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EXPLORATION OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Edited by Edited Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao Michael Hsiao Hsin-Huang
Program for Southeast Asian Area Studies Academia Sinica Sonica Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C.
Published by the Program for Southeast Asian Area Studies, Academia Sinica Nanchang, Taipei, Taiwan Republic of China
©
2001 by Program for Southeast Asian Area Studies, Academia Silica.
All rights reserved.
Program for Southeast Asian Area Studies Library Cataloging- in
Publication Data Hsiao, Hsia-Huang Michael, 1948Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia/
edited by Hsin -Huang Michael Hsiao p. cm. Includes Bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 957-671-832-5 (Cloth) (NT600) ISBN 957-671-833-3 (pack.) (nT500)
1. Middle class-Southeast Asia. 2.Middle class-the Philippines. 3.Middle class-Malaysia. 4. Middles class-Thailand. 5. Middle class-hidonesia HT690.A7-45 H75 2001
Printed in Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of Chirla
Contents
vii
Preface
ix
Con tribe tors Contributors
Part I Overview 1. The Formation of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia: An Overview Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao Hon8-Zen Hong-Zen Wang H Part 11 2.
3.
4.
3
Philippines
Methodological Notes of the Philippine Middle Class Survey Survey Cynthia Bautista Battista
41
Composition and Origins Composition Origins of the Middle Classes Cynthia Battista Bautista
91
Middle Class Cultures: Glimpses into Lifestyles and Outlooks
151
Cynthia Bautista 5.
Middle Class Politics and Views on Society and Middle Government Government 209
Cynthia Bautista 6.
'
Images of the Middle Classes in m Metro Manila Cynthia Battista Bautista
267
l
3
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Part III 7.
Malaysia
The Portrayal of the Malaysian Middle Classes
Abdul Rah ran Embong 8.
301
Middle Class Politics, Democracy and Civil Society in Malaysia
Abdul Ragman Embong
Fart IV 9.
343
Thailand
Thai Middle Classes: Between Class Ambiguity and Democratic Propensity Prudhisan lumbar Chantal Banpasirichote
381
10. Middle Classes in Bangkok
Anusorn Limmanee Chantal Banpasirichote
Prudhisan fumbala Surfchai Wlrn' Gaea
Part V
Indonesia
11- Lifestyles and Political Behavior of the Indonesian Middle Classes Daniel Dhakidae
Index
415
475 515
Preface
This volume middle classes aspects of the middle various aspects essays on various contains 11 essays volume contains 'international
in the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. Some of them were originally presented at the two international workshops on "Southeast Asian Middle Classes in Comparative Perspective" organized by Program for Southeast Asian Area Studies (PROSEA), Academia Silica Sinica in June January 1999 respectively. The two workshops and the June 1998 and January current volume are the product product of the multi-year Southeast Asian Middle Classes (SEAMC) Project funded by PROSEA. A total of 10 sociologists, political political scientists and anthropologists from the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia have participated in this exploratory comparative research team. The SEAMC Project was was formed to study the culture and politics of the rising middle classes in origins, formation, culture Southeast Asia. The SEAMC Project has been one of the ambious arnbious research projects initiated and sponsored by PROSEA. lt It was aimed to empirically explore: 1. the composition composition and its portrayal portrayal of the middle classes in the above above the culture culture and politics of four major Southeast Asian capital cities; and 2. Me those Southeast Asian middle classes. The 11 chapters of this volume,
though not so evenly, are therefore designated to provide comparative explorations of the above two major themes. This current volume can be viewed as a.s a follow up to my two previous edited books, books, entitled Discovery of the A/lialdles Middles Classes in East Asia (1993) and East Asian Middle Classes in Comparative Perspective (1999), which both have same middle class phenomena, but in East Asia. The have dealt with the same two books are the product product of my another multi-year East Asian Middle Classes (EAMC) Project. These two books have served as important steps
"
viii
n, £1
1Exploration of
the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
toward the conceptual formation of the SEAMC Project, and is a
significant reference to the content of this volume. As director of the SEAMC Project, I would like to extend my sincere 'intellectual
gratitude to all project members with whom I have the pleasure to work stimulation and cooperation for more than four years. Their are much valued for the completion of the project and this book. In particular, I would like to thank the coordinators of the four national
teams: Drs. Cynthia Bautista, Abdul Rahaman Err bong, Chantal Banpasirichote, Surichai Wun'Gaeo and Daniel Dhakidae. Upon the release of the third book on the middle class research series in Asia Pacific, I look forward again to collaborating again with all of my teammates of the EAMC and SEAMC Projects in the near future. I believe that, with the collective efforts we already have and will put, an Asia Pacific theory of the middle classes can soon be in the making.
Hsia-Huang Michael Hsiao
December 2001
Contributors
Abdul Rah ran, Embong Llrzioersity of Department of Anthropology and Sociology, National University Malaysia, Malaysia Banpasirichote, Chantal Department of Government, Gouernment, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand Bautista, Cynthia
Department of Sociology, University of the Philippines, Philippines Dhakidae, Daniel Daniel Dhakidae, Kompas Research and Development Development Department Kornpas Hsiao, Hsiao, Hsia-Huang Hsin-Huang Michael Sinica, Taiwan Institute of Sociology, Academia Silica, Limmanee, Lintmanee, Anusorn
Department of Government, Chulalongkorn lalongkom University, Thailand
Prudhisan, Prudhisan, Jumbala Jumbala Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), Chulalongkorn Chulalongkorn University, Thailand Surichai, Wun'Gaeo Centre for Social Development Studies, Chu lalongkorn University, Cltzalalongkorn Thailand Wang, Hong-Zen Wang, Hong-Zen Marketing, National National Chung Hstng Hsing University Llniversihj Department of Marketzlng,
I
PART I
Overview
1
The Formation Formation of the Middle Southeast Asia: Middle Classes Classes in Southeast Asia: An Overview Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao Hsia-Huang Hong-Zen Hong-Zen Wang
I. Introduction' Introduction: Four Hypotheses on East Asian Middle Classes Economic development brings brings with it enormous change for occupational structures, as can be seen seen very clearly in the cases of the four Little - Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. The Dragons of East Asia those engaged in primary industry have dwindled, and a numbers of those large proportion proportion of the agricultural agricultural workforce has moved moved across to the industrial and service sectors. With the occupational division of l a b o r and within within these new new sectors, there there have started started to emerge unskilled blue collar workers in general, professionals, technicians, managers and other higher grade grade white collar workers, lower grade white collar workers who perform routine work, as well as those those running running small small businesses businesses who have broken broken away from the rest in response to the division of industry. The impact of these new occupational structures on society, culture and politics continues to be an important issue researchers. issue for researchers. Ching-kuo Foundation, the With the financial assistance of the Chiang Ching-kuo first large-scale research research project first author was responsible for overseeing a large-scale project in 1992 on "the middle classes in East Asia," Asia," and, and, together together with with scholars from Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, research on the middle classes of these four East Asian territories was undertaken. undertaken. Based on the results obtained from this study, several hypotheses hypotheses were tested (Hsiao & So, 1999). Based on this research, research, we would would now like to try to understand understand last twenty whether economic economic development in Southeast Asia over the last
4
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| Exploration of the Middle Classes
'Ln
I
Southeast Asia
years has travelled the same course as in East Asia's Little Dragons, and whether that development has also brought with it a sizable middle class. Moreover, are the origins of the Southeast Asian middle classes similar to those in East Asia? What distinctive social characteristics do they display? And what political attitudes are expressed? Before addressing these questions we will first look back at our hypotheses relating to East Asia's middle classes.
Based on several points of concern regarding social class (class boundaries, class identity, the social characteristics of different classes,
lifestyle and class politics), and from the experience of our research into East Asia's middle classes, four hypotheses may be generated as follows:
1.
The First Generation Hypothesis
This hypothesis states that the middle classes in East Asia first appeared after the 19705, that the bulk of the first generation of these territories' middle classes came from the homes of agricultural labourers and workers, that their self-identification as middle class is unclear because they had passed through a period of poverty and hardship, that they have ambivalent feelings toward other classes, but that emotionally they draw closer to workers, and will lean towards supporting them in times of conflict between workers and capitalists (Lui, 1987; Cheung, 1987; Hsiao, 1989).
2. The Ajfluenee Hypothesis This theory states that the 1;rLiddle classes are the greatest beneficiaries
over the entire course of economic development. They are able to develop a substantial class culture, owing to an extremely favorable market situation. Members of the middle class select their spouses from among their own class, and not from the working class. They have their own consumer tastes and symbols, which are used to express difference from other classes. In order to safeguard their benefits they lean towards the status quo politically, thus becoming political conservatives (Lui & Wong, 1994).
3. The Ascending Class Hypothesis This theory states that the middle classes possess their own specialist
skills and that the services they provide are irreplaceable. For this reason
The Southeast Asia |l Middle Classes in Southeast Formation of the Middle The Formation
(
5
'J
members of the middle class will believe that they belong to a unique unique group: not only will they not lean towards workers, they will also distance regard themselves themselves as management. They will regard themselves from management. distance themselves
the defenders of democracy, as having a large contribution to make to important role to play in social movements. society, and also as having an important Therefore, the state bureaucracy, capitalists and workers' representatives must vie with this "ascending middle class" for resources (So & Kwitko, 1990). 1990).
4. The Middle Class Differentiation Hypothesis This theory states that the middle class has different segments and that differentiation is very apparent. This class can be further subdivided into administrators), (salary-earning professionals the "new middle middle class" (salary-earning professionals and administrators), self-employed) and the proprietors and the self-employed) "old middle class" (small proprietors the "old "marginal middle class" (lower grade white collar workers and small proprietors who deal with more routine tasks). Members of the new middle class are said to sympathise with workers, the old middle class will be more conservative and the marginal middle class will want to establish means for collective action (Hsiao, 1993, 1999). These Asian middle classes These four hypotheses relating to the East Asian provide us with coordinates with which we may compare the middle classes of Southeast Asia and establish if Southeast Asian economic development over the last twenty years has brought with it a sizable middle class. Further, are the origins origins of the Southeast Asian middle classes similar to those of East Asia's middle classes? What distinctive
social characteristics do they display? In addition, what political attitudes are expressed?
II. Class Scheme in Research Research on Southeast Middle Asian Middle Southeast Asian Class Scheme Classes Current research on social classes largely follows the neo-Marxist school (of which E. O. Wright is representative) or the neo-Weberian school (of which Iohn Goldthorpe is representative) in distinguishing between classes. Wright utilities the concept of "exploitation" in establishing boundaries between classes as well as two modes of production - to distinguish capitalism and petty commodity production distinguish social
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
categories. Goldthorpe, on the other hand, utilities occupational status to differentiate class. Wright's approach is rather complicated and quite inflexible in practice. Thus, as Goldthorpe's neo-Weberian school continues the use of Weber's methods, and in so doing can freely adjust class categorisation according to the "market situation," the categories
used therefore in research on the middle classes in East Asia and in ongoing research on the middle classes in Southeast Asia are more consistent with a revised version of Goldthorpe's categorisation.
Goldthorpe's original tabulation of class structure featured eleven categories (Table 1). To allow for the special circumstances displayed in individual countries, there are differences in the categories used for the ' four countries here. Class structure in Southeast Asia can, in principle, be divided. into the following: (a) capitalists, (to) the new middle class, (c) the old middle class, (d) the marginal middle class, (e) the working class, and (f) the agricultural class (referring in this paper to farmers and farm l a b o r ) . Research teams in each country were required to use the method
of intentional sampling, and, in their respective capital cities, conduct a study of class with the middle class as the core of the study and the capitalist and working class samples as control conditions and comparative tools. The relative distribution of the three subcategories within the middle class was considered to be capable of reflecting the current circumstances in each country. Class categories in Jakarta, Indonesia, were the upper class (i.e. Goldthorpe's IVa, denoting proprietors with more than 25 employees), the middle class (including the old middle class; i.e. Goldthorpe's IVa, but denoting less than 25 employees; Ivb; IVc), the new middle class (i.e.
Goldthorpe's I and II), the marginal middle class (Goldthorpe's Illa and Illb) and the working class (Goldthorpe's V, Via, Vila and VIIb)(The Kornpas Research Center 1KPC], 1997:10). Class categories in Manila, the Philippines, were the capitalist class (denoting proprietors with more than 10 employees), the new middle class (professionals, administrators
and managers), the old middle class (denoting small proprietors and proprietors with less than 10 employees), the marginal middle class (denoting marginal white collar l a b o r ) and the working class (denoting manual blue collar labour and the self-employed in marginal, informal sectors)(Bautista, Rivera, Tabunda & Arguillas, 1998:6). Class categories
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, were the capitalist class (denoting
proprietors with more than 10 employees), the new middle class (professionals, technicians, administrators and managers 111 government
The Formation of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia |
f 7
`l I
and private enterprise), the old middle class (the self-employed self-employed and private enterprise), family), and the employees from outside the family), proprietors of 10 or fewer employees working class (denoting blue collar and lower grade white collar labor)(Chang et al-, 199623) Class categories in Thailand were the al., 1996:3). capitalist class (denoting proprietors of 500 or more more employees and with capital of at least least 50 million baht), the new middle class (professionals and administrators), the old middle class (petty capitalists and small family entrepreneurs), the marginal middle class (lower grade white
semi-professionals) and the working class (Center for collar l a b o r and semi-professionals) [CSDSL 1999:3). Social Development Studies [CSDS], Table 1
Goldthorpe's Class Scheme The Original Original Goldthorpe's
Class Service
Intermediate Intermediate
Descriptions II
Higher-grade professionals, administrators and officials; managers in large establishments; large proprietors
II
Lower~grade professionals, administrators and and officials; Lower-grade higher-grade technicians; managers in small business business and establishments; supervisors of non-manual industrial establishments, employees
Ula Hla
Routine non-manual employees in administration and
cornnnerce commerce
Working Working
IIIb my
workers Personal Personal service service workers
IVa
Small proprietors, artisans, etc., with employees
IV we
Small proprietors, artisans, etc., without employees
We
small-holders, self-employed fishermen Farmers and small-holders,
V
Lower-grade technicians; supervisors of manual workers
Via VIa
Skilled manual workers
VIIa Vila
Semi-skilled Semi-sldlled
and
unskilled manual workers workers (not in
agriculture)
Vllb vub
Agricultural workers
199917. Source: Hsiao & So, 1999:7.
IL
s8 ]
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
I
'interviews
With regard Indonesia (i.e. Jakarta) saw a total of 1,073 1,073 size, Indonesia sample size, regard to sample interviews, the Philippines (i.e. the Manila area) saw 837 successfully completed interviews, Klang Valley, including Kuala interviews, Malaysia (i.e. the Klara saw 520 interviews completed, Lumpur and Petaling Jaya) saw completed, and in Thailand (i.e. Bangkok) 1,008 people were interviewed in total. All research was conducted in 1996, except for that in Thailand, Thailand, which took was conducted place from May to August 1997. Table 2 is the sample class distribution for the four Southeast Asian countries. Table 2
Sample Distribution of Southeast Asian Classes (%)
Class
The Philippines Indonesia Indonesia
Thailand Malaysia Thailand
3.9
1.6
5.0
4.8
33.9
36.3
30.4
49.8
Professionals/ Professionals/ technicians
15.9
77.4 17.4
Administrators
18.0
18.9 18.9
37.7
26.8
14.8
23.8
15.1 15.1
12.4 12.4
22.6
14.4
14.8 14.8
25.7
29.1
11.9
9.7
9.6
20.7
9.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
837
1073
1008 1008
520
Capitalists Capitalists
New middle class
Old middle class Small proprietors
Self-employed Marginal middle class
farmer class class/farmer Working class/
Total Effective sample sample size
III. The Origins of Southeast Asian Middle Classes In Southeast Asian class structure, intergenerational mobility is a widespread phenomenon, and all four countries countries also display display the
phenomenon of "de-agriculturaljzation" agricultural "de-agriculturalization" or leaving the agricultural workforce. Because the locations in which which the present carried present study was carried workforce. out were large urban areas, the proportion of those undertaking agriculture was rather small. However, a large number of the fathers of
The Formation of the Middle Classes i:r\ Southeast Asia I
9
L..
I
the interviewees had agricultural or working class backgrounds. in the
Philippines, the number of people in the agricultural or working classes 'increase
fell almost 42%, with the Malaysian figure even greater at37%. Indonesia, on the other hand, saw an in working families of 4.1%. Of the fathers' generation in Thailand, 31.4% were agricultural workers; of special note here is the working class, of whom 73% came from agricultural families. in Malaysia and the Philippines, there is a high rate of children breaking away from the working class to which their fathers
belonged. One of the reasons for this is that the level of economic development and industrial transformation in these two urban areas
have been quite rapid, with much of their industrial sectors relocating elsewhere. Thereafter, they became centres for urban commercial activity, chiefly the service industries. Table 3
Proportional Change among Southeast Asian Classes (%)
o
D
D-O
Malaysia
Indonesia
The Philippines O
D
D-o
Capitalists
New middle class
Old middle class
15.7 33.9
9.3* 41.7*
Marginal middle class
23.0 14.6
Working class
52.0
9.9
33.9
734
837
D
1.3
4.8
3.5
D-O
18.2
15.6
18.3 15.4 49.8
34.4
32.4
45.5* 28.4 -17.1 13.1 23.8
10.7
-8.4
33.4
25.7
-11.4
-42.1
5.5
9.6
Farmer class
Effective sample size
o
1026
1073
_|7.7
23.3 11.9
4.1 22.5
9.6
-12.9
24.4
O
-24.4
520 520
*Includes capitalists. Note: O = occupation of father, D = occupation of interviewee Source: Philippines data: Bautista et al., 1998:15; Indonesia data: KPC, 199732, Malaysia data: Abdul Rah ran, 1998:8.
But are the middle classes of Southeast Asia similar to those of East Asia in the sense that the latter are mostly the first generation of a new product of mobility in the social structure? Here we want to also ask: are
their origins also largely based in the lower stratum of the farmer and
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| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Southeast Asia
working classes? The Malaysian data indicate that new middle that 42% of the new class had an farmer or working class family, 54% of the old middle class
came from an farmer or working working class background, and 55% of the marginal 4; rnarinal middle class had working or agricultural class origins (Table 4, Abdul Rah ran, 1998:8). In other words, of the three middle class subcategories in Malaysia, 42% to 55% had their origins in relatively humble farmer or working class families. Table 4
Intergenerational Class Mobility in Malaysia (%) 'interviewee
Class of father of interviewee
Capitalist
Capitalist New middle
32.0
Class of interviewee Marginal New Old Marginal Working middle middle middle middle
Total Total
1.9
0.8
1.6
7.3 16.9 16.9
9.7 8.1
10.0 10.0
15.4
6.0
13.1
34.0
23.3
1.3
did middle
8.0
20.1 14.3 14.3
Marginal middle
20.0
22.0
21.0 21 .0
25.8
Working
16.0
20.1
27.4
27.4
20.0
22.5
Farmers Farmers Total (Sample (Sample size)
24.0
21 .6
24.4
100 (259)
27.4 100 (62)
30.0
100
26.6 100 (124)
100
100 (520)
(25)
(50)
Source: Abdul Rah ran, 1998:8.
The from the Philippines support this reading of The results of the study from
the Malaysian data (Table 5, Bautista et al., 1998:15). There are some differences in that 25% of white collar workers of the new middle class in the Philippines came from agricultural or blue collar homes, while 22% of
the self-employed or small proprietors of the old middle middle class also came working class background. Only a few of the from an agricultural or working higher-status professionals, technicians and those in the administrative stratum of the new middle class had their origins origins in the blue blue collar working class or farmer 16.7%). farmer class (from 6.5% to 16.7%). A different picture emerges in the case of Indonesia KPC, Indonesia (Table 6, KFC, 1997:32). In general, the great majority of Indonesia's middle class does not have its origins in the lower-level lower-Ievel farmer and working classes. Only 1.8% and 5.7% of the 1.8% of the new middle class, 4.9% of the old middle class and
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The Formation of the Middle Classes
(..
Southeast Asia |
11 I
marginal middle class have farmer and working class origins. Of these three middle class categories, 68% of the members of the old middle class have a father of the same background and 46% of the members of the marginal middle class also share their fathers' class origin, whereas the new middle class divides its family origins among new middle class, old middle class and the marginal middle class.
Table 5
Intergenerational Class Mobility in the Philippines (%) Class of interviewee
Class of father of interviewee
Merchants/
Administrators Professionals
Entrepreneurs
White
Blue collar
CO]_1aI
workers/ Farmers 5.6
employees
Administrators
11.1
4.3
Professionals
16.7
26.1
6.5 2.8
4.8 5.3
Merchants/
18.5
28.3
25.9
18.9
44.4
White collar employees
37.0
34.8
42.5
46.0
33.3
Blue collar workers
16.7
6.5
22.3
25.0
16.7
entrepreneurs
farmers Total
100
100
100
100
100
(Sample size)
(54)
(46)
(247)
(187)
(18)
Source: Bautista et al., 199817.
Table 6
Intergenerational Class Mobility in Indonesia (%) Class of interviewee
Class of father of interviewee
Old middle New middle Marginal middle
Wgfkmg N=]026, sig = .00000
Middle class Old middle 68.2 8.1 18.7 4.9
New middle
Marginal middle
35.6
38.9
Working class 36.6
28.3
9.8
2.2
34.3 13
45.7 57
39.8
21.5
I 12
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I Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
The proportion of middle class constituents with farmer or working class backgrounds in Thailand is situated between those of Malaysia and the Philippines. Fathers of the new middle class are chiefly merchants, white collar employees professionals, with with only 19.7% hailing from white employees and professionals, agricultural or working class families. Fathers of those belonging to the old middle class are in the main from the merchant class (about (about 60%), particularly self-employed and small particularly the self-employed small merchants within within the old middle class. As for the marginal middle class, 42% of their fathers are merchants and around around 24% come from the farmer or working classes. Rather more conspicuous is the working class, which sees more than 70%/ of its members coming from farmer families.
Table 7
Mobility in Thailand (%) Intergenerational Class Mobility (86)
Class of father Class father of interviewee Capitalist interviewee Capitalist Working Farmer Farmer White collar collar
Class of interviewee
Old middle 3.4
10.0
New middle 2.4 17.3
3.3
24.3
15.1 15.1
66.7 20.0
33.3 22.7
100.0
100.0
0.0
Marginal middle 0.8 23.2
Working Working
Total
10.6
3.8
72.9
31.4 31.4
27.4
4.0 4.0
18.6 18.6
59.7 5.9
42.1 6.6
11.6 11.6 1.0
100;0 100;.
100.0
100.0 100.0
35.7 10.4 100.0
16.0
employees
Merchants Professionals Total Total
N=862. 1999:20, Source: CSDS, 199920.
IV. The effects of difference difference in industrialization phases From the above analysis, analysis, the character character of the product of this this "first generation" upward upward mobility in the middle classes of our four Southeast Asian consistent. The trend for the first first generation generation Asian countries is not at all consistent. of die the Malaysian Malaysian middle class -- its upward mobility mobility from the lower-level lower-level farmer and working classes - is rather conspicuous, and quite closely resembles the East Asian experience. Thailand's phenomenon of upward
-
The Formation of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia |
( 1 3 1
mobility is arguably second to Malaysia's, and the Philippines follows thereafter. But the trend of upward mobility from the lower-level farmer and working classes to the Indonesian middle classes is the weakest, in other words, Indonesia's middle classes are still largely "self-recruiting,"
and do not make up numbers from below. This trend happens to correspond well with the trends in economic development in each country. We observe that, with regard to intergenerational mobility, the increase in the size of the new middle class is the most considerable, with
Malaysia seeing an increase of 34%, Indonesia 18% and the Philippines also increasing by 5%. As for the size of the old middle class, however, these three countries saw rises and falls, with the Philippines increasing by 23% and Malaysia 11%, but Indonesia falling by 17%. In addition to this is the comparative fall in the number of marginal middle class. In third world countries many service industries in the informal sector offer work opportunities to migrants. Therefore, in the early period of economic development, many people will initially have been concealed within this sector. Once an"opportunity arises, these people will then flow to other sectors. Therefore, we can say that the relative fall in the marginal middle class in these three countries may be seen as the result of the workforce flowing to modern sectors in the wake of industrial development. If this is the case, it serves as strong evidence for the
"difference in phase of industrialisation" hypothesis. This hypothesis states that by the early 1970s the four Little Dragons of East Asia had already industrialised to a certain extent, but also that our countries in Southeast Asia did not enter the initial phase of
industrialisation until the 1990s, with agriculture gradually moving towards an industrial structure that placed emphasis on light industry, and manufacturing still largely relying on labor-intensive methods of production. By the 1990s the industrial structure of East Asia's four Little Dragons had already advanced to become capital-intensive, technology-intensive and information-rich, with the service industries becoming more important by the day and agriculture no longer occupying an important place within the economy as a whole. Because a certain stage of industrialisation had been reached, their middle classes were relatively large, with the proportion of the new middle class particularly so. But for Southeast Asia, because inclustrialisation had just
begun, the proportion of middle class people was not large, and moreover a relatively large number of these were of the old middle class.
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14
\ Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Thus, the distinctive culture and influence of the middle class had yet to
develop. Table 8 Country
Industrial Structure by Country (%) Malaysia
Indonesia
The Philippines
1970
1992
1970
1992
994
27,854
500
..-
(US51IH) Food
65
23
26
10
39
Textiles
Value added
1970
Thailand
1992
1970
1992
1,665 12,811
1,130
31,185
23
16
14
16 40
14
16
3
6
8
37 13
Machinery
2
14
8
34
8
11
4
Chemicals
6
7
9
11
13
12
25
5
13
40
54
39
32
27
34
23
Other
Source: TonDzon, 1998:56.
In the above table we see that the value for industrial output of these four countries increased extremely rapidly, but that there are differences in the way industrial structures have changed over the last twenty years. Indonesia's food industry reduced in size quite significantly, while its greatest increase was in the " other" category - chiefly petroleum products. Malaysia saw its machinery and chemical industries increase the most, while its food industry decreased to only 10%. Thailand saw a substantial increase in the machinery industry, while a slight increase
was registered by the textiles industry and the food industry dropped to a 16% share. The Philippines was the country with the least structural change, with the textile and machinery industries increasing their share only slightly, and food dropping by only 2%. Looking at it this way, the industrialisation of Malaysia and Thailand are the most conspicuous, particularly with their enlarging industries requiring a large workforce, which means their middle classes have increased. With the Philippines, on the other hand, there seems to be very little change in the economic structure, so the change in the number of people in the middle class is smaller. Although the transformation of Indonesia's industry is concentrated in the "other" category, this is mostly the effect of the capital-intensive petrochemical industry and, because there are limits to
The Formation of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia |
l 15'l
the size of the workforce it can attract., the proportion of the new middle class remains low. Based on these proportions, we see that different phases of industrialisation definitely influence the size of the middle classes in each country, but, on the other hand, we see that different methods of industrialisation also influence the size of the middle class.
V. Southeast Asian Middle Classes Differentiation and Subjective Class Identity Since many in the Southeast Asian middle classes come from farmer, working and marginal middle class families, and as some are also from new and old middle class families, we might then ask: in terms of subjective identity, how do people differentiate their class from others? Is it the case diet different members of the new middle class will have different forms of identification? The "internal diversity of the divided middle class" hypothesis differentiation states that the middle class has within it different sections and jurisdictions, and thus that internal "differentiation" does more than exist, it is, rather, very conspicuous, The "different middle classes" of each country have their different sociocultural characteristics. Therefore, there should also be differences in regard to class identity and social origin. In Indonesia, more than three-quarters of the new middle class consider themselves to be "middle class," while this proportion among the small proprietors of the old middle class also stands at 66%. But the proportion of "self-employed" who consider themselves to be "middle class" is only about 37%. A larger number (about 60%) consider
themselves to be lower class. As for the marginal middle class, about 45% think they are middle class, while another 48% think they are lower class. With the working class, only around 15% consider themselves to be middle class (KPC, 1997:53). This indicates that members of the new middle class most thoroughly identify themselves as middle class, followed by small proprietors of the old middle class. However, 48% to 60% of the self-employed within the middle class and the marginal middle class identify themselves as lower class. In the Philippines, a solid majority (70% to 80%) of the new middle class, the old middle class and the marginal middle class in each case considered themselves to be "middle class" (that is, the upper-middle and middle-middle). This proportion is decidedly higher than that of
LExploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
16 .I1
Indonesia (Bautista et al., 1998:13); however, 14% of the new middle class, 20% of the old middle class and 23% of marginal middle class interviewees identified themselves as lower middle or lower class. In other words, the objective new middle class, more than any other, tends toward adopting a middle class identity. Table g
Class Identification in Indonesia (%) Actual class of interviewee
Class
Old middle class
claimed by
interviewee
Capitaljst
Small proprietors
New middle class
Marginal
middle
Self-
employed Managers Professionals
class
Worldng Total
class
Upper
23.5
4.5
1.3
5.9
4.8
3.3
1.9
4.1
Middle
58.8
66.2
36.6
75.2
77.0
44.9
14.6
55.0
Lower
17.6
25.6
59.5
16.8
17.6
47.8
80.6
38.3
3.8
2.6
2.0
0.5
4.0
2.9
2.6
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
No answer Total
100
N 7071.
Table 10
Class Identification in the Philippines (%) Actual class of interviewee
Class claimed by
interviewee
(includes small
New
proprietors)
middle
(Effective sample size)
Marginal middle middle
Working class
1.4
1.3
0.8
10.8
7.1
3.2
2.4
51.5
73.4
72.7
49.4
18.2
12.2
73.0 14.1 4.5
17.7
19.3
5.6
28.9
100 (724)
(83)
2.2
Lower class
Total
Old
30.3
Upper class Upper-middle Middle-middle Lower-middle
Middle class
Capitalist
100 (33)
100
100
(279)
(312)
100
The Formation of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia |
I 17
In Malaysia, 91% of people belonging to the upper class (i.e. capitalists and the new and old middle classes) consider themselves to belong to the upper, upper-middle or middle-middle classes, but only about three-quarters of the marginal middle class believe this to be the case, a figure that approaches the Indonesian result. However, one-quarter of the lower grade white collar class think they belong to the working or farmer classes. As for blue collar workers, close to one half of their number think they belong to the working class (Chang et al. 1996:23). This also firmly indicates that members of Malaysia's new middle class are believers in their middle class status. Table 11
Class Identification in Malaysia (% ) Actual class of interviewee
Class claimed by interviewee
Capitalist class
Upper class
Old
New
Marginal
middle
middle
middle
class
class
class
0.5
3.5
2.4
Working Total class 1.4
Upper-middle class
26.1
17.2
15.0
9.5
10.6
75.7
Middle class
73.9
77.3
64.6
42.9
63.8
68.9
4.9
14.2
42.9
23.4
12.9
2.7
2.4
2.1
1.2
700
100
100
100
Working class
Farmer class
Total
100
100
N=428.
In Thailand, a majority (56.8%) of the capitalist class believe they belong to the upper class, while the identity of the middle class conforms quite well with their objective status: more than 86% of the new middle, old middle and marginal middle classes believe they belong to the middle class. Only 56% of the working class, however, believe they are
middle class, while as many as 42.5% identify themselves as lower class.
This pattern of class identity is similar to the distribution for Malaysia. We see therefore that in our four Southeast Asian countries it is the new middle class which emerges as the class that most clearly identifies
itself as "middle class." The old middle classes and the marginal middle
18
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
classes are not so certain about which category of class they belong to, and still display a tendency toward identifying themselves as lower-middle class or as farmer or working class. With regard to class identity, Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12 demonstrate that the proportion of the new middle class who consider themselves upper-middle class is relatively high, indicating that the there is a division between the new middle class and the other middle classes.
Table 12 .
Class Identification in Thailand (%) Actual class of interviewee
Class claimed by interviewee
Upper class
56.8
Middle class
29.4
Lower class Other
3.9
Declined to identify No answer
7_8
Total
Old
New
Marginal
class
middle class
middle class
Capitalist middle class
100
1.6 86.5 6.4 1.6 --
1.6 86.7 4.5 3.3 1.4
4.0
2.5
3.0
100
100
100
Working Total class 3.8
88.5
56.1
78.0
7.1
42.5
12.9
0.7
0.5
1.9
1.1
0.7
1.0 100
2.4 100
N=1013; Source: Jumbala & Banpasirichote, 1999:30.
A corresponding problem is intergenerational mobility. Indonesia's new middle class mainly has its origins in the old middle class (35%), the marginal middle class (34%) and the new middle class itself (28%). This distribution is dramatically different from that of the old middle class, with the latter primarily coming from its own ranks (68%). Further, the marginal middle class also derives firstly from its own ranks (46%), followed by the old middle class (39%). Based on these figures, it would appear that these three middle classes have no origins in the working class (KPC, 1997:43). The new middle class in the Philippines also seems to have its origins in its own ranks. With regard to professionals, if the father was a
professional then the chances of his children becoming professionals is
The Formation of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia |
I 19 .I
3.75 times more likely than the average. With administrators, the figure is 1.8 times the average, but for the white collar wage earning class, the more likely origins are the blue collar or farmer classes (1.17
times)(Bautista et al., 1998:17). The difference in intergenerational mobility between the new middle class and the old middle and marginal middle classes in Malaysia lies in the fact that one-fifth of the new middle class comes from its own ranks, whereas the proportion of the other two middle classes that come from the new middle class is low - less than one-tenth. From the preceding we can say that the proportion of the Malaysian middle class (the new, old and marginal middle classes) that comes from a farmer or working class background is greater than that of both Indonesia and the Philippines (about 40% to 54%), whereas Thailand's situation is closer to that of Malaysia, with 22% of the new middle class coming from its own ranks. The corresponding proportion for the other two middle classes is only 6%. On this point the situation is decidedly different from the Philippines and Indonesia.
From this it can be seen that these Southeast Asian countries display significant differences among the three subcategories of the middle classes with regard to subjective class identity and class origins and causes. Finally, regarding educational attainment, the members of the new middle classes in the four Southeast Asian countries receive much more education than do people in the old and marginal middle classes, and for this reason they claim a much finer "market situation" (see Tables 13 to 16); this can also be viewed as a phenomenon of class division.
In summing up the preceding discussion, we learn that the members of the middle classes in Southeast Asia come from families of similar class background, in addition to having their origins in the lower level farmer and working classes. When we compare them with the four territories of East Asia, upward class mobility does not appear to be so
far-reaching. The different parts of the middle class feature different phenomena of intergenerational mobility. Different subjective class identities within the middle classes also present divisional phenomena. As opposed to the new middle class category, which is quite unequivocal in its identification with middle class status, the old middle class and marginal middle class retain indefinite and ambiguous subjective class identities. Of the four countries, the class origins and subjective identities of the Malaysian middle class most closely approach those of East Asia,
I
20 )
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
followed by Thailand and the Philippines, and then Indonesia, which contains the greatest differences. These phenomena can be said to reflect different effects on social structure produced by different phases of industrialisation in different countries. In this way, phenomena Of division and diversity within the middle classes in each country are made apparent.
VI. Are the Southeast Asian Middle Classes "Ascending"? Our hypothesis states that the middle class is the greatest beneficiary over the entire course of economic development and is also a newly affluent class. As their "market situation" is extremely good, they are able to develop a substantial class culture of their own. At the same time, members of the middle class grouping will intensively select their spouses from within their own class, and not from the lower-class farmer and working classes, to make conspicuous the internal cohesion and insularity of their class. We will investigate this problem from three angles: are education, residential circumstances and marriage patterns of any special significance? Let us look at the educational angle first. Educational levels attained by Indonesia's new middle class (professionals and administrators) are concentrated around senior high school, technical college and university, and on average are superior to those of the small proprietors of the old middle class. Further, those educational levels among the self-employed of the old middle class are lower than those of the marginal middle class,
wide their distribution approaching those of the working class. The marginal middle class instead is concentrated at the level of senior high (reaching 62%)(Table 13). Otherwise, educational levels among the capitalist class are highest (KPC, 1997:30). In the Philippines, the highest educational level on average is also held by the new middle class, with 84% of that group being tertiary graduates or higher (Table 14). Their average level of education is even higher than that of the capitalist class, with 73% being tertiary graduates or higher. The educational levels of the old middle class and the marginal middle class are about the same, with about 55% having a tertiary educational background or higher. The working class is the lowest, with
their proportion receiving a tertiary education seeming to be only half
The Formation of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
that of the marginal middle class (of which 30% of people had a tertiary educational background or higher)(Bauhlsta et al., 199811-12).
Level of Education by Class in Indonesia (%)
Table 13
Class of interviewee Interviewee
Old middle class
level of education
Capitalist
Small
TS
proprieto
3.0
None
New middle class
Marginal Working Total middle C]aSS employed Managers Professionals class
1.9
1.0
0.7
Elementary
16.5
37.7
7.2
39.8
13.1
]ullior high
12.8
18.2
1.5
0.5
12.7
20.4
9.8
Senior high
29.4
39.8
29.9
30.0
29.0
62.3
35.9
40.1
Technical college
23,5
13.5
2.6
27.1
25.7
10.9
1.9
75.0
University
47.1
13.5
5.2
37.9
40.1
5.8
0.8
1.9
3.0
3.2
Doctorate
0.5
0.5
No answer
2.6
Masters
Subtotal
1.6
12.4
14.4
1.6
0.2
17.4
18.9
18.8
1.1
1.0
0.7
25.'7
9.6
100
N 1073.
Table 14
Level of Education by Class in the Philippines (ind. spouse) ( %) (proportion who have received tertiary education or higher)
Class of interviewee Capitalist
New middle Old middle class
class
middle class
Working class
Marginal
Interviewee
72.7
84.4
58.6
55.6
27.7
Spouse of
64.7
76.3
57.0
53.9
37.9
interviewee
(22
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
The educational levels of the new middle class in Malaysia are also the highest, with nearly 80% being tertiary graduates. Following the new middle class is the capitalist class with a tertiary or higher educational figure in the region of 50 %, / although members of this class, elementary school graduates account for 20% of the total. As for the educational level of the old middle class, there is no great difference between that and those of the marginal middle class and working class: each class is concentrated around the level of secondary education (Abdul Rah ran, 1998: 10). Table 15
Level of Education by Class in Malaysia (%)
Interviewee
level of education
None Elementary
Capitalist (includes
small proprietors)
Class of interviewee Middle class
Marginal Working Old middle middle middle New
0.8
20.0
Total
2.0
0.4
13.7
8.1
12.0
6.3
Junior high
8.0
9.3
60.5
62_9
68.0
33.5
Senior high
16.0
6.9
14.5
9.7
2.0
9.0
8.0
5.0
4.0
8.1
10.0
5.8
Other universitylevel colleges
28.0
22.0
0.8
8.1
6.0
14.0
University
12.0
42.1
5.6
1.6
23.1
8.0
14.7
1.6
7.9
100 (25)
100 (259)
Technical/ professional college
Research institute or higher Total (Sample size)
100 (124)
100
100
(62)
(50)
100
The lowest average level of education in Thailand is also found among workers, with more than 81 o/, receiving an education at or below the level of junior high school; the corresponding proportion for the old I
The Formation of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia |
(231
middle class is only 24.8%(Table 16). Most distinctive is the capitalist class, with 15.7% of its members with an education at OI' below junior high school level, yet with as many as 66.6% having received an education at university level or higher. As with the other three countries,
the educational level of the new middle class remains highest, with around 90% receiving an education at the level of university or research institute or higher. Following them is the marginal middle class, with 68% receiving a university education or higher. Of the three middle classes it is the old middle class that has the lowest educational level,
with only 47.7% receiving an education at university level or higher. Table 16
Level of Education by Class in Thailand (incl. spouse) (%) (proportion who have received tertiary education or higher)
Education level
Illiterate Elementary
Junior high
Capitalist
New
middle
Marginal Working old Sub-total class middle middle
1.3
4.0
0.0
3.3
0.0
10.1
1.7
42.1
10.9
1.3
10.7
2.4
35.9
10.7
4.2
0.0
0.0
3.9 11.8 5.9
19.5
18.3
11_0
10.6
11.8 52.9
4.6
7.4
14.0
5.7
8.3
62.7
42.3
62.8
1.9
46.6
Research institute or higher
13.7
27.1
5.4
5.1
0.0
11.2
Chinese~1angLla be
0.0
0.0
0.7
0.7
0.0
0.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Senior high
Technical college University
school Total
N=1008.
The data discussed above indicate that .the middle classes of each Southeast Asian country definitely possess a finer "market situation," and particularly the new middle class, whose positions are much better than those of the old middle and marginal middle classes. Now, materially speaking, are they better placed than the other classes? A
24
'qnloraiion of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
house is a necessity in life, and with this commodity we can examine the differences that exist among classes in levels of ownership. In Indonesia, 100% of the capitalist class own their own homes and about 77% of the old middle class own their places of residence, but when we come to the new middle class this proportion drops to only 55% or so (Table 17). The marginal middle class figure is even lower at 42%. As for the working class, only about one-third have their own residences, while the others live with their parents, their brothers or sisters, or with other relatives. Using this index, the new middle class is not - by virtue of a finer "market situation" materially better placed than the old middle class. Further, the marginal middle class is closer to the working class on this measure (KPC, 1997:47).
-
Table 17
Residential Circumstances by Class in Indonesia (%)
Interviewee's residential Capitalist circumstances
Has own home Rents /boards
100
Class of interviewee Old middle class Small
Self-
¢
proprietors employed
New middle class
Marginal Working
Managers
Professionals
middle
class
77.4
76.6
57.1
51.9
42.4
33.0
13.5
14.3
12.3
12.3
15.2
21.4
2.5
5.9
5.4
Company dormitory
1.5
Lives with
9.8
7.8
21.7
26.7
31.5
40.8
0.8
1.3
5.9
3.2
5.1
2.9
0.4
1.9
other family
Lives with parents
Other
0.5
In the Philippines, the highest rate of home ownership belongs to the capitalist class, but the middle classes (i.e. the new, old and marginal middle classes) also have a rate of ownership exceeding 70%(Table 18). Further, 58% of working class people also have their own residence. Even if these rates of home ownership are high, however, the size of the homes
is different, with close to one half of the capitalist class "having three or
The Formation of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia |
125
I
more rooms." The proportion for the new and old middle classes is only one-third, for the marginal middle class even lower at 20%, and the lowest figure of 13% belongs to the working class (Bautista et al., 1998:19). In this respect, the middle classes in the Philippines are certainly much better off materially than is the working class.
Table 18
Residential Circumstances by Class in the Philippines (%) Class of interviewee
Interviewee's residential circumstances
Middle class
Capitalist
(includes small
proprietors)
New middle
Old
Marginal middle middle
Working
class
Total
Has own home
78.8
72.7
72.1
70.2
57.8
70.8
House with more than three rooms
48.5
33.3
32.1
20.2
13.3
29.5
House has at least
66.7
53.2
50.5
34.7
15-5
46.7
2nd housel Apartment
54.5
32.6
35.9
31.5
22.9
33.6
Sample size
33
284
315
124
one comfortable room
81
837
Those in the Malaysia's capitalist class also have- 100%/ ownership of their own residences. This proportion drops to about two-thirds for the new and old middle classes, but the greatest surprise- comes from the working class figure, which turns out to be the same as the new and old middle classes (Table 19). Unexpectedly, only half of the marginal middle class have their own homes. Are the sizes of their homes the same as for
the Philippines? According to our study, home ownership is greatest among capitalists, and the distribution of residence type among the three middle class categories is largely similar, concentrating on two-story
houses, while the working class mainly (42%) lives in apartinents (Abdul Rah ran, 1998:16). Therefore, it is difficult to say that the Malaysian
middle classes are living under uniquely wealthy circumstances.
26
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Table 19
Residential Circumstances by Class in Malaysia (%)
Class of interviewee Interviewee's
Capitalist
residential
(includes
circumstances
Middle Class New
small
proprietors) Has own home
100
Rents entire
Old
middle middle 65.6
67.7
Mar . 1 Working middle
class
50.0
64.0
Total (Sample
size) 65.8 (342)
22.0
26.0
37.1
32.0
Rents one room
5.0
1.6
3.2
2.0
Company-
5.4
0.8
6.5
2.0
3.2
3.2
2.0
(18) 3.7 (19) 2.4
100
100
100
100
100
(25)
(259)
100 (124)
(62)
(50)
(520)
apartment
provided Lives with parents/ relatives Total (Sample size)
Table 20
24.8 (129) 3.5
(12)
/) Residential Circumstances by Class in Thailand (%
InteI'viewee'5 residential circumstances
Has own home Rents
Capitalist
class
New middle class
Old Marginal Working Sub-total middle middle class class class
84.3
37.6
55.7
23.2
11.0
32.9
2.0
12.4
22.1
19.8
47.4
22.7
2.9
1.3
1.7
Mortgage
1.6
Lives with parents
9.8
36.3
14.8
42.3
27.3
31.6
Lives with relatives
2.0
6.2
2.7
7.8
2.4
5.2
0.3
7.7
1.7
Company accor. 3.9
0.7
2.0
1.4
2.2
2.0
0.7
2.0
2.4
2.9
1.9
0.7
0.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Government Accor.
Other (e.8. with friends) No answer Total
0.2
:
The Formation of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia |
~
27 J
Thailand's capitalists are still those with the greatest economic power:
84.3% own their own residences. The class with the least economic power is the working class, with 47.4% still renting accommodations(Table 20). Because of its many self-employed merchants and small proprietors, the residence and workplace for the old middle class is often at the same location, the proportion of home ownership therefore is 55.7%. For the new middle class and the marginal middle class the proportion of those living with parents is high, mainly due to economic considerations (Table
20; csDs, 1999:36). With regard to marriage among the classes, is there a phenomenon of intra-class marriage? Intra-class marriage in Indonesia is most frequent among the marginal middle class, reaching 62%(Table 21). Second to them is the capitalist class (50%), then the old middle class (40-51 %) and the new middle class (34-40%), with the lowest figure of 18% belonging to the working class. With regard to the middle classes, the rate of "inter-elass marriage" among the new middle class was quite high (60-65%); here, there is still no phenomenon of erecting class closure through marriage (KFC, 1997137-38). So, we may say that the phenomenon of "class formation through marriage" does not exist for the middle class in Indonesia. Table 21
Inter-Class Marriage in Indonesia (%) Class of interviewee Old middle New middle
Type of marriage
Capitalist
Small
Self-
proprietors employed
Managers Professionals
Marginal Working . riddle
Total
Intra-class
50,0
51.4
38.9
40.4
34.2
61.7
18.3
42.7
Inter-class
50.0
48.6
61.1
59.6
65.8
38.3
81.3
57.3
2.9
13.5
13.1
20.8
26.6
17.2
5.8
100
Total N=274.
In the Philippines, the new middle class has the highest average level of education, with the educational level of members' spouses also the highest in that category, 77% / receiving a tertiary education or higher.
28
H
I
I
I Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
_.I
Next are the spouses of the capitalist class (65%), while the figure for the old middle class and the marginal middle class is about the same at around 55%. The working class figure is the lowest at only 38%. If we look at educational level, there is a marked phenomenon of intra-class
marriage for the new middle class in the Philippines (Bautista et al., 1998:1-4). Malaysia resembles the Philippines in this regard, with 88.1% of working class spouses having received an education at junior high level
or lower, while more than 48.5% of spouses in the new middle class were tertiary graduates or higher (Table 22). Only 12.2% of the spouses of the old middle class were tertiary graduates, with the marginal middle class figure at 14.6% (Abdul Rah ran, 1998:10). In other words, same-class marriage within the new middle class also exists. Table 22 Level of education of spouse of mtervlewee
Inter-Class Marriage in Malaysia (%) Class of interviewee
Capitalist (includes small
New
proprietors
middle
Middle class
Marginal Old middle middle
Working class
Total
0.7
1.9
2.1
Elementary
9.1
1.0
17.8
8.3
7.1
7.2
Junior high
40.9
33.0
57.9
62.5
81.0
48.0
Senior high
13.6
13-0
4.7
6.3
Technical/
9.1
4.5
5.6
6.3
9.5
5.7
13.6
12.0
1.9
10.4
2.4
8.4
University
9.1
30.0
8.4
Graduate school or higher
4.5
6-5
1.9
100
100
100
(22)
(200)
None
8.8
professional college
Other university-
Ievel colleges
Total
(Sample size)
(107)
17.2 l
100
(48)
4.1
100
100
(42)
(419)
The Formation of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia |
I
29
1
With regard to class intermarriage in Thailand, as many as 54% of spouses do not work, and this is particularly the case for the working and
marginal middle classes (with figures of 63.6% and 67.9% respectively) (Table 23). For the new middle class, the proportion of spouses who do not work is as high as 54%. Further, 56.9% of the spouses of the capitalist class and 43% of the spouses of the old middle class (mainly self-employed merchants and small proprietors) are themselves merchants (je. small proprietors and self-employed merchants); this is probably because they are the proprietors or wives of proprietors within a family enterprise. One characteristic of the new middle class is that 14% of their spouses are professionals, a figure which tops all other classes, while 18.4% of the spouses of the marginal middle class belong to the lower class category of white collar employees. This situation illustrates that Thailand's middle class has gradually seen the emergence of marriage within same class boundaries.
Table 23
Inter-Class Marriage in Thailand (%) Class of interviewee
Occupation
Total
New
Old
middle
middle
9.8
54.2
28.2
67.9
63.6
54.1
Worker
0.0
0.0
0.7
0.0
17.2
3.7
Farmer
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.3
1.4
0.4
White collar
7.8
16.0
10.1
18.4
5.7
13.3
56.9
6.5
43.0
4.4
5.7
13.7
5.9
14.1
3.4
2.7
0.5
6.0
Housewife
13.7
6.5
9.4
2.4
0.5
4.9
No answer
5.9
2.6
5.4
3.8
5.3
4.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
of spouse Not
Capitalist
Marginal middle
Working
employed
employee Merchant Professional
Total
u
-30
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
VII. The Political Attitudes of the Southeast Asian Middle Classes What about the political role played by the middle classes in a changing society? Are they conservatives? Or are they reformers? Are they playing an increasingly important role within social and political development in general? Let us first examine if the circumstances of middle class political
participation are any different from those of other classes. The most direct method of political participation is voting behaviour, as well as participation in electoral campaigning (Table 24). Records of voting in Indonesia from 1992 indicate that more than 90% cast their ballots, but there was no apparent difference between classes in this regard (KPC, 1997:99). In the Philippines' 1995 election, about 80% of interviewees voted, and of these the highest proportion of voting occurred among the new middle class (84.4%), with the lowest figure belonging to the working class (70.3%)(Bautista et al., 1998:32). In Malaysia, more than 90% of interviewees east their votes, with the marginal middle class having the highest rate of voting ( 9 8 I Z ] and the capitalist and new se)(Abdul Rah ran, middle classes having the lowest rate
_
1998:27). In Thailand, 85.9% of the old middle class voted, followed by u the new middle class with only 73.9% . only 71%. In Thailand, the capaalisag more active classes in voting. is-.
~
During electoral campaigns, if one actively participates in political
activity then one will probably seek to exert influence on friends to vote for a certain candidate. In Indonesia, the class that most frequently attempted to influence the voting behavior of others was the capitalist class (5.9%). The figure of least frequency belonged to the working class (1%), but there was no significant statistical difference between different classes (KPC, 1997:112). In the Philippines, as many as 32% of people attempted to influence voting behavior and, of these, the new middle class had the highest proportion at 37%, and the working class the lowest at 22% (Bautista et al., 1998:32)i' Proportions in Malaysia were also high, with 24%/ of people attempting to influence others to vote for a certain person. Here the highest figure was held by the marginal middle class (30%) and the lowest by the old middle class (21%)(AbduI Rah ran, 1998:27). In Thailand, the capitalist class had the highest proportion
(43.1%) followed by the old middle class (42.3%) and the new middle
The :Formation of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia |
31 'l
class (39.5%) but in this case we could not detect conspicuous differences within the middle classes. Table 24
Comparison of Political Participation across Four Southeast
Asian Countries (% ) Class of interviewee Middle class
Political
participation
Capitalist
Country
(includes
New middle
index
old middle
Marginal
slnnall proprietors Managers
ProfessSmail Selfionals proprietors employed
Worldng Total class
middle
The P11ilippine5 (1995) "Do you vote?"
Malaysia
{1995)
Thailand
[1996]
"DO you Indonesia
74.1
84.4
77.4
79.4
70.3
79.2
88.0
88.2
94.8
98.2
93.5
91.5
80.4
73.9
85.9
71.0
50.7
70.3
2.5
1.0
3.7
5.9
3.0
5.3
5.2
5.3
attempt to influonce
33.3
36.9
32.8
24.5
21.9
32.0
Malaysia
28.0
22.8
21.0
30.6
26.0
23.8
Thailand
43.1
39.5
42.3
42.0
39.2
40.8
Indonesia
5.9
1.8
1.9
2.9
'm
The Philippines
others their
choice of
candi-
date?"
"Do you make
dona-
The
2.0
3.2
6.0
3.2
8.0
5.9
3.7
2.1
1.6
4.1
Malaysia
24.0
5.0
12.1
6.5
2.0
7.5
Thailand
19.6
4.2
6.7
1.7
2.9
4.4
Fhilippines
tions to candi-
dates?"
(32
`
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
One other way of investigating political participation i5 to look at class behavior relating to financial contributions. In Indonesia, only 2.9% of people contributed money and, of these, the capitalist class made up the largest component (6%) and the marginal middle and working classes the lowest (1.8%). In the Philippines, the highest proportion was held by the capitalist class (8%), followed by the new middle class (5.9%), and with the lowest proportions held by the working class (1.6%) and the marginal middle class (2.I%). In Malaysia, there were relatively more contributors,
with 7.5% of interviewees saying they had contributed money. Of these, the capitalist class was the highest (24%), followed by the old middle class (12%), but the new middle class proportion turned out to be lower than that of the marginal middle class (5% and 6.5% respectively). The lowest figure, however, remained with the working class, at only 2%. On this spread of figures Thailand resembles Malaysia, with the capitalist class the most frequent contributor of funds (19.6%), followed by the old middle class (6.7%), and with the marginal middle class the least frequent (1.7%) Does the new middle class grouping support the political status quo to protect its class benefits? in Indonesia, the result we see is that there is no relative tendency to support the status quo. Of the responses to the statement "If the government is able to maintain public security... [etc.1
then democracy is not important at all," only the working class,
the self-employed and the capitalist class had greater than 40 % agreement; the proportion of the new middle class who agreed, however, was less than 30% (Table 25). Small proprietors and the marginal middle class were situated in the middle, at around 35% (KFC, 1997:109). The data from the Philippines, however, present a stark contrast: each class on average agreed to the same statement in excess of 75%. The smallest proportion was that of the new middle class (p 3 0 If not
0.91
Regression coefficient
(Cont~rasts)*
Capitalist class/ NMC NMC/OMC OMC/MMC
0.75 0.58 0.27
MMC/ WC
0.58
(Contrasts} AB/Cl
1 .90
C1/ cz C2/D D/E Model III A and B Y= 1 If comfort room > 1
0.00
0.56 1.54 4.39 Regfegsion
0.25 0.16 0.16 7.4 Standard
0.55 Significance of
coefficient
error
Wald statistic
0.37 0.17 0.21 0.34
0.02 0.01 0.03
0.00 0.00 0.01
0 If not
(Contrasts)* Capitalist class/ NMC
NMC/ OMC OMC/MMC MMC/WC
0.82 0.41 0.46 0.88
0.01
(Contrasts)
AB/ C1 C1 / C2 C2/ D
1.88 0.80 2.33
D/ E
4.31
0.34 0.14 0.60 6.72
0.00
0.00
0.00 0.52
*NMC=New middle class; OMC=OId middle class, MMC=Margina1 middle class; WC=Working class
Middle Class Cultures: Glimpses into Lifestyles and Outlooks
(
I
Table B Model I A and B Y= 1 If HH employs maids* 0 Otherwise
Regression
Standard
Significance of
coefficient
error
Wald statistic
(Contrasts) Capitalist class/ MMC
1.46
0.39
0.00
NMC/ MMC OMC/ MMC
0.69 0.46
0.19 0.21
0.00
(Cent-fasts) AB/ C2 C1/ C2 Model II A and B Y= 1 If 2 or more maids 0 Otherwise (Contrasts) Capitalist class/ MMC NMC/ MMC OMC/ MMC (Contrasts) AB/C2
c1/c2
1.50
25
0.88
15
0.03 0.00
Regression
Standard
coefficient
error
0.00 Significance of Wald statistic
2.25 1.23 0.77
0.40
0.00
0.28 0.29
0.00 0.01
2.40 1.03
0.25 1.03
0.00 0.00
*HH=Household head.
