Exploring the Criminal Decision Process: Rational Choice, Irrational Behaviour? (Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society) 3031462300, 9783031462306

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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN RISK, CRIME AND SOCIETY

Exploring the Criminal Decision Process Rational Choice, Irrational Behaviour? Rachael Steele

Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society

Series Editor Kieran McCartan , Department of Criminology, University of the West of England, Bristol, UK

Risk is a major contemporary issue which has widespread implications for theory, policy, governance, public protection, professional practice and societal understandings of crime and criminal justice. The potential harm associated with risk can lead to uncertainty, fear and conflict as well as disproportionate, ineffective and ill-judged state responses to perceived risk and risky groups. Risk, Crime and Society is a series featuring monographs and edited collections which examine the notion of risk, the risky behaviour of individuals and groups, as well as state responses to risk and its consequences in contemporary society. The series will include critical examinations of the notion of risk and the problematic nature of state responses to perceived risk. While Risk, Crime and Society will consider the problems associated with ‘mainstream’ risky groups including sex offenders, terrorists and white collar criminals, it welcomes scholarly analysis which broadens our understanding of how risk is defined, interpreted and managed. Risk, Crime and Society examines risk in contemporary society through the multi-disciplinary perspectives of law, criminology and socio-legal studies and will feature work that is theoretical as well as empirical in nature.

Rachael Steele

Exploring the Criminal Decision Process Rational Choice, Irrational Behaviour?

Rachael Steele School of Justice Studies Liverpool John Moores University Liverpool, UK

ISSN 2946-2517 ISSN 2946-2525 (electronic) Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society ISBN 978-3-031-46230-6 ISBN 978-3-031-46231-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46231-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: David Wall/getty images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Preface

This book is about thinking, or more precisely, about how people think (or don’t think) about committing crime. For many years, criminologists and psychologists have explored the reasons why certain people commit certain crimes at certain times, and one of the stalwart approaches to understand this process has been the Rational Choice Perspective. This approach, at its core, suggests that a person will weigh up the potential costs and benefits of an action before they decide to do it. That of course, is simplified, and many developments, refinements, caveats and critiques have been applied to this perspective over the years. One of these main criticisms is that for many reasons, much of the research in this area has not looked at decision making in those who have actually committed crime. This book aims to rectify this to some extent. As the opening chapters will explain, there has been a huge development in Rational Choice Theories of Crime over the years, moving from a purely economic model, to a more complex, human-brain friendly approach that allows for imperfect thinking and circumstances. This book hopes to take this understanding further, by factoring in a whole range of real-life findings from people who have actually committed

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crime. This wider approach is reflected in this book by the use of the term Rational Choice Perspective, rather than Rational Choice Theory, to allow and encompass all aspects of human decision making within the model. This allows us to view human decision making as imperfect. Indeed, the decisions made about crime work in the same way as the decisions we all make so in a way, the thinking (about thinking) in this book is the thinking that we all do. Instead of our thoughts, desires and circumstances leading us to choose a stay-at-home break over a week in the Canaries, or purchase one washing machine over another, the thoughts, desires and circumstances of the people in this book may mean their choice is to burgle or shoplift. The process by which we get to the end point of our actions may look very similar, even if the end points are miles apart. Just like those who commit crime, we also recognise times that we have all made decisions that don’t seem to be rational at all. What about those times our behaviour is impulsive, emotional or just plain stressed out? This book aims to look at all of these elements, how they fit within the Rational Choice Perspective (RCP), and now new ideas about thinking may help us understand those that commit crime (and perhaps ourselves!). Using real experiences from a range of people who have committed a range of crimes, the central tenets of decision making under the RCP will be explored and updated in a way that is rooted in real-life criminal events. The insights given by the participants help guide the conclusions about the ongoing validity of the RCP, its use both academically and in policy and practice, and where future research may be best guided. Liverpool, UK

Rachael Steele

Acknowledgements

I would like to offer my deepest thanks to my family for their support throughout this, and all of my projects. You are only as strong as the foundation on which you sit, and I am lucky to have the strongest foundations. To my Mum, Ann, my Dad, Robert, my brother Simon and husband Steve (Badger)—this is for you. And to my nephew William—I hope your love of learning continues like mine has. Finally, without the time and words of those who have offered me insight into their own experiences and thinking about crime—I couldn’t have done this. Thank you.

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Contents

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What This Book Is About Why We Need to Understand Criminal Decision Making Development of the Rational Choice Perspective Related Ideas Something to Think About When Researching Crime References

1 3 6 11 15 18

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What Has the Rational Choice Perspective Told Us About Crime Driving Offences Shoplifting Offences Burglary Offences Corporate Crime Aggravated Vehicle Taking—‘Carjacking’ Robbery Identity Theft Violent Offences Sex Offenders

21 22 23 25 27 27 28 28 29 29

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Conducting Studies on Rational Choice and Offending Chapter Summary References

30 32 33

3

Critique and Methodological Issues Chapter Summary References

35 38 38

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The Importance of Understanding Thinking Expertise, Heuristics and Thinking Shortcuts The Role of Experience Rewards Mood, Emotion and Different States of Mind Hot and Cold Decision Making Chapter Summary References

39 39 40 45 48 50 54 54

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Other Challenges to Consider Drugs and Alcohol Violence and Aggression Emotion and Expressive Crime The Research in This Book Gender Chapter Summary References

59 59 61 62 65 66 68 68

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Exploring Experiences of Crime How was the Data Collected? Designing the Interview The Cognitive Interview Making the Data Make Sense Who Were the Participants? Talking About Crime Chapter Summary References

73 74 75 77 79 79 81 82 82

Contents

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The Lived Experience of Crime—In Their Own Words Acquisitive Offending Thinking Ahead Risks and Rewards An Occupational Hazard Other Costs of Offending Bounded Rationality References

85 85 88 90 95 95 99 101

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Rewards, Benefits and Goals Wanted It/Needed It Drugs Excitement, ‘Kicks’ and Social Reinforcement Making It Work It Works for Me I Had No Choice Chapter Summary Reference

103 103 105 107 108 109 111 114 114

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Violent and Emotional Offending It Just Happened A Sense of Relief—Feelings and Situations I Need to Feel Better Not Thinking Straight Thinking Back Chapter Summary Reference

115 115 116 116 118 123 125 126

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Mixed-Up Rationalities Rational and Non-rational Within the Same Individual Rational and Non-rational Behaviour in the Same Event The Effects of Alcohol and Drugs Drunk, and Sober, Decision Making It only Happened When I Drank Drugs Alter Me Chapter Summary References

127 132 138 142 143 145 147 151 151

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Confounding Factors and Decision Enhancers Making Sense of It All What Costs Do Matter? Planning Ahead Revisiting Expertise Expertise and Bounded Rationality Violent Offending, Choices and Circumstances Mixed-Up Rationalities Alcohol, Drugs and Individual Differences References

153 159 159 160 165 167 169 178 182 189

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Putting It All Together The Choice to Offend The Offending Process References

193 195 198 200

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Developing a Model to fit the Data Why is This Important? The Decision Structure Model and Integrating Theory How Could These Ideas Be Used? References

203 206 211 213 221

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Reflections and Thought Future Research References

223 225 228

Index

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About the Author

Dr. Rachael Steele is Subject Lead in Criminal Justice at Liverpool John Moores University. With over 15 years of experience working within the Criminal Justice Sector, she has a particular interest in understanding the individuals who commit crime, their motivations, needs and how they can be supported to change. Since moving into Academia, she maintains close links with the Criminal Justice System, fueling her research work into Criminal Justice Practice, with an emphasis on supporting the changing of criminal behaviour. As well as her research, Rachael leads an undergraduate programme in Forensic Psychology and Criminal Justice, in addition to supervising a range of postgraduate research projects.

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List of Figures

Fig. 13.1 Fig. 13.2

Decision structure model Chain of choices

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1 What This Book Is About

Crime, criminals and the motivations behind it are at the heart of current public interest. They feature large in government policy, in the news, and even make up a significant proportion of entertainment. We only need to look at the latest releases on streaming sites and in bookstores to see that crime, whether true crime, police drama or serial killer documentaries, are hugely popular. For those working within the justice system, understanding how and why real-life crime happens is an ongoing endeavour. Within the fields of criminology, psychology and sociology, different academics have, in their own particular way, tried to explain why people commit crime. Within all of these different approaches, one of the main points of discussion is exactly how much capacity an individual has to determine his or her own behaviour. Criminological theories emphasise how external forces acting upon the person could lead to crime based on the effects of these forces (e.g. social, economic). By contrast, the law holds individuals responsible for their actions so they are taken to possess free will and to make decisions about their actions, or at the very least are able to prevent themselves from breaking the law. This leads us into the Rational Choice Perspective—a core approach within the theory © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Steele, Exploring the Criminal Decision Process, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46231-3_1

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of crime. The Rational Choice Perspective focuses on an individual’s internal processes, and the decision-making mechanism that guides their behaviour. The assumption of this perspective is that to some extent at least, a criminal event is the result of some form of rational decision. The core element of the Rational Choice Perspective is that an individual has free will to make a choice and that their criminal behaviour is an outcome of this choice. This idea aligns with the dominant ethos of the contemporary Criminal Justice System in England and Wales (Jones, 2008). One key consideration for this approach (which will be explored more fully later in this book) is that a person will consider the possible ‘costs’ of crime before they make their decision to offend. The punishment delivered via court sentence, whether that be custody or community order, is thought by many to be the main deterrent to crime and would be seen as factoring into a decision as a formal sanction or ‘cost’ of criminal behaviour (Sutherland & Cressey, 1974). These utilitarian assumptions form the basis of our legal system (Matsueda, 2006). There is significant and ongoing debate about whether this basic assumption actually holds true. Garland (1990) states that there is no evidence that punishment has ever achieved a high rate of reform, yet the legal system’s punitive approach persists, despite the evidence that suggests if punishment fails, the punitive system is ineffective (Jacob, 1979). This examination of the deterrence effect of court sanctioned punishment is far too extensive to get into here, indeed this would be (and is) a whole different book. However, it is important to point out the assumption that formal ‘costs’ or punishments are factored into a decision to commit crime within the Rational Choice Perspective. Considering the ‘costs’ of crime, along with potential rewards, leads to a weighing of options and a final decision. This is the core, original assumption of the Rational Choice Perspective. This book aims to explore the developments in the Rational Choice Perspective as applied to criminal decision making. From the core foundation of the perspective, the developments, added sophistication, and research on the topic will be explored, along with the criticisms that the Perspective has attracted. In order to contribute to the development of this Perspective, this book will consider the findings of a research study in which the core assumptions of the Perspective are tested. By examining the real experiences of men and women who

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have committed a wide range of crimes, the applicability, usefulness and explanatory power of the Rational Choice Perspective will be explored. At the same time, it is hoped that the reader may build a picture for themselves of the variety of circumstances and differences in reasoning that help different individuals arrive at the point that they will commit a crime. For many, the idea that a person ‘decides’ to commit a crime makes sense. For some types of crime, for example burglary, we can understand that a person selects a target, and acts on this choice. However, for other crimes, it is not as clear whether something resembling a rational decision takes place. For the Rational Choice Perspective to be useful, it must be able to explain a range of crimes and apply to a range of criminals. Understanding what happens leading up to, and resulting in a crime, is an important area for all those working within relevant fields, and it is those questions that this book hopes to (at least in part) answer.

Why We Need to Understand Criminal Decision Making In order to understand fully the problems (and potential benefits) of the Rational Choice Perspective, it is important first to explore exactly what this means, and place this in context. Theories of crime and criminality fit on a spectrum from those approaches that see the cause of crime as being social, to those that locate criminal behaviour within the individual. The Rational Choice Perspective, being a theory of decision making, is an individual-level theory. Individual-level theories concern the individual and the internal processes that may cause the individual to commit an offence. These exist as a range of theories which look at various factors, from the individual’s part in the convergence of the key elements of crime (Cohen & Felson, 1979) to the detailed psychobiological approaches that have existed within criminology for some time. An approach often related to the Rational Choice Perspective is the ‘Routine Activity’ theory of crime (Felson, 2002). Routine activity theory links the individual with the environment around him or her, suggesting that crime will occur given

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the presence of three key elements—a motivated offender, a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian. Within this approach, links can begin to be made between the psychological approach (the motivated offender), and the more sociological approaches which deal with opportunity, and control. Although the last two elements have received a lot of attention within Routine Activity research and theory the first, the motivated offender, is deliberately left to one side by the theorists. This is the basis of criticism levied at this approach in that though it begins to describe how different elements come together to explain how a crime occurs, the first of these, the ‘motivated’ offender, is not explored or explained (McGuire, 2004). This is, however, exactly what is focused on within the Rational Choice Perspective of crime. Rational Choice Theory focuses on the cognitive process of decision making, and for the most part, work has focused on the potential costs and benefits of the offence (resulting in the ‘motivated offender’) (Rock, 2002). These costs and benefits could be material, or intrinsic, and are subjective and individual to the offender (Palmer, 2003). A key point of critique of the Rational Choice Theory was that it originally ignored societal or external influences on a person’s decision making, however further work within the remit of Rational Choice Theory has moved on to encompass both societal influence (connecting to more social theories) as well as the role of motivation, subjective values and emotion in offending decision making. In order to reflect this broader focus, and allow the approach more flexibility in this way, this book refers to a Rational Choice Perspective, rather than a Rational Choice Theory. These concepts are discussed in more detail later in this book. At the very end of the ‘internal spectrum’ sit the theories regarding individual factors that are purely psychological theories which may affect an individual. These theories are important—as individual factors will affect the way that a person thinks about their goals, acceptable risks and the value of perceived rewards. Work such as examining the interactive effects of personality characteristics such as extraversion with criminality (Eysenck, 1977) as well as self-control (Ahlstrom & Havighurst, 1970) and impulsivity (Rotenberg & Nachson, 1979) has refocused individual

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approaches to criminality. Locus of control, the extent to which an individual believes their behaviour to be controlled by themselves or chance, is another feature of psychological research into crime (Rotter, 1966). Given the wide range in focus and scope of the varied approaches to explaining crime, it is no surprise that in developing the thinking in the discipline, theorists have sought to integrate and combine the explanatory power of different approaches. This in itself could be beneficial to criminological theory as a whole, by reducing the number of differing theories and allowing broader models in which to analyse research evidence (Bernard & Snipes, 1996). One of the main ways in which this integration began to take place is through the inclusion of psychological processes and aspects into sociological theories, and vice versa. For example, Containment Theory (Reckless, 1967) develops control theory to include ‘inner’ containments such as self-concept and investment in societal norms with ‘outer’ containments imposed by adults on children as they develop. One of the most intriguing and useful convergences between two seemingly different approaches is the conceptual links made between Differential Association Theory on the sociological side, and Social Learning Theories originating in the psychological perspective of behaviourism. In both approaches, the influence of the groups and community around the individual is important (Sutherland & Cressey, 1974). This combination of psychological and sociological approaches has proved to be fertile ground. Braithwaite (1989) proposes a version of Control Theory called ‘Shaming Theory’ which explores the concept of shame as a control mechanism in an individual, with ‘reintegrative shaming’ and ‘stigmatisation shaming’ both having different effects on the outcome of the individual’s behaviour. Thornberry (1987) marries up Control Theories and Learning Theories by suggesting that if social constraints are loosened, individuals may be ‘freed up’ to offend, but will not necessarily do so unless they are also in a situation where they acquire pro-delinquency attitudes and knowledge, and these are reinforced. Elliot et al. (1985) agree, suggesting that it is the coming together of the strength of the individual’s socialisation (Control Theory) as well as its content (Differential Association) that combines to produce offending behaviour.

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Another theory that integrates different approaches to explaining crime is the Situational Action Theory, which contains similarities to Rational Choice Theory in that individuals are assumed to be motivated to act by their perception of different outcomes, but that their perceptions of those outcomes and the range of choices they perceive depend on their situation, as well as their characteristics (Wikström, 2006). Wikström states that a criminal act can never be solely explained by individual characteristics or by situational circumstances, as neither exist in a vacuum, but that the process of making a choice links the individual, their situation and their action together, therefore choice can only be understood within this context. The marrying up of the individual, the social and the cognitive appears to be fertile ground for the development of criminological theory. This combination of elements is seen as key for the integration of criminological theory to be possible, but can only occur, according to Short (1979) if a model of crime can be devised that unites the individual, situational and macro levels of analysis of crime. Vila agrees (1994) and suggests that any successful paradigm for understanding criminal behaviour needs to be applicable at both the macro and micro-levels, as well as having an interactive element.

Development of the Rational Choice Perspective Even from the brief whistle stop tour of some criminological theories given here, it is clear that this is a complex area with a whole range of potential individual traits, learning and societal influences to consider. With this wide range of theories and ideas, what contribution can one approach really make? Thus far, the Rational Choice Perspective of criminal decision making has been an influential approach, becoming particularly popular during the late 1980s and 1990s when much empirical work was undertaken to examine how ‘Rational Choice Theory’ or the study of how rational decisions are made, could be applied to criminal behaviour in individuals, by explaining this act as the result of a decision-making process.

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With theoretical roots in philosophy, the concept of ‘free will’ and an individual’s ability to exercise it is central to the Rational Choice Perspective (Bouffard & Wolf, 2007). This approach went on to become a central proposition of the Classical School of Criminology, focusing on control of crime through manipulations of penal sanctions (as costs to criminal behaviour) (Moran, 1996). The idea and philosophy that potential offenders would avoid offending for fear of potential punishment, is an idea central to the Rational Choice Perspective and also Deterrence Theory (Akers, 1990). These two theoretical approaches share the assumption that individuals act under free will, and in doing so will seek to avoid costs, the main difference between the theories being that within the Rational Choice Perspective, the rewards of an action or behaviour are equally as important as the costs or punishment, and some research suggests that rewards are actually more important (Loughran et al., 2016). This will be discussed more later. The Rational Choice Theoretical approach was also influenced by economic models which became popular in the late 1960s and 1970s, when economists expanded their focus on consumer behaviour to focus on criminal behaviour (Mehlkop & Graeff, 2010). In particular, Becker’s (1968) ‘Crime and Punishment’ could be viewed as the most influential work within the Rational Choice approach to crime of the era, introducing a ‘Subjective Expected Utility’ approach which emphasised that it was the expected utility as perceived by the offender that was pertinent to the decision-making process, but maintaining that an individual’s behaviour still represented ‘careful thinking and sensible decisions’ (Felson, 1993, p. 1497). The economic model of Rational Choice Theory assumed therefore at least a minimal level of rationality to weigh up different outcomes, and maximise utility, stating: When the probable costs exceed probable benefits, an individual will not commit the crime. (Banfield, 1968, p. 160)

This weighing up of costs and benefits, can, under an economic approach, be expressed as a complex mathematical equation, but such an equation does not represent the realistic human decision-making process. The assumption of a normative status in this mathematical approach is

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useful for theorists who want to avoid the tricky business of thinking about the motivations of the potential offender. After all, methodologically speaking, it is easier to focus on the external, observable aspects of an action, than the internal desires and drivers (Hechter & Kanazawa, 1997). However, human beings are not perfect calculators, and though they may want to act in their own interests (i.e. rationally) the way people see their actions, and indeed what they see as their interests, will vary widely. For this reason, the idea of the perfectly reasoned decision maker has been criticised as being unrealistic, and indeed Cornish and Clarke, proposers of the concept of the ‘reasoned criminal’ (1987) agree that individuals are unlikely to go through such a calculating mental process. Instead, they claim, individuals ‘intuit’ the values and costs of an action. This means that someone making a decision about a course of action will estimate the value and probability of different outcomes based on guesses rooted in their own feelings and experiences. The idea of the perfect decision maker, and the perfect decision-making conditions do not apply to the everyday human decision, and instead, people will do the best they can based on their limited ability, the limited information available to them and the pressure they are under at the time. Cornish and Clarke refer to this as ‘Bounded Rationality’ (1986). Simon (1978) suggests that while these decisions are rational, they do not seek to maximise utility in the truest sense, and instead individuals make a decision that is ‘satisficing’ or good enough, given the situation and information the decision maker is working under at the time. However, even given these limitations of the imperfect human decision, we can still see a person who is deciding to offend (or not) as making their choice based on what they perceive will give them the best outcome, and failing that, what will achieve a ‘satisficing’ or good enough outcome. Despite the fact that this decision process may not be perfect, this ‘satisficing’ can be seen as fitting within the Rational Choice framework as the decisions made have a basis in weighing up costs and rewards (Farrell, 2010). Cornish and Clarke propose that this assumption makes up an ‘Informal model’ of Rational Choice (1987) in which offenders do make a weighted decision, but in a more ‘rudimentary and cursory way’ than advocated by the classical economic approach

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to decision making. The ‘Informal Rational Choice model’ was originally developed by Cornish and Clarke (1987) to develop thinking about situational crime prevention and in doing so takes both individual and situational factors into account. The movement away from the classic Rational Choice model has developed the approach considerably, with modern theorists recognising that Decisions to offend…are influenced by both offences and offenders. (Cornish & Clarke, 1987, p. 935)

The inclusion of the offence opportunities available and the situation the potential offender finds him or herself in is a key development in the Rational Choice approach to crime. It is important to remember that when a potential offending decision is made, that the range of options a person has to choose from may be limited. As Felson (1986, p. 119) states, People make choices, but they cannot choose the choices available to them.

Newer versions of the Rational Choice Perspective therefore recognise that our choices are altered by the information and ability of the decision maker, their motivation, but also the limiting circumstances that may be in place at the time. This approach to Rational Choice belongs to the family of Choice theories described by Hechter and Kanazawa (1997) as ‘thick’ theories, which differ and progress from the classic, economically based ‘thin’ Rational Choice Theories. Whereas the ‘thin’ theories described earlier avoid any examination of the subjective motivations and values of the individual offender, in contrast, the ‘thick’ family of theories place the motivation of the individual as central to his or her decision making, and states that an understanding of an individual’s value hierarchy is necessary to understand their decision making. The incorporation of individual motivation links back to the previously mentioned Routine Activity Theory, which expresses the view that crime will occur at the intersection of three key elements: a suitable target, the lack of a guardian and the motivated offender (Palmer, 2003).

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The development of Rational Choice Perspective to include situational factors marks a distinct difference between the older, ‘thin’ versions of Rational Choice and the newer ‘thick’ models (Felson, 1993) and allows further consideration of the factors that may affect a decision-making process outside of the economic viewpoint of the classical approach. Cornish (1993) points out that the Rational Choice Perspective is concerned with the criminal event (committing an offence) rather than a theory of criminal involvement (or how an individual could become sensitised to or first involved in crime), and as such, the Rational Choice Perspective dovetails well with theories of offending that describe a dispositional involvement approach. Recent work has been undertaken to develop this idea of dovetailing theories further, for example, incorporating the idea of social norms into the model (Scott, 2000). Social norms can be viewed as socialised preferences within an individual that affect their decision making, and therefore feed into the rational choice to offend or otherwise. The central tenet of a Rational Choice Perspective of crime that offenders are active, rational beings encourages us as researchers to find out exactly what an individual’s subjective perceptions of costs and benefits are. In addition, we will need to explore whether the Rational Choice Perspective sufficiently explains all (or most) crimes, committed by all (or most) people. Furthermore, if we can understand why an offending decision is made, then it should be possible to work with people to help them understand their thinking process, and potentially alter their decision making. This book and the research it covers aims to do just that—help us understand the offending decision-making process, and relate this back to the Rational Choice Perspective. Of course, there is a wealth of previous research within the area, and that will be covered too. In doing so, it becomes clear that all offenders and offences are different—moreover, some offences appear to fit into a rational construct more easily than others. Offences which are violent, aggressive or affective in nature may challenge the rationality explanation of offence decision making. All of these aspects of decision making, and offending, will be explored, and some interesting data emerges.

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Related Ideas Before we explore these complexities, it is worth reiterating that the idealised decision-making environment proposed in original ‘thin’ versions of the Rational Choice Perspective is not present within real life, and that real-life decisions are affected by all sorts of things. When the theory is applied to real people, and real offenders, it is difficult to assume that decisions are made in this fully informed manner and that any individual could possibly process and be aware of every possible factor that may affect the outcome. This leads us to the concept of ‘bounded rationality’ (Cornish & Clarke, 1986) or ‘limited rationality’ (Simon, 1978) as described above, suggesting that just as important as the possible costs and benefits to a decision, is the availability of information to the decision maker in their context. For ‘boundedness’, we can read the reality of life, as well as the less-than-ideal circumstances a decision maker may find themselves in. Just as well, as developing a theoretical perspective that did not apply to real life and real people would not be of much use in the real world. We should also remember that as well as weighing up the costs and benefits of any action, a person will be subject to a whole range of internal (cognitive and affective) influences as well as social influences. While the Rational Choice Perspective seems to focus on the internal aspects of a decision such as how we think and feel, it does not seem at first to account for the latter (external or social influences). There are a wide range of criminological theories that focus their lens on these social and ‘external’ influences. For example, the Control Theory (described earlier) of crime (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990), like Rational Choice Theory, depicts offenders as rational beings, who can decide to conform to societal norms, or decide to not conform, based on the level of ‘control’ they are subject to. This control is seen as originating through attachments to others, such as family, limitations on time due to legitimate pastimes such as school or work, a commitment to a legal means of achieving goals, such as education and additionally the internal attitude towards illegal attitudes in general. Control Theorists such as Box (1981) will argue that in order for an individual to be free to decide to commit a crime, these levels of control must be low, and also the potential offender must be in possession of the skill, means and willingness to

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act. Although Control Theory considers what is happening around the offender, unlike classical Rational Choice Theory, the individual is still viewed as a rational agent, influenced by these controlling forces. What Control Theory does not do however, is to describe the internal process by which an individual enters into a particular criminal event (Hirschi, 1986), instead it is limited to describing a set of circumstances that make a decision to offend, or the propensity to offend, more likely. This potentially leads back to the use of the Rational Choice Perspective in order to understand the process of any decision to offend (or decision not to) and which factors eventually affect the outcome of this process. So, Control Theory may set out the circumstances that may free up an individual to consider illegal activity, and Rational Choice Theory may be useful in thinking about exactly how that decision to offend is made. Another approach, Social Learning Theory, adds to the debate by suggesting how the ‘criminal’ option in any decision may become an option for consideration at all. Why is it that some people would never even consider committing a crime as an option and others do? Social Learning Theory sees individual behaviour as being the outcome of an individual’s learning within a social context. Individuals base how they behave, and react, on observations of others, family, friends and neighbours, for example (Sutherland & Cressey, 1974). Behaviours are then reinforced by being practised and tested out. There is a body of evidence to support this approach. For example, evidence suggests that children who witness violent behaviour are more likely to display violent behaviour as an adult (Widom, 1989a, 1989b). Whereas Rational Choice Theorists may criticise this viewpoint as deterministic (that is the individual will repeat what they have observed without any free will), it can be argued that far from this being the case, social learning may equip an individual with the ‘tools’ to behave in a particular way, though how they eventually behave is determined by the individual themselves. This school of thought may apply where there are cases of offences that appear to occur without any prior planning or decision making. It is possible to understand how a particular behaviour (such as violence) could occur in a given situation, where an individual has witnessed violence being used in similar circumstances before (Owens & Strauss, 1975).

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There is of course, a lot more to the above theoretical approaches and we have not even begun to explore the research and theoretical complexity developed within each approach. However, even as rudimentary as it is, the picture painted, of Control Theory, and Learning Theory, helps us position the viewpoint of the Rational Choice Perspective. Beginning to understand that a decision to commit a crime, if one can said to be taken, will be affected by the societal controls and proximal influences around the individual is helpful if the Rational Choice Perspective is to be useful in a real-world context. Traditionally, the things that affect this decision, the costs and benefits, have been described in limited, material terms, with monetary gain being the most salient ‘benefit’, and punishment (e.g. imprisonment) the most salient cost. The view that a change in sentencing policy to impose more serious penalties for a particular type of crime will affect people’s decision to commit that crime follows from this idea. More modern Rational Choice Perspective will expand the conceptualisation of these basic costs and benefits to an action, and can try and account for crime by considering social context, as well as the peculiarities of individual action and decision making, in particular the values and motivations pertinent to the individual offender. Only by developing an understanding of the values and goals of the person, can the person’s decision making be understood. As these values and goals are unique to the individual, then the costs and benefits perceived or expected by the individual are just as important to our understanding, if not more so, than the actual rewards or penalties the decision maker may end up facing. Let’s flip that idea on its head for a moment. The costs and rewards of committing a crime, could be evaluated by a decision maker as being beneficial enough that it is worth the risk, but the opposite is also true. The individual may decide one time, or for a large number of times, that the potential costs outweigh (for them) the benefits. Again, perception of costs and benefits will be identified based on a person’s individual values and overall goals. These individual values and goals have also been identified as really important to the success (or otherwise) of people who are trying to move along their journey of desistance, that is the moving away from crime and criminality (Maruna et al., 2004). People who are trying or hoping to decrease or cease their criminal behaviour will have

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their own individual motivations for this, just like each person committing a crime will have their own unique motivations deciding whether or not to commit crime. Although this book is not focused on those stopping committing crime as complete change of lifestyle (desistance), the recognition that sometimes the weighing up of options will lead to deciding to not offend is relevant. Some of the other important elements of desistance research are important here too. The concept of agency, for example, is central. The idea that a person sees themselves as having the power to effect change for themselves is key to the journey away from an offending lifestyle (ibid.) but also relates back to the previous consideration of how some criminal individuals don’t see themselves as having a lot of options to choose from. Another key element in desistance research is the concept of social capital (Sampson & Laub, 1992), the level to which a person has meaningful ties with their immediate and proximate social group. The idea that someone with strong family/education/work bonds is less likely to commit an offence relates back to earlier mentions of Control Theory, and the factors that make someone more likely to see crime as an option in the first place. In short, evidence exploring the decisions that people make to stop committing crime, is just as pertinent to a Rational Choice Perspective as exploring the reasons that they do decide to commit crime (if indeed such a decision takes place). The ways in which these two bodies of evidence are linked are important, and need further exploration, but first we must try and establish if a Rational Choice Perspective of crime has sufficient validity. That is the core reason for this research and this book. In order to establish this, it is important to remember exactly what functionality a theory like this should have. To be valid as a perspective that views crime as being as an outcome of a decision, that validity must apply to a range of offences (e.g. shoplifting assault, fraud), a range of individuals (young and old, men and women) in a whole range of circumstances. If available information (Rational Choice Theories) levels of control (Control Theory) or variations in experience (Social Learning Theory) can differ from time to time, it is the real-time factors that must be pertinent to any decision-making process.

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Something to Think About When Researching Crime Researching crime is quite difficult in some ways. It is impossible, never mind unethical, for a researcher to observe and explore the decision, then action, of someone committing an offence as it happens. Researchers must therefore try and use various proxies to this access. One of the ways of doing this, particularly when researching how criminals think about crime, is to ask people how they would feel about, or how likely they would be, to commit a crime in particular circumstances. This type of research is done frequently with a student or college population (such as Tibbetts, 1997). The reasons for this are obvious—these populations are easily accessible to most researchers and are usually more than willing to participate in research with the academics that teach them. Though this approach is convenient, there have to be concerns about the ecological validity of comparing a student’s potential estimation of their future behaviour with the real-life criminal experiences of a person in real-life circumstances. That is not to say that the findings of this type of research are not useful—we know for example that ‘intention to offend’ as an estimated likelihood of doing so is in fact correlated with actual later offending (Tibbetts, 1997). This is helpful, but again intention to offend does not always equal future offending, especially when the students estimating their intention to offend are in qualitatively different circumstances from most real-life offenders.1 An ‘intention’ to offend reported by a student presented with hypothetical scenarios is qualitatively different from an offenders’ ‘intention’ to offend within a real-life situation. If the Rational Choice Perspective is to have real and meaningful applications to the study of criminal decision making, it must explain actual offending decisions made by various offending individuals, at the time the decisions are made. That is not to say that learning from these proxy studies will be dismissed—insights gained in this way have been and continue to be 1 Students who are engaged in education may be far less likely to commit an offence in real life. The estimated intention to offend in certain theoretical circumstances cannot feel as real as someone deciding to actually commit a real-world crime.

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useful, they just cannot be the whole of Rational Choice crime research. Both the results of these hypothetical decision studies, as well as research using those with lived experience of committing crime will be explored here in an effort to present an overview of the current state of understanding and knowledge in this area. Having done this, and the main point of this book and the research within it, is to see whether what we think we know about the RCP of crime actually seems to apply to a wide range of real-life crimes, criminals and circumstances. That is, do real-life criminals make an active decision to participate in criminal behaviour? These decisions will vary hugely, in nature (what type of offence), timing, circumstances and so on. A real-world offending decision, if it can be said to take place, will inevitably be made in a different set of circumstances from a hypothetical decision, and the decision maker themselves may have their decision-making process affected in very different ways (due to time or peer pressure, or urgent need, etc.) to the factors that may feed into a decision-making process in a hypothetical situation. Staying with the definition of ‘offending decision’ for a moment, it is also useful to look at the different types of decision that are potentially involved in the committing (or otherwise) of a criminal offence, but that would all have slightly different applications of a decision-making analysis. Paternoster (1989) notes that individuals may make many different types of decisions about their offending, and that each of these different types of decisions may be affected to a greater or lesser extent by different factors. For example, the decision to first become involved in offending, what Paternoster calls the ‘initial participatory decision’ is potentially qualitatively different from what Paternoster defines as a ‘current participatory decision’. The first of these is a choice whether to become involved in crime in general (to commit their first ever crime), and the second to become involved in a particular crime event. If in fact, an individual does make what could be described as a decision to become ‘involved’ in crime, this would be a distinct deliberation from a decision to commit an actual offence and relates back to Cornish and Clarke’s (1986) description of Rational Choice Theory as being concerned with the criminal event, rather than a theory of criminal ‘involvement’. It is interesting to make this distinction, while recognising that in real life, the distinction

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between these types of decisions may be more theoretical than realistic. After all, the first time a crime is committed, there would theoretically be a decision of criminal involvement as well as criminal event, and this decision of criminal involvement may be seen to apply again after a period of non-offending say, (do I want to get back into this again?) or when a different type of crime is being considered. It may be better to conceptualise a decision of criminal involvement as one factor feeding into the decision about the criminal event. That is, not having done it before may make someone more (or less) cautious about planning or becoming involved in their first crime—so it is a decision factor rather a standalone consideration, and in practice it is unlikely that someone would deliberate over these factors separately. This aside, whether an individual makes a decision to commit a criminal offence (the event) for the first time, or for the 101st time, Rational Choice Perspective suggests that a decision is made in each case, and that this decision is made up of the person weighing up their perceived costs and benefits of that action. In addition, these perceived costs and benefits could be different each time a decision to offend takes place, requiring a fresh decision to be made. This has been a very quick overview of the different elements of a Rational Choice Perspective on crime, but as we develop a deeper understanding of the research that has been done in the area, these ideas will become more fully fleshed out. Considerable research has gone into the application of Rational Choice Perspective to criminal decision making, which the next chapter will review. By looking further at the findings, we can begin to explore the value, validity and applicability that the RCP has to real-life offences. Later, the book will go on to look at the current research which attempts to uncover the real level of evidence that a decision takes place, what contributes to it and how useful the approach is for a wide range of crimes and people that commit crimes. The research in the next chapter focuses on what was defined earlier here as the ‘current participatory offence’ (Paternoster, 1989) rather than looking at a person’s first decision to get involved in crime. However, rather than using the ‘current participatory offence’ to suggest that the decision to commit a crime is made ‘in the moment’ or immediately before the criminal event, the review of literature and the current research

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is interested in all the decision making leading up to the event. For some people, this decision making could be seen to start hours, days or weeks in advance of the actual event. Therefore, the term ‘offending decision’ will be used to describe any thought process or decision-making calculus related to the commission of a crime. The next chapter will look at existing literature and research examining findings concerning the ‘offending decision’ associated with a range of offence types.

References Ahlstrom, W. W., & Havighurst, R. J. (1970). 400 losers. Jersey Banks. Akers, R. L. (1990). Rational choice, deterrence and social learning theory in criminology. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 81, 653–676. Banfield, E. C. (1968). The unheavenly city revisited . Little, Brown. Becker, G. (1968). Crime and punishment—An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76 , 169–217. Bernard, T. J., & Snipes, J. B. (1996). Theoretical integration in criminology. Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, 20, 301–348. Bouffard, J., & Wolf, K. (2007). Rational choice theory: A crime related perspective. In G. Ritzer (Ed.), Blackwell encyclopaedia of sociology. Blackwell. Box, S. (1981). Deviance, reality and society. Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Braithwaite, J. (1989). Crime, shame and reintegration. Cambridge University Press. Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social change and crime rate trends: A routine activity approach. American Sociological Review, 44, 588–608. Cornish, D. (1993). Theories of action in criminological: Learning theory and rational choice approaches. In R. Clarke & M. Felson (Eds.), Routine activity and rational choice: Advances in criminological theory. Transaction Publishers. Cornish, D., & Clarke, R. (1986). The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer-Verlag. Cornish, D., & Clarke, R. (1987). Understanding crime displacement: An application of rational choice theory. Criminology, 25 (4), 933–947. Elliot, D., Huizinga, D., & Ageton, S. S. (1985). Explaining delinquency and drug use. Sage. Eysenck, H. J. (1977). Crime and personality (3rd ed.). Routledge & Kegan Paul.

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Farrell, G. (2010). Situational crime prevention and its discontents: Rational choice and harm reduction versus ‘cultural criminology.’ Social Policy and Administration, 44 (1), 40–66. Felson, M. (1986). Linking criminal choices, routine activities, informal control and criminal outcomes. In D. Cornish & R. Clarke (Eds.), The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer Verlag. Felson, M. (1993). Review of ‘choosing crime’ by K. Tunnell. American Journal of Sociology, 98, 1497–1499. Felson, M. (2002). Crime and everyday life. Sage. Garland, D. (1990). Punishment and modern society: A study in social theory. University of Chicago Press. Gottfredson, M. R., & Hirschi, T. (1990). A general theory of crime. Stanford University Press. Hechter, M., & Kanazawa, S. (1997). Sociological rational choice theory. Annual Review of Sociology, 23, 191–214. Hirschi, T. (1986). The compatibility of rational choice theory and social control theories of crime. In D. Cornish & R. Clarke (Eds.), The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer Verlag. Jacob, H. (1979). Rationality and criminality. Social Science Quarterly, 59, 584– 585. Jones, D. W. (2008). Understanding criminal behaviour: Psychosocial approaches to criminality. Willan Publishing. Loughran, T. A., Paternoster, R., Chalfin, A., & Wilson, T. (2016). Can rational choice be considered a general theory of crime? Evidence from individual-level panel data. Criminology, 54 (1), 86–112. Maruna, S., LeBel, T., Mitchel, N., & Naples, M. (2004). Pygmalion in the reintegration process: Desistance from crime through the looking glass. Psychology, Crime and Law, 10 (3), 271–281. Matsueda, R. (2006). Criminological implications of the thought of George Herbert Mead. In M. Deftem (Ed.), Sociological theory and criminological research: Views from Europe and the United States. Elsevier Science. McGuire, J. (2004). Understanding psychology and crime. Open University Press. Mehlkop, G., & Graeff, P. (2010). Modelling a rational choice theory of criminal action: Subjective expected utilities, norms and interactions. Rationality and Society, 22, 189. Moran, R. (1996). Book review: Bringing rational choice theory back to reality (a review of ‘Burglars on the job’ by Wright and Decker). The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 86 (3), 1147–1160.

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Owens, D. J., & Strauss, M. A. (1975). The social structure of violence in childhood and approval of violence as an adult. Aggressive Behaviour, 1, 193– 211. Palmer, E. (2003). Offending behaviour: Moral reasoning, criminal conduct and the rehabilitation of offenders. Willan Publishing. Paternoster, R. (1989). Decisions to participate in and desist from four types of common delinquency: Deterrence and the rational choice perspective. Law and Society Review, 23(1), 7–40. Reckless, W. C. (1967). The crime problem (4th ed.). Appleton Century-Crofts. Rock, P. (2002). Sociological theories of crime. In M. Maguire, R. Morgan, & R. Reiner (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of criminology. Oxford University Press. Rotenberg, M., & Nachson, I. (1979). Impulsiveness and aggression among Israeli delinquents. British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 18, 59– 63. Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalised expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 80 (609), 1–28. Sampson, R., & Laub, J. (1992). Crime and deviance in the life course. Annual Review of Sociology, 18, 63–84. Scott, R. E. (2000). The limits of behavioural theories of law and social norms. Virginia Law Review, 86 , 1603–1648. Short, J. F. (1979). On the etiology of delinquent behaviour. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 16 , 28–33. Simon, H. A. (1978). Rationality as a process and product of thought. American Economic Review, 8, 1–11. Sutherland, E., & Cressey, D. R. (1974). Criminality (7th ed.). Lippincott. Thornberry, T. P. (1987). Towards an interactional theory of delinquency. Criminology, 25, 863–891. Tibbetts, S. (1997). Shame and rational choice in offending decisions. Criminal Justice and Behaviour, 24 (2), 234–255. Vila, B. (1994). A general paradigm for understanding criminal behaviour: Extending evolutional ecological theory. Criminology, 32, 311–360. Widom, C. S. (1989a). The cycle of violence. Science, 244, 160–166. Widom, C. S. (1989b). Does violence beget violence? A critical examination of the literature. Psychological Bulletin, 106 (1), 3–28. Wikström, P. O. (2006). Individuals, settings, and acts of crime: Situational mechanisms and the explanation of crime. In P. O. H. Wikström & R. Sampson (Eds.), The explanation of crime: Context, mechanisms and development. Cambridge University Press.

2 What Has the Rational Choice Perspective Told Us About Crime

In order to examine how useful the Rational Choice Perspective has been in explaining crime, we will take a look at previous studies done in the area, to see the conclusions that a range of researchers have come up with. Rational Choice has been applied to various types of offence, ranging from crimes with a clear and easy to identify ‘outcome’ such as shoplifting and burglary, to more impulsive or emotional, violent offences. Cornish and Clarke recommended a crime-specific model of Rational Choice (1987). Using this idea as a starting point, the following chapter will look at studies examining different crime types, including everything from common illegal behaviours such as speeding (Corbett & Simon, 1992), to offences such as sexual offences (Beauregard & LeClerc, 2007). It will include crimes that clearly aim to get money or goods, versus those that seem to have no (easily observable) benefits for the individual whatsoever. To start with, we should consider a type of antisocial behaviour that many people will have taken part in (whether they have been caught or not)—driving offences.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Steele, Exploring the Criminal Decision Process, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46231-3_2

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Driving Offences Driving offences, such as speeding, are relatively common and are behaviours that many drivers are guilty of at some point. A study by Corbett and Simon (1992) was interested in seeing what reasons drivers may give for choosing not to adhere to the rules of the road. From a sample of questionnaires and interviews, the researchers were able to identify the reasons why people would, and would not, obey driving law. All the drivers expressed that they wanted to avoid formal penalties for their behaviour, but frequent offenders estimated a lower probability of apprehension than those who offended less often. Those that admitted breaking driving law more frequently also admitted to a wider range of illegal driving behaviours. So, it would seem that some of the drivers perceive the chances of being caught as low, which factored into their decision making. One other interesting finding was that the drivers may see their driving offences as being qualitatively different from ‘real’ offences (so they did not feel like criminals), and that this feeling may be a function of the behaviour being contained in the comfort of the driver’s own vehicle, often alone, and with very low real likelihood of being caught. So, in the terms of the Rational Choice Perspective, you could say that these drivers saw the potential costs (i.e. getting caught) as very low, but the benefits as being immediate and relatively desirable (such as getting there faster, and convenience). This certainly fits within the core assumptions of a RC approach. It is interesting to also look at the sample that was used for the study—in which almost half of the participants were under the age of twenty-five, as we know that youth correlates with lower self-control, and research has confirmed that lower self-control is closely linked to offending behaviour (Jolls et al., 1998). The idea that we assign a probability of what may happen to us (rather than it being a straight 50/50 split—it will, or it won’t happen) is key to the decision-making model of the Rational Choice Perspective. In the above study, a judgement was made of not only what the penalty may be, but also how likely it would be that it would happen. This is a feature of many of the studies that have applied Rational Choice Perspective to criminal decision making, as we shall see as we look further into the existing research. It is also important to note that the benefits in these

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circumstances were not related to money, but were described as payoffs for the driver in terms of convenience (getting there faster) and the excitement gained by driving too fast. These benefits are clearly valid to the research participants, but are a departure from the original, economically rooted forms of the Rational Choice approach, and is the first stage is recognising that the ranges of both costs and benefits of an action can be far wider than just monetary reward, and are supportive of the more modern iterations of the RCP.

