Exploring Base Politics: How Host Countries Shape the Network of U.S. Overseas Bases 2020027963, 2020027964, 9780367404758, 9780429356315

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Exploring Base Politics

This book sheds light on the mechanisms of base politics that surround U.S. overseas military bases, comparing several countries across different regions. Analyzing cases from Japan, Greenland, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Singapore, the contributors paint a detailed and complex picture of the role and impact of U.S. bases. In times of war they project military power, and in times of peace they deter the emergence of general and latent threats. Furthermore, they are used to secure access to resources, and as a means of politically and economically influencing small and mid-​size countries. Military bases provide host countries with many benefits of the U.S. security umbrella, but can cause internal problems, including accidents and noise pollution that accompany the functioning of a base, as well as constrain their sovereignty. Military bases do not simply serve to bring America strategic and security benefits—​as symbols of the hierarchical structure of the international system, they influence power relations in the entire world. An invaluable resource for scholars of International Relations with an interest in the practical and theoretical challenges of the U.S.’s relationship with its allies. Shinji Kawana is Associate Professor at Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan, where he is affiliated with the Institute for Liberal Arts. He has a doctorate degree in international politics from Aoyama Gakuin University, Japan. His research has focused on base politics, U.S. bases in Japan, and the issue of military bases in Okinawa. Among his recent publications are Base Politics:  The Origins of the Post-​War U.S. Overseas Bases Expansion Policy (Hakutō Shobō, 2012, in Japanese) and The Rise and Fall of U.S. Military Bases 1968–​1973: The Policy of Withdrawal from Mainland Japan (Keisō Shobō, 2020, in Japanese). Minori Takahashi is Assistant Professor at Hokkaido University, Japan, where he is affiliated with the Slavic-​Eurasian Research Center and the Arctic Research Center. He holds a Ph.D. in international political economy from the University of Tsukuba, Japan. His research interests include security issues and the development of living and non-​living resources in the Arctic. Among his recent joint and individual publications are The Influence of Sub-​state Actors on National Security:  Using Military Bases to Forge Autonomy (Springer, 2019), “Autonomy and Military Bases:  USAF Thule Base in Greenland as the Study Case” (Arctic Yearbook, 2019), “The Contours of the Development of Non-​Living Resources in Greenland” (Polar Record, 2020), and “The Politics of Whaling and the European Union” (Senri Ethnological Studies, 2020).

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Iran in the International System Between Great Powers and Great Ideas Edited by Heinz Gärtner and Mitra Strohmaier International Relations as Politics Among People Hannes Hansen-​Magnusson Mexico’s Drug War and Criminal Networks The Dark Side of Social Media Nilda M. Garcia Transnational Labour Migration, Livelihoods and Agrarian Change in Nepal The Remittance Village Ramesh Sunam A Middle East Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction A New Approach to Nonproliferation Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Emad Kiyaei Weak States as Spheres of Great Power Competition Hanna Samir Kassab Understanding Mexico’s Security Conundrum Agustin Maciel-​Padilla Exploring Base Politics How Host Countries Shape the Network of U.S. Overseas Bases Edited by Shinji Kawana and Minori Takahashi United Nations Financial Sanctions Edited by Sachiko Yoshimura For information about the series: https://​www.routledge.com/​Routledge-​ Advances-​in-​International-​Relations-​and-​Global-​Politics/​book-​series/​IRGP

Exploring Base Politics How Host Countries Shape the Network of U.S. Overseas Bases Edited by Shinji Kawana and Minori Takahashi

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 selection and editorial matter, Shinji Kawana and Minori Takahashi; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Shinji Kawana and Minori Takahashi to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Names: Kawana, Shinji, 1979– editor. | Takahashi, Minori, 1982– editor. Title: Exploring base politics : how host countries shape the network of U.S. overseas bases / edited by Shinji Kawana and Minori Takahashi. Identifiers: LCCN 2020027963 (print) | LCCN 2020027964 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367404758 (hardback) | ISBN 9780429356315 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Military bases, American–Political aspects–Foreign countries. | United States–Armed Forces–Foreign countries. | United States–Military relations. | United States–Foreign relations. Classification: LCC UA26.A2 E96 2021 (print) | LCC UA26.A2 (ebook) | DDC 355.70973–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020027963 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020027964 ISBN: 978-​0-​367-​40475-​8  (hbk) ISBN: 978-​0-​429-​35631-​5  (ebk) Typeset in Galliard by Newgen Publishing UK

Contents

List of contributors  Introduction 

vii 1

S H I N J I KAWAN A A ND MINO RI TA KA H A S H I

1 What questions does the study of military bases pose? 

6

S H I N J I   KAWAN A

2 Rethinking the politics surrounding the U.S. military base in Greenland with a focus on non-​material factors 

21

M I N O RI TAKA H A S H I

3 U.S. bases in Italy: From a Cold War frontier to a hub for power projection 

39

M ATTEO   D I AN

4 Defending NATO’s southern flank: Spain’s democratization, the ending of the Cold War and the U.S. military presence 

56

S H I N O H ATE RU MA

5 Domestic environmental policy and Status of Forces Agreement: U.S. military presence and new water pollution risk in Germany 

77

KE I S U KE   M O RI

6 Why do anti-​base movements occur and/​or activate? An analysis of the Turkish case  KO H E I   I M AI

93

vi Contents

7 Strategic asset or political burden? U.S. military bases and base politics in Saudi Arabia 

111

M AS AKI M I ZO BU CHI

8 Singapore’s distinctive “quasi-​bases”: Regional security environment, national discourse and path-​dependence 

133

KEI   KO G A

9 Base politics within the framework of the U.S.–​ROK alliance management scheme 

152

TO M O N O RI  IS H IDA

Conclusion 

176

S H I N J I KAWA NA A ND MINO RI TA KA HA S H I

Index 

194

Contributors

Matteo Dian is Senior Assistant Professor at the University of Bologna, Italy, where he is affiliated with the Department of Political and Social Sciences. He has a doctorate in Political Science from the Italian Institute of Human and Social Sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore. His research has focused on Japanese and Chinese foreign and security policies, U.S. alliances in East Asia and the role of collective memory in East Asia. Among his recent publications are “Networking Hegemony: Alliance Dynamics in East Asia” (special issue of International Politics, co-​edited with Hugo Meijer, 2020)  and Contested Memories in Chinese and Japanese Foreign Policy (Elsevier, 2017). Shino Hateruma is a Ph.D. student at the Graduate School of Asia-​Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Japan. She obtained her MA in international relations at the same university. Her Ph.D. research focuses on the conditions leading to the closure of U.S. overseas military bases. Her research interests encompass security issues in the Asia-​Pacific region. She has contributed a chapter to the book The Influence of Sub-​state Actors on National Security:  Using Military Bases to Forge Autonomy (Springer, 2019), and published several journal articles in Japanese concerning the issue of U.S military bases in Okinawa. Kohei Imai is Research Fellow at the Area Studies Center, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan, where he works as a member of the Middle East Studies Group. He holds dual Ph.D. in international relations from the Middle East Technical University, Turkey and in political science from Chuo University, Japan. His research has focused on Turkish foreign policy, international politics of the Middle East, including Syrian refugee issues, and the theory of international relations. Among his recent publications are “Rethinking the Insulator State: Turkey’s Border Security and the Syrian Civil War” (Eurasia Border Review, 2017), The Possibility and Limit of Liberal Middle Power Policies: Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Middle East during the AKP Period (2005–​2011) (Lexington Books, 2017) and “Why Syrian Refugees in Turkey Choose Turkey as a Final Destination:  Results of Public Opinion Survey of Syrian Refugees in Turkey” (Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies, 2019).

viii Contributors Tomonori Ishida is Research Fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense, Japan. He received his MA in political science at Keio University, Japan. His research interests include Japanese foreign policy and international politics in the Korean Peninsula. Among his recent publications are “Japan’s Economic Assistance to the Republic of Korea, 1977–​1981: An Analysis within the Framework of the U.S.-​Japan Security Burden-​sharing Scheme” (World Political Science, 2015) and “The Orientation of Diplomatic Policies of Post-​war Japan towards the Korean Peninsula: The Mapping of the Political Détente, 1969–​1973” (Journal of Law and Political Studies, 2016, in Japanese). Shinji Kawana is Associate Professor at Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan, where he is affiliated with the Institute for Liberal Arts. He has a doctorate degree in international politics from Aoyama Gakuin University, Japan. His research has focused on base politics, U.S.  bases in Japan, and the issue of military bases in Okinawa. Among his recent publications are Base Politics: The Origins of the Post-​War U.S. Overseas Bases Expansion Policy (Hakutō Shobō, 2012, in Japanese) and The Rise and Fall of U.S. Military Bases 1968–​1973: The Policy of Withdrawal from Mainland Japan (Keisō Shobō, 2020, in Japanese). Kei Koga is Assistant Professor at the Public Policy and Global Affairs Programme, School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He received his Ph.D.  in international relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, USA. His current research focuses on comparative regional security/​ institutions and East Asian/​ Indo-​ Pacific security (particularly Japan and ASEAN). His recent important publication include: Reinventing Regional Security Institutions in Asia and Africa:  Power Shifts, Ideas, and Institutional Change (Routledge 2017), “Japan’s ‘Indo-​Pacific’ Question: Countering China or Shaping a New Regional Order?” (International Affairs, 2020), “The Concept of ‘Hedging’ Revisited: The Case of Japan’s Foreign Policy Strategy in East Asia’s Power Shift” (International Studies Review, 2018), and “ASEAN’s Evolving Institutional Strategy:  Managing Great Power Politics in South China Sea Disputes” (Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018). Masaki Mizobuchi is Professor at NUCB Business School, Japan. He holds a Ph.D. in Area Studies from Sophia University, Japan. His research has focused on political, economic and military issues in the Middle East. Among his recent joint and individual publications are Islamist Movements after the Arab Spring (Minerva Shobō, 2019, in Japanese) and “Emerging Order in the Middle East after the Arab Uprising: What Comes after the Pax-​Americana?” (Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2018, in Japanese). Keisuke Mori is a post-​doctoral fellow of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. He has obtained a Ph.D. degree in sociology from Hitotsubashi University, Japan. His research interests include civil society, security issues and social movements. Among his recent joint and individual publications are

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Contributors  ix “Connections Result in a General Upsurge of Protests: Egocentric Network Analysis of Social Movement Organizations after the Fukushima Nuclear Accident” (Social Movement Studies, 2020) and “Between Security Policy and Peace Movement: Current Contentious Politics Related to U.S. Military Base Construction in Okinawa Prefecture” (Japan:  Politics, Economy and Society, 2018, in German). Minori Takahashi is Assistant Professor at Hokkaido University, Japan, where he is affiliated with the Slavic-​Eurasian Research Center and the Arctic Research Center. He holds a Ph.D.  in international political economy from the University of Tsukuba, Japan. His research interests include security issues and the development of living and non-​living resources in the Arctic. Among his recent joint and individual publications are The Influence of Sub-​state Actors on National Security: Using Military Bases to Forge Autonomy (Springer, 2019), “Autonomy and Military Bases: USAF Thule Base in Greenland as the Study Case” (Arctic Yearbook, 2019), “The Contours of the Development of Non-​ Living Resources in Greenland” (Polar Record, 2020), and “The Politics of Whaling and the European Union” (Senri Ethnological Studies, 2020).

Introduction Shinji Kawana and Minori Takahashi

American military bases around the world are important infrastructure for implementing the U.S.  global strategy. In times of war they project military power, and in times of peace they serve to deter the appearance of general and potential threats. Furthermore, they are used to secure access to resources such as oil and natural gas, and as a means of politically and economically controlling small and mid-​size countries. From the viewpoint of the countries that host them, U.S. military bases on one hand guarantee an increase in deterrence, but on the other, also bring problems that accompany their functioning, such as accidents, noise pollution or the limitation of the host country’s sovereignty. Furthermore, military bases do not simply serve to bring America strategic and security benefits—​they influence power relations in the entire world as symbols of the hierarchical structure of the international system and of the empire (imperialism). And yet, in the field of international relations the work on accumulating academic insights into the issue of military bases has been insufficient. To be sure, studies on military bases have been treated as a part of the traditional research on national security, such as the theory of strategy, the alliance theory or geopolitics. However, in such research, military bases tended to be mere subsets of the phenomena the researchers strove to elucidate. Or, put in terms of causality, they were treated as nothing but the effects—​bases as a result of occupational policies, bases as a result of alliance policies, or, bases for the purpose of gaining access to natural resources. There are also other reasons why military bases have not attracted more attention as objects of academic research. Among them are the difficulties regarding the definition and observation of military bases. Usually, what we call “military bases” encompasses airfields and ports, radar facilities, training grounds, warehouses, barracks, schools, hospitals and even golf courses. However, there is no clear agreement among scholars as to which of these facilities should be recognized as military bases. Even if we succeed in defining the object of study, we still face the problem of the decisive lack of primary material and information necessary for its analysis. That is why today hardly anybody knows the exact number and locations of U.S. bases that span across the globe. This has hindered the entry into the study of military bases of scholars who attach importance to demonstrability.

2  Shinji Kawana and Minori Takahashi Furthermore, there is also the fact that among American scholars there are only few who are interested in the issue of overseas U.S. military bases. For researchers who focus on policies, choosing overseas military property for which the interest of American taxpayers is low as object of research required courage. Therefore, it may be said that although research on military bases has been conducted in the United States as part of the study of strategy in the period from the Cold War era up till now, there has not been much research focusing on the interaction between the United States and base-​hosting countries. That, too, we may say, is one of the reasons why researchers from host countries have traditionally led in this field. On the other hand, since the appearance of Alexander Cooley’s work (2008), in what came to be known as base studies, the direction of causality has been reversed and military bases themselves have become the subjects. That is, as different from conventional theories of strategy and alliance, the very mechanisms in which bases affect the U.S. strategy, contribute to the extension of alliances or reverse the power relations between large countries on one side and small and mid-​size countries on the other have become the object of analysis. Although this is somewhat reminiscent of the chicken and egg issue, we may say that one of the characteristics of base studies in recent years is that, in terms of causality, attention has been focused on the direction opposite from before. Furthermore, this new research trend has been actively trying to grasp the internal politics in small and mid-​sized host countries and the actions of non-​ state actors, which have not been covered by the traditional research on national security. Also, a major trait of the new approach is that it extends the scope of investigation in the study of military bases—​which used to be confined only to certain areas of the world such as Europe and East Asia—​to include Middle East, Central Asia and Latin America. These new developments deserve attention for putting a spotlight on contemporary problems with strategy and alliance theories, which have for a long time been regarded as enjoying the seat of honor. With the above in mind, in this book we aim to shed light on the mechanism of base politics surrounding U.S.  overseas military bases by comparing several countries and regions. This volume not only contributes to the refinement of the base politics theory (BPT), which has been developing in recent years, but is also an important attempt to relativize and come closer to the elucidation of the political dynamism of the problem of military bases in Okinawa, which have for a long time been a political issue in Japan. Taking up and analyzing military bases is not something Japanese scholars from the field of political science are uncomfortable with. This is because the issue of military bases cannot be eschewed when discussing the post-​war Japan–​ U.S. relations, Japanese diplomacy and national security, or Okinawa. Indeed, a sufficient number of studies on Japanese national security, history of Japan’s foreign diplomacy and Okinawa that treat military bases has been accumulated. This volume has largely been built around the contribution of Japanese researchers who find themselves in such a special environment.

Introduction  3 We first trace the development of base studies and clarify the position of this book in relation to recent trends in the study of base politics in Chapter  1 by Shinji Kawana, and then present a series of case studies in Chapters 2 to 9. We take up the cases of Greenland (Denmark), Italy, Spain, Germany, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and South Korea, on which there has been hardly any empirical research.1 The authors are specialists for the above-​mentioned geographical areas and possess not only a good command of the local languages, but also the knowledge and the ability to grasp the development paths of individual bases, their relationship with the United States, as well as the cultural and religious idiosyncrasies behind the establishment of the bases. Their fields of expertise are diverse: international relations, area studies, sociology, etc. Below we shall briefly outline the case studies contained in this volume. Chapter 2 by Minori Takahashi takes up the case of Greenland, autonomous territory of Denmark. It is well known that the U.S. airbase in Thule, Greenland contributes much to the national security of Denmark as a whole. On the other hand, it has also been pointed out that the non-​state actor of Greenland has a significant influence on Danish national security. In this chapter the author, while also shedding light on the functioning of the base through an analysis of defense agreements and the power relation between the sending and the hosting country, examines the role that non-​material factors, i.e., the Danish democracy (characterized by values such as dialogue, mutual respect and compromise) played in the decision-​making process of the host country regarding national security. His work is a novel attempt in which the base politics of the host country of Denmark are deciphered by focusing on its political climate and conventions, which have largely been brushed aside in past studies of national security. Chapter 3 by Matteo Dian takes up the case of Italy. He points out that the Italian government possesses the right to manage the bases in which U.S. troops are stationed, which is a high degree of authority. To empirically examine the background in which such authority has been acquired and how the bases are operated, a comprehensive, multipronged approach that comprises temporal changes in the functioning of the bases, forms of anti-​base movements, the legal provisions regarding the rights of the host country as well as their practical implementation, is indispensable. The chapter, therefore, sheds light on the political choices of the host country’s government regarding U.S.  bases by taking into account the interaction of these elements and discusses the Italian membership in the North Atlantic alliance, the political cost–​effect ratio and the issues of transparency and constitutionality. U.S.  bases were stationed in Spain throughout the Cold War although no common threat for both countries existed. The bases were placed there as a result of one-​sided, strategic intentions of the U.S. This is why Spain was, generally speaking, relatively reserved when it came to accepting them. Partly due to such state of affairs, Spain has been a host country that seems to occasionally manipulate the United States. Chapter 4 by Shino Hateruma focuses on the process in which the U.S. bases built during the Cold War in Spain were reduced both in

4  Shinji Kawana and Minori Takahashi terms of the number of facilities and stationed troops in late 1980s and meticulously discusses how base politics were being handled in the period of political reforms when, after the death of General Franco, democratization was under way in the country. In Germany, which was occupied and divided after World War II, foreign military bases, including those belonging to the U.S., have long been stationed. For a while the country grappled with various problems such as inequalities stemming from the Status of Forces Agreement. However, after the end of the Cold War the agreement was significantly revised, enabling the application of German domestic laws to the bases and alleviating the problem of inequality. Chapter 5 by Keisuke Mori sheds light on environmental issues in base politics, an aspect of base politics that has not been sufficiently addressed thus far. He focuses on the PFAS pollution originating in U.S. military bases and affecting the surrounding areas as an example in which the presence of the U.S. military, SOFA and the domestic laws of the host country closely interact. More concretely, Mori discusses the pollution issue by looking at the process in which EU environmental regulations are incorporated as domestic norms in Germany, as well as at how German environmental laws and SOFA are implemented and operated within local base politics, and not just at the legal normative dimension. Next, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Singapore are examples of host countries where military bases have been deployed and withdrawn, or the troop levels increased and decreased several times until today. However, the factors that have affected the outcomes of base politics in these countries vary. When it comes to Turkey, for many years the relations with the United States regarding base politics were stable and cooperative. There, almost no incidents that are typical of the presence of military bases such as rapes took place. And yet, certain bases in Turkey have been exposed to strong anti-​base protests. Chapter  6 by Kohei Imai endeavors to identify factors that generate or activate anti-​base movements, which hamper stable and continuous operation of military bases, by examining the following three variables: contact between the stationed foreign troops and local population, consensus regarding national security in the host country and Turkishness, i.e., the national and religious identity of the Turkish people. The entire chapter points to the validity of taking into consideration factors such as regional or ethnic identity that have thus far been regarded as not belonging to the field of national security and have not be sufficiently included as independent variables. Saudi Arabia’s high strategic importance, the fact that it is the largest supplier of oil in the world who boasts a huge surplus production capacity, as well as its anticommunist stance based on rigorous Wahabi Islam, are factors that have strongly influenced U.S.–​Saudi base politics. They have also shaped its history of establishment and withdrawal of U.S.  bases, which has been different from other Gulf countries. For example, whereas other Gulf states established military ties with the U.S. only at the beginning of the 1990s, Saudi Arabia accepted American bases in the early stages of the Cold War and closely cooperated with Washington in military matters. However, since the end of the Cold War it has not concluded an official military agreement with the U.S., and the situation

Introduction  5 regarding U.S. military bases has been fluid, too. Chapter 7 by Masaki Mizobuchi traces base politics in Saudi Arabia by focusing on such Saudi peculiarities. In Singapore, since the beginning of the 1990s, efforts have been made to increase the size of bases and related facilities and improve their capabilities by adding cutting-​ edge functions. At the same time, Singapore has proactively conducted joint military exercises not only with the United States military but also with China’s People’s Liberation Army, thoroughly preparing for possible scenarios such as security frictions, tensions and confrontations. However, these activities have largely passed unnoticed by the general population and the so-​ called “typical base-​related incidents” such as accidents, noise pollution or crime, have not evolved into political issues in Singapore. Chapter 8 by Kei Koga focuses on the significance of military bases in the national security of Singapore and, from the perspective of interaction of material and ideational factors, argues in detail about the process in which the soil that fosters the citizens’ attitudes toward defense has been created. In the case of the Republic of Korea, the asymmetricity of its alliance with the United States has often been pointed out. How to change the security relationship with the U.S. and make it more reciprocal has been one of the topics of Korean base politics that cannot be ignored. In such conditions, President Roh Moo-​Hyun attempted to effect a change in the alliance by producing a concrete agenda, consisting of the rearrangement and reduction of U.S.  bases and curtailment of the troop levels. Chapter 9 by Tomonori Ishida sheds light on the demands for the rearrangement and downsizing of U.S.  military bases and the reduction of the troop levels, i.e., the movement for enhancing the country’s independence in relation to the United States expressed in the slogan “Koreanization of Korea’s defense” by focusing on the discrepancy between what was intended by such demands and the actual outcome. In this book, through the above studies, we shall extrapolate the issues specific to countries and areas hosting U.S. military bases that could not be fully grasped from the viewpoint of the traditional theory of national security. Building on that, we shall also assess the general validity of the base politics theory (BPT) and examine its potential for future development. Furthermore, in the closing chapter, aside from evaluating the development potential of the BPT with a focus on local base issues, we shall take up Japan’s Okinawa to consider the question of time, a theoretical problem in base politics which the above chapters do not address.

Note 1 Chapters 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 are partly based on papers published in Japanese in the academic journal Kokusai Anzen Hoshō (Journal of International Security), Vol. 47, No. 3, 2019.

Reference Cooley, A. (2008). Base Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

1  What questions does the study of military bases pose? Shinji Kawana

1.1  Introduction The objective of this chapter is to arrange in an orderly fashion different theoretical lineages from the field of international relations that aim to explain military, political and economic issues regarding overseas bases of great military powers (from hereon:  “the study of military bases”), and to shed light on their reach and problems that beset them.1 In the past, it was customary to treat the study of military bases as a part of the traditional research on national security, such as the theory of strategy, the alliance theory and geopolitics. For that reason, there were no specific attempts to extract from within them just the study of military bases and to shed light on its genealogy, nor was there a recognition of the need to do so. However, in recent years a new theory that is not simply relying on previous research on national security, the base politics theory (BPT), is being developed in the field of the study of military bases (Cooley, 2008). This chapter focuses on the BPT while attaching special importance to the analysis of the internal politics of the countries that accept foreign military bases (from hereon: “host countries”). The BPT has provided effective hypotheses for the explanation of phenomena that could not be fully grasped by preceding theories (such as, for example, the reluctant withdrawal of bases by the U.S.A). What brought such gains was the theory’s attention to the influence of small-​and mid-​size countries as well as sub-​state actors, which had until then been generally neglected by the traditional theory of national security. Therefore, these new, recent developments in the study of military bases are, perhaps, redirecting the spotlight back onto the contemporary problems with the theory of strategy and the alliance theory, which used to be seen as occupying the seat of honor in academia. This chapter will be tracing the genealogy of the study of military bases, divided into three periods: the Cold War era, the post-​Cold War era and the post-​9/​11 period. This is not for the sake of convenience, but because the development of the study of military bases follows the reality of international politics. The central questions posed by the study of military bases, as in other social sciences, were not unrelated with the political and social demands of the times. For example, during the Cold War era, the main preoccupation in the study of military bases was the

The study of military bases  7 military functioning of bases. The theoretical objective was to grasp the strategic effects generated by military base networks through a functional understanding of individual bases. In the midst of the Cold War, such understanding served, through policy, to support the global expansion of military bases. After the Cold War, it was the political function of military bases that came under scrutiny. The focus was on the elucidation of the base maintenance mechanism that does not rely on the assumption that a threat exists. After the Cold War, while reducing the number of bases itself, the U.S. maintained and increased the number of countries hosting them. The new movements in the study of bases, while subsuming the notions of governance and contract, partially converged into the theory of empire. After 9/​11, the interest in the field underwent a considerable change, with much of it being directed at the political dynamics that constrain the maintenance and expansion of military basis. In the background was the political conflict between the countries of Near East, the Middle East and Central Asia which accepted U.S. military bases anew during the war on terror and Washington. Decisions by these mid-​size and small host countries often imposed checks on the U.S. strategy. This mechanism of power, which would, from the viewpoint of the traditional theory of national security, seem counterintuitive emerged as an important topic that needed to be addressed by the study of military bases. Below, while tracing the genealogy of the study of military bases as its target moves from the forces that stimulate the expansion of military bases (the thrust) to the forces that place checks on their spread (the drag), I will be looking at the BPT, which emerged with the task of particularly grasping the latter, and at the developments that arose in response to it.

1.2  An examination of the thrust force Military bases abroad have been indispensable for projecting the military might of powers since ancient times (Kennedy, 1987). The world that Thucydides described, it may be said, was that of a face-​off between Sparta and Athens over the access to bases and of the dynamics of alliance making (Thucydides, 1998). The Roman Empire, too, built bases throughout the world for the purpose of countering rebellion by its own subjects and invasions from outside, as well as for the deployment of its troops to neighboring areas (Allison, 2013). The fifteenth-​ century Ming Dynasty built a network of bases stretching from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean as a means for the expansion of its territory from South Asia to the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa. From the end of the sixteenth century, all the way to the nineteenth century, Spain, Portugal, Holland, France and Britain continued fighting over the acquisition of overseas bases (Boxer, 1969). On the other hand, the United States started to build its network of overseas bases in earnest only after the beginning of World War II. The number of American overseas bases, which was less than 14 in 1938, was nearing 5,000 at the end of the war in 1945 (Sandars, 2000, p. 5). After the war, their purpose was redefined and they became important tools for countering the expansion of the

8  Shinji Kawana Soviet influence in Europe, Asia-​Pacific and the Persian Gulf area, for protecting sea lanes and for indicating the role of the United States in the international community (Kawana, 2012). The confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War era showed not only signs of an arms race, but also of a base race. For researchers of the Cold War era, the central question concerning military bases was how a state could optimize the deployment of its military forces through the operation of its overseas military bases.2 The aim of the study of military bases was to construct theories concerning the expansion of the network of military bases, and its interest focused on the functioning of bases. Comprehending the military functions of bases was regarded as an important means for understanding main Cold War era policies, such as nuclear deterrence, power balance and alliance making. 1.2.1  The Cold War era: What is the function of military bases? The most systematic investigation of the military function of bases in the Cold War era was conducted by Robert E.  Harkavy (Harkavy, 1982, 1989). His research in the 1980s was influenced by Richard Rosecrance’s theory of trade systems and Saul Cohen’s geopolitics (Harkavy, 1982, p.  270). For Harkavy the acquisition of bases was an element constituting the equation between the objective military power of a state and its presence in a more subjective sense. The functions of military bases are diverse, but, he thought, basically come down to the following three characteristics.3 The first one is the provision of the rapid response capability in emergencies, the second—​deterrence of enemy states and the provision of credibility to allies, and the third is the furthering of national interests in the broad sense of the word, which includes the acquisition of natural resources. Needless to say, these were realized in conjunction with policies such as alliance making, weapon transfers, military training, economic assistance, etc. (Harkavy, 1975). Not just Harkavy, but a majority of studies from this period argued about military bases by placing a focus on all or some of these three functions. Studies turning attention to the first function matched well with the theory of strategy, those focusing on the second function interacted with the alliance theory,4 while those directing attention to the third function shared their analytical perspective with the theory of world systems and the dependency theory, or with the theory of empire (imperialism) (Kemp, 1978). As regards discussions on policies, for example, the U.S. policy of acquiring, maintaining and expanding bases was regarded as desirable from the viewpoint of the security of the West (Paul, 1973). That being said, analysts who looked at the functioning of bases not individually but as a network, were aware of the risk of overextension by the U.S. For example, James Blaker, while agreeing to the above concept of three functions, advocated the need to understand those functions in the context of interaction with other bases (Blaker, 1990, p. 3). He argued that the cost–​benefit calculus regarding a base should be made by taking into account

The study of military bases  9 the extent of the influence it has on the productivity of other bases, and that if, for example, in a geographically proximate area there is another base of high substitutability (i.e., if there is a functional overlap), then adjustments, such as scale reduction or base withdrawal, should be made (Blaker, 1990, pp. 119–​121). 1.2.2  After the Cold War: What leads to the maintenance and expansion of bases? After the end of the Cold War the United States expanded the geographical scope of its network of military bases. As is well known, it established new bases in East Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa (Baker, 2004; Barnett, 2004). In view of this situation, the focus in the study of military bases shifted to the mechanism that leads to the maintenance and expansion of military bases after the security threat to the country that uses them has disappeared (Wallander, 2000). Along with deterrence and alliance making, the notions of the contract with the host country and governance through military bases were examined. Such studies shared the perception of the United States, especially since the 1990s, as an empire (or at least discussed whether the U.S. should be seen as an empire or not), as well as a common awareness of the issues that needed to be examined (Yamamoto, 2006). For these researchers, the maintenance and expansion of base networks did not necessarily depend on the existence of enemy states (Boot, 2003; The Editors, 2002; Klare, 2003). Rather, military bases were but a means for taking small-​and mid-​size countries under one’s wing and expanding one’s sphere of influence (Toynbee, 1962; Steel, 1967). For example, Bruce Cumings called U.S. overseas military bases the “archipelago of the empire” and viewed them as a symbol of the hierarchical structure of the international system (Cumings, 1999, p. 289). Also, Chalmers Johnson argued that the borders of an empire should be drawn along the lines of its network of military bases (Johnson, 2004). Since the second half of the 1990s, examples of governance through military bases could be seen everywhere. For instance, the U.S.  army stationed in Colombia and El Salvador not only conducted training of the local military forces and supplied them with weapons, but also taught them about norms regarding human rights and the principles of democracy (Kaplan, 2005, pp.  51–​69). The U.S.  military commanders on the ground were deeply involved in diplomacy and resembled imperial “proconsuls” (Priest, 2003, p. 73). What is more, the cases in which they were invited by the host countries were not rare (Lundestad, 2005). Unlike the empires of the past, the American imperial system was not based on the premise of a master–​servant relationship. Rather, the relationship between the U.S. and host countries was based on contracts, such as base agreements or status agreements, where the latter receive security patronage from the former. Such contractual and interest-​based exchange relationship was seen as the core of the mechanism of the maintenance and expansion of military bases in an “age of no large security threats” (Sandars, 2000; Lutz, 2009).

10  Shinji Kawana

1.3  An examination of the drag force Since the 9/​11 terror attacks, aiming to counter the asymmetrical threat, the U.S.  commenced a realignment of its overseas military bases.5 Its network of bases expanded from Central Asia to Africa, and instead of massive, large-​scale bases of the past, the establishment of small-​scale, highly flexible bases called “lily pads”6 was undertaken. U.S.  bases were divided into three categories in accordance with their size and function: main operating bases (MOB), forward operating sites (FOS), and cooperative security locations (CSL). Among them particular importance was given to the “lily pads,” that is, FOSs and CSLs. The expansion of the network of FOSs and CSLs, however, against the will of the U.S. enhanced the autonomy of the host countries and induced opportunistic behavior on their part (such as, e.g., demands for the withdrawal of bases or for increases in economic aid). This is because the confidence of these countries in the long-​term commitment of the U.S. to their security fell as the bases became “lighter.” (Or, put conversely, the presence of semi-​perennial large-​scale bases, which could be seen during the Cold War era, served as a proof of the strong U.S.  commitment to the security of the countries hosting them (Cooley and Spryut, 2009)). Inopportunely, domestic anti-​base, anti-​American movements in host countries became interconnected and intensified thanks to the development of global communication tools and greater opportunities for cross-​border mobilization (Davis, 2015, p. 3). Elucidating the political mechanisms restricting the operation of military bases became a pressing matter for researchers and officials interested in the U.S. diplomatic policy. 1.3.1  An inclination toward the analysis of internal politics The focus of the study of military bases shifted to analyzing the internal politics of host countries. Of course, the issue of refusal and opposition by host countries used to be an important topic in the study of military bases even before, as can be seen in the above-​mentioned Johnson’s tripartite work (Johnson, 2000, 2006).7 However, previous research had not empirically answered the question of why such backlash occurred. This was especially so in the case of research focusing on the U.S.  strategy. The drag force working against base policies was seen as basically an internal issue, and not a problem of the American foreign diplomatic policy (Lutz, 2006). The opposition to the presence of U.S. bases, which were supposed to guarantee extended deterrence to the countries hosting them, was not even taken up for discussion as it was regarded as difficult to comprehend (Howard, 1982 [1983]). Kent E. Calder (2007) and Alexander Cooley (2008) brought change to this tendency. They termed the interaction regarding military bases between the countries providing them and the countries hosting them “base politics.” Their research was similar in that both compared the cases of multiple host countries and tried to identify the conditions in which bases are stable. Furthermore, the two also shared a portion of the conclusion that influenced later research. And

The study of military bases  11 that is that the drag force constraining base policies arises from the changes in the internal political system of the host country or regime changes in it rather than from the strategy, operations or technological development by the U.S. Cooley’s work was particularly novel in the sense that it endeavored to ensure the empirical validity of presented hypotheses, which was definitely missing from the research that preceded it. 1.3.2  The Base Politics Theory (BPT) Cooley proposed the so-​called “base politics theory” (BPT). What his model sought to grasp were the conditions necessary for a stable base contract between the U.S. and the host country. What is meant by the stability of a base contract is a state in which a military base does not evolve into a political issue, its utilization is not impeded, and the contract concluded does not undergo a revision that is unfavorable for the U.S. and does not get scrapped. Therefore, even if, for example, tens of thousands of locals protest in the streets against a U.S. base but this does not pose problems for its functioning, the base contract is deemed stable. On the other hand, even if the locals welcome the base but there is a very small anti-​base movement influencing the functioning of the U.S. military, this means that the military base contract has become unstable. Thus, the stability of a base contract is a notion that takes into account not only the character of the reception of the base, but also the influences on its functioning. The BPT makes the following two major hypotheses (Cooley, 2008, pp. 10–​ 12). One has to do with the political survival of the rulers in the host country. The theory assumes that the goal of the rulers is to strengthen the foundations of their political power and maximize the probability of their survival in the domestic political system. The second hypothesis is related to the two-​ level game—​it assumes that base politics is conducted through negotiations on two different levels: between the governments of the country using the base and the country hosting it, and between the government of the host country and other stakeholders within it. In other words, the rulers of the host country, as rational actors engaged in negotiations regarding a military base, face the representatives of the country using the base and, on a different level, collaborators and competitors in the domestic politics. Based on such assumptions, the political system of the host country is thought to influence the stability of a base contract. Cooley divides political systems into three categories:  1) authoritarian regimes, 2)  consolidated democracies and 3) democratizing regimes (Cooley, 2008, pp. 13–​18). Among these, the stability of the contract is the highest in mature democracies. The reason behind this thinking is that in such countries agreements between states tend to be honored, and questions arising due to the implementation of contracts are normally almost automatically dealt with by relevant bureaucratic institutions. The stability of the contract is second highest in authoritarian states. In such countries the influence of the public opinion is small, and the contract is preserved as long as the bases function as a means of maintaining the power of the leader

12  Shinji Kawana and the political elite. However, deals made with dictators are essentially not to be trusted, since various past examples (such as those of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan) indicate that a contract can easily be annulled if the political tide turns (Cooley, 2012, pp. 32–​39). Furthermore, in such countries, once the movement toward democracy begins, serious doubts are cast on the legitimacy of the base contracts concluded under the old system. Military bases come under attack by the media and civil groups as a negative legacy of the previous regime, and their removal is often demanded. Thailand in the mid-​1970s, Spain in late 1980s and the post-​ Marcos Philippines fall in this category. Thus, base contracts are least stable in democracies which are in a transition phase from an authoritarian political system.

1.4  Since the BPT Cooley thus raised the issue of, so to speak, the “compatibility” of democracy. This attracted researchers interested in the U.S. diplomatic policy to the analysis of base politics. That is because Cooley’s work suggested the possibility that the policy of global democratization pursued by the U.S. since the end of the Cold War might actually be in a strained relationship with the U.S. national security. The study of military bases has since developed in the form of the reply to and the criticism of Cooley. To be sure, problems with the BPT are not few. For example, the model predicts that the base contract will be stable in a mature democracy, but, in reality, many examples that seem to disprove that have been observed.8 Also, it has come to light that in several democratic countries the local governments that have accepted U.S. military bases, in fact, possess veto powers regarding the functioning of the bases. In such cases the base functioning was especially wrought with difficulties (Kawato, 2015). The U.S.  itself has, since 2011, in its policy of “rebalancing,” brought up the stable functioning of its military bases in democratic countries as one of the main topics.9 The BPT’s boundary conditions, too, were ambiguous. For example, in Cooley’s model, there was no distinction in terms of the stability of the base contract between countries such as Japan and the Republic of Korea, which have both adopted democracy and are in alliance with the U.S. Furthermore, it was very difficult to capture the variations in stability between individual bases in countries that accepted them voluntarily (such as, e.g., the difference between Futenma Base in Okinawa and Misawa Base in Aomori in Japan). The fact that 20 years had passed since the end of the Cold War and that it seemed that a lot of countries had already carried out the process of democratization also functioned to limit the applicability of the BPT on the policy level. With the above issues in mind, I shall examine below the research of recent years aimed at the application and further development of the BPT. 1)  Making bases invisible According to Sebastian E.  Bitar, the BPT cannot sufficiently explain the outcome of base politics in cases where the U.S. and the host country have a mutual

The study of military bases  13 interest, but the opposition parties and local governments clearly object (Bitar, 2016, p. 47). This is because the BPT predicts that in such cases the base contract will either not be signed or, if it already exists, will be rendered void. However, in Latin America there are many bases that exist despite not having the support of the people. (Except Cuba, all of the Latin American countries hosting U.S. bases are treated as “formally democracies.”) One stratagem for obviating this problem is the use of quasi-​bases as loopholes that enable the avoidance of the influence of internal politics.10 This functions as the second-​best measure in cases where there is an agreement on the level of central governments about the establishment of a base, but, due to internal politics, its implementation is not easy. Bitar defines quasi-​bases as “foreign military bases that are not supported by a formal agreement.” For such bases there are no legal regulations such as those concerning the contract period, etc.—​they are quietly tolerated as a part of a silent agreement with the host country, or as a part of the already existing security cooperation (Bitar, 2016, pp. 49–​50). On the other hand, when it comes to the utilization of such bases, there is no difference at all with the official bases. Of course, quasi-​bases are politically vulnerable. Even without a regime change, the presence of a base comes under threat as soon as there is a change in the relationship between the government of the hosting country and the U.S. Thus, the U.S. is forced to offer huge rewards in order to sustain such bases, not only to the host country’s central government, but to other relevant domestic actors, too (such as people working on the base, construction companies, etc.). Attempts to make a military base politically invisible and to sustain it by offering rewards to certain domestic actors is not a practice limited to the cases where the host country is a democratic state. According to Geoffrey F. Gresh, for example, U.S.  military bases in authoritarian states such as Bahrein and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East are affected by their governments’ perception of foreign and domestic threats (Gresh, 2015). The defense capability of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states is, generally speaking, poor, so when external security becomes a pressing issue for them, the involvement by the U.S. becomes a necessity. On such occasions the stability of the base contract naturally increases. On the other hand, when internal security threats exceed external security threats, GCC member states start demanding the removal of the bases. This is because the leaders, as soon as they notice a danger for the survival of their monarchy in an approaching rebellion or revolution, attempt to relieve the internal political pressure by requesting an end to the military base contract with the U.S. Indeed, in this region, Bahrein and Saudi Arabia have frequently annulled their base contracts (Gresh, 2015, p. 12). However, what is important is that in each of these cases after the termination of the contract, the U.S. managed to keep a “light footprint” (Gresh, 2015, p. 3). For example, Saudi Arabia allowed a small portion of U.S. troops to remain under the rubric of the training of the National Guard when it made the U.S. military withdraw in 1962 and 2003. In the case of Bahrein, the U.S. military lost access to a military base there in 1977, but continued to station a small unit in charge of managing facilities for the provision of logistic support in the Gulf. The same

14  Shinji Kawana could be seen in Oman. In 1980, after the Iranian revolution, the U.S. was told to leave Masirah Base as the price for using the base for the operation to rescue American hostages in Tehran without the permission of Oman’s government. Nonetheless, the U.S. managed to keep the access to the base by implementing measures such as not hoisting the American flag (i.e., by making the base less conspicuous). These facts were important rebuttals of the BPT, which sees the scale and the state of a military base as unrelated to the stability of the base contract (Cooley, 2008, p. 257, p. 266). 2)  Pathways of influence Another problem with the BPT was that the causal pathway between the political system and the stability of the military base contract was not clear. Just how does the democratic system affect the variation in base politics? With regard to that, Andrew Yeo, focusing on popular movements in democratic states, compared base politics in the Philippines, Japan, Italy and Ecuador (Yeo, 2011). According to his study, whether an anti-​base movement will affect the decisions of the host country depends on the consensus regarding national security within the government and the ruling party or the policy elites, that is, on the system of their shared perceptions and ideas about the security relations with the U.S. (Yeo, 2011, pp. 25–​27). For instance, in cases where the consensus regarding security was weak, anti-​ base movements were able to effect change in the policy of the host country’s government more easily. On the other hand, where the consensus regarding security was strong, anti-​base movements were not able to directly influence decisions of the central government. Nonetheless, the important point in Yeo’s argument is that, even in such cases, activities by anti-​ base movements sent negative signals to the U.S. (Yeo, 2011, p. 26). The central government and the policy-​ making elite, who attach importance to the security relationship with the U.S., perceived the politicization of military bases as a risk for the relations with the U.S. Therefore, countries in which there is a strong consensus on security, albeit indirectly, are often affected by anti-​base movements. In Yeo’s model, the host country government acts like an intermediary positioned between the U.S. and the host country’s sub-​state actors, such as citizens, NGOs, etc. Similar to Yeo, Amy Austin Holmes strove to capture the dynamics of the penetration of internal politics regarding bases into the realm of international politics (Holmes, 2014). Through a study case on Germany and Turkey, she demonstrated the mechanism in which a certain anti-​base movement can directly influence the U.S. policy (or, in other words, can bypass the host country’s government). Holmes was interested in anti-​base movements that arose at the Cold War frontline. The grounds for the presence of U.S.  bases in NATO member states are found in the NATO treaty, and the tendency has been to view them as, on the whole, legitimate, both in terms of procedure and policy, especially so during the Cold War (Duke, 1989). And yet, despite that, bases in Germany and Turkey were exposed to intense opposition at the peak of the Cold War.

The study of military bases  15 In her study, Holmes focused on social unrest in host countries. Whether such unrest will influence American policy decisions depends, she concluded, on 1)  the extent of the external threat to the country hosting the base, and 2) the extent of the social and other damage suffered by the host country, such as violations of sovereignty, environmental destruction, criminal incidents and accidents (Holmes, 2014 BIB-​028, p. 23). That is, when the external threat to the host country is small and at the same time the social damage that accompanies a military base is large, the U.S.  makes a policy response to the social unrest. And that response sometimes takes the form of restricting the functioning of the base.11 This is because the functioning of a base, in fact, depends in every respect on the civilian infrastructure of the host country. Not just roads, ports and airports, but also the provision of goods and services by local companies, organizations and individuals are prerequisites for the functioning of a base. Work such as guarding the base and conducting security checks in front of the gates is done by the local police and security firms. Furthermore, there are countries where the everyday functioning of bases is subject to strict audits and inspections by the host country’s legislative bodies. Thus, according to Holmes, America’s base policy is essentially vulnerable to host countries’ civil society (e.g., civilian infrastructure, oversight by parliament, local labor force, etc.). 3)  Reversal of power Also vulnerable to civil society are the governments of host countries. Minori Takahashi endeavors to empirically prove the influence of civil society through the case of Denmark and Greenland (Takahashi, 2019). According to him, the vulnerability of governments in democratic countries is informed by the asymmetry in dependence that stems from the bargaining regarding military bases with the local political subjects (local governments and parliaments). He explains that it is due to that asymmetry that the reversal of power, which is often seen in the relationship between the host country’s central government and the local government, occurs (in which the local government gains the political upper hand over the central government). As David A. Lake pointed out long ago, in the case that a host country receives protection from the U.S. in return for the provison of a base and cannot ensure its own safety without it, its central government will end up being dependent not only on the U.S., but also on the local political actor that has accepted the base (Lake, 1999, p. 202). Local political subjects can in such circumstances hold up central governments in situations of decisive importance for base politics.12 For example, such an actor can request from the central government a revision of the transaction conditions regarding the base (the reduction of the base, an increase in subsidies, etc.) and can take action to impede the functioning of the base if its demands are not met. In such a circumstance, the central government is pressed by the need to decide whether it should, in view of its position as a “kidnapped hostage,” meet the demands of the local political subject or flatly refuse them. Such a decision

16  Shinji Kawana is influenced by the distinctive quality of the base, i.e., the combination of its substitutability, urgency and specificity.13 Of course, in order to reduce the risk of opportunistic behavior by the local political subject, the central government strives to control the modality of the transactions. Thus, the government might attempt an integration of the transactions (in the case of Denmark and Greenland that meant colonization), or their institutionalization through subsidies and public projects. Or, it may attempt to lessen the cost of opportunism per each transaction by distributing the transactions (e.g., distribution through transfers to other local governments). Models such as the above attempt to grasp the mechanisms that separate voluntarily accepted military bases in democratic countries that have stable functioning from those that do not by extending the BPT.

1.5  Conclusion This chapter has examined the genealogy of the study of military bases, stretching from the Cold War era until today. First, we may say that, looking historically, the interest of researchers from the field has shifted from shedding light on the thrust force that leads to the establishment of bases to elucidating the drag force that keeps under control the maintenance and expansion of military bases. Assuming that the mainstream in the study of military bases during the Cold War era asked questions about the functioning and the effects of military bases, we can say that, since the 2000s, the field has shifted to posing questions about the political burden or the mechanism of “blowback” brought about by military bases (Johnson, 2000). In accordance with that, the research approach has also changed, from looking at the international system to directing attention to the internal politics of host countries and to the level of negotiations between the U.S. and hosting countries. Second, especially from the second half of the 2000s, studies that empirically examine theories, which until then could hardly be seen, increased in number. The trigger for that was Cooley’s work (2008). The BPT, which addressed the relationship between the stability of bases and the political system, attracted the attention of a part of the scholarly community interested in the U.S. diplomatic policy to the field of base studies, and formulated issues that would later become important, such as political invisibility, the pathways of influence and the reversal of power relationships. The new research on military bases after the appearance of the BPT has actively sought to understand the internal politics in small-​and mid-​size (host) countries and the actions of non-​state actors, which the traditional study of national security did not cover. Furthermore, the scope of research, which used to be limited in breadth only to a portion of the world’s regions, such as Europe and East Asia, has been extended to encompass the Middle East, Central Asia and Latin America. Looking from a different angle, these developments, it may be said, have exposed the contemporary problems of the mainstream of the traditional study of national security:  the theory of strategy, the alliance theory and geopolitics.

The study of military bases  17 At the end, I wish to point out that the contribution to the above development of base studies by neighboring fields such as sociology and area studies, which have, while sharing the common theme of military bases from before, developed almost independently, has not been small. The empirical wall in the study of military bases (i.e., the limitations in the availability of primary material and data) still remains, but research aimed at overcoming these limitations by incorporating the achievements of neighboring fields is steadily growing in number.14 Such methodological ingenuity and improvement, too, have provided a momentum for the creation of contemporary trends in the study of military bases.

Notes 1 In this chapter the term “overseas base” refers to military facilities and infrastructure that a country establishes abroad (buildings, airfields and runways, communication installations, sleeping quarters for the troops, roads, etc.). 2 Research focusing on the military function of bases in the Cold War era was strongly influenced by Alfred T.  Mahan and Nicholas J.  Spykman (Mahan, 1965; Spykman, 1942). 3 A similar argument can be found in Cottrell and Moorer (1977, p. 6). 4 Some of the studies focusing on the first function are Wolstetter (1951) and Cottrell (1963). Among studies focusing on the second function are Hoopes (1958) and Fox and Fox (1967). 5 Prepared Testimony of US Secretary of Defense Donald H.  Rumsfeld before the Senate Armed Services Committee: Global Posture, 23 September 2004, p. 1. 6 Statement of General James L.  Jones, USMC Commander, United States European Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 23 September 2004, pp. 6–​7. 7 There are also other studies, such as Kugler (1998), Gerson and Birchard (1991), or Gerson (1999). 8 During the Cold War era, U.S. military bases in Turkey, West Germany, France, Iceland, South Korea, Japan (Okinawa), etc., often became political issues (Sandars, 2000). 9 State Secretary Hillary Clinton, in addressing the new defense strategy, brought up the issue of the political sustainability of military bases (Clinton, 2011). 10 Of course, examples such as this existed in the Cold War era, too, and cannot be said to be phenomena that emerged for the first time in the 2000s (Harkavy, 1982, p. 33). 11 In this respect Holmes’ argument has affinity with Gresh (2015), which was mentioned earlier. However, the two differ in that Gresh thinks that the actions of sub-​state actors affect the decisions of the host country’s government, whereas Holmes thinks that they bypass the host country’s government and directly influence the U.S. 12 A similar argument can be found in Liska (1962, p.  144) and Cooley and Spruyt (2009, p. 20). 13 “Substitutability” denotes the extent of the possibility that a government may replace a base, the bargaining regarding which has been discontinued, with another domestic base of equal value. Urgency is an index for measuring whether the base in question is perceived as indispensable for the existence and prosperity of the country that hosts it. Specificity is assessed in relation to the possibility of the conversion of a military base (particularly for civilian use) (Kawana, 2019). 14 For example, as recent achievements in the fields of sociology and area studies that take up military bases as their topic, the following works can be mentioned:  Vine

18  Shinji Kawana (2009); Höhn and Moon (2010); Kirk (2013); Fitz-​Henry (2015); Schober (2016); and Inoue (2017).

References Allison, P. (2013). People and Spaces in Roman Military Bases. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. Baker, A. (2004). American Soldiers Overseas. Westport: Praeger. Barnett, T. (2004). The Pentagon’s New Map. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons. Bitar, S. (2016). U.S. Military Bases, Quasi-​Bases, and Domestic Politics in Latin America. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Blaker, J. (1990). United States Overseas Basing. New York: Praeger Boot, M. (2003). “Neither New Nor Nefarious,” Current History, 102(667), pp. 361–​366. Boxer, C. (1969). The Portuguese Seaborne Empire. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Calder, K. (2007). Embattled Garrisons. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Clinton, H. (2011). “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, 189, pp. 56–​63. Cooley, A. (2008). Base Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. —​—​—​ (2012). Great Games, Local Rules. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —​—​—​ and Spruyt, H. (2009). Contracting States. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cottrell, A. (1963). “Soviet Views of U.S. Overseas Bases,” Orbis, 7(1), pp. 77–​95. —​—​—​ and Moorer, T. (1977). U.S. Overseas Bases. Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications. Cumings, B. (1999). “Still the American Century.” In Cox, M., Booth, K. and Dunne, T. (eds.). The Interregnum: Controversies in World Politics 1989–​1999 (pp. 271–​299). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Davis, S. (2015). Empires’ Edge. Athens: University of Georgia Press. Duke, S. (1989). United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fitz-​Henry, E. (2015). U.S. Military Bases and Anti-​Military Organizing. New  York: Palgrave Macmillan. Fox, W. and Fox, A. (1967). NATO and the Range of American Choice. New  York: Columbia University Press. Gerson, J. (1999). “Architecture of U.S. Asia-​Pacific Hegemony,” Peace Review, 11(3), pp. 399–​407. Gerson, J. and Birchard, B. eds. (1991). The Sun Never Sets…: Confronting the Network of Foreign U.S. Military Bases. Boston: South End Press. Gresh, G. (2015). Gulf Security and the U.S Military. Stanford:  Stanford University Press. Harkavy, R. (1975). Arms Trade and International Systems. Cambridge: Ballinger Pub. Co. —​—​—​ (1982). Great Power Competition for Overseas Base. New York: Pergamon Press. —​—​—​ (1989). Bases Abroad. Oxford: Oxford University Press. —​—​—​ (2007). Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 1200–​2000. London: Routledge. Höhn, M. and Moon, S. eds. (2010). Over There. Durham: Duke University Press. Holmes, A. (2014). Social Unrest and American Military Bases in Turkey and Germany since 1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hoopes, T. (1958). “Overseas Bases in American Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, 37, pp. 69–​82. Howard, M. (1982 [1983]). “Reassurance and Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs, 61(2), pp. 309–​324. Ignatieff, M. (2003). Empire Lite. London: Vintage.

The study of military bases  19 Inoue, M. (2017). Okinawa and the U.S. Military. New York: Columbia University Press. Johnson, C. (2000). Blowback. New York: Metropolitan Books. —​—​—​ (2004). The Sorrows of Empire. New York: Metropolitan Books. —​—​—​ (2006). Nemesis. New York: Metropolitan Books. Kaplan, R. (2005). Imperial Grunts. New York: Random House. Kawana, S. (2012). Base Politics: The Origins of the Post-​war U.S. Policy of the Expansion of Overseas Military Bases (Kichi no Seijigaku: Sengo Beikoku no Kaigai Kichi Kakudai Seisaku). Tokyo: Hakutō Shobō (In Japanese). —​—​—​ (2019). “Base Politics and the Hold-​up Problem.” In Takahashi, M. (ed.), The Influence of Sub-​state Actors on National Security (pp. 11–​24). Dordrecht: Springer. Kawato, Y. (2015). Protests Against U.S. Military Base Policy in Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Kemp, G. (1978). “Scarcity and Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, 56(2), pp. 397–​414. Kennedy, P. (1987). The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House. Kirk, D. (2013). Okinawa and Jeju. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Klare, M. (2003). “The Empire’s New Frontiers,” Current History, 102(667), pp. 383–​387. Kugler, R. (1998). Changes Ahead: Future Directions for the U.S. Overseas Military Presence. Santa Monica: RAND. Lake, D. (1999). Entangling Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Liska, G. (1962). Nations in Alliance. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Lundestad, G. (2005). The United States and Western Europe since 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lutz, C. (2006). “Empire is in the Details,” American Ethnologist, 33(4), pp. 593–​611. —​—​—​ ed. (2009). The Bases of Empire. New York: New York University Press. Mahan, A. (1965). The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–​ 1783. London: Methuen. Paul, R. (1973). American Military Commitments Abroad. New Brunswick:  Rutgers University Press. Prepared Testimony of US Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld before the Senate Armed Services Committee: Global Posture, 23 September 2004. Priest, D. (2003). The Mission. New York: W. W. Norton. Sandars, C. (2000). America’s Overseas Garrisons. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schober, E. (2016). Base Encounters. London: Pluto Press. Spykman, N. (1942). America’s Strategy in the World. New  York:  Harcourt, Brace and Company. Statement of General James L.  Jones, USMC Commander, United States European Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 23 September 2004. Steel, R. (1967). Pax Americana. New York: Viking. Takahashi, M. ed.. (2019). The Influence of Sub-​state Actors on National Security. Dodrecht: Springer. The Editors (2002). “U.S. Military Bases and Empire,” Monthly Review, 53(10), pp. 1–​14. Thucydides (1998). The History of the Peloponnesian War. Translated by Steven Lattimore. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing. Toynbee, A. (1962). America and the World Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vine, D. (2009). Island of Shame. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wallander, C. (2000). “Institutional Assets and Adaptability,” International Organization, 54(4), pp. 705–​735.

20  Shinji Kawana Wolstetter, A. (1951). “Economic and Strategic Consideration in Air Base Location,” RAND Corporation, D-​1114, December 29. Yamamoto, Y. (2006). The Empire in the Study of International Politics: The Post-​Cold War International System and America (Teikoku no Kokusai Seijigaku: Reisengo no Kokusai Shisutemu to Amerika). Tokyo: Tōshindō. Yeo, A. (2011). Activists, Alliances, and Anti-​U.S. Base Protests. New  York:  Cambridge University Press.

