Extended Axiomatic Linguistics 9783110810141, 9783110160864

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Extended Axiomatic Linguistics

W G DE

Trends in Linguistics Studies and Monographs 111

Editor

Werner Winter

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin • New York

Extended Axiomatic Linguistics

by

James Dickins

Mouton de Gruyter Berlin · New York

1998

Mouton de Gruyter (formerly Mouton, The Hague) is a Division of Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin.

© Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.

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Dickins, J. (James) Extended axiomatic linguistics / by James Dickins. p. cm. - (Trends in linguistics. Studies and monographs ; 111) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 3-11-016086-2 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Linguistics-Philosophy. 2. Functionalism (Linguistics) 3. Semiotics. 4. Semantics. 5. Linguistic analysis (Linguistics) I. Title. II. Series. P121.D45 1998 401 - d c 2 1 98-23957 CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek —

Cataloging-in-Publication-Data

Dickins, James: Extended axiomatic linguistics / by James Dickins. - Berlin ; New York : Mouton de Gruyter, 1998 (Trends in linguistics : Studies and monographs ; 111) ISBN 3-11-016086-2

© Copyright 1998 by Walter de Gruyter G m b H & Co., D-10785 Berlin All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Printing: Werner Hildebrand, Berlin. Binding: Lüderitz & Bauer, Berlin. Printed in Germany.

To Janet, Alistair and Sarah

Acknowledgements

Numerous people have helped me in the writing of this book. Barry Heselwood, in particular, has read drafts of much of the book, commented at length on numerous issues, and provided expert guidance especially in questions relating to phonetics and phonology. Prof. Werner Winter has read two drafts of the book and his comments have led to a greatly improved final version. My thanks are also due to Ronak Husni for answering various questions relating to Standard and Classical Arabic, to Andy Jones for explaining a number of matters concerning the natural sciences, and to Ann Taormina for checking Dutch examples. My wife, Janet Watson, deserves special thanks not only for reading a complete draft of the book and making many useful comments, but also for giving me time to complete the project, especially during the final stages. Finally, the debt which I owe to Michael Lamb should be apparent throughout the book. Any misinterpretations of his ideas, and any mistakes more generally, are my responsibility alone. I am also grateful to the University of Durham for granting me research leave for Epiphany Term 1995, during which I was able to give my concentrated attention to this project, and for providing a publications subvention of £1000 for the book. The author and publishers would like to thank the copyright holders for permission to reproduce extracts from the following: Monty Python's Flying Circus (p. 295, also p. 272): by permission of Python (Monty) Pictures Ltd. T.S. Eliot's "The Hippopotamus" (p. 332): by permission of Harcourt, Brace & Co. (for the United States of America) and Faber and Faber (for the rest of the world); Dorothy Parker's "Ninon de Lenclos, on her last birthday" (p. 334): by permission of Penguin Putnam Inc. (for the United States of America and Canada) and Gerald Duckworth & Co.Ltd. (for the rest of the world).

Contents

Acknowledgements List of figures Chapter One: Introduction: the general context 1.1 The scope of this book 1.2 Semiotics 1.2.1 Wide-scope vs. narrow-scope semiotics 1.2.2 Semiotic systems as systems of conventions for communication 1.2.3 Index and signum 1.3 Semiotics and linguistics 1.4 Psychological vs. sociological vs. pure-systematic approaches 1.5 Relativism vs. universalism

vii xii 1 1 5 6 6 13 16 18 27

Chapter Two: Standard axiomatic functionalism 35 2.1 On the nature of theory 35 2.1.1 Scientific theories as worst-case theories 39 2.1.2 Interfaceability 41 2.1.3 Theoretical and descriptive simplicity 42 2.2 Standard axiomatic functionalism: basic components 46 2.2.1 The ontology of standard axiomatic functionalism 46 2.2.2 The semantics of standard axiomatic functionalism 53 2.2.3 The systemology of standard axiomatic functionalism 56 2.3 Realisational aspects of standard axiomatic functionalism 81 2.3.1 Types of allophony and allomorphy in standard axiomatic functionalism 81 2.3.2 Allophonic and allomorphic amalgamation 86 2.3.3 Allophonic and allomorphic splitting 89 2.4 Incomplete neutralization and imperfect homonymy 90 2.5 Hervey's strategy of language 98 2.6 Modified standard axiomatic functionalism 100 2.6.1 A proposed framework for semantic protocolisation 103 2.7 Nuance and imperfect synonymy 117 Chapter Three: Extended axiomatic functionalism 126 3.1 Extended axiomatic functionalism: basic components 126 3.1.1 The signum ontology of extended axiomatic functionalism 128

X

Contents

3.1.2 The system ontology of extended axiomatic functionalism 3.2 An assessment of the terminology of extended axiomatic functionalism

138 150

Chapter Four: Signum-ontological implications 4.1 Free allomorphy 4.2 Al lodely/pol y dely 4.3 Allosemy/polysemy 4.3.1 In defence of polysemy 4.3.2 Free allosemy: allosemy vs. homonymy 4.3.3 Free allosemy and everyday metalanguage 4.3.4 Free allosemy: allosemy vs. allosemony 4.3.5 Contextually determined allosemy 4.3.6 Allosemic amalgamation 4.3.7 Idiom 4.3.8 Proverbs 4.3.9 A worst-assessment defence of polysemy 4.4 Allosemony and allomorphony: theoretical and descriptive parallels

169 169 178 183 185 187 195 198 225 227 241 244 247

Chapter Five: Canonicality and figures of speech 5.1 Canonicality 5.2 Literal and figurative language 5.3 Metaphor 5.3.1 Dead metaphor 5.3.2 Live metaphor 5.4 Simile 5.5 Non-purportive figures of speech: irony, hyperbole and understatement 5.6 Euphemism 5.7 Figurative language: an overview

253 253 258 258 258 261 292

Chapter Six: Wider implications 6.1 Canonicality, prototypicality and the core-1 i η gui sti cs~~psy choli ng ui sti cs interface 6.2 Figures of speech as potential linguistic universals 6.3 Types of connotation 6.4 Metaphor understanding and interpretive pragmatics

251

296 300 303 310 310 316 318 320

Contents

6.5

xi

Connotational context and the multiple conventionality of metaphor From figures of speech to figures of attitude The core-linguistics-text-linguistics interface Lexological implications Conclusion

326 332 337 343 348

Appendix: Provisional postulates for extended axiomatic functionalism Introduction Provisional postulates for extended axiomatic functionalism

351 351 355

6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9

Notes References Index to the provisional postulates for extended axiomatic functionalism Index of names Subject index

418 445 456 460 462

Figures

1.1 1.2 2.1 2.2 2.3

The general status of semiotic systems Types of index Standard axiomatic functionaliam: ontology and semantics The phonology of standard axiomatic functionalism The grammar (plerology) of standard axiomatic functionalism 2.4 The "abstract semantics" of standard axiomatic functionalism 2.5 The systemology and "abstract semantics" of standard axiomatic functionalism 2.6 Standard axiomatic functionalism: systemology, ontology and semantics 2.7 "Allo-states" in Mulder and Hervey 2.8 Formal descriptive procedure for incomplete neutralization 2.9 Modified standard axiomatic functionalism: ontology and semantics 2.10 A proposed framework for semantic protocolisation 3.1 Extended axiomatic functionalism: signum ontology 3.2 The phonology of extended axiomatic functionalism 3.3 The lexology of extended axiomatic functionalism 3.4 The delology of extended axiomatic functionalism 3.5 Extended axiomatic functionalism: system ontology and signum ontology

8 14 47 58 66 74 76 78 86 96 101 105 129 140 144 146 149

Chapter One Introduction: the general context

1.1. The scope of this book This book presents aspects of a functionalist model of language which has been proposed by M.A.L. Lamb, on the basis of J.W.F. Mulder and S.G.J. Hervey's axiomatic functionalism (Mulder 1968; Mulder — Hervey 1972; Hervey 1979; Mulder — Hervey 1980; Hervey 1982; Mulder 1989). Useful summaries of standard axiomatic functionalism are to be found in Lamb (1980), and Shimizu and Lamb (1985). The current model introduces a number of extensions to that of Mulder and Hervey. Like Mulder and Hervey's model it is conceived as an axiomatic theory; a provisional set of postulates is provided in the Appendix to this book. Like Mulder and Hervey's model the current model may therefore be regarded as an axiomatic functionalism. To distinguish between the two theories, Mulder and Hervey's model is referred to throughout this book as standard axiomatic functionalism, while the current model is referred to as extended axiomatic functionalism. This terminology is suggested in Shimizu and Lamb (1985: 118), and is adopted throughout in Dickins (1989), and Heselwood (1992). The term axiomatic functionalism is used where the notions considered apply equally to standard axiomatic functionalism (the "standard version") and extended axiomatic functionalism (the "extended version"). Two published versions of the postulates for standard axiomatic functionalism exist. These are both organised in the form of axioms, and definitions (abbreviated as Def.). The first version of the postulates (in Mulder — Hervey 1980: 40-63 and 203-211) includes postulates for axiomatic-functionalist semantics. The later revised version of the postulates (in Mulder 1989: 435-457) does not include postulates for the semantics. Where I refer to the postulates for standard axiomatic functionalism in this book, I refer to both versions, in order to make it easier for readers to compare the two versions. This book has as its major theme the network of relationships between the abstractions of linguistic theory, and the phonetic and semantic facts of language reality. This network of relationships is treated in the standard version by the ontology (also known as sign

2

Introduction: the general context

theory, or signum theory), and the semantics. In the extended version, it is treated by what is termed the signum ontology (a term suggested by Barry Heselwood). The book also discusses, though in less detail, what is known in standard axiomatic functionalism as the systemology, and what I propose be termed in extended axiomatic functionalism the system ontology: that is the internal organisation (and analysis) of phonology and grammar in the standard version, and the internal organisation (and analysis) of phonology, lexology, and delology in the extended version. I have chosen to focus on the signum ontology of extended axiomatic functionalism (and the corresponding ontology and semantics of standard axiomatic functionalism) because the signum ontology can in some respects be regarded as more fundamental than the system ontology. That is to say, a linguistic theory of the current type depends crucially on the coherence of the relationship of its abstract models to linguistic reality (cf. Mulder 1989: 7Φ75). If this relationship does not make sense, the entire theory fails to make sense, regardless of the ingenuity and apparent adequacy of the analyses which may be produced within the system ontology (as it is termed in extended axiomatic functionalism) or the systemology (as it is termed in standard axiomatic functionalism) (cf. however, Chapter Two, Section 2.2.3 for a discussion of the logical relationship between the ontology and the systemology). Within the confines it sets itself, the current book concentrates on those aspects of extended axiomatic functionalism which yield descriptions significantly in contrast with those of standard axiomatic functionalism, focusing in particular on the treatment of allomorphy, polysemy and figures of speech. The book is divided into six chapters. In the main part of this Chapter (Sections 1.2-1.5), I address a number of general preliminary issues. In particular I consider and defend the position of axiomatic functionalism in four broad areas which I believe are particularly relevant and interesting with regard to its overall orientation as a theory. These areas are: wide-scope vs. narrowscope approaches to semiotics (Section 1.2-Section 1.2.3), the relationship between semiotics and linguistics (Section 1.3), the psychological, sociological, and "pure-systematic" approaches to linguistics (Section 1.4), and linguistic relativism vs. linguistic universalism (Section 1.5). Chapter Two, Standard axiomatic functionalism, starts with a consideration of fundamental metatheoretical issues. I discuss

The scope of this book

3

Mulder and Hervey's Popperian-based criteria for a scientific linguistics, supporting their contention that a scientific linguistic theory should yield descriptions which are consistent, adequate to the data, simple, and in principle refutable. I also point out the acceptability of introducing non-scientific elements into a theory where no scientific elements are available, and I suggest that a further criterion for an acceptable linguistic theory is its wider interfaceability with other language disciplines, such as historical linguistics, textlinguistics, sociolinguistics, and psycholinguistics. The remainder of Chapter Two presents the three components of standard axiomatic functionalism: the ontology (or sign theory, or signum theory), the semantics and the systemology, focusing on the two components which are of direct relevance to the relationships between theoretical abstractions and language reality: the ontology and the semantics. I highlight features of standard axiomatic functionalism which involve asymmetricality, and a consequent reduction in potential theoretical simplicity, and suggest ways in which greater simplicity can be achieved along with greater descriptive scope. I consider forms of variance with respect to allomorphy and allophony, and discuss Mulder and Hervey's rejection of free allomorphy in the light of their acceptance of free allophony. I consider the notions of form and allomorphon, and show that despite Mulder's claim that these notions lack descriptive applicability (Mulder 1989: 304), they can be brought to bear to yield coherent formal models for what has come to be known as incomplete neutralization (Port — Crawford 1989), and more generally for cases of "imperfect homonymy" of which incomplete neutralization is a sub-type. I then suggest a modified version of standard axiomatic functionalism, which involves the use of protocolised models for the data on the content side of the signum, as well as the expression side, and I develop a proposed framework for semantic protocolisation. I show that this modified standard axiomatic functionalism allows for analyses of the connotational semantic phenomenon of "imperfect synonymy" (Geeraerts 1988; termed "nuance" in Hervey 1971) which parallel those for the analysis of imperfect homonymy. Chapter Three, Extended axiomatic fimctionalism, presents extended axiomatic functionalism as a theory. Under an extended axiomatic-functionalist approach the three components of standard axiomatic functionalism - the ontology, the semantics and the

4

Introduction: the general context

systemology - are reduced to two components: the signum ontology, and the system ontology. The resulting theory is fully symmetrical and therefore maximally simple, allowing for the development of a theoretical terminology which is in many areas itself symmetrical and semantically transparent. Chapter Three concludes with an assessment of the terminology of extended axiomatic functionalism in the light of general terminological principles. Chapter Four, Signum-ontological considerations, considers phenomena which partially parallel those discussed in Chapter Two. By accepting the notion of free allomorphy, extended axiomatic functionalism provides accounts of variance at the allomorphic and allophonic level which precisely parallel one another. The same notions can also be applied to forms of variance in semantics. Traditional notions such as polysemy and homonymy are coherently differentiable, and criteria derived from the overarching theoretical principle of distinctive function are provided and illustrated for differentiation between polysemy proper and polysemony (plurireferentiality). I uphold Mulder's contention that the acceptance of free allomorphy and polysemy introduces non-scientific elements into the theory. Within an extended axiomatic-functionalist approach, however, these non-scientific elements are controlled and kept within defined boundaries; they do not compromise the scientificity of other aspects of the theory, and are therefore acceptable in terms of the criteria outlined in Chapter Two. I also show that the exclusion of these phenomena (as in standard axiomatic functionalism) itself gives rise to major problems, particularly with regard to the semantic analysis of utterances involving everyday metalanguage. In the same light, I consider the implications of an extended axiomaticfunctionalist approach to the analysis of idiom and proverbs. Chapter Five, Canonicality and figures of speech, proceeds from the discussion of idiom and proverbs in Chapter Three, and focuses on figures of speech, including metaphor, simile, irony, hyperbole, and understatement. I suggest that a consistent distinction needs to be drawn between dead (specific-conventional) and live (generalizedconventional) variants of each of these figures. A coherent and adequate description of both dead and live figures of speech can be achieved by interfacing (cf. Chapter Two) models from the semantic aspect of the signum ontology with what is strictly speaking the extra-theoretical notion of canonicality. According to this analysis, different figures of speech originate at different levels within the

Semiotics

5

sign um ontology; they all, however, share the common feature of marked non-canonicality. This approach makes it possible to reconcile the traditional "internal" concern with the way in which metaphor is distinguished from other figures of speech (the signumontological aspect) with the more modern "external" concern with the way in which metaphor and other figures of speech are distinguished from literal language (the canonicality aspect) (Cooper 1986: 12). With respect to live metaphor in particular, I argue that a modified and more precisely defined version of the so-called comparison theory (originally proposed by Aristotle, and extensively developed by the Arab rhetoricians among others) is adequate to account for the data of English and possibly other languages. Chapter Six, Wider implications, looks at a number of more general issues arising from the analyses presented in the book. These include the relationship between the notions of canonicality and prototypicality (Taylor 1989), the interface between core-linguistics and psycholinguistics, the potential linguistic universality of figures of speech, types of connotation, metaphor understanding (particularly the relevance theory approach of Sperber and Wilson (1986)), the notion of connotational context, the multiple conventionality of metaphor, the distinction between figures of speech and figures of attitude, the interface between core-linguistics and text-linguistics, and the implications of extended axiomatic functionalism for lexological ("connotational-grammatical") analyses, with particular regard to the treatment of functional sentence perspective and ellipsis.

1.2. Semiotics Axiomatic functionalism (in both its standard and extended versions) is conceived in the first instance as a general semiotic theory rather than as a linguistic theory. Semiotics - of which semiology can be regarded as a synonym - is typically defined as something like "the study of signs and symbols, esp. the relation between physical or spoken signs and their referents in the physical world or the world of ideas" (Collins English Dictionary). This definition is broad and rather vague. In the following Sections I consider the place of axiomatic functionalism within this overall general definition of semiotics.

6

Introduction: the general context

1.2.1. Wide-scope v.v. narrow-scope semiotics The term semiotics is applied to a wide variety of approaches, many of which seem to have little in common with one another. In the 19th and 20th centuries, ideas put forward by thinkers as diverse as Saussure, Peirce, Morris, Austin, Searle, Prieto and Barthes have all been described by their originators or by commentators on them as "semiotic" (or "semiological") (cf. Hervey 1982 for detailed discussion of these and other approaches). Hervey proposes the following general typology of semiotic theories: (1) semiotic theories with a wide scope: theories whose scope of interest extends to communication as a whole (that is everything that 'signifies' is semiotic); Peirce and Morris fall into this category: (2) semiotic theories with a medium scope: (a) theories whose scope covers only cases of deliberate, conventional forms of communication (Austin, Searle and Prieto fall into this category); (b) theories whose scope covers only systematic forms of communication (that is, everything that forms a system of 'signification' is semiotic); Barthesian semiology exemplifies this category; (3) semiotic theories with a narrow scope; theories whose scope is, in principle at least, restricted to systems of conventions for communication (that is, only 'signals' from conventional systems intended for communication are semiotic); Saussure, functionalism, and axiomatic semiotics belong to this category (Hervey 1982: 3-4).

1.2.2. Semiotic communication

systems

as systems

of conventions

for

Axiomatic functionalism (termed axiomatic semiotics by Hervey in the above passage) adopts a narrow-scope approach to semiotics.

Semiotics

1

Confining its scope to semiotic systems, it chooses to define a semiotic system as a "system of conventions for communication" (Mulder - Hervey 1980: 42, Def. lc; Mulder 1989: 436, Def. lc.). The key notions of this definition - systems, conventions, and for communication - are worth considering in more detail. For present purposes, a system can be defined along Saussurean lines as "a network of co-existing and mutually opposed alternatives" (Hervey 1983: 13). This rules out ad hoc means of communicating (but cf. Mulder and Hervey's notion of a nonce symbol; Mulder — Hervey 1980: 42, Def. 2a 2 b , 185; Mulder 1989: 123-126, 140, 145, 437, Def. 2a3b). "Conventional" (from which "conventions") means non-natural. This rules out two things; (i) conveyance of information by natural phenomena, e.g. the conveyance of information by heavy clouds that rain is imminent (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 178-179); Mulder and Hervey refer to this kind of thing as a symptomatic index (Mulder - Hervey 1980: 181; Mulder 1989: 125-132); (ii) conveyance of information by man-made objects which make sole use of natural processes, e.g. the conveyance of information by a kettle whistle that the water in the kettle has boiled. Mulder and Hervey refer to this kind of thing as a signalling device (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 179-181; Mulder 1989: 125, 130-132). "For communication" implies that the system has as its purport - or ostensible raison d'etre - communication. Importantly, this rules out all conventional forms of behaviour which do not have communication as their purport, even though they may on occasion be said to convey information, and even though they may be used deliberately to convey such information - for example when somebody adopts a particular style of dress in order to indicate membership of a particular social group.1 Ignoring the notion of system (which I believe is less important here), the possibilities established by the notions "conventional" and "for communication" can be tabulated as in Fig. 1.1.

8

Introduction: the general context

Non-conventional (= natural)

conventional

Not-forcommunication

e.g. clouds indicating rain (symptomatic index)

e.g. pattern of dress

Forcommunication

e.g. whistle of kettle indicating water has boiled (signalling device)

e.g. natural language, musical notation (semiotic system)

Figure 1.1. The general status of semiotic systems

As already noted, this definition of semiotics is a narrow one, ruling out three of the four boxes in Fig. 1.1, as well as other possibilities not represented in that figure. There are a number of reasons why one should operate with a narrow definition of semiotics. The first centres around the nature of the information conveyed by phenomena which do not involve systems of conventions for communication. Consider first natural phenomena. One may say that heavy clouds indicate rain. However, this is to present as a simple hard fact, phenomena (and the causal relation between them) which are in reality subject to indefinite variation. Heavy clouds may be said to indicate rain, very heavy clouds heavy rain, unusually heavy clouds unusually heavy rain, light clouds the possibility of rain, very light clouds the slight possibility of rain, etc. There is no limit to the number of divisions one might wish to make with respect to the nature of the clouds and the nature of the possible rain. Nor is there any limit to the length of the causal chain, or the divisions within it. Given that heavy clouds indicate rain, one might say also in appropriate circumstances that they indicate a rise in the river level, or subsequent flooding or even flood damage to low-

Semiotics

9

lying buildings. Similarly, as Mulder points out, one can reasonably say that spots (of a certain type) indicate measles. However, it would also be possible to construct a much more delicate causal chain linking the action of the measles virus to the appearance of spots on the sick person's body, through a series of physical interactions (Mulder 1989: 129-130). Finally, there is no guarantee (in the case of some natural phenomena at least) that one thing is really indicative of another. Spots might turn out to have another cause apart from measles; heavy clouds might drift away, leaving glorious sunshine. In such a case one would hardly accuse the spots or the clouds of having imparted false information. At most we might say that we had misinterpreted the signals. The same basic problems occur with respect to conventional phenomena which are not for communication. In the case of clothes for example, there exists the same potential for indefinite variation in type of dress and type of information conveyed as there does in the case of clouds. The associative chains through which one might wish to pursue connections also seems as indefinite in the case of dress as it does in the case of clouds. And finally, as in the case of clouds, the information conveyed by dress is provisional and unreliable. We might infer from the fact that someone is wearing a pinstripe suit, for instance, that he is a businessman, a city gent perhaps. However, if we were to discover that the person in question was in fact a building worker with a certain sense of elegance, we would not claim to have been misinformed - although we might claim to have been deceived. This, however, would be by virtue of our own preconceptions, i.e. the fact that the man did not dress in accordance with the norms of the social group to which he belonged. Slightly different issues arise with respect to signalling devices, i.e. phenomena which are designed by human beings for communication, but are not conventional in that the link between the physical phenomenon and the information conveyed is purely of a cause-and-effect nature, as in the case of a whistle on a kettle indicating that the water has boiled. Here the nature of the information is not at issue, at least if the machine is constructed with sufficient skill that its operation can only reasonably be triggered by the specific phenomenon which is supposed to trigger it. However, one can see that in crude machines, or machines which are sophisticated but unreliable, this may not always be the case. Similarly, the boundary between natural phenomena and machines

10

Introduction: the general context

utilising natural processes is not clear. We can, for instance, deduce which way the wind is blowing by looking at the direction in which a field of corn is bent over. This would be a symptomatic index. We could also deduce wind direction by hanging a plastic bag on the branch of a tree, and observing the direction in which it is blown. This would be a signalling device. However, exactly the same effect could be achieved in the case of a second plastic bag which was blown around, and happened to lodge itself in a tree. In this case the object in question would be a symptomatic index. To an observer who did not know the history of the two bags there would be no difference in either their nature or the information gained from them. Viewed from this perspective, the boundary between symptomatic indices and signalling devices is revealed as rather arbitrary. This suggests that if symptomatic indices are to be excluded from semiotic study, so also should signalling devices. I want now to consider indicative phenomena which are not for communication (symptomatic indices, and conventional not-forcommunication phenomena) in relation to conventional phenomena which are for communication. All the phenomena which I have been discussing have a physical aspect. Slightly extending the terminology proposed by Hjelmslev, and adopted by Mulder and Hervey, we may refer to this as their cenetic aspect (in natural language this is referred to as the phonetic aspect). Inasmuch as these phenomena do actually convey information, the information they give can correspondingly be referred to as their semantic aspect. As has been seen, in the case of symptomatic indices and conventional not-for-communication phenomena, the cenetic features of the phenomena may be precisely describable, but the semantic features are indeterminate. In some approaches to semiotics, this dubiousness is even exploited and effectively made the object of enquiry. The virtual raison d'etre of Barthesian semiology is the discovery (or invention) of the semantic data (via the notion of the "myth"; cf. Barthes 1973; also the critique of Barthesian semiology in Hervey 1982: 126-154). In the case of the semantic data of conventional for-communication phenomena, the situation is quite different. Here, the semantic data are unambiguous. That this should be the case is guaranteed by the fact that the phenomena themselves are defined as for communication. Inasmuch as the would-be data fail to satisfy this criterion, they are by definition not included within the category of conventional for-communication semantic

Semiotics

11

phenomena. The indeterminacy of the semantic data in the case of not-forcommuncation phenomena gives rise to an indeterminacy in analysis. This has already been noted in the cases of clouds, measles, and patterns of dress. It is also true of more developed approaches in the area of conventional not-for-communication phenomena. Part of the attraction of Barthesian semiology, for instance, is that one could "do it oneself'. That is to say, it would be perfectly possible to take Barthesian examples, such as Barthes' analysis of soap-powders and detergents (Barthes 1973: 36-38), and construct wholly different "mythic" data (for instance, on the basis of different ideological precommitments) from those which he proposes. By contrast, in the case of for-communication conventional phenomena, both the cenetic and the semantic aspects of the phenomena are determinate (or at least normally so; cf. Chapter Four, Section 4.3.4 for a discussion of indeterminacy in natural language). The fact that the data are properly defined makes it possible to construct properly defined and testable - i.e. potentially refutable - abstract (generalising) analyses. This is one of the bases of the scientificity of semiotics as understood in an axiomaticfunctionalist context (cf. Chapter Two, Section 2.1). Such scientificity, however, is only achievable by divorcing semiotics, in an axiomatic-functionalist sense (i.e. for-communication conventional phenomena), from semiotic phenomena in a more general sense (i.e. natural phenomena, for-communication nonconventional phenomena, and not-for-communication conventional phenomena). This separation has other advantages. For instance, not only can the way we dress indicate our membership of a particular social group, so can the way we speak. That is to say, a proper (forcommunication) semiotic system such as language can (and perhaps inevitably will) have associated with it the same kind of indicative features which are associated with not-for-communication conventional phenomena such as dress. The study of phenomena of register, sociolect, and related notions such as dialect obviously occupies an important place within the field of modern linguistics. The point here, however, is that axiomatic functionalism makes explicit how and why notions such as register are to be excluded from semiotics proper (linguistics proper). It also shows how and where they fit within the broader study of "general semiotics". Mulder and Hervey define "semiotics" - or rather "semiotic

12

Introduction: the general context

systems" - as the area of enquiry of axiomatic functionalism. In the preceding discussion I have used the term "semiotics proper" for this area, and have suggested "general semiotics" for anything which falls outside it. One could use other terms for what is studied by axiomatic functionalism. A precise but extremely cumbersome term would be "systematic conventional for-communication semiotics". A more obvious term would perhaps be "core-semiotics". This would parallel the way in which core-linguistics is used both by Mulder (1989: 4), and in this book (e.g. Chapter Two, Section 2.1.2; Chapter Six, Section 6.1), to refer to those aspects of language study which fall within the purview of axiomatic functionalism. It is important here not to be misled by what Karl Popper has called methodological essentialism (Popper 1986: 26-34). That is to say, in asking a question such as "What is semiotics?", we should not be attempting to discover the essence of semiotics. Rather, we should be attempting to provide a precise and serviceable definition of the term "semiotics", such that this term (which has the virtues of brevity and convenience) can be used wherever its definition could also be used. Mulder defines a semiotic system as a "system of conventions for communication" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 42, Def. lc; Mulder 1989: 436, Def. lc). This is not to say that alternative definitions of the term "semiotics" are invalid; they would only be invalid if the definitions were themselves internally incoherent, or if it could be shown that the notions as defined were incapable of coherent application to the phenomena they were designed to cover. Indeed other, perhaps more inclusive, definitions of the term "semiotics" could even be used by axiomatic functionalists themselves - provided it was made plain exactly in which sense the term "semiotics" was being used in which particular context. There are, however, at least two good reasons for wanting to reserve the term "semiotics" for the area studied by axiomatic functionalism. The first, which has already been mentioned, is that it is only this area which seems likely to prove itself amenable to precise, scientific enquiry. Inasmuch as semiotics is popularly felt to be the science of signs, it makes sense to restrict the definition of semiotics to that area of enquiry which we believe to be scientific (cf. however, Chapter Two, Section 2.1; Chapter Four, Sections 4.3.1, 4.3.9). The second reason for restricting the term "semiotics" to the area studied by axiomatic functionalism is this. There is reason to believe that those "indicative" areas which fall outside the purview of

Semiotics

13

axiomatic functionalism will, inasmuch as they are amenable to coherent analysis at all, prove to be a reflection of "semiotics proper" (or core-semiotics). This is, admittedly, only a "guesspectation". However, there are good reasons for giving the idea credence. As has been noted, only proper semiotic phenomena provide determinate data for both cenetics and semantics. This allows for the coherent and testable establishment of generalising abstract entities. Proper semiotic systems of the complexity of natural language also allow for the following (indeed they might be said to demand the following for their reasonable explication): (i) the establishment of coherent and testable generalising abstract entities which at least potentially consist of complexes of other entities, and (ii) the establishment of such coherent and testable complex generalising abstract entities (e.g. the entities of grammar in natural language) which are related to other coherent and testable complex generalising abstract entities (e.g. the entities of phonology in natural language). That is to say, such semiotic systems exhibit a double articulation (both into the different sub-systems of phonology and grammar, and within the subsystems, into complex combinations - and specifically into ordered combinations; cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 43, Def. 3b, Def. 3c; Mulder 1989: 439, Def. 3b, Def. 3c). The organisation of semiotic systems proper is of a sufficient degree of complexity to suggest that the notions it contains will be applicable without further significant development to other areas of enquiry which might be more generally thought of as semiotic. Indeed, it seems possible that the notions involved in semiotics proper might be applicable to the analysis of any conventional code, regardless of whether that code is conceived as communicative or not.

J .2.3. Index and signum Although axiomatic functionalism is not a wide-scope semiotic approach, Mulder and Hervey have proposed a general framework into which semiotics proper fits. Under this, all "indicative" phenomena are to be described in terms of indices.2 Indices can be divided into natural indices on the one hand and conventional indices on the other. Natural indices can be divided into symptomatic indices and signalling devices (cf. Fig. l.l and associated discussion). Conventional indices are called signa. These are the basic entities in

14

Introduction: the general context

semiotic systems proper. The different classes of index can be tabulated as in Fig. 1.2 (based on Mulder 1989: 125).

index

natural index

symptomatic index

conventional index (= signum)

signalling device

sign

svmbol

proper svmbol

nonce svmbol

Figure 1.2. Types of index

As can be seen from Fig. 1.2, Mulder and Hervey further divide signa into signs and symbols, and symbols into proper symbols and nonce symbols (Mulder — Hervey 1972: 13-18; Mulder — Hervey 1980: 186-187; Mulder 1989: 123-151). The difference between these is as follows: a sign is a "signum with wholly fixed conventional information-value" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 42, Def. 2a l ; cf. also Mulder 1989: 437, Def. 2a2). A symbol is a "signum with not wholly fixed conventional information-value, i.e. to which a temporary item of information-value can be attached by a definition" (Mulder - Hervey 1980: 42, Def. 2a 2 ; cf. also Mulder 1989: 437, Def. 2a3). A proper symbol is a "symbol with partially fixed conventional information-value" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 42, Def. 2a 2 a ; cf. Mulder 1989: 437, Def. 2a3a). A nonce symbol is a

Semiotics

15

"symbol with no fixed conventional information-value" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 42, Def. 2a 2 b ; cf. Mulder 1989: 437, Def. 2a3b). Most signa in natural language are signs. However, examples of symbols are also encountered. Examples of proper symbols (the first sub-type of symbols proposed by Mulder and Hervey) are proper names, such as John or Mary (cf. Mulder 1989: 108, 123, 137, 340). Examples of nonce symbols (the second sub-type of symbols proposed by Mulder and Hervey) are nonsense words, such as Lewis Carroll's brillig, slithy and vorpal (Mulder 1989: 146), inasmuch as these can be taken to have information-value at all. The ad hoc nature of the nonce symbol, and particularly the ad hoc nature of the information-value attached to it implies that nonce symbols are not properly systematic, and therefore do not normally fall within the analysis of semiotic systems. This means that natural languages, as normally conceived under an axiomatic-functionalist approach can be taken to contain only signs and proper symbols. It should also be noted that signa may also be either simple or complex; for current purposes simple signa can be defined as signa which are not made up of other signa, while complex signa can be defined as signa which are made of other signa. In fact, it is not directly signa which are simple or complex; rather signa correspond to entities in the systemology which are simple or complex. Provided this is understood, however, there seems nothing wrong in talking about simple and complex signa. For a more complete and coherent definition of the relationship between signum and corresponding systemological entities, see Chapter Two (Section 2.2.3), also Chapter Three (Section 3.1.2). The implication for natural language of the provisional definition given here that signa may be simple or complex is that all the elements which fall within the study of grammar, from "morpheme" (i.e. moneme; Mulder — Hervey 1980: 47, Def. 8b 3 ; Mulder 1989: 444, Def. 8b2), through to "word", etc. (i.e. plereme; Mulder — Hervey 1980: 47, Def. 8b 1 ; Mulder 1989: 443, 8b), "phrase" (i.e. syntagm; Mulder — Hervey 1980: 48, Def. 9b; Mulder 1989: 444, Def. 9b), clause (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 56, Def. 20a; Mulder 1989: 453, Def. 21a), and up to sentence (Mulder - Hervey 1980: 56, Def. 20; Mulder 1989: 453, Def. 21) are signa. It is also important to note that in early versions of the theory, Mulder and Hervey had not developed the distinction between signum, sign and symbol. The notion sign (rather than the notion

16

Introduction: the general context

signum) was originally conceived as standing in direct opposition to natural index (e.g. Mulder 1968). It is for this reason that ontology in standard axiomatic-functionalist theory has as synonyms both signum theory and sign theory (the latter term predating the distinction between sign and signum). For ease of usage I have employed the term signum (rather than sign) throughout the book, in accordance with the current terminology of the theory.3 In his most recent work, Mulder has proposed within conventional indices a distinction between labels (classificatory entities) and signa. Again, since this is not directly relevant for the purposes of this book, I do not propose to go into this here (with regard to the notion of labels, cf. however, Note 1 to Section 1.2.2; also Mulder 1989: 123-167, for a discussion of all these distinctions).

1.3. Semiotics and linguistics There is a continuing controversy over the relationship between linguistics and semiotics. Hervey suggests that the two extremes of this controversy can be formulated as follows: (a) linguistics is the 'parent' discipline of semiotics; it has the more 'inclusive' theory - semiotics is the application of notions borrowed (or, at most, adapted) from linguistics to communication outside of natural language; (b) semiotics is the meta-discipline of which linguistics is a sub-discipline; the scope of semiotics is inclusive of the scope of linguistics; linguistic notions are merely specialised semiotic notions developed particularly for describing natural languages (Hervey 1983: 5). As should be apparent from the preceding discussion, axiomatic functionalism adopts position (b). However, there are two further complications to the relationship between linguistics and semiotics which are worth considering. As Mulder puts it: It is very possible, and even likely, but this is pure speculation, that the limits of intellectual thought and those of our command of language are exactly coincidental. If this is

Semiotics and linguistics

17

the case, then artificial systems that cannot be translated into language are most probably a priori ruled out in principle, as it is unlikely that we would create what lies beyond our powers of thought.... this alone justifies regarding language as very special among semi otic systems ... (Mulder 1989: 147). This extraordinary communicative ability of natural languages is linked to (and can be regarded as a consequence of) an extremely high degree of complexity at the abstract analytical levels. As Michael Lamb has pointed out to me, natural languages seem to be of such a higher degree of complexity as compared with other semiotic systems that one might reasonably expect any analytical situation exhibited in other semiotic systems to be exhibited in natural language also. One would not, however, expect analytical situations exhibited in natural language necessarily to be exhibited in other semiotic systems. As with the belief that semiotics proper may provide all the notions necessary for a description of other general semiotic phenomena, or the belief that it would be impossible to construct an artificial system which could not be translated into natural language, this is only a "guesspectation", i.e. a speculation (cf. Chapter Two, Section 2.1 for further discussion of the notion of speculation). However, this seems a reasonable area in which to speculate. If it is the case that any analytical situation exhibited in other semiotic systems is exhibited in natural language but not vice versa this would give rise to a situation where "The Child is father of the Man" (Wordsworth), again as pointed out to me by Michael Lamb. In practice, it would mean that the application of a semiotic theory to areas of semiotic enquiry - both with a view to producing specific descriptions in terms of this theory, and with a view to testing the workability of the theory itself - would be most interestingly and decisively carried out on natural languages. This is one of the underlying assumptions I have made in this book, and it is the reason why I have chosen to apply the theory to natural languages, rather than to other semiotic systems. (The language with which I am most concerned in this book is English; this is because it is my native language, and therefore the language about which I am able to make the most reasonable judgements in terms of acceptability or otherwise of the putative data.) There are, of course, other views that could be taken of the

18

Introduction: the general context

relationship between semiotics and linguistics, even while maintaining a general axiomatic-functionalist framework. It may be that, as Lyons puts it, "... language-systems appear to have distinctive properties that are unique to them as semiotic systems" (Lyons 1991: 20), i.e. it may turn out to be the case that there are specific respects in which natural languages are distinctive vis ä vis other existing or imaginable semiotic systems. In order to test this claim properly, one would need (apart from anything else) to operate with a general semiotic theory, under which natural languages could receive analysis. This is something which axiomatic functionalism offers, but which most approaches to linguistics do not. As Culler has noted of modern linguistics, "While other Saussurean concepts have been assimilated, Saussure's ruling concept, the notion of the sign and of language as a system of signs, has been largely neglected" (Culler 1976: 88).

