering to its constants and principles protected the group from disintegration and downfall. The group’s leadership represented by the General Guide and his deputies is the legitimate leadership for all ranks. This is what all members are aware of, and this is what they have pledged their alliance to. A Brother’s commitment is based on the pillars of his bay’a (oath). Holding to the bay’a is the trial [from God] and the savior from fitnah (temptation)” (IkhwanSite, December 15, 2015). On the same day, Kamal’s faction issued a statement on its website in which it confirmed that “all administrative decisions related to the group are issued by the High Administrative Committee in Egypt. It is not permissible for any institution or individuals within the group to speak on behalf of the committee or to issue decisions that are within the powers of the administration committee” (IkhwanInfo, December 15, 2015). The Revolutionary bloc also declared that the suspension of Kamal, Montasser and others was not valid since these decisions did not originate from a legitimate leadership. In addition to this, the Revolutionary bloc declared an investigation of the leaders who issued those suspensions, since they had exceeded the powers entitled to them (IkhwanInfo, December 16, 2015). These announcements meant that the HAC perceived itself as the highest body in the group, challenging the legitimacy of the exiled Guidance Office. This perception was also clearly stated in several announcements. For example, on December 18, the group published on its website a statement asserting that the “elected” HAC, formed in October 2015, was an interim Guidance Office, since the HAC was elected after the termination of the mandate of the Guidance Office. In addition, it pointed out to the impossibility of attaining the legal quorum for the meetings of both the Shura Council and the Guidance Office, since only six members of the Guidance Office, and about ten percent of the Shura Council members were left. The rest were detained or killed. In other words, the Guidance Office and the Shura Council were effectively paralyzed. Even if they met, they could not attain the quorum needed in the meetings, since the majority of their members were detained

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or killed, making all decisions taken by both bodies illegal according to the existing bylaws. Besides, their mandates have already terminated more than two years ago. Thus, the HAC was the only institution within the MB that was recently elected by the ranks and therefore the only legitimate leadership within the group. On December 18th , the revolutionary faction announced that the HAC headed by its Secretary General Kamal has met and attained the quorum required (the presence of seven out of eleven members) and took several decisions, and that the “decisions issued by its head Abdelrahman Al-Mursi are individual acts that do not represent the Committee and violate the group’s institutionalism” (IkhwanInfo, December 18, 2015). However, Ezzat’s faction responded the next day, with a statement arguing that, according to the bylaws, any legal meetings of the HAC can only occur after an invitation from its head. In addition, the four members who are suspended, including the Secretary General of the Committee, are not allowed to attend these meetings. Therefore, the meeting announced by Kamal’s faction is illegitimate, and its decisions are not valid (IkhwanSite, December 19, 2015). Similarly, in April 2016, a battle of statements and counter-statements erupted, in which Kamal’s faction tried to prove the old guard’s disrespect of the group’s bylaws and institutionalism. The clash erupted when the old guard announced that the Shura Council had met and that it had taken several important decisions. Most importantly, it created four committees: an elected interim administrative committee, an elections committee, an investigation committee, and a vision committee. On the same day, the interim administrative committee announced that the administrative and shura institutions within the group will be “completed”, and that they are only interim committees (IkhwanSite, April, 3, 2016). Simultaneously, Ezzat appointed the London-based Munir as a Deputy to the General Guide. Mounir declared further suspensions of Turkey-based Office members. The decisions of the Shura Council and the appointment of Munir provoked statements from the revolutionary faction insisting that Ezzat’s faction did not respect the group’s bylaws. Again, it framed the conflict as a conflict between institutionalism and individual tyranny. Munir’s appointment was not legitimate since it was not in conformity with the bylaws. A deputy cannot assign a deputy with no evidence that Badi’ approved this decision (Mekameleen TV, June 21, 2016). Furthermore, Kamal proclaimed that the Shura Council’s meeting in February 2016 was not in accordance with the bylaws. He published detailed documents proving that only about fourteen members out of a total of 128 Shura Council members attended this meeting. He explained that “only 32 members of the Shura Council remained in Egypt after the crackdown, and 18 members among these have retired. The majority

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of administrative offices which represent the backbone of the group and the reason for its survival on the ground were excluded from the Shura Council meeting” (IkhwanInfo, April 6, 2016). Kamal assured in the same statement that some administrative offices were deliberately not invited to the meeting. He mentioned that the four administrative offices in Cairo, the three offices of northern Upper Egypt, and five out of seven offices of southern Upper Egypt were not invited by Ezzat and concluded that the potential participants are therefore only fourteen, adding that “whoever denies this, must show [us] the attendance records of the meeting.” Internal elections and institutionalism The effort that Kamal’s faction exerted to demonstrate the disrespect of the Organizational bloc of the existing bylaws nurtured their main narrative of the conflict: Ezzat’s faction did not respect the group’s principles and “constants” which it assumed to safeguard; the respect of the group’s institutions and shura principle (consultation) was among the most important principles of the group. The Revolutionary faction insisted that the conflict was not about pacifism and violence but rather “a conflict between institutionalism and individual tyranny”, accusing Ezzat’s faction of deliberately hindering the re-building of the group’s institutions. This implied that the members’ oaths of allegiance, loyalty and obedience to the leadership were no longer binding, since the leaders disregarded the group’s principles in the first place, diverting from shura and institutionalism (IkhwanInfo, April 6, 2016). Ezzat’s faction responded to this narrative with a counter-narrative: the conflict was not between two factions, it was rather between a legitimate leadership and a dissident group of members who refused to adhere to the Shura Council decisions of June 2015, and who attempted to control and monopolize the decision-making process within the group. According to this narrative, the HAC was formed as “a temporary administration committee for a period of six months, and that it works under the supervision of the acting General Guide.[..] However, some members in the HAC committed transgressions and issued incorrect statements. They were transferred to an investigation committee and [..] were suspended by the acting Guide for a period ranging from two and eight months […]. Yet they refused these decisions” (IkhwanSite, December 17, 2015). Kamal’s faction responded, with a statement accusing Ezzat’s faction of disrespecting shura and institutionalism. Kamal’s faction insisted that the conflict “is confined by some [..] to a conflict between revolution and pacifism. Yet the conflict goes beyond this; it is a conflict about the methodology of management and the decision-making process” (IkhwanInfo, December 18, 2015). This statement led to a counter-statement from Ezzat’s faction, according to which “ the origin of the crisis is not a conflict between two parties, but rather a

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group’s disrespect of the legitimacy and methodology of work and their attempt to conceal their transgressions. It was evident that this group is an extension of the same group that rebelled against the Brotherhood’s constants causing the crisis in May 2015. We thought that their presence in the new administration and the clear definition of their responsibilities would help overcome the crisis. Yet, it is obvious that the goal of this group is unilateral control and a monopoly of power. [..] They refused the Shura Council’s decisions in June 2015, although the formation of the committee and their presence were based on these decisions. They refused the supervision of the acting General Guide. They refused the temporary nature of the committee which was limited for a period of six months despite being informed of this. [..] They wanted absolute power, refusing any supervision or accountability. They considered themselves a Guidance Office with the powers of a Guidance Office, which contradicts the method of their selection: they were not elected from the General Shura Council, but the selection was rather at the level of geographic sectors (qita’) from a small electoral base. [..] They failed in their basic tasks and did not support the committee in charge of reforming the bylaws [..]. They committed many violations, requiring the intervention of the acting Guide to correct them. [..] We urge them to abide by the decisions of the Shura Council of June 2015” (IkhwanSite, December 19, 2015). In April 2016, Kamal’s faction had the opportunity to revive its narrative of the conflict: Ezzat’s faction was not respecting the group’s principles of shura and institutionalism. It contended that the Shura meeting of February 2016, which decided to create four committees among them an “elected interim administrative committee” defied the internal bylaws. The revolutionary current used this example to support its narrative of the conflict. Again, it insisted that the struggle was between individual arbitrary power and institutionalism. Kamal insisted that Ezzat was accumulating all organizational power challenging thus the group’s bylaws and the principles of shura and institutionalism: “Mr. Ezzat now is the acting General Guide, and he takes over the Guidance Office and the Shura Council, and he is the one who decides who to attend the Shura Council meetings and who cannot attend, without respecting any regulations. If the administrative offices are dismantled and their members detained, he [Ezzat] will also embody them! All decisions are issued in his name, violating the group’s regulations. It is not in accordance with our religion nor with the constants or the bylaws of our group that all these powers are in the hands of only one individual no matter who he is. No General Guide ever assumed all these powers, and of course not deputies. The fight against injustice is nothing else than the fight against individual rule and tyranny. Weren’t the group’s institutions found to consult and respect each

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other’s opinions? Is this the model that we want to apply after ousting the coup?” (IkhwanInfo, April 6, 2016). Simultaneously, the Revolutionary current pushed towards carrying out comprehensive elections on all administrative levels, assuring that elections and institutionalism were the only way to terminate the internal conflict. It also agreed to al-Qaradawy’s reconciliation attempt, which suggested organizing elections and internal reform. Yet, the Organizational bloc refused all calls for internal elections under the current circumstances. It seemed that the Organizational bloc intended to avoid elections fearing its elimination from leadership positions. Ezzat’s faction claimed that it was not possible to organize comprehensive internal elections due to the crackdown as well as the fear of more detentions. Kamal’s faction insisted, however, that the local leadership was able to manage internal elections without putting its members at risk. Ezzat’s stance on carrying out elections was the reason for the failure of all reconciliatory attempts. and enhanced the Revolutionary faction’s narrative of the conflict, as a struggle between a faction that respects elections and institutionalism and a faction that relies on individual arbitrary power and historical legitimacy. “The conflict is between a High Administrative Committee elected from geographic sectors, and a designated High Administrative Committee that does not represent the ranks” (Mekameleen TV, June 21, 2016). Field legitimacy and youth representation In an attempt to challenge the Organizational bloc, the Revolutionary faction evoked the matter of legitimacy and on-the-ground activism as well as the representation of the youths’ revolutionary aspirations. The revolutionary current argued that local leaders, who are active on the ground, were the legitimate representatives of the ranks and thus deserved being the group’s legitimate leadership. While the old guard was mainly in exile, Kamal and many of his supporters were at that time still in Egypt. The conflict was therefore framed as a conflict between leaders who live safely in exile and who were not able to grasp the situation on the ground, and local leaders who are exposed to dangers but are still able to effectively organize the ranks in Egypt. Consequently, it was neither logical nor acceptable that local leaders submit to those in exile. “Legitimacy is attributed to people on the ground” (Mekameleen TV, June 21, 2016). This idea was shared by several MB members and Islamists, whom I have interviewed in 2016. The interviewees believed that the management of the Brotherhood’s activism in Egypt should be left to those who stayed in Egypt and are familiar with the situation and paying the price of their activism. Local and field leaders were attributed more legitimacy than “official” leaders who are in exile. A

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young Islamist who actively participated in MB protests but disengaged because of police brutality said: “Brotherhood leaders in Turkey or elsewhere insisted on a very high-risk form of activism. They ask us to protest. It is easy to ask other people in Egypt to protest, while they are in Turkey” (author’s interview, March 22, 2013). Similarly, a young MB member asserted: “leaders in exile don’t live [with us] on the real ground. They want us to protest. These people left the country when protest was still possible. They can’t understand or imagine how impossible it has become [..]. I wish all those who are in exile don’t interfere in our matters” (author’s interview, April 4, 2016). Similarly, the Revolutionary bloc argued that Ezzat’s faction does not represent the ranks in Egypt, nor did it seek to communicate with the administration offices since the coup. Local leaders are the field leaders who manage the ranks, while Ezzat’s faction is disconnected from reality. The exiled Guidance Office members “never met with any of the administrative offices in Egypt. Repression is not an excuse, since it didn’t hinder the local activists and leaders from meeting and forming a High Administrative Committee and even carrying out elections” (Mekameleen TV, June 21, 2016). Furthermore, Kamal’s faction questioned the existence of Ezzat and, consequently, questioned all the decisions taken in his name. “Mr. Mahmoud Ezzat, we do not know for sure whether he exists or not. Whether he is in Egypt or abroad [..] over the course of six whole months we have made all attempts to meet him, but our efforts were in vain. […] We feel obliged to tell all Brothers that we cannot assure them with certainty whether Mr. Ezzat exists or not, if he is in Egypt or outside it. This [uncertainly] makes all decisions issued in his name doubtful” (IkhwanInfo, April 6, 2016). Another argument related to Ezzat’s legitimacy was expressed in a TV- interview with Batikh, a prominent leader of the revolutionary wing: “If Ezzat really communicated with some members, particularly with Ibrahim Munir and Mahmoud Hussein, why did he not communicate with other Brothers? How is it possible that an acting General Guide is not accessible? Where is Mahmoud Ezzat? We have not met him during the two years of our work through the High Administrative Committee. A Committee consisting of only nine members, which is in the top of the hierarchal pyramid of the group. Why did Badi’ need a deputy? Because he cannot communicate with the group. Similarly, Ezzat cannot communicate with the group. Maybe he exists. But his signature on papers and documents is not enough. He cannot lead the group by signing papers. Ezzat cannot fulfill his responsibility as an acting General Guide” (Mekameleen Tv, June 21, 2016). Although the group was divided on all levels and across age groups, the matter of youth representation was an important aspect in the framing of the conflict. Since

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the beginning of the tensions inside the group, and with the accelerating rage among the ranks, the MB, at the time not fractured yet, announced that it seeks to empower its youth. The appointment of Montasser, in May 2015, as the group’s spokesman was considered a step towards the “empowerment of the youth generation (jil alshabab) and in accordance with the revolutionary activism” (IkhwanInfo, January 24, 2015). Representing the youth and their aspirations was linked to the matter of legitimacy. Specifically, Kamal’s faction gave the conflict a generational dimension, claiming that it represented the youth and their aspired revolutionary strategy and that Ezzat’s faction represented the old guard and marginalized the youth by adopting a top-down approach. Ezzat’s faction contended this narrative by adopting a discourse praising the youth and promising to realize their aspirations. Both factions issued statements assuring that youth are the “new blood of the organization defining its future” and the “pioneers of the future.” Finally, a statement issued by the Turkey-based Office summed up the legitimacy matter evoked by the Revolutionary bloc in its narrative of contention: “It is about time that the Brotherhood unites behind an elected leadership, present on the ground, and in which the spirit of the youth is embodied in thought, action and individuals. It is this leadership that will lead the Brotherhood to overthrow the military criminal coup. At the same time, the Brotherhood’s youth will lead the battle of renewal within the group to make it more institutional, professional, and more expressive and responsive to the aspirations and ambitions of its youth” (IkhwanInfo, December 16, 2015).