2  Rethinking the politics surrounding the U.S. military base in Greenland with a focus on non-​material factors Minori Takahashi 2.1  Introduction The compatibility between the stable and continuous operation of American bases deployed overseas and the political system of the countries hosting them, as an angle from which to approach the dynamics of base politics, has been one of the main points of debate in the study of international relations. Shinji Kawana has reviewed past discussions regarding the correlation between military bases and democracy (2019a) by critically examining research by Alexander Cooley (2008) and Kent Calder (2007). First, Cooley claims that, if the host country is a mature democracy, the credibility of the contract regarding a base will be higher and the base will be politically stable. Against that, Calder argues that a base will be prone to instability exactly because the host country is a democracy, since it will be influenced by domestic factors in all kinds of situations due to the pluralism of political voices. We can learn a lot from the studies by the two researchers, who have aptly pointed out both sides of democracy in relation to base politics—​that it can generate confusion, as well as order. However, there are some difficulties with their arguments (Kawana, 2019a, p. 12). Regarding the former, the problem is that no distinction can be made, for example between Japan and South Korea, both of which have adopted the democratic system and are given security by the United States. Regarding the latter, it is not clear just when and under what conditions the internal factors, which are said to function as explanatory variables, affect the stability of military bases. Kawana, therefore, attempted to identify the conditions that generate the difference between local governments (areas that host bases) which have influence on the central government of the host country and those who do not, with the aim of operationalizing the politics surrounding military bases in host countries on a more micro level. He centered his argument on the degree of dependence of central governments on military bases and focused on the bargaining between central governments, which endeavor to minimize that dependence and enable a stable functioning of bases, and local governments, which, while keeping an eye on the degree of dependence of the central government on the bases, try to increase their discretionary powers in base politics in order to reverse the asymmetrical power relationship with central governments. He theorized that in case

22  Minori Takahashi the dependence of a central government on a base is high and the government has no options for improving the situation (or they are limited), then it will strip the local government of its residual management rights in order to carry out the bargaining to its advantage. From the viewpoint of central governments who wish to secure stable functioning of bases and are contemplating how to reduce their dependence on the bases, it is rational to conclude that limiting opportunistic language and actions of local governments is an urgent option that needs to be taken. However, this view could not sufficiently explain the bargaining concerning military bases between the host country of Denmark and its territory of Greenland, which is the main topic of this chapter. Denmark has placed high priority on maintaining relations with the United States and NATO (Frederiksen, 2017, p. 23). It has recognized Thule Air Base, almost the only security asset that it can offer to the United States, as indispensable for its own survival and prosperity and for the stabilization of its national security. Despite that, as I shall write later in more detail, Denmark has opted to increase Greenland’s discretionary powers by adopting a stance characterized by flexibility, compromise, considerateness and talks (Takahashi, 2019b). Here it is worth noting that since Denmark (more precisely, its parliament) holds the right to making decisions concerning foreign relations of the entire kingdom, based on Article 19 of the Danish constitution, such approach cannot be taken for granted as an a priori choice. Of course, it would be too naïve to reduce Denmark’s relations with the United States in the field of national security only to one military base and the bargaining about it. For example, the fact that, after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Denmark, as a NATO member, quickly dispatched its military personnel to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan to conduct peace keeping and humanitarian work clearly illustrates that. In addition, Denmark sent its troops to Iraq in 2003 as a member of the coalition of the willing and pushed for the ousting of Saddam Hussein’s regime, showing unequivocally that it was keen to maintain and further strengthen its alliance with the United States. On the other hand, it is undeniable that the presence of American military bases has served to crystalize Denmark’s relations with the U.S. and NATO and that, although their role has changed over time, they have functioned as a kind of a symbol of the “special relationship” between Denmark and the U.S.1 For Denmark, the U.S. bases in Greenland (during the Cold War, not just Thule, but the base network including Narsarsuaq and Sondrestrom/​Kangerlussuaq) have been assets that make its alliance with the U.S. and NATO constantly visible. They have also been of crucial importance for simultaneously ensuring Denmark’s own security and influence (in NATO). In that sense, accepting and enabling the presence of American military bases was not unrelated with the questions of the stability of Denmark’s own national security, and its own survival. Such was the environment in which Denmark chose to increase Greenland’s discretionary powers. In this chapter I  wish to highlight the Itilleq Declaration that Greenland managed to secure in 2003 amidst the debates on the inclusion of Thule Air Base

The U.S. military base in Greenland  23 in the American missile defense shield, on which I shall touch later. The Itilleq Declaration gave Greenland the right to have a say in matters of national security and enabled it to exercise certain influence in that field. The declaration defined Greenland as a subject that can, especially regarding issues that are important to it, demand international negotiations, participate in them and have an equal influence as others. Greenland exercised that right and in the following year signed the Igaliku Agreement, a complex agreement with the U.S. and Denmark that includes a defense (military) component, as one of the parties concerned. These examples show that Denmark, although its primary goal was the maintaining of relations with the U.S. and a stable functioning of the base, not only did not choose to limit Greenland’s discretionary powers but had in fact planned to substantially expand them. That is why the view that assumes that the central government is a rational actor who tries to maximize its own gains or advantage is not applicable here. Why did Denmark involve Greenland in inter-​state negotiations regarding the defense agreement and create an environment in which Greenland was in the end able to become one of the signatories, even though that was a choice that was likely to destabilize the functioning of the base in Thule? The main goal regarding this issue in my previous studies was to trace the debates before and after the conclusion of the Igaliku Agreement using the minutes from the Danish and Greenlandic parliaments and to empirically demonstrate the content of narratives in those parliaments (Takahashi et al., 2019). In this chapter, however, while reaffirming the importance of the Thule base from the viewpoint of military agreements, the base’s functions and geopolitical position and recognizing that these elements influence the substance of decisions concerning base politics, I wish to revisit the idea that they are not the only factors that shaped the debates regarding Thule Air Base. I shall do that by focusing on the host country’s political climate and conventions. Christopher Hemmer and Peter J.  Katzenstein have pointed out that NATO’s collective security system was established because North America and Europe shared the same religion and democratic values and that no such alliance has been formed in Asia because of a lack of shared values (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002). This chapter takes the methodological approach of focusing on non-​material factors, such as values, in situations where they have made a difference in decision-​making regarding security. I shall first briefly survey the functions of the base by considering the provisions of the Igaliku Agreement, which provides guarantees for the presence of U.S. bases. Secondly, looking back at the gradual enhancement of Greenland’s say in decision making, I shall examine base politics in the Danish state with a focus on the role played by the domestic political climate and conventions.

2.2  From the viewpoint of defense agreements The United States got directly involved in Greenland because of World War II. Needless to say, its interest in Greenland was of military nature (Saito, 2019). The 1941 Defense Agreement provided legal grounds for U.S. military activities

24  Minori Takahashi in Greenland. It was signed between the U.S. government, which was concerned that Germany, who had occupied Denmark in April of 1940, may extend its influence to Greenland (Lidegaard, 1983, p. 15), and the Danish ambassador to Washington, Henrik Kauffmann. Because of that, the Danish government for a while claimed the agreed framework had no binding power. However, this was due to the occupation, and after the war Copenhagen recognized the agreement retroactively amidst reassessments of the security role it played.2 In the preamble of the 1941 agreement, the strategic military importance of Greenland was affirmed. In addition, it was clearly stated that the agreement was being concluded in an emergency situation, which was the occupation of Denmark. The stated main purpose of the agreement was not just the defense of Greenland, but also of the United States, which is geographically close to it. The gist is that, because Greenland is geographically adjacent to the North American continent and concerns exist that it might be converted into a point of aggression against the U.S. and other nations, the U.S. offers its assistance to Greenland so that it can maintain its present status (Article 1). To accomplish this goal, the agreement provided for the construction of military bases and related facilities and stipulated that the U.S. possessed the exclusive rights for their maintenance (Article 2). Those rights included roads and other necessary infrastructure (Article 3). Article 5 stated that the fullest consideration should be given for the well-​being, health and economic needs of the local native population in allocating defense areas, as long as there were no impediments for their military use. Article 10 specified the period of validity of the agreement by stating that it would remain in force until the parties agreed that the dangers to the peace and security of the American continent have passed. A 1940s report by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning American plans to build military bases recognized the stationing of American troops in Greenland as a matter of very high urgency (Kawana, 2012). During the construction and operation phases, the bases in Greenland were regarded as being among the main American bases in the world (ibid., pp.  65–​149). Furthermore, when NATO was being established in April 1949, Denmark became one of its founders. That status is to a great extent attributed to the fact that it possessed Greenland as its territory and that it allowed the placement of American bases there (Lidegaard, 1983, p. 16). That is, it is exactly because it employed Greenland as a bargaining chip, that Denmark was able to meet the requirements of Article 3 of the NATO treaty, which stipulates that the signees will: “separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-​help and mutual aid… maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” (North Atlantic Treaty). The United States viewed Greenland as its backyard (Berry, 2016). That notion has occasionally been reflected in the desire to purchase it. Just to mention those instances that have been publicly revealed—​the U.S. approached Denmark in 1946 regarding the possible purchase of Greenland, and a similar idea circled the globe in 2019 through Twitter (Salama et al., 2019). In fact, the U.S. saw Greenland as a part of the North American continent from the time of the formulation of the Monroe doctrine in the first half of the nineteenth century, when the

The U.S. military base in Greenland  25 principle of non-​intervention with European powers was advocated (Lidegaard, 1999). The idea to purchase Greenland was an extension of that policy. After Denmark joined NATO, the so-​called “1951 Defense Agreement,” a bilateral agreement between Denmark and the U.S.  was signed in April 1951 (owing to which, the 1941 agreement ceased to be valid). The period of validity of the 1951 agreement (Paragraph 2 of Article 14) was set to coincide with the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty. This means that the 1951 agreement was concluded with an eye to a harmonization with NATO. As for the defense areas, the initial plan was to have six, including Grønnedal/​Kangilinnguit, the value of which was reaffirmed when in 2016 a controversy regarding whether the port and bay area should be sold to a Chinese company emerged, but, in the end, the number was cut to three (Thule, Sondrestrom, Narsarsuaq) in line with Denmark’s wish that the number be reduced. The preamble to the 1951 agreement states that the U.S. and Denmark are signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty and that they enter into the agreement mindful of their responsibility for the defense of the treaty area, for the purpose of defending Greenland and the rest of NATO area. This shows that the purpose of the agreement was to build a system that would, in accordance with NATO plans, enable collective defense and the maintenance of peace and stability, for which NATO aspired. Therefore, the operational range of U.S. troops was not limited to Greenland and the North American continent but was broader and included NATO member states (Article 1). The agreement framework provided for the free movement of U.S. troops on land between the bases, as well as on the sea and in the air in the vicinity of the bases (without compensation to the Danish authorities) (Article 2, Clause 3b). It also stipulated that Denmark would not impede U.S. activities in defense areas (Article 2, Clause 3c), while the U.S. would not hinder Danish activities (Article 2, clause 4b). Furthermore, based on the mutual consent of the U.S. and Denmark, the U.S. enjoyed the right of free access and movement between the defense areas by vessels, aircraft and vehicles, by land, air and sea (Article 5, Clause 3). Exclusive jurisdiction by the U.S. over the defense areas was also clearly indicated (Article 8). At the same time, in Article 6, the government of the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark agreed to cooperate to the fullest in carrying out operations under the agreement. And while the obligation of the U.S. government and U.S. nationals living in Greenland to give due respect to all the laws, regulations and customs pertaining to the local population, the need to make every effort to avoid contact between American personnel and the locals was also clearly noted. During WWII and the Cold War, American bases in Greenland, as well as meteorological stations and other facilities, were known under the code name Bluie. There were five outposts in the East and nine in the West. Among them, Sondrestrom Air Base in central western Greenland and Thule Air Base, which were under direct U.S. jurisdiction, played undoubtedly the largest role in the U.S. national security and in the NATO system for collective defense. For example, Sondrestrom was a strategic base that was included in the Operation Bolero, which carried the brunt of the defense of the North Atlantic,

26  Minori Takahashi together with Iceland, the United Kingdom and the east coast of Canada. During the Cold War the base was included in the Distant Early Warning Line (DEW Line) (Rasmussen, 1983, p. 12). On the other hand, Thule, which came to be fully utilized during the Cold War, became a strategically extremely important base with multiple functions: it was a strategic radar outpost in the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) and also had a role in the satellite control network (OL-​5) (Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut, 1997, p. 339). Activities by the U.S.  military were carried out within the framework defined by the provisions of the 1951 defense agreement, such as those that guaranteed free movement between American bases (Article 2, clauses 3b and 3c), or those that guaranteed free access to and the right of movement between defense areas in Greenland on land, sea and air (Article 5, clause 3). Several incidents and accidents that would later, after the end of the Cold War, cast a shadow on the relations between the two countries occurred during that time. For example, the forceful eviction of local residents for the purpose of the construction and enlargement of Thule Air Base (Brøsted og Fægteborg, 1987), the crash of a B-​52 bomber carrying hydrogen bombs and the ensuing plutonium contamination should be mentioned (Nielsen and Roos, 2011, p. 38). Thus, under the 1951 agreement, for the U.S., Greenland was a stage for conducting military activities, while for Denmark it was a space that it could provide for such activities. Greenland’s agency, we may say, was buried in the context of national security.3 After the Cold War, a substantial revision of the 1951 agreement became a main task of Greenland’s politics and, by extension, base politics of the entire Danish state.4 Right at that time, in the second half of the 1990s, the U.S. came up with the missile defense plan, mulling the installation of new radar facilities in the Thule base. The official approach by the U.S. came in December of 2002, and this request for the improvement of the base capabilities provided Greenland with the opportunity to reform its status through an amendment of Article 13 of the 1951 agreement. In 2004, the Agreement to Amend and Supplement the 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland was signed. As already mentioned, this, so-​called “Igaliku Agreement,” was based on an understanding between three sides: the United States, Denmark and Greenland. Greenland became one of the contractual parties, together with the U.S. and Denmark. The work on amending and supplementing was tied to the debates on the inclusion of Thule Air Base in the missile defense shield. Within a larger trend of realignment and reduction of bases after the end of the Cold War, Thule Air Base became the only defense area under direct U.S. control (Article 1, Clause 1). As I shall argue later, the fact that the number of defense areas was limited to one, meant that the level of Denmark’s dependence on Greenland practically increased and that options for lowering that dependence were lost. What is interesting in terms of understanding the 2004 agreement is that, although the U.S. request was very military in nature, the amendment and supplementation carried out were not confined only to the subjects concluding the agreement and the provisions of the agreement themselves, but encompassed the

The U.S. military base in Greenland  27 very framework of the agreement. That is, the 2004 agreement was not simply a defense agreement between the U.S., Denmark and Greenland,5 but a more complex document that included a declaration on economic and technical cooperation in the fields of research and technology, energy, education, tourism and commerce, and a declaration on the natural environment that, from the viewpoint of prevention, called for the protection and improvement of the fragile Arctic environment, including Greenland. Clause 2 of Article 3 of the military agreement provides for the strengthening of cooperation between the parties by stipulating that (a)  Greenland’s Home Rule Government may appoint and dispatch a representative for talks with the United States and Denmark about issues pertaining to its interests, and that (b) should problems arise, in order to guarantee the holding of talks, the three sides will without undue delay secure a venue for consultations through the establishment of a regular committee or through diplomatic channels. In the provisions regarding economic and technological cooperation, the establishment of a joint committee is envisaged for the purpose of realizing mutual benefits, with the committee scheduled to meet at least once a year (Paragraph 2, Clause 1). When it comes to the environmental initiative, to ensure the health and safety of Greenland’s local residents, American military personnel and civilians, the establishment of an environmental subcommittee that would meet regularly and address environmental issues is called for, with a view to encouraging the formulation of countermeasures against risks that could be posed by environmental contamination affecting the Thule defense area and the areas adjacent to it (Article 2 of the Joint Declaration on Cooperation on the Environment in Greenland).

2.3  Denmark’s choice The military agreement which is a part of the broader document from 2004 is a revision and supplementation of the 1951 defense agreement. That is why a significant portion of its text has been taken from the 1951 agreement. For example, articles 2, 7 and 9 of the 1951 agreement, which provide for the free movement of, and tax exemptions for, U.S. military personnel and other staff or stipulate that Danish laws cannot impede with U.S. activities, continue to apply. Despite that, the fact that an environment was created in which Greenland was able to participate as one of the contractual parties in the framework of a military agreement between two nations, and was able to, more or less, exercise its influence, is, at least in the security environment of the Danish state, a turning point that should not be overlooked. The preamble of the 2004 agreement states that the document is concluded between three parties because Danish authorities always consult and closely cooperate with the Home Rule Government of Greenland in affairs of state of particular importance to Greenland. Thus, we may say that in 2004 there was a conscious effort to clearly incorporate Greenland’s agency, which used to lie buried under the framework of the 1951 agreement, into the backbone of the new amended agreement.

28  Minori Takahashi According to Kawana, if a bargaining regarding a base that used to be confined to two sides (the country that establishes the base and the country that hosts it) is opened to include a third party (the local entity accepting the base), then the power relations between the subjects involved will become more fluid (Kawana, 2019a, p. 14). If that is so and the stable operation of the base can be hampered by an increase in the number of actors involved, why was such a choice made? Needless to say, not just the political judgment of a base provider the United States,6 but also the influence of Denmark which, as a host country, handled the domestic politics, was at work.7 If we stick to the letter of the 1951 and 2004 agreements, Greenland hosts 100 percent of American bases in the country and the establishment of such bases elsewhere is not an option. Thus, the security of the entire Danish state, so to speak, depends on Greenland, or more precisely, on Thule Air Base. If a stable functioning of the base was the prerequisite, then a rational choice Denmark could have made was to create an environment which would be easier for it to deal with by narrowing Greenland’s discretionary powers. However, on the contrary, Denmark made a decision to institutionally augment Greenland’s discretionary powers.

2.4  Greenland’s legal status To understand such a choice by Denmark, we need to take into consideration the legal position of its autonomous territory of Greenland. The author finds a remark by Gorm Winther useful in terms of understanding the relationship between the two. In his book on democracy and political power he brings up an episode in which Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen invited the head of Greenland’s Home Rule Government Jonathan Motzfeldt to a NATO summit in November 2002 (Winther, 2003). Winther points out that Rasmussen thought it appropriate to invite a representative of Greenland to the summit, since it was expected that the inclusion of Thule Air Base into the U.S. missile defense shield would be placed on the agenda and since the U.S. plan was to inevitably influence Greenland’s interests. But, why exactly was that appropriate? We can grasp the reason by looking at the provisions of the Home Rule Act from 1978, which guaranteed Greenland’s status at that time of the invitation. The act, while giving Denmark the power to make decisions in international relations (Section 11, Clause 1), also imposed certain obligations on it when it comes to making decision that concern the interests of Greenland. In other words, when making plans to conclude international treaties that could directly affect the interests of Greenland, Denmark is obligated to hold talks with the Home Rule Government before engaging in international negotiations (Section 15, Clause 1), as well as to request the opinion of the Home Rule Government before the signing of a treaty (Section 13). The appropriate invitation referred to in the episode cited by Winther was probably a result of his attentiveness to these provisions. Motzfeldt, who was invited to the summit by Rasmussen, stated in a speech in the Greenlandic Parliament the night before the request for the inclusion of Thule Air Base in the missile defense shield

The U.S. military base in Greenland  29 that “the (Danish) government and parliament have confirmed that they would conduct a close dialogue about the issue with Greenland’s government and parliament” in case a formal request was received from the U.S.8 Also, Clauses 1 to 3 of Section 16 gave Greenland the right to express its desire to participate in international negotiations and to demand from Denmark that it be included in international negotiations when matters of particular interest to it were at issue. These rules regulating Greenland’s external relations meant that, in legal terms, Greenland was different from other administrative units in the Danish state. Greenland was regarded as having a special place in the kingdom of Denmark in terms of ethnicity, culture and geography (as stated also in the preamble of the act), but what legally guaranteed that distinctiveness was the Home Rule Act. Nonetheless, at this stage the breadth of Greenland’s discretionary powers was still institutionally limited. This is because the Home Rule Act incorporated Greenland into the Danish state as a special ethnic society (Section 1, Clause 1). This arrangement gave Greenland a certain say (in matters of internal politics) but to a maximum degree protected the benefits of an integrated kingdom. Peter Skaarup clearly explained this in the Danish parliament when he said that the collaboration between Denmark and Greenland9 shaped the argument regarding the incorporation of Thule Air Base into the missile defense shield, but that at the same time it should be understood that “Greenland has no veto rights.”10 In other words, if Greenland were to have some influence on issues that were regarded as the jurisdiction of the state, such as foreign relations or national security, that would be solely thanks to Denmark’s lending it an ear and letting it independently participate in the decision-​making phase. The intention behind Skaarup’s statement was to reaffirm the legal status of Greenland, which had no right to exert influence on final decisions. This is exactly why Denmark could have opted (or continued to opt) to strongly insist on the implementation of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled and to limit Greenland’s discretionary rights. Thus, the question again arises:  why did Denmark, despite that, in the base politics of the early 2000s, choose to secure a two-​way communication with Greenland and prepare a stage for Greenland to get independently involved in the decision-​ making phase? Regarding this question, it is possible to put forth several hypotheses from different angles, such as, for example, the following: •​ Because Greenland is strategically important, Denmark took an amicable stance as part of its strategy to keep Greenland under control. •​ Denmark cannot ensure the security of the entire Danish state on its own; the security of the entire kingdom can be guaranteed only through Greenland. Therefore, Denmark’s choice was a political decision aimed at raising deterrence against possible threats. •​ Because the base in Thule is a strategic asset of vital importance for maintaining ties with the U.S. and, more broadly, NATO (Heurlin, 1982), Denmark made a balanced choice that secured the stable functioning of the base (Rasmussen, 1983, p. 13).

30  Minori Takahashi If we base our understanding on aspects such as the power relationship between Denmark and Greenland, their respective status, or threat perception, then all of the above have certain persuasive power. In fact, at the time of intensive debates about the missile defense shield, the then Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen clearly indicated that his country shared the threat perception with the U.S. by stating that “a positive response to the U.S. request regarding the defense shield would contribute not only to the security of the United States but to our own security”11. Although the following is somewhat different in nature from the above, it would also be possible to put forth a hypothesis centering on the democratic legitimacy of decision making: •​

If Greenland is given the ability to have its say reflected in the process leading up to legislation, then the democratic legitimacy of a decision will be guaranteed, which is good for Denmark too, as it can reap the benefits during the implementation of the decision.

This is an understanding that is related to a past study by the author in which he focused particularly on the role played by the self-​image and reputation of Denmark as a democracy in its politics toward Greenland (Takahashi, 2019b). It is a view that cannot be ignored if we are to understand the problem of military bases from the viewpoint of the local actor. However, all of the above hypotheses are beset with difficulties. In case of the first three, the problem is that, even if we grasp the general mechanisms and trends of base politics by identifying the specific character of the base politics in each host country from the viewpoint of international power relations and threats, there is still a possibility that we have overlooked the structure and subtleties of the base problem at the local level. For, if the study of base politics today is different from that which used to rely on the theory of strategy and theory of alliances, and if we are now in the midst of refining the base politics theory by trying to understand host countries’ politics from within (Kawana, 2019b), then, I think that accruing research that seeks to grasp base politics from within the host countries is a pressing need. On the other hand, regarding the latter hypothesis, i.e., the view that attaches importance to securing democratic legitimacy in the decision-​making process, we may say that it only pointed to issues such as the creation of self-​image and how a country wants to present itself externally, but did not really explain the country’s internal politics inherently (although we need to be aware that external and internal interests cannot be sharply distinguished).

2.5  With a focus on the political climate and conventions in Denmark Statements by Prime Minister Rasmussen and Minister of Foreign Affairs Per Stig Møller offer us valuable clues for approaching the problem of military bases in the

The U.S. military base in Greenland  31 Arctic region with a focus on Thule Air Base. First, at a parliament session held immediately after the reception of a formal request for the inclusion of the base in the missile defense shield, Rasmussen stated the following: “We shall work closely with the Home Rule Government of Greenland to develop a cooperative relationship. We shall make the decision on how to respond to the American request with a clear understanding from Greenland’s Home Rule Government, and our government hopes to secure close involvement of Greenland in all considerations concerning missile defense.12 He also went on to say that “the (Danish) government’s stance has always been that the reply to the U.S. request should be made based on a shared understanding with Greenland.”13 Next, Møller stated the following:  “The decision on how to reply to the U.S.  request must be made based on a clear understanding with Greenland’s Home Rule Government. This has been the government’s hope all along. That is why the Danish government has been making huge efforts to secure Greenland’s close involvement in all matters regarding missile defense.”14 Furthermore, he said he would ask Greenland “to assume co-​responsibility (medansvarlig), not only in terms of the future of its own defense policy but also in the context of cooperation with the U.S.”15 On that occasion Møller frequently used the expression “good and close cooperation” and emphasized “the full participation of Greenland in debates regarding missile defense.”16 Furthermore, he also stated that, together with “co-responsibility, Greenland possessed “the right to co-​determination (medbestemmelse)” and that, in the case that the perception regarding that had not been properly shared between the two, “the right to co-​ determination should be given to Greenland in an obvious way.” In addition, he said he hoped “that an agreement could be reached through collaboration (medinddrages)17 in matters of national security in which Greenland has interests,” and repeatedly called Greenland’s attention to the issue of co-​responsibility.18 In their statements both Danish politicians not only called for the deepening of the collaboration and mutual understanding with Greenland, but also urged Greenland to closely participate in the inclusion of Thule Air Base in the missile defense shield, an affair that concerned its interests. As a matter of fact, during the parliament session before the conclusion of the 2004 Igalliku Agreement, Denmark conducted a close dialogue with Greenland, aiming to achieve a “co-​ influence” (medindflydelse) in order to get Greenland involved as much as possible in the decision-​making regarding diplomacy and national security policy.19 In the Danish parliament voices could be heard that Denmark “will not agree to the inclusion of Thule Air Base into the missile defense shield without Greenland’s understanding.”20 Common to all these statements in the Danish parliament is the shared usage and the attribution of meaning to words with the prefix “med,” which means “mutually,” “together,” or “in collaboration with.” “Co-​responsibility,” “co-​ determination,” “collaboration” and “co-​ influence” are among such words. They have been understood as being related to the distinctive characteristics of Danish politics, such as dialogue, mutual respect and compromise. Historically, terms starting with “med” were first used to describe the coordination between

32  Minori Takahashi the government, syndicates and employers in the labor market and to express neo-​corporatism. However, after clashes between workers and employers in the second half of the nineteenth century and the institutionalization of the talks between the two sides about working conditions, they permeated Danish society and started to be “mimicked” in other areas of life (Koike, 2017, p. 8). It may be said that this spillover could also be seen in the debates about the missile shield. Expressions such as “co-​ responsibility,” “co-​ determination,” “collaboration,” and “co-​influence” contributed to the shaping of at least a portion of the debate regarding the incorporation of Thule Air Base in the American missile defense shield. Expressions that connote a single direction of action, such as “responsibility” (ansvar), “determination” (bestemmelse), “participation” (inddragelse) or “influence” (indflydelse) seemed insufficient. Denmark’s attitude of wanting to enable a bidirectional input in its relationship with Greenland, as well as the trial and error it went through regarding what strategy to adopt in the struggle between the ideal and the real, have been understood as the mode in which democracy that guides decision-​making in Denmark works. Here the “strategy” means a comprehensive method of thinking about how to make decisions based on the premise that conflict should be avoided. Interpretations have been put forth that at its core lies the democratic approach which postulates that political decisions should be made with the interested parties as close as possible to each other and with “a maximum flexibility in responding to the reality” (Pedersen and Knudsen, 2005, p. 160; Petersson, 1994). This is different from the utilitarian approach in which democracy is understood as a process in which the will of the majority is reflected in decisions, which are then imposed on the minority. What is emphasized here is that the essence of democracy is found in dialogue, mutual respect and compromise. In fact, if we look back on the debates in the Danish parliament about the missile defense shield we can see that Denmark’s statements and actions were not confined only to geopolitics and its interests concerning its relationship with the U.S., but that it was also trying to strategically build a harmonious relationship with the domestic “special ethnic society” of Greenland.21 Soon after the Igaliku Agreement was signed, Holger Terp summarized this point aptly by saying that “Denmark’s national security policy has always put a lot of weight on the involvement of Greenland, especially in the phase of democratic participation in the decision-​making process” (Holger, 2004). Of course, it is undeniable that behind such words and deeds by Denmark lies the political environment in which, ever since 1909, there has been no party with an absolute majority. It is said that the reason why no political party in Denmark can win the majority is that the system of proportional representation is used and that the percentage of valid votes that a party needs to win in order to gain seats in the parliament is just two percent. Karina Pedersen and Tim Knudsen argue that such an environment has generated a mindset which values consensus building that includes interactive influencing. Furthermore, Pedersen and Knudsen also point out that politics in Denmark tends not to be based on particular ideologies, but on facing the reality and adopting a conciliatory, intermediate stance

The U.S. military base in Greenland  33 characterized by an appreciation for consensus building, cooperation and considerateness (Pedersen and Knudsen, 2005, pp.  159–​ 160). “Value nihilism” and “trans-​ideology” are some of the expressions used to denote the thinking that does not cling to a particular ideology, but cuts across various ideologies. These expressions have often been employed to explain the mindset that values consensus building and to understand Danish politics. When multiple political parties hold seats in the parliament, the parties that form ruling coalitions tend to practice politics aware of the need for a conciliatory, intermediary stance. This is often reminiscent of what is, in the Swedish context, known as “the mild multi-​ party system,” and is a tendency that has become particularly apparent since the 1970s, when the diversification of values and thinking among voters spread around the world. Nonetheless, it is impossible to understand the democracy in Danish politics by focusing solely on the country’s party politics. Rather, it is of vital importance to approach it by looking at the social fabric. For example, Robert Kuttner describes Danish society as having socialist elements but at the same time possessing a very libertarian culture in which individuals are given maximum freedoms as long as they do not violate the rights of others (Kuttner, 2008). As Koike points out, in Danish society there is “a dialogical process in which shared intention is formed” and a mindset that lays emphasis on “individuals with diverse backgrounds in the community (or group) talking to each other, debating, learning from each other, compromising and accumulating shared understanding and shared intentions” (Koike, 2017, p. 319). According to him, this has to do with how publicness and public space are perceived. Namely, in Denmark, where peasant movements, often called “democratic movements,” developed in diverse ways since the nineteenth century, public space came to be seen (or internalized) not as something that is given from above, but as something that is created through the interaction of various actors. That is, today’s Danish society is an outcome of the process of formation of the public space through a vector different from self-​righteous government rule—​a process that functioned to, together with other elements, shape the attitude of valuing dialogue and mutual respect in politics. It combined in a complex manner with the above-​mentioned party politics to generate a pluralistic democracy that is premised on bidirectional (med-​) communication. Denmark’s choice to make its position as a state clear and lead until a decision was made by demonstrating in the negotiations a stance that values dialogue, mutual respect and compromise, was an important factor in the shaping of the 2003 declaration and the 2004 agreement. Mikkel Broholt, researcher who approached domestic debates in Denmark about the U.S.  missile defense shield and Thule Air Base by focusing on the culture of consultations, drew a conclusion similar in character to a statement in the parliament by Møller, who emphasized that the post-​Cold War base politics in Denmark were designed by taking Greenland as the foundation stone,22 when he noted that the relationship with Greenland played the central role in the attitude of Danish people toward the missile defense (Broholt, n.d.).

34  Minori Takahashi Of course, in recent years in Europe and elsewhere socio-​economic analyses speaking of disparities and poverty, as well as ostracism, have shaken to the core the principles of dialogue, mutual respect and compromise (which may be regarded as the cornerstones of democracy). Denmark is not an exception. The politics carried out by Rasmussen, who was at the government’s helm in the period under review, we may say were, in fact, value politics, based on specific values such as freedom of expression and on toning down religious hues in the public space. His politics even seemed to be departing from dialogue and mutual respect. If so, then, considering what was actually being practiced, the judgments speaking of “value nihilism” and “trans-​ideology,” as well as the understanding that Danish politics were democratic politics based on them, should have been reserved. In fact, I  feel that Denmark’s collaborative stance toward Greenland has been strengthened since the 2000s, when Rasmussen was in power, but from a different direction. That is, I  believe that the base politics under review was shaped in connection with the political context in the Arctic region that started to emerge in the 2000s. Concretely, as the melting of ice in the Arctic Ocean and the ice sheath covering Greenland started to accelerate due to climate change, not only the development of natural resources and the opening of new sea lanes, but also a multi-​purpose utilization of Thule Air Base, including roles in satellite control and scientific research along with its military function, began to be debated (Udenrigsministeriet, 2011, p. 12). The Danish state policy on the Arctic announced in 2011 clearly mentions the possibility of linking the post-​Cold War Danish base politics, which centered on Thule Air Base, with new trends in the international politics concerning the Arctic by making Thule function as a hub or a platform for international cooperation (Udenrigsministeriet et al., 2011, pp. 53–​ 55). The policy also advocates the idea that the multifaceted functions of the base could be used to increase the quality of defense of Greenland and surrounding areas in cooperation with NATO member states. Furthermore, the utilization of Thule as a platform for both internal efforts and international cooperation with members of the “A5” (five Arctic Ocean countries) group, as well as other interested parties, in maintaining safety of maritime navigation, search and rescue at sea, and monitoring of the environment and disaster response was also emphasized (Ilulissat Declaration, 2008). In other words, Denmark placed Thule Air Base in a broader context and envisioned a scenario in which it gets involved into Arctic politics as an Arctic country through Greenland (Taksøe-​Jensen, 2016). In such a situation, Denmark became increasingly aware of the need to clarify its stance as an Arctic country by taking the approach we have described in this chapter: viewing Greenland as an important counterpart, collaborating with it and practically involving it in decision making. Denmark itself is not geographically adjacent to the Arctic Ocean. It legally comes into contact with the Arctic Ocean and can have the right to speak as an A5 country only thanks to having Greenland as its territory. Denmark was aware of this. Therefore, when we take into consideration the intensification of Arctic politics since the 2000s, the linking of Danish base politics to it and the position of Denmark in the Arctic region, it becomes easier to give a tentative answer to

The U.S. military base in Greenland  35 the question posed by this paper. In other words, viewed rationally, Denmark’s choice to increase the possibility that the functioning of Thule Air Base might be destabilized can be explained by at least two factors: • Greenland had become important for a sustainable implementation of the Danish security policy, which is based on a friendly relationship with the U.S. and NATO. To secure stable maintenance of that relationship, Denmark tried to deepen its bilateral relationship with Greenland by maintaining a two-​way communication with it, in line with the Danish political environment and the political climate and conventions based on it. • In the background lay the fact that, due to the inception and development of Arctic politics in recent years, Greenland had become closely intertwined with Denmark’s own base politics, national security policy, and the question of Denmark’s stability and survival in international politics. In light of the new developments in Arctic politics since 2000s, Rasmussen actively pursued collaboration with Greenland, which had come into the world’s spotlight as the climate change ground zero (Loukacheva, 2009). He made it clear that the commitment to Arctic politics was not meant to be in the form of mainland Denmark and Greenland acting as separate individual entities, but as one, as the Danish state (Takahashi, 2011). Having the global interest in climate change and the Arctic in mind, he hoped that Greenland could play a more active role in diplomacy and national security policy and aimed to create more room for that role within the framework of the diplomatic policies of the Danish state. Mette Frederiksen, who became Danish Prime Minister in June 2019, said the same in her first speech before the Danish parliament (Sørensen, 2019), and has since frequently taken up the issue (Sommer, 2020). These statements imply a push for a deeper collaboration in areas with shared interests, with active involvement by Greenland. Thule Air Base has long been the foundation stone for the relationship of Denmark and Greenland with the U.S. (and NATO) and an asset, but has, we may say, recently also become a venue for the realization of the bidirectional communication aspired for by Denmark.

2.6  Closing remarks By accepting U.S. military bases, Denmark has built relations with the United States and NATO—​in the past 70 years hosting those bases has been one of its major contributions to NATO. However, in recent years, Thule Air Base has been the only security asset Denmark can offer to the United States. In that sense, it can be said that Denmark has been trying to maintain its special relationship with the U.S.  by using Thule Air Base and Greenland as bargaining chips. From the models presented by previous studies we would imagine that, exactly because of that, Denmark should have tried to come up with policies for minimalizing opportunistic behavior by Greenland. However, the choice

36  Minori Takahashi Denmark took was to lend an ear to Greenland and plan to include it in the decision-​making  phase. Why did Denmark choose to involve Greenland in international negotiations concerning the amended defense agreement of 2004 and to create an environment in which Greenland in the end became one of the signatories even though that was likely to destabilize the functioning of the base? In this chapter, while admitting that Greenland’s strategical importance, Denmark’s threat perception and the maintenance of its relationship with the United States all matter as variables explaining base politics surrounding Greenland, I have argued that we cannot achieve a full understanding of those politics based only on those criteria. That is, I have also taken into account non-​material factors—​the Danish democracy, which is characterized by dialogue, mutual respect and a compromising stance and finds expression in terms such as co-​responsibility, co-​determination, collaboration and co-​ influence. Furthermore, I  have demonstrated that Denmark’s democratic response was applied strategically in a real political venue and that Greenland was used as a stage for it. I have also shown that Denmark’s stance, which embraces co-​responsibility, co-​determination, collaboration and co-​influence, was strengthened due to the recent emergence of Arctic politics. By doing so, this chapter has shed light on political mechanisms concerning U.S. overseas bases through the prism of the political climate and conventions inherent in the host country. The chapter has also reassessed the nature of base politics by making visible the unique context of the host country and region, which models postulating rational actors have not been able to sufficiently approach.

Notes 1 Because of such symbolism possessed by military bases, often it is not possible to secure the support of the people for their acceptance. Kawana points out that in such cases the approach in which no agreement is signed and a base is made less conspicuous, or is, in other words, made to function as a “quasi-​base,” has often been adopted as the second best policy (Kawana, 2019b). 2 Retroactive ratification was carried out on 16 May 1945. 3 At the time of the conclusion of the 1951 agreement Greenland was a Danish colony. 4 Folketinget (2003). Kl.15.45. 5 This document is also known in Denmark as the Agreement for the Modernization of the 1951 Defense Agreement. 6 Folketinget (2003). Kl.16.45. 7 Folketinget (2003). Kl.17.30. 8 Naalakkersuisut (2002). Dagsordenspunkt 1, Åbningstale Jonathan Motzfeldt. 9 Folketinget (2003). Kl.17.30, Kl.17.50. 10 Folketinget (2003). Kl.17.35. 11 Folketinget (2003). Kl.15.40 12 Folketinget (2003). 13 Folketinget (2003). Kl.15.40. 14 Folketinget (2003). Kl.15.45. 15 Folketinget (2003). Kl.15.50.

The U.S. military base in Greenland  37 16 Ibid. 17 Folketinget (2003). Kl.18.35. 18 Ibid. 19 Folketinget(2004). Kl.10.00. 20 Folketinget (2003). Kl.17.20. 21 Folketinget (2003). Kl.18.35. 22 Folketinget (2003). Kl.18.35.

References Berry, D. A. (2016). “The Monroe Doctrine and the Governance of Greenland’s Security.” In Berry, D. A., Bowler, N. and Jones, H. (eds.), Governing the North American Arctic (pp. 103–​121). London: Palgrave Macmillan. Broholt, M. (n.d.). “Den danske debat om Missilforsvaret og Thule-​basen,” IIS Research-​ brief (pp. 1–​10), No. 21, Copenhagen: Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier. Brøsted, J. and M. Fægteborg (1987). Thule –​fangerfolk og militæranlæg, Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag. Calder, K. E. (2007). Embattled Garrisons:  Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cooley, A. (2008). Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut (1997). Grønland under den kolde krig, Copenhagen: Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut. Folketinget (2003). Forespørgsel nr. F 29, 29 April 2003. —​—​—​ (2004). Forespørgsel nr. F 60, 26 May 2004. Hemmer, C. and Katzenstein, P. J. (2002). “Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organization, 56(3), pp. 575–​607. Heurlin, B. (1982). “Danish Security Policy,” Cooperation and Conflict:  The Nordic International Studies Association, 17(3), pp. 237–​255. Holger T. (2004). “Forsvarsaftaler 1951 og 2004,” Arbejderen, 24 August. Ilulissat Declaration (2008). Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat, 28 May. Frederiksen, C. H. (2017). “Denmark in a Rapidly Changing Security Environment.” In Fischer, K. and Mouritzen, H. (eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2017 (pp. 23–​30). Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies. Lidegaard, B. (1983). “Fribillet til NATO,” forsvar (pp. 14–​16), 1983, Nr.10. —​—​—​(1999). “Grønland i amerikansk perspektiv,” Inuit, Kultur og Samfund (pp. 231–​ 239), Aarhus: Systime. Loukacheva, N. (2009). “Climate Change Policy in the Arctic: The Cases of Greenland and Nunavut.” In Koivurova, T., Keskitalo, E.C.H. and Bankes, N. (eds.), Climate Governance in the Arctic (pp. 327–​350). Heidelberg: Springer. Kawana, S. (2012). Base Politics: The Origins of the Post-​war U.S. Policy for the Expansion of Overseas Bases (Kichi no Seijigaku: Sengo Beikoku no Kaigai Kichi Kakudai Seisaku). Tokyo: Hakutō Shobō (In Japanese). —​—​—​(2019a). “Base Politics and the Hold-​up Problem.” In Takahashi M. (ed.), The Influence of Sub-​state Actors on National Security (pp. 11–​24). New York: Springer. —​—​—​(2019b). “Resonating International Politics and Area Studies” (“Kyōshin Suru Kokusai Seijigaku to Chiiki Kenkyuu”). In Kawana, S. (ed.), Resonating International Relations and Area Studies:  Base Politics, Conflict and Regional Order (pp.

38  Minori Takahashi 3–​15), (Kyōshin Suru Kokusai Seijigaku to Chiiki Kenkyuu:  Kichi, Funsō, Chitsujo). Tokyo: Keisō Shobō. (In Japanese.) Koike, N. (2017). The History and Thought Concerning Denmark’s Communal Society: The Creation of a New Welfare State (Denmaaku Kyōdō Shakai no Rekishi to Shisō: Aratana Fukushi Kokka no Seisei). Tokyo: Ōtsuki Shoten. (In Japanese.) Kuttner, R. (2008). “The Copenhagen Consensus: Reading Adam Smith in Denmark,” Foreign Affairs, 87(2), New York: Council on Foreign Relations. Naalakkersuisut (2002). 1. Mødedag, 20 september 2002. Nielsen, S. P. and P. Roos (2011). Thule-​2007. Roskilde: Risø-​DTU National Laboratory for Sustainable Energy. North Atlantic Treaty. NATO official website. Available from:  www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​ natolive/​official_​texts_​17120.htm. (Accessed 27 February 2020). Pedersen, K. and Knudsen, T. (2005). “Denmark:  Presidentialization in a Consensual Democracy.” In Poguntke, T. and Webb, P. (eds.), The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies (pp. 159–​175). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Petersson, O. (1994). The Government and Politics of the Nordic Countries, Stockholm: Fritzes. Rasmussen, I. (1983). “De amerikanske militære anlæg i Grønland: hverken defensive eller harmløse,” forsvar (pp. 10–​13), 1983, Nr.10. Saito, K. (2019). “How Have the U.S. Interests in Greenland Changed? Reconstructing the Perceived Value of Thule Air Base after the Cold War.” In Takahashi, M. (ed.), The Influence of Sub-​state Actors on National Security:  Using Military Bases to Forge Autonomy (pp. 51–​68). New York: Springer. Salama, V., Ballhaus, R., Restuccia, A. and Bender, M. C. (2019). “President Trump Eyes a New Real-​Estate Purchase: Greenland,” The Wall Street Journal, 16 August. Sommer, K. (2020). “Udenrigspolitik i focus på møde hos statsministeren,” Kalaallit Nunaata Radioa, January 7. Sørensen, H. N. (2019). “Åbningstale: Mette Frederiksen vil have tættere samarbejde med Grønland,” Kalaallit Nunaata Radioa, 1 October. Takahashi, M., Kawana, S., Saito, K., Koizumi, Y., Hateruma, S. and Shimizu, A. (2019). “Autonomy and Military Bases: USAF Thule Base in Greenland as the Study Case.” In Heinen, L., Exner-​Pirot, H. and Barnes, J. (eds.), Arctic Yearbook 2019 (pp. 43–​57). Available from: https://​arcticyearbook.com/​. (Accessed 4 May 2020). Takahashi, M. (2011). “Denmark and the dispute over exploitation rights in the Arctic: Greenland, ‘geographical neutrality’ and diplomatic leadership,” Balto-​Scandia, Extra Edition, pp. 137–​162. —​—​—​(2019a). “Base Politics and Denmark,” The Journal of International Security, (47)3, pp. 35–​54. (In Japanese.) —​ —​ —​(2019b). “Greenland’s Quest for Autonomy and the Political Dynamics Surrounding Thule Air Base.” In Takahashi, M. (ed.), The Influence of Sub-​state Actors on National Security: Using Military Bases to Forge Autonomy (pp. 25–​49). Dordrecht: Springer. Taksøe-​Jensen, P. (2016). Dansk diplomati og forsvar i en brydningstid, Copenhagen: Ud enrigsministeriet. Udenrigsministeriet (2011). Årsrapport 2010, Copenhagen: Udenrigsministeriet. Udenrigsministeriet (Danmark), Udenrigsdirektoratet (Grønland), and Udenrigsministeriet (Færøerne) (2011). Kongeriget Danmarks Strategi for Arktis 2011–​2020 (pp. 53–​55). Winther, G. ed. (2003). Demokrati og magt i Grønland, Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag.

3  U.S. bases in Italy From a Cold War frontier to a hub for power projection Matteo Dian

3.1  Introduction U.S. bases located in Italy have had a very significant role in the U.S. post-​war security strategy. During the Cold War, the bases played a major role in the strategy of containment of the Soviet Union in Europe and in the Mediterranean region. In the post-​Cold War period, their function considerably evolved, turning the country into a fundamental hub for power projection toward North Africa and the Middle East. This chapter analyzes the evolving role of the U.S. bases in Italy from three different perspectives:  (1) their strategic purpose; (2)  the degree of organized domestic resistance to their presence; and (3) the legal framework regulating the use of the bases. The chapter is further divided into two sections, looking at the Cold War period and the post-​Cold War period.

3.2  U.S. bases in Italy during the Cold War The early years of the Italian Republic were characterized by an intense debate over the future foreign policy orientation of the country. Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana) and other centrist forces proposed a foreign policy rooted in two main pillars, the participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and an active role in the process of European integration. Socialist and Communist Parties favored neutrality and hoped to avoid participating in any form in anti-​Soviet military organizations. In the aftermath of the crucial elections held in 1948, the Italian government led by the Christian Democrat Alcide De Gasperi, strongly supported by the U.S., opted for the first option, signing the Treaty of Washington in 1949 and becoming a founding member of NATO (Del Pero, 2001; Mistry, 2014). The bilateral relationship was further consolidated with the signing of the Washington Bilateral Agreement on Mutual Defense Assistance of 1950 and the Rome Bilateral Agreement on Mutual Security of 1952. Moreover in 1951, NATO countries signed the Treaty of London (also known as the Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA) regulating the presence, the possible use and the costs associated with U.S.  troops deployed on the territory of member states of the

40  Matteo Dian 5,00,000 4,50,000 4,00,000 3,50,000 3,00,000 US troops in Italy 2,50,000

US troops in Europe US troops in Germany

2,00,000

US Troops in Japan

1,50,000 1,00,000 50,000

1950 1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004

-

Figure 3.1 Total Number of U.S. Troops in Europe and in Japan between 1950 and 2004. Source: The Heritage Center for Data Analysis

Atlantic alliance. These agreements consolidated Italy’s pro-​Western choice and laid the preconditions for the development of a network of U.S. bases in Italy (Mammarella e Cacace, 2006; Saiu, 2014). While significant, the U.S. presence in Italy was substantially lower compared to other main U.S. partners in the region. During the Cold War, West Germany hosted the vast majority of U.S.  troops in Europe (between 200.000 and 250.000). Italy on average hosted only between 10.000 and 15.000 troops (see Figure 3.1). U.S.  forces were organized around three hubs:  Camp Ederle, near Vicenza in the North-​East; Camp Darby, in Tuscany, between Pisa and Livorno in the center; and Napoli in the South. The north-​eastern and central hubs constituted the bulk of two lines of defense against a possible Soviet invasion. In 1955, the U.S.  established SETAF (U.S. Army Southern European Task Force), initially headquartered in Camp Darby. SETAF was moved to Vicenza in 1963 when the base received the 5th Battalion of the 30th Field Artillery, equipped with nuclear-​ tipped Sergeant missiles1 (Paragano and Fois, 2012). Since the beginning of the Cold War, Napoli has been considered a key hub for NATO activities. From 1951 the city hosted the Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) command. At the time, it was one of the two main NATO

U.S. bases in Italy  41 commands in the Mediterranean, together with the Allied Forces Mediterranean, located in Malta, and controlled by the British Armed Forces. The British led command was closed in 1967, making Napoli the main center of operation for NATO forces in the Mediterranean. Italy also started hosting the headquarter of the U.S. Sixth Fleet located in Gaeta from 1967, when the U.S. Navy was forced to abandon the Villefranche sur Mar, after Paris’ withdrawal from NATO military command structure. The strategic significance of the bases located in Napoli grew significantly throughout the Cold War, due to the process of decolonization in the Middle East and Northern Africa, which led to a decline of the geopolitical influence of France and Great Britain, and the emergence of a Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean (Monteleone, 2007). The renewed centrality of the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East in the bipolar competition made Italy, as a bridge to the Mediterranean, much more valuable in strategic terms for the U.S. and for NATO (Hatzivassiliou, 2015; Pedaliu, 2009; Varsori and Zaccaria, 2018). One of the most visible manifestations of the changing strategic value of the Italian territory within the evolving geopolitical exchequer was the establishment of the Naval Base of Santo Stefano La Maddalena. This base, established through a secret agreement2, was designed as a home port for Los Angeles class nuclear powered attack submarines3. Another sign of the increased centrality of the bases located in Southern Italy was the development of the facilities in Comiso, in Sicily. Comiso was selected as a main operating base of the ground launched cruise missiles, armed with nuclear weapons, as part of the military response to the Soviet deployment of the SS-​20 missiles in Eastern Europe. Between 1983, when the new base was completed and 1991 when it was dismantled, as a consequence of the signing of the 1987 INF Treaty, Comiso Air Base was the largest nuclear missile site in Southern Europe (Pettyjohn and Kavanagh, 2016).

3.3  U.S. bases in the Italian domestic politics during the Cold War The Cold War ideological and strategic rivalry deeply influenced Italian domestic politics, as well as the country’s debate on foreign policy. Christian Democrats, together with other minor parties, such as the Liberal and the Republican Party, favored the membership in NATO and permanent alignment with the U.S. This choice was strongly opposed by the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI) and, initially, by the Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano, PSI). Communists and socialists, who played a crucial part in the war of resistance against fascism and the Nazi occupation after 1943, aspired for a peace-​loving identity and a neutralist stance in the emerging Cold War. During the early Cold War years, however, the Italian Communist Party was also committed to following directives coming from the USSR. Since 1947 the PCI, supported by Moscow, promoted the movement of “Partisans for Peace.” This movement opposed the anti-​Soviet-​oriented choice made by the Christian democrats, claiming that

42  Matteo Dian pacifism and neutralism should have been accepted as the logical consequence of the anti-​fascist struggle (Guiso, 2007; Pons, 2001). Pacifism and neutralism also had a significant influence on the “left wing” of the Christian Democrats, on Catholic intellectuals, as well on the high ranks of the Catholic Church. On the one hand, many Catholics recognized the necessity to contain communism. On the other, they felt that Christian values mandated promoting peace, universal disarmament and reconciliation (Moro, 2008). Despite the significant ideological opposition, neither the PCI nor other forces mobilized directly against U.S. military bases. The most significant campaign led by the PCI targeted the bases only indirectly. The Communist Party sought to mobilize railway and port workers, to stop or delay the delivery of U.S. weapons directed to the bases. This campaign, that had marginal political and practical effects, was effectively ended in 1952 (Guiso, 2007). The degree of acceptance of the U.S.  presence in Italy positively surprised American policymakers. Frank Nash, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, then an advisor for the Pentagon, in 1957 wrote to Washington that the widespread irritation caused by American troops was almost absent in Italy: “Compared to the great majority of other countries,” he stated, “the Italian reaction is paradoxical. Instead of asking for a reduction, Italians ask for adjunctive units” (Nuti 1998). In the early 1960s, the anti-​NATO and anti-​American front started to erode with the “opening to the Left.” The Socialist Party abandoned Marxism and broke the “people’s front” with the communists. This allowed the Christian Democrats to broaden the coalition supporting the government by including the Socialists. This alliance would characterize the majority of the Italian coalition governments up to the early 1990s. This led the socialists to accept NATO and the U.S. presence on the Italian territory (Nuti, 2002). In the second phase of the Cold War, during the 1970s and the 1980s, the Italian opposition to the U.S.  bases significantly evolved:  from an ideological resistance backed by key national political parties it become a much more localized movement, supported by grass-​root associations and NGOs, targeting mainly the presence of nuclear weapons. The first key factor in shaping this outcome was the evolution of the Italian domestic situation. In the 1970s, Italy experienced a period of intense instability and political violence that led to a decade-​long wave of political terrorism. In this context, the Italian Communist Party promoted the idea of creating a coalition for a “national responsibility” government with the other main national parties.4 In the meanwhile, the PCI started to promote an approach defined as “Euro-​communism,” that implied a gradual detachment from the alignment with Moscow and embracing a more autonomous stance. In this context the Secretary of the PCI Enrico Berlinguer declared that his party was willing to accept the Italian membership in NATO (Heurtebize, 2017). The second key development was the evolution of the role of bases during the late 1970s and early 1980s when, in the aftermath of the Euro-​missile crisis, NATO bases hosted intermediate range missiles directed against the Warsaw

U.S. bases in Italy  43 Pact. The Euro-​missile crisis led to the rise of the Italian “peace movement” that mobilized against nuclear weapons and against the presence of nuclear missiles in the country, especially after the introduction of those weapons in the base of Comiso, in Sicily.5 This movement was supported by a very diverse coalition that included progressive Catholics, communists, trade unions and environmentalists. The heterogeneity and the lack of political leadership within the movement meant it was not able to stir the country toward a radically different foreign policy orientation. The peace movement of the 1980s either tended to focus on certain specific issues, such as the deployment of cruise missiles in Sicily, or to generally argue for “peace” and general disarmament, rather than to promote a radically alternative ideological and political platform. Beyond Comiso, which became the symbol of the Euro-​missile crisis, the peace movement did not mobilize against NATO and U.S. bases as such. With the signature of the Intermediate Range Forces Treaty in 1987, which forbade the deployment of intermediate range missiles in Europe, the peace movement largely lost its focus on the U.S. military presence in Italy. Moreover, the peace movement of the 1980s focused primarily on different objectives, such as the anti-​nuclear campaign, which included civilian use and the abolition of conscription (Ruzza, 1997). Finally, the level of direct opposition and mobilization against the bases was relatively low. During the early phase of the Cold War, the debate on the bases was a direct by-​product of the debate on the foreign policy orientation and the attempts to resist a full integration to the NATO alliance. During the late Cold War, the resistance to the bases detached itself from a primarily ideological confrontation, incorporating new issues, such as opposition to nuclear programs (military and civilian), environmentalism, as well as local grievances.