Shoplifting Offences Another study that suggests that offenders do not particularly consider the potential ‘official’ costs of a crime is a study of shoplifters (Schlueter et al., 1989). The researchers interviewed more than one hundred and thirty shoplifters. Many of the participants were employed in white collar roles, female and categorised as ‘middle class’, and as such may not fit the usual profile of a shoplifter. The typical outcome of a shoplifting offence, to obtain goods or goods to sell for profit, did not seem to apply to this particular group who were, by and large, bringing in an income. The researchers interviewed these shoplifters, examining the narrative for evidence of rational thought, creating in the end two categories of rational and non-rational offenders. Those categorised as rational described having a clear goal for their behaviour. For some, this was indeed monetary, but many other reasons were identified including wanting the challenge, the convenience (not wanting to wait in a long queue) and as a form of ‘revenge’ against the store for a perceived slight. The remaining individuals interviewed, categorised as either ‘nonrational’ or ‘mixed’ by the researchers, were likely to blame illness, anxiety or emotional instability for their behaviour, rather than having a clearly defined goal. Another study of shoplifters took a slightly different approach (Carroll & Weaver, 1986), in taking both experienced and beginner (novice) shoplifters to a store, and asking them to walk around and report their thinking about potentially shoplifting there. They found that the individuals did an initial risk assessment of potentially being

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caught, but that this was set aside once the individuals had focused on the item they would like to steal. Interestingly, the ‘expert’ more experienced shoplifters went through a more robust analysis of the strategies they would use to successfully complete the offence, perhaps testament to their previous experience. All of the shoplifters were well aware of the penalties should they be caught but this did not significantly feature in their decision-making process, especially for the experienced shoplifters. Once again the application of the RCP to shoplifting suggests that some form of decision is being made, that this decision was weighted more by potential benefit while costs were not as fully considered. It is worth noting that this is not because the individuals were unaware of the potential penalties, but because they appeared to mentally set them aside. Expertise also seemed to make a difference, and although there must be a caveat here that for this study, this was self-reported by the shoplifters themselves, but even considering this, previous experience does seem to affect the decision-making process. For the shoplifters in these studies, there does seem to be a decisionmaking process taking place. While money was one of the listed benefits, participants also listed other benefits. Excitement, rising to a challenge, settling a grudge and convenience have all been listed, while potential apprehension seems to be less of a concern. This limitation on consideration of costs is a theme that emerges within studies of Rational Choice and crime in other offence categories, for example, burglary (see below). In the shoplifting study above, Carroll and Weaver (1986) compare the decision making of novice and expert shoplifters—and begin to illustrate how time and experience can change how a person makes decisions. This is an important point to note. As a person ages and matures, and gains experience, we are likely to change our decision-making calculus. It is therefore important to note that those committing crime are no different, and a young and/or inexperienced individual may well make a qualitatively different decision about committing a crime to a more mature or more experienced criminal, even in similar circumstances. These changes in decision making will be explored later.

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Burglary Offences Moving on from shoplifting to another acquisitive crime, Wright and Decker’s (1994) extensive research on burglars helps to further clarify the decision-making process that criminals go through. The research aimed to identify the decision-making process of burglars by specifying the costs and benefits that were considered, adding in to the calculus the concept of ‘mental space’—or the time they actually gave to considering an aspect of the burglary. Unlike some other studies, these participants were all people with real offending experience, and as part of the research, were taken back to a recent crime site in order to help them recall their thought processes at the time of the offence. The results suggest that burglars could specify their expected benefits of a burglary easily. Monetary gain, drugs, social standing and keeping up appearances were all cited by respondents as desirable. The burglars also had a good understanding of the potential costs of their behaviour, and, possibly based on personal experience of the justice system, could realistically predict what would happen should they be caught. Despite this understanding, most of the burglars said that they just tried not to think about being caught, and focused on getting the job done. They chose not to devote too much thinking time or mental space to the possible negative outcomes. It is also interesting to note that although burglary as an acquisitive crime seems to have easily identified benefits (at least to the observer) of money and goods to sell, that the burglars also identified other non-tangible benefits such as increased social standing and ‘keeping up appearances’ as being strongly motivational. Burglars were also the people of interest for Shover and Honaker (1992) who wanted to study the rational decision making of a group of offenders classed as ‘persistent property offenders’ (p. 276). The burglars were asked to focus on remembering how their decision to offend played out, and provide detailed descriptions of the possible risks and rewards that they considered as part of the process. Most of those interviewed admitted giving very little thought to being arrested and again, focused on what they would gain from the offence. It is worth a methodological note that the burglars interviewed in this study, like in many other studies, were recalling their offences, and self-reporting their own

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thoughts and feelings. It may be possible that their recall was inaccurate, especially if it had been a considerable amount of time since the offence happened (for example, some of the men in this study had just spent a considerable period in prison). There also may be issues with self-report in any type of research—interviewees can exaggerate or play certain things down at times which always needs to be recognised. That said, once again the study shows that even very experienced property offenders give little truck to thinking about arrest and other formal sanctions, just like the burglars in Wright and Decker’s study (1994) and the driving offenders and shoplifters discussed earlier. The driving offenders talked about not factoring formal costs into their decision making, seeing the likelihood of these as very low and therefore making a favourable risk assessment. The burglars seemed to skip this risk assessment completely, and simply chose to ignore the possibility of formal costs. Staying with burglary, Nee and Meenaghan (2006) interviewed criminals with a particular interest in how experience or expertise affected their decision making about offending. Fifty burglars from the UK were asked to talk through their burglary from the initial decision right through to the conclusion of the offence. Their narratives were analysed for elements of concentration. The results suggested that the burglars used their skilled judgement in appraisal of the offence and used their expertise to help them carry out a successful offence. The recognition of cues, speed and autonomy of decision making found in the burglars’ decision-making process is comparable to studies of expertise in other fields. The idea of expertise in criminal decision making is an important element when investigating the RCP of crime. Expertise in any area of skill represents a depth of understanding and experience that an individual can draw on to help them make faster, and better decisions. Expertise in committing crime is no different, and must affect the decisions made by expert burglars. This incorporation of an individual’s characteristics, such as a developed skill set or expertise is a significant development to Rational Choice Theory and the decision calculus seen to be taking place: after all, a confidence in your own abilities to successfully complete an offence, based on previous experience would be a strong influence in undertaking another burglary.

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Corporate Crime Developing our understanding of the RCP of crime further, corporate criminals were the focus of a study by Paternoster and Simpson (1993). Conducted in Australia, their research looked at how over two hundred CEOs felt about the potential for discovery and punishment should they violate workplace rules. The research found that the idea of formal punishment did not seem to be a deterrent, but informal costs such as loss of reputation, moral costs and poor conscience were far more offputting when considering committing a workplace crime. Of course this research was a hypothetical study (the CEOs had no ‘real-life’ experience of committing these crimes) but even for this group, personal and reputational costs were much more effective at preventing criminal behaviour than the likelihood of being caught and formally punished.

Aggravated Vehicle Taking—‘Carjacking’ A very different scenario to corporate crime is the street crime commonly known (particularly in the USA) as Carjacking—otherwise known as aggravated vehicle taking (Jacobs et al., 2003). This study included interviewing twenty-eight individuals with real experience of carjacking, having committed the crime of stealing occupied cars with force. The research looked at the decisions made by these offenders (all men) who cited the benefits of this offence as follows: cars are relatively easy to sell, and the offence is quick to execute. One of the most interesting findings from this study was the speed with which these men made their decisions to offend. These decisions were very much shaped by the immediate surroundings that the men were in at the time and complex judgements were made in almost no time at all. Jacobs et al. (ibid.) suggest that this is possible by using what they refer to as ‘perceptual shorthand’ representing a range of thinking shortcuts based on previous experience. If the decision-making process is sped up by ‘thinking’ shortcuts, then there would be less time available for alternative action to be considered. These thinking shortcuts are known as heuristics and will be covered in more

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depth further on in this book. It is worth considering again the situations in which these men were making their offending decisions. The researchers describe how they found that carjacking was, for these men, embedded in a wider street culture that they were members of. This culture prioritised hedonistic pleasure, excitement and a steady turnover of cash in order to maintain this lifestyle. These elements are all clearly related to the perceived benefits of carjacking, therefore the culture and the offending are mutually supportive, and this would be a large factor in deciding to commit an offence. Of course, this research was a small sample in one particular area but illustrates nicely how an offending decision can be shaped by the circumstances that the offending individual is in, and that these circumstances or situations can shape decision making.

Robbery A similar finding was discovered in a study on robbers by Feeney (1986). From interviews with people who had committed street robbery, the results suggested that the robbers felt their past experience was a good substitute for planning for an offence, and therefore sped up their decisions. This is a similar concept to the ‘perceptual shorthand’ identified above. In addition, while the largest motivation for the robbers was obtaining money, they also cited revenge and excitement as common benefits of the offence. Very few of those interviewed had what Feeney described as a detailed ‘planned approach’ and only a few more said they gave any thought to being caught. Some of those in the sample had committed so many offences that their wealth of previous experience acted entirely as a substitute for forward planning.

Identity Theft Copes and Vieraitis (2009) interviewed almost sixty individuals who had been prosecuted for identity theft-related crimes and reviewed their decision-making process. Unsurprisingly, they found that the main

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motivator for people committing these types of offences was money— claiming that it was far easier to make large sums of money, more so than any other form of theft. For many of these individuals, they had been led into these offences by a desire for a party lifestyle, similar to the carjacking offenders described above. Many also had addictions to alcohol or drugs and needed the funds to maintain this addition. Like the burglars described above, most did not give any thought to the risks of being caught, stating that probability as low, and feeling that their own skills and expertise were out of reach of incompetent law enforcement who could not keep up. These individuals also expressed a moral superiority to those who commit street robbery or other types of theft, claiming that as they never directly hurt people (which they saw as morally wrong), they are less guilty.

Violent Offences The idea of expertise in criminal decision making was also evident from a study on violent offenders in St Louis (Topalli, 2005). A group of active violent offenders, a group of non-offenders from the local area and a group of college students were asked to look at a moving light display which could be interpreted as different situations. A complex analysis suggests that the violent offending group had a particular way of interpreting things, based on their previous experience and expertise. Topalli suggested that expertise for these individuals is a combination of perceptual skill and procedural knowledge. The idea of the ‘expert’ violent offender may seem at odds with the idea of the stereotype of the impulsive, angry violent offender, an interesting idea which will come up again later.

Sex Offenders Another group of offenders traditionally seen as impulsive and irrational (Pithers, 1990) were the subject of a study by Beauregard and LeClerc (2007) who aimed to apply the Rational Choice Perspective to

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the offending process of sex offenders. The rewards of such an offence could not be conceptualised as monetary but were described in this study as being related to fulfilment of fantasy, desire for power and sexual gratification. From interviews with almost seventy sex offenders in Canada, (cross-checked with police records), responses were classified into three phases. These were the pre-offence phase, the criminal event phase and the post-event phase. Results suggested that there was evidence of rationality at each stage (although the decision-making process was bounded) but that decisions were definitely being made at each stage in the process. Despite the general perception that sex offenders must be emotionally driven and impulsive, fewer than 35% of this sample showed no element of pre-planning. Decisions about offending were altered at each stage by situational factors including assessment of risk and suitability of the victim. These individual preferences on victim and risk will affect the individual decision-making process, potentially resulting in a different outcome in each case.

Conducting Studies on Rational Choice and Offending Most of the research described so far has used individuals with real-life experience of offending as their sample. Of course, while this allows researchers access to real offending experiences, there is always the chance (as mentioned earlier) that the person’s recall of their crimes is faulty, or indeed that they could embellish or play down their actions. In order to improve recall, various researchers have attempted to reinstate the circumstances of the offence in a safe way. For example, Carroll and Weaver (1986) and Wright and Decker (1994) introduced the method of placing the offender at a real, or potential, scene of an offence in order to try and capture thoughts about offending in the current circumstances, rather than ask about previous ones. There is still of course potential for response bias, and findings may be less accurate if the potential offenders are not in the same emotional state as they would be in a real-life situation (as the offence is hypothetical) which could impact their thinking process. In addition, in any research project involving real-life offenders,

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sampling is always an issue. Getting access to those who have committed crimes can be challenging, not to mention fraught with ethical issues and it may also be difficult to obtain a sufficient sample size. To overcome these issues, other researchers have tried to approach the problem in a different way. As mentioned earlier, one way is to use non-offenders as subjects, often college or university students (as these students are easily accessible to academics) using what is known as a ‘scenario’ method. Participants are presented with a scenario or vignette describing a particular set of circumstances and their reactions to these circumstances are examined in relation to other factors, such as personal characteristics. One example of a study like this is Tibbetts (1997), who was interested in the effects of shame on students’ estimation of their likelihood of offending. In a survey of more than six hundred students, scenarios including likely drink driving and shoplifting were presented. The students were asked to rate the likelihood that they would behave in the same way as the characters in the scenarios, and their responses were measured. They (the students) were also asked if they felt their self-esteem would be impacted if their ‘offence’ was discovered, or not discovered, alongside measuring propensity to feel shame. The outcomes of the research suggested that those students who expected to feel shame as an outcome of their behaviour took this into account when making a decision about whether to offend or not. Feelings of guilt, embarrassment and actual experiences of shame were also found to be pertinent to the students’ estimations of offending in given scenarios. The extent to which these costs exerted influence on the offending decision appeared to vary between (proxy) offender, and (proxy) offence. This again lends credence to the view that each offending decision is based on a balancing of potential costs and benefits. In this instance, internal sanctions such as feeling shame or feeling that one’s morals had been compromised were effective deterrents for shoplifting, whereas the students felt that external sanctions such as arrest and prosecution were more effective for drink driving. Another study, using high school students as participants (Paternoster, 1989) also found that decisions to commit their first ever offence (described earlier as the initial participatory decision) was almost entirely

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unrelated to the students’ perceived severity and certainty of punishment. Once again, the research suggested that non-formal and internal sanctions were the biggest deterrent, for example, moral beliefs, parental supervision levels and social activities were more influential on the decision to offend than the chance of official punishment. So, the idea that formal costs are not really made a feature in the offending decision seems to be a theme in both research with people with real-life offending experience, as well as those taking part in hypothetical scenario studies. Likelihood and certainty of apprehension and punishment do not tend to feature in the decision-making process to any great extent, whereas factors such as expectation of shame and countering your own moral beliefs could be more effective as a deterrent. These internally imposed deterrents also featured in a large study of college students (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993). Almost seven hundred students were presented with a questionnaire describing in great detail a crime, and the circumstances around it. These scenarios described theft, drink driving and sexual assault. The students were asked to rate the probability that they would commit the crime described in the scenario and this was correlated with measures of self-control, and shame. Based on the results, the researchers suggested that these ‘internally imposed functions’ such as propensity to shame, ‘present orientation’ and weak social bonds directly or indirectly affected intention to offend.

Chapter Summary This chapter has given an overview of some of the various studies that have applied a Rational Choice Perspective to various difference offence types, and each raises a range of interesting considerations, not least the way in which research such as this is conducted. The following chapter looks at this in more detail, and sets out some reasoning for the research approach and methodology underpinning the study that forms the core of this book.

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References Beauregard, E., & LeClerc, E. (2007). An application of the Rational Choice approach to the offending process of sex offenders: A closer look at the decision making. Sexual Abuse, 19 (2), 115–133. Carroll, J., & Weaver, F. (1986). Shoplifters’ perceptions of crime opportunities: A process tracing study. In D. Cornish & R. Clarke (Eds.), The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer Verlag. Copes, H., & Vieraitis, L. M. (2009). Understanding identity theft: Offenders’ accounts of their lives and crimes. Criminal Justice Review, 34 (3), 329–349. Corbett, C., & Simon, F. (1992). Decisions to break or adhere to the rules of the road, viewed from the rational choice perspective. British Journal of Criminology, 32(4), 537–549. Cornish, D., & Clarke, R. (1987). Understanding crime displacement: An application of rational choice theory. Criminology, 25 (4), 933–947. Feeney, F. (1986). Robbers as decision makers. In D. Cornish & R. Clarke (Eds.), The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer Verlag. Jacobs, J., Topalli, V., & Wright, R. (2003). Car-jacking, street life and offender motivation. British Journal of Criminology, 43, 673–688. Jolls, C., Sunstein, C. R., & Thaler, R. (1998). Behavioural approaches to law and economics. Stanford Law Review, 50, 1471–1550. Nagin, D., & Paternoster, R. (1993). Enduring individual differences and rational choice theories of crime. Law and Society Review, 27 (3), 467–496. Nee, C., & Meenaghan, A. (2006). Expert decision making in burglars. British Journal of Criminology, 46 , 935–949. Paternoster, R. (1989). Decisions to participate in and desist from four types of common delinquency: Deterrence and the rational choice perspective. Law and Society Review, 23(1), 7–40. Paternoster, R., & Simpson, S. (1993). A rational choice theory of corporate crime. In R. Clarke & M. Felson (Eds.), Routine activity and rational choice: Advances in criminological theory. Transaction Publishers. Pithers, W. (1990). Relapse prevention with sexual aggressors: A method for maintaining therapeutic gain and enhancing external supervision. In W. L. Marshall, D. R. Laws & H. E. Barbaree (Eds.), Handbook of sexual assault: Issues, theories and treatment of the offender. Plenum.

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Schlueter, G., O’Neal, G., Hickey, F., & Seiler, G. (1989). Rational vs. non rational shoplifting types: The implications for loss prevention strategies. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 33(3), 227–239. Shover, N., & Honaker, D. (1992). The socially bounded decision making of persistent property offenders. The Howard Journal, 31(4), 276–293. Tibbetts, S. (1997). Shame and rational choice in offending decisions. Criminal Justice and Behaviour, 24 (2), 234–255. Topalli, V. (2005). Offender decision making: An experimental analysis on how offenders and non offenders differently perceive social stimuli. British Journal of Criminology, 45, 269–295. Wright, R., & Decker, S. (1994). Burglars on the job: Street life and residential break-ins. North-Eastern University Press.

3 Critique and Methodological Issues

While the findings from the non-offending samples in general support the offending-based samples in that not much thinking time is given to the likelihood and severity of formal punishment, there are also considerations about the methodology for these studies to be made. It is a common criticism of this type of study (using college or university students for example) that what is being examined are the hypothetical decision-making processes of people who have never actually made the decision to offend in real life. That means that any decision-making process observed is based on imagined thoughts and feelings based on hypothetical scenarios. This is an important consideration. Thinking about concepts such as shame proneness, for example, it may be likely that measurements of this would differ dramatically between a group of university students and a group of real-life offenders. In general, the personal circumstances of the students may be very different from those that are committing real offences, and therefore the ‘intention to offend’ recorded in these types of studies cannot be seen to be equivalent of actual decisions to offend. These difficulties aside, the informal bonds and costs identified in these student-based studies make a significant addition to the official © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Steele, Exploring the Criminal Decision Process, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46231-3_3

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sanctions traditionally thought of as deterrents in the Rational Choice Perspective. Studies of decision making under the Rational Choice umbrella have therefore identified a range of potential risks and rewards outside of the simple idea that money is the reward, and arrest and punishment are the main risks. It is clear that any useful version of the Rational Choice Perspective will include all of these risks and rewards, with a recognition that these will vary between situations and individuals. At this point, it is useful to remind ourselves of the concept of bounded rationality that was introduced in the previous chapter (Cornish & Clarke, 1986). The concept of bounded rationality suggests that no decision maker will be fully aware of the whole range of potential outcomes, and will also likely be short of time, or other information, and therefore will make the best decision they can with the resources that they have at the time. As can be seen from the brief review of research discussed earlier—the concept of ‘mental space’ suggests that even where people may actually be aware of the possible outcomes, these are not really given much thought. This could be thought of as being ‘self-bounded’ in that the decision maker is actually in possession of the necessary information on likely formal sanctions, but deliberately excludes these (or pays very little attention to them) in the active decision-making process. Criminal Propensity Theories would suggest that this is due to criminally prone individuals being more impulsive by nature, neglecting to think about long-term consequences of behaviour and instead focusing on short-term outcomes (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). This impulsiveness, or ‘present – orientation’ makes potential offenders more likely to only consider short-term outcomes as factors in their decision making (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993). The lack of ‘mental space’ given to formal sanctions is a regularly occurring feature in research exploring the RCP and offending. Typically, offenders lend much more consideration to the benefits or positives of offending rather than the costs, and understanding the way in which they do this is key to any application of the Rational Choice Perspective to the process of the offending decision. Recall the findings around carjackers above (Jacobs et al., 2003). One of the most pertinent findings of this study was the speed at which the decisions to offend were

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made. The quick thinking observed in these offenders (‘perceptual shorthand’) impacts directly on the nature of the decision to offend. If the thinking process is accelerated significantly, then the decision to commit an offence may be made very quickly, in some cases so quickly that other courses of action or outcomes are not considered at all, and the factors that are considered are perhaps reduced. One thing that may contribute to the thinking shortcuts used in offending decision making is the contribution that extensive previous experience of offending may make to the process. This accumulation of previous experience can be classed as ‘expertise’ where a person has amassed a considerable amount of knowledge about, as well as skill in executing an offence. There is much related research on the developed ‘expertise’ of offenders which is too wide-ranging and detailed to be covered here in any depth, but the particular overlap of ‘expertise’ research with decision-making research suggests that an expert offender may consider different elements when deciding on action than a firsttime or novice offender, and even if considering these elements, may allot them less mental space or thinking time. For example, the study on shoplifters described earlier (Carroll & Weaver, 1986) found that the decision-making processes of expert shoplifters versus novices focused on different factors, with ‘expert’ shoplifters building strategies to accomplish a successful crime. Similarly, Wright et al. (1995) noted in their study of expert burglars that as their expertise grew in their specialist field of offending, their decision making was helped by the knowledge they had gained through experience. Without delving too deeply into the wealth of evidence regarding criminal expertise, it is certainly a relevant element of an offender making a decision, in as much as Topalli (2005) points out, expertise affects both the skill and the knowledge the offender can utilise when making a decision. Topalli argues that the development of both the procedural and perceptual skills necessary to commit a successful offence is obtained through environmental and behavioural experiences. More specifically, Topalli describes how individuals gain environmental expertise by living in areas with crime, even though the individual may not be actively participating in crime. Additionally, individuals involved in crime also

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had perceptual skills, honed due to their behavioural involvement in crime, and were able to read situations and the actions of others in reference to their own previous experiences.

Chapter Summary This chapter has begun to introduce some ideas around expertise, thinking shortcuts and decision making which will be elaborated on in the next chapter.

References Carroll, J., & Weaver, F. (1986). Shoplifters’ perceptions of crime opportunities: A process tracing study. In D. Cornish & R. Clarke (Eds.), The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer Verlag. Cornish, D., & Clarke, R. (1986). The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer-Verlag. Gottfredson, M. R., & Hirschi, T. (1990). A general theory of crime. Stanford University Press. Jacobs, J., Topalli, V., & Wright, R. (2003). Car-jacking, street life and offender motivation. British Journal of Criminology, 43, 673–688. Nagin, D., & Paternoster, R. (1993). Enduring individual differences and rational choice theories of crime. Law and Society Review, 27 (3), 467–496. Topalli, V. (2005). Offender decision making: An experimental analysis on how offenders and non offenders differently perceive social stimuli. British Journal of Criminology, 45, 269–295. Wright, R., Logie, R., & Decker, S. (1995). Criminal expertise and offender decision making: An experimental study of the target selection process in residential burglary. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 32(1), 39–53.

4 The Importance of Understanding Thinking

Expertise, Heuristics and Thinking Shortcuts Extensive work has been carried out into the ‘heuristics’ of judgement making, which identify a range of principles which reduce the number of complex tasks an individual must engage in when making a prediction of outcomes (such as the outputs of an offending action). These heuristics help us make decisions by making prediction of potential outcomes simpler by substituting simpler judgements for the more complex ones necessary to make an informed choice. While much of the research on judgement heuristics has not focused directly on the decision to commit crime, the contribution of this work to general decision-making theory (Tuck & Riley, 1986) and the legal and judicial decision-making process and risk assessment of offenders (such as Strachan & Tallant, 1997) is useful to consider. The research is complex, but there are several identified heuristics that can be applied to the understanding of how a criminal makes a decision to offend. The first of these key processes is that of representativeness, in which an individual will base their predictions of the current action on similar events or circumstances that they have experienced in the past. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Steele, Exploring the Criminal Decision Process, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46231-3_4

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So, for example, if a potential offender knows of many of his or her friends that have not been caught for similar behaviour, and they are considering the same offence, they may assume that it is safe to commit the crime with low probability of being caught. The second key heuristic relevant here is availability, which refers to the ease with which an individual can bring to mind (or imagine) a similar circumstance or event. So, using the concept of ‘criminal expertise’ for those who have experienced similar things in the past (representativeness) and for whom these events or experiences are easily brought to mind (availability), we can understand how these particular decision heuristics can help experienced criminals make faster, but still useful decisions about their offending. These concepts of representativeness and availability seem to fit with Topalli’s (2005) description of individuals within similar environments developing similar skills to aid with decision making, whether or not the individual is engaged in criminal activity. Likewise, the ‘perceptual shorthand’ described earlier (Jacobs et al., 2003) could be conceived of as being made up of judgement heuristics such as this, and may be a rich source of information into exploring just how offenders become expert within their field, and what that means for their decision making.

The Role of Experience One such development of offending expertise to the decision making of offenders is to apply the idea of environmental expertise to Differential Association Theory and Social Learning Theory, which were discussed briefly earlier. Differential Association Theory describes how an individual could obtain knowledge of offending from observation of those around him or her (Sutherland & Cressey, 1974), and Social Learning Theory suggests that spending time with those who hold favourable attitudes towards offending will affect the individual’s attitude to offending. This acquiring of pro-offending attitudes and knowledge by observing others’ behaviour is precisely what Topalli describes, evidenced by the ‘environmental expertise’ found in criminal and non-criminal individuals in the same community. This crossover of Rational Choice Theory and Social

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Learning Theory is not limited to the evidence described in Topalli’s study. Some theorists suggest that decisions to offend (such as taking illegal drugs) which may appear irrational to outsiders, may be defined as normal within the group or social circumstances within which the individuals live. Individuals develop ideas about drug use through learning from their peers, and in this context, their decision to use drugs is seen as usual, or normal (Becker, 1968). The contribution of the evidence regarding expertise, and the concept of ‘perceptual’ shorthand adds a meeting point between theories of criminal involvement and theories of the criminal event. Despite Rational Choice Perspectives focusing on the criminal ‘event’ and Social Learning Theory focusing on the involvement in crime and why this may happen, it is possible to make a link between the two. The Rational Choice Perspective has been criticised as being isolated and removed from the social context in which decisions take place, but as Hirschi (1986) points out, Rational Choice Theory is a theory of ‘crime’, that is the event of crime, and Social Learning Theory is a theory of ‘criminality’, that is recurrent involvement in criminal offending. So, the question of why an individual offends may be best answered by a theory of involvement such as Social Learning Theory, and the Rational Choice Perspective adds to this a theory of the criminal event, or how the crime itself takes place. The potential development of ‘expertise’ as a set of perceptual and procedural skills around offending is an area where the ‘decision regarding the event’ is affected by the factors influencing ‘involvement’. This potential meeting of theories is an important development for the Rational Choice Perspective and may be a way forward to integrating the different ways in how crime is understood to happen. However, while the concepts of expertise and ‘perceptual shorthand’ contribute greatly to this analysis, the wider applications of a joining of theories of involvement in crime with theories of the event are beyond the scope or space of this chapter, which instead is focused on establishing firstly the existence of any defined decision making in the commission of a crime, and if one appears to take place, the applicability of the Rational Choice Perspective to offending decisions. Bearing this in mind then and stepping away from the various skills and techniques an offender may use to ease the process, the core theory

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of offenders ‘maximising their expected utility’ (Carroll & Weaver, 1986) or maximising their benefit remains the question at hand. To recap. The Rational Choice Perspective sees a decision maker as making choices based on a (at least cursory) weighing up of the costs and benefits they see as being the likely outcome of their actions. The answer to why an individual offends would therefore be expressed as based on the perceived benefits of this action being comparatively greater than the perceived costs, as these are understood by the individual. The costs of offending have traditionally been viewed in criminology as externally driven (legal sanctions), this view making up the core of the ‘deterrence model’ and strongly influencing sentencing policies (Jones, 2008). However, as can be seen even within this short review, other costs have been found to be far more influential. It is clear then, that in order to understand if the Rational Choice Perspective has applicability and validity to the decision-making process of the potential offender, that we need to understand the wider definition of costs. The application of deterrence policy tends to largely disregard this variety of potential costs. The deterrence model in its basic form takes as its central premise the severity and certainty of punishment as the main attributes that discourage people from committing an offence (Massoglia & Macmillan, 2002). However, evidence from research in deterrence theory, just as evidence form the research described here, suggests that the idea that these elements constitute a strong deterrent is lacking. Carroll and Weaver (1986) found that the thought of being caught was a far greater deterrent for ‘novice’ shoplifters (those with little or no experience) than for individuals with more experience. This is compatible with the view that the point at which ‘official’ punishment or sanction would be the greatest deterrent is at the start of the criminal career (Matsueda et al., 2006). A person with no previous experience of the criminal justice system may feel that they have more to lose (for example, gaining a criminal record) and may be more fearful of what might happen to them than a person who has already been arrested and processed through the system. If we recall the idea of the ‘initial participatory decision’ (Paternoster, 1989), then this is the point at which these

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formal sanctions may be most influential. In other research, however, this has been found not to be the case. For example, a study on the initial participatory decision for delinquents (Paternoster, 1989) found that this decision was almost entirely unrelated to the perceived severity and certainty of punishment. In a survey of two and a half thousand high school students over three stages in their life, information on various factors, including background, affective ties, material considerations, opportunities for delinquency, informal sanctions, formal sanctions and moral beliefs was collected. Findings suggested that once again, non-official sanctions such as moral beliefs, parental supervision levels and social activities were far more influential on the making of the initial offending decision than perceived formal punishment. In addition, costs, as defined by classical Deterrence Theory were unimportant in the decision to desist from offending. Once again, the findings of research into criminal decision making point us back to another theory of crime, in this case Control Theory. As suggested earlier, Control Theory views individuals as being powerfully influenced by various factors, from the influence of attachments to others and legitimate opportunities (Hirschi, 1971) to self-control and moral development. Paternoster’s findings here mirror this closely, and once again, evidence gained through research into decision making links the theory of the event with a theory of ‘involvement’, in this case Control Theory. As above, these links are a useful connection between seemingly opposed viewpoints. This research again suggests that influential factors in deterrence vary by offence, but again are related to more personal costs than to those traditionally defined under ‘deterrence’. The phrase ‘personal costs’ is interesting to consider. With an aim to use the RCP as a valid tool to understand the decision making of an individual, care must be taken to ensure that the factors that are important and relevant to that individual (and not those that seem important to the researcher) are accounted for. As Bouffard (2007) points out, the relevance of costs and benefits will vary between individuals. It would be dangerous during research to rely on the onlooker’s impression of costs and benefits to the individual. Instead, we must let the potential offender determine what these are, and the relative value of these to the individual.

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If the influential costs are personal to the offender, and therefore not easily objectively observed, then where does this leave the Rational Choice ‘balance’ of costs and benefits? Clearly, for this approach to be useful, costs need to be defined more widely than official sanctions. Individually focused work has expanded this narrow definition of costs with more personal factors such as perceptions of shame and embarrassment, moral judgements and self-esteem being taken into account. For example, work done on feelings of shame as a cost explores the effect that ‘anticipated shame’ has on the making of an offending decision (Tibbetts, 1997). Anticipated emotion is an important consideration in decision making, and we will cover that in more detail later in this book. Thinking about the use of shame in this particular study, it is important to remember that the participants ‘anticipating shame’ were students, rather than an offender population. What influences feelings of shame for a student may be very different to factors affecting shame in an offending individual. The factors that a student may take into consideration when speculating on their actions (parental condemnation, exclusion from peer groups, ruining promising prospects, losing their place on their course) could be very different from those factors which may be considered in a real offending situation (boredom, a real need for food or even drugs, lack of other options). In addition, measuring intention to commit a hypothetical offence is not the same as considering a real offence. Using students as a research group also tends to sample a group with similar backgrounds and intelligence level, who may statistically not be likely to go on to commit an offence in any case, and raises questions about the generalisability of the results, and their application with real offending decisions. Even taking this into consideration, this finding has implications for constructing a theory of committing various offences, and in fact Cornish and Clarke (1987) have suggested that given the findings of varied research into the Rational Choice Perspective and its applicability to offending, and the range of offences that have been covered, a ‘crime specific theory’ for each offence type may be necessary. The inclusion of personal factors, such as anticipated shame, and related traits such as shame proneness, seem to fit within the Rational Choice Perspective, in that they are all factors that make up the costs or

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rewards in any decision. As we have seen above, the level of attachments an individual has to family or legitimate groups, and the environment in which the individual learns, all affect how the individual subsequently thinks and makes decisions. These personal differences, added to the individual traits, will affect which factors an individual weighs up and how much weight is given to each factor in decision making. If an individual has a high level of shame proneness, they may weigh the risk of being exposed in their actions much more heavily. An individual who tends to consider short-term outcomes over long-term outcomes may discount official sanctions in their decision making entirely.

Rewards The balancing of the ‘costs’ in any decision under the RCP is done by a review of the rewards, and this is just as essential to an understanding of the decision-making process. Though studies suggest the rewards of offending are given far more ‘mental space’ than costs by those that commit crime, rewards of offending (as affecting the offending decision) are often surprisingly neglected in research. It is often assumed that offenders commit offences purely for monetary or other material gain (Green & Shapiro, 1994). Evidence from analyses of different offenders’ motivations however reveals that rewards to offenders may well be less materialistic, but just as influential. Social status, peer acceptance, excitement or ‘kicks’ and emotional release have also been identified as strong motivators for offenders (Tibbetts, 1997). Research applying the Rational Choice Perspective to actual decisions made by convicted offenders has been useful in identifying perceived or subjective costs and benefits of offending (Ellis & Simpson, 1995; Klepper & Nagin, 1989a, 1989b). Again, it is the value of the benefits to the offender that must be considered rather than the researcher perception, and many of these benefits (such as maintaining social standing for carjackers [Jacobs et al., 2003]) will be rooted in their own individual social group and environment and may make no sense to the outsider whatsoever. An understanding of the motivations, goals and fears of the person making a decision can be difficult to obtain for several reasons. Firstly,

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as described, theorists must ensure that they employ the individuals’ subjective definitions of costs and benefits rather that the theorists’ own. Secondly, there must be awareness that costs and benefits may be perceived as qualitatively different by offenders and researchers. It must also be noted that even where a cost, e.g. a legal sanction such as a prison sentence is understood by both, the value assigned to the risk of this happening, or the decision weighting it is given may be very different, both in terms of the ‘mental space’ it is given, and also in terms of the impact it may be felt to exert on the individual. For example, to most readers, the consideration of a prison sentence may be unthinkable, but to an offender who has experienced it several times, it may feel like an ordinary experience. When costs and benefits become less overt, these distinctions become even more complex. The availability of information to an offender and the context of that information is another important factor in the decision-making process. Along with a focus on offender perceptions of costs and benefits, these factors are central to the making of an offending decision. Each of these particular risks and rewards, how influential they are for the individual, how much information the decision maker has and how much stock they put in this information will vary. If the Rational Choice Perspective at its core is a logic-based approach, based on weighing up all of these factors, is it possible to do so in a way that accurately reflects the real decision-making process, or does it become so generalised that it is no longer useful as a tool for understanding criminal decision making? Perhaps, the answer to this question lies within the theories that approach crime from the opposite direction—from the individualdifference standpoint. The Rational Choice Perspective does not begin with the individual. Instead it is decision-focused, assuming that the decision maker—whoever he or she may be—is logical and seeking to maximise expected utility. Classic Rational Choice Theory assumed a normative approach, that is, every decision maker was able to process their decision under ‘ideal’ circumstances. This concept was replaced by the ‘bounded rationality’ concept (Cornish & Clarke, 1986), but this is still seen from the viewpoint that committing a crime is always an unacceptable option, and that being law-abiding is desirable. This may be a serious roadblock in using the Rational Choice Perspective to understand

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the criminal decision-making process. If one starts from the view (when observing a person making a decision to offend) that the offending is unwanted, undesirable or unacceptable (to them), then trying to understand why the decision is made is going to be a challenge. However, it may well be that for whatever reason, committing a crime (or many crimes) is not particularly undesirable or unwanted to the individual. As a non-offending observer, we will therefore struggle much more to understand why someone decides to commit a burglary, for example, than why someone picks one savings account over another. The latter we understand more, because it aligns with our understanding of what is desirable and acceptable. So what separates those for whom offending becomes part of their general spectrum of choice, and those for whom it is not? Nagin and Paternoster (1993) describe this split between ‘situation and circumstance’ theories and economic theories. They present evidence showing a strong association between self-control measures and intention to offend, supporting the view that crime is caused by ‘enduring individual differences’. As described earlier, Nagin and Paternoster presented a large number of college students with scenarios describing in detail a crime, and the circumstances around it. Respondents were asked to state the probability that they would commit a crime as described, and correlated this with measures of self-control, perceived utility and shame. Findings suggested that internal factors, such as proneness to shame and tendency to focus on the present as well as the strength of social bonds all affect how likely an individual feels he or she is to offend in given scenarios. Despite the methodological drawbacks (using students rather than real-life offenders), integration of individual differences remains an important step forward for developing the RCP. Traditionally, Rational Choice Theory has ignored individual differences between offenders (and non-offenders) and has focused solely on facts, or information as the ‘choice structuring properties’ of any decision (Cornish & Clarke, 1986). However, work described here by Nagin and Paternoster, and Tibbetts, etc., shows that these individual differences are pertinent to the study of offender decision making.

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These individual traits can be encompassed by the Rational Choice Perspective focus on decision making, by understanding how these traits alter how an individual interprets information, places value on the level of risk and potential outcomes and then makes their final decision. The decision therefore is the outcome of a complex interaction between what a person sees as the possible outcomes of an offence, and who that person is (and how that affects how they think). Studies described above suggest that the weighing up of costs and benefits have around the same level of influence as offender characteristics when an offending decision is made. In these studies, the only factor that did not seem to alter the decision process were the objective facts of the scenario presented (for example, in the drink/drive scenario, the type of road and the distance from home specified). While this research suggests that all offenders have different individual propensities, this by no means suggests that offenders are irrational. Rather, these offenders are viewed as being rational beings making logical choices within the boundaries or tendencies of their own personality. If we consider the example making a decision on booking a holiday, we would not be surprised if the outgoing and athletic couple next door booked a hiking retreat where they would meet a group of likeminded individuals, or if the harassed and busy professional decided to book a beach resort where every need was catered for. Each choice would be logical for each holidaymaker, based on their personality, and what they viewed as desirable/a benefit at this point in time. Viewed in this way, the theories based on individual differences and the Rational Choice Perspective seem to be not opposed, but complementary.

Mood, Emotion and Different States of Mind Similarly, discussion of feelings and emotional aspects of an offending decision do not negate the mechanisms of the Rational Choice Perspective, but in fact add depth to it, contributing detail to the understanding of the ‘maximum expected utility’ for the offender. Perhaps, the reclassification of the Rational Choice Perspective as a tool, with which to map and dissect a decision-making process, presents as a more inclusive,

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holistic manner in which to understand the decision-making process, and the mind within which the decision is made. This viewpoint is perhaps illustrated by the possibilities of interaction between the ‘individual differences’ traits of an offender, and the costs and benefits they weigh in balance when making a decision. The use of ‘maximum expected utility’ is certainly easier to understand in a rational sense when these ‘individual’ factors are taken into account. For example, research has suggested that offenders, in general, tend to have a low level of self-control, and in particular, tend to be impulsive and ‘present-oriented’ (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). This character trait would certainly not preclude an offender from considering long-term costs of a decision, but may mean that the probability of them doing so is smaller than for someone who decides not to offend. Additionally, the positive expectations of a decision, at the time that the decision is made by the individual (expected utility) may vary considerably to the observed or actual good outcome that ensues due to the final action taken (Brezina, 2002). With this understanding, a decision that from the outside looks highly irrational may make more sense. The way a person feels at the time and place of an offending decision is also important. Far from being an irrelevance in a Rational Choice Perspective, emotion is seen as a key element in affecting how people make decisions. Research discussed above has suggested that anticipated feelings of shame or guilt could sway a decision to offend. As suggested earlier, a perspective such as the Rational Choice Perspective has traditionally been seen as useful for those crimes with a visible outcome that make sense to the onlooker (usually acquisitive crime), but less so for those violent, irrational (to the observer) or similar offences that appear ‘laden with strong affect’ (Loughran et al., 2016, p. 86). The role of emotion in decision making has been neglected, but outside of the strict Rational Choice approaches, research has been done which compliments the premises of the Rational Choice Perspective and helps us understand how emotions may become a factor in the decision-making process. Some research suggests that when considering emotion, that there are several factors at play. Studies described earlier suggest that negative emotions that can be seen as a possible outcome of committing

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a crime (e.g. anticipatory shame) and can therefore factor into the decision-making process. For example, Grasmick and Bursick (1990) found that anticipated shame of tax cheaters made their offending less likely. However, in addition to these anticipated or expected moods, there are the present, and very real effects of the emotion and mood of the decision maker which have an effect on the actual ability to make a decision, rather than simply being factored into the decision-making process (Van Gelder et al., 2022). Van Gelder et al. (ibid.) suggest that mood is a less-focused and longer-lasting general state of feeling, you may be feeling depressed for example, or optimistic, and this general state of being may continue for some period of time. Emotions on the other hand are keenly and presently felt and may demand more immediate attention or seek immediate resolution. Research suggests that mood can affect decision making, for example Johnson and Tversky (1983) showed that optimistic people tend to make more positive risk assessments— highly applicable to the decision making around crime. General negative or low mood can also be linked to impulsive, spontaneous behaviour in an effort to cheer yourself up (Shover & Honaker, 1992). Emotions on the other hand are more acutely felt—they may be closely tied to an event, conversation or relationship, and can be profoundly powerful in the way that they affect how we think, and therefore our decision making (Ekman & Davidson, 1994). When we feel strong emotion, the way we feel overrides much of our existing logic and makes us feel certain about things we would not usually be certain about (Frijda, 1986), and can prime the way we view certain situations. For example, someone feeling fearful about something may tend to read a situation as threatening, where normally they would not (Van Gelder et al., 2022).