6.1.3

Internal Reform: Adjusting of the Bylaws and Vision

Besides the strategic and legitimacy dimensions of the conflict, internal reform was also a matter of disagreement. Before the split, during the Shura Council meeting in June 2015, a committee was formed with the responsibility to propose reforms of the internal bylaws and regulations. After the escalation of the conflict and the factionalism of the group into two fronts, both fronts were keen to present themselves as reformers as well as supporters of the revolution and its principles. Therefore, the Organizational bloc formed a new committee to develop a new vision and amend some existing bylaws. Yet, the Revolutionary bloc developed a comprehensive reform initiative encompassing three projects: self-critique, a new vision, and new bylaws. The Revolutionary bloc’s attempts to rebuild the MB’s institutions and reform the bylaws were used in the conflict narrative to undermine Ezzat’s faction.

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The Third Founding One year after the dispersal of Raba’a, at the same time when divisions on strategic lines started to forge, contention about the internal molding of the organization and its regulations gradually emerged. Kamal’s front, which sought to adopt an innovative revolutionary strategy against the regime, also pushed for internal elections and required reform of some bylaws. In its attempt to increase its legitimacy, the Revolutionary bloc developed a comprehensive reform project. This project was called “The Third Founding” (al-ta’sis al-talit); the First Founding refers to the group’s founding phase during the 1930s and 1940s, and the Second Founding indicates the group’s re-organization in the mid 1970s. Mohamad Kamal, leader of the Revolutionary bloc was thus considered the group’s “third founder” after al-Banna and al-Tilmisany, and its third ideologue after al-Banna and Qutb. The killing of Kamal in October 2016 added to Kamal’s legacy, who became “a martyr following the path of al-Banna, Qutb, and Akef” (IkhwanInfo, October 3, 2017). As of February 2016, the Revolutionary current’s website “ikhwanonline.info” published several updates regarding its roadmap, and its reform project. It also established an interactive platform, where members were able to share their suggestions and comments for each article of the group’s bylaws. In March 2016, the draft of the new bylaws was available online.2 The bylaws were divided into five sections: First, the introductive section; second, definitions and concepts; third, the Brotherhood’s institutions; fourth, general regulations and fifth, transitional regulations. The HAC encouraged members to post their comments or send their opinions, suggestions and requests per e-mail. This was an exceptional moment, since the old bylaws were not available to members until after the 2011 uprising. The project of the “new bylaws”, (mashru’ al-la’iha al-jadida) was given the name nahw al-nur; “towards light”, a name that also indicated the faction’s framing of the conflict: the revolutionary current is saving the group from the “dark ages” of the old guard’s domination towards the light of reform and innovation. Most importantly, the new bylaws introduced better representation of women and youth. In addition, it separated the executive and legislative bodies within the group. For the first time in the group’s history, the General Guide was no longer the head of the Shura Council. The new bylaws also guaranteed the accountability of leaders through the separation of both bodies. Moreover, the political activities of the group were separated from its proselytization activities. The final draft of the new bylaws

2

The complete draft of the new bylaws can be retrieved from https://mbpolicy.ikhwanonline. info, last accessed on August 20, 2021

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was introduced and approved by the newly elected Shura Council in December 2016. These amendments were not different from the reforms aspired by the Reformist current before 2011. However, this time, the reform requirement was related to the group’s failure to reverse the coup and retain power, coupled with fierce repression which created outrage and deepened the rifts within the group. The outrage was not only directed at the regime and the society, but also at the MB leaders and the organizational deficits, which allowed leaders to dominate the decision-making process and put forth their “outdated” strategy. Ironically, the current initially pushing towards a confrontational stance against the regime, by redefining pacifism to include more violent tactics, was the same current introducing internal reform, including enhancing internal democratization, transparency, accountability, institutionalism and youth inclusion. After factionalism, Kamal’s front insisted on framing the conflict “not as a dispute about pacifism and revolution, but a conflict about the methodology of management and decision making processes” (IkhwanInfo, April 6, 2016). Against this background, the Turkey-based Office was charged with the development of a “new vision” (al-ru’ya al-jadida) and new bylaws. It is important to note that the Revolutionary current was eager to include the ranks in the reform projects. In addition, a series of conferences were held in Turkey where members and observers discussed the group’s mistakes, and reassessed its performance from January 2011 to January 2017. It was declared that the re-evaluation only concerned the MB as a group and not the political performance of the parliament, the government, or the presidency institution. The self-evaluation was published under the name “Vision 28: pre-vision evaluations” in two documents in March and April 2017. Giving the group’s new vision this name indicated that the Revolutionary bloc asserted its intent to refine the group from the ‘impurities’ added to its goals, ideas and strategies, and revive the group in a way similar to al-Banna’s founding of the group in 1928. This name symbolized the group’s narrative of the conflict: the Orginizational bloc deviated from the initial principles, shura and institutionalism, set by al-Banna. The Revolutionary current’s objective was to re-establish the group according to its primary principles as elaborated in 1928. This seemed to be a counter-narrative to the old guard’s narrative of the conflict, portraying itself as the guardian of the groups’ principles and “constants”. In other words, al-Banna’s fundamentals and the group’s original principles and goals were disputed, too. The revolutionary faction declared that “Vision 28” was customized in a manner that avoided the errors and mistakes of the past. Carrying out self-critique and internal reforms enhanced Kamal’s faction narrative of the conflict as a struggle

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between, on the one hand, revolution and innovation and, on the other hand, conservatism and rigidity. The critiques were directed at the leadership of the past six years, which meant that the critiques were directed at the Organizational bloc’s ideas and strategies. The first document “Vision 28/1” published in March 2017 mainly criticized the marginal priority given to political activism, the poor partisan activism, and the inability to understand or deal with revolutionary mechanisms. It criticized the prioritization of social activism, especially charity work over other aspects of public work. This led to an exchange with a limited segment of the society, mainly consisting of the poor and marginalized. The group was distanced from the rest of the Egyptian society, and its political activism was restricted to the provision of social services. This was related to the prioritization of proselytizing over political activism, and led to the non-formulation of a comprehensive political project, as well as the lack of academic and technical preparation of specialized cadres in the field of political activism. In addition, the group was not politically ambitious and operated within the limits decreed by the regime. Brothers were repressible. The group “did not imagine that it might one day acquire power” nor did it “opt to ascend to power like any opposition” (Vision 28/1, 2017, p. 19). This was reflected in the absence of a political program, academic research, and discussions about the group’s political project. The Brotherhood did not even seek to direct its political gains to obtain a ministerial position or increase the scope of its opposition. The group even failed to seize the opportunities of political openness, particularly in 2005. “The participation in the Parliamentary elections was departing from a social activism standpoint and aimed at finding an appropriate political cover for dealing with the society, rather than opting for a ministerial position or realizing political gains [..]. The group did not present itself as an alternative to the existing government” (pp. 22–23), as it feared a crackdown. Instead, it focused on the group’s educational, spiritual, and moral aspects. The negative consequences of this stance were obvious during and after the 2011 Uprising. When the urgent desire to establish a political party and formulate a political project appeared, the group was not ready. The accumulation of several aspects of misprioritization as well as the lack of political ambition led to the group’s “insufficient political readiness” to manage state affairs in the aftermath of 2011. The Freedom and Justice Party was trapped within the framework of the group. It was working through the mechanisms of the group and not as a conventional political party. “The party was the political committee of the group rather than a political party, and the group often dealt with it just as it dealt with the rest of its sections” (Vision 28/1, 2017, p. 35). The matter of confusion and overlapping between the group and the party was tackled. “The party was practicing political

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competition in the name of the group, and the group competed in the name of the party. Important decisions about the party were taken by the group. And the party’s headquarters became the decision centers for the group” (p. 35). The document also pointed out to the overlapping between the leading figures in the group and the party, and that the political party, just like the group, was mostly exclusively active in social services. It postulated that the MB failed to “predict the revolution or act according to its strategies” (Vision 28/1, 2017, p. 45). In this respect, the Organizational bloc, which dominated the leadership of the Brotherhood, was openly criticized. The document criticized the leadership’s inclination towards gradualism over revolution and its inclination to deal with the regime as a political opposition instead of a revolutionary actor. “Despite the fact that revolutionary thought was present in al-Banna’s understanding. Yet, the notion of revolution became absent in the generations that followed al-Banna, especially those inside the prisons of Nasser and Sadat [..]. The reformist strategy became the only choice for the group and turned into an implicit agreement between the group and the political regime” (p. 45). It also criticized the Organizational bloc’s prominence given to the preservation of the organization, its structure and cohesion. “The organization was what counted most for this generation. These organization-oriented beliefs and strategies were incompatible with the idea of the interactive and flowing revolution” (p. 54). Additionally, the group did not benefit from the young revolutionary youth, i.e. the “MB Youth” generation, and pushed them outside the group as they demanded internal reform. They were excluded, although they were suitable for the revolutionary stage and were recognized by the wide spectrum of revolutionary actors. Organizationoriented members were promoted instead. The document concludes that the MB was not politically ready to manage the revolution and the transitional phase. It also miscalculated the dangers of permitting the SCAF to manage the transitional phase unilaterally. The second part of the self-evaluation document “Vision 28/2” was published in April 2017 and dealt with the deficits of the internal organizational structure, and the group’s errors after the coup. This document indicated a clear revolt against the organizational bloc, its ideas, narratives, and norms. The document argued that al-Banna’s established organizational structure was originally compatible with the group’s ideology. However, over time, the organizational molding became an obstacle to the group’s performance, ideas and goals. This was attributed to several aspects, most importantly “the internal heterogeneity” which was the result of the existence of three different generations; the historical leadership, the 1970s generation, and the Youth, as well as the absence of a comprehensive intellectual framework and postponing the resolution of important disaagreements.

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In addition, it pointed out to the lack of separation between the legislative and the executive bodies within the group, which undermined the leaders’ accountability. In reality, the executive body; the Guidance Office controlled the decision making, planning and execution, while the Shura Council’s role was limited to the election of the Guidance Office. The document also postulated that the group’s tradition recommended that members should not run for any administrative positions since a devoted member should not seek power. This tradition led to the permanent choice of famous figures even if they were neither professional nor experienced. The group’s institutional structure was considered weak due to the absence of accountability, especially in high-ranking bodies. The weakness of the structure was also related to the overlapping between administrative and educational tasks, and the marginalization of the committees. The document pointed out to the deficiencies of the bylaws notably, the underrepresentation of women and youth. “The representation within the organizational structure, and its administrative bodies started at the age of 40 or 50.” (Vision 28/2, 2017, p. 7) It criticized the bylaws’ focus on the powers of the executive body, and the marginalization of regulations regarding the supervisory role of the legislative. A system regulating individual claims against organizational and administrative decisions also remained absent. This was considered the reason for the consolidation of the hierarchical structure which limited the member’s ability and opportunity for free thinking about the group’s affairs: “The hierarchy was originally sought to protect the group, yet, in reality, it limited it”. The critiques directed at the Organizational bloc were focal in this document: “it was necessary to correct and reform the structure of the organization and its management methods […]. The leadership which managed to keep the organization intact throughout these years, was also able to introduce these reforms if it wanted and intended to. However, this required overcoming the sanctity of the organization and the guardianship of those who advocate for it” (Vision 28/2, 2017, p. 8). The MB’s performance after the coup was also evaluated. The Organizational bloc was criticized for relying on the narratives of al-mihna (ordeal) and al-fitna (temptation). The Revolutionary bloc argued that the mihna narrative enhanced passivity and patience. It was contended that this narrative might be relieving when used in personal problems, but not in organizational struggles. The fitna narrative framed the struggle with the coup as a tribulation, a conflict, or a civil strife, which is a narrative that has important connotations in Islamic history, especially the necessity to isolate oneself at times of tribulation to maintain the religious commitment. The Revolutionary faction contended that both narratives (mihna and fitna) created fear among members and resulted in their isolation and encouraged them to accept the new circumstances gradually. “The group lost a lot of time due to these narratives.