Table C Model I A and B Y= 1 If R OWI75 car*
Regression
Standard
Significance of
coefficient
error
Wald statistic
0 Otherwise
(Contrasts] Capitalist class/ NMC
0.81
0.54
0.13
NMC/ OMC
0.79
0.19
0.00
OMC/MMC
0.68
0.21
0.00
AB/C1
0.64
0.36
0.07
C1 / C2
1.25
0.17
0.00
(Contrasts}
*R=Respondent.
l
195 I l
(
196 )
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Model II A and B Y= 1 If R owns 2 or more cars 0 Otherwise
Regression coefficient
Standard error
Significance of Wald statistic
(Contrasts)
Capitalist class/ NMC
1.33
0.38
0.00
NMC/OMC
081
0.21
0.14
OMC/ MMC
0.89
0.36
0.01
AB/C1
1.70
0.26
0.00
C1 / C2
0.36
0.20
0.06
(Contrasts)
Model IHA and B
Y= 1 If R has credit card
Regression coefficient
Standard error
Significance of Wald statistic
0 Otherwise (Contrasts) Capitalist class/ NMC
0.29
0.34
0.40
NMC/ OMC
0.56
0.17
0.00
OMC/ MMC
0.46
0.21
0.03
AB/ C1
0.78
0.24
0.00
C1 / C2
0.76
0.15
0.00
(Contrasts)
Model IVA and B Y= 1 If R has gold credit card
Regression coefficient
Standard error
Significance of Wald statistic
0 Otherwise (Contrasts)
Capitalist class/ NMC
1.02
0.47
0.02
NMC/OMC
0.54
0.26
0.04
OMC/MMC
0.43
0.41
0.29
(Contrasts)
AB/C1
1.17
0.29
0:00
c1/c2
0.75
0.26
0.00
Middle Class CLLlt1.1r€S: Glimpses into Lifestyles and Outlooks
MOde1V A and B Y= 1 If H owns stereo 0 Otherwise
Regression coefficient
I
(
197 I
Standard
Significance of
error
Wald statistic
(Contrasts) Capitalist class/ NMC
0.08
0.77
0.91
NMC/ OMC
-0.32
0.43
0.45
OMC/ MMC
1.46
0.41
0.00
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
(Contrasts)
AB/ C1 C1/ C2
mode1VI A and B
R€g1'€SSiO1'1
Standard
Y= 1 If H owns video recorder 0=Otherwise
coefficient
error
NA Significance of Wald statistic
(Contrasts)
Capitalist class/ NMC
-0.27
0.67
NMC/OMC
0.33
0.31
0.45
OMC/ MMC
0.92
0.29
0.00
NA
NA
NA
0.91
(Contrasts)
AB/C1 C1 / C2
Model VII A and B
»
Y= 1 If H owns videocamera
NA
NA
NA
Regression
Standard
Significance of
coefficient
Error
Wald statistic
0 Otherwise
(Contrasts) Capitalist class/ NMC
NA
NA
NA
NMC/ OMC
NA
NA
NA
OMC/ MMC
NA
NA
NA
(Contrasts)
AB/ Cl
0.45
0.22
0.04
CO / C2
0.50
0.15
0.00
l
LExploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Model VIII A and B
1 Lf H owns laserdisc
Regression
Standard
coefficient
error
0 Otherwise
Significance of Wald statistic
(Contrasts) Capitalist class/ NMC
0.77
0.33
0.02
NMC/ OMC
0.28
0.18
0.12
OMC/ MMC
0.38
0.23
0.09
AB/ C1
0.85
0.23
0.00
C1/C2
0.56
0.15
0.00
(Contrasts)
Model IX A and B
Y= 1 If R owns cell phone
Regression coefficient
Standard
Error
Significance of Wald statistic
0 Otherwise (Contrasts)
Capitalist class/NMC
0.68
0.36
0.06
NMC /OMC
0.27
0.17
0.11
OMC/ MMC
0.72
0.21
0.00
AB/ C1
1.07
0.27
0.00
C1/ C2
0.71
0.15
0.00
(Contrasts}
Model IX A and B
Regression
Standard
Significance of
Y= 1 If H owns computer
coefficient
error
Wald statistic
0 Otherwise
(Contrasts)
Capitalist class/ N MC
1.45
0.39
0.00
NMC/ OMC
0.41
0.17
0.02
OMC/ MMC
0.63
0.23
0.01
(Contrasts)
AB/ C1
0.97
0.24
0.00
C1 / C2
0.85
0.15
0.00
Middle Class Cultures: Glimpses into Lifestyles and Outlooks
Model X
Regression
Standard
Y= 1 If H subscribes to cable iv
coefficient
error
0 Otherwise
I
I
199
Significance of Wald statistic
(Contrasts) Capitalist class/ NMC
1.02
NMC/ OMC
0.18
0.17
0.29
OMC/ MMC
0.49
0.23
0.03
1.01
0.23
0.00
0.68
0.15
0.34
0.00
(Contrasts)
AB/ C2 C1/ C2 Model XI 1 If R has aircon
Regression
0.00
Significance of
coefficient
Standard error
Capitalist class/NMC
0.77
0.39
0.05
NMC/ OMC
0.03
0.17
0.88
OMC/ MMC
1.12
0.21
0.00
1.01
0.29
0.00
Wald statistic
0 Otherwise
(Contrasts)
(Contrasts)
AB/ C1 CO / C2 Model XII and B Y= 1 if R has savings
0,68
0.15
Regression
Standard
coefficient
error
0.00
Significance of Wald statistic
0 Otherwise (Contlasts) Capitalist class/NMC
-0.37
0.45
0.41
NMC/OMC
-0.01
0.26
0.97
OMC/MMC
0.59
0.29
0.04
(Contrasts)
AB/C1
NA
NA
NA
C1 / C2
NA
NA
NA
i~ 200 }
l
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Model XIII A and B Y= I If R has stocks/bonds 0 Otherwise
Regression coefficient
Standard error
Significance of Wald statistic
(Contrasts}
Capitalist class/ NMC
0.17
0.36
0.64
NMC/ OMC
0.43
0.21
0.21
OMC/ MMC
0.56
0.31
0.31
0.61
0.24
0.01
0.52
0.20
0.01
Standard
Significance of
error
Wald statistic
(Contrasts) AB/ C1
c1/c2 Model XIV A and B Y= 1 If R/H owns real estate
Regression coefficient
0 Otherwise (Contrasts)
Capitalist class/ NMC
0.61
0.33
0.06
NMC / OMC
0.37
0.19
0.05
OMC/ MMC
0.67
0.28
0.02
AB/ Cl
1.01
0.23
0.00
C1/ C2
0.50
(Contrasts)
Mode1XV A and B Y= 1 If R has foreign currency 0 Otherwise
Regression coefficient
0.18
Standard error
0.00 Significance of
Wald statistic
(Contrasts)
Capitalist class/ NMC
-0.41
0.55
0.45
NMC/ OMC
1.10
0.34
0.00
OMC/ MMC
-0.78
0.40
0.06
(Contrasts)
AB/ C1
0.62
0.30
0.04
C1 / C2
0.38
0.26
0.13
Middle Class Cultures: Glimpses into Lifestyles and Outlooks
ModeIXVI A and B Y= 1 If H owns antiques or paintings 0 Otherwise
Regression
coefficient
Standard error
I
Significance of Wald statistic
(Contrasts) Capitalist class/ NMC
0.58
0.52
0.27
NMC/ OMC
1.27
0.50
0.01
OMC/ MMC
0.42
0.84
0.62
AB/C1
1.54
0.40
0.00
CO / C2
0.66
0.47
0.16
(Contrasts)
Table D Regression coefficient
Standard
Capitalist class/ MMC
0.82
0.35
0.02
NMC/ MMC
1.03
0.28
0.00
OMC/ MMC
0.69
0.48
0.15
1.26
0.25
0.00
error
Significance of Wald statistic
(Contrasts)
(Contrasts)
AB/ C2 C1 / C2 Model II
Y= 1 If R engages in cultural
0.76
Regression coefficient
0.25
0.00
Standard
Significance of
error
Wald statistic
activities 0 Otherwise (Cent-fasts)
Capitalist class/ MMC
0.51
0.36
0.15
NMC/MMC
0.87
0.26
0.00
OMC/ MMC
0.40
0.39
0.30
AB/ C2
0.54
0.30
0.07
C1/C2
0.71
0.23
0.00
(Contrasts)
(202 }
I Exploration of the
Model Illa and b Y= 1 if R engages in community
Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Regression
Standard
Significance of
coefficient
error
Wald statistic
Capitalist class/ NMC
NA
NA
NA
NMC/ OMC
NA
NA
NA
OMC/ MMC
NA
NA
NA
act:ivih'es
0 Otherwise (Contrasts)
(Contrasts)
AB/ C1
-0.27
0.24
0.25
C1/ C2
0.32
0.15
0.04
Model IV A and B
Regression coefficient
Standard error
Significance of
Y= 1 If R plays golf
1.34
0.52
0.01
Wald statistic
0 Otherwise {Contrasts) Capitalist class/MMC
NMC/ MMC
0.37
0.48
0.44
OMC/ MMC
1.46
1.07
0.17
1 .55
0.44
0.00
(Contrasts}
AB/ C2 C1/ C2
0.55
0.52
0.29
Model V A and B
Regression
Standard
Significance of
Y= 1 If R is a member of a sports
coefficient
error
Wald statistic
club
0 Otherwise (Contrasts)
1.05
0.35
0.00
NMC/ OMC
0.58
0.26
0.02
OMC/ MMC
0.09
0.07
0.79
AB/C1
1.35
0.25
0.00
C1 / C2
0.69
0.25
0.01
Capitalist class/ NMC
(Contrasts)
I
Middle Class Cultures: Glimpses into Lifestyles and Outlooks |-
ModelVI A and B
Y= 1 If R is a member of a golf
Regression coefficient
Standard
error
203
Significance of Wald statistic
club 0 Otherwise (Contrasts)
Capitalist class/ MMC
1.04
0.39
0.01
NMC/MMC
0.76
0.34
0.02
OMC/MMC
1.00
0.65
0.12
AB/ C2
2.21
0.31
0.00
C1/ C2
0.65
0.38
0.08
{Contrasts)
Model VII
Y= 1 If R is a member of a social
Regression coefficient
Standard
Significance of
error
Wald statistic
club
0 Otherwise
(Contrasts) Capitalist class/ MMC
0.74
0.38
0.05
NMC/MMC
0.99
0.32
0.00
OMC/ MMC
0.06
0.46
0.90
0.54
0.30
0.07
(Contrasts)
AB/C2
C1/ C2 Mode1VIII Y= 1 If R is a member of a health and fitness club
0.71 Regression
coefficient
0.23 Standard error
0.00
Significance of Wald statistic
D Otherwise
(Contrasts)
Capitalist class/ MMC
NA
NMC/ MMC OMC/MMC
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
0.57
0.27
0.04
0.27
0.22
0.22
(Cent-rasts)
AB/ C2 Cl/ C2
'
|
J
f
204
1
1 Exploration
of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Table E Model IA and B
Y= 1 If R agrees career is equally or more important than family
Regression coefficient
Standard
error
Signifcance of Wald statistic
0 Otherwise (Contrasts)
Capitalist class/ NMC
-0.62
0.55
0.26
NMC/ OMC
0.17
0.22
0.45
OMC/ MMC
-0.61
0.27
0.02
NA
NA
NA
(Contrasts)
AB/ Cl C1 / C2
Model II A and B Y= l If R agrees that husband-wife relations are more important
NA
NA
NA
Regression'
Standard
Significance of
coefficient
error
Wald statistic
0 Otherwise (Contrasts)
Capitalist class/ NMC
-0.02
0.36
0.96
NMC/ OMC
-0.48
0.18
0.01
OMC/ MMC
0.05
0.2.4
0.83
NA
NA
NA
{Contl'asts) AB/ Cl C1 / C2 Model III A and B Y= I If R agrees that divorce ought
NA
NA
Regression
Standard
coefficient
error
to be legislated
NA Significance of Wald statistic
0 Otherwise (Contrasts) Capitalist class/ NMC
0.97
0.37
0,01
NMC/ OMC
0.16
0.18
0.38
OMC/ MMC
-0.61
0.27
0.02
AB/ C1
NA
NA
NA
C1 / C2
NA
NA
NA
{ConUasts)
Middle Class Cultures: Glimpses into Lifestyles and Outlooks_I
Model IV A and B Y= 1 If R agrees that it is all right to live in
Regression coefficient
Standard error
(205 l
Significance of Wald stahlsl7ic
0 Otherwise (Contras'ts} 0,77
0.37
0.04
NMC/ OMC
-0.51
0.19
0.00
OMC/ MMC
-0.13
0.23
0.58
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Capitalist class/ NMC
{Contrasts)
AB/ CO C1 / C2
Model V Y= 1 If R agrees that nmnin8 to the family is best in financial
Regression coefficient
Standard error
Significance of Wald
statistic
difficulties 0 Otherwise
(Conj"rasts} Capitalist class/ MMC
NA
NA
NA
NMC/ MMC
NA
NA
NA
OMC/ MMC
NA
NA
NA
Model VI Y= 1 If R agrees that it is the
Regression
Standard
coefficient
error
obligation of children to take care of old parents
Significance of Wald
statistic
0 Otherwise (Contrasts] Capitalist class/ MMC
-0.78
0.37
0.62
NMC/ MMC
-0.38
0.17
0.02
0.07
0.22
0.76
OMC/ MMC Model VII Y= 1 If R agrees that running to the
Regression
Standard
Significance
coefficient
error
of Wald statistic
family is best in financial difficulties 0 Otherwise
1
(Contrasts)
AB/ C2
0.69
0.24
0.00
ci/ CO
0.19
0.14
0.18
l
206 }
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Model VIII Y= 1 If R agrees that it is the
obligation of children to take care of old parents
Regression
Standard
coefficient
error
Significance
of Wald statistic
0 Otherwise
(Contrasts)
AB/ C2
0.04
0.22
0.86
C1 / C2
-0.36
0.15
0.01
Table F Model la and b
Y= 1 If HH spends for art and music lessons 0 Otherwise
Regression coefficient
Standard error
Significance of Wald statistic
(Contrasts)
Capitalist class/ NMC
NA
NA
NA
N M C / OMC
NA
NA
NA
OMC/ MMC
NA
NA
NA
AB/ C1
0.56
0.29
0.06
C1/ C2
0.74
(Conti-asts) 0.25
0.00
Model II A and B
Regression
Standard
Significance
Y= 1 If HH spends for foreign
coefficient
error
of Wald
language lessons
statistic
0 Otherwise
(Contrasts) NA
NA
NA
NMC/ OMC
NA
NA
NA
OMC/ MMC
NA
NA
NA
AB/ C1
1.36
0.40
0.00
C1/C2
1.17
0.57
0.04
Capitalist class/ NMC
(Contrasts)
Middle Class Cultures: Glimpses into Lifestyles and Outlooks |
Model III A and B
R€g1'€SSiOIll
Standard
Significance
Y= 1 If HH spends for personal/
coefficient
error
of Wald
computer skills U Otherwise (Contrasts)
Capitalist class/ NMC
statishlc
NA
NA
NA
NMC/OMC
NA
NA
NA
OMC/ MMC
NA
NA
NA
AB/C1
0.74
0.29
0.01
C1 / C2
0.13
0.23
0-56
(Contrasts)
Model IV A and B Y= l If HH spends for athletic/
Regression coefficient
Standard
Significance
error
of Wald statistic
gymnastics
0 Otherwise (Cent-rasfs) NA
NA
NA
NMC/ OMC
NA
NA
NA
OMC/ MMC
NA
NA
NA
Capitalist class/ NMC
{Contrasts)
AB/ C1
0.93
0.29
0.00
CO / C2
0,42
0.24
0.07
Reference Arcinas, F. R. & Bautista, C. 1992. Determinants of successful labor
migration to the Gulf region. In G. Gunatilleke (Ed.), The impact of l a b o r migration on households: a comparative study in seven Asian countries. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
Crompton, R. 1993. Class and stratcation: au introduction to current debates, pp. 166-186. Cambridge: Polity Press.
de Guzman, E. 1991. Family households in the Philippines: current perspectives and future prospects. Paper prepared for the University of the Philippines Assessments of the Nation. In B. Medina (Ed.), The Filipino family: a text with selected readings. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.
} 208
. 1986.
'
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes m Southeast Asia
Infant/Child MOrtality and Fertility: A Survey of Liiikages.
Philippine Population local, Vol. 2 No. 1-4. March-December 1986 (published in 1989) Glassman, R. 1977. The new middle class and democracy in global perspective. Hampshire: McMillan Press. Mills, C. W. 1951. White collar: the American middle classes. New York: Oxford University Press. 1934. The Theory of the Leisure Class. New York: Modern Veblen, Library.
5
Middle Class Politics and Views on Society and Government Cynthia Bautista
This chapter analyzes the attitudes of the middle classes to a set of related themes about society and politics. To situate the findings in context, however, it begins with a brief historical overview of middle class politics in the Philippines in light of the country's experience of formal democratic rule since independence, the authoritarian interregnum, and the transition to democracy.
I. Middle Class Politics at Varying Conjunctures Since Independence As noted in Chapter 1, the middle classes have in fact played important political roles in varying historical conjunctures since the declaration of independence in 1946. There are a number of important factors that account for the political role of the middle classes in the country on a scale seemingly out of proportion to their actual numbers. First, an educated middle class highly concentrated in Metro Manila and later in
the major urban centers emerged as early as the American colonial period due to a combination of factors. Manila's role as a center of the export and import trade in the country spawned a lot of diverse professional
and technical services. in this context, American colonial policy
'including
introduced a system of mass public education and initiated the Filipinization of the civil service, which opened up new opportunities for employment as professionals in government. Thus, by the twilight of American colonial rule in 1939, those employed as professionals (accountants, engineers, lawyers, physicians, and college professors) those performing teachers and government civil servants,
clerical tasks, constituted 18 percent of the labor force in Manila (Doeppers, 1984).
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Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
As noted previously, an education boom at the tertiary level was sparked in the 1950s by the remarkable economic growth that took place during the initial period of exchange controls and import- substitution, which saw the manufacturing sector grow at an average of 12 percent per year. This period of economic growth resulted in the proliferation of numerous colleges and universities providing relatively cheap tertiary education, albeit of very uneven quality. As economic growth slowed and later stagnated in the ensuing decades, the relatively large sector of college-educated individuals with middle class outlooks who could not find stable and satisfying jobs proved to be a potent factor for the political activism of this segment of the middle classes. A second factor in the significant political presence of the middle classes lies in the country's legacy of a formal liberal democratic system, which allowed for a far greater space in articulating and organizing middle class interests of various kinds. Thus, the country's history of regular electoral contestations, free media and formal guarantees of civil and political rights has also served to develop the political skills and confidence of key
factions of the middle classes. It is interesting to note that not even the authoritarian rule of Mr. Marcos was able to effectively stifle the activism of civil society organizations, even while many were forced to go underground at the height of martial law. A third factor that has enhanced the role of the middle classes in waging political actions has been the development and growth of the new and old middle class factions outside of the direct control of the state. This has been historically rooted in the development of a relatively weak state in the Philippines vis-8-vis powerful economic elites that initially developed with a large degree of autonomy from the state. Unlike in the
economies of the NICs of both East and Southeast Asia, where the state exerted a more direct and pervasive control over economic activities, there developed in the Philippines a more autonomous private economic sector, which was able to capture or strongly influence various agencies of state power! While the developments discussed above have served to condition the politics of the middle classes in the Philippines, it must also be made
clear that there is no distinct and predictable role associated with middle classes. In actual historical circumstances, middle class political propensities and practices can range from right- wing conservatism and radicalism to liberal and left- wing political causes.
Middle Class Politics and Views on Society and Government |
I 211 I
To understand better the major manifestations of middle class politics in the Philippines, three broad political periods will be examined in the country's post-war history. The first coincides with the period of formal liberal democratic politics from the declaration of independence in 1946 to 1972. The second covers the period of authoritarian rule by Marcos from 1972 to1986. And the third examines the post-Marcos period from 1986 to the present. For the three periods, it is significant to note that there are common features and tendencies associated with middle class politics and social behavior. First, all of the major oppositional political projects and movements during these three periods had middle class leadership. In turn, these oppositional movements relied strongly on constituencies of university students and college educated professionals as their initial bases of political support, even while such projects self-consciously aimed at organizing other social classes and sectors for their ultimate political goals. Second, these major organized political movements led by middle class personalities have been invariably influenced by the following ideologies: Marxist-Communist, conservative and radical schools of Christianity, syncretic versions of liberal-pluralist views, and in particular in the Southern Philippines, Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism. Third, there has been a significant rate of out-migration whether as permanent residents (mainly to the United States, Canada and Australia), or overseas contract workers (Middle East, Southeast Asia
and Europe) particularly by the educated factions of the middle classes.
1.
Middle Class Politics During the Period 0fFormal Liberal Democracy, 1946-1972
Dur Mg the postwar period underpinned by a formal liberal democratic system, middle class involvement in politics ranged from conservative to moderate and radical projects. Among the educated progressive middle classes during this period, the most compelling political issue focused on fleshing out a nationalist and democratic alternative political program to what was then perceived as a government run by the country's most powerful dynastic political clans largely subservient to American political and economic interests in the region. In the context of the economic downturn that overtook the manufacturing growth in the fifties, two major oppositional political responses emerged. The first was
Marxist-Maoist inspired
and gathered
strength
with its militant
212
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I
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
youth-student organizations in the sixties and climaxed with the launching of a new communist party in 1968. Of the 13 founding members of the new communist party, ten came from middle class families and the founding chairman, Jose Ma. Sis of, while born into a landed clan, worked as a university professor? Moreover, during the formative years of the new party the overwhelming majority of the party's initial core of cadres were university students and intellectuals from middle class families. The guerrilla movement founded by the new
party in 1969 also gained its momentum with cadres recruited from militant student and youth organizations. Under the direct influence of the new party, several sectoral and people's organizations were formed in the sixties and seventies; most of these were also led by cadres with middle class backgrounds. The second significant oppositional political response to the crisis of the sixties and seventies centered on a grouping of parties and organizations directly inspired by Christian reformism and radicalism. These church-based movements also emerged as a direct response to what was then perceived as the developing hegemonic political threat posed by Marxist-inspired organizations? Among the Catholic-based organizations, the influence of the social activism of the papal encyclicals of the sixties was significant, with much of the initial political guidance coming from Jesuit priests and theologians. One concerted attempt to develop a formal national political party anchored on principles of Christian social democracy was exemplified by the founding of the Christian Social Movement in the sixties, and later the National Union of Christian Democrats. Two of these church-inspired organizations continue to have a political presence in current politics: the Democratic
Socialist Party of the Philippines (PDSP) founded in 1972> and KASAPI, organized in 1969. A more radical version of Christian activism also emerged under the influence of Marxism, Maoism and the liberation theology of Latin America and would take organizational root with the founding of the Christians for National Liberation in the early seventies. Like the Marxist inspired parties and organizations that were formed during the sixties, the church-based reformist and radical movements were also led and staffed by middle class professionals and college
graduates. A third strand of middle class politics during the fifties and sixties is seen in the reformist liberal activism of professionals and business
entrepreneurs who founded citizen's parties for good government or
Middle Class Politics and Views on Society and Government
I
( 213 'l
sought to safeguard and reform the electoral process. The best example of a middle class organization known for its continuing project of
monitoring electoral processes and results is the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). Founded in 1951 under American auspices, the organization has succeeded in institutionalizing itself as the country's 'involved
unofficial guardian of electoral contests, particularly of the counting of votes, and has in the process many leading professionals, church and business personalities. Middle class liberal activism during this period was also dramatized by the mobilization of political support
for many independent candidates during the election in 1971 for members of a commission to draft a new constitution. The decade of the fifties and sixties also marked the second wave of out-migration of substantial numbers of Filipino professionals to the United States.'* Most of the professionals who immigrated to the United States at this time were nurses and medical doctors. During this period, Filipinos constituted the biggest number of nurses in the United States, while the medical doctors were the second biggest group of migrant doctors, next only to those from India. The pre-war and post~war wave of migrations has in fact made the Filipino community in the United States
the fastest growing group of immigrants from Asia. This "brain drain" first to North America and later to various countries of Asia, the Middle East, and Europe is one of the enduring proclivities of the educated Filipino middle class. During the liberal democratic period, middle class political activism
made its most dramatic impact with the popularization of a nationalist consciousness and political program articulated through both Marxist
revolutionary idioms and Christian social activism. Moreover, by propagating the nationalist program through the use o f Pilipino, the national language, these political movements advanced immensely the acceptability of a common language of every day discourse. In light of
the practice of the elites in using English as the official means of communication and the traditional hostility of other major ethnic linguistic groupings to the use o f Pilipino, this political popularization of the national language by nationalist and revolutionary organizations was an important contribution to national consciousness and identity. Finally, reflecting their structural weakness as a political constituency, the middle-class led political movements during this period deliberately sought and cultivated systematic linkages and coalitions with other social
classes and sectors, primarily those of the peasantry and agricultural
[214 )
i
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
workers, and the urban poor and industrial workers. Whether as a product of conscious ideology and strategy or a pragmatic political response, these political and organizing efforts by the middle class- led political movements and parties largely defined their political credibility and organizational strength.
2. Middle Class Politics During the Authoritarian Rule Marcos, 1972-1986
of
During the authoritarian rule of Marcos, middle class politics needs to be situated in the context of the struggle against the dictatorship. Shaped by the earlier alignment of political forces during the sixties, the organized involvement of middle class factions against authoritarian rule was mediated through three basic political forces; 1) the Marxist-Maoist inspired organizations under the leadership of the new Communist party and the much smaller independent Marxist-socialist organizations; 2) the Christian-rooted political movements and parties with the more militant ones adopting variations of Christian social democratic ideologies; and 3) the organizations propelled by liberal democratic ideologies such as KAAKBAY (Movement for National Independence and Sovereignty), headed by the well-known liberal oppositionist politician, the late senator ]use W. Diokno. Along the same mold were organizations such as MABINI and the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), made up of human rights lawyers opposed to the dictatorship. In the southern part of the country in Mindanao, middle class opposition to authoritarian rule took on a special dimension due to the special religious ethnic factor. Among ethnic Muslims, middle class
'intellectuals
participation in the struggle was principally mediated through the originally separatist Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) whose and leadership also included many university educated students, including its founding head, Nur Misuari, who once taught at
the University of the Philippines. A unique process of middle class radicalism took place during the period of authoritarian rule with the politicization of the As an institution, the military in the Philippines has an officer corps made up overwhelmingly of recruits from middle class families. By the early eighties, the protracted war with the communist-led guerrillas and the separatist Muslim armed parties in the context of the cronyism and lack of professionalism of the top loyalist Marcos generals had demoralized
Middle Class Politics and Views on Society and Govemrnent |
215 |
the younger battle-hardened officer corps. Spearheaded by the class of 1971 graduates of the Philippine Military Academy, a reformist faction identified with then Secretary of National Defense Enrile developed within the military. This would later constitute the nucleus of the mutinous faction that ignited the February uprising. Unlike other processes of middle class activism whose success usually required systematic linkages and coalitions with other social classes and sectors, the middle class military officers were in control of an institution that could propel them into power without any need for a social and political base (Fhilippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1990; Felipe B.,
1995).5 Fortunately for the Aquino administration that replaced the authoritarian rule of Marcos, the seven coup attempts launched by military rebels all failed. But, at the same time, the politicization of the military, like in most transitions to democratic rule, became the most de-stabilizing problem that the first two post-Marcos administrations (Aquino and Ramos) had to address. In terms of the composition of the middle classes, another important feature of authoritarian rule under Marcos was the rapid expansion of the state bureaucracy. With its direct intervention and control of various aspects of the economy, the Marcos administration created several government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs). In 1975, employment in GOCCs totaled 41,250; by 1984, employment in these same government corporations reached 134, 453, an increase of 226 percent. During the same period, the entire government civil service also experienced a 145 percent increase from 533,284 in 1975 to 1,310,789 in 1984 (Civil Service Commission, 1986). Among civil servants, public
school teachers at varying levels proved to be the most responsive to the anti-dictatorship struggle and a number of both above ground and clandestine militant organizations emerged from their ranks. In 1983, the assassination of oppositionist senator Benign Aquino Jr., who was returning from political exile in the United States provided a decisive turning point in the struggle against authoritarian rule. Aquino's murder took place in the context of an intensifying economic crisis and a more than decade-long struggle against the dictatorship by communistled armed guerrillas in the countryside and several legal and clandestine organizations in major cities and town centers aI1 over the country. The assassination of the well-known opposition leader further fractured the remaining elite support for the dictatorship and
opportunities
for coalitional
politics among
opened up new
various
parties
and
[216
J
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
organizations of different political persuasions. With the emergence of a far broader and more determined opposition, many sectors traditionally cowed by the dictatorship were emboldened to join open actions of defiance against authoritarian rule. Thus, during the twilight years of the authoritarian regime some of the most vivid open protests erupted in the very centers of high commerce and finance involving the professionals, white-collar workers, and the anti-crony business personalities (Bautista, 1983). Through four days of military mutiny and a people's uprising from 22-25 February 1986, the struggle against the dictatorship climaxed with Mr. Marcos fleeing to Hawaii under American auspices (]ovate de Dios, Darcy & Kalaw-Tirol, 1988).6 It has become fashionable to refer to the four days of mutiny and uprising in February 1986 as the "middle class revolution" that signaled the end of the dictatorship. It is of course true that many of those who played leadership roles during the uprising, particularly in the EDSA7 part of the confrontation, were professionals and middle class personalities including the mutinous military officers and the ubiquitous priests and nuns. It is also true, however, that in other areas of the popular uprising, in particular the Mendiola area in the vicinity of the presidential palace, left-wing organized labor organizations had a pronounced political presence. What needs to be explained more carefully is the genuinely popular nature of the uprising that galvanized the participation of the people from all walks of life, rich and poor alike (Pinches, 1991).8 In the struggle against the authoritarian rule of Marcos, middle class leadership was pervasive among all opposition groups across ideological and political lines, with the exception of the political parties led by
anti-Marcos politicians from conservative, long established political and economic clans. It was difficult, however, to construct stable coalitional linkages among various groups with competing ideological outlooks and polihlcal strategies. For instance, the assassination of Aquino provided excellent opportunities for coalitional politics against the dictatorship. in another sense, however, by pushing the Marcos administration into a politically defensive stance, this same event opened up the democratic space that allowed smaller, less ideological opposition groups to be less dependent organizationally on the much bigger political formations. On the whole, the struggle against the Marcos dictatorship showcased the political strengths and weaknesses of the middle classes in their political
practices as class factions. As a source of political leadership, the middle
Middle Class Folitics and Views on Society and Government
&
[217
)
classes, especially their most educated segments, have indeed responded to all kinds of political projects, whether as technocrats of the Marcos dictatorship, cadres of revolutionary parties, or army coup leaders. But it is this same flexibility and contradictory nature that stresses the limitations of the middle class as a constituency for political action.
3. Middle Class Politics During the Post-Marcos Period since 1986 With the restoration of formal democratic rule following the popular ratification of a new constitution and the holding of elections in 1987, the electoral system once again became the main arena for legitimizing political contestation in the country (Kalaw-Tirol, 1995).9 The transition to democratic rule, however, has been extremely contentious and protracted. Reflecting the problem of a politicized military, the Aquino-Ied successor administration to authoritarian rule had to weather no less than seven coup attempts in its first four years in office. It took the next administration under former General Ramos, elected as president in 1992, to successfully conclude a political settlement with the military rebels in 1995 and a peace accord with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1996. Following the Ramos administration, the Estrada presidency, begun in 1998, has yet to work out a political solution vis-8-vis the local communist-led challenge, now more than thirty years in armed opposition. Moreover, the government continues to face another armed challenge from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a breakaway armed party from the MNLF. For many middle class-led organizations and middle class
personalities, the opening up of democratic space and the restoration of electoral contests in the post-Marcos period signaled a serious reexamination of strategies and tactics for political practice and contestation. Many have opted to explore the opportunities and possibilities provided by the democratized conjuncture, in spite of all its faults and weaknesses. The passage of the Local Government Code in 1991 further provided incentives for NGOs and smaller, new political parties to contest political power at the local levels of-government. the revival of the 'electoral process, much of the more moderate strand of middle class activism centered on the revival and strengthening of NAMFREL as the electoral watchdog, particularly during national elections.
l 218
1
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
In taking advantage of these new arenas of organizing and mobilizing, many developmental NGOs and people's organizations (POs) have formed political networks to support progressive candidates or work out coalitions with the existing political parties. More recently, these networks have formed new political parties in response to the party list system, resulting in the first set of elected party list candidates in the lower house of congress in the 1998 national elections. Another tendency has been reflected in simply maximizing the political and organizational reach of developmental and advocacy NGOs and people's organizations, but uncoupling this effort from any armed political movement. A good example of this is the political activism that has E Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM), the country's biggest single developmental NGO (Wui & Lopez, 1997; Coronel Ferrer, 1997).10
These new possibilities for political action and strategy sparked by the transition to a more open polity highlights the most crucial aspect of policy debates across all political and ideological spectrums: does the newly opened up political space provide enough opportunities to pursue fundamentally transformative socio~political projects without resorting to armed struggle? In its various manifestations, this contested claim has been one of the reasons for the internal debates that have bedeviled the armed communist movement in the country since 1986, leading to 1994; Abinales, 996).11 In serious organizational splits (Rocarn $11 of the democratic restoration of form response' . i parties influenced by Christian social oppositions formations activism have embraced the electoral system as the legitimate arena for political contestation. Following the successful peace negotiations concluded with the government in 1995, the once clandestine military __.__
rebel formations have also come out in the open. With the active participation of personalities with military backgrounds in electoral
contests, a new generation of soldier-politicians has emerged in fact. One important area for further understanding middle class behavior lies in their participation in the phenomenon of contract labor overseas. In the search for better work opportunities abroad, Filipinos have served as overseas contract workers in significant numbers. One study shows that "the number of processed Filipino contract workers increased twenty-fold over a 16-year period, from just over 36,000 in 1975 to almost 700,000 in 1991" (Carino, 1992:6). During a 12-year period from 1985 to 1996, statistics from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency show
that an average of 600,000 Filipinos left the country as overseas contract
Middle Class Politics and Views on Society and Government
I
f
219
workers. From 1986 to 1994, the average dollar remittances of these overseas workers constituted 17 percent of the country's annual exports." The extent of middle class participation in the overseas Filipino workers (OFW) phenomenon is indicated by data on their educational backgrounds. Using data from the 1995 Census of Population, one author calculates that of those with at least some college background, 22 percent had served as OFW. The same data show that of those with at least a college degree, 16 percent had been OFWs (Jackson 1997:44). One other
study completed in 1983 also reveals that over 50 percent of the Filipino migrant workers surveyed had completed college, or had at least taken some college subjects (Gibson, 1983).13 An important aspect of the OFW experience that needs to be systematically studied lies in the way this process has reconstituted identities and transformed the social, economic, and political positions of the workers and their families." For its political implications, it may be argued that the OFW phenomenon has provided a safety valve that undercuts the social basis for political activism and militancy. On the other hand, it may have also produced a new generation of community leaders with political skill, diverse resources,
greater receptivity to progressive political projects and less tolerance for the traditional ways of doing things. Another significant arena of middle class politics lies in the support for charismatic religious movements, in both their Catholic and Protestant variants. While not new in the country's cultural and religious tradition, these charismatic movements took on a special fervor starting in the mid-eighties with the founding of EI Shaddai, the biggest Catholic charismatic movement claiming a card-carrying membership of half a
million.17 Among the Protestant groups, the most influential are the Iesus is Lord Fellowship and Jesus Miracle Crusade. Spawned during periods of economic and political crisis, these movements have thrived due to their ability to address some popular need or longing, either ignored or unattended to by established institutions, including the
government. An important indicator of middle class support for these religious movements can be inferred from the socio-economic profile of the regular listeners of radio station DWXI, which regularly airs the El Shaddai programs. During the Monday to Friday ah-ings of El Shaddai's programs, one survey reveals that 40 percent of the regular listeners belong to Class C, which is the equivalent of the middle classes in the classification
scheme used by consumer research organizations in the country (Hilsdon,
( 220
~}
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
1997; Pertierra, Cabilao, Escobar
1.1
Middle Class Politics and Views on Society and Government
Table 31
247 |
:
Opinion: "The middle class is indifferent to demands of the poor" by Employment-based Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation % within employment- based class of respondent Employment- based class of respondent Old M ' a l New . Capitalist middle m.idd.le middle ar83* Working Total class class class class class
The middle class is indifferent to
demands of the poor
Strongly agree
(N)
5.2
14.5
23-1
17.0
6.8
12.8
10.2
3.5
4.6
7.7
Agree
20.0
13.7
20.4
Neither agree nor disagree
17.1
13.7
Disagree
57.1
58.8
59.6
62.4
46.2
58.9
10.2
8.8
8.5
5.1
8.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(35)
(284)
(260)
(717)
(39)
(735)
Strongly disagree
Total
12.8
5.7
When asked whether "the middle class is indifferent to the demands of the poor," about seven out of ten (69%) of all MC respondents disagree with the statement. A lower percentage of capitalists (57%) and worker respondents (51%) also disagree with the same statement (Table 31). A stereotypical perception of the middle classes is that they are more concerned with political freedom than economic growth. Responding to this same issue, six out of ten of all MC respondents disagree that the middle class is more concerned with political freedom than economic growth. On the other hand, a small majority (54%) of all capitalists and worker respondents (53%) also show disagreement with this perception that the middle class prioritizes political freedom over economic growth (Table sz). On the perception of whether the middle class is overtaxed, seven out of ten (69%) of all MC respondents agree with this statement. Six out of ten (63%) of the capitalists agree that the middle class is indeed overtaxed while eight out of ten (80%) of the worker respondents also agree (Table 33). On the whole, the survey responses show that majority of the middle classes have a positive image of themselves particularly in regard to their
248 /1
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
contribution to the development of society and their role as "vanguard of democracy" .
Table 32
Opinion: "The middle class is more concerned with political freedom than economic growth" by Employment-based Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation % within employment- based class of respondent Employment- based class of respondent Old New . . 1 Capitalist Marina Working Total middle middle middle class class class class class
The tniddle
class is more concerned with political freedom than economic growth
Sixongly agree
4.2
3.4
7.9
Agree
28.6
20.6
23.1
28.2
26.3
23.4
Neither agree
17.1
11.0
8.5
11.1
73.2
10.5
Disagree
45.7
56.4
56.5
53.8
47.4
55.1
Strongly disagree
8.6
7.1
7.7
3.4
5.3
100.0
100.0 (282)
100.0
100.0
100.0
(260)
(117)
(39)
nor disagree
Total
(N)
Table 33
5.0
(35)
100.0 (732)
Opinion: "Middle class is overtaxed" by Employmentbased Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation % within employment- based class of respondent
Employment- b ased class of respondent
Capitalist class Middle class is overtaxed
New
Old
middle
middle class 13.5
Marginal Working middle class 15.5
Strongly agree
11.4
class 19.6
Agree
51.4
52.3
54.6
Neither agree nor disagree
11.4
108
8.8
Disagree
20.0
16.4
18.1
28.4
Strongly
5.7
1.4
5.0
2.6
100.0
100.0 (260)
class
Total
28.9
16.8
49.1
55.
52.7
4.3
10.5 3
18.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
(117)
(39)
(735)
D
disagree Total
(n)
100.0
(35)
|
(284)
Middle Class Politics and Views on Society and Government
I
( 249 "|
X. Ranking of Preferred Country Goals In a listing of 13 preferred country goals, the respondents from all social classes (capitalists, middle classes and workers) show a remarkable consensus on what they perceive as the two most preferred goals: (1) maintaining a high rate of economic growth, and (2) maintaining order in the nation (see Table 4-34). At the time the survey was conducted, these two goals were arguably the country's most pressing concerns. Next to these two goals considered most important, the middle classes rank maintaining a stable economy as important, a concern shared by the capitalists,together with the more lofty goal of progress toward a more humane society. Among workers, the next two most preferred country goals show an interesting combination of more participation in decision-making and addressing ecological degradation. To conclude this chapter, the following roost important views of the middle classes on society, politics and the economy may be inferred. First, the MCs are highly conscious of class divisions and differences in Fhilippine society and the difficulty of class mobility. However, this perception about the potential for class-based conflicts rooted in strong class awareness is tempered by a strong belief that such class differences may be addressed through education and the cultivation of a work ethic (industriousness). Moreover, a huge majority of the MCS also consider their political ideas as "definitely close to the center" further implying that they will most likely address issues of class differences and conflicts through moderate political practices. The middle classes tend to favor giving workers more power in government, respecting workers' rights during labor strikes, and ensuring that management does not openly exploit workers even while making profits. However, middle class support tends to be more cautious and ambivalent in actual conflict situations involving labor and management particularly in cases where the MCs are called upon to provide concrete and direct forms of support and involvement.
250
Table 34
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Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Most important goal of all by NCSO- based Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation % within NCSO- based class of respondent Capitalist
class Most
Maintain high
important
economic growth rate
NCSO- based class of respondent New Old Marginal middle
middle
middle
class
class
class
Working class
Total
41.2
33.5
35.0
32.5
41.0
34.6
2.9
6.8
4.2
5.1
10,3
5.6
4.3
4.2
1.7
12.8
4.1
2.9
2.5
3.8
0.9
2.6
2.7
2.9
5.7
6.5
3.4
5.1
D
17.6
20.6
14.2
16.2
10.3
17.0
Give people more say in decision malting
2.9
3.9
1.5
2.6
2.6
2.7
Fight rising prices
2.9
4.3
10.0
12.0
5.1
7_5
1 .1
0.4
0.9
goal of all Address pollution and ecological degradation
Ensure people participation at work and community
Formulate and
implement asset reform Formulate and
I
Maintain order in nation
Protect freedom of
5
0.7
speech Maintain stable economy
8.8
9.3
7.7
11,1
5.1
8.8
Progress toward more
8.8
4.6
3.1
7.7
2.6
4.7
Fight against crime
5.9
2.5
7.7
2.6
Progress toward l
2.9
1.1
1.5
3.4
2.6
1.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(34)
(281)
(260)
(117)
(39)
(731)
humane society
4.4
primacy of ideas over money
Total
(N)
Middle Class Politics and Views on Society and Government |
f
251
I
J
There is also strong middle class support for government assistance to small and medium-sized busyness companies, as against big corporations. On the practice of government operation of business corporations, the
MCS show a split opinion as to its impact on wages and jobs, with about
half agreeing as to its favorable impact and the other half disagreeing. In terms of involvement with interest groups and social movements, the MCS give their highest level of support to environmental issues and organizations, followed by human rights and student concerns. Since environmental issues also command the highest level of involvement and support from the capitalist and worker respondents, this suggests the possibility of the environment becoming the focal point of a broad basis of political unity and action across al] social classes. The middle classes share with both capitalist and worker respondents a remarkable consensus on the first four national problems perceived to
be the most serious: corruption, environmental pollution, public safety and crime, and prostitution. While these perceptions have to be situated within the context of the period when the survey was conducted and
completed (early 1997), the consensus does reflect a set of persistently intractable national problems.
An overwhelming majority of the middle classes perceive the Philippines as a democratic country and recognize that a democratic form of government is suitable for the development of Philippine society.
In the same breath, however, a significant majority (seven out of ten) is not averse to accepting any form of government, democratic or not, as long as it does a good job for the country. This potential middle class
constituency for an authoritarian project is further seen in a majority of MC views affirming that government can disregard public opinion as
long as it knows what is best for the country. It must be pointed out, in this regard, that middle class support for authoritarian rule under Marcos was strongest during its first two years when the government used an iron hand in dealing with public disorder, and the economy temporarily
benefited
from the rise in prices of the country's major export
commodities.
Consistent with the country's historical voting record, the middle classes show an impressive voting turnout (eight out of ten). However, other forms of electoral practices, such as supporting political parties, attending public rallies, passing out flyers for candidates, and donating money to candidates, indicate quite a low level of participation from the
middle classes. This is partly explained by the weakly institutionalized
[252
5
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
political parties, which are unable to provide a continuing fulcrum for mass political education and mobilization. It must also be pointed out, however, that other forms of political action and practices not limited to electoral activities are not captured by the questionnaire. The middle classes show a healthy self-image and a very high regard of their contribution to the development of Philippine society. Considering themselves as the "vanguard of democracy," they strongly deny that they have been indifferent to the demands of the poor or more concerned with political freedom than economic growth. In their ranking of their preferred goals for the country, they share with both capitalists and workers the view that maintaining a high rate of economic growth and political order in the nation are the two most important. Finally, in comparing the findings of the historically grounded analysis offered in the first Part of the paper with that of the survey data, one theoretical and empirical gap stands out. Given their own theoretical assumptions and levels of generalization, the survey data are unable to address and explain the process of middle class radicalization that took place during two broad historical conjunctures in Philippine society: (1) the breakdown of formal elite democratic rule during the sixties and early seventies; and (2) the struggle against authoritarian rule and the transition to formal democratic rule. On the other hand, the survey findings provide broad generalizations about systemic characteristics of the middle class, which transcend the part-icularities of historical conjunctures. Without glossing over differences in theoretical assumptions and logic of analysis, a closer reading of the findings of both approaches, no doubt, contributes to a better understanding of the politics of the middle classes in Philippine society.
Notes 1. For systematic arguments about this thesis, see Hutchcroft (1991) and Rivera (1994). 2. For background historical material on the new Communist Party of the Philippines, see Sis of (1989), Jones (1989) and Nemenzo (1984). 3. Philippine-Church state relations are analyzed in the following books: Fabros (1987), Youngblood (1990) and Bolasco (1994). 4. The first cycle of migration to the United States took place under American colonial rule durinE the twenties and thirties involving
Middle Class Politics and Views on Society and Government |
(253
J
primarily cheap labor for the plantations of Hawaii and California and canneries of Alaska. During this period, the labor-migrants were mostly young men from the rural areas of Luzon. The third wave of integration to the United States occurred during the seventies and eighties involving this time the parents and immediate relatives of the professionals who had immigrated after the war (the second wave of migration) and had become citizens of their adopted country. 5. Various aspects of the politicization of the military are analyzed in the following works: The Final Report of the Fact Finding Commission (pursuant to R.A. No. 6832), October 1990. This was the report of the presidential commission created by Pres. Aquino to conduct a fact-finding investigation of the 1989 military rebellion and the involvement of military and civilian officials and private persons in this failed project . See Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (1990 ) and Felipe B. (1995). 6. For a comprehensive analysis of the rise and fall of the Marcos dictatorship, see Javate de Dios et al. (1988) 7. EDSA stands for the initials of the highway named after Epifanio-de los Santos, a historian of the Philippine revolution against Spain. The major part of the people's uprising in February 1986 converged at a portion of EDSA which runs between the two major military camps where the rebellious factions of the military launched their mutiny against Marcos. 8. Seeking a more culturally nuanced explanation for the participation of workers and the urban poor in the popular uprising, Michael Pinches deploys the notion of commuriitas. This captures the extraordinary sense of camaraderie generated by the event while explaining the management of shame in its contradictory aspects of resistance and accommodation to the established order. See Pinches (1991). 9. For an assessment of developments ten years after the formal restoration of democratic rule in 1986, see Kalaw Tirol (1995). 10. Various aspects of the activities of NGOs, and peoples organizations and their relations with the state are analyzed in: Wui & Lopez (1997), Coronel Ferrer (1997).
_
11.For a discussion of the problems that have beset the communist-led
armed revolutionary movement in the country since 1986, see Rocamora (1994), Abinales (1996). 12. Data calculated from the Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 1995 and the POEA, Employment Info Series 1 (1) 1993,
54
I
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
13. Gibson, Katherine D. Contract l a b o r migration from the Philippines: preliminary fieldwork report. Department of Human Geography, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University. Cited in CariNo, Benjamin B. 1992. Migrant Workers from the Philippines. In Philippine Labor Migration: Impact and Policy, edited by Graziano Battistella and Anthony Paganoni. Quezon City: Scalabrini
Migration Center . 14.Some studies that address the various aspects of this phenomenon include: Hilsdon (1997), Pertierra et al. (1992), and Vasquez (1992) 15. For a study of E1Shaddai, see Gorospe-Iarnon (1999). 16. Survey findings by the Asia Research Organization and cited in Grace Gorospe-Jarnon. This same survey shows that 56 percent of the regular listeners of the radio station belong to Class DE, the equivalent of the low-income and poor social classes. 17.1 owe this insight to Prof. Felipe B. Miranda who has systematically analyzed public opinion poll survey results for several years now. 18.The full tables indicating participation in or support for particular social movements or interest groups are as Table A, B, C, D, E, F, G
and H. l9.This survey was completed in early 1997 when the country was enjoying GDP growth rates averaging about 5 percent during the last two years and before the outbreak of the regional economic crisis. 20.The full tables indicahlng the respondents' perception of social problems are as Table I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P and Q. 21.However, Karaos' study suggests that urban middle class families have
generally
mobilization.
been
uninvolved
in
political
organizing
and
Discussions of public issues generally do not take
place in middle class homes although families discuss scams crimes
and nefarious acts of politicians that are the subject of media. Moreover, middle class adults' awareness of ways to participate in the affairs of government is low. For a discussion of features of the socialization, decision-making and social control processes in middle class families that can support the formation of democratic values as well as authoritarian political tendencies, see Karaos (1999) .
Middle Class Politics and Views on Society and Government
I
(
255 )
References Abinales, P. N. (Ed.). 1996. The revolution falters: the left in Philippine politics after 1986. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Publications. Bautista, C. 1985. The protest movement and white collar workers of Makati after the Aquino assassination (U.P. Department of Sociology Paper Series, No. 1). Manila: University of the Philippines. Bolasco, M. V. 1994. Points of deparhire: essays on Christianity, power and social change. Manila: St- Scho1astica's College. Coronel Ferrer, M. (Ed). 1997. (Philippine democracy agenda volume 3: civil society making civil society. Quezon City: The Third World Studies
Center. Doeppers, D. F. 1984. In Manila, 1900-1941: social change in a late colonial metropolis, p.53. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies. Fabros, W. 1987. The church and its social involvement in the Philippines, 1930-1972. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. Felipe B., M. 1995. The military: at the crossroads of politicization. In Lorna Kalaw-Tirol (Ed.), Duet for EDSA 1996: looking back, looking forward, pp. 63-87. Manila: Foundation for Worldwide People Power, Inc.
Gibson, K. D. 1992. Migrant workers from the Fhilippines. In G. Battistella & A. Faganoni (Ed), Philippine labor migration: impact and policy. Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center. GorospeJamon, G. 1999. The E1 Shaddai prayer movement: a shidy of political socialization in
a religious context. Ph.D. dissertation,
University of the Fhiiippines. Hilsdon, A. M. 1997. The
good life: cultures of migration and
transformation of overseas workers in the Philippines. Pilipinas, no29: 49-62. Hutchcroft, P. D. 1991. Oligarchs and cronies in the Philippine state: the Politics of patrimonial plunder. World Politics, 43:3 April: 414-50. Iavate de Dios, A., Daroy, P. B. & Kalaw-Tirol, L. (Ed.). 1988. Dictatorship and revolution: roots of people's power. Metro Manila: Conspectus Foundation,hu; Jones, G. R. 1989. Red revolution: inside the Philippine guerrilla movement. Boulder: Westview Press.
256
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Kalaw-Tirol, L. (Ed.). 1995. Duet for EDSA 1996: Looking Back, Looking Forward. Manila: Foundation for Worldwide People Power, Inc. Karaos, A. M. 1999. Perceptions and practices of democracy and citizenship among urban middle class families. In M. S. I. Diokno (Ed), Philippine democracy agenda volume 1: democracy E citizenship in Filipino political structure, pp. 114-132. Quezon City: Third World Studies Center. Nemenzo, F. 1984. Rectification process in the Philippine communist movement. In Lim J. J. & S. Vani (Ed.). Armed communist movements in Southeast Asia. England: Gower. Pertierra, R., Cabilao, M., Escobar, M. & Pingol, A. (Ed.). 1992. Remittances and returnees: the cultural economy of migration in locos. Quezon City: New Day Publishers. Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. 1990. Kudeta: The Challenge to Philippine Democracy. Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. Pinches, M. 1991. The working class experience of shame, inequality, and people power in Tatalon, Manila- In B. J. Kerkvliet & R. B. Mojares (Ed.), From Marcos to Aquino: local perspectives on political transition in the Philippines, pp. 166-186. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University
Fress. Rivera, T. C. 1994. Landlords and capitalists: class, family and state in philippine manufacturing. Quezon City: University of the Philippines
Press. Rocamora, I. 1994. Breaking through: the struggle within the communist party of the Philippines. Metro Manila: Anvil Publishing, Inc. Sis of, J. M. 1989. The Philippine revolution: the leaders view. New York:
Crane Russak. Vasquez, N. D. 1992. Economic and social impact of labor migration. In G. Battistella & A. Paganoni (Ed.), Philippine labor migration: impact and policy, pp. 41-67. Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center. Wui, M. A- & Lopez, M. G. S. (Ed). 1997. Philippine democracy agenda volarrie 2: state-civil society relations in policy-making. Quezon City: The Third World Studies Center. Youngblood, R. L. 1990. Marcos against the church' economic development and political repression in the Philippines. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Middle Class Politics and Views on Society and Government
257
I
Tables Table A
Opinion: "Participation in or Support for the Consumer
Movement" by Employment-based Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation % within employment- based class of respondent based class of respondent
E1J'1P1O}"'1I|.1€1'lt*
New
Capitalist middle class class
Pariicipalrion in or support
Very active pa1-tidpant
for the
Supper ter/
consumer movement
Old Marginal Working middle middle class class class
Total
3.7
7.3
2.6
5.1
4,7
32.4
23.2
21.5
24.1
5.1
22.2
38.2
41.7
30.4
25,9
33.3
34.4
29.4
31.4
40.8
47.4
56.4
38.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(34)
(271)
(260)
(116)
(39)
(720)
member
Aware of nut not interested
Unaware of the movement Total
(N)
Table B
Participation in or Support for the Environmental Movement by Employment-based Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation % within employment- based class of respondent Employment- based class of respondent
middle
class
class
class
15.2
10.5
9.6
10.3
7.7
10.2
42.4
40.1
30.0
23.1
10.3
32.2
Aware of but not interested
24.2
30.0
29.2
27.4
33.3
29.2
Unaware of
18.2
19.5
31.2
39.3
48.7
28.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(33)
(277)
(260)
(1173
(39)
(726)
Participation
Very active
in or support for the
participant
movement
1
Old middle
class
environmental
M
New middle
Capitalist
Supporter/
.
Bl'gma Working ¢
class
Total
member
the movement Total
(N)
_J
'
258 }
l
Table C
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Participation in or Support for the Student Movement by Employment-based Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation % within employment- based class of respondent
Employment- based class of respondent New M . 1 Old .
Capitalist
class Participation
Very active
in or support
participant
for the student
movement
middle
middle
class
class
arguns Working Total middle class
class
21.2
12.4
7.7
11.2
Supporter/ member
36.4
28.4
21.5
21.6
10.3
24.2
Aware of but not interested
15.2
35.6
37.3
31-0
41.0
34.9
Unaware of
27.3
23.6
33.5
36.2
48.7
30.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(33)
(275)
(260)
(116)
(39)
(723)
10.2
the movement Total
(N)
Table D
Participation in or Support for the Labor Movement by Employment-based Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation % wit1°ui11 employment based class of respondent
Employment- based class of respondent Capitalist
class
class
class
5.4
7.8
2.6
6.4
Supper ter / member
31.3
28.1
21.5
28.4
12.8
25.1
Aware of but not interested
40.6
41.5
38.5
358,
46.2
39.6
Unaware of the movement
18.8
23.3
34.6
28.4
38.5
28.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(32)
(270)
(260)
(116)
(39)
(717)
participant
for the labor
(N)
class
7.0
Very active
Total
class
Old Iviarginal Working Total middle middle
9.4
Participation
in or support movement
New middle
"|
Middle Class Politics and Views on Society and GoverNment
Table E
I
'
259
Participation in or Support for the Womens Movement by Employment-based Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation % within employment- based class of respondent Employment- based class of respondent
Capitalist class Participation
in or support for the women movement
Old middle
class
class
Marginal Working middle Total class
class
Very active participant
2_9
88,
3.8
3.4
2.6
5_4
Sup por ter/
32.4
24.2
25.8
20.7
7.7
23.7
Aware of but not interested
32.4
40.8
35.4
32.8
41.0
37.2
Unaware of the movement
32.4
26.7
35.0
43.1
48.7
33.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
0-0
(277)
(260)
{116)
(39)
(726)
member
Total (N) Jlllllllllllr
Table F
New middle
Participation in or Support for the Political Parties by Employment-based Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation % within employment- based class of respondent Employment- based class of respondent al . New old M "Et Working Capitalist middle middle middle class class `
Participation
Very active
Total
class
class
class
3.6
6.2
6.9
5.7
5.0
in 01' support participant for the
political parties movement
Supporter/ member
15.6
15.6
15.4
11.2
5.7
74.3
Aware of but
65.6
56.4
45.4
46.6
35.9
50.1
18.8
24.4
33.1
35.3
53.8
30.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(32)
(275)
(260)
(116)
(39)
(722)
not interested Unaware of the movement Total
(N)
L
260 }
Table G
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Participation in or Support for the Agra1ain Reform Movement by Employment-based Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation % within employment- based class of respondent Employment- based class of respondent New Old M . 1 . Capitalist argma Working
class Participation
Very active
in or support
participant
for the agTE\1'ail'l
reform movement
middle
middle
middle
class 4.0
class 3.1
class 5.2
class
Total
2.6
3.6
18.8
22.1
19.7
12.1
D1
18.5
Aware of but
62.5
47.1
40.5
39.7
28.2
43.2
18.8
26.8
36.7
43.1
64.1
34.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(32)
(272)
(259)
(116)
(39)
(718)
not
`mterested
Supporter/ member
Unaware of the movement Total
(N)
Table H
Participation in or Support for the Human Rights Movement by Employment-based Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation % within employment- based class of respondent Employment- based class of respondent New Old M . .
Capitalist class
argoal Working class
middle
middle
middle
class
class
class
Total
Very active
6.3
9.1
8.8
10.3
2.6
8.7
in or support participant for the human Supporter/ rights member movement
25.0
35.8
28.8
23.3
72.8
29.5
Aware of but not interested
46.9
36.1
31.9
31.9
38.5
34.5
Unaware of the movement
21.9
19.0
30.4
34.5
46.2
27.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(32)
(274)
(260)
(116)
(39)
(722)
Farticipation
Total (n)
Middle Class Politics and Views on Society and Government
Table I
(261
I
Fublic Safety & Crime by Employment-based Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation
Public safety Very serious & crime
% within employment- based class of respondent Employme nt- based class of respondent New Old Marginal Working Capitalist middle middle middle Total class class class class class 65.7 70.5 77.7 62.4 '74.4 71.7
Some serious
28.6
27.4
19.2
35.0
23.1
25.5
Not serious
5.7
2.1
2-7
2.6
2,6
2.6
Total
(n)
Table ]
Env'l. polly &
ecoI'l
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(35)
(285)
(260)
(117)
(39)
{736}
Env'l. poHu& ecol'l degradion by Employment-based Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation
Very serious Some serious
decoration Not serious
% within employment- based class_of reggondent Employment- based class of resBoncient_ New Old Mar . al . Capitalist gM Working m1°ddle middle middle Total class class class class class 68.6 75.8 77.6 66.7 79.5 74.8 25.7
22.1
20.8
29.1
17.9
22.7
5.7
1.8
1.2
3.4
2.6
2.0
0.4
0.4
0.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
700.0
100.0
(35)
(285)
(259)
(117)
(39)
(735)
No serious at all
Total
(N)
0.1
0.4
No opinion
0.4
3
r
262
}
Table K
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Insufficient Soc'l welfare by Employment-based Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation % within employment- based class of respondent Employment t- based class of respondent Old M . 1 New .
Capitalist class
middle
33.3
40.4
middle class 45.7
48.5
47.7
4..5
52.1
48.7
46.3
18.2
10.2
11.2
11.1
7.7
10.9
No serious at all
1.4
1.2
2.6
1.1
No opinion
0.4
0.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(33)
(285)
(258)
(177)
(39)
(732)
Insufficient Very serious $061 welfare . Some serious
Not serious
Total (N)
Table L
class
arElna Working Total middle class class 41.0 36.8 41.4
0.3
High housing cost by Employment-based Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation % within employment- based class of respondent Employment- based class of respondent Old New Marginal Working Capitalist Total middle middle middle
class
High housing
ncos t
class
class
45.7
56.7
70.3
66.7
69.2
63.2
Some serious
34.3
34.2
23.9
30.8
25.6
29.6
Not serious
17.1
1.7
5.1
5.7
2.9
1.1
No opinion
(N)
class
Very serious
No serious at all
Total
class
0.9
0.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(35)
(284)
(259)
(717)
(39)
(734)
Middle Class Politics and Views on Society and Government
Table M
|
(263
]
Inflation & high consump price by Employment-based Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation % within employment- based class of respondent
Employment- based class of respondent Capitalist
class
Old New Marginal Working Total middle 1: middle middle class class class class 76.9 73.5 77.7 64.9 70.7
Inflation &
Very serious
48.6
high consul
Some serious
28.6
26.0
18.5
23.9
15.4
22.6
Not serious
22-9
17
31
26
77
6.0
1.4
0.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(35)
(285)
(260)
(117)
(39)
(736)
price
No serious at all
Total (N)
Table N
0.8
Income inequality by Employment-based Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation % within e mployment- based class of respondent
Employmentt- based Class of respondent . New M . 1 Old Capitalist argma Working class Income inequality
middle
class
class
Total
Very serious
34.3
47.4
38.8
Some serious
48.6
38.2
45.4
40.5
Not serious
14.3
10.5
13.5
12.9
2.9
1.8
1.5
1.5
2.1
0.8
1.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(35)
(285)
(260)
(116)
(39)
(735)
No opinion
(N)
middle
class
class 44.8
No serious at aI1
Total
middle
61.5
44.1
38.5
41.6
11.6
l
264 J l
Table O
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Income inequality by Employment-based Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation % within employment- based class of respondent Employment- based class of respondent Old New M . . Capitalist a r g a l Working Total middle middle middle
class
Income inequality
class
class
class
Very serious
74.3
85.6
91.5
88.0
94.9
88.0
Some serious
22.9
13.3
6.2
11.1
5.1
10.5
2.9
0.7
0.8
0.9
0.4
1.2
0.5
0.4
0.1
Not serious No serious at all No opinion Total
(N)
Table P
class
0.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(35)
(284)
(260)
(117)
(39)
(735)
Obscenity & prostitution by Employment-based Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation % within employment- based class of respondent
Obscenity & Very serious prostitution Some serious Not serious
Total
(N)
Employment- based class of respondent New Marginal Working Old Capitalist middle middle middle class class class class class 57.1 87.2 75.2 76.2 69.7 34.3
26.4
8.6
17.7
22.2
5.4
2.6
12.8
Total 73.2
22.3 4.1
No serious at a l
0.4
0.3
No opinion
0.4
0.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(35)
(284)
(260)
(116)
(39)
(735)
Middle Class Politics and Views on Society and Government
Table Q
l
I
265
Unemployment by Employment-based Class of Respondent Crosstabuiation % within employment- based class of respondent Employment- based class of respondent , Old M . 1 New Capitalist argma Working Total middle middle middle class class
class
Unemployment Very
class
class
48.6
55.4
61.9
59.0
66.7
58.6
34.3
36.5
28.8
32.5
28.2
32.6
Not serious
14.3
6.7
8.1
:> 1
7.6
No sensuous at all
2.9
1.4
0.8
1.1
0.4
0.1
serious Some serious
No opinion Total
(N)
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(35)
(285)
(260)
(117)
(39)
(736)
6
Images of the Middle Classes in Metro Manila Cynthia Bautista
I. Significance: Visible but Absent The significance of the middle classes in Philippine postwar history is indisputable. Many of the manufacturers in the 19505 and 1960s originated from the class of salaried professionals, white-collar workers and state employees. By the 1960s, they had broadened the composition of the elite beyond traditional landed interests. At the height of the Marcos administration, the educated middle class managed the national economy and the state bureaucracy. Ironically, segments of this class also figured prominently in the revolutionary movement, fanning the protest against authoritarianism that climaxed in the EDSA uprising and ended more than 14 years of authoritarian rule. With the restoration of elite democracy in 1986, predominantly middle class communities of development workers have focused their energies on substantiating the democratization process by organizing and building the foundations of a strong civil society. Despite their visibility, however, the middle classes are absent in social science research. Except for a few recent articles, the literature has generally focused on social classes at the lower and upper ends of the
social spectrum. There are several reasons for this scholarly neglect. For one, the middle classes have constituted a small proportion of the population. National trends in the occupational distribution of employed persons reveal that persons in professional, administrative, technical and white-collar clerical positions have constituted only 10% to 12% of the working population in the last two decades. The long-standing influence
of a two-tiered model of Fhilippine society on social scientists in the country and Philippinists in other parts of the world could have also hindered the investigation of the classes in-between. Although the main
1268 }
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
conceptual challenge to such a model emanated from Marxist circles in the late 1960s and the 1970s the Left considered the middle classes irrelevant to its agenda because of their small size, vacillating position on revolutionary issues, and theoretical questions regarding their class status. Finally, the Philippine economy's boom and bust cycle and lackluster performance while its Asian neighbors posted remarkable growth rates dampened any- impetus to analyze changes in class composition.
This chapter aims to fill a gap in our information on urban middle classes by synthesizing the findings in the previous chapters into an overview of the composition of the intermediate classes in Metro Manila and drawing preliminary images of their origins, lifestyles, values and politics. Given the methodological limitations of a survey, most of the images are gross and hazy and would require more nuanced qualitative methods to improve their resolution. Nevertheless, they make for a good start in describing a neglected terrain that ought to be explored more fully to understand the urban sociology of Metro Manila and contemporary forces in Philippine politics-
II. Class Boundaries: Too Diverse to Define The issue of delineating the middle classes is central to the report. Allusions to the middle class in Philippine historical and social science literature have generally relied on occupation, that is, the number of professional and white-collar workers, in identifying the middle class. Although sociologists began working on occupational rankings in the 1960s to measure social inequality, they stopped short of applying their findings to map out the country's social classes. Research along this line did not prosper because class was hardly problematized at the time. Moreover, classifying occupations in an economy with a vibrant informal sector was fraught with methodological difficulties, leading social scientists to adopt socio-economic status (SES) scales instead in the study of social stratification. The current system of determining SES, developed by researchers to discriminate among market segments, has gone a long way since the pioneering sociological work on levels of living scales. Scoring schemes, which differ from one market research outfit to another, involve the use of indirect income, consumption and status indicators to categorize
Images of the Middle Classes in Metro Manila
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[269
J
households into AB, C1, C2, D and E classes. The AB class combines the A and B upper classes, which are indistinguishable empirically. The upper C (Cl) and lower C (C2) groups constitute the middle classes, while the D and E categories make up the lower classes. The classification rule used by organizations such as like the Marketing and Opinion Research Society of the Philippines, Inc. (MORES) include variables such as the durability of the home, maintenance of the house, condition of the yard, type of neighborhood, educational attainment and occupation of
the household head, and the facilities found in the home. To differentiate the ABCDE classes in terms of their homes and furnishings, AB houses are made of heavy and high quality materials, are usually well maintained with sprawling lawns or gardens, have expensive furnishings and are located in exclusive villages or stand out in mixed neighborhoods. C houses, on the other hand, are made of a mixture of light and heavy materials, are well maintained, may or may not have a lawn or garden, have adequate furnishings, and are usually found in middle class subdivisions or mixed neighborhoods. D houses, on the other hand, are made of light and cheap materials, are generally shabby in appearance, are located in crowded neighborhoods and have scanty furnishings. Finally, those that fall under the E category are dilapidated, makeshift structures put up in cramped spaces OI' slum districts. The ABCDE scheme represents a rradational or hierarchical approach to class. It does not specify classes conceptually beforehand, but relies on clusters of attributes that reflect material reward or social standing to empirically identify them. Within this scheme, the middle classes are positioned midway between the upper and lower classes in a continuum. In contrast, a second approach recognizes gradational differences, but also considers the location of individuals in a class structure that shape patterns of advantage and disadvantage, as more critical in defining class. This approach draws from different theoretical traditions but utilizes occupation and employment-related variables, such as supervision over 'individual
the labor of others and whether the
is an employer or
employee, to cluster occupations corresponding to preconceived class positions. This approach differs from earlier sociological attempts to develop .occupational prestige scoring systems because it does not assume that an occupation with a higher prestige ranking would necessarily constitute a different class from the ones below it- What
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Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
matters in the second approach is the location of the occupation in the labor market or production unit. In an employment-based approach, the middle classes would consist of the following clusters of occupations: Service Class or New Middle Class Higher grade professionals, administrators and officials, managers in large industrial establishments; Lower-grade professions, administrators and officials; higher grade technicians, managers in small industrial establishments and supervisors of non-manual employees
.
Petty Bourgeoisie or Old Middle Class ¢
Small proprietors, artisans, etc. with employees proprietors, artisans, etc. without employees
» Small
Routine Non-manual Workers or Marginal Middle Class »
Routine non-manual employees, higher grade (administration and commerce)
• Routine non-manual employees, lower grade (sales and services) The occupational categories correspond to the usual notion of middle class occupations found in the Philippine historical and social science literature. The professional, managerial and technical workers fall under the service classes. The clerical and service white-collar workers correspond to routine non-manual workers. Petty bourgeoisie occupations, which are identified through employment status rather than occupation, do not usually figure in allusions to the middle classes in the Philippines, although in classical Marxist theory this class is the closest equivalent of the middle class. In the theoretical literature, the term new middle class is used to refer
to the service class, while the old middle class is equated with the petty bourgeoisie. The use of marginal middle class in relation to routine white-collar workers reflects the position of this class between the new middle and the proletarian class. Depending upon working conditions and economic outcomes, the boundary between routine non-manual workers and the working class and their trajectories may be difficult to delineate. The terms new middle class, old middle class and marginal middle class are used in this study. The adoption of employment~based categories to classify respondents and households in Metro Manila raises numerous methodological issues. For one, it assumes that occupational affiliation is a Inajor deterrninant of
Images of the Middle Classes in Metro Manila
l
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I
.,.-"
socio-economic and psychological attributes. It also assumes that clusters of occupations (i.e., white-collar jobs) with slightly different chances in the market share a common class position. This assumption may be untenable for developing societies like the Philippines where the
distinctions among occupations and the commonalities among workers with similar occupational groupings are not as they are clear as in more developed societies. To illustrate, occupations associated with the middle class in the Philippines have grown with the expansion of the service sector and not as a consequence of industrial development. However, unlike the service sectors of Western economies or those of the high-performing Asian countries, which significantly provide producer services that utilize capital and knowledgeintensive technology, the service sector in the Philippines is dominated by final use services. Its largest sub-sector in terms of GDP share is wholesale and retail trade, followed by private services that range from restaurants to education. These sectors employ little capital and use antiquated technology entailing hardly any investment in human capital. The nature of the predominant service sub-sectors and the informal economy's substantial share of the nonagricultural sector contribute to declining gross value-added per worker. The dominance and organization of the service sector in Metro Manila's economy account for wage differentials across industries, making it difficult to assume that people in the same occupational category, kg. professionals, technical workers and managers, share similar market situations and positions in a hierarchy of rewards and privileges. Similarly, the economic trajectories of routine white~collar
workers depend on a host of variables, ranging from the sector of the economy (public versus private) in which a person is employed, to years of experience, geographic location, and female density of an industry. Combining occupation with the nature of employment- that is, whether a person is an employer, self-employed, manager or employee does not completely solve the problem. Entrepreneurial activities are just as heterogeneous, if not more diverse. Moreover, most of them are carried out in the informal sector.