Hot and Cold Decision Making One way to conceptualise the way that emotion and decision making interact, is to bring in more recent research on system 1 and system 2 thinking, sometimes referred to as the hot/cool model of decision making. This concept postulates that human beings have two thinking

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and feeling systems running in parallel at all times. System 1 is intuitive, rapid and can be emotional, and can make up our mind how we feel or react to a situation without us always being fully conscious of what went into the decision making. This is often referred to as the ‘hot system’ referring to the heat of emotion (Van Gelder et al., 2022). System 2 is our more logical and rational thinking system—where we take more time to consider alternatives and consequences, to play out possible solutions, and make a reasoned decision to the best of our ability. This system is conversely often referred to as the ‘cold’ system. Clearly, a true and pure rational decision-making process would fall into system 2, even where this is bounded by lack of knowledge or ability. We will all be influenced in our thinking by both hot and cold systems at different times (ibid.). Different individuals will be affected to different extents by each system, and this may change over time, or in response to external stimuli (Mukherjee, 2010). There is also evidence to suggest that each system responds to different things, with the hot thinking system being swayed by the vividness in which it can imagine the desired outcome, and the cold system being more able to weigh probabilities. Our hot, impulsive system 1 wants what it wants now, whereas our more cool and rational system 2 brain can look to the future and assess probability of outcomes (Van Gelder & De Vries, 2012). However, even the most calm collected thinker, who may usually present as having their decision making rooted in their system 2, can make impulsive decisions when triggered by intense emotion or stress (ibid.). This can be true even when the emotions felt have nothing to do with the actual decision being made, and research suggests that this is an integral part of the human condition—a person can make impulsive and emotional system 1 decisions without the engagement of system 2, but not the other way around (LeDoux, 1996). This is not always necessarily a bad thing, with some research suggesting that in some cases, emotion can actually be an adaptive response, based on time-tested previous experiences (Van Gelder et al., 2022). However, there is a wealth of research to show that people that commit crime tend to have lower self-control, which could be understood as them having an overpowering system 1 (Jolls et al., 1998) and in addition, we also know that negative feelings and emotions are linked to risky behaviour (e.g. Bruyneel et al., 2009). In addition,

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there is also reason to believe that strong positive feelings can engender a ‘devil may care’ attitude, again leading to impulsive behaviour (Cooper et al., 1995). Earlier, within this book, the idea of criminal expertise and the use of cognitive ‘heuristics’ were used to describe how more experienced criminals use their previous experiences to make quicker decisions. This use of ‘heuristics’ can be seen as applying within a rapid, system 1 decision, where the brain maps the current situation onto a range of previously experienced situations and comes up with a rapid response based on what has happened before. Just as adaptive emotions can lead to valid shortcuts in thinking (Van Gelder et al., 2022), so can cognitive shortcuts based on previous experience. This was evident in a study by Beauregard et al. (2007) looking at the target selection decisions of sex offenders, where they found that potential offenders would only plan victim approach strategies that fit with their skill set. They instinctively knew which methods would work for them, and which would not. For these individuals, their specific crime strategic approach was sometimes overt and well planned, but sometimes was made based on a quick almost impulsive decision, where opportunity matched their instinct for success (Beauregard & LeClerc, 2007). Use of heuristics as described, in particular perceptual shorthand (Jacobs et al., 2003) such as representativeness can also work against the individual. For example, reliance on successful prior experiences can cause individuals to overestimate their skills and underestimate their risk by developing a ‘self-serving’ bias in thinking, leading to an overconfident system 1-based decision being made (Waldo & Chiricos, 1971). Conversely, Cesar and Decker (2017) talk about the decision-making process of ‘carjackers’ emphasising the high risk and rapid nature of this offence type. They describe these individuals as having to make ongoing, constantly updated and sound decisions based on their environment in order to succeed, and do this with a combination of system 1 and system 2 decision making. In this way, great risks are overcome by reliance not only on cool logic, but also on instinct based on emotion, and previous experience. The hot/cool approach to understanding decision making is not in opposition to a Rational Choice Perspective of criminal decision making, but instead can be seen as furthering its explanatory power. If we consider

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that a decision to commit a crime may be made under ‘hot’ system 1 conditions, or under cool, system 2 conditions, or by some conjunction of the two, it can help us begin to understand how individual values, available information, mood and emotion, can affect each decision at each time and place. Shover (1991) suggests that the mood felt by a person making a decision could mean they felt desensitised to risk. If the decision maker was experiencing an ongoing mood in addition to an acute emotion, this could lead to a person bypassing the logical thinkthrough process entirely and making a ‘decision’ solely driver by their hot, impulsive system 1. Previous studies have suggested that this reckless hedonism may indeed be the desired outcome of a criminal event (rather than simply the driver, for example the study done by Jacobs et al. [2003] who found that those street criminals taking cars by force saw their hedonism as a desirable lifestyle choice). Studies on shoplifters do suggest that many individuals do plan ahead, and make at least rudimentary decisions on their activity, but other studies suggest that a proportion (20%, Cromwell et al., 2003) explain their actions using feelings. Adding emotion and mood into the Rational Choice Perspective could help make this approach a much more all-encompassing and explanatory model (Van Gelder & De Vries, 2014). Indeed, if we are to develop a model that explains criminal behaviour, it must be able to account for the significance of an offending person’s feelings about the event (De Haan & Voss, 2003). Just as emotion can be the driver of a decision, release of that emotion can also play its part. De Haan and Voss suggest (2003) release of tension is an important motivator within their study of street criminals, and this visceral need to feel better could be an important factor to consider. Tice and Bratslavsky (2000) suggest that when someone is feeling in a bad mood, they may take a range of actions, often connected to indulging their own appetites in order to feel better. This seeks to release a bad mood that can result in impulsive and criminal behaviour.

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Chapter Summary This chapter has given an overview of how expertise, thinking shortcuts as well as emotion may play in to a decision about committing crime. In addition, the introduction of research around the idea of thinking working in two systems, system 1 the hot and emotional approach, and system 2 the cooler more rational thinking, is introduced. The next chapter goes on to consider further challenges in generating a valid model of criminal decision making, and the concepts introduced here will be returned to.

References Beauregard, E., & LeClerc, E. (2007). An application of the rational choice approach to the offending process of sex offenders: A closer look at the decision making. Sexual Abuse, 19 (2), 115–133. Beauregard, E., Rossmo, D. K., & Proulx, J. (2007). A descriptive model of the hunting process of serial sex offenders: A rational choice perspective. Journal of Family Violence, 22(6), 449–463. Becker, G. (1968). Crime and punishment—An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76 (2), 169–217. Bouffard, J. A. (2007). Predicting differences in the perceived relevance of crime’s costs and benefits in a test of rational choice theory. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 51(4), 461–485. Brezina, T. (2002). Assessing the rationality of criminal and delinquent behaviour: A focus on actual utility. In A. Piquero & S. Tibbetts (Eds.), Rational choice and criminal behaviour: Recent research and future challenges. Routledge. Bruyneel, S. D., Dewitte, S., Franses, P. H., & Dekimpe, M. G. (2009). I felt low and my purse feels light: Depleting mood regulation attempts affect risk decision making. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 22, 153–170. Carroll, J., & Weaver, F. (1986). Shoplifters’ perceptions of crime opportunities: A process tracing study. In D. Cornish & R. Clarke (Ed.), The reasoning criminal : Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer Verlag.

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Cesar, G. T., & Decker, S. (2017). Cold-blooded and badass a “hot/cool” approach to understanding carjackers’ decisions. In The Oxford handbook of offender decision making (pp. 611–632). Oxford University Press. Cooper, M. L., Michael, R., Russell, M., & Mudar, P. (1995). Drinking to regulate positive and negative emotions a motivational model of alcohol use. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 990–1005. Cornish, D., & Clarke, R. (1986). The reasoning criminal : Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer-Verlag. Cornish, D., & Clarke, R. (1987). Understanding crime displacement: An application of rational choice theory. Criminology, 25 (4), 933–947. Cromwell, P., Parker, L., & Mobley, S. (2003). The five-finger discount: An analysis of motivations for shoplifting. In P. Cromwell (Ed.), In their own words: Criminals on crime. Roxbury Publishing Company. De Haan, W., & Voss, J. (2003). A crying shame—The over rationalised conception of man in the rational choice perspective. Theoretical Criminology, 7 , 29–54. Ekman, P., & Davidson, R. J. (1994). The nature of emotions: Fundamental questions. Oxford University Press. Ellis, L. A., & Simpson, S. S. (1995). Informal sanction threats and corporate crime: Additive versus multiplicative models. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 32, 399–424. Frijda, N. H. (1986). The emotions. Cambridge University Press. Gottfredson, M. R., & Hirschi, T. (1990). A general theory of crime. Stanford University Press. Grasmick, H. G., & Bursik, R. J. (1990). Conscience, significant others, and rational choice: Extending the deterrence model. Law & Society Review, 24 (3), 837–861. Green, D., & Shapiro, I. (1994). Pathologies of rational choice theory: A critique of applications in political science. Yale University Press. Hirschi, T. (1971). Causes of delinquency. University of California Press. Hirschi, T. (1986). The compatibility of rational choice theory and social control theories of crime. In D. Cornish & R. Clarke (Ed.), The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer Verlag. Jacobs, J., Topalli, V., & Wright, R. (2003). Car-jacking, street life and offender motivation. British Journal of Criminology, 43, 673–688. Johnson, E. J., & Tversky, A. (1983). Affect, generalization, and the perception of risk. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5 (1), 20–31. Jolls, C., Sunstein, C. R., & Thaler, R. (1998). Behavioural approaches to law and economics. Stanford Law Review, 50, 1471–1550.

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Jones, D. W. (2008). Understanding criminal behaviour: Psychosocial approaches to criminality. Willan Publishing. Klepper, S., & Nagin, D. (1989a). Tax compliance and perceptions of the risks of detection and criminal prosecution. Law and Society Review, 23, 209. Klepper, S., & Nagin, D. (1989b). The deterrent effects of perceived certainty and severity of punishment revisited. Criminology, 27 , 721–746. LeDoux, J. E. (1996). The emotional brain. Simon & Schuster. Loughran, T. A., Paternoster, R., Chalfin, A., & Wilson, T. (2016). Can rational choice be considered a general theory of crime? Evidence from individual-level panel data. Criminology, 54 (1), 86–112. Massoglia, M., & MacMillan, R. (2002). Deterrence, rational choice and criminal offending: A consideration of legal subjectivity. In A. R. Piquero & S. G. Tibbetts (Eds.), Rational choice and criminal behaviour: Recent research and future challenges. Routledge. Matsueda, R., Kreager, D., & Huzinga, D. (2006). Deterring delinquents: A rational choice model of theft and violence. American Psychological Review, 71, 95–122. Mukherjee, K. (2010). A dual system model of preferences under risk. Psychological Review, 177 , 243–255. Nagin, D., & Paternoster, R. (1993). Enduring individual differences and rational choice theories of crime. Law and Society Review, 27 (3), 467–496. Paternoster, R. (1989). Decisions to participate in and desist from four types of common delinquency: Deterrence and the rational choice perspective. Law and Society Review, 23(1), 7–40. Shover, N. (1991). Burglary. In M. Tonry (Ed.), Crime and justice: A review of research. University of Chicago Press. Shover, N., & Honaker, D. (1992). The socially bounded decision making of persistent property offenders. The Howard Journal, 31(4), 276–293. Strachan, R., & Tallant, C. (1997). Improving judgement and appreciating biases within the risk assessment process. In H. Kemshall & J. Pritchard (Eds.), Good practice in risk assessment & risk management (Vol. 2). Jessica Kingsley Publishers. Sutherland, E., & Cressey, D. R. (1974). Criminality (7th ed.). Lippincott. Tibbetts, S. (1997). Shame and rational choice in offending decisions. Criminal Justice and Behaviour, 24 (2), 234–255. Tice, D. M., & Bratslavsky, E. (2000). Giving in to feeling good: The place of emotion regulation in the context of general self-control. Psychological Inquiry, 11(3), 149–159.

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Topalli, V. (2005). Offender decision making: An experimental analysis on how offenders and non offenders differently perceive social stimuli. British Journal of Criminology, 45, 269–295. Tuck, M., & Riley, D. (1986). The theory of reasoned action: A decision theory of crime. In D. Cornish & R. Clarke (Ed.), The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending research. Springer-Verlag. Van Gelder, J.-L., & De Vries, R. E. (2012). Traits and states: Integrating personality and affect into a model of criminal decision making. Criminology: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 50 (3), 637–671. van Gelder, J. L., & De Vries, R. E. (2014). Rational misbehavior? Evaluating an integrated dual-process model of criminal decision making. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 30, 1–27. Van Gelder, J. L., De Vries, R. E., van Sintermaartensdijk, I., & Donker, T. (2022). Personality pathways to aggression: Testing a trait-state model using immersive technology. Criminology; an Interdisciplinary Journal, 60, 406– 442. Waldo, G. P., & Chiricos, T. G. (1971). Perceived penal sanction and self-reported criminality a neglected approach to deterrence research. Florida State University, Tallahassee. Southeastern Correctional and Criminological Research Center.

5 Other Challenges to Consider

Drugs and Alcohol The Rational Choice Perspective gives us a framework to explore the costs and benefits of a decision, what importance those factors have for the offender and why they are important at this point in time. All of these things will be affected by individual factors, or ‘choice structuring properties’ (Cornish & Clarke, 1986). The use of drugs is an interesting example of how offenders can be aware of their own ‘choice structuring properties’. Cromwell et al. (1991) describe how rather than burglars being motivated by drugs, they are enabled by them. Cromwell et al.’s work, which explored how burglars’ decisions are affected by drug use, found that far from drugs simply being a motivator (goal) of an offence, they also acted as a facilitator. The evidence collected from interviews with burglars describes the manner in which burglars may use drugs as a relaxant, enabling them to ‘think straight’ and get on with the job in hand. Many of the individuals in the study described how using drugs enables them to focus more easily on the task in hand, become less distracted and less affected by nerves, therefore improving their thinking and decision making. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Steele, Exploring the Criminal Decision Process, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46231-3_5

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Choice structuring properties (altered with drugs or otherwise) affect what information offenders perceive in the first place (their bounded rationality), how they process it when they do (values of costs and benefits), the engagement of their system 1 and system 2 (hot and cold) processes and subsequently the decision made. In a similar way, Assaad and Exum’s (2002) examination of the literature on how alcohol affects decisions suggests that drinking alcohol does not preclude a decision being made, but alters the way it is made, asserting that one of the effects of alcohol is to make aggression seem like the most rational response. Latest statistics show, that 42% of violent crime is thought to be committed by an offender under the influence of alcohol (House of Commons Committee, 2023), making the understanding of how alcohol affects thinking, and decision making, extremely important. Alcohol and anger have both been shown to impede neural functioning and impair cognition, acting on the thinker to reduce their understanding of consequences (Weisman & Taylor, 1994). Research on how alcohol affects the way in which individuals make decisions suggests that one aspect of this phenomenon may be a function of expectancy, that is, individuals believe that people behave aggressively after drinking, and therefore this is how they behave themselves (Hull & Bond, 1986; Maisto et al., 2010). Another viewpoint labelled ‘Cognitive Disruption Theory’ describes how alcohol can diminish the drinker’s capacity to pay attention to what is going on around them (situational cues) while at the same time, having the effect of minimising any potential consequences in the mind of the drinker (Chermack & Giancola, 1997). In addition to reducing consideration of future consequences, alcohol can make the thinker very rooted in the present, their memory’s ability to think back for cues from similar previous experiences is reduced, all leading to a breakdown of the normative decision process (Exum et al., 2017). Therefore, it seems that alcohol does not automatically lead to aggressive behaviour, but that this can be a behavioural outcome of it, when all the effects are taken into account. As Assaad and Exum (2002) point out, given the effects of alcohol on the decision-making capabilities of an individual, aggression and violence may even seem to the individual to be a logical response to provocation or outside cues.

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If a decision does take place before an offence is committed, then the method of looking at the real costs and benefits to the offender, reveals a lot about decision making, the factors that influence it, and what can be done to alter these decisions. Taking into consideration the research into different decision types, different situations and different cognitive affectors (such as intoxication), there is a grounding of literature and evidence to explore concerning the application of a Rational Choice Perspective. Given that every decision is assumed to have a new, and fresh analysis within the boundaries of this theory, Cornish and Clarke (1986) suggest that there is a need for a crime-specific focus of the Rational Choice Perspective, which should lead to an increased understanding and level of detail about how individuals decide to commit particular types of crime. This detailed approach has been lacking in other approaches to explaining crime and may go a long way to obtaining a real grasp of the factors that influence different criminal events taking place.

Violence and Aggression A further challenge to the application of the Rational Choice Perspective of crime is the analysis of offences which seem to the observer to be purely expressive in motivation, particularly violent and aggressive offences where no decision appears to take place. It certainly appears that criminological theory research has tended to focus on either Deterrence/Rational Choice approaches, or alternatively on situational / emotional explanations, the role of emotion being neglected in the individual decision-making calculus described in Rational Choice models (Carmichael & Piquero, 2004). Cornish and Clarke (1986), perhaps the primary advocates of the Rational Choice Perspective of crime, themselves admit that this has traditionally been a gap in the application of their Rational Choice Theory to crime and have called for more work to be done in this area, to which several authors have responded. Applying a model of rational behaviour to violent or aggressive crimes may seem counterintuitive, but research has shown that it can be applied in several ways (Exum, 2002 studied aggressive behaviour; Bachman et al., 1992 examined sexual offences).

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The role of affect and emotion and the explanation of affective crime within the Rational Choice Perspective has benefited from several theoretical developments within the ‘thick’ family of rational decision-making theories. Traditionally, as described above, the roles of emotion and rational decision making in human behaviour have been seen as opposed (Heckathorn, 1993), but a range of models have been developed to try and explain the effect of emotion on decision making. It can be argued that emotions can both contribute to rational deliberation (e.g. anticipated shame), and also make individuals behave in ways that would seem rational on a short-term basis, but be disadvantageous on a longterm basis (Hirschleifer, 1992). Contrary to this approach, some theorists have described how emotion, particularly strong emotion, can override rational decision making, causing the decision maker to focus on shortterm outcomes at the disadvantage of long-term outcomes. Loewenstein suggests that emotions and visceral factors can in fact cause people to behave in a way that is directly contrary to their own self-interest, in some cases, with full awareness that they are doing so (Loewenstein, 1996). Of course, relating back to the two systems of thinking, system 1 in this case (the ‘hot’ system) is taking preference and being driven by emotion. The inclusion of a potential emotional state could therefore be important in any examination of an individual’s decision-making process about offending, both for the effect emotion has on the potential costs and benefits of offending (such as shame, or excitement) but also because of the potential for negative emotion to influence an individual to seek a way of regaining balance, or ‘right the wrong’ that has caused the negative affect (Agnew, 1992) which clearly has implications for any decision making that may take place.

Emotion and Expressive Crime Emotions play a part in decision making, whether from the point of view of affecting the personal traits that affect the decision-making process (Collins, 1993) or by turning the decision maker’s intention ‘inward’ (Bouffard et al., 2008), focusing on immediate personal gain and not

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long-term consequences for themselves or for others. Understanding this clearly impacts on any analysis of violent, or expressive crime. When considering violent or aggressive actions, there has traditionally been a dichotomy drawn between ‘instrumental’ and ‘expressive’ violence. Instrumental violence is described as violence with a purpose, meaning that the violent act is used as a means to an end, and therefore fits quite well into a decision-making model (the individual has committed the act in order to achieve a goal). Juxtaposed to this, an act of ‘expressive’ violence is said to be intrinsic, in that it is borne of emotion, and the act (an outburst, a crime) is an end in itself rather than a means to achieve anything else. Considering this led Brezina (2002) to an intriguing application of the Rational Choice Perspective as a ‘tool’ to examine the precursors of such violent offences, and the thoughts that accompany them. In his analysis, Brezina describes how aggressive behaviour among delinquent youths may well achieve an instrumental goal for them, in the short term at least. Delinquent behaviour, Brezina argues, can be a way of gaining a sense of control, and of raising selfesteem (primarily through peers) where youths feel they lack influence and control in their home, or in their community. In the same way, young people in high crime neighbourhoods may use ‘functional aggression’ and deliberately act aggressive or even ‘crazy’ and out of control, in order to protect themselves from the unwanted attentions of others. This assertion is supported by research suggesting that if we examine the sequence of activities leading up to a violent offence, then the behaviour can often be understood as instrumental (Tedeschi & Felson, 1994). Some theorists, working within the Social Interactionist perspective, would suggest that all actions are instrumental, in that a person always acts in a way that they feel will be to their benefit. Wilkinson’s study of decision making during violent events (2002) agrees, describing how violent incidents may seem irrational, but can be seen to have a rational sequence of events leading up to them. This particular study involved interviews with one hundred and twenty-five young offenders (and a matched local control group) in which they were asked to describe a detailed account of one or more violent incidents they had participated in. The content of the interviews was then analysed for references to reasons and motivations, weapons and targets.

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Wilkinson describes these violent events as being similar to ‘public performances’ in which certain precursory factors (particular places, finding a weapon, particular people) are put in place prior to the violent event. Using the Rational Choice Perspective to assist in the understanding of what the decision maker values, and what they are attempting to achieve is an important development in applying this approach to affective, as well as economic offences (Farrell, 2010). The patterns of aggressive behaviour as described above (Brezina, 2002) though highly personal for the offenders, seem nevertheless to fit within a Rational Choice Perspective framework. The making of a rational decision involves a purposeful, effective and measured way of achieving maximum utility for the decision maker. Remembering that this decision is not just based on external benefits and costs but also includes personal, affective, self-related and self-imposed costs and benefits is essential. The consideration of the effects of individual differences and personality characteristics and the influence of these factors on the decision-making process widens the Rational Choice Perspective of crime. Within this wider model, the individuals are not only rational, but their individual complex value systems are represented. This viewpoint helps move us away from the traditional dichotomy of criminological and psychological theories about crime, that offenders are either at the mercy of their personality ‘flaws’ (individual theories of crime) or are cool, logical decision makers, possessing all facts and relevant information (Classic Rational Choice). Joining both the understanding of the decision-making process with the knowledge about individual differences brings the two strands of understanding together. The explanation of aggressive behaviour offered by Brezina above, suggests that this analysis can be extended further. The criminal behaviour demonstrated by the youths in Brezina’s study (described above) clearly had a purpose in mind—that of self-protection. With a wider understanding of the costs and benefits for an offender, it is important to remember that the goal an offender is seeking to achieve is equally as pertinent to the decision-making process. Without an understanding of the outcome a person wants to achieve, even the best analysis of costs

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and benefits may fall short—and just like the costs and benefits themselves, these goals may be highly personal to the offender, and not easily understood by others at first examination. A deeper analysis and understanding of what people hope to achieve with either offending (their goals) as well as the costs and benefits that they consider seems to be the way forward in developing the Rational Choice Perspective for crime, as well as the key to understanding some of the more-difficult-to-explain crimes. The application of the Rational Choice Perspective to aggressive (Exum, 2002) and sexual (Bachman et al., 1992) offences has begun, but still remains an area with great potential for developing further understanding.

The Research in This Book The evidence presented above begins to suggest that the Rational Choice Perspective can begin to become an encompassing framework of analysis for the offending decision. There are still elements to the Rational Choice Perspective however that need exploration and development. Though work to apply the Perspective to violent and emotional/affective crimes has been done, the explanatory power of the Rational Choice Perspective still needs to be explored in this regard. In order to provide a useful model for explaining crime, it must be a model that can be applied to different offending individuals with different values and preferences, as well as different offence types. At this point in time, there seems to be lacking a unified model that can be applied to all offence types and all offending individuals with equal validity and success. While the research evidence so far looks promising, it has by no means proven that the Rational Choice Perspective is applicable in all offending cases and for all individuals, for many of whom an ‘offending decision’ does not appear to exist at all, least of all in the calculated manner specified by the approach. Referring back to earlier in this chapter, Bouffard (2002) suggests that individuals dealing with strong emotion can simply act to deal with this emotion without regard to outcomes or consequences, sometimes resulting in a criminal act. Though work has begun looking into expressive crime, the results of this research do not go so

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far as to completely convince us that for this type of crime, the Rational Choice Perspective is a useful tool for understanding these offences. On the subject of the versatility of the Rational Choice Perspective and its usefulness in understanding different offence types, there is a wide range of literature studying actual offences of different kinds within the Rational Choice framework, though these studies have tended to focus on one offence type at a time. Cornish and Clarke have called for a crime-specific theory, suggesting that different crimes have different decision calculi, and different things are considered in the decision to commit the crime. However, it is common that in many cases offending individuals have experiences of committing more than one offence type, and it would be useful to investigate whether a different decision (if any) was made for each offence type or whether underlying factors consistent within the individual were at play. To try and shed light on some of these issues, the following chapters present the results of interviews with a range of individuals convicted of at least one crime. They talk about their experiences, and the thoughts and considerations that were in play at the time of the criminal event, along with any situational or psychological factors that they feel influenced them at the time. By exploring these experiences, it is hoped that we can examine the evidence to suggest that a decision did (or did not) take place about committing an offence. To overcome some of the criticisms previously levelled at the research, all the people who took part in the research have real-life offending experience, and participants were chosen to represent varied offence types.

Gender A final point, which applies not only to this study, but to criminology in general, is the usual focus for the most part on men who commit crime (Miller, 2002b). While it is true that the majority of the offending population that is known about is male (Öza¸sçılar, 2022), it does not follow that a theory of offending decision making should therefore only apply to men (Davies, 1999). Feminist critiques of the Rational Choice Perspective have made just this point. Miller (2002a) comments

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that criminological theory either tends to ignore women, instead only focusing on men, or alternatively holds assumptions about women, for example they are less rational, and more emotional than men. Where criminological focus does point at the female offender, it is often within the context of ‘women as victim’ (Simpson, 1989). It is really important to recognise the nature in which women are often victimised in a male-dominated society, and indeed female offenders are very often also victims (Franklin, 2008) (so are male offenders, but not to the same extent). However, it would be remiss to dismiss the offending behaviour of women as entirely in response to men. Instead of focusing exclusively on men, it was felt that within this investigation, a focus on the decision making, or lack of decision making of both men and women would be beneficial. The research was not set up to look at gender differences, but rather to try and include as wide a range of people who commit crime as possible. It is certainly possible that due to established Gender roles, men and women may be sensitised to particular risks and rewards differently. Girls and women do tend to be raised under a higher level of scrutiny than men (Sampson & Laub, 1992) and this may lead to women offenders having a higher sensitivity to social sanctions for crime. Various studies have shown that women can be seen to consider some items more seriously, such as formal sanctions (Carmichael et al., 2005) or higher anticipated risk (Miller & Simpson, 1991) though more studies suggest that anticipated feeling such as shame and guilt are more influential (Rebellon et al., 2015). It is clear that for women offenders, the influences of risk and reward operate on an individual level, just as they do for men. Therefore, while it was important that the female criminal voice was represented here, the goal is not to set out a dichotomous analysis of gender and rational thinking, simply that women as a valid group of people who commit crime, need to be represented in any test of a theoretical model. After all, if the RCP is truly to be seen as a valid explanatory framework for the criminal decision, it should explain all such decisions. Therefore, it should apply to women who commit crime, as well as men. This is a recommendation increasingly being called for by criminological theorists as a way of strengthening the evidence of women’s

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agency in crime. Theorists such as Maruna (2001) call for the application of existing research and theory to more women, and Harding (1987) suggests that only by doing so will theory develop ideas of women’s agency in crime.

Chapter Summary It is hoped that by including a range of individuals with a range of offending experiences within the participant group, and allowing these individuals to speak about their experiences, thoughts and feelings leading up to their offence that a range of ideas and concepts can emerge that begin to link together these different experiences of decision making, or the absence of decision making, around offending. In doing so, the aim of this study is to investigate how far the individuals themselves felt a decision to offend was made, and what factors they felt were influential if this process was seen to take place. The following chapter will explain in more detail the reasons behind the participants chosen, and the way in which the study was conducted. It is not an exhaustive methodology chapter, but it does clarify some of the essential elements necessary for the research.

References Agnew, R. (1992). Foundation for a general strain theory of crime and delinquency. Criminology, 30, 47–87. Assaad, J., & Exum, L. (2002). Understanding intoxicated violence from a rational choice perspective. In A. Piquero & S. Tibbetts (Ed.), Rational choice and criminal behaviour: Recent research and future challenges. Routledge. Bachman, R., Paternoster, R., & Ward, S. (1992). The rationality of sexual offending: Testing a deterrence/rational choice conception of sexual assault. Law and Society Review, 26 , 343–372. Bouffard, J. (2002). The influence of emotion on rational decision making in sexual aggression. Journal of Criminal Justice, 30 (2), 121–134.

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Bouffard, J., Bry, J., Smith, S., & Bry, R. (2008). Beyond the science of sophomores: Does the rational choice explanation of crime generalise from university students to an actual offender sample. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 52(6), 698–721. Brezina, T. (2002). Assessing the rationality of criminal and delinquent behaviour: A focus on actual utility. In A. Piquero & S. Tibbetts (Eds.), Rational choice and criminal behaviour: Recent research and future challenges. Routledge. Carmichael, S., Langton, L., Pendell, G., Reitzel, J. D., & Piquero, A. R. (2005). Do the experiential and deterrent effect operate differently across gender? Journal of Criminal Justice, 33(3), 267–276. Carmichael, S., & Piquero, A. (2004). Sanctions, anger and criminal offending. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 20 (4), 371–393. Chermack, S. T., & Giancola, P. R. (1997). The relationship between alcohol and aggression: An integrated biophychosocial conceptualisation. Clinical Psychology Review, 17 (6), 621–649. Collins, R. (1993). Emotional energy as the common denominator of rational action. Rationality and Society, 5, 203. Cornish, D., & Clarke, R. (1986). The reasoning criminal : Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer-Verlag. Cromwell, P., Olson, J., Avary, D., & Marke, A. (1991). How drugs affect decisions by burglars. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 35 (4), 310–321. Davies, P. (1999). Women, crime and an informal economy: Female offending and crime for gain. British Criminology Conference: Selected Proceedings Vol 2. Papers from the British Society of Criminology Conference, Belfast. Exum, M. L. (2002). The application and robustness of the rational choice perspective in the study of intoxicated and angry intentions to aggress. Criminology, 40, 933–967. Exum, M. L., Austin, L. A., & Franklin, J. D. (2017). The effect of alcohol and arousal on criminal decision making. In W. Bernasco, J.-L. Van Gelder, & H. Elffers (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of offender decision making (pp. 445– 465). Oxford University Press. Farrell, G. (2010). Situational crime prevention and its discontents: Rational choice and harm reduction versus ‘cultural criminology.’ Social Policy and Administration, 44 (1), 40–66. Franklin, C. (2008). Women offenders, disparate treatment, and criminal justice: A theoretical, historical, and contemporary overview. Criminal Justice Studies, 21(4), 341–360.

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Harding, S. (Ed.). (1987). Feminism and methodology. Open University. Heckathorn, D. (1993). Emotions and rational choice: Introduction. Rationality and Society, 5 (2), 157–159. Hirschleifer, J. (1992). The affectations and the passions: Their economic logic. Rationality and Society, 5 (2), 185–202. House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts. (2023). Alcohol treatment services Fifty-Fourth Report of Session 2022–23. UK Parliament. Hull, J. G., & Bond, C. F. (1986). Social and behavioural consequences of alcohol consumption and expectancy: A meta analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 99 (3), 347–360. Loewenstein, G. (1996). Out of control: Visceral influences on behaviour. Organisational Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, 65, 272–292. Maisto, S., Galizion, M., & Connors, G. (2010). Drug use and abuse. Wadsworth Publishing Co. Maruna, S. (2001). Making good: How ex-convicts reform and rebuild their lives. American Psychological Association. Miller, J. (2002a). The strengths and limits of ‘doing gender’ for understanding street crime. Theoretical Criminology, 6 (4), 433. Miller, J. (2002b). Reconciling feminism and rational choice theory: Women’s agency in street crime. In A. R. Piquero & S. G. Tibbetts (Eds.), Rational choice and criminal behaviour: Recent research and future challenges. Routledge. Miller, S. L., & Simpson, S. S. (1991). Courtship violence and social control: Does gender matter? Law & Society Review, 25 (2), 335–365. Öza¸sçılar, M. (2022). Gender differences in rational decisions on shoplifting. Crime Prevention and Community Safety, 24 (2), 169–187. Rebellon, C. J., Wiesen-Martin, D., Piquero, N. L., Piquero, A. R., & Tibbetts, S. G. (2015). Gender differences in criminal intent: Examining the mediating influence of anticipated shaming. Deviant Behavior, 36 (1), 17–41. Sampson, R., & Laub, J. (1992). Crime and deviance in the life course. Annual Review of Sociology, 18, 63–84. Simpson, S. (1989). Feminist theory, crime and justice. Criminology, 27 , 605– 631. Tedeschi, J. T., & Felson, R. B. (1994). Violence, aggression and coercive actions. American Psychological Association. Weisman, A. M., & Taylor, S. P. (1994). Effect of alcohol and risk of physical harm on human physical aggression. The Journal of General Psychology, 121(1), 67–75.

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Wilkinson, D. (2002). Decision making in violent events among adolescent males: An examination of ‘sparks’ and other motivational factors. In A. Piquero & S. Tibbetts (Ed.), Rational choice and criminal behaviour: Recent research and future challenges. Routledge.

6 Exploring Experiences of Crime

This chapter will briefly set out the rationale for the research that follows and explain how the data was collected. Though a long, detailed methodology chapter is more at home in a thesis than a book of this type, it is important to mention some of the considerations here as they have direct relevance to both the previous research in the Rational Choice Perspective, and to the validity of any conclusions that can be drawn from it. The approach taken for this research was a fairly standard methodology, in that the semi-structured interview was the tool of choice, but in addition special techniques, adapted from the toolkit of techniques known as the ‘cognitive interview’ (see Fisher et al., 1987) were used to help the participants recall as much detail as possible. This chapter will also describe who participated in the study and what sort of experiences they have had, as well as give a picture of the gender and age range included within the study. All of this information will hopefully explain why the findings from this research are especially interesting, and useful to the exploration of how offenders make decisions.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Steele, Exploring the Criminal Decision Process, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46231-3_6

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How was the Data Collected? In order to access real experiences of thinking about committing an offence, it was really important to actually access those with that experience. As explained earlier, many studies within the area of Rational Choice and offending have relied on using non-criminal populations to look at the decision-making process. That is, participants have been asked to think about how they would think about making a decision in different scenarios. While this has been useful in theory development, there is no doubt that ‘thinking about thinking about a decision’ is no substitute for the real-world experience of actually thinking about a reallife decision with real-life rewards and consequences. When a person becomes involved in criminal behaviour, whether they make a decision or not, the pressures, considerations and the reasons for that behaviour can only be known to them. In order to access these experiences, therefore, it is appropriate to speak to those that have had them. An in-depth interview gave the opportunity to spend considerable amounts of time listening to the participants (average interview was just over one hour, some as long as three hours) talk about their experiences, not only what they did and how it happened, but also what they were feeling, experiencing, thinking and not thinking at that time. Through these interviews, it felt possible to glimpse the reality as lived by the participant, and express their experiences and views, their meanings, and use these to represent and constitute their understanding of the world in which they live. As Charmaz (2004, p. 980) states, We can know about a world by describing it from the outside, yet to understand what living in that world means, we need to learn from the inside.

The overall goal of this study was to examine the experiences of the participants, and ‘learn from the inside’ of their experiences. The reality of the participants’ world is embedded within their perception of their own experiences and is a product of their engagement and interaction with the world (Berg, 2001). As it is these experiences that are important, this research helped to move away from those studies which utilise

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‘proxies’ for real experiences and tap into the lived reality of those that have actually committed crime—and are therefore the ‘experts’ within the research (Nee, 2010) and in their own life experiences.

Designing the Interview As mentioned earlier, interviews are a popular choice for research that seeks to search out ideas, concepts and themes from a set of experiences. As stated, a lot of research within this area has utilised proxy populations, but there have been some notable studies that have conducted primary research with an offending population. One such classic study was undertaken by Maruna (2001) in his large-scale investigation into desistance from offending. Maruna utilised a technique known as the ‘life story interview’, adapted from the version used by McAdams (1985). This interview was semi-structured in style, meaning that the interviewer could guide the topic, but allowing flexibility for the participant to include whatever they felt was important. Another example of the use of interview methods in criminological research is the study by Zamble and Quinsey (1997) who used this technique to research the criminal recidivism process. Zamble and Quinsey asked their participants (recently re-convicted Canadian prisoners) about the events leading up to their most recent re-offence. They supplemented this interview with the use of two ‘timelines’ which prompted the participants to recall their thoughts, feelings and time taken between the first ‘thought’ of an offence occurring, and the actions to the point at which commission of that offence took place. Bennett and Wright (1984) used a similar technique, using semi-structured interviews with more than one hundred and twenty burglary ‘specialists’ in order to examine what affected their decision to offend. The use of the interview is therefore the best approach to obtaining the data required for the present purposes. Interviews can be flexible and allow access to the participant’s own understanding of their actions (Bottoms et al., 2004) ideal for this study. The interview schedule was designed loosely upon the ideas used by Zamble and Quinsey which is to elicit information from the offender about his or her offending, and the

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thoughts, circumstances and feelings that led to that action being taken, allowing the participants to define their own timelines of before and after the incident. The men and women interviewed were asked to talk about their most recent prosecuted offence (which of course may not be the same as their most recent offence). All participants were under current supervision by the Probation Service either on a community order or on licence. They were all asked to describe what happened, and then to go back to the time before the offence. They were asked to talk about what was happening to them at the time, their own feelings and thoughts and what went through their mind in the minutes, hours and days leading up to the offending event. The timescale was left up to them—they could talk about the minutes, hours or weeks before the offence took place if they wanted to. Likewise, they could talk about whatever aspects of their experience they felt were important, leading up to the offence. Participants were allowed to introduce whatever topics they felt were relevant to this narrative. This flexibility was allowed in an attempt to access the factors that were important to the offender, rather than the researcher. With any interview, there is trust that the participants will tell the truth about their experiences. This may be particularly important when interviewing people about their criminal behaviour—there may be the motivation to hide details, or minimise responsibility. Conversely, some individuals may like to exaggerate for effect (Graham & Bowling, 1995). There was no reason to believe that the participants within this study did any of these things, and some measures were taken to make sure the details of their narrative were accurate.1 More of an issue was the fact that participants were recalling events that happened some time ago. Memories, over time, can be subject to distortion or modification (through, for example, hindsight) and this would affect the accuracy of the stories that 1

The facts of the offence, e.g. the time of day, place, victim, co-offenders, what behaviour took place, etc., were cross-references with an official description of events recorded within the individual’s OASys (Offender Assessment System) risk assessment, which is informed by Police and Probation records. This helped to ensure that the observable elements of the offence were accurate and were not being misrepresented in the interview.

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people tell. As it is really important to understand exactly what was going on for the individual at the time of the event, special measures were used to increase the likelihood of rich and accurate recall.

The Cognitive Interview There are a set of techniques known as ‘cognitive interview’ that are used by the police in interviewing witnesses that acts in order to increase the number and accuracy of facts recalled by eye witnesses (Fisher et al., 1987). Although often called a ‘cognitive interview’, this technique is not a procedure in itself, but is a collection of techniques that can increase recall of events. Research has found that using these techniques can result in up to thirty-five per cent more information being recalled than a basic interview (Fisher et al., 1987). This information also tends to be more accurate (Geiselman et al., 1985). Though these techniques are more commonly used in the interview of witnesses or victims of crime, in this instance, they were incorporated into the planning and execution of the interviews with the offenders, in order to assist them in accurate recall of as much information as possible about their thoughts, feelings and events leading up to an offence, in order to obtain as accurate a reflection as possible of their experiences. The methods of increased recall that the ‘cognitive interview’ employs are rooted in knowledge of the principles of memory, particularly that there are different ways of retrieving information (Milne & Bull, 2002). There is extensive evidence to suggest that this approach to interviewing can be effective at improving recall (Boon & Noon, 1994; Fisher et al., 1989; Geiselman et al., 1985) and therefore some of these techniques were adopted within this study to help the participants recall a more detailed and in-depth picture of what they were thinking and feeling at the time of the event. One of the techniques used emphasises the importance of the sequencing and timing of questions. A failure to sequence questions properly, or to interrupt a participant in their description, can result in their recall being disrupted and potentially useful information being lost. For example, if a participant was midway through describing what they

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had seen, it could really put them off their stride to interject and ask what they were hearing, potentially losing out on useful info (Kebbell et al., 1999). This could equally apply to a participant offender who is diverted from recalling their feelings or thoughts (internal focus) to what was happening around them (external focus). Other ‘cognitive interview’ techniques adopted are methods often used within qualitative interviews, without explicitly referring to them as cognitive techniques. The technique of ‘mentally reinstating’ the personal context that existed for the individual at the time of the offence, is a key element of the interview and timeline technique and has been used in previous studies of this type (e.g. Zamble & Quinsey, 1997). This simply involved asking participants to explore what was around them at the time, externally, and try to recall all of the internal things that were going on for them at the time. Did they feel happy, sad, bored, excited, desperate? Were they influenced by drugs or drinking? Were they worried about something, or distracted perhaps? Research suggests that reconstructing the personal context of the crime has been found to be particularly powerful technique (Geiselman et al., 1985). With the purpose of this research being to discover the existence of any evidence of decision making or rational thought leading up to an offence, this technique could be very useful. The second of these techniques simply encourages the participant to report everything they recall. If it is remembered by the participant, then it may be important to them, and this is exactly what we are trying to discover—what important factors affected their thinking. Finally as well at the technique of recalling events in a timeline leading up to the event, participants were then asked to move backwards though the event being prompted to consider what elements had led them to be in their particular position. It was hoped that the use of these techniques was helpful in prompting the participants to recover as much contextual memory of the thoughts and feelings that had leading up to an event, therefore fulfilling the initial goal of the interviews, i.e. accessing the ‘internal reality’ of the offending experience.

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Making the Data Make Sense As suggested earlier, it is really important for this type of research that to understand a person’s decision making, we must consider what is important to them, not what the researcher may assume is important. To make sure that the ideas and concepts that came out of the analysis made sense to people with the actual experiences, the themes and data were discussed with groups of different offenders using focus groups. Interviews and focus groups are a common research combination (Morgan, 1996). They also added to the richness of the data collected, as the participants were able to discuss with each other their own reasons and thinking behind their behaviour. This is an important validity check, and is a great way to make sure that the analysis being done actually made sense to those with similar life experiences to the people interviewed.

Who Were the Participants? As stated above, all of the forty-six men and women interviewed were currently under supervision by the Probation Service in England, most being on licence after prison release, and a few being on Community Orders. In order to make this study as thorough as possible, it is important to get a range of different people as participants. As stated earlier in this book, many studies on decision making in offending focus only on acquisitive crime, and though there are studies on violent, sexual or other non-acquisitive crimes, these are not as common. Another common issue with crime research in general is that much of it focuses on men. There are very good reasons for this, in 2021/22 less than 15% of arrests made were of women (Statista.com). However, if the research was to properly explore the Rational Choice Perspective as a useful model to explain all crime for all offenders, it was really important to include women in the sample. A range of ages were included in the sample in order to get the widest range of experiences possible, with the individuals being interviewed ranging from 18 and 60 years of age, the average age was around 34. The average age for female participants was slightly higher

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at 35, with men having an average age of 33. On average, the interviews with the male participants lasted 81 minutes, with the shortest being 45 minutes and the longest 125 minutes. Interviews with female offenders were somewhat longer, the average being 103 minutes, with a minimum of 58 minutes and the maximum being 180 minutes. All of the participants were categorised into acquisitive or non-acquisitive categories based on the offence they spoke about, but most had a varied offending history. The final thing to note here are the ethical considerations that need to be made for research of this type. The ethics of research are a complex and extensive area of study in their own right. They are particularly of concern when interviewing people about their own illegal activity. General ethical issues, such as right to withdraw, and good record keeping of course apply, but there are some particular things to consider. Asking individuals to relive their ‘real-life’ experiences of their offending behaviour can be difficult for them—their behaviour may have caused them real trauma or remind them of a time in their lives that they were at a very low ebb. These experiences may also be difficult for the researcher to hear, and a certain level of professional detachment—a must for all successful researchers, may be needed. The issue of confidentiality is also important—the changing of names, removed of identifying details and so on comes as standard, but the extent to which confidentiality can be assured in this kind of interview is debated. All names in this book are pseudonyms given to protect identities. How far can the research confidentiality agreement be upheld, where information shared may indicate future illegal activity on the part of the participant of or others? The research principle that the research should remain confidential, and yet should cause no harm can therefore be contradictory and problematic, and needs careful consideration (Crow & Semmens, 2008). In research relating to crime, it is not possible to ensure complete confidentiality (Feenan, 2002; Hodgson et al., 2006). This is particularly important should this information shared pertain to something that may cause harm to a victim, especially if that victim were a child. In studies such as this, these issues need to be considered carefully. In this instance, it was made clear to participants that should they share

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any information that led the researcher to believe someone was at risk of harm, that this would be flagged appropriately and not kept confidential for the purposes of preventing that harm. All participants were very happy to comply with this condition, and the issue did not arise.