3.4  SOFA agreements and legal framework Since the early 1950s, the presence and the activities of the U.S.  and NATO troops in Italy have been regulated by a complex legal framework. General norms regulating the presence and the use of NATO bases in member states are defined primarily by the Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of their Forces, signed in 1951 in London. The preamble to the treaty reads: “forces of one Party may be sent, by arrangement, to serve in the territory of another Party.” However, “the decision to send them and the conditions under which they will be sent, in so far as such conditions are not laid down by the present Agreement, will continue to be the subject of separate arrangements between the Parties concerned” (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1951). As a consequence, specific rules to regulate the presence of U.S.  troops in an ally’s territory, as well as the use of the bases is devolved to specific agreements between sending and hosting nations. In the Italian case, the fundamental agreement regulating the status of U.S.  bases in Italy and their use is the Bilateral Infrastructure Agreement (BIA), signed on 20 October 1954. The text of the agreement has remained secret, generating,

44  Matteo Dian according to several Italian legal scholars, a significant breach of the constitution and in particular of the principles of parliamentary control over the country’s foreign policy (Saiu, 2014). While the Washington Treaty, as well as the establishment of NATO headquarters in the national territory, have been duly ratified by the Italian Parliament, the 1954 BIA has been approved through an executive procedure, eschewing the oversight of the parliament, as well as a public debate. The BIA remains classified, despite the approval of the Law no.  839 of 11 December 1984 that calls for the publication of all international agreements, including those that are formally technical in nature. According to other legal interpretations, the duty to make every international agreement public stipulated by the law of 1984 is limited by the article 12 of the Law no. 801 of 1977, or law on state secrets. That law states that international agreements can be treated as state secrets if they are aimed at safeguarding the integrity of the institutions of the republic and the independence of the Italian state in relation to other states (Ronzitti, 2008). Despite the fact that the fundamental agreement remains classified, legal scholars have clarified a number of significant issues regarding the discipline of NATO and U.S. bases in Italy. Firstly, bases, as different from diplomatic missions, do not imply concessions of sovereign territory, nor extra-​territoriality. As a consequence, the nature of activities permitted on the bases is regulated by mutual agreements and disclosed to Italian military authorities. A second significant issue, from a legal, as well as from a political standpoint, regards the need to regulate the actual use of the bases and its limits. The article 11 of the Italian constitution allows “limitations to sovereignty where they are necessary to allow for a legal system of peace and justice between nations.” Moreover, it “promotes and encourages international organizations furthering such ends.” In 1984, the Supreme Court of Cassasion6 stated that NATO should be considered a defensive alliance. Consequently, the use of bases is considered legal under the constitution, since collective defense is regarded as the main purpose of NATO, which, in turn, is considered coherent with pursuing “peace and justice among nations.” Limitations of sovereignty resulting from the presence and the use of bases are equally allowed under the article 11 of the constitution. Ultimately, during the Cold War, since NATO activities could be broadly interpreted under the rubric of deterrence and collective defense, any legal obstacle to the use of bases could be bypassed through the 1984 ruling (Ronzitti, 2008). A third significant problem regards the “dual nature” of the bases located in Italy and the impossibility to distinguish NATO from U.S.  bases. This impossibility stems from the fact that the legal framework is rooted primarily in the Washington Treaty and in the NATO SOFA, that were later “bilateralized” by agreements signed by the U.S. and Italy. The last and most significant problem regards the role of nuclear weapons stored in the bases. The United States introduced nuclear weapons in the Italian territory in 1957 upon Italy’s request. U.S. missiles with nuclear warheads were dislocated within SETAF (Southern East Task Force). Between 1960 and 1963, 30 Jupiter Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) and 90 anti-​aircraft

U.S. bases in Italy  45 nuclear-​tipped Nike-​Hercules missiles were deployed in Italy, in addition to an uncertain number of so-​called ADMs (Atomic Demolition Munitions), or atomic land mines, placed along the border with Yugoslavia and Austria (Nuti, 2007). The presence of nuclear weapons started to constitute a problem after the signing of the Non-​Proliferation Treaty in 1968. The United States, as a “nuclear state” officially recognized by the NPT, has the right to possess atomic weapons. However, it has the duty not to transfer nuclear weapons or the control of such weapons to non-​nuclear states (Article 1). Italy, as a non-​nuclear state, is obliged not to produce nuclear weapons, but also not to receive their transfer or control (Article 2) (Foradori, 2011). U.S. and Italian governments solved this apparent legal conundrum through the dual key system: nuclear weapons remain under the exclusive control of the U.S. armed forces and only the U.S. can decide on their use. However, a previous authorization of the Italian government, representing the host nation, is necessary for their use. From a strictly legal point of view, this formula allowed Italy and the U.S. to comply with the letter of the NPT. This solution however did not solve all the normative and political issues raised by the presence of nuclear weapons and intermediate range missiles in the country. From the normative point of view, the deployment of nuclear weapons appeared in contrast with the spirit, if not the letter of Article 11, the “pacifist clause” of the Italian constitution.7 Overall, during the Cold War, Italian policy makers sought to square the circle between the need for a degree of legality and legitimacy for the bases and the military requirements stemming from the NATO membership during the bipolar confrontation. When the two were in contrast, Italian policy makers as well as their counterparts in Washington opted for legal compromises that allowed only formal transparency and oversight, while the actual activities carried out in the bases were largely shielded from public scrutiny and democratic control.

3.5  Evolution of strategic purpose and structure of U.S. bases in the post-​Cold War era The end of the Cold War radically altered the geopolitical equilibrium in Europe, as well as the Italian role in terms of defense policies (Andreatta, 2008; Davidson, 2009). The demise of the Soviet Union, the process of democratization of Eastern Europe, together with the integration of former members of the Warsaw Pact in NATO and in the European Union, removed the external threats that characterized the Cold War era. These developments led to a radical evolution of the function of NATO, which in the early 1990s had apparently lost its original rationale, collective defense. NATO adapted to the new strategic needs with the emergence of the Balkan Wars. In 1999, NATO’s leaders approved a new strategic concept that redesigned NATO missions and purpose. The alliance added peace and stability of the wider Euro-​Atlantic area and crisis management to its core mission of collective defense (Deni, 2016; Gheciu, 2005). NATO-​led out-​of-​area military interventions led to a significant evolution of the strategic role of the bases located in Italy. They acquired a new function of

46  Matteo Dian hubs for power projection, firstly toward the Balkans, and during the following decades, toward the Mediterranean and the Middle East. During NATO interventions, the bases located in Italy were at the forefront of the military operations. Both the Operation Deny Flight and Deliberate Force, the two main air campaigns of the 1995 military intervention in Yugoslavia, were coordinated by the AFSOUTH (Allied Forces Southern Europe), based in Naples. The majority of air operations were conducted by jet fighters and bombers stationed at Aviano Air Base (Haulman, 2013). In 1999, the Operation Allied Force, aimed at stopping Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo against the Albanian minority, was coordinated from the AIRSOUTH and by the NATO Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Vicenza. Aviano Air base, as in the previous conflict, played a central role (Haulman, 2015). The second phase of the evolution of U.S. bases in Italy is associated with the Global Posture Review, launched by the U.S. Department of Defense in 2004, that redesigned and rationalized the U.S.  military presence at the global level. This document was defined by Robert Harkavy as “the most relevant global posture review since the NSC-​68” (Harkavy, 2006). Based on the Global Posture Review, the U.S.  would focus on mobility and power projection in distant theatres, rather than on fixed bases designed to ward off, or respond to, conventional attacks from well identified adversaries. The Global Posture Review led to a reduction of force levels in Western Europe, from 100,000 to 50,000, with the majority of cuts coming from Germany. Despite the reduction, Italy is the only country in Europe that maintains a level of U.S. troops similar to the Cold War level (US Department of Defense, 2004). While the strategic relevance of U.S.  bases in the United Kingdom and Germany, main European host countries during the Cold War, has declined, bases located in Italy have developed a new and increasing strategic value, making the country the linchpin for the power projection toward the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Northern Africa. The first significant development following the GPR is the enlargement of the U.S. naval presence in Italy. In 2004, the 6th Fleet moved its main port from Gaeta to Napoli. Contextually, in 2004 the United States moved NAVEUR, the Naval Command of the EUCOM, from London to Naples. This entailed that the all the activities of the 6th Fleet be coordinated by the Naval Support Activities base in Naples. In 2013, the role of the NATO base in Naples was changed due to a reform of the NATO military command structure:  the AFSOUTH command of Naples was transformed into the Joint Force Command Naples. These developments made Naples one of the most significant naval bases in the Mediterranean region (Samaan, 2018). Bases located in the north east of the country also have undergone a significant process of change. Camp Ederle has significantly been expanded since the end of the Cold War. The artillery groups based there were de-​activated, and the base assumed a function of coordination and training for troops later deployed in the Balkans and in the Middle East. The base also acquired, maintained and expanded its role in terms of supervision, command and control of conventional

U.S. bases in Italy  47 stocks and nuclear facilities located in Italy. The base in Aviano was doubled in size. In the mid-​1990s the base received a new F-​16 squadron and demonstrated its strategic centrality in the conflict in the Balkans. Camp Darby was downgraded to the status of sub-​garrison, but remains the main deposit for weapons systems, ammunition and equipment in Southern Europe. In the south of the country, Sigonella in Sicily is probably the base that has undergone most radical changes. While at the end of the Cold War it hosted only 500 personnel, today it hosts around 3,000. The value of Sigonella is both logistic and military. From the logistic point of view, it represents a fundamental hub for TRANSCOM (the U.S.  military command dedicated to logistics) since the U.S.  established there the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center as a logistics hub for the entire Southern Europe and the Middle East (Monteleone, 2007). Moreover, Sigonella became the Main Operating Base for the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS), a NATO program aimed at acquiring airborne ground surveillance capability through the use of Global Hawk drones (Ce.S.I., 2013). Finally, Sicily acquired a further value due to the installation of the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), a radar system enabling military communications. Ambassador Ronald Spogli captured the evolution of Italy’s strategic role, stating the following in one of his final classified cables to Washington in 2009 (later made public by Wikileaks): Italy provides a unique geostrategic platform within Europe for U.S. forces, allowing us to reach easily into troubled areas throughout the Middle East, Africa and Europe. And because of that advantage, Italy is home to the most comprehensive set of military capabilities –​from the 173rd Airborne to cutting edge Global Hawks –​that we have anywhere outside the United States. Most importantly, Italy has shown a willingness, and even an eagerness, to partner with the U.S. in addressing many of the most pressing global challenges of our age. (Wikileaks, 2009) The creation of AFRICOM8 has further increased the relevance of the bases in Italy. While the main headquarter of AFRICOM is located at the Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart (Germany), the Naval and Army headquarters are located in Napoli and Vicenza, respectively. As Ambassador Spogli argued in the above-​mentioned leaked communication with the U.S. State Department: “With the establishment of AFRICOM, Italy has become an even more significant partner in our power projection calculations” (Wikileaks, 2009). Other cables from Spogli underline the “emphatic desire” of the Italian government to host the entire structure of AFRICOM, to further improve the relationship with the United States, and to contribute to acquiring influence in North Africa (Wikileaks, 2008b). Bases located in Italy were at the forefront of the NATO intervention against Lybia in 2011. The intervention was divided into two distinct operations: Odyssey Down and Unified Protector.9 During the first, mission operations were

48  Matteo Dian coordinated by AFRICOM, while during the second they were coordinated by the Joint Force Command in Naples. The air bases of Aviano and Sigonella were at the center of the military operations, due to their proximity to the Libyan territory (Mueller, 2015). The process of revision of the U.S. presence in Italy did not only lead to the consolidation or the enlargement of the key bases. It also led to the closure of the naval base of Santo Stefano-​La Maddalena. In the aftermath of the accidents that occurred to the nuclear submarines USS Hartford and USS Oklahoma City, the local mobilization, supported by the regional authorities, led to the closure of the base (Dessì, Chiri, 2011). Other bases were closed between the 1990s and the early 2000s. One example is Comiso Air Base, returned to the civilian authorities in 2004 and later turned into a civilian airport. Ultimately, the role of U.S. bases in Italy radically changed in the post-​Cold War period. However, both the U.S. and Italy consider them as a crucial contribution of Rome to the Atlantic alliance and a key resource for Italy’s security and defense policies.

3.6  U.S. bases in the contemporary Italian political debates After the end of the Cold War, forms of opposition and resistance to the role of U.S. and NATO bases deeply changed, together with the international environment and the Italian political system. In the early 1990s, the Communist Party turned into a social-​democratic party called Democratic Party of the Left (Partito dei Democratici della Sinistra)10 and fully accepted the alliance with the United States and other Western powers (Fouskas, 2018).11 The pro-​Western turn of the Italian Left was confirmed when Massimo D’Alema, the first former communist to become Prime Minister, actively supported the NATO-​led intervention in Kosovo (D’Alema, 1999). As a consequence, since the early 1990s, the only political parties opposing NATO and the presence of the bases were small radical parties such as Rifondazione Comunista (the Communist Refoundation Party), that did not accept the reformist evolution of the PCI. This wide consensus on the foreign policy orientation left the role of opposition to the bases to local activist and pacifist social movements. On the one hand, their opposition built on pacifist and anti-​nuclear narratives developed by the pacifist movement in the 1980s. On the other, local activists tended to express local grievances related to issues such as environmental degradation and health concerns. In this context the anti-​base mobilization appeared only in few very specific instances. The first was the Cermis incident in 1998, when twenty people, of different nationalities, died after a United States Marine Corps aircraft cut a cable supporting an aerial tramway. Despite the very significant loss of life and the renewed attention of the public, the incident led only to a minor mobilization against the bases. Rifondazione Comunista and several anti-​base social movements promoted a rally in Aviano12. However, they encountered the opposition of local business associations, positively affected by the presence of the base. The general

U.S. bases in Italy  49 public as well as mainstream national progressive forces, while showing signs of indignation, did not participate in any anti-​base mobilization. A second wave of protests occurred immediately after the beginning of the war in Iraq in 2003. On that occasion several pacifist movements conducted various forms of protests against U.S.  and NATO bases. For instance, they sought to recreate the blockade of the shipment of U.S. weapons in and out of the bases, echoing the initiative promoted by the Communist Party in the early 1950s. The anti-​base mobilization, however, represented only a very minor aspect of the large-​scale national mobilization against the war. In 2003, as on previous occasions, the anti-​base movement failed to link anti-​base mobilization to the national debate on the country’s foreign policy. Since the early 2000s, two significant movements emerged at the local level, protesting the broadening of the base in Vicenza (Caserma Ederle) and the radar station MUOS in Niscemi, respectively. The former was probably the most significant anti-​base protest in Italy. The expansion of Caserma Ederle in Vicenza and the stationing of the army component of AFRICOM there generated a significant wave of protests. The opposition against the base was animated both by radical leftist groups, demanding a complete stop to the expansion project for political reasons, and local groups, protesting the environmental impact, noise and traffic issues related to it. The protest acquired national prominence, since the government, then led by Prime Minister Romano Prodi and supported by a center-​left coalition, included two small radical-​left parties. Those parties threatened to withdraw from the coalition in case the government did not stop the expansion of the base. Moreover, local activists managed to maintain a high level of mobilization between 2006 and 2007. This dynamic put the issue under the national spotlight. Eventually, the government decided to consider the requests of the local activists, negotiating with the U.S. Army a revision of the expansion project, in order to reduce the burden on the local population (Yeo, 2011). The final example of resistance is the “NO MUOS” movement, opposing the radar station located near Niscemi in Sicily. This movement, founded in 2014, exemplifies the evolution of anti-​base opposition in Italy. It declared itself “free from party and political influence,” while it promoting an alliance with environmentalist groups and on opposing a single military installation. The group has promoted a number of initiatives, ranging from local roadblocks and rallies to information campaigns on the alleged heath impact of radars on the local population. Moreover, it has promoted a number of legal petitions at several levels of the Italian justice system to stop the activities of the MUOS. Overall, during the post-​Cold War period, the opposition to the bases gradually become detached from the national debate on foreign policy, while starting to represent more specifically the interests of local communities and their grievances. Those movements did not manage to alter the national discourse on the bases or to cause a significant reduction of the U.S. presence. In some cases, however, they had some impact, accelerating the closure of facilities considered as no longer strategically essential, such as Comiso and La Maddalena.

50  Matteo Dian

3.7  SOFA agreements and legal framework after the Cold War Since the end of the Cold War, the legal regime regulating the presence of U.S.  troops in Italy has not radically changed. Nevertheless, the existing legal framework, stemming from the classified BIA of 1954, was integrated by the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1995 by the Italian Defense Ministry and the U.S. Department of Defense (widely known as the “Shell Agreement”). In 1998 the government led by Massimo D’Alema made this agreement public, in the wake of the Cermis Disaster (Foppiani, 2011). The Shell Agreement, confirming the Italian sovereignty over the territory of bases, states that the Italian installations, land and equipment in each base is controlled by an Italian commander, while a U.S.  commander has an exclusive control over the U.S. personnel and equipment but must notify the Italian authorities about all U.S. activities carried out in the base. The Italian commander has the right to access every facility and area of the base, even those subject to restrictions and military secrets. This right is, however, limited by the necessity of prior notification to the U.S. authorities (U.S. Embassy to Italy, 2016). Furthermore, and importantly, the Shell Agreement underlines that the bases should be used only for NATO-​related purposes (Monteleone, 2007). In the following years, the evolution of the strategic purpose of NATO led to the emergence of new problems for the legal framework regulating the U.S. bases in Italy. In 1999 NATO members approved a new strategic concept that included new missions for the alliance, beyond Article 5 (collective security): conflict management and out-​of-​area missions. In principle, NATO activities should conform with the international law, and, in case of use of force, be authorized by the UN to be considered as legal under Article 11 of the Italian constitution. However, the new NATO strategic concept opened up the possibility for U.S. bases located in Italy to be used for activities that are interpreted as legal by the U.S. or other NATO members, even if they are not considered legal under the Italian law. An example of this are humanitarian interventions not approved by the United Nations, such as the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Another significant development related to the BIA emerged with the publication of Wikileaks files in late 2018. A leaked document testified that in 2008 the Italian government repeatedly requested the de-​classification of the BIA. These requests were denied by the U.S. Ultimately, the information emerging from the Wikileaks cables allows us to conclude that the BIA formally enables a relatively significant degree of control over the U.S. activities, but that the Italian authorities allow a very broad interpretation of the articles contained in it. In particular, beyond collective defense, the BIA seems to limit the activities carried out in and from the bases to UN-​approved military interventions. The Italian government has chosen to interpret this norm very loosely, however, also allowing the use of the bases for interventions not legitimized by a UN mandate (Wikileaks 2008a,b). Ultimately, a publication of the BIA might create political incentives for the Italian government to restrict the use of bases, and make their use more difficult for the U.S. and NATO.

U.S. bases in Italy  51 As during the Cold War, the presence of U.S. bases has remained linked with the presence of nuclear weapons on the Italian territory. According to recent estimates, around 90 B-​61 nuclear bombs are stored in Aviano Air Base and in Ghedi Air Base. These are gravity bombs that could be delivered by F-​16 jet fighters stationed at Aviano, by Italian Panavia Tornados or by Lockhead Martin F-​35, recently acquired both by the U.S. and Italian Air Forces (Kristensen and Norris, 2017). The conformity of these deployments with the NPT remains questionable from the legal standpoint. Moreover, experts have questioned their strategic value in terms of extended deterrence (Foradori, 2012; Blechman and Rumbaugh, 2014). The bottom line is that the Italian legal framework overseeing the use of the bases, as well as the bilateral agreements with the U.S., remain affected by a low level of transparency. Moreover, it appears clear that both countries have given very broad interpretations to the letter of the agreements, diminishing the level of the host country’s oversight, while allowing the U.S. an almost unrestricted use of the bases.

3.8  Conclusion In the early 1990s, Italy lost its status of a “frontier state” in Western Europe and the Mediterranean Sea. The demise of the Soviet Union and the communist bloc has completely redefined the strategic environment surrounding the country. As a consequence, the strategic value of Italian bases is now determined by their capacity to provide a logistical hub for power projection toward the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Northern Africa. The Italian political elite tends to consider them a necessary and rather limited cost, associated with a largely beneficial and substantially uncontested membership in NATO. The above analysis of the legal framework reveals another significant element in the Italian case. At first look, the Italian case seems to be characterized by a significant amount of control and oversight. Italy, as a member of NATO, has formal control over the activities carried out on the bases. U.S. forces do not have extraterritorial rights, and an Italian commander is always present to monitor activities carried out on the bases. However, this formal control does not seem to have translated into actual political influence directed at limiting the use of the bases. More than often rules and agreements have been re-​interpreted in consideration of the political and strategic necessities of the day, rather than strictly applied with the purpose of maximizing transparency and oversight. Lack of transparency regards also the role of the nuclear weapons still stored in the country. The Italian government, also due to the complete absence of political debate on the issue, has never asked for the removal or at least for a higher degree of transparency regarding those weapons. When it comes to the domestic political resistance to the presence of U.S. bases, Italy has displayed a higher degree of acceptance compared to other U.S. allies (Dian, 2014). During the post-​Cold War period the issue of bases all but disappeared from the national political debate. The wide consensus on NATO membership, contested only by a few radical left parties, turned the presence of

52  Matteo Dian U.S. bases into a NIMBY13 issue affecting local communities, with only a limited number of NGOs very loosely coordinating beyond the local level. Overall, the presence of U.S.  and NATO bases in Italy has been largely accepted by Italian policy makers and by the wider public opinion. This coexistence is not entirely devoid of legal, logistical and social problems. However, the country seems to have accepted that the bases are a significant and yet relatively cost-​effective contribution that the country can offer to the Atlantic alliance. Efforts to change the reality on the ground are currently limited to local activists who focus on local grievances, without a solid connection with the wider national debate on foreign policy.

Notes 1 Sergeant Missiles were solid fuel short range missiles that could be equipped with nuclear weapons. 2 Italian authorities repeatedly denied the existence of the base in the 1970s and early 1980s. The existence of the base was admitted only in the 1990s, while the Italian state has not officially taken a position on whether nuclear submarines have been deployed at La Maddalena. 3 These submarines were not armed with SLBMs. Therefore, their aim was not to be ready to retaliate against an enemy through the launch of nuclear missiles. Rather, their function was to hunt for Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean. 4 The idea of including the Communist Party into a “national solidarity” or emergency government was proposed especially after the kidnapping and the murder of Prime Minister Aldo Moro. However, the proposal was never put into practice both due to the opposition of a part of the Christian Democrats and the opposition by the U.S. 5 The peace movement of the early 1980s was a transnational social movement that developed in the entire Western Europe after the end of the détente and the beginning of the “second Cold War” of the 1980s. On the peace movement, see Cortright, 2008. 6 In the Italian system the Supreme Court of Cassasion is the court of last resort. It ensures the correct application of law in the inferior and appeal courts. Its function is different from the Constitutional Court, which establishes the conformity of laws to the Italian constitution. 7 Article 11 states: “Italy repudiates war as an instrument of offense against the freedom of other peoples and as a means of resolving international disputes; it allows, on an equal footing with other states, the limitations of sovereignty necessary for an order that ensures peace and justice among nations; promotes and favors international organizations aimed at this purpose.” 8 AFRICOM is one of the ten unified combat commands of the U.S. Armed Forces. The responsibilities of AFRICOM extend to the entire Africa, with the exception of Egypt. 9 Odyssey Down lasted between 19 and 31 March 2011 and was led by the U.S. forces. Unified Protector ended on 31 October 2011 and was led by the NATO joint command. 10 The party later changed its name into Democratic Left (Democratici di Sinistra), and in 2008, formed the backbone of the new Democratic Party (Partito Democratico). 11 The Communist Party changed its name into the Democratic Party of the Left in 1991. At the same time the rest of the Italian political system was affected by a wave of

U.S. bases in Italy  53 corruption scandals that led to the disappearance of the Christian Democrats and the Socialist Party. 12 The fighter jet that caused the incident was based in Aviano. 13 NIMBY (an acronym for the phrase “not in my back yard”) refers to movements that oppose political and economic developments imposing costs on local communities, on the ground of economic, social or environmental motivations.

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U.S. bases in Italy  55 Samaan, J. (2018) “Outflanked? NATO’s Southern Hub and the Struggle for its Middle East Strategy,” The International Spectator, 53(4), pp. 58–​74. The Heritage Foundation (n.d.). Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950–​2003. Available from: www.heritage.org/​Research/​NationalSecurity/​troopsdb.cfm. (Accessed 12 November 2019). U.S. Department of Defense (2004). Strengthen U.S. Global Defense Posture –​ Report to Congress. Washington D.C. U.S. Embassy in Italy (2016). Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Italy and the Department of Defense of the United States of America Concerning Use of Installations/​Infrastructure by U.S. Forces in Italy. Available from:  https://​it.usembassy.gov/​wp-​content/​uploads/​sites/​67/​2016/​04/​USSSO-​ shell.pdf. (Accessed 15 December 2019). Varsori, A. and Zaccaria, B. (2018). Italy in the International System from Detente to the End of the Cold War. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Wikileaks (2008a). Italian Request to Declassify Bilateral Infrastructure Agreement. Available from: http://​wikileaks.org/​plusd/​cables/​08ROME1322_​a.html. (Accessed 2 February 2020). —​—​—​ (2008b). Italy Proposed Way forward on AFRICOM. 29 July 2008. Available from:  https://​wikileaks.org/​plusd/​cables/​08ROME945_​a.html. (Accessed 4 February 2020). —​—​—​ (2009). Final Thoughts on the U.S.-​Italy Relationship:  What We Can Ask from a Strong Ally. Cable from U.S. Ambassador Spogli to the U.S. Secretary of State, 5 February 2009. Available from:  www.wikileaks.org/​plusd/​cables/​09ROME128_​ a.html. (Accessed 7 February 2020). Yeo, A. (2011). Activists, Alliances, and Anti-​US Base Protests. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press.

4  Defending NATO’s southern flank Spain’s democratization, the ending of the Cold War and the U.S. military presence Shino Hateruma 4.1  Introduction Following the conclusion of a basing contract in 1953, the United States deployed its forces to Spain and provided military and financial aid to the host. The treaty, which served the United States best in terms of enabling it to defend southern Europe against the Soviet threat, was jeopardized in the mid-​1980s when the socialist-​led Spanish government demanded a significant reduction of U.S. forces stationed there. In particular, it demanded the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Torrejón Air Base near Madrid. After bilateral negotiations lasting over sixteen months, the host state eventually notified the sending state that it would not renew the existing base agreement, which meant that the United States could lose three airbases and one naval base, which accommodated approximately 9,000 military personnel. Though it was a time of Soviet domestic reforms, Soviet intentions still appeared unpredictable to the United States. Nonetheless, it bowed to Spain, agreeing to return the aforementioned major airbase and withdraw all three fighter squadrons based there in January 1988. By the end of the year, the two countries had signed a new treaty, the conditions of which included the return of the base to Spain, no provision of aid by the United States, and the application of the policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons in Spanish territory. There are a few conditions which made closure of the Spanish base a hard choice for the United States. First, major threats to the United States were not abating. As the Soviet Union was in the process of reforming both internal and external policies, the United States viewed it with caution. Second, abandoning foreign bases in Europe was rare during the Cold War. U.S.  military base disposition in Europe was kept consistent, excepting the complete withdrawal from France in 1966. Third, there was concern over a possible domino effect—​ U.S. concessions to one host state could encourage others to bargain over U.S. military presence, which could further result in fraying the U.S.’s overseas base network. Spain was first in line to negotiate over U.S.  bases before the expiration of its ongoing contract, followed by Greece, Turkey, Portugal, and the Philippines (Ottaway 1987; Grimmett 1988; Duke 1989, p. 262). Despite these difficulties, under what conditions did the United States decide to give up on the contested Torrejón base?

Defending NATO’s southern flank  57 This chapter argues that the United States agreed to return the base to Spain not simply because it decided to accommodate the demands of the democratizing host state, but because it took a multilateral approach that complied with the regional security imperatives and domestic and international political hurdles. The findings of this study are as follows. The final agreement to close the Torrejón base was contingent upon the relocation of the forces stationed in the base, and was linked to the U.S.  threat perception regarding the Soviet military power being projected in southern Europe. The Torrejón base was to be relocated to Italy due to the U.S. perception that the Soviet threat still remained, and because the United States thought it important to maintain military capabilities in the region. While the United States searched for an alternative site, it sought to make the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) a stakeholder responsible for the relocation issue. It further sought to depend on NATO to share the costs of moving the Torrejón base to Italy. Some base politics scholars explain this Spanish case by focusing on the impact of Spain’s democratization on U.S. base continuity. According to them, democratization challenges the legacy of the preceding autocracy or dictatorship that admitted U.S. military presence within the country. U.S. bases in host countries transitioning toward democracy tend to be criticized and politicized amidst the pursuit of sovereignty, territorial integrity and party consolidation; therefore, the transition period is least stable for U.S. presence (Calder, 2007; Cooley, 2008; Lostumbo et al., 2013). Although a democratizing regime is a necessary condition for the politicization of bases, it does not necessarily lead to a U.S. agreement to base closure. While recent base politics literature has shed light on domestic factors in host states and clarified the mechanisms of how foreign bases become politicized in them, this study focuses on base closure as one end on the spectrum of base politicization outcomes. There are three reasons why this focus is significant. First, this study examines other conditions that are necessary for establishing a causal link between host state democratization and a U.S.  agreement to relinquish the contested base. Identifying these conditions contributes to a deeper understanding of political phenomena pertaining to overseas bases. Second, this research reconsiders strategic factors, especially those concerning the sending state, which are regarded as important factors at the time of base establishment (Harkavy, 1989; Kawana, 2012) but less significant during the base termination phase (Calder, 2007). It helps identify the factors affecting the dynamics of overseas base presence. Third, by examining the conditions that enabled the abandonment of a contested base, this research highlights the fact that base issues may not be solved bilaterally but by multilateral means. It indicates that the United States takes into account not only the host state but also relevant regional aspects in dealing with base contestation. This chapter first touches upon how Spain brought issues pertaining to U.S. bases to the level of national politics in the mid-​1980s, followed by a brief overview of the establishment of U.S.–​Spanish security relations and U.S. military bases in Spain. Secondly, U.S. threat perception and evaluation of the base in

58  Shino Hateruma question will be examined. Threat perception is analyzed via U.S. public reports and high officials’ statements made at the time of base negotiations. Through such analysis, it is possible to understand how the United States went about evaluating the Torrejón base. I assemble congressional testimonies made by American high government officials and concerned military officials, as well as their comments reported on by newspapers. Such remarks can be regarded as official and institutional, rather than personal, because they are generally prepared within respective departments involved in negotiation and relocation examination processes. Aside from matters of security assessment, I  examine U.S.  domestic circumstances of the time to show that the U.S. government also had to deal with Congress in order to solve the Spanish base issue. Thirdly, I  examine the process of the U.S. securing an alternative for the Torrejón base. Despite limited access to diplomatic documents, data from secondary materials are telling of what elements were considered important in searching for an alternative and how the United States sought to secure it.

4.2  Background to the base contestation led by democratization 4.2.1  Overview of U.S.–​Spain security relations Before the main discussion, this section presents an overview of the development of the United States–​Spain security relations and base arrangements. I will also demonstrate how the U.S. bases in Spain became contested—​Spain’s democratization led to a demand for the reduction of U.S. forces. On the verge of the Cold War, the United States became interested in Spain because of its geographical advantage (Whitaker, 1961, p.  48). In 1953, the United States and Spain signed the Pact of Madrid, which consisted of three agreements:  the Defense Agreement, the Economic Aid Agreement, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement.1 The Defense Agreement granted the U.S. access to military bases in Spain, although the United States was not obliged to defend Spain. In return, the United States pledged to provide Spain with military and economic aid as an enhancement of Spanish defense efforts. As the 1953 Defense Agreement was valid for ten years and the term of validity of the renewed agreements was five years each, the two governments were required to negotiate basing rights as well as the amount of aid to be provided each time an expiration date approached. The number of U.S.  military personnel in Spain was around 9,000 from the mid-​1960s until the late 1980s.2 The troops were housed in four separate bases: three Air Force bases and one Navy base (see Figure 4.1). Torrejón Air Base accommodated the headquarters of the Sixteenth Air Force, equipped with fighters and tanker aircraft; Moron Air Base and Zaragoza Air Base were staging bases for contingency purposes; and Rota Naval Station supported the Sixth Fleet in the western Mediterranean, engaged in intelligence gathering and anti-​ submarine missions (Duke, 1989, p. 266).

Defending NATO’s southern flank  59 4.2.2  Spanish democratization and base contestation The U.S. presence in Spain was established and maintained by the dictatorship of Francisco Franco (Cooley, 2008, pp. 57–​64). However, after his death in 1978, Spain underwent democratization and sought for a change in its defense policy, including in its security relationship with the United States. In 1982, Spain attained membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) after 150 years of isolation and domestic political crisis. Even still, the entry did not change the basing status contracted between the United States and Spain.3 The Spanish Workers’ Socialist Party (Patido Socialista Obrero Espanõl, PSOE), which took office in October 1982, claimed that Spain’s membership in NATO could increase the risk of war involvement. Spanish threat perception at the time differed from that of the United States and NATO. While the United States recognized the Soviet Union as a remaining threat—​as later discussed—​, Spain did not share the threat perception of the United States. For Spain, the Soviet threat was neither so obvious nor imminent. According to Spanish journalist Antonio Sanchez-​Gijon, the socialist administration did not depict the Soviet Union as a military threat to Spain or Western Europe (1988, p. 105). If anything, the Spaniards considered Morocco an adversary because of a territorial dispute between the two countries. Spain had two separate enclaves contested by Morocco in the northern edge of Africa—​Ceuta and Melilla. Another reason for Spain’s lack of attention to external threats was domestic instability. As indicated by Angel Viñas, the then senior advisor in the Spanish Foreign Ministry, who stated that “a precondition of meeting external threats is the ability to strengthen internal structures and eliminate domestic vulnerabilities,” the PSOE government considered Spain’s dependency on external raw material, trade with Western Europe, maritime access, etc. when revising its security policy (1988, pp. 172–​173). Internal terrorism was a concern of the government as well. PSOE’s preference for NATO had no relation to Soviet threats; rather, it had to do with domestic considerations. The Socialist government sought to utilize NATO membership as a means of modernizing and controlling the Spanish military in order to avoid coup d’état and attacks from anti-​ government organizations (Stuart, 1989, p. 91). Based on the security situation described above, and despite criticizing joining NATO, the PSOE administration recognized the necessity to improve Spanish defense capabilities and contribute to Western security, and thus, considered it important to maintain its bilateral relationship with the United States as the leader of the West (Sanchez-​Gijon, 1988, pp. 97–​98; Serra, 1988, p. 6). The then PSOE leader and Prime Minister Felipe González announced in the spring of 1985 that Spain would hold a national referendum on continuous membership in NATO within the following year. To gain support for a pro-​ NATO campaign, he attached three significant conditions to the referendum: (1) Spanish membership would remain outside of the NATO military command

60  Shino Hateruma structure, (2)  storing, stationing or introducing nuclear weapons would be banned in Spain, and (3) “progressive reduction” of U.S. forces in Spain would be achieved (Platt, 1987, p. 166). The referendum on 12 March 1986 turned out with about 53 percent of voters supporting Spain remaining in NATO. The result established a solid foundation for the PSOE government to challenge continuous U.S. presence. Spanish Defense Minister Narcís Serra considered public support for U.S. force reduction as an opportunity to prove to the sending state that a democratized Spain could build an equal and mature relationship with it (Serra, 1988, p. 12). Prior to the expiration of the 1982 base agreement, Spain and the United States began their first negotiations in July 1986. Madrid consistently requested that the renewal of the base agreement should exceed “symbolism” and bring about “significant” U.S. force reduction (Platt, 1987, p. 167). From the Spanish point of view, reduction of the U.S.  presence seemed legitimate because the Spanish proposal to newly commit to the defense of the West through military modernization would help reduce the burden on U.S. forces stationed in Spain (Serra, 1988, pp. 11–​13). At the onset of negotiations, both parties exchanged position papers. According to a Spanish daily newspaper, El País, the Spanish position paper examined the defense needs of Spain and NATO and called for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the airbases of Zaragoza and Torrejón (Bayón, 1986; The Associate Press, 1986). However, negotiations over the Torrejón base were not easy. The two parties did not reach a compromise even after the seventh round of negotiations in November 1987. 4.2.3  The role and function of Torrejón Air Base The Torrejón base, located twelve miles (twenty kilometers) northeast of Madrid, became the point of dispute during the bilateral negotiations for a new contract. The airbase had played a distinctive role since the United States began its force deployment in Spain in 1953. Torrejón was once home to strategic bombers as part of the implementation of the massive retaliation doctrine. Under NATO’s Flexible Response strategy introduced in 1967,4 Torrejón received the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) composed of three squadrons of F-​16s. With a combat radius of 500 miles (860 kilometers), an F-​16 aircraft could fly from Torrejón to the front without refueling, and could fight near the border of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO)-​controlled sphere. The Torrejón base performed various functions. It was a rear base of strike operations in which the 401st TFW would be launched from Incirlik, Turkey and Aviano, Italy (Grimmett, 1977, p. 18). The three squadrons of the wing were deployed in triangular rotation between Spain and the two countries. Such rotational deployment was expected to “be crucial to interdiction of a Soviet advance through Iran to the Persian Gulf” (Harkavy, 1989, p. 296). Furthermore, because F-​16s can carry nuclear weapons, their dual capability reinforced NATO’s combat power on the southern flank (Price, 1990, p. 197). In addition, Torrejón served as “a major staging, reinforcement, and logistic airlift base for U.S. forces, as well

Defending NATO’s southern flank  61 as a communications center” (Grimmett, 1977, p. 18). Sometimes its operational boundary extended beyond the NATO sphere to places such as the Middle East and North Africa. For example, the United States had used Torrejón to refuel its planes for their flight to Israel during the Yom Kippur War in 1973 (Bardaji, 1986; Viñas, 2003, p. 23).

4.3  The U.S. view of international and domestic situations 4.3.1  U.S. security assessment in southern Europe Although Madrid demanded withdrawal from the Torrejón airbase, Washington did not readily yield to its counterpart due to security concerns in southern Europe. The importance of the Torrejón base was related to the U.S. assessment of the strategic environment in the region for which the base’s combat units were responsible. This section investigates how the United States recognized threats in the area where the 401st TFW was responsible—​spanning the Mediterranean Sea, to Italy and Turkey—​and in the area that the United States referred to as NATO’s Southern Region. During the basing negotiations that took place between July 1986 and December 1988, the United States recognized a Soviet threat in the area and its threat perception in regard to the Soviet Union remained solid. Such U.S. perception of a Soviet threat persisted for the entirety of the negotiations. Annual reports made by the Secretary of Defense to Congress continuously claimed that Soviet military power remained the largest threat to the United States and its interests, allies and friends. The Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1988, published in January 1987, asserted, “In every corner of the globe, America’s vital interests are threatened by an ever-​growing Soviet military threat” (Weinberger, 1987, p. 4). The Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1989, published in February 1988, warned that despite domestic political and economic reform in the Soviet Union, it still allocated military resources and was expected to seek a quick penetration of the NATO region (Carlucci, 1988, pp. 31–​32). Recognizing its own ability to deter the Soviets from starting a war or even challenging a small sector in Europe, the United States paid close attention to the Soviet Union, which had advantages in most categories of forces, such as conventional ground and air forces, nonstrategic nuclear forces and chemical capabilities. The United States assumed the WTO would initiate offensive maneuvers and penetrate deep into the rear of NATO (U.S. Department of Defense [DoD], 1987, p. 65). Therefore, the United States and its allies had to secure the defense lines on all flanks. In terms of NATO’s Southern Region, the area corresponded roughly with what the Soviets called the Southwestern TVD (Teatr Voennykh Deistvii, or theaters of military operations), which included Mediterranean littoral countries, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the southwestern Soviet Union. The U.S. Department of Defense predicted that the Soviets could enter the region, even if the possibility for that was not as high as it was in the NATO Central Region. It analyzed possible Soviet military actions in the region as follows:

62  Shino Hateruma The Soviets plan operations in the Southwestern TVD to support their advance in the Western Theater and to establish dominance in NATO’s Southern Region. In wartime, Soviet plans for offensive operations in the region include an attack through neutral Austria into southern Germany and northern Italy. Soviet plans also include operations to seize the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Efforts to seize the Turkish straits would be accomplished by coordinated ground, airborne, and amphibious operations. Warsaw Pact naval forces in the theater organized into a combined Black Sea Fleet and the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron would attempt to clear the Black Sea of NATO naval forces and would attempt to prevent Allied forces from using the eastern Mediterranean to reinforce their defenses. (DoD, 1986, pp. 61–​62) The United States expected that, for the WTO, it was necessary to secure the Black Sea for “the movement of Soviet land forces into Greece and Turkey,” and that the WTO had high quality equipment such as surface-​to-​air and surface-​to-​ surface missiles (DoD, 1989, p. 97). This meant that there was a possibility for U.S.  fighters to make a sortie from its airbases in Turkey and Italy to prevent Soviet invasion. The United States recognized that air superiority was shifting positively toward its adversary in terms of quantity. The comparison of NATO–​WTO combat aircraft presented in the Soviet Military Power 1988 report indicated that fighter/​ interceptors and bomber/​fighter-​bombers possessed by the WTO outnumbered those of NATO (1988, p.  115). 910 tactical fighter aircraft were deployed to the Soviet southwestern TVD in 1986, although the number of deployed aircraft decreased by 50 in the following two years. In contrast, NATO Air Forces maintained 620 fighters and bombers in the Southern Region.5 Soviet missiles were another source of threat posed in NATO’s Southern Region. The Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1988 warned that the WTO increased its number of longer-​ range, dual-​ capable, surface-​ to-​ surface missiles that threatened the survivability of NATO’s air forces and air defense systems (Weinberger, 1987, p. 30). In fact, the Soviet Union maintained about 200 tactical SSM missiles in the southwestern TVD throughout the latter half of the 1980s (DoD, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989). Arms reduction initiatives between the two superpowers did not automatically reduce U.S. threat perception of the Soviet Union. They signed the Intermediate-​ Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. This contributed to the easing of U.S.–​Soviet tensions because it banned the use, possession and testing of nuclear and conventional ground-​launched cruise and ballistic missiles that could travel between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Paradoxically, however, the regulation of nuclear options meant the increasing importance of conventional forces as a means to deter Soviet aggression. Before the INF Treaty was enforced, the Department of Defense maintained awareness of Soviet military development (DoD, 1988, p. 67) and addressed the need to continue improving U.S. conventional forces (Carlucci, 1988, p. 56).

Defending NATO’s southern flank  63 4.3.2  Importance of the Torrejón base for the United States Based on the threat assessment discussed above, the United States asserted the importance of the Torrejón base to American lawmakers and Spanish negotiators. U.S. military officials first declared that it would be best to keep the fighter wing in Spain. For example, Tidal W. McCoy, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, testified before the Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations in April 1987: “Our first choice would be, because of the importance of that southern flank of NATO, to stay at Torrejón and continue.”6 James F.  Boatright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment and Safety, also testified: “Certainly we would like to be able to keep the fighter wing that is presently located at Torrejón. We would like to keep them in Spain in the southern flank of NATO.”7 The United States had two main reasons why the wing and the Torrejón base were necessary in southern Europe. First, the military balance was in favor of the WTO. American high-​ranking officials were aware of the NATO–​WTO power imbalance in this region. For instance, Secretary of State George Shultz argued: “The INF Treaty underscores the importance of conventional military capability in NATO. There are imbalances and they need to be corrected.”8 Assistant Secretary of the Air Force McCoy presented the same assessment that the southern flank of NATO was “already less than satisfactory balanced compared to the adversaries we face.”9 American officials reportedly asserted that, on the verge of the arms control agreement, “the role of tactical jet fighters like the F-​16 become more important to European security and should not be tampered with at this time” (Delaney, 1987a). As the INF Treaty prohibited ground-​ launched intermediate-​ range missiles, the F-​ 16s of the 401st TFW became a vital intermediate-​range nuclear delivery system in NATO’s Southern Region. In other words, from the standpoint of U.S. officials, the treaty elevated the value of the wing in the region. Second, related to the first point, the wing was a committed part of the NATO defense strategy. As Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, testified: “The base in Spain was home to air units that had very clear NATO missions for forward defense through Italy and Turkey.”10 Comptroller Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Helm stated: “We would like to keep those F-​16’s in Europe if possible. They are really key to our NATO defense structure.” He also asserted that “the 401st is vitally important for NATO’s deterrent.”11 Based on such evaluations of the base, the United States offered small concessions during negotiations with Spain. When the first round of negotiations took place in July 1986 and Spain requested the return of the Torrejón base, U.S. Ambassador to Spain Thomas Enders responded that his country was willing to replace 500 U.S.  personnel at the Torrejón base with Spanish civilians.12 By the end of the year, as Madrid had told Washington that the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Torrejón was sine qua non, State Secretary Shultz had agreed to work simply toward force reductions (Heiberg, 2018, pp. 180–​181).

64  Shino Hateruma The United States reportedly suggested to Spain that the fighter jets based in Torrejón would be relocated to another Spanish base (Zaragoza, Moron or Rota), but the host country rejected the idea (Pick and Ellman, 1986; Delaney, 1987b; la Repubblica, 1987). In February 1987, the United States proposed a package deal, which included that Spain would take responsibility for a branch of command at Torrejón, and that Spanish personnel would take over certain U.S.  positions (Heiberg, 2018, p.  183). In addition to proposing a series of compromises, the United States resorted to the reduction of foreign aid to Spain by 72 percent (ibid.). However, the Spanish socialist government did not change its bargaining stance. Furthermore, the United States refused a Spanish proposal to compensate for reduced U.S. forces by building up the Spanish armed forces. The PSOE administration had underlined that it had been engaged in efforts to modernize the Spanish military since 1983. The Spanish government prioritized modernization of the Air Force by purchasing 72 F/​A-​18 fighter aircraft from the United States for three billion dollars (Dabrowski, 1996, p. 252).13 Spanish Defense Minister Narcís Serra (1988) argued his country would contribute to NATO’s security by increasing the role of Spanish forces, as opposed to just providing military bases for the United States. U.S. defense officials, however, did not share this view. For instance, John J. Maresca, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO policy, testified that the United States doubted that Spain could take responsibility for the 401st TFW since Spanish F-​18s would be committed to Spanish national defense.14 Tidal W. McCoy, Assistance Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, explained that the sophistication of its fighter aircraft and reinforcement capabilities provided by its additional troop numbers were U.S.  privileges that Spanish armed forces lacked.15 In short, the United States did not acknowledge that upgrading the Spanish Air Force could make up for reduced security resulting from the withdrawal of the 401st TFW. 4.3.3  U.S. domestic constraints In the meantime, the U.S. government had to deal with pressure from Congress regarding the future of the Torrejón base. The government presumed the possibility and necessity of the relocation of Torrejón. As evidence, in February and March 1987, State Secretary Shultz and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Maresca argued that if U.S. forces had to leave Torrejón, they should be relocated somewhere else. However, Capitol Hill opposed the idea of the United States unilaterally investing the federal budget into the Torrejón relocation. The U.S. Congress prohibited the appropriation of military construction funds for a relocation of the 401st TFW to another country. In July 1987, for the first time, Congress explicitly stated that NATO should take responsibility for any construction costs associated with the relocation from Torrejón. U.S.  domestic opposition stemmed from frustrations that Congress had regarding U.S. allies in Europe. Some American policymakers had pointed out the disproportionate contributions made by NATO members throughout the 1980s. From the U.S. perspective, factors such as the cost of U.S. force deployment in

Defending NATO’s southern flank  65 Europe; its impact on the U.S.’s balance of payments; other NATO members’ reluctance to provide troops; and other aggregate defense costs, including for both conventional and strategic forces, meant that the United States was paying more than its fair share (Douglas, 2008, p.  34). There were critical views in Capitol Hill about the U.S.’s European allies, as some members of Congress proposed that the United States should recall its forces from Europe unless other NATO members increased their defense budgets (Douglas, 2008, pp.  34–​36; Duke, 1993, pp. 78–​79). Hoping that NATO would pay its fair share, Congress considered it appropriate for NATO to fund the relocation of the base.

4.4  Solving the problem through a regional security framework 4.4.1  The jeopardized U.S. presence in Spain Sixteen months of base negotiations neared an end on 10 November 1987 when Spain notified the United States that it would not renew the existing base agreement. Spain did so because both sides could not reach a compromise. At the seventh round of negotiations in early November 1987, when the United States offered a withdrawal of only one of the three fighter squadrons based in Torrejón, Spain was dissatisfied and criticized the suggestion for making no difference in terms of the usage of Torrejón (Heiberg, 2018, p. 184). A Spanish high official explained to The New York Times that three fighter squadrons were deployed in Spain, Italy and Turkey in rotation, and one squadron of 24 planes were constantly stationed at Torrejón; thus, the U.S. compromise was “something short of that” (Delaney, 1987a). Spain’s notification of its conditions had set a deadline. Unless a new base agreement was signed by May 1988, U.S. forces would have to leave Spain within a year. In other words, the United States would lose access not only to Torrejón, but also to another two airbases, a naval base, and nine other minor installations (Kerry, 1987). A new agreement was necessary for the United States to retain its military access to the country. Washington seemed to resign itself to Spanish demands after being notified of the impending contract termination. When Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernández-​Ordóñez told the U.S. Ambassador in Madrid Reginald Bartholomew in the beginning of December that the 401st TFW would have to leave Torrejón within three years, Bartholomew promptly informed State Secretary Shultz. On 7 January 1988, Bartholomew delivered a message from Washington to Fernández-​ Ordóñez that “the United States would seek a new location for the TFW, and if unable to do so, it would start dismantling it” (Heiberg, 2018, p. 185). The United States and Spain announced a preliminary agreement on 15 January that 72 F-​16s based at Torrejón would be removed within three years of the effective date of a new agreement (Jeffrey Smith and Ottaway, 1988). 4.4.2  In search of a replacement of Torrejón Based on its assessment of the threats and military balance present in southern Europe, the United States considered it critical to maintain the 401st TFW in the

66  Shino Hateruma region. Disbanding or recalling it to the continental United States (CONUS16) would have a negative effect on regional security. Strategically, it would mean a lessening of the U.S. commitment to Western security, and a blow to NATO’s credibility. It could also mean a reduced effectiveness of deterrence efforts against the Soviet Union and arising threats from the Middle East and North Africa. Relocating the 401st TFW might create a logistical disadvantage as well. Even if the wing was deployed from CONUS to troubled areas in regions such as Europe and the Middle East, deployment would take much longer and be more costly in terms of resources.17 In order to simultaneously meet Spanish demands and maintain the wing’s combat capabilities in the region, a replacement for the Torrejón base was necessary—​and there were a couple of conditions that had to be met. First, the replacement should be located somewhere in NATO’s Southern Region. Namely, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Turkey served as suitable candidates. Second, in terms of capacity, the replacement base ought to have facilities that could accommodate F-​16s, including a runway, control and communication facilities, hangars, barracks, etc. Finally, there ought to be political circumstances that would support the installation of a replacement base. Indeed, a wide range of locations were discussed as candidates for the Torrejón replacement, though limited access to classified documents prevents us from fully understanding the U.S.  selection and negotiation processes with parties concerned. In various newspaper reports, the following countries featured as candidate hosts:  Italy, Portugal, Turkey, Morocco, Belgium and the United Kingdom (Burns and Ghiles, 1987; Hoagland, 1987; Wallace et al., 1987; The Economist, 1987). In the end, most of them were dismissed for various logistical and political reasons. A newspaper article reported that Britain and Belgium were rejected because they were considered to be too far away.18 Though both locations were so close to the frontline of NATO’s southern flank that they were both capable of reinforcing defense capabilities in the Southern Region, as well as engaging in operations beyond the Mediterranean, it is possible that they were considered weak candidates because of certain geographical responsibilities. As previously discussed, the United States insisted that the 401st TFW was an important defensive element in the region. If the wing’s base was moved to either Britain or Belgium, both of which lay in NATO’s Central Region, it might have given an impression of reduced defenses in the south. In the cases of Portugal and Turkey, suitable political circumstances were lacking. Portugal was a U.S. base host sustained by quid pro quo. The United States provided Portugal with economic and military assistance in return for basing access. Portugal had been considered a potential fallback base for the 401st TFW, but Lisbon warned that a reduction of U.S. aid would be unacceptable in terms of the U.S.  being allowed to maintain its military footprint in the host country (DeYoung, 1987). Turkey, who also expressed its dissatisfaction with the level of U.S. security assistance, was in a similar situation (Grimmett, 1986, p. 53; Gottlieb, 1987). In fact, Ankara confirmed that by the end of January 1988 it had not received a request from the United States to accept the fighter wing (Reuters,

Defending NATO’s southern flank  67 1988). For these would-​be host states, the most important consideration was how much financial aid the United States could offer in return for being allowed to rebase the wing. 4.4.3  Narrowing it down to Italy Italy was an accommodating and suitable home for the 401st TFW. After the U.S.–​Spain Joint Statement on 15 January 1988, the Italian government shared its concerns over the U.S.  presence in southern Europe. For example, Italian Defense Minister Valerio Zanone emphasized that his country would not allow the wing’s F-​16s to return to the United States.19 He repeated later that relocating the wing to Italy was the “only suitable solution” for keeping the important fighters in Europe so that they could aid the defense of NATO’s southern flank (Suro, 1988). In an interview with The Washington Post, Prime Minister Ciriaco De Mita said that Italy’s acceptance of the 401st TFW would contribute to a continued “military equilibrium” between NATO and the WTO (Ottaway, 1988). A suitable location for the replacement base was debated in the United States and Italy respectively. Both countries also engaged in bilateral consultations, such as when U.S. Defense Secretary Frank C.  Carlucci and Italian officials met in Rome on 3 February 1988 (Sciolino, 1988a). Three main locations were discussed: Comiso in Sicily, Aviano in northern Italy and Crotone on the southern edge of the Italian Peninsula. The first two housed facilities used by the U.S. military, and the third had a small civilian airport. At Comiso Air Base, the United States had stationed 4,300 personnel and 112 cruise missiles, which were subject to being withdrawn due to the conclusion of the INF Treaty (Duke, 1989, p.  201). The second candidate, Aviano Air Base, accommodated rotational deployments and exercises throughout the 1970s and 80s, and remained on stand-​by status with no units permanently stationed (Butler, 2004, pp. 23–​24; Waller, 2005, pp. 5–​6). Finally, Sant’Anna Airport near Crotone had been closed to air traffic for a while, but equipped with an operational military radar facility (Jane’s Defense Weekly [JDW], 1988a). Comiso and Aviano were frequently featured in media reports about the Torrejón issue. As early as November 1987, it was disclosed that Washington had quietly explored the possibility of Comiso serving as the base relocation site (Anderson et al., 1987). Both Comiso and Aviano were considered strong candidates (Sciolino, 1988a, 1988b). However, as was the case with other candidate host countries, political and technical factors affected the situation in Italy. The city of Comiso opposed hosting the fighter jets from Spain. Comiso citizens had formerly protested against nuclear missiles stationed at the base, making it unlikely that they would welcome dual-​capable F-​16s (Jenkins, 1988). Faced with a communist mayor’s negative attitude, the Italian administration had little hope for Comiso to accept the base relocation by February 1988 (Price, 1990, p.  205). As for Aviano, relocation seemed troublesome due to northeastern Italy’s high population density and busy air traffic (ibid.). These conditions

68  Shino Hateruma would make it difficult to expand the runway for fighter planes and to conduct sufficient drills and operations. Another apparent reason for Aviano’s rejection was its function. The 11 June 1988 issue of Jane’s Defense Weekly quoted Italian Defense Minister Zanone’s comment that a substitute for Torrejón should be located at a “nuclear-​safe” base (JDW, 1988b), but Aviano had nuclear warheads storage. His comment implied that the fighters would fly from a rear base to Aviano, load nuclear weapons, and advance toward the frontline in Turkey or Greece (ibid.). Crotone was the final candidate due to its logistical advantages. The Italian Ministry of Defense compiled the results of examining possible options and submitted a report to Defense Minister Zanone on 14 June 1988 (Nigro, 1988). On the same day, he revealed his decision to accept the Torrejón relocation to Crotone as a result of considering the proximity of military radar facilities, the feasibility of training and operations, and the compatibility in terms of civil air traffic in the area (Ibid.; Ottaway, 1988). The choice was noncontroversial, as a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (Italian lower house) voted to support the cabinet decision on 30 June (Price, 1990, p.  206). Soon after Zanone’s announcement, U.S. President Ronald Reagan expressed appreciation for Italy’s acceptance of the 72 F-​16s (Stars and Stripes Europe, 1988; Ottaway, 1988). On 4 August 1988, the Department of State explained to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that Crotone was selected as the new home of the fighters, and the United States, Italy and NATO began discussions regarding a construction program.20 4.4.4  Relying on NATO’s funds While searching for alternative sites for the Torrejón base, the United States also had to secure financial resources for the relocation since Congress had opposed unilaterally bearing the cost of the relocation. The Reagan administration sought to divide costs among NATO member states. In a letter sent to NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington in February 1988, U.S. Ambassador to NATO Alton Keel noted that the relocation of the fighter wing at Torrejón was a NATO issue and requested funding (Sciolino, 1988a). Italian Defense Minister Zanone also underlined that the issue was not just a matter of U.S.–​Italian bilateral relations, but one affecting the entire multilateral alliance.21 The Pentagon intended for existing NATO common funds to be used as potential funds for the relocation. In March, Assistant Secretary of Defense Helm indicated that a certain amount of NATO infrastructure funds could be counted on in order to lessen the impact of the relocation program on the federal expenditure.22 The United States sought to persuade the NATO member states to understand its fiscal limitations and share the burden. When Deputy Secretary of Defense William Howard Taft IV visited Europe in the beginning of May 1988, he urged allied governments to make greater contributions to the multilateral alliance (Fialka, 1988). Some member states wanted NATO to cover the relocation costs, while others were reluctant to dip into the joint account for

Defending NATO’s southern flank  69 such a purpose (Ibid.; JDW, 1988c). Hearing Taft’s briefing about congressional pressure, NATO Secretary General Carrington formed an executive working group to study how member states might share the burden (Buchan, 1988). Eventually, the defense ministers of the NATO member states reached an agreement regarding the relocation of the base on 26 May 1988. Acknowledging “the vital political and military importance” of relocating the 401st TFW to another location in Southern Europe, the NATO Defense Planning Committee formally asked Italy to provide a base for the wing and agreed on financing all of the required costs of the wing relocation through NATO’s Infrastructure Fund (NATO, 1988). This agreement was significant because the common fund was earmarked for necessary wartime installations and NATO had never used the account for the construction of a replacement airbase during peacetime (Grimmett, 1990). The State Department disclosed that the United States would contribute 27.82 percent of the Infrastructure Fund.23 The cost of constructing an alternative base in Crotone, including housing construction costs, was estimated at 827.3 million dollars in total and the United States was to contribute 230.2 million dollars (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 1989). In summary, although the United States directly negotiated with Italy in hope of persuading its ally to accept a redeployment of the 401st TFW based at Torrejón, the sending state shifted responsibility toward NATO to take care of the issue officially. As a result, NATO played a principal role in resolving the issue by formally asking Italy to accommodate the wing from Spain and by financing the costs of the move. After the United States agreed to withdraw from the Torrejón base in January 1988, it took another eleven months for the United States and Spain to reach a final conclusion. The two countries negotiated on the remaining critical issue of nuclear weapons (Heiberg, 2018, p. 187). U.S. Ambassador to Spain Reginald Bartholomew and Spanish chief negotiator Máximo Cajal signed the Treaty of Friendship, Defense and Cooperation on 1 December 1988. The new agreement included that the United States would return the Torrejón base by 1992; provide no aid to Spain; be allowed to use the remaining three bases—​Rota, Zaragoza and Moron—​as well as nine communication posts; and that Spain would uphold U.S. access to the remaining three bases and its policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons.24

4.5  Conclusion The United States agreed to withdraw its forces from the Torrejón base, even though the Soviet threat still existed in southern Europe and the U.S. concession to Spain might have resulted in a curtailing of U.S. access to other host countries. What were the conditions that led the United States to accept the abandonment of the base? In order to answer this question, this chapter clarifies the link between democratization of the hosting state and base closure as one end on the spectrum of base contestation/​politicization outcomes. It also highlights the conditions that appeared in the link:  U.S.  assessment of regional security,

newgenrtpdf

70  Shino Hateruma

Figure 4.1 Map of U.S. bases in Spain. Source:  Library of Congress, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division and Grimmett, R.  F. (1977). United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean:  Report Prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., p. 14.