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Of course, we are in a state of distress and ordeal, but we should not surrender to this description or work accordingly. This narrative was evoked to recall the solutions from the past, to make people accept the current situation, and wait patiently” (Vision 28/2, 2017, p. 12). Re-adjusting the “compass” Ezzat’s faction disregarded the Revolutionary bloc’s revisions and announced that the dissidents’ effort to create new regulations and bylaws was an attempt to legitimize itself. Furthermore, it refused the reforms to the bylaws issued by the Revolutionary faction, since any reform to the bylaws must “be through the legitimate channel and get approved by the responsible bodies” (IkhwanOnline.com, March 21, 2017). The Organizational bloc announced in 2016 that the group’s bylaws and regulations would be reformed according to the members’ aspirations. It was announced that four committees were formed, including a “vision committee” and an “elections committee”. The vision committee assembled members inside and outside of Egypt and was tasked with re-adjusting the group’s vision after receiving observations from the ranks. The final draft was supposed to be presented to the Shura Council, which should discuss and approve the vision (IkhwanSite, April 3, 2016). The “elections committee” was responsible for the completion of elections and the suggestion of adjustments to the bylaws regulating internal elections. The heads of administrative offices and the “development committee” were also allowed to submit their suggestions in this regard to the elections committee. After assembling all aspirations, the committee was supposed to submit a draft to the Acting General Guide. This meant that any reform was only approved through this channel, and that reform only concerned specific bylaws and regulations, in contrast to the Revolutionary faction’s comprehensive reform. Moreover, the Organizational bloc, developed a new narrative focusing less on internal reform and stressing the importance of “re-adjusting the compass” of the group’s vision. In fact, Ezzat’s faction refused to focus on the Egyptian case and called for a “re-adjustment of the compass” towards the Palestinian issue (author’s interview, February 2, 2019). This narrative was evident in Ezzat’s statement in which he highlighted that the MB is a transnational organization that defends Muslim nations and Muslim people and should not forget its original mission. “The Palestinian issue is the central issue of the Islamic nation [..] and that liberating alAqsa Mosque from the Zionists is a duty of every Muslim, each according to their ability, and the Islamic nation is required to unite to liberate every inch of Muslim lands from every occupier [..]. The internal problems of each country in the Islamic world are not an excuse to retreat into regional issues, forgetting the common issues

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of the nation, especially the issue of Palestine, the oppression of Islamic minorities, the liberation of the occupied Muslim lands from every foreign power, and the preservation of the territorial integrity of the targeted Islamic countries for division, especially in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen” (IkhwanOnline, April 24, 2017). As for the Egyptian case, the Organizational bloc announced that all political forces should re-evaluate their political performance (IkhwanOnline, January 24, 2018). Yet, it never published any re-evaluation of its activism. It seemed that the matter of re-evaluation and reform was not a focal concern of Ezzat’s faction, and that the latter’s utmost ambition was to keep what was left of the organization intact, and to guarantee the safety of its leaders who had escaped the crackdown. This stance from reform and self-critique was closely linked to the Organizational bloc’s narrative of mihna, which the Revolutionary bloc has criticized in “Vision 28”. In fact, the old guard considered the Raba’a dispersal and its aftermath as an ordeal. Externally, the group was facing a crisis. Internally, the divisions and conflicts within the group were a trial; “fitna”. The solution was to “hold on to the group’s constants and unite behind the leadership during these hard times” (IkhwanOnline, January 24, 2018). The events of Raba’a and the coup were framed as inevitable. The deep state conspired against the first democratic experience in Egypt and ousted the legitimate President. Ordeals were God’s trials to the believers, meant to filter out the real believers from the nonbelievers. At the same time, members should trust that victory is awaiting them, and that injustice will certainly end. This narrative was also promoted by Hussein, Secretary General and prominent figure in the Organizational bloc, who announced in a broadcast interview that: “The victory of the righteous is a divine rule. Injustice does not last, and the unjust regime will fade. When this relief will happen and when victory will appear, is a divine matter. Whether the current generations or the next generations experience the victory is an unknown matter. But we must be sure and trust that victory will definitely come” (Mekameleen TV, June 20, 2019). The MB is a social and political actor among many others and is therefore not responsible for the mobilization of revolts against the coup. Yet, the MB is “at the disposal of the people and is waiting for the moment where the masses will rise to bring down the oppressor” (IkhwanOnline, June 16, 2017). Until that moment members were expected to endure repression and commit to patience and self-restraint.

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Reconstructing the Conflict Narrative: The Implicit Dimensions in the Factional Conflict

The narratives adopted by both factions in their contention reflected many dynamics of the factional battle. Yet, it only revealed the explicit part of the faction. However, “factional battles are often about something else” (Polletta and Kretschmer, 2015, p. 38). While the narrative of the conflict focused on strategic disagreements, legitimacy dilemmas and internal organizational regulations, I argue that the battle was predominately about core fundamentals, doctrinal heritage, cognitive frames, and a long-held code of identity based on submissiveness. I argue that it is these microstructural dynamics that we need to unpack in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of MB factionalism. Therefore, this section analyses the deeper emotional and moral conflicts within the group. It shows how the contending players were disputing the meaning and practice of core values, differently interpreting the same events, and disputing long-standing organizational norms and codes of identity. While these moral battles aim to control the movement’s positioning in broader political fields, particularly the movement’s strategy against the regime, they are also directed internally, towards the organizational “rules of the game” as well as the informal practices shaped by the code of identity.

6.2.1

Unpacking the Strategic Conflict: Fighting Against ‘Religious Determinism’

The factional conflict goes beyond the superficial dichotomies of moderates/ radicals, old/young, conservatives/reformers. In fact, the conflict is against the Organizational bloc’s dominance over the leadership of the MB. The Revolutionary faction is not only concerned with undermining the Organizationalists’ domination on leadership positions, but also predominantly attempts to reconfigure long-standing doctrinal cognitions, particularly “religious determinism” (Kandil, 2015), and the conceptions and implications derived from them. Religious determinism and implications Religious determinism is a central belief that can be considered the core of the Brotherhood’s ideology (Kandil, 2015). It constitutes the doctrinal base for the group’s important principles or ‘constants’ (thawbit), particularly patience, gradualism and victimhood (mazlumiyyah). These conceptions underlie the current factional battle.

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Religious determinism is the belief that the world operates according to certain ‘deterministic laws of causality’ (qawanin al-sababiya). The most important among these is that the pious are promised divine support that secures victory in worldly matters. In other words, worshiping God and abiding by Islam is a way to seek and be worthy of God’s help in advancing in this world. Victory is “a divine reward in which material causes are suspended and miracles and wonders appear” (Kandil, 2015, p. 82). Religious determinism argues that “realizing certain religious conditions prompts historical change, specifically that producing a godly community triggers a divinely ordained transformation of that community’s material situation” (Kandil, p. 85). This means that religious determinism is based on the belief in a recurring historical pattern. This pattern is derived from the theological interpretation of history, particularly that of the stories of prophets in the Qur’an. In fact, al-Banna established the principle of religious determinism, when he proclaimed that “people are mistaken when they think that eastern countries lack material instruments of power, such as money, war machines and equipment […]. What is more important and equally absent is spiritual strength[…]. If [we] cultivate spiritual strength and moral righteousness, the material instruments of power will hail to [us] from all directions. This can be derived with certainty from the pages of history” (1990, p. 37). Religious determinism in al-Banna’s thought is also evident in his emphasis on the virtue of patience, asserting that Brothers “will be rewarded by God: either victory and sovereignty, or martyrdom and happiness” (1990, p. 100). Al-Banna calls Brothers to “wait for the hour of victory”, ensuring “God’s victory is guaranteed as long as [they] are devoted”. Similarly, second General Guide alHoudaybi maintained that Brothers “are like the shepherd who was asked why he was not guarding his sheep [from the wolf], and replied: ‘I have mended my relation with God, and so God mended the relation between my sheep and the wolf’” (al-Hudaybi, 1973 cited in Kandil, 2015, p. 87). Religious determinism thus explains the roots of the gradual approach that the Brotherhood adopts. Al-Banna indicates that the Brotherhood is concerned with the Muslim individual, the Muslim family, until it reaches the Muslim society. Once the society is ‘truly’ abiding by Islam, it becomes worthy of divine support, and will thus conquer as a reward for their devotion. Al-Banna affirms: “Past and present experiences have proven that there is not a better way except your way […]. Jihad is a wise product that leads to the greatest profit with the least sacrifices” (1990, p. 104). According to the MB’s ideology, religious determinism does not call for passiveness. Instead, it is a call to adhere to patience and religious devotion. It implies that individuals become concerned with changing themselves instead of changing the world, and patiently await empowerment, which is God’s reward for their devotion.

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Religious determinism also implies that individuals endure injustice and oppression, and remain committed to patience, non-violence and spiritual devotion, since injustice is punished by God in life and in the hereafter. “God has promised to help the oppressed even if after a while. When the oppressor rejoices his wrongdoing and takes pride in his tyranny and strength” (al-Barr, 2020). This leads to the important concept of mazlumiyyah, or victimhood. This concept is based on the belief that Brothers should endure injustice and oppression until God’s will intervenes and saves them. Yet, to become worthy of divine intervention, they must resist oppressors and refuse to obey them. Resistance should take the form of “advice”. If the oppressed do not resist using “the power of advice”, injustice overwhelms the whole nation. The deterministic divine laws imply that “God empowers nations that are just, and destructs unjust nations, and [that] God defeats the oppressor even if he is surrounded by his soldiers and servants[..]. Yet the nation needs first to rise against injustice and corruption and to rush to reform, so that it becomes a nation worthy of God’s victory” (al-Barr, 2020)3 . This means that “the ummah has a duty to confront injustice. It is not enough for us to recognise injustice and remain silent […]. Instead, each of us must have a role in achieving justice and restoring equality between the people [..]. It is the right of the ruler to receive advice from his people. If he is tempted and deviates [from the path of justice] they should set him back up on the right path. When the nation performs its duty, the oppressor cannot continue in his path [of injustice]. [..]Nations take their rights by the power of advice” (al-Barr, 2020). Hence, the strategic implication of religious determinism conveys gradualism and opposition (advice in the group’s words). It is exactly this concept that distinguishes the MB from other Islamist movements. While the MB seeks to serve their goals through classical political activism and aims to reform the society, quietist Salafists give legitimacy to Muslim regimes and tend to delegitimize all forms of political opposition. They justify their stance by arguing that contesting regimes create “fitna” (sedition) which might endanger the socio-political order without which the maintenance of the religion could be threatened. The third group, on the contrary, justifies the use of violence and incites the armed struggle aimed at overthrowing the jahili regimes, even if these are “nominally” Muslims (Wiktorowicz, 2006; Adraoui, 2019). Thus, the old guard’s commitment to a certain strategy in the aftermath of Raba’a derives from the fundamental concept of religious determinism. The latter draws 3

Abdelrahman al-Barr is a prominent leader and mufti of the group, arrested in May 2015 and sentenced to death. He wrote -apparently-from his prison cell an article entitled “Islam’s posture from injustice and oppressors” which summarizes the concept of victimhood.

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a certain strategy for the group, i.e., that of victimhood, gradualism, non-violence and opposition to the regime. Yet the Revolutionary faction criticized in Vision 28 the leadership’s commitment to gradualism and opposition instead of revolution. It also criticized the previous commitment to the limits of opposition put forth by the regime, accusing the leadership of lacking political ambition and of being repressible. After the coup, the leadership was described as incapable of cognizing the real meaning of revolutionary strategy, and that it is still committed to the outdated opposition logic (Vision 28/1, 2017). Regardless of the old guard’s discourse that praises the 2011 uprising and frames the coup as a struggle between the remnants of the January 25 Uprising and the deep state, the Organizational bloc does not support revolution as a strategy in any way. Revolution is the opposite of the group’s treasured strategy of gradual change and reform. The founder and first ideologue of the MB, al-Banna, highlighted that the political aspiration of the group is “a call for reforming the national government” (1990, p. 109). He clearly opposes revolution, asserting that “the Muslim Brothers do neither think about revolution, nor depend on it. They do not believe in its benefits and results […]. If a revolt occurs [it will] not be from the actions of the Muslim Brothers, nor from those whom I called upon, but from the pressure of circumstances and the necessities of the situation” (al-Banna, 1990, p. 110). Instead, the revolutionary capacity of the group is of a spiritual nature: “Brothers are revolutionary in their capacity to patiently endure injustice rather than confront it” (al-Ashmawi,1985, cited in Kandil, 2015, p. 60). This cognition of spiritual revolution is also reflected in the appeal of Head of the HAC al-Mursi to Brothers: “Revolt against bad habits [..] revolt against oppressors with the Quran, with repentance, hope, trust, and awaiting relief. [..] Revolt by performing the prayer, visiting mosques, visiting family members and neighbors [..]. Be armed with prayers. The prayers of the oppressed are not refused. And wait patiently for the victory” (IkhwanSite, June 5, 2016). At first, it may seem controversial that a group that moved quickly from the margins of the political sphere to its center thanks to “a revolution” does not value the revolutionary strategy. Yet, analyzing the old guard’s cognition in light of religious determinism helps us understand their stance on revolution. In fact, the old guard perceives the 2011 Egyptian uprising and Mubarak’s overthrow as their reward for decades of worship. In addition, the uprising maintains religious determinism: while the MB remained committed to patience and victimhood, the revolt was initiated by “secular activists supported by millions of desperate citizens [who] forced Mubarak to hand authority to the generals, who -in turn- decided to transfer power to an elected authority, which turned out to be the Brotherhood- divine intervention indeed” (Kandil, 2015, p. 85).

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Against this background, the declaration of Secretary General Mahmoud Hussein about the group’s plan to undermine the regime seems coherent. The latter declared in 2019 in an interview on “Mekameleen TV” that the Brotherhood does not have a plan to undermine the regime rather than wait patiently for the Egyptian people to revolt against injustice. “There is a difference between calling for revolution and making revolution. The Brotherhood calls for and participates in revolution, but it does not do revolution. It is the Egyptian people that should revolt, and we are part of the Egyptian people. We are ready to endure what the people endure”. Hussein assures: “We will definitely win. Justice will certainly win. The coup will fade away. This is the truth. This is God’s promise to us. […] But when and who will live to witness the downfall of oppression and injustice is another issue. It doesn’t have to be me who witnesses the restoration of justice. It might be [the generation of] our children or grandchildren. What concerns me is that I go to heaven” (Mekameleen TV, June 20, 2019). Yet, the January 25 uprising imparted very different lessons for the new generation of leaders. The revolution showed the power of direct action, confrontation, and cross-partisan activism. This made the new leaders believe in the value of the revolutionary trajectory, and the necessity of mass mobilization, which succeeded in the toppling of the head of the regime in 2011. The preeminence of organizational maintenance that resulted from the set of values put forth by the Organizational bloc was considered an obstacle in the way of their goals. Therefore, the Revolutionary faction sought to re-read al-Banna’s principles and re-evaluate the group’s constants derived from his ideas. The Revolutionary faction thus argued that the structure and hierarchy of the organization, which al-Banna originally founded to serve the goals of the group and its ideas, became sacred. Instead of serving the goals and ideas of the organization, they became ends themselves. Therefore, this faction focused most on the reform of the organizational norms and constants, revolting thus against the Organizational bloc’s domination. Raba’a: a fourth ordeal or a transformative event? During the Raba’a sit-in, the leadership assured the protestors that divine intervention would restore Mursi to office, and that God will empower His pious servants. The sit-in coincided with the holy month of Ramadan, which was also the month that witnessed the early Islamic victories. The spiritual mood in the Raba’a square was reinforced by the leaders’ discourse about divine intervention and God’s promised support to his ‘soldiers’ (Kandil p. 81). Yet, on August 14, 2013, the sit-in was violently dispersed. Within a few hours, the “Islamic utopia” was terminated. The meaning of the crackdown differed among group members as it stems from different