1.4. Psychological vs. sociological vs. pure-systematic approaches There are two currently popular general approaches to the relationship between linguistics and other relatable areas of study. The first, and more influential, conception regards linguistics as a branch of psychology. There are many different variants of this. The most popular is undoubtedly the Chomskyan approach, which posits that there is in the human brain a specific language faculty. It is this faculty which allows human beings to acquire their first language with such apparent ease. Chomsky's precise ideas have, of course, changed over the years. However, the following can reasonably be taken as a statement of his recent thinking: The language faculty is a distinct system of the mind/brain, with an initial state So common to the species (to a very close first approximation, apart f r o m pathology, etc.) and apparently unique to it in essential respects. Given appropriate experience, this faculty passes from the state So to some relatively stable state Sswhich then undergoes only peripheral modification (say, acquiring new vocabulary items). The attained state incorporates an I-language (internalised language! (it is the state of having or knowing a particular I-

Psychological v.v. sociological κν. pure-systematic approaches

19

language). UG | universal grammar] is the theory of So; particular grammars are theories of various I-languages (Chomsky 1986: 25). According to this view, the role of general linguistic theory (universal grammar) is to provide "a characterisation of these innate, biologically determined principles, which constitute one component of the human mind - the language faculty" (Chomsky 1986: 24), while the goal of a generative grammar of a particular language is to discover the particular internalised language in question, i.e. "... the system of knowledge of language attained and internally represented in the mind/brain" (Chomsky 1986: 25) on the basis of the preexisting universal grammar. The psychological approach to linguistics has been challenged over the last thirty years at least by what might be termed the sociological approach. Within the British (and British-oriented) linguistic scene, the outstanding figure of the sociological approach has been Halliday. Halliday's views are often subject to a high degree of revision, even within a short period of time (cf. Butler 1985: 81). However, the following is perhaps a reasonable statement of the Hallidayan position: The structure of sentences and other units is explained by derivation from their functions - which is doubtless how the structures evolved in the first place. Language is as it is because of the function it has evolved to serve in people's lives (Halliday 1978:4). It should be evident that axiomatic functionalism adopts neither the psychological nor the sociological approach to linguistics (and semiotics). Rather, it may be said to adopt a pure-systematic approach. That is to say, the abstract generalising models which are proposed in an axiomatic-functionalist linguistic (semiotic) description to account for and inform the data are just that. Their sole purpose is to account for and inform the data in a coherent and testable manner (see also Chapter Two, Section 2.1 for what this means in practice). No a priori claim is made about their relationship to features of the human mind (or brain); similarly, no claim is made about their relationship to features of the social environment. At first sight this may seem odd. It seems easy to conceive of the

20

Introduction: the general context.

abstract models of linguistic analysis as expressing or corresponding to models of language which we presumably have in our minds (or even brains). It seems similarly easy to regard our models of linguistic analysis as standing in relation to aspects of social reality. Both approaches seem to offer the prospect of anchoring linguistic analysis in some other, apparently more solidly grounded, area of scientific enquiry. To regard the abstractions of linguistic description as, in themselves, nothing more than testable, generalising abstractions, on the other hand, might seem to accord them a decidedly obscure status (cf. Chomsky 1986: 26-27 for arguments along these lines). This perception is perhaps profoundly influenced by the persuasive power which has been exerted by both the psychological and sociological approaches over the last few decades. Interestingly, however, the view of linguistic abstractions adopted in axiomatic functionalism corresponds in significant ways to common-sense views of language, as expressed through our "everyday metalanguage" (Lyons 1991: 32), i.e. the way in which we customarily use language to talk about language, and by extension the way in which we use language to talk about other semiotic systems, and other conventional systems in general. Consider the following: "Do you know French?", or "Do you know musical notation?" (for a discussion of musical notation as a semiotic system, cf. Mulder 1989: 103-107); or "Do you know chess?" (and parallel to these, the common "performance" usages "Do you know how to speak/read/write French?", "Do you know how to read/write musical notation?", "Do you know how to play chess?"). What is it we claim to know when we say we know French, or musical notation, or chess? This is a difficult question to answer, and I shall not attempt to pursue this issue here (however, cf. Chapter Six, Section 6.1). A more easy question to answer is what we do not claim to know. One thing we do not claim to know is knowledge of French·, or knowledge of musical notation, or knowledge of chess. That is to say, in expressing ourselves through such everyday metalanguage we claim to know the object of knowledge (i.e. the language, or the notation system, or the game in question), not knowledge of the object of knowledge. That is to say, our everyday metalanguage in this simple example at least does not concord with the psychological approach to linguistics. It is interesting in this respect that Chomsky defines Ssin the quotation

Psychological vs. sociological vs. pure-systematic approaches

21

above as "the state of having or knowing a particular I-language [internalised language]"; the notion of knowing an I-language is properly speaking incoherent since the I-language is defined as a system of knowledge. The introduction of the word knowing, however, seems motivated rhetorically by the fact that "to have a language" is significantly at variance with common parlance. Other examples of everyday metalanguage are equally non-concordant with the psychological approach. Take an utterance such as "Do you speak French?". Clearly, the entity "French" which one might speak is not to be equated with knowledge of French ("Do you speak knowledge of French?" is bizarre to the point of incomprehensibility). In fact, I am not aware of any examples from everyday metalanguage which are strikingly concordant with the psychological approach to linguistics, while many examples are strikingly non-concordant. Similarly with everyday metalanguage and the sociological approach to linguistics. There seems be nothing in our everyday metalanguage which directly supports the view that language structure derives from social structure. We may, however, consider a related (although properly speaking rather different) view which is often subsumed under the general sociological approach to linguistics. This is the view that language is a "tool for action". According to this view, to know French means to possess the ability to use French appropriately in appropriate social circumstances. This view perhaps has some general plausibility. Consider, however, the same view with respect to the semiotic system of musical notation. Clearly, to know musical notation is not simply to possess the ability to use musical notation appropriately in appropriate social circumstances. More centrally, it is - or at least it is expressed by the ability to use musical notation in such a way as to correctly communicate the information which the user of the musical notation wishes to communicate. Similarly, with respect to the non-semiotic conventional system of chess, which as I have suggested is described in English in the same sort of terms as are used to describe semiotic systems such as natural language and musical notation. To know chess is not simply to possess the ability to make appropriate chess moves in appropriate social circumstances - unless chess itself (both the abstract rules and the actual moves in a particular game?) is regarded as a purely social (or sociological) phenomenon. This, however, would be to extend the notion of social to cover almost everything - including

22

Introduction: the general context

presumably all aspects of all games. It would therefore denude of almost all real content the claim that linguistics is fundamentally a sociological phenomenon. Returning to natural language, it will be seen on analogy with the example of musical notation that to know a language is not in fact simply to possess the ability to use that language appropriately in appropriate social circumstances. More centrally, it is - or at least it is expressed by - the ability to use that language in such a way as to correctly communicate the information which the user of the language wishes to communicate. To say this is to restate the point in other words that semiotic systems, such as natural language or musical notation, have as their purport - or ostensible raison d'etre - communication (cf. Section 1.2.2). Other ways of talking about natural language turn out to be equally non-concordant with the sociological approach to linguistics. When we say that no-one speaks a particular language any more, we are virtually denying that the language in question has any sociological status - especially if that language has been dead for a long time, has no current usage (even as a liturgical language for example), and no longer has any place in the general consciousness of members of a particular society. Yet it is perfectly possible to investigate such dead languages, and even write grammars of them, provided sufficient records have been left behind. Again, this is perfectly concordant with the pure-systematic notion of linguistics adopted in axiomatic functionalism. It is important not to make too much of the apparent concordance between everyday metalanguage (and associated language behaviour), and the notion of linguistics adopted in axiomatic functionalism. I have considered only the case of English (and only a few selected examples from English at that). It may well be that other languages talk about language in ways which are much more concordant with either the psychological or the sociological approach to linguistics. Nor does the fact that English everyday metalanguage is non-concordant with the psychological approach, for example, necessarily mean that this approach is invalid. No doubt the way we talk about physical objects in everyday speech is strikingly discordant with the notions of quantum physics. This is clearly no argument against quantum physics. In the case of linguistics, however, there is a further twist to the argument. I believe this is quite significant. The way we talk about physical objects in everyday speech is irrelevant to the data on which

Psychological

vs. sociological

v.v. pure-systematic

approaches

23

physics bases its descriptions. The way we talk about language in a particular language - our everyday metalanguage - on the other hand forms part of the data for the description of that language. Inasmuch as the views of a particular theory accord with our everyday metalanguage, the theory concerned can be expected to provide a reasonable basis for a successful account of at least the metalinguistic aspects of that language. I shall return to this theme in Chapter Four, Section 4.3.3. For the moment, I wish to underline the following points: (i) the nonconcordance between our everyday metalanguage (and related language usages), and the psychological and sociological approaches to linguistics cannot be regarded as evidence of the non-validity of these approaches; (ii) the concordance between our everyday metalanguage (and related language usages), and the pure-systematic approach to linguistics can be regarded as suggestive of the validity of this approach, at least with respect to the analysis of everyday metalanguage. These two statements are not contradictory. It might be that all three approaches to linguistics (the psychological, the sociological, and the pure-systematic) are valid; it may be, for instance, that they consider language from different but equally reasonable perspectives. The point I want to make is that regardless of the reasonableness of other perspectives, the pure-systematic approach of axiomatic functionalism is one fundamentally grounded in common sense. My personal opinion is that both the psychological and the sociological approaches to linguistics may ultimately prove of value in their different ways, but that a pure-systematic approach is required as a precursor to both these other approaches. This is pure speculation (cf. also Chapter Two, Section 2.1), but it seems a reasonable area to speculate about. There are other profound problems with the psychological approach in our current state of knowledge. Firstly, we do not properly understand the relationship between the mind and the brain. Chomsky's proposal "to regard talk of mind as talk about the brain undertaken at a certain level of abstraction" (Chomsky 1986: 22) is clearly not the only possible standpoint. Secondly, even assuming that mind can in some sense be equated with brain, we do not know enough about the brain to be able to provide reasonable tests in terms of known features of the brain for the claims that models established in psychological approaches to linguistics are plausible models for phenomena in the brain. As Mulder has noted, the argument that a

24

introduction: the general context

linguist's grammar and the brain must be similarly structured since they both achieve the same goals (the generation of language) confuses necessary criteria for identity with sufficient criteria for identity. Two mechanisms may be quite differently structured, but achieve the same output (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 1-4). As Mulder puts it, "Having the same output is a necessary condition for assuming structural equivalence between two mechanisms. It is not, however, a sufficient condition" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 4). There is a further problem with the Chomskyan approach, which I shall deal with in the next Section. There are similarly profound problems with the sociological approach to linguistics. One of the abiding difficulties of those working within a Hallidayan systemic framework has been to link aspects of social reality in any stable and predictable way with language behaviour - let alone abstract language structure which is normally taken to underlie (or overarch) language behaviour. Put crudely, human responses to social situations seem to be too creative to allow them to be tied down in this way in anything but the most stereotypical of social situations. The full-blown Hallidayan programme that "Language is as it is because of the function it has evolved to serve in people's lives" seems unrealisable. Indeed, Halliday himself seems to admit that it is unrealisable for aspects of language most closely related to the cenetic (phonetic) data, when he concedes the Saussurean contention of the essential arbitrariness (conventionality) of the relationship between sound and meaning in language: "When we talk about the arbitrariness of the sign, we are referring to the Saussurean content/expression relation. I believe every linguist must agree that there is arbitrariness here" (Halliday 1978: 44). This is not to deny the importance of phonetic features for differentiating registers, etc. (see Section 1.2.2). However, more is involved than considerations of register in attempting phonetic and phonological analyses. This is evident in the prosodic analysis approach of Firth, who exercised a formative influence on Halliday. The acceptance of the unrealisability of an approach to linguistics in which linguistic phenomena are regarded as causally derived from social structure would not require the abandonment of any belief that at least some aspects of linguistic structure are related to social structure. It would still be possible to maintain the position that at least certain of those aspects of linguistic structure most closely related to the semantic data are motivated by social structure, or

Psychological v.v. sociological v.v. pure-systematic approaches

25

appropriate to social structure. That is to say, rather than adopting an extreme causal (determinist) position, it may make better sense to adopt a weaker motivationist general standpoint. Such an approach would still allow for precise and testable investigation of the relationship between social structure and linguistic structure, and would include the possibility of development of significant generalisations of various kinds. This general proposal also points up the need for something else. This is the independent formulation of both the social and the linguistic notions whose relationship to one another is to be investigated; one cannot investigate the relationship between two areas of phenomena in an unprejudiced way, if the analysis of the one area is a priori made in terms derived from the analysis of the other area. This suggests that a pure-systematic approach to linguistics, rather than a sociological approach, has the potential to provide appropriate linguistic models for the investigation of these relationships - since this is the only approach which does not a priori introduce other considerations of a sociological kind. I believe the same line of argument may also prove valid with respect to the relationship between language psychology and linguistics. Consider again the proposal that there exists in the human mind a language faculty and that the essential task of linguistics (universal grammar) "is a characterisation of these innate biologically determined principles, which constitute one component of the human mind - the language faculty" (Chomsky 1986: 24). It seems perfectly reasonable to argue that there is a language faculty, and that this differentiates human beings from even the most human-like apes, allowing us to acquire natural languages, a task which seems impossible for non-human animals. There also seems to be some plausibility to the claim that natural languages show a degree of similarity. A word of caution is, however, sensible here. The catastrophic effects of western European colonization on the indigenous peoples of the "new worlds" of the Americas, southern Africa, Australia and elsewhere have meant that over the last five hundred years in particular many hundreds of languages have been wiped out (along with their tens of millions of speakers). Most of these languages have left little or no trace; and of the languages which have survived, many have not been investigated at all. 4 Of such languages which have been investigated, many have been subject to description which is to be suspected as bearing the

26

Introduction: the general context

trace of bias towards the familiar grammatical categories of the well known languages of western Europe. In this regard, it is interesting that proposals for the irrelevance of basic "western" grammatical categories for such "exotic" languages are often rather cursorily dismissed (cf. for example, "Salish evidence against the universality of "Noun" and "Verb"" Kinkade 1983, and the response to this; Van Eijk — Ess 1986). It is also noteworthy that interest in such languages notwithstanding, the bulk of linguistic analysis - and particularly of detailed linguistic analysis - continues to be carried out on English and the other well-known languages of western Europe. Finally, almost all of such indigenous languages which have survived with reasonably large numbers of speakers have now been in direct contact with a dominant western European language for an extended period of time. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising if the indigenous languages currently show significant similarities to the western European contact language in question. Even if we put aside such considerations, and even if we concede that there must be some language faculty in the human brain, it does not necessarily follow that we can investigate this language faculty directly by linguistic study. That is to say, even if there is a mental organ for language in the brain, it does not necessarily follow that this organ will causally determine the nature of language. Its relationship to language might be less direct. As in the case of the relationship between sociology and linguistics, I suspect it might make better sense to talk in terms of motivation or appropriateness. If this is so, a non-prejudicial investigation of the relationship between linguistics and the psychology of language would require separate and independently grounded models for linguistics and brain/mind (and probably, I suspect, separate, though related, models for brain and mind). In such circumstances only a pure-systematic approach to linguistics would have the requisite independence from psychological considerations to be potentially able to provide appropriate models for linguistics. I shall consider the question of the relationship between linguistics and other areas of language study in more detail in subsequent chapters (cf. Chapter Two, Section 2.1.2; Chapter Six, Sections 6.1, 6.7). The above argument is not, of course, an attempt to disprove the notion that language is causally determined by features of the brain. We do not currently possess detailed knowledge about the precise workings of the brain and its relationship to workings of the mind.

Relativism

vv. universalism

27

Without such knowledge it is not even possible to begin to attempt to refute the notion that language is causally determined by features of the brain. Given this, however, it must be conceded that it is possible that language - in some of its aspects at least - is causally determined by features of the brain. This possibility raises a further interesting problem for the current approach. If it is possible that the brain determines language in a causal manner, it might seem that one could establish a causal chain via the workings of the brain between the phonetic phenomena of natural language and the semantic phenomena. In this case, natural language might be construed as a non-conventional system for communication, i.e. a signalling device, rather than a conventional system for communication, i.e. a semiotic system (cf. Section 1.2.2). Accordingly, its study would not fall within the scope of semiotics as defined by Mulder and Hervey. This apparently alarming scenario turns out to be a chimera. From a semiotic perspective, the conventionality of semiotic systems is a function of the conventionality of the relationship between the cenetic phenomena (= phonetic phenomena, in the case of natural language) and the semantic phenomena. If this relationship is conventional, the system as a whole can be regarded as "semiotically conventional", regardless of any other non-conventional features which it may contain. The contention that the relationship between the phonetic phenomena and the semantic phenomena of natural language is conventional has not been seriously challenged by any modern school of linguistics (the phenomenon of iconicity is to be regarded as a limitation on the degree of conventionality, not a refutation of the principle; cf. Mulder 1989: 106-107, 140, 142 for a discussion of icons and iconicity). The area of psychologically/biologically determined non-conventionality proposed in Chomskyan and other generative approaches is confined to the internal organisation of language and centres around syntax. Chomskyan universal grammar, in particular, makes no reference to semantic phenomena, either in terms of data or "interpretation" (cf. Horrocks 1987: 95).

1.5. Relativism vs. universalism In their different ways, approaches such as the Hallidayan and the Chomskyan are universalist. That is to say, they take it as basic that

28

Introduction: the general context

there are certain features of language which are universal. In the case of Hallidayan systemic grammar, these are the sociologically oriented ideational, interpersonal and textual "metafunctions" (as well as a number of sub-functions which have also been proposed): ... those features that are explicitly claimed as universal are built into the theory. An e x a m p l e of this is the 'metafunctional' hypothesis: it is postulated that in all languages the content systems are organised into ideational, interpersonal and textual components. This is presented as a universal feature of language (Halliday 1985: xxxiv). In the case of the still current Chomskyan "government-binding" (or "principles-and-parameters") model 5 , the proposed universals combine traditional notions such as government, verb, noun, adjective, preposition (the parts of speech possibly derived from the more basic categories such as verbal and nominal) with notions developed within the generative tradition such as X-Bar and bounding theory. Universalism is currently the dominant paradigm in linguistics, although it has only achieved this position in the last few decades. Prior to this, "General linguistics ... had as its goal the construction of a general theory applicable to particular linguistic descriptions, rather than of a general theory of the structure of all languages" (Lyons 1991: 48). It is essentially this older perspective on linguistics which is adopted in axiomatic functionalism. There is perhaps no strict logical connection between the sociological or psychological approaches to linguistics and the universalist approach. However, once one commits oneself to a causal explanation of linguistic structure in sociological or psychological terms, it seems inevitable that one will commit oneself to the establishment of putative universals within language, either on the assumption that these reflect universal social properties (as in Halliday), or universal properties of the brain/mind (as in Chomksy). Just as there is no strict logical connection between the sociological or psychological approaches to linguistics and universalism, so there is no strict logical connection between the pure-systematic approach to linguistics and relativism. It is thus perfectly possible to adopt a Chomskyan approach, but not to draw the psychological conclusions from it which he does. In this case one

Relativism

vs. universalism

29

is left with an "uninterpreted" pure-systematic generative model. Some generative grammarians have in fact adopted an explicitly agnostic or even sceptical approach to the psychological validity of their models (e.g. Gazdar et al. 1982). I believe that Horrocks is right to claim that the alternative to a realist (e.g. psychological) interpretation of generative grammars is an instrumentalist one (Horrocks 1987: 5-10), i.e. one is forced to acknowledge that the theory in question is not to be judged as true or false, but merely as a tool for deriving predictions from observational data. A detailed consideration of this question falls outside the scope of this book (cf. however, Chapter Two, Section 2.1 for a brief discussion of this issue). Suffice it to say here that I believe instrumental!sm becomes inevitable once a realist (e.g. psychological) interpretation of a generative grammar is rejected, given the lack of coherent and testable connection between generative grammars and the facts (both actual and potential) of language usage which form the data for linguistic enquiry (for a critique of instrumentalism, cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 5-6; Mulder 1989: 9-12). While it is possible to combine universalism with a puresystematic approach, it is reasonable to say that relativism and a pure-systematic approach are much more obviously coherent with one another than are universalism and a pure-systematic approach. Once linguistics is removed from the dominion of other areas of enquiry, the raison d'etre of the proposed universale themselves is removed (and if the universals are retained, they acquire an instrumentalist nature). The association between relativism and puresystematicity in axiomatic functionalism is thus one which has coherent underpinnings. Relativism and universalism are generally felt to be incompatible alternatives; one is either a linguistic relativist or a linguistic universalist. I do not believe this to be the case. Logically, relativism does not exclude universalism. That is to say, the adoption of a relativist theory for the investigation and description of natural languages (and other semiotic systems, in the case of a general semiotic theory) does not imply a precommitment to the proposition that there are no universal features of natural language. Properly speaking, it does not even imply a precommitment to a disbelief that universalist theories might be able to shed light on universals of natural language (although in practice a failure to adopt a particular approach can perhaps normally be taken as evidence of a lack of

30

Introduction: the general context

belief in the validity of that approach). All that the adoption of a relativist approach to the description of a language properly implies is a commitment to an investigation of that language without any a priori presumption that it will contain particular specific features. The converse of this is not the case. That is to say, universalism, as normally understood at least, does exclude relativism. This is because relativism is neutral as to the existence of universal features of language, while universalism positively states that they exist. To subscribe to a universalist position is to deny the possibility of relativism; to subscribe to a relativist position is merely to adopt a neutral stance with regard to linguistic universals. In attempting to investigate linguistic phenomena such as metaphor in this book, therefore, I am by no means attempting to deny that they may be universal features of human language (cf. also Chapter Six, Section 6.2). There is one other rather subtle, though extremely important, problem with respect to linguistic universalism which is worth broaching here. As Mulder has pointed out, once entities or relations are posited as universals - i.e. as part of a universal theory of language - they strictly speaking lose their amenability to coherent testing; that is to say, they become irrefutable. The following example may help to explain what this means. (I have phrased matters very loosely here, since I have not yet introduced the requisite technical notions to allow for a more coherent treatment of the issues. This is provided later on in the book, especially in Chapter Two and Chapter Three.) Suppose we have two theories of language: Theory A which stipulates that words may only have one meaning (i.e. that they must all be monosemous), and Theory Β which allows that words may have more than one meaning (i.e. that they may be polysemous). Suppose also that I wish to attempt to refute the proposition that a certain word in a certain language has only one meaning. It is only in principle possible for me to do this in a linguistic description produced under Theory B. In a linguistic description produced under Theory A, I am forced by the theory itself to say that if there is more than one meaning there is more than one word. Of course, in a linguistic description conducted under Theory Β, I may also conclude that a certain word has only one meaning. This, however, would be an empirical analysis, since the theory itself did not dictate that all words have only one meaning. It is therefore quite different

Relativism

vs. universalism

3 1

from an analysis of a word having only one meaning conducted under Theory A. The central point here is that under Theory A, which adopts as a universal the view that words have only one meaning, it is impossible even in principle to produce a counter-example. The assigning of the notion that words necessarily have only one meaning to the theory itself removes this notion from the realm of the genuinely testable. It might seem that this line of argument can be easily shown to be incorrect when applied to other areas of linguistic enquiry. Consider the following example (which is in itself trivial, but allows for extremely simple exposition and has been chosen for that reason). Suppose it is claimed that all languages have the sound [x], i.e. this is claimed to be a linguistic universal. It can easily be shown that this is not a universal feature of language by consideration of the sounds of Received Pronunciation English, standard varieties of French, standard Turkish, and many other languages. It would appear here that one has proposed an element in a universal theory of language, and that this element of the theory has been directly refuted. This would seem to provide a counter-example to the claim (illustrated by so-called Theory A and Theory Β above) that features of a universal theory of language are properly speaking irrefutable. In fact the proposed counter-argument to the irrefutability of theoretical features is flawed. In order to analyse anything one needs some analytical apparatus; this apparatus is the theory or theories which one is using to do the analysis. In order to investigate whether languages have a [xj sound, for example, one needs (amongst other things) to make use of a phonetic theory which is constructed in such a way that it does not predetermine that languages necessarily contain a [x] sound. That is to say, the theory which one is using specifically leaves open the possibility that particular languages may not contain a [xj sound. It is this precommitment to a relativistic stance in one's phonetic theory which makes it possible to test the claim that all languages contain a [x] sound. From what I have just proposed, it follows that if it is to have empirical content, the claim that all languages have the sound [x| could not even in principle be part of a universalist theory of language. What then is the status of such a claim? I believe that if this and other possible universals are to be given coherent status, they need to be regarded not as part of a universalist theory of language,

32

Introduction: the general context

but as testable generalisations made in terms of descriptions (analyses) of particular languages under a previously established relativist theory of language. Since such generalisations, i.e. proposed universals, are tested against previously established descriptions of various languages, they can reasonably be referred to as cross-descriptive generalisations. 6 There is also no need to wait for the description of many languages before one proposes such cross-descriptive generalisations (linguistic universals). Inasmuch as they are framed in such a way as to be properly refutable, they can be reasonably launched on the basis of the analysis of a few languages (and in principle only one language). All that is required is an acknowledgement of their proper status. This boils down to two things: (i) that they are generalisations made in terms of descriptions under a specific theory; if the theory used had been different, the descriptions and therefore the generalisations (proposed universals), would also be different; and (ii) that such generalisations (proposed universals) are necessarily provisional and subject to potential refutation; it is always possible that a language which is as yet undescribed will prove not to exhibit the proposed universal feature in question. I believe that universalist theories necessarily tend to conflate the three aspects of theory, description, and cross-descriptive generalisation. I will concentrate here on generative approaches. There is of course some distinction between theory and description in generative approaches; one knows whether one is talking about general principles or the working through of these principles with respect to a particular language. Crucially, however, there is a lack of differentiation between theory proper and cross-linguistic generalisation. The things that should come last - the cross-linguistic generalisations - are presented as an integral part of the thing which should come first - the theory, as they are in the simple example discussed above regarding the sound [xj. This situation can be simply illustrated by the Chomskyan notion of the head-complement parameter (cf. Chomsky 1986: 88, 103). This states that in some languages the head precedes the complement; these are known as head-first languages. In other languages the head follows the complement; these are known as head-last languages. The notion in axiomatic functionalism which most closely corresponds to head in the Chomskyan approach is that of nucleus. (There are of course profound differences between the Chomskyan

Relativism v.y. universalism

33

head and the axiomatic-functionalist nucleus. However, the treatment of such topics is beyond the ambitions of the current book.) Axiomatic-functionalist theory stipulates syntactic analyses involving nuclei, and also contains a commitment to an account of the phonetic data, as ultimately realisational of grammatical, including syntactic, notions. Given these precommitments, it will be seen that it is possible under an axiomatic-functionalist approach to establish as a potential cross-descriptive generalisation the notion that languages are either nucleus-first (cf. head-first) or nucleus-last (cf. head-last); that is to say, the nucleus in a particular language is always realised in utterances either first or last. This generalisation is rigorously testable under a standard axiomatic-functionalist account. It turns out to be refuted (if one adopts the strict criterion of refutability; i.e. that only one counterexample is needed). Thus, Japanese is a consistent nucleus-last language (Michael Lamb, personal communication), and Turkish virtually so. Standard Arabic is a moderately good example of a nucleus-first language (with, I believe, some counter-examples), while English has mainly cases of nucleus-first structures, but also a fair number of nucleus-last structures. It should be stressed that this analysis can only be carried out because axiomatic functionalism contains (i) the notion of grammatical nucleus, defined in a certain way, and (ii) a commitment in the theory to description of the phonetic data, these data being considered as ultimately realisational of grammatical phenomena. The second of these theoretical features derives ultimately from the nature of semiotics as understood in an axiomatic-functionalist context (cf. Section 1.2.2), and could not be much altered without a radical change in general perspective. The notion of nucleus, however, could no doubt be redefined, or alternative notions could be substituted for it to give an alternative semiotic and linguistic theory (whether these notions would prove to yield coherent descriptions or not is beyond concern here). If nucleus were redefined or if it were replaced by alternative notions, the crossdescriptive generalisations made would of course be quite different. To recap the preceding argument: in order for notions such as head-first (nucleus-first) language or head-last (nucleus-last) language to have empirical validity, they must be removed from the domain of theory and presented as cross-descriptive generalisations. Such generalisations, however, can only be made in terms of descriptions which rely on theoretical notions such as head

34

Introduction: the general context

(nucleus), which are not directly refutable. An approach such as the Chomskyan government-binding model fails to make the necessary ontological distinctions between a notion such as head, and a notion such as head-first language. In saying this, I am not of course pretending to offer anything like a detailed critique of Chomskyan universal grammar; in particular, I do not claim to do justice to the subtlety of the proposed interrelations between the various principles and parameters proposed in current Chomskyan theory, or to the enormous intellectual effort which has gone into developing this and other universalist theories. Many of the universalist approaches I personally find extremely interesting - and I would not wish to deny that they might be true. Rather, my point is concerned with the nature of theory, and what sort of theories give rise to properly refutable descriptions. I believe that much of what is currently done in universalist approaches to linguistics can be recast as testable and potentially refutable cross-descriptive generalisations made in terms of relativistic theory-based descriptions. Even where universalist approaches give rise to irreducibly arbitrary and non-testable descriptions, this does not necessarily mean that such descriptions are untrue. It merely means that they are unscientific - a situation which, in some circumstances at least, is perfectly acceptable. I discuss these and related issues in more detail elsewhere in this book (especially Chapter Two, Section 2.1; Chapter Six, Section 6.2).

Chapter Two Standard axiomatic functionalism

2.1. On the nature of theory The bulk of this chapter is concerned with an exposition of standard axiomatic functionalism (Sections 2.2-2.2.3), a consideration of realisational aspects of the theory (Sections 2.3-2.3.3) with particular focus on "incomplete neutralization" and imperfect homonymy (Section 2.4), and an analysis of the implications of a modified version of the theory (Section 2.6) for the semantic notions - which are roughly analogous to "incomplete neutralization" and imperfect homonymy - of "nuance" and imperfect synonymy. As a prelude to the exposition of the theory, the chapter begins (Sections 2.1-2.1.3), with a consideration of basic metatheoretical presuppositions (some of which have been broached informally in Chapter One) underlying - or, perhaps better, overarching - not only standard axiomatic functionalism, but also the extended version. Karl Popper proposes the following typology of theories : First, logical and mathematical theories Second, empirical and scientific theories Third, philosophical or metaphysical theories (Popper 1963: 197) Of these, logical and mathematical theories are "demonstrable"; that is to say, they can be verified - i.e. shown incontrovertibly to be true (as Popper points out such theories are confined to logic and finite arithmetic (Popper 1973: 38)). Scientific theories, by contrast, cannot be verified; rather, in order to qualify as scientific, they should be set up in such a way that they are potentially refutable. A scientific theory cannot be proven; it can only be corroborated by surviving various rigorous attempts to refute it by confronting it with critical data. Ultimately, it may be confronted with data which it cannot account for. In this case, it will be refuted, and should be replaced by a new and more adequate theory of a type which can account for all the relevant data, as soon as such a theory is put forward. Philosophical or metaphysical theories, finally, are "neither demonstrable nor refutable, but are RATIONALLY ARGUABLE" (Lass 1976: 216).

36

Standard axiomatic fanctionalism

I believe that the second and third categories of theory which Popper identifies are of particular relevance to axiomatic-functionalist linguistics, and I shall consider implications of them at various points in this book. 7 For convenience, I shall refer to Popper's second category of theories (his empirical and scientific theories) as scientific theories, and his third category of theories (his philosophical or metaphysical theories) as metaphysical theories. In their approach to the philosophy of science Mulder and Hervey base themselves largely on Popper, refining his ideas particularly with respect to the relationship between scientific theories, and scientific descriptions. Those aspects of Mulder and Hervey's philosophy of science which are of most relevance to this book may be summarised under three categories, as follows: (1) Like Popper, Mulder and Hervey stress the necessity of distinguishing between scientific theories and non-scientific, particularly metaphysical, theories. With regard to metaphysical theories, Mulder and Hervey identify two methodological approaches: the speculative and the instrumentalist. The difference between these two is that "existential assumptions are attached to the first but not to the second" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 5). That is to say, speculative theories are regarded as in some sense true, while instrumentalist theories are merely regarded as producing the desired "output" (for a critique of the speculative and instrumentalist approaches cf. Mulder 1989: 7-12). An example of an instrumentalist notion for Mulder and Hervey is "the notion "morpho-phoneme" in Bloomfieldian linguistics, unless one assumes that their objects really exist, in which case they are speculative" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 5). Scientific theories are to be preferred to metaphysical theories whenever the former are available (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 1; Mulder 1989: 8). (2) Unlike Popper, Mulder and Hervey argue that there is a crucial ontological distinction between a scientific theory and a scientific description made under that theory. In the natural sciences this distinction is trivial, since there is only one (known) universe which a natural scientific theory, such as physics, is called upon to describe, i.e. the natural universe. In the case of a science such as linguistics, however, there are a potentially infinite number of "parallel universes", which a linguistic theory is called upon to describe, i.e. the potentially infinite number of natural languages (cf. Mulder - Hervey 1980: 67; Mulder 1989: 37-43). Thus, for Mulder

On the nature of theory

37

and Hervey, a scientific linguistic theory does not directly provide specific hypotheses relating to the data of particular languages; rather it provides the general abstract models in terms of which it becomes possible to produce specific hypotheses which together form the basis for descriptive statements about particular languages (for the distinction between hypothesis and descriptive statement, see Mulder 1989: 43). Thus, the theory provides the general notion "phoneme", but it is the particular description which provides the particular notion "phoneme lb/ in English". As Mulder says: The role of the theory in this respect is that from it the form or matrix for descriptive statements can be derived, and it is, again, the theory that makes any descriptive statement scientifically meaningful. It is also the theory that allows us to ask meaningful questions about the data, and to formulate our observations of the data in a meaningful way (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 10). This implies that a hypothesis, "should not contain any non-primitive terms that are not defined by the theory, nor should it state anything that is either irrelevant to, or inconsistent with, the theory in question" (Mulder 1989: 181). (3) Mulder and Hervey stipulate that a scientific theory should permit descriptions which are in principle refutable, in that it could in principle be demonstrated that they are internally inconsistent, inadequate to the external data, or not as simple as they might be (Mulder 1989: 7, 55-65). In order for it to be demonstrable that the hypotheses which form the basis for descriptions are inadequate to the data, these hypotheses must refer to properly observable phenomena. In the case of linguistics these phenomena will be of a phonetic or a semantic nature (Mulder 1989: 181). Of these interconnected stipulations, it is (3) which for Mulder and Hervey crucially demarcates scientific from non-scientific theories. More precisely within (3), it is the principle of refutability by potential demonstration of inadequacy to the observable external phenomena which specifically differentiates scientific theories from metaphysical theories. That is to say, descriptions made in terms of metaphysical theories can be evaluated with respect to their internal consistency and overall simplicity. Only hypotheses made under a scientific theory can in addition be evaluated with a view to their

38

Standard axiomatic

functionalism

potential refutation in terms of their adequacy to the data. In addition to these three stipulations about the nature of theories (and descriptions made under them), there is one more claim put forward by Mulder which I wish to highlight. This is that in a theoiy: .... there is usually one all-pervading principle that characterises the whole approach. All the other principles are subordinate to it, or, at least, they are interpreted in terms of it. For Functionalists this all-pervading principle, i.e. their primary point of view, is embodied in A. Martinet's dictum: "Function is the criterion of linguistic reality" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 10). Mulder highlights the necessity for adopting a single overall point of view for a number of reasons. I shall not discuss all of these here (but cf. Mulder 1989: 6). Rather, I want briefly to focus on one practical consideration; namely, that: It is perhaps possible in principle to have a thoroughly rigorous theory with an extremely complicated or multiple aim .... but such a theory would be so complex and unwieldy as to be completely useless, except maybe in the hands of some universal genius Therefore, a theory that wishes to claim to be a truly scientific theory should be as nearly monistic as possible (Mulder 1989: 6). Mulder is, I believe, quite correct to stipulate this monistic approach to linguistic enquiry; as he points out, this is the approach which is found in "the more rigorously organised sciences" (Mulder 1989: 6), of which the natural sciences are the prime examples. The notion that linguistics should in principle attempt to emulate the rigour and aspects of the methodology of the natural sciences has been criticised on a number of grounds. Notably it has been claimed that by excluding non-scientific elements linguistics relinquishes its most potentially important insights (cf. Lass 1976: 213-220). Such arguments are not without their merits, and, as has already been noted, Mulder himself accepts that there is nothing wrong with nonscientific speculation, provided there is no scientific alternative which covers the same phenomena (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 4). If, of a particular theory, however "... it can be demonstrated that it can be

On the nature of theory

39

scientific and non-speculative - and for those areas for which this can be demonstrated - speculativism has to be rejected" (Mulder 1989: 8). The phrase "for those areas for which this can be demonstrated" implies that there would be nothing wrong with a theory which was in general respects scientific but which included speculative elements - provided the speculative elements were clearly dissociable from the scientific ones. That is to say, if a theory mixes scientific with nonscientific elements, it may still be regarded as a reasonable theory provided (i) the non-scientific (speculative) elements are not to our knowledge substitutable by scientific ones which cover the same phenomena, and (ii) the scientific and non-scientific elements are genuinely discrete, such that the non-scientific elements can, if desired, be "extracted" from the theory (or even substituted by other non-scientific elements which cover the same phenomena), without interfering with the scientific elements of the theory and the descriptions it gives rise to.

2.J.I. Scientific theories as worst-case

theories

There is one aspect of scientificity which is deducible from the notion of refutability, and seems to be universally accepted in the natural sciences. It is not, however, typically made explicit in linguistics, and therefore deserves special mention. This is the notion that scientific theories are worst-case theories, and that the descriptions made under them are worst-case descriptions. What I mean by this is that a scientific theory should be consistent and unified - i.e. non-adhoc - and should yield descriptions of a type which themselves account for all the relevant phenomena in a consistent and unified manner. This stipulation is deducible f r o m the criterion of refutability, since refutability implies that ad-hoc elements are not introduced into descriptions in order to avoid refutation. To give a practical example, the worst-case doctrine implies that having established in the theory that allomorphs have phonological forms, rather than being phonological forms (cf. Mulder 1968: 43; Mulder — Hervey 1980: 61), we are not logically entitled to identify an allomorph with a phonological form. This is the case, even where a particular signum has only one allomorph (this allomorph by definition having only one phonological form), and where the phonological form of this allomorph is not shared by any other

40

Standard axiomatic functionalism

allomorph (i.e. where this phonological form could not be the form of the realisation of any other signum). Thus, the signum modicum in English has only one allomorph, and the phonological form of this allomorph can only be the realisation of this particular signum. General logical principles, however, dictate that this does not permit us to regard as the same entity the single allomorph of the signum modicum and the phonological form of this allomorph. This principle holds even where every signum in a particular semiotic system has only one allomorph and where the cenological form (the nonlanguage analogue of phonological form: cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 60, Def. 23; Mulder 1989: 455, Def. 23) of no one allomorph is shared by any other allomorph (i.e. where there are no homomorphs throughout the entire system; cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 26; Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 26, for a formal definition of homomorph). That is to say, it is the case where we could identify each signum unambiguously in terms of its cenological (or phonological) form. This rules out the sort of analysis apparently motivated by purely practical considerations - which proposes "that the parts of a word may be phonemes or morphemes, and that these may be mixed up together (e.g. in cats the first part [i.e. cat] is a morpheme and the second fi.e. 5] a phoneme)" (Hudson 1984: 54). A more detailed formal discussion of the notions signum, allomorph and phonological form is provided in Section 2.2.1. For practical purposes, we could happily disregard the distinction between allomorph and cenological (phonological) form in the case of a system in which each signum was unambiguously identifiable in terms of its cenological (phonological) form. Indeed, we could go further, and disregard the distinction between signum and cenological (phonological) form. In the case of natural languages such as English and French, as Mulder observes: We can even speak of the sign [signum] 'man' and the sign [signum] 'boeuf' as if they had writeable or nameable forms. We should not forget, however, that this is only by way of speaking. If we want to talk about things in an intelligible manner, we have to simplify, and the degree of this simplification (and distortion) is dictated by purely practical considerations (Mulder 1969: 111).

On the nature of theory

41

There is nothing exceptional about linguistics in this respect. In the case of a natural science such as physics, changes to an existing theory may yield a new theory which accounts for (or predicts) dramatically different phenomena in certain areas, but more or less the same phenomena in other areas. Assuming that the new theory provides a reasonable account of all the relevant phenomena, while the old one does not, we are to regard the new theory as globally truer (or more truth-like) than the old one. That is to say, the new theory is to be considered truer than the old one even for those areas of phenomena in which the two theories yield identical results. The new theory is also to be considered truer even if it is more complex as a theory than the old one. Given that the old theory were simpler, someone whose interests were purely practical might continue to make use of it for areas of work in which he or she was satisfied that it would not yield significantly different results from the new one. With respect to physics, for instance, this might be the case with an engineer in certain areas of work. This situation is analogous to the linguist - or other language practitioner - who treats signa ("words", etc; cf. Chapter One, Section 1.2.3) as if they had writeable or nameable forms. It is useful to be able to behave in this way. However, the local serviceability of the superseded account implies neither its global nor its local validity in strict scientific terms.

2.7.2. Interfaceability In addition to the criteria for a core-linguistic theory laid down by Mulder and Hervey, I believe we can establish one more criterion for a good core-linguistic theory: that of interfaceability. That is to say, we should expect of a core-linguistic theory that relevant aspects of the descriptions it yields should be reapplicable in such areas as historical linguistics, sociolinguistics, text-linguistics, and so on. At the moment a global judgement of the criterion of interfaceability is impossible. This is in part because of the relative immaturity of all the language disciplines - from historical linguistics to the various forms of "macrolinguistics" (cf. Lyons 1991: 14, 207) (also known as "hyphenated linguistics": Sampson 1980: 10), such as psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics and text-linguistics, and including, I believe, core-linguistics itself. More subtly, it is because

42

Standard axiomatic

functionalism

any theory defines positively the scope of its data (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 11), and negatively at least aspects of the scope of the data of adjoining disciplines - as Mulder notes of the scope of nondenotational semantics (Mulder 1989: 80). That is to say, by adopting axiomatic functionalism as a theory we are making a statement directly about the kind of phenomena that our linguistics does and does not cover and indirectly about the kind of phenomena which related language disciplines should and should not cover. Thus, axiomatic functionalism rules out the possibility that we regard text as a higher-level unit than the sentence within our core-linguistic theory as many text-linguists have suggested. This dictates that if we venture into text linguistics from an initial axiomatic-functionalist core-linguistic point of view, and if we are to consider "text" a useful notion at all, we must regard it differently from those who start with a different initial point of view (see also Chapter Six, Section 6.7). This suggests that axiomatic functionalists should, at least in principle, map out their conception of the relationship between corelinguistics and the other language disciplines, and that they should be particularly concerned with the areas in which the other language disciplines interface directly with axiomatic functionalism. Some interesting preliminary work has been carried out in this area (Hervey 1990). However, it is clear that the vast bulk remains to be done. For the moment we must regard the criterion of interfaceability as both a promissory and an admonitory note.