Defending NATO’s southern flank  71 evaluation of the contested base and a search for the base relocation site. The study findings are summarized as follows. First, regarding the base contestation that took place in Spain, the United States did not immediately and unconditionally accommodate the host’s demands, and during negotiations proposed only minor concessions, such as Torrejón’s relocation within the host country and a partial force withdrawal. This was because the sending state regarded the airbase as necessary for the defense of southern Europe, where the Soviet threat still lingered. U.S. defense and state secretaries as well as Pentagon high officials emphasized the importance of the base to Spanish negotiators, the press, and before Congress until a U.S.–​Spanish agreement was reached in December 1988. Second, the United States secured a replacement for Torrejón that would allow it to retain its military capabilities in southern Europe, and then reached a final agreement with Spain to return the contested base. The United States obtained Italy’s preliminary approval of hosting the 401st TFW in February 1988. Italy considered possible locations and decided in June on Crotone, in southern Italy, as the new home of the fighters. Relocating to southern Europe was a feasible option in terms of proximity to Soviet and other out-​of-​NATO area threats, base functions and capacities that had to be maintained, and Italy’s political support. Third, it was notable that the United States translated the Spanish base issue as NATO’s responsibility and persuaded NATO members to fund the relocation from Spain to Italy. Relying on regional frameworks enabled the United States to maintain its military presence and meet regional security imperatives in southern Europe, at the same time, evading the domestic pressure of budgetary constraints. The case of the U.S.–​Spain base negotiations in the 1980s did not conclude as a result of bilateral relations. Rather, the United States resorted to the multilateral security institution that is NATO in order to solve the base problem. The third finding signifies an important implication for base politics. Considering that the U.S. military presence has never been politicized in Spain since the 1988 agreement and that the United States was able to maintain its force level in southern Europe (Cooley and Hopkin, 2010), the fact that the United States was able to rely on NATO for assistance with the base issue was a benefit to the sending state. Availability of a regional security framework was a critical condition for the United States to be able to forego the valuable but contested base. It made it possible for the sending state to relinquish the base at the end of the Cold War. Thus, research on base politics may benefit from more attention to how sending states use or rely on regional institutions and other alliances as a condition of overseas base closure.

Notes 1 For deeper analysis on pre-​agreement situations and conditions of the 1953 agreements, refer to Duke (1989, pp. 252–​254) and Sandars (2000, pp. 243–​247).

72  Shino Hateruma 2 The number of U.S.  military personnel in Spain was retrieved from the Defense Manpower Data Center, “DoD Personnel, Workforce Reports & Publications,” www. dmdc.osd.mil/​appj/​dwp/​dwp_​reports.jsp. Last accessed: 26 February 2020. 3 The U.S.–​Spain defense agreement, which was renewed in July 1982, just about a month after Spain officially became a member of NATO, stated that Spain granted the United States basing access. In other words, the military installations provided for the United States were not recognized as NATO facilities. See the second clause of Article 2, Agreement on Friendship, Defense and Cooperation Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, signed 2 July 1982. https://​photos. state.gov/​libraries/​164311/​tratados_​bilaterales/​Defense%20TIAS%2010589.pdf. Last accessed: 25 February 2020. 4 Flexible Response strategy aimed to deter Soviet incursion and war by a triad of forces:  conventional forces, short and intermediate range nuclear forces, and strategic nuclear forces. Alliance and Defense Capabilities in Europe: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Conventional Forces and Alliance Defense, the Senate Committee on Armed Services. 4 August 1987. (Statement of Major General Norman C.  Wood, Director of the Intelligence, U.S. European Command), p. 5. 5 “NATO and Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons: Defense of Southern Region,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​natohq/​declassified_​138256. htm. Last accessed: 26 February 2020. 6 Military Construction Appropriations, FY88: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations. 1 April 1987. (Statement of Tidal W. McCoy, Assistant Sec, Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Installations, Air Force Department), p. 455. 7 Military Construction Appropriations for 1988 Part 5: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations. 1 April 1987. (Statement of James F. Boatright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Installations, Environment and Safety, Air Force Department), p. 553. 8 Review of U.S. Foreign and National Security Policy:  Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 2 February 1987. (Statement of George P.  Shultz, Secretary of the State Department), pp. 62–​63. 9 Military Construction Appropriations, FY88:  Hearings before the Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations, 1 April 1987. (Statement of Tidal W. McCoy, Assistant Secretary of the Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Installations, Air Force Department), p. 456. 10 Developments in Europe, Feb. 1988: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. 9 February 1988. (Statement of Rozanne L.  Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, State Department), p. 31. 11 Military Construction Appropriations for 1989:  Hearings before the Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations, the House Committee on Appropriation. 1 March 1988. (Statement of Robert W. Helm, Assistant Secretary, Comptroller, Department of Defense), p. 415. 12 Platt (1987, p.  167) states that the preliminary talks were held on 10 July 1986. Heiberg (2018, p. 177) points out that it was 10 June 1986 when the delegations of the two countries met for the first official round of negotiations. In the meeting, it became clear to the Spanish side that “Washington would only agree to a ten percent cut in the aircraft stationed at Torrejón.” 13 For defense policy shift and reforms under the PSOE administration, see Viñas (1988, pp. 175–​186).

Defending NATO’s southern flank  73 14 Military Construction Appropriations for 1988:  Hearing before the Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations, the House Committee on Appropriations. 19 March 1987. (Statement of John J.  Maresca, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the European and NATO Policy, Office of Assistant Secretary, International Security Policy, Department of Defense), p. 250. 15 Military Construction Appropriations, FY88:  Hearings before the Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations, 1 April 1987. (Statement of Tidal W.  McCoy, Assistant Secretary, Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Installations, Air Force Department), p. 456. 16 According to the DoD dictionary, CONUS indicates U.S.  territory, including the adjacent territorial waters, located within North America, between Canada and Mexico. See:  www.jcs.mil/​Portals/​36/​Documents/​Doctrine/​pubs/​dictionary.pdf. (Accessed: 27 March 2020). 17 Grimmett refers to an estimate that it would take eight to ten days for the 401st to redeploy from CONUS to Europe (1990, p. 5). Another source offers a calculation according to which a wing of three squadrons flying from CONUS to the Middle East would require approximately 90 refueling sorties and 40 transport sorties (Jackson, 1991, pp. 30–​31). 18 The Sunday Times of 17 January 1988 reported so without clearly indicating the source (Milligan and Witherow 1988). According to Duke (1989, p. 20), a ground-​launched cruise missile unit was stationed at Florennes Air Base in Belgium. The base was to be closed to comply with the INF Treaty. Soon after the treaty was signed, the Belgian defense minister suggested the F-​16s be redeployed to Florennes. 19 Italy. Defense Committee of the House of Representatives. 10th Legislature 4th Permanent Commission, 1988. www.camera.it/​_​dati/​leg10/​lavori/​Bollet/​19880 202_​00_​02.pdf. Last accessed: 18 February 2020. 20 Developments in Europe, August 1988: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 4 August 1988. (Supplemental Questions Submitted by the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East to the State Dept. and Responses Thereto), p. 53. 21 Italy. Defense Committee of the House of Representatives. 10th Legislature 4th Permanent Commission, 1988. www.camera.it/​_​dati/​leg10/​lavori/​Bollet/​ 19880202_​00_​02.pdf. Last accessed: 18 February 2020. 22 Military Construction Appropriations for 1989:  Hearing before the Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations, the House Committee on Appropriations. 1 March 1988. (Statement of Robert W. Helm, Assistant Secretary, Comptroller, Department of Defense), p. 28. 23 Developments in Europe, August 1988: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 4 August 1988. (Supplemental questions submitted by the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East to the State Department and responses thereto), p. 54. 24 Agreement of Defense Cooperation between the U.S.A. and the Kingdom of Spain with Annexes and Notes signed on 1 December 1988, Hein Online. Last accessed:  27 March 2020.

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Defending NATO’s southern flank  75 Harkavy, R. E. (1989). Bases Abroad:  The Global Foreign Military Presence. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Heiberg, M. (2018). U.S.-​Spanish Relations after Franco, 1975–​1989: The Will of the Weak. Lanham: Lexington Books. Hoagland, J. (1987). “Spain Tells U.S.  to Remove F16s,” The Washington Post, 24 December, p. A1. Jackson, R. E. (1991). Relocating the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing. Available from: https://​ apps.dtic.mil/​dtic/​tr/​fulltext/​u2/​a281968.pdf. (Accessed 4 March 2020). Jane’s Defense Weekly (1988a). “Italian Site Confirmed as New USAF Fighter Wing Base,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 25 June. —​—​—​(1988b). “Italy Approves US Plans for F-​16s,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 11 June. —​—​—​(1988c). “Burden-​sharing Prime Topic for NATO Talks,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 28 May. Jenkins, L. (1988). “Italy Considers Accepting U.S. F16s from Spain,” The Washington Post, 2 February, p. A10. Jeffrey Smith, R. and Ottaway, D. B. (1988). “U.S. to Pull Fighter Jets from Spain,” The Washington Post, 15 January, p. A1, A28. Kawana, S. (2012). Base Politics: The Origins of the Post War U.S. Overseas Bases Expansion Policy (Kichi no Seijigaku:  Sengo Beikoku no Kaigai Kichi Kakudai Seisaku). Tokyo: Hakutō Shobō (In Japanese). Kerry, F. (1987). “Spain Formally Tells U.S. It Will Not Extend Defense Pact,” Reuters, 10 November. La Repubblica (1987). “Gonzalez sfida gli USA,” La Repubblica, 17 March. Available from: https://​ricerca.repubblica.it/​repubblica/​archivio/​repubblica/​1987/​03/​17/​ gonzalez-​sfida-​gli-​usa.html. (Accessed 7 March 2020). Lostumbo, M. J., McNerney, M. J., Peltz, E., Eaton, D., Frelinger, D. R., Greenfield, V. A., Halliday, J., Mills, P., Nardulli, B. R., Pettyjohn, S. L., Sollinger, J. M., and Worman, S. M. (2013). Overseas Basing of U.S. Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. Milligan, S. and Witherow, J. (1988). “Sicily Site for Evicted U.S. Fighter Jets,” The Sunday Times, 17 January. NATO (1988). “Final Communiqué of the NATO Defense Planning Committee,” NATO Online library. Available from:  www.nato.int/​docu/​comm/​49–​95/​c880527a.htm. (Accessed 21 February 2020). Nigro, V. (1988). “Per gli F-​16 la base sara’ Crotone,” La Repubblica, 15 June. Available from:  https://​ricerca.repubblica.it/​repubblica/​archivio/​repubblica/​1988/​06/​15/​ per-​gli-​16-​la-​base-​sara-​crotone.html. (Accessed 7 March 2020). Ottaway, D. B. (1987). “Foreign Aid Cuts, Hostility of Hosts Seen as Perils to U.S. Bases Abroad,” The Washington Post, 24 November, p. A11. —​—​—​(1988). “Italy to Base Evicted U.S. F16 Wing in Calabria,” The Washington Post, 15 June, p. A28. Pick, H. and Ellman, P. (1986). “Spain Issues Bases Ultimatum,” The Guardian, 12 December, p. 8. Platt, A. (1987). “NATO’s Southern Flank: A Troubled Region.” In Blechman, B. E. and Luttwak, E. N. (eds.), Global Security: A Review of Strategic and Economic Issues (pp. 164–​185). Boulder: Westview Press. Price, E. D. (1990). “The Decision to Provide a Base for US F-​16s and Italy’s Role in NATO,” Italian Politics, 4, pp. 196–​211.

76  Shino Hateruma Sanchez-​Gijon, A. (1988). “On Spain, NATO and Democracy.” In Stuart, D. T. (ed.), Politics and Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance (pp. 96–​116). Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Sandars, C.T. (2000). America’s Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sciolino, E. (1988a). “U.S. Asks Italy to Take F-​16 Jets that Spain Has Ordered Removed,” The New York Times, 4 February, p. A6. —​—​—​(1988b). “The Sun May Set on More and More U.S. Bases Abroad,” The New York Times, 24 January, p. A2. Serra, N. (1988). “Spain, NATO and Western Security.” In O’Neill, R. (ed.), Prospects for Security in the Mediterranean (pp. 3–​13). London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. Stars and Stripes Europe (1988). “Reagan Praises Italy’s Willingness to Consider Taking F-​16s from Spain,” Stars and Stripes Europe, 15 June, p. 4. Stuart, D. T. (1989). “Continuity and Change in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance.” In Golden, J. R. (ed.), NATO at Forty: Change, Continuity, & Prospects (pp. 74–​97). Boulder: Westview Press. Suro, R. (1988). “Italian Cabinet Accepts NATO F-​16s,” The New York Times, 5 June, p. 3. Reuters (1988). “Turkey Says No U.S. Request on F-​16s Leaving Spain,” Reuters, 27 January. U.S. Department of Defense (1986). Soviet Military Power 1986. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. —​—​—​ (1987). Soviet Military Power 1987. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. —​—​—​ (1988). Soviet Military Power:  An Assessment of the Threat, 1988. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. —​—​—​ (1989). Soviet Military Power: Prospects for Change, 1989. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. U.S. Government Accountability Office (1989). Overseas Basing:  Costs of Relocating the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing:  Report to the Chairman Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate. Available from: www.gao.gov/​assets/​220/​ 211640.pdf. (Accessed 23 February 2020). Viñas, A. (1988). “Spain and NATO:  Internal Debate and External Challenges.” In Chipman, J. (ed.), NATO’s Southern Allies Internal and External Challenges (pp. 140–​ 194). London: Routledge. —​ —​ —​(2003). “Negotiating the U.S.-​ Spanish Agreements, 1953–​ 1988:  A Spanish Perspective,” Jean Monnet/​Robert Schuman Paper Series, 3(7). Wallace, J., Chesnoff, R. Z., and Kaylor, R. (1987). “When the Stepping Stones of World Power are Rocky Bases,” U.S. News & World Report, 23 November, p. 30. Waller, N. A. (2005). Fifty Years of Friendship and Cooperation: A History of Aviano Air Base 1955–​2005. Office of History, Headquarters, 31st Fighter Wing, United States Air Forces in Europe, Aviano Air Base, Italy. Available from: www.aviano.af.mil/​Portals/​ 1/​documents/​Aviano%20History%2050th%20Anniversary-​English.pdf?ver=2016-​09-​ 23-​052357-​290. (Accessed 4 March 2020). Weinberger, C. W. (1987). Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1988. Available from:  https://​history.defense.gov/​Portals/​70/​Documents/​annual_​reports/​1988_​ DoD_​AR.pdf?ver=2014-​06-​24-​151204-​840. (Accessed 26 February 2020). Whitaker, A. P. (1961). Spain and Defense of the West: Ally and Liability. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

5  Domestic environmental policy and Status of Forces Agreement U.S. military presence and new water pollution risk in Germany Keisuke Mori

5.1  Purpose and scope This chapter analyzes the political process at the point where the presence of stationed foreign troops and the environmental laws of the host country intersect. Specifically, it is an analysis of the legislative regulation process of per-​and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), triggered by water pollution caused by the spillage of PFAS and related chemicals from base facility areas to the surrounding areas in Germany. In particular, this study will focus on the process of regulation of perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (PFOS). The main object of this study is the federal state Rhineland-​Palatinate (RLP), which is located in the west of Germany and borders with France, Luxembourg, and Belgium. It is a state where NATO soldiers (French troops at the end of World War II, and later U.S. troops) have historically been stationed. RLP is also noteworthy because it is still one of the regions in the German Federation where the U.S. military is most concentrated, even after a major reduction of U.S. military bases after the end of the Cold War in Europe. The significance of this paper is to supplement analyses in the field of international relations by identifying and approaching sociological problems relevant for the study of base politics. 5.1.1  Regulation process of organic fluorine compounds “PFAS” is a generic name that refers to a chemical substance group consisting of more than 3,000 similar substances, including PFOA and PFOS. In recent years, measures to regulate PFOA and PFOS have been implemented because, among PFAS, they are particularly dangerous to the human body and the environment. To date, PFOA and PFOS have been widely used in the chemical industry as catalysts or as waterproof/​water-​repellent coating agents, due to their water-​ insoluble properties and surfactant characteristics. They have also been used as fire extinguishing foam for containing fires in chemical factories, as well as fires caused by aviation fuel that cannot be extinguished with water. This paper focuses on PFAS pollution that originated in U.S. military bases due to fire drills and firefighting and affected the surrounding areas.

78  Keisuke Mori One might ask why we should pay attention to these substances at all. This is because PFAS are environmental pollutants that do not decompose easily in the natural environment and accumulate in the body of wild animals and humans, which is why they have become a social problem in Germany and Europe. In particular, the European Commission began strict regulation of PFOA and PFOS at the EU level in the 2000s. Since the German Federation views regulations regarding the allowed substance levels and the management of production determined by the EU as norms that need to be observed and followed in the country, the regulation of these harmful substances is also gradually being advanced in Germany. Below, I shall shed light on this process in relation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agreement (NATO SOFA) and its supplementary agreement for Germany. 5.1.2  Administrative involvement in the regulatory process at the federal level This chapter also focuses on another point, namely the relationship between environmental laws and SOFA. Regarding the environmental protection of military facility areas where foreign troops are stationed in Germany, it has often been pointed out in previous research that the amendment to the supplementary agreement to NATO SOFA in 1993 strengthened the powers of the German federal government concerning environmental protection in relation to the stationed foreign forces (Articles 53 and 54) (Honma, 2004). On the other hand, if we turn our attention to the actual practice following the revision of the supplementary agreement of SOFA from the perspective of implementing laws, the question is: how can domestic laws be applied to the PFAS pollution problem? To answer this question, it is necessary to consider the actual political and administrative processes concerning the pollution issue. I believe that the perspective that focuses on domestic environmental issues surrounding foreign military bases in host countries will offer a new independent variable to the study of base politics systems, which I shall touch upon below. 5.1.3  Past research, issues with it, and the positioning of the present study The study of troop stationing, including the global deployment of U.S.  military bases, is a specialty niche, not only in the field of political science but also in sociology. The main reason for this is that it contains various dimensions that cannot be fully clarified by a single academic field or by looking at a single area of life (international relations, domestic politics, economy, environment, population migration, legal norms and practices, etc.). In addition, there has been a delay in the development of that discipline due to a lack of academic infrastructure for experts from different fields to share their respective epistemological assumptions. However, since the 2000s, there has been an increase in interdisciplinary research regarding military bases, mainly in the English-​speaking world (Calder, 2007; Davis, 2015; Lutz ed., 2009; Yeo, 2011). In Japan, Satoshi Kawana and Shiro

U.S. military presence in Germany  79 Sato have initiated this type of study (Kawana and Sato, 2018). There is now, therefore, a growing momentum for systematically discussing the study of the stationing of troops, which, in the past, tended to remain a very specialized area. If we are to position our study in accordance with the four categories of social scientific research on base politics proposed by Kawana, which are said to be systematic and in a state of mutual tension (system research, peace studies, historical research and strategy theory), we may say that this chapter does not belong to the theory of strategy or peace studies, which tend to be oriented toward a priori political norms (Kawana, 2018, pp.  24–​26). Rather, we may say that it belongs to the area between system research of base networks and historical research. While a certain degree of path-​dependent development in base politics is assumed in historical research, at the same time, if we think of the establishment and development of a base network as a result of a system with many actors functioning as independent variables, we can view “the emergence of base politics” as a dependent variable. As mentioned at the beginning, this paper analyzes the political process at the point where the presence of foreign troops and the environmental laws of the host country intersect. Thus, I wish to look not only at the stakeholder’s political decisions regarding security policy in the international political arena but also at how the environmental regulation processes at the EU/​ Germany level have developed politically in conjunction with what Kawana calls the “immediate limiting factors” (ibid.) experienced by local actors in Germany. In the fields of sociology and social geography, studies on environmental issues related to military bases have accumulated (e.g., Asai, 2009; Davis, 2015; Lutz, 2009; Vine, 2015). The environmental issues are diverse and include collateral damage associated with the functioning of military bases, such as noise, loss of human life and injury, soil pollution, water resource pollution, and aircraft crashes. The stationing of foreign troops in host countries is regulated by SOFA, but analysis of water pollution caused by the presence of such troops to the surrounding areas has so far been overlooked. The role of this paper is to compensate for that shortcoming. Germany, the same as Japan and Italy, can be said to belong to the category of countries that in the typology of base politics presented by Kent E.  Calder conduct “compensation politics” (Calder, 2008, pp. 129–​130). The main goal of such politics is to appease and compensate those who heed the request of the host nation’s government to accept the presence of a foreign military and support it. Among previous studies on Germany and the Status of Forces Agreement with the U.S., there are those that have examined the character of the status agreement and the supplementary agreement, and also conducted a detailed analysis of the institutional history of that SOFA (Deiseroth, 1986; Honma, 2004; Koch, 2012; Matsuura, 2003; Schommer, 2005; Zinn-​Thomas, 2010). In recent years, German cases have been addressed and compiled under the framework of Japan–​ German comparative research on SOFAs (Okinawa Prefecture, 2019; Japan Federation of Bar Associations, 2018). On the other hand, important studies on the structural causality in base politics using the method of international comparison have been conducted (Cooley, 2008; Lutz, 2009; Sanders, 2000;

80  Keisuke Mori Yeo, 2011). Although the present study takes into account the basic postulates of the strand of research on international law, it looks at the political process surrounding PFAS pollution coming from military facilities at the level of legal practice or the operation of law, and not at the level of comparison of legal norms. On the other hand, while aiming to contribute to comparative research in the future, this chapter also offers a detailed, pioneering analysis of a close interaction between a status of forces agreement and the domestic laws of a host country in relation to the removal of PFAS pollution, which is a new phenomenon that is not confined only to Germany. 5.1.4  Method and chapter structure This chapter first reconstructs the political process concerning the PFAS (including PFOA/​PFOS) pollution on the administrative, organizational level using administrative documents (German federal parliament/​ administrative agency, state parliament/​administrative agency). In the following section, the process of the regulation of PFAS will be considered at the EU/​Germany and RLP level. Next, the actual PFAS pollution problem and the countermeasures in RLP will be discussed. In particular, environmental pollution in the area surrounding the currently operating U.S. Air Force Spangdahlem Base, and the conflict between the federal, the state and local governments regarding it will be discussed. Finally, the paper concludes by touching on future prospects and challenges.

5.2  Regulation of PFOA/​PFOS on the EU and German federal levels 5.2.1  Overview of PFAS production history PFAS have been produced in various forms for industrial purposes since the mid-​ twentieth century. PFAS exist very stably without decomposing in nature and have accumulated in various environments. Let us take a brief look at the production history of PFOA and PFOS, which are subcategories of PFAS, and which began to be strictly regulated from the early 2000s. The production of PFOA started in the 1940s. It was used as a protective coating agent in the mid-​1950s. PFOS, on the other hand, began to be produced in the 1940s. Similar to PFOA, initially it was used to develop products with corrosion and water-​resistance characteristics in the 1950s, and then, from the 1960s, came to be mainly used as a fire extinguishing foam. Production restrictions on both PFOA and PFOS have been implemented in the United States since the 2000s. In 2000, 3M, a major producer in the industry which made fluorinated organic compounds containing substances related to PFOS, PFOA and PFHxS (perfluorohexanesulfonic acid), decided to withdraw from the production of these chemicals by 2008 due to the significant impact they had on the human body and the environment (Interstate Technology and Regulatory Council, 2017).

U.S. military presence in Germany  81 Regarding the effects on the human body, in the 1970s reports emerged that PFAS had been found in the blood of employees exposed to them at work, and by the 1990s it was also detected in the blood of a larger segment of general population. However, it was only in the early 2000s that this situation began to be widely recorded and data gathered extensively, even though more than fifty years had passed since the start of their production. The turning point came when the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Substances (PoP Convention) was signed in 2001. The convention was signed with the aim of reducing and prohibiting the production, use and release of major persistent organic substances (PoPs) that are highly accumulative, mobile, difficult to decompose and harmful (Japanese Ministry of the Environment, 2019a; ITRC, 2017, p. 3). 5.2.2  PFOS/​PFOA regulations in the EU—​from the early 2000s The regulation of PFOS was first initiated by the European Commission in 2004. The regulation of production, use and sales of PFOS in the EU started under this guideline. In 2007, the new EU regulation on chemicals, namely the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) came into effect and the newly established European Chemicals Agency started working.1 In 2008, PFOS regulations were tightened and in the German Federation, too, guidelines regarding the distribution of PFOS, as well as health guidelines concerning its presence in drinking water were set. PFOS was registered among PoPs in Annex B (chemicals whose production, use, import and export should be restricted) at the fourth meeting of the PoP Convention in 2009. Since June 2011, the usage of substances containing 0.001 percent or more of PFOS was banned within the EU. In 2016, the European Commission decided to ban the production of PFOS in the EU (Landesamt für Umwelt Rheinland-​Pfalz, 2017, p.  12). In 2013, PFOA was classified as a PoP and added to Annex A  of the PoP Convention in 2019 (substances that should not be manufactured, used, imported or exported) (Japanese Ministry of the Environment, 2019b). As mentioned above, at the EU level, the regulation has consistently been tightened since the 2000s. 5.2.3  Regulatory process in Rhineland-​Palatinate, 2007–​Present In RLP, the PFAS regulation target was set by the state Ministry of Environment in 2007 in accordance with the pollution levels defined in the European Parliament, with the same guidelines being transferred to the German law (Landtag Rheinland-​ Pfalz, 2018). Particularly attracting attention as a cause of environmental pollution was aqueous film-​forming foam which contains PFAS, that is, water and land pollution caused by firefighting foam. Fire extinguishing foams have been used for public firefighting missions (at airports, smelters and chemical factories) and for local firefighting tasks. In late March 2011, the Green Party made a big leap in the state election (15.1 percent of votes, up by 10.8 percent compared to the previous election),

82  Keisuke Mori and its member Ulrike Höfken was elected the RLP Minister of Environment. With this as a turning point, the same year the state Ministry of Environment started PFAS soil and water quality surveys in suspected pollution areas and monitoring throughout the state. As a result of the surveys, instances of pollution that clearly exceeded German guideline values were found, and particularly high levels were detected around airfields and firefighting training fields. For that reason, in October 2014, Höfken established an administrative group that worked on PFAS and carried out water quality surveys in a concentrated manner in 2015–​ 2016. The group was tasked with conducting monitoring through surface and groundwater basic measurement programs throughout the state, identifying sources of pollution and implementing the necessary protection or decontamination measures (ibid., p. 5). Water pollution assessments began with the participation of federal and U.S.  military representatives, local governments, environmental administration and experts (Deutscher Bundestag, 2015, p. 4). The surveys revealed that soil and water pollution was particularly concentrated in NATO and U.S.  military bases (including the sites of former bases) and waters and watercourses in wider areas surrounding the bases (SGD Nord Rheinland-​Pfalz, 2016). 5.2.4  Federal government’s response to PFAS pollution and its legal basis The German federal government first became aware of PFAS pollution related to military bases in 2012, when PFAS contamination was detected in and around federal military facilities in Bavaria. The government clarified its response to the PFAS contamination in base areas in its answers to the questions posed by the Green Party (Bündnis 90/​Die Grünen) and the Left Party (Die Linke) in the federal parliament. The situation regarding the pollution related to military facilities in the federation as a whole is as follows. The German federal army, together with the environmental administration of each region, conducted a survey of 125 facilities throughout the country that were suspected of being contaminated—11 were found to be contaminated. In addition, 14 out of 24 military facility areas owned and controlled by the Federal Real Estate Agency, Bundesanstalt für Immobilienaufgaben (BImA), which has the authority over military facility areas, were confirmed as contaminated. Five of these are military facilities in the southern and western parts of Germany that are still being used2 (U.S. Air Force bases Ramstein and Spangdahlem, U.S. Army Katterbach Base, as well as Grafenwöhr and Hohenfels Training Areas) (Deutscher Bundestag, 2019a, pp.1–​2, 2019b). Two of the facilities are located in the state of Rhineland-​Palatinate (Ramstein and Spangdahlem). The German Federation takes the following position with regard to the responsibilities of the users of facility areas that are allowed for use based on international law (SOFA): With regard to facility areas that are allowed for use by foreign troops, in light of the conclusion of international law, their users (U.S.  or NATO)

U.S. military presence in Germany  83 are responsible for carrying out the necessary exploration and restoration measures while complying with German federal environmental laws. Monitoring for compliance with environmental laws is the responsibility of the federal state agency and local government responsible for managing the facility area. The access rights of the government in charge concluded under international law are guaranteed, and the relevant administrative body can perform the work within the facility area provided. (Deutscher Bundestag, 2019b, p. 2) Due to this, the decontamination effort will be led by BImA and state environmental administrations.3 Also, based on the principle of the responsibility of the facility area user, BImA does not set a cap on the cost of decontamination within the facility area (ibid., p. 8). Furthermore, the extension of the survey to the areas surrounding military facility areas is provided for those cases in which the pollutant moves across the boundary of the facility area through groundwater or drainage, or a need arises for the administrative control regarding it. However, when it comes to groundwater contamination, since groundwater is not private property, such contamination does not fall into the category of private property rights violation (ibid., pp. 7–​9). How can, then, pollution caused by PFAS that leaked from a military base to the surrounding area be cleaned up within the current relationship between NATO SOFA, which falls under the international law, its supplementary agreement and the domestic environmental law? In the following section I examine this issue by focusing on the contamination of Spangdahlem Air Base in RLP.4

5.3  Overlap between PFOS/​PFOA pollution and SOFA 5.3.1  Opinion of the Federal Parliament Bureau of Investigation: The case of the contamination of U.S. Spangdahlem Air Base Before considering the political and administrative procedures after the discovery of pollution, let us first examine how the German Federal Parliament Bureau of Investigation (Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages) views the PFAS pollution problem within the structure of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and the supplementary agreement. I  choose this approach because the bureau is an independent research organization that reports on various issues at the request of parliament members, and its report is useful for a structural understanding of the case. Since this is a case of contamination at a U.S. base, the NATO SOFA is legally relevant.5 The bureau specifically examined how the SOFA could be applied to the decontamination of the surrounding areas polluted by substances originating from Spangdahlem Airbase. The bureau concluded in its report that problems in dealing with the pollution in Spangdahlem and the surrounding areas had emerged as a consequence of “legal tensions between environmental protection, national security and sovereign immunity” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016a). But, what concretely was the problem?

84  Keisuke Mori 5.3.2  Issues related to the damages to “third parties,” i.e., parties other than the signatory countries As is well known in customary international law, foreign troops stationed in a base (in this case belonging to the United States) are regarded as an organization of the sending country, and thus enjoy sovereign exemption. Due to the principles of customary international law, predetermined treaty legislation is required to establish the status of the stationed forces in the host country. NATO SOFA exists for this purpose—​it determines the extent to which the stationed forces are legally bound by the host country laws (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016a). It states in Article 2 that the stationed foreign troops must comply with the German law: It is the duty of a force and its civilian component and the members thereof, as well as their dependents, to respect the law of the receiving state, and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of the present agreement, and, in particular, from any political activity in the receiving state. It is also the duty of the sending state to take necessary of measures to that end. (NATO, 2009) Paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 8 refer to “damages between Contracting Parties” (treaty signatory countries), while paragraphs 5 and 6 address “damages to third parties.” Paragraph 6 deals with damages arising out of acts or omissions of “members of a force and civilian component not done in the performance of official duties,” whereas paragraph 9 refers to acts and omissions of “members of a force and civilian component done in the performance of official duties.”6 Paragraphs 1 to 4, which address the issue of damages between treaty countries, stipulate that the right to claim compensation will be relinquished in many instances if damage, including injury and death of military personnel, arises in the execution of official duties. Furthermore, the right to property of the signatory country will also be waived in certain cases. Water areas (Gewässer) are considered as not falling under paragraph 1 of Article 8 if the water area in question does not belong to a signatory country, but pollution affecting them may fall into the category of “damage to third parties” mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6. “Third parties” are defined in paragraph 5 of Article 8 of the agreement: Claims (other than contractual claims and those to which paragraphs 6 or 7 of this Article apply) arising out of acts or omissions of members of a force or civilian component done in the performance of official duty, or out of any other act, omission or occurrence for which a force or civilian component is legally responsible, and causing damage in the territory of the receiving state to third parties, other than any of the Contracting Parties, shall be dealt with by the receiving state in accordance with the following provisions. (NATO, 2009)

U.S. military presence in Germany  85 The Federal Parliament Bureau of Investigation, however, was of the opinion that this definition of “third parties” in paragraph 5 was ambiguous and could cause “a legal tension between environmental protection, national security and sovereign immunity.” According to the bureau, the reason for this is clearly indicated in paragraph 2 of Article 1 of SOFA, which states:  “however, that property owned by political sub-​divisions shall not be considered to be property owned by a Contracting Party within the meaning of Article 8” (ibid.). 5.3.3  Dealing with damage in the military base facility areas and the intervention by German legislative and administrative institutions On the other hand, the German federal government does not take a position in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 1 of SOFA, but clearly defines “third parties,” as can be seen in its answer to members of the German federal parliament inquiring about the costs and consequences of the presence of foreign troops in the country. The government envisaged the following three scenarios for handling damages. (1) In case state or local government (third party) property has been provided by the federal government or BImA as a military use facility area through a treaty, the compensation for damages will be paid based on an agreement with the owner, within the framework of the treaty. On the other hand, (2) regarding the adjustment of damages in facility areas that state or local governments (third parties) did not allow the stationed troops to use, the stationed forces will, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article 8 of the NATO SOFA and based on international law, reimburse the German federal government for the compensation it paid to those state and local governments. Furthermore, although this does not concern third parties, (3) damages in facility areas owned by the federal government or BImA will be considered based on the residual price of the facility area expected at the time the area is returned,7 and the cost of the damage incurred will be paid to the federal government while also taking into account the arguments of the stationed military (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014, p. 14). How are German citizens’ access rights to military facility areas regulated? Articles 53 and 53A of the supplementary agreement stipulate the duty of the stationed military to manage the licensed facility area. The provisions in paragraph 4 of the supplement Article 53 to the signed Conference Document give the federal, state, and local governments access to licensed facility areas, except for entering secret military facilities (ibid., 4). The members of the legislature form a part of the legislative organization and do not belong to the administrative organization; they can enter licensed facility areas only with the approval of the administrative organization. Article 54A of the supplementary agreement also recognizes the importance of environmental protection in relation to all activities of troops stationed in the federation and provides for compliance with federal environmental laws (Honma, 2004, p.  49). Such was the concrete process in which measures against PFAS pollution at Spangdahlem Airbase and in entire RLP were implemented.

86  Keisuke Mori 5.3.3  Measures by the federal administration and its delayed response As already mentioned, the federal administration clearly perceived state and local governments as third parties, taking a position that was contrary to that of BImA, which was pointing out the ambiguity of laws. As already noted, it was decided that, in principle, concrete surveys and remediation of soils would be carried out in agreement with BImA by the relevant government institutions responsible for the protection of soil, water supply and environment (Deutscher Bundestag, 2019b, p. 9). The federal government had already paid 330,720 EUR in 2014–​ 15 for the decontamination of waters around the Spangdahlem base. Of that total, 75 percent has been returned to Germany by the U.S. military (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016b, pp. 4–​5). Moreover, a problem at the local level arose because the measures taken by the administration in charge of BImA were behind schedule and fell short of the expectations by the locals. 5.3.4  Response by state and local governments 2017–​present The state of RLP submitted its own decontamination guidelines for the protection of soil against PFAS contamination in March 2017, which included PFOA and PFOS. It started its own investigation and monitoring of contaminated areas (Landesamt für Umwelt Rheinland-​Pfalz, 2017). In addition to the aforementioned Ramstein and Spangdahlem airbases, RLP confirmed that, as of May 2018, the following military facility areas were also contaminated:  the former U.S.–​NATO Army Bitburg Airbase, Hahn Airbase, Sembach Airbase, Mainz-​ Finthen Airbase, Zweibrücken Airbase, and Büchel Airbase, belonging to the German Federal Airforce. In addition, the state concluded that further investigation of PFAS substances other than PFOA/​PFOS and the evaluation of the results were required (Landtag Rheinland-​Pfalz, 2018). This seems to be one of the causes of the delay in pollution countermeasures by BImA. As the planned rapid removal of pollutants from Spangdahlem Airbase by BImA did not progress well, the threat to state and local residents coming from rivers and water sources in the living areas surrounding the base that had been recognized as contaminated was not removed for a while. In response to that, in May 2018, the state decided to utilize the Water Resources Act to accelerate the cleanup of environmental pollution (especially in the Liesenbach pond) caused by PFAS-​contaminated water that kept being discharged from the storm water treatment pipes at the highly contaminated Spangdahlem Airbase. Based on that law, the state submitted an administrative decree requesting immediate action from BImA. However, BImA dismissed it and filed a complaint (Anordnung), rejecting the state administration’s petition (SGD Nord Rheinland-​Pfalz, 2018). The reason for this is that BImA, despite the fact that in the affected areas there were no pollution sources other than the military bases, alleged that it was still unclear whether the pollution had originated from the bases, and that therefore it was not in charge of solving the problem (Trierischer Volksfreund, 2019a). Thus, BImA was reluctant to decontaminate the areas surrounding the bases in

U.S. military presence in Germany  87 RLP although it normally conducts decontamination in areas authorized for use by foreign troops under the NATO SOFA. Furthermore, in February 2019, the neighboring municipality Wittlich-​Land started a civil trial against BImA over PFAS damage caused by Spangdahlem Air Base. The purpose of this legal action was to prevent the spread of pollution caused by the mismanagement of time by the administrative agency (Trierischer Volksfreund, 2019b). As can be seen from the above, the decontamination of areas around the Spangdahlem base has created tensions between the federal institutions responsible for the decontamination of military facility areas that are being used and those that have been returned to Germany, and the concerned state and local governments. Furthermore, in May 2019, BImA announced a plan to remove PFAS-​contaminated soil from Spangdahlem Air Base and transfer it to former Bitburg Airfield because the collection facility for PFAS-​contaminated soil became physically full. This work proceeded in cooperation with the state authorities. Environmental activists from local green parties and the environmental group BUND criticized the plan as unclear and inadequate (Trierischer Volksfreund, 2019c). These grievances are due to the fact that water pollution is perceived by local governments as an issue affecting everyday life and a threat to residents’ health—​hence the misgivings regarding the federal administration’s reluctance to carry out prompt decontamination.

5.4  Discussion The chapter has focused on PFAS contamination in bases currently used by U.S.-​ NATO and military sites returned to Germany. Surveys concerning suspected PFAS contamination in military bases and sites, including those that belong to the German Federal Army, conducted since the first half of the 2010s have revealed a number of cases of PFAS contamination. Regarding decontamination, it came to light revealed that the process and the degree of decontamination varied between facility areas which the federal government had authorized for use by stationed foreign troops, facility areas the usage of which had been authorized through contracts concerning land owned by states and local governments, and facility areas which the state or local authorities had not allowed to be used by a foreign military. In this chapter, as a case study, I  also focused on RLP, where U.S.  military bases remain concentrated even after the Cold War. Although the decontamination of areas polluted by substances originating in Spangdahlem Air Base is being handled by the federal and state environmental administrations, that state and local governments have brought civil cases against the federal government. PFAS pollution is recognized as a threat to human life and the awareness of local residents regarding this issue has increased. However, although the number of private workers at Spangdahlem base is not so large—​it was about 600 in 2014 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014, p.  19)—​the influence of the base on the economy of the region cannot be overlooked as one of the variables that offset the awareness concerning environmental problems.8 Nonetheless, the issue of

88  Keisuke Mori health care for base employees exposed to PFAS contamination will likely emerge as another problem in the future. Awareness regarding the current state of PFAS contamination is not limited to RLP, but is also spreading to Bavaria and other federal states, as similar contamination has been discovered at German Army bases since 2019. A  federal investigation and the decontamination process are now beginning. From a larger perspective, the consequences of the PFAS pollution for non-​U.S. NATO forces will become clearer as the findings already discovered in present and former U.S. military bases become more concrete.

5.5  Conclusion and challenges ahead This chapter analyzed the environmental pollution originating from U.S. military bases, with a focus on Spangdahlem Air Base, by looking at the political process at the point where the presence of foreign troops and the environmental laws of the host country intersect. The significance of this paper was to supplement analyses in the field of international relations and political science by identifying and approaching sociological problems relevant for the study of base politics. In particular, the EU’s REACH regulation of chemical substances, which was established with the aim of protecting the environment within the union’s economic zone, appears to have offered a practical solution to the problem of base pollution. Regarding the PFAS pollution problem, the decontamination is still being handled by the German federal government as well as the states, since the countries sending military forces to Germany are legally responsible only to participate in “the adjustment of third party (environmental) damage,” as stated in paragraph 5 of Article 8 of SOFA. On the other hand, tensions between the federal government and the state and local governments are increasing as the outflow of contaminated water from the Spangdahlem base continues. Such tensions are characteristic of the political process in the German federal system, which has not thus far attracted much attention in international comparisons of SOFAs. This chapter, therefore, presents a new perspective for analyzing national political systems (centralized and federal government systems) in relation to the implementation of SOFAs. In more general terms, the main reasons for local discontent tend to be pragmatic since as Calder points out, “crime, environmental pollution are among their typical concerns, together with inadequate financial compensation, where that is a live policy issue” (Calder, 2008, p. 84). This can also be seen in cases in which the opposition to basing is emerging as a process within the administrative and parliamentary politics of environmental protection. In his study Calder took up the issue of the relocation of the Yongsan Garrison in South Korea, and the fact that in 2004 SPARK, an NGO that opposed the relocation, announced that the large German environmental organization BUND had given it a copy of the agreement between the U.S. and Germany regarding the relocation of the U.S. base Rhine-​Main in Germany. Calder pointed out the role of transnational NGOs who highlighted the gap between the U.S.  and South Korea on one hand, and the U.S.  and Germany on the other in terms of the relocation conditions (ibid., pp. 88–​90).

U.S. military presence in Germany  89 In Germany, the Green and left-​wing parties played an important political role at the federal level in carrying out environmental administration in this case. PFAS-​related contamination issues are expected to be discussed in the future in countries with different SOFAs and different environmental regulations based on domestic laws, so similar cooperation between NGOs and parliamentary parties may take place. Moreover, as in the case of environmental pollution originating from a U.S. military base in Puerto Rico, in which the U.S. Department of Defense won in the House of Representatives a partial exemption of the contamination it caused from the application of the Endangered Species Act and the Marine Mammal Protection Act (McCaffrey, 2009, p. 232), in some cases, the high costs of decontamination of military facility areas have been significantly reduced. We may conclude that if the scale of the pollution is very large, it is reasonable to expect that there will be considerations and dealings in which environmental impacts will be underestimated as a consequence of the political and economic struggles between parliaments, environmental and security administrations. Furthermore, I  would like to highlight the importance of paying attention to the operation of laws. A comparison of legal norms alone is not sufficient as it will overlook not just the way in which a law is put into practice and operated, but also the contingencies brought about by political maneuvering by many actors in parliaments and elsewhere in the political sphere before the law is finally interpreted. Therefore, attempts that end with a comparison of the legal provisions of each country’s SOFA are not meaningless, but are partial, and so is looking at the operation of laws in individual countries separately. In the future accumulate knowledge on more cases similar to that of Germany to further shed light on regulatory patterns concerning water quality protection in the context of the NATO–​SOFA and the host country’s domestic laws.

Notes 1 REACH regulations aim to greatly improve human health and environmental protection while promoting innovation and maintaining the competitiveness of the EU chemical industry. Environmental standards will be established so as to secure economic benefits within the EU. 2 Decontamination of these facilities and areas has not started yet. 3 On the other hand, environmental pollution control in the German Federal Army facility areas is done within the Army’s own waste disposal program. Also, BImA has authority over pollution control in military areas that have already been returned to Germany (i.e., old military bases). 4 Soil pollution and groundwater pollution have been discovered in a joint investigation with the U.S. military authorities at Ramstein, another U.S. military base, but comprehensive administrative documents on the course of events leading to the pollution and countermeasures are still not open to public (Landtag Rheinland-​Pfalz, 2018, 2015, and 2014). 5 When it comes to countries who are not members of NATO, SOFAs are concluded through bilateral agreements.

90  Keisuke Mori 6 Also, Article 41 of the supplementary agreement provides for damages caused by military personnel and civilians working in the military while engaging in official duties in the host country. 7 The price remaining after the statutory useful life and depreciation. 8 Wittlich-​Land, a federation of neighboring municipalities, has a population of about 30,000 (as of December 2018).

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92  Keisuke Mori North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2009). Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces. Available from: www.nato.int/​cps/​ en/​natohq/​official_​texts_​17265.htm? (Accessed 12 February 2020) Okinawa Prefecture (2019). Survey Report on Status of Forces Agreements in Other Countries (Europe) [Takoku Chii Kyōtei Chōsa Hōkokusho (Ōshū-​hen)]. Available from: www. pref.okinawa.lg.jp/​site/​chijiko/​kichitai/​sofa/​documents/​190411-​1.pdf. (Accessed 12 February 2020). (In Japanese). Sanders, C. T. (2000). America’s Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire. London: Oxford University Press. Schommer, M. (2005). Binsfeld und die Base:  Eine Gemeindestudie über den Alltag mit Amerikanern, Münster: LIT. SGD Nord Rheinland-​Pfalz (2016). PFT-​Belastungen in Wasser und Boden. Available from: https://​sgdnord.rlp.de/​de/​wasser-​und-​abfall/​wasser/​gewaesserschutz/​ gewaesserguete/pft-​belastungen/​. (Accessed 12 February 2020). —​ —​ —​(2018). Vollzug der Wasser-​und Abwasserabgabengesetze; Wasserbehördliche Anordnung -​ zur Minimierung der Einleitkonzentrationen von PFC-​ verunreinigten Niederschlagswasser aus dem Bitburg Flugplatz. Trierischer Volksfreund (2019a). PFT-​Belastung:  Nichts wird wie’s mal war. Available from:  www.volksfreund.de/​region/​bitburg-​pruem/​so-​wie-​sie-​war-​bekommen-​wir-​ die-​umwelt-​nicht-​zurueck_​aid-​35762515. (Accessed 12 February 2020). —​—​—​(2019b). Streit um Giftstoffe von der Airbase Spangdahlem landet vor Gericht. Available from:  www.volksfreund.de/​region/​streit-​um-​giftstoffe-​von-​der-​airbase-​ spangdahlem-​landet-​vor-​gericht_​aid-​36504663. (Accessed 12 February 2020). —​—​—​(2019c). Bitburgs Grüne wollen Pläne für PFT-​Lager nicht schlucken. Available from:  www.volksfreund.de/​region/​bitburg-​pruem/​bitburgs-​gruene-​wollen-​plaene-​ fuer-​pft-​lager-​nicht-​einfach-​schlucken_​aid-​38705747. (Accessed 12 February 2020). Vine, D. (2015). Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World. New York: Metropolitan Books. Yeo, A. (2011). Activists, Alliances, and Anti-​US Base Protests. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. Zinn-​ Thomas, S. (2010). Fremde vor Ort:  Selbstbild und regionale Identität in Integrationsprozessen. Eine Studie im Hunsrück, Bielefeld, transcript.

6  Why do anti-​base movements occur and/​or activate? An analysis of the Turkish case Kohei Imai

6.1  Introduction U.S. military bases in Turkey, specifically İncirlik Air Base in Adana province and Çiğli Air Base in Izmir province, have served an important role in international politics. İncirlik Air Base has served as a deterrence to the Soviets during the Cold War and to the Middle East, specifically, eastern Mediterranean countries such as Iraq and Syria, in the post-​Cold War period. It has contributed to both Western defense policy and U.S. military strategy. Of course, by forming an alliance with the U.S., Turkey itself has been able to minimize threats posed to it by the above nations. Traditionally, a majority of military base research has focused on the military strategy and alliances of the sending country. Meanwhile, military base exercises have considerable influence on the politics of the host country. First, not all host countries show the same response to the military exercises of the sending country. Additionally, host’s reactions to a military base can change over the decades. In recent years there have been more studies mindful of these facts, that put a spotlight on the politics of the host country (Kawana, 2012, pp. 28–​29). In this chapter, I  focus on U.S.  military bases in Turkey and conduct a chronological comparative analysis to understand why anti-​base movements, which are a form of anti-​Americanism, occur. The reason Turkey has been chosen as an example is that incidents that stoke national sentiments (e.g., rape cases in Okinawa) have been virtually non-​existent there, and problems of economic burdens imposed on the host country due to foreign military presence (e.g., South Korea) have also been rare. Another reason is that anti-​base movements have regularly occurred in Turkey since the mid-​1960s until the present, despite the U.S.–​Turkey alliance being indispensable from a security standpoint, especially in the Cold War period. Although at first glance there seem to be no consistent and definitive reasons for why anti-​base movements occur, an analysis of the Turkish case may prove important in terms of clarifying those reasons.

6.2  Review of previous research and hypotheses 6.2.1  Previous research relating to the Turkish hosting of U.S. military bases Research regarding the relationship between Turkey and U.S. military bases can be broadly classified into studies on the hosting of U.S. military bases and studies

94  Kohei Imai on anti-​base movements. With regard to the Turkish hosting of U.S.  military bases, this paper references two researchers, Kent Calder and Alexander Cooley, who revitalized military base research in the late 2000s. Calder classifies the behavioral patterns of the Turkish government and the political elite regarding foreign military bases in their country as the “bazaar politics” paradigm. Bazaar politics are present in those hosting countries where the leaders oppose military base placement, even at the cost of national security (Calder, 2007, p. 128). The characteristics of “bazaar politics,” as defined by Calder, can be summarized as follows: the politics of the host country is a two-​level game that involves both international and domestic levels. Domestic interest groups receive some form of compensation in exchange for supporting the policies of the government that stations foreign troops, and there are numerous negotiations between the hosting government and the domestic interest groups (Calder, 2007, pp.  140–​143). Calder cites the Turkish response to the 2003 Iraq War as a classic example of the bazaar politics paradigm. It is true that, in the end, Turkey enacted a policy in which the U.S. military bases within its borders were not to be used in the Iraq War. However, this decision was not a result of the negotiations held during that time, but was based on the lessons that Turkey learned following the Gulf Crisis of 1990–​91. In addition to the bazaar politics paradigm, Calder also proposes fiat politics, affective politics, and compensation politics paradigms to explain the decision-​ making process of base politics; but of these, only the bazaar politics paradigm serves as an ahistorical explanation and is thought to be of a different nature from the other three. As such, it is difficult to explain the Turkish hosting of U.S. military bases solely from this perspective. Meanwhile, Cooley investigates the Turkish hosting of U.S.  military bases while comparing it to South Korea through independent variables: the reliance of these countries on the U.S. for their national security and their trust in the U.S. political system (Cooley, 2008, pp. 95–​136). Cooley explains that Turkey began hosting U.S. military bases in the 1950s, which became a political issue in the 1960s and the target of increased criticism in the 1970s; however, the bases were hosted without any problems in the 1980s, and only became a problem again after the Gulf Crisis. However, since Cooley is not a specialist in Turkish politics, his explanations are at times imprecise. For example, during the so-​called détente period from the late 1960s to 1970s, Turkish reliance on the U.S. was low, but was extremely high during the Turgut Özal administration (1983–​ 1989). However, Cooley’s explanation is that reliance on the U.S.  was high from the late 1960s to 1970s and low during the 1980s (Cooley, 2008, p. 135). Moreover, Cooley explains that the consolidation of democracy results in the depoliticization of military base hosting issues and cites the Özal administration as an example in Turkey. But, this too is inaccurate. Özal’s political power was extremely great and following his transition from Prime Minister to President of Turkey in 1989, he made independent decisions regarding the Gulf Crisis, going against the tradition and constitution, which stipulates that the president does

Why do anti-base movements occur?  95 not involve himself in politics. Thus, although internal politics was stable during this time, it was not necessarily a period of democratic consolidation.1 6.2.2  Previous research relating to anti-​base movements Regarding anti-​base movements in Turkey, the book, The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle Against U.S. Military Posts, edited by Catherine Lutz, can be cited as a work that compiles cases of anti-​base movements in several countries (Lutz, 2009). However, this compilation does not establish a common framework or independent variables and, as such, lacks the consistency that a compilation of papers like this would typically have. Calder has proposed five hypotheses regarding movements against U.S. military bases: the contact hypothesis, the colonization hypothesis, the occupation hypothesis, the regime-​shift hypothesis, and the dictator hypothesis. Of these, the one that is applicable to Turkey is the contact hypothesis.2 The contact hypothesis specifies that increased interaction with local populations results in increased anti-​ base sentiments (Calder, 2007, pp. 75–​76). Applicable cases for this hypothesis include South Korea, Japan, Germany, and Turkey; anti-​base tensions in Turkey are considered “very high,” second only to South Korea, and higher than even Japan. The low local population density in the vicinity of military bases in Turkey is second only to Germany, which has low anti-​base tensions. But Calder also specifies the role of Islamic cultural influence (Calder, 2007, p. 121). For example, anti-​base sentiments in Turkey are high, and Calder explains that the large Muslim population also spurs these sentiments (Calder, 2007, p. 121). However, this is more of an informed opinion than an evidence-​based theory, and it is not yet clear to what extent Islamic culture is a valid parameter. Furthermore, Amy Austin Holmes defined the level of outside threat and the level of collateral harm as independent variables and compared demonstrations against U.S. military bases in Germany and Turkey (Holmes, 2014, pp. 15–​31). Holmes primarily focused on anti-​base movements in Turkey during the 1960s and the 1970s. Holmes’ research is a pioneering work that specializes in anti-​base movements and uses the method of case study research, incorporating Turkish-​ language documents. However, there is some doubt concerning the designation of the two independent variables. Although the levels of outside threat and collateral harm are valid explanations for the host country, they do not refer to the actors’ direct motives as an explanatory variable for anti-​base movements. Therefore, this is not an ideal framework. Andrew Yeo, who investigated the relationship between U.S.  alliances with base-​hosting countries and anti-​base movements, analyzed the security consensus formed by institutions, historical legacies, ideologies, and threat perceptions in the Philippines, Japan, Ecuador, Italy, and South Korea (Yeo, 2011, pp. 14–​16). External security is the crux of Yeo’s arguments and serves as a very easy-​to-​ understand explanation. However, a consistent point of concern is to what extent external security alone can serve as an explanation for anti-​base movements.

96  Kohei Imai 6.2.3  Statement of hypotheses In this chapter, I establish hypotheses derived from three independent variables for explaining anti-​base movements in Turkey. The first independent variable is the contact hypothesis outlined by Calder. The second is the security consensus hypothesis outlined by Yeo. The third independent variable is Turkishness, which is defined as the combination of national identity, Muslim identity, and territorial identity. Çağaptay has argued that there is a ranking among these, with national identity coming first, followed by Muslim identity and finally by territorial identity (Çağaptay, 2009, pp. 75–​76). Çağaptay primarily spoke about Turkishness in the 1930s, but the relative prioritization of these identities still continues. Turkishness is a kind of nationalism and self-​confidence for Turkish people. The hypotheses that are formed from these three independent variables are as follows: 1. anti-​base movements occur/​are activated with increased contact; 2.  anti-​base movements occur/​are activated when outside threats and security issues increase; and 3. anti-​base movements occur/are activated when the feeling of Turkishness among Turkish citizens is infringed upon.