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cognitive and affective frames (Passy and Giugni, 2000). While the Raba’a dispersal and the crackdown that followed were considered by the old guard as a fourth ordeal, they engendered a moral shock and were transformative events for several mid-ranking leaders and members. The latter started to question the effectiveness of the group’s strategy of non-violence and gradual change. Patience and the focus on one’s spiritual struggle seemed insufficient and passive. Therefore, several Brothers pushed their leaders towards a more assertive strategy. Yet, the old guard remained committed to gradualism, patience and victimhood, which are derived from the main doctrine; religious determinism. In this respect, the old guard recalled ‘fiqh al-mihna’ (the ordeal jurisprudence). According to this concept, an ordeal is a divinely ordained trial that tests Brother’s determination and persistence. During an ordeal, Brothers should endure injustice, advise the oppressor, reinforce their piety, and wait patiently for God’s victory. The old guard has always believed that the “real revenge is to exert more patience […] the revenge of the Muslim Brothers is to control themselves, obey their leaders, trust their movement, and endure harm” (Abbas, 2008, cited in Kandil, 2015, p. 61). If the ordeal narrative is derived from religious determinism and victimhood, it prospered as a result of the brutal crackdown of the group in the 1960s, which included large-scale arrests, torture and death sentences. This experience, which culminated in Qutb’s hanging, reinforced the importance of organization maintenance, the value of strict leadership hierarchy, and the necessity of adapting to political repression and enduring injustice (Ayyash, 2015). It is not coincidental that Mahmoud Ezzat and Ibrahim Munir as well as the detained General Guide Mohamad Badi’ were part of the group arrested with Sayyid Qutb in 1965. Indeed, for this group, Raba’a, was not an exceptional accident. It is a ‘fourth ordeal’. It adds to the series of ordeals that the group underwent repeatedly (see Section 4.2). Thus, the old guard’s cognition of the current crackdown is affected by their own memories of repression, and the solution to the current ordeal lies, like the previous ones, in patience, endurance and religious determinism. Yet, for the revolutionary middle ranking leaders and younger members, Raba’a is more than an ordeal. It is a transformative event. A comparison of the rhetoric used by both factions on the occasion of the sit-in’s dispersal commemoration highlights the differences in the cognition of the event. While the old guard recalls notions of patience and endurance, the revolutionary faction’s statements on this occasion usually embody tense emotions, particularly anger and vengeance. Furthermore, the old guard describes Raba’a as a “symbol of resistance” (IkhwanOnline, August 13, 2018), while the Revolutionary faction considers the day of the sit-ins’ dispersal a “transformative day that will not be forgotten”. What happened on that day in Raba’a and al-Nahda squares are “not just events that have passed, and they cannot

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be narrated as history. [..] This day will remain a stain in the history of the homeland” (IkhwanInfo, August 13, 2018). Framing the crackdown as an ordeal also explains Ezzat’s faction’s nonapologetic attitude towards the errors of the past, in contrast to the Kamal faction, which engaged in a process of self-critique. In fact, the old guard believed that the downfall of the group was not related to the group’s mistakes but rather a plot against the group. In this sense, the coup was inevitable, since the secular forces conspired with the military institution and the deep state against the MB. Yet, it was all a divine plan to test the steadfastness of the Brothers. Framing the crackdown as an ordeal undermined the blame and anger towards the leadership. In fact, blame can engender indignation if people believe that the suffering could have been avoided by an individual or a group (Jasper, 2007, p. 85). Yet, the old guard sought to frame the group’s downfall as an act of God and a trial, and therefore requested Brothers to focus on passing the trial by holding on to patience, non-violence, endurance, and victimhood, as well as by strengthening their piety in order to become worthy of God’s victory once again. Although, the mihna narrative was previously the source of legitimacy and respect for the leadership, it had less appeal among several members after the 2013 crackdown. Patience and spirituality seemed like an appeal for passivity. Waiting for divine intervention without admitting one’s mistakes seemed wrong. Therefore, the Revolutionary faction contended that the mihna narrative evoked by the old guard aimed at enforcing the group to enter a dormancy phase, and to silence calls for internal reform (see: Vision 28/2, 2017). Instead of awaiting relief, this group was convinced that it should admit its errors and adjust its deficits. Furthermore, the Revolutionary current believed that the MB cannot remain committed to self-restraint, patience, and gradual change, since Raba’a was a “transformative event” in the history of the group and its strategy. Arguing that al-Banna’s ideology was not a fixed concept but rather a dynamic idea that can fit within different political contexts, the revolutionary faction advocated that a new innovative strategy fitting the new era must be developed; a revolt against injustice rather than political opposition to it. Indeed, the factional battle was less of a conflict between violence and pacifism, it was rather a conflict between revolution and the concepts of ordeal and victimhood (Mekameleen TV, June 21, 2016). As a young MB member puts it: “the current internal conflict is not between young and old but rather a debate between a group that believes that the MB is suffering an ordeal, and that we did not make mistakes but that rather everyone was against us, and a group that thinks that we have been deceived and that we committed great mistakes. We were neither ready nor qualified for this phase” (author’s interview, April 3, 2016).

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Re-Configuring the Brotherhood’s Collective Identity

In its narrative of the conflict, the Revolutionary faction focused on the importance of re-evaluating the group’s strategies, goals, and organizational regulations. It also published the document “vision 28” admitting the group’s internal deficits and political miscalculations. However, this document does not only re-evaluate the political performance of the group, but it also challenges the leadership’s competence and criticizes its priorities and norms. I argue that “vision 28” reflects one of the most important unspoken dimensions of the group’s factional battle: the attempt to undermine the group’s collective identity, or what al-Anani (2016) calls ‘ikhwanism’. In this respect, I analyze the conflictual interplay between a faction that attempts to maintain the group’s code of identity, and a faction that struggles to re-configure the long-standing collective identity. The dispute mainly arises from the norms regulating the relationship between ranks and leaders. Submissive collective identity and organizational coherence The MB has a unique code of identity, ikhwanism, that distinguishes it from other Islamist movements. This identity reflects the interplay of organizational norms, structure, and ideology. This means that the MB’s organizational dynamics, such as internal regulations, values, patterns of leadership, and social interaction, shape its members’ perceptions and views and create a subculture that dominates Brothers. In turn, this subculture defines the Brotherhood’s identity, affiliation rules, power relations and organizational roles. It also affects the structure of incentives that foster collective action and engender activism (Al-Anani, 2016). Ikhwanism as a collective identity reflects the group’s organizational ideology, structure, norms, interactions, and power relations, which are in turn affected by external dynamics. In other words, the collective identity is not a pure reflection of organizational dynamics (micromeso dimension) but is also affected by external dynamics, most importantly the political environment (micro-macro dimension). The code of Brothers identity was created by al-Banna, who built a solid internal culture. Al-Banna’s “letter of teachings” (Risalat al-ta’alim) is the keystone of the MB’s collective identity. It identifies the indoctrination and identification processes as well as the norms and code of values of Brothers. In fact, al-Banna revived the concept of al-by’a (the oath of allegiance4 ) and linked it to commitment and loyalty. 4

The oath is an obligatory procedure undertaken to join the group. The roots of this ritual are derived from the Islamic tradition. Prophet Muhammad took oaths from new converts to Islam in the early years of his message. Al-bay’a is a contract between a member and a leader, but also to God.

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A member who joins the MB must pledge his allegiance to the General Guide, as well as to the group’s cause and ideology. A member is committed to his oath not only in front of the leader, but also in front of God. This makes members accountable not only to the leadership but also to God. In the “letter of teachings”, al-Banna identified ten pillars of al-bay’a and provided a detailed explanation for each of these pillars. These are: understanding ( fahm), sincerity (ikhalas), action (’amal), jihad, sacrifice (tadhiya), obedience (ta’a), perseverance (thabat), devotion (tajarud), fraternity/brotherhood (okhuwa), and trust (thiqa). These ten pillars constitute the basis of the Brotherhood’s code of identity. Yet, al-Banna’s successors put emphasis on some of these principles and codes and internalized them into the organizational structure. Under a repressive regime, and the domination of the Organizational bloc on the leadership, the principles of obedience, trust, and perseverance were particularly highlighted. These three principles, in addition to the principles of commitment and loyalty, which were reflected in the concept of bay’a, constituted the core of the Brotherhood’s code of identity. As for the obedience (ta’a), it entails complete submission to the leadership, “in hardship, and ease, in the desired and the despised” (al-Banna, 1990, p. 280). A leader should command, and members should obey, exactly like in military operations. “Obedience must be without hesitation, revision, doubt, or embarrassment” (p. 281). Trust is also related to obedience. According to al-Banna, Brothers should trust their leaders just like “the soldier’s profound confidence in the competence of the leader and [his] loyalty to him.” The leader in the organization has “the same rights as the father in terms of emotional bonds; the professor in terms of scientific respect, the [mystic] sheikh in terms of spiritual nurture, and the political and military leader in terms of general policy” (1990, pp. 282–283). Al-Banna considered trust to be “everything in successful missions” (1990, p. 282). Brothers obey their leaders since they have absolute trust in the leaders’ virtuousness. He explains that Brothers must submit to the moral superiority of the leader, his knowledge and experience, as well as his wisdom. This absolute trust produces love, appreciation, respect, and obedience. Meanwhile, erroneous decisions taken by the leadership are considered a reflection of God’s will and His way of testing members’ steadfastness and weeding out the weak and the hesitant. Thus, failures should not be blamed on leaders: those who strive to apply their reasoning are rewarded even if they are wrong. “God did not burden you with the results of the work, but [what counts is] your sincerity and good preparation, and then we will, if wrong, have the reward of the hard workers, and if right we will have the reward of winners” (al-Banna, 1990, p. 98–104).

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Patience is another central value in the group’s code of identity. It doesn’t differ from perseverance, the seventh pillar of bay’a. Al-Banna explains that a member should “remain striving for the sake of his goal, no matter for how long, and no matter how long the years are. […] In our call, time is part of the treatment. The road is long. It is multi-phased, and it is full of obstacles, but it is the only way that leads to the goal” (1990, p. 281) and “there is no doubt that the final goal or the full result will not materialize until after decades” (al-Banna, 1990, p. 99). The Organizational bloc relies on al-Banna’s speech in which he urged “the enthusiastic and hasty” and “those want to pick a fruit before it is ripe” to leave the group. He explains that, before reforming the regime, members have to be “spiritually equipped with belief and conviction, intellectually [equipped] with science and culture, and physically [equipped] with athletics and exercise”. He declares that the path he set for the group “is delineated, its steps are set, its limits are set.” He assures that “it is a long road, but there is no other” (1990, p. 98). These notions that al-Banna implanted in the group’s collective identity, coupled with the group’s experience of several persecution waves (of which the hardest took place during Nasser’s era), prompted the ‘mihna narrative’. This narrative implies that the old guard, who have led the group since the mid 1990s, are a heroic generation. The sacrifices, injustice, and torture that this generation endured, in addition to their ability to rebuild the organization and maintain it under repression, implied the leadership’s superior knowledge and wisdom. In other words, the righteousness of the leaders relies notably on their ordeals and prison experiences5 . This explains why this generation inspired younger members, who are requested to fully trust their leaders. Trust implies unconditional obedience. Therefore, the old guard was keen to familiarize the younger generations with the so called ‘prison literature’ (adab al-sujun). These are memoirs accounting for the ordeals, the sufferings, and the torture. Leaders also used to share their stories of the prison years’ hardships in group meetings. Patience is also another important value reinforced by the mihna narrative. It is not only a pillar of bay’a, but it constitutes the only solution to the ordeals. It also enriches the effectiveness of the group’s gradual approach. It enhances the belief that “years, decades and centuries are worthless in the lifetime of messages and nations. What counts is that [they] remain steadfast on the path” (Al-Ghazali, cited in Kandil, 2015, p. 60). The leadership’s focus on the principles of patience, obedience, trust, loyalty and the ordeal narrative, combined with the organizational norms and structure as well as the repressive political environment, constituted the building blocks of 5

Almost all senior figures, including the former and current general Guides in the Guidance Office have been imprisoned during the 1960 s.

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the Brotherhood’s unique collective identity. This collective identity enhanced the organizational cohesion and hindered serious fragmentation during Mubarak’s era. These codes were maintained through the cultivation (tarbiyya) and the ideological identification processes. The leadership did not tolerate the violations of these standards to maintain the legitimacy of the movement’s indoctrination and identification processes, and prevent the emergence of a legitimate opposition. The violation of bay’a was punished with the tools of suspension or marginalization. We have seen how the leadership expelled dissidents who challenged these norms, for example al-Wasat group in the mid 1990s and the bloggers generation in the 2000s (see Section 4.3). During the early stage of the factional conflict in 2014, the old guard (led by Ezzat) sought to delegitimize challengers by recalling the ‘group’s constants’ formulated by al-Banna. Thereby, Ezzat’s faction evoked the pillars of al- bay’a and members’ commitment to it. Their discourse stressed on the oath’s symbolic and religious character. Members were reminded that their oath was not just a reflection of organizational commitment, but also a religious duty and a sign of members’ religious devotion. The mihna narrative was also extensively used by Ezzat’s faction since the dispersal of Raba’a.6 In sum, Ezzat’s faction sought to return to the pre-2013 configuration where the old guard was granted superiority and respect and was able to impose its will regardless of internal opposition or internal bylaws. The bylaws themselves remained inaccessible to members until 2010 (Kandil, 2015). The Organizational bloc sought to return to a pattern of relationships between leaders and ranks based on three values ‘listening, obeying, and trusting’. The disruption of ikhwanism in the aftermath of a moral shock Raba’a sit-in dispersal was a transformative event for many Islamists and MB members. The amount of violence deployed by the forces and the societal approval of violence was not only a human tragedy, but doubtlessly an “ideological tragedy” (Kandil, 2015, p. 81). Not only did the dispersal constitute a moral shock and engendered anger and indignation towards the state and the society, but it also shook the set of beliefs of several members. Indeed, especially repressive events can function as turning points. They are moral shocks, that engender emotions capable of disrupting previously established beliefs (Jasper, 2007). 6

This was evident in several articles and statements published by the Organizational bloc leaders before and after the factionalism in December 2015. For instance, the article by Ghozlan (2014) and al-Mursi’s first statement on the group’s newly launched website IkhwanSite,.(December 15, 2015) as well Ezzat’s statement on the occasion of the Raba’a commemoration in 2018. (see 6.1)

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“Everything changed after Raba’a”, is what almost everyone agreed on. While some Brothers started to doubt the strategy of the group, others doubted the internal structure and norms. The re-evaluation project ‘Vision 28’ reflected these doubts. Yet, another implicit aspect of the doubts concerned the organizational norms and code of identity. Criticizing the hierarchical structure, the dominance of the Organizational bloc, their set of ideas, and the political decisions and performance of the leadership reflected the eruption of the Brothers collective identity. Criticizing the leadership’s priorities, pointing out to the lack of accountability in high administrative bodies within the group and accusing the leadership of poor political competence starkly defies the belief in the virtuousness of leaders, their superiority in knowledge and wisdom. In other words, Kamal’s faction significantly contested ikhwanism as a code of identity. Kamal’s faction is indeed a ‘revolutionary’ current in this regard. It led to a revolt against long-standing and deeply rooted norms and principles and pushed towards reconstructing the MB’s collective identity. The principles of patience, obedience, trust and loyalty are the most contested codes of identity. If the sufferings of the old guard secured respect and superiority of knowledge for the leadership, their miscalculations and failures since 2011 as highlighted in vision 28 disrupted the belief in their wisdom. The absolute trust in the leadership was substituted by criticism and blame. While members are taught to dismiss any critical thoughts as “satanic whispers” against their leaders (Kandil, 2015), it was for the first time in the group’s history that a faction dares to draft and publish a document that openly re-evaluates the group’s performance and criticized several practices of the leadership. Kamal’s faction encouraged critical thinking, arguing that if the group does not re-evaluate its performance and admit its errors, “it will be replaced by another group that carries the message of Islam steadily. These are God’s deterministic laws in the universe” (IkhwanInfo, April 6, 2016). Although Brothers were taught not to criticize the leadership, since that would not only weaken the organization, but “also makes Islam vulnerable to enemy blows” (Kandil, 2015 p. 58), Kamal’s faction contended that the opposite was right: “Indeed, Allah will not change the condition of people until they change what they have themselves”7 (IkhwanInfo, April, 6, 2016). The trust in leaders’ virtuousness used to make them hardly accountable. After Raba’a -however- members’ trust in the leaders was disrupted. They were considered as incompetent, and not ready to acquire political power. “Many are convinced that leaders are part of the problem, and that the way they dealt with the situation reflected that they were either inexperienced, senseless, naive, or incompetent”, said a young 7

This is the Verse (3:11) in the Qur’an.