Apart from wage differentials and variations in the life chances of people in the same work designation, employment-based class analysis in Metro Manila is bogged down by the problem of classifying those with
multiple occupations, sources of income, or employment statuses. The
I
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Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
survey data, for instance, captured professionals or corporate managers in the country's central business district who are at the same time employers in their own family business ventures. These respondents are classified as higher-grade professionals although they devote considerable time to their enterprises as small employers. The survey also found routine non-manual workers in the government bureaucracy or small private enterprises moonlighting to augment their incomes. By definition, they are simultaneously white-collar workers and self-eMployed entrepreneurs. Interesting combinations of multiple occupations or employment statuses exist for at least 10% of the sample household heads. Estimated from marginal notes on the interview schedule regarding the multiple employment of the respondents or their spouses, the 10% figure is conservative, considering that there was no formal question on primary and secondary occupations or sources of income. Cases with multiple occupations were classified along their primary occupation, usually in the formal sector. However, in an overall context of low wages and an active underground economy, a respondent or household head's formal work is not necessarily his or her main occupation in terms of time spent on the job and incomes earned. In such situations, privileging class, defined in terms of occupation and employment status, in explanations of observable differences, especially in attitudes and perspectives, would be misleading. There are many other issues surrounding the use of employment-based categories for analyzing social classes in the Philippines. A more appropriate scheme, for instance, would have
required theorizing and operationalizing the service sector and informal economy in Metro Manila and incorporating the refinements into a classification system adapted to the nuances of life in the metropolis. However, the more important objective for now is to begin the
exploration of the middle classes. Under the circumstances, an employment-based class scheme, with all its limitations, serves as an initial exploratory tool to the extent that Metro Manila is integrated into the global economic environment and there are significant numbers of people clearly located within an employment-based class scheme. It helps that the scheme overlaps substantially with the ABCDE market research
categories (Table 1). About 84% of middle class household heads fall within the C1 and C2 classes. The location of those outside the C classes
is consistent with expectations. Professionals and managers (20%) are in
Images of the Middle Classes in Metl'o Manila |
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~'
273
`l
the higher status and consumption class-AB, while the bulk of the
marginal middle class outside the C category (14%) are in the D class. The remaining old middle class heads, 92% of whom are classified as belonging to C households, are either in the AB or the D classes. Eight old middle class and marginal middle class heads fall under the E class.
A final methodological point-the appropriate unit of analysis is a debatable issue in the use of employment-based categories. One side of the debate assumes individuals in concrete occupations, work situations or relations of production as the bearers of class, regardless of the circumstances of their households. However, in countries like the
Philippines, where the household head's class position profoundly affects the life chances of household members and determines their socio-economic status, it is appropriate to consider the class position of the head as indicative of the current position of the working members as well as their class trajectory, The congruence of the class position of respondents and household heads justifies the shifts in units of analysis throughout the chapter depending on the topic. For questions of perspective, for instance, the class position of the respondent is used.
III. Size and Composition: Substantial to Disregard For the Philippines a whole, the image of a pyramid-shaped social structure with a small middle segment and a big base, popularized in the 1970s by student activists, still holds. However, for Metro Manila, the size of the middle class is not negligible. Going by available indicators, one out of four professionals, managers and white-collar clerical workers were middle class in 1997 (Table 2). The proportion would even be higher
if some of the workers under sales and services in Table 2, performing
routine non-manual functions, are included. About one out of five urban households were classified as middle class or C in the 19805 and 19905. As expected, the estimates for Metro Manila (MM) are even higher. In 1983, 24% of Metro Manilals households were classified as C. A decade later, market surveys revealed that middle
class households constituted between 32%-40% of MM households (Table 3). Table 3 also includes Tabunda and de Jesus's 33% estimate based on the application of a sequential socio-ec anomic rule to the 1990 census data.
274
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Table 1
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Market Research Classification by Employment-based Class of Household Head (in percent ages)
Market research classification
Employment-based class* OMC NMC MMC
Total
AB
20.1
4.4
3.3
C1
59.5
35.3
29.6
44.9
C2
20.4
56.7
48.7
38.8
D
32
13.8
4.0
E
0.4.
4.6
1.1
100.0 (252)
100.0 (152)
100.0 (732)
%
100.0 (328)
(N)
11.2
*NMC=New Middle Class; OMC=Old Middle Class; MMC=MarginaI Middle Class.
Table 2
Employed Persons by Major Occupation Group, Metropolitan Manila 1975-1995 (in percents1 es)*
Occupation group
1975
1985
1997
Professional and technical workers
9.5
10.8
9.2
Administrative, executive
3.5
3.0
4.6
and managerial workers Clerical and related work
11.8
11.2
10.2
Sales
21.0
19.6
19.4
Services
19.3
18.7
23.1
Production, transport,
33.4
35.1
32.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
equipment operators and laborers
Total
*Excludes unclassified occupations.
Sources: 1978 Statistical Yearbook; 1986 Statistical Yearbook; 1998 Statistical Yearbook. National Statistical Coordination Board.
Images of the Middle Classes in Metro Manila
I 275 )
I
In addition to the substantial share of C households in Metro Manila, other indicators point to the growing presence of these intermediate classes. The proliferation of non-governmental organizations in the past decade is one indicator. So is the high demand for cars in Metro Manila. Vehicle registration in die metropolis, for instance, grew at an average annual rate of 10.5% from 1985 to 1995.
Table 3
Estimates of Metro Manila Households by Socioeconomic Classification (in percentages)
Socio- economic classification
Estimate by the Asian
Estimate by the Philippine
Estimate by the Unilever
research
survey
market
research center 1.1Si.I"lg the MORES
research group llsjIllg
-organization using the
MORES classification rule
(N=10944) AB
classification
rule [N=1199)
the MORES classification rule (n=500)
Estimate by
Tabunda and de Jesus using a sequential socio-econon-Li C rule
[N=l569167; 1990 census)
3.0
7.0
C
40.0
37.0
32.0
33.5
D
35.0
29.0
51.0
32.3
E Total
3.0
3.5
22.0
27.0
14.0
30.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Source: MORES Unified SEC Project Report, 1993 and Tabimda and de Jesus, 1995. A Sequential Classification Rule for Metro Manila Barangays. In.
Socio-Economic Ciassiicafion
0f Be:rangay5 in Metro Manila., 1995. Philippine
Statistical Association.
Who constitute the middle classes? The distiributrion of the sample heads by employment-based class is as follows: New mmrdze Class • Higher grade professionals, administrators and officials;
% 45.0
N (331)
26,5
(195)
18.5
(136)
managers in large industriaI.establisI'1ments;
• Lower-grade professions, administrators and officials; higher
grade teclulicians, managers in small industrial establishments and supervisors of non~manual employees
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| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Old Middle Class
. I
Small proprietors, artisans, etc. with employees Small proprietors, artisans, etc. without employees
.
Marginal Middle Class Routine non-manual employees, higher grade (administration and commerce) Routine non-manual employees, lower grade (sales and
.
34.3
(252)
15.9 18.4
(117) (135)
20.7 10.9 9.8
(72)
servicesll
The new middle class professionals and managers among the sample household heads work mostly in the private sector (83%) About 41% of them occupy managerial posts and more than 40% work for companies hiring 500 employees or more. Reflecting the country's economic structure, half of the companies the new middle class heads work for provide financial, social and individual services. Not all of them are corporate or government employees, however. One out of ten employ less than 11 workers to perform functions in line with their professional business, while five percent are self-employed. Interestingly, at least eight percent of new middle class heads have sideline businesses that range from the provision of individual services to garments subcontracting. By definition, the marginal middle class heads are all employees. Like the new middle class, most of them work for private firms. However,
29% or almost three out of ten are civil servants. Six out of ten companies employing this class are in the service industry or in wholesale and retail trade. The companies are also relatively big, Almost half of them hire
more than 500 workers. At least 13% of the members of the marginal middle class have a range of sideline businesses that include jeep fey or tricycle operations, sari-sari stores, as well as selling garments and food in offices. The old middle class household heads are a heterogeneous group. About 70% hire less than 11 workers, the rest are self-employed. They provide a wide range of small-scale services, from financing activities, pawnshops and real estate brokering to carinderias, advertising, and recruitment of domestic helpers. About 38% of their businesses are in the service sector; 39% are in the merchandising and transportation sectors. In terms of ethnic composition, only there percent of the old middle class '
Images of the Middle Classes in Metro Manila
I
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I
heads in the survey have parents who speak Chinese, although only 1% / of the respondents can speak the language. The eMployment based middle class categories used in this paper generally match the perceived class identification of respondents. About 88% of professionals and managers consider themselves middle-middle or upper middle class. While three out of four old middle- and marginal middle class respondents classify themselves as middle-middle class, about 20% think they are in the lower middle class.
IV. Social Origins: Lower Middle Class but Upwardly Mobile Asked to classify their families of orientation when they were 15 years old, half of the respondents claim to have grown up in middle-middle class families. However, a significant proportion-34% of new middle class professionals and managers, 44% of old middle class proprietors
and 33% of routine non-manual workers say they moved up from lower class origins. Their subjective perceptions coincide with more objective indicators of upward mobility. Most of the respondents (70%) are second-generation migrants. At least 85% of their parents moved to Manila from other provinces in the period between 1939 and 1960, when migration accounted for almost 50 % of population growth in the country's primate city. This period of in-migration was marked by remarkable economic growth. From 1949 to 1962, the era of exchange controls and import substitution, industrialists located their offices and factories conveniently in Manila and its suburbs.
Their demand for professionals and skilled technical workers led to a proliferation of private secondary schools, colleges and universities in the city. At the time, the respondents' parents directly experienced the high correlation between college degrees and well-paying jobs within their own families or vicariously through their friends and neighbors. Having grown up when the establishment of a free public elementary school system and the promise of jobs in the American colonial civil service for qualified personnel infused the value of formal schooling, they invested in their progeny's education as an avenue for social mobility. It is not surprising then that Metro Manila's middle class respondents surpassed their parents' educational attainments. The proportion of children (respondents) who finished college is almost twice the
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Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
proportion of fathers and mothers with similar educational achievements for each segment of the middle classes (Table 4). It is noteworthy that in terms of possession of college diplomas, the proportion of female respondents, who tended to have higher educational attainments than their male counterparts, is from three to six times higher than that of their mothers. Table 4
College Graduates among Respondents, their Spouses, Fathers and Mothers by Social Class NMC
Respondent
87.0
OMC 56.6
MMC 58.3
R's father
43.2
20.5
18.5
R's mother
28.1
13.6
12.3
R's spouse
75.9 87.3
Female R's mother
29.9
56.5 56.2 11.6
58.3
Female R
12.3
(265)
(258)
(117)
(N)
67.2.
Through formal education, significant proportions of the middle classes succeeded in moving beyond their social origins. About 36% of them originated from families headed by workers or small farmers; 20% have agricultural roots. Although the proportion of Metro Manila respondents with farmers as fathers in the 1997 survey is much lower than the 40% obtained from the1968 National Demographic Survey, the
middle class respondents are
no less occupationally
mobile
(Bacol-Montilla & Stinner, 1975). Eighty one percent moved to occupations which are higher or lower than their fathers: three out of four outranked their fathers, as opposed to only one out of four ending up in lower occupational categories. Interestingly, analysis of mobility ratios, i.e. the ratio of the observed frequency found in a category and the expected number if the father's occupation had no effect on the child's profession, reveal short-distance movements except for children of workers and farmers, who filled up lower professional and routine non-manual occupations that are more than two ranks higher than their father's classification. Furthermore, respondents with professional fathers
Images of the Middle Classes in Metro Manila |
( 279
ended up as professionals as well, although children from lower occupational origins added to their ranks. The high level of upward mobility (and the lower proportion of respondents with agricultural origins in 1997 compared to 1968) is due to fundamental changes in the occupational structure, with the expansion of white-eollar positions in the city in the 1950s and 19605 (Table 5). However, the observed mobility of sample respondents is not only a consequence of the changing composition of occupations resulting from the growth of industries and services, but may also indicate the relatively fluid occupational structure of Metro Manila. Respondents flowed into and out of their father's occupations easily, especially in the intermediate categories. In particular, the movement out of and recruitment into the proprietor and routine non-manual occupations is beyond statistical expectations, reflecting a dynamic occupational structure and vibrant informal market. Table 5
Distribution of Middle Class Respondents and their Fathers by Occupation (in percentage) Father' s
Occupation Category
Respondents occupation
occupation
Percentage difference
(N)
%
(N)
%
Higher professionals and managers
(77)
12.6
(153)
25.0
12.4
Lower professionals and
(69)
11.3
(115)
18.8
7.5
Routine non-manuals, higher degree
(68)
11.1
(74)
12.1
1.0
Routine non-manuals, lower degree
(46)
7.5
(30)
4.9
-2.6
Proprietors
(130)
21.2
(241)
39.2
18.0
Workers and farmers
(226)
36.3
(0)
Total
(613)
100.0
(613)
managers
-36.3
100.0
( 280
V.
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Living Arrangements: Nuclear Households Supported by Two Earners
Most of the middle class households (75%) are nuclear, consisting of parents and their children. A minor but nevertheless interesting variation in household structure is the relatively higher proportion of extended families among the marginal middle class (22%) compared to the new middle- and old middle classes (5.8% and 18.586, respectively). A similar
patter prevails between the C1 and C2 market research classes, with 18% of the former and 23% of the latter living in extended households. These observations may either reflect an increasing preference among those in higher socio-economic classes to live privately with their families of procreation, or the financial capacity of their extended kin to live in their own homes. Unlike the middle classes in the West, however, live-in domestic helpers (DH) serve half of Metro Manila's middle classes (Table 6). Financial or status considerations account for variations in the proportion of middle class households with DH and in the proportion with more than one helper. Half of new middle class households have at least two helpers, compared to only 38% of old middle class- and 25% of marginal middle class households. Of greater interest, however, is the significant proportion without domestic helpers (39% of new middle-, 45% of old middle- and 56% of marginal middle class households) as this runs counter to the common perception that most middle class homes in Metro Manila have maids. Apart from financial considerations, discussions with middle class professionals reveal that a growing
number are now opting to run their homes without helpers or rely on
part-time non-live-in help for various reasons: difficulty of competing with the overseas market for suitable helpers, greater need for privacy and the availability of work-saving devices.
Six out of ten households have children in grade school or high school and 20°/, have elderly members living with them. On the average, the burden of reproducing the middle class status of these households falls on at least Wo working members. Regardless of middle class segment, three out of four households have at least two earners. The deployment of household labor overseas is commonly believed to propel households to middle class status. While indeed overseas labor migration has supported the economy and countless studies have I
documented improvements in the lives of those with members earning
Images of the Middle Classes in Metro Manila
281
I
1
foreign currencies, the proportion among sample middle class households is only 17%. Most of the overseas contract workers belong to new middle- and marginal middle class households.
Table 6
Household Composition by Employment-based Class of Household Head (in percentages)
Variables reflecting household composition
Middle class
Total
NMC
OMC
MMC
64.4
63.9
66.4
64.6
(N)
(213)
(161)
(101)
(475)
With domestic helper/ s
61.0 (202)
55.6
(140)
44.1 (67)
56.4 (409)
49.5 (100)
38.6 (54)
25.4 (17)
43.6 (177)
31.0 (202)
21.1
11.2
22.3
(140)
(67)
(408) 0.6
With children in grade school and high School
(N) » With two or more domestic helpers % of those with domestic helpers only
(N) % of total (N) with driver or houseboy
(N)
6.6
With elderly members (65 years and over)
(22) 20.8
(N) with an overseas contract worker (N)
(69) 18.1 (60)
With at least two working members (n)
VI.
0.8 (2)
(24) 20.1 (146)
21.0
15.8
(24) 19.7 (30)
76.7
(53) 7.9 (20) 76.6
75.7
76.5
(254)
(193)
(715)
(562)
16.7 (110)
Lifestyles: Consumers Constrained by Low Income Levels
Some aspects of the lifestyles of Metro Manila's middle classes may be
gleaned from the goods they possess and the way they spend their recreation time. Of material possessions, the house is an outlet of in the Philippines. Filipinos spend conspicuous consumption hard-earned money on the appearance of their houses. This is eloquently
illustrated in the literature on overseas migration, which documents the use of remittances to construct houses or renovate old ones in styles close to the architecture of their work destinations, once debts incurred in the
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Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
course of landing jobs abroad are paid. Although
townhouse
and
condominium
living
is
becoming
fashionable among the upper classes in Metro Manila, the majority (66% ) of the middle classes live in single detached homes while the rest occupy duplexes or multi-residential apartment buildings. The proportion of professionals and managers with detached houses is higher (72% compared to 59% of the old middle- and 63% of the new middle classes). Seven out of ten respondents across class segments claim home
ownership. However, the types of houses owned differ. New middle class homes are more spacious with more than one comfort room. They are twice as likely as old middle- or marginal middle class homes to have more than three rooms (apart from the kitchen/ dining room, receiving
room and toilets). Four out of ten new middle class houses have houses with more than three rooms, with 14 respondents living in houses with
more than ten rooms. On the other hand, only two out of ten old- and marginal middle class households enjoy the same space. Moreover, while 57% of new middle- and 38% of old middle class houses have more than one comfort room, only five percent of marginal middle class houses do. The localities of the houses also differ. About half are located in heterogeneous neighborhoods with varying levels of congestion and commercialization. As expected, the proportion of professionals and managers living in exclusive residential subdivisions is higher than the rest-14%, compared to five percent of the old middle- and marginal middle class respondents. Across the three groups, a third live in less exclusive neighborhoods but with houses of similar size. For instance,
some of the households with marginal middle class heads are found in low-cost government housing projects. Cars have become an essential part of the lifestyles of the middle classes in Metro Manila. More than half possess cars with the proportion of car ownership increasing progressively with each class segment (Table 6). Six out of ten marginal middle class households, seven out of ten old middle class households and eight out of ten new middle class households own cars. The type of cars also varies, with new middle class
households owning more up-to-date and expensive models (e.g. Honda Accord, Honda Civic, Mitsubishi Galant) compared to the older economy
models (kg. Mitsubishi Lancer EL, Toyota Corolla XL) of the other middle class households. The new middle class households also outrank
Images of the Middle Classes in Metro Manila
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the others in the possession of two cars, with 39% having two cars, compared to 31% of the old middle- and 16% of the marginal middle class households. Of the consumer durables in Table 6, the possession of stereo component and a video recorder by an overwhelming majority of the middle classes affirms the overall value of sounds, music and movies to Filipinos. Interestingly, these are the items overseas migrant workers also spend on for their families. Because of lower purchasing power, households with marginal middle class heads lag behind the rest in terms of ownership of these goods. They are four and 2.5 times less likely than the old marginal middle classes to own stereos and video recorders. Apart from stereos and video recorders, air conditioners and cellular phones are the other gadgets a majority of the new and old middle class households own. Once again, lower income levels of marginal middle class-headed households, 18% of which are classified as D/ E, explain why they lag behind in the ownership of these goods. Nevertheless, the cheapening of items like the cellular phone since 1997 would have narrowed the gap between the marginal middle class and the rest. Compared to the level of possession of consumer durables, Table 6 also shows that the proportion of middle class households with various forms of investments is quite low. Although almost nine out of ten new and old-middle class households and eight of ten marginal middle class households have savings, less than a third of new middle class heads claim to have private insurance, stocks, real estate or foreign currency that would ensure the continuation of their lifestyles in the event of sickness or other family crisis. Much lower proportions of old- and
marginal middle class heads claim to have similar investments. Although the information they disclosed to interviewers may be inaccurate for fear of future crimes on their property, it may nevertheless reflect the fact that the steady incomes of Metro Manila's middle classes are sufficient to purchase consumer goods with cash or credit cards, but they are not at a level that can be set aside for significant investments. Income levels may also account for the simpler forms of leisure of the middle classes in the metropolis. Golf, the sport of the new and mobile middle class in the fast growing economies of the region, has not attracted more than 11% of new middle class heads who have the means to pay golf club membership fees. Membership in sports, health and fitness clubs, as well as social clubs, attract more new middle and old middle class members than golf clubs, but the levels do not go beyond
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Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
284
17%. About one out of ten have traveled to foreign lands. However, unlike the middle classes of advanced industrial societies who can afford overseas vacations, it is more likely for the small segment of Metro Manila's middle classes who have traveled to have sponsors (et. family members living abroad). Table 7
Selected Material Possessions by Employment-Based Class of Household Head (Excludes Respondents with Working Class Heads) (In percentages)
Material possessions of
NMC
OMC
MMC
Savings
88-4
88.5
80.9
Frigate insurance
30.2
27.4
20.4
Stock, bond and mutual funds
24.1
17.1
10.5 13.8
respondent/household Some assets of respondents
Real estate
31.1
23.8
Foreign currency
12..1
4.8
9.9
Lottery tickets
11.3
13.5
8.6
Gold jewelry
14.6
13.5
13.2
6.7
2.0
1.3
Antiques, paintings, etc.
Applier ces and amenities of households Car
• With 2 or more cars
81.6
67.1
50.7
38.8
31.4
15.8
. Gold credit card
59.2
45.2
54.2
37.8
26.1
19.2
Stereo component
95,1
96.4
86.2
Video recorder
92.9
90.4
78.9
Video camera
36.9
36.0
27.0
Credit card
Laser disc
40,0
33.6
25.7
Cellular phone
57.5
50.8
33.6
Personal computer
47.7
37.6
248
Cable TV
41.1
36.8
26.3
Air conditioner
64.2
63.6
36.2
(328)
(252)
(152)
(n)
Images of the Middle Classes in Metro Manila
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With constrained incomes for more expensive recreational activities, the forms of leisure of the middle classes include participation in community center and church activities, occasional eating out in restaurants and shopping in malls for one or two affordable consumer goods. The survey did not probe into leisure activities and reading habits, but some data would suggest that the middle classes settle for home-based forms of recreation, reading newspapers, watching television shows and video movies, and listening to music. Public Affairs shows are the most watched, with an audience of seven out of ten middle class respondents. Featuring personalities with varying positions on a wide range of burning political and social issues that dominate the headlines, these shows engage or entertain the middle classes. In an essay published by the Free Press magazine, anthropologist Raul Pertierra bewailed the absence of the middle class at high culture events in Manila. He cited, for instance, the March 1994 Royal Shakespeare Company, which performed Henry VI in the Cultural Center of the Philippines to an empty house, save from the expected presence of expatriates and Manila's high society. Indeed, only 20% at respondents with new middle class household heads, 10% with old middle class heads and 7% with marginal middle class heads engage in cultural activities or watch cultural shows. However, the relative indifference of the middle classes to highbrow cultural activities does not seem to be reflected in their musical tastes. More than ha].f claim to like classical music, although the meaning of classical may range from melodious orchestral tunes to the music of the masters (Table 8). Next to classical music, ballads and jazz appeal to three
out of four respondents. It is noteworthy that contemporary Filipino music, which has struggled for equal radio space with Western music in the last two decades, has come a long way since the 1970s. Clearly 31% to 35% of the middle class respondents now listen to music composed by Filipinos. Gone are the days when listening to Filipino music was only for the masses or the 'bakya' crowd from which segments of the new middle class would consciously distinguish itself. It is also interesting to note that while only less than ten percent appreciate alternative Filipino music, which may range from indigenous music to protest songs, it has an audience in the C classes.
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Table 8
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Media Exposure and Preferred Music of Respondent by Social Class of Household Head (in percentages)
Media exposure
and
preferred
music of respondents
Employment-based class
Market research class categories AB C2 C1
NMC
OMC
MMC
90.2 55.5
92.5 45.6
91.5 47.2
89.8
91.8
44.7
54.6
47.7
Foreign news
33.5
27.4
27.6
32.1
29.7
29.1
Local news
38.1
48.3
53.9
45.3
43.3
43.6
Business section
27.1
21.0
19.7
36.8
24.4
17.6
Sports section
33.2
40.5
27.6
24.5
30.4
38.3
10.1
7.9
11.8
13.2
10.0
8_7
28.0
21.8
21.7
34.0
27.8
18.4
74.4
70.6 20.2
72.4
21.7
71.7 20.8
72.2 26.0
75.8 18.6
Media exposure: parts of newspaper read Headline and front page Editorial/ opinion section
(:OI1'LlCS
page
Features/ lifestyles section
89.5
Media exposure: type of television
shows watched Public affairs/ documentaries Show business talk shows
22.9
Filipino situation comedies
15.2
17.5
16.4
12.5
14.4
18.4
Variety shows (e.g. noontime shows)
28,0
34.1
40.1
18.9
36.2
33.2
Game shows
11.9
13.5
14.5
13.2
14.7
13.3
Soap operas
22.0
17.9
27.0
17.0
26.5
27.9
Western drama/ movies
28.7
26.6
24.3
30.2
29.1
26.5
Sports
36.9
38.9
32.9
30.2
32.3
41.8
MTV
5.5
1.2
5.9
6.6
4.2
3.6
Classical
65.2
Jazz
33.5
62.7 35.7
50.7 30.3
80.2 28.3
64.0 35.4
58.7 31.9
Preferred music
Rock (hard metallic)
6.7
4.8
12.5
4.7
6.3
8.2
Filipino Kundiman
18.3
24.3
25.0
19.8
20.5
27.3
Alternative Filipino music
6.4
88
5.9
1.0
8.4
6.4
Filipino contemporary music
31.4
34.9
30.9
31.1
32.3
33.4
Pop music
26.8
19.8
27.6
20.8
26.5
21.2
Ballads
43.0
43.7
44.0
40.6
45.9
40.1
Broadway music
9.8
5.2
3.9
23.6
7.6
5.1
3.0 (325)
1.2
2.6
1.0
2.9
1.8
(250)
(152)
(106)
(381)
(392)
New wave
(N)
Images of the Middle Classes in Metro Manila
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1
VII. Social Values: Family Centered and Conservative? As in the wider society, the value of the family is high among Metro
Manila's middle classes. When asked what concerns them most, nine out of ten respondents identify family matters, with 69% concerned with their children's education and 22% / with harmonious relations in the home. Interestingly the proportion of respondents who claim to consider other concerns such as self-fulfillment important is quite low (less than 6%) even among professionals and managers. Concern over the education of children is translated to investments that enhance the future chances of the young. Of households with children in grade school or high school, about 6 out of ten with new middle class heads (56.3%) send their children to private schools, five out of ten old middle class heads (49.7%) and four out of ten marginal middle class heads (40.6%) do so. In the face of deteriorating standards of public education in the country, middle class parents think that despite extremely uneven quality standards, private schools would give their children an edge in admission to reputable colleges and universities. It would seem that income level is an important determinant of the likelihood of private schooling for middle class children, as AB households are twice more likely than C1 households to send children to private schools and C2 households are 8 times more likely than D households to do so. The odds that C1 and C2 households would seek private education for their children are not statistically different. To complement curricular activities, more than three out of ten new middle heads spend money for their children's art and music lessons as well as courses that improve their athletic and other personal skills. The
old- and marginal middle class parents also spend for these extra curricular activities although only 17% to 26% do so. Investment in extra-curricular activities does not discriminate among the employmentbased social classes although there are significant contrasts among the market research categories. Parents from AB households are twice more likely to make their children learn computer and other skills and are four
and 2.5 times more likely to give their kids the opportunity to learn other languages and gymnastic or athletic skills. The C1 parents, on the other hand, are twice more likely to pay for art and music lessons and three times more likely to fund foreign language lessons. Children are not the only focal point of the respondents. Across classes, majority (64%) considers husband-wife relations as more
I 288 J
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
important than parent-child relations. Agreement with the statement to this effect is highest among the old- and new middle class respondents. As to the relative power of husbands and wives, majority of the respondents (60% to 80%) claim that decisions are made jointly on expensive purchases or the education of children. However, less than half of the respondents think decisions on household finances are shared, since a third believe wives decide single-handedly on this matter. The
respondents seem to be conservative when it comes to
relationships between spouses. Seven out of ten across class segments disagree with the legislation of divorce in the country. The view of respondents on living in without marriage is equally conservative. More than 63% disagree with this arrangement. Surprisingly, the most vehement disagreement comes from new middle class respondents. Only 24% of the professionals and managers in this class are open to living in for adults who love each other. Still related to the family, half of old middle (52%)- and marginal middle class respondents (51 %) think it is the obligation of children to care for elderly parents while 43% of the new middle class think so. These proportions are lower than what is normally associated with traditional notions of care for aged parents. This finding would suggest that the middle classes are more centered on their families of procreation, explaining the high value of education in their agenda. For instance, concern over the future of their progeny and the hope that children will find better career options abroad are expressed by the majority (64%) of hopeful emigrants among the middle class respondents (39.2% of respondents) to justify their intentions of leaving the country. Socialization processes reinforce the family centeredness of Metro
_
_
L..
Manila's middle classes. in an article linking family v a 1 ° ' to 'S
democratic agenda, Karaos observed that there is little in the socialization of middle class children from selected neighborhoods in Quezon City that inculcates in them notions of belonging to a wider community (Karaos, 1999). She notes that personal obligations to the family are emphasized in the process of rearing children and even the stress on academic performance is associated with family expectations rather than the service of a bigger community. But Karaos is also quick to point out
that the involvement of families with adult members to voluntary, civic
or religious organizations may gradually reorient their family-centered consciousness to a wider community.
I
Images of the Middle Classes in Metro Manila
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in
Interestingly, it is their family centeredness that encourages particular segments of the middle classes to move beyond their homes and provide leadership in movements to preserve the family unit. The phenomenal growth of such movements is not surprising since 63% of the survey respondents consider the increase in broken families a serious social problem in the Philippines, with the proportions increasing as one moves up the middle class segments. While 57% of the marginal middle class is bothered by this problem, slightly higher proportions of old middle- and new middle class respondents (62% and 67% respectively) worry about its seriousness. These classes are the key organizers and constituencies of Catholic Church-backed Couples for Christ, a family movement whose adherents also form the core of civic action groups. In recent years for instance, neighborhood associations of middle class households with active members of the Couples for Christ have begun to form coalition networks with other communities to address common community problems. The joint effort of subdivisions in the Commonwealth district of Metro Manila to devise and implement strategies to ease traffic during rush hours is a case in point.
VIII. Political Participation: Aware but Uninvolved There are indications that the middle classes of Metro Manila are aware of political developments beyond their communities. An overwhelming majority, nine out of ten, read newspapers. About half read the editorial
section where opinions on critical issues are expressed. As noted previously, seven out of ten middle class respondents watch public affairs tall< shows that dwell on burning political and social issues. In
addition, almost half of all middle class respondents discuss politics with friends, with 15% of the new middle class doing this quite often. The sensitivity of four out of ten professionals and managers and almost one out of three old middle and marginal middle class respondents to political issues may be a consequence of their involvement in or support for the student movement in the late 1960s and 1970s. While politically aware, however, the middle classes in the sample are generally uninvolved in political activities. Although their voting turnout in 1995 was high (81%), considering that the 1995 election was not a presidential contest, other political activities and electoral practices of the respondents are not impressive. Less than 20°/J supported a political
party, attended public rallies and passed out flyers for candidates during
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Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
the 1995 election, and less than a third encouraged friends to vote for candidates. The low level of middle class participation in odder election-related activities may be explained partly by their relatively more cynical view of elections, although this does not seem to have affected their decisions to vote. Using the 1992 election data of the Social Weather Stations for Metro Manila, Karaos noted that the proportion of respondents who disagreed with the statements "Election is a game of the wealthy" and " All that citizens can hope for is the price of a vote" are lower among the C than the D and E classes (Karaos, 1999: 126). Moreover, the lack of middle class support for political parties is to be expected because of the low level of institutionalization of political parties in the Philippines and the dominance of key personalities and political machines as the major instruments of political articulation and aggregation. Political data from the survey shows that less than 30% of the middle classes participate or support social movements- The only exceptions are the environmental and human rights movements, which command the highest degree of involvement by middle class constituencies (47% and 40%, respectively). The level of participation in or support by the new middle and old middle class segments of the environmental movement are about the same, with half of them considering environmental issues worth their while. On the basis of this observation, the report suggests the possibility of the environment becoming the focal point of a broad basis of political unity and action across all social classes. The proportion of middle class respondents who participate or support the interest groups and social movements in Table 8, while low from the perspective of numbers may not be as insignificant when
situated within a broader historical context. Rivera's account of the development of middle class politics from the period of liberal democracy (1946-1972) to the struggle against Marcos' authoritarian rule (1972-1986), down to the post-Marcos period reveals that throughout the post-war decades, middle class factions, while small in numbers, have provided leadership for all kinds of political projects, some of them with profound national consequences' Seen in this light, the observation that at least one out of four middle class respondents support urban consumer groups as well as thematic and sectoral movements, a probable legacy of previous organizing efforts, attests to the existence of relatively organized segments that could be drawn potentially into broader
networks of civil society groups.
Images of the Middle Classes in Metro Manila
Table 9
291
u
Participants and Supporters of Interest Groups and Social Movements Employment-based Class of Respondents (in percentages)
Interest groups and social movements
NMC
OMC
MMC
Total
Consumer groups
26.9
28.8
25.7
27.4
Environmental movement
50.6
49.6
33.4
47.4
Labor movement
35.1
26.9
36.2
31.8
Women's movement
32.5
29.6
24.1
29.8
Agrarian reform movement
26.1
22.8
17.3
23.2
Human rights movement
44.9
37.6
33.6
39.9
(275)
(260)
(116)
(651)
(N)
'involvement
In her case studies of middle class families in Metro Manila, Karaos did not find similar evidence of engagement in organized activities of a political or quasi-political nature. Observing instead their in civic, religious or professional organizations, she nevertheless concludes that the
membership of
middle class individuals in
voluntary
organizations provide a stable organizational infrastructure that can support civil society initiatives and facilitate mobilization in moments of political or economic crisis (Karaos, 1999: 124).
IX.
Political Positions and Perspectives: Ambivalent and
Contradictory While the existence of voluntary and quasi-political organizations that draw participation and support from the middle classes is a starting point for social mobilization, what would galvanize the middle classes to act collectively toward community or national goals is a logical question. Unfortunately, it could not be addressed by the survey. What the data show, however, are respondents who mostly classify their political ideas as "definitely close to the center" and manifest ambivalent positions on specific issues that may be observed when larger political issues are at stake.
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The position of middle class respondents on labor strikes illustrates
this ambivalence. The report notes that middle class respondents show a higher degree of support for worker issues and demands against management in the context of strikes and labor disputes. When asked whether management should not dismiss workers during a strike, 64% agree while 18% disagree. Slightly more from the marginal middle class are in support of the injunction against management firing workers on strike. Qualifying their sympathies for workers, 64% would not prefer favorable outcomes for workers outright unless these are called for by prevailing conditions. Ambivalence also marks middle class perceptions of what white-collar workers should do during labor disputes. About 42% of those who responded say that white-collar workers ought to give moral support, but a slightly higher proportion (48%) think they should remain neutral. On the question of the middle classes and democracy, the relationship is far from unequivocal. Political thinkers are divided between those who write off the middle classes, specifically the new middle class, as the basis for democracy and those who believe they are essential to the foundation of a democratic agenda. The technocratic and bureaucratic orientation of this class and its cooptation into bureaucratic organizational structures are the arguments used to support those who dismiss the middle classes. On the other hand, the more positive view of the middle classes as the constituency for democratic politics emanates from the belief that their university educations make them less dependent on systems of patronage and imbue them with rational worldviews to appreciate the rule of law. Examining empirical data, the survey reveals a democratic orientation
among the middle classes on the one hand, and openness to forms Of authoritarian intervention, on the other. Rivera notes that eight out of ten middle class respondents consider themselves the "vanguard of democracy." An overwhelming majority of the middle classes perceive the Philippines as a democratic country and recognize that a democratic form of government is suitable for the development of Philippine society (Table 10). In the same breath, however, probe statements on what
respondents are willing to allow government to do reveals openness to the authoritarian temptation. Three out of four respondents believe the form of government does not matter as long as the government does a good job in developing the country. In a similar vein, 68% feel that
government need not bother about public opinion if it knows what is
Images of the Middle Classes in Metro Manila
1
I 293 )
good for the nation. Interestingly, 52% of middle class respondents are willing to allow government to ban political organizations, that may jeopardize the country's interests, while 37% are open to muzzling media. Table 10
Views on Democracy by Employment-based Social Class in
percent agreement) Statement
NMC
OMC
The Philippines is a democratic country.
87.6
88.4
84.6
87.4
A democratic form of government is suitable for the development of Philippine
83.8
82.6
86.3
83.8
69.3
77.7
82.9
75.0
As long as government knows what is best for the nation, it should not be bothered by public opinion.
60.3
72.7
76.9
68.1
Government ought to ban media from
31.4
40.4
41.9
36.8
47.7
55.0
56.9
52.2
55.9
68.9
65.0
62.6
(282)
(260)
(117)
(659)
MMC
Total
society.
It is not important for the government to be democratic or not. What matters is that it is doing a good job in the development of the country
publishing / broadcasting information or public opinion that will destroy the image
of the country among potential investors and tourists.
Political organizations, which might jeopardize the country's interests, ought to be banned, even if they do not resort to
violence. Government knows what is best for the nation and the people
(n)
The positions of new middle class respondents are noteworthy. Although they are as open as the rest of the middle classes to authoritarian intervention, professionals and managers in the new
middle class are less open compared to the old middle and marginal middle class respondents. More of them think the form of government
294
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
matters and that government ought to be sensitive to public opinion.
They are also less trusting of governments capacity to know what is best for the people. While the majority of the middle classes are averse to banning media from publishing or broadcasting information that will
destroy the image of the country, only three out of ten new middle class respondents, compared to four out of ten old middle and marginal middle class respondents, are willing to allow government to curtail freedom of speech. In contrast to media, the middle class respondents are more inclined, however, to allow government to ban nonviolent
political organizations, although the proportion of professionals and managers who agree with the statement to this effect is lower than that of the other middle class segments. Karaos highlights similar observations regarding the affinity of the middle classes for democratic ideas and simultaneous openness to authoritarian forms of intervention. She noted, for instance, a general satisfaction with the way democracy is working in the country, although she cites dissatisfaction with the performance of government officials that led key respondents to propose benevolent authoritarianism (Karaos, 1999: 124) . The overall ambivalence of the middle classes toward political issues, their family centeredness, concern with private professional or business pursuits, and low levels of involvement in political and quasi-political activities beyond casting their votes, imply the absence of a stable and consistent middle class politics. Therefore, discussions of factors and processes that would spur Metro Manila's middle classes to act collectively for political ends when the need arises, in the way they rose to the occasion in 1986, would depend on specific conjunctures and
circumstances.
X. Concluding Notes The survey of the middle classes in Metro Manila, on which this paper is based, was conducted in 1997, a few rnondis before the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis. Although the crisis did not hit the Philippines as badly as it did its neighbors, because of lower exposure to portfolio investments, the country was not spared from the damaging effects of the Asian turmoil. It is even more likely for the large capital outflows in 1997, exacerbated by drought, to have had a more insidious impact because the
Images of the Middle Classes in Metro Manila
Q295
I
'incidence
Philippines had lagged behind most of its Southeast Asian neighbors in terms of economic growth, per capita income and poverty before July 1997. What are the prospects for Metro Manila's middle classes in light of the economic crisis and its effects? This paper concludes by giving partial answers to this question on the basis of survey data. The paper portrayed an upwardly mobile class. Respondents occupied positions higher than their fathers', because of their eligibility to
fill the jobs opened by the establishment of new industries and services in the 1950s and the 19605. Indeed, a significant majority of the sample (73.4% of the new middle class, 77.3% of the old middle class and 90% of the marginal middle class) agrees that education and industriousness are
the most important factors in deciding a person's class background, the level of agreement increasing as one moves to the lower segments of the
middle classes. In contrast, only one out of ten respondents pinpoint family background as a determinant of success, the proportion being highest for the new middle class, many of whom had parents in the same class (16%) The relative fluidity of Metro Manila's occupational structure since the 1970s could not be ascertained from data on the current generation of middle class respondents. With population growth and the boom-andbust cycle of the economy since the 1960s, there have been more constraints on the attainment of similar levels of mobility among the respondents' children. At the time of the survey, more than half of the respondents from all middle class fractions (from 62% to 68%) complain that it is not easy to move up the social ladder or it is becoming more difficult at this time.
Perceptions of a more rigid social structure explain why some of the middle class respondents have sought new channels of social mobility for their progeny. Unfortunately, their sights are no longer set on career options within the country. Four out of ten respondents across middle class segments have thought of emigrating elsewhere or hope that their children will leave the Philippines. Considering the unusually good performance of the economy prior to the survey, the proportion of middle class respondents searching for greener pastures elsewhere is quite high. In general, the urban middle classes may be distinguished from the other groups by the
material improvements and changes in their
lifestyles, with the new middle class disseminating the status symbols to
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| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
the rest of the lower classes. Indeed, the paper portrays an interesting picture of the middle classes in Metro Manila, based on their material possessions and some aspects of their lifestyles. They are essentially consumers, but with much lower levels of income and investments than their counterparts in the region or in advanced capitalist societies. Their income levels constrain their lifestyles and tastes. In a society without adequate social insurance, the low investments of the middle classes would render them vulnerable to family crises such as illnesses even under normal conditions. But apart from unexpected family predicaments, any political development that affects the economy would take a toll on the lifestyles of the middle classes. Table 11
Emigration Plans by Employment-based Class of Household Head (in percentages)
Have you ever thought of emigrating?
Employment-based class
Total
NMC
OMC
MMC
Yes, in the process of preparation
13.7
16.3
9.4
14.0
Yes, but not yet in the process of preparation
21.5
17.4
20.5
19.7
Not for myself but I hope children will
. 3.9
6.2
7.7
5.5
8.1
1.9
0.9
4.4
52.8
58.1
61.5
56.4
100.0
100.0 (258)
100.0 (117)
100.0
(284)
Neither for myself nor for my children Never thought of emigrating % (N)
(659)
This chapter also depicts the middle classes as politically and socially aware. From their perspective, the four most serious problems at the time were corruption, environmental pollution, public safety and crime and prostitution (Table 12). These problems captured the salient issues that dominated the papers then-the exposes of corruption in high government offices the year before the presidential elections, the high rates of kidnapping and other crimes, and the poor air quality and pollution of Metro Manila's rivers. The lower ranking of economic issues may be due to the 5.8% GDP growth rate at the time of the survey. But the rankings of
problems like lack of
educational opportunities,
Images of the Middle Classes in Metro Manila
I
2 LIE
' welfare, etc. may not reflect the relative unimportance of insufficient these problems but the privatization of such issues. Metro Manila's population has lived with inadequate provisions of social services and the middle classes have adapted or done what they could for themselves. In the course of everyday life in Metro Manila, many have learned to
demand less of their government and society.
Table 12
Respondents' Perceptions of the Seriousness of National Problems (In percentages who consider the problem very serious)
Problem
NMC
Public safety and crime
"
Environmental pollution and ecological
MMC
Total
§'0.5
77.7
62.4
71.9
75.8
77.6
66.7
74.9
30.9
39.2
29.9
33.9
OMC
degradation Lack of educational opportunity
40.4
45.7
36.8
41.8
56.7
70.3
66.7
63.8
Inflation and high consumption price
64.9
77.7
73.5
71.4
47.4
38.8
44.8
43.6
85.6
91.5
88.0
88.3
Obscenity and prostitution
69.7
76.2
75.2
73.2
Unemployment
55.4
61.9
59.0
58.6
(284)
(259)
(ll7]
(736)
Income
'inequality
Insufficient social welfare High housing cost
Corruption
(N)
Fortunately, there are organized, albeit fragmented, constituencies
among the middle classes that may be moved to help develop appropriate notions of citizenship and build institutions of civil society. Only by establishing institutional mechanisms for holding government and citizens accountable can they put an end to the sense of helplessness they have learned to accept and to their tendency to privatize public issues. But with the ambivalent politics of the middle classes, their social mobilization for urgent and longterm concerted action remains a daunting challenge.
1 298 )
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Notes 1.
For an overview of middle class politics in the post-war period, see Rivera (2000).
References Bacol-Montilla, M. & Stirrer, W- F. 1975. Farm origins, education and occupational mobility in Metro Manila: a footnote on the overurbanization thesis. Philippine sociological review, 23: 21-28. Karaos, A. M- 1999. Perceptions and practices of democracy and citizenship among urban middle class families. In M. S. I. Diokno (Ed.), Philippine democracy agenda volume 1: democracy pa* citizenship in Filipino political structure, $.128. Quezon City: Third World Studies Center. Rivera, T. 2000. Middle class politics: the Philippine experience. The journal of social sciences, 45: 1-22.
PART III
Malaysia
7
The Portrayal of the Malaysian Middle Classes Abdul Rah ran Embong
I. Introduction The middle class in Malaysia emerged since the begirming of the twentieth century as a product of colonial capitalism and the expansion of the colonial state under the British. However, its rapid growth is a recent phenomenon in post-independence Malaysia, coming mainly in the wake of the post-1970s capitalist development and the restructuring of society, which was planned and executed by a strong developmentalist state. Unlike the pre-1970s period, when the middle class consisted mainly of one ethnic community, was. the Chinese, whilst among the majority Malay community, the middle class comprised mainly of a small group of government administrators, the post-1970s saw the expansion of a more multiethnic 'new' middle class. Besides administrators, tris 'new' middle class was mostly made up of managers, doctors, architects, lawyers, lecturers, technologists, and other professionals, with some working in the state sector, whilst the majority worked in the private sector. In Goldthorpe's terms (Goldthorpe, 1980, 1982) the 'new' middle class consists of "the salariat" comprising professional, managerial and administrative employees who share a "distinctive employment status
whose principal feature is the 'trust' that employers necessarily have to place in these employees whose delegated or specialized tasks give them a considerable autonomy" (Lockwood, 1995: 1). The changes that took place, which led to the emergence and expansion of a multiethnic 'new' middle class, indicate that the middle class is not a static social category but an historically constituted and dynamic entity, which emerged in specific historical, political, economic and cultural contexts in the country. The dramatic changes in the ethnic
[302 }
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
and sectoral composition of the Malaysian middle class is closely related to Malaysia's in-depth structural transformation over the last thirty years. Just as in East Asia, where the rise of the 'new' middle class has become the subject of research by scholars (Hsiao, 1993, 1999; Robison & Goodman, 1996), so too in Malaysia, the rise of the 'new' middle class has drawn the attention of Malaysian researchers and Malaysianists who have studied it from various aspects, such as social mobility, affluence, lifestyle and consumption, class consciousness, political orientation, collective action, and so on. As has been pointed out elsewhere, studies of the Malaysian middle class can generally be grouped under two broad categories (Abdul Rah ran, 1997). First, earlier studies conducted in the late 1960s and 1970s concerning the administrative middle class, which developed since the colonial period as well as during the early independence years, examine such themes as the origin, growth and social composition of the administrative middle class, its political role as well as lifestyle (see, for example, Scott, 1967; Nordin, 1976; Khasnor, 1984). Second, more recent studies, which examine the impact of post-independence social engineering and export-led industrialisation on the Malaysian social structure, with particular reference to class transformation and the growth of the middle class, especially the 'new' middle class (see, for example, Saravanamuttu, 1989; Kahn, 1991, 1996, Crouch, 1996; Abdul Rah ran, 1995, 1996, 1997). These studies examine the structural changes brought about by rapid industrialisation and economic growth, the role of the state in class formation, the growth and expansion of the middle class, their ethnic composition, middle-class consciousness, politics and culture, as well as their impact on national unity and dernocratisation. A
number of these studies also take up the critical question of the problematic of both middle~class conceptualisation and theorising. This chapter and Chapter 8 constitute an attempt to portray the Malaysian middle class by drawing upon the data culled from a survey conducted in 1996 on the middle class in the Klang Valley, Malaysia. Whilst Chapter 8 is devoted specifically to middle class politics, this chapter tries to provide the background of the emergence and expansion
of the middle class and some of its important characteristics. lt first gives a macro-analysis of the economic transformation of Malaysian society, which serves as a backdrop for an analysis in the second part, of middle class intergenerational mobility, lifestyle, family and middle class
reproduction in the micro-study.
The Portrayal of the Malaysian Middle Classes
I
I
303
~1
II. Economic Transformation of Malaysian Society The evolution of the class structure and middle-class formation in
Malaysia are not sudden phenomena, but ones that took place slowly over a period of about a century, with the most dramatic changes taking place over the last three decades. The structural changes during the pre-independence period were tied up with the imposition of British colonial capitalism, which eventually turned the then Malaya (now Malaysia) into Britain's biggest dollar-earner through the development of rubber and tin mining industries (Puthucheary 1960; Ion 1988). Whilst
broad structural changes had occurred during the colonial period that led to the emergence of the modern classes in Malaysian society, nevertheless, any discussion of in-depth changes and transformation in Malaysia has to be focused on the post-colonial period, especially after the 1970s (Brookfield 1994). The transformations of the post-1970s have markedly different characteristics than earlier transformations, not only in terms of the actors who carried out the transformations, but also in terms of their consequences. The transformations have been actively carried out by a
developmentalist state with a clear agenda of restructuring society, together with capitalist market forces, and the result has been the emergence of a multiethnic middle class, characterised in particular by
the dramatic emergence and expansion of a Malay detailed exposition of the transformations, see Abdul Three major transformative processes, which bearing upon middle class formation and expansion,
middle class. (For a Rah ran, 1996) . had an important shall be highlighted
here.
First, the rapid and extensive structural changes in the economy and society over the last three decades had transformed Malaysia from being a basically agricultural economy and a primary producer to an increasingly industrialized one. Such structural transformation brought about by industrialization can be seen clearly if we compare the relative 1 sectors over the last positions of the primary, secondary an ter three decades, which show the rapid contraction of the contribution of the agricultural sector to the gross domestic product (GDP). Official statistics show that whilst the contribution of the agricultural sector to the GDP was the biggest in 1970, amounting to 31.4%, its share fell to 18.7% in 1990, and is expected to fall further to 10.4% in 2000. The decline of the agricultural sector contrasted with the rapid expansion of the secondary
sector (manufacturing, construction, and mining), which increased its
(304
I
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
contribution to the GDP from 23.3% in 1970 to 40.2% in 1990 (an increase of 16.9 percentage points), and is expected to increase further to 48.0% by the end of the century. The contribution of the tertiary sector (various types of services) to the GDP also expanded in absolute terms over the three decades, though in proportionate terms, its contribution, which was 45.3% in 1970, fell slightly to 41.1% in 1990, but is expected to slowly climb to 41.6% in 2000 (Malaysia, 1971; 1996). Second, the structural changes above brought about changes in the occupational pattern of the labour force, which show a decline of Me rural l a b o r force and an expansion of the l a b o r force in the secondary and tertiary sectors. Official figures show that the proportion of the rural l a b o r force shrank from 54% of the total l a b o r force in 1970 to 28% in 1990, and is expected to decline further to 20.0% by the year 2000 (Malaysia, 1996). On the other hand, the non-a( ricultural l a b o r force expanded very rapidly. For example, the proportion of the l a b o r force in the manufacturing sector increased from 8.7% in 1970 to 19.5% in 1990 and is expected to increase further to 24% by the year 2000, registering an average annual growth rate of 10.3% during the 1971-1990 period. For the service sector, its l a b o r force grew at the average annual rate of 7.6% during the 1971-90 period, increasing its share of the total l a b o r force from 32.5% in 1970 to 45.7% two decades later (Malaysia, 1996). Third, rapid urbanization during the last three decades transformed Malaysia's agricultural society into a predominantly urban modernizing society. In 1970, of a population of 10.4 million, only slightly more than a quarter (26.7%) lived in urban areas. However, the ensuing decade saw very rapid urbanization, which increased the proportion of the urban
population to more than one-third or 34.2% -- an increase of 7.5
percentage points during die intercensal period. A decade later, the 1991
'increase
census showed that of a total population of 19 million, the urban population had increased sharply to slightly more than half, i.e. 50.7% (Malaysia, 1995: 30-31), and is projected to increase further to about 60% in the urban by 2000. However, it should be noted that the sharp population in the 1990s is due to two factors. natural growth and in-migration, as well as the redefinition of urban areas. Whilst in previous censuses, urban areas only included gazetted areas which had a population of 10,000 or more, the 1991 census expanded the urban areas 'include
to
both gazetted areas as well as adjacent built-up areas with a
population of 10,000 or 1nore.1
The Portrayal of the Malaysian Middle Classes |
305
I
It should be emphasized that these transformative processes took place during a period of rapid economic growth and unprecedented affluence in Malaysia. In fact, during the economic transformation of the last thirty years, the GDP grew at an average rate of 6.7% per annum. It recorded a rapid annual average rate of 7.5% in the 1970s, but it went down to 5.9% in the 1980s due to the 1985-86 recession. However, from
the late 1980s until early 1997, the GDP grew more rapidly than ever before, recording an average growth annual rate of 8.7%. Nevertheless, with the economic 'meltdown' following the post-1997 financial and economic crisis, die GDP is forecasted to experience negative growth of 3 to 3% in 1998 (National Economic Action Council, 1998), and its full impact on society is yet to be seen.
III. Expansion of the Middle Classes The middle class, being an elusive category, is not easy to define. As an intermediate class in the production relations between the capitalist class on the one hand, and the working class on the other, the middle class is not only very heterogeneous (hence, it is more appropriate to speak in the plural "middle classes" rather than the singular), but also amorphous, making it difficult to ascertain class boundaries (Kahn, 1996; Abdul
Rah ran, 1995). In this chapter, for operational purposes, we take the occupational approach to identifying the middle class, by extrapolating data on occupations tabulated in official statistics. These statistics, however, only refer to occupational categories, and not relational ones. They give statistics of different types of occupations, both whitecollar as
well as different types of blue-collar occupations. However, the occupational definitions used here are only for purposes of making estimates of the relative sizes of the various occupational groups in the
work force and should be taken only as proxies for class. in this approach, we take the first two top categories - professional and technical, as well as administrative and managerial -- to represent the new middle class, whilst those in the clerical, sales and a portion of the services category are taken to represent the lower middle class occupations Two other categories - production and related workers category, and agricultural workers category - are taken as proxies for the working class and rural classes, respectively.
I
I
(' 306
u
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
However, since occupational categories do not provide any insight regarding class production relations, especially the size of the capitalist class, we have to rely on data regarding occupational status to estimate the size of this class. Based on the 1947 census, 'employers' (the occupational status which approximates the capitalist class) numbered
'increased
some 24,200 persons or only 1-3% of the working population, while by 1980, the number went up to 150,500 or 3.8% of the working population, registering a six-fold increase in over three decades. (Since the 1957 and 1970 population censuses did not distinguish between 'employers' and 'the self-employed' categories, we have to rely on the data tor 1947 as a base year to estimate the size of the commercial/ business class at independence). By 1991, the employers category increased further in absolute terms to about 185,000, but its proportion of the working population fell to 3.1% due to the rapid expansion of those in the 'employees' category (Malaysia, 1995; 144). Though their number is small in relation to other classes, as capitalists, they, together with foreign transnationals, own and control most of the country's wealth. For the middle class(es), an examination of the occupational categories indicates that their growth and expansion was the most rapid, especially since the 1970s -- the most remarkable and dramatic growth having been experienced by the 'professional and technical' as well as 'administrative and managerial' categories, or the 'new' middle class, as they are commonly referred to (Lockwood, 1995). From being a relatively small group in the early years of independence, making up only 4.0% in 1957 and 5.9% in 1970 (see Table 1), the 'new' middle class significantly to 11.2% in 1990, 13% in 1995, and is expected to increase
--
further to 15.3% in 2000 (Malaysia 1996: 113) almost a threefold increase in thirty years. Nevertheless, though the proportion of the 'new' middle class in Malaysia may be on the rise compared to its previous historical position, its proportion is relatively smaller when compared with the proportion of the 'new' middle class in the four East Asian 'tiger' economies -- Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore -which had undergone rapid industrialization much earlier (Rodan, Hewison & Robison, 1997).3
The Portrayal of the Malaysian Middle Classes
Table 1
1307
I
Malaysia: Employment According to Major Occupations 1957 - 2000 ('000)
Occupational categories
1957
1970
1990
2000
Professional, technical & related workers
2.8
4.8
8.8
12.1
Adminislxative & managerial
1.2
1.1
2.4
3.2
2.9
5.0
9.8
10.3
Sales workers
8.6
9.1
11.5
11.5
Service workers
8.6
7.9
11.6
12.9
56.4
44.8
28.3
16.4
workers
Clerical & related workers
Workers in agriculture, livestock, forestry, fisheries & hunting Production & related workers Total
(N)
18.9
27.3
27.6
33.6
100.0 (2,126.2}
100.0 (2,850.3)
100.0 (6,686.0)
(9,.066.2)
100.0
Figures for 1957 and 1970 refer to Peninsular Malaysia only. Sources: Extracted from Homo (1988: 300-301) Malaysia (1996: 113) .
The lower-middle class (comprising employees in clerical, sales and about half of the services categories) made up another 15.8% and 23.9% respectively in 1957 and 1970. Their proportion increased to 27.1% in 1990, 27.6% in 1995, and is expected to increase to 28.3% by 2000 (see
Table 1) -- a much lower percentage increase (about four percentage points between 1970-2000) compared to the new middle class. During the same period, the rural classes have shrunk drastically from 44.8% in 1970 to about 21.0% in 1995, a drop of about 2.1 times, and is expected to decline further to 16.4% in 2000. However, the ranks of the
blue-collar workers grew together with the growth of the middle class. The proportion of production workers had expanded from 27.3% in 1970 to 32.2% in 1995 (an increase of 1.7 times), and is expected to stabilise at around 33.6% in 2000. What is significant in these transformations is the fact that the middle class(es) have entered the Malaysian historical stage and are very visible in Malaysian cities, and even in the countryside, today. Over and above that, they are also multiethnic in nature, reflecting more accurately the multiethnic composition of Malaysian society.
)
t
308 i~l
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
IV. Middle Class(es) in the Klang Valley The preceding sections gave a broad historical sweep of the macro transformative processes that took place in Malaysian society over the last three decades or so, the evolution of the class structure, and the emergence and expansion of the middle class. In order to obtain a detailed picture of the characteristics and role of the middle class, a survey of the middle class was carried out in the Klara Valley, Malaysia in April 1996, in which I was involved as the principal researchers* The study was sponsored and coordinated by the Program for Southeast Asian Area Studies (PROSEA), Academia Silica, Taipei, Taiwan as part of the latter's Southeast Asian Middle Class (SEAMC) project, which is a comparative study of the Southeast Asian middle classes in four capital cities -- Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Manila, and Bangkok. The following section uses the data obtained from the Klang Valley study. The sample in the Klang Valley study comprised 520 respondents, containing a mixture of capitalists (defined for operational purposes as
employers with 11 or more employees), 'new' middle class (professional, technical, administrative and managerial workers, including executives, with almost equal proportion from both the government and private
sectors), 'old' middle class (self-employed or small proprietors with one to ten non-family workers), marginal or lower middle class (lower rungs of white-collar workers, or routine non-manual employees), and working
class (blue-collar workers). Since the focus of the study is the 'new' middle class, respondents from this category constituted the majority,
making up about 50% of the sample. The other classes serve as 'control groups' of sorts, used for intra-class as well as inter-class comparisons.
The distribution and characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 2. Because of the difficulty in obtaining a sampling frame, the sample for the study was selected purposfully using the 'snow-ball' method. Since in multiethnic Malaysia ethnicity is a very important issue, which often overrides class issues, care was therefore taken to ensure that the sample reflected the ethnic mix of the Klang Valley population, with Malay and Chinese respondents each making up 42.1%, whilst Indians and others make up the balance (15.8%) However, by sex, the sample was male~biased (75% male), whilst in terms of marital status, the sample was
also weighted in favour of married respondents, who made up about 80%. The age distribution of the respondents was fairly proportionate,
with the majority being relatively young -- 58.6% being in their thirties,
The Portrayal of the Malaysian Middle Classes
309 )
I
33% in their forties, and the rest (8.4%) aged 50 and above. The original residents of the Kiang Valley comprised only a minority (18.1%) of the sample, whilst the rest were from outside the region. Since the Kiang Valley in which Kuala Lumpur and Petaling Jaya are located - had been
-
Table 2
Distribution and Characteristics of Respondents (N=520)
Characteristics
Class Capitalist class
Percentage 100.0
4.8
Characteristics Refigiorl
Percentage 100.0
Islam
42.3
49.8
Buddhism
42.1
Old middle class
23.8
Hinduism
15.4
Marginal middle class
11.9
Others
New middle class
Working class
Sex
0.2
9.7 100.0
Age gfoilp
100.0
Male
74.6
30 .- 34
34.6
Female
25.4
35 - 39
24.0
40 - 44
18.8
45 .- 49
14.2
50 - 55 Ethnic group
100.0
Place of birfh
Malays
42.1
Kuala Lumpur/
Chinese
42.1
Petaling Jaya
Indians
15.4
Other areas in
Others
0.4
Marital status
100.0
Married
79.4
Widowed
1.7
Divorced/ separated
1.2
Never married
Source: Fieldwork, 1996.
17.7
8.3
100.0 16.7
12.9
Selangor Outside Selangor
67.7
Outside Malaysia
3.5
310
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
and is the most important administrative, industrial, commercial, financial and educational hub for Malaysia, it is not surprising that over 80% of the respondents in the sample were people from outside the region, who had migrated and settled there for various reasons. It is important to analyze whether the objective class position (defined by using the occupational criteria) corresponds with the respondents' own subjective assessments of their class positions. As shown in Table 3, 85.7% of the respondents of all classes perceive themselves to be "middle class" (including a small percentage of 15.7% who regard themselves as "upper middle class"). When the respondents' perceptions are examined by class, it is found that all the respondents in the capitalist class category regard themselves either as "middle or upper middle class." Among the 'new' middle class respondents, 94% also perceive themselves to be "middle or upper middle class," whilst among the 'old' middle class and the marginal middle class, those who perceive themselves to be "middle or upper middle class" constitute about 80% and 74.4% respectively. Only among the working class respondents is the perception mixed. Whilst 45.3% identify themselves as belonging to the lower class, the remaining regard themselves as the middle, and some even upper middle class. The above findings more or less correspond with the objective class position identified by using the occupational approach. This is especially true among the 'new' middle class. This chapter, as well as Chapter 7, focus the discussion on the 'new' middle class, which was captured in the Klang Valley survey, and addresses five interrelated questions. For analytical convenience, Chapter . new is this 'new' middle class :* . .. . 6 address Q! historically? Second, has the 'new' middle class become a distinct social
category clearly differentiated from other classes in terms of affluence? Third, what is the lifestyle and status consciousness of the 'new' middle class? Fourth, what is the nature of the middle class family and how does it try to reproduce itself? The fifth question, relating to middle class politics, democracy and civil society, will be addressed in Chapter 7. However, the findings should not be taken as representative, but rather as tentative and exploratory, to be verified by further research.
(
The Portrayal of the Malaysian Middle Classes I
Table 3
311
Respondents' Perception of their Current Class Position Perception of current class position
Perception of class position
Upper class
Capitalist class
Upper middle
class 26.1
(6)
New middle class
0.5
old middle class
(1) 3.5
17.2 (35)
15.0 (17)
Middle
Working
class
class
Rural class
5.4
(17)
(23)
77.
(157) 64.6
4.9 (10)
47.4
Working class
(5)
(30)
2.4
9.5
42.9
42.9
Total
(1) 1.4
(4) 15. 7 (67)
(18) 68.9 (295)
(18)
2.4 (1)
12.9
1.2
(55)
(5)
Marginal middle class
10.6
(6)
(N)
73.9
14.2 (16) 23.4 (11)
(4)
Total
(73) 63.8
2.7
(3) 2.1
(1)
(203) 26.4 (113) 11.0 (47) 9.8 (42) 100.0 (428)
Source: Fieldwork, 1996.
V. 'New' Middle Class as a New Class The East Asian middle class study shows that in Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, the middle class had emerged and developed only since the 1970s, when dies economies had undergone and were undergoing rapid industrialization, and that the 'new' middle class is a first generation middle class (Hsiao & So; 1999). In the main, it can be said that the first generation hypothesis also applies to the Malaysian
situation. From Table 4, which compares the class positions of the respondents with those of their fathers, it can be seen that 80% of the respondents from the 'new' middle class were first generation middle class who had experienced rapid upward social mobility. The 'new' middle class in the main came from humble origins, with about 42% coming from farmering and working class backgrounds, 74% from the 'old' middle class, 22% from the marginal middle class, and some 2% from capitalist class backgrounds. From the data, it is clear that the 'new' middle class is a predominantly a historically new class in Malaysia, a country experienced dramatic upward intergenerational mobility over the last three decades.