2.1.3. Theoretical and descriptive

simplicity

One of the relevant factors in assessing two approaches which cover the same or nearly the same phenomena is their relative simplicity. Such simplicity can be assessed at both the theoretical and descriptive levels. As a general rule, descriptive simplicity may be said to be more important than theoretical simplicity. That is to say, if a somewhat more complex theory can be shown consistently to produce more simple descriptions than a more simple theory, the more complex theory is to be preferred. This is not only intuitively reasonable; it also makes sense from the point of view of the fact that for every one theory there are a potentially infinite number of descriptions that may be made under it. In terms of the overall number of simplicities therefore, the slightly greater complexity at the

On the nature of theory

43

theoretical level pales into insignificance. As Mulder puts it: ... where there is a choice between sacrificing some simplicity (but this should always be within reason) in the theory in order to simplify descriptions or vice versa, it is good strategy to opt for the former. This is because ... there is a one-many relationship between theory and descriptions, and it is better to sacrifice simplicity only once, rather than doing this in every single description under that theory (Mulder 1989: 63). I have already looked at one aspect of theoretical simplicity. This is embodied in Mulder's injunction that a theory should be "as nearly monistic as possible". From the point of view of overall simplicity this is normally rather trivial; the more nearly monistic a theory is, the narrower its descriptive potential will tend to be. A simple theory is thus attained at the cost of relatively limited descriptive potential. There is one circumstance, however, in which this monistic aspect of theory is not trivial. This is where one theory has the same scope as another, or greater scope than it, but where the former can be shown to be more fully monistic that the latter. In Chapters Three and Four I shall try to demonstrate that this is the case with extended axiomatic functionalism as compared to standard axiomatic functionalism. A second and related aspect of theoretical simplicity is embodied in the notion of symmetry, or, more generally structural analogy. The more a theory consistently reapplies the same notions in different areas, the more simple it is. I shall attempt to show that in these terms as well extended axiomatic functionalism is more simple than standard axiomatic functionalism. Compared with theoretical simplicity, descriptive simplicity tends to be somewhat difficult to assess. There are good reasons for this, and bad ones. The good reasons have to do with what might be called "legitimate trade-off'. For instance, in phonology it might sometimes be legitimate to make our phonematic description more complex (e.g. to increase the number of phonemes we establish) in order to allow for a greatly simplified phonotactics. At other times the reverse might be the case. In principle at least we could also have cases where it was not clear whether a phonematically more complex but phonotactically less complex description was to be preferred to a phonematically less complex but phonotactically more complex description. Ultimately, we might have to fall back on purely

44

Standard axiomatic

functionalism

aesthetic considerations, or even deem both descriptions to be equally reasonable. "Legitimate trade-off' contrasts with what might be called "illegitimate trade-off'. An example of this latter would be a description in which we increased the number of phonemes (or other phonological entities) in order to make our statements of realisation (or realisation rules) more simple - that is in order to simplify the descriptive relationship between our phonology and our allophonics. From a functionalist point of view, that this is illegitimate should be obvious; for it violates the functional principle which is at the core of functionalist thinking. That it is illegitimate in the case of phonology in particular is doubly demonstrated when we consider the nature of allophones. In axiomatic functionalism allophones are protocolised phonetic forms (i.e. models for generalisations about speech sounds, symbolised / : cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 59, Def. 22a; Mulder 1989: 455, Def. 22a) which are brought into a relationship with a phonological distinctive function (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 44, Def. 7a 3 ; Mulder 1989: 441, Def. 7a3), phonological distinctive function being symbolised as d, and allophone as /Rd. A more detailed formal discussion of the notions allophone and phonetic form is provided in Section 2.2.1, and a more formal discussion of phonology, phoneme and distinctive function is provided in Section 2.2.3. For current purposes and for purposes of the discussion of the ontology in Section 2.2.1, distinctive function can be defined as "semiotic identity", i.e. the being of an entity (as opposed to other entities within the language in question) in phonology or grammar. Protocolisation means the representation of those aspects of the phenomena which are relevant to a description. This representation is normally achieved in terms of an existing a priori theory (such as the International Phonetic Alphabet for speech sounds). Protocols are thus "direct statements of particular observational facts" (Mulder 1989: 46), or generalisations about these facts. As Mulder observes, protocolisation is an essential adjunct to description proper: It is protocols, not the phenomena directly that scientific descriptions refer to. Phenomena are evasive and fluid. At the moment of observation they have already receded to the past, and are then no longer available phenomena. This is why one has to 'arrest' them as is done by protocolization. This is also why descriptive statements can only refer to protocols, not to

On the nature of theory

45

phenomena directly. By protocolization, phenomena, which are 'events', become 'facts' (Mulder 1989: 46-47). One aspect of protocolisations is that they are arbitrary; by "arbitrary" is meant here, as elsewhere in an axiomatic-functionalist context, "could have been different/could have been effected in another way", i.e. not (purely) natural, i.e. conventional. This is a sense which is different from any of the uses of "arbitrary" in everyday speech, and from the typical use of the term in modern linguistics, but comes close to Saussure's usage of the term in the Cours (as noted in Lyons 1991: 55). It is important to stress that the arbitrariness of protocolisations does not also exclude their being appropriate or motivated; thus a phonetic protocolisation, for instance, may well reflect innate articulatory or auditory constraints (as well as learnt ones). The following example illustrates what I have in mind. If we regard dark [1] and light 11] as two (generalised) "speech sounds", we may say that English IM has two allophones 11] and [1] (in fact this remains the standard analysis for Received Pronunciation English, as well as a number of other dialects; cf. Mulder 1989: 182; Giegerich 1992: 211-213; Giegerich's account also provides a simple realisation rule based on the two-allophone analysis). If we make a cruder protocolisation we might ignore this difference and say that English had only one Ί'-allophone. Conversely, we might wish to make an extremely delicate protocolisation which recognises five or twenty or even a hundred different Ί'-allophones in English. 8 Clearly the recognition of more or fewer allophones dictates a change in the statements of realisation. That is to say "rule simplicity", in this area at least, is determined by the arbitrary (but not necessarily inappropriate or unmotivated) decision of the linguist about how to segmentalise the universe of speech sounds. Again, this should all be obvious from a functionalist point of view. It is, however, worth pointing out because of the extent to which rules (and cognate notions) have come to predominate, particularly in generative approaches. This has had the effect of shifting the focus of interest in linguistics away from simplicity at the purely formal (or abstract) levels, to simplicity in terms of level correlations, and specifically in terms of generalisations about correlations between entities at different levels. From a functionalist point of view trade-off in this area is not legitimate. Simplicity at the

46

Standard axiomatic

fimctionalism

purely formal (or abstract) level takes absolute precedence over simplicity of correlation between formal and realisational entities.

2.2. Standard axiomatic functionalism: basic components As noted in Chapter One (Section 1.1) standard axiomatic functionalism has three theoretical components: ontology (also known as sign theory or signum theory), semantics, and systemology. In the following Sections (Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3) I discuss each of these components in turn. Fig. 2.1 is a representation of the ontology - plus associated phonetic notions - and the semantics of standard axiomatic functionalism. The representation of the ontology is based on the figure in Mulder (1989: 166). The representation of the semantics is based on Mulder and Hervey (1972: 39), reproduced in Mulder (1989: 150). Two things should be noted about Fig. 2.1 (and also Fig. 2.9 "Modified standard axiomatic functionalism: ontology and semantics"; Section 2.6). Firstly, I have been deliberately "generous" in my use of symbols. I suspect it is possible to reduce the number of symbols, and therefore basic concepts, used. I believe, however, that a thoroughgoing attempt to do this is more sensibly left to subsequent publications - and possibly to other authors, who are better equipped than myself to deal with all potential set-theoretical and relation-theoretical ramifications. Secondly, I have constructed the step-pyramid "boxes" of Fig. 2.1 and Fig. 2.9 (Section 2.6) to conform to the overall step-pyramidical structure of Fig. 3.1 (extended axiomatic functionalism: signum ontology; Chapter Three, Section 3.1). The step-pyramidical structure of Fig. 3.1 obviously has no direct relevance to Fig. 2.1 or Fig. 2.9. However, since Fig. 2.1 and Fig. 2.9 (and associated information) are specifically intended to prefigure Fig. 3.1 (and associated information), I felt it useful for expository purposes to superimpose the step-pyramidical structure of Fig. 3.1 onto both Fig. 2.1 and Fig. 2.9.

2.2.1. The ontology of standard axiomatic functionalism There are two phonetic notions entities associated with the ontology of standard axiomatic functionalism. These are as follows:

Standard axiomatic ßmctionalism: basic components

47

S E M A N T I C S

Key to symbols R R' & ( ) '·••·"

in relation to in converse relation to a conjunction of a set of [a] certain [set of] > relation of correspondence

Figure 2.1. semantics

Standard

• 4 — r e l a t i o n of mutual implication relation of transformation other relation d distinctive function in phonology s distinctive function in grammar

axiomatic

functionalism:

ontology

and

48

Standard axiomatic

fiinctionalism

Image or phonetic image is "a model for the unique form of a single realisation" (Mulder 1989: 153; cf. also Mulder 1989: 455, Def. 22). That is to say, it is a model for a spatio-temporally unique speech phenomenon; it does not involve any abstract linguistic analysis proper. Thus a model for a particular occurrence of [11 ("dark T " ) without any further reference to its linguistic status would be an image. Image can be symbolised as i . Phonetic form is "a generalised model for a class of impressionistically similar speech phenomena ..." (Shimizu — Lamb 1985: 109; cf. Mulder - Hervey 1980: 59, Defs. 22, 22a; Mulder 1989: 455: Def. 22a). [1] as a general notion - in contradistinction to |11 ("light T " ) , for instance - is a phonetic form. Like image, phonetic form does not involve reference to linguistic analysis proper. Image and phonetic form are therefore independent of particular languages and are models for either those phonetic aspects of the "brute facts" of language which it is believed will be relevant for linguistic analysis, in the case of image, or generalisations for these aspects, in the case of phonetic form. (Note also that one may have "brute facts" of a purely relational nature, such as are required for the treatment of tones in tone languages, for example.) In Mulder's terminology these models are "protocolisations" standing for the facts of speech, or generalisations about these facts (cf. Section 2.1.3; also Mulder 1989: 45-49). Images and phonetic forms are related to one another by the member-to-class operator; and they may be regarded as mutually implying one another. This relationship of mutual implication is represented in Fig. 2.1 by a vertical doubleheaded arrow. Phonetic form can be symbolised as/, where/={/}. Once we move to the right of (phonetic) image and phonetic form we move into the ontology proper, i.e. into linguistics proper. This change of status is signalled in Fig. 2.1 by the break between the boxes representing (phonetic) image and phonetic form, and those representing the entities of the ontology. The entities of the ontology are as follows: Allophonon (in Mulder's terminology) or phonete (the term preferred by Lamb) is an image brought into a relationship with a phonological distinctive function. Thus, an allophonon (phonete) is not simply a model for a speech sound such as [1| occurring at a particular time and place. Rather, it is a model for this speech sound, |l|, viewed as the realisation of a phonological entity in a particular language, such as the phoneme 71/ in English. An allophonon

Standard axiomatic fiinctionalism: basic components

49

(phonete) is an image "having and in its capacity of having a particular phonological distinctive function" (Mulder 1989: 167). An allophonon (phonete) is thus arrived at from an image by application of the operator "distinctive function" (cf. Shimizu — Lamb 1985: 110; Mulder - Hervey, 1980: Def. 7a 3 ; Mulder 1989: 441, Def. 7a3). This is represented in Fig. 2.1 by a thick-shafted arrow of transformation, which is intended to be reminiscent of the doubleshafted arrow of transformation used in transformationalgrammatical approaches. The arrow of transformation indicates that the form of one "column" (i.e. ontological level: cf. Mulder 1989: 166) is carried over into the next "column" (ontological level). This notation was suggested by Michael Lamb, and is used wherever an analogous "transfer of form" occurs. Allophonon (phonete) may be symbolised as z'Rd, where d stands for distinctive function in phonology. Allophone is a class of allophonons (phonetes), just as phonetic form is a class of images (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 60, Def. 23a; Mulder 1989: 455, Def. 23al). That is to say, allophone stands in the same relation to allophonon (phonete) as phonetic form does to image. Allophone also stands in the same relation to phonetic form as allophonon (phonete) does to image (it is related by application of the distinctive function operator). An allophone is a generalised model for speech phenomena brought into a relationship with a (phonological) distinctive function. Thus, [1] is an allophone of the phoneme /l/ in English. Allophone can be symbolised as / Rd, or equivalently as {/Rd}. Phonological form is a "self-contained class of allophones" (Mulder - Hervey 1980: 60, Def. 23; Mulder 1989: 455, Def. 23). Thus l\l in English is generally taken to have the two allophones [1] and [1] (as noted in Section 2.1.3 the number of allophones we describe a particular phonological entity as having is a function of the nature and delicacy of the phonetic protocolisation we adopt). Phonological form and allophone imply one another, as is indicated by the double-headed arrow. Phonological form can be symbolised as/? where/? = {flnRd}. Closely related to the notion of phonological form is that of figura. Mulder and Hervey define a figura as a "semiotic entity that has only form" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 43, Def. 2b; Mulder 1989: 438, Def. 2b), i.e. it is a semiotic entity which bears no direct relation to meaning. This can be compared with a signum (see

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Standard axiomatic functional ism

below), which is defined as a "semiotic entity which has both form and information-value" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 42, Def. 2a 1 ; Mulder 1989: 436, Def. 2a 1); unlike the figura, therefore, the signum bears a direct relation to both form and meaning. Figura is not represented in Fig. 2.1. In practical terms, the difference between a phonological form and a figura is this: a figura, as a notion in the ontology, corresponds to a phonological entity (i.e. a distinctive feature, phoneme, phonotagm, para-phonotactic feature, or paraphonotactic entity), as a notion in the systemology (cf. Section 2.2.3); i.e. a figura corresponds to an entity which is established as a "coherent whole" in the phonology. A phonological form, however, need not correspond to a phonological "coherent whole". Rather, the notion phonological form is established solely to account for the phonological "shape" of allomorphs of particular signa (see below). This phonological shape may correspond to various non-coherent phonological "bits", rather than to phonological entities (as coherent wholes) in the systemology (cf. the discussion in Mulder 1989: 119120 of "discontinuous allomorphs" and related issues). Form - moving back to the bottom of Fig. 2.1 and going one column rightwards - is an allophonon (phonete) brought into a relationship with the distinctive function appropriate to a particular signum. This relationship is represented in Fig. 2.1 by a second arrow of transformation. A form is a model for the phonetic aspect of the singular realisation of a grammatical entity (rather than a phonological entity). Note that form, as defined by Mulder, involves reference to phonological as well as grammatical analysis. Thus, for Mulder, a form is "an allophonon (phonete) of a signum"; for Hervey it is simply an "image of a signum" (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 204, Def. lb l a ; also Mulder - Hervey 1980: 205, Def. l b l b ) . Both Mulder's and Hervey's definitions are consistent with the overall theory, and both can be incorporated into it. That is to say, the single term "form" is used to apply to two different notions. Although Hervey's notion of "form" is interesting, and has its own practical ramifications, I shall not further explore these in this book, concentrating rather on "form" as defined by Mulder. An example of a form is a model for the speech sound sequence [fil] (occurring at a particular time and place), this being considered the realisation of both the phonological form /fil/ and the signum fill. Form, as defined by Mulder, can be symbolised as F, where F=(/ Rd)Rs. Form, as defined by Hervey, could be symbolised as F, where F-iRs.9

Standard axiomatic functionalism: basic components

51

Allomorphon - moving one column to the right from allophone is an allophone brought into a relationship with the distinctive function appropriate to a particular signum. Allomorphon is related to allophone by reapplication of the same distinctive function operator through which form is related to allophonon (phonete). This relationship is represented in Fig. 2.1 by a second arrow of transformation. An allomorphon is thus a generalised model for the phonetic aspect of the realisation of a signum; like form, however, allomorphon includes reference to phonological form. It is the generalised nature of an allomorphon which distinguishes it from a form; that is to say, an allomorphon is a class of forms, just as an allophone is a class of allophonons (phonetes). An example of an allomorphon is a generalised model for the speech sound sequence [fil] (in effect generalised away from a particular time and place), this being considered the realisation both of the phonological form /fil/ and the signum fill. Allomorphon can be symbolised as (/Rd)Rs, or equivalently as {(/Rd)Rs}. It would also be possible to establish a generalisation of the allomorphon type from Hervey's notion of form (i.e. /Rs). This would have the formula ^Rs, or equivalently {/Rs}. It could perhaps be termed a protocolisedallomorph (cf. also Chapter Three, Section 3.1.1 for the corresponding notion of a protocolised alloseme on the content side of the signum in extended axiomatic functionalism). Allomorph - moving one column to the right from phonological form - is a phonological form brought into a relationship with the distinctive function appropriate to a particular signum, i.e. "a particular phonological form (i.e. member of a particular class of phonological forms) in its capacity of having a particular distinctive function (in grammar)" (Shimizu — Lamb 1985: 106). Alternatively, it is a "member of an expression ... (as a class)" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 24a»; cf. Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 24bla). An allomorph is also a class of allomorphons. Just as phonological form and allophone imply one another, so allomorph and allomorphon imply one another. An example of an allomorph is the phonological form /fil/, considered as the realisation of the signum fill. Allomorph can be symbolised as pRs, or equivalently as {(/Rd)Rs). Expression - moving one step up from allomorph - is a set of allomorphs, i.e. "a particular self-contained class of phonological forms in their capacity of having a particular distinctive function (in grammar)" (Shimizu — Lamb 1985: 105; cf. Mulder — Hervey

52

Standard axiomatic functionalism

1980: 60, Def. 24a; Mulder 1989: 455, Def. 24a). Expression and allomorph imply one another. An example of an expression is that aspect of the signum fill which relates directly to non-meaningrelated entities in the ontology and associated phonetic notions - i.e. the entities described in this section: (phonetic) image, phonetic form, allophonon (phonete), allophone, phonological form, form, allomorphon, and allomorph. Expression can be symbolised as E, where Ε = {/?* n Rs}. Having considered the non-meaning-related, or expression-side, entities of standard axiomatic functionalism, I turn now to the meaning-related, or content-side, entities. Still within what can be regarded as the ontology, these are as follows: Reference is a model for the meaningful aspect of the singular realisation of a signum, just as form is a model for the phonetic aspect of the singular realisation of a signum (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 204, Def. lb 2 a , Def. lb21»). Reference is thus the converse of form. Reference and form imply one another, since reference and form are two aspects of the same entity (cf. also Mulder 1989: 162). Reference can be symbolised as R, where R=(/Rd)R's (and where the symbol ' stands for '[in] converse [relation to]'). Note that reference, as defined by Hervey, is the converse of form, as defined by Hervey, and is therefore a different notion from reference, as defined by Mulder. Reference in Hervey's sense can be symbolised as R, where R=iR's. I shall not explore reference in Hervey's sense further in this book, although it is doubtless interesting and has its own practical ramifications. Utterance is the conjunction of a particular form and a particular reference (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 202, Def. la, Def. lb; Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 29). The notion utterance thus provides a complete model for both phonetic and meaningful aspects of individual realisations of grammatical entities. Just as form and reference imply one another, so utterance and form imply one another, and utterance and reference imply one another. Utterance can be symbolised as U, where U = F&R. 10 Content is a set of references, just as expression is, ultimately, a set of forms. Content is also "the converse of a particular expression" (Shimizu — Lamb 1985: 105; cf. Mulder - Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 24b; Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 24b). From these definitions, it follows that content and reference imply one another, just as expression and form ultimately imply one another, and that

Standard axiomatic functionalism: basic components

53

content and expression imply one another, just as reference and form imply one another. Content can be symbolised as C, where C={pi n R's}. Signum, at the highest level in the theory (along with expression and content), parallels utterance, at the lowest. Thus, just as an expression is ultimately a set of forms, and a content a set of references, and just as an utterance is the conjunction of a particular form and a particular reference, so a signum is "the conjunction of a particular expression and a particular content, which mutually imply one another" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 60, Def. 24; Mulder 1989: 455, Def. 24; cf. Shimizu — Lamb 1985: 105). As Hervey notes, "... an utterance is a 'token' (member) of a signum to the extent of reproducing its properties, as it were 'in miniature' ..." (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 205, Def. lb 2 b ). Signum can be symbolised as S, where S=E&C. The above models can be taken as constituting the ontology of standard axiomatic functionalism (with the exception of (phonetic) image and phonetic form which provide allied phonetic notions). Closely related to the ontology of standard axiomatic functionalism is the semantics, which is represented by the group of boxes to the right of the ontology. This allows the grammatical entities (cf. Section 2.2.3) and their realisations to be related ultimately to meanable entities in the extra-linguistic world, just as phonology (and its realisations) as well as the protocolised entities of general phonetics allow grammatical entities and their realisations to be related to entities in the extra-linguistic world of sound. This relatability of the linguistic models of standard axiomatic functionalism to extra-linguistic entities of sound and meaning is designed to ensure the testability of standard axiomatic-functionalist descriptions in terms of entities which are independent of the theory itself.

2.2.2. The semantics of standard axiomatic functionalism Just as the entities of the ontology, and in particular the entities on the expression side of the signum, proceed from one basic notion, (phonetic) image, so the entities of the semantics proceed from one basic notion, ostensible entity. Ostensible entity is any entity which is "distinct from at least one

54

Standard axiomatic fimctionalism

other entity, or from its own absence" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 206, Def. 4b 1 ). Hervey goes on, "It will be noted that 'ostension' is interpreted here in terms of the functional principle, whereby any 'positive' entity acquires its identity 'negatively' through opposition to other terms" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 206, Def. 4b 1 )· An ostensible entity, therefore, is any "thing" in the world (including "objects", "processes", "relations", etc: cf. Hervey 1979: 31). The notion "ostensible entity" allows us to describe anything in the extralinguistic world (including purely relational things) to which linguistic entities may refer. The notion "ostensible entity" is not represented in Fig. 2.1. The notion which comes closest to ostensible entity and which is represented in Fig. 2.1 is "denotable", and it is from this that my account of standard axiomatic functionalist semantics proper will proceed. Denotable is any "actually or potentially ostensible entity capable of being expressed by the realisation of at least one index" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 206, Def. 4b). As noted in Chapter One (Section 1.2.3), there is properly a distinction between index and signum; signum implies the conveyance of information through conventions, whereas index implies the mere conveyance of information, regardless of whether conventions are involved (see also Mulder — Hervey 1980: 180). Since this distinction is not relevant for the present discussion, however, for "index" in the above quotation we may read "signum". Hervey goes on, "By 'potentially ostensible entity' is meant an entity which, although its existence has not been instanced in a concrete sense (e.g. a fictional entity), would be ostensible in certain specifiable ways. For instance, an entity unicorn, would, if it 'existed', be ostensible via direct evidence of sight" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 206). This stipulation allows us to circumvent potential logical problems regarding the nature of reference to non-existent objects. A denotable, then, is any "entity" in the extra-linguistic world, whether real or purely fictitious, of a type which can be expressed by the realisation of at least one index (signum). Denotable appears in Fig. 2.1, on the far right column at the the bottom. Note that denotable is like (phonetic) image in that it does not imply linguistics proper (although it does imply amenability to expression in linguistic terms). I have separated the box for denotable from the main group of boxes for semantics in order to emphasise this similarity. Denotable, however, is unlike (phonetic) image in that (phonetic)

Standard axiomatic functionalism: basic components

55

image is a "model for the unique form of a single realisation" (Shimizu — Lamb 1985: 109; underlining mine); that is to say (phonetic) image is a model for an entity in the extra-linguistic world. Denotable, on the other hand, is simply an entity in the extralinguistic world, not a model for this entity. Denotatum - moving one column to the left from denotable - is "a denotable denoted by utterances" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 206, Def. 4). When we come to denotatum, we are thus in linguistics proper. The relationship between denotatum and reference is one of one-way correspondence (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1972: 139), symbolised by a single-headed dotted arrow; a particular reference corresponds to (or relates to) a particular denotatum, but a particular denotatum need not correspond to a particular reference (that is to say, it is possible for more than one utterance to describe the same entity, state of affairs, etc. in the world). Denotable and denotatum are concrete notions, which allow us to relate individual utterances (references) to entities in the world which they refer to. However, just as it is possible to establish a one-way correspondence between a reference (utterance) and a particular denotatum (as a concrete entity), so it is possible to establish a oneway correspondence between a particular content (signum) and a particular denotation (as an abstract entity). Denotation means "correspondence with a particular denotation class" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 206, Def. 5); and a denotation class is "the set of all and only the denotata denoted ... by respective utterances belonging to the same signum" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 206, Def. 5b). Denotation class is thus a class of entities the identity of each of which is established in terms of a relationship between reference (utterance) and denotatum. Denotation "corresponds" to this class, but unlike denotation class does not involve restriction to a relationship to one particular signum. A denotation is thus a set of denotata (of a certain type), and as such is shown in the column directly above denotatum in Fig. 2.1. Just as there is a relationship of one-way correspondence between reference (utterance) and denotatum, so there is a relationship of one-way correspondence between content (signum) and denotation (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1972: 39). Thus, just as a single reference corresponds to only one denotatum, but one denotatum may correspond to more than one reference, so a single content corresponds to only one denotation, but a denotation may

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correspond to more than one content. This allows for the coherent treatment of synonymy; synonyms, such as micturate and urinate perhaps, are different signa (let us assume this for the moment), but have the same denotations. More formally, a synonym is a "signum whose denotation class totally overlaps with (is identical to) the denotation class of another signum" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 208, Def. 7b). Equivalently a synonym is a "signum in comparison with and having the same intrinsic ... denotation ... as another signum" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 28). Just as content and reference ultimately imply one another, so denotation and denotatum imply one another.

2.2 J. The systemology of standard axiomatic fiinctionalism The ontology and the semantics of standard axiomatic functionalism allow us to relate semiotic notions to real utterances - and specifically to features of sound and meaning - in the real world. The third component, the systemology, by contrast treats "the internal deployment of [linguistic] objects, ... their analyticity and combinability and connected issues" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 14). Specifically, systemology deals with the internal organisation of phonology (distinctive features, phonemes, phonotagms, etc.), and grammar (morphology, syntax, etc; cf. Chapter One, Section 1.2.3). It therefore covers those areas which have traditionally been regarded as the central concern of linguistics (cf. Chapter One, Section 1.1). As Mulder puts it, "It is true that the whole of the signum theory [i.e. the ontology] is an ontology, and that it is this very ontology that dominates the systemology as well as the semantics" (Mulder 1989: 152; cf. however, below for a discussion of the logical relationship between the ontology and the systemology). In Section 2.2.1, two operators (in the mathematical sense) were discussed in relation to the ontology of standard axiomatic functionalism. The first of these was the member-to-class operator. This derives from set theory, and its coherence as a notion can be taken for granted on the basis of its coherence within set theory. The second operator was what is termed distinctive function. This notion is central to axiomatic functionalism and is not derived from any source outside the theory. In this book I have recognised for standard axiomatic functionalism two sub-types of distinctive function:

Standard axiomatic functionalism: basic components

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distinctive function in phonology, symbolised as d, and distinctive function in grammar, symbolised as s (cf. however, Note 9 to Section 2.1.2). The notion distinctive function pervades the ontology. Either d (distinctive function in phonology) or s (distinctive function in grammar) appears as the right-hand term in each of the definitions in the ontology. Thus: allophonon (phonete) is defined as /Rd, allophone is defined as / R d or as {/Rd}, phonological form is defined as { / n Rd}, form is defined as (/Rd)Rs, allomorphon is defined as (/Rd)Rs or as {(/Rd)Rs}, allomorph is defined a s p R s or as {(/Rd)Rs}, expression is defined as {pl n Rs}, while content is defined as the converse of expression, i.e. {/>' n R}'s}, and signum is defined as E&C, i.e. {/?' n Rs}&{/?i n R}'s}. As noted above, the notions (phonetic) image, sybmolised /, and phonetic form, symbolised / , properly speaking fall outside the ontology; their purpose is to provide phonetic protocolisations of the data, plus simple generalisations from these, for the ontology. Distinctive function is formally defined in standard axiomatic functionalism as "the set of commutations in which an entity [i.e. a phonological entity or a grammatical entity, in a systemology] may partake" (Mulder 1989: 441, Def. 7a3; cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 44, Def. 7a 3 ), and commutation is defined as "alternation (or: choice) between semiotic entities (or ' z e r o ' and semiotic entities) in functional opposition as immediate constituents in a given context" (Mulder 1989: 441, Def. 7a2; cf. Mulder - Hervey 1980: 44, Def. 7a 2 ). It is the analysis of distinctive function itself which is central to systemology (i.e. phonology and grammar), in standard axiomatic functionalism. It will also be seen that since distinctive function is required as an operator in the ontology, in a strictly logical sense the systemology is prior to the ontology, and the ontology presupposes i.e. implies - the systemology.

58

Standard axiomatic functionalism

Key to symbols — •

relation of implication

Figure 2.2. The phonology of standard axiomatic functional ism

Standard axiomatic fitnctionalism: basic components

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In standard axiomatic functionalism the organisation of the phonology and the grammar parallel one another; that is to say the general organisational principles of the systemology are equally instanced in phonology and grammar. The internal organisation of the phonology can be represented as in Fig. 2.2. As can be seen from Fig. 2.2 there are four levels of analysis in phonology; and since grammar and phonology mirror one another, there are four corresponding levels of analysis in grammar (as discussed below). This yields a total of eight levels of analysis for the entire systemology. These eight levels can be termed sub-systems of the overall systemology; with regard to the larger systemological sub-systems of phonology and grammar, the eight levels are subsub-systems. I will work from the bottom of the diagram up, i.e. from the simplest features to the most complex ones. The simplest features in the system of phonology are called distinctive features. At the most basic level of analysis, which I have called the "level of simple phonological entities" in Fig. 2.2, the distinctive features constitute "an inventory of simple entities" (Mulder 1989: 79); that is to say, they are simply opposed to one another without further organisation. Accordingly, a distinctive feature can be defined as the "basic phonological entity" (cf. Mulder 1989: 443, Def. 8a3). This definition points up that distinctive features are by definition the basic building blocks of phonology. They are not themselves further analysable phonologically into simpler, more basic elements. Distinctive features in standard axiomatic functionalism are similar to disinctive features as understood in the "classical phonemics" of Trubetzkoy and later scholars. The level (sub-system) of simple phonological entities is not accorded a single-word name in standard axiomatic functionalism (cf. however, Chapter Three, Section 3.1.2 for the corresponding sub-systemic term, phonidics, in extended axiomatic functionalism). The level of simple entities provides the basic entities for the next level up, the phonematics. From the point of view of the phonematics, a distinctive feature can be defined as the "minimum phonematic entity" (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 46, Def. 8 a 3 ) , i.e. the minimum entity in a phonematics, or as it is described in Fig. 2.2, the basic entity in a phonemantics. The unit in phonematics is the phoneme. The phoneme can be defined as a "self-contained bundle of one or more distinctive features as its immediate (and at the same time: ultimate)

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constituents" (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: Def. 8a, also Def. 8a 2 ; cf. also Mulder 1989: 443, Def. 8a), or as a "self-contained simultaneous bundle of one or more distinctive features" (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: Def. 8a). By "bundle" or "simultaneous bundle" is meant "unordered set". That is to say, a phoneme is an unordered set of distinctive features. The stipulation that these distinctive features are the ultimate constituents of the phoneme reflects the fact distinctive features are not themselves further analysable into simpler entities. The stipulation that distinctive features are also the immediate constituents of the phoneme also rules out the possibility that phonemes might be analysable into simultaneous bundles (unordered sets) of other phonemes (with also a theoretically limitless potential for recursivity). Under such a set up, phonemes would be only ultimately, but not necessarily immediately, analysable into distinctive features. Finally, the stipulation "one or more distinctive features" rules in the possibility that some phonemes might consist of only one distinctive feature; Mulder (1989: 226) proposes that /h/ and /1/ in English, for example, both consist of only one distinctive feature. This proposal is consonant with general principles of set theory, which recognise the distinction between a set (e.g. the phoneme IM as a set) and the only member of that set (e.g. the distinctive feature /I/ as the only member of the phoneme IM). Phonematics itself is the name for the sub-system within the overall phonological system. A phonematics can be defined as a "complex unordered phonological system" (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 43, Def. 2b l b , Def. 3a 1 ; Mulder 1989: 438, Def. 2blb, Def. 3a). It is complex because it involves the analysis of phonemes as complexes (combinations) of distinctive features. It is unordered because these complexes, by definition, involve only unordered sets ("simultaneous bundles"), as already discussed, i.e. they do not involve ordering relations. The relationship between the level of simple phonological entities and phonematics can be described as one of interlock, where interlocking is defined as "the one sub-system providing the basic entities of the other sub-system" (Mulder 1989: 439, Def. 3c2a; cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 44, Def. 3c 2 c ). That is to say, the analysis (which is no more than a simple listing) at the level (sub-system) of simple phonological entities, provides the basic entity, the distinctive feature, of the sub-system of phonematics. This situation means that phonematic analyses are logically dependent on analyses at the level

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of simple phonological entities. This is illustrated in Fig. 2.2 by the "arrow of implication" pointing from phonematics to the level of simple phonological entities. Just as the standard axiomatic-functionalist distinctive feature is similar to the distinctive feature as understood in classical phonemics, so the standard axiomatic-functionalist phoneme is similar to the classical-phonemic phoneme. In accordance with the general principles of axiomatic functionalism, in establishing phonemes, only functional criteria can be brought into consideration (cf. Section 2.1). Thus, "For example, the pre-vocalic part of German Pfund ('pound'), realised as a medium [pf] is nevertheless, under this theory, a simultaneous, i.e. unordered, bundle of [distinctive] features: occlusive, fricative and labial. Crucial here, for a functionalist, is the fact that the order of the features cannot be manipulated, i.e. there is no choice as to changing relations, whilst keeping the constituents (in this case 'distinctive' features) the same" (Mulder 1989: 95; cf. also Section 2.3.3). From the point of view of the phonematics, the phoneme is the unit, i.e. the most complex entity. It is also, however, possible for phonemes to combine with other phonemes (indeed this seems to be a feature of all natural languages). In standard axiomatic functionalism complexes of phonemes are dealt with in the phonotactics. Within the phonotactic sub-system in the phonology, therefore, the phoneme is the basic entity. Accordingly, the phoneme can be defined not only as a "self-contained bundle of one or more distinctive features ..." (cf. above), i.e. in terms of its status within the phonematics. It can also be defined as the "minimum syntagmatic element in phonological system", or as the "minimum phonotactic element" (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 46, Def. 8a, Def. 8a2; Mulder 1989: 443, Def. 8a), this latter definition being made in terms of the status of the phoneme within the phonotactics. Syntagmatic means "the ordering aspect of semiotic entities" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 45, Def. 7b; Mulder 1989: 441, Def. 7b). A syntagmatic entity is an "entity capable of standing in ordering relations with other entities or having an internal structure such that it is capable of containing - as constituents - entities capable of standing in ordering relations with other elements" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 45, Def. 7b 2 ). An alternative term for syntagmatic entity is "tactic entity" (Mulder 1989: 441, Def. 7b2). Ordering relations are "asymmetrical relations between entities in combinations (constructions)" (Mulder 1989:

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440, Def. 6a; cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 44, Def. 6a). As such they contrast with the non-ordering, or simultaneous, or "symmetrical", relations which are one of the defining features of relations between distinctive features in phonematics (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 44, Def. 6b; Mulder 1989: 440, Def. 6b; also above). Phonotactic analysis in axiomatic functionalism is organised around the twin notions of sub-ordination (or determination) and super-ordination (or government). Sub-ordination is defined as a "direct tactic asymmetrical relation of functional dependency" (Mulder - Hervey 1980: 48, Def. 11a; Mulder 1989: 445, Def. 1 la). Super-ordination is defined as the converse of sub-ordination (Mulder - Hervey 1980: 48, Def. 11a; Mulder 1989: 445, Def. 11a). A direct relation is a "relation between constituents (not necessarily immediate constituents) that is not a relation via other constituents" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 52, Def. 15; Mulder 1989: 448, Def. 15). This definition is more relevant to grammar (plerology), and within this to syntax (plerotactics), than it is to phonology, and I shall reconsider it when discussing syntax (plerotactics) subsequently in this Section. Tactic relations are "constructional relations ... between syntagmatic entities, as immediate constituents in combinations (constructions)" (Mulder 1989: 442, Def. 7c2; cf. Mulder - Hervey 1980: 45, Def. 7c*). Functional dependency is dependency proper. Taken together with the notion of asymmetricality, functional dependency implies that one entity in a construction is sub-ordinate to the other - and conversely that the other entity is super-ordinate to the one (for another and rather different kind of what is termed dependency - i.e. occurrence dependency - cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 49-50, Def. 12a, Def. 12b, Def. 12c; Mulder 1989: 446, Def. 12a, Def. 12b, Def. 12c). In a relation of sub-ordination, "... if a and b are in direct tactic relation, and a is for its tactic function dependent on b, but not vice versa (in symbols a-*b), a is said to be sub-ordinate to b, and b superordinate to a. Furthermore, a is said to be standing in peripheral, and b in nuclear position in the construction in question" (Mulder 1989: 445, Def. 11a; cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 48, Def. 1 la); in such a situation a is described as the nucleus (or governing entity) (cf. Mulder - Hervey 1980: 50, Def. 13a; Mulder 1989: 446, Def. 13a), while b is described as the governed entity (or determinant entity) (cf. Mulder - Hervey 1980: 50, Def. 13b; Mulder 1989: 447, Def. 13b). The nucleus can be defined as "in a relation of sub-ordination,

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the identity element for the tactic functions of the other elements" (Mulder 1989: 446, Def. 13a; cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 50, Def. 13a). The peripheral entity can conversely be defined as "in a relation of sub-ordination, a non-nuclear immediate constituent" (Mulder 1989: 447, Def. 13b; cf. Mulder - Hervey 1980: 50, Def. 13b). The unit - i.e. the most complex entity - in phonotactics is the phonotagm. As noted earlier in this Section, phonotactics involves ordering relations. It might be thought that the ordering in question was between the phonemes standing in different positions. In fact, this is not the case. As Mulder points out, the ordering is between the phoneme and the position in which it stands. Taking a phoneme /p/ and a position which we can call ' e l ' , "Such a pair as (p, ei) ... is an ordered pair, if we say that the 'comma' indicates the relation of 'standing in We can say that /p/ stands in ei but not that ei stands in p" (Mulder 1968: 118). The relationship between the ordered η-tuples each of which consists of a phoneme and the position in which it stands, and which together make up a phonotagm, does not involve ordering: "Strange as it may seem at first sight, these «-tuples ... are unordered. It does not make any difference in which order one writes the terms" (Mulder 1968: 118). That is to say, just a phoneme is an unordered set of distinctive features, so a phonotagm is an unordered set of ordered phonemeposition pairs. In practice, in doing phonotactics, one needs to identify the nucleus, since as the "identity element" (see above), this can be said to "stand for" or characterise the entire phonotagm. Consider a simple example, such as English cat (/kat/). Here /a/ can be identified as the nucleus, on grounds of realisational adequacy (regardless of other considerations which might be brought to bear), since vocalic features are central to the pronunciation (realisation) of /kat/. This nucleus can be given a label; it is convenient to label it Ό'. From a phonotactic point of view, therefore /a/ in /kat/ can be described as "/a/ standing in 0", i.e. the ordered pair (a, 0). /k/ and /t/ are both peripheral to /a/. There is also no need to describe either of /k/ or /t/ as more peripheral than the other with respect to /a/; and since there is no need to describe /k/ or /t/ as more peripheral, the general principle of simplicity (Section 2.1) decrees that no attempt be made to establish either of IkJ and Itl as more peripheral. All that needs to be said is that both /k/ and Itl are peripheral to /a/, but that they are differently peripheral. In order to make this plain, one can assign

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different labels to the positions "occupied by" Ikl and Iii - let us say position ' - Γ for the position "occupied by" /k/ and position Ί ' for the position "occupied by" Itl. The phonotagm /kat/ is therefore an unordered set whose members are the ordered pairs (k,-1), (α,Ο) and (U).