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Brother (author’s interview, April, 3, 2016). Since trust in leaders’ competence and wisdom decreased, accountability for their decisions and actions was required. Among the important critiques that were expressed in ‘Vision 28’ was the lack of accountability of leaders. “Serious accountability measures are to be applied if leaders violate the rules and regulations, or if they are incapable of carrying out their duties (Vision 28/1, 2017, p. 7). Many members and middle rank leaders hold the leadership accountable for what happened since the 2013 coup, because of mistakes that had been made during Egypt’s transition period after the 2011 Uprising, and the errors made after the July 2013 coup. The leaders even failed to predict the coup, although it was quite evident to many observers at the time. A MB member explained: “By the end of 2012, I was sure that we [the MB] are going in the wrong direction. I saw a catastrophe forthcoming. [..] But I was sure that the leadership knew and did something about it. However, I found out that they were delusional” (author’s interview, April, 3, 2016). The leadership caused the downfall of the group and undermined the gains it had accumulated throughout decades. Furthermore, many circles of younger Brothers feel betrayed by both the leadership and the regime, albeit for different reasons. If the regime ordered the massacre in Raba’a, the leadership was equally responsible for the bloodbath in Raba’a and its aftermath (al-Tellawi, 2015). A young MB member said: “The leadership led us to this situation. It was Mursi who promoted al-Sisi. The leadership made a terrible mistake when it mobilized Brothers in Raba’a, putting thousands of lives in danger. They miscalculated the situation and chose the wrong strategy. Even the choice of Raba’a al-Adawiyya square for the sit-in was wrong. Nasser City is where National Security is, and it hosts a huge number of police stations and military institutions. The residents of Nasser City are mostly families of policemen and military elites. It was not logical to organize the sit-in at such a location. This was more of a teenager’s way to handle politics. Mursi was a President not a student, he had a Parliament to rely on, he certainly had more tools. […] I don’t blame myself for being a Brother neither for participating in Raba’a. I blame Mursi and the MB leaders” (author’s interview, April 3, 2016). After Raba’a, “this leadership insisted on the inefficient strategy of peaceful protest, which caused more killings and detentions in vain” (author’s interview, March 22, 2016). Patience, which was a virtue for the group, became much less valued after 2013 (Brown and Dunne, 2015). Kamal’s faction and several MB circles were convinced that patience reflected weakness. Patience was considered the reason that the MB have always been repressible. Patience coupled with religious determinism (Kandil, 2015) -assuring that a divine intervention will bring relief and victory- was strongly questioned. A MB member denoted: “We are facing a disaster and they [the leaders] are still telling us: it’s okay, calm down, relax, be patient. Even in Raba’a, this

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has been the discourse. There is a hashtag that we [youth] use on social media called ‘mukhaderat’ [drugs]. Whenever leaders start their discourse of ‘the coup is swaying, Mursi is returning’ we would laugh and post it on Facebook using the hashtag mukhaderat. They are using these words to drug us, so we won’t use our minds” (author’s interview, April, 3, 2016). Additionally, the leader’s virtuousness which implied an image of a “saintly leadership” was also disrupted, especially when Ezzat’s faction stopped providing financial support to administrative offices supporting Kamal and to the families of detainees or martyrs who refused to follow the instructions of the leadership to enter a dormant phase (Ayyash, 2019). Although the old guard argued that the families’ fund was shut down so the money could be sent to the families through other means, these claims failed to re-build the image of the saintly leadership. Cutting off the funds for needy families to pressure their opponents engendered rage and disgust among several members.It was considered by a close observer to the MB as a turning point in the factional conflict, since members were outraged and shocked that the saintly trustworthy leaders “used the funds entrusted to them in a fight over power” (author’s interview, February 6, 2016). Similarly, in 2017, a group of young exiled Brothers, aligned with Kamal, accused the leadership of expelling them from the apartments provided by the group to its exiled members because of their political orientation. The youth taped a video on the street where they stated: “We had never imagined that Brothers who had one day inspired us and taught us virtues would expel us today from the residence. They declared us dissidents and told us that the Brotherhood was not responsible for us anymore. This happened after a discussion here in Sudan with our leaders, where we expressed our opinion concerning the alteration of power in the Brotherhood and the failures of the group since 2011”8 . A mood of suspicion dominated. Many started to believe that the old guard in Turkey was behind the deportation of a 28-yearold MB member from Turkey to Egypt, where he was sentenced to death.9 Some even suspected that the Ezzat’s faction informed on the leader of the Revolutionary current Mohamad Kamal, who was killed by the security forces in October 2016, in order to grasp power over the organization and improve the negotiation setting with the regime (al-Tellawy, 2016). 8 “Qiyadat al-ikhwan tatrod shabab al-ikhwan min manazilhum bil Sudan” (The MB leadership throws out the MB youth from their residence in Sudan). The video can be retrieved from Youtube: https://youtu.be/XUBYy8g0Vr4, last accessed on May 5, 2021. 9 See: BBC News Arabic (2019, 6 February). “Tahqiq turkey fi tarhil Mohamad Abdelhafiz min Turkiyya ila misr” (Turkish investigation’s about the deporting of Mohamad Abdelhafiz from Turkey to Egypt”, retrieved from https://www.google.co.uk/amp/s/www.bbc.com/ara bic/middleeast-47145638.amp, last accessed on May 7, 2021.

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Finally, the failures of the leadership as of 2011 engendered several emotions among dissidents, such as rage, blame, distrust, disgust, betrayal, and bitterness. These emotions disapproved previous emotions and norms established in the group, such as respect, trust, love, and affection towards the leaders. Consequently, the Brothers’ code of identity and pattern of relationship between leaders and members based on submission were no longer valid. The Revolutionary faction’s argument that “Brothers give the oath to ideas and principles, not to individuals” (Kamal, 10. May 2016), disrupted the old guard’s absolute power over the organization. A young MB member conveyed: “After all these failures, it became impossible for old leaders to inspire us or lead the group again. It is impossible to let these people decide for the group. If they get out of prison, I will go visit them and even kiss their hands. But that’s it! I don’t want to see them in leading positions again! Enough!” (author’s interview, April 3, 2016). Indeed, ikhwanism as we knew it before 2013 is disrupted and a new code of identity is being re-configured.

6.2.3

Disputing the Organization

The MB is undergoing a deep factional rift on many dimensions: the factions dispute the strategy, the organizational molding, the bylaws and the collective identity. One could understand that a group can break away to form its own organization to embody its own strategy, bylaws, and norms. Yet, the rejection of each faction to “officially” breakaway indicates that the factional battle is about whose organization it is. This battle is different from previous strategic factional conflicts, which ended in the breakaway of “radical dissidents”. It is different from the first breakaway party, “Our Master Muhammad Youth” which split under al-Banna’s leadership after a strategic discordance with al-Banna’s gradual approach (see: Section 4.1.1). It is also different from the radical breakaway groups during the prison years, which ideologically and strategically disagreed with the MB’s leadership. We are witnessing a factional battle, where factions dispute the representation of the group, the organization’s name, its logo, its slogan, and even dispute the website’s name and online address, “ikhwanonline”. Here, research in social psychology helps us understand the mechanisms of attachment and continued faithfulness to a group, especially in a repressive environment.

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The tight-knit emotional community: affective bonds in the MB Factions insisting on representing the Brotherhood’s true message and strategy is not only a matter of legitimacy or organizational power distribution. It also indicates how faithful and attached members are to the organization. The latter is not only the rules and the structure, it is a ‘comfort zone’ and a ‘home’ to many. MB members are strongly attached to their organization. The strong social ties, the tight-knit emotional network, as well as the absence of alternatives make disengagement a very hard choice. Combes and Filieulle (2011) point out that “the more individuals are caught up in a system that is the only one to distribute rewards and costs, the more they remain committed. Attachment breeds cohesion: cohesion, defined as the range of affective ties that exist between individuals, is based on the two mechanisms of renunciation and communion. Renunciation refers to a withdrawal from all social relationships outside the group. Communion designates all the ways to reinforce the feeling of belonging to a community brought together by a dialectic of unanimityexclusion. Ensuring cohesion requires means and techniques of control, ranging from the most subtle to the most extreme, such as mortification and denial. Mortification is renouncing one’s desires and interests, giving up one’s private identity to identify with a group. Denial, on the other hand, refers to unconditional dedication to an authority, and to the members’ internalization of what the group says and wants. The more exclusive the organizations, the more these mechanisms of attachment are likely to impact individuals and cause phenomena of conversion and alternation […]. Faced with the risks of infiltration, arrest, and the dismantling of activist networks, they become progressively cut off from the outside world and adopt strict codes of conduct that often leads to a state of isolation that is conducive to the construction of tight-knit emotional communities”. Indeed, MB members are ‘caught up’ in the organization. Many scholars have pointed out to the existence of strong affective ties between MB members. Kandil (2015) and al-Anani (2016) even considered that the group’s focus on the strong social ties is what makes the MB unique among other ideological movements and political parties. In fact, al-Banna has implanted the notions of renunciation and communion which Combes and Filieulle (2011) consider as important mechanisms for the creation of affective ties. Indeed, the notions of sincerity (ikhlas), perseverance and determination (thabat), devotion (tajarud), brotherhood (okhuwa), and trust (thiqa) which are the pillars of the MB bay’a (oath) reinforce the attachment to the group and its network. It creates a tight-knit emotional community. Although MB members do not withdraw from other social relationships outside the group, they are embedded in a social network that covers all issues of life. The Brotherhood constructs the private and public worlds of its members (al-Anani 2016).

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MB members are emotionally attached to the group and their community. Members are bonded to each other through dense personal networks such as friendships, marriage, and kinship ties, business partnerships that strengthen the attachment to the organization. Kandil (2015) suggests that these human bonds even compensate for the MB’s weak ideological cohesion, so that the group becomes a social rather than an ideological contract. The MB’s oath, norms and distinctive collective identity reinforce the feeling of belonging to a community. This feeling was certainly reinforced after 2013, since it was accompanied by injustice and exclusion that brought members closer together. MB members show what Combes and Filieulle (2011) define as “extreme forms of cohesion, such as mortification and denial”. In fact, the pillars of oath, which al-Banna generated, foster these “extreme” forms of affective ties toward the organization. MB members’ give the pledge to sacrifice (tadhiya), which means renouncing their own desires, interests, money and lives for the sake of the group. They are ready to die for it: “Jihad is our way, and martyrdom is our wish” (al-Banna, 1990, p. 286). They also give oath to their unconditional dedication to the group and its leadership “in hardship, and ease, in the desired and the despised” (al-Banna, 1990, p. 91). This dedication to the group is described by al Banna as “the symbol of [your] idea and the bond between you” (p. 91). Al-Banna encourages members to hold together. He calls Brothers to “love one another, and be keen on [your] bond, for it is [your] secret of strength and the backbone of [your] success” (1990, p. 91). The emotional attachment of MB members to their group and community was evident in a personal interview that I conducted with a 30-year-old MB member who joined the Raba’a sit-in on July 3 until its dispersal on August 14, 2013. He participated in the sit-in together with his siblings and mother, who are all Brotherhood members. The young activist expressed that he was “not convinced that the crisis should be managed by a sit-in”, and that he “believed that the sit-in would be dispersed violently and all of [us] killed”. Yet, it was exactly for this reason that he participated for 43 days in the sit-in: “I stayed in Raba’a because I wanted to spend some good time there. I wanted to enjoy life for a few days. I believe that seventy percent of those who stayed in Raba’a stayed for this reason. Those who really understood the situation, knew that our sit-in was hardly going to change anything: neither undermine the coup, nor mobilize the support of the international community which perceives us as militant radical Islamists. I joined the sit-in not in order to fulfill a moral obligation. It was as if my house was going to be destroyed. One can take his belongings and move to another place until his house is destroyed within a few hours or a few days. But for me it was different: if I knew that my house would be destroyed, all I would be thinking about is that I wanted to enjoy a cup of tea on this balcony for the last time,

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pray in that room for the last time, watch TV in my living room for the last time. I was going to miss my community. Not the whole Brotherhood. There are people in the Brotherhood that I don’t like. I was going to miss my “comfort zone” [he said this expression in English]. I wanted to spend time with those people before we got killed, injured, arrested, or separated. I knew that I would not see these people again” (author’s interview, April 3, 2016). This strong emotional attachment to the group seems to be absent in the interviews with other Islamists who do not adhere to the MB. Most of them had joined the sit-in or the protest that followed the dispersal for political and strategic reasons, or even out of some feeling of guilt. For instance, an Islamist explained that he participated in the sit-in “to make pressure so that negotiations take place and a certain settlement is reached, which would reduce the severity of our defeat. Thus, I was determined to stay in Raba’a as long as my presence constituted a source of pressure on the coup, and as long as the ratio of the pressure I exert, to my personal security was acceptable” (author’s interview, April 9, 2016). Although this young man left Raba’a only a few minutes before the dispersal, he deliberately drove back to the sit-in as soon as he knew from his friends that the security forces were about to disperse the sit-in. He explained that his decision to go back to the sit-in was because his friends were there, but also because of the fear of not acting according to what he perceives as righteous. “I experienced it before on January 28th (2011). I was afraid to join.[..]. I knew that if I was not in Raba’a at that moment, I would regret it for the rest of my life, like I regret not having joined demonstrations on the 28th of January.” The strong personal bonds between MB members and their emotional identification with the group, indicate how hard it is for MB members to disobey their leaders and how attached they are to their community. Challenging the set of values defining ikhwanism, not only risks the dismissal of the organization, but, more importantly, risks the loss of one’s social network, including friends and family members. When members leave the organization, they feel estranged and alienated (Kandil, 2015; al-Anani, 2016). Finally, the tight-knit emotional bond explains how hard dissent is, let alone disengagement and breakaway. The attachment to the group partially explains why members of both factions hold on to the organization and refuse to break away. Even members who are in a state of apathy as a result of the increasing factional conflict, did not necessarily disengage. Several remained in the MB, and formed a third group, distancing itself from factional battles, and maintaining members’ meetings and discussions, while upholding the strong bonds in their narrow ‘comfort zones’ of usar, (families) the smallest unit in the group (Hashem, 2016).