J
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
312
Table 4
Intergenerational Mobility among Respondents leather's Class
Respondent's class
_
Capitalist class
Capitalist
AtTic./
Total
rural
(n)
New
Old
Marginal
middle
middle
middle
class 32.0
class
class
8 .0
20.0
16.0
24.0
100.0
Working class
class
class
(25)
New middle class
1.9
20.1
14.3
22.0
20.1
21.6
100.0 (259)
Old middle class
0.8
78,
16.9
21.0
27.4
26.6
700.0 (124)
Marginal middle class
1_6
9.7
8.1
25.8
27.4
27.4
100.0
10.0
6.0
34.0
20.0
30.0
100.0
15.4
13.1
23.3
22.5
24.4
(50) 100.0 (520)
(62)
Worldng class
Total
1.3
(n)
Source: Fieldwork, 1996.
However, a reading of Table 4 shows that the trend of upward intergenerational mobility is not confined to the 'new' middle class alone;
it is also a general trend involving other classes, indicating an openness and fluidity in the class structure. For example, the proportion of respondents originating from the working and agriculhlral classes is 40 % among the capitalist class, but is much higher among the 'old' middle
class (54%) and the marginal middle class (54.8%). This suggests at least
two things. One, that a large proportion of the members of the capitalist class, the 'old' middle class and the new middle class are also first
generation; and two, that although the class structure is rather open and that upward intergenerational social mobility is a distinct phenomenon, it nevertheless tends to be rather 'short range' in the sense that it is relatively easier to enter the 'old' and the marginal middle classes than the 'new' middle class and the capitalist class. Whilst entry into the capitalist class would require a certain amount of money capital, business acumen and drive, as well as qualifications, the 'new' middle class requires acquisition of high quality en nc.o: cultural capital, which comes with a high level of education. What
The Portrayal of the Malaysian Middle Classes |
l 313 'l
differentiates the 'new' middle class from their parents and from other classes is their far superior cultural capital in the form of higher education. As shown in Table 5, compared to other classes, the 'new' middle class is the most educated class in society, as evidenced by the fact that 79% of the respondents from this class had received tertiary education (about one-third abroad) either at university or at college level,
with 42% having a first degree, and another 15% having a postgraduate degree- The percentage of respondents with tertiary education among other classes varies considerably. Whilst it is quite high among the capitalist class (48%), it is nevertheless very low among the marginal middle class (11.3%), and lower still among the 'old' middle class (6.4%) However, the percentage of respondents with tertiary education is expectedly lowest among the working class, with none having university or college education. (see Table 5) How did members of the 'new' middle class manage to obtain their high educational levels, which facilitated their upward mobility and enabled them to enter the 'new' middle class today? At least three factors -- class background, family educational background, and state financial sponsorship -- seem to have operated simultaneously. First, in terms of their class background, although 40% of the 'new' middle class respondents came from the working and rural classes, the majority (60%) originated from non-working class or non-rural class backgrounds. In fact, 20% of them hailed from 'new' middle class families, and another 40% came from the 'old' and marginal middle classes, including a few from the capitalist class. On the contrary, the percentage among the 'old' middle class and the marginal middle class who came from working and rural classes was much higher, i.e. 54% for each of the class factions. In short, family class background obviously had an important bearing in terms of the ability to provide better life-chances for their off-spring. Second, in terms of family educational background, especially the educational level of their parents, the 'new' middle class had the advantage of having parents (namely fathers) who were also educated, though not at the same level as they were. This can be seen when we compare educational levels across generations for all classes, which shows that there has been a very major advance in the educational attainment of the present generation of all classes compared to the educational level of their parents, and that this advance is most dramatic among the 'new' middle class. For example, in terms of educational level
}
a
.
314
| Exploration of the Middle Classes
ill Southeast
Asia
of the earlier generation, 5.8% of fathers of the 'new' middle class had tertiary education (either a diploma or a degree holder), about 38% had secondary and post-secondary education, 35% had primary education, whilst only 21% had no formal education (see Table 5). This compares very favourably with the other classes, that is, the 'old' middle class, the marginal middle class and the working class, the overwhelming majority
of whose fathers (over 70%) were educated up to only primary level or had no education at all. Thus, members the 'new' middle class definitely had the advantage of their fathers' education, because their fathers -though mostly not from the 'neW widdle class themselves
--
were by far the most educated among their generation, whose relatively superior cultural capital could have contributed to some extent in providing motivation and enhancing the educational attainment of their children. Third, the advantage of financial sponsorship, especially, from the state to pursue higher edu.cation had clearly helped a substantial number of respondents, especially from the 'new' middle class. Higher education is a costly affair, which can hinder many from humble backgrounds from pursuing it, unless they manage to obtain sponsorship. In the sample, we find that slightly more than a quarter (25.4%) of all respondents had the benefit of financial sponsorship (in the form of scholarship and/ or study loan) for their education -- 79% of the grants came from the state, and the rest came from private foundations, including a very small number from overseas foundations. When these scholarship or loan recipients were examined by class, it is found that almost half (45%) among the 'new' middle class were scholarship or loan holders, whilst among other classes, the percentage is far lower -- 2.8% among the capitalist class, 6.5% among the marginal middle class, 3% among the "old' middle class, and only 2% among the working class.
62.9
to
Q
I
12.0
6.3 (33)
22.0
5.8
33.5
Q ©
23.1 (120)
I
(30)
be
(174)
l'\l
10.0
I
al
U210L
(n)
ca
(51 VU
FE
Working class
G\
(mr)
1-1
U'6
schlep
aWPPFL11 PIO
Marginal middle
16.0
First degree 12.0
Other tertiary 28.0
Vacational/ technical 8.0
l*:
class
Post5econda1y
L0
ndary
20.0
Primary
Highest level of education: respondent (% )
LQ
U99
SSEp
SIPPHIIMSN
Capitalist class
:J
*Q1-1
(QL)
l
to
I
on
I
591;
I
lll8
No formal schooling
I
of
§`09
Class
Highest Level of Education attained by Respondents, Respondents' Spouses and Parents (Father only)
cq nu '4.
I
(Hr) EL
c> oc \-D
*Q
(n)
Total
(029) 000L
Xaepuoaag O\
!-|
(09)
co Fu*
U`00l
vzv
ca -Q
(59)
nr
oo O
I
U`00 l
0.8
LF)
m
(Val) 0001
(693) U`00T.
(so) I
aa.13ap
I
0001
S1BI'lPl?.I8II'SOd'
Table 5
The Porttrayal of the Malaysian Middle Classes | 315 H .I
I
(09) ZZ
(Q
1-1
C'\I
\-D I
to
19101
(n)
1
(9)
1
LT]
Workj 1g class
-¢
10.4
62.5
(Luz) 0`9°t*
Margi 1a1 micldl ' class
(AQ)
57.9
I
(n)
Total
( I L)
class "2 *"E
I I
W
old middle
degree 4.5
Postgraduate
30.0
First degree 9.1
we
99
13.0 3
Other tertiary 13.6
CJI~
"1
(6117)
New middle class
I
Vocational/ technical 9.1
up:
(175)
N
Ln
A`9
UE1-1
(Qs)
of
VG
C
p-1
(m)
DO
Marginal
"E
t~.a
DO
32.8
o
*CZ
V9
on (Nl
Old middle
Apartment I
class
store terrace 16.0
Single
G\
o-
(z9)
cg
IU\
SSQD
Capitalist class New middle class
store terrace 48.0
Condominiuml
Double
Type of living quarter
vi
Type of Living Quarter
D-.
'd'l
(vzl)
\-¢
0`[](]I
I
my\
UT'
A»»\o[e8ung
cu
C`\I
0001
ca
(Asa)
I
0001
I
(sz)
0001
paqaeqap 'BUGS
Table 9
The Portrayal of the Malaysian Middle Classes
I
u">
1
|,
co
Ln
f 321
J
56.0*
32.3
9`9[
Workingclass
Total
*Q
r~.
86.0
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
`-tE
*
T*
55.4
OI
cg
Source:Fieldwork, 1996. *Mostof the vehicles are motorcycles.
class
54.8
E99
Marginal middle
(520)
(50) 100.0
(62) 100.0
100.0
(724)
100.0
(259)
(25) 100.0 56.8 32.3
(N) 100.0
84.0
16.0
8.0
8.0
4.0
48.0
32.0
Total
Yes
No
Five
Four
Home computer
Three
Two
One
Number of cars/motorcycles
1..re
l]'0T'
65.3
Lfa
Old middle class
New middle class
Capitalistclass
Class
Ownershipof Vehicles and Home Computers
CJ
"Q
we
no
01:1
l l
I
Qu
1
HZ
WE
EO lb-.
'8`9TL
017€
z I
6`9`[
VU
N I
A29
Z`€T'
Table 10
- L Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
35
co
~_c
(3
\-D
I on01
The Portzrayal of the Malaysian Middle Classes |
I
323
Among working class respondents, 60% own vehicles, but most of the latter are motor cycles. Further analysis shows that among the 'new'
middle class, 37% own two or more cars, compared with only 12.8% among the 'old' middle class, and 12.9% among the marginal middle class. Besides houses and cars, personal computers constitute the third most expensive item needed by a modern family, and their ownership is a distinctly middle-class phenomenon. Of the total sample, though 45 %
own home computers, the inter-class distribution is very uneven- Whilst respondents from the capitalist class have the highest percentage of home computer ownership, at 84%, followed by the 'new' middle class respondents with 57%, respondents from the other classes are far behind, with only 32% among the 'old' middle class, 27% among the marginal middle class, and 14% among the working class, having personal computers in their households. During the period of rapid economic growth and prosperity in Malaysia prior to July 1997 when the financial crisis erupted, the well-developed hire-purchase system had enabled various classes, especially the 'new' middle class, to obtain loans to purchase their houses and motor vehicles. Of the total sample, 52% had loans at the time of the study, of which 33% had one loan, 16% had two loans, and the remaining 2.5% obtained three loans (see Table 11). In terms of class, 64% the 'new' middle class had loans, followed by the capitalist class with 60%, the marginal middle class with 47%, the 'old' middle class with 38%, and the working class with 34%. Again, in terms of having a second loan, the 'new' middle class topped the others with 23% among them having a second loan, compared with 12% among the capitalist class, 11%/ among the marginal middle class, and 8% each among the 'old' middle class and
the working class. The purpose of the loan is clear. For example, in the case of the first loan, 55.3% used them to purchase a house, 30 DI-1 for
purchase of motor vehicles, 5.5% for business operations, 2.6% for share investment, and the rest for personal use. It is interesting to note that among the 'new' middle class, none took loans for business, unlike the
'old' middle class and the capitalist class, some of whom did apply for business loans. However, a small number (4%) from the 'new' middle class obtained loans to invest in the share market, whilst no other class
did the same. Among the working class respondents, their loans where basically to purchase a house (67%), and only 24% took loans for purchase of motor vehicles (see Table 12).
(324
>
I
Table 11
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Amount and Number of Loans taken by Respondents
Class
Loan one (RM)* 50,001100,001100,000 150,000 26.7 20.0
Total
13.3
10,00150,000 40.0
9.1
35.2
33.9
12.7
9.1
(15) 100.0 (165)
12.8
55.3
17.0
6.4
8.5
100.0
Marginal
20.7
48.3
27.6
3.4
middle class Working class
17,6
58.8
23.5
I l I
Total
11.7
41.8
29.3
10.3
150,001
(N) 100.0
(47) 100.0
(29) 100.0 7.0
(17) 100.0
(273)
Class
Loan two (RM)*
Total
10,00150,000 66.7
50,007100,000
6.8
64.4
22.0
6.8
(3) 100.0
20.2
40.0
20.0
20.0
100.0
28.6
57.1
14.3
100.0
Working class
25.0
50.0
25.0
Total
10.8
60.2
20.5
150,001
(N) 100.0
33.3
(59)
(10)
middle class
(7) 100.0
(4) 8.4
100.0
(83)
The Portrayal of the Malaysian Middle Classes |
Table 11
.J
Amount and Number of Loans taken by Respondents (Continued) Loan Three (RM)*
Class
I 325 'l
150,001
Total (N) 100.0
(2) New middle class
71.4
28.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
(7)
Old middle class
Marginal middle class
(2) 100.0 (2)
100.0
Working class
Total
53.8
46.2
Source: Fieldwork, 1996. *Exchange rate (at time of survey) : USS1 = RM250.
100.0 (13)
'~*:8
51.7
EQ
Lx
an
In
'Q
199 I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
V99
20.5
70.3
Personal
I
25.0
Education
Personal
I
50.0
l
9'8Z
9131
I I 1
42.9
I
20,0
I
20.0
33,3
Land I I
0'09
71.2
Le
a>I!qlolou1
(3 l.-l
Purpose of loan two
T*
Business/ shop/ factory
I I
Do
Housing
*'! ca
1112310101/Q
Ln
USE
m
55.3
I \-D
(re
seep
a[pp;1.u MAN
ssrzp
1s¥[e4¥de3
SSBID
Working class Total
31.9 m
class Total
29.1
26. 7
Busines5/ shop/ factry
59.4
33.3
Motorcar/ motorbike 40.0
i
018
s6913
Capi tali st
Housing
.
l"-
-:al
:J
'ft'
PSI
Table 14
The Portrayal of the Malaysian Middle Classes
(332
)
l
Table 15
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Patronizing Boutiques and Sales Boutiques (%)
Class Often 12.0
Capitalist
Sometimes
Total
Very seldom
Never
44.0
28.0
16.0
(N) 100.0 (25) 100.0
New middle class
5.0
22.4
32.0
40.5
Old middle class
2.4
12.9
32.3
52.4
100.0 (124)
Marginal middle
1.6
9.7
29.0
59.7
Working class
2.0
10.0
30.0
58.0
100.0 (62) 100.0
Total
4.0
18.5
46.2
(21)
(96)
31.3 (163)
(259)
class
(50)
(n)
Table 15a
(240)
100.0 (520)
Patronizing Boutiques and Sales
Never
Total (N)
4.2
0.4
100.0 (25) 100.0
41.9
12.1
1.6
40.3
41.9
17.7
Worldng class
34.0
58.0
6.0
2.0
Total
52.1 (271)
38.8
8.3
(202)
(43)
0.8 (4)
Supermarkets (%)
Class
Often
Sometimes
Very seldom
Capitalist
76.0
12.0
12.0
New middle class
59.8
35.5
Old middle class
44.4
Marginal middle
(259)
class
(n)
100.0 (124)
100.0 (62) 100.0 (50) 100.0
(520)
The Portrayal of the Malaysian Middle Classes
Table 15b
I
I
333
Patronizing Boutiques and Sales Any shop offering cheap sales (%)
Class
Total
Often
Sometimes
Very seldom
Never
(N)
Capitalist
20.0
68.0
8.0
4.0
100.0 (25)
New middle
47.9
43.6
6.2
2.3
100.0
Old middle class
41.1
44.4
12.1
2.4
100.0
Marginal middle class
56.5
38.7
3.2
1.6
100.0
Working class
56.0
32.0
10.0
2.0
100.0
Total
46.7 (243)
43.3
7.7
(225)
(40)
2.3 (12)
(50) 100.0 (520)
class
(259)
(124)
(n)
(62)
Source: Fieldwork, 1996.
VIII
Middle Class Family and Middle Class Reproduction
The middle class family tends to be a symmetrical family, with decision-making being shared between the spouses, and even among die whole family. In this study, it is found that about four-fifths of respondents discuss with the spouses, and in some cases, even include the whole family when it comes to making decisions on major issues,
such buying a house or expensive household items, children's education, and so on. When it comes to buying food and other items, the husband tends to leave it to the wife to decide, though among 50% of the respondents, decision-making involves both of the couple and in some cases the children as well. However, the study shows that this practice is not exclusive to the 'new' middle class, since other classes also do the same. Nevertheless, it should be noted that though a democratisation tendency exists, power is still much weighted in favour of the husband. This is so especially when it comes to deciding on major things (such as buying houses and other expensive items), partly because of cultural values and traditions that consider the male to be the 'breadwinner.'
~al
Q
334 `I |
I
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Among the respondents, 53% of their fathers and 75% of their mothers were still alive at the time of the study. Whilst about one-third of the parents live with their spouses, the rest stay either with respondents or with their siblings. This is true for all classes, although among capitalist class respondents the percentage of parents living with their spouses is distinctively higher (44%) Regarding the ideal living arrangements for the elderly, a quarter of the respondents prefer them to live on their own but close to their married children, whilst about one-fifth leave it to the elderly to decide for themselves. However, the majority (55%) prefer that the elderly stay with their children, and none of the respondents want the elderly to live in old age homes. This view seems to be independent of class. Nevertheless, a larger proportion of the 'new' middle class and the capitalist class respondents prefer a living arrangement whereby the elderly parents live on their own, but close to their married children. This arrangement is better sLulted to the wishes of the parents, who feel that they can maintain their independence, but at the same time, they can call upon their children, or be visited by the latter regularly. Whilst members of the 'new' middle class try to reproduce themselves by giving better quality education to their children, the lower classes try to use education as a means for their children to achieve social mobility. That is why parents with school-age children make special efforts to send the latter to tuition classes outside of school hours. In the study, 63.4% of all respondents with school-age children send their children to extra curricular lessons for tuition, the highest being among the capitalist class (74%) and the old middle class (71 %). They give special importance to English language and computer lessons, with 69% sending their children
to English classes tuition and another 60% to computer lessons (see Table
16). This seems to apply to respondents from all classes. The only difference is for art classes (music, painting and dancing), in which children from the capitalist and the 'new' middle classes participate more
than children from other classes. For example, among capitalist class respondents, 79% send their children to art classes, followed by respondents from the 'new' middle class (64%) Among the 'old' middle class, the percentage is much lower (57%), and lower still among the marginal middle class (48%) and working class (46%).
The Portrayal of the Malaysian Middle Classes
Table 16
Class
I
K
335
'1
Tuition in Art and Other Lessons for Children Art hjjtign (%)
English language tuition (%)
Computer lessons (%)
Total (N)
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Capitalist class
36.6
68.4
21.0
79.0
21.0
79.0
100.0
New middle
48.3
51.7
34.7
65.7
36.1
63.9
100.0
62.4
37.6
23,5
76.5
43.5
56.5
(147) 100.0
Marginal
54.8
2.7
35.5
64.5
51.6
48.4
(85) 100.0
middle class Working class
54.2
45.8
33.3
66.7
54.2
45.8
52.3
47.7 (146)
30.7
69.3
40.2
59.8
100.0 (24) 100.0
(94)
(212)
(123)
(183)
(306)
(19)
class Old mjcidle
class
Total
(N)
(31)
(160)
Source: Fieldwork, 1996.
The study also shows that respondents from all classes do not discriminate among their male and female children in education. It is found that about 78% of the respondents with school-age children (sons and daughters) want the latter to achieve university or other tertiary education (see Table 17). However, there is some class effect on their educational aspirations for their children. Among the capitalist class
respondents, 87% want their school-age children to gain entry into the university or other tertiary institution (many want them to go abroad), followed closely by respondents from the 'new' middle class (86%), and the marginal middle class (80%), Respondents from the 'old' middle class and the working class have somewhat lesser aspirations for their children compared to respondents from the other Mree classes. Among the 'old' middle class respondents, 67% want their school-zoing children to reach tertiary level, whilst among working class respondents, the number is 65%. Despite the lower percentage among the 'old' middle class and working class respondents, it still demonstrates that the majority among the lower classes also want their children to achieve social mobility and
enter the 'new' middle class.
336
Table 17
I Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Respondents' Aspirations for Minimum Educational Level to be Attained by their Children Minimum level of education for sons (%)
Class Capitalist
class New middle
Secondary school 8.7'
-
Pre-univj a level/ STFM
Vocational/
Other
technical
tertiary
4-3
17.4
69.6
University
middle class Working class Total (N)
Table 17a
(23) 100.0 (188) 100.0 (103)
4.3
14.9
70.7
20.4
12.6
3.9
63.1
12.5
5.0
10.0
70.0
100.0
20.0
15.0
57.5
(40) 100.0
13.9
7.4
0.5
10.9
(55)
(29)
(2)
(43)
67.3 (265)
100-0 (394)
class Marginal
100.0
10.1
class
Old middle
Total (N)
2.5
(40)
Respondents' Aspirations for Minimum Educational Level to be Attained by their Children Minimum level of education for daughters (%)
Class
Secondary
school
Capitalist
Pre-univj a level/ STPM
Vocational/ technical
Other
tertiary
University
Total (N)
4_3
17.4
69.6
100.0
0.5
14.4
69.1
100.0
13.6
4.9
62.1
12.5
5.0
10.0
72.5
22.5
15.0
5.0
57.5
(40) 100.0 (40)
66.5 (262)
100.0 (394)
8.7
class New middle
11.6
4.3
class Old middle
19.5
Marginal
middle class Working
(23)
class
class Total
14.7
7.6
0.5
10.7
(N)
(58)
(30)
(2)
(42)
Source: Fieldwork, 1996.
(188) 100.0 (103) 100.0
'
The Port-rayal of the Malaysian Middle Classes
I
I 38:7 l~
IX. Conclusion This chapter has argued that the middle class in Malaysia is a new class historically, which emerged and expanded through the process of rapid transformations during the last thirty plus years, and that it is still in the process of formation. The chapter has also pointed out the heterogeneous nature of the middle class, which is so much so that it would be more appropriate to speak of it in the plural -- middle classes -- with the 'new'
middle class being its major faction. The study also shows that the middle class family tends to be quite symmetrical; its members also maintain close relations with their parents, and they aspire to ensure that their children reproduce their class position. Just like in East Asia, the Malaysian 'new' middle class is a first
generation middle class that is preoccupied with the acquisition of material affluence. However, being a new class, it has not yet developed a clearly distinct lifestyle and status consciousness to make it stand apart and bounded from the other middle class factions. However, it should be noted that since the study was conducted in 1996, i.e. prior to the
financial turmoil in Malaysia and in other parts of Asia that began in nid-1997 Uomo, 1998) this chapter is not in a position to discuss the impact of the crisis upon the consumption patterns and lifestyles of members of the 'new' middle class. Nevertheless, since their consumption and lifestyles are very much supported by well-developed hire-purchase systems managed by banks and finance companies, it can be surmised that the financial crisis which resulted in high interest rates (an increase from about 8% before the crisis to 16% a year later), a tight credit squeeze, and a lack of liquidity in the financial system has
--
--
reduced the effective purchasing power of the Malaysian middle class. Those with outstanding loans to service will have to pay higher interest rates, whilst those intending to acquire housing, vehicle and other loans will have difficulties in securing them. All these factors have slowed both public and private consumption. In fact, according to official figures, private consumption in Malaysia is expected to contract by 2% in 1998 (National EcOnomic Action Plan, 1998). Nevertheless, the impact of the crisis on the consumption patterns and lifestyles of the middle class should be the subject of another study.
I
I
338
U
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Note 1. According to the 1991 census, urban areas are gazetted areas with their adjoining built-up areas which have a combined population of 10,000 or more. Built-up areas are defined as areas contiguous to a gazetted area, have at least 60% of their population (aged 10 or above) engaged in non-agricultural activities and at least 30% of their housing units have modern toilet facilities (Malaysia, 1996: 153). 2. The occupational definition used here is only for purposes of making estimates of the relative sizes of the various occupational groups in the work force. These occupational groups should not be taken as classes, but only as indicators for making class estimates. Some writers (e.g. Crouch, 1994) take only the first four occupational categories listed in the census - professional and technical, administrative and managerial; clerical; and sales when they refer to middle class occupations. Others (e.g. Johan Saravanamuttu, 1989; Abdul Rah ran, 1995), besides taking those four in their estimates, also include about half of the work force in the services category. The first two categories give an estimate of the 'new' middle class, whilst the other three give an estimate of the marginal or lower middle class. 3. To have a sense of comparison between Malaysia and Singapore, the employers' category in Singapore made up 1.9% of the work force in 1945, 3.9% in 1980 and 5.9% in 1993. This is a much bigger percentage than the employers' category in Malaysia, which stood at 3.1% in 1991. Similarly, the professional and technical, as well as the administrative and managerial categories (taken as proxies for the 'new' middle class) in Singapore have expanded from 11% in 1970 to
-
18% in 1980 and 29.5%
al
1992 (Yun, 1997: 79-118), which is a far
bigger percentage than its counterpart in Malaysia, which registered 13% of the work force in 1995. 4. The technical team which conducted the Kiang Valley survey was headed by Associate Professor Tan Poo Chang from the Faculty of Economics, University of Malaya, whilst Professor Jomo KS- from the same faculty acted as advisor to the team. 5. The exchange rate at the time of the survey in April 1996 was US$1.00 equivalent to RM2.50. After the Asian financial crisis, the value of the Malaysian ringgit fell sharply to US$1.00 to RM4.20 (July 1998). 6. However, all these indicators should be examined together as a
composite, for if taken separately, they will give a different picture.
The Portrayal of the Malaysian Middle Classes
I
339
For example, house- ownership status alone will not be able to reveal the differences between the classes.
References Abdul Rah ran, E. 1995. Malaysian middle classes: some preliminary observations. jurrzal antropologi dan sosiologi, 22: 31-54. . 1996. Social transformation, the state and the middle classes in post-independence Malaysia. Southeast Asian studies, 34(3): 56-79. . 1997. Malaysian middle class studies: a brief overview. Paper presented at The first international Malaysian studies conference organised by Malaysian Social Science Association, University of Malaya, 11-13 August. The paper has been accepted for publication. . Forthcoming. perindustrian, peranan pemerintah dan pembentukan keas menengah Ilndustrialjzation, the role of the state, and the formation of the middle class]. In Abdul Rah ran Embong (Ed.), Negara, pasaran dan modenisasi Di Malaysia: proses, is dan halo tuju be abad 21 [State, market, and modernization in Malaysia: processes, issues, and directions into the 21st century]. Bangi: UKM Publishers. Beyer, P. 1994. Religion and globalization.. London: Sage Publications. Brookfield, H. (Ed.). 1994. Transformation with industrialization in Peninsular Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. Chang, T. P., Thao, N. S. Abdul Rah ran, E., Pens, T. N., Mohd Yunos, ]. & Leng., C. G. 1996. A survey of the middle class in the Klang Valley, Malaysia. Report submitted to Program for Southeast Asian Area Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan-
Crouch, H. 1994. Industrialization and political change. In H. Brookfield
(Ed.), Transformation with industrialization in Peninsular Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. . 1996. Government and society in Malaysia. St. Leonard, NSW: Allen &: Unwire. Goldthorpe,
J. 1980. Social
mobility and class structure in modern Bnfain.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
. 1982. On
the service class, its formation & future. In A. Giddens &
G. Mackenzie (Eds.), Classes and the division of labour' essays in h o n o r Ilea Neustadt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
of
I-Isiao, H. H. M. (Ed.). 1993. Discover! of the middle classes in East Asia.
Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica.
f
>
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I Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
. 1999. East Asian middle classes in comparative perspective. Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Silica. Hsiao, H. H. M. & So, Alvin. 1999. The making of the East Asian middle classes the five propositions. In H. H. M. Hsiao (Ed.), East Asian middle classes in comparative perspective, pp. 3-49. Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Silica. Jorno, K. S. 1988. A question of class: capital, the state, and uneven development in Malaya. New York: Monthly Review Press. . 1998. Tigers in trouble: financial governance, liberalisation, and crises in East Asia. London & New York: Zed Books Ltd. Kahn, J. 1991. Constructing culture: toward an anthropology of the middle classes in Southeast Asia. Asian studies review, 15(2), November: 50-57. . 1996. The middle class as a field of ethnological study. In M. lkmal Said & Zahid Emby (Eds.), Critical Perspectives: Essays in Hof our of Syed Hus i f Ali. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Social Science Association. Lockwood, D. 1995. Introduction: marking out the middle class. In T. Butler & M. Savage (Eds.), Social change and the middle classes. London: UCL Press Ltd. Malaysia. 1971. Second Malaysia plan 1971-1975. Kuala Lumpur: Government Printing Department. . 1995. Population and housing census 1991. Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics . 1996. Seventh Malaysia plan, 1996-2000. Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Nasional Ber fad.
_
_
National Economic Action Council. 1998- National economic recovery plan.
Kuala Lumpur: National Economic Action Council, Prime Minister's
Department. Puthucheary, J. J. 1960. Ownership and control of the Malayan economy. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press. Robertson, R. 1992. Globalization: social theory and global culture. London: Sage Publications.
Robison, R. & Goodman, D. S. G., (Eds.). 1996. The new rich in Asia: mobile phones, McDonalds and middle-class revolution. London Sr New York:
Routledge.
Rodan, G., Hewison, K. & Robison R. (Eds.). 1997. The political economy of Southeast Asia. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. Vidiclt, A. ]. (Ed.). 1995. The new middle classes: life-styles, status claims and political orientations. London: Macmillan.
The Portrayal of the Malaysian Middle Classes
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H
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l
Waters, M. 1995. GlobalizuhOn. London: Routledge. Yun, A. H. 1997. Industrial restructuring and the reconstitution of class relations in Singapore. Capital 6' class, 62: 79-118.
8
Middle Class Politics, Democracy and Civil Society in Malaysia Abdul Rah ran Embong
I. Introduction The problem of middle class politics, and the role of the middle class in championing democracy and civil society, has attracted the attention of many scholars who study the middle class in the West, as well as in Asia (Huntington, 1991; Hsiao, 1993; Vidich, 1995; Robison & Goodman, 1996; Cox, 1997). In Asia, civil society is just emerging. As argued by Cox, capitalist development in Asia has generated a class basis for the development of a civil society that is weaker than that of Europe in the face of state and corporate authoritarianism, but which has nevertheless made some significant progress in recent years (Cox, 1997: 28). The middle class and the working class are considered to be the main social forces involved in this emergent civil society. However, Cox opinions that Asia provides a mixed picture of authentic and passive structural change in societies. In addition to the negative effects on the growth of democracy and civil society caused by the excessive consumerism and individualism indulged in by members of the 'new' middle class (Robison & Goodman, 1996), in some countries, such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, it has been argued that authoritarianism has
blocked the democratization movement, although many local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) exist in these countries (Cox, 1997: 26). Scholars researching and writing on the emerging civil society in Asia draw attention to the growth of what is called the non-profit sector, and the role of the middle class in leading the non-profit organizations, or NGOs (Yamamoto, 1995). They argue that the emergence of a sizable urban middle class serves to provide leadership for the non-profit sector, which is critical to the emergence of private non-profit organizations. In
344
'I
II
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Indonesia, for example, "NGOs have been able to reflect on and articulate more general concerns for the environment, human rights and democratization now emerging most obviously, but by no means exclusively, among the middle class" (Yamamoto, 1995: 11). As summed up by Huntington, the "Third wave movement for democratization were not led by landlords, peasants, or (apart from Poland) industrial workers. In virtually every country the most active supporters of democratization came from the urban middle class" (Huntington, 1991: 67) . The preceding arguments exude a kind of "development optimism" that the middle class has an historical role to play in Me democratization process and in expanding civil society in Asian countries, as the latter embark further along the road of industrialization and modernization! This "democratization thesis" -- which posits the liberal democratic notion of the middle class as a champion of democracy, an agent for democratic transformation, and an advocate of civil society - is based in part on Western experience, and in part on the political struggles waged
by the organized sections of the middle class in some non-Western post-colonial societies . In Chapter 7 of this volume, the author has portrayed the emergence and growth of the Malaysian middle class in historical terms, and discussed its economic basis as well as its lifestyle and consumerism. In
this chapter, the author attempts to complement Chapter 7 by discussing the "democratization thesis" in the context of Malaysia, focusing on the non-material aspects of the middle class, namely its role in Malaysian politics and civil society. Because of the importance of ethnicity and religion in Malaysian politics (Brown, 1994; Shamsul, 1994; Crouch, 1996),
the latter part of the chapter discusses these two issues in relation to
middle class politics and the growth of civil society in Malaysia.
II. Participation in Public Associations, Political Parties, and in the Electoral Proeess In a study of the political role of the middle class in Malaysia conducted in the late 1980s, Saravanamuttu (1989) argues that the Malaysian middle class is politically conscious, participates in movements championing democracy, and has emerged as a force to be reckoned with in national
politics,
offering
resistance
to
the
institutionalization
of
state
authoritarianism. He foresees that the middle class will continue to play
its role in attempting to expand its terrain of control and activity within
Middle Class Politics, Democracy and Civil Society in Malaysia l
(
345
1
civil society, despite various setbacks effected by the authoritarian state in Malaysia. However, his sample of 468 respondents consisted of the organized members of the middle class, namely leading elements in charge of various NGOs. In fact, 78% of the respondents were top leaders of these organizations, serving as presidents/ chairmen, deputy presidents/ deputy chairmen, vice-presidents/vice-chairmen, and secretary-generals. The findings, therefore, indicate an active involvement of the middle class in politics, and in espousing democratic ideals. Saravanamuttu's study supports strongly the democratization thesis in the context of Malaysia. However, whilst the above findings are tenable if we confine ourselves to the organized or the leading elements of the middle class, a rather different picture would invariably emerge if the sample is taken from more varied segments of the heterogeneous middle class(es), as was
done in the Klang Valley study conducted by the author. (See Chapter 7 of this volume for a discussion of the nature of the sample in this study. For more details on the sample, see Tan Poo Chang, et al. 1996). Though a proportion of the sample in the Klang Valley study also consists of a small number of the organized members of the middle class, the rest are not. Nevertheless, a heterogeneous sample such as this is also important since it helps to give another picture of the role of the middle class in politics and democratization, which is not captured if the sample were to comprise only the organized members of the middle class. To have an idea of the role of the middle class in politics and how far the middle class has entered the public domain on issues of public and national interest, the Klara valley study tries to assess both the views and perceptions of the respondents about politics and public affairs as well as their actual involvement in political parties and public interest associations, including religious organizations. The study differentiates between the level of politicization and actual political involvement -- the former refers to the state of political awareness, interest and concern respondents show toward public and national affairs, whilst the latter refers to membership and actual praxis of the respondents in organized movements. For analytical purposes, the organized movements are divided into three - public interest associations, political parties, and religious movements.
346 .
1.
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Public Interest Associations
Public interest associations are generally those associations that cater to specific groups and champion specific issues affecting the public. They as NGOs, are often referred mug and" sir leadership is target tltough. not emerging civil societ cant is that exclusively drawn from the middle class. What is si some NGOs are also writers, the importaggqg can provide indicati (Giddens 158). In this study, three such NGOs are singled out, consumer associations, environmental organizations, and residents' associations. (For analytical convenience, religious organizations, though part of NGOs, are treated separately in the subsequent section). Though these organizations are often identified as championing the interests of the middle class and are middle-class dominated since m e n . educated and are regarded to have better leadership abilityE it members of the working class -- t h , however, are not exclusively include>eople from -the middle-class in composition, for they working class. Consumer associations § >»* w
--
1 'I
-.
are part of national social movements and the issues they fight for involve demands for changes ,..,_;_' . Tables 1, 2 and 3 show the respondents' participation in consumer associations, environmental organizations and in residents' associations. _ _ . _ .
Of the three, involvement and participation in residents' associations is highest, with almost one-third (31.3%) of al] respondents involved,
followed rather far behind by participation in environmental organizations (17.3%) and in consumer associations (16%). When examined by class, it is found that respondents from the marginal middle class are more active than those from other classes, including the 'new' middle class, in both consumer and environmental movements, though in residents' associations, the marginal middle class respondents came
second after respondents from the old middle class? Respondents from the 'new' middle class are somewhat behind the marginal middle class. For example, in consumer organizations, more than a quarter (25.8%) of the marginal middle class respondents are involved as members or supporters, whilst the 'new' middle class respondents come second, with
15.1% participation, followed in order of decreasing significance by
Middle Class Politics, Democracy and Civil Society in Malaysia |
(347
Y
respondents from the working class (14%), 'old' middle class (12.9%), and capitalist class (8%) (see Table 1). Table 1
Involvement in Consumer Associations
Class
Very active
Capitalist class New middle
Consumer movement (%) Supporter/ Aware but not member 8.0
involved 88.0
Total Unaware
4.0
14.3
80-3
4.6
1.6
12.9
80.6
4.8
100 (124)
25.8
64.5
9.7
14.0
82.0
2.0
15.0
79.0 (411)
5.0 (26)
100 (62) 100 (50) 100
Marginal middle class
Working class
100 (25) 100 (259)
0.8
class
Old middle class
(N)
2.0
Total (N)
(78)
(520)
Source: Fieldwork, 1996.
Almost the same picture is obtained when we examine the participation of respondents in environmental organizations. Respondents from the marginal middle class are most active (19.4%), followed by those from the 'new' middle class (18.9%), whilst among respondents from the other three classes, their participation is around 12% for each category. (see Table 2) As indicated earlier, the participation of respondents from all classes in residents' associations is much higher, with 31.3% of the total sample involved in them either as 'very active' members, or at least as ordinary members or supporters. However, by class, respondents from the 'old' middle class are most active, as shown by the fact that 43% of them are revolved in these associations. Respondents from the marginal middle class are also quite active, with over one-third (35.5%) involved, followed in descending order by respondents from the working class (30%), the 'new' middle class (28%) and the capitalist class (28%) (see Table 3).
1 348
\|
1
J
Table 2
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Involvement in Environmental Organizations Environmental movement (%)
Class
Very
Supporter/
Aware but not
active
member
involved
Capitalist class New middle
0.8
Unaware
12.0
84.0
4.0
100 (25)
18.9
75.7
4.6
100 (259)
12.9
78.2
8.9
100 (124) 100 (62)
class Old nliddle class
Total (N)
Marginal middle class
1.6
19.4
72.6
6.5
Working class
2.0
12.0
76.0
10.0
100
6.3
(50) 100
(33)
(520)
Total
0.8 (4)
(N)
16.5 (86)
76.3 (397)
Source: Fieldwork, 1996.
Table 3
Involvement in Residents' Associations
Class
Very active
Capitalist class New middle
Residents' association {%) Aware but not Supporter/ involved member 28.0
56.0
Unaware 16.0
100
(25) 100
4.2
23.9
58.3
13.5
4.0
33.1
52.4
10.5
class Old middle
(259)
middle class Working class
100 [124)
class
Marginal
Total (N)
11.3
24.2
53.2
11.3
100 (62) 100
4.0
26.0
66.0
4.0
4.8 (25)
26.5 (138)
56.9 (296)
11.7
(50)
Total (N)
Source: Fieldwork, 1996.
(61)
100 (520)
Middle Class Folitics, Democracy and Civil Society in Malaysia
I
(
349 ,I
These findings indicate that a portion of the members of all classes, including the 'new' middle class, are being drawn into activities in the public domain and are organizing themselves in public interest organizations. This is a positive development for the enlarging of the public space, which is necessary for the growth of civil society. However, the difference in the participation rate in residents associations and in consumer and environmental movements needs some explanation. Whilst it is true that residents' associations have a longer history in Malaysia than consumer and environmental movements, and that the former are local bodies which unite residents in a particular locality around issues of immediate concerns for the welfare of the neighbourhood, these are only part of the explanation. A more compelling reason is Me nature of the cause championed by the two other groups, which though it ostensibly concerns consumer rights and the environment, is essentially political in nature. At times, these groups can be confrontational with the powers-that-be. Consumer movements and environmental groups in Malaysia (such as Consumer Association of of Malaysia Consumer Associations, and Penang, Federation Environmental Protection Society of Malaysia) have been known to be vocal and critical of Malaysian government policies on consumer affairs and on environmental management (Saliha, 1998). This may explain why many elements of the middle class, especially the 'new' middle class, whose political views are oriented more toward maintaining security, stability and growth than exercising citizens' rights in determining the a f f a i r s of society and political freedom (see discussion below), may shy away from participation in such NGOs. The fact that certain NGOs have
often been attacked by many Government leaders, who accuse them of peddling "the Western agenda," has also made the public nervous about joining the NGOs, and even suspicious of then.
2.
Participation in Political Parties and the Electoral Process
Compared to involvement in public interest associations
(with the
exception of residents' associations), involvement in political parties is
higher among all respondents. As shown in Table 4, almost a quarter (23.4%) of all respondents are involved in political parties as members and/ or supporters. Although the percentage is lower than that for involvement in residents' associations, political parties have definitely
made their presence felt, as evidenced by the fact that all respondents are
I 350
\
I
I
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
aware of them, whilst for residents' associations, some 12% are unaware of their existence (see Table 4). This is not surprising, since political
parties are national institutions involved in the business of power and power struggles, and are active especially during elections. Table 4
Involvement in Political Parties Political party (% )
Class
Very
Capitalist class
active 4.0
Supporter/ Mmember 20.0
Aware but not involved 76.0
New middle
1.5
18.1
80.3
class Old middle
2.4
23.4
74.2
3.2
33.9
62.9
class
Marginal middle class
Working class Total
(N)
2.0
18.0
80.2
2.1
21.3 (111)
(398)
(11)
76.6
Total Unaware
ac.
(n) 100 (25) 100 (259) 100 (124) 100
(62) 100 (50) 100 (520)
Source: Fieldwork, 1996.
The percentage of involvement in political parties varies by class, with respondents from the marginal middle class again being the most active, ahead of respondents from the 'new' middle class and the other three classes* Among the former, 37.1%, or more than one-in-three of the respondents are members of political parties, whilst among respondents
of the 'new' middle class, the percentage is 19.6%, or one-in-five, which is the lowest compared to other classes. This score is next only to
respondents from the working class, which is also one-in-five, whilst among respondents from other classes, it is about one-in-four. Based on the sample, the marginal middle class constitutes the major class basis of political parties and public interest associations in the Klang Valley, whilst the 'new' middle class is behind the marginal middle class in terms of its organized involvement.
Middle Class Politics, Democracy and Civil Society in Malaysia |
3.51
)
It is important to note the consistency of marginal middle class participation in all the organizations, including political parties. Such consistency, however, is not found among respondents from the 'new' middle class; though they come out second in terms of participation in NGOs (especially in environmental movements), they come out last in terms of political party membership. lt is also interesting that the same inconsistency is also shared by respondents from the working class. When we examine the participation of respondents from all classes in
the electoral process, the 'new' middle class again comes out last or almost last, whilst the marginal middle class is ahead of all the other classes. Participation in the electoral process involves not only registering
themselves as voters and exercising their voting rights, but also in campaigning for election candidates, giving donations to the campaign funds of the latter, and so on. As shown above, though party membership may not be widespread among all classes, including the 'new' middle class, it does not mean that the level of electoral mobilization and political interest among them is low. In terms of political mobilization, it is clear that voter registration and voting in elections are very high among all respondents, with 90°/1 or more among them being involved. When examined in terms of class, respondents from the marginal middle class and the 'old' middle class seem to be the most active, while those from the 'new' middle class come out last among all the respondents, though percentage wise they are not far behind the marginal middle class (see Table 5). Among the marginal middle class respondents, 92% were registered voters, and 98% of those registered came out to vote in the 1995 general election. This is followed by respondents from the 'old' middle class, among whom 92.7% were
registered voters, 95% of whom exercised their voting rights. Among the 'new' middle class respond ents, 91.5% were registered voters, and out of those, 88% came out to vote. Among respondents from the working class, voter registration is also high (92%), and out of those 93.5% voted in the 1995 election. However, among the capitalist class respondents, although all of them were registered voters, their voting turnout was almost the same as the 'new' middle class, i.e. only 88%, the lowest turnout
compared to respondents from all other classes under study.
352
Table 5
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Participation in Electoral Politics
Class
Are you a registered voter?
No
Capitalist class
New middle
8.5
Total
(%)
Yes 100.0
100
91.5
(25) 100
class
Old middle
11.8
88.2
5.2
94.8
(259)
7.3
92.7
class
8.1
Working class
8.0
91.9
100
1.8
100
(57) 100 (46)
100
6.5
93.5
92.3 (480)
(50) 100 (520)
8.5 (41)
91.5 (439)
Did you encourage
Did you campai1 n
Did you donate
friends to vote for
for certain
money to
certain candidates in candidates in 1995
political
Capitalist
1995 election? (%) No Yes 72.0 28.0
candidates? (%) No Yes 76.0 24.0
(%) Yes 16.0
class 77.2
22.8
91.9
8.1
95.0
5.0
class 21.0
79.0
Marginal
69.4
30.6
82.3
17.7
93_5
6.5
74.0
26.0
90.0
10.0
98.0
2.0
76.2 (396)
23.8 (124)
89.2 (464)
10.8 (56)
92.5 (481)
7.5 (39)
87.9
12.1
87.9
12.1
100 (25) 100
100 (124)
middle class
Total (N)
(n)
(259)
Old middle class
Working class
100
(480)
Total
Class
New middle
100
98.2
92.0
election? No 84.0
100 (25) 100
(115)
(62)
7.7 (40)
Total (n)
(237)
100 (124)
Marginal middle class
Total (N)
(N)
Did you vote in last election (1995)? (% ) No Yes 12.0 88.0
100
(62) 100 (50) 100 (520)
Souree° Fieldwork, 1996.
When it comes to encouraging friends to vote for certain candidates, and campaigning for them, again the marginal middle class is ahead of all other classes, whilst the 'new' middle class comes out last. Respondents from the marginal middle class only fall behind when it
Middle Class Politics, Democracy and Civil Society in Malaysia |
I 353 al
comes to giving donations to campaign funds of election candidates; in this exercise, respondents from the capitalist class take the lead, with about one-in-four making such donations. This is to be expected, given the wealth of the capitalist class and the gains to be obtained through political connections. (For a discussion of the relationship between business and politics in Malaysia, see Gomez, 1994, Gomez and Jomo, 1997). But even here, the 'new' middle class is sell behind the marginal middle class when it comes to making donations, despite being financially better off than the latter.
III. Political Interest and Concern in Public Affairs: Contestation between Demands for Development and Social Order, and for Democracy Whilst both voter registration and electoral voting are high among all classes, interest in and concern with public affairs are also quite high. in fact, it can be said that Malaysian society is politicized in terms of everyday politics, whereby members of all classes take an interest in politics and have definite views and attitudes regarding various issues affecting the public and the nation. This can be gauged from the responses they expressed to a set of statements on various political issues. As shown in Table 6, which portrays the views of respondents on
democracy, social order and development, respondents from all classes express a desire for democracy and the enlarging of civil society.
However, there is an underlying contestation and tension between the demand for development and social order on the one hand, and the demand for democracy and greater space for citizens' views and
participation on the other. They want development and social order, but at the same time, they also want democracy and more public space. Thus, whilst they want the government to do a good job in national development, the majority (52.1%) stress that the government cannot disregard democracy (see Table 6, statement A). They want the government to take into account public opinion, and they recognize the importance of NGOs in improving governance. For example, 60% disagree that the government can do what it wants and need not be bothered by public opinion (see Table 6, statement B); and 66% want the government to take a conciliatory approach by listening more to NGOs on various issues affecting the public (see Table 6, statement C). Implicit
in their view is the idea of representative governance, i.e. whilst the
J
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
government, through the electoral process,- is given the mandate to govern, such a mandate is contingent upon the mandate to represent the electorate. However, the respondents would not support democracy for its own sake, especially if it is at the expense of social order and stability. That is why they are divided on questions like freedom of expression (kg. freedom to voice criticism, and to publicly air views and opinions), as well as freedom for political organizations to carry out their activities irrespective of their e f f e c t on the social order. Thus, whilst about one third or less would agree with such freedom, an almost equal number would be opposed to it, with another one third remaining somewhat undecided (see Table 6, segments D, E & F). In fact, when prompted with the statement that "political organizations which might jeopardize the country's interests should be banned, whether or not they use violence," almost half (48.1%) agree with it, less than one-third (29.4%) are undecided, and only less than one-quarter (22.5%) oppose the statement. Also, when the respondents were asked to indicate their priorities regarding the most important thing to them as far as the country is concerned, 53% regard "maintaining law and order in the nation" as the most important issue, which should take precedence over the need to "give people more say in important decisions" (see Table In fact, their own perception of the political character of the Malaysian middle class is that the latter is more concerned with the country's economic growth than with championing political freedom (see Table 8). In terms of class, there is only a small difference between the political attitudes of respondents from the 'new' middle class when compared to
m.
those from other classes on the question of democracy, civil society and
development, although on certain issues, the 'new' middle class respondents tend to be more advanced in their views than the others. For example, on issues of democracy, 58.3% of respondents from the 'new' middle class would disagree if the government were to ride roughshod over democracy in the name of development, compared to 50% among the working class, 47% each for the 'old' middle class and the marginal middle class, and 36% among the capitalist class (see Table 6, statement A). On the role of NGOs, a sizable majority (67.2%) of respondents from the 'new' middle class want the government to pay more attention to their views on various issues affecting the public; a percentage second only to the capitalist class, among whom, 68% hold the same view, and much higher than that of the marginal middle class, of which 61.3%
Middle Class Politics, Democracy and Civil Society in Malaysia |
{
355
I
adhere to the same view (see Table 6, statement C). However, if a certain political organization were to jeopardize the country's interest, the majority (50%) of the 'new' middle class respondents would support the government's move to proscribe it, whilst another 26% would quite agree -- a view which is shared by respondents from the other classes as well.
When we examine the attitudes of the various classes concerning the issue of maintaining law and order, which is their top most priority for the nation, respondents from the 'new' middle class and the capitalist class score highest, with 56% each, followed by those from the marginal middle class (5I.6%), working class (50%), and the 'old' middle class (48.4%) (see Table 7). In short, respondents from all classes in particular the 'new' middle class, desire democracy and the enlarging of civil society, but on condition that it help promote social order and economic growth, and not contradict what they perceive as "national interests." Also, it is the respondents from the 'new' middle class and the capitalist
class, more than other classes in society, who are most security-oriented, as shown by the fact that they are the ones who score highest on the "law and order" priority. These findings suggest that a paradox exists in the attitudes of the middle class regarding democracy and authoritarianism. Whilst the
middle class supports democracy, it tolerates and is not averse to the institutionalization of state authoritarianism. The middle class views the latter, i.e. strong and effective government, which is often the
euphemism for authoritarianism, as necessary for national development and economic growth, provided some degree of democracy prevails in society.
(79)
15.2
(N)
50.0
Total
Working class 68.0
54.9
Marginal rid dl class
66.9
55.7
25.8
25.0
Old middle class
67.2
58.3
24.3
New middle class
68.0
Agree
64.0
Disagree
4.0
(HI) 6'IZ
(191)
929
cg00
(buzz)
0'z[
N
L`QZ
36.0
(451) V152
36.0
(we)
909
28.0
Agree
64.9 (342)
35.5
8.0
Disagree
(191)
Disagree
(51)
z'Qz
0'0z
0`6Z
agree
0`6
0`09
we
Agree
(N)
Total
(039) 001
0:r.»z
89?
21
Capitalistclass
'QF fol
0'9[
919
Quite
(C). The government should listen more to NGOs on various issues affecting the public (%)
"Q
t'f'J
(09) 00 I
(B). The central goverrllnen' knows what is best for the nation and should not be bothered by public opirdon (%)
of
n.
Z`8Z
9`8T.
9%
9'£l
government job 'ut national is not important &mocratic or not
a\
(z9) 001
of* Ni
N.
'3'T=Z
R1
ML I'Z9
go
aa181a
0`Z'E
MWC)
Q the
ODD
"E m
(1:51)
(Asa) 001
(sz)
of
39189
3>1€>
853
001
Respondents' Views on Issues of Democracy, SocialOrder and Development
x
SQQID
Table 6 356
L Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
40.0 25.5
33.1
40,0
20.0
30.7
36.0 33,8
20.0
35-0 (159)
Old middle class
Marginal middle class
Source: Fieldwork, 1996.
(215)
35.5
29.8
New middle class
Total (N)
34,7
(QW
Worldng class
20,0
or
I' IE
8`9'P
36.0
20.0
22.5
36.0
(117)
26.0
35.5
36.0
(z91)
mfs
6`0E
go
Capitalist class
Disagree
(THE
agree
Quite
(941) 9`E'8
Agree
L'gf7
(093)
0"F'T7
Disagree Disagree
Quite agree 44.0
Agree
(SQL)
0'0z
us
$62
0'9'f*
922
(580)
[THE
891-»
V119
Disagree
(E). Public opinion, regardless of whether or not it might cause social disorder, should not be restricted by the government From being publicized (%)
(D). Strong criticisms from the public about the government is not a good thing for social order (% )
(N)
Total
(0239) 001
(UQ)
001
L`0E
8'6Z
V61
(59)
001
[PE
LLP
(WL)
OUT.
602
o'1-117
Agree
(F), PoLitical organizations which might jeopardize the count1*y's interests should be banned, whether OI' not they use violence (36)
9915
we
Respondents' Views on Issues of Democracy, Social Order and Development (Continued)
we
Z`6F'
we
HZ
U99
S8189
ET615*
(602) 001
(Qz)
ODD
Ann() SSIBV
SSPK)
Table 6
Middle Class Politics, Democracy and Civil Society in Malaysia
357 1
1" 358 in
l
Table 7
Respondents' Views Regarding the Most Important Thing to Them
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Most important to me is Class
Maintaini
Give people
Fighting
Ensuring
Frogress
law & order in the nation
say important
rising prices
ordinary
more
people own house
society
fig
decisions
-
Capitalist class
56.0
12.0
New middle
56.0
11.2
10.4
Old middle
48.4
21.0
class Marginal
51.6
Working class
Total
4.0
humane
Total (N)
28.0
100.0
4.6
17.8
14.5
3.2
12.9
100.0 (259) 100.0 (124)
9.7
8.1
9.7
21.0
100.0
50.0
20.0
4.0
4.0
22.0
53.1
14.2
10.2
4.6
17.9
100.0 (50) 100.0 (520)
(25)
class
middle class
(62)
(N)
Source: Fieldwork, 1996
Table 8
Respondents' Perception Regarding Whether the Middle Class is More Concerned with Political Freedom than Economic Growth
Class Capitalist class
Ferception of respondents' that the middle class is more concerned with political freedom than economic growth Disagree Strongly Quite Strongly Agree disagree agree agree 12.0 24.0 16.0 -~ 48.0
Total
(n) 100.0 (25) 100.0
3.1
15.8
34.4
32.8
13.9
Old middle class
8.9
18.5
35.5
26.6
10.5
(259) 100.0 (124)
Marginal middle class Working class
6.5
19.4
30.6
30.6
12.9
100.0
10.0
14.0
30.0
26.0
20.0
100.0
5.4
16.7
33.3
31.2
13.5
(50) 100.0
New middle class
Total (N)
(62)
Source: Fieldwork, 7996.
(520)
Middle Class Politics, Democracy and Civil Society in Malaysia
I
"|
359
.I
IV. Class, Politics and Ethnicity Today, all societies in the world are affected in one way or another by the multi-layered process of globalization (Robertson, 1992; Beyer, 1994; Mittelman, 1996). The paradox of globalization is that whilst the global system undermines inherited, ascribed or constructed cultural and personal identities (through the homogenization process), it at the same time promotes the construction and revitalization of particular identities. This is done, according to some scholars, as a way of gaining control over systemic power (Beyer, 1994: 3). Two such particular cultural and personal identities that will be discussed in this chapter are ethnicity and religion, and their relationship to politics. Ethnicity is an important issue in Malaysia, and any study of class and politics has to take into account ethnicity. This is, so because historically the evolution of the class structure took place within an ethnic context in which different communities were affected differently and ethnic loyalties were often paramount (Rat ram, 1967, Abdul Rah ran, 1973-74, Hus if Ali, 1984). In fact, in post-war Malaysian political history there was a shift toward the ethnic institutionalization of class-based political movements (Brown, 1994: 220). That being the case, it is necessary to examine the middle class within edinic communities (Crouch, 1996: 192). The importance of ethnicity becomes very clear, especially when the question of politics, culture and religion is examined. In this section, we will examine briefly ethnic differences in politics and religion only,
leaving culture for a separate treatment due to space constraints. The importance respondents place on ethnicity can be gleaned from the
manner in which they perceive ethnic problems in relation to Malaysia's progress, class and ethnic differences, and the criteria they use for supporting candidates in elections. For example, respondents from all classes feel that for Malaysia to achieve a developed nation status by the year 2020, as envisioned in Prime Minister Mahathir's Vision 2020 (Mahathir, 1991), the two most important things Malaysia must realize are rapid economic growth and the ability to overcome ethnic problems. Also, the respondents, by and large, whilst agreeing that people of different classes often have conflicting interests, and that class differences are distinct in Malaysia, also tend to regard ethnic differences as very distinct. For example, when respondents were prompted with the statement that "class differences are very distinct" in Malaysia, only 49 %
f 360 I
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
agreed, 33% were unsure, and 8% disagreed. However, when posed with the statement that "ethnic differences are more distinct than class differences," a slightly higher percentage (52%) agreed, 33% are unsure, and 15% disagreed (see Table 9). By class, it is found that the majority of
the respondents from the capitalist class and the 'new' middle class regard ethnic differences as being more distinct than class differences, whilst respondents from the other classes are generally more divided on the issue. For example, whilst 64% of respondents from the capitalist class, and 58.3% of respondents from the 'new' middle class regard such differences as distinct, less than half of respondents from other classes have the same view, and almost an equal number are unsure about it. Also, when it comes to the choice of political candidates whom the respondents would support in elections, the ethnic factor is one of the three most important criteria respondents would consider, next to other crucial factors such as the candidates' commitment to fight for the benefit of society as a whole and to help solve the problems of the electorate. This suggests that among the respondents, ethnic consciousness is important, perhaps more so than class consciousness. This is not surprising since the major political parties in the ruling Barisan Nasional (National Front) Government (henceforth referred to as BN), such as the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) are all ethnic-based, with membership drawn from members of all classes within the same ethnic group, thus masking the class divisions within each ethnic community. Other parties whose membership is not officially based on ethnicity, such as the Purti Gerakan Rabat Malaysia (Malaysian People's Movement - Gerakan), which is a member of the ruling BN, and
the two major opposition parties -- the Democratic Action Fatty (DAP)
-
and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PMIP) are also ethnically based. The Gerakan and the DAP draw their membership largely from among Chinese, whilst the PMIP from among Malays. In fact, when fielding candidates for elections, the leadership of the various parties always take into consideration the ethnic factor of both the candidates and the constituencies in Which they would be contesting. . There is also a marked difference in the level of participation in NGOs and in political parties among the three ethnic groups. Given the fact that Malaysian political parties operate based on claims of ethnic representation, with the Malay party, UMNO, being most dominant, and
the specific characteristics of Malaysian history whereby politics and
Middle Class Politics, Democracy and Civil Society in Malaysia
I
1361)
public affairs, are in the main determined by active Malay participation and that the Malays regard their survival as being contingent upon their ability to control political power (Mahathir, 1970), it is not surprising that there is also a marked difference in actual involvement in social and political organizations by ethnic group. In the study, it is found that Malay respondents have a higher level of organizational involvement in political parties, residents' associations and, even more so, in religious
organizations. In terms of party politics, 35% of Malay respondents are members of political parties, compared to only 13% among Chinese respondents, and 22% among their Indian counterparts (see Table 10). In residents' associations, Malay respondents again have the highest percentage (47.5%), compared to 15-5% and 30.4% among Chinese and Indian respondents, respectively (see Table 11). Table 9
Respondents' Perception Regarding Class and Ethnic Differences in Malaysian Society Many different
Class differences are very distinct
classes exist in Class
Capitalist
class New middle class Old
Malaysia
Not
No
Yes
84.0
sure 4.0
28.0
9.3
68.0
22.8
9.7
66.1
24.2
No
Yes
12.0
Not
Ethnic djffelences are more distinct than class differences
Not
No
Yes
48.0
sure 24.0
12.0
64.0
24.0
100.0
17.0
48.6
34,4
14.3
58.3
27.4
100.0 (259)
16,1
50.0
33.9
15.3
43.5
41.1
100.0
sure
(25)
(124)
middle class
Marginal
Total (N)
16.1
66.1
17.7
19.4
53.2
27.4
19.4
40.3
40.3
n'Liddle
100.0 (62)
Class Working
l0.U
74.0
16.0
18.0
46.0
36.0
14.0
44.0
42.0
100.0
10.4
68.7
21.0
17.7
49.2
33.1
15.0
5.5
33.5
(50) 100.0 (520)
class
Total (N)
Source: Fieldwork, 1996.
(
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
I
Table 10
Involvement in Political Parties by Class and Ethnic Groups Malays (%)
Class
Very active
Capitalist class
New middle class
3.7
Old middle class Nlafgiflal middle class
Ordinary member/ supporter 33.3
Aware but not involved 66.7
Total
(N)
100
(9)
25.0
71.3
100 (108)
5.7
37.7
56.6
100
(53)
6.7
53.3
40.0
100
(30)
5.3
94.7
100
(19)
30.6
65.3
100
(219)
Working class
Total (N)
4.1
Class
Very active
Chinese
(%)
Member/ supporter 16.7
Aware but not
Total
(N)
involved
75.0
100
(12)
12.7
87.3
100
(110)
Old middle class
5.8
94.2
100
(52)
Marginal middle class Working class
16.7
83.3
100
(24)
19.0
81.0
100
(21)
12.3
87.2
100 (219)
Capitalist class
8.3
New middle class
Total (N)
0.5
Indians & others Class
Very active
(%}
Ordinary member/
Aware but not
Supporter
involved
Total (N)
100.0
100
(4)
New middle class
14.6
85.4
100
(41)
Old middle class
31.6
68.4
100
(19)
Marginal middle class
12.5
87_5
100
(8)
10.0
40.0
50.0
100
(10)
1.2
20.8
78.0
100
(82)
Capitalist class
Working class Tota1(N)
Source: Fieldwork, 1996.
Middle Class Politics, Democracy and Civil Society in Malaysia
Table 11
I
I
363
Involvement in Residents' Association by Class and Ethnic
Groups Malays ( % )
Class
Very active
Capitalist class 8.3
New middle class
Ordinary
member/ supporter
Aware but not involved
Unaware
Total
(N)
44.4
44.4
11.1
1[N0
(9)
36.1
51.9
3.7
100
(108)
Old middle class
7.5
47.2
39.6
5.7
100
(53)
Marginal middle
23.3
36.7
36.7
3.3
100
(30)
Worldng class
5.3
21.1
73.7
100
(19)
Total (N)
9.6
37.9
48.4
100
(219)
class
Class
Very
active
Chinese ( % ) Aware Member / but not supporter
1
involved 58.3
4.1
Total
(N)
Unaware 25.0
100
(12)
New middle class
0.9
12.7
64.5
21.8
100
(110)
Old middle class
1.9
17.3
61.5
19.2
100
(52)
8.3
70.8
20.8
100
(24)
23.8
71.4
4.8
100
(21)
14.6
64.8
19.6
16.7
Capitalist class
Marginal middle class
Working class
Total (N)
Class
0.9
Indians & others (%) Aware
Very
Member/
active
Supporter
25.0
Capitalist class New middle class
2.4
but not
58.5
Old middle class
36.8
63.2
Marginal middle class
25.0
62.5
Working class
Total
(N)
Unaware
involved 75.0
22.0
100 (219)
100
(4)
100
(41)
100
(19)
12.5
100
(8)
17.1
10.0
40.0
40.0
10.0
100
(10)
2.4
28.0
58.5
11.0
100
(82)
Total (N) Source: Fieldwork, 1996.