Phonotactics is the name of the sub-system within the overall phonology, in which phonotactic analysis is carried out. A phonotactics can be described as a "complex ordered phonological system" (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 43, Def. 2b l c , also Def. 3a 2 ; Mulder 1989: 438, Def. 2blb, Def. 3a) (cf. the earlier definition of phonematics as a "complex unordered phonological system"). The relationship between phonematics and phonotactics (as that between the level of simple phonological entities and the level of phonematics; cf. above) is one of interlock. That is to say, the combinatory analyses in the sub-system of phonematics (i.e. the analyses of phonemes as unordered combinations or sets of distinctive features), provide the basic entity, the phoneme, of the sub-system of phonotactics. This situation means that phonotactic analyses are logically dependent on phonematic analyses. This is illustrated in Fig. 2.2 by the "arrow of implication" pointing from phonotactics to phonematics. By contrast with the relationship between phonematics and phonotactics, the relationship between phonotactics and paraphonotactics (Fig. 2.2; cf. Mulder 1989: 79) - or, as it is also known, the para-phonotactic level (i.e. the next level "up") - is not quite so simple. As Mulder puts it, the para-tactic levels, i.e. the para-phonotactic level, and the para-syntactic (para-plerotactic) level (see below) "... stand slightly outside the system of systems that constitute language, in so far as their connexion with the tactic levels [cf. phonotactic level] is not one of simple interlock. But they do have a real connexion with these levels in that the tactics fcf. phonotactics] provides the bases for the para-tactic [cf. paraphonotactic] entities produced by the para-tactic [cf. paraphonotactic] level" (Mulder 1980: 149). Base, here, is defined as "in a para-tactic [cf. para-phonotactic] entity, the total complex of those features which correspond (on another level) to tactic [cf. phonotactic] entities" (Mulder 1989: 452, Def. 20a; cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 56, Def. 20b). With respect to phonology, the "other level" (referred to in brackets) is the phonotactics. Mulder illustrates this principle in practice as follows: "E.g. in Pekingese /ma/2 (i.e. the

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syllable /ma/ under the rising tone) the base is the phoneme-complex (phonotagm) /ma/" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 56). In Fig. 2.2,1 have drawn a double line between the phonotactics and the paraphonotactics, to illustrate that the relationship between the two levels is not one of simple interlock. Para-phonotactic entities are made up of the base plus para-phonotactic features, these latter being definable as, "phonological features accompanying, but not determining the identity of, phonotactic features" (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 53, Def. 17; also Mulder 1989: 451, Def. 18). The unit in paraphonotactics can be called the para-phonotagm. As noted near the start of this Section, the organisation of grammar (also known as plerology) in standard axiomatic functionalism parallels that of phonology. The fundamental aspects of standard axiomatic-functionalist grammar are presented in Fig. 2.3. In describing standard axiomatic-functionalist grammar, I shall adopt the same procedure as in describing standard axiomaticfunctionalist phonology. That is, I shall work from the bottom of the diagram up, i.e. from the simplest features to the most complex ones. The simplest features in the system of grammar are called monemes. At the most basic level of analysis, the monemes, just as the distinctive features of phonology, constitute "an inventory of simple entities" (Mulder 1989: 79); i.e. they are simply opposed to one another without any further organisation. Accordingly, a moneme can be defined as the "minimum plerological (grammatical) entity" (Mulder 1989: 444, Def. 8b2; cf. Mulder - Hervey 1980: 47, Def. 8b 3 ), emphasising that monemes are the basic building blocks of grammar, just as distinctive features are the basic building blocks of phonology. One of the stipulations regarding the moneme (as any grammatical entity) in standard axiomatic functionalism is that it in order for it to be established the tentative corresponding signum must have a specific and independently identifiable denotation. Thus, in ascribe, describe, and proscribe, the a-, de- and pro- elements are not to be regarded as monemes, since the corresponding signa would not have a specific or independently identifiable denotation. Similarly, the -scribe element is not a moneme, since the corresponding signum would not have a specific and independently identifiable denotation. An associated aspect is that monemes must, within certain limits, exhibit "one hundred per cent productivity" (Mulder 1989: 13), i.e. they must reoccur with only specific restrictions (discussed in

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para-svntax (para-plerotacticsl wunit: para-syntagm· (para-plerotagm) feature: para-syntactic feature (para-plerotactic feature) base: syntagm (plerotagm)

\

svntax (plerotactics) unit: syntagm (plerotagm) basic entity: plereme

X

mprphplQgy (plerematics) · unit: plereme basic entity: moneme level of simple^ grammatical Si Λ (plerological) entities unit: moneme

Key to symbols — •

relation of implication

Figure 2.3. The grammar (plerology) of standard axiomatic functionalism

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Mulder 1989: 193-200) in different contexts, the corresponding signum having in each of these contexts the same denotation. According to this requirement, -ness would appear to be a moneme. "As far as I can see, one can add '-ness' to several categories, e.g. 'table-ness', 7h/-ness', 'kindness', and I do not see any genuine structural, intralinguistic restrictions, other than ridiculousness, redundancy, or other matters of irrelevantness and irrelevancy, including considerations such as cacophony. Of course, one will not find real monstrosities in the dictionary, but they are not structurally impossible - only subjectively ugly and therefore unlikely to be encountered" (Mulder 1989: 199). This requirement of one hundred per cent productivity rules out the acceptance as monemes of a form such as -ling. Although this occurs in duckling, codling and gosling (cf. Mulder 1989: 202) and would appear to have the same denotation in each of these cases, it is not one hundred per cent productive; one cannot, for example, have a pigling in the sense of a young pig. For a critique of the notion of one hundred per cent productivity, and related notions in an extended-axiomatic functionalist context, see Note 33 to Chapter Four, Section 4.3.6. Except in respect of its strict denotational orientation, the moneme in standard axiomatic functionalism is similar to the morpheme of many approaches to linguistics. Just as the level (sub-system) of simple entities in phonology is not accorded a single-word name in standard axiomatic functionalism, so neither is the level (sub-system) of simple entities in grammar (cf. however, Chapter Three, Section 3.1.2 for the corresponding sub-systemic term, lexidics, in extended axiomatic functionalism). The level of simple entities provides the minimum entities for the next level up, the morphology. From the point of view of morphology (also known as plerematics) the moneme can be defined as the "minimum morphological (plerematic) entity" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 47, Def. 8b 3 ), i.e. the basic entity in a morphology (plerematics), as it is described in Fig. 2.3. The unit in morphology (plerematics) is the plereme. This can be defined as a "self-contained (by definition: simultaneous) bundle of one or more monemes as its immediate (and at the same time: ultimate) constituents" (Mulder 1989: 443, Def. 8b; cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 47, Def. 8b, Def. 8b 1 ). Compare also the definition of phoneme above in this Section. As is implied by the separation in standard axiomatic functionalism between phonology

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and grammar (plerology) a plereme may or may not correspond to a "phonological word", i.e. a phonotagm, or complex of phonotagms. Morphology (or plerematics) is the name for the relevant subsystem within the overall grammatical (plerological) system. A plerematics can be defined as a "complex unordered plerological system" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 42, 2£ b ; Mulder 1989: 438, Def. 2a4a). Compare the definition of phonematics above in this Section. Just as in the case of the phoneme, only functional criteria can be brought into consideration in deciding whether something is or is not a plereme. The relationship between morphology (plerematics) and the level of simple grammatical (plerological) entities, just as the relationship between phonematics and the level of simple phonological entities, is one of interlock; that is to say, the level (subsystem) of simple grammatical (plerological) entities provides the basic entity, the moneme, for the sub-system of morphology (plerematics). From the point of view of the morphology (plerematics), the plereme is the unit, i.e. the most complex entity. From the point of view of the grammatical sub-system of syntax (plerotactics), on the other hand, the plereme is the basic entity. Accordingly, the plereme can be defined not only as a "self-contained bundle ... of one or more monemes ..." (Mulder 1989: 443, Def. 8; cf. also above), i.e. in terms of its status within the morphology (plerematics). It can also be defined as the "minimum syntagmatic entity in plerological (grammatical) system" or "minimum plerotactic (syntactic) entity" (Mulder 1989: 443, Def. 8b; cf. Mulder - Hervey 1980: 47, Def. 8b, Def. 8b 1 )· The latter definition is made in terms of the status of the plereme within the syntax (plerotactics). The workings of syntax (plerotactics) in standard axiomatic functionalism precisely parallel the workings of phonotactics, and the definitions of syntagmatic entity, ordering relations, non-ordering relations, sub-ordination, super-ordination, nucleus, peripheral entity, etc. given above with respect to phonotactics apply equally to syntax (plerotactics). The unit in syntax is the syntagm (or plerotagm) (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 48, Def. 9b; Mulder 1989 444, Def. 9b). One important practical difference between phonotactics and syntax (plerotactics) is that syntax (plerotactics), unlike phonotactics, exhibits recursivity. That is to say, in syntax (plerotactics), but not in phonotactics, one can have syntagms within syntagms. This is an interesting and important feature of syntax

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(plerotactics) (though cf. Mulder 1989: 119-110 for a discussion of the de facto limitations of the importance of recursivity in syntax (plerotactics)). It is, however, a purely practical matter. That is to say, the non-feasibility of recursivity in phonotactics is a function of the simple temporally "linear" nature of phonetic realisations. This renders recursive structures in phonology realisationally untenable. Mulder also proposes that in syntax (plerotactics), but not in phonotactics, one needs to distinguish between what he terms "parallel (or conjunctive) determination" and what he terms diverse (disjunctive) determination" (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 50, Def. 14a; 51, Def. 14b; Mulder 1989: 447, Def. 14a, Def. 14b). This distinction has been criticised by Hesel wood (1995), and the following account is based on Hesel wood's arguments. Mulder's distinction between diverse and parallel determination concerns the composition of the position classes associated with the peripheral positions - position classes being definable for present purposes as "sets of items which can occur in the same position ..." (Mulder 1968: 118). As Mulder puts it, "Within subordination I distinguish between diverse determination, i.e. the case in which two or more peripheral constituents can be demonstrated to stand in different positions to the nucleus ..., and parallel determination, i.e. where this is not the case" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 154). Mulder amplifies this distinction elsewhere: "... in cases of parallel determination the position classes of the peripheral constituents are different (though they may have some members in common), whereas in diverse determination they are basically the same" (Mulder 1989: 174-175). Mulder gives as an example of diverse determination John likes Mary (Mulder 1989: 448). Mulder analyses likes as the nucleus of this syntagm. He also claims that any item that can stand in "subject" position can also stand in "object" position, and vice versa, i.e. the "subject" and "object" position classes are the same. As Heselwood points out, this does not appear to take into account reflexive structures, such as He hurt himself. Compare this with He hurt him. In this case him could refer to the same person as the initial He (cf. "What do you think of Bill Clinton, John?". "I admire him". "And what does Hilary Clinton think of Bill Clinton?". "She admires him". "And what does Bill Clinton think of Bill Clinton?". "Oh, he admires him, too". In such a case, "He admires himself' would be at the least rhetorically inept). In most cases, however, He and him in He hurt him would involve reference to two different people (cf. Section

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2.6.1, for a proposed general framework for dealing with referentiality, and Chapter Four, Section 4.2, for a treatment of more specific relevant issues). The fact that himself and him have different meaning potentials means that they cannot be treated as simple allomorphs of one another (this is in any case also ruled out by Mulder and Hervey's general prohibition of free allomorphy; cf. Section 2.3.1). They must therefore be different signa. The conclusion should be that "subject" and "object" are different position classes in English. For the sake of ease of exposition, I shall, however, ignore this in what follows, and instead accept Mulder's proposal that the position classes of "subject" and "object" in English are identical. This, then, would be a case of diverse determination. Parallel determination is illustrated in English by the blue vase (Mulder 1989: 448). Here, the commutes with a etc., while blue commutes with green, white etc. That is to say, the position classes are different (they do not even have any members in common). According to Mulder, therefore, this is a case of parallel determination rather than diverse determination. According to Mulder, "one has to assume parallel determination until this is refuted" (Mulder 1989: 448), i.e. one assumes that the position classes are different until such time as they are shown to be identical, i.e. supposing we had two position classes, a and b, we would have to refute the hypothesis "Class a and class b are not equivalent" (Heselwood 1995: 22; cf. also the important methodological arguments regarding "negativism" presented in Heselwood's article). As Heselwood points out: To refute this we need to list the members of both classes and compare the lists. If the two lists are identical in number the hypothesis cannot be said to have been refuted, for if both lists contain, let us say, ten items this is no proof against one of the classes actually containing an eleventh member ... Mulder quite rightly points out that not finding something in a field of phenomena of infinite extension is no justification for concluding that it isn't there [Mulder 1989: 182; Mulder 1990: 120] ... For while we might be intuitively satisfied that we have in fact identified all possible members of a particular position class, e.g. all the possible commutants of the in the blue vase, and even have the full agreement of all our linguist

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colleagues, we are not at liberty to elevate that satisfaction and agreement to the status of exact knowledge (Heselwood 1995: 22). The criteria for establishing the distinction between parallel and diverse determination thus break down. The distinction must therefore be abandoned, even within Mulder and Hervey's standard axiomatic functionalism. All one can say about peripheral positions which are "equally" peripheral is therefore that they are equally but differently peripheral. This situation is also fairly satifactory in view of the apparent confusion in Mulder with respect to parallel determination in phonotactics. As Heselwood (1995: 19) points out, Mulder's general position is that in phonotactics there is diverse determination but no parallel determination (cf. Mulder 1989: 293-294), i.e. Mulder seems to be claiming that in phonotactics position classes are identical (a view which would appear inconsistent with the distribution of /h/ and /g/ in English for example). Elswhere, however, as Hesel wood also points out (Heselwood 1995: 19), Mulder states that "... archipositions can only obtain, with respect of peripheral positions, in cases of parallel determination" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 155; cf. also Mulder 1989: 230-232, 443, Def. 7h). A further complication with respect to syntactic (plerotactic) analysis should also be considered. As discussed earlier in this Section, in phonotactics one may have a relationship of subordination/super-ordination between two phonemes in a phonotagm, i.e. where the one phoneme is dependent on the other, but the other is not dependent on the one. In such as situation, the non-dependent phoneme is termed the nucleus (or governing entity), and the dependent phoneme is termed the peripheral entity (or governed entity, or determinant entity). This kind of situation is widely recognised in linguistics, and terms such as "head" and "modifier" are used in a similar sense in other approaches, to the sense in which "nucleus" and "determined entity" are used in axiomatic functionalism (cf. Chapter One, Section 1.5). The situation in which a is the governed entity and b the nucleus can be represented as a—»/> (as noted above), i.e. a implies b (or b implied by a). This (and its converse a*^b, i.e. "a is implied by b", or "b implies a"), however, is not the only relationship which logically can obtain between two entities. In addition, one can have a

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situation in which neither a nor b imply one another, and a situation in which a and b both imply one another. The situation in which neither a nor b imply one another can be represented as a< / *b. This is termed by Mulder a relation of coordination, and is defined as a "direct tactic (by implication: symmetrical and therefore simultaneous) relation of mutual functional independency" (Mulder 1989: 445: Def. l i b ; cf. Mulder - Hervey 1980: 48, Def. lib). Mulder gives as an example of coordination the relationship between big and black in a big black box (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 49). The situation in which a and b both imply one another can be represented as a* - >b. This is termed by Mulder a relation of inter-ordination, and is defined as a "direct tactic (by implication: symmetrical, i.e. simultaneous) relation of mutual functional dependency" (Mulder 1989: 446, Def. 1 lc; cf. Mulder - Hervey 1980: 49, Def. 1 lc). As Mulder notes, both coordination and inter-ordination are cases of non-syntagmatic (i.e. simultaneous, or non-ordering) relations between syntagmatics entities. In this respect they contrast with subordination (/super-ordination) which is a case of syntagmatic (i.e. ordering) relations between syntagmatic entities. In practice, it would seem that both inter-ordination and coordination are confined to syntax (plerotactics), and do not figure in phonotactics. As with the issue of recursivity, however, this seems to be a question of what phonetic realisations will "support"; it is not something which is impossible for general logical reasons, or for reasons of the way in which axiomatic functionalism is set up as a theory. Just as phonotactics is the term for the overall sub-system in which phonotactic analysis is carried out, so syntax (plerotactics) is the term for the overall sub-system in which syntactic (plerotactic) analysis is carried out. A syntax (plerotactics) can be defined as a "complex ordered plerological system" (Mulder 1989: 438, Def. 2a4b; cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 42, Def. 2a 3c ). The relationship between morphology (plerematics) and syntax (plerotactics), just as the relationship between phonematics and phonotactics, is one of interlock; the sub-system of morphology (plerematics) provides the basic entities for the sub-system of syntax (pelerotactics). This means that syntax (plerotactics) is logically dependent on morphology (plerematics), as indicated in Fig. 2.3. Just as phonotactics provides the bases for para-phonotactics, so syntax (plerology) provides the sentence-bases for para-syntax (also termed para-plerotactics) (cf. Mulder 1989: 80, 91) or what is also

Standard axiomatic fimctionalism: basic components

73

known as the para-syntactic (or para-plerotactic) level. As noted earlier the base is "in a para-tactic [cf. para-syntactic] entity, the total complex of those features that correspond (on another level) to tactic [cf. syntactic] entities" (Mulder 1989: 452, Def. 20; cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 56, Def. 20b). With respect to grammar (plerology), the "other level" (referred to in brackets) is the level of syntax (plerotactics). In Fig. 2.3 I have drawn a double line between the syntax (plerotactics) and the para-syntax (para-plerotactics), to illustrate that the relationship between the two levels is not one of simple interlock. Para-syntactic entities are made up of the sentencebase plus other para-syntactic (para-plerotactic) features, these being defined as "features accompanying, but not determining the identity of, syntactic entities or conglomerations of syntactic entities" (Mulder 1989: 451, Def. 19; cf. Mulder - Hervey 1980: 54, Def. 18). In natural language, para-syntactic features include such things as intonation patterns (cf. Mulder 1989: 453-454; Mulder — Hervey 1980: 54-55). Clauses are sets of (consist of) para-syntactic entities (in particular cases they may be sets with only one member), a clause being definable as an "immediate constituent (perhaps the only one) of a sentence" (Mulder 1989: 453, Def. 21a; cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 56, Def. 20a). A sentence - the ultimate unit at the parasyntactic (para-plerotactic) level - can be defined as a "plerological entity (by definition corresponding to a signum) with such features that it cannot be a feature (constituent, or other feature) of another plerological entity" (Mulder 1989: 453, Def. 21; cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 56, Def. 20). There is one further area of enquiry which can, for the sake of expository convenience, be included with the systemology. This is the syn-semantics and the para-semantics (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 216-217). These are represented, along with the more basic level of denotation in Fig. 2.4. Properly speaking, these form part of the semantics in standard axiomatic functionalism. However, they parallel features of the phonology and the grammar (plerology), and can therefore be usefully discussed under the same heading as the systemology. Their inclusion alongside the systemology of standard axiomatic functionalism also parallels the discussion of the system ontology of extended axiomatic functionalism (Chapter Three, Section 3.1.2).

74

Standard axiomatic fmictiomdixtn

Key to symbols — •

relation of implication

Figure 2.4. The "abstract semantics" of standard axiomatic functionalism

Standard axiomatic JunclionaUsm: basic components

75

Hervey points out that in standard axiomatic functionalism there are three sources from which contributions may be made to the denotation of a sentential signum: (1) The denotation of signs [signa] corresponding to parts of the sentence-base; (2) The syn-semantic role of the constructional relations (if any) between the signs [signa] corresponding to parts of the sentence-base; (3) The para-sernantic role of the para-syntactic (e.g. intonational) features that accompany the sentence-base (Mulder - Hervey 1980: 216-217). Instead of syn-semantics Mulder has more recently used the term constructional semantics. He comments, "Constructional semantics is envisaged as a sub-discipline which concerns itself with analyzing syntagms qua denotations of their constituents, as well as qua semantic import of the syntactic relations between those constituents. It is theorematic that the denotation of a syntagm can be predicted from the denotations of its constituents and the syntactic relations between those constituents" (Mulder 1989: 81). Just as the more complex levels (sub-systems) in phonology and grammar (plerology) imply the less complex ones, so the para-semantics implies the synsemantics (constructional semantics), and the syn-semantics (constructional semantics) implies the level of denotation. One problem with both constructional semantics (or synsemantics) and para-semantics is that no work has as yet been carried out on them - as is explicitly acknowledged by Mulder for constructional semantics (Mulder 1989: 382). It is therefore impossible to say what forms analyses in these areas would take. It is also reasonable to ignore questions relating to constructional semantics (syn-semantics) and para-semantics in considering specific descriptive proposals within standard axiomatic functionalism. In subsequent discussion, therefore, this is what I shall do, confining my account to theoretical parallels between standard axiomaticfunctionalist constructional semantics (syn-semantics) and parasemantics, and what are at least superficially similar notions in extended axiomatic functionalism.

76

.VΊα tulard axiomatic · [inn iionalism

S Y S T E M O L O G Y phonology grammar (plerology)

"abstract semantics"

Key to symbols • relation of correspondence • relation of implication Figure 2.5. The systemology and "abstract semantics" of standard axiomatic functionalism

Standard axiomatic functionalism: basic components

11

The systemology (i.e. the phonology and grammar) of standard axiomatic functionalism, along with the "abstract semantics" (i.e. the basic level of denotation, plus the syn-semantics - or constructional semantics - and the para-semantics) are represented in Fig. 2.5. The para-syntax (para-plerotactics) is linked to the para-semantics by a dotted arrow pointing towards the para-semantics. The syntax (plerotactics) is similarly linked to the syn-semantics (constructional semantics), as is the level of simple grammatical (plerological) entities to the level of denotation. The dotted arrows in each case indicate "corresponds to" (as in Fig. 2.1). Thus, para-syntax (paraplerotactics) can be said to correspond to para-semantics; syntax (plerotactics) can be said to correspond to syn-semantics (constructional semantics), and the level of simple grammatical (plerological) entities can be said to correspond to the level of denotation. Two things need to be said here. Firstly, no correspondence has been established between morphology (plerematics) and any notion in the abstract semantics. Morphological (plerematic) relationships, however, involve only unordered sets in which each of the morphological (plerematic) entities has an equal role. It appears therefore that the semantic correspondences of these relationships could treated be at the level of denotation. Secondly, the model of correspondence which is indicated in Fig. 2.5 is in a form of "shorthand"; properly speaking it is signa, and not their corresponding grammatical (plerological) entities which have denotations (Section 2.2.1). Analogously, it should be signum-level features and not their corresponding syntactic (plerotactic) entities which have syn-semantic roles; and it should be signa and not their corresponding para-syntactic (para-plerotactic) features which have para-semantic roles. For the sake of simplicity, however, I have not included indications of the indirectness of the relationships between the grammar (plerology) and the abstract semantics in Fig. 2.5. The entire theory of standard axiomatic functionalism - i.e. the ontology, the systemology, and the semantics (including synsemantics/constructional semantics, and para-semantics) can be presented as in Fig. 2.6. Note that denotation in Fig. 2.6 is represented twice. This is a consequence of the "shorthand" notation adopted in Fig. 2.5, whereby the "abstract semantics" was aligned to the systemology. Properly, this "abstract semantics" should appear in its entirety in Fig. 2.6, below the heading SEMANTICS, where only the term denotation actually appears in the figure. I have not

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Standard axiomatic fiuiclionalism

S Y S T E M O L O G Y phonology grammar (pleroiogy)

"abstract semantics"

Key to symbols R R' & ( } i....n

in relation to in converse relation to a conjunction of a set of [a] certain [set of] relation of correspondence

+—•

d s

• relation of implication relation of mutual implication relation of transformation other relation distinctive function in phonology distinctive function in g r a m m a r

Figure 2.6. Standard axiomatic functionalism: systemolo ontology, and semantics

Standard axiomatic fiwctionalistn: basic components

79

attempted to present Fig. 2.6 in this manner for two reasons: firstly, the resulting figure would be presentationally messy, and secondly Fig. 2.6 is designed to prefigure the figures for extended axiomatic functionalism in Chapter Three, and particularly Fig. 3.5. In subsequent sections of this Chapter I shall consider realisational and other aspects of standard axiomatic functionalism. As there is some potential for variation in terminology in these areas, it is useful to discuss this here before proceeding. In Chapter One (Section 1.2.3) I spoke of signa themselves as being either simple or complex. This is in line with the form of wording in both versions of the postulates for standard axiomatic functionalism. Thus Axiom B, "Semiotic systems contain simple, and may contain complex ordered and complex unordered signa and figurae" (Mulder 1989: 437; cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 42). It is also in line with the terminology used in descriptive analysis, particularly in older writings (e.g. Mulder — Hervey 1972; Mulder — Hervey 1980; Shimizu — Lamb 1985). However, if we consider the formula for signum, it will be seen that properly speaking it is only the right-hand element of the signum formula - i.e. s in the formula {/J1 n R s } - which is simple or complex (i.e. which is amenable to grammatical analysis). Properly therefore, the form of Axiom Β notwithstanding, it is not directly the signum which is simple or complex, but the grammatical entity to which the signum corresponds which is simple or complex. Similarly, it is not the figura (cf. phonological form: i.e. { / n Rd}) which is simple or complex, but the phonological entity to which the figura corresponds which is simple or complex. In principle, however, there seems nothing wrong in using the terms simple and complex signum, and simple and complex figura, provided it is understood that these are shorthand for signum corresponding to a simple grammatical entity, signum corresponding to a complex grammatical entity, etc. Similarly, it has been seen (Section 2.2.1) that realisational questions are matters pertaining to the ontology, rather than the systemology, the subject of this Section. Realisational notions such as allomorph and allophone thus belong to the ontology and not to the systemology. 11 Properly therefore, entities in the systemology, i.e. entities in grammar such as monemes, or entities in phonology such as phonemes are not realised directly in the ontology. Rather they are realised via their corresponding entities in the ontology. Thus, a moneme is not realised directly as an allomorph. Rather, it is

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fimctionaiism

the signum to which a particular moneme corresponds which is realised as an allomorph. Similarly, a phoneme is not realised directly as an allophone. Rather, it is the figura to which a particular phoneme corresponds which is realised as an allophone. Provided this is understood, however, there is in principle nothing wrong in speaking of a moneme (or other grammatical entity) being realised by an allomorph, and a phoneme (or other phonological entity) being realised by an allophone. These various possible alternative forms of wording pose the practical problem of which wording to use in particular cases. In this book I shall adopt the following strategy. I shall in the main talk about simple and complex signa, on the basis that these terms have general currency in axiomatic functionalism. I shall also talk about the realisations of signa, rather than the realisations of grammatical entities. I shall only adopt another form of wording, such as complex grammatical entity, or realisation of a grammatical entity, where the specific context requires a formulation not involving the term signum. These usages allows for maximum terminological continuity with previous writings in axiomatic functionalism. They are also reasonable in view of the fact that terms such as plerology, grammar, grammatical entity, morphology, plereme and plerotactics are all replaced in extended axiomatic functionalism by forms involving the element (-)lex(-), as discussed in Chapter Three (Sections 3.1.2, 3.2). The term signum, however, is retained. Therefore use of the term signum throughout permits maximum terminological continuity within this book between standard axiomatic functionalism and extended axiomatic functionalism. By contrast with the usages simple signum and complex signum, the usages simple figura and complex figura do not occur commonly in writings in axiomatic functionalism. Much more common are the usages simple phonological entity and complex phonological entity. Similarly, it is standard in linguistics to talk about the realisation of a phonological entity, and particularly the realisation of a phoneme. In this book, I shall therefore normally talk about simple and complex phonological entities (or in the extended version, simple and complex phonos; cf. Chapter Three, Section 3.1.2). I shall similarly talk about the realisations of phonemes, etc. unless there is specific reason not to do so.

Realisational aspects of standard axiomatic functionalism

2.3. Realisational functionalism

aspects

of

standard

81

axiomatic

Having provided an outline sketch of the ontology and semantics of standard axiomatic functionalism, I want now to concentrate on a number of specific realisational aspects of the theory. I have chosen these aspects because they prove to be important both to a consideration of the relative theoretical simplicity of extended axiomatic functionalism as compared with that of standard axiomatic functionalism, and of the relative scope of the two theories. The first aspect of standard axiomatic functionalism which I shall consider is the types of allophony and allomorphy which the theory establishes. Clearly, most of the notions presented in Sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 (various types of allophony and allomorphy) are not new in a general sense. The same is true of other notions, such as polysemy (Chapter Four, Section 4.3 and following), which are discussed later. From this perspective my intention in giving examples is purely illustrative. However, it should be emphasised that the notions involved are strictly speaking particular to axiomatic functionalism; intuitively similar notions under other approaches (even if these are identically termed) cannot properly be regarded as identical, except in some extensional respects in certain cases. The difference between the axiomatic-functionalist notions and those of other theories is a simple consequence of the fact that the axiomaticfunctionalist notions are derived from different theoretical a prioris to those of other approaches. In the case of axiomatic functionalism, these a prioris are the formal axioms and definitions, plus derivable theorems. In other approaches they may have another, possibly less formal, origin.

2.3.1. Types of allophony and allomorphy in standard functionalism

axiomatic

Standard axiomatic functionalism recognises two basic types of allophony, and one simple derived type. The two basic types may be termed (i) contextually determined allophony, and (ii) free allophony, while the simple derived type may be termed (iii) free allophony within contextually determined allophony. While further sub-types of allophony can be conceived, these three types can be regarded as

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Standard axiomatic functionalism

primary. I will consider these three types of variance, not only with respect to allophony and allomorphy (this Section), but also with respect to other "allo-levels" which can be established in an axiomatic-functionalist approach, in an attempt to demonstrate the applicability of the basic notions throughout the theory - and indirectly to corroborate claims of the coherence and reasonableness of the theory itself. An example of (i) contextually determined allophony occurs with the phoneme Ιψ in the G'aylliabbän dialect of Arabic in the south of the Republic of Yemen. In most phonological contexts this is realised as [1]; however, in the context of Irl or /!/ it is realised as [ö5] (cf. Habtoor 1988/1989: 31-33). An example of free allophony would be a phoneme which could be realised in either of two ways irrespective of the phonological context in which it occurred - for instance a phoneme Itl in a particular language which had allophones ft] and fd], both of which were possible in all contexts. Finally (iii) free allophony within contextually determined allophony is exemplified in dialects of Arabic where one finds "optional devoicing" of voiced consonants before voiceless consonants. Thus, the phoneme Ibl in the form mabsuut 'happy' is in some dialects of Sudanese Arabic realised as either [b] or [p]; in other contexts, however, it is only realisable as [b]. That is to say, the realisations [b]/[p] in mabsuut are free variants in that they both occur (but never contrast) in the same context; at the same time this free variance is itself contextually determined; in other contexts only the realisation [b] occurs. The same sort of situation obtains with respect to [t] and [?] as allophones of /t/ in intervocalic positions in some dialects of English. With respect to contextually determined allophony, it is also worth noting the phenomenon of sandhi - which is reserved in an axiomatic-functionalist context for juncture phenomena between the realisations of different phonotagms (i.e. the units in phonotactics; Section 2.2.3). Mulder suggests that: Sandhi has to be regarded as phonetic variance at which the upper limit of distinctive realisation becomes conspicuously suspended. Even the most conspicuous cases of sandhi, however, usually have an alternative realisation, e.g. in slow diction, in which the distinctive realisation of the proper phonematic form is not suspended. That is to say, the upper limit of distinctive realisation in sandhi nevertheless remains

Reatisational aspects of standard axiomatic functionalism

83

distinct. It may, however, very well be the case that these upper limits can hardly be called 'normal' realisations (Mulder 1968: 194). The notion of the upper limit of distinctive realisation refers to that realisational area which is specific to one phonological entity, rather than being a possible realisation of two or more phonological entities (cf. also Mulder 1989: 47, 256). The upper limit of distinctive realisation - for which Lamb prefers "upper level of distinctive realisation" - is typically associated with "careful" or "correct" pronunciations (cf. Section 2.4 for exemplification and further discussion). According to Mulder, therefore, in cases of sandhi one has not contextual determination proper, but rather, contextual near-determination, the context here being between realisations - i.e. allophonons (phonetes) - which belong to distinct phonotactic units (and by generalisation allophones of these), rather than within the realisations - allophonons (phonetes) - of single phonotactic units, and by generalisation allophones of these. It is worth considering Mulder's proposals regarding sandhi in the light of three analogous phonetically relevant phenomena which are dependent on relationships within the phonotagm. Within the purview of the phonotagm, it is possible to have neutralization, which is the "suspension of opposition between members of a correlation in given contexts, and governed by those contexts" (Mulder 1989: 441, Def. 7a4). An example of this is /raT/ (the realisation of RadJRat 'wheel'/'advice' in German). This is discussed in more detail in Section 2.4. It is also possible to have contextual determination proper of the allophonic form (contextually determined allophony), as in the case of G'aylliabbän [1] and [ 0*1 cited above. Finally, it is possible to have contextual near-determination, where the context does not absolutely determine the phonetic realisation of the particular phonological form, but in which one realisation is at least much more likely than any other possibility. This would seem to be the case with the realisation of the phoneme /b/ in the form mabsuut 'happy' in some dialects of Sudanese Arabic. While this is a case of free allophony, in that /b/ may be realised as either [b| or [p], the realisation with [p] is the norm, and fb] is probably only instanced in careful speech. If this is so, this is a case of contextual near-determination of the allophone [p]. Of these three phonetically relevant possibilities, it is only the

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Standard axiomatic

fiinctionalism

last, contextual near-determination, which Mulder recognises with respect to sandhi. Neutralization is ruled out, since it is a phonological matter, and can by definition occur only within a particular phonotagm; sandhi, by contrast, is a juncture phenomenon occurring between the realisations of different phonotagms, as noted above (cf. Mulder 1968: 194). However, I see no reason why contextual determination proper should not also be recognised at points of juncture between the realisations of different phonotagms, as it is within the realisations of the phonotagm. In the case of Arabic, for example, the classical Arab grammarian, Sibawayhi notes that the phrase man bika 'Who is with/at you?' is actually pronounced " m a m bika'''' (Sibawayhi 1982: 453; cf. also Al-Nassir 1993: 68). Assuming this to have been an obligatory pronunciation in running speech (i.e. assuming that a pronunciation " m a n bika" was not in fact acceptable), the realisation of the /n/ of man as [m] is to be regarded as a case of contextual ly determined allophony. There is, however, an important difference between contextual determination within realisations of a single phonotagm and contextual determination as a function of sandhi. In the former case the context for the determination is established by reference to features in the phonology. In the latter case, by contrast, the determination can only be established by reference to features at the phonetic level (i.e. the level of the phonete/allophonon), and by generalisation at the allophonic level - since there are no relevant phonological units in terms of which to establish sandhi-based contextual determination beyond the phonotagm. This extension of the operation of contextually determined allophony would render the relationship between sandhi phenomena and intra-phonotagm phenomena somewhat more straightforward. It would also solve a problem which Mulder perhaps alludes to when he says "even the most conspicuous cases of sandhi, however, usually have an alternative realisation ... in which the distinctive realisation of the proper phonematic form is not suspended" (Mulder 1968: 194; underlining mine). That is to say, there are cases of sandhi in which it is not really possible to say that there is an alternative distinct realisation; such a distinct realisation can only be made to occur where a pause is added, such that sandhi is no longer properly operative. I believe that the extension of sandhi which I propose here is not only sensible in its own terms. As I shall attempt to show later it also has desirable results with respect to analogous

Realisational aspects of standard axiomatic

fimctionalism

85

areas of enquiry in semantics (cf. Chapter Four, Section 4.2). Before leaving allophony, I should like to restress the point made earlier (Sections 2.1.3, 2.2.1). All considerations of allophony depend on the delicacy of the protocolisations adopted. We could eliminate occurrences of allophony simply by adopting a grosser, less precise phonetic protocolisation. Conversely, we could multiply occurrences of allophony simply by adopting a more delicate protocolisation. Turning to allomorphy, we might, on analogy with allophony, expect to find (i) contextually determined allomorphy, (ii) free allomorphy, and (iii) free allomorphy within contextually determined allomorphy. In fact, Mulder and Hervey allow (i) and (iii), but specifically disallow (ii). An example of (i) occurs in English with the allomorph of the past tense which (amongst other possibilities) is sometimes realised as /d/ (e.g. in called), and sometimes as ΙΎΙ (e.g. in walked). An obvious "potential" example of (ii) is either realised either as /aiör/ (phonetically [aiös]), or as /iRör/ (phonetically Ii: ös]). Mulder and Hervey, however, specifically rule this out on the grounds that the only plausible reason for saying that the forms /aiör/ and /iRör/ are allomorphs of the same signum is their phonetic (or phonological) similarity. Similarity, however, is not a precisely definable phenomenon. On these grounds, Mulder and Hervey claim, it could be argued that fellow and bloke are the same signum in English, because they have the same denotation and happen to have the phonological feature /IOu/ in common and are, therefore, also phonetically similar. Given its dependence on the notion of similarity, and given the lack of proper definability of this notion, Mulder and Hervey argue that free allomorphy is to be excluded from axiomatic functionalism altogether (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1972: 3031). Finally, an example of what is to be interpreted as (iii) free allomorphy within contextually determined allomorphy is the realisation of been (past participle of the verb [to] be) as /bin/ (realised phonetically as [bm]), or /bRin/ (realised phonetically as [bin]). The allomorphy here is free; there are no linguistic constraints on the use of /bin/ or /bRin/. This free allomorphy, however, only occurs in the context of the form in question being a past participle of the verb be - a context which involves allomorphic amalgamation of the past participle and the be elements (cf. Section 2.3.2 for a general discussion of the notion of allomorphic amalgamation). Interestingly,

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Standard axiomatic fiwctionalism

while Mulder disallows simple free allomorphy of the /aiör/ViRör/ sort, he specifically accepts free allomorphy within contextually determined allomorphy. The example he gives is "... "dem Mann" ~ "dem Manne" as forms of the so-called dative in German" (Mulder 1989: 354, also 164). That is to say, within the context of dative, the "-e" ending of Manne is optional (free). Tabulating the above examples we can represent the possible "allo-states" allowed by Mulder and Hervey as in Fig. 2.7. Note in particular the asymmetricality engendered by Mulder and Hervey's prohibition on free allomorphy. I shall reconsider free allomorphy, and free allomorphy within contextually determined allomorphy below in Chapter Four, Section 4.1.

ALLOPHONY

ALLOMORPHY

contextually determined

[11-10*1 in GaylRabban

/dMT/, past tense in English

DISALLOWED IN

free

[ d H t l in all contexts in some language

HERVEY

free within

[bHpl in

contextually

mabsuut in

determined

Sudanese Arabic

'dem Mann'~ 'dem Manne', dative in German

MULDER A N D

Figure 2.7. "Allo-states" in Mulder and Hervey

2.3.2. Allophonic and allomorphic atnalgamation The second realisational aspect of standard axiomatic functionalism which 1 want to consider with a view to later comparison with

87 ReaiisationaI aspects of standard axiomatic fitnclionalism extended axiomatic functionalism is the notion of amalgamation. I shall then go on in Section 2.3.3 to consider the converse of amalgamation, which can be termed "splitting" (cf. also Mulder 1989: 345). The simplest realisational situation is where the realisational entity simply "mirrors" the entity at the higher level of abstraction. Thus, the simplest realisational situation with respect to phonology is where a particular phoneme (or other phonological entity) is realised by what may be regarded as a simple discrete allophone. An example of this might be the realisation of the phoneme /hi in English by the allophone [h]. As noted in Section 2.2.3, /h/ can be regarded as phonologically simple in English (it is a phoneme having only one distinctive feature). It can also be regarded as phonetically simple (inasmuch as any sound can be considered phonetically simple). Thus, in terms of one phonetic protocolisation, [h] can be regarded as "the maximally undifferentiated voiceless ... fricative" (Lass 1984: 115). To the degree that "voicelessness" can be regarded as phonetic zero-feature, [h] is simply a fricative (and otherwise "undifferentiated"). Another recent phonetic analysis of [h] also treats it as quasi-simple, regarding fh] - and ffi] - as "segments that have only a laryngeal specification, and are unmarked for all other features" (Ladefoged — Maddieson 1996: 326). Similarly, the simplest realisational situation with respect to grammar (plerology) is where a single "word" (or other signum) is realised by a simple discrete phonological form. An example of this would be the realisation of a "word" (or other signum) in a particular language by an allomorph having a simple, unanalysable phonological form. An example of this might be the realisation of the "diminutive" signum -/, as in Kindl "little child" in some south German and Austrian dialects of German by an allomorph of phonological form [1]. (I assume here that the "diminutive"-/, is to be regarded as a signum in a standard axiomatic-functionalist analysis; cf. the discussion of one-hundred-per-cent productivity in Note 33 to Chapter Four, Section 4.3.6. I also assume /I/ to be a simple phoneme, i.e. a phoneme having only one distinctive feature, as proposed in Mulder 1989: 264.) This kind of situation is, of course, hardly a common occurrence in natural languages. Such simple realisations, where the realisations, simply "mirror" the abstract formal entities do not pose any descriptive challenge, and I shall therefore ignore them in this discussion. More descriptively interesting are cases in which such realisational "mirroring" does not

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functionalism

occur. The most fundamental of these other "non-mirroring" realisations are amalgamation and splitting. Although other more complex "non-mirroring" realisations can be conceived, I shall therefore confine my discussion here to these two fundamental types of "non-mirroring" realisation (just as I confined the discussion in Section 2.3.1 to the three least complex types of variance). As in the case of variance, my wider purpose in considering amalgamation and splitting is to demonstrate the applicability of the same basic notions throughout the theory - and indirectly to corroborate claims of the coherence and reasonableness of the theory itself. In standard axiomatic functionalism amalgamation may be of two kinds: allophonic amalgamation and allomorphic amalgamation. Allophonic amalgamation is the phonetic realisation of a complex phonological entity in such a way that it is impossible to say which aspect of the realisational phonetic feature (phonetic image or phonetic form; cf. Section 2.2.1) corresponds to each element of the complex phonological entity. Any case in which a simple phonological entity - e.g. a phoneme having only one distinctive feature - is realised by what is regarded as a complex phonetic feature is properly speaking a case of amalgamation. However, the situation is perhaps more obviously exemplified by an example such as Sudanese Arabic /bait/ (where /ai/ is a sequence of two phonemes, not a monophonemic diphthong, as discussed in Note 8 to this Chapter, Section 2.1.3). This may be realised as [be:t] (or even as [be:t]; that is to say /ai/ in Sudanese Arabic may be realised as [e:], or even as [ε:]). The claim which is sometimes made to the effect that some colloquial Arabics have an /e:/ phoneme (e.g. Fischer — Jastrow 1980) appears untenable in axiomatic-functionalist terms, at least with regard to Sudanese. The reason for this is that no genuine opposition can be established between this proposed /e:/ phoneme, and /ai/; if we were to establish an /e:/ phoneme, we would find either that this was in complementary distribution with /ai/ (with some dubious cases in which it was not clear whether the entity involved was /e:/ or /ai/), or that /ai/ never occurred in the system. In addition [e:] is a plausible realisation of /ai/ in general phonetic terms, considering the overall spread of realisations of /a/, in particular, in other contexts. Given all this, there is no reason to establish an /ai/~/e:/ opposition. For further arguments from an axiomaticfunctionalist perspective in favour of this analysis, and against the establishment of an /e:/ phoneme in various dialects of Arabic, cf.

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Rakas 1981; Said 1983; Dickins 1989. Watson 1989 also provides a similar analysis using the generative model of underspecification. P a r a l l e l i n g a l l o p h o n i c a m a l g a m a t i o n is a l l o m o r p h i c amalgamation. This is the realisation of a complex signum in such a way that it is impossible to say which element of the realisational phonological form corresponds to each element of the complex signum. An example of allomorphic amalgamation is the realisation of the complex signum au (consisting of the two signa ä+le) in French as /o/, which is a phonological form corresponding to a phonological entity having only one distinctive feature (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 148). An amalgamated allomorph corresponds closely to what Hockett (1947: 333) has termed a portmanteau morph.