Talking About Crime This chapter will start to investigate the themes and concepts that emerged from the interview data and begin to explore the evidence for rational decision making within these offending experiences. In particular, the initially apparent differences between those describing experiences of acquisitive offending, such as shoplifting and burglary, will be contrasted to those with predominantly non-acquisitive offending experiences, such as assault, wounding or other violent behaviour. In order to facilitate analysis, participants were separated into two groups—those whose main offence fell into the acquisitive category (that is, the goal of the offending was clearly to gain money or goods) and the non-acquisitive category. This decision follows suggestions and practices from previous research which tends to focus on one category of crime (e.g. burglary, violent offending) (Cornish & Clarke, 1987). Therefore, these broad categories were initially used as a tool to separate the data and to aid comparison and contrast should differences in experience be found. However, these categories were not designed to be a ‘hard border’ between experiences, and as the research shows, this border between experiences of different offence types is more blurred, or even non-existent, than previous studies and arbitrary categories may suggest. This categorisation was not made known to the participant and was applied to the data after completion of the interviews to aid analysis—this is important to note as participants were in fact encouraged to talk about not only this ‘index offence’ but also any other experiences of offending, thinking about offending or feelings about offending that they may have. Based on index offence only, there was a wide range of offending experience within the participant sample. Non-acquisitive category offences

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included attempted murder, wounding, assault in various forms, criminal damage and various dangerous driving offences. Acquisitive offences covered a range including robbery, burglary, shoplifting and theft, fraud and personal drug use.

Chapter Summary This chapter has focused on the way in which the present study was designed to try and get into the real and meaningful detail of a person’s thoughts, feelings and motivations as they were leading up to committing an offence. In this way, it is hoped that the resulting research data will be as valid as possible, enabling a deep-reaching analysis to be completed, and a true test of the Rational Choice Perspective to be applied. The next chapter begins to explore these experiences in depth, and gives the participants of the study chance to express themselves in their own words.

References Bennett, T., & Wright, R. (1984). Burglars on burglary: Prevention and the offender. Aldershot books. Berg, B. L. (2001). Qualitative research methods for the social sciences. Allyn & Bacon. Boon, J., & Noon, E. (1994). Changing perspectives in cognitive interviewing. Psychology, Crime and Law, 1(1), 59–69. Bottoms, A., Shapland, J., Costello, A., Holmes, D., & Muir, G. (2004). Towards desistance: Theoretical underpinnings for an empirical study. The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, 43, 368–389. Cornish, D., & Clarke, R. (1987). Understanding crime displacement: An application of rational choice theory. Criminology, 25 (4), 933–947. Charmaz, K. (2004). Keynote address: Fifth international advances in qualitative methods conference: Premises, principles and practices in qualitative research—revisiting the foundations. Qualitative Health Research, 14 (7), 976–993.

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Crow, I., & Semmens, N. (2008). Researching criminology. Open University Press. Feenan, D. (2002). Legal issues in acquiring information about illegal activity in criminological research. British Journal of Criminology, 42(4), 762–781. Fisher, R., Geiselman, R.E. & Amador, M. (1989). Field test of the cognitive interview: Enhancing the recollection of actual victims and witnesses of crime. Journal of Applied Psychology, 74 (5), 722. Fisher, R. P., Geiselman, E. & Raymond, D. S. (1987). Critical analysis of police interview techniques. Journal of Police Science and Administration, 15 (3), 177–185. Geiselman, R. E., Fisher, R., Mackinnon, D., & Holland, H. (1985). Enhancement of eyewitness memory with the cognitive interview. American Journal of Psychology, 99 (3), 385–401. Graham, J., & Bowling, B. (1995). Young people and crime. Home Office Research Study, 145. Hodgson, P., Parker, A., & Seddon, T. (2006). Doing drugs research in the criminal justice system: Some notes from the field. Addiction Research and Theory, 14 (3), 253–264. Kebbell, M. R., Milne, R., & Wagstaff, G. F. (1999). The cognitive interview: A survey of its forensic effectiveness. Psychology, Crime and Law, 5, 101–115. Maruna, S. (2001). Making good: How ex-convicts reform and rebuild their lives. American Psychological Association. McAdams, D. P. (1985). Power, intimacy and the life story: Personological enquiries into identity. Guildford Press. Milne, R., & Bull, R. (2002). Back to basics: A componential analysis of the original Cognitive Interview Mnemonics with three age groups. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 16 (7), 743–753. Morgan, D. (1996). Focus Groups. Annual Review of Sociology., 22, 129–152. Nee, C. (2010). Research on residential burglary: Ways of improving validity and participants’ recall when gathering data. In Bernasco, W. (Ed.) Offenders on offending: Learning about crime from criminals. Willan Press. Statista.com (2023) Number of arrests in England and Wales in 2021/22, by offence and gender. https://www.statista.com/statistics/377453/femalesarrests-type-of-offense-england-and-wales/ last accessed 17 August 2023. Zamble, E., & Quinsey, V. (1997). The criminal recidivism process. Cambridge University Press.

7 The Lived Experience of Crime—In Their Own Words

An initial analysis of the data did indeed reveal some differences in the thinking process between the participants in each offence type category. There was, in general, a difference in the phrases individuals used about their offences. Those offenders in the acquisitive category appeared to make decisions about their offending, whereas the individuals in the non-acquisitive (violent/emotive) category did not make such explicit decision statements. Statements such as ‘I planned’ and ‘I thought’ were common within the acquisitive category, but not present within the other category of offenders. Evidence from the acquisitive offenders will be explored first.

Acquisitive Offending When analysing the narratives of the acquisitive individuals, it was apparent immediately that statements of intent were common: Phrases such as ‘I wanted’ and ‘I needed’ suggested that at the very least, there was some consideration of a goal or desire that the participant was aware © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Steele, Exploring the Criminal Decision Process, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46231-3_7

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of prior to the offence taking place. Indeed, acquisitive offenders’ narratives were marked by their desire to meet a need or want, and in fact, in many cases, the participants actually stated that they made a decision to go after what they wanted/needed. For example, one male participant expressed how all his actions followed his desire to ‘make money’ clearly expounding the decision-making processes involved in his behaviour. I was going out with a specific reason. I was going out with the specific intention of making money. (Michael)

This was a commonly expressed idea—but the analysis showed even more evidence of forethought. Not only were individuals planning to go out and get what they needed or wanted, but they planned to do this in a way that deliberately maximised their chances of doing so. For many, this was based on prior knowledge on what methods would work best. This prior knowledge may be from previous experience, or simply from canvassing demand from those around them, for whatever they may be able to steal to order. I thought, if it’s there, I want it, I’ll take it. Simple. I would never take anything unless I could get it sold though. If someone said ‘I need a new laptop’ that’s what I would get for them. (Kevin)

Maximising utility is a clearly defined concept within the Rational Choice Perspective of offending and seems to be clearly demonstrated by some of the participants within this sample. Of course, the phrase maximising utility does not tend to occur in the narrative of people talking about their own experiences (unless they happen to be psychologists, or economists), but the concept of maximising ‘takings’ seemed to be a popular preoccupation. My thing is fraud and deception. I sold weed for a bit, but there was too much going round so not enough money in it. (Sol)

Supply and demand, again more commonly the subject of choice for economists, appeared to be a common theme. This is an interesting point

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to note, given the roots of the Rational Choice group of theories in economics. For many of these individuals, a lot of thought seemed to go into how best to work the demand for whatever they could provide, and how they could best supply it to their advantage. Within the remit of the individual’s range of experience and expertise, decisions were clearly made on how best to ‘maximise utility’ or as the participants put it, profit. As one woman said: I always planned to get lists of what people wanted me to get for them, I knew I wouldn’t be able to get rid of some stuff but there were always some things you knew you could always get rid of like CDs, DVDs. Things like that I would always take. (Annie)

Another female offender, also a shoplifter, comments: I took orders. It was the best way of doing it; you knew you could sell the stuff straight away. Those (hair) straighteners…………. everyone wanted them at Christmas. (Jenni)

She goes on to elaborate: (My) offences were pretty well planned – even when I didn’t take orders I had an idea what to go for anyway and I could always get rid of my stuff especially at Christmas. All my buyers love the ASDA stuff – they could take it back then and get the money back. (Jenni)

Maximising the profit that can be made certainly seems to be a common theme in the experiences of shoplifters so far. This is clear evidence of a decision-making process in that the participant wants money and participates in shoplifting to obtain goods that they can sell for money. They describe taking the time to think about how they can make sure that what they have to sell is also something that someone wants to buy. However, this consideration of supply and demand is not always contained to the pre-offence planning, with other participants talking about how they assess opportunities to make money even as they are involved in shoplifting for items for other customers. For example:

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I have been in a shop grafting (shoplifting) to order, and seen someone pick up a £60 top, and I would say to them ‘I can get you that for £30’ and they will say ‘yeah go on then’. (Kaz)

This process makes sense for the individual—they are already shoplifting in a location and for goods that appeal to their ‘customers’. Suggesting to other potential customers that they may be able to supply items they are interested in could be a potential way to expand their profit without much extra effort—they are after all already doing the job! Of course, offering a theft on demand service to a stranger could be a risk—what if that person informs the shop security? The element of risk in offending decision making is an important concept, as discussed earlier in this book, and is something that comes up again from the offenders’ experience. For now, we can continue with an exploration of this emerging idea of planning ahead—and maximising profits.

Thinking Ahead Planning, or thinking ahead, is a recurring concept or theme within the experiences of the acquisitive category individuals. As these participants describe their efforts to obtain maximum utility or profit, with minimum effort and risk, they also refer to planning ahead in order to get the most benefit out of any effort that they are making to obtain their goal. By doing this, the individuals are describing their experiences in being as efficient as possible. One young woman, who offended to obtain money for her own drug use, explains: Think, plan, then go out. Then you would only need to go out once and make enough to get enough (drugs) for the day. If they (offences) were not planned, you would need to go out four or five times a day. (Sheila)

Another participant, a middle-aged man with a long history of armed robbery corroborates this idea:

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Stake out the office where they keep cash for a few weeks to see when the money is taken. Go and loosen the hinges on the door. Then on the day go to the cashier office and kick the door in. (Peter)

This level of planning is clear—not only is this participant thinking ahead but is taking preparatory action some considerable time in advance to make sure that his offending efforts are successful. In doing so, this participant has made sure he got what he wanted from the exercise. Thinking and planning ahead can therefore, from the analysis of this group of participants at least, take the form of assessing supply and demand, of familiarising oneself with the environment and habits of targets, but it can also take other, much more creative forms. Some participants, quite apart from ensuring they get what they need, seem quite good at making things go as smoothly as possible by managing others’ perceptions. One enterprising female shoplifter became skilled in avoiding the attention often focused on a known criminal. When I shoplifted I planned loads. I used to wear uniforms – nurses’ uniforms, hairdressers’ outfits. ‘Cause I’ve got short hair I used to wear wigs – look completely different. I made foil bags, and go on the train – Chester, Warrington, St Helens. It was like going to work – doing a day’s work. I went there yesterday, so I’ll leave there today. I wore that wig with that uniform last time, so I’ll change. (Sheila)

This participant’s creative approach to her ‘work’ seems akin to the process that some actors may use to get into character—using props and costume to ‘set the scene’ for whatever character or performance they are portraying. This intriguing idea is further developed by the same woman. She also described how being caught travelling without a train ticket compromised her chances of appearing calm during a subsequent offence. Being caught on a train without a valid ticket would make her flustered, even if the potential outcome was less serious than the offending she had planned for later in the day. It was really important to her to play the character of a good, law abiding citizen, so invested in this characterisation, and therefore ensured her calm, unflustered state of mind, by investing in a monthly rail card for this sole purpose.

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Changing the way you look was also a common tactic for the participants in this research. For example, one man talked about how he used his appearance to assist with his theft from various supermarkets. I specialise in filling supermarket trolleys with wine and joints of meat then walk out to the car park. I get away with it for about 6 months before they notice. You put on trousers and a shirt and tie, not a tracksuit. Look respectable and no-one bothers you. (Jack)

Looking at what has been discovered so far, the planning ahead, the changing of outfits and the careful preparations that some people take before they commit a crime, then it would certainly seem that there is evidence that people are thinking somewhat rationally. Where the crime type being discussed is acquisitive—that is, people are committing crime to get money (usually by stealing goods to sell)—it does seem that at least some elements of the Rational Choice Perspective would apply. The approach suggests that when making a decision, a person will maximise the utility of that decision. In other words, a person will make a decision that maximises the positive outcome of the decision, while minimising the risks or negative outcomes of the decision. To explore this idea a bit further, it is interesting to explore exactly what the perceived rewards and risks are as they appear to the person considering a crime. From an observer’s point of view, it may seem simple to point out the benefits, but also the risks of deciding to commit a crime— but it is important to remember that a situation can only ever be fully understood by the person having that experience. Understanding how someone assesses the potential positive outcomes as well as the possible risks could be key to understanding the offending decision.

Risks and Rewards Previous literature has explored the range of risks and rewards that influence decision making around offending, far beyond the official ‘risks’ or sanctions posed by the courts. In order to assess the application of rational choice theories to decisions about offending, the full range of

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risks and rewards of each decision must be recognised, and the theoretical approach must be flexible enough to recognise them all (Paternoster & Simpson, 1993). Though an observer may be able to have a guess at what things were of most importance to the ‘offender’ at the time, it can never be known exactly what was going through their mind. It is therefore very important to understand what the individual was thinking about, what aspects were weighed up (and what aspects may be unknown or ignored) and what the individual cared about most at the time. This latter point is key—for example, an individual committing an offence may well be aware that they are at risk of detection and prosecution for their behaviour, but they may not think it is likely, or in fact, not care too much about that possibility. Though a potential arrest and a court appearance would be very off-putting to most citizens, research has shown that this does not hold so much sway over the decision making of many people who commit crime. Many of the people interviewed for this book had been in prison, or serving some form of community sentence, many times before. The thought of appearing in the courtroom or even of being sentenced to custody was therefore not a novel thought—and so was not given too much weight in the decision-making process. ‘Weighing up’ the risks of being caught for a criminal offence would look like a very different process for a non-offender, than it would for someone with previous experience in the criminal justice system. Research again shows that this affects the decision-making process in two ways—the individual does not see the negative impact of being caught as being as serious as we may think, but also it suggests that many individuals just don’t give the possibility of being caught any headspace at all (Wright & Decker, 1994). If decision-making theory, and in particular the Rational Choice Perspective, is to be helpful, it must be able to explain both aspects of the weighing up of risks and rewards for any action—that is, how much do people think about them, and how much do people care about them. The idea that individuals thinking about crime both ignore and spend very little time considering, being caught, as well as the idea that they care less about the possibility, is something that came through in the interviews discussed here.

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The concept of ‘bounded rationality’ (Cornish & Clarke, 1986) suggests that decision makers are making decisions within certain boundaries—they may be rushed for time, have limited access to information, or be making decisions under stress. Certainly, most decisions made by us all on a daily basis are not perfect—we can be rushed, impulsive, too lazy to research things properly, or simply stressed and exhausted. Making ‘bounded decisions’ is certainly part of the everyday human condition. The idea that potential offenders are making rushed or imperfect decisions is often attributed to the fact that they are not aware of the risks of arrest, prosecution and sentence—but it could be argued that actually, as many of these individuals have been through the system before, they likely have a better assessment of the risks of discovery than the average person. Arguments made in Rational Choice approaches that offenders do not fully understand the consequences of their offending decisions are at the core of the ‘bounded decision’-making approach to offending behaviour. There were certainly many references within the interviews to the idea that individuals simply did not think about the consequences of their actions. For example, when the concept of ‘thinking about consequences’ was mentioned in an interview, the following was a fairly typical response. One male shoplifter says; No, you think about the money. While you are doing it, you think about what you can get, like a bad day at a job, that’s all. (Sol)

Interviewees describe how they understand potential consequences but that this does not necessarily affect their decision. A female shoplifter said: We know, I knew, what could happen if you get caught – but you need to do it and get it done, and you can’t think about it. (Sally)

Another male burglar agrees: When you do it you don’t think about the consequences, you just go ahead and do it. Not that you don’t know them, Oh no, you know what

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can happen, you don’t think about it at the time. You don’t care – it’s not important. (Alan)

Other individuals are more specific about their expectations of exactly what the consequences would entail. I’ll go out, know what can happen if you got caught, at first a slap on the wrist or conditional discharge. (Ned)

The idea, then, that individuals were making poor decisions because they were unaware of certain information, such as the likelihood of getting caught, or what would happen if they did, does not seem accurate. For these individuals at least, it seems that they did have that information (again, usually from prior experience) but that they just did not think about it —instead being more focused on what they had to gain, than what they had to lose. Many were very specific about what they thought could or would happen at some point—but still, remained focused on their goal rather than the risks. Even where potential consequences were very serious, people still focused on benefit rather than risk. As Another female shoplifter says: Because I shoplift every day, I know I’ll get caught now and again. I’ll only get a couple of weeks in jail. That usually does me good and settles me down a bit. (Jenni)

This sentiment applies to other types of offence also. A male drug dealer says: You know what can happen – and you know that you’d be ok. Prison means nothing to me. (Stephan)

Even at the most extreme range of potential consequences, the thinking appears similar. An offender with a string of convictions for serious violent offences says:

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If I went out I know I could get wiped off (caught) I gamble with a life sentence every time. It might put you off, but no, I just go back out and get straight back on it. (Kevin)

It would appear then that one of the main risks (as we see it) of offending behaviour is largely being ignored or being given very little thinking time. As suggested earlier, this may simply be because the possibility of serving a sentence is not as meaningful to someone with experience of the system as it would be to the average individual. Another aspect of this is the individual’s assessment of how likely it is that they will actually be caught. Therefore, the amount of consideration given to the main risk is made up of both the self-assessed ‘odds’ of being caught and how much the individual would actually mind being caught. On the ‘odds’ of being caught, the general feeling was that they were fairly low. One male shoplifter with a long history of shoplifting offences states regarding his offence: I get away with it a lot. I have only been caught twice – it is easy and quick. (Freddie)

An experienced female shoplifter says: There are 70 odd charges on my pre-cons, but I have loads more – 15 years worth of doing it daily. I was good at it. (Lydia)

Far from the idea of making an ‘imperfect’ decision due to lack of information about outcomes, it appears that in reality, many of those committing crime have a fairly good and even thorough understanding of the potential consequences of being caught and see their chances of success as favourable. In many cases, their understanding of sentencing practice and punishment was far more sophisticated than perhaps that of the general public. The other aspect of consideration around the risks of arrest is the value placed on this outcome by the individual—likely to far less than to someone with no previous experience.

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An Occupational Hazard Several individuals described how the official sanctions given to them were perceived as perhaps less serious than they would seem to the nonoffending observer. One man explains: I have been going to jail since I was 16 and it has never bothered me. (Michael)

Another man goes further: It’s a job, and jail is just, you know, an occupational hazard. All jobs have a down side. (Jay)

In fact, some individuals went as far as to say it was a positive outcome for them. This is summed up by one woman: Easy two occasions at least, I have got nicked purposely especially in winter – just for a roof over my head and food for a couple of weeks. (Tracey)

Clearly, the intended deterrent effect of official arrest, sentencing and even custody is not as effective as it may seem. The idea that ‘getting caught’ is factored into a decision as being both unlikely and unimportant is key to assessing if a Rational Choice Perspective can explain decision making around offending. The further idea that in some cases, some people would actually deliberately get arrested in order to get custody for short spells of time may seem counterintuitive but was mentioned by several men and women within their interviews.

Other Costs of Offending If official sanctions are not factored into a decision as costs or risks— what is? There are certainly some risks considered in the decision-making process, but according to this research, these are far more likely to be

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personal than anything to do with arrest and sentencing. Many of those spoken to were dismissive at the possibility of being arrested, or even the personal impact of a custodial sentence, but instead talked about costs that were individual to themselves. One man talks about how he is put off from shoplifting, even though he generally commits robberies and burglaries—offences many would see as much more serious. For him— that is the key. He would not want his peers to think any less of him for taking part in a ‘lesser’ crime. I have done armed robberies and that; I have done all kinds, all extremes. I don’t like shoplifting though, it is scary. Scared of getting seen and embarrassed. It’s not the getting caught bit, jail wise, just the social part. People know me. (Stephan)

For this man, the embarrassment of being caught shoplifting and the subsequent effect on his reputation is far worse than being caught committing a robbery. For many others, it is the way that offending affects their families that weighs heavy. One woman, an experienced shoplifter, worries about keeping her behaviour from her family. I feel bad, not about the nicking stuff, but about lying to my family about where I got stuff. I feel guilty about lying to them. Once, my mum insisted on giving me the money for a pair of trainers for the (kids) I’d pinched, and I said ‘No, it’s fine’ but she insisted and I felt really bad. (Kaz)

Effect on family was a repeatedly cited ‘cost’ of an offence to the offender. One male offender, convicted of fraud, accepts that he got a jail sentence, but does not see this as the primary cost of his actions. Instead, he says: The emotional fall out is horrendous. On my wife, my kids. (Barry)

Barry feels strongly after the offence that his family suffered the worst of the consequences of his actions, but freely admits that he did

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not consider this when planning how to manage the fraud offences, committed to feed a gambling addiction. For a lot of our marriage I have lied – but not in an unfaithful sort of way, it has always been finances, so it was OK. But those finances have big consequences – I would lie and say I was at work when I was actually at the Casino or lie I was in a traffic jam when I was actually in a Casino. I didn’t even think about it. But now, she says ‘I have been married to him but I don’t even know him’. (Barry)

One female offender talks about the negative outcomes of an offence, in terms of her relationship: I was in a violent relationship. It was more what he would do to me if I got caught (shoplifting) than what the law could do. Not official stuff, just him. (Sheila)

This would seem like excellent motivation not to commit an offence, but as the same woman describes further in this chapter, that was not an option for her. Negative effects on family were a common theme and the exact nature of these effects was as personal as each individual’s situation. Effects on parents, children and partners were all mentioned. While many of the individuals interviewed were at peace, or even satisfied with the negative effects of their behaviour on themselves, they did not want others that they cared about to suffer in any way. For example, one man with a long history of stealing cars describes how his behaviour has impacted on his brother: I realise now why it is so bad. Last year I caught my little brother doing it. He is only 17 and looks up to me. I took the car off of him, and told him ‘I learned the hard way’ and don’t want (him to). I was a bad example. Don’t want him having the same problems. (Phil)

Negative effects on loved ones may not be an immediate consideration for some people when committing crime, but the realisation that their actions have impacted on those closest may come further down the

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line. For example, one man talked about how his family was falling apart around him, and that the lack of closeness and time spent with loved ones was a real regret: I have been going to jail since I was 16, and it has never bothered me, but now I am thinking, it’s taken too much life from me. I know someone who came out (of custody) and their family had passed away. I don’t want that to be me, not being able to be there, funerals and hospitals, and I have two younger brothers now I wasn’t there for and that is just sad for them. (Vinnie)

In addition to impact on family life, several interviewees regretted that their own lives could no longer be ‘normal’. Spending long periods of time incarcerated has a direct impact on the ability to deal with the outside world—one man explains that he lost his communication skills which made life really hard for him on release: You get a reputation, and as well, you lose social skills which makes (it) hard to communicate. People look at you, and you think it is a threat, but they just want to talk. When you are not used to communicating it is hard to do anything. It is a big obstacle. (Lee)

The desire to regain ‘normality’ is also mentioned by a woman known in her local community for a string of theft and shoplifting offences, in the main committed to feed a drug habit. Being recognised meant that she felt she could never really move away from that image of the ‘offender’. She also expressed regret that the drug use had clearly impacted her physical appearance—she was underweight and had skin and digestive issues, but her greatest embarrassment was for her teeth which were loose and rotten. Even though she had been clean from drugs for some time, her appearance still drew negative attention in the street. Having been (an offender) it changes how people see you. I just want to be Sheila now. Not Sheila the grafter, or Sheila the smackhead. People look down on me. I just want to be anonymous, live normal. (Sheila)

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Imagine the excitement for this particular woman when she was supported to get dental care—and after much painful work—was the proud owner of a very respectable and natural looking set of teeth (dentures). This change in appearance and the inability to move away from looking like an ‘offender’ was not a consideration for her at the start of her offending career—but it was a deeply held regret afterwards. The ability to ‘smile at a child and not have them run screaming!’ was really important to her.

Bounded Rationality So, if a person discounts the ‘official’ sanctions of their behaviour— neither giving mental space to or not really caring about potential arrest and punishment—and other more personal costs may not be discovered until long after the event, how does this fit within the Rational Choice Perspective? From an earlier example from the individual with the record of fraud, the effects on his wife and family did not factor in his decision making, but yet are causing him the most distress after conviction. The young man who missed the birth of his younger brothers finds himself coming to a realisation after numerous jail sentences that he is missing out on a lot of things by being locked away. Another man describes how he feels he has lost his social skills, making his life in the community a tricky obstacle course. A woman talks about the physical impact of her behaviour, and how it has potentially impacted her new life. None of these realisations appeared to be a concern at the time of making a decision to offend; indeed, they seem instead to be borne of a long spell of consideration. The bounded model of rational decision making explains how this may happen, that is, a person will make a decision using what faculties, and information and resources are available to them at that time. As human beings, we all make ‘bounded’ decisions. We jump to conclusions, fail to research, act on instinct and rush to a final decision all the time. Human beings make thousands of decisions every day, and an impulse buy, an unhealthy snack or a last-minute holiday may not do too much damage, but making these ‘bounded’ decisions could certainly have more severe and long-lasting consequences. If

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an individual is making a decision about committing a crime, it can be seen from the evidence so far that these decisions (where made—more on that later) can be rushed or made under non-ideal circumstances (not to mention the influence of drugs, alcohol, etc.) but that these long-term, personally impactful consequences may not ever have occurred to the person at that time. Recall also the concept of the two-system thinking, the ‘hot or cold’ decision process—could this be a useful idea to consider where the decision-making process is located? It may not have been possible for these individuals to know of these consequences before they had the experience of them, and indeed, if they had considered effects on family or society as a ‘factual’ input into a decision, it would not have had the same impact on that decision as the real experience of such an effect. Thinking, then, about the key elements of a decision under this model, it is more important than ever to understand what is factored in as a cost and benefit from that person’s point of view. This is really important to remember when working with people that have committed offences in the past. If you, the reader, had been a similar situation as one of the people interviewed for this book, you may have had access to many more options that may not have been available to others. Many people who were a little short of cash before payday could use a credit card, dip into savings and borrow from a family member, friend or colleague. These options are not available to all, and often, decisions about offending are made in circumstances that are desperate in one way or another. A hungry child or perhaps symptoms of withdrawal are among many reasons why decisions may be rushed. Of course, there are offences and offenders that demonstrate high levels of planning and are free to make complex and sometimes ‘expert’ decisions without this pressure. This is a concept that will be explored more later, but for now, it is sufficient to understand that perceived costs and outcomes, and the facility to make a bounded decision, will vary widely between situation and decision maker. Thinking about the interplay between what the individual sees as a risk and reward, the weight and value given to these outcomes, and how these may change over time leads to a fascinating consideration on just how useful a Rational Choice Perspective of offending can be. Any valuation

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of a benefit or cost (how much is matters) and weighting of a benefit or cost (how much time is spent thinking about it) is subjective and will depend on circumstances. To explore these costs and benefits further, common themes expressed by the individuals interviewed are explored below.

References Cornish, D., & Clarke, R. (1986). The reasoning criminal : Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer-Verlag. Paternoster, R., & Simpson, S. (1993). A rational choice theory of corporate crime. In R. V. Clarke & M. Felson (Eds.), Routine activity and rational choice (pp. 37–58). Wright, R., & Decker, S. (1994). Burglars on the job: Street life and residential break-ins. North-eastern University Press.

8 Rewards, Benefits and Goals

Wanted It/Needed It So far, the focus has been on acquisitive type offences such as theft, shoplifting and robbery, where money or goods was clearly one of the main goal of the behaviour. For these cases, it is easy to identify the clear outstanding benefit of an offence—the individual’s intentions to meet a need or get something they want. In telling their stories, various individuals were open and explicit about what they stood to gain. The simplest expression of what an individual wants out of an offence is described by one male shoplifter: (I needed) basic stuff, clothes, trainers and T shirts. I had nothing. I was at a pretty low point. (Ned)

Another man agrees. His primary motive was: Food to sell, and to eat myself. (Doug)

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Steele, Exploring the Criminal Decision Process, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46231-3_8

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Similarly, another man, this time convicted of street robbery, and another male with a varied criminal background add: I was desperate for food and money. I was living on the street, with no money and no food and I was desperate. (Freddie) Money just for me, not for drugs just for me, for food and stuff. (Stuart)

Of course this view is not limited to male offenders. For example, one female shoplifter says: When I started, I had to for the baby. Stuff for him, and stuff for the house. (Manda)

From basic needs such as food and clothes, another common need was money. One individual, specialising in fraudulent phone contracts, says: I thought, I’ll do it one more time to pay the rent. (Steve)

Money to pay rent, buy food and clothes, and for the general needs of life is a common theme. Offenders were not always specific about the reasons they needed or desired money. Money – that’s what you did for money in the 1970s. (Vinnie, Armed Robbery) I was going out with one specific intention, to make money. (Joe, Burglary)

The general need for money was a strong motivator and in some cases, appeared to be the only way the individual saw to achieve it: Where I was brought up, there was nothing. You had to survive, if you wanted something you had to pinch it. (Vinnie)

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Drugs For many individuals, acquisitive crime is their main route to feeding an addition to drugs. For these people, shoplifting was often the first port of call. Several of the individuals within the study talked about how, given the option, they would prefer not to have committed an offence, but the real and urgent need for drugs made their range of options reduce rapidly. As one woman said: It did my head in, but I had to do it, do you know what I mean? To get it (money) for the drugs. I thought every day, ‘I am sick of this’ but I had to go out. (Jenni)

A man who became involved with robberies committed by peers agrees that his move into offending was to get money for drugs: A robbery, that was the first time I committed a crime – to get drugs. (Michael)

This is story told multiple times within the research, from both men and women, and from shoplifters, burglars, robbers and more— all united in the need to obtain money for drugs, and all having very limited routes to being able to get that money. I needed drugs, so I needed money. It was a complete struggle. (Paul)

This idea related back to the concept of bounded rationality discussed earlier. Within the restrictions placed on the options of the individual, committing an offence (or more likely, repeated offences) is the only real option for feeding a drug addiction. In all likelihood, legitimate means for obtaining the money have been exhausted. Several of the individuals had talked about having jobs at the start of their drug journey, and more less managing to pay for what they needed for some time. However, as addiction became more serious, these jobs will be lost, and the next resort may well be asking friends and family for money or selling items for some quick cash. Of course, these sources of funds will not last forever, but the

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need for the drugs is pressing, with an individual likely facing extremely unpleasant mental and physical withdrawal. Along with the realisation that the issues that precipitated the drug use in the first place have not gone away, it is no great leap of understanding to see why a person may turn to crime. I was going out with the intention of making money – money for my drugs. (Doug)

Feeding an addiction is a common reason for some individuals to commit crimes, but those additions are not always necessarily illegal. One individual interviewed for this study had lost a successful career, relationships and any financial stability he once may have had due to an addiction to gambling: I had a gambling addiction, erm, gambling addictions. I had no money, so I needed some. (Andrew)

The pervasive need to keep gambling bears all the hallmarks of addiction and can be just as powerful a motivator as drug taking. For this man, his gambling was a route into shoplifting and burglary. The idea of needing money, whether this is for general life expenses, to feed an addiction to drugs or to gambling, could clearly sit within the boundaries of the Rational Choice Perspective on decision making. These participants identified the need they were looking for and made a decision about the best way to get it. This decision may well be taken under extremely limited or ‘bounded’ circumstances—a pressing hunger or withdrawal does not make for the ideal thinking conditions after all. However, it is clear that there were identifiable benefits to the decisions taken, and that these decisions set out to achieve those benefits in the best way the person saw to be possible at the time. What about other types of benefits? Just like some of the potential risks of committing a crime, some benefits are not immediately obvious—for example, as described above, some people only felt the loss of family relationships further down the line, and some of the benefits may not be immediately apparent to the onlooker. Non-tangible benefits can be

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really powerful, but as observers of a behaviour, we cannot readily identify them. Human beings are social animals broadly speaking, and we yearn for more than simply being fed and watered. While the public may be more sympathetic to a person stealing for basics like food, or children’s shoes, we also understand that there are more social needs that we like to be fulfilled. The next section looks at some of those more ‘intangible’ benefits that are just as powerful in motivating behaviour—criminal or otherwise.

Excitement, ‘Kicks’ and Social Reinforcement Individual behaviour is motivated by much more than the basic need to be housed, fed and watered. While it is in no doubt that some crime is committed due to lack of provision in these areas, it is also true that as people, we yearn for other things. A feeling of belonging, of identity, of interest and excitement in the world around us—this is no less true for those who commit crime than everyone else. For some young people, the feeling of belonging is the most rewarding outcome of any behaviour, and if this belonging is not forthcoming from legitimate means, they may seek it elsewhere. One young man was extremely honest—he was an unpopular youth and wanted to make more friends. I didn’t have a lot of confidence; I had no money. I thought people would like me if I had stuff, so I started nicking. (Andrew)

For others, it was the shared excitement or comradeship of participating in a risky adventure that motivated them: My mates had a zest for life. I wanted to join in. (Stuart)

In cases like this, a person can see that their peers are having experiences, or excitement that they would like to buy into, and the behaviour that follows is solely to share in the ‘buzz’. Cars – I always nicked for the buzz. (Freddie)

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For others, their initial motivation may have been for the money, but the side effects of the crime were just as rewarding. In these cases, people report being as rewarded by the way they felt—just as much if not more than the original goal. Essentially, they come to the offence for the money—but stay for the good times. As one armed robber says: You start out for the money, but you keep going because you are on a buzz. (Vinnie) Money is not really a motivator for me (anymore). It was always having a good time. Always the partying, anytime. (Ken)

Making It Work So far, it seems clear that for some criminal offences, there can be a clear outline of the benefits, and costs, that a person sees as being likely to follow whatever action they take. This would suggest, at least initially, that the action of committing a crime does make sense, at least in the fact that the people committing the crimes get a real benefit from it— whether that is money or other items, or even a positive emotional reward. These rewards will differ for each individual. The risk and excitement offered by a particular action may be enough to tempt one individual, while it simultaneously puts another off. Likewise, we may expect that different offence types would have different rewards too— given the examples above, stealing cars for joyriding ‘for the buzz’ and committing a robbery to make money to fund drug or gambling habits have very different motivators. If there is a clear weighing up of costs and rewards, how much can the odds of increasing the former and decreasing the latter be influenced by the way that a person commits the offence?

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It Works for Me For some individuals, blending in was the best strategy for getting away with their criminal behaviour—looking like an ‘ordinary member of the public’ is really helpful when trying to avoid scrutiny from security and shop staff for example. One man utilised the role of ‘harassed Christmas shopper’ when out and about: At Christmas I would make a killing by putting my stuff in a bag then a big cardboard box like in Argos. (Ron)

While stashing stolen items in a big cardboard box may seem to make a person more conspicuous, doing so at Christmas may provoke more thoughts of sympathy or wry amusement (look at that poor man wrangling the Christmas shopping!) than any thought that he was up to no good. In fact, hiding in plain sight was a more common theme than may be expected within these real-life criminal experiences. Recall Jack, quoted earlier, who would wear a suit and tie and stride authoritatively around the supermarket—before simply walking straight out with a trolley full of food and other goods. It seems that there is an element of skill or expertise involved with some of these incidents. Prior experience is an important part of the decision-making process. Level of expertise has been shown by previous studies to directly affect and improve the decisions being made about future offences (e.g. Nee & Meenaghan, 2006). Using prior knowledge (or using what you know) was a common theme that emerges within this research too. For example, one burglar says: I wouldn’t just go out (on chance) I would get up, go out, just walk about out of town to certain areas. Like one Estate, I knew my way round so I would go back there. I would walk past a few (times) looking and see somewhere. I got to know instinctively if there was someone in. Milk bottles, mail, no car in the drive at a certain time of the morning. (Manda)

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Using your skills and experience to make a task easier sounds a lot like working, and this was a concept that was certainly clear from many of those interviewed. It is like a full time job. It occupies a lot of thought. From the second I’m home I am planning the next one. (Sheila)

Others take this a stage further and discuss how opportunities present themselves throughout the course of their day-to-day activities. This is an important thing to note, as it relates back to the foundational ideas of a theory related to decision making—that of routine activity theory. This theory proposed that part of a crime being able to happen is the motivated individual coming across an opportunity to offend. The motivated individual, the right opportunity and the lack of a suitable guardian combine to make the crime likely. This is explained well by one man who describes his first burglary. I knew it (the victim) was a vulnerable person. I had been round there as a visitor and left the window on the latch. I was thinking about going back even then. It was planned ahead, not spur of the moment. (Andrew)

This man found himself planning ahead of time, knowing that this house was the perfect mark for a burglary. So perfect in fact, that breaking in once was not enough. As the burglar says himself: Obviously before you go back again a person will put in more security than they had the first time, but because you took something (before) and did not have time to get anything else, but you know what is there because you have seen it. You go back in.

This planning ahead of repeat offending certainly suggests that clear decisions were made in the commission of the original and follow-up offences. Even with the risk of added security, the knowledge gained from the first visit to the house makes it worthwhile. This use of knowledge and ability to take advantage of circumstances can certainly appear sophisticated and are described by some individuals as making them ‘skilful’ or ‘specialised’, just like you would need to be for some jobs.

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That’s exactly what it is, a job. I know people who don’t take drugs but shoplift. It’s something they do, it is their job they have chosen. They might go regular, three times a week. You specialize. One mate specializes in designer glasses – gets you a £300 pair for £35. (Sol)

Another man sums it up: It’s always planned. Maybe not the first few times, but then you get clever, you get good. (Kevin)

So far, there are several themes emerging from the real-life experiences that suggest that for some people, at least those with acquisitive offences, there is evidence that decisions are being taken. Evidence suggests that these decisions are not simply whether to commit an offence at all, but also that some level of thought goes into the planning of the criminal event. This may be in terms of the manner in which the offence is carried out ‘looking the part’, choosing the right target, using all your previous experience and knowledge, as well as being observant to potential opportunities. Plans are made, and carried out, whether these plans be formed within minutes or days/weeks in advance.

I Had No Choice Of course, evidence that a decision is being made on some level is not evidence that a clear, unhurried, entirely unconstrained decision is being made. For most people, decision making is a task that takes place alongside a multitude of other demands on our time and mental resources. It is rare that we sit down and think through the entire known possibilities of cost and reward when making a choice (perhaps when buying a house or a car?), but even in these circumstances, we cannot possibly know of the permutations of all possible options. For many people that commit crime, their options are significantly more limited. Even though some individuals describe their thinking around committing crime with creativity and plenty of planning, in the wider context, their available choices may be very limited.

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The concept of ‘bounded’ rationality—that is, that we make a decision using the knowledge, time and capacity we have in that moment—helps us understand why a decision is less than ideal, can be rushed, poorly informed or based on faulty reasoning. However, for many people, their decision making can be seen to be ‘bounded’ even outside of these limitations—by the circumstances, they find themselves in socially, psychologically and economically at that time. One obvious example is the need for drugs to those struggling with addiction—the withdrawal from drugs can be extremely difficult both physically and mentally—and means that the individual may feel compelled to do something they would not normally do, in order to simply feel better. Likewise, those seeking money may be doing so due to legitimate sources of money being unavailable to them. This understanding of limited choices does not intend to condone or excuse behaviour but must begin to try and explain it at least. If the situation the individual is in reduces their options down to very few, this may explain why some dismiss some of the risks of their behaviour out of hand—the alternative, that is not committing the crime, is not really an option. To illustrate, one recurring theme within the research was the idea that given wider options, the individual would prefer not to commit the crime and have to cope with everything that comes with it, but under the circumstances, the crime was the least worst choice. This is touched on by the offenders who commit offences in order to obtain money for drugs, in that the withdrawal from, and the need for, drugs overcame all other considerations. If it wasn’t for needing the drugs I probably wouldn’t have done it, or if I did it, it would be a one off. Say for instance my son needed something I would go out and get it, but not daily. (Deb)

Deb goes on to illustrate her point: When I first started on drugs, I had £5000 under my bed, I spent every penny, that all went. All gone. In the end I had to shoplift. The kids moved in with my Mum in the end, I liked having them but at least I

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knew they were getting looked after with my Mum, and I could go there and get fed too.

Deb missed her children badly, and despite the calls for ‘just quit drugs and get them back’, she sadly did not find things so easy. Once in the throes of addiction, it can be impossible for an addict to quit without support, and this is often not easy to access. Even when a person manages to get clean, the problems that led to the initial drug use are often still there—usually having worsened, so staying clean is even more of an impossible task. The choice about whether to take drugs or not is therefore, in the current moment, not a choice for many of these individuals, it is a given. Needing the drugs right now means needing money, which for these individuals means committing an offence, despite their disinclination for doing this. One man describes how offending for him was a last resort, but his need for drugs drove him to it. He had been employed in a job that paid a fair wage, and for a long time managed his work and his drug use fairly successfully: I lost my job, then I needed to offend. To pay for it (drugs). That is when it started, to get stuff. I didn’t want to offend; I never had more than a speeding ticket. I knew all about the risks and stuff, actually thought it was worse than it was because I hadn’t done it before, but I needed the stuff and that was more important than everything else. (Gary)

Needing drugs is a common reason that a person may feel they have no choice but to commit a crime, but there were also other reasons that interviewees gave that explained why their options were more limited than they would like. One woman describes shoplifting under duress as directed by her partner: I knew what to do because I had been told by him, But as I came out, of the one (supermarket) in X through the little shopping precinct – I came out that way, and he was at the bottom (of the walkway), and I started legging it with the trolley and he ran up behind me and started saying ‘stupid cow, what are you running for people will look at you’ and I was terrified of him. (Kathy)

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Another woman reports a similar experience. She explains that she was terrified of being caught, arrested and even sent to prison, but that her violent partner sent her out to steal and she was so terrified of the very real, and imminent consequences, that disobeying him was far scarier than the thought of possible being caught: Yeah. I run through things in my head – getting caught and stuff. If it is opportunistic – at first I was terrified I case I got caught, what would happen in court, but like I said, I was in a violent relationship, It got to the stage though, where I was more worried about, what he would do if I didn’t go back with something. (Sheila)

Chapter Summary From the review of some of the experiences of acquisitive offending, there certainly does seem to be evidence of decision making. Aspects of planning, weighing up costs and maximising benefits are clearly referenced. These aspects of decision making must be taken with the caveat that while an individual is thinking about what they want to/have to do to meet their goal, these decisions may be made with a background of very limited options. In this case, the Rational Choice Perspective that depicts a decision maker objectively reviewing his or her options is not a comfortable fit for the choices described by these offenders. Instead, their rationality is bounded not only by knowledge, skill and time, but also by the range of options actually viable as an outcome. This range of options will be determined by the particular circumstances of the offender, and therefore, any decisions must be considered in this context.

Reference Nee, C., & Meenaghan, A. (2006). Expert decision making in burglars. British Journal of Criminology, 46 , 935–949.

9 Violent and Emotional Offending

Whereas those people who talked about their experiences of committing acquisitive type offences talked around themes of planning, and weighing up options, the other group of individuals, those with an index offence of violence or other non-acquisitive offence, reference a different set of ideas and themes.

It Just Happened The first emerging theme coming from this range of interviews was the feeling that the criminal behaviour occurred when the individual was acting under a compulsion or against their better judgement. In an overlap between the offending categories, violent and emotional offenders do talk in a similar way to the acquisitive offenders about committing crimes despite preferring not to. However, whereas the acquisitive offender, the shoplifters and the burglars describe not wanting to commit an offence as a feeling that starts ahead of time, but feeling like they have no choice, the violent and emotive individuals describe © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Steele, Exploring the Criminal Decision Process, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46231-3_9

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the criminal incident as happening almost instantaneously, or automatically, despite any disinclination for it to happen. In short, things happen without any time to really think. Sometimes I don’t feel like hitting someone but I still go ahead and do it. (Gary)

For some of these men and women, their goal does not seem to be to acquire anything, but rather to rid themselves of something—frustration, anger or just bad feelings. Phrased a different way, it could be said that the theme emerging from these emotional offenders is the desire for relief.

A Sense of Relief—Feelings and Situations I Need to Feel Better Feeling better can certainly be a powerful motivator. Some glimpses of this have already been seen in those individuals who are committing crime to obtain money for drugs. In these cases, the money for drugs is the goal of the offence, but the overall goal for the individual is to relieve the feelings of withdrawal, or those negative emotions that crop up once the substance of choice wears off. In this way, ‘feeling relief ’ is the main goal of the offence just as much as the money to make that happen. For emotional offenders, the need to ‘feel relief ’ is centred more around a feeling that they have within them that they are unable to process or cope with. For example, a male offender, convicted of a serious assault, discusses the feelings around his offence. He made me feel so horrible, to make it go away, I nearly killed him. (Keagan)

This man described how the victim had made a sexual advance towards him and how this made him uncomfortable, and he did not know how to deal with it. He had been drinking and felt unable to cope

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with what was going on around him. The offender in question did not offer this reason as an excuse; in fact, he regretted his actions deeply, but instead has this as an explanation of how he released his unpleasant feelings through taking action. A different, but similar experience from a man with violent convictions described how his drug habit began: I was helping someone come off heroin. I ended up on it myself. I know this sounds weird, but I was jealous of him using it. It influenced me, I was trying to get him off it, I had all these bad feelings inside, I was struggling and the voice in my head said ‘Would it be so wrong to get away from all this for a few hours?’ (Jimmy)

This man was clearly tempted by his friend’s drug use, seeing it as a way of relieving the difficult feelings that he was struggling to cope with. His desire to ‘get away’ from his negative feelings is clearly stated, and this man is self-aware enough (after the event) to understand what his motivating factors were, and why he took the decision to try drugs. Previously, the same man has also described how the violent offences he has committed were also as a result of the immediate and compulsive desire to relieve negative feelings. While this man is self-aware, and able to eloquently describe his inner dialogue, not all individuals are able to express themselves so well. However, many others do describe the same or similar experiences. Another man, with a long history of assault, says: The way I have always been, is there are people that do your head in. Make you feel bad, if you kick them or give them a good battering they won’t do it again and the bad feelings go and they won’t do it again. (Peter)

A perspective from a female offender describes a similar feeling of needing relief—the circumstances are very different, but the overwhelming need to relieve a negative feeling, in this case anxiety and worry about her daughter, resulted in the impulsive behaviour and the criminal incident in which she took a young girl’s phone and pushed her: I wanted to see my daughter, that was at the forefront of my mind. I was anxious, scared, worried. I wanted to call (Social Services). I saw the

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phone, I thought I would take the phone, I thought I would take the phone, make my call, and give the phone back, and had no intention of pinching it. (Paula)

This action resulted in the woman being charged with a very serious offence, assault on a minor, and made the situation much worse, eventually putting the woman’s relationship with her daughter in even more jeopardy. However, this clearly did not factor into the thinking at the time, with this woman wanting to achieve relief of a negative state of mind, and as she says, the intention was not to keep the phone. Again, the powerful and irresistible motivation was to achieve a feeling of relief, a clear motivator for the behaviour, even though any active decision making seems to be absent.

Not Thinking Straight So, unlike the acquisitive group individuals, there is no clear evidence so far of what a Rational Choice Perspective would call a decision being made. In addition, for many of the emotional or violent offenders interviewed, many describe them not engaging in any thought process at all, describing circumstances were things ‘just happen’ to them. Though some have enough insight to know that they were acting to try and achieve relief from whatever bad feelings they were struggling to cope with, many more will use phrases such as ‘just happened’, ‘red mist’ or ‘lost it’ to describe their criminal actions. In contrast to the seemingly practical and pragmatic approach of the acquisitive group offenders, even some who were using drugs at the time of their criminal offence, this group displays a very different view of how an offence may occur and of the thought processes that seem not to be in play. For example, one man describes how he committed a violent assault, saying: It was too quick. Nothing happens really, just blank and adrenaline, and go for it. It is me or them, so I go in first. (Gary)

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This seems to be a common experience. Other offenders describe this experience variously as a ‘blank mind’ or as ‘seeing red’, a common phrase used to suggest that a person has become very angry, very quickly, and judgement is clouded by this excess of emotion, for example: I saw red, and went for her. (Jay)

The man quoted here had a long list of violent criminal convictions, for both affray and assault on other men, and for specific violence against his partner. The ‘red’ he describes in this case for him was a common theme between his descriptions of previous assaults on other men, and this one, on his partner. Other interviewees also described this sort of incident, frequently referred to something ‘snapping’ or being out of their usual frame of mind. I wasn’t in my right mind. (Sue) I just flipped. (Annie) You would get up and just flip. (Lee)

So, the internal landscape for these individuals is characterised by them as impulsive, unpredictable and uncontrolled, and this lack of control is then forced outwards, in an angry or frustrated show of violence. I was angry, I wanted to lash out. (Keagan)

The uncontrolled nature of this ‘lashing out’ is important; it appears that the individual was so compelled by inner emotion to express what they were feeling and that the actual target of their violent or explosive behaviour may not be anything to do with why they felt that way in the first place. Indeed, several offenders described how the actual victim of their offence was someone they did not want to attack or hurt, from assault on a Police Officer by Keagan to a family member.

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I was angry and assaulted him. He was a Policeman. I wasn’t angry at him or because he was a copper but because like I said, I wanted to lash out. (Keagan)

For another male offender, his moment to ‘flip’ got the better of him in the worst possible way for him. It was my mum! I love my mum to bits, but she was there and I ended up losing it. I jumped up and I snapped and I grabbed her by the shoulders and pushed her over. (Jon)

Individuals describe the moment at which they ‘snap’ or ‘lash out’ say that at the point of the event, they experience ‘not being in their right mind’ or that their mind goes completely blank. For some individuals, their experience of this, being ‘out of your mind’ or of going blank, continues past the actual criminal event and may last for hours or even days after the event before the person has calmed and collected themselves enough to recognise what they have done. For example, one woman, convicted of wounding, says: I didn’t know what was happening (at the time). After a couple of days it started coming back in bits. (Jean)

For others, it is only when the details of their actions are revealed to them that they remember what had happened. One woman who stabbed her partner describes how even in custody after the event she was blank, until her solicitor told her what she was charged with (Sect. 18 assault and wounding). On hearing the charges, she remembers: I lost it, because, I knew it had happened. When it went in (the knife) I remember now, I remember thinking it was like (cutting) a raw chicken and that scared me. I remember I was crying and there was blood everywhere and I knocked twice on a door and the police came. (Becky)

This woman describes the ‘blankness’ as having lasted several days. Her memory seemed to return to her in dribs and drabs and was likely due to the shock of committing the offence. Shock, and trauma, caused

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by committing an offence is a more common occurrence than many may think, and many individuals suffer from PTSD symptoms after the event (see Leigh-Hunt & Perry, 2014). This individual continues to describe how, at some level, she must have been aware of what she had done, as she reportedly knocked on the neighbour’s door where she confessed to her actions and asked for the police and an ambulance. The separation of conscious decision making and actual action taken is a theme repeated by other interviewees. Consider this recollection from a male offender, convicted of manslaughter after assaulting a young man in the street. Was I aware of what was going on? Well I have to say 50/50, because I don’t remember but before the Police came, I had put the lad in the recovery position. I was aware enough to know he was bad even when the ambulance came I was still there. It was pretty serious. (Elliot)

The victim that he talks about here suffered severe permanent brain damage. This was a very serious assault, and despite being the perpetrator of the offence, this young man is extremely traumatised by the event, and though he takes full responsibility is still concerned by his hazy recall of the event. Another man, with a long history of violent crime, described how he feels very different to his usual self when in offending circumstances. At the time I am doing it, I wasn’t, aren’t arsed. I wasn’t bothered. Almost like a split personality, Jekyll and Hyde like. (Tommy)

The same offender described his thoughts during his offences: I wasn’t thinking straight, I was thinking bendy. (as above)

Previously, several people have talked about how, at the time of their offence, there has been no thinking at all—at least consciously (as apparently, they were raising the alarm/putting victims in the recovery position). Some of the emotional/violent category offenders do describe

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their thought process, but see these processes as being out of their ordinary thinking pattern. The man quoted above says he ‘was not thinking straight, but bendy’ and this is a common theme. Another man described how his ‘bendy’ thinking (to use the previous description) gets him into trouble, I know I hit before I ask questions. I need to be wiped clean like a computer. My PO (Probation Officer) says try to imagine the faces of the people you are hitting. I can, it helps. I can see the fear in their eyes now. (Ray)

Confusion around what was happening is evident in many of the interviews with emotional and violent offenders. Once again, the description of events reveals a degree of separation from the usual, conscious thought processes, even as the perpetrator is conducting their actions in a more automatic or instinctive way. This confusion is also evident in the narrative of a woman who was convicted of murdering an elderly person in their care. The separation of reality and conscious thought is starkly clear. That old woman in the house never goes out anywhere. It’s dead bizarre! She just basically died, or someone killed her. She has suffocated. There was no-one else in the house, so it must have been me done it. Even if I have done it, my mind is thinking ‘Have I done it?’ but I said to myself ‘I haven’t done it’ and I feel better. (Alice)

The contrast between the controlled and often creative thinking described by the acquisitive group (where the goal was clearly set out) and the confused thinking described by the violent/emotional group is evident. It seems reasonable, based on these narratives, to argue that in general, the acquisitive group of individuals displayed more obvious decision making—planning, preparing, weighing up consequences and mitigating costs are all themes that feature. To this end, the application of decision-making theory would seem to hold—the central theoretical tenets of a weighing up of costs vs rewards and making a decisions with the best information at the time (bounded rationality) have direct applications here. Clearly, here, the idea of a system 1 and system 2

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thinking process is starkly echoed—with many of these violent individuals describing what can be thought of as typical ‘system 1’ thinking, instinctive, raw and emotional with no contact with their logical side whatsoever. Is the dichotomy between those that think rationally about offending (mainly acquisitive) and those that seem to ‘see red’ as simple as this difference in hot/cool decision making? If so, would any decisionmaking model based on the Rational Choice Perspective be useful for those committing emotionally driven, ‘red mist’ offences? While there is little evidence of rational planning, or system 2 thinking in the offending ‘moment’ of the violent/emotive group, it would be wrong to say that these individuals only think with their ‘hot’ brain. Outside of the critical criminal ‘event’, it is clear that these individuals are, by and large, perfectly capable of making decisions as soundly thought out as the acquisitive group. One way that this is demonstrated is how the same individuals who ‘saw red’ or experienced not being in their ‘right mind’ when the offence was committed talk about their actions in hindsight. For example, consider a woman looking back on the assault she committed. Looking back, I see I should have, could have given myself more thinking time before I make a snap decision. I go along with things half heartedly. (Sue)

Thinking Back Another woman, who had been arrested with breach of the peace and assaulting a Police Officer while sitting in the middle of a busy dual carriageway while drunk, talks about her offences with the benefit of hindsight with a clarity that was not evident at the time of the event. The Police Officer had tried to move the woman from the road, where she was endangering herself and other drivers, and she did not want to leave, becoming aggressive with the officer. Looking back, she says: I can see that he has to come and talk to me. I could have been sick. The logical me knows there is no way he is going to leave me sitting there

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on a main road but at the time I think differently. I think ‘I am doing no harm so go away and leave me alone’. The next day I wake up and I think to myself ‘Bloody stupid woman’. (Tracey)

Of course, the fact that the woman was drunk makes a big difference to not only why she was in that position at the time, but also how her thinking was affected. Being influenced by drinking and drugs was a large factor to emerge within this research and has a clear impact on decision making in numerous ways. This will be explored more fully later; however, for now, remaining on the topic of acting without thinking, one young, male offender sums it up perfectly. You can read situations to avoid potential trouble, but you cannot do that if you are drunk. (Liam)

The clarity of hindsight is not limited to those who were drunk or under the influence of other drugs at the time. Many other individuals talked about the differing perspective they had on events after the fact. The benefit of hindsight allows everyone to consider their actions, and what choices were made at the time, and is an important element in consideration of how different choices may be made next time. Although it would seem from these examples that no active decision was taken, would the knowledge of the unintended consequences affect whether a person would behave the same way in the future? This is a good question and is raised by the participants themselves. Looking back now, I can see how it went wrong. I lost my temper, and I should have stayed away. You see it time and again, you might have two ways you can go but get in a situation with certain people and it is likely. (Billy)

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Chapter Summary So far, this chapter has explored the differences in evidence within the narratives of two broad categories of offenders: acquisitive types and violent/emotive types. These groups were created for analytic convenience based on previous literature, and so far, the evidence does seem to differ between the two. The acquisitive group display elements of decision making in a range of ways—they actually refer to decisions being made, and they describe the planning, target selection and manipulation of circumstances that they use to get the best possible outcome. In contract, the violent or emotive group use phrases such as ‘I saw red’ and ‘my mind was blank’ suggesting that action happened without any conscious thought. This was not due to lack of intellectual capacity, as the same individuals were able to think clearly in hindsight. In terms of evidence therefore for the usefulness of a Rational Choice Perspective in helping analyse the criminal event and the thought processes leading up to it, there does seem to be some merit in applying the key tenets of the theory to the acquisitive offenders. The weighing up of costs and benefits, and the mitigation of risk all directly apply. This is not so clear cut for the violent/emotive group. However, within both groups, there is clearly a defined benefit to the criminal action, even where this benefit is not immediately apparent. Money, drugs or goods are tangible benefits of the offences such as burglary, robbery and shoplifting. However, there is also a very real reward to the violent actions. The relief or removal of a bad feeling (frustration, anger, anxiety, etc.) can be a very real reward to those suffering. Reducing the behaviour to this need for relief does not easily fit within a Rational Choice Approach. Discussion of their offences by various individuals does suggest that some of their actions, while not being the outcome of a conscious decision, may have resulted from a set-up of circumstances that the individual did have control over—this concept is explored in depth later in the book. Conscious decision making is further muddled by individuals being under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the offence. Given the high number of offences thought to be committed while under some sort of influence, the importance of this cannot be underestimated.

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Reference Leigh-Hunt, N., & Perry, A. (2015 June). A systematic review of interventions for anxiety, depression, and PTSD in adult offenders. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 59 (7), 701–725.

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The contrast between the seemingly logical thought processes and planned actions of the acquisitive group and the ‘blank mind’ or ‘red mist’ of the violent and emotive group was explored in the previous chapter, but there was also a hint, in the evidence examined, that there were at least some elements of thought process that could fit within a decision model. The most obvious of these was the ‘goal’ of relieving a negative affect or emotion, suggesting that the behaviour of the violent and emotional individuals interviewed did, at least, have some recompense. Likewise, when the same people looked back on their behaviour with a clear head, they refer to a choice that could have been made had only they not ‘lost their temper’ for example. How can this reference to choice be encapsulated within a useful decision-making model of offending? If a Rational Choice Perspective of decision making is based on the weighing up of possible good and bad outcomes, made with the best information available at the time, it is difficult to see how this would apply to the narratives of those violent and emotional offenders discussed in the previous chapter. However, even in the absence of what (in this context) could be called a ‘decision’ to commit the offending action, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Steele, Exploring the Criminal Decision Process, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46231-3_10

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there is evidence of other, prior choices being made. If we delve deeper into the descriptions of events given to us by the individuals who had committed violent offences, they describe setting up circumstances and making unhelpful choices prior to the offending event. These unhelpful choices added to the stress they were feeling and made that moment where they ‘snap’ or ‘see red’ much more likely. This would not appear to be the same as ‘planning’ an offence in the way described earlier, but still can be considered a successive string or chain of choices by which the offender arrives at the offending action. A similar idea is suggested by Bouffard (2002) who suggests that some criminal activities cannot realistically be interpreted as one-off events but are better understood as a ‘sequence of events where offenders flow from one situation to the next’ (Van Gelder, 2012, p. 751). This is an important consideration for any decision-making model—the outcomes of an earlier action (even immediately before) will affect the next action taken. This may involve more complex feelings or emotions coming into play on top of the initial things considered and makes understanding the process even more important. As we explored earlier, dual process models of thinking allow us to conceptualise how this may take place, as the cooler more rational system 2 interacts with, and sometimes is overwhelmed by, the hot, emotional system 1. Criminal events can often be seen to develop and be created from a series of sequential steps as the individual moves towards the criminal action (Clarke, 2013). If we think about the offending event as the end point and look at the period of time leading up to it, it can be seen as a journey or trajectory moving towards the offence. The differences in this journey or trajectory are clear—for an acquisitive offender, this period of time may be spent planning, making decisions about when and where to target and what to steal for example. For a violent or emotional type offender, this journey may look different. This may be characterised by that string or chain of choices where an offender finds themselves (or chooses to put themselves) in ever more risky situations for them, making it more and more likely that they will commit an offence. The distinction between making an active decision to participate in an offence and making a choice or series of choices to enter a set

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of offending likely situations does seem to closely reflect the split in offending types. Consider these quotes from various offenders. Shoplifting: I used to go out to (shoplift), I used to walk around different shops just looking about. I knew I was going out shoplifting for whatever – but I used to walk around and weigh it up and see what I could get. (Alan)

Armed Robbery: I always knew where I was going and what for. I used to watch them. For days, watch them, say they called in on a Thursday – a jewellers’ van, to pick up stock, then we knew the boxes were in the van. We would follow him home and put sugar in the gas tank then follow him the next day until he broke down on the motorway then rob him. (Peter)

Criminal Damage: I thought she smashed my car up, I went right round there and did (smashed the TV). It wasn’t my first thought ‘right, now I will go and smash the telly’ but I just went round there and saw it, so I smashed the telly. (Steve)

Serious Assault: At a friends house on New Year’s Eve I thought some guy wanted to sexually assault me and then he left, so I went after him and really went on (him) with a full can of beer and nearly killed him by hitting him over the head because……… I am not a bad person but he made me feel so horrible and the police were called and I assaulted him it wasn’t because he was a copper I just wanted to lash out. (Jimmy)

Section 18 wounding: A knife though? I can’t forgive myself. I felt sorry for him, he was up on a section 18, I felt I couldn’t leave him. What did I do? Why? Spur of the moment. Seconds it was, not even seconds. (Becky)

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The first set of offences, from the acquisitive style offenders, would certainly seem to fit within a Rational Choice Perspective model of crime. Individuals are weighing up their options, acting to maximise the positive outcomes of their actions and mitigating costs. This Perspective does not map so easily on to the more violent and seemingly emotional offences. These particular accounts do not describe a planning or weighing up process in the same way—but in some cases there do seem to be prior choices being made, which seem (to the reader, or observer) to put the individual in more and more risky situations, making a buildup of emotion or frustration (or whatever negative emotion is driving the behaviour) more likely. In some cases, the individual is self-aware (perhaps with the benefit of hindsight) enough to see how their actions in the journey lead up to the offence. This self-awareness could fit in to an initial application of a decision-making approach, the decisions being bounded by the capacity that the individual had at the time. By way of further example, look again at the narrative given by one woman planning her shoplifting offence. When I shoplifted I planned loads. I used to wear uniforms – nurses’ uniforms, hairdressers’ outfits. ‘Cause I’ve got short hair I used to wear wigs – look completely different. I made foil bags, and go on the train – Chester, Warrington, St Helens. It was like going to work – doing a day’s work. I went there yesterday, so I’ll leave there today. I wore that wig with that uniform last time, so I’ll change. (Sheila)

In contrast, Dan, a man in his thirties, describes the events leading up to his most recent, serious offence which involved a serious assault on two other men, who he found in bed with his on/off girlfriend. What it was, was we (self and partner) were rowing a bit so I went and stayed at a friend’s, it was his birthday so I was out drinking with him. I got a phone call from my ex, she said call round I want to see you. I had my own key so I went there, and got in the front and said to her kids ‘where’s your Mum’? They said ‘upstairs’ and I could see that they were frightened, I said ‘what’s up?’ they said ‘nothing’. When I walked in they looked terrified.

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Could I have done it different? If I wasn’t drinking, maybe. She chose a night I would be drunk. I would have gone back down and said to the kids ‘come on with me’ and taken them to my mates and said they could call their mum from there. And brought them home afterwards but for her to have those kids there and for them to know what she is doing and they know I’m coming they were terrified; X (one of the children) shouted to me ‘don’t get arrested’ as I went upstairs. (Dan)

In the troubling situation above, there definitely seem to have been a number of occasions where the Dan made choices that were against his better judgement—knowing that he was putting himself in a situation where he may lose his temper and commit an offence. While the end point of his offence involved him losing his temper and attacking the men, the journey to this point involves a set of (poor) decisions that would fit into a decision-making model. It can be argued that in application to the ‘choices’ there is some level of awareness of consequences at each stage, one of those potentially being an offence. If this ‘choice’ or each subsequent ‘choice’ is viewed as a standalone decision, and the guide for rational behaviour is applied, then this choice could fit within a bounded version of the model. Both people above have clearly described their thinking in the lead up to the actual moment of the commission of the offence (or the offending act). However, there are clear differences. The first narrative sets out a thinking process that may be familiar to many of us, when we are planning a purchase for the home or for a holiday, for example. A goal is identified, and care and thought are put into how best to achieve this in the most profitable, efficient and risk-free way. The second individual, the violent offender, describes a set of choices that result in the highest probability that an offence may occur. Far from being unaware that this is happening, a person may be able to explicitly describe how the choices he made prior to the offence led him to be in a set of circumstances, which for him make the commission of an offence more likely. The acquisitive person seems to move from a consideration of outcomes direct to an action, whereas the other man made choices that made the commission of an offence much more likely. This difference may go some way to explaining the differences between the groups highlighted earlier.

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Rational and Non-rational Within the Same Individual There does seem to be a separation between the acquisitive and violent type offences, then, in terms of the rationality that each displays in their accounts of offending. However, examining the narratives from all participants more closely, it becomes clear that though a shoplifter or burglar may be rational in the planning of their offence sometimes, this does not always ring true. Likewise, many of those individuals who were characterised by violent or emotive offences also describe some offences which were planned, well thought out and certainly were the result of a decision. Throughout the evidence presented within this book so far, different ways of thinking have been illustrated from the impulsive, ‘blank mind’ type of experience, to the meticulous planning and thinking of some acquisitive type offenders. Delving deeper though, the narratives suggest both of these behaviours, impulsive and rational, can exist within the same individual. What implications does this have for the application of a Rational Choice Perspective to offending behaviour? Many of the interviewees, both male and female, had been guilty by their own admission of committing a mixture of acquisitive and violent type offences in their past that they may or may not have been convicted for. One man, Peter, specialising in well-planned and complex armed robberies has a parallel record of violent assaults, mostly committed while he was in custody. Peter was equally as capable of spending weeks or months planning an offence, as committing a violent offence in high security custody, where the chances of discovery are very high. Consider these excerpts from the same offender interview. Stake out the office where they keep cash for a few weeks to see when the money is taken. Go and loosen the hinges on the door. Then on the day go to the cashier office and kick the door in. (Peter) I (have) spent about 30 odd years in prison. Every time I am in, I am fighting so I was always in solitary confinement. Last time I went to (X Prison) and I broke my jaw, busted my wrist and broke my eardrum. 2

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years on top (of my sentence) just because I pushed someone and they fell downstairs, but I came off worse.

The contradictions within this case are interesting. Additionally, the same offender asserts his preference for Prison over being under Probation supervision, saying of his licence: I am on a final warning again (with Probation), they will send me back inside. I would rather be inside. They (Probation) try to control me and won’t give me any space. I need some space. People watch me doing things.

Peter clearly feels more comfortable being in custody than he does living in the community, though it seems strange that he feels that Probation supervision does not allow him ‘any space’ and he is ‘watched’ when considered against the amount of control exerted over prison inmates. He goes on to explain what may be at the root of this issue for him. It is harder being out than in prison. People in my face – I can’t switch off and I have a bad temper anyway. I spent 4 years in solitary. 4 years without going outside. I came out and my head was done in. I can’t do it. I can’t read and write, I can’t even tell the time at 58 years of age I like to be by myself. I don’t trust people I like to be by myself.

Reading what Peter had to say, we begin to understand why he may find it easier to live in prison than to survive in the community. Peter clearly expresses his anxieties about being surrounded by people and about coping with the demands of everyday life. For such a person, preferring a controlled and limited environment may make sense. If this understanding is taken further, it begins to explain Peter’s actions within prison. The violent assaults may seem counterintuitive but will have the result of increasing the prison term for Peter, as well as increasing the likelihood of solitary confinement, which for him, is desirable. Peter was not the only person interviewed who seemed to have more rational reasons for their violent behaviour than may immediately meet the eye. In some instances, interviewees talked about different types of

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offences, both acquisitive and violent, that they had committed and displayed elements of rationality in each. For example, take Dean, 31 years old, whose most recent offence was burglary. I was in a strange place, the house belonged to a friend and once I said ‘should I shut the window?’ And she said ‘no leave it open for the cat’ so I knew I could get in.

His analysis of why he chose his target for a burglary makes sense, it was easy to access as he knew the window would be left open. His next offence involved throwing a large kitchen knife at a child—he explains it by saying that he was staying with a friend who was being targeted and subject to homophobic bullying by local teenagers. In order to try and stop this happening, he grabbed a kitchen knife and threw it hard at one of the teenagers, causing an injury. Although this seems (and indeed was) impulsive, his choice to do so was made with a clear goal in mind—he himself (and his friend) was in no physical danger. Though extremely unpleasant, the abuse was verbal and shouted from a distance and Dean had no reason to believe it would become a physical threat. He also claims to have been drunk when he made the decision, which he argues made it seem more of a logical choice. Dean was actually asked to leave their shared house by the friend he was ‘defending’ (as his behaviour was making things worse) and he (Dean) retaliated once again—this time by stealing from his friend when Dean knew his friend would be out. His logic is clear. So I thought right, if I’m evicted I will need some money so I took the DVD player.

The impulsivity of throwing the knife suggests that this was not a rational choice to make, but Dean can identify a clear goal that he wanted to achieve by his behaviour. Later, the choice to steal from his friend seems to have been motivated as much by revenge as it did money, and a tangled web of acquisitive and non-acquisitive motivation begins to emerge.

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This tangled motivation becomes even more intriguing when considering a further serious offence committed some months later by Dean which caused life changing injuries to a young man. He tells a story of drinking by the seaside and watching his friends jump from the 30ft wall down to the sand below, ducking and rolling at the bottom. Clearly a risky activity, Dean decided that this was not for him, and declined to take his turn, but instead pushed another man in his early twenties from his position seated on the wall. Dean’s victim was unprepared and landed feet first, breaking both legs and his back. Dean claims to have no recollection of meaning to do this, or in fact doing it. I don’t know whether I’ve done it or not you see so apparently I pushed him off the sea wall but instead of rolling he’s landed on his feet, and jolted his back.

Dean does not claim that this was a rational event in any way—and that there was no motivation for the offence. However, later in conversation, Dean admits that the victim was the same ex-friend who had evicted him from his house. This behaviour would not be called rational of course, but knowing that Dean has before committed offences partly due to revenge, could revenge really not have been part of this behaviour? Revenge is a strong emotional feeling which could easily guide a person’s actions if it was felt keenly. Yet more evidence that the theoretical concept of well thought out, rational behaviours, and violent, emotional behaviours may not be as far apart as they seem. Indeed, the latter may be just as powerful in their motivation and provide just as much benefit for the actor (at least in the short term) that we can still conceptualise them as fitting within a risks/rewards model, albeit one where his system 1 brain was operating on motivations that had not quite reached his conscious decision making. The idea that human beings engage in both rational, reasoned behaviour and seemingly irrational, emotional behaviour is not a surprise. It is something that most of us will be familiar with from our own daily lives and interactions—but knowing this is the case, how much can we tease out the risks and rewards of the ‘emotional’ behaviour, and

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how much can these said to be considered before action is taken? For Dean, his impulsive and violent behaviour seems spontaneous but is still motivated by something. Can this assessment of motivation be sufficient to fit these behaviours into some form of decision-making model? In the last chapter, the idea of the ‘chain of choices’ (e.g. Bouffard, 2002) was introduced, the process by which a person can put themselves into increasingly difficult sets of circumstances where they are aware that their risk of emotional behaviour is heightened. If the application for a decision-making model could be extended to include this chain of choices, could this encompass Dean’s violent behaviour? For another woman, Annie, 28, the mixture of rational, planned offending and more emotional offending was also evident. Annie says: I always planned to get lists of what people wanted me to get for them, I knew I wouldn’t be able to get rid of some stuff but there were always some things you knew you could always get rid of like CDs, DVDs. Things like that I would always take.….You have to do something to get the money shoplifting is the least worst it isn’t as personal. Then when I was in London in one period I used to pretend to be a prostitute and take the punters’ money but people found out what I was doing and people (started) getting violent. I don’t want that.

Annie was very organised—she targeted her shoplifting directly at what she could make the most money out of. Annie would certainly exemplify the rational actor—maximising the positive benefits of her decision while reducing potential risks. However, Annie had also been convicted of a violent offence. She describes how this happened: I went into (shop) to look for some bras for (a friend), I didn’t realise the security guard was following me. I went to the bus and I got the two security guards stopping me, and (they) said that I have taken goods and they wanted to check my bags. I hadn’t taken anything so argued with them for a while and then just to get away I started to take things out of the bag to show them. Just then one of them dived on top of me and pushed me into the street and started pushing me I just flipped. One of them shouted she’s a junkie she’s probably got AIDS the bastard. So when he said that I really lost it and said I had AIDS, to get him off me. The

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police came and charged me with affray and claimed that I try to give them AIDS that even though I haven’t got it.

The details of this assault reveal that the offender had scratched and bitten both the security guards and a Police Officer in a violent attack. Annie was ashamed of this behaviour—saying she had AIDS, she says, was a reaction to the security guard physically trying to restrain her, because she knew he would let go. Annie was more upset about saying this, than about assaulting the man, she felt she had done people who were actually ill a disservice. The incident moves from Annie acting rationally, trying to argue with the guards and showing them her bags when an impulsive act by the guard resulted in a violent retaliation by Annie. It is certainly possible that Annie did do something to provoke the guard’s reaction, although official records of the incident do suggest it went from arguing to violence quickly. The use of the terms ‘I flipped’ and ‘I really lost it’ is in contrast to Annie’s earlier choice of words, ‘I always planned’ and wanting the ‘least worst’. The dichotomy between the rational actor and the emotional actor is similar to those we have seen before, such as with Peter who committed planned armed robberies and also violent assaults in prison. Like Peter, Annie’s aggressive behaviour served a purpose for her—she did inflict relatively minor injuries on her victim but exacerbated this by claiming to have AIDS. As she had drawn blood, this was a quick thinking move to get the guard away from her. This was not initially Annie’s thought and was based on something someone else had said, but she took the idea on board and ran with it, realising it may help—a rational decision in the rush of the moment? Another example of this mixture of planned and impulsive behaviour comes from Kevin, 45. Kevin was an experienced shoplifter. Recall this quote from earlier in the book: Yeah – that’s there, I want it, I’ll take it. Simple. I would never take something unless I could get it sold though. If someone said I needed a new laptop I would get it for them.

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Kevin goes on to describe another incident, a violent assault on a female friend, then a Police Officer. This bird spat in my face and just totally I lost it. I didn’t hit her but gave her loads of abuse and the Police came and I barricaded the door and a Police Officer got hit by the door and ended up getting hurt.

Once again we see the same person use words that imply thought and preplanning ‘I would never take something unless I could get it sold’ along with the now familiar phrase ‘Just totally lost it’.

Rational and Non-rational Behaviour in the Same Event So far, several examples from different people have illustrated how both rational and non-rational behaviour and decisions can be seen within one individual on different occasions. This is not new; as discussed earlier, most of us will understand how sometimes decisions can be made that are based on impulsivity and emotion, that is, with the ‘hot’ as opposed to the ‘cold’ thinking system (Van Gelder et al., 2022). However, this does not mean that the violent or emotional behaviour should be dismissed as not fitting within some version of a decision-making model. Even within the rush (both time and emotional) of these decisions, there are still elements of thinking that suggest that the individual is, to some extent at least, using what circumstances are available to them at the time to help facilitate their behaviour. Dean found the ex-friend against whom he had a grudge perched on a high wall and pushed him. Annie was in a sticky situation and took the idea that someone else brought up and used it to prevent herself being hurt. Kevin is convicted of assaulting a Police Officer by hitting him with a door, but suggests that he both ‘lost it’ and refrained from hitting the woman that had spat at him, suggesting some form of restraint. In other examples, evidence of more rational, cold, decision making and the hot, emotional behaviour happens not only within the same person’s criminal behaviour, but in some cases, in the same criminal event.

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For example, an individual described in an earlier chapter, Jay, was prosecuted for a serious assault on his partner. He described leaving the pub one afternoon to look for his partner. I went outside and saw her necking some bloke. I saw red and went for her.

With this action, he has committed what from the outside to an observer seems like an irrational action, in which the offender described himself as ‘seeing red’, but even as this was happening he recalls having a clear thought: I went for her, not him. He ran away fast, and besides, he was bigger than me.

Even within the heat of the moment, Jay realises that things will likely not end well for him if he were to attack the man his partner was with instead targeting his partner. The aim of this research was to examine both acquisitive and violent/ emotional offence types to see if there is evidence of decision making at any level. So far, example narratives have illustrated that there are differences in the use of language that suggest that in general, those decisions made around offences where the goal is money tend to fit in with a Rational Choice Perspective of decision making. For the emotional and violent offending, the language used is more likely to suggest impulsivity, spontaneity and lack of decision making. However, within this, there have been glimpses that however limited, some form of thinking is happening. Even in the heat of the moment, there are indicators that some individuals are trying to maximise the best positive outcome from the situation or (possibly and ) minimise the negative outcomes. Despite the general differences between offence types, it is clear that most individuals do have experiences of both types of event. As discussed earlier, many of the individuals interviewed tended to commit either acquisitive or emotional offences, but after talking to them and examining records, almost all had a history of one or two (or more) offences of the opposite category. A shoplifter would also have a few counts of assault

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for example, or a habitually violent offender would also have taken part in the odd burglary. A model of thinking and decision making should aim to explain both types of behaviour. A final example in this section illustrated how two types of thinking could even be demonstrated within the same event, suggesting that any model would need to allow for both cold and hot, or rational and impulsive choices happening at the same time. Returning for now, to the idea that there is a general split in evidence for rationality between acquisitive and emotional/violent offences, it is illuminating to see if this trend holds true for all individuals in all cases. We know that individuals can exhibit both rational and seemingly irrational behaviour at different times, or sometimes even at the same event. Is it possible that the same offence type can be a result of different thinking in different individuals? Could a shoplifting offence be a result of careful planning for one person, and an impulsive act for another? There does seem to be evidence that some individuals are making a decision which would fit into the Rational Choice Perspective, but also, there are other offence descriptions that would suggest no decision is being taken specifically related to the commission of the offence. Both these phenomena appear to occur between offence types, and both between and within individuals. Looking back at some of the evidence, it is possible to begin to examine how similar offence types may be carried out for different reasons. Returning back to the considerations made right at the start of this discussion, the idea that costs and rewards are the key to the decision making may reveal why the same action (e.g. shoplifting) may have a different significance to different people. Consider Sheila, who didn’t want to shoplift, but felt she had to: I was in a violent relationship, It got to the stage though, (where I was more worried about) what he would do if I didn’t go back with something.

Contrast the above statement with that below from Sally, who seemed very proud of her shoplifting success.

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I did it for nice stuff, and for money. I got satisfaction - I got away with it for 15 years – it was something, the only thing I was good at. I got satisfied through that. I was an expert. I had practice – if you go to one of the shops that are difficult – M&S, BHS – get away with it – have a good graft – you felt good afterwards.

Although the offences that Sheila and Sally committed were the same, their motivations were very different. Sheila shoplifted out of fear—as she had been forced into it by her abusive partner. Sally enjoyed it and almost seemed to get a type of ‘job satisfaction’ from her work. In a similar vein, consider two assault offences that may have looked similar to the observer, but again resulted from a very different internal individual experience. The first example of assault was committed by Peter, who we met previously. I (have) spent about 30 odd years in prison. Every time I am in, I am fighting so I was always in solitary confinement. Last time I went to Dartmoor and I broke my jaw, busted my wrist and broke my eardrum. 2 years on top (of my sentence) just because I pushed someone and they fell downstairs, but I came off worse. It is harder being out than in prison. People in my face – I can’t switch off and I have a bad temper anyway. I spent 4 years in solitary on the Isle of Wight. 4 years without going outside. I came out and my head was done in.

Compared with another assault, committed by Keagan, 31: It was New Year’s Eve hours at some house at a party. My girlfriend was working so I was there are my own. It was her friend’s house. Some guy sexually assaulted me so went out after him after a got kicked out of the house and really went down on him and nearly killed him by hitting him across the head with a full can of beer and lost it I mean I’m not a bad person but the way he made me feel was so horrible and I nearly killed him.

Both of these instances resulted in a conviction of assault, but the feelings and thoughts that were experiences by Keagan and Peter were very different.

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Once again, a similar offence type, once examined more closely, appears to have distinct points of difference. Just as a theory of decision making, applied to criminal behaviour, needs to be able to take account of different offence types, it needs to be able to account for the different processes at work within the same offence type. It is clear that offending decisions, if they can be said to be made at all, need to be taken as a caseby-case basis. It would also need to be considered how the above accounts fit within an existing model where costs and benefits are weighed up. For Peter, the assault was calculated to extend his time in prison—a goal that does not make sense to many, but suited Peter perfectly. For Keagan, his behaviour was as a result of the way the victim made him feel. In his view, he was provoked to act by somebody else’s behaviour. This of course does not excuse his violence, but it could help develop an understanding of it.

The Effects of Alcohol and Drugs When talking to people who have committed crimes about their experiences, there is one element of these experiences that is present so often that it cannot be ignored. A great many criminal offences take place when the offender is under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or both. This is an important consideration on several levels. Not only does the consumption of drugs and alcohol put people in places where criminal behaviour is more likely to happen, but it can significantly foreshorten, alter or completely obscure any thinking that may happen before an offence is committed. Drug use often compounds the issues further, as taking them, holding them or supplying them is illegal in itself, even before they affect thinking and behaviour. The narratives explored with the individuals in this study suggest that the need or desire for drugs and alcohol can be variously (and sometimes at the same time) the reason for offending, the enabler of offending and the cause of the individual being caught and prosecuted. As well as the possession and supply of drugs offences, substances can also be related to specific offences such as drunk driving but are also very commonly found to be a factor in general offences, including everything from shoplifting to assault.

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Alcohol use in particular is strongly associated with assaults and public order offences (Census, 2021) and this factor certainly seems to be a strong theme emerging from the narrative. For example, as Irene says. I have a string of convictions, when you look at it like that it is 3 or 4 pages the string of convictions. Not one of them was committed when I was sober.

Tommy says: I had been out drinking all night. Every time I get in trouble it is because of drinking.

Likewise Jay, who we met earlier agrees that alcohol is at the root on his offending. I have been to court 10 times and 9 of them have been through the drink.

Drunk, and Sober, Decision Making Many people would laughingly report making less than ideal decisions when they had drunk a few alcoholic beverages, mystery eBay purchases, deciding to jump street bollards resulting in sprained ankles or simply far too much money spent on a night out. However, these decisions do not, for the most part, result in a criminal conviction. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that for the people in this study, that alcohol or drug use was the sole course of their offence. With this is mind, it is interesting to see what these individuals say about how their thinking was affected while under the influence of drugs or alcohol. One woman, Becky, convicted of stabbing her partner describes how alcohol influenced her. I met my partner in alcohol rehab and we were together for a year and had just got engaged but what he tended to do, you see I’m not an angry drunk – if I am provoked I can get verbally abusive, same as anyone, but in general it tends to make me emotional. But not aggressive.

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Another individual, Keagan, describes how using alcohol affected his temper. It is easy to see looking back to understand how I lost my temper. I lost my girlfriend and home and Mum. A lot of it was to do with drink.

Again, Jay confirms his experience of alcohol and temper being linked. I can control my temper when I am sober. The drinking pushes me over the edge. Drink is like a trigger. I am on a course, so I know that it isn’t the drink that does it (the offending), it is me. I am not allowed to blame the drink. But it is the drink.

For Becky, Jay and Keagan, alcohol affected both their intensity of feeling and their ability to control their emotions. Other individuals described how alcohol affected them in different ways. Gary, convicted of robbery and assault, describes how his intoxicated state affected his judgement. I was drinking alcohol, out one night with me mates after drinking all night. I saw these lads and thought I’d ask one for a ciggy and erm he had none so I put my hand in his pocket to search him and he spat and it went on me and because I was drunk I thought he had spat AT me, so I gave him a good kicking, so I was charged with attempted Robbery and Assault.

This change in ability to manage one’s emotions and plan ahead is not always a surprise to the individuals concerned. For many, they are well aware that they are at risk of getting themselves into serious trouble if they drink, but they do it anyway. For example, Lee described in detail how he understands how alcohol will affect him and his behaviour. I just shouldn’t drink. If you know something is on your mind before you start, you shouldn’t start drinking you should just think. If you are annoyed or unhappy the drink will make it worse you are going to get wound up and flip. Make you worse. You should learn by your mistakes

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and think ‘before I have this drink and am I gonna be OK, how drunk am I gonna get?’

Lee goes on to state ‘It is about reading situations to avoid trouble but you can’t do that when you are drunk’. The difference between sober and drunk thinking is something that many of the interviewees were aware of in their own lives. Tracey talks about the difference in her thinking when sober and drunk as a ‘difference in logic’. Tracey gives an example of when she was sat in the middle of a busy dual carriageway late at night: I know now he (the Police officer) has to come and see me, I might be sick. The logical me when I’m sober tells me has not going to leave me sitting there on a main road but the logical drunken me thinks differently. It still logic but it’s a warped logic. I am doing no harm to you so why are you hassling me – go away. That to me is logical when I am drunk, it is not logical when I am not. The next morning I say the bloody stupid woman, you have done it again, but that’s how it goes. It is the difference in logic.

Tracey seems to be suggesting that she is making decisions while she is drunk, but that these decisions, unsurprisingly, are not good ones. When she was drunk, sat on a busy road, her thought processes made sense, she felt she was not bothering anyone and was just having a rest, and she just wanted to be left alone. Sober, she sees this decision as ridiculous— knowing how unsafe she was and that any Police Officer that did not try to help would not be doing his job.

It only Happened When I Drank For others, alcohol not only made their decisions less sound, but made them capable of behaviour that they would never show while sober. The lack of inhibitions caused by alcohol was often cited by the participants as being something that ‘made it happen’. Freddie says:

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The street robbery only ever happened when I was drunk, it wasn’t planned. If I was out and saw the opportunity I would just go for it and thought why not? Cars I always nicked for the buzz, but the street robberies were for whatever I could find. Cos I needed to.

For Freddie, he would never take the risk of a street robbery unless he was drunk—and benefiting from the disinhibiting effect that alcohol gave him. It is interesting to note that many of those committing offences spoke about the disinhibiting effect of alcohol seeming to ‘make things happen’ without any reference to their own underlying emotions or motivations (e.g. money, excitement) almost as if alcohol was acting independently. For example, Steve talks about violent incidents with his partner: It was mostly alcohol. Me and my girlfriend we get on great, but when we get drunk together something always ends up happening.

Some people felt that alcohol was such an overwhelming influence that they were completely unaware of what was happening, and therefore were totally taken over by drinking. Becky, for example, describes how she discovered that she had assaulted her own mother, an event she had no recollection of. But not my mum! I’d never hit my mum, but on that cider you don’t know what you are doing. I have had blackouts. Did I do that last night? Food I can’t remember eating, total blackouts.

Jay describes his consciousness disappearing behind a ‘mist’. Drunk - drinking then drunk and a mist comes down. Don’t remember.

Once the ‘mist’ comes down, many people report that they are completely unaware of their behaviour, even after they sober up. For some, the memories come back, but for others they never seem to. For example, Dean says:

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I don’t remember if I did it all cos of the drink. I wasn’t too smashed but enough that I am not sure.

Even more worrying is Lianne’s admission of something that happened more than four decades ago, when she had been very drunk. I stabbed my husband in 1970. I have no recollection of it to this day, and he wouldn’t give evidence. The first recollection I have of it is waking up in a police cell with the cell door open and a police man outside and thinking ‘why the hell am I here’ and they tell me I stabbed (husband) and I just went absolutely hysterical and I was terrified. I was covered in blood, part of it was (husband’s) and part mine.

Alcohol was present in a great many of the stories of offending that the interviewees told. Almost one quarter of the people interviewed (fortysix in total) said that alcohol was one of the main causes of their crimes. For the women interviewed, this was as high as one-third. In addition, the issue of drug use and abuse was also very common. More than a third of all interviewees said that drugs had been directly related to their offending behaviour, and looking again at the women’s sample, this was as high as forty percent of all interviewees.

Drugs Alter Me Earlier in this chapter, the need to obtain money for drugs was described as being a strong motivation for many people’s offending behaviour. Whether shoplifting, burglary or some other type of offence, obtaining the money to buy goods was a common theme. However, as well as being the motivation for offending, they can also in fact hinder the successful execution of an offence. Much as some people explained that alcohol impaired their decision-making process, several individuals described how they found it more difficult to plan an offence while using drugs heavily. As Keagan says: The drugs stop you making the decisions.

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Several people described how their use of drugs had impaired their judgement, and therefore their ability to carry out a successful offence. As Paula suggests: You start (to) think like a smackhead. It affects you mentally and physically.

Paula, a 28-year-old woman, describes a time that she committed an assault on a minor (a 14-year-old girl) after smoking crack cocaine, by snatching a phone out of the girls’ hand and pushing her away. She starts the story earlier that same day, when she was approached by an acquaintance who owed her some money while on the way to the telephone box to speak to her daughter, who was temporarily being looked after by a foster family. Wanting her money, she followed the acquaintance back to her home and was there offered crack cocaine as payment instead of cash. Paula accepted the offer, and her day got much worse. On arriving at the telephone box, she had no change to make a call and asked some teenagers sitting nearby if they had any change. They called her a name, based on her having clearly used drugs, and in her impaired state, she took one of the girls’ phones to call her daughter resulting in the assault. She blames the drug for impairing her judgement, but sees that the decision to accept it was a poor one. I shouldn’t have gone into her house, I had never really connected with her. I shouldn’t have gone there. It was the wrong decision to go instead of phoning (her daughter) and another wrong one to smoke the pipe. It makes you paranoid.

Paula’s decision to follow her acquaintance home, and to accept the drugs instead of money, resulted in a much anticipated call with her daughter being missed and the serious charge of assault on a minor— further scuppering chances of seeing her child. Just as some interviewees explained how using drugs or alcohol impaired their thinking, a number of others explained that in a state of addiction, you actually need some of your preferred drug in order to restore your thinking skills to successfully achieve your goals. For most,

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these goals were carrying out another offence in order to obtain more of the drug—a vicious circle. For example, Sue, a shoplifter, says: No way could I go grafting (stealing) without having anything. I always made sure I would save something to wake up to. Most of the times I have been arrested is when I have been greedy – smoked everything the night before and woken up to nothing – gone out desperate – withdrawing or getting there – and walked in a shop and lifted- not thinking.

The idea of needing a ‘little something’ to get you going was also described by Annie. If I had a good day I would keep some money back, not spend it so that I could buy some more (heroin) next morning. It is difficult to think straight in the morning without having any and as you will be going to go out again that day (to offend) you need to be thinking straight so I always make sure I had some ready for the next morning. The time I was nicked was because I haven’t had any, wasn’t thinking straight, wasn’t concentrating.

Both Annie and Sue are not trying to say that the drugs enhanced their cognitive abilities in any way, simply that their abilities were very much impacted by not having the drugs in their system. The drugs were not performance enhancing for them in that they elevated their everyday abilities; rather, they compensated for the reduction in faculties brought on by withdrawal. They were so dependent on the drug to feel ‘normal’ that trying to operate without drugs felt nearly impossible. Jenni puts it simply: You just need a bit, then you feel alright so you can force yourself to get out of bed and get dressed. You had to have a bit to get you going.

In addition to using drugs in order to restore the ability to think and plan, and feel ‘alright’, there is also evidence within the narratives that different individuals use drugs or alcohol to actually enhance their ability to commit an offence. Previously, the disinhibiting effects of both

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drugs and alcohol was blamed for behaving in ways that someone would not normally behave, and some people talked about taking advantage of that disinhibition—not enough to be out of control, but just enough to spur them on with confidence. Freddie, with a long history of theft and shoplifting, tells us about an incident where a friend has asked for help with a burglary, an offence Freddie wasn’t familiar with. I did it with him (the friend). We had been drinking and he persuaded me. I was shitting myself, so on the night, I had to have a drink like, cos I was shitting myself and I needed to chill out. It (helped) me relax enough

Freddie needed to relax his nerves before his first burglary. In a similar way, Stuart describes using cocaine for the same reason. I have got a long history of offences. Yes, violence, a bit of theft and that. And burglary. That was the worst one, I always took a bit (coke) before that. It makes me feel stronger.

Though the role of alcohol and drugs in offending behaviour is not the remit of this book, it would be remiss to overlook the extent to which alcohol and drugs affect a person’s thinking and behaviour. Just as each individual criminal has their own particular motive for offending, each also has their own relationship to using alcohol or drugs. Some interviewees have described how using substances impairs decision making, or even obliterates it. For others, it is both their motivation for offending, and something that can help that offending be more successful. Whether substances are the cause of the offence through altering behaviour (such as raising aggression levels) or through being the main outcome of an offence (such as shoplifting to make money to buy drugs), they are clearly a pertinent issue for consideration in any theory of decision making to the commission of crime.

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Chapter Summary In addition to the insight that the interviews have provided around how drug and alcohol affect people’s thinking and behaviour, it is also clear that there are a wide range of factors at play when a decision appears to be taken. The evidence of thinking for both acquisitive and emotional or violent offending suggests that the level of decision making differs between the two, but that is just the start of trying to untangle rationality and offending behaviour. What appears to the observer to be the same offence type (e.g. shoplifting) can be seen as both rationally motivated and irrational, depending on who is committing the crime. Likewise, evidence that individuals can commit both more rational and less rational offences further confuses things. Lastly, examination of the narrative suggests that some individuals can be rational about some elements of an offence, while being irrational about others—all in the same offending event. The next chapter applies these findings more closely to the Rational Choice Perspective looking at decisions in more detail, to examine what (in addition to alcohol and drugs) could enhance or detract from a decision, how people make quick ‘shortcuts’ in decision making, and how being an ‘expert’ can benefit decision making.

References Bouffard, J. (2002). The influence of emotion on rational decision making in sexual aggression. Journal of Criminal Justice, 30 (2), 121–134. Census 2021. (2015). Violent crime and sexual offences. Alcohol-Related Violence: Findings from the 2013/14 Crime Survey for England and Wales. Clarke, R. (2013). Affect and the reasoning criminal. In J.-L. van Gelder, H. Elffers, D. Reynald, & D. Nagin (Eds.), Affect and cognition in criminal decision making (1st ed.). Routledge. Van Gelder, J.-L. (2012). Beyond rational choice: The hot/cool perspective of criminal decision making. Psychology Crime & Law, 2013, 745–763. Van Gelder, J. L., De Vries, R. E., van Sintermaartensdijk, I., & Donker, T. (2022). Personality pathways to aggression: Testing a trait-state model using immersive technology. Criminology: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 60, 406– 442.

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From what has been discussed so far, it seems that there is mixed evidence for the existence of the rational ‘offending decision’ as defined by a Rational Choice Perspective. Although not always implicitly stated (‘I decided to do that’) for most of the acquisitive offence types, there is a significant amount of language that suggests a decision took place. For example, people in this group talk about planning, thinking, taking orders, scoping targets and other activity that suggests that a decision to commit an offence was made ahead of time. This language implies an active thinking process before the crime actually took place. Though the evidence and language, used by the violent and emotive type offenders, do not suggest this active thinking process ahead of time, instead, phrases like ‘I lost it’ and ‘It just happened’ suggest that there was no prior thought. Despite this, interviewees do talk about making decisions as the events were unfolding, often rushed and sometimes based on very little information. In addition, when prompted to describe what happened leading up to an offence, they do recall a serious of choices or decisions that led them to be ‘in’ the event before they even realise this is happening. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Steele, Exploring the Criminal Decision Process, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46231-3_11

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There does appear to be a fundamental difference in rationality in the way that different individuals experience thinking about their offending. Given what has been demonstrated about the ‘thinking’ language used in some narratives, is this sufficient to constitute a ‘rational decision’ within the theoretical definition? Even if this is the case, to what extent can a Rational Choice Perspective be seen as a useful way to examine offending behaviour given that half of the people interviewed (most of those with violent offence types) displayed no evidence of making an active decision. This chapter will look at these ideas in more detail and explore how the decisions described by these participants fits in with the idea of what motivations, risks and rewards might be in an offending decision. Looking at those situations where a decision does appear to have been made, those elements considered in that thinking process can be applied to the Rational Choice Perspective. The classic or ‘thin’ models of rational choice view a decision as being made by weighing up costs and benefits, and choosing the option that delivers the best outcome. The ‘thin’ decision-making model would assume that the individual has full knowledge of their options as well as the time, ability and capacity to process the information. Of course, in reality this ‘thin’ or Classic approach may apply to very few real-life decisions, whether these are about offending, or anything else. Many of the acquisitive type offenders can be seen to be going through a ‘weighing up’ process when they talk about their criminal behaviour, some decisions being made way in advance of the actual event. However, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, many of these individuals were making decisions on offending with the goal of obtaining drugs/money for drugs, in some cases having to take their drug of choice before being able to make a decision. The impairment of thinking due to these drugs is an important consideration when looking at how a decision is being made. The ‘ideal’ decision-making conditions of the ‘thin’ rational choice approaches are certainly likely to be compromised. The term ‘bounded rationality’ as used by Cornish and Clarke (1986) is an attempt to account for this, suggesting that any decision and decision maker will be bounded by the level of their knowledge, the capacity for processing that knowledge, and the time available. In this example, a decision maker who is also a drug user may have a wide knowledge

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of potential costs and benefits (and indeed, extensive experience) as well as sufficient time to plan, but they may be viewed as having decreased capacity to make that decision due to the influence of the drug. The appeal of the basic ‘thin’ models of rational choice is that the decision can be used as a simple weighing up of consequences and there is no need to account for the particular and individual motivations of the actor (Hechter & Kanazawa, 1997), however in practice, there is no way to remove both the individual motivation, and the circumstances in which the decision is made from the decision itself, and that for many people committing crime, both the motivation and circumstances may seem detrimental. The decision-making process within the classic rational choice conceptualises the individual as weighing up all possible positive and negative outcomes for the behaviour. One of the ways in which the decisions displayed by the people interviewed for this study did not conform to this model is the general disregard they had for the potential negative outcomes. Many people talked about their disregard for the potential legal consequences of their behaviour. It is important to note that this was not due to them not knowing about what could happen; indeed, as most of those with criminal experiences had a long list of prior offences, their knowledge of potential legal outcomes could be said to be better than that of the average member of the public. The concept of ‘bounded rationality’, that is, that the decisions to offend were made without full knowledge of potential arrest and prosecution does not apply. Instead, their prior experience meant they generally had good knowledge of the justice system but chose not to think about potential negative consequences. Therefore, the lack of consideration of formal sanctions is not due to lack of information, but a lack of care or value placed on these potential sanctions. For example, participants actually stated that contrary to not understanding the consequences, they simply decided not to think about them. For example, as Alan explains: When you do it you don’t think about the consequences, you just go ahead and do it. Not that you don’t know them, Oh no, you know what can happen, you don’t think about it at the time.

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Perhaps, their decision making could be argued to be ‘bounded’ by a lack of knowledge of other ways of obtaining (usually) money, such as working, borrowing or similar, but again many interviewees stated that they had already exhausted all of these options. Therefore, a decision about how to act is being made as a choice between a limited range of options. That is, the range of options actually available to the individual is very limited, and therefore, the actual decisions that are able to be made are limited by circumstances (Felson, 1986). Recognising the individual circumstances of the decision maker as well as the extent to which the individual both perceives, and considers the consequences, fits much more comfortably within the ‘thick’ family of Rational Choice Theories (Hechter & Kanazawa, 1997) and begins to develop a more realistic conceptualisation of actual decisions. Returning for a moment to the idea that the people represented in this study are aware of the negative consequences of their behaviour, but choose not to think about them presents a unique challenge for the ‘bounded’ nature of a rational decision. It would appear that rather than decisions being bounded by lack of knowledge, they are taking on a self-imposed ‘boundedness’ by simply setting the potential consequences aside. This is not a new finding in research such as this, with previous work such as Shover and Honaker’s (1992) study of ‘persistent property offenders’ whose respondents described not allowing any thinking time or ‘mental space’ to negative consequences in the decision-making process. One reason for this discounting of potential negative consequences may be that the overriding motivation or desire to obtain the benefits of criminal behaviour may be so consuming, that consequences are simply discounted. This may be a cognitive shortcut that is especially powerful for those who are under the influence of drugs or alcohol, but also applies for those making offending decisions while free of any substance. For many people who have shared their experiences of committing crime within this study, the motivation to obtain the goals of the offence has been sufficiently large for the potential negative consequences to be discounted and not given the ‘mental space’ in the thinking process. This phenomenon, found in a range of offender decision-making research (Shover & Honaker, 1992; Wright & Decker, 1994), would of course

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have wide-ranging implications for criminal justice policy which is based on deterring crime through criminal sanctions (Matsueda, 2006). If the potential costs of an offence are simply not considered, then what does this mean for the Rational Choice decision-making model? The weighing up of costs and benefits of the model are the central tenet of the approach—removing the cost element from consideration seems to negate the model entirely. However, the reasons why potential offenders discount the negative outcomes of criminal behaviour need to be examined. When considering potential negative outcomes of committing crime, previous chapters have suggested that it is not legal sanctions that are truly considered, but that other potential negative outcomes may be, such as reputation or impact on family. However, staying with legal outcomes for the present, other studies have suggested that where offenders do think about being arrested or convicted of offences, they will assess these sanctions in terms of the probability of capture and punishment. Simply put, in general, offenders perceive that it is unlikely they will be caught. For example, Corbett and Simon, in their study of driving offenders (1992), found that for high frequency offenders, estimates of the probability of capture were low. For those with extensive history of criminal behaviour, an estimate of probability of apprehension is probably much more accurate than that of a member of the public. This estimation of the low probability of being caught was also evident throughout the present study. As described in Chapter 7 many explained that their experience had taught them that they could commit a number of offences before being caught—for example Lydia: There are 70 odd charges on my pre-cons, but I have loads more – 15 years’ worth of doing it daily.

It would make sense that if a person estimated their chances of getting caught as being very low, then this would make sense in terms of the subsequent ‘discounting’ of this factor from the offending decision. These perceptions of risk are dynamic and will be altered by changes in the individual’s experience and knowledge, as a person’s offending ‘career’

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grows longer they will be more knowledgeable about what their likely outcomes may be. This dynamic estimate of risk has been demonstrated in other research. A study in Australia of Chief Executive Officers (Paternoster & Simpson, 1993) found that their estimates of how likely it was that they be caught for committing a corporate crime were altered by various items of prior knowledge. For example, if they knew that a previous, similar crime had been discovered and prosecuted within the company they would readjust their risk estimation. Similar estimations of changing risk were found in the present study too, with interviewees explaining how changes in family life for example may alter how risky they estimate their behaviour to be. One man, for example, explained how a terminal diagnosis of a parent meant all of a sudden, that a ‘short spell inside’ could mean being away from someone they care about at a critical time. For people deciding to commit a crime (or not) risk is not estimated simply as a mathematical probability—very few human decision makers would do so in real-life situations. Instead, what seems to be meant when people say that the risks of getting caught have gone up, would be better explained as the ‘value’ that they place on being caught (and everything that follows) has gone up. When individuals within this study speak about the risk of being caught, they do not refer exclusively to the probability of that happening. Instead, risk is a value-laden concept, which is factored into a decision. Many of those interviewed would place the probability of being caught as low, but in addition, the value (so, how much the cost part of the decision hurts them) placed on legal consequences is low. This is essentially the idea that though arrest and possible prosecution may be unthinkable to risk for most people, for those with a history of criminal behaviour, these ‘costs’ become little more than minor bumps in the road on their offending journey. The people telling their offending stories not only guessed that their chances of being caught were low, but also explained that even if it did happen, it simply would not matter as much as one would think. The negative value placed on the potential justice-based sanctions was low. As Michael says:

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I have been going to jail since I was 16 and it has never bothered me.

Thinking about a person who is thinking about offending, it is, therefore, not surprising that someone with both a low estimation of the likelihood of being caught, as well as a low amount of caring if they get caught, may decide to discount this ‘risk’ altogether’. To discount something that seems both unlikely and unimportant would fit within a rational thought process.

Making Sense of It All What Costs Do Matter? So, if formal/legal sanctions are discounted what, if any, negative consequences would a potential criminal actually consider? Evidence from both this study and from previous research has suggested a range of informal costs that an individual may consider when making an offending decision. Paternoster and Simpson (1993), in their study of Chief Executive Officers (see above), identified moral reasons, reputational costs and conscience as salient factors. Additionally, shame, guilt and family disapproval are all personal costs that may apply (Tibbetts, 1997). These costs fit with the evidence found in this study. From the impact on children and other family members discussed at length in the offender focus group, to the ‘emotional fall out’ described by one of the interviewees, it is clear that where costs are factored into an offending decision, these will be personal and unique to the individual, based on their own values. One such example is the deterrent effect of shame, and loss of reputation, that one man, Dermot, in the focus group phase of the research referred to as a deterrent from shoplifting. In this case, the shame of being caught for such a ‘trivial’ offence was effective at preventing him from shoplifting, an interesting insight given that he was however happy to carry out violent street robbery. In this case, being arrested has acted as a deterrent, though not in the way that would perhaps be expected. Like Stephan earlier in this book, Dermot would rather be caught for a

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more serious offence, than be caught for shoplifting, as the latter would be perceived as damaging to his reputation (as an offender). He was not worried about the actual arrest for shoplifting, but the fact that his peers may discover he had been involved in what they perceived as a lesser offence, and he would lose status in the group. It is really important when looking at how perceived costs and benefits affect decision making that the particular perspectives of the individual are taken into account. The potential outcome of perhaps arrest or conviction may be very effective as dissuading a general member of the public from committing a crime. From what the participants are saying within this study, the same does not apply for many of those with more experience of the criminal justice system. This is not a new finding, for example, in their study on decision making in shoplifters, Carroll and Weaver (1986) found that new or novice shoplifters were far more deterred by the prospect of formal sanctions than more experienced or expert shoplifters. Where negative consequences are considered, these are more likely to be non-official and may relate to shame and embarrassment, costs to family, or changes in lifestyle.

Planning Ahead Earlier, the use of the phrase ‘I planned ahead’ was described to be indicative of a rational decision being made to commit a crime. This concept of planning and preparation was a strong theme for those who were committing crime to obtain money (whether for its own sake or for drugs). Planning was also a common element found in other research onto Rational Choice Theory and crime. Cornish and Clarke (1986) envision a model of criminal decision making where a decision to commit, for example, a burglary, is made, and then planning follows that decision to select a target, in order to maximise the likely success and outcome of the burglary. In contrast to this, the findings of this research suggest that rather than being something that occurs after the offending decision, planning is something that actually affects whether or not the person decides to commit the offence at all. In looking at whether an offence is viable, the

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potential costs and benefits of the crime are weighed up. In this way, the best way of manipulating these to get the best possible outcome is arrived at, and only then is the decision to make the offence made. Examples of where planning precedes the final offending decision are numerous within the interview narratives. Consider the story told by Sheila, who changed her appearance and matched this to her target shop before shoplifting. Jack talks about how he would dress to portray a particular image and choose his time carefully before wheeling a trolley full of food from the supermarket. Many others describe taking orders or making a ‘shopping list’ of goods they would have the most success in selling on. There are also examples of individuals taking notes on security measures and access to properties before deciding to come back and burgle them. This identification of security weaknesses or desirable goods to be stolen is similar to Bennett and Wright’s (1984a) idea of ‘target selection’. However, Bennett and Wright talk about a target being selected after a decision to burgle has taken place, whereas the current evidence suggests once again that the separation between decision to offend and the decision on where/how to offend is not as clear. Within the target selection process, the offender is thought to have decided to commit the burglary, and is now engaged in a process of selecting the most beneficial, and least risky target. This may actually involve the individual, on their own or as a group, going out to scope out potential targets and spending time watching them before deciding to act. Examples within the present research study suggest that the decision to offend at all is more bound up with the finding of a suitable target. The extent to which the offending decision and the target selection decision are blurred could depend on many things—such as the expertise of the offender, how much they are made impulsive by drug or alcohol use, for example (perhaps pushing them more into their system 1 thinking), or just by urgency. However, the point can stand that the planning of the offence can still be considered as part of the decision-making process, and indeed that the weighing up of potential outcomes during this process actually fits well within a rational choice approach.

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In addition, examining the length of the planning process can also be interesting, and can tell us a lot about the thinking and decisionmaking processes of the individual. Whether the decision to offend is separate from the target selection, or whether these decisions are one and the same, examining this process can be illuminating. In the examples contained within this book, it can be seen that some planning starts several days or a week before (e.g. taking shopping lists for stealing), to the day before, to even almost on the spot. Perhaps counter to intuition, some of the individuals using drugs were actually the ones who put significant amount of work into the planning and execution of their offences, whereas others act recklessly and impulsively. Some of the well organised individuals in this study talk about keeping records of their shoplifting, planning outfits or disguises, enlisting decoys and other measures designed to increase their likelihood of success, right down to keeping a little of their chosen drug behind to help them think. Examining this timeline was a particular focus for the work of Zamble and Quinsey (1997) who used a timeline technique with released prisoners in Canada. These timelines allowed the prisoners to plot how far ahead the planning for, or thinking about, the offence took place. This was charted by the researchers until the thinking process reached what they called the ‘point of inevitability’—that point at which the individual is about to commit the offence. Contrary to previous findings with property offenders, the burglars that they spoke to did not report a long lead in planning or thinking process, and indeed the only group that they did find a planning process for was some robberies—and even for these evidence of planning was minimal. This is in contrast to the findings of other researchers (such as Bennett and Wright [1984b], and Beauregard and LeClerc [2007]) as well as within this study. There may be several reasons for this. One possible explanation is the definition of the decision. From the evidence from the current participants, the decisionmaking process could be seen as a series of thoughts and ideas that come together after a period of time, rather than a discrete, self-contained ‘decision moment’. Viewing a final decision as a process that is made over time, and is a product of an assessment of risks and benefits, as well as a manipulation of these, is a concept that applies to much of the evidence found within this study.

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This staged and ‘thinking ahead’ process has been demonstrated in other research, such as the study by Nee and Meenaghan (2006) who found, in their study of burglars that the decision to burgle was made away from, and ahead of the event, with the actual site for the offence being selected afterwards. This implies a decision process over a period of time, in a model that fits within the ‘target selection’ scenario discussed above. The idea of the decision being made at the ‘point of inevitability’ although present in previous, similar, studies, does not seem to reflect all of the evidence within the current study. Though some offence decisions, if they took place at all, were spontaneous and impulsive, others were made over a much longer period of time. There was also a mid-way point on this scale for the offending decision, where the target selection was the prompt for the thinking process. Here, instead of a decision to offend being made before a suitable target is selected, the identification of a suitable target is what precipitates the decision-making process. Clearly, offending decisions can fall at any point on the continuum. Lattimore and Witte (1986) describe a similar, two-stage decisionmaking process which fits with these findings. The first stage is referred to as ‘editing’ in which an offender will set their own values on the perceived outcomes of an offence, discard potential opportunities that are outweighed by others, and pull all of this together to estimate different outcomes with similar probabilities. The second stage of the decisionmaking process is evaluation and is concerned with choosing the actual ‘winning’ action, that is the final details of the when/where/why of the offence which secures the best outcome in terms of risks and rewards for the offender. These two stages could happen in either order, with the final part of the decision, (i.e. deciding on a burglary), occurring before the ‘weighing up’ value setting (or target selection); or the other way round, as found in this study, where offenders compare possibilities and manipulate probabilities before deciding exactly what their course of action should be. It can be imagined that for people who commit crime on a regular basis, that decision making is an ongoing and interactive process wherein the re-assessment and re-valuing of costs and benefits can occur again at any point until the offence is actually complete, and which then informs the next offending decision.

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It is important to understand the way that these decisions are made to help us explain a wide variety of offending decisions and actions. In some cases, an individual may make the decision to commit a particular crime, but on arriving at the time or place, quickly reevaluate the risks and change their mind. This change of mind can occur very quickly— perhaps triggered by a new factor in the decision-making formula. This could be something like finding a resident at home when the house was expected to be empty, seeing a newly fitted alarm system, or the individual not feeling too well and being worried about making mistakes. Things that can change a person’s mind about intended actions could be related to an increase in risk (extra security, too many people, being recognised) or a reduction in potential payoff (cash being unexpectedly removed from the premises or expensive items being locked away inside the shop). It is important to make the distinction between intention to offend and the actual act of offending. This is of course an issue with much of the research into Rational Choice approaches to crime—the use of non-criminal populations to measure ‘intent’ to offend rather than actual offending (e.g. Topalli, 2005). Aside from the validity issues of comparing criminal intent in a non-criminal population and actual action, even within a genuine offending decision-making process, intent to offend cannot be conflated with the actual act itself. There is room for a re-evaluation between one and the other, an adaptive response to a change in anticipated conditions. Turned on its head, the immediate presentation of ideal circumstances for offending may result in an ‘opportunistic’ offence. This could be described as a potential offender being presented with a situation that triggers an evaluative process very quickly, resulting in an offence. It follows that for a repeat offender, previous decision-making processes may have made him or her well-practised in assessing potential outcomes, and these ‘opportunistic’ offences, though they seem impulsive, are actually based on previous decision making and crucially, earlier knowledge of risks and rewards in a given situations.

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Revisiting Expertise The idea of offending expertise is an intriguing one. As a person practises a skill or works on a particular task, it is expected that over time they would develop techniques, shortcuts and understanding that makes them better at whatever the task may be. The idea of offender expertise is something that researchers have looked into—certainly it is not unusual within the justice system to find an ‘expert’ burglar or shoplifter. As described previously, many of the individuals interviewed for this study describe how their history of offending is long and well developed, with some describing the ‘management’ and oversight of their offending as meticulously as someone else may manage their career in academia. Within the interviews described within this study, there have been several examples of individuals describing themselves as ‘skilled’, ‘specialised’ and ‘expert’ in various fields of offending, basing these judgements on their high success rate, level of experience and knowledge of their chosen ‘field’. Criminal ‘expertise’ is a factor mentioned in several previous studies. For example, a study on shoplifters mentioned above by Carroll and Weaver (1986) compared ‘expert’ shoplifters with ‘novices’ and found that the expert shoplifters used their previous knowledge and experiences to think strategically and make better decisions about their offence. Nee and Meenaghan (2006), after studying the decisions of expert burglars, concluded that experiences of burglary and development of burglary ‘expertise’ were a good alternative for planning ahead and prior knowledge of the burglary and allowed individuals to make fast, but good decisions. Therefore, ‘expert’ burglars were able to act swiftly to offend if an opportunity presented itself, and the time elapsed between decision to offend, and the offence could therefore be shorter. Feeney (1986) made a similar observation in a study on robbers, finding that previous experience greatly reduced the need for planning ahead, allowing offenders to make quick yet efficient decisions about offending. Topalli (2005) expands on the idea of offending ‘expertise’ by explaining how it is made up of a mixture of perceptual skills (knowing what to look out for) and procedural knowledge (knowing how things are likely to play out). Combining these skills means that the ‘expert’ criminal could shorten the planning phase of decision making by using

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these skills to quickly weigh up risks and rewards and how the event was likely to go much more quickly than the inexperienced criminal. There is certainly evidence of this ‘practiced eye’ in the stories told by the people in the present study. Remember Dean who while visiting an acquaintance was alerted to cues indicating poor security and the vulnerability of the inhabitant. Dean’s ‘expertise’ in offending highlighted to him that this property was a potential target, and he made a quick decision to return later. Several demonstrations of skill were described by others, who used their prior experience to their advantage by manipulating their image while committing their crime. Knowing that looking suspicious, or being recognised, may scupper their attempt to steal, they changed their appearance in order to create a less suspicious persona, as the ‘nurse’ or the ‘businessman’. Sheila went so far as to express her enjoyment of shoplifting in the ‘difficult’ shops with better security, just so she could enjoy the challenge! Looking at the words that individuals use when describing their expertise is a useful way of expanding our knowledge of how we understand the decision-making process, as it can demonstrate some of the judgements that are being made. These judgement heuristics or ‘thinking shortcuts’ help us understand where an experienced offender can think more quickly, in a way that does not detract from the quality of the decision being made. For example, the heuristic of ‘representativeness’ is apparent in several of the stories told, where individuals talk about how their prediction of apprehension or difficulty of achieving their goal is based on how previous offences have gone (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). These heuristics or shortcuts enable individuals to make faster decisions by reducing the number of complex thinking tasks required, by using skill and experience (combined as expertise) to make rapid assessments. This is experienced and described by the offending individuals as being ‘skilled’ or ‘specialised’ within their chosen field. In summary, expert offenders can be seen to have developed a range of judgement heuristics or ‘thinking shortcuts’ which enable them to make quick and successful decisions about committing crime, based on the immediate situation, in order to achieve a good enough or ‘satisficing’ outcome (Johnson & Payne, 1986).

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Expertise and Bounded Rationality Understanding these ‘thinking shortcuts’ is essential to understanding how an individual would arrive at a decision to offend. The idea that judgement heuristics can help a person make good decisions quickly can be contrasted with the idea of bounded rationality, the concept that people make imperfect decisions based on imperfect conditions such as lack of knowledge and time. In this scenario, the decision maker is limited by available knowledge or time. However, when the idea of expertise is brought into consideration, the skills and experience that the ‘expert’ offenders have go a long way to overcome the ‘binding’ effect of imperfect conditions. They use experience as a substitute for planning, and skill as a substitute for procedural evaluation, enabling them to make faster and more effective decisions even when limited for time. Likewise, a person may not have all of the information about a situation, but whereas this is a serious disadvantage for a first time or inexperienced offender, the ‘expert’ decision maker can fill in the gaps. All of this prior learning can go a long way to overcoming the ‘bounded rationality’ that decision makers struggle with. Jacobs et al. (2003) describe this as a process they call ‘perceptual shorthand’ in which an individual can quickly survey the environment and integrate whatever they observe into their decision-making process, thus taking advantage of opportunities where possible. The need to make a satisfactory or ‘satisficing’ decision is the need to arrive at a position where a decision is made that is of sufficient quality for the decision maker. Walsh (1986) describes this as a ‘good enough’ decision, which meets the criteria that are deemed as most valuable and most essential by the decision maker. The criteria that are valued most will depend on the decision maker and will vary by individual, so the extent that any decision can be seen to be rational will depend on that individual’s values. A decision will ‘satisfice’ the offender (Johnson & Payne, 1986) if the chosen outcome passes a set of criteria, and practised offenders will be more skilled at making this type of decision, being able to use their previous experience to correctly set the right range of criteria for themselves.

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When examining the evidence for the usefulness of a Rational Choice approach to offender decision making, considering the contribution of the research on offender expertise is important to consider. As stated earlier in this book, an offending individual may value different outcomes and assign very different weightings to potential outcomes than a non-offending person. In addition, the exact nature of these valuations and weightings will vary between individuals, within individuals over time, and will be altered by experience and changing circumstances. Therefore, a novice criminal may display very different decision-making elements from a more experienced offender. Many of the people interviewed as part of this study could be said to have been ‘experts’ based on the length and in some cases variety and success of their criminal careers. By their own admission, many individuals in this study described themselves as skilled or experienced. With this in mind, the evidence of decision making found within the stories they tell may look different from what a different, relatively ‘novice’ offender group may say. So far, the evidence for decision making within the acquisitive offender group seems to support the idea that some sort of active decision is made at a point in time before an offence takes place. This could be some time before, or immediately before, but it does seem that some sort of decision calculus is made before an offence is committed in at least a ‘minimally rational’ way (Feeney, 1986). The evidence suggests that these decisions are often made quickly, in stressful circumstances and to attempt to achieve many goals, which often include money, and sometimes include non-economic benefits such as excitement or fun. With this in mind, it would certainly appear that the evidence from the acquisitive group of offenders would fit within the ‘thicker’ iterations of the Rational Choice model identified in earlier in this book. Before a final consideration of the applicability of the Model to the decision making illustrated in the stories told within this study, it is first necessary to think about the other group of offenders—the violent and emotional type.

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Violent Offending, Choices and Circumstances As we began to explore earlier, the stories told by those who described committing violent or emotionally driven offences do not appear to offer the same level of evidence in support of a decision-making model as the acquisitive type offenders. Rather than the elements of planning and weighing up of options described by the latter group, the violent group’s stories are characterised more by elements of chaos, impulsivity and lack of control. The opposite of ordered thinking, this approach would seem to be entirely contrary to a Rational Choice approach to decision making. Instead, they appeared to act without thinking, showing impulsivity, poor judgement and poor problem solving. These decisions could be seen as being pure ‘hot’ or system 1 decisions, driven by emotion and not subject to any logic or consideration. To illustrate, closer examination of the narratives reveals a lot more depth than is immediately apparent about the individuals’ experiences around these violent, aggressive crimes. For example, Gary says of his experiences of being involved in violent fights: It is me or them, so I go in first.

The message here is that the offending behaviour has been, at least in part, triggered by what is happening around them, rather than by internal motivation. As well as the feeling that ‘it is me or them’, others describe how their victim made them feel bad, or angry, and this makes them, the offender, lose control of their actions. The idea of ‘losing’ is recurrent in the stories told by the individuals describing their violent offences. From losing their temper, to losing their mind, or quite simply losing control, the theme remains that they have experienced something being ‘taken away’ from them, which results in them behaving violently or aggressively. It is also interesting to note that as well as the feeling that something has been lost or taken away, the cause of this loss is always attributed externally—that is, it is always someone or something else that triggers this feeling. Sometimes, this loss of control is blamed on a person (later becoming the victim) that ‘winds

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them up’ or makes them feel bad, but in addition, this loss of control has also been blamed on drugs or alcohol. It is interesting to contrast this with the offence descriptions given by the acquisitive offenders, whose whole thinking and decision-making process is focused on gaining something, rather than losing it. Where the acquisitive offender for the most part describes manipulating the circumstances around them to their best possible advantage, the violent offender describes how the circumstances manipulate them. This distinction directly relates to the concept of locus of control (Rotter, 1966). The acquisitive offenders could be described as feeling in control of their actions and circumstances, therefore having an internal locus of control. The violent/emotive offenders, however, feel at the mercy of their circumstances and of anger/feelings/alcohol, etc. For the individual about to commit a violent or affective offence, the experience of simply as Sue says ‘Going along with things’ makes them feel powerless to stop an event taking place. This is a very interesting concept, and it would be an interesting development of the present study to apply the concepts of locus of control more directly to the interviews given by these individuals, but of course even this seemingly clear distinction between an internal and external locus of control is blurred. The phrase ‘going along with things’ is also an interesting consideration when reminding ourselves of the concept of system 1 and system 2 thinking. Could it be that the ‘things’ leading the events are the results of some hot thinking, rather than simply the person responding to the demands and influences being placed on them externally? Consider the shoplifters who clearly plan their offending, thus seemingly being rational and motivated by gaining something, but who feel they have to commit a crime to obtain further drugs, a substance which has (external) power over them, and addiction leading to a strongly influenced cognitive process. The emotional offenders, seeing themselves as out of control, and at the mercy of external events, would not describe themselves making a decision to commit a crime. However, they do talk about placing themselves in increasingly risky or crime-likely circumstances by making a series of choices over time. Several participants described a situation where their choices placed them in situations that they knew may put them at risk, or would expose them to risk, and that would severely

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limit their options going forward. This process of making a series or set of choices that make the risk of offending higher is clear in hindsight—though may not have been clear to the individual at the time. In one example described earlier, a woman (Paula) committed an assault after going to make a telephone call. She explained how the sequence of choices that she made, following an acquaintance who owed her money, instead of going straight to the phone to speak to her daughter, and accepting drugs as payment, resulted in her experiencing such an overwhelming sense of anxiety and desperation that her ‘snap decision’ was extremely poor. A similar story was described by a man (Dan) convicted of a Section 18 wounding on two men he found in bed with his partner. He describes himself as feeling anxious about his relationship, as he and his partner had not been getting on, so much so he was staying with a friend. He had been drinking with his friend when he received a phone call from his partner asking him to come round. He decided to do so, despite thinking at the time that it was a bad idea (as he was upset and drunk). After Dan arrived at his partner’s home, he was confronted by his partner’s children who appeared scared, and who asked him (Dan) not to go upstairs, and to leave straight away. Dan’s first instinct was to take the children (who loved him, and he loved them) away and calm them down, but instead, against his better judgement went upstairs to find his partner in bed with two men, upon which he ‘lost it’ and hurt both men and his partner. Again, looking back at the offence, Dan describes how he made the string of choices that he felt had led him to behave in such a way. He sees that the choices of accepting the invitation even though feeling drunk and angry, of ignoring the children’s pleas and going upstairs led him to a situation where he felt he had no further choice but to act as he did. It would not be accurate to say that for Dan, the choices he made before committing the assault made it inevitable (he could, after all have just left) it is clear that each decision that was made, increased the likelihood of him losing his temper. He suspected that his partner was calling to ‘wind him up’ on his birthday and when he was drunk, but he answered anyway. Knowing he was drunk and angry, he went to the family home, where he was further distressed by seeing the children

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upset. By the time he had confronted his partner in bed with two other men (which had clearly been prearranged by her), he was so angry, drunk and disinhibited, the assault, while clearly wrong, was perhaps expected. At each stage, the emotional load that Dan carried increased, and the number of easily available exits from the situation reduced. For him, an individual with previous issues with anger management and violence, even an awareness that the situation was ‘going bad’ did not prevent him entering the situation, and once there, resorted to established patterns of behaviour instead of, for example, taking the children and leaving. This perception of having no ‘final choice’ is of course dependent on a person’s individual personality and life experience, and once again raises the question of how ‘offending’ as a means by which to deal with meeting need, or dealing with a situation, becomes part of the range of options. If a rational reason for committing a crime is present, the action must meet some form of need. This meeting of needs, so evident in the acquisitive group of offenders, is harder to find in the violent and emotional group. However, it is useful to think about meeting need using the concept of ‘boundedness’ discussed earlier. If a person ends up in a situation where a violent offence is likely, this could be based on a series of less-thanideal decisions. These less-than-ideal decisions themselves can be seen as ‘bounded’ by lack of time, being under the influence of alcohol, being affected by strong emotion, etc. These poor decisions feel may like the best ones at the time and lead to the final action, the offending event, in which no other viable solutions prevent themselves. Bear in mind of course, that whereas many of us, when faced with a situation that may result in violence, would simply leave as soon as possible, for others who have a very different set of experiences, this may not even register as a potential response. Understanding how their choices link together to result in a crime being committed can go some way to helping people not find themselves in these situations. Practising and exploring alternate responses at each stage of the journey toward an offence can be used as a method to help a person who wants to move away from crime and move on with their desistance journey. So, a person finding themselves in an emotionally charged, time limited and high-pressure situation, is never likely to make a reasoned, cool-headed and logical decision. To what extent, then, is a Rational

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Choice model of decision making applicable? The choices that seem to be made at each stage, however bounded, could be seen as a weighing up of options. As both Paula and Dan describe in the set of decisions leading up to the assaults they committed, they were each aware of alternative outcomes they could have taken, but for whatever reason chose not to. Therefore, these decisions could be subjected to a rational choice analysis. While the decisions to commit an offence (or those leading up to the offence) are not as clearly understandable as a weighing up of options for one of the acquisitive offence types, these decisions could still fit within the ‘thick’ rational choice approaches. Earlier, the idea was explored that anyone making a decision will be limited by the potential outcomes that they see as available to them. This visibility of outcomes is something that will be affected by a whole range of things, background, previous experience, education, emotion, time, gender, financial and other physical resources and so on. Creative solutions to problems are a luxury available only to those with the resources and thinking time available to them. This limiting of visible options certainly seems to be the case here, though this is not enough to explain why people repeatedly make choices that they know will limit future options, ending in a situation where their final decision to offend is experienced as spontaneous or unexpected. The idea that a seemingly irrational, violent event can have rational underpinnings, is something that has been demonstrated in previous research. For example, Wilkinson (2002) in her study of decision making during violent events, suggests that though the violent incidents themselves may appear irrational, and expressive in nature, they can in some cases be understood to have a rational sequence of events leading up to them. Based on interviews with 125 violent offenders, Wilkinson analysed interviews with them for references to reasoning and motivation, finding that in many cases, the violent events were almost played out as public performances, for which circumstances were arranged in advance (such as location, other people). In this way, Wilkinson suggested that these violent events can be understood to have a series of rational thoughts taking place in the lead-up to the offence, in much the same way as some of the individuals in this study describe a sequence of choices or events taking place prior to their offending. This may be a

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useful technique when working with those who have committed this type of crime—to follow this chain of choices back and discuss their thinking process and motivation at each stage. If, as the evidence suggests, many individuals are entering their offending event by way of a series of poor choices, that they even at the time recognised were a bad idea, then it would be really important to understand why. Tedeschi and Felson (1994) have an interesting perspective on this, suggesting that when the sequence of events leading up to a violent or aggressive offence is examined, then almost all of these events can be viewed as instrumental. The division of violent and aggressive offences into two categories, the ‘cold’ instrumental and the ‘hot’ hostile type of violent behaviour, has been an established model for understanding different types of aggression (Bushman & Anderson, 2001). Psychologists have traditionally viewed instrumental aggression as being deliberately undertaken to achieve a goal (so the violence is a means to an end), whereas hostile aggression is emotionally driven, and committed in hurt or anger, and on impulse. This description could certainly be understood in terms of a hot vs cold thinking system. Instrumental violence would clearly fit within a Rational Choice model of decision making. Using violence and aggressive behaviour as a means to achieve a goal (whether money, power or whatever it may be) is another factor to observe in the weighing up of costs and benefits—for some individuals behaving violently may be an excellent way to achieve cooperation. For example, a person who behaves violently during a robbery may be more likely to achieve their goal of obtaining money and valuables as their victim is scared of the consequences of resistance. Certainly, there are examples of street robbery and armed robbery within this study, where violence was used as a tool to achieve a goal. One armed robber suggests that violence is what happens when: Someone jumps out of a car to stop us robbing a security van and then ends up getting hurt – baseball batted or whatever we used. Peter

For Peter, the violence he used in his robberies was specifically designed to scare the security staff and any other onlookers from intervening in the offence. The actual goal of the crime of course was to

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obtain money—but Peter was prepared to be violent in order to achieve this goal. This is in direct contrast to others who tell stories of committing crimes due to a buildup of hurt, frustration, anger or any other feeling that they cannot contain. For some, they describe the actual commission of the offence as something that happens while they are ‘not thinking’, resulting in an aggressive or violent outburst of behaviour. Outsiders would see this behaviour as hostile, volatile and would assume that the perpetrator was a ‘violent person’ or someone with poor anger management skills. The dichotomy between cold, instrumental violence and hot emotional violence has been challenged by Bushman and Anderson (2001) who would argue that the basic difference between the behaviours are seen as being basic differences between the primary goal of the behaviour, the presence of anger and the amount of planning or preparation that takes place. Instrumental aggression or violence has been seen as having a primary goal other than simply seeking to hurt someone, whereas affective aggression has no additional goal, and is conceptualised as reducing an affective state for the aggressor. An example of instrumental aggression is given in the armed robbery scenario above, to obtain money and get away with the robbery without interference. Hostile or affective aggression is seen as impulsive and borne of an emotional state while in comparison, instrumental aggression can be planned and calculated. However, on examining violent or aggressive events, the distinction between these two approaches is not always clear. Consider Dean, who committed a violent assault by pushing somebody off a high sea wall causing severe injury to the victim. Within Dean’s account of this taking place, he describes himself as vague about events; he had been drinking and was not sure what had happened. At first reading, this account may suggest a hostile violent act, as it appears impulsive and perhaps exacerbated by the use of alcohol. However, only by later examining different parts of his story (which were later confirmed by official data) does it become clear that the victim of the assault had in fact evicted the offender from his flat some weeks before. Was this motivation operating at a more instinctive level? Clearly, this fits the remit of the ‘angry offence’ but does not fit within the immediate timescale and impulsive reaction of the typical emotive

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violent crime. Was there an element of primary goal fulfilment here (e.g. revenge)? Return for a minute to Peter, the armed robber from the previous example. In addition to his well-planned, and sometimes violent, armed robberies, Peter also has a record of extremely violent assaults within prison. Attacks both on other prisoners and in some cases, guards, are said by Peter to be as a result of his bad temper, but then adds that he prefers to be in prison than outside in the community, and that he knows these assaults will extend his stay (preferably, for him, in solitary confinement). Both of these examples may appear to observers as incidents of hostile, temper loss aggression, but on further examination, there may be queries about the main motivation for the offence, or the length of time it took to move from anger to hurting the victim. The motivation behind aggressive behaviour is not always easy to understand, but previous research has suggested that individuals will act violently or aggressively for many reasons. Brezina (2002) suggests that this sort of behaviour can be beneficial for offenders (in Brezina’s case, youths) as it can raise self-esteem, and give the offender a sense of control and influence over others that they may be lacking from elsewhere. Brezina also suggests that individuals may employ ‘functional aggression’ in seemingly random ways, acting crazy or unstable simply to protect themselves, and build a reputation as someone who ‘Don’t take any shit’ (Dermot) for the purposes of self-protection. The confusion between the seemingly rationally based instrumental violence and the hostile aggression type offences is deepened when looking at examples where both rational and non-rational elements seem to be at play, even while the offence event is taking place. One excellent example of this from within this study, is from Jay, who tells his story earlier in this book. He exits the pub to find his partner kissing another man. He describes himself as ‘seeing red’ and ‘going for her’ yet even as this is happening, reports a clear thought—he attacked his partner not the man she was with because ‘he was bigger than me’. It would appear, as Bushman and Anderson (2001) propose, that just as other offences can be motivated by different things (a shoplifter may be equally reinforced by money or the thrill of the offence) then a violent offence may have mixed motives, and the key to understanding these offences is to understand what makes someone feel that this behaviour

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will be effective in that situation (at least on a short term basis). When examining stories and experiences described by men and women who have committed a violent offence, even where they express that this happened spontaneously, impulsively, etc., there are clues in their stories as to why this behaviour helps them in some way. Several interviewees expressed how their behaviour, though not ideal, did provide relief to the anger, frustration, bad feeling or hurt that they were overwhelmed by at the time. One man, Jimmy, commits an assault and violently lashes out at someone that he feels was trying to sexually assault him. The victim’s behaviour made him ‘feel horrible’ and lashing out allowed Jimmy to express this horrible feeling, therefore making him feel better. Of course, there may be other complex thoughts and beliefs underpinning these horrible feelings (the victim as well as the offender was male, and it is unlikely he would have reacted the same way with a female who was behaving in a sexually provocative way even if he was not interested). Trying to understand the behaviour of those who commit such offences does not imply condonement, but will help with understanding, preventing and rehabilitating future offenders. Jimmy is not alone in describing how he wants to get rid of his ‘horrible feelings’ Others share similar experiences, with phrases such as ‘they make you feel bad’ and that hitting the victim makes the bad feelings go away. If losing something like ‘bad feelings’ rather than gaining something (e.g. money or status) is the outcome of violent or aggressive behaviour, then people who behave this way may not be seen as rational (to the wider society) but may be more understandable. If it is possible to begin to understand a violent offence in terms of a (bounded) decision-making calculus, then it may be possible to employ a version of the Rational Choice model to enhance this understanding. For some individuals, their options of what to do in a situation where they are scared, hurt, angry or frustrated may be very limited by past experience. If a person has learned these coping techniques from family, or peers, or from their own prior behaviour, it may be rational for them to behave in this way in the future. Conceptualising violence and aggression as a rational response to feeling strong emotions that you have no means to process is an interesting consideration within a Rational Choice decision-making model. If ‘lessening’ the bad, is just as powerful a motivator as achieving the good,

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it could, therefore, be feasible to encompass both expressive and instrumental violence within a rational decision model, just as with acquisitive, goal-oriented crime. However, there is another set of considerations— those events, individuals or offences where all of these rationalities come into play.

Mixed-Up Rationalities The previous section looks at how some violent type offences are actually goal-oriented offences, where the violent behaviour has been designed to assist with the success of the offence by keeping passers-by away, scaring security guards or intimidating those who may impose a threat. Just as the differences between hostile, emotional violence and instrumental violence can be blurred it is also evident in the distinction between the motivations between violent offences and acquisitive offences. In both cases, there seems to be an argument for (at least a very bounded, minimal) thinking process, an identified goal (whether that be gaining, or relieving something) whether this thinking or goal achievement is actually the best available option to the individual at the time or not. From committing an assault to stay in prison longer (which may seem counterproductive to an observer but makes sense for the offender) to remain in prison to attacking a partner rather than the person they are kissing (because he is bigger), there does seem to be some consideration of outcome. Those clear boundaries between the motivations of the emotional/violent offender and the acquisitive offender are looking somewhat blurred in places, and the planning ahead to open up choices contrasted with the sequential restriction of eventual choices shown in the two offence categories can be seen as a related process, albeit going in the opposite direction. Up to this point, the categories of ‘acquisitive offences’ and ‘violent offences’ have been usefully used to describe a split between offence types that appear (to an observer) to have different outcomes for the offender, and for the most part, these categories have also reflected a split in terms of the extent of evidence for the existence of a decisionmaking process. Before analysis, the offender narrative was split into

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two, based on the prevalence of ‘rational statements’ such as those referring to planning, thinking and choosing, present within the narrative of each offending type. In general, on first analysis, the acquisitive type offences appeared to be most likely to conform to a Rational Choice Perspective with offending individuals able to vocalise their planning and thought processes, and also the benefits they hoped to gain. In contrast, the violent outcome offences described tended to portray a picture of unplanned, impulsive offences which displayed few, or no rational elements. However, on closer examination, the differences in terms of the existence of rational processes do appear to be less clear cut. Examining the offending experiences described by the interviewees more closely seems to suggest that similar motivations or drivers can exist within both violent and acquisitive offences, and that both rational and non-rational elements can be present both within the same individual and even within the same offending event. If the motivation for the offender can be different even within the same offence type (such as someone who shoplifts for monetary gain and someone who shoplifts for emotional reasons), then the process by which an individual decides, or does not decide, to commit an offence must also vary. Is it still viable to apply the labels of rational and nonrational without knowing the motivations for the individual at that time, and the circumstances in which they found themselves? It is clear, that some offences take place after a certain amount of planning, thinking through, such as committing an assault to remain in prison, and others are clearly helping the offender relieve, or avoid, a negative consequence and may not demonstrate the same level of reasoning (despite in some cases, the outcome appearing to be ‘rational’, i.e. monetary gain). The sequence of choices leading up to a violent offence, as described above by Brezina (2002) and Tedeschi and Felson (1994) as instrumental further muddies the waters between the rational and the non-rational. It is clear that though the outcome of an offence may suggest a rational process (such as acquisitive gain—a gain that makes ‘sense’ to an observer), this does not necessarily mean that the motivations for this action can be assumed to be rational, or that the process an individual goes through to arrive at the outcome was rational.

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So, it is impossible to simply classify an offence as rational or nonrational based on the observed outcome, it is also impossible to classify an offence type (e.g. shoplifting, assault) as rational or non-rational. One person’s shoplifting may be entirely monetary, another’s motivated by frustration, poor mental health or the need to take a risk. Another person’s assault may be purely borne of anger, another, a carefully calculated message sent to others that they are ‘not to be messed with’. It is also very difficult to split individuals into those that appear rational or irrational. Most human beings demonstrate a mix of both logical and illogical behaviour throughout their lifetime, but if the aim of this work is to try and understand offending behaviour—this capacity for rational and non-rational action needs to be recognised within their offending behaviour. Looking at the histories of the people within this study, most of them admitted having a mixture of acquisitive outcome and violent outcome offences in the past. This mixture of past offences was a strongly emerging theme. In order to explore this further, this idea was presented to a focus group of offending individuals consisting of different people from those that had been interviewed in depth. This group was set up after the analysis of the interviews in order to help make sure that the ideas and thinking that were coming out of the interviews made sense to those with actual criminal experience. After all the goal is to understand how people actually experience their criminal thinking and behaviour— making sure that any conclusions about what happens also makes sense to those that know what it feels like. The idea that people who commit crime will likely be involved in different types of offending over their criminal career was echoed by the people in the focus group. One man in his forties, Henry from the focus group clarifies: Most people done both, (violent and acquisitive offences) – their experiences are different. Henry

Another group member took up the idea, thoughtfully describing how different offence types can feel and be experienced differently, but that this difference cannot be assumed—

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Just by looking at someone. Vic (focus group)

He contrasts himself, a mainly violent offender, with a fellow group member who deals drugs, and suggests that on face value it could be assumed that the drug dealer ‘thinks and the violent offender ‘doesn’t’. He goes on to say that even though this may look obvious to someone on the ‘outside’ you can’t assume what is going on ‘inside’. He also makes a remark that this is often what happens in court, or with a Probation Officer—an assumption of what was going on ‘inside’ a person at the time of the crime. So, if evidence suggests that rationality varies between offence type, within type, between individuals, within individuals and even within the same offending event, what implications does this have for a Rational Choice Perspective of offender decision making? A rational decisionmaking approach may be applied (albeit bounded and limited decision making) to the reasoning behind both an acquisitive crime, and the journey of choices leading up to a violent offence. Can a model be adapted that takes account of all of this variation in thinking, feeling and action? That also recognises that a person’s thinking may be influenced by system 1 (hot) as well as system 2 (cool) thinking? This is not a new thought. Cornish and Clarke (1986) also recognise that a differentiation of approach may be needed, suggesting that to effectively explain the different decisions that are made about different offence types, a ‘crime specific theory’, based on the Rational Choice model, would be necessary in order to further understanding of why individuals engage in these different types of crime. This idea was in part a response to the findings of various different studies that suggested that different benefits were associated with different crime types. In addition to this, research such as that by Tibbetts (1997) had described how different sanctions (or costs) discouraged different crimes, and therefore, a ‘crime specific’ theory would be based on the understanding of the benefit and costs specifically associated with that offence type. However, based on the findings from this study, that motivations can vary even within offence type, it is unlikely that a crime-specific theory would be adequate to explain the range of reasons different individuals may become involved in what from the outside looks like a similar

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offence. A theory that was crime specific to, for example, shoplifting may include a range of benefits, money, goods, the thrill of getting away with it, and while this may apply to many individuals who shoplift, it would not (as demonstrated here) apply to all. Crucially, and from the evidence reviewed here, this crime-specific theory may not even consistently apply to one individual for the same offence type over time. So, the question remains, what is the best approach to creating a model to help us understand how people make decisions about their crimes, in such a way that it helps us work with individuals to understand what happened, explore alternative outcomes and essentially change outcomes in the future. A starting point is to look at the ideas emerging from this, and from other research to begin to model the different things that motivate and affect how an individual thinks, based on knowledge about how an individual processes information, how they feel and how all of that interacts with their circumstances, thus affecting their behaviour. Is it possible to conceive of a Rational Choice model that can be flexible enough to explain various offence types for various individuals without the decision calculus element of the model becoming so diluted that it can no longer be conceived of as a decision-making theory? This possibility will be explored a little later, but prior to that, it is important to consider something that stood out as being hugely influential in the thinking and behaviour of any number of different crimes—the influence of drugs and alcohol.

Alcohol, Drugs and Individual Differences Listening to what the interviewees say in their explanations of their offending incidents, it is impossible to ignore the fact that so many of them make reference to using drugs or alcohol in relation to their offending. If an individual’s actions, decisions and feelings are to be understood, then this relationship between substance use and offending is clearly important. It is a known fact that alcohol in particular is a common factor in offending within the UK (Census 2021, 2015) and its influence is no less felt within the group of individuals interviewed here.

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Alcohol affects decisions in many ways. We have already examined how many people interviewed within this study talk about how it alters the way they think, its effect on their ability to judge a situation, and what their expectations are. A primary consideration in itself is the fact that a number of people within this study admit that most or all of their offences have been committed while under the influence of alcohol. Despite this prevalence of drug and alcohol use in offending, and the inevitable impact these substances must have on decision making, previous Rational Choice theorists and authors have yet to fully explore the effects of psychopharmacological agents on the decision-making process (Exum, 2002). It has been suggested that as alcohol and drugs have such an impact on decision making, a Rational Choice Perspective could not apply to actions undertaken while an individual is under the influence of such a substance, as this would mean the individual had no capacity for a rational decision (Dudley, 2005). It is of course true that alcohol or drugs will impact the decision process. Research has shown that alcohol, and other drugs, impair the higher order cognitive functioning of an individual (Chermack & Giancola, 1997) leading to poorer decision making, and this effect does seem to have been in evidence for some of those offenders interviewed here. Earlier, extracts from the interview narrative suggested a particular link was made by these individuals between drinking and losing their temper, causing aggressive behaviour and in some cases, violence. Similar experiences were also described by the people in the offender focus group. When this idea was presented to them, many of them agreed that they also blame alcohol for their own anger and offending. One woman, Tracey, described how different logic applies when she is drunk than sober, causing her to expect people to act in different ways. When she sobers up, she can see that her expectations are unreasonable. The assertion that alcohol prevents you reading situations correctly is made by one interviewee, a viewpoint that is supported by the work of Chermack and Giancola (1997) whose work into alcohol and aggressive offending suggests that alcohol diminishes the drinker’s capacity to pay attention to situational cues. At the same time, the alcohol tends to minimise in the mind of the drinker the potential outcomes of any action. Research into the effects of alcohol has also suggested that it

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increases a person’s focus on provocative cues, while diminishing focus on non-provocative cues (Assaad & Exum, 2002) and that use of alcohol can increase an individual’s capacity for risk taking behaviour (Hurst et al., 1972). This combination of factors creates a situation where aggressive behaviour is more likely, and for some people, inevitable. Assaad and Exum’s (2002) examination of literature on alcohol draws them to the conclusion that using alcohol does not mean an individual is not making a decision about their behaviour, but that decision is affected by the alcohol in terms of its impact on cognitive functioning, in many cases leading the individual to believe that aggression is a rational response to a situation they perceive as a threat. This would mean that to them, the action is based on a rational evaluation of the ‘facts’ as they see them, even though these facts are wrongly interpreted. If an offender finds themselves in a situation where they feel under threat, they are likely to experience emotional arousal in the form of fear, which in itself has been found to inhibit cognitive functioning (Royce & Diamond, 1980), and this coupled with the additional effects of drugs or alcohol could combine to significantly alter the decision-making calculus and may make a violent or aggressive response (and offence) both more likely, as well as seem like the only viable option to take (Zeichner & Pihl, 1979). The use of psychopharmacological substances and how they impact on the applicability of Rational Choice Theory to decision making is an under-researched field (Exum, 2002) with many theorists such as Dudley (2005) simply dismissing the possibility of Rational Choice Theory as applying to those under the influence of drugs or alcohol. However, some research has taken place that suggests that although it is clear that alcohol and drugs do alter the decision-making process that these alterations could still be understood within a Rational Choice framework. Studies on alcohol and decision making by Exum (2002) suggest that intoxicated individuals are still capable of perceiving the costs and benefits of an action, but that they may perceive these differently and assign these costs and benefits different weightings. We already know that different individuals make different probability estimates for potential outcomes and also place different values on them occurring. Therefore, an intoxicated offender may still be capable of processing

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these options—a key element of a rational decision, but the risk/reward assessment may be altered by the alcohol they have taken. As well as altering the perception of options available, being drunk or drugged could affect the interpretation of the circumstances around the individual. Research has also suggested that in addition, a person may place a different value on the potential costs and benefits, and not only this, but use of drugs or alcohol may also affect decision making by shortening the decision-making process. Jaffe (1980) found that smoking marijuana caused a deterioration in an individual’s ability to carry out multiple mental steps, shortening the decision-making process. This may lead an offender’s decision to appear more impulsive, or that they have made a ‘snap decision’ such as was reported in the experiences of many of the offenders within this study. If the decision-making process is shortened, then the mental steps, or cues, that the offender attends to will be confined to those that appear more salient at the time, that is, the most provocative cues will be attended to (Assaad & Exum, 2002). If a person is in a pressured situation such as many of the offender experiences reported here, the limited focus on provocative cues could make aggression an even more likely response. A shortened and instinctive decision-making process also suggests that the decision is being taken in the light of a ‘hot’ system calculus—whereas usually the individual may be more logical and considered, the emotion and alcohol present in a situation means that a ‘cool’ decision is too cognitively effortful, and therefore, they resort to the easier system 1 decision-making route. In the thinking about decision making contained within this book so far, the interaction and combination of situational factors and personal factors has started to emerge. All of the elements of decision making, whether this be the costs and benefits, how much these are valued, how much time is given over to consideration of them and how much people take shortcuts in their thinking based on either expertise or prior learning, are all important. All of these factors and more (the presence and effect of drugs and/or alcohol, for example) produce a unique interaction between the person and the circumstance that must be understood at that level. This combination and interaction of the situational and personal/psychological factors in decision making is a theme that has been recurring throughout examination of the evidence collected

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within this study and will be discussed further in the subsequent chapter. However, remaining, for now, with the effects of drugs and alcohol there are particular considerations of this interaction of the circumstantial and personal to be made. Research has shown that although alcohol (and some drugs) can facilitate aggression potentially leading to offending by increasing risk taking behaviours and causing dismissal of cues, the use of alcohol does not necessarily lead to aggression or offending. For example, Taylor et al. (1973) showed that while alcohol was found to facilitate aggression when an individual felt that they were under pressure or threat, this did not apply when the individual was in non-pressured circumstances. If both circumstantial factors and psychological (and psychopharmacological) factors combine and interact to increase the likelihood of an aggressive response and subsequent offending, it is, therefore, important once again to gain an understanding of how these factors affect the decision-making process. Another way in which this interaction can be seen to take place is through the explanation given by some individuals who describe deliberately using substances to increase their likelihood of success at offending. Several people within this study describe using substances to alter their psychological state in order to interact better with their environment, suggesting that they are aware of the effects their substance of choice can have on them. Different individuals report using alcohol or drugs to enable them to commit an offence more effectively. Several drug users interviewed within this study described how they kept a small amount of drug back for the next morning, to take before they went out to commit an offence, in most cases so they felt ‘normal’ or relaxed enough not to make errors. Similar ideas were brought up around alcohol, one example being a young man in the offender focus group who described drinking alcohol to give him confidence when going to an area of Liverpool where he knew there was likely to be a fight. Cromwell et al. (1991) described a similar finding in relation to burglars, who used drugs before offending to act as a relaxant, and again, help prevent them making mistakes due to anxiety, as did Bennett and Wright (1984a). As stated earlier, research has shown that emotional arousal, such as fear experienced by a potential burglar, can lead to a

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reduction in cognitive function, leading an offender to neglect particular clues and make poor decisions (Royce & Diamond, 1980). This has been described as a ‘funneling of awareness’ (Zajonc, 1980). This funnelling could lead to a burglar, for example, missing cues that suggest the investigation of a neighbour, passers-by or the return of the homeowner (Cromwell et al., 1991). Whereas the combination of emotional arousal and alcohol/drugs was described above as a possible facilitator of aggression, these individuals used specific amounts of their chosen substance in order to give them confidence, relax nerves and enable them to be alert to necessary cues in order to commit a successful offence. In varying narratives within this study, individuals cite using alcohol to either make them confident and ready for a fight (as described above) or relaxed and calm. Maisto et al. (2010) suggest that alcohol has certain expectations linked to it as regards how it will make you feel, and that these are learned from watching those around you who drink. If an individual observes others drinking and behaving aggressively, then this expectation may influence the individual’s behaviour when she or he drinks. This idea links in with Social Learning Theory, one of the theories of criminal involvement (rather than the criminal event) and would be a pertinent addition to the question of how offending, as an option for behaviour in any decision process, comes to be favoured as a potential solution to a situation. After all, many people drink alcohol without ever committing a crime. To look at alcohol and drug use in terms of the ideas beginning to develop within this chapter, they can be seen both as a means of achieving a goal, (such as relaxing before a burglary), and of moving away from a hurtful emotion (such as drinking to numb painful feelings). Likewise for drug use, but use of illegal drugs brings its own issues, being a criminal offence in itself. Of course, obtaining drugs is a goal for many offenders and drives a lot of the shoplifting and burglary activity described in the offender narrative within this study. It is important to ask why drugs or alcohol are being used, and it certainly seems that the use of either substance can be tied up with trying to escape from an aversive situation. If the use of substances is primarily targeted at escaping, numbing or mitigating bad feeling, could this be an indicator that any

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subsequent offending was also an attempt to mitigate these bad feelings, to feel ‘less horrible’? In some cases, the offending behaviour while under the influence of drugs or alcohol is an outcome of being drunk/drugged in those particular circumstances. The alcohol or drugs have been taken for whatever reason the person has to take them, but the outcome is that they find themselves in circumstances which are dangerous, or inappropriate such as that of Tracey who drank to excess and was found sitting in the middle of a dual carriageway. The offence committed (assault of a Police Officer) was almost secondary. When the Police Officer tried to move her to safety, she became violent. She had no desire to attack an officer, but in her altered state, she thought his behaviour unreasonable and wanted to be left alone. The part that substance use plays in an offending decision is an essential element when attempting to understand a person’s offending. Various theorists have suggested that a decision-making theory such as Rational Choice Theory is not useful or valid when applied to offending decision in which the individual was under the influence of a psychopharmacological substance. Exum (2002) found in her studies on how alcohol affects aggression that the integrity of the Rational Choice model was compromised when the decision maker was intoxicated, and Cromwell et al. (1991) agree that as it stands, Rational Choice Theory cannot explain the variances they found in drug using burglars, without additional elements being introduced to the theory to account for the effects of the drugs. It is not clear, for example, why for some offenders, alcohol or drugs and emotional arousal work together to increase aggression and offending, whereas for others, the use of substances can directly affect, in a positive way, the commission of a successful offence. Again, individual factors come into play. Without some way to account for these variations, a decision-making theory could not be said to apply. Zajonc (1980) agrees, suggesting that without a combination of cognitive and affective elements, a decision-making model could not explain why different elements combine for different individuals and result in offending. Likewise, without this understanding, attempts to help a person understand and change their behaviour would be stymied. In attempting to understand the decision making taking place before an offence where drugs or alcohol have been taken, and in an attempt to

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create or adapt such a model, it is important, therefore, to know first of all whether the drugs or alcohol were used to facilitate the offence (e.g. to gain confidence), were the goal of the offence (shoplifting for money to buy drugs) or were a primary factor in affecting the circumstances of the offence (like the example above). The reasons that the individual used the substance to excess will be just as pertinent in this case as the way the alcohol or drug alters decision making. It is clear from this brief review that the use of psychopharmacological substances is an important issue for consideration in any application of decision-making theory and offending, and at the core of these considerations must not only be the ways in which such substances can impair (or facilitate) decisions but also the motivations the individuals had for taking them in the first place. By understanding these motivations, a better understanding of the particular psychological state of the offender may be gained, which can feed into the analysis of any decision calculus that may take place.

References Assaad, J., & Exum, L. (2002). Understanding intoxicated violence from a rational choice perspective. In A. Piquero & S. Tibbetts (Ed.), Rational choice and criminal behaviour: Recent research and future challenges. Routledge. Beauregard, E., & LeClerc, E. (2007). An application of the rational choice approach to the offending process of sex offenders: A closer look at the decision making. Sexual Abuse, 19 (2), 115–133. Bennett, T., & Wright, R. (1984a). Burglars on burglary: Prevention and the offender. Aldershot Books. Bennett, T., & Wright, R. (1984b). The relationship between alcohol use and burglary. British Journal of Addiction, 79, 431–437. Brezina, T. (2002). Assessing the rationality of criminal and delinquent behaviour: A focus on actual utility. In A. Piquero & S. Tibbetts (Eds.), Rational choice and criminal behaviour: Recent research and future challenges. Routledge.

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Bushman, B., & Anderson, C. (2001). Is it time to pull the plug on the hostile versus instrumental aggression dichotomy? Psychological Review, 108(1), 273–279. Carroll, J., & Weaver, F. (1986). Shoplifters’ perceptions of crime opportunities: A process tracing study. In D. Cornish & R. Clarke (Eds.), The reasoning criminal : Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer Verlag. Census 2021. (2015). Violent crime and sexual offences—Alcohol-Related Violence: Findings from the 2013/14 Crime Survey for England and Wales. Chermack, S. T., & Giancola, P. R. (1997). The relationship between alcohol and aggression: An integrated biopsychosocial conceptualisation. Clinical Psychology Review, 17 (6), 621–649. Cornish, D., & Clarke, R. (1986). The reasoning criminal : Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer-Verlag. Corbett, C. & Simon, F. (1992). Decisions to break or adhere to the rules of the road, viewed from the rational choice perspective. British Journal of Criminology, 32(4). Cromwell, P. F., Olson, J. N., & Avary, D. W. (1991). Breaking and entering: An ethnographic analysis of burglary. Sage. Dudley, C. (2005). Alcohol, sexual arousal and sexually aggressive decision making preventative strategies and Forensic Psychology implications. Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice, 5 (3), 1–34. Exum, M. L. (2002). The application and robustness of the rational choice perspective in the study of intoxicated and angry intentions to aggress. Criminology, 40, 933–967. Feeney, F. (1986). Robbers as decision makers. In D. Cornish & R. Clarke (Eds.), The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer Verlag. Felson, M. (1986). Linking criminal choices, routine activities, informal control and criminal outcomes. In D. Cornish & R. Clarke (Ed.), The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer Verlag. Hechter, M., & Kanazawa, S. (1997). Sociological rational choice theory. Annual Review of Sociology, 23, 191–214. Hurst, P. H., Bagley, S., & Ross, S. (1972). Effects of alcohol and methylphenidate on complex judgements. Psychology Reports, 31, 59–67. Jacobs, J., Topalli, V., & Wright, R. (2003). Car-jacking, street life and offender motivation. British Journal of Criminology, 43, 673–688. Jaffe, S. (1980). Drug addiction and drug abuse. In L. Goodman & A. Gilman (Eds.), The pharmacological basis of therapeutics. Macmillan.

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Johnson, E., & Payne, J. (1986). The decision to commit a crime: An information processing analysis. In D. Cornish & R. Clarke (Eds.), The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer Verlag. Lattimore, P. K., & Witte, A. D. (1986). Models of decision making under uncertainty: The criminal choice. In D. Cornish & R. Clarke (Eds.), The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer-Verlag. Maisto, S., Galizion, M., & Connors, G. (2010). Drug use and abuse. Wadsworth Publishing Co. Matsueda, R. (2006). Differential social organisation, collective action, and crime. Crime, Law and Social Change, 46 , 3–33. Nee, C., & Meenaghan, A. (2006). Expert decision making in burglars. British Journal of Criminology, 46 , 935–949. Paternoster, R., & Simpson, S. (1993). A rational choice theory of corporate crime. In R. V. Clarke & M. Felson (Eds.), Routine activity and rational choice (pp. 37–58). Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalised expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 80 (609). Royce, J., & Diamond, S. (1980). A multifactor-system dynamics theory of emotion: Cognitive affective interaction. Motivation and Emotion, 4, 253– 298. Shover, N., & Honaker, D. (1992). The socially bounded decision making of persistent property offenders. The Howard Journal, 31(4), 276–293. Taylor, I., Walton, P., & Young, J. (1973). The new criminology: For a social theory of deviance. Routledge, Kegan and Paul. Tedeschi, J. T., & Felson, R. B. (1994). Violence, aggression and coercive actions. American Psychological Association. Tibbetts, S. (1997). Shame and rational choice in offending decisions. Criminal Justice and Behaviour, 24 (2), 234–255. Topalli, V. (2005). Offender decision making: An experimental analysis on how offenders and non offenders differently perceive social stimuli. British Journal of Criminology, 45, 269–295. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1982). In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. Walsh, D. (1986). Victim selection procedures among economic criminals: The rational choice perspective. In D. Cornish & R. Clarke (Eds.), The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending research. Springer-Verlag Wilkinson, D. (2002). Decision making in violent events among adolescent males: An examination of ‘sparks’ and other motivational factors. In A.

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12 Putting It All Together

The evidence reviewed so far suggests that while there may be enough evidence of decision making present in what people say about their offending behaviour, enough perhaps to apply a decision-making model in some format, an exclusive focus on the tangible costs and benefits of an offence is insufficient in explanatory power. Therefore, a ‘thin’ or traditional decision-making model is not an appropriate tool to help us understand these thinking processes—as this model would not cover a lot of the factors that have been demonstrated to be pertinent in such a decision. Simply attempting to look at factors within the offending decision and listing costs and benefits as perceived by the offender does not go far enough as to give a useful picture of the thought processes taking place. This could be accomplished, so long as the benefits and risks were defined by the individual, but the end result would be a dry exercise, removed from the personality, lifestyle and circumstances of the individual making the decision. While Rational Choice Theory as a theory of the offending event is useful and allows examination of a discrete event, it means setting to one side all of the issues about how offending came to be a viable option for the individual, making the focus on the event alone can seem somewhat artificial. This artificiality or lack of ecological © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Steele, Exploring the Criminal Decision Process, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46231-3_12

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validity has been a criticism levelled at Rational Choice Theory in the past. This simply means that the way in which Rational Choice models have looked at criminal decision making in the past has done it is a way that is outside the real-life experiences and circumstances of the person committing the crime. Theorists such as Hirschi (1986) support his critique, suggesting that the social isolation in which traditional Rational Choice Theory operates removes decisions from their social, and real, context. Given that social outcomes such as peer approval, living a party lifestyle (Wright & Decker, 1994) and respect from others have been cited as benefits of offending, the removal of decision making from a social context seems inappropriate. This removal from the social context means that the ‘thin’ Rational Choice model suffers particularly when attempt is made to apply it to affective, violent or aggressive events. Although a decision to commit what is traditionally thought of as instrumental aggression, that is aggression to achieve a goal, may fit the model, those offences perceived as being hostile or emotion based can cause some problems for the model. At the same time, the idea that a ‘normative status’ is assumed, that is, a person has all of the available facts and information they need, and the time and capacity to process it all, is problematic. The bounded rationality concept (Cornish & Clarke, 1986) goes some way to compensate for this, but even with the expected limitations of lack of knowledge or time, the decision-making process in the Rational Choice model seems over simplified and removed from the real-life experiences of many offenders. The assumed status of many of the costs and benefits a potential offender may be seeking, under this normative status, can be very inaccurate. For example, one foremost criticism of this approach is focused on the assumption that formal sanctions (prospect of arrest and conviction) are one of the factors that offenders do not know a lot about. It was certainly found within this study that this was not the case: In many cases, individuals displayed a thorough knowledge of the Criminal Justice system, but simply did not think about it in the context of the decision making. Many expressed the view that these potential outcomes simply were not important to them. When examining the contribution of the costs and benefits to a decision under the Rational Choice model, a key element seems to be the

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estimates given by individuals of the probability of different outcomes, in this case that formal sanctions are relatively unlikely, and satisfying needs is relatively likely. Also relevant to the way costs and benefits affect a decision is the value or importance the offender places on each outcome. As described by many people interviewed for this study, the possibility of arrest and sentencing in court was not important to them; many had experienced it before and knew they could get through it again. For several of them, formal sanctions were seen as one of the drawbacks of the job and were viewed as an inconvenience rather than a serious deterrent, some of them even deliberately seeking a prison sentence for a ‘break’ from everyday life.

The Choice to Offend A Rational Choice Perspective posits that each offence is as a result of a decision, in which an individual weighs up the costs and benefits of each action to achieve the best outcome. This approach focuses exclusively on the criminal event, that is how the offence itself comes to take place, but wider questions are raised about how the option of committing an offence comes to be part of a range of outcomes for an individual in the first place. This relates to criminal involvement, the process by which a person considered committing a crime for the first time, and finds that offending is one of a potential range of behaviours to choose from. There is a huge body of research and theoretical writing on how this may happen and exploring this is out of the scope of this book. However, what may be worth some examination is the reasoning given by the participants in this story for their initial involvement in offending. As past experience and learning will certainly be a factor in a current participatory offending decision, it makes sense that their initial criminal experiences will have some effect on these decisions. The individual’s beliefs about offending are an essential part of any decision-making process, and many would (like those interviewed for this study) describe their understanding of offending as a normal way of life and a type of behaviour they saw all around them. For one man interviewed, he explains how life as a child taught him that everyone in

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his neighbourhood survived by committing crime, and that it was only the very few who actually got jobs. For others, they were introduced to shoplifting as an early age when they needed food or other items not provided by their parents. For some, their parents provided the drugs that later paved the way for a life of offending. The child as he or she grows, in this way, may absorb these patterns of behaviour as ‘norms’ and these norms then provide a blueprint from which an individual will make sense of his or her decisions in later life. For the individual described here, it would appear that the norms of his own ‘subculture’ of a deprived area of Liverpool in the 1960s and 1970s have affected his behaviour right through his life. Sub-cultural theory suggests exactly this—that an individual may adopt the norms of an alternative group, a community, family or group of peers, and live by these norms while rejecting those of wider society (Cohen, 1955). Beliefs about offending are more complex than labelling offending as right or wrong. Even within an offending cohort, different individuals describe their reluctance to commit different types of offences. One woman, a successful shoplifter, describes how she would never commit street robbery as that was too ‘personal’. Several individuals expressed shoplifting as their choice because they believed it was a victimless crime, and that nobody would be hurt. Conversely, others were happy to commit burglary, or street robbery, but not shoplifting believing it to be too ‘scary’, or in more than one case, too ‘trivial’. The implication that shoplifting was a woman’s crime was made on more than one occasion. When individuals make an offending decision, they are not just choosing to commit ‘an offence’, but also choose what type of offence to commit (such as a street robbery, rather than shoplifting as in one example). In that way, the decision could be conceptualised as being similar to what a person chooses to have for dinner, or where to go on holiday—a choice between several options. However, the difference here is that the offender is choosing to do something that is against the law— but it is just a choice between options and may feel just as everyday a decision as choosing what to eat. It is that aspect that sets this decision making apart. It is not to say that the option of stealing from a shop is not there for everyone to consider when they are thinking about making a purchase, but for a lot of people this is never considered as a realistic

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option. What is it about a person that makes their chosen offence viable and acceptable? One of the ways in which individuals appear to minimise the significance of the offending event is by utilising cognitive distortions. One example is the claiming of shoplifting as a victimless crime, with the assumption being that if nobody is hurt, then it is not such a bad thing to do. Corbett and Simon (1992) found this also with their study of driving offenders, describing how these individuals perceived driving offences as not being the same as ‘real’ offences, thus justifying to themselves that the behaviour was not as bad. Other methods for reducing your own resistance to committing crime include blaming others for the action, implying circumstances allowed no other choice, or the individual claiming they had no control over the situation, all reasons given by people interviewed as part of this study. For many individuals though, the belief that they had no other choice seems to be genuinely held, rather than being used as a justification. When one shoplifter, caught stealing food and sweets for her child from a supermarket, talked about her crime, she says how all her options were used up. She had spent her benefits, already borrowed from her mum, who herself was on a pension. She had begged and borrowed food or money from the few neighbours who would speak to her. The child’s school had refused to help by giving her child food at ‘before school clu’ unless she paid in advance which she could not afford to do. As she says: People say I should get a job. I agree, but that doesn’t help right now when we are starving, and Tomas (her son) is crying with hunger. (Ivana [focus group])

Whether or not it was the case, if an individual believes that an offence is the last resort and no other options are available, then that is highly likely to push them into that offence. With so many different types of offence, and so many different types of offending individuals, is it possible to devise a decision-making theory that could truly become a general theory of crime, in that it can explain all crimes for all criminals? The concept of a chain or string of choices leading up to an event as described within this study and discussed

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by Brezina (2002) and Assaad and Exum (2002) is one way in which the wider context of an offence could be understood. While this is a promising avenue for exploration of how an individual arrives at a point where an offence is committed, the application of Rational Choice Theory to these choices may not be helpful. By its definition, Rational Choice Theory would apply a discrete decision-making process to each of these leading choices, which may appear logical, but by breaking down a sequence of events into smaller and smaller component parts any explanations offered by the model could become over generalised and not useful. Given the differences apparent in offender motivation, consideration of costs and benefits and evidence of decision making both between and within offence types, how can a model such as Rational Choice Theory remain valid, with application to all offending events? This chapter will examine further how the features of the offending process, and the elements of decision making displayed here, may or may not be accommodated within a modern Rational Choice Perspective, and what implications this may have for future research and theoretical development.

The Offending Process As discussed earlier, it would appear that though offenders do report some commonality of experiences, there is a wide variety of experiences between offence types and individuals. As well as between type differences (e.g. shoplifting and assault offences), there is also evidence of within type variants (e.g. two individuals may shoplift for very different reasons). Given this differentiation of experiences, how can a theory of decision making begin to make sense of the wide range of processes that appear to take place? Though the family of ‘thick’ Rational Choice approaches do appear to fit the data to a greater extent than (and are clearly an improvement on) ‘thin’ or classic Rational Choice Theory, there are still some pertinent findings within this study that would need to be explicitly recognised by a decision-making model in order to explain the evidence

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gathered here fully. Modern Rational Choice Theory recognises that an individual’s behaviour can only be understood if his or her motivation and reasons are understood. This approach recognises that individuals may be motivated by non-monetary or financial outcomes, and that these motivations will be affected by the individual’s unique value hierarchy (Hechter & Kanazawa, 1997). In addition, the presence of strong affect or mood can also be integral to the individual’s behaviour. However, despite this recognition of non-monetary motivations and emotion, the main Rational Choice assumption is still that an individual will seek to gain something, to maximise utility, of whatever they mostly desire or value. Yet in many examples given here, individuals are not seeking to achieve a maximum of any outcome; rather, they appear to be seeking to minimise some other aspect in their situation. A burglar may plan an offence well in order to choose the target with the most profit for the least effort. An individual caught in a difficult situation and experiencing strong feelings may, in the absence of any other coping mechanism, seek to reduce or minimise these feelings by translating affective energy into physical action, thus committing an offence. While it is valid to say that the model of Rational Choice could be turned on its head, and instead, the individual could analyse the best ways of achieving less of what they wish to be rid of, once again the lack of social observation included in the model renders it slightly dry and removed from the real-life experiences of those people who have committed an offence. In particular, the idea of a measured decision process to ‘minimise’ pain or negative feelings does not adequately portray the urgency and stress that many individuals report feeling in such situations. Despite this, the actions of an individual to achieve their goal, for example to minimise the effect of strong emotions, or other ill feelings (such as drug withdrawal) upon themselves, could be viewed as rational. Every individual will seek equilibrium and will act in the best way they know how to achieve it. In this case, rationality, as defined by a theory of rational decision making, could be defined as taking action to maximise the achievement of desired positive goals, or the taking of action to avoid or minimise specific negative outcomes or states. In this way, the individual could be seen to be seeking to either ‘maximise utility’ or ‘minimise disruption’ by attempting to relieve or avoid a negative state. If this approach could be combined with

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a developing understanding of the dual thinking processes of system 1 and system 2, this could be moulded into an approach that not only helps us understand the thinking process about offending—but could also serve as a mechanism to help individuals understand their own thinking. To know the goal of an offender (to maximise or to minimise) is not the same as assuming the rationality (or otherwise) of a person, but it is key in understanding the thought processes that lead a person to their behaviour. This motivation may not be immediately visible, it is the actions taken that are visible to analysis. Whether those actions were designed to result in a gain of money or drugs, or the way in which an individual makes choices to relieve or release their pain based on the possible outcomes that the individual perceives to be available, it is necessary to dig deeper into the internal processes of the individual’s cognition. In defining these motivations, it is paramount once again to recognise that the positive goals or the negative outcomes or states within this process are those that are pertinent to the offender. It is easy to assume when observing a particular offence that the goals of this offence (and therefore the reasoning behind it) are overt, but as described above, there is considerable variation in what individuals hope to achieve (or avoid) by committing different crime types, even within the same crime types in their career; it can be impossible for the observer to determine the outcome intended by the individual by what outcomes are observed by the onlooker. To further complicate this matter, not every decision or action instigated by an individual is successful—and the actual utility gained from the action will not always be equal to that expected by the individual (Brezina, 2002).

References Assaad, J., & Exum, L. (2002). Understanding intoxicated violence from a rational choice perspective. In A. Piquero & S. Tibbetts (Eds.), Rational choice and criminal behaviour: Recent research and future challenges. Routledge.

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Brezina, T. (2002). Assessing the rationality of criminal and delinquent behaviour: A focus on actual utility. In A. Piquero & S. Tibbetts (Eds.), Rational choice and criminal behaviour: Recent research and future challenges. Routledge. Cohen, A. (1955). Delinquent boys. Free Press. Corbett, C., & Simon, F. (1992). Decisions to break or adhere to the rules of the road, viewed from the rational choice perspective. British Journal of Criminology, 32(4). Cornish, D., & Clarke, R. (1986). The reasoning criminal : Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer-Verlag. Hechter, M., & Kanazawa, S. (1997). Sociological rational choice theory. Annual Review of Sociology, 23, 191–214. Hirschi, T. (1986). The compatibility of rational choice theory and social control theories of crime. In D. Cornish & R. Clarke (Ed.), The reasoning criminal: Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer Verlag. Wright, R., & Decker, S. (1994). Burglars on the job: Street life and residential break-ins. North-eastern University Press.

13 Developing a Model to fit the Data

If a theory of decision making could begin to encompass the processes described above, it may become possible to form a model of offending decision making that covers all of the themes emerging from this data, and places the offending decision within the personal, social and cognitive context in which it is made. Placing decision making within a personal and social context is essential to the success of such a model if it is to have ‘real life’ applications. Traditionally within Rational Choice Theory this social element had been neglected, though modern Rational Choice Perspective has begun to include some of the personal elements involved in decision making such as the recognition of internal value hierarchies. One development in this area is in the related model of Routine Activity Theory, which expresses the view that crime will occur at the intersection of three key elements—a motivated offender, a suitable target and the absence of capable guardians (Palmer, 2003). Felson (1993) points out that the addition of situational factors to the Rational Choice approach marks a distinct development between the old ‘thin’ Rational Choice and the more modern Rational Choice related models, and allows further consideration of the factors that may affect a decision-making process outside © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Steele, Exploring the Criminal Decision Process, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46231-3_13

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of the ‘economic’ viewpoint of the classical approach. Cornish (1993) suggests that as Rational Choice Theory focuses on the criminal event, it can dovetail well with theories of offending that describe a dispositional involvement approach. Scott (2000) takes these links further by describing how social norms can be viewed as socialised preferences within individuals that affect their decision making, and therefore feed into the ‘Rational Choice’ to offend or otherwise. Emotion or affect also needs to be accounted for. All of these applications and developments remain valid, but the argument could be brought that by adapting Rational Choice Theory to include so many new elements, the model itself becomes so watered down as to be lost and is no longer a valid tool with which to understand a decision. If the key assumptions could be made, that actions taken in seeking both pleasure or benefit enhancement, or the actions taken based on the motivation to be ‘pain-neutral’ are rational, then it may be possible to conceive of how a Rational Choice model could begin to encompass those acquisitive type offences that have been traditionally found to ‘fit’ better within the Rational Choice approach, but also those affective or violent offences where Rational Choice Theory has not traditionally been seen to be useful. This suggestion is not a new one, and there is a body of previous work suggesting that violent offences, for example, can be understood as rational, a review of which can be found in earlier chapters of this document. This ‘maximising utility/minimising disruption’ dichotomy can be understood as two separate goal regulation type processes, that is, put simply, the desire to attain a want or need versus the desire to relieve or avoid an undesirable state or situation. Considering the idea of a system 1 and system 2 process, the former could be thought of as a ‘cooler’ leaning decision with the latter leaning ‘warmer’. Given that human decision making is complex, it is possible to conceive that an individual may engage in one or other of these processes at any point in time, and indeed, within-individual variations found within this study show this to be the case. It is also true that within-offence type variations exist suggesting that the motivations of the offender cannot be inferred from the outcome of their behaviour (i.e., the criminal event). Once again, the importance of placing emphasis on the personal and social factors in

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decision making comes to the fore. Understanding the particular needs, concerns, feelings and circumstances of the offender would be the best way to identify which goal regulation process an individual was engaged in and how an offence came to be the result of it. A theme related to this need for understanding of individual motivations is the evidence suggesting that for many individuals their offence has been the outcome of a ‘chain of choices’ or decisions made in the preceding period of time, which have led to an individual being within a state or set of circumstances in which their options for action appear to them to be severely limited. These ‘chains’ are particularly prevalent within the experiences of individuals describing the period leading up to a ‘minimisation disruption’ type offence where the final action results from the offender perceiving that they have no other choice but to ‘lash out’, behave violently, or become aggressive in order to achieve ‘pain neutrality’. It is worth noting that although drug-related offending is often perceived as being acquisitively motivated based on the offender’s end result being the acquisition of drugs or money to purchase drugs, the experience of many drug users reported here would be better off as categorised within the ‘minimisation disruption’ or ‘pain neutral’ process. Many individuals with these offence types expressed the severe physical and psychological discomfort they felt when they had not taken their drug of choice and of desperately wanting to obtain a substance to enable them to feel ‘normal’. Of course, it would not be accurate to assume that a drug-related offender would not also seek to use more of a substance to feel pleasure, thus moving into the ‘maximisation utility’ set of motivations. (Though again, some individuals claimed this ‘pleasure’ came more from the ability to temporarily forget other negative circumstances or feelings that had existed before their drug use rather than any physical or psychological feelings of pleasure.)

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Why is This Important? If a decision-making approach, rooted in the Rational Choice Perspective, but capable of encompassing the themes emerging here, could be developed, it would have considerable benefit to the study of offending behaviour. It would not only provide a heuristic tool for understanding how individuals make decisions to commit an offence, for a range of offence types, but could also begin to further close the gap between theories of the criminal event (such as within Rational Choice Theory) and theories of criminal involvement by describing the process by which an offence may become the best or only choice of action. This could be achieved by bringing together the elements affecting involvement with those affecting the decision(s) associated with an actual offending event by placing the decision in context. It would give researchers and staff working with offending individuals a tool to build up a picture of the decision structure as far back as the first offending incident, if desired, or as far back as just the period leading up to the last offence. The primary element of this model would be to identify which offending purpose was currently at play—whether the individual was aiming to achieve an outward goal (that is gaining something) or to minimise or avoid an inward state. In other words, which goal was more important to the individual at the time, to maximise utility or minimise disruption? The traditional Rational Choice model of offender decision making sees the offender as evaluating a range of costs and benefits in order to achieve the highest utility for their sought outcome. Affecting this decision is their own perception of these costs and benefits, their knowledge and experience, how they felt at the time, and the individual’s characteristics such as impulsivity that may skew the decision making in one way or the other. Within this alternative model, let’s call it a ‘Decision Structure Model’, the basic Rational Choice elements would be placed within the context of an individual’s personal traits and previous knowledge and experiences, based on evidence reviewed previously to suggest that these elements are influential on decision making. Within the Rational Choice Model, the process of making a decision applies each time a decision is made and would be followed anew each time an individual makes a decision on

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how best to achieve their goal. This decision-making process would fit well with the descriptions given by many interviewees of committing an acquisitive type of offence, such as a theft, shoplifting, robbery or burglary, but does not fit as well with some of the affective or violent crimes described in the study. In comparison, the model proposed here, described as a ‘Decision Structure’ model, would suggest a decisionmaking process that could appear in one of two ways depending on the primary motivating force at play within the individual—the desire to move towards a goal, or the desire to move away from or avoid a negative state. In this way, the person’s feelings, circumstances and individual personality could become central to helping them in understanding the decision-making process. If the individual wishes to move towards a goal, that is, gain something such as money, excitement or peer respect, he or she will weigh up the positives and negatives of each course of action as they relate to his or her own perceptions, values and personality traits. These positives and negatives will be moderated by planning, and the best outcome, in this case the offence, is followed up as action. In other circumstances, individuals may find themselves in a situation where they are experiencing what is for them an unbearable level of difficult emotion or other adverse internal state. As the decisions he or she took leading up to the situation have effectively narrowed the options of behaviour, the individual needs to act to relieve this situation (achieve pain-neutrality). Alternatively, and again being in a situation with a limited number of possible resolutions, an individual observes a negative state approaching (such as the disapproval of a partner) and wishes to act to prevent this from happening. If the individual does not have many options for action and coupled with the fact that they may have poor coping skills (determined by their own personality traits, emotional state and previous experiences), this may then result in an offending act as a consequence. A key difference between these two scenarios is intention—in the former scenario, where the individual wishes to achieve a goal they focus their ‘intent’ on deliberate action, in this case an offence, to achieve it. In the latter scenario, an individual’s attention is focused on their internal state, and the offence occurs almost without intent—their attention is exclusively focused on wishing to relieve or avoid their internal state. Understanding how these

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different motivations come about (seeking either achievement of a goal, or relief of a negative feeling) could be an important process for how we understand crimes to happen, and how we understand those that commit them. As part of a therapeutic or change targeted process, examination of the ‘chain of choices’, and the overwhelming feeling and motivation at the time, could be a useful exercise for those working with people struggling with criminal behaviour. Another important difference between the two types of motivation may be the particular circumstances that lead to a maximisation or minimisation decision taking place. From the acquisitive type offences (though not of course for all) individuals do appear to have, in general, time to think, they can make plans, and in many cases feel confident in their ability to carry out their intended actions. Individuals describing ‘pain-neutral’ seeking circumstances feel more pressure, they often describe lack of time to think, the effect of strong emotion on their thoughts, the lack of options they perceive and, in many cases, the fact that their judgement has been further impaired through the use of alcohol and drugs. Some understanding of the postulated two-system approach to thinking could help here, with it being a useful exercise for researchers and those in the criminal justice system alike to consider how both types of decision benefit from, or are negatively influenced by both system 1 and system 2 (hot and cold) thinking. Above, we discussed ways in how feelings can also affect the decision-making process, both as anticipated outcomes, and immediate affect, and this also needs to be taken into account. These adverse circumstances make it even more difficult for a decision to be made at the time, a factor emphasised when individuals looking back in hindsight do actually see other options or outlets they could have taken that they did not consider at the time due to extreme pressure. A ‘Decision Process’ or ‘Decision Structure’ model, as a development of the modern Rational Choice Perspective could account for these differences in offending motivation, and in doing so, begin to identify some of the factors that have affected a person’s decision as well as the decisions leading up to it. These factors could include the costs and benefits of an offence traditionally included in a decision-making model, but would also take

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account of the personal feelings and value hierarchies of the individual, the social circumstances, and any time pressures or other constraints that the individual was under. Of course, this is not a new idea within decision-making theory, and the concept of ‘bounded rationality’ described by Cornish and Clarke (1986) can be extended to cover these factors. Cornish and Clarke described bounded rationality as a decision calculus that used just enough information to make a ‘good enough’ decision, but in this context could be used to describe all of the elements that constrict the individuals’ ability to make a decision, such as high emotion, time pressures. An understanding of the type of decision making conceptualised in the Rational Choice Perspective added to a consideration of a more raw, emotion or instinctual decision-making mechanism, helps academic researchers, criminal justice workers, and those with criminal experience begin to see their thinking and consequent actions as flawed, yes, but perhaps more human and less ‘other’ than they may believe. It is also important to understand what factors into that decision making today may vary quite dramatically from what affects our thinking next year, next month or tomorrow. This hangs true with the original conceptualisation of Rational Choice Perspectives as offering a theory of the criminal event—where that event is seen as the final point in a process where thinking, feeling, personal characteristics and circumstances come together as an action. Just as the core concepts of a modern Rational Choice approach ‘decision calculus’ can be seen to operate within a ‘Decision Structure’ model, provided the initial maximisation/minimisation goal is understood, so then do some of the important concepts identified by Rational Choice theorists remain relevant. The Cornish and Clarke (1986) definition of bounded rationality can be seen to have applications as described above, and additionally the concept of ‘choice structuring properties’, originally referring to the information that offenders attend to when deciding on an offence, can be utilised. Rather than these choice structuring properties being limited to the information an individual attends to, these properties can also be made up of the value hierarchy individuals hold, their feelings and preferences, and the way they make judgements (such as a tendency towards impulsivity). All of these choice structuring properties can go towards making up the individual’s judgement or heuristic

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framework—as it applies at that point in time. Once an individual moves to a different set of internal and external circumstances, this heuristic framework will be altered, the most extreme alteration occurring where an individual moves from a maximising to a minimising motivation or vice versa. The model can also be situated in a line or chain of choices, as discussed, which effectively reduce the options available to the individual at each stage. This could be related to money, for example, where at first the person is employed, then borrows from friends and family, then sells items, and no longer has these options. It could also relate to a person who puts themselves in increasingly risky situations, perhaps going to the pub, seeing friends that are a bad influence, drinking, etc. As these themes and concepts begin to illustrate, the evidence collected within this study appears to be suggesting that an inclusive model of decision making such as a ‘Decision Structure’ model described here may be appropriate. In summary, the evidence suggests that a development of the Rational Choice Perspective in the ways identified within this chapter could enable the use of this developed model as a tool for the understanding and explanation of the offending process. The first of these developments, in short, would include the identification for the motivation behind the offence as either outward/maximising or inward/minimising. In addition, there is the necessity to work within the personal features and social circumstances of the offender, as the motivation for the offence cannot simply be deduced by observing the output behaviour. To enable this, the model would expand its focal point from the criminal event as a discrete point in time and recognise that most criminal events involve either prior-thinking or prior-choices or both. The model can also help with explaining these choices using the same tools of analysis, identifying the bounded nature of the available options, the choice structuring properties in place and most importantly the maximising vs. minimising elements of motivation. The model would need to recognise whether the individual had a general tendency to engage in hot or cold decision making, and which mode of thinking they were operating under at the time of the criminal event. Much of this information would come from an examination and discussion of past behaviour, and from the

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individual interview after the offence. This model, essentially, is an exercise in guided conversation, a dialogue which focuses on the factors listed above, but really listens to the responses given. This is a dialogue not to ascertain the facts of the matter, but to ascertain the thoughts, feelings and imperfect human-ness surrounding the matter.

The Decision Structure Model and Integrating Theory If such a model as described above were to be useful, what impact would it have on the bridge between theories of the criminal event and criminal involvement? (Cornish, 1993). As described earlier in this book, work has begun to develop integrated theories of crime which attempt to do just that. By combining psychological theories of crime with sociological theories of crime, criminological theorists have gone some way to explaining how the individual operates within and is influenced by the society and groups around them. For example, Thornberry’s (1987) combination of Control Theory and Learning Theory described how social constraints may prevent offending, but where these are loosened individuals do not automatically offend, instead will only do so if they also have pro-delinquency attitudes. This theory suggests perhaps a similar process to that described in the Decision Structure Model proposed here, in that an individual, finding him or herself in particular social circumstances, will alter judgements according to their value hierarchy and act in a way to satisfy those values and the underlying motivation. If the individual is in a ‘maximisation’ frame of mind, she may or may not decide to take advantage of any opportunities the circumstances present. If the person is in within a ‘minimisation’ frame of mind at the time, and in the same circumstances, the thinking style perhaps being ruled by the ‘hot processes’ described above, the end behaviour may be very different. Wikström’s (2006) Situational Action Theory agrees that individuals do not operate in a vacuum, but that the individual, the social and the cognitive factors pertinent to the individual at that time will together influence any choices made. Situational Action Theory shares many

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similarities with the model proposed here, emphasising that it is the interaction between the social/environmental factors and the individual themselves that results in a person ‘breaking the rules’ or offending. An offence will occur, the theory argues, where an individual with the propensity and motivation to commit a particular offence finds him or herself within a situation that contains the correct criminogenic features (Wikström, 2009). This theory, therefore, recognises that individuals will vary in their propensity to see crime as an option, and that this propensity will interact with the options perceived as being available within the social/environmental context. Just as Situational Action Theory describes the interaction between various influences on the offending process, so does the ‘Decision Structure’ model proposed here, by emphasising that at any point in time the influences or effects of the individual’s motivation, their feelings, values or circumstances will work together to affect decision making, and that all of these factors can vary over time. The main influence within this model is the drive for the offender to ‘minimise’ or ‘maximise’ and that this motivation will affect what action he or she takes, within the context of their individual propensity to offend, their values, judgement heuristics and situation. The potential appears to exist for a developed decision-making theory to integrate elements within the existing range of criminological theories, for example, by utilising aspects of sociological theory to explain how circumstances and ‘choice-chains’ occur to place an individual in a circumstance where an offence is an option (or the only perceived option) using concepts such as control, power, poverty or peer influence as contributing factors. Equally, the application of psychological theory may help to explain how individuals construct value hierarchies, become affected by stress or emotion, or make judgements, for example. Of course, such an ambitious goal cannot be fully realised with a model developed from a small sample but these ideas hold promise and scope for further research, exploration and refinement.

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How Could These Ideas Be Used? The model described above is based solely on the offender experience collected as part of this study, alongside the discussions of both offender and staff focus groups, (more on this below) but if application to the offending experience can be assumed based on this preliminary sample, what applications can the model have to how others work with those who have committed crimes? Given the preliminary outline of this model proposed above, and the description of the key components of the model, the next stage of evaluation will, by necessity, be the extent to which the Decision Structure model applies to the work done by criminal justice workers. After all, any theoretical model is only as good as its explanatory power. In advance of this, we can look at how this may work. The first really important point to note in this context is the finding that formal sanctions are, as has been found in previous research, not generally regarded as a deterrent by offending individuals. Evidence here and elsewhere shows that formal sanctions are often not included in the decision-making process, the perceived assessment of their probability is low, and offenders furthermore do not place a high value on their costs. This certainly is pertinent to working with those individuals who do offend, to understand that something other than threat of a more severe punishment is needed to change behaviour. Much of what was found in the results of this study was not a surprise to a group of criminal justice staff who were presented with the emerging findings of this study. Findings were taken to a staff group, all of whom had significant experience in working with individuals who offend, to present the emerging research themes and ideas, and see what they thought. When discussing whether a ‘decision’ takes place before an offence, staff members described very much the aspects of decision making that were found here, emphasising the importance of an individual’s circumstances, feelings and decision history. Telling their own stories of experiences of working with people who have committed crime, they described similar scenarios to some of the interviewees, talking about rational ‘cold headed’ acquisitive offenders as well as emotional, ‘hot headed’ people. They saw some individuals being seen as making

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highly rational straightforward decisions to offend, and others making a series of poor choices that narrowed their options considerably. This is extremely encouraging, finding a common ground where expert staff, and those with real-life experience, can come together in agreement on how offences can happen, is a positive thing indeed for fruitful work to be done where the offending individual wants to make better choices. The criminal justice staff in the group were keen to discuss how these ideas could help an individual take responsibility for their actions, by changing their decision making, or by having a better understanding of how they end up in situations that feel out of control. They thought that the proposed data model could help considerably with this task. As the model proposed in this book takes account of both the decisions taken before the offence, and the individual’s motivations and needs, it could be used as a tool with offenders to, as one member of staff suggests, ‘untangle’ the situations these individuals may be in and help them understand how circumstances come to be, and how this affects their behaviour. The criminal justice system already has a focus on offenders’ criminogenic needs as they relate to their offending behaviour, and attempts to match interventions given to both a person’s needs and their responsivity. Doing so makes it more likely that the individual would be able to make permanent changes to their behaviour. All of this could be supported by the model’s examination on the ‘maximisation of utility’ or ‘minimisation of disruption’ motivations behind any action and how this motivation, interacting with the individual’s personality and circumstances may lead to certain behaviours. In working through a situation or behaviour with an offender a criminal justice professional will attempt to help the individual understand their behaviour, and how this was a product of both themselves and their environment. This model could assist with that process, enabling individuals to identify their stressors, understand their motivations and consider similar occasions where the outcome was different in order to begin to analyse alternatives. As suggested above, this ‘decision structure model’ could form the focus of a guided dialogue, guiding the process but encouraging a frank sharing of relevant thoughts and feelings. In addition to one-to-one work with people who are sentenced to community orders, or whom are on licence, criminal justice agencies

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such as the Prison Service and Probation Service also work with offenders in groups, using shared experiences and established theory-based techniques in order to explore their thinking and behaviour, and exercises completed in group work often involve ‘mapping’ out the circumstances leading to an offence to examine how it happened. This technique certainly draws parallels with the ‘chains-of-choices’ identified within this study, and again this data model could assist by applying a further conceptual framework to tie the process together. Essentially, the criminal justice system in the UK sets out to achieve justice, to protect the public and to reduce risk by encouraging the desistance of individuals from offending. As referred to earlier, a large amount of work has been done concerning desistance, an approach to offending which looks at it from the other side of the phenomena, that is, why offenders stop offending, and what happens when they do. There exists an interesting and important body of literature on the theory of desistance from crime, and although impossible to locate a thorough review of this here (but see McNeill & Weaver, 2010), it is pertinent to mention that the evidence within this study, and suggestions made on the basis of this evidence would potentially have applications to the desistance field. Although cessation of offending was not a point of analysis for this study, instead focusing on factors occurring when an offence takes place, there was considerable reference made by the individuals within the study to what would make, or has made, them reconsider their behaviour. It is possible that a re-analysis with focus on these elements could be performed, and evidence revealed could add to the conclusions drawn here, and in doing so assess the usefulness of this model in light of desistance theories. However, even without further analysis the ‘Decision Structure’ model as it stands in preliminary form can be seen to have implications and overlap with elements of desistance theories. Desistance or the process of ceasing to offend is a study of the reasons that individuals cease to participate in crime, and the factors that may influence this process. One of these factors recognised as being influential in the process of desistance is the concept of ‘social capital’ (Sampson & Laub, 1992) of the individual. Social capital refers to the interdependent bonds an individual forms with others—a partner, child or other significant people in the

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community. These bonds were reported as being influential on behaviour by the individuals interviewed within this study, by both the offender and the staff participants. Several offenders described how they now have a partner or child, which had led them to be motivated to offend less, and one staff member referred to the ‘hatch, match and dispatch’ effect being influential on offending behaviour, meaning that a birth, marriage or death of a significant other can affect an offender’s outlook. Interestingly, there were also cases in which individuals within this sample described their strong social bonds as contributing to the circumstances affecting their decision to offend. Examples of this include the desire to placate a violent partner by offending, or the stress caused by being parted from a child taken into care leading to a violent outburst. It is clear that social capital has a strong influence on offending behaviour, but that once again, the exact influence it exerts on an individual will also depend on many other factors. Further examination of the emotions (positive, negative or just plain confusing), caused by or mitigated against by close relationships, and the effect on thinking and behaviour, is a rich area ripe for research in the context of criminal behaviour. However, social attachments are not the only influential factor. Psychological factors have also been shown to be important to the desistance process. In particular, individuals need to have a sense of agency and self-efficacy—the belief that they can effect change (Maruna, 2001). Research into desistance has shown that ‘hope’ or the belief that things can change, is associated with lower recidivism (Snyder et al., 1991). It seems then, that for desistance to be possible, that practical, circumstantial and psychological factors must combine in order for it to happen (Maruna et al., 2004). The equal pertinence of the social/external and the internal/psychological factors to desistance mirror the findings within this study that the combination of these factors is equally important to the ‘opposite’ process, i.e. committing a crime rather than stopping doing so. Just as the data model emerging from the present findings suggests that it is the particular combination of social and personal factors that affect the decision-making process, so is desistance a product of the interaction between the personal/subjective and the social/environmental (LeBel et al., 2008).

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Of course, aside from the internal factors such as value hierarchies, personality, and the circumstances and environment an offender is in, the other key aspect that this study finds to be central to the decision-making process is the motivation of the offender to maximise or minimise. Once again, parallels can be drawn with the developments in Desistance Theory. It is argued within what have been termed ‘motivational models of desistance’ (Uggen & Kruttschnitt, 1998) that even where social bonds or circumstances are such that an individual may be well placed to desist from crime that any change must be preceded by a change in attitude (Giordano et al., 2002). Therefore, desistance is only possible when the offender has his or her own motivation to change. The overlap between the two decision process models, that of deciding to commit an offence, or deciding not to (and repeating this decision) is apparent, and it is possible that developments in the Decision Structure model outlined within this study could be equally beneficial to the study of desistance as to the study how offences are committed. It is interesting to explore offender motivation within each of these models. If as stated earlier an offender can be seen to be acting through a motivation to maximise benefits or minimise disruption, then these categories of motivation could equally be applied to the decision or motivation to desist. However, if within an offending situation an individual decides to maximise benefit, this may result in an offence, if that benefit is perceived as being the excitement or the money and so on that may come from the offences. If another individual with a different value hierarchy is in the same circumstances, but perceives their maximised benefit as continued family life, for example, they may take the decision not to offend. If this overlap in the importance of the nature of the individual motivation to the offending/desistance process is pertinent, so are some of the desistance concepts pertinent to the development of the data model discussed here. A sense of agency is seen to be important within the desistance process, that is, the individual is able to perceive that they are able to affect outcomes through the choices that they make, that they have efficacy within their life (Maruna, 2001). However, for this to be the case the individual must perceive that alternative options are open to him or her. It is difficult to see, given the narrative of some of the offenders within

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this sample who describe ‘having no other choice’, where this agency may be. Equally, the concept of self or alternative identity within Desistance Theory wherein the individual must be able to develop a ‘non offending’ identity (Laub & Sampson, 2001) is an interesting idea to consider in light of the findings presented here. Several offenders expressed the view that they no longer wished to be seen as a ‘smackhead’, for example, but struggled to conceive of what they would ‘be’ instead. As Sheila, the skilled shoplifter said. I just want to be anonymous, live normal.

In addition, many of the individuals interviewed can be seen to identify positively with their ‘offender-self ’ identity, citing their pride in their skills and expertise in these pursuits, and even describing offending as a job. This appears to be the concept of ‘alternative identity’ turned on its head. It does seem even from this brief review that the findings within this study do have direct application not only to offending decision theory but also to related fields such as Desistance Theory. If a good understanding of the personal, motivational and social factors that combine to form a decision to offend can be further established, then this understanding has the potential to contribute also to knowledge of how these decisions can become reversed and feed into a model of desistance. Again, there is scope for much more research to be done here, but the introduction of the maximising/minimising focus to the study of cessation of offending may add a useful facet to existing knowledge.

Fig. 13.1

Usual thinking Prev. system experience /expertise

Decision structure model

Current situation

Substance/ cognitive alterants

Personal traits

Main Motivation at time of thinking GAIN/LOSE

Emotion/Mood

Current thinking system

Loss

Gain

Target at perceived cause of pain or proxy

Rapid action

Subject to individual weighting, info and value assigned

Risks and rewards

Assessment of outcomes

CRIMINAL ACTION

Rewards the actor with their goal, or causes unforeseen costs (factor into next decision)

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Fig. 13.2

Chain of choices

CONSECUTIVE CHOICES LIMIT OPTIONS

CURRENT CHOICE

CHAIN OF CHOICES: DECSION STRUCTURE MODEL FUTURE CHOICES

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References Cornish, D., & Clarke, R. (1986). The reasoning criminal : Rational choice perspectives on offending. Springer-Verlag. Cornish, D. (1993). Theories of action in criminological: Learning theory and rational choice approaches. In R. Clarke & M. Felson (Ed.), Routine activity and rational choice: Advances in criminological theory. Transaction Publishers. Felson, M. (1993). Review of ‘choosing crime’ by K. Tunnell. American Journal of Sociology, 98, 1497–1499. Giordano, P. C., Cernkovich, S. A., & Rudolph, J. L. (2002). Gender, crime and desistance: Toward a theory of cognitive transformation. American Journal of Sociology, 107 , 990–1064. Laub, J., & Sampson, R. (2001). Understanding desistance from crime. Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research, 28, 1–70. Palmer, E. (2003). Offending behaviour: Moral reasoning, criminal conduct and the rehabilitation of offenders. Willan Publishing. LeBel, T., Burnett, R., Maruna, S., & Bushway, S. (2008). The chicken and egg of subjective social factors in desistance from crime. European Journal of Criminology, 5 (2), 130–158. Maruna, S. (2001). Making good: How ex-convicts reform and rebuild their lives. American Psychological Association. Maruna, S., LeBel, T., Mitchel, N., & Naples, M. (2004). Pygmalion in the reintegration process: Desistance from crime through the looking glass. Psychology, Crime and Law, 10 (3), 271–281. McNeill, F., & Weaver, B. (2010). Changing lives? Desistance research and offender management. Project Report. Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research, University of Glasgow. Sampson, R., & Laub, J. (1992). Crime and deviance in the life course. Annual Review of Sociology, 18, 63–84. Scott, R. E. (2000). The limits of behavioural theories of law and social norms. Virginia Law Review, 86 , 1603–1648. Snyder, C. R., Harris, C., Anderson, J. R., Holleran, S. A., Irving, L. M., Sigmon, S. T., Yoshinobu, L., Gibb, J., Langelle, C., & Harney, P. (1991). The will and the ways: Development and validation of an individualdifferences measure of hope. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 570–585.

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Thornberry, T. P. (1987). Towards an interactional theory of delinquency. Criminology, 25, 863–891. Uggen, C., & Kruttschnitt, C. (1998). Crime in the breaking: Gender differences in desistance. Law and Society Review, 32(2). Wikström, P. O. (2006). Individuals, settings, and acts of crime: Situational mechanisms and the explanation of crime. In P. O. H. Wikström & R. Sampson. The explanation of crime: Context, mechanisms and development. Cambridge University Press.

14 Reflections and Thought

It is useful, now this book is at the point of drawing conclusions, to review what it was hoped would be achieved with this research, and what actually was achieved. One of the main reasons that this research took place was to overcome the issues with a lot of the previous research into criminal decision making. Much previous research, however useful, has used ‘intention’ or ‘willingness’ to offend as a measure, often with samples of students or the general public. While this may be a useful proxy measure of criminal decision making that overcomes a lot of the access issues in speaking to people with real-life criminal experience, it is not ecologically valid. Asking people how likely they would be to commit a crime, when they have no previous experience of actually doing so, has some real drawbacks. As confident as some of the respondents may be that they would/would not offend in a given set of circumstances, there is no real way to tell how a person would behave in a real-life pressured situation. Another common feature in the study of the applicability of Rational Choice Theory is that many studies apply their investigations to one crime type. For example, studies that focus exclusively on Burglary (Wright & Decker, 1994), driving offences (Corbett & Simon, 1992) or © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Steele, Exploring the Criminal Decision Process, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46231-3_14

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violent/sexual offences (Assaad & Exum, 2002; Bachman et al., 1992). Unlike these previous studies, this research did not focus exclusively on one specialised offence type, instead applying the methodology to various types of offence and offender within the same cohort in order to test the Rational Choice Perspective of offending in a general offending sample, rather than as applied to a discrete offence type. This was purposefully done to investigate any apparent similarities and differences between crime types—an approach that became fruitful as the evidence displayed suggested that there were similarities within and between crime types and even within and between individuals. This sampling included those having committed an expressive or affective offence, to which the Rational Choice Perspective perhaps does not traditionally seem to apply and is an offence category with which more limited work has been done. For similar reasons, that is, to test out the applicability and validity of rational choice to all offending and offenders, female participants in the interview groups were deliberately oversampled so that a review of decision making could be undertaken not just across offence types, but across males and females. A further point of note to the research sample used within this study was that all individuals had real, convicted, offending histories (at least one convicted offence), which was felt to be important. From the narrative obtained from this offender sample, and from the additional individuals in the focus groups, a set of emerging themes was noted, an analysis of which suggests some points of overlap with the processes outlined within the Rational Choice Perspective on decision making. Though the support within these findings was very limited for the traditional ‘thin’ models of Rational Choice Theory, the flexibility and more comprehensive nature of the ‘thick’ Rational Choice approaches suggested a better fit with the evidence. A key component of theory suggested within this study is the conceptual split in motivation to offend between a ‘maximising utility’ and a ‘minimising disruption’ type goal and this is argued within this book as a pertinent development of Rational Choice Perspective to make the approach more useful when considering a wider range of offences, including emotional or violent offences. The examination of the ‘chain of choices’ leading up to an offending event is also seen as valuable within the data model and it

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is suggested that the same ‘Decision Structure’ model can be used to analyse each of these choices in the same way. This model is able to incorporate the influence of affect, the tendency of a person, under particular circumstances to rely on their system 1 or system 2 thinking, and goes to some way to bridging the divide between the situational and individual explanations of crime. Overall, it is the position of the author that although traditional Rational Choice Theory may have outlived its usefulness as a theory of real-life offender decision making, the modern ‘thick’ approaches to Rational Choice Theory do still have useful functionality and utility in furthering our understanding of the offending decision. The developments proposed within this book are aimed to update and in essence, provide a re-birth or new generation of decision-making models that bridge the gap between situational and individual explanations for crime by infusing Rational Choice approaches with an emphasis on the importance of the interaction between the motivation, the personal, the emotional and the social factors in existence for the individual at the time of the offence. In short, the ‘Decision Structure’ model represents a development of the modern Rational Choice Perspective and retains the functionality of the Rational Choice approach while attempting to increase the validity of the application of the approach, by developing a model that can be applied to all types of offences and offenders, with the means to explain both within offence/offender and between offence/ offender type variances in behaviour.

Future Research This is by no means the end of the story for the development of a Decision Structure Model. It is hoped that the work contained in this book will encourage further debate in the use of the new forms of rational choice or decision-making theories into crime, and how well they can be adapted into a general theory of crime. The development of the ‘decision structure’ model described here is rooted in and developed out of the indepth data gained from a range of ‘real’ people with criminal experience.

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It is hoped that this data-driven model will lend itself to further refinement, and study, with the aim of eventually becoming a bonafide way to explain the crime and the criminal. In addition, this approach has the potential to assist those working with people who commit crimes in a targeted way, utilising all of the interview skills that they already have. However, more work needs to be done before this can even begin to be achieved. For example, some of the ways in which this work could be developed are: . It would be useful to take the developed ‘Decision Structure’ model of decision making to groups of criminal justice staff and individuals with criminal experience in order to explore in more detail the applicability of the model to their understanding and experiences. It would also be illuminating to include in this research other groups with an interest in crime, such as the police, magistrates and judges. . It would also be relevant in future iterations of this research to examine in more detail a comparison of the ‘offending description’ as stated by the offending individual and his/her criminal justice worker. Although this was attempted on a very basic level within this study as a verification check, the information contained in the documentation used for this purpose was limited. However, it would be possible to obtain a fuller version of events from the criminal justice officer’s point of view by interviewing the officer as well as the supervised offender, in order to perform a similar analysis. . Returning to the discussion regarding the potential differences in decisions made by novice or ‘new’ offenders and more expert or skilled offenders, it would be illuminating to split a study sample in such a way so that these decisions could be examined in more detail. . In terms of methodological approach, it is felt that the somewhat unusual sampling employed within this study, the representation of female offenders in the sample and the mixed offence type group, is a useful step forward from the all male or all-burglar/shoplifter/ robber type samples that have been seen in a lot of previous work on offending decision making. Future use of such a mixed sample group from other offending populations could add to the representativeness of any conclusions drawn about how offending decisions are made,

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testing theories against various offending choices and both genders, while highlighting interesting and illuminating differences. . This investigation of gender is important for several reasons. Of course, much research around crime has been focused on men, as men make up the greater proportion of the known offending population. However, it is important to recognise the different circumstances and pressures that female offenders may be under in a model such as this. If any model of crime and the criminal is to be truly general, it is very important to explain all cases, as far as possible, no matter the gender of the perpetrator. . Although a good deal of offending variety was covered within this project, there are various offence types that were not covered simply due to population availability. No sexual offences were included in the sample for example, and there are many offence types that have not been represented due to the relative ‘newness’ of the crime at the time that the research took place. For example, stalking, although it became a separate, recognised criminal offence in 2012 (UK Parliament, 2018), had not yet filtered through in the general population of offenders used as research participants within this study. Likewise, a whole range of internet-based crimes is even now developing and becoming new fodder for criminal and psychological research. Hopefully, some of the ideas generated by this work will go on to be tested with a wide range of further offence types and people. . No theory, no matter its history and provenance, is ever immune to development and testing. Fortunately for academics, the work to attempt to try and understand why human beings are and do what they do is ongoing! It is hoped that in some way, the ideas presented in this book allow the reader to think in a slightly different way about how the way people come to their criminal behaviour can be understood. It is exciting to see how these ideas can be further tested, developed and indeed critiqued as our understanding develops.

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References Assaad, J., & Exum, L. (2002). Understanding intoxicated violence from a rational choice perspective. In A. Piquero & S. Tibbetts (Ed.), Rational choice and criminal behaviour: Recent research and future challenges. Routledge. Bachman, R., Paternoster, R., & Ward, S. (1992). The rationality of sexual offending: Testing a deterrence/rational choice conception of sexual assault. Law and Society Review, 26 , 343–372. Corbett, C., & Simon, F. (1992). Decisions to break or adhere to the rules of the road, viewed from the rational choice perspective. British Journal of Criminology, 32(4). UK Parliament. (2018). Stalking: Developments in the Law. House of Commons Research briefing. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/ sn06261/#:~:text=The%20Protection%20of%20Freedoms%20Act,or%20s erious%20alarm%20or%20distress Wright, R., & Decker, S. (1994). Burglars on the job: Street life and residential break-ins. North-eastern University Press.

Index

A

acquisitive offending 81, 114 affective state 175 agency 14, 68, 216, 217 Aggravated vehicle taking 27 aggressive behaviour 60, 61, 63, 64, 137, 174, 176, 177, 183, 184 Alcohol 59, 60, 143, 147, 182, 183 anticipatory shame 50 Armed Robbery 129 availability 40

B

benefits v, 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 13, 17, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 28, 31, 36, 42–46, 48, 49, 59–62, 64, 65, 90, 101, 106, 108, 114, 125, 136, 142, 154–157, 160–163, 168, 174, 179, 181, 182, 184,

185, 193–195, 197, 198, 206, 208, 217 bounded decision 92 bounded rationality 11, 36, 46, 60, 92, 105, 122, 154, 155, 167, 194, 209 Burglary Offences 25

C

Carjacking 27 chain of choices 128, 136, 174, 205, 208 choice structuring properties 47, 59, 209 Classical School of Criminology 7 cognitive distortions 197 cognitive interview 73, 77, 78 cold 51, 60, 100, 138, 140, 174, 175, 208, 210, 213

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Steele, Exploring the Criminal Decision Process, Palgrave Studies in Risk, Crime and Society https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46231-3

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Index

Community Orders 79 Confounding factors 153 consequences 36, 51, 60, 63, 65, 74, 92–94, 96, 97, 99, 100, 114, 122, 124, 131, 155, 156, 158–160, 174 Control Theory 5, 11–14, 43, 211 corporate crime 27, 158 costs of crime 2 crime specific 21, 44, 61, 66, 181, 182 Criminal Damage 129 Criminal Propensity Theories 36 current participatory decision 16 ‘current participatory offence’ 17

D

decision making v, vi, 2–4, 6, 9, 10, 12–18, 22, 24–26, 28, 29, 32, 36–50, 52, 54, 59–63, 66, 68, 74, 78, 79, 81, 86, 88, 90, 91, 95, 99, 106, 110–112, 114, 118, 121, 122, 124, 125, 127, 130, 131, 135, 136, 138–140, 142, 143, 147, 150, 151, 154, 156, 157, 160–165, 167–169, 173, 174, 177, 178, 181, 183–185, 188, 193, 194, 196, 198, 199, 203, 204, 206, 208–210, 212–214, 223–226 Decision Process 208 Decision Structure 207, 208, 210, 212, 215, 225, 226 Decision Structure Model 206 deterrence 2, 42, 43 Deterrence Theory 7, 43 difference in logic 145

Differential Association Theory 5, 40 Driving Offences 22 drugs 25, 29, 41, 44, 59, 60, 78, 88, 98, 100, 104–106, 111–113, 116–118, 124, 125, 142, 143, 147–151, 154, 156, 160, 162, 170, 171, 181–189, 196, 200, 205, 208

E

emotion 4, 44, 48–50, 52–54, 61–63, 65, 119, 127, 130, 138, 169, 172, 173, 185, 187, 194, 199, 207–209, 212 Excitement 24, 107 expert 24, 26, 29, 37, 40, 100, 141, 151, 160, 165–167, 214, 226 expertise 26, 29, 37, 38, 40, 41, 52, 54, 87, 109, 161, 165–168, 185, 218 expressive 61, 63, 65, 173, 178, 224 Expressive crime 62 external sanctions 31

F

focus groups 79, 213, 224 formal costs 26, 32 free will 7 functional aggression 63, 176 Future research 225

G

gambling 97, 106, 108 Gender 66, 67 getting caught 95

Index

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H

L

heuristics 27, 39, 40, 52, 166, 167, 212 hot 50, 52, 54, 60, 62, 100, 123, 128, 138, 140, 169, 170, 174, 175, 181, 185, 208, 210, 211, 213 Hot and cold decision making 50 hypothetical decision-making 35

lash out 120, 205 Learning Theories 5 licence 76, 79, 133 likelihood 15, 22, 26, 27, 31, 35, 77, 93, 105, 133, 159, 162, 171, 186 Locus of control 5 loved ones 97

I

M

Identity Theft: 28 impulsive vi, 21, 29, 36, 49–53, 92, 117, 119, 132, 134, 136, 137, 140, 161, 163, 164, 175, 179, 185 increased recall 77 individual differences 47–49, 64, 182 individual traits 6, 45, 48 informal bonds 35 inhibition 145 initial participatory decision 16, 23, 26, 31, 42, 43, 78, 85, 108, 113, 128, 130, 195, 209 instrumental 63 internal sanctions 31, 32 internet based crimes 227 interviews 22, 28, 30, 59, 63, 66, 74, 75, 77, 78, 80, 81, 91, 92, 95, 115, 122, 147, 151, 165, 170, 173, 180 inward/minimising 210 ‘I planned’ 85 I saw red 119, 125, 139 ‘I thought’ 85

make money 86 maximise utility 7, 8, 87, 199 Maximising utility 86 mental space 25, 36, 45, 46, 156 methodology 32, 35, 68, 73, 224 Mixed up rationalities 127, 178 monetary gain 13, 179 Mood 48 motivations xiii, 1, 8, 9, 13, 14, 45, 63, 82, 135, 141, 146, 154, 155, 178, 179, 181, 189, 199, 200, 204, 205, 208, 214

N

non-offenders as subjects 31 Non-tangible benefits 106 normative status 7, 194 Not thinking straight 118 novice 23, 24, 37, 42, 160, 168, 226

O

offending description 226 outward/maximising 210

232

Index

P

past experience 28, 177, 195 perceptual shorthand 27, 28, 37, 40, 41, 167 persistent property offenders 25, 156 personal costs 43 planning 12, 17, 28, 30, 77, 86–90, 97, 100, 110, 111, 114, 115, 122, 123, 125, 128, 130–132, 140, 153, 160–162, 165, 167, 169, 175, 178, 179, 207 planning ahead 88–90, 110, 165, 178 point of inevitability 162, 163 policy vi, 1, 13, 42, 157 proxy studies 15 pseudonyms 80 psychopharmacological 183, 184, 186, 188, 189 punishment 2, 7, 13, 27, 32, 35, 36, 42, 43, 94, 99, 157, 213

R

Rational Choice Perspective v, vi, 1–3, 6, 7, 9–11, 13–15, 17, 21, 22, 29, 32, 36, 41, 42, 44–46, 48, 49, 52, 59, 61–66, 73, 79, 82, 86, 90, 91, 95, 99, 100, 106, 114, 118, 123, 125, 127, 130, 132, 139, 140, 151, 153, 154, 179, 181, 183, 195, 198, 203, 206, 208–210, 224, 225 Rational Choice Theory vi, 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 16, 26, 40, 41, 46, 47, 61, 184, 188, 193, 198, 203, 204, 206, 224, 225 real-life experience 30, 214

representativeness 39, 40, 52, 166, 226 reputation 27, 96, 98, 157, 159, 176 rewards 2, 4, 7, 8, 13, 30, 36, 45, 46, 67, 74, 90, 91, 108, 122, 135, 140, 154, 163, 164, 166 right to withdraw 80 risks 90 Robbery 28, 104, 129, 144 Routine Activity 3, 9, 203

S

satisficing 8, 166, 167 Section 18 120, 129, 171 seeing red 119, 139 self-control 22, 32, 43 self-esteem 31, 44 self-protection 64, 176 semi-structured 75 Serious assault 129 Sex offenders 29 shame 5, 31, 32, 35, 44, 47, 49, 50, 62, 67, 159, 160 Shoplifting 23, 129 Shoplifting offences 23 Situational Action Theory 6, 211, 212 situational factors 9, 10, 30, 185, 203 social capital 14, 215, 216 Social Learning 5, 12, 14, 40, 41, 187 Social Learning Theory 12, 14, 40, 41, 187 social reinforcement 107 supply and demand 87, 89

Index

system 1 50–54, 62, 122, 128, 135, 161, 169, 170, 181, 185, 200, 204, 208, 225 system 2 50–54, 122, 123, 128, 170, 181, 200, 204, 208, 225

233

timelines 75, 76, 162 two-system thinking 100

V

violent offences 21, 29, 63, 93, 117, 128, 140, 169, 178, 204, 224 T

Thinking Ahead 88 thinking shortcuts 27, 37–39, 54, 166, 167

W

Weighing up 91