~! I
364
I
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes m Southeast Asia
However, when the degree of involvement in these organizations is examined by class within ethnic communities, the general finding that respondents from the marginal middle class are the most active is only applicable among Malays, whilst among Chinese and Indians, respondents from their working class (and not the marginal middle class) emerge as the most active. This is true in terms of the involvement in consumer, environmental and residents' organizations, and also in political parties. (And, as will be shown shortly, this finding is also generally true for religious organizations, except for the Chinese, where their 'new' middle class is the most active). For example, among Malay respondents, the participation of the marginal middle class in political parties is very high (60%), whilst among Chinese and Indian respondents, the participation of the marginal middle class is only 16.7% (Chinese) and 12.5% (Indians), which is very low compared to the participation of respondents from the working class, which is 19% among Chinese, and 50% among Indians (see Table 10). The lower level of involvement of the respondents from the 'new' middle class compared to the marginal middle class in NGOs and political parties, as well as in the electoral process, may be attributed to several factors. The general argument that the 'new' middle class are mainly higher grade white-collar employees respondents (administrators, professionals, managers, and executives), who are inundated with a host of career demands and time constraints, and whose lifestyles are greatly influenced by consumerism (see Chapter 7 of this volume, also Robison & Goodman, 1996; Loh Koch Wah, 1997), may help to explain their lower level of involvement compared to other classes. This is true for respondents among the 'new' middle class within
the three ethnic communities. However, in this study, no firm conclusions can be drawn regarding the apparent differences in the role
of the marginal middle class and the working class within the different ethnic groups, since the sample size for these two classes is relatively much smaller than that for the 'new' middle class. Thus, what is being offered here is orly tentative and exploratory in nature. Among the non-Malay communities, the fact that respondents from the working
class appear to be the most active may be seen from a historical perspective. Whilst among Malays the working class is of recent origin (this class expanded only after the implementation of the New Economic Policy [1971-1990] together with the Malay 'new' middle class), among
Chinese and Indians, the working class was relatively developed and
Middle Class Politics, Democracy and Civil Society in Malaysia |
365
advanced politically, being at the forefront especially of left-wing struggles through trade unions and political parties before Malaysia's independence in 1957 (Stenson, 1970). The Malay community, on the other hand, being historically a rural community (unlike the non-Malays, especially the Chinese), and the Malay working class being of recent origin, may explain its lower level of involvement in political activities compared to its counterpart among the Chinese and the Indians. However, the marginal middle class, especially Malay teachers and clerks, was very active in political struggles for independence, as well as in post-independence politics. In fact, the leadership of UMNO, especially at the local level, was in the hands of Malay teachers for many years until the 1980s, when their role was successively eroded by the emergence of professional and corporate figures from the private sector and the practice of "money politics" within the party. This factor may help explain the active participation of the Malay marginal middle class today, apart from the obvious fact that their economic position is relatively weak compared to the 'new' middle class. Their participation in political parties and/ or any other organized groups provides them with the psychological security in numbers to fight for their interests.
V. Class, Politics and Religion As in many other countries, rapid industrialization and modernization in the era of globalization have not diminished people's beliefs in religion and participation in religious movements and activities in Malaysia. Instead, religious beliefs and movements have been revitalized in both the industrializing and the industrial countries (Beyer, 1994)- In Malaysia,
the resurgence of religious movements, especially the Islamic resurgence of the 1970s and 1980s, has been the subject of study by many scholars. (Among recent studies, those by Jomo and Ahmad Shabery Cheek, 1992, and Sharifah Zaleha, 1997, stand out). Whilst it is true that religious resurgence should be studied in its own right (Jomo and Ahmad Shabery Cheek, 1992: 82), we have to recognize the significance of class and ethnicity, which underlie the resurgence, and the relationship between religion and politics, although of course religion is not reducible simply to these objective phenomena. In the present study, it is found that compared to social and political organizations, religious movements
seem to attract the highest number of respondents from various classes. Of the total sample, 45%/ are active members or supporters of such
366
\|
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
movements. By class, the most active seem to be the respondents from the marginal middle class, among whom more than half (55%) are involved, followed quite closely by those from the 'new' middle class (48%), the 'old' middle class (43%), the working class (34%), and the
capitalist class (28%) (see Table 12). Table 12
Involvement in Religious Organizations by Class Religious movement ( % )
Class
Very active
Capitalist class New middle class
Total
Supporter/ member
28.0
Aware but not involved
68.0
Unaware 4.0
100 (25) 100
11.6
35.9
49.4
3.1
Old middle class
8.1
34.7
54.8
2.4
Marginal middle class
9.7
45.2
41.9
3.2
Working class Total (N)
(N)
(259) 100 (124) 100
(62) 10.0
24.0
64.0
2.0
9.8
35.2
(51)
(183)
52.1 (271)
2.9 (75)
100 (50) 100 (520)
Source: Fieldwork, 1996.
This finding is reaffirmed when respondents' self-assessment of their religiosity is examined. As shown in Table 13, whilst the majority (54%) admit that they are 'moderately religious/ a small percentage (13.3%) regard themselves as 'very religious' When examined by class, again, the respondents from the marginal middle class are ahead of others, with 21% claiming to be "very religious," compared to respondents from the other classes who are quite far behind. In fact, when asked whether they regard religion as a hindrance to modernization and development, the majority (about two thirds) in all classes disagree, about one-quarter to one-third agree that it could hinder development to a certain extent, and only a very small percentage regard it as an obstacle (see Table 13). This finding is very important, for it shows that Malaysia's industrialization
Middle Class Politics, Democracy and Civil Society in Malaysia |
(
.
367
and modernization are accompanied by a reaffirmation of religious beliefs and practices, and that even the most educated and modernized class -- the 'new' middle class -- is not much different from the other classes in terms of religious faith and practices. It also shows that they are generally supportive of the modernist and tolerant Islam advocated by the UMNO leadership, namely by Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohammad (see Table 13). As already mentioned above, whilst by class some difference is perceived in terms of involvement in social and political movements and in terms of religiosity, there is nevertheless a marked difference when the
different ethnic groups are compared. For example, in terms of their involvement in religious movements and their self-assessment of religiosity, not only are more Malays and Indians religious, but they are also more actively involved in religious organizations than the Chinese. As shown in Table 14, whilst among Malay respondents, 61% are members of religious organizations (with 11% being "very active" in them), followed by 44% among Indian respondents (with 13.4% being "very active"), among the Chinese respondents, only 29% are members, with some 7% being "very active." When intra-ethnic inter-class comparisons are made, it is found that among Malays, the respondents from the marginal middle class appear .to be most active, with 87% involved in religious organizations, followed by the respondents from the 'old' middle class, with 64%, and the 'new' middle class, with 59% .
Among Chinese, on the other hand, respondents from the 'new' middle class appear to be most active, with more than one-third (36.4%) among them being involved in religious movements, whilst among Indians, it is the respondents from the working class who appear to be the most
actively involved in religious organizations.
(69)
13.3
Source:Fieldwork, 1996.
(NJ
Total
58.0
12,0
55.6
54.8
21.0
Old middle class
Marginal middle class Wurkxhg class
New middle class
48.0
4.0 48.0
along
]:'C]igiO1.15
33.6 (166)
30.0
30.7
Free Thinker
(3)
0.6
|»
(295)
is
Capitalist class
lustgo
Mod eratcly No
67.7
I
(ess)
l.IETI
VST?
WE
Very religious 36.0
extent
Onlyto a certain Yes
Is religion a hindrance to Modernization & development? (% )
I I
8`89
£09
L`1'8
Class
30.0
32.3
(n)
Total
:J
(oz)
I
of
(oz5)
r
0'z9
CN!1-4
(ZH) SZZ
I I
or
9`E
\JQ
DQ
00I
iv
6`Z9
Self-assessment of reli8iosity (96)
Respondents' Self-assessment of Religios ity and their View RegardingReligion and Modernization
wtf
(up) 00I
[N
(39) 00I
°Q
(WI)
m on
VAN
Q
00I
I
(693)
I
.we
E
00I
(QZ) 001
Table 13
I 368 Exploration of the Middle Classes in South east Asia
Middle Class Politics, Democracy and Civil Society in Malaysia |
Table 14
(369
Involvement In Religious Organizations by Class and Ethnic Groups Malays
Class
Very active
Capitalist class
Member/ supporter
(%) Aware but not
Total (n) Unaware
involved
55.6
44.4
39.8
0.9 1.9
100
(9)
100
(108)
New irdddle class
11.1
48.1
Old middle class
11.3
52.8
34.0
100
(53)
Marginal middle class
20.0
66.7
13.3
100
(30)
26.3
73.7
100
(19)
50.2
37.9
100
(219)
Working class Total
10.9
(N)
Chinese
Class
Very active
Old middle class
(%) Aware but not
Total
(n)
Unaware
involved
16.7
75.0
8.3
100
(12)
10.9
25.5
59.1
4.5
100
(110)
3.8
17.3
75.0
3.8
100
(52)
20.8
70.8
8.3
100
(24)
(27)
Capitalist la-Ss New middle class
Member/ supporter
1.0
Marginal middle class Working class
9.5
19.0
66.7
4.8
100
Total
7.3
21.9
65.7
5.0
100 (219)
(n)
Indians & others
Class
(% )
Aware but
Very
Member/
active
supporter
New middle class
14.6
31.7
48.8
Old middle class
10.5
31.6
not involved .
100
(4)
100
(47)
57.9
100
(19)
37.5
62.5
100
(8)
100
(10)
100
(82)
100.0
Capitalist class
Marginal middle class Working class
30.0
30.0
40.0
Total
13.4
30.5
53.6
(N)
Source: Fieldwork, 1996.
Total (N) Unaware
4.9
2.4
J
370
~}
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
1
Table 15
Self-Assessment of Religiosity by Class and Ethnic Groups Malays (%)
Class
Very
religious
Moderately religious 55.6
Total
(N)
33.3
100
(9)
100 (108)
just go
Free
along
thinker
Capitalist class
11.1
New middle class
13.0
74.1
13.0
Old middle class
17.0
75.5
7.5
100
(53)
Marginal middle
30.0
63.3
6.7
100
(30)
class Working class
10.5
78.9
10.5
100
(19)
Total (N)
16.0
72.6
11.4
100
(219)
Class
Very
Chinese religious Capitalist class
Moderately religious
(%)
Just go along
Free thinker
Total (N) 100
(12)
100
(110)
41.7
58,3
10.0
37.3
50.9
Old middle class
'7.'7
30.8
61.5
100
(52)
Marginal middle class
16.7
20.8
62.5
100
(24)
(21)
New middle class
1.8
Working class
4.8
33.3
61.9
100
Total (N)
9.1
33.8
56.2
100 (219)
Class
Very
Moderately
Just go
religious
religious
along
50.0
50.0
Indians & others
Capitalist class
0.9
(% ) Free thinker
Total (N)
100
(4)
New middle class
17.1
51.2
29.3
100
(41)
Old middle class
21.1
68.4
10.5
100
(19)
75.0
25.0
100
(8)
100
(10)
100
(279)
Marginal middle
class Working class Total
(n)
30.0
70.0
17.1
59.8
Source' Fieldwork, 1996.
22.0
2.4
1..2
Middle Class Politics, Democracy and Civil Society in Malaysia I
{
I
371 JI
The above finding tallies with their own self-assessments of religiosity, whereby the Malay and Indian respondents appear to be more religious than the Chinese. Whilst there are a few freethinkers among the Chinese in the sample, there are none among the Malays or the Indians. As shown in Table 15, among the Malays, 16% regard themselves as "very religious," 73% as "moderately religious," whilst those who "just go along" or who are nominal Muslims constitute a minority of only 11%. This pattern is repeated among the Indian respondents, whereby 17.1% regard themselves as "very religious," 59.8% "moderately religious," and
23.1% as "just going along." Among the Chinese (the respondents in the sample are mainly Buddhists), the proportion who regard themselves as
"very religious" is much smaller (making up only 9%), "moderately religious" another 33%, whilst the majority (56%) regard themselves as "just going along," with some adhering to customary rituals only. The higher level of religiosity and involvement in religious organizations among Malay respondents of all classes is to be expected. Islam, the religion of the Malays, is the official state religion in Malaysia. It is also a defining component of Malay identity, for legally a Malay is defined as someone who habitually speaks the Malay language, practices Malay culture, and embraces the Islamic faith. Islam has been a part of the domain of politics since before Malaysia's independence. The Islamic resurgence, which became pronounced in the 1970s and 1980s, left an indelible mark on Malaysian politics and society. Furthermore, Islam is the ideology championed by the two dominant Malay-based political parties UMNO and PMIP. The latter, which reclaims as its goal the
-
establishment of an Islamic state, is in control of the Kelantan State
Government, a province on the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia. UMNO, which is involved in consociational arrangements with its partners in the ruling BN, thus has to manacover carefully between the need to espouse Islamic ideals to appeal to the Malay electorate and keep at bay its
adversary, the PMIP, on the one hand, and the need to allay the fears of its non-Muslim partners, on the other. This it does by promoting a modernist and tolerant Islam, an effort most noticeable under the
leadership of the prime minister, Dr. Mahathir, who has been in power since 1981. Thus, Islam among the Malays, including their middle class, though fundamentally a question of faith, is also very much a political
agenda. For Indian respondents, their high level of religiosity and involvement
in religious organizations and activities is partly for reasons similar to
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
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those of as the Malays, although their religion Hinduism - is not a state religion. The Hindus have a more established religious philosophy than the Chinese. They practise their religion in the home and in the shrine, and they also link their religious activities with politics through the connections between their religious organizations and the MIC, the most important political party among the Indians. Just as there is an Islamic resurgence in the Muslim community the world over, including in Malaysia, a similar phenomenon is also occurring among Hindus, including those in Malaysia. In fact, the MIC leadership is responding to Hindu resurgence by paying greater attention to the Hindu religious organizations, and even promoting religious activities and various rituals in the community.
VII.
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the problem of middle class politics, and the role of the middle class in championing democracy and civil society in Malaysia, based on a study of the middle class in the Klang Valley conducted in 1996. It has examined the "democratization thesis," espoused by a number of writers, about the proclivity of the middle class to champion democracy and civil society. It has shown that a paradox exists among the 'new' middle class in the Klara Valley, that whilst it supports democracy, it is very much "law and order"-oriented. As such, it does not necessarily oppose state authoritarianism, since it regards the latter as necessary for national development and economic growdi, and sees democracy as secondary to economics and law and order. That being the case, Me middle class role in promoting the emergent civil society,
though important, is very much constrained by its lack of autonomy, namely the caution exercises when it comes to state policies concerning the fundamental rights of citizens with regard to freedom of association and expression. Thus, if "civil society" refers to the realm of autonomous group action distinct from both corporate power and the state, and if the concept focuses upon "autonomous groups articulating the views and interests and fears of the less powerful," as argued by some scholars (Cox, 1997: 10), then one may conclude that civil society in Malaysia is still fragmented and weak, despite the growth of the "new" middle class. However, it needs to be emphasized that this study does not contradict the findings of an earlier study conducted in late 1980s by
Saravanamuttu (1989) that argues that the middle class is "a force to be
Middle Class Politics, Democracy and Civil Society in Malaysia |
reckoned with" in opposing creeping state authoritarianism and promoting civil society. This is so because, as discussed in the beginning of this chapter, saravanamuttu's sample was comprised of leaders of NGOs, i.e. the leading and organized elements of the middle class, whilst the sample in the present study is comprised of the non-organized elements of the middle class, with the organized elements constituting only a minority. If we take the findings of the two studies together, we may be able to obtain a more balanced picture of the paradoxical role of
the middle class in the democratization process and in promoting civil society on the one hand, and in tolerating authoritarian moves by the state on the other.
This chapter has also shown that ethnicity and religion need to be taken into account when discussing middle class politics in Malaysia. It is true that with the emergence and expansion of the middle class, and of market-driven growth and consumerism, there appears to be "a shift from the politics of ethnicism to the politics of developmentalism" (Loh Koch Wah, 1997). However, the shift is gradual, and sometimes convoluted. Developmentalism (taken to mean concern with growth, prosperity, and pursuit of wealth) is still often perceived in ethnic terms (although it is much less pronounced today that in the 19605 and 1970s). Nevertheless, the changed psychology among the Malays, especially the
newly found sense of confidence among the Malay middle class (Abdul Rah ran, 1995; Abdul Rah ran, 1996), has helped to foster this new climate of accommodation. To attribute the shift merely to market- driven developmentalism and consumerism only explains part of the story.
Despite the importance of ethnicity among the middle class in Malaysia, including among its Malay component, it would be rather
one-sided to regard the Malay middle class as constituting "a breeding ground for new forms of anti-Chinese sentiments" (Kahn, 1994: 39). The financial and economic crisis that erupted in the middle of 1997 in a number of East Asian and Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia and Indonesia, unleashed a spate of anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia, in Malaysia, although anti-Chinese sentiments prevail, they are not as pronounced. In fact, when the Malaysian Government proposed in early
1998 that some Malay-owned companies (the fruits of the New Economic Policy) facing financial trouble be bought by non-Malays, i.e. Malaysian Chinese - a very sensitive issue in the 1970s and 19805 - there was no visible opposition from the Malay community. On the contrary, a number
of Malays in the business community and the 'new' middle class
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welcomed the move as positive and necessary, not only to prevent the companies from going bust, but also for radon-building. Not a few viewed it as a part of the strategic partnership that should be fostered between Malays and non-Malays as a way forward into the future-
Note 1. Samuel Huntington, the leading advocate of the third wave democratization thesis (je. democratization of the late twentieth century), argues that the movement of countries into the middle income ranges of the economic transition zone led to changes in social structures, beliefs and culture that were conducive to the emergence of democracy. "Rapid economic growth creates rapidly the economic
base for democracy that slower economic growth creates more slowly. It does, however, raise expectations, exacerbates inequalities, and create stresses and strains in the social fabric that stimulate political mobilization and demands for political participation" (Huntington, 1991: 68-69). 2. Note that is only true when the ethnic factor is not taken into account. As will be shown below, when classes are examined within ethnic
communities, respondents from the marginal middle class are found to be the most active only among Malays, whilst among Chinese and Indians, the working class respondents are the most active. 3. During the water crisis in the Klang Valley in 1998, the .Federation of Malaysian Consumer Associations (FOMCA) threatened to take the Selangor State Government and the Water Supply Department to court for their failure to supply water to the public. The confrontation
later cooled down after both sides began to negotiate to resolve the issue peaceably, and the Selangor State Government pledged to the handle the crisis more effectively. 4. Again, when ethnicity is factored into the analysis, this finding is only applicable to Malays, and not to Chinese or Indians- See note 1 above, and also the relevant section below.
References Abdul Rah ran, E. 1973-74. A comment on the state of sociology of race relations in Malaya. DIurnal an tropologi Dan sosiologi., 3: 63-68.
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. 1995.
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Malaysian middle classes: some preliminary observations.
luna Antropologi dan Sosiologi, 22: 31-54.
. 1996. Social transformation, the state and the middle classes in post-independence Malaysia. Sou feast Asian studies, 34(3): 56-79. . 1997. Malaysian middle class studies: a brief overview. Paper presented at The first international Malaysian studies conference organised by Malaysian Social Science Association, University of Malaya, 11-13 August. Beyer, P. 1994. Religion and globalization. London: Sage Publications. Brown, D. 1994. The state and ethnic politics in Southeast Asia. London & New York: Routledge. Chang, T. P., Thao, N. S. Abdul Rah ran, E., Peng, T. N., Mohd Yunos, J. & Leng., C. G. 1996. A survey of the middle class in the Klang Valley, Malaysia. Report submitted to Program for Southeast Asian Area Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan. Cox, R. 1997. Gramsci's thought and the question of civil society in the late 20th century. Revised version of the paper presented at The conference on grarnsci, modernity, and the twentieth century, held in Cagliari, 15-18 April. Crouch, H. 1996. Government and society in Malaysia. St. Leonard, NSW: Allen & Unwire. Giddens, A. 1991. The consequences of modernity. London: Polity Press. Gomez, E. T. 1994. Political business: corporate involvement of Malaysian political parties. Townsville, Queensland: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, James Cook University. Gomez, E. T. &z ]onto K. S. 1997. Malaysia's political economy: politics, patronage and profits. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Huntington, S. 1991. The third wave: democratization in the late twentieth century. Norman & London: University of Oklahoma Press. Hsiao, H.H. M. (Ed.). 1993. Discovery of the middle classes in East Asia, Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Silica. Hsiao, H. H. M. & So, Alvin. 1994. The making of the middle classes in
East Asia: some tentative
hypotheses.
Paper presented
at The
International Conference on East Asian middle classes and national
development in comparative perspective, Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, 19-21 December. Hus if Ali, S. 1984. Ethnicity, class and development in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Social Science Association.
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Jomo K. S. & Ahmad Shabery Cheek. 1992. Malaysia's Islamic movements. In ]. S. Kahn & F. K. W. Loh (Ed.), Fragmented vision: culture and politics in contemporary Malaysia, pp. 79-106. Sydney: Allen & Unwire. Kahn, J. S. 1994. Subalternity and the construction of Malay identity. In A. G. Gomes (Ed.), Modernity and Identity: Asian illustrations, pp. 23-41. Bandoora. Victoria: La Trobe University Press. . 1996. The middle class as a field of ethnological study. In M. Ikmal Said & Z. Emby (Eds.), Critical perspectives: essays in h o n o r of Syed I-Iusin Ali, pp. 12-33. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Social Science Association. Loh, K. W. F. 1997. Developmentalism in Malaysia in the 1990s: is a shift from the politics of ethnicism underway? Paper presented at the first international Malaysian studies conference organized by the Malaysian Social Science Association, at the University of Malaya, 71-13 August. Mahathir Mohammad. 1970. The Malay dilemma. Singapore: Donald Moore. . 1991. Malaysia - the way forward. Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies. Mittelman, J. H. (Ed.). 1996. Globalization: critical rejlech'oi-is. Boulder & London: Lynne Reimer Publishers . Ratnarn, K. J. 1967. Coirntnunalisrri and the political process in Malaya. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press (first published 1965) . Robertson, R. 1992. Globalization: social theory and global culture. London: Sage Publications. Robison, R. & Goodman, D. S. G. (Eds.). 1996. The new rich in Asia: mobile phones, McDonalds and middle-class revolution. London & New York: Routledge.
Saliha Hassan. Forthcoming. Organisasi bunyan-kerajaan dan Penyertaan Politik di Malaysia. [Non-governmental organizations and political participation in Malaysia]. In Abdul Rah ran Embong (Ed.), Negara, Pasaran Dan Modenisasi Di Malaysia: Proses, Isa dan Hala Taju be Abad 21 [State, Market, and modernization in Malaysia: processes, issues, and directions into the 215* century]. Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Publishers. Shamsul, A. B. 1994. Religion and ethnic politics in Malaysia. In C. F. Keyes, Kendall, L. &: Hardacre, H. (Eds.), Asian visions of authority: religion and the modern states of East and Southeast Asia. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
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Sharifah Zaleha Syed Hassan. 1997. Constructions of Islamic identities in a suburban community in Malaysia. Southeast Asian journal of social science, 25(2): 25-38. Stenson, M. R. 1970. Industrial conflict in Malaya: prelude to the communist revolt of 1948. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. Vidich, A. I. (Ed.). 1995. The new middle classes: life-styles, status claims and political orientations. London: Macmillan. Waters, M. 1995. Globalization. London: Routledge. Yamamoto, T. 1995. Emerging civil society in the Asia P a c e community. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange.
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PART IV Thailand
9
Thai Middle Classes: Between Class Ambiguity and Democratic Propensity .
Prudhisan lumbar Chantal Banpasirichote
I. Introduction Thailand today is believed by many political analysts to have passed certain stages of democratization. At its first establishment, in 1932, "democracy" was fought for by an elite group, and politics were for a long time afterward dominated by the Thai bureaucracy. Only in the subsequent periods have the people taken initiatives for democratization and appeared on the scene through major political protests against authoritarianism. Scholarship on Thai democracy may have attributed political change to various factors of modernization and development, but the concern has always been with analysis of the people who make the changes. Actors and groups that fought against Thailand's authoritarian legacy include the famous student movements in 1973 and 1976 and, during the bubble economy of 1992, the extraordinary "mobile-phone mob." Now, the country has just given birth to a new constitution, which was believed to be the result of nation-wide public
participation. The process of writing the constitution was said to be a battle and, at the same time, a compromise between elitist and the populist propaganda; and yet democracy still remains to be reached. During the course of democratization in Thailand there is no doubt
that people from the middle stratum have taken an active part in the struggle. The recent celebration of the 25th anniversary of the 14 October 1973 democratic struggle was more of a celebration by the middle classes than by others. Yet, the role of the middle classes in protecting Thai democracy has yet to be established, as shown in may political science analyses, especially when one takes into consideration the participation
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and responses of other partners to democratic action. In addition, democracy can mean much more than demanding an electoral government, and more analysis is needed to appreciate the assumption that the middle classes are the prime actors for social and democratic change. This paper intends to further explore the characteristics, opinions and behavior of the Middle Classes as they pertain to social and political transformation in Thailand. It includes a review of analyses of the middle classes and their political roles that have appeared in selected writings. However, an overview of literature, which is mostly based on interpretation of past events, needs to be substantiated with more empirical data. The paper thus adds relevant data from The Survey of the Middle Classes in Bangkok, 1997, conducted by the Center of Social Development Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University M Bangkok, in collaboration with Program for Southeast Asian Area Studies (PROSEA), Taipei, Taiwan. The review of previous analyses and the support of the survey data reveals that the understanding of the middle classes might not be as simple as it seems. The Middle class is diverse, with members from different origins and socio-economic backgrounds and with different political experiences. Members may also have different economic interests. In fact, there are many opportunities for conflicts of opinions within the class. Analyses of the middle classes drawn from the literature review have also indicated a changing picture of the middle classes' involvement in politics pre- and post- the May Incident of 1992. This paper is therefore skeptical about the use of the middle class as a concept in political analysis. A deeper analysis is required of particular incidences which might reveal ambiguous political stances toward democratic values.
II. Pre-1992 Analysis' Middle Classes and AntiAuthoritarianism Academic writings about the middle classes in Thai society and politics are relatively recent. Yet it would not be entirely true to say that the middle classes did not received academic attention until they became visibly involved in the street rallies of May 1992, which succeeded in preventing in the bud the return of military domination of government. Indeed, there exist several important previous works written by Western
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scholars studying . Thailand that have placed the middle classes somewhere near the core of their analyses, linking them to the politics of the 1973 - 1976 period of democratic experimentation after long years of military authoritarian rule. (On this period, see Prudhisan, 1992: 66-80). While seeing the middle classes as a new social force on the political scene, these studies expressed doubts about their democratic credentials. Gir]ing's Thailand: Society and Politics (Girling, 1981) paid a good deal of attention to the "urban middle class" and the "middle strata" as
one of the new extra-bureaucratic social forces spawned by the industrialization, urbanization and educational expansion of the 1960s. His analysis concluded that the urban middle class, ranging from executives and professionals to clerks and shopkeepers, chiefly outside the government bureaucracy and often with specialized skills, was striving to become autonomous of the bureaucratic elites. Girling argues that there was a spread of democratic ideas among members of this class, but that it was limited by the cultural weight of patrimonialism. Thus, in the 1970s, they were on the whole ambivalent between the ideals of free choice and government by popular consent and the fear that a more open society would release mass pressures and demands that would result in dangerous instability. The strata, Girling argued, was neither strong enough nor unified enough to be considered a class and exhibited a diversity of political opinions on account of this ambivalence (Gilling, 1981: 120-121, 144-147 and 177-178). It is clear that Girling was referring to what this present paper calls
the middle classes, that broad stratum behfveen "the capitalists" or big business, from whom they are distinguishable in that they have no or
little capital nor real control of large enterprises, and the working class, from whom they are differentiated by their higher level of education and/ or technical skills or expertise. Gilling recognized a gradation within his "middle class," placing clerical and sales staff in the "lower-middle strata" (Girting, 1981: 178) as we do. His analysis emphasized that the strata were growing but still weak, precarious positioned between the bureaucratic- business ruling elites and the masses, not united or uniform in their political attitudes or actions, and indeed ambivalent on account of politico - cultural constraints. Another work, smaller but more provocative in tone than Girling's, but also dealing with the mid-1970s, is Ben Anderson's analysis of the social and cultural aspects of the October 1976 coup (Anderson, 1977).
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Anderson similarly identifies as arising from the 1960s boom two social groupings, among others: the "new petty bourgeoisie" and the "new moyer bourgeoisie." The former were migrants to Bangkok from the provincial towns who found niches in the expanding service - oriented occupations as tailors, motor repairmen, receptionists, tellers and small
shop owners, for instance. They served and were largely dependent on the second group, whose members were largely of previous urban origin but because much more directedly connected to and dependent on foreign capital than on the Thai ruling class, and who worked as advertising executives, movie house owners, buiders, hotel mangers and the like (Anderson, 1977). These two social groupings could begin consolidating themselves into social classes because of opportunities afforded to their children by the expanded tertiary educational system. So long as their aspirations were met by the military-bureaucratic regime, they were content with their lack of political say. But, once the boom began to fade, they supported their student children's constitutional demands in 1973, angry at the regime's nepotism, corruption and inability to extract greater commitment to Thai security from the US. Yet, in Anderson's opinion, the political role these groups played on the side of democracy was specific to the historical context, rather than lasting. Thus, the three years of economic decline, student left radicalization and worker and peasant agitation made them feel, bewildered buffeted and angry that the golden days were over. They became open to military and right wing political cultural manipulations and reverted to supporting the return to military rule in October 1976. Anderson's two bourgeois groups were not so much business elites who had a share in state power but the next strata lower. Although he
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does not use the term, it is clear that Anderson was referring to some sections of what this present paper regards as the middle classes. His and Giirling's positions are similar concerning the rapid growth of these groups. as a result of mobility, their fledgling character, and the unreliability of their political stances. Both emphasized that the middle classes' foremost concern was to safeguard their interests, and hence could shift along the democratic - authoritarian continium depending on situational circumstances. This political ambivalence existed in the context of constraints placed upon them by the dominant culture and
institutions. Yet, to Anderson, things have changed so much that the ruling class would subsequently find it difficult to deny middle class
participation in politics.
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A much later work (Ockey, 1992) considers the middle class as one of three non-bureaucratic societal groups that emerged seeking political
participation in the 1970s. Ockey traces the competition among these groups and military factions in the incremental transition to civilian rule from 1978 to 1992 (but prior to the May uprising). The other two new societal groupings, the local notables, or provincial politicians, and the newly rich and powerful business interests, had gained footholds in the institutional structures of the political parties and the parliament under
the 1978 constitution, which allowed once again the incremental transition to democracy. Ockey's position is that the political elites, both old and new, realized that they could not entirely exclude the middle class from political participation, and thus competed for middle class support. In other words, he posited that the middle class was of some importance in perpetuating parliamentary rule in Thailand (Ockey 1992: Chapter I). Ockey includes in the middle class those in administrative, executive, managerial clerical, sales and service jobs, and estimates that these occupations expanded between 76.3 to 134% between 1970 and 1980 (Ockey, 1992: 308). As a result of their occupations and rapidly rising incomes, members of the middle class were able to secure for their children greater prestige through education. They were particularly visible as consumers, able to purchase cars, televisions and numerous household appliances. Television and other media, through advertising and soap operas, promoted consumerism and other middle class values (not clearly defered), but were also channels for political news and messages (Ockey, 1992: 314-319). While politically active on occasions, the Thai middle
class' normal political role was that of audience, albeit one deemed important by those seeking or holding power and influence--the military, the political parties and politicians, the Monarchy and academics-- who sought to influence and gain support from the middle class. Ockey goes into some detail as to how and when this was done by each of the players in an effort to gain middle class support for their positions, and explains how, in doing so they had to reconcile their own interests with middle class values, norms and interests (Ockey, 1992: 305). Reading Ockey's data diachronically, one can see a progression towards greater support for democratic rule among the middle classes. While their ambivalence made them open to manipulations by the
military and their r i g h t i n g allies in 1976, the medium term result was
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middle class disillusionment with both the
military and civilian
politicians. Yet, by the mid-19805, Bangkok middle class voting turnout picked up as politicians such as Chamlong Srimuang, who seemed acceptable to them, appeared on the scene. Subsequently, however, while
die middle classes remained wary of the military and generally supported democratic institutions, they have not found any political
party worthy of their longer erm allegiance. More revealing of their influence on the course of political events are their stances as seen through the discourse in the media on crucial political occasions, such the 1981 Young Turk coup against Prem and the baht devaluation crisis in
1984, when die aspiring Army Commander Art fit pitched against Prem's teclmocrats to his own disadvantage. Particularly clear, however, was the role of middle class academics in using public opinion polls and current affairs programs to give form to a broader middle class stance against political party support for Prem to continue as prime minister in 1988. As a result, Chatichai Choonhavan became the first MP to become prime minister since 1976. And though the military tool advantage of the middle classes ambiguous opinions about that government, which presided over an exceptional export-oriented boom but which appeared overly corrupt, to stage its 1991 coup, it was careful to appease the urban middle classes. Thus, the military imposed a ban on hoarding and price hikes, cracked down on crime, avoided press censorship, installed a liberal bureaucrat-turned businessman, Anand Panyarachun, as prime minister, promised a new constitution and an early return to parliamentary rule, and proceeded to weaken workers' ability to organize (Ockey, 1992: Conclusions). To bring the historical progression up to the 1992 uprising, one can add that when it subsequently became apparent that the coup group was manipulating the constitution drafting process and was emasculating the large political parties so as to ensure its own control over the postelection government, opposition rapidly swelled among elements of the middle classes, including academics, students, professionals and business managers. Despite this, the document was passed into law. Yet, again, when after the elections the emasculated parties installed the unelected coup leader, Suchinda Kraprayoon, as prime minister, it was organized democracy-oriented, human rights and lawyer NGO and student groups, as well as intellectuals, who coalessed and joined politician Chamlong and his Bangkok-based Palang Dham Party as the vanguards of the oppositional rallies of May 1992 (Prudhisan, 1992: 121-122). Most of
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these participants were indeed middle class, but had more political experience, broadly defined, many from activism during the 1973-1976 period, and greater commitments to democratization, than the vast majority of the middle classes had. And while the appearance of the middle class salariats and businessmen was much publicised, there emerged controversies as to the classes of the so-called "mob/' an issue to which we will now turn our attention.
III. Analysis' Toward Re-democratization
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In the aftermath of the 1992 uprising, there was a surge of writing seeking to ascertain the extent and importance of middle class involvement in the event, and also to clarify understandings about the middle classes and their propensities, in general, and toward politics in particular. A compilation of these studies appear in a volume published
by Chulalongkorn University's Political Economy Center in 1993 (Sungsidh & Pasuk, 1993). Examining these articles, one can arrive at a more accurate j balanced view of those involved in the run-up to and during the 1992 authors there are divergences Nonetheless, event. conceptualizations of the middle class(es) and in their judgments regarding the class' political stances and roles. The event was seen as a high point in an ongoing struggle for democracy, but as significantly different from the 1973 uprising to the extent that student organizations did not play a leading role, but were .:.
.
merely a part of the campaign for Popular Democracy (CPD) made up of intellectuals, professionals, NGO leaders, labour leaders and students.
The CFD had been consistent in its opposition to the 1991 coup, in lobbying for a more democratic constitution, in playing a central role in the Pollwatch election monitoring organization, and, parallel to politician Chamlong Srimuang and his Palang Dham Party, in mobilizing the May rallies (Voravidh, 1993: 119-121). This was indicative of the existence of a broader and more vibrant "civil society," an organized society playing a role in the public sphere, wherein though cross-class cooperation, members of the different middle classes played prominent roles as vanguards in the struggle for democracy as symbolized by democratic constitutionalism and a parliament less dominated by the influence of money politics. But it must be recognized also that among the NGOs, the human rights NGOs had since the 1991 coup obtained cooperation from
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development NGOs (which had been working at empowerment of the rural and urban disadvantaged lower classes so as to help them become better able to defend their rights to livelihood in the face of resource .conflicts that multiplied as a result of the economic boom) to assist in political education for democracy among provincial and rural populations. Indeed, many of these development NGO personnel were
crucial to Pollwatch activities in the provinces. Thus, the NGO part of the democracy movement did not entertain only typical urban middle class
concerns about political rights or "democratization at the top," but also ideas about the economic and social rights of the lower classes involving notions of grassroots participation in development decisions affecting their lives and localities, or "democratization at the grassroots or bottom up democratization," as well. The NGOs were at least beginning to see these two modes of democratization as complementary (Bar torn, 1993 : 227-230 and Voravidh, 1993 : 121; see also Callahan, 1993). Intellectuals in academia and the media had also been active in putting out communiques, organizing seminars and panel discussions and putting arguments in the media about the constitutional provisions and the choice of prime minister (Voravidh, 1993: 122). Professionals, lawyers and doctors particularly were prominent, as individuals and in groups, in the process and at the rallies, particularly in the Confederation for Democraey (CFD) that strategically sprang up as a coalition for action comprising former activists of the 1973 generation, labour and slum leaders. Other medical personnel largely remained keen observers until they were obstructed from performing their professional duties when violence erupted and quickly sprang into action and networked throughout the country in opposition to the repression (Kiatchai, 1993).
The point is that the core of the movement for political democracy in 1992 and the events leading up to it were mostly middle class people in a wide range of occupations united by their democratic ideals, but mobilized into political action for different reasons and entertaining differing notions of democracy. True enough, there were lower class people and l a b o r and slum activists in leadership roles, but they were in a minority. Many of the core activists had much more experience in political activism, particularly during the 1973-1976 period, than the "average" middle class person. Therefore, a generational character of activism for democracy cannot be entirely discounted. However, the excitement about "middle class" participation was not
so much about this core group, but about the well-dressed people who
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came to the rallies in the early morning and after office hours in cars and using mobile phones to communicate what was happening to others, and
thus drew in large crowds even in the face of government misinformation. It was assumed that these people worked in offices and were sufficiently economically secure to spare the time to attend the rallies, in other words were affluent than the average Bangkokian. An on-the-spot survey found this to be so, more than half having degrees, 45% were from the private sector and 13.7% were business owners.
Press reports would have it that some owners of businesses allowed employees to leave work and join the rallies, contributed funds and foodstuffs and participated in them. This active rather than passive support was decidedly different from the situation in 1973. There were calls from businessmen in finance for peaceful resolution to the conflict, lest foreign investment and tourism suffer. Once the military had perpetrated violence, the three leading associations of banks, commerce and industry called for Suchi.nda's resignation, and this having been achieved, called for new elections. This change of attitude on the part of business, which had not opposed the 1991 coup or even supported it, Anek Laothamatas argues, was on account of the fact that the "new middle classes" were rejecting military rule once and for all. Businessmen could no longer hold on to the ready-made formula that military government meant political stability (Anek, 1993: 179). In other words, businessmen were not the vanguards of democracy, the vanguards were the middle classes in the universities, NGOs, the media and in certain political parties (Anek, 1993: 189). However, still has to account for the thousands of supposedly middle class people who attended the rallies. To this, Voravidh (Voravidh, 1993)
offers an explanation. Voracidh argues that the middle classes as a whole benefited from increased business opportunities and income from the mid-1980s on, especially during the export-oriented boom under the Chatichai government, but that within the class there were variations. Office and service workers, independent professionals and traders gained most, while government officials benefited much less so. Many middle class elements conspicuously consumed and speculated, as evidenced in the
stock market and property booms and car sales. To the middle classes, economic growth and democratic politics seemed to go hand in hand. Thus, according to Voravidh, the 1991 coup very much interrupted their
dream come true. The coup had direct adverse consequences on the
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Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
middle classes' economic interests. Their dissatisfaction with the military thus accumulated, and when the military manipulated the constitution drafting process so as to prolong its domination of politics, the middle classes immediately joined the democracy groups' bandwagon. To them, democratic rule, in so far as it provided political stability, was necessary for economic development and investment. Voravidh concludes by asserting his neo-Marxist theoretical position that the middle class was not fighting for its immediate interest, but to protect the source of its privileges, that is, capitalism and development (Voravidh, 1992: 738-139 and 130). In other words, though not proxy to capitalists, it none the less acted in the long-term interest of capitalism. Yet, statistics of the dead and injured show a rather different picture. More than half were from lower class occupations, who Sungsidh and Pasuk suggest were slum youths, representative of the "underclass" or urban poor (Sungsidh & Pasuk, 1993: 34). Sungsidh, in his own post-event interview study of the participation of the urban poor, blue-collar and white-collar workers, posits that the first two and the lower white-collar were similar in their (low) income, social status and consumption patterns, but had different actual experiences in the world of work, relations with other classes and with the state. This accounted for their differential participation (Sungsidh, 1993: 323). The urban poor, constantly facing evictions, especially during the boom, had acquired experience of political struggle and organization and were linked to middle class people in NGOs in their quest for legislative changes. This made them prefer elected governments and abhor the coup group. Yet, their need to work for a daily living prevented most from
taking an active part in the rallies (Sungsidh, 1993: 342-347). Blue collar workers were least evident, due to laws prohibiting unions from engaging in political activities, something which employers used to good effect in discouraging workers from participating in the rallies. The workers' own conceptions of democracy was confined to the right to collective bargaining, something which most l a b o r leaders had an interest in perpetuating for their own benefits as "oligarchs," concerned with their own individual mobility through employer or state patronage (Sungsidh, 1993: 326-332). While the class, status and consumption patterns of the lower white collar were similar to those of the blue collar workers white-collar
managers' patterns were more similar to those of the capitalist
Thai Middle Classes: Between Class Ambiguity and Democratic P1-opensity
391
I
entrepreneurs, argues Sungsidh. In the middle were middle income and status employees, whose skills and expertise were relatively easy to sell in the modern l a b o r market. Businesses exerted less control on this latter group and their interests lay in the growth of the private sector and the market economy. Less dependent on the state, they valued personal freedom, preferred the rule of law to arbitrary rule, and found nepotism and corruption in the public sector somewhat irksome. Most of them were not organized except in professional associations for professional ends. The ones with union organization, such as bank and hotel employees, tended to have considerable bargaining power. The bank employee union opposed the 1991 coup from the beginning and also the "de-unionization" of public enterprise workers. Many of their members joined the rallies as committed individuals, but not so much so as their white-collar counterparts in the NGOs, who were consistently active in democracy campaigns (Sungsidh, 1993: 332-337) In sum, in 1992, a coalition of the different middle classes was the vanguard or agenda-setter, other middle class people were the supporters, and lower class people were the persistent and daring
protesters. The capitalists were the situation-specific legitimizer who put a brake on the establishment. So, is it the case that no single class, the middle class included, could alone struggle successfully for democracy? Is some form of class alliance necessary? The papers in the Sungsidh and Pasuk volume, in addition to other studies, tried to answer this question from different conceptual and
theoretical angles.
Though they can be classified as Marxist and
Weberian in their traditions (Siriporn, 1995), a good deal of eclectic is
evident. Among the neo-Marxists, Voravidh's work has already been aired. Another, Preecha Piampongsan, concedes the existence of a diverse middle class in contemporary Thai society, occupying the broad social space between the ruling and ruled classes. He does this by arguing for an analysis that places the middle class in the specific context of the development of dependent capitalism in Thailand. Apart from modern business executives, government officials, especially in the economic bureaucracies, should also be included, since they produced the state
developmental authoritarian ideology. Similar to Voravidh, Preecha asserts that the middle classes were not servants of capitalists but of capitalism, producing and perpetuating its ideology.
This included
individualism, market competition and freedom to accumulate capital,
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Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
but not popular democracy, social justice or environrnentalisrn (in other than a faddish form). This class, while quite independent of the ruling class was "in alliance with" (sic) modern capitalism, which it had an abiding interest in promoting. lt would therefore not be so progressive as to support social change for the benefit of the dispossessed classes (Preecha, 1993: 85-8 . Eclectic is Pasuk (Pasuk, 1993), who also emphasizes the special character of the development of capitalism in Thailand and the Asian newly industrializing countries. She points out that the service sector, which grew parallel to the industrial sector, meant that, contrary to the Western experience of industrialization, the middle class expanded more rapidly than the working class. Secondly, the rising middle classes, executives and professionals, the petty bourgeoisie, the white collar workers and the intellectuals, were oriented towards international norms and practices because they were ever more dependent on foreign investment, education and technology. This linkage, and the fact that the threat of communism no longer existed, weaned the middle classes away from the forces of authoritarianism. With their wealth gained independently, they gradually adopted anti-military and antibureaucratic attitudes and took part in the 1992 uprising with the lower classes. This was to consolidate parliamentary democracy, which would enable them to participate in policy-making and legislation for their interests. Yet, valuing individual rights and supportive of the free market, some sections of the middle class, that is, the petty bourgeoisie and some executive groups, tended to oppose workers' rights or to want to limit the benefits of democracy to themselves. They were furthermore narrow in their emphasis on urban interests and neglectful of rural needs. Only some intellectuals, especially those in NGOs, were tending to rural needs and trying to invent a more participatory democracy. It is probable that in an economic downturn, the Thai middle class will again favour authoritarianism (Pasuk, 1993: 107-109). The political fickleness of the middle class is explained in a more theoretically sophisticated way by Anek (Anek, 1993). Having taken issue with received wisdom that the bourgeoisie, capitalists and businessmen were the vanguards of democracy (see also Anek, 1997), he reviews their roles in Thai democratic history and finds that prior to 1973 they were either politically passive or supportive of and benefited from the military's developmental authoritarianism. Having become economically
strong and Thai-ised, but not significant to the 1973 uprising, many of
Thai Middle Classes: Between Class Ambiguity and Democratic Propensity |
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'u
them took the opportunity to enter parliamentary politics so as to reap personal economic benefits, and in fact created problems for Thai democracy by making politics into a business, with vote-buying and corruption on a grand scale. Yet other businessmen were neither committed to democracy nor necessarily against coups. Unhappy about money politics, they were pleased with the 1976 coup, which did away with "havoc-makinE" parliamentary politics. This stance did not change much in the years of semi~dernocracy. Businessmen liked the economic
policies of the elected Chatichai government for their growth, export and private investment orientation, but found the corruption irksome. The 1991 coup was palatable to them, especially since the appointed Anand government pursued the same kind of policies. This accounted for the business colnmunity's overt support for Anand. In other words, there was no policy difference between elected and unelected governments, the interests of business continued to be promoted. Still, believing that democracy was good in theory but had many flaws in practice, businessmen still continued to look to the military to act as the balance of power vis-a-vis elected politicians. The change in attitude was to a belief that the military should not directly govern. Thus, when the coup group tried to perpetuate its rule, some businessmen crossed the fence and stood with the anti-military forces in 1992. Citing Thongchai Wongchaisuwan's survey of businessmen's political attitudes in October 1991 (after the coup) (Thongchai, 1992), Anew demonstrates that more than 70% of salaried executives wanted democracy (constitution and elections), as against 60% of business owners. Furthermore, those who said the political climate adversely affected investment greatly were engaged in large-scale enterprises and ones with international links. Thus, in talking about businessmen, one has to be aware of the increasing influence and weight of non-owner executives who had risen as companies corporatized, Anek argues, for this influence explains why big business finally came out in opposition to Suchinda and the political parties that lent him support. The businesses had to go along with the members of the middle class, many of whom were their own executives. .Yet, cautions Anek, businessman may still regard democracy as a temporary solution to a crisis of instability that brought much damage to the economy on account of lack of foreign investor confidence. He thus concludes that, contrary to received wisdom, Thai businessmen were not
the vanguards of democracy, but
neither were they any longer
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Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
necessarily hindrances to democracy. Rather, whether they are pro or against democracy depends on how, in specific situations and historical epochs, the rules of democracy and the policies of elected governments affect their interests. He also cautions against treating businessmen as a homogeneous group with the same interests. In fact, there are many groupings with different stances towards dictatorship and democracy. He thus urges further studies into each of the groupings, but notes from Thongchai's and the May 1992 participation data that salaried business
executives in their thirties, particularly those in real estate, the stock market and tourism, are keen barometers of politics and are the most politically active. Their rise was rapid over a short time-span and they were similar to Beniamino Anderson's bourgeoisies of 1976 in their alarmism about a world lost. In sum, the open economy was beneficial to democratization only to the extent that it undermined authoritarian tendencies to suppress democratic forces; but as soon as a democratic government is installed in Thailand, the open economy could also easily create problems for governmental stability (Anek, 1993: 187).
Anek is non-committal on whether businessmen and other middle classes, despite their current influence and weight, will spearhead democracy in the long run. However, his historically and comparatively informed position is that democratic consolidation would not be possible if the rural people are not involved in democratization. The liberalism that the bourgeoisie and the middle class brought to politics the West stopped short of democracy, because these very elements opposed the extension of democratic rights to the lower classes. There, democracy came about through the struggle of the lower classes, such that the upper
and middle classes had to concede. In Thailand, though enjoying universal suffrage, the lower classes' democratic participation was confined to voting and vote-selling, mere formalism, and real democracy will only come about through the lower classes' struggle for economic
and social reform and decentralization of power to the localities. Surin Maisrikrod (Surin, 1997) gives greater prominence to the middle class in his study of political alliances (and contention) among the state, the capitalists and the middle class from the 1970s on. He argues that the class had, over time, played decisive roles in the democratization process. Members of the Middle class were capable of launching resistance to authoritarian regimes to the extent of installing democratic ones in their place, but less capable of consolidating democracy. In 1975-76, they went
into disarray, as the military and the capitalists launched multi-pronged
Thai Middle Classes: Between Class Ambiguity and Democratic Propensity
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395
attacks on them. In 1988 the Middle Class opened up die space for Chatichai to become prime minister, but two years latter gave tacit support to the military to topple his elected government. Surin concludes that the middle class lacked strong ideological commitment to democracy, preferring it for pragmatic reasons, and fearing that any other system would limit their jealously guarded freedom. Strong in times of crisis, the Middle Class was unable to prolong its irMuence. Its activist image created credibility problems and, in any case, it has so far been rarely capable of setting long~term political goals. Its recent rise, merely three decades, accounts for this (Surin, 1993: 164). However, Surin also sees an increase in middle class capability over the years. In the 1980-88 period, when Prem presided over a "grand coalition," a compromise between the state and the capitalists, the rapidly expanded middle class, feeling excluded, was able to reorient the system towards democracy by easing Prem out. Again, in 1992, the Middle Class acted against Suchinda's reversal, succeeding in stealing the capitalists' support from him. Nonetheless, democracy cannot be consolidated by the middle class alone, argues Surin, it needs the cooperation of the state (the bureaucracy) and the capitalists. Yet, the capitalists, though recently more independent of the state than ever before, have not been reliable in installing or consolidating democracy (Surin, 1997: 165). In contrast to others, Surer does not even consider an alliance for democracy between the middle class and the lower classes, even though he cites as one reason for the political strength of the middle class the leadership provided by the 1973 generation of returnees from the jungle, who had retained their rebellious spirits despite partaking in the fruits of capitalist growth (Surin, 1997: 153 and 160). In addition, if middle class activism owes much to this generation of leadership, what are the chances of its continuing to be the vanguards of democracy in the years to come? To use the 1973 general:ion's former analogy, would the torch of shwiggle be handed over to the lower classes to move liberalism towards democracy? Or, would the newer and younger middle classes, without the experience of political struggle of such an intensity as that of the 1970s, in fact become the stumbling block of democratization, as Anek warns?
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Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
IV. Middle Classes in Bangkok Questions are being raised about whether the middle classes and their political consciousness could sustain democracy in the long run. The class was first explained as not unified, and therefore possibly not strong enough to lead a democratic transition. Skepticism also prevails that the class ultimately serves its own economic interests, which is reflected in an inconsistency in political stances regarding the role of the military and political stability. It is also questioned whether the majority of the middle classes sympathize with any of the protests of the rural poor calling for social and economic equity. At times, development conflicts over natural resources management have split opinions on human rights issues.
This does not mean that the middle classes have no role in political struggle, since much of the core group in political uprisings tends to emerge from the middle stratum. The middle classes are therefore seen as vanguards of democracy. A number of studies still believe a democratic values among the middle classes, but for some reason do not have confidence that the class will sustain democracy in the long run, considering their vested interests and their closer links with the establishment. A lot of questions can be answered through further observation and analysis of political situations. An attempt to understand the dynamics of the class and the class background could facilitate analysis of the class' propensity toward democratic transformation. Up to now, a survey on a large scale to capture the characteristics of the class at one point in time has not been available. The 1997 survey of the middle classes in Bangkok conducted by the Center for Social Development Studies, Chulalongkorn University in collaboration with the Academia Sinica, Taipei, used a sample size of approximately 700 members of the middle classes, plus another 50 and 200 samples from the capitalist and working classes, respectively, for a cross check. However, the survey was not intended to
test a specific hypothesis as much as to explore the general characteristics of the middle classes and, in some aspects, to compare them check with he capitalist and the working classes.
1.
Middle Classes in Bangkok: Characteristics
A convenient way to identify middle classes is by using occupational categories. Even previous writings refer to the middle classes as petty
Thai. Middle Classes: Between Class Ambiguity and Democratic Propensity
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( 397 `}
bourgeoisie, technocrats, bureaucrats, managers, or sometimes, white collar staff. In the broadest sense, middle classes are simply the people who are not capitalists or workers. So, it can be assumed that there is a diversity within the classes. While other analyses might want to assign the label middle class to specific target groups participating in political action, such as university students, academics, professionals, or new businessmen, it will be closer to reality to portray the class in a more inclusive manner, covering the new, the old and the marginal middle classes! It is interesting to note that within the middle classes themselves there are considerable differences in general characteristics, for example, education, income, occupation, residence, and place of origin (birth place) (Table 1). The old middle class may be differ from the new and the marginal middle classes in that its members usually earn more but have lower educational status. Although it is hard to differentiate between the types of residence and neighborhood the classes reside in, because Bangkok is not a well planned city, the old middle class tends to be concentrated in inner city commercial areas. It is likely that members of the new middle class follow the capitalists in their types of residence, which are located in the new and well developed settlements. The capitalists might also share similar life experiences with the new middle class, because both classes have higher percentages of people educated abroad. With comparable levels of education and a tendency toward similar lifestyles, it is likely that the two classes can appreciate the effects of modernization and globalization. Taking into consideration where they come from, it is clear that almost half of the middle classes are not natives of Bangkok, especially when compared with the capitalists. They have moved to Bangkok from
either the provincial towns or further away, from rural communities. The marginal group has the closest association with the rural sector, since the larger majority are not Bangkok natives and received their education
in the provinces.
I
398
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Table 1
l
Exploraiion of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
General Characteristics of Classes (%)
Selected variables Av. Income (Baht/ M)
Capitalist
Working class 5,000
NMC
OMC
MMC
10-30,000
50,000
10-20,000
52.9
62.8
37.3
13.7
25.6
1,6
62.5 5.2
1.9
class 100,000
Level of education
. B.A.
Higher
5.3
Education Bangkok
78.4
71.4
64.3
75.8
7.7
Buddhist religion
98.0
94.4
97.6
95.2
97.6
Neighborhood type Residential area Expensive settlement
..
51.0 13.7
22.2 9.2
13.5 3.2
21.9 4.8
22.2 1.9
Native of Bangkok
68.6
52.8
57.1
40.9
2.9
5.9
13.1 25.3
8.7 49.2 2.4 (126)
22.7
26.8 6.3
69.4 10.0 1.0
(269)
(207)
.
Father's occupation
Farmer Trader/merchant
31.4
Professional
17.8
(N)
(55)
16.1 (360)
Labels: NMC=New Middle Class, OMC=O1d Middle Class, MMC=Margina1 Middle Class. Sources: Data from Anusorn Lima fee, Prudhisan Iumbala, Chantal Banpasirichote & Surichai Wun' Gaea (1999).
Members of the middle classes also differ on another account, their father's occupations, which to a certain level have passed between generations. Although it seems that the middle classes today might have their origins in the old middle class (petty bourgeoisie), because at least 25% come from families of traders/merchants, there is some variation in the new and the marginal middle classes. The variation shows that each class in part reproduces itself. Professional fathers have produced 16% of the members of the new middle class in the survey sample. At the same time, this is also a result of class mobility, as in the case of the marginal
middle class, of which a considerable number (22.7%) come from families of the lower class, such as farmers. The variations in the backgrounds of the middle classes only shows a lack of a common ground, which might be the reason they are not a unified class that act: collectively as a propeller for dcnlocracy in any real
Thai Middle Classes: Between Class Ambiguity and Democratic Propensity
I
I 399 YI
sense. Although the survey cannot prove that the variation in the backgrounds of the class might affect their diverse political stances, it is noteworthy to be aware that it might have an influence on their concern for individual vested interest. While the variation in the backgrounds of the class might dilute class unity, members' perceptions of own class status are equally problematic.
Data from the survey indicates that the objective classifications offered by the researchers and the subjective perceptions of class given by the respondents themselves are generally similar for the middle classes; higher than 86 % of middle class respondents identify themselves in the middle stratum. Exceptions are in the capitalist and the working class, of whom 29.4% and 56.1 %, respectively, think that they are in the middle level. It is suspected that the border line between classes could create a gray area that results in a vague perception of one's own classes. While this should not effect how the middle classes perceive their own class status it may effect the extent to which the class will have meaning to its members. The clash between objective and subjective class perceptions of the middle classes became obvious after the economic crisis beginning in 1997. The bubble economy of the early 19905 created a "new rich" class, another label for the new middle class. The economic crisis, on the contrary, has created a "new poor," or people who have fallen from the new rich class. A number of suicides by executives in private companies soon after the crisis illustrates the inability of some members of the new middle class to cope with change. The perception of belong to a new middle class is often no longer supported by objective class identification. In times of crisis, class consciousness might be rising, because of the pressure of not being able to continue to live the same lifestyle. in the earlier review, there is a question of whether people act as a class or as individuals in politics. Class consciousness and perceptions of class prone conflict are fundamental if people are to act as a class. In this respect, the middle classes believe in the existence of classes, but they do not believe strongly that class differences will necessarily lead to conflict. However, the capitalist and the working classes who are at opposite ends of the class continuum, are clear about class conflict (Table 2-Table 4).
400
Table 2
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Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Perceptions of Class Divisions (%)
Existence of class divisions Yes
Capitalist class
No
OMC
MMC
98.0
93.6
89.7
92.9
2.0
0.8
0.8
1.1
5.6
9.5
5.9
6.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
(1013)
Not sure Total (N)
Source: Data from Anusorn Lima
Table 3
Upper classes
Upper
• Rich Middle classes
Total 93.1 0.8
6.1
et aL (1999).
Middle class
Capitalist class
New
Old
56.8
1.6
1.6
Marginal
Working class
Total 3.8
.-..
7.8
0.8
0.8
0.9
49.0
0.8
0.8
2.9
29.4
86.7
86.5
88.5
1.1
0.5
2.4
84.8
55.1
73.5
56.1
78.0
Upper-middle
13.7
3.6
Middle
13.7
80.6
84.1
2.0
2.5
2.4
2.6
0.5
2.1
4.5
6.4
7.1
42.5
12.9
3.1
3.2
5.2
26.6
8.3
Lower middle
Lower classes • Poor »
fee
class 93.2
Class-Identification (Subjective) (%)
Identified classes
I
Worldng
NMC
1.4
3.2
1.9
15.9
4.6
3.9
3.3
1.6
0.7
0.5
1.9
7.8
1.4
Low
Others: capitalist crorues, COHTIHOIT.,
intguectual
No class, and do not want to identify No answer
Total (N)
U.7
1.1
2.0
2.5
4.0
3.0
1.0
2.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
(1013)
Source: Data From Anusorn Lima fee et al. (1999).
Thai Middle Classes: Between Class Ambiguity and Democratic Propensity |
Table 4
Absolutely agree Agree Disagree
No answer Total (N)
401
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Opinion on Class Antagonism (%)
Opinion On class antagonism
Absolutely disagree Not sure
l
Middle class
Capitalist
Working class
Total
class
New
Old
Marginal
16.9 62.8
55.8
2.0
12.8
80.4
51.9
7.1 48.4
12.5
9.8
23.9
25.4
13.4 54.3 17.5
11.1
19.1
2.0
1.9
1.6
2.2
1.0
1.8
3.9 2.0
9.2
16.7
11.9
7.7
0.3
0.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
0.7 100.0
0.5 100.0
(51)
(360)
(/26)
(269)
(207)
10.3 0.6 100.0 (1013)
Source: Data from Anusorn Lima fee et aL (1999).
2. Middle Class Lifestyles and Social Values The middle class is often seen as an advance consumer and is very responsive to the market economy- If democracy is necessary for the growth of economic liberalism, it is therefore expected that the middle classes will be the vanguard of democracy. With variations in background including discrepancies in socio-economic conditions, the members of the classes might not be able to act equally well as advance consumers. However, it is not always the case that those who earn more know how to consume. In this respect, the survey also shows variations
in consumerist behaviour among the middle classes. The new middle class may come close to the capitalist class regarding the use of modern technology, such as home personal computers, mobile telephones, and pagers, which are considered exclusive gadgets for Thai people. As a result of increasing surpluses from the bubble economy and a more liberal policy for the import of luxury goods, the middle classes have also developed activities that in a way indicate a certain class status. For example, before the current economic crisis, the SO called new rich developed a higher living standard that included vacations abroad, wine tasting, sport club membership, or golf playing. Classes that have experienced those activities are the capitalist, the new middle class, and a
I
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Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
portion of the old middle class. It is clear though that the marginal and the working classes are cut off from such status symbol activities? Interestingly enough, although the middle classes are not exactly the same in their backgrounds and some aspects of their lifestyles, certain of their values are more or less the same, differing only by degree. Respondents give the first priority to a decent family life. This similarity cuts across classes, and might reflect how Thai people think in general and not apply specifically to class values. Yet, the new middle class is the leading group (75.6 %) that chooses a decent family life as its first priority, while the capitalist class comes last (64.7%) There are also signs of slight deviation within each class. The new and the marginal middle classes have shown concern for personal freedom and individualism (happy personal Izzy%), although this view is limited to a small number of respondents (Table 5). Table 5 No 1
2
3
4
5
(N)
First Priority in Life New middle
Old middle class Decent family life (69.6 % )
Marginal middle class
Worldng
Decent family life (70.6%)
Decent funnily
Successful
Successful
(8.6 % )
Economic security (16.7%)
Fame
Successful
(2.0%)
career (8.1%)
Capitalist class Decent family
class Decent family
life (64.7%)
life (75.6%)
Economic security
Happy personal life
(25.5% )
class life
(71.5%)
career
career
(11.5%)
(11.6 %)
Successful
Economic
Economic
career
security
security
(9.5% )
(8.9%)
(10.6%)
Happy
Feonomic
Happy
Happy
Happy
personal life (2.0%)
security
personal life
personal life
(7.2% )
personal life (3.2%)
(8.6%)
(6.8 %)
Successful career (2.0%)
]F1'eQdO1I1
Fame
(0.3% )
(0.8% )
Freedom (0.4%)
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
Source: Data from Anusom Lima fee et al. (1999). Notes: Respondents were asked to rank their first and the second priorities. Only the first priority is reported in this table.
Thai Middle Classes: Between Class Ambiguity and Democratic Propensity |
I 403 J
Class opinions are again similar when asked what are the important factors contributing to personal achievement. All classes indicate hard
work, education and intelligence, except the old middle class, which sees opportunity as coming before education (Table 6). This is understandable since most members of the petty bourgeoisie have not achieved their status on the basis of education. However, it is generally perceived that education is key for class up-grading. Therefore, it might be surprising to learn that the old middle class has ranked this point lower than others,
but yet not so low as to be discarded. In general, most respondents cutting across classes, pay attention to personal ability more than to the social and political system in achieving personal goals. The middle classes, besides thinking alike themselves, are not much different from others in this respect. The same line of opinion is also reflected again in the question on how the classes value the individual. The classes' reflections on criteria for valuing a person are based on the intrinsic qualities of individuals ability and moral standards. The middle classes again think alike and not much differently than the capitalist and the working classes. In emphasizing ability and moral standards instead of, for instance, wealth and political power, all classes are considered to be modernized(Table 7). Yet, middle class respondents do believe that the majority of society still regards wealth or affluence as significant criteria for valuing a person. Topics that might divide people's opinions are those that are more controversial, namely, premarital sexual relationships, the relevance of seniority, and the preference for women's subordination. If the middle classes
are consistent in their modern and liberal ideas, the responses on these issues should point in the same direction. However, the results of their
responses reveal ambiguities. 1) Opinions are divided between supporting and opposing premarital sexual relationships among all of the middle classes; 2) people clearly support the relevance of seniority. This unfortunately contradicts earlier responses of the middle classes themselves that indicate that they value persons for their abilities; and 3) responses on the preference for women's subordination are not as those for clear as other issues. Whereas the majority (84%) of the new and the marginal middle classes do not agree with the idea of women in suborfinate role, the old middle class falls short of the same percentage, with only 76% sharing that position.