23.3. Allophonic and allomorphic splitting Just as one may have amalgamation, i.e. the simple realisation of complex formal entities, so one may have its converse, i.e. the complex realisation of a simple formal entity. As noted (Section 2.3.2), this can be termed "splitting". Properly speaking, allophonic splitting is exemplified by the realisation of any simple phonological entity by a phonetic feature (phonetic image or phonetic form) which is regarded as complex. A more obvious example of allophonic splitting from German is the phoneme / p f / (as in Pfeife 'pipe'), which is realised as [pf] (cf. Mulder 1989: 95; also Section 2.2.3). It will be seen that as with other features at the allophonic level, the decision to recognise splitting is largely a matter of the delicacy of the protocolisation which we decide to adopt. This is most obvious in the case of vowels, where some degree of diphthongisation is likely even in the most monophthongic of cases. As soon as we choose to recognise a diphthong - i.e. a non-simple phonetic feature - in our phonetic analysis and assuming the phonological analysis involves only a single phoneme, we have splitting at the allophonic level. Allomorphic splitting is, properly speaking, exemplified by any simple signum which is realised by an allomorph having a nonsimple phonological form, for example a phonological form corresponding to a complex phoneme (i.e. a phoneme consisting of more than one distinctive feature). A more obvious example of allomorphic splitting, however, is the simple English signum cat, realised as the phonotactically complex /kat/. In the case of

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Standard axiomatic fimctionalism

allomorphy, splitting is the norm, rather than the exception (indeed, it is hard to find examples of the au type, discussed in the previous Section). This situation clearly concords with considerations of communicative efficiency.

2.4. Incomplete neutralization and imperfect homonymy The final aspect of standard axiomatic functionalism which I want to consider concerns what Michael Lamb has suggested be termed "configurational phenomena" (a notion which I discuss further in Section 2.7). As discussed in Section 2.2.1, Mulder establishes for standard axiomatic functionalism the notions form and allomorphon. Form is an allophonon (phonete) brought into a relationship with the distinctive function appropriate to a particular signum; in other words a form is an allophonon (phonete) of a signum. An allomorphon is an allophone of a signum. Mulder suggests that notions such as image, allophonon (phonete), form, and allomorphon "... are primarily theoretical notions. They may be useful in definitions, but would scarcely be used in descriptions" (Mulder 1989: 304). In saying this I suspect Mulder is underestimating the potential descriptive applicability of his own theory. In fact, recent work in phonetics on what is sometimes referred to as incomplete neutralization appears to indicate the necessity of the notions form and allomorphon in particular for fully adequate descriptions of natural languages. Incomplete neutralization is exemplified by pairs in German such as (i) Rad 'wheel, bicycle' and Rat 'advice'; (ii) Bund 'association, group', and bunt 'colourful'; and (iii) seid '[you] (familiar pi.) are' and seit 'since'. Traditionally there is said to be no opposition between final 'd' and final 't' in forms like this in German; the voiced/voiceless opposition is said to be neutralized and the resulting entity is described as an archiphoneme (cf. Mulder 1989: 441, Def. 7a4b, for a formal definition of archiphoneme in standard axiomatic functionalism). Recent work of a detailed phonetic nature appears at first sight to refute the claim that there is no phonological opposition between forms such as Rod and Rat. Thus, it is claimed that it is possible to consistently detect differences in realisation between members of such pairs as German Rad and Rat (cf. Port — Crawford 1989). Similar results throwing doubt on previously

Incomplete neutralization and imperfect homonymy

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assumed cases of neutralization have also been obtained for other languages - e.g. Catalan (Dinssen 1984; Dinssen — Charles-Luce 1984), Polish (Slowiaczek — Dinssen 1985), Russian (Pye 1986), and English (Fourakis — Port 1986). Phonological neutralization in an axiomatic-functionalist context involves there being no extensional phonetic difference in the (phonetic) realisations of two putatively distinct forms in a given context. Thus, Rod and Rat involve neutralization of the /d/~/t/ opposition if and only if (i) every realisation of Rad can also be a realisation of Rat, and (ii) every realisation of Rat can also be a realisation of Rad. This means that budding and butting (and similar intervocalic 'd'-'t' pairs) in most dialects of American English at least do not involve neutralization; although they are both typically pronounced with an intervocalic medial flap (or median tap in the IPA system), in careful speech the first will have a [d] and the second a [t] (as noted in Port — O'Dell 1985: 465; cf. Shimizu — Lamb 1985: 109). That is to say, while budding and butting share some realisations (and are even, perhaps, realised non-differentially on most occasions), there are realisations of budding which cannot be realisations of butting, and also realisations of butting which cannot also be realisations of budding. A slightly more tricky situation is exemplified by English cases

such as prayed and parade. In the case of prayed and parade, there seem to be no realisations of prayed which cannot also be realisations of parade (particularly in rapid or informal speech, parade tends to be pronounced as [preid], and is thus indistinguishable from prayed). There are, however, realisations of parade which cannot be realisations of prayed (those which have a schwa after the initial [p]). Thus, prayed and parade are distinguishable at the upper limit/level of distinctive realization (cf. Section 2.3.1), and this is not to be regarded as a case of phonological neutralization. The case of prayed and parade exemplifies the insight of Michael Lamb (personal communication) that distinctiveness need be in one dimension (or one direction) only - i.e. it is only necessary for one of the members of a pair of the type prayedJparade to have a realisation which is distinct from any realisation of the other member of the pair for there to be a phonological difference (and therefore for there not to be neutralization). This is why I specified above that Rad and Rat involve neutralization of the /d/~/t/ opposition if and only if (i) every realisation of Rod can also be a realisation of Rat, and (ii) every

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realisation of Rat can also be a realisation of Rad. I return now to a consideration of what has been referred to as incomplete neutralization. It may be the case that incomplete neutralization is genuine non-neutralization in some or all of the cases cited. That is to say, it may be that phonologists and phoneticians have in the past been less than fully competent, and have failed to recognise that there are, for instance, realisations of Rad which cannot be realisations of Rat, or realisations of Rat which cannot be realisations of Rad. If this is the case, it is simply to be concluded that previous analyses were wrong; the putative cases of neutralization in these languages are not in fact cases of neutralization, and these forms are distinct, whether in one or in both dimensions (directions). This possibility does not invalidate neutralization as a general notion. Indeed, even if it were ultimately to be found that no natural language contained neutralization, the notion of neutralization itself would not be invalidated, merely shown to have no application to the phonologies of natural languages (this would not, however, preclude its applicability to other semiotic systems). It must remain a possibility that the phenomena investigated in these languages are not cases of neutralization (at least until further experimental research is carried out). However, I believe it is much more likely that these are, after all, cases of phonological neutralization, but with a further complication. As has been said, phonological difference implies an extensional phonetic realisational difference - and it is the existence or non-existence of this difference that an axiomatic-functionalist phonological account would initially focus on in order to test its adequacy. Unfortunately for present purposes, this is not the focus of the investigations which have been carried out in this area to date. It is therefore necessary to assess material which is somewhat tangential to present concerns, in order to arrive at a plausible assessment of whether there is any extensional difference involved. As far as I have been able to make out, no claim is being made that there is an extensional difference in the realisations of Rad/Rat and the other similar pairs investigated in terms of incomplete neutralization. This certainly seems to be borne out by the most careful analysis of this kind of phenomenon to date, that of Port and Crawford (1989). Port and Crawford ran a number of experiments using the pairs bunt/Bund, Rat/Rad and seit/seid. The experiments

Incomplete neutralization and imperfect homonymy

93

involved five conditions; these ranged from the reading and also oral repetition of utterances some of which contained one of the word pairs, and some of which were simply "distractors" designed to mask the purpose of the exercise at one extreme (Port — Crawford 1989: 262); and went through to the reading of utterances of a type which involved explicit contrast such as "Ich habe "Rat", wie "Ratschlag", gesagt; nicht "Rad" wie "Fahrrad"", and also "Ich habe "Rad" gesagt, nicht "Rat"", at the other (Port — Crawford 1989: 263). A technique known as discriminant analysis was used to combine five spatio-temporal measurements taken from sound spectrograms of the productions of the pairs to categorize the tokens as voiced or voiceless in each condition. Correct categorization for discriminant analysis was higher than the 50% which would be obtained if variation was simply random; it varied between 55% and 78% depending on the task (and was highest when original utterances themselves involved explicit differentiation). A similar experiment was also run using some of the original data with another group of native German speakers, who were asked to say which member of the pair was being uttered in each individual case. The results obtained were very close to those obtained using discriminant analysis. What is interesting from the present point of view is the statistical nature of the findings. As the authors note, "No speaker does any better in any condition than about 90% correct - still much poorer than would be expected for a real phonological contrast like Bundebunte" (Port — Crawford 1989: 269). It is to be suspected that this is also much poorer than would be obtained under a condition where native speakers of American English were asked to assess the identity of forms like budding and butting, when extracted from utterances of the type, "I said "budding", not "butting"", or similarly where native English speakers were asked to assess the identity of forms like prayed and parade, when extracted from utterances of the type, "I said "prayed", not "parade"". Certainly Port and Crawford themselves do not regard the RadlRat phenomenon as the same kind of overlapping realisation which occurs in the case of parade and prayed for example; they explicitly contrast the phenomenon of "incomplete neutralization", as in the case of Rad and Rat with that of "full contrast", as in the case of prayed and parade, which in their terminology (though not, as has been seen, that of axiomatic functionalism), "are sometimes

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fitnclionalism

neutralized in fast speech" (Port — Crawford 1989: 259). This leads to the conclusion that there are probably no extensional phonetic realisational differences between the realisations of the German word-pairs described by Port and Crawford; i.e. any realisation of one member of the pair could also be a realisation of the other, and vice versa. Rather, it is simply the case that: Pairs like Bund "association, group" and bunt "colourful" have long been said to be homophonous yet the words tend to retain a small difference in certain phonetic parameters (Port — Crawford 1989: 258; underlining mine). Let us suppose this analysis is correct, i.e. all we are dealing with in cases of incomplete neutralization is a tendency for the one form to be pronounced in one way, and the other form in the other way. In this case the phenomenon does not in axiomatic-functionalist terms involve phonological difference between the two members of the pair. That is to say, this is a case of neutralization, despite superficial evidence to the contrary. Taking this analysis to be correct, the relevant allomorphs of Bund and bunt in the case of incomplete neutralization are homomorphs (i.e. they share the same phonological form); therefore we only have one phonological form here to talk about. This means that we cannot investigate incomplete neutralizational phenomena purely in terms of allophones and representative sets of the allophonons (phonetes) which are the members of these allophones, as might initially be thought. At the same time we cannot simply investigate these phenomena purely in terms of the signa involved. If we were to do this, we would introduce consideration of all realisations of Bund and bunt, Rad and Rat etc. In the case of Rad, for instance, these would include the dative singular form Rode; this is unambiguously differentiated from all realisations of Rat (which has a dative singular form Rate). This would mean that we were not investigating the same range of phenomena we were originally interested in, and we would correspondingly achieve results which were irrelevant to the original area of investigation. Clearly what is needed is a means of controlling the range of phenomena in phonological terms, and thus ultimately in general phonetic terms, and at the same time differentiating cases such as Rod and Rat in terms of their signum identity. That is to say, we need

Incomplete neutralization and imperfect homonymy

95

simultaneously to identify the phenomena in question phonetically, phonologically and grammatically (grammatical entities being entities which correspond to signa; cf. Section 2.2.3). If we go back to the representation of the ontology and semantics of standard axiomatic functionalism in Fig. 2.1, it will be seen that this is what the notions form, allomorphon, and allomorph do. In particular, the notions form and allomorphon provide coherent models for the investigation of the relative frequencies of different individual phonetic realisations of phonologically identical realisations of Rod and Rat. By looking at representative samples of data we are able to determine the relative sizes of the different "form-sets" which make up the allomorphons in question. The following provides a simple illustration of the kind of procedure which I have in mind. In order to s i m p l i f y the presentation, I will take an imaginary example, but one which is analogous to Rad/Rat for illustration. Let us suppose a language which has two signa, which we may call Signum-A and Signum-B, each signum having an allomorph of one particular phonological form (i.e. the two signa share a homomorph). We may call this phonological form /cd. Let us assume that we can divide the phonetic range of the allophonic realisations of / a / into six. That is to say, we have arbitrarily - but let us also assume appropriately - established six allophones for the entire phonological form (corresponding to a p h o n o t a g m ) / a / (cf. Section 2.2.1) taken as a whole. T h e s e allophones by definition correspond to six different phonetic forms, which are themselves arbitrary but also appropriate (cf. Section 2.2.1; also Note 8 to Chapter Two, Section 2.1.3). Let us call these allophones l a 1 ] , ( a 2 ] , f a 3 ] , l a 4 l , [ a 5 ] and [ a 6 ] (the corresponding phonetic forms being a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 and a 6 ) . Let us now assume we have a sample of fifty individual realisations each (perhaps artificially elicited in a phonetics laboratory) of the signa Signum-A and Signum-B. Each one of these realisations, considered simultaneously both as a realisation of a signum and as a realisation of a phonological form, will be a form (an instance of a particular allomorphon), which will have an allophonon - or, in L a m b ' s terminology, a phonete (an instance of a particular allophone) - which will itself have a phonetic image (an instance of a particular phonetic form). The form of each utterance of Signum-A and Signum-B can thus be simply related to a particular allophone of the phonological form / a / (as should also be apparent from Fig. 2.1). Let us suppose

96

Slandard axiomatic

fimctionalism

that of the fifty utterances of Signum-A, 17 relate to the allophone [a 1 J (i.e. they have the allophonon, or phonete, which instantiates the allophone [a 1 ]), 6 relate to the allophone [a 2 ], 7 relate to the allophone [a 3 ], 8 relate to the allophone [ a 4 ] , 4 relate to the allophone [a 5 ], and 8 relate to the allophone [a 6 ]. Let us also suppose that of the fifty utterances of Signum-B, 7 relate to the allophone [a 1 ], 7 relate to the allophone [ a 2 ] , 4 relate to the allophone [a 3 ], 12 relate to the allophone [a 4 ], 14 relate to the allophone [a 5 ], and 6 relate to the allophone [ a 6 ] . This situation can be tabulated as in Fig. 2.8.

allophone of phonotagm

number of utterances of Signum-A and Signum-B

/cx/

relating to ('having') particular allophone (from total of 50 each)

[U 1 ]

Signum-A=

17 utterances

Signum-B=

7 utterances

[« 2 1

Signum-A= 6 utterances Sigtium-B= 7 utterances

f«3l

Signum-A=

7 utterances

Signum-B=

4 utterances

[« 4 1

Signum-A= 8 utterances Signum-B= 12 utterances

[a 5 ]

Signum-A= 4 utterances Signum-B= 14 utterances

[a 6 ]

Signum-A= 8 utterances Signum-B= 6 utterances

Figure 2.8. Descriptive procedure for the analysis of incomplete neutralization

Incomplete neutralization and imperfect homonymy

97

Given the results which are presented here, one could reasonably claim that Signum-A has a "focal" allomorphon which has the allophone (or allophonic form) [a 1 ]; 17 out of 50 utterances of Signum-A have a form which has an allophonon (phonete) which instantiates the allophone [a 1 ]. Signum-B, on the other hand, has a "focal" allomorphon which has the allophone (or allophonic form) [a 5 ]; 14 out of 50 utterances of Signum-B have a form which has an allophonon (phonete) which instantiates the allophone la 5 ]. Given the ultimately arbitrary nature of phonetic analyses, this would not be the only way in which one could divide the phonetic continuum. It would be possible to establish many more than six phonetic forms for the relevant phonetic range, and therefore many more than six potential allophones and allomorphons. It would also be possible to set up secondary (also tertiary, etc.) foci; for SignumB the realisation [ a 4 ] with 12 utterances might be considered a secondary focal realisation. Similarly, it would no doubt be possible to adopt mathematically more sophisticated models for the investigation of incomplete neutralization and the differing phonetic foci of phonologically identical realisations of different signa. These might for instance involve fuzzy sets, rather than the discrete sets normally utilised in axiomatic functionalism (although it would have to be determined that the use of fuzzy-set theory to describe realisational phenomena did not interfere with the general consistency of the theory). Whatever the most appropriate descriptive strategy for treating focal realisations, the general point is that incomplete neutralization and associated phenomena demonstrate that theoretical models which it appears "would scarcely be used in descriptions" (Mulder 1989: 304) may in fact have practical applicability - an interesting example of what can be regarded as the theoretical predictive power of axiomatic functionalism. The principles involved in incomplete neutralization are a specific sub-type of a more general phenomenon which might be called imperfect homomorphy, or imperfect homonymy. Mulder defines a homomorph formally as an "allomorph of one signum the realization of which corresponding to that of an allomorph of another signum" (Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 26; cf. Mulder - Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 26). Homomorphy thus describes a situation where an allomorph of one signum has the same phonological form as an allomorph of another signum. An example of homomorphy is the allomorph of the signum bin {- storage container) having the phonological form /bin/,

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in relation to the allomorph of the signum be+pastparticiple also having the phonological form /bin/. Where all allomorphs of one signum have the same phonological forms as all allomorphs of another signum, Mulder describes this as homonymy (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 27; Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 27). Mulder's use of terminology is perhaps slightly eccentric in these respects, and it might be felt more usual to describe what he terms homonymy as total homonymy. Cases where two signa had at least one allomorph each with the same phonological form, but did not have all allomorphs with the same phonological forms, would be termed partial homonymy. Homonymy could then be defined as "either total homonymy or partial homonymy". I shall adopt this revised terminology in subsequent discussion of relevant phenomena. An example of imperfect homonymy in my idiolect at least is holy, i.e. sacred, vs. holey, i.e. characterised by holes. (The latter form is given in Collins English Dictionary, although I accept its somewhat marginal status, and possible tendency to be associated with children's speech.) I believe that it is reasonable to regard the range of possible realisations of these two signa in my idiolect as the same (cf. however, Chapter Four, Section 4.3.4). This would mean that for me there is no possible realisation of holy which cannot also be a realisation of holey, and no possible realisation of holey which cannot also be a realisation of holy. However, I personally tend to realise holey more frequently as [h?oh] (reflecting my pronunciation of hole) while I tend to realise holy as [hsyli]. 12 I suspect there are a far larger number of cases of imperfect homonymy (imperfect homomorphy) of this type in natural languages than is typically recognised.

2 . 5 . H e r v e y 's strategy of language So far I have considered with respect to standard axiomatic functionalism the following notions: contextually determined variance, free variance, free variance within contextually determined variance, amalgamation, and imperfect homonymy (imperfect homomorphy) including incomplete neutralization. In subsequent sections I shall consider nuance, or imperfect synonymy (see below), under a slightly modified version of standard axiomatic functionalism (Section 2.7). In Chapter Three I introduce extended

Hervey's strategy of language

99

axiomatic functional ism, and in Chapter Four (Sections 4.1-4.3.9) I discuss variance and amalgamation with respect to extended axiomatic f u n c t i o n a l i s m , concluding that chapter with a reconsideration of the parallels between imperfect homonymy and imperfect synonymy under an extended axiomatic-functionalist approach. In Chapter Five, I shall consider the extra-theoretical notion of canonicality (Section 4.1), and the ways in which this notion may be interfaced with extended axiomatic-functionalist notions to shed light on aspects of figurative language (Sections 5.2 - 5.7). Within this overall framework I shall consider four notions discussed by Hervey in his paper, "Notes on the Manipulation of Non-Denotational Meaning in Speech" (Hervey 1971), which fall outside the scope of standard axiomatic functionalism. These are (a) nuance, where nuance is "a model for describing differences of meaning between synonymous signs |signal" (Hervey 1971: 34), (b) polysemy, where polysemy in standard axiomatic-functionalist terms refers to "certain connotative and associative relations which are, our intuition tells us, present between certain homonyms but not others" (Hervey 1971: 35) (c) metaphor, where according to Hervey metaphor is "the first and novel creation of a 'homonym', from a sign [signumj already established in a given language" (Hervey 1971: 36) and (d) euphemism, where euphemism is "the model for explaining non-denotational differences between a superordinate sign I signumj and its hyponym" (Hervey 1971: 39). Hervey proposes that these phenomena be dealt with under what he calls a "strategy of language", which falls outside the scope of standard axiomatic functionalism. 1 shall attempt to show that all these notions can be wholly or partially integrated within extended axiomatic functionalism, and that this integration is achieved merely by generalising aspects of the theory which have already been discussed. I shall discuss nuance in Section 2.7 and Chapter Four, Section 4.4 (as noted above), polysemy in Chapter Four, Sections 4.3-4.3.9, metaphor in Chapter Five, Sections 5.3-5.3.2, and euphemism in Chapter Five, Section 5.6.

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Standard axiomatic functionalism

2.6. Modified standard axiomatic functionalism Of the four notions mentioned by Hervey I shall consider first nuance. I shall do this initially through consideration of a slightly modified version of standard axiomatic functionalism, which I shall use as a precursor to a presentation of extended axiomatic functionalism. Consider Fig. 2.9. The basic difference between standard axiomatic functionalism and the "modified standard axiomatic functionalism" presented here is this: in standard axiomatic functionalism a denotable is an "actually or potentially ostensible entity capable of being expressed by at least one index" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 206, Def. 4b), where "ostensible" means "distinct from at least one other entity, or from its own absence" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 206, Def. 4b 1 ), and index is either a signum or a natural index (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1972: 15; Mulder — Hervey 1980: 41, 69, 177, 178, 187). The notion natural index is not relevant to the present discussion (cf. Chapter One, Section 1.2.3). To establish modified standard axiomatic functionalism one basic change would be needed - the redefinition of denotable in the following way: Denotable would become a "model for an actually or potentially ostensible entity capable of being expressed by at least one index". This would introduce a parallelism between the notions "denotable" and "image", an image being a "model for the unique form of a single realisation" (Shimizu — Lamb 1985: 109; underlining mine; cf. also Mulder — Hervey 1980: 59; Def. 22). Denotable could be symbolised as /' (cf. the symbolisation of image as i ) . Denotatum would correspondingly become a "model for an entity expressed by an index", thus introducing a parallelism between the notions allophonon (phonete), and denotatum. The relationship between denotable and denotatium would be characterisable as one of transformation, just as is the relationship between phonetic image and allophonon (phonete). Denotation could be defined as /Re, where e stands for distinctive function in semantics (cf. the definition of allophonon (phonete) as iRd, and the symbolisation d for distinctive function in phonology).

Modified .standard axiomatic fnnctionalism

O N T O L O G Y

Key to symbols R in relation to SL a conjunction of { ) a set of '··••» [ a ] certain [set of] •*• relation of correspondence • 4 — • relation of mutual implication

^ ^ ^ d s e

SEMANTICS

relation of transformation other relation distinctive function in phonology distinctive function in grammar distinctive function in semantics

Figure 2.9. Modified standard axiomatic functionalism: ontology and semantics

101

102

Standard axiomatic fiinctionalism

Reference would remain a "model for the meaningful aspect of the realisation of a grammatical entity", as in the standard version. However, this "meaningful aspect" would involve relationship to a modelled entity, denotatum, just as form on the expression side involves relationship to a modelled entity, allophonon (phonete). Modified standard axiomatic functionalism would thus introduce a greater degree of parallelism between the notions form and reference. Reference could be redefined without any material consequences as (/Re)Rs (cf. the definition of form as (/Rd)Rs). (Michael Lamb has suggested to me that here - and elsewhere - "converse" definitions, of the type (/Rd)R's, could be retained; these would be supplementary to, but compatible with, the definitions which I have introduced. In this book, I have not followed up this suggestion, since I am not sufficiently competent in set theory and relation theory to be able to assess the potential ramifications of retaining the "converse" definitions.) These changes to existing models would allow for the introduction of a number of generalising models in semantics denotable-type, denotatum-type, and reference-type. Of these: Denotable-type would be a "generalised model for a class of impressionistically similar ostensible entities" (cf. the definition of phonetic form in Section 2.2.1). Denotable-type could be symbolised as g, where g={j} (cf. the symbolisation of phonetic form as / w h e r e

/={/»· Denotatum-type would be a class of denotata, just as a denotabletype is a class of denotables (cf. the definition of allophonon/ phonete). Denotatum-type would be defined as gRe, or equivalently as {/Re} (cf. the definition of allophone as yRd, or equivalently as {/Rd}). Reference-type would be a class of references, also a denotatumtype brought into a relationship with the distinctive function appropriate to a particular signum (cf. the definition of allomorphon). Reference-type would be defined as (gRe)Rs, or equivalently as {(/'Re)Rs} (cf. the definition of allomorphon as (/Rd)Rs, or equivalently as {(/Rd)Rs}). Denotable-type, denotatum-type and reference-type on the content side, would thus closely parallel phonetic form, allophone and allomorphon on the expression side. However, it should be noted that the relationship between reference and denotatum, reference-type and denotatum-type, and also content and denotation would remain

Modified standard axiomatic funct ionalism

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one of one-way correspondence, as in standard axiomatic functionalism. Thus, a reference-type, for example, could correspond to only one denotatum-type, whereas a single denotatumtype might correspond to more than one reference-type. Finally, it should be noted that the definition of content in Fig. 2.9 has been changed to DRs. This has no material consequences (and as in the case of reference, Michael Lamb has suggested that the "converse" definition could also be retained here).

2.6.7. A proposed framework for semantic

protocolisation

The changes proposed in Section 2.6 to yield modified standard axiomatic functionalism do not, I believe, produce any radical theoretical changes beyond those discussed in that Section. They do, however, make profound changes to certain aspects of the semantic description, particularly those relating to the treatment of the data. As already discussed, Hervey establishes the notions denotable and denotatum not in order to treat models for the data, but to treat the data themselves, i.e. those entities in the real-world to which utterances may refer (in the case of denotatum, to which utterances do refer). One consequence of this is that two or more utterances of non-synonymous signa - e.g. "horse"', "stallion", "this thing" - may have the same denotatum, i.e. they may be coreferential (to use a common term), or in Hervey's terminology they may be referentially similar (cf. Hervey 1979: 14-15, 21). This situation seems perfectly acceptable in terms of the way Hervey has set up his semantics. However, once we establish a modelled semantics for meaningful phenomena, as proposed in modified standard axiomatic functionalism, the situation is no longer reasonable. This can be shown by the following. Two utterances, let us say "table" and "antique", may be "referentially similar" in that they have the same denotatum (in the sense in which denotatum is defined by Hervey). However, this does not entail that they mean the same thing. This is evident from an utterance such as "The table is an antique". The information provided by "table" in this utterance is not the same as that provided by "antique" (I ignore the use of the articles "the" and **a(n)", since this is irrelevant to the argument); if the information was the same, the utterance would be tautological (as is any equativetype utterance where the two terms are synonymous, such as "the

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ladybird's a ladybug"). As soon as we provide models for the semantic data, rather than simply relating linguistic phenomena to features of the extra-linguistic world, we commit ourselves to providing what is at least in general terms an adequate account of the information given by particular utterances. This parallels the requirement on the expression side of the signum that phonetics should provide at least a generally adequate account in terms of which the realisations of phonological entities are to be described. By virtue of the fact that it did not recognise any distinction in meaning between an utterance "table" and an utterance "antique" in an overall utterance (i.e. a "sentence-utterance"; cf. Mulder 1989: 215) "The table's an antique", a semantic protocolisation which provided models for the phenomena treated in Hervey's account could not be regarded as adequate. I believe that an attempt to provide an overall account for semantic protocolisation would be a Herculean task - perhaps a Sisyphean task, since I suspect that even in principle a "universal semantic alphabet" is impossible. Even an attempt to set out the underlying principles in some detail would require an effort far beyond the possibilities of a work of this kind. However, the material I consider in much of the remainder of this book requires that at least some account of a basic framework for semantic protocolisation be provided here. This is therefore what I attempt to provide in Fig. 2.10, and the following paragraphs. I shall consider the notions presented in Fig. 2.10 in the following order: (i) proper denotable, (ii) referential entity, (iii) ascription, (iv) subspecification, (v) other potential ascriptions. The notion general denotable will emerge from the discussion of the other notions.

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general denotable

proper denotable

referential entity (conceived in "puresuchness" terms)

ascription (description as)

other potential ascriptions of referential entity (i.e. those ascriptions not referred to by the utterance in question) sub-specification (aspect/type/ part/respect etc.)

Figure 2.10. A proposed framework for semantic protocolisation

(i) Proper denotable A proper denotable is simply another term for denotable. That is to say, it is the basic protocolised real-world semantic notion to which linguistic semantic descriptions relate. (ii) Referential entity The referential entity is the entity to which reference is made. It is similar to what Hervey calls an entity, and bears some correspondence with what other writers have called a reference (e.g. Lyons 1977: 177-197). I propose, however, that the notion (referential) entity be used more widely in axiomatic functionalism than it is in most other approaches to linguistics; it is to be taken to include not only objects (whether physical or abstract), but also

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qualities (e.g. "blue"), processes (e.g. "walk"), and relations (e.g. "on"). It should also be taken to include not only "real" hypothetical entities, but also hypothetical entities which are "candidates for reality", and hypothetical entities which are "not candidates for reality" (for details of the working out of these proposals, cf. Hervey 1979: 28-31). I have used the term referential entity, in order to point up similarities between the approach I am adopting and other approaches to this area of enquiry. I also wish to retain the standard linguistic usage coreferential (see below). The notion referential entity can be thought of as having three sub-aspects: (a) object, (b) time, (c) location. I will consider the notion of referential object first, and will illustrate what I mean by a referential entity with respect first to the referential object, since I believe the principles involved are most easily grasped in this area. Firstly, referential objects, like referential entities in their entirety, must be thought of in "pure-suchness" terms. In the case of referential objects, we might say that they have to be thought of in "pure-thatness" terms. What I mean by "pure thatness" can be illustrated by consideration of a series of utterances in "diary entry" form; for example: "Unwell. Anxious. In bed till midday. Got up. Ate lunch. Might go to the doctor tomorrow". Each of these separate utterances (i.e. "Unwell", "Anxious", "In [bed till midday]", "Got up", "Ate [lunch]", "Might [go to the doctor tomorrow]") shares the same referential object; this referential object might be shared by any number of other utterances, such as "The writer", "John" (if that is his name), "Him", "That man", etc. By using examples which exhibit different parts of speech, I want to stress that the notion referential entity should not be equated with a noun, such as a proper noun, or referential features peculiar to that noun (or to nouns in general), any more than it should be equated with a preposition (or prepositional phrase), or an adjective, or whatever. Nor should it be equated with referential features which are of long (perhaps indefinitely long) duration (such as those associated with proper nouns), as opposed to transitory qualities (such as those associated with many adjectives) or short-term processes (such as those associated with many verbs). In this respect, the notion referential object perhaps differs from the notion of reference (or referent) in philosophical approaches to this kind of issue. The notion referential object, therefore, is designed to identify

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the object in question with no further specification of that object whatsoever. The notion of referential time can be illustrated by two further imaginary diary entries, which are to be taken as written on different days by the same writer, and which both read "Went to town". Let us assume that the town in question is the same town on both occasions; we can therefore ignore further consideration of the "to town" part of the utterance. Since the writer of the diary entry is the same person, "went" corresponds in both cases to the same referential object, i.e. that "object" which could also be referred to as "John", "the writer", etc. The two utterances are, in this respect, coreferential. They are, hardly, however, globally coreferential, since they refer to different times. This contrasts with a situation in which one and the same action is referred to as "Went to town" in one utterance, and "Walked to town" in another utterance. Here, both the referential object and the referential time are coreferential. Just as one must think of the referential object in "pure-suchness" - or "pure-thatness" - terms, so one must think of the referential time in "pure suchness" - or "purethenness" - terms. Thus, the time aspect of "Went to town" might also be referred to by, let us say, "Yesterday", "On Tuesday", "On March 17th", "Two days after your brother came back from India", etc. An example of the operation of the notion referential time is provided by the following Standard Arabic example: (2.1) ad-dunyahiya hiya the-world it [is] it the world is as it was In this example, both occurrences of the pronoun hiya 'it (f.s.)/she' are coreferential with the (feminine) noun dunya 'world'; that is to say, they both have the same referential object as dunya 'world'. They do not however have the same referential time. The first hiya 'it (f.s.)/she' has a referential time which is subsequent to the referential time of the second hiya 'it (f.s.)/she' (dunya 'world' has a referential time which can be regarded as extending before and beyond the referential time of both hiya's). The final aspect of referential entity which as far as I can see needs to be recognised is that of referential location. Again, this has to be thought of in "pure-suchness" - i.e. "pure-thereness" - terms.

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Thus, the referential location of "town" in an utterance "Went to town", is simply to be conceived as that location which might also be referred to by "there", "the place we visited last Thursday", "your birthplace", etc. The account I have given of referential entity is no doubt extremely crude, and there are areas where it is obviously lacking. Even in terms of the analysis I have given, it should be clear that "went", for example, involves not only a referential object, but also a referential time which is not punctual but extends for a specific period. An adequate account of an utterance of "went" as a referential entity would also have to include an account of the referential location which itself varies over time. The model also appears biased towards concrete entities and events. Would it, for instance, be sufficient to say that an abstraction such as "beauty" or "the atom" (as opposed to a specific atom at a specific time and place) simply lacks referential time or place? Might it be necessary to establish other categories in addition to referential object, referential time and referential location, in order to deal adequately with other aspects of existence in addition to the physical? All these matters would have to be considered in more detail before anything purporting to be an adequate account could be drawn up. It is also to be noted that the notion of referential entity is sufficient in assessing the semantic relationships - hyperonymyhyponymy, paronymy and antonymy - established by Hervey in his postulates for axiomatic-functionalist semantics (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 203-211, especially Defs. 7a 1 -7c l b ). This is be expected in view of the fact that the notion referential entity proposed in this Section is effectively simply a modelling of what Hervey terms an entity. Such semantic relationships are most simply observed with respect to denotations corresponding to simple signa. Thus horse is a hyponym of equine (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 207, Def. 7a l a ) on the basis that any entity which can be referred to as a "horse" can also be referred to as an "equine", but not vice versa (i.e. there are equines, such as zebras, which are not horses). Comparisons in terms of referential entities can, however, also be made with respect to complex signa, or cases where one of the pairs of signa is complex and the other is simple. Thus one can contrast the referential entity of stallion with what might be termed the global referential entity of adult horse, as well as with the individual referential entities of adult and horse. In this case, stallion is a

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hyponym of adult horse, as well as being a hyponym of adult and horse individually. The principle can be extended further to include what might be called global referential situations. Thus, The grass was eaten by the stallion and The stallion ate the grass can be said to be synonyms in terms of their global referential entities (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 208, Def. 7b). Similarly, The grass was eaten by the stallion is a hyponym of The adult horse ate the grass. This applicability of notions such as hyponymy to global referential entities and global referential situations will be seen to be important in relationship to a number of semantic questions in respect of extended axiomatic functionalism later in this book (cf. the discussion of missel and blackbird in Chapter Four, Section 4.3.6; cf. also Chapter Five, Section 5.3.2, Section 5.4; Chapter Six, Section 6.2, Section 6.4). (iii) Ascription The notion ascription means what is ascribed to, or said of, the referential entity, i.e. the way in which the referential entity is described. If someone says of me, "Idiot!", I might say that the person in question "described me as an idiot". In a phrase of the type "to describe X as Y", the X element ("me" in "he described me as an idiot") provides information about a referential entity, while the Y element ("as an idiot" in "he described me as an idiot") provides information about an ascription. In an utterance, "The table is an antique", "table" and "antique" share the same referential object they are coreferential. They are, however, distinct with regard to ascription - they are not co-ascriptive. The notion ascription obviously bears some relation to the traditional philosophical notion of sense. A key difference, however, is that sense as traditionally understood "is a relation that applies in the first instance to lexemes and holds independently of particular occasions of utterance" (Lyons 1977: 208). By contrast, ascription, as understood under the present approach, is solely a referential matter - it is one facet of referentiality itself. It may be that ascription can be thought of in terms of class membership. That is to say, for the purposes of semantic modelling at least, it may be that in calling someone an idiot, I can be said to be assigning him/her to the class of idiots, whether this class be regarded in extensional terms as the class of all real (and potential idiots), or whether the class be regarded in intensional terms, i.e. in

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terms of the supposed defining characteristics of idiothood. Again, questions of this nature could only be answered in terms of a much fuller account of the issues than I am able to give here. (iv) Sub-specification It might be thought that referential entity and ascription were the only two notions required to account for the referential features of natural language. Unfortunately, this is not so. Consider the following examples: (2.2) Helen of Troy was a beautiful woman. (2.3) Joan of Arc was a beautiful woman. Let us suppose that "beautiful" in example (2.2) means physically beautiful, rather than spiritually beautiful or beautiful in some other way. Let us also suppose that Helen of Troy was not spiritually beautiful or beautiful in some other non-physical way. Similarly, let us suppose that "beautiful" in example (2.3) means spiritually beautiful, rather than physically beautiful or beautiful in some other way. Let us also suppose that Joan of Arc was not physically beautiful, or beautiful in some other non-spiritual way. In this case, (2.2) is not true if the speaker means that Helen of Troy was spiritually beautiful, and (2.3) is not true if the speaker means that Joan of Arc was physically beautiful. Concordantly, it would be possible for a speaker of (2.3), for example, to make a comment along the lines, "When I said Joan of Arc was a beautiful woman, I didn't mean she was physically beautiful". All this demonstrates that there is a referential difference between the two senses of beautiful physically beautiful and spiritually beautiful. Clearly, when one makes an utterance "Joan of Arc was a beautiful woman", the referential object is the same whether one means spiritually beautiful or physically beautiful - i.e. it is the referential object also referable to as "Joan of Arc", "a saint", "died at the stake", "French", and in any number of other appropriate ways. (I ignore here considerations of referential time and referential location for the sake of ease of exposition.) This suggests that the ascription involved must be different in a case where one means "physically beautiful", as opposed to a case where one means "spiritually beautiful". Consider, however, the following:

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(2.4) Helen of Troy and Joan of Arc were both beautiful people. If (2.4) is taken to mean that Helen of Troy was physically beautiful and Joan of Arc was spiritually beautiful, and if we regard the referential features "physically beautiful" and "spiritually beautiful" as ascriptions, it would appear that "beautiful" in this utterance simultaneously has the ascriptions "physically beautiful" (with respect to Helen of Troy), and "spiritually beautiful" (with respect to Joan of Arc). This would suggest that the utterance ought to be zeugmatic in that beautiful should make a different sense with respect to Helen of Troy, from the sense it makes with respect to Joan of Arc (cf. Chapter Four, Section 4.3.4 for further discussion of zeugma). In fact, "Helen of Troy and Joan of Arc were both beautiful people" is a perfectly reasonable, non-zeugmatic utterance, even where what is meant is that Helen of Troy was physically beautiful and Joan of Arc was spiritually beautiful. In order to deal with this kind of situation I propose that a third facet of denotables should be recognised, in addition to referential entity and ascription. This is what I have called sub-specification. This allows us to say that the reference of "beautiful" in "Helen of Troy and Joan of Arc were both beautiful people" is analysed as involving two referential entities (i.e. those entities also referred to in this utterance by "Helen of Troy" and "Joan of Arc"), a single ascription ("beautiful") and two sub-specifications "physically beautiful" (in the case of Helen of Troy), and "spiritually beautiful" (in the case of Joan of Arc). Elsewhere, the sub-specification may specify not so much a respect or an aspect, but a part (although these notions are not always clearly distinguished). A case in point is the following (example from Cruse 1986: 53): (2.5) The car needs washing. Here potential referential variation is also a matter of subspecification. Thus: (2.6) (a) Does the car need washing? (b) It depends whether you mean the whole car including the engine, or whether you just mean the bodywork.