6.3  Anti-​base movements from the 1960s to 1970s 6.3.1  Rising anti-​U.S. sentiment Given the regular Soviet meddling since the end of World War II, it was inevitable that Turkey would form an alliance with the U.S. The case of Turkey, not resisting the U.S., which has the largest military force in the world, but the U.S.S.R., which is a neighboring country with aggressive intentions, is in line with Stephen Walt’s “balance-​of-​threats” theory.3 Meanwhile, the U.S.  was aware of Turkey’s geopolitical significance since World War II, and in 1943 had already established an air force base where the İncirlik military base is located today.4 The İncirlik military base was constructed in 1951 by Meltcalfe-​Hamilton-​Grove. İncirlik means “fig grove” in Turkish; there used to be a fig grove in the location where the base now stands. The 39th Air Base Wing is stationed in this base, and there are currently approximately 1500 servicemen stationed on the site.5 Apart from the İncirlik and Çiğli military bases, there are other U.S. military bases in Turkey: in Izmir, Batman, Müş, and Yumurtalik, as well as an administrative office in Ankara (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, p.  152). U.S.  basing strategy primarily focuses on securing resources and establishing a secure geographic position from a military standpoint, but with regard to Turkey, a heavier emphasis was placed on the latter, specifically considering threats from the Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq, and Syria (Calder, 2007, pp. 7–​9). Anti-​base movements in Turkey first occurred in the period from the 1960s to 1970s. Both domestic and international factors played a role in these events. The following account relates to the domestic factors. On 27 May 1960, the

Why do anti-base movements occur?  97 democratically-​elected government that was in political power since May 1950 was overthrown in a coup d’état, after which a military government under the former Commander of Land Forces Cemal Gürsel was imposed for 17 months before it transitioned into a democratic government. Under this military rule, a new constitution (Constitution of 1961) was drafted to replace the old one, written in 1924. Compared with the Constitution of 1924, the Constitution of 1961 was different in that it greatly expanded civil liberties (e.g., upholding basic human rights, allowing political activism, protecting workers’ rights, freedom of speech and press, and the autonomy of universities). This constitution resulted not only in the acceptance of the activism of socialist and Islamic parties, but also in the rise of student activism. Many university students were committed to activism centering on socialism from 1964, and in 1965 a broad union of such groups was formed. On the other hand, the international factors relate to a steadily rising Turkish anti-​U.S.  sentiment since the late 1950s and the Johnson letter caused by the Soviet position of détente. The origin of this anti-​U.S. sentiment can be traced back to the U.S. response to the Lebanon Crisis in May 1958. This internal conflict was between President Kamil Shamun and his opponent Fuad Chehab, and the former requested U.S. intervention. The U.S. responded with a direct military intervention in Lebanon in July of the same year. During this time, Turkey, at the request of the U.S., allowed the usage of the military base in İncirlik; however, this U.S. intervention in response to the Lebanon crisis was clearly beyond the mandate of NATO. Turkish anti-​U.S. sentiment further intensified with the U-​2 incident. “The U-​2 incident” refers to when the U-​2 American reconnaissance spy plane that departed from the İncirlik military base was shot down by the Soviet Union while it was flying over Soviet airspace. The Turkish government was afraid that allowing the U.S. to use the İncirlik base would result in Soviet reprisals. This fear was compounded by the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. During that crisis, the U.S.  demanded that the Soviet Union withdraw their intermediate-​ range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) from Cuba, while the Soviets demanded that the U.S. withdraw their own IRBMs (i.e., Jupiter missiles) from Turkey. These Jupiter missiles were stationed in the Çiğli military base in Izmir province.6 The Kennedy administration in the U.S. accepted Soviet demands and withdrew their Jupiter missiles, but, reportedly, Kennedy did not discuss this decision with the government of Turkey, where the missiles were stationed. 6.3.2  The Johnson letter and the intensification of anti-​Americanism What made Turkish anti-​U.S. sentiment definite was the Johnson letter. Citizens of the Republic of Cyprus, including both Greek and Turk Cypriots—​80  percent of the population Greek and 20  percent Turkish—​formally declared their independence from the U.K. in August 1960. Tensions had been running high between the two ethnic groups since the pre-​independence period. In November 1963, Makarios III, the ethnically Greek President of Cyprus and Archbishop of

98  Kohei Imai the Church of Cyprus, proposed constitutional amendments which would strip Turkish Cypriots of special privileges. Turkish Cypriot legislators resigned in protest. Given this situation, İsmet İnönü, who was the Prime Minister of Turkey at the time, decided to intervene in Cyprus on 2 June 1964, in order to protect the Turkish Cypriots. However, on 4 June, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a letter to İnönü. Johnson said the following: I wish to emphasize, in the fullest friendship and frankness, that I do not consider that such a course of action by Turkey, fraught with such far-​reaching consequences, is consistent with the commitment of your Government to consult fully in advance with us. …I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO Allies. … I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances. (Correspondence between President Johnson and Prime Minister Inönü, 1966, pp. 386–​387) This letter resulted in the Turkish government reconsidering their relations with the U.S. and a rise in anti-​Americanism within Turkey. In Turkey’s eyes, the U.S.  shifted from a trusted partner to an “imperialist,” and anti-​Americanism became formally entrenched in Turkey (Candar, 2000, p.  140; Güney, 2008, p. 474). In this heightened anti-​ American environment, a sexual harassment incident involving eight U.S.  servicemen and several Turkish women occurred in November 1966 in the vicinity of the İncirlik military base. In response, 2000 individuals participated in protest rallies near the military base (Holmes, 2014, p. 65). This incident was caused by the few U.S. soldiers present within Turkey’s borders. At the center of anti-​Americanism during this time were leftist groups that became active following the Constitution of 1961, with their primary targets being U.S.  soldiers and military facilities (Güney, 2008, p.  474). A  well-​cited leftist anti-​U.S.  demonstration took place in 1968:  when the U.S. 6th Fleet stopped in Istanbul, leftist students threw several U.S. sailors into the sea in protest. In January 1969, the extreme leftist group Revolutionary Youth Federation of Turkey burned the official vehicle of the U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Robert Komer, who was visiting Middle East Technical University in Ankara (Criss, 2002, pp. 477–​479). Additionally, although for a short duration, several U.S. soldiers were detained between 1970 and 1971 (Harris, 1972, p. 139). More peaceful examples of anti-​Americanism involved strikes of Turkish employees at U.S. military bases in Turkey, including the İncirlik base. The first large-​ scale strike occurred in September 1967 at the İncirlik base and at military facilities in Ankara (Holmes, 2014, p. 75). The second large-​scale strike occurred in the spring of

Why do anti-base movements occur?  99 1969 at military bases in Ankara, Izmir, Istanbul, Yumurtalik, and İncirlik. Many families of U.S. servicemen decided to leave Turkey in response to these forms of anti-​Americanism (Holmes, 2014, pp. 75–​77). 6.3.3  The second Cyprus conflict and U.S. arms embargo In 1974, Greek Cypriot far-​left groups staged a coup d’état in Cyprus. With the livelihoods of Turkish Cypriots threatened, the Turkish government decided to dispatch troops to Cyprus. Turkey invaded Northern Cyprus, occupying approximately 37 percent of the island. In February 1975, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was declared by the Turkish Cypriots. As was the case during the first Cyprus conflict, these actions of Turkey during the Cypriot dispute, also referred to as the second Cyprus conflict, served to further antagonize the U.S.  side.7 In August 1974, the Ford administration, in power in the U.S.  at the time, decided to freeze military aid and the sale of military equipment to Turkey. In response, Turkey ended its defense pact with the U.S. and, in June 1974, prohibited the American use of all non-​NATO military facilities in Turkey (Altınay and Holmes, 2009, p. 274). In October of the same year, the U.S. issued an arms embargo against Turkey, which lasted for three years until August 1978. U.S.–​ Turkey relations did not immediately improve after the end of the embargo. For example, during the Iranian hostage crisis in October 1979 after the Iranian Revolution, the U.S.  government requested the use of the İncirlik base for hostage rescue missions, but the Turkish government denied the request (Güney, 2008, p. 475). The major events that finally improved relations between the U.S. and Turkey were the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, which induced fear in both countries; the coup d’état on 12 September 1980, which ended leftist student activities and escalating left-​right tensions; and the election of pro-​U.S. Turgut Özal as Prime Minister in the general elections of 1983.

6.4  The Iraq War in 2003 and anti-​base movements 6.4.1  Anti-​base movements during the Iraq War Next, I would like to focus on anti-​base movements in Turkey during the Iraq War in 2003. Holmes makes a distinction between anti-​base movements and anti-​ war movements. However, as Holmes herself has indicated using case studies of the Iraq War, at times, anti-​base movements in the host country can be a form of anti-​war movement (Holmes, 2014, p. 26). Anti-​base movements in Turkey during the Cold War era also served as anti-​war movements. Thus, depending on the case, it may not be easy to make a distinction between anti-​base movements and anti-​war movements. This chapter assumes that anti-​war activities occurring in the vicinity of military bases, including the İncirlik military base, are a form of anti-​base movement.

100  Kohei Imai As specified by Kakizaki, it was primarily left-​wing groups who formed the core of anti-​Americanism (including anti-​base movements) in Turkey during the Cold War era, but after the end of the Cold War anti-​Americanism was not just limited to the left wing but also spread to various other groups (Kakizaki, 2011, p. 85). In March 2003, the Turkish government passed a motion to not participate in the U.S.-​led coalition regarding the Iraq War. On 1 March, members of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey voted to decide whether their country should participate in the coalition. Turkey would participate in the coalition if 267 out of the 533 votes were in favor of it. However, with only 264 votes in favor (and with 250 against and 19 abstaining), Turkey decided not to participate in the war. There were numerous other factors involved in this decision apart from the voting result in the Grand National Assembly (Imai, 2015, pp.  83–​101). For example, a portion of the policymakers active in 2003 used to serve as representatives of Özal’s Motherland Party in the assembly in the 1980s and 1990s, at the time when Özal chose on his own to have the country participate in the Gulf War of 1990–​1991. However, this decision had unforeseen consequences for Turkey: the closing of the Turkey–​Iraq oil pipeline at the beginning of the crisis, and a severe economic impact on Turkey of the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq. Furthermore, a renewed attention given to the Kurdish people during the war brought the Kurdish problem to the international spotlight, and Turkey’s actions regarding this matter came under doubt.8 Therefore, in 2003 several policymakers expressed skepticism, reflecting on Özal’s decision. In addition, the domestic public opinion influenced the government’s decisions. Even during the Gulf War, the public, as well as opposition parties, were largely against the dispatch of troops into a neighboring country with a large Muslim population, and as a consequence of Özal ignoring these voices, the Motherland Party lost power during the general elections the following year, 1991. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), which came to power in 2002, primarily comprised devout Muslims and middle-​class Muslim businessmen, so paying attention to the public opinion was a very sensitive issue for it. It has been said that over 90 percent of Turkish citizens were opposed to the Iraq War, with pro-​Islam television programs (e.g., Kanal 7, STV) and newspapers (e.g., Yeni Ş afak, Vakit, Zaman) conducting anti-​Iraq War campaigns (Gözen, 2005, p. 79). Furthermore, Ahmed Necdet Sezer, who was the president of Turkey at the time, was also opposed to the war. This anti-​Iraq War sentiment directly translated into anti-​Americanism and anti-​ base movements. The first large-​ scale anti-​ Iraq War movement was in Istanbul, primarily organized by members of the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (Türkiye Mimarlar ve Mühendisler Odalar Birliği), in which over 160 political organizations and parties and a total of 10,000 individuals participated (Altınay and Holmes, 2009, p. 280). Following these protests, other anti-​Iraq War protests sprung up in major Turkish cities throughout the country. Naturally, there were protests in front of the İncirlik military base as well. For example, on 24 January 2003, Turkish human rights organizations protested

Why do anti-base movements occur?  101 the Iraq War, as well as the usage of the base for military purposes (Altınay and Holmes, 2009, p. 281). 6.4.2  Anti-​base movements after the Iraq War The decision to prohibit the usage of the İncirlik military base infuriated the George W. Bush administration, but the Turkish government’s participation in the post-​war recovery of Iraq gradually softened relations between the U.S. and Turkey. The İncirlik base also served as a transport hub during this time. However, as pointed out by Altınay and Holmes, supplying lethal arms and products that could potentially infuriate Turkish citizens was not allowed through this base (Altınay and Holmes, 2009, p. 288). Meanwhile, protests continued even after these events. Even in March 2003, right after Turkey’s decision not to participate in the Iraq War, protests flared up in front of the İncirlik military base and the Yumurtalik military base, which faces the Mediterranean Sea.9 The leftist Freedom and Solidarity Party (Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi) chanted that the U.S. must leave Turkey and the Middle East and that they do not wish to lease Turkish land to the U.S., as they marched from Mersin to the İncirlik base.10 The Freedom and Solidarity Party regularly posted online about their opposition to the improved post-​Iraq War relations between Turkey and the U.S., and to the usage of the İncirlik base.11 On 16 May 2005, Greenpeace established a Peace Embassy next to the base. Greenpeace believed that the 90 nuclear weapons stored in the İncirlik base were a threat not only to Turkey, but also to the Middle East and the international community, and their reason for constructing the embassy was to campaign for the removal of the weapons.12 Additionally, the Global Coalition for Peace and Justice (Küresel Barış ve Adalet Koalisyonu) periodically conducted protests against the İncirlik military base. The base was temporarily closed in mid-​May of 2005, and after that they campaigned for the former base area to be converted into a children’s park.13

6.5  Anti-​base movements in the 2010s 6.5.1  Deployment of Patriot missiles and demonstrations Anti-​base movements continued even in the 2010s. Heightened anti-​Americanism, including anti-​base movements, coincided with increased U.S. interventions in Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s and 2000s. The Syrian Civil War started in March 2011. In the following month, refugees began pouring across the 910-​km Turkey–​Syria border. Turkey severed ties with the Assad regime in October of the same year and began providing support to Syrian opposition groups. In 2012, with the shooting down of a Turkish aircraft and another incident resulting in the death of five civilians in Akçakale, the Assad regime became a serious threat to Turkey. In response, Turkey convened an emergency NATO meeting, and on 4 December of the same year, NATO

102  Kohei Imai deployed Patriot missiles for air defense purposes in the Turkish provinces of Gaziantep, Adana, and Kahramanmaraş, which are all close to the Syrian border—​ the deployment was finalized on 15 February 2013. Each site had six Patriot missile launchers and 400 U.S., Dutch, or German soldiers. In response, protests against the deployment of these missiles were staged at the İncirlik military base. It was the German military that was stationed with the Patriot missiles in İncirlik, while the U.S. soldiers were stationed at Gaziantep, but the protests continued regardless.14 6.5.2  Coup d’état attempt of 2016 and demonstrations On 15 July 2016, a coup d’état was attempted in Turkey. The last time a military coup was staged in Turkey was on 12 September 1980—​36  years earlier. The coup was led by a section of the military that was discontented with the AKP, which was the ruling party, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for more than 13 and a half years. For a time, a fraction of the key military facilities in Istanbul and Ankara were occupied and several top military officials, including the Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar, were detained. In the end, this coup attempt was thwarted by the military, as well as by citizens who heeded President Erdoğan’s calls for resistance. It was reported by Turkish media that the Gülen movement, led by Fethullah Gülen, was responsible for the coup, and many Turkish citizens believed that.15 Next, I shall briefly outline the Gülen movement. It was founded in the 1970s by Fethullah Gülen, who served as a state preacher in Turkey, and is now an organization with a global network that is primarily focused on Turkey. It is, in essence, a new Islamic religious sect, but since the 1980s, it has steadily incorporated members of the Turkish bureaucracy, military, and police (Hazama, 2017, p. 37). Though the Gülen movement originated from Sufism, which seeks to find the inner truth of Islam through religious training, it was also actively involved in politics and has been forming strong relationships with the ruling political parties of Turkey since the 1980s. Meanwhile, especially following the end of the Cold War, the movement spread to Central Asia, the Balkan Peninsula and Africa, becoming a global organization through education enterprises such as international schools, their tutoring programs and dormitories. In developed countries, the movement not only promoted educational initiatives as an essentially moderate form of Islam, but also worked on eliminating West–​Islam tensions by focusing on tolerance and dialogue as key concepts. Among developed countries, the U.S. has particularly strong ties with the Gülen movement. It is said that the Clinton administration had strong ties with the movement. Fethullah Gülen came to the U.S. for medical treatment in 1999, during the Clinton administration, and he currently resides in the U.S. state of Pennsylvania. It was also reported that Hilary Clinton’s campaign during the 2016 U.S.  presidential elections received large financial donations from organizations affiliated with the Gülen movement.16 The Turkish government blamed the Gülen movement for orchestrating the coup attempted in 2016—there was an underlying motive for that. The AKP and

Why do anti-base movements occur?  103 the Gülen movement were on good terms with each other until 2012, after which relations between the two deteriorated rapidly. On 7 February 2012, the Chief of the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MİT) Hakan Fidan, who had close ties with the AKP, was arrested for negotiating secret peace talks with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The chief was eventually released from custody, but accusations could be heard that the Gülen movement, which had a powerful influence over the Turkish police force, was responsible for this incident. The AKP responded in kind to these actions from the Gülen movement. In the fall of 2013, the AKP tightened regulations on student housing, which is one of the primary institutions through which the Gülen movement exerts its influence. In response, a corruption scandal involving AKP executives and President Erdoğan himself was exposed in December of the same year, leading to the resignation of three cabinet members. The falling out of the two organizations became clear with this corruption scandal—​the Gülen movement was labeled a terrorist organization in 2015, and in the list of dangerous persons issued by the Turkish Ministry of the Interior, Fethullah Gülen was nominated as one of the most dangerous men in the world, alongside top ISIS and PKK leaders. Since the coup attempt occurred in such a context, in its wake it was reported that the Gülen movement had orchestrated it with the help of the U.S. The U.S. government immediately denied these accusations. Furthermore, claiming that there is insufficient evidence to hold the Gülen movement responsible for the attempted coup, the U.S. refused extradition requests for Fethullah Gülen. In response to these U.S.  actions, anti-​U.S.  movements began in Turkey. At the governmental level, Turkey cut fuel supplies to İncirlik and closed its airspace just after the coup attempt.17 At the end of July, two weeks after the attempted coup, a large-​scale demonstration was held in front of the İncirlik military base. The demonstration was instigated by Turkish officials, who blamed the U.S.  soldiers stationed in the base for supporting the Gülen movement.18 Furthermore, it was reported that a high-​ranking official affiliated with the Gülen movement was among the Turkish employees at the base, and that he had used a U.S. military aircraft on the day of the attempted coup.19 Afterwards, a Turkish citizen who served as a translator in the base was arrested. Tensions continued to run high a year after the attempted coup, with organizations opposed to U.S. deployment in Turkey protesting in front of the base.20 Thus, as in many preceding eras, the İncirlik military base was a symbol of the U.S. in the eyes of Turkish citizens throughout the 2010s and was a target for anti-​ U.S. demonstrations. Additionally, during this time, the base was also a target for anti-​U.S.  demonstrations due to its perceived role as the place where the attempted coup d’état was orchestrated. 6.5.3  The Armenian issue In addition to the above problems, the so-called “Armenian issue” is one of the continuing disputes between Turkey and the United States. The Armenian issue is about whether to recognize that the Ottoman Empire committed “the

104  Kohei Imai Armenian genocide” during World War I.  Officially, the Turkish government does not recognize such a genocide. On the other hand, the Armenian government and the Armenian diaspora assert that it happened. Many Armenians live in the United States and their lobbying is influential in U.S. politics. For example, the approach of the U.S. Congress to this issue has been pro-​Armenian for about two decades. In particular, the Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi has been keen to recognize “the Armenian genocide.” On the other hand, past administrations—​those of Bill Clinton in 2000, George W. Bush in 2007 and Barack Obama in 2010—​have rejected resolutions concerning “the Armenian genocide.” In December 2019, however, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution recognizing “the Armenian genocide.” The Turkish government criticized this decision harshly and President Erdoğan implied in his statements that two U.S. bases in Turkey, İncirlik and Kurecik, might be closed.21

6.6  Analysis of hypotheses In Sections 2, 3 and 4, I outlined three examples of anti-​base movements in Turkey. Additionally, I  will now analyze the three hypotheses presented in Section 1 of this chapter:  1. anti-​ base movements occur/​ are activated with increased contact; 2.  anti-​base movements occur/​are activated when outside threats and security issues increase; and 3.  anti-​base movements occur/are activated when Turkishness is infringed upon. Let me begin with the contact hypothesis. There were tensions between stationed U.S. military forces and Turkish residents, as represented by the sexual harassment incident involving U.S. soldiers in November 1966. Also, there were a few other problems induced by contact, such as the direct harm inflicted on U.S. soldiers by left-​wing groups. However, the number of stationed U.S. soldiers decreased by 75 percent following agreements between the two countries in 1969—​the families of the soldiers left shortly afterwards and contact between Turkish citizens and the U.S. military forces decreased (Holmes, 2014, p. 39). Even during the anti-​Iraq War protests in 2003 and the anti-​U.S. demonstrations in the 2010s, no problems arose due to contact. Therefore, it cannot be said that contact is a consistent independent variable that explains anti-​base movements in Turkey. Next, I  would like to discuss the relationship between increased outside threats and security issues, and anti-​base movements. The period from the 1960s (following the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis) to the 1970s was a détente period, with the Soviet threat receding, and the Turkish perception of the Soviet threat decreasing even further than the level before 1962. This is evidenced by the improvement in Turkish-​Soviet diplomatic relations during this time.22 Although there was a possibility that fighting might break out with the neighboring country of Iraq during the 2003 War, it was unlikely that Turkey would have invaded Iraq on its own accord. Furthermore, there was virtually no relationship between Turkish anti-​base movements and outside threats during the 2010s. For these

Why do anti-base movements occur?  105 reasons, it cannot be said that outside threats are a consistent independent variable that explains anti-​base movements in Turkey. Finally, I wish to discuss the relationship between Turkishness and anti-​base movements. The reason why anti-​base movements in Turkey arose in the period from the 1960s to 1970s was not the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962; instead, the trigger was President Johnson’s letter regarding the Cyprus conflict. The Turks perceived this letter in at least one of the following three ways: the U.S.  has abandoned the Turkish people; the U.S.  has betrayed the Turkish people; or the U.S. has chosen to side with the Greek people. On the other hand, it is said that Turkey’s self-​confidence was strengthened after the Cold War (Bora, 2011, p.  59). This is because of Turkey’s effort to become a regional leader in relation to Central Asian, Caucasus and Balkan states, which became newly independent in the post-​Cold War period. However, this effort to be a regional leader, it may be said, had already been applied to the Cyprus issue since the 1960s. In April 2010, Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities was established for creating a network of people of Turkish origins living abroad as part of the regional leader approach. In this way, the Turkish government has consistently placed importance on people of Turkish descent in foreign countries and the Turkish people share this attitude. We also need to add that the attitude toward protecting and maintaining the state, as well as the threat perceptions of the Turkish government and citizens are affected by Tukey’s national identity (Bora, 2011, p. 57). A major reason for anti-​ Americanism and anti-​ base movements in Turkey during the Iraq War in 2003 was that the U.S. attacked and dispatched troops to Iraq, where many of Turkey’s Muslim brethren live.23 Even during the anti-​base movements of the 2010s, and particularly during the coup d’état attempt in 2016, the Turkish nationalism espoused by the government resonated with the Turkish people. Therefore, it can be said that anti-​base movements and anti-​Americanism in Turkey would arise or be activated whenever Turkishness was infringed upon. Also, according to Katzenstein and Keohane, there are four types of anti-​ Americanism: liberal, social, sovereign-​nationalist, and radical (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007, pp. 28–​34). In this classification, Turkey’s anti-​Americanism corresponds to sovereign-​nationalist anti-​Americanism. Sovereign-​nationalist anti-​ Americanism can be further subdivided into three subtypes (ibid., p.  32). The first lays emphasis on nationalism and national identity; the second centers on protecting state sovereignty, while the third is mostly about the relationship with great powers. In accordance with the above categorization, I would characterize Turkish anti-​Americanism as being of the first subtype. Analyzing Turkey’s anti-​base movements reveals another point. As discussed above, Yeo uses security consensus as an analytic framework. Basically, he focuses on the degree of each government’s pressure on anti-​base activities. In the case of Turkey, it seems that the government did not put much pressure on protesters. On the other hand, Okinawa in Japan is a typical case of strong pressure by a government on an anti-​base movement. Okinawa was one of the harshest battlegrounds of World War II. The United States occupied Okinawa from 1945 to 1972.24

106  Kohei Imai According to Arasaki, there have been three waves of protests by Okinawan people against the U.S.  bases on the island (Arasaki, 1999; Tanji, 2006; Yeo, 2011). The first wave was the protest against U.S. land policy in 1956. This wave, however, was brief and weak because the interests of the local people in relation to the land issue varied. The second wave of local protests occurred in the 1960s, when the Cold War entered the détente period and Okinawans expected that the number of U.S. military facilities on their island would decrease. While the Japanese government was concerned that U.S. bases might be withdrawn both from the mainland and Okinawa because of the U.S. security policy, the people in Okinawa gradually started to demand the revision of the U.S.–​Japan security treaty. According to Tanji, differences between the mainland and Okinawa and Japanese concerns regarding Okinawan nationalism were the main reasons for the second-wave protests (Tanji, 2006, pp.  104–​105). In the second wave several elements were mixed, such as protests by the locals, by the right-​wing, and the left-​wing. The third wave occurred in 1995, when the largest rally in Okinawa’s history took place after an incident in which a 12-​year-​old girl was raped by three U.S. marines came to light in September of that year. This terrible incident brought about an atmosphere of opposition both to the U.S. presence and to the Japanese government. The Japanese government attempted to persuade and put pressure on Okinawans to halt the protests because it tried to be mindful not only of the people in Okinawa but also of the wishes of the U.S. government. For Japan, the U.S. is the most important ally—​therefore it was difficult for the government in Tokyo to accept Okinawa’s demands (for the withdrawal of the U.S. forces). In addition, anti-​base protests in Okinawa were, basically, local protests. As in the case of Okinawa and Japan, the United States was a necessary partner for Turkey in terms of national security, especially during the Cold War period and the Iraq war in 2003. However, the responses of the Turkish government were different from those of the Japanese government. It seems that, historically, Japanese governments have been more sensitive to security issues than Turkish governments.25 Also, some of the Turkish anti-​base movements seemed to have sympathized with their government’s stance. Furthermore, the main protesters in Turkey have tended not to be local people as in Okinawa. As described above, in many cases, Turkey’s anti-​base protests were based on anti-​Americanism. In Turkey it has often been difficult to hear local people’s opinion.26

6.7  Conclusion This chapter has used Turkey as a case study to discuss why anti-​base movements occur and are activated. Based on previous research, three hypotheses were proposed:  1. anti-​base movements occur/​are activated with increased contact; 2.  anti-​base movements occur/​are activated when outside threats and security issues increase; and 3. anti-​base movements occur/are activated when Turkishness is infringed upon. Examples of anti-​base movements from the 1960s to 1970s, anti-​ base movements related to the Iraq War in 2003, and anti-​base movements in the

Why do anti-base movements occur?  107 2010s were analyzed. The findings show that Turkishness has served as the most consistent independent variable that explains anti-​base movements in Turkey. This chapter has compared three chronologically differentiated cases. Our future work will involve further refining the independent variable of national identity and analyzing that variable in other countries hosting U.S. military bases.

Notes 1 For Özal’s influence as president, see Duran and Miş (2016, pp. 11–​26). 2 Turkey is not a colony of the U.S., and it has never experienced U.S.  occupation. Additionally, Turkey introduced regular elections in 1946, and has never been under a dictatorship during the base hosting period. With regard to the regime-​shift hypothesis, there are no historical examples of basing problems due to regime change in Turkey. 3 Walt views the following as sources of threat: aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions (Walt, 1987, pp. 21–​26). 4 For details regarding the establishment of the U.S. air base at Adana during World War II, see Cossaboom and Leiser (1998, pp. 73–​86). 5 For details on İncirlik Air Base, see Bölme (2012), especially Chapter 3. 6 Jupiter missiles were stationed in September 1959, following three and a half years of discussions between the U.S. and Turkey. For details on Jupiter missiles in Turkey, see Criss (1997) and Seydi (2010). 7 It has been said that powerful Greek lobbying groups had applied pressure on both the U.S. President and the Congress. In addition to the Cyprus dispute, in the 1970s, the U.S.  government criticized Turkey as a hotbed of opium cultivation. In this period, rampant opium addiction among young people was a social problem in the United States. The then Turkish Prime Minister Nihat Erim prohibited opium cultivation in 1971. However, the next Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit permitted opium cultivation in seven provinces in 1974, inviting the U.S. government’s opposition to his decision. For details concerning the opium issue between Turkey and the United States, see Erhan (1996). 8 The İncirlik base was one of the most important bases during the war; it was also used for Operation Provide Comfort, which was conducted by multinational forces after the war, and Operation Northern Watch, which was for the reconnaissance of Iraqi airspace. 9 “Clashes at Turkey Anti-​U.S. Demo,” BBC, 12 March 2003. 10 Bianet Bağımsız Iletişim Ağı, “ÖDPden Mersin-​İncirlik Protesto Yürüyüşü,” (http://​ m.bianet. org/​ bianet/​print/​17175-​odpden-​mersin-​incirlik-​protesto-​yuruyusu). The Freedom and Solidarity Party is a leftist political party formed in 1996. Despite a lack of substantial electoral success, they hold strong anti-​imperialist and world peace views and regularly conduct anti-​U.S. protests. 11 “İncirlik Üssü Kapatırsın!,” ÖDP Website, Nisan 28, 2005 (http://​portal. odp. org. tr/​incirlik-​ussu-​kapatilsin/​). 12 “Greenpeace, İncirlik’te ‘Barış Elçiliği’ açtı:  İncirlik’teki nükleer bombalar dışarı!,” Greenpeace Akdeniz website (https://​www.greenpeace.org/​archive-​turkey/​tr/​press/ releases/​160505_​ PeaceEmbassy/​). 13 “İncirlik Üssü Yıkılsın Çocuk Parkı Yapılsın,” Bianet Bağımsız Iletişim Ağı (https://​ bianet. org/​bianet/​ toplum/​61108-​incirlik-​ussu-​yikilsin-​cocuk-​parki-​yapilsin). 14 “NATO Support to Turkey,” NATO website (http://​www.nato.int/​cps/​en/​ natolive/​topics_​92140.htm); “Journalist Detained in İncirlik Air Base Patriot Protest,”

108  Kohei Imai (http://​m.bianet. org/​ bianet/​youth/​143753-journalist-​detained-inincirlik-​air-​basepatriot-​protest). 15 “Turks believe cleric Gulen was behind coup attempt –​survey,” Reuters, 26 July  2016. 16 “Gülenists donated around $2 mln to Clinton campaign:  Democratic source,” Hürriyet Daily News, 12 November 2016. 17 “Turkey’s power cutoff to Incirlik Air Base a problem for Pentagon,” CNN, 19 July 2016. 18 “More protests at Incirlik as U.S.–​Turkey tensions ratchet up,” Stars and Stripes, 29 July 2016. 19 “Turkey officials to demand extradition of Fethullah Gülen from U.S.,” The Guardian, 28 July 2016. 20 “Security Message for U.S. Citizens:  Demonstration in Adana, July 14, 2017” (https://​tr.usembassy.gov/​security-​message-​u-​s-​citizens-​demonstration-​adana-​july-​ 14–​2017/​). The Kurdish issue in Syria is another sensitive issue that burdens the relations between Turkey and the U.S,. Despite that, I have not identified any anti-​ base protests in Turkey motivated by the Kurdish issue in Syria. 21 Matt McGarry, "Analysis:  Turkey once again threatens to close U.S.  bases.” ABC News, 16 December 2019 (https://​abcnews.go.com/​International/​analysis-​turkey-​ threatens-​close-​us-​bases/​story?id=67751304), p.  21. Kurecik is an important radar base for NATO’s missile defense. 22 On 5 November 1964, the two nations concluded a cooperation agreement regarding cultural, scientific and technological cooperation. Furthermore, immediately after the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko visited Turkey in May 1965, the Turkish Prime Minister Ali Suat Ürgüplü visited Moscow. Also, in December of the same year, Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin visited Turkey, becoming the first Soviet Prime Minister to visit the country. 23 Not just anti-​U.S.  base protests, but anti-​Israel policies are another example of the Turkish government valuing Turkishness and Muslim identity. The Turkish ship “Mavi Marmara” with volunteers intending to supply humanitarian aid to a blockaded Palestine territory of Gaza (popularly called the “Gaza Freedom Flotilla”) was attacked by Israeli naval commandos on 31 May 2010. In this incident, nine civilians (eight Turks and one ethnically Turkish American person) were killed. Turkish governments, especially the AKP government, enthusiastically supported the Palestinian autonomous government and Hamas. The then Turkish government harshly responded to this incident. For example, in 2010 Turkey refused to participate with the United States and Israel in “Anatolian Eagle,” the annual aerial military exercise at Konya Air Base in the central Anatolian region of Konya. Since 2001, Turkey had hosted “Anatolian Eagle” for several countries, including Israel and the United States. Instead of Anatolian Eagle, in late September and early October 2010, Turkey and China held a bilateral military exercise in Turkey, the first such exercise China conducted with a NATO member. 24 Japanese mainland recovered full sovereignty in 1951 under the Peace Treaty of San Francisco. 25 Several Turkish governments also prioritized security issues. For example, faced with the Gulf Crisis in August 1990, the then president Özal moved forward with the decision to deploy Turkish forces to Iraq because of his pessimistic outlook on the international order. He believed that for Turkey the collapse of the Cold War structure meant losing Western protection and aid, and that Turkey would have to make

Why do anti-base movements occur?  109 an appeal regarding its strategic importance by participating in Operation Desert Storm. 26 There are no previous studies about “local” anti-​base movements in Turkey.

References Altınay, A. G. and A. Holmes (2009). “Opposition to the U. S. Military Presence in Turkey in the Context of the Iraq War” in Catherine Lutz (ed.). The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U. S. Military Posts, London: Pluto Press, pp. 270–​298. Arasaki, M. (1999). “The Okinawa Struggle: History and Future Prospects” (“Okinawa Tōsō: Sono Rekishi to Tembō”). In Editorial Board of Jōkyō Publishing (ed.), Okinawa o Yomu (Reading Okinawa), Tokyo: Jōkyō, pp. 39–​58. (In Japanese). Bölme, S. M. (2012). İncirlik Üssü: ABD’nin Üs Politikası ve Türkiye. İstanbul, İletişim. Bora, T. (2011). “Nationalist Discourses in Turkey.” In Kadıoğlu, A. and Keyman, F. (eds.), Symbiotic Antagonisms:  Competing Nationalisms in Turkey (pp. 57–​81). Salt Lake City: Utah University Press. Calder, K. (2007). Embattled Garrisons. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Candar, C. (2000). “Some Turkish Perspectives on the United States and American Policy toward Turkey.” In Abramowitz, M. (ed.), Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy (pp. 117–​152). New York: The Century Foundation Press. Cooley, A. (2008). Base Politics:  Democratic Change and the U.  S. Military Overseas. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Cossaboom, R. and Leiser, G. (1998). “Adana Station 1943–​45: Prelude to the Post-​war American Military Presence in Turkey,” Middle Eastern Studies, 34(1), pp. 73–​86. Criss, N. B. (1997). “Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959–​1963,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 20(3), pp. 97–​122. —​—​—​(2002). “A Short History of Anti-​Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case,” The Journal of American History, 89(2), pp. 472–​484. Çağaptay, S. (2009). “Reconfiguring the Turkish Nation in the 1930s,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 8(2), pp. 67–​82. Erhan, Ç. (1996). Beyaz Savaş: Türk-​Amerikan İlişkilerinde Afyon Sorunu. Ankara: Bilgi. Gözen, R. (2005). “Causes and Consequences of Turkey’s Out-​of-​War Position in the Iraq War of 2003,” The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 36, pp. 73–​99. Güney, A. 2008. “Anti-​Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,” Middle Eastern Studies, 44(3), pp. 471–​487. Harris, G. (1972). Troubled Alliance: Turkish-​American Problems in Historical Perspective 1945–​1971. Washington, D.C: AEI-​Hoover Policy Studies. Hazama, Y. (2017). “Infiltration and Exclusion” (“Shintō to Haijo”), Ajiken World Trend, February Issue, pp. 36–​43. (In Japanese). Holmes, A. A. (2014). Social Unrest and American Military Bases in Turkey and Germany since 1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Imai, K. (2015). Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Middle East: Contributing to the Construction of the Regional Order (Chūtō Chitsujo wo Meguru Gendai Toruko Gaikō). Kyoto: Minerva Shobō. (In Japanese). Kakizaki, M. (2011). “Anti-​Iraq War Protest in Turkey: Global Networks, Coalitions, and Context,” Middle Eastern Studies, 47(1), pp. 81–​99.

110  Kohei Imai Katzenstein, P. J. and Keohane, R. O. (2007). “Varieties of Anti-​Americanism: A Framework for Analysis.” In Katzenstein, P. J. and Keohane, R. O. (eds.), Anti-​Americanism in World Politics (pp. 9–​38). Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kawana, S. (2012). Base Politics: The Origins of the Post-​war U.S. Policy for the Expansion of Overseas Bases (Kichi no Seijigaku: Sengo Beikoku no Kaigai Kichi Kakudai Seisaku). Tokyo: Hakutō Shobō. (In Japanese). Lutz, C. ed. (2009). The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U. S. Military Posts. London: Pluto Press. Middle East Journal (1966). “Correspondence between President Johnson and Prime Minister Inönü, June 1964, as released by the White House, January 15, 1966,” Middle East Journal, 20(3). Seydi, S. (2010). “Turkish–​American Relations and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1957–​63,” Middle Eastern Studies, 46(3), pp. 433–​455. Tanji. M. (2006). Myth, Protest and Struggle in Okinawa. New York: Routledge. U.S. Department of Defense (2018). Base Structure Report –​Fiscal Year 2018 Baseline. Available from:  https://​www. acq. osd. mil/​eie/​ Downloads/​BSI/​ Base%20 Structure%20Report%20FY18. pdf. (Accessed on 3 March 2019). Walt, S. (1987). The Origins of Alliance. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Yeo, A. (2011). Activists, Alliances, and Anti-​U. S. Base Protests. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

7  Strategic asset or political burden? U.S. military bases and base politics in Saudi Arabia Masaki Mizobuchi

7.1  Introduction In August 1996, Osama Bin Laden, the ringleader of the 9/​11 terrorist attacks in the United States, issued the notorious document titled “Declaration of Jihad against Americans” (Bin Ladin, 1996). In the document, he accused the existence of U.S.  military bases in Saudi Arabia—​the land of the two Holy Places; the foundation of the house of Islam; the place of the revelation; the source of the message; and the place of the noble Ka’ba, the Qibla of all Muslims—​as the greatest invasion on Muslims and the greatest tragedy of the Islamic world. Furthermore, he insisted that expelling from there the “Zionist-​Crusader (Israel–​ U.S.) Alliance,” which occupies the land of the two Holy Mosques (Saudi Arabia) and the land of the Al-​Aqsa Mosque (Palestine), is an important duty for Muslims, next to faith. He also quoted “expel the infidels from the Arabian Peninsula” as the will of the Prophet Muhammad. The history of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States can be traced back to 14 February 1945, when ‘Abd al-​’Aziz ibn ‘Abd al-​Rahman Al Sa’ud (King’ Abd al-​’Aziz; Ibn Sa’ud), the first king and founder of Saudi Arabia, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, the 32nd president of the United States, met aboard the USS Quincy in the Great Bitter Lake, located along the Suez Canal. The talks lasted about five hours, and both were said to have spent a lot of time discussing oil and energy issues intensively. The United States was eager to get oil for World War II and postwar reconstruction, and King ‘Abd al-​’Aziz craved for foreign currency income and the national security that the U.S. could bring (Riedel, 2018, pp. 3–​4). Later, in August 1945, the two countries signed the first official military agreement, and the United States established the first military base in the Saudi territory. Since then, the presence of U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia has been vital in security strategies for both Saudi Arabia and the United States. Bin Laden’s “declaration” and the September 11 attacks illustrated this point clearly. Then, what are the factors that have a major impact on the outcome of base politics—​in this chapter, it was defined as a series of negotiations and cooperation between the base sending nation and the host nation over the status and operation of military facilities located within the host nation’s territory1—​in Saudi Arabia? Also, what

112  Masaki Mizobuchi are the particularities of base politics in Saudi Arabia and what kind of strategic implications can we find from it? In the following sections of this chapter, I will consider these points.

7.2  An overview of U.S. military bases in gulf countries and recent trends The United States has, since World War II, consistently viewed the Middle East, where a strategic resource of oil and the key ally Israel are located, as one of the vital areas (Pollack, 2008). However, it is relatively recent that it has built some military bases in the Persian Gulf countries and adopted direct political and military involvement in the Middle East. The Gulf Crisis (1990–​1991) proved an important watershed. Prior to the Gulf War, the United States had delegated much of its security responsibilities to its allies while minimizing its engagement in the Middle East (this is known as the “Twin Pillars Policy”).2 However, after the end of the Cold War, the George H. W. Bush administration drastically changed the U.S. policy and deployed 500,000 troops to the Gulf region in January 1991, promptly drove Iraq out of Kuwait, and showed its overwhelming military power to the neighboring countries. Following this event, since both the United States and Gulf states recognized the weakness of the regional order and the threat of Iraq, the United States has maintained a constant military presence in the Gulf region and become more directly and proactively involved in the regional security situation as a hegemonic power (Hinnebusch, 2015, pp. 243–​257; Gause, 2010, pp. 121–​134).3 However, around November 2011, the Barack Obama administration clearly stated its intention to withdraw from the Middle East and expand its involvement in the Asia–​Pacific region (this is the so-called “pivot” or “rebalancing” strategy). In the process, the size of the U.S. forces deployed in the Gulf decreased steadily (Chollet, 2016, pp. 52–​61). In 2014–​2017, the number of the U.S. military personnel in the region temporarily increased because of U.S.-​led military operations against the “Islamic State (IS; al-​Dawla al-​Islamiya)” (Operation Inherent Resolve), but since the inauguration of the Donald Trump administration in January 2017, the reduction trend accelerated further.4 Based on the above, this section first outlines the U.S. military bases in the Gulf countries (including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE and Oman) and summarizes the recent trends (see Figure 7.1 for changes in the number of the U.S. forces stationed in Gulf states), and then defines the questions that will be addressed in this paper. 7.2.1  An overview of the U.S. military forces in the Gulf 7.2.1.1  Saudi Arabia After the Gulf War, throughout the 1990s Saudi Arabia hosted the largest unit of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM, responsible for 20 nations

U.S. bases & base politics in Saudi Arabia  113 including the Middle East). Above all, Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia played a central role in the U.S. victory in the Gulf War, and the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in it was responsible for the enforcement of Iraqi no-​fly zones and the invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). However, due to the growing anti-​American public sentiment, the base in Saudi Arabia was closed in August 2003 after transferring its role to Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. During 2004, almost all U.S. military troops withdrew from Saudi Arabia, except for the United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) and embassy and consulate guards. Subsequently, CIA built a secret drone base in southeast Saudi Arabia in 2011 (its existence was confidential until 2013)  to support counter-​terrorism operations in Yemen (Washington Post, 5 February 2013). The Trump administration authorized the deployment of military personnel and resources to Saudi Arabia to provide “an additional deterrent” in the face of “emergent, credible threats [from Iran]” in the region (Guardian, 20 July 2019). The Pentagon said in October 2019 that a large deployment for Saudi Arabia was authorized, which included fighter squadrons, an air expeditionary wing and air defense personnel, two additional Patriot batteries, and one Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system (THAAD) (Reuters, 12 October 2019). 7.2.1.2  Qatar On the other hand, Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, where the CAOC was moved from Saudi Arabia, had two runways of over 3,600m and protective shelter facilities capable of accommodating nearly 100 aircraft. It was the largest and most important base in the Middle East, at least until 2012. Since the start of construction of the base in 1996, all construction costs were borne by Qatar. Sayliyah Army Base has an armored army unit and a storage facility for equipment and supplies. The Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) was signed between the United States and Qatar in June 1992 (expiration period: 10 years; last renewed in 2013). However, as noted above, the Obama administration launched a “rebalancing” strategy at the end of 2011. The number of personnel stationed in Qatar, which had exceeded 10,000 in September 2012, fell below 1,000 in March 2017. Despite a temporary increase in the personnel as described above, the total number of the troops stationed as of September 2019 was 545, with almost no active troops stationed. 7.2.1.3 Bahrain Around 2017, CENTCOM seems to have shifted its focus from Qatar (air force) to Bahrain (navy) both financially and in terms of personnel. Bahrain has hosted a U.S. naval command headquarters for the Gulf region since 1948 (on command ships) and the command of the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet since 1995. The U.S. command in Bahrain is located in a vast facility called the Naval Support Operations (NSA) Bahrain (in 2010–​2017, the United States spent approximately

114  Masaki Mizobuchi $580 million on expanding its facilities) and has one main carrier strike group, one amphibious operation ready group, and several surface combat units. These play a major role in the regional stability. Bahrain is also home to Muharraq Airfield, which has two large runways, and Shaikh Isa Air Base. The formal DCA was concluded in October 1991 (valid for 10  years; last renewed in 2011)  and Bahrain was designated as a major non-​ NATO ally (MNNA) in March 2002. The number of the personnel stationed in Bahrain moved up from 5,259 in March 2017 to 8,598 in September 2017. However, as in other Gulf countries, the number of troops in Bahrain has also decreased recently and remains constant at 4,300 (this does not include approximately 10,000 troops on board carrier strike group vessels). 7.2.1.4  Kuwait In September 1991, seven months after the end of the Gulf War, Kuwait signed a formal DCA with the United States (initial validity 10  years; still valid after two renewals). In April 2004, Kuwait was also designated as an MNNA for close defense cooperation between the two countries. Kuwait has a number of U.S. military facilities, many of which are primarily related to the Iraq War (e.g., Ali al-​Salem Air Base). After the U.S.  forces withdrew from Iraq in 2011, the number of the troops temporarily increased in 2014 and 2017 in connection with anti-​IS operations (with headquarters in Kuwait), but the scale was later gradually reduced. The number of the U.S. troops stationed in Kuwait in September 2011 was 16,881, but as of June 2019, it was just 1,885. 7.2.1.5  UAE The UAE also signed a formal DCA with the United States in July 1994, and in May 2017 the two countries signed a new DCA (with 15-​year validity). Major U.S.  bases in the UAE include Port of Jebel Ali, Al-​Dhafra Air Base, and the Fujairah Naval Base. Jebel Ali is the world’s largest man-​made harbor and the biggest port in the Middle East (it can accommodate a carrier and carrier strike group ships simultaneously) and is said to be the most frequently visited port for U.S. Navy vessels outside the United States. Most U.S.  military personnel stationed in the UAE were assigned to Al-​Dhafra Air Base, which had only U-​2 reconnaissance aircraft and KC-​10 aerial refueling aircraft in the 1990s; now F-​15 fighters, F-​22 fighters, RQ-​4 Global Hawks (unmanned aerial vehicles), and Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) aircraft are deployed. The base also houses the Gulf Air Warfare Center (GAWC), and the two countries conduct joint training there, such as early warning and missile defense. The Port of Jebel Ali in Dubai and the Fujairah Naval Base are also positioned as valuable ports to secure logistics by land if the Strait of Hormuz becomes inaccessible (National, 21 October 2010). In 2014 and 2017, the total number of U.S. military personnel stationed in the UAE was nearly 4,000, but as with other Gulf countries, this number has

U.S. bases & base politics in Saudi Arabia  115 12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 0 2008

2009

2010

Saudi Arabia

2011

2012 Qatar

2013

2014 Bahrain

2015

2016

2017

Kuwait

2018

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Figure 7.1 U.S. Military Personnel in the Gulf States (2008–​2019). Source: Defense Manpower Data Center

been reduced, and as of June 2019, the total number of U.S. military personnel stationed in the UAE was 352. This reveals that the U.S. regional power has been shifted from the Air Force to the Navy. 7.2.1.6  Oman Oman signed the Facility Access Agreement (FAA) in April 1980, granting U.S. forces the right to use military bases in the country (the FAA was updated in 2010 and is still valid). The agreement states that the United States may use some of Oman’s Air Force facilities (with a prior notice and for limited purposes). A  new agreement was signed in March 2019, allowing the U.S.  forces access to port facilities at Duqm and Salalah. The port of Duqm, in particular, can receive carriers and is becoming a strategic point for the U.S. CENTCOM, which positions the Navy as its mainstay today. In addition, China also focuses on Duqm as part of the so-​called “Belt and Road Initiative,” so this port has become a focal point in the international rivalry in recent years. 7.2.2  Research question Since the early 1990s, the United States has direct military involvement in the Middle East through military bases and base networks established in Gulf countries, ensuring order and security in the region as a hegemonic power. However, an interesting exception in such developments is Saudi Arabia. Unlike other Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia has accepted U.S. military bases since the early Cold War. After the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia accepted large U.S.  forces in the 1990s, but unlike other Gulf states, did not sign an official agreement with the United States. Although almost all U.S.  troops were withdrawn from its bases after 2003, it decided again to accept a certain number of U.S. troops in 2019. In this way, the

116  Masaki Mizobuchi transition of the U.S. forces stationed in Saudi Arabia is far beyond the overall framework of the U.S. strategy for the Middle East, which means that base politics in Saudi Arabia are obviously affected by distinct political features different from those of other Gulf countries. If that is the case, what are those distinct political features? Regarding this question, Calder (2007), for example, categorized base politics in Saudi Arabia as “affective politics” and focused on the impact of Saudi Arabia’s national credo, Wahhabi ideology (i.e., social and cultural factors), on the country’s base politics. Even so, a static argument such as that cannot explain why the Saudi government steadily accepted U.S. military bases at a certain period, but did not at other periods. On the other hand, Cooley (2008) argued that base politics are contingent on two factors: (1) the host regime’s dependence on the contract for political survival; and (2) the contractual credibility of the host nation’s institutions. Cooley also argued that base contracts come under duress when their political costs outweigh the quid pro quo for the host nation’s political elites (i.e., political factors). Cooley’s argument is persuasive and can explain many cases, but it does not adequately explain Saudi Arabia’s particular case. Gresh (2015) is currently the most important study for understanding base politics in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. Gresh (2015, p. 3) argued that “[w]‌hen external security concerns outweigh perceptions of internal security, a Gulf Arab host nation is more likely to maintain a U.S.  military basing presence. … when the respective host monarchy feels that its regime’s survival is threatened due to a possible coup or the imminent threat of revolution, the monarchy will call for the termination of a U.S. military basing agreement as a means to relieve pressure and as an attempt to re-​exert its power and legitimacy locally.” This argument is compelling, but cannot explain, for example, why in 1995, when King Fahd ibn ‘Abd al-​’Aziz Al Sa’ud (King Fahd) delegated his political power to Crown Prince Abdullah ibn ‘Abd al-​’Aziz Al Sa’ud (Crown Prince Abdullah) because of health problems, the dynamics of base politics in Saudi Arabia largely changed despite there being no major change in the security environment at home and abroad. So, what factors inform base politics in Saudi Arabia, what makes it unique, and what are its strategic implications? These are the questions that this chapter focuses on, and in the next section, we will try to answer them.