404
l
Table 6 No
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Opinion on Most Important Factors for Achievement Capitalist class
Middle class
Working
Old
Marginal
class
Hard work (90.2%)
New Hard work (91.9%)
Hard work
Hard work
Hard work
(93.7%)
(89.6%)
(87.0%)
Education
Education
Opportunity
(86.3%)
(88.9%)
(85.7%)
Education (89.2%)
Education (86.0%)
3
Intelligence (84.3%)
Intelligence (81.9%)
Intelligence (83.3%)
Intelligence (77.0%)
Intelligence (67.1%)
4
Long vision
Opportunity
(77.8% )
Education (81_0%)
Opportunity (7'7.0% )
Social coimect
(66.7%) Opportunity
Long vision (75.0%)
Long vision (72.2%)
Long vision (70.3% )
1 2
5
(43.1%)
(50.2%) Family
background (48.8%)
6 7
8 9
(N)
Social connect
Social connect
(27.5%)
(51.1%)
Family background (23.5%)
Family background (43.9%)
(42.1%)
(52.8%)
Social connect (57.1%)
Social connect (59.1%)
Opportunity
Family
Family
background
background
Long vision (38.6%)
(44.4%)
Luck (17.6%)
Luck
Luck
Luck
Luck
(16.4%)
(25.4%)
(19.0%)
(15.9%)
Others (3.9%)
Others (6.9%)
Others
Others
Others
(8.7%)
(7.8%)
(3.9%)
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
Notes: -Respondents
were asked to weigh factors. Only answers for "most
important" are reported. -Other factors on the list, other than those listed above are: charm, human relations, politics, strength, power, money.
Source: Data from Anusorn Lima
fee
et al. (1999)-
In general, there is evidence that liberal thinking is only nascent among the middle classes and seems to appear more clearly among the marginal group than among others. In fact the middle class as a whole would have been labelled progressive if they were consistent in their liberal opinions. However, the new middle class has failed to meet our expectations in that they are advanced in their lifestyles but not
I
Thai Middle Classes: Between Class Ambiguity and Democratic Propensity
I
( 405 I l
consistent in their thinking. Finally, some conservative opinions are
observed among the old middle class that make them lag behind in keeping up with modern values.
Table 7
Opinions on Individual Value (%) Classes
Criteria Ability
Family background
Capitalist 51.0
New
Old
46.9
38.1
Marginal
37.2
2.0 7.1
Economic
Working 56.0
Total 100
1.9
100
0.7
1.4
100
1.9
1.9
100
affluence Work position
2.0
1.1
0.8
0.4
0.5
100
Goodness/ moral principles
21.6
43.1
39.7
45.0
32.4
100
More than one choice
23.5
6.1
7.1
10.0
4.8
100
2.8
7.1
4.8
1.0
100
100 (126)
100 (269)
100 (207)
Political power
No answer Total (N)
100 (51)
Source: Data from Anusom Lima
100 (360) fee
100 (1013)
et al. (1999).
3. The Concerns of the Middle Classes and Democratic Propensities Getting closer to reality, middle class concerns for social problems are for the kind that receive public attention. Respondents were asked to weigh
the seriousness of a list problems. The three problems ranked highest by the middle classes are narcotics, environment and corruption, which were much talked about by media at the time of the survey. The middle classes did not put much emphasis on fundamental problems such as human rights, employment, welfare, housing, social violence, public safety, etc. In this regard they differ from the working class and the capitalist class,
who indicated that they are most concerned with problems of consumer
|
1406 )
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
prices and public safety. The awareness of the middle classes on social problems is limited to some extent. This is supported by the fact that there is a larger percentage among the middle classes (from 21 oo/ to 33%) than among others who are not aware of the existence of NGOs. In order to get an idea of how liberal and democratic the middle classes are, their responses to a number of questions were scored from the least (score 1) to the most (score 4) democratic and liberal answers. The average scores from the two sets of 11 questions on liberal and the
democratic tendencies indicate that, 1) there is almost no difference among classes in propensities toward liberalism and democracy; and 2) the majority of respondents (above 90%) are considered in between the progressive and conservative categories, in other words, having moderate opinions toward liberalism and democracy.
Table 8
Liberal and Democratic Propensities of Classes Liberal propensity
Classes
Mean
Stv.Dev
Democratic propensity
Cases
Mean
Stv.Dev.
Capitalist
29.9474
2.5674
(38)
30.6875
2.5833
(32)
New middle
28.4139
2.3140
(244)
30.4083
3.1099
(218)
Old mjdd.le
28.7333
2.7051
(60)
29.5588
2.8357
(68)
Marginal middle
28.5292
2.6261
(156)
29.6284
2.8001
(148)
Lower
28.3203
2.2863
(128)
28.5726
2.2981
(117)
Entire population
28.5447
2.4649
(626)
29.7581
2.5833
(583)
Cases
Sources: Data from Anusom Lima fee et al. (1999). Note: 1. Liberalism and Democracy scores are derived from a set of 11 questions each, and the scores are ranged from 1 (least) to 4 (most). Therefore, the highest score for liberal and democratic is 44. 2. List of the 11 questions are shown in the appendix. 3. Responses for "no comment" are given 0 score, but are not included in
the mean calculation, so there are a lot of missing cases (38 and 42% in each respective category).
4. The mean value will be slightly lower if the "no comment" responses are included.
Thai Middle Classes: Between Class Ambiguity and Democratic Propensity
I
I
407
J
The respondents received an average score of 28.5 and 29.7, respectively, for questions on liberalism and democracy, while the
highest possible score is 44. It is therefore understood that all classes, which have similar average scores are tipping the scale a little bit over to the side of liberalism and democracy. The classes that received higher scores than the population average for questions on liberalism are the capitalist and the old middle class. This confirms the general perception that entrepreneurs dO not want too much state intervention. Concerning democracy, the leading classes receiving scores above the population average are the capitalist and the new middle class. The capitalist class seems to have a slight edge in this respect, while the working class lags behind_3
The level of public participation of the middle classes is not satisfactory. The only activity which induces participation by the middle classes members je in professional associations. Supporting charity organizations through donations is also a common practice and not confined to only the middle classes. Middle class participation in political activities such as casting and canvassing votes, joining protests, donating to political parties and discussing politics, are not remarkable either. Approximately one-third of middle classes respondents are involved in the above activities.
V. Conclusion There are different ways to analyze the middle classes: a) from political incidences, and, b) from survey data. Indeed, we are referring to two
realities, one based on interpretation of political actions and the other on the opinions of the class-members themselves. Based on the interpretation of political actions, the role of the middle classes in Thai political movements has been so prevailing that it has caught the attention of the mass media and academic writings. Yet, the data from the survey is not conclusive regarding middle class democratic enthusiasm. Skepticism about the role of the middle class in sustaining democratic transition seems to have gained more credibility. However, judging from the survey data, it is not because of middle class ambiguity in political stance, but rather the absence of strong democratic consciousness and the concern for social development. Among the middle classes themselves, differences and diversity can be observed in their background, but not so
as ..JI
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
much in their social values. Their lifestyles and some aspects of their social behaviour may differ, but differences in their public and political participation are minimal. In comparison with others, the middle classes do not show distinctive characteristics in their values and opinions. A number of them share a similar views with the capitalists and with the working class on some issues. A democratic propensity among the middle classes can be observed, but not on the scale previously expected. Within the middle classes, progressive tendengies are more commonly found among the new, and the marginal middle class, but less so among the old middle class. In short, the middle classes are comprised of both conservative and liberal elements. It has been taken for granted that the expansion of the middle classes will result in political transformation toward greater democracy. This is quite true in the sense that active citizens are the product of the middle
classes. In the case of Thailand, it is still too early to expect the middle classes to be sympathetic to the problems of the society at large while its members are sijll trying to maintain their own status. The data from the survey has confirmed that the middle classes' social conscience is not ripe, and there is no simple equation for achieving a full democracy by means of middle class expansion. An analysis of the middle classes in politics that is also sensitive to the parallel movements of the underpriviledged would likely be most fruitful.
Note 1. The survey of the middle classes in Bangkok relies on occupational classification in identifying classes. l
The capitalist class: large scale employers (>500 employees), investors in enterprises of a minimum of 50 million Baht. new middle class: professional and management work, including high level white collars, business persons, social service
. The
. The old middle class: petty bourgeoisie, including merchants, small workers.
scale business owners, and small family businesses. » The marginal middle class: clerical work, including low level white
.
collar, semi-or associate professionals, and the self-employed The working class: wage workers, employees in small enterprises, farmers.
Thai Middle Classes: Between Class Ambiguity and Democratic Propensity
I
(409
)
Analyses of consumption behavior and lifestyles must take into consideration differences in age, sex and marital status. The respondents in each of the classes do not exhibit similar qualities, which results in non-conformity of behavior. Some aspects of consumption behavior cannot be generalized, such as investment in children's education, which can be applied only to married respondents. 3. While there could be some theoretical explanations for this, it could also be attributed to a technical problem. The samples from the capitalist class might not be 100% distinguished from the middle classes, and the working class respondents were not keen in responding to those complicated social, economic and political questions, which resulted in a lot of missing data.
410
`>
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
I
Tables Table A
No 1 2
Awareness of Critical Economic, Social and Political Problems Middle class
Capitalist
Working class
class
New
Old
Marginal
Narcotics
Narcotics (89.7%)
Narcotics (90.5%)
Narcotics (92.9%)
Narcotics
(92.2%)
Public safety
Environment
Environment
Environment
Consumer
(82.4%)
(86.9%)
(81.7%)
(85.1%)
(89.4%) price
(74.9% ) 3
Environment
Corruption (80.8%)
Corruption (79.4%)
Corruption
(78.1% )
(72.5%)
Prostitution pornography
Prostitution and
Prostitution and
Prostitution and
Employment/
pornography
pornography
pomoraphy
(72.5%)
(65.0%)
(74.6% )
(75.8%)
welfare (72.5% )
Public Safety (61186)
Consumer price (72.2%)
Consumer price
Prostitution
(80.4%)
4
5
son
COI'I'UP
(64.7%)
(67.3%)
Environment
and
pornography (72.0%) 6
Violence against
Consumer price
Public safety
Public safety
Corruption
(59.7%)
(69.8%)
(66.5%)
(61.4 %}
,
(47.1%) 7
Education
Violence against
Violence against
Violence against
(45.1%)
women-children (52.2%)
1i11111l1111
WOITIEII-Chi.1dI'€-I'1'l
Violence against women-
(63.2%)
children
Consumer price
Education
Education
Education
(31.4%)
{46.1%]
Education (51.6%)
(51.7%)
(56.0%)
Human rights
Employment/
Employment/
Employment/
Public safety
(27.5%)
welfare
welfare
weLfare
(56.0%)
(36.9%)
(49.2%)
(51.3%)
Housing (25.5%)
Human rights (35.0%)
Human rights
Human n`ght
Employment/
Housing
(59.4%) 8
9
10 17
welfare
{46.0%) .
I-Iousing
(41.3%)
(49.8%)
Housing
Housing
Human rights
(30.8%)
(44.4%)
(39.0%)
(45.4%)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
(13.7%)
(N)
(51)
Note: Multiple responses sources: Anusorn Lima
fee
et
al.
.
(1999)
Thai Middle Classes: Between Class Ambiguity and Democratic Propensity
Table B
2.
Democracy
Do you agree that poverty is normal because there are always rich and poor?
5.
6.
7.
8.
2.
Do you agree that government should help small and medium scale more than large enterprises?
4.
1.
Do you agree that workers should have more bargaining power?
3.
3.
Do you agree that if the g o v e e n t , instead of private business, invests and operates industries, it will be beneficial for the work security of workers? Do you agree that one should solve
4.
one's own problems before helping society? Do you agree that regulating luxury goods is equivalent to interfering with individual rights? Do you agree with the idea that the taping private citizens telephone lines, by government officials for
5.
national security is acceptable? Do you agree with privatization of
6.
7.
8_
will lead
to economic
9.
disadvantage?
Do you agree that if we want a
Do you agree that our country can be fully democratized if only the people
are active and organized?
10. Do you agree that monopolies are hard to avoid in capitalism?
10.
government
should intervene more in people's activities ?
Do you agree that bad politics make
for a bad economy?
11. Do you agree that in order to solve economic crimes, the
Do you agree that severe punishrrient is the only effective measure for reducing crime? Do you agree that labor strikes and farmers protests generally cause chaos? Do you agree that the huge gap behlveen the rich and the poor is a barrier to democracy? genuine democracy, the bureaucracy must be reformed?
Do you agree that a lack of political
freedom
Do you agree that the middle classes should help solve economic problems rather than getting involved in politics? Do you agree that economic freedom is more important than political freedom? Do you agree that during recession, workers should also sacrifice by not asking for higher wages? Do you agree that the slow response to pollution problems is due to a lack of advance technology rather than poor performance of the authorities?
state enterprises? 9.
411
List of questions on Liberal and Democratic Propensities Liberalism
1.
I
11.
Do you agree that workers should
have the right to form labor unions in their enterprises?
Notes: Responses are in four scales: Absolutely Agree, Agree, Disagree, Absolutely Disagree
Sources: From the questionnaire of Anusorn Lima
fee
et al. (1999)
_
(
412
.}
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
References Anderson, B. R. O. 1977. Withdrawal symptoms: social and cultural aspects of the October 6 coup. Bulletin of concerned Asian scholars, 9 (July-September): 13-30. Anek Laothamatas. 1993. Business and Thai democracy. In Sungsidh Piriyarangsan & Pasuk Phongpaichit (Eds.), The middle class and Thai
democracy, pp- 155-194. (in Thai)
. 1997. Development and democratization: a theoretical introduction with reference to the Southeast Asian and East Asian Cases. In Anek Laothamatas (Ed.), Democratization in Southeast and East Asia. Chiangmai: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies/Silkworm Books . Anusorn Lima fee, Prudhisan Jumbala, Chantana Banpasirichote & Surichai Wun' Gaeo. 1999. The survey of middle classes in Bangkok. A report submitted to the Program for Southeast Asia Area Studies, Academia Silica, Taipei. Bangkok: Center for Social Development Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University. Banthorn, O. 1993. NGOs and Thai democracy. In Sungsidh Piriyarangsan & Pasuk Phongpaichit (Eds.), The middle class and Thai democracy, pp. 307-320. (in Thai) Callahan, W. C. 1996. Black May, NGOs and post-state politics. Journal of social sciences, Vol. 29, No, 2 (May): 82-89. Girling, J. L. S. 1981. Thailand: society and politics. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Kiatchai Sarnsawet. 7993. The participation of health personnel in the May 1992 crisis. journal of social sciences, Vol- 29, No.2 (May): 47-66. (In Thai]
Oekey, J. S. 1992. Business leaders, gangsters and the middle classes: societal groups and civilian Rule in Thailand. Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International. Freecha Piampongsan. 1993. The middle class: concepts and theories. In Sungsidh Piriyarangsan & Pasuk Phongpaichit (Eds.), The middle class and Thai democracy, pp. 67-90- (in Thai) Prudhisan Jumbala. 1992. National-building and democratization in Thailand :
a political history. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Research Institute. Siriporn Yodkamonsat. 1995. Social thoughtson the middle classes in Thailand. Master of Economics Dissertation, Department of
Thai Middle Classes: Between Class Ambiguity and Democratic Propensity
|
5413
l
Economics, Graduate School, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok. (In
Thai) Sungsidh Piriyarangsan. 1993. The workers, the urban poor and May 1992. In Sungsidh Piriyarangsan & Pasuk Phongpaichit (Eds.), The
middle class and Thai democracy, pp. 321-354. (in Thai) Sungsidh Piriyarangsan & Pasuk Phongpaichit. 1993. The middle class and Thai democracy. Bangkok: The Political Economy Centre, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University and Friedrich Ebert Stiftungs. (In Thai) . 1993. Introduction. In Sungsidh Piriyarangsan & Pasuk Phongpaichit (Eds.), The middle class and Thai democracy, pp. 11-26. (in Thai)
Surin Maisrikrod. 1997. The making of Thai democracy: a study of political alliances among the state, the capitalists, and the middle class. In Anek Laotharnatas (Ed.), Democratization in Southeast and East Asia, Asian Southeast of Institute Chiangrnai: 141-166. pp. Studies/Silkworin Books. Thongchai Wongchaisuwan. 1992. The political attitudes of businessmen. Thammasat University Political Science Faculty. Unpublished research report, edited in Anek (1993) . Voravidh Charoenlert. 1993. The middle class and May 1992. In Sungsidh Piriyarangsan Hz Pasuk Phongpaichit (Eds.), The middle class and Thai democracy, pp. 117-154. (in Thai)
10
Middle Classes in Bangkok Anusom Limmanee Chantal Banpusirichote Prudhisan lumbar Surickai Wun'Gaeo
I. Introduction 1. Background The survey from which this chapter is based a part of the larger project on South East Asian middle classes initiated by the Program for Southeast Asian Studies (PROSEA), Academia Sinica, Taiwan, which attempts to do a comparative analysis of the middle classes in South East Asia, including Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. The survey in Bangkok was carried out by the Center for Social Development Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University. It was conducted in May 1997, with a number of mail-questionnaires returned between July and August of the same year. This is the first attempt to conduct a survey of this scale in Bangkok, after much has been said about the middle classes and their roles in boosting up the bubble economy, as well as participaing in the political
uprising of the May Incident of 1992. A number of surveys, in fact, have been carried out by several agencies, but they were mostly concerned with middle class consumer behaviour. The purpose of this survey is to provide data for comparison of the middle classes in South East Asia.
It
is an exploratory survey, to get a sense of what the middle classes are in terms of their origins, life styles, values and behavior, political attitudes and public participation. The comparative perspective of the middle classes in South East Asia is focused on class mobility. As for the interests of the Thai survey team, middle class attitudes toward liberalism and democratic values are an important factor that will enable us to reflect on
1416
I
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
their roles in social and political reform. This interest stems from the current debate about the abiguous nature and roles of " middle classes" as prime actors for social change.
2. The Survey Data collection is based on the questionnaire survey of approximately 1,000 samples. The samples include three classes the capitalist (100), the middle (700), and the working class (200). These sample sizes were determined by PROSEA, Academia Silica for purposes of comparison among Southeast Asian countries. The capitalist and the working classes are meant to be control groups. The questionnaire was drafted with an effort to make the content comparable to the surveys in other countries, to the greatest extent possible. Contents are structured as follows:
--
(1) Background of respondents: bio-data, origins, family (2) Housing, neighborhood and lifestyle: neighbourhood household decision-making
investment in children extra/ supplements] economic activities selected social values and worldview
consumer behaviour, mass media consumption social engagement (3) Occupations and mobility occupations of immediate family members positions in occupations ' of employment industries
respondent comparative employment status with parents and spouse size of business change of employment (4) Class perceptions and attitudes existence of class
class divisions respondents and family class identification comparison of own class and the majority
comparison of past and present family class
Middle Classes in Bangkok
I
417
.1
perception on class mobility
attitudes on factors of personal achievement opinions on factors of class divisions (5) Opinions on economic, social and political situations
perceptions of critical problems
degree of liberalism degree of democratic values political participation
The survey covers only residents of Bangkok, except for the working class, the majority of whom were migrant-workers from various provinces. It was conducted during the university summer term-break, April and May 1997. Students were recruited to be enumerators, and had to attend an orientation on the questionnaire, sampling, and interview techniques. The majority of the respondents were interviewed by enumerators. However, a number of the respondents prefered to fill in the questionnaires by themselves. A mail-questionnaire was also used for respondents in the capitalist class, and was returned much later, in July and August 1997.
3. Identification of Classes and Sampling The classification of classes was done in the same manner as in every country-by breaking the middle classes into three sub-classes. It is assumed that the middle classes are rather diverse and cannot possibly fit
into one single type of occupation. The class scheme used in the analysis therefore consists of five groups: the capitalist, the new middle class, the
old middle class, the marginal middle class, and the working class. For practical reasons, this survey has to rely on occupation for classifying groups of respondents into classes. The operational definitions of different classes based on occupations are listed as follows:
The capitalist class: large scale employers (>500 employees), investors of minimum in an enterprise of a 50 million Baht. a The new middle class: professional and management work, including high level white collar, business persons, and social service workers. » The old middle class: petty bourgeoisie including merchants, and small scale business owners, small family business owner's.
( 418 `)
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
. The marginal middle class: clerical work, including low level white collar, semi or associate
professionals,
and employers in small
enterprises The working class: wage workers, employees in small enterprises, and farmers
.
Sampling in the capitalist group was not possible, because the respondents are not easily accessible. Lists of business people and
investors were gathered and questionnaires were distributed at the meetings of two major business associations, i.e., the Industrial Association of Thailand and the Chamber of Commerce. However, this
did not guarantee a satisfactory result, because only a few people were willing to fill in the questionnaires. An additional list of business people was obtained from MBA students at a state university, with the assistance of the instructor. There was still a problem, because not all of them were owners of businesses of the size that matched the capitalist
class. In short, sampling cannot be done for capitalist respondents. All returned questionnaires that fell into the capitalist operational definition
were included in the samples; yet, there were only 51 respondents from the expected 100. Sampling of the middle classes was done in a more systematic manner by using the structure of occupation in the Labour Force Survey, 1994, of the National Statistics Office. Seven hundred samples were drawn according to the distribution of occupations in the l a b o r force of the Bangkok population, taking also into consideration types of industry, status of work, and employment sectors (public, private and own enterprise). The middle classes, according to the Labour Force Survey, fall in most
categories of occupation. The categories are: professionals, administrative staff, clerks and employers in different industries, as well as some of the self-employed. This group excludes farmers, laborers and employees in
small enterprises. The category of enterprise owners could include both the capitalist and the middle classes, because the sized of enterprise is not shown in the statistics- This problem cannot be resolved. Therefore, the
proportion of samples in the category of enterprise owners are all treated as middle class.
Middle Classes in Bangkok _|-
419 -
Table 1
Sampling Framework
Categories of occupation
Labour force distribution
Male Employee z`n the
government sector Clerk/ official
Manager/admin. Professionals Employee in the private
11 .7
Female 13.4
Total
Samples distribution
Male
25.1
82
Female
Total
94
176
58 32
3.9
4.4
8.3
27
31
2.3
2.3
4.6
16
5.6
6.7 24.4
12.3
16 39
47
86
54.1
208
17]
379
14.1 0.5 9.7 5.0 0.4 1.3
30.1 4.2 19.3 15.3 0.8 1.7
116
30.0
sector
Clerk/while collar Manager Professionals
Enterprises Owners Commercial Factory
16.6 3.7 9.6 10.3 0.4
0.4
0.7
0.7
9.4
2.7
2.8
2.4
12.1 5.3
Sport/ entertainment Others Self-employment
26 66
99 4
3 3
68 35 3 9
66
19
20
17
72
5
215 30 /34
108 6
12 5 85 37
Working class
200
Capitalist class
100
Source: Labour Force Survey, Round 2, May 1994(Ban8kok).
It was more convenient to identify three locations for enumerators to look for respondents. These locations are government offices, business offices and small enterprises. A relatively large number of government departments, state enterprises, and private companies, including commercial banks, were listed for enumerators- The Office of the Civil Servant Commission was also a central place where questionnaires were distributed to respondents in the government sector. A number of streets
were also recommended to enumerators to look for small enterprises
and private companies.
The enumerators were advised not to interview
more than three people from any one place/ department. They used also instructed to note the gender and rank of respondents. Sampling of the working class group was not as problematic as it was-for the middle classes. This survey gave priority to wage workers, although a small number of employees in small shops or enterprises were also
included. For convenience sake, workers were interviewed on weekends
M
(. 420
/
I
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
when they were not at work. It was possible for the enumerators to be stationed at various recreational places, like shopping malls and public parks, to interview wage workers. A number of workers were also interviewed during their May Day activities. 4.
General Characteristics
of Respondents
The survey results do not meet the sampling framework exactly. The total. number of respondents are 1013, broken down into classes as
follows: a) Capitalist class b) Middle classes New Old Marginal c) Working class Total
51 755 360
126 269 207 1,013
The distribution of respondents is not so satisfactory because of a few short comings : (1) We were not able to interview as many capitalist respondents as expected, because of problems getting access to and responses from the group. In addition, our samples are not ideal, because some respondents are on the border between the capitalist and the upper middle class which, in reality, are difficult to distinguish. As a matter of fact, an operational definition of capitalist is not clear regarding asset and business size. lt is even more unfortunate that a number of respondent
did not specify the size of their businesses. Therefore, the capitalist samples might not be an effective control group, and it will assumed those in some cases their responses can be close to that of the middle classes. (2) The distribution of middle class samples is equally unsatisfactory. The samples are concentrated in the private sector, with a higher proportion of male respondents. This is attributed to the field supervision, in that there was repetition in the sample allocations for enumerators. The concentration of respondents in the private sector resulted in a large proportion of respondents of younger age. In other words, we have a large proportion for the new white collar group in the samples. However,
Middle Classes in Bangkok
|
1421
1
I
this should not distort the structure of the class because we still have enough samples in the old and the marginal middle classes. Table 2
General Characteristics of Respondents by Classes Capitalist class
Selected variables
Middle classes
New
Old
Marginal
Working class
49
35.3
41.3
28.5
27.3
(10.75) 2.6 : 1
(10.32) 1.7: 1
(11.41) 1.1 : 1
(6.74) 0.6 : 1
(886) 1.5 : 1
Monthly income
>100,000
category (% )1 Median size of enterprise2 (Std Dev] Median nulnber
(82.4) 300 mil. (1331458317}
10-30,000 (42.1)
l0-20,000 (43.1)
n.a
(50.2) n.a
(41108660)
>50,000 (38.4) 1 mil. (2964748)
7 (21.48)
5 (7.64)
n.a
n.a
(17405) 8.8 1
0.9:1
1.9:l
0.4:1
0.5:1
5.2
4.5
5.2
5.1
4.9
52.9
62.8
57.3
62.5
1.9
(51)
(360)
(126)
Mean age
(Std Dev)' Sex-male: female
of emp10yee53 (Std Dev) Marital status, married:single Mean family size Education
100
2 lrLil.
< 5,000
(% with B.A.) Sample size
[269]
(270)
Notes: 1. Monthly income (baht) is divided into categories, only the most numerous category of each class is reported in percentages, for each respective class (See Table 9).
2. There are a lot of missing cases, since not all respondents gave information regarding their enterprises. Number of valid cases are: 32 in the capitalist, 53 in the NMC, 78 in the OMC.
3. Number of valid cases for a question on the size of the enterprise (employees) are: 42 in the capitalist, 50 in the NMC, and 78 in the
OMC. 4. n.a. = less than 4 valid cases.
( 422
s
|
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
II . Backgrounds of Classes 1. Age and Educational Levels Concerning age, members of the middle class age groups surveyed are mostly under 59 years of age. The majority are between the 20 years old and the forties. Only the marginal middle classes respondents
are
younger, with about 60% of the total under 30. Otherwise, the rest of the
age-groups cohorts are relatively similar. As for the capitalists, about 80 % are above 40 years old. For the working class, nearly 800/, are relatively younger, i.e., under 40 (See Table 4). The educational levels of the surveyed middle class respondents are quite highs. On the average, about 50% are university or college graduates, of which the new and the marginals account for a higher proportion, 62.5%, while the old middle class accounts for only 37%. The proportions are similar for the capitalists. On the other hand, 78% of the working class has attained secondary school education or lower, and 11 % have finish high school. On average, over 70% of middle class respondents report having studied in Bangkok, which is a little less than the percentage in the capitalist class (around 85%). In contrast, about 90% of workers were educated in the provinces, and only 8% studied in Bangkok (See Tables 5 and 6). Table 3
Distribution of Respondents by Sex and Classes (%) Classes
Sex
Middle
Capitalist New
Male Female
72.5 (37) 27.5 (14)
Old
Total
62.5
53.2
36.8
60.9
54.7
(225) 37.2 (134)
(67l 46.8
(99) 62.8 (169) 0.4
(167) 39.1
(554) 45.1
(81)
100.0
100.0
100.0
100. 0
100.0
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
(1013)
(59)
0.3
(1)
(l ) (N)
Working
(457) 0.2 (2) 100.0
no answer Total
Marginal
Middle Classes in Bangkok
Table 4
I
423 /:`
Distribution of Respondents by Age and Classes (t,/ ) Classes
Age group
Middle
Capitalist New
below 30
Old
Working
Marginal
Total (N)
37.2
20.6
61.0
66.7
45.6
(134)
(26)
(164)
(138)
(462)
17.6
28.9
23.8
28.3
22.2
(9)
(104)
(30)
(76)
(46)
26.2 (265)
40-49
39.2
19.2
29.4
6.3
9.2
16.0
(69) 12.5
(37) 23.0
(19) 1.4
(29) 3.2
(3)
(98)
17.6
(45) 2.2
(17) 3.0 (8)
(162)
50-59
(20) 25.5 (13) (9)
(8)
(4)
30-9
above 60
0.4
2.2
(1) 1.1
(22) 0.5
0.4
(3)
(1)
100.0
100.0
(269)
(207)
(4) 100.0 (1013)
no answer
Total
100.0
(51)
(N)
Table 5
100.0 (360)
100.0 (126)
9.7
Level of Education (%) Classes
Level ofeducadon
Capit31ist
Middle old New 0.6
3.2
3.9
0.6
11.1
11.8
1.9
5.9
Vocational/ diploma B.A
11.8
M.A./ Ph.D.
Literate only
Elementary (6 yrs) Secondary (9 yrs)
High school (12 yrs)
(N)
Total
3.4
1.3
1.9
42.5
11.0
11.1
2.6
35.7
10.7
3.9
25.4
13.4
11.1
10.7
4.7
8.7
14.1
5.3
8.2
52.9
62.8
37.3
62.5
1.9
46.6
13.7
25.6
1.6
5.2
1.6
0.4
100.0
100.0 (360)
100.0
100.0 (269)
Chinese school Total
Working Marginal
(51)
(126)
11.4
0.3
100.0 (207)
100.0 (1013)
K
424
J
Table 6
|
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Place of Education Attainment (% ) Classes
Place
Capitalist
In the province
New
13.9
7.8
In the Bangkok
78.4
71.4
Abroad(foreign)
13.7
14.2
Chinese school
Middle Old Marginal 19.7 28.6
Total
100.0
(N)
Table 7
(51)
Total
89.9
32.5
7.7
59.0
64.3
75.8
4.8
4.1
7.4
1.6
0.4
0.3
No study
No answer
Working
0.6
0.8
100.0 (360)
100.0 (126)
1 .0
0.2
1.4
0.6
100.0
100.0
(269)
(207)
100.0 (1013)
Marital Status (%) Classes
Marital status
Capitalist
Married
Middle
86.3 9.8 3.9
50.3 0.8
0.3
0.8
0.4
1.4
1.4
0.8 100.0
0.8 0.8 100.0
0.7 1.9 100.0
100.0
41.7 54.1 1.5 0.6 0.8 1-4 100.0
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
(1013)
Widow/ widower Living separately Divorced ]ust living together
100.0
(N)
Table 8 Religion Buddhist Cristian Catholic Islamic
No religion Total (N)
Total
Old 60.3 32.5 4.8
Single
Total
Worldng
New 46.4
(51)
Marginal 26.0 70.3 0.7
31.4 63.8 1.0
2.4
Religion ( % )
Capitalist 98.0
New
94.4 3.3
Classes Micicle Old 97.6
Marginal 95.2 0.7 0.4 3.7
Working
. Total
97.6
95.9
1.0
1.6
2.2
2.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
0.1 2.4 0.1 100.0
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
(1013)
1.4
2.0
Middle Classes in Bangkok
Table 9
Income Level (%)
Income level
Capitalist
100,000 (> 3,900$US)
Others Total (N)
2.
I 425 )
I
Classes Middle
New
dh
Marginal
Working
Total
0.8
0.8
1.5
50.2
8.9
10.4
32.0
43.5
21.7
23.3
17.6
43.1
5.7
23.1
11.2
18.8
1'7.6
11.5
11.9
2.0
13.3
9.6
4.5
7.3
3.9
8.3
5.6
1.5
4.2
9.8
18.3
23.2
4.5
11.1
82.4
7.8
15.2
1.1
9.1
2.0
0.6
0.4
0.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
100.0
100.0
(207)
(1013)
Place of Origins
On average, about 50% of middle class respondents are natives of Bangkok while around 20% or less are from other urban areas, and a little more than a quarter are from rural areas (See Table 10). This is in contrast with the workers, who are overhelrningly rural (87%), with only 13% from coming from urban areas including Bangkok. 69% of Capitalists are Bangkokians, and less than a quarter originate in rural
areas. When compared with place of education (Table 5), it is clear that at least 20% of the middle classes came to Bangkok for educational purpose, despite originating elsewhere.
As for their fathers, one third of the middle class are natives of Bangkok, about one-fifth are from other urban areas, and about another one third care from rural areas. The fathers of working class respondents are mostly (89%) from the rural areas, with only 10% coming from urban areas, including Bangkok.
L
426
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
I
Table 10
Place of Origin (%) Respondents classes
Flace of origin
Capitalist
Middle
Urban area
23.5 7.8
24.4 22.5
Old 28.6 11.9
Native Bangkok
68.6
52.8
57.1
Rural area
New
Foreign country
Working
Marginal 32.0 26.8
40.9
87.0 10.1
39.7 19.1
2.9
40.8
2.4
0.3
Other
Total
0.3 0.2
0.4
No answer Total
(N)
3.
100.0
100.0
(51)
(360)
100.0 (126)
100.0
100.0 (207)
(269)
100.0 (1013)
Housing Status and Neighborhood
'ut
On average, 40% of middle class respondents live single detached houses, and about one-fifth live in town-houses, flats or condominiums. Members of the o.ld middle class live least comfortably compared with the other sub-classes, with 45% living in shop houses the housing conditions of workers are not much poorer (Table 13] . Table 11
Place of Origin of Respondents' Fathers (%) Classes of respondents' father
Place of origin
Total
Middle
Capitalist
Working
New
Old
Marginal
Rural area
33.3
33.1
29.4
43.1
Liao
46.7
Urban area
7.8
21.1
12.7
25.7
8.2
18.0
Native Bangkok
45.1
34.7
38.1
29.0
2.4
27.5
Foreign counlTy
13.7
10.0
19.8
2.2
0.5
7.4
Other
0.6
0.2
No answer
0.6
0.2
Total
(N)
100.0
100.0
100.0
700.0
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
100.0
100.0
(207)
(1013)
Middle Classes in Bangkok I
Table 12
(
427
21
Types of Neighborhood (%)
Types of neighborhood
Classes
Capitalist
Middle
Mostly single houses, residental area
51.0
New 22.2
New settlement, full services New settlement,
13.7
9.2
3.9
Old 13.5
Marginal
Working
Total
21.9
22.2
22.5
3.2
4.8
1.9
6.0
26.4
15.9
22.3
3.9
18.5
9.8
21.4
31.0
27.5
36.2
26.7
Crowded Local market area
7.8
3.1 5.8
6.3 10.3
5.6 6.3
17.4 8.2.
6.9 7.1
Commercial
9.8
8.9
14.3
8.2
2.9
8.2
3.9
3.1
5.6
3.0
6.8
4.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
0.2 100.0
(51)
(360)
(126)
0.4 100.0 (269)
0.5
100.0
(207)
(1013)
average level Mixed types of
houses, but not crowded
area Others: shop
houses, flat and apartment f, etc.
No answer Total
(N)
We found that, on average, about 40% of the middle class own their
housing. Only 26% of the marginal middle class does so, while nearly half of the old middle classes and 42% of the new middle class own their
homes. About one-fifth rent from others. Surprisingly, quite a few still live with their parents, who own the house: 44% of the marginals, one-third of the new and nearly one-fifth of the old. These ownership situations contrast with those of the capitalists and the workers. About 84% of the capitalists own their houses, while only 11% of the workers do so. Nearly half of the workers rent from others and 27% live with their parents. As for housing neighborhood, conditions among the middle class are quite comfortable. More than two-thirds live in either a single house, a
(428
)
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
I
new settlement, or in mixed-types of housing that are not crowded. Certainly the capitalists have an even better situation, with more than half living in single houses. In contrast, about one quarter of the working class live in crowed houses, in markets, or in commercial areas. Table 13
Types of Housing (%) Classes
Types of housing
Middle
Capitalist
Marginal
Working
Total
New
Old
78.4
52.2
31.0
45.0
39.1
46.3
Duplex (twirl house)
3.9
2.5
1.6
4.1
1.0
2.6
Townhouse
3.9
18.6
16.7
17.8
5.8
14.8
Single detached
Flat
3.9
-
8.2
11.6
5.9
Condominium
5.6
16
78
1.4
4.8
14.7
45.2
12.3
27.1
20.0
Apartment
0.8
1.6
1.5
6.3
2.2
Others: donnifonj, slzzm, factors
1.7
2.4
3.3
7.7
3.4
100.0 (360)
100.0 (126)
100.0 (269)
100.0
100.0
(207)
(1013)
Shop-house
No answer
Total (N)
100.0
(51)
What is interesting is that while more than half of the middle class
respondents do not have extra houses, about one-fifths do, and have them in the Bangkok metropolitan area, while about 10% have extra
housing in a rural or a provincial town (See Table 15). Among the middle class respondents who have extra housing, the percentage for the old middle class is 30, for the new 22 and for the marginal, 20%. Almost 50 % of the capitalists have the extra housing in Bangkok or in other resort areas.
1
Middle Classes in Bangkok
Table 14
Housing~Ownership Status (% ) Classes
Ownership
Self (/ Spouse) Rent
Capitalist 84.3
2.0
Mortgaged Parents' Relatives' Employers' Government house
9.8 2.0
Others: friend,
2.0
Middle New 41.7
Old 48.4
12.8 2.2 32.5 6.4
25.4 1.6
Marginal
20.8 19.7
Working
Total
11.1
32.9
47.3
22.7 1.6 31.7
2.2
2.8
as
44.2 7.8 &4 30
1.7
1.6
1.5
2.9
7.9
100.0
0.8 100.0
0.4 100.0
100.0
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
0.2 100.0 (1013)
19.0 2.4
-
27.1
1.4
1.7 2.2
2.4 7.7
5.2
rtzother-in-law, temple, slum
No answer Total
(N)
Table 15
al
100.0 (51)
Location of Extra Housing (%) Classes
Second
Capitalist
Middle New 55.6
Working
Total
Old
Marginal
55.6 44.4 30.2
66.2 33.5
85.5
64.3
13.5
35.0
19.7
9.7
19.5
1.6
1.9
None Extra housing In Bangkok
51.0 49.0 17.6
Resort towns
5.9
43.3 21.7 2.2
Provinces
3.9
'7.5
7.1
6.7
5.6
Rural area
2.0
4.4
2.4
4.1
5.6
Bangkok & Resort
9.8
3.1
Bangkok &
3.9
1.9
1.6
0_4
5.9
2.5
1.6
0.4
100.0 (51)
1.1 100.0 (360)
100.0 (126)
0.7 100.0 (269)
1.8
Abroad 1.6 0_5
1.3
provincial town
Others: dyterenf places/
1.5
suburban/ in
provinces No answer Total (N)
1.4 100.0 (207)
0.9 100.0 (1013)
I 430
1
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
|
III. Social Values of the Middle Classes The attitudes of Bangkok's middle classes on selected social values are quite interesting. Here we focus on their attitudes toward four issues: pre- marital sex, the seniority principle in modern social and economic life, the role of women, and support for NGOs. First, premarital sex: on the whole, the middle classes are a little more liberal than the capitalist ('85,5%), and about as liberal as the working class (45.9%) Among the sub-classes, the marginal are the most liberal (50%) on the question of pre-marital sex, followed by the new (43.9%) and the old (39.7%) Second, on the seniority principle, most of the middle classes do not agree that it is not relevant anymore (about 85% on average), which is higher than the working classes (76%) and lower than the capitalist classes (90.2%) Table 16
Opinion on Selected Social Values (%)
Selected social values
Classes Capitalist
New
Middle Marginal Old
Working
TotaI
Premarital sex l
Agree
• Not agree
. No comment Total
(N)
43.9
39.7
50.2
38.6 17.5
34.1
36.4 13.4
13.0
16.2
100.0 (360)
100.0
100.0 (269)
100.0 (207)
100.0
11.8 83.8 4.5
12.7
9.0
18.8
82.5
87.7
75.8
12.2 83.3
4.8
3.4
5.3
4.5
100.0 (51)
100.0 (360)
100.0 (126)
100.0 (269)
100.0 (207)
100.0 (1013)
39.2
58.8 2.0
9.5 84.1 6.4
14.3 76.2 9.5
10.4 85.1 4.5
28.0 66.2 5-8
15.6 78.4 5.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
100-0
100.0
100.0
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
(1013)
35.3 54.9 9.8 100.0
(51)
26.2 (126)
45.9 41.1
45.0
38.8
(1013)
Irrelevance of
seniority principle Agree Not agree • No comment
Total (N) Women should remain inferior role
Agree • Not agree
I
»
No comment
Total
(N)
Middle Classes in Bangkok
I
I
431
`l
Third, on the-role of women, the middle class respondents express the highest degree of disagreement with the norm that emphasizes an inferior role for women (more than 80%), while the capitalists are more conservative (38.8%) and the working classes in the middle (66-2%)
On the attitudes towards supporting non-governmental organizations (NGOs), about 5% of Bangkok's middle classes are supportive, compared to 68.7% of the capitalists and slightly more among the working classes (Qee Tables 16, 48).
Table 17
Decision-making in the Household (%)
Subject
Self
Spouse
Both
Parents
A11
Others
Total--
Capitalist class (51) Financial
25.5
2.0
62.7
2.0
7.8
Housing (buy/f rent)
21.6
3.9
62.7
2.0
9.8
Child education
15.7
2.0
64.7
Purchase of properties
23.5
2.0
64.7
Financial
33.6
3.6
272
20.8
12.5
2.3
100.0
Housing (buys rent)
27.5
2.8
30.0
18.1
14.4
7.2
100.0
Child education
11.4
2.2
27.5
4.2
4.2
50.6
100.0
Purchase of properties
33.3
3.1
31.9
11.1
18.1
2.5
100.0 100.0
3.9 I
100.0 100.0
13.8
9.8
100.0 100.0
New middle class (360)
Old middle class (126) Financial
46.8
4.0
27.8
11.1
8.7
1.6
Housing (buy/ rent)
35.7
4.8
35.7
10.3
9.5
4.0
100.0
Child education
12.7
2.4
37.3
6.3
41.3
100.0
Purchase of properties
36.5
3.2
40.5
7.1
11.9
0.8
100.0
I*/largNiril middle class (269) Financial
34.2
1.5
14.5
33.5
74.1
2.2
100.0
Housing {b1.1y/ rent)
30.5
3.3
13.8
30.1
17.8
4.5
100.0
5.2
1.1
11.2
8.9
3.7
69.9
100.0
33.8
2,2
16.4
24.2
21.2
2.3
100.0
Child education
Purchase of properties Working class (207) Financial
28.5
6.8
16.4
33.3
14.5
0.5
100.0
Housing (buy/ rent)
32.4
1.9
18.4
30.9
11.6
4.8
100.0
5.3
1.0 2.4
21.3
26.6
2.9
43.0
100.0
21.3
32.4
12.1
6.8
100.0
Child education
Purchase of properties
25.1
I 432 )
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
I
Table 18
Respondents Business Size, Baht and Employees (only business owners) (%) Classes
Business size
Capitalist
Middle New
Old
Marginal
Working
Total
Business size/ business asset
. Below 50
.
Might.
• Over 100 Might.
. .
25.5
14.4
61.9
50-100 MBht.
No answer
No business
Total
(N)
2.6
14.8
11
51.0
0.6
15.7
3.1
2.8 11.1
1.1
4.3
4.4
7.8
81.9
27.0
96.3
95.7
78.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
(1013)
25.5
13.3
61.9
2.2
14.3
0.8 0.4
1.3
Number of employee
-
.
1-50 persons
. 101-500
23.5
0.3
19.6
0.6
• Over 500
15.7
51-100
. No answer
. No business Total
(N)
1.4
0.8
7.8
3.9
10.3
1.1
4.3
4.2
7.8
81.9
27.0
96.3
95.7
78.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
(1013)
Middle Classes in Bangkok
Table 19
1433 ]
I
First Priority in Life (5) Classes
No.
Capitalist
middle Old Happy family life (69.6)
Happy family
Economic security (16-7)
Successful career (11.5)
Successful
personal life (8.6) Successflll
Successful
Economic
Economic
career
career
security
security
(8-1)
(9.5)
(8-9)
(10.6)
Happy personal life (6-8) Freedom
New
1
Happy
Happy family life (75.6)
2
family life (64.7) Economic security (255 Fame (2.0)
3
4
5
Happy
life (70.6)
Happy personal life (2.0)
E¢:ono1:rLic
Happy
security
persons] life
(7.2)
(3-2)
Happy personal life (8.6)
Successful
Freedom
Fame
Freedom
career (2.0)
(0-3)
(0~8)
(0.4)
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(N)
Working
Marginal
Happy family life (71.5) career [11.6)
(207)
Notes: Respondents were asked to rank the first and the second priority. Only the first priority is reported in this table-
Table 20
Pattern of Exclusive Consumption (%) Classes
Use of selected products
Middle
Capitalist Norw
Mobile telephone
96.1
60,8
Pager
3..3
Credit card
98.0
Home computer
(N)
Old
Marginal
59.5
37.2
38.6
28.6
63.1
53.2
74.5
55.3
(51)
(360)
Working
Total
1.9
44.1
34.6
4.3
29.2
37.9
5.3
45,1
35-7
32.3
2.4
36.9
(126)
[269]
(207)
(1013)
(
434 'I
Table 21
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
|
Favorite Exclusive Leisure Activities (%) Classes
Favorite activities
Capitalist
New
14.7 31.7 10.6
Middle Marginal Old 7.4 12.7 27.1 25.4 26 95
Working
Total
Golf playing
56.9 33.3 31.4
Vacation abroad
33.3
20.8
21.4
10.8
1.0
26.5 7.2 14.8
(N)
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
(1013)
VvjIqg drinking Sport dub member
2.4
12.1
15.5
Note: Multiple Answers.
Table 22
Investment in Child Extra Activities (%) Classes
Type of activities
Music and arts Sports Foreign language Computer Tutorial session
Capitalist
Middle New
Old
39.2 33.3 54.9 58.8
12.5 11.7 12.5
8.7 9.5
54.9
13.3 0.8
(51)
(360)
Others: cheer leader (N)
17.2
Marginal 2.6
Worldng 2.4 2.4
3.7
Total 8.7 8.5
4.3
11,2
4.3 5.8 0.5
14.2 13.7
1.6
2.6 4.5 5.6 0.4
(126)
(269)
(207)
19.0 24.6 28.6
0.7 (1013)
Note: Multiple Answers.
Table 23
Strategies for Solving Income Insufficiency (%) Classes
Strategies
I
Capitalist
Reduce expenses/
.
save more Borrow extra work
Others: borrow from
Middle Old
78.4
71.2
56.0
Marginal 65.1
11.8
14.7
19.6 5.9
3.6 52.4 5.3
14.4 6.4 48.0 6.4
(51)
(360
(126)
Fawn shop visit
• Overtime or
-New
Working
Total
54.1
64.5
12.6 7.1 56.5 5.9
16.3 8.6 1.4
14.3 5.7 51.2 4.8
(269)
(207)
(1013)
51.7
parents or relatives and friends, government bank loan, montage
(N)
Note: Multiple Answers.
Middle Classes in Bangkok
Table 2.4
I
I 435
Respondent Other Economics Activities (%) Classes
Other economic activities
Middle
New l
Sales
Total
Capitalist
Old
Working Marginal
5.9
9.4
7.9
14.1
1.0
8.6
33.3
16.7
5.6
8.6
1.0
10.8
39.2
8.1
5.6
4.5
0.5
6.8
70.6
19.4
24.6
5.2
1.0
15.1
2.0
0.3
0.8
1.1
5.9
5.0
11.9
5.6
representative
. Stock market
investment .I
Stock market
exchange
• Real estate inveshnent
. Foreign currency
0.6
exchange
.
jewelry
trading
• Antique trading
Extra work/ overtime work I
.
Lottery (legal and underground)
.
Other:
3.9
5.8
3.9
0.6
0.8
1.9
1.0
1.2
7.8
23.1
68
7.1
10.1
13.3
15.7
21.1
27.0
34.9
59.9
321.2
5.9
11.1
12.7
11.2
11.1
11.1
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
taxi' diver, trading, underground money lender, consultancy' work, typist,
translator (N)
{1013)
I
1436
L
1
Table 25
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Opinion on Most Important Factors of Achievement (%) Classes
No.
Middle
Working
Capitalist
New Hard Work (90.2)
Hard Work (91~9)
Old Hard Work (93.7)
Education (86.3)
Education
Opportunity
Education
(88.9)
(85.7)
(89.2)
(86.0)
3
Intelligence (84.3)
Intelligence (81.9)
Intelligence (83.3)
Intelligence (77.0)
Intelligence (67.1)
4
Long vision (66-7)
Opportunity (77.8)
Education
Opportunity
(81.0)
(77.0)
Social connect (50.2)
Opportunity (43.1)
Long vision (75.0)
Long vision
Long vision (70.3)
Background
Social
Social
connect
connect
Social connect
connect
(27.5)
(51.1)
(57.1)
(59.1)
1 2
5
(72.2)
Marginal }{and Work
Hard Work
(89.6)
(87.0) Education
Family (48.8)
6
7
8
9 (N)
Notes:
Social
Opporhmity (44.4) Long vision (38.6)
Family
Family
Family
Background
Background
Background
(43.9)
(42.1)
(52.8)
Luck (16.4)
Luck {25.4)
(19.0% )
Luck (15.9)
Others
Others
Others
Others
Others
(3-9)
(6~9)
(8-7)
(7.8)
(3.9)
(360)
(12.6)
(269)
(207)
Family Background (235) Luck (l7.6)
(51)
- Respondents were asked to
Luck
weigh those faetors.Only the answers for "most important" are reported. - Others: Charm, human relations, politics, strength, power, money.
Table 26
'm
Middle Classes
Bangkok
I
I 437 ,I
Criteria for Valuing a Person: Perception of Societal Values
and Own Values (%) Classes
Criteria
Capitalist
New
Old
Marginal
Working
Total
Perception of societal value 21.6
8.1
11.9
6.7
20.3
100
Family background
3.9
2.8
0.8
5.6
5.8
100
Economic affluence
Ability
37.3
63.6
56.3
62.8
42.0
100
Work positions
2.0
11.1
8.7
6.3
14.0
100
Poliiical power Goodness/ moral
5.9
6.4
7.9
5.9
4.8
100
1.1
0.8
1.1
8.2
100
27.5
3.1
7.1
6.3
2.9
100
2.0
3.9
6.3
5.2
1.9
100
100.0
principles
More than one choice No answer
(126)
100.0 (269)
100.0
(51)
700.0 (360)
100.0
(N) Own value
(207)
100.0 (1013)
Ability
51.0
46.9
38.1
37.2
56.0
100
Total
Family background
2.0
Economic affluence Work positions
7.1 2.0
Goodness/ moral principles
21.6
More than one
23.5
choice
No answer Total
100
(n)
(51)
43.1
100
0.7
1.4
100
1.9
1.9
100
0.8
0.4
0.5
100
39.7
45.0
32.4
100
1.1
Political power
1.9
6.1
7.1
10.0
4.8
100
2.8
7.1
4.8
1.0
100
100 (360)
100
(126)
100 (269)
100 (207)
100 (1013)
(. 438 .}
IV. 1.
|
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Class Perceptions and Attitudes Class Structure
Respondents in all classes and class categories perceive Thai society to be divided into classes to roughly the same degree (Table 27). The capitalists are most certain about this (98%). The middle classes range in their opinions from the new middle class (93.6%), to the marginal middle class (92.9%) and the old middle class (89.6%) The working class is aware of class divisions to an extent similar to that of the new middle class (93.3%). Interestingly, the old middle class, most of whom are merchants and traders, are the least convinced of the existence of class division's (9.6%). The reason for this may be that, among the middle classes, this part of the old middle class is comprised of people who have experienced the least amount of generational mobility (see Table 35) and have had the fewest opportunities to encounter symptoms of class division.
2. Classification of Classes In terms of the classification of classes, Table 27 shows that the capitalist the prefer (50.8-56.9%) classes middle the and (43.1 %) "high-middle-low" classification to any other, while the working class prefers the simpler "rich-poor" classification. This does not seem odd since it reflects everyday language. Interestingly though, the capitalists also prefer the "rich-poor" division (33.3%). Here the influence of everyday language can be discounted. Perhaps the capitalists expressing this preference would like to deny the middle classes a separate existence
and to see all people below them as poor. While the middle classes as a whole are strongest among the respondents in favouring the first type of classification, the old middle class exibits a deviance 25.4% of them express preference for the simpler "rich-poor" classification. These data re-enforce our earlier observation about the more static experience of the OMC and its influence on their perceptions. However, it must be pointed out that the extent of deviance from the other middle class categories is not great.
Middle Classes in Bangkok |
r I 439
1
3. Distribution of Thai Classes Table 27 shows that respondents vary greatly on the question of which class makes up the majority, or is the most numerous class in Thai society. While most of those in all the middle classes and in the working class identify the middle class as the most numerous (NMC 48.9%, OMC 60.3%, MMC 56.9% and WCL 54.1 %), only 15.7% of the capitalists do so. Most of them (58.8%) see the lower class (lower plus poor) as the most numerous. Their perception appears to be closest to objective data? The middle classes' identification of themselves as the most numerous appears to be an exhibition of wishful thinking or else one based on Bangkok, rather than Thai society as a whole. The latter explanation would also hold true for the perception held by the working class, 34.8% of whom identify the lower class (poor plus lower) as the most numerous. Another interesting figure is that 6.2% of the lower class perceive the upper (rich plus upper) class to be the most numerous, compared with 84.8% who perceive the lower (poor plus lower) to be the most numerous. A much smaller percentage of the middle classes see the upper class as the majority class. It indicates that a small but significant part of the working class still perceive a large gap between themselves and the middle classes that leads them to categorize the latter as part of the upper class.
4. Own Class A great majority (over 85%) of the middle classes identify themselves as in the middle classes (Table 28). This willingness to concur with the
researchers' objective assessment is not shared as strongly by the capitalist and working classes. Only 42.5% of working class respondents are willing to place themselves in the lower classes. On the other hand, 56.1 % prefer to label themselves as middle class (Table 28). This finding is interesting in that it indicates a strong aspiration to belong to the middle class, an aspiration which likely reflects a process of embourgeoisement, or the greater enjoyment of affluence, since 45.9% of working class respondents feel their incomes to be close to that of majority (which 54.5% of the working class identify as the middle class) (Tables 28 and Table 27). Some 30% of capitalists prefer to be seen as middle class. These tendencies to self-identify as middle class, when objectively belonging to
f
440
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
a different class, needs to be carefully analyzed. Do the indicate a willingness to be mobilized with the middle classes, for instance, on political issues? If so, class alliances, particularly between the middle and working (or lower) classes, would be more likely to occur.
5. Income Comparison with Majority Class Concerning income comparison with the majority class, the three middle class categories varied in their assessments (Table 28). Few of the MMC (10.4%) think they have higher incomes than the majority class, a reflection of their marginality. The NMC fared best of all (34.3%) followed by the OMC (22.4%). This is as expected.
A possible additional observation that can be made from examining Tables 27 and 28 together is that while the middle classes appear to use income as an important criterion in class classification, it is clearly not the only criterion. 6. Conflict between Classes Turning now to respondents' opinions on conflict between classes (Table 51), one finds that the majority in all classes either absolutely agree or agree with the statement that "people from different social classes have conflicts of interests." The combined figures are 82.4% for the capitalists, 64.7% for the NMC, 55.5% for the OMC, 67.7% for the MMC and 79.7% in the working class. Given the high scores across the board, it can be said that most respondents find conflict of interest between people in different classes a normal, everyday occurrence, or a normal state of affairs. As such, it does not appear to have the connotations of class conflict
or class antagonism in the theoretical sense. Nonetheless, if one looks only at the "absolutely agree" scores, one can see that the lower classes, the MMC and the working class have higher scores (13.4% and 16.9% respectively). This might be an indication of a propensity towards class struggle or antagonism on the part of some of these lower classes. A slightly lower degree of class awareness or consciousness can be detected among the NMC (12.8%), who occupy managerial positions. In other words, everyday conflict of interest between classes is most vividly felt in
everyday contacts in the workplace and i t s natural that those in the classes who have constant contact with each other should feel it more than others.
Whether this could develop into class conflict qua classes
remains a matter of conjecture.
Middle Classes in Bangkok
7. Factors
I
( 44]
'I
.*
of Class Division or Indicators of Class Interest
Table 31 (items 31.1-315) attempts to discover opinions regarding factors of class division with a more specific set of statements to which respondents are asked to absolutely agree, agree, disagree or absolutely disagree. These are quite revealing. In answer to the first question of this set: Do you agree that "poverty is normal because there are always the rich and the poor"? (Table 31, item 31.1) a clear majority in each of the classes "absolutely agree" or "agree,"
'increase
This acceptance of a hierarchy of rich and poor confirms our earlier observation of the unlikelihood of class conflict of a class struggle kind. Two questions in this set concern opinions on whether "workers should have more bargaining power vis-a-vis the government and business enterprises"(Table 31, item 312) and whether "workers or employees should have the right to form a l a b o r union in their own enterprises" (Table 31, item 31.5). These yield interesting results. As much as 87% of the working class absolutely agree or agree that workers should have more bargaining power, and 84.5% agree with the right to form unions, presumably as a means to do so. The same sort of percentages apply to the marginal middle class. Thus, while these two lower classes see a hierarchical society as normal, they are not resigned to accepting it as an entirely unalterable condition. They try to improve their standing within the hierarchy, even by banding together horizontally as in l a b o r unions. Thus, unionization is very much an accepted mode of collective action to workers' bargaining power vis-a-vis employers, whether they be representatives of the state or of private interests.
Given this support for an increase in workers' bargaining POWEIT and unionization among the working class and marginal middle class respondents, it is interesting to find a significant level of support for both, though of a lower percentage, among the new middle class respondents. If these are their true opinions, it would bode well for Thai industrial relations. However, this conclusion is clearly over-optimistic, given that capitalist respondents have the opposite tendency, nearly 50% of them see an increase in workers' bargaining power and the right to form l a b o r unions as absolutely undesirable or undesirable. The data suggests another very important situation. It is that new middle class managers and administrators are very much in the classic
contradictory class position that befalls the middle class, of having to act
442
I
I
I
_I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
»l
on behalf of employers or the capitalist class and yet are themselves employees with interests at times similar to those of other employees in the working class. In view of the current public policy concern about privatizing public (state) enterprises, respondents were asked __'Flo you agree that if the government invests more in or nationalizes industries rather than privatizes them, workers would be more secure in their jobs?" It must be noted that this is a situation specific question and relates directly to job security, rather than a more philosophical one with broader implications, such as to indicate preference for a socialist economy. Table 31, item 31.4 sets out the responses to this question. Taking the "absolutely agree" and "agree" together, one finds that 73.2% of the working class concur with the statement. Since private sector employees account for 90.9% of our working class respondents (Table 35), this is a high percentage indeed. While one would expect public enterprise employees to concur, the fact that private sector employees do so in such numbers suggests either that the question was a leading question in its emphasis on job security or else that private sector employees are considerably concerned about job security and see public enterprise employment as the panacea. Given that the field study period was at the onset of the financial crisis with lay-offs impending, these responses are to be expected. However, this tendency to see the state as the guarantor of job security is definitely not shared by any of the other classes, including the marginal middle class, with higher levels of education and hence greater understanding. Significantly, the percentage of NMC respondents agreeing with the statement closely matches the percentage
of the class category who were employed in government service and in
the state enterprises (25.5% as against 32%, the latter figure in Table 35). On the surface, their responses appear to reflect their own concerns for
job security. Yet, when the responses of the OMC (all of whom are in the private sector-Table 35) are brought in for comparison, one finds that 23.2% of them also concur. Therefore, the effect of the leading question cannot be discounted. As expected, the capitalists disagreed in great
numbers (86 %). The responses to the question whether respondents agreed that "the government should help small and medium-sized companies more than larger enterprises" reveal that respondents are not in favour of a socialist economy controlled by the state. It would appear diet middle class and working class respondents are all overwhemingly in favour of this,
Middle Classes in Bangkok |
(443
)
scoring over 80% if those absolutely agreeing and agreeing are aggregated. This contrasts with the capitalists' 49.1% It seems as if most Bangkokians are aspiring to become small or mid-sized entrepreneurs; indeed a return to Thai roots of small entrepreneurial farmers who
pushed the land frontier at the turn of the century. It must be noted that they look to the state for help, another traditional trait. Alternatively, it can be argued that this is an expression of opposition to big business, which most Thais feel has had the politico-economic structure in its favour for many decades. Examining figures for each middle class category, one can make some more specific observations. The NMC, most of whom are private sector managers, want to establish their own businesses. The OMC are already operating small and medium-sized enterprises and thus 23% of them absolutely agree (the highest percentage). The marginal middle class have similar aspirations to the NMC and exhibit similar percentages. The capitalist is the only class split into half between those agreeing and
those disagreeing. This may be dependent on the size of their enterprises, By way of summarizing this set of opinions regarding factors of class division, one can say that all the middle classes accept as natural the existence of class division or hierarchy but are at the same time definitely liberal in favour of workers' rights and unionization. The contradictory class position of the NMC appears quite clear. They are already small or medium-sized entrepreneurs or aspiring ones who would like to see the
state do more to help diem strengthen or establish their own concerns. They are not in favour of nationalization, nor do they see the state as the guarantor of job security. It is also possible to argue that they are in favour of privatization, though this question was not asked. 8.
Factors
of Achievement
Turning now to respondents' opinions on factors of achievement (Table 25), which is a multiple answer question: among the choices of education, hard work, luck, long vision, intelligence, opportunity, social connections and family background, hard work was the answer which received the strongest support (i.e. "very important" being chosen by the greatest percentage of respondents) by people in all the classes and class categories. This is closely followed, in slightly different orders across the classes, by education and intelligence. Trailing quite far behind in all classes are social connections and family background. Luck is
1444}
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
consistently the most unpopular answer across all classes. However, these three (social connections, family background and luck) are all considered as having moderate influence on achievement by almost all the classes and class categories. It is clear that achievement rather than ascription is highly rated. At the same time, ascription and personal connections remain methods people would quite readily use to achieve what they want, though with some qualms. Luck or fortune, which can be good or bad, remains a factor that people still use to explain successes or failures they did not expect from their use of effort, educational ability and intelligence, or else, in the case of successes, to camouflage dieir use of social connections. Opportunity and long vision are factors that remain to be discussed. Opportunity is noticeably considered as of great importance by 77-85% of the middle classes, as compared with about 43% and 44% of the capitalist and working classes, respectively. Long vision also scored 66-75% among all classes except the working class (39.2%) Both are terms more readily understandable to the educated, and are factors that in their operation become available or are more likely to be acquired by those with educational skills. This is why they are ranked low by the working class. The difference between the middle classes and the capitalists on opportunity as a factor of achievement is significant (NMC 77.8%, OMC 85.7%, MMC 77.00., / as compared with 43.1% of capitalists designating it as "very important"). Those who have clearly achieved, the capitalists, are much more sure of their achievement and would not like to put it down to opportunity. Those who are in the process of achieving obviously look to opportunities to make a breakthrough. Another observation is that, after effort, the new middle class favours education,
the old middle class opportunity, the marginal middle class education and the working class intelligence this latter perhaps to compensate for their own lower level of educational attainment (see also Table 5 on levels of education). All these are as expected.
Middle Classes in Bangkok
Table 27
\
I
( 445 I l
Perceptions about Classes: Class Division, Classification of Class and Majority Class (%)
Perceptions about
classes
Capitalist
New
Classes Middle Marginal Old
Working
Total
Existence of class
division Yes
98.0
93.6
89.7
92.9
93.2
93.1
No
2.0
0.8
0.8
5.6
9.5
1.1 5.9
6.8
6.1
48.6
Not sure
0.8
Class yica fion of classes High-midd1e- low Royal (monarchy) high~midd1e- low Noble (aristocrats) high-]ILidd1€~ low High-low Rich-averagepoor-very poor
43.1
50.8
56.9 2.2
33.3
3.2
2.2
1.4
1.9
3.4 1.9
1.3 2.2
1,5
2.0
1.9
1.6
2.0
0.6 1.9
1.6
3.9
33.3
18.1
25.4
18.2 0.4
498
26.2
13.7
18.3
11.1
11.9
8.2
0.1 13.4
2.0
08 5.8
0.8
3.2
1.1 4.5
2.4
4.1
15.7
48.9
60.3
0.4 56.9
6.2 54.1
51.8
Lower-middle
11.8
10.3
0.4 8.6
0.5
7.4
Lower(poor+ lower)
58.8 3.9
33.9
6.3 22.2
34.8
32.3
3.9
1.6
2.0
0.8 5.6
1.1
7.8
0.8 2.2
4.1
2.4
3.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
(1013)
Rich-poor
2.4
High-middle
Others: Disaduan-tagei/ politician
Exclusive/educated/ fuggy'
No class division No 31l1SW€I'
0.8
Majority class 2.4
Upper (rich+upper)
Middle Upper-middle
Others No class division No answer Total (N)
0.8
27.8 0.7
1.7 0.2
1.9
2.4 0.8
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
-|
( 4-6
Table 28
Comparison of Respondent Income Level with the Majority and Self Class-Identification (%) Classes
Topics Capitalist
Middle
New
Old
Marginal
Working
Total
Income level compared
to the majority
.