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Cruse refers to this as an example of "highlighting" (the converse of which he calls "backgrounding"). He identifies it as one of two forms of contextual "modulation" of meaning (the other form, which he calls "promotion"/"demotion", is discussed below). Regarding contextual highlighting, Cruse comments, "For instance, The car needs servicing and The car needs washing highlight different parts of the car. (This is not to say that car refers to something different in each of these sentences - in both cases it is the whole car which is referred to)" (Cruse 1986: 53). In one sense, Cruse is undoubtedly right that it is the whole car which is referred to. In another sense, however, an utterance "The car needs washing" normally does refer only to the bodywork - as evidenced by an abnormal interpretation of the the-whole-car type. The fact that it seems possible in cases of the type "The car needs washing" to conclude both that the whole car is referred to and that something other than the whole car is referred to is part of my motivation for identifying sub-specification distinctly from ascription (as well as referential entity). The notion ascription provides an account of the sense in which it is reasonable to say that the whole car is being referred to, while the notion sub-specification provides an account of the sense in which it is reasonable to say that only the bodywork is being referred to (if that is what is actually intended). The sub-specification may also specify a type. Consider the case of a man who walks into a model shop, and says, "I want to buy a car". In this case, it is highly unlikely that the man intends to buy a real car; and if the salesperson pointed to his own Ford Fiesta standing in the backyard of the shop and said, "There's my car. Would you like to buy that one?", the customer could legitimately reply, "I didn't mean that kind of car". Conversely, if someone went into a car showroom, and said, "I want to buy a car", he would be expected to mean a real car, and not a toy car. (v) Other potential ascriptions As noted above, the referential entity is conceived in "pure-suchness" terms. That is to say, no further information about the entity concerned is involved other than its entityhood. Any further referential features of the denotable proper are either a matter of the ascription, or of the sub-specification. However, as also noted above, it is the case that for any referential entity referred to in a particular way, there are a potentially indefinite number of other ways

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in which it could also have been referred to. For example, a referential entity referred to as "Joan of Arc" could also be referred to as "a saint", "died [at the stake]", "French", and in any number of other appropriate ways. These other potential ways of referring to a particular referential entity are not part of the denotable (proper), when this referential entity is referred to in a particular way. That is to say, they do not fall within the model established for a particular denotatum (or, by extension, a particular reference). They may, however, be said to be part of the denotable in a more general sense, i.e. what I have termed the general denotable in Fig. 2.10. It may seem that the notions of general denotable and other potential ascriptions are of marginal relevance to axiomatic functionalism, falling as they do outside the scope of proper denotable, and therefore properly speaking outside the scope of the model for semantic protocolisation for axiomatic functionalism. It is, however, useful to have the notions general denotable and other potential ascriptions. This is partly because it is quite easy to confuse aspects of the other potential ascriptions with aspects of the denotable (proper), and particularly with the sub-specification. This potential for confusion can be illustrated with reference to Cruse's notion of promotion/demotion of referential features (the other aspect of contextual modulation which Cruse identifies; Cruse 1986: 52). I should emphasise that I am not suggesting that Cruse himself is guilty of confusion in this area. While the models he establishes for different facets of referentiality are, I believe, easily adaptable to the present approach, they are not made in terms which have any direct connection with the present approach. I have already considered, with regard to the example "The car needs washing", Cruse's notion of "highlighting" of referential features. This, I have suggested, corresponds under the present approach to sub-specification of the denotable (proper). Cruse contrasts this with what he calls "promotion" of referential features (the converse of which he terms "demotion"). He gives as an example of promotion: (2.7) Arthur poured the butter into a dish (Cruse 1986: 52). In this example, Cruse argues that the context "promotes" the feature "hot" (of the butter) from a possible to a canonical status. Under the present approach to referentiality, "hot" (of the butter) falls outside

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the scope of the denotable (proper), and is to be regarded under other potential ascriptions of the butter. That is to say, features of the butter may be adduced from "world knowledge" (e.g. knowledge about the nature of things which can be poured, knowledge about the temperature of butter when it is pourable, etc.), but is not as such referred to in the statement "Arthur poured the butter into a dish". One might be tempted to regard "hot" as a sub-specification of the butter, and thus include it within the denotable (proper). That this is not correct can be shown by a comparison with "Joan of Arc was beautiful", i.e. spiritually beautiful, which was discussed above. Here, the statement is true if Joan of Arc was spiritually beautiful, even if she was also physically ugly. The analogy with "hot" in the case of "Arthur poured the butter into a dish" breaks down. Let us assume we took this to mean "Arthur poured the hot butter into a dish". In this case the statement would be true if the butter was in fact hot, and false if it was not. However, the truth or falsity of the statement actually has nothing to do with whether the butter is hot or not. Witness the incongruity of the following: (2.8) (a) Did Arthur pour the butter into a dish? (b) Do you mean, "Did Arthur pour the hot butter into a dish?"? o r It depends whether you mean the hot butter or not. Example (2.8) would of course make sense if taken to imply a difference in referential entity - i.e. a difference with respect to which particular piece (or pat) of butter is being referred to. This, however, is not of relevance to the present discussion. Contrast with this the reasonableness of the following: (2.9) (a) Was Joan of Arc beautiful? (b) Do you mean physically beautiful or spiritually beautiful? or It depends whether you mean physically beautiful or not. Cruse also suggests with regard to the example "Arthur poured the butter into a dish", that "liquid" can similarly be regarded as a promoted referential feature (Cruse 1986: 52-53). This example is somewhat more problematic than that of "hot", but is, I believe, resolvable in much the same way. The problem here hinges around the fact that "pour" implies that the object is pourable - either a liquid

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or a powder, or similar. Again, however, liquid/powder is to be regarded as part of other potential ascriptions of the butter. So: (2.10) (a) Did Arthur pour the butter into a dish ? (b) It depends whether you mean the liquid butter or not. o r It depends whether you mean the liquid or the powdered butter. As in the case of (2.8), (2.10) only makes sense if interpreted in terms of a difference in referential entity. It cannot be made to work on the basis of a difference in sub-specification. This contrasts with an example such as (2.5), "The car needs washing". One difference between standard axiomatic functionalism, and the modified standard axiomatic functionalism which I have been discussing is the greater degree of parallelism under the latter approach between features on the expression side and those on the content side of the signum. In particular, modified standard axiomatic functionalism, introduces the notion of protocol!sation of models for the semantic data. This suggests that the models in terms of which protocolisation is made should parallel one another, i.e. that the model proposed in Fig. 2.10 should have parallels with respect to the models for protocolisation proposed with regard to the phonetic data - and that where such parallelism does not exist there should be a reason for this. In fact, it does appear that there are significant, though not immediately apparent parallels, between the model presented in Fig. 2.10, and notions relevant to protocolisation on the expression side (in phonetics). In this light, consider the realisation on a particular occasion of [1] as a realisation of the phoneme l\l in English, i.e. this particular allophonon (phonete) of the phoneme /I/. The "entity" (cf. referential entity) to which this corresponds is simply that particular realisation itself. That is to say, in semantics one can refer to the same referential entity a potentially unlimited number of times through a potentially unlimited number of utterances. On the expression side, each separate occurrence corresponds to a unique "entity" (i.e. the distinction between the realisational entity and the "entity" to which it relates simply does not exist in phonetics). The ascription of [11 can be regarded as the full range of phonetic possibilities which constitute the realisations of the phoneme /I/. One difference between phonetic realisations of natural language and

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denotata is that in the case of the latter it is possible to have cases where the full range of possibilities covered by a particular denotation is instanced. For example, it would be possible to claim that someone was "beautiful" in all possible senses - i.e. physically, spiritually, etc. It is not, however, possible for a single allophonon (phonete) of the phoneme IM to exemplify the full phonetic range of possible allophonons of that phoneme. Assuming we adopt the standard analysis of IM as having two allophones [1] and [11, each particular instance (allophonon/phonete) of the phoneme IM must be either [11 or [1] (but not both). This situation is a happenstance of the nature of the human vocal organs, rather than an intrinsic limitation on features on the expression side of the signum. Consider an invented semiotic system involving a chessboard pattern with squares 10cm by 10cm. The system is extremely simple; each square corresponds to a potential message, which is conveyed by "filling in" that particular square with black pen. To fill in a particular square all that is required is that a mark at least 5cm wide and the full 10cm deep is made in the relevant square. Any mark which is at least this wide is taken to convey the intended message; any mark which is less wide does not count as a successful communication, and is therefore excluded from the semiotic analysis and by extension from the statements of realisation of that analysis. In the case of such a semiotic system the maximal form of any realisation would be a mark which covered the entire square of the chess board (such a realisation could in other respects perhaps be compared with a phonetic realisation in natural language which was articulated with maximum care). It will be seen that in the case of the "chess-board" semiotic system, unlike natural language, it would be possible to have certain realisations (i.e. maximal-form realisations) whose scope covered the scope of all other possible realisations. Such realisations would be analogous to the situation in semantics, where the scope of one denotatum of a particular denotation (e.g. "beautiful [in all senses]") covers the scope of all other possible denotata (e.g. "physically beautiful", "spiritually beautiful", etc.) of that particular denotation. Finally, the other potential ascriptions of the (phonetic) entity are those aspects of the sound event which are deemed irrelevant to linguistic semiotics, such as individual voice quality or tone of voice (cf. Laver 1994: 397-399). These are by their nature not subject to protocolisation, or as Mulder puts it, "at the

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protocolised stage ... everything which is a priori irrelevant under the theory to be employed is omitted" (Mulder 1989: 46). This analysis of the nature of reference is not to be regarded as more than provisional, and it will doubtless need extensive development and revision. From the point of view of material discussed in this book, in particular, the detailed viability of this approach to the notion of reference would need to be considered in relation to the distinction between purport and import which is drawn in Chapter Five (Section 5.5), and in relation to the proposed treatment of ellipsis, discussed in Chapter Six (Section 6.8). The analysis of denotatum (and reference) as multi-faceted entities also has serious implications for the treatment of denotatum-type as a class of denotata (and reference-type as a class of references). I do not attempt to explore these issues in detail in this book, principally because they would require a more developed notion of the nature of referentiality itself than the preliminary account which I have given here. It is also striking that the notion of denotation is in some respects more closely linked to the notion of ascription than it is to the notions of referential entity and sub-specification. I shall illustrate this in the discussion of nuance in Section 2.7.

2.7. Nuance and imperfect synonymy The reason that I have presented modified standard axiomatic functionalism and the associated general proposals regarding semantic protocolisation is not that I believe that standard axiomatic functionalism is incoherent. 13 Rather, I want to consider the relevance of modified standard axiomatic functionalism to nuance, in Hervey's sense of "a model for describing differences of 'meaning' between synonymous signs [signa]" (Hervey 1971: 34). In the same light I will also consider what is sometimes known as imperfect synonymy (Geeraerts 1988) and the associated notion of "...denotational tendencies (a form of "connotation")" (Mulder 1989: 164). Mulder and Hervey give a number of examples of two signa which show differences in nuance, e.g. girl and bird (Hervey 1971: 34), die and kick the bucket (Mulder — Hervey 1972: 61), policeman and cop (Mulder - Hervey 1980: 214; also Mulder 1989: 148) fellow and bloke (Mulder — Hervey 1972: 31, and adder and

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viper (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 208). An apparently similar example is provided by bucket and pail, where, according to Collins English Dictionary, a bucket is an "open-topped, roughly cylindrical container; pail", while a pail is a "bucket; esp. one made of wood or metal". The case of bucket and pail, although expositorily simple, is not without its problems from a proper descriptive point of view. 14 Specifically, it might reasonably be objected that the claim that pail refers particularly to a bucket made of wood or metal rests entirely on the account given in Collins English Dictionary. There do, however, exist more substantial linguistic investigations into corresponding cases, for instance vernielen and vernietigen in nineteenth-century written Dutch, both meaning "to destroy", which has been investigated by Geeraerts (1988). The results of Geeraerts investigations are summed up by Taylor, as follows: Geeraerts ... offers as possible candidates [for "perfect synonymy"] the two verbs vernielen and vernietigen "to destroy, bring to nought" in nineteenth-century Dutch. The two words appear to have referred to exactly the same range of situations and exhibited identical selection restrictions, even in the writings of one and the same author. Were these two words, then, "perfect synonyms"? Geeraerts argues they were not. Differences emerged when the frequencies of different senses were compared, vernietigen being used predominantly in an abstract sense, while vernielen referred predominantly to an act of physical destruction. Remarks in contemporary handbooks of good usage also pointed to a difference in the conceptual centres of the two words (Taylor 1989: 56). A final example, which closely parallells the above pairs, but involves only a single signum comes from Mulder. Mulder suggests it may be that "... 'rock garden' tends to refer to a stereotype, but may in principle refer to any garden involving a rock, or even strewn with rocks ..." (Mulder 1989: 196). If we apply fairly traditional linguistic criteria to these examples, they fall into two groups: (i) cases where we may suspect that the meaning difference between the members of the pairs is one of difference in "conceptual centre" (Geeraerts), or "stereotype" (Mulder), and (ii) cases where the meaning difference between the

Nuance and imperfect synonymy

1 19

members of the pairs is one of difference in attitude, or what Leech calls "affective meaning" (Leech 1974: 14-16). Examples of pairs where we may suspect a difference in "conceptual centre" or "stereotype" are bucket and pail, and vernieten and vernietigen. Examples of pairs exhibiting attitudinal difference are girl and bird, die and kick the bucket, policeman and cop, fellow and bloke, and adder and viper. We may also apply to these examples the model for semantic protocolisation proposed in Section 2.6.1. I shall deal first with the group (i) examples, then briefly consider examples from group (ii). In the case of the group (i) examples, the meaning difference is, in most instances at least, a matter of a tendency towards different sub-specifications, i.e. it is a properly linguistic matter. I will take first the case vernielen and vernietigen. Consider the following, both of which can be translated into English as 'The conflict destroyed the village': (2.11) De strijd heefi het dorp vernield. (2.12) De strijd heeft het dorp vernietigd. Example (2.11) with a form of vernielen would tend to mean that the village was physically destroyed, while example (2.11) with a form of vernietigen would tend to mean that the village was destroyed as a community. That is to say, the sub-specfications tend to be different in the two cases, and if (2.11) were taken by a reader in a given instance to mean that the village was destroyed as a community, the writer might object that this was not what he meant. It might even be the case that the utterance was true under the "physical destruction" interpretation (as, let us say, intended by the writer), but untrue under the "destruction as a community" interpretation (as misinterpreted by the reader). The example with rock-garden is analogous to vernielen and vernietigen (with the exception of lacking a parallel term). Thus, rock-garden has the typical sub-specification "garden featuring rocks or rockeries", and this may be criterial in terms of truth or falsity. Thus, "Have you got a rock-garden?". "It depends whether you mean a garden which has rocks as a central feature, or just one with lots of rocks strewn about it". The case with bucket and pail is, I believe, more problematic (even if we accept pail as non-archaic; as Barry Heselwood has pointed out to me, in Britain at least it seems scarcely used by

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younger people). As noted above, Collins English Dictionary suggests a pail is to be regarded as a bucket, but especially one made of wood or metal. That is to say, there ought to be a tendency towards a sub-specification of this type of bucket in cases where pail is used. Such a tendency towards sub-specification should be instantiated in cases where the utterance in question is true under a "made of wood or metal" interpretation, but false under a "made of another substance" interpretation. It seems, however, to be difficult to construct utterances where this distinction is manifest. Take the situation of a man who walks into a hardware store and says, "I want to buy a pail". The assistant shows him a plastic bucket, and the man replies, "I didn't mean that kind of pail. I meant a wooden pail". In this case, the assistant could quite reasonably (if not necessarily politely) reply, "Well, why didn't you say so, then?". That is to say, although it is possible to attribute to an utterance "I want to buy a pail" the sub-specification wooden (or metal), this sub-specification does not carry much plausibility. This would suggest that the distinction in meaning between bucket and pail is not a linguistic-semantic one under the approach I am adopting. It is, however, quite possible that I have overlooked some crucial possible types of utterance which would demonstrate genuine differences in tendencies towards sub-specification. I would therefore wish to leave open the question of whether this is a genuine linguistic-semantic difference. A point which should be made, however, is that even if the difference is not one of tendency towards different sub-specification, but merely of "pseudo-tendency", this remains amenable to investigation in terms of the model proposed in Fig. 2.10, under the category "other potential ascriptions". That is to say, it may be that wooden/metal is never criterial with any degree of plausibility for the truth (etc.) of an utterance involving use of the word (signum 15 ) pail. However, it may also be that when one considers the object in question in utterances involving pail (and where information regarding the nature of the object is independently available), this object tends in fact much more commonly to be made of wood or metal than the object in question in utterances involving use of the word (signum) bucket. By contrast with the group (i) examples, the group (ii) examples {girl and bird, die and kick the bucket, policeman and cop, fellow and bloke, and adder and viper) do not at first sight appear to involve potential difference in the sub-specification. Rather any difference in

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meaning is apparently a matter of difference in the general denotable; in terms of the criteria laid out for modified standard axiomatic functionalism in Section 2.6.1, therefore, they are not linguistic (although they are equally evidently linguistic, in terms of the wider general use of the term "linguistic"). So, if we take the example of policeman and cop, cop does not tend to refer to a different type of policeman from policeman', for instance, it is apparently not the case that cop is typically used for a policeman who is corrupt or brutal, while policeman is used for a policeman who is upright or restrained. Rather, cop suggests a generalised attitude on the part of the speaker towards policemen, perhaps one of slight disdain (cf. Mulder 1989: 164). It is also, in register terms, more informal, but this falls outside present concerns (see, however, Chapter One, Section 1.2.2, for a suggested approach to the treatment of register). This generalised attitude has to be regarded as falling under other potential ascriptions, i.e. it is an opinion of policemen (or a policeman) which could be expressed of them using other utterances having the same referential entity as the utterance in question. In the case of most utterances, I believe this position is adequate and accords nicely with the traditional notion of affective meaning as falling outside the domain of denotation. It does, however, seem that at the margins even the difference between members of pairs which differ in terms of their "affective meaning" may be semantically manipulable, i.e. that a sub-specificational difference can be brought into play. Consider the following (example from Lamb 1983: 1): (2.13) I'm not a bloke. I may be a fellow; but I'm not a bloke. In an utterance of this type, it seems inescapable that "fellow" and "bloke" have different denotata; the meaningfulness of the utterance requires this. The only obvious alternative would be to say that "fellow" and "bloke" in such an utterance are being used metalinguistically, as "ladybird" and "ladybug" would be in an utterance of the type, "That's not a ladybug, it's a ladybirdto indicate, for example, that a particular form is not generally used in a certain dialect. This, however, seems unsustainable in the case of an utterance, "I'm not a bloke. I may be a fellow, but I'm not a bloke". Instead, I believe we are forced to accept that "bloke" has the type sub-specification of "typical bloke" (i.e. common, perhaps

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Standard axiomatic fimctionalism

somewhat uncouth man, etc; cf. the notion of "blokeishness" in colloquial British English); similarly "fellow" has the type subspecification of "typical fellow" (i.e. respectable man, etc.). The example, "I'm not a bloke. I may be a fellow, but I'm not a bloke" raises an important general issue. It might seem that the fact that only "bloke", and not "fellow", can apparently carry the "blokeish" sub-specification, i.e. "common, perhaps uncouth, man, etc." is a demonstration that there is a denotatum of bloke which cannot also be a denotatum of fellow, and that therefore fellow and bloke do not share identical ranges of denotata. This would imply that the denotation of the signum fellow and the denotation of the signum bloke are not the same, i.e. that fellow and bloke are not synonyms. Such a conclusion would, I believe, have extremely undesirable consequences for the notion of denotation, since it would introduce rather obviously unstable and impressionistic "connotational-type" features at the abstract level. It would also though this is perhaps less important - shift the notion of denotation in modified standard axiomatic functionalism considerably away from the notion of denotation in standard axiomatic functionalism. Particularly in view of the unstable and impressionistic nature of the features involved, therefore, such a conclusion is to be avoided if possible. This problem can be solved by simply ignoring subspecificational features (as well as features appertaining to the referential entity) in the assessment of denotation. That is to say, all that is to be taken into account in the assessment of denotation is the ascription, since the ascription implies the full extensional range of possible meanings. In the case of fellow and bloke, the ascription is the same, since fellow does not necessarily have the meaning "respectable man, etc."; there are many contexts in which "fellow" is simply used to mean "man". Similarly, bloke does not necessarily have the meaning "common/uncouth man"; there are many contexts in which "bloke" is simply used (informally) to mean "man". Another way to approach this problem is through a consideration of the difference between incongruity and contradiction. If I say, "That fellow's not a bloke" I have uttered a contradiction, provided I am using "fellow" to mean "man", and provided I am not making use of the kind of sub-specificational possibilities exploited in the example, "I may be a fellow, but I'm not a bloke". If, however, I say "That bloke's not in the least uncouth", what I have uttered might perhaps be regarded as somewhat incongruous. This demonstrates

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that "uncouth (etc.)" is merely a sub-specificational feature of "bloke" in certain utterances, and is not part of its definition, i.e. it is not a feature of the ascription. A more obvious illustration is provided by the pair pig (= policeman) and policeman (I take it that a woman can be a "policeman" as well as a "policewoman"). Of the pair pig and policeman, pig is clearly derogatory, while policeman may be regarded as neutral. As in the case of "That fellow's not a bloke", if I say, "That pig's not a policeman", I have uttered a contradiction (provided I am using pig in the sense of policeman, and provided I am not making use of the kind of sub-specificational possibilities exploited in the fellow/bloke example above). If, however, 1 say, "I have always respected the pigs", what I have uttered is incongruous to the degree that I could be regarded either as incompetent at English, or even facetious or ironic (the same provisos holding as in the example "That pig's not a policeman"). I have not, however, uttered a contradiction. This demonstrates that the "despicable" element attaching to pig is not part of the ascription, and is not relevant to the denotation. The proposals for semantic protocolisation which I presented in Section 2.6.1, and which I have worked through in somewhat greater detail here extend the notion "denote" as established by Hervey. They do this partly because they adopt a modelled (protocolised) account of the semantic data (as noted in Section 2.6.1). Additionally, however, they interpret the term "denote" roughly to mean "refer to by virtue of relevant conventions", these conventions deriving from the definition of semiotic systems as "systems of conventions for communication" (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 40, Def. lc; Mulder 1989: 436, Def. lc). This contrasts with Hervey, who defines "denote" as "refer to by specific conventions" (Hervey 1980: 206, Def. 4a). Hervey's inclusion of the term "specific" allows him to exclude from consideration those "connotational" features which I have included in the current account in terms of sub-specification (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 212-235). As the overall theoretical shape of modified standard axiomatic functionalism suggests, there are extremely close parallels between imperfect homonymy (or, making partial use of Mulder's terminology, imperfect homomorphy), and imperfect synonymy (nuance) as a proper linguistic notion. As examples of imperfect synonymy, we may consider vernielen and vernietigen, comparing

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Standard axiomatic functionalism

these with Rad and Rat as examples of imperfect homonymy (imperfect homomorphy) (Section 2.4). Vernielen and vernietigen correspond to a single denotation (there is no difference in the range of the denotables to which they can refer). At the same time vernielen has a tendency to mean not merely to destroy but to destroy physically, while vernietigen tends to mean not merely to destroy, but to destroy in an abstract sense. Since we have only a single denotation we cannot investigate differences in tendencies to mean purely in "sub-denotational" terms - i.e. in terms of denotata and denotatum-types. This parallels the way in which we cannot investigate differences in pronunciation tendencies between Rad and Rat purely in "sub-phonological" terms - i.e. in terms of allophones and allophonons (phonetes). Rather, we need both the analysis of vernielen and vernietigen as different signa plus the analysis of their correspondence to a single denotation, just as we need the analysis of Rad and Rat as different signa plus the analysis of the "correspondence" of the relevant allomorph in each case to a single phonological form. That is to say, just as the notions form and allomorphon allow us to investigate the differing "tendencies to sound" of Rad and Rat, so the notions reference and reference-type would allow us to investigate the differing tendencies to mean of vernielen and vernietigen. Vernielen and vernietigen in nineteenth century written Dutch seem clear examples of synonyms, as defined by standard axiomatic functionalism, i.e. two signa ("words") which have the same denotation (cf. Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 28, for a formal definition of synonym). However, they are not "perfect synonyms", in the sense that this term is used by Taylor, since they have differing "focal reference-types" (or what I shall later refer to in extended axiomaticfunctionalist context as differing canonical allosemons\ cf. Chapter Five, Section 5.1). As with imperfect homonymy (imperfect homomorphy), there is reason to believe that this kind of situation is not at all rare in natural language. At least one other study of synonyms has been carried out which provides a parallel to the analysis of vernielen and vernietigen. This involves the verbs parere and sembrare in Modern Italian (de Longe 1993). These two verbs both mean "to seem", "to appear", and are generally held to be total synonyms. Basing himself on a previous analysis of the differing frequencies of these two verbs in different syntactic contexts (Lindvall 1986), however, de Longe

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125

suggests that while the two verbs may be extensionally identical and therefore in principle at least interchangeable in all contexts, in practice there is a tendency towards referential distinction, such that "sembrare focuses on the entity involved and parere on the activity of the entity" (de Longe 1993: 528). This general approach can also be extended to areas of analysis which do not involve comparison between different signa. Thus, as we have seen, while no other apparent potential interpretation is ruled out, we may say that the focal reference-type of rock garden is "a garden featuring rocks or rockeries" (Collins English Dictionary). On the content side of the signum the notions denotatum and denotation in standard axiomatic functionalism - as well as denotatum-type in modified standard axiomatic functionalism - allow us to investigate denotational aspects of meaning; the notions reference and reference-type (as established in modified standard axiomatic functionalism), on the other hand, would allow us to investigate at least some aspects of what are traditionally called connotational aspects of meaning. Correspondingly, on the expression side the notions phonological form, allophone, and allophonon (phonete) allow us to investigate what Michael Lamb has proposed be called figurational aspects of "sounding" (to borrow a Hallidayan term) - i.e. the way realisations of signa are pronounced in a general sense. That is to say these notions allow us to investigate the organisation and realisations of figurae (a figura, as noted in Section 2.2.1 being a "semiotic entity which has only form" 1 6 ; Mulder and Hervey 1980: 43, Def. 2b; Mulder 1989: 438, Def. 2b); the notions allomorph, allomorphon and form, on the other hand, allow us to investigate what Lamb has proposed be called configurational aspects of "sounding".

Chapter Three Extended axiomatic functionalism

3.1. Extended axiomatic functionalism: basic components Modified standard axiomatic functionalism, which I put forward in the previous chapter, not only allows for the treatment of connotational as well as configurational phenomena, but does this in a way which can reasonably be said to render the overall theory simpler than standard axiomatic functionalism, by introducing a greater degree of parallelism or symmetry into the theory. I want now to consider further modifications to the theory, which result in a fully symmetrical theory, yielding what I refer to in this book as extended axiomatic functionalism. Extended axiomatic functionalism has two basic components. I present the first of these, the signum ontology, in Section 3.1.1. This corresponds roughly to the ontology and the semantics of standard axiomatic functionalism. The second component, the system ontology, I present in Section 3.1.2. This corresponds roughly to the systemology of standard axiomatic functionalism, although it also includes elements which have some correspondence to the "abstract semantics" - i.e. the level of denotation, plus syn-semantics (constructional semantics) and para-semantics - of standard axiomatic functionalism (cf. Chapter Two, Section 2.2.3). In the final Section of this Chapter I assess the terminology of extended axiomatic functionalism in the light of general principles of terminology production (Section 3.2). In the Appendix to this book, I have added a Provisional postulates for extended axiomatic functionalism (henceforth Postulates). I have included these for two reasons. Firstly, it seems odd to refer to extended axiomatic functionalism as an axiomatic theory (or as an axiomatic functionalism) if there is no set of postulates (axioms and definitions) available for scrutiny. Secondly, I am aware that the terminology of extended axiomatic functionalism may appear somewhat daunting. It therefore seemed sensible to provide an account of the Postulates, in order to render the theory as accessible as possible. I have, however, used the title Provisional postulates for extended axiomatic functionalism in order to stress that this version is presented for consideration and discussion, and is not to be regarded as a canonical statement of the theory.

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From the next Section (Section 3.1.1) onwards I have included cross-references to all formally defined notions in the Postulates. These are given by Definition number, rather than page number. I have also included an Index to the provisional postulates for extended axiomatic functionalism, immediately before the subject index to the book. The intention of cross-referencing technical terms in extended axiomatic functionalism is to allow interested readers easily to relate analyses which are sometimes presented informally in the main body of the text to the formal theoretical apparatus of extended axiomatic functionalism, thus providing a mechanism for checking the coherence of the analyses presented with the overall theoretical framework. In certain subsequent Sections I also use terms referring to general-linguistic notions, or notions in standard axiomatic functionalism, and on occasion to notions in modified standard axiomatic functionalism (Chapter Two, Section 2.6). Such terms are not cross-referenced to the Postulates in the Appendix, since properly speaking they are not terms which refer to notions within extended axiomatic functionalism (notwithstanding what is sometimes their shared terminology, and however clearly they may in general terms be said to resemble notions in extended axiomatic functionalism). On other occasions, subsequent Sections of the book deal in the first instance with standard axiomatic functionalism, but also by analogy with extended axiomatic functionalism (particularly Chapter Four, Section 4.1). In such cases I have not crossreferenced theoretical terms to the Postulates. Finally, I sometimes use terms in a way which may be regarded as simultaneously applicable to their general-linguistic usage and their usage as technical terms within extended axiomatic functionalism; for example the use of the terms polysemy and homonymy in the discussion of Lehrer's (1974) study of the judgements of native speakers regarding the distinction between cases of polysemy and those of homonymy in English. In cases like this, where there is at the least a compatibility between common usage and technical usage in extended axiomatic functionalism, I have cross-referenced the relevant terms to the Postulates. In this Chapter, as throughout this book, I am centrally concerned with the application of extended axiomatic functionalism to natural language. As the theory is a general semiotic theory, rather than simply a linguistic theory (Chapter One, Section 1.3), however, the postulates are formulated in such a way that they apply to any

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semiotic system, including natural language. The major practical consequence of this is a terminological one; namely that where the form (-)log(-) is used in the main body of the Postulates, this is to be substituted by the form (-)lex(-) in the description of natural language. Similarly, where the form(-)cen[e](~) is used in the main body of the Postulates, the form (-)phonfej(-) is used in the description of natural language. Accordingly, all forms with (-)phonfej(-) in the main body of the text are cross-referenced to corresponding Postulates with (-)cenfej(-), and all forms with (-)lex(-) in the main body of the text are cross-referenced to corresponding forms with (-)log(-) in the Postulates. The distinction between the terms (-)cen[e](-) and (-)phonfej(-), and (-)lex(-) and (-)log(-) is itself formally defined in the preliminary definitions of the Postulates: Def. Oa, and Def. Ob.17

3.1.1. The signum ontology of extended axiomatic fiinctionalism In extended axiomatic functionalism, the ontology and most aspects of the semantics of the standard version are both brought within a single component (as they are in effect in modified standard axiomatic functionalism, proposed in Chapter Two, Section 2.6). This extended ontology is referred to in Dickins (1989) as the matrix ontology, since it is this ontology which provides the general matrix for the entire theory. However, following a suggestion from Barry Heselwood (personal communication) I have in this book adopted the term signum ontology (Def. F4 4 ) to refer to this theoretical component. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, the term signum ontology (Def. F4 4 ) is reminiscent of both ontology and signum theory, which Mulder and Hervey employ synonymously (Chapter One, Section 1.1; Chapter Two, Section 2.2.1) to refer to that component of the standard version which most closely individually corresponds to the signum ontology (Def. F4 4 ) of the extended version. Secondly, the signum ontology (Def. F4 4 ) is that ontology - i.e. "the set of entities presupposed by a theory" (Collins English Dictionary) - whose highest-level abstraction is the signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24). It also shares the property of being an ontology in this sense, with the other basic component of extended axiomatic functionalism, the system ontology (Def. 3a l a ) (cf. Section 3.1.2).

Hxtended axiomatic fimctionalism: basic components

S

I

G

N

U

M

O N T

O L

Ο

G

Y

signum S=E&C

GENERAL PHONETICS

phonetic form

Mi)

phonetic image

Key to R & { } '• •·» « »

expression E={/j'-; ,n Rs(

conlcnl C={"j.

400

Appendix

Def. 25d.

Def. 26.

Def. 26a.

Def. 26b.

Def. 26c.

Def. 26d.

Def. 26e.

' C e n e ' for 'allocene (second sense) (Def. 23a 1 ), homocene (Def. 25b), or heterocene (Def. 25c)'. Comment: Since homocene (Def. 25b) and heterocene (Def. 25c), but not allocene (second sense) (Def. 23a 1 ) imply more than one entity (Def. Ic2), where only a single cene is referred to, this is necessarily an allocene (second sense) (Def. 23a 1 ). 'Homomorph' for 'allomorph (second sense) (Def. 2 4 b l a ) of one signum (Def. 2 a 1 , Def. 24), in comparison with and having the same cenological form (Def. 2 b l d , Def. 23) as allomorph (second sense) (Def. 2 4 b l a ) of another signum (Def. 2 a 1 , Def. 24)' (cf. Mulder - Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 26; Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 26). 'Homomorphy' for 'relationship obtaining between homomorphs (Def. 2 6 ) ' . Formal definition of l l l homomorphy: p Rs ~ /^Rsi, *j. 'Heteromorph' for 'allomorph (second sense) (Def. 2 4 b l a ) ) of one signum (Def. 2 a 1 , Def. 24), in comparison with and having a different cenological form (Def. 2 b l d , Def. 23) from, allomorph (second sense) (Def. 2 4 b l a ) of another signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24)'. 'Heteromorphy' for 'relationship obtaining between heteromorphs (Def. 26b). Formal definition of heteromorphy: p'Rs1 RsJ, '"J. 'Morph' for 'allomorph (Def. 2 4 b l a ) , homomorph (Def. 26), or heteromorph (Def. 26b)'. Comment: Since homomorph (Def. 26) and heteromorph (Def. 26b), but not allomorph (second sense) (Def. 2 4 b l a ) imply more than one entity (Def. l c 2 ) , where only a single morph is referred to, this is necessarily an allomorph (second sense) (Def. 24b la ). 'Homoseme' for 'alloseme (second sense) (Def. 24c l a ) of one signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24), in comparison with and having the same delological form (Def. 2c l d , Def. 23c) as alloseme (second sense) (Def. 2 4 c l a ) of another signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24)'.

Provisional postulates for extended axiomatic

Def. 26f. Def. 26g.

Def. 26h. Def. 26i.

Def. 26j.

Def. 26k. Def. 261.

Def. 26m. Def. 26n.

fiinctionalism

401

'Homosemy' for 'relationship obtaining between homosemes (Def. 26e). Formal definition of homosemy: g'Rs1 ~ q ' Rs-i, 'Heteroseme' for 'alloseme (second sense) (Def. 2 4 c l a ) of one signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24), in comparison with and having a different delological form (Def. 2 c l d , Def. 23c) from alloseme (second sense) (Def. 24c l a ) of another signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24)'. 'Heterosemy' for 'relationship obtaining between heterosemes (Def. 26g)'. Formal definition of heterosemy: q l Rs' ~ gJRsi, H . 'Seme' for 'alloseme (Def. 24c l a ), homoseme (Def. 26e), or heteroseme (Def. 26g)'. Comment: Since homoseme (Def. 26e) and heteroseme (Def. 26g), but not alloseme (second sense) (Def. 24c l a ) imply more than one entity (Def. lc 2 ), where only a single seme is referred to, this is necessarily an alloseme (second sense) (Def. 24cla). 'Homodele' for 'allodele (second sense) (Def. 23c2) of one denotation (Def. 2c) in comparison with and having the same semantic form (Def. 23b *) as allodele (second sense) (Def. 23c 2 ) of another denotation (Def. 2c)'. 'Homodely' for 'relationship obtaining between homodeles (Def. 26j)\ Formal definition of homodely: g ' Re' - ^ ' R e i , ' * ) . 'Heterodele' for 'allodele (second sense) (Def. 23c 2 ) of one denotation (Def. 2c) in comparison with and having a different semantic form (Def. 23b 1 ) from allodele (second sense) (Def. 23c 2 ) of another denotation (Def. 2c)'. 'Heterodely' for 'relationship obtaining betwen heterodeles (Def. 26m). Formal definition of heterodely: g ' Re' ~ giRei, H . 'Dele' for 'allodele (Def. 23c 2 ), homodele (Def. 26j), or heterodele (Def. 261)'. Comment: Since homodele (Def. 26j) and heterodele (Def. 261), but not allodele (second

402

Appendix

Def. 26o.

Def. 27.

Def. 27a.

Def. 27b.

Def. 27c. Def. 27d.

Def. 27e.

sense) (Def. 23c 2 ) imply more than one entity (Def. lc 2 ), where only a single dele is referred to, this is necessarily an allodele (second sense) (Def. 23c 2 ). 'Allont' or 'manifestation' for 'allomorph (Def. 24b l a ), allomorphon (Def. 24b l e ), alloseme (Def. 24c l a ), allosemon (Def. 2 4 c l e ) , allocene (Def. 23a 1 ), or allodele (Def. 23c 2 )'. Comment: See also: instantiation (Def. F4 5 ), realisation (Def. F46). 'Homonym' for 'total homonym (Def. 27a) or partial homonym (Def. 27b)' (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 27; Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 27). 'Total homonym' for 'total class of allomorphs (second sense) (Def. 24b l a ) of one signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24) in comparison with, and the cenological forms (Def. 2b1(i, Def. 23) of its members being the same as, those of the total class of allomorphs (second sense) (Def. 24b l a ) of another signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24)' (cf. Mulder - Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 27; Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 27). 'Partial homonym' for 'at least one member of class of allomorphs (second sense) (Def. 24b l a ) of one signum (Def. 2a Def. 24), in comparison with and having the same cenological form (Def. 2b l d , Def. 23) as at least one member of class of allomorphs (second sense) (Def. 24b l a ) as another signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24), but the two signa (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24) not being totally homonymous (Def. 27a)' (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 27; Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 27). 'Homonymy' for 'total homonymy (Def. 27d) or partial homonymy (Def. 27e)\ 'Total homonymy' for 'state of affairs in which total class of allomorphs (second sense) (Def. 24b l a ) of one signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24) is compared with, and has the same cenological forms (Def. 2b 1 d , Def. 23) as, those of the total class of allomorphs (second sense) (Def. 24b l a ) of another signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24)'. 'Partial homonymy' for 'state of affairs in which at least one member of class of allomorphs (second

Provisional postulates for extended axiomatic

Def. 28.

Def. 28a.

Def. 28b.

Def. 28c. Def. 28d.

Def. 28e.

fitnctionalism

403

sense) (Def. 24b l a ) of one signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24), is compared with and has the same cenological form (Def. 2b l d , Def. 23) as at least one member of class of allomorphs (second sense) (Def. 24b l a ) of another signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24), but the two signa (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24) are not totally homonymous (cf. Def. 27a)'. 'Synonym' for 'total synonym (Def. 28a) or partial synonym (Def. 28b)' (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 28; Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 28). 'Total synonym' for 'total class of allosemes (second sense) (Def. 24c l a ) of one signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24) in comparison with, and the delological forms (Def. 2c 1 d , Def. 23c) of its members being the same as, those of the total class of allosemes (second sense) (Def. 24c l a ) of another signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24)' (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 28; Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 28). 'Partial synonym' for 'at least one member of class of allosemes (second sense) (Def. 24c l a ) of one signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24), in comparison with and having the same delological form (Def. 2c l d , Def. 23c) as at least one member of class of allosemes (second sense) (Def. 24c l a ) of another signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24), but the two signa (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24) not being totally synonymous (Def. 28a)' (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 61, Def. 28; Mulder 1989: 456, Def. 28). 'Synonymy' for 'total synonymy (Def. 28d) or partial synonymy (Def. 28e)\ 'Total synonymy' for 'state of affairs in which total class of allosemes (second sense) (Def. 24c l a ) of one signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24) is compared with, and has the same delological forms (Def. 2 c l d , Def. 23c) as, those of the total class of allosemes (second sense) (Def. 24c l a ) of another signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24)'. 'Partial synonymy' for 'state of affairs in which at least one member of class of allosemes (second sense) (Def. 24c la ) of one signum (Def. 2a Def. 24), is compared with and has the same delological form (Def. 2 c l d , Def. 23c) as at least one member of class of allosemes

404

Appendix

(second sense) (Def. 24c l a ) of another signum (Def. 2a1, Def. 24), but the two signa (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24) are not totally synonymous (cf. Def. 28a)'. Axiom F.

Signa (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24) may be instantiated (cf. Def. F4 5 ) an unlimited number of times each resulting utterance (Def. Fla, Def. Flb 0 a , Def. Flb a b ) being a member of a potentially infinite class of utterances (Def. Fla, Def. Flb 0 a , Def. Flb a b ). Comment: Axiom F in the standard version deals with the semantics (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 203-211; Mulder 1989: 457). In the extended version, some of what is covered by standard axiomatic-functionalist semantics is subsumed under the system ontology (Def. 3a la ), and as such is dealt with by Axioms B, C and D and ensuing Definitions. Other aspects of what is covered by the standard axiomaticfunctionalist semantics are subsumed under the extended axiomatic-functionalist signum ontology (Def. F4 4 ), and as such are dealt with partially by Axiom Ε and ensuing Definitions. In the extended version, Axiom F - though closely related in form to Axiom F in the standard version - deals not with semantics (cf. Def. F4 3 for a definition of semantics under the extended version), but with aspects of the signum ontology (Def. F4 4 ) not dealt with by Axiom E. In the following Definitions I have attempted as far as possible to retain the numbers used by Hervey in his postulates for axiomaticfunctionalist semantics (Mulder — Hervey 1980: 203-211). Hervey's Definitions are numbered from la. As noted in the Introduction to these Postulates, I have prefixed "F" to each of the corresponding Definition numbers in this version of the postulates in order to specify that the following Definitions relate to Axiom F, and

Provisional postulates for extended axiomatic

fiinctionalism

405

to differentiate them from what would sometimes otherwise be identically labelled Definitions under Axioms A and B. 'Utterance (both senses: see Def. F l b 0 a , Def. F l b o b below)' for 'member of a signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24) (as a class) such that it is a model for a single realisation (Def. F4 6 ), i.e. an instantiation (Def. F4 5 ), of that signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24)' (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 203, Def. la). Comment: "This means that "utterance" is to be understood, not in the sense of single communication-act as such, but as a construct or model accounting for and applying to a single communication-act. Furthermore, it is to be noted that this model applies only to communication-acts that are realisations of signa, i.e. realisations that convey information as determined by the conventions governing the appropriate signa. In actual fact only sentences are realised in communications, but since sentences may contain several signa, we may also say that each of these signa is, itself 'separately' realised (within the sentence). Consequently, every signum, whether it is a sentence, or can correspond to, or be part of, a sentence-base (Mulder's Def. 20b), can be said to be realised in actual communication. This gives us the right to account or individual realisations of any signum by setting up a unique model, i.e. "utterance", for each of these realisations. In this way we are entitled to regard every signum as a class of "utterances", each member of which class is a model for a single realisation of the appropriate signum" (Hervey 1980: 203). 0a Def. Flb . 'Logete' or 'Utterance (1st sense; Def. F l a ) ' for 'a conjunction of a morphete (Def. F i b l a 0 ) and a semete (Def. F l b 2 a 0 ) ' (cf. Mulder - Hervey 1980: 203, Def. lb). Formal definition: iRs &yRs. Def. Fla.