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Investment, sacrifice and deserve The fight about the organization reflects more than just the dense social ties and emotional attachment to the group and MB community. It reveals the amount of investment and sacrifice members engage in, from the moment they become members in the group. Sacrifice and investment, especially in a highly repressive environment, are two mechanisms that help maintain attachment to a group (Combes and Fillieule, 2011). Although MB members neither withdraw from other social relationships outside the group, nor are required to break their previous social ties (Wickham, 2002), the self-evaluation document published in April 2017, pointed out that MB members are “isolated from the outside world as a result of the focus on internal organization dynamics”. This highlights the amount that MB members invest in their activism. Furthermore, MB members do not only give a hypothetical oath to determination, devotion, and sacrifice, but they effectively endure sacrifices and investments to maintain their attachment to the group. These sacrifices ranged from imprisonment, torture, and security harassment to deprivation from certain jobs, disqualification for university examinations, exclusion or expulsion from university dorms, etc. After the dispersal of Raba’a and al Nahda sit-ins and the crackdown that followed, MB members have endured enormous sacrifices. Many lost several family members and friends in only a few hours, others experienced the suffering in prisons, those in Egypt live in constant fear of persecution, and others suffer in exile. These sacrifices make the breakaway even harder. Breaking away from the group might even seem like betraying the martyrs and prisoners and giving up on the group they have died for or suffered for. The battle over ‘whose organization it is’, is certainly influenced by the amount of investment and sacrifices members have endured; “the higher the sacrifice made to join a group and remain committed to it, the higher the cost of defection; the cost of activism, in this sense, determines its price. The more efforts have been made, the more it is difficult to admit that they have been in vain” (Combes and Fillieule, 2011). This explains why both factions are still disputing the organization, its name, its, logo, its slogan and even the website address. The conflict is about ‘whose organization this is, and who deserves to represent it’. On the one hand, the Organizational bloc, which is, -above all, interested in maintaining the organization, is pushing for going into a long period of dormancy so that the organization can absorb the shock and adapt to the new environment. The Organizational bloc leaders, have spent their lives in the group, invested in its survival and scarified it for years. They cannot endure letting it deviate from what they consider as its original ideology and strategy, nor are they ready to let enraged members destroy what they have built throughout the decades. If consultation and

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institutionalism risk the radicalization of the group and may lead to its destruction, these leaders are ready to disregard the majority’s aspirations, and use a top-down approach to enforce cohesion, pacifism, and dormancy. Their stance is quite comparable to the old guard’s stance in the 1960s who opposed the reorganization of the Brotherhood in fear of Qutb’s ideological radicalization and influence on the ranks. It was reported that prominent leader Salah Shady even threatened to inform on Organization 1965 in order to impose dormancy on the group (Ra’if, 1986; Ahsmawy, 2006). In fact, some suspected that Ezzat’s faction was behind the killing of Kamal in October 2016, and the detention of young members supporting Kamal’s faction. On the other hand, the ranks have endured sacrifices since 2013, and some believe that they deserve to shape the group and its bylaws in a way that represents their aspirations and beliefs. If the ‘historical legitimacy’ of the old guard was derived from their endurance of repression, second rank leaders and ranks have also endured a lot of sacrifices over the last years. The “dissidents” now feel that they finally deserve to take their fate into their own hands. They are not willing to break away from the group, given their investment and sacrifices. Their anger towards the regime, the society and their leaders cannot be absorbed as long as the crackdown and strategic failures remain. At the same time, the fight over the right to represent the organization shows how attached members remain to their group, and that both factions still invest a lot of effort in their group. This battle indicates that MB members internalize their oath. Indeed, as Kamal has pointed out in his statements, the oath is given to the idea of the group and its principles, not to its leadership. We have seen how each faction tried to “purify” the MB’s ideology by referring to al-Banna’s ideas, principles, and goals. Each group is trying to defend the group’s principles according to its cognition, each faction defends the organization from the ‘other’ who wants to deviate from the movement’s original goal. This investment indicates a strong affiliation to and identification with the group, but it also reveals that the more time passes, the more each faction invests in its battle over the organization, and the harder an “official” split is likely to take place.

6.3

Concluding Remarks

This chapter suggests that the factional conflict within the MB goes beyond strategic lines. It analyses the dimensions of the conflict as narrated by the contending fronts. Furthermore, it points out to the existence of microstructural dimensions in the factional battle. These dimensions are not necessarily prominent in the players’ narratives. Instead, they are mostly implicit, although they

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are the fundamental causes of contention. This means that the player’s narratives only constitute the tip of the iceberg, while the core dilemmas are predominantly hidden. Before factionalism, the online sphere was a contentious arena. Each faction published its contradictory views on the same platform. This resulted in several controversial statements, particularly concerning the group’s strategy. The factional battle escalated in May 2015. By the end of the year, two factions had formed, each assuming legitimacy and advocating for a different strategy. By June 2016, the factions had created a dual administration. Each group had its own institutions, bylaws, leaders, and supporters. The online platform became an important instrument in the conflict, especially when internal tensions escalated. Particularly between December 2015 and December 2017, the contending factions engaged in an online reciprocal ‘statements battle’. Each faction had its own website and its own spokesman, both portrayed by the two groups as the “official” representatives of the MB. The websites became an active arena for the conflict, where each faction prompted its own narrative of the conflict and responded to the contenders’ narratives. Although both groups adopted different narratives concerning the causes of schism, the narratives can be divided according to three main aspects: the strategic aspect, the legitimacy matter, and the problem of internal structure and regulations. As for the strategic aspect, the old guard portrayed the conflict as a struggle between violence and pacifism. In this respect, Kamal’s faction was portrayed as a dissenting group that has deviated from the MB’s main principles of gradualism and commitment to non-violence. Kamal’s faction contended that the strategic discord was not about violence and non-violence, but rather between stagnation and adaptation to the new repressive environment; the conflict was between an innovative revolutionary strategy, and an outdated strategy of self-restraint and dormancy. The second narrative concerned the legitimacy issue. Each faction interpreted the bylaws in a way that delegitimized its rival. For instance, the revolutionary current argued that the mandate of the Guidance Office was terminated and thus its members were no longer legitimate. Instead, the HAO was considered as an interim Guidance Office since it was directly elected from the ranks. According to this narrative, the old guard relied on its historical legitimacy and attempted to suppress grassroots aspirations, which starkly contradicts the concepts of consultation and institutionalism. The Organizational Bloc’s narrative highlighted that it still represented the “official leadership” according to the group’s Shura Council. Kamal’s faction was portrayed as a dissenting group that neither committed to its oath of allegiance,

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nor respected the decisions of the group’s institutions. It was a minor trend that attempted to impose its will on the majority and monopolize the decision-making process. Another aspect of the legitimacy dilemma concerned the activism on the ground. The revolutionary faction narrative revealed that field leaders who effectively organize the ranks in Egypt are those who represent the official leadership. The old guard were portrayed as exiled members that are disconnected from reality, and do not represent the aspirations of the ‘revolutionary youth’. In other words, the conflict was a struggle between the youth’s field legitimacy and the old guard’s historical legitimacy. The third narrative revolved around the introduction of internal amendments and carrying out comprehensive elections. Each faction represented itself as a reformer, carrying out the recommendations of al-Qaradawy’s reconciliation roadmap separately. In this respect, the Revolutionary faction engaged in fundamental revisions and self-critique and introduced a new bylaw and a new vision. It presented itself as an enlightened revolutionary innovator combating orthodox conservatives. The old guard also assured that it had carried out amendments to the bylaws and the group’s vision. Yet, it neither reviewed its political performance, nor held itself accountable for previous mistakes. Instead, it criticized the exaggerated focus of Kamal’s faction on the Egyptian case, calling for the readjustment of the group’s vision towards the Palestinian case. Yet, these narratives only revealed a part of the contention. Other implicit issues underlie the revealed aspects of the conflicts, such as cognitive frames, memories, core ideological convictions, emotions, and collective identity. In this respect, I argued that religious determinism, the ordeal narrative as well as the personal memories of repression of the 1965 generation affected the Organizational bloc’s cognitive frame of the crackdown. While the “Organizationalists” perceived the dispersal of Raba’a and its aftermath as an ordeal; the new emerging leadership; the Revolutionary bloc and several members perceived the dispersal as a transformative event. Not only did it constitute a moral shock, engendering indignation and anger directed at the regime, but also internally at the leadership. In this respect, blame, disgust, bitterness, and despair were prominent emotions. These emotions triggered the eruption of ikhwanism as a long-standing code of identity. The post-Raba’a crisis quashed trust in leaders and their ‘sanctity’, to the extent that the leaders became the focal point of the conflict in the eyes of several members. Finally, I suggested that emotional dynamics hindered the breaking away of either faction from the group. I relied on the concepts of investment and sacrifice in disengagement processes as well as the emotions of deserve and merit to explain the factions’ fight over the organization itself.

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In sum, this chapter demonstrated that the fight over maintaining the old configurations and pushing for re-configurations did not only concern internal structures, power distribution, regulations, or power balance, but also other micro-structural dimensions, particularly doctrinal heritage, cognitive frames, and collective identity. Finally, if the Revolutionary current did not effectually adopt a revolutionary strategy against the regime, it certainly succeeded in ‘making a revolution’ inside the organization and against its ultimate dominating player; the Organizational bloc.

7

Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter sums up the aim of the research, the research approach, as well as the applied methodology. It also discusses the research hypothesis and summarizes the key findings of the study. The theoretical implications of the study are also reviewed. Finally, the chapter points out to the study’s contributions and gives insight into future research needed.

7.1

Research Review

The objective of this research was to unpack the reasons behind the Muslim Brotherhood’s factionalism post-2013 and define the scope of disagreements and schism within the group. The main research questions that this study aimed to answer were: First, what are the root causes of the MB’s factionalism after 2013? How did state repression affect the process of factionalism? What effects did organizational and microstructural dynamics have on the schism? Second, what is the scope of disagreements within the MB? How did contending factions perceive and narrate the contention? What is the conflict ‘really’ about? What are the implicit or unspoken dimensions of that factionalism? These questions join the theoretical debate on social movement factionalism. In this respect, existing scholarship treats the causes of factionalism either as internal or external to the organization. Internal factors were linked to the organizational structure and internal deficits, such as the pattern of leadership, the distribution of power, the internal heterogeneity and generational conflicts and the poor conflict resolution management (Miller, 1983; Zald and Ash 1966; Gamson, 1975). External factors included state agencies, repression, allies and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 N. Aboushady, Factionalism in Social Movements, Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen Ostens, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41581-5_7

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opponents, funders, and the press (e.g. McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Polletta and Kretschmer, 2015). A third perspective contended that factionalism is a dynamic process, where both the structural (macro) and the organizational (meso) levels of analysis interact (Balser, 1997). Yet, literature did not go far enough— I argue—in capturing the interactional processes involved in factionalism, until recently when a minor emerging line of research (Bosi et al., 2014; Mishe, 2015; Poletta and Kretschmer, 2015) suggested thinking less in terms of organizational and external conditions and proposed a more interactionist approach. Although social movement studies underwent an emotional turn, introducing a number of new concepts such as moral shock, emotional management in collective action, transformative events and collective identity; these micro-dynamics, were not taken into consideration in previous analysis of factionalism. Against this background, and aiming to fill the theoretical gap in the study of social movement splits, I argued that factionalism is a process that is neither solely generated by internal organizational factors, nor a pure response to external pressures, such as repression. Instead, I contended that it is a complex process of interaction between the macro- (structural), the meso- (organizational) and the micro- (individual) levels of analysis. This interactionist approach allowed the integration of the micro-level of analysis, which has been neglected by previous research. I also adopted the re-configurational approach, which highlights the interdependencies between actors and groups as well as the resulting constant re-configuration and reinterpretation of power relations in political, social, and cultural arenas (Ouaissa et al., 2021). Given the recency of the topic and the dynamism of the process, the study was based on a combination of primary sources in Arabic: website statements, organizational documents, and MB leaders’ memoirs. The study was also supported by in-depth interviews that I conducted with young Islamists between April and December 2016, one expert interview with a researcher on Islamism and a previous MB member, as well as some broadcast leaders’ interviews. In addition, I referred to a number of reports that accounted for the chronological unfolding of the factional conflict, as well as to the few academic studies on the topic, that started to emerge by 2016–2017. In terms of methodology, this study extended beyond content analysis to include an ethnographic analysis of the virtual arena. For four consecutive years (from 2015 to 2018), I consulted on a daily basis the two official websites of each faction “Ikhwanonline.info” and “Ikhwan.site”, which was replaced by “Ikhwanonline.com” as of Autumn 2016. These daily visits to the websites enabled me to analyze the narrative of the contention produced by the two factions and to observe the interaction between them in the online sphere. While

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some observers and researchers reproduced the narrative of the Organizational bloc, describing the contention as a split between a violent and a non-violent group, or fell for the Revolutionary bloc’s narrative portraying the conflict as a bifurcation between the youth and the elders, my methodology allowed me to observe both narratives and re-construct the existing narrative of the factionalism. In fact, the analysis of the different statements and narratives produced by the two factions exposed the multilayered aspects of the conflict. It thus offered evidence that the conflict goes beyond the simple dichotomies of moderate/violent, and young/old stipulated by the existing research.