7.3  U.S. military bases and base politics in Saudi Arabia The importance of Saudi Arabia to the United States can be summarized in the following four points:  oil, money, location and anti-​ Communism. First, maintaining the regional order to secure oil and its transportation is the primary task of the U.S. military presence in the Gulf.5 As mentioned above, the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia was initiated because of oil, and, especially since the mid-​1970s, Saudi Arabia has exerted enormous influence in the international oil market. Even today, Saudi Arabia possesses 16  percent of the world’s proved oil reserves, exports the highest amount of petroleum liquids

U.S. bases & base politics in Saudi Arabia  117 in the world, and maintains the world’s largest crude oil production capacity at roughly 12 million barrels a day. It also has a large surplus production capacity to offset the disruptions caused by other oil-​producing countries (U.S. EIA, 2017). Second, Saudi Arabia is an important partner for the United States because it is ready to use its vast funds from oil revenues for the benefit of the United States (e.g., purchase large quantities of American-​made weapons or provide the funds needed for U.S. diplomacy). According to a study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Saudi Arabia’s total military spending in 2018 was estimated at $67.6 billion (third in the world), making it the world’s largest importer of arms from 2014 to 2018 (accounts for 12  percent of the world’s total imports). For the United States, Saudi Arabia is the largest arms buyer, accounting for 22 percent of its total arms exports around the same period (Tian et al., 2019; Wezeman et al., 2019). The Saudi government also signed a $110 billion arms deal with the United States in 2017 (with an option to buy weapons worth $350 billion over the next decade), which is the largest single deal in the U.S. history. In addition, the Saudi government has underpinned financially the U.S. foreign policy in various phases. For example, the Saudi government worked with the United States in the 1980s to provide billions of dollars in support for the anti-​Soviet resistance movement (Mujahideen) in Afghanistan (Coll, 2004; Wright, 2006). Also, during the Gulf Crisis, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker paid significant amounts of Saudi cash to various foreign governments to organize a global multinational force against Iraq (Bronson, 2006, pp. 173, 196). Third, its geopolitical location has been vital for the United States since World War II to the present. As Dean Acheson argued: Saudi Arabia lies between the vital Red Sea and Persian Gulf shipping routes and across the direct air route to India and the Far East. The Government of Saudi Arabia has been highly sympathetic to the cause of the United Nations [Allied forces] and has accorded United States Army aircraft the right to fly over certain uninhabited zones of Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the [U.S.] Army may at any time wish to obtain extensive air facilities in Saudi Arabia. However, the Department is of the opinion that it will be difficult to obtain additional privileges from the Government of Saudi Arabia unless we are prepared to furnish certain direct assistance to that country. (FRUS, 1943, p. 854) Saudi’s geopolitical significance did not diminish during the Cold War. It lies within 1,600 km of the Soviet Union (i.e., a possible bombing range), and the U.S.  military saw significant strategic advantages in denying the Soviet Union passage through Saudi airspace. In addition, U.S. military bases stationed in Saudi Arabia became a major center for military supplies to Afghanistan throughout the 1980s; and during the Gulf War in 1991, they became important for stationing multinational forces. Since then, the bases have played a pivotal role in the surveillance of Iraq’s southern no-​fly zone, invasion on Afghanistan in 2001, and invasion on Iraq in 2003. However, the gradual relocation of the U.S.  base

118  Masaki Mizobuchi functions to other Gulf countries since the 1990s has relatively reduced Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical importance. Fourth, Saudi Arabia, which has a very strict Wahhabi Islam as its national credo, has been a thorough anti-​Communist country throughout the Cold War, which is also an important factor for the United States. Because of Saudi Arabia’s strategic and geopolitical significance, the United States has stationed its military bases in the country since World War II to the present. On the other hand, for Saudi Arabia, the presence of U.S. military bases is crucial to its own national security because the country has, in order to manage the risk of a military coup, a relatively small and vulnerable army despite its huge military spending (Pollack, 2002, pp. 425–​446; Quinlivan, 1999). U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia, however, have not always been stable. In the 1950s and 1960s, and in the 1990s and 2000s, the presence of U.S. bases became a serious political issue both inside and outside Saudi Arabia, and the pressure for their withdrawal increased significantly. In the rest of this section, we first briefly review the origins of U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia. Next, we focus on two eras, the 1950s–​1960s, and the 1990s–​2000s, when the dynamics and the dilemmas of base politics in Saudi Arabia came to the surface, and analyze the international/​regional/​domestic politics of the periods and the dynamics and the peculiarity of base politics in Saudi Arabia (for U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia at this period, see Figure 7.2. and Figure 7.3.). 7.3.1  The origin: Dhahran Airfield Agreement (1945) The first military agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United States, the Dhahran Airfield Agreement, was signed in August 1945. At that time, King ‘Abd al-​’Aziz was very concerned that the agreement would be the beginning of the imperial U.S.  intervention and that it would overstimulate Britain (King ‘Abd al-​’Aziz would not agree to allow the U.S.  to build the base unless the British indicated their “no-​objection” in writing). Considering this, the agreement used the term “airfield” instead of “air base”; the American flag was carefully hidden so that the surrounding tribes would not recognize it as a foreign invasion; it was also promised that the full ownership would be transferred to the Saudi side three years later. On the other hand, it was agreed that non-​Saudi personnel on the base premises would be subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. Army in any case (FRUS, 1945, pp. 944–​950). The construction to expand the existing infrastructure at the airfield began in January 1946; by the time it was operational, however, the war had ended. Beginning in early 1948, renegotiations commenced upon expiration of the agreement. With the Cold War situation intensifying, the Harry Truman administration proposed a right to use the base for 12 years (FRUS, 1949, p. 1575). However, King ‘Abd al-​’Aziz was deeply concerned that this would create an impression of colonial submission, and that the early approval of the United States for the founding of Israel (May 1948) had led many Saudis to look at the United States with disdain.6 Eventually, in March 1949, it was agreed that the ownership

U.S. bases & base politics in Saudi Arabia  119 of the base would be Saudi (the U.S. side would pay the rent) and that it would be a short-​term contract for a single year rather than a long-​term contract for several years (FRUS, 1949, pp.  1589–​1594). Subsequently, in June 1951, the U.S.–​Saudi base agreement was changed from an inefficient single-​year contract to a five-​year contract. Also, based on the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDAA), which was also signed at that time, the USMTM was established in June 1953 with the task of providing training and advice to the Saudi Army (the mission continues to this day as mentioned above). Looking at the early stages of the U.S.  military bases being built in Saudi Arabia, we found several features that defined the base politics that followed. First, while King ‘Abd al-​’Aziz was keenly aware of the need to obtain foreign currency and security guarantees from the United States, he also realized that the presence of U.S. military bases could jeopardize the legitimacy of his rule. Such trade-​offs (e.g., is the presence of U.S.  military bases a strategic asset or political burden?) may have become the basic dilemma of base politics in Saudi Arabia. Second, because the U.S.–​Saudi alliance was initially launched just for oil, the Saudi side, which owned the oil, basically possessed a relatively larger initiative than the U.S. This was very different from the cases of Japan and Germany, whom their defeat in World War II forced to accept U.S. troops as part of the occupation, with the U.S. side having a larger initiative than them. As this basic framework of base politics was being formed, the U.S.–​Saudi relations and the presence of U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia were destabilized drastically due to the turbulent regional affairs of the 1950s and 1960s. 7.3.2  The “Arab Cold War”: From the 1950s to 1960s The most prominent feature of Arab politics during this period was the fact that Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser gained tremendous political power and exerted a strong influence on other Arab states. He did that using his charisma as a weapon, by conducting offensive radio propaganda, inciting revolts in other “conservative” countries, and manipulating the ideology of Arab nationalism (Kerr, 1971; Barnett, 1998). In July 1952, Nasser, along with Muhammad Nagib (first President of Egypt, June 1953 to November 1954) and others, led the so-​called Free Officers and overthrew the Muhammad Ali dynasty in a coup. In June 1956, he became the president and assumed full power. In October the same year, he won a “diplomatic victory” against Britain, France and Israel over the Suez War, and, as a result, his prestige and political influence expanded rapidly throughout the Arab world (Dawisha, 2003, pp. 181–​185). In addition, Nasser’s Egypt achieved integration with Syria in February 1958 and founded the United Arab Republic (UAR). This won him enthusiastic popular support throughout the Arab world; Nasser became a hero of the Arab world. Since the late 1950s, Nasser used his dexterous rhetorical skills to denounce pro-​Western monarchies as “reactionary forces, agents for imperialist,” and called for a revolution for ordinary Arabs through Egyptian radio broadcasts Voice of the

120  Masaki Mizobuchi Arabs (Sawt al-​Arab), which had a wide audience throughout the Arab world. The sporadic political demonstrations by supporters of Nasser in Saudi Arabia and other Arab monarchies in 1955 and 1956, made the Saudi government and other Arab monarchs recognize Nasser’s rapidly increasing influence and aggressive diplomatic strategy as life-​and-​death matter for their regimes. Thus, at that time, in Arab politics, the so-​called “Arab Cold War” between the “progressive” camp led by Egypt under Nasser and the “conservative” camp of monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq (prior to the 1958 Revolution) was formed (Kerr, 1971). Both sides were fiercely competing with each other using the power of their ideologies—​the former: Arab nationalism, the latter: Islam—​and the support of their respective super powers (Soviet Union and United States), to ensure their supremacy in the Arab world and defend the regimes in their respective countries (Gerges, 1994; Walt, 1987, pp. 50–​103). On the other hand, Saudi Arabia descended into chaos after the death of the first King ‘Abd al-​’Aziz in November 1953 (Bronson, 2006, pp.  68–​77; Al-​ Rasheed, 2010, pp.  102–​129). The 51-​year-​old new king, Sa’ud ibn ‘Abd al-​ ’Aziz Al Sa’ud (King Sa’ud), who succeeded his father, was a spender, drank alcohol, and lacked political skills. Under King Sa’ud, Saudi foreign policy was also inconsistent, such as trying to compete both with Egypt and the United States, which led to the Western nations raising question marks on its loyalty. Prince Faisal ibn ‘Abd al-​’Aziz Al Sa’ud (the younger brother of King Sa’ud) was one of the few figures who could restrain the king’s actions. Despite no apparent confrontation, their power struggle continued until 1964, when King Sa’ud delegated his throne to Prince Faisal. With Nasser’s growing prestige and influence after his victory in the Suez War of 1956, the influence of Britain and France on the region shrank rapidly, and the Soviet Union aggressively took steps to fill that political vacuum through the “progressive” Arab camp. U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower was worried about these developments, and in a speech to the Congress in January 1957, he singled out the Soviet threat in his doctrine by authorizing the commitment of U.S. forces “to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism.” At the same time, he urged the Congress to spend 200 million dollars in economic and military assistance to help friendly states in the Middle East increase their security and welfare (the so-​ called “Eisenhower Doctrine”). In response to these developments, King Sa’ud, who was suffering from a serious financial crisis because of unbridled spending at that time, traveled to Washington in February 1957 to secure economic and military assistance (e.g., $110 million sale of weapons with a grace period and $50 million in grant aid over five years subject to parliamentary approval) from the Eisenhower administration. In return, King Sa’ud expressed a modest support for Eisenhower’s Doctrine, signed a new military agreement with the United States in April 1957, and extended the lease period for the Dhahran base for five years (the lease period

U.S. bases & base politics in Saudi Arabia  121 had expired in 1956, after which it was renewed monthly) (FRUS, 1955–​57, pp.  478–​480). Around this time, Dhahran Air Base began to be a target of Nasser’s fierce accusations. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles argued that King Sa’ud was “the only figure in the area with sufficient presence and potential assets to serve as a counterpoise to Nasser,” and begun to seriously consider converting King Sa’ud’s religious authority to political power in Arab politics. The U.S. President also believed that “we should work toward building up King Sa’ud as a major figure in the Middle Eastern area.” Some within the administration began referring to King Sa’ud hopefully as the “Islamic Pope” (Bronson, 2006, p. 74). King Sa’ud, however, was not a character who could compete with Nasser, either in terms of political ability or charisma. One long-​serving American diplomat recounted that the U.S. administration was “desperate,” noting that “to believe that Saud ever could have been an alternative leader to Nasser in terms of pan-​Arabism, was just unbelievable” (Bronson, 2006, p. 74). As Nasser’s power culminated, only a few Arab states actively supported the Eisenhower Doctrine, and in July 1958, after Iraq’s pro-​Western Hashemite kingdom was overthrown by a bloody coup by Nasser-​influenced military personnel, the doctrine ended in a miserable failure (Yaqub, 2004). The John F. Kennedy administration, launched in January 1961, was sympathetic to the “progressive” idea of Arab nationalism from the outset. Kennedy, while criticizing “conservative” monarchies such as Saudi Arabia for causing social unrest and Soviet penetration by themselves, attempted a major reorientation of the Middle East policy (Spiegel, 1985, pp. 94–​117). Also, regarding the military dimension, the Kennedy administration valued intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and thus believed that the strategic value of Dhahran Air Base had declined (Long, 1985, p. 40). On the other hand, in Saudi Arabia, power struggles between King Sa’ud and Prince Faisal from the late 1950s continued, and its “conservative” regime was shaken by Nasser’s relentless propaganda attacks. At the same time, Prince Talal ibn ‘Abd al-​’Aziz Al Sa’ud, who did not hide his sympathy for Nasser, and his followers demanded radical political reforms and the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in Saudi Arabia (this is the so-​ called “Free Princes Movement” [al-​Haraka al-​Umara’ al-​Ahrar]). The Saudi kingdom was widely believed to be on the verge of collapse (Holden and Johns, 1982, pp.  198–​222; al-​Rasheed, 2010, pp.  102–​110). During such a revolutionary storm in the Middle East, maintaining the Dhahran Agreement entailed significant political costs for both countries, especially for the Saudi kingdom. During the late Eisenhower administration in November 1960, Prince Faisal told Donald Heath, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia: In this modern world, with all the new inventions, the airfield at Dhahran is not of as much use or value to you as in the past. … The burden of my view which, as I said, is expressed here for the first time is that with all the eyes on us, with all the fingers pointing at the airfield, I find that its presence hampers

122  Masaki Mizobuchi 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970

Figure 7.2 U.S. Military Personnel in Saudi Arabia (1953–​1970). Source: Defense Manpower Data Center

cooperation between us. I want to cooperate, but I can only do so when this obstacle is removed. (FRUS, 1960, pp. 768–​769) He added that both governments should come up with a way to end the lease on the base peacefully. Thus, in April 1962, upon mutual agreement, the U.S. military officially turned over the operation of the Dhahran Airfield to the Saudi Arabian Government (FRUS, 1962, p. 585). However, this did not necessarily mean a break in military cooperation between the two countries. Indeed, following a de facto coup d’etat by Prince Faisal in October 1962 and the inauguration of the Lyndon Johnson administration in October 1963, the U.S. pro-​Egyptian policy quickly declined and the relations with Saudi Arabia soon improved. Large-​scale arms trading continued. In addition, since April 1962, the 500-​ personnel USMTM was stationed in Saudi Arabia, and the military infrastructure at the Dhahran base was continuously maintained by that personnel and a U.S. contracting firm. The relationship between the two nations continued to be strong, through twists and turns, and its usefulness was greatly demonstrated during the 1991 Gulf War. 7.3.3  The rise of anti-​Americanism: From the 1990s to 2000s On 2 August 1990, the Iraqi Army, with 1,800 tanks and 140,000 soldiers, under Saddam Hussein invaded neighboring Kuwait and took it over in less than 24 hours. The international community was shocked by Saddam’s sudden and daring actions, which happened immediately after the end of the Cold War, and a heated debate raged over what measures to take (Freedman and Karsh, 1993, p. 67). As was obvious to everyone from the outset, this situation was also extremely urgent for Saudi Arabia, and, despite enormous defense spending of the 1980s (during this period, Saudi’s defense spending averaged about 20 percent of its

U.S. bases & base politics in Saudi Arabia  123 GDP, amounting to $14 to $24 billion [Cordesman, 1997, pp. 105–​107]), it was impossible for the Saudi Army alone to repel the Iraqi Army. Within the George H. W. Bush administration, there was a serious disagreement over the need for the U.S. to plunge into the war, the purpose of the war, and the war plan,7 but, eventually, the U.S. government decided to send a large military expedition to Saudi Arabia and repel Iraq from Kuwait. The mission, led by U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, visited Saudi Arabia on 6 August 1990 and proposed to the Saudi government to accept a large multinational force. Some voiced concerns about accepting a large foreign army of “infidels” in the country, but the imminent threat prompted King Fahd to decide immediately to accept it. The king further sought fatwa of ‘Abd al-​’Aziz ibn Baz, who was the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1993 until his death in 1999, to justify the decision in the context of Islamic law, and in January 1991 he succeeded in getting it (Bronson, 2006, pp. 191–​203). On 17 January 1991, the U.S. Army mobilized 500,000 troops to execute Operation Desert Storm, and a ceasefire was declared on 28 February, only six weeks later. At that time, “[t]‌he U.S.  role was made immeasurably easier by existing Saudi military infrastructure, access to its airspace, and the long-​standing history between the two states” (Bronson, 2006, p. 200). Subsequently, the Bush administration ended the war early without aiming to invade Iraq or overthrow Saddam’s regime. The United States then quickly withdrew its wartime troops as planned before the war, and the size of the U.S. forces stationed in Saudi Arabia fell below 1,000 in 1994. However, in October 1994, Iraq again threatened the northern Kuwaiti border, in response to which the United States decided to urgently send 30,000 U.S. troops to the Gulf region (Operation Vigilant Warrior).8 The incident prompted the United States to reconfirm that Iraq under Saddam remains an imminent danger to its Gulf allies and that a large number of U.S. troops must remain stationed in the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, to contain Iraq. In this way, the Bill Clinton administration began to implement its long-​conceived policy of containing Iran and Iraq simultaneously (the so-​called “Dual Containment Policy”).9 However, the Operation Desert Storm and subsequent U.S. troop deployments caused strong opposition from various groups in Saudi Arabia. The criticism came from both the liberal (or “secularist”) and Islamist camps, but the latter posed a more serious threat to the regime. Moreover, the Islamist camp could be further divided into moderate reformists and radical extremists. Looking back in time, since the 1970s, and especially throughout the 1980s, King Fahd had been working to encourage religious life at home and spread the ascetic Wahhabi ideology abroad. This was not because he was a devout Muslim but for political purposes. (Indeed, he was known for his indulgence in drinking, gambling and womanizing.) At that time, the legitimacy of the Saudi kingdom was greatly undermined by a series of serious events (e.g., the Iranian revolution, the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca, and Shi’a rioting in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province) in the late 1970s. Therefore, he was keenly aware of the need to relativize Iran’s revolutionary Islamic ideology to increase his authority as a

124  Masaki Mizobuchi “guardian of the two Holy Places” and to solidify the legitimacy of the Saudi kingdom. Under these circumstances, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was a precious opportunity for the Saudi government. “The Afghan war would dramatically alter Saudi society by bringing to the surface and encouraging the most ascetic and fundamentalist religious interpretation. … Afghanistan provided Fahd an opportunity to mobilize domestic support along religious grounds” (Bronson, 2006, pp.  169–​170).10 King Fahd continued to support numerous Islamic organizations at home and abroad11 and actively encouraged support and participation in anti-​Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. Young people who criticized the government in the early 1990s were generations who were strongly influenced by such religious policies by the Saudi government. At the core of the moderate reformer Islamist camp was a group of young intellectuals called Sahwa (Awakening). The group’s representatives, such as Salman al-​Awda, a faculty member at Imam Mohammad ibn Saud Islamic University in Riyadh, and Safar al-​Hawali, dean of the Islamic College at Umm al-​Qura University in Mecca, were imprisoned by Saudi authorities in 1994. Despite their beliefs being based on a rigorous Wahhabi tradition in Saudi Arabia, they were also strongly influenced by Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood members who had fled to Saudi Arabia in the 1950s and 1960s and especially by Qutbism.12 After the Gulf War, they sharply criticized the Saudi government for being unable to defend the country despite huge defense budgets, accepting “infidel” U.S. forces inside the country, and deviating from pure Islamic principles. They also argued that this was a sign of mental and economic corruption, as well as physical disintegration of the kingdom. In the early 1990s al-​Hawali expressed the idea that “If Iraq has occupied Kuwait, then America has occupied Saudi Arabia. The real enemy is not Iraq. It is the West” (Fandy, 1990). The cassette tapes of his speeches denouncing the American deployment in Saudi Arabia were circulating throughout the kingdom, just as tapes of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s speeches once permeated Shah’s Iran. They also sent open letters addressed to the king and other religious authorities in May 1991 and September 1992—​the former was the so-​called “religious petition,” signed by 52 Islamists, and the latter was titled the “Memorandum of Advice,” and was signed by over 100 Islamists. In the “petition,” several reforms within an Islamic framework were demanded. The proposed reforms covered a number of areas: the role of the ulama and preachers, laws and regulations, the judicial system and the courts, public administration, the economy and finance, social institutions, the army, the information system, and foreign policy. The proposed reforms implied that in these areas the government was not applying the Shari’a, and demanded the “Islamization” of politics in Saudi Arabia, calling for the establishment in Saudi Arabia of a strong “Islamic Army” of 500,000 people (Fandy, 1999, pp. 50–​60; al-​Rasheed, 2010, pp. 164–​166). As Gause (1994, p. 35) argued, these open letters were unprecedented in the recent Saudi history in the bluntness

U.S. bases & base politics in Saudi Arabia  125 of their tone, their detailed critique of a wide range of the government’s policies, and the public nature of their dissemination. Nevertheless, Sahwa was an elite group of intellectuals who wanted reforms within the regime, not revolution. Apart from them, there were also revolutionary and radical militants (Salafi-​jihadi movements),13 who were mainly Saudis returning from Afghanistan, and lower class people who had a high school diploma or less formal schooling (Hegghammer, 2010, pp.  239–​243). Bin Ladin (although he was not from a lower class) was a representative of these movements. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, his document “The Declaration of Jihad against the United States” of 1996 was marked by intense anti-​Americanism and harsh criticism of the Saudi royal family. Importantly, these ideas had a certain appeal among the ordinary Saudis. The revolutionaries repeated terrorist attacks on U.S.  military facilities in Saudi Arabia throughout the 1990s. The first such attack after the Gulf War was the bombing of a joint U.S.–​Saudi facility in Riyadh that housed a USMTM helping to train Saudi Arabia’s National Guard personnel on 13 November 1995. The attack was specifically targeted at Americans (the bomb exploded when many Saudis were out for worship), and killed five U.S. soldiers. Different groups claimed credit for the attack but the truth regarding the incident has not yet been elucidated. Also, in June 1996, a month after four terror suspects were executed for the Riyadh bombing, a truck bomb exploded outside Khobar Towers, an apartment complex housing 2,000 members of U.S.  armed forces. The explosion killed 19 U.S. servicemen and wounded another 372. The truth of this case remains unclear (although the theory that this terrorist attack was carried out by Iran-​ influenced Saudi terrorist organizations is widely accepted).14 U.S. officials, who saw the matters seriously, decided to move most of the American air force personnel to Prince Sultan Air Base, located in al-​Kharj, 90 km southeast of Riyadh. Unlike the area around the Dhahran Airfield, the area around Prince Sultan Air Base is almost an uninhabited desert, which makes it hard for Saudis to see the U.S. presence. In such circumstances, the ordinary Arabs gradually started to look harshly at the United States and the U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia.15 There were several reasons for that. One is the suffering of innocent Iraqi people (called by some a “genocide” [Boukhari, 2000]), brought by severe U.S.-​led economic sanctions and watched in real time across the Arab world, including Saudi Arabia, on Qatari satellite TV channel Al-​Jazeera, which began broadcasting in 1996. On the other hand, sporadic punitive operations against Iraq (U.S.  military bases in Saudi Arabia served as strongholds for such attacks) did not hurt Saddam’s regime, and he and other high-​ranking government officials continued to wriggle out of sanctions and flourish through illegal businesses. Arab people also questioned the American “double standards,” i.e., the U.S. support for authoritarian states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia through the stationing of its military personnel there, despite its discourse on “freedom” and “democracy.” Regarding the Arab–​Israel

126  Masaki Mizobuchi 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 1992

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1997

1998

1999

2000

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Figure 7.3 U.S. Military Personnel in Saudi Arabia (1992–​2005). Source: Defense Manpower Data Center

conflict, they were of the opinion that the Clinton administration, believed to have been most pro-​Israel among the successive U.S.  administrations, always respected the Israeli side in peace talks and maintained an attitude that was unbecoming of an “honest broker.”16 As the hatred for the United States and the criticism of the Saudi government grew within and outside Saudi Arabia, the government gradually moved away from the United States. This trend became even more pronounced after the government authority was delegated to Crown Prince Abdullah following the collapse of King Fahd due to a stroke, two weeks after the 1995 terror attack (although, officially, Prince Abdulla came to throne in August 2005). Unlike King Fahd, who was a staunch pro-​American, Crown Prince Abdullah was more cautious about the relationship with the United States and thought that too close a relationship with the U.S. could jeopardize his regime’s stability. In addition, the Cold War glue that had held the two countries together for so long was dissolving in December 1989. “Common interests were over time being reduced,” said Martin Indyk, and the two nations were “gradually going our own ways” (quoted by Bronson, 2006, p. 231). This situation did not change after George W. Bush, who for long had close ties with Saudi Arabia, became the U.S. president in January 2001. Moreover, the 9/​ 11 terrorist attack in 2001 overturned the U.S.–​ Saudi relations from the bottom. From the outset, various evidence showed the links between Al-​Qaeda and the Saudi government (15 out of 19 perpetrators were Saudis). For example, in 2002, an independent task force report sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (chaired by Maurice R. Greenberg) found that “for years, individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia have been the most important source of funds for Al-​Qaeda. And for years, Saudi officials have turned a blind eye to this problem” (CFR, 2002, p. 1).17 Due to this, the U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia, which had played a role during the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the Iraq war in 2003, were withdrawn by 2004 (except for training and facility maintenance personnel and embassy and consulate security personnel).

U.S. bases & base politics in Saudi Arabia  127

7.4  Conclusion This chapter first provided an overview of the U.S. military presence in the Gulf region, and then focused on Saudi Arabia in particular, looking at U.S. military bases and political developments concerning base politics in the country. Based on the arguments in the chapter, the following three peculiarities of base politics in Saudi Arabia can be identified. First, oil and Islam are crucial factors in considering base politics in Saudi Arabia. In this regard, Calder (2007) was right. Although this point is not particularly new in Middle Eastern studies, it is important in the context of comparative base politics, so I would like to affirm its inclusion here. For U.S. and Saudi policymakers, the presence of the U.S.  military was essential since the world’s largest oil-​producing country has a small and vulnerable army. Of course, the “infidel” military presence in the most sacred space in the Islamic world carries a risk of serious political problems. Such trade-​ offs (e.g., is the presence of U.S.  military bases a strategic asset or a political burden?) could become the basic dilemma of base politics in Saudi Arabia. Such a dilemma has not been fully resolved by attempts to obscure the problem (e.g., by setting up bases in unmanned desert areas) and has continued to this day. Second, unlike the cases of Germany and Japan, the host nation has a relatively large initiative in base politics in Saudi Arabia. This has not changed since the 1940s to the present. In addition, Saudi Arabia’s strategies and policies are heavily dependent on the attitudes of a small number of elites (in many cases, the most important decision-​maker is the king), which is why the dynamics of base politics in Saudi Arabia have changed significantly whenever a new king has assumed power. Furthermore, as many studies have pointed out, Saudi Arabia’s strategic position and the presence of external threats can be of relatively low importance in the Saudi elites’ strategic perception. The primary concern for them is how to maintain the current regime, and the main source of threat for them is not external but internal (Gresh, 2015; Gause, 2014). Therefore, in the past, if domestic criticism of the U.S. military presence would soar and shake the regime, the Saudi government would urge the U.S.  troops to withdraw immediately. (In doing so, the circumstances of the United States were largely ignored.) Third, the ambiguity concerning U.S.  military bases, namely, whether they are strategic assets or political burdens, cannot be designed by policymakers in advance. Rather, it is created autonomously within complex international/​ regional/​domestic political dynamics, and has its own political influence. Neither King ‘Abd al-​’Aziz nor President Truman, for example, could have anticipated that the presence of U.S. bases would be someday viewed as the greatest invasion of Muslims and the greatest tragedy of the Islamic world. Thus, for the U.S. military, Saudi Arabia is a country with various uncertainties and risks when it comes to stable maintenance of military bases. The United States signed military agreements with neighboring Gulf states in the early 1990s to disperse the risk of Saudi bases becoming unusable. Since 2017, the Trump

128  Masaki Mizobuchi administration has pushed anti-​Iran policy to the forefront of its Middle East policy and has positioned Saudi Arabia as a pillar of its strategy. The potential inherent risks, however, need to be fully understood.

Notes 1 For definitions of base politics, see also Cooley (2008) and Calder (2007). 2 For more details on the “Twin Pillars Policy,” see Macris (2012) and Sick (2018). 3 Keohane and Nye (1977, p. 44) simply defined “hegemony” as “a situation in which one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations and is willing to do so.” From the 1990s to the 2000s, the United States had both the “power” and the “will” to maintain the security order in the Middle East, acting as a hegemon. 4 It is true that there is a lot of confidential and non-​public information regarding the size and substance of U.S. military forces stationed in Gulf countries. Therefore, this paper will mainly discuss the situation based on open sources and interviews with stakeholders. The figures below are based on the data from the Defense Manpower Data Center (www.dmdc.osd.mil/​appj/​dwp/​index.jsp). It should be noted that there is a large gap between the DMDC and other reports (e.g., IISS [2019] or various reports released by Congress Research Service) regarding the number of U.S. military personnel stationed in Gulf countries. 5 Regarding this, however, some researchers have argued that even without massive forward deployment by the U.S.  military in the Gulf, the regional order could be maintained and Saudi oil could be defended. See, Gholz and Press (2010) and Glaser and Kelanic (2016). 6 Indeed, at that time, there was a controversy over whether the recognition of Israel could be directly linked to the U.S. national interests. For example, George Kennan, in early 1948, summed up the case against the recognition of Israel in an internal State Department analysis: “Supporting the extreme objectives of political Zionism” would be “to the detriment of overall U.S. security objectives” in the Middle East. Such an American policy, he warned, would increase the opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence, endanger profitable oil concessions, and threaten U.S. military basing rights in the region. See Slater (2002, p. 167). 7 Regarding disagreements and controversy within the Bush administration, see Freedman and Karsh (1993, pp. 201–​295) and Mann (2004, pp. 179–​197). 8 Now most analysts believe that Saddam’s movement of troops toward the Kuwaiti border at that time was simply a feint (Gause, 2010, p. 123). 9 For the Dual Containment Policy, see Gause (2010, pp. 121–​134) and Sick (2018). Originally, the idea of “dual ​​ containment” was first announced by American diplomat Martin S. Indyk in the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) in May 1993. 10 According to Bronson (2006, p. 170), in the words of one now reformed Saudi ideologue, during the 1980s “society was given an overdose of religion.” 11 As Atwan (2005, p. 135) argued: “The primary purpose of Saudi Arabia’s emphasis on promulgating the Wahhabi ideology is not religious duty but the use of religion for its own policies. An example of this is the way of life of King Fahd. He was well-​known for his gambling and profligacy, although he built 210 Islamic centers, 1,500 mosques, 202 faculties, and 2,000 religious schools around the world, including Pakistan,

U.S. bases & base politics in Saudi Arabia  129 Nigeria, Bosnia, Chechnya, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. That totaled $87 billion.” 12 For more details about Sayyid Qutb and Qutbism, see Calvert (2009) and Abu-​ Rabi’(1996). About Sahwa, see Fandy (1999) and Lacroix (2011). 13 For more details on the ideology of Salafi-​jihadism, see Maher (2016). 14 Note that the U.S. 9/​ 11 Commission (chaired by former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean) has also since speculated that Bin Ladin and his followers “played some role, as yet unknown” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 60). 15 For more details about the anti-​Americanism that spread throughout the Middle East during the 1990s and 2000s, see Jamal (2012) and Lynch (2006). 16 Many studies have pointed out the Clinton administration’s pro-​Israel attitude. For example, Shlaim (2004) remarked that “Bill Clinton was by far the most pro-​Israel President until George W. Bush’s rise to power,” and added: “[i]‌ndeed, it is difficult to think of an American official who is more quintessentially Israel-​first in his outlook than [the special Middle East coordinator under Clinton] Dennis Ross.” In addition, Pape (2005, p. 114) argued that “[a]lthough there may well have been excellent reasons for their presence, the stationing of tens of thousands of American combat troops on the Arabian Peninsula from 1990 to 2001 most likely made al-​Qaeda [conduct] suicide attacks against Americans.” 17 This situation has not changed since then. “More needs to be done since Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial support base for al-​Qaida, the Taliban, LeT [Lashkar-​e-​ Taiba] and other terrorist groups,” says a secret December 2009 paper signed by the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Her memo urged U.S. diplomats to redouble their efforts to stop Gulf money reaching extremists in Pakistan and Afghanistan. “Donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide. … [O]‌ngoing challenge to persuade Saudi officials to treat terrorist funds emanating from Saudi Arabia as a strategic priority” (Guardian, 5 December 2010). According to the U.S. Department of State, “[d]espite serious and effective efforts to counter the funding of terrorism within the Kingdom, some individuals and entities in Saudi Arabia probably continued to serve as sources of financial support for terrorist groups” (U.S. DoS, 2016).

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8  Singapore’s distinctive “quasi-​bases” Regional security environment, national discourse and path-​dependence Kei Koga 8.1  Introduction Military bases are important assets for Singapore. Being located in a geopolitically important area, the Malacca Strait, where the Indian and Pacific Oceans meet and where important sea lines of communication (SLOCs) exist, Singapore has long attracted great powers, including the United Kingdom, the United States, and China, all of which are eager to have access to its ports to ensure their own commercial benefits, and thereof increase strategic influence in the region. However, precisely because of its important location, Singapore is often susceptible to great power competition, forcing it to choose a side in time of rivalry among them. Although Singapore has traditionally strengthened its military ties with Western powers such as the United Kingdom and the United States, it has eschewed concluding military alliances with them by providing exclusive access to its military bases. Rather than having foreign bases on its soil, Singapore has opened its bases to friendly states. This arrangement has the characteristics of a “quasi-​base” deal where the state does not have a formal agreement that allows foreign troops to be permanently stationed. At the same time, one would think, such a military arrangement would likely result in social discontent. Given Singapore’s openness, it is fairly easy to assume that the number of foreign military visits would be relatively high, which could cause certain social problems, such as crimes committed by foreign troops. Furthermore, Singapore faces its own military-​related issues domestically, particularly personnel-​related accidents. These incidents have raised public concern toward its military system. Salient examples are accidents which have occurred during National Service (NS)—​the two-​year conscription of all male Singaporeans and permanent residents—​such as the death of Aloysius Pang, a Singaporean actor, in 2019; Liu Kai in 2018; Lee Han Xuan Dave in 2018; and Chan Hiang Cheng Gavin in 2017 (Sim, 2015; Mahmud, 2018, 2019a; Lam, 2017, 2018). Despite these, however, Singapore does not face any severe social discontent against its military bases. After examining news databases (Nexis Uni and NewspaperSG) about Singapore’s base issues since Singapore’s political independence in 1965 up until 2018, it was found that there are few base issues, such as noise, foreign military presence and accidents, that have instigated public protests

134  Kei Koga or pleas.1 Indeed, although training accidents during NS have recently been reported, resulting in the training system being reformed to avoid more accidents (e.g., Sun, 2019), no such thing as typical “base issues” was found. Admittedly, given that Singapore is a state that has tight control over public protests (e.g., Singapore Statutes Online, 2020), it would be difficult to examine such issues via the state-​influenced media. However, even foreign media have not reported such issues, which gives rise to the question: Why has there not been either explicit or implicit public discontent against the “base issues” in Singapore? I argue that Singapore’s military base arrangements are highly unique and can be characterized as “quasi-​ base,” even though they were established to manage changing regional strategic environments in Southeast Asia in the 1960s. According to the conventional “quasi-​base” theory, such a base is established because of a host nation’s strategy to avoid public protests and discontents against an incumbent government, and thus quasi-​bases are expected to be seen in quasi-​or full-​democratic states, where the local public can raise their voices and influence domestic political outcome. However, Singapore’s quasi-​ bases are based on its strategic calculation, derived from its strategic environment, where Singapore is generally susceptible to great power competition. Given this, Singapore has attempted to be seen as a strategically neutral state and maintained the openness of its military bases to friendly states in the post-​Cold War period, although its general preference toward the West remains. Domestically, the Singaporean government has successfully managed public perception of its bases through (1) diversification of military training, (2) effective land management, and (3) institutionalization of defense education. Since its independence in 1965, the government institutionalized the domestic narrative of military imperatives, nurturing “militarized civilians,” individuals who are civilians but understand military culture through national education, such as National Service. These arrangements have become path-​dependent, making it possible for the government to minimize public discontent while creating quasi-​bases for maintaining its strategic neutrality. This chapter consists of four parts. First, the existing literature on foreign bases, namely the theory of quasi-​base, is discussed, and how applicable this theory is to Singapore is examined. Second, the chapter analyzes the role of international and regional strategic environments in creating Singapore’s quasi-​bases, and then, focuses on domestic factors that have enabled Singapore to pursue quasi-​bases. Fourth, the chapter summarizes and discusses the theoretical implications of Singapore’s case.

8.2  Theoretical framework: Quasi-​bases, international environment and path-​dependence Singapore has unique types of agreements with foreign governments, such as the United States, which allow foreign military forces to use Singapore’s commercial and military facilities. For example, Singapore concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the United States in 1990, allowing the U.S. military to use Singapore’s military facilities “for transit and logistical support”

Singapore’s distinctive “quasi-bases”  135 (MINDEF, 2019), but it is yet to allow U.S.  troops to have its foreign bases stationed on Singapore’s soil. The MOU was updated in 1998 to allow the U.S.  military to use the Changi Naval Base and again in 2019 to extend the effects of MOU until 2034, but there has been no offer for the United States to have a base in Singapore. In other words, Singapore grants the United States “access” to its bases, but neither permanent nor temporary bases are permitted. This brings us to the concept of “quasi-​base” and its theoretical framework to understand the nature and characteristics of Singapore’s military bases. “Quasi-​ bases” are “foreign military bases that are not supported by a formal agreement” (Bitar, 2016, p. 50). Here, “foreign military base” refers to “a physical installation where foreign troops carry out operations with a high degree of autonomy from the local military,” the size of which does not matter, but which should support foreign military functions (ibid., p. 49). The quasi-​base is different from a formal base that requires a formal agreement between two governments and “specifies the terms of use of the base and the type of operations allowed” (ibid., p. 50). In other words, a formal base is subject to a legally binding agreement, specifying the terms and conditions, while a quasi-​base is founded on a more informal and flexible political agreement. Quasi-​bases are a preferred strategic option for both basing and host nations under certain security conditions. The first factor is change in international political situation, which triggers inter-​state negotiation between host and basing nations. If the international and regional strategic environment changes, the necessity for foreign bases will likely fluctuate. An increase in threat perceptions for host and basing nations would increase the likelihood of continuing or enhancing their formal basing agreement and vice versa. The end of the Cold War changed the cost–​ benefit calculations between host and basing nations and triggered a number of negotiation failures to continue formal foreign base agreements between the United States and host states, including the Philippines in 1991 and Panama in 1999. This factor—​inter-​state negotiation in the context of changes in the utility of foreign bases—​functions as the independent variable, determining whether foreign bases will be retained or abolished. The second factor is the domestic political situation. If the incumbent government of a host nation needs to manage domestic opposition to its existing foreign bases, it might have to reconsider whether it should continue to have the bases by renegotiating the terms. In this sense, the regime type of the host nation matters. This is because a democratic system is more susceptible to public pressure as politicians need to secure their political survival for reelection. Conversely, autocratic states are likely to be more capable of resisting public pressure because they do not have to consider public interests for reelection (ibid., pp. 47–​48). In short, domestic political situation and regime type are relevant to sustaining foreign bases. Basing nations also acquire political and diplomatic benefits through quasi-​ bases because of their informality. One of these is that they can conduct secret operations more easily because, given the agreement’s informal nature, a formal administrative process need not be followed to gain permission from a host nation. The other is that they are relatively immune to public pressure because neither

136  Kei Koga government needs to publicly discuss the issue (ibid., p.  10). These domestic factors work as the intervening variable, which makes it possible for host and basing nations to reach an agreement for a quasi-​base. Bitar argues that the concept of a quasi-​base is important in order to understand the possibility of a continuous military presence of a basing nation in a particular region despite the end of an existing formal basing agreement (2016, p. 10). Host nations also prefer the arrangement as they do not incur heavy financial, legal, administrative and political costs. These characteristics of quasi-​bases shed light on some important traits of Singapore’s military bases. Singapore has no formal foreign military base on its soil. Singapore’s basing agreements with foreign states are rather informal and relatively flexible, although it has some formal agreements with its allies within multilateral frameworks, such as the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).2 Even if the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) are concluded between Singapore and other states, their purpose is to enable the Singapore military to train in foreign countries. Other defense agreements are non-​ mutual defense arrangements, for example, traditional alliances or/​and an equal agreement in terms of jurisdiction. In other words, Singapore’s base arrangements do not guarantee mutual defense assistance in times of inter-​state crises as do traditional military alliances. Rather they aim to facilitate defense-​related cooperation such as military technology development and secure the benefit of logistical support from Singapore. These Singaporean characteristics are important because they provide clues to understanding motivations for creating quasi-​bases, which are different from those provided by the conventional theoretical explanation of the quasi-​base. While the theory attributes domestic politics, particularly democracies and quasi-​ democracies, to the creation of a quasi-​base, Singapore’s “semi-​autocratic” political system has been relatively constant. Indeed, Singapore has been operating under a one-​party dominant political system since 1965, when it first became independent. The ruling party, the People’s Action Party (PAP), was led by Lee Kuan Yew, who was prime minister for 25  years. Subsequently, a change in leadership took place with Goh Chok Tong in 1990, followed by Lee Hsien Loong in 2004, but their leadership duration was generally much longer than in full democracies. Given this, Singapore is often regarded as a “soft authoritarian” or “hybrid regime,” where characteristics of authoritarian and democratic regimes co-​exist (Roy, 1994; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007). The theory of quasi-​bases expects such states to take a decisive step in concluding formal base agreements with other powers for its national defense, particularly considering Singapore’s limited military capabilities. Nevertheless, in Singapore, this is not the case. Obviously, there are differences between the assumptions made in the theory of quasi-​bases and Singapore’s reality. One of the research puzzles that the quasi-​ base theory attempts to unravel is the cause of change in base arrangements from formal to informal ones. However, since its independence, Singapore has not concluded any formal foreign agreement regarding bases to begins with. However, given the relatively centralized government system that makes a strong top-​down

Singapore’s distinctive “quasi-bases”  137 decision-​making process possible, Singapore could have chosen to create a formal base agreement with external powers. Singapore also faced a severe geopolitical environment during the 1960s and the 1970s because of two hostile neighboring states, Malaysia and Indonesia. In 1965, Malaysia decided to detach Singapore, making it an independent state, largely because of its concerns about Singapore’s ethnic Chinese-​dominant demography, which had resulted in racial riots the previous year. Likewise, Indonesia under the Sukarno administration conducted Konfrontasi (confrontation) toward Malaysia and Singapore from 1963. In such conditions, it was entirely possible for Singapore to invite external powers, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, and to negotiate formal bases, but that did not happen. An alternative answer is that both international and regional environments can shape a state’s decision over whether or not to establish foreign bases, bypassing domestic politics. Although the definition of “region” is amorphous and too often socially and politically constructed, a region defined at a given time and space has its own history that ultimately shapes regional states’ security perceptions. For example, in the post-​World War II period, the sub-​Saharan Africa was politically and socially united in order for all African states to gain independence from Europe, while countries in Southeast Asia attempted to enhance regional autonomy (Koga, 2017). These social forces sometimes function as political constraints on regional states’ behavior and principles, shaping the future course of state actions. If certain regional principles prevent local states from creating formal bases, these political constraints may lead them to conclude an agreement for quasi-​bases. At the same time, at a domestic level, the public’s perception of military bases is still important. Even under a strict authoritarian regime, it is possible for the public to undertake demonstrations against the government if dissatisfaction reaches a certain threshold, resulting in political and social instability. It would then be necessary for the government to strategize a means to deal with public discontent. For example, such means include providing reasonable justification that military bases are necessary to protect citizens and pursue national interests, or changing the public mindset through such means as defense education which, if successful, contributes to establishing path-​dependence of a long-​term stability in terms of the state–​society relations over military bases. In this sense, domestic political consideration is not the only intervening variable to establish a quasi-​base. The weakness of the conventional quasi-​base theory is that its independent variable is confined to inter-​state level renegotiation between host and basing nations, and it does not holistically consider the dynamics of international and regional strategic environments that also affect a base negotiation process. In fact, a change in the international environment is not only a factor that triggers inter-​state level negotiation between host and basing nations, but also alters strategic relations with neighboring countries, which can influence a host nation’s decision regarding foreign bases. Therefore, examining the international strategic environment from a broader perspective, particularly through a balance of power calculation, enhances the explanatory

138  Kei Koga power of the theory of quasi-bases, allowing it to explain the creation of informal agreements more generally. The following sections explore how Singapore, from an international and domestic perspective, began to have quasi-​bases.

8.3  International strategic environment: Historical development of regional autonomy Singapore has faced a unique regional strategic environment. In the Malay Peninsula, the end of World War II created a political momentum for independence, resulting in the establishment of the Federation of Malaya in 1948. After the federation became formally independent of Great Britain in 1957, Malaysia was created in 1963. While Singapore was a part of Malaysia, domestic political tensions arose between Singapore and the federal government because of their different perspectives on economic and financial arrangements, as well as lingering racial tensions between ethnic Chinese and Malays, which was illustrated by the 1964 race riots (HistorySG, 2014; Han, 2014). Eventually, the Malaysian Parliament made the decision to expel Singapore, which thus unwillingly gained independence. At this point, Singapore did not have its own military force to ensure its sovereignty and security, and it was psychologically and politically vulnerable to potential and existing external threats. It is within this context that Singapore began to regard its closest neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia as strategically the most important states and decided that it needed a stable relationship with both. The ties that bound Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia together were arguably their shared colonial experience and history, during which they were not able to exercise political autonomy. Indeed, this psychological and political experience led them to participate in the global movement in the 1950s and the 1960s for political independence from former colonies (Koga and Nordin, 2019). For example, in 1955, the Bandung Conference, organized by former colonies in Southeast Asian and South Asian states, including Indonesia and India, laid the foundations for the Non-​Aligned Movement (NAM), whose member states aimed to avoid being entrapped in great power politics between the United States and the Soviet Union (Shimazu, 2014). The movement for decolonization was accelerated in 1960, when the United Nations General Assembly issued the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” (The United Nations, 1960). As former European colonies, there was a political will among Southeast Asian states, including Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, to collectively unite to prevent external intervention in the region. Despite these unifying forces, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia faced intensive inter-​state tensions. As described above, Singapore and Malaysia experienced political and ethnic tensions, resulting in the separation of the two states in 1965 against Singapore’s will. More acutely, Indonesia under the Sukarno administration inclined toward the communist camp and conducted the Konfrontasi policy against the Federation of Malaysia from 1963 because member states of the

Singapore’s distinctive “quasi-bases”  139 federation were seen as puppet regimes of Great Britain (HistorySG, 2014b). The Konfrontasi policy continued even after the separation of Singapore from Malaysia, and Singapore was prepared to establish its own military in order to defend its sovereignty and people. However, given its limited capabilities Singapore understood that it could not defend itself without external support. Thus, Singapore kept the British military bases even after independence, including the Sembawang naval base (Omar and Chan, 2007). At that point, Defense Minister Goh Keng Swee argued that [I]t is no use pretending that without the British military forces in Singapore today, the island cannot be easily overrun within a matter of hours by any neighboring country within a radius of 1,000 miles, if any of these countries care to do so. (Singapore Parliament Reports, 1965a) However, this did not mean that Singapore would also allow Great Britain to use its bases in Singapore for future aggression. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam stated that their purpose was defensive—​to protect Singaporeans (National Archives of Singapore, 1965; Singapore Parliament Reports, 1965b). In other words, the existing foreign bases were meant to ensure Singapore’s own security, and had no other strategic purposes such as extending the sending country’s power projection capabilities. In the late 1960s, when the United Kingdom decided to withdraw its military—​“east of Suez”—​Singapore began to seek alternative solutions, visiting regional powers, such as Australia and New Zealand, to ensure regional security (National Archives of Singapore, 1965). Since it was unable to find a complete replacement, Singapore undertook a two-​pronged strategy. On the one hand, it agreed to establish the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with regional states, including Malaysia and Indonesia. Singapore did not envision that ASEAN would become a military organization, but that such a regional organization would provide an opportunity to strengthen diplomatic ties and mitigate tensions among the members (Leifer, 1987; Koga, 2017, pp. 34–​35). Such a cooperative framework was also meant to prevent the member states from conducting hostile policies, such as Konfrontasi. On the other hand, Singapore still needed to gain military support from external powers. This is because the power vacuum created by the disengagement from the region of the great powers, namely the United Kingdom and the United States, needed to be filled in order to maintain regional stability. With no alternatives remaining, Singapore agreed to establish the FPDA, whose member states include Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. It never provided a concrete military commitment but, rather, it ensured a commitment to consult in times of crisis, which functioned as a “political and psychological deterrence” (Emmers, 2015, p. 175). Thus, instead of relying entirely on one great power for its military protection, Singapore attempted to diversify ways and means to ensure its national security.

140  Kei Koga In this context, ASEAN created an interesting political agreement regarding foreign military bases in 1967. According to the 1967 ASEAN Declaration, the ASEAN member states affirmed that: … all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of States in the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national development. (ASEAN Secretariat, 1967) As this policy was vigorously pursued by Indonesia, regional autonomy and independence became one of the most important ASEAN principles in nurturing regional unity in Southeast Asia (Ba, 2009, pp. 60–​61). Although ASEAN was never a military alliance, its political force functioned as a constraint on member states’ behavior, holding them back from engaging in intra-​ regional military conflicts. The declaration of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971 is a case in point. ZOPFAN issued member states’ political aspirations for regional neutrality, and despite the non-​binding nature of the declaration, it set certain behavioral guidelines for the unity of its member states to defend from excessive external intervention (Koga, 2017, pp. 28–​50). Southeast Asian states certainly understood that it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to remove all foreign bases, considering the legal security commitment by the United States to its regional military allies, namely the Philippines and Thailand, which were unwilling to follow regional interests at the expense of their own security. Nevertheless, given Lee Kuan Yew’s strategic calculation on the basis of the balance of power politics and changes in the regional strategic environment in Southeast Asia, structurally and ideationally, this principle was gradually embedded in Singapore’s foreign policy. The U.S. and U.K. retrenchment, the establishment of the FPDA, and regional pressures from Indonesia and Malaysia, all helped facilitate this trend. Indeed, Indonesia and Malaysia were concerned about Singapore’s unilateral decision to invite U.S. forces by concluding the 1990 MOU near the end of the Cold War, when the Philippines began to renegotiate its U.S.  military bases there, namely Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base (Ciorciari, 2010, p.  98). Singapore established Changi Naval Base, so that it could accommodate large naval ships, including U.S. aircraft carriers, and it agreed to relocate Commander Task Force 73 (CTF73), a task force of the U.S. 7th Fleet that was in charge of logistics (Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific, 2015). This is because Singapore believed that the power vacuum in Southeast Asia created by the end of the Cold War might expedite regional power competition, particularly between Japan and China, potentially destabilizing the region. However, such military arrangements have never evolved into a full-​fledged military alliance or led Singapore and the United States to issue a SOFA for U.S. military officers in Singapore, although subsequent agreements between Singapore and the United States have allowed the latter greater access to Singapore’s facilities.

Singapore’s distinctive “quasi-bases”  141 In this sense, Singapore’s foreign policy principles and its regional strategic environment have been the main factors for understanding its preferences and motivation to create and maintain quasi-​bases. In addition, Singapore’s quasi-​ bases are relatively open to any actors, indicating that Singapore wants to avoid being seen as a staunch Western ally in Southeast Asia. Still, Singapore’s domestic factors are also of significance because its politics have been based on an election system. In such circumstances, although the political system is strongly dominated by one party, the public has the means to express dissatisfaction and the government needs to accommodate or suppress it. The next section discusses domestic factors that legitimize Singapore’s quasi-​ bases to the public.

8.4  Singapore’s domestic environment: Non-​existence of “base issues” Singapore’s land area is only 725 square kilometers, but it has technologically advanced air and naval bases (Data.gov.sg, 2019). Within only 55  years from its independence, Singapore’s air and naval bases experienced drastic changes—​ some were abandoned, restructured, or newly constructed in order to enhance the country’s base capacities (Table 8.1). Since there are currently four air bases and two naval bases in active use, local dissatisfaction with those bases should not be significantly high. Yet, irrespective of the number, military bases in general can cause domestic problems, such as “not in my back yard” opposition, noise pollution, crimes, operational accidents, and environmental pollution (Government of Singapore, 2019). In other words, it is entirely possible that the local public may pressure the government by demanding the modification of its base system. And yet, there is not much political pressure from the local constituencies against the government concerning Singapore’s military bases. This unique political environment stems from both material and ideational factors, namely Table 8.1 Singapore’s Air and Naval Bases

1 2 3 4 5 6

Air bases

Naval bases

RAF Seletar (1928–​1971) Kallang Airport (1937–​1955) Tengah Air Base (1939–​present) Sembawang Air Base (1941–​present) Paya Lebar Air Base (1954–​present) Changi Air Base (East & West) (2004–​Present)

Sembawang Naval Base (1938–​1968)* Brani Naval Base (1974–​2000) Tuas Naval Base (1994–​present) Changi Naval Base (2004–​present)

(Compiled by the Author) * Sembawang Naval Base became a commercial port in 1968, but is still used for military purposes. The United States, for example, uses the base facilities in accordance with the 1990 MOU, while it still possesses some small FPDA logistics functions.

142  Kei Koga (1)  diversification of military training, (2)  effective land management, and (3) institutionalization of defense education. 8.4.1  Diversification of military training Singapore’s military capability is the strongest in Southeast Asia. Its defense spending has steadily increased and in 2018 reached S$15,47 billion, which is over 3  percent of its GDP from the 2010s (IISS, 2020, p.  225; SIPRI, 2019; Brimelow, 2018). Singapore has developed the most technologically advanced armed forces in Southeast Asia, currently consisting of 51,000 active personnel and 252,500 reservists (IISS, 2020, pp.  306–​307). Given the population of approximately 6 million, the size of the military is relatively large—​the fifth largest in Southeast Asia, after Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Myanmar (ibid., pp. 220–​323). As such, Singapore’s military assets are matched with neighboring states. In order to take advantage of the full potential of its military assets, Singapore needs to increase its military readiness through continuous and consistent training. However, given the limited land, air, and maritime space (including the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ))—​the total land size is around 725 square kilometers and the territorial waters comprise 673 square kilometers—​it is not ideal for Singapore to conduct all military training within its territory (Sea Around Us, 2014). Thus, the alternative for Singapore is to use external training fields. In fact, Singapore has historically developed friendly ties with other countries, such as the United States, Australia, France, and Thailand, and concluded agreements with them for military training (Table 8.2). In addition, Singapore also has training agreements with other external defense partners, including Taiwan, Brunei, India, and Germany (Chow, 2016; Hsieh, 2019). Consequently, its troops are spread worldwide, making it possible for them to engage in practical operations and cooperative military action with other states for non-​traditional security purposes at a global level, such as its humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities in the 2005 Hurricane Katrina. These external training fields

Table 8.2 Singapore’s overseas air and naval bases

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Oversea training bases

Country (location)

Redmond Taylor AHP Luke Air Force Base Mountain Home Air Force Base Silverbell Army Heliport Oakey Army Aviation Centre RAAF Base Pearce BA120 Cazaux Airbase Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base

The United States (Texas) The United States (Arizona) The United States (Idaho) The United States (Arizona) Australia (Queensland) Australia (Western Australia) France (La Teste-​de-​Buch) Thailand (Bangkok)

(Compiled by the Author)

Singapore’s distinctive “quasi-bases”  143 help Singapore reduce the possibility of accidents, noise, and crimes within its territory, which served as a factor mitigating the public dissatisfaction with the military bases. 8.4.2  Effective land management Singapore has also successfully managed the ownership and use of land for its military bases. During the colonial period, Singapore had six British air and naval bases on its soil: RAF Seletar, Kallang Airport, Tengah Air Base, Sembawang Air Base, Paya Lebar Air Base, and Sembawang Naval Base. RAF Seletar and Kallang Airport have ceased operations, but some of the bases, such as Tengah and Paya Lebar Air Bases, were refurbished and remained in use even after the Singaporean government took them over. Since the U.K.  and Singapore governments have used these military bases for over half a century, there are no strong vested interests over these lands and public dissatisfaction toward land ownership. Admittedly, there are new bases that have been established by the Singapore government after the end of the Cold War: Changi Air Base, Tuas Naval Base, and Changi Naval Base. This could have potentially created public concern and dissatisfaction. However, the government minimized such a possibility by establishing these bases on reclaimed land. In general, land reclamation is not an unusual practice for Singapore, which historically expanded its land area from 581.5 square kilometers in 1960 to 682.7 in 2001, to 724.2 in 2018 (Data.gov. sg, 2019; Subramanian, 2017). Plans for land reclamation and new bases, therefore, have long existed, and those bases were located in the very eastern (Changi) and western (Tuas) parts of Singapore, where land reclamations were relatively easy. Although the size of these bases is relatively larger than the previous ones, as their locations are away from large residential areas, they do not have a significant impact on the daily lives of the public. Furthermore, Singapore has unique property laws. Unlike large democratic countries, and similar to most small countries, the government does not allow individuals or private sectors to freely “own” the land and territory in Singapore. According to Section 3(2) of Ch. 29 Land Law, “… all land ultimately belongs to the state and other persons can only own an estate or some lesser interest in the land” (Singapore Law Watch, 2019). Generally, land leases, such as those issued by the Housing and Development Board (HDB), are valid for a maximum of 99 years, i.e. not permanent, and the government has the ultimate authority to allocate and decide whether a lease can be terminated (Ong, 2018). The compulsory acquisition of land is thus possible because the government is of the opinion that “land use must be optimized for the public benefit” (Singapore Land Authority, 2019). The government provides compensation, and if unsatisfactory, the government allows those who are affected to take legal action (ibid.). This state of land management has been generally accepted by the public as a fact of life and so too has been the existence of the military bases. It is possible that new bases may be established in the areas that require relocation of some residents in

144  Kei Koga the future. The public, however, is more or less psychologically prepared for such an event. 8.4.3  Institutionalization of defense education The Singapore government emphasizes the importance of education in national security given its vulnerability in terms of its geopolitical location, territorial size, and population. When Singapore was established in 1965, the geopolitical situation surrounding it was dire, and the leaders, particularly Lee Kuan Yew, considered national security as the top policy priority. Of course, there are arguments that leaders use such a narrative, the so-​called crisis narrative, to maintain the PAP’s dominant political power; however, the fact is that Singapore has perceived itself vulnerable throughout its national history (Heng, 2013, pp. 426–​ 428). Lee Kuan Yew’s raison d’être for publishing his first memoire in 1998 was that “people should understand how vulnerable Singapore was and is, the dangers that beset us, and how we nearly did not make it” (Leifer, 2000, p. 9). Also, this thought has been inherited by subsequent leaders, and when Indonesia’s president B. J. Habibie referred to Singapore as a “red little dot,” Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said that the statement “was a vivid and valuable reminder that we are indeed very small and very vulnerable” (Lin, 2019). The logical consequence of this was Singapore’s emphasis on strong military capabilities. In fact, Lee Kuan Yew repeatedly emphasized the importance of “power” in the context of the regional strategic situation (ibid.). In such circumstances, Singapore has constructed national narratives to ensure public awareness of the importance of national defense. Without a doubt, Singapore’s concept of security is not limited to its military capabilities. While such capabilities are a vital part, Singaporean leaders understood that the limited military capabilities of small states could not be substantially shape the regional balance of power or defeat and conquer neighboring countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia. Rather, it aims to maintain and develop “deterrent capabilities” to prevent threats from arising (Chandran, 1975). In this sense, Singapore has taken a broader view of security, linking military, diplomacy, and economy. As early as 1966, Lee denied the need for Singapore to become “a military power” in Southeast Asia, and argued that [T]‌here are many ways in which we can all achieve [security]… [and] [t] here are other aspects of security which are equally pertinent in the long run: your economic viability, the capacity of your political structure to withstand pressures either of a social, cultural or whatever nature. (National Archives of Singapore, 1966) While, initially, the policy priority was to increase its defense capabilities, this was because Singapore did not possess any military before its independence, and thus building military capability became an urgent task. In fact, Singapore’s concept of security has been broader from the outset.