406

Appendix

Def. Flb ( ) b .

Def.

Def. Def.

Def.

Def.

Def.

Def.

Def.

Def.

'Logonete' or 'Utterance (2nd sense: Def. F l a ) ' for 'a conjunction of a morphonete (Def. F l b l a 4 ) and a semonete (Def. Fib 2 3 5 )' (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 203, Def. lb). Formal definition: (ZRd)Rs & (/Re)Rs. Flb 0 c . 'Logetics' for 'the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4 4 ) dealing with logetes (Def. Flb 0 a ) or logonetes (Flb o b )\ Flb o d . 'Logonetics' for 'the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4 4 ) dealing with logonetes (Flb 0 b )\ F l b l a ( ) . 'Moφhete' or 'form (1st sense: cf. Def. F l b l b ) ' for 'cenetic image (Def. 22) in its capacity of having the particular distinctive function (cf. Def. 7a3) appropriate to a particular signum (Def. 2a 1, Def. 24)'. Formal definition: iRs (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 204, Def. llbla). F l b I a l . 'Morphetics' for 'the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4 4 ) dealing with morphetes (Def. Flbla0)'. F l b , a 2 . ' M o r p h o t i c s ' for 'morphologies (Def. F l b l a 3 ) , allomorphics (Def. 2 4 b l b ) , morphonetics (Def. Flb l a 5 ), and (or) nu^hetics (Def. F l b l a 1 ) ' . F l b , a 3 . 'Moφhologics' for 'sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4 4 ) corresponding to logology (Def. 2a 4a ) in the system ontology (Def. 3 a l a ) and dealing with expressions (Def. 24a)'. , a 4 F l b . 'Μοφίιοηείβ' or 'form (2nd sense: cf. Def. F l b l b ) ' for 'cenetic image (Def. 22) in its capacity of having the particular distinctive function (cf. Def. 7a 3 ) appropriate to a particular figura (Def. 2b), in its capacity of having the distinctive function (cf. Def. 7a 3 ) appropriate to a particular signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24)'. Formal definition: (/Rd)Rs (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 204, Def. l b l a ) . F l b l a 5 . ' Μ ο φ ί ι ο η ε ^ β ' for 'the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4 4 ) dealing with πιοφ1ιοη6ΐ68 (Def. Flbla4)'. F l b l b . 'Form (both senses)' for 'member of an expression (Def. 24a) as a class, such that it is a model for a single realisation (Def. F4 6 ), i.e. an instantiation (Def. F4 5 ), of that expression (Def. 24a)' (cf. Mulder — Hervey

Provisional postulates for extended axiomatic

fiinctionalism

407

1980: 204, Def. lb l b ). Comment: "Informally, we may say that the form of an utterance accounts for the necessary aspect of 'substance' without which a signum cannot be realised in actual communication. At the same time the form of an utterance is a 'token' of the expression (see Mulder's Def. 24a) of the signum whose realisation the given utterance is a model for. That is to say, a form is an intrinsic aspect of an utterance, in the same way that an expression is an intrinsic aspect of a signum" (Hervey 1980: 203-204). "Thus the form of an utterance accounts for the spatio-temporally unique nature of the realisation for which the given utterance is a model, at the same time as incalculating the fact of that unique realisation being the realisation of a signum with a particular grammatically [cf. logologically (Def. 2a 43 )] distinctive function" (Hervey 1980: 204). 2a0 Def. F l b . 'Semete' or 'reference (1st sense)' for 'semantic image (Def. 23b, Def. F4b) in its capacity of having the particular distinctive function (cf. Def. 7a 3 ) appropriate to a particular signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24)'. Formal definition: yRs (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 204, Def. lb2a).

Def. F l b 2 a l . 'Semetics' for the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4 4 ) dealing with semetes (Def. Flb2a0)\ Def. F l b 2 a 2 . 'Semotics' for 'semologics (Def. Flb 2 a 3 ), allosemics (Def. 2 4 c l b ) , semonetics (Def. F l b 2 a 6 ) , and (or) semetics (Def. Fib 2 3 1 )'. Def. F l b 2 a 3 . ' S e m o l o g i c s ' for 'sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4 4 ) corresponding to logology (Def. 2a 4 a ) in the system ontology (Def. 3 a l a ) and dealing with contents (Def. 24b)'. Def. F l b 2 a 4 . ' L o g o l o g i c s ' for 'sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4 4 ) corresponding to logology (Def. 2a 4 a ) in the system ontology (Def. 3 a , a ) and dealing with signa (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24)'.

408

Appendix

Def. Flb 2 a 5 . 'Semonete' or 'reference (2nd sense)' for 'semantic image (Def. 23b, Def. F4b) in its capacity of having the particular distinctive function (cf. Def. 7a 3 ) appropriate to a particular denotation (Def. 2c), in its capacity of having the distinctive function (cf. Def. 7a3) appropriate to a particular signum (Def. 2a Def. 24)'. Formal definition: (/Re)Rs (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 204, Def. lb 23 ). Def. Flb 2 a 6 . 'Semonetics' for 'the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4 4 ) dealing with semonetes (Def. Fib 2 ® 5 )'. Def. F l b 2 b . 'Reference (both senses)' for 'member of a content (Def. 24b) as a class, such that it is a model for a single realisation (Def. F4 6 ), i.e. an instantiation (Def. F4 5 ), of that content (Def. 24b)' (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 204, Def. lb215). Comment: "A reference accounts for the necessary information-bearing aspect without which no act could be construed as a communication-act, let alone the realisation of a signum. Form and reference are merely two equally relevant and equally important ways of looking at the same thing (i.e. utterance). Form and reference as 'tokens' of expression and content respectively, may be conceived as the converse of one another. This is analogous with the way expression and content, themselves, are each other's converse (see Mulder's Def. 24). In intuitive terms this view of form and reference can be explained by pointing out that form accounts for the fact that an utterance is not mere substance, but substance necessarily linked with information-content, whereas reference accounts for the fact that an utterance is not just an information-content, but an information-content necessarily linked to a substance" (Hervey 1980: 204). "We may say that looking at an utterance from the aspect of reference is looking at that aspect of the realisation which links it to the

Provisional postulates for extended axiomatic fiim tionalism

Def. F2.

Def. F2 1 .

Def. F2a.

Def. F2a1.

Def. F2b.

Def. F2b I .

409

actual piece of information conveyed by ... that realisation" (Hervey 1980: 205). 'Class of equivalent logetes (Def. F l b 0 a ) (or: utterances: Def. Fla, first sense)' for 'the set of all and only the logetes (Def. Flb 0 a ) (or: utterances: Def. Fla, first sense) which are members of a given signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24) as a class' (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 205, Def. 2). 'Class of equivalent logonetes (Def. F l b o b ) (or: utterances: Def. Fla, second sense)' for 'the set of all and only the logonetes (Def. Flb o b ) (or: utterances: Def. Fla, second sense) which are members of a given signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24) as a class' (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 205, Def. 2). Comment: "A signum can now be treated ... as a class of equivalent utterances" (Hervey 1980: 205). 'Class of equivalent morphetes (Def. F l b l a 0 ) (or: forms: Def. F l b l b , first sense)' for 'the set of all and only the morphetes (or: forms, Def. F l b l b , first sense) which are members of a given signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24) as a class' (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 205, Def. 2a). 'Class of equivalent morphonetes (Def. F l b l a 4 ) (or: forms, Def. F l b l b , second sense)' for 'the set of all and only the morphonetes (or: forms, Def. F l b l a 4 , second sense) which are members of a given signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24) as a class' (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 205, Def. 2a). Comment: "... we may conceive of an expression as a class of equivalent forms" (Hervey 1980: 205). 'Class of equivalent semetes (Def. F l b 2 a 0 ) (or: references, Def. Flb 2 b , first sense)' for 'the set of all and only the semetes (Def. Flb 2 a 0 ) (or: references, Def. Flb 2 b , first sense) which are members of a given signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24) as a class' (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 205, Def. 2b). 'Class of equivalent semonetes (Def. F l b 2 a 5 ) (or: references, Def. Flb 2 b , second sense)' for 'the set of

410

Appendix

Def. F3d.

Def. F3e. Def. F3f. Def. F3g. Def. F3h. Def. F4.

all and only the semonetes (Def. F l b 2 a 5 ) (or: references, Def. F l b 2 b , second sense) which are members of a given signum (Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24) as a class' (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 205, Def. 2b). Comment: "... we may conceive of a content as a class of equivalent references" (Hervey 1980: 205). Defs. 3a, 3b, and 3c in Hervey (1980: 205206) provide definitions for form class, reference class, and form-reference class. These definitions are no longer needed in the extended version, since they are superseded by the notions morphonete (Def. F l b l a l ) and semonete (Def. l b 2 a l ) . They do not therefore appear in these Postulates. 'Cenete' for 'member of a figura (Def. 2b) (as a class) such that it is a model for a single realisation (Def. F4 6 ), i.e. an instantiation (Def. F4 5 ), of that figura (Def. 2b)'. Formal definition: zRd. 'Cenetics' for the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4 4 ) dealing with the description of cenetes (Def. F3d)'. 'Cenotics' for 'cenologics (Def. F3g), allocenics (Def. 23 a2 ), and (or) cenetics (Def. F3e)'. 'Cenologics' for level of description within the signum ontology (Def. F4 4 ) corresponding to cenology (Def. 2b la ) in the system ontology (Def. 3a l a )'. 'Morphontics' for 'morphotics (Def.Flb l a 2 ) and (or) cenotics (Def. F3f)\ 'Delete' or 'denotatum' for 'member of a denotation (Def. 2c) (as a class) such that it is a model for a single realisation (Def. F4 6 ), i.e. an instantiation (Def. F4 5 ), of that denotation (Def. 2c)'. Formal definition: /Re. Alternative definitions: 'model for an ostensible (Def. F4b ! ) entity denoted (cf. Def. 4a) by utterances (Def. Fla, Def. Flb 0 a , Def. lb ob )'; 'model for an ostensible (Def. F4b l ) entity expressed by an index (Def. 2) as an item (i.e. as a member of an index (Def. 2) as a class of items)' (cf. Mulder — Hervey 1980: 206, Def. 4). Comment: In the extended version, a delete

Provisional postulates for extended axiomatic fiini tionalism

Def. F4°. Def. F4 1 . Def. F4 2 . Def. F4 3 . Def. F4 4 . Def. F4 5 .

Def. F4 6 . Def. F4a.

Def. F4b.

411

(denotatum) is a model for a "piece of information". Entities which are such "pieces of information" "may be objects, qualities, processes, relations, or complex circumstances. They may, furthermore, be 'real' entities, 'candidates for reality', or purely abstract or fictional" (Hervey 1980: 206). 'Deletics' for 'the sub-theory within the signum ontology (Def. F4 4 ) dealing with deletes (Def. F4)\ 'Delotics' for 'delologics (Def. F4 2 ), allodelics (Def. 23w German 430 given information, in Halliday 444 global referential entity 108-109, 229, 413, 434; see also range global referential situation 109, 413 go to the bathroom, in English 302303 governed entity, = determinant entity, peripheral entity 62, 71, Def. 13b governing entity, = nucleus 62, 71, Def. 13a government, in af 62; in Chomskyan approach 28 government-binding model 28, 32-34, 421 grammar, in saf: = plerology 2, 13, 15, 33, 50, 51, 56, 57, 59, 62, 6 5 - 7 3 ,

75, 77, 79-80, 87, 95, 177, 226, 233, 236, 242, 407, 422, 423; correspondence between grammar' plerology in saf, and lexology in eaf 145; as traditional notion 159; excluded as technical term, in eaf 1 5 8 - 1 6 0 ; see

also cognitive

grammar, connotational grammar, denotational grammar, stratificational grammar, traditional grammar, transformational grammar, universal grammar grammatical categories, in general sense 26 grammatical entity, in general

474

Subject index

linguistics 443; in msaf 102; in saf 50, 52, 53, 57, 65, 171, 177, 338, 426; in saf, correspondence with signum 65-66, 77, 79, 338, 426 grammatical level, in saf 176 grammatical system, = plerological system, in saf 68-72 (-)graph(-), in eaf 165, 427 grasp the nettle, in English 241-243, 324, 435 Greek 153-155,162,317 groundnut, in English 436-437 /h/, in English 6 0 , 7 1 , 8 7 [h], in English 87, 170, 226 Hallidayan linguistics, see systemic grammar/linguistics hand, in English 245-246, 436 handle, in English 217-219 Hausa 329-330 head, in Chomskyan approach 32-33; in general linguistics 71 head-complement parameter 32 head-first language, in Chomskyan approach 33 head-last language, in Chomskyan approach 32, 33 hetero-, as prefix in eaf 165 heteromorph 152, Def. 26b heterophone 152, 226, Def. 25b heterosemic, as term 164 highlighting, in Cruse 112, 113 historical linguistics 3, 41, 313 holey/holy, in English 98. 196, 216, 424 homo-, as prefix in general linguistics and eaf 164-165 homodele 137, Def. 26j homodely 137, Def. 26k homomorph, in eaf 137, 152, 189, Def. 26; in saf 40, 94, 95, 97 homomorphy, in saf 97,413; see also imperfect homomorphy homont 137 homonty 137 homonym, in eaf Def. 27; of terms, in eaf 161, 165; in saf 99, 280, 437; see also homnymy homonymy, in eaf 4, 127, 165, 189, 199, 437, Def. 27c; in eaf, vs. allosemony/polysemony 187194, 429; in eaf, vs. polysemy

185-186; in Lehrer 127, 190192; in saf 4, 98, 199; in saf, correspondence with homonymy, polysemy or polysemony in eaf 199; in Spencer 189; see also imperfect homonymy, partial homonymy, total homonymy homophone, in general sense 94; in eaf 137, 151, Def. 25; in saf 172 homophony, in eaf 137, Def. 25a homoseme 137, 290, Def. 26e homosemic, as term 164; see also homoseme, homosemy homosemy 137, Def. 26f horn, in English 188, 193-194, 275 horse, in English 108-109 hyperbole 4, 258, 290, 296, 299, 307, 309, 316, 335, 439, 440; see also dead hyperbole, live hyperbole hyperonym, in eaf: = superordinate 206, 210, 212, 287, 302, 434, 440, Def. F7a!; in saf: = superordinate 108, 165, 210, 300-301 hyphenated linguistics 41 hyponym, in eaf 229, 230, 302, 434, Def. F7a 2 ; in saf 99, 108-109, 300301 hypothesis 37, 189, 194, 201, 220, 221; see also corroboration, metahypothesis, non-hypotheticality, null hypothesis, refutation hypothetical model 312 hypothetico-deductivism 185, 325 I-language, in Chomsky 18-19, 21 -ic, as suffix in eaf 164-165 iconicity 27 -ics, as suffix in eaf 136, 155-156 -id, as suffix in eaf 155 identity, phonological as criterion of linguistic identity in saf 169 ideolect 216 idiom, both senses 4, 241-244, 322324; = standard or normal usage 193, 246, 308; = noncompositional, etc., sense 245, 246, 261, 295, 303, 324, 328, 344, 435, 436; see also quasi-idiom, sentential idiom image, = phonetic image, in saf 48, 49, 50-55 {passim), 57, 100; see also phonetic image, semantic image

Subject index

image phonetics 133, 148, 160, Def. 22b image semantics 133, 148, Def. 23b 2 immediate constituent 57, 59-60, 62, 63, 67, 73, 230, Def. 7Π* imperfect homomorphy, = imperfect homonymy 97-98, 123 imperfect homonymy 3, 35, 90, 9798, 99, 123-124, 216, 251 imperfect synonymy 3, 35, 98, 99, 1 1 7 - 1 2 5 , 1 2 3 - 1 2 4 , 172, 173, 251, 324 implication 57, 61, 64, 71, 75; see also mutual implication implicature, in relevance theory 321 import, with regard to eaf 117, 297298, 299, 307, 308, 309, 316, 321, 333, 335, 336, 347, 348, 440; see also canonicality, conventional import, level (of import) in both senses, in English 193-194, 195-196, 241, 242, 245, 289, 292, 309 incomplete neutralization 3, 35, 90, 9 2 - 9 7 , 251 incongruity 245; vs. contradiction, incoherence, etc. 122-123,328 independency, see functional independency, mutual functional independency independent maximisability of senses, in Cruse 203, 206-208, 212, 213, 214 indeterminacy 11, 221-223, 264, 269-274, 276, 279, 280, 284, 291, 294, 321, 328; of import 348; of meaning, pronunciation, sense 196; in Cruse 202-21; see also model (for indeterminacy) index 7, 13-16, 54, 100, 151, 336, 419-420, 425, 426, Def. 2; see also conventional index, natural index, symptomatic index, theory of indices indirect ambiguity test, in Cruse 202203 indirect criteria for ambiguity, in Cruse 211; see also direct criteria for ambiguity, indirect ambiguity test individual occurrence 130-131, 157; see also instantiation, ontetics,

475

single/singular realisation inert metaphor, = dormant metaphor 259-260, 328 information 405, 408, 409, 411; in Halliday vs. Prague School 443-444 information-content 408 information-value 14, 15, 50, 419420, 425, Def. 2a, innate constraint 45 instance 377-381 (passim) instantiation 96, 97, 163, 181, 183, 184, 194, 205, 218, 219, 231, 232, 254, 255, 268, 279, 280, 281, 284, 287, 294, 307, 308, 311,319, 339, 340, 341, 345, 347, 434, Def. see also level of instantiation instrumentalism 29, 36, 186 integration, of polysemy in eaf 249; of theory, in eaf 244, 349; see also terminology intension 109 inter-ordination 72, Def. 1 lc interaction view of metaphor 277, 281-286, 320-326 interface 3, 4, 41-42, 99, 175, 188189, 223, 257, 262, 303, 319, 326, 339, 345, 350; and canonical allont 312; between core-linguistics and psycholinguistics 5, 310-315, 326, 342; between core-linguistics and text-linguistics 5, 249, 335, 337-342 interlock 158, 366-367, Def. 3 c ^ ; in eaf, between ontotactics and paraontotactics 366-367; in eaf, between phonotactics and paraphonotactics 157; in saf, between level of simple grammatical/ plerological entities and morphology/plerermatics 68; in saf, between level of simple phonematic entities and phonematics 60; in saf, between morphology/plercmatics and syntax/ plerotactics 72; in saf, between phonematics and phonotactics 64; in saf, between phonotactics and para-phonotactics 65; in saf, between syntax/plerotactics and parasyntax/para-plerotactics 73; see a/soontological interlock,

476

Subject index

transformational interlock International Phonetic Alphabet 44, 91 interpretive pragmatics, see pragmatics intersection 370, 373, 412, 415, 416, 417, 428 intersubjectivity 190 intonation 73, 75, 305, 306, 387, 389, 390; and irony 299 intra-linguistic determination, contextual 179, 184 intra-utterance context 181, 269, 429; see also context intuition 81, 99, 177, 185-186, 187, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 199, 245, 247, 347, 408 inventory, of basic entities = basic inventory 156; of distinctive features 137; of elements 143; see also basic signum inventory, lexid inventory investigative strategies, see strategy irony 4, 258, 296, 298-299, 307, 316, 334-336, 439, 440, 442; lack of recognition in Arabic tradition 315-316; as term, in English 442, 443; ironic laughter 335-336; see aIso dead irony, live irony Italian 124-125 item, see lexical item Japanese 33 juncture 82, 84, 181, 387 kenos, in Greek 153 Khoisan languages 420 kick the bucket, in English 117, 119, 120, 241, 425-426 kick up a fuss, in English 242-243 knowlege, see objective knowledge, world knowledge [1], in Classical Arabic 239; in English 45, 49, 116, 293, 422; in German 87 /l/, in English 45, 48, 49, 60, 115, 116, 293, 422 1, as unique phoneme, in Classical Arabic 293 [1], in Classical Arabic 239; in English 45, 48, 49, 115, 116, 293, 422; in G'aylüabbän Arabic 82, 83, 170, 204, 213, 226, 253; in general

phonetics 48 label, = classificatory entity/device, in saf 16, 358; = non-theoretical generalising term in description 63, 64, 421 ladybird/laydbug, in English 104, 121, 429 language, as semiotic system 11; as system of systems 64, Def. 3c 1 ; see also convention (of language) language faculty, in Chomsky 18, 25, 26 language-internal difference, etc. 266, 293 Latin 431 laughter, ironic 335-336 law of excluded middle 285 layer of import, see level (of import) legein, in Greek 153 legitimate trade-off 43-46 level, of analysis: = level of theory/description 154, 156, of denotation, in eaf: = delologics 154; of denotation, in saf 73, 75, 77, 126, 147; of description 45, 360, 361, 363; of figura 134 (see also phonotics); of import 335, 348; of instantiation 137; of manifestation 137; of phonetic entities 133 (see also general phonetics); of signum, in saf 134; of signum, in eaf: = lexologics 159, 240 (see also morphotics); of simple grammatical/ plerological entities 59, 68, 77; of simple phonological entities, in saf (cf. phonidics, in eaf) 59-661, 64, 67, 68, 139; of theory 59, 64, 73, 75, 136; see also abstract level, allolevel, allomorphic level, allophonic level, allosemic level, connotational level, denotational level, ontological level, para-phonotactic level, para-plerotactic level, paratactic level, phonetic level, phonological level, purely formal level, sentential level, signum level, tactic level (-)lex(-), as stem in eaf 80, 128, 145, 153-154, 155, 354, Def. 0a lexematics 145, 147, 156, 157, 159, 160, Def. 2a 4b lexeme, in eaf 145, 187, Def. 8b;

Subject index

compared with general usage 158; in Lyons 109, 187 lexemotactics 145, Def. 2a 4 « 2 lexete, = utterance, in eaf 133, 135, Def. FlbOa lexetics 135, Def. FlfcPc lexical blend, see blend lexical item, in Geeraerts 224 lexical meaning, in Geeraerts 224 lexical sense, in Lyons 223 lexical systematicity, of terms in eaf 161, 1 6 2 lexid, = moneme, in eaf 159, 160, 163, 166, 228, 233, 237, 238, 249, Def. 8b 2 lexid inventory 168, 227 lexidics 67, 143, 147, 156, 157, Def. 2a4a2 lexidotactics 145, Def. 2a 4 « 1 lexis, in Greek 153 lexo 167, 233, 310, 311, 338, Def. 2a 4 ; see also complex lexo lexologics 148, 156, Def. Flb2a4 lexology 2, 5, 134, 135, 143-145, 147, 154, 156, 158, 159, 160, 162, 176, 180, 181, 225, 226, 229, 239, 240, 241, 303, 308, 339, 340, 343-348, Def. 2a 4 *; correspondence between lexology in eaf, and grammar/plerology in saf 145 lexomics 143, 145, Def. 2a 4al lexonete, = utterance, in eaf 132, 133, 135, 167, 179, 181, 184, 194, 205, 218, 231, 235, 246, 267, 268, 269, 271, 284, 287, 303, 304, 306, 319, 340, 344-348 (passim), 339, 429, Def. Flb o b ; informed nature of 339340, 344 lexonetics 135, 283, 345, Def. FlbPd lexotactic entity 344, Def. 7d, Def. 9bl lexotactic relation 344, Def. 7d' lexotactics 145, 148, 157, 159, 160, 308, 345, 347, Def. 2a 4c lexotagm 145, 345, Def. 9b; see also sentential lexotagm lexotheme 145, Def. 9b°c light [1], see [1] like, in English 263-265, 270, 293294, 439 likeness, see figurative likeness, literal

477

(likeness), simile limerick, as text-form 340-342 linguistic context 183; see also context linguistic criterion, for distinguishing polysemy from vagueness in Geeraerts 224 linguistic theory, in Chomskyan approach 19; see also theory linguistic universal, see universal linguistics, in af: = core-linguistics 249; in general 11; in relation to psychology, sociology 18-27; in relation to semiotics 2, 5, 16-18; narrow sense vs. wide sense 121; relativism vs. universalism in 2734; see also core-linguistics, general linguistics, historical linguistics, hyphenated linguistics, linguistic theory, psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics, system grammar/linguistics, text-linguistics literacy, and effect on linguistic judgements 192-193 literal, comparision; vs. figurative comparison 266, 270, 292, 293, 294; likeness vs. figurative likeness 293; in English 290, 307-309 literalness, of language, meaning, reference, sense, etc. 5, 242, 245, 246, 247, 258, 261, 263-264, 265, 267, 270, 275, 278, 280, 281, 283, 284, 286, 287, 289, 298, 303, 307, 308, 320, 323, 324, 326, 332, 333, 343, 344 live figure of speech 4 live hyperbole 300, 307, 335 live irony 299-300, 303, 307, 335 live metaphor 5, 246, 261-291, 293, 295, 296, 303, 307, 308, 318, 319, 321, 322-328 (passim), 330, 331, 333, 335, 343, 439, 440, 441; see also reminiscency live pragmatic figure of speech 300 live simile 294, 296, 303, 307, 335 live understatement, see understatement local sense, in Cruse 211-212 (-)log(-), as stem in eaf 128, 153154, 155 logic 71-72, 153 logical construction, of terms in eaf

478

Subject index

161, 1 6 2 logical criterion, for distinguishing between polysemy and vagueness in Geeraerts 224 logical dependence 72 logical priority, of core-linguistics over interfacing analyses 188-189 logical theory 35, 421 logo 338, Def. 2a 4 ; see also simple logo logologics 235, Def. Flb2a4 logology 153, 235, 353-354, Def. 2a*a logome 234, Def. 8b 5 logontology 163 loo, in English 160 Low German 430 macrolinguistics 41 manifestation, = allont, in eaf 137, 163, 213, 275, Def. 26o; see also level (of manifestation) Mann, in German 86, 177 mathematical theory 35, 421 matrix ontology, = signum ontology 128

maximisability, see independent maximisabilty of senses maximisation, of semantic image 206 mean, in English 299-300 meaning 279; and words, in English 200; in English, indeterminacy of 196-197; see also affective meaning, conventional meaning, figurative meaning, lexical meaning, tendency to mean meaning potential 70 medial flap, = median tap 91 median tap, = medial flap 91 medium-scope semiotics 6 member, of a class 51, 53, 60, 64, 73, 83, 142, 143, 306, 357, 359, 369, 373, 382, 394, 396, 397, 402-406 (passim), 408, 409, 410, 412, 416, 417, 419, 424, 425; see also class, member-to-class operator, set, token member-to-class operator 48, 56; see also operator membership, see class membership meta-hypothesis, of theoretical adequacy 269 metafunction, in Halliday 28 metalanguage, see everyday

metalanguage, metalinguistic usage metalinguistic usage, terminology, status, etc. 121, 173, 197, 227, 253, 309, 315 metaphor 4-5, 30, 258-291, 292, 293, 298, 303, 304, 305, 307, 318, 324-336 (passim), 438-442 (passim)·, in Hervey 99; as term, in English 442, 443; appreciation 317; comprehension, interpretation, understanding 5, 281, 291, 320-326; effect, force, etc. 260, 281, 317, 438; of wit 272; without meaning, view of metaphor 277-280; systematicity of 329; see also cliche metaphor, comparison theory/view, dead metaphor, dormant metaphor, inert metaphor, interaction view of metaphor, live metaphor, mixed metaphor, original metaphor, pragmatic approach to metaphor, puzzles, recent metaphor, reference (and metaphor), stock metaphor, substitution view of metaphor, truth, types of metaphor metaphysical theory, = philosophical theory 35-37, 186, 247 metareferentiality 440 metatheory 2-3, 35, 201 methanol, in English 174 methodological essentialism 12 methodology 36, 70, 220, 232-233, 247 metonymy 336, 439 mind 18-20, 23, 25, 26, 28 minimalist program 421 minimum element, = minimum entity, in saf 61 minimum entity, = basic entity, in af 59, 65, 67, 68, Def. Ic2a missel, in English 4 3 1 - 4 3 2 missel thrush, in English 229-232, 431-432 mistletoe, in English 431-432 mixed metaphor 328 model, for data in af generally 3; for indeterminacy 222-223; for phonetic data and associated notions, in eaf 306, 394, 406, 408, 410; for phonetic data and associated notions, in saf 44, 48-51 (passim),

Subject index

55; for semantic data and associated notions, in eaf 138, 220, 395, 410, 411; for semantic data and associated notions in msaf, also eaf 101-103, 103-117, 123; for utterance, in eaf 405; for utterance, in saf 52; theoretical 37; see also descriptive model, hypothetical model modified standard axiomatic functionalism 3, 46, 98, 100-103, 127, 128, 251, 425 modifier, in general linguistics 71 modulation, in Cruse 112, 113; see also contextual modulation moneme, = lexid, in eaf 163, 166, Def. 8b 2 ; in saf 15, 65-68, 79, 80, 426 monistic nature, of theory 38, 43, 281 mono-, as prefix in eaf 165 monosemic, as term 164, 165; nature of terms, in eaf 161, 165; see also monosemy monosemous, as term 164, 165, 205; see also monosemy monosemy, in general sense 30; in eaf Def. 24c Monty Python 272, 294-295, 325 (-)morph(-), as stem 136, 162, 165 morph, in eaf 138, 162, Def. 26d; in eaf vs. saf 152, 412-413; see also portmanteau morph morpheme, as traditional notion 15, 159, 426; exluded as technical term, in eaf 158-160; in Hudson 40; in other approaches 67; see also connotational morpheme, denotational morpheme, unique morpheme morphete, = form, in eaf 131, 132, 133, 134, 137, 152, 155, 166, Def. Flbla0 morphetics 134, 137, 157, Def. Fl b I a l morpho-phoneme 36 morphological variants, of terms in eaf 161, 1 6 4 - 1 6 5 morphologies 134, 135, 148, Def. Flbi*3 morphology, as traditional notion 159; excluded as technical term, in eaf 158-160; in saf, = plerematics 56, 67-68, 72, 77, 145, 432-433; see

479

also connotational morpheme, denotational morphology morphonete, = form, in eaf 130, 131, 134, 137, 148, 152, 155, 166, 197, 235, 339, Def. Fib 1 »4 morphonetics 134, 137, 148, 155, 157, Def. Fl bias morphontic, = expression-side, in eaf 130, 136, 238; see also morphontics morphontics, = expression side, in eaf 130, 136, 178, 181, 193, 199, 200, 204, 234, 252, 339, Def. F3h; as a blend 136, 162 morphotics 134, 136, Def. Flb'a2 motivation 24-26, 45, 188, 255, 317318, 320, 325-326, 327, 436; see also denotational motivation mousetrap, in English 273-275, 278, 280, 284, 289, 326 mouth, in English 210-211, 213, 2 1 4 - 2 1 7 , 429 musical notation 20-22 mutual functional dependency 72 mutual functional independency 72 mutual implication 48-53 (passim), 56, 72, 396 muwaSSah, as verse form in Arabic 443 myth, in Barthesian semiology 10-11 /η/, in English 71, 170, 226 narrow-scope semiotics 6, 8 native speaker 190, 194, 196-197, 215, 247, 311, 314-315, 347; judgements, correspondence with allonts in eaf 312; see also intuition natural class 199-200, 212-213, 219, 293 natural index 13-14, 16, 100 natural language 13, 29, 36, 142, 145, 316, 365, 367, 387; in relation to other semiotic systems 16-18; terminology for in eaf 127-128, 1 5 3 - 1 5 4 , 157, 354, 355, 427 natural phenomenon 7, 9 natural science 36, 38, 41 nature of data, see data near-determination, see contextual neardetermination necessary criteria 24, 314 negativism 70,412 neutralization 8 3 - 8 4 , 9 0 , 9 1 , 9 2 , 9 4 ,

480

Subject index

427^28, Def. 7a*; in delology 209; in grammar 177; see also incomplete neutralization new information, in Halliday 444 nominal tautology 429 non-canonical alloseme, and metaphor 217, 261-262, 307, 319, 320; see also canonical alloseme non-canonical allosemon 307 non-canonicality 5, 307; see also pragmatic non-canonicality, semantic non-canonicality non-denotational semantics 42, 99, 300; see also connotation, denotational semantics non-empirical theory, see philosophical theory non-hypotheticality, of theory 37, 197 non-literal comparison 292; see also literal comparison non-opposition, see opposition non-ordering relation, = simultaneous relation, symmetrical relation 61, 68, 72 non-presuppositionality, of af 225 non-primitive term 37, 352 non-purportive conventionality 258, 296-300, 308, 316 non-syntagmatic relation, = nonordering relation 72 non-total contextual conditioning, and ambiguity in Cruse 203-206, 212, 213, 214; see also contextual modulation, modulation nonce symbol 7, 14-15, 259, 324, 436, Def. 2a 3b noun 26; in Chomskyan approach 28; in relation to referential object 106 nuance 3, 35, 98, 99, 100, 117-125, 172, 173, 251, 318, 324; in relation to functional sentence perspective 345 nuclear position 62 nuclear stress 429 nuclearity, see nuclear position, nucleus nucleus, in Cruttenden 345; in af: = governing entity 32-34, 62, 63, 68, 69, 71, 142, 345, 346, 347, Def. 13a nucleus-first language 33 nucleus-last language 33 null hypothesis 201

object, in English 69-70; see also referential object objective knowledge, in Popper 441 objectivity, of polysemy 436-437 observability, of facts, phenomena 37, 44, 287, 314 occurrence, see frequency of occurrence, individual occurrence, occurrence dependency occurrence dependency 62 one hundred per cent productivity, see productivity one-way correspondence, see correspondence (one-way) onomasiologial approach, to terminology formation 152 (-)ont(-), as stem in eaf 137, 147, 155, 354, Def. 0c ont 137, 162 ontematics 147, Def. 3a1 b onteme 147, 148, Def. 8d ontete 137, Def. F45 ontetics 137, 157; see also general ontetics ontid 147, Def. 8d2 ontidics 147, Def. 3a1 a 2 ontological interlock 366 ontological level 49 ontological status 132, 312; definition of 198 ontologies 156 ontology, as expected cover term for phonology, lexology, delology in eaf 147, 156; in eaf, compared with philosophical sense 147, 157; in msaf 101; in saf 1-3, 16, 46-53, 57, 77, 79, 419-420, 423; in saf, compared with philosophical sense 56, 420; in saf, compared with signum ontology, system ontology in eaf 126, 128, 138, in saf, and semantics; correspondence with signum ontology in eaf 125, 128; in philosophical sense 128, 138, 157, 312; in philosophical sense; lack of in generativism 198; see also signum ontology, system ontology ontotactics, = articulation, in eaf 147, 157, Def. 3b; correspondence between ontotactics and base of paraontotactics 345, 367

Subject index

ontotagm 148, Def. 9d operator 48, 49, 56, 57; see also distinctive function , member-toclass operator opposition, in af 57, 59, 65, 83, 88, 90, 91, 143, 156, 200, 204, 208, 210, 215, 216, 218, 221, 222, 224, 225, 226, 257, 267, 292, 293, 309, 360, 362, 363, 364, 369, 388, 412, 442; in more general sense 54, 306; voiced vs. voiceless 93; see also suspension of opposition orange, in English 415, 416 ordered combination, complex, etc. 13, 63-64, 79, 141, 142, 257 ordered n-tuple 63 ordered system 64, 72, Def. 4b2 ordering, see ordering relations ordering relations 60, 61, 63, 68, 72, 141, 151, Def. 6a original metaphor, in Newmark 258260, 438 ostensible 100, 306, Def. F4b! ostensible entity 53-54, 100, 102, 306, 311, 410, 411, 412, 425; see also canonical ostensible entity ostension 54, 412 -otagm, as suffix in eaf 151, 155, 156 other potential ascriptions 104, 112117, 120, 121, 138, 302 -otics, as suffix in eaf 135 -ous, as suffix in general linguistics and eaf 164-165 overlapping paronym 166, Def. F7c3 [p], in Sudanese Arabic 82, 83 pail, in English 118-120, 251-252, 256, 257 para-, as prefix in eaf 151, 155 para-delotactics 148, 157, Def. 18i para-delotagm 148, Def. 18k para-lexotactic feature 304, Def. 19 para-lexotactics 148, 157, 306, 345, Def. 19c para-ontotactic feature 148, Def. 17 para-ontotactics 157, Def. 19f; correspondence between ontotactics and para-ontotactics 367 para-ontotagm 148, Def. 20 para-phonotactic entity, in eaf 143, Def. 18d; in saf 50, 6Φ65, 156

481

para-phonotactic feature, in eaf 143, 151, Def. 18; in saf 50, 65, 156, 428 para-phonotactic level, = paraphonotactics, in saf 64 para-phonotactics, in eaf 143, 148, 157, Def. 18c; in saf 64-65, 72, 156 para-phonotagm, in eaf 143, Def. 18; in saf 65 para-plerotactic feature, = parasyntactic feature 73, 77 para-plerotactic level, = para-syntactic level, = para-plerotactics/parasyntax 64, 73 para-plerotactics, = para-syntax 7273, 77, 306 para-semantics 73-75, 77, 126, 147 para-syntactic entity 73 para-syntactic feature, = paraplerotactic feature 73, 75, 77 para-syntactic level, = para-plerotactic level, = para-plerotactics/parasyntax, 64, 73 para-syntax, = para-plerotactics 7273, 77 para-tactic entity 64, 65, 73 para-tactic level 64 parade, in English 91,93 paradigmatic 151, 204, Def. 7a; see also pseudo-paradigmatic contrast paradigmatic relations 151, Def. 7a1 paradigmeme 142, 143, Def. 10a parallel, see parallelism parallel determination, = conjunctive determination 69-71, 385 parallelipiped, in English 171-172, 427 parallelism, between allomorphic amalgamation and allosemic amalgamation in eaf 184; in eaf, between allomorphony and allosemony 251-252; in eaf, between allophonic amalgamation and allodelic amalgamation 182; in eaf, between morphontics and semantics 181, 200-202; in eaf, between nature of data for phonology and delology; in eaf terminology, etc. 132, 162; between eaf and saf 143; in msaf 100, 102, 115, 123,

482

Subject index

126; between live and dead metaphor 280 216 parameter 32; see also principles-andparameters model paraphrasability 244, 322-323 parere, in Italian 124-125 paronym 108, Def. F7c; see also overlapping paronym partial homonymy 98, Def. 27e partial synonym 130, 160, 165, 166, Def. 28b partial tautology 231,432,434 past participle, in English 85 past tense, in English 85 Pekingese, see Chinese perfect synonym 124 perfect synonymy 118 peripheral entity, = determinant entity, governed entity 63, 68, 71, Def. 13b peripheral position 62, 69, 71 [pf], /pf/, in German 61, 89 phenomenology 437 phenomenon 37, 44-45; see also field of phenomena, natural phenomenon, speech phenomena philosophical theory, = metaphysical theory 35-36,247-249 philosophy of science 36, 235 )phon[e](-), as stem in af 128, 136, 155, 162, 165, 354, 364, 427, Def. Ob phone, in eaf 137, 152, 162, Def. 25d; in eaf vs. saf 151 phonematics, in eaf 141, 142, 145, 147, 151, 156, 157, 430, Def. 2b'»>; in saf 43, 59-61, 62, 64, 68, 72, 82, 156 phoneme, in both versions of af 170; in eaf 141-143, 150, 151, 158, 168, 201, 204, 213, 216, 239, 240, 253, 254, 256, 257, 430, Def. 8a; in general linguistics 170, 422; in Hudson 40; in msaf 115, 116; in saf 3 7 , 4 3 . 4 4 , 48, 49, 50, 59-64, 67, 68, 71, 79-80, 82, 87, 88, 89, 156, 424; see also archiphoneme, complex phoneme, quasi-phoneme, simple phoneme, unique phoneme phoneme-complex, = phonotagm 65 phoneme-table 170 phonemics, see classical phonemics

phonemotactics 141-142, 145, 163, Def. 2b1 c 2 phonete, in eaf 130, 134, 137, 148, 152, 155, 163, 181, 182, 235, Def. F3d; in saf, = allophonon 48-49, 50, 51, 52, 57, 83, 84, 90, 94-97 (passim), 100, 102, 115, 116, 124, 125, 423 phonetic analysis, see phonetics phonetic data, see data phonetic detail, see phonetics phonetic entity, see level (of phonetic entities) phonetic feature, in eaf defined 234; in saf 88, 89 phonetic form, in eaf 130, 132, 133, 148, 151, 155, 163, 164, 166, 216, 226, 234, 306, 438, Def. 22a; in saf 44, 48, 49, 52, 53, 57, 88, 89, 95, 97, 102, 306, 427 phonetic image, in eaf 130, 132, 133, 148, 155, 163, 234, 235, 339, Def. 22; in saf 48, 52-55 (passim), 57, 88, 89, 95, 100 phonetic level, in saf 84 phonetic protocolisation, see protocolisation phonetic realisation, see realisation phonetic theory, see phonetics phonetics, as general notion 1, 10, 24, 33, 37, 53, 87-97 (passim), 104, 115-116, 165, 170, 172, 173, 175, 199, 226, 239, 348, 422, 438; phonetics, arbitrary nature of analysis in 97; detail in 305, 306307; phonetic theory 31, 220; in af, generally 91, 92; in eaf 134, 137, 148, 155, 157, 219, 341, 346, Def. F3e; in eaf, vs. general linguistic usage 160; in saf 46-53 (passim)', see also form phonetics, general phonetics, image phonetics, range (phonetic) phonid, = distinctive feature, in eaf 139, 141, 142, 156, 162, 163, 430, Def. 8a2 phonidete 163 phonidics 59, 139-141, 147, 156, 157, Def. 2bi*2 phonidotactics 141-142, 145, 163, Def. 2 b l c ' phono, = phonological entity, in eaf

Subject index

167, 168, 201, 253, 310, 311, Def. 2b 1 ; see also complex phono, phonological entity, simple phono phonological entity, in eaf: = phono 50, 57, 226, Def. 2b 1 ; in general sense 422; in saf 44, 48, 79, 80, 83, 87, 88, 89, 104, 424; see also complex phonological entity, phono, simple phonological entity phonological feature, in saf 65, 85, 169 phonological form, in both versions of af 151, 171, 176, 177, 178; in eaf 130, 148, 150, 155, 166, 184, 189, 195, 196, 201, 235, 239, 256-257, 341, Def. 2 b l d , Def. 23; in saf 3940, 49-50 , 51, 52, 57, 79, 83, 87, 88, 89, 94, 95, 97, 98, 124, 125, 166, 199, 233, 424, 426, 428; in saf, correspondence between signum and phonological form 89 phonological level, in saf 136, 176 phonological realisation, see realisation phonological system 60, 61, 64 phonological word, see word phonologies 133, 134, 135, 148, 156, Def. F3g phonology, in general sense 24, 93, 156; and natural classes 199-200; in af, generally 13, 173, 177; in eaf 2, 133, 139-143, 145, 147, 153, 156, 158, 159, 176, 196, 199-202 (passim), 204, 213, 216, 219, 226, 238, 239, 240, 339, 340, 341, 343, 345, 427, 430, 431, Def. 2b" a; in saf 2, 44, 48-50, 53, 56, 57, 59-65, 67, 68, 69, 73, 75, 77, 82, 84, 85, 87-92 (passim), 95, 156, 422, 423; see also generative phonology, universal phonology phonome 139, Def. 8a 5 phonomics 139, 145, Def. 2b 1 a l phonotactic entity 64, Def. 7e, Def. 9a 2 phonotactic feature, in saf 65 phonotactic unit, = phonotagm 83 phonotactics, in eaf 141-143, 147, 156, 157, 158, 163, Def. 2b'c ; in saf 43, 61-64, 68, 69, 71, 72, 82, 89, 156

483

phonotagm, in eaf 141, 142, 151, 181, 255, Def. 9a; in saf 50, 56, 63-65, 68, 71, 82, 83, 84, 95, 156; see also complex phonotagm phonotheme 142-143, 145, Def. 9a0c phonotics 134, Def. F3f phrase, as quasi-technical notion = syntagm 15 physics 22, 36 pig, in English 123, 196, 288-291, 292, 318, 319, 320, 325, 326 pigsty, in English 289, 290, 295, 322323 pitch, see absolute pitch pleonastic terms, lack of in eaf 161, 163 (-)pler[ej(-), as stem in saf 153 plerematics, = morphology, in saf 6768, 72, 77, 145 plereme, in componential analysis 154; in saf 15, 67-68, 80, 153 plerological entity 65, 73, 338; correspondence with signum, in saf 73 , 7 9 - 8 0 plerological system = grammatical system, in saf 6 8 - 7 2 plerology, in sal. = grammar 62, 6573, 75, 80, 87 145, 147; in saf, correspondence with delology in eaf 147; in saf, correspondence with lexology in eaf 145; rejected as theoretical term, in eaf 153-157 pleros, in Greek 153 plerotactic entity, = grammatical entity 68 plerotactics, = syntax, in saf 62, 6872, 72, 73, 80, 145, 153, 387; correspondence with constructional semantics/syn-semantics, in saf 77 plerotagm, = syntagm, in saf 68 plurireferentiality, = polysemony 4 point of view 38, 355 policeman, in English 117, 119, 120, 121, 123, 318, 325 Polish 91 polv-, as prefix in eaf 165 polydely 178-183, 185, 200, 201, Def. 23c-s; see also allodely polygraph), in eaf 165 polymorphous, see polymorph} polymorphy 178, 195, 201, 252, Del.