7.2

Hypothesis: Discussion and Results

Since I rely on an interactionist approach, it is not possible to discuss each hypothesis separately, as the dimensions are interrelated. Therefore, I will divide the findings into two parts, each answering a research question.

7.2.1

The Causes of Factionalism

The first research question focused on the root causes of factionalism after 2013. Given, that factionalism in the MB occurred after the state’s crackdown on the group, I considered repression as a starting point in the interactionist approach. In this respect I hypothesized that first, the MB’s organizational dynamics (molding and regulations) are determinant causes of factionalism. In this respect, the MB reveals—besides other organizational dynamics—multidimensional disparities between its members and has a history of unresolved conflicts, which makes it prone to factional conflicts (hypothesis 1). Second, the scale and degree of state repression against the Brotherhood are related to the severity of internal schisms and the propensity for factionalism. A moderate level of repression helps MB members to hold together, through emotional identification, injustice frames, victimization, etc. Meanwhile, a high level of repression directly challenges the organizational setup, and sparks diverse emotions and responses in individuals, leading to divisions along strategic lines (hypothesis 2). The findings of this study approved the first hypothesis. Indeed, the MB’s internal structure was “already” factionalized before 2013, given that the group was heterogeneous; it revealed well-defined conscious wings and generations, as well as several political, religious, and intellectual trends. Furthermore, the group did not address controversial issues that divided its members. Hence, repression

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post-2013 brought old conflicts (in addition to new challenges) back to the fore. I illustrated that the group was divergent and divided along many lines: generational, intellectual, religious, and socio-economic. These tendencies were shaped in a turbulent political environment, which led to the swift production of several discontinuous waves of new movement generations, and tendencies within the group. In addition, to the heterogeneity of internal movement players, I pointed out in the study, that the MB had a poor conflict resolution management and relied on the top-down approach to quell any dissent, instead of engaging in negotiations and genuine reform. This was evident throughout its history, and resulted in the existence of several unresolved matters. There is also historical evidence that repression brought these old conflicts to the fore. For example, the study pointed out that the matter of internal reform and democratization, as well as the scope of activism of the group and how it defined itself (political party or social organization), were never resolved since the 1930s, and came back to the fore several times throughout the years, in 1939, 1953, 1996, 2005–2007 and 2011–2012. In the factional conflict post-2013, the internal reform issue was central for the dissidents. In this respect, the newly formed “Revolutionary faction” adopted the agenda of previous reformists. It particularly addressed the institutional shortcomings, the dominance of the executive body the Guidance Office, the limited role of the legislative body the Shura Council, the lack of accountability and the marginalization of youth and women. It also reformed the internal bylaws and introduced new regulations enhancing internal transparency and democratization of the group. The Revolutionary group also addressed the matter of the separation between the political party and the group and criticized the submission of the groupcreated Freedom and Justice party to the group during the year 2012–13, considering its poor performance as a cause for the downfall of the MB. This does not mean that the post-2013 factionalism was only about old conflicts. The study illustrated that repression also prompted new challenges that paved the way for factionalism. This leads us to the second hypothesis, about the effect of repression on factionalism. The second hypothesis suggested that the level and scale of state repression against the MB determine the severity of internal schism and the propensity for factionalism along strategic lines. The findings of the study verified the second hypothesis. Indeed, the study illustrated that the group was able to maintain its coherence under a moderate level of repression. Before 2013, repression reinforced MB’s cohesion through emotional identification, injustice frames, victimization, etc. and enabled the leadership to assert control over its members and to enforce organizational coherence.

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In addition, the MB’s ability to adapt and navigate to the ever shifting “red lines” set by the regime, allowed the maintenance of the group, and the resilience of repression. The internal power balance, even though it was starkly in favor of the Organizational bloc, kept the group’s unity intact. This bloc was reinforced during times of shrinking political opportunities. The Organizational bloc’s strategy of self-restraint and caution allowed the group to survive hard times, and even to diffuse and increase its “societal legitimacy” thanks to its social and religious activities. Internally, the group boosted members’ affective ties, commitment, and group identification through recalling the ordeal (mihna) and victimhood narratives, as well as notions of endurance, patience and other important values defining the group’s collective identity; ikhwanism. Dissidents were expelled, punished or marginalized to maintain the legitimacy of the group’s collective identity and unity. Yet, the high scale of repression post-2013 prompted new challenges and triggered a re-configuration of the group’s internal arena, paving the way for factionalism. In this respect, the findings provided evidence that repression affected the internal movement arena “directly”, by placing leaders behind bars and forcing the movement to go underground. The group attempted to adapt to the new challenges, by introducing a new strategic and tactical plan, based—in its first phases—on the mobilization of anti-coup protestors, and in a last decisive phase on carrying out “special operations” to overthrow the regime. It also implemented several transformations in the organizational structure to adapt to the new circumstances; new committees were created while others were combined or dissolved. The downsizing of the organization aimed at keeping the organization intact after it had gone underground, and to assert control over its members. Yet, the group’s efforts failed. Neither did it succeed in undermining the regime nor did it assert control over its members. I explained the failure of the group’s adaptation attempts to repression, by integrating the micro level of analysis. In fact, the MB’s failure to challenge the regime, coupled with an ongoing wave of state repression against MB members, engendered several emotions among members, ranging from burnout, apathy, and disillusionment to anger and indignation. Some members defected, others joined established Jihadi groups, while others formed their own militant groups, adopting “smart violence”. In addition, I argued that repression drastically disrupted the internal set-up of the group, by triggering the emergence of new internal players within the movement. I suggested that that repression triggered the forging of a new generation; “Raba’a Youth”, which assembled a new generation of field leaders adopting a non-compromising stance against the regime. This generation acquired support among several members, particularly among those who were

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disenchanted by the old leadership’s strategic failures after the coup. Furthermore, multiple power centers forged inside and outside Egypt often overlapped in their functions and competed over resources. These new players re-configured the internal map of alliances within the group and destabilized the long-held internal power balance previously favoring the Organizational bloc. Furthermore, the study approved that repression engenders debates about the group’s strategy. The historical account of schisms within the MB as well as the analysis of the escalation of factionalism after 2013 confirmed that severe repression created different responses in individuals. While some tend to adapt and restrain their activism, others are inclined towards confrontation and challenge, leading to severe factionalism since coherence becomes at risk. This is due to the organization’s communication chains being interrupted, and the leadership finding it harder to assert control over its membership. This was the case in 1949, 1954, and the 1960s. The study illustrated, that the high level of repression post-2013 created different emotions and responses in individuals. While some tended to restrain their activism, others were inclined towards confrontation and challenge, leading to divisions along strategic lines. After the 2013 crackdown, a faction within the leadership—supported by the “Raba’a Youth” generation—aimed at stretching the definition of MB’s strategy of “peaceful social change” to include more assertive and effective tactics. This did not reflect an ideological transformation, as much as it was a strategic means in the first place to assert control over the disenchanted ranks. By the end of 2015, the leadership was divided along strategic lines. Conflict arose about the definition of pacifism as well as the strategy relevant to the new phase. A “Revolutionary faction” argued that the group should adopt a more assertive stance in order to assert control over its ranks. The other faction, the Organizational bloc, believed that any escalation against the state puts the organization’s survival at stake. The Organizational bloc’s attempt to enforce cohesion through its top-down approach led to further escalation of the conflict and caused the group’s split on all administrative levels; from the highest administrative level to the smallest administrative one “division”. By 2016, the group was factionalized and continued to drift further apart.

7.2.2

The Scope of Factionalism

As for the second research question, which focused on the scope of factionalism, I suggested that the conflict goes beyond strategic lines and is focused on

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institutional arrangements and internal reform (hypothesis 3), and that the factual conflict goes beyond the declared causes of fissions. Emotions, cognitive frames, and a re-negotiation of collective codes of identity underlie factionalism and constitute its hidden, yet core, dimension (hypothesis 4). The findings of the study asserted the fourth hypothesis. Indeed, the conflict flared up because of the strategic dilemma. Yet more dimensions were added to the conflict making the scene more complex: the tools and methods that manage the organization, and the dilemma of legitimacy. As for the strategic aspect, the Organizational bloc’s narrative portrayed the conflict as a struggle between violence and pacifism. The Revolutionary bloc’s narrative portrayed it as a conflict between stagnation and adaptation to the new repressive environment. An important finding of the study is also that the divisions along strategic lines were not as major as they seemed at first sight and were not the main reasons behind the conflict. While both groups remained, more or less, ideologically committed to non-violence, the first faction can be considered as representative of “revolutionary” ideas, while the second group reflects “organizationalist” ideas of caution and self-restraint. Neither the leadership’s top-down approach, nor the notions of patience, endurance, victimhood, and the ordeal narrative—which have always been used to undermine dissidents—were able to appease enraged members or reduce divisions. Although repression triggered strategic and tactical divisions in the beginning, the conflict soon focused on the organization itself. These findings approved the third hypothesis, which suggested that the conflict opened the door for increased doubts among some members on the efficiency of the long-standing intact institutional arrangements and collective identity, which were thought to achieve the desired goals of stability and cohesion. When these goals became the subject of intraorganizational conflict, the search for the cause of and the solution to the conflict became focused inward on the organization itself, putting the organizational arrangements and the collective identity at stake. Indeed, the research has proved that the conflict was a dissent against the Organizational bloc, its set of beliefs, priorities, and cognitive frames. These critics were explicitly expressed in the “self-evaluation” document published by the Revolutionary bloc, namely “Vision 28”. The Revolutionary bloc criticized the Organizational bloc for making the maintenance of the organization a goal in itself. This goal became a barrier in the path of the group, and only led to more stagnation. It was the Organizational bloc’s political miscalculations and stagnation that were considered the reasons for the group’s downfall. It was also the organizational structures, bylaws and the submissive collective identity that

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allowed the Organizationalists to take over and decide unilaterally over the fate of the group and its members. Finally, the fourth hypothesis, suggesting that the conflict goes beyond the declared narratives of the contention, was proved to be relevant. I showed that the factions’ narratives about the contention, although they expose several aspects of the internal disagreements, only reveal a limited scope of the “real” reasons for factionalism. There are implicit dimensions of the conflict that can be read between the lines. In this respect, I illustrated how the contending factions were “implicitly” negotiating and re-negotiating the group’s collective identity. Although the Revolutionary bloc did not oppose the collective identity explicitly, it starkly challenged it by blaming and criticizing its leaders who were previously considered “sacred”. The Revolutionary bloc’s argument that MB members are only committed to their oath of allegiance (bay’a) towards the ideas, and not the leaders of the group, certainly defies one of the core principles shaping ikhwanism; that is obedience and trust in the virtuousness of the leaders. Similarly, the implications of “religious determinism”, and the ordeal doctrine were disputed. While the old guard perceived the dispersal of Raba’a and its aftermath as an ordeal; the new emerging leadership and several members perceived the dispersal as a transformative event, that should be reflected in the group’s strategies and regulations. The crackdown, did not only constitute a moral shock, engendering indignation and anger directed at the regime but also at the leadership and inwards on the organizational structure itself. In this respect, blame, bitterness, and despair were prominent emotions. In other words, the factional battle revealed the efforts of two contending factions to maintain and re-configure the group’s cognitive frames and codes of collective identity. While the “Organizationalists” seek to maintain the core ideology of the group, “religious determinism” and its collective identity, “ikhwanism”; the “Revolutionists” seek to renegotiate the meaning of those concepts and their implications. Finally, the study suggested that the holding of both factions to their legitimacy, to the name of the group, and even to the name of the group’s website, reveals another hidden aspect of conflict: the fight over the organization itself, which can only be explained by integrating the emotional dimension of political engagement. In this respect, I argued that the contending factions’ dispute over the organization is derived from emotions such as merit, and can only be explained by integrating the micro dynamics of activism and defection into the analysis, particularly the concepts of investment and sacrifice.

7.3 Key Findings: Sum up

7.3

207

Key Findings: Sum up

This research unpacked the reasons of the Muslim Brotherhood’s factionalism post-2013 and defined the scope of disagreements within the group, by applying an interactionist approach to factionalism. Such an approach analyzes the interplay between the macro-, meso-, and micro-levels of analysis. Repression was considered the starting point of that interaction. The research reconstructed the narrative of MB factionalism post-2013, and included the unspoken microstructural dimensions of the factional process, thereby proposing a more comprehensive narrative for the factional conflict. The key findings of the study illustrated the following: First, repression triggered factionalism in two ways: it reconfigured the internal arena’s players and their configuration, and sparked divisions along strategic lines. This means that repression affected the organization’s internal arena “directly”, by creating gaps in leadership positions or forcing it underground (macro-meso dimension), and “indirectly” by re-shaping its internal players and their beliefs and provoking certain emotions in them, leading to different responses to repression, and thus to different strategic stances, which ultimately paved the way for factionalism (macro-micro dimension). The re-configuration of players coupled with the strategic dilemma led to the disruption of the long-held internal configuration of players: old alliances were disrupted, and new alliances were built. The new alliances represented the remnants of the Organizational bloc, and the newly shaped alliance of “revolutionary” leaders, mainly of mid-ranking cadres, supported by younger leaders of the “Raba’a generation”. While the Organizational bloc tried to maintain the existing configuration, through their domination and strategy of self-restraint and dormancy, the revolutionary faction sought to restore the power balance, and push for an “innovative revolutionary” strategy. This interplay paved the way for factionalism. While the disaccord about the definition of peaceful social change triggered the conflict, it was the top-down approach of the “Organizationalists” in dealing with the conflict that led to the escalation of such conflict. Second, the first observable division concerned the strategy and the definition of peaceful social change. The Organizational bloc maintained its commitment to non-violence, patience and endurance, while the Revolutionary bloc sought to stretch the definition of pacifism, and advocated for an innovative revolutionary strategy. Yet, it is important to note that we cannot talk about a radicalization here. The discourse against the regime escalated, notions of jihad, and the legitimate right of self-defense were recalled, but radicalization on the ground cannot be proved with certainty and even if it existed, it was not sustained.