Singapore’s distinctive “quasi-bases”  145 In this context, Singapore gradually constructed national narratives to ensure its own security. Rather than being entangled in ideological conflicts, Singapore attempted to embed a “pragmatism” discourse in its defense education and foreign policy in addition to a “vulnerability” discourse. Domestically, the concept of Singapore’s national security has become an important subject matter in its national education. This was well illustrated in 1984, when Singapore introduced the concept of “Total Defence.” The concept attempted to “unite all sectors of society—​government, business and the people—​in the defence of the country,” and took a “whole-​of-​society” approach for national defense (Hawkins, 1972). The initial concept of “Total Defence” consisted of five pillars:  Military, Civil, Economic, Social and Psychological Defence (In 2019, “Digital Defence” was added to ensure cyber security) (Singapore Civil Defence Force, 2020). The comprehensiveness and interconnectedness of different aspects of security show the imperative of using every means to defend Singapore because of its innate strategic vulnerability. Among them, the most important factor for defense education stems from Psychological Defence. Psychological Defence refers to “each person’s commitment to and confidence in the nation’s future” and “trust among people and faith in government, together with a resilience against forces aimed at sowing discord” (ibid.; Lim, 2018). By having a strong belief in defending Singapore, each citizen will nurture the collective will to do. To this end, the National Education (NE) program institutionalized (1)  the Total Defence Day and (2) national defense education. Total Defence Day was established in 1994, an annual commemoration (of the British surrender to the Japanese on 15 February 1942) that “seeks to remind people of the sufferings endured by [Singapore’s] forefathers during the Japanese Occupation” and is “an occasion to refamiliarize [the Singaporean] with the modern defence strategy of ‘Total defence’…to ensure our continued survival and security” (Singapore Civil Defence Force, 2020). Through national defense education, which instills ideas such as “Singapore is our homeland; this is where we belong,” “We must ourselves defend Singapore,” and “We have confidence in our future,” all trainee teachers need to learn the basics of defense policies (Huxley, 2020, pp. 24–​25; Ministry of Education, Singapore, 2017, p. 6). Since national history tends to be forgotten without institutionalized education, Singapore invented the concept of Total Defence, the Total Defence Day, and defense education through NE, aiming to nurture patriotism and nationalism and educate about the necessity of the defense capabilities. This defense education has facilitated the institutionalization of the “militarized civilian,” which made Singapore citizens understand the necessity of military for the city-state’s security. According to Chong and Chan, the Singaporean government constantly raises awareness of the crisis that Singapore faces (Chong and Chan, 2017, p. 366). For example, in its formative years, Singapore continuously emphasized the threats emanating from neighboring states, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia. In the post-​Cold War period, the potential instability of the Asia-​Pacific region caused by U.S.  disengagement and non-​traditional security

146  Kei Koga issues, including terrorism after the 9/​11 attacks, was emphasized. In so doing, Singapore was able to justify the existence of NS, as well as impose strict rules to prevent any citizens and permanent residents from defecting from the service. Simultaneously defense education through national and military institutions nurtured the so-​called “dual personality,” which means: [that] being an effective soldier requires indulging in simulated military suffering as a badge of pride; at the same time, the citizen soldier has to believe that military and civilian values are perfectly interchangeable and contribute equally to the maintenance of peace. (Ibid., p. 367) Since military culture, such as command and control, is theoretically situated against the democratic one, militarized civilians always face a dilemma between the two. In the Singaporean case, what mitigates these tensions is a “balancing act between political tranquility and perceptions of political crises” (ibid.). As such, it becomes not too difficult for citizens to accept “military imperatives,” including quasi-​bases, if they are reasonably persuaded.

8.5  Conclusion: Quasi-​bases, institutionalization and path-​dependence The case of Singapore’s basing strategy illustrates that it is not only the domestic factor, namely the regime type, that determines whether a state can pursue the quasi-​base option. While democratization and social pressures would influence a state’s basing decision, the international environment and pressures can also play a pivotal role in making such decisions. In fact, Singapore has uniquely developed its military bases since its independence in 1965, resulting in quasi-​bases. It is true that in the pre-​independence era, under British rule, Singapore only had foreign bases because the country did not have its own defense forces. However, after independence and the subsequent U.K. military withdrawal, Singapore began to pursue a distinctive defense policy. Singapore constructed its military through NS, but it also understood that its military capabilities would be insufficient to proactively shape the regional and global balance of power, and thus aimed to use them for deterrence purposes. Although military alliances and partnerships with other states were a strategic option for Singapore, given the ever-​changing strategic environment in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s, when great powers such as the United Kingdom and the United States disengaged from the region, it had no choice but to construct and participate in softer regional institutions, namely the FPDA and ASEAN, for its survival. These softer institutions had different strategic objectives. As for ASEAN, Singapore chose to embrace Indonesia and Malaysia, both potential threats, rather than balancing them. As for the FPDA, recognizing the structural constraints

Singapore’s distinctive “quasi-bases”  147 that reduced security commitments from traditional regional powers, namely the United Kingdom and the United States, Singapore embraced their weak commitments and did not completely relinquish its military linkages to them. However, this strategic choice can be operationalized only by formulating Singapore’s new strategic principle—​equidistance diplomacy. This is because, once Singapore takes a side, it cannot be seen as a neutral actor by regional states and other external states, increasing the risk of becoming entrapped into great power politics without military backing. Singapore needed to avoid leaning toward a particular great power as long as its survival as a state was not affected. This diplomatic posture also affects its base policy. Having foreign bases in Singapore would highly likely increase tensions with its neighbors, Indonesia and Malaysia. Yet, losing military linkages with its traditional strategic partners in the West would significantly weaken Singapore’s deterrence effect. Striking a fine balance between them is therefore imperative for survival, and Singapore has taken a quasi-​base approach to this problem. Accordingly, Singapore’s military bases are not exclusive to those partners, but are basically open to all, as illustrated by the fact that Singapore accepts defense agreements with external states that allow them to conduct port calls and bilateral military exercises, including China (Mahmud, 2019b). Domestic factors surely matter, but they play a secondary role in the Singaporean case. Public dissatisfaction has clearly been low because of the diversification of military training, effective land management, and the institutionalization of defense education. This does not mean that public dissatisfaction with the government is non-​existent; though many have expressed their concern about social inequality and poverty issues, there have been virtually no typical “base issues,” such as noise pollution and accidents, which has significantly influenced the course of Singapore’s base policy.3 This is partly because the Singapore government has successfully constructed the narratives of “vulnerability” and “pragmatism” and institutionalized militarized civilians in the country. Taken together, the strategic environment has largely shaped Singapore’s quasi-​ base policy, and the domestic system has nurtured the norms of the necessity of military imperatives, including quasi-​ bases, resulting in a strong path-​dependence. This chapter demonstrates that, as different from the conventional quasi-​base theory, the establishment of a quasi-​base can also be derived from the structural pressure of the international strategic environment. Of course, as Singapore has been gradually democratizing since independence, the ways and means for the Singaporean government and its public to deal with military bases can be altered in the future. However, this case illustrates the possibility that regime type is not necessarily the only variable that determines the state’s decision to pursue quasi-​bases. The complexity of the decision-​making process on quasi-​bases and the broader interaction of international and domestic factors, such as the state’s geo-​strategic location and defense education, should be explored in advancing a quasi-​base theory.

148  Kei Koga

Notes 1 The search was conducted throughout 2019, using the key words “Singapore” and “military bases.” 2 It is noted that Singapore has the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) with allies and partners, such as Australia and France. However, these bilateral SOFAs are fundamentally arrangements for the Singaporean military to train in those foreign countries, and not vice-versa. In fact, even with the FPDA agreement (with Australia), Singapore basically retains “the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction… with respect to offenses committed within Singapore and punishable by the law of Singapore” (see Embassy of France in Singapore, n.d.; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, 1988; Department of Foreign Affairs, Australia, 1971). 3 For social inequality debates, see Teo Yu Yenn, “Speak about inequality, not just inclusion,” The Straits Times, 4 May 2017.

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Singapore’s distinctive “quasi-bases”  151 Singapore Civil Defence Force (2020). What is Total Defence. Available from:  www. scdf.gov.sg/​home/​community-​volunteers/​community-​preparedness/​total-​defence (Accessed 2 April 2020). Singapore Parliament Reports (1965a). Speech by the Minister of Defence (Dr. Goh Keng Swee), Singapore Army Bill, 23 December 1965 (Hansard). —​—​—​(1965b). Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (S. Rajaratnam), 16 December 1965 and the Yang Di-​Pertuan Negara’s Speech: Debate on the Address, 17 December 1965 (Hansard). Singapore Statutes Online (2020). Public Entertainments Act (Chapter  257):  Revised Edition 2001 (31st July 2001). Available from: https://​sso.agc.gov.sg/​Act/​PEA1958. (Accessed 2 April 2020). SIPRI:  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2019). SIPRI Military Expenditure Database: Data for All Countries 1949–​2018. Available from: www.sipri. org/​databases/​milex. (Accessed 2 April 2020). Sun, D. (2019). “Aloysius Pang’s family:  Set up preventive measures for future sons,” asiaone. Available from:  www.asiaone.com/​singapore/​aloysius-​pangs-​family-​set-​ preventive-​measures-​future-​sons. (Accessed 2 April 2020). The United Nations (1960). 1514 (XV). Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. Available from: https://​undocs.org/​A/​Res/​1514(XV). (Accessed 2 April 2020). Sea Around Us (2014). Singapore. Available from:www.seaaroundus.org/​data/​#/​eez/​ 702?chart=catch-​chart&dimension=taxon&measure=tonnage&limit=10. (Accessed 2 April 2020). Subramanian, S. (2017). “How Singapore Is Creating More Land for Itself,” The New York Times Magazine. Available from:  www.nytimes.com/​2017/​04/​20/​magazine/​how-​ singapore-​is-​creating-​more-​land-​for-​itself.html. (Accessed 2 April 2020). Singapore Law Watch (2019). Ch. 29 Land Law. Available from: www.singaporelawwatch. sg/​About-​Singapore-​Law/​Commercial-​Law/​ch-​29-​land-​law. (Accessed 2 April  2020). Singapore Land Authority (2019). Acquisition of Land: Compulsory Acquisition of Land. Available from: www1.sla.gov.sg/​state-​land-​n-​property/​acquisition-​of-​land. (Accessed 2 April 2020). Teo, Y. Y. (2017). “Speak about inequality, not just inclusion,” The Straits Times. Available from: www.straitstimes.com/​o pinion/​speak-​about-​inequality-​not-​just-​inclusion. (Accessed 2 April 2020).

9 Base politics within the framework of the U.S.–​ROK alliance management scheme1 Tomonori Ishida

9.1  Introduction The U.S. military in the Republic of Korea, consisting of approximately 20,000 army personnel and 8,000 air force personnel, is mostly concentrated in two areas: the Osan-​Pyeongtaek area, located south of Seoul in the mid-​West of the country, and the Daegu-​Busan area, which is in the southeast, facing the Sea of Japan. Located in the former area, Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, in which the United States Forces Korea Command and the U.S.  military’s largest formation the 2nd Infantry Division are stationed, and Osan Air Base, housing the Headquarters of 7th Air Force, form the backbone of the U.S. military power, while the facilities in the latter area serve as hubs for logistics and supply in time of emergency (Sharp, 2011, p. 102). The U.S. military presence in South Korea took this shape through a process of alliance restructuring that the two countries advanced in the 2000s. The two countries searched through talks for the optimal solution regarding the size and positioning of U.S. military units and bases that had until then been scattered throughout the country. As a result, it was decided that the total surface area of U.S. bases in South Korea be reduced to only one third of its previous size, from 73.2  million pyeong (approx. 59,800 acres) to 25.15  million pyeong (approx. 20,550 acres) (ROK Ministry of National Defense, 2006, p. 99). The troop level was also cut substantially, from 37,500 to 28,500 personnel. This rearrangement and reduction of the U.S. military presence in South Korea was partially a consequence of the democratization South Korea accomplished in 1987 (Cooley, 2008). In March 2002, the two countries’ representatives signed the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), which envisaged the return to South Korea of 39.4  million pyeong (approx. 32,200 acres) of land used as training areas and small installations scattered north of Seoul. Behind this agreement was an increase in friction with local residents and the initiative of the U.S.  military, which was planning for selective investment and consolidation (Moon, K. H. S., 2012, pp. 86–​87; Nam, 2006). Furthermore, as part of the process of alliance restructuring, with a view to more radical realignment of U.S. bases, an agreement was achieved to revise the LPP and return the Yongsan Garrison, which had been a matter of concern for years. Important factors behind this were an accident

The U.S.–ROK alliance management scheme  153 involving a U.S. armored vehicle in June 2002, in which two Korean schoolgirls lost their lives, and the rise in nationalism in relation to the United States triggered by it, which influenced the outcome of presidential elections held in December of that year. Korean voters decided to entrust the fate of their country to Roh Moo-​hyun,2 who had stated:  “I will not kowtow to Washington. The ROK-​U.S. alliance should be transformed into horizontal relations” (Kim, H., 2006, p. 286). The change in the political system generated an atmosphere that encouraged a rethinking of both South Korea’s confrontational stance toward the North Korean threat and the U.S. military posture. However, a broad look at the change in the U.S.–​ROK relationship brought about by the alliance restructuring reveals that, due to that process, South Korea actually ended up being more deeply integrated into the U.S.  global strategy. In other words, despite Roh Moo-​hyun’s interest in regaining autonomy in the alliance with the United States and a large-​scale realignment and reduction in the presence of the U.S. military in the country reflecting that desire, through the process of alliance restructuring, South Korea’s role as a country providing military bases to the U.S.  became more clearly visible. What the U.S.  military consistently sought to achieve through the realignment was ensuring the strategic flexibility of its forces in South Korea, that is, their transformation into a mobile force that could be deployed outside of the Korean Peninsula. One of the basic ideas of the U.S. realignment in South Korea—​that the 2nd Infantry Division, which had been stationed along the front line north of Seoul since the Cold War era, should be relieved of its function as a “trip-​wire” that guarantees the automatic intervention of the U.S. in case of war and transferred to the rear, to the Osan-​Pyeongtaek area, so as to ensure its capability as a rapid deployment force—​was guided by this goal. As a consequence of such U.S. intentions, Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, the main destination to which U.S. military installations scattered throughout South Korea, including the front line area, were transferred, was expanded and adapted, becoming one of the largest U.S. military bases abroad, with a total surface of 14.67 million square meters (approx. 4.44 million pyeong). The U.S. plan to expand the mission of its forces in South Korea, which until then centered on the defense of South Korea, so as to include areas in which the military involvement of Seoul is not self-​evident implied a fundamental change in the alliance between the two countries. To put it plainly, due to that change, South Korea came to face the stark dilemma of whether to cooperate or not with the U.S. regarding the use of military bases on its soil. How can the paradox that the plan of Roh Moo-​hyun’s administration, which advocated the restoration of South Korea’s autonomy in the relationship with the United States, resulted in the definition of the role of South Korea as a subsystem within the U.S. global strategy, be explained? It is my opinion that this question has not been sufficiently examined either in studies interested in U.S.–​ROK relations which focused on the analysis of the push for regaining autonomy formulated in the plan of the Roh Moo-​hyun administration (Heo and Roehrig, 2018; Kim, 2008; Lee, 2006; Roehrig, 2014; Snyder, 2018), or in studies which were more interested in the political dynamics of base hosting countries and placed more emphasis on

154  Tomonori Ishida internal politics originating in anti-​base protests than on the interaction between the two countries (Kawato, 2015; Moon, K. H. S., 2012; Yeo, 2011). The autonomy–​ security trade-​ off model of alliances, which was proposed by Morrow (1991) is useful for shedding light on the above question. Morrow points out that there are two types of benefits pursued by states through alliances: security, defined as the ability to defend the status quo on issues where the state does not wish to pursue change, and autonomy, defined as the freedom to pursue desired changes in the status quo. An alliance that is characterized by an exchange of autonomy for security he calls “an asymmetric alliance.” In such an alliance, he claims, a deal is reached when one of the parties voluntarily accepts constraints on its autonomy, such as the provision of military bases or the adjustment of its internal and external policies, in order to enjoy more security benefits, while the other party accepts security risks, such as the possibility of being dragged into a war by the ally, in order to gain more autonomy benefits. When we apply Morrow’s argument, it becomes clear that even throughout the process of its restructuring, the alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea remained asymmetric in nature. In other words, we may say that with growing internal political demands for the reassertion of autonomy in South Korea, the two countries faced the issue of how to strike a new balance in the exchange between autonomy and security, which is an alliance management problem characteristic of asymmetric alliances. The agenda taken up by the U.S.  and South Korea as part of the alliance restructuring was very diverse: from the nature of the U.S. military presence in general (not limited just to the state of U.S.  military bases but also including the structure of the capability of U.S.  forces in Korea), through the decision-​ making by the two militaries in conducting joint operations, to the issue of the significance of the U.S.–​ROK alliance and the geographical scope of the alliance cooperation. The revision of base contracts the U.S. and South Korea engaged in during that process was a part of a more comprehensive process aimed at finding a new balance in the trade-​off between autonomy and security. Thus, below, I  shall examine the base politics that unfolded between the United States and South Korea by placing it in the context of the restructuring of their alliance. First, in the next section I wish to briefly review the background of the work by the two countries on restructuring their alliance. That work was the result of the attempts by the two countries to, each for its own reasons, find a role for their alliance that would not be confined to the defense of South Korea.

9.2  The background of the talks: Search for a role of the alliance that would exceed the defense of Korea 9.2.1  The Roh administration’s view of national security and the U.S.–​ROK Alliance Approximately six months after inauguration as President, on 15 August 2003, in his celebratory speech on the occasion of the 58th anniversary of national liberation Roh Moo-​hyun said the following to his people:

The U.S.–ROK alliance management scheme  155 The imperialistic Cold War order that caused suffering and trials is fading into the back alley of history. Budding in its place is a new order of conciliation and cooperation, as well as peace and coexistence. A new day is dawning for us when we will have to forge our destiny on our own… Even the territorial division, the War and persistent military dictatorship, which are the products of the Cold War, failed to halt our march forward. (Blue House, 2003d) [Partly translated by author from Korean] These words indicate a view of history that regards events form the north–​ south division to the establishment of the military dictatorship as “products of the Cold War.” Or, put conversely, we can see here a problem consciousness characteristic of South Korean progressives, which, from the perspective of overcoming the Cold War, perceives the period from democratization to the overcoming of the north–​south division as a continuum. In it the motivation to relativize the U.S.–​ROK alliance germinated. In light of such problem awareness, it seems natural that Roh Moo-​hyun inherited and, under the slogan of “policy of peace and prosperity,” further developed the basic framework of his predecessor Kim Dae-​jung’s “sunshine policy,” which sought to engage North Korea (Moon, C., 2012). The purpose of Roh’s policy, according to the formulation by the Blue House, was to lay the foundation for the peaceful unification of Korea and, more broadly, peaceful coexistence and co-​ prosperity in Northeast Asia through the promotion of peace on the Korean Peninsula and the pursuit of common prosperity between South and North Korea. More concretely, the policy, while being predicated on the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, aimed to stabilize inter-​Korean relations based on the principles of peaceful coexistence, reconciliation and cooperation by simultaneously pursuing inter-​Korean economic, social and cultural exchange projects and military confidence-​building measures. Furthermore, it also envisioned achieving peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia through strengthening regional multilateral security cooperation (Blue House, 2004a). This was an idea that emerged just as the attempts were being made to get the six party talks under way (involving the U.S., China, Russia and Japan, alongside North and South Korea) concerning the problem of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. That being said, the foreign policy of Roh’s administration, especially that toward the United States, was somewhat different from that of the previous government in the sense that it was colored with nationalistic hues. In its background was the peculiar worldview shared by the generations supporting Roh, which may be termed the spirit of the times. Roh, a human rights lawyer who turned politician after the democratization of 1987, was propelled to presidency by young voters, especially by the strong support of the so-​called “generation 386,”3 who were university students during the 1980s (Kim, H., 2006, pp.  239–​241). They prided themselves on having achieved social change by themselves and placed their hopes for further social development on Roh. Upon winning the presidential election, he included cadres from the generation 386 in the core of his government, called “participatory government,” and strove to meet its expectations. The fact that

156  Tomonori Ishida as many as ten persons who had been imprisoned during the movement for democratization (Seo, 2003) were appointed to the Blue House during Roh’s mandate speaks volumes of the character of his administration. The generation 386, which lead the movement for democratization and brought Roh and his government to power, shared the experience of the Gwangju massacre, which took place in May 1980. In it, the faction lead by general Chun Doo-​hwan, who had grabbed power through a coupe within the military at the end of the previous year, carried out forced mass arrests of the leaders of the pro-​democracy movement, including Kim Dae-​jung, and violently suppressed the opposition of Gwangju citizens to those arrests. The deep disappointment and indignation at the reaction of the U.S., the supposed champion of democracy who at the time failed to take conspicuous measures for bringing the situation under control and gave out the impression that it tacitly approved of the persecution, even welcoming Chun Doo-​hwan to the White House as a state guest the following year, remained firmly imprinted on the collective memory of the generation 386 (Cumings, 2005, pp. 379–​391; Drennan, 2005; Oberdorfer and Carlin, 2014, pp. 98–​105). In the above line from Roh’s speech on the imperialistic Cold War order that brought about suffering and trials to the Korean people we can see the remnants of nationalistic resentment toward the “patron of the military regime.” Such image of the U.S. was easily linked with the nationalistic discourse on America as “the factor impeding the relations between the North and South.” The fact that Roh Moo-​hyun put up the realization of self-​reliant defense as the goal of his government at an early stage can first be understood within this dimension of ideational orientation toward overcoming the consequences of the Cold War. If a new age in the relations with North Korea was to be ushered in in the face of the Bush administration, which was openly expressing its firm stance by calling North Korea an axis of evil, then desiring certain autonomy from the United States was a logical necessity. In the same anniversary speech in 2003 Roh, although praising the security role the U.S.  forces had played in Korea, remarked that it would not be right for the country to leave its national security to the U.S. troops for an indefinite time and indicated that laying “a firm foundation for our armed forces to be fully equipped with self-​reliant national defense capabilities within the next 10 years” was his government’s task. That being said, Roh’s argument regarding self-​reliant defense was not just a product of ideals. It was also a reflection of the reality in which South Korea found itself. As his emphasis in the same speech that “self-​reliant national defense by no means contradicts the ROK–​U.S.  alliance—​they are mutually complementary” indicates, his argument for self-​reliant defense was premised on the existence of the U.S.–​ROK alliance. To make this point clear, his administration soon formally adopted the term “cooperative self-​reliant defense” (Blue House, 2004a, pp. 26–​27). Roh devoted much effort to the functioning of the alliance not just in terms of conceptual ordering but also through concrete action. The greatest proof for that was the fact that when the war in Iraq broke out, on 20 March 2003, he immediately expressed his government’s support for the United States

The U.S.–ROK alliance management scheme  157 ignoring domestic public opinion, and formulated a plan for sending Korean engineering and medical units consisting of 700 troops (Blue House, 2003a), which was followed by a decision in December of the same year to send another 3,000 personnel at the U.S. behest (Blue House, 2008, pp. 270–​274). Furthermore, Roh’s self-​reliant defense was also a response to the attempts by the Bush administration to realign the U.S. forces in South Korea. Caught, so to speak, between its own ideal to free itself of the consequences of the Cold War and the reality of the U.S. plans for realignment, the Roh administration formulated a national security policy which relied on two pillars: policy for engaging North Korea and self-​reliant defense. Therein the request for a revision of the alliance with the U.S., which had until then focused on defending South Korea, was conceived. 9.2.2  The Bush administration’s global posture review (GPR) and the U.S.–​ROK alliance For the Bush administration, the realignment of the U.S.  forces in Korea was a part of the global posture review (GPR), which itself was a part of the transformation of the U.S. military. The basic concept of the transformation, strongly implemented under the leadership of the Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld upon the inauguration of the administration, could already be seen in President Bush’s campaign speeches. In an address delivered at a military academy in South Carolina on 23 September 1999 Bush touched upon threats posed by North Korea, Iran, as well as on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorist threats, and after pointing out the importance of information technology, stealth technology and long-​rage precision guided weapons, warned that the U.S.  military was “still organized more for Cold War threats than for the challenges of a new century.” He advocated the need for the transformation of the U.S. military by saying: “Our forces in the next century must be agile, lethal, readily deployable, and require a minimum of logistical support” (Bush, 1999). Although the implications of their respective views are completely different, it may be said that President Bush shared the stance of President Roh in that they both desired reforms based on the awareness that the consequences of the Cold War should be overcome. When the awareness concerning the need for transformation was implemented in the GPR, which meant the review of the overseas U.S.  troops and base locations, the U.S. forces stationed in South Korea and their bases simply could not be left out as an exception. This is because, as Secretary Rumsfeld pointed out, American troops in Korea were the part of U.S. military that was most specifically organized to counter Cold War threats: “In South Korea, our troops were virtually frozen in place from where they were when the Korean War ended in 1953” (Rumsfeld, 2004, p. 8). Furthermore, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) issued in September 2001 states that the U.S. “overseas presence posture, concentrated in Western Europe and Northeast Asia is inadequate for the new strategic environment” and calls for the development of “a basing system that

158  Tomonori Ishida provides greater flexibility for U.S. forces in critical areas of the world.” What the authors had in mind when making the above clear statements were U.S. forces in Germany, Japan, and especially Korea (U.S. Department of Defense, 2001a, pp. 25–​26). This was not the first time the realignment of U.S. forces was on the agenda. It is an issue that emerged early, as the Cold War was winding down. Already in April 1990 in a report prepared at the request of Congress (“A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century”), the U.S. Department of Defense presented a three-​stage plan for the reduction of U.S.  forces in South Korea. Guided by the idea that the role played by these forces should change from a leading to a supporting role, the planners proposed reducing the number of troops by 7,000 in the first three years, considering the realignment of the 2nd Infantry Division in the following three years while keeping an eye on the North Korean threat, and suggested that the remaining time in the ten-​year period covered by the plan be used by the Koreans to prepare “to take the lead role in their own defense” (U. S. Department of Defense, 1990, p. 11). This plan for the realignment of U.S.  forces in Korea, drawn up by the Department of Defense under the George H. W. Bush administration, with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz playing central roles, came to a halt after the first phase was carried out and the number of U.S. troops in Korea reduced to 37,500, due to the emergence of the problem of North Korean nuclear weapons. However, the realignment plan was later placed in the context of the transformation of the U.S. military and resurrected by the George W. Bush administration, in which Cheney took part as Vice President and Wolfowitz as Deputy Secretary of Defense. The plan aimed to make U.S. troops in Korea function as an organic part of the U.S. global military system by transforming them into an “agile, lethal and readily deployable” force. From that point of view, everything from the troop level, base size and disposition, to the composition of U.S. military units and probable operational activities was subjected to a thorough review. In other words, the Koreanization of the Korean defense was now to be pursued within the new context of the transformation of U.S. Forces Korea into a mobile force ready for deployment outside of the peninsula. The Bush administration officially announced the beginning of talks with allies based on the GPR in November 2003 (White House, 2003b). Coordination with South Korea regarding the U.S. forces in the country had already started in 2002, before the inauguration of President Roh’s administration. Concretely, in November that year, with regard to the problem of realignment, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J.  Feith proposed joint research on the future of the U.S.–​ROK alliance to President Kim Dae-​jung’s administration during his visit to Korea (Blue House, 2008, pp. 180–​181). The following month, in December, during the 34th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), annual talks involving government officials, the two countries, sharing the understanding that the alliance would serve to bolster peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the

The U.S.–ROK alliance management scheme  159 Asia-​Pacific region as a whole, agreed to hold conferences under the Future of the Alliance (FOTA) Policy Initiative in order to adapt the alliance to the changes in the global security environment (U.S. Department of Defense, 2002). At the first FOTA conference held in April 2003 after the inauguration of President Roh’s government, the two countries reached the following common ground: “The U.S. and the Republic of Korea share the understanding that the U.S.–​ROK alliance should in the future develop so as to contribute to the stability on the Korean Peninsula and outside of it. Accordingly, both sides in principle agree that the role of the Republic of Korea in the security of the Korean Peninsula should be enhanced and the contribution of U.S. Forces Korea to the stability of the area should be strengthened” (Blue House, 2003b). Thus, the two countries sat at the negotiation table to explore the possible roles of the U.S.–​ROK alliance that would not be confined just to the defense of South Korea, while sharing the common basic direction of the Koreanization of Korea’s defense.

9.3  Negotiations about the distribution of alliance resources: The realignment of the U.S. military in Korea 9.3.1  The return of the Yongsan Garrison and the transfer of the 2nd Infantry Division to the rear The new talks in which the U.S.  and South Korea engaged were supposed to include from the very beginning the question of what strategic goal other than defense from North Korea they should pursue through their alliance, a problem which could be termed a redefinition of the alliance. Nonetheless, what first made the two countries accelerate the talks in the FOTA venue was a more tangible problem concerning the U.S.  military presence:  how to position U.S.  troops and bases. That was the consequence of the thinking in the Bush administration according to which the transformation of the U.S. military was a pressing, current issue and the thinking of Roh’s administration, which saw the rearrangement and downsizing of U.S. bases as a pressing issue. Regarding the realignment of U.S. Forces Korea, mainly two concrete issues became the focus of discussions: the return of the Yongsan Garrison, located in the center of Seoul, and the transfer of the 2nd Infantry Division, whose elements were spread along the frontline, north of Seoul. At the second FOTA meeting held in June 2003, in addition to the implementation plans regarding the above questions, for the purpose of enhancing the combined defense, the two parties reaffirmed the objective of drawing up an implementation plan for capability enhancement on which both countries would work together and an implementation plan for the transfer of military missions, under which the frontline responsibilities which had been shouldered by the U.S. military stationed in Korea would be gradually transferred to the South Korean military,4 by the next security consultative meeting, which was scheduled for later the same year (U.S. Department of State, 2003). Prior to this, at the end of May, commander of U.S. Forces

160  Tomonori Ishida Korea General Leon J. LaPorte announced, through a meeting with the Korean Defense Minister Cho Young-​kil, the investment of 11 billion dollars for enhancing the capability of the U.S. military in the country (U.S. Forces Korea, 2003).5 “That a foreign army is stationed in the middle of our capital, from our point of view is, a wound to our national pride and a testimony to our painful past” (Blue House, 2008, p.  248)—​as a publication summarizing its achievements reminisced, for the Roh administration, the return of the Yongsan Garrison was, first and foremost, a question of national pride. Yongsan, squeezed by Mt. Nam in the north and facing the Han River in the south, has been a strategic stronghold ever since the Mongol occupation in the thirteenth century. In modern times it was used by the Qing empire, Japan placed its military headquarters there during occupation, and after the Korean war the United States used it as a seat for its military command. For those Koreans whose memories of the war were still fresh, the presence of the Yongsan Garrison was a source of security, as much as the 2nd Infantry Division deployed north of Seoul. However, this perspective, faced with the changes in the Korean society such as economic development and democratization and with the metamorphosis of the international environment brought by the end of the Cold War, could not remain unchanged. That the U.S.  and Korea quickly agreed on the basic goal of the return of the garrison reflected the change in the environment surrounding the Yongsan base. Namely, in June 1990, the two countries exchanged a memorandum of understanding regarding the return of the Yongsan Garrison with the condition attached that South Korea should shoulder the expenses of the relocation in full. Later, the plan was temporarily abandoned by the Korean government since the costs of the relocation greatly exceeded the initial estimates, but the rise of nationalism in relation to the United States throughout 2002 and its influence on the result of the Korean presidential election the same year made the U.S. strengthen its resolve to aim for an early return of the Yongsan Garrison. The two countries agreed at the 34th SCM, held in December 2002 prior to the establishment of President Roh’s government, “to find a mutually acceptable way to relocate U.S. forces outside the city of Seoul” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2002). However, the talks hit a snag over concrete conditions concerning the return, and in the process differences within the Korean government also emerged over whether the emphasis should be placed on autonomy or security. The trigger for this was the decision by the U.S. to switch from the initial plan that envisioned transferring only the command of U.S. Forces Korea, which accounted for the largest portion of U.S. soldiers stationed in the Yongsan Garrison, and leaving behind the U.S.–​ROK Combined Forces Command and the United Nations Command that were located in the same base, to a complete transfer that would also include these two headquarters—​ a turn that occurred after the negotiations with the Korean side about the surface of the base that would remain in U.S. hands reached an impasse. The objective of drawing up the relocation plan by the 35th security consultative meeting in November 2003 did not materialize and, as it became clear that the U.S.  had made a policy turn, a sense of uncertainty spread in Korea regarding the full relocation of U.S.  forces from

The U.S.–ROK alliance management scheme  161 the Yongsan base. In the Korean parliament a resolution opposing the move, which was rooted in the concern that the “relocation of the two headquarters to the south of the Han River means absolute abandonment of the U.S.F.K.’s capability to defend the capital and thus leaves Seoul without security,” attracted the signatures of the majority of parliament members (Park, 2003), and during the U.S.–​ROK working-​level talks, the Korean side submitted a compromising proposal regarding the base surface that was going to be left in U.S. hands (Choi, 2004a; Yu, 2004). As early as January 2004, at the sixth FOTA meeting, the two countries reached an agreement regarding the full transfer of U.S. military units stationed in the Yongsan garrison to the Osan-​Pyeongtaek area. This was a reaction to President Roh’s political decision, which he indicated before the FOTA meeting. Namely, during a luncheon meeting with business journalists on 15 January Roh said: “There are people, including some government officials, who want to keep the Yongsan base as it is now, but this is an old idea” (Choi, 2004a), thereby clearly spelling out the policy of full relocation. Thus, Roh Moo-​hyun opted to clear foreign forces from the capital even though that meant he would have to accept the security implications such a move would bring about.6 In contrast with the question of the return of the Yongsan base, which had its origins in the wishes of the Korean side, the redeployment of the 2nd Infantry Division was an initiative of the American side. Its trigger was the statement of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. On 13 February 2003, days before the start of the Roh government, in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Rumsfeld revealed the blueprint for the realignment of the U.S. forces in Korea by saying: “I would like to see a number of our forces move away from the Seoul area and from the area near the de-​militarized zone (DMZ), and be more oriented toward an air hub and a sea hub” (Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 49). Even after the Nixon administration pulled out the 7th Division from the frontline area north of Seoul at the beginning of the 1970s, the 2nd Infantry Division remained in it. Purposefully stationed in an area in which, in case of a war between the Koreas, the involvement of the U.S. could not be avoided, the division was required to function as a symbol of the resolve of the United States to get involved in the defense of South Korea. However, the G. W. Bush administration made a plan to free this division from such a “trip-​wire” function and transform it into a mobile formation capable of responding rapidly to various challenges on and off the Korean Peninsula. President Roh, who attended his first U.S.–​Korean summit in May 2003 advocating the stance that “the government and the Korean public want the U.S. Yongsan Garrison to be relocated as soon as possible and the future position of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division to be reviewed after the North Korea nuclear issue is resolved” (Blue House, 2003c; Kim, 2004), managed to secure the pledge by the U.S.  that “the relocation of U.S.  bases north of the Han River should be pursued, taking careful account of the political, economic and security situation on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia” (White House, 2003a). However, in the joint statement issued after the second FOTA conference in June the concept of realignment was incorporated in which the consolidation of the bases would

162  Tomonori Ishida take a number of years and proceed in two phases, whereby in the first phase the U.S. troops north of the Han River would be concentrated in Camp Casey in Dongducheon and Camp Red Cloud in Uijeongbu, and then, in the second phase, transferred to hub bases south of the river (U.S. Department of State, 2003). At the 35th SCM in November of the same year the two sides agreed that the first phase should begin as soon as possible and that the exact timing of the second phase of relocations would be determined by the highest national authorities (U.S. Department of Defense, 2003). From there on, the focus of U.S.–​Korean talks in which, as described above, by the beginning of 2004 an agreement was reached regarding the overall framework for the return of the Yongsan Garrison and the transfer of the 2nd Infantry Division to the rear, moved onto concrete terms, such as the alternative base sites South Korea should prepare for the relocation. The results of these talks were revealed at the tenth FOTA conference in July 2004. The two sides agreed Korea would provide 3,49  million pyeong of land in the Pyeongtaek area for the relocation of the Yongsan Garrison and the 2nd Infantry Division. They also found common ground regarding the content of the Umbrella Agreement and the Implementation Agreement concerning the return of the Yongsan base and the Amended Agreement on LPP, which reflected the plan for the relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division (Choi, 2004b; ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004). The substantial expansion of Camp Humphreys to 4,44  million pyeong was a result of this agreement. 9.3.2  Review of U.S. troop levels in Korea In his testimony before Congress in which he hinted at the relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division Rumsfeld also said the following: “possibly, with our improved capabilities of moving people, some of those forces come back home” (Rumsfeld, 2003, p. 49), indicating that the Bush administration plan for the realignment of U.S. Forces Korea also included a consideration of the revision of troop levels. After that, the issue was not taken up in the U.S.–​Korea talks for almost a year, but sometime around the second FOTA conference, which was held in June 2003, the U.S. side presented to the Koreans not only the idea for the relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division but also a proposal for the gradual reduction of 12,500 U.S. troops in Korea (Blue House, 2008, pp. 182–​183). The reduction of U.S.  troops in Korea was explicitly put on the agenda of the talks concerning the alliance at the beginning of June in 2004. The occasion for that was a U.S. proposal laid out in May for a redeployment of U.S. forces stationed in Korea. Namely, President Bush spoke with President Roh on 17 May as U.S.  occupation in Iraq was encountering difficulties and conveyed to him the plan to send to Iraq the approximately 3,600-​strong 2nd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division (Lee, 2006, p. 264). Since the two leaders practically closed the matter between themselves, criticism grew in Korea that bilateral consultations preceding the decision were lacking. On the other hand, as the U.S. was indicating the will to start talks on the reduction of its troops in Korea in earnest, the

The U.S.–ROK alliance management scheme  163 Roh administration was pressed to accept formal talks about the issue of troop reduction, among other measures, in order to appeal to the public that it was closely coordinating with Washington.7 On 6 June, using the occasion of the ninth FOTA conference, the U.S. officially presented a proposal for the reduction of 12,500 U.S. troops by the end of 2005, which included the personnel dispatched to Iraq (Choi and Pu, 2004).8 From that point onwards, the efforts of the Korean side were mainly directed at the review of the schedule for the reduction. Agreement was not achieved by the 12th and last FOTA conference in September, but, after some complications in the negotiations, the two countries announced the final agreement concerning the curtailment of U.S.  troops in Korea on 6 October (U.S. Department of Defense, 2004a). Its gist was that 12,500 personnel would be reduced by 2008 in three stages. The first phase would encompass 5,000 combat troops, including the 3,600 sent to Iraq, and be implemented by the end of 2004. In the second phase, scheduled for 2005 and 2006, 5,000 personnel from combat support units and units that have transferred their mission to the Korean military; and in the last phase, by the end of 2008, 2,500 soldiers, mostly from rear support units, would be reduced respectively.9 On 22 October 2004, at the 36th SCM the two countries agreed to end FOTA talks citing “successful efforts to build a comprehensive and dynamic alliance relationship,” while at the same time launching the U.S.–​ROK Security Policy Initiative (SPI) as a framework for addressing “the broader, long-​term issues the Alliance faces” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2004b). This meant that the U.S. and South Korea, having finished discussing material or tangible problems, i.e., the issues concerning resource distribution within the alliance, were now transferring the focus onto the conceptual or intangible problem of power relations in the alliance. In these new talks South Korea attempted to recover its military’s wartime operational control, whereas the United States focused on securing the strategic flexibility of its forces in South Korea.

9.4  Negotiations about power relations within the alliance 9.4.1  Korean military’s authority for wartime operational control In the celebration speech on the occasion of national liberation in August 2003, which launched the argument regarding self-​reliant defense, Roh made a public plea stating that “the military is still not completely equipped with its own independent capability and authority to implement combat operations” (Blue House, 2003d). Simultaneously with the establishment of the SPI, he set out to further advance his argument. On 8 March 2005, in an address at the Airforce Academy, Roh went deeper into the issue saying: “Within ten years, we should be able to develop our military into one with full command of operations” (Blue House, 2005a). In September the same year at the fourth SPI meeting, reflecting the president’s strong desire, the Korean side officially brought up the issue of the

164  Tomonori Ishida transfer of wartime operational control, and at the 37th SCM in October the two sides agreed to “appropriately accelerate discussions on command relations and wartime operational control” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2005). The issue of wartime operational control goes back to the beginning of the Korean War. In mid-​July 1950 the then president of South Korea Rhee Syngman and the commander of UN troops Field Marshal Douglas MacArthur transferred the Korean military’s operational command to the UN through an exchange of letters—​an arrangement the U.S. and South Korea decided to preserve after the signing of the truce.10 That is the reason why the armistice agreement with the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army and the North Korean People’s Army on behalf of the Free World camp was signed only by the commander of the U.N. forces, who represented the South Korean military too. That is also what gave North Korea an incentive to pursue the realization of direct talks with the United States, rather than the North–​South dialogue. The return of the authority for operational control for Roh’s government was not simply a matter of fulfilling national pride. The following statement Roh made to the media in August 2006 illustrates this point (Blue House, 2006b; Yonhap News Agency, 2006): The wartime operational control is the core of self-​defense, and self-​defense is the core of a self-​reliant country… When we have wartime operational control, we also can take the initiative in military talks with North Korea to ease tensions and build up military confidence measures on the peninsula. That being said, the real issues that needed to be solved in order to realize the return were numerous and complicated. One of them had to do with the fact that the commander of the combined forces was an American general and his deputy a Korean general. Furthermore, the return of operational control posed questions about how well the Korean side was prepared. It was thought that in order to return the authority for operational control to South Korea without harming its defense system, the Korean military had to build the capabilities in the areas it was relying on the United States, such as command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). In January 2006, a day after Roh stated his wishes for the New Year by saying that he would hold talks with the United States so as to settle the issue of the return of wartime operational control within the year, the commander of U.S. Forces Korea Leon LaPorte expressed the view that the control would be transferred when the Korean military achieved the necessary capability (Kim, S., 2006)—​an opinion that was widely shared by military authorities on both sides. However, the bilateral talks carried out by responsible bureaucrats in a cautious manner took a sharp turn after the political functionaries signaled a change in their views. When in June 2006 Roh welcomed representatives of the pro-​democracy movement for an informal, cordial talk, he expressed the opinion that the Korean military would be able to exercise operational control within five years or so, a statement that was more concrete than any previous in terms of the date of the return of control (Blue House, 2006a). Following this, at the

The U.S.–ROK alliance management scheme  165 ninth SPI meeting in July, the U.S. made an about face departing from its previous cautious stance and proposed that the authority for operational control be returned during 2009 (Chosun Ilbo, 2006). Furthermore, on 9 August, it was reported that President Roh stated the following in a media interview:  “Our defense capability has been continuously strengthened… Even if we got back the wartime operational control now, we could exercise it” (Yonhap News Agency, 2006). A  week later, a letter from Secretary Rumsfeld was delivered to the Korean government advocating the return of the operational control for 2009 (Dong-​A Ilbo, 2006). At the 38th SCM in October 2006, the two sides agreed and announced that the return would be completed after 15 October 2009 but not later than 15 March 2012 (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006). After Rumsfeld’s departure from office, during bilateral talks between defense secretaries held in February 2007, an agreement was reached that the return be completed by 17 April 2012 (U.S. Department of Defense, 2007).11 9.4.2  Strategic flexibility of U.S. Forces Korea While South Korea sought the right to command its own military, the U.S. advocated the right of its forces stationed in South Korea to function flexibly, in accordance with strategic needs both on the Korean Peninsula and outside of it. In other words, it wanted the right to use the bases provided by South Korea more freely. The effort by the Bush administration to place the U.S.–​ROK alliance in a context exceeding the Korean Peninsula12 in each joint statement with the Korean authorities reflects that interest. At the first FOTA conference in April 2003, the two countries agreed on the common perception that the U.S.–​ROK alliance should develop in the direction of contributing to the stability of the Korean Peninsula as well as other areas (Blue House, 2003b), and in November of the same year in the Joint Communiqué of the 35th SCM they “reaffirmed the continuing importance of the strategic flexibility of United States forces in the Republic of Korea” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2003). Similar wording was later repeated in SCM joint communiqués of 2004 and 2005 (U.S. Department of Defense, 2004b; U.S. Department of Defense, 2005). Nonetheless, for South Korea, the strategic flexibility pursued by the United States was not something that could be easily affirmed. First of all, approving the possibility of dispatches of U.S. Forces Korea outside the peninsula at the U.S. discretion would mean accepting the risk that the U.S. troop levels in the country might fall unexpectedly low due to America’s one-​sided convenience. Furthermore, as an ever more serious problem, there was a danger that, if Korean bases were used as a departure point of U.S. troops engaged in operations abroad, South Korea might get involved in a conflict it did not desire as a country providing the bases. The participation of U.S. Forces Korea in a possible conflict in the Taiwan Strait was a particularly nightmarish scenario for South Korea. On the other hand, in light of the goal of maintaining the credibility of the U.S. involvement in the defense of South Korea, flatly refusing the interest of U.S. Forces

166  Tomonori Ishida Korea in strategic flexibility, which was rooted in the global strategy of the Bush administration, was not a sensible idea either. Thus, the Roh administration, which was thus forced to make choices concerning how to balance the strained relationship between autonomy and security in regard to the issue of strategic flexibility of U.S.  forces in Korea, attempted to secure the right to veto the deployment of U.S. Forces Korea outside the peninsula by proposing a limit in the geographical scope of the veto powers. President Roh announced his thinking regarding this matter in his speech at the Korea Air Force Academy on 8 March 2005: There have been some voices worrying about possible expansion of the role of U.S. Forces in Korea. This has to do with what is called strategic flexibility. However, it should be clarified that we will not be embroiled in any conflict in Northeast Asia against our will. This is an absolutely firm principle we cannot yield under any circumstance. (Blue House, 2005a) As was clarified the next day on the official website of the president’s cabinet, the above statement by Roh was based on the judgement that as a friend and ally we may have to accept [the strategic flexibility of U.S. Forces Korea] in case the area in question is not Northeast Asia and if, upon the examination of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula, it is judged that there are no major repercussions for that security. (Blue House, 2005b) In fact, as suggested by media reports that a high U.S. Department of Defense official who visited Seoul just before the bilateral summit held in June 2005 pressured the Korean side to accept strategic flexibility of U.S. Forces in Korea by hinting at the possibility that U.S. forces might completely withdraw from the country (Ser, 2005), the relations between the two countries became considerably strained due to the issue of strategic flexibility. It is said that on 10 June at the presidential summit, in reply to President Bush who brought up the issue of strategic flexibility, Roh Moo-​hyun stated the following (Funabashi, 2007, p. 251): As a sovereign nation, South Korea cannot allow foreign troops stationed in its territory to make a unilateral move without its knowledge and, as a consequence, let itself be entangled in a regional conflict, however exceptional the case might be. South Korea retains the right to express its views on this issue. South Korea must be consulted before any action is taken. When asking “as a sovereign nation” for the establishment of a mechanism for prior consultations about the deployment of U.S. forces outside the peninsula,

The U.S.–ROK alliance management scheme  167 President Roh especially had in mind the scenario in which the U.S.  forces in Korea might be embroiled in a conflict in Northeast Asia. At the 37th SCM in October of the same year it was reaffirmed that the issue of strategic flexibility remained important. In November at a new summit the two countries announced the beginning of strategic consultations on the ministerial level for the purpose of discussing bilateral, regional and global issues of mutual interest, with the first meeting scheduled for the beginning of the following year (White House, 2005). After the first round of this meeting termed “Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership,” held on 19 January 2006, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ban Ki-​moon and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that the two sides had, in principle, reached the following agreement concerning strategic flexibility (U.S. Department of State, 2006). The ROK, as an ally, fully understands the rationale for the transformation of the U.S.  global military strategy and respects the necessity for strategic flexibility of the U.S. forces in the ROK. In the implementation of strategic flexibility, the U.S. respects the ROK position that it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people. The Roh administration foreign ministry and the National Security Council (NSC) prepared additional material dated 22 January, in which they elaborated on the agreement. It says that the above agreement, “by affirming only the basic shared understanding in the form of the joint statement instead of regulating concrete and uniform procedures [for the deployment of U.S. troops outside of the Korean Peninsula], leaves room for a flexible response.” The material also states that “in reality it is not possible or desirable to regulate an entire series of procedures based on the current assumptions of future uncertainties,” and that “it should be possible to come up with solutions through bilateral talks whenever a concrete situation develops” (Blue House and ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006). The Roh administration thus, it can be said, withdrew its request for advance consultations regarding the deployment of U.S. troops outside of the peninsula and decided to instead pin its hopes on the U.S. respecting Korea’s position as a sovereign state.

9.5  Conclusion After opposition parties came to power in both countries, on 16 June 2009, presidents Barack Obama and Lee Myung-​bak, who met in the White House, released a document titled “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea.” In the document, which starts with the declaration that “the United States of America and the Republic of Korea are building an alliance to ensure a peaceful, secure and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-​Pacific region, and the world,” the two countries express their resolve to “build a comprehensive strategic alliance of bilateral, regional and

168  Tomonori Ishida global scope” and reaffirm the development direction of their alliance by stating that “the Republic of Korea will take the lead role in the combined defense of Korea, supported by an enduring and capable U.S. military force presence on the Korean Peninsula, in the region, and beyond” (White House, 2009). The course of the alliance restructuring consisting of parallel enhancement of the geographical scope of the alliance cooperation and the Koreanization of Korean defense that was laid out by presidents Bush and Roh was steadily taking root in the relations between the countries. If we apply our theoretical framework, we may say that the restructuring, in terms of the direction it was aiming for, contained elements of an effort for the mitigation of the asymmetry in the alliance. The Koreanization of Korean defense, advanced through the realignment of U.S. forces in Korea, was, in other words, no other but a pursuit of the reduction of the asymmetric transaction—​ the exchange of autonomy for security—​that had characterized the U.S.–​ROK alliance until then. The question of the return of wartime operational control to the Korean military, which President Roh passionately pursued, can also be understood in that context. Moreover, the expansion of the geographical scope for alliance cooperation opened the way for symmetric cooperation, in which, on the Middle Eastern stage for example, the U.S. and South Korea could exchange security with each other. That being said, if we ask whether the two countries aimed to, through the restructuring process, reform their alliance so as to make it symmetrical, the answer is “no.” As Camp Humphreys, which has grown into one of the largest U.S. overseas bases, shows, it could be argued that through the restructuring the U.S.–​ROK alliance has become even more asymmetric in character. Despite the Roh administration’s plan to regain autonomy, the work on alliance restructuring remained within the confines of an asymmetric alliance and was a process in which a new balance point in the trade-​off between autonomy and security was sought. The fundamental reason why the U.S.–​ROK alliance was restructured within the confines of an asymmetric alliance can be found in the fact that the Korean side, who desired to restore its autonomy, was not ready to accept the loss of security provided by the U.S. which that would bring about, as that could have ultimately lead to the dissolution of the alliance. Whenever a situation emerged in the operation of the alliance which required the choice between security and autonomy, a serious domestic rift would occur in South Korea, requiring the president’s political decision. However, Roh, who laid emphasis on the restoration of autonomy, could not make decisions that would put aside considerations concerning the credibility of the U.S.–​ ROK alliance. That Roh’s self-​ reliant defense was after all positioned as a supplement to the U.S.–​ROK alliance is a clear example of that. Logically, a path in which South Korea could strive both for the acquisition of security and the restoration of autonomy by expanding the symmetric relationship in which the two countries provide security to each other, was possible. However, the fact that, regarding the deployment of Korean forces to Iraq, the Roh administration—​caught between the U.S., which expected that

The U.S.–ROK alliance management scheme  169 a substantial number of Korean combat troops would be dispatched, and the domestic public opinion, which was reserved regarding the deployment—​had to search for a compromise (Funabashi, 2007, pp. 230–​238) suggests that in the Korea of the post-​democratization period a sufficient implementation of symmetric cooperation with the U.S. was, practically, impossible. To put it plainly, South Korea was not ready to break out of the framework of asymmetric alliance that ties it to the United States. It is easy to see how, in facing Korea which, while desiring to stay within the confines of the asymmetric alliance also strove for the restoration of its autonomy, the U.S. focused its interest on how autonomy benefits could be extracted from the alliance in the future. In that sense, it can be said that the Bush administration, which desired to run the U.S. forces in Korea in a more flexible way in accordance with its strategic needs, had sufficient incentive to accept the review of the transaction. When revisited in such a way, it seems rather natural that the process of alliance restructuring, an important portion of which was the radical rearrangement and integration of U.S. bases in South Korea, resulted in the practical augmentation of the U.S. military’s discretionary powers concerning the use of the bases. Because, if the security that has been enjoyed under the framework of an alliance, the essence of which is the exchange of autonomy for security, is not to be diminished and the compensation paid for it—​that is, military bases—​is to be reduced, then the quality of the compensation offered must be raised. Thus, South Korea under the Roh administration, which planned to recover autonomy from the United States, had to make a clear choice to strive to be a convenient base hosting nation for the U.S. military.

Notes 1 The views expressed in this chapter are the author’s and do not reflect the official position of the National Institute for Defense Studies or Japan’s Ministry of Defense. 2 It is worth noting that, although during the elections he explained he had changed his mind, Roh Moo-​hyun had in fact previously signed a petition calling for the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea (Kim, H., 2006, p. 286). 3 The term was coined in the 1990s and referred to people who were in their thirties at that time, having attended university during the 1980s and having been born in the 1960s. 4 Under this plan, ten military missions, including the responsibility to police the Panmunjom Joint Security Areas, were to be transferred (Blue House, 2008, pp. 253–​254). 5 According to LaPorte, the plan for force enhancement encompassed upgrades to the intelligence collection systems, increased numbers of improved precision munitions, rotational deployment of the Army’s newest Stryker unit to improve responsiveness, and additions to Army pre-​positioned stocks to increase readiness to defend the Republic of Korea. See also, LaPorte, 2004, p. 29. 6 On the same day Roh made the quoted statement Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Yoon Young-​kwan, who was accused of failing to properly manage the ministry, which

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8 9

10

11

12

was critical of the government’s stance towards the alliance, said in his farewell speech to senior members of the ministry: “Korea does not exist in an international vacuum. It exists in relation to other countries, and our national interest must be found in this reality.” These words were interpreted as a warning to the Blue House, which desired the restoration of autonomy from the United States (Funabashi, 2007, p. 239). The fact that the Roh administration announced at this time that the issue of U.S. troop reduction had been on the agenda of bilateral talks since the previous year has to do with this context (Blue House, 2004b, 2004c; Choi and Choi, 2004). About reactions in South Korea to the reduction plan presented by the U.S., see U.S. Department of State, 2004. In April 2008, after a regime change in South Korea, at the U.S.–​Korea summit an agreement was reached to discontinue the troop reduction and maintain the then troop level at 28,500 (White House, 2008). Furthermore, the authority for operational control of the Korean military was transferred from the U.N. Forces to the newly established U.S.–​ROK Combined Forces Command in 1978 (In fact, the commander of the U.S. Forces Korea also served as the U.N. Forces commander and the U.S.–​ROK Combined Forces commander). In 1994 peacetime operational control was returned to the Korean military. President Roh focused his energies on paving the way during his term in office for a speedy return of the wartime operational control, which remained an unfinished task (Roehrig, 2014, pp. 77–​78). However, later, after regime changes in both countries, the time of the return was first changed to December 2015 during the new Lee Myung-​bak administration, and then, during the following Park Geun-​hye administration, the two countries agreed not to put a time frame on the return but to instead attach importance to the condition that the Korean military achieves the necessary capabilities. See, Heo and Roehrig, 2018, p. 215. An early example of this is the wording of the Joint Communiqué of the 33rd SCM held in November 2001, according to which the two secretaries of defense “concurred that the alliance will serve to bolster peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the Asia-​ Pacific region as a whole” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2001b).

References Blue House (2003a). Irakeu jeonjaeng balbare jeueumhan daetongnyeong damhwa, 20 March. Available from:  http://​16cwd.pa.go.kr/​cwd/​kr/​archive/​archive_​view.php? meta_id=speech&page=&category=&sel_​type=1&keyword=%C0%CC%B6%F3%C5%A 9+%C0%FC%C0%EF+%B9%DF%B9%DF%BF%A1+%C1%EE%C0%BD%C7%D1+%B4% EB%C5%EB%B7%C9+%B4%E3%C8%AD&id=a5783fd87ca2254cbbec0921 (Accessed 25 May 2020). (In Korean). —​—​—​ (2003b). Juhanmigun yongsangiji jogiijeon wonchik habui, 10 April. Available from: http://​16cwd.pa.go.kr/​cwd/​kr/​archive/​archive_​view.php?meta_​id=cwd_​news& page=&category=&sel_​type=1&keyword=%C1%D6%C7%D1%B9%CC%B1%BA+%BF %EB%BB%EA%B1%E2%C1%F6+%C1%B6%B1%E2%C0%CC%C0%FC+%BF%F8%C4% A2+%C7%D5%C0%C7&id=419e0b79eab0f67d0b1ad755 (Accessed 25 May 2020). (In Korean). —​—​—​ (2003c). Daily News Briefings, 10 April. Available from:  http://​16cwd.pa.go. kr/​ c wd/​ e n/​ a rchive/ ​ a rchive_ ​ v iew.php?meta_ ​ i d=en_ ​ p ress_ ​ r elease&page=25&m_​ def=&ss_​def=&category=&navi=issues&sel_​type=1&keyword=&id=7ef5b6d5be894f2 8b100f6c (Accessed 25 May 2020).