484

Subject index

24b 1 d ; see also allomorphy polyphone, in standard English 165 polyphony, in eaf 165, 178, 201, Def. 23a 4 ; see also allophony polysemic, as term 164; see also polysemy polysemony 4, 198, 200, 208, 211, 212, 225, 425, 429, 443, Def. 24c 1 6; see also allosemony polysemous 164; see also polysemy polysemy, in eaf 2,4, 81, 127, 150, 164, 178, 201, 183-185, 195198, 199, 200, 204, 205, 206, 208, 211, 212, 221, 224, 247-251, 260, 264, 266, 267, 275, 299, 300, 303, 309, 318, 425, 429, 436, 437, 442, 443, Def. 24c1 d; correspondence between homonymy, polysemony, or polysemy in eaf, and homonymy in saf 199; in eaf, vs. homonymy 185-186,187-194; in Geeraerts, vs. vagueness 223-224; in general sense 30; in Hervey 99, 198, 248; in Lehrer 127, 190-192; in Lyons 187; in Spencer 189; see also allosemy portmanteau morph 89 position 62, 63, 64, 69, 70, 71, 142, 143, 156, 184, 240, Def. 7g; see also archi-position, nuclear position, peripheral position, position class position class 69-71 possible world 213-214 postulates, for af generally 1, 177, 234; for eaf 356-417, 420; for eaf, general discussion of 126, 127, 427; for eaf, introducton to 351355; correspondence between eaf postulates and saf postulates 351; for saf 79, 108, 169, 170, 444; see also provisionality potential utterances/speech phenomena, as source for data 139, 235 pragmatic approach to metaphor 277278, 3 2 0 - 3 2 6 pragmatic Figure o f speech, see dead pragmatic figure of speech, live pragmatic figure o f speech pragmatic non-canonicality 298-300, 307

pragmatics 281, 318, 349; interpretive pragmatics 320-326 Prague School 344-345, 443-444 prayed, in English 9 1 , 9 3 pre-theoretical analysis, see pre-theory pre-theory 174, 197, 312 precision, of terms in eaf 161, 165166 preposition, in Chomskyan approach 28; in relation to referential object 106 primary stress 345-346, 444; see also nuclear stress primitive term 352; see also nonprimitive term principle of relevance 320-321 principles-and-parameters model 28 productivity 65-67, 87, 4 3 2 - 4 3 3 promotion, in Cruse 112, 113, 114 pronunciation, general sense analysed 195-196 proper denotable 104,105,113,138, 302; see also denotable, denotable proper proper noun, in relation to referential object 106 proper semiotics, see semiotics proper symbol 14, 15, 420, Def. 2a 3 3 proposition, see analytic proposition, synthetic proposition prosodic analysis 24 protocol 44, 425 protocolisation, in general 3, 44-45, 175, 220, 394; phonetic 45, 48, 53, 57, 87, 115, 137, 199; phonetic, delicacy of 49, 85, 89, 422; semantic 103-117, 119, 123, 137, 138, 222, 271, 309, 311, 425; semantic, delicacy o f 293, 294, 3 1 7 ; see also framework for semantic protocolisation protocolised allomorph 51, 131, 132, 351 protocolised alloseme 51, 132 prototypicality 5, 310-315 proverbs 4, 244-247, 261 provisionality, of postulates for eaf 126, 351 pseudo-paradigmatic contrast 207 pseudo-referential coherence 327-328, 331, 438 pseudo-referentiality 319, 326, 328,

Subject index

329, 337, 437 psycholinguistics 3, 18-27, 281; interface with core-linguistics 5, 41, 3 1 0 - 3 1 5 , 342 psychology 2, 18-27, 28, 29, 257, 310-315, 325, 422, 437, 441; see also scientificity (of psychology) pun 225, 292 pure-systematic approach, to linguistics 2, 18-27, 28-29 purely formal level, analysis, etc. 45, 176, 234-235 purport, in af generally 7, 22, 175; in eaf 1 1 7 , 2 4 5 , 2 6 9 , 2 7 2 , 2 7 3 , 2 9 4 , 296-297, 298, 299, 302, 307, 308, 309, 316, 333, 335, 336, 347, 348, 356, 357, 440; general sense, vs usage in af 442; see also canonicality, non-purportive conventionality put [one'Js foot in it, in English 241, 247, 261 puzzles, and metaphor 271-272,294295 quasi-definition 421 quasi-delid 433-434 quasi-element 433-435 quasi-idiom 436 quasi-phoneme 240 quasi-refutation 189, 432 quasi-signum 240, 431-432 quasi-standard axiomatic functionalism 250 Rad/Rat, in German 83, 90-95, 124, 251-252, 255 railroad/railway, in English 323-324 range, of denotables, denotata, interpretations, meanings 122, 124, 222, 283; of denotata 122, 172; of global referential entities 230, 231, 287, 291; of referential entities 279, 291, 316, 317, 323; of terminology, in eaf 151, 155, 156157, 164; phonetic 95, 97, 98, 216; see also denotational range, global referential entity, referential range, semantic range Rat, see Rad rational arguability, in Popper 35, 247-

485

248 real-world determination 231; see also contextual determination realisation, in eaf 135, 137, 163, 172, 173, 175, 177, 180-184 (passim), 195, 204, 213, 216, 226, 229, 234, 238, 239, 241, 244, 246, 253, 255, 256, 257, 263, 275, 277, 284, 293, 294, 295, 305, 306, 316, 339, 341, 347, 428, 435, Def. F4 6 ; in eaf, general issues 169-252 (Ch. Four); in msaf 100, 102; in saf 33, 35, 40, 44, 46, 48, 50-55 (passim), 63, 69, 72, 7 9 - 8 0 , 8 1 - 8 9 , 90-95 (passim), 97, 98, 104, 115, 116, 125, 199, 405, 407, 408, 409, 422, 424, 425; in general sense 90, 422; phonetic 6 9 , 7 2 , 9 1 , 9 2 , 9 4 , 9 8 , 172, 239; phonological 175; see also complex realisation, focal realisation, instantiation, manifestation, scope (of realisations), statement (of realisation), single/singular realisation realisation rule 44, 45, 48 realise, see realisation reasonable speakability 215-216, 220 recent metaphor, in Newmark 258-260, 438-439 recoverability, of saf descriptions from eaf descriptions 250-251; see also unequivocal recoverability recurrence 233, 234-240, recursivity 60, 68-69, 72; metaphorical 277 red, in English 415, 416 reductio ad absurdum 170, 172 reference, in eaf: = semete, semonete 131,132, 151-152, Def. Flb2a0 ( Def. Flb2a-\ Def. F l b ^ ; in msaf 102, 113, 117, 124, 125; in saf 52, 53, 55, 56, 426; in Hervey 132, 408; in Hervey vs. Mulder 52, 152; in Lyons 105; in philosophical approaches 106, 117; and metaphor 268-271, 285; usage of term from Ch. Four onwards 167; see also class of equivalent references, figurative meaning, literalness, pseudo-referential

486

Subject index

coherence, pseudo- referential ity reference class 410, 412 reference-type, in eaf: = allosemon 131, Def. 24c1 e ; in msaf 102103, 117, 124, 125; see also focal reference-type referent 106, 214, 224 referential approach, to semantics 159, 268 referential entity 104, 105-109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 121, 179, 180, 229, 291, 413, 428, 439; see also global referential entity, range (of referential entities) referential location 106-107, 108, 110 referential object 106-107, 108, 109, 110, 179, 180, 182, 271, 274, 281, 284, 291, 301, 439 referential range 294; see also range (of referential entities) referential similarity 103 referential spread, used in respect of saf 223 referential time 106, 107, 108, 110 referential vagueness 291 referential ity 70, 110, 113, 117,326 reflected meaning, in Hervey and Higgins 437 reflexive 69 refutation 3, 27, 30-34 (passim), 3738, 39, 70, 90, 185-186, 189, 194, 197, 201, 202, 212, 220, 221, 225, 227, 229, 242-249 (passim), 264-267 (passim), 313, 314, 325, 333, 432; in Popper 35, 208; of theory 268-269; see also quasirefutation register 1 1 , 2 4 , 1 2 1 , 2 3 9 relation, see asymmetrical relation, constructional relations, direct relation, non-ordering relation, ordering relations, paradigmatic relations, simultaneous relation, symmetrical relation, syntactic relation, syntagmatic relations, tactic relation relation of coordination, see coordination relation of inter-ordination, see interordination relation of simultaneity, see

simultaneity relation of sub-ordination, see subordination relation theory 46, 102 relationality 48, 54, 347 relativism 2, 27-34, relevance, see principle of relevance relevance theory 5, 290, 320-326 reminiscency, aspect of live metaphor 266-268, 271-276 (passim), 281, 284-287 (passim), 289, 291, 293, 343, 440; in live vs. dead metaphor 287, 326 residue, see analysis without residue retread, in English 238 rheme 345-346, 444 rhetoric 5, 21, 69, 222, 243, 247, 249, 260, 270, 271; Arabic tradition in 316-317 rock-garden, in English 118, 119 rule 45; see also realisation rule Russian 91 sad, in English 219-220 Salishan languages 26 sandhi 8 2 - 8 5 , 1 8 1 - 1 8 2 scheme 307 science, see natural science, philosophy of science, scientificity scientificity, in general 12, 34, 3641, 188, 250, 312, 325, 326; of af 3, 4, 11, 119, 169, 174, 185-186, 199, 216, 223, 235, 236, 281, 313, 437; of psychology 313-315 scone, in English 173, 175, 176 scope, of af generally 6-7, 27, 175, 318, 324; of eaf 116, 256-257, 262, 268, 306, 319, 349-350, 353, 420, 436; of eaf vs. saf 81, 99, 197-198, 245, 349-350; of msaf, also eaf 113, 114; of saf 3, 355; of realisations 116; of semiotics 6 , 8 , 13, 16; of theory, in general 42, 43; see also ambiguity (of scope) seid/seit, in German 90 self-contained 49, 59, 60, 67, 68, 143, Def. lb 1 ( )sem[ej(-), as stem in eaf 165 semantic, = content-side, in eaf 136, 213 semantic component, in componential analysis 154

Subject index

semantic contrast, see contrast semantic data, see data semantic feature, in eaf 138; in saf 415 semantic figure of speech, see dead semantic figure o f speech semantic form, = denotable-type, in eaf 131, 132, 133, 138, 148, 155, 203, 210, 211, 221, 293-294, Def. 23b> semantic image, = denotable, in eaf 131, 132, 133, 138, 148, 155, 203, 205, 206, 221, 222, 223, 235, 263, 264, 267, 272, 273, 278, 280, 281, 284, 287, 293, 301, 302, 318, 339, 429, 439, Def. 23b, Def. F4b; maximisation o f 206 semantic indeterminacy, see indeterminacy semantic modelling 109; see also framework for semantic protocolisation, model semantic non-canonicality 298 semantic protocolisation, see protocolisation semantic range 271, 275, 276 semantic realisation, see realisation semantic role, in saf 233 semantic unit, ν iew o f text in Halliday 337-339 semantics, in af generally 13, 175; in componential analysis 154; in eaf 85, 109, 136, 162, 178, 181, 199, 204, 213, 219, 225, 234, 243, 252, 255, 256, 260, 266, 267, 269, 270, 273, 279, 287, 292, 293, 309, 316, 325, 328, 338, 340, 438, 440, Def. F4 3 ; in eaf, and natural classes 200; in general sense 37, 243, 348; in msaf 116; in Mulder, defined 419; in saf 1-4, 46, 47, 53-S6, 73, 75, 77, 108, 126, 128, 136, 351, 354, 419-420, 425; in saf, and related notions in eaf 404; and ontology in saf, correspondence with signum ontology in eaf 128; see also abstract semantics, constructional semantics, denotational semantics, form semantics, general semantics, image semantics, non-denotational semantics, referential approach, truth-conditional semantics semasiological approach, to

487

terminology formation 152 sembrare, in Italian 124-125 seme 138, 152, 162, Def. 26i semete, = reference, in eaf 132, 133, 135, 137, 152, 155, Def. F l b ^ o semetics 135, 137, 157, Def. Flb2ai semioid entity 418 s e m i o l o g y , = semiotics 5, 6; Barthesian 10-11 semiotic entity, in eaf 136, 138, 139, Def. Ic3; in saf 49-50, 57, 61, 125 semiotic system, in af 7, 11-22 (passim), 27, 79, 123, 171, 193, 259, 296, 306, 420, 418, Def. lc, Def. 5; eaf terminology in relation to 127-128; terminology for, in eaf 153-154; see also auxiliary semiotic system, semiotics, theory o f semiotic systems semiotics 2, 5-13, 33, 335; in relation to linguistics 16-18; medium-scope semiotics 6; narrowscope semiotics 6, 8; wide-scope semiotics 6, 13; semiotics proper = core-semiotics 11-13, 17, 27, 418; see also core-semiotics, general semiotics semologics 134, 135, 148, Def. Flb2a3 semonete, = reference, in eaf 131, 135, 137, 148, 152, 155, 179, 183, 221, 222, 235, 263, 267-272 (passim), 274, 280, 281, 283, 294, 298, 301, 311, 339, Def. Flb2a5 semonetics 135, 137, 148, 155, 157, Def. Flb2a6 semotics 135, 136, Def. Flb2a2 sense, general meaning analysed 195196; contrasted with reference 283; see also basic sense, figurative meaning, in both senses, lexical sense, literalness, local sense sense-spectrum, in Cruse 210-220 sentence, in eaf 180, 181, 244, 246, 303-307, 340, 341, 338-339, 345, 347, 405, Def. 21; in general sense 42, 245, 443; in saf 15, 73, 426; see also utterance-sentence relationship sentence-base 72-73, 75, 345; correspondence with signum, in saf

488

Subject index

405; see also base sentcncc-utterance 104, 181, 339, 340, 341, 345, 346 sentential features 306, Def. 21b sentential idiom 244 sentential level 390, 392 sentential lexotagm 345-346 sentential signum 75, 180 set, = class 51, 52, 53, 55, 57, 60, 63, 64, 69, 73, 77, 97, 141, 142, 143, 154, 156, 306, 357, 360, 362, 363, 364, 369, 373, 379, 381, 382, 409, 413-417 (passim), 425; see also fuzzy set .unordered set set theory 46, 55, 56, 60, 69, 102, 428 sign, in eaf 151, 420, Def. 2a 2 ; in general sense 5, 12, 24; in saf 1416, 75, 99, 117, 169, 171, 172, 236, 280, 300, 419, 420, 424 sign theory, = ontology, in saf 1, 3, 16, 46, 419-420 signalling device 7, 9-10, 13-14, 27, 418 significant generalisation, see generalisation signum, in af generally 13-16, 169178 (passim); in af generally, use of in this book 419-420; in eaf 130, 132, 133, 135, 136, 148, 150, 151, 167, 168, 175, 180-189 (passim), 192-195 (passim), 198205 (passim), 208, 210, 221, 223229 (passim), 231-246 (passim), 249, 252, 253, 255, 256, 260, 263, 264, 267, 270, 271, 274, 275, 279, 283, 287, 288, 292, 293, 294, 304, 305, 308, 310, 311, 319, 338, 339, 343, 344, 347, 429, 431-436 (passim), 442, 443, Def. 2a 1 , Def. 24; in eaf, correspondence with allomorph, allosemc 184; in eaf, relationship to word in everyday metalanguage 195-198; in msaf, also eaf 108, 115, 116, 118, 120, 122, 124, 125; in quasi-standard af 250; in saf 39-41, 49-50, 51, 52, 53, 54-57 (passim), 65, 66, 70, 73, 75, 77, 79-80, 85, 87, 89, 90, 94100 (passim), 102, 103, 104, 117, 125, 199, 210, 233, 236, 242, 245, 280, 300, 338, 405, 407, 408, 409, 417, 419-420, 424-428 (passim).

433; in saf, correspondence with denotation, etc. 108, 124, 132, 419; in saf, correspondence with phonological form 89; in saf, correspondence with grammatical entity/plerological entity 65-66, 73, 77, 79-80, 338, 426; in saf, correspondence with sentence-base 405; see also archi-signum, complex signum, level (of signum), quasisignum, sentential signum, simple signum signum inventory, see basic signum inventory signum level, in eaf: = lexologics, lexology, logologics, logology 153-154, 225, 226, 235, 236; in saf 154,236 signum ontology 2, 4, 5, 46, 126, 128-138, 139, 151-159 (passim), 167, 168, 198, 233, 235, 303, 308, 310, 338, 339, 343, 344, 350, 354, 427, Def. F4 4 ; correspondence with ontology and semantics, in saf 128; see also correspondence signum theory, = ontology, in saf 2, 3, 16, 46, 56, 128, 138, 418, 419-420 similarity, as criterion for linguistic identity in af 85, 169-171, 173, 174, 226 simile 4, 262, 265, 272, 278, 298, 307, 332, 335; definition of 292296; in Arabic tradition 316; see also dead simile, live simile simple delo 182 simple denotation, in eaf 167 simple entity 59, 434 simple figura, in saf 79-80; in eaf 167 simple grammatical entity, see level (of simple grammatical/plerological entities) simple inventory, see inventory simple logo 234 simple phoneme 87 simple phono, in eaf 80 simple phonological entity, in saf 80, 87, 88, 89; see also level of simple phonological entities simple plerological entity, see level (of simple grammatical/plerological entities) simple signum, in eaf 167, 234, 236,

Subject index

239, 275, 431, 432; in saf 15, 7980, 89, 108, 242, 245; see also unanalysable signum simple system Def. 4a simplicity, of description 3, 37, 63, 172, 175, 201, 220, 232, 234-235, 249; of formal analysis vs. simplicity of level correlation 176; of theory 3, 4, 37, 41, 81, 126, 176, 178; of eaf vs. saf 249; theoretical vs. descriptive 42-46 simultaneity 151, Def. 6b simultaneous bundle, = unordered set 60,61, 67, 142; see also bundle, simultaneity simultaneous relation, = non-ordering relation, symmetrical relation 62, 72 single/singular realisation 48, 50, 52, 100 situational context 181, 182, 264, 348; see also context situational irony 336; see also irony so did, in English 209-210 social structure, in relation to linguistics 24-25 sociolect 11 sociolinguistics 3, 18-27, 41, 174175, 305, 306, 313 sociology 2, 18-27, 28, 311 song thrush, in English 229-232 sound, see speech sound Spanish 443 speculation 16, 17, 23, 38, 185-186, 188, 190, 248, 250, 315 speculative theory 247; see also speculation, speculativism speculativism 36, 39 186, 325; of aspects of eaf 190, 247 speech event 222, 269, 270, 340, 341, 347, 423, 424 specch phenomena 48, 49, 235, 423, 427; as area of enquiry of af 347; see also potential utterances/speech phenomena speech sound 44-45, 48, 50, 51, 52 spelling, influence on judgements regarding polysemy vs. homonymy 192-193 splitting 8 7 , 8 8 , 8 9 - 9 0 , 183; also allodelic splitting, allomorphic

489

splitting, allophonic splitting, allosemic splitting spoken language, vs. written language 193, 342, 427 stallion, in English 108-109, 414, 416 Standard Arabic 33, 107,316,330331, 333-334, 441-442 standard axiomatic functional ism, general features of 1-3, 46-98, 128, 186, 418, 419, 422-426 (passim), and complementary distribution in grammar 226; scope in relation to nuance, polysemy, metaphor, euphemism in Hervey 99; vs. eaf, in general 127, 128, 136, 138, 141, 142, 143, 145, 188, 306, 349-350, 351-356 {passim), 387, 397, 413, 427, 433; vs. eaf, and everyday metalanguage 197-198); vs. eaf, denotation in 132, 412; vs. eaf, equivalence of expression-side notions 130; vs. eaf, in relation to allosemy vs. allosemony 198199; vs. eaf, in relation to free allomorphy 169-178; vs. eaf, in relation to idioms, proverbs 245; vs. eaf, in relation to polysemy 223, 248-249, 264, 437; vs. eaf, in relation to signum analysability 227, 233, 236, 237, 239; vs eaf, in relation to simplicity and scope 81; vs. eaf, in relation to terminology 150, 151-155, 156, 157-158, 161, 164, 166; recoverability of saf description from eaf description 250-251; vs. eaf, msaf, lack of parallelism between expression side and content side 115, 126; vs. msaf, denotation in 122, 125, see also correspondence; modified standard axiomatic functional ism, quasistandard axiomatic functionalism standard of textuality, see textual ity state of affairs 137, 148, 201, 395, 396, 398, 399, 402, 403; see also alio-state statement, and non-statement in respect of purport 297-298; ; of realisation 44-45, 116; see also descriptive statement, extra-descriptive statement, theoretical statement

490

Subject index

status, see ontological status stereotype, in Mulder 118-119 stock metaphor, in Newmark 258-260, 438 strategy, investigative/test strategy 194; of language in Hervey 98-99, 198, 262 strati ficational grammar 158 strength, in English 142 stress, see nuclear stress, primary stress string, see utterance string structural analogy 43 structure, see social structure, underlying structure stylistics 174, 222, 259, 270, 281, 288, 317, 328 sub-discipline 75 sub-ordination, = determination 62, 63, 68, 69, 71, 72, Def. 11 sub-specification 104, 110-112, 114, 115, 117, 119-123 (passim), 172, 179, 181, 182, 196, 203-206 (passim), 215, 217, 220, 221, 224, 256, 264, 266, 267, 270, 271, 274, 278-281 (passim), 284, 287, 288, 290, 293, 294, 301, 302, 317, 428, 439 sub-sub-system 59 sub-system 1 3 , 5 9 , 6 0 , 6 1 , 6 4 , 6 7 , 6 8 , 72, 75, 139, 143, 145, 147, 148, 358; see also sub-sub-system, system of sub-systems sub-theory 133, 134, 135, 354, 358, 395, 396, 398, 399, 406, 407, 408, 410, 411, 419 subject, in English 69-70 subordination, see sub-ordination substance 407, 408 substitution view of metaphor 111, 280, 281, 285 Sudanese Arabic 82, 83, 88, 178179,246, 253-255, 257, 280, 422 sufficient criteria 24, 314 super-ordination, = government 62, 68, 71, 72 superordinate, in eaf; = hyperonym 206, 210, 212, 287, 302, 434, 440, Def. 7a 1 ; in general linguistics 210, 212-213, 224, 285; in saf: = hyperonym 99, 210, 300-301 supersentence, view of text 337-338, 443

suspension of opposition 83 suspension of upper level/limit of disinctive realisation, see upper level/limit of distinctive realisation swine, in English 289-290 symbol, in af 14, 15, 151, Def. 2a 3 ; in general sense 5; see also nonce symbol, proper symbol symmetrical relation, = non-ordering relation, simultaneous relation 62, 72, 368 symmetry, of theory 4, 43, 16, 176, 249;in msaf 126 symptomatic index 7-10, 13-14, 336, 419 syn-semantics, = constructional semantics, in saf 73-75, 126, 147; correspondence with syntax in saf 77 synchronic nature, of af 188 synecdoche 336 synonym, in eaf 151, 165, 167, 183, 289, 323, 324, 432, Def. 28; in msaf, also eaf 109, 122, 124; in saf 56, 99, 117, 169, 415, 420, 425; in general linguistics 103; see also partial synonym, perfect synonym, total synonym synonymous, as term in eaf 164-165; terms in eaf 131, 132, 133, 152153, 161, 163-164, 167; also synonym, synonymy synonymy, in eaf 165, Def. 28c; in saf 56, 172, 425, see also imperfect synonymy syntactic entity, = plerotactic entity, in saf 68, 72, 73 syntactic relation, = plerotactic relation, in saf 75 syntagm, = plerotagm, in saf 15, 68, 69, 75 syntagmatic 61, Def. 7b syntagmatic entity 61, 62, 68, 72, Def. 7b2 syntagmatic relation 72, Def. 7b 1 ; see also non-syntagmatic relation syntagmeme 142, 143, Def. 10 syntax, as traditional notion 159; in general sense 27; in saf, = plerotactics 33, 56, 63, 68-72, 73, 145, 387, 432-433; in saf, correspondence with constructional

Subject index

semantics/syn-semantics 77; excluded as technical term, in eaf 158-160; see also connotational morpheme, denotational syntax synthetic proposition 214 system 6-13, 59, 123, 148, 156, 259, 296, 306, 307, 335, Def. lb; see also complex system, grammatical system, ordered system, phonological system, plerological system, semiotic system, simple system, unordered system system of sub-systems; see also system of systems 139, 143, 145 system of systems 64; see also system of sub-systems system ontology 2, 4, 73, 126, 128, 133, 134, 135, 138-150, 151, 154-159 (passim), 162, 167, 235, 338, 339, 343, 350, 3 5 3 - 3 5 4 , 427, Def. 3a l a ; as ontology in general sense 128 systematicity 15; metaphorical 285, 339; see also lexical systematicity systemic grammar/linguistics 24, 28, 326 systemic terms 133, 126, 155; correspondence with entity terms, in eaf signum ontology 149-150 systemology 2-4, 15, 46, 50, 56-80, 126, 162, 419, 423-424, 427 [t], /t/, in English 82 tactic entity, = syntagmatic entity 61, 64, 73 tactic function 62, 63, 142 tactic level 64 tactic relation 62, 72 tactics 64 tagmemics 337 tautology 103, 231; see also partial tautology taxonomy 200, 266 tendency to mean 119-120, 124, 125, 318; see also denotational tendency term, see cover term, generalising term, non-primitive term, primitive term, systemic terms, terminology terminological theory 152 terminologically integrated term, see terminology

491

terminology, of af generally 10, 442; of eaf 4, 126-128, 130, 138, 147, 162, 442; of eaf, assessment of 150-168; of eaf, coherence of 166; of eaf, consistency of 151, 155157, 164; of eaf, core terminology 162; of eaf, integration of 130, 131, 132, 133, 147; of eaf vs. saf, consistency of 167-168; of saf 7 9 - 8 0 , 98; see also generation of terminology, metalinguistic usage, onomasiological approach, range (of terminology), term, semasiological approach, transparency test strategy, see strategy text 42, 319, 337-342, 443 text-linguistics 3; interface with corelinguistics 5, 41, 42, 249, 335, 337-342 textuality, standards of in de Beaugrande and Dressier 337, 340, 341 the early bird catches the worm, in English 244-245, 247, 261 theme, in Halliday and Prague School 444 theorem, also theorematic notion, term, etc. 81, 3 5 2 - 3 5 3 theoretical interface, see interface theoretical notion 248 theoretical statement, = postulate, in eaf 196 theory 35-41; vs. description, in af generally 3, 28-34 (passim), 42-46, 354; integration of, in eaf 244; in Popper 247-248; in Chomskyan approach 18-19; non-hypothetical nature of 197; see also empirical theory, level (of theory), linguistic theory, logical theory, mathematical theory, metaphysical theory, monistic nature (of theory), philosophical theory, relation theory, relevance theory, scope (of theory), sign theory, signum theory, speculative theory, terminological theory, theory of indices, theory of semiotic systems, worst-case theory theory of indices 359; as sub-theory of semantics, in Mulder 418-419 theory of semiotic systems 418-419 thought experiment 213, 222

492

Subject index

tiger, in English 269, 291 toilet, in English 160 token, = member 53, 407, 408 tone 48, 65, 306, 387, 389 tone language 48, 306 tone of voice 116 total contextual conditioning, see contextual modulation, modulation, non-total contextual conditioning total homonymy 98, Def. 27d total synonym 165, Def. 28a traditional grammar 145, 197 traffic lights, as semiotic system 233236 transformation, in eaf 150; in eaf vs. transformational grammar 157-158; in saf 49, 50, 51, 100, 150, 157 transformational grammar 49, 158, 314-315 transformational interlock 366 translation 2 5 8 , 3 1 6 , 3 2 6 , 4 3 7 transparency, of terminology in eaf 4, 151, 155-157, 164, 166 tree, in English 266, 275, 286 trope 307 true, see truth truism 429 truth 41, 186, 297-298, 316, 321; and figures of speech 298; and metaphor 268, 269; see also truth-likeness truth-conditional semantics 268, 348 truth-likeness 41,321 Turkish 31,33 types of metaphor, in Newmark 258260 ultimate constituents 59-60, 67, Def. 7fib unambiguous recoverability, see recoverability, unequivocal recoverablity unanalysable signum, etc. = simple signum, etc. 243, 245 under-determinative context 270, 271 underarticulation 305 underspecification 89, 438 understatement 4, 258, 296, 299, 309, 316, 335 unequivocal recoverability, and ellipsis 346-347 union, in set theory 428 unique morpheme 228, 236-240,

431-432 unique phoneme 239 unit Def. 9e; in morphology/ plerematics, in saf 67-68; in ontematics 147; in ontidics 147; in ontotactics 148; in para-ontotactics 148; in para-phonotactics, in eaf 143; in para-phonotactics, in saf 65; in para-syntax/para-plerotactics, in saf 73; in phonematics, in eaf 141, 430; in phonematics, in saf 59, 61; in phonidics, in eaf 141; in phonotactics, in eaf 141; in phonotactics, in saf 63, 82, 83, 84; sentence as largest unit in lexology 181, 338; see also phonotactic unit universal, linguistic 5, 26, 28-32 (passim), 316-318; see also universal grammar, universal phonology, universalism universal grammar 19, 25, 27, 34, 421 universal phonology 199; see also phonology universalism 2, 27-34, 225, 349, 421 unordered set, etc. 6 0 , 6 1 , 6 3 , 6 4 , 7 9 , 141, 142, 156, 256, 430 unordered system 60, 64, 68, Def. 4b1 unparaphrasability, see paraphrasability upper level/limit of distinctive realisation 82-84,91,216,305, 428 usage, see convention (of usage) use of language, basic 270 utterance, in af vs. general usage 423; in eaf 132, 133, 151, Def. Fla, Def. F1 b 0a , Def. FlbPb; in saf 52, 53, 55, 56, 405, 407, 408, 409, 419, 423-426 (passim); use of utterance from Ch. Four onwards 167; in Bar Hillel, and sentence-utterance distinction 304; in general sense, vs. non-utterance 209; see also class of equivalent utterances, potential utterances/speech phenomena, sentence- utterance utterance interpretation 325; see also metaphor (interpretation) utterance-sentence relationship SOSSOT, 340 utterance-string 339-342 utterance-type 429

Subject index

vagueness 221, 323; in Geeraerts, vs. polysemy 223-224; see also referential vagueness variance, in af both versions 171-172, 176, 213; in eaf 3, 4, 99; in saf 3,4, 81-86, 88, 99, 428; see also contextually determined variance, free variance, free variance within contextually determined variance variant, see variance, morphological variants verb 26; in Chomskyan approach 28; in relation to referential object 106 verbal context 181, 264, 348; see also extra-utterance context vernielen/vernietigen, in Dutch 118119, 123-124, 256 veterinary, in English 171-172, 427 viper, in English 118, 118, 120, 173, 176, 325 voice-quality 116,305,306 voice setting 424 voiced/voiceless distinction 93 voicelessness 87 vowel 89 well-formedness, of utterance, etc. 194, 387, 392 white coffee, in English 232 wide-scope semiotics 6, 13 wolf; in English 282-284, 321 word, as informal label for type of type of lexo/signum in eaf, grammatical entity/signum in saf 15, 120, 426; as representation of delological form 183; excluded as technical term, in eaf 158-159; general sense analysed 195-198; in wider sense 30, 31, 174, 193-194, 210; meaning, and natural classes 199, 200; phonological word 68 world knowledge 114 worst-case theory 39-41; see also theory written language, vs. spoken language 193, 342, 427 Yemeni Arabic; see Arabic yes, in English 371

493

zero 57, 240, 373, 384, 385, 389, 392 zero-feature 87 zeugma 111, 203, 208-220, 224

Trends in Linguistics. Studies and Monographs Edited by Werner Winter Mouton de Gruyter · Berlin · New York 71 Trends in Romance Linguistics and Philology. Vol. 5: Bilingualism and Linguistic Conflict in Romance. Edited by Rebecca Posner and John N. Green. 1993. 72 Language Conflict and Language Planning. Edited by Ernst H. Jahr. 1993. 73 Language Change and Language Structure. Older Germanic Languages in a Comparative Perspective. Edited by Toril Swan and Olaf Jansen. 1994. 74 Allan R. Bomhard and John C. Kerns, The Nostratic Macrofamily. A Study in Distant Linguistic Relationship. 1994. 75 Tense and Aspect in Discourse. Edited by Co Vet and Carl Vetters. 1994. 76 Wolfgang U. Dressier and Lavinia M. Barbaresi, Morphopragmatics. Diminutives and Intensifies in Italian, German, and Other Languages. 1994. 77 Language Contact and Change in the Austronesian World. Edited by Tom Dutton and Darreil T. Tryon. 1994. 78 On Languages and Language. The Presidential Adresses of the 1991 Meeting of the Societas Linguistica Europaea. Edited by Werner Winter. 1995. 79 Medieval Dialectology. Edited by Jacek Fisiak. 1995. 80 Thomas V. Gamkrelidze and Vjacheslav V. Ivanov, Indo-European and IndoEuropeans. A Reconstruction and Historical Analysis of a Proto-Language and Proto-Culture. 1995. 81 Linguistic Change under Contact Conditions. Edited by Jacek Fisiak. 1995. 82 Language and the Cognitive Construal of the World. Edited by John R. Taylor and Robert E. MacLaury. 1995. 83 Insights in Germanic Linguistics I: Methodology in Transition. Edited by Irmengard Rauch and Gerald F. Carr. 1995. 84 Meaning as Explanation. Advances in Linguistic Sign Theory. Edited by Ellen Contini-Morava and Barbara S. Goldberg. 1995. 85 Autolexical Theory. Ideas and Methods. Edited by Eric Schiller, Elisa Steinberg and Barbara Need. 1996. 86 Creole Languages and Language Acquisition. Edited by Herman Wekker. 1996. 87 Peter Harder, Functional Semantics. A Theory of Meaning, Structure and Tense in English. 1996. 88 Language Contact in the Arctic. Northern Pidgins and Contact Languages. Edited by Ernst H. Jahr and Ingvild Broch. 1996. 89 A Bibliography on Writing and Written Language. Edited by Konrad Ehlich, Florian Coulmas and Gabriele Graefen. Compiled by Gabriele Graefen and Carl W. Wendland, in collaboration with Georg F. Meier and Reinhard Wenk. 1996.

90 Historical, Indo-European, and Lexicographical Studies. A Festschrift for Ladislav Zgusta on the Occasion of his 70th Birthday. Edited by Hans H. Hock. 1997. 91 Henning Andersen, Reconstructing Prehistorical Dialects. Initial Vowels in Slavic and Baltic. 1996. 92 Natural Phonology. The State of the Art. Edited by Bernhard Hurch and Richard A. Rhodes. 1996. 93 Hans H. Hock and Brian D. Joseph, Language History, Language Change, and Language Relationship. An Introduction to Historical and Comparative Linguistics. 1996. 94 Insights in Germanic Linguistics II: Classic and Contemporary. Edited by Irmengard Rauch and Gerald F. Carr. 1997. 95 Seiichi Suzuki, The Metrical Organization of Beowulf. Prototype and Isomorphism. 1996. 96 Linguistic Reconstruction and Typology. Edited by Jacek Fisiak. 1997. 97 Advances in Morphology. Edited by Wolfgang U. Dressier, Martin Prinzhorn and John R. Rennison. 1997. 98 Language Change and Functional Explanations. Edited by Jadranka Gvozdanovic. 1997. 99 Modality in Germanic Languages. Historical and Comparative Perspectives. Edited by Toril Swan and Olaf J. Westvik. 1997. 100 Language and its Ecology. Essays in Memory ofEinar Haugen. Edited by Stig Eliasson and Ernst H. Jahr. 1997. 101 Language History and Linguistic Modelling. A Festschrift for Jacek Fisiak on his 60th Birthday. Edited by Raymond Hickey and Stanislaw Puppel. 1997. 102 Robert S. Bauer and Paul K. Benedict, Modern Cantonese Phonology. 1997. 103 Studies in Middle English Linguistics. Edited by Jacek Fisiak. 1997. 104 Culture and Styles of Academic Discourse. Edited by Anna Duszak. 1997. 105 New Approaches to Chinese Word Formation. Morphology, Phonology and the Lexicon in Modern and Ancient Chinese. Edited by Jerome L. Packard. 1997. 106 Codeswitching Worldwide. Edited by Rodolfo Jacobson. 1997. 107 Salish Languages and Linguistics. Edited by Ewa Czaykowska-Higgins and M. Dale Kinkade. 1997. 108 The Life of Language. Papers in Linguistics in Honor of William Bright. Edited by Jane H. Hill, P. J. Mistry and Lyle Campbell. 1997. 109 English Historical Linguistics and Philology in Japan. Edited by Jacek Fisiak and Akio Oizumi. 1998. 110 Marta Harasowska, Morphophonemic Variability, Productivity, and Change. The Case ofRusyn. 1998. 111 James Dickins, Extended Axiomatic Linguistics. 1998.