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Third, although the strategic divisions triggered the eruption of factionalism, the conflict extended beyond that. The two factions disputed the legitimate representation of the group and produced different narratives in this regard. The Organizational bloc claimed its legitimacy based on the members’ commitment to their oath of allegiance and respect of the “constants” of the group. The Revolutionary bloc evoked its legitimacy given its representation of the ranks (through elections) and its activism on the ground. In other words, the contention was portrayed by the Revolutionary faction as a contention between field leaders vs. historical leaders, and institutional legitimacy vs. historical legitimacy. Fourth, in addition to the disputed strategy and legitimacy, the conflict was focused inward on the organization itself. Internal reform, revision, revaluation, and self-critique were important aspects in the contention. The Revolutionary faction engaged in a serious process of self-critique and internal reform. The Revolutionary faction led an internal revolt: not only did it carry out serious internal reforms for the first time in the group’s history, but it also contested the group’s collective identity in many ways. Challenging the historical leadership, and blaming them for the failures of the group, shook ikhwanism, which was based on submission, obedience and trust. It terminated the deification of leaders and their “sanctity”, to the extent that the leaders became the focal point of the conflict in the eyes of many of the group’s members. This means that repression engendered emotions (anger, indignation and blame) that were directed at the regime, and reflected in the strategic dilemma. Yet, these emotions of anger and blame soon shifted towards the group’s leadership that was considered as the reason for failure. Hence, repression disrupted the long-standing collective identity of ikhwanism. Fifth, the findings of this study assert that the factional conflict within the MB is deeper than it might seem. The conflict about the strategy, the legitimacy and the organizational structure and bylaws, only reveal the tip of the iceberg. Underneath are the hidden fundamentals of the conflict. The conflict is not only about power relations, power distribution or organizational structure, it exposes a renegotiation of the collective identity (ikhwanism), long-held narratives (ordeal and victimhood), and the logics of empowerment and cognitive orientations (religious determinism, patience, and endurance). Sixth, emotional dynamics hindered the breaking away of either faction from the group: both factions have invested in their activism and endured many sacrifices. If the factionalism exposed the disparities between members, it also revealed the strong group identification of MB members. Neither of the two factions can easily “give up” on the organization. The Organizational bloc cannot “risk” the maintenance of the organization, which is considered a goal in

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itself, and the Revolutionary bloc wants to finally take its fate into its own hands after having endured the cost and—at the same time—the “capital” of leadership: distress, suffering and persecution.

7.4

Theoretical Impications

This section gives a brief overview of the key findings of the study in terms of their relationship to previous theoretical research. The study confirmed that the internal movement arena is not static, and that players are constantly interacting. They shape and reshape the configuration of the group’s arena through their interactions. It also provided evidence that internal players usually operate in “alliances”, which are always shifting; “appearing, merging, splitting, going through dormant periods, disappearing altogether, growing, shrinking, changing names and purposes” (Jasper, 2015). It also approved recent studies on the MENA region adopting a re-configurational approach, defining re-configuration as a process of both conflictual and cooperative interactions seeking to re-establish or uphold the “old order” (Ouaissa et al., 2021). A key finding of the study is that individual responses to repression are uneven. This can be explained by the complex social psychological process, in which an individual’s social identity, cognition, and emotions interact to shape one’s motivation, and thus collective action (Klandermans, 2007). It also approves Goodwin and Jasper’s (2006) analysis according to which moral emotions, such as blame and moral shocks, are crucial to collective action. Blame for instance can engender indignation, which enhances action, if people believe that the suffering could have been avoided by an individual or group. However, if suffering is framed as an act of God or nature, people are more likely to become sad, which is hardly a mobilizing mood. In this respect, the study provided empirical evidence of how central the emotion of blame is in the MB’s factionalism. Recalling the narrative of ordeal, which implied that the crackdown is an act from God, and the belief in religious determinism, which implied God’s victory to the pious, explains why the old guard has not been affected by the crackdown, as the other younger members have. It explains the old guard’s non-violent strategy and their non-apologetic attitude towards the failures of the group post-2011. As for the repression-dissent nexus, the study confirmed previous suggestions (Miller 1983; Balser 1997; al-Anani, 2019) postulating that the scale and level of repression affect factionalism. It showed that the degree of repression affects

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the internal cohesion of a group. A low level of repression might help organizations to hold together by increasing solidarity and emotional identification among members who share “the burden” of repression. Yet, beyond a certain level of repression, movements can factionalize. The findings also provided evidence that severe state repression increases the propensity of factionalism, since it engenders moral shocks, which are often transformative events that disrupt the individual’s previous beliefs. This study echoes scholars’ hypotheses about repression’s effect on groups’ tactical choices: it approved Hafez’s (2003) suggestion that non-discriminate repression of Islamists provided more accuracy to violent tactics, since it provides empirical evidence that activism through constitutional channels is irrelevant. Similarly, it supports Lichbach’s (1987) and Asal et al. (2012) propositions implying that non-violent groups may approve tactical violence as a response to increasing state repression, and that such strategic change triggers conflict among group members. Internal disagreement over organizational strategies and tactics in response to state repression is usually a reason for serious internal debates, which increases the possibility of splintering. Yet this study also contended that confrontational tactics might be carried out or backed up by leaders to appease enraged members and avoid their defection. The findings of this research approved Mische’s (2015) hypothesis about the scope of factionalism: factions do not only dispute leadership styles, organizational power, local “rules of the game”, access to resources, action plans, strategies, and coalitional tactics but also dispute deeper symbolic meanings and practices of political values. Similarly, the study supported Polletta and Kretschmer’s (2015) assumption that factional battles “are so often about something else.” It also showed that factional battles unfold in different ways, as Balser (1997), and Polletta and Kretschmer’s (2015) contended. The study demonstrated that a factional conflict does not necessarily lead to the group’s decline, but it can also prompt internal reforms, refine the group’s agenda, and address unresolved conflicts; it might also lead to an “official” split or, as it is the case with the MB, to the emerging of “double” organizations. The case of the MB factionalism post-2013 disapproved the suggestion that outbidding, escalation and repression lead to radicalization (De Fazio, 2014). The MB remained, despite the existence of these three aspects, committed to nonviolence. The discussions concerning the definition of violence and pacifism, and the forging of new militant groups revealed more of an immediate backlash than a long-term radicalization process.

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Finally, the study demonstrated that the most heterogeneous and internally factionalized movements can maintain their cohesion as long as they have a shared sense of collective identity and a strong group identification. Yet, when collective identity is questioned, factionalism might occur. It also showed that internal players in contentious social movement arenas are not solely ideologic, or solely strategic, they are also “emotional”. Factional disputes may take place over leadership matters, strategies, ideological divisions, but they may also be over micro-dynamics and loaded with emotions while being exposed as strategic, ideological, or power-related. It is only by integrating the micro-dynamics into the analysis of factionalism that we can develop a better understanding of what factional conflicts are “really” about.

7.5

Contributions and Suggestions

This section, sums up the study’s contributions to filling the gap in the existing literature on factionalism and on MB factionalism post-2013. It ends with insights on further research needed and a short update on the recent MB factionalism. This study contributed to the existing research on the Muslim Brotherhood in several ways. First, it provided a comprehensive overview of the internal schisms throughout the history of the MB, analyzing them in view of state repression. Second, this study contributed to the emerging research on the MB’s factionalism post-2013, which remains very limited and needs further investigation. Most importantly, this study re-constructed the existing narrative of factional conflict within the MB. The study proposes an analysis of the conflict that goes beyond the simple dichotomies of moderate/violent, and young/old stipulated by the few existing analysis on the matter. Instead, the research demonstrated that the conflict is between the Organizational bloc which has dominated the MB since the 1990s, and a newly formed “Revolutionary” trend, which did not effectively adopt an “innovative revolutionary strategy” against the regime, yet certainly succeeded in ‘making revolution’ inside the organization. While the Organizational bloc seeks to maintain the old configuration of the internal movement arena, the Revolutionary bloc is pushing for re-configurations. The scope of the conflict does not only include strategic choices, internal structures, power distribution, and regulations but also other micro-structural dimensions, particularly the re-interpretation of cognitive frames (religious determinism) and collective identity (ikhwanism). Finally, I suggested that emotional dynamics hindered the breaking away of either faction from the group, leading both to dispute the organization itself. In this sense, the factionalism is less of

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an ideological or strategic conflict than it may appear. The best evidence that the conflict is less about a strategy or an ideological discord, as much as it is an internal revolt against the domination of the “Organizationalists” on the movement, is that after the establishment of two groups, the “Revolutionary bloc” did not engage in violent activities. Instead, the focus was directed inward on the organization itself: the “Revolutionary bloc” thus engaged in a comprehensive and serious re-organization of the internal structure. A new vision and new bylaws were molded after a process of self-critique and revisions. The new organizational structure and regulations seek to avoid the domination of a current on the group’s leadership, limit or counterbalance the Guidance Office and the General Guide’s powers, and ensure more accountability of leaders. On the theoretical level, this research contributed to filling the key shortcoming in the existing literature on movements’ and groups’ factionalism, first by contributing to the relatively scant literature on the repression-dissent nexus. It helps understand the puzzling outcome of repression on intragroup dissent and to answer the question: “why does repression sometimes lead to group solidarity and in other times to dissent?” While literature often makes an analytical distinction between the levels of analysis: structural (macro), organizational (meso), and individual (micro), this study proposed a multilevel interactionalist approach linking between macro-, meso-, and micro-aspects of analysis of the complex process of factionalism. The findings of the study provided evidence that factionalism’s root causes, as well as the effect of repression on movement factionalism, can only be fully explained by applying an approach that takes into account the interaction between the macro, meso and micro factors. This work also proposed the integration of the micro aspect of analysis, not only in the analysis of social movement splits, but also in the shaping of the conflict itself and its scope and severity. By including the micro aspect of analysis, it re-introduced the concept of factionalism, as a complex interaction between macro-, meso- and micro-levels of analysis. It also concluded that the scope of factional battles is not necessarily purely strategic, ideological, or power-related but also includes collective identities, cognitive frames, and emotions. Finally, based on the key findings of the research, I suggest a new approach to the study of factional conflicts within social movements and groups. According to this, I suggest that: Factionalism is a complex process of interactions between the macro- (environmental), meso- (organizational), and micro- (individual) structural dimensions of a social movement organization. The scope and severity of factional conflicts are defined by the aspects that contending movement factions seek to maintain or restore. These aspects can include any of the following: (1) the group’s ideology and objectives, (2) the relationship between

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the movement and the society (means of collective action, strategies) (3) the internal organizational dynamics regulating the relationship between the organization and its members (membership and affiliation rules, structure of incentives) (4) the relationship between the components of the organization itself, such as organizational structure, organizational roles, power relations, hierarchy, patterns of leadership, regulations). (5) the collective identity (subculture, norms, values, cognitive frames). Factions can dispute one of the aspects or all of them. This defines the scope of the rift. This model needs further investigation to prove its validity. MB’s factionalism after 2013 will certainly have far-reaching effects not only on the MB, which is undergoing a serious re-configuration of its internal organizational structure and its unique collective identity, but also on the Egyptian political and socio-economic sphere, and on the Islamist movement in Egypt as well as in other countries. These aspects need to be examined in further research. • Further research addressing the MB’s internal factionalism is needed. The merging of the spatial dimension as an analytical axis might be very interesting for future research. Including the spatial aspect in the analysis of the MB’s factionalism might enrich the findings of this study. Future research can elaborate on how internal players enduring different experiences and challenges in different countries develop. Will Brothers in Turkey develop differently than Brothers in Sudan, Qatar or Europe? How will the diffusion of members in various countries influence the harmony and cohesion of the group? • Research addressing intra-movement competition dynamics is needed. Certainly, the MB’s downfall in the aftermath of a coup gave credibility to militant Islamist ideas, which reject democracy and activism through constitutional channels. Elections and the reliance on people’s will proved to be vulnerable. To what extent, do militant Islamists benefit from the gap left due to the MB’s disarray and investment in internal conflict? • Further research is needed to analyze the effect of the Egyptian MB’s factionalism on other MB branches in the MENA region. Does the factionalism of the “mother-organization” in Egypt pose a challenge to other groups or does it constitute new opportunities, especially in shaping the movement’s ideas, given that the “guardianship” of the mother-organization has diminished? To what extent does the Egyptian MB’s case present lessons to other Islamists, or encourage them to engage in internal reform prophylactically? • Further research is needed regarding the political implications of MB factionalism on the political scene in Egypt. The MB has always been the strongest

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political opposition actor in Egypt, and an important political force in the revolutionary movement. MB’s investment in internal conflicts left Egypt without any organized political opposition. This is reflected in the absence of all forms of collective action. • It is also interesting to investigate how the regime addressed the gap left by the MB in regard to the socio-economic services it had previously provided for the poor and marginalized sectors of the Egyptian society. Without any doubt, the organization is witnessing an exceptional historical moment of unprecedented state repression and a reconfiguration of both the internal organizational structure as well as its code of identity. This process of reconfiguration, which has not been terminated yet, is expected to influence and shape not only the future of the Brotherhood itself, but also that of the Islamic movement as a whole. Until the drafting of these lines, the Brotherhood is still divided, and the state crackdown on the movement is maintained. The MB does not exist on the ground in Egypt anymore. Its members went underground, and all remaining Guidance Office members in Egypt, were either killed or arrested, including Ezzat, who was arrested in August 2020. Ezzat’s detention paved the way for another round of reconfigurations. London-based Munir (84 years old) became the head of the group and introduced new organizational transformations. It seems that he seeks reconciliation with both the regime and the Revolutionary faction. Yet, the future of the MB remains uncertain, especially due to the absence of the heroic generation of the “old guard” due to death or imprisonment, the insufficient cultivation of the MB’s new generations due to the crackdown, the disruption of the MB’s code of identity, and the fragmentation of the group. Last but not least, MB’s factionalism and reconfigurations will undoubtedly have an impact on the future of the group and the Islamic movement as a whole.

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