.
2.8 55.3
5.6
12.6
45.9
7.8
61.1
65.1
45.9
54.3
86.3
34.2
23.0
10.4
2_4
22.6
5.9
6.7
7.1
11.5
4.8
'7.6
1.1
3.2
0.4
1.0
1.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
100.0 (1013)
56.8
1.6
1.6
3.8
7.8
0.8
0.8
49.0
0.8
0.8
0.9 2.9
86.5
Lower than majority Close to majority
I • Highor than
.I .I
14.4
ma]or1
Do not know, never
compared
• No
answer
Sub-totaf (N)
Self Class- Identqication
Upper classes |
.
Upper Rich
Middle classes
. .
Upper-middle
.
Middle
Lower middle
29.4
86.7
13.7
3.6
13.7
80.6
2.0
Lower classes
Poor
• Low
88.5
56.1
1.1
0.5
2.4
84.1
84.8
55.1
73.5
78.0
2.5
2.4
2.6
0.5
2.1
4_5
6.4
7.1
42.5
12.9
3.1
3.2
5.2
26.6
8.3
1.4
3.2
1.9
15.9
4.6
Others: capitalist cronies, fntelledual, common
3.9
3.3
1.6
0.7
0.5
1.9
No class, and do not want to identify
7.8
1.4
No answer Sub-total
(N)
1.1
0.7
2.0
2.5
4.0
3.0
1.0
2_4
100.0
l00.U
100.0
100.0
100.0
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
100.0 (1013)
11111111
Middle Classes in Bangkok
Table 29
Opinion on Class Antagonism (% ) Classes
Opinion on class antagonism
Capitalist
Absolutely agree
Middle
New
80.4
12.8 51.9
9_8
23.9 1.9 9.2 0.3
Total
2.0 3.9 2.0 100
100
(n)
(51)
(360)
2.0
Agree
Disagree Absolutely disagree Not sure
No answer
v.
I 447 J 1
I
Old
Marginal
Working
Total
7.1
13.4
16.9
48.4
54.3 17.5 2.2 11.9 0.7
62.8
55.8
11,1
19.1 1.8
25.4 1.6 16.7 0.8 100 (126)
1.0 7.7
0.5
100
100
(269)
(207)
12.5
10.3
0.6 100 11013)
Class mobility
1. Family Class Mobility To probe further into perceptions of class mobility, respondents were asked to identify' the class of their own families' at present, as compared to when they were 15 years old (Table 34). Married respondents were also asked to compare their spouses' economic status at the time of marriage with their own, this to g a g e whether marriage was a factor making for mobility or for class consolidation (Table 33). Finally, they were asked their opinions on how easy or difficult they thought class mobility was (Table 30).
Table 30
Opinion on Class Mobility (%) Classes
Opinion on
class mobility Easy Difficult Increasingly difficult Increasingly easy
No answer Total (N)
Capitalist
Middle New
5.8 23.5
32.2 31.7 29.4
27.5 47.1 2.0 100.0
100.0
(51)
(560)
0.8
Old 7.9
Marginal 4.1
33.3 37.4
38.7 24.2
26.2 1.6 100.0 [126]
31.6 1.5 100.0 (269)
Working 1.4 75.4 13.0 9.2 1.0 100.0
(207)
Total 4.4 42.4 25.6 26.4 1.2 100.0 (101)
448
1 I
J
I
Table 31
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Opinion Regarding Class Division (%) Classes
Opinion regarding
class division
Capitalist
Middle New
Old
Marginal
w01' dr 8
Total
31.1 Poverty is a normal phenomenon there always rich's and peers.
Absolutely agree Agree
9.8 68.6
7.5 59.4
Disagree
19.6
26.1
Absolutely disagree Do not know Sub-total
(N)
9.3 62.8 19.0 5.2 3.7 100.0
8.7 72.9 13.0 4.3 1.0 100.0
2.0
5.3 1.7
100.0
100.0
7.9 65.1 19.0 4.0 4.0 100.0
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
-
8.4 64.3
20.3 4.6 2,4
100.0 (1013)
31.2 Workers should have ignore bargaining power.
Absolutely agree Agree Disagree Absolutely disagree Do not know Sub-total
(N)
2.0
15.3
16.9
19.4
45.1 41.2 7.8 3.9 100.0
62.5 16.4 4.8 4.7 100.0
57.3 12.1 4.8 8.9 100.0
70.5
23.2 63.8
5.2 0.4 4.5
8.7 1.9 2.4
100.0
(360)
(126)
100.0 (2.69)
100.0
(51)
(207)
(1013)
13.6 71.8 10.2 1.0 34 100.0 (207)
17.5 63.0 11.2 2.9 54 100.0 (1013)
31.3 Goo should support small enterprises more than big bbusiness. 23.0 18.3 12.2 Absolutely agree 17.9 57.9 61.9 38.8 Agree 64.6 10.4 8.7 12.8 14.3 Disagree 2.4 0.8 34.7 Absolutely disagree 1.5 7.9 6.1 Do not know 56 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Sub-total (126) (360) (n) (269) (51)
17.5 63.4 12.6 1.9 4.7
31.4 If8overnmerr t operates industries (i stead of private Sector) workers would be more secured.
2.0
5.0
2.4
8.9
18.4
8.3
Agree
12.0
20.6
20.6
26.0
55.8
28.8
Disagree Absolutely disagree Do not know Sub-total
26.0 60.0
54.3 16.2
54.8 11.9
18.4 1.5 53 100.0
43.6 13.1 62 100.0
Absolutely agree
(N)
-
3.9
10.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
46.5 9.7 89 100.0
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
315 Workers should have a right to terr n Unions. 15.8 6.0 Absolutely agree
Agree
40.0
Disagree Absolutely disagree Do not know
46.0 4.0 4.0
Sub-total
(N)
65.3 10.8
20.0
21.6
19.9
56.8
64.7
64.6
14.4 0.8
8.6 0.7
8.0
4.5
11.2 0.5 3.9
100.0
1.1 6.9 100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
(1013)
18.2 62.7 12.5 1.0 5.6 100.0 (1013)
Middle Classes in Bangkok |
Table 32
l
449
Size of Workplace Compared to Parents' (% )
Size of workplace as compared to
Classes Middle Capitalist
parents
Working
New
Old
Marginal
11.9 15.9 52.4 4.0 10.5 5.6
11.2 25.7
2.4 26.1
44.2
44.9
1.1 12.3 5.6
23.0
Total
Father place
smaller
. bigger
3.9
13.3 19.4 50.8
I
C811 compare
17.6 58.8
l
the same size
5.9
2.2
can tell N.A.
7.8
9.4 4.8
» I
6.0
Mother place • smaller bigger
.
can compare
the same size can tell N.A. Sub-total (N)
Table 33
52.9 2.0
3.9 27.5 100.0
(51)
0.5
6.7 27.8 100.0 (360)
100.0 (126)
2.0 12.8 3.8
3.8
7.8
6.3 7.9 38.9 1.6 6.3 38.9
4.2 15.3 45.0 1.7
13.7
9.9 21.9 48.5
14.9 37.2 0.7 8.6
30.9 100.0 (269)
1.4 22.7 45.9 1.5 19.8 8.7
4.6 15.7
100.0
100.0 (1013)
42.7 1.2 9.7
26.1
(207)
/) Perception of Comparative Economic Status with Spouse (% Classes
Total
Middle
Comparative status
Capitalist
Worldng
New
Old
Marginal
Same status
60.8
34.4
49.2
15.2
26.6
30.9
Higher than spouse
19.6
5.8
8.7
4.8
_
5.4
Lower than spouse
7.8
5.3
4.8
4.5
2.4
4.5
Incomparable
2.0
2.5
2.4
2.6
4.3
2.9
No answer/ not married
9.8
52.0
34.9
72.9
66.7
56.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
(1013)
Total
(N)
,I
( 450 ~}
I
Table 34
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Perception of Family Class, Past and Present (%)
Class
Capitalist
categories
Class Middle Old
New
Marginal Past Now 0.7 0.4
Past*
Now
Past
Now
5.9
45.1
0_8
0.6
Past -
Now 0.8
31.4
37.3
11.1
20.3
6.3
10,3
Middle class
37.3
13.7
55.0
66.4
59.5
72,2
63.6
Lower middle
17.6
2.0
22.2
10.8
22.2
12.7
23.8
7.1
0.3
7.1
2.4
3.7
4.0
0.8
4.0
0.8
2.2
100.0
High or upper
Worldng
Now
Past
class Upper middle class
4.3
2.9
74_3
36.2
37.7
13.8
15.5
20.8
1.9
21.7
12.6
0.7
22.2
26.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
5.9
8.9
class
5.9
Lower
Worldng class
No answer
Total
(n)
Note: * Past
2.0
2.0
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
= at the respondent age of 15 years old.
Perceptions of lifetime upward mobility were exhibited by respondents in the middle classes taken as a whole (Table 34). Regardless of dieir perception as to which level of the middle classes they belong (upper middle, middle, lower middle), the percentages of those placing themselves in the level for the present is higher than for the past (i.e. when they were 15 years old). From this measure of perception, it appears that the greatest mobility was from the lower middle class into the middle class, or at least it was perceived as such. This is also true of the lower class respondents. There appears to be a perception of upward mobility from the lower class into the lower middle class. Data on the capitalist or upper class' perceptions appear spurious for any interpretation to be made.
Middle Classes in Bangkok |
l
.
451 ~l
Occupations of the Respondents by Classes (%)
Table 35 Categories
Capitalist
NMC
OMC
MMC
Working
Total
Ocfuputions 1. laborer
1.5
65.2 1.0
0.2
96.7
31.4
40.7
2.4
12.5
2. farmer
3. employee1
3.9
4. merchant/ trading
9.8
5. professionals
3.9
92.9
23.3
65.0
1.9
1.1
6. social services
7.fa1I1i1y/ OWTL enterprise
23.6
0.9 0.9
7.1
2
8. business
13.7
7.8
82.4
10.3
2.0
42.2
0.8
Position in occupation 1. employee
99.3
93.2
60.6
86.3
11.1
88.1
2_4
19.7
3. manager/ high rank
7.8
24.2
2.4
1.0
9.5
4. low level manager/
2.0
19.4
0.8
1.9
7.7
foreman 5. family business/
2.0
0.6
5.6
1.4
1.3
2.5
2.4
2. employer/ owner
0.7
enterprise 6. partners
1.2
Organization of workplace 1. government 2. state enterprise
3. private enterprise
62.7
4. international organization 5. own enterprise
(N)
19.0
4.
5.6
3.0
0.5
2.9
76.6
90.8
65.2
60.3
13.5
37.3
6.7
86.5
100.0 (360)
0.4
4.3
100.0 (126)
100.0 (269)
16.0
0.5
1.1
0.6 100.0 (51)
15,4
0.1
08
6. non-profit organization Total
26.7
100.0 (207)
100.0 (1013)
Remarks: 1. Employee includes both government and private sectors.
2. Family and own enterprise are separated but with few number they are put into one. Own enterprise also include self-employed with or without employee. 3. I-Iousework in some instance is a part of family business which
covers both sexes.
452
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
When the middle classes are broken down into new, old and marginal (NMC, OMC and MMC) (Table 34), those in the objective category of NMC who place themselves in the upper middle or lower middle class are made up of both those who retained their class level within the middle class in their life time (11.4% and 54.8%, respectively) and those who have moved up from the lower middle class. Only 10.8% of the NMC consider themselves to be at this lower middle class level today, whereas 23% of them say they were at this level when they were 15 years old. It would appear from the data that those who left this level moved upwards to the middle and upper levels of the middle class. There is also some indication that members of the lower class also moved upwards, but they still make up a small percentage of the new middle class. The old middle class appear also from this perception data to have experienced a similar rate of lifetime upward mobility. Also, some member of the lower class have moved upwards into the lower middle class. The marginal middle class exhibit the same trend, especially from the lower middle level into the middle level.
2. Marriage as a Factor in Mobility Data on perception of comparative status with spouse at the time of marriage (Table 33) is of limited use, because more than 50% of middle class respondents gave no answer, most likely because they were unmarried. Nonetheless, a large number of the middle class taken as a whole who did answer said they were of the same status. Much smaller percentages of them married persons of higher status and of lower status. This is clearly not the case with the capitalists (upper), 60.8% of whom
married persons of the same status, 7.8% of them persons of higher status and 19.6% of
them
persons of lower status. Status (class) consolidation
through marriage is much more pronounced for the capitalist class; and marriage does not appear to be a means of social mobility for the middle class taken as a whole. This remains true even when it is broken down into the three categories. A difference between the three categories concerns marrying persons of the same status. The OMC tops this with 49.2% , followed by the NMC (34.4%) and the MMC (15.2%) Since the largest proportion of the OMC (45.6%) are living in shop houses (Table 13-14) and are in merchant/trading occupations (93.6% according to Table 35), it is likely that they are Sino-Thai families wide stronger tendencies to marry
Middle Classes in Bangkok I
L
453
I
persons from similar backgrounds than are those of any other middle class categories. Among the middle classes, they are also either the most often married or the most willing to offer information on spouses' status. The MMC stand out as having the most with no answer (72.9%), and
slightly more than the lower class. Their young age (over 60% below 30 years old in body class categories-Table 4) appears to be the main reason, that is, most of them are unmarried. For the rest who did not answer, the question may have little meaning to them or else they withheld
information for personal reasons . 3.
Occupation and Class Mobility
The majority of the samples, as expected, fall into the new middle class. Almost half of them (45.8%) are white collar workers, more than half of which are employees in Dre private sector. This simply follows the trend of the l a b o r market in the past decade. In the survey, respondents' classes are objectively defined by their
occupations, but this does not necessarily reflect how they subjectively perceive their own classes. The distribution of occupations as seen in the above table shows that the respondents in different classes are distinguished from each other by their different types of occupations. However, in Table 39 there seems to be a grey area between classes in (1) between the upper middle class and the capitalist or two situations: upper class, and (2) between the marginal middle class and the working class. In the first situation, only half of the respondents in the capitalist group (54.9%) see themselves as upper class. Quite a few see themselves as members of the middle class (13.7% for the middle class and 13.7% for
the upper middle class). This is partly attributed to the survey itself, because the top members of the capitalist class were not easily accessible for the interview. Another reason could be that the perception of class is influenced by factors other than occupation alone. In the second situation, it is surprising to find that a lot of respondents in the working class see themselves as middle class (55.5%).
454
Table 39
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Objective and Subjective Identification of Class (%)
Objective identification
Upper
Subjective perception of Upper middle
OWI'l
class
Middle
.ml
Lower
Others
2.0
3.9
0.8
0.4
54.9
13.7
13.7
2.0
New Middle
1.6
3.6
80.6
2.5
4.5
3.3
Old Middle
1 .6
84.1
2.4
6.4
1.6
Capitalist
Marginal
¢»
1.1
84.8
2.6
7.1
0.7
Wo1-king
0.5
0.5
55.5
0.5
42.1
0.5
Total
3.7
2.4
73.6
2.1
13.0
1.9
No
Total
class
100.0 100.0 100.0
0.7
100.0 100.0
0.1
100.0
Remarks: 1. This table does not show responses of no answer. 2. Upper class includes answers for both rich and upper class. 3. Lower class includes answers for both poor and lower class. 4. N= 51 (Capitalist), 360 (New Middle), 126 (Old Middle), 269 Marginal), 207 (Working).
The respondents' perceptions of their own classes by all means implies a rather large coverage and loose territory of the middle class because part of both the capitalist and the working classes place themselves in the middle level as well. This means that respondents were also reluctant to identify themselves with particular classes. When taking income level into consideration, about half of the respondents (51.9%) believe that the majority of Thai people, including themselves, are in the middle level, although quite a few find that a lot of poor people are still in the lower level (32.2%) SO, it is not surprising that 73% of all respondents, mostly those in the middle class group, think that they are iN the middle level, which corresponds to the sample size of the middle classes. In this respect, the capitalist group view of class structure differs from that of other groups, because they think that the majority is in the lower income level (See Table 27). Respondents' perception of their own class might have an implication for the analysis of class mobility, in diet their class can change both objectively and subjectively. The overall picture indicates that there is certainly an upgrade of class, but not remarkable. The class upgrading is concentrated more in the new middle class and the capitalist class than in
others. This observation is based on two sets of data 1) the pattern of
Middle Classes in Bangkok
I
455 J'l
occupation within one's family, 2) the respondent's judgment of his/ her changing class. (1)
The pattern
of occupation
in the family
There are additional questions on whether class reproduces itself, and whether members of the current middle classes are the first generation in
their own family to reach that class. In this survey, there are difficulties answering these questions because it is not possible to objectively identify the parents' classes, due to the problem of missing data. Therefore, an analysis of occupational shift within a family, particularly between the parents generation and the respondents, is used to substitute for the missing data on parents' classes. At this stage, a cross-cheek of respondent's and family member occupations is attempted, at least to provide a picture of whether the fathers and the respondents are in the same occupation category . Table 40
Occupations of Respondent's Fathers (%) Respondents by classes
Father/s
occupation
Capitalist
New Mid. 1.7
Old Mid. 3.2
Marginal 0.7
Working
Total
Worker
--
10.1
3.3
Farmer
5.9
13.1
14.3
2.7
69.4
27,0
Clerk/ white collar
2.0
17.5
8.7
28.6
3.8
15.8
Merchant/
31.4
25.3
49.2
26.8
10.0
25.8
11.8
16.1
2.4
trading
Professional Social service
1.1
Family
1.4
business Business
1.0
8.5 0.6
0.7
5.6
1.0
0.9
3.7
7.8
5.0
Housework
3.9
6.1
4.8
No answer
37.3
1.8
11.9
6.7
4.8
100.0 (51)
100.0 (360)
100.0 (126)
100.0 (269)
100.0
100.0
(207)
(1013)
Total (N)
3.3 .p
3.8
.3
10.6
'456 1
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
|
In general, respondents' fathers are in three major occupations, namely, farmers (27%), merchants or traders (25.8%) and clerks or white collar workers (15.8%) This proportion should indicate that while most respondents are in the middle class, they have come from lower class families judging from their fathers' occupations. According to the data, merchants or petite bourgeois can be considered an important origin of the middle and the capitalist classes today. It is noted that 31.4 % of the capitalist group and another 25.5% of the new middle class group have merchant fathers. Merchant fathers, who mostly belong to the old middle class group, also produced almost half of the old middle class respondents. Looking closely at the middle classes, it is noted that professional work, which is concentrated in the new middle class, is a stepping stone for class upgrading. Father occupations of respondents in the professional group are rather diverse. At least 30% of fathers are in the lower category of occupation (i.e. workers, farmers and clerks). This should indicate that at least 30% of the professional group are first generation middle class.
Table 41
Fathers and Respondents' Occupations in the Middle Classes (%) Occupations of respondents in the middle classes (n=755)
Father's occupation
2
1
1 .worker
4
3
7
6
5
9*
8
75.0
41
Total
n.a. 0.5
25.0
Zfarmer 3.clerk/ office
0.6
18.6
29.6
27.0
7.2
4.mercha.nt
3.4
15.3
9.3
50.0
2.5
5.professional
2.6
15.0
12.4
26.1
_
22.2
22.2 -
37.5
-
-
10.8
18.9
24.3
10.8
-
1.6
16.7
20.0
29.8
10.3
0.8
6.socia1 service
7.fa1I1j1y business
8.busine5s Total
_
0.3
19.2
1.3
11.1
22.2
0.9
1.7
4.1
8.1
5.7
5_1
12,7
0.6
4.3
5.6
12.0
1.0
22.2
1.2
1.1
-
62.5
-
10.8
8.1
16.2
4.9
0.9
4.5
4.9
10.5
100.0
I I I I l I I I
Note: *9= housework.
3.8
1.7
Middle Classes in Bangkok
l
(
457 ,|
The class that re-produces itself more than any other is the old middle class. It is clear that 50% of the merchant group indicate that their fathers are also merchants or petite bourgeois. The statistics on occupation of spouses do not lead to a conclusion that it is a factor in class mobility, especially for the middle classes, but perhaps even less so that the capitalist class where most respondents are of a higher economic status than are their spouses. Most of the respondents have spouses working in the same circle, if not exactly the
same occupation. The data is not clear cut, since only half of the respondents are married. The comparison between occupations of respondents and their spouses coincides with their own perceptions of comparative economic status with their spouses. The majority in all classes see themselves as of the same status as their spouses. There are more or less the same number of respondents who have spouses of either higher or lower economic status. The only exception is for members of the old middle class, who married persons of a lower economic status more than the other way around. This corresponds to the earlier observation that the old middle class is the origin of the new middle class. (2)
Perception of Changing Classes
The perception of changing class, although it sounds very subjective, is a good indicator to asses class mobility. The respondents compared their families' classes at the present time with the in class at age 15. Most of them indicate a certain degree of upward mobility.
Perceptions of Changing Family Class in the Fast and the
Table 42
Present (% N=l013) Past
Present
Upper
Upper Upper-middle Middle
14.8
Upper mid. 'so 66,7 31.1
Middle 14.8 53,
69.0
Lower middle
Lower mid.
--
11.1 20.6 52.9
Lower
Lower
1.5
6.5 23.5 86.3
Labels :
moving down Inovil'lg up
Past
= Class
of their families at 15 years of age.
Total 100 100 100 100 100
458
.}
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
It is interesting to find that the class mobility of their families does not immediately move directly from the lower to the upper. The majority
move one step up, which perhaps takes average less than 15 years, considering their present ages. This only confirms the understanding that the economic boom manifest at the beginning of 1990s contributed to expansion of the new middle class. A more specific evaluation of class change is a comparison of respondent and family (parents.') classes. The data indicates that the
majority think they are in the same class category as their families. In other words, change of class between generations, if there is any, is not seen as significant. Naturally, the upper class Minks that they are moving up, while the lower class feels the opposite. This means that class mobility is not equally dispersed. The widening income gap as a result of the rapid economic growth very well reflects the fact that upward class mobility is felt more by the upper, or the advantaged, class. Table 43
Perceptions of Own and Family Classes (N= 988 in %)
Own
Upper
Upper 60.5
Upper middle Middle Lower middle
8.3
18.2 2.7 II
Label
28.9
7.9
20.8 -.73. 4.8 24.4 61.1 54.5 61.1
0.8 22.2
Other
Family Diddle
ms 13.0 4.8
Lower No class Total
Upper mid
27.3 13.6
Lower mid
Lower
2.6
Total 3.8
2.4 11.5
2.1
75.4
9.6
19.1 11.1
55.7
2.1 138
13.3
9.3
so
5.6
1.8 1.1 100.0
respondents and families in the same class category
There is a discrepancy between the pattern of occupational shift and perceptions of changing classes. The data from the family occupation pattern indicate an upward mobility of class, while the perception of changing class is not equally observed. This implies that although the respondents may have upgraded their occupations from the pattern of their fathers, they do not see themselves as occupying a higher class. Time and other factors might be involved in this analysis, although it is not yet clear how. One important consideration is that establishment of
class requires more than an economic factor, as exemplified by
Middle Classes in Bangkok
I
r\
459
occupation. On the one hand, this has to do with what they are, on the other hand, it depends on how an individual relates to other people in the society.
4. Extent of Class Mobility Table 30 tabulates opinions on the extent to which class mobility is possible. Nearly 30% of the middle classes as a whole view class mobility as increasingly easy. This tallies with their perceptions of lifetime mobility presented earlier. The NMC and the MMC find it more possible than do the OMC, sorrxething we have already seen above. Yet, about the same percentage (28.8%) of the middle class find it increasingly difficult, with the NMC and OMC expressing this opinion more strongly than the MMC. Few of the middle classes find mobility easy. Indeed, 32.1% of the NMC, 33.6% of the OMC and 38.7% of the MMC find it difficult. By adding together the "easy" and "increasingly easy," one can conclude that some 35% of the middle classes across the board deem social mobility to be easy. This compares with 47.1% for the capitalist class and 11.4% for die working class. Thus, upward social mobility in Thai society appears to be not difficult, except for the working class. This also tallies with data on perceptions of lifetime upward mobility interpreted earlier, where few self-defined lower class people perceived mobility into the middle class, in contradistinction to the strong tendency of working class people to aspire to or place themselves in the middle class.
5
Socio-Political Opinions and Public Participation
The 1997 Middle Classes Survey in Bangkok deals first with the opinions of the Thai middle class on economic, social and political situations in Thailand, and later with their level of political participation before the current economic problems. The opinions cover their perceptions of critical problems, liberal attitudes and democratic orientation. All of these are aimed at finding the extent to which the middle class are problemconcerned, liberal-minded and democratically- oriented. However, opinions do not necessarily mean action. The level of political participation by the class is therefore also taken into consideration.
Perceptions of critical problems: The middle class in general is expected to be more concerned with societal problems than are any other
l.` 460 pa
l
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
classes, particularly the working class, since its members are usually well educated, informed and interested in public affairs. As a result, they tend
to be more sensitive to such critical issues as public safety, environment, education, human rights, housing, consumer prices, corruption,
pornography and prostitution, narcotics, employment and welfare and violence against women and children. Among the three groups of the Thai middle class, there are some differences in their awareness of and sensitivity to each problem, which depend on their views of the risk of
the problem. An absolute majority of respondents in the middle classes, together with those in the capitalist and working classes, are well aware of the
critical problems. For each issue more than 90% of those in each class say that there is either a serious or some problem. Nevertheless, some differences among the three classes and within the middle class are found in their opinions of the seriousness of each problem. As for the problem of public safety, the capitalist class is obviously more sensitive to the problem than are the middle and the working classes. While 82.4% of the respondents in the capitalist class rate the problem as serious, 70.4% of the old middle class, 60.9% of the new middle class, 66. 5% of the marginal middle class and 56.0% in the working class agree (See Table 44).
A different pattern of opinion is found in the case of environmental problems. In this case, respondents in the middle class are more worried about the issue than are those in the capitalist and the working classes. Respondents who believe that the problem is serious constitute 86.9%, 85.1% and 81-7% of in the new, marginal and old groups of the middle class respectively, compared to 80.4% and 72.5% of the respondents in the
capitalist and the working classes. Certainly this shows that the middle class is more concerned with environment problems than with public safety. The education problem seems much less threatening in the view of the
middle and the other two classes. It is a serious problem for only 51.6% of the respondents in the old middle class, 46.1% of those in the new middle class and 51.7% of those in the marginal middle class. At the same time, 45.1% of the respondents in the capitalist class and 59.4% of those in the working one accept the seriousness of the problem. Their related opinions toward critical issues in Thai society are also seen regarding the human rights and housing problems. The three groups of the middle
class do not seem to care much about the human rights problem. Among
Middle Classes in Bangkok |
l
461
respondents in the class, the proportions of those who regard the problem as serious range from 35% in the new middle class to 41.3% in the marginal middle class and 45% in the old middle class. For the housing problem the proportion of respondents who take it seriously range from 30.8, to 39 and 44.4% in the new, marginal and old middle classes, respectively. In this case, the capitalists care the least, whereas the workers are most worried about the two issues. When the corruption, prostitution and pornography and narcotics problems are taken into account, the middle class becomes more anxious. Between 78 and 80% of the three subclasses think that corruption is a serious problem. The percentage in the case of prostitution and pornography decreases to between 65% and 75% and in the case of narcotics, increases to between 89 and 92%. A different pattern is found for their opinions about issues of employment and welfare and violence against women and children. In the two cases the middle class does not express strong concern. Among the middle class, the new middle class is less worried than are the old and marginal middle classes. Only 36% of the new middle class in this survey says that the employment and welfare issues are a serious problems, while 52% of the subclass see violence against women and children as serious. It is evident in this survey that the anxiety of the middle class regarding general is considerable in the environment, narcotics and corruption, moderate regarding public safety, education, consumer prices, prostitution and pornography and violence against women and children, and relatively slight regarding human rights, housing and employment and welfare issues. Certainly this results from the different degree of threat they perceive from these is. On the one hand the environment,
narcotics and corruption issues make the middle class feel very insecure because they are not in its control. On the other hand the class does not
pay much attention to the housing, and employment and welfare issues. The previous economic growth enables members of the middle class to own houses and to be employed fairly easily. Liberalism and the Thai middle class The growth of liberalism in Western society goes hand in hand with the development of the middle class. Such tenets of liberalism as individualism, economic freedom, political rights and hirnited government have influenced ideologically the middle class and legitinrrated its social, political and economic roles ih modern society. Dominated and benefited by the ideology, members of
1 L
F
1462
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
i
the middle class are anticipated to be mainly liberal and more liberal than those of other social classes. Table 44
No
Awareness of Critical Economic, Social and Folitical Problems (% )
Capitalist class
Middle classes
Working class
New
Old
Marginal
Narcotics 92.2
Narcotics
Narcotics
90.5
Narcotics 92.9
Narcotics
89.7
2
Public Safety 82.4
Environment
Environment 81.7
Environment
Consumer price 74.9
3
Environment
Cornlption 80.8
Comaption
Environment
79.4
Corruption 78.1
Prostitution and pornography 65.0
Prostihxtion and pornography
Frostitution and pornography
Employment/
74.6
75.8
72.5
Public Safety 61.1
Consumer price
Consumer price
Prostitution and
72.2
67.3
pornography
1
80.4 4
Prostitution
-
pornography 72.5
5
Corruption 64,7
86.9
85.1
89.4
72.5
Welfare
72.0
6
7
Violence against
Consumer price
Public Safety
Fublic Safety
nomen- ChildI`E1'l 47.1
59.7
69.8
66.5
Corruption 61.4
Violence against
Violence against women- children 64.3
Violence against
Violence against
Education 45.1
women-children
52.2 8
Consumer price
Education
46.1
women- children women- children 63.2
59.4
Education 51.6
Education
Education 56.0
51.7
31.4
g
10
11
Human right
Employment/
Employment/
Employment/
27.5
welfare 36.9
welfare 49.2
we]§are
Housing 25.5
Human right 35.0)
Human right
Employment/
Housing
Housing
welfare 13.7
30.8
44.4
46.0
Public safety 56.0
51.3
Housing 49.8
EHIT Housing 39.0
Note: Multiple answers. "no answer" is not presented in the table.
Human right 45.4
Middle Classes in Bangkok
l
l
463 I
The Thai middle class, however, is neither so liberal as expected nor more liberal than the capitalist and working classes. In individualistic aspect of liberalism (Table 45) it is found in this survey that the members of the Thai middle class are as individualistic as those of the two classes. Among the respondents who strongly agree or agree with the statement olving individual problems before public problems", for example, approximately from 61 to 74% are those in the middle class, while around 51% and 91% are those in the capitalist and working class respectively. As a matter of fact the capitalists are more liberal than the middle class in some other aspects. For instance, around 86% / of them, in comparison with 55% of the new middle class, strongly agree or agree with privatization of state enterprises. On the statement that limited political freedom leads to economic disadvantage 76% of the capitalists and not more than 60% of the middle class strongly concur and concur. Democratic orientation of the middle class regarded as a pillar of democracy, the middle class has more likelihood to be democraticminded than other classes. Yet the survey does not support the argument. No substantial difference among the capitalist, the middle and the working classes are found. The middle class in fact is less democratic-minded than the capitalists, once the question on relationship between democracy and people alertness and organization is asked. The statement that democracy relies on people alertness and organization is strongly agreed by 58% of the respondents in the capitalist class and between 30-34% of those in the middle class. As for its opinion on economic gap as an obstacle to democracy, the middle class does not show any unique orientation. Among the classes 92% of the capitalist class, between 53 and 77% of the three groups of the
middle class and 73% of the working class strongly agree or agree with the statement. However once the statement that worker protests create disorder is raised, respondents disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with it are found more in the middle class than in the capitalist class. Among those who show their disagreement or strong disagreement with the statement 37% are in the new middle class while 9% and 37% are in the capitalist and working classes respectively.
464
Table 45
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
|
Respondents Tendency toward Liberalism and Democratic Values (%)
Responses
Capitalist
MNC
OMC
MMC
Working
Total
45.1 Solving individual problems before public problems
Absolutely agree
11.8
20.0
30.2
24.2
27.1
23.4
Agree
39.2
41.7
36.5
49.8
64.7
47.8
Disagree
2.9
22.2
45.1
31.7
26.2
18.2
Absolutely disagree
2.0
4.4
4.0
3.3
N.A./No Comment
2.0
2.2
3.2
4.5
3.1 5.3
3.6
45.2 Control of luxurious consumption affecting individual rights 7.8
6.4
3.2
5.9
9.7
6.6
Agree
45.1
33.9
35.7
35.3
44.9
37.3
Disagree
Absolutely agree
35.3
48.3
41.3
47.6
31.9
43.2
Absolutely disagree
5.9
6.1
2.4
3.7
0.5
3.8
N.A./ No Comment
5.9
5.3
17.5
7.4
13.0
9.0
45.3 Telephone tappfngfor national security is acceptable Absolutely agree Agree
3.9
6.7
4.0
6.3
6.3
6.0
52.9
33.9
23.0
24.5
26.1
29.4
Disagree
17.6
36.4
38.9
42.0
40.1
38.0
Absolutely disagree
17.6
16.4
15.9
16.4
9.7
15.0
N.A./ No Comment
7.8
6.7
18.3
10.8
17.9
11.5
1.4
10.9
45.4 Privatization
of state enterprises
Absolutely agree
51.0
14.2
8.7
7.1
Agree
35.3
40.8
28.6
33.1
30.9
34.9
Disagree
2.0
31.9
27.0
37.2
38.6
32.6
Absolutely disagree
2.0
4.2
5.6
4.5
4.3
4.3
N.A./ No Comment
9.8
8.9
30.2
18.2
24.6
17.3
11.7
8.7
10.0
6.8
9.6
45.5 Monopoly naturally exists in capitalism
Absolutely agree
5.9
Agree
60.8
56.9
52.4
55.4
45.4
53.8
Disagree
17.6
24.4
22.2
20.4
19.8
21.8
3.9
2.8
1.6
1.5
2.4
2.3
11.8
4.2
15.1
12.6
25.6
12.5
Absolutely disagree N.A./ No Comment
Middle Classes in Bangkok
f.
I
465
45. 6 Limited political freedom leading to economic disadvantage
.
Absolutely agree
35.3
10.3
11.9
8.6
9.2
Agree
41.2
49.7
34.1
45.7
50.7
46.5
Disagree
11.1
11.8
24.7
27.8
25.3
22.2
24.1
Absolutely disagree
-
3.1
4.8
2.2
1.9
2.7
N.A./ No Comment
11.8
12.2
21-4
18.2
15.9
15.7
45.7 Solving economic crimes demands more government control oner people economic activities Absolutely agree
Agree
2.0
8.3
5.6
10.4
10.6
8.7
5.9
25.6
19.8
34.6
46.4
30.5
Disagree
37.3
50.6
46.8
42.4
28.0
42.6
Absolutely disagree
52.9
10.3
15-1
5.6
2.4
10.2
N.A./ No Comment
2.0
5.3
12.7
7.1
12.6
8.0
45.8 Severe punishrnentfor crimes is reasonable
Absolutely agree
15.7
30.0
54.0
44.6
39.1
38.0
Agree
27.5
36,1
27.8
33.5
45.9
35.9
Disagree
37.3
26.7
11.9
17.8
11.1
19.8
Absolutely disagree
15.7
5.0
2.4
2.2
1.0
3.7
N.A./ No Comment
3.9
2.2
4.0
1.9
2.9
2.6
45.9 Demociraey :relies on people alertness and organization Absolutely agree
58.8
34.4
34.1
30.9
26.1
33.0
Agree
35.3
54.7
46.0
57.6
63.8
55.3
2.9
3.9
4.2
8.7
8.6
Absolutely disagree
-
0.8
1.6
0.4
N.A./ No Comment
2.0
5.8
9.5
2.6
7.2
Disagree
5.6
0.6
5.5
45.10 Workers should not ask for a raise
9.8
6.9
7.1
5.9
12.1
7.9
Agree
74.5
38.3
41.3
26.0
24.2
34.4
Disagree
38.2
Absolutely agree
11.8
36.4
27.8
44.2
46.4
Absolurely dis gree
2.0
5.0
5.6
'7,1
10.6
6.6
N.A./ No Comment
2.0
13.3
18.3
16.7
6.8
12.9
45.11 To have genuine democracy needs administrative reform
Absolutely agree
72.5
. 36.7
37.3
33.8
15.5
33.5
Agree
23.5
53.3
43.7
56.1
62.8
53.3
Disagree
2.0
Absolutely disagree
N.A.;' No Comment
2.0
4.4
1.6
4.1
7.2
4.4
1.9
0.8
0.4
1.4
1.2
3.6
16.7
5.6
13.0
7.6
l
I
466
3
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
45.12 Bad politics leading to economic recession
Absolutely agree
88.2
55.3
60.3
52.0
30.9
51.7
Agree
9.8
39.7
37.3
42.8
57.5
42.3
Disagree
2.0
3.1
1.9
6.8
3.1
Absolutely disagree N.A./ No Comment
-
1.1
0.8
1.9
1.0
1.2
0.8
1.6
1.5
3.9
1.7
20.4
17.4
22.1
45.13 Rich-poor gap is an obstacle to democracy Absolutely agree
45.1
25.0
15.9
Agree
47.1
53.1
46.0
52.0
56.5
52.3
Disagree
3.9
17.5
25.4
18.2
14.5
17.4
Absolutely disagree N.A./No Comment
2.0
1.4
1.6
3.0
3.4
2.3
2_0
3.1
11.1
6.3
8.2
5.9
10.0
9.5
11.5
15.5
11.5
45.14 Workers protest create disorder Absolutely agree
11.8
Agree
64.7
40.3
38.9
39.4
32.9
39.6
Disagree
7.8
33.1
26.2
29.4
31.4
29,6
Absolutely disagree
2.0
4.4
6.3
3.7
6.3
4.7
N.A./No Comment
13.7
12.2
19.0
16.0
14.0
14.5
13.0
7.8
45.15 Middle class economic role should be greater than politics Absolutely agree
3.9
6.1
10.3
5.6
Agree
43.1
41.9
35.7
49.8
59.9
47.0
Disagree
37.3
37.5
38.1
28.3
14.5
30.4
Absolutely disagree
3.9
6.4
4.0
4.1
0.5
4.1
11.8
8.1
11.9
12.3
12.1
10.7
45.16 Slow entlironmenl uctifm causes by technical problems rather than bureaucratic
inefCiciency
N.A./No Comment
Absolutely agree
11.8
13.6
13.5
14.5
15.0
14.0
Agree
58_8
33.1
34.1
46.8
56.5
42.9
Disagree
11.8
36.7
22.2
27.1
10.1
25.7
Absolutely disagree
3.9
11.7
11.1
4.1
2.9
7.4
N.A./No Comment
1s.7
5.0
19.0
7.4
15.5
10.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
(51)
(360)
(126)
(269)
(207)
(1013)
Sub-total (N)
Middle Classes in Bangkok |
\
-(4-67 I
The Middle Class and Political Participation Political participation can
take many forms and have different degree. It covers, for example, political discussion, voting, membership of a political party and becoming a politician. The middle class is generally expected to have a high degree of political participation, particularly higher than any other social classes. Once the case of the Thai middle class in our survey is taken into account. It is found that the expectation does not always hold true. A relatively high degree of political participation by dis class is found only in some forms.
The Thai middle class in general has neither a higher degree of political participation than the capitalist one nor a much higher degree than the working class though, at first glance, its level of voting participation in the last election is quite high. lt ranges from 68.4% for the
marginal middle class to 84.8% for the old middle class. But at the same time 80.4% of the capitalist class and 50.7% of the working one take part in the same political activity. Nevertheless in other forms of political participation like political assembly, vote canvassing and donation to politicians or parties only a small proportion of the middle class takes active part. For example 32.2% of the new middle class gets involved in political assembly, compared to 33.3% of the capitalist class and 48.3% of the working class. Only 6.1% of the new middle class members in comparison to 19.6% of those in the capitalist class used to donate to political parties or politicians.
In terms of their role in politics-related organizations, a majority of the member of the class, as well as those in other classes, do not get involved with any interest groups, political parties and non-government organizations. in comparison the new middle class has a higher
proportion than the capitalist one of membership of professional associations but not of such other interest groups as labor unions and employment associations. In labor unions all groups of the middle class take less active role than the working class. (Table 46) As for their activities in political parties, democratic organizations and non-government organizations, the members of the middle class have lower percentage of membership and active participation than the capitalists and not substantially higher than the workers. Only 3.3% of
those in the new middle class are members of political parties, compared to 9.8 and 3.3% of the respondents in the capitalist and working classes respectively. While 3.9% of capitalists are rnernbers and 35.3% active
participants in democratic organizations, only 1.1% of the new middle
(468
3
|
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
class take membership and 9.7% of them play active part in this kind of political organization. The same pattern is also found in the membership and the active participation in non-governmental organizations. For the old and marginal middle class they have lower degree of participation than the new middle class in every aspect. (Table 47) All in all it appears that in terms of its perception of the critical problems, liberal and democratic orientation and political participation social -. `cantlv different from the Thai middle class is not si
mob iii
_
not ever been . to developed its own distinctive character. Its members, as a result, look similar to other bigger classes in many aspects, particularly in their political, economic and social attitude.
Table 46
Level of Political Participation (%) Classes
Political participation
Total
Middle Capitalist
New
Old
Marginal
Working
Last election vote
80.4
76.9
84.1
68.4
50.7
70.4
Political assembly
33.3
32.2
31.0
30.5
48.3
34.9
Political lobbying
43.1
43.3
37.3
40.5
39.1
41.0
Donation to politicians/ parties
19.6
6.1
2.4
1_1
2.9
4.3
Regular political
27.5
31-7
20.6
22.7
5.8
22.4
100.0
100.0 (360)
100.0 (126)
100.0 (269)
100.0 (207)
100.0
(51)
(Vote canvassing)
discussion Total
(n)
(1013)
*
Middle Classes in Bangkok |
Table 47
r
469 `l
Social Engagement and Public Participation (%)
Associations
Capitalist
NMC'
OMC
17.6 41.2
24.4
15.6
10.3 6.3
MMC
Working
Totai
Professional assoc. a
Membership Only
I
Active participant Donation
15.7
6.1
7.1
3.0
4.3
12.5 10.0 5.5
Not concerned
25.5
52.5
76.2
87.4
91.8
71.4
. I
n
1.4
no answer
5.6 3.7
1.0
2.9
0.6
0.4
Labor unions
. Membership only
1.9
3.4
2.5
1_1
8_7
3.4
3.9 3.9
2.5 3.1
0.8
0_7
1_4
1.7
86.3
89,4
95.2
95.9
90.9
5.9
2.8
85.5 1.0
11.8 58.8
12.7
0.4
4.8 2.4
1.9
3.9 3.9
3.9
3.9 3.1 1.7
0.4
0_5
19.6
88.3
80.2
96.3
91.8
4.4 5.9 1.3 86.7
5.9
3.1
• Membership only
9.8
3.3
2.4
2.2
3.4
3.3
Active participant
5,9
3.6
3,2
4.3
3.3
5.9
3.1
1.6
1.5 1.1
74.5
87.2
92.9
94.8
92.3
90.3
3.9
2.8
Active participant
I l
Donation
I
Not concerned
. no answer . Membership only
2.2
1 .6 2.4
0.4
1.6
Employer assoc.
Active participant
l
Donation
l
. . No answer
Not concerned
1.7
1.1
Political parties »
• Donation
. .
Not concerned
-
No answer
1.9 1.3
0.4
Charity org. Membership only
.
28,6
29.5
6'7.3
84.1
64.4
5.8
2,4
3.0
Donation
34.4
31.0
Not consented
13.'7
57.2
66.7
2.0
1.9 1.1
0.8
.
3.9 35.3 9.8
9.7 3.3
12.7
.
45.1 5.9
82.2 3.6
84.9
I
No answer
0.6
0.5 3.9 11.6
1.1
0.6
15.7 68.6
~» Active participant
4.7
0.8
Organization for democracy »
Membership only
• Active participant Donation
1
Not concerned
No answer
91.1 0.7
0.5
1.0
9.7
10.4
0.5
2.4
B9.4
84.5 1.8
1.4
0.8
NGOs .. Membership only
2.0
0.6
1.6
l
Active participant
21.6
7.5
6.3
l
Donation
25.5
4.7
3.2 3,2
Not concerned
47,1
84.4
92.1
2.8
89,2 0.4
90.3
3.9
86.0 1.3
100.0
100.0
[360)
100.0 [126)
100.0 [269)
100.0
(51)
100.0 (1013)
* No answer
Total
(N)
J
1.6
0.7 5.9 1.5
8.2
7.5
4.4
4.1
(207)
1470)
Table 48
|
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Opinions on financial support to NGOs (%)
Responses
Capitalist
Absolutely agree
2.0
New 6.4
Classes Middle Old Marginal 1.6 5.6
Working
Total
8.2
5.7
45.0
49.3
46.1
26.8
21 .7
23.3
Agree
66.7
44.7
38.9
Disagree
11.8
23.3
23.0
1.1
3.2
0.7
1.9
1.4
19.6
23.6
33.3
21.6
18.8
23.1
Absolutely disagree
Do not know NGO5 Individual decision
0.3
No answer
0.6
Total (N)
0.1 0.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
(51)
(360)
(126)
100.0 (269)
0.3 100.0 (207)
100.0 (1013)
VII. Conclusions This survey has used occupational categories as the criteria to identify classes. Middle classes are in a wide range of occupations, excluding only investors, large scale employers of the capitalist class and wage workers in the working class. Because of diversity of occupation in the middle classes, analysis of the class is broken down into three sub-classes: the old, the new and the marginal middle classes. Respondents perceptions of own classes are mostly corresponding to their occupations classified by the survey. However, there is only an exception in the working class, in diet, about half of which identity
themselves in the middle class. There is also a grey area between the capitalist class and the new middle class whose occupations are not
clearly distinguished in some cases. For example, some professionals have investment in business or manufactures, they only differ from the
capitalist by the size of their business. It is therefore understandable why some of the capitalists identify themselves in the middle class. Almost all respondents believe in the existence of classes. About half of the them finds three categories of high-middle-low comprised in the structure of class. In another group of opinion, categorization of classes indicates a tendency toward economic basis of differentitation,
Middle Classes in Bangkok |
I
471 ,|
considering the chosen classification of rich-poor by the respondents themselves.
Interestingly enough to learn that although the middle classes do believe in the differentiation of classes, they do not have as strong opinion on class conflict as the capitalist and the working class whose majority anticipats conflicts between classes. Class upward mobility is viewed by most of respondents across classes as something difficult to achieve. The only group that see class
upward mobility increasingly easy is the capitalist. The working class and the capitalist are in opposition to each other in this matter, and that is attributed to their different experiences. The capitalist finds they have moved up while the working class do not share the same feeling for themselves. Analysis of class mobility, based on perception of changing family class and changing pattern of occupation from fathers' to own generation, reveals that the capitalist did move up more than other classes, and upward mobility in the working class is minimum. A considerable number of respondents in both the capitalist and the middle classes have fathers in the old middle class (merchant/ petty bourgoeisie). As well, a large number of middle class also have fathers who are farmers. Among the middle class, the larger group that experience class upgrading is the new middle class. The most possible way to upgrade their status is through changing occupation, and professional work is an important stepping stone. Finally, the survey does not find class upgrading through marriage. What distinguishes people in different classes are not their social values but lifestyle and some economic behaviour. There is a tendency that the new middle class and the capitalist will be closer in regarding lifestyle but their values on selected matters are more or less in the same line. Despite their different views regarding class differentiations, respondents' opinions on certain social, economic and political standpoints are not much different. Most of them are in the middle range toward liberalism and democracy. However, in regarding to public participation, the capitalist and the working class is once again chose a way that is suitable to their conditions. The capitalists seek their way through resource contribution to public organizations while the working
class prefers direct action for political participation. In general, the survey of the middle classes in Bangkok provides data
for Eurther investigation regarding the role of the middle classes in social
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Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
and political transformation. At this stage, the data does not convince that the middle classes as a whole is a useful tool for political analysis because the class does not seem to have unified characters and perspectives. The professionals as members of the new middle class occupy some distinguished characteristics than the rest of the middle class and could be paid to attention in the analysis of social and political
transformation. The results of this survey open for an opportunity to draw a hypothesis that although the middle class concept can be a useful tool for economic development analysis, it might not be sufficient for political development analysis. This observation should need a further investigation. |.
Note 1. A rough indication of classes objectively defined, derived from data on work status of the economically active population in Thailand for the year 1990 (Statistical Yearbook, Thailand, 1992) is middle class 23 % and working class 77% (64% in a8rieulture and fishing, and 13.2% in production and related work)
_
PART V Indonesia
11
Lifestyles and Political Behavior of the Indonesian Middle Classes1 Daniel Dhakidae
I. A Brief Theoretical and Historical Survey Let me begin by citing a concluding statement from a conference in Australia, June 1986, concerning the topic of "The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia": "At this conference we have been looking at some of the reasons why the concept of middle class is a confusing and complex one in the Indonesian setting" (Abeyasekere, 1992: 175). While most of the reasons tabled at the conference were not unfounded, some counter arguments did provide strong findings as to the basis for looking at a complex issue such as "a middle class," or " the middle class" or even " the middle classes" in a society like Indonesia. There is a strong probability that we will conclude our conference here with a similar statement. The fundamental question of "is there a class in Indonesian society to make class analysis make sense at all" seems to be unavoidable. This is not an issue solely limited to the Indonesian case, heated debates are taking place among social scientists on the whole notion of class. No one has come up with a conclusive definition of the concept of class itself. It depends on the way an economy is organized and how it
affects society in general. Class is objectively opaque to the extent that forms of ownership and control are distant, more impersonal, and less concrete. The occupational structure has become progressively more complex as the numbers in traditional proletarian occupations are decreased and those in services increased. This generates both theoretical and subjective opacity. In effect the distinction between manual and non-manual l a b o r becomes less salient sociologically and socially.
Theoretical opacity means simply that the intricacies of modern class
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1 Exploration of the Middle Classes in Soudwast Asia
arrangements create problems for sociological analysis. (Marshall, 1988: 5)
Of course this holds for a highly industrialized society like Great Britain. However, with the increasing complexity of industrial societies the same holds for almost any industrial society. in a newly industrializing economy like that of Indonesia, sociologically and politically, society has been divided by way of living-rural versus urban, westernized versus indigenous. It is also divided by streams of ideological tenets, as advocated by anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz and adopted by Herbert Feith as a basis for looking at Indonesian politics. Class analysis thus competes internally with various models and externally with many other approaches. Middle class as a sociological concept has been which challenged and the primacy of class has also been challenged in many ways. In the West, the whole structure of the theory has been put under critical investigation and the viability of the theory is in serious question. The challenge to class theory comes from many quarters of which there, at least three strands. Two of them will be discussed below: 1. The class structure has changed so rapidly and radically that the old frame of thinldng about class is now no longer applicable. A new set of concepts needed. 2. An even more fundamental challenge comes from the intellectual movement known as postmodernism. This is a collection of new approaches within the social sciences and humanities, which reject traditional forms of general theory, predominantly that of Marx, as invalid. It argues that such theories should be replaced with accounts,
which focus only on specific limited locales (Bradley, 1996: 2, 5, 12). The difference between Marx and Weber, under whose legacies any discussion of class has been founded, seems unbridgeable. Absolute differences between the two, however, have been exaggerated, while similarities between them have been neglected. In fact both Marx and Weber focused their discussing of social class on the correlates of industrialization and market capitalism. The former term refers to a threefold process embracing the development of technology (technical division of l a b o r ) , growth of manufacturing industry (sectoral division of l a b o r ) and changes in the organization of production (social division of l a b o r ) . The three
dimensions of the division of l a b o r raise issues primarily of
Lifestyles and Political Behavior of the Indonesian Middle Classes |
477 l
co-ordination and control as these emerge from the differentiation, allocation, and negotiation of roles and tasks. The development of market capitalism, on the other hand, describes the extension of market principles to social life in general and the consequences of this for the distribution of wealth in society. It pertains to issues arising out of the ownership and exchange of private property. (Marshall, 1988: 14).
Marx is considered responsible for anything about class. Nevertheless, it can be reasonably claimed that his conception of class relationships involves the three dimensions of ownership, production and struggle (Marshall, 1988: 15). What about Weber? The two are considered diametrically opposed to each other. In fact, for Marx and for Weber as well, social class relationships embrace the same three dimensions of ownership, production, and struggle (Marshall, 1988: 16). Weber, like Marx, perceives class relations as existing on the political and ideological as well as the economic levels, and insists that the relationships between these are a matter for empirical investigation in each case.
In fact, since classes tend not to be the group or communities, it is more often the case that the social sources of shared iderzlitj and collective action are located in status groups, these being defined in terms of 'a specific positive or negative, social estimation of honor', normally expressed in 'a spec style of life " (Marshall, 1988: 18, all emphases added). The same line of argument comes from two opposing approaches,
Weber and Marx, but they converge on some similarities. Weber's account has something in common with that of Marx whose concept places the emphasis on property and ownership and the centrality of the market, while at the same time Weber emphasizes the importance of bureaucracy as the most appropriate and efficient way of pursuing capitalist enterprise. Bureaucracy is in a sense the rationalization of a process inextricably bound to capitalist development. Weber believed that a variety of rationally based institutions, such as a legal system, a banking infrastructure and rational systems of accounting, were needed to promote capitalist development. Technology and science can also be seen as an embodiment of rationality. The development of these rational institutions promoted
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LExplo1-ation of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
the growth of middle-class groupings, which were highlighted in Weber's theory of class. Between them, Marx and Weber pointed to a number of elements central to subsequent theories of capitalism: the dominance of profits over needs, the market, private ownership of capital, wage labour; alienation; the pressures of competition and capital accumulation; bureaucracy, the application of science and technology to production, economic rationalism as the key principle of decision-making. For both Marx and Weber capitalist societies were societies stratified by class (although they conceived class somewhat differently). It is this form of inequality that features centrally in all . theories of capitalism (Bradley, 1996: 31-32) While this is a highly debated concept within the social sciences in general, Indonesian social scientists are faced with two additional fundamental difficulties. In the first, clouds of uncertainty are hovering over the thing itself. Is Indonesia a class based society in the sense developed either by Marx or by Weber? Is there any middle class sufficiently meaningful to deserve the term? How large or how small is it? The second difficulty concerns the research conducted by Indonesian social scientists. No middle class theories have been developed either by Western or national scholars on an Indonesian middle class. In 1984, Prisms, a Jakarta based social and economic journal, published a special issue on the Indonesian middle class. Each and every scholar cast doubt as to whether there was one and how to define the
Indonesian middle class. Vague terms such as "the middle group" were picked up, but it is amorphous in its notion, and floats between this and
that strand of social theory and is in many instances confusing 2 (Nianpoeno, 1984: 49). One may locate him/ herself in the middle stratum just to demonstrate that (s) he doesn't belong to the "lower stratum." There are also instances where one thinks of him/ herself as belonging to the "middle stratum" because of one's ambition to interact with those elites above him/ herself. The consequence is that the middle class is a [concept] of theoretical importance required [only] by social research methodology that orients itself in textbook stratification theory, instead of something based on the real Indonesian situations and conditions with their varieties and pluralities comprising 150 million people. Then he came to the conclusion that to attack the middle class in a meaningful
way one has to take into account:
Lifestyles and Political Behavior of the Indonesian Middle Classes |
1.
Indonesian history itself
2.
The way of thinking about national development
N
( 4 7 9 . /I
3. The cultural attitude of the Indonesian people. Another Indonesian scholar responsed by defining the middle class in terms of the Dutch colonial legacy. Dutch colonialism created two kinds of middle classes, while at the same time killing the very "embryos" of the middle stratum within the [indigenous] society, like traders and brave sea men and capitalists in small industries. The first middle class created by Dutch colonialism are the so called "pariah capitalists." Due to the penetration of Dutch capitalism and its commanding position in navigation and trading, their roles were marginalised. This was due to
the penetration of Dutch capitalism into the villages, which exacerbated and virtually incapacitated local traders. Large traders became more dependent On the "pariah capitalists" (Soetrisno, 1984: 24)-
This is further corroborated by an expert on the Dutch economy, who, citing Daniel H. Buchanan, a British Indian economist, argues that there is a big difference between British India and the Netherlands Indies in that: India has not become more and more capitalistic but is only exploited and applies in even greater measure to the Netherlands ladies because here capitalists are almost entirely foreign. Here, therefore, Western enterprise is almost without exception European enterprise; and this, by reason of its predominantly agrarian character, has penetrated even more deeply into the life of the indigenous society than it has in India. Yet, in India's Western enterprises there remain enclaves in
native society, and the
boundaries of these enclaves constantly become more clearly defined. On the one side, Western enterprises are extended, grow
more complicated in techniques, organization, finance, land sales procedures, while the sharer in them of native production factors
becomes more and more modest. On the other side, the native crofter industries shrink and decline. A striking example of this in the Netherlands Indies is the development of the sugar industry. In other branches of production the enclave character of European enterprise was there from the beginning: e.g. for example, and in the cultivation of oil palms, fibres, and cinchona (Bourke, 1946: 7). The enclave type of the Netherlands Indies economy needed the
so-called "intermediate groups." They were created by the Dutch to
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| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Soudieast Asia
function as intermediates--a "go-between" between the Dutch traders who resided in the coastal areas and the agricultural producers in the rural countryside. The Indonesians of Chinese descent played this role of " the pariah capitalists" (Soetrisno, 1984: 23-24). The second middle class created by the Dutch includes bureaucrats and Westernized intellectuals. In the beginning, this group was ideologically similar to the "pariah capitalists," the admirers of Western achievements in developing their nations. There is, however, a big
difference between the two in their perceptions of Dutch colonialism and their own survival. While the first look upon the Dutch as their political
protectors, the latter is more ideological in looking at the Dutch as the source of political injustice. The decisive point came in the late 1950s and in the 1960s, when the military dominated almost all social fields in Indonesian society. Nationalization of foreign capital became the turning point for the whole change in the class composition. When the military became the manager of the nationalized firms, it gave a totally different form to economic society. The collusion between the governing party leaders of the 1950s and their sympathizers changed the format of the economy itself. The change happened in two determinant fields: the field of bureaucracy and the field of business, where the two groups became interlocked . In fact, more interesting is the change in the composition of the "middle class" based on the economic forces in our society. The decade of the 1960s saw the melting away of the difference between "the pariah capitalists" and "bureaucratic middle class," which, during colonial times, were two different entities. The opporhinities
for civilian bureaucrats and the military members of ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces, DD) to sit on the top management of state companies and the
license system allowed the
civilian
bureaucrats and the military to accumulate capital. However, despite the fact that they dominated capital, they lacked management knowledge to enable them to invest their capital firms. This forced them to cooperate with the pariah capitalists (Soetrisno, 1984: 25) .
In his individual attempt to attack this middle class problem, Howard Dick, an Australian scholar, wrote a seminal article in Indonesia magazine, published by the Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.
His arguments run as follows. An urban middle class is on the rise. After
Lifestyles and Political Behavior of the Indonesian Middle Classes |
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481
the hiatus of the guided democracy under Sukarno, the new order government restored political stability as the basis of an economic development and "...the unprecedented prosperity of the oil boom of the 1970s has enabled this middle class to flourish" (Dick, 1985: 71). The term middle class is taken in "a common sense" way: To identify a group distinct from either an upper class of feudal origin, holding power and wealth by virtue of birth, or a lower class of peasants and workers, lacking power, wealth, and even education. This middle class has education, some wealth and whatever power it has been able to win from the aristocracy. In all three respects, however, the definition of the middle class is a residual one. Where Me middle class can be identified Sui generis is in terms of lifestyles and values. These are best described, unpejoratively and with an urban connotation, as "bourgeois" In this regard it is still meaningful to talk of a middle class, even though in most Western democracies (including Japan) it has absorbed the upper class, stripped of its power and economic privileges, and ceased to be middle in any strict sense (Dick, 1985; 74, all emphases added).
The most important contribution made by Dick lies in the fact that he excludes the more "traditional" aspects, such as production and struggles, as described above. Dick puts full emphasis on "material lifestyles" measured by expenditures. And, as might be expected, self-employed professionals, managers and supervisors, military, professionals (excluding teachers), employers, teachers, and higher clerical and sales personnel all have much better access to these goods than do the
self-employed (petty traders, etc.), lower clerical, sales and service personnel, and, especially, manual workers, even though some individuals in the latter categories earn sufficient income to appear to be on the fringe of the middle class. By contrast, only the tiny group of farmers owning more than five hectares have a level of access to
consumer durables approaching even that of manual workers in urban areas. Dick's second important contribution is the idea that the middle class is sharply defined by "social behavior, reflecting what may be described as the privatization of the means of consumption. This is readily apparent
from the contrast between middle-class and kampong society (village society).
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| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
In the latter, the urban society of the common people, consumption assets such as transistors, bicycles, and crockery are shared ("borrowed"), as well as money, land are to some extent communal property A refusal to lend something is regarded as antisocial. Houses are left open to anyone who wants to drop in or walk through. What one has is a matter of common knowledge. lt is
the social pressure to share possessions, as well as the lack of privacy, that tends to drive the more prosperous out of the kampong,
either physically or socially. Their houses are likely to face away from the kampong onto the street and the amorphous outside world. In order to establish and defend their exclusive access to the goods they have purchased, their doors are likely to be locked and their windows barred" (Dick, 1985: 75-76).
With these arguments at hand, Dick proposes, in order to avoid confusion and any ambiguities of the terms "middle class" and "bourgeois." to refer instead to a "consumer class." Daniel Lev has intentionally avoided the confusing term "middle class" and aptly touched on a similar issue pointing to the fact that the so-called middle class is a consequence of the colonial period and, therefore, has a very specific meaning. Lev gave the name "intermediate group" to the " dynamic bunch growing in the space between two polarized classes, the Dutch society as the colonizer and indigenes as the colonized" (Lev, 1992: 27). Those involved, neither farmers nor urban workers, on the one hand nor state elite on the other, occupy entrepreneurial, commercial, financial and professional state in the economy" (Lev, 1992: 27). As in many new states, they do not constitute a
bourgeoisie in any useful sense, for they neither own nor actually control property or the means of production. Lacking this, they do not have consistent influence over the institutions of the state. Moreover, they are heterogeneous, quite fragmented in fact. Another attempt to come to grips with the middle class question took place in Australia. In 1990, a book, In 1992 the second edition was published the outcome of the conference, was published in Australia. One can't help wondering what is the meaning of Dick's statement, "the Indonesian middle class has been discovered." (Dick, 1992; 63).3 Dick continued, explaining that at the Monash conference no one, Indonesian or foreigner, disputed that there was such a thing, or that it was growing in size and political significance. Beyond these broad generalizations,
Lifestyles and Political Behavior of the Indonesian Middle Classes |
I 483
however, there was little agreement. Dick offers a definition of the middle class that includes three components.
'independent
First, occupation and sources of income are the fundamental determinants of political behavior. In this sense, the economic interests of members of the middle class are certainly diverse, even to the point stat they confound the whole notion of "middle class." The second group of determinants of membership in the middle class are culture and values that come into play. Thus, class can be defined in terms of shared-culture and values as well as shared economic interests, although these criteria do not necessarily coincide. The third and the most important determinant, Dick argues that identifies the Indonesian middle class is mode of consumption. This does not refer just to level of consumption, which is obviously a function of income. Nor does it refer specifically to type of consumer goods, such as durable goods. No substantive change occurs between Dick's 1985 and his 1992 views of the Indonesian middle class. Most Indonesians aspire to own modern consumer durables, and many who are certainly not middle class have managed to acquire such items as radio-cassette players, television sets and motorcycles. Using all of these concepts, Dick came to the conclusion that the identification of the Indonesian middle class in terms of it mode of consumption is not the end, but only the starting point for research. The really interesting question then becomes one of how that class can be broken down into groups that are useful for political analysis. One obvious approach is to focus on occupational groups and their relations to the state. This approach would give rise to a dichotomy between a middle class. The state-dependent middle class and an
virtue of this approach is that it highlights vested interests in wealth and power (Dick, 1992: 66). Based on this approach, three classes can be identified: first, the upper stratum that encompass as the ruling elite and big business, the "middle" stratum that encompass as professionals and the intelligentsia, and the "lower" stratum that encompasses small businessmen, larger rural landholders and relatively highly paid factory workers and artisans.