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Conclusion Shinji Kawana and Minori Takahashi

The goal of this volume was to shed light on the mechanisms of politics concerning U.S.  overseas military bases with a focus on the attitude of host countries toward the bases. But, why should attention be paid to host countries? The reason for that, as explained in the introductory chapter, lies in the change of the character of U.S. military bases. The sending country, the United States, realigned its bases stationed overseas after the 9/​11 terrorist attacks to make them highly mobile in order to be able to counter asymmetrical threats. As a result, bases lighter both in terms of size and capability have come to the fore (Calder, 2007, p. 66). However, this lightness has induced opportunistic behavior by host countries, who had until then affirmed their trust relationship with the U.S. by accepting heavy bases, and has thus become a trigger for destabilizing their relations with the U.S. Following this qualitative change in relations regarding military bases, the need increased to conduct analyses with a focus on specific issues faced by base-​ hosting countries and areas, which the past research on national security had neglected or could not fully address. Concretely, a trend developed of examining various movements and activities regarding bases in host countries by directing attention to the developmental path of each individual base and the distinctive features of the religious and cultural context behind the establishment of bases. The goal became to accurately trace factors that inform base politics of host countries and areas by identifying the local base issues, while also taking into account the trends in global base politics. The discussions in the chapters of this book have hinted at the importance of area studies, a discipline which has strong interest in describing, understanding and explaining such local phenomena. The authors share the idea that it is exactly the field of area studies, which treats not only the politics and economics but also the culture and society of the people living in a certain space and aims to achieve a comprehensive understanding of foreign cultures, that makes it possible for us to include the factors that the traditional study of military bases could not fully grasp. Also, there is a common understanding among the authors that shedding light on agents or structural factors inductively and from within by finding meaning and value that are difficult to demonstrate through numbers, which is one of the oft-​ quoted characteristics of area studies, is an effective method for comprehending

Conclusion  177 the opportunistic behavior of host countries—a method that can be linked with the present-​day trend of refining the base politics theory. Moreover, the comprehensive understanding of local areas we mentioned does not mean simply digging deeply into a single aspect of life but presenting a theory that connects different aspects. Such area studies approach, often relying on the “intuition” or “nose” of the scholar, involves grasping and interpreting the context of a region or area and has been, we believe, effective in inductively observing the political dynamics of each individual area that could not be detected by the existing, systematic disciplines. In the following section we shall tentatively summarize the findings of this volume from the viewpoint of area studies.

10.1  The discovery of local base issues First, we shall mention the argument by Minori Takahashi, who sheds light on the political dynamics concerning the U.S.  military base in Greenland from a perspective that focuses on non-​material factors such as the political climate and conventions of Denmark, whose government accepted the base. Denmark attaches high priority to the maintenance of its relations with the U.S., and by extension, NATO, and has regarded Thule Air Base in Greenland, which is practically the only security commodity it can offer to the United States, as an asset indispensable for its own survival and prosperity. If so, then, based on models that assume the existence of rational actors, one would expect that Denmark would strip Greenland, which actually hosts the base, of its residual rights in order to be able to carry out bargaining regarding the base to its advantage. However, contrary to this rationalistic prediction, Denmark chose to increase Greenland’s discretionary rights in diplomatic relations. In his chapter, while shedding light on the functioning of Thule Air Base from the perspective of defense agreements and power relations, Takahashi examined the role that non-​material factors, i.e., the Danish democracy, characterized by dialogue, mutual respect and compromising stance and expressed in notions of co-​responsibility, co-​determination, collaboration and co-​influence, played in that decision. As a precondition for that analysis, it was important to see whether there were common interests regarding the acceptance of the base between the host country’s government and the local government and whether the threat perception was shared by them. In that sense, in Takahashi’s chapter, a mutually complementary relationship had to be established between his original inductive analysis and traditional, deductively derived insights. The gist of the chapter is in the explanation that, as is the case with Imai’s chapter upon which we shall touch later, non-​material factors, which have generally been seen as not belonging to the field of national security, can actually affect the substance of base politics decisions and be a valid variable, in some cases a more convincing one than material factors. Second, taking U.S. military bases in Italy as his study case, Matteo Dian offers a comprehensive discussion that sheds light on the change in the functioning of those bases (in response to a change in the source of threat), the change in the

178  Shinji Kawana and Minori Takahashi form of the domestic anti-​base movement (from ideological opposition to the bases to the not-​in-​my-​backyard type of local protest), as well as on the legal framework regarding the bases and the operation of those laws. The chapter reveals the understanding of Italian authorities that accepting U.S. bases is politically desirable, both in terms of the country’s contribution to the North Atlantic alliance and cost-​effectiveness. In order to understand this, Dian points out, we need to consider both the provisions of the status of forces agreement (de jure) and various nuances in their implementation (de facto). According to him, the Italian government is, in principle, in a position that enables it to control the U.S. and NATO activities to a high degree. This is because the Italian authorities possess the right to manage the bases. Nonetheless, Dian argues, the Italian authorities have not used that right to maximize the transparency and oversight of the operation of the bases, but have avoided adhering strictly to the letter of the agreement and have tended to reinterpret it in an ad hoc manner, in accordance with the political and strategic needs of the times. Furthermore, in his discussion concerning nuclear weapons, which are present in Italy in accordance with NATO regulations, Dian also points out that political debates about the issue were completely absent within the government. In that sense, he concludes, it can be said that the Italian authorities have preferred to conduct a very limited control over the U.S. military activities. Third, Shino Hateruma, taking Spain in the period of political system reforms as her case study, sheds light on the tripartite relationship between that country, the United States and NATO. Hateruma focuses on the process in which U.S. military bases built in Spain in the 1950s were reduced, both in terms of the number of facilities and military personnel, in late 1980s and asks why that happened. She explains this with factors such as Spain’s democratization, the closing years of the Cold War, realignment of U.S. forces and the interaction of these elements with the demands of the host country. The chapter reveals that the U.S. administration in the late Cold War period, having received a request from the host Spain to downsize American bases (withdraw the 401 Tactical Fighter Wing stationed in Torejon Base), dealt with the pressure by the Congress, which refused to approve funds for the relocation, and the notification from the Spanish government that it would not renew the SOFA by inviting NATO to share the financial burden of the relocation and by conducting base politics relying on a multilateral security framework. This chapter indicates the importance of approaching reality through a solid grasp of base politics achieved by looking at the mutual relationship between the functioning of the global network of U.S. bases and local trends concerning military bases. Fourth, Keisuke Mori has convincingly elucidated the link between base politics and environmental issues by focusing on the problem of the pollution of waters and water sources that has arisen in areas surrounding U.S.  military bases in Germany. To use Mori’s own words, he endeavored to empirically capture the political process regarding bases at the point where the presence of the U.S. military and the environmental laws of the host country intersect, by closely examining the political and administrative process concerning the removal

Conclusion  179 of pollution caused by per-​and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), which comprise PFOA and PFOS, in the state of Rhineland-​Palatinate, in the German Federation. He developed his discussion by taking into consideration REACH and other EU regulations, the process of their normativization in Germany, as well the operationalization of German environmental laws and the status of forces agreement (that is, not just the legal norms but also how they are been practiced and operated within the local base politics). Not enough of such attempts, striving to connect nature and bases or base politics, have been made so far in the study of base politics between the central government and local governments of hosting countries. As a matter of fact, in political science in general, nature (natural environment) has not been viewed as completely self-​sufficient and sustainable of itself and has routinely been separated from its relationship with humans (human society) and objectified. That is, a premise existed that the primitiveness of nature is removed only when nature is managed by the human hand (Takahashi, 2019, p. 114). Because of that, political science has not been able to sublimate nature (environment) as its own matter of interest. However, human activities strongly influence the future of the planet itself. Today, in the age of Anthropocene, the old mindset in the field of political science is being updated, with discussions attempting to grasp the relationship between nature and politics without preconceptions starting to emerge little by little. Mori’s research is advanced in that it links environmental issues and base politics by trying to look at the base politics of a host country from within. Furthermore, the chemicals he takes up, PFAS (which include PFOA and PFOS), are called “forever chemicals” because they are difficult to decompose once they enter the human body and cause great harm to human health. Fifth, in his chapter Kohei Imai has pointed out the validity of directing attention to regional and ethnic identity, which has thus far often been seen as not belonging to the field of national security and has not been sufficiently incorporated as a variable into research on security. Imai focuses on anti-​base movements against U.S. bases in Turkey and compares three different periods: the 1960s and 1970s, 2003, and the 2010s, aiming to derive a constant explanatory variable for anti-​base movements in Turkey. According to Imai, the constant factor behind the anti-​base protests, which hamper continuous and stable operation of military bases (and function as what Kawana calls “drag force”), since the 1960s is not an increase in the contact between the stationed foreign troops and the local population as has been suggested in previous research (the so-​called “contact hypothesis”), nor the weakening of the consensus on national security among the domestic political elites leading to the thinning of security ties with the United States (the “national security consensus” hypotheses), but infringements of Turkishness (Turkish national and religious identity). Indeed, Calder has pointed out that Islamic culture serves to encourage anti-​base movements in Turkey and that it, in combination with the contact factor, generates (anti-​) base sentiments in that country (Calder, 2007, p. 121). However, what should especially be mentioned concerning Imai’s work is that, by comparing several different instances of protest

180  Shinji Kawana and Minori Takahashi in the country, he has shown that anti-​base activities in Turkey have not been fixed but fluid, and that he has explained what factors strengthen or weaken anti-​ base sentiments within such constant vacillation. Sixth, in conditions where research material and available information is limited, Masaki Mizobuchi approached the issue of the nexus between a despotic state and base politics inductively, using Saudi Arabia as a case study. Mizobuchi focused on Saudi Arabia’s peculiarity among Gulf states, such as the fact that whereas other states in the Gulf region started building direct relations with the U.S. military from the early 1990s, Saudi Arabia had already accepted American military bases in the initial phase of the Cold War and has since conducted close military cooperation with Washington. Also, unlike other Gulf states, Saudi Arabia has not concluded an official military agreement with the U.S. after the Cold War, and its situation regarding the stationing of U.S.  forces has been very fluid. Mizobuchi sheds light on the political dynamics of this host country by taking up two periods in its history when U.S. military bases became both an internal and external political issue:  the 1950s and 1960s, and 1990s and 2000s. He makes it clear that although U.S.  military bases in Saudi Arabia have been important in the relationship between the two countries in terms of national security strategy, since in Saudi Arabia the utmost priority has been placed on domestic sentiments regarding the bases and the maintenance of the regime, which rests on the legitimacy it derives from Wahabi Islam, foreign bases have continuously been a sensitive issue and have sparked various problems. The important thing to note is the regime’s recognition of the existence of internal threats to its survival. In other words, in Saudi base politics, changes in the global strategic environment tend not to be a variable of high importance. Therefore, the chapter shows that whether the U.S. military can carry out base politics in Saudi Arabia stably and continually is closely related with Saudi domestic political trends, which are more influenced by the specific local context. Of course, the mutual relationship between political systems and base politics can also be elucidated using a deductive approach. However, when trying to unravel the internal political dynamics of a host country, it is necessary to empirically demonstrate what political subject, with what interests, exercised influence in what kind of a process, and whether due to that a base was continued or rejected, and in that sense it may be said that the meticulous work by Mizobuchi on depicting the dynamics surrounding U.S. military bases from the local perspective is indispensable. Seventh, in his chapter, Kei Koga focused on the type of environment in which foreign military bases are not politicized domestically, taking Singapore as an example. In Singapore, as a result of thorough government control over demonstrations and media, typical base-​ related incidents such as accidents, noise pollution and crime are not politicized. The chapter asks why. Koga, while recognizing that strict control is possible since Singapore has adopted a semi-​ authoritarian/​autocratic style of governance, goes on to shed light on the social structure in which bases are not problematized (or in other words, in which

Conclusion  181 the issue of military bases is marginalized), by focusing on the interaction of material and ideational factors. He points out Singapore’s history, in which the issue of military bases has not appeared before the eyes of common citizens because defense cooperation with the United States has been carried out behind the closed doors without concluding an alliance (which is often called “the Singaporean model”). He also points out the fact that issues such as noise pollution, etc., have been minimized thanks to the fact that a substantial portion of military exercises is conducted abroad because Singapore’s territory is small. Furthermore, supplementing such material factors, Koga brings up the awareness regarding defense which has been fostered since Singapore’s independence in 1965 through education based on the concept of total defense, as well as its ideational foundations. The chapter shows that Singapore has, by raising awareness regarding defense through education and using it to boost patriotism, nurtured a soil in which national defense is viewed as an obvious necessity (and is not problematized). Eighth, based on the local context, Tomonori Ishida sheds light on the inverse relationship between the quality (capability) and quantity (number) of bases. By examining the case of U.S. base realignment in the Republic of Korea during the administration of President Roh Moo-​Hyun, he empirically demonstrates that in the case bases are rearranged and downsized without amending the framework based on an asymmetric alliance, the role of the remaining bases can in fact be enhanced by reducing the overall number of bases. President Roh’s attempt to reform the alliance was rooted in the idea of achieving greater autonomy in relation to the U.S. through the rearrangement and downsizing of U.S. bases and cutting the number of U.S. troops in his country. However, what was really achieved was the enhancement of U.S. discretionary powers, the reduction of the scope of Korean veto powers, and the fixation of South Korea’s status as the ruled through a deeper integration into the American global strategy. The question posed in Ishida’s chapter was how this paradox could be explained. Ishida, while taking into consideration the end of the Cold War, the rise in non-​ traditional threats and the change in the U.S. military strategy brought about by the growing uncertainty due to those threats, traces the process of bargaining between South Korea and the United States by focusing on the movements for “the Koreanization of Korean defense.” This concept was based on nationalism in relation to the U.S.  and greater independence from the U.S., which were the foundations of President Roh’s politics. Korea’s stance that it would not get involved in regional conflicts in East Asia was respected by the U.S.  and the two countries, against the will of the Korean people, reached an agreement under which the strategic flexibility of U.S.  forces in the Republic of Korea was secured. There, however, a political dilemma arose for South Korea, which was seeking the Koreanization of its defense but only within the framework of the alliance with the U.S., between the realization of the rearrangement and reduction of U.S. bases on the one hand and the expansion of the framework of benefits the country had to provide for the remaining U.S. bases.

182  Shinji Kawana and Minori Takahashi

10.2  Future development of the base politics theory (BPT) Based on the above, we can conclude that issues regarding foreign military bases in countries and areas hosting them become more clearly visible when linked to non-​material factors, which have traditionally been valued by researchers from the field of area studies. Our approach of identifying base issues relying on the context of a certain country or area and inductively shedding light on the diversity of base politics while also developing a mutually complimentary relationship with the approach that looks at the dynamism of military bases from the viewpoint of the entire global disposition of bases undoubtedly contributes to the deepening of the study of base politics, and especially the BPT. More concretely, the contribution of this volume can be summarized as follows. To overcome the issues with the BPT indicated in the introductory chapter and achieve a new theoretical development, we strove to empirically update the theory in terms of understanding various aspects of the drag force by geographically and spatially expanding the scope of case studies. That is, simultaneously with deepening the academic discussions regarding the three points brought up in the introductory chapter: the issue of military bases becoming less visible, the pathways of influence and the reversal of power, we strove to increase the scope of the geographical range that was being analyzed in those discussions. When it comes to the process in which military bases become less visible, the volume has clearly pointed to the existence of variety in it through the cases of Saudi Arabia and Singapore, which use different approaches to make military bases on their territories less visible. Regarding the pathways of influence, through the case of Italy, which has a high degree of authority over bases on its territory, the case of Germany which clearly indicates the connection between environmental pollution faced by host countries and the acceptance of foreign bases, the case of Spain, which during a period of political reforms requested a rearrangement and reduction of U.S. bases, the case of Turkey, which experienced repeated anti-​base protests, and the case of the Republic of Korea, which linked its intention for increasing independence in relation to the United States to base politics, we have shed light on the factors that lead to different outcomes in base politics. Also, we have managed to derive implications for the issue of the reversal of power from the case of Denmark, which conducted its base politics using its territory of Greenland as a stage. Thus, elements of the drag force in base politics appear in various ways. The discussions in chapters two through nine, which strove to update the present position of the BPT described in the introductory chapter by enhancing the geographical and spatial scope covered by case studies, serve to increase the degree of empirical support in the stream of research that attempts to approach that diversity. They also contribute to the relativization and theoretical refinement of the traditional BPT, which has tended to address the relationship between political systems and the stability of base contracts in a simplistic manner. That being said, there is a theoretical issue that could not be sufficiently resolved in this volume. We are referring to the problem of how to treat historical,

Conclusion  183 chronological factors, which can be regarded as playing an important role in generating the diversity in base politics. In this book, by comparing cases of base politics straddling over several regions, we have examined the possibilities of geographically and spatially expanding as well as further generalizing the theory that explains them, specifically, the BPT. But, needless to say, for a theory to really withstand the test of generalization, evidence that supports the validity of the propositions derived from it must be found even beyond a certain point or period in time. Therefore, in the future, in order to deepen the study of military bases, we should work simultaneously in the horizontal direction, that is, on comparing different base-​hosting countries and areas, and in the vertical direction, that is, on historical comparisons. However, to deal with this theoretical issue, we need to overcome a difficult problem peculiar to base politics. This the fact that in the unraveling of base politics time itself can be an important factor (a cause or intermediate factor) affecting the outcome. In fact, because of this problem, the development of base politics is fairly path-​dependent, which is why a simple historical comparison, i.e., a comparison of a point in time t-​1 with the point in time t may not be possible. Since this problem is an important argument that may sway the direction of future theoretical development, we shall briefly address it in the supplement below. Only those readers who are interested in it should continue reading. We bring up the topic of base politics in Okinawa, Japan. 10.2.1  Supplement: How to view base politics in Okinawa 10.2.1.1  The problem of military bases in Okinawa The Japanese and American governments reached an agreement regarding the return of Futenma Base (Marine Corps Air Station) in Okinawa, the most politicized base in Japan, in April of 1996. More than 20 years have passed since, but it is still impossible to foresee when the return will take place. The opposition to bases in Okinawa is still not waning and Okinawa’s society is still being swayed by politics surrounding military bases. In Okinawa, which comprises only 0.2 percent of Japanese territory, approximately 70  percent of all facilities used exclusively by the U.S.  military are concentrated. To explain this phenomenon, Okinawa’s geographical superiority is often quoted. In other words, the explanation is that U.S. military bases are concentrated in Okinawa because the island is located in a geographical area that is strategically important for the U.S. national security. Indeed, it is thought that the bases in Okinawa play an important role in the forward deployment of the U.S. military in the West Pacific. Okinawa is located 1,000 km from the Korean Peninsula, 800km from Kyushu, and 900km from the Taiwanese Strait, with fighter jets, midair refueling planes and early warning aircraft deployed in Kadena Air Base. If we suppose that the action radius of the fighter jets is more than 1,200km, then Kadena Air Base covers the entire area from North East Asia to South China Sea. This constitutes the core of the deterrence in the region.

184  Shinji Kawana and Minori Takahashi Therefore, the concentration of bases in Okinawa seems to be influenced by the geographical factor. However, if we trace back history we can see that the decisions regarding the stationing of American bases in Okinawa, rather than a strategy deduced from the geography, were in many instances heavily influenced by politics. If the U.S. military was stationed in Okinawa based on geographical reasons, then the distribution and organization of its bases in Far East should have been consistent during the Cold War, but were in fact close to fluid until the 1970s. Even the Marine Corps, which forms the backbone of the U.S. forces stationed in Okinawa (utilizing approximately 70% of U.S. bases on the island), was first deployed in Okinawa only in the mid-​1950s, a couple of years after the end of the Korean War. We also know that plans for the withdrawal or transfer of the Marines were examined over and over again. The candidate sites for their relocation have indeed been diverse: Guam and Saipan, the Mariana Islands, the Philippines and South Korea. For example, during the peak of the Vietnam War in 1968 and 1969 the U.S.  considered a full withdrawal of the marines stationed in Okinawa to the mainland, and, in accordance with that, examined the closing of Futenma Base (Kawana, 2020a). The military did not seem to view the Marine Corps in Okinawa as strategically important at that time. The strategic meaning of the airfield in Futenma was ambiguous for a while after its caretaker changed from the Air Force to the Marine Corps in 1960—​in January 1969 it operated only four helicopters. Nonetheless, as a result of the realignment at that time, the U.S.  bases in mainland Japan were reduced, while the bases in Okinawa relatively increased in size. Behind this was the political situation affecting both Japan and the United States, in which the military bases in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area, which had come under a strong pressure to be withdrawn, had to be scaled down. In other words, the change in the policy direction so as to first temporarily keep and later fully preserve Futenma Base, which had for a while been labeled as useless, comprised an aspect of substitution for Atsugi Base in Kanagawa Prefecture near capital Tokyo, which housed air force units. Fighter planes belonging to Yokota Base in Tokyo, as well as bombers from Itazuke in Fukuoka were also transferred to Okinawa. Thus, Okinawa, before its return to Japan in 1972, was, we may say, a repository of military assets that could no longer be maintained in mainland Japan. In that sense, Okinawa was, no doubt, a substitute for the mainland. That being said, we cannot negate the strategic meaning of military bases in Okinawa just based on these facts. That is, because it is quite conceivable that what began as a base without a clear purpose or as a very small facility may, under certain conditions, grow with time and, through repeated interactions with other bases and revisions of the initial purpose, come to possess strategically important functions. In fact, there is a high possibility that a portion of bases in Okinawa went through this process. To understand this, I shall below examine the self-​ reinforcing nature of bases and the problem of path dependence, which emerges

Conclusion  185 in that process, with a focus on the issue of time, which can influence the direction of the development of a base (Kawana, 2020b). 10.2.1.2  Self-​reinforcement The economist W. B. Arthur, who approached the problem of path dependency from the viewpoint of self-​reinforcement, specified the following four conditions for self-​reinforcement to take place:  fixed costs, learning effects, coordination effect and adaptive expectations. Fixed costs have to do with the fall in per-​unit cost that follows an increase in output. Learning effects denote effects which act to lower of the cost of a product as it becomes more widely available and is improved. Coordination effect refers to the advantage of collaborating with other economic agents performing the same activities. Adaptive expectations refer to the phenomenon that an increased prevalence in the market enhances agents’ beliefs regarding further prevalence. 10.2.1.2.1  FIXED COSTS

The cost the user pays in the process of the establishment of a base is huge. The United States in most cases bears the costs of the construction, maintenance and repair of facilities, the employees’ salaries, as well as the operational costs for all kinds of services on the base.1 Therefore, if we are to state a simple assumption, we may say that the more times a base is used the cost that the user pays per one usage falls, and the net profit derived from the base increases. Furthermore, unlike direct private investment, it is difficult to convert military bases for a different usage because they are specific assets by nature (Lake, 2009, pp. 129–​30). Paul Joskow divided this asset specificity into three categories: 1) geographical specificity (where the value of a base depends on the distance and positional relationship with the country regarded as a threat), 2) formal stability (where the value of a base is influenced by the character of the contract and the degree of residual rights),2 and 3) human specificity (where coordination with the host country agents, communication and mutual trust affect the value of the base) (Joskow 1988, pp. 95–​117). Theoretically, those bases that meet these conditions well should be sustainable, since agents using them have the incentive to protect their previous investments (Cooley and Spruyt, 2009; Wallander, 2000). The U.S.  bases in Okinawa remained without much change in this respect even after the return of the administrative rights over the island to Japan in 1972. The few bases that were returned were mostly leisure facilities or abandoned sites that were not fit for use. The reason behind that was the issue of costs. The United States utilized not only the facilities that used to belong to the Japanese Imperial Army, but also requisitioned new land and constructed bases from scratch. Furthermore, in some areas it bore the cost of building civilian infrastructure, such as that for electricity, gas and water supply. In other words, for the U.S., in comparison with mainland Japan where bases were formed by inheriting the facilities that had belonged to the Japanese Imperial Army, the construction

186  Shinji Kawana and Minori Takahashi cost of bases in Okinawa was relatively high (Taira, 2012, p.  92).3 On top of that, there were also political costs due to forceful appropriation of land carried out despite the broad opposition by the local residents, typified by the so-​called “island-​wide struggle,” as well as administrative costs associated with the execution of contracts for base use. Thus, after the war, the United States consistently sought to protect its investment. The bases, as specific assets in which investment had ended, were not returned even when their initial function ceased but continued to be used thanks to a conversion to a different kind of military usage. Also, in 1949, a proposal was floated to transfer strategic air force formations from Okinawa to Japanese mainland or the Philippines for military reasons, but it did not see the light of day due to the costs for the acquisition of new land in both of these locations and construction costs (ibid., pp. 34–​35). Similarly, in 1967 a transfer of land forces stationed in Okinawa to the Philippines was considered from a military point of view, but the idea had to be abandoned in view of the extra cost of 180.5 million dollars that would have been incurred (Kawana, 2016, p. 69). What is more, the reason why Okinawa was chosen from the 1950s as the relocation destination for the 3rd Regiment, which was based at Fuji maneuvering range, is that the investment of funds for base construction in Okinawa had already started (Yamamoto, 2016, p. 41). 10.2.1.2.2  LEARNING EFFECTS

What were the learning effects? Operating a complicated base system requires an implementation of a status agreement; coordination between different authorities; the communication between the military, the government and private companies; as well as knowledge and experience regarding the formation of public opinion. The accumulation of such knowledge and experience enables a more efficient functioning of bases and units, and as a result, stimulates a gradual increase in the profit generated by the bases.4 Even if the accumulated experience has been acquired through a particular military operation or training, it can still be reused in a different tactic or in a joint training with a different country (for example, with the Japanese Self-​Defense Forces), or reactivated by incorporating related techniques and skills. Through the continuous use of a base, politicians and bureaucrats, as well as military personnel, can deepen their relations with other organizations and perhaps even develop a certain political or social identity (Kaplan, 2005). It is conceivable that in such a case the agents involved will have the incentive to maintain the existing base and be attached to it. In the case of Okinawa, the Marine Corps, which has become practically the only U.S. ground formation in Japan, has acquired the status of a “symbol” of the defense of Japan (or, rather, the participation of the United States in the defense of Japan as stipulated by Article 5 of the Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan) (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 2003, pp. 185–​7). In such circumstances, agents from both Japan and the U.S. have deepened interpersonal and systemic collaboration. Of course, the Japan–​U.S.

Conclusion  187 Security Consultative Committee (SCC) and the Security Consultative Group were established as venues for discussing the implementation of the treaty even before, but in 1976 the Japan–​U.S. Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation was founded as a venue to coordinate joint response actions between the U.S. military and the Japanese Self-​Defense Force. From thereon, considerations concerning Japan-​U.S. defense cooperation gained momentum and the so-​called “guidelines,” summarizing the subcommittee discussions, were adopted. Thanks to the formulation of the guidelines and to put their implementation on firm grounds, joint training by Japan and the U.S. began officially. The U.S. Navy and Japan Maritime Self-​Defense Force, as well as the U.S. Airforce and Japan Air Self-​Defense Force had already established cooperative relationship, but Japan Ground Self-​Defense Force, which had no counterpart, was an exception. Then emerged the possibility of joint training of the U.S. Marines with the Ground Self-​Defense Force. So, in 1976 a cooperation commenced between the Marines and the Japanese Ground Self-​Defense Forces in Okinawa, where each side would observe the exercises conducted by the other. The U.S. military saw in this an opportunity for future joint Japan–​U.S. training and joint operations (Nozoe, 2006, pp. 197–​8). And, indeed, in October 1984, the first joint training was held in Hokkaido, and with it, the relations between the two sides started growing closer with each day. 10.2.1.2.3  COORDINATION EFFECTS

The coordination effect denotes a phenomenon in which the benefits an agent derives from a certain action are augmented when others choose the same action. Such effects are especially large when compatibility is required for a certain technology or related equipment. In this respect, for a lot of activities conducted in bases, the geographical proximity between units and facilities is important. Therefore, when it comes to coordination effects, bases have a particularly high “cumulative effect” (Krugman, 1991). For example, the centers of military activities such as airfields and ports function as magnetic fields which influence decisions regarding locations of other bases and facilities (command centers; training, communication and logistic facilities). Bases attract private companies, skilled workers and the appropriate physical infrastructure. When such elements are put together other military branches are naturally attracted and, following that, public policies aspiring for mutual complementation with bases, such as urban planning, infrastructure building and subsidies, are designed. If we assume that such magnetic fields existed in Okinawa after the administrative rights over it were returned to Japan, then Air Station Futenma is probably one such example. As already mentioned, at the time the agreement regarding the return was reached, the strengthening of marine bases had already been decided. In July 1969 the 9th Marine Regiment entered Camp Schwab, and in November the 36th Marine Aircraft Group (MAG-​36) transferred to Futenma. Similarly, in November, the 3rd Marine Division’s Headquarters relocated to

188  Shinji Kawana and Minori Takahashi Camp Courtney and the 4th Marine Regiment transferred to Camp Hansen. In April 1971, the Headquarters of the 3rd Marine Amphibious Corps was placed in Camp Courtney and in August, the 12th Marine Regiment entered Camp Hague (United States Marine Corps, 1983, p. 5). Furthermore, in 1973, improvement work started in Futenma Base (at the cost of the Japanese side) to enable the usage of jet aircraft in it. In 1975, a large-​scale reduction of the Army forces was conducted and their headquarters were moved from Camp Zukeran to the supply area in Port Maki. However, Camp Zukeran, whose one role thus ended, was not returned to Japan, but became a foothold of the Marine Corps Installations Command. In February 1976, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command was transferred to Okinawa. The jurisdiction over the Maki Port Supply Area was also transferred from the Army to the Marines. This is how the commands of the 3rd Marine Division, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and the 3rd Marine Amphibious Corps got concentrated in Okinawa and the conditions for forming a Marine Air-​Ground Task Force (MAGTF)5 and training were created. What needs to be emphasized here is that this concentration of bases was not conducted in accordance with a clear, preplanned American strategic goal. The strategic status of Okinawa’s marines was defined from 1975 onwards, only after the realignment of bases was mostly finished. On that occasion, Okinawa was given the status of “a main, indispensable base abroad” that can respond to any emergency situation and provides the strategic reserve to the U.S. forces in the Pacific (Nozoe, 2006, pp. 146–​147). Furthermore, simultaneously with the above process, a variety of public policies accompanying the bases were implemented. The Japanese government enacted the so-​called “three Okinawa laws” concerning the development of the island and based on them established the Okinawa Development Agency and its branch institution, the Okinawa General Bureau, pouring in large sums of development funds. That is the beginning of the “bases for subsidies bargaining.” Furthermore, development projects were designed based on the premise that the already existing bases remain (or, put conversely, the projects were focusing on “chipped prefectural land” that is left when the bases are excluded), so there were no sufficient conditions for attracting businesses as was initially planned (Kindai Nihon Shiryō Kenkyukai, 2006, p.  21). This later brought about the economic structure of dependency on the bases in Okinawan society (Kawase, 2003, pp. 167–​170). 10.2.1.2.4  ADAPTIVE EXPECTATIONS

In case they predict that a choice that was not widely supported may later fail, rational agents may feel the need to abandon their previous preference and take the “right horse” (Pierson, 2004, p. 24). Such adaptive expectations can be seen widely in base politics. For example, even if an agent is looking forward to the withdrawal of a base, if it becomes clear that that will not happen anytime soon, it may start to pursue its interest based on the premise that the base remains. At times, construction industry, chambers of commerce, drinking and food

Conclusion  189 establishments and landowners will adapt to the environment in which a base exists, and may actively attempt to avail themselves of the economic benefits it brings. As a matter of fact, after the return to Japan, in a portion of Okinawa’s society such expectations began to appear. Construction companies, chambers of commerce and landowners, who used to desire the return of land, rectified this preference and began to explore the possibility of collecting compensation for the use of land by the U.S. military and boosting public works projects. The rental charges for land used for military purposes in Okinawa jumped from 2,8 billion yen in 1971 to 21.5 billion yen in 1972 after the return of Okinawa, and since continued to rise: to 22.1 billion in 1973 and 31.3 in 1974 (Tochi-​ren, 1984, p.  831). Furthermore, because of difficulties with land registration, after the return of Okinawa to Japan, planning regarding the use of abandoned military sites could not go ahead. In such circumstances, landowners opposed the return of military bases and, after some of them were returned, continued to ask for the same amount of compensation as during the time the land was used for military purposes. Thus, it can be said that the Association of Owners of Land Used for Military Purposes, which used to lead the island-​wide struggle, changed its character into a profit organization after Okinawa was returned to Japan (Ryukyu Shimpō, 2012). Furthermore, the number of construction workers in Okinawa rose from approximately 40,000 before the return of Okinawa to more than 60,000 in the mid-​1970s, reflecting the steep rise in the budget for public works (Kawase, 2003, p. 170). The interest of the local population, too, gradually shifted from the issue of bases to economy, especially the problem of high unemployment. According to public opinion polls, the percentage of Okinawans who approved of the existence of U.S. military bases rose from around 26 percent in 1975 to about 34 percent in 1977 (Kōno, 2013, pp. 87–​141). About the same time, the conservative Nishime Junji assumed the governor’s office in 1978. He implemented profit-​oriented politics under the rallying cry of “on a par with the mainland,” and advanced integration with the Japanese government while making it increase expenditure from state coffers for the development of Okinawa. Due to that, a social and economic base for the strengthening of a conservative faction who conditionally approved of military bases started to be formed.

10.3  Path dependence As we have seen, the establishment of military bases occasionally imposes high initial costs on agents belonging to the side of base users and can, with time, lead to the fulfillment of conditions for the activation of self-​reinforcement, namely, learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations. Furthermore, it should be noted that the problem of the status quo maintenance bias by the military, which reinforces the above effects, exists in base politics. The difference between base politics and other political issues is that it straddles over multiple politically sensitive domains such as sovereignty, dignity, or a country’s

190  Shinji Kawana and Minori Takahashi autonomy. That is why it is difficult to put things back as they used to be once the United States decides to withdraw from a certain base or a status agreement and operational rules are modified in favor of the host country (Kawana, 2020a). Also, for the U.S.  military, the maintenance of bases is a means for obtaining funding in the Congress, and the amount of such funds affects the size and posture of organizations within it, as well as their power relations with other branches of the military. Particularly, for the Marines, whose raison d’etre has been constantly questioned since the end of the Second World War, obtaining sufficient funding is a categorical imperative, and they are known to have repeatedly adapted themselves to the environment in order to achieve that (Nonaka, 1995, pp. 171–​176). When there are self-​reinforcement pressures, the benefits of the choices that can be made at present (e.g., maintaining a base) become larger than those of the choices that could have been made in the past (the withdrawal of the base). Put conversely, the cost of the policy that could have been adopted until then increases. For that reason, once base politics start to move along a certain path, turning back for some agents gradually becomes difficult. This is the so-​called “problem of path dependency.” Paul Pierson described the notion of path dependency in the following way. First, the differences in the timing of events and in the chronology are important. In other words, preceding points in time are more important than the ensuing points, and what might appear as a solution at one point in time, may not be at another under the same conditions. For example, for the U.S.  military, the fact that in the second half of the 1960s the marines remained in Okinawa was important, as was the timing of the capability enhancement. This is because the political cost of establishing and operating bases was considerably different before and after the agreement on the return of Okinawa to Japan—​political resources that could widely be used before the return were scarce or unusable after it (Pierson, 2004, pp. 44–​48). Also, had the arrival of the nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise (in January 1968), which caused fierce political opposition in Japan, and the accidental fall of a combat aircraft on Kyushu University (in June 1968), occurred after the return of Okinawa (in May 1972), would the anti-​base movement in Japanese mainland that was lifted by these events have found a rallying point? At that time there was already no place that could serve as a “repository” of bases, and even if someone had considered transfers to Okinawa, the political cost would have been too high. It is not unreasonable to suppose that, due to the timing and temporal arrangement of events, in that case the bases would have been stationed in a completely different way from today. Second, even if the departures are from within the same conditions, going through a series of initial conditions in which self-​reinforcement is prone to occur, there will be multiple conclusion points that are different from the actually manifested outcome. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s when the U.S. ground forces pulled out and the early shape of the present U.S. military base system in Japan was formed, the U.S. policy makers had many possible options regarding

Conclusion  191 that system. Initially, the possibility of transferring abroad the marines stationed in Gifu and Yamanashi prefectures was examined and, as already mentioned, the main bases of today, such as Yokota, Misawa, Yokosuka and Sasebo, were all considered for transfer or closure, albeit temporarily. However, from the 1970s such options started disappearing one by one and gradually ceased to be seen as realistic solutions. Third, even relatively small perturbations and accidental occurrences, if they happen at the right time, may produce significant outcomes. For example, contingencies such as incidents and accidents involving the U.S. military tend to be averaged, but have especially large significance in situations where base politics are beginning to lean toward a new structure or pattern. The new structure that emerges is preserved and is from thereon incorporated as a new development layer of base politics. In this regard, since there can be a time lag between the manifestation of important causal factors and the outcomes, the impact of small events tends to be overlooked (Jervis, 1997). For example, the Kanto Plan (on the realignment of the network of air force bases in mainland Japan), the execution of which commenced at the beginning of the 1970s, as a base realignment process had several starting points already in 1968 (Kawana, 2020a). The trigger for that process was the response to a series of incidents and accidents involving the U.S. military in the mainland of Japan. This was a time when U.S. politics were in turmoil over the Vietnam War and the Japan-​ U.S.  relations were unstable, with the 1970 security treaty just around the corner. Fourth, in the process of path dependence, once a certain measure is taken, overturning it becomes difficult. When such a process is established, the outcomes gradually converge, and the balance that is then generated is resistant to change. For example, it is possible that the period after the return of Okinawa to Japan served as a watershed moment when the concentration and settling of bases in Okinawa became an unmovable political and military solution. Furthermore, if there is a competition of multiple agents for the same limited political space, such as, in this case, the Army, Navy, Airforce and the Marines, and one of the agents manages to occupy that space, then removing it from there becomes difficult. Thus, what began as a very small base with no clear goal at the outset may under certain circumstances grow with time and, while rewriting its own purpose, through repeated interaction with other bases in the system, take on functions suited to the environment. If bases can be put together in the right place and at the right time, the political environment can, as a result, be completely changed. While strongly swayed by the strategic environment and contingencies, as well as the structure of the surrounding political environment, the future developmental paths of military bases converge into a single direction with the passage of time, which, in the case of Okinawa, meant “the fixation” of bases. There is a possibility that in that process, time, as an environmental factor, constitutes both the cause and effect in the direction of development of bases.

192  Shinji Kawana and Minori Takahashi

Notes 1 These costs fluctuate, but, for example, in the 1950s they were on average around 5 billion dollars and accounted for 2–​4 percent of the entire U.S. defense budget (Blaker, 1990, p. 104). 2 For example, in Okinawa under American rule, the U.S. had extremely large residual rights according to base contracts. In that sense, it can be said that the formal stability of American bases was substantially different before and after the return of Okinawa to Japan. 3 For example, in 1953, an estimate was made that purchasing around 40,000 acres of land for military use would cost 15 million dollars, and the related cost of moving the local residents was calculated to be 70,000 dollars. 4 On the other hand, there are also cases where problems related to the use of bases also accumulate with time or the perception that problems exist strengthens, so that the benefits for the society as a whole, including local governments and residents, shrink and the political costs rise. 5 At the same time, the commander of the Marine Corps became a regular member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Marines became one of the branches of the military on a par with the Army, Navy and Airforce, but within the Department of the Navy.

References Arthur, W. B. (1994). Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Blaker, J. (1990). United States Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the Dilemma. New York: Praeger. Calder, K. (2007). Embattled Garrisons. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cooley, A. and Spruyt, H. (2009). Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Jervis, R. (1997). System Effects. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Joskow, P. (1988). “Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4, pp. 95–​117. Kaplan, R. (2005). Imperial Grunts:  The American Military on the Ground. New  York: Random House. Kawana, S. (2016). “The Contours of Futenma as Seen in the 1960s Plan for the Withdrawal of Marines” (“1960 Nendai no Kaiheitai Tettai Keikaku ni Miru Futenma no Rinkaku”). In Yara, T., Kawana, S., Saito, K., Nozoe, F. and A. Yamamoto (eds.), Okinawa and the Marine Corps (Okinawa to Kaiheitai) (pp. 53–​84). Tokyo: Junpōsha. (In Japanese). Kawana, S. (2020a). The Rise and Fall of U.S. Military Bases 1968–​1973:  The Policy of Withdrawal from Mainland Japan (Kichi no Shōchō:  Nihon Hondo no Beigunkichi ‘Tettai’ Seisaku). Tokyo: Keisō Shobō. (In Japanese). Kawana, S. (2020b). “Time in Base Policy” (“Kichi Seisaku ni okeru Jikan”). In Takahashi, R. and Yamazai, N. (eds.), Challenges in Chrono-​ politics (Jiseigakue no Chōsen). Tokyo: Minerva Shobō. (In Japanese). Kawase, M. (2003). Policies for Maintaining Bases and Finances (Kichi Iji Seisaku to Zaisei). Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyōronsha. (In Japanese). Kindai Nihon Shiryō Kenkyukai ed. (2006). Oral History of Takeshi Kozuma (Kozuma Takeshi Oraru Historii). Tokyo: Kindai Nihon Shiryo Kenkyukai. (In Japanese).

Conclusion  193 Kōno, K. (2013). “The Attitudes of Prefectural Residents in the Forty Years Since the Return to the Mainland” (“Hondo Fukkigo 40 Nenkan no Okinawa Kenmin Ishiki”), The NHK Annual Bulletin of Broadcasting Culture Research 2013, 57, pp. 87–​141. (In Japanese). Krugman, P. (1991). “History and Industry Location:  The Case of the Manufacturing Belt,” American Economic Review, 81(2), pp. 80–​83. Lake, D. (2009). Hierarchy in International Relations. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (2003). Oral History: Itō Keiichi, Volume 2, (Oraru Historu –​Itō Keichi, Gekan). Tokyo: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies. (In Japanese). Nonaka, I. (1995). American Marines (Amerika Kaiheitai). Tokyo: Chuō Kōronsha. (In Japanese). Nozoe, F. (2006). The Security Treaty between Japan and the United States after the Return of Okinawa (Okinawa Henkango no Nichibei Anpo). Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan. Pierson, P. (2004). Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ryukyu Shimpō ed. (2012). The Structure of a Distortion (Hizumi no Kōzō). Naha: The Ryukyu Shimpō. Taira, Y. (2012). Post-​War Okinawa and U.S. Military Bases (Sengo Okinawa to Beigun Kichi). Tokyo: Hōsei University Press. (In Japanese). Takahashi, M. (2019). “The Future of Greenland: Political and Economic Implications for the Arctic: An International Relations Perspective.” In Corell, R. W., Kim. J. D., Kim, Y. H., Moe, A., Morisson, C. E., WanderZwaag, D. L. and Young, O. R. (eds.), The Arctic in World Affairs: A North Pacific Dialogue on Global-​Arctic Interactions –​The Arctic Moves from Periphery to Center (pp.114–​119.) Busan: Korea Maritime Institute and Honolulu: East-​West Center. Tochi-​ren [Landowners’ Association] Sanjū Shūnen Kinen-​shi Henshū Iinkai ed. (1984). The Progress of the Landowners’ Association (Tochi-​ren no Ayumi), Naha:  Okinawa Gunyōchi Tou Jinushi Rengōkai. (In Japanese). United States Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, Historical Branch, Reference Section (1983). The 3D Marine Division and its Regiments. Washington DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. Wallander, C. (2000). “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” International Organization, 54(4), pp. 705–​735. Yamamoto, A. (2016). “The Transfer of the Marine Corps to Okinawa in the 1950s” (“1950 Nendai ni okeru Kaiheitai no Okinawa Iten”). In Yara T., Kawana, S., Saito, K., Nozoe, F. and Yamamoto, A. (eds.), Okinawa and the Marine Corps (Okinawa to Kaiheitai) (pp. 25–​52). Tokyo: Junpōsha. (In Japanese).

Index

‘Abd al-​’Aziz ibn Baz 123 Acheson, D. 117 adaptive expectations 188–​189 Afghanistan, wars in 113, 124 AFRICOM 47–​48 al-​Awda,  S.  124 Ali, M. 119 al-​Jazeera  125 Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) command 40–​41 anti-​base movements: from the 1960s to 1970s 96–​99; in the 2010s 101–​104; analysis of Turkish 104–​106; hypotheses on 96; Iraq War, 2003 and 99–​101; Johnson letter and intensification of anti-​ Americanism and 97–​99; previous research relating to 95; rise of anti-​ Americanism in Saudi Arabia, 1990s to 2000s and 122–​126, 126 Arab Cold War, 1950s to 1960s 119–​122, 122 Arasaki, M. 105–​106 Armenian issue and Turkey 103–​104 Arthur, W. B. 185 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 139–​140 Bahrain 113–​114 Baker, J. 117 Ban Ki-​moon  167 Bartholomew, R. 65 base politics theory (BPT): boundary conditions of 12; conclusions on 16–​17; drag force and 10–​12; future development of 182–​189; introduction to 6–​7; major hypotheses of 11–​12; making bases invisible 12–​14; pathways of influence

in 14–​15; research on application and development of 12–​16; reversal of power and 15–​16; thrust force and 7–​9; U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia and 111–​112, 116–​126, 122, 126; U.S.-​ROK alliance and (see Republic of Korea, U.S. military bases in) Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle Against U.S. Military Posts, The 94 bazaar politics 94 Belt and Road Initiative 115 Berlinguer, E. 42 Bin Laden, O. 111 Bitar, S. E. 12–​13 Blaker, J. 8 Boatright, J. F. 63 Bush, G. H. W. 112, 123, 158 Bush, G. W. 101, 104, 156; global posture review (GPR) and U.S.-​ROK alliance under 157–​159 Çagˇaptay, S. 96 Cajal, M. 69 Calder, K. E. 10, 21, 79, 94, 96, 116, 127 Carlucci, F. C. 67 Carrington, Lord 68 Chehab, F. 97 Cheney, R. 123, 158 China Belt and Road Initiative 115 Cho Young-​kil  160 Chun Doo-​hwan  156 Clinton, B. 102, 126 Clinton, H. 102 Cohen, S. 8 Cold War, the 6–​7; Arab Cold War, 1950s to 1960s 119–​122, 122; function of military bases in 8–​9;

Index  195 rising anti-​U.S. sentiment in 96–​97; U.S. bases in Italy during 39–​43, 40; U.S. bases in Republic of Korea during 152–​154; U.S. bases in Turkey during 93; U.S.-​ROK alliance and 156–​157; U.S.-​Spain security relations during 58; see also post-​Cold War era compensation politics 79 contracts 9 Cooley, A. 2, 10, 11, 16, 21, 94 coordination effects 187–​188 crisis narrative 144 Crown Prince Abdullah ibn ‘Abd al-​ ’Aziz Al Sa’ud 116, 120, 126 Cumings, B. 9 Cyprus 96–​99 D’Alema, M. 48 De Mita, C. 67 Denmark see Greenland, military base in Dhahran Airfield Agreement, 1945 118–​119, 121–​122 drag force 10–​12 Dulles, J. F. 121 Enders, T. 63 Erdogˇan, T. 102, 104 Feith, D. J. 158 Fernández-​Ordóñez,  F.  65 Fidan, H. 103 Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) 136 Future of the Alliance (FOTA) Policy Initiative 159, 163 Germany, PFAS regulation in see PFAS (per-​and polyfluoroalkyl substances) Global Coalition for Peace and Justice 101 global posture review (GPR) 157–​159 González, F. 59 Greenland, military base in 177; defense agreements between the U.S. and Greenland and 23–​27; Denmark’s choice on 27–​28; Greenland’s legal status and 28–​30; introduction to 21–​23; political climate and conventions in Denmark and 30–​35 Greenpeace 101 Gresh, G. F. 13, 116 Gülen, F. 102–​103

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 13 gulf countries, history of U.S. military bases in 112–​116, 115 Gulf Crisis 94 Harkavy, R. E. 8, 46 Heath, D. 121–​122 Helm, R. 63, 68 Hemmer, C. 23 Höfken, U. 82 Holmes, A. A. 14–​15, 95, 99 Hussein, S. 122–​123 imperialism 8 Incirlik Air Base 60, 93; fuel supplies cut to 103; rising anti-​U.S. sentiment and 96–​99, 100–​102 Indyk, M. 126 Inönü, I. 98 Iraq War, 2003 99–​101, 105, 113 Islamic State 112 Italian Communist Party 41–​42 Italian Socialist Party 41–​42 Italy, U.S. bases in 177–​178; during the Cold War 39–​43, 40; conclusions on 51–​52; contemporary Italian political debates and 48–​49; evolution of strategic purpose and structure of post-​Cold War era 45–​48; introduction to 39; Italian domestic politics during the Cold War and 41–​43; as replacement for bases in Spain 67–​68; Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and 39–​40, 43–​45; storage of nuclear weapons in 44–​45 Jane’s Defense Weekly 67–​68 Japan see Okinawa Johnson, C. 9, 10 Johnson, L. B. 97–​99, 122 Jupiter Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) 44 Katzenstein, P. J. 23 Kauffmann, H. 24 Kawana, S. 21, 28, 78–​79 Keel, A. 68 Kennedy, J. F. 97, 121 Kim Dae-​jung 155, 158 King ‘Abd al-​’Aziz (‘Abd al-​’Aziz ibn ‘Abd al-​Rahman Al Sa’ud) 111, 118–​119, 120, 127

196 Index King Fahd ibn ‘Abd al’Aziz Al Sa’ud 116, 120–​121, 123, 124, 126 Komer, R. 98 Korea see Republic of Korea, U.S. military bases in Kuwait 114 Lake, D. A. 15 LaPorte, L. J. 160 learning effects 186–​187 Lee Myung-​bak  167 Loong, L. H. 136, 144 Lutz, C. 94 MacArthur, D. 164 Makarios III 97–​98 Maresca, J. J. 64 McCoy, T. W. 63, 64 military bases, American: anti-​ base movements (see anti-​base movements); base politics theory (BPT) on (see base politics theory (BPT)); bazaar politics and 94; compensation politics and 79; discovery of local issues with 177–​181; in Europe and Japan, 1950–​2004 40; fixed costs of 185–​186; function of, during the Cold War era 8–​9; in Germany (see PFAS (per-​and polyfluoroalkyl substances)); global posture review (GPR) and 157–​159; in Greenland (see Greenland, military base in); importance of 1; in Italy (see Italy, U.S. bases in); made invisible 12–​14; maintenance and expansion of 9; in Okinawa 105–​106, 183–​189; PFOA (perfluorooctanoic acid)/​ PFOS (perfluorooctanesulfonic acid) at (see PFAS (per-​and polyfluoroalkyl substances)); research on 1–​5, 78–​80, 115–​116, 176–​177; in Saudi Arabia (see Saudi Arabia, U.S. military bases in); in Singapore (see Singapore, ‘quasi-​bases’ in); in South Korea (see Republic of Korea, U.S. military bases in); in Spain (see Spain, U.S. bases in); thrust force of 7–​9; in Turkey (see Turkey, U.S. military bases in) Morrow 154 Motzfeldt, J. 28 Muslim Brotherhood 124

Nash, F. 42 Nasser, G. A. 119–​121 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 14; Denmark and 22–​25; importance of Torrejón base to 63–​64; Italy and 39–​43; Patriot missile deployment by 101–​102; post-​Cold War era and 45–​48; Spain and 57, 59–​61, 66, 68–​69, 71; Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and 39–​40, 43–​45, 50–​51, 78, 83–​85; U.S. security assessment in southern Europe and 61–​62 neutralism 42 New York Times 65 9/​11 6–​7, 176; drag force and 10; Saudi Arabia and 111, 126 Non-​Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 1968 45 nuclear weapons 44–​45 Obama, B. 104, 112, 113, 167 Okinawa 105–​106, 183–​189 Oman 115 Operation Allied Force 46 Operation Bolero 25–​26 Operation Deliberate Force 46 Operation Deny Flight 46 Operation Desert Storm 123 Operation Odyssey Down 47–​48 Operation Unified Protector 47–​48 Ottoman Empire 104 Ozal, T. 100 pacifism 41–​42 Pang, A. 133 path dependence 185, 189–​191 pathways of influence 14–​15 Patriot missiles, deployment of 101–​102 Pelosi, N. 104 PFAS (per-​and polyfluoroalkyl substances) 179; conclusion and challenges ahead for 88–​89; damage to military base facility areas by 85; decontamination efforts on 87–​88; EU and German federal level regulation of 80–​83; federal administration measures and delayed response to 86; federal government’s response to 82–​83; federal level regulation of 78; issues related to damages to “third parties” from

Index  197 84–​85; overlap between SOFA and 83–​87; overview of production history of 80–​81; past research on regulation of 78–​80; regulation process for 77–​78; research method on 80; state and local government response to, 2017-​present 86–​87 PFOA (perfluorooctanoic acid)/​ PFOS (perfluorooctanesulfonic acid) see PFAS (per-​and polyfluoroalkyl substances) post-​Cold War era: evolution of strategic purpose and structure of U.S. bases in 45–​48; history of U.S. military bases in gulf countries in 112–​116, 115; quasi-​bases in 135; SOFA agreements and legal framework in 50–​51; see also Cold War, the power, reversal of 15–​16 Prince Faisal 121–​122 Prince Talal ibn ‘Abd al-​’Aziz Al Sa’ud 121 Prodi, R. 49 Qatar 113 quasi-​bases: theoretical framework of 134–​138; see also Singapore, ‘quasi-​bases’  in Rasmussen, I. 28–​31, 34–​35 Reagan, R. 68 regional autonomy 138–​141 Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) 81 Republic of Korea, U.S. military bases in 181; background of talks on 154–​159; Bush administration’s global posture review (GPR) and 157–​159; conclusions on 167–​169; introduction to 152–​154; negotiations about power relations and 163–​167; negotiations about the distribution of alliance resources and 159–​163; recovery of Korean military’s authority for wartime operational control and 163–​165; return of Yongsan Garrison and transfer of 2nd Infantry Division to the rear in 159–​162; review of U.S. troop levels at 162–​163; Roh administration’s view of national security and 154–​157; strategic

flexibility of U.S. Forces Korea and 165–​167 reversal of power 15–​16 Rhee Syngman 164 Rhineland-​Palatinate PFAS regulatory process 81–​82; see also PFAS (per-​and polyfluoroalkyl substances) Rice, C. 167 Ridgway, R. 63 Roh Moo-​hyun 153–​154, 168–​169; recovery of Korean military’s authority for wartime operational control under 163–​165; return of the Yongsan Garrison and transfer of the 2nd Infantry Division to the rear and 159–​162; review of U.S. troop levels in Korea and 162–​163; strategic flexibility of U.S. Forces Korea and 166–​167; U.S. global posture review (GPR) and 157–​159; view of national security and U.S.-​ROK alliance under 154–​157 Roosevelt, F. D. 111 Rosecrance, R. 8 Rumsfeld, D. 157, 162 Sahwa 124–​125 Sanchez-​Gijon,  A.  59 Sato, S. 78–​79 Saudi Arabia, U.S. military bases in 180; Arab Cold War, 1950s to 1960s 119–​122, 122; base politics and 116–​126, 122, 126; conclusions on 127–​128; Dhahran Airfield Agreement, 1945 118–​119, 121–​122; introduction to 111–​112; overview of U.S. military bases in gulf countries and recent trends and 112–​116, 115; recent history of 112–​113; research on 115–​116; rise of anti-​Americanism in, 1990s to 2000s 122–​126, 126 Serra, N. 60, 64 Shamun, K. 97 Shultz, G. 63, 65 Singapore, ‘quasi-​bases’ in 180–​181; conclusions on institutionalization and path-​dependence with 146–​147; diversification of military training and 142, 142–​143; effective land management and 143–​144; historical development of regional autonomy and 138–​141; institutionalization of defense education and 144–​146;

198 Index introduction to 133–​134; non-​ existence of base issues in domestic environment of 141–​142, 141–​146; theoretical framework of 134–​138 southern Europe, U.S. security assessment in 61–​62 South Korea see Republic of Korea, U.S. military bases in Soviet Union, the see Cold War, the Spain, U.S. bases in 178; conclusions on 69–​71, 70; introduction to 56–​58; Italy as replacement for bases in 67–​68; jeopardized U.S. presence in Spain and 65; regional security framework and 65–​69; relying on NATO’s funds 68–​69; role and function of Torrejón base 60–​61, 63–​65; search for replacements for 65–​67; security relations between the U.S. and 58; Spanish democratization and contestation of 59–​60; U.S. domestic constraints and 64–​65; U.S. view of international and domestic situations and 61–​65 Spangdahlem base, Germany 86–​87 Spogli, R. 47 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 39–​40, 43–​45, 50–​51; German response to PFAS pollution and 82–​83; overlap between PFOS/​PFOA pollution and 83–​87; regulation of PFAS and 78; Singapore and 136 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Substances 81 Sukarno 137 Swee, G. K. 139 Syrian Civil War 101–​102 Taft, W. H., IV 68–​69 Takahashi, M. 15 Tanji, M. 106 Thule Air Base see Greenland, military base in

Tong, G. C. 136 Torrejón base 60–​61, 63–​64; search for a replacement for 65–​67; U.S. domestic constraints and 64–​65 Treaty of Friendship, Defense and Cooperation, 1988 69 Treaty of London 39 Truman, H. 118, 127–​128 Trump, D. 112 trust force 7–​9 Turkey, U.S. military bases in 179–​180; analysis of hypothesis on anti-​base movements and 104–​106; anti-​ base movements from the 1960s and 1970s and 96–​99; anti-​base movements in the 2010s and 101–​104; Armenian issue and 103–​104; conclusions on 106–​107; introduction to 98; Iraq War, 2003, and 99–​101; review of previous research and hypotheses on 93–​96 UAE (United Arab Emirates) 114–​115 U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) 112–​115 Viñas, A. 59 Warsaw Pact 42–​43 Washington Post 67 Washington Treaty 44 Wikileaks 47 Wolfowitz, P. 158 Yeo, A. 14, 95, 96 Yew, L. K. 136, 144 Yongsan Garrison 159–​162 Zanone, V. 67–​68 Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) 140