Exploring Emotions in Turkey-Iran Relations: Affective Politics of Partnership and Rivalry (Middle East Today) 3030390284, 9783030390280

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MIDDLE EAST TODAY

Exploring Emotions in Turkey-Iran Relations Affective Politics of Partnership and Rivalry

Mehmet Akif Kumral

Middle East Today Series Editors Fawaz A. Gerges Department of International Relations London School of Economics London, UK Nader Hashemi Center for Middle East Studies Josef Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver Denver, CO, USA

The Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, and the US invasion and occupation of Iraq have dramatically altered the geopolitical landscape of the contemporary Middle East. The Arab Spring uprisings have complicated this picture. This series puts forward a critical body of first-rate scholarship that reflects the current political and social realities of the region, focusing on original research about contentious politics and social movements; political institutions; the role played by non-­ governmental organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Muslim Brotherhood; and the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Other themes of interest include Iran and Turkey as emerging pre-eminent powers in the region, the former an ‘Islamic Republic’ and the latter an emerging democracy currently governed by a party with Islamic roots; the Gulf monarchies, their petrol economies and regional ambitions; potential problems of nuclear proliferation in the region; and the challenges confronting the United States, Europe, and the United Nations in the greater Middle East. The focus of the series is on general topics such as social turmoil, war and revolution, international relations, occupation, radicalism, democracy, human rights, and Islam as a political force in the context of the modern Middle East. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14803

Mehmet Akif Kumral

Exploring Emotions in Turkey-Iran Relations Affective Politics of Partnership and Rivalry

Mehmet Akif Kumral Independent Scholar Balıkesir, Turkey

Middle East Today ISBN 978-3-030-39028-0    ISBN 978-3-030-39029-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39029-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: LOMAKIN shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To Zehra and Ömer, for their brighter future in the coming generations

Preface

This monograph is a long-term study of a dyadic case in international relations. By looking at the psycho-historical transformation of Turkey-Iran diplomatic interactions, this study illustrates the analytical purchase of examining inter-state neighborhoods as complex emotional, affective and normative processes unfolding within a relational spectrum of partnership and/or rivalry. For this purpose, the author draws inter-disciplinary insights from international emotions researches, social psychology, relational pragmatics and other cognate fields. The book combines key findings and weaves conceptual threads from seemingly disparate theoretical literatures on international politics of neighborhood, emotional exchange and trans-governmental interactions. A holistic research framework is developed to analyze how relational modalities of partnership and rivalry are co-extensively configured by emotional entanglements, affective arrangements and normative tendencies. Put it more precisely, this research delineates the nexus of “emotionality,” “affectivity” and “normativity” in the political-diplomatic making of neighborhood relationships. Emotional, affective and normative reconceptualizations of international interactions provide a synthesizing angle to understand how relational structures and practices are established among historical neighbors. From this perspective, four empirical chapters explore the relational history of emotions and reconstruct affective norms of political neighborhood in Turkish-Iranian interactions. Through historical-historiographical enquiring and psycho-social researching of emotional themes in Turkey-­ Iran official diplomatic relations, political rules of (dis)engagement are exposed periodically. The historical treatment begins by the end of the vii

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First World War in Nov. 1918 and finishes in Nov. 2018 since the United States has withdrawn from the nuclear deal and intensified sanctions against Iran. The century-long relational history is analyzed according to the diplomatic stages of emotional entanglements and affective arrangements in the Turkey-Iran neighborhood. In each period, the global context and regional contours of trans-governmental interactions between Turkey and Iran are revealed consecutively. Dyadic dynamics of collaborative partnership and confrontational rivalry between these two contiguous states are examined critically, since they have left continuing implications for local (in)stability in the neighboring countries, most recently in Iraq and Syria. There are overarching questions that were posed to guide empirical research: how has the neighborhood relationship been configured by affective arrangements of Turkish and Iranian governments? Distinct from legal laws and customary codes, were there emotional norms established to govern economic exchanges and cultural interactions between Ankara and Tehran? What was the psycho-social strength of dyadic neighborhood norms? Were they stronger than international rules of regional influence and global alignment? These relational questions reiterate scholarly significance of the research endeavor, which calls for excavation of affective neighborhood norms over the century-long history of the Ankara-Tehran trans-governmental relationship. The psycho-social research path undertaken by this book opens new vistas to reconceptualize Turkey-Iran neighborhood relations. Compared with other contemporaneous phenomena, the domestic politics of nationalism and modernization have considerably shaped trans-governmental structures and practices between the two historical neighbors. Secular and sectarian rules of domestic governance enormously influenced diplomatic modes of feeling between Ankara and Tehran. Essentially, two main affective action tendencies have emerged on both sides of the Turkey-Iran border. The right-wing, hard-line conservative psychology is moved by, and fuels, fear and anger to control social contours of the relationship. The left-wing, soft-line liberal sentimentalism is driven by, and espouses, hope and honor to rule over psycho-social interactions. Indeed, the relational history has transformed in between these two emotional action tendencies. The psycho-social history unfolding in the empirical chapters renders a complex processual account of affective-normative exchange, emotional-­ moral learning and local management of diplomatic ties between the two nation-states. I identify four relational narratives that have captured

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Turkish and Iranian hearts in some interesting ways: (1) returning back to the primordial times of Turkish-Iranian relations, the foundational Özsoy legend recast an eternal kinship between twin brothers. (2) Reminding the imperial Ottoman-Safavid battle in 1514, the Çaldıran myth reproduced an enduring sectarian conflict between the two states. (3) Referring to the imperial peace accord of 1639, the Kasr-ı Şirin narrative has reinvented the “law of primeval neighborhood” (kadim komşuluk hukuku) naturally governing the Turkey-Iran international relationship. (4) The cold shoulders saga reconstructed the 1949–1978 period of regressive alignment in Turkish-Iranian affairs. Based on cross-episodic observations, I argue that the Çaldıran mythology has left a longer psycho-social influence over the historical course of Turkish-Iranian interactions. The 1514 tragedy has become the central story of hard-line sectarianism, notwithstanding soft-line bilateral reactions. By taking this tragic battle at its relational baseline, the sectarian psyche informs isolationist policies in the Turkey-Iran neighborhood. Regardless of its contentious storyline, the Çaldıran cliché captures neighboring hearts so resonantly. It could serve various propaganda purposes. The propagandist aims might even exploit popular emotions on both sides of the border. The Çaldıran memory came to surface in subtle forms of dyadic disgust and confrontational exchange, as witnessed during the territorial disputes of 1926–1930. Quite similarly, the dark days of 1996–1999, experienced as diplomatic duels, have indicated the Çaldıran psychology deep seated in the Ankara-Tehran social relationship. The reformative period of 1979–1988 has seen how sectarianism resurfaced in emotional norms of fear. The affective rule of anxiety has led to reciprocal restraint and reluctant engagement between Turkey and Iran. The Çaldıran psyche turned more harmful, when it deeply entangled with affective anger. The politics of antagonism, coupled with regional status ambitions, has driven positional rivalry in Turkish-Iranian neighborhood. This has been the relational case at revisionist times such as 1989–1995 and 2008–2018. More recently, the Turkish side liked to deploy a new narrative. The Kasr-ı Şirin story assumes that there exist old fences of neighborhood. Turks and Persians have well-established customary rules and natural norms to govern their interactions. The long-standing and relatively peaceful character of relations with Iran has been perceived by Turkey as the strength of neighborhood rules. These affective-normative practices help to empower the relational structure of the Turkey-Iran neighborhood.

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I contend that the Kasr-ı Şirin story was invented as an emotional-­ affective antidote against the nagging Çaldıran mythos. The euphoric peace in 1639 has been taken as the zero point of the Turkey-Iran relationship. The presumed peacefulness of the trans-communal neighborhood was tied to the strategic nature of territorial bordering between the two countries. It seems that the trans-national trauma was not addressed emotively. Instead of investing in collective happiness or joy, the Kasr-ı Şirin truism has entangled with surface sentiments such as bilateral status concerns and shared conservative compassion. I argue that this half-­ hearted spirit has yet to overcome the Çaldıran challenge. Far from rehabilitating affective fences of neighborhood, let alone building the long-needed confidential climate for cross-cultural integration, the constructed consciousness of Kasr-ı Şirin has only helped to justify interactive collaboration between Ankara and Tehran, when indeed the two capitals were stuck in sectarian confrontation, configured consecutively over neighboring Iraq, and then Syria. The lack of sectarian trust still incites regional rivalry in Turkey-Iran exchange relations. Good neighbors help, but not hurt, each other. The Ankara-Tehran political neighborhood demonstrated a mixed historical record. Both good and bad practices have shaped complex rules of the Turkey-Iran international game. Notwithstanding their domestic differences, the Turkish and Iranian nation-states have developed a political culture of peaceful coexistence. Yet, their struggle for regional influence in the Middle East has not abated. As two non-Arab political entities, Turkey and Iran sought to carve rival geopolitical spheres in neighboring Arab countries, namely, Iraq and Syria. Over the last decades, the enduring conditions of war in Iraq and Syria have increased the risks of military conflict between Turkey and Iran. So far, it seems that Ankara and Tehran have mutually managed to control their rivalry in the Middle East. Some of the relational damages were controlled, and some of them repaired. The historical condition of fences reflects signs of good and bad neighborhood. Cases of altruistic political assistance have been rare. On the other hand, both sides learned to refrain from overtly harming each other. The reciprocal reluctance not to directly hurt each other does not preclude the reemergence of a local confrontation any time sooner or later. Affective empathy and altruistic normative commitment have not been established on both sides of the Turkish-Iranian border. Neighboring governments have not yet achieved deontological (emotional-moral) norms of sincere

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cultural friendship. Dyadic partnership is still based on self-interests, lacking a truly collective intention to sustain mutual economic development. Viewed from Hegelian and Onufian metaphorical standpoints, the two neighboring “political houses” mutually governed their social-­ psychological relationship as they have faced significant challenges from within and without. Mirroring and shadowing on each other’s fences for decades, the two neighboring political houses display both similarity-­ closeness and difference-distance. Complex psycho-social forces concurrently push and pull Turkish-Iranian political houses toward and against each other. Ultimately, ambivalent emotional rules governed their neighborhood relationship. “Good” and “bad” affective management left mixed relational signs of erosion, reparation and restoration in the historical fences of the Turkey-Iran neighborhood. Over the course of their affective relational history, Ankara and Tehran have collectively displayed “deep acts” of heart management in a Hochschildian sense. At least, common affective norms have proved relational resilience, as they helped address recurrent political-military threats, such as the transboundary Kurdish uprisings that emerged during the formative eras (1918–1945, 1946–1979) and the cross-border terrorist infiltrations of the PKK militants ongoing in the reformative and revisionist periods, respectively (1980–2000, 2001–2018). The joint local management of scaling crises has shown the strength of relational “feeling rules” in the Turkish-Iranian neighborhood. Ankara and Tehran had covered a long way to build collective confidence. However, the dyadic emotional management has remained far from achieving a full-fledged sympathetic relationship based on rules of amity, sincerity and trust. Even though both sides could not generate shared feelings of confidence, the evolution of their relationship displayed rules of mutually managed distrust. The trans-governmental emotional commitments embedded into the culture of neighborhood have prevented the Turkey-Iran relationship from slipping into the political dangers of direct deadly conflict and overt military warfare. Governing of distrust, in and of itself, could not guarantee conditions for sustainable dyadic partnership. Common fear and collective anger have only led to ad hoc collaboration. Joint needs and dual desire have driven the gradual enhancing of economic exchange relations. Reciprocal bids for local influence have fed sectarian suspicion and resulted in growing of regional rivalry. Overall, the affective politics of neighborhood has transformed in between episodes of dyadic collaboration and regional

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c­ onfrontation. As historical neighbors, Turks and Iranians have developed non-legal codes to govern their complex political interactions. Emotional-­ moral structures and practices have transformed the Turkey-Iran partnership and rivalry in the tough neighborhood of the Middle East. As a matter of fact, the historical puzzle of “tough neighbors” is topically salient, since it also provides relevant insights for resolving the persistent policy paradoxes in Turkish and Iranian global relations. How hearts are managed among Turks and Iranians creates social-psychological implications for the making of global politics in the foreseeable future. Until very recently, Turkish leaders have liked to deploy a historical narrative that elevated the primordial nature of the political neighborhood between Ankara and Tehran. More often than not, the Kasr-ı Şirin myth is invoked to underline the normative longevity of the Turkish-Iranian relationship. To a great extent, the Ottoman-Qajar border agreement of Kasr-ı Şirin (1639) is reified politically; in a way it is portrayed as the prehistoric foundation of relational norms, to make a clear case for temporal comparison with other international events in world history, most formidably the formation of the United States in 1774. Quite tellingly, this political narrative deliberately speaks to the American hearts, among other international actors. Indeed, this story is still important and relevant for Washington, as well as other prominent capitals equally interested in Turkish-Iranian affairs. As of Nov. 2018, the American political controversy still lingered on how to further repudiate Tehran through punitive relational measures. It became clear that the affective politics of American conservatism has ruled over the international nuclear deal formerly reached with Iran. Once again, the relative endurance of relational peace in the Turkish-Iranian borderlands was represented by Ankara as a psycho-social asset for soft power reproduction that might in turn help to balance against the hard enforcement of comprehensive material sanctions by the United States. Time would exactly tell whether affective norms would truly “trump” over other real forces operating around the Turkish-Iranian neighborhood in the Middle East. Perhaps, the invisible soft strength of deontological neighborly norms might be a hard historic reality that could be endured invincibly. That is to say, dyadic transformation of emotional-moral “habitus” in the Turkish-Iranian neighborhood would most likely create real relational implications for regional and global politics. As a whole, the book follows these empirical and argumentative lines. In four case study chapters, I make a theoretically informed contribution to the empirical literature. While analyzing the emotional themes e­ mergent

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in empirical texts, argumentative interventions are made minimal, so as to preserve analytical neutrality. Through minimalist interferences, I let textual evidences of emotionalities speak for themselves. The tracing of psycho-social history has focused on the relational configuration of emotional entanglements and affective arrangements in key episodes. Following practical approaches of emotions historians, chronicles are taken as primary resources to analyze the phenomenal entanglement of psycho-social sentiments and the affective arrangement of relational psyche in Turkish-­ Iranian affairs. Before closing each episodic chapter, I summarize the emotional-­affective dynamics of partnership and rivalry in the Turkey-Iran neighborhood relationship. Emotional-affective patterns of collaboration and confrontation are reviewed around relational events. In terms of ontology, relational examination is somewhat different from the psychological analysis of decision-­ making. Relational psychology moves beyond embodied evidences of actual feeling in human practice. By assigning ontological priority to the history of relationships, psycho-social analysis foregrounds residual, non-­ embodied emotional constellations, and latent, derivative affective implications. From this research perspective, international relationships are co-constituted by emotional discourses and affective contexts. The changes in psycho-social practices and structures mutually shape relational contours of historical phenomena. Here, the international inquiry seeks to uncover how emotional entanglements and affective arrangements co-­ extensively configure history of relational events. The Conclusion chapter of this monograph aims to relocate the overall relational history on the ground of psycho-social theory. Here, I return to conceptual arguments of the Introduction chapter to extend empirically grounded theoretical propositions on the affective-normative politics of international neighborhood. Here, my analytical purpose is both critical and comparative. First, I aim to better delineate cross-episodic threads in the psycho-social history of the Turkey-Iran neighborhood. Second, I seek to provide further conceptual insights and to make a more generalizable theoretical contribution to the literature on international emotional-­ affective phenomena. Building on critical and comparative observations, I make important theoretical interventions and offer a tentative proposal for further research in comparative case studies. As the final point, I recommend building of more holistic meta-theoretical frameworks to reconceptualize the categorical nexus of narrativity, emotionality, affectivity, normativity and relationality.

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This project has long been in the making. The initial research ideas have been crystallized during the “Turkey and Its Neighbors” course that I taught in spring 2017. I have developed important conceptual notions and empirical threads during my last semester in Tokat, Gaziosmanpaşa University. The students’ significant intellectual interest in the subject matter motivated me to think more critically and comparatively on the historical habituation of neighborhood cultures around Turkey’s immediate periphery. Moreover, the ISA panels have informed this study in various ways. Without further ado, I would like to kindly thank the ISA panel chairs and discussants, namely, Özgür Özdamar, Vera van Hüllen, Lenore G. Martin, Fred Chernoff and Steven F. Jackson. Their constructive comments have encouraged me to move forward in the exploration of emotions in Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighborhood relations. My thanks also go to the anonymous Palgrave reviewers who have made succinct suggestions to help improve the manuscript. Last but not the least, the Palgrave editorial team has done an excellent job in steering the way for this publication. The usual academic disclaimers apply for my book as well. Translations from the Turkish texts are made by me. Errors of scholarship are mine. Above all, my family provided memorable support in adapting myself to full-time research and writing mode, after long years in professional positions. At times of urgent need, my mother helped me keep on track and work patiently until the very end. Without her, the academic pursuits would not bring such valuable fruits for me. Equally, I have always felt the wholehearted backing of my father and brother. I dedicate this book to our family, particularly to the coming generations. Balıkesir, Turkey

Mehmet Akif Kumral

Contents

1 Introduction: Historical Psychology of Turkey-Iran Neighborhood Relations  1 2 The Formative Emotional Climate of Turkish-Iranian Relations (1918–1945) 69 3 The Affective Atmosphere of Ankara-Tehran Alignment in Cold War (1946–1979)119 4 Reformative Psychology in Turkey-Iran Interactions (1980–2000)183 5 Psycho-Social Revisions in Turkey-Iran Neighborhood (2001–2018)239 6 Conclusion: Overall Findings and Research Recommendations307 Index333

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Abbreviations

AIOC AKP/AK PARTi ANAP AP ASEAN CAATSA CENTO CHP CIG ̇ CIP CISADA CUP D-8 DCA DP DYP EC ECO EEC EU FETÖ HLCC ILSA IRGC ISIS

(Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) Association of South East Asian Nations Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act Central Treaty Organization Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) Central Iraqi Government ̇ Islamic Republican Party (Cumhuriyetçi Islam Partisi) Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act Committee of Union and Progress Developing Eight Countries’ Organization for Economic Cooperation Defense Cooperation Agreement Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti) True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi) European Community Economic Cooperation Organization European Economic Community European Union Fethullahist Terror Organization (Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü) High-Level Cooperation Council Iran and Libya Sanctions Act Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (or DEASH) xvii

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Abbreviations

JCPOA JEC KDP KRG LN MBK MHCP MHP ̇ MIT MKO MSP NATO NSC OIC OPEC PJAK PKK PUK PYD RCD RP SAVAK SEATO SNSC TMFA TOBB UN UNGA UNSC US USSR YPG

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Joint Economic Commission Kurdistan Democratic Party Kurdistan Regional Government League of Nations Committee of National Unity (Millî Birlik Komitesi) Muslim People’s Republican Party (Müslüman Halkın Cumhuriyetçi Partisi) Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) ̇ Turkish National Intelligence Organization (Millî Istihbarat Teşkilatı) Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization National Salvation Party (Millî Selâmet Partisi) North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Security Council Organization of Islamic Conference/Cooperation Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistane) Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partia Karkaren Kurdistan) Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat) Regional Cooperation for Development Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) Iranian National Intelligence and Security Organization (Sazman-e Ettela’at va Amniyat-e Keshvar) South East Asia Treaty Organization Supreme National Security Council Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Turkish Union of Chambers and Exchange Commodities (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği) United Nations United Nations General Assembly United Nations Security Council United States of America Union of Soviet Socialist Republics People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel)

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 2.1 Table 3.1 Table 4.1 Table 5.1 Table 6.1 Table 6.2

Emotional-affective configurations of modal interactions in inter-state neighborhoods 5 Formative psycho-social constellations in Turkey-Iran neighborhood114 Cold War climate in Turkey-Iran transactions 177 Reformative sentiments in Turkey-Iran interactions 232 Recent psycho-social revisions in the Turkey-Iran neighborhood294 Psycho-social history of Turkey-Iran neighborhood relations 311 Tentative outline for future research in comparative case studies 323

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Historical Psychology of Turkey-Iran Neighborhood Relations

Canonical writings tell us that modern history of Turkey-Iran relations has been shaped by security considerations. Ankara and Tehran could hardly escape from strategic challenges embattling the regional countries (Brown 1984: 197–277; Walt 1987; Ehteshami and Hinnebusch 1997; Hansen 2000). In line with their common “middle-power” characteristics, Turkey and Iran pursued resembling regional policies, dubbed as “omni-­balancing” (David 1991), to eliminate simultaneous internal and external threats to their national security and/or state survival (Olson 1998). As a corollary to their similar security calculations, Turkish and Iranian regimes have displayed traditional patterns of geopolitical behavior in regional affairs. Strategic assessments are still common among scholars and historians analyzing Turkey-Iran relations (Olson 2000; Ehteshami and Elik 2011). In these portrayals, balancing of power/threat and aligning of interests over the Kurdish issue are taken for granted as shaping regional dynamics in Turkey-Iran relations (Olson 2004; Elik 2011; see also Hentov 2012 and Charountaki 2018). Available analyses on Turkey-Iran relations, such as those referenced above, mostly provide geopolitical readings of events within the broader history of the Middle East. By and large, conventional security approaches predominate the theoretical framework of historical studies on the subject matter. To a certain extent, strategic studies have covered important aspects of Turkey-Iran relations. However, these past perspectives have failed to fully grasp complex, deeper dynamics of social-psychological © The Author(s) 2020 M. A. Kumral, Exploring Emotions in Turkey-Iran Relations, Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39029-7_1

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exchange in Ankara-Tehran interactions. I argue that the primary reason for this failure has emanated from the analytical preference centering on “patterns of state behavior” rather than “modalities of inter-state relationship.” By starting from unit-level behavioral assumptions, one would have ontological difficulty in building concise conceptual categories and theoretical propositions on modes of relationship that emerge out of inter-­ actions among those atomistic units. Relational and processual viewpoints (Emirbayer 1997; Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005; Jackson and Nexon 1999, 2013; Dépelteau 2018; Fuhse 2018) provide analytical alternatives to resolve those critical problems. By looking from relational and processual angles, and focusing on the level of relations instead of unit-state behaviors, we would be better equipped to deal with impending theoretical and empirical challenges of interpreting the history unfolding between Turkey and Iran. In many ways, this relational history presents persistent “pathological” (or perhaps pathos-logical) puzzles that still confound the international scholarship. Consider the connotations of confusing remarks extracted from a scholarly work on this topic, in which Turkey-Iran relations were viewed through the prism of middle-power statehood: As the discussion in previous chapters indicates, the relationship between Iran and Turkey can be characterized as one of mistrust and this largely depends on the past experience and social memory of both the Turkish and Iranian peoples. Though both societies have been faced with the collective amnesia of religious and secularist apostasy, the relationship of conflict and cooperation make up their sub-conscious mindset … This research presumes that Iranian-Turkish trade volume has the potential to reach US$ 100 billion should both neighbors manage to overcome the aforementioned pathologies … Should they be successful in building a constructive relationship with regard to their respective economies, security management and energy infrastructures, these two regional heavyweights will be able to bring peace and stability on a regional level. (Elik 2011: 174–176)

This sample excerpt is representative of perplexing conceptualizations quite common in other works as well. It is an astonishing observation that how ambivalent affective-normative categorizations could be used arbitrarily, without thorough conceptual engagement with theories of social psychology and emotions. Examples include but not limited to some canonical titles portraying Turkey and Iran as “essential friends and natural enemies” (Çetinsaya 2003), “friendly competitors and fierce rivals” (Ayman 2014), “not quite enemies but less than friends” (Akbarzadeh

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and Barry 2017) or “the best of frenemies” (Tahiroğlu and Ben Taleblu 2015). As some scholars saw, conceptual oversimplifications (Stein and Bleek 2012) and cursory identifications (Hentov 2012) do not capture “uneasy” and “complicated” nature of interactions between two historical neighbors (Özcan and Özdamar 2010). Put in other words, the historical complexity of Turkey-Iran neighborhood relations calls for more systematic psycho-social research. These preliminary inter-textual evidences constitute a prelude for revisiting Turkey-Iran diplomatic relations and grounding this history-­ historiography onto the theoretical canvas of international psychology and emotions. This new research space has not been an uncharted territory. Past portrayals still provide significant points of departure for psycho-­ social reinterpretation of historical interactions between Ankara and Tehran. There are emotional-affective themes found between the lines of prior research. These treatments establish thematic puzzles to be resolved through further theoretical and empirical investigations. As a matter of fact, this book departs from the past puzzling conceptual ground and moves toward more concise analytical horizons. I adopt a pragmatic (discursive-contextual) variant of relational approaches to reexamine available historical/historiographical data and reinterpret emotional-­ affective implications of co-extensive partnership and rivalry between Turkish and Iranian governments. For these aims, I provide a compact conceptual framework and comprehensive empirical analyses on past states of psycho-social exchange and relational modalities of rule-making in Turkey-Iran interactions. The affective-normative contours of Turkey-­Iran neighborhood relationship help to better understand historical trajectories of international transformation and regional (dis)order in the Middle East. The inquiry has been designed and conducted by following “pragmatic” procedures of data collection and analyses proposed by “grounded theory” approaches (Timonen et al. 2018; Charmaz 2017; Tucker 2016). The methodological framework has been adopted from historical-textual approaches advanced in critical studies of emotion and affect in international relations, social sciences and humanities (Koschut 2017a, 2018a, b, c, 2019; Rosenwein 2002, 2010; Chatterjee et al. 2017; Wetherell 2015; Rice 2008). Along these lines, the book aims to make theoretically informed empirical contribution to the growing emotions literature in international studies (Markwica 2018; Hutchison 2016; Hall 2015; Ross 2014; Fierke 2013; Eznack 2012; Zarakol 2011).

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As a broadly defined topic of key interest, the psycho-social implications of inter-state neighborhood practices and regional/local rule-­making structures have not been thoroughly inquired (Chyzh 2017). Quantitative analyses of big data fall short of assisting case-specific conduct of inquiry on neighborly relations (Zhukov and Stewart 2013). Lacking sufficient data, qualitative researchers still seek more comprehensive applications of neighborhood concept in comparative cases covering (geo)political sociology and social psychology of borderlands (McConnell 2011; Doevenspeck 2011). In due course, affective-normative rules of dyadic-regional interactions among neighboring states have been investigated in a limited fashion (Williams and Nguyen 2018; Allen, Bell and Clay 2016; Johnson et  al. 2011). That is to say, there is a further intellectual need and scholarly space to broaden conceptual research and deepen empirical analyses on historical transformation of “neighborhood effect” in various locales of world politics (Gartzke 2003; Gleditsch 2002; Rasler and Thompson 2000). Taken as the topic of a long-term, single case study, the Turkey-Iran dyad reiterates the analytical purchase of examining inter-state neighborhoods as complex social-psychological processes unfolding within a relational spectrum of rivalry and/or partnership. In any case, the relational history of inter-state neighborhood indicates “managed hearts” (Hochschild 1983/2012) in stages of world politics and international diplomacy. Emotional practices, “feeling rules” and affective-normative structures (Hochschild 1979) mutually transform psycho-social history of trans-governmental neighborhood relations. By tapping further insights from historical sociology and psychology of international and regional relations (Hymans 2010; Mercer 2010; Ross 2006; Reus-Smit 2002; Barnett 1998, 2002) and psycho-social researching of emotions (Smith-­ Lovin and Winkielman 2010; Barrett 2009; Berezin 2009; Russell 2009; Turner and Stets 2006; Lively and Heise 2004; McCarthy 1994), this book reinterprets affective politics of rule-making (Hall and Ross 2015; Onuf 1989, 1994, 2014, 2017; Banerjee 1991, 2015; Acharya 2011; Duffy and Frederking 2009) in the case of Turkey-Iran neighborhood interactions. Researching how emotion discourses and affective contexts have transformed the Turkey-Iran historical neighborhood requires relational analyses. To meet that demand, this book distills distinctive insights from constructivist studies on international rule-making, cross-fertilizes them with psycho-social inquiring of emotional exchange in official-public diplomacy and fuses them with affective-phenomenal analyses of historical

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Table 1.1  Emotional-affective configurations of modal interactions in inter-state neighborhoods Discursive-emotional entanglements

Sentimental-normative Contextual-­ interaction tendencies affective arrangements

Relational modalities

Soft-line discourse

Productive mutuality Shared solidarity

Progressive partnership

Hard-line rhetoric

Positive emoting Love-hope Honor-trust Compassion-care Negative emoting Anger-­hate Fear-­anxiety Envy-­jealousy

Punitive reciprocity Status competition

Respect-­ engagement Collaborative atmosphere Reprisal-­ containment Confrontational climate

Regressive rivalry

partnership and rivalry in dyadic-regional neighborhood interactions. This study develops a composite (micro/textual-macro/contextual) framework to analyze relational transformation of emotional-discursive practices and affective-contextual structures in international politics of neighborhood. The modal research template for relational analysis is summarized in Table 1.1. The relational modules in this template are based on prototypical clustering of core emotions in human interactions (Shaver et al. 1987). The hypothetical scheme applies non-discrete modeling of “core affects” (Barrett 2006a, b, 2009) and “affective circumplex” (Russell 1980, 1991, 2003, 2009). By blurring the emotion-affect nexus, these modal typologies circumvent disciplinary divisions established in social sciences and cultural studies. This analytical proposal builds on conceptual advances in cognate fields such as relational affective pragmatics (Slaby 2019; Kopytko 2004), cultural sociology (Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005; Baerveldt and Voestermans 2005; Moon 2013), discursive psychology (Edwards 1999; McAvoy 2015; Wetherell 2015), political psychology (Skonieczny 2018; Brodersen 2018; Clément et al. 2017; Koschut 2017b; Wolf 2017, 2018; McDermott et al. 2017; De Rivera et al. 2007; Bar-Tal et al. 2007) and critical emotion-affect studies (Kahl 2019; Slaby and von Scheve 2019). In terms of methodology, this outline helps to examine discursive entanglements of “emotionality” (Denzin 1983; Ahmed 2004; Leep 2010) and contextual arrangements of “affectivity” as “open-textured” and “situated” webs of meaning, which historically configure pathways of

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­ ormativity and performativity within relational structures and practices n (Slaby and Röttger-Rössler 2018: 1–11). International neighborhood relationships provide novel cases to trace textual evidences of “emotional entanglements” and contextual cues of “affective arrangements.” International neighborhoods are relational structures and practices mutually constituted by “emotional communities” ruling in power. Emotional diplomatic cultures shape affective-­ normative making of politics among neighboring governments. Emotional-affective structures and practices of rule-making in Turkey-­ Iran relations have implications for the Middle Eastern neighborhood and the larger world (Brown 2014; Ayoob 2011; Hen-Tov and Haykel 2010; Kinzer 2010). As a matter of fact, social-psychological transformation of dyadic partnership and regional rivalry in Turkey-Iran neighborhood relations has been conceptually untheorized, empirically unaddressed and hence analytically underspecified. On these topics of academic-scientific interest, we can only find tiny bits and pieces of intellectual information disseminated in several sites of scholarly interaction (Özcan 2004; Middle East Technical University 2005; Karacasulu and Karakır 2011; Jenkins 2012; Ayman 2012; Demiryol 2013; Renda 2014; Keyman and Sazak 2015; Sinkaya 2016). Regarding these subject matters, the inter-textual corpus is largely scattered around here and there, lacking to afford cumulative knowledge about comprehensive reality. The inter-textual thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006) of these historical-historiographical accounts enables to offer a more holistic picture. My research goal is to tackle with this analytical task. In this chapter, I provide a conceptual framework to emphasize theoretical significance of the research topic. Theoretical framework of this inquiry helps to identify conceptual connections between relatively distinct literatures in international relations research, like constructivist social psychology, dyadic-regional neighborhoods, rules and rule complexes and their configurative constellations with core emotions (master feelings) in communicative practices and dialectical interactions. The theoretical part provides conceptual tools for empirical investigation conducted in the following chapters. Empirical chapters are divided into four so as to capture significant evidence that shed light on dyadic transformation of Turkey-Iran relations in distinct historical periods. In these chapters, I review the historical-­ historiographical corpus to distill relevant analytical insights. The second chapter excavates the formative (1918–1945) era of rule-making in the

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Turkish-Iranian neighborhood. The third chapter looks at Turkey-Iran relationship during the Cold War period (1946–1979). The fourth c­ hapter inquires the volatile times of 1980–1989 and 1990–2000  in Ankara-­ Tehran exchange relations. The fifth chapter covers two turbulent episodes, 2001–2010 and 2011–2018, and analyzes recent developments in Ankara-­ Tehran interactions. Empirical chapters seek to understand relevant inter-­ textual data to reveal psycho-social continuity and emotional-affective change in Turkey-Iran neighborhood game. Four empirical chapters are followed finally by the Conclusion chapter. In this final chapter, overall findings and research recommendations are presented.

Conceptual Framework: Constructivist Insights from Cognate Fields Symbolic interactionist school of social psychology observes emotional phenomena as “a meaningful object to be interpreted, controlled, used, or managed by social actors” operating within cultural-normative structures. These approaches treat emotions as intervening and intermediary variables between micro (agential-discursive feelings) and macro (structural-­ affective context) level inquiry. In these holistic analyses, emotional explorations help “to link macro factors to micro factors, micro to macro factors, or both.” Collective micro-level symbolic interactions constitute a macro-­ level cultural habitus and a normative network of rules within which the context of the relationship forms structure of rule. Shared emotional experiences create a social-psychological context through which human relations are built and sustained. Emotional norms help to establish, manage and maintain psycho-social relations. In other words, “affective principles or processes govern interaction” (Thoits 1989: 329–331). All processes of social interaction are constituted by emotional-moral rules and affective-normative rule of exchange. Main categories of social exchange (such as love, status, information, services, money and goods) are determined by human agents interacting in various affective-normative contexts. Basic kinds of human relationships can be categorized by looking at structures and practices of social exchange (Haslam 1994: 61–68). Communal sharing relationships are based on equivalence and collectivity membership in which individual distinctiveness is ignored (e.g., relationships among close family members). Equality matching refers to egalitarian relationships marked by in-kind reciprocity and balanced exchange

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(e.g., relationships between non-intimate room-mates). Authority ranking relationships are asymmetrical, based on precedence, hierarchy, status, ­command and deference (e.g., relationships within military organizations). Market pricing relationships, finally, are based on proportionality, with interactions organized with reference to a common scale of ratio values, such as money; rational calculations of personal cost and benefit determine social transactions (e.g., commercial relationships). (Haslam 1994: 61)

Close communal partnerships of equality and reciprocity entail egalitarian exchange and collective sharing of affective-normative space, whereas distant relational rivals compete for status and/or influence in their common psycho-social interactions. By and large, modes of relational engagement are constituted along the social-psychological middle ground between partnership and rivalry. Mutual socio-economic interest and socio-cultural interdependence determine practical (emotional-moral) codes and pragmatic (affective-normative) contours of interactive exchange. On the extreme ends of relational continuum, social friendships may be driven by “strong affection or feelings of joy”; cultural animosities “may result from fear or anger; economic partnerships may thrive because they produce positive feelings such as confidence or pleasure. The context of exchange may have a discernible emotional tone, invoke particular emotional rules” (Lawler and Thye 1999: 217–218). Neighborhood relationships in general, the Turkey-Iran case in particular, validate complex transformation of psycho-social roles (partnership-rivalry) and emotional-­affective rules. Affective-normative dynamics of exchange condition and mediate socialpsychological making of interactions. Collective changes in social-­ psychological states and inter-changing conditions of emotionality conjointly shape contextual structuration of the relationship. Affective-normative practices have an impact on and are influenced by identity (self-other) conceptions, role (partner-rival) relationships, dyadic signaling performances and collective social-psychological structures. Interactive management of these multi-layered processes molds into socially “shared realities,” narratives and myths, which in turn expose the episodic quality and historical “longevity” of the relationship (Thoits 1989: 329–333). The long-term history of Turkey-Iran neighborhood provides a compelling empirical ground to analyze relational making of emotional rules and international roles.

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Social Psychology of Political Neighborhood: Relational Making of International Roles and Rules Viewed from psycho-social perspective of exchange, international practices and structures of emotion management present key topic of interest for researchers. For analytical purposes, constructivist conceptualization of “rules and rule” helps to interrogate communicative (discursive), contextual (historical) and narrative (historiographical) structuration of emotions in international relations. Complex international relationships can be inquired by looking at political manifestation and public representation of emotional-moral practices (constitutive rules) and affective-normative structures (constitutive rule) of interactive exchange. At this point, theoretical foundations laid by Nicholas Onuf (1989, 1994, 2014, 2017) deserve analytical elaboration. Post-Onufian conceptual findings (Banerjee 2015; Acharya 2011; Duffy and Frederking 2009; Banerjee 1991) help to further investigate social-psychological making of “rules and rule” in international relations. As Onuf (2017: 10) recaps, making of rules and rule is “the natural condition of humanity … Since rules are everywhere, rule is everywhere, including … the relations of nations.” There is a general rule, indeed an iron law, for social existence: Where there are rules, there is a condition of rule … Our conduct, singly and together, is always, if not consciously or actively, a matter of choosing whether to follow rules, or not. We typically choose to follow rules, and effectuate rule, for all sorts of compelling reasons. When we do not, we anticipate adverse consequences. (Onuf 2017: 10)

Rules system and systems of rule “make it possible for agents to act: they give us choices, they tell us who we are and who others are, they tell us which social goals are appropriate, and ultimately they tell us what we should do.” Intersubjective “social rules fundamentally influence the coordination of action” in the political realm. We can conceive political practices in “world politics as a set of pragmatic rules” and social structures as international establishment of systemic rule. Continuity and change in “both social structure and social interactions can be analyzed according to the rules invoked and/or challenged by the meaningful actions of agents.” Discursive-affective commitments and normative-­ contextual intentions mutually shape practices of rules and structures of rule (Duffy and Frederking 2009: 326–330).

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As reiterated by Onuf (2014), we can treat international “norms” and “rules” as attributive references to the same phenomena constituting the social world of relationships. With different conceptual names, both of them refer to the same socially constructed and culturally conditioned things and relational processes in our world. The human relations are made possible and managed through social practices of rules and cultural structuration of rule. International society, conceived as “the ensemble of relations among nation-states,” has been constituted not only by legal rules and international law, but also by non-legal rules and customary convention. Constructivists seek to “show how [ruling] systems work.” They “start with … rules to show how rule works.” In constructivist sense, “kinds of rules” and “kinds of rule” intimate one another (Onuf 2014: 1–3). In crux, Onuf identifies three interrelated types of rules and rule: rules of “direction, instruction and commitment”; and rule of “hierarchy, hegemony and heteronomy (heterarchy).” By looking at his overall analyses, Onufian typological kinds could well be reduced to two broad categorizations. This typical modification better serves for purposes of parsimony. Rules of direction and instruction essentially indicate relationships of “privilege (status-power)” emerging in hierarchical and/or hegemonic rule. The social need and psychological value of these rules are constituted through rulings of basic emotions such as fear, anger, shame and honor (Onuf 1989: 120–126, 2014: 3–10). On the other hand, rules of commitment mainly implicate uneven, asymmetrical and poly-lateral “role” relationships structured by heteronomous rule. For these reasons, “heteronomy is least likely to be stable” and hence poses challenges for role managers. Social-psychological management of roles constitutes a general associative framework for all interactants, be them collaborative partners or confrontational rivals. Role relationships differ since “every agent is a unique social being.” However interactive exchange of social commitments is based on a set of collectively shared affective-normative rulings. This type of emotional-moral rulings primarily depends on shared desires for reciprocal exchange and collective sentiments of responsibility for mutual rights and duties. Social-­ psychological implications of heteronomy are exposed through affective (de)composition of feelings like trust, pride, pleasure and love (Onuf 1989: 120–126, 2014: 3–10). Affective-normative and cultural making of roles, rules and rule displays complex contextual patterns. International combinations of political rules and rule, as conceived by Onuf, are co-extensive, complementary and commensurable (Onuf 1989: 120–126, 206–227, 2014: 5).

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Of all rules, commitment-rules are the most difficult to practice because they require a correlative [role and rule] consciousness…commitment-rules may be practiced to mutual advantage [of exchange] only if partners [of interaction] impute an appropriate [role] and rule-consciousness to each other. (Onuf 1989: 118) Rules of change are always commitment-rules…Every time agents choose to follow a rule, they change it—they strengthen the rule—by making it more likely that they and others will follow the rule in the future. Every time agents choose not to follow a rule, they change the rule by weakening it, and in so doing they may well contribute to the constitution of some new rule. (Onuf 1994: 14, 18)

Following these constructivist assertions, this book proposes a social-­ psychological analysis of international interactions by re-focusing on political “exchange of commitments,” which shape interactive configuration of “role relationships” and contextual constellation of “rules and rule.” It also seeks to apply these conventional notions to the customary category of “neighborhood.” Following (post)Onufian arguments, this study reinstates neighborhood as social-psychological community co-constituted by emotional-moral practices of rules and affective-normative structures of rule. Social-psychological relations among international neighbors are defined by rules of interactive exchange and rule of communal commitment. Emotional Exchange and Interactive Rulings Among Neighboring States Neighborhood relations entail emotional-affective arrangements, which are structured by substantive needs and ideational values for social engagement and psychological interaction. For both peoples and states neighborhood is a complex social-psychological relationship co-determined by local roles, contextual rules and rule. Here, due to limitations of space, I refrain from reinstating philosophical foundations and narrative underpinnings of scholarly discussion on (de)merits of treating “states” and “people” as if they are alike (Jackson 2004a, b; Neumann 2004). But the discussion intimates important implications for understanding the conceptualization of neighborhood in peoples’ affairs and states’ conduct. Within pragmatist philosophical spirit (Jackson 2009; Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009), I assume that the notion of neighborhood still exists in lived experiences of peoples and practices of states. Pragmatist variant of social psychology focuses on lived experiences, relational habitus of

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c­ultures, affective-normative structures and practices ruling among ­interactants (Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005; Baerveldt and Voestermans 2005). Even under the sweeping currents of mass connectivity and globalization of digital space, neighborhood still constitutes a pragmatic category for international research. Humans and states continue to arrange emotional-­moral practices and develop psycho-social structures in their neighborhood. Peoples and states produce rules as they interact with their neighbors. They also establish the rule of neighborhood. These public-­ diplomatic practices reveal configuration of communicative rulings that constitute reproduction and transformation of neighborhood in various discursive-contextual cases. International public realm is shaped by affective practices and structures. Making of emotions and international rules implies one another. Without an inter-relational feeling, no inter-national role to be played, no political commitment to be made, no rules and rule to inter-act. The power of emotional rule seizes all actors and structures alike. States are no exception to the rule of emotions and feeling rules. They are also governed by the rules of emotions and rule of feeling. The social psychology of international relations is constituted through “emotional diplomacy” and “official emotions” (Hall 2015; Hall 2011). Social psychology approach provides a critical angle to capture “states’ emotions” (Sasley 2011) and helps to better understand making of “affective politics” (Hall and Ross 2015; Ross 2014; Hall 2012) in inter-state and transnational interactions. At this point, Onuf’s categorization of human relationships helps to foreground the notion of neighborhood norms in constructivist research domain. By returning to classical philosophy of Aristotle, Onuf (2014) provides conceptual analogies to understand international rule-making among neighboring peoples and states forming the international society. States, like people, live in social neighborhoods. The social nature of state neighborhood can be better grasped by looking at analogical pictures concentrating on the households and their relations within the political society. By their very nature, women and men are political. Therefore, households and their inter-relations are political. Within the households, ­durable forms of familial roles endure in political rulings of human relations. Fathers or mothers rule over the family (paternal/maternal hierarchy), husbands and wives rule over each other (consensual hegemony). The ruling among brothers implies heteronomy, which is like an interdependent “commonwealth” (Onuf 2014: 9–12).

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Individuals, households, neighbors and society are continuously c­o-­constituted through political structuration of rules and rule. These performative-­normative transformations are made possible through the medium of political discourse and public language. “By making, following and talking about rules people constitute the multiple structures of society; through such rules societies constitute people as agents” (Onuf 1994: 1–6). Emotional-discursive makings of rules produce affective-contextual structures of political rule in the world. That is to say, emotional-discursive strategies and rhetorical maneuvers transform the affective communicative context of political exchange in international neighborhoods. A multitude of coterminous states (like peoples holding adjacent houses) interact with their local neighbors. These political interactions establish structures of social exchange and create affective-normative webs of psychological engagement in the neighborhood domain of international relations. Normative notions of political parity and social reciprocity have always been defining features of international neighborhood relations. Most interactions of neighbors are shaped by mutually defined commitment rules. Normative rule of neighborly exchange is structured on the basis of common needs and values of nations and states. The nation-state is a group entity composed of government and public. State leaders and citizens feel in similar ways. In this regard, states can be conceived as “psychological–emotional groups” identified with certain psycho-social sense of belonging called “prototypical group emotions.” The conceptualization of “states-as-groups with emotions” provides a psycho-social theoretical leverage to inquire “prototypical” making of “states’ emotions” and their “emotional identifications” in international public space. State leaders would most likely be high primers in the making of popular emotions (Sasley 2011: 465–468). The view here is that persons with state authority and their allies in society share a certain political culture. The logic of such cultures makes states not only unitary decision-makers but integrated psychocultural subjects with state-level identities, emotions, … and other components of subjecthood [that] are not anchored in individuals. Rather, even in persons these ­psychological functions arise from the inner logics of shared cultures. Some special cultural meanings have psychological force … of the … inner logic of the … foreign policy cultures, showing how emotions, identities, and motives can arise from a culture’s descriptions of the state-self and others in historical situations. A group of state leaders who share a culture will respond to events deemed by that culture to implicate their state with common perceptions, causal attributions, emotions, and motives. (Banerjee 1991: 19, 20)

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The political identity and history of subject-cultures emerge and are sustained through dynamic processes of social structuration and psychological habituation. These contextual processes could be modeled in four steps. First, subjects use social categories to construct “interpretations of the situation” by looking at “the latest round of actions.” Second, these situational constructs mold into social roles and cultural identities, comprised of emotions and norms. Third, emotions and rules transform affective-­normative structures of commitments for relational interchange. Fourth, social-psychological exchange of commitments generates rounds of interaction. Contextual combinations of social, psychological and cultural interactions shape the historical reproduction of affective-normative practices and structures (Banerjee 1991: 20–21). Social “rules call for conduct consistent with their content” (Onuf 2017: 9). They constitute states as agents and make their international interaction possible. Social rules of commitment entail four features: communal foundation, collective instantiation, contextual configuration, conditional vindication. “Two or more agents can form a community through shared rules of interaction…communities of two agents, with each pair sharing rules and instances through their interaction, can connect to form social networks … A community perceives events collectively through the instantiation of its rules … [which] must retain credibility” (Banerjee 2015: 281–283). Credible political commitments are key for communal interactions between the states. At the global level, credibility of commitments depends on three interrelated components constituting the communal habitus or the “life-world” of social interaction: rules (norms), roles (identities) and culture of exchange. Regional cultures of collective security and global rules of influence create contradictory consequences for international actors and normative structures (Duffy and Frederking 2009: 332–343). The globalregional contours of international interactions create implications for local rule-making among neighboring states (Acharya 2011). The non-legal, informal rules of neighborhood indicate varying social-­psychological “signals” of practical “commitment” and customary ­“compliance” to the international “network norms” observed in trans-governmental spaces of world politics (Whitehead 2006: 695–702). In this sense, international politics of neighborhood implies affective-­ normative localization of communal cultures.

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International Politics of Neighborhood: Affective-Normative Localization of Communal Cultures As social agents, states also act in their local neighborhood. In this communal-­communicative setting of contiguity, neighbors co-extensively interact for two contradictory ends: (1) to produce collective security-­ stability and (2) to generate influence over local-regional spheres. The former rule relies on communal responsibility, while the latter depends on reciprocal respect. More often than not, competition for spheres of influence creates tension among neighbors. Rival geopolitical positions contradict the rule of collective security and stability necessary for local-regional partnership. That is to say, complex social-psychological structuration of neighborhood relations creates ambivalent exchange of political commitments swinging between collaborative partnership and confrontational rivalry. Only credible commitments help to build mutual trust and communal honor among political neighbors. Dual processes of modernization—democratization and development—produce the transnational “neighborhood effect” in various locales of world politics (Gartzke 2003; Gleditsch 2002). Neighboring states “act upon shared rules to change or preserve [social] structures” within which they jointly operate. These dialogical and dialectical structures of neighborhood are tied to political practices of rule-­ making and role enactment by the state agents. The international inter-play between rules and roles instantiates and assembles political-public “narratives that become the identities of states, motivating their actions and practices.” Rules and roles are enacted pragmatically through repeated uses of discursive instruments like historical metaphors and analogies. Historical structure of international interaction is reproduced or transformed through reconstruction of political-public narratives, state identities and social-psychological rules (Banerjee 2015: 274–279). The identity narrative then motivates action. In this way, shared rules turn the human community that shares them into collective agents. This model of structure and its reproduction are rooted in the requirement that rules be vindicated for their continued instantiation … Rules instantiate themselves upon particular events and objects. Rules connect in networks to each other, the context of one rule being formed by instances of other rules … Over a historical sequence, rules operate and combine to form agents and their practices, as well as structures that rise and fall … This process of structuration gives rise to enduring social networks of agents connected by

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interdependent practices. This process also yields … succession of structures. Structures rise, unevenly, as new rules and practices join into the reproduction process and some old ones drop out. Structures break down when some rules are discredited, leading to a disruption of established practices, causing the discredit of yet more rules. (Banerjee 2015: 274–275)

The structure of international neighborhoods can be determined by typological measurements of proximity and connectivity. Geographical proximity can be quantified by topographical contiguity (inter-border distance and/or inter-capital distance). Non-geographical proximity can be qualified by looking at social-psychological channels of connectivity such as ethnolinguistic bonds, trade ties, alignment linkages and trans-­ governmental associations. Large-scale statistical data analyses have shown that trans-governmental (and alliance) connectivity outperforms geographic proximity as international measure of neighborhood (Zhukov and Stewart 2013). Geographical distinction of an international neighborhood is easy to map, but lends little political evidence for sound analyses. Hence, it is more “useful” to distinguish political “neighborhoods” by focusing on the transnational connections emerging out of the “non-geographic space.” The social-psychological conception of international space brings better insights to unpack affective-normative puzzles of (good and bad) neighborhoods in world politics (Williams and Nguyen 2018). With these recent assertions in mind, this research foregrounds trans-­ governmental politics of rule-making to explore social psychology of international relationships among state neighbors. This analytical focus distills scholarly insights from political theory and sociology of rule-­making and “emotional management” of public relationships and policy making processes by modern national governments (Pykett et al. 2017). Here, critical conceptions of “governmentality” (Lemke 2016; Death 2013; May 2011; Dolan 2010; Taylor 2009; Hindess 2005; Bonnafous-­Boucher 2005; Dupont and Pearce 2001) are revisited to chart non-­geographic qualities of political neighborhood relationships among nation-states. Extending on these views, this study re-introduces “ ­ trans-­governmentality” as a conceptual tool to inquire relational codes of conduct between state neighbors. One can conceive trans-governmentality as a holistic measure of neighborhood quality at dyadic, regional and global levels. Trans-governmental modes of rule-making shape social-­ psychological dynamics of political neighborhood. Put in other words, international politics of neighborhood is ruled by trans-governmentality.

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The notion of trans-governmentality helps to better interrogate neighborhood relationships in world politics. It is the relevant governments that rule over the non-geographic spaces of the state and the political neighborhoods. Inter-governmental space also includes channels of transnational exchange (alignment and trade) and cross-cultural connections. The relationship between international neighbors is ruled by “govern-­mentality.” The relational governance is essentially a political management process addressing transnational affairs at global, regional and dyadic levels of neighborhood. Political structures and practices of rule-making shape patterns of relational management among state neighbors. Governments speak in the name of and act for the neighboring states. State neighborhoods are constituted by trans-governmental structures of exchange and practices of interaction. Inter-state neighborhood, as a political relationship, entails forms of governance. Neighboring governments are designated institutions to manage those relationships. The trans-governmental process requires relational rules. Without a political norm, there would hardly be an international relationship. Besides, state relationships almost inevitably implicate political management of hearts. Affective and normative dynamics concurrently shape trans-­governmentality and social psychology of inter-state neighborhood. Political structures and practices of governmentality have a distinct “emotional life.” Politics of relational rule-making operates through “emotionalities,” which assume how to govern “particular ways of feeling about the world.” Out of this social-psychological management process “emotionalities of rule” emerge. Under political circumstances of “uncertainty” and “insecurity,” the affective-normative domain of governance displays complex rules of “emotionalization.” Hard-line/conservative and soft-line/liberal “modes of governance” are constituted by affective registers. Valence-based positive and/or negative “popular affects” are mobilized to shape a country’s normative context from within and without. Rules of feeling are employed to create a certain climate conducive for political administration. Hard-line/conservative right-wing mode of ruling heavily relies on “fear,” “anger” and “distrust” to control political “anxiety” and “resentment.” Soft-line/liberal left-wing mode of ruling often invokes “honor,” “hope” and “trust” to build political “confidence” and “respect.” Both kinds of governmental conducts are politically conditioned by countervailing sentiments of sympathy (desire, love, amity) and antipathy (disgust, hatred, animosity) developed toward significant others located inside and/or outside. The emotional logics of governmental

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practices leave lingering implications for states’ conduct in domestic and international realms (Campbell 2010). These social-psychological conceptualizations are key to better delineate inter-governmental politics of neighborhood in world affairs. International neighborhood relationships are ruled by trans-­governmentality. The modes of relationship between state neighbors are constituted through emotionalities of political rule-making. Each political neighborhood has a distinct affective-normative life story visible in historical texts and observable in historiographical contexts. The emotional-­moral lifeworld of a state neighborhood transforms temporally. Trans-governmental structures and practices of rule-making shape social-­ psychological habitus of international neighborhoods. The psycho-social life of a political neighborhood can be conceived as the multi-modal constellation of relationality in global, regional and dyadic locales. The temporal trans-governmentality of a neighborhood is co-extensively configured by affectivity and normativity. The affective-normative continuum of good and bad neighborhood episodes ranges between collaborative partnership and confrontational rivalry. The transnational affective-normative analytics of governance is also applicable to the world neighborhood as a whole. This brings us to the “puzzling conception of global neighborhood relationships” (Baxi 1996) ruled by international customary codes and trans-­cultural norms. Customary Codes and Trans-governmental Norms of Neighborhood in World Politics The “law of neighborhood” has been historically customized in domestic private and public spheres (Savaş 2014). As international relations have developed, some of these customary laws have been transmitted into the inter-state realm as well. Modern international rule-making structures have set some “standards for the conduct” of political relations among all neighboring nations. The United Nations (UN) has pioneered the making of international law on political neighborhood. The UN Charter (1945), in the preamble, has urged countries to “live together in peace with one another as good neighbors.” The Article 74 has taken “the general principle of good-neighborliness” as the normative basis governing international interactions and the world politics. Building on this historical breakthrough, the Joint Communiqué of Bandung Conference (1955) explicated social-psychological foundations of “good neighborliness” with these terms: “Free from mistrust and fear,

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and with confidence and good-will towards each other, nations should practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors and develop friendly cooperation.” This terminology has been later incorporated into various UN documents, which have been endorsed to codify “the principles of good-neighborliness” and catalog the verities of bad “un-neighborly conduct.” The international law of neighborhood has accumulated through historical progress in codification and cataloging (Sucharitkul 1996: 1–2, 15, 19). The UN General Assembly (GA) has ratified key resolutions to manage political relationships around the globe of neighborhood. Resolution 1236 was adopted in 1957. It reiterated the need for fostering “Peaceful and Neighborly Relations Among States.” It reminded that states are deemed equal “irrespective of their divergences or the relative stages and nature of their political, economic and social development.” States are notified to build “peaceful and tolerant relations … based on mutual respect and benefit, non-aggression, respect for each other’s sovereignty, equality and territorial integrity and nonintervention in one another’s internal affairs” (UNGA 1957). Resolution 1514 was adopted by unanimity in 1960. It called for total de-colonization all over the world (Sucharitkul 1996: 3). Resolution 2129 (1965) has endorsed “Actions on the Regional Level with a View to Improving Good Neighborly Relations Among European States Having Different Social and Political Systems.” It delegated responsibility to “all countries, great and small, to establish an atmosphere of co-operation and security throughout the world.” In this regard, it has requested from “the Governments of the European States to intensify their efforts to improve reciprocal relations, with a view to creating an atmosphere of confidence which will be conducive to an effective consideration of the problems which are still hampering the relaxation of tension in Europe and throughout the world” (UNGA 1965). Resolution 2625 was adopted as a declaration in 1970. It stipulated five fundamental principles of international law governing “Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States.” Every state is expected to perform the following political duties: (1) to refrain from the threat or use of force, (2) to settle international disputes by peaceful means, (3) not to intervene/ interfere in others’ domestic affairs, (4) “to co-operate with one another,” (5) “to respect the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” and (6) “to respect the principle of sovereign equality of states.” Resolution 3314 was adopted in 1974 to define acts of aggression, which

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involved the “sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries” (Sucharitkul 1996: 3–6, 11–12; UNGA 1970). By the end of the Cold War, the UN “Sub-Committee on Good-­ Neighborliness” has developed “the principle of anti-hegemony or anti-­ hegemonism” which aims to prevent “states of any acts seeking to establish zones of influence or domination.” In spite of the progress in codification, neighborhood relationships are governed by state practices that constitute customary norms and habitual rules. Over the codification process, the conceptual scope of neighborhood has expanded. Geographical proximity was no longer seen as the only range of neighborhood. Due to international interdependence, the political norms of good-neighborliness have extended far beyond the local borderlands and the frontier regions. As a result of the post–Cold War international integration, the world has gradually turned into a unified global neighborhood (Sucharitkul 1996: 7–10). The “Sofia Declaration on Good-Neighborly Relations, Stability, Security and Cooperation in the Balkans” was issued as an official document by the UNGA in 1996. In parallel to the international peacemaking efforts in the territories of former Yugoslavia, the regional countries of south-eastern Europe, involving  Turkey, have agreed to “enhance good neighborly relations including confidence and security building measures” among themselves and the larger international community. As reiterated by the Bulgarian Prime Minister Jean Videnov, the Sofia Declaration has demonstrated “the political will to open up new prospects to strengthen regional stability, security and cooperation along the lines of good-­ neighborliness” in the Balkans. He further asserted that “the new situation in Europe [has] freed of the spirit of confrontation and division,” which in turn created “even broader opportunities for the development of multilateral regional cooperation” and gave “rise to the hope that … [they were] not far from the day when each country in the region [would] see its neighbor first and foremost as a partner.” With this understanding, the Balkan countries set forth their political aspirations with such objectives as “development of economic cooperation through cross-border cooperation, upgrading transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructures, trade and investment promotion; development of humanitarian, social and cultural contacts; cooperation in the field of justice, the combating of organized crime, illicit drug and arms trafficking and the elimination of terrorism” (UNGA 1996). The political commitment of the south-east European countries to establish good neighborly relationships among the Balkan states has been an important local step that has contributed to the

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process of region-based law making in the post–Cold War era. Turkey actively participated  in international law making efforts that promoted norms of neighborhood in the Balkans. The UNGA adopted the resolution on “Development of Good-­ Neighborly Relations among Balkan States” in 1997, which helped to strengthen the normative basis of international peace building in the region. The resolution has emphasized “the urgency of the consolidation of the Balkans as a region of peace, security, stability and good neighborliness.” For this purpose, “the need for strict compliance with the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity or political independence, the inviolability of international borders and non-intervention” into domestic affairs was reaffirmed. At this point, “the relevant international organizations and competent bodies and organizations of the United Nations system” were urged “to continue to support and assist the ongoing process of development of good neighborly relations among the Balkan States” (UNGA 1997). In this context, the European Union (EU) has also sought to build normative order of “good neighborliness” and added a new political conditionality for membership accession. The EU neighborhood policy called for peaceful conflict resolution and friendly cooperation in international relations (Arıkan 2008). As neighborhood relationships have proved their instrumental efficiency in crisis management, the UN Security Council (SC) has become part of the international law making process. The historical stage was set by the crisis in Afghanistan. On 22 Dec. 2002, the “Kabul Declaration on GoodNeighborly Relations” has been signed by Afghanistan and its neighbors. With this declaration, the neighboring countries (including Iran) have displayed common “desire” for regional “peace and stability” and confirmed collective “commitment to constructive and supportive bilateral relationships based on the principles of territorial integrity, mutual respect, friendly relations, co-operation and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.” UNSC Resolution 1453 has called on “all states to respect the Declaration and to support the implementation of its provisions” (UNSC 2002a, b). The customary practical codification of neighborhood norms has also lingered over the crisis management in Iraq. At times of political need, the neighborhood diplomacy has been utilized as an instrumental mechanism for governing of the local emergency. However, it was no longer legal dynamics of law making but international politics that has stimulated the letter and spirit of complicated affective-normative relationships among

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state and non-state neighbors in the Middle East. The cross-border (non) governmental “networks” have shaped complex social-psychological “signs of compliance” to the “non-legal, informal rules” regulating the international politics of neighborhood (Whitehead 2006: 695–702) in the region. Initially, it was the Turkish government that envisioned to implement a regional diplomacy of neighborhood to prevent international military conflict looming over the horizon of Iraq. What began as a local process of conflict prevention in Jan. 2003 would later turn into a diplomatic tool for damage control. For various domestic and dyadic reasons, the regional neighbors of Iraq have committed themselves to the collective rule-making process achieved through consecutive inter-governmental meetings. The trans-governmental politics among Iraq’s neighbors has been deeply affected by “common fear” from cross-border instability arisen after the US-led invasion. The regional diplomacy of neighborhood was aimed to address sources of insecurity emanating from Iraq. The spillover impact of trans-boundary terrorism has been a collective concern for Iraq’s neighbors. Most of the neighboring governments have sought to manage their likely security losses in a regional environment of heightening uncertainty. In this regard, Ankara saw these meetings as a diplomatic venue to ease the geopolitical tension between Washington and Tehran and Damascus (Balci and Yesiltas 2006). Due to deteriorating security conditions in post-war Iraq, the United States has joined the neighborhood meetings as well. The international rule-making with Iraq’s “expanded neighbors” has helped the US administration to revise its policies and re-build much needed affective-normative “confidence” in the Middle East, and even offered Washington a social-psychological “opportunity to transcend America’s obsessive preoccupation with Iran and Syria” (Pollock 2007). To a great extent, the political expansion of neighbors’ diplomatic platform has been influential in providing international input and trans-­ governmental support for the UNSC decisions on Iraq. For example, Resolution 1511 (16 Oct. 2003) acknowledged that “the situation in Iraq” has continued “to constitute a threat to international peace and security.” It affirmed that “the terrorist bombings of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad on 19 August 2003 … and of the Embassy of Turkey on 14 October 2003” were “attacks on the people of Iraq, the United Nations, and the international community.” International assistance provided most proximately by “Iraq’s neighbours” would be “essential … for restoration of conditions of stability and security” and for

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“maintaining law, order, and … combating terrorism.” It was also requested from the regional-international neighbors that they should display political solidarity to observe immediate trans-governmental obligations and strengthen economic-financial cooperation “to help meet the needs of the Iraqi people by providing resources necessary for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Iraq” (UNSC 2003). Since then the international community, broadly defined, has garnered support to establish global networks of neighborhood assisting the Iraqi government. The core group of Iraq’s immediate neighbors has assumed a central role within trans-governmental networks of international assistance. Since the United States had pledged military withdrawal from Iraq, the regional support of contiguous neighbors has become much more important in 2008. In this regard, UNSC Resolution 1859 (22 Dec. 2008) has emphasized the importance of engagement with neighboring countries. Accordingly, the resolution has endorsed the recent “Expanded Neighbors’ ̇ Conferences held in Sharm El-Sheikh, I stanbul and Kuwait.” As a matter of fact, Iraq was “still in need of regional and international support” so that the Iraqi people continued to make progress “in their pursuit of peace, stability, security, democracy and prosperity.” The Iraqi government’s diplomatic letter to the UNSC, signed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on 7 Dec. 2008, has signaled a strong political “commitment to living in peace with its neighbors in a manner that contributes to the security and stability of the region.” With the help of international and regional supporters, “terrorist activities in and from Iraq” would be eliminated drastically. The conditions of security and stability would in turn “reassure donors and creditors” and allow Iraq to end international economic isolation caused by long years of sanctions (UNSC 2008). The case of Iraq has shown the significance of practical considerations in customary codification of neighborly interactions in international law making. At this point, we cannot talk of universalized laws of n ­ eighborhood. There are no peremptory norms, only selective normative implementations varying across historical cases. International organizations have established themselves as institutional sites of rule-making among neighbors (Chyzh 2017). Global and regional rules of neighborhood are registered somewhere between making of regressive fragmentation and progressive integration. Local security fences and regional defensive “fortresses” go hand in hand with enhanced economic engagement to build common (free and open) world market operating through collective cultures of (post)capitalism. This means that the normative dynamics of

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international neighborhood would most likely be encompassed by a combination of practical rules of “pluralism” and moral norms of “solidarism” (Bellamy 2004: 51). Overall, neighborhood norms would be shaped by trans-governmental configurations of global, regional and dyadic network relationships. Social-­ psychological structures and practices of international rule-making would guide affective-normative interactions among political neighbors. In some cases, state neighbors would be divided by strong physical fences, while in some others political boundaries would be blurred by transnational networks (Duany 2011: 227–233). Good physical fences, particularly the border fixity, may not guarantee safety among state neighbors. States’ social weaknesses and political failures might create enduring international conditions for regional conflict and local war around world political neighborhoods (Atzili 2012; Atzili 2006/07). Due to migration movements, management of trans-cultural relations would entail humanistic, liberationist and emancipatory theological visions and strong psycho-social commitment to change the feeling rules toward neighboring peoples. The solidarity of human neighborhood would overcome the risks of inter-/intra-faith confrontations. International management of hearts would ultimately define political fate of neighbors between goodness and badness (Heyer 2010). In some sense, world neighborhoods might also be conceived within “transnational geographies of the heart” (Walsh 2018). The inter-communal and trans-cultural spaces, that are “emotional geographies” (Davidson et al. 2016; Davidson and Milligan 2004; Anderson and Smith 2001), and “affective atmospheres” (Michels 2015) of human neighborhood would be engulfed by an ambivalent normativity swinging between “a series of opposites—presence and absence, materiality and ideality, definite and indefinite” (Anderson 2009). That is to say, “affective communities” (Hutchison 2016) of the global neighborhood would implicate essential psycho-social contradictions “torn between inclusive emotions and passions such as the ones related to empathy, solidarity, respect for others and peace, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, exclusionary emotions and passions such as those connected to discrimination and conflict” (Coicaud 2016: 404). The puzzling affective-­ normative climate of global affairs would leave a conditioning impact on regional and dyadic neighborhood relationships. The social psychology of a political neighborhood is an empirical question, which could be revealed by looking at particular relational cases through observation of historical-­ historiographical data.

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Empirical Basis of Research: Historical Surveys and Historiographical Accounts Historical surveys and historiographical accounts on Turkish-Iranian relations help to capture complex dyadic dynamics of social communication and psychological interaction constituted by emotional norms of neighborhood. The case in point is the thick descriptive application of conceptual categories to historicize mixed social characteristics and ambivalent psychological trajectory of the Turkish-Iranian relations. Examples include liminal conceptualizations such as “essential friends and natural enemies” (Çetinsaya 2003), “friendly competitors and fierce rivals” (Ayman 2014) and “not quite enemies but less than friends” (Akbarzadeh and Barry 2017) or “the best of frenemies” (Tahiroğlu and Ben Taleblu 2015). Basically, these exemplars mark “uneasy” and “complicated” nature of interactions between two historical neighbors (Özcan and Özdamar 2010). The complex character of Turkish-Iranian exchanges “resists” to conceptual oversimplification (Stein and Bleek 2012) and cursory categorical identification (Hentov 2012). Therefore, this book aims to reassess historical puzzles of rule-making in Turkey-Iran neighborhood relations by reintroducing social-psychological evidence from historiographical data. With this aim, it also makes a “novel” contribution to the comparative studies on history-historiography of Turkey-Iran political interactions, which still call for “new” research frameworks (Hazır 2015). The psycho-­ social/cultural components, emotional dimensions and affective dynamics of Turkey’s foreign relations have not been thoroughly investigated. At this early stage, there are some initial interventions into the subject matter (see for example Zarakol 2011; Sasley 2014; Saltzman 2015; Özlük 2016). Social-psychological reexamination of historical-historiographical material exposes how rules of (dis)engagement have been made possible through core emotional-discursive codifications and combinations of affective arrangements in Turkish-Iranian contextual constellations. These studies also provide empirical evidence to reiterate local rule of affective-­ normative structures reigning in Ankara-Tehran relations. By looking at these scholarly treatments, we can dissect textual-contextual data particularly associated with conceptualization of emotional-moral interactions between Turkey and Iran.

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Methodological Design: Inquiring of Emotionalities in Textual-Contextual Data The constructivist historical sociology (Reus-Smit 2002; Barnett 2002; Barnett 1998) provides a solid meta-theoretical (ontological-­epistemological) ground to inquire ideational (emotional-moral) implications in the realm of world politics. The historical methodology is a viable tool to trace transformation of emotional norms in international neighborhood relations. Good and bad neighborhood behaviors emerge in sequences of international interactions and mold a normative history of relational “conventions” co-configured by egoistic-strategic (material) desires and altruistic-“deontological” (moral) concerns. The historical-­historiographical case studies on normative structures and practices help to measure continuity and change in the relational quality of inter-state neighborhood (Goertz and Diehl 1992). The regional complexes of neighborhood are configured by political cultures of amity and enmity in local interactions (Kelly 2007). Dyadic neighborhood relations display complex historical patterns (Rasler and Thompson 2000), swinging between psycho-social rivalry and/or partnership. The dyadic relationships between political neighbors are transformed through trans-governmental structures and practices. Inter-cultural configurations of affective dispositions and constellations of emotional commitments are found as constitutive psycho-social variables to qualitatively measure historical transformation of neighborhood norms in political texts and international contexts. States construct their neighbors and fences as either good or bad. Neighborhood relationship reflects a political-­ public imagination constructed mutually by social-psychological network structures and communally shared affective-normative practices. Even though the geographical-cartographical representations of their ­neighborhood relationship remain same, neighboring states view themselves and their interactions quite distinctively. States conceive their neighbors historically, which could be portrayed as a threat or a savior, a friend or an enemy. Even the American-Canadian political relationship has been constructed through “liminal” makings of good and/or bad fences in the neighborhood (Baker 2010; Ronner and O’Connor 2001). Turning to Turkey’s case, Ankara’s historical interactions with Moscow (Coş and Bilgin 2010) and Damascus (Hinnebusch and Tür 2013) display ambiguous affective-normative imaginations of psycho-social relationships among neighboring states.

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The international history tells us that state neighbors imagine their relationships in ambivalent patterns. Shifting “emotional-moral motivations” shape complex affective-normative dynamics of political-behavioral exchange among historical neighbors (Brodersen 2018). In many ways, qualitative (historical-historiographical) foreign policy analyses, directed toward particular neighborhood relationships, help to foreground psycho-­ social theories of relationality in mutual making of inter-agency and inter-­ action. The “grounded theory” approach builds on international history to develop conceptually informed and empirically sound arguments within the school of international relations. The “actor-specific” methodological approaches grounded on particular psycho-cultural relationships offer promising avenues to bridge the paradigmatic divides between theoretical-­ historical domains, global and local levels, micro-agential and macro-­ structural factors (Hudson 2005). The mining of historical-historiographical data has been an established approach in psycho-social studies. In this regard, the psy-disciplines have utilized various strands of inter-textual research methodologies to observe discursive-contextual implications of emotions (Edwards 1999; Lawler and Thye 1999; Weigand 2004; Coupland et al. 2008; Rice 2008; Riad et al. 2012; McAvoy 2015; Wetherell 2015; Godbold 2015). Following these approaches, this book adopts inter-textual thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006) as a methodological framework. The book focuses on the analyses of main “emotional themes” (Cupchik 2016) emerging in historical surveys and historiographical accounts and investigates phenomenal-­ contextual implications of “core affects” (Barrett 2009) that shape episodic transformation of Turkey-Iran neighborly relations. Over the recent years, the emotion research in social sciences and world politics has accumulated a massive body of methodological literature (Clément and Sangar 2018; Ariffin et  al. 2016; Flam and Kleres 2015; Parkinson and Manstead 2015). As matter of fact, a comprehensive treatment of this vast literature is beyond the scope of this book. For this reason, I act along the principle of parsimony and provide a synoptic review highlighting main methodological viewpoints pursued during the production of this book. Several significant book-length studies have enabled me to conceive and complete this challenging task. By and large, these works are aligned with the traditional school of history within the interdisciplinary realm of social psychology. To begin with, this research tradition aims to reinterpret the international diplomatic “history,” as well as neighborhood politics, “through a social-psychological lens” (Volkan and Itzkowitz

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1994: 1; Volkan 2014). Here, the “history comes in” as a methodology to trace international dynamics of “emotion and change” in world politics (Stearns 2016). The traditional school of “historical psychology” or “emotionology” (Stearns and Stearns 1985) still provides important insights for empirical explorations in international studies (Fierke 2015; Pupavac 2004). Due to “the variety of empirical situations,” emotions history has not generated “grand theories” for the researchers of this disciplinary field. “Emotions historians” focus on complex political-cultural dynamics of change to portray more holistic picture of historical reality. “Emotional rules clearly vary from one society to the next and change over time. The changes normally leave clear records” of alteration in actual affective experiences. “But obviously, historically, even in the present, evidence of ‘real’ emotion is the hardest element to identify reliably.” For this reason, there is an analytical need to “linking emotions history to larger social processes” and to larger consequential changes in cultural-normative structures, political milieu and intellectual environment. As a comprehensive approach, the historical work on emotions seeks to uncover transformative rules of feeling that govern social-psychological spaces over time. Historical inquiry into emotional logics of world politics and international relations requires “concerted research” rather than offering hypothetical frameworks. “Emotional cultures” create contingent impact on domestic politics and hence influence historical trajectory of international diplomacy. Rule by “fear” has traditional roots and modern political applications. Management of “grief” and controlled mobilization of “anxiety” and “anger” have been instrumental in formulating public policies. “Emotional formulas” of governance shift in conjunction with political modes of rule-­ making and shape the affective-normative contexts of international interactions. Thus, the research areas of emotions history need to be extended “particularly in terms of regional coverage.” Additional steps should be taken to broaden comparative case-based historical analyses (Stearns 2016). It remains true that the range of topics, settings, and approach applied to the history of emotions is considerable, which the importance of the topic both explains and justifies. But there are many time periods, specific emotions [and their episodic timetables], and emotional connections [and their particular contextual configurations] that have yet to be explored, quite apart from the huge imperative to widen the geographic base of this historical specialty. (Stearns 2016: 56)

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The psycho-social approach to the history of emotions has been broadly utilized by scholars of world politics. Several methods are combined to observe the “messy” and “intangible” neuro-social realm of emotions. These mixed methods flexibly combine historical sociology-psychology and ethnomethodology to trace discursive-contextual implications of affective-normative processes and incorporate historiographical-­ethnographical evidence to make sense of emotional-moral commitments in various political neighborhoods. The research is directed toward collecting “discursive and behavioral evidence of emotion” during critical moments. The evidential aim is “to assemble an empirical record of traces … left behind” and beneath social-psychological interactions in world politics. The “cross-referencing” of textual data with contextual evidence is used as a viable framework to deconstruct underlying affective-­ normative “currents” and “circulations” that habituate the “emotional worlds” of international actors over time and space. This mixed research framework allows to move “back and forth across three kinds of social phenomena: collective actions or practices with emotional significance,” the emotional expressions of political elites “that often surround those activities” and the broader narratives on conceptual making of emotions in public sphere (Ross 2014: 60–65). The neighborhoods are salient formations of international society, which have been historically shaped by deeply embedded systemic structures of social stratification and psychological stigmatization. International status hierarchies have created lingering implications for core-periphery, North-South and East-West relations. The international social system rests on a collective ground of normativity. All states, either “the established” ones or the strange “out-siders” of the international system, are bounded by a shared political framework and common trans-cultural habitus. To a great extent, domestic structures of modern nation-states are homologous. States are equally driven by status motivations. They are similarly ruled by politics of nationalism and modernization. Their political “obsession with development” is paramount. Political societies coalesce around popular feelings such as fear, anger, desire, honor and hope. The complex amalgamation of these emotions shapes political interactions. The inter-­ state relationships change across time and space. These relational configurations could be better grasped by making historical comparisons of episodes within a single monadic case or by selecting multiple cases for comparative-historical analyses. The “comparative history” perspective provides an angle to view the world through layers of temporal, spatial and contextual reality. This broad “approach is neither purely inductive nor

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purely deductive, but should rather be thought of as layered, moving back and forth between various levels of abstraction, inference, and observability” (Zarakol 2011: 12–26). In this regard, the emotion research can be directed toward the three layers of international affairs. (1) In the first layer, we can examine the political society as an affective-normative system shaped by emotional-­ moral values. (2) At the second layer, we can explore implications of political emotions for “inter- and intra-state relations.” (3) The third layer would help us to unpack “the nexus of time” and space and the international making of emotions in world politics. The three-layered research scheme rests on a number of analytical assumptions. First and foremost, international relations constitute “an emotional system” regulated by social norms and psychological rules. Second, the systemic actors, the nation-states, are ruled by “emotional regimes” from within and without. Third, international politics and diplomatic practices are governed through management of hearts. Fourth, political-diplomatic emotions create relational cultures at global, regional and dyadic levels of trans-state interactions. Fifth, changes in emotional cultures of political neighborhoods co-configure temporal-spatial transformations in the international system (Coicaud 2016: 399–403). By foregrounding these analytical assumptions, we can take some methodological steps and develop an empirical design for researching of emotionalities in textual-contextual data. The first step would be to inquire relational emotions emerging out of the interactions between nation-state actors. Inter-state feelings change over time and space. Intra-state emotions may “differ” depending on domestic politics of rule-making. Political processes of nation-state formation and modernization (civilization, Westernization, democratization, liberalization and the other concomitants) create critical implications for the making of affective-normative relationships in contemporary world system. The second step would look at the political “nature of the relationship.” Emotional rules differ among friends and foes and allies and enemies. Diverse political status-power considerations set the affective stage of international diplomacy. The third step is to analyze trans-state “emotional regimes” governing the dynamics of international interactions (Coicaud 2016: 401). At this point, domestic-dyadic and regional-global dimensions of emotional entanglements and affective arrangements should be assessed accordingly. Overall, this is a management process configured by national governments. State representatives and government officials speak from

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and to the heart. Political rulers feel the world for the state. They express their worldly emotions in the name of the state. States rule through generation of “emotion cultures” (Koschut 2017b). Trans-governmental relationships are managed through “emotion norms” (Koschut 2014). States’ affective-normative practices of relational management produce “behavioral” and contextual consequences (Eznack 2013; Eznack 2011). The critical and in-depth analyses of “emotional episodes” in dyadic relationships help to broaden empirical applications of comparative case research in world politics (Eznack 2012). The psycho-social dynamics of “emotion management” could be better revealed through long durée “process” tracing (Linklater 2014). The fourth step would determine the episodic context of the political relationship. Diplomatic emotions are built selectively, altering at times of peace or war. Identification of interactive-contextual linkages is fundamental for understanding the temporal (past-present-future) cycle and historical life of emotions in international politics. Interdisciplinary conceptual insights from sociology, psychology, political theory and moral philosophy would assist “context-sensitive analyses” on the international history of relational emotions (Coicaud 2016: 400–405). As a hybrid field of research, social psychology provides a holistic angle for pooling, mining and distilling of emotional data in international relations. Social psychology better helps tracing of affective traits in politics and diplomacy. The historical analyses of international emotions bring to fore social-psychological management of political-public relationships. It is right here where we can most vividly grasp the conceptual intersections between social psychology of emotional management (Hochschild 1983/2012) and political rule-making (Onuf 1989). Affective and normative makings of the world imply one another. In some quite interesting ways, both “feign” emotional displays (“surface acting”) and sincere “emotional states (‘deep acting’)” shape affective-normative governance of relational politics in world affairs (Hall 2012: 382, 400). Politicians and diplomats also operate in an affective-normative environment of relational rule-making. As one might expect, the professional regimes of feeling in politics and the rules of engagement established by “emotional cultures” (Lois 2001) in official and private diplomacy (see Hochschild 1969) would be “much more extensive and intensive.” Management of hearts through “deep and surface acting” gets more complicated due to multi-dimensional relational linkages between domestic politics and international diplomacy. Political choices of means and ends

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inevitably “include emotions.” Political actions are always taken in a complex social-psychological atmosphere involving “emotional” risks, opportunities, costs and benefits. Therefore, state leaders are often caught up in emotional strategic dilemmas in their domestic engagements and international interactions. The “emotional dynamics” of “unsolvable” strategic dilemmas are difficult to “model” in formal games. Yet, understanding of emotional strategic dilemmas is key to gain critical, and perhaps counter-­ intuitive, insights for the deeper historical analyses of international relationships. To give a striking example, “the Band of Brothers Dilemma” foresees that “emotional attachments” to the “immediate comrades” would be much stronger than the affective investments saved for the distant team members. Emotional making of international roles and rules might also be re-configured through the strategic lens provided by “the Home-Turf Dilemma.” Political “protection” of house-to-house relations with the geographic neighbors and the management “institutional” interactions with “familiar” friends create a perennial puzzle. The policy paradoxes associated with the “emotional work” get even more complicated under the pressure of time. The social-psychological need to harmonize shortand long-term “emotional goals” reinforces the strategic dilemma asking either “Today or Tomorrow?” (Jasper 2016: 65–70). We should remind ourselves that historical dynamics of affective politics have not changed significantly. Still emotions are generated and managed psycho-socially for political purposes such as communication, persuasion, mobilization and manipulation. “If we are to understand the political actions undertaken, we need to understand the emotions that guide, accompany, and result from them.” That is to say, the historical analysts should pay more attention to the fact that emotions emerge in sequences and combinations (Jasper 2016: 75–78). The historical inquiry of emotionalities (emotional discourses) and affectivities (affective contexts) in textual-phenomenal data provides a practical mode of research for the relational analyses of contemporary international puzzles ranging broadly between peaceful cooperation and violent conflict witnessed across various neighborhoods of world politics. Emotional processes determine “the boundary conditions” of social-­ psychological relations in political neighborhoods. The “emotional phenomena … encapsulate the core beliefs and appraisals of societies … together with the core political motivations that are implied by these appraisals.” Within the realm of politics, core social-psychological beliefs and affects are mutually intended and collectively constituted. Each

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affective-­normative belief “reflects a core appraisal theme” within clusters of positive-negative emotions dominating the general political atmosphere. Configurations of “emotional goals” build the relational narratives and themes within which political actions are shaped. Constellations of positive-negative emotions create political “action tendencies.” More often than not, hard-line and right-wing aggressive inclinations are associated with fear, anger, hate and harm; while soft-line and left-wing pacific proclivities are accompanied by hope, trust, love and respect. The “emotional climate” shapes both bottom-up and top-down political relationships. Under social-psychological conditions of a particular context, “emotional orientations” mold in “multi-faceted” manners and “play a pivotal role in producing the screenplay of events and orchestrating the behavior of all involved individuals and groups … Emotional experiences and their behavioral and political consequences should be understood and analyzed as by-products of that unique context.” The general affective-­ normative markers of a particular political context “can be found in public discourses, mass media, cultural products, ... and so on.” Emotional histories reveal discursive-contextual making of international phenomena in quite puzzling ways (Halperin 2016: 1–15). However, the emotions historians might get more confused due to analytical challenges of definition and conceptualization. Talking about sentimental phenomena (emotional words, expressions, experiences and behaviors) is indeed a complicated task. Conceptual categorizations help to elaborate relevant points of departure for researchers of emotion in international history. Emotions could be grasped by looking at their political functioning through two constitutive components. Interpretational part of political conducts is performed by affective appraisals. Motivational aspect of affective process “actually” fulfills the political practice. Each discrete emotion is endowed with multiple intentionality and “pluripotentiality.” For example, a common fear from a threatening third party might motivate a tendency for collective safety. Yet, the potential of fear might also drive intentions toward joint defection (flight) and/or mutual aggression (fight). Complex contextual configurations of affective intentions and action tendencies co-extensively “determine the political implications of discrete emotions in the public sphere.” To understand affective implications in the international realm, researchers had better focus on “emotional stories” shaping the context of relational interactions (Halperin 2016: 16–25).

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Along these scholarly lines, this book attempts to reconstruct the trans-­cultural “emotional scripts” (Russell 1991: 442–445) and “embedded” customary codes (Thomas 2001) of psycho-social rule-making (Branco and Izzo 2017; Ellerbrock and Kesper-Biermann 2015; Maroney 2011) in Turkey-Iran neighborhood relationship. By relying on historical-­ historiographical sources, this study collects discursive-contextual evidences of “emotionalities” (Denzin 1983; Ahmed 2004; Leep 2010) through cross-referential and critical analyses of inter-textual data. By adopting this methodology, the author traces constellations of “emotional configurations” (Baele et al. 2016), which primarily include “emotional episodes” (Kuppens et al. 2009), “emotional climates” (De Rivera et al. 2007), “emotion cultures” (Koschut 2017b), “emotional beliefs” (Mercer 2010), “emotion norms” (Koschut 2014), “emotional commitments” (Saurette 2006), “affective values, and emotional actions” (Roach 2016). The analysis focuses on structuration of affective-normative exchange between contiguous states to reveal “the role of emotions in cultural evolution of norms” (Nichols 2002) among international neighbors. By reworking on these key notions, this book explores long-term psycho-­social transformation of neighborhood in international interactions. Conceptually, this monograph reveals the affective-normative nexus in international neighborhood relations. In this sense, it presents a novel argument for emotion researchers in world politics. Complex constellations of emotional structures and practices shape social-psychological dynamics of rule-making among political neighbors. This conceptual innovation is an advancement for historical studies on international ­politics of neighborhood and by extension for comparative analyses on Turkey-­ Iran relations. Social Psychology of Turkey-Iran Relations: Complex Rule-Making Between Historical Neighbors Historians hint puzzling points for foregrounding empirical entry into theoretically informed inquiry. These empirical puzzles can be resolved by gaining and refining conceptual insights from social and psychological strands of constructivist international relations. As social theory suggests, friendship and enmity are shaped through dyadic interaction between the self and the other. Identity and role conceptions determine the social structure between the ego and the alter. Structural cultures emerge out of social interactions. Since states are social actors, they operate within three sys-

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temic cultural conditions: cultures of Hobbesian enmity, Lockean rivalry or partnership, and Kantian friendship. Perceptions of others change depending on social makings of international relations. In Hobbesian setting, egoistic senses of insecurity and self-help shape social psychology of world politics. Inevitably, others are put in “distant” and “enemy” positions. Feelings of fear and anxiety rule the war-like state of nature over the globe. In Kantian social climate, altruism governs inter-­state relations. Collective security is the international norm. Others are treated as both “close” and “friends” under rules of love, empathy and respect. Constituting a relatively “neutral” middle ground, the Lockean environment constructs social space between two dichotomous political cultures of enmity and amity. The contemporary Westphalian world order has been established by international politics of modernization, managed as a multi-layered process under predominant rules of state nationalism and systemic capitalism. Over the long transformation of modern inter-­state relations, both distant enemies and close friends have learned to interact as social partners and cultural “rivals” on the international space. Trans-cultural passions like jealousy and anger drive rivalry and confrontation, which go hand in hand with common economic desires for partnership and collaboration. Self-restraint helps to manage distrust in world politics, creating environment of pluralistic security cultures at regional and dyadic levels. Conceived as a global habitus of international interaction, the Lockean milieu is a heteronomous constellation, comprised of both regressive (enmity, conflict, war) elements and progressive (amity, friendship, peace) aspects (Wendt 1999). The “social theory of international politics” provides important points of entry for understanding systemic dimension of relational rule-making among neighboring states. Succinctly put, international neighborhood is “what states make of it.” The contemporary state neighborhood implies a heteronomous psycho-social structure and mixed affective-normative practices. Turkey’s making of international neighborhood is not exception to the rule. The historical transformation of global hegemony, particularly from the British colonial rule to the American imperial order in 1929–1947 period, has created certain regional ramifications for Turkey’s interactions with its neighbors (Barlas and Yilmaz 2016). The unfolding game of great power politics, and the global inter-play dominated historically by Britain, Germany, Italy, France, Soviet Union and the United States, has manifested the impact of third parties on Turkey’s international conduct in the Middle Eastern neighborhood (Aydin 2000; Özcan 2004.). On the other hand, it was the dyadic dynamics that determined psycho-social contours

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of Turkey’s local politics toward next-door neighbors. Turkey’s affective-­ normative relationships with immediate neighbors, for example, Syria and Russia, have been historically molded between rules of “enmity and amity” (Hinnebusch and Tür 2013), and “suspicion” and trust (Özcan et al. 2017). The structures and practices in Turkey’s neighborhood policy reveal two historical modes of social-psychological exchange. The hard-line realpolitik tradition defines relations with neighbors in terms of self-interests and status quo orientations. The realistic-egoistic mode pushes for confrontational right-wing policies such as power-threat balancing particularly in the security realm. The soft-line idealpolitik convention upholds neighborhood norms as emotional-moral values of relational solidarity and regional integration. The idealistic-altruistic approach envisions left-­ leaning rules of collaborative engagement specifically in economic and cultural spheres. In terms of historical inter-action tendencies, the Turkish diplomacy of neighborhood oscillates contingently between hard (realistic) and soft (idealistic) lines (Askerov 2017), globalist and nationalist world views (Öniş 2007), authoritarian-conservative and democratic-­ reformist political positions (Kaliber 2005). More often than not, scholars of Turkish foreign policy assume that domestic identity groups compete over ideological interpretation of state-­ to-­state social interactions at both dyadic and regional levels. Extending on this assumption, empirical propositions are developed. For example, it is presumed that main ideological groups of Turkey’s domestic politics saw Iran as a “rival” and hence took a social stance of “cold-shouldering” toward their historical other (Kösebalaban 2011: 16–19). I argue that this presumption fails to represent significant episodes of partnership in TurkeyIran dyadic interactions and misses to account for important dynamics shaping the long-standing social-economic collaboration between Ankara and Tehran. Despite cultural confrontation, Turkish-­Iranian collaborative exchange relations displayed mythical longevity (Çağaptay and Yeğenoğlu 2006). Theories of social psychology help to understand these dyadic peculiarities. Taking theoretical views from social psychology, I concur with the notion of “neutral” (Kösebalaban 2011: 19) social space existing between these two neighbors. At the conceptual level, neighbor is a neutral social category. In practice, however, some neighbors get close, while others remain distant, depending on social-psychological context. Put in other words, identity and role theory could not adequately address some key questions regarding the context, process and outcome of interactions

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between neighboring social actors. It might offer only limited help to understand social and psychological dynamics of neighborly relations. In this regard, social theory of emotional exchange (Lawler and Thye 1999) opens up new avenues for researchers conducting inquiry on international (dyadic-regional) neighborhood interactions. With this theoretical perspective, we can better conceptualize affective-normative making of contiguous exchange relations within the realm of social psychology. Neighborhood is a distinctive conceptual category. It is pertinent for relations among social actors. The social-psychological implications of neighborhood for peoples and states cannot be regarded as exactly alike. In general, people usually feel free to leave from and move into neighborhoods. Simply put, people may somehow choose their immediate neighbors. At least, people usually check normative structures in available neighborhoods and prefer cultural conditions of affective security before moving into a house. States are geographically and politically constrained. To a great extent, states do not have such kinds of options regarding the choice of their contiguous neighbors. But both peoples and states have the wherewithal to change affective-normative practices (feeling rules) and transform social structure (psychological rule) in their neighborhoods. For this reason, neighborhood relations among categories of social actors can be conceived in quite similar ways. In this study, I propose to review neighborhood as heteronomous regime of communal ruling co-constituted by rules of emotional-moral commitment and contextual rule of affective-­ normative interaction. In actual cases of psycho-social interaction, cost-benefit and loss-gain considerations inform political making of neighborhood relations. Complex rules of collaboration and confrontation constitute heteronomous rule of neighborhood. Both “essential” cluster of positive feelings like love and amity and “natural” nest of negative emotions such as anger and enmity are entangled in narratives of partnership and rivalry. These affective arrangements are reflected in myths and metaphors of historical neighborhood and reproduced in international affairs. Narratives of Neighborhood: Revisiting Myths and Metaphors in Turkish-Iranian Affairs Major contours of the relations between Turkey and Iran have been analyzed by historical studies. These analyses mainly tell us that Turkey-Iran relations have been reigned by geopolitical conventions. As they reiterate,

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Anatolia and Persia have been governed by two different (to a certain extent Turanian and Iranian) centers of power since the medieval times. Over the course of medieval history, socio-linguistic and cultural interactions have paved the way for the development of common political heritage among Turkish and Persian peoples, which culminated in the trans-civilizational experience of the Seljuk rule in around eleventh and thirteenth centuries. The cross-civilizational Anatolian-Persian neighborhood has created a vast relational space for cultural interactions among Turkish and Farsi populations. Through historical processes of cultural exchange, the two neighboring peoples have influenced each other socially and psychologically. The interactive habitus of neighborhood has been quite influential in shaping the historical psychology of Turkish-Farsi relationship. The mutual mimicking of neighborhood habits has led to emergence of mirroring cultures on both sides. Through emotional exchange and affective transactions, both communities have learned how mirroring psychologies shape their social selves in relational space of neighborhood (Doğan 1996). In spite, dynastic and sectarian (Sunni-Shii/Alevi) aspirations shaped the historical trajectory of imperial competition over contiguous territories from the Caspian basin extending toward Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia and to the south toward the Gulf of Hormuz and the east coast of the Mediterranean basin and the Gulf of Aqaba. Competing territorial and sectarian ambitions lingered in the coming centuries, which shaped conflictual ruling practices in geopolitical interactions between Ottoman (Sunni) Sultans of Anatolia and Safavid-Qajar (Shii) Shahs of Persia. The Sunni and Shii theological interpretations of Islam differ, notwithstanding the collective Muslim belief in the divinity of religion that has been purely ordained by the God. The original sources of Islam are the Holy Qur’an, the Hadith (Sayings of the Prophet) and the Sunnah (the conduct of the Prophet). All communities (Muslims, Christians, Jews and even non-believers) are endowed with the natural human rights to pursue good life within the worldly social realm of Islam. Differences in theological interpretations (ijtihad) of original sources have led to the emergence of sects within Islamic communities (Tadjbakhsh 2010). As it is the case in Judaism and Christianity, the religion of Islam preaches peaceful neighborhood relations. Despite theological differences of sects, the original sources of Islam command “good relations” particularly among nearby neighbors (Çelik 2014). The social rights of immediate neighbors are only seconded to family members and close relatives

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(Türkmen 2016). However, when religious interpretations have entered into the secular space, they become part of political theologies. Sacred and secular realms have been inter-twined within the politics of Islam. Historical transformation of good and bad neighborhood relationships among Muslim communities has left lingering implications for international structures and practices. One such moment came in 1514 when Ottoman Sultan Yavuz Selim defeated Safavid Shah Ismail in the battle of Çaldıran. The psycho-social history of 1514 has become part of myth making and shaped the collective memory of neighborhood relationship (Genç 2011; Bilge 2010; Doğan 1996: 25–30, 106–111, 137–143; Mackey 1998: 81–85). The dynastic rivalry between Yavuz Selim and Shah Ismail has been historicized as a mythic emotional story. These chronicles have affectively politicized sectarian divisions between Sunni Ottomans and Shii Safavids. The psychological struggle, emotional propaganda and affective politics have shaped sectarian historiography and conditioned relational history of Ottomans and Safavids (Arslantaş 2013: 91–102; Küpeli 2010: 18). Notwithstanding deep-seated politics of sectarianism and regional rivalry for influence, Ottoman and Safavid empires sustained bilateral trade exchanges. In some ways, both sides “learned to fight and trade simultaneously.” However, geopolitical “differences prevented both empires from rising above mutual mistrust” (Ünver 2016: 133). The dyadic distrust has waxed and waned at times of war and peace. The Ottoman Sunni sense of betrayal has been affectively conditioned by Shii political theology of the “Safavid state,” referred originally as “Kızılbaş-ı bed-ma’âş” or “Kızılbaş-ı fidne-faş” (Eravcı 2010: 255). For example, Safavid Shah Abbas has reinforced the Shii political theology of ruling through affective cultural rules that was more aggressive toward co-religionist Sunnis rather than believers of other faiths, including Jewish subjects and even Christian foreigners (Aydoğmuşoğlu 2011; Mackey 1998: 88–90, 99). Modern authors of the Turkish history textbooks, included in national curricula of secondary schools, have helped to reproduce “otherization” of Safavids (and imperial Iran) through emotional narratives and affective writing practices. While soft-line authors have promoted positive spirit and displayed “pro-peace” writing orientations, hard-line historiography stuck to war-prone negative psyche. More often than not, the imperial myth of 1514 served to sustain sectarian psychology and nationalist ideology. Changing emotionalization of Çaldıran narratives has informed affective arrangement of sectarianisms and nationalisms even in post-imperial Turkey and Iran (Alaca 2015; Çelik and Çelik 2015; Doğan 1996).

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As a matter of fact, the imperial relations between Ottomans and Safavids have molded into cycling periods of war and peace. After the 1555 Amasya accord, peaceful climate prevailed until 1577. The 1639 Kasr-ı Şirin agreement has assured a longer era of peace until 1722 (Eravcı 2010). Then, intermittent wars have occurred during 1723–1746 and 1776–1779/80 periods. Azerbaijan and Iraq have been main imperial battlegrounds of dyadic struggle for regional hegemony. Turkish-Persian imperial rivalry has deepened in the Ottoman-Qajar era (1796–1918), which was marked by more aggressive colonial penetration of “great powers” into the Middle East and East Asia. The Turkish-Persian imperial frontiers, stretching from the Ağrı Mountain to the Shatt-al Arab, have remained disputed until the beginning of world war (1914), notwitḣ standing agreements of Erzurum (1843) and Istanbul (1869), let alone the doomed 1913 border protocol (Çetinsaya 2006a: 29–31, 37). The contemporary waves of state centralization, coupled with territorial struggles for regional hegemony, have re-configured structures and practices of “b/ordering” in the Ottoman-Iranian political neighborhood (Ateş 2013: 1–25). In this period, the “Eastern Question” has been invented as the “great game” of international politics primarily by Britain and Russia, and to a lesser extent by France, Germany and Italy. These so-called great powers manipulated and prevailed over the “rules of the Eastern Question game” in various geopolitical ways. The Middle Eastern regional game was ruled by the “distinctive diplomatic culture” of realism. Under the rule of political realism, regional actors could not easily break “their commitments” and opt out of the vicious systemic cycle. Even though the game proved to expose counter-productive consequences, regional countries had no way out. They had to play the “dangerous game” of international politics with “old rules” based on political logic of power and interest. This logic persisted to dominate Middle Eastern affairs in the inter-war (1919–1945) period and the Cold War (1946–1989) era. Pursuit of geopolitical interests and balancing of power and/or threat have endured to determine persistent parameters of international relations in the Middle East (Brown 1984: 197–277; Walt 1987; Hansen 2000). As the saying goes “good fences make good neighbors.” The commonsensical understanding tells us that normative structure of neighborhood (rule of neighborhood) and normative quality of neighbors (and their practical pursuit of neighborhood rules) are mutually constitutive. Valence-­ based affective-normative rules of dyadic interaction are embedded in and shaped by regional rule of neighborhood. This book particularly, but not

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exclusively, focuses on how the Turkish side conceived and constituted (presumably) “good fences” with their Iranian neighbors. Keeping this fact in mind, it becomes quite useful to get a deeper sense about the Turkish meaning making practices that reveal popular framing of neighborhood with the Iranian people. Popular narratives often presume culture of peace in Turkey-Iran historical relations. This has been “a common belief in Turkish public opinion,” notwithstanding the fact that “the two countries have engaged in armed conflicts many times” since the signing of Kasr-ı Şirin (Qasr-e Shirin) agreement in 1639. Even though serious bilateral border clashes occurred over the last three centuries, Kasr-ı Şirin is used as a metaphorical device. This popular representation helps to certify natural character of common boundaries and relatively unchanging dynamics of dyadic-­ regional status quo ruling over the “uneasy” neighborhood (Özcan and Özdamar 2010: 103). This popular story is coined as the “Kasr-ı Şirin myth” (Çağaptay and Yeğenoğlu 2006). This narrative gained public resonance and has shaped diplomatic perceptions in Turkey. Kasr-ı Şirin myth is commonly invoked in various public-diplomatic occasions. Some foregone conclusions are drawn regarding the story of long bilateral peace between these two neighbors. This storyline takes for granted the fact that Turks and Persians have not made dyadic war for more than 300 years. Since the sealing of Kasr-ı Şirin in 1639, both sides terminated hostilities. They did not instigate overt and direct conflict toward each other. Incidence of open warfare has not been witnessed. The common borders of neighborhood have not changed. Good neighborly relations remained as if intact. Especially the Turkish side likes to deploy primordial Kasr-ı Şirin frame to emphasize longevity of rule and durability of rules naturalized in Ankara-Tehran regional relations. Political narratives often start from the “primeval nature of neighborhood” in Turkey-Iran relationship. The primordialist frames also intrude into the foreign policy discourse and guide strategic deliberations in Turkey. Most prominently, government officials refer to the “law of primeval neighborhood” (kadim komşuluk hukuku) naturally governing the Turkish-Iranian relationship. The former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, the author of “strategic depth” doctrine and the founder of “zero-problems-with-neighbors” approach, views Turkey-Iran interactions from a primeval perspective. As he reifies, Kasr-ı Şirin even dates earlier than the formation of the United States (1774) and the German unification (1871) (Baytar and Erginyürek 2016: 70).

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The Kasr-ı Şirin narrative assumes that there exist old fences of neighborhood. Turks and Persians have well-established customary rules and natural norms to govern their interactions. The long-standing and relatively peaceful character of relations with Iran has been perceived by Turkey as the strength of neighborhood rules. Historical making of Turkey-Iran relations present empowering of neighborhood rule through affective-normative practices. In general, these relational representations speak to, and often resonate with, public perceptions about the making of neighborhood inside Turkey. In the traditional Turkish culture, neighborhood is a salient concept. Popular Turkish proverbial and idiomatic expressions underline historical meaning of human neighborhood. Similar aphorisms can also be observed in Central Asian (Biçer 2014) and Middle Eastern (Gökçen 2014) countries. Most of these sayings reflect public conceptualization of neighbor as both economic partner and/or cultural rival. Practical translations of two of these expressions are quite telling: (1) Komşu komşunun külüne/tütününe muhtaçtır (You may need your neighbor’s ash/smoke), (2) Ev alma, komşu al (You had better not get a [good] house, but you should have a [good] neighbor). A number of meanings can be extracted from these metaphorical public sayings (Alver 2014). I am particularly interested in insights to be gained regarding the social-psychological implications of neighborhood norms. As the first saying goes, neighbors are in need of each other and hence socially exchange their economic commodities, including trivial stuff like ash or even smoke. Since neighbors feel needy, they necessarily keep interest over exchanging economic properties with each other. These mutual economic interactions are structured by neighborly norms of interdependence. In case of mutual need, social-psychological commitments enhance economic collaboration. In other cases, things turn tough. Competitive logic of “keeping up with the Joneses” and “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies govern rules of confrontation over economic possessions. Due to envy and jealousy, affective misperceptions grew to the extent that “a chicken in neighbor’s fence is perceived as a goose.” The second saying hints social culture as much more distinctive quality of neighborhood. Hence it calls for scrutiny of your neighbor’s cultural practices before moving into a house. Here, neighborhood is conceived as site of cultural contact, rather than commercial connection. Commonly shared cultural norms constitute social rule of harmony and collaboration among neighbors. It is highly likely that affective anxiety and feeling of insecurity

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give rise to negative emotional states resulting in confrontational cultural commitments toward neighbors. If and when common affective-normative commitments emerge, collaborative culture of partnership reigns in the neighborhood. So the saying goes, “love thy neighbor as thyself.” Otherwise, neighbors turn into confrontational cultural rivals. In general, people usually feel free to leave from and move into neighborhoods. Simply put, people may somehow choose their immediate neighbors. At least, people usually check normative structures in available neighborhoods and prefer cultural conditions of affective security before moving into a house. States are geographically and politically constrained. To a great extent, states do not have such kinds of options regarding the choice of their contiguous neighbors. Both peoples and states have the wherewithal to change practices (feeling rules) and transform affective-­ normative structure (psycho-social rule) in their neighborhoods. Some important propositions can be distilled from these extractions. First and foremost, neighborhood is a distinctive concept. As conceptual category, it is pertinent for relations among social actors. Neighbors are facilitators of human socialization (Akın 2014). The social implications of neighborhood for peoples and states cannot be regarded as exactly alike. But neighborhood relations among categories of social actors can be ­conceived in quite similar ways. To reiterate, neighborhood is a relational concept. On the whole, it is a heteronomous regime of communal ruling co-constituted by rules of emotional-moral commitment and contextual rule of affective-normative interaction. Social psychology of neighborhood is embedded in the mutual rule of interdependent economic structure and the common rules of shared cultural system. Emotional characteristics and affective qualities shape economic-­ cultural norms of neighborhood. Two essential and natural modes of psycho-social exchange can be witnessed here: collaborative engagement and confrontational interaction. International neighborhood games can be unraveled by concentrating on affective cultures of partnership and rivalry. Affective Cultures in Turkey-Iran Neighborhood: Playing Games of Partnership and Rivalry The psycho-social perspective of international history (Linklater 2014) helps to reinterpret affective “cultures of neighborhood” (Koyuncu 2014) in Turkish-Iranian interactions. Seen from anthropological and ethno-

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graphic angles of aesthetics and humanities, international neighborhoods can be conceived as historical-cultural “heritage” (Ahunbay et al. 2018) and social-psychological “capital” (Aydemir 2014). Cross-cultural neighborhoods are founded by historical narratives. Neighborhood narratives configure “emotional worlds” (Ling 2014) in transnational relations. By extension, international “feeling rules” and “emotional norms” mutually constitute affective cultures in historical neighborhoods. Besides, geopolitical neighborhood relationships transform through historical processes of affective-normative learning (Zarakol 2011). The “geopolitics of emotions” (Moїsi 2009) shapes international exchanges across various regional neighborhoods. Emotional geopolitics of neighborhood can also be re-­ viewed as social-psychological structuration of regional hegemony and local influence. The psycho-social history of Turkish-Iranian interactions indicates these affective implications. There are key historical junctures where we can better observe textual evidence to trace social psychology of Turkish-Persian neighborhood relations. As a matter of fact, great power penetration into the region and hence third-party involvement in dyadic relations have created serious consequences for neighborly interactions between Turks and Persians. Ottoman-Russian wars of 1853–1856 and 1877–1878 constituted ­occasions of those defining moments in late modern history. In both war instances, the government of Iran was dominated by Russian patronage. The Shah sided with the Russian Czar rather than the Ottoman Sultan. In the coming decades, the Turkish political-military elite could not forget the bitter taste of betrayal committed by their Iranian counterparts. From their perspective, the Iranian rulers were engulfed by negative emotional state of “blind jealousy” and “Shii fanaticism.” In spite of this, mimesis rather than nemesis shaped the social psychology of Persians. The Iranian bureaucratic elite strived to emulate reformist movements sweeping in the ̇ Ottoman capital. Since then Istanbul has been a convenient “center for Iranian dissidents, political refugees and opposition groups consisting of former officials, intellectuals and men of letters” (Çetinsaya 2003: 116, 117; Çetinsaya 2006a: 30, 31). In the late Ottoman period, during the reign of Abdulhamid II, “Pan-­ Islamist” political ideals gained social-psychological resonance among both Turkish and Iranian elites. Sunni-Shii moral rapprochement was deemed as necessary for the political unity of Muslims. As Sultan Abdulhamid closely observed, the theological strata have gained an influential role in Iranian affairs. This clerical control has also extended over to

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the provinces of Atabat (most notably Najaf and Karbala), ruling the Shii holy shrines in Iraq. Abdulhamid was determined to restore moral influence of the Islamic Caliphate. For this purpose, he deliberately collaborated with local partners including Shii clerical classes composed of ulema, mujtahids and mullahs. He was quite astute in exploiting the political fissures emerging between the Shah and the Shii clergy. These political engagements proved counter-productive for both sides (Çetinsaya 2003: 118–120; Çetinsaya 2006a: 32–35). But these political interactions set a historical precedence. During the 1907–1909 period, contemporaneous revolutionary conditions, and transboundary politics of anti-monarchism, have enabled cross-­ border rapprochement between Young Turks and Iranian constitutionalists (Vejdani 2010; Cezani 2014: 159–160, 237–238). The interactive context of this episode has constituted a significant facet in modern making of Turkish-Iranian neighborhood relations. After the revolution of Young Turks in 1908, the Ottoman government, led by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), has continued the occupation of western Azerbaijan. Young Turks have also maintained political support for the constitutionalist movement in Iran. Pan-Turkist CUP collaborated with Azeri Turks and the Shii clergy to mobilize pro-parliament forces against the rule of Shah. At that time, the Qajar politics was under the threatening  influence of British-Russian colonial rivalry. Faced with the challenge of imperial war in their common neighborhood, both Turkish and Iranian nationalists, in collaboration with Germany, have sought ways to form local resistance against the regional maneuvers of great powers (Çetinsaya 2003: 120–123; Çetinsaya 2006a: 36–40). The historical roots of heteronomous rule in Turkish-Iranian neighborhood relations have been embedded in the late Ottoman period. Turkish security perceptions have been deeply influenced by negative affective commitments, which were fueled by feeling of fear from Russo-Persian alignment. On the other side, envious emulation of Turkish model has left a lingering impact on modernist/reformist political movements in Iran. Social psychology of dyadic jealousy, bilateral envy and regional fear did feed into transformation of neighborhood norms in Turkey-Iran historical relations. Affective perception of third-party roles has been a significant historical factor shaping neighborly practices on both sides of the border. The pervasive penetration of third parties (particularly British, Russian, German and later American players) has long been a regional impediment for local

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rule-making in Turkey-Iran neighborhood. As long as hegemonic conditions prevailed in regional affairs, the Turkish side has always encircled with the preeminent fear from the alliance between Russia and Iran; while the Iranian side remained envious and constantly concerned about Turkey’s geopolitical undertakings within Western sphere of influence. In other words, negative affective practices have ruled over the geopolitics of neighborhood. To a certain extent, mutual pragmatic engagements and common affective commitments (Gundogan 2011) did inform neighborhood norms in Ankara-Tehran relations. Shared cultural notions of “pragmability” and “affectability” (Kopytko 2004) have instructed rules of psycho-social exchange and hence helped to shape normative structure of Turkey-Iran neighborhood. Social-psychological context of these neighborly interactions has been determined by dominant networks of exchange ruling mainly in economic and cultural realms. Incumbent rulers of both sides sought dyadic-diplomatic and/or local-political partners to collaborate. “Emotional work” and psychological commitment (Hochschild 1979) of political leaders and social groups have defined contours of collaboration between Ankara and Tehran. The social-psychological exchange of positive emotional commitments and affective public investments helped to enhance the power of neighborhood rules in Turkish-Iranian diplomatic interactions. Historical analyses of state-society relations in Turkey and Iran point to resembling dynamics of political order and change. Domestic political context displays similar social and cultural characteristics. Both polities have experienced historical challenges of political modernization in varying degrees (Huntington 1968). In the Turkish case, the Republican rules of government and rule by the Parliament have been predominant practices. Party politics and bureaucratic (civil-military) structures have determined rules of order and change in Ankara. In contrast, the Iranian case has displayed certain historical differences. To a great extent, the Iranian polity has been ruled by the Palace in either monarchical or clerical order. Complex structures of factionalism and practices of clientelism have shaped political ruling in Tehran. Both Ankara and Tehran governments have emulated French and German models of nation-state building (Erden 2017). In spite, the two neighboring nation-states have experienced distinct domestic transformations, as they muddled through overlapping processes of political modernization, secularization and liberalization (Atabaki 2010; Gürakar 2012).

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Along their way of national development, Turkey and Iran have struggled to overcome perennial contradictions of state-society relations. These political cleavages have been exacerbated by psycho-social crises of “modernization.” Like other modern polities, lack of “trust” has shaped emotional-moral atmosphere of rule-making (Çetin 2007). What was happening inside the political houses has created repercussions for their neighborly relationship. The liminal relational space of neighborhood has transformed between statist “utopias,” nationalistic “ideologies,” societal dreams and humanistic “dramas” (Aydın 2014). The affective-normative politics of Turkey-Iran neighborhood has reflected configurations of modern psycho-social dichotomies such as idealism-realism, universalismparticularism, secularism-mysticism, liberalism-conservatism, democracyautocracy, capitalism-socialism and revolution-reform. Put in other words, the Turkey-Iran interactive relationship has evolved between partnership and rivalry as rules of political neighborhood swing between crisscrossing contradictions such as secular-modern versus religious-­traditional and liberal-democrat versus conservative-­authoritarian politics. These political paradoxes have been deepened by complex sectarian-­theological (Sunni-Shii/Alevi) divisions. Pan-Turkist and PanFarsi nationalist ideologies have reinforced these dilemmas as well. Last but not least, the local politics of Azeri and Kurdish nationalisms has enormously influenced dyadic and regional rules of (dis)engagement between Ankara and Tehran. Complicated demographical dynamics, coupled with complex transborder geographical determinants, have left the contiguous Turkey-Iran dyad with the constant challenge of militarized local conflict in their historical relationship. Competitive state ideologies and politics of ethnicsectarian nationalisms have rendered propensity toward war making in the Middle Eastern neighborhood. One should also note that the dyadic risks of a direct warfare, between Turkey and Iran, were particularly significant even under relatively stable global environment of the Cold War period (Woodwell 2004). After the end of the Cold War, the conflict proneness in Turkey-Iran relationship has increasingly exacerbated, largely due to the enduring international conditions of ethnic-sectarian warfare in neighboring Iraq and Syria. The struggle for regional influence has reinforced a dyadic climate of rivalry and confrontation in Ankara-Tehran political interactions. Even though Turkey and Iran have saved their political relationship from dangerous implications of deadly conflict, they could not totally

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develop a dyadic atmosphere of sincere friendship and altruistic solidarity (Çetinsaya 2006a; Çetinsaya 2006b; Çetinsaya 2007). To a great extent, common desires and shared interests have determined psycho-social contours of Turkey-Iran relationship. In spite of dyadic partnership in strategic security issues and neighborly collaboration in economic affairs, Turks and Iranians have still remained far from fully achieving their collective potential for regional cooperation. Of course, there could be some plausible global reasons to be accounted for this psycho-social failure. However, the century-long history of Turkey-Iran interactions reminds that neighborhood relationships entail much stronger affective-normative commitments and a lot more political emotion work in dyadic diplomacy as well as in public affairs. To overcome regressive relational tendencies, mutual management of fear, anger and distrust would not be sufficient. In the coming decades, a new phase of progressive engagement between Ankara and Tehran would inevitably require reciprocal building of hope, empathy and confidence into their historical relationship. In the following four empirical chapters, I proceed along the theoretical-­ historical framework laid out in the Introduction. The empirical chapters cover four historical phases in the making of neighborhood relationship between Ankara and Tehran governments. Chapter 2 excavates the formative 1918–1945 phase in Turkey-Iran relations. Chapter 3 explores relational implications of the Cold War years (1946–1979) for Ankara-Tehran neighborhood. Chapter 4 examines the exceptional era of 1980–2000 that reformed modes of engagement between Turkey and Iran. Chapter 5 investigates the recent 2001–2018 period of Turkish-Iranian interactions. Each empirical chapter looks at processes of continuity and dynamics of change that have constituted affective-normative practices and psycho-­ social structures of rule-making in the Turkish-Iranian neighborhood. The empirical chapters present necessary and sufficient qualitative (contextual-­ discursive) evidence to understand relational contours of progress and/or regress in trans-governmental interactions. Emotion and affect are intangible things, which resist experimental testing, let alone positivistic observation and rationalistic analysis. These analytical challenges make it all the more difficult for emotions scholars to comply with established modes of writing. Argumentative style of writing may work for showcasing the implications of emotions particularly at the unit-level psychological analysis. Individual and collective psychological factors can be hypothesized in a way that causally links them to decision making processes and thereby hypothesis testing may explain policy

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outcomes (Dolan 2016; Dolan Jr. 2016; Mercer 2013). In contrast, understanding of relational psychology entails non-atomistic, non-causal and constitutive analysis, which further demands interpretative textual compositions. As emotions historians point out, international studies need not “venture hypotheses” but make “more concerted exploration” of co-­extensive changes in sentimental meanings and political contexts (Stearns 2016: 60). For these purposes, some scholars received stylistic insights from literary criticism, and other cognate fields, and composed a highly accessible monograph on international politics of emotions (Leheny 2018, 2019). The narrative-hermeneutical style of writing offers the reader better avenues to navigate temporally and realize changes in relational representations of emotionality and affectivity and grasp the episodic “connections between time and emotional experience” (Eroukhmanoff and Fazendeiro 2018). This style of writing also aligns with narrative approaches utilized in emotions history (Rosenwein 2002, 2010). Among available alternative academic styles of writing, “narrative explanation” (Suganami 2008) provides one of the most viable techniques to trace co-­extensive implications within textual-emotional data and contextual-­affective phenomena (Kleres 2011). Along these lines, I regularly follow narrative format of theoretical-­ historical interpretation (Roberts 2006). In the empirical chapters, I usually let the psycho-social data flow in an episodic way. While presenting textual evidence together with phenomenal observations, I keep my ­analytical interventions minimal in an effort to provide the reader with a voice of scientific objectivity and empirical neutrality. While concluding each chapter, I return to the initial research scheme to make sense of episodic evidences of emotionality and affectivity emerging in relational modes of partnership and rivalry in Turkey-Iran neighborhood interactions. Put more precisely, most of my critical theoretical interventions come in the Conclusion chapter. The final chapter allows me to re-locate cross-­episodic findings onto the ground of theory. The Conclusion chapter wraps up the overall argument through conceptual and comparative analyses. On the whole, this book argues that Turkey-Iran neighborhood relationship has been shaped by complex psycho-social practices in political and diplomatic realms. Mixed emotional-moral commitments arranged the heteronomous affective-normative structure of the neighborhood game between Turks and Iranians. Ambivalent relational arrangements configured dyadic dilemmas of collaborative partnership and confrontational rivalry. The puzzling nature of emotional entanglements reflects

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affective rule of heteronomy in Turkey-Iran historical neighborhood interactions. Put in other words, this monograph does not reinvent the international history. It reinterprets the history that is already out there. This reinterpretation more systematically reveals emotional-affective dimensions of psycho-­ social exchange, which has been previously untheorized and under-researched. Various phenomenal scenes taken from historical episodes of Turkish-Iranian relations expose an intriguing picture. After the escalation of territorial rivalry in the 1925–1930 period, the golden years (1933–1938) have remained a short-lived story. The formative spirit of progressive partnership has evaporated during the Cold War, notwithstanding the geostrategic alliance between Ankara and Tehran. Both sides have failed to fully exhaust their potential for collaboration. The growing mutual mistrust has fed relational psychology of confrontation during the years of loss (1958–1978). By the end of the Cold War, the making of regional norms in Ankara-­ Tehran neighborhood relations has been constrained by the rules of new global game set between the United States and the Russian Federation. To a great extent, Washington and Moscow put intermingling impact over the Middle East region and complicated the matters in Turkish-Iranian neighborly engagement. Second, perhaps more importantly, by the end of the Gulf War in 1991, Turkey and Iran had to cope with local challenges that emerged in their common neighbor, Iraq. Under the influence of international political-military and economic sanctions, the Baath regime was squeezed into central Iraq and hence lost its conventional control over northern and southern Iraq. Once again, Mesopotamia (Iraq) has turned into contiguous geopolitical cusp between two intersecting spheres of influence, one historically constituted in Anatolia (Turkey) and the other in Persia (Iran). That is to say, Iraq has been a key country, a common ground of denomination where Turkish-Iranian interactions have identified local rules of collaboration and confrontation. Engagement with other regional partners and rivals has also entered into the fray. Particular positions of Syria and Israel have had lingering impact over social psychology of dyadic rule-making in Ankara-Tehran relations. As a matter of fact, the relations between the two capitals have been dramatically transformed after the 1979 Iranian revolution and the Turkish military coup in 1980. Despite ideological differences of ruling regimes, the two neighboring governments have managed their hearts and pushed collaborative interactions toward unforeseen directions. In the 1985–2000

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period, Turkey-Iran relations have witnessed unprecedented progress like the regional development of Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). Turkey-Iran economic partnership has remained steady, even when rising regional security problems (such as the PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] terrorism and the Kurdish question) posed strategic constraints over the relationship. Against this challenging background, two neighboring states have dually checked their positional rivalries. Regional confrontation did not abate particularly in Iraq. But the relationship has remained far from open conflict and direct warfare until 2012. Since the neighboring Syria has been increasingly spiraled into civil war, and then drowned into multilateral international war, the Turkish-Iranian regional rivalry regressed toward proxy warfare. The local situation has begun to stabilize only after the trilateral (Russia-Turkey-Iran) strategic talks in late 2016. The Astana peace process has re-opened the way for regional diplomacy and helped to ease political-military tension in Turkey-Iran relations. The spirit of rapprochement has gained a more solid ground by “High-Level Cooperation Council (HLCC)” meetings conducted consecutively in Ankara and Tehran. After the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey and the collapsing of US-­ Iran nuclear deal in 2017, both neighbors got closer over the recent years. More than any other social-psychological factor, neighboring governments have managed peoples’ hearts and determined political-diplomatic feeling rules on both sides of Turkish-Iranian border. Overall, the incumbent regimes had dealt with two main domestic issues through complicated rules of heteronomy. These internal concerns were the militant-terrorist character of Kurdish separatism and the radical-violent nature of Islamist and/or secularist political opposition. The domestic-­dyadic implications of these two matters had created contiguous consequences for local rule-making in Turkey-Iran neighborhood. During the past century, factionalism has persisted in Iran, while political-military tension did not abate in Turkey. Complex political structuration of domestic-­dyadic rules contributed to ambivalent affective-normative practices swinging between collaborative partnership and confrontational rivalry. In these historical episodes, bilateral neighborly interactions have been governed through domestic-dyadic management of fear, anger and distrust. In the following empirical chapters, I examine emotional expressions explicit in official-public diplomacy and also evaluate affective-normative experiences implicit in international interactions that transform collaborative and confrontational politics of neighborhood between Ankara and

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Tehran. Psycho-social rules of commitment (feeling rules) are identified by looking at patterns of emotional exchange in official-public diplomatic stages. Affective politics of partnership and rivalry is observed through contextual analyses of dyadic and regional relations. This pragmatic (discursive-­ contextual) framework offers a composite and holistic picture that better captures complex emotional-affective transformations in Turkish-Iranian affairs. Overall, the book seeks to enable the reader to reinterpret emotional-discursive entanglements and affective-contextual arrangements that co-extensively configure constellations of collaborative and confrontational rules in Turkey-Iran neighborhood relations.

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CHAPTER 2

The Formative Emotional Climate of Turkish-Iranian Relations (1918–1945)

In the first empirical chapter of this book, I look at how contemporary emotional climate of Turkey-Iran relations has been founded in the inter-war era. While presenting textual evidence together with phenomenal observations, I move along the framework outlined in the Introduction. Let me briefly restate that this chapter flows in a narrative format. My analytical interventions remain minimal so that the reader navigates through objective and neutral composition that reveals psycho-social dimension of TurkeyIran historical relations. In the first part, I examine the foundational period from the end of the First World War in 1918 until the onset of global depression in 1929. The second part covers the 1930s, which marked the “golden years” in Turkey-Iran neighborhood. In the conclusion, I return to the relational research template. Here my analytical interpretations come in. The interpretative analyses reconstruct emotional-affective patterns to make sense of partnership and rivalry in Turkey-Iran episodic interactions. Turkey-Iran relationship has gained its contemporary character during the inter-war period. The “twenty years” (between 1918 and 1938) have been marked by recurrent “crises” in world politics. The predicaments have been co-founded by ambivalent structures of power and paradoxical practices of morality embedded in politics of international life (Carr 1939). The social psychology of this formative international era has created formidable repercussions for bilateral interactions between Turkey and Iran. Global political structures and diplomatic practices have ruled over both countries and created enduring implications for their regional relations. Early years of this © The Author(s) 2020 M. A. Kumral, Exploring Emotions in Turkey-Iran Relations, Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39029-7_2

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formative episode were particularly significant for the historical trajectory of Turkish-Iranian interactions. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938) and Reza Pahlavi (1878–1944) have emerged as two foundational rule-makers sharing strong social-psychological affiliations. Both leaders have served as soldiers and later acted as statesmen. As “the men of order,” they worked to establish new norms of political governance against the background of old traditional rules descending from Ottoman and Qajar ancien régimes. In the post-Ottoman/Qajar era, Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah have pioneered contemporaneous processes of “authoritarian modernization” and nation-state building (Atabaki and Zürcher 2000). By and large, the concurrent political modernization projects led by Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah have relied on etatist structures and coercive practices of rule-making, which were co-extensively guarded and governed by the national army and the state bureaucracy (Bozarslan 2014: 69–73). Both leaders have committed themselves to transform the ruling order in their countries and make a new beginning in their neighborhoods. Considerably, the personal bonds at the leadership level have laid the ground for progressive engagement in Turkish-Iranian diplomatic interactions. The formative diplomatic-political practices between two founding fathers helped to reconstruct affective-normative structure of dyadic inter-actions and build bilateral venues for socialpsychological exchange. The close inter-personal relationship between two political pioneers has constituted the psycho-social basis of collaboration and partnership between their neighboring countries. Due to the challenging circumstances ensuing after the First World War (1914–1918), the logic of Turkish-Iranian collaboration was initially based on mutual political interests, shared diplomatic goals and common affective aspirations toward national liberation and independence. Dyadic relations were mainly based on the spirit of anti-imperialism and primarily oriented toward national unity, which also extended over to neighborhood solidarity. The cross-border political-diplomatic relations between two nationalist regimes have developed gradually. Along the way, emotional-moral commitments of both sides have helped to deepen affective-normative framework of national survival and social-cultural coexistence in their common neighborhood. With formal codifications and informal arrangements, the rule of heteronomous exchange in Turkish-Iranian neighborhood has been re-written along multifarious notions of political-territorial sovereignty, diplomatic reciprocity, social-cultural solidarity and moral responsibility.

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However, the Ankara government has always been preoccupied by their national security concerns arising from insidious ambivalence in Iranian international policy. As a matter of fact, the Tehran government has perniciously played into changing fortunes in the Anglo-Russian balance of power. For example, the Iranian Majlis refrained from ratifying the agreement of 19 Aug. 1919, imposed by Britain (Çetinsaya 2000: 770). Iranian policymakers played a diplomatic gambit to overrule British ploy in the region. In order to gain further political concessions from London, Tehran did need extra bargaining chips such as territorial demands along QajarOttoman borderlands. Iranian diplomacy inevitably turned against Turkish interests, and made quite opportunistic maneuvers during consecutive post-war conferences of Paris (1919) and Sèvres (1920). These deceptive moves were seen as harmful since they aimed to acquire substantial land mass in neighboring Eastern Anatolia. Tehran’s ambivalent political ambitions engendered sense of “betrayal” among the Turkish elite and public opinion, notwithstanding the fact that Iranian territorial demands were declined by Britain instantaneously (Çetinsaya 2000: 774–775; 2003: 122; Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009a: 206). By implication, this episode set a historical precedent for molding of mutual mistrust between two sides. During and after the War of Independence, Turkish political-diplomatic elites showed signs of distrust toward their Iranian counterparts. Turks remained anxious about perilous prospects like British colonization or Russian occupation over Iran. Apparently, an independent republican regime in Tehran would become a better neighbor for Ankara. When Shah and Shii clergy have jointly opted for monarchical rule, the Turkish government was frustrated. In addition to political disappointment, the Turkish side was moved by suspicion growing against Iranian policies. Caution and fear have habitually managed Turkish hearts as Ankara sought to develop affective rules in dealing with Tehran (Çetinsaya 2003: 122–124). While Turkey was anxious about Iranian manipulation (or toleration) of Kurdish (and to some extent Armenian) nationalism, Iran for its part was suspicious of Turkish “irredentism” in Iranian Azerbaijan and Ankara’s tutelage of Azeri nationalists … In Ankara, two opposite views emerged regarḋ ̇ ing policy toward Iran. While Ismet Pasha (Inönü), the prime minister, and Tevfik Rüştü (Aras), the minister for foreign affairs, advocated a tough pol̇ icy, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and Ibrahim Tali (Öngören), the inspector for eastern Anatolia, preferred a more moderate policy towards Iran. (Çetinsaya 2003: 124)

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In a sense, these two modal logics of interaction have determined broad contours of general Turkish political-diplomatic attitudes toward relationship with Iranians. Ambivalent combinations of these approaches have been witnessed in various historical occasions and manifested through complex rules of emotional exchange in Ankara-Tehran relations. Dyadic diplomatic interactions have been configured between hard-line (conservative-radical) and soft-line (liberal-moderate) making of “relational rules” on both sides of the Turkish-Iranian border. The rules of neighborhood game swing paradoxically between collaboration and confrontation restructuring historical rule of heteronomy in Turkey-Iran relations. Affective-normative rules of political conduct and pragmatic public practices mutually constituted psycho-social dynamics of rule-making in Turkey-Iran neighborhood. Complex (positive-negative) constellations of affective commitments have shaped social psychology of Turkey-Iran relationship and transformed normative structuration of their historical neighborhood.

Formation of Feeling Rules in Dyadic Diplomacy (1918–1928) The inter-war years have created significant international, regional and domestic challenges for Ankara and Tehran governments and set salient contextual implications for their dyadic relations. Imperialist intentions of Britain and Russia have directly influenced region-based policies. Evidently, sustainment of an independent regime in neighboring Iran was perceived as a geopolitical concern for the Ankara government. This policy would also help defend Turkish national security interests along the eastern borders. By 1920, Turkish defense policy sought to protect Iran from mainly British colonial rule, which had already expanded over Iraq and Palestine. At that time, Russian imperial aggrandizements seemed to pose relatively a lesser threat for Ankara and Tehran. The local context did simply entail anti-colonial collaboration among regional countries. Should two neighboring states achieve regional solidarity, they would better help themselves to withstand extra-regional penetration into their dyadic and domestic affairs. Given conditions of regional uncertainty, bilateral logic of local cooperation between Ankara and Tehran was quite understandable: protect your friend, protect yourself; help your neighbor, help yourself. Under contextual circumstances of the War of Independence, Ankara government strongly assisted the nationalist movement led by Reza Khan and extended emotional and “moral support in order to assure Iranian

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independence and territorial integrity.” Both sides exchanged affective “messages of friendship,” signaling their common normative commitment to their neighborly relations. Local interactions between these two neighboring regimes have been advanced through bilateral recognition of diplomatic representatives and/or missions (Çetinsaya 2003: 123). Trans-boundary nature of the Kurdish issue and resolution of border problems have put extra political-military pressure on Turkish-Iranian diplomatic interactions. In spite of straining regional conditions in their mutual borders, Ankara and Tehran have worked through traditional logic of reciprocity. Both regimes usually remained loyal to mutually shared commitments in order to manage local crises in their borderlands. In cases of normative violation, both sides did not refrain from taking unilateral coercive measures and/or covert actions against each other. In this sense, they habitually used local proxy forces to gain the upper hand in regional matters. To a certain extent, these coercive measures-covert actions have proven to be counter-productive as they provoked deepening of dyadic distrust. The instigation of recurrent revolts by the Kurdish tribal chief ̇ Simko (Ismail Agha) has marked crises of bilateral bordering. This historical case has tested and transformed psycho-social dynamics of neighborhood relations between Ankara and Tehran governments. Trans-boundary Kurdish Rebels and Neighborhood Norms During the First World War, Tehran government often pointed to the “Turkish finger” in covert border operations and protested against the “Turkish invasion” of western borderlands in Iranian Azerbaijan. After the ̇ Mudros Armistice (1918), the Ottoman government in I stanbul was forced to retreat from the occupation of neighboring Qajar lands in Azerbaijan and Iran. The end of war has discharged processes of dissolution for the Ottoman and the Qajar political rule in international affairs. The colonial rules of geopolitical partition set between Britain and Russia have created devastating influence on two dynastic-imperial monarchies reigning in the region. As a result, a regional power vacuum has emerged around Ottoman-Qajar borderlands. The local uncertainty has been exploited by the Kurdish tribes. ̇ In 1919, Kurdish tribal chief Ismail Agha (Simko), accompanied by some other political figures and local notables, like Abdurrezaq Bedirhan and Sheikh Sayyed Taha Nehri, revolted against the Iranian forces. Following British proposals, the inexperienced and incompetent Qajar ruler, Shah Ahmed, has tried to appease the Kurdish rebels by letting Simko reign

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through traditional sort of limited autonomy in some minor areas of western Iran and Azerbaijan. This local deal did not last long. Unsatisfied by Anglo-Iranian patronage, Simko sought to garner regional support from the Ankara government, which was formed by Mustafa Kemal after the inauguration of Grand National Assembly on 23 Apr. 1920. During the critical context of Independence War, Turkish military officials, most prominently Kâzım [Karabekir] Pasha (Commander of the Eastern Front), saw the tribal cohorts of Simko as traditional local collaborators to be deployed against the attacks of Armenian-Nestorian militia lurking around strategic cities such as Van. In addition, Simko forces were expected to assist paramilitary operations against the British units in Revanduz and strengthen Ankara’s hand in Mosul and northern Iraq. On the contrary, these expectations proved unrealistic and unhelpful. Warring by proxies turned out to be a military miscalculation, which unintendedly inflicted political damages on good neighborly relations (Çetinsaya 2000: 771–773). Since local alliances shifted almost instantaneously, striking sustainable deals with Kurdish tribal forces has been an uneasy affair for national governments and even for British colonial rulers. Kurdish leaders attempted to manipulate regional rivalries among political actors. Dealing with Kurdish insurgents constituted a foundational problem for Ankara-Tehran political relationship. On the Iranian side, Brigadier General Reza has assumed a prominent role step by step. Initially, he has commanded the Iranian elite forces, entitled as the Cossack Brigade. He has gained military success during the turbulent period of Kurdish revolts. Victorious military performance has quickly paved the way for Reza’s gaining of control over the Defense Ministry in Feb. 1921. The nationalist takeover and the capturing of political power by Reza Khan were a welcome development for the Ankara government. Ultimately, two nationalist regimes would be better partners in their mutual struggle against British imperialism. They could work jointly to constrain British colonial penetration. They could also harmonize their local policies and revise their bilateral interactions along traditional norms of neighborhood. In fact, Britain was anxious about the Russian backing of unionist attempts among Muslim countries. British anxiety had been further deepened after the signing of the Turkish-Afghan friendship agreement on 1 Mar. 1921. Not unexpectedly, Turkish government sought to seal a similar treaty with their Iranian counterparts. On 24 June 1921, the head of the Turkish delegation, Yusuf Kemal (Tengirşenk) Bey, acknowledged Ankara’s approach to the relationship with Tehran: “We are on the way of determining mutual

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­ olicies and enhancing bilateral relations with the neighboring and brethp ren nation of Iran” (Çetinsaya 2000: 772–777; Akgül 2005: 4). Turkish-Iranian diplomatic talks prolonged for one year between June 1921 and June 1922 and dissolved without making any substantial breakthrough. It was mainly the divisive nature of Kurdish issue that had made it more difficult to resolve the diplomatic deadlock. Anglo-Kurdish collusions became affective in seeding political suspicions and supporting diplomatic divisions among regional players and generating distrust across transnational borders. Even the likelihood of a diplomatic rapprochement between Ankara-Tehran governments might upset London’s political-­ military plans to sustain its colonial hegemony over the region. To ­preclude anti-colonial cooperation between Turks and Iranians, British officials colluded with the trans-boundary Kurdish tribes in Turkey, Iran and Iraq. For some time, British covert cross-border engagements have worked to undermine local solidarity. As of June 1922, the number of Kurdish rebels inside Iran had grown to 10,000, turning Simko into a local challenge for Reza Khan’s reign in power. Incidentally, the Turkish military discovered that Simko had made simultaneous secret engagements with the British. The discovery revealed the treacherous character of Simko’s intentions. Presumably, he has been clandestinely working toward the Kurdish statehood covering trans-boundary territories of Iran, Iraq and Turkey (Kaya 2017). Around mid-June, Turkish military turned against Simko. At that stage, Turkish military had also been gaining the upper hand on the western front of the Independence War fought against the Greeks. The resilience of the Ankara government has reinforced the political position of proTurkish domestic forces in Iran. This historical coalition was composed of loosely affiliated groups such as liberationist “Democrats,” republican “Committee of Kemalists,” Azeri nationalists and anti-British clergy and “Pan-Islamists.” Since more favorable contextual conditions have prevailed by the end of June 1922, Kurdish insurgency could no longer overshadow the founding of official diplomatic relationship between Ankara and Tehran governments. The Simko affair was almost dropped off from the negotiation table. Henceforth, particularly the Iranian side could seek solution to their secondary concerns regarding the security of TebrizTrabzon transit route and local Turkish tax-custom regulations exerted on Iranian merchants (Çetinsaya 2000: 772–778). Due to mutually held suspicions regarding their external engagements, Turkish-Iranian cooperation had been delayed for some time. Both

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regimes have been muddling through British intervention into their domestic and dyadic affairs. In various ways, the rules of (dis)engagement between Ankara and Tehran were shaped by the rules of international interaction between London and Moscow. Anglo-Russian geopolitical rivalry created uncertainty over the region. Both Britain and Russia deployed imperial measures of coercion and used colonial tactics of cooptation for purposes of patronage politics. In an era of rapidly growing nationalisms, ethnic-sectarian pride and nationalistic honor were provoked to mobilize local clients toward “communal conflict.” Indigenous populations, such as Kurds, Assyrians, Armenians and Azeri Turks, were victimized by pitting one against the other. The rising of rival nationalisms during the Simko revolts had begun to identify social-psychological boundaries among the local communities. It was the provincial politics of nationalism that shaped affective-normative implications of Shi-ness, Sunni-ness, Kurdish-ness, Azeri Turkish-ness, Ajam-ness and Iranian-ness. This period was foundational for social-psychological construction of Persian nationalism and etatist rule in Iranian political life (Soleimani 2017: 953–957, 959–961). The prospects of geopolitical partition and territorial dismemberment also threatened historical boundaries of the neighborhood between Turks and Iranians. To counterbalance British domination, Ankara and Tehran governments separately turned to Moscow. In 1921, each side signed distinct agreements of partnership with Soviet Russia. Both regimes sought to receive diplomatic support and security assistance from the Bolshevik government. In quite similar vein, Ankara and Tehran approached Moscow as local “friend” and viewed London as regional “enemy” (Çetinsaya 1999: 148). Turkish and Iranian national defense strategies aimed to eliminate colonial aggressions against their territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Two neighboring governments were moved by international rules of suspicion and fear. Both sides closely watched each other’s diplomatic engagements and political-military maneuvers. They remained anxious about their true intentions vis-à-vis each other. Overall, the post-war regional security context has growingly led to affective exchange of distrust between post-Ottoman and post-Qajar rulers in the region. No longer than Ankara and Tehran governments have assured their survival, they began to resuscitate their bilateral relations. In Mar. 1922, the Turkish side displayed enthusiastic eagerness to build “good regional relations” with their Iranian counterparts (Cin 2007: 66). The long-overdue diplomatic step came from Tehran. On 30 July 1922, the

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̇ Extraordinary Ambassador of Iran, Ismail Khan (Mümtazüddevle), extended ̇ his “letter of confidence” to the Ankara government. Ismail Khan, the former Education Minister, has been a leading politician in the Democrat camp ̇ and renowned for his strong anti-British leanings. Ismail Khan emphasized that he would work to strengthen social-psychological solidarity between two neighboring nations. Mutual sharing of “common pain” and “collective happiness” would enhance “bonds of brotherhood” between Tehran and Ankara governments (Erdal 2012: 79, 80; Cin 2007: 68). ̇ Ismail Khan’s appointment was perceived as a positive development by Mustafa Kemal, head of the Turkish government constituted by the ̇ Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara. Upon Ismail Khan’s arrival to Ankara, Mustafa Kemal has delivered key public speeches on various occasions (Çetinsaya 2000: 778–780). The excerpts derived from those talks underline affective-normative foundations of Ankara-Tehran diplomatic relations and hence worth re-framing here at extensive length: The Grand National Assembly, the sole and actual representative of the Turkish people, has been absolutely pleased by your distinguished appointment, which has been made with noble intentions such as sharing the sincere feelings of Iranian state and Iranian people, confirming the authentic notion of Islamic brotherhood, enhancing the unity and friendship between our co-religionist (dindaş) and contiguous (hemcivar/komşu) states and nations. Since this development reflected the decisiveness of Turkish and Iranian states to improve dyadic interactions and enhance normative framework of bilateral relations, it brought great happiness to the Turkish Government, who has already been nourished by the same aspirations and felt the same emotions. Please extend our nation’s thanks to the special emotions displayed by our co-religionist Iranians. (Atatürk 1922a)

Mustafa Kemal’s deliberate deployment of emotional-moral rhetoric illustrates Ankara government’s discursive-contextual motivations toward foundation of neighborly regional relations with Tehran. The diplomatic use of affective-normative language by the top Turkish official leader reflects pragmatic logic of state making and nation building under military circumstances of war and extraordinary political rule. Through sentimental discursive deliberations, Turkish foreign policy makers aimed to transform the psycho-social context within which they operate. The international implications of Ankara’s emotional-moral engagement with Tehran were further disclosed by Mustafa Kemal on 7 July 1922, when he joined the diplomatic dinner hosted by the Russian Ambassador Araloff in honor of ̇ Ismail Khan (Mümtazüddevle).

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Those who share same sorts of emotional strains are peers of pain (dertdaş), who seek and find one another. These kinds of passionate partners have always been affected by same sincere feelings … Similar sentiments of sincerity are shared by representatives of those partnering nations … Still, collective feelings of pain could not solely constitute social bonds between the Turkish people and the eastern nations including Russia, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, and Iran. Those ties have depended on real, material and perpetual principles … Up until now, Turkish and Iranian peoples could not have a genuine and candid relationship … The nation and state of Iran, as represented here by Mümtazüddevle, have founded the actual basis of our relationship … I got extremely emotional by his remarks praising our government and our people … He can be confident that our hearts truly beat with deep feelings of friendship. (Atatürk 1922b)

The “Great Offensive” of the Turkish army has dealt the final blow to the Greeks and wiped out their forces of invasion from the western Anatolia. The newspapers in Tehran called their nation to “take lesson from the Turks” and urged them to follow their neighbors and defend the Iranian independence with “dauntless courage” (Cin 2007: 72). The conclusion of Mudanya Armistice on 3–11 Oct. 1922 and the abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate on 1 Nov. 1922 have enormously strengthened international position of the Ankara government. The Iranian government officials, most prominently Reza Khan (Defense Minister/Army Commander) and Ahmad Qavam al-Saltana (Prime Minister/Foreign Minister), have been impressed by political-military implications of the Turkish victory in the region. They have decided to send special messengers to further articulate their personal congratulations. The dyadic context has become more viable for Ankara to appoint the Turkish ambassador to Tehran on 7 Oct. 1922. The Iranian delegation led by Salar Nizam, Reza Khan’s private military aide, began visiting Ankara on 22 Oct. and met with Mustafa Kemal on 2 Nov. Reza Khan sought to garner security assistance from Turkey in exchange for the extension of Iranian military support for prospective special operations against the British forces in Mosul. The Iranian interest over the Kurdish issue and the Mosul question has risen after the gathering of international peace conference at Lausanne on 21 Nov. 1922. Indeed, Iranian leaders were still seeking to gain local concessions from Britain. Like Ankara, Tehran was primarily concerned about regional ramifications of the British mandate over Iraq. As a matter of fact, both regimes were almost equally disturbed by costly

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implications of covert collaboration between British forces and transboundary Kurdish tribal militia. In spite, both governments could not cooperate to eliminate the Anglo-Kurdish threat in their neighborhood. This failure strengthened British hands enormously in the political-military field and the diplomacy table. By using the Kurdish card in northern Iraq, London has been able to manipulate Turkish-Iranian regional rivalry over Mosul. For this reason, Tehran government has also been driven by a diplomatic desire to thwart Ankara government’s geopolitical ambitions over Mosul (Çetinsaya 2000: 780–784, 793–794). The historical evidence also suggests that Tehran government remained anxious about Turkey’s future plans regarding Azerbaijan. The affective dislike toward Turkey was fed by feeling of fear from political mobilization of pan-Turkist movements particularly among the Azeri-Turkish population living in Iran. The complex constellation of need, desire, fear and dislike shaped Iranian making of relationship with Turkey. Under those social-psychological circumstances, building bilateral confidence was a challenging diplomatic task for the Turkish ambassador Muhiddin (Akyüz) Pasha, who arrived in Tehran on 7 Feb. 1923. He was welcomed by a remarkable ceremony, which was organized by a group of “Pan-Islamists” and “Kemalists” working with Ottomans/Turks since the reign of Abdulhamid II (1876–1909). In 1923, the pro-Turkish historical bloc was led by a well-known Iranian mujtahid Seyyid Abu’l Qasim Kashani (Çetinsaya 2000: 780–784). While extending his letter of confidence to Shah Ahmed on 22 Feb. Muhiddin Pasha portrayed Turkey and Iran as two “great states” within the realm “of Islam.” In his words, Iran has historically been “the most esteemed Islamic neighbor of Turkey.” He conveyed Mustafa Kemal’s heartfelt wishes to the Iranian state. Receiving these warm messages, Shah Ahmed responded in reciprocal sincerity. Both sides emphasized the importance of enhancing good relations between two neighbors. Ankara and Tehran governments have concurred to re-institute their ­consulates in Tebriz and Trabzon correspondingly (Cin 2007: 74, 75). This implied that the time was ripe for improving dyadic diplomatic interactions between two neighboring capitals. Both sides showed common commitment to develop reciprocal relations. After Turkey’s signing of the Lausanne Treaty on 23 July 1923, the first ̇ Iranian Ambassador to Ankara, Ishak Khan, assumed the diplomatic ­mission in Aug. 1923. Reza Khan and Mustafa Kemal exchanged warm

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political messages in Sept. 1923. Reza Khan framed Turkey’s diplomatic success with empathetic expressions such as “the great sacrifices” made for “the honorable peace” (Akgül 2005: 5, 10, 11). Actually, Ankara government has been aware of sensitive political dynamics in Tehran. Therefore, dyadic feeling rules has oscillated between mutual “suspicion and sympathy” (Erdal 2012: 81). As Mustafa Kemal publicly acknowledged Reza Khan held some “dictatorial tendencies.” Despite diplomatic suspicions about the political uncertainty in Tehran, Turkish policymakers saw Reza Khan as the viable key for consolidation of stability in Iran’s internal affairs and its external relations with Turkey (Akgül 2005: 11). Reza Khan’s critical domestic and dyadic position was also reiterated by the Turkish ambassador. After meeting with Reza Khan on 7 Sept. 1923, Muhiddin Pasha painted a blunt picture of the status quo and portrayed future expectations in Ankara-Tehran relations: Shah [Ahmed] is willing to reign the country under Russian protection … Shah’s main opponent, the Minister of Defense [Reza Khan], has survived four assassination attempts and managed to move independently … Defense Minister is the man who holds the power in Iran. This man is the friend for us. After his re-formation of Iranian body politic, he would support us sympathetically. (Çetinsaya 2000: 786 quotes from Şimşir 1996: 86)

With these expectations, Ankara government has enhanced politicalmilitary support provided to the prospective local partner. Reza Khan’s assumption of the Iranian Prime Ministry on 28 Oct. and the proclamation of the Turkish Republic on 29 Oct. 1923 have created extra moral motivation for the Ankara government to actively back the formation of a republican regime in Tehran. Breaking with the past Ottoman tradition, the Turkish government has ruled out the use of the word “Ajam” in official expressions (Erdal 2012: 82, 84), as it had implied negative connotations for the Iranians. This diplomatic gesture was aimed to prevent persistence of negative emotions offending the Iranian side. By avoiding psychological disturbance in the neighboring hearts, Ankara would better help cultivate pro-Turkish feelings and reinforce the republican cause among the Iranian masses. Nonetheless, the political conflict between hard-line republicans and their soft-line opponents (mainly monarchists, conservatives and democrats) poured into the Iranian streets and bazaar. The Iranian polity has lacked social and psychological bases that would support the republican revolution along the Turkish model. The Iranian republican project has

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faced an unexpected backlash after Turkey’s abrogation of the Caliphate on 3 Mar. 1924. The Iranian politics has been mired by domestic unrest. Conservative groups led by the clergy did fear from losing their powerful position under the new, presumably secularist/anti-theocratic regime. Democrats were still defiant and wary about Reza Khan’s dictatorial rule. The strength of the opposition has forced Reza Khan to withdraw from the ideals of republic. Due to the mobbing of demonstrators, he could not execute his republican plan that called for ceremonial (re)opening of the Iranian Majlis on Nowruz, the Persian New Year’s Day. The conditions of civic unrest worsened on 22 Mar. Reza Khan’s resorting to violence turned counter-productive, as he lost the popular support in Tehran. In order to reestablish his political authority over the Iranian public, Reza Khan absolutely abandoned republicanism and stroke a monarchical deal with the clerics in Qum (Çetinsaya 2000: 787–789; Akgül 2005: 15; Erdal 2012: 82). In his declaration, Reza Khan emphasized that he has “chosen to respect popular sentiments” and called for the rallying of Iranian masses under his national government. The social psychology of monarchical rule in Iran proved peculiarly resilient. Turkish leaders, including Mustafa Kemal, were quite disappointed by the failure of republican project in the neighboring political house (Cin 2007: 49–53; 79–81). Indeed, the Ankara government has been aware of the historical disparities that shaped Turkish and Iranian political houses. Over the course of the past century, the Ottoman-Turkish polity has made significant progress to keep up with the modernization processes ruling over the European neighborhood. The Turkish constitu̇ tional development has begun by the rulings of Sened-i I ttifak (1808), Tanzimat (1839) and Kanun-u Esasi (1876) and progressed until the revolution of 1908. During this period, the Qajar-Iranian political undertakings have displayed dyadic discrepancies. There was a psycho-social time lag and a generational gap between Ottoman-Turkish and Qajar-Iranian politics of modernization. While talking with Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish Minister of Education Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver) succinctly put the historical differences enduring inside two neighboring political houses: In today’s Iran, it is impossible for anyone to succeed in the republican movement. Because they lack enlightened officer corps, awakened and conscious generations, just like ours, who has come of age in modern schools and universities, formed since the time of Tanzimat [1839]. The Turkish Republic has been formed by these generations. Without them, could it be possible [for us] to establish the republican movement in Turkey? (Cin 2007: 81)

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The Turkish sense of being in front has been mirrored as being back in Iranian psyche. Likewise, the sentiment of lagging behind was later spilled into Reza Khan’s words: “What could be the East, a whole, Turkey; and a half, Iran.” Indeed, the emotional making of Iranian half-ness has been related to the Farsi inferiority complex. This deeply embedded psychosocial weakness could easily turn against the Turks and feed feelings of “enmity” in Ankara-Tehran relations (Esendal 1999: 53, 81). Relational Struggles: Radical Hard-Liners Versus Moderate Soft-Liners The feeling of frustration reminded the fact that Ankara’s influence over Tehran would be constrained by internal dynamics of Iranian politics. These political limitations have certainly shaped the social psychology of diplomatic exchange in Ankara-Tehran interactions. In the post-war period, both countries have experienced fundamental rule changes. Foundational domestic transformations left lingering implications for dyadic relations between Turkey and Iran. The Turkish regime established a secularist-republican rule of order inside its borders. In a sense, Mustafa Kemal was moved by the psycho-social spirit of Rousseau (if not Kant) while deliberately desiring “like units” outside Turkey’s territorial borders. This philosophical logic called for republican rule both at home and abroad to achieve peaceful interactions among nations and realize friendly inter-state relations. A like-minded republican government in Tehran would essentially assist Turkey’s security along the eastern borders and hence constitute a better neighbor for Ankara. However, Turkish neighborly aspirations did not resonate well with traditional rules of theological-political game in Iran. The Shii religious establishment has habitually upheld the privileged status of a popular political player. These customary privileges allow autonomous influence over making of political rules in Iran. Mujtahids were quickly captured by processes of state-led secularization in Turkey and consequentially realized that a similar secular government in Iran would most likely attack clerical hold on political power. Mujtahids fed sectarian fear and mobilized political anger toward the secularists in Iran and Turkey. Feeling of disdain has gradually grown among rivaling identity groups. The dyadic secular-sectarian schisms have caused anxiety in both sides. Foundational cleavages have emerged between modernist and conservative ruling elites. The ideological antagonisms of the opposing transnational (political-clerical) factions were discharged into

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affective-normative spheres of interaction and circulated among peoples in Turkey and Iran. The emotional-moral contagion of dislike affected dyadic interactions between two neighboring countries. Nonetheless, governments in Ankara and Tehran have managed the hearts and controlled the impact of religious backlash on their longer-term bilateral exchange relations. Affective-normative bonds of neighborhood and transnational ties of friendship were co-founded by mutual diplomatic practices of TurkishIranian politicians. On 17 Nov. 1924, Mustafa Kemal accepted Sheikh Sadık Khan Tabatabai, the new Iranian Ambassador appointed by Prime Minister Reza Khan. As a theological figure, pertaining credentials of seyyid (descendant of the prophet), Tabatabai has previously spent some ̇ time in Istanbul to support the constitutional movement in Iran. While extending his letter of confidence, Tabatabai referred to theological themes to restore religious solidarity between the two regimes. In a rather reactive diplomatic mood, Mustafa Kemal addressed the Iranian ambassador through short and blunt discursive engagement. Here, one should note the fact that dispositional discontent toward Tabatabai’s ­clerical-conservative credentials did not devour Mustafa Kemal’s political engagement with the Iranian diplomatic mission in Ankara. At that time, Turkish government desperately needed political partners to balance the British influence in regional affairs. In this regard, Turkish foreign policy makers were mainly concerned about the resolution of the Mosul dispute through international negotiations commenced on 20 Sept. 1924. The breaking of Sheikh Said rebellion on 13 Feb. 1925 has challenged Turkish government’s policies toward local Kurdish populations and weakened Ankara’s political position in international negotiations over Mosul. Due to the lingering of Mosul question, until the 1926 i­nternational agreement, trans-boundary Kurdish movements constituted a common threat for territorial integrity of both Turkey and Iran. Against the backdrop of pan-Kurdist political aspirations and British colonial penetration into northern Iraq, Mustafa Kemal sought neighborly collaboration with Reza Khan. For regional purposes, Ankara government refrained from alienating the Iranian regime. Turkey did not meddle into Azeri/Turkmen internal uprisings in Iran. By doing so, Ankara also aimed to prevent Soviet influence over Tehran and the larger region (Çetinsaya 2000: 790–794). However, Turkish leaders remained wary about domestic developments in Iran. They cautiously watched the unfolding of events under Reza

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Khan’s rule. Iranian Ambassador Tabatabai had to work harder to dissuade diplomatic doubts prevailing in Ankara. By Oct. 1925, Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü (Aras) privately assured Tabatabai that “Turkish government was determined to pursue policy of friendship towards Reza Khan” (Çetinsaya 2000: 791). Tevfik Rüştü also promised to publicly acknowledge the friendly character of the Turkish political posture toward the neighboring regime. The publishing of Tevfik Rüştü’s diplomatic comments turned into a blunder. Indeed, he was basically conveying messages of goodwill and support. Turkish intentions turned upside down and were misconstrued by the Iranian side. According to Tabatabai, Iranians in general and Reza Khan in particular became sensitive since they perceived signs of contempt. From Tabatabai’s perspective, contemptuous discursive manners, like “condescending” and “belittling,” reflected that Turkey cares “less about neighboring Iran” but “perhaps more about Chile or Guatemala.” Paraphrasing his words, Turkey’s relationship with Iran should be different from those of Britain, France and the United States who often treat Iran as if they were caring “a twelve years old child” (Çetinsaya 2000: 791). The post-war diplomatic context and discursive encounters emergent in historical narratives are quite revealing since they imply certain hints about relational codes of affective-normative exchange between rulers of (post-Ottoman) Turkey and (post-Qajar) Iran. To a certain extent, the early-modern period of the Turkish-Iranian relationship was marked by affective charges, usually observed among close companions. The affective-normative characteristics of early diplomatic practices expose perceptual markers of dyadic superiority and inferiority in Ankara-Tehran exchange relations. These temporal interactions were ruled by complex configuration of ego-centric feelings (like self-esteem and pride) and alteroriented sentiments (such as respect and resentment). The dyadic feeling rules were also structured by ambivalent emotional beliefs and complicated mirror images, held by rivaling (modernist/secular vs. conservative/sectarian) elite factions and identity groups. Mixed ideological feelings and political emotions resulted in dual diplomatic dispositions swinging between affective-normative collaboration/partnership and psycho-social disengagement and rivalry. The defunct dynastic rule of Qajars was formally brought to end by the Iranian Majlis on 31 Oct. 1925. Even at that point in time, Ankara was not fully withdrawn from its republican foreign policy agenda in Iran. One week later, Turkish Foreign Ministry requested from the newly appointed

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Ambassador Memduh Şevket (Esendal) Bey to convey a private message to Reza Khan recommending him to opt for “presidency” in a republican regime rather than “being shah” in a monarchical order. Turkish diplomatic advice presumed that republican option would be better for modernist-reformist transformation in Iran. Ankara government’s persistence on the republican project reflected that Turkey tied its hand to political transformation of Iran by Reza Khan. Once again Turkish government was frustrated, this time by the proclamation of Constitutional Majlis on 12 Dec. 1925, which entitled Reza Khan as the new Shah of Iran. At his meetings with Memduh Şevket in Nov. and Dec., Reza Khan seemed to be perceptive about Turkish political anger and so he felt the need to “explain why he could not promulgate the republic” and how he was still committed to modernist-reformist ideals notwithstanding his domestic predicaments (Esendal 1999: 17–19, 52–58, 73–75; Cin 2007: 81–84; Çetinsaya 2000: 792; Akgül 2005: 14, 15). Memduh Şevket’s impression of Reza Khan was quite positive. Like his predecessor Muhiddin Pasha, he thought that a strong military leader, like Reza Khan, would better serve Turkish political interests in Iran. Since Memduh Şevket has formerly served in Baku, he got accustomed to the Azeri-Turkish dialect and improved his fluency in Farsi. He also received experiential knowledge about local dynamics and international intricacies of Persian politics. Correspondingly, Reza Khan’s approach to the new Turkish Ambassador was cordial. He articulated two important diplomatic messages to Memduh Şevket. First, Reza Khan wanted to pay a visit to Ankara. Secondly, he sought to establish a private channel to discuss special issues of bilateral concern. These special contacts would go hand in hand with official diplomatic communication. Under those political circumstances, Reza Khan seemed more eager to exchange private messages with Mustafa Kemal, and the Ankara government. As Memduh Şevket noted, Turkish government has been offended by the idea of a new “dynastic rule” and re-making of “Palace,” rather than popular party, politics in Iran. Initially, it was evident that Reza Khan was trying to establish a domestic power base. For this purpose, he sought to balance political relations with first Russia, and then Britain. Realizing these predicaments, and also having been more concerned about regional uncertainty surrounding the Mosul question, Ankara reluctantly accepted the historical choice made by the Iranian house (Esendal 1999: 9–19, 22–32, 41–51). Despite psycho-social dissatisfaction and frustration, tying hands to Reza Khan’s dynastic rule demonstrated affective management of dyadic

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diplomacy by the Turkish government (Esendal 1999: 53–87; Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009b: 358). It also indicated the fact that how rules of feeling have been co-founded and co-operationalized in the relationship between Ankara and Tehran at the very early stages of post-war period. Even though the republican diplomatic gambit failed and turned into an unfulfilled dream for Turkey, at least Reza Khan learned from Mustafa Kemal that he should be sensitive and empathetic about political ruling of resentment in Ankara. Dyadic management of hearts and affective rulemaking in both capitals would be key for political foundations of friendly bilateral relations between two neighboring nation-states. On 5 Jan. 1926, Turkish President Mustafa Kemal sent the official telegram of celebration to the Iranian Shah Reza. Furthermore, a high-level Turkish delegation attended the royal ceremonies in Apr. 1926. The fantastic flight of the two Turkish (Junker) war planes over Tehran proved to be a remarkable diplomatic gesture supporting the rule of the new crown. The Turkish military pilots presented the official gifts of Mustafa Kemal to Reza Shah. He accepted the presents as “souvenirs of his friend and brother.” He expressed that his heart has been filled with “honor and hope” (Şener 2012: 391; Çetinsaya 2000: 793; Akgül 2005: 16; Cin 2007: 89; Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009b: 358). Through mutual normative recognition and with affective energies of foundational rulers, President Mustafa Kemal and Shah Reza, Turkey and Iran established a new relationship in their neighborhood. Even though these two sympathetic leaders desired to move beyond the traditional legacy of ancient (Ottoman-Qajar) regimes domestically, they could not overcome regional dilemmas of the post-war period. Due to contextual structures and practices, Turkey-Iran exchanges have developed with dyadic complications. That is to say, the foundational history of Turkish-Iranian bilateral interactions has revealed a “dual (two-dimensional) structure” determined by relational patterns of partnership and “collaboration” on one hand and “rivalry” and confrontation on the other. Over the coming decades, these historical structures and practices of neighborhood have mutually transformed the psycho-social relationship between two nation-states (Çetinsaya 2000: 795–796). When the Turkish-Russian friendship agreement was declared in Dec. 1925, Iranian fears and suspicions have resurfaced. Tehran perceived hostile intentions, such as the likelihood of Turkish irredentism toward Azerbaijan. Iranian wariness has increased due to the activities of Azeri nationalists in Turkey. The civic empowerment of Iranian diaspora, living

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in Turkey, was another political-diplomatic concern. Driven by these anxieties, Tehran approached Ankara rather than Moscow. On the other hand, Ankara wanted to check Tehran’s soft-line accommodationist engagement with local Kurdish tribes and hard-line assimilationist policies toward domestic Azeri population. With these expectations, the Iranian court minister Abd al-Hussein Taymurtash (Reza Shah’s chief deputy) and the Turkish Ambassador Memduh Şevket negotiated a settlement in Tehran. The negotiations were not disclosed until the final stage. The signing of “Bilateral Friendship and Mutual Security” agreement on 22 Apr. 1926, has reinforced the diplomatic recognition process between new Turkish and Iranian regimes. This treaty has founded the legal basis of trans-governmental relationship between two neighboring nation-states (Çetinsaya 1999: 149–152). By securing its relationship with Tehran, Ankara has gained further regional confidence to resolve the local Mosul dispute with Iraq and Britain on 5 June 1926. The Turkey-Iran treaty of Apr. 1926 has founded the normative basis for future relational practices between Ankara and Tehran. Both sides agreed to jointly deal with common threats in their neighborhood. Transboundary and tribal characteristics of Kurdish insurgency constituted a common concern for both regimes. Both signatories accepted the pledges of “non-aggression” and “passive neutrality.” These codes intended to balance the threat of overt imperial-international intrusions and address covert colonial-tribal actions in trans-boundary areas of common neighborhood. In case any side was faced with military actions of third parties, the other side would remain inactive and “neutral.” Lest any of the sides should worry about regional (in)stability, states of Turkey and Iran pledged to prevent formation of illegal organizations inside their local borders, stop criminal structures and practices that violate public security and order in each other’s sovereign territories and eliminate radical anti-regime activities against governments of legitimate rule. These foundational clauses of joint rule-making have been affective in building trust between two nationalist regimes and enhanced the normative basis of bilateral collaboration against the common threat of Kurdish tribal insurgency around Turkish-Iranian borders. The two neighbors have also displayed collective will to improve bilateral cooperation in areas of trade, customs, postaltelegraph services, consulate-visa affairs and extradition of criminals (Şener 2012: 389; Çetinsaya 1999: 152, 153). The foundational Turkey-Iran accord of 1926 helped to promote a collective diplomatic culture and build cross-border security and regional

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stability. It has envisioned to establish mutual norms of “sincere friendship” and “eternal affiliation” between two historical neighbors. In the words of Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü, the first treaty sealed by the states of Turkey and Iran has come to fruition as a result of “delighting developments” which concurred favorable domestic conditions in both countries. The “common destiny and collective interests” between the two neighboring nations have formed the political, economic and geographic basis of the historical agreement. By vindicating rules of peaceful engagement and political-military “solidarity,” Turkey and Iran have aimed to prevent regional instability around their borderlands. The two governments were also wary about the Soviet intentions. Over the coming months, Ankara assisted Tehran to sign a separate bilateral treaty with Moscow. Due to the Soviet-Iranian political rift, these efforts have failed in Oct. 1926. In terms of perceptions, Ankara has remained “anxious” and “angry” about Tehran’s soft-line policies toward the local Kurdish threat (Şener 2012: 389–391; Cin 2007: 86–91; Akgül 2005: 6; Çetinsaya 1999: 154; Erendil 1976: 128). Not surprisingly, before the resolution of Mosul dispute in June 1926, Kurdish militias have re-emerged across Turkey-Iran borderlands. The intermittent revolts around the Ağrı area have lingered from June 1926 to July 1927. The security crisis in Ankara-Tehran relationship has deepened by mutually antagonistic press campaigns. Feelings of reciprocal resentment were exchanged (Çetinsaya 1999: 155, 156). In the meantime, panKurdist ambitions have intensified. A clandestine Kurdish congress was gathered to re-design anti-Turkish policies. To achieve their local objectives inside Turkey, Kurds decided to end their disagreement with Armenians. They sought ways to reconcile with the Tehran government, and with their Iranian “brothers,” and to collaborate with Britain and France, the mandating powers in Iraq and Syria (Cin 2007: 99, 100). Sponsored by various European powers, the Armenian (Tashnak) and Kurdish (Khoybun) committees have reached a clandestine concord to join forces against the Turkish army. The secret alliance was directed to subvert the local status quo again in the Ağrı cross-border region (Değerli 2008). ̇ The committee of Khoybun has delegated the ex-Ottoman officer Ihsan Nuri as the chief of militants. Due to the mountainous terrain in the bilateral borderlands, Kurdish insurgents were easily escaping to the Iranian safe havens and getting ready for the following hit-and-run campaigns. The Turkish unilateral military operations have proved insufficient to eradicate the Kurdish insurgency around the Ağrı-Beyazıt border area. The second

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round of the Ağrı revolts in June 1927 has caused the resurfacing of frontier problem between Turkey and Iran. In Oct. 1927, the “Beyazıt incident” caused a diplomatic crisis between Ankara and Tehran. Upon Ankara government’s request, the Turkish hostages detained by the insurgents were immediately released. Yet, the Iranian side displayed reluctance to negotiate the terms of border re-demarcation. Consequently, Ankara recalled the Turkish ambassador from Tehran. The assertive diplomatic message was well received by Reza Shah. He immediately sent his special representative Mohammed Ali Foroughi to mend the political fences with Ankara (Şener 2012: 391–393; Çetinsaya 1999: 156–159). President Mustafa Kemal sought peaceful ways to reach a political settlement. The Turkish government established a general inspectorate for the cities in eastern Anatolia, which included Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, ̇ Mardin, Siirt, Urfa and Van. Ibrahim Tali (Öngören), the Member of Parliament from Diyarbakır, has served as the general inspector between Dec. 1927 and Dec. 1932. The first political step taken by I ̇ brahim Tali was to declare a general amnesty. Since these soft-line measures could not bring the intended local consequences, the Turkish government opted for hard-line policies advocated mostly by Prime Minister ̇ ̇ Mustafa Ismet (Inönü). On the other side, Tehran seemed not so empathetic about sharing Ankara’s security concerns in cross-­border Kurdish areas. Despite their goodwill gestures, the Iranian side was reluctant to extend neighborly assistance, let alone actively joining in the Turkish military operations. However it may seem odd, Iranian leadership has been ruled by particular “fear” from Turkey’s irredentist territorial ambitions toward Azerbaijan. Time and again, both Reza Shah and Foroughi Khan were haunted by the prospect of pan-Turkist’s returning to power, ­particularly after Mustafa Kemal’s passing from the political scene. Tired of being failed to convince Tevfik Rüştü on the validity of ill-fated 1913 border protocol, Foroughi himself privately confessed: “Pan-Turanism dies hard in Turkey” (Çetinsaya 1999: 159). Turkey’s diplomatic determination was perceived as hegemonic and created “resentment” on the Iranian side. Due to Tehran’s reluctance, Ankara failed to reach a conclusive border settlement with its neighbor. Instead, they signed a supplementary protocol on 15 June 1928. The two additional clauses were formally attached to the previous agreement and called for pro-“active neutrality” in case any one side encounters “hostile actions” of the third parties. The joint normative intention was to further strengthen dyadic

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norms of “political collaboration” and neighborly “economic exchange,” and prevent the risk of imperial-colonial warfare in the shared neighborhood and establish local solidarity for regional peace and stability. Yet, the signing of supplementary protocol with Tehran could not bring about the desired local security for Ankara (Akgül 2005: 7; Cin 2007: 92–102; Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009b: 360–361; Çetinsaya 1999: 160). Nonetheless, the economic aspect of the agreement could become much more salient due to the financial burdens shared by both neighbors. At that time, the global financial system and the international structure of hegemony has begun to experience early shocks of a coming earthquake. The colonial decline of Pax Britannica and the imperial rise of Pax Americana have created a multi-polar world order. The global rivalry among great powers induced an environment of relative regional autonomy. Led by American and French foreign policy makers, the BriandKellogg pact of Aug. 1928, which was initially signed by the United States, France, Britain, Germany, Italy and Japan, has aimed to prevent the making of war among all nations. Even though international peace has been espoused as a general ideal, political practices of European great powers have remained far from keeping their affective-normative commitments. The rules of international game fed fear and uncertainty into world social psychology. The British-German rivalry has been deepened by geopolitical struggle among France and Italy, and the United States and the Soviet Union. Global powers raced to gain new local friends, and strived not to lose their old regional partners. The historical psychology of 1928–1938 period has reinforced a feeling of autonomy among regional players (Barlas and Yilmaz 2016; Barlas and Gülmez 2018). Realizing emergent risks and international opportunities, Turkey and Iran held shared political desires to benefit from the advantageous regional climate of their historical neighborhood.

Foundations of Progressive Engagement (1929–1945) By the onset of global depression in 1929, the Turkish bureaucracy switched the gears from political development to economic growth. The modernization project, driven by “etatist” political ideology (Barlas 1998), has run full swing to save Turkey from disasters of “economic backwardness” (Türegün 2016). The catastrophic global economic conditions have further pushed Ankara toward Tehran. Moreover, the regional

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security circumstances have deteriorated under the impact of imperialist struggle over the Middle East. Once again pan-Kurdist insurgency was at the center stage of covert international activities designed to interfere in  local geopolitics surrounding Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria (Değerli 2008). In spite of the global strains engulfing the regional horizon, Turkish and Iranian governments have remained committed to experiential norms of neighborhood in order to manage re-emergence of border crises. After a series of diplomatic-political wrangling, particularly over the dead 1913 frontier protocol, both sides exchanged notes to establish the joint border commission in Apr. 1929. Nonetheless, the commission’s slow pace has remained far from meeting Ankara’s urgent expectations. The intermittent cross-border Kurdish uprisings around the Ağrı (Ararat) Mountain have threatened the Turkey-Iran relationship (Şener 2012: 395; Çetinsaya 1999: 158–162). The Turkish Cabinet gathered on 28 Dec. 1929 to address the ensuing local instability in Ağrı district (Cin 2007: 102–105; Köçer 2004: 384–386). The historical meeting has laid down the details of Turkey’s crisis management strategy, which would rely on incremental staging of various tactics such as “coercive diplomacy” and “political-military escalation” over the June–Sept. 1930 period. In early July, the Turkish press has unleashed the propaganda campaign that increased the social-psychological pressure on the Iranian regime. The dyadic tension has arisen after the exchange of reciprocal diplomatic notes. On 27 July, the Turkish government sent the second diplomatic note to reiterate two regional security demands from Tehran: (1) re-demarcation of the border through mutual land compensations that would entirely leave the p ­ roblematic Little Ağrı area to Turkey’s strategic control and (2) permission to conduct “hot pursuit” operations (against the insurgents fleeing) inside the Iranian borderlands (Şener 2012: 395–399). The Turkish Ambassador in Tehran has proved unsuitable to manage the ongoing crisis. Memduh Şevket (Esendal), the renowned man of letters, has been characterized as a dovish figure. His diplomatic mission might not be successful in securing Ankara’s two main political expectations from Tehran: assisting the suppression of trans-boundary Kurdish revolts and facilitating the re-demarcation in local border area. Memduh Şevket Bey was recalled upon formal “resignation.” In his place, a comrade of Mustafa Kemal, relatively hawkish Münir Hüsrev (Gerede) Bey, was dispatched. The former officer [Rıdvanbeyoğlu] Hüsrev was known for his achievement during a counter-insurgency campaign in

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Gerede province. President Mustafa Kemal expected that Hüsrev Bey would restore success in Turkish “policy of peace and friendship by solving the frontier problem” with Iran. In contrast, Prime Minister Mustafa ̇ Ismet instructed Hüsrev Bey on using diplomatic coercion and pursuing a tough line against the regime in Tehran (Cin 2007: 106–108; Çetinsaya 1999: 162–164; 2003: 124; Akgül 2005: 9; Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009b: 362–363). The crisis escalated by reciprocal exchange of notes in early Aug. 1930. The ultimatum of Ankara threatened Tehran with the total military occupation of Little Ağrı area, including the critical environs of Aybey Mountains inside the Iranian borders. As publicly declared by Hüsrev Bey, Ankara’s target was to eradicate the malicious “abscess poisoning the body of friendship in Turkey-Iran” historical neighborhood. To placate Ankara, Tehran offered the conduct of simultaneous operations. By late Aug., both sides seemed unable to resolve their outstanding differences over the modalities of military actions in the borderlands. Besides, Ankara has pushed Moscow to exert more pressure on Tehran. Even under those tense conditions, the joint Turkey-Iran commission gathered in Iğdır to discuss border re-demarcation and land compensation. In Sept. 1930, the Turkish forces conducted cross-border operations and took military control over the riots by surrounding the area around the Little Ağrı Mountain. The de facto military occupation was part of Turkey’s overall crisis management strategy. Despite Tehran’s protests, Turkey did not withdraw from the key military positions inside the Iranian territory. Ankara offered land swaps instead of ending the military incursion (Şener 2012: 401–405, 408–411; Cin 2007: 109). While presenting his letter of confidence to the shah on 15 Sept. 1930, Hüsrev Bey defended Turkey’s military position by deploying strategic security justifications. Shah seemed quite disgusted by the political caricatures published in Turkish newspapers that portrayed him, and hence Iran, as assisting Kurdish insurgents around the Ağrı Mountain. In response, Hüsrev Bey emphasized the deep rule of “anger” reigning in Ankara. Turkish hearts were governed by strong resentment against their neighbors. This “negative atmosphere” could be eliminated only through enhanced cooperation in bilateral political-military affairs (Cin 2007: 110, 111; Çetinsaya 1999: 165). For more than a year, Hüsrev Bey has worked hard to resolve the diplomatic dispute over dyadic delimitation of bilateral borders. In Oct. 1931, he went to Ankara to receive the final approval on the making of state boundaries. Upon Hüsrev Bey’s proposal, Mustafa Kemal has sent Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü, as the head of Turkish

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­ elegation, going to Tehran on 9 Jan. 1932. In order to address bilateral d economic issues, Mahmut Celal (Bayar) was also involved in the diplomatic team. Since international and regional “winds” have been backing Turkish diplomacy, Ankara seemed confident more than ever. Tehran would no longer risk damaging the fences of neighborhood with Turkey and refrained from incurring further relational “harm” (Çetinsaya 1999: 166). In case of a deadlock in the negotiations, the Turkish side would accept Reza Shah’s diplomatic arbitration in order to reach a final settlement. Since the Iranian military officials saw the exchange of one particular hill as unfavorable, that moment of emergency appeared, and hence Tevfik Rüştü requested that the head of Iranian delegation Mohammed Ali Foroughi ask the shah to arbitrate on the hill issue (Şener 2012: 406–408). Even though strategic resistance was strong, Reza Shah defended the Turkish position quite empathetically (Şener 2012: 408; Çetinsaya 2003: 124; Cin 2007: 112, 113). The excerpt below reveals Reza Shah’s political-diplomatic logic and confirms his affective-normative commitments toward maintaining good neighborly relationship with Turkey: You do not understand me. It is not this or that hill which is important: it is the settlement, once and for all, of our frontier disputes with Turkey. The disagreements between our two countries in the past, which have always been to the profit of our enemies, must cease, and a sincere friendship based on our mutual interests be established between Iran and Turkey. If we are allied and united, I do not fear anybody. (Çetinsaya 2003: 124–125 quotes from Arfa 1964: 230–231)

On 23 Jan. 1932, the two neighbors have agreed to resolve the ensuing border crisis and decided to cooperate on lingering matters of law and order. The physical demarcation of bilateral border would be finalized gradually up until 1934. Reza Shah was happy about the bargaining process. After the negotiations, he assigned one of the most sophisticated (Junkers) planes to the Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü to assist his timely arrival to the League of Nations’ meeting in Geneva. Paid as a return visit, Foroughi has attended the Republic Day (29 Oct. 1932) ceremonies in Ankara. In his interview to Turkish daily Hakimiyet-i Milliye, Foroughi reiterated their political commitment to further enhance economic and security cooperation. For Tevfik Rüştü, the renewal of 1926 and 1928 accords and negotiation of additional extradition agreement assumed higher priority. Turkey was also in search of a regional arrangement among

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Ankara, Tehran and Baghdad. Ankara has also kept diplomatic interest to facilitate Tehran’s political relations with Moscow and London. On 5 Nov. 1932, the two states restored their former “Friendship Agreement” and reinforced their previous rule-making practices with the signing of “Security, Neutrality and Economic Cooperation Agreement.” The reinstatement of friendly rules of engagement highlighted the common will to advance Ankara-Tehran relationship at the economic front. Turkey and Iran pledged to provide “the most favored nation” status to each other’s diplomatic representatives. This joint normative commitment reflected social-psychological building of “confidence” between two neighbors. Now, it was high time for the opening of a new era of commercial cooperation between two neighboring states. From this time on, Turkish government has developed a softer approach, and accommodated the Pahlavi regime, in resolving other bilateral issues of low politics (Cin 2007: 114–116; Akgül 2005: 10; Çetinsaya 1999: 167, 168). In 1932 and 1933, Ankara and Tehran have exchanged diplomatic messages to facilitate an official meeting between President Mustafa Kemal and Shah Reza. Finally, Reza Shah displayed his political willingness to pay a visit to Ankara in 1934. According to him, this visit would be a historical occasion to open up a “new era of happiness” and re-making of neighborhood relations between “two brotherly nations” and “two great leaders” (Gerede 1952: 263–267; 274–276). The shah’s historical visit has facilitated the signing of extensive cooperation agreements in Dec. 1934. These treaties were covering the sectors of commerce, transportation and border security (Altan 2018: 8). According to the final border agreement of 27 May 1937, the strategic terrain of Ağrı Mountain was totally left to Turkey, while the agricultural area of Kotur (near the city of Van) was extended to Iran. Border demarcation processes have eventually led to progress in bilateral economic cooperation. Foundational rulers Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah have jointly worked to improve regional collaboration, which ultimately paved the way for making of a “regional pact” among the Eastern nations (Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009b: 363). Founding Fathers of Friendship: Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah’s exchanging of sincere messages have helped to develop strong diplomatic ties between two nation-states. The state-to-state relationship has been re-established on affective-normative foundations of friendship. The founding fathers were keen on not bothering their political relationship due to their personal differences, most visi-

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ble in their leadership traits and lifestyles. Quite the contrary, their inter-personal practices elevated common commitment of courtesy to the diplomatic stage of international relations. Social psychology of altruistic assistance and empathetic help have cascaded from their mutually supportive interactions (Cin 2007: 127–131, 136–140; Gerede 1952: 266–275). Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah have become role models to promote positive relational engagement between two neighbors. Through positive bilateral interactions, two leaders have managed affective politics of amity. Rules of sympathy and sincerity have governed social psychology of friendship in Turkey-Iran relations. The modernist reforms of Gazi Mustafa Kemal have constituted “psychological” support for Reza Shah. In this regard, Ankara has set a viable model for Tehran. Regardless of domestic differences, Turkey’s reform process has been a source of political inspiration and historical emulation for Iran (Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009b: 357). In a sense, Tehran was trailing behind Ankara. As Reza Shah told the Turkish Ambassador Hüsrev Bey, what he has been doing in Iran was “to walk along the way drawn by Turkey’s savior, in other words to imitate Gazi” (Gerede 1952: 266). Consequently, shared “feelings of friendship” have created a “shining” climate to warm up political partnership between two neighbors (Saray 1999: 112). Reciprocal rules of progressive engagement have ultimately reigned over Turkish-Iranian relations. Upon the official invitation sent by Mustafa Kemal, Reza Shah’s visit to Turkey took place between 10 June and 6 July 1934. The Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Foroughi, holding the title of Zekau’l-Mulk, has ardently lobbied for this historical visit. Foroughi has already established close personal ties with Mustafa Kemal while acting as the Iranian representative to Ankara during the 1928–1930 period. In addition to Foroughi, principal court ministers Abd al-Hussein Taymurtash and Ali Akbar Davar have similarly emulated the reform program implemented by Mustafa Kemal (see also Oberling 1994; 1997: 209; Yapp 1996: 173–175). After assuming the office of prime minister, Foroughi has begun to “orchestrate” pro-Western secular nationalist reform projects in Iran (Vekili 2003: 94–97). In Mar. 1934, Foroughi addressed the Iranian Parliament with notable explanations: Iranian and Turkish nations have confronted each other for centuries. The historical opposition has brought mutually destructive consequences for both countries. Now, the two leaders, Shah and Gazi, have committed themselves to their countries’ progress. They realized that Iran and Turkey

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should not be divided by disputes. They could overcome deep seated disagreements through policy of friendship and brotherhood. (Cin 2007: 118 quotes from Anbarcıoğlu 1983: 19, 20)

Obviously, the shah’s visit would provide first-hand exposition and perceptual knowledge about the state-led Westernization and secularistnationalist political mobilization in contiguous Turkey. The historicalhistoriographical accounts of the visit reveal some salient features of the social-psychological climate. These discursive-contextual indications provide significant evidence to understand modern foundations of neighborhood relationship established by the governments of Ankara and Tehran. Long before the shah’s state visit, Turkish government has devoted enormous efforts for the preparation of official receptions and public ceremonies. The streets and squares of all cities, involved in the itinerary, were renovated. The inter-city roads were refurbished. Almost all places of the diplomatic route were decorated with the arches full of Turkish and Iranian flags. Mustafa Kemal himself checked the arrangements in the capital Ankara and sent official inspectors to oversee the preparations in other places as well. The city of I ̇stanbul has been particularly ready for Turkey’s “grandeur guest.” The military factory in Kayseri was appointed to assemble the war plane to be gifted officially to the shah. The pictures of Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah were engraved on both sides of the officially issued state medals to be presented to the Iranian side (Akgül 2005: 17–19, 28, 38; Atuk 2017: 233). To fully finance the state expenditures for Shah’s visit, the Council of Ministers took a decision to allocate budgetary resources from existing and impending fiscal years (Cin 2007: 119–121). The historical visit has marked the highpoint of “golden years” in Ankara-Tehran exchange relations (Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009b: 358–359). Indeed, this was the first (and the last) official state visit for him. At that time, state visits of such length were exceptional. The visit has carried a number of “political meanings” for the neighboring states. First and foremost, governments of Turkey and Iran have sent a strong diplomatic message to the wider international community and displayed their determination to maintain peace and stability in their region. Given the rising of geopolitical struggle among the European capitals, Ankara and Tehran have  intended to build a regional balance of power. The shah’s extraordinary visit was closely watched by London, Berlin, Moscow and Rome. Even the long route of the visit has indicated strategic signals to be received by the global players (Atuk 2017: 219–225, 232–242).

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The official schedule of shah’s trip was announced on 26 May 1934. As scheduled, the Iranian delegation entered the Turkish territory from the Gürbulak border gate on the morning of 10 June. The Iranian Shah was officially welcomed by Ali Sait (Akbaytogan) Pasha, representing the Turkish President. The joint military ceremony began after the echoing of national anthems across the inter-state border. From the beginning till the end of the shah’s visit, the Turkish nation-state has been mobilized as a whole. From the top to the bottom, the Turkish leaders and the people have displayed unprecedented hospitality and generosity. The Turkish side deliberately deployed a kind of social-psychological campaign to demonstrate their past achievements in all areas of modern public life. The Turkish model of modernization was promoted in order to improve bilateral relations with the neighboring Iranian brothers. In the background, the deeper diplomatic intention was to create affective-normative influence over the Iranian political house. The long visit has provided ample opportunity for social exchange and psychological interaction between two political neighbors (Akgül 2005). By following the roadways of Beyazıt-Iğdır-Kars-Erzurum-Bayburt-­ Gümüşhane, the Iranian delegation arrived at the Trabzon port. The historical warship Yavuz took them to the Samsun harbor. From there, they got on the special train to Ankara. After welcoming Reza Shah at the train station, Turkish President Mustafa Kemal himself accompanied his counterpart all along the diplomatic trip. The state capital Ankara has observed the unusual making of a public festival (bayram). By the end of Ankara ̇ program, the two heads of state moved to Izmir, tracking the rail route of ̇ Eskişehir-Afyon-Manisa. Subsequent to a two-day stay in Izmir, Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah visited Soma, Balıkesir and Çanakkale. Ultimately, ̇ they arrived in Istanbul by sea (Altan 2018; Atuk 2017; Akgül 2005). It appears that the overall route and the entire program have been deliberately planned to meet reciprocal political expectations of Turkey and Iran. Most notably, Ankara and Tehran have been driven by mutual economic needs. Economic interdependence has reinforced collective emotional motivation for bilateral collaboration. Shared desires have shaped social psychology of partnership in Turkey-Iran neighborhood. Iranian government has been striving to bypass Soviet and British domination through alternative trading routes. The Iranian side sought to diminish its economic dependency by improving access conditions to the Black Sea and/or Mediterranean ports. Historically, Turkey has constituted a geo-economic gateway for exportation of Iranian domestic products into

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European markets. The rejuvenation of the Tebriz-Trabzon (and Köstence) route would provide a feasible alternative for the Iranian transit transportation. The Turkish economy would benefit from the transit trade. The revitalization of Trabzon and Samsun ports might also challenge the Soviet trade hegemony based in the harbor of Batumi. Perhaps more importantly, the integration of Turkish-Iranian railways would open new vistas for Ankara to gain strategic access to the Central Asian heartland (Atuk 2017: 219–225, 232–242). Moreover, the increased economic exchange would reinforce cultural interaction in the Turkish-Iranian neighborhood. As put forward on 15 June 1934, by the Cumhuriyet columnist Yunus Nadi, the “new Turkey” and the “new Iran” were “supporting” and complementing each other. Ankara and Tehran were living under similar conditions of “materiality,” “spirituality,” “emotionality” and interactivity (Altan 2018: 10). Both neighboring nation-states were affectively aspiring to keep up with the contemporary norms of Western civilization. In the long road of political modernization, Ankara has started the race much earlier than Tehran. Compared to Reza Shah, Mustafa Kemal has advanced further in the international race of development, since he managed to control political dissent influentially. Mustafa Kemal established progressive popular institutions to rule by the Parliament. He affectively worked through Republican norms of party politics and garnered institutional legitimacy. In contrast, Reza did rule by the Palace. The monarchical regime could not create extensive support for the reform movement. The domestic opposition has constituted a serious internal challenge for the Pahlavi monarchy. Despite Shah’s domestic political predicaments, Ankara was eager to provide affective support and normative guidance for the ongoing reform process in Tehran. Under those contextual circumstances, deepening of distrust would be detrimental for the Turkish diplomacy. Hence Turkish leaders promoted social-psychological similarity and closeness rather than political difference and distance. This was necessary for rebuilding of relational confidence between two “neighboring nations and brothers.” In some sense, non-interference in domestic affairs was observed as a relational norm. Social psychology of neighborhood was expected to overcome dyadic desires for regional influence. The dyadic diplomatic discourse called for the opening of a new chapter. The political feelings pumped to public circulation were “resentment” toward the past imperial confrontation between Ottoman and Qajar rulers (Atuk 2017: 234–236). While touring with Reza Shah, Mustafa Kemal himself was quite careful in not

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using, and even accidentally implying, the negative connotations of the old Ottoman word “Ajam.” He put personal effort to reframe the neighboring peoples as “Iranians” (Akgül 2005: 30). ̇ ̇ Paraphrased in framings of Prime Minister Mustafa Ismet (Inönü), Turks and Iranians could not genuinely live as “two close nations” as well as “neighbors and brothers.” Over the long course of history, these two neighboring brothers have been divided apart by political deviations and moral misconduct like “conspiracy” (fesat) and “hypocrisy” (nifak), notwithstanding their common “interests” and collective “sentiments” (Atuk ̇ 2017: 234–236). While addressing the Turkish Parliament, Mustafa Ismet explained the matter in this way: The century long border conflict has poisoned all kinds of sentiments supporting mutual confidence. This issue has been resolved by the two eminent leaders, their foresightedness playing a greater role … In recent years, all of the perpetrators, violating bilateral security in cross-border areas, have fallen into sense of desperation, since they faced with the dyadic power of serious policies … Our trust is so strong that the new atmosphere and the relational climate would develop positively for both countries. (Cin 2007: 126)

Now, it was high time for Ankara and Tehran to usher a new era of cooperation by overcoming the deep crises in their historical relationship. ̇ According to Mustafa Ismet, the Turkish masses have “displayed their love and trust to the Iranian nation” as they welcomed their great guest with warmth and affection. As he put, the new “era of happiness” has begun in Ankara-Tehran interactions. From his perspective, “the new Turkey-Iran relationship would be deemed as a blessing for the peace in all neighboring countries near and far” (Akgül 2005: 25, 26). The new progressive partnership between two neighbors would deal a serious blow to the ancient rules of imperialist (dynastic-sectarian) rivalry. Leaving the bygone age behind was the new code of cultural conduct between states of Turkey and Iran. In essence, the progressive culture of neighborhood was based on modern secular rules of development. Reza ̇ Shah concurred with Mustafa Kemal, and Mustafa Ismet, on secularization of state-society relations. They were all against usurpation of religion in political affairs, notwithstanding their executive differences in practically dealing with reactionary radical opposition. As Shah observed, the Turkish secularization was “rapid, systematic” and institutionalized, compared to the “slow, reluctant” and disorderly reform process unfolding in Iran (Cin 2007: 141).

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Shah Reza has already been fascinated by the developments of OttomanTurkish modernization. After the visit, Shah’s admiration for Mustafa Kemal and his commitment to emulate the Turkish model have grown deeper. As a matter of fact, Ankara has put extra effort in order to impress Turkey’s historical guest coming from neighboring Iran. While moving forward in their way, the secularist proponents of collaboration attempted to repair relational myths as well. The first Turkish opera of Özsoy has been orchestrated and played in honor of the Iranian Shah on 19 June 1934. In terms of artistic format, Özsoy was original. Mustafa Kemal himself involved in the production process. He has put special effort to re-cast TurkishIranian brotherhood through reproduction of shared myths. The main story of Özsoy re-constructs Turkey-Iran relationship in some interesting ways. Once upon a time, there was a country of Feridun in the East. ̇ Feridun Khan names his new-born twins Tur and Iraç. Wolf and lion are believed to be their natural companions respectively. The twin brothers are somehow separated by evil forces and took different roads in the darkness. With the help of an emergent savior, Feridun’s sons ride back toward the light and get together in the end. After long years of separation, the twins return to their “essential roots” of brotherhood in their fatherland. The syncretic story did combine traditional Iranian mythology, as famously portrayed by Ferdowsi in Shahnameh (Book of Kings), with modern musical compositions (Araci 2010). The performance has been crafted extraordinarily as it sought to catch popular political feelings and resonate well with the psycho-social context of dyadic relations between two nationstates. The recital in Ankara was a nice gesture for the “grandeur guest” long-awaited from neighboring Tehran. Shah has been deeply captured by affective re-imagination of Turkish-Iranian relationship (Atuk 2017: 240–242; Akgül 2005: 26, 27). It is quite striking that the analogy of twin sons, or the semiology of “Siamese” twins, is still reproduced by some reporters of Turkey-Iran relations (Brown 2014) without referring back to the myth framed in Özsoy opera. Nonetheless, the psycho-social complexity of Turkey-Iran neighborhood relations can be better captured by popular analogy of brotherhood. This notion was reflected on various moments of Shah’s historical visit. At an official dinner, both leaders exchanged warm messages of friendship. On that occasion, Mustafa Kemal portrayed the historical trajectory and current state of Turkish-Iranian relations in terms of “natural tendencies” for cultural interaction and “high interests” for economic

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exchange between two “brethren and neighboring countries” sharing “same sentiments and sights” for building a better future in their region (Atatürk 1934). When these two countries had departed from the path of friendship, they were exposed to most challenging times of their history. They were happy and pleasant at times when they had been tied with strong bonds of friendship … As of today, since this reality is grasped correspondingly by [our] brother[s in] Iran, the unshakable and eternal Turkish-Iranian friendship has been established … Today, Turkey and Iran take further stronger steps towards fulfillment of their historical roles in uplifting and upgrading [of human civilization]. Accordingly, the progression of closer friendship between two brotherly nations has constituted one of the most welcoming outcomes for humanity and civilization. (Atatürk 1934)

In response to Mustafa Kemal’s remarks, Reza Shah expressed that he has been equally honored by “love and friendliness” displayed toward him and his country. After inviting Mustafa Kemal to Iran, he also added that he has always felt the need to establish friendship with Turkey. On that day, he saw “sincere social ties” between two peoples that would help them continue to uphold their friendship and cooperation eternally (Cin 2007: 125). As he put, “the two nations, both as neighbors and brothers, would rely on each other with growing [social] confidence and [psychological] trust to sustain mutual development, enhance the civilization and serve for the world peace” (Akgül 2005: 25). From Tehran, the Iranian Foreign Ministry observed hosting of the shah in Ankara. Echoing in affective terms, they stated that Tehran got sentimental, and prided, by the Turkish hospitality shown toward the shah and the people of Iran (Saray 1999: 118; Akşin 1991: 195). ̇ During the shah’s visit, the city of Istanbul has experienced extraordinary days reminiscent of a festival (bayram). It later became clear that the ̇ shah’s longer stay in Istanbul (26 June–2 July 1934) was privately planned for his medical (dental and ophthalmological) treatment. The shah was healed not only by the cure, but also by the therapeutic impact of splendid site-seeing tours. More deeply, he was impressed by the popular affective ̇ climate in Istanbul. While talking to the Iranian expatriates gathered in the I ̇ stanbul consulate, Reza Shah expressed his personal happiness to witness the existing emotions of solidarity and sentiments of brotherhood in Turkish-Iranian interactions. With these feelings, he urged the Iranian

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diaspora to “regard Turkey as their own homeland, and deem Turks as their brothers in order to establish [a new era of] sincere social relations” between two historical neighbors (Akgül 2005: 31–37; Cin 2007: 135). The footages of Shah’s historical visit have been discovered more recently. By the time of writing, some of these documentary recordings have still been accessible and open to web viewers. Together with the audio-visual material (see, e.g., “Atatürk; Rıza Pehlevi’nin Iṡ tanbul Ziyareti 16 Haziran 1934,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kbhem6t5i5Y, 3 June 2013), available non-official English transcripts (see, e.g., “The only known footage of the Reza Shah of Iran with audio discovered in Turkey,” http://www.iranlivenews.com, 31 Oct. 2010) of the short public conversation between Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah provide important insights. The following inferences are drawn from the audio-visual data cited above. Foremost, the visual images projected by Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah are distinct as they reflect social-psychological clues about their relational positions. The stark contrast in the clothes of the two leaders captures immediate public attention. While Mustafa Kemal follows contemporary civic codes of diplomatic dressing, Reza Shah wears ­full-fledged royal military uniform (see also Altan 2018: 11; Akgül 2005: 22). The dressing styles reveal civilizational-global aspirations and nationallocal orientations of Turkish and Iranian leaders respectively. These pictures also give subtle impressions about rules of governing in Ankara and Tehran. In this sense, Mustafa Kemal’s popular appeal to civilian-­consensual government and Reza Shah’s personal preference for military-coercive rule are observed. In association with these observations, some propositions can also be made regarding the deeper operation of feeling rules between two heads of state. As representing the host nation, Mustafa Kemal moves by a strong sentiment of self-confidence and feeling of respect toward his counterpart. His polite voice and gentle gestures demonstrate his excelling in diplomatic protocol and political communication. Speaking for the guest nation in local Azeri-Turkish dialect, rather than Farsi, Reza Shah has displayed strong signs of affiliation with the Ankara government. The Turkish revolution has always been a source of emulation for the reform movement pursued by Shah. The long visit has equipped Shah with affective sources of inspiration. He could not help but display sentiments of envy to mobilize more people for further reform (Cin 2007: 141).

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The envious sense of lagging behind from Ankara would likely trump other dyadic feelings in Tehran. Shah’s sentiment of lacking could be witnessed in his observations comparing Turks and Iranians: Turks, either a soldier or a civilian, hold strong sentiments of [national] discipline. Turks obey [rules] more willingly and hence it is easier to rule them. On the other hand, Iranians are more skilled and if they whole-heartedly commit themselves to this [national] project, they would progress more rapidly. (Cin 2007: 141 quotes from Richard 1990: 87)

Actually, this psycho-social comparison highlights the contemporaneous variations of rule-making in Ottoman-Turkish and Qajar-Iranian modernizations. To use the famous dichotomy, proposed by Joel S. Migdal (1988), in Turkey a “strong state” tradition has been inherited from the late Ottoman era. The Ottoman-Turkish politics of state building rested on strong surveillance over “civil society” institutions (Zürcher 2010; Barkey 2000). By and large, the state kept tight control over mainstream Sunni religious foundations. The clerical subordination to the state has molded as a historical culture during the Ottoman Empire (Öztürk 2015). The Ottoman state has developed secular public law to run administrative affairs. The customary realm of governance has largely been under state jurisdiction. In terms of political hierarchy, the high-ranking Sunni clerical authorities were under the rule of the Palace. The office of Sheikh al-Islam could play an advisory role in daily politics, by providing limited theological input into political decrees. As a matter of fact, the Ottoman Sunni orthodoxy had no doctrinal or practical incentive to challenge the state rule. They often acted in the service of state and its rule-making practices. The culture of theological subordination has been inherited into the modern era. While the Qajar-Iranian clerical strata have strived to build “ulema’s state,” the Ottoman-Turkish priesthood has acted as “state’s ulema” (Gürakar 2012: 314–320). The modern orthodoxical spirit of Islam in Anatolia has grown quite conservative and status quo oriented. Heterodoxical voices of dissent were marginalized or eliminated easily. Individual religious reformers lacked autonomous resources and independent instruments to organize and mobilize mass opposition movements against the state-led secularization. At very rare instances, they preached anti-secular ideas to attract local grassroots backing. Yet, reactionary movements could not garner sweeping support from the Turkish masses at large (Küçük 2010; Azak 2010).

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In other words, the strong rule of “fear” has precluded psycho-social development of theological trust in “popular opposition.” As a result, civic sentiments of obedience and allegiance have been more strongly embedded in affective-normative culture of modern Muslims in Turkey (Çetin 2007: 156–199; 2012). In contrast, the strata of Shii ulema have gained a privileged position during the Qajar period. Due to their financial autonomy and concomitant class consciousness, they have often contended for political power. By using their autonomous status, Iranian clerics have become partners of modern rule-making. At some moments, clerical classes even mobilized violent opposition to challenge secular rules of state building in Qajar and Pahlavi eras. The historical sociology of Islam in Persia has inspired the development of radical revolutionary mass movements (Moazami 2018). At least initially, the Iranian state was relatively weaker in terms of coercive capabilities, capacity of centralization, ideological institutionalization and rule of law. The historical roots of Iranian opposition seemed relatively stronger due to societal reasons such as rural demographics, communal sources of mobilization, culture of mass uprising and indiscriminate exploitation of violence. The weak state capacity and strong society tradition put Iran in a vulnerable position, which would turn more prone to politics of arbitrary rule and then illegitimate use of violence. The culture of “resistance” was shaped by strong feelings of resentment and reaction permeating Iranian polity deeply from below (Erden 2017; Cronin 2010). Therefore, Shah’s fear from “the power of ulema” has been much stronger, compared to his Turkish counterparts. Even at a later diplomatic instance in 1938, he could confess that “dark forces of religious fanaticism existed in Iran which were more powerful and more hostile to progress than those which existed in Turkey” (Yapp 1996: 176). To some degree, Shah has managed to control domestic clerical opposition before taking a long trip to Turkey in 1934. As a matter of fact, he displayed keen interest to learn from the recent Turkish experiences and to keep up with Turkey on two main areas of national growth and state development. In addition to institutions of higher education, Shah extensively visited military units and defense facilities in each and every stop of his long journey. He was particularly impressed by Turkey’s historical progress in military affairs including defense industry, strategic planning and field training (Atuk 2017: 239, 240; Altan 2018: 16). Shah’s strategic interest on joint defense issues has implied his intention to regionally balance the pressure of Soviets and British. He was somehow looking for a

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“military alliance.” While visiting Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, Shah spoke quite candidly: “I wish you to be the chief of staff of both armies” (Çetinsaya 1999: 169; see also Arfa 1964: 249, 252). At another instance of exigency, Shah seized the moment to reiterate his personal admiration to Mustafa Kemal’s military superiority with these words: “I am the soldier, you are the commander!” (Men leşkerem, sen serdarsen). In a sense, this wording reflects the military world-view immensely pervading Shah’s relational perceptions. It might also be seen as a surface act ruled by feelings of diplomatic sincerity and political sympathy. Yet, it even points to deep acts driven by psycho-social rules of dyadic interaction between brothers or close companions. More often than not, status emotions are prevalent among peers. The relational rules of neighborhood emerge episodically. They can be sensible from the unsaid normative conditioning and affective implications of episodic context. The audio-visual recordings expose striking contrasts in social-psychological manners of Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah. Apparently, diplomatic friends reflect demeanors expected from the host and the guest. But, the snapshots imply a status gap shaping the relations between neighbors. Shah speaks from a position of lag and lapse, since he has lacked historical advantageous benefitted by Mustafa Kemal. The late Ottoman polity has ̇ experienced constitutional reforms since the “Sened-i Ittifak” in 1808. The “Mashruti-ye movement” in Qajar monarchy has come relatively late, ultimately led to the constitutional revolution in 1906 and died sooner than later (Cezani 2014). The concurrent timeline of political modernization in Ottoman-Turkish and Qajar-Iranian societies points to a centurylong time lapse. By any measure, the temporal delay amounted to a gap of generations as well. Shah had to cope with this dyadic discrepancy as the challenge of his lifetime. Through his own eyes, Shah was able to better see the structural contradictions between Tehran and Ankara. While visiting Turkey, Shah might have also re-considered his earlier incompetence in governing the politics of modernization under conditions of traditional rule-making. Compared to Mustafa Kemal’s proven political-military skills and performative achievements, Shah’s intellectual education and leadership qualities fall behind considerably. Two fingers are unequal, so are neighboring brothers. Two sons do not always run head to head; one or the other lags behind in lapses of time. Regarding global race of nationstate building and regional rush to modernization, the single-party government in Turkey has moved far more ahead of the one-man rule rearing back in Iran. The monarchical regime in Tehran has been caught in social

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psychology of latter development. The emotional-moral dilemmas of political modernization have put enormous pressure on Shah’s shoulders. As a matter of fact, Reza Shah has relied on coercive measures to sustain his autocratic rule. Unlike Mustafa Kemal, he has failed to fully control political challenges posed by clerical establishments. By and large, mainstream Sunni clerics remained subordinate to state-led secularization in Turkey. On the contrary, the Shii ulema has continued to play by traditional rules of autonomy. Direct clashes with the ulema and violent suppression of the opposition have undermined monarchical bases of order in Iran. Shah’s visiting of Turkey came along the impending shadow of domestic disorder inside the country (Saray 1999: 110–111). Shah’s relatively weaker psycho-social position during the visit might have been conditioned by sentimental predicaments at home. In this respect, his diplomatic manners seemed to be ruled by sentiments of social selfrestraint, psychological insecurity and political fear. Indeed, Reza Shah’s tense mood was slightly eased by Mustafa Kemal’s empathy. By the beginning of his long visit, Reza Shah privately requested from Mustafa Kemal to replace the Turkish Ambassador, who has been in Tehran for four years. Shah was disturbed by Hüsrev Bey’s recent hardline attitudes. After the resolution of border dispute in 1932, the tension was to be lifted from Ankara-Tehran relations. By 1934, both capitals were concentrated on building better bilateral relations and disregarded issues of lesser importance. Under such political circumstances, neither of the sides could tolerate any diplomatic risk of confrontation. Of course, Hüsrev Bey was aware of circumstantial sensitivities. Had he not exaggerated his role as the “doyenne diplomat” in Tehran, he might have directed his mission longer. But he made some incredible mistakes. Perhaps unintendedly, he came to defend other embassies at a high cost of attacking the Iranian government. Shah himself was infuriated by Hüsrev’s political errors (Cin 2007: 142, 143; Çetinsaya 1999: 170). The shah’s request was examined, and then accepted by the Turkish President. This diplomatic compliment indicated that Turkey no longer needed coercive engagement with Iran. Turkey’s Ambassador to Athens, Mehmet Enis (Akaygen), seen as the diplomatic architect of the TurkishGreek reconciliation, was called back immediately. He joined the shah’s ̇ later visits in Istanbul, which made it easier for him to replace Münir Hüsrev (Gerede) and get ready for his new mission sooner than later.

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Mehmet Enis Bey accompanied the shah when his return trip began on ̇ 2 July 1934, from Istanbul to Trabzon by sea (Akgül 2005: 39, 40). In Beyazıt, before leaving the Turkish territories from the Gürbulak border gate, Reza Shah sent a telegraph to Mustafa Kemal on 6 July 1934, which read: From this place, I say goodbye to Turkey. This visit has been an invaluable opportunity for me. The affection and the candid sensibility of my grand brother would create unforgettable feelings in my heart … During my visit, I have personally observed the unity of hearts and spirits between the nations of Iran and Turkey. As time passes, we would see the fascinating fruits of these ties. (Akgül 2005: 38)

̇ Responding from Istanbul on the same day, Mustafa Kemal reiterated that he would always remember the days passed together with the shah. He also emphasized “the strong natural bonds tying the two nations.” In his words, “the collective sentiments of brotherhood” between two neighboring countries have been enhanced after the shah’s historical visit (Cin 2007: 140). Mustafa Kemal later framed the shah’s visit as “one of the most honorary events” of the 1931–1935 period (Akgül 2005: 39, 41). The shah’s historic visit has received significant interest from the larger international community. The possibility of a military alliance between Turkey and Iran, and even perhaps the formation of a joint Turkish-Iranian army command, has been widely discussed by the international media. Quite possibly, Ankara and Tehran have also coordinated their foreign policies vis-à-vis the great powers (Cin 2007: 142). It seems that the visit could create implications for the strategic rivalry between Britain and Germany; neither of them could afford to lose Turkey and Iran to the other side. Simply put, the collective stance shown by the shah’s visit has strengthened the international standing of Turkey-Iran neighborhood relationship. During the Council elections at the League of Nations (LN), Iran acted altruistically and withdrew its candidacy for non-permanent membership of the 1935–1937 period. The historical abstention reflects Iranian restraint from dyadic dueling and exposes affective-normative favors put forward to support Turkey’s diplomatic bid to achieve temporal influence over international rule-making and world politics. In return, Ankara has assisted Tehran to resolve its bilateral disputes with Kabul, and then Baghdad. Fahrettin Altay Pasha, who attended Shah’s 1934 visit, has

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refereed the Iran-Afghanistan joint border commission. After four months of field work, the Turkish delegation has returned home with prestigious regional success. Further impressed by Ankara’s neighborly assistance, and Akaygen’s outstanding ambassadorial performance, Shah enhanced his personal engagement with the Turkish military attaché in Tehran. In Nov. 1935, Shah took him as the only foreign observer to receive his professional views on the military maneuvers conducted by the Iranian army near Tehran (Çetinsaya 1999: 169–170). After the shah’s visit, TurkeyIran cultural interactions gained momentum as well. During the Ferdowsi’s millennial anniversary, an official Turkish delegation has attended the Iranian celebrations in Nov. 1934. Iranians also awaited that Atatürk could pay a return visit to Tehran in 1935 (Yıldırım 2011: 89). Even though the Turkish Embassy has made some initial preparations, Atatürk could not realize the expected return visit. On the other hand, the Turkish diplomatic delegation, headed by Cemal Hüsnü Taray, arrived in Tehran in Oct. 1936. While negotiating bilateral agreements on various fields of common concern, Taray and his team have had a hard time to overcome “excessive caution and suspicion” displayed by the Iranians. Due to the “narrow minded nationalist” Iranian approaches, the negotiations have lingered a lot longer than expected. At last, on 21 Apr. 1937, both sides signed a number of agreements and protocols on areas of transit transportation-logistics, customs, maritime shipments, air travel, judicial matters, criminal extradition, veterinarian issues and residential affairs (Çetinsaya 1999: 174). In sum, the shah’s visit emboldened the social-psychological spirit of “golden years” in Ankara-Tehran diplomatic interactions (Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009b: 358–359). This sensational era in Turkey-Iran political neighborhood confirmed the mutual volition to further strengthen dyadic partnership and bilateral collaboration. The Turkish-Iranian neighborhood solidarity created immediate local implications and paved the way for building of a regional pact among Eastern nations. Beyond the Saadabad Pact: The Short Story of “Golden Years” As a matter of fact, the making of Oriental Entente (Şark Misakı) has begun in Oct. 1935 when Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq have initialed the regional treaty in Geneva. The initiative was led by the Turkish government. As President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk saw, the LN has not proven to be an effective institution for maintaining the global peace. The

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danger of war was still “imminent” particularly in Europe, mainly due to the rise of radical regimes manipulating popular national feelings. Quite interestingly, Atatürk’s public framing of international disorder in 1935 reflects his affective-normative conception of the world as one unified neighborhood: “Regardless of their geographical positions, the world nations are tied to each other with various bonds.” Along these lines, he used the apartment metaphor to portray the international connections. All apartment dwellers would be affected by the impact of a fire in any one tenant’s house. International war would seriously undermine the political logic of peaceful coexistence and stable relationships among the states. In order to achieve permanent peace, civic kind of national sentiments ought to be promoted. Accordingly, “all citizens of the world should be educated [both affectively and normatively] to make them get rid of jealousy (haset), greed (aç gözlülük) and hatred (kin).” For these reasons, Atatürk endorsed “regional pacts” (mıntakavî misaklar) as influential mechanism of collective rule-making that would enhance peace and stability all over the world neighborhood (Atatürk 1935). The Balkan Entente of 9 Feb. 1934, has provided a local umbrella to maintain security along Turkey’s western frontiers opening toward the south east of Europe. It was high time for Ankara to establish a similar collective rapprochement with Turkey’s neighbors in the east extending toward the center of Asia. The assignment of Akaygen to Tehran was a key decision in this regard. Akaygen has earlier served as the Deputy (Secretary) of the Turkish Foreign Ministry in the 1927–1929 period, and has worked hard, as the acting envoy in Athens, to enhance Turkey-Greece friendship and establish the Balkan Pact. Earning Shah’s political trust from the very early on, Akaygen was expected to enhance regional collaboration between two neighbors. As of Aug. 1934, Akaygen’s anticipated service to the Turkey-Iran neighborhood has been motivated by Shah quite affectively: “The friendship and sincerity between two brotherly states and nations is much beyond the significance of any document” (Şimşir 1996: 389, 399). Akaygen’s distinctive life story (Tulça 2015) reveals that affective-­ normative practices shape relational outcomes in dyadic diplomacy. As a dovish diplomat, Ambassador Akaygen has made a significant contribution and helped to develop positive psycho-social atmosphere in TurkeyIran relationship. Akaygen’s soft-line diplomatic service indicates that he has simultaneously managed to keep stronger personal ties with the Shah and build more influential psycho-social networks of friendship between two neighboring countries (Çetinsaya 1999: 174).

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During Akaygen’s term, Turkey-Iran relations have progressed considerably. Bilateral partnership was enhanced through the implementation of various agreements. The economic collaboration has been improved extensively. Both sides have particularly increased their effort to revitalize the transit trade route between Trabzon and Tebriz. These joint endeavors have paved the way for deepening and widening of regional cooperation between Turkish and Iranian governments (Cin 2007: 145; Turan and Turan 2011: 1752, 1753; Aslan and Yel 2018). Ankara’s meticulous mediation efforts have been influential in the resolution of enduring disputes along Iran-Afghanistan and Iran-Iraq frontiers. Without Turkey’s deliberate diplomatic commitment, the Eastern Pact might not come to final fruition (Turan and Turan 2011: 1749–1756; Cin 2007: 143–146; Çetinsaya 1999: 170–173). On 8 July 1937, the signing of a regional pact in the Saadabad palace of Tehran has asserted collective psycho-social aspirations and joint diplomatic desires toward enhancing stability in the common neighborhood of Turkey and Iran. In fact, Saadabad Pact was a treaty of friendship and nonaggression signed between Iran and its three main neighbors, namely Turkey, Iraq and Afghanistan. Safety and stability around trans-boundary areas was the core concern of regional rule-making. The principal ­diplomatic aim was to build “confidence” among the signatory states, which would permanently resolve cross-border security issues lingering over the region. Secondarily, perhaps more importantly, the pact would enhance regional solidarity among new nation-states and help to prevent re-emergence of colonialist incursions. According to historical accounts, British colonialism seems to be the usual suspect targeted by the pact. While London refrained from joining the pact, Moscow did not hesitate endorsing full support for it, which means that Soviet imperialism was conceived as a lesser threat by regional countries. Upon the official signing ceremony in Tehran, Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras directly flew to Moscow so as to inform his counterparts (Erdal 2012: 84–86; Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009b: 365–369; Çetinsaya 1999: 170–173). The Oriental Entente has implied the political construction of affective-normative “solidarity” to form a “region of peace and friendship” in the common neighborhood stretching from “the Aegean to the Persian Gulf and extending over to the Himalayas.” Şark Misakı has been envisioned as a social-psychological rapprochement to “deter” international aggression and regional warfare around the Turkish-Iranian neighborhood (Erdal 2012: 86; Kumral 2016: 63–66).

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Particularly, Baghdad’s inclusion in the pact has made the space of friendship more significant for regional geopolitics. For the first time, the Middle Eastern countries were introduced to notions of local solidarity and regional deterrence in their common neighborhood. From the very first meeting in Sept. 1937, the regional pact has also solicited influence at the global level, as it supported Iranian candidacy for non-permanent membership at the LN Council. In Oct. 1937, Iranian Foreign Minister Enayetullah Samiy came to Turkey and joined official ceremonies celebrating the Day of Republic. The high-level talks have been conducted in a warm atmosphere. After Atatürk’s passing from the political scene on 10 Nov. 1938, Reza Shah displayed “deep acting” (Hochschild 2012/1983). He officially declared a one-month public mourning. The Iranian Majlis arranged a special meeting for the commemoration. Iranian press acted emphatically, published pieces praising Atatürk and his friendship with Reza Shah. To pay their last tribute, the Iranian soldiers, and some high-ranking officers who were earlier involved in the 1934 visit, have attended the official funeral on 21 Nov. 1938. Collective sentiments of sorrow were shared by neighboring countries as well (Cin 2007: 149–151; Çetinsaya 1999: 174). After Atatürk’s death, Reza Shah lost a sincere regional friend and a source of local ­support in international affairs. The Turkish-Iranian dyadic solidarity and the “golden age” in Ankara-Tehran neighborhood relations were gradually drawn to a close. Due to the dawn of the world war, Ankara and Tehran began to fall apart as their global foreign policy choices diverged distinctively. Ankara tilted toward London and Paris, while Tehran sided with Berlin. Iranian political-military collaboration with Germany has had historical roots. During the First World War, Iranian nationalists had sided with the Germans (Erendil 1976: 121). Coming from anti-colonialist ideological background, Reza Shah has displayed stronger feelings of antipathy and enmity particularly toward Britain (Ataei and Monavari 2013: 122–124). In line with pan-Farsi ideals, Reza Shah has often espoused the German model of “nationalism” for Persian development. In the 1938–1941 period, Reza Shah’s “Persianism” and “Pahlavism” and his foreign policies slipped more toward the German orbit (Moazami 2018: 91; Vekili 2003: ̇ 94–96; Ismayilov 2015). Under the shadow of global war, the social-psychological bonds between Pahlavi Iran and Kemalist Turkey have been weakened. In July 1939, Ankara wanted to rotate Ambassador Akaygen. At least for some time, Shah used his personal influence to keep Akaygen in Tehran. To no

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avail, Akaygen returned to Turkey in Aug. 1939. He was officially replaced by Suad Davaz in Oct. 1939. Shah perceived the change as a sign of diṗ ̇ lomatic “distancing” made by hard-line President Ismet Inönü. To tell the truth, Turkish and Iranian normative sentiments, emotional climates and affective atmospheres were shaped quite divisively along contending psychological poles of Anglo-philia and (pro-Germanic) Anglo-phobia. Turkey’s alignment with Britain and France on 19 Oct. 1939 has virtually terminated the “golden era” of interactions between Ankara and Tehran governments. In spite, Ankara’s halfhearted engagement with Tehran has endured until Reza Shah’s deposition from power, as a consequence of the occupation of Iran by Britain and Soviet Union in Aug. 1941 (Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009b: 359; Çetinsaya 1999: 174–175). The invasion of Iran dealt a serious blow to the regional solidarity emerged around the Saadabad Pact (Turan and Turan 2011: 1761). The Turkish press has framed the invasion of Iran as violation of international morality. Ankara was “frustrated” by London’s unethical conduct. The feeling of “deep sorrow” was circulated empathetically for the Iranian people. What happened to the neighboring political house in Tehran has turned out to be a historical lesson for the Turkish government. In order to protect Turkey from detrimental consequences of international intervention, Ankara had to pursue a cautious line in diplomatic affairs. The sentiment of “self-help” has become more salient in Turkish foreign policy making (Yıldırım 2011: 104–106). Due to the conditions of occupation imposed on the Iranian monarchy, Ankara-Tehran relations have been virtually frozen. Under the rule of occupying powers, Reza Shah was exiled to South Africa. When he died in 1944, his son Mohammed Reza was designated as new heir to the throne. In Jan. 1942, Britain-United States and Soviet Union agreed to leave their area of occupation by the end of the war. Moscow has not kept its promise. Quite the contrary, Soviet government has sought to create durable indirect influence. Through the communist Tudeh Party, Soviets supported Azeri and Kurdish secessionism inside Iran. With Soviet assistance to the separatist movements, two autonomous republics were established. In Dec. 1945, Ja’far Pishavari has led the formation of Azeri Republic. Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was proclaimed under the leadership of Qazi Mohammed in Jan. 1946. Ankara was alarmed by Soviet indirect infiltration into the region. The dissolution of Iranian territorial integrity would be a fearful prospect. Ruled by fear, Turkish government has backed

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Tehran’s political sovereignty over the whole country. Ankara was relieved since both of the autonomous republics were crushed by the Iranian army in Dec. 1946. Turkey’s regional support was a key for the Iranian regime. By the end of the war, Turkish and Iranian threat perceptions began to converge on preventing communist infiltration into their neighborhood. Henceforth, Ankara and Tehran sided with the Western bloc to balance regional threats posed by Moscow (Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009c: 648–649; Yıldırım 2011: 107–109). In the post-war global climate, rejuvenation of the “golden years” remained a distant possibility for both countries. The Turkish-Iranian political neighborhood has gradually lost the foundational logic of progressive engagement. Despite their common affective-normative commitments, Ankara and Tehran governments have remained far from fully completing the Trabzon-Tebriz transit trade project (Erdal 2017; Aydın 2012). Over the coming years, the relational spirit of economic partnership and regional collaboration did fade away. The episode’s sad ending underlined the vulnerability of Turkey-Iran relationship to disruptive external influences like major wars and large-scale conflicts. Under the impact of global strains, the social psychology of the golden era evaporated. Yet, the short story of the relational climax has set an affectivenormative benchmark for the future practices of political neighborhood and rebuilding of Turkey-Iran bilateral interactions. The strong personal partnership between President Atatürk and Reza Shah has determined the ground rules of regional engagement. These rule-makers have themselves co-founded relational norms of political neighborhood for the coming Turkish-Iranian generations. The inter-personal foundations of AnkaraTehran collaboration implied that social psychology of the relationship would demand high-caliber political leaders exemplified by founding fathers.

Conclusion: Episodic Summary In this chapter, I looked at psycho-social contours of Turkey-Iran neighborhood relations during formative years. The emotional-affective findings indicate emergence of two key episodes. Table  2.1 provides an overview of this relational history. In the post-war 1921–1930 period, fear and anger have prevalently shaped the dyadic feeling rules. On the Turkish side, fear has been built due to Iranian regional collusion with Britain in

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Table 2.1  Formative psycho-social constellations in Turkey-Iran neighborhood Key episodes

Prevalent emotional entanglements

1926–1930

Fear-anger Reciprocal Punitive exchange resentment Love-trust Mutual Progressive pride partnership

1934–1938

Dominant affective arrangements

Relational contours

Confrontational Enduring climate dispute Collaborative Golden era atmosphere

particular and British colonial influence in general. On the other side, Iranians were still wary of Turkish territorial ambition and pan-Turkist regional expansion. The Iranian clerics were irritated by the secular reform process in Ankara. The Turkish government was upset by the clerical influence over Tehran. This relational episode evidently lacked positive psychosocial constellations. The negative affective atmosphere has deepened as a result of rising Kurdish and Azeri nationalisms in two neighboring countries. Among other third parties, it was initially Moscow that kept certain influence on Ankara-Tehran regional interactions. However, the Russian role has remained limited due to shared senses of betrayal. The dyadic diplomacy did deeply entangle with reciprocal resentment. This emotional climate has reinforced politics of confrontation and punitive exchange. Nonregressive, territorial rivalry has shaped the local culture of neighborhood. The relational result has amounted to a decade of diplomatic dispute. After long years of relational testing, both nation-states have learned to manage their hearts and remained committed to protecting trans-governmental neighborhood norms even under crisis circumstances. The personal affiliation of founding fathers has played a key role in this regard. President Mustafa Kemal and Shah Reza gradually invoked affective synergies ushering a golden era of progressive partnership. The collaborative atmosphere was indeed configured by politics of collective amity. The emotional resonances of brotherly love were reflected in the legendary tale of twin Turkish-Iranian sons. Ostensibly secular Özsoy narrative has elicited senses of mutual trust and communal pride on both sides. The 1931–1938 episode has displayed psycho-social progression of partnership in Turkey-Iran neighborhood.

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CHAPTER 3

The Affective Atmosphere of Ankara-Tehran Alignment in Cold War (1946–1979)

This chapter seeks to understand affective implications of Ankara-Tehran alignment during the Cold War. The psycho-historical account is divided into two parts. The first part covers the 1946–1960 period. The second part looks at the détente era (1961–1979). Overall, these two relational episodes highlight the widening of psycho-social distance in Turkey-Iran neighborhood, notwithstanding their pro-Western rapprochement in the northern tier. This chapter follows the framework outlined in the Introduction. While presenting textual evidence together with phenomenal observations, I adopt a narrative approach. My argumentative interventions remain minimal. The event-based empirical composition allows easier navigation for the reader. The chapter concludes with episodic summary. This synopsis is based on the introductory research scheme. Here, I summarize emotional-affective data and reinterpret relational patterns of partnership and rivalry. On the whole, I argue that Cold War has created a negative psycho-social atmosphere that enormously weakened the dyadic strength of neighborhood in Turkey-Iran relations. As a matter of fact, the global psychology of Cold War has left lingering repercussions for world politics. The bipolar structuration of international society has deepened the divisions between the East and the West. The Western camp was led by the United States, while the Soviet Union dominated the Eastern bloc. Even though non-alignment and neutrality were available options for foreign policy makers, international rule-making was essentially shaped by two great powers. Other states should play by © The Author(s) 2020 M. A. Kumral, Exploring Emotions in Turkey-Iran Relations, Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39029-7_3

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s­ocial-­psychological rules of global confrontation. There were two ideological orbits in global affairs: dominions of liberal democracy and satellites of socialism-communism. There were two main modes of inter-state relations: making of allies or adversaries. The sense of local belonging and rules of regional engagement were identified by Washington and Moscow. Geopolitical struggle between the two poles has created regional ramifications for affective-normative relations between contiguous states. Under social-psychological rule of fear, international politics of neighborhood reflected black-and-white logic of affective threat construction. Neighbors could become either enemies or friends depending on their global alignment choices and threat perceptions. Even though ideological lines of amity and enmity were clear, relational rules of exchange among allies and friends were ambiguous. This ambiguity has also transformed Turkey-Iran neighborhood relations during the Cold War. Put in other words, the rule of heteronomy has governed Ankara-Tehran relationship unexceptionally. Despite the fact that pro-Western alignment has shaped global identity of Turkey and Iran along corresponding lines, regional roles assumed by Ankara and Tehran governments have not matched accordingly. Both Turkish and Iranian regimes have usually acted as if they were not regional allies. Largely due to differences in geostrategic positions, levels of legal institutionalization, patterns of political development and economic growth, and possession of energy resources, the two countries could not fully embrace each other. Both sides failed to manage dyadic envy and jealousy. The increasing status competition resulted in relational regression. Therefore, neighborhood norms were affectively weakened. The relational game oscillated between stagnant partnership and positional rivalry. At the outset, common geopolitical positions allowed Turkey and Iran to reshape the neighborhood context toward regional rapprochement. Regional regimes like Baghdad Pact (1955), Central Treaty Organization (1959) and Regional Cooperation for Development (1964) have been established consecutively. As a result, regional rule-making gained institutional ground. In spite, the Iranian side was not satisfied. Moreover, Tehran has been biased by political resentment, due to relatively higher social status privileged to Turkey by membership to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Ankara, on the other hand, could not get rid of its enduring fear and still stayed anxious about the prospect of rapprochement between Tehran and Moscow. The growth of social-­psychological ­interactions among Turkish and Iranian leftist groups was a common political

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concern. Both sides diverged while handling ethnic and sectarian (Azeri, Kurdish and Alevi) questions, and settled their scores through local media. Political divergences and “mutual accusations” were leaked into the domestic press. The communicative tradition of “mutual vilification” gained affective-normative ground in  local media culture and bilateral public diplomacy (Çetinsaya 2003: 125–127). Even though Turkey and Iran remained on quite similar pages of regional geopolitics during the Cold War, political conditionality of Washington’s regional security assistance would make it more difficult for Ankara and Tehran to act independently in their historical neighborhood. Since both governments attached greater importance to receiving higher levels of US aid rather than raising their bilateral exchange relations, Turkey-Iran dyadic interactions lost their local significance. The most favored nation status was no longer operational in Ankara-Tehran neighborhood. The third parties gained the upper hand on regional initiatives. Dependent logic of defensive cooperation has precluded local ventures for economic development. International interference was particularly prevalent in the oil sector. Since Ankara and Tehran have prioritized cliental ties with Washington, their relational solidarity has been weakened. In some paradoxical ways, Turkish-Iranian dyadic diplomacy has been deeply engulfed by the cold climate of strategic interactions.

Pro-Western Rapprochement in the Northern Tier (1946–1960) After the end of the Second World War, the world has been divided between two poles led by Washington and Moscow. The geopolitical-­ ideological rules of global confrontation have created implications for regional relations between contiguous neighbors such as Turkey and Iran. The United States sought regional allies to contain the communist expansion into “the rim-land” of Eurasia. Challenged by Moscow’s regional threats, Ankara and Tehran had discretely decided to align with Washington. To a certain extent, Turkey-Iran relationship has been shaped by US influence. In a sense, Ankara-Tehran relationship has lost its local salience and become an indirect extension of relationship with Washington. US regional interests created implications for domestic politics and dyadic interactions in Turkey-Iran neighborhood. In this regard, Turkey ­displayed earlier political eagerness and stronger diplomatic determination to engage with international institutions of the Western world. Turkish ­government’s

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strategic enthusiasm was well received by the US administration. Western international assistance to Turkey has begun in accordance with the Truman Doctrine of Mar. 1947 and the Marshall Plan of Apr. 1948 (Yıldırım 2011: 123–127, 138–142). The Turkish general elections of 14 May 1950, have brought a major shift in power. After years of single-party rule under Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) governments, Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti-DP) came to office. Transition to multi-party system has introduced Western-type of democratic rules into Turkey’s domestic politics and influenced its external relations. As a matter of fact, Anglo-­ American foreign policy orientation has reinforced its popular ideological bases across the Turkish political spectrum. Pro-Western global alignment has been driven by popular bi-partisan spirit in Ankara. In order to deter Soviet regional ambitions, both secularist-etatist (left-wing) CHP and conservative-liberal (right-wing) DP have supported Turkey’s accession to the NATO. In Nov. 1948, the CHP government applied for the membership to the “Atlantic Pact.” Turkey’s NATO membership has been realized by the DP government in 1952. From the early years of the Cold War, the NATO umbrella was a key security asset for Ankara. The Atlantic international neighborhood was based on the value of human freedom and political commitment toward liberal-democratic order. As President Celal Bayar reiterated, the Turkish government firmly believed in “the spirit of Atlantic community” as it “would constitute the sole path to liberation of humanity” (Yıldırım 2011: 134, 135). Furthermore, Ankara’s pro-Western global alignment has served as a diplomatic leverage for Prime Minister Adnan Menderes “to enhance Turkey’s sphere of influence in the region.” DP government’s “assertive” regional policies (Kösebalaban 2011: xv) have created a serious backlash due to the rising challenge of pan-Arabism in Turkey’s neighborhood. Menderes clashed with the Egyptian rulers (namely Nasser) to assert political leadership over the Middle East. The spreading of socialist Arab nationalism and Nasserism particularly over Iraq and the Persian Gulf would be equally disturbing for Shah Pahlavi (Kayaoğlu 2014: 464; Ramazani 1982: 10). The Pahlavi regime also held historical suspicions toward the pan-Turkist movements and remained anxious about the re-­ emergence of irredentist Azeri nationalism (Gökdağ and Heyet 2004). At that time, Turkey also faced with the rising tide of indigenous nationalisms sweeping across the region. By the beginning of 1950s, nationalist opposition movements have gained popular strength and fueled

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political unrest in most countries of the Middle Eastern neighborhood. On the face of regional uncertainty, Ankara government has managed to utilize Turkey’s geostrategic assets affectively and assumed a more advantageous global position compared to the one held by the Iranian regime. While Ankara has achieved institutional neighborhood with the Western capitals, most prominently Washington and London, Tehran lacked such kind of privileged international status, notwithstanding vast reserves of oil in Iran. This social-psychological “lack,” in Lacanian sense, has a significant bearing upon Tehran’s security-based and defense-oriented regional interactions with Ankara and the larger Western world. In terms of global context, Turkey’s political-military contribution to the Western alliance was critical for the containment of communist aggression and outflanking of the Soviet threat in the “northern tier” of the Eurasian rim-land. Alliance with Ankara was also crucial for Anglo-­American regional policies in the Middle East (Çetinkaya 2016: 1–7). Since Britain has begun to retreat from the Middle East, American diplomacy has aimed to fill emergent geopolitical vacuum and reinforce Western domination over the local status quo. Overall, the US policies were driven toward gaining international access and strategic control over Middle Eastern oil resources. By Mar. 1947, London was no longer capable of providing security assistance to Ankara. Hence, this strategic role was to be sustained by Washington (Yıldırım 2011: 122, 123). Britain has also ceded its dominant position in other domains of Middle Eastern affairs. British local losses have incrementally expanded after the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. Anti-British national feelings swept across national boundaries. In fact, popular nationalist movements have gained regional ground by the onset of the Second World War. Pro-German local nationalisms have posed trans-boundary challenges for political regimes ̇ ̇ including the CHP government. During the war, President Ismet Inönü has deployed coercive measures to address social-psychological affinity of the pan-Turkist movement with pro-German political-military causes. These “combined” sentimental phenomena have been influenced by complex “psychological factors” and public feelings such as fear and suspicion from the Russian resurgence around the Turkish neighborhood. Affective spreading of anti-Russian/Soviet public sentiments intruded into the elite circles as well. But, the Turkish cabinet was not thoroughly tainted by Soviet “hatred” and Germanic love. By and large, Ankara government has remained loyal to war-time alignment with London and Paris. The policy of “active neutrality” was to be adopted toward Germany, Turkey’s most

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valuable Western trading partner before the onset of global war (Türegün 2016: 676). This affective-normative stance would help manage the damaging impact of war on Ankara-Berlin economic exchange relations. Other than concerns for relational management, Turkish rulers have not held any affection for the Hitler regime (Yıldırım 2011: 102–106). When the war-­ time German ambassador in Ankara, Franz von Papen, “considered offering Iranian Azerbaijan to Turkey in return for a breach in Anglo-Turkish ̇ relations, Inönü and the cabinet rejected this offer outright” (Kösebalaban 2011: 67 refers to VanderLippe 2005). This diplomatic act was even beyond the rules of alliance making. By implication, Ankara displayed deeper affective commitment to court historically established norms of neighborhood with Tehran. After the war, Turkish-Iranian neighborly relations have been restored gradually. Tehran took the first step by assigning the Iranian ambassador to Ankara in June 1948. Reciprocally, Turkish Ambassador Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu was appointed from Bern to Tehran in Oct. 1949 (Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009a: 649). In fact, Karaosmanoğlu was a prominent man of letters and founding ideologue of etatist Kadro movement. As Karaosmanoğlu put, he was “forced” to become a diplomat in 1934, since the Kadro journal has become critical of CHP bureaucratic circles. At that time, the Ülkü journal has been representing the CHP mainstream leadership. The single-party elites seemed not tolerant of oppositional voices coming from within. Thus, Karaosmanoğlu was sidelined from domestic politics. His diplomatic journey has begun “unwillingly,” so to speak. Unlike his career-oriented counterparts, Karaosmanoğlu has worked as an “involuntary diplomat.” Having been so accustomed to intellectual freedom of speech, he took an uphill battle against the dogmatized diplomatic mindset. Rather than relying on official sources and routine intelligence assessments, Karaosmanoğlu displayed keen interest to grasp deeper psycho-social arrangements that shape longer-term international dynamics in world politics (Karaosmanoğlu 1955: 3–50). While extending his letter of confidence, Karaosmanoğlu has witnessed warm reception of the Iranian Shah. Mohammed Reza saw Turkey and Iran as “two brother nations” sharing a common faith. Shah was eager to restore the level of “sincere and close” relationship achieved mutually by his late father and Atatürk. Indeed, Karaosmanoğlu was quite impressed by Shah’s emotional commitment. The chief of the Iranian cabinet, Saad Khan, has been striving for that kind of relationship between Tehran and Ankara. Later on, while talking to the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Asğar

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Hikmet, Karaosmanoğlu expressed his sympathetic feelings as if he were “in his own homeland.” Karaosmanoğlu also conveyed his commitment to “work just like two brothers.” The public restoration of brotherly feelings has become more visible when the late Reza Shah’s mausoleum was relocated to Tehran in Apr. 1950. Acting along affective norms of reciprocity, Turkish soldiers have attended the ceremony and paid their final tribute (Karaosmanoğlu 1955: 269, 270; Yıldırım 2011: 144, 146, 147). Even though Karaosmanoğlu’s term in Tehran has lasted shorter than expected, his personal “observations,” written in the 1953–1954 period, provide important insights to historicize the social psychology of Turkey-­ Iran neighborhood relationship. Karaosmanoğlu’s diplomatic assignment came on the verge of a domestic turmoil in Iran. This “chaotic” picture was succinctly summarized by Karaosmanoğlu. As he witnessed, the shah has not fully recovered from the wounds of assassination (Karaosmanoğlu 1955: 269–271), attempted on 25 Feb. 1948. Deeply disturbed by the assassination attempt, the monarch sought to consolidate his power against potential sources of opposition gathering around the Majlis. In May 1949, the shah held the constitutional privileges to dissolve the parliament, and even appoint half of the senators. Rather than relying on civilian societal forces, the monarchical power base shifted toward the military. Not bothered by parliamentary procedures, the Pahlavi king assigned his new prime minister through a court decree. In Feb. 1950, the former Joint Chief-ofStaff, General Hadji Ali Razmara, became the first military official ascending to the Iranian premiership (Moazami 2018: 98, 99). The “tough” Razmara was expected to “push the [July 1949 Anglo-Iranian] oil agreement through the Majlis.” But Razmara’s “radical” stance has turned the opposition against him, eventually leading to his assassination on 7 Mar. 1951 (Yapp 1996: 183, 184). As Karaosmanoğlu asserted, two sources of popular resistance have risen against the British presence and the Pahlavi rule in Iran. While the “Fedayin-i Islam” has fostered violent reactionary mobilization, the “Tudeh” has led a militant revolutionary movement. In fact, it was the anti-imperialist affective appeal that has enabled the subtle collaboration between Iranian socialists, conservatives and nationalists. Ultimately, the anti-Shah coalition was driven by popular psychology of liberation in Iranian politics. Apprehensive of perilous prospects, Shah has taken earlier steps. For example, on 20 Feb. 1949, Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Borujerdi instructed the Qum ulema and the mainstream Shii establishment “to stay out of the oil issue.” However, this call could not prevent

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the oil issue from becoming further “emotionally charged.” Antagonistic fervor did not die down. The reactionary nationalist cleric Ayatollah Seyyid Abu’l Qasim Kashani, who formerly headed the “Mujahedin-e Islam,” called for resistance. Against all odds, Kashani fashioned “a revolutionary theology.” He “politicized Islam” based on “the idea of religion as politics.” Kashani supporters lined up against the shah. At the outset, Kashani “provided a crucial ally” to the National Front, led by Mohammed Mosaddeq. The radical cleric and the liberal lawyer have shared a common antipathy against the British colonialism and the Pahlavi despotism. National Front supporters saw Mosaddeq as “the heroic leader defending the Iranian homeland against the hated foreigners” and their much resented colonial puppets (Mackey 1998: 196–199). Mosaddeq “depicted his dispute with the British as a choice between ‘independence or servitude’ ” (Isteqlal ya Enqiad) (Ramazani 2004: 554). In some sense, Mosaddeq’s rallying cry has reminded the crucial call of “either independence or annihilation” (ya istiklâl, ya ölüm), made by Mustafa Kemal during the Turkish War of Independence. Some 30 years later, Mosaddeq’s struggle for Iranian independence could speak to the Turkish hearts. It might well gain resonance particularly over Kemalist-­ nationalist circles, elicit sentiments of socialist-democratic solidarity and probably provoke progressive opposition movements in Turkey. For these reasons, I submit, conservative DP government did refrain from interference into Iranian domestic affairs. Ankara chose to side with the status quo forces defending the interests of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). This diplomatic choice was not without political costs. The mounting popular opposition targeted those involved in Anglo-Iranian oil deal. Saad Khan, Turkey’s prominent “friend” in the Iranian cabinet, could not withstand Mosaddeq’s affective popular campaign (Karaosmanoğlu 1955: 278). From Karaosmanoğlu’s perspective, Mosaddeq has exploited the negative emotional climate arising against the British and the Pahlavi rule. In the words of Karaosmanoğlu, the country was increasingly surrounded by the bad smelling of “reactionary rot” (gerilik taaffünü) and “communist gunpowder.” This “shuddering” and “wavy” weather was an indication of imminent public unrest, and even perhaps a popular “revolution.” In the environment Karaosmanoğlu portrayed, Mosaddeq was seen as an experienced “demagogue,” who has already cultivated the image of a political victim, long oppressed by the Pahlavi regime. In the eyes of Iranian people, Mosaddeq came close to earn the blessed Shii status of a popular “martyr.” Unlike other emotional cultures, Farsi hearts have resonated

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more strongly with “suffering” and “pain,” rather than “daring” and “pleasure.” This national character was skillfully represented by the political drama played by Mosaddeq. According to Karaosmanoğlu, “Fars are national (milli), but not nationalist (milliyetçi).” The Farsi “sentiment of nationality (milliyet duygusu),” as Karaosmanoğlu put, should not be confounded with common notions of nationalism. The Farsi national feeling, or better heart and soul of Fars, Karaosmanoğlu claimed, have been molded by millennia of seeping and sedimentation in civilizational sub-­ consciousness. One could not call this complex (Asian-civilizational) psyche as merely Shii. Karaosmanoğlu views Farsi spirit as the “dense and dim culture,” composed of Zoroastrianism, Islam and Eastern mysticism. This thick and deep culture has shaped the thin rules of Farsi feeling that puts higher valence on shedding tears even in political sphere. As Karaosmanoğlu implies, Mosaddeq used emotional manifestations and public crying as a way to operationalize an affective politics along Farsi feeling rules (Karaosmanoğlu 1955: 278–289). In essence, Mosaddeq has appealed to national and democratic sentiments. Not only has Mosaddeq organized the legislative opposition to establish national sovereignty over oil resources, but he also worked to restrict monarchical powers through constitutional changes in parliamentary democratic system. National Front has challenged the established rules of Iranian political game by garnering popular backing from two key constituencies: conservative crowds and socialist supporters of the Tudeh (Masses) Party. Mosaddeq surfed over the mob psychology sweeping across Iranian streets. Shah was quite intimidated, since the oil issue has created serious ramifications for the Pahlavi throne. In Dec. 1949, the Iranian Majlis rejected to ratify the July 1949 concession given to the AIOC. The perpetuation of oil crisis has undermined Shah’s power considerably. Razmara’s assassination added insult to the injury. The emergent political vacuum was exploited by Mosaddeq instantaneously. After crafting the Majlis decision to nationalize the AIOC in Mar. 1951, Mosaddeq assumed premiership in Apr. 1951. Mosaddeq’s coming to power has been a watershed for Turkey-Iran relationship. Mosaddeq government tried to implement “neutralist foreign policy of movazeneh-ye manfi ­(negative equilibrium),” which seemed quite similar to the notion of ­non-­alignment espoused later by Nasser (Alvandi 2014c: 425). For London and Washington, Mosaddeq’s liberal nationalist power base was relatively weak, compared to more dominant social forces like the militant Tudeh

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and the radical ulema. Over the long term, Mosaddeq might not consolidate the regime, leading to more perilous prospects like a communist coup in Tehran (Falle 1999). Due to regional uncertainty, Turkish government has remained wary about a communist takeover in Iran. Indeed, this fear might have precluded confidential engagement between the two neighbors. Seen from Ankara, non-alignment was a ploy of the Soviets. Thus, Turkey has refrained from appealing to anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist movements as well. Pro-Western foreign policy outlook has made it more difficult for Turkey to build local solidarity in the Middle Eastern neighborhood (Sönmez 2009; Çetinsaya 2007: 173–174). Given Mosaddeq’s liberal, nationalist and pro-American leanings (Kalinovsky 2014; Ramazani 1976b: 325; 1982: 9; 2013: 2), he could well become a viable political partner for Menderes. This did not happen due to Ankara’s tying hands to the shah and the pro-Western status quo in Iran. Mosaddeq nationalized the Iranian oil in the name of defending sovereign and absolute rights of the country. Initially London, and later Washington, directly clashed with the Mosaddeq government, and campaigned against nationalization of Iranian oil. The international dispute on Iranian oil has exacerbated Ankara’s anxieties. To a great extent, the Menderes government was concerned about regime stability rather than constitutional democracy in Iran. As Karaosmanoğlu later noted, Turkey’s democratic elections in May 1950 has resonated well with the Iranian press. The local demonstration effect of political neighborhood was there. Iranians were striving to emulate the Turkish example, despite their lacking of electoral laws and republican order in the country (Yıldırım 2011: 145–147). In those days, as Karaosmanoğlu sensed, the “spiritual state” of Iranian people was “quite complicated and paradoxical.” He saw Mohammed Reza Shah as one of the most “righteous, royalist, and legitimate” king among known rulers of the Orient. By Karaosmanoğlu’s measure of lifestyle, education and mindset, the Iranian ruler was just like his Western counterparts. Besides, Karaosmanoğlu added, Mohammed Reza has remained sincerely loyal to his country and the Iranian nation. Unlike his late father, the new king has not directly clashed with the clerics. Quite the contrary, he tolerantly let clerical centers to observe traditional Shii rituals in public spaces. What’s more, Karaosmanoğlu claimed, Mohammed Reza has tended to adopt “a kind of Islam policy” toward the neighboring states. In spite of Islamic overtures, the new king could not thoroughly wipe out negative sentiments built against the Pahlavi throne. His father’s autocratic rule has

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left a lingering affective climate of clerical “anger, hatred, and revenge.” Karaosmanoğlu pointed the “reactionary psyche,” sustained by Kashani and other radicals, as the predominant factor shaping the “dark atmosphere of terror” in Tehran. The domestic turmoil has also been driven by external influence. From Karaosmanoğlu’s perspective, communist and capitalist forces have penetrated from diametrically opposite directions and turned Iran as their chasse gardée (“hunting ground”). Russia has been operating in Iranian Azerbaijan through “the Tudeh cell structures.” Britain has been exploiting Iranian oil resources in Abadan facilities. Since the United States entered the game lately, Karaosmanoğlu perceived Washington’s policies as “inconsiderate and incomprehensible.” In his view, all three external players have deliberately affected the heart and soul, and hence the “lifeworld” (can evi), of Iranian nation (Karaosmanoğlu 1955: 271–277). Under precarious internal and external circumstances, Mohammed Reza Shah had relied on Washington. By doing so, he gained global leverage to balance diametrical regional influence exerted by Moscow and London. More importantly, the American alliance could help him to eliminate his domestic rivals (Ramazani 1982: 7–14). The fundamental reason for this importance is the fact that the Shah’s domestic politics formed the raison d’être of his American policy from start to finish. Bluntly stated, the Shah wooed, won, and eventually lost American support largely because of the way he played the game of domestic politics. (Ramazani 1982: 7)

To Karaosmanoğlu’s surprise, the Iranian king also sought to use Islamic regional policies as an international ploy against the Russian imperialists and the British colonialists. Indeed, the “Islamic unity” among Muslim countries might provide local solidarity. Nonetheless, Muslim countries have remained far from building collective bases for regional collaboration. In fact, Muslim countries have different internal weaknesses, external security concerns and threat perceptions. For these reasons, secularist and Westernist Karaosmanoğlu hinted, it would be imprudent to pursue an Islamic solidarity pact. Critical of Tehran’s theocratic and pro-­ Eastern regional diplomacy, Karaosmanoğlu could not make a significant contribution to advance Turkish-Iranian local interactions. The two neighbors achieved symbolic progress in their economic and cultural transactions. Turkey has taken a cautious approach regarding domestic developments in Iranian economy. In Apr. 1949, Iranian government has

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established the “Economic Council” to streamline plans and coordinate policies. This step was welcomed by Ankara. Since then Karaosmanoğlu worked to enhance bilateral cooperation on key areas. In Dec. 1949, acting on behalf of the Turkish government, Karaosmanoğlu signed a mutual imbursement agreement for payments of transit passengers and supplies (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 2018). Two respective agreements on transit transportation and air travel were later sealed in Jan. and Mar. 1951. On the bases of former agreements, both sides decided to form a joint council to promote educational exchange programs and revive cultural interactions among sportspersons, students, teachers, researchers and journalists (Karaosmanoğlu 1955: 290–292; Yıldırım 2011: 145–147). In early Cold War years, Ankara and Tehran held common concerns about the likelihood of Soviet regional aggression. Nonetheless, shared anxieties could not fully motivate local security cooperation between two neighboring governments. Indeed, the Iranian side offered Turkey to revive the Saadabad Pact as a region-based military alliance. This time the regional alignment would be bolstered by Pakistan’s inclusion. In response, Ankara pointed out regional repercussions of such an endeavor. From the Turkish perspective, Saadabad Pact could be much more viable with the US membership. Otherwise, the regional alliance would be counter-­ productive, as it might only provoke Soviet aggression toward the common neighborhood. Initially, Turkish nationalists were reluctant to share the defense burden of the weaker Iranian army. Quite similarly, Iranian nationalists were not eager to bandwagon Turkish military power and acquiesce to Ankara’s positional domination (Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009a: 651). Reciprocal senses of humiliation and rules of honor did surpass other emotional entanglements. Dyadic status considerations have hindered military collaboration in Turkey-Iran strategic interactions. The Anglo-American domination over the Iranian oil resources has been challenged during the 1951–1953 period. Since Iran’s interactions with the Anglo-American axis have deteriorated, Turkish-Iranian bilateral relationship experienced a dyadic crisis. Ankara was intimidated by popular (nationalist-communist) unrest in Tehran. At that time, Turkish government has already been concerned about Soviet manipulation of and communist intrusion into local nationalist movements. For obvious political reasons, Turkey did not accept to take part in British mediation efforts. However, Turkish government sided with the status quo forces and appealed to Anglo-American oil affiliations in Iran. Turkey could go even further and embrace the imposition of international oil embargo on Iran.

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This diplomatic posture offended Tehran inevitably. When Turkey supported Britain and voted against Iran in the UN Security Council, Ankara’s attitude was protested in a diplomatic letter sent by Tehran. As of Oct. 1950, the diplomatic protest has unleashed a dyadic political battle over media outlets (Yıldırım 2011: 148–150, 164–165). As a matter of fact, the Iranian radical left has begun to oppose Turkey’s pro-American foreign policy much earlier. In Dec. 1950, the Turkish government finally ascertained sending of troops to the UN-endorsed military operations in the southern Korea. In early stages of the Korean War, the leftist Iranian press rebuked the Turkish soldiers, and the political leaders, most prominently President Bayar, through publishing condescending caricatures (Çetinsaya 2006: 382). Deeply offended by deceptive practices of Iranian press, Karaosmanoğlu took a personal initiative, and made a cordial complaint to the acting Prime Minister Razmara. The meeting brought immediate effects, as Razmara lambasted parliamentarians at the Majlis, and called for seizure of printed materials, and in some cases closure of printing houses (Karaosmanoğlu 1955: 299, 300). However, the Iranian leftist media provocations have not abated due to the worsening of Anglo-Iranian oil crisis. The international imbroglio put Turkey in an awkward position between its ally and neighbor. Ankara attempted to walk a fine line without damaging its relations with London and Tehran. But the situation was so precarious, any political move in one side’s favor would inevitably hurt the other side. Pro-Western Turkish newspapers displayed more sympathy toward the British position. For example, on 5 Oct. 1951, the chief editor of daily Hürriyet Sedat Simavi praised the “loyalty” shown toward the international friends. Ankara’s attitude was deemed as “excusable,” since Tehran has been marching toward the path of “Bolshevism.” Being Iran’s “closest neighbor,” Turkey was extremely offended. In Ankara’s case, the rule of dyadic disgust seemed so subtle since it turned as political “support” for London. According to Simavi, Tehran has incited an international conflict by not accepting the oil deal (Yıldırım 2011: 150, 151). Regardless of the ensuing crisis, Turkish and Iranian governments have displayed affective-normative commitment to maintain good relations. Dyadic resentment was somehow managed. In June 1951, the two neighbors signed a military cooperation agreement to facilitate bilateral exchange of officers and students. Security interactions have progressed gradually. The joint “High Border Commission” has convened in Van to discuss security issues in cross-border areas. While speaking to the Turkish

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parliament in Dec. 1951, Foreign Minister Mehmet Fuat Köprülü adopted a softer political tone. As he expressed, Turkey has kept “sincere and friendly feelings towards neighboring Iran.” Ankara has been quite “worried about the ongoing dispute” between Tehran and London. In Köprülü’s words, Turkish government has been working “wholeheartedly” to resolve this conflict (Yıldırım 2011: 152). Köprülü’s affective rhetoric aimed to repair relational damages recently incurred on the Ankara-Tehran neighborhood. However, these rhetorical moves have remained far from managing the hearts on other side of the border. The pro-Western posture has increasingly charged negative affective costs for the DP government. Anti-Turkish feelings began to spill all over to the region, almost creating a psycho-social contagion. The rising Turkish antipathy has coupled with the affective tide of nationalism. The trans-boundary nationalist reactions were so strong that they gradually generated a regional backlash against the DP government. The top DP policy makers—President Celal Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes—could not affectively discharge negative psycho-social resonances growing across the region. Over the coming years, Ankara’s regional anxiety has increased considerably. The turning point was the July 1952 nationalist military takeover in Egypt. After abrogating the Egyptian constitution in Dec. 1952, the Revolutionary Command Council asserted full powers in Jan. 1953. It was evident that the Egyptian monarchy would collapse in the coming months. The spreading of revolutionary nationalist spirit over the region posed a serious concern for Ankara. On 3 Feb. 1952, the chief editor of the daily Ulus Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın read recent regional developments as emanating from the lack of genuine “democracy” in Middle Eastern regimes. Seen from Yalçın’s perspective: Iran is just like a burning oil well. Officially their etiquette is democracy. They have parliament, political parties and free press. But what all these has produced was nothing less than anarchy … It was widely rumored that an Iranian cleric kept the whole power out of the official government apparatus. Ultimately, the crisis of authority and governance has dragged the country towards disasters. (Yıldırım 2011: 153)

Yalçın was probably alluding to the influential role played by Majlis Speaker Ayatollah Seyyid Abu’l Qasim Kashani, who had been earlier viewed as an ally of the Ankara government in the 1920s. Actually, it was not the radical ulema, but the communist Tudeh affiliates, who attacked

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the Turkish government and spread anti-Turkish feelings inside Iran. Mosaddeq government was “disgusted” by Turkey’s pro-British posture in the oil issue. Behind the scenes, the Soviets were exerting indirect influence over Tudeh to further alienate Iranian people from Turkey and the Western camp. The Iranian imbroglio was watched closely by the Turkish press and the public at large. One of the strongest reactions came from the prominent Hürriyet columnist Simavi. On 13 Mar. 1952, Simavi stormed against the Iranian regime, since they had not prevented publication of “contemptuous” pieces in the newspapers affiliated with the “Bolsheviks.” The actions of Iranians could not be “forgiven,” since they despised the leaders of a neighboring government. The policies of Mosaddeq government have brought the country on the brink of a tragic disaster. Iran was about to become a “Soviet satellite” lurking behind “the iron curtain.” Simavi went even further, increasing the affective charge on Iranian political house. For him, the confrontation was not merely ideological. There were in fact affective ingredients to it. To justify his hard-line rhetoric, Simavi returned to the 1514 Çaldıran myth, which would make it much easier for him to put the historical blame on Iranian shoulders. Since the time of Safavids ̇ and Shah Ismail, Iranians have never forgotten the bitter taste of Çaldıran defeat; they have always kept deep-seated feelings of enmity against the Ottomans and the Turks. As Simavi mythologized, this history of affective antipathy repeated itself chronically. The hard-line abuse of mythology has gone further than affective blaming and attacked the very foundations of Turkey-Iran relationship. Simavi’s “shaming” of the past era of friendship, established mutually by the founding fathers, shows how hard-line social psychology could undermine affective norms of neighborhood and invites emotional culture of confrontation in Turkish-Iranian interactions. Simavi “shamed” Tehran unequivocally. He thought that the era of amity has been shattered totally. To a certain extent, Simavi’s resentment resonated ̇ with the Turkish public. Sooner, angry crowds have gathered in Izmir to protest the two Iranian newspapers, regardless of the public statement issued earlier by the Iranian Embassy in Ankara (Yıldırım 2011: 153–155). Distributed on 11 Mar. 1952, the declaration put the blame on Iranian communists led by Tudeh. The public announcement read: The Iranian Embassy feels grieved and sorrowed by the ugly and the regretted caricatures published by two newspapers in Tehran … This has been done by Tudeh communists who, for their own political purposes, desired

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to hurt the feelings of, friendly and brotherly, Turkish nation, and turn Turkish public opinion against Iran, and sever ties of friendship between two countries. Hence, the issue has been conveyed to the Iranian government immediately. (Yıldırım 2011: 153)

Despite diplomatic calls to tone down, the Turkish press took the political matter seriously. For this reason, Turkish Prime Minister Menderes intervened and managed the crisis quite affectively. Menderes’s remarks show his sophistication in social psychology of international affairs, and worth quoting at length here: Likewise, I have noticed that vulgar and ugly caricature with feelings of aversion. Undoubtedly, this kind of publications hurt national honor and dignity and arouse popular indignation. Nonetheless, one should not forget the fact that resentment [is a valence based feeling, it] turns against the social status [behooved on the other side]. If the inappropriate action comes from an honorable and serious person, the relational damage lasts longer and deeper. On the other hand, if the same action is perpetrated by an insane or a dishonorable person, you feel pity for the first, get disgusted by the second. These latter two do not deserve too much attention. If I am not mistaken this piece was published almost six months ago. Now, it is transmitted to our press. This is actually done by provocateurs … Our Tehran Embassy has brought the issue to the purview of Iranian Foreign Ministry. The matter is now under the jurisdiction of authorized courts … It is my opinion that our Iranian brothers, just like us, have been saddened by the publication of obscene images and texts. Our noble nation, seeing the real target behind those provocations, would definitely act in prudence and remain loyal to our traditional traits such as self-esteem and self-restraint. (Yıldırım 2011: 156–158)

This lengthy quote demonstrates the significance of status feelings in Turkey-Iran relationship. Honor, dignity, disgust and resentment have co-­ extensively shaped emotional rules of exchange between the two neighbors. I also argue that the deployment of affective rhetoric at this critical moment has been quite influential for relational management. Menderes’s messages were well received by the Iranian side. The Iranian Embassy sent an official letter to thank the Turkish Prime Minister for his public statements. Menderes responded in a kind manner. The Speaker of Iranian Government stated that Iranians and Turks have been brothers and friends for centuries. The friendly relationship between two brotherly nations

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would never be challenged. The Iranian Embassy also assured that the final outcome of judicial investigation would be conveyed to the Turkish public (Yıldırım 2011: 158, 159). The exchange of reciprocal assurances in public space has helped to repair relational damages sooner than later. It seems that the dyadic crisis was managed by mutual affective-normative commitments. Normalization process would inevitably take some more time. As the Turkish Embassy observed in Mar. 1952, the severe liquidity shortage deeply hit the Iranian market right before the national Nowruz holiday. The traditional commercial elites broke ties from the Iranian government, who were allegedly negotiating with international funders to overcome the financial impasse (Yıldırım 2011: 154, 164). In the coming months, the Iranian regime faced an acute domestic crisis. The political rift between the shah and the government has deepened as well. The balance of power shifted more toward Mosaddeq’s advantage (Erden 2017). On 30 May 1952, the daily Cumhuriyet took a somewhat sympathetic approach toward the Mosaddeq government. The historical background of Anglo-Iranian oil conflict has been given in detail. The assassination of Iranian Prime Minister Ali Razmara in Mar. 1951 was reminded regretfully and tied perceptively to the treacherous politics of oil in international relations. Here, the Mosaddeq government was portrayed as conducting a costly anti-colonial struggle against Britain. Mosaddeq’s addressing of the ̇ Iranian diaspora gathered in the Istanbul Yeşilköy Airport has been largely covered. However, the Iranian delegation seemed not hopeful about the ongoing arbitration at the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The final decision would most likely be left to the discretion of conflicting parties. After the court decision, Cumhuriyet wrote, Mosaddeq government could seize the critical moment and make progress in settling the international dispute on Iranian oil. In this regard, Mosaddeq was urged to take “sensible” decisions to “save” his country from deteriorating circumstances. Otherwise, Cumhuriyet noted, “the red factions” would exploit the apparent advantages and might even “move the country behind the iron curtain.” Like Cumhuriyet, Turkey hoped that its “friend and neighbor” would resolve the inter-governmental conflict through political management of counter-productive and self-defeating sentiments (Yıldırım 2011: 160–162). The coverage of Cumhuriyet highlighted the complexity of Turkish feeling rules displayed toward anti-colonialist and anti-communist movements in Iran. Most obviously, Mosaddeq was not portrayed as a popular

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hero. The Iranian National Front was not fully embraced either. The dislike shown against the Iranian communists were apparently far stronger than the spirit of anti-colonial comradeship. Rules of fear were also operational for propaganda purposes. The abuse of phobia has also built into the antipathetic atmosphere of the Cold War relationship in Turkey-Iran neighborhood. The protraction of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute did constrain Turkey’s regional policies. As Foreign Minister Köprülü reiterated in Oct. 1952, Turkey was forced into a liminal foreign policy position. Choosing between an “ally” and a neighboring “close friend” was not easy. Therefore, Ankara has never assumed a position of mediation shuttling between London and Tehran. Turkey’s desire was to find solution along the international principles of “justice and equality.” As Köprülü thought, “Middle Eastern countries have been watching Turkey’s regional policies with great assurance and [deep] trust” (Yıldırım 2011: 162). Indeed, Turkey was quite careful in not further alienating the National Front, as they might challenge pro-Western monarchical rule in Iran. The Iranian nationalists would most likely pursue independent foreign policy and side with the Egyptian regime led by Nasser. The Tehran-Cairo axis of non-alignment might possibly be a political nightmare not only for Ankara but also for the anti-communist Anglo-American allies. Not surprisingly, Menderes and Köprülü shared the Turkish anxiety about the plotting of a “communist coup” in Iran. Ankara urged London to take appropriate measures to prevent that threat. Otherwise, Soviets might further exploit domestic weaknesses of the Iranian regime through their indirect influence over the Tudeh Party (Yıldırım 2011: 162, 163). Over the coming months, Turkey cautiously watched the weakening of Mosaddeq government. The Iranian nationalists were divided between left and right factions. The National Front has been tainted by factional infighting between the Tudeh Party and the Shii ulema. In Feb. 1953, Kashani has abandoned the National Front. “With this action he sided with the shah” and by extension with his foreign allies. He “portrayed Mosaddeq as a demagogue who has hidden his true dictatorial nature behind the mask of a democrat” (Siavoshi 1999: 73). Kashani stayed as the Majlis Speaker for some time. His defense of a non-sectarian political vision was noted by the Turkish press in Apr. 1953. In my opinion, all Muslims of the world should unite around an ideology of brotherhood and harmony, either they are Sunni or Shii or belong to other sects, they should overcome the minor differences among them. If we desire

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to remain far from the third world war, there should be no division among Turks, Arabs, Iranians and Hindus. We are brothers and we should share our happiness as well as our sadness. (Yıldırım 2011: 165, 166)

The withdrawal of ulema support dealt a serious blow to Mosaddeq’s broad-based coalition. The balance of power turned toward the communists, which exacerbated the divisions between Mosaddeq and the Tudeh Party. The alienation of the masses has put extra strain on the Iranian government. As a result, Mosaddeq resorted to authoritarian measures to suppress the political opposition. He had two main aims: (1) eliminate the British influence over the Iranian economy, and (2) destroy the dynastic rule of Pahlavis and build a popular republic in the country. These two political aims were mutually reinforcing (Yapp 1996: 184, 185; Erden 2017: 126). Unable to reach a timely compromise with the mediating US administration, Mosaddeq pushed himself toward an uncertain situation. Ultimately, Americans sought stability, rather than democracy, in Iran (Collier 2017; Mackey 1998: 200–210; Ramazani 1980a: 456). From Feb. 1953 onward, Turkish political anxiety has exacerbated since Shah Mohammed Reza has been forced to retreat from power. By the end of July 1953, the Iranian Parliament was dissolved completely. Mosaddeq wielded power into his own hands. Mosaddeq’s head-on clash with the Shah climaxed on 15 Aug. 1953. Shah dismissed Mosaddeq by decree, but he refused to go. Due to mass demonstrations Shah fled the country, first to Baghdad and then to Rome. At this critical point came covert assistance of Anglo-American intelligence services (the joint operations conducted under the code of “Ajax”). Then, the Shah returned to the palace on 19 Aug. 1953 (Saray 1999: 125; Yapp 1996: 185). After the Anglo-American-backed coup in Tehran (Gasiorowski 1987, 1999), relief has been the prevalent political sentiment ruling in Ankara. The new Iranian government, formed by General Fazlallah Zahedi, promoted better relations with Turkey. In Oct. 1953, a select group of Turkish journalists visited Iran upon official invitation. Possibly, through international media campaigns, Shah has been trying to restore his public image. He told the Turkish media that “the friendship between Turkish and Iranian nations has been a heritage from [his] father and this friendship would live forever.” Similar feelings were echoed by the new Iranian Ambassador Ali Mansur arriving in Ankara in Nov. 1953. Mansur felt that as if he were in his native home. The Turkish government was quite happy about the restoration of order in Iranian internal and external politics

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(Yıldırım 2011: 148, 166–169). Shah resuscitated oil concessions to the Western companies in Aug. 1954. Thereafter, Ankara and Tehran have begun to re-fashion a pro-Western pact over the region (Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009a: 650). From Baghdad Pact to CENTO: Regional Sources of Domestic Disorder During the formation of the Baghdad Pact in Jan.–Feb. 1955, Menderes and Bayar have put enormous diplomatic effort to build a pro-­Western security zone around Turkey’s neighborhood. The government’s regional policies were very much in line with Atatürk’s foundational foreign policy ideals such as the “belt of peace” to be established in Turkey’s immediate periphery. The Saadabad Pact of 1937 has been mainly intended for this geostrategic purpose. Due to the gloomy prospect of war on a global scale, the international environment was more conducive for Turkey’s relatively independent regional maneuvers. But the post-war local conditions were not similar. The tighter structural conditions of Cold War did not help the DP government. Foremost, Moscow has been infuriated by Ankara’s assertive pact-making diplomacy. Turkey’s aspirations for regional influence have encountered serious regional backlash. The inadvertent local polarization created counter-­ productive consequences such as the fueling of anti-Turkish sentiments in most Arab capitals including Baghdad and Damascus (Yıldırım 2011: 171–178). Indeed, the pan-Arabist propaganda warfare unleashed by Nasser was so strong in managing the hearts in Arab streets. Moreover, Nasser’s leading of the “non-aligned movement” has created serious implications for Turkey’s foreign policy making in the broader neighborhood extending over to the Indian subcontinent (Çetinkaya 2016: 8–20; Bostancı 2013: 174–180; Sönmez 2009). In those circumstances, the Turkish diplomacy had lacked social-psychological wherewithal to affectively and normatively deal with the regional tide of socialist nationalism sweeping across the Arab state borders. Notwithstanding Nasser’s diplomatic rivalry and Arab public reactions, the DP government worked to change rules of international interaction in the Middle East. Without the strong psycho-social anchor of NATO membership and lacking ­affective-­normative support of the Anglo-American axis, the instituting of a pro-­Western regional security organization would be a more daunting international experience for the Turkish policy makers (Kumral 2016:

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79–115). At a time of urgent political need, Ankara sought regional partners and knocked the neighbors’ doors including Tehran. As of 12 Apr. 1955, Iranian Prime Minister Hussein Ala acknowledged their reception of formal invitation from the Baghdad Pact (Yıldırım 2011: 196). Initially, Shah Mohammed Reza displayed reluctance for various diplomatic reasons. It later became clear that Tehran’s foot-dragging was deliberately designed to receive much more US aid in terms of military hardware and technical equipment. Shah seemed cautious about reactionary moves of the domestic opposition led by nationalist and leftist groups. He also refrained from provoking the Soviets (Yıldırım 2011: 196, 197; Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009a: 651). At that juncture, the Turkish government seemed less vulnerable due to the social-psychological strength pertained by the NATO membership. Unlike soothing senses of comfort and courage governing the hearts in Ankara, exasperating feelings of unease and tension have reigned in Tehran. These internal and external social-psychological reasons have precluded Iranian government’s early entry into the Baghdad Pact. Ankara was disturbed by lack of enthusiasm in Tehran. In Sept. 1955, President Bayar took an official trip to Iran. More than 20 years later, Bayar has returned the visit of late Shah Reza paid in 1934 to Turkey. Before his journey, Bayar reiterated the common fate between the two countries. Similar feelings were also captured by Ahmet Emin Yalman, the chief editor of daily Vatan. There is comprehensive concord of fate between us. Both of us have been exposed to similar perils … Same types of obstacles were laid in their road [towards development]. If we get hand in hand with each other, and with our neighbors, and mutually exploit our experiences, we can easily overcome obstacles and increase the pace of our progress … The common understanding between Turkish and Iranian nations, and the building of total trust between them, would serve as a source of regional stability in the Middle East, and would function as a barrier against external ambitions of aggression, provocation and sabotage. (Yıldırım 2011: 184)

Likewise, the Iranian press circulated corresponding feelings. Some journalists praised Iranian Prime Minister Hussein Ala for not yielding to the Soviet pressure, and propaganda campaign, deployed by Radio Moscow. By joining the collective defense pact, Iran would meet its regional security needs in the Middle East. Otherwise, the country would

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be weakened. Iranian newspapers also highlighted the importance of progress in bilateral relations. By working along the foundations of Atatürk and Reza Shah, Iran and Turkey could obtain a better international position in world affairs. Further enhancement of Turkish-Iranian collaboration in areas of trade, transportation and cultural exchange would help to achieve integration between European and Asian neighborhoods (Yıldırım 2011: 185–187). During the Iran visit, Bayar has delivered a number of public speeches. While addressing the Iranian Parliament, Bayar repeated the need to work hand in hand to achieve peace and prosperity. As Bayar conveyed, there has been a unity between Turkey and Iran in terms of common “ideations, destiny and conscience.” Bayar’s emotional messages aimed to convince the Iranian side to join the pact of regional defense. While visiting Isfahan, Bayar told that he came to Iran in order to further enhance “the primordial friendship” between two neighboring countries. “We would like to cooperate for our mutual security should Iranians and the Iranian government decide so. Just like both nations share the happiness jointly, they are exposed to the danger collectively.” Commonality of contentment and distress were two affective benchmarks stressed by Bayar in order to build psycho-social solidarity for Turkish-Iranian security cooperation (Yıldırım 2011: 186, 187). In his inaugural speech at the University of Tehran, Bayar has made a stronger case in an attempt to garner political support for regional defense cooperation. Bayar told that it would not be sufficient for the nations to rely on the power of moral principles in world politics. Acting on the basis of “realism,” states should maximize their military power and get prepared to join their forces in cases of territorial aggression and violation of sovereignty. Economic development would be key for national defense. Therefore, Bayar urged, Turkey and Iran ought to work together to jointly achieve economic growth and military progress. The global “geopolitics” and regional “roles” have made the Turkish-Iranian neighborhood relationship more important than ever. Paraphrasing Bayar, if two neighbors act along their “common fate,” they would acquire more influential international status. “This is no longer the times that you get satisfaction from your neighbor’s devastation. Either we would rise in concert or we would hit to the bottom all together.” Turkey and Iran are “two brother nations determined to rise” both economically and militarily. If they collaborate particularly on these two fronts, Bayar concluded, both neighbors would be better off (Yıldırım 2011: 188, 189).

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The last day of a week-long visit has indicated positive results for Turkey-Iran bilateral relations. Both sides signed a joint declaration for economic cooperation. For this purpose, the “Joint Economic Commission” (JEC) was established. Initially, JEC was assigned with these tasks: (1) transit transportation and travel, (2) joint transportation enterprises, (3) transit roads, (4) railroad connections, (5) telecommunications, (6) commerce and clearinghouses, (7) joint enterprises for civil aviation. Even though the joint declaration remained vague about defense and security issues, the Iranian press was confident that Tehran would join the Baghdad Pact sooner (Yıldırım 2011: 190, 191). The semi-official newspaper Ittılaat put it more strongly, reverberating the authoritarian voice of the Iranian palace. The mission for the Iranian government is to move forward in the designated road, comply with common aspirations of the two nations and unite their forces. Ripened opportunities do not wait so long. We must be quick for this reason. Iran and Turkey have to unify and collaborate in order to collectively defend their independence and sovereignty and assist the perpetuation of peace in world politics. (Yıldırım 2011: 191)

As Bayar saw, Iranian membership to the pact was just like Turkey’s participation in the NATO. Only after becoming NATO member, Ankara could satisfy defensive demands of the Turkish army. Based on former Turkish experience, Bayar assured that Tehran’s joining to the pact would bring satisfactory benefits to meet the needs of Iranian military. As Bayar reasserted in the press conference, “the character of the Baghdad Pact would be absolutely different from the one pertained by the Saadabad Pact.” Since the 1937 treaty was not an alliance agreement, Iran could not receive security assistance from the member countries. The “text and spirit” of the new agreement provided a collective assurance and regional security umbrella for all member states. There was not any need to devise country-specific guarantees. Without further ado, Iran has been officially invited to join the Middle East defense pact. The final decision was to be made by the Shah acting on behalf of the Iranian people. It was just a matter of time for Tehran to declare official accession to the Baghdad Pact. In this respect, Bayar returned to Ankara with positive expectations (Yıldırım 2011: 192, 193). Despite Bayar’s assuring diplomacy, Iranians could not formalize their decision due to increasing Soviet pressure. On 9 Oct., Shah reasserted that

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“neutrality” has not helped Iran to protect itself from the detriment of two world wars. For this reason, he urged the Iranian government to seek collective security and mutual defense organizations. Upon this call, Prime Minister Hussein Ala announced Tehran’s decision to join the Baghdad Pact. Even though Moscow’s threatening diplomatic note was rejected by Tehran on 14 Oct., the Soviets caused some delay. Consequently, Iran joined the Pact at a later date, on 3 Nov. 1955. Meanwhile, Ankara-Tehran bilateral relations have gained momentum. JEC has made new arrangements to improve transit trade, transportation and air travel. “High Border Commission” continued to carry on its joint activities. Turkey provided technical help to assist administration of general census in Iran (Yıldırım 2011: 193, 201). Turkey and Iran have also signed a “protocol” for equitable management of water resources in trans-­boundary rivers basins of “Karasu and Sarısu” (Çetinkaya 2016: 21). To celebrate the first anniversary of the Baghdad Pact, Turkish leaders have issued public statements. Köprülü reaffirmed that Baghdad Pact has been a “regional agreement” established by common commitments of “peace-loving neighbors.” The international aim has been to provide local avenues and regional organizations for collective security cooperation among neighboring countries. As Köprülü saw, the regional pact has constituted a “geographical whole,” which has been standing like a “well-­ founded wall” against external “aggression.” Menderes took these points to make further assertions. As Menderes defended, the Baghdad Pact has constituted a regional linchpin interlocking NATO with the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). This has been a significant contribution for world peace, which by the same token deserves immeasurable “praise.” In addition to the main goal of maintaining peace in the Middle East, Menderes concluded, the Pact has been serving to improve economic, cultural and social interaction among member states (Yıldırım 2011: 199, 200). In Apr. 1956, Menderes and Köprülü have attended the Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council meeting in Tehran. On this occasion, Menderes emphasized the need to enhance regional military capacity, in order to defend the Middle East from communist infiltration. The member states have issued the “Tehran Declaration,” where they have addressed l­ ingering regional questions such as Palestine, Israel and Egypt. As Menderes pointed out, “ally countries” have worked “candidly” to strengthen their regional bonds. The Tehran meeting has also generated new avenues for the development of neighborly relations between Ankara and Tehran.

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Turkish and Iranian parliamentarians have founded the “Friendship and Culture Association” in order to strengthen the traditional ties of neighborhood. Consequently, the Turkish delegation has returned to Ankara with feelings of gratitude (Yıldırım 2011: 201, 202). The revival of positive sentiments has enabled further progress in Turkey-Iran partnership. Upon official invitation, the Iranian Shah has paid a state visit to Turkey. The trip has started on 16 May 1956, and lasted two weeks. The diplomatic occasion has made a significant contribution to Tehran-Ankara relationship, as it promoted friendly and brotherly interactions and supported social-psychological solidarity between the two neighbors. Mohammed Reza, like his father, has been deeply impressed by the hospitality of Turkish people. As he framed, the popular feelings of “brotherhood and unity,” co-founded earlier by his father and Atatürk, were still warm in neighbors’ “hearts.” The founding fathers have left an enduring legacy for Turkey-Iran partnership. The two foundational leaders have opened a path of collaboration, full of happiness for both sides. On following the path of founding fathers, Mohammed Reza noted, Turkish and Iranian governments would further contribute to the making of peace and security in the region and the larger world. The young Shah also observed that Iran and Turkey share similar “desires and aspirations” that reinforce their regional alignment. In this regard, he was hopeful about the future of the Baghdad Pact and Tehran-Ankara alliance relationship (Yıldırım 2011: 203–205). Like his father, Mohammed Reza saw the visit as a historical opportunity to learn from Turkey’s recent experiences, particularly in areas of military modernization, defense industry and national education. The itinerary was prepared to meet the Iranian expectations. The program included ̇ sightseeing of various facilities located in Ankara, Izmir, Efes, Karabük, ̇ Zonguldak, Yalova, Gölcük, Bursa, Balıkesir and Istanbul. During the ̇ Istanbul program, Bayar and Mohammed Reza seemed more committed to display dyadic solidarity, reminding the spirit of progressive engagement between two founding fathers. The naval exercises in Gölcük and air force maneuvers in Balıkesir have received congratulations from Shah. In all spots, Reza Shah has witnessed “warm feelings” displayed wholeheartedly by the Turkish people. The extraordinary affective nature of Turkish reception has captured the Iranian hearts and gained a prominent place in collective consciousness. Shah saw the “high affectivity” and positive relational atmosphere as the real assurances for the consolidation of Turkey-­ Iran alliance. Affective coalescing around a common cause would reinforce

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regional significance of Tehran-Ankara alignment (Yıldırım 2011: 206, 207). Shah’s messages, in paraphrase, implied that social psychology of Tehran-Ankara bilateral relationship and their regional interactions in the Middle Eastern neighborhood would transform co-extensively. When nationalization of Suez Canal has led to an international crisis in Oct. 1956, Turkish and Iranian governments have acted in concert and demonstrated regional solidarity of the Baghdad Pact. Turkish-Iranian local efforts have encouraged Washington to increase the US military commitment toward the Baghdad Pact. The “affective atmosphere” impending after Shah’s visit has contributed to construction of normative structures and practices in Turkey-Iran relations. The Menderes government acted highly empathetically and provided humanitarian support for the Iranian flood victims in Sept. 1956. The “Trade Agreement” and “Payment Protocol” and “Transit Memorandum” have been signed in Tehran on 13 Oct. 1956. These normative arrangements have set the rules of joint operation in respective areas. The trade agreement stipulated lists of goods mutually authorized for import and export. The payment protocol confirmed that national currencies were to be used in commercial exchanges. Turkish Central Bank would maintain a specific account to facilitate Iranian financial transactions. The transit memorandum reasserted the joint commitment to complete the cross-border (Muş-Tatvan-Van-Kotur-Tebriz) railroad project in ̇ three years. This joint venture would tie Tehran to Ankara and Istanbul and to the European centers. In addition, the land routes of transit transportation would be overhauled, which would connect Tehran-Tebriz-­ ̇ ̇ Bazargan road to Erzurum-Trabzon and Iskenderun-I stanbul directions and link Eizaiye-Bacirge and Hoy-Kotur roads to Hakkari-Diyarbakır-­ ̇ Iskenderun track. Other protocols, annexed to the transit memorandum, have included arrangements like joint transportation company, mutual management of passenger control and customs procedures at the land border gates. It later become obvious that strategic infrastructure projects, like transit roads and telecommunication systems, in addition to the joint civil aviation venture, were left to the discretion of Baghdad Pact-Economic Committee. In this regard, some further agreements were devised in June 1957. London has hosted the Sept. 1957 committee meeting, where member states discussed avenues for building a “common market” or establishing “free trade zones” in their region. Turkey also sought to establish an oil pipeline from Iran. German investors have shown keen interest in the oil pipeline project extending from Qum-Rızaiye to Cizre-­

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̇ Mardin-­Urfa-Antep-Iskenderun. While Refik Koraltan, the Speaker of Turkish Parliament, and his delegation were visiting Iran in May 1957, Shah acknowledged that the government has been still talking with the oil consortiums. By Nov. 1957, the oil pipeline project has not been ratified yet (Yıldırım 2011: 208–213). In fact, Turkey’s neighborly moves seemed far from satisfying Shah’s social-psychological desires. He was still jealous of NATO privileges pertained to Turkey. He felt the lack of full membership in the Western diplomatic club. In order to keep up with neighboring Ankara, Tehran returned to regional re-alignment with Washington. Shah steadily sought active US participation in the Baghdad Pact. His diplomatic efforts bore fruit after the declaration of Eisenhower Doctrine in Jan. 1957. Washington adhered to the military committee of the Pact in Mar. 1957 (Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009a: 651). During the period of 1957–1960, geopolitical ramifications of the Cold War ran deep into the Middle East and shaped the social psychology of regional countries in important ways. Ambivalence in Bilateral Interactions: Getting Closer but Feeling Colder Until the signing of London and Zurich accords in 1959, the Cyprus question loomed large in Turkish foreign policy agenda. While seeking international friends for the Turkish Cypriot cause, Ankara has also tried to utilize the Baghdad Pact. In response, regional members Iran, Pakistan and Iraq pledged support for the Turkish position in the island (Yıldırım 2011: 219). After the Syrian crisis of Aug.–Oct. 1957, the Menderes government realized that Moscow had gained the upper hand in Damascus. The loss of Syria by the Western camp (Lesch 1999) has gradually reinforced pathetic senses of siege in Ankara. The Turkish government has also closely watched the warming of regional relations between Moscow and Tehran (Yıldırım 2011: 208, 219). In Oct. 1959, the Menderes government granted permission for the ̇ installment of 15 Jupiter missiles with nuclear warheads in Izmir. Since the deal almost instantly provoked Soviet reactions, US President John Kennedy attempted to review the deployment plan as early as Apr. 1961. The diplomatic discussions proved futile, since the Turkish side found the likely consequences of American backstepping as “embarrassing” and demoralizing for a NATO member. When the Cuban missile crisis erupted

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in Oct. 1962, Ankara has “suspected that there has been a Turkey-for-­ Cuba trade.” The dismantling of Jupiter missiles in Apr. 1963 confirmed some of Turkish suspicions. The Jupiter case “led to the questioning of the United States as a trustable ally” (Kösebalaban 2011: 93). The international incident reminded that “exclusive reliance on US support was risky.” With these perceptions, Turkish diplomacy has adopted “more flexible policies towards the superpowers” (Hale 2002: 134–136). Due to the American ambivalence over the nuclear missile defense in NATO’s southern flank, Turkish policy makers felt deeply insecure and frustrated by its traditional alignment choices and sought new alternatives for international collaboration and regional partnership. Seeing steady signs of global détente, Ankara’s feeling rules began to change toward the Cold War game played between its distant ally and its close neighbor. As a matter of fact, the Turks had little choice other than developing better relations with the Soviet Union since the Russians have historically been their big neighbor (Kösebalaban 2011: 93–102). Much earlier, similar sentiments have aired in the political climate of Tehran. The Iranian diplomacy of détente with Moscow has been mainly influenced by domestic dynamics. Shah was still politically worried about perils of hidden instability, persistently emanating from social psychology of factionalism ruling among Iranian political-military elites. Despite the US failure, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi discovered in Feb. 1958 that the head of Iranian army intelligence, General Valiollah Qarani, attempted to plot a coup against him. His apprehensions worsened after the Iraqi revolution in July 1958. Presumably under the guise of “neutrality,” and for reasons of regime security, Shah also had made secret attempts to flirt with the Soviets. Tehran’s diplomatic détente with Moscow eventually fell short of meeting Shah’s political expectations (Alvandi 2014b, c). Reza’s diplomatic discontent became more apparent after the Iraqi departure from the Baghdad Pact in Mar. 1959. Shah was quite disturbed by the Turkish leftist publications attacking the Pahlavi monarchy. Under those circumstances, Shah might have felt the deeply penetrating impact of communism, which was subtly imposed behind the scenes. Mohammed Reza personally sued Kurtul Altuğ and Doğan Avcıoğlu, the executives of Akis magazine. The Turkish court found Akis affiliates guilty and sentenced them  to imprisonment and payment in Nov. 1959. Since the leftist public pressure did not abate, Shah’s alienation has deepened, forcing him to seek further personal engagement with the Soviet Union. These actions were not welcomed by Menderes and Bayar. Both

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leaders put personal effort to change the course of events and preclude the prospect of regional rapprochement between Tehran and Moscow. With these efforts, at least the solidarity of regional defense has been saved. In Aug. 1959, the Baghdad Pact was renamed as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and its headquarters were moved to Ankara. Henceforth, CENTO defense arrangements were a primary concern for Tehran. Unlike his Turkish counterparts, Mohammed Reza strived to increase institutional influence of CENTO over regional affairs. In contrast, the Turkish government was mainly concerned about meeting military requirements of NATO membership. Quite paradoxically, however, Turkey aimed to restore good neighborly relations with the Soviet Union. Ankara’s surprising move has been partly encouraged by Tehran’s accommodating approach toward Moscow. More importantly, it was deeply driven by Ankara’s frustration from Washington, as the Eisenhower administration turned down urgent credit requests of the Menderes government. On 12 Apr. 1960, the Turkish-Soviet joint declaration was issued. It was publicly announced that Menderes’s visit to Moscow has been planned for July 1960. As a matter of fact, Americans have themselves made earlier overtures to the Soviets. The Turkish government felt that the time was ripe for Ankara to restore bilateral relations with Moscow. The Menderes government was quite aware of potential risks such as the Iranian reaction. Even though Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu has swiftly sent a special diplomatic envoy to ease Tehran’s tension, Mohammed Reza remained suspicious about the change of hearts in Ankara. The visit has been endorsed during the 28–30 Apr. 1960, CENTO meeting in Tehran. However, the US administration and the Iranian government have grown distrust toward Menderes’s mending of fences with the Russians. In the midst of international troubles, the outbreak of domestic unrest has complicated the matters worse for Menderes and Zorlu (Yıldırım 2011: 220–225; Dikerdem 1977: 12–16, 20–22, 25–28). Seeing Ankara’s ambivalence very early on, the shah wanted to establish a “special relationship” with the US administration to re-assure Washington’s support for his political survival. Dissatisfaction from regional structures of defense pushed Tehran toward strategic partnership with Washington in Mar. 1959. Moscow desired to distract development of a patron-client relationship between Tehran and Washington. The Soviet government deployed various diplomatic measures to “dislodge” Tehran from Washington’s orbit. During a key moment of Soviet-Iranian

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diplomatic meetings held on 30 Apr. 1959, the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko seized the opportunity and increased the political pressure on the Iranian Ambassador Abdul Hoseyn Masud Ansari. Gromyko strongly reminded Ansari that “one cannot choose his own neighbor according to one’s own wish.” Ansari bore “the brunt of Soviet anger” because he was “a long-time advocate of Soviet-Iranian détente.” Despite Ansari’s diplomatic efforts, the dream of détente with Moscow would not come true for Tehran as a consequence of Shah’s uncertain political commitments swinging between military partnership with Washington and economic collaboration with Moscow (Alvandi 2014c: 427). By its very nature, Iranian international interactions have remained in social-psychological limbo, largely due to ambivalent relational diplomatic maneuvers oscillating between the close regional neighbor and the distant global partner. The Iranian monarch had to play a delicate international balancing act. On the one hand, he needed to sustain necessary economic exchange relations with the immediate next-door neighbor. On the other hand, he had to keep political-military alignment with the remote superior patron. The diplomatic choice would be uneasy for the Pahlavi crown. As the Palace got closer to the US government, the opposition against the monarchy grew incrementally. The fear of losing power began to impair Shah physically and psychologically. Nonetheless, the US support and the Iranian regime proved to be more resilient than expected. On the other side of the fence, however, Turkey was hit by political-­ military turmoil of an unprecedented scale. The Menderes government was toppled by a military coup on 27 May 1960. In the wake of the coup, Washington’s affective-normative support for the Menderes government has dropped near to zero. Like the US administration, the Iranian regime was anxious about the latest moves of Menderes seeking diplomatic rapprochement with Moscow. Probably, Tehran might have been calmed down by pro-Western military takeover in Ankara. In the view of Shah, only “incompetent” politicians could be removed from office by military coups (Yıldırım 2011: 225, 226). No sooner the Committee of National Unity (Millî Birlik Komitesi-MBK) took control, they issued a public statement declaring that Ankara would remain “loyal” to NATO commitments and CENTO affiliations. Pro-Western foreign policy orientation of Turkish military was welcomed by Shah. “According to Mahmut Dikerdem, who was then Turkey’s ambassador to Tehran at the time of the coup, even the Iranian regime knew about it beforehand” (Kösebalaban 2011: 90), let alone the US administration. Americans turned deaf ears,

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since they had little love lost for Menderes. Shah was not surprised either, since the coming of coup was probably reported to him, as early as 21 May 1960, by the Iranian Ambassador in Ankara. Just two days after the regime change in Turkey, Shah displayed no hesitation to engage with some MBK ̇ affiliates in the Istanbul Yeşilköy Airport (Çetinsaya 2006: 384; Dikerdem 1977: 30, 31). Hereafter, the future agenda of Turkey-­Iran dyadic relationship was set toward strategic promotion of CENTO (Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009a: 651–652; b: 803). Not surprisingly, Shah “acclaimed the coup” makers in Turkey. This hasty political move was mainly caused by “his deep anxiety over Menderes’ projected visit to Moscow in July 1960.” Earlier, Menderes has himself attempted to convince Shah with a genuine proposal of building the “CENTO Command.” Indeed, Menderes’s diplomatic step was risky since the project has faced bureaucratic resistance inside the Turkish General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After the fall of Menderes from power, Shah was still hopeful about Ankara’s support to address Tehran’s persistent security concerns through CENTO. Since the time of Reza Shah, Iranian policy makers have been striving to develop a “defensive alliance” with neighboring Turkey. In the view of the Turkish leadership, however, “Iran was politically vulnerable and militarily weak.” Simply put, Ankara had almost no “incentive” to share regional responsibility of Tehran’s defensive burdens. Lacking local solidarity, Ankara-Tehran defense relationship has not matured toward a level of mutual satisfaction (Çetinsaya 2003: 126).

Under the Shadow of Global Détente (1961–1979) Arguably, the post-coup period has brought the Turkish foreign policy back to the pro-American lines of regional interaction. Seen from Washington, Ankara’s diplomatic engagement with Moscow was precluded for some time to come. But the “disciplining” impact of the military coup (Kösebalaban 2011: xiv) has waned in the face of significant internal and external developments. The fall of the DP government ushered in an era of republican restoration in the Turkish political center. The Turkish Constitution of 1961 has restored modernist-secularist codes of rule-making in Turkey. In the 1961–1964 period, the Kemalist regime was re-formed by the historical ruling bloc composed of civil-military bureaucracy and intelligentsia (Kahraman 2008: 181–184). The National Security Council (NSC),

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established as a military watchdog in Mar. 1962, has assumed the power of ultimate arbiter in Turkish politics. The military monitoring of civilian governments has brought disruptive consequences for state-society relations (Hale 2002: 45; Yapp 1996: 319–321). After initial public declarations, the MBK turned against CENTO commitments. This was mainly due to the “anti-CENTO attitudes in Turkish public opinion.” Therefore, “the new government abandoned the project of the CENTO Command.” Defense issues have stalled Ankara-Tehran diplomatic relations for almost two years. Diplomatic deadlock in the dyadic relationship has been overcome by re-engagement between governing elites, rejuvenation of friendly affective-normative interactions and re-activation of neighborly exchange practices. Joint political efforts have reached a high point of regional rule-making in July 1964 when Turkey and Iran, together with Pakistan, established the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) to help better manage their local exchange interactions in economic, technological, cultural and other areas of common concern. Noticeably, the formation of RCD indicated the diplomatic sidelining of CENTO and implicated political localization in Turkey-Iran bilateral relationship (Çetinsaya 2003: 127). Indeed, RCD has emerged due to local dissatisfactions of neighboring CENTO members. Quite similarly, Turkey and Pakistan were frustrated by Anglo-American policies toward Cyprus and Kashmir disputes. Iran has been driven by intra-regional concerns in the Persian Gulf. Bitter feelings of disappointment and resentment have shaped emotional motivations of CENTO neighbors. The positional discontents of three countries have provided political impetus for seeking alternative diplomatic venues. RCD would help them strengthen their regional positions, “develop ties between themselves and other Muslim countries in the region” and gain “wider field of maneuver” by further engaging with “the non-aligned” neighboring nations like Afghanistan. Turkey’s main political aim was to exert more international pressure on the Greek-Cypriot side. Pakistan pursued more assertive policies against rivaling India. Iran was more eager to balance inter-Arab influence growing over adjacent littoral areas. These positional desires for local autonomy, and independent foreign policy, have cemented the RCD. Shared expectations of economic benefits have also paved the way for the new region-based organization. Initially, RCD did lack military incentives, since the strategic structure of CENTO was still seen as security assurance against the threat of “communist aggression.” RCD was particularly intended “to foster regional cooperation in

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the fields of economy, technology and culture” (Yeşilbursa 2009: 637–644, 654). RCD has aimed to establish intra-regional cooperation on free trade arrangements, joint chambers of commerce, corporate industrial projects, cross-border postal services, transnational airline travel, maritime transportation, trans-boundary railroad construction, international tourism, visa exemption, technical assistance and cultural activities. On 2 Sept. 1964, Turkey and Iran signed RCD trade agreements. By the end of Aug. 1965, the RCD Chamber of Commerce was inaugurated in Tehran. In Dec. 1966, the joint petroleum venture was under way, with Turkey and Pakistan participating in Iran’s oil exploration activities. In this regard, the “construction of a pipeline from the Iranian oilfields to the Turkish ̇ Mediterranean port of Iskenderun” was also discussed. RCD Payments Union came into effect on 1 July 1967. It was decided in Aug. 1967 that ̇ the Turkish ports of Trabzon and Iskenderun would be renovated to enable free flow of Iranian transit trade. However, RCD has still lacked financial resources, technical capacity and administrative capability to make substantial progress in economic and technological areas of collaboration. As of Dec. 1967, RCD industrial enterprises remained limited. Likewise, RCD could only minimally promote intra-regional trade (Yeşilbursa 2009: 644–652). As a matter of fact, RCD members had “many common economic problems” emanating from similar structural predicaments. The neighboring “economies of the three countries were not complementary and did not form a natural economic unit; thus, the similarity of their economies placed a limit on intra-regional trade.” For example, between 1958 and 1962, the trilateral commercial exchange constituted less than 2% of their total trade volume (Yeşilbursa 2009: 652–653). This “insignificant” percentage has not changed over the coming years. For example, Iran’s trade with Turkey and Pakistan was less than 1% of its overall imports and exports in 1967–1968 period. By signing anew RCD trade agreement on 3 Sept. 1968, the three neighbors have granted most favored nation status to each other (Tahran Büyükelçiliği 1968: 16, 22). Despite these efforts, RCD trade volume has not improved significantly. Besides, RCD industrial cooperation progressed slowly. The “conflicting national aspirations” and lack of reciprocal commitment have precluded successful collaboration among RCD partners (Yeşilbursa 2009: 654–658). With the re-ascendance of conservative governments into power, Turkish foreign policy returned to traditional rules of balancing in regional

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affairs. In this sense, Ankara’s local engagement with the Arab countries, including Iraq, has deliberately aimed to garner diplomatic support for Turkey’s regional policies toward the Cyprus Island divided essentially between indigenous Turks in the north and Greeks in the south. In the view of most Arab peoples, there was also a regional need to address the question of Palestine. Ankara’s diplomatic efforts have intended to prevent regional instability arising from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Above all, Turkish governments have been concerned about the Kurdish uprisings inside Iraq. Ankara has been particularly disturbed by Tehran’s covert support for the Iraqi Kurds. Two neighbors diverged over dyadic rules of regional influence. Shah worked to undermine the Iraqi regime through providing assistance to local Kurdish militia groups. For the Turkish leaders, Shah’s imprudent aiding of Kurdish autonomy in neighboring Iraq might unleash unintended consequences for contiguous countries. Due to local divergence over the Kurdish question, distrust has determined feeling rules in political-diplomatic interactions between the two capitals. The affective-normative implications of dyadic distrust have accorded “years of loss” for the relationship of neighborhood between Ankara and Tehran. The history of decline in Turkey-Iran partnership has also been implicated by domestic changes in state-society interactions. The political game between the government and the opposition has been transformed quite dramatically in Turkey and Iran. Multifaceted forces of fragmentation and polarization have altered rule-making practices across the state center and the societal periphery. Both regimes have experienced political crises in their domestic rule-making. In varying degrees, domestic disorders in Turkey and Iran have led to psycho-social deprivation and affective-normative erosion of neighborly interactions. Bilateral bases of economic partnership were forestalled by political stalemate. The dyadic context of decadence has been aggravated by irreparable damages and relational losses exposed on Turkish-Iranian neighborhood relations. Seeing the indications of global détente, Turkish policy makers have returned to more balanced approaches in regional affairs. The facilitating international conditions helped Ankara to untie its political hands. By diversifying its diplomatic relations, Ankara could better play traditional game of power balancing. From 1963 onward, Turkish governments sought new trading partnerships through enhanced institutional-­ commercial collaboration with the European Economic Community (EEC). These gradual efforts enabled Ankara to diversify Turkey’s pro-­ Western orientation along the Euro-Atlantic divide.

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Nevertheless, Turkey’s prospects for a military intervention into Cyprus were intimidated diplomatically by the United States. Since President Johnson’s sending of an ill-fated letter in June 1964, Turkish policy makers lost trust in their American counterparts. When the content of “Johnson letter” was leaked to the Turkish press around June 1965–Jan. 1966 period, both leftist and rightist radicals have begun to exploit growing anti-American sentiments in Turkey (Yapp 1996: 318; Kösebalaban 2011: 95, 205). In this critical period, Turkey held the general elections in Oct. 1965. The Justice Party (Adalet Partisi-AP) government led by Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel has re-formed dominant majoritarian rules of centerright politics in Turkey. Like his role-model Menderes, Demirel established himself as a proficient populist, competent at catching votes from both sides of the Turkish center-right, swinging between authoritarian-­ conservative and liberal-democratic political lines (Arat 2002: 94, 99; Sayarı 2002). The historical sociology of political center has been reshaped by AP government. Indeed, AP has “managed to capture the old DP support.” AP represented a broad-based political “coalition of industrialists, small traders and artisans, peasants and large landowners, religious reactionaries and Western-oriented liberals.” Demirel spoke “the language of the masses” and particularly generated political “hope” among the new provincial bourgeoisie. To a great extent, Demirel’s right-wing policies have rested on conservative codes which appealed to nation-state development through protection of traditional Turkish culture and Islamic values (Zürcher 2005: 250–254). AP government was “much more moderate and realistic than the DP.” Based on “pragmatic” party politics, Demirel struck a sensible deal with the military and the state bureaucracy to achieve optimal “growth” in Turkish economy (Levi 1991: 140–146). By setting the national ideal of “Great Turkey,” Demirel envisioned to build a “strong” country in world politics (Arat 2002: 97–99). Similar to Menderes, Demirel “pursued” a multilateral “foreign p ­ olicy,” which “remained essentially pro-Western but also integrationist and assertive.” Following Menderes, Demirel “sought to expand Turkey’s political and economic relations with the Soviet Union” (Kösebalaban 2011: 12, 100, 101; Hale 2002: 151). Demirel’s balanced approach was primarily driven by financial-industrial needs of the country and reflected Turkey’s changing international perceptions in an era of global détente.

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In that regard, Ankara’s Soviet engagement came somewhat later than the Tehran-Moscow rapprochement. By Sept. 1962, Iran gave assurance to “the Soviet Union that it would not allow foreign missile bases on its territory.” Afterward, Iran-Soviet economic relations have developed considerably. Consecutive trade agreements were signed in 1964 and 1967. In those years, Pahlavi regime has displayed “unusual success within a relatively short span of time.” Shah has achieved enormous “international prestige” through rapid developments in Iranian oil industry. No longer was oil called “the black blight” (balay-e siyah); now it was named as “the black gold” (talay-e siyah). With growing self-possession, Shah has repacked Iran’s international relations under the rubric of “independent national policy” (siyasat-e mustaqell-e melli). The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) has become the new political-economic “arm of the Iranian government” at home and abroad. Shah has made the best use of “favorable” external atmosphere and, in turn, exploited these gains for shaping more “propitious” internal climate. The “political supremacy at home” implied a more assertive and hegemonic “role abroad.” Shah consolidated “royal power” through his tight control over the armed forces and the intelligence-secret police services (Ramazani 1970: 421–423, 427–430, 432–435). The National Intelligence and Security Organization (Sazman-e Ettela’at va Amniyat-e Keshvar-SAVAK) has become the “most feared” institution in Iran. Interfering in various facets of public life, SAVAK operated “outside the law,” making arbitrary arrests and carrying out clandestine tortures, “executions and assassinations” (Yapp 1996: 332–337). However, Shah’s increasingly suppressive “security-police methods” have caused growth of domestic discontent among alienated segments of society. As of 1968, this strata has included “the urban middle-class, particularly the intellectuals,” as well as other disgruntled elements such as “the former landowners” and the unyielding clerical groups. While dealing with all sources of opposition, SAVAK has demonstrated specific concern for crushing the “nihilist-communist” threats (Ramazani 1974: 133, 134). Quite similarly, the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (Millî ̇ ̇ Istihbarat Teşkilatı-MIT), backed by the NSC, has exerted enormous pressure to eliminate Marxist-communist movements inside the country. By 1968, Turkish politics has witnessed growing ideological polarization across the right and the left (Zürcher 2005: 251–259). The military has accused the AP government of assuming a relatively soft stance toward “anarchist-communist” militants. Demirel was seen as “unable to take

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effective action” against the unrest worsening in 1970. The military representatives of the NSC delivered a warning on 27 Mar. 1970. The highranking generals “feared” that radical violence would lead to widespread political-military instability. Therefore, the Demirel government was forced to resign on 12 Mar. 1971. The incoming governments were formed by more “conservative politicians and technocrats.” The caretaker governments stayed in power for two years (Yapp 1996: 319–321). Interestingly enough, the post-coup period has led to restoration of the “Kemalist right” in Turkish politics. The “conservative-republican” state elites have tightened their hold on political privileges and associated economic resources. However, authoritarian-conservative consolidation has created democratic backlash sooner than expected. The “Kemalist left,” and the traditional CHP politics, has been re-organized along contemporary lines of social democracy. After the general elections in Oct. 1973, CHP won 33.3% of the popular votes under Bülent Ecevit’s leadership (Kahraman 2008: 218–221; Kösebalaban 2011: 102–106; Yapp 1996: 319–321). As a matter of fact, the 1971–1973 transitional period has been an era of stagnation for Turkey. The country was hit by financial ramifications of global crises in international monetary system and oil markets. Turkey’s fiscal problems have been exacerbated by developments in energy sector. The dependency on oil imports has emerged as a critical predicament for the Turkish economy. Indeed, Ankara has long looked for ways to build a pipeline from Iranian oilfields in Ahvaz to Mediterranean seaports in ̇ Iskenderun. As of Mar. 1971, CENTO General Secretary Turgut Menemencioğlu called for the institution of “Industrial Development Fund” to support those kinds of regional economic endeavors (Türkiye ̇ Iktisat Gazetesi 1971a). Lacking the driving impetus of oil sector, Turkish-Iranian joint ventures have not improved toward desired directions. For example, the strategic passages of Turkish-Iranian railroad have been completed rather late in Sept. 1971. Indeed, the government program, which was announced in Nov. 1965 by Prime Minister Demirel, has pledged to speed up the construction of railroads and ferryboat facilities extending from the shores of Lake Van to the Iran border (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz 2013: 2188). Actually, these kinds of “joint projects” have been e­ nvisioned 16 years ago. It was Turkey’s diplomatic representative Taha Carım who headed the formation of economic committee under the Baghdad Pact auspices in 1955. The joint railroad initiative has later been supported by

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CENTO and RCD (Carım 1971d), which also coincided with Ambassador Carım’s term (1967–1969) in Turkey’s Tehran Embassy. During the 1965–1970 period, Demirel government and Pahlavi regime have displayed strong pro-Western tendencies. On the other hand, both leaders did not hesitate to develop their bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. Still, the CENTO alliance has shaped the strategic surface of Turkish-Iranian military relations. The communist danger has been manipulated through affective circulation of fear and anxiety. The anti-­ communist strategic alignment between Ankara and Tehran has brought deeply problematic consequences, such as collective radicalization of leftist student movements in both countries. Despite shared anti-communist sentiments, Turkish and Iranian governments have failed to generate conservative solidarity to enhance their neighborly relations. RCD has remained far from bringing significant remedies for transforming Turkey-­ Iran neighborhood. Both Ankara and Tehran have concerned more about their own national development, and less about improving their historical relationship. Lack of common Turkish-Iranian desire has limited their reciprocal economic exchange. Due to deficient collective commitment, mutual industrial projects have progressed slowly and could not produce substantive results for Ankara-Tehran neighborhood. To tell the truth, Demirel’s first government program, announced on 3 Nov. 1965, emphasized Turkey’s urgent economic and industrial need for cheap crude oil (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz 2013: 2187, 2191). In that respect, RCD could help to facilitate petroleum partnership between two neighbors. Nonetheless, Ankara was unable to make progress on Iran-Turkey pipeline project due to Tehran’s enduring reluctance. On Tehran’s part, lack of enthusiasm has been entangled with structural reasons and economic concerns. Iranians, and their international partners, have already made strategic choices to build two routes for oil marketing. The south lanes were mainly tied to the Strait of Hormuz. The north paths were primarily opened to the Caspian Sea (Lokman 1972a, b). Arguably, these strategic choices have precluded development of more expensive oil projects between Iran and Turkey. In the meantime, natural gas pipeline agreements were signed between ̇ Washington and Moscow. Writing in the weekly Türkiye I ktisat Gazetesi, Carım reviewed the American-Soviet economic partnership as a contemporary source of inspiration for regional countries (Carım 1973a). On the other hand, Turkey and Iran have failed to emulate changing global economic rules and adopt best collaborative practices into their neighborly

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interactions. Indeed, Iranian oil and natural gas sectors have been seeking economic exchanges with their counterparts in Russia, Britain, United States, Germany, India and even Greece (Lokman 1973). The concurrent crises in global energy and financial sectors have dually strengthened Iran’s economic position. In contrast, Turkey deeply felt its lack of oil resources and weaknesses in petrol industry. Sooner or later, the “oil weapon” might bring devastating consequences for the dependent Turkish economy (Carım 1973c, d). Seeing those global and regional dangers earlier, Ankara diverted its focus toward Iraq-Turkey energy transportation routes. On 27 Aug. 1973, Turkish and Iraqi foreign ministers signed an agreement to build joint infrastructure and mutual facilities for cross-border transferences from ̇ Kirkuk oil fields to Iskenderun sea ports. The Turkey-Iraq pipeline would start pumping oil in the 1977–1979 period and reach its maximum capacity over the years between 1983 and 1996 (Carım 1973b). The Ankara-Baghdad energy cooperation has taken affective energy from an already crippling Turkey-Iran partnership. Since RCD has become somewhat fruitless, the Turkish side has tried to rejuvenate business talks among trade and industry associations. In June 1973, the commerce and industry council of the RCD gathered in Ankara. The joint chamber of businessmen has decided to improve investments for transit trade and allocate resources for venturing through a multilateral trading company ̇ (Türkiye Iktisat Gazetesi 1973). RCD’s economic potential would be fully exploited when members establish commercial concessions and customs union among three neighboring countries (Manisalı 1973a). Before those long-term targets, Turkey’s short-term economic priority was to increase exportation of industrial products to Iran (Manisalı 1973b). By and large, the economic efforts to attract Iranian petrodollars to Turkey have gone in vain. Ankara closely watched how Tehran has taken a self-centric capitalist stance and used oil wealth as a political-economic leverage in Iranian foreign affairs. The Tehran agreement of Feb. 1971 was the first of its kind, which set precedence in providing extraordinary financial terms for oil producing countries. Iran has assumed a leading role among the members of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Over a couple of decades, the Iranian treasury would receive enormous amount of oil revenues. Calculating those exceptional prospects, Carım found Iranian oil fortune as “biting every one’s finger” (Carım 1972a, b). Carım’s sentimental metaphor implied how petrol-­ poor nations might develop envious feelings toward the oil-rich countries.

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But it could also be more than jealousy. The feeling rules between petrol producers and oil consumers have also been shaped by other international sentiments as well. One may sense deeper traces of anger and despair in Carım’s comments, where he affectively calls for building of a more universalistic spirit of economic solidarity to protect all-time losers of oil politics that were mostly developing or less developed consumer countries (Carım 1971a, b, c). In essence, Carım asked for fair play in world oil affairs. In addition to commercial justice, this conservative economic critique also reflected developmentalist outlook of the center-right in Turkish politics. Ostensibly, ̇ these tenets were well defended in Türkiye I ktisat Gazetesi, the weekly newspaper published by the Turkish Union of Chambers and Exchange Commodities (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği-TOBB). Since its establishment in Feb. 1952, TOBB has been one of the strongest bedrocks of conservative-nationalist economic consciousness (Çavuşoğlu 2007). ̇ Working under the auspices of RCD (Türkiye Iktisat Gazetesi 1973), TOBB has become the central (semi-official) institution in promoting conservative collaboration between Turkish and Iranian economic elites and state circles. The early Turkish conservative classes, represented by both DP and AP, have been driven by concerns of economic power and national development. By and large, these elites supported the “strong state” tradition. In contrast to CHP’s “bureaucratic” etatism, center-right parties adopted “technocratic” administration of mixed economy, where private sector complements state-run business enterprises. While the CHP tradition did endorse hard-line secularism, early conservative populists envisioned state’s soft-line control over religion. To a great extent, the early Turkish right wingers have displayed “procedural” commitment toward civil society. Their “love” of liberal democracy was indeed halfhearted. This style of limited liberalism saw state-society relations as part of regime security rather than as ground of social solidarity and political consensus. Quite typically, authoritarian-conservative Turkish governments have not wholeheartedly committed themselves to address serious questions of political liberalization and democratization. Displaying typical conservative reflexes, the early Turkish center-right cadres intuitively defended political stability and national development and vehemently opposed social and cultural disorder in and out of Turkey (Osmanbaşoğlu 2014). As one might anticipate, Turkey’s conservative bourgeoisie was not genuinely concerned about authoritarian policies of the Pahlavi regime.

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Their best hope was to develop more profitable exchanges. The Turkish right’s economic expectations seemed strong particularly for the oil sector. With these anticipations, the conservative right-wing Turkish commentators have not been critical of Shah Mohammed Reza. The Pahlavi monarch was portrayed as a competent statesman, a friendly leader and a ̇ regional ally in Turkey’s neighborhood (Türkiye Iktisat Gazetesi 1971b; Lokman 1972a, b, 1973). It was no coincidence then that TOBB has hosted a historical photograph exhibition on Turkish-Iranian friendship ̇ (Türkiye I ktisat Gazetesi 1971c). These portrayals were reinforced by Iranian public relations campaigns conducted on various occasions ̇ (Iranlılar Hayır Cemiyeti 1956; Ajans Türk 1970, 1972). Evidently, the Iranian Shah has devoted a little bit of financial resources to cultivate a positive image among Turkish conservative elites and the public at large. However, the conservative solidarity has largely remained on the surface, lacking much needed depth to forge economic partnership and regional collaboration in Turkish-Iranian affairs. Requiring sufficient industrial base and productive capacity, the Turkish economy has become much more dependent on foreign rents mainly in the form of external debt. The “rentier state” has evolved under political-­ economic conditions of dependent development. The import substitute model of industrial growth has driven the state-led modernization projects. The financing of foreign debt has put Turkish governments in a vulnerable position both from within and without. Economic crises and political instability have created a vicious cycle of ideological conflict and civil-military unrest inside Turkey. Domestic instability has created enduring implications for re-making of Turkish politics. Over the decade marked by consecutive coup d’états in 1971 and 1980, the Turkish ideological struggle between the left and the right has radicalized incrementally and drifted toward militant violence of mounting scale, bearing enormous internalexternal costs on the country (Kahraman 2008: 176–184, 216–221). Across the border, the Iranian regime has also entered into a parallel period of restoration and encountered similar domestic challenges from the political opposition. Within the years of renewal, the “White Revolution” was a turning point. During the 1960–1963 period, Shah has initiated “socioeconomic reforms,” which had mostly been “induced” by the American administration (Ramazani 1974: 130, 131; 1980a: 445; 1982: 15, 16). Shah’s land reform particularly sought to curtail the contending power of popular opposition. As a historical bloc, the oppositional coalition was composed of the ulema, big landowners and traditional

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bourgeoisie dominating the local bazaar. Economic reform intended to empower the industrial-commercial capitalists, new middle classes, as well as other strata such as workers and peasants. The nouveaux riche would be the key client of Shah as they remained dependent on the distribution of state revenues in Iran. The “rentier” structure of the Iranian regime has been reinforced by the rises in oil prices. As a result of Shah’s rampant drive for modernization, socio-economic inequality has swept across the country. Under high rates of joblessness, large masses of poor emerged among the urban populations. Popular discontent has growingly turned against the Pahlavi regime (Ramazani 1982: 15–17; 2013: 13–15; Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009b: 805). Even though the White Revolution promoted modernization and secularization in public life, the royalist rule of Mohammed Reza Shah has remained “devoid of democratic values.” Initially, structural reforms and economic development programs have helped the Pahlavi monarchy to broaden its power base. However, the dynastic autocracy could not adequately address Islamic sentiments of popular reaction and clerical resistance. In spite, Mohammed Reza was driven by “dynastic ambitions” and status aspirations. He sought to restore the “great civilization” of pre-­ Islamic imperial times (Ramazani 2004: 554). He tried to achieve this goal by arming Iran to the teeth so that it could become one of the five conventional military powers of the world. In the process he turned Iran into one of America’s leading arms purchasers, a surrogate state of the United States, and an American policeman of the Persian Gulf. His popularly opposed status-of-forces agreement with the Pentagon [was seen as] reviving the hated foreign capitulatory privileges in Iran. (Ramazani 2004: 554)

The Iranian king has made “military ties with the United States the centerpiece of his American policy.” His military goals stretched “far beyond the requirements of Iranian self-defense.” Expanding “military purchases created logistical, maintenance and training problems,” which exceeded “the country’s capacity to handle.” On the economic front, Shah’s reform record has been more malevolent. The White Revolution in general, the land reform in particular, was driven by Shah’s political desire to establish dictatorial control over the country (Ramazani 1982: 15–17). Several state agencies were utilized to carry out the secular revolution. Among them, the literacy corps (1963), composed of school teachers, and

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the religious corps (1971), joined by theology department graduates, deserve particular attention. Dubbed as “mullahs of modernization,” the secular theologians have essentially undermined the traditional popular bases of clerical classes. In addition, Shah has made constitutional changes to consolidate his coercive power (Yapp 1996: 332–337; Ramazani 1974). In June 1963, the top-down White Revolution has encountered “the Black Reaction” from the bottom-up. The leading clerical figures in Qom, Meshed and Shiraz, instigated antigovernment riots, which were later suppressed brutally. By and large, the Pahlavi monarchy has turned a blind eye on psycho-social implications of dictating a revolution from above (Ramazani 2013: 9, 12–15). The suppression of domestic opposition by the shah has led to the emergence of radical-militant splinter groups within the “National Front” and socialist rank and file of Tudeh Party. The ulema reasserted their anti-­ Shah demeanor through outspoken protests of Hojjat al-Islam Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini. The diplomatic immunity provided to the American personnel has provided additional motivation for Khomeini to further confront the regime. Khomeini rebuked the contract as “document of the enslavement” for Iranian people. He also declared that the “shameful” agreement was “contrary to Islam and the Koran and hence illegal.” Furthermore, Khomeini condemned “that all the difficulties faced by the Iranian nation and the Muslim peoples are because of aliens, because of America” (Ramazani 1982: 15). Khomeini supporters attacked Mohammed Reza by calling him “the American Shah” (Ramazani 2004: 554). Injured by these attacks, Mohammed Reza has kept  Khomeini under custody. In Oct. 1964, Khomeini was exiled to the city of Bursa in Turkey. After a one-year stay in Bursa, Khomeini moved to Najaf (Iraq) in Oct. 1965. While in Najaf, Khomeini “developed new political ideas … and elaborated his concept of Islamic government” (Yapp 1996: 339). Later on, Khomeini went to France where his campaign against Shah has intensified incrementally. Certainly due to autocratic practices of Pahlavi aristocracy and coercive measures of SAVAK, Iranian public intellectuals have also affectively alienated from the ruling civil-military classes. The incessant struggle between state/government elites and public/popular opposition groups engendered political crises. The lingering domestic disorder at home has also affected Iranian policies abroad and created significant implications for neighboring Turkey (Saray 1999: 125–129; Ramazani 1982).

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Local Struggles for Influence: Emotional Habituation of Regional Rivalry Shah’s modernization project has been directed toward significant foreign policy ends such as the bolstering of regional influence in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. Motivated by the lust for local power, Tehran has sped up its armament program. Through heavy arms acquisitions, Shah hoped that Iranian conventional weapons arsenal would become the fifth largest in the world. He aimed to achieve powerful international status through regional domination. Over the 1965–1975 period, Shah’s positional struggle has intensified gradually leading to the annexation of three strategic Gulf islands, Iranian covert interference in Iraq and Lebanon (Reisinezhad 2018) and overt intervention in Oman (Goode 2014). After all, Iranian status aspirations have given service to Western (Anglo-­ American) oil and security interests particularly in the Gulf region. Consequent to the Nixon Doctrine, US government’s political support to Shah has been expanded considerably. The oil crisis in 1973 helped the shah increase state revenues. During the 1965–1975 era, Tehran emerged as the potent “pillar” of Washington’s regional policies (Alvandi 2012, 2014a; Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009b: 802; Sick 1999: 278–279; Ramazani 1976b: 330–334). Evidently, Iranian ambitions for “regional hegemony” (Çetinsaya 2007: 175) were to be realized by appealing to ethnic-linguistic (Aryan-Persian) and sectarian (Shii-Muslim) solidarity across territorial borders. The pan-­ Farsi regional politics has been located in direct opposition to the pan-­ Turkist local aspirations. The Pahlavi regime deployed coercive measures against the Turkish political movements in Iranian Azerbaijan (Gökdağ and Heyet 2004). Turkey assumed a neighborly position and refrained from direct interference in Iranian domestic affairs. On the other hand, Tehran’s trans-boundary Kurdish engagements have been a serious political concern for Ankara. Due to Iranian covert assistance to the Iraqi Kurds, Turkish government’s regional anxiety has deepened. During the high-level visits, both sides have addressed the growth of mutual suspicions and dyadic divergence over local Kurdish politics. President Cevdet Sunay has paid his first diplomatic visit to Tehran in Oct. 1966. Turkey sent goodwill messages to Iran with Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel’s visit in May 1967. Iranian Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda visited Turkey in June 1969 (Ramazani 1970: 428). The neigḣ boring government officials have joined the RCD-Izmir summit in May

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1970 (Ajans Türk 1970). During the rail road connection ceremonies on 27 Sept. 1971, President Sunay hosted his counterpart in Van (Dışişleri Bakanlığı 1971). President Fahri Korutürk and Shah Mohammed Reza held high-level talks as they reciprocally exchanged official visits during the critical period of 1973–1975. After Iran and Iraq signed the Algiers Accord in Mar. 1975, the Kurdish issue has ceased to influence neighborhood interactions between Tehran and Ankara (Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009b: 802). Shah realized that Iranian “aiding and abetting of the Kurds may ultimately prove counterproductive if it were to lead to a genuine Kurdish autonomy” in Iraq. The Iraqi Kurds’ local “independence” might jeopardize the “loyalty” of Iranian Kurds to the Tehran government. By Mar. 1975, the Iranian domestic stability has already been threatened by “internal unrest” leaving “visible marks of disruption, strikes, and even physical damage in universities.” At that time, the Pahlavi monarchy was also concerned about Saddam Hussein’s collusion with “extremist Palestinians and Iranian communists opposing the Shah’s regime from within Iraq.” Shah’s rapprochement with Saddam Hussein could enhance Iranian global and regional position in some unforeseen ways. The Iran-Iraq “unified front” pushed for “greater harmony” among OPEC nations. The Tehran-­ Baghdad axis might further enhance “collective security” cooperation among the Gulf States. The notion of “collective self-defense” has gained certain traction in Iranian international affairs. In this regard, Shah searched for possibilities of “regional cooperation” with pivotal countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, India and even Australia. To tell the truth, Shah’s security vision was quite over-stretched. These international ambitions were beyond Iran’s outreach. The Gulf security was still awaiting the settlement of outstanding issues. At the psych-social level, “greater efforts” were needed to overcome deep-seated “Arab-Iranian suspicions and mistrust.” These emotional challenges might hinder the development of “a more genuine atmosphere for durable regional cooperation” between Iran and its Arab neighbors (Ramazani 1976a: 174–176, 178–181, 184–186). Due to Shah’s ambitious international engagements, Turkey-Iran relationship has remained uneasy and precarious. Ankara and Tehran have deeply felt Washington’s third-party role in their making of dyadic interactions. Turkish-American relations have already been strained by the imbroglio lingering over Cyprus since 1963 and 1964. Notwithstanding the fact that Turkey has held legitimate rights of a guarantor state within the context of London and Zurich Accords (1959), the interim caretaker governments

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of 1971–1973 period have remained reluctant to take military action in Cyprus. In Jan. 1974, Ecevit formed an unusual coalition government with Necmettin Erbakan leading the nationalistic-Islamic-­ oriented National Salvation Party (Millî Selâmet Partisi-MSP). Both politicians shared similar views and agreed on taking independent courses of action on main international issues such as closer interactions with the Middle Eastern neighbors, management of alliance relations with the United States and conflict resolution in the Cyprus island. Due to deteriorating security conditions in the island, Turkish government intervened in northern Cyprus in July/Aug. 1974 to protect the well-being of Turkish Cypriots settled mainly in the north (Kösebalaban 2011: 102–106; Yapp 1996: 319–321). Ankara’s unilateral military action has been sanctioned by Washington through implementation of arms embargo in Feb. 1975. While TurkishAmerican alliance has been weakened by the strain of sanctions, Iranian government and US administration have been experiencing heydays of their special relationship. In 1972 President Richard Nixon promised the Shah that he could buy any and every category of U.S. conventional military equipment he wanted. The explosion of oil revenues the following year enabled the Shah to buy large quantities of arms; by 1977 he had purchased over $6 billion’s worth from the United States and had more than $12 billion’s worth on order. The Shah dreamed of making Iran one of the five conventional military powers of the world, and Washington fueled his ambitions to some extent by anointing his regime the policeman of the Persian Gulf. (Ramazani 2013: 112)

To Ankara’s dismay, Tehran reinforced its regional status as main political collaborator and key military client for Washington. Turkish leaders have been offended by Shah’s pro-American stance and the role of “regional gendarmerie” promoted for Iran (Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009b: 803). Turkish political-diplomatic elite was ruled by mixed feelings of “unease and envy.” Even though “the government and public opinion in Iran seemed supportive of” Turkey’s intervention into Cyprus, “Shah’s views … were more complex.” Initially, Shah took a cautious approach, which turned “unfavorable” for Turkey (Kayaoğlu 2014: 465–468). The Iranian palace was quite disturbed by the oppositional demonstrations of the Iranian students attending universities in Turkey. As long as the shah wanted to use Tehran’s strategic advantages, the dyadic diplomatic distance began to widen. Furthermore, the affective atmosphere in Ankara

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was increasingly ruled by “apprehension” and “resentment” (Çetinsaya 2006: 385; 2007: 175). Despite Turkey’s urgent needs, Shah cold-shouldered Ankara’s credit requests for relieving the pressure on finance and oil sectors (Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009b: 803). As a matter of fact, domestic socio-economic conditions in Iran were not any better than Turkey. However, Shah provided some “supplies to the Turkish air force,” after receiving tacit approval from the United States. Perhaps for face-saving purposes, he also offered some modest “credits for highway construction to improve Iran’s” trade routes to Europe. His basic intention was not to let “a fellow anti-communist power” weakened by counter-productive moves of the US administration. In May 1975, he met with the US leaders and urged them to lift the arms embargo. Shah realized that Iran’s “western neighbor and CENTO partner” would be weakened uselessly. The prospect of instability in Turkey “would jeopardize Iran’s lines of communication with the West.” Shah seemed smart enough. This was like a Farsi fashion political play. The traditional Ajam game (Acem oyunu) dominated the Pahlavi politics. Shah was playing by old rules of Persian diplomacy (Acem diplomasisi). “Mohammed Reza Pahlavi did not want to lose Turkey but he did not want to throw Iranian petrodollars down the bottomless Turkish well either” (Kayaoğlu 2014: 463–469). At that conjecture, this apathetic minimalist logic was a digression from established neighborly norms of social solidarity and economic exchange. For this reason, Turkish-Iranian political cooperation dislodged from its affective-normative ground. During 1974–1976 period, there was even a slight possibility to develop joint projects in areas of “defense industries” and cross-border commercial transportations. Unfortunately, those opportunities were missed. Ankara and Tehran remained as two distant partners, largely due to diverging regional interests and distinct domestic concerns. Once again, Ankara-Tehran relations have been marred by reciprocal suspicions and “mutual distrust.” This negative psycho-social climate growingly hindered development of neighborly collaboration between Turkey and Iran. Both sides did not refrain from confrontation on the economic front, the showcases being the Iranian-imposed hikes in oil prices and the Turkish-exerted increase in transit transportation fees (Kayaoğlu 2014: 463–472). Despite the fact that both sides would benefit from commercial interactions, they used trade as an advantageous leverage against the other without any significant political gains. The counter-­ productive logic of trade wars has eroded affective-normative bases of economic collaboration and dyadic partnership.

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After the caretaker government of Sadi Irmak (Nov. 1974–Mar. 1975), Demirel formed a right-wing coalition government in Apr. 1975. This step constituted the opening of the “National Front” in Turkish politics. In addition to conservative AP and Islamist MSP, Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP), headed by Alparslan Türkeş, did join the ruling coalition. “On 17 June 1975, the coalition government announced that, if the US Congress would not lift the embargo, it would abrogate Turkey’s Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with the United States and close US bases that operated outside the NATO framework on its territory.” The Turkish government suspended the DCA on 25 July 1975 (Kayaoğlu 2014: 469, 470). Pending the removal of sanctions by the US Congress, the DCA was renewed in Mar. 1976. In order to repair the damages incurred on Turkish-American relations the US arms embargo was finally lifted in Sept. 1978 (Kösebalaban 2011: 108). By that time, Washington’s move came too late for Ankara. Turkish polity has been surrounded by chaotic conditions. The economic downturn coupled with political uncertainty drove the country toward anarchy. The rising political violence “claimed nearly 2,000 lives from 1975 until 1977.” These disturbing developments were closely and cautiously watched by neighboring Iran. As Mohammed Reza realized, “when Turkey sneezes, Iran catches cold” (Tülümen 1998: 8, 139). The shah was convinced that “multi-party democracy meant chaos” for Iran. Hence, he remained committed to the single-party rule of the Rastakhiz (Resurgence). Shah has also re-considered the implications of the US sanctions on Ankara-Washington relations. Turkish governments have been unfairly treated by ambivalent American administrations. “Around the same time as the Turkish embargo, the US Congress questioned the Pahlavi regime’s human rights record and criticized the Ford administration (and the Carter administration after Jan. 1977) for arms sales to Tehran.” Shah’s political distrust and diplomatic alienation deepened. He gradually fell out of love with Washington (Kayaoğlu 2014: 470, 471). Indeed, the Turkish public opinion has also been embittered by authoritarian (non-democratic) practices of Shah. Leftist-socialist opposition groups coalesced against the dictatorship ruled by the Pahlavi dynasty. The dyadic solidarity was particularly vibrant among the Iranian university students in Turkey and their political peers coming from the Turkish youth. Neighboring publics shared political feelings of disenchantment from the monarchical disorder in Tehran. Popular sentiments began to rule over

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bilateral relations and led to sensitive diplomatic skirmishes between two neighboring regimes. When the Turkish Grand National Assembly was opened by the official ceremony in Nov. 1965, dissident Iranian students have gathered in Ankara and instigated protests against the Shah. Angered by the damage incurred on his political prestige, Shah requested from the newly elected center-right Demirel government to implement “heavy judicial measures” against the protesters. The diplomatic request was declined due to authentic basis of judicial autonomy in Turkey. Since Shah was not satisfied with the judicial process, he demanded return of the protesters in 1966. The radical left, led by Turkey Workers’ Party (Türkiye I ş̇ çi Partisi-TİP), extended political support and attempted to provide socialpsychological protection for the Iranian dissident students (Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009b: 804). Over the coming years, affective solidarity of Turkish and Iranian left-­ wing groups has intensified incrementally (Hanoğlu 1979). Through utilization of media propaganda, the Turkish hearts toward neighboring Iran have been managed and governed by dually reinforcing core affective and emotional commitments: warm-hearted sympathy toward social needs and democratic desires of the next-door people and cold-hearted apathy toward authoritarian (anti-democratic) rulers of the distant monarchical regime. These core components have shaped the psycho-social climate of Ankara-Tehran interactions until the transformation of their relationship by historical regime changes occurred in the 1979–1980 period. In spite of the developments in areas of local transportation and communication, mutual mechanisms of reciprocal trade and joint structures of equivalent economic exchange have not established yet. For this reason, Ankara has been dissatisfied by the level and the direction of trade interactions with Tehran. The Turkish dissatisfaction has deepened after the oil crisis in 1973. The large quantity of crude oil imports has created a big burden for bilateral balancing of total trade volumes. Tehran was reluctant to refrain from its relative gains. The commercial imbalance has not been recovered since the Iranian government neither did offer lucrative contracts nor provide profitable foreign investments. From the Turkish perspective, neighborly engagement has not realized truly. Without genuine affective-normative commitments, the “eternal friendship,” co-founded in Turkish-Iranian bilateral agreements, has lost its political power. Devoid of historical meaning, the amity rhetoric swayed just as another surface act of diplomatic “lip-service” between Tehran and Ankara (Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu 2009b: 804).

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Put in other words, even though the Iranian regime seemed to be playing by historical rules of diplomatic friendship on the surface, it has failed to display affective-normative commitments of a faithful neighbor expected to extend assistance to the Turkish government at times of critical need. The deep acts of Tehran have remained far from meeting emergent needs of Ankara. Indeed, Ankara has felt the diplomatic frustration emanating from inequality in economic exchange. On the part of Turkey, Iranian acts have created social-psychological distance and lack. As a matter of fact, the joint management of relational (psycho-economic) feelings would better help to mend the dyadic fences in diplomatic-political fields. Addressing this dyadic deficit would leave lingering implications for future episodes of Turkey-Iran neighborhood relationship. More often than not, media battles could not help to address those kinds of deficiencies. Newspapers are not the best fora to repair relational damages. For example, writing from secular-nationalist/socialist-anti-­ imperialist perspectives, Cumhuriyet columnists regularly “criticized the shah’s modernization program and his crackdown on the opposition” and his pro-American policies in the region. On 8 Jan. 1976, the center-­left Turkish daily Hürriyet accused Iran of “interfering in the domestic affairs of neighboring countries.” The media narrative was “less-than-­praiseful, but nevertheless covetous.” The story basically “covered Tehran’s arms procurement and its influence in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. The coverage was resentful of Iran’s oil fortune at a time when Turkey suffered under the US embargo” (Kayaoğlu 2014: 473). Nonetheless, Tehran’s fortunes turned upside down due to the bust in international oil prices. The growing popular disappointment has reproduced a negative psycho-social atmosphere inside Iran. The colossal oil-revenue earnings of 1973-74 were accompanied by a spectacular rate of economic growth—43 percent in 1974—an unprecedented budget surplus of $2 billion in the same year, and rising expectations. But almost immediately thereafter the GNP rate fell drastically to 14 percent in 1975, the budget deficit rose dramatically to nearly $6 billion by 1977, and the revolution of rising expectations developed into a revolution of rising alienation. (Ramazani 2013: 112)

During the 1977–1979 period, both Iran and Turkey had to devote their political energies into internal affairs. The rising domestic instability has constituted a major political concern for both neighbors. Since

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CENTO alliance has stayed far from addressing these kinds of indigenous challenges, Ankara and Tehran have turned inward, and ceased to look each other’s eyes empathetically. Lacking altruistic feelings, Turkey-Iran relationship lost shared emotional bases of political interaction and slipped into diplomatic erosion. The affective decadence and degrading partnership left lingering implications for undoing of neighborhood culture in Turkey-Iran regional relations. Dealing with Domestic Instability: Affective Decadence and Degrading Partnership After the June 1977 general elections, Demirel formed a right-wing coalition government, which remained in power for six months. Ecevit managed to form a weak center-left government in Jan. 1978, which lasted until his resignation in Oct. 1979. Even though Ecevit espoused to “establish an atmosphere of mutual confidence” with Turkey’s neighbors in May 1978, his short stay in power could not allow him “to put any effective new strategies” into practice. The signing of a “Political Document on the Principles of Good Neighborly and Friendly Cooperation” with the Soviet Union has not gained operational significance, besides the affective display of “a less committedly pro-US attitude.” Ecevit’s non-dependent outlook and regionalist vision have remained as “partial, hesitant and uncertain” foreign policy orientations, due to dire domestic crises debilitating the country (Hale 2002: 162). In June 1978, Turkey-Iran relations were tarnished by the blunt coṅ Tehran claimed that radical Iranian frontation between SAVAK and MIT. opposition groups, notably the Marxist-oriented People’s Fedayin (Sazman-e Cherik’ha-ye Fada’i-ye Khalq), have sought refuge in Turkey. In response, Ankara accused Tehran of covertly orchestrating Kurdish militant groups against Turkey (Kayaoğlu 2014: 473, 474). The events revealed early indications of structural change in the politics of Kurdish nationalism. In addition to the conservative proponents of tribal revolt, Marxist-socialist type of popular rebellion began to prevail over Kurdish insurgency. International and regional implications of this crucial transformation have not been thoroughly grasped by the top intelligence officials in Ankara and Tehran. Historical mistakes have precluded Turkish-Iranian intelligence collaboration, which might have prevented the emergence of pan-Kurdist socialist separatist movements in the region. As the new

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Turkish Ambassador to Tehran, Turgut Tülümen, has later realized, there was a radical Iranian faction strongly opposing collaboration with Turkey. The affective waves coming from Ankara have always been a concern for Tehran. On many occasions, Shah himself stated that “when Turkey sneezes, Iran catches cold.” During the 1970s, the rise of ideological polarization in Turkey might have created a contagious impact over Iranian opposition movements. Once again, the Iranian communists led by Tudeh Party, the right-wing nationalists and radical conservatives ruled by clerical leaders, have formed an existential threat against the Pahlavi monarchy. The re-emerging “National Front” has been cross-cutting ethnic cleavages. Azeri and Kurdish mobilizations have pushed themselves into frontline positions of revolutionary struggle in Iran (Tülümen 1998: 8, 139, 177). In the 1977–1979 period, the dyadic interactions of various ideological groups might have also facilitated radical opposition movements through spreading of “affective contagion” (Ross 2014) among the two neighbors. In any case, the revolutionary radicalization of mass politics has contaminated Turkish-Iranian neighborhood relations like an infectious disease. The ailing governments have remained far from recovering themselves, let alone managing their relationship. The trans-governmental interactions between Ankara and Tehran have not produced substantial collective gains, in spite of mutually urgent and complementary needs of both sides. At this historical juncture, one should also note that the Soviet influence over Iran has been much stronger than the one permeating inside Turkey. In these years, the Soviet regional ambitions would grow around Persia and lead to the invasion of Afghanistan in Dec. 1979. In addition to the Tudeh’s local communist networks, Moscow has recruited clerical collaborators to destabilize the pro-American Pahlavi monarchy. In Jan. 1978, the public demonstrations at Qom “marked the beginning of major revolutionary disturbances.” Over the coming months, anti-Shah popular feelings have circulated precipitously and the revolutionary affective atmosphere has engulfed the country quite dramatically. Fearing loss of control over the country Shah declared martial law on 7 Sept. 1978. The next day mass demonstrations were suppressed violently. The massive bloodshed particularly at the “Jaleh Square” has backfired and scored highly negatively against the regime. Several million people have participated in “the massive Ashura demonstrations” of Nov. 1978 (Ramazani 1982: 13, 19).

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Deeply upset by domestic instability, Shah seemed psychically worn out, when he accepted Tülümen’s letter of confidence on 18 Sept. 1978. Expressing Ecevit’s thankful remarks, Tülümen sought Shah’s consent for the Iranian oil sales to be paid in the form of Turkish goods. Almost instinctively, Shah supported all kinds of efforts to improve bilateral relations. Correspondingly, Tülümen believed, crisis conditions were driving the two neighbors closer. Mutual “needs” might help to overcome the historical shadow of dyadic “envy” in Turkish-Iranian neighborhood relations (Tülümen 1998: 16–19, 26–29). One week after the lifting of US arms embargo, the Turkish Naval Commander General Bülent Ulusu visited Tehran on 19 Sept. 1978 to discuss joint ventures in defense industry. Since economic circumstances were grim, it was not easy to find ways for partnership and collaboration. Over the coming months, the Turkish side would realize conjectural limits of cooperation with the Shah regime whose downfall has become more imminent. The interim Iranian governments could not resolve deep-seated domestic predicaments. As these attempts proved futile, the opposition turned more violent after the Khomeini’s call for more radical demonstrations on 1 Dec. 1978. Americans began evacuation as soon as possible. Turks had no choice but to endure dire consequences of neighborhood. The events in Tebriz have caused a diplomatic crisis in Ankara-Tehran relations. The Turkish transit trucks were attacked and the Turkish Consulate was put on fire by the mobs. The conditions of insecurity have reigned over the country until the Khomeini’s return to Iran on 1 Feb. 1979. He was welcomed like a state leader at the Tehran Airport (Tülümen 1998: 38–57). In the meantime, the revolutionary upheaval in Iran has created serious ramifications for local Kurdish geopolitics. The Iranian Kurds’ struggle for local autonomy has inspired similar ambitions across the Turkish, Iraqi and Syrian borders. Abdullah Öcalan’s inception of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partia Karkaren Kurdistan-PKK) in Nov. 1978 was by no means a coincidence. PKK’s plot was to establish autonomous and/or independent socialist-nationalist rule over the Kurdish localities in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. The PKK conspiracy has opened the international stage for low-intensity local conflict among regional neighbors. Indeed, Iran would later realize that SAVAK’s supporting of the Kurdish militants prove self-defeating. SAVAK assisted the gathering of radical socialist Iranian Kurds under the title of Kawa (“the Kurdish name for the mythological ironsmith Kaveh”). The organization of Kawa did abuse the

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mythic story of liberation among the local Kurds. Due to the Kurdish mili̇ has indefinitely halted bilateral intelligence tant activities of Kawa, MIT collaboration with SAVAK (Kayaoğlu 2014: 474). It was quite ironic that Mohammed Reza’s clandestine arming of the Kurdish rebels along the borderlands has completely exhausted bilateral norms of good neighborliness and devastated dyadic rules of friendship co-founded by his father and Atatürk. Almost 44 years ago, Atatürk and Reza Shah were mutually affected by the reconstruction of Ferdowsi’s popular myths in “Özsoy opera” (Araci 2010; Atuk 2017), which primarily portrayed Turkey and Iran as “twin sons,” separated by the demonic tyrant (Zahak), and later brought together by their righteous father Feridun Khan, who received extraordinary aid from the oppressed blacksmith (Kaveh) struggling against the rule of tyranny. Now, it was tragic that the Özsoy narrative has been wiped out from the collective memory of Turkish-Iranian neighborly relations. More tragically, Ferdowsi’s version of the story has been manipulated for malevolent objectives. The political abuse of the Kaveh myth, presumably by SAVAK, threatened to separate Ankara from Tehran. Under conditions ̇ of local uncertainty and domestic instability, the MIT-SAVAK intelligence battle would aggravate irreversibly. Over the coming years, Turkey-Iran political relations have witnessed deepening of social-psychological strains. The affective-normative traces of dyadic divisions underlined the fact that nationalistic myths serve for dual purposes and help to shape relational contexts in two polar directions. While the “tonic” civic utilization revitalizes amity, partnership and collaboration, the “toxic” ethnic exploitation feeds enmity, rivalry and confrontation (Ansari 2012, 2017). In Dec. 1978, the Turkish journalistic accounts noted that the Iranian Shah has been “considering abdication” due to his physical illness and mental exhaustion (Kayaoğlu 2014: 474). He left the country on 16 Jan. 1979. Returning from the exile in Paris, Khomeini arrived in Tehran on 1 Feb. 1979. Consequent to Khomeini’s much celebrated arrival, the Pahlavi monarchy has dissolved quite dramatically on 12 Feb. 1979. After a general referendum, the Islamic Republic of Iran was proclaimed by Khomeini on 1 Apr. 1979. The “Assembly of Experts” approved the new Constitution on 15 Nov. 1979. Then, the Constitution was ratified by the referendum held on 2–3 Dec. 1979. The constitutional deliberations were revolved around the powers conferred on the clerical hierarchy. Rather than codify-

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ing a “supervisory” role, the Islamic Constitution granted “executive” authority to the velayat-­e faqih (“supreme leader”). The Constitution stated that “in His absence, the Twelfth Imam will be represented by a qualified religious leader who enjoys the confidence of the majority of the people.” The “supreme leader” has assumed ultimate powers such as enjoying “the commander-­in-­chief” position and appointing “the nation’s highest judicial authorities.” The new Iranian Constitution was a “unique experiment” for global and regional politics (Ramazani 1980b: 181–183). Tehran’s historical experience has been closely monitored by international capitals including Ankara. The clericalization of state power by Khomeini was a source of political anxiety for the international community. The neighboring countries were particularly haunted by the “fear” of Iran’s intrusive revolutionary provocations (Ramazani 1980a: 457). At least initially, Turkey has moved by caution. Due to the growing public antipathy toward the late Iranian Shah, the Turkish government kept no tears for his dramatic downfall. As Prime Minister Ecevit reiterated at the Parliament, Turkey did refrain from interfering in domestic affairs of neighboring Iran. Ecevit held a firm belief that the Iranian people could solve their internal problems and eventually determine their political fate. Therefore, Ankara had waited until Tehran’s situational picture became more obvious (Neziroğlu and Yılmaz 2014: 688). On 13 Feb. 1979, Ecevit’s celebratory messages were broadcasted repeatedly by the Iranian state television. Ecevit put emphasis on the opening of a new era in neighboring Iran and wished the best for brotherly Iranian people. The Turkish government was ready to develop “close” friendly relations with the new Iranian administration. As Ecevit framed, Ankara-Tehran relationship was beyond psychical contiguity of “neighborhood.” There have been “historical and cultural bonds and spiritual values” tying two nations together. By taking the non-physical, psycho-­ social “closeness” as relational benchmark, Ecevit articulated his intention to develop good neighborly relations with the new Iranian regime. He believed that those relations would absolutely serve “regional peace and tranquility.” Upon Ecevit’s request, the Turkish Ambassador Turgut Tülümen has become the first diplomatic representative to officially visit Khomeini. Tülümen stated that “the Turkish nation has approached positively to the revolutions bringing benefit to the people” and Ankara was ready to extend assistance in case of Tehran’s need. Khomeini received these messages well. While responding, he framed Turkey as a “country of Islam.” In Khomeini’s words, the “Muslim Turkish nation” has been just

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like “brothers” sharing “either happiness or sadness” of Iranians. He vaguely called for a re-union among Islamic countries, which would later turn as a regional project for Shii influence (Tülümen 1998: 57–67). Indeed, Ankara would like to have a secular rule of order in neighboring political house. At that interim period, Ankara saw the opportunities, but failed to capitalize on them, and hence could not tip the balance toward the secular forces of the revolutionary regime. As a matter of fact, the Turkish leaders should be much more concerned about the rule of law inside their own borders. In Jan. 1979, Turkey’s own domestic predicaments would make it more difficult for Ecevit to stay longer in power. Coupled with domestic security challenges, such as prevailing conditions of disorder and ideological-sectarian violence, the Turkish economy was severely hit by a financial crisis. The rate of inflation reached 70%. Ecevit could not accept the international political conditionality of institutional public credits. Instead, he turned to private American banks such as “Wells Fargo.” Short of declaring bankruptcy in the treasury, the Ecevit government collapsed in Nov. 1979. Once again, the “National Front” took charge under Demirel’s leadership. The right-wing (AP-MHP-MSP) coalition government has aimed to revitalize strategic cooperation with the United States (Kösebalaban 2011: 108, 109). While encountering revolutionary consequences of the radical regime change in Iran, US grand strategy faced another serious setback after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in Dec. 1979. Turkey has remained as the key American regional ally defending NATO’s southern borders. The “Carter Doctrine” provided the Turkish government with diplomatic avenues to resuscitate political partnership with the US administration. On 29 Mar. 1980, the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) has been mutually signed by governments of Turkey and the United States. Ankara also took the advantage of the deterioration in Tehran’s international relations. In stark contrast to the Pahlavi era, the new Iranian regime has shown greater eagerness to expand trade relations with Turkey. The June 1980 trade agreement constituted a significant step for re-building of economic exchange relations. Both neighbors have gradually gained reciprocal benefits from the rising of bilateral trade (Kayaoğlu 2014: 472, 475). Indeed, these economic developments were too little and too late. The Cold War years have scored a relational loss for Ankara and Tehran. Even though both sides would be better off by mutual neighborly interactions, affective-normative making of relative gains and losses have impeded bilat-

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eral economic cooperation. The psycho-social context of “envy” and “jealousy” has been influenced by a variety of domestic, dyadic and regional issues. In terms of domestic factors, both Turkish and Iranian regimes have experienced crises of ruling inside the country. The ideological rift between the left and the right has been deepened by emergent class cleavages in both countries. Political economy of rule-making has evolved along somewhat similar lines in Ankara and Tehran. Yet, indigenous changes have altered processes of economic structuration and social stratification in quite distinct directions. Complex changes in political sociology of domestic rule-making have transformed the social psychology of the relationship between Turkey and Iran. Psycho-social logics of dyadic partnership and regional rivalry have been reconstituted through mutual affective-­normative exchange between two historical neighbors. Given the complex constellation of ruling coalitions in each country, political struggle between government and opposition forces has created a hegemonic disorder. Two broad networks of social-psychological interactions could be discerned from configuration of political-diplomatic structures and practices in Turkey and Iran. The right-wing corporatist collaboration has been desired between the ruling governments at the expense of increasingly growing socialist solidarity between left-wing opposition groups. Even though neighborly exchange was based on rules of common need, economic logic could not necessarily yield confidence between partners. Quite the contrary, affective norms of “envy” and “jealousy” could trigger economic rivalry and political confrontation. The dyadic distrust between neighbors might also be exacerbated by divergent threat perceptions, security concerns and local instability arising from the region. The diplomatic relations between the two close capitals have remained remote. Foremost, Turkey and Iran have tied their hands to alignment with Washington. Accordingly, the United States has gained the upper hand in managing the political sentiments between the two “distant neighbors.” While longing for generous assistance from the United States, Turks and Iranians could not improve their bilateral relations toward desired directions. The social ties and psychological bonds between Turkish and Iranian leaders have weakened considerably, since both sides failed to look each other’s eyes empathetically. The formative Turkish-­ Iranian feelings of son-like solidarity and foundational rules of progressive engagement have lost their affective-normative power under Cold War circumstances. Notwithstanding the common commitment to CENTO

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and RCD, the Ankara-Tehran dyad has remained far from achieving close cooperation. Under the Cold War conditions, the Turkey-Iran neighborhood has encountered deep relational damages. It would take more time to repair the affective-normative harm incurred on both neighbors’ fences. In spite of the fact that both Turkey and Iran took the advantage of global détente and sought regional rapprochement with the Soviet Union, Ankara and Tehran could not develop a joint neighborhood policy toward Moscow. In addition to Washington’s political pressure, both sides fell victim to their own misperceptions of Russian regional engagements and their local ramifications. The psycho-social climate of suspicion and fear has impaired the development of full-fledged partnership in Turkey-Iran local relations. Even though both sides lacked dyadic trust, they could not mutually assure building of confidence in their common neighborhood. In sum, Turkey-Iran bilateral relations have been largely constrained by Cold War alignment rules and global dependency norms. Particularly during the 1970–1979 period, both neighbors were forced to turn inward and became increasingly concerned about their own domestic predicaments. Partial political engagement and limited economic exchange have become a prevalent feature of Ankara-Tehran relations. The affective-­ normative climate of Cold War politics has molded into complex “emotional culture” of fear, suspicion, envy, jealousy, humiliation, disgust and distrust in the Turkey-Iran relationship. Historical habituation and constellation of diplomatic envy and jealousy, political humiliation and dyadic distrust have “prevented and continued to prevent Turkey and Iran from cooperating more closely” (Kayaoğlu 2014: 477). Overall, episodic configuration of emotional entanglements and affective arrangements have conditioned the social psychology of Turkey-Iran bilateral relations, notwithstanding divergent regional interests and distinct domestic concerns. The international structures and regional practices of the Cold War created unfulfilled senses of cooperation on both sides of the Turkey-Iran neighborhood. This dually felt psycho-social “lack” left enduring implications for the future of Ankara-Tehran relations.

Conclusion: Episodic Summary In this chapter, I looked at relational contours of Turkey-Iran neighborhood during the Cold War era. Two key episodes emerged out of this psycho-social history. The emotional-affective findings are summarized in Table 3.1. In the 1951–1960 period, the dyadic diplomacy was ruled by

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Table 3.1  Cold War climate in Turkey-Iran transactions Key episodes

Prevalent emotional entanglements

Dominant affective arrangements

Relational contours

1953–1958

Envy-jealousy

1973–1978

Shame-­ humiliation

Degrading engagement Degenerative exchange

Ambivalent alignment Years of loss

Dyadic disgust Mutual mistrust

Positional transactions Regressive rivalry

envy and jealousy. The Turkish envy was entangled with its oil shortage. Lack of resource equality has implied the rule of greed in Ankara. Thus, when the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis broke out, Turkey somewhat hesitantly sided with its distant ally, rather than with its close neighbor. In contrast, lack of strategic parity has fueled Iranian jealousy and pushed them further apart from Turkey. Tehran has been avaricious about Ankara’s anchoring in NATO. Hence, the Baghdad Pact has remained far from hindering Iranian covetousness. Affective norms of envy and jealousy have considerably weakened sentiments of empathy in Turkish-Iranian historical neighborhood. As a result of dyadic disgust, Ankara and Tehran have begun to interact as two distant neighbors. The growing psycho-social distance has degraded the affective quality of Turkish-Iranian diplomatic engagement. The Turkey-Iran partnership politics has turned toward positional transactions. The early Cold War affective-relational practices marked the historical episode of ambivalent alignment. In the later era, the cold climate has stiffened notwithstanding Turkish-­ Iranian affiliations in CENTO and RCD. Harmful practices of reputation have increasingly entangled with politics of shame and humiliation. The affective feeding of mutual mistrust has put extra negative charge on Ankara-Tehran interactions. The relational damage has worsened even under conditions of global détente. The negative affective atmosphere aggravated after the 1973 oil crisis. Turkey-Iran relationship has descended into regressive rivalry. Therefore, Tehran cold-shouldered Ankara even at times of urgent neighborly need. Cold historical feelings swayed affectively during the 1974–1978 period of US sanctions against Turkey. Degenerative practices of emotional exchange resulted in years of loss for Turkish-Iranian neighborhood relations.

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CHAPTER 4

Reformative Psychology in Turkey-Iran Interactions (1980–2000)

This chapter focuses on how Turkey and Iran have managed their neighborhood relationship after dramatic rule changes in both countries. The period of psycho-social reformation is revealed in two parts. Contrary to prevalent presuppositions, secular Turkey and theocratic Iran have taken a progressive relational path in the 1980–1989 period. In spite of regional challenges, such as the Iran-Iraq war, reformative psychology has governed episodic rules of feeling between Ankara and Tehran. So long as both sides felt mutual need for local stability, emotional norms of neighborhood proved resilient. Since the two neighbors desired reciprocal economic exchange, both regimes have handled their dyadic distrust even under exceptional circumstances encountered during the 1990–2000 period. As a whole, these two case studies show how Turkish and Iranian governments have coped with relational tension through cultural customization of pragmatic caution and practical prudence in neighborhood diplomacy. Similar to earlier chapters, psycho-historical case studies are conducted along the introductory research scheme. Narrative approach is adopted to present textual evidence together with phenomenal observations. Again, argumentative interventions are kept minimal. The reader would find it easier to navigate through event-based empirical evidence. The episodic summary comes in the chapter conclusion. Along the introductory framework, I summarize emotional-affective contours of reformation in

© The Author(s) 2020 M. A. Kumral, Exploring Emotions in Turkey-Iran Relations, Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39029-7_4

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Ankara-Tehran interactions. The synopsis is based on relational patterns of collaboration and confrontation in Turkey-Iran neighborhood. In many sense, the late Cold War years (1979–1989) proved particularly challenging for Iran and Turkey. Largely due to domestic predicaments, political rulings have been paralyzed in both countries. As a result, incumbent regimes have been overthrown by the 1979 revolution in Iran and the 1980 coup d’état in Turkey. Indeed, these times could mark the end of longstanding tradition and the beginning of a new chapter in historical sociology of both countries. In the coming decades, Ankara and Tehran would muddle through historical stages of large-scale processes like modernization, liberalization, democratization, secularization and Islamization, all of which might leave profound implications on their neighborhood. The domestic rule changes have generated salient affective-­ normative ramifications for Turkey-Iran relations. At early stages of the revolution, some Turks hoped that the new Iranian regime would develop better policies toward the Azeri population. The end of Pahlavi regime might also weaken pan-Farsi regional ambitions. Initially, the revolutionary rule could put an end to political chaos and prevent spillover into neighboring areas. Indeed, the civic unrest and chaotic circumstances in Iran were a source of fear for Turkey. Ankara sought stability rather than turmoil in Tehran (Gökdağ and Heyet 2004). The deeper Turkish fears resurfaced as well. Iran could be driven toward fragmentation and disintegration by the Soviets. Ankara was also concerned about the fate of Kurds in cross-border areas (Çetinsaya 2007: 174). Turkish wariness has molded around questions of territorial integrity in revolutionary Iran. Some of these anxieties have abated as both neighbors renewed their relationship in quite surprising ways. In terms of political “identification and differentiation” (Hurd 2004, 2007, 2010; Rumelili 2003, 2004), secular/pro-Western governments in Ankara and theocratic/pro-Eastern rulers in Tehran would be highly unlikely candidates for building better fences in their neighborhood. Besides, Ankara and Tehran no longer held formal alignment relationship after re-structuring of their regimes. They began to take different sides in the global game ruled by Washington and Moscow. During the reformative period, both Turkey and Iran have faced political paradoxes in their internal and external affairs. Despite dramatic changes in politics of rule-­ making, Turkish and Iranian regimes have rehabilitated emotional norms in their neighborhood.

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Emotional Norms After Dramatic Rule Changes (1980–1989) As a matter of fact, Turkey and Iran have been challenged by various degrees of domestic unrest during the 1977–1979 period. This era points to a heightening in the Middle Eastern geopolitics leading to shifts in global balance of power. By signing the peace accord with Israel on 26 Mar. 1979, Egypt has shifted to the American camp. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in Dec. 1979, leading to the formation of a puppet government by Babrak Karmal, has demonstrated Moscow’s unending ambitions toward the northern tier. Due to historical and geographical reasons, the Soviet impact has intruded much deeper into Tehran than Ankara. As the Iranian Shah Mohammed Reza has often liked to say, “when Turkey sneezes, Iran catches cold” (Tülümen 1998: 8, 139). This might well be the case. But the reverse, I would argue, might be true as well. That is to say, both neighbors were infected by similar kinds of psycho-social diseases and fall victim to deepening political violence almost contemporaneously. The incumbent Turkish governments have not “proved capable of dealing with increasing violence of left and right, Kurd and Turk and Sunni and Alevi” (Yapp 1996: 322). In 1978, the violent “clashes” among ideological factions and terrorist groups claimed lives of “nearly 700 people.” After the rising ethnic-sectarian (Turk-Kurd/Sunni-Alevi) conflict in Çorum, Malatya and Kahramanmaraş, in Dec. 1978, martial law was declared “in 13 provinces” (Kösebalaban 2011: 111). In the meantime, the Iranian state-society relations have been incrementally crippled by the rising of domestic violence between Mar. 1977 and Dec. 1978. The uproar of coming revolution has worsened Shah’s ailing health. When he left the country for medical treatment on 16 Jan. 1979, he probably knew that he might not come back. When Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini returned from exile on 1 Feb., large Iranian crowds flocked to the Tehran airport. In the popular referendum, held by the end of Mar. 1979, the sweeping majority of Iranian people voted for the establishment of Islamic republic (Bozarslan 2014: 144–149). Mainly due to Turkey’s geopolitical concerns and security needs, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, the head of the center-left Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP), officially recognized the revolutionary government in Tehran within 48 hours of its inception on 12 Feb. 1979. Ecevit sent strong messages to develop good neighborly relations with the new Iranian regime. Furthermore, the anti-American p ­ osition of

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the revolutionary regime was embraced by Ecevit’s former coalition partner Necmettin Erbakan (Bolukbasi 1989: 94–99), the outspoken leader of the traditional movement of Turkish Islamists—dubbed National View (Millî Görüş)—gathered under the political umbrella of the National Salvation Party (Millî Selâmet Partisi—MSP). Encouraged by the Iranian revolution, MSP in Aug. 1980 “called for the restoration of Sharia law in Turkey, a fundamental challenge to a basic principle of secular republic” (Yapp 1996: 323). At that time, general Turkish public opinion, including the left, was also against American policies, due to the US embargo imposed on Turkey since the 1974 military intervention in Cyprus. Remember the fact that it was Ecevit-Erbakan (national leftist-Islamist) coalition government who dared to face those likely repercussions. Consequently, anti-American feelings have been deeply seated in the hearts of Turkish people and shaped political contours of Turkish nationalism from the left to the right. As Washington’s key regional protégée Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was much disliked in public and government circles in Ankara. Turkish press was also critical of Shah’s support for the armed opposition movements, such as the Kurdish militants, in Iraq and elsewhere. The center-­ left daily Cumhuriyet saw Shah “as a dictator” using disproportionate force to crack down on the domestic opposition. It was “the lack of sympathy for Iran’s ruler” rather than “fear” from the radical popular opposition that shaped the making of public and political opinion in Turkey (Gundogan 2011). On 12 Mar. 1979, the revolutionary regime terminated the Shah’s “de facto alliance with the United States” by withdrawing Tehran from the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). More consequentially, the IranianAmerican defense agreement of 1959 was canceled on 3 Nov. 1979 (Ramazani 2013: 113). The revolutionary takeover of American Embassy on 4 Nov. 1979, constituted the second stage of the Iranian revolution. At that point, Khomeini’s international posture turned from “defensive” to “confrontational.” The lingering of crisis for 444 days has created passionate reactions such as affective constellation of “resentment and frustration” in Washington (Ramazani 1985: 59, 62). As of 6 Nov. 1979, Khomeini admitted that Iran was “still in a state of revolution, a revolution greater than the first one.” It was this second period that has fed “international distaste for the revolutionary regime.” The United States has adopted a “containment policy toward the revolutionary regime economically, ­politically, and militarily.” American ­administration also exerted diplomatic

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pressure on “other nations to curtail their dealings with Iran” (Ramazani 2005: 274–276). The “hostage crisis” was a key juncture testing Turkish decision makers’ delicate foreign policy position between alliance obligations and neighborhood commitments. This case represented the subtle beginning of a long political path, which would be later pursued by Ankara at times when it struggled to strike a sensible balance between Tehran and Washington. Even though the CHP government was not “sympathetic” toward Shah’s authoritarianism, Ankara was now faced with a more perilous prospect: the danger of clerical dictatorship. Since Washington has lifted the sanctions against Ankara in Sept. 1978, the new Iranian regime saw Turkey as a gateway to obtain American brand defense items. A number of times, Turkey has kindly declined Iranian requests for (original US) military spare parts. Taking various opportunities, Turkey warned Tehran about dangerous implications of ongoing “hostage crisis” with Washington and reminded the regional risks of gravitating toward the Soviet orbit. As Turgut Tülümen, the Turkish Ambassador in Tehran, reiterated “if Iran got in trouble, Turkey would bear the local costs” almost on an equal footing with its neighbor. It came as no surprise then that the Turkish government attempted to engage and empower secular-liberal-progressive factions of the revolutionary movement with the little hope for creating a clout over the neighboring political house (Tülümen 1998: 68–89, 97–117, 125–127, 131–133, 137–139, 207–211). One such moment came earlier in June 1979 when the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün visited Tehran. Much like Ecevit, Ökçün held no sympathies for the late shah (Çetinsaya 2006: 386). However, Ökçün’s reception by Khomeini in Qum was less than cordial. Khomeini attacked politics of Westernism, liberalism and laicism in Turkey. Ökçün took the risk of further alienating Khomeini, as he paid an unofficial and informal visit to the leader of Muslim People’s Republican Party (Müslüman Halkın Cumhuriyetçi Partisi—MHCP), Ayatollah Seyyid Kazim Şeriatmadari, who was staying under house arrest in Qum. Şeriatmadari was a moderate ulema with Azeri descent. He had fundamental disagreements with Khomeini, which caused him trouble. But he refrained from preaching violence. To Ökçün, he told: “You are Sunni, we are Shii. The rest parts of us are all the same. There are those who desire to make us enemies. We all love our homeland. We should not worship the country. Wholehearted homeland philia is sufficient for all of us” (Tülümen 1998: 86–92, 137).

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Iranian Azeris felt that they have been discriminated under the Pahlavi rule. By claiming lineage to the Arian race, Persian nationalists created kinship ties with the Kurds. In stark contrast, Turks have been exposed to differentiation, marginalization and exclusion. Therefore, Azeris positioned themselves as “equal partners” to Farsis in the making of new regime. They thought that the troublemakers were hard-line Farsi nationalists and radical Shii “fundamentalists.” For their purposes, the right-­ wing revolutionaries sought to manipulate the “fear” from “powerful Turkey.” They could weaken Turkey in two ways. The assimilation of Azeris into pan-Farsi state culture would definitely contain regional politics of pan-Turkism and local irredentism. Second, perhaps more importantly, the Iranian regime sought to throwback the “firing ball of Kurdish nationalism” to the Iraqi or the Turkish courtyard. Undoubtedly, the revolutionary circumstances in Iran have changed the Kurdish geopolitics across borders of Turkey, Iraq and Syria. Turkey closely watched the cross-­ border interactions between Iraqi and Iranian Kurdish leaders, namely Masoud Barzani, Jalal Talabani and Abdurrahman Qasimlou. The likelihood of Soviet-Marxist intrusion into Kurdish affairs was taken as a vital security concern (Tülümen 1998: 62, 63, 77–79, 133–136, 146–154, 161–169). Among other Marxist militant movements, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partia Karkaren Kurdistan—PKK) and the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) have utilized violent tactics of terror and gradually gained prominence in regional security affairs. PKK, and to a lesser extent MKO, would leave poisonous impact on the social psychology of Turkey-Iran relationship. By taking the advantage of revolutionary circumstances, the Iranian Kurds intensified their struggle for local autonomy in July–Aug. 1979. The Iranian and Iraqi branches of Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Qasimlou and Barzani respectively, were at the forefront of cross-­ border mobilization. Around those days, the PKK chief Abdullah Öcalan has sought refuge in Syria, together with the Iraqi opposition leader Talabani, the head of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Both Öcalan and Talabani were trying to exploit political uncertainties brought about by the Iranian revolution (Özcan 1999: 326–330; Ramazani 1980: 447, 448). KDP, PUK and PKK were also manipulating political rivalries among regional countries. While the PKK aligned strongly with Syria-Iran (and Libya) axis, KDP and PUK switched their sides according to shifts in military balance of power. Complex regional dynamics have emerged out of the political-military confrontations among neighboring nation-states and

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the local non-state actors. The enduring conflict between Iran and Iraq has played more into the hands of KDP, PUK and PKK. After assuming the government on 12 Nov. 1979, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, the head of center-right Justice Party (Adalet Partisi— AP), disapproved the radical embassy takeover vehemently. As a precautionary measure, the dependents of the Turkish diplomatic staff residing in Tehran were evacuated. Yet, the Turkish government moved in caution in order to not antagonize the Iranian side any further. Turkish Ministry of Defense announced that Ankara would not allow the use of Turkish ̇ military facilities (most prominently the Incirlik Air Base) by the US forces for an intervention into Iran. Despite Washington’s requests, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (TMFA) announced on 19 Apr. 1980, that Ankara would not join the economic embargo against Tehran due to the “special nature” of their neighborhood relations (Bolukbasi 1989: 94–99). Over the coming years, if not decades, Ankara would most likely play by the same rules, when quite similar instances arise. In this regard, Khomeini himself tested Turkey’s neighborly patience. As a matter of fact, the Turks get accustomed to the tough nature of Iranian neighborhood, which has often been recalled by the historical tradition of trouble making. Perhaps offended by Azeri, and Kurdish, ascendance in the revolutionary struggle, Khomeini tried to intimidate Turkey (and Iraq) on 19 Dec. 1979. Otherwise, why would he call the Turkish and Iraqi people to revolt against their national armies? Nations are with us. Were the bayonets taken away from the governments’ heads, all of them could subscribe to our cause. The power of the bayonets prevents the Iraqi and Turkish nations from joining us. The Iranian nation has broken the bayonet directed against them. Other governments should listen to us and pay attention to the desires of their own people. (Tülümen 1998: 136, 137)

Another possible reason was that Khomeini sought to “export Islamic revolution” to neighboring Muslim countries in order to consolidate domestic power sooner than later (Bozarslan 2014: 151, 152). The Turkish government instantaneously saw where Khomeini was heading. In an immediate reaction, Ankara pushed the button for evacuation of the dependents of embassy personnel. The next day, the Turkish Ambassador Tülümen handed over the diplomatic note to the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kemal Kharrazi. Four messages were conveyed in the Turkish

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note: (1) Ankara conceives revolution as Iranian domestic affair, (2) Turkey always attaches great importance to relations with Tehran, (3) should Iranians desire bilateral cooperation, Turks would be gratified, (4) Khomeini’s targeting of Turkey has been a cause of worry for Ankara. Tülümen further lamented: “If you continue to break Turkey’s heart, who do you think would help you?” By implication, Tülümen once again staked the card of “transit trade” to corner the Iranian side. Speaking on behalf of the Iranian government, Kharrazi expressed their deep “regret.” They verbally recognized the incident as unintentional “slip of the tongue.” The official written response demonstrated that Tehran has not inclined toward the escalation of tension with Ankara (Tülümen 1998: 125–127, 137–139). The Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Qotbzadeh later admitted that “Khomeini was surrounded by people who were pointing him towards wrong directions. Some of them do not want to understand that laicism is not being against Islam. Without Turkey, any regional arrangement would not bear fruit” (Tülümen 1998: 173). Qotbzadeh’s “throwing of flowers” helped the mending of affective fences with Turkey. In fact, Tehran has still been muddling through the revolutionary chaos. The radical-conservative camp was manipulating the “hostage crisis” to consolidate popular power. The moderate-liberal wing was drowned into factional infighting. The political rivalry among soft-liners like Mahdi ̇ Bazargan, Karim Sanjabi, Ibrahim Yazdi, Abu’l Hasan Bani-Sadr and Sadeq Qotbzadeh could be easily exploited by hard-liners (Tülümen 1998: 110–118, 126–131, 193–197, 199–203). Right before the first anniversary of revolution, Iranian society has been struck by another wave of violence. In fact, the Azeri activists have been in conflict with the regime since they were sidelined from the constitutional processes of political representation. They demanded a fair power sharing arrangement in all of the new constitutional institutions. MHCP and Şeriatmadari were at the center of Azeri political mobilization, still protesting the constitutional referendum held on 2 Dec. 1979. Şeriatmadari was highly critical of enormous powers concentrated in the office of velayat-e faqih (“supreme leader”) held by Khomeini. In Şeriatmadari’s view “one cannot force the public to accept” clerical usurpation of supreme powers by one man (Rizvi 2012: 113, 114). Since Şeriatmadari believed in the supremacy of the national will of the people, he thought that the arbitrary rule of supreme leader might “result in a dictatorial government.” Şeriatmadari’s vocal protest has fueled popular unrest in Iranian Azerbaijan (Ramazani 1980: 451, 452). Azeri masses

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moved to the streets of Tebriz, after the provocative attack on Şeriatmadari’s residence. Some demonstrators even went further to Qum, where Şeriatmadari has been persecuted under house arrest. The Revolutionary Courts, headed by Ayatollah Kuddusi, have begun to eliminate MHCP and other Azeri factions from political life. Khomeini and the Revolutionary Guards perceived the democratic demand in Tebriz as a threat to their rule. MHCP and Azeri democrats have been suppressed and wiped out from the political scene. Şeriatmadari’s access to clerical power was denied by the high-ranking Azeri ulema, who were earlier coopted by the regime. Şeriatmadari did not step back; he charged the regime of manipulating anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism for political purposes (Tülümen 1998: 133–136, 167, 185). On 4 Jan. 1980, Şeriatmadari supporters and Khomeini factions clashed in armed conflict in Qum and Tebriz. Both sides took the dangerous course of accusing each other of selling the country to either the Americans or the Soviets. By doing so, they brought Iran to the brink of civil war. The spiraling of violence has created negative ramifications for TurkeyIran relationship. The head office of Turkish Airlines in Tehran was attacked on 10 Jan. 1980. The state of Turkey was put to target provocatively by “the Secret Armenian Army.” Four days later, Turkey’s Urmia Consulate has been bombed by a controversial monarchist opposition group (dubbed “FARUG”). The anti-Turkey provocateurs claimed  that the bombing would serve for complex political causes such as Kurdish and Armenian rights and Islamist popular aspirations. Ostensibly, the revolutionary committees, and the Iranian security services, have turned a blind eye on perpetrators of these two events, notwithstanding Turkey’s diplomatic demands. Under revolutionary conditions, the fueling of ethnicsectarian violence would play into the hands of Shii radicals and right-wing Farsi nationalists (Tülümen 1998: 146–148, 161). The revolutionary radicalization has escalated dramatically in 1980 and 1981. The “cultural revolution,” proclaimed by Khomeini on 22 Apr. 1980, unleashed a process of radical Islamization in every facet of Iranian life (Bozarslan 2014: 152). The domestic bloodshed has increased due to political killings and factional violence. The revolutionary situation has lingered on until Dec. 1982, when Khomeini declared victory in both internal and external fronts. In two years, the domestic rivals were eliminated and the Iranian army has begun counter-offensive strikes against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq (Yapp 1996: 349). These two bloody years of revolutionary consolidation have created serious security predicaments for the diplomatic

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missions in Tehran. The Turkish delegation weathered this storm through patience and prudence. Almost parallel to the global rise of Armenian terrorism (read ASALA) and the surge of militant activities conducted on Armenian commemorative day (24 Apr.), the Turkish targets were attacked fiercely in Iran. The ferocity of Armenian violence has increased over the coming years (Bleda 2000: 119–125, 131–134). The pro-Soviet Marxist factions, like the People’s Fedayin, took the center stage to sabotage the Turkish-Iranian relations. Despite these setbacks, both governments have come together to meet their mutual needs. On 5–7 June 1980, Turkish and Iranian Central Banks negotiated and enforced an annual financial agreement to facilitate 500 million dollars of credit for especially oil trade and other economic exchange activities. As for Ankara, the oil credit deal was quite relieving, given Turkey’s total petroleum payments amounting to three billion dollars at that time. The contract was made right after the inauguration of new Iranian Majlis on May 28. Khomeini’s son Ahmed read his father’s message to the parliament: “Do not slide towards deviant policies from the left to the right … Do not open the door for factional divisions … Do not discriminate sectarian and racial differences.” Khomeini’s instructions came at a time when Iranian politics has been drifting toward fierce inter-personal power struggle within and between various cliques (Tülümen 1998: 167–171, 181–185). Still fearful from the fledgling of a “counter-revolutionary” spirit in June 1980, Khomeini has ordered the eradication of all remnants of the ancient regime. The Revolutionary Guards could push radicalization toward unforeseen directions. By Aug. 1980, Khomeini has completely drained sources of defiance to his rule. Key offices of the government and the parliament were occupied by his loyalists. After escaping from a car bomb attack on 23 June the Governor of West Azerbaijan Jamsheed Hakgu was forced to resign. Earlier, President Bani-Sadr’s attempt to assign Hakgu as Ambassador to Turkey has been precluded by the Islamic Republican Party (Cumhuriyetçi ̇ ̇ Islam Partisi-CI P), ruling the parliamentarian majority under the leadership of Ayatollah Mohammed Husayni Beheshti. Bluntly put, the Iranian moderates have lost considerable political ground and come to the throes of virtual death. The social psychology of soft-line action has faded away. The psycho-social sea change in Iran has led to far-reaching damages in neighborly relations with Turkey. The Iranian state radio turned as an anti-Turkish propaganda machine. Fanatical propagandists caused irreparable relational damages by attacking Atatürk. Khomeini’s agitating public remarks added insult into the ­relational injury. Even under those unfavorable psycho-social circumstances, the Iranian Foreign Ministry seemed to

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represent voices of moderation and articulated reconciliatory position to defend the political neighborhood between Tehran and Ankara (Tülümen 1998: 187, 193–199). However, anti-Turkish press campaign and insults against Atatürk did not die down completely. In June 1981, new Turkish Ambassador Tanşuğ ̇ leader Beheshti and discussed the issue. In Bleda’s Bleda met with CIP view, while Turks were helping their neighbors at a time of urgent need, Iranians have returned this neighborly gesture with “unfair” and “hurtful” media attacks. The diplomatic discussion revealed that the Iranian attitude has been driven by affective rule of revenge. Earlier, the Turkish Playboy magazine did publish photographs of Khomeini in bath suits. Presumably, the pictures were shot while the radical cleric had temporarily stayed in Bursa as a political exile. Anyhow, Bleda and Beheshti shook hands gently, and gave promise to immediately stop publishing offensive material in both countries (Bleda 2000: 126). Despite diplomatic assurances, it would be much more difficult for the Turkish press to keep gentlemen’s promise. The hard-line secular media could not control their growing antipathy against the radical Khomeini regime. Khomeini’s revolutionary zeal has pervaded the Iranian state and reached a relatively high point in Sept. 1980. In reaction, the Iranian Kurds, led by Qasimlou, have broken ties with the Khomeini regime. Since the Kurds were recently denied fair access to popular representation, they were alienated from the politics of Islamic revolution. They began to side with the Iraqi Kurds, and even perhaps with Baghdad, in order to threaten Tehran. The Iraqi-Iranian border areas have been drowned in conflict within five years of the 1975 Algiers Agreement (Tülümen 1998: 203–207). The rising tension between Tehran and Baghdad and the local uncertainty in cross-border Kurdish areas have been followed cautiously in regional capitals including Ankara. On 12 Sept. 1980, the Turkish military took control over the country by declaring martial law that put an end to the period of enduring political unrest. Even after that historical turning point, the Turkish military regime did not challenge pragmatic rules of global and regional engagement. Ankara continued to follow diplomatic tradition (Ahmad 1981: 6–10). When the war between Iran and Iraq broke out on 22 Sept. 1980, Ankara was still under the dust of post-coup security conditions. Turkey took a position of active and positive “neutrality” toward the ­warring parties. The new Prime Minister Bülent Ulusu has participated in international peace making initiatives, such as the one steered by the Organization

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of Islamic Conference (OIC). By the end of 1980, the OIC-­led ceasefire talks have failed. In early 1981, the Iranian President Abu’l Hasan BaniSadr has still been commanding the war at his frontline bunker in Ahvaz. In that trench, he accepted the letter of confidence extended by Turkey’s new ambassador Tanşuğ Bleda. Upon hosting the president’s request, Bani-Sadr and Bleda spoke in Turkish. After expressing his pleasure of being appointed to a “friendly and brotherly” country, Bleda reiterated that Turkey has “respected” the revolution, since it was desired by the Iranian people. Turkey hoped that the revolutionary process would soon be over, and Iran could reach the rightfully deserved level of development in a short time. Bleda reassured Bani-Sadr that Turkish government was ready to help in case their neighbors needed. Indeed, Ankara has displayed strong neighborly commitment toward Tehran. Bleda emphasized three points in that regard: (1) Ankara did not join Western economic embargoes. (2) Turkish government did not apply visa restrictions. (3) Turkey did not constrain transit trade and air travel. If and when the war ended, Turkish neighbors could be ready to make vital contribution to Iranian recovery and reconstruction. Turkish government has been closely watching the Iran-Iraq war. Upon Bani-Sadr’s invitation, Bleda and his colleagues, including the Turkish military attaché, have toured the war-torn city of Ahvaz. After receiving further information from the battle zone, Bleda was able to make succinct assessments on Iranian and Iraqi war positions. Contra to conventional calculations, Bleda predicted that the Iranian army would gradually adopt a counter-offensive strategy and occupy territories inside the Iraqi mainland. Iranians have kept a strong desire to overthrow the Iraqi regime ruled by Saddam Hussein. With this ambition, they took back Abadan and Khorramshahr respectively in Sept. 1981 and May 1982, and then they entered Iraqi lands in July 1982. The Iranian counter-offensive has spoiled short-term prospects for ceasefire (Bleda 2000: 113–118). The Iran-Iraq war has lingered on until 1988, putting extra regional pressure on Turkish foreign affairs. Through adopting policy of “active neutrality,” the Turkish government sought to minimize losses in Middle Eastern neighborhood. By assuming an intermediary position, Ankara aimed at gaining the upper hand on regional security and local stability. Neighborhood relations ought to be governed on the face of deep-seated political dilemmas. Traditional themes of collaboration/partnership and confrontation/rivalry resurfaced. Recurrent historical problems also emerged in this period (Calabrese 1998: 78).

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Neo-liberal and Radical Rules of (Dis)engagement: Özal Government Versus Khomeini Regime After the military coup, the National Security Council (NSC) headed by General Kenan Evren “declared that they would continue to pursue the economic policies of the toppled Demirel government, something that government itself had been unable to do” largely due to political instability and civil unrest. More than seven months before the military coup, Turkish economy was put on the path of neo-liberal reform. The historical process was unleashed by the decisions of 24 Jan. 1980, taken by the Demirel government. Turgut Özal, Demirel’s undersecretary and head of the State Planning Organization, was the architect of these austerity measures. In terms of financial matters, Özal was unofficially regarded as Turkey’s “de facto prime minister” and “economic ambassador” negotiating with the Western agencies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the European Common Market. It came no surprise then that Deputy Prime Minister Özal held political “reins of power” in Turkish economic affairs (Ahmad 1981: 6–10) until July 1982. When Özal-led civil government was formed after the parliamentary elections in Nov. 1983, his prior management of the neo-liberal economic reform process has set “the political conditionality” of Turkey’s relations with Middle East neighbors including Iran. Export-led and market-­ oriented growth strategy did entail Ankara’s economic collaboration with Tehran, strong secularist opposition notwithstanding (Aydin and Aras 2005). On his way to Tehran, Turkey’s new ambassador Tanşuğ Bleda has taken time to check the condition of Gürbulak land border gate in Dec. 1980. Indeed, this quick control was instructed by Evren. No sooner did Bleda arrive in Tehran than he sent the special report on Gürbulak. After achieving the first task, he could deal with Evren’s second—more time taking— directive. The top Turkish decision maker demanded exclusive information on the resilience of revolutionary regime in Iran. Before leaving Ankara, Bleda made a private visit to the former foreign minister, and the president ̇ of the Senate, Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil. Due to familial reasons, Çağlayangil has kept keen interest toward Iranian domestic politics, and paid particular attention to internal developments in Tehran. Based on the letter of Queen Farah Diba, Çağlayangil predicted that the “mullarchy” (mollarşi) would be overthrown within three months, and consequently the shah would return to the country. Çağlayangil’s prediction implied that the Ankara

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government has urgently needed more accountable information on what would really happen in neighboring political house over the coming months, if not years (Bleda 2000: 96, 100, 101, 103, 104). After having the air in Tehran, Bleda’s first impression has come to surface. The revolutionary Iranian regime would highly unlikely return to the status quo ante. In Bleda’s analysis, all segments of the Iranian society have been alienated from the late shah for more than a decade. The political spoiling of national wealth and oil resources by the Pahlavi palace and their coterie has infuriated the Iranian masses. By calling “death to Shah,” Khomeini was able to capture the public heart and seize the revolutionary moment. At its initial stage, the popular takeover has been achieved by a broad-based coalition of societal-political forces coming from the left and the right. The revolution gained its Islamic character gradually. Due to their strong organizational wherewithal, clerical classes have managed to form the political core within the newly emerging Iranian regime. Thus, Shii clerics have assumed central powers of ruling in Iran. The clerical regime took every opportunity to consolidate revolutionary power. The hostage crisis with the United States and the war with Iraq have provided enormous pretexts for Khomeini’s consolidation of radical politics inside and outside Iran. After passing these general notes to Ankara, Bleda stressed the historical fact that even though the revolutionary process was not still over, the clerical regime would remain in power far longer than expectations held in some Western capitals. In a period of some time, radicals were more likely to gain full control over the county. Even under those circumstances, Bleda urged, Ankara should keep “all dialogue channels open.” In Bleda’s view, Turkey’s engagement policy would better help preserve territorial integrity and national unity in Iran (Bleda 2000: 105–107). Given the American absence, the Turkish diplomatic presence in Iran has become quite important for the ongoing Cold War dynamics. The Western influence has further weakened since the embargo decision taken by the European Economic Community (EEC) in May 1980. Ankara was almost alone in balancing Moscow’s diplomacy in Tehran. In fact, the Soviet Union, through Tudeh and other leftist organizations, sought to achieve a comprehensive influence all over Iran. For this purpose, the Soviets have sent experienced and skillful diplomats to Tehran. As Bleda later noted, the Soviet Ambassador had previously worked at the Turkey-­ Iran-­Afghanistan desk of the foreign office in Moscow. Not surprisingly, he earned fluency in Turkish. More interestingly, Zoraki Diplomat, pub-

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lished in 1955 by former Turkish ambassador Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, has been the most favorite desk book still read by the Russian diplomat in Tehran. The Russians were well aware of the fact that Turks have remained as their main rival in Tehran. In that regard, the Turkish role in Tehran has been appreciated by Western diplomats as well (Bleda 2000: 107, 108, 144). More often than not, Iranian government officials wanted to talk in Turkish as they met with Ambassador Bleda. Among Turkish-speaking Iranian leaders, Mir Hossein Mousavi, first as foreign minister and then as prime minister, has always acted on norms of “sympathy,” and nurtured a “warm” relational climate. Indeed, the Turkish lineage was quite common among Iranian government officials of the time. The Communication Minister, and acting speaker of the government, Behzat Nabavi has been fairly confident in claiming Turks’ ascendance to power in Iran. Even though Iranian Turks have risen higher echelons of power, they could make only limited impact over the inter-state relationship between Iran and Turkey. It was apparent that Iranian Turks would like to see a political partnership based on sovereign equality. Pan-Turkist patronage politics would not work, and inevitably create backfire in Tehran. As Bleda underlined, Ankara should refrain from “patron-client” type of ethnic engagement with Iranian Turks (Bleda 2000: 108, 110, 111). In spite of his secular credentials, Bleda did not display any reluctance to personally engage with clerical figures running the Iranian government. He has put enormous efforts to improve economic transactions between the two neighboring countries. During his term, Bleda claims, Turkey’s exports to Iran have risen from 11 million dollars in 1979 to 1.5 billion dollars in 1983. Much of this progress has been owed to the Turkish government and their economic excursions made in 1981. The visit of Turkish Trade Minister Kemal Cantürk has opened a new page for Turkey-Iran relations. Deputy Prime Minister Özal has played a key role in thrusting this process forward. Özal brought 500 businessmen to Tehran. The crowded trip was euphemistically propagated as the new “Çaldıran expedition,” implying neo-liberal spirit of economic conquest in Turkish foreign affairs. Actually, Özal intended to transform Turkish-Iranian border toward interactive exchange along the contemporary models of economic integration observed between France and Germany. Özal’s neighborly engagement has helped to diffuse the psychological milieu of distrust that has long overshadowed Turkish-Iranian collaboration (Bleda 2000: 108–114, 118–119, 127–131).

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Özal was long known for his ambitious political vision striving to combine Western liberal economic principles with Islamic cultural values (McFadden 1985: 75). His political reconfiguration of neighborhood politics was based on this ambivalent mix. In some circles, Özal was “portrayed as being in favor of an alternative Islamic Economic Community,” which had been traditionally espoused by Erbakan and MSP. These views failed to account for the real motivation behind Özal’s policies toward Middle Eastern and Islamic countries. It was “economic pragmatism of expanding Turkish trade” (Dagi 2001: 18) that has driven Ankara closer to Tehran in the early stages of post-coup political period. During the first Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi—ANAP) majority government (1983–1987), Turkey’s Prime Minister Özal has been a strong proponent of economic engagement with Iran. He took a dovish political posture to sidestep ideological differences dividing both regimes. On the other hand, President Evren assumed a hawkish position toward Tehran (Çetinsaya 2003: 128). The memoirs of Evren reveal that he was critical of Özal’s trade-­ centered and trust-based foreign policy toward Iran (Çetinsaya 2006: 387). In 1991, Evren remembered those days of 1984 when Prime Minister Özal visited Tehran. As Evren viewed, Turkish-Iranian economic interactions would be overwhelmed by deep-seated sectarian (Sunni-Shii) divisions dating back to 1514, when Ottoman Sultan Yavuz Selim defeated Safavid Shah Ismail in the battle of Çaldıran. Since that historical setback, Evren believed, Iranians have still been waiting for the right time to take “revenge.” In Evren’s view, friendly economic cooperation would not work due to the cultural background of historical conflict between Turks and Iranians (Çetinsaya 2003: 128; Baş 2013: 114). The affective-normative signposts extracted from Evren’s memoirs reflect the content of discursive-public appeal and hints the degree of contextual resonance targeted by and extensively involved in political myth-­ making. This historical extraction helps to highlight the fact that peoples of various persuasions in Turkey often have mythologized the rivalry between Yavuz Selim and Shah Ismail. By looking at historical mythologization of Çaldıran in Turkey (Alaca 2015; Çelik and Çelik 2015; Bilge 2010; Küpeli 2010), one could better conceive affective-normative implications of “emotional beliefs” (Mercer 2010) involved in Ankara’s making of neighborhood with Tehran. That is to say, discursive use of historical myths indicates important clues about social psychology of rule-­making in Turkey-Iran relations.

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General Evren and other secularists have to be credited for their devotion to the rule of laicism established by Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkish Republic. Following Atatürkist principles, Evren tended to view the Iranian revolution as a cultural backlash from contemporary ways of life determined by modernization and Westernization. Through self-­ focused secular eye one could not easily realize social-psychological roots of the Iranian revolution. Other-oriented reading would better help understand psycho-social rules of revolutionary change unleashed in neighboring Iranian society. The Turkish home-made secular conceptions of Iranian political house were cognitively dissonant. Despite the fact that paths of historical-­ sociological transformation were quite different in Turkey and Iran, forms of Islamist domestic opposition were seen as similar sectarian movements and fixated as political threats to secular rule, under categorical boxes of reactionary backlash and radical resurgence. Through biased and deceptive processes of secularist differentiation and otherization, affective-­ normative seeds of cultural confrontation were sipped into the soil of neighborhood. These complex and interdependent processes of secularization and securitization (Hurd 2004; Bilgin 2008) have engendered negative emotions (dislike, fear and anger) and provoked affective-­ normative confrontation between Turkey and Iran. In fact, both countries were ruled by different economic establishments and cultural coalitions. Incumbent regimes and their respective oppositions had to pursue distinctive domestic strategies to win the political game. “Konya,” the city of Sufi Islamic tradition and center of Turkish Islamists, might not be like the Shii central city of “Qum.” Political economy and political culture of Turkish and Iranian Islamism were incongruent. The political Islamist movement, represented by MSP and Erbakan, has played by the rules of secular state establishment. They could not have the wherewithal to overrule the secular character of the political game in Ankara. After all, MSP and Erbakan could not deliver their part of the political-popular bargain by only paying lip service to “Islamic nationalism and national capitalism.” Since the general elections of 1977, traditional-­ conservative right-wing majority voters displayed alienation from Islamist politics represented by MSP and Erbakan (Ahmad 1981: 5–10). Aiming to capitalize on that decline, Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi—MHP) used Islamic calls for campaigning purposes. In one election slogan, MHP utilized the renowned Islamic hadith on popular neighborhood relations (Yeni Şafak 1977), which read “those are not

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with us, if they go to bed in full stomach while their neighbor lives in hunger (komşusu aç iken tok yatan bizden değildir). “With this public call, MHP might have appealed to social-economic solidarity among neighboring Turkish peoples. As could be witnessed in those years of turbulence, the structural conditions and the political spectrum of Turkish majoritarian right represented “the historical bloc” called “the national front,” which was mainly composed of Turkish conservatives, nationalists and Islamists (Kösebalaban 2011: 4–9, 92, 104–113). In the post-coup period, the ruling rightist economic bargain and ideological culture reigning in Turkish politics were restructured along neo-­ liberal and globalist lines. Consequently, the center of the right primarily shifted toward liberal-democratic Islamism and secular-patriotic nationalism. As a matter of fact, the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” (Çetinsaya 1999) was a deliberate design of the ruling establishment seeking a political reconciliation between nationalist secularization and Islamist reformation. Following the rules of Atatürkist practices, the military regime desired to have “a state of controlled secularity” (Tank 2005) and hence sought to “take religion under state control” through a process of “cultural and educational Islamization.” The secular-nationalist and cultural Islamist domestic rule would help to simultaneously balance two external threats perceived in regional-global realm: radical impact of Iranian-Islamic revolution and communist-socialist influence of the Soviet Union (Kösebalaban 2011: 112). Turkey’s new domestic deal was based on consensus of secularist-­ rightist elites with pro-Western/pro-American orientations and pro-­ capitalist credentials. In this social-psychological climate, traditional agenda of Turkish nationalism and Islamism lose their salience. Under crisis conditions, Ankara could no longer pursue political mobilization toward anti-imperialist/anti-Western resistance and radical mass movement. The heteronomous rule of “Özalizm” has been based on an ambivalent secular right-wing political doctrine mixing economic principles of neo-liberal/global capitalism and cultural-ideological codes of local conservatism (Aral 2001: 73–75). Nonetheless, one should also investigate the real contemporary bilateral context within which rules are locally constructed by social actors, namely Turkish and Iranian foreign policy makers. The Turkish domestic political pendulum swings between soft-liners and hard-liners continued to create historical implications for neighborhood relations with Iran. On the other side of the border, several domestic actors with various economic

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interests and cultural convictions have entered the game of neighborhood with Turkey. Soft-liners in Ankara looked for local partners among Iranian moderates, while rival hard-liners awaited ripe opportunities to confront Iranian radicals in Tehran. In any event, perfect political matchups were not easy to come by. The historical picture of the period intimated a patchwork of reciprocation. The context, process and outcomes of social-psychological exchange implied rule of heteronomy governing affective-normative interactions between Ankara and Tehran. Both capitals gradually, if not painfully, learned how to shape local dynamics of reciprocal rule-making. Through historical practices they gained pragmatic knowledge on steering of affective-normative processes on political-diplomatic grounds. Both sides proved their social aptitude and psychological skills in “managing hearts” (Hochschild 2012/1983) in their common neighborhood. Local rules did not change much since social-psychological convention of reciprocal exchange continued to rule over affective-normative structures. On the Iranian side, the traditionalist-conservative camp coalesced around Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and President Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, while the moderate-liberal wing represented by Speaker of the Parliament Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi. The theory of Islamic rule proposed by Khomeini rested on “the principle of ‘trusteeship’, which holds that, during the period of absence, the functions of the Hidden Imam could and should be exercised by a group of leading jurists (fuqaha) who themselves are guided by a Supreme Jurist.” The notion of “the guardianship of the religious jurist” (velayat-e faqih) has been the key linchpin structuring the theocratic rule in Iran (Dallmayr 2011: 642–643). [Khomeini envisioned] two tiers of rulership: a secular and a clerical tier, with the second superimposed on the first. While the secular tier comprises a parliament (Majlis) and a president, the second and higher echelon includes a Council of Guardians or Religious Jurists (fuqaha) under the guidance of Khomeini as Supreme Jurist (faqih). (Dallmayr 2011: 642)

This type of mixed (theocratic-secular) rule was based on contested interpretation of Shii Islam. The political “Islamization during Khomeini’s rule” was structured as “a response to the Shah’s modernizing agenda, to Western political interference, and to the perceived ills of Western modernity as such” (Dallmayr 2011: 642). The counter-hegemonic rule of the-

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ocracy and secular (non-theocratic) rules of political revolution were mutually constituted in “opposition to the shah and to Westoxification.” Western intrusion into Iranian economy and culture has fed the political-­ popular perception of poisoning, coined as gharbzadegi by nativist and anti-modernist Iranian intellectuals. Feeling of resentment and the restive and reactive social psychology directed against the Western (particularly the US) penetration have shaped the spiritual rule of revolutionary change and temporal rules of domestic transformation in Iran. Anti-Western/anti-­ American, anti-modernist and anti-secular  reconfiguration of Iranian identity and nationalist-socialist-Islamist mobilization processes left enduring  impact on post-revolutionary politics in Tehran (Hurd 2010: 28; Maloney 2002: 101; Mirsepassi 2017). Popular Iranian nationalism (Iranianism) was re-constituted along ethnic-sectarian (Persian/Shii) lines to serve for political purposes of Iranian Islamism (Shoor 2013). Political economy of authoritarian rule, conservative-nationalist ideologies and class cultures were reconstructed hand in hand to wipe out counter-­ hegemonic social forces basically representing secular/non-theological and democratic/liberal contextual-discursive formations and their affective-­normative practices (Hurd 2010: 25–28). In fact, the response of Iranian revolutionaries to the Western ideational influence displayed a mixed record. For their own political purposes, revolutionary ideologues seemed pragmatic in attempting to emulate and adopt the Western philosophical thoughts. Khomeini himself had taught Western philosophy in order to debunk it, and his critique of Marxist materialism had led to the appropriation–and Islamization–of Marxist terms for use in the Iranian context. Khomeini’s division of the world into the oppressors and the oppressed would be familiar to any reader of the Communist Manifesto; and the phrase ‘Great Satan’, for example, can be seen in terms of the Islamization of the Marxist contention that capitalism corrupts and will inevitably collapse under the weight of its own contradictions (such motifs were to be enthusiastically taken … and applied to Zionism). (Ansari 2007: 20)

Revolutionary political spirit was made influential through psycho-­social re-arrangement of Shii sectarian feeling rules. The affective atmosphere of revolutionary mobilization has been configured by negative emotional entanglements like “disgust,” “resentment,” “humiliation,” “victimization,” “oppression” and “revenge” (Demirkılınç 2017). Revolutionary

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social psychology has determined Iran’s long-term interaction with the larger world. Under the banner of Islamic revolution, Shii political theology of radicalism has been fused with sectarian populism, Farsi-Persian nationalism, socialist solidarity and Marxist militancy (Demirci 2013). The emotional exploitation of the “Great Satan” image and further manipulation of “anti-American sentiments” have shaped the revolutionary atmosphere in Iran (Ramazani 1982: 21). The populist black-and-white picturing of psycho-cultural conflict between the oppressors (mostakberin) and the oppressed (mostazafin) has informed revolutionary Iranian politics during the Khomeini era and beyond. As a matter of fact, “Khomeinism” has not posed existential political threat to the modern logic of ruling by the nation-state. Quite the contrary, the revolutionary regime has attempted to radically strengthen nationalist-statist foundations under the banner of Islamic republic in Iran. Despite rhetorical utilization of anti-imperialism and Islamic universalism, “Khomeinism” did in fact affectively speak to fused feelings of territorial nationalism and Shii sectarianism (Abrahamian 1993: 11–15, 33–38). “Khomeini himself maintained a stridently nationalist agenda,” which sought “selective cooperation to promote the country’s survival.” Therefore, the government in Tehran took a pragmatic “flexible position” while dealing with both superpowers in Moscow and Washington (Maloney 2002: 100–106). Like preceding Iranian rulers, Khomeini re-­ interpreted Shii “religious ideology pragmatically in order to advance the state interests.” During the Iran-Iraq war, Khomeini himself let “the secret purchase of arms from the United States, ‘the Great Satan’ and Israel, ‘the lesser Satan’ ” (Ramazani 2004: 556, 559). A deal was struck through intermediaries. American and Israeli arms were to be shipped to Iran in return for Iran’s help with the release of Western hostages in Lebanon. Six shipments of arms went to Iran, several American hostages were released, each after Iran received a shipment of arms. Embarrassed by the disclosure of the secret deal, some Iranian leaders, particularly Hashemi-Rafsanjani, tried to cover up the transactions … In the end, when the internal pressures built up for demanding a parliamentary investigation of the scandal, Khomeini himself intervened to squash the demand. (Ramazani 2004: 556)

Indeed, “it was a quite difficult job to derive a state theory from the characteristically oppositional Shii doctrine.” To a certain extent, Tehran achieved this task through “sectarian nationalism,” which foresaw

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“isolationist” policies toward Ankara. This was strictly a secular stance. The theocratic regime has not genuinely sought Islamic brotherhood with Turkey. Khomeinism did not deeply desire cultural integration among Muslims of two neighboring countries. Instead, revolutionary Shiism targeted cultural “containment” of Turkish nationalism and secularism, which concomitantly opposed the Sunni doctrine. Radical return to politics of sectarianism has reminded the Safavid-Shii spirit of antagonism directed against the Ottoman-Sunni rule in Anatolia. In fact,  the Shii-­ Sunni schism did cause devastating dyadic consequences in the imperial battle of Çaldıran (1514). In some diverse ways, the contentious memory of 1514 has re-captured Iranian hearts and minds even after the 1979 Islamic revolution. Sectarian populism has provoked negative emotions and fueled affective confrontation in Turkish-Iranian affairs. The Shii psychology of “isolationism” ruling in Tehran has hindered promising prospects for cultural collaboration and productive partnership with Ankara (Doğan 1996: 25–30, 106–111, 137–143). At the time of revolutionary regime formation in Iran, Turkey has witnessed considerable domestic challenges. In the post-coup period, Turkish politics has been redefined. Social forces of hegemony and counter-­ hegemony have clashed in the attempt to re-arrange complex (economic-­ cultural/social-psychological) boundaries of domestic rule in Turkey. Hard-line conservative-nationalist tendencies and soft-line democratic-­ socialist inclinations have constituted the political game between government and the opposition. The neo-liberal interpretations of Islam also left important impact on Turkey’s regional relations and created historical implications for remaking of neighborhood with Iran. Ultimately, reciprocal practices have shaped social psychology of Turkey-Iran relations. Turkey’s regional policies have been influenced by the lingering of war between Iran and Iraq. Under war conditions, both Ankara and Tehran had to cope with costly consequences of cross-border conflict in northern Iraq. Ankara became much more anxious about the cozy relationship between the Iranian regime and the Kurdish opposition groups in Iraq and Turkey. As a matter of fact, the Iranian state has a long historical record of geostrategic engagement with the local non-state militant actors in the Middle East. “Iran’s non-state foreign policy” has been inherited as a regional legacy from the monarchical era. The 1977–1979 period has constituted an era of “resurrection” in Iranian covert entanglements with ethnic and sectarian militia forces particularly in Iraq and Lebanon

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(Reisinezhad 2018). The regional strategy of resurgent militancy has been embraced by the Islamic republic as well. To confront Israel, the revolutionary regime utilized indirect means, provided assistance to Yasser Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Khomeini did not even refrain from supporting secular-nationalist factions, like Palestinian Fatah and Lebanese Amal. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Israeli invasion of the south Lebanon have offered greater ground for covert collaboration among Iran and Syria (and Libya). By the early 1980s the Shii Hezbollah in Lebanon, and in the late 1980s the Islamist Hamas in Gaza, have become linchpins of Iran’s revolutionary foreign policy. Turning to the regional conflict in Iraq, the Iranian war making by Kurdish proxies has become detrimental for collective security in the common neighborhood. The revolutionary radicalization and the war with Iraq have mutually reinforced consolidation of aggressive and resistant approaches in Iranian regional policy. Local proxy wars have been exploited by PKK militants operating in contiguous cross-border areas. The prevention of Kurdish terrorist insurgency was the single most strategic concern for the national security establishment in Turkey. In the neighboring political house, divergent perceptions were ruling. The total war with Baghdad has determined rule-making practices in Tehran. The Iranian politics of war dictated the logic of enmity toward Iraq and Turkey. The hard-liners positioned in higher echelons of Iranian security bureaucracy sought to covertly use the Kurdish militants, including the terrorists of PKK, as a local “leverage” against Iraq and Turkey. This leverage could undermine the burgeoning Ankara-Baghdad cooperation, particularly over the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline. By holding the Kurdist-PKK card for dual use, Tehran would simultaneously check the Arabist-Khuzestan card of Iraq and the Turkist-Azerbaijan card of Turkey, which might be deployed in impending international contingencies (Özcan 1999). Under these regional circumstances, a complex jigsaw has emerged among Iran, Syria, the Iraqi Kurds and the PKK. After the second congress in June 1982, the number of PKK militants in Lebanon has reached 300. As of Sept., these militants were relocated to the KDP camps in transboundary areas across the trilateral Iran-Iraq-Turkey borders. From the spring of 1983, PKK militants, following the orders sent by Öcalan from Damascus, have entered southeastern Turkey in small squads so as to conduct limited reconnaissance operations. On 15 Aug. 1984, the “Long Term People’s Struggle” was unleashed by the PKK militants’ ambushes in Eruh and Şemdinli. After the third congress on 21 Mar.

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1986, the PKK turned toward “popular guerilla tactics” to confront the Turkish army in the inlands of northeastern Anatolia, such as provincial areas of Ağrı, Van, Bingöl, Muş, Elazığ and Tunceli. The PKK’s local expansion has been facilitated by covert Iranian support. More often than not Tehran has turned deaf ears against Ankara’s accusations in these regards (Özcan 1999: 331–336). When regional security needs seemed interdependent, the Iranian administration sought “to allay Turkish fears” and hence refrained from sheltering PKK terrorist activities inside their own territorial borders. As a result, Ankara and Tehran concluded a security agreement in Nov. 1984, following the one signed between Ankara and Baghdad in Feb. 1983. During this period, both governments of Turkey and Iran remained faithful to their security commitments. On the contrary, both sides did not cease to exchange accusations regarding (presumably covert) interference into each other’s domestic affairs. The Iranian side accused Turkey of “assisting anti-regime activities, particularly by the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO).” Rejecting those claims outright, Ankara further charged Tehran of clandestinely supporting anti-secular subversive factions and radical sectarian groups (read Hezbollah) inside Turkey (Gundogan 2011). Despite the “mistrust” propagated by these political allegations, Ankara and Tehran have “adroitly managed” to avoid diplomatic divergence and improve their bilateral relations. Both capitals were “resilient” in acting along traditional social psychology of neighborhood. Their affective-­ normative interactions were “committed to limiting the damage to the bilateral relationship and exploiting the situation for the sake of [mutual] economic gain and military security” (Calabrese 1998: 78). Rule of Resilience: Mutual Need for Local Stability and Managing Mistrust Through Economic Exchange Under circumstances of “unfinished” revolution and “unwinnable” war, Iran desperately needed Turkey’s regional collaboration. “Five years of death and destruction have added the problem of public war-weariness to many unsettled problems facing Iranian leaders.” The revolutionary regime was aware of popular passions growing against the Iraq war. “In June 1985, in order to reduce casualties, Khomeini decreed that fewer Iranian troops take part in future offensives—partly to increase military effectiveness, but also to dampen antiwar feelings” (Ramazani 1985: 60).

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In Tehran’s recognition, regional position of Turkey was invaluable as both an “economic partner” and a diplomatic mediator. On the other side, Iran was a key supplier of oil necessary for the Turkish economy. By expanding trade with Iran, Turkey relieved the crisis conditions permeating the domestic economy. Enhanced commercial activity gradually alleviated Turkey’s growing trade deficit and helped to balance international credit funding and increase foreign reserves earmarked for the payments of enormous external debt (Aydin and Aras 2005; Gundogan 2011). The statistical data covering the 1978–1987 period shows that Turkey’s imports from and exports to Iran reached a decade’s high in 1984 and 1985 respectively (Bolukbasi 1989: 108). Deputy Prime Minister Özal’s earlier visit to Tehran in 1982 has paved the way for further improvement in mutual economic collaboration. As Turkish-Iranian bilateral trade relations grew incrementally, Ankara and Tehran rejuvenated the “Joint Economic Commission (JEC)” in 1983 (Elik 2011: 161, 162) to improve economic collaboration in various fields. The second JEC meeting concluded by the signing of “Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation Agreement” on 1 May 1984. After assuming the Prime Ministry, Özal has made the first state visit to Iran in Apr. 1984. The return visit, paid by Iranian Prime Minister Mousavi on 20–22 Jan. 1985, has constituted a tangible breakthrough in mutual interactions. Mousavi was accepted by President Evren as well. After the third JEC meeting, both sides pledged to increase bilateral trade volume from two billion dollars to three billion dollars. The bilateral “trade protocol” envisaged further enhancement of cooperation in areas of industry, technology, transportation, electronics and communications. Two “preliminary contracts” have been signed to establish transit oil and natural gas pipelines from Iran to Turkey. Taking the opportunity, Özal expressed his happiness to inaugurate these two groundbreaking projects, which have been stalled for so many years. Mousavi hoped that the oil and natural gas cooperation would set a model for the relations among other Islamic countries. Özal and Mousavi reiterated their political commitment to fight against international terrorism and to maintain border security and regional peace in their common neighborhood. Regarding the events in southeast provinces, Özal stated that Turkey has been taking necessary measures and expecting her neighbors to act “emphatically.” The Turkish and Iranian governments also arranged cultural exchange programs for the next three years. On 27–29 Jan. 1985, Turkey and Iran (together with Pakistan) worked further to promote regional economic collaboration. The three countries decided to replace

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the dormant structure of Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) with the institutionalization of Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni 1985a: 10, 11, 25, 28–30, 40–45). Through ECO Ankara and Tehran promoted regional collaboration “in various fields (the economy, industry, agriculture, science, education and culture) for the well-being and prosperity of their peoples” (Aydin and Aras 2005: 25). To tell the truth, the Iranian regime was “threatened by so many social, economic, and political problems.” While responding to “mounting domestic problems,” both Supreme Leader Khomeini and President Khamenei sought to transcend Iran’s international isolation and hence endorsed an “open door policy” toward global players and regional neighbors. Seen from Tehran’s perspective, the ECO initiative was part of regime survival strategy. “Iran has used its increasing economic, commercial, and transportation ties with Turkey and Pakistan to forge closer political relations with these countries” (Ramazani 1985: 62, 65, 66, 69, 74). Apparently, Turkey-Iran political relations gained a new momentum after Mousavi’s state visit. Indeed, this was quite in line with Özal’s expectations. Upon Mousavi’s visit, on 23 Jan., Özal has delivered a comprehensive speech so as to inform the parliament. He framed neighboring Iran as both “friend and brother.” As Özal saw, Turkey-Iran international relationship has been founded on strong historical ties, close cultural bonds and common spiritual values. In the view of Özal, the new Iranian regime has attached great importance to relations with Turkey. Thus, mutual understanding has taken hold to improve bilateral economic collaboration. The reciprocal building of “trust” between two neighbors has helped to overcome security challenges encountered along the lengthy common borders. Özal thought that affective “sincerity” and normative “solidarity” would be key to resolve regional problems in Turkish-Iranian neighborhood. With these considerations, Özal once again called Mousavi to end the costly war between “two brothers and neighbors.” Ankara was ready to facilitate the cessation of hostilities between Tehran and Baghdad. In this regard, Özal framed Turkey’s regional policy of neutrality as both “positive and humanitarian” (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni 1985a: 40–45). Prime Minister Özal has further delineated Turkey’s neighborly policies in Davos, while delivering an international speech on 2 Feb. 1985, during the “European Leadership and Management Symposium.” After portraying himself as “a veteran of Davos meetings,” Özal attempted to address the “thorny” topic assigned by Professor Schwab: “Can the Middle East

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find peace?” The Iran-Iraq war constitutes the larger part of Özal’s international talk. His addressing of the topic is counterintuitive in many respects. Özal begins by describing the warring parties. Notably, Özal challenges established taboos regarding Khomeini and the Islamic regime in Iran. Against the backdrop of “widespread misperceptions,” Özal provides a nuanced view and depicts different characteristics of the five-yearold Islamic rule in Iran. The message is crystal clear. The international community should engage with the Iranian government just like any other political regime in the world. Because the revolution was “genuine” and it “gradually but steadily had gained ground.” The Islamic regime “seems to be there to stay” whether one likes it or not. Any political alternative is unlikely to emerge even when the country moves into the post-Khomeini era. Özal counters the portrayal of one-man rule in Iran. According to him, Khomeini assumed the position of “spiritual leader.” There were “other influential leaders down the line.” The “democratic institutions” in Iran were “reflecting the will of the people” (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni 1985b: 34, 35). In the view of Özal, the Iranian regime seemed weaker in terms of war-­ making capabilities. Iraq’s reception of external Arab aid has been crucial in creating the shift in regional balance of power. Despite the majority of Shii population, the Ba’th regime has consolidated power. The mass mobilization during the war has reinforced Saddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq. Given the current positions of Iraqi and Iranian regimes, Özal saw “a peaceful solution” was beyond political reach. Both Baghdad and Tehran were still decisive not to accept the stalemate. They were determined to gain victory so as to dictate their own terms in making of truce. The Iraqi and Iranian intentions indicated persistence of the war for a longer period of time, notwithstanding “tragic losses and unbearable human suffering on both sides.” To “alleviate” those detrimental consequences, Turkey has put enormous efforts. As Özal highlighted, the unique regional position of “neighborhood” to both Tehran and Baghdad has enabled Ankara to pursue “positive and humanitarian neutrality” during the international war. By no means, this was a policy of “indifference.” Turkey has maintained good neighborly relations with both sides. Despite the setback of war, Turkey’s economic cooperation and transit trade have improved equally with Iran and Iraq. For this reason, Özal underlined, the Turkish government has been better “equipped to help bring an honorable peace for both sides.” Ankara’s “constructive attitude” would “give confidence to … the entire Middle East.” Paraphrasing Özal, the economic coopera-

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tion on oil and natural gas sectors would be key for achieving peace and stability in the region (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni 1985b: 34–38). Since the oil prices dropped significantly, Turkey-Iran trade relations decreased dramatically in 1986. Due to declining oil revenues, Tehran had to terminate economic privileges saved for Turkish trading partners. Ankara could not expand exports to other oil producing neighbors (namely Iraq and Libya) and had “to look for more stable and sustainable markets in the West.” On 14 Apr. 1987, Turkey applied for full membership into the European Community (EC). Ankara’s application for accession into the EC could be seen as the extension of Turkey’s broader strategic and cultural interaction with Western institutions, most prominently NATO. Yet, the historical decision of Özal government rested on pragmatic economic rationale. Turkey needed to develop “complementary” economic relations (Dagi 2001: 26, 27) with both European and Middle Eastern neighbors. Ankara’s engagement with Brussels was not aimed at the expense of Tehran. Quite the contrary, the EC card would strengthen Turkish government’s hand in developing better neighborhood relations with Tehran. Despite criticisms in the domestic media, the Iranian government was not bothered by Turkey’s developing interactions with the EC, since it needed stronger economic and strategic ties with Ankara (Gundogan 2011). Nonetheless, Iran’s breaking of bilateral security commitments has led to further deterioration of bilateral economic relations in Mar. 1987. Bilateral trade talks, which had been scheduled for 8 Mar. were postponed. The Iranian regime took the offensive in order to win the war against Iraq. Once again, Tehran turned to Kurdish local proxies in northern Iraq to fight against the Ba’th regime in Baghdad. Iranian assistance to the Kurdish militia forces exacerbated the security risks for Turkey. The PKK terrorists sought refuge in strongholds taken and controlled by KDP and PUK. Based on the “hot pursuit” agreement with Iraq, Turkey conducted several cross-border military operations against PKK hideouts. These operations were criticized by the Iranian Foreign Ministry, calling them as “aggression directed against Iraq.” In response, TMFA strongly warned that the Iranian side should refrain from attacking oil fields and pipelines in Kirkuk. In spite, Iranian army get closer to Kirkuk by taking the town of Halabja. As of Mar. 1988, Iranian land forces had only 100 miles to control Kirkuk. Prime Minister Özal did stick to Turkey’s neutrality and remained in deaf ears to contradictory calls for military intervention in Kirkuk. Ankara was relieved by Iraq’s recapture of Halabja in June 1988.

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As a matter of fact, the ceasefire and Iran-Iraq peace negotiations were welcomed by Ankara. In Sept. 1988, Turkish and Iranian governments agreed to increase their volume of bilateral trade (Bolukbasi 1989: 102–107). Yet, Iranian regime’s interference in Turkish domestic affairs created a political rift between two capitals. On 7 Mar. 1989, the wearing of headscarf (hijab) in Turkish university campuses was banned by the ruling of Constitutional Court in Ankara. Islamist demonstrators took to the streets in major Turkish cities. Tehran sided with the protestors. Khomeini denounced the ruling of headscarf ban in Turkey. Dyadic diplomatic tension did reduce after the death of Khomeini on 3 June 1989 (Gundogan 2011). The passing of Khomeini from the political scene set in motion a new episode of rule-making in Turkey-Iran neighborhood. Despite all odds of the post-1979/1980 period, Ankara and Tehran have kept up with their neighborhood relations. They managed to maintain neighborly tradition of cultural “coexistence” (Bolukbasi 1989: 94–95) and economic exchange. Contextual structures of collaborative partnership and confrontational rivalry have been constituted by bilateral emotional-moral commitments and psycho-social practices. Pragmatic partnership on mutual, need-based economic exchange has not been overshadowed by dyadic duels in diplomacy. The real sources of geopolitical confrontation did emanate from the realm of security. Regional-local conditions of warfare and low-intensity conflict in contiguous areas of northern Iraq posed contagious challenges for both sides. Turkey has been primarily concerned with the PKK threat. For Tehran, the main enemy was the Ba’thist (Arab nationalist-socialist) regime ruling in Baghdad. The Iranian regime played by old geopolitical rules of Middle Eastern game and supported Kurdish (KDP-PUK) militia forces against the rule of Saddam Hussein. As a result, Tehran’s regional sphere of influence extended to Dohuk, Suleymaniyah and Erbil. In order to eliminate exploitation of KDP-PUK safe havens by PKK terrorists, Turkish military conducted cross-border operations. Competing spheres of influence cusped over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk testing the local limits of confrontation. These experiential instances contributed to habitual learning and recreated contextual structure of pragmatic (affective-­ normative) interaction based on bilateral convention of reciprocity and neighborly exchange. Both sides refrained from conflictual military commitment, notwithstanding rhetorical confrontation and conventional battles over domestic media. Pairing of secular and theocratic hard-liners

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(Evren-Khomeini) and coupling of liberal and moderate soft-liners (Özal-­ Rafsanjani) have re-enacted local rules of social-psychological engagement and affective-normative structure of pragmatic exchange and ultimately re-fashioned the heteronomous context of rule-making in Ankara-Tehran neighborhood. In sum, Turkey and Iran have re-formed “the basic structure of their bilateral relationship” and redefined the economic convention of collaborative exchange and cultural habitus of “peaceful coexistence” (Gundogan 2011) between 1980 and 1989. The historical legacy of neighborhood has reconfigured psycho-social modes of exchange particular to Ankara-­ Tehran relationship (Çetinsaya 2002: 322). The re-invigoration of Turkish-Iranian JEC in 1983 and re-institutionalization of regional partnership through ECO in 1985 marked the key historical junctures. Despite geostrategic confrontation in northern Iraq and ideological battles in domestic media, Turkey and Iran have managed to enhance bilateral economic partnership. These post-revolution/post-coup years constituted a historical episode for remaking of social-psychological rules in Ankara-­ Tehran neighborhood. In this historical period, both sides have controlled their divisive emotional states emanating from negative “core affects” (Barrett 2009; Russell 2009) like fear and distrust, and have reinvented positive rules of political feeling based on pragmatic caution and practical prudence. Prevention of contiguous harm and pain provided a moral basis of neighborly interaction. Mutual “official emotions” (Hall 2015) and affective commitments have helped to implant seeds of political honor and diplomatic respect onto the common ruling ground of neighborhood. Traditional norms of neighborhood were revised through habituation of economic reciprocity and customization of cultural responsibility. Complex pragmatic (affective-normative) structuration of neighborhood rules led to heteronomous rule of political collaboration and confrontation.

Exceptional Era of Affective-Normative Encounters (1990–2000) In this historical episode, the social psychology of Turkish-Iranian relations revealed the “ambiguous character” of traditional neighborly interactions. Complex centrifugal and centripetal forces have drawn Ankara and Tehran “closer together, and at the same time have driven them further apart.” Ankara’s state of emotional ambivalence has reflected “both mistrust and the desire to cooperate” with Tehran (Calabrese 1998:

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79–81). By the end of the Cold War in 1989, global balance of power shifted toward the unipole constituted by the United States. Washington’s regional preponderance has solidified by the end of the Gulf War in 1991. The post–Gulf War local instability and the emergent geostrategic vacuum in northern Iraq created serious security implications for both Ankara and Tehran. After Özal’s ascendance to the presidency on 9 Nov. 1989, Turkish politics entered into a new period. Due to the constitutional constraints, Özal could no longer officially hold the leadership position in ANAP. After Özal’s official departure, ANAP has been drifted toward factional disintegration between “conservative-nationalist” and “liberal-­democrat” wings. Political fractionalization has been particularly exacerbated by mainstay center-right voter alienation from ANAP.  This decline has been quickly exploited by parties positioned both right and left of the center. The sudden death of Özal on 17 Apr. 1993, proved detrimental for consolidation of center-right majority rule in Turkey. Old Neighbors Get Closer as They Fall Further Apart: Between Demirel-Rafsanjani and Erbakan-Khamenei The political fragmentation in the Turkish right has accelerated after Demirel’s accession to the presidency on 16 May 1993. For a period of considerable time, Turkey could be ruled by slight majority or weak coalition governments. The uneasy nature and precarious character of political coalitions created critical consequences for Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy. Foremost, divisive contours of civil-military relations have determined the rule of political heteronomy in Ankara. Increasingly weakening civilian governments lost their political power and control over military affairs. The Turkish military officials gained the upper hand in the NSC. The military bureaucracy took charge of managing internal and external security affairs. Militant Kurdish separatism (namely PKK terrorism) and radical Islamist organizations, such as the “Kurdish Hezbollah” (Kurt 2017), were identified as main threats to Turkey’s national security. Weak coalition governments turned to hard-line measures proposed by the security bureaucracy. Far from alleviating Turkey’s security predicaments, hard-line policies exacerbated the chaotic conditions ensuing in the country. Turkey has been completely embroiled into the vicious cycle of political-economic corruption and Mafia-type scaling violence. Covert practices, or the so-called deep state, began to overrule legal norms of

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political game (Kösebalaban 2011: 140–141). Under the rule of partisan-­ patronage cliques and political-economic conditions of mismanagement, foreign policy establishment could barely uphold liberal norms and pursue “trading state” interests. The chaotic social-psychological structures and affective-normative practices of these years mold into the emotional state of “exasperation” and “hopelessness” and ultimately reinforced sense of total “loss” in Turkey. Ankara was in the midst of those gloomy years when “two and a half war doctrine” has been projected as a political panacea or a strategic savior. According to the proposed political-military strategy, Turkey should be able to win two major wars (against Greece and Syria) and conduct military operations against the PKK terrorist organization (Kösebalaban 2011: 127–130). These projected threat perceptions and rules of military engagement would feed into feeling of existential fear from fully problematic neighbors. Social psychology of encirclement and sense of siege by bad neighborhood would inevitably affect Ankara’s making of relations with Tehran. Particularly the military and their civilian loyalists in the secular-­ nationalist camp served as a strong impediment for fostering economic engagement between Turkey and Iran. Apparently, the foreign policy orientation of this historical bloc was pro-Western. In their security vision, Israel has been identified as Turkey’s key military ally (Kösebalaban 2011: 135, 138) in helping to enhance defensive measures and sharing information on countering common regional threats. The context of regional relations began to change after the disclosure of the military cooperation agreement between Turkey and Israel in Feb. 1996. This development has increased the “anxiety” in Iran. In the meantime, a fierce media battle has emerged through reciprocal accusations of “espionage.” Dyadic crisis was resolved by mutual calling of four diplomats to return (Çetinsaya 2002: 324). President Demirel visited Tehran in order to dispel political “apprehension” taking hold in the Iranian establishment. President Rafsanjani’s pragmatic attitude helped to minimize the “tension” in bilateral relations (Calabrese 1998: 86–87). Indeed, the Turkish government has been willing to develop better relations with all countries in the region, including both Iran and Israel (Kösebalaban 2011: 136–139). Yet, the dominant dichotomous portrayal of Iran versus Israel has been captured by popular campaigns in the mainstream Turkish media. The negative public image of Iran did provoke negative feelings in Ankara, which would make it all the more difficult for

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the Turkish government to engage with their counterparts in Tehran. As a matter of fact, Turkey desperately needed neighboring Iran to diversify natural gas supplies. President Demirel and his heir in the center-right True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi—DYP) Prime Minister Tansu Çiller (1993–1996) have already been seeking alternative natural gas suppliers to meet domestic energy requirements. With these regional arrangements the Turkish government could hope to break the “over-reliance on Russian gas” (Calabrese 1998: 83). The right-wing (Islamist-conservative) coalition government of Erbakan has received the vote of confidence on 8 July 1996. An unwritten division of labor has ruled in the new government, where Prime Minister Erbakan took the responsibility of engagement with the Eastern countries, dealing with the Western world left to Foreign Minister Çiller. Erbakan preferred to tour “those countries with majority Muslim populations. He never visited any Western nation in his official capacity as prime minister” (Kösebalaban 2011: 134–136). The new government sought to increase Turkey’s trade potential through economic interactions with the East. As Erbakan foresaw, the center of the global economy has been gravitating toward the Asian countries. Erbakan’s pro-Eastern economic vision has constituted the governmental rationale to tour Iran, Pakistan, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia on 10–20 Aug. 1996. The state visit has been justified on the bases of Turkey’s urgent needs for fast economic recovery. Erbakan has been accompanied by six ministers, including the State Minister Abdullah Gül, the Defense Minister Turhan Tayan, and the Energy and Natural Resources Minister Recai Kutan. Representing the Turkish military institutions, four mid-ranking generals have attended the visit as well. Erbakan portrayed the historical visit as a turning point for “reawakening and restoration,” so as to rejuvenate Turkey’s “economic potential” through more vibrant interactions with the Muslim world. In a peculiarly outspoken style, Erbakan attempted to challenge the dominant political picturing of Turkey as “turning its back to the Muslim countries” (Erbakan 1996: 28, 29, 44, 45, 100–102). Here, one should note the fact that the four Muslim countries (Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia) would later form the backbone of the D-8 (Developing Eight Countries’ Organization for Economic Cooperation) platform to be engineered by Erbakan. Erbakan’s historical visit opened up new avenues for Turkey to develop trans-regional trade relations and to connect the ECO space with the area of the Association

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of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In this sense, the visit represents continuity in Turkey’s proactive “multilateralism.” defended most recently by Özal (Kiraz 2018: 131, 137). Following Özal’s multi-layered foreign policy tradition, Erbakan also envisioned Turkey as a geopolitical “center” and called for international cooperation in all (East-West/North-South) directions (Erbakan 1996: 11–14, 28, 29, 44, 63). Turkey’s bilateral and regional neighborhood relations have constituted the essential blocks for building multi-directional foreign policy. Like Özal, Erbakan ranked higher geopolitical importance to the Turkish-Iranian neighborhood relationship so as to better govern trans-regional interactions along horizontal and vertical directions. During the two-day visit in Iran, the Turkish delegation held extensive bilateral meetings and exchanged collaborative views with their counterparts. Resolution of border security issues has constituted the highest priority in inter-governmental negotiations. The two neighbors have reassured not to weaken each other’s national security. The Iranian government gave a free hand to the Turkish delegation to control their side of the border at any time. The Iranian “sincerity” was deemed important by Erbakan. Tehran’s influence over Damascus would be key to eradicate “terrorism” from the region. Erbakan hoped that the building of confidence in Ankara-­Tehran security relations would pave the way for regional cooperation with the Syrian government. The trilateral trans-governmental collaboration among three neighboring states would help Ankara “drain swamps of terror” in cross-border areas. Without establishing security cooperation against the trans-boundary terrorist activities (of PKK), it would be very difficult to improve local economic interactions and enhance regional trade in the common neighborhood. Since the two delegations reached a mutual understanding on border security issues, Erbakan and Rafsanjani have joined their institutional forces to speed up the completion of the transit natural gas pipeline toward the Turkish province of Van. As Erbakan reiterated, the transit pipeline project has been accorded much earlier, during the reign of the former Çiller government. In the view of Erbakan, it was “so natural for Turkey to buy natural gas from Iran.” As the acting German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel pointed out, buying natural gas has been a usual business in international affairs. Even though the incumbent US administration has demonstrated political “understanding” in this respect, some American circles have exposed Turkey’s normal business with Iran to “negative interpretations” (Erbakan 1996: 30–32, 52–57, 71–74).

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During the Iran visit, the Turkish government concluded the final agreement to build the necessary pipeline to import natural gas from Iran. The total amount of gas imports has been priced to 20 million dollars at the time of signing. The agreement was signed only a few days after the approval of the Iran-­ Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) in August 1996. Despite Washington’s dislike and active opposition, Turkey insisted that ILSA allowed trade (as opposed to “investment”) with Iran, and also the Turkish-Iranian gas deal should be exempted from the sanctions since it was agreed to in May 1995, before the approval of the new bill. (Aydin and Aras 2005: 31)

Notwithstanding US political pressure, Erbakan’s visit proved to be a turning point for historical making of rules in Turkey-Iran neighborhood. The two-day visit marked “Erbakan’s de-securitization of Iran through religious discourse.” More often than not, his affective politics of cooperation among Muslim countries has been branded by anti-Westernist and anti-Zionist feelings. Based on shared sentiments of Islamic culture, Erbakan framed “Iran as an ally.” In spite of Iran’s international isolation, and its categorization among “rogue states,” Erbakan attempted to build “sympathetic” relationship with Rafsanjani. Indeed, “it was Erbakan’s [affective] accomplishment to create the necessary trust to sign a deal that would be binding for the next twenty three years between the Turkish and Iranian governments” (Aydindag and Isiksal 2018: 300–301). Escorting Erbakan, a large delegation of Turkish businessmen, most of them affiliated with conservative-Islamist bodies like the Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (Müstakil Sanayici ve Iş̇ adamları Derneği-­ ̇ MÜSIAD), have made lucrative contracts even in such a short period of their stay in Iran (Erbakan 1996: 31, 32, 39–43, 105–109). In addition to the natural gas transfer agreement, Turkey and Iran renegotiated a settlement on transit land transportation. The new deal would better facilitate the access of Turkish trucks to Central Asia. In return, the Iranian trucks would reach out to Europe under more convenient transit conditions. Furthermore, the joint delegations decided to increase the total trade volume from 1 billion to 2.5 billion dollars. At this point, the Iranian side pledged to rectify the imbalance in bilateral trade causing considerable disadvantages for Turkey. To handle these issues JEC meetings would be held periodically. Bilateral economic collaboration would be extended to other Muslim countries through trans-regional engagement among

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ECO, ASEAN and Organization of the Islamic Conference/Cooperation (OIC) members. The Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial ̇ Cooperation—COMCEC (Islam Iş̇ birliği Teşkilatı Ekonomik ve Ticari ̇ ̇ Işbirliği Daimi Komitesi—ISEDAK) has been the institutional key to improve collaboration among OIC countries. With the assistance of ̇ ISEDAK, “the Islamic Bank” could secure far more comprehensive financial “efficiency.” The Turkey-Iran joint efforts in economic affairs would help to address enduring international issues as well. Among other regional topics, the stability of Iraq has been the  key political concern shared by Turkish-Iranian delegations. The urgent international humanitarian assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina and the immediate resolution of local conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia have been highly primed in Turkey-Iran neighborhood agenda as well (Erbakan 1996: 30–32, 71–74). In Dec. 1996, Erbakan’s visit was returned by Rafsanjani. The joint meetings in Ankara proved productive for both sides. The two delegations discussed possibilities of collaboration in the areas of defense, intelligence and border security as well as trade, customs, transportation and tourism. Several economic agreements and protocols were signed. After reassuring Iranian opposition to the PKK, Rafsanjani publicly proposed local cooperation against the terrorist threats. Rafsanjani’s offer has divided the political-military elites in Turkey. Even though civilian officials of the foreign ministry maintained a “moderate” approach toward Iran, the military bureaucracy took a tougher line against the Islamic regime. Instead of Tehran, Ankara consolidated regional security partnership with the Israeli defense establishment in Tel Aviv (Çetinsaya 2002: 325–326). The warming of neighborly relations with Iran faced a serious backlash when Erbakan’s Welfare Party (Refah Partisi—RP) was challenged by dominant secular-nationalist elite factions. Signs of sectarianism in Erbakan’s messy political rhetoric were still fresh in the public memory. Remember also it was actually Erbakan who has earlier made controversial international proposals such as “the Muslim UN,” “the Islamic Union,” “the Islamic Common Market” and even perhaps a security structure under the banner of so-called Islamic NATO (Kiraz 2018: 137). International lobbying for these utopian dreams would be too costly for Erbakan. His second tour, in Oct. 1996, to Egypt, Nigeria and Libya proved disastrous for him. The US State Department expressed “fierce American reaction.” For Washington, it was not “a good idea to have business-as-usual with dictators.” International engagement with “Islamic radicals” has triggered extra Western pressure on Erbakan’s shoulders, which really became burdensome (Kösebalaban 2011: 136, 137, 139).

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Erbakan was taken completely off guard by “the Susurluk scandal” spoiled on 3 Nov. 1996. The circumstantial evidence indicated that criminal cliques and mafia gangs have dirtied the Turkish political house, presumably in the name of state security. Lacking a strong bureaucratic power base inside the security services, Erbakan (and Islamist conservatives) opted to bandwagon with nationalist conservatives (led by Demirel and Çiller). Ultimately, the instinct of political survival has prevailed. The right-wing autocratic reflexes of protecting the state have helped the dominant hard-line coalition to cover up the mess. The societal demands for human security have been ignored absolutely. Since Erbakan could not capitalize on the domestic opportunity to make urgent “institutional reforms in the security sector,” he has not met popular expectations in making of “clean politics.” By doing so, he could only delay the heavy political price already incurred on him. Over the coming months, the psycho-­social crisis in “state-society complex” has deepened and created enduring implications for Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy (Kösebalaban 2011: 134–141; Bozarslan 2014: 262–264). Domestic provocations in Turkey have reached a peak point during “the Sincan incident.” On 30 Jan. 1997, RP organized “the Quds night” in Sincan, Ankara. Perhaps not unexpectedly, the Iranian Ambassador was invited. The Iranian diplomat took the opportunity to criticize Turkey’s growing military cooperation with Israel. Via parading of tanks over municipal streets, the Turkish army displayed publicly recognizable reaction to the Sincan affair. The emergent diplomatic crisis exacerbated through infighting over domestic media outlets. Turkey and Iran withdrew their ambassadors reciprocally. The international and domestic media cartels have added insult to the injury. They provoked political feelings as if Turkey were sliding from the Western world. The psycho-social atmosphere has reinforced negative sentiments, such as the shifting of “axis” in Ankara’s pro-Western orientations. Erbakan’s strong anti-­Zionist/antiWestern political dispositions, coupled with his pro-Islamist credentials, have deeply agitated secularist-modernist sensitivities within the national security establishment in Turkey. Under those circumstances, the Turkish state has polarized between the government and the military bureaucracy. The military officials submitted a memorandum to the NSC on 28 Feb. 1997. The NSC asked Erbakan to implement “ ‘recommendations,’ most of which aimed to curtail the purported rise of Islamism” in politics and other fields. In one of those recommendations, NSC proposed the government to closely watch

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Tehran’s “efforts to drive the regime in Turkey to instability” and implement policies “to prevent Iran’s intervention into Turkey’s domestic affairs.” Having experienced two direct coups in the past, President Demirel, heading the NSC, “cooperated with the military.” With this accommodation, “soft coup” conditions began to shape political climate in Ankara (Kösebalaban 2011: 140–141). Erbakan could cope with these domestic challenges for only four months. Before resigning, Erbakan has been able to host the first D-8 summit on 15 June 1997. The foundational ̇ Istanbul summit initiatives would later become the forerunner of institutional partnership and collaboration among major developing Muslim nations including Turkey and Iran. Even though D-8 has not created salient international influence compared to other financial gatherings like BRICS, let alone G-8, Erbakan’s pro-Islamist rhetoric of “multilateralism” has taken a foothold in Turkey’s economic relations with the Muslim world including Iran (Kiraz 2018). Economic development has been a shared historical need on both sides of the Turkey-Iran border. After the end of formative Khomeini era (1979–1989), Iran has entered into a period of “reconstruction.” During this “thermidor phase” (Wells 1999; Rajaee 1999), revolutionary zeal in state-society relations gradually died down, and the Islamic regime moved toward consolidation. In this new term, Khamenei assumed the powers of Supreme Leader, while Rafsanjani moved to the post of President. “Indeed, Rafsanjani is widely credited for being Khamenei’s kingmaker, working behind the scenes to have his old friend and ally anointed Leader, which Rafsanjani claimed to be Khomeini’s dying wish” (Sadjadpour 2008: 6). In this new era, economic opening “became imperative,” entailing commercial interaction and diplomatic engagement with regional neighbors and European powers. Rafsanjani’s economic efforts and diplomatic initiatives have been supported by Khamenei. Regarding relations with the declared opponents (the United States and Israel), the regime’s “rhetoric remained stern and revolutionary” (Sadjadpour 2008: 7). Fully aware that he lacked both the respect of the country’s senior clergy and Khomeini’s popularity, Khamenei initially moved slowly and cautiously to strengthen his position. He assured the regime’s political and clerical elites that he did not intend to disrupt the status quo, but shrewdly set out to create what he lacked as president: an independent base of support and a personal network working as his “eyes and ears.” He quietly began cultivating this network of “clerical commissars.” (Sadjadpour 2008: 7)

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Holding the most privileged constitutional title, the “supreme leader” (velayat-e faqih), Khamenei clung to political power by furthering of “clericalization” in state-society relations and reactionary radicalization in Iranian foreign affairs (Roy 1994: 168–193). The key to his survival strategy was to expand on cultural-economic institutionalization of “Khomeinism” to reinforce political hegemony of clerical classes. This could be largely done through dispersing of institutional power among dominant factions. By doing so, Khamenei has reassured his seat at the top of the Iranian state. Khamenei established his personal control over key institutions of politicalmilitary power. The “Supreme Leader’s Office” (SLO) has gradually become central in Iran’s domestic political order (nezam). Within SLO, “key group of advisers, … comprised of high-­profile former ministers and retired top military commanders … serve as his first line of consultation and whose collective counsel holds great weight” over Khamenei’s strategic decisions (Lim 2015: 151). The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) has been influential in handling “specific short-term issues on foreign policy, national security, defense, and domestic security.” The SNSC secretaries have been appointed by the president after receiving consent from the supreme leader. In that regard, moderate-centrist Hassan Rouhani has played a key role in Iranian policy making during his long tenure at the SNSC secretary, extending from Oct. 1989 to Aug. 2005. The SNSC decisions have “become the official policy of Iran” after the supreme leader’s approval (Kazemzadeh 2017: 201, 202). By and large, the Supreme Leader has received “unmediated inputs from the various security apparatuses, the chief of which is the top brass of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).” Unlike the ­conventional army (Artesh), the IRGC “openly aligns itself with domestic political actors (usually within the conservative-ultraconservative fold) and falls under little civilian oversight.” In “the sense of an entrenched, unelected organization with the means—often armed—and the will to challenge elected civilian rule … the IRGC approximates a ‘deep state’ ” for Iranian political-military relations. Khamenei’s political favoring of IRGC “ensured that the militant hard-line became normative” in Iranian internal and external affairs. The IRGC’s special elite unit known as the Quds Force (QF) has been “tasked with operational and intelligence responsibility, as well as the training of frontline resistance groups, in Iran’s most sensitive theatres of operations, including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, and Afghanistan.” On the whole, the IRGC has stood “as the main

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line of defense for a regime whose overriding priority is its own survival, or in other words, maslahat-e nezam” (Lim 2015: 151, 158–160). For better or worse, complex clerical-militant regime survival strategies and concomitant hard-line practices of psycho-social control and conservative cultural-ideological mobilization have all buttressed autocratic politics in Iran. Over the long course of post-revolutionary period, the Iranian people felt that nothing has really changed in their political house. There was only a superficial revision. The monarchical palace was replaced by the clerical compound. The failure to meet democratic demands, coupled with economic mismanagement and political corruption, has put Khamenei and the Islamic regime in a precarious position. The clerical rule, resting upon the reinvented notion of velayat-e faqih, faced serious domestic challenges (Mavani 2011). Iranian people “harbored deep uncertainty not only about who determines what, or who rules whom, but also what the future principal of rule” would be. The clerical system of rule created deepening tension between the transcendental/spiritual and the mundane/material realms of human life. Most segments of the Iranian society were under the rising impact of political stress and still have been demanding “liberty, equality and justice” from the Islamic state (Mackey 1998: 377–380). Due to factional fighting among moderate liberals and radical conservatives, political institutions “tended to cancel each other out.” When popular riots broke out, Khamenei did not hesitate and resorted to repressive use of force to eliminate the scaling opposition to his clerical rule (Yapp 1996: 485–488). On the external front, a number of historical factors have inadvertently bolstered the Khamenei regime. The regional war with Iraq has left a traumatizing impact on Iranian collective memory. After bitter historical experiences of two world wars, Iranians once again deeply felt their ­ national weaknesses in terms of independent military capabilities and selfsufficient defense industry. The psycho-social trauma of war has been influential in remaking of Persian/Farsi nationalism by the “state-society complex.” National security considerations were primed high by domestic structures and practices of rule-making. Much like the Pahlavi monarchy, the Islamic republic has also sought to assume a prominent role in regional affairs, so as to maintain local sphere of influence. Tehran’s regional security concerns exacerbated due to the uncertainty unleashed by dissolution of the Soviet Union. Under those international circumstances, the Khamenei administration aimed at three main targets: (1) prevention of external dependency, (2) enhancement of deterrence capacity, (3) empow-

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erment of regional status. Ruled by feelings of national honor and dignity, the Iranian state often sought to achieve more powerful “status” in international affairs. Only rarely did “territorial gains” play a role in Tehran’s power demands and regional ambitions (Çetinsaya 2007: 175–179). The psycho-social struggle for better international status has reconfigured affective-normative linkages between Iranian internal and external affairs. Most apparently the intensification of US trade embargo over the 1992–1996 period has played into Khamenei’s hands, who could manipulate popular anti-American feelings for domestic political purposes. Washington’s ambivalence, swinging between “punitive containment” and “constructive engagement,” has been exploited by radical hard-liners in Tehran (Cordesman and Hashim 1997). “The paranoid style of Iranian politics” (Abrahamian 1993: 111–131) has been re-fashioned by the Khamenei administration. Politics of paranoia, and “autocratic populism,” could help divert the domestic anger toward the external enemy. Ruled by animosity against the outside, the Iranian people have increased their solidarity inside. Rally around the flag impact has been sustained by Khamenei’s nationalist-statist rhetoric. By re-playing on psycho-social game of “outside repression” and “inside victimization,” the post-revolutionary regime could push itself toward reactionary confrontation and sectarian radicalization in regional politics. The Iranian security establishment has adopted military strategies of unconventional warfare. They covertly supported local paramilitary forces to conduct proxy operations in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine (Salamey and Othman 2011). Apart from assisting Kurdish and Shii militias in the region, the Iranian security services have also utilized covert tactics of terror to intimidate global enemies and regional rivals. Tehran has not refrained from using the card of terrorism (read PKK and Hezbollah) against Ankara (Cordesman and Hashim 1997: 146–149). In spite of his Azeri/Turkic lineage, Khamenei played by hard-line rules of inter-state confrontation between Iran and Turkey. The affective ties of kinship have been overruled by political boundaries of rivalry in Iranian-­ Turkish neighborhood. As a matter of fact, drawing “boundaries of faith” among the communities of Islam has been a common historical practice. Like other communal believers, Shii Muslims inherited social-psychological rules that determine ontological conditions of their being in the world. Quite naturally, “emotional convictions” have played a key role in contextual practices of boundary drawing in Shii political thought (Martin 1996: 12–14, 77–94, 119). In many ways, Khamenei’s political rhetoric has been built

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into “emotional beliefs” of Shii community as well as “moral sentiments” of Iranian nation. By looking at Khamenei’s public talks during the 1990–2000 period, one could better grasp how he sought to preserve the post-revolutionary regime through reinstatement of sectarian and national boundaries. Following Khomeini’s footsteps, Khamenei has developed a complex rhetoric blending sectarian-theological concepts with secular-­ ideological notions. Most evidently, he has been preoccupied with preserving the post-revolutionary rule of order in Iranian politics. This political preoccupation clearly overshadows other considerations such as the truly Islamic rules of a democratic republic. One might search in vain to come across political-theological references to ruling codes of Islam, such as “open society” and “open market,” let alone “cosmopolitan rule of order,” in Khamenei’s historical making of “Iranian reality.” Nonetheless, Khamenei’s discursive corpus provides emotional evidence of how he has managed Iranian hearts during the 1990–2000 episode (Hamanei 2018). Khamenei is the leading disciple and defender of “Khomeinism,” representing “typical Shii ambiguities,” and populist-nationalist contradictions swinging between revolutionary socialism and radical conservatism. The Islamic republic has assumed a “Janus-face,” in a public attempt to equally appeal to both sectarian Shiism and Iranian nationalism (Abrahamian 1993: 15, 20, 38). The Islamic regime moved by these “two complex and interlocking traditions,” knowing the fact that “almost every Iranian so emotionally adheres” to their mixed identity. Indeed, the “emotional power” of the Iranian nation-state could fully emerge out of a “wedding” between Shiism and Iranianism. The people of Persia have long strived for “honor, valor, wisdom, and patriotism” to preserve their sectarian soul and “national psyche” (Mackey 1998: 5–9, 63–65). Khamenei is an expert demagogue who knows how to resonate with the historical social psychology of Iranian people. During the critical post-­ Khomeini decade (1990–2000), the political theology of regime security has been most influentially crafted by Khamenei. His public speeches are just like political sermons delivered to indoctrinate, mostly younger generations of students, teachers and political-clerical network leaders in universities, madrasas, cultural institutions and other social organizations. His pedagogical and theological language has political power to influence followers, make them rally around a common cause. His affective-normative rhetoric, full of emotional-moral messages, has been crucial in the preservation of clerical rule in post-revolutionary Iran (Hamanei 2018).

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Through affective management of hearts, Khamenei has kept the position of ultimate arbiter on critical defense and security matters and key foreign policy issues, including relations with neighboring Turkey. The office of prime minister was abolished by a constitutional change. As a result, executive power was handed to Rafsanjani. This was a political necessity since Khamenei “lacked a distinct constituency and appeared … to be politically reliant on Rafsanjani, who did have a constituency.” The domestic structure of rule was to be re-based on traditional alliance between political rulers and mercantile classes (bazaris). Rafsanjani’s first term (1989–1993) has been an era of economic opening, which has been “driven by trade, not investment.” In this “facade of liberalism,” political “populism” and social “mercantilism” created serious implications for domestic rule-making in Iran (Ansari 2007: 12–14). Rafsanjani had intended that the mercantile–clerical alliance, with himself the crucial bridge between the two, would be sufficient to ensure his preponderant power while he managed the system and kept the people happy with the occasional populist policy. Where populism failed, there was always religion to keep the faithful content with their lot, and, for a time, this strategy worked. The righteous rich looked down upon the mass of the poor safe in the knowledge that religion would protect them from opposition. (Ansari 2007: 14)

The Rafsanjani government was not truly interested in making necessary structural reforms to provide “accountability” and “transparency.” Rafsanjani’s vision of “reconstruction” has rested on “pragmatic-­ conservative” mentality attempting to eclectically combine secular and theocratic rules of the game. Instead of taking the tough road of genuine reformist policies, Tehran slipped into the easy way and fell victim to the politics of nepotism and popular patronage. Iranian social psychology has been driven by feeling of “happiness” to be gained by material wealth. Iranians’ lust for money-making grew at all unforeseen costs. Illicit networks of political nepotism and economic corruption have permeated the core constituency of Iranian society and the key sectors of state establishment. Right-wing conservative politics of popular patronage reinforced the authoritarian rule in Iran (Ansari 2007: 13–19). To a great extent, politics of autocracy informed by Machiavellian rules have determined Khamenei-Rafsanjani relations and shaped their relatively long rule over Iranian affairs. “For Rafsanjani Iran’s support for radicalism

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seemed to be a means to an end, while for Khamenei it was an end unto itself.” Radical conservative Khamenei carefully cultivated coteries in defense and security establishments. This deliberate choice underlined Machiavellian making of the feeling rules, which seeks “to have people’s fears rather than their affections” (Sadjadpour 2017). Through affective rule of fear, Khamenei has kept the principal position on international affairs, including exchanges with the United States. With Khamenei’s tacit acceptance, Rafsanjani sought accommodation with Washington. He even “took the dangerously political decision of awarding a contract to a US oil company (Conoco) in 1995.” But, Washington remained “reluctant to engage” (Ansari 2007: 18; Sick 1999: 287). Coping with Diplomatic Tension: Cultural Customization of Pragmatic Caution and Practical Prudence The US policy of “dual containment” against Iraq and Iran has further constrained regional neighborhood relations in the Middle East. Under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of Aug. 1996, the United States began to impose economic restrictions “to prevent Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction or supporting terrorism.” Washington’s sanctions policy put extra strain on Iran (Sick 1999: 287). The angry and interventionist tone of American diplomacy marked the growing extent of third-party impact on social psychology of regional relations. In spite of the strategic supremacy and diplomatic “anger” exposed by its global ally, Turkey continued to play by customary rules of local solidarity. Informed by enduring neighborhood norms, Ankara chose to collaborate with Tehran and “voted against a UN resolution condemning Iran for its human rights violations” (Kösebalaban 2011: 136). This stance did also reflect Turkish historical anxiety emanating from the US regional penetration into Kurdish affairs. Both Ankara and Tehran feared from the emergence of independent Kurdish rule in northern Iraq. They were concerned about the spread of pan-Kurdist nationalism and spillover of local instability in neighboring cross-border areas. Territorial integrity of Iraq was vital for both Turkey and Iran. In spite, Turkish and Iranian governments sought to enhance their sphere of influence in northern Iraq. Both of them took various measures of overt intervention and covert interference to gain the upper hand over local affairs. Due to contradictory entanglements with Kurdish groups, rival alignments emerged. By and large, PKK and PUK got closer to Iran, while

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KDP and the Iraqi Turkmen Front (Irak Türkmen Cephesi—ITC) sided with Turkey. The local salience of non-state actors made it more difficult for neighboring states to re-assert their conventional playing rules into the new game. Rule of fear has managed to govern hearts in both Ankara and Tehran. The PKK posed a contagious threat, damaging the security in common neighborhood. Both Turkey and Iran feared from the spread of local instability and spillover of pan-Kurdist nationalism in cross-border areas. Therefore, bilateral security cooperation against the PKK was reinstated by the Turkish-Iranian agreement in Oct. 1993. Since then both sides have refrained from further instability across their borders. Still, the “nagging mistrust” and “lagging commitment” have prevented both sides from policy coordination in northern Iraq. The UN sanctions against Iraq have unleashed unbearable economic costs and local consequences for Ankara. Collaboration with Tehran would help to ease Turkey’s economic predicaments. In return, Iran saw “the importance of economic ties with Turkey.” However, there were divergences and contradictions in Rafsanjani’s economic patronage politics. The contradictory rulings of political establishment “have influenced where Iran has struck the balance between exerting pressure on, and extending goodwill towards Turkey” (Calabrese 1998: 82–83, 88–90). The Iranian government charged Turkish authorities with granting clandestine assistance and protection to MKO members and activities in Feb. 1996. Denying those allegations, Ankara has accused Tehran of reportedly providing covert support to “radical” Islamist opposition groups in order to destabilize Turkey through conducting anti-secular, sectarian and violent actions. Affective accusation practices have configured “deepening [of] mutual mistrust” and growing of “animosity” between the two neighbors (Calabrese 1998: 82, 85). The summer of 1997 brought important internal changes in both countries. Reformist and left-leaning Iranian leader Mohammed Khatami won the general elections on 23 May 1997. The Khatami presidency ushered a new era in domestic politics and international relations of Iran. Diplomatic dialogue and political détente began to shape Iranian foreign policy in regional and global affairs. Khatami “seemed to suggest that democracy at home and peace abroad were two sides of the same coin” (Ramazani 2004: 557). Khatami’s policies were “designed to resolve the domestic crisis of legitimacy and to improve the international image of the regime.” The reformist Iranian government advocated “expanding the number of allies,

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transforming neutrals into friends, rivals into neutrals, and enemies into rivals.” Driven by anxieties about international sanctions, Iranian soft-­ liners wanted to reduce psycho-political tension at home and abroad. They sought to “improve relations with the US,” and enhance engagement with “the EU and Iran’s neighbors (especially Saudi Arabia and Turkey), maintain good relations with Russia and China” (Kazemzadeh 2017: 204, 205). Khatami’s soft-line international engagement has been reciprocated with “constructive dialogue” by European countries. Immediate economic developments came to fore. “Less than sixty days after Khatami took office, the French oil major Total, together with state-owned partners Gazprom of Russia and Petronas of Malaysia, concluded a $2 billion deal to develop an Iranian gas field” (Sick 1999: 288). The European Union lifted the ban on exchange of high-level state visits with Iran. Italian and French leaders took the lead in visiting Tehran. In return, Khatami paid state visits to Rome (Mar. 1999) and Paris (Oct. 1999) respectively. After the long tenure of Ali Akbar Velayati (1982–1997), Kemal Kharrazi began to control the portfolio of Iranian foreign ministry. In the meantime, Tehran-London relations have progressed after reciprocal appointment of ambassadors in May 1999 and Kharrazi’s official visit to Britain in Jan. 2000 (Çetinsaya 2002: 320). On the other side, Turkey has entered into a new political phase after the resignation of Erbakan. Mesut Yılmaz, the liberal leader of ANAP, formed a center-left coalition government on 30 June 1997. The portfolio ̇ of TMFA was handed over to social-democrat politician Ismail Cem. To a great extent, Cem’s outstanding intellectual prominence and political performance in this post made him serve for the three governments formed in five years. Cem and Kharrazi have worked together and put joint personal effort to ease the tension in diplomatic relations. The left-­leaning worldviews and soft-line solidarity have strengthened politics of hope in Turkish-Iranian affairs. Realizing the prospects for building a better relational future, both sides appointed new ambassadors respectively. Demirel and Khatami held their first meeting in Dec. 1997, on the sidelines of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) summit held in Tehran. After this historical summit, Iran assumed the OIC Presidency for three years. The summit talks of Khamenei and Khatami have highlighted dual ruling of radical conservatism and pragmatic liberalism in Iranian foreign affairs. After President Khatami’s historical interview to the CNN on 7 Jan. 1998, where he extended olive branch to the American people (Demirtepe 1999:

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12–14, 15–18, 25–28), “Washington responded to the Khatami initiative cautiously but generally positively.” On 17 June 1998, the US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright stated that their administration was “ready to explore further ways to build mutual confidence and avoid misunderstandings.” At least for her, it was the right “time to test the possibilities,” look for a “road map” to restore political “trust” and build “normal” bilateral relations between two countries (Sick 1999: 288–289). On 17 Mar. 2000, Albright confessed to “the American role in the overthrow of the popular government of Mosaddeq and expressed regrets for the United States’ having sided with Iraq in its war against Iran” (Ramazani 2004: 557). Nonetheless, the Supreme Leader Khamenei and his more powerful radical-conservative coterie worked hard to block Tehran’s reconciliation with Washington (Rizvi 2012: 119, 120). Despite the opposition of pro-­ Israel (anti-Iran) lobbies, the American administration worked to ease some of the economic pressure applied on the Iranian people. The two steps, which came respectively in Apr. 1999 and Mar. 2000, were symbolic as they only re-opened US access to humanitarian exports (read food and medicines) to Iran and agrarian-handmade imports (read caviar, pistachios and carpets) from Iran. Dissatisfied by the US ambivalence, the Iranian government turned to Russia and China so as to improve military and industrial collaboration (Çetinsaya 2002: 321). As identified and exemplified earlier, relations with other regional countries, such as Israel, have also created impact on local dynamics of rule-making in Turkey-Iran neighborhood. Late in this episode, Syria also entered the local fray. The Baath regime has been harboring Kurdish separatist terrorism and hosting PKK’s head Abdullah Öcalan in Syria. For a long time, Ankara has encountered enormous disappointment and endured open violation of neighborhood norms. However, Turkey’s public-­political patience had certain affective-normative limits. By Sept. 1998, Turkey’s negative emotional mood turned into official anger. Top political-military officials and the NSC fiercely demanded Öcalan’s expulsion from Syria. Indeed, it was Turkey’s diplomacy of anger and crisis escalation strategy that really paid off. Before signing the “Adana Accord” on 20 Oct. 1998, the Syrian regime did deport Öcalan from the country. Iranian President Khatami, capping the OIC title as well, and Foreign Minister Kharrazi provided diplomatic services to resolve the crisis through regional mediation among neighbors (Çetinsaya 2002: 327). Iranian efforts could be read as a sign of Muslim solidarity shaping Tehran’s

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affective-­normative commitments in regional relations. The role of Iranian intermediation during Öcalan’s extradition from Syria might also be seen as an exercise of “face-saving” (aberru), a common feeling rule in Persian public-political culture. In his historical call for dialogue between Eastern and Western civilizations, Khatami portrayed Iran as neighboring Asia and Europe, a cultural ground of intersection enabling connections between eastern hearts and western minds. As Khatami saw, Iranian hearts were beating by feelings of “love and tolerance” and advocating “justice and peace” in world politics (Hatemi 1999). Khatami’s capturing and promoting of the inter-civilizational dialogue project through the OIC have reflected a policy change in Iranian international diplomacy. In Nov. 1998, Khatami’s proposal was accepted by the UN General Assembly and “2001” was designated as “the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations” (Kayaoglu 2012: 130–139). Despite such a highly claimed diplomatic achievement, Khatami’s global footprint has remained weak due to predominant logic of hegemony and “geopolitical clashes” enduring in international politics. President Khatami has also been constrained by domestic factors such as weak constitutional powers and strong political factionalism ruling in Iranian parliament. His regional clout has also been limited by sectarian-nationalist rivalries among majority-Muslim states. In hindsight, Khatami’s soft-line diplomacy could be read as part of a “defensive strategy” employed by the Islamic republic. Based on the principle of sovereign equality, Tehran’s civilizational dialogue initiative was indeed a political demand for inclusive communication, participatory rule-­ making and collective governance among all nations. Khatami espoused liberal and reformist ideals as “part of a state political discourse.” The nationalist-statist ideological markers of “Khatamism” indicated a ­deliberate attempt to “resist” hegemonic codes of contemporary world order. The counter-hegemonic move aimed to co-constitute external “respect” and internal “dignity.” By doing so, Tehran wanted to re-build political “trust” for the post-revolutionary regime. The Iranian-Islamist policy of strategic resistance has been constructed against all forms of neo-­ imperialism and post-colonial domination. In terms of political theology, “Islam” was not simply politicized but also “Iranianized” and became “Iranian political Islam.” In cultural terms, the post-revolutionary regime has sought a paradoxical reconciliation between “Iraniyat (Iran’s pre-­ Islamic culture) and Islamiyat (Iran’s Islamic culture)” (Holliday 2010). These perennial paradoxes have deepened psycho-social/cultural tensions within Iranian state/national identity. The affective-normative crisis

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of “insecurity” lurking between “Iranianness and Islamicness” was managed by a qualitative return to politics of “Persianization.” The “Persian-­ dominated state in an ethnically diverse society confronted with hostile and fearful neighbors and a permanently belligerent relationship with a superpower” (Saleh and Worrall 2015: 74). Complex remaking of Islamism and nationalism has reconfigured the Iranian “security problematique” allencompassing internal and external domains of politics. The “sectarian Shii Islamist” and “secular Farsi nationalist” practices of securitization have reenforced “anti-other sentiments” in post-revolutionary Iran. Even though Shii-Farsi “hard-line” practices of political otherization are mostly directed toward the imperialist global enemy (read the United States), Iranian historical/geographical rivals (certainly Arabs, and categorically Turks) have also been otherized through rules of “fear” and “suspicion” (Saleh and Worrall 2015: 74, 79–91). The psycho-social making of regional rivalry by Tehran has influenced the political dynamics of neighborhood in the Middle East. After the capturing of Öcalan in Feb. 1999, PKK militants and supporters found refuge in Iran, raising doubts about Tehran’s emotional-­moral commitment toward neighborly relations with Ankara. Ultimately, common security needs prevailed and redefined joint rules of military engagement against the PKK. Furthermore, in Jan. 2000 both sides agreed to regularly exchange diplomatic views on issues of common concern like the completion of pipeline and the flow of Iranian natural gas to eastern Turkish cities as early as 2001. To summarize, the Turkey-Iran relationship has experienced periodic “waning and waxing” during the 1990–2000 episode. Even though both neighbors refrained from “worsening” in their long-term interactions, they failed to make prominent progress in their historical relationship (Çetinsaya 2002: 323–324). Turkey and Iran managed to cope with “acute tension” in the post–Cold War period. Despite domestic differences and internal rule changes, Ankara and Tehran by and large remained committed to the customary rule of neighborhood. Reciprocal affective-­ normative practices helped to maintain and revise dyadic rules of interaction in the face of global pressure and regional volatility. After the Gulf War, the lingering of local instability over northern Iraq has been a cause of serious concern for both contiguous countries. Adding to this apprehension was the mutually shared anxiety about cross-border pan-Kurdist aspirations and PKK terrorism. Due to common security needs in northern Iraq, Turkish and Iranian governments often moved with pragmatic

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caution and practical prudence to refrain from direct military conflict. In spite of regional tension and local uncertainty, both capitals could not “sacrifice” their mutual gains on the economic front. This bilateral strategy might be regarded as a deliberate attempt to use “economics” for “separate” political purposes (Calabrese 1998: 84). The economic trajectory of Turkish-Iranian neighborly engagement in this historical episode also hints at habituation of heteronomous rule in local and regional affairs. In spite of regional tension and local uncertainty, both sides demonstrated political will to play the dyadic exchange game through non-zero-sum rules. Mutual economic needs and expectations helped to institutionalize affective-normative practices and structures. On the economic front, this historical episode was marked by collaborative partnership. Dyadic desire for trading and bilateral hope for development have redefined emotional norms of exchange. The economic interactions of this period may also be viewed as precursors of “compartmentalization” (Kirdemir 2014; Stein 2014; Sinkaya 2016) found in later chapters of Turkish-Iranian affairs. That is to say, historical findings on the 1980–2000 episode provide sufficient evidence that underlines heteronomous rule-making in Ankara-Tehran neighborly relations. ­ Complex emotional-­ affective entanglements have recreated contextual patterns of regional rivalry and dyadic partnership that would re-shape the historical psychology of Turkey-Iran neighborhood over the coming decades.

Conclusion: Episodic Summary The emotional-affective constellation of reformative psychology has been traced in this historical chapter on Turkey-Iran relations. The psycho-­ social configurations indicate two critical episodes. In Table 4.1, I summarize episodic findings. After the dramatic rule changes in Tehran and Ankara, the social psychology of Iranian-Turkish interactions has swung Table 4.1  Reformative sentiments in Turkey-Iran interactions Key episodes

Prevalent emotional entanglements

Dominant affective arrangements

Relational contours

1984–1988

Hate-­ Reciprocal hope restraint Anxiety-­ Shared goals dignity

Constructive collaboration Interactive exchange

Reluctant engagement Limited rivalry

1996–1999

Constrained confrontation Managed crises

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between latent hate and nascent hope. Despite the haunting of sectarian hatred, and retrieval of abhorring memories from the distant imperial past (remember the 1514 myth regarding the battle of Çaldıran), hope for the near future has moved the Turkey-Iran relationship in more powerful ways. Encouraging emotional entanglements have generated a constructive desire for collaboration. Since both sides displayed reciprocal restraint, rivaling secular and theocratic regimes were able to control regional confrontation. By and large, the 1984–1988 period witnessed a reluctant return to politics of engagement in Turkish-Iranian neighborhood diplomacy. Even though Ankara and Tehran no longer held formal alignment relationship, they have coped with their regional rivalry in quite unprecedented patterns. Contrary to conventional expectations, the two neighbors learned how to refrain from harmful transactions and painful conflicts. Collective esteem and relational dignity have helped to reconfigure common positive emotional entanglements. Both sides have managed negative sensations emanating from dyadic anger and anxiety. To some extent, shared regional goals toward Iraq and Syria have also strengthened neighborly ground of interactive exchange. The affective-normative power of Ankara-Tehran neighborhood has been tested through consecutive crises unfolded in the 1996–1999 period. Those trans-governmental management practices and psycho-social encounters particularly exposed lingering of limited rivalry in Turkish-Iranian affairs.

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CHAPTER 5

Psycho-Social Revisions in Turkey-Iran Neighborhood (2001–2018)

The recent psycho-social revisions in Turkey-Iran relations are examined in Chap. 5. This last empirical case study illustrates the historical waning and waxing in politics of neighborhood between two countries. The twists and turns in Turkey-Iran relational history are presented in two parts. During the 2001–2010 period, both collaborative and confrontational sentiments have governed Turkish-Iranian regional interactions. With a mirroring rise of neo-conservative governments into power, Ankara and Tehran have turned neighbors in need and deed. The new psychology of neighborhood has revealed the relative power of global norms and local rules in Turkey-Iran political affairs. Since Ankara and Tehran have moderated the nuclear crisis through affective diplomacy, the relational soft strength of neighborhood norms has scaled more vigorously. The Turkish-Iranian diplomatic feeling rules have changed quite dramatically after the Arab uprisings. The two neighbors returned to status struggle and competed for rivaling spheres of influence in the 2011–2018 period. The resumption of positional rivalry did weaken emotional norms governing the Ankara-Tehran relationship. The regional confrontation has remained limited due to reciprocal relational concerns. Both sides felt mutual anxiety over cross-border instability and hence refrained from further risking local security. Besides, after the collapsed coup in Turkey and the attained nuclear deal in Iran, the two neighboring governments have developed stronger affective-normative commitment toward dyadic collaboration. © The Author(s) 2020 M. A. Kumral, Exploring Emotions in Turkey-Iran Relations, Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39029-7_5

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The psycho-social research for this historical chapter follows the introductory framework. I take a narrative approach to present textual evidence together with phenomenal observations. I minimally make argumentative interventions. Navigating through event-based empirical evidence would be easier for the reader. The chapter’s conclusion provides an episodic synopsis. Here, I summarize recent emotional-affective configurations in the Ankara-Tehran neighborhood. Collaborative and confrontational patterns of partnership and rivalry are recapped based on revisionary contours in the Turkey-Iran relationship. Indeed, the historical psychology of Turkey-Iran social relations has begun to change by the dawn of the new century. At this point, it should be remembered that the center-left/nationalist coalition government, led by Bülent Ecevit, has been ruling Turkey since the general elections of Apr. 1999. The Ecevit government and the Turkish economy have been heavily hit by the detrimental tectonic earthquake in Aug. 1999 and the devastating financial crisis in Nov. 2001. For apparent economic reasons, Turkey has been willing and eager to improve economic relations with Iran. Ankara put in a significant commitment to boost trade interactions with Tehran. In May 2000, the Turkish Undersecretary of Foreign Trade Kürşad Tüzmen visited Tehran to discuss joint economic issues with his Iranian counterparts. On the basis of Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), the formation of “a common market” was taken into the agenda. After the terrorist attacks on 11 Sept. 2001, the US government called for taking interventionist measures against the regimes identified as “evil.” Washington’s declaration of open hostility toward Tehran has created an affective-normative impact on social psychology of the Turkish-Iranian neighborhood. At least for some time, economic interactions were postponed. The establishment of the Turkish-Iranian Business Council on 6 Nov. 2001, the initial flow of Iranian natural gas to Turkey on 11 Dec. 2001, and the outspokenly secular Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s Tehran visit in June 2002 have constituted key turning points in bilateral interactions (Aydin and Aras 2005: 26–27, 32). Mutual economic needs have also helped to overcome the Iranian fear from regional rapprochement between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Political questions arising from Baku and/or Tebriz have no longer constituted a source of anxiety for Ankara-Tehran economic exchange relations. The trilateral economic cooperation efforts in the South Caucasus have gradually grown over the coming years (Kelkitli 2017: 77–79). In contrast, the

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Middle East relations have developed in more complicated ways for both Turkey and Iran. The social and psychological strength of the Turkish-­ Iranian neighborhood has been tested by contiguous developments in Iraq, and later in Syria. The Turkey-Iran relationship has been rearranged in a complex affective-normative atmosphere of shared needs and reciprocal deeds.

Neighbors in Need and Deed (2001–2010) The “Project for New American Century” has been the forerunner of the “neoconservative revolution” (Hudson 2005: 298, 301) that transformed rule-making in Washington. This affective-normative transformation has led to certain global rule changes, which brought implications for regional rules of engagement in the Middle East. After the terrorist attacks on 11 Sept. 2001, the right-wing US government adopted a “preemptive strategy” to eliminate emergent threats against its security. This new politicalmilitary doctrine called for taking interventionist measures against the regimes identified as “evil.” All of Turkey’s immediate Middle Eastern neighbors (Iraq, Iran and Syria) have been put at the top of the target list declared by the American administration. Washington’s declaration of open hostility toward Tehran has rung the alarm bells in Ankara. The antagonistic otherization of Iran by the United States did provoke a negative psycho-social impact on the Turkish government. Moreover, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 has created serious implications for regional relations between Turkey and Iran. The international impact was comparable to the conditions that ensued during and between the two world wars. The Turkey-Iran relationship has been structurally influenced by hegemonic attempts (external penetrations and non-regional intrusions) to destabilize the Middle Eastern neighborhood. That is to say, historical interactions among international powers (predominantly the United States, USSR/Russia, Britain, Germany and France) have shaped social psychology of confrontational rivalry and collaborative partnership in the Ankara-Tehran relationship. The first decade of the new millennium brought little difference indeed. Like they did in earlier episodes, both neighbors have adapted themselves to the changing regional circumstances and managed to save their dyadic relationship. The history of the Turkey-­ Iran relationship during the 2001–2010 episode reveals the resilient rule of neighborhood for mainly three reasons: (1) Turkey and Iran have managed to address their shared security concerns at times of urgent need, (2) Ankara

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and Tehran have governed their mutual economic interests over the long run, (3) Through trans-governmental interactions, both neighbors have developed a cultural habitus within which each side could not risk losing the other completely, and hence their relationship (Çetinsaya 2007). A number of contextual factors have contributed to relational learning and affective acculturation of neighborhood norms between the Turkish and Iranian governments. Foremost, both neighbors’ security perceptions converged regarding how to deal with local terrorist threats posed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partia Karkaren Kurdistan—PKK) and the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO). This was quite salient since the PKK’s head Abdullah Öcalan has been detained in Feb. 1999. After letting mass Kurdish (pro-PKK) demonstrations in the Feb.–Aug. 1999 period, Iranian officials sought political reconciliation with their Turkish counterparts to conduct “ad hoc” bilateral surveillance and joint “synchronized operations” against the PKK strongholds in cross-border areas. When the counterterror operations were fulfilled against the Hezbollah and other anti-secular insurgents, between Jan. and May 2000, Turkish public opinion repeatedly pointed out the “Iranian finger,” like they did in Oct. 1999, after the assassination of secularist public intellectual Ahmet Taner Kışlalı. Despite these domestic setbacks, Turkish and Iranian Foreign Ministers ̇ Ismail Cem and Kemal Kharrazi have mutually maintained a “constructive” and “conciliatory” relationship between the two political neighbors. In Jan. 2000, the two foreign ministries signed a “Memorandum of Understanding” to form an inter-state mechanism for high-level bureaucratic consultation and diplomatic coordination (Çetinsaya 2002: 328–329; Çetinsaya 2007: 168–169). Coming at a time of dyadic uncertainty, this political step for joint rule-making has played an important role in rebuilding of trust in Turkey-Iran neighborly interactions. Nonetheless, both sides have not completely got rid of dyadic distrust debilitating their regional relations. While Tehran has suspected Ankara’s covert supporting of the Iranian opposition (read MKO), and perhaps using of the Azeri card, Turkey feared Iranian clandestine cross-border collaboration with the Kurdish militants (read PKK), sectarian/anti-­ secular encroachments, and radical, revolutionary engagements toward the Shii-oriented (read Jafari and/or Alevi) population. Yet, these reciprocal anxieties were overwhelmed by shared concerns about each other’s domestic stability. In Turkey’s case, Ankara has always been worried about the destabilization of Iran as it may lead to catastrophic consequences such as intervention-invasion by foreign powers (read Russia) and inception of

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a Kurdish state in the region. Since Turkish historical worries could not abate, Ankara has continued to refrain from interfering in Tehran’s internal affairs including the Azeri question (Çetinsaya 2007). This historical understanding has been reconfigured by right-wing, neo-conservative and populist practices of rule-making in the Turkey-Iran political neighborhood. Neo-conservative and Populist Psychology of Neighborhood: From Erdog ̆an to Ahmadinejad Over the 2001–2010 period, Turkey and Iran have muddled through countervailing processes of democratic moderation and political polarization. Quite similarly, “Muslim reformers” have ushered the era of post-­ Islamist politics in both countries. However, both Turkish and Iranian liberals lost their reformist spirit during the second half of this decade. Building a truly liberal, democratic political system has remained an equally unfulfilled dream for the two neighboring societies (Tezcür 2010). Since liberal reformisms have turned into similar incomplete stories, both Turkey and Iran have experienced new waves of conservatism and populism. On the part of Turkey, the political picture has dramatically changed after the Nov. 2002 general elections. Winning the majority of popular votes, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi— AK PARTi/AKP) came to power. The AKP has been a heteronomous political formation aiming to represent the new center-right by blending Islamist, nationalist, conservative and neo-liberal tendencies in Turkish politics (Yavuz 2009). Initially, the AKP attempted to reconcile perennial dichotomies of state-society relations through influential management of public diplomacy inside and outside (Boyraz 2018; Magued 2012). In addition to a public relations strategy, the AKP government has exploited the emergent fissures within the “deep state” structures and practices. The subtle employment of divide and rule tactics has worked to tip the bureaucratic balance of power to AKP’s advantage. After defending its position against the “e-memorandum” in Apr. 2007, and the closure case in Mar. 2008, the AKP began to pursue an offensive strategy in the internal realm. The indictments directed against high-level bureaucrats have considerably undermined the hegemonic power of the left-leaning oppositional coalition of Eurasianist Kemalists and Eurosceptic nationalists. The lingering of the “Ergenekon conundrum” (Ünver 2009) and the paranoid politics of man hunting have aided authoritarian-conservative consolidation inside the country (Kaya 2012). This psycho-social climate gradually facilitated

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the AKP’s domination in domestic politics and civil-­military relations. However, AKP leaders have begun to face serious challenges as they realized clandestine “parallel structures” ruling inside the “deep state,” which led to the emergence of a bureaucratic (judiciary-­intelligence) crisis in Feb. 2012. AKP’s right-wing ruling strategy was further tested by the Gezi Park popular protests in May–June 2013. The “dual (formal and informal) domination” (Söyler 2015: 1–3, 6) over political-military bureaucracy has allowed the AKP to alter affective structures and emotional practices inside the country. Concomitant to post-­Islamist and neoconservative politics of rule-making, Turkey’s domestic cultural psychology has been transformed profoundly. During the AKP era, Turkey’s “geopolitical culture” has been refashioned as well. The defensive-protectionist geopolitical norms advocated mostly by the Kemalist political-military elites have been displaced through the assertive-revisionist rules of engagement in the Middle Eastern neighborhood. Ultimately, the AKP’s new regional vision has aimed to relocate Turkey at the “center” of Islamic “civilization” (Yeşiltaş 2013). Indeed, key cadres of the AKP have descended from the banned political parties of Necmettin Erbakan, the founder of the pro-Islamist Millî Görüş (National View) movement. The AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then the acting I ̇ stanbul mayor, was also banned from politics due to the “prison term of four months” sentenced in 1998. It was ironic that Erdoğan’s verdict resulted from his reciting of controversial lines (“mosques are our barracks, domes our helmets, minarets our bayonets, believers our soldiers”) from the poem titled “Prayer of the Soldier” (Asker Duası) written in 1912 by Ziya Gökalp, prominent intellectual founder of the Turkish nationalism. Erdoğan’s indictment, together with the charge of “inciting hatred” during the 1997 Siirt speech, was found “unjust” by many people, which “further boosted his already strong charismatic appeal among the … Turkish population.” More ironically, Erdoğan was able to enter into the Turkish parliament after winning the repeat elections in Siirt held on 14 Mar. 2003 (Kösebalaban 2011: 141, 208). By that time, Turkey’s “state-society network” did really need the rule of peace and order, free from the reign of fear, terror and chaos. What was happening inside the next door political houses in the Middle Eastern neighborhood was “extending into” the Turkish political house. The Turks were essentially striving to restore “pride” and reconstruct “trust” at home and abroad. The Turkish feeling rules have been swinging between degen-

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erative “despair” and productive “hope.” Rebuilding a social psychology of stronger and safer neighborhood was deemed quite important for the new Erdoğan government (Mango 2004: 243–254). As a brilliant demagogue, Erdoğan skillfully managed a majority of the Turkish hearts. He surfed on the vibrant tides of psychological “victimhood” and social “solidarity” and adopted an amalgamated politics of traditional nationalism, post-Islamism and neo-conservatism (Yavuz 2009: 1–13, 33–41, 73–74, 81–93, 118–119). His right-wing codes of populism were quite similar to the patterns witnessed in other political places. The merging of mass populism with majoritarian neo-liberalism formed AKP’s ruling logic under the initial rubric of “conservative democracy” (Aytaç and Öniş 2014). Under AKP’s “plebiscitary” rule, the domestic atmosphere of Turkish politics has molded into a complex psycho-social climate shaped by mixed practices of “reform and repression” (Erensü and Alemdaroğlu 2018). To a certain degree, Erdoğan’s populism leaned toward contradictory political ends in domestic and foreign realms. Yet, “populism at home and abroad” was the key in Erdoğan’s governing formula over the long run (Özpek and Yaşar 2018; see also Yalvaç and Joseph 2019). On the whole, the AKP government has pursued a seemingly incompatible combination of neoliberalglobalist economic approaches and post-Islamist/nationalist cultural agendas. AKP’s two-tiered ruling strategy fit well into the practical-economic structuration of regional rule-­making and pragmatic-cultural habituation of local rules in Turkey’s social-psychological engagement with the Middle Eastern neighborhood. Reigning the country through the political rule of heteronomy, the AKP government has desired to play a “non-zero-sum” game in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood. For this end, Ankara should have none or “zero problems” with all of its neighbors. This was the gist of the geostrategic vision put forward by Ahmet Davutoğlu, the chief architect of AKP’s foreign policy. In essence, professor Davutoğlu’s “strategic depth doctrine” has been developed as a composite geopolitical initiative calling for geo-­ economic reformulation and geo-cultural recodification in Turkey’s foreign policymaking. Davutoğlu’s and later the AKP’s strategic outlook reflected a social psychology aiming to recover years of loss through changing the affective-normative context toward win-win circumstances in interlinked realms of domestic and foreign policy. In this new era, economic and cultural remaking of regional neighborhood norms in Ankara would entail reshaping of dyadic rules of engagement with Tehran.

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Regional stability clearly has become of paramount importance to Turkish foreign policy and the country has sought to reduce conflict intensity across the board. Turkey’s self-ascribed role in the region could be summarized as ‘zero problems, but a hundred percent influence.’ Avoiding and resolving conflicts in the immediate neighborhood has thus to be seen under the premise of maximizing Turkey’s influence in the region. Turkey’s ‘zero problems’ approach towards its neighbors has naturally had profound implications for its relations with Iran. (Breitegger 2009: 110)

Nevertheless, the interventionist US policies “put tremendous pressure on the Turkish government.” Ankara has been wedged between the main global “ally” and “immediate regional neighbors” (Aydin and Aras 2005: 35). Finding a delicate balance would be uneasy and precarious. In fact, the Saddam regime has not always been a good neighbor for Turkey. But after the Gulf War the Turkish government has already endured the enormous costs of international sanctions against the Ba’th regime in Baghdad. For this reason, Ankara has displayed certain reaction against extra-regional military interventions. Notwithstanding US pressure prior to 1 Mar. 2003, the Turkish parliament did not permit the deployment of American forces which would intervene into Iraq from the north. By doing so, Turkey did not open a war front against its neighbor and refrained from direct involvement in the US-led invasion. In order to protect the regional status quo and prevent the impending war, on 23 Jan. 2003, the Turkish government hosted the first meeting ̇ The leading role in this regional of “Iraq’s Neighbors Group” in Istanbul. initiative revealed the significance of neighborhood norms in Turkey’s foreign policymaking and the implications of local rules in Ankara’s crisis management strategy (Balci and Yesiltas 2006). Before the fall of Baghdad on 9 Apr. 2003, Ankara warned Washington that consecutive military measures against Tehran and Damascus would reinforce the international image of Americans’ “clash of civilizations” in the Middle East (Aydin and Aras 2005: 36). After the US invasion in Iraq, Turkish-­American relations have further aggravated. Turkey could not sacrifice its neighborly engagement with Iran, which might have been hijacked by unilateral US sanctions. On 26 Apr. 2003, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül emphasized the importance of improving neighborly relations with Iran (and Syria) to achieve regional peace and local stability (Aydin and Aras 2005: 26, 36, 40).

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So long as the US military occupation prolonged and conditions of uncertainty prevailed particularly in northern Iraq, Ankara sought collaboration with neighbors of Iraq. Most prominently, Tehran (and Damascus) seemed to be a regional partner(s) for local stability. Under the rule of US occupation, circumstances of insecurity in northern Iraq might spill over to cross-border areas. The PKK threat ought to be contained through local rule-making among contiguous neighbors. For this purpose, Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Iran in July 2004. Erdoğan’s visit came at a historical point where the right-wing politics of conservative populism has been steadily rising in Iran. Put bluntly, the deep-seated radical ruling elite was really in charge of governing Iranian affairs (Alamdari 2005). During this visit, both sides agreed to conduct joint military operations against the PKK and the Iranian wing of the PKK, dubbed as “Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan” (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistane—PJAK). To a certain extent, Washington’s burgeoning support for the local Kurdish militia groups drew Ankara closer to Tehran (Baş 2013: 118; McCurdy 2008: 96). Under those global and local circumstances, Turkey’s former secretary of the National Security Council (NSC), Retired General Tuncer Kılınç, called for enhanced regional “solidarity” among Eurasian countries including Turkey, Iran, Russia and China. The historical call came on 3 Sept. ̇ 2004 during the Istanbul University international symposium entitled “Turkish-Russian-Chinese and Iranian Relationships on the Eurasian Axis.” The new “Eurasian alignment,” promoted by the symposium, would prevent external powers from dominating over the common neighborhood. Otherwise, Kılınç warned, Washington’s next military target might most likely be Tehran. If not thwarted by Eurasian neighbors, American military ambitions against Iran could bring “disastrous” international consequences for world politics, Kılınç added. Among the keynote speakers of the symposium, the Iranian Ambassador Firouz Devletadabi supported the Eurasianist call and proposed high-level military visits and security cooperation among four Eurasian countries (Perinçek 2016: 98–99, 193–197). Coming from staunchly secular, Kemalist, nationalist and socialist circles, the “Eurasianist” call for enhanced regional partnership between Ankara and Tehran was quite unprecedented indeed. As a matter of fact, “Kemalist Eurasianism” has indicated the fledgling of an “anti-imperialist” and “counter-hegemonic” geopolitical vision as an alternative to the dominant pro-Western/neo-­ liberal Islamic foreign policy orientation reigning in Turkey. The left-wing

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(socialist and Kemalist) elites in Turkey saw Iran as a collaborative partner in implementing the regional “resistance strategy against the perceived Western global hegemony” (Akçali and Perinçek 2009: 560–562). The emergent security perceptions of the Turkish nationalist-left have been mostly shared by the defense policymakers in Ankara. The Eurasian outlook has informed the Turkish military minds and transformed the shaping of geopolitics in Ankara (Yeşiltaş 2015a: 87–89; Erşen 2015: 235–237). Indeed, the secular-socialist recoding of Turkish-Iranian regional collaboration has dealt a serious blow to sectarian-conservative rules of confrontation in Ankara-Tehran dyadic interactions. In essence, Ankara’s opting for an alternative pro-Eastern defensive vision and regional neighborhood solidarity could well resonate with the anti-Western resistance rhetoric of the state establishment in Tehran. Nonetheless, Turkish and Iranian governments have developed divergent strategies toward post-war remaking of Iraqi politics. Since Iraq has long constituted a contiguous space of mutual geopolitical influence, post-war political rule-making in this common neighboring country posed contagious challenges for Tehran-Ankara relations. The fall of Saddam Hussein from power has sealed the end of the Ba’th regime in Iraq. Socialist Arab nationalism and sectarian Sunni rule has dissolved. The total de-Ba’thification in Iraqi state institutions inadvertently played into the hands of Shii Arabs and Kurds. Remnants of the ancient regime, former officers and Sunni Arab nationalists revolted against the invasion. Incidentally, radical-militant Wahhabi factions, and Salafi terrorist formations such as Al Qaeda, have penetrated into Sunni resurgence in Iraq. In the midst of US occupation, spiraling of terrorist provocations, ensuing of ethnic-sectarian violence and lingering of civil war conditions created severe consequences for the Iraqi people and their neighbors. In parallel to the Shii ascendance to power in Iraq, ethnic-sectarian cleavages began to dominate political rules of the game. Tehran’s political clout over Baghdad has deepened. Iranian military influence on Iraqi Shii militia forces has grown incrementally. The hegemonic extent of Shii rule became much more visible during and after the withdrawal of US combat forces from Iraq. It was in this critical period of 2009–2011 that the rivalry between Ankara and Tehran cusped over the ethno-sectarian divisions in Baghdad. The episodic context of this struggle has left an affective-­ normative impact on confrontational making of regional rules in Turkish-­ Iranian neighborhood relations.

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In addition to these regional predicaments, the global dynamics of conflict in US-Iran relations has driven the Turkish government toward an “impossible position” (Aydin and Aras 2005: 36). Turkey’s foreign policy dilemma deepened as Ankara straddled to reconcile alliance rules with neighborhood norms. In practice, Turkey’s affective-normative commitments tilted toward regional structuration of rule-making in the Middle East. The gradual growth of economic cooperation and trade interactions would help to bring prosperity and establish stability in the region. Economic interactions between Turkey and Iran were based on mutual substantive needs. Due to the solid ground of bilateral interdependence, the structural practices in Turkey-Iran neighborhood have steadily evolved toward collaborative partnership. The evolution of local rule-making in the Ankara-Tehran neighborhood has displayed a steady course. This historical path could not be distorted or reversed by global impediments put forth by Washington. Affective Moderation of the Nuclear Crisis: Rethinking Global Norms and Local Rules The “nuclear file” tendered against Tehran has been a key international challenge for the development of Turkish-Iranian relations. The story unfolded on 14 Aug. 2002, when MKO affiliates leaked information about secret nuclear facilities run by the Iranian regime. From the very beginning, Turkish diplomacy acted cautiously and prudently. By and large, Turkey has followed global norms on nuclear energy acquisition and international non-proliferation. Ankara aimed to resolve the emergent crisis through complex rules of global and local engagement. Clearly, Turkey has defended the legitimate rule of acknowledging the sovereign right of access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Iran, like any other country, could not be exempted from this global rule. In conjunction with this normative position, the Turkish government stood firmly against banned nuclear armament structures and practices. Illegal nuclear weapons in Turkey’s neighborhood would destabilize the region. The acquisition of nuclear weapons capability by the Iranian regime would be a threatening development for regional peace and security. For this reason, Ankara worked to persuade Tehran to act in line with global rules of nuclear engagement. Through innovative diplomatic commitments, the Turkish government managed to play the role of intermediary between the Iranian regime and the UN establishments. The diplomatic

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processes of political exchange and the dyadic context emerging out of these affective-normative interactions helped to build much needed social-­ psychological confidence in Turkish-Iranian neighborhood relations. Coming at an unfortunate time, Turkey’s diplomatic mediation has not progressed smoothly. As a matter of fact, the Khatami era (1997–2005) has produced much more conducive communicative conditions for international engagement. In Oct. 2003, Iranian President Mohammed Khatami and Hassan Rouhani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and the acting chief nuclear negotiator, have conceded to temporarily suspend the uranium enrichment program. Subsequent negotiations with the EU-3 (troika of European Union composed of Germany-France-Britain) could not bear fruit since the Khatami government lost parliamentary support (McCurdy 2008: 100). Earlier, the US framing of Iran within the “axis of evil” dealt a detrimental blow to Khatami’s visionary diplomacy of dialogue in international politics (Ansari 2007: 19–22, 47). Unfortunately, the opportunity of political reform and cultural dialogue has been wasted by the West. Before the presidential elections in June 2005, reformists lost their public standing incrementally. Iranian people have developed sentiments of “betrayal” toward Khatami and felt that “his ideas amounted to nothing in practice.” These negative psycho-social indicators marked the dramatic trend toward “reversal” in Iranian politics (Holliday 2010: 2). After fully assuming power in Aug. 2005, ultra-hawkish hard-liners have resumed practices of “aggressive and offensive foreign policy (siasat khareji tahajomi)” in Iranian diplomacy (Kazemzadeh 2017: 205, 210). The international community in general and the Turkish diplomacy in particular would likely prefer continuation of the liberal status quo in Iran and would find it much more convenient to work with political figures from the moderate-reformist bent. Still, interference into domestic affairs would be a violation of international norms of engagement. Ankara had to resuscitate rules of neighborhood given significant domestic rule changes in the Iranian game of politics. The center-right AKP government had no choice but to work with the right-wing Iranian government ruled by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013). Quite similar to Western patterns, a number of social-­ psychological factors have led to the political resurgence of “neo-­ conservatism” in Iranian society and the state establishment. Domestically, reformists were unable to deliver their political promises. As a result, great popular expectations waned and turned to grave public disappointments.

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Mass support for the Khatami government gradually evaporated. Like any movement of political change, reformist mobilization has faced growing resistance in Iran. The internal cleavages among the Iranian liberals and leftists have been easily exploited by informal networks within conservative factions (Ansari 2007: 19–22, 47). Traditional conservative elites in Iran realized that they need to restore the revolutionary spirit in order to pursue strategic confrontation in international affairs. The political soul searching in conservative rank and file brought a new “principlist (fundamentalist, osulgaran)” outlook. Ahmadinejad and the principlists have positioned themselves as a popular political response to two decades of historical failures under consecutive rulings of “conservative-capitalist corruption” and “liberal-reformist betrayal” (Ansari 2007: 23–36, 68–76). From 1989 to 1997 the individual focus was on [conservative] President Rafsanjani, the group focus was Islamic technocrats, and the theme was [economic] reconstruction. From 1997 to 2005 the individual focus was on reformist President Khatami, the group focus was the student movement, and the theme was democracy and civil society. From 2005 [to 2013], the individual focus has been on hardline President Ahmadinejad, the group focus has been on the Revolutionary Guards, and the theme a return to revolutionary radicalism. (Sadjadpour 2008: 2)

In all three periods, Khamenei has enjoyed enormous constitutional powers of the “velayat-e-faqih” (supreme leader). More often than not, he used theo-political influence to advance right-wing conservative (Islamist-­ nationalist) policies (Rizvi 2012). After Khomeini’s demise, Khamenei’s ideological-political orientation has usually tilted toward the hard-line defense of a revolutionary heritage. Yet, the “ideological cosmos” of Iranian “political society” has constituted three historical traditions. The leftwing/soft-line, the right-wing/hard-line and the centrist/mid-way factional tendencies have configured the psycho-social dynamics of politics in postrevolutionary Iran. The principlist (osulgaran) faction advocates aggressive Shiism and radical Pan-Islamic policies. The “reformist (eslahtalab)” faction promotes democracy, legitimacy and moderation in internal and external affairs. The “practicalist (amalgara)” faction refrains from an “adventurous offensive policy” of baast (exporting revolution and expanding influence) and upholds the Iranianist-republican concept of “omm-ol-­ghora (mother base)” to rationalize strategic policymaking. All three factions affectively

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shape the state-society complex in Iran. They equally arrange core affectivenormative constellations such as “ezzat” (power-­honor-­order), “hekmat” (foresight-hope-change) and “maslahat” (expediency-­ caution-continuity) and transform emotional contours of Iranian politics at home and abroad (Abedin 2011: 614, 615, 618). Over the last decades, Khamenei has staunchly defended core revolutionary norms of “justice, independence, self-sufficiency, and Islamic piety.” At a time of impending international and regional crises, what Khamenei politically needed was a radical vanguard, a convicted loyalist and a subservient disciple ruling at the presidential palace (Sadjadpour 2008: 3, 9–13). Khamenei himself vetted and endorsed Ahmadinejad as a “wild card” to race against the old guard of the conservative establishment. Portraying himself as “simple man of the people,” he revived popular “hope” among the masses. Ahmadinejad campaigned for bringing the oil money back onto people’s dinner tables. He was expected to “combat corruption” particularly in oil businesses. Assuming an “anti-­establishment” populist position, he recklessly attacked political-economic elites working in the energy sector. As Khamenei indicated, Ahmadinejad called for the reinstitution of revolutionary principles and a restorative return to autarchic-­authoritarian practices of the Khomeini era, which fundamentally implied the heteronomous rule of militant nationalism and radical Islamism (Ansari 2007: 36–39, 67–73, 93). Unlike his predecessors Rafsanjani and Khatami, President Ahmadinejad has been blessed by the rise in oil prices, particularly during his first term in office (2005–2009). Ahmadinejad might use the oil windfall for much needed economic resurrection in the country. Recalibration of the domestic economy would entail foreign investment, infrastructural rejuvenation, industrial relocation and sectoral diversification. Above and beyond those structural transformations, the new Iranian government could revitalize economic rule-making along norms of accountability, transparency and legitimacy. For obvious political reasons, Ahmadinejad and the principlist protégé did not take interest even in economic normalization and hence diverted the oil and gas revenues toward unmonitored gray areas and structures directly controlled by the Supreme Leader and his coterie in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The extensive involvement of the IRGC in the energy sector and nuclear program “rendered it even more powerful” (Ünver 2016: 138, 139). The implications of economic mismanagement deepened in 2006 and 2007 since Iranian businesses were increasingly exposed to financial sanctions. Within the economic

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atmosphere of depression, desperation began to reshape the social-­ psychological climate inside Iran (Ansari 2007: 79–82). However, extraordinary advantages of the honeymoon period provided the principlist faction with financial resources to consolidate power. The primary goal of hard-line conservatives was to achieve domestic hegemony. To this end, they deployed mixed measures of authoritarianism and populism. In order to reinforce hard-line policies at home, Ahmadinejad deliberately pursued strategic confrontation abroad. Heightening of international crises helped Ahmadinejad increase his populist appeal. An isolationist outlook, provocative posturing and hard-line revisionism took hold in Iranian external affairs (Ansari 2007: 75, 81, 82). The new international politics of Iran was portrayed as a battle for national dignity and “patriotic defiance.” The regime’s sense of insecurity was pervasive. Since the American “axis of evil” framing, the “paranoia” of regime change, presumably by overt US intervention or a covert “velvet revolution,” has haunted Iranian political-public imaginations. Under those psychological circumstances, the Iranian government’s highly publicized mission was to keep the country away from “being like Iraq” (Ansari 2007: 61, 77–78). From the end of 2003 onwards, Iranians in general were becoming more willing to tolerate the suppression of what limited political liberties they had had in order to avoid the worse development of appearing weak to the corrupt power next door, and/or succumbing to the kind of anarchy they saw in their neighbor. Thus, far from encouraging a democratic revolution in the Middle East, the example of Iraq had precisely the opposite effect. (Ansari 2007: 61)

As Iranian neo-conservatives saw, Iraq and the region seemed still far from the outreach of peace and stability. This local picture played into their hands. Hard-liners capitalized on this opportunity. The hard-line outlook in Iranian foreign policymaking paved the way for Persian-Shii “imperial overstretch” in the Middle East. The regional implications of this radical strategy were first felt in Iraq. Hard-liners sought extensive political-military influence in Iraq. First, they attempted to fill the emergent vacuum particularly in southern and northern Iraq. Second, they aimed to shape the ground for early US departure so as to dominate political-­ military affairs in the capital Baghdad and over central Iraq. During the Lebanon War (2006), Iran also backed the Hezbollah militia against the Israeli forces. When the war led to Israel’s defeat in Aug. 2006,

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Ahmadinejad assumed a “dominant role” and “ideological leadership” position in the Middle East. Ahmadinejad’s vision of “resurgent Iran” and his political bid for regional hegemony could not last long due to domestic political-economic predicaments (Ansari 2007: 58–62, 83–93). Ahmadinejad’s handling of the nuclear issue has also proved counterproductive. Mishandling of the nuclear issue would become self-­defeating in the coming years. The strategy of confrontation led to the endorsement of consecutive sanctions by the UN Security Council in June 2006 and Mar. 2007 (McCurdy 2008: 100). This was a serious blow to the “reckless and self-perpetuating policy of international confrontation apparently for its own sake; clearly damaging economic policies; and, … has crossed the threshold of acceptability” (Ansari 2007: 91–93). Ahmadinejad could be interpreted as a consequence of the continuing crisis in Iran’s mercantile capitalist system. He was a short-term solution to a long-term problem, but he might well prove more damaging to the very foundations of the Islamic Republic than his backers could ever have imagined … At this rate, some said, it would surely only be a matter of time before the president became the author of his own destruction. (Ansari 2007: 79, 96)

In sum, Iran under Ahmadinejad turned into an inward-looking country. By raising nationalist sentiments, the Iranian regime appealed to the conventional rule of fear and repression. The popular sense of Western siege has been provoked to create affective-normative alienation from the international community. Yet,  authoritarian structures and practices did not lead to political acquiescence. Quite the contrary, the social psychology of anger and resentment shaped feeling rules among Iranian masses. Authoritarian rule inadvertently nurtured the affective-normative ground for political opposition. However, the Iranian regime remained intransient about international commitments. The “nuclear dossier” has been handled for domestic consumption to direct public-political fervor against the Western sanctions led by the United States. At a time of urgent need, losing the support of the European troika (Germany-France-Britain), which could counterbalance US pressure, has been a fatal failure for Iran’s economic endeavors and constrained its room for maneuver in nuclear negotiations. Due to these self-defeating and counterproductive mistakes, Tehran’s relations with the EU have been put in an awkward path.

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At that time, Turkey-EU relations have been rapidly growing. By taking an intermediary political position between Brussels and Tehran, Ankara could achieve two complementary international ends: (1) broadening of international norms in the EU neighborhood and (2) strengthening of neighborhood rules in Turkey’s immediate periphery. Enhanced engagement in Ankara-Brussels relations has led to processes of economic reform and political democratization in Turkey. During these structural transformations, the role of the military has steadily declined. As a corollary, traditional rules of national security began to wane, whereas liberal norms of democratic peace and economic integration started to wax. The changes in domestic rule-making allowed Turkey to transform its neighborhood relations along the lines of “de-securitization” (Aras and Polat 2008). Post-Islamist/Post-revolutionary Engagements: Collaborative and Confrontational Sentiments After the parliamentary elections of 22 July 2007, the AKP government, led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, shored up its domestic legitimacy by winning almost half of the popular votes. The unprecedented margin of electoral victory helped to appease the domestic opposition, posing a challenge to AKP’s bid for the election of their presidential candidate in the parliament. Foreign Minister Gül’s rise to presidency on 28 Aug. 2007, has been a turning point for the consolidation of AKP rule in Turkey. Since this domestic change, the AKP government has become more assertive in the international domain and took a leading role in regional affairs. Both Gül and Erdoğan have aimed to build on their earlier diplomatic commitments toward neighboring Iran. Assuming a constructive role in US-Iran nuclear negotiations, Gül had visited Washington and Tehran sequentially in June–July 2006. Gül’s diplomatic facilitation has been driven by regional security needs. Unilateral political-military measures taken by the United States would exacerbate the local instability in the Middle East. For this reason, Ankara should “prevent the emergence of another Iraq-like quagmire in its neighborhood.” The fear of external instability could only be eased by building a “belt of peace” in Turkey’s immediate periphery. This regionalist vision was in line with Atatürk’s foundational motto “peace at home, peace abroad.” Reinterpreting ­contextual conditions of regional peace, Erdoğan also took a more positive and interactive stance toward Iran. During his visit to Tehran in Dec.

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2006, Erdoğan called for increasing the volume of exchange in Turkish-­ Iranian bilateral trade relations. The eagerness of the Iranian side for local collaboration on the energy sector has been acknowledged by Erdoğan as well (Aras and Polat 2008: 507–508, 511–513). The regional dynamics called for a new social logic based on the psychology of mutual trust among natural neighbors. The affective reproduction of confidence among Turkey’s neighbors would help to develop common normative commitments in all areas of mutual interactions. Turkey’s constructive diplomatic role in nuclear negotiations was a deliberate political move for regional de-securitization. In addition, it constituted a strategic and pragmatic (affective-normative) maneuver of Turkish public diplomacy, desiring to win people’s hearts and minds in Iran and the region. However, the dyadic lust for regional leadership did not abate in Ankara-Tehran relations. These social-psychological struggles were grounded in Iraq where both sides competed to strengthen their local sphere of influence. Consequently, complex affective-normative practices of collaboration and confrontation have reshaped the structuration of heteronomous rule-making in this crucial episode of Turkey-Iran neighborly interactions. In June 2007 and Nov. 2008, Turkey and Iran decided to boost their joint efforts on natural gas production and transportation. Despite US reactions, the agreements were reached under the auspices of the Nabucco project backed by international sponsors ruling in the European energy ̇ market (Breitegger 2009: 111–114; Elik 2011: 3; Inat 2009: 9, 12–16). When Turkey has conducted cross-border military operations against the PKK strongholds in northern Iraq in Dec. 2007 and Feb. 2008, Iran “took a sympathetic posture” and “remained conspicuously silent.” While visiting Baghdad in Mar. 2008, Iranian President Ahmadinejad acknowledged that Ankara’s security concerns have been well received in Tehran. He also called for close collaboration among the three contiguous neighbors. In Apr. 2008, the 12th meeting of the Turkey-Iran High Security Commission was held in Ankara. Both sides reiterated their joint politicalmilitary commitment to fight against the PKK-PJAK terrorism. In July 2008, Turkey has made a diplomatic overture to facilitate the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States. During Ahmadinejad’s ̇ Istanbul visit in Aug. 2008, Gül “encouraged a diplomatic solution to the problem” and warned “Iran from ­getting into an unwinnable war with the United States” (McCurdy 2008: 98–103).

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While talking about the historical stability of the dyadic relationship, Gül implied the primordial nature of Turkey-Iran neighborhood norms, dating as far back as the 1639 Kasr-ı Şirin agreement. The primeval interactions between Turkish and Iranian civilizations have constituted a strong affective-normative basis to develop bilateral relations between “two brotherly nations.” As Gül framed, the trans-governmental neighborhood relationship with Tehran has historically been an “invaluable” asset for Ankara. Gül’s neighborly gestures, particularly the diplomatic “defending of Iran’s legitimate rights,” were received cordially by the Iranian President. As Ahmadinejad expressed, the Ankara-Tehran relationship was one of “deep brotherhood.” He believed that the two neighboring nations have shared mutually supportive “feelings.” Hence, he felt “as if being at home, together with brothers.” In Ahmadinejad’s view, both neighboring governments held “almost alike” political visions on global and regional affairs (Habertürk 2008). Nonetheless, Ahmadinejad has remained defiant and turned a deaf ear to diplomatic assistance offered by the Turkish government in Nov. 2008, when Erdoğan proposed Turkish mediation to resolve the diplomatic deadlock in nuclear negotiations. Due to the dominance of hard-­ liners in Iranian politics, Turkey could provide only limited help to its neighbor to overcome the  international impasse (McCurdy 2008: 98–103). Against all odds, Ankara has approached Tehran’s “international isolation more sympathetically” since Turkish psyche was fed up with “feeling of rejection by Europe.” Turkey’s affective resentment toward Europe has emanated from the EU’s deceptively conditional strategy of putting the Turkish membership bid in an ambivalent and uncertain course. Under these geopolitical circumstances, Turkey needed “diversification” of its regional partners and hence could not risk losing neighborhood relations with Iran. Both countries celebrated the common “Culture Year” in 2009. The growing of the cultural dimension in public diplomacy interactions demonstrated an increasing salience of social pride and psychological affinity shared between two neighbors. Along the lines of “constructive impartiality,” Ankara took the traditional wait and see posture toward the Iranian presidential elections in June 2009 (Breitegger 2009: 115–121). The reformist contender, former prime minister, “Mir Hossein Mousavi was denied victory in the 2009 presidential elections; the IRGC made sure that Ahmadinejad won re-election.” The “Green Movement” representing the politicalpopular opposition of moderate-reformist groups has been ruthlessly

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suppressed by the hard-line-conservative security establishments. The authoritarian-conservative ruling bargain between Ahmadinejad and the IRGC has been reinforced over the coming years (Ünver 2016: 140). Regarding the domestic conflict in Iran, Turkey is mainly concerned about local instability caused by disruptive change in the status quo and political equilibrium. The then Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu demonstrated a diplomatic position of neutrality and abided by conventional norms of non-interference in the internal affairs of Iran. The socially “silent” and psychologically “cautious” approach of Davutoğlu “reflected a more thorough understanding of the complex political undercurrents and fluidity within the Iranian establishment, the nature of the protest and its chances of success.” He emphasized that “the Turkish government wanted to continue the deep-rooted relations with its neighboring country Iran.” The historical sources of those multifaceted interactions have been based on mutual economic exchange and common cultural engagement. Therefore, President Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan congratulated Ahmadinejad upon his reelection (Breitegger 2009: 110–111, 120). However, the presidential return visit of Gül to Tehran came at a later date in Feb. 2011. Domestic political considerations might have played some role in the diplomatic delaying of this official trip. The diplomatic timing of Gül’s visit has proven important in terms of local developments sweeping across the Middle East. At the joint press conference with Ahmadinejad, Gül reminded his earlier diplomatic warnings. During the 2003 Tehran meetings of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Gül has made a sincere diplomatic call for the “reordering of political houses in the common neighborhood.” As Gül implied, the popular Arab uprisings could have been precluded had the political leaders taken necessary steps to establish the democratic rule of order in their countries. With regard to ongoing popular protest movements in Iran, Gül did refrain from even hinting of interference into domestic affairs. Indeed, he highly valued the historical nature of the Turkey-Iran neighborhood relationship. In his view, the Turkish-Iranian border has not changed since the 1639 Kasr-ı Şirin treaty. This “stable relationship” was seen as quite exceptional by Gül, when compared with other dyads in world politics. Gül has sent a strong message to emphasize the inter-cultural “heritage” in the Turkish-­Iranian neighborhood. The primordial interactions between the two civilizations have been alive for almost two millennia. As Gül expressed, he deeply felt the trans-civilizational spirit of solidarity while visiting historical destina-

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tions and popular public places in Tehran, Tebriz and Isfahan. In line with these collectively shared sentiments, the Turkish government would continue to facilitate the Iranian nuclear negotiations (Gül 2011a, b). Ankara sincerely stuck to the psycho-cultural spirit of neighborhood with Tehran. Indeed, Ankara’s neighborly approach was crucial for Tehran, which has been enduring exceptional external pressure. The Iranian regime has been living under extraordinary rules of international isolation and economic embargo since the intensification of UN sanctions. In fact, the UN sanctions were breached and remained far from attaining the desired ends. The intensification of counterproductive UN sanctions has produced unforeseen local consequences (like popular Persian/Shii mobilization coalescing around authoritarian political rulers) and put extra tension on Turkish-Iranian relations. Ankara was also anxious about the probable implications of American (and/or Israeli) military strikes targeting nuclear facilities in Iran. At that time, the Khamenei regime had been using “virulent anti-Americanism … to solidify its support base.” It was psycho-­socially surrounded by feelings of vulnerability, weakness and a deepening crisis of legitimacy. Hence, the Iranian regime “might even welcome an attack because it would help to rally people around it.” Therefore, the US administration tended to refrain from further complicating Iran’s nuclear dossier. Instead, Washington opted to “play the long game” with Tehran (Barkey 2009). Capitalizing on emergent international opportunities, the Turkish government deliberately sought to break the diplomatic deadlock in nuclear negotiations and eliminate the vicious cycle of economic sanctions. Despite apparent risks of failure, Erdoğan acted boldly to relocate Ankara in the international bargaining table (Birand 2010). In June 2010, Turkey and Brazil, acting as non-permanent members in the UN Security Council, persuaded Iran to agree on revised conditions of “the nuclear swap deal.” The scheme was the modified version of a formerly crafted proposal, which had been wasted by Iran earlier. Still, Tehran’s affective rule-making was entangled with “mixed emotions,” displaying ambivalence between “ambition and fear” (Perthes 2010). Due to the unbridgeable rift between Tehran and Washington, the new offer was doomed to fail. In spite, Ankara has made the diplomatic commitment to prevent further escalation of the international crisis. This diplomatic attempt was swiftly nullified by a new resolution further enhancing the UN sanctions regime. The watershed incident marked Turkey’s ­diplomatic deficit in giving an influential input into the global rule-making processes.

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Yet, the international context unfolding with these consequential events revealed Turkey’s social-psychological capacity to reject, if not overrule, global impositions in its neighborhood. These anti-hegemonic practices have epitomized the diplomatic desire to establish the real rule of international heteronomy and the truly global representation in the UN Security Council. So the Turkish government did stick to the self-­professed political dictum of Erdoğan: “World (of primordial neighborhood) is greater than the (permanent) five.” Despite the political odds of global rule-making, Turkey sided with its local contiguous neighbor and voted against the ill-fated resolution. The deliberate political choice can be seen as phenomenal evidence demonstrating Turkey’s affective-normative commitment to regional rule-­making and local neighborhood rules. The sticky notion of “just rule” was reinvented and redeployed into structures and practices of neighborhood management. Turkey’s no vote did solicit some sympathy from Iran, but much of the good will was soon squandered. On the Turkish side, Iran’s continued refusals to lessen import tariffs and grant Turkey most favored nation economic status continued to prevent closer cooperation. In Iran, there was the belief that Turkey was using the nuclear issue to catapult itself to the center of world affairs. Turkey, in contrast, believed that Iran should have been grateful for its diplomatic defense and consider what its no vote meant for its relationship with the West. (Stein 2012)

On the economic front, Turkey still provided a gateway for Iran to surpass international isolation. In fact, the enforcement of the “Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA)” by the United States in July 2010 has put significant pressure on the Iranian financial system. Iranian banks were desperately striving to keep transactional ties with international partners since their availability has been declined saliently. On the other side, energy security was critical for the Turkish industry. Turkey urgently needed to diversify its energy resources by increasing the amount of natural gas imported from Iran. Both sides would mutually benefit from bilateral economic exchange. These shared desires have driven the opening of a new customs gate at the Turkish-Iranian border. The inauguration of the Kapıköy-Razi border gate in Apr. 2011 would enhance the transit trade between two neighbors ̇ (Inat 2012: 23–25). In the face of increasing US pressure, the Turkey-Iran

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total trade volume has steadily increased and reached the decade’s high in 2012 (Baytar and Erginyürek 2016: 72–74). Overall, the episode of 2001–2010 has constituted a dramatic breakthrough in Ankara-Tehran bilateral relations. Rebuilding of affective-­ normative trust in dyadic interactions has helped to reshape the social-psychological context of the Turkish-Iranian neighborhood. Common affective-normative structures and practices have developed to the extent that both countries have managed to maintain their joint commitment toward the rule of local heteronomy in neighborly interactions. In some ways, this dynamic period has been resembling to the formative context of 1918–1928 years. After nine decades of historical rule-making, the new millennial episode revealed the social-psychological implications of relational learning in Ankara-Tehran exchange relations. Both capitals revalued each other’s role in constituting geo-economic gateways for the historical Silk Road and providing key transit connections between Eastern Asia and Western Europe. The economic exchange would be dependent on local stability around the Turkey-Iran neighborhood. Once again, the internationalization of the Kurdish question loomed large in regional security perceptions. In addition, the geopolitics of sectarianism, particularly the Shii majority-Sunni minority polarization in neighboring Iraq, has reshaped contours of dyadic partnership and regional rivalry between the Turkish and Iranian governments (Çetinsaya 2007: 181–183). Accordingly, new feeling rules have begun to govern relational cases of collaboration and confrontation.

Shifting of Feeling Rules Between Collaboration and Confrontation (2011–2018) Political landscape of the Middle East has transformed quite dramatically since the beginning of the Arab uprisings in Dec. 2010. In spite of their divergent positions on a number of regional issues, “both Turkey and Iran have demonstrated the capacity to keep their bilateral relationship on an even keel.” At least, the initial course of regional transformations implied the beginning of “a Turko-Persian future” in the Middle East (Ayoob 2011: 115). Nonetheless, over the later stages, both Ankara and Tehran have caught off guard by the unprecedented scale and enormous pace of developments sweeping across all over the region. The political divergences in perceptions of the local events in neighboring Arab states

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has redrifted the Turkey-Iran relationship toward the old path of bilateral competition and regional rivalry. But the mutual fear of local instability has reminded Ankara and Tehran that historical neighborhood norms ought to be observed. Affective-normative checks and balances in dyadic and regional interactions have reproduced complex, and “compartmental” (Kirdemir 2014; Stein 2014; Sinkaya 2016), rule-making practices in the Turkish-Iranian neighborhood. The early years of this episode indicated historical recurrence of a “friendly but competitive relationship” between Turkey and Iran (Uzun 2013). Both neighbors also utilized public diplomacy assets to achieve regional “dominance” over the Middle Eastern “neighborhood” (Mohebi 2015). For the Iranian regime in Tehran, regional challenges were seen as “revolutionary” forms of popular struggle against pro-Western and oppressive Arab rulers. The AKP government in Ankara, on the other hand, tended to view the regional atmosphere from a rather liberal perspective. Democratic opposition “movements were about an anger caused by decades of repression and widespread corruption” (Ünver 2016: 134). The bottom-up transformations toward political legitimacy has long been awaited and would hopefully bring “democratic peace” into the region. In general, Turkish conservatives supported the legitimate representation of democratic opposition in the Arab world and primarily sided with moderate Islamist forces gathered under the umbrella organization of Muslim Brotherhood. On the other hand, Tehran attempted to capitalize on emergent opportunities and to expand Shii influence over the Gulf States such as Bahrain and Yemen. The Iranian moves were checked by counter-actions taken by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. More often than not Ankara opted for preservation of the local status quo and protection of geopolitical stability in the Gulf. Since sectarian standoff has lingered, Turkey’s neighborhood strategy has muddled between rising radical Shii domination and reactive Wahhabi influence. By and large, Turkey sided with incumbent authoritarian Sunni rulers in the Gulf. This move toward “sectarian balance” (Ünver 2016: 135) put the Turkish government in a delicate political position. With this local balancing act, the Turkish government’s local position leaned toward the pro-Western moderate Sunni Arab camp committing regional resistance against the rival radical Shii axis. Having itself framed in the same political picture with Sunni Arab factions on various occasions, Turkey inadvertently has slipped into the local context of sectarian strife and long-standing “proxy wars.” No matter how hard Ankara has tried to

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erase the pro-Sunni regional image, it could not escape from the affective-­ normative implications of those contextual manipulations in its neighborhood. Social-psychological polarization got more complicated when Syria has drifted toward sectarian (Sunni-Alevi/Nusayri) conflict in Mar. 2011. In sum, the Arab uprisings have created a significant impact on “not only the way Turkey and Iran approach each other but also their regional policies.” The two different “modes of engagement” have also affected the shared Middle Eastern neighborhood as both neighbors have attempted to challenge each other’s historical “sphere of influence,” particularly in Iraq and Syria. Iran’s “reckless” regional policies have damaged “its relations with reliable partners” like Turkey. Put it metaphorically, the historical “roller-coaster ride” in the Turkey-Iran affective-normative “relationship shifted from suspicion and mistrust to cooperation and solidarity, and recently back to a state of caution and conflicting interests” (Keyman and Sazak 2015: 321, 328, 331). Consequently, the affective politics of confrontation have reconfigured rival normative practices in the Turkey-Iran neighborhood. Regional Struggles over Spheres of Influence: Loosening of Neighborly Norms The political victory in the June 2011 parliamentary elections provided a new impetus for the AKP government to reassert Turkish/Islamic leadership in the Middle Eastern neighborhood. The regional transformation envisioned by Erdoğan and Davutoğlu aimed to change public sentiments from “oppression” and “humiliation” toward “hope” and “dignity.” Capitalizing on the popular Arab “awakening,” the Turkish government sought to build a new order based on “regional ownership.” Ankara’s ambitious local bid for “norm-making” and “order-instituting” has constituted a departure from the Turkish foreign policy tradition relying on “neutrality on intra-Arab or Iranian-Arab axes.” The Syrian crisis did pose a strategic challenge for AKP’s assertive “regionalism,” testing affective-­ normative limits of Turkey’s influence in the Arab-Iranian neighborhood (Dal 2012). Ankara has been further disillusioned by the strengthening of political-military alignment between Damascus and Tehran. Notwithstanding disastrous humanitarian consequences, Iran fully committed itself to the survival of the Ba’th regime ruled by Bashar al-­ Assad. Shii sectarian affiliations were also invoked as a way to legitimize Tehran’s tough geopolitical position ruthlessly seeking to sustain the

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minority Nusayri (Alevi) rule in Syria. On the other hand, Turkey has reiterated Syrian people’s legitimate political need for genuine democratic reform. Ankara’s call for good governance, human rights, democratic legitimacy and the rule of law was rebuked by Damascus. Moreover, the Assad regime has publicly displayed political anger toward AKP’s courting of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The Syrian ambassador to Turkey signaled “a tacit warning to Turkey when he made a comparison between the Brotherhood and the PKK.” Delivered in Apr. 2011, Damascus’s diplomatic signal was “indeed a reminder to Turkey that Syria would support the PKK … just as Turkey supports the Brotherhood.” In spite, Syrian opposition groups, including the MB, have gathered in Antalya by the end of May 2011. Their final declaration called for political change in Syria. Since then, Damascus and Tehran have “systematically and deliberately worked to disrupt Syria’s faith in Turkey.” The “anti-Turkish” media campaign affectively denounced Turkey’s foreign policy toward Syria (Mohammed 2011: 93, 94). After the historical Aug. 2011 meeting between Foreign Minister Davutoğlu and President Assad, the AKP government broke political ties with the Syrian regime. Thereafter, Turkey fully opened the door for Syrian refugees, engaged with the legitimate representative of opposition groups gathered under the Syrian National Council (SNC) and began to host members of the Free Syria Army (FSA), a local militia that declared its mission as fighting against the Assad forces. Intimidated by Ankara’s animosity, Damascus chose to incite Ankara’s archenemy. Rather than acting unilaterally, Damascus could use the PKK card in complicity with Tehran. The “evil” Iranian messages climaxed in July 2011. The Iranian regime “touched upon a very hot-bottom case concerning Turkey’s internal affairs” and also “resorted to remind Turkey of the Kurdish issue, perhaps an issue that Turkey hates the most to remember.” Two consecutive border security incidents have raised Turkish suspicions over the clandestine collaboration between Syria and Iran. In Mar. and Aug. 2011, Turkish officials intercepted a cargo plane and seized a logistical truck carrying “Iranian arms shipments into Syria” (Mohammed 2011: 92, 94, 96). These two extraordinary events have exposed how “the Syrian split” and the concomitant regional rivalry might cause deeply damaging cracks in the Turkey-Iran neighborhood relationship (Bekdil 2014). In the coming months, the Syrian-Iranian influence over the PKK has increased. This amounted to serious security consequences for Turkey.

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Before the Aug. 2011 NSC meeting, Prime Minister Erdoğan asserted that the instability over the long Syrian border constituted an “internal” security question for Turkey. Erdoğan’s rhetorical framing reflected “a strong fear of refugee flow from Syria into Turkey,” which might be coupled with cross-border PKK insurgency. Even at that early stage of the Syria crisis, Turkish policymakers were quite anxious and sought to preempt the spreading of instability from Syria. These concerns have shaped contingency plans for protecting Turkey’s national security along the Syrian border (Mohammed 2011: 88, 90). Indeed, Turkish political-military anxiety has been founded on historical memories of neighborhood and painful experiences lived on the Iraqi border. By the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, Turkey has collectively coped with the Kurdish refugee crisis as well as the PKK incursions around transboundary areas. The emergence of similar circumstances after the Gulf War (1991) has created challenging ramifications for Turkey’s national security. The US invasion (2003) and its subsequent withdrawal (2011) have made Turkey’s neighborhood relations all the more challenging. On 19 Oct. 2011, the Turkish security units stationed along the Iraqi border have lost a significant number of military personnel, after the PKK terrorist attacks in Çukurca. Reflecting the heartfelt intensity of Turkish pain, President Gül demonstrated a deeply emotional reaction: One must never forget that those who caused this pain would be retaliated overwhelmingly. They would soon experience more than our suffering … We are decisive in the struggle against terrorism … Terrorism might not influence Turkey’s democratic progress … Embracing our people with compassion, protecting their rights are distinctive concerns for us as well. (Sabah 2011)

Gül’s remarks and other contextual evidences implied that the Çukurca challenge came at a critical time with regard to Turkey’s domestic politics (Süt 2011). For almost two years, the Turkish government has been working to end the PKK violence through the “Kurdish opening” and the “solution process,” both of which did intend total disarmament of terrorists. For Erdoğan, the cross-border PKK incursion was a political “provocation.” It indirectly targeted assembling of the “new constitution.” As Erdoğan saw, “democracy and freedom were antidotes against terrorism. Even though the mischievous attack came on the beginning of political deliberations for new constitution, the government would not alter its determined course” (Takvim 2011).

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In addition to the internal dimension, Prime Minister Erdoğan also reconsidered security relations with regional neighbors. Indeed, the mountainous area of Kandil has long been a security concern for the Turkish government. It was evident that the PKK militants have raided from and returned to their safe havens in northern Iraq. Therefore, Erdoğan gave a last warning to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), which has been headed by Masoud Barzani in Erbil. Once more, Ankara urged Erbil to cut local logistical support and conduct military operations against the PKK camps, particularly located around the Iraq-Iran border (Aydemir 2011). There were also rumors about covert cross-border collusion between the Iranian secret operatives and the PKK’s Kandil insurgents. After Ankara’s abandoning of Damascus, the clandestine Syria-PKK-Iran axis might pose growing local risks for Turkey. Due to those anxieties, Syria and Iran were pinned down as usual suspects behind the Çukurca ordeal. Tehran has quickly realized the growing of political-public suspicions in Ankara. The Iranian foreign ministry responded earlier than expected. On 21 Oct. 2011, Ali Akbar Salihi paid an official visit to Turkey. Foreign Affairs ministers Salihi and Davutoğlu held a joint press conference subsequent to their meeting. After extending diplomatic condolences, Salihi sent strong messages highlighting Tehran’s historical relations with Ankara. He framed the Iranian-Turkish “relationship” as one of “brotherhood.” The “century-long” interactions have helped to establish “exemplary” exchange practices between two peoples. From Salihi’s metaphorical perspective, “two countries are just like two branches of one tree.” Due to their natural relationship, the two neighbors have shared exactly equal concerns. So, the dyadic spirit of “complementarity” rather than regional “rivalry” has determined Tehran’s approach toward Ankara. Salihi emphasized that Iran and Turkey have been working together to fight against “PKK and PJAK.” In spite, some countries were striving to undermine the Iran-Turkey relationship. Extending astutely on this point, he claimed that the Çukurca incident could have been precluded had the US forces in Iraq shared military intelligence with the Turkish army. In any case, Davutoğlu expressed diplomatic gratitude for Salihi’s solidarity. Davutoğlu’s message was more strategic and direct to the point: “PKK has been threatening regional stability, as well as the local Turkish-Kurdish-Iranian alliance.” Therefore, Ankara and Tehran would continue their security partnership against the threat of terrorism posed by the PKK and the PJAK. At that stage, both Salihi and Davutoğlu have tended to downplay their positional differences most likely to emerge in Syria (NTV 2011; Mehrnews 2011).

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Quite similar psycho-social tendencies have been witnessed during the “Kürecik case,” which posed strategic challenges for the strengthening of security partnership between Turkey and Iran. As of Sept. 2011, Ankara and Washington, working under the NATO auspices, have agreed to install the “anti-ballistic missile radar system” in Kürecik, Malatya. The air defense agreement has put extra strain on already aggravating Turkish-­ Iranian relations. Since the NATO Lisbon Summit in Nov. 2010, Ankara has been squeezed between global alliance commitments and regional neighborhood norms. Turkish leaders have had a hard time in convincing their Iranian counterparts that the NATO radar base would be located in Kürecik for only defensive purposes. They argued that NATO’s early warning radar system has not identified specific regional threats and would not trace particular predetermined offensive targets in any of Turkey’s local neighbors including Iran, Russia and Syria. Despite these high-level discursive assurances, Iranian anxiety has not abated. Quite the contrary, Tehran’s angst has exacerbated due to manipulative media battles growing over the later years. The prolonged propaganda campaigns, centering on the Kürecik case, have incurred deep psycho-social damages on TurkeyIran neighborhood relations. Politics of mutual trust did fade away irrevocably, despite diplomatic heart management and pragmatic damage ̇ control in Turkish-Iranian international affairs (Inat 2011: 13–16; ̇ Davutoğlu 2012; Yeniçağ 2012; Inat 2012: 12–21; Oktav 2015; Eroğlu 2017; Tınbek 2018). After the US combat forces have fully withdrawn from Iraq in Dec. 2011, it has become much more difficult for Ankara to deal with regional instability in Turkey’s south-eastern periphery. Due to intensification of ethnic-sectarian clashes in Iraq, Ankara-Baghdad neighborhood relations worsened. In Jan. 2012, “Erdoğan lashed out against Iraqi President Nouri al-Maliki, accusing him of fueling sectarian tensions” in the Middle East (Ünver 2012: 106). The radical sectarian Shii drive toward regional hegemony caused a serious concern in Turkey. Geopolitical areas of confrontation in Turkish-Iranian rivalry, which had mostly been limited to northern Iraq, began to enlarge mainly toward Iraqi and Syrian inlands and the Levant. “No incident has been as poisonous for Turkish-Iranian relations, however, as the Syrian civil war” (Ünver 2016: 134). During the early stages of the Syrian uprising, the social-psychological distance between Ankara and Tehran has widened. The emergent dyadic distrust has caused a loosening in historical norms of neighborly engagement. Affective-normative divergences have invariably seated confronta-

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tional perceptions in Turkish-Iranian interactions. Both sides have competed over the true meaning of what is really happening in their neighborhood. The political struggle of meaning making has headed the regional affairs toward uncharted directions. The dual accusations have been fostered by affective-normative contestations. The diplomatic duels reshaped the interactive making of roles and rules in the Turkey-Iran relationship. These practices have also reinforced confrontational sentiments in the sphere of neighborhood. In this regard, a serial of several dichotomies have been packaged and mobilized. For example, the AKP government’s regional assertiveness was portrayed as “neo-Ottomanist,” implying a return to the old rules of the imperial game in Turkish-Iranian relations. The mapping of geopolitical competition has touched raw sectarian nerves controversially. The rising “pan-Sunni bloc” and the emergent “pan-Shii crescent” were pushed into positions of enmity. The essential disparities between the Turkish type and the Iranian version of “pan-Islamism” were emphasized. As the story went, Turkey was leading a pro-Western political role-rule model based on secular-liberal values. The Turkish model was directly targeting the Iranian bid for regional influence and undermining radical-theological ideals and anti-Western revolutionary policies pursued by Tehran. The sectarian codes of confrontation were manifested by the deployment and mobilization of fear, disgust and hatred among Sunni and Shii neighboring peoples. To a certain extent, emotional-moral norms of sectarianism have determined the social psychology of the Turkey-Iran neighborhood relationship intersecting over the civil war in Syria (Uzun 2013). Apparently, Iranians have feared regional implications of regime change in Syria. Tehran has been primarily concerned about losing its longtime political-military influence over Damascus (and by extension Beirut). The sectarian (Shii-Alevi/Nusayri) collusion between Iranian and Syrian regimes has resulted in the escalation of PKK terrorist actions against the Turkish government. Therefore, AKP elites once again resented creeping of ethnic-sectarian violence in Turkey’s geopolitical periphery, lost their normative commitment toward their neighboring counterparts in Tehran and affectively “fell out of love with Iran” (Ünver 2012: 105–106). To Ankara’s dismay, the Persian bid for Shii regional supremacy has also been supported by their global patrons mainly in Moscow and Beijing. Contrary to the norms of humanitarian responsibility, Russia and China used their veto power to preempt the downfall of the Assad regime. Their recurrent vetoes in the Security Council have blocked the passage of a

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resolution endorsing UN-led military intervention in Syria. At that stage, a robust multilateral operation might have hopefully put an end to the deepening humanitarian tragedy in Syria (Tür and Kumral 2016). As of Feb. 2012, Ankara saw how global tightening of the Shii crescent in Syrian affairs has led to the worsening of humanitarian conditions in its immediate neighborhood. The AKP government found itself in an uncertain regional position and began to search for alternative regional diplomatic avenues to resolve the humanitarian crisis in Syria. Turkey supported the establishment of “Friends of Syria (FoS)” as an international platform driving the diplomatic process. To counter Ankara’s regional drive for influence, Iran reciprocated diplomatically in Aug. 2012. Russia and China kindly participated in the Syria conference held by the Iranian regime (Uzun 2013: 159). As of Sept. 2012, international reports confirmed that Iran was “shipping weapons and personnel to Syria via Iraq.” Not surprisingly, Tehran acknowledged that “the IRGC Quds Force was present in Syria to provide advice and economic assistance” (Esfandiary and Tabatabai 2015: 13). Despite Tehran’s reactions, Ankara colluded with Washington with the hope of toppling the Assad regime in quite a short time. The initial action plan was intended for “training and equipping” the armed military opposition. But the Ba’th rule proved to be much more resilient than its global and local opponents had anticipated. “Miscalculating Iranian and Russian stakes in Syria, Turkey gambled on a quick victory against Bashar al-Assad and became frustrated as Damascus refused to give in to Washington’s and Ankara’s demands” (Ünver 2016: 135). Various global and regional factors reinforced this misperception and have led to the failure of Turkish-­ American collaboration in Syrian affairs. Foremost, the brutal killing of the US Ambassador in Libya on 11 Sept. 2012 has dramatically changed the course of American posture in the greater Middle East. Since the rising democratic opposition movements have recklessly returned to violence, no one could surely address the question of political uncertainty looming over the regional horizon. Since post-authoritarian rule-making seemed far from delivering local stability, the US government has retreated from liberal ­affective-­normative practices of political reform that would considerably transform the social-psychological ruling structures within the region. The Egyptian military coup of 3 July 2013, has dealt a serious blow to the “Arab spring.” The affective hope for achieving peaceful democratic transition and normative expectations for establishing an accountable rule

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of governance could no longer shape the political climate in the Arab world. Due to the US and Western courting of the authoritarian backlash in Egypt, the social psychology of rollback swayed silently in Arab hearts and minds. Within this regional context, geopolitical priorities of Ankara and Washington have increasingly diverged, their affective-normative commitments falling further apart. After Washington’s declaration of extra financial sanctions in Feb. 2013, the Turkish Minister of Economy Zafer Çağlayan stated that Ankara would continue to buy oil and natural gas from Iran. Since private banks have stepped back, Turkish public banks (read the Halkbank) would most likely take the international financial risk ̇ of exchanging gold for the Iranian oil-natural gas (Inat 2015: 15). On the face of growing unilateral American sanctions, Turkey once again sided with its historical neighbor rather than its strategic ally. This time the more vocal siding with the Iranian regime might bear some unforeseen political consequences for the AKP government in managing its relations with the American administration. Indeed, the psycho-social rift between the two NATO allies has deepened markedly in subsequent years. The factors that fueled a deterioration in Ankara-Washington relations have in complex ways contributed to Turkey’s remaking of neighborhood rules with Iran. In Aug. 2013, moderate-centrist Hassan Rouhani, who worked as the SNSC secretary between 1989 and 2005 and served as the chief nuclear negotiator for the reformist Khatami government, has assumed the presidency in Iran. During Rouhani’s early presidential years, “Iran agreed to make concessions on its nuclear program in exchange for removal of sanctions.” To tell the truth, the intensification of international sanctions in 2012 had threatened regime stability in Iran. Compelled by domestic economic concerns, Supreme Leader Khamenei allowed Rouhani to run for the presidential office. Khamenei wanted “Rouhani to only engage and succeed in the nuclear agreement and sanctions removal.” Khamenei’s conditional support enabled Rouhani to gain political ground at home and abroad (Kazemzadeh 2017: 202, 207–210). Domestic economic, social and psychological circumstances called for less costly defensive strategies in Iranian international affairs. Rouhani’s presidency marked an era of moderation resuming pragmatism and ­traditionalism in Iranian diplomacy. The incumbent Iranian government would be “more conservative about the risks of ideological policies” and costly confrontational practices. The moderate diplomatic rationality sought “more balanced,” less risky foreign policy approaches. Tehran’s pragmatic strategy aimed to strike a sensible balance between “power

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resources” and “strategic limits.” In order to achieve an “optimal” international position, the Iranian government revised its political vision along new affective-­normative considerations like regional “responsibility” and diplomatic “patience” (Barzegar and Divsallar 2017). Rouhani’s pragmatic posture provided new political avenues for collaboration in Ankara-Tehran neighborhood relations. More than that, both neighbors did really “need each other” (Bahgat 2014: 121). But it would take some time and require practical commitment to revitalize the social-cultural exchange in bilateral interactions. As expected, Azerbaijan has constituted the local linchpin for Turkey-Iran economic collaboration growing around the Caucasus-Caspian basin (Kelkitli 2017: 79). However, the growth in regional economic affairs was overshadowed by domestic political developments. In Dec. 2013, the AKP government’s domestic predicaments deepened due to alarming operational moves of the “parallel state structure,” clandestinely organized by the former cleric Fethullah Gülen, living under exile in Pennsylvania. For more than 30 years, the “Gülenist cliques” have worked to dominate the higher echelons of judiciary and security bureaucracy in Turkey. Ultimately, the Gülenists’ judicial-intelligence operation has targeted to investigate corruption committed by political-­bureaucratic elites and key government officials, including the Economy Minister Çağlayan. The AKP government has been badly injured by the corruption probe. The political scandal has also been associated with Iranian commercial figures (such as Babak Zanjani and Reza Zarrab) having financialbusiness arrangements with government circles managing the “gold for gas and oil” exchange between two neighbors. These domestic developments left a lingering impact over Ankara’s relations with Tehran and Washington (Ünver 2016: 134–136, 140–141). The damaging domestic political battle between the AKP government and the “Gülenist faction” turned into a fierce fight over Turkey’s foreign policy toward Iran. The discursive practices of “Gülenist media” have reinforced social-­ psychological feelings of sectarian distrust and “enmity” toward Iran. Political maneuvers of the “Gülenist bloc” turned against the pro-Iran position defended by Erdoğan (Balcı 2015: 9–13). Gülenist media followed three main strategies … first, they argued that Turkey has been cheated by Iran, especially in energy agreements, … second, they asserted that the encroachment policy pursued by Erdoğan … not only comes at the detriment of Turkish interests but it also aggravates the

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penetration of Iran into Turkish domestic politics. The third criticism argued that Erdoğan’s love of Khamenei proves that Erdoğan behaves like a servant of Shii ambitions in the region. (Balcı 2015: 15)

Countering those affective-normative charges, pro-government media has rebuked “the Gülenist movement as a subcontractor working for the US and Israel.” Yet, implications of the so-called “love affair” (Balcı 2015: 16–17) in Ankara-Tehran relations still begged further contextual investigation. Despite an unfavorable political atmosphere at home, Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Tehran in Jan. 2014. The visit facilitated the enhancement of normative structures for neighborly collaboration. Turkey and Iran signed a “Preferential Trade Agreement” and established a “High-Level Cooperation Council (HLCC).” After meeting with Khamenei, Erdoğan framed his affection to Iran as if feeling like at “his second home.” Cordially, Khamenei acknowledged his contention about the historical improvement in Turkish-Iranian neighborhood relations (Bahgat 2014: 122). Both Erdoğan’s and his opponents’ portrayal of Tehran in emotional terms demonstrated the level of affective involvement in Turkish public diplomacy and foreign policy toward Iran. After Erdoğan assumed the presidency in Aug. 2014, Ankara continued to patiently and cautiously pursue a constructive engagement policy toward Tehran. The announcement of the HLCC has been a historical development for Turkish-Iranian diplomatic affairs. Following this strategic step, Ankara has endorsed important initiatives to stop sectarian bloodshed in Iraq and Syria. For this purpose, the AKP government has also devoted theological public diplomacy assets. Together with the Foreign Affairs Minister Davutoğlu, theology professor Mehmet Görmez, the acting head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA), has employed affective strategies of theo-diplomacy to thwart the violent atmosphere engulfing the Middle Eastern Muslims, and the larger Islamic world. Most notably, the DRA ̇ hosted the Istanbul meeting of “Peace, Moderation and Commonsense Initiative” on 17–19 July 2014. The seminar has gathered theology scholars and traditional theologians from around the Islamic world. Davutoğlu and Görmez thought that these “wise men,” acting as public opinion makers, would help to restore the eternal “psychology of peace” among Muslim populations. The theo-politics orchestrated by Davutoğlu and Görmez has rested on conventional truisms. Since Islam literally means peace, the religion of peace can in no way be taken as a sacred source to justify sectarian skirmishes. Indeed, the humane “spirit” of Islam tran-

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scends all kinds of differences across various popular cultures. Thus, genuine reawakening of transcultural Islamic solidarity would essentially rehabilitate an affective atmosphere of peace among all Muslim peoples. Truly reestablished Islamic social psychology would be key to totally eradicate contemporary political causes of sectarian violence and inter-/intra-­ ethnic conflict in the Middle East (Davutoğlu 2014; Bulut 2014). During Davutoğlu’s term at the prime ministry (Aug. 2014–May 2016), Turkey’s foreign policy agenda has transformed quite dramatically. Largely due to the rising of ethnic-sectarian violence, the Turkish government found itself in an increasingly exacerbating regional security context. ̇ Therefore, Görmez has pursued the spiritual aims of the Istanbul initiative during his exceptional visit to Tehran in Dec. 2015. This time the theopolitical occasion has been organized by the Iranian-led “Conference on the Unity of Sects.” On the opening day, at the plenary session, Görmez delivered a public “manifesto” calling for an urgent psycho-social critique among Shii and Sunni ulema. Countering the deceptive propaganda unleashed against the religion of Islam, Görmez’s clerical call implied that secular ideologies of authoritarian statism and ethnic nationalism have constituted deeper political causes of sectarian-communal conflict among Muslim masses. As Görmez framed, human “blood” should not be treated as either “Shii or Sunni.” The believers ought not to let further shedding of their “brothers’ blood.” To save Islamic “honor, dignity, and unity,” Muslims must prevent spreading of sectarian “resentment” and “hatred.” As Görmez acknowledged, it would entail enormous emotional-affective commitment to extinguish the psycho-social fires of divisive “incitement” and partisan “separation” among Shii and Sunni believers of Islam (Takvim 2015). These extraordinary public diplomacy events re-marked the significance of emotional-moral exchange in Turkish-Iranian affairs. Being part of larger neighborhood politics, theological interactions have helped to ease regional tension. Yet, it would require stronger collective political commitment and joint diplomatic effort to rehabilitate the local security environment mutually shared by Turkey and Iran. Rising Anxiety over Cross-border Instability: Reciprocal Reexamination of Regional Policies Over the period of 2014–2016, both Turkey and Iran have encountered damaging local consequences of ethnic-sectarian warfare in Iraq and Syria. The Al Qaeda-affiliated Wahhabi-Salafi militants of the Islamic State in

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Iraq and Syria (ISIS or DEASH) and the pan-Kurdist PKK insurgency have constituted common security concerns for both Turkey and Iran. Mutual anxiety over cross-border instability has driven a reciprocal reexamination of regional policies in the two neighboring capitals. On 11 June 2014, Iranian President Rouhani paid a historical visit to Ankara. The first HLCC meeting marked a turning point in dyadic engagement. Rouhani portrayed the Turkish-Iranian collaborative partnership in terms of mutual local needs and committed himself to the remaking of complementary economic bridges in the common regional neighborhood. These views were shared by President Gül as well (Bahgat 2014: 121–122). Coincidentally that day, Ankara faced a significant security challenge in northern Iraq. The ISIS (DEASH) terrorist infiltration and capturing of hostages in Turkey’s Mosul Consulate have dramatically changed the local context and affected Ankara’s policies toward its immediate neighbors, particularly in northern Iraq. Up until the rescue operation that safely brought Turkish hostages back home on 20 Sept. 2014, Turkish diplomacy has concentrated on local security implications of the rising ISIS threat. In fact, the ISIS has simultaneously posed serious transboundary threats for Tehran. Initially, Iran backed the Maliki government. By and large, local Shii and Kurdish militias have been supported as proxy forces to retain cross-border influence. Since the ISIS threat has become somewhat unmanageable for Baghdad, Iraq’s stability constituted “a core foreign policy concern” for Tehran. While visiting Baghdad in Aug. 2014, Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif highlighted that the Iranian government saw “Iraq’s security as its own.” Based on pragmatic reasons, Iran has “opposed to partition” Iraq’s territorial integrity. The chaotic case of partition would “shift power dynamics in the region and threaten regional stability” and “clearly diminish Iran’s area of influence” (Esfandiary and Tabatabai 2015: 2, 5, 7). Evidently, the ISIS episode has “put Iran in a difficult situation.” The spillover of instability from the long Iraqi border could “have a direct impact on Iran’s population and territory” and hence posed a “more important challenge to Iran.” In contrast, the Syrian crisis was “still viewed as far from home.” While some Iranian elites have questioned Tehran’s providing of security assistance to the Assad regime, they mostly supported cross-border military incursions “to stop the spread of ISIS” in neighboring Iraq. Syria was “considered an optional war … not an existential issue.” From the military perspective, Iran could survive “without

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Syria.” On the strategic front, Iraq was more “fundamental” for Iranian “national security.” Regarding economic affairs, the lingering Iraqi instability would incur much higher “opportunity costs” for Tehran. In contrast, the Iranian investment to the Assad regime was not a big deal. These were already “sunk costs,” which might turn into an early political loss for the new Iranian government (Esfandiary and Tabatabai 2015: 12–14). Nevertheless, the Iranian old guard, the hard-liners led by Khamenei and the IRGC, have conceived the international developments somewhat differently. On 4 Sept. 2014, in his “address to the Assembly of Experts on foreign policy issues,” Khamenei spoke from a position of power, defined in terms of “strategic depth” shaping Iran’s regional policies. Shii sectarianism, together with Islamic conservatism and Iranian (PersianFarsi) nationalism, have been reconstructed as popular psycho-­social/cultural sources of Iran’s “strategic depth” in internal and external affairs (Akbarzadeh and Barry 2016). In some interesting ways, the Iranian sectarian “strategic depth” doctrine has constituted an anathema for the secular Turkish formulation espoused for more than a decade. Professor Davutoğlu’s and Ayatollah Khamenei’s competing right-wing regional visions have cusped over neighboring Iraq and Syria. Once again, the historical patterns of Turkish-Iranian regional rivalry reemerged over the contiguous “Mesopotamian neighborhood” (Gourlay 2016), which extend along southern riparian areas of the Tigris-Euphrates basin and the eastern Mediterranean coast. In order to balance the Iranian influence and the Shii Arab domination over the Central Iraqi Government (CIG) in Baghdad, Ankara sided with the broad coalition comprising the Turkmen, the Sunni Arabs and the KRG, which has been headed by Masoud Barzani in Erbil. Since Turkey and Iran took different sides in neighboring Iraq, the domestic political interactions between the CIG and the KRG have polarized, which also created cross-border implications for the ongoing ethnic-sectarian crisis in Syria (Aktaş 2018). The Syrian civil war has worsened by the increased interference of Iranian forces into the Syrian battleground. In order to protect the Assad regime, Iranian covert security units have assisted the deployment of local Shii militia (including the Lebanese Hezbollah) into key battle fronts (Posch 2017: 84–90; Akbarzadeh 2017: 116–119). The regional instability further exacerbated on 7 Oct. 2014, since ISIS (DEASH) and PKK militants clashed near the border town of Kobane (Ayn al-Arab) in northern Syria. The incident and the surrounding circumstances signaled the spiraling of ethnic-sectarian proxy warfare in Syria. The Syrian civil war

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turned into an undeclared international war fought through unconventional means. The local instability emerging along the Syrian border has created significant security threats for Turkey. Ankara would never like to see non-state terrorist actors as its next door neighbors. Dealing with these unwelcome hostile neighbors has taken enormous energy from Turkey’s democratic and economic progress (Yeşiltaş 2015b; Yeşiltaş et al. 2016). The resumption of domestic violence by PKK militants in July 2015 has ruined the “Kurdish opening” and the “solution process,” both of which have been vigorously pursued by the AKP government since 2009 (Yeşiltaş and Özçelik 2018). Due to the rising rule of fear, Turkey’s democratic development was sacrificed to national security concerns growing over the regional neighborhood. Under those circumstances, Ankara has been warily concerned about Tehran’s spoiling moves in Syria. As long as Tehran liked to sustain the regional position of “spoiler,” rather than “stabilizer” (Kösebalaban 2011: 182–183), Ankara would prefer to distance itself from its neighbor. Due to the social-psychological distance in neighborhood relations, the Turkish government could no longer display diplomatic eagerness to extend help to Iranian nuclear negotiations. In any case, Iran and P5+1 (permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) have reached a final agreement on 14 July 2015. The comprehensive deal called for lifting of all sanctions in exchange for Iranian full compliance with the international norms on nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament, verification and control. The “nuclear deal” could be a welcome development for Ankara, as it might hopefully drive Tehran toward a policy change in Syria. Resolution of the Syrian crisis has been the key for regional stability. With these thoughts in mind, President Erdoğan went to Tehran in Apr. 2015 for the second meeting of HLCC. Enhancement of bilateral trade, re-­arbitration of natural gas prices, struggle against PKK terrorism and regional instability emanating from Iraq and Syria have been discussed quite extensively. Still, Erdoğan could not solicit strong affective-­normative commitment from his counterparts to overrule their deadly course in Syria. Turkey-Iran diplomatic engagement remained far from providing a social-psychological environment through which both sides would reconstitute regional rule of peaceful neighborhood and refrain from playing by destructive rules of the global war game played over Syria. Yet, it seemed that both sides could not “afford to sacrifice” their bilateral relationship (Tahiroğlu and Ben Taleblu 2015: 131). On 22 July 2015, following the PKK attack in Suruç, the Turkish town in the Syrian border, Rouhani told Erdoğan

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that “it was Iran and Turkey’s responsibility to cooperate in the fight against” the threat of terrorism rising over the region (Akbarzadeh and Barry 2017: 990). In the meantime, the overwhelming penetration of non-regional powers (US-led coalition warfare and Russian air operations) and the intermingling of non-state actors (terrorist groups, foreign fighters and militia forces) into the Syrian battleground have constituted a critical impediment for Turkey’s neighborhood relations with Iran. The regional security environment has deteriorated by Sept. 2015. Turkish-Iranian local rule-­making could not develop to the extent that both sides would jointly commit themselves to put out the fires of war altogether in their common neighborhood. The adverse affective-normative atmosphere surrounding the Turkish-Iranian neighborhood has further weakened since the resurfacing of dyadic media battles, which began to reshape the social-­psychological context of confrontational rivalry. Moreover, Turkish media nurtured “fears” about a threat of gas cut by Iran and Tehran’s “using of natural-gas supply as an ‘energy weapon’” (Ünver 2016: 138) against Ankara. To a certain extent, bilateral political tension has been eased during Prime Minister Davutoğlu’s Tehran visit on 4 Mar. 2016. The third meeting of the HLCC was held in Ankara and co-chaired by Erdoğan and Rouhani on 16 Apr. 2016. Both sides have managed to remake a joint commitment toward advancement of bilateral relations, minimization of losses and maximization of gains in their neighborly exchange. As Erdoğan acknowledged, the dyadic state of affairs has reached a distinctive level by moving “beyond relational frameworks of any other ordinary neighboṙ Haber Ajansı 2016). hood” (Ilke On 15 July 2016, the “Gülenist cliques” attempted to instigate a military coup against the AKP government. To a certain extent, the attempt was precluded by Erdoğan, who called for mass mobilization in streets and popular resistance around public places and official buildings. The coup makers, the Fethullahist Terror Organization (Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü— FETÖ), have been charged with crimes against the government and the state. The FETÖ coup attempt has immediately changed the rules of Turkish political game played inside and outside. Foremost, Erdoğan has strongly consolidated his presidential rule, through reconfiguration of the right-wing/hard-line coalition, representing mixed populist tendencies of nationalism, conservatism and Islamism. At least, for a considerable period of time, Erdoğan’s allies and partners in the Western world (most prominently in the United States, NATO and EU) have turned a blind eye, or, even worse, provided shelter and offered support to the escaping FETÖ

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operatives. Frustrated by Western negligence and ignorance, the Turkish government’s heart turned to the East, most emphatically toward the neighbors in Moscow and Tehran. After the FETÖ coup attempt, actually at midnight, Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammed Javad Zarif instantaneously shared the Iranian diplomatic reaction in his official twitter account. His message read: “The courageous defense displayed by the Turkish people for the democracy and the elected government has proven the fact that the coup plots have no place in the region and hence they are doomed” (Afacan 2017: 303). From the very early on, the Iranian regime “showed solidarity” with and “offered help” to the Turkish government. In this case, rulers in Tehran have been really concerned about “foreign hands” orchestrating the violent coup attempt and plotting illegitimate change of rules in neighboring Ankara. The historical context eventually revealed an affective-normative extent of dyadic neighborhood rules within which Iran has viewed “security and stability of Turkey as pivotal to its own national security” and regional stability (Hashem 2016). Supreme Leader Khamenei pointed to a foreign plot in the coup attempt and allegedly “loathed” American involvement. In contrast, President Rouhani spoke more strongly. As he put it, the times of coup plotting have passed, popular problems could only be resolved at the ballot box. For him, Erdoğan’s “call to the streets” for popular resistance was quite similar to the one made by Khomeini before the 1979 Islamic revolution. Within the Iranian political house, only some critical voices have been heard raising minor concerns about Erdoğan’s Syria policy (Afacan 2017: 297–298, 302–304, 312). Tehran’s support was quite important, since “Ankara was enraged and disillusioned by Turkey’s traditional western allies’ protective attitudes towards the coup plotters and their difficulties in even wishing the government well.” In the coming months, the growing alienation from the West has led to a reorientation in Turkey’s Middle East policy, which paved the way for the opening of a new chapter in Turkey’s regional relations with Iran (Uygur 2017). The neighborhood game continued through rebuilding of affective-­normative commitments. Beyond the Failed Coup and the Flopped Nuclear Deal: Rebuilding of Neighborly Commitments The failed coup of “June 15 (7/15)” has constituted a historical turning point for Turkish politics. After “7/15,” dramatic changes have occurred with regard to rule-making in the Turkish political house. To give a com-

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parative sense of the phenomenological impact, the brunt of “7/15” for Ankara was somehow similar to the burden of “9/11” for Washington. The affective-normative politics of “7/15” took Turkey toward unprecedented directions. Most urgently, Erdoğan began to rule the country thorough “extraordinary governmental decrees.” Erdoğan reconfigured populist politics of “victimhood,” this time under extraordinary ruling conditions prolonging sharply for two years. The long “state of emergency” gave way to hard-line domestic practices, which concomitantly fed radical-autocratic social psychology inside the country (Yilmaz 2017; see also Özpek and Yaşar 2018; Yalvaç and Joseph 2019). In order to cleanse the FETÖ threat from key bureaucratic institutions, Erdoğan collaborated with Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi—MHP). Primarily driven by state/regime security concerns, the right-wing (AKP-MHP) grand coalition has taken political root during the parliamentary endorsement of constitutional changes on 21 Jan. 2017. The amendments would transform the country from de facto executive rule toward a de jure presidential governing system. The Islamist-nationalist collaboration turned into a populist pact of contingency, called “the People Alliance (Cumhur ̇ Ittifakı),” so as to forge a political victory in the 16 Apr. constitutional referendum. Aiming to collectively counter Erdoğan’s rule, the opposition parties formed a partnership of “necessity” under the umbrella of ̇ “the Nation Alliance (Millet Ittifakı)” (Uras 2018). By receiving 51.41% of the popular votes, the Erdoğan-Bahçeli coalition won the first case in the long political battle. Even though the presidential-parliamentary elections were scheduled for Nov. 2019, Erdoğan and Bahçeli have mutually agreed to hold them on 24 June 2018. As the candidate of “the People Alliance,” Erdoğan won the presidential race in the first round, gaining  52.59% of the ballots. These consecutive victories have helped the hard-line domestic coalition to transform Turkey’s regional policies, most immediately in neighboring Syria. When Turkey launched the “Operation Euphrates Shield” (Fırat Kalkanı Operasyonu) in northern Syria on 24 Aug. 2016, the Iranian regime remained silent as Tehran shared Ankara’s concerns for regional security. By that time, the regional burden of Syria has become so overwhelming for the Iranian government. The total Iranian losses were quite high, perhaps more than 1200 military personnel, even including dozens of generals. While Khamenei’s office has justified (IRGC) intervention into Syria as necessary for the defense of Shii holy sites, humanitarian and

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economic costs of the Syrian war have become too heavy for the Iranian people. Criticizing fatal consequences of hard-line policies, the Iranian opposition urged for military withdrawal from the region. Iranian soft-­ liners were supporting a diplomatic solution in Syria and a local partnership with Turkey (Ebrahimi 2018). Softening of relational psychology and the changing emotional entanglements in both capitals have configured an affective atmosphere more conducive for bilateral collaboration. Hence, Turkey and Iran lined against the emergence of any kind of terrorist threat in their neighborhood. The cross-border operations underlined Turkey’s decisiveness on protecting the Euphrates basin from the security threat posed by the Syrian wing of the PKK, mainly composed of the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat—PYD) and People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel—YPG). Moreover, Turkish military operations have aimed to eliminate ISIS (DEASH) militants. In this regard, the AKP government has been deprived by the controversial fact that the US-led international war coalition, formed to fight against ISIS (DEASH) terrorism, has collaborated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (actually the PYD/YPG militants) located in areas so close to Turkey’s national borders. Hence, seeking new regional partners became a local necessity for Turkey. Since the “Geneva Meetings” could not help to resolve the Syrian crisis, Ankara sought to establish an alternative platform from within the region. After almost a century later, once again the Russian role has become quite critical in facilitating the diplomatic détente in Turkish-Iranian neighborhood relations. The regional rivalry over Syria has incurred unbearable costs for both political houses. At last, Ankara and Tehran have realized that they came to the dead end in Syria. Both neighbors were dually surrounded by a psycho-social atmosphere of “reciprocal exhaustion” (Aktaş 2018: 167). The dyadic politics of “relational repair” (Eznack 2012) would take time as years-long affective damages have paralyzed norms of good neighborly interactions between the two countries. The “Astana Talks” conducted among Russia, Iran and Turkey aimed to address urgent security problems and vital humanitarian needs in Syria. Despite divergent foreign policy interests and distinct international strategies (Friedman 2017), the three neighbors concurred to act as guarantors of peace, security and stability in Syria. The trilateral Moscow agreement of 30 Dec. 2016 called for the implementation of cease-fire, the deescalation of violence and the resumption of humanitarian assistance

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inside Syria. With UN blessing, new rounds of Astana peace talks have continued over the coming year. On the part of Tehran, the Iranian government has already realized that “it could not unilaterally save the Syrian regime.” Iran’s realization of strategic limits has forged the exceptional military collaboration between the Iranian ground units and the Russian air forces operating in Syria (Barzegar and Divsallar 2017: 51). Indeed, Russia’s military involvement in the Syrian crisis has “emboldened” the Iranian regional position. In the short term, it seemed that the Assad regime has “come back from the verge of collapse.” Yet, over the long run, the Russian global interests might “prove detrimental” to Iran’s local standing and regional prestige. The convenient opportunistic alignment with Moscow, Tehran’s historical nemesis, was “unlikely to exonerate Iran in the eyes of many, including within the Islamic Republic” (Akbarzadeh 2017: 121–123). After the fall of Aleppo in Dec. 2016, the growing American-Russian geostrategic collusion over Syria has shown the global limits of local military collaboration between Tehran and Moscow (Barzegar and Divsallar 2017: 42). Quite similarly, the ad hoc rapprochement with Moscow might bring disturbing consequences for Ankara. Turkey’s regional cooperation with Russia, and Iran, has developed at a time when its partners began to face the growing threat of American sanctions. On 2 Jan. 2017, the US Congress has endorsed the “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA),” which foresaw the imposition of new sanctions on Iran, Russia and North Korea. To walk out of its way, Turkey had to find a fine line between Washington and Moscow, and Tehran. Managing global and regional relations with American allies and Russian and Iranian neighbors would require a delicate international diplomacy. The multilateral interactions have reinforced the impact of third parties, in this case Russia and the United States, on the Turkey-Iran neighborhood ­relationship. Due to the complexity of political conjecture, the Turkish government chose to remain silent about the CAATSA until its enactment by the US President on 2 Aug. 2017. Under those complex circumstances, Ankara still sought to acquire S-400 air defense missiles from Russia and to continue with the procurement plan of F-35 joint fighter jets from America. In addition, Turkey has begun to buy increasing amounts of LNG from the United States, to decrease its natural gas imports from Russia and Iran. The reelection of Rouhani to the Iranian presidency on 19 May 2017, implied that the moderate-reformist camp put their lot behind the “Hope

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Front.” Still, Rouhani’s second term in office has created an ambivalent emotional climate, between “hope and disappointment,” that would polarize the Iranian “state-society complex” in some unforeseen ways (Şen 2017). During the short election campaign, Rouhani’s populist rhetoric “cut dangerously close to the bone for the system’s legitimacy” (Maloney 2017). On the other hand, President Rouhani was aware of his limits of institutional power, which could be easily overruled by Supreme Leader Khamenei (Rizvi 2012). For nearly three decades, Khamenei has assiduously cultivated “patronage networks” and made “the office of the supreme leader … somewhat invulnerable,” indeed, Rouhani displayed restraint and “managed his relationship with Khamenei more carefully.” This meant that Rouhani would unlikely change his established mood in Iranian politics: “judicious, risk-averse, focused on discrete, achievable goals rather than broad transformational initiatives.” Ultimately, Khamenei would be “responsible for deciding” and “pursuing” the political interests of the Iranian regime (Maloney 2017). At the very beginning of Rouhani’s second term, Tehran and Ankara revitalized political-military negotiations on Syria. Turkish-Iranian military engagement reached a high level when General Mohammed Hossein Bagheri, the Iranian Armed Forces’ Chief of Staff, visited Turkey on 15 Aug. 2017. Bagheri’s visit was historical. For almost 40 years, such highranking military visits have not taken place between Ankara and Tehran. During high-level military talks, both sides exchanged their views on regional security issues of common concern particularly in Iraq and Syria (Gafarli 2017). As the sources close to the “Turkey’s Defense Ministry” later revealed, the “military convergence” between Ankara and Tehran was made possible by “the two countries’ annoyance over the PKK presence on their borders.” Shared security concerns of the two neighbors provided the collective motivation for the planning of “a joint military operation” ­ against PKK/PJAK strongholds located across the common borderlands, intersecting trilaterally over northern Iraq, around the Kandil Mountains and the Sinjar area. More importantly, Ankara and Tehran were also wary about the local collaboration between the PYD/YPG forces and the US-led war coalition in Syria, seeking to conduct joint operations against the ISIS (DEASH) militants concentrated in the Idlib and Rakka provinces (Daily Sabah 2017; Takvim 2017; Majidyar 2017). According to these observational accounts, the Turkey-Iran positional partnership has been driven by collective anger.

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Obviously, both countries were exasperated by the rise of the pan-­ Kurdist territorial threat in their common neighborhood. Ankara and Tehran, as well as Baghdad, have remained on the same page regarding political ambitions of the Kurds in northern Iraq. The three capitals lined up against the KRG’s referendum plan for independence. For the last time on 20 Sept. 2017, the KRG leader Barzani was called “to refrain from holding the referendum.” The Foreign Affairs ministers of the three neighbors “registered their unequivocal opposition to the referendum” and “agreed, in this regard, to consider taking counter-measures in coordination” (Joint Communique 2017). In spite, the referendum was held on 25 Sept. 2017. Nonetheless, the referendum results were suspended, since the KRG was squeezed by the local pressure of trilateral sanctions. The common threat perceptions in neighboring Iraq have paved the way for the enhancement of security cooperation between the Turkish and Iranian governments (Aktaş 2018: 178). After the fourth meeting of HLCC held in Tehran on 4 Oct. 2017, Erdoğan and Rouhani reiterated their commitment to improve bilateral collaboration in areas of regional security and local stability particularly in Iraq and Syria. The joint decisive posture against the Kurdish referendum was defended by sending strong messages to the KRG, and its global and regional patrons. Both neighbors have shown solidarity to balance against the threatening impact of US and Israeli policies over the region. While Ankara was anxious about American engagement with the PYD/YPG militants, Tehran’s concern was about Washington’s increasing political pressure and a probable defection from the nuclear deal (Konukçu 2017). As a countermove, both governments declared that they would work to enhance bilateral trade through common utilization of national currencies. Both neighbors signed memoranda of understanding for the cooperation between Turkish and Iranian Central Banks and Ministries of Economic Affairs (Sabah 2017). Arguably, this positional partnership has been configured by affective norms of collective fear and emotional rules of shared anger. Indeed, Ankara and Tehran were still far from displaying deeper psycho-social commitment to enhance their economic collaboration. The long awaited regional economic integration could really transform the relational atmosphere of the Turkish-Iranian neighborhood. The international potential of ECO has not been fully exploited, due to deficiencies in Turkish-Iranian financial cooperation. This issue has been addressed by the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu dur-

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ing the 22th ECO (Islamabad) summit in Feb. 2017. As he framed, “budgetary problems” and financial “burden-sharing” were two main institutional issues to be resolved by the “Implementation Fund.” As foreseen in the “ECO 2025 Vision.” The ECO reform process would be based on transnational “connectivity for regional prosperity.” The ECOBANK, together with free trade and transit transport agreements, would help to revitalize the important regional role played by neighboring countries (Çavuşoğlu 2017). On another occasion, Çavuşoğlu reiterated that Ankara was “sincere in voicing opposition to Iran’s some policies, particularly in Syria, Iraq, and Gulf region … But on the other hand, Iran is our neighbor. We criticize Iran’s mistakes, but if it’s right, we support Iran. It’s a wrong idea to fully stalemate Iran.” Reciprocity has determined relational rules of engagement between Ankara and Tehran. In this diplomatic spirit, the Turkish Armed Forces’ Chief of Staff General Hulusi Akar paid a visit to his counterpart Bagheri. The visit constituted the first of its kind since the 1979 revolution. After accepting the Turkish top general, Iranian President Rouhani said that they “should strive to advance military and defense cooperation consistent with other fields” of bilateral relations. Indeed, dyadic interactions “have gained momentum, not because of overlapping interests, but overlapping concerns.” While looking at their contiguous spheres of influence, Ankara and Tehran have gradually shared feelings of anxiety due to the growing impact of pan-Kurdist regional aspirations in the northern areas of Iraq and Syria. High-level military and intelligence officials also discussed security measures (like physical walls) against illegal infiltrations across the borders and institutional coordination of joint counterterror operations against the PKK strongholds in transboundary areas (Xinhua 2017). Yet, the “regional security complex” surrounding the Turkey-Iran relationship has increasingly encountered new transnational risks such as irregular migration and organized crime. ­ Turkey’s construction of a “security wall” in border areas implies the strengthening of material fences in the Turkey-Iran neighborhood (Birdişli and Gören 2018). Emergent asymmetrical security challenges in the Turkish-Iranian borderlands would put extra strain on neighborly interactions. Over the coming years, physical bordering practices would bring enduring ramifications for psycho-social exchange between the two countries. It needs to be seen whether the “stronger fences, safer neighborhood” truism would turn into a psychical reality. Wall-making, as a political practice, does not reflect

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the sensible logic of open borders. It reminds the rule of fear superseding the security relations between the garrison states. Powerful psychical control, if not closure, over the borderlands might not empower affective-­ normative structures of economic exchange governing the interactions between the trading states. Without any doubt, taking psychical measures against the threats of terrorism and organized crime is necessary. Nevertheless, given the tough topographical conditions prevalent in Turkish-Iranian borderlands, building of psychical barriers might not be the smartest strategy, as it would drain resources from much needed areas. Over the long term, it would be much wiser for both neighbors to increasingly invest into collective economic projects to further promote free trade and better facilitate legal exchange particularly in interdependent border areas (Baytar and Erginyürek 2016). As a matter of fact, both sides displayed their mutual “happiness” regarding the joint steps taken against the PKK terrorism and the pan-­ Kurdist regional ambitions and the common commitment to improve bilateral trade through the use of national currencies. Turkey and Iran have slowly worked to lift the barriers hindering free trade. In order to boost economic partnership, both sides agreed to enhance collaboration on bilateral investments on energy and banking sectors. As mentioned earlier, the Turkish and Iranian Central Banks signed a memorandum of financial cooperation to pave the way for using local currencies in trade exchanges. The positive psycho-social atmosphere of the Turkish-Iranian neighborhood has also shone over the ninth summit meeting of D-8 (Developing Eight Countries’ Organization for Economic Cooperation) ̇ held in Istanbul on 20 Oct. 2017 (Hürriyet Daily News 2017). The institutional platform of D-8, as envisioned by the former Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan in 1997, has provided Turkey and Iran a trans-governmental venue to improve regional partnership and ­collaboration with major developing Muslim nations. In terms of deed, the 20th anniversary of the formation of D-8 has marked an episodic milestone in regional politics of neighborhood and local rule-making in Ankara-Tehran interactions. In spite of their concurrent confrontational rivalry in regional affairs particularly in neighboring Iraq and Syria, both sides displayed a commitment to reconstitute psycho-social rules of collaborative partnership. Once again, Turkey and Iran have managed their heteronomous relationship. Notwithstanding the “crisis of confidence,” the psycho-social atmosphere of “constructive competition” has lingered in the Turkey-Iran

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neighborhood (Afacan 2018). The growing of US pressure over Iran has created salient regional implications. On 13 Oct. 2017, US President Donald Trump declared a new strategy against the Iranian regime. He called “the 2015 nuclear deal,” known as “the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” (JCPOA), as “deeply controversial.” In his words, JCPOA was “the worst … transactions the United States has ever entered into.” The Iranian government was “not living up to the spirit of the deal” by continuing to “fuel conflict, terror, and turmoil throughout the Middle East and beyond.” The US administration’s new strategy would address “the increasing menace” posed and “destructive actions” pursued by the Iranian regime. Most significantly, the strategy emphasized the need to “place additional sanctions” to deter “the regime’s proliferation of missiles and weapons that threaten its neighbors.” Washington held no desire to “continue down a path whose predictable conclusion is more violence, more terror, and the very real threat of Iran’s nuclear breakout.” The White House urged US allies to “take strong actions … including thorough sanctions outside the Iran Deal that target the regime’s ballistic missile program, in support for terrorism, and all of its destructive activities.” Otherwise, and when the circumstances arise, President Trump could withdraw from the JCPOA, at any time and without a further international notice (White House 2017). Indeed, this strategic declaration paved the way for the rejuvenation of US sanctions against Iran. The strain of US sanctions has reshaped affective norms of diplomacy between Ankara and Tehran. Against the growing American political pressure, the AKP government defended legality of mutual trade relations between Turkey and Iran. On 5 Dec. 2017, President Erdoğan reiterated that Washington has not been in a position to judge affective norms of the Turkish-Iranian neighborhood. By implication, Erdoğan alluded to the “Kasr-ı Şirin myth” (Çağaptay and Yeğenoğlu 2006), which has often been invoked to underline the primordial nature of neighborhood norms in Turkish-Iranian interactions. As he put it, “the Turkey-Iran border has been established much earlier than the [political] formation of America” (Erdoğan 2017). In essence, Erdoğan has long been frustrated by American ambivalence in resolving the Syrian conflict. Those grievances accumulating against the American alliance have further pushed the Erdoğan government toward enhanced collaboration with regional partners. In this regard, the Astana peace process has provided extra leverage for Turkey. By getting closer to Moscow and Tehran, Ankara hoped to better handle its thorny regional

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relationship with Washington. On 22 Dec. 2017, the eighth high-­level “International Meeting on Syria” was once again concluded in Astana. Acting “as guarantors of the observance of the ceasefire regime” in Syria, the three neighbors issued a joint statement, which was also made public by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (TMFA). With this public statement Iran, Russia and Turkey reaffirmed “their strong and continued commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity” of Syria and “their determination to continue cooperation in order to ultimately eliminate” all “terrorist entities” from the region and to ensure “the ceasefire regime” in designated areas of “de-escalation” and emphasized the need to give “momentum to negotiation process under the UN auspices in Geneva and facilitating an intra-Syrian agreement based on mutual consent” (TMFA 2017). The Astana process has helped to persuade the Iranian regime to turn toward regional reconciliation and make neighborly concessions to meet Russian and Turkish demands in Syria. Over the long diplomatic process, the radical clout of Tehran gradually waned, as the practical influence of Moscow and Ankara have waxed, due to their significant military advantages on the operational ground. By the end of Dec. 2017, the Iranian regime was struck by mass demonstrations spreading violence inside the country. The events were contrasted with the onset of popular movements in the Arab streets. In due course, the covert influence enacted by American secret service officials was pinpointed. Accordingly, this was the “Ajam spring” that should be seriously addressed by the rulers in Tehran (Diler 2018a, b). Quite cold heartedly, the “Iranian spring” was read within general contours of Turkish geopolitical thinking. The global context is foregrounded on the rivalry between the United States and China. The “crisis of American imperial hegemony” and its implications for the Trump administration and world affairs were reminded as well (Öğün 2017a, b, 2018a, b). That is to say, unlike the beating of hearts for opposition movements in Egypt and Syria, AKP circles have shown no “sympathy” for the Iranian protesters. Quite the contrary, they displayed affective antipathy toward the local provocateurs presumably collaborating with American, Israeli and Saudi agents. Empathetic feelings toward the Rouhani government were serviced by drawing blatant parallels with the 2013 Gezi protests in Turkey (CNN Türk 2018a; Sabah 2018) and the 2014 Kobane incidents in Syria (Yeni Şafak 2018a). At the highest level, Erdoğan sent “sympathetic” messages to Rouhani, strongly supporting his moderate approach to help resolve the domestic crisis through democratic and peaceful means

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(Reuters 2018). This point was made official through a mention in a public statement issued by the TMFA. On 2 Jan. 2018, the TMFA expressed deep “concern” about the escalation of violence in neighboring Iran. Framing the Ankara-Tehran relationship as one of “friendship and brotherhood,” the TMFA called for refraining from local “provocations” and any kind of “external interventions” (TMFA 2018). Turkey’s neighborly support was well received by the Iranians (Yeni Şafak 2018a). In the emergent regional disorder, Ankara had no choice but to help Tehran as a good “neighbor” and a sincere “friend.” Turkey had to feel “like a giant firefighter” in order to put out “all fires fueled by imperial” powers (Esayan 2018). The missionary conceptualization of neighborly “feeling rules” would demand much higher affective commitments, which might be beyond Turkey’s potential outreach. The Astana peace process was still fragile, as the three neighbors have been collaborating for different international reasons (Friedman 2017). These regional differences resurfaced when Damascus spearheaded a military offensive in Idlib, where “Ankara deployed soldiers … to monitor a cease-fire between Syrian government forces and rebels.” The sense of “growing alarm” in Ankara was reflected by Çavuşoğlu saying, “Russia and Iran must stop the Syrian regime. They should realize their duties as guarantor countries.” On 9 Jan., the Russian and Iranian ambassadors were summoned by an official protest (Jones 2018). As a matter of fact, Ankara’s neighborly approach, striving for regional reconciliation, has not been reciprocated wholeheartedly by the Iranian side. On 21 Jan., when Turkey started the cross-border “Operation Olive Branch (Zeytin Dalı Operasyonu)” against the PKK (PYD/YPG) and the ISIS (DEASH) enclaves in northern Syria, Tehran began to display an “ambiguous” attitude. First and foremost, Iranian foreign and defense policy officials expressed full support to the Assad regime. “Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity” was emphasized, while “the protection of civilians” was deemed equally important. Thus, Tehran has shown opposition to the US presence and the Kurdish fait accompli for autonomous rule over northern Syria. In this regard, Iranians thought that the Turkish intervention should be short. Otherwise, the Turkish presence in Afrin would violate Syrian sovereignty and constitute a breach in international law (Salimipoor and Demir 2018; Akşam 2018). The hazy portrayal of political positions by the Iranian press has not only indicated the “eclipse in the minds” (Yeni Şafak 2018b), but also revealed the mixed management of hearts by Khamenei and Rouhani (Gündede 2018).

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Once again, Tehran was ruled by the feeling of disappointment, since the danger of increasing US sanctions has become much more imminent after 12 Jan. 2018. On that day, President Trump gave “a last chance … to fix the terrible flaws of the Iran nuclear deal.” If the key European allies could not support the remaking of sanctions through “a supplemental agreement,” President Trump would “withdraw from the deal immediately.” As he put it, those who “choose not to work with [them] will be siding with the Iranian regime’s nuclear ambitions, and against the people of Iran and the peaceful nations of the world” (White House 2018). The public statement displayed the political decisiveness in the White House not to further waive the implementation of sanctions against the Iranian regime. Since the AKP government has been embroiled in its own bilateral problems with the Trump administration, the shadow of American sanctions has not noticeably altered Ankara’s affective atmosphere. Washington’s sheltering of the top FETÖ agents and its collaboration with the PYD/YPG militants have reinforced Turkey’s affective investment into trilateral collaboration with Russia and Iran. President Trump’s exit from the JCPOA was an awaited decision. It came as no surprise then that the United States began to reimpose sanctions against the Iranian regime on 8 May 2018. The sanctions would enter into effect in two stages: the first beginning on 6 Aug. 2018, and the second starting on 5 Nov. 2018. Rather than assuming an intermediary role between Washington and Tehran, Ankara changed its former course of action and sought to receive certain exemptions from the US sanctions. Among seven other countries, Turkey has gained an exempt status, granted for certain oil sectors and to be valid for a definite period of time. The prevalent tendencies indicated that the Turkish government could continue to pursue multilateral policies to further enhance its strategic capabilities in energy management (Özdemir 2018). What comes out of technical-administrative decision-making processes is beyond the scope of this research. Yet, it is clear that Turkey would desperately need Iranian energy (natural gas and oil) resources for some time to come. Among other factors, energy concerns would much likely prime higher in shaping Ankara’s politics of neighborhood with Tehran and Moscow. In addition to energy security, the local instability in Syria has pushed the AKP government toward partnership with Russia as well as Iran. Notwithstanding the shadow of American sanctions under CAATSA, Erdoğan’s strategic engagement with Russian President Vladimir Putin has developed along a number of fronts, including the procurement of

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S-400 air defense missiles, establishing of new natural gas pipelines and building of a nuclear energy reactor in Turkey. These extensive contacts have enabled Putin to gain the upper hand in regional affairs, particularly over the resolution of the Syrian crisis along Russian global interests. The third party role played by Moscow has become quite influential in managing of the regional confrontation between Ankara and Tehran. The factorial dependence on Russia has influenced regional rules of engagement between the Turkish government and the Iranian regime. As Erdoğan and Putin got closer, Rouhani has been gradually sidelined from the trilateral picture of neighborhood diplomacy. Once again, the psycho-­ social milieu of Turkish-Iranian dyadic relations has been shaped by the global and regional politics of neighborhood. After the trilateral Ankara summit of 4 Apr. 2018, the Russian impact over the Turkey-Iran relationship has become much more evident. Before meeting with Rouhani, Erdoğan and Putin have joined the inauguration of the first Turkish nuclear plant in Akkuyu, Mersin. Erdoğan has proudly announced Turkey’s prospective participation into the privileged “family of nuclear nations.” Much praised was the collective Turkish-­ Russian “spirit of cooperation” that made the nuclear project possible. Erdoğan also expressed strong “determination” to enhance collaboration with the Russian government to work out regional issues, most notably to resolve the international conflict over Syria (Erdoğan 2018). As a matter of fact, the Euphrates basin has constituted the international lines of detachment between Russian and American spheres of influence inside Syria. On the western side of Euphrates, Turkey has developed military cooperation with Russia, which helped Ankara to counter the growing threat of PKK (PYD/YPG) terrorism on the eastern side of Euphrates. As Erdoğan acknowledged, both PKK and DEASH (ISIS) were used as covert tools to create fait accompli situations on the Syrian ground and, by extension, to serve American geopolitical interests in the Middle East (Habertürk 2018). Nonetheless, the Ankara summit on Syria has exposed the substantive limitations of the trilateral collaboration between Turkey, Russia and Iran. The diplomatic talks have failed to bring about a comprehensive road map for a political-military solution in Syria. Instead, the three parties expressed their shared diplomatic intentions to help the Syrian people through humanitarian assistance, medical aid and economic reconstruction. In these regards, the three leaders, particularly Putin, invited all other nations to take social responsibility in providing a peaceful, stable order, and

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restoring economic development in Syria. Putin’s diplomatic call has reiterated the financial dimension of peace building in Syria. At this point, Erdoğan re-emphasized the enormous socio-economic burden shouldered to host Syrian refugees in Turkey. While Erdoğan and Putin engaged empathetically on issues of financial burden-sharing, Rouhani seemed reluctant to speak on these matters. Instead, Rouhani took a position in defense of the Assad regime. He implied that Tehran and Damascus have still been struggling against the American-Israeli conspiracy, which was presumably sponsored by the Arab money flowing from the Gulf capitals (Habertürk 2018). The Iranian opposition to the US presence in Syria has intensified during the next trilateral meeting hosted by Tehran on 7 Sept. 2018. As Rouhani saw, collaboration with the Syrian government was the key for providing security and stability in the neighboring country. Rouhani’s framing of neighborhood with Syria implied trans-governmental solidarity rather than border contiguity. In this regard, he called for collective action against the “illegitimate” US presence and the “illegal” Israeli occupation in Syria. In contrast, Erdoğan emphasized the transboundary nature of Turkish-Syrian neighborhood. As Erdoğan framed it, the mounting “fire” in Idlib province has posed cross-border security risks for Syria and Turkey, and the larger region. Turkey has already been overwhelmed by the inflow of Syrian refugees. Any further migration movement would bring unbearable consequences for the Turkish government. For obvious reasons, Ankara’s aim was to “put out” this fire immediately. The Idlib issue could only be resolved through common commitments devoted along the collective “Astana spirit.” To protect innocent civilians living in Idlib, Erdoğan urged the immediate implementation of “cease-fire” by all parties, including terrorist groups, such as DEASH (ISIS), Al Nusra, Al Qaeda and their affiliates. Sharing similar concerns, Rouhani and Putin called for “disarmament” of all terrorists in Idlib (NTV 2018). The “Tehran Declaration” underlined the need to separate the terrorists from legitimate opposition forces, who would remain committed to the cease-fire regime in the Idlib de-escalation zone. The three leaders rejected new fait accompli situations to be created under “the guise of war on terror.” They also displayed a strong “determination to withstand against separatist agendas aimed at weakening of Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity and neighboring countries’ national security.” The Astana spirit of trilateral collaboration in Syria would drive the fourth round of high-level meetings to be hosted by President Putin (CNN Türk 2018b).

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As a matter of fact, Ankara and Tehran rounds of trilateral meetings have disclosed affective-normative differences in Turkish and Iranian diplomatic commitments that shaped the politics of neighborhood with Syria. The “affective atmosphere” of trilateral talks has  widened the psycho-­ social distance between the two capitals. Sentiments of disgust and rule of hate have determined the codes of Iranian resistance directed against the American-Zionist collusion over Syria. In contrast, Ankara has been ruled by fear and anger. Distress was emanating from the protracted instability in Turkey’s doorsteps. The Turkish resentment was fueled by furthering of US covert support to pan-Kurdist (PKK/YPG) militants inside Syria. To a certain extent, the situation in Syria remained fragile, due to different relational undertakings of Ankara and Tehran. For this reason, Erdoğan got closer to Putin rather than to Rouhani. After the trilateral Tehran meeting, Erdoğan once again reiterated the need to work further with Russia, as well as Germany and France (Türkiye 2018). The “Sochi Memorandum” reached with Russia made it easier for Turkey to provide cross-border stability in the Idlib de-escalation zone. In addition, Ankara and Moscow held joint desires to reap the benefits of the Astana format, by tying it to the broader political and humanitarian processes led by the UN in Geneva. As Putin and Erdoğan concurred correspondingly, the resolution of the Syrian crisis has entailed financial support from major European partners. Therefore, the psycho-social spirit of Astana has been overshadowed after ̇ the making of a new diplomatic ensemble in Istanbul. On 27 Oct. 2018, Turkey and Russia formed a quartet with Germany and France in order to enhance international political-economic efforts and pave the way for peace, security and stability in Syria (Orhan 2018). Regardless of the lip service paid by Putin and Erdoğan to the Iranian role over the resolution of the Syrian crisis (CNN Türk 2018c), Rouhani has been sidelined from the foursome diplomatic picture given from I ̇stanbul. The Iranian exclusion from the diplomatic table would imply the waning of Tehran’s regional clout. Coupled with resentment against the US-led global sanctions, strategic sidelining from multilateral diplomatic fora might intensify feelings of frustration and exacerbate psycho-social isolation in Iran. These implications would create certain consequences for local politics of neighborhood. International pressure might roll Tehran toward the path of confrontation in regional affairs. The Iranian reinforcement of regional rivalry might even overwhelm the ongoing progress in dyadic partnership between the Tehran and Ankara governments.

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Indeed, both neighbors have remained far from achieving regional cooperation based on common affective-relational aspirations. Despite the recent progress in economic transactions, Turkey and Iran had to take more substantial steps to establish practices of “complex interdependence.” On their own, Turkey and Iran still lack independent capabilities to constitute a new regional order in the Middle Eastern neighborhood (Pulat 2018; Aktaş 2018). There is still a long way ahead to build regional structures for full-fledged integration in the local neighborhood. Therefore, revisionary geopolitical projects for the Turkish-Iranian regional union (Çeçen 2005a, b, 2008) are still premature. Political-economic management of relational “asymmetries” is the key for “good neighborhood policies” in Turkish-Iranian relations. The bourgeoning collaboration in the “energy sector” might help to build a culture of confidence and to overcome the “chronic mistrust” embedded in the politics of Turkey-Iran neighborhood (Ünal and Ersoy 2014). More than anything, the process would require collective management of hearts through deep emotional interactions (Hochschild 1983/2012). In order to achieve joint economic ventures, dyadic “feeling rules” should be reconstructed through reciprocal affective commitments and mutual “emotion work” (Hochschild 1979). In the foreseeable future, local stability would be hard to come by. Regional reconciliation is not in the offing. As the historical evolution of the France-Germany relationship demonstrates, good fences and good neighbors should be made mutually. The construction of a commonly shared positive psycho-social atmosphere would help Turkish and Iranian governments to improve their affective-normative interactions ­considerably. By building better relational rules for economic integration, Ankara and Tehran would fully demonstrate their bilateral potential for trans-­ governmental cooperation and ultimately achieve international ̇ peace and regional development in the Middle East (Inat 2009; Koç 2012; Sayın 2015; Nasırı 2016). Over the coming decades, both capitals would display a stronger collective will to work together and fix the deontological (affective-­normative) fences, rather than the physical barriers, in their historical neighborhood. Undoubtedly, cross-border security is a mutual need. From a hard-line perspective, building barriers could well be justified by the military rationale of border surveillance. However, the long-term consequences of such projects might turn costly and counterproductive. Remember the Turkish military minefields over the Syrian border, which have become dysfunc-

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tional and created unforeseen burdens for Ankara. Indeed, wall-making practices do not neatly fit into the historical politics of Turkey-Iran neighborhood. By taking a societal security perspective, Turkish and Iranian politicians would develop a soft-line strategy to better help themselves to address transnational questions and resolve transboundary problems. The deeply rooted social psychology of their political neighborhood entails building of more efficient venues to enhance inter-communal interactions immediately beginning from the borderlands. To make the relational dreams of their founding fathers come true, the states of Turkey and Iran should seek new opportunities to accelerate the integration of the Caspian with the Mediterranean and the Black Sea basins. By moving along these lines, Ankara and Tehran could collectively work to achieve regional integration between the European and Asian neighborhoods and restore their regional role in the broader international neighborhood of the Silk Road.

Conclusion: Episodic Summary This chapter examined recent relational revisions in the Turkey-Iran neighborhood. Based on historical-historiographical evidence, I found two episodes salient for psycho-social analysis. The synopsis of my findings is charted in Table  5.1. The last empirical case study shows affective-­ normative ebbs and flows in Turkey-Iran partnership and rivalry. By looking at the psycho-social history of recent relational events, prevalent emotional entanglements are identified. For more than a decade, the Turkish-Iranian neighborhood has been ruled by populist politics of neo-­ conservatism. The trans-governmental practices of the 2006–2010 period exhibited the relational psyche of fear and compassion. Shared neo-­ conservative feeling rules have entangled with common global and regional concerns. Most manifestly, Ankara has adopted an unforeseen diplomacy of sympathy to ease Tehran’s tension in the nuclear crisis. These Table 5.1  Recent psycho-social revisions in the Turkey-Iran neighborhood Key episodes

Prevalent emotional entanglements

Dominant affective arrangements Relational contours

2006–2010

Fear-­ compassion Anger-honor

Sympathetic interactions Antipathetic transactions

2013–2017

Common concerns Mutual ambitions

Pragmatic collaboration Sectarian rivalry

Positional partnership Status competition

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sympathetic interactions in the nuclear field would have been inconceivable in earlier relational periods of Turkey-Iran neighborhood. Remember the fact that the late Iranian shah has cold-shouldered Turkish neighborly demands when Washington imposed dire sanctions on Ankara during the 1974–1978 period. Even though Ankara could never forget shah’s undermining of neighborly norms of help, harmful feelings of reprisal have not reigned long in Turkish hearts. In spite of growing US-led global sanctions over Iran, Turkey compassionately choose to side with its close neighbor, rather than its distant ally. The pragmatic basis of Turkish-­ Iranian collaboration has broadened due to the affective convergence of apprehensions in regional affairs. Interacting as Iraq’s neighbors, Turkish and Iranian governments attempted to preserve the cross-border status quo. Their positional partnership was driven by collective wariness about the deepening of local cooperation between the United States and the Iraqi Kurds. The Turkish-Iranian relational partnership has lost local resonance after the US withdrawal from Iraq, and the outbreak of consecutive civil wars in Iraq, and later in Syria. From the early stages of the Syrian conflict in 2013, Ankara and Tehran have pushed themselves toward oppositional poles. Instead of neighborhood solidarity, an anger-based sectarian spirit has gained more powerful ground in the Middle Eastern psycho-social milieu. Regional polarization, coupled with extra-regional interventions, has made it all the more sensitive for Turkey and Iran to preserve their own sense of pride. The ambitious politics of regional reputation and transnational honor have generated antipathetic transactions between the two sides. Even until 2017, divisive emotional exchanges have reloaded affective charges of rivalry in Turkey-­ Iran affairs. As a result, relational psychology of status competition has endured sentimentally, in spite of springing high-level Turkish-Iranian interactions in this episode and beyond.

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CHAPTER 6

Conclusion: Overall Findings and Research Recommendations

This book has traced historical-historiographical evidence to reinterpret psycho-social dynamics of partnership and rivalry in Turkey-Iran neighborhood relationship. The tracing of psycho-social history has focused on relational configuration of emotional entanglements and affective arrangements in key episodes. Following practical approaches of emotions historians (Stearns 2016; Rosenwein 2002, 2010), chronicles are taken as primary resources to analyze phenomenal entanglement of psycho-social sentiments and the affective arrangement of relational psyche in Turkish-­Iranian affairs. In my critical reading of historical-historiographical resources, I essentially looked at the politics of neighborhood in Turkey-Iran relations. Emotional-affective patterns of collaboration and confrontation are reviewed around relational events. In terms of ontology, relational examination is somewhat different from psychological analysis of decision-­ making. Relational psychology moves beyond embodied evidences of actual feeling in human practice. By assigning ontological priority to the history of relationships, psycho-social analysis foregrounds residual, non-­ embodied emotional constellations and latent, derivative affective implications. From this research perspective, international relationships are co-constituted by emotional discourses and affective contexts. The changes in psycho-social practices and structures mutually shape relational contours of historical phenomena. Here, the international inquiry seeks to uncover how emotional entanglements and affective arrangements co-­ extensively configure the history of relational events. © The Author(s) 2020 M. A. Kumral, Exploring Emotions in Turkey-Iran Relations, Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39029-7_6

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In the preceding empirical chapters, the psycho-social making of dyadic partnership and regional rivalry between the Ankara and Tehran governments have been explicated under the available light of historical data and historiographical evidence. Historical-historiographical accounts have provided main points of entry for exploring emotions in Turkey-Iran interactions. With minimal argumentative interventions, the empirical chapters usually followed a narrative style. Based on an introductory research framework, episodic findings are summarized in each chapter’s conclusion. The Conclusion chapter of this monograph aims to relocate the overall relational history onto the ground of psycho-social theory introduced in Chap. 1. At this point, I follow the “pragmatic” processes of conceptual critique and comparative synthesis adopted in various strands of “grounded theory” research (Timonen et  al. 2018; Charmaz 2017; Coicaud 2016; Tucker 2016; Eznack 2012; Zarakol 2011; Hudson 2005). Here, my analytical purpose is both critical and comparative. First, I aim to better delineate cross-episodic threads in psycho-social history of Turkey-Iran neighborhood. Second, I seek to provide further conceptual insights and to make a more generalizable theoretical contribution to the literature on international emotional-affective phenomena. Along these lines, the chapter’s first part provides overall findings reached by this long durée single case study. The psycho-historical implications of four relational myths (Özsoy twin sons tale, cold shoulders saga, the 1514 Çaldıran myth and the 1639 Kasr-ı Şirin story) are reinterpreted critically and comparatively. Building on these critical and comparative observations, the second part presents theoretical interventions and offers a tentative proposal for further research in comparative case studies. I recommend the building of more holistic meta-theoretical frameworks to reconceptualize the categorical nexus of narrativity, emotionality, affectivity, normativity and relationality.

Cross-Episodic Empirical Findings: Critical and Comparative Observations By looking at Turkey-Iran neighborhood narratives over the past century, I found four relational myths salient for psycho-social analysis: (1) Returning back to the primordial times of Turkish-Iranian relations, the foundational Özsoy legend recast an eternal kinship between twin brothers.

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(2) Reminding everyone of the imperial Ottoman-Safavid battle in 1514, the Çaldıran myth reproduced an enduring sectarian conflict between the two states. (3) Referring to the imperial peace accord of 1639, the Kasr-ı Şirin narrative has reinvented the “law of primeval neighborhood (kadim komşuluk hukuku)” naturally governing the Turkey-Iran international relationship. (4) The cold shoulders saga reconstructed the 1949–1978 period of regressive alignment in Turkish-Iranian affairs. The Özsoy tale of twin sons has been reproduced in the golden 1934–1938 era of progressive engagement in the Turkey-Iran neighborhood. In this episode, secular solidarity has been founded on soft-line affectivity. Dyadic diplomacy has been built by positive emotional norms of brotherly love and trust. In contrast, the cold shoulders saga has entangled with the negative emotionality of dyadic jealousy and resentment, and caused affective degeneration in Ankara-Tehran regional alignment. The relational regression exacerbated by emergent oil crises (1949–1953, 1973–1978) resulted in lost years. Based on cross-episodic observations, I argue that the Çaldıran mythology has left a longer psycho-social influence over the historical course of Turkish-Iranian interactions. This extraordinary temporal impact could well be associated with psychological-pedagogical implications of official history textbooks (Alaca 2015; Çelik and Çelik 2015) and popular political-­literary writings (Doğan 1996). In any case, the 1514 tragedy has become a central story of hard-line sectarianism, notwithstanding soft-line bilateral reactions. By taking this tragic battle at its relational baseline, the sectarian psyche informs isolationist policies in the Turkey-Iran neighborhood. Regardless of its contentious storyline, the Çaldıran cliché captures neighboring hearts so resonantly. It could serve various propaganda purposes. The propagandist aims might even exploit popular emotions on both sides of the border. For these reasons, the Çaldıran myth easily generates relational implications over the bottom-up spectrum, which extends from deep, dormant affective rules to vibrant emotional norms circulating on the diplomatic surface. For example, even though the sectarian logic seemed dormant, the Çaldıran memory came to surface in subtle forms of dyadic disgust and confrontational exchange, as witnessed during the territorial disputes of 1926–1930. Quite similarly, the dark days of 1996–1999, experienced as diplomatic duels, have indicated the Çaldıran psychology deep seated in the Ankara-Tehran social relationship. The reformative period of 1979–1988 has seen how sectarianism resurfaced in emotional norms of

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fear. The affective rule of anxiety has led to reciprocal restraint and reluctant engagement between Turkey and Iran. The Çaldıran psyche turned more harmful when it deeply entangled with affective anger. The politics of antagonism, coupled with regional status ambitions, has driven positional rivalry in the Turkish-Iranian neighborhood. This has been the relational case at revisionist times such as 1989–1995 and 2008–2018. More recently, the Turkish side liked to deploy a new narrative. Probably, the Kasr-ı Şirin story was invented as an emotional-affective antidote against the nagging Çaldıran mythos. The euphoric peace in 1639 has been taken as the zero point of the Turkey-Iran relationship. The presumed peacefulness of trans-communal neighborhood was tied to the strategic nature of territorial bordering between two countries. It seems that the transnational trauma was not addressed emotively. Instead of investing in collective happiness or joy, the Kasr-ı Şirin truism has entangled with surface sentiments such as bilateral status concerns and shared conservative compassion. I contend that this half-hearted spirit has yet to overcome the Çaldıran challenge. Far from rehabilitating affective fences of neighborhood, let alone building the long-needed confidential climate for cross-cultural integration, the constructed consciousness of Kasr-ı Şirin has only helped to justify interactive collaboration between Ankara and Tehran, when indeed the two capitals stuck in sectarian confrontation converging consecutively over neighboring Iraq, and then Syria. The lack of sectarian trust still fuels regional rivalry in Turkey-Iran exchange relations. As Table  6.1 shows, these four historical narratives portray psycho-­ social episodes of neighborhood between two nation-states. These relational myths constituted reference points for psycho-historical, comparative observations. During the century-long Ankara-Tehran interactions, the emotional “display rules” have changed as the affective-normative context of the diplomatic relations has transformed. In the early formative years, deep acting was the norm. Hence, it was more conventional to deliberately use emotional expressions and discharge affective commitments in diplomatic talks. This was quite understandable given the fact that both the Ankara and Tehran governments have been struggling to resuscitate their relationship for their own survival. In those stormy years, norms of fear, honor and anger have been mixed to govern deep “feeling rules” (Hochschild 1979) in diplomatic exchange and official engagements. Turbulent times created a more conducive social-psychological context for deployment of affective-normative jargon and emotional-moral messages,

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Table 6.1  Psycho-social history of Turkey-Iran neighborhood relations Neighborhood narratives

Affective arrangements

Özsoy legend Soft-secular (twin sons solidarity tale) Cold shoulders saga

Çaldıran myth Strong-­ (war in 1514) sectarian psyche

Kasr-ı Şirin Half-hearted story (peace in spirit 1639)

Emotional entanglements

Relational configurations

Historical episodes

Brotherly love-trust

Progressive partnership

Golden era (1934–1938)

Dyadic jealousy-resentment

Degenerative alignment

Oil crises-lost years (1949–1953, 1973–1978) Dormant disgust Confrontational Territorial exchange disputes (1926–1930) Diplomatic duels-dark days (1996–1999) Surface Reciprocal Reluctant Reformative fear restraint engagement period (1979–1988) Deep  Mutual Positional rivalry Revisionist anger ambitions times (1989–1995, 2008–2018) Bilateral concerns-­ Interactive shared compassion collaboration

which mutually shaped sensitive signaling practices in diplomatic discourse and the contextual climate of political interaction. Emotional-moral codes of conduct and customary affective-normative commitments have shaped psycho-social making of relational rules between the two neighboring governments. The trans-governmental structures and practices have revealed two modes of interaction. The contours of the Ankara-Tehran relationship have been co-constituted by both right-wing/hard-line and left-leaning/soft-line political tendencies. Complex cultural habituation of nationalistic “self-esteem,” economic “self-interest” and military “self-restraint” in security affairs have determined customary codes of collaboration and confrontation. That is to say, the Turkey-Iran neighborhood has displayed ambiguous social-­ psychological characteristics of relational partnership and rivalry.

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In hindsight, this psycho-social complexity could be attributed to the sectarian Sunni-Shii divisions between the two nations. However, majority of Turks and Iranians are part of the Islamic culture that calls for good neighborhood relations (Türkmen 2016). Good neighbors help, but not hurt, each other. The Ankara-Tehran political neighborhood demonstrated a mixed historical record. Both good and bad practices have shaped complex rules of the Turkey-Iran international game. Notwithstanding their domestic differences, the Turkish and Iranian nation-states have developed political culture of peaceful coexistence. Yet, their struggle for regional influence in the Middle East has not abated. As two non-Arab political entities, Turkey and Iran sought to carve rival geopolitical spheres in neighboring Arab countries, namely, Iraq and Syria. Over the last decades, the enduring conditions of war in Iraq and Syria have increased the risks of military conflict between Turkey and Iran. So far, it seems that Ankara and Tehran have mutually managed to control their rivalry in the Middle East. Some of the relational damages were controlled, and some of them repaired. The historical condition of fences reflects signs of good and bad neighborhood. Cases of altruistic political assistance have been rare. On the other hand, both sides learned to refrain from overtly harming each other. The reciprocal reluctance not to directly hurt each other does not preclude the reemergence of a local confrontation any time sooner or later. Affective empathy and altruistic normative commitment have not been established on both sides of the Turkish-Iranian border. Neighboring governments have not yet achieved deontological (emotional-moral) norms of sincere cultural friendship. Dyadic partnership is still based on self-interests, lacking truly collective intention to sustain mutual economic development. Along these lines, the following two sub-sections dissect the psycho-social puzzles of dyadic partnership and regional rivalry in the Turkish-Iranian international neighborhood. Ankara-Tehran Dyadic Partnership: Affective-Normative Configuration of Bilateral Collaboration The century-long Turkey-Iran neighborhood has produced relational rules and configured affective codes of political collaboration between Ankara and Tehran. Most of the time, the two neighboring capitals have displayed trans-governmental commitment to pursue a collaborative mode of engagement. The interactive psycho-social space of Turkish-Iranian partnership has been governed in a shared “affective atmosphere” (Anderson 2009; Michels 2015) filled by core feelings such as fear and desire.

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 utual Making of Fear: Shared Rules for Security Cooperation M Due to border contiguity, Turkey and Iran have shared a “common fate” in their geopolitical neighborhood. They have displayed similar anxieties regarding their bigger neighbor in the north. In addition to Russian regional expansion, Ankara and Tehran also held common fears about Anglo-American local interventions. Shared perceptions about the bad intentions of the third parties have led the bilateral security cooperation between both capitals. Particularly in the periods of 1918–1928 and 2000–2018, Moscow has played a more dominant role in supporting the Ankara-Tehran axis. The Turkish-Iranian neighborhood has experienced relative local autonomy in the era of 1929–1938. These “golden years” were achieved by exploiting regional opportunities of multi-polarity and reaping international advantages of the British-German rivalry and the gradual rise of American influence in world politics. During the early Cold War years (1945–1960), the Turkish-Iranian regional rapprochement was formed under Anglo-American tutelage to contain the Soviet threat in the northern tier. During the détente and demise phases of bipolar world order (1961–1999), jointly constructed Russo phobia and Soviet hatred have dissipated gradually. Even at times of regional alliance, such as the Baghdad Pact, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), Turks and Iranians held similar suspicions about each other’s global engagements with Moscow and Washington. That is to say, global psycho-social climate has bred dyadic distrust in Ankara-Tehran interactions. Yet, it was not global but rather regional fears that configured stronger security affiliation between the two neighboring nation-states. Both sides shared their anxiety about instability in transboundary Kurdish areas inside their territorial borders. These cross-border concerns were compounded by the growing fear about pan-Kurdist local ambitions. Initially, the Kurdish tribal revolts of 1920–1930 period have led to the re-demarcation of political boundaries between the Turkish and Iranian governments. The enduring conflictual relations between Iran and Iraq, which later turned into an inter-state war in the 1980–1988 period, have dramatically transformed the international making of the Kurdish question. The Iranian covert support extended to the local Kurdish militia forces in northern Iraq has always been a serious concern for Ankara. When Turkey’s national security was challenged by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party [Partia Karkaren Kurdistan]) terrorism between 1984 and 1990, Tehran turned a blind eye and cold-shouldered its neighbor. The Gulf War (1991) has

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changed the geopolitical picture. The US regional policies exerted enormous influence on the Iraqi regime and hence on the Turkey-Iran neighborhood. After the Iraq War (2003), the growing American collaboration with Iraqi Kurds has reignited old fears about the territorial partitioning of Iraq and the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the north. This collective political fear has ultimately cemented Turkey-Iran security cooperation against the common threat of Kurdish terrorism posed by the PKK and the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistane [PJAK]). Due to the sanctions regime imposed by Washington, Ankara and Tehran got closer as well. Given the upsurge of popular Arab revolts in 2011, Turkish-Iranian trans-governmental fears have been exacerbated, particularly due to cross-­ border terrorist activities and the international conditions of war encircling this time Syria as well as Iraq. In recent years, the restoration of high-level military engagement between Ankara and Tehran has gained strategic prominence. However, the bilateral military rapprochement of two neighbors has been overshadowed by multilateral diplomatic efforts to resolve conflict in Syria, namely, the Russia-led trilateral Astana talks and the Geneva international negotiations endorsed by the United States. Over the coming years, the global rivalry between Moscow and Washington might exacerbate the international conflict over Syria. The local implications would be first felt by Ankara and later by Tehran. As far as it could be seen today, it would not be too far-fetched to predict the likelihood of enhanced bilateral military cooperation between Turkey and Iran to manage local instability according to the shared rules of fear surrounding their regional neighborhood. It is more likely that the two neighbors would diverge in terms of their political preferences within the global security architecture. Turkey’s military anchoring within the Western alignment, read the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), would not be challenged socially and psychologically, except for the emergence of extreme cases of depriving international dissatisfaction and debilitating regional despair. With the rejuvenation of US-led Western sanctions against the Iranian regime, Tehran’s pro-Eastern military orientation will not shift any time soon. The globally divisive nature of military social psychology would make it harder for the Turkish and Iranian governments to work together, and would definetely  preclude the  two capitals from  leading the collective construction of affective-­ normative commitments necessary for building stronger security regimes and establishing a sustainable peaceful order in their regional neighborhood.

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 ollective Production of Economic Desires: Affective Cultures C of Bilateral Trade Economic affairs require affective-normative investments as well as material resources and financial instruments. The economic habitus of state neighborhoods creates affective cultures that shape normative structures and practices of bilateral trade. Not all commercial interactions end up with the neoliberal climate of complex interdependence. More often than not, complicated affective commitments and the heteronomous rule of psycho-social exchange co-extensively shape the trans-cultural politics of inter-state trade. Even though Turkish and Iranian economies display structural complementarity, the bilateral capacity of production and the local potential of consumption are not fully exhausted. Despite the fact that the French and German nation-state building models have been emulated by Ankara and Tehran (Erden 2017), both capitals have remained far from mimicking comprehensive economic cooperation as best practiced by Paris and Berlin and their European neighbors. Indeed, Turkish Prime Minister Özal has envisioned to transform the Turkish-Iranian border toward economic integration as observed between France and Germany (Bleda 2000: 128). The vast geo-economic spaces of Anatolia and Persia still await for trans-regional integrative rule-making, notwithstanding institutional initiatives of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). Indeed, the economic integration of the Caspian basin with the Black Sea and the Mediterranean has long been an unfulfilled dream shared by both Turkish and Iranian leaders. The traditional Silk Road neighborhood could well be rejuvenated by restoration of regional trade in Tebriz-­ ̇ Trabzon and Tebriz-Iskenderun transport routes. The trans-cultural economy and positive psychology of neighborly integration would alleviate the age-old Iranian paranoia about Azeri irredentism and pan-Turkist unionism. Yet, Ankara and Tehran have remained far from trans-­governmental economic cooperation and regional integration. The two neighboring governments have a long way to fully exploit their bilateral potential (Nasırı 2016; Sayın 2015). For these reasons, geopolitical proposals for TurkishIranian regional union (Çeçen 2005a, b, 2008) have proved premature. From the outset, the two nation-states would need a commonly shared market, a strong collective financial base and established economic rules to make their unfulfilled dream come true. Even under relatively more conducive historical conditions, the golden era of Turkish-­Iranian progressive engagement, climaxed with the formation of the Eastern Pact in 1937, has remained short-lived. Later economic endeavors have not kept up with the

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shared spirit of mutual development, as established between two foundational leaders Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Shah Reza Pahlavi. At least so far, the ECO has institutionally failed to establish free trade regulations among the member states. In fact, the national restrictions imposed by Tehran are based on self-interests, which still create a negative psychological impact on Turkey’s economic policies toward Iran. Foremost, the customary rules of reciprocity and the economic norms of “preferential trade agreement” would call Tehran to balance Ankara’s deficits. Potentially, the affective-normative improvement of Turkey-Iran bilateral exchange relations would be key for larger economic interactions and broader social progress in the Middle Eastern and the North African neighborhoods, extending from the Gulf of Hormuz to the Straits of Gibraltar. This could be seen as a more healthy social-psychological development for regional stability, including Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and global peace including most prominently the permanent five (the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China) plus Germany. It remains to be seen whether future generations of Turks and Iranians would come of age and commit themselves to collective “emotion work” (Hochschild 1979) and put necessary “affective investment” (Solomon 2014) into joint ventures for such historical development in their neighborhood. In the short term, political stakes are high largely due to the economic embargos reimposed on Iran. Over the long run, the international sanctions regime would more likely turn counterproductive. In any case, changing the culture of neighborhood would better drive political-economic integration of Iranian society into the community of nations. Good fences of international trade could help make good inter-state neighborhoods. It does not matter whether political neighbors exchange with local currencies or return to gold standards, or perhaps even use bit coins. Turkey-Iran Regional Rivalry: Emotional-Moral Constellation of Local Confrontation Opposites attract; parallels repel each other. This rule of thumb applies to social psychology of trans-governmental interactions between Turkey and Iran. The historical record tells us a complex story. Let’s dissect the complicated whole into more palpable pieces. This heuristic move would allow us to distill more generalizable propositions also applicable to other cases of international neighborhood relationships. Two human modes of psycho-­social conduct can be observed in the politics of Turkish-Iranian

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neighborhood. Strong hard-line interaction tendencies were reciprocated mutually. The two neighbors have displayed deep emotional commitments for regional influence. The political mobilization of anger and jealousy has eroded the normative makeup of neighborhood. The local confrontation and political rivalry have been more acute in the Middle East and intensely felt over Iraq and Syria. The constellation of confrontational climate has made it all the more difficult for the two rivals to build collective confidence in their neighborhood. Weak soft-line emotional exchanges between Ankara and Tehran could only help manage mutual mistrust. It seems that both capitals have not let negative emotions, like dyadic resentment, govern their relationship. However, the two neighboring governments have failed to generate positive sentiments, like collective confidence, enduring in Turkish-Iranian affairs. This psychological lack still constitutes a lingering predicament for the Turkey-Iran social relationship. Sensibly, this perennial problem of relational ruling needs to be grappled by younger generations of politicians assuming power on both sides of the common border.  mbedded Envy and Accumulating Anger: Affective Competition E for Regional Influence The analogy of “twin sons” best captures the feeling rules between Turks and Iranians. The founder of modern Turkey Atatürk was himself involved in reconstructing the mythology of the twin sons during Reza Shah’s historic visit in 1934. The first Turkish opera Özsoy ran the mythic story between the two historical neighbors. The affective aim of the diplomatic drama was to rebuild emotional solidarity and to overcome the negative impact of political feelings accumulated during the past imperial era. By breaking ties with the imperial past, including the dyadic disaster of Ottoman-Safavid jealousy and the regional tragedy of greed deeply entangled in the 1514 battle of Çaldıran (Genç 2011; Bilge 2010), President Atatürk and Reza Shah have attempted to manage hearts through psycho-­ social reconstruction of Turkish-Iranian relationship in pre-Islamic ages. Those trans-governmental practices have helped to overcome sectarian schisms and construct a climate of positive envy, rather than negative ­jealousy. This affective atmosphere has facilitated progressive solidarity and productive engagement between both sides. However, the social psychology of twin neighbors has displayed sentiments of uneasiness and required the remaking of relational rules in several time periods. These emotional episodes reflect the embedded nature of envy built into the Turkey-Iran

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relationship. The international politics of Ankara-Tehran neighborhood has revolved around the dyadic control of greed and regional management of resentment. This has been the case since the twin neighbors share quite similar characteristics in terms of emotional cultures. National “self-esteem” has been a predominant emotional value shaping political judgments in Turkey and Iran. In each country, social status and psychological prestige are the main sources of human honor. Affective norms of power play an important role in the making of political status in the two neighboring cultures. The primary motivation driving each society is the individualistic sense of power. The political engineering of power strongly supports a culture of “self-help.” Usually, the haves and have-­ nots did condition the rule of “possessive jealousy” (Wendt 1999). In rare instances, social recognition and the psychological management of jealousy have prevented the risks of direct military confrontation between the two neighboring nation-states. Both neighbors have always looked at the other side of the fence to mirror their own national power and social status. The salient mirror images are reinforced by particular politics of local nationalisms. Even though the pan-Turkist phobia was prevalent in Tehran, Reza Khan did not display any hesitation while requesting military aid from the Ankara government. He highly respected Mustafa Kemal’s military career as well as his extraordinary political leadership. The enormous pace of Turkish modernization has always been a source of envy for Reza Shah. Nonetheless, he learned by doing how difficult it was for the Tehran government to “keep up with the Kemalists” in Ankara. The domestic opposition did pose a radical challenge against the Iranian regime. The hard-line resistance movement was supported by strong social strata of traditional merchants and conservative clerics. Thus, the Iranian political house had to be founded on rules of absolute monarchy rather than popular republic. Interestingly enough, the foundational differences in regime types have not caused serious dyadic conflict. As a matter of fact, the new regimes have tested their relations during the cross-border Kurdish tribal revolts, known as the Simko affair of the 1920–1930 period. On the brink of a limited local warfare, when Ankara began to deploy anger, Reza Shah deliberately refrained from diplomatic escalation. The recognition of weaker relational status has made the Iranian leader take a low-profile approach toward Turkey. Reza Shah’s altruistic attitude, together with soft-line Iranian diplomacy, has helped Tehran to resolve the cross-border

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security crisis and save friendly neighborhood relations with Ankara. The re-demarcation of borders through mutually favorable land swaps has opened wider political avenues for regional rapprochement between the two capitals. The Saadabad Pact of 1937 markedly indicates how managed jealousy and controlled anger have prevented the two neighbors from regression into regional rivalry. In spite of foundational commitments, Turkey and Iran have fallen back to the international trap of degenerative jealousy under the impact of the Cold War. For Mohammed Reza Shah, Turkey’s privileged social status, endowed specifically by NATO membership, has been a source of political envy. Under the affective rule of ambition, the Iranian regime has built a special strategic relationship with the US government. Through US patronage the Shah has gained the upper hand in regional geopolitics. The Shah has turned toward self-centric political aspirations such as power accumulation and local domination. Driven by sentiments of primacy, Iran aimed to outdo Turkey’s strategic power. These hard-line policies turned counterproductive and caused the undoing of neighborly norms. The psycho-social distance between Tehran and Ankara has increasingly widened regardless of their pro-Western regional alignments. After the Turkish military intervention into northern Cyprus in 1974, the Turkish government was faced with severely damaging US embargoes. At a time of urgent need, the Iranian Shah has not displayed empathy toward the immediate needs of his neighboring political counterparts. He seemed more interested in meeting US regional demands. Indeed, the Shah himself was cognizant of the psycho-social implications of historical neighborhood with Turkey. On several diplomatic occasions, he prudently stated that “when Turkey sneezes, Iran catches cold” (Tülümen 1998: 8, 139). In fact, this happened to be the dyadic case particularly during the 1977–1979 period. The psycho-social interactions of Turkish-Iranian opposition groups might have probably facilitated mass radicalization through the spreading of “affective contagion” (Ross 2014) among two neighbors. The revolutionary radicalization of mass politics has contaminated Turkish-Iranian neighborhood relations like an infectious disease. The ailing governments have remained far from recovering themselves, let alone managing their relationship. Coupled with other domestic sources of psycho-social discontent, the overreliance on Washington’s political support has caused the fall of the Pahlavi regime in 1979. The Islamic republic instituted by the Iranian revolutionaries has become an anathema for the staunchly secular pro-­

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Western Turkish military elite that assumed power after the 1980 coup. Furthermore, Tehran’s anti-American posture has put the two neighbors at odds with each other. In this confrontational setting, Turkish President Evren was not affectively inspired by the modern milieu of bilateral friendship co-founded between two disparate (monarchical and republican) regimes during the 1930–1938 period. To settle scores with the anti-­ secular Iranian Supreme Leader Khomeini, Evren anachronistically turned back to the pre-modern era and rekindled bitter memories of the 1514 Çaldıran battle. Deep-seated antipathies resurfaced gradually in media battles and the reciprocal exchange of negative emotions turned toward antagonistic directions. Soft liners’ relational impact remained relatively weak during the 1980–2000 period. From the outset, the revolutionary radicalism in Iranian foreign policy was perceived as a threat by the Turkish national security establishment. Every so often, Tehran has been accused of interfering with domestic affairs and inciting instability in Turkey. These negative perceptions were exacerbated by Iranian covert support for the PKK (Özcan 1999) and clandestine connections with the “Kurdish Hezbollah” (Kurt 2017). The Iranian government has also strengthened secret ties with the Syrian regime and consolidated its strategic alliance with the Lebanese Hezbollah. Therefore, Turkey sought regional partners for security cooperation. The growing of military ties between Turkey and Israel has led to international polarization in regional affairs. Consequently, an affective atmosphere of enmity has ruled over the Middle Eastern neighborhood. Soft-line policymakers coming from either the left or the right could not challenge the psycho-social reign of anger and disgust in the Turkey-Iran neighborhood. Ecevit and Khatami have remained far from establishing a leftist-reformist dyadic solidarity. Erbakan and Rafsanjani have failed to achieve conservative-Islamist regional collaboration. The period of 1980–2000 has shown how feelings of anger and resentment remain so strong and how they deeply mobilize hard-line tendencies in Turkish-Iranian interactions. Over the recent years, Turkey and Iran have entered into a new phase of regional struggle to dominate the Middle Eastern neighborhood through cultural and communicative assets of public diplomacy (Mohebi 2015). Both neighbors have habitually tested their international capacities of soft and hard power. Erdoğan’s anti-Israel rhetoric has posed a challenge for Ahmadinejad’s anti-Zionist stance. Both leaders sought to win Palestinian hearts and achieve influence over the Arab streets. The

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affective-­normative competition did not die down after the Arab uprisings. Quite the contrary, Ankara accused Tehran of sponsoring Shii radicalism in Iraq and supporting the sectarian warfare, unleashed by the Assad regime, in Syria. Turkey’s political engagement with the Syrian opposition and military collaboration with the Free Syrian Army and its enlarging cross-border operations have been read by Iran as yet another regional sign of neo-Ottomanism. It is still the case that sectarian social psychology reinforces secular rules of confrontation between rivaling regimes. As long as this affective atmosphere persists, hard-line tendencies would determine competitive modes of interaction in the Turkey-Iran trans-governmental neighborhood.  ack of Local Confidence: Management of Mistrust Within L a Confrontational Climate It is not the feelings themselves but how they are managed that makes relational difference and shape the political outcomes. Uncontrolled annoyance hurts the relationship, while managed anger helps collective mobilization. The same feelings create divergent contextual consequences depending on how they are managed trans-governmentally. In the case of the Turkey-Iran relationship, both sides have learned to work within a confrontational regional climate. Time and again, mutual mistrust has governed relational rule-making. The local habituation of this negative psychology prevents natural progression in the Turkish-Iranian political neighborhood. A radical sea change in the Middle Eastern security culture will not come effortlessly. Regional challenges still lie ahead. The way forward is not easy. It is up to rule-makers governing the political houses in both countries. Their feeling rules and affective-normative commitments ultimately determine the future trajectory of the Turkey-Iran relationship. Since the political houses in Ankara and Tehran have historically overseen their relations along rules of “self-restraint” and damage control, they could take further political steps to build confidence around their neighborhood. Human socialization starts from the house and extends toward neighboring houses (Akın 2014). The social space of neighborhood becomes a “relational reality” through shared feelings. Emotional exchange creates collective psycho-social sentiments among human ­neighbors. Mutual “trust” is the most salient “social capital” of psychological neighborhood (Aydemir 2014). These assertions can be applied to state neighbors as well. Political neighborhood relationships are qualitatively shaped in the emergent social space in between two or more states.

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Expectedly, progress toward a positive psychology in the Middle Eastern neighborhood would entail strong affective-normative commitments to transform domestic, dyadic and regional politics. Trans-governmental rule-making structures and practices should promote relational empathy in all possible ways. The strategic hearts (and minds) need to be set toward the security culture of other-help. The political logic of altruistic assistance has to govern neighborly interactions in more comprehensive ways, rather than being only confined to humanitarian aid and disaster relief under conditions of emergency. Public diplomacy and popular exchanges are still key for the development of cultural relations. Bottom-up developments in non-governmental, public-to-­ public and face-to-face social interactions would help to improve affective-­ normative politics of neighborhood between Turkey and Iran. Repairing of relational damages takes longer times. Fixing of fences requires enormous effort from all sides. Initially, the digital exchange of positive emogies in cyberspace may offer little help. Hopefully, the current lack of bilateral confidence could be overcome by new generations of Turks and Iranians, building better relations in their old neighborhood. The digital transformation of international neighborhoods through new media would be an interesting topic for further research. The following theoretical interventions provide preliminary recommendations in these respects.

Theoretical Interventions: Recommendations for Further Research Even though new mediums of social communication emerge, human hearts are managed through old feeling rules of relational psychology. Historical analyses of affective-normative structures and practices help to relocate how rules of emotional exchange govern international relations in world neighborhoods. Broadening of historical investigations on regional relationships would provide critical conceptual insights to advance constructivist theories of international politics. The psycho-social history approach opens up new vistas for comparative researching of emotions in trans-cultural studies. Historical inquiry into the social psychology of international relations tells us a great deal of many interesting things about how we should make sense of the intertextual-contextual implications of “emotionality” (Ahmed 2004) and “affectability” (Kopytko 2004) in world politics. This approach enables tracing of how feeling rules and

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affective rule mutually constitute one another and transform emotional-­ moral configuration of relational discourse and interactive context within which official diplomacy takes place. Qualitative inquiring of the immediate “neighborhood effect” (Gartzke 2003) helps to identify local cultures of socialization in international politics. The psycho-social transformation of “neighborhood culture” (Koyuncu 2014) in the Turkey-Iran dyad reveals important insights to understand the broader implications of international socialization within regional communities of political neighbors and a global society of world neighborhood. In this regard, the Turkey-Iran contiguous dyad is categorically distinctive as it presents cultural qualifications of similarity and difference. Coming to these more general points of discussion, I realize that these cross-episodic observations call for re-grounding of comparative history within broader theoretical investigations. Here, I offer a tentative outline for future research. My proposal is summarized in Table 6.2. This provisional design refocuses on discursive-contextual “pathways” of emotional entanglements and affective arrangements in world politics (Hall and Ross 2015). These emotional-affective contours can be better grasped by returning to ontological theories of “narrativity” and “relationality” (Somers 1994). In terms of epistemology, revisiting recent advances in “practice theory” (Adler 2019; Adler and Pouliot 2011) would better inform international making of communicative-performative “emotionality,” cross-communal “affectivity” and trans-cultural “normativity” (Mattern 2011, 2014). Regarding methodology, the “narrative” approach provides a productive angle to review conceptual linkages among sub-categories of emotional-affective-normative phenomena (Kleres 2011). Table 6.2  Tentative outline for future research in comparative case studies Narrativity

Emotionality

Affectivity

Weak investments Identification

Surface emoting Vibrant sentiments Sympathy Optimism

Normativity

Relationality

Norms of help Approach

Progression

Differentiation Antipathy

Pessimism

Avoid

Strong resonance

Dormant arrangements

Rules of harm

Deep entanglements

Integration-­collaboration-­ engagement Containment-­ confrontation-­isolation Regression

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Overall, I reiterate a scholarly need for more holistic meta-­theoretical synthesis. A fine-tuned framework of meta-theory, combining cross-disciplinary insights from “relational” researches (Slaby 2019; Fuhse 2018; Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005; Kopytko 2004), would help to relocate the nexus of narrativity, emotionality, affectivity, normativity and relationality in international affairs. Indeed, there are encouraging case studies (Skonieczny 2018; Clément et al. 2017; Subotić 2016) that suggest likely contributions of psycho-historical explorations for meta-­theoretical emotions research in international diplomacy. The historically grounded theoretical contribution of Table  6.2 may further assist comparative analyses of dyadic diplomacy. I found that the dyad of Turkey-Iran exposes both European and Asian cultures of neighborhood. It can be compared with both European and Asian dyads. Promising comparative studies might delve into the France-Germany and China-Japan cases. For historical reasons, I see the France-Germany historical pair as having more comparable psycho-social qualities. Even though modern Turkish and Iranian political houses have been built along the nationalist state traditions of France and Germany (Erden 2017), relational rule-­ making between Ankara and Tehran has not reached the relatively high normative level of European neighborhood. This is quite striking when one thinks of the impact of historical damages incurred on Franco-German interactions. After their belligerence in the two world wars, France and Germany have displayed a strong relational will to overcome their political enmity, which helped to transform their neighborhood relationship toward affective friendship and normative unity (Friend 1991; Krotz 2002; Cole 2014). Even though Ankara and Tehran have not directly fought a war against each other, they could not build collective confidence in the conflict-­ridden Middle Eastern neighborhood. The war proneness in regional security affairs might be viewed as the local source of psycho-­social weakness observed in TurkishIranian trans-governmental relations. These comparative arguments open up new vistas for critical-constructivist studies on international neighborhoods. On International Studies of Neighborhoods: Foregrounding Relational Psychology in Constructivism Constructivist social psychology offers a broader conceptual perspective to observe international neighborhood as a complex constellation of contextual practices configured in between collaborative partnership and con-

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frontational rivalry. The conceptual framework of constructivist social psychology indicates important clues about contextual rule-making in neighborhood relations. Social-psychological practices constitute complex structural-cultural rules of neighborhood game. These trans-cultural facts and international realities can be grasped through deeper analyses of relational cases. In this regard, the long-term historical examination of Turkey-­ Iran interactions reveals how emotional-affective commitments shape social-psychological episodes in neighborhood relations. Over the past century, Turkish-Iranian emotional-affective entanglements have determined episodic contours of their psycho-social interactions. Since both sides have displayed common affective dispositions, they have been able to manage local relations under the operating rules of global “heteronomy” (Onuf 1989). This might not come as a surprise given the predominance of “Lockean systemic culture” (Wendt 1999) over contemporary world politics. Largely due to the concomitant processes of nationalist-capitalist development, modern states have established local neighborhood cultures to govern their regional relations. What is more interesting is that these indigenous relational cultures prove their political resilience even under strong globalist currents toward making of unified neighborhood. The international forces of globalization have certainly challenged traditional forms of social neighborhood. The really social face-to-face human relationships have been eroding qualitatively. Cyberspace provides new social media for virtual human engagement in real time. The digital neighborhood has become part and parcel of human life. Do all these developments make the social phenomenon of neighborhood irrelevant? Definitely not. Relations with next door neighbors still play an important role in human socialization (Akın 2014). The relationships between human neighbors also make sense for social-psychological analyses of community cultures and trans-­ cultural interactions inside societies and among nations. The “neighborhood culture” (Koyuncu 2014) should still be treated as a valid analytical concept to combine micro and macro levels of enquiry in social-­ psychological research. Constructivist theory emphasizes the need to investigate social relationships in comparative international dyads. Certainly, international power matchups can be seen as more significant for understanding the configuration of social status in an international system. Great powers shape transnational cultures of security in world politics. Other pairs of middle and small powers are less significant in many regards. The cultural conception of the international system focuses on the social making of

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roles and identities. This choice comes with analytical trade-offs. Foremost, the psychological dimension of international politics is downgraded. The affective-normative implications of role relationships are seen as epiphenomenal. Indeed, every social relationship is constituted by feeling rules. Emotions are at the core of relational norms. By incorporating insights from emotional exchange theory, the constructivist agenda can be foregrounded toward new research frontiers such as relational psychology. The new frontiers of constructivist theory would better equip us to observe international neighborhood as cross-cultural “heritage” (Ahunbay et  al. 2018) and psycho-social “capital” (Aydemir 2014). Transnational neighborhood cultures constitute history of world society. They are part and parcel of our anthropological experience. The relational histories of international neighborhoods can be excavated through constructivist social psychology approaches that combine qualitative insights from cognate fields such as psycho-linguistics and cultural ethnography. Constructivist psycho-social archeology of human neighborhoods would promote interdisciplinary interactions among scholars of border studies, political geography and critical geopolitics. These cross-fertilizations would also enrich emotion research in world politics. On International Researches of Emotions: Focusing on Complex Affective-Normative Implications The research on international emotions is still at a stage of infancy. There is much that needs to be done to broaden geographic scope and deepen trans-cultural bases of emotional enquiry. As a theoretical interpolation, we can incorporate conceptions of relational feeling rules and international politics of rule-making to arrive at a novel conceptual space coined here as emotional entanglements and affective arrangements in trans-­ cultural neighborhoods. This new space would complement the emotions literature on international conflicts, friendships and alliances. À la Churchill, there are no “permanent” bases for passionate “friendships” in international affairs. Foreign policymaking would be perpetually based on the “rational interests” of the nations concerned. How those nations perpetuate and pursue their interests is a matter of political-­ diplomatic decision-making. But these decision choices involve political “circulation of affect” (Ross 2014). That is to say, politicians pay tribute to passions in momentous episodes. More often than not, they are personally involved by getting emotional and expressing their own feelings on

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the ongoing affective game of international politics (Hall 2015; Eznack 2012; Hall and Yarhi-Milo 2012). With these reassertions, we can make a theoretical suggestion: states shift their logical bases of interaction among (un)friendly nations since their emotional-moral making of international context and their affective-­ normative foreign policy commitments do change along perceptual patterns of relationality. This proposal helps to better comprehend the affective shifting of amity among nations and conceive of constantly changing courses of friendly inter-state relations. At this point, it is recommended that emotion researchers should focus on emotional-affective logics that govern temporal making of relationality within particular histories of dyadic interactions. The multilayered relational habitus of psycho-social neighborhood is co-extensively transformed by multifaceted emotional-moral structures and practices. Therefore, international studies should move beyond single emotion researches. I argue that mixed emotions studies would better help to explicate a complex constellation of affective-normative processes in international relations. Mixed approaches would enable us to trace the historical psychology of international partnerships and rivalries as configurations of positive and negative emotionalities transformed by composite affective clusters of core feelings such as fear, anger, trust and hope. This holistic understanding would also assist comparative enquiries on the international history of Turkey-Iran relations. On Comparative Analyses of Turkey-Iran Relations: Enquiring Deeper Psycho-Social Interactions The constructivist theory of emotional exchange and the social psychology of international neighborhood provide more productive grounds for scholars of comparative history working on the Turkey-Iran dyad (Hazır 2015). As I have mentioned earlier, historical comparisons with “the Franco-German tandem” (Mourlon-Druol 2017; Schott 2018; Mody 2018) could be a fruitful endeavor to expand our knowledge on trans-­ cultural making of emotions and neighborhood relations in Middle Eastern and European geopolitics. These efforts are expected to encourage scholars to reexamine how neighborhood with Turkey has been constructed affectively inside Iran. Indeed, the domestic Iranian perspectives are much looked forward to. The Iranian researchers are expected to generate further discussions among scholarly communities of two neighboring countries.

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Building on aesthetic foundations of humanities, Turkey-Iran studies could be extended in interesting directions. Comparative analysis may possibly help in revisiting relational implications of classical literary writings and modern political myths (Doğan 1996). New comparative contributions might come from the literary history of intellectual sentiments, the political sociology of media and popular affect and the linguistics of emotions and neighborhood in Turkish and Persian languages. Deeper exploitation of trans-cultural polling data, such as the GLOBE (Paşa et al. 2001; Javidan and Dastmalchian 2003), would be a thought-provoking endeavor, as it may well trigger supplementary reviews and extraction of new findings on topics of relational psychology. Experimental investigations, such as administration of opinion surveys (Erişen 2013), would shed more light on how trans-cultural feeling rules are constituted among university students, particularly IR-PS (International Relations–Political Science) majors, a younger generation of politicians, public intellectuals and media professionals. Comparative history-pedagogy studies on Iranian and Turkish school textbooks (Alaca 2015; Çelik and Çelik 2015) would better inform our understanding of educational-political pathways that co-extensively transform narrative emotionalities and affective relationalities. The disciplinary ̇ histories of Türkiyat researches in Iran and Iraniyat studies in Turkey (Dilek and Atmaca 2018; Küpeli 2010; Eravcı 2010) might provide innovative data to relocate how international feeling rules govern modes of social scientific research (Callard and Fitzgerald 2015; Flam and Kleres 2015) in both neighbors. These cross-cutting investigations could be enhanced by looking at the comparative historiography of educational developments in Turkish and Iranian IR-PS departments. In the coming decades, emotionalaffective explorations on  “home-grown (yerli) Turkish-Anatolian theorizing” (Aydınlı and Mathews 2008; Aydınlı and Biltekin 2017) and “indigenous (bumi) Iranian-Persian thinking” (Moshirzadeh 2018) would more likely add distinctive pedagogical dimensions to the  comparative researches in international psychology.

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Index

A Action tendencies categorization; hard-line, viii, 33; soft-line, viii, 33 Affect in international interactions, vii, 3, 28, 51 in social relationships, 26 See also Emotion Affective concepts in use; roles, 10, 45; rules, 10, 71, 309 constellations; circumplex model, 5; positive-negative configurations, 72 and normative nexus; affectability, 46; pragmability, 46 practices; affective commitment, 45, 46, 72, 124, 212, 288, 293, 310, 315; circulations, 29, 156, 326; diplomacy, 239; harm, 176, 212; impact, 8, 24, 28, 45, 124, 240, 317; politics, xi,

xii, 4, 12, 32, 39, 95, 127, 217, 263 structures; affective arrangements, vii, viii, xiii, 6, 25, 30, 37, 39, 176, 307, 323, 326; atmosphere, 24, 112, 114, 119–177, 202, 203, 273, 280, 289, 292, 312, 317, 320, 321; contagion, 170, 319; context, xiii, 4, 5, 13, 32, 52, 307; currents, etc, 29 See also Emotional Affectivity psycho-cultural, 27, 203 psycho-social, 8, 26, 43, 44, 47, 48, 72, 84, 85, 138, 140, 152, 175, 177, 273, 292, 307, 311, 312 Afghanistan relations with; Iran, 78, 108, 110, 196; Russia, 78, 174, 185; Turkey, 78, 108, 110, 150, 170, 196

© The Author(s) 2020 M. A. Kumral, Exploring Emotions in Turkey-Iran Relations, Middle East Today, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-39029-7

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334 

INDEX

Ağrı Beyazıt province, 88 Gürbulak border gate, 97, 107, 195 Kurdish revolt, 74, 91 Mountains, 40, 91, 92, 94 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 250–254, 257, 258, 320 domestic politics; neoconservative populist restoration, 243–249, 252 global-regional affairs; nuclear confrontation, 254; strategic resistance against American-­ Israeli axis, 253; support for Hezbollah-Hamas, 254 relations with Turkey, 257; diplomatic meetings and visits, 256; PKK issue, 256; radical diplomacy, 257 Ajam/Acem concept, 80 game, 165 spring, 287 See also Farsi Akar, Hulusi, 284 Akaygen, Mehmet Enis, 106, 108–112 Akis magazine attacks on Pahlavi monarchy, 146 executives Doğan Avcıoğlu and Kurtul Altuğ, 146 Akkuyu nuclear plant, 290 province of Mersin, 290 Akyüz, Muhiddin, 79 Ala, Hussein, 139, 142 Albright, Madeline K., 229 Alevi, 38, 47, 121, 185, 242, 263, 264, 268 Algiers Agreement (1975), see Iraq-Iran

Alignment global, viii, 120, 122 regional, 130, 143, 309, 319 Alliance and affect, 326 and norms, 249 Al Qaeda, 248, 273, 291 See also Terrorism Altay, Fahrettin, 107 America/American, see United States of America American, 281 Anatolia, 38, 50, 71, 78, 89, 103, 204, 206, 315 Anglo-American axis, 130, 138 interests, 162 Anglo-Iranian oil company, 125–127 See also Britain/British Ankara city, 71, 72, 74, 75, 77–81, 83, 85, 89, 102, 123, 132, 292, 318 See also Turkish Government Ansari, Abdul Hoseyn Masud, 148 Anti-American, 153, 185, 186, 202, 203, 223, 320 Anti-colonial/imperial, 72, 75, 128, 135, 136 Anti-communist, 135, 136, 156, 165 Anti-Turkish, 88, 132, 133, 138, 192, 264 Anti-Western, 200, 219, 248, 268 Anti-Zionist, 217, 219, 320 Arab countries, x, 152, 312 peoples, 152 states, 138, 261 Arab nationalism, 122, 248 See also Pan-Arabism

 INDEX 

Arab spring democratic awakening, 269 popular uprisings, 269 Aras, Tevfik Rüştü, 71, 84, 110 Armenian insurgency, 192 relations with Kurds, 71, 76, 88, 191 Asia/Asian, 109, 127, 140, 215, 230, 294, 324 Al-Assad, Bashar, 263, 269 Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 216, 218 Astana city, 287 diplomatic talks, 280, 314 process, 287 spirit, 291, 292 See also Syria/Syrian Atabaki, Touraj, 46, 70 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, 70, 71, 74, 77–83, 85, 86, 89, 91, 92, 94–108, 111, 113, 114, 124, 126, 138, 140, 143, 192, 193, 255, 316–318 domestic politics; republican government, 199; weak opposition, 140 global-regional affairs; First World War, 111; Saadabad Pact, 108, 109; War of Independence, 126 relations with Iran; border disputes, 106; diplomatic meetings and visits, 108; Kurdish rebels, 172; preparation of Özsoy opera, 172; progressive partnership, 99, 114 Azerbaijan, 40, 45, 71, 73, 74, 78, 79, 86, 89, 124, 129, 162, 190, 192, 205, 218, 240, 271

335

Azeri nationalism, 47, 114, 122 politics in Iran, 79, 83, 112, 170 B Baghdad city, 22, 94, 107, 111, 137, 138, 193, 205, 206, 208–211, 246, 248, 253, 256, 274, 275, 283 See also Iraq/Iraqi Baghdad Pact (1955) formation, 138 meetings, 142 Bagheri, Mohammed Hossein, 282, 284 Bahçeli, Devlet, 279 Bahrain, 262 Baku, 85 city, 240 See also Azerbaijan Balance of power/threat global, 185, 213 regional, 96, 209 Balkan Entente (1934), 109 Balkans, 20, 21 Bani-Sadr, Abu’l Hasan, 190, 194 Barzani, Masoud, 188, 266, 275, 283 See also Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Ba’th rule in Syria, 269 Bayar, Mahmut Celal, 93, 122, 131, 132, 140, 141, 143, 146 domestic politics; military backlash (1960 coup), 148, 149; transition to multi-party rule, military backlash (1960 coup), 122

336 

INDEX

Bayar, Mahmut Cela  (cont.) relations with Anglo-American axis; Baghdad Pact and CENTO, 138, 141; Korean War, 131; NATO, 141 relations with Iran; diplomatic meetings and visits, 139, 140; foundation of JEC, 141, 142; Mosaddeq and oil crisis, 133 See also Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti-DP) Beheshti, Mohammed Husayni, 192, 193 Beyazıt incident (1927), 89 Black Sea, 97, 294, 315 Bleda, Tanşuğ, 192–197 Borujerdi, Mohammed Hussein, 125 Brazil, 259 and Turkey in “nuclear swap” deal (2010), 259 Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928), 90 Britain/British impact on Turkey-Iran relationship, 131 regional interests and policies, 123, 129 relations with; Iran, 71, 72, 78, 112, 114, 129, 131, 137; Turkey, 71, 72, 78, 83, 112, 113, 131, 133 C Çağlayan, Zafer, 270, 271 gold for gas-oil, 271 Halkbank, 270 US sanctions, 270 Çağlayangil, Ihsan Sabri, 195 Cairo, 136 See also Egypt Çakmak, Fevzi, 105

Çaldıran, ix, x, 39, 133, 197, 198, 204, 233, 308–310, 317, 320 as narrative, ix, 39 as war of 1514, ix, 39, 198, 204, 233, 309, 317, 320 Caliphate, 81 Carım, Taha, 155–158 Caspian Sea, 156 Çavuşoğlu, Mevlüt, 158, 283, 284, 288 ̇ Cem, Ismail, 228, 242 Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 120, 138–145, 147–150, 155, 156, 165, 169, 175, 177, 186, 313 and Iran, 139, 140, 147–151, 156, 165, 168, 175 and Turkey, 139, 140, 150, 151, 156, 165, 168, 175 and Turkish-Iranian relations, 141, 149, 150, 156, 169, 176, 177 Çiller, Tansu, 215, 216, 219 Cold War, 7, 20, 40, 47, 48, 50, 119–177, 184, 196, 213, 231, 313, 319 periods; détente, 119, 146, 148–177, 313; polarization, 138, 152, 154, 170 psychology in Turkey-Iran interactions, 183–233 Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), 45 and Azeri nationalists, 45 and Young Turks, 45 Communism, 120, 128, 146 and nationalism, 130 as propaganda, 136 Communist, 112, 113, 121, 123, 126, 128–130, 132, 133, 136, 137, 142, 150, 156, 163, 170 movements, 112, 130, 135, 154, 156, 170

 INDEX 

Conceptual, vii, xiii, xiv, 2–6, 10, 12, 16, 20, 25, 29, 31, 33, 34, 36, 37, 43, 49, 308, 322–324, 326 findings, 9 framework, 3, 6–24, 325 Constructivism/constructivist approach in; international politics, theory of, 322; social psychology, 6, 11, 324–327 theory of; rule, 9–11 Cuban missile crisis (1962), 145 and dismantling of Jupiter missiles from Turkey (1963), 146 Cyprus question, 145 and Iranian foreign policy, 320 Turkish diplomacy; Johnson letter, 153; London and Zurich accords (1959), 145, 163; military intervention (1974), 153, 319; US arms embargo (1975), 164, 319 D Damascus city, 22, 26, 138, 145, 246, 247, 263, 264, 266, 268, 269, 288, 291 See also Syria/Syrian Davaz, Suad, 112 Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 41, 245, 258, 263, 264, 266, 267, 272, 273, 275, 277 acting as; foreign minister, 258, 264; prime minister, 41, 277 and neighborhood policy, 275 and regional strategy, 272 and relations with Iran, 258 and “strategic depth” doctrine, 41, 245, 275 D-8 (Developing Eight Countries’ Organization for Economic Cooperation), 285

337

Demirel, Süleyman, 153–156, 162, 166, 167, 169, 174, 189, 195, 213–215, 219, 220, 228 domestic politics; coalitions, 166, 169, 174, 213, 219; instability, 155, 195; military coups(1971/1980/1997), 148, 195; Susurluk scandal (1996), 219 global-regional affairs; alliance with US, 164; cooperation with Israel, 219; Kurdish question, 51; PKK issue, 51 relations with Iran; diplomatic meetings and visits, 162; natural gas and trade agreements, 215, 217; 1997 Sincan crisis, 219; pragmatic exchange, 198, 270 Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat-PYD), see Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partia Karkaren Kurdistan-PKK); Terrorism Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti-DP), 122, 126, 132, 138, 149, 153, 158 Developing Eight Countries’ Organization for Economic Cooperation (D-8), 215, 220, 285 Devletadabi, Firouz, 247 Dikerdem, Mahmut, 147–149 Domestic unrest, 81, 147, 185 in Iran, 185 in Turkey, 185 E Eastern Anatolia, 38, 71, 89 Eastern bloc, 119 Eastern Pact, see Saadabad Pact

338 

INDEX

Eastern Question, 40 Ecevit, Bülent, 155, 164, 169, 171, 173, 174, 185–187, 240, 320 domestic politics; coalitions, 169, 174; instability, 171 global-regional affairs; 1974 Cyprus intervention, 164 relations with Iran; diplomatic meetings and visit, 173 Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) meetings, 284 Economic crises in Iran, 157, 207 of 1971, 155 of 1929, 90 in Turkey, 157, 174, 207 of 2001, 240 Egypt military coups; 1952, 132; 2013, 269 peace with Israel (1979), 185 reactions to Baghdad Pact, 142 See also Nasser, Gamal Abdul Emotion conceptual categorization, 33 research in; social sciences, 27; world politics, 27, 34, 326 in social exchange, 7 and social psychology, vii, 2, 12 See also Affect; Feelings Emotional concepts in use; belief, 34, 198, 224; community, 6; culture, 28, 31, 176; diplomacy, 12; emotional action, 34; geopolitics, 44; impact, 28, 317; power, 224; work, 32, 46; worlds, 29, 44 configurations, 34; proto-typical negative-positive clusters, 33

discourse; emotional words, 33; expressions, 33 history/historiography; context, 18, 25; emotional climate, 34; entanglements, viii, xiii, 294, 307; episode, 34; experience, 49; narrative, 39; script, 34; story, 39; theme, vii, 27 management; emotional logic, 17, 28; mobilization, 28; regime, 30 and moral nexus, 31 relationship; dilemma, 32, 194; emotional commitment, xi, 26; exchange, 38, 72, 177, 322, 326; norm, viii, 26, 239; value, 318 See also Affective Emotionality/emotionalities, vii, xiii, 5, 8, 17, 18, 26–34, 49, 98, 308, 309, 322–324, 327, 328 Emotionology, 28 Empirical analysis, 3, 4 findings, 308–322 Episodic analysis, 69 findings, 113, 232, 308 Erbakan, Necmettin, 164, 186, 198, 199, 213–226, 228, 244, 285, 320 domestic politics; Islamist parties in coalition, 164 global-regional affairs; anti-Zionism, 217; D-8 project, 285; 1974 Cyprus intervention, 164; pro-Eastern vision, 215 relations with Iran; diplomatic meetings and visits, 215–218; natural gas and trade agreements, 4; PKK issue, 218; Sincan crisis (1997), 219

 INDEX 

Erbil, 211, 266, 275 See also Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip, 243–249, 255–260, 263, 265–267, 271, 272, 276–279, 283, 286, 287, 289–292, 320 domestic politics, 271, 272; neoconservative populism, 243–249 global-regional affairs; assertive regionalism, 263; Astana talks on Syria, 286; civil war in Syria, 267; ethnic-sectarian conflict in Iraq, 267; neighborhood diplomacy on Iraq, 290; US-Iran nuclear negotiations, 255 relations with Iran; high-level meetings and visits, 295 Esendal, Memduh Şevket, 82, 85, 86, 91 Etatism, 158 Ethnic/ethnicity conflict, 273 violence, 191, 248, 268, 273 Euphrates basin, 280, 290 Eurasia/Eurasian geography, 121, 123 geopolitics, 248 neighborhood, 247 regional solidarity, 247 thought and Eurasianism, 247 European Community/ Union (EC/EU) EU-3 (Germany-France-Britain troika), 250 Nabucco natural gas project, 256 relations with; Turkey, 210, 255, 257, 314

339

Europe/European, 19, 20, 81, 88, 90, 96, 98, 109, 140, 144, 165, 210, 217, 220, 228, 230, 254, 256, 257, 289, 292, 294, 315, 324, 327 Evren, Kenan, 195, 198, 199, 207, 320 1980 coup, 195 relations with Iran, 195, 198, 199 F Farsi community, 38 culture, 38 language, 38, 82, 85, 102, 126, 127, 165, 188, 191, 222 politics, 127, 165 Fedayin-i Islam, 125 Feeling rules and action tendencies, viii, 33 categorization; deep acting, 31, 111, 310; surface acting, 31 in social relationships, 8, 326 and status considerations, 130 in world politics, 27–31, 34, 230, 322, 323, 326 See also Feelings Feelings conceptual categorization, 37 negative cluster; anger, viii, ix, xi, 8, 10, 17, 28, 29, 33, 35, 37, 48, 51, 82, 85, 92, 113, 129, 148, 158, 199, 223, 226, 229, 233, 254, 262, 264, 282, 283, 292, 310, 317–321, 327; animosity, 8, 17, 223, 227, 264; anxiety, ix, 17, 28, 35, 42, 74, 82, 87, 128, 130, 132, 136, 137, 149, 156, 162, 173, 184, 214, 226, 228, 231, 233, 239, 240, 242,

340 

INDEX

265–267, 273–278, 284, 310, 313; disgust, ix, 17, 131, 134, 176, 177, 202, 268, 292, 309, 320; distrust, xi, 17, 35, 39, 48, 51, 71, 73, 75, 76, 98, 147, 152, 165, 166, 175, 176, 183, 197, 212, 242, 267, 271, 313; envy, 42, 45, 102, 120, 164, 171, 175–177, 317–321; fear, viii, ix, xi, 8, 10, 17, 18, 22, 28, 29, 33, 35, 45, 46, 48, 51, 71, 76, 79, 81, 82, 86, 89, 90, 93, 104, 106, 112, 113, 120, 123, 128, 136, 148, 156, 173, 176, 184, 186, 188, 199, 206, 212, 214, 226, 227, 231, 240, 244, 254, 255, 259, 262, 265, 268, 276, 277, 283, 285, 292, 294, 310, 312–314, 327; grief, 28; harm, 33, 93, 176; hatred, 17, 109, 123, 129, 233, 244, 268, 273, 313; jealousy, 35, 42, 44, 45, 109, 120, 158, 175–177, 309, 317–319; resentment, 17, 84, 86, 88, 89, 92, 98, 104, 114, 120, 131, 133, 134, 150, 165, 186, 202, 254, 257, 273, 292, 309, 317, 318, 320; shame, 10, 177; suspicion, xi, 36, 71, 75, 76, 80, 86, 108, 122, 123, 146, 162, 163, 165, 176, 231, 263, 264, 266, 313 positive cluster; ambition, ix, 38, 71, 79, 88, 89, 114, 122, 139, 160, 162–164, 170, 171, 184, 185, 194, 223, 247, 259, 272, 283, 285, 289, 310, 313, 319; amity, xi, 17, 26, 35–37, 95, 114, 120, 133, 167, 172, 327; confidence, xi, 8, 17, 19, 20, 22, 48, 77, 79, 83, 87, 92, 94,

98, 99, 101, 110, 124, 169, 171, 173, 175, 176, 194, 209, 215, 216, 229, 250, 256, 285, 293, 317, 321–322, 324; desire, xi, 10, 17, 21, 26, 29, 35, 48, 79, 90, 97, 98, 110, 136, 143, 145, 150, 156, 160, 167, 187, 189, 190, 194, 204, 212, 232, 233, 260, 286, 292, 312, 315–316; empathy, x, 24, 35, 48, 106, 177, 312, 319, 322; happiness, x, 77, 94, 99, 101, 137, 140, 143, 174, 207, 225, 285, 310; honor, viii, 10, 15, 17, 29, 76, 77, 86, 100, 130, 134, 212, 223, 224, 273, 295, 310, 318; hope, viii, 17, 20, 29, 33, 48, 86, 153, 159, 187, 215, 228, 232, 233, 245, 252, 263, 269, 282, 327; joy, x, 8, 310; love, 7, 10, 17, 33, 35, 37, 43, 99, 101, 114, 123, 149, 158, 166, 187, 230, 268, 272, 309; pleasure, 8, 10, 127, 194; respect, 15, 17, 19, 21, 24, 33, 35, 81, 84, 102, 106, 141, 156, 209, 212, 216, 220, 230, 322; restraint, ix, 107, 282, 310; solidarity, 23, 24, 36, 48, 70, 72, 75, 77, 83, 88, 90, 101, 108, 110–112, 121, 126, 128, 129, 140, 143, 144, 147, 149, 156, 158, 159, 162, 165–167, 175, 200, 203, 208, 223, 226, 228, 229, 245, 247, 248, 258, 263, 266, 273, 278, 283, 291, 295, 309, 317, 320; trust, x, xi, 10, 15, 17, 33, 36, 47, 87, 99, 101, 104, 109, 114, 136, 139, 153, 176, 208, 217, 229, 230, 242, 244, 256, 261, 267, 309, 310, 321, 327

 INDEX 

in relation, 82, 168, 321 in rule, xi, 4, 12, 24, 37, 43, 44, 51, 52, 72–90, 102, 113, 127, 135, 146, 152, 158, 226, 230, 239, 244, 254, 261–263, 288, 293, 294, 310, 317, 321, 322, 326, 328 in status, 134, 223 See also Emotion; Emotional; Sentiment/sentimental Ferdowsi, 108, 172 and Shahnameh, as poet, 100 First World War, viii, 69, 70, 73, 111 Foreign policy of Iran, 84, 136, 200, 204, 227, 253, 320 of Turkey, 36, 41, 77, 83, 112, 128, 138, 145, 148, 149, 151, 187, 198, 200, 213, 219, 245–247, 249, 263, 264, 271–273 Foroughi, Mohammed Ali, 89, 93, 95 Framing, 41, 99, 109, 250, 253, 265, 288, 291 France/French, 35, 40, 46, 84, 88, 90, 112, 161, 197, 228, 241, 292, 315, 316, 324 G Geneva city, 108, 287, 292, 314 meetings, 93, 280 See also Syria Geopolitical struggle, 90, 96, 120 Gerede, Münir Hüsrev, 91, 94, 95, 106 Germany/German, 35, 40, 41, 45, 46, 90, 111, 123, 124, 144, 157, 197, 216, 241, 276, 292, 315, 316, 324

341

relations with; Iran, 45, 111, 315, 324; Turkey, 45, 107, 315, 324 Görmez, Mehmet, 272, 273 Governmentality in inter-state interactions, 16 in world politics, 17 Great game, 40 Great powers, 35, 40, 44, 45, 90, 107, 119, 325 Greece/Greek, 75, 78, 152, 157, 214 Gromyko, Andrei, 148 Grounded theory in research methods, 308 in social sciences, 3 See also Constructivism/ constructivist; History/ historiography; Methodology/ methodological Gül, Abdullah, 215, 255–259, 265 acting as; foreign minister, 246; president, 258, 265, 274 in meetings and visits with Iranian leaders, 255, 258 US-Iran nuclear negotiations, 255 Gülen, Fethullah, 271 and failed coup and Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü (FETÖ), 277 and Gülenist factions, 271 Gulf War (1991) local consequences; PKK terrorism, 231, 313 regional impact on; Iran, 50; Turkey, 50, 246, 265 H Hard-line politics, 231, 311 psychology, viii, 133, 311 tendency, viii, 33, 204, 251, 311, 317, 320, 321

342 

INDEX

Hezbollah, see Kurdish Hezbollah; Lebanon/Lebanese, Shii forces, Hezbollah High Border Commission, 131, 142 High-Level Cooperation Council (HLCC) meetings, 51, 274, 276, 277, 283 High Security Commission, 256 History/historiography of emotions, vii, 9, 28, 29, 31–33, 49 as empirical data, vii, viii, 4, 24–52, 239 in grounded theory, 27, 324 of international relationships, xiii, 1–52, 69, 208, 232, 239–241, 258, 262, 272, 293, 307, 311, 322, 326, 327 as methodology, 26 of neighborhood, vii, viii, x, xiii, xiv, 1–52, 72, 73, 88, 90, 92, 99, 100, 102, 121, 124, 125, 146, 175, 177, 204, 212, 232, 239, 258, 262, 265, 270, 272, 293, 294, 308, 311, 312, 316, 317, 319, 326 in qualitative analysis, 27 of rule-making, 3, 4, 25, 28, 34–37, 175 in social psychology research, vii, viii, x–xiii, 3, 4, 25, 27, 31, 34–37, 39, 43, 49, 69, 73, 96, 125, 176, 212, 224, 240, 294, 307, 308, 310, 311, 322 Hochschild, Arlie Russell, 4, 31, 46, 111, 201, 293, 310, 316 Hoveyda, Amir Abbas, 162 Hussein, Saddam, 163, 191, 194, 209, 211, 248

I Idealism/idealist, 36, 47 Idealpolitik, 36 Identity in psycho-cultural differentiation, 27 in self-other social relationships, 8 Ideology of nationalism, 47, 273 of ruling; conservative, 202, 270; left-wing vs. right-wing, 200; liberal, 202; radical, 170 of sectarianism, 39, 224 Incirlik air base, 189 Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (Müstakil Sanayici ve Iş̇ adamları ̇ Derneği, MÜSIAD), 217 India, 150, 157, 163 ̇ Inönü, Mustafa Ismet, 71, 89, 99, 112, 123, 124 Interaction tendencies, 317 Inter-disciplinary approach, vii See also Social psychology International Politics anti-pathetic affect; anglophobia, 112; anti-American, 153, 186, 203, 223; anti-colonial/ imperial, 74, 125, 128, 135, 136; anti-communist, 135, 156; anti-Iran, 229; anti-­ Turkish, 132, 133, 138, 193; anti-Western, 202, 248, 268; anti-Zionist, 320; axis of evil, 250, 253; Russo phobia, 313; Soviet hatred, 313 relationship categorization; clash of civilizations, 246; dialogue of civilizations, 230; enmity, 26, 34–36, 320, 324; friendship, 8,

 INDEX 

21, 26, 34, 35, 48, 74, 76, 86, 92, 94–96, 101, 109, 134, 137, 159, 288, 319, 320; partnership, viii, xii, 3–6, 15, 35, 36, 43–52, 76, 97, 114, 143, 146, 152, 157, 174, 176, 177, 197, 218, 240, 241, 247, 267, 274, 285, 289, 292, 294, 295, 311–316; rivalry, viii, x, xii, 3–6, 15, 35, 40, 43–52, 76, 79, 90, 107, 188, 190, 223, 233, 239–241, 248, 261, 262, 275, 287, 292, 295, 307, 308, 310, 311, 313, 314, 316–322 social psychology; identity, 8, 14, 15, 34, 36, 230, 326; position, ix, 36, 75, 83, 102, 104, 106, 193, 222, 255, 262, 271, 288; relation, vii, xiii, 1–52, 69, 73, 95, 100, 109, 119, 125, 175, 176, 188, 204, 212, 226, 267, 276, 311, 327–328; role, 8–11, 14, 103, 268; rule, vii, 6, 9–11, 14, 15, 35, 37, 43, 103, 120, 199, 201, 202, 212, 232, 239, 254, 276, 285, 311; status, 94, 120, 123, 295, 318 structural orders; hegemony, 10, 12, 35, 40, 44, 75, 90, 98, 204, 221, 230, 254, 267, 287; heteronomy, 10, 12, 50, 51, 72, 120, 201, 213, 245, 260, 325; hierarchy, 10, 12, 29, 103, 172 sympathetic sentiments; Germanic philia, 112; pro-Western, 219 systemic cultures; Hobbesian, 35; Kantian, 35; Lockean, 35, 325

343

Inter-textual research, 27 Iranian Ambassador/Embassy in Ankara, 79, 83, 84, 124, 133, 137, 148, 149, 219, 247, 288 Iranian government action tendencies; hard-line, 72, 133, 223, 251, 253, 319; left-wing, viii, 167; right-wing, viii, 175, 225, 243, 250; soft-line, viii, ix, 39, 72, 80, 228, 294 domestic politics of rule-making; autocracy, 160, 225; capitalism, 35; conservatism, 275; Islamism, 199; Khomeinism, 203, 221, 224; liberalism, 225, 228; moderate reformism, 281; nationalism, 35, 71, 202, 224, 275; nativism, 202; neo-­ conservatism, 250; populism, 225, 243; revolutionary radicalism, 251; sectarianism, ix, 39, 203; socialism, 224 global relations; Britain, 71, 78, 84, 85, 112, 129, 135, 157, 254, 316; China, 229, 316; EU, 228, 254; France, 84, 254, 316; Germany, 111, 157, 254; Russia, 129, 157, 228, 229, 281, 316; US, 51, 84, 112, 129, 146, 148, 157, 164, 174, 175, 189, 202, 241, 249, 250, 255, 291, 292, 316 interaction with Turkish government; affective-­ normative commitments, altruistic, x, 36, 312

344 

INDEX

Iranian government  (cont.) regional relations; Iraq, 78, 188, 194, 204, 205, 209, 226, 269, 272, 273, 284, 313; Israel, 316; Syria, 88, 188, 230, 246, 268, 269, 272, 273, 275, 279, 284, 287, 291 Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 157, 221, 228 Iranian National Intelligence and Security Organization (Sazman-e Ettela’at va Amniyat-e Keshvar– SAVAK), 154, 161, 169, 171, 172 Iranian nationalism, 47, 76, 111, 162, 184, 188, 268 Iranian politics-recent trends current affairs and future prospects; costs of the Syrian war on society, 280; Green Movement, 257; popular demands for democratization, 230; resistance against the US sanctions, 286, 289 Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in command of Quds Force, 221, 269 in domestic politics, 221 in foreign policy, 275 Iranian Turks, 197 See also Azeri Iraq-Iran bilateral relations; Algiers Accord (1975), 163; border disputes, 110; Shatt-al Arab, 40; war (1980–1988), 183, 194, 203, 209 Iraq/Iraqi domestic politics; Central Iraqi Government (CIG), 275; revolution of 1958, 146; “Turkmen Front”, 227

local diplomacy, 22; Iraq’s neighbors group, 246 regional relations; Syria, viii, x, 47, 91, 171, 188, 205, 233, 241, 263, 269, 273–276, 283–285, 312, 314, 321; Turkey, x, 22, 50, 75, 91, 108, 122, 152, 171, 188, 189, 193, 204, 205, 209, 210, 226, 241, 246, 256, 263, 265, 267, 273, 312, 321 See also Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Iraq War (2003) and American force withdrawal in 2011, 248, 295 local consequences; ethnic-sectarian conflict, 246, 268; insurgency, 266, 275, 276, 285 and long US military occupation, 247, 248 regional impact on; Iran, 239–295; Turkey, 239–295 Irmak, Sadi, 166 Iskenderun oil pipeline projects from; Ahvaz, 155; Kirkuk, 157 Islam religion, 38, 126, 273 sects, 38 See also Neighborhood Islamabad city, 284 See also Pakistan Islamic Republican Party ̇ (Cumhuriyetçi Islam Partisi, ̇ CIP), see Beheshti, Mohammed Husayni Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS or DEASH) militants, 273 security threats, 276, 280 See also Terrorism

 INDEX 

Islamist groups, 191, 227 ideology, 200 movements; Millî Görüş, 186, 244; Muslim Brotherhood, 262 parties, 279 Ismail Khan, 77 Israel, 50, 142, 185, 203, 205, 214, 219, 220, 229, 253, 272, 316, 320 Istanbul city, 96, 101 Yeşilköy Airport, 135, 149 Italy/Italian, 35, 40, 90 J Jafari sect, 242 Joint Economic Commission (JEC), 141, 207, 212, 217 Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP/AK Parti), 243–245, 250, 255, 262–264, 268–272, 276, 277, 279, 280, 286, 287, 289 Justice Party (Adalet Partisi-AP), 153, 154, 158, 166, 174, 189 K Karabekir, Kâzım, 74 Karaosmanoğlu, Yakup Kadri, 124–131, 197 Kashani, Abu’l Qasim, 79, 126, 129, 132, 136 Kasr-ı Şirin as narrative, ix, x, 42, 308–310 as peace agreement of 1639, xii, 40, 41, 257 Kemalist movement, 126

345

Khamenei, Ali, 201, 220–226, 228, 229, 251, 252, 259, 270, 272, 275, 278, 279, 282, 288 domestic politics; autocratic populism, 223; repressive rule, 222; revolutionary consolidation, 191 global-regional affairs; conflict with Israel, 272; conflict with US, 272 pro-American Arab regimes; in Gulf War (1991), 222, 275; in Iraq War (2003), 222, 275; in Lebanon War (2006), 162, 203–205, 221, 223, 253; in nuclear crisis, 252, 254, 260, 270; in Syrian war (2011), 280 relations with Turkey; coup by military memorandum (1997), 219; cross-border military operations in Iraq and Syria, 274; diplomatic meetings and visits, 228, 272; failed FETÖ coup (2016), 278; PKK issue, 288; sectarian confrontation, 224, 275; “strategic depth” doctrine, 275 ̇ Khan, Ismail, 77 Kharrazi, Kemal, 189, 190, 228, 229, 242 Khatami, Mohammed, 227–230, 250–252, 270, 320 domestic politics; popular thrust for liberal-democratic order, 120, 158 global-regional affairs; dialogue of civilizations, 230; Iraq War (2003), 229; nuclear negotiations, 250 PKK issue; constructive diplomacy, 228; Syria-Öcalan affair (1998), 230

346 

INDEX

Khatami, Mohammed  (cont.) relations with Turkey; diplomatic meetings and visits, 228 Khomeini, Ruhollah Musavi, 161, 171–173, 185–187, 189–193, 195–206, 208, 209, 211, 220, 224, 251, 252, 278, 320 domestic politics; building of opposition, 87, 161; living in exile, 161, 172, 185; radical rule-making, 195–206; revolutionary struggle, 189 global-regional affairs; conflict with US, 186; war with Iraq, 196, 206 relations with Turkey; anti-secular rhetoric, 224; diplomatic meetings and visits, 171, 173, 211; media battles, 320; selective strategy, 203 Kılınç, Tuncer, 247 Kinkel, Klaus, 216 Kirkuk city, 157, 210, 211 oil and pipeline, 210 Kışlalı, Ahmet Taner, 242 Kobane (Ayn al-Arab), 275, 287 Köprülü, Mehmet Fuat, 132, 136, 142 Koraltan, Refik, 145 Korutürk, Fahri, 163 Kotur border area, 94 province, 94 Kurdish Hezbollah, 206, 213, 223, 242, 253, 320 Kurdish nationalism, 47, 169, 188 Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), 188, 189, 205, 210, 227 Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), 266, 275, 283 See also Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP); Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partia Karkaren Kurdistan-PKK) covert collusion with; Iran, 266, 268; Syria, 290, 292 intermittent cross-border incursions; Çukurca (2011), 265, 266; Eruh-Şemdinli (1984), 205; Suruç (2015), 276 presence in; Iran, 171; Iraq, 171; Syria, 171 safe havens in; Kandil Mountains, 282; northern Iraq, 282 See also Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat-­ PYD); Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistane, PJAK); People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG); Terrorism Kurds/Kurdish collusions with global powers; Britain, 73; Russia, 73; US, 226, 247, 248, 265, 266, 283, 288, 295, 314 local politics; ambitions for autonomy-statehood, 75; popular parties, 85 question and Turkey-Iran relationship, 1, 51, 91, 152 question in Iran, 50, 92, 152, 261 question in Turkey, 51, 152, 261, 313 transboundary movements; cross-­ border insurgency, xi, 313; tribal uprisings, xi, 73, 75, 79, 87 Kürecik case, 267 province of Malatya, 267 Kuwait, 23

 INDEX 

L Lausanne conference, 78 treaty, 79 League of Nations (LN), 93, 107, 108 Lebanon/Lebanese and PKK, 205 relations with Iran, 162, 203, 204, 221, 223 Shii forces; Amal, 205; Hezbollah, 205, 206, 223, 242, 253, 275, 320 Libya, 188, 205, 210, 218, 269 London city, 71, 75, 76, 79, 94, 96, 110–112, 123, 127–129, 131, 132, 136, 144, 145, 163 See also Britain/British M Mahabad Republic (1946), 112 Malaysia, 215 Al-Maliki, Nouri, 23, 267 Mansur, Ali, 137 Mediterranean Sea, 155 Menderes, Adnan, 122, 128, 132, 134, 136, 138, 142, 144–149, 153 domestic politics; military backlash (1960 coup), 148; transition to multi-party rule, 122 regional relations, 145; rivalry with Nasser, 122, 138 relations with Anglo-American axis; Baghdad Pact and CENTO, 138; Korean War, 131; NATO, 138 relations with Iran; diplomatic meetings and visits, 142; Mosaddeq and oil crisis, 128

347

relations with Soviet Union, 146, 147 See also Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti-DP) Menemencioğlu, Turgut, 155 Mesopotamia as neighborhood, 275 Methodology/methodological design, 26–34 framework, 3, 27 Modernization process in Iran; clerical influence, 114; constitutional movement, 45; Islamic revolution, 173; monarchical tradition, 320 in Turkey; constitutional development, 81; military coups, 195; republican rule, 46; secular reforms, 114 Moral, see Normative Mosaddeq, Mohammed, 126–128, 133, 135–137, 229 domestic politics, 127, 137 foreign policy, 127 international dispute, 128, 135 oil nationalization, 127, 128 political-popular psychology, 125 Moscow city, 26, 50, 76, 87, 88, 92, 94, 96, 110, 112–114, 120, 121, 129, 138, 142, 145–149, 156, 170, 176, 184, 185, 196, 203, 268, 278, 281, 286, 287, 289, 290, 292, 313, 314 See also Russia/Russian Federation (Soviet Union/USSR) Mosul city, 74, 78, 79, 83, 85 dispute, 83, 87, 88 Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-­ ANAP), 198

348 

INDEX

Mousavi, Hossein, 197, 201, 207, 208, 257 acting as; government official (foreign minister-prime minister), 197; opposition leader (Green Movement), 257 relations with Turkey, 208; meetings and visits, 208 Mudanya Armistice (1922), 78 Mudros Armistice (1918), 73 Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), 188, 206, 227, 242, 249 Muslim countries, 74, 129, 150, 189, 215, 217 nations, 220, 285 peoples, 161, 273 Muslim Brotherhood, see Islamist, movements Muslim People’s Republican Party (Müslüman Halkın Cumhuriyetçi Partisi-MHCP), 187, 190, 191 N Narrative approach, 49, 119, 183, 240, 323 explanation, 49 See also Methodology/ Methodological Narrativity, xiii, 308, 323, 324 Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 122, 127, 136, 138 “National Front” politics in Iran, 127, 136 in Turkey, 136, 166 National Intelligence Organization ̇ ̇ (Millî Istihbarat Teşkilatı-MIT), 154, 169, 172 Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP), 166, 199, 200, 279

National Salvation Party (Millî Selâmet Partisi-MSP), 164, 166, 186, 198, 199 National Security Council (NSC), 149, 154, 155, 195, 213, 219, 220, 229, 247, 265 Natural gas agreements, 156, 217 pipelines, 156, 207, 217, 290 trade, 276 Neighborhood categories; geographical, 16, 20, 109; non-geographical, 16 culture; Islamic values, 153; local customs, viii, 18–24, 34, 40, 47, 110, 120, 150, 241, 245, 248, 260, 276, 290, 311; universal codes, 14, 23, 241, 249, 259 diplomacy and trans-governmental interactions, 21, 22 effect in world politics; contiguous, 23; cultural, 20; psychological, 18, 22, 24, 35; social, 18, 20, 22, 24, 35 fences in good-bad relationships, x, 26, 40, 312 narratives in Turkish and Middle Eastern cultures, 320 norms in international law; European Union (EU), 21, 255; regional initiatives, 246; United Nations (UN), 18 practices among social actors, 37, 43 rules in inter-state relations, 4 structures of communal rule, 12, 15 Neutrality of Iran, 142, 146 of Turkey, 193, 208, 210 Non-alignment policy, 119 Normative

 INDEX 

commitments, x, 73, 94, 256, 268, 312 culture, 14, 315 impact, 240, 248 interaction, vii, 7, 18, 26, 77 localization, 14–18 power, 175, 233 practices, 263 relations, 13, 26, 73, 77, 87, 144, 324 sentiments, 112 structures, 14, 26, 37, 40, 43, 46, 144, 272, 315 See also Affective Normativity, vii, xiii, 6, 18, 24, 29, 308, 323, 324 Norms and affect, vii, xi, xii, 125, 133, 175, 177, 283, 286, 318 of neighborhood, viii, 12, 18–24, 26, 36, 42, 45, 46, 73–82, 114, 120, 226, 229, 239, 242, 245, 246, 249, 257, 262, 267, 286 in world politics, 18–24 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 120, 122, 138, 139, 141, 142, 145–148, 166, 174, 177, 210, 267, 270, 277, 314, 319 Northern Iraq and Iran, 212 and Turkey, 212, 256 and US, 247 Northern tier, 119, 121–149, 185, 313 Nusayri, 263, 264, 268 O Öcalan, Abdullah, 171, 188, 205, 229–231, 242 Oil

349

agreements, 125 concessions, 138 crises, 127, 131, 162, 167, 177, 309 interests, 144, 162, 252 pipelines, 144, 145, 151, 155, 157, 205, 210 trade, 167, 192, 210 Ökçün, Ahmet Gündüz, 187 Oman, 162 ̇ Öngören, Ibrahim Tali, 71, 89 Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood, 4, 9–14, 31, 325 Opposition in Iran, 44, 95, 104, 106, 152, 199, 204, 258, 284 in Turkey, 95, 104, 122, 126, 152, 170, 199, 204, 217, 227, 258 Organization of Islamic Conference/ Cooperation (OIC), 194, 218, 228–230, 258 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 157, 163 Oriental Entente (Şark Misakı), see Saadabad Pact Ottoman Empire constitutional developments; Kanun-u Esasi (1876), 81; 1908 revolution, 45, 81; ̇ Sened-i Ittifak (1808), 81, 105; Tanzimat (1839), 81 relations with; Britain, 35, 45; Germany, 41, 45, 46; Qajars, 45; Russia, 44; Safavids, ix, 39, 40, 309, 317 rulers; Abdulhamid II, 44, 79; Yavuz Selim, 39, 198 Ottomanism/neo-Ottomanism, 321 Özal, Turgut, 195–210, 213, 216, 315 domestic politics, 36, 46, 121, 122, 200, 213, 265, 271; neoliberal rule-making, 200

350 

INDEX

Özal, Turgut  (cont.) global-regional vision; Gulf War (1991), 213; Iran-Iraq War, 209; Kurdish question, 226 relations with Iran; diplomatic meetings and visits, 198, 207, 208, 216; ECO and JEC initiatives, 212; natural gas and trade talks, 190, 207, 210; PKK issue, 205–206; pragmatic engagement, 46 P Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza domestic politics; conflict with opposition, 162; 1953 coup, 137, 146; White Revolution (1963), 160, 161 global-regional affairs; Baghdad Pact and CENTO, 147; Iraqi Kurds, 152, 162, 163; regional ambitions, 122, 170; relations with Anglo-American axis, 138; relations with Soviet Union, 147, 156 relations with Turkey; diplomatic meetings and visits, 80; 1974 US arms embargo, 166; 1973 oil crisis, 162; 1960 coup, 174 Pahlavi, Reza, 70, 72, 74, 75, 78–87, 89, 93–108, 111–113, 125, 140, 143, 149, 172, 317, 318 domestic politics; monarchical government, 98; strong opposition, 81, 98, 99 dynasty, 166 global-regional affairs; First World War, 111; Saadabad Pact, 110; Second World War, 111 monarchy, 98, 146, 160, 161, 163, 170, 172, 222

relations with Turkey; border disputes, 106; cross-border Kurdish rebels, 75; diplomatic meetings and visits, 80, 95, 105 Pakistan, 130, 145, 150, 151, 207, 208, 215 Palestine/Palestinian and Fatah, 205 Hamas, 205 PLO, 205 Yasser Arafat, 205 Pan-Arabism, 122 See also Arab nationalism Pan-Farsi, see Iranian nationalism Pan-Islamism, 268 Pan-Kurdism, see Kurdish nationalism Pan-Turkism/Turanism, see Turkish nationalism Pan-Shii, see Iranian nationalism Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistane-PJAK), see Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partia Karkaren Kurdistan-PKK); Terrorism Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), 188 People’s Fedayin, 169, 192 People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel-YPG), see Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partia Karkaren Kurdistan-PKK); Terrorism Persia, 38, 50, 104, 170, 224, 315 Persian nationalism, see Iranian nationalism Pishavari, Ja’far, 112 PKK, see Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partia Karkaren Kurdistan-PKK) Political-popular psychology in Iran, 199, 202 in Turkey, 199 Populism

 INDEX 

and collective feelings, 78 and propaganda, ix and public sentiments, 263 Pro-Western outlook in; Turkey, 128 Psycho-cultural/psycho-social approach, xiii, 12, 27–29, 240, 307, 322, 326 community, 11, 76, 323, 325 habituation, 14, 176, 212, 232, 245, 311, 321 history, 14, 27–29, 183, 322, 326 modes of exchange; hard-line, ix, 17, 33, 72, 80, 204, 251, 309, 311; soft-line, ix, 17, 33, 72, 80, 192, 204, 251, 309, 311 See also Social psychology Psychological atmosphere, 112 climate, 112 distance, 98, 276 environment, 276 lacking, 168 milieu, 197 Putin, Vladimir, 289–292 Q Qajar monarchy constitutional developments; Mashruti-ye revolutionary movement (1906–1911), 105 relations with; Britain, 45; Germany, 45; Ottomans, xii, 40, 70, 71, 73, 76, 86, 98; Russia, 45 rulers; Shah Ahmed, 73, 79, 80 Qarani, Valiollah, 146 Qasimlou, Abdurrahman, 188, 193 Qatar, 262 Qavam, Ahmad, 78 Qazi Mohammed, 112 Qotbzadeh, Sadeq, 190

351

Qum city, 81, 187, 191 Shii clerical center, 199 ̇ transit route to Iskenderun, 145 R Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi, 201, 203, 212–227, 251, 252, 320 domestic politics, 221, 223; post-revolutionary reconstruction, 220 global-regional affairs; Gulf War, 221; local instability in Iraq, 226; PKK issue, 216, 217, 231 relations with Turkey; diplomatic meetings and visits, 214, 218; natural gas and trade agreements, 217; pragmatic exchange, 212, 214 Razmara, Hadji Ali, 125, 127, 131, 135 Realism/realist, 40, 140 Realpolitik, 36 Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) and Iran, 120, 150, 151, 207, 313 and Turkey, 120, 150, 151, 157, 207, 313 and Turkish-Iranian relations, 150, 156, 177 Relational affect, 5 approach in; pragmatics, 3, 5; psychology, xiii, 31, 49, 50, 280, 295, 307, 322, 324–326, 328; sociology, 4, 31 commitments; altruistic, 95; empathetic, 95 contours; collaboration, viii, 46; confrontation, 183, 240 enquiry in social sciences, 3

352 

INDEX

Relational (cont.) feelings, 326; negative and positive configurations, 327 history/historiography; events, xii, xiii, 294, 307; practices, 177; psyche, xiii, 307; structures, vii, 6 management; culture, 30; damage, 267; governance, 17; repair, 280; rule, 17 modalities; progressive partnership, 5; regressive rivalry, 5 See also Constructivism/ constructivist Relationality, xiii, 18, 27, 308, 323, 324, 327, 328 Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), 122–124, 155, 158, 185, 187 Research design, 30 findings, 7, 307–328 framework, vii, 25, 29, 308 recommendations, 7, 307–328 Reza Khan/Shah, see Pahlavi, Reza Rouhani, Hassan, 221, 250, 270, 271, 274, 276–278, 281–284, 287, 288, 290–292 acting as; nuclear negotiator, 250; president, 250; SNSC secretary, 250 domestic politics; pragmatism, 270; reformist populism, 282 global-regional affairs; Astana talks on Syria, 291; counter-­ terrorism, 277; Kurdish question in Iraq, 283; nuclear deal, 282, 283, 289, 290 relations with Turkey; high-level meetings and visits, 282, 284; interactive collaboration, 271, 274, 283

Rule and rules interactive rules; commitment, 9, 10, 13, 14, 24; direction, 10; instruction, 10 rule structures; hegemony, 10, 35, 248; heteronomy, 10, 37, 43, 45, 50, 51, 72, 120, 200, 212, 232, 245, 252, 260, 261, 315, 325; hierarchy, 10, 103 Rule-making and emotions, 16, 18, 28, 31, 184 in family and social relationships, 7, 12 among human neighbors, 12 in international relations and world politics, 18, 107 in Turkey-Iran interactions, 3 Russia/Russian Federation (Soviet Union/USSR) impact on Turkey-Iran relationship, 290 regional interests and policies; Afghanistan, 170, 174; Syria, 290 relations with; Iran, 46, 71, 112, 154, 170, 174, 176, 242, 281, 288, 289; Turkey, 36, 147, 170, 176, 228, 267, 280, 281, 287, 290, 292 S Saadabad Pact, 108–113, 130, 138, 141, 315, 319 Safavid Monarchy relations with; Ottomans, ix, 39, 40, 309, 317 rulers; Shah Abbas, 39; Shah Ismail, 39, 133, 198 Salafi groups, 248 Salihi, Ali Akbar, 266

 INDEX 

Saudi Arabia, 163, 228, 262 Second World War, 121, 123 Sectarian conflict, 131, 309 ideology, 174 violence, 174, 191, 248, 268, 273 Sentiment/sentimental interactions, viii, 295 orientations, 33 tendencies; antipathy, 17; sympathy, 17 See also Affective; Feelings; Normative Şeriatmadari, Kazim, 187, 190, 191 Sèvres conference, 71 Sezer, Ahmet Necdet, 240 Shatt al-Arab, 40 See also Iraq-Iran Sheikh Said, 83 Shii, 38, 39, 45, 71, 82, 104, 106, 125–128, 136 clergy; fuqaha, 201; mujtahid, 45, 82; ulema, 106 regional influence; axis, 262; crescent, 269 theological sites in Iraq; Atabat (Najaf, Karbala), 45 Silk Road, 261, 294, 315 Simavi, Sedat, 131, 133 ̇ Simko, Ismail Agha, 73–76, 318 Social Psychology of collaboration, 42, 113 of confrontation, 133, 241, 277, 321 and constructivism, 324–326 and inter-disciplinary methodology, vii, 27 in international diplomacy, 4, 27 of neighborhood in of partnership, 4, 6, 8, 97, 241, 311 as popular phenomena, 7

353

and pragmatist approaches, 11 of rivalry, 4, 6, 8, 241 as scientific discipline; human relations, 325; state relations, 17 Social relationships among; human neighbors, 325 dimensions; psychological, vii Social Relationships among; human neighbors, 12, 24, 37, 326; neighboring states, 4, 16, 17, 24 conceptual categories; communal sharing, 7; equality matching, 7 dimensions; cultural, 25, 257, 326; psychological, 257 in world politics, 9, 13, 35 Sociology as popular phenomena, 29, 325 Soft-line politics, 190, 200, 294, 311 psychology, viii, 212 tendency, 251, 311 Soft power, xii South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 142 Soviet Union, see Russia/Russian Federation (Soviet Union/USSR) Strait of Hormuz, 156 Suez Crisis (1956), 144 Sunay, Cevdet, 162, 163 Sunni doctrine, 204 theology, 39 ulema, 273 Supreme Leader (Velayat-e Faqih), 173, 190, 201, 208, 220, 221, 229, 251, 252, 270, 278, 282, 320 Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), 221, 250, 270

354 

INDEX

Syria/Syrian civil war, 267, 275; Aleppo, 281; Astana Talks, 51; ethnic-­ sectarian conflict, 275; Geneva Meetings, 280, 287, 292; Idlib, 282, 291; ISIS, 280, 282; Kobane incident, 275; mass refugee inflow, 291 1957 crisis, 145 relations with; Iran, 246, 277; Russia, 268, 277, 280; US, 241, 277, 280, 282, 288, 291 relations with Turkey; Adana Accord (1998), 229; Free Syria Army (FSA), 264; Muslim Brotherhood (MB), 264; Operation Euphrates Shield (2016), 279; Operation Olive Branch (2018), 288; proxy battles, 262, 275; PYD/YPG, 280, 288 siege of cities; Aleppo, 281; Idlib, 282, 288, 291, 292 war with Israel, 50 T Tabatabai, Sadık Khan, 83, 84 Talabani, Jalal, 188 Tanrıöver, Hamdullah Suphi, 81 Taray, Cemal Hüsnü, 108 Taymurtash, Abd al-Hussein, 87, 95 Tebriz city, 79, 110, 171, 191, 240, 259 ̇ transit routes to; Iskenderun, 315; Trabzon, 79, 110 See also Azeri Tehran city, viii, 71, 119–177, 183, 239, 308 See also Iranian government Tengirşenk, Yusuf Kemal, 74

Terrorism, 20, 22, 23, 51, 192, 207, 213, 216, 223, 226, 229, 231, 256, 265, 266, 276, 277, 280, 285, 286, 290, 313, 314 Al Qaeda, 248, 291 ISIS (DEASH), 274, 280, 290, 291 PJAK, 256, 266, 314 PKK, 205, 206, 210, 211, 213, 214, 223, 229, 231, 256, 265, 266, 268, 276, 285, 290, 313, 314 YPG, 280, 290 Thematic analysis, 6, 27 findings, 3 Theoretical analysis, 6, 27 findings, 3 framework, xiii, 1, 6, 308 interventions, xiii, 49, 308, 322–328 Tigris, 275 basin, 275 Trabzon city, 79, 97, 98, 107, 110, 151 transit routes from Tebriz, 75, 98, 110, 113 True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi-­ DYP), 215 Trump, Donald, 286, 287, 289 Tudeh Party, 112, 136, 137, 161, 170, 174, 187, 188, 191, 196, 199, 201–205, 209, 223, 224, 242, 248, 259, 261–263, 267–269, 272–275, 279, 321 Tülümen, Turgut, 166, 170, 171, 173, 174, 185, 187–193, 319 Türkeş, Alparslan, 166 Turkey-Iran comparisons; different/similar status ambitions, ix, 310; political-­ historical differences/

 INDEX 

similarities, xi, 46, 81, 98, 323; “strategic depth” doctrines, 41, 245, 275 emotional encounters; anger, viii, ix, xi, 8, 10, 17, 28, 29, 33, 35, 37, 48, 51, 82, 85, 92, 113, 129, 158, 254, 262, 264, 282, 283, 292, 310, 317–321, 327; anxiety, ix, 17, 28, 35, 42, 74, 82, 87, 128, 130, 132, 136, 137, 156, 162, 173, 239, 240, 242, 265–267, 273–278, 284, 310, 313; distrust, xi, 17, 35, 39, 48, 51, 71, 73, 75, 76, 98, 147, 152, 166, 175, 176, 242, 267, 271, 313; envy, 42, 45, 102, 120, 171, 175–177, 317–321; fear, viii, ix, xi, 8, 10, 17, 18, 28, 29, 33, 35, 45, 46, 48, 51, 71, 76, 79, 81, 82, 86, 89, 90, 93, 104, 106, 112, 113, 120, 123, 128, 136, 148, 156, 173, 176, 240, 244, 254, 255, 262, 265, 268, 276, 277, 283, 285, 292, 294, 310, 312–314, 327; hope, viii, 17, 20, 29, 33, 48, 153, 159, 245, 252, 263, 269, 327; jealousy, 35, 42, 45, 109, 120, 158, 175–177, 309, 317–319; love, 7, 10, 17, 33, 35, 37, 43, 99, 114, 123, 149, 158, 166, 272, 309; resentment, 17, 84, 86, 88, 89, 92, 98, 104, 114, 120, 131, 133, 134, 150, 165, 254, 257, 273, 292, 309, 317, 318, 320; trust, x, xi, 10, 15, 17, 33, 36, 47, 87, 99, 101, 104, 109, 114, 136, 139, 153, 176, 242, 244, 256, 261, 267, 309, 310, 321, 327

355

partnership; collaborative, 10, 15, 18, 49, 51, 211, 232, 241, 248, 249, 274, 285, 324; limited, 156, 171, 197; pragmatic, 211; progressive, 50, 99, 114, 143 politics of neighborhood; bilateral trade, 39, 174, 207, 211, 217, 256, 276, 283, 285, 315; border disputes, 106; cultural-­ social connections, 17, 42, 230; diplomatic interactions, vii, 46, 70, 72, 73, 79, 108, 152; economic exchange, viii, xi, 90, 98, 100–101, 124, 148, 156, 157, 165, 167, 168, 174, 176, 183, 207, 211, 241, 260, 261, 285; media battles, 168, 267, 277; mutual needs (oil-natural gas), 207, 210; transit transportation, 98, 165 regional economic associations; D-8, 220, 285; ECO, 51, 208, 215, 218, 240, 283, 284, 315, 316; RCD, 120, 150, 151, 156–158, 176, 177, 208, 313 regional spheres of influence in; Iraq, x, 50, 122, 211, 256, 263, 284, 312; Syria, x, 263, 290, 312 relational representations; brotherhood rhetoric, 96, 100, 101, 257, 266; friendship discourse, 4, 96; primordial neighborhood (kadim komşuluk) narrative, ix, 41, 309 rivalry; confrontational, viii, 10, 15, 18, 43, 49, 51, 241, 277, 285, 324–325; local, viii, xi, 44, 114, 162–169, 316–322; positional, ix, 51, 120, 239, 310; regressive, 177

356 

INDEX

Turkey-Iran (cont.) security affairs; border surveillance issues, 293; counter-terrorism measures, 213, 241 strategic military alignment; Baghdad Pact, 120, 138–147, 155, 313; CENTO, 120, 138–145, 147–150, 156, 165, 169, 175, 177, 186, 313 See also High-Level Cooperation Council (HLCC) Turkey-Iran bilateral agreements economic agreements, 218; finance, 96, 165; investment, 20, 32, 46, 157, 167, 217, 225, 252, 275, 285, 289, 315, 316; natural gas, 156, 157, 207, 210, 215–217, 231, 240, 256, 260, 270, 276, 281, 289, 290; oil, 121, 123, 125–133, 135, 136, 138, 144, 145, 151, 154–160, 162, 164, 165, 167, 168, 171, 177, 192, 196, 205, 207, 210, 211, 226, 228, 252, 270, 289, 309; trade, 2, 16, 17, 20, 39, 87, 98, 110, 113, 140, 142, 144, 146, 151, 154, 157, 165, 167, 174, 194, 207, 209–211, 215–218, 223, 240, 249, 256, 260, 261, 276, 283–286, 315–316; transit, 75, 98, 108, 110, 113, 130, 141, 142, 144, 151, 157, 165, 171, 194, 207, 209, 216, 217, 260, 261, 284; transportation, 94, 98, 130, 140–142, 144, 151, 157, 165, 167, 207, 208, 217, 218, 256 political agreements; border demarcation, 94; diplomatic-­ cultural relations, etc., 322

strategic agreements; border security cooperation, 94, 207, 216, 218, 264; counter-terrorism, 242; defense-military affairs, 104, 213 Turkey-Iran media battles, 168, 214, 267, 277, 320 Turkey-Iran relations compared with other dyads; France-Germany, 324 conceptual categorizations; enemies, 2; friends, 2 dyadic dimension; affective-­ normative deficiency and erosion, 152; mixed (negative-­ positive) feelings, 84, 164, 310, 327; mutual warming, 80; psycho-social sentiments of lacking, xiii, 307, 321; reciprocal cooling, ix, xi, 48, 79, 91, 114, 130, 135, 183, 214, 231, 239, 293; relational decadence, 152; waxing and waning, 231 global-regional implications; local solidarity, 75, 90, 111, 128, 129, 149, 226; regional responsibility, 149; third party roles, 45, 163, 290 modern historical transformation; golden years, 50, 69, 96, 108–113, 313; mutually managed mistrust, x, xi, 312; progressive collaborative partnership, 50, 99, 114; regressive confrontational rivalry, 177; relational culture of coexistence, x, 109, 312; son-like solidarity, 175; years of loss, 50, 152, 177, 245

 INDEX 

neighborhood narratives; Çaldıran myth, ix, 133, 308, 309; cold shoulders saga, ix, 308, 309; Kasr-ı Şirin story, ix, x, 41, 42, 308–310; Özsoy legend, ix, 308; twin sons tale, 308, 309 pre-modern historical evolution; metaphors, 37–43; myths, 37–43 See also Kurds/Kurdish Turkey-Iran visits, 140, 217 Turkish ambassador/Embassy in Tehran, 78, 79, 87, 89, 91, 95, 106, 124, 134, 156, 170, 187, 197 Turkish government action tendencies; hard-line, viii, 33; left-wing, viii, 33; right-wing, viii, 33; soft-line, viii, 33 domestic politics of rule-making; autocracy, 47; capitalism, 47; conservatism, 47; democracy, 47; etatism, 70; Islamism, 200; liberalism, 47, 158; moderate-­ reformism, 250; modernism, 45; nationalism, 39, 71, 186, 200, 204, 244; neo-­ conservatism, 294; neoliberalism, 245; populism, 294; revolutionary radicalism, 320; sectarianism, 39, 261; secularism, 47; socialism, 47; statism, 47 global relations; Britain, 35, 84, 107, 112, 113, 241, 316; China, 287, 316; EU, 255, 257; France, 35, 84, 112, 241, 316; Germany, 35, 45, 107, 241, 316; Russia, 35, 78, 241, 316; US, 35, 84, 122, 165,

357

166, 174, 241, 246, 249, 266, 287, 316, 319 interaction with Iranian government, viii, 3, 91, 110, 131, 143, 144, 156, 183, 197, 207, 211, 217, 226, 231, 242, 248, 261, 283, 293, 295, 313, 314; affective-normative commitments, altruistic, x, 312; affective-normative commitments, empathetic, 93 regional relations; Iraq, 241; Israel, 214, 218, 220, 259, 283; Syria, 145 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (TMFA), 189, 210, 228, 287, 288 Turkish nationalism, 89, 186, 200, 204, 244 Turkish politics-recent trends current affairs and future prospects; counter-terrorism operations against PKK, 242; cross-border activities in Iraq and Syria, 242, 247, 256, 265, 273, 274, 280, 282, 284, 288, 291–295; diplomatic position towards the latest US sanctions against Iran and Russia, 281, 289; People ̇ Alliance (Cumhur Ittifakı) vs. Nation Alliance (Millet ̇ Ittifakı), 279 Turkish Union of Chambers and Exchange Commodities (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği–TOBB) and Turkish-Iranian relations, 158, 159 and Turkish politics, 158 Tüzmen, Kürşad, 240

358 

INDEX

U Ulusu, Bülent, 171, 193 Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), see Russia/Russian Federation (Soviet Union/USSR) United Nations (UN), 18–22, 131, 218, 227, 230, 249, 254, 259, 260, 276, 281, 287, 292 General Assembly, 19, 230 Security Council Resolutions, 21, 131, 254, 259, 260, 268, 276 United States of America (US), viii, xii, 22, 23, 35, 41, 50, 84, 90, 119, 121–123, 129, 130, 137, 139, 144–148, 153, 157, 160, 162, 164–166, 168, 171, 174, 175, 177, 186, 187, 196, 203, 213, 216–218, 220, 223, 226, 228, 229, 231, 240, 241, 246–248, 250, 253–256, 259, 260, 265–267, 269, 270, 272, 277, 281, 283, 286–289, 291, 292, 295, 313, 314, 316, 319 administrations; impact and interests on Turkey-Iran relationship, 121, 241 regional policies; dual containment (1992), 226; Eisenhower Doctrine, 145; Marshall Plan (1948), 122; Nixon Doctrine (1969), 162; Truman Doctrine (1947), 122 relations with; Iran, 228, 246; Israel, 203, 220, 229, 259, 283; Syria, 246 relations with Iran; 1953 coup plot, 278; 1979 hostage crisis, 187, 196; nuclear deal

(JCPOA-2015), 286; sanctions, Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA)-2010, 260; sanctions, Countering America‟s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA-2017), 281; sanctions, Iran-Libya Sanctions Act ILSA-1996, 217 relations with Turkey; arms embargo (1975), 164–166, 171; Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) (1980), 174; Johnson letter (1964), 153 V Van city, 74, 89, 94 Kapıköy-Razi border gate, 260 in transit routes, 216 Velayati, Ali Akbar, 228 W War of Independence, 71, 72, 126 Washington city, xii, 22, 50, 120, 121, 123, 127–129, 144, 145, 147–149, 156, 162–164, 166, 175, 176, 184, 186, 187, 189, 203, 213, 217, 218, 226, 229, 240, 241, 246, 247, 249, 255, 259, 267, 269–271, 279, 281, 283, 286, 287, 289, 295, 313, 314, 319 See also United States of America (US)

 INDEX 

Weapons of mass destruction nuclear weapons, 249 US sanctions, 289 Welfare Party (Refah Partisi-RP), 218 Wendt, Alexander, 35, 318, 325 Western alliance, 123 camp, 119, 133, 145 countries, 113, 123, 128, 215, 254 interests, 121 White House, 286, 289 See also United States of America (US)

359

Y Yemen, 262 Yılmaz, Mesut, 35, 90, 155, 156, 173, 228, 279 Z Zahedi, Fazlallah, 137 Zanjani, Babak, 271 Zarif, Mohammed Javad, 274, 278 Zarrab, Reza, 271 Zorlu, Fatin Rüştü, 147 Zürcher, Erik J., 70, 103, 153, 154