Military officers and civil servants fall in all three strata, according to rank, reflecting the mobility conferred by successful career paths in the armed forces and the state. Richard Robison provides a completely different perspective in looking at the "middle class." In his view, a concept such as middle class
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
covers too broad a spectrum and he speculates on whether that "renders it a fairly useless concept." As Robinson explains:
The traditional feudal rulers of the country have now not only lost their political power and access to traditional sources of wealth but are no longer even the possessors of what might be termed a
ruling class culture. Neither have the newly powerful (the generals) or the newly wealthy (mainly Chinese corporate capitalists) established themselves Ln a sufficiently cohesive and systematically
'include
ins ti tu tionalised way to qualify as the new ruling class. Certainly they have not forged a new ruling culture, unless gross conspicuous consumption is a sufficient qualification. We are, therefore, faced with the problem that the Indonesian middle class could potentially be seen to a range of people from the local rice dealer (on the grounds that he has a house, car, TV, is literate and employs others) to Liem Sloe Liong, one of Asia's biggest corporate capitalists. Similarly, are we to lump together the generals with the local
schoolteachers on the ground that they are all bureaucrats? (Robison, 1992: 128-129, all emphases added).
Setting aside all the differences in the definition of a middle class, the fact still remains that the Indonesian social scientists and those specializing in Indonesian studies have been left unprepared for the new situation in which the middle class finds itself. Daniel Lev makes this quite clear: "For some time we have lagged behind Indonesian stratificatory realities, under the impression, once quite true, the middle classes (or whatever we choose for the moment to call them) were too minute to make a difference. Now, suddenly, when they appear to be
making some difference, or anyway are substantial enough to compel notice, we are at a loss to figure out who exactly they are, why they are important, and what difference they actually make"(Lev, 1992: 25). The research conducted in Iakarta, as part of the larger project of research on Southeast Asia, concentrates both on the theoretical side and the application of the theories in order to attempt to address the above questions. Our basic assumption is that the systematic industrialization that took place in the 1970s was the watershed in Indonesian development. With changes in the economic structure, came changes in the social structure and the new rich emerged. Whatever name is assigned to it, there is a section of society that occupies a certain position
in the production sector and emerged with changes that occurred in
Lifestyles and Political Behavior of the Indonesian Middle Classes |
I 485
'l
ownership patterns. The political ideas embraced by this group, the middle class, have been referred to as the "struggle" These assumptions form the background for this research project.
II. Who Are the Indonesian Middle Classes? The above brief survey of the concept of the middle class paves the way
for a closer look into who are the members of the Indonesian middle class. But again in order to have a clear common picture of what middle class we are referring to, we will begin with a brief history of Indonesian development in order to give context to this empirical survey research, which is by its very nature just a snapshot of what has developed over a period of decades. The year of the military coup d'etat and the counter coup, from October 1965 to 11 March 1966, should be taken as the turning point that changed the whole spectrum of Indonesian society in almost every sense. How deep was the change? A heated debate is still underway in determining what really change after the fateful event, the toppling down of Soekarno. Professor Anderson of Cornell University argues that there was no structural change in the Indonesian economy and politics: the old state remains in the new society; the only change was a change of actors, not a change of structure. Instead of the Dutch, the new state is ruled by the indigenes, with the same or a similar type of colonial laws and similar kinds of colonial regulations. On the other hand, Robison takes a diametrically opposed view. In his vies, nationalization of foreign capital in the 1950s changed the picture dramatically, but the dramatic change requires a much closer look. Nationalization doesn't necessarily mean diet control of the economy fell into the hands of society. Robison puts it aptly when he says that:
The burden of economic nationalization, such as it was, fell upon the state, not only because of residues of socialist sentiment and the demands of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party, DD) the left PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party, DD), and some PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party) elements that the state should play a crucial economic role, but also because national private capita, both indigenous and Chinese, was too weakly developed to play the major role. This was especially so in large-scale sectors of economic
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activity, particularly in manufacturing and infrastructure (Robison, 1986: 40).
The takeover of foreign capital by the state means that the bureaucracy penetrate the Indonesian economy in a meaningful way. In the 1950s, an economic policy was called developed the Benteng Policy in which the state did its best to create a stronghold for the indigenous economic elite, which mainly fell apart because of a lack of managerial capacity to control the businesses. Soekarno's Guided Democracy did the same in its economic policy in the sense that it was the state that controlled the economy through the military and a limited number of the president's cronies. The toppling of Soekarno's Guided Democracy changed the situation dramatically. A type of rightist coalition came onto the scene, make up of the intelligentsia, students, professionals and the military. The control of the Indonesian economy by the military and the eclipse of the Indonesian Communist Party can be interpreted as the control of the economy by the urban sector of the population. The situation is clearly seen by Mubyarto, an economist from Gadjah Mada University, as one in which economic development occurs at the expense of the rural economy. The situations in the rural economy and the urban economy are very different: whereas the former became increasingly impoverished, the latter, was subsidized by the state. The trade conditions for rural products, such as rice have
decreased over time, so that it has become much more profitable not to grow rice but to grow palawija, between two harvests commercial crops, or starting a massive urbanization right because sources of living are located in the cities, in the construction industry, real estate, and other
such fields, rather than in villages (Mubyarto, 1989: 313-324). This kind of economic development leads to many income disparities. First, there is the pauperization of the village, as seen in the sharply declining terms of trade between the rural economy and the urban economy. Second, There is a disparity in economic development between Java and the outer-islands. Java, where 85% of the population is concentrated, has only a small portion of the country's natural resources, but has the largest economy. Third, there are disparities in development between Jakarta and all cities outside of the capital. In a certain sense, Jakarta has a kind of "enclave economy" that closely parallels that described by Boeke.
Lifestyles and Political Behavior of the Indonesian Middle Classes |
'487j
The great concentration of the economy in the urban areas, in the urban areas of Java, and especially in Jakarta, parallels the lack of political control of state policies. While most of Indonesia's economic development has been due to oil, the fall in the price of oil sealed the fate of the economy itself. In 1986, the state was sapped of its strongest source of income when it was forced to deregulate the economy. This, however, does not mean that in macro economic terms no real prosperity has resulted from the economic policy. To further emphasize this point, let me cite the following observation by two Australian economists:
Two decades of rapid economic growth have had numerous consequences. One of the most conspicuous has been the emergence of H sizable local business class, and in particular a limited number of very large family owned conglomerates. Predictably, these large controlled by Chinese combines have been overwhelmingly Indonesians, the most notable exception being the rapidly expanding business empires of President Soeharto's children (Mackie and Maclntyre, 1994: 39, emphasis added) The political consequences of the development of big businesses have been enormous. First, the business are actually taxed by the state, for political and other purposes, to compensate for the facilities provided to them- Thus, the capitalism that has developed is a retier capitalism that runs parallel to the decreasing role played by political parties. It is interesting to compare Indonesian scholar statement above on the "pariah capitalists" of the colonial period with a similar phenomenon in the present New Order period. Let me emphasize this point
by
citing
Mackie and Maclntyre. In sum, for most of the New Order period, the state has been widely seen as relatively Llnconstrained by business pressure in the shaping of policy decisions. Indonesia's business class has frequently been described, in the terms applied to Thailand by Riggs (1966) as a "bureaucratic polity" and its business class as impotent "pariah entrepreneurs". There have indeed been strong grounds for this view. In most cases the fastest growing large business groups have been heavily dependent upon preferential political treatment, which, inevitably, brings into question the degree of autonomy or potential for independent political action the leaders of Indonesia's business class in fact enjoy. Second, notwithstanding the growth of indigenously controlled
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firms, it remains inescapably the case that the great majority of firms are in the hands of Chinese Indonesians, who remain politically vulnerable and teas ultimately beholden to the government for protection (Mackie and Maclntyre, 1994: 41, all emphases added). Some points need clarification. First, the collusion between the state and business makes for an extremely unique relationship between the two, which in tum might affect the behavior of business managers down the lines in management of all firms. Second, the vulnerable position of Indonesian Chinese means that they fall prey to two groups of interests, namely the economic and political interests of the counter elite within the middle class on one hand, and the risk of becoming the object of mass violent action at times of social frustration, on the other hand. With this social background established, we proceed to our field research.
III. Class Identity of the Middle Classes With the above facts and figures as background, we can now move to the main research on middle classes in Indonesia. Who are the so-called Indonesian middle classes? The table below shows that grouping respondents according to class does not materially change the percentages in different occupations. As the above chart shows, the private sector continues to account for the largest proportion among the various classes- The growth it the private sector was boosted by the change in economic policy of the late 1980s when deregulation and debureaucratization gave rise to the emergence of the private sector. On the basis of the above categories,
those working m the private sector continue to be more numerous than
are those in other sectors. This remains true if the above criteria are the
criteria of "an
'independent
related to
relationship with the
government," which distinguishes between government and non-government workers. Thus, it can be said that a large portion of the respondents to this survey were not directly dependent on the government either with regard to their salaries or their work policies. Within the ten sector categories, our research finding indicate that the
trade sector, the individual and social services sector, and the financial sectors contained the largest number of people. In fact, the findings of this survey do not differ greatly from those of the BPS (Biro Pus at
Lifestyles and Political Behavior of the Indonesian Middle Classes 1
(489
1
Statistic-Central Bureau of Statistics, $995), which also shows that these three sectors dominate employment in Jakarta. Table 1
Respondents' Main Jobs by Class (%).
Main occupation
C
OMC SE PB
Indonesian armed
NMC
MMC
WC
Total
M
P
1.0
0.5
2.5
0.9
17.7 9.5
24.1 5.3
21.0 8.3
13.4 5.0
63.5
54.0
62.3
86.4
45.8
6.4
5.9
3.3
1.0
3.2
2.0
8.0
2.5
5.8
25.7
9.6
3.0 7.6 4.8 15.9 0.3 100
forces
Civil servants Public company
employees Private sector
employees Foreign private
company employees Social employees
Traders
18.8
37.0
Businessmen
64.7
30.1
0.6
Entrepreneurs
35.3
51.1
59.7
0.5
2.1
12.4
1.9 14.4
18.9
17.4
Farmers, fisherman Total
1.6
Notes: C = Capitalist class; OMC = Old middle class; NMC MMC = Marginal middle class; WC = Working class.
New middle class;
The survey results also demonstrate that there are six dominant ethnic groups- Javanese, Sundanese, Beta vi, Chinese, Batak and Minangkabauwith the Javanese being the largest group (37.5%) The variety in ethnic
identities among various classes in the five research areas in Jakarta is not surprising, because jakarta, the governmental capital as well as the center of economic activity has long been a destination for migrants from other
areas. Divided by class category, the result shows the differences in proportion of the various ethnic groups. A notable exception are the Beta vi, the original Batavians, who are concentrated in the Old Middle Class (OMC) as land owners and petty bourgeois, and in the Working Class (WC). Sociologically, this demonstrates the dynamics of the New Middle Class (NMC), as distinct from all other ethnic groups, the
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members of which chose Jakarta as their destination by choosing universities or other educational institutions as die basis of their careers. In terms of education, the middle class includes a high number those with high school degrees, close to 70%, in a country where more or less 85% of the population have only elementary school education.
Table 2
Primary Income of Respondents According to Class
Income (rupiah)
C
400.000 Or less 400.001-1 million 1000001-51IdHLon 5000007-100nnnion
Total
5.9 35.3 58.8 1.6
OMC
NMC
FB
SE
M
P
31.8 24.0 39.5 4.7 12.4
65.1 27.4 6.2 1.4 14.4
16.4
27.1
48.7 32.3 2.6 18.9
45.1 26.5 3.3 17.4
MMC
WC
67.2 29.9 3.0
100.0
47.9 31.5 17.9 2.8
25.7
9.6
100
Total
Divided according to class, the preceding table shows differences in income. The outstanding result of a comparison of income according to class shows that all working class (WC) respondents List incomes below Rp.400, 000. A somewhat higher proportion of the marginal middle class
(MMC) respondents, 67.2%, state their incomes a below Rp.-400.000 (equivalent to US$ 150). A rather different situation prevails among the old middle class (OMC), for which incomes range from less than Rp.400, 000 a month to between Rp. 1 million and 5 million per month. This group also includes those with incomes ranging from Rp 5 million to 100
million a month. Incomes among this group are high, far above the average per capita income of the generally public. According World Bank data (1996) and several other sources, it is estimated that the Indonesian per capita income is about US 1000 per year. Thus, the new middle class (NMC) averages at least triple that income.
The findings also demonstrate that the NMC shows the highest percentage of working spouses/ partners. This result is reinforced by the fact that 96.7% of working partners are women. That means that the "wife"---which so far has been identical with the "housewife" who does not engage in formal work 'but whose time is entirely spent in the home---is rarely found among the NMC. In this class category, wives work as well as their husbands, and this situation has ajready become
commonplace. This in highly contrast to the working class category, in
Lifestyles and Poliiical Behavior of the Indonesian Middle Classes |
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which the smallest number of working spouses, 19-8 %, are found. In that category, the economic contribution to the household is made only by the head of the household.
IV. Class Mobility Objective inter-generational class mobility refers to a change in social class (objective) from that of respondent's father during the respondent's youth to the social class (objective) of the respondent at the time of the research. A large part of the OMC, 68.2%, and NMC, 35.6%, originate from OMC fathers. The majority of the middle class does not come from the lower class (LC); only 5.5% had LC fathers. Only among the OMC do a large portion not undergo any change in class from the father's generation. The majority of NMC and LC experienced a change in class, as their fathers belonged to a different class. The conclusion regarding this shift in class shows the same result, both in comparison to the father's class. ]akarta did not develop from an agrarian region- Thus, many long-term inhabitants, except for immigrants from the regions, do not come from an agrarian background. Research shows that only 19.8% of Jakarta residents have families with an agricultural background. Nevertheless, 17.9% of these no longer work in that sector. Furthermore, 80.2% have a family backgrounds in non-agricultural sectors. Those with agricultural family background tend to a greater extent to fall into the OMC/SE (small employee) category, 39.6%, than in other classes. They also tend to a greater extent than other classes to continue to work in their parent's work sector. Those with a non-agricultural class backgrounds tend to fall into the NMC/ MMC category (88.1%) Thus, there is an automatic increase in the number of those who changed profession from the agricultural sector of their fathers to their own non-agricultural work. Those who initially did agricultural work, even though they did not come from an agricultural background, also shifted to non-agricultural sectors. In general, a large proportion of those who worked aS private employees, 61.3%, had parents who worked for the government or in the Armed Forces/ Civil Service (34.3%). This phenomenon demonstrates that work in the private sector accommodates the majority of respondents even though many of them were born to bureaucrats.
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Table 3
Inter-Generational Work Mobility (%)(Respondent's First Work by Father's Work) Father's work
RespondentS first work
Total
Civil
Private
Business
Civil servants
25.9
13.1
10.0
25.9
Private employees
65.2
76.0
59.7
44.3
61.3
8.6
10.9
28.6
20.4
17.1
Business persons
Farmers/ fishermen
Total
Farmers
19.1
0.3
00
17
9.5
2.5
100
100
100
100
100
Notes: 1. Civil servants include armed services, employees in government offices, and employees in state owned businesses. 2. Private employees are private company employees, personal employees, and social employees.
3. Business people are traders, business owners and the self~employed.
Even though the majority of Armed Forces/ Civil Service employees had father who were in the Armed Forces/ Civil Service (46.4%), a large portion of Armed Forces or Civil Service fathers have children working as private employees (65.2%) Similarly the majority of fathers who are civil servants (76%), fathers who are traders/ businessmen (59.7%), and
fathers who are farmers/ fishermen (44.3%), have cMdren who are private-sector employees. The majority of trader/ business people, who represents the OMC, tend to continue the work of their fathers who were
also, traders/businessmen (48%) The same trend is found among farmers/fishermen who had fishermen farmers/ fishermen fathers (76%) Generally speaking, education has increased between generations. The majority of respondents received middle school (SLTP, junior high school) (76.4%) or SLTA (High School) (46%) educations, and had fathers with elementary school education or no schooling. A large portion of / had fathers with SLTA education. those with higher education, 34.2D0,
Thus, the educational level of respondents tends to be higher than that of their fathers.
Furthermore, fathers tend to send their children to higher levels of education than they had themselves reached. The majority of fathers who
did not attend school or have elementary school education (SD), 41.8%,
Lifestyles and Political Behavior of the Indonesian Middle Classes I
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and those with SLTP education, 22%, sent their children to SLTA. The majority of fathers with SLTA education, 529'/,i sent their children to higher education, and the majority of fathers with higher education, 29.9%, also sent their children to higher education. Seen objectively, it is ambiguous whether or not there is evidence of class mobility that has T. resulted from the education. What has been said about the objective evidence of class mobility is corroborated by the subjective sense of class mobility. Comparing their own and their father's class positions 71.9% feel that they have not experienced class mobility. Viewed according to their present class, there seem to be no differences among the various classes. In all classes, a large proportion feel that they have not experienced class mobility. Nevertheless, in the capitalist class, OMC/PB, OMC/SE, NMC/M (manager) and the NMC/ P (professional) categories, more people feel that they have experienced upward mobility. On the other hand, in the NMC and WC categories, more people feel that they have experienced downward social mobility, 11.6 and 11.7%, respectively. The majority of those from the lower class state that it is difficult for the lower class to experience upward mobility (68%) In all classes, a large proportion declares that it is difficult for the lower classes to be upwardly mobile. Since education has paved the way for class mobility, the new middle class benefited most from it. The phenomenon of the NMC, which appears more progressive than all the other classes, is also supported by members backgrounds which also differ from those of
_ _
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members of the other classes (60).
V. Lifestyles of the Middle Classes Ownership here is defined as the ownership and control of goods by the head of the family or the family. This ownership is divided into two parts, i.e., ownership of goods and home ownership. Ownership of goods consists of car, second car, audio-video equipment, computer, mobile phone, and credit cards. Home ownership describes ownership status of the house occupied, land area, house area, and ownership of other house OI' second houses.
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1.
1
Status
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
of House Occupied
The status of the house occupied is an important indicator of an individual's socio-economic status. This is so because house ownership
continues to be a necessity for a large part of the Indonesian public at this time. The survey results show that, except in the WC, a large portion of Jakarta's middle class occupy their own houses. Among the WC, a large proportion (40.8%) live in their parents', siblings' or other relatives' houses. The percentage of people living wide others is larger than that of those occupying their own house. This shows that the socio-economic level of the WC is lower than that of other classes, and indicates that many of its members are not yet self-sufficient. The largest percentage of inhabitants who occupy their own houses are C (100%), SE (76.6%), PB with employer status (74.4%), M (57.1%), followed by P (51.9%) and NMC (42.4%). Among the NMC and the MMC, the percentage of people who live with others is rather large, between 21.7% and 40.8%. This is the result of the fact that many among the NMC and the MMC are still young and unmarried. Thus, they continue to live with parents or other family members, even though they are already working Table 4
Status of House Occupied by Class (%)
Status of home Self-owned home Rent/ contract/
1UU.U
NMC
OMC
C
MMC
WC
51.9
42.4
53.0
128
12.3
15.2
21.4
2.5
5.9
5.4
PB
SE
M
P
77.4
76.6
57.1
13.5
148
board
Company owlled home
1.5
Live in others
9.8
7.8
21.7
26.7
31.5
40.8
0.8
1.3
5.9
3.2
5.1
2.9
0.4
1.9
home Parent owned
home Other
0D
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2. Home Ownership Home ownership is divided into two categories, ownership of another home, ownership of a second home, and so on. Owning another home means that even though the house presently occupied is not owned, another home is owned. Second home ownership means that the respondent owns more than one house. Table 5 shows that the largest percentage of the Iakarta population who own other houses are in the C category (70.6%). This is not surprising, because the upper class consists of inhabitants whose social economic status far surpasses that of other classes, so that they view ownership of other houses as ordinary. Table 5
Home Ownership by Class of Respondents
Status of home Own another homer Own a second home
C 70.6 64.7
NMC
OMC
PB 30.8 28.6
SE
M
P
18.8 14.3
31.5 28.1
29.9 20.9
MMC
WC
18.5 14.1
10.7
5.8
Sig: 0,0003
in the middle class, the largest percentage owning other houses are the NMC with managerial status (31.5%) This may be because the homes they own are located far from their work place, so that they prefer
renting or living with parents closer to the work places. Another possibility is that their presently occupied homes are provided by
employers, the government, office, company, etc. and they therefore do not live in their own house. The percentage of people who own second houses is greatest in the C category (64.7%). This is closely tied to the level of income of the C group, which is higher than that of the other classes. For the ]akarta population,
ownership of more than one house only occurs among those with high income. Therefore, it is not surprising that the largest percentage of ownership of more than one house is found in the C category which, it must be noted, has the largest income. In the WC, which has the lowest income, the percentage of ownership of more than one house is the
lowest, at 5.8%, among all the classes.
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Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
Building and Land Area
The area of land and buildings can reflect the social economic status of the house owner. Generally, those with high incomes have larger and more extensive houses, especially in large cities in which land and building prices are very high. In Jakarta, people with barely adequate incomes are unable to buy large houses because they cannot afford the price. Table 6 shows that members of the upper capitalists (C), which on the average have the highest incomes, as suspected, in large part (88.2%) have houses which fall into the largest category, that is, above 120 sq. m. The SE have the smallest percentage of large house ownership. Table 6 House area
House Area by Class
pa
5,9
4.5
5,9
30,8 63,2 100.0
< 21 m2 22-45 in2 46-120 m2 >120 ma
Total
OMC
C
NMC SE 1,9
7,5
88,2 100.0
13,0 40,9 44,2 100.0
P
M
0.5 2,7
2,0 21,2 76,8 100.0
23,0 73,8 100.0
MMC
WC
7,1 5,4 26,1
1,0 4,9
100.0
24,3 69,9 100.0
MMC
WC
67,4
Sig: 0,00000.
Table 7 Land area
Land Area by Class (%) C
'< 60 m2
6i-120 m2 121-250 1112 251-500 m2 >501 m2
Total Sig: 0,00000.
5.9 64.7 17.6 11.8 100.0
NMC
OMC PB 19.2
SE 29.9
M . 4.4
P 9.5
32.5
55.9
25.3 35.4 15.2 5.1 100.0
35.0 21.4 10.3 3.4 100.0
24.6
33.7
35.9
32.4
47.4 16.7 7.0 100.0
38.9 13.7 4.2 100.0
23.1
8.8 2.9
6.8 1.7
100.0
100.0
Lifestyles and Political Behavior of the Indonesian Middle Classes |
I497"l
With regard to land area, the findings are similar. Table 7 shows that, cumulatively, C has the largest percentage (94-1%) of occupancy in houses with land area in excess of 120 sq. m. The reverse situation, however, is found among the SE, MMC, and WC, of which a large percentage occupy land of less than 120sq in. 4.
Ownership of Goods
Gwnership of goods is one manifestation of an individual's lifestyle. Ownership of electronic articles, cars and credit cards characterizes the social economic conditions of the owner. The number, variety and cost of the goods owned indicate their owner's income level. In other words, the greater someone's income, the greater the quantity, variety and cost of
goods owned. Table 8 below shows the percentage of ownership of luxury goods by the various classes. Ownership of goods classified as luxurious can describe the life style of their owner. The table clearly shows that for all types of goods owned, the upper class (C) has the largest percentage. This is understandable, because C has the largest income of all classes. This clearly indicates that ownership of expensive goods is characteristic of the high income respondents in category C. It may be said simply that C is the social group with large incomes and luxurious life styles as
indicated by goods owned. Among the middle class, for those who fall into the PB, M, and F categories, the percentages of ownership of luxury goods are about even. This is not surprising because the level of income in these three categories is also evenly balanced. The percentage of ownership of goods in these classes is slightly below that of the C category. The situation is different
for those respondents who fall into the SE, MMC, and WC classes. Ownership of goods in these classes is far below that of C, and even below that of the middle class employers (PB) and the new middle class (M or P) . The disparity in ownership among the two groups is very large, especially with regard to expensive, modern goods such as cars, computers, and even disk players. This shows that cars are still luxury goods in Indonesia and are out of reach for people of middle or low economic status. The price of cars is considerably higher in Indonesia than in other countries, and this is one reason that cars can only be
owned by people with incomes above a certain level.
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The same applies to ownership of credit cards. For those in the MMC and the lower class/ workers (WC), the percentage of ownership of credit
cards is very small. This is because a certain minimum income level is required in order to obtain a credit card. Ownership of electronic goods has already become commonplace, especially with regard to radios, televisions and tape recorders. Nevertheless, the quality of electronic goods varies and thus even though people may own the same types of electronic goods, such as televisions, their prices may vary greatly. It is interesting to note that the gap in the percentage of ownership between the WC and other classes, especially the C, is very large. Ownership of goods by the WC is very small in comparison to other classes. Thus, at a glance, it is possible to determine by ownership alone as above- that the C category represents the richest social group, while the WC category includes the poor who have very little. Table 8
Ownership of Goods by Class (%)
Ownership
Car
C
SE 21.4 3.2
M
P
MMC
58.6
54.0
13.4
1.4
46.8
14.8 71.4
66.3
53.3
11.7
48.8
47.1
18.8
28.6
5_8
34.0
29.9
9.1
28.6
5.8
34.0
32.1
9.1
88.2 70.6
62.4
27.3
66.4
59.9
40.6
29.3
9.1
25.6
7.1
43.9 35.8
13.4
82.4
48.8 43.3
100.0
55.6
Second car
64.7
19.5
Audio system
76.5
VCR
76.5
72.2 42.9
Video camera Disc player
58.8
58.8
Color TV20 Computer Credit card
NMC
OMC PB
WC
17.0 39.8
24.3
9.8
Sig: 0,00000.
Recreational and social activities are ways in which people fill their leisure time. Everyone has his/her own way of making use of his/her spare time, depending on social economic situation. There is even the possibility that those with high incomes do not have spare time for recreational or other social activities, because almost all of their time is
used for work. In this sense, recreational activities are less dependent on
Lifestyles and Political Behavior of the Indonesian Middle Classes |
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499 I I
real income than on one's attitude, which is more cultural in nature in the sense that it depends on how people invest fun, honor and prestige in his "unproductive consumption of goods" (Veblen, 1953: 61) Why is leisure time of importance to the middle class? Leisure time is not a kind of
"animal rest," and not only something needed to recuperate in order to get more energy for the machine of production. Mills explains the matter when he says:
the problem of leisure does not arise in a society or for an individual until work has been split from life. For if our work allows us to express our true interests and to facilitate their more skilful expression, then our leisure is not escape, or recuperation, or that tired frenzy by which we strive for the animated glee we call fun (Mills, 1939: 348-349). The deeper problem of leisure, according to Mills, and the cultural content of leisure time, can be solved only when leisure and work are easy companions rather than tense opposites. How does the middle class unite work and fun as a life style? From a completely different angle, Thorstein Veblen sheds some light on this issue: Unproductive consumption of goods is honorable, primarily as maker of prowess and perquisite of human dignity; secondarily it honorable in itself, especially the becomes substantially consumption of the more desirable things (Veblen, 1953: 62).
How does the Indonesian middle class use its leisure time? Generally, the
recreational and social activities of ]akarta's middle class are
dominated by the NMC, both the managerial section and the professional section of the class. This is evident in the fact that the NMC occupies the largest percentage in all recreational and social activities, especially compared to the non-capital owning, working middle class. The difference in percentage because the NMC and other classes in these activities is considerable. This reinforces the view that the NMC is a social group with a different lifestyle. Yet, it is noteworthy that the recreational and social activities of the middle class elsewhere in the world are not very popular among ]akarta's middle class. This is indicated by the small percentage of those who engage in activities such as golf, membership in exclusive clubs, overseas vacations, cultural and other activities. The percentage of the
middle class involved in any of these does not exceed 35%. But, it still
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holds that although not outstanding, the NMC in Jakarta has its own characteristics distinguishing it from other middle classes and the
working class in its use of leisure time and in its social activities. Financial management is something crucial to lifestyle in the sense of how people define their position in and relate themselves to the capitalist system, and their confidence in the system. Class influences people's savings activities in terms of placing their money in banks, participating in insurance programs, investing in houses or land, storing their wealth in the form of jewelry (gold, precious stones, etc.), and even lending it at a profit. A large proportion of Jakarta's middle class believes that banks are a proper place for investing their money or managing it. This is evident in the high percentage of respondents from all classes who use banks--all above 50 percent, except for the WC and the SE, which reach only 32 percent. The largest percentage of those who are bank customers belong to the capitalist category, 94%, followed by the NMC with 90.6% and 86.1%. Surpassing other ways of managing money (insurance, jewelry, etc.), banks come first among classes. Banks have become very important for Jakarta's middle class and their steadily improving services have earned them the confidence of a large part of the public. Investment in stocks and bonds through the stock exchange is not very popular among Jakartans, because it is still something new. Yet, this type of investment is characteristic of modern and middle class investment in advanced countries. Thus, the percentage of those investing in the exchange is still very low in comparison to their countries. This shows that ]akarta's middle class is still not modern in its choices of investment.
Traditional money management or investment is still of great interest to the public. This is evident in the high percentage of investment through the An'san4 method, investment in land or houses, as well as investment in gold, stones and other jewelry. The NMC which, it should be noted, is a modern social group, actually has the highest percentage of traditional money management. Arisan is an institution for furthering social relationships and is commonly used by the public a means of socializing while managing their money. Investment in land and houses is also attractive to Jakarta's public, especially the middle class. This is
understandable, because investment in land and houses is very profitable. Land and house prices rise continuously in Jakarta, where land is
increasingly limited, and this form of investment is very profitable.
Lifestyles and Political Behavior of the Indonesian Middle Classes |
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Extra-curricular activities for children. Participation in extracurricular activities relates to one's view of the whole educational system, which is deemed too ideological in its curriculum and not pragmatic enough by some, or too pragmatic and not cultural enough by others.
The upper class and the new middle class are most concerned about the out-of-sehool activities of their children. This is clear, judging from the high percentage of C and NMC who provide their children with opportunities for participating in extra curricular activities. The difference between these and the other classes is considerable. Concern for their chjldren's future is evident in their encouragement of their children's development to enable them to compete in the future by enrolling them in foreign language and computer courses, as these two fields are necessary for scientific and technological development. The broad outlook that comes with the high levels of education among parents in the NMC leads them to strive to assist their children in mastering these two fields. This explains why computer and foreign language course are frequently taken by the children in the NMC and C class categories. The arts, which include music, dance, and other activities, are among the activities attractive to the public and especially children, but they do not receive adequate attention from schools. Many parents therefore send their children to out-of-school courses in this field. Generally, an average of 14% of ]akarta's middle class send their children to art lessons. The largest percentage of those who do so are in the upper class, 30.8%. Among the middle class, the professional class of the NMC has the largest percentage sending their children to art courses, 29.6%, almost
equal to the upper class. The use of mass media, such as newspapers, magazines, television, and radio, as sources of information and entertainment is an integral part of the behavior and habits of the middle class. An individual's level of education and income influences use of mass media. There is a trend that the higher the educational level of an individual, the greater is the number of mass media used for information or entertainment. Today, the mass media, both printed and electronic, are a part of the lives of the middle class at all levels. This table demonstrates that on the average, the use of the mass media, especially newspapers and television, is high, above 75%. This shows that
Jakarta's middle class in large part is already accustomed to using the
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| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
mass media for information and entertainment. The survey results show that at less than 40% of the population, the percentage of magazine readers and radio listeners is not as high as that for television users and newspaper readers. This may be because radio and magazines only serve to supplement newspapers and television. The upper class has the highest percentage of mass media users, yet if the above table is examined more closely, it becomes evident that among the middle class, it is the NMC that has the highest percentage of mass media users. The NMC consists of professionals with high levels of education and large incomes, who certainly need information from the various media for their work, as well as to increase their knowledge and expand their horizons. Newspapers are the information medium most attractive to the public. More than 80% of Jakarta's middle class read newspapers. At the second level is television, with 79.3 %, followed by magazines, 38.6 %, and finally radio, at 30.7% . Table 9
Use of Mass Media by Class I I I I l I I I
Type of media Read newspapers Read magazines Watch TV Listen to radio
C 94.1 58.8
100 47.1
OMC PB 84.2 33.1 73.7 27.8
SE 64.9 17.5 68.8 23.4
NMC M 93.6 58.6 85.2 31.5
P 91.4 54.4 85.6 39.6
MMC
WC
85.1 35.1 81.5 29.3
66.0 14.6 69.9
28.2
Sig: 0,00000.
Authority in the family is evenly divided between husband and wife concerning decisions about family problems- this is one aspect of family life style. This is partly because of changes in the household structure, which in turn has brought about changes in the relationships between husband and wife. The rising percentage of working women or wives, especially in the large cities, also brings about changes in family management. Responsibility, as well as authority, usually held by the husband may shift to the wife (or the reverse), if both husband and wife are working. It is believed that this is happening in Jakarta, where husband and wife both have to work in order to be able to meet family needs. This has resulted in a shift in responsibility and authority in
family management.
Lifestyles and Political Behavior of the Indonesian Middle Classes I
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In the present survey, responsibility and authority in the family are
explored concerning finances, purchasing and moving house, children's education, the purchase of expensive or valuable goods. Within ]akarta's middle class, responsibility and authority in deciding financial matters seem to be largely the business of both the husband and the wife. This is found among all classes, but most frequently in the WC, 65.8%, followed by NMC (63.3% and 56.5%), the capitalists (52.9%), and, least frequently, in the OMC (45.5% and 44.5%). Even though there are no meaningful differences across class, statistically class does have an effect on who plays the greater role in making decisions on family financial matters. Responsibility and authority of husband and wife in making decisions on family financial problems are closely tied to their respective contributions to family income. If husband and wife earn the same or mark even contributions the family to income, their responsibility and authority will also be the same or balanced. This is evident in families in which husband and wife both work. Because they both have an income and contribute to the family income, both feel that they have a share in making decisions on family financial matters. The high percentage of shared responsibility for family finances in the WC and the NMC most likely can be attributed to the above situation. In WC families, which on the average have low incomes, husband and wife both have to work to meet family needs. So, in the working class the high percentage of husbands and wives with equal authority in family
financial matters is probably a consequence of the fact that both work. Table 10 More authority resides with Husband
Wife Both Other
Family France-Related Decision Making by Class (%) C 41.2
5.9 52.9
OMC
PB 32.8 19.3 44.5 3.4
SE 26.9 22.8 45.5
4.8
NMC P M 19.4 22.5 12.9 15.9 63.3 56.5 4.3 5.0
MMC
WC
24.2 18.1 54.9 2.7
22.8 10.1 65.8 1.3
Sig: 0,00000_
This also occurs in NMC families. The NMC, which consists of modem social groups with large incomes and high educational levels,
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| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
usually have households in which husbands and wives are both working. Emancipation plays an important role in the percentage of women or wives working. This is due, among other factors to the high level of education of the women of NMC families, so that gender does not become a problem. With regard to the education of their children, husband and wife together generally play the most important role ('70.4%). Responsibility and authority in making decisions on the best education for their children rest jointly with the husband and the wife. Even though, in general, the percentages of the various classes do not differ much, statistically class does differentiate with regard to who plays the most important role in decisions on children's education. Upon closer examination, it becomes clear that the percentages of the NMC and the MMC are higher than those of any other class, at 74.6% and 76.7%, respectively. Interestingly, the highest percentage of wives having greater authority over children's education occurs in the OMC, 25.7%. This may be due to the background of die OMC, in which the husband or head of family tends to have a primary job as a businessman or trader, and is too busy attending to his business leaving, family problems entirely to the wife. Thus, wives of this class are expected to play a greater role in their children's educations than are husbands . Discussion of family values unveils matters relating to priorities to be achieved by the head of the family in his own life and matters that are related to family relations. These priorities involve children's education, stability and harmony of the family, self-development, reputation in society, economic guarantees for the future, and career success. Family relations refers to relations with parents and close family, as well as the
relationship between career and family. The finding shows that in all classes a harmonious and stable family is a matter of greatest priority, while children's education takes second place. The highest among those placing first priority on a stable family is the upper class (C), at 64%. In addition to harmony and stability in the family, relationships with
parents and close relatives still receive considerable attention. Respect for parents, which is expressed through the children's obligation to care for parents in their old age, is also still greatly valued.
Lifestyles and Political Behavior of the Indonesian Middle Classes |
VI.
505 )
Political Views of the Middle Classes
A large proportion of the middle class, both old middle class as well as the new middle class and even the marginal middle class, tend to see themselves as the spearhead of democracy, as a class which has made a very significant contribution to social development in Indonesia, and as a class that cares about the needs of the poor. Nevertheless, there are differences between the old and the new middle classes, between the old employer class and the old middle class, which includes the self-employed, as well as among the professional and the managerial categories of the new middle class. The percentage of old middle class self-employed respondents who agree with the above views is smaller than the percentage of those in the old employer middle class who agree. Among the new middle class, those who agree with the opinions tend to come from the professional rather than the managerial category. In the meantime, even the upper class agrees that the middle class has made a great contribution to social development, as does the lower class. In the middle class itself, the old middle class of self-employed has the least positive view of the middle class role in society, while the new professional middle class has the most positive evaluation of their role.
Even though the middle class views itself as a force for change in society, its concern for political freedom is doubted by all classes, including the middle class itself. Only less than 15% of the middle class, as well as the lower and upper classes, agree that the middle class is more concerned with political freedom than with economic growth. This view is most clearly evident among the upper class, where only 5.9% agree with that opinion. This shows that the other classes do not view the middle class as a class that has political concerns or political power. The middle class in fact tends to adopt a conservative stance vis-a-vis the causes of poverty in society. In this they do not differ much from the lower class. Among the middle class--even though statistically the MMC appears to be most conservative-- the attitudes tend to be the same. Nevertheless, in the OMC there are significant differences between small-scale businessmen and the self-employed. In the employer group a smaller number disagrees with the view that one of the causes of poverty is the failure of government policies, 45.9 %, while more than 50% of the rest of the middle class do not agree that one of the causes of poverty is the shortcomings of government policies. On the other hand, more than
55% agree that poverty is caused by the social structure, which in every
r
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
506
society has, an upper and a lower class, a natural view of the society. _ the middle class is in favor of government policies and believes that the social structure, which causes poverty, continues to exist. * . . .
p,
»
L
\
1¥é~
F
I I
1
Table 11 Statement
The middle class has made great
|
l
Views of the Role of the Middle Class by Class (%) Attitude
C
OMC
PB
NMC
MMC
WC
Total
77.5
74.6
64.1
70.5
SE
M
P
57.8
70.4
Agree
76.5
No opinion
5.9
21.7
31.2
18.7
11.8
15.6
27.2
19.4
the development of our society
Disagree
17.6
8.3
11.0
10.8
70.7
9.8
8.7
10.2
The middle class
Agree
64.7
50.4
42.2
54.2
58.8
56.5
47.6
is the vanguard of democracy
No opinion
11.8
33.1
38.3
23.2
17.1
27.9
35.0
27.7
Disagree
23.5
16.5
19.5
22.7
24.7
15.6
17.5
19.4
Agree
5.9
9.8
15.6
4.4
4.8
9.8
18.4
9.5
No opinion
5.9
14.3
25.3
11.8
10.2
13.0
21.4
14.9
Disagree
88.2
75.9
59.1
83.7
85.0
77.2
60.2
75.6
Agree
5.9
12.8
13.0
10.8
11.8
11.2
13.6
11.8
No opinion
23.5
28.6
37.7
19.7
19.8
27.9
32.0
26.7
Disagree
70.6
58.6
49.4
69.5
68.4
60.9
54.4
61.4
Agree
29.4
27.1
27_9
26.6
20.9
30.1
25.2
No opinion
29.4
24.1
35.7
20.7
18.7
22.1
33.0
24.6
Disagree
41.2
48.9
36.4
52.7
60.4
47.8
41.7
48.7
contributions to
70.7
Sig: 0.00144 52.9
Sig: 0.00099
The middle class
is indifferent to the needs of the poor
Sig: 0.00000
The middle class is more
concerned about freedom than
growth
Sig: 0.01344 The middle class is overtaxed by its life style
26.7
Sig: 0.00179
Middle class views regarding labor and business relations are not very clear--neither among the OMC nor the NMC, with its managerial and professional groups. The middle class tends to favor labor and especially in conflicts between labor and business, their loyalty is not ambiguous.
More than 70% of the middle class disagree with the exploitation of
Lifestyles and Political Behavior of the Indonesian Middle Classes |
L
507 'Q
workers by business for profit, and more that 70% agree that companies should not fire workers involved in strikes. There is no significant difference among the views of the different categories of the middle class. Confronted with problems faced by the nation and asked to rate their perceived level of seriousness, the middle class, as well as the lower class, showed the same tendency to believing that these problems have already reached a serious stage. Among the various problems rated by the middle and upper classes, democratization clearly is most infrequently viewed as important. Criminality, unemployment, environmental pollution, inflation, corruption and several others were viewed as far
more important than the lack of a democratic political system and clean government. This differs considerably from the views of the upper class, which considers criminality as the most serious problem, and the question of monopolies as the least serious, but does not view the problem of a democratic political system as least serious. Thus, the upper class views the attainment of a democratic political system as more important than does the middle class, which so far has been viewed as the spearhead of democracy. Among the various middle class categories, it is the NMC, including the professional and the managerial categories, that rated most of the problems presented as serious --- with the exception of the problem of social and economic discrepancies. On the other hand, the OMC, the self-employed, show the least tendency to view those problems as having
reached the serious stage. This means that of all the middle class categories, the NMC is roost critical in its evaluation of problems faced by the state. . All classes, including the middle class, tend to agree about the importance of democracy. Democracy here is defined as the recognition of the right of the public to hold different opinions and the limitation of the domination of the state-~in this case the government--vis-a-vis the
people. A large portion of the middle class agrees that democracy continues to be important, and that even though development in several fields is going well, the government should not suppress the critical views of the public should given freedom to the press, and should listen more carefully to the voice of the people. Nevertheless, the OMCself-employed tend to agree with the view that democracy is no longer very important if the government can do a good job in the various fields of development. Their views differ from those of the small-scale
508
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Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
businesspersons of the OMC, as well as from those of other middle class categories.
VII.
Some Afterthoughts
The Indonesian team went into the field with an assumption that the Indonesian middle class, or ]akarta's middle class to be precise, would consist of those with an occupation that heavily relies on government or government-related jobs such as state bureaucracy (civilian and military), state enterprises, and state~related enterprises. While this is not an bearing in mind the development strategy unfounded assumption state sponsored development taken by the Indonesian government thus far --- the results of the survey were unexpected, since they paint a different picture of the Indonesian middle class. According to the survey, 80.6% of the middle class are "independent," or at least indirectly dependent on government-related occupations. The new middle class stands at the top of those with independent occupations, at 36.4% of the entire middle class, and hold commanding positions as managers and --.-
supervisors (46.3%, 53.7% respectively). Two other characteristics worth mentioning are education and income,
two of the most important constituent factors of the middle class. The majority of those in the old middle class, 49.2%, achieved a high school
level of education, and the majority of the new middle class, 69.1%, reached the higher education level, the third education stratum. In terms of income, the majority of the old middle class, 44.6%, comes from the less than Rp 400,000 (US$200) income group and the majority of the new middle class, 44.2%, comes from the higher income group, Rp 400,000-1
million (Us$200-$500). Whereas the statistics on education are as one might expect, the income levels of the middle class begs further questions as to why is income so low. This can only be explained by referring to what occurs in the macro-economic field. Within the last few years, Indonesia has been categorized as a nation of the middle income group,
and thus belongs to the middle income group in the World Bank category, with a per capita income of USS61000. Set into this backdrop the Indonesian middle class earns six times Indonesia's per capita income, or twice the income level of Greater IakartaWith these main class characteristics in mind, we can focus on the main findings of the research, which are class mobility, life style, self perceptions of the class, and the political attitudes of the Indonesian
Lifestyles and Political Behavior of the Indonesian Middle Classes |
F 509 )
middle class. Industrialization has been taking place for quite sometime with characteristics as different as colonial type development and the more "nationalistic" development of the 1950s and 1960s. The kind of industrialization that know now, which is more open to the world, was established in 1970s. Since then, Jakarta has become the very center of the process of industrialization. This, in turn, has given rise to a specific kind of Indonesian middle class. The middle class in Jakarta is a middle class with a specific tradition. It is predicated upon the old colonial legacy in what has been coined a beamtenstaat, a bureaucratic state. The Dutch and the Indo-European section of the society were responsible for extracting economic resources (the real capitalists), the Indonesian-Chinese section and other Asian foreigners were responsible for the middleman jobs, and the indigenous section of society was trained for and educated for the development of administrative skills to service Dutch colonial capitalism. Set against the background of the colonial legacy, one can see that the colonial way of industrialization is the cradle of the Indonesian middle class. How fast is social mobility created by Indonesian industrialization? Most of the class categories, except the new middle class, did not have this class mobilization. A move from the lower class to the middle class issue with Indonesian takes place at a very slow pace. This is the tricky ' development in general and industrialization m particular. There is a sort of chicken and egg cycle with the middle class. Does one type of industrialization result in a certain middle class, or does that middle class create a certain type of industrialization? It is not easy to break that cycle, and this is not the place to discuss this. In order to break the cycle, we will begin with industrialization. What has been created by Indonesian industrialization, and who benefited from it? Was there a shift, otherwise known as class mobility, from the lower to the upper classes? Iakarta, always referred to as the largest center for attracting people from outside areas, has not shown results of vertical mobility. Research shows that class mobility did not occur in families whose parents were farmers. This is also true for the lower and marginal middle classes. In other words, those that were successful enough to shift classes vertically were already in that class, in this case the new middle class, which is relatively well educated, well paid, and relatively civilized. Yet, in the middle of the static class situation, the dynamic class
referred to as Jakarta's "new middle class," was lifted up because of its
l
510
n
I
Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
members high education, and given a high level of expertise, and was able to participate in the movement of capital made possible by industrialization. If we consider this, we can see that it is a continuation of the above argument. Once the middle class is uplifted by
industrialization,
then it is possible for its members to progress
professionally, increase their skills and improve in other areas. Nowadays, this is referred to as human resource development. This group is capable of taking off because they are equipped with education and skills. This reality is not much different from what is shown in research, and in other observations. Industrialization clearly increases individual
income. But, at the same time, industrialization widens the gulf between groups in the qualitative sense. The gap between "the haves" and "the have not" has increased, even if they both differ qualitatively from the previous decade. Other findings about the middle class refer to their political views. Indonesian experts always look to the West. In the West,
the middle class willingly became agents for democratic change and human rights. The Jakarta middle class consists of those participating a high thinking environment when looking at certain things. They feel that social change is necessary, as does the middle class in ' the West and other areas, however they do not want to be involved m
actions that move toward this social change. They feel that democracy is a value that must be sought after, but research shows that their own participation in the quest for such things is quite low. What we are facing then is a social group that may possess high ideals, but their ideals will not be pursued through high risk. This prompts the question, is it possible to bring this idealistic class to earth with the lowest risk
possible? Will change occur in a country driven by such a middle class? This will depend on what change means. First, if change means an increase in economic stability or consumerism, then this class is quite capable of achieving. The level of consumerism is high and this behavior pattern is very infectious. Second, if that change means democratization in the wide sense that they should take on the role of a motor to push the people toward an open political arena, then they will be ambivalent. Because of this ambivalence, the middle class cannot be depended upon to become agents of change or champions for democracy.
Lifestyles and Political Behavior of the Indonesian Middle Classes |
l 511
3
Note 1. This article is based on research on the Indonesian Middle Class conducted by Kompas Research and Development Department, Litbang Kompas, where Ariel Budiman, PhD., Ariel Heryanto, Ph.D. and Daniel Dhakidae, were held responsible for the project. The team was spearheaded by the late Mindra Faizaliskandiar---the then Manager of Koreas' Litbang, to whose memory the present article is dedicated. Bestian Nainggolan, Anna Mardyastuti, Niken Setiadi, Farida Sondakh, Anung Windyartaka, Ban bang Setiawan, and Krishna Pandita P. Contributed to this study, and I thank them for that. It's deficiencies are my sole responsibility. 2. This is based on social-psychological research on their self-perceptions about who they are and where they locate themselves in a social structure. 3. Ariel Heryanto made an interesting comment on this statement, saying it sounds "orientalistic/' something seemingly unintended by the author. The author talks about the middle class as a thing created .
by external forces, namely, "...at the Monash conference..." This "discovery of the middle class" is further emphasized in Helyahto's next paragraph: "An analogy may be drawn with European knowledge of Australia in the eighteenth century. Cartographers recognized the existence of Terra Australis, and parts of the coast had even been charted. Whether it was one continent or several large islands, however, and the nature of its topography, climate and habitation were matters that could be argued according to prejudice and imagination." (Ariel Heryanto, 1993: xxiii). Since Heryahto did not read the Indonesian translation of the texts, it turns out that the translators had their own interpretation of the text. "Indonesian middle class has been discovered has been translated as "Kelas menengah di Indonesia telah dap at ditentukan," which has a very
different connotation, a mistranslation of the verb "invented" as " determined". The orientalistic condescending notion does not appear in the Indonesian translation, largely due to a misunderstanding by the team of translators. The fact is, even in Australia the definition of the Indonesian middle class has never been "determined." What happened at the conference was more a contention of ideas, not even theories, of what the Indonesian middle class is, and what constitutes
the so-called middle class.
E
512 }
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
4. Arisen is a social gathering where members have the obligation to provide a certain amount of cash to another member of the association as determined by drawing a lottery. The payment can also take place in kind. Everyone has a turn after a certain length of time decided collectively by the association. The period can be one.month, two months, etc., though monthly basis is most common.
References Abeyasekere, S. 1992. Statement at the conference on the politics of middle class Indonesia. Ln R. Tauter &z K. R. Young (Eds.), The politics of middle class Indonesia. Australia: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University. Boeke, J.I-I. 1946. The evolution of the Netherlands Indies economy. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. Boeke, J. H. 1951. Economie van Indonesia. H.D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon N.V. Haarlem. Bradley, Harriet. 1996. Fractured identities: changing patterns of inequality, Cambridge, Mass. : Polity Press. Dick, H. W- 1992. Further reflections on the middle class. In R. Tanter & K. R. Young (Eds.), The politics of middle class Indonesia. Australia: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University. . 1985. The rise of a middle class and the changing concept of equity in Indonesia: an interpretation. Indonesia, 39: 71-92. New York: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University. Coldthorpe, J. H. 7987. Social mobility and class structure in modern Britain.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Heryanto, A. 1993. Mempenelas Sosok yang Samar. In R. Tauter & K. R. Young (Eds.), Politic lcelas nzenengah Indonesia. Jakarta: Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education & Information [LPBES]. Hill, H. (Ed.). 1994. Indonesia's new order. the dynamics of socio-economic transformation. Australia: Allen & Unwire. Kahin, A. R. 1985. Indonesia, No. 39. New York: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University. Lev, D. S. 1992. Intermediate classes and change in Indonesia: some initial reflection. In R. Tanter &z K. R. Young (Eds.), The politics of middle class Indonesia. Australia: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University.
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Mackie, J. & Maclntyre, A. 1994. Politics. In H. Hill (Ed.), Indonesia's new order: the dynamics of socio-economic transformation. Australia: Allen & Uwin. Marshall, G. et al. 1988. Social class in modern Britain. London: Unwire Hyman.
Mills, C. W. 1963. Power, politics 8 people. New York: Oxford University Press. Mubyarto. 1989. Pemiikiran Terobosan dalam Pembangunan Pedesaan. In Sjahrir (Ed.), Menuju Masyaraka f Anil Makmur: 70 Taken Prof. Sarbini . Sumawiriata. Jakarta: Gramedia. Nimpoeno, J. S. 1984. Mencari Golongan Menengah dan Perilakunya.
Prisma, No. 2 February, 1984 t h u r XIII. Jakarta: LP3ES. Robison, R. 1992. Problems of analyzing the middle class as a political force in Indonesia. In R. Tauter & K. R. Young (Eds.), The politics of middle class Indonesia. Australia: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University. 1986. Indonesia: The Rise of Capital. Sydney:
.
Asian Studies
Association of Australia. Sjahrir (Ed.). 1989. Menuju masyarakat soil maker: 70
tafian Prof. Sarbini Sumawinata. Jakarta, Gramedia. Soetrisno, L. 1984. Pergeseran dalarn Golongan Menengah di Indonesia. Prisms, No. 2 February, 1984 tahun XIII. Jakarta: LPSES,
Tanter, R. & Young, K. R. (Eds.). 1992. The politics of middle class Indonesia. Australia: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University. Tanter, R. & Young, K. R. (Eds.). 1993. Folitik keas menengah. Jakarta: LPSES. Veblen, T. 1953. The theory of the leisure class: an economic study of institutions. New York: Mentor.
Index affluence hypothesis, 4, ascending class hypothesis, 4 authoritarianism, 35, 44, 88, 267, 294, 343-344, 355, 372-373, 381-382, 392
bureaucracy, 5, 44, 58-59, 138, 179, 215,267,272,381,383,395,411, 477,478,480,486,508 capitalist, 4-10, 12, 16-18, 20-34, 42-43, 48-49, 51, 55-57, 60, 63-64, 69-79, 83, 88, 91-96, 98-99, 107-103, 108-112, 125-139, 141-143, 145-146, 153-167, 169-190, 194-207, 221-252, 256, 296, 301, 303, 305-306, 308-336, 343, 347-348, 350-358, 360-363, 366, 368-370, 383, 390-392, 394-410, 413, 416-457, 459-464, 467-471, 477-480, 484, 487, 489, 494, 496, 500,503,509 Chinese, 23, 477, 301, 308-309,
360-365, 367, 369-374, 423-424, 480, 484-485, 487-489, 509 civil society, vi, 210, 236, 255-256, 267, 290-291, 297, 310, 343846, 349, 353-355, 372-373, 375, 377,
387 class: awareness, 221, 249, 440, consciousness, 50, 302, 360, 399; identity, 4, 15, 17-19, 35, 488, in formation, 37; mobility, 10-12,
19, 85, 126-127, 132, 137-138, 149, 221-222, 249, 398, 415, 417, 447, 453-454, 457-459, 471, 491, 493, 508-509, position, 49, 56, 62-63, 98, 112-113, 115, 126, 129, 131, 134-135, 138-139, 222, 269, 271,273,310-311,320,337,441, 443, 493; scheme, 5, 7, 50, 61, 75, 138,151,153,272,417;
structure, 6, 8, 42, 50-51, 61, 82, 85-87, 128, 161, 165, 170, 223, 269,303,308,372,328,339,359, 438, 454, 476, 512; struggle, 49, 440-441, transformation, 302 consumption, 51-52, 82, 237, 268, 273,287,297,s0s,330,337,s90, 409,416,433,464,487-484,499 contradictory locations, 42 democracy, 5, 32-35, 86, 208-209, 211-212, 237, 246, 248, 252, 255-256,267,290,292-294,298, 311, 343-344, 353-357, 372, 374,
381-382, 384-396, 398, 401, 406-408, 411-413, 463, 465-466, 469, 471, 481, 486, 505-507, 510 Democratic Action Party (DAP), 360 democratization, 34, 37, 267, 343-345, 372-375, 381, 387-388,
394-395, 412-413, 507, 510 East Asia, 3-4, 6, 9, 13 ,19, 35-37, 43, 48, 60, 86, 302, 337, 339-340,
516
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
375, 412-413, 415 education, 19-23, 27-28, 36, 44, 57, 92-93, 95-96, 110-111, 114-115, 134, 138. 140-141, 149, 174, 179-180, 182-184, 188, 191, 193, 209-210, 219, 222, 249, 252, 271, 277-278, 287-288, 292, 295, 298, 312-317, 326-327, 330, 334-336, 383, 385, 388, 392, 397-398, 403-404, 409-410, 421-425, 431, 436, 442-444, 460462, 481, 490, 492-493, 501-504, 508, 510, 512 entrepreneurial, 57-58, 59, 271, 443, 482
ethnicity, 51, 152, 308, 344, 359-360, 365, 373-375 first generation hypothesis, 4, 311 Goldthorpe, 5-7, 51, 54-55, 61, 69, 75, 83, 85, 114, 132, 149, 151, 153, 192, 301, 339, 512 income, 44, 49, 52-53, 56-59, 61-62, 64-65, 70, 72-73, 80, 83-84, 103, 108-109, 114, 138, 153, 159, 162, 166, 170, 179, 236-237, 254,
263-264, 268, 271-272, 281, 283, 285, 287, 295, 296-297, 318-319, 374, 385, 389-391, 397-398, 421, 425, 434, 439-440, 446, 454, 458, 481, 483, 486487, 490, 495-499, 501-503, 508, 510 Indians, 308-309, 362-365, 367, 369-372, 374 Indonesia, 6, 8-11, 13-16, 18-21, 24, 27, 30-34, 37, 48, 81-82, 343-544,
373, 415, 475-476, 478, 480, 487-488, 497, 505, 508, 511-513 intermediate class, 42, 46, 268, 275, 305,513 labor, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49-50, 54-57, 60-61, 69, 71, 73, 75, 81, 83-84, 87, 92-93, 103-104, 113, 121, 123, 125-126, 132, 140, 164, 190-192, 207, 209, 216, 218, 231-235, 249, 253-256, 258, 269-270, 280, 291-292, 411, 451, 467, 469, 506 lifestyle, 4, 37, 47, 50-52, 56, 59, 61-62, 77, 139, 151-153, 159, 165, 170-171, 173, 177-178, 180, 268, 281-283, 286, 295-296, 302, 310, 328, 337, 344, 364, 397, 399, 401-402,404,409,416,471,475, 481, 493, 497, 499-500 Malay, 301, 303, 308, 360-361, 364-365, 367, 371, 373, 376 Malays, 360-364, 367, 369-371, 373-374 Malaysia, 6, 8-10, 12-14, 17, 19, 22, 25-26, 28, 30-34, 36-37, 48,
81-82, 171, 190, 301-311, 320, 323, 328-329, 337-340, 343-345, 349, 353, 359-361, 365-366, 371-373, 375-377, 415 Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), 360 Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), 360, 372 marginal middle class, 5-13, 15-30, 32, 34-36, 48, 55, 63-64, 69,
Index |
71-79, 92-99, 103-112, 126-139, 141-143, 146-149, 153-155, 158-159, 161-162, 164-166, 169-170, 173-176, 179, 182-189, 191, 194, 222-233, 238-243, 246-248, 250, 257-265, 270, 273-274, 276-277, 280-283, 285, 287-289, 292-295, 309-317, 318-322, 323-327, 328-331, 332-336, 346-348, 350-358, 361-367, 368-371, 374, 397-398, 402-404, 408, 417-418, 421-422, 427, 431, 438, 441-444, 452-453, 460-461, 467-468, 470, 489-490, 505, 509 Metro Manila (MM), 45-46, 57-58, 61-62,76,82,85,88,98,103, 111, 120, 122, 125, 139, 151-153, 166, 170-172, 175, 190-191, 209, 220,236,255,267;268,270-275, 277-284, 287-291, 294-298 middle class differentiation hypothesis, 5, middle stratum, 381, 396, 399,
478-479 mobility, 8-13, 18-19, 43, 49-50, 56, 62-63, 77, 85, 87, 92, 110, 113-115, 117-127, 129-130, 132-138, 140-141, 149, 183, 222-223, 250, 277-279, 295, 298, 302, 311-313, 334-335, 339, 384, 390, 398, 415-417, 438, 447, 450, 452-454, 457-459, 468, 471, 483, 491-493, 508-509, 512
(517
I
new middle class, 5-13, 15-24, 26-32, 34-38, 43, 48, 55, 58, 60, 63-64, 69-74, 76, 78-79, 87, 92-99, 101-112, 126-739,
141-143, 145-149, 151-155, 158-159, 163, 165-166, 169-172, 174-176, 179, 182, 184-191, 194, 208, 222-234, 238-243, 246-248, 250, 257-265, 270, 274-277, 280, 282-283, 285, 287-289, 292-295, 305, 307, 309, 311-312, 315-317, 319-322, 324-328, 331-333, 335-336, 340, 347-348, 350, 352, 356-358, 361-364, 366, 368-370, 377, 389, 397-399, 401-402, 404, 407-408, 417, 427, 431, 438, 441, 444, 452-454, 456-458, 460-461, 463, 467-468, 470-472, 489-490, 493-494, 497, 501, 505, 508-509 non-governmental organizations, 275,343,376,431,468 occupations, 44-45, 47, 50, 52-53, 55-59, 63, 69-70, 72-73, 75, 88, 113-114, 116, 119-123, 125-126,
268-274, 278-279, 305, 307, 338, 384-385, 388, 390, 398, 416-418, 451-453, 455-458, 470, 475, 488, 508 old middle class, 5-13, 15-30, 32-35, 48, 55, 60, 63-64, 69, 71-79, 92-99, 101-103, 108-112, 127-133, 135-139, 141-143, 146, 154-155, 159, 161-162, 165-166, 169-172, 174-176, 179, 182, 184,
If
518 }
| Exploration of the Middle Classes in Southeast Asia
186-189, 191, 194, 210, 222-233, 238-243, 246-248, 250, 257-265, 270, 273-274, 276-277, 280, 282-283, 285, 287, 290, 295, 309, 311-312, 315-317, 319-322,
324-328, 331-336, 346-348, 350, 352, 356-358, 362-363, 366, 368-371, 397-398, 402-403, 405, 407-408, 417, 422, 426-428, 431, 438, 444, 452, 456-457, 460-461, 467-468, 471, 489-490, 505, 508 Palang Dham Party, 386-387 Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PMIP), 360, 371 Patti Gerakan Rabat Malaysia (Malaysian People's
Movement - Gerakan), 360 petty bourgeoisie, 42, 54-55, 80, 270,384,393,398,403,408,417 Philippines, 6, 8-16, 18-21, 24-25, 27-28, 30-34, 42-45, 48-49, 52-53, 56-58, 60, 63, 69, 80-89, 114-115, 141, 149, 152-153, 171, 174,
293-294, 301, 364, 383, 386-389, 392,397,408,418-419,451,470, 472,481,483,486,502
small farmer, 278 social mobility, 62-63, 77, 87, 92, 113-115, 119-120, 126, 140-141, 183, 277, 295, 302, 311-312, 334-335, 339, 452, 459, 493, 509, 512 social movement, 5, 34-35, 212, 220, 234-235, 251, 254, 290-291,
346 socioeconomic status (SES), 44-46, 49, 52-53, 109, 268 Southeast Asia, 3-4, 6, 9, 13, 19, 34-35, 38, 47, 149, 210-211, 255-256, 340, 375-376, 412, 480, 484, 512-513 stratification, 36, 42, 48, 52, 54, 56, 62-63, 81, 87, 120, 122, 151, 207, 268, 478 subjective class, 15, 19, 35, 399 Thailand, 7-9, 12, 14, 17-20, 22-23,
180-181, 190, 207, 209-212, 214,
26-27, 29-32, 48, 82, 381-383,
237-238, 244, 251-252, 254-256, 269-273, 281, 285, 289-290,
385,391-392,394,408,412,475, 418,459,468,472,487 United Malays National Organization (UMNO), 360, 365, 367, 371 white-collar worker, 44, 56, 58, 60, 85, 97, 191, 216, 233, 267-268, 270-272, 292-293, 308, 390 Wright, 5, 6, 50-51, 55, 83, 89, 151, 153,192
292-295, 415 professionals, 3, 5-8, 10-12, 16, 18,
20-21, 24, 27, 29, 44, 46, 54-55, 57-58, 69-70, 75, 83-84, 92, 97-98, 103, 107, 114-120, 122-124, 131, 137, 185, 191, 209, 211-213, 216, 253, 267, 270-273, 275-277, 279-280, 282, 